


5-2011

# An Exploratory Investigation of Stakeholders' Perceptions of Political Leaders' Behavior and Outcomes

Edward S. Piatt

*Olivet Nazarene University*, [epiatt@olivet.edu](mailto:epiatt@olivet.edu)

Follow this and additional works at: [https://digitalcommons.olivet.edu/edd\\_diss](https://digitalcommons.olivet.edu/edd_diss)

 Part of the [American Politics Commons](#), [Legal Ethics and Professional Responsibility Commons](#),  
and the [Public Policy Commons](#)

---

## Recommended Citation

Piatt, Edward S., "An Exploratory Investigation of Stakeholders' Perceptions of Political Leaders' Behavior and Outcomes" (2011).  
*Ed.D. Dissertations*. 65.  
[https://digitalcommons.olivet.edu/edd\\_diss/65](https://digitalcommons.olivet.edu/edd_diss/65)

This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Graduate and Continuing Studies at Digital Commons @ Olivet. It has been accepted for inclusion in Ed.D. Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Olivet. For more information, please contact [digitalcommons@olivet.edu](mailto:digitalcommons@olivet.edu).

AN EXPLORATORY INVESTIGATION OF STAKEHOLDERS' PERCEPTIONS OF  
POLITICAL LEADERS' BEHAVIOR AND OUTCOMES

by

Edward S. Piatt

Dissertation

Submitted to the Faculty of

Olivet Nazarene University

School of Graduate and Continuing Studies

in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for

the Degree of

Doctor of Education

in

Ethical Leadership

May 2011

AN EXPLORATORY INVESTIGATION OF STAKEHOLDERS' PERCEPTIONS OF  
POLITICAL LEADERS' BEHAVIOR AND OUTCOMES

by


Edward S. Piatt

Dissertation




Dissertation Adviser

May 5, 2011  
Date



Dissertation Reader

May 4, 2011  
Date



Dissertation Coordinator

May 5, 2011  
Date




Program Director

May 5, 2011  
Date



Dean of the School of Graduate and Continuing Studies

6/6/11  
Date



Vice President for Graduate and Continuing Education

6/13/11  
Date

© 2011

Edward S. Piatt

All Rights Reserved

## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I wish to thank my mentor, advisor, and friend, Dr. Donald D. Daake, for inspiring me to tackle a project that seemed overwhelming at first. Through his constant feedback and useful insights, I was able to develop a profound comprehension and knowledge that substantially added to the body of knowledge in the field of stakeholder theory and agency theory, and thereby, apply it to the political realm. Without his wisdom and dedication to this process, it would not have been possible for me to complete my doctoral journey. I am forever indebted to his patience with me.

I would also like to acknowledge and thank Dr. Paul Koch, the second member of my dissertation team, whose insightful knowledge of economics added another critical dimension to my research.

## DEDICATION

I would like to dedicate this dissertation to my parents, Gary and Rose Marie Piatt, both of whom encouraged me to pursue my education, serve others, and act ethically. Without my parent's encouragement, I would have not been able to complete this doctoral journey. Through my parents love and love for God, I rest on my favorite biblical verse from Isaiah 41:10. Fear not, for I am with you; be not dismayed, for I am your God; I will strengthen you, I will help you, I will uphold you with my righteous right hand.

## ABSTRACT

by

Edward S. Piatt, Ed.D.  
Olivet Nazarene University  
May 2011

Major Area: Ethical Leadership

Number of Words: 120

This was an exploratory and descriptive study on stakeholders' perceptions of political leaders' behavior and outcomes. A purposeful sample comprised of 471 respondents whom were highly engaged in the political process was conducted on five distinct stakeholder groups, consisting of government employees, elected officials, union-building trades, business professionals, and college students. Two emergent results were identified: political party affiliation was a major indicator of stakeholder differences, and the inversion of agency theory. Contributing factors of the inversion of agency theory whereby a political agent begins to act as a principle have led the researcher to develop the Corrupt-Unethical Behavior (CUB) model. Future research would focus more on the salient differences between political party affiliations rather than differences between stakeholder groups.

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter	Page
I. INTRODUCTION .....	1
Statement of the Problem.....	18
Background-Foundational Concepts Relating to Problem Statement .....	19
Exploratory Hypotheses that Emerge from the Literature .....	30
Description of Terms .....	32
Significance of the Study .....	42
Procedure to Accomplish.....	44
II. REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE .....	49
Introduction.....	49
Chapter I: Concepts Review .....	53
Concept 1: Stakeholder Theory .....	56
Concept 2: Principal-Agency Theory .....	75
Concept 3: Corruption.....	86
Concept 4: Governance.....	99
Concept 5: Public Choice.....	100
Concept 6: Political Motivations .....	103
Concept 7: Narcissistic Behavior.....	107



## TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter	Page
Concept 8: Resource Dependency .....	110
Concept 9: Power .....	112
Concept 10: Congruence.....	114
Concept 11: Trust.....	116
Concept 12: Perceptions .....	118
Concept 13: Cynicism.....	121
Concept 14: Ethical Leadership .....	123
Concept 15: Media Influence and Communications Strategy .....	128
Concept 16: Political Communication Strategies .....	132
Concept 17: Demographics.....	134
Concept 18: Self Report Bias.....	137
Conclusion .....	138
III. METHODOLOGY .....	146
Introduction.....	146
Overall Research Question .....	149
Exploratory Hypotheses.....	150
Research Design.....	157
Population .....	170
Data Collection .....	175
Analytical Methods.....	178
Limitations .....	179

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter	Page
IV. Findings and Conclusions .....	181
Introduction.....	181
Findings.....	185
Conclusions.....	301
Implications and Recommendations .....	306
REFERENCES .....	311
APPENDIXES	
A. Cronbach’s Alpha –Reliability Statistics - Questions 1-46 .....	347
B. ANCOVA Test for Linear Combination - Question 70 .....	350
C ANCOVA Test for Linear Combination - Question 71 .....	352
D. ANCOVA Test for Linear Combination - Question 72.....	354
E. ANCOVA Test for Linear Combination - Question 73 .....	356
F. ANCOVA Test for Linear Combination - Question 80.....	359
G. ANCOVA Test for Linear Combination - Question 90.....	361

## LIST OF FIGURES

Figure	Page
1. Corrupt-unethical behavior (CUB) model .....	9
2. Communications model between stakeholders and political leaders.....	30
3. Piatt research model.....	45
4. Survey design methodology.....	48
5. Factors affecting political-unethical behavior .....	56
6. Concept Map for Literature Review .....	145
7. Factors affecting political – unethical behavior.....	157
8. Sequential exploratory mixed-methods model .....	160
8. Sequential exploratory mixed-methods model (continued).....	161
9. Occupational stakeholder group breakdown percentage .....	198
10. Likert Question 1 .....	199
11. Likert Question 2 .....	199
12. Likert Question 3 .....	200
13. Likert Question 4 .....	200
14. Likert Question 5 .....	201
15. Likert Question 6 .....	201
16. Likert Question 7 .....	202

## LIST OF FIGURES

Figure	Page
17. Likert Question 8 .....	202
18. Likert Question 9 .....	203
19. Likert Question 10 .....	203
20. Likert Question 11 .....	204
21. Likert Question 12 .....	204
22. Likert Question 13 .....	205
23. Likert Question 14 .....	205
24. Likert Question 15 .....	206
25. Likert Question 16 .....	206
26. Likert Question 17 .....	207
27. Likert Question 18 .....	207
28. Likert Question 19 .....	208
29. Likert Question 20 .....	208
30. Likert Question 21 .....	209
31. Likert Question 22 .....	209
32. Likert Question 23 .....	210
33. Likert Question 24 .....	210
34. Likert Question 25 .....	211
35. Likert Question 26 .....	211
36. Likert Question 27 .....	212
37. Likert Question 28 .....	212

## LIST OF FIGURES

Figure	Page
38. Likert Question 29 .....	213
39. Likert Question 30 .....	213
40. Likert Question 31 .....	214
41. Likert Question 32 .....	214
42. Likert Question 33 .....	215
43. Likert Question 34 .....	215
44. Likert Question 35 .....	216
45. Likert Question 36 .....	216
46. Likert Question 37 .....	217
47. Likert Question 38 .....	217
48. Likert Question 39 .....	218
49. Likert Question 40 .....	218
50. Likert Question 41 .....	219
51. Likert Question 42 .....	219
52. Likert Question 43 .....	220
53. Likert Question 44 .....	220
54. Likert Question 45 .....	221
55. Likert Question 46 .....	221
56. Occupational group rankings in descending order from most to least ethical .....	230
57. Best way for elected leaders to communicate if changed mind on votes .....	241
58. Best way for POL/PL to communicate if changed mind on votes.....	277

## LIST OF TABLES

Table	Page
1. Exploratory Hypotheses 1A-E Mapped to Literature Streams .....	141
2. Exploratory Hypotheses 2A-E Mapped to Literature Streams .....	142
3. Exploratory Hypotheses 3A-E Mapped to Literature Streams .....	143
4. Exploratory Hypothesis 4 Mapped to Literature Streams .....	144
5. Exploratory Hypothesis 5 Mapped to Literature Streams.....	144
6. Occupational Demographics.....	173
7. Ethnicity Demographics.....	173
8. Gender Demographics .....	174
9. Age Group Demographics .....	174
10. Political Affiliation Demographics.....	175
11. 46 Likert Questions.....	185
11. 46 Likert Questions (continued) .....	186
12. 46 Likert Questions - Means by Stakeholder Groups.....	187
12. 46 Likert Questions - Means by Stakeholder Groups (continued) .....	188
13. 46 Likert Questions - Standard Deviations by Stakeholder Groups .....	189
13. 46 Likert Questions - Standard Deviations...(continued) .....	190
14. 46 Likert Questions - Means and Standard Deviations by Gender.....	191
14. 46 Likert Questions - Means and Standard Deviations by Gender (continued) ..	192

## LIST OF TABLES

Table		Page
15.	46 Likert Questions - Means and Standard Deviations by Pol. Affiliation .....	193
15.	46 Likert Questions - Means and Standard Deviations by Pol...(continued).....	194
16.	46 Likert Questions - Means and Standard Deviations by Age Groups .....	195
16.	46 Likert Questions - Means and Standard Deviations by Age...(continued) ....	196
17.	Rankings of Different Professions Perceived as being Ethical.....	229
18.	Best Way Elected Official’s Communicate if Changed Mind on Votes .....	240
19.	Question 55 - Best Way... if Changed Mind by Age .....	261
20.	Question 55 - Best Way...if Changed Mind by Gender .....	262
21.	Question 55 - Best Way ... if Changed Mind by Political Affiliation.....	263
22.	Question 53d - How Ethical or Unethical are POL/PL.....	268
23.	Question 59 Scenario Regarding Politician - Developer .....	270
24.	Question 55 - Best Way... If Changed Mind by Non Political vs. Politician .....	276
25.	Overall Mean for Linear Combination - Question 80.....	280
26.	A Visual Comparison of Composite Question 80 .....	281
27.	Summary of Major Significant Findings for Hypothesis 1A.....	285
28.	Summary of Major Significant Findings for Hypothesis 1B.....	286
29.	Summary of Major Significant Findings for Hypothesis 1C.....	287
30.	Summary of Major Significant Findings for Hypothesis 1D.....	288
31.	Summary of Major Significant Findings for Hypothesis 1E .....	289
32.	Summary of Major Significant Findings for Hypothesis 2A.....	290
33.	Summary of Major Significant Findings for Hypothesis 2B.....	291

## LIST OF TABLES

Table	Page
34. Summary of Major Significant Findings for Hypothesis 2C .....	292
35. Summary of Major Significant Findings for Hypothesis 2D .....	293
36. Summary of Major Significant Findings for Hypothesis 2E .....	294
37. Summary of Major Significant Findings for Hypothesis 3A .....	295
38. Summary of Major Significant Findings for Hypothesis 3B .....	296
39. Summary of Major Significant Findings for Hypothesis 3C .....	297
40. Summary of Major Significant Findings for Hypothesis 3E .....	298
41. Summary of Major Significant Findings for Hypothesis 4 .....	299
42. Summary of Major Significant Findings for Hypothesis 5 .....	300
43. Rankings of Professionals .....	305



## CHAPTER I

### INTRODUCTION

Thomas Jefferson (third President of the United States from 1801-1809) stated, “Whenever a man cast a longing eye on office, a rottenness begins in his conduct” (as cited in Fitzhenry, 1993, p. 353). Nikita Khrushchev (First Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union from 1953-1964) said, “Politicians are the same all over. They promise to build a bridge even where there is no river” (as cited in Fitzhenry, p. 351). Finally, Ronald Reagan (40<sup>th</sup> US President of the United States from 1981-1989) was often quoted as saying, “Politics is supposed to be the second oldest profession, I have come to realize that it bears a very close resemblance to the first” (as cited in Fitzhenry, p. 355).

In looking at the social framework and individuals pursuing rational self-interest, Adam Smith, who is referred as the patriarch of economics and noted author of “*The Wealth of Nations*,” expressed his central premise of free market belief in the year 1776: The public interest is often best served by allowing individuals to pursue their own self-interest. However, Smith assumed that self-interest would be constrained by what he described as the “moral sentiments”. In the 21<sup>st</sup> century (2010), this carries a quite different connotation in the field of public policy, and further evidence suggests that ethical failings of political leaders incur considerable social and economic costs to society.

What common themes do the insights into politics of these two famous former U.S. Presidents, First Secretary of the Communist Party, and Adam Smith’s share: the

belief that politicians are often seen as corrupt, unethical, and often promoting self-serving interest behaviors over those of their constituents? Through the course of time, politics often carries a negative connotation where the self-interest behavior of the political leader is often greater than the common pursuit of good governance.

Ideally, in a democracy, public officials (trustees) are elected to represent their constituents (various stakeholder groups) and not to pursue a course of personal private gain. Economists describe this process as a *principal-agent problem*, [italics added] when trustees abandon their obligations and misuse the power delegated to them in ways that advance their own personal agenda or interests rather than those of the public whom they were elected to represent. Principal-agency theory was first advanced to describe behavior in business organizations, but can be applied across all organizations and especially political organizations. There is often confusion just who is the principal and who is the agent? In a democratic system, according to political theory, the agent is the politician and the stakeholder is the principal. Stakeholders elect the politician to represent their interests and pursue good governance policies. However, too often, turning agency theory on its' head, the politician, assumes the role of the principal, which can cause political corruption when political leaders pursue their own self-interests and not that of the stakeholders who elected them.

Recently, the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) arrested former Illinois Governor Rod Blagojevich for allegedly trying to sell an Illinois United States Senate seat. The former governor was subsequently impeached by the Illinois House and removed from office by the Illinois Senate in December 2009. The former governor removed from the highest office in Illinois has provided much fodder for news stations across the country and has brought shame and disgust from citizens across the country

and even the world. What does this say about Illinois politicians and citizen's perceptions of corruption?

Consequently, a Sunday Chicago Tribune headlined the front page with "A history of insatiable greed" (Sector, 2009, p. A1). Furthermore, "We have put an impressive collection of cheats and boodlers into public office over the decades, and the public outcry has never led to more than a token crackdown of government" (p. A1). As such, "No-bid contracts get inflated to cover the cost of campaign cash needed to grease them. Public jobs too often go to the connected and lazy instead of the brightest and most eager" (p. A1). We all pay the cost of corruption and illegal dealings from unethical and corrupt politicians who seek their own self-interests and personal gain over those of the electorate.

Illinois politicians and citizens are calling for changing the culture of corruption that has pervaded the state of Illinois for so long. Changing the culture of corruption will mean recognizing that our elected political leaders have cheated us as much by favors as by fraud. According to a University of Illinois at Chicago political scientist, over 1,000 public officials and businessmen have been convicted of public corruption in Illinois since 1970 (Sector, 2009, p. A2). Cindi Canary, director of the Illinois Campaign for Political Reform, publically stated, "The social compact of this state was built on corruption" (p. A2).

What then are the consequences of this perverse and corrupt behavior that seems inextricably linked to Illinois politics? It has long been presumed by Illinois state lawmakers that they are not bound by some of the laws imposed on other Illinois public bodies, which force them to do their work in the open and not in secret.

This apparent lack of ethics in good governance further promoted the culture of corruption in Illinois. If the citizens do not know what state lawmakers are doing in private then how can they are held accountable if not caught.

As a result, a recent Chicago Tribune poll conducted in February 2009 indicated that nearly two-thirds of Illinois voters said they consider Illinois among the more corrupt states in the nation. In addition, the respondents of the poll indicated at a low margin of 43% that reform is likely to end corruption. However, voters in the same poll were sharply divided when asked what would curb political corruption, they replied that with greater access to government records and term limits for politicians at the top this would limit corruption (Pierson & Kidwell, 2009, p. A4)

Finally, four individuals interviewed by the Chicago Tribune as appeared in the February 15, 2008, story had this to say, Emily Riehl, 24 years old, stated, “Money is such a huge factor in deciding all elections, which is what all these scandals show us” (Sector, 2009, p. A4). Lorraine Hanschke, 87 years old said, “They think they own the job when they are there that long, and they get too much power” (p. A4). Robert Boerman, 38 years old stated, “People and corporations that donate a lot of money obviously are expecting something in return, and it becomes very hard for a politician not to do it” (p. A4). Reggie Alston, 42 years old said, “We need to be able to look into the books and the bidding and all that. If all of it was open the people who watch this stuff could find out about it, and the people who do it would be more afraid of getting caught” (p. A4 ).

Consequently, this sets the stage for the researcher’s study of corruption and the perceptions of the electorate. The culture of corruption and its consequences such as

hidden taxes, bad governance, and unethical, corrupt, and illegal activities make the citizens more cynical and less likely to trust government officials.

An example of this dilemma is the current Speaker of the House, Nancy Pelosi. For weeks, pressure has been mounting in Congress to approve additional domestic oil drilling, but House Speaker Nancy Pelosi has held the line. She has used her power to block a vote on offshore drilling for which in a new CNN/Opinion Research poll released in early August, 2008, found that 69 % of Americans favor more offshore drilling, while 30 % oppose it. However, Pelosi's constituents in San Francisco might be likely to oppose this action. "In a private meeting last week, according to some in attendance, Pelosi told members of her leadership team that a decision to relent on the coastal ban would amount to capitulation to Republicans and the White House" (Coile, 2008, p. A5). Pelosi attributed today's energy problems to "a failure of the Bush administration to develop a comprehensive approach, its ties to the industry and a mishandling of the economy" (p. A5). "A solid majority of Americans want us to have more drilling for more American-made energy, and they aren't going to take no for an answer," (p. A5), stated House Minority Leader John Boehner, R-Ohio. While a special session is unlikely, Boehner made clear that his party plans to use the issue as a bludgeon against democrats throughout the five-week August recess. Boehner said Thursday. "Speaker Pelosi, Senators (Harry) Reid and (Barack) Obama are defying the will of the American people, and they're doing so at their own risk" (p. A5). Boehner accused the speaker of using procedural maneuvers to thwart votes on expanding drilling; a position he said would prevail if the moment arrived. "Harry Reid and Nancy Pelosi are standing in the way of what American people want," (p. A5).

While one might argue the merits of oil drilling, this display of Speaker Pelosi's action illustrates principal-agency theory at work. By ignoring the pleas of her constituents (the principal) Speaker Pelosi is pursuing actions as if she was the principal while she is in fact an agent of the stakeholders. She is ignoring the pleas of those who elected her to pursue good governance. While there is no evidence of wrongdoing on the part of the Speaker, it does illustrate a potential flaw or pitfall of modern representative democracy. Specifically, the problem of who works for whom, or in agency theory parlance just who is the principal and whom is the agent (Piatt, 2009).

Consistent with the above, Illinois Speaker Michael J. Madigan and President of the Illinois Senate, John J. Cullerton, wrote a letter to Illinois citizens after the impeachment and removal from office of Governor Blagojevich, for trying to sell a U.S. Senate seat, stating,

The legitimacy of democratic government is dependent entirely upon the public's expectation that elected officials will remain mindful of the sacred trust that has been placed in them. We expect elected officials to act in the best interests of their fellow citizens, free from considerations of personal gain. We intend to move swiftly to put this dark period in our state's history behind us and take steps to insure that it never happens again. (Madigan & Cullerton, 2009, p. A7)

At an extreme level, some public officials behave in ways that erode the public's faith in political institutions by exhibiting behavior that maximizes their personal gain. Selling their votes to special interests groups in exchange for campaign contributions, favoritism, nepotism, back-room deals, racketeering, mail fraud, and accepting bribes are

all forms of unethical and often illegal activities public official can engage in (Piatt, 2009).

The costs of corruption and/or unethical behavior can be significant and affect not only good governance and public policy, but raises the costs of doing the public's business (Piatt, 2009). Corruption affects and reduces the efficiency of both public and private enterprise. Taxpayers incur higher costs and are assessed higher fees for government services and programs to subsidize corrupt and unethical behaviors of political leaders (Piatt).

According to Piatt (2009), ethics and corruption are prominent subjects in today's society driven by the constant stream of newspaper, radio, internet, and television reporting of political scandals. The public is often confused over the concepts of unethical behavior, corrupt behavior, and illegal behavior (Piatt).

There are clear definitions in the literature of what constitutes illegal political activities and behavior, but various stakeholder groups frequently perceive the concepts of unethical and corrupt behavior differently. This researcher distinguished these perceived differences between illegal activities, unethical, and corrupt activities by measuring these dimensions in the survey with the various stakeholder groups and political leaders (Piatt, 2009). The researcher has postulated that differences in demographics among stakeholder groups will vary based on age, race, political affiliation, union affiliation, religion, education levels, and media exposure. In addition, the stakeholders' interaction and methods of communication with an elected official can also affect or influence the level of perceptions regarding corrupt or unethical behavior (Piatt). As well, does non-communication or the inability to interact with political leaders

influence perceptions and if so, how can those perceptions be aligned with communication strategies to overcome incorrect biases or correct unethical behavior?

Consequently, the researcher is advancing a proposed Model of Corrupt – Unethical Behavior (CUB) - Figure 1 to describe and differentiate the differences between unethical, corrupt, and corrupt-illegal behavior (Piatt, 2009). This model advances the notion of concentric circles of unethical behavior. Political leaders can move throughout the various circles. The nucleus of the inner circles (corrupt-illegal behavior); is the most severe form of mistrust and criminal behavior.

From this viewpoint, the researcher is postulating that political leaders who violate the principal-agency theory and begin to exhibit unethical behavior can easily move to the next level of corrupt behavior (Piatt, 2009). If not checked, they can eventually move to corrupt-illegal behavior as exhibited in the former governor George Ryan corruption case and described in the following section of corruption in Illinois.

The researcher has developed the CUB Model to identify the stages of unethical and corrupt behavior. As the model indicates, once a political leader or elected official moves from ethical to unethical behavior a pattern usually emerges (Piatt, 2009). The ideal place to remain on the CUB model is to remain in the ethical realm, outside of the first circle, and not enter into corrupt behavior. This model indicates the problems associated with unethical behavior, which can lead to corrupt behavior and then corrupt-illegal behavior (Piatt).

(A)= Unethical behavior all of which is contained in all of the three circles.

(B)= Unethical Behavior, plus corrupt behavior, which is everything but illegal behavior.



(C) = Unethical behavior + corrupt behavior + corrupt illegal behavior, is the most severe form of corruption, which leads to indictments and prison.




Figure 1. Corrupt-unethical behavior (CUB) model.

A) *Unethical behavior*. Includes organizational actions that are deemed immoral or unacceptable according to societal norms or general standards of conduct (Sharpe, 1993).

B) *Corruption*. Is an elected official's concealed private, for gain, appropriation of a public right (which may include monetary reward, power, special favors to family and friends, and possible re-election to their current office or higher office) - (Rose-Ackerman 1975; Shleifer & Vishney, 1993; Treisman 2000).

C) *Corrupt-illegal behavior*. Is the result of the misuse of authority for organizational gain (Ashforth & Anand, 2003), as well as conduct by an organization that is proscribed and punishable by criminal, civil, or regulatory law (Braithwaite, 1989, as cited in Piatt, 2009).

Measuring corruption is often difficult and there have been some attempts to try to capture this phenomenon. Measuring corruption is conducted on a worldwide level through the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI). Transparency International (2007) has

published an annual CPI- Index ordering the countries of the world according to the degree to which corruption is perceived to exist among public officials and politicians. The poll covered 180 countries in their 2007 survey. The U.S. ranked 20<sup>th</sup> out of 179 countries in the 2002-2007 Worldwide Corruption Perceptions ranking of countries.

While global corruption indexes have been formulated to compare countries, surprisingly, little or no research has been done at the state or local level. In addition, virtually no researcher has looked at perceptual differences between and among stakeholders regarding corruption/unethical behavior and those of political leaders. Furthermore, no one has studied the effects relating to good governance.

### *Corruption in Illinois*

The focus of this dissertation is looking at corruption and unethical behavior of political leaders at the state level and how stakeholders perceive corrupt and unethical behavior. Former governor George H. Ryan clearly illustrates the critical importance of the highest-ranking state official engaging in illegal, corrupt, and unethical behavior and seeking his self-serving interests over those who elected him.

On December 17, 2003, U.S. Attorney Patrick Fitzgerald issued this statement to Illinois citizens,

Former Illinois Gov. George H. Ryan, Sr., was indicted by a federal grand jury on racketeering conspiracy, mail and tax fraud and false statements charges alleging public corruption during his terms as Illinois Secretary of State from 1991 to 1999 and as Governor from 1999 to 2003. Ryan and certain of his associates allegedly engaged in a pattern of corruption that included performing official government acts, awarding lucrative government contracts and leases, and using the resources of the State of Illinois for the personal and financial benefit of Ryan, members of

his family, his campaign organization, and certain associates. (Fitzgerald, 2003, p.1)

The Chicago Tribune reported that after a prolonged and lengthy trial, former Governor George H. Ryan, Sr., Illinois' 39<sup>th</sup> governor, was convicted on April 17, 2006 on sweeping federal corruption charges of wielding power to help himself and his friends. (Connor & Bush, 2006, para.1) Ryan was found guilty on all 18 counts of steering state business to cronies for bribes, gutting corruption-fighting efforts to protect political fundraising and misusing state resources for political gain. U.S. Attorney Patrick Fitzgerald called Ryan's quashing of investigations into the sale of driver's licenses for bribes as secretary of state a low-water mark for public service (para. 5).

In brief remarks after the verdict was announced, Ryan said he was disappointed with the jury's decision but confident he would be vindicated on appeal. On May 27, 2008, the United State Supreme Court announced it has refused to hear former Gov. George Ryan's appeal of his racketeering and fraud conviction. Ryan's only hope for release from prison now is a possible clemency order by the president. "Mr. Ryan has exhausted every legal avenue and argument afforded him but the verdict stands that he was guilty of corrupting the highest office in the state," (Fitzgerald, 2008, as cited in Court, 2009).

U.S. Attorney Fitzgerald stated, "The former governor is serving a six ½-year sentence imposed by Judge Pallmeyer at the correction center in Terre Haute, Indiana. Ryan's attorney, another former GOP Illinois Governor, Jim Thompson, said he still believes Ryan's conviction on fraud and racketeering was the result of an unfair trial. But Thompson knows there's only one way to cut Ryan' prison term now. Thompson stated,

“We recognize that the judicial process has come to an end for former Governor Ryan and there will be no more court review,” (Parker, 2008, para. 5, as cited in [www.abclocal.go.com](http://www.abclocal.go.com)). “In my opinion, the next step is to ask the President of the United State for executive clemency” (Parker, para. 5). In a final statement, Thompson said, “His career is gone. His reputation is gone.” (Parker, para. 8). Former Assistant U.S. Attorney Zachary F. Fardon who is now in private practice stated after the Ryan conviction, “when defendants are charged and they are convicted by overwhelming evidence and it is in the context where the public trust was manipulated and violated then I think the conviction should stand” (Court, 2009, para. 27).

The Ryan case illustrates that unethical behavior and political corruption is a prominent issue in Illinois. Based on the news stories over the last 20-30 years, it exists at the highest levels and exists in the bureaucracy of state government. It is also a problem at the county, city, and township levels. Unethical behavior and even corruption occurs when the agent (politician) assumes the role of principal and supersedes his own private interest over those of the public’s. The reporting by the media of the Ryan case and others throughout Illinois indicates the necessity of stakeholders having accurate and complete information to evaluate how their elected political leaders behave in an illegal, corrupt, or unethical way when they believe the public does not monitor their actions. Nevertheless, stakeholders themselves have a variety of interests, values, and agendas. Therefore, the researcher hypothesized that the perceptions of various stakeholders might be quite different.

For example, what one stakeholder might consider unethical, another might perceive as okay since the political leader is just doing his (her) job in serving their

interests. Virtually, to date, no researcher has conducted studies looking at this phenomenon. This researcher will examine this phenomenon, describe, and delineate these differences.

### *Costs of Corruption*

Political corruption is like the common cold. It is persistent and society often treats the symptoms and not the disease. It exists at all levels of government and all types of public office holders. Television, internet, newspapers, and radio report daily on corruption and public scandals. This occurrence of corruption and scandals of unethical behavior raises important issues for society. Bollens and Schmandt (1979) asked the question, what is the reaction of citizens to the continual exposure of wrongdoing by their elected officials: disbelief, indignation, indifference, cynicism. Has society failed to move more determinedly against the abuse of public trust and does the media tend to exaggerate the problem and in doing so, create the impression that most officials are dishonest?

Most citizens believe that political corruption is a personal failing of the individual public servant, which is often reinforced by the press with its focus on individuals prosecuted on a case-by-case basis. Therefore, an individual's understanding is not always sufficient in explaining public corruption (Maxwell & Winters, 2004). If the corruption of public officials is unevenly distributed or skewed to certain states, then some states will exhibit higher percentages of this public *bad* [italics added] than others will. Therefore, specific conditions must act to elevate or reduce rates of public wrongdoing (Maxwell & Winters).

In 1966, Wilson argued that state governments are more susceptible to public corruption when compared to local governments or the wealthier federal government. The federal government appears to have a higher level of professionalism. He postulated that national politicians are subject to higher levels of intense scrutiny by the abundance of national press and television reporting organizations, which historically are more professional and skilled compared to state and local press. In addition, he argued there are interests that are more prevalent and watchdog groups monitor corruption.

Wilson (1966) contended states are more uniquely prone to corruption and offered the notion that state officials may be subject to less voter scrutiny because each voter has limited access to information regarding the daily actions or behaviors of state officials. However, recent events, as illustrated by the Ryan case, show this might be changing. In Illinois for example, higher levels of accountability might be occurring due to increased media attention regarding recent corrupt behavior at the state, county, and local levels. Regardless, if corruption is higher at the federal or state level, there is no doubt; given the recent events, that corruption is a major issue in Illinois. However, state government also delivers a different mix of goods and services than the federal government.

Corruption is often viewed through stakeholders' lenses of officials' concealed-knowledge. Again, as illustrated in the Ryan case, stakeholders had incomplete and inaccurate information of what the agent was doing on their behalf, and the agent's actions benefited him personally over those of the stakeholders. This allows the agent the potential for gain appropriation of a public right.

Gunnar Myrdal approximated the links between public officials and corruption: there is high value associated with officials' control over the power to positive, or negative affect and coerce individuals (Maxwell & Winters, 2004). Myrdal's contention is consistent with agency theory and information asymmetry.

Unethical and corrupt behavior has many economic costs associated with it in both economic and non-economic terms. For example, non-economic costs such as cynicisms, low voter turnout, and lack of interest in the political process, affect the entire culture. Economic costs such as higher taxes, hazardous public works projects (bid rigging), and lower quality service from public employees (ghost pay rolling, favoritism, and nepotism) reduce the overall efficiency of government.

One of the most important consequences of corruption is the net effect it has regarding the public economic welfare. Corruption has been described as an illegal tax on citizens. Corruption increases the cost of public activity of which the government has not formally approved. Corruption also has implications relating to transaction costs and the insidious and illegal behaviors multiply to address the cover-up. The public often accepts at face value the outcomes of politicians' actions, but citizens have intense doubts about the quality of the process and who paid whom, how often, how much, and when, in order to get something done or not done (Hibbing & Theiss-Morse, 1995). In addition, as predicted by agency theory, the public is not in a good position to judge because of informational asymmetry.

Smith (1914) once again showed keen insight into these issues in *The Theory of Moral Sentiments*, which he indicated that to have a civil society one must have moral constraints that place socially appropriate limits on individual action. This moral constraint is the law of the land, which constrains individuals to make our social and

economic economy work. This certainly applies to citizens and politicians alike.

Interestingly enough, the State of Illinois ranks fifth in corruption according to a report released by the Corporate Crime Reporter (2004) at the National Press Club, Washington D.C. As indicated earlier, because both the profound economic and non-economic effects of unethical and corrupt behavior a more sophisticated understanding of the public's perception and understanding of this behavior is needed.

Corruption is prevalent and pervasive in Illinois's political structure. Because of this, perceptions of corruption become an important factor to evaluate and define how political behavior (ethical or unethical) is observed and tolerated within the fabric of organizational politics and public policy issues.

Organizations can be seen through the lenses of politics. Political patterns are comprised of competing interests, conflicts, and power. We can see how organizations become politicized because of divergent interests of individuals and groups. Conflict is a natural property in every organization. Many skilled political leaders recognize the continuous interplay between competing interests and utilizing conflicts as a positive force (Morgan, 1998).

Morgan (1998) stated, "Organizational politics arises when people think differently and want to act differently when confronted with alternative paths of action. Diversity creates a tension that must be resolved through political means" (p. 152). In addition, every individual's personal interests may be viewed in a political context as we recognize the existence of other stakeholders with differing agendas. Morgan further elaborated that organizations are coalitions, and coalitions arise when groups of individuals (stakeholders) have an interest or stake in the organization but whose goals and preferences differ. Development of coalitions brings about advancing the interests,



power, and influence in an organization and not those of the politician's coalitions' wants and desires. Conflict is the direct result when interests collide. There will always be divergent interests and stakeholders seeking scarce resources for their stakeholder group. Effective political leaders can manage divergent groups by utilizing effective power techniques of who gets what, when, and how. Scarcity and dependence are the key resources of power. How political leaders utilize these resources to the benefit of the public is contingent often times on how they are viewed ethically or unethically.

Morgan (1998) further addressed the issue by looking at how decisions are made. He suggested that a final way of controlling decision-making is to influence the issues and objectives to be addressed. The political leader can accomplish this through control of knowledge and information (information asymmetry) and making the knowledge available to different people thereby influencing their perceptions of the situation. This is consistent with agency theory previously discussed. This is commonly referred to as being a "gatekeeper" and allowing the flow of information out or in as it suits their own self-interests. Finally, Morgan contended that politics is a natural feature of organizations. "Tensions between private and organizational interests provide an incentive for individuals to act politically" (p. 177). Morgan argued that people employ gamesmanship and other forms of wheeling and dealing. Ultimately, this allows researchers to recognize and understand how and why organizational actors (stakeholders) can act as political actors to gain understanding. Political significance of events enacted in the organizational culture and subculture are the direct result of this behavior.

Morgan (1998) provided a significant insight of how although everyone has access to sources of power, ultimate power is given to those stakeholders who are best

able to determine the course of action in which the political games are played. In other words, when stakeholders realize where the source of power emanates from and comprehend that they are political players in the game of politics, their interests will be more likely taken seriously.

### Statement of the Problem

Stakeholders and politicians may have significant perceptual differences of opinions in defining political corruption and unethical behavior. Differences in perceptions affect public policy. This issue raises an important question – what are the implications these differences have for the quality of government? An exhaustive review of the literature points out a gap. This issue again is both surprising and significant. More specifically, the problem statement flowed from the following process and background:

1. A review of the relevant literature streams that include stakeholder theory, agency theory, power, moral hazard, congruence theory, trust/leadership theory, ethics, resource dependency theory, corruption, and other relevant theories as it relates to corruption and unethical behavior. A broad-based literature review of top academic journals (Journal of Business Ethics, Academy of Management Review, California Management Review, Journal of Public Administration Review and others) was conducted from the fields of ethics, business, public administration, political science, and communications.
2. Discussions and input from political leaders on their perceptions of corruption and ethics, how they define it, and possible consequences for effective communications and good governance.
3. Advice and input from academic experts and advisors on how to development this proposed research model.

4. Having 25 years of government experience at all levels of state government, the researcher has seen firsthand the effects of corruption and unethical behavior and its dramatic consequences on public policy and good governance. This experience provides a deeper ethnographic perspective.

The purpose of this research is to examine differences in perceptions of political corruption and unethical behavior between and among various stakeholder groups and elected political leaders and the consequential impact on each other and public policy. Additionally, the research will look at how communications can be improved between stakeholders and political leaders. Finally, by utilizing appropriate literature and findings from this study a working model relating stakeholder and political leaders' perceptions will be advanced.

#### *Background -Foundation Concepts Relating to Problem Statement*

Carl Friedrich (as cited in Heidenheimer and Johnson (2008) illustrated his definition of political corruption by stating,

The pattern of corruption can be said to exist whenever a power-holder is charged with doing certain things, i.e., who is responsible functionary or office-holder, is by monetary or other rewards not legally provided for, induced to take actions, which favor whoever provides the rewards and thereby does damage to the public interests. (p. 9)

As indicated in Figure 1 - (CUB Model), the researcher has defined the relationship between corruption and unethical behavior and illegal corrupt behavior for the purposes of this research. The concept of public interest has many interpretations and it is suggested that in determining whether a political policy-influencing action is or is not corrupt will depend on the observer's (stakeholder or politicians) judgment as to whether

a particular policy is or is not desirable (Friedrich, 1972). Public opinion is important in defining what is actually corrupt or unethical. How a group of stakeholders defines, corruption can be vastly different according to Friedrich. So just what is corruption? According to Acton (1887), “systematically, corruption is a form of coercion, namely economic coercion” (p. 1). He goes so far to say “Power tends to corrupt; absolute power corrupts absolutely” (p. 1). Political leaders can find themselves in this position as they become more experienced and if arrogance and hubris sets in. The effects include direct and indirect forms such as gifts, or attempts to influence the judgment of those who exercise government functions or decision-making. Such corruption is possible in all forms of government.

Again then why are political opinions or perceptions of corruption important? If there are significant differences between what a nation’s laws say and how most citizens or stakeholders define corruption, there is a disparity between the two. Gardiner (1970) contended that it is likely politicians or government officials will be guided more by local culture than by the law and thus will be more likely to break the law.

Organizational political theory is relevant to the discussion here. Thompson and Ingraham (1996) defined organizational politics “as being the art of competition among individuals while striving for divergent objectives” (p. 292). This concept illuminates agency theory in this context. Trust in governance refers to the level of faith or confidence citizens have in state authorities. Political efficacy is defined as one’s potential influence on political and government system (Verba, Scholzman & Brady, 1995). Citizen’s perceptions of internal politics and ethics in the administrative branches of democracies may prove useful in explaining trust in governance, as well as political efficacy and political participation (Vigoda-Gadot 2007).

As mentioned earlier, stakeholder theory arises out of the rejection of the idea that the corporation (or organization) should single-mindedly strive to maximize the benefits of a single stakeholder, the shareholders (Freeman, 1984). Freeman and Evan (1990) made the Kantian recommendation that every stakeholder has a right to be treated as an end and not a means. They took a significant step forward when they proposed that pursuing the interests of the stakeholder is the true purpose of the organization and that the organization should balance the interests of different stakeholders by the implementation of the Rawlsian veil of ignorance. This veil makes decision makers ignorant with the respect to the question which stakeholder is theirs (Wijnberg, 2000). Since Freeman's landmark work, stakeholder theory has been widely applied to all types of organizations, both public and private. If one can argue this for a corporate environment, even a stronger case for this can be made for political democracy.

Donaldson and Preston (1995) utilized a normative approach to stakeholder theory and argued that managers should acknowledge the validity of diverse stakeholder interests and should attempt to respond to them within a mutually supportive framework because it is the moral requirement for the management function. Principal-agent relationships are premised on the recognition of two principles-honoring agreements and avoiding lying (Quinn & Jones, 1995, p. 38). The researcher will apply this to the political environment and look at the possible effects arising out of divergent and often self-serving interests of the political leader(s).

In summary, the researcher has arrived at the problem statement by integrating the following:

- Corruption is prevalent in all areas of society and especially in Illinois.

- A literature- based definition of what corruption/unethical behavior are (see Figure1 - CUB model) has been provided.
- Based on both the literature and 25 years government experience the researcher contended that various stakeholders view corruption differently.

The proposed research will determine what perceptual differences exist between various stakeholder groups (businesses, unions, college students, and government workers) and those of the elected political leaders regarding perceptions of corruption and unethical behavior. Possible implications and effects will be explored.

To restate the problem: Stakeholders and politicians may have significant perceptual differences of opinions in defining political corruption and unethical behavior. Differences in perceptions affect public policy. This raises an important question – what are the implications these differences have for the quality of government? An exhaustive review of the literature points out a gap. This issue is both surprising and significant.

#### *Definitions and Implications of Corruption and Unethical Behavior*

This section will delineate and explain the definitions and implications of corruption and unethical behavior. This section will focus on corruption and will demonstrate the need for this research to be completed. Corruption and unethical behavior has evolved and been a prevalent factor in society dating back to the fourth century B.C. Recently, corruption has been studied through various disciplines including psychology, sociology, economics, law, and political science. Utilizing a multilevel approach and drawing on various disciplinary perspectives an integrative conceptualization of organization–level of corruption was adapted (Pinto, Leana, & Pil, 2008).

Corruption and unethical behavior often varies in frequency and occurs at all levels in the political process. Two general types of corruption can be identified out of this process – first, those in public office who use or enhance the wealth or pleasure of the politician; and secondly, those whom political leaders employed to maintain or expand the holder’s personal power. At all levels of government and throughout the spectrum of public officeholders those engaging in corruption have been charged and/or convicted of misusing their office or position for private purposes or gain (Bollens & Schmandt, 1979).

The problem of political corruption has reached epidemic proportions. The percentage of corruptive acts might not have increased or may have gone unreported over the past 50 years, but it has become significant in bringing discredit to the political process. Poll after poll indicates that a large percentage of Americans have a low degree of confidence in the government and exhibit a degree of distrust of its elected leaders. This attitude becomes more prevalent as the media highlights additional scandals (Bollens & Schmandt, 1979). If not dealt with, these attitudes can lead to cynicism and disengagement.

Perceptions of political corruption are part of a larger societal problem that affects all parts of society, not just government. The prevalence of corrupt behaviors in organizations across the United States appears to be growing and a recent survey found that more than half of U.S. employees observed at least one example of unethical conduct in the previous year, and 36% observed two or more (Ethical Resource Center, 2005).

We have become a nation of distrust, intimidation, and fear. When citizens speak out against corruption, those in power play the game of “Killing the Messenger,” instead of addressing and correcting the perceived problem. If perception is reality

we are in serious trouble” (Grant, 2006, p. 1).

Bollens and Schmandt (1979) argued that political corruption might not rank as high in the public’s perceptions as problems such as inflation, unemployment, rising energy costs, taxation, or crime in the streets. However, this issue demands the citizen’s attention. When the public lacks confidence or trust in their government and are skeptical of their political leader’s motives, distrust in government is not likely to change.

Phillips (2003) further contended that there are cases that seem incontestably corrupt and proposed political corruption is recognized by the following occurrences: Public Official A is in violation of the public trust placed in him by the public (B) and in a manner which harms the public interest, and knowingly engages in conduct which exploits the office for clear personal and private gain in a way which runs contrary to the acceptable rules and standards for the conduct of public office within the political culture, so as to benefit a third party (C) by providing C with access to a good or service C would not otherwise obtain (Heidenheimer & Johnston, 2008, p. 42).

What are the real motivations for those who hold public office? Are they motivated by policy outcomes, or do they simply seek the perquisites of office? Political office holders have both the power to determine the direction and efficacy of government policy. It is important to know, whether elected leaders view public office as a means to an end or as an end in itself (Callander, 2008). Motivation for attaining political office could also determine the possible perceptions of political leaders and whether they are perceived as unethical or not.

Pinto, Leana, and Pil, (2008) defined an organization of corrupt individuals as a scaling up of personally beneficial corrupt behaviors to the organizational level. Further, they have developed the two dimensions of corruption in the organization. The first is



whether the individual or organization is the beneficiary of the corrupt activity and the second dimension is whether the corrupt behavior is undertaken by an individual actor or by two or more actors.

In the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization (RICO) indictment, Ryan was accused of fraud, bribery and obstruction acts, perjury, and tax violations (Fitzgerald, 2003). The political campaign committee of Gov. George Ryan and two former top committee officials (who also served as key aides during Mr. Ryan's 1991-99 tenure as Illinois Secretary of State) were indicted on April 2, 2002 for allegedly engaging in a pervasive pattern of fraud and corruption while working on then Secretary of State Ryan's and other political campaigns (Fitzgerald, 2003). Patrick J. Fitzgerald, United States Attorney for the Northern District of Illinois, announced the charges as part of *Operation Safe Road*, [italics added] the ongoing four-year-old investigation of public and political corruption. The defendants were Citizens for George Ryan, Sr. (the 28-year-old state campaign fund-raising committee that supports Mr. Ryan's campaign efforts) and Scott Fawell (formerly chief of staff to Secretary of State Ryan and the principal decision-maker for Citizens for Ryan). These defendants were charged with racketeering, mail fraud, and conspiracy to obstruct justice in a 10-count indictment returned by a federal grand jury (Fitzgerald, 2003).

Corruption and unethical behavior is commonly studied at either the individual level (e.g., as principal-agent dynamics in economics) or as a group acting in concert or tandem (e.g., sociology). Pinto et al. (2008) argued that exploring the relationship between these two levels is useful, as individuals engaging in personally corrupt behaviors, without essentially colluding, also comprise an organizational-level corruption occurrence. According to Finey and Lesieur (1982), many scholars have sought to

distinguish between different forms of corruption and whether the violator acts strictly for private benefit or whether the beneficiary includes the organization itself. An organization may implement procedures to inhibit corruption against it, but the same organization may not discourage corruption on its behalf (Ashforth & Anand, 2003).

Sherman (1980) argued that often it is difficult or nearly impossible to assess an individual's intent, but it is possible to observe the communications from the leading coalition or leadership to organizational members and observe whether a member's behavior is consistent with those messages. Pinto et al. (2008) utilized the dimensions of the beneficiary and collusion to look at differences in occurrences. Corruption and unethical behavior at the organizational level takes two forms. First is where a majority portion of organization's members' act in a corrupt manner to benefit their own personal interests known as organization of corrupt individuals (OCI), and the alternative is the corrupt organization (CO), where a group collectively acts in a corrupt manner for the benefit of the organization. In both forms of corruption, the organization is the focal unit. As mentioned earlier, the Ryan administration blended the two forms of organizations (organization of corrupt individuals (George H. Ryan and his top aides) and his political campaign committee, which took the form of a corrupt organization.

Political scandals and CUB play an important role in their effects of eroding attitudes and perceptions about government and political institutions in general. Clark, Feigert, Seldon, and Stewart (1999) indicated that scandals lower the regard for individual politicians and government leaders. Bowler and Karp (2004) contended that the effect does not stop with popularity but has larger consequences for the public's view of politics and political institutions. While a great deal of research has focused on effects of cynicism, very few researchers have studied the effects of how CUB influences how

citizens' or stakeholders' underlying view of government and institutions. Public opinion polls continue to indicate a decline of trust in politicians. Additional contributing factors for this decline include media coverage, economic performance, and politician's lack of sophistication. Unfortunately, for political leaders, voters may punish unethical or corrupt behavior more heavily than they reward good behavior (Bowler & Karp).

Caldwell, Hayes, Karri and Bernal (2008) proposed that perceptions about the trustworthiness of leader behaviors allow those leaders to be perceived and viewed as ethical stewards. They further argued that in contrast to the constant cynicism based on never-ending ethical blunders in business and government ethical stewards can rebuild organizational trust. According to Caldwell et al., ethical stewardship is rooted in stakeholder theory. It utilizes a theory of governance in which leaders are stewards whose motives are aligned with the objectives (goals) of several parties (stakeholders).

#### *Stewardship Theory in Relation to Corruption*

Davis, Schoorman, and Donaldson (1997) in describing stewardship suggested that steward "will not substitute or trade self-serving behaviors for cooperating behaviors but will seek to maximize utility for the organization based upon rational principals" (p. 26, as cited in Caldwell, Hayes, Karri, & Bernal, 2007). Block (1996) proposed that stewardship "was established on the principal of service over self-interest, and management will treat employees (stakeholders) like partners and owners in the organization" (p. 23). For example in the political arena, it works like this: great leaders are ethical stewards who generate high levels of commitment from followers (Caldwell et al.). The relationship between leadership behaviors, perceptions of trustworthiness, and the nature of ethical stewardship reinforces the importance of ethical governance in dealing with stakeholders. This means they will create organizational systems that are

congruent with the organization's values (Caldwell et al., 2008). By creating perceptions of trustworthiness, political leaders can encourage the public to be more involved in the political process as it benefits the stakeholders.

Caldwell and Karri (2005) stated the fundamental supposition underlying stewardship theory, "is the maximization of long-term economic wealth that will lead to the overall well-being of the principals and various stakeholders collectively and present opportunities for maximizing social welfare and provide economic benefits to society" (p. 251).

While previous researchers have studied and applied this to the business and organizational structures, and based on a thorough review of the literature, this theory can also be applied to government and non-profit entities. Through efficient use of taxpayer resources, efficiency and effectiveness in spending stimulate economic development. C

Caldwell et al. (2007) described stewardship characteristics and their implications for leaders. The leader has a duty to create added value and wealth and benefit society based upon virtue ethics and a commitment for ethical focus (Caldwell et al.). A leader's primary function as a steward is to create meaningful opportunities that benefit society in whole and not themselves. The vision or focus should increase organizational (society) wealth to serve the interests of all stakeholders. The moral imperative for an ethical steward is that duties must be honored and interests of all parties must be protected (Caldwell et al.). Finally, each person or stakeholder is a valued member of society and his or her rights are considered precious. Society should balance the individual's rights with the collective welfare and continuation and growth of the community.

In summary, the preceding sections have led the researcher to conclude the following:

- 1) Based on a preliminary and yet comprehensive literature review, it is apparent this is a topic of great interest. There is a significant gap in the literature and a compelling need to fill this gap.
- 2) Communication between politicians and stakeholders was discussed. A thorough review of appropriate communication theories between stakeholders and political leaders are discussed in Chapter 2.

The researcher's communication model was introduced to show the communication cycle between stakeholders and political leaders. As a result of the various variables introduced in the model which affect the communications between political leaders and stakeholders, often times distorted, and as a result, this proposed model will further demonstrate and clarify how and why communications between stakeholders and political leaders are important for better governance strategies.

*Communication Model between stakeholders and political leaders*

Communication is affected by the following variables Mistrust (A), Distortion of Facts (B), Prior Experiences(C), and Media Influences (D). This proposed model is descriptive (describing the various interactions and variables that affect communications between the various stakeholder groups and elected political leaders).The researcher refined this model to make it potentially a prescriptive model to improve communications between political leaders and stakeholders. The researcher developed the Communication Model to show the relationships between stakeholders and leaders.




Figure 2. Communication model between stakeholders and political leaders

Note: \* Stakeholders are the principal and political leaders are the agents.

*Exploratory Hypotheses that Emerge from the Literature*

H1a: There will be significant perceptual differences between stakeholder groups regarding political leaders' ethical behavior.

H1b: There will be significant perceptual differences between stakeholder groups regarding political leaders' trust.

- H1c: There will be significant perceptual differences between stakeholder groups regarding political leaders' unethical/corrupt behavior.
- H1d: There will be significant perceptual differences between stakeholder groups regarding political leaders' ethical relativism.
- H1e: There will be significant perceptual differences between stakeholder groups regarding political leaders' communications.
- H2a: There will be significant perceptual differences between stakeholder groups based on key demographics (age, gender, and political affiliation) regarding political leaders' ethical behavior.
- H2b: There will be significant perceptual differences between stakeholder groups based on key demographics (age, gender, and political affiliation) regarding political leaders' trust.
- H2c: There will be significant perceptual differences between stakeholder groups based on key demographics (age, gender, and political affiliation) regarding political leaders' unethical corrupt behavior.
- H2d: There will be significant perceptual differences between stakeholder groups based on key demographics (age, gender, and political affiliation) regarding political leaders' ethical relativism.
- H2e: There will be significant perceptual differences between stakeholder groups based on key demographics (age, gender, and political affiliation) regarding political leaders' communication.
- H3a: There will be significant differences between political leaders and all other stakeholder groups regarding ethical behavior.

H3b: There will be significant differences between political leaders and all other stakeholder groups regarding trust.

H3c: There will be significant differences between political leaders and all other stakeholder groups regarding unethical/corrupt behavior.

H3d: There will be significant differences between political leaders and all other stakeholder groups regarding ethical relativism.

H3e: There will be significant differences between political leaders and all other stakeholder groups regarding communication.

H4: There will be a significant difference between stakeholders and politicians regarding their level of communications.

H5: Political leaders will perceive their level of trust and ethics higher than the various will stakeholders who will perceive those same qualities.

#### Description of Terms

*Adverse selection.* Occurs when the agent has some private information, prior to entering into relations with the principal (Heath & Norman, 2004).

*Agency theory.* A theory in which managers are agents for the shareholder and assume that both parties are utility maximizers. As the interests of managers diverge from those principals, an agency problem is said to exist (Jensen & Meckling, 1976).

In law, it is defined as a fiduciary relationship that is funded on trust. In economic models, it can be defined as an assumption of an absence of trust between the principal and agent, focusing instead on moral hazard and adverse selection (Casadesus-Masanell, 2004).

*Alliance.* Is an arrangement between two or more firms or stakeholders that establishes an exchange relationship but has no joint ownership involvement (Dickson & Weaver, 1997).



*Altruistic.* An agent who acts in the principal's well being and enters positively in his utility function. (Casadesus-Masanell, 2004).

*Autocracy.* Described as a paternalistic organization where the rule of "one" individual in a small group is characterized by absolute or dictatorial power (Morgan, 1998).

*Beneficiary of corruption.* The actor who derives direct and primary benefits from the action (Wheeler & Rothman, 1982).

*Business/government ethics:* What is perceived as appropriate in the organizational setting (Berne & Freeman, 1992), and comprise moral principals and standards that guide behaviors in the world of business (Ferrell & Fraederich, 1991).

*Bureaucracies.* In government or regulatory organizations, rule is associated with the use of the written word and is exercised by bureaucrats who sit behind their "bureaux" or desks, making and administering the rules that guide organizational activity (Morgan, 1998).

*Civil order.* The absence of collective resorts to violence, or other coercive actions, to achieve private or public objectives (Eckstein, 1997).

*Congruence theory.* Is based on the tenants of two hypotheses: The first pertains to the viability and performance of political systems regardless of types that says governments perform well to the extent that their authority patterns are congruent (sameness of form – either exists or does not exist) with the authority patterns of other units of society (Eckstein, 1997). The second hypothesis says, Democratic government performs well only if their patterns exhibit balanced disparities - that is, combinations of democratic and non-democratic traits (Eckstein, 1997).

*Contract.* Is commonly used in stakeholder theory as a metaphor for the relationships between the firm and its stakeholders (Eisenhardt, 1989, as cited in Kuratko, Goldsby, & Hornsby, 2004).

*Corrupt act.* The ability for a public official's control over the power to positively or negatively coerce individuals - the public official has to do something in order to obtain the illegal rewards and there can be the power to do nothing, to overlook violations of regulations (Myrdal, 1968).

*Corrupt behavior.* Is the result of the misuse of authority for organizational gain (Ashforth & Anand, 2003), as well as conduct by an organization that is proscribed and punishable by criminal, civil, or regulatory law (Braithwaite, 1989).

*Corruption.* Is an elected official's concealed private, for gain, appropriation of a public right (Rose-Ackerman, 1975; Treisman, 2000, as cited in Piatt, 2009). This also includes behavior which deviates from the normal duties of a public role because of private-regarding (family, close private clique), pecuniary or status gain; or violates rules against the exercise of certain types of private-regarding influence. This includes such behavior as bribery (use of reward to pervert the judgment of a person in a position of trust), nepotism (bestowal of patronage by reason of ascriptive relationship rather than merit); and misappropriation - illegal appropriation of public resources for private-regarding uses (Nye, 1967).

*Corrupt unethical behavior (CUB).* As described earlier in Figure 1, as concentric circles of unethical, corrupt, and corrupt illegal behavior.

*Unethical behavior.* Includes organizational actions that are deemed immoral or unacceptable according to societal norms or general standards of conduct (Sharpe, 1993, as cited in Piatt, 2009).

*Corruption.* Is an elected official's concealed private for gain appropriation of a public right (Rose-Ackerman 1975; Shleifer & Vishney, 1999; Treisman, 2000, as cited in Piatt, 2009).

*Corrupt-illegal behavior.* Is the result of the misuse of authority for organizational gain (Ashforth & Anand, 2003, as cited in Piatt, 2009), as well as conduct by an organization that is proscribed and punishable by criminal, civil or regulatory law (Braithwaite, 1989, as cited in Piatt, 2009).

*Counter organization.* Consists of individuals who coordinate their actions to create a rival power block (Morgan, 1998).

*Decisional efficacy.* The extent to which governments make and carry out policies in response to political demands and challenges (Eckstein, 1997).

*Democracy.* The power rests with the demos, or populace, and shared is through participatory forms of rule where different stakeholders are formally represented in the decision-making, process (Morgan, 1998).

*Directiveness.* Denotes the extent to which activities in a social unit occur because directives, not the free choice of members, and include supervision and in which severe sanctions are used even against mild compliance (Eckstein, 1997).

*Ethical relativist.* Condone any ethical code as long as society accepts it (Valasquez, 1992).

*Ethical standard.* A level of effort that is considered “appropriate behavior” (Casadesus-Masanell, 2004).

*Façade of conformity.* Is a term used to refer to an individual behavior that is inconsistent with personally held values (Hewlin, 2003).

*Firm.* Is characterized by a relationship with many groups and individuals (stakeholders), each with (a) the power to affect the firm’s performance and/or (b) a stake in the firm’s performance (Freeman, 1984).

*Governance.* Every social unit (political parties, workplace, business, trade unions, community associations, friendly societies, voluntary associations, professional societies, churches, sport teams, colleges, and families) must be directed and managed in some way (Eckstein, 1997).

*Group character.* Is the ability of groups of people to refrain from unethical and antisocial actors without the threat of punishment. The latter refers mainly to the actions of governing bodies (Fleming, 2001).

*Individual character.* Is the ability of an individual to refrain from unethical and antisocial acts without the threats of punishment (Fleming, 2001).

*Information asymmetry.* Deals with the study of decisions in transactions where one party has more or better information than the other. This creates an imbalance of power in transactions, which can sometimes cause the transactions to go awry. Also called asymmetric warfare where smaller challengers beat a dominant incumbent, because the challengers fight in ways the incumbent was unprepared for (Newman, 2000).

*Institutional theory.* Suggests that institutional environments impose pressures on organizations to appear legitimate and conform to prevailing norms (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983).

*Instrumental stakeholder theory.* Purports to describe what will happen (Mitchell, Agle, & Wood, 1997).

*Irrationality.* Is described as the exclusion of information in the formation of intentions and subsequent behaviors, how one intends to and ultimately behaves (Watson, Freeman & Parmar, 2008).

*Latent stakeholder.* Is one who tends to be “uninterested and uninformed” (Price, 1992, p. 36) and has a low level of involvement in the discourse process (Van Leuvan & Slater, 1991).

*Leadership.* The ability to define the reality of others, in effect, the leader wields symbolic power that exerts a decisive influence on how people perceive their realities and therefore on the way they act (Morgan, 1998)

*Learning theory.* A theory that suggests firms can enhance their competitive position through superior knowledge (Simonin, 1997).

*Legitimacy.* The degree to which an establishment is considered by its members as worthy of support (Eckstein, 1997).

*Locus of control.* Is the individual’s belief about the relationship between his or her behavior and the consequences of that behavior (Rotter, 1966).

*Moral hazard.* Is a situation where an agent’s action, or the outcome of the action, is imperfectly observable to the principal (Heath & Norman, 2004).

*Moral stakeholder.* The one or group that is affected by the firm's behavior (Evan & Freeman, 1988).

*Moral value.* A type of personal value described as one that cannot be violated by or actions nor omitted from our considerations of right and wrong which includes trust, honesty, reliability, and the like (Watson et al., 2008).

*Narcissism.* The degree in which an individual has an inflated sense of self and is preoccupied with having that self-view continually reinforced. The chief manifestations of narcissism include feelings of superiority, entitlement, and a constant need for attention and admiration (Bogart, Benotsch, & Pavlovic, 2004).

*Network.* Is described as a constellation of businesses or groups that organize through the establishment of social rather than legally binding contracts (Atler & Hage, 1993; Jones, Hesterly, & Borgatti, 1997).

*Norm.* Is a rule or guide to behavior to determine what is appropriate or inappropriate (Casadesus-Masanell, 2004).

*Normative theory.* Is concerned with the moral propriety of the behavior of the firm and/or managers (Jones, 1995).

*Open system theory.* Is a theory that examines how the environment affects an organization (Katz & Kahn, 1966).

*Organizational politics.* Is defined as self-serving, informal behavior that requires at least two parties: one initiator, the individual trying to exert influence, and a target, the object of the influence attempt (Goffman, 1959; Porter, 1981)

*Participation.* Focuses on the individual as a rational actor who decides whether or not to participate in terms of the benefits and costs to him/herself (White, 1976).

*Political behavior.* A behavior that is frequently used as an upward influence strategy to promote self-interests of the initiator (Porter, 1981).

*Political corruption.* The behavior in question is judged particularly heinous or corrupt if both public officials and the public judge it corrupt and both parties wish it to be restricted (Heidenheimer & Johnston, 2008).

*Political efficacy.* The feeling that individual political action does have, or can have, an impact upon the political process, i.e., that it is worthwhile to perform one's civic duties (Campbell, Gurin, & Miller, 1954).

*Polity.* Originally, a term used in ancient Greece to refer to the many Greek city-states that had an assembly of citizens as part of the political process and often described how performance is measured and if the political component does what it is intended to do (Heidenheimer & Johnston, 2008).

*Power.* A relationship among social actors in which one social actor A can get social actor B to do something that B would not have otherwise done (Pfeffer, 1981, as cited in Mitchell, Agle, & Wood, 1997).

*Prospect theory.* Proposes that individuals are relatively risk averse for gains and risk seeking with respect to potential losses; simply stated: a loss of \$X is more aversive than a gain of \$X is attractive (Kahneman & Tversky, 1984).

*Psychological distance theory.* Several theories of interpersonal communication suggest that physical proximity in communication fosters stronger bonds between parties than communication that occurs remotely (Latane, 1981).

*Public.* Designates that a benefit affects the public in general, rather than a specific individual (White, 1976).

*Public good.* Is one in which consumption by one person does not decrease its availability to others (Samuelson, 1954).

*Public good theory.* Certain benefits, designated as *public* [italics added] by economists may be desired by an individual, and yet he/she will not participate to achieve them (White, 1976).

*Resource dependency theory.* Whereby organization A supplies a large proportion of inputs to organization B, or absorbs a large proportion of outputs from B, then B will be dependent on A. The criticality of a resource has to do with whether an organization can exist without it, if the resource is an input, or exist without a market for it, if the resource is an output. Inherent in the firm need for resources provides opportunities for others to gain control over it (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978).

*Stakeholder.* Any group or individual who can affect or is affected by the achievement of the firms' objectives (Freeman, 1984, as cited in Piatt, 2009).

*Strategic stakeholder.* The one who can affect the firm or organization (Freeman, 1984).

*Stakeholder theory.* The stakeholder approach is about groups and individuals who can affect the organization, and is about managerial behavior taken in response to these groups and individuals, and enables managers to understand stakeholders and strategically manage them. In addition, it is about managing potential conflict stemming from divergent interests (Freeman, 1984).

*Stewardship theory.* Suggests that managers should not be constrained by control systems because they will act as a constraint on the ability of executives to



manage effectively. Stewards believe that by acting in the best interests of the principals, their own will be served (Davis, et al., 1997).

*Self-deception.* Is based on the formation of beliefs and ultimately a formulated framework of beliefs. A person who values or desires a particular state of being is not the same as declaring that person will act in such a way as to bring about that state (Smith, 2001).

*Social exchange theory.* The central concept of actors exchanging resources via a social exchange relationship. Where social exchange (e.g., Ax; By) is the voluntary transfer of resources (x, y,...) between multiple actors (A, B,...) (Cook, 1977).

*Social Units.* Can be described as collective individuals, not just aggregates of Individuals, which have their own identities, separate from individual identities of members (Eckstein, 1997).

*Subculture.* Social and ethnic groups may give rise to different norms and patterns of behavior with a crucial impact on day-to-day functioning, especially when the ethnic groupings coincide with different organizational activities (Morgan, 1998).

*Trade associations.* Are typically non-profit organizations formed by firms in the same industries to collect and disseminate trade information, offer legal and technical advice, furnishes industry-related training, and provides a platform for collective lobbying (Gupta & Lad, 1983; Oliver, 1990).

*Transgression.* Is defined as a corrupt or unethical act by an organization that places its stakeholders at risk (Coombs, 1995).

*Unethical behavior.* Includes organizational actions that are deemed immoral or unacceptable according to societal norms or general standards of conduct (Sharpe, 1993, as cited in Piatt, 2009).

*Utility.* In economics, utility is a measure of the relative satisfaction from or desirability of consumption of goods and encompasses a moral commitment to equality, or the enjoyment of social contacts (White, 1976).

*Utilitarianism.* A doctrine that states the maximization of utility as a moral criterion for the organization of society and according to John Stuart Mill (1806-1876), society should aim to maximize the total utility of individuals, aiming for the greatest happiness for the greatest number (Mill, 1906).

#### Significance of the Study

The objective of this research study was to begin to fill this important gap in the literature. This is primarily a descriptive study with potential prescriptive implications. To this end, based on extensive literature review, previous empirical studies, prior developed ethical scales, and sound methods of original scale development, this researcher has developed an instrument to measure perceptions CUB and its effects on stakeholders' and political officials relationships and communication patterns. Supporting the importance of more research in this area, Gioia (2002) contended that a systemic view is important because corruption appears to thrive in particular organization, industry and national environments. Furthermore, "if that systemic corruption or even the perception of corruption prevails, the entire system can fail" (Ashforth, Gioia, Robinson, & Trevino, 2008, pp. 670-671). Ethical leadership and the CUB model have probably never had a higher profile than they do today.

The media can greatly affect the perceptions of stakeholders with the constant barrage of negative reporting on elected political leaders, as illustrated by the Ryan case

cited previously. One of the outcomes of this is that stakeholders can be influenced with the constant negative reporting media's portrayal of political leaders. This research will enable the stakeholders and political leaders to address their perceptions on CUB and to start developing necessary means of better communication strategies to modify these perceptions whether based on real or biased information.

By addressing these key research questions and looking at the various stakeholder groups and political leaders, the researcher will gain valuable insights to their perceptions. By understanding the issues of political perceptions (a descriptive test), the outcome can provide key communication strategies to tackle the disparity in perceptions between political leaders and stakeholder groups (a prescriptive outcome). The net effect of this study could promote better governance in public policy through more effective communications between stakeholders and political leaders.

Leadership is about vision. However, leadership is equally creating a climate where the truth is heard and the brutal facts confronted. There is a huge difference between the opportunity to "have your say" and the opportunity to be heard. The good –to great leaders understood this distinction, creating a culture wherein people had a tremendous opportunity to be heard and, ultimately, for the truth to be heard. (Collins, 2001, p. 74)

This significant statement becomes a major underlying theme in this research. Increased communication between the stakeholders and political leaders is crucial for the furtherance and development of good governance. Collins (2001) elaborated on his point that leaders cannot make good decisions without implementing the process of honest confrontation of the brutal facts. Furthermore, they must create a culture wherein people have significant opportunities to be heard and primarily, that the truth be heard. Collins

further stated that leadership does not begin just with a vision. It begins with people able to confront the brutal facts and to act on the implications. Finally, Collins further explained that one of the primary ways to de-motivate people is to ignore the brutal facts of reality. One potential finding of this present study may be that cynical view of political leaders reported by the media may be overblown. If in fact this is true, *the brutal facts* [italics added] may be pleasantly surprising. In fact, this misunderstanding could inhibit the better communications advocated in this research.

#### Procedure to Accomplish

In the planning process, the researcher demonstrated and utilized a mixed methods approach and combine qualitative and quantitative methods to gather the data following the illustrative model (see Figure 3). The Research Model in Figure 3 has driven the research.




Figure 3. Piatt research model




Figure 3. Piatt research model (continued)

These specific steps for the major exploratory hypotheses are:

1. An integrative literature review of scholarly journal articles from several relevant streams of literature to frame the research question.
2. Discussions with political leaders (state senator, state representative, county board chairperson, county board members, mayors, and trustees to get their perspectives on the problems of perceptions of political corruption and their views on how they deal with these perceptions from their constituent groups and various stakeholder groups. In addition, to understand needs political leaders express regarding stakeholder perceptions.
3. From the literature review and input from the political leaders, the final research questions will be refined and formulated.
4. Develop testable hypotheses from the information gathered from the political leaders.
5. Phase I research will consist of conducting a comprehensive survey of stakeholder groups to determine their perceptions.
6. Statistical analysis will include correlation, ANOVA, ANCOVA, Cohen's d, correlations, frequencies, means, standard deviations, Independent-samples t-tests, and qualitative interpretation of the data.
7. Phase II will consist of conducting in-depth interviews with selected individual informant focus groups to develop a deeper understanding of the data.
8. The results of this research will be reported in Chapter 4. Beyond the final defense, papers and journal articles and workshops will be developed.

An important aspect of this research is that it uses multiple methods, both qualitative and quantitative. The researcher set up meetings with political leaders to follow-up on survey results. One of the most compelling aspects of this research is once data are analyzed; the researcher will meet again with several political leaders to discuss results. This will then allow them to see what the stakeholders perceptions are in relation to theirs and thus create more effective communication strategies for better governance.

Shaw (n.d) best sums up the politician by stating “He knows nothing; he thinks he knows everything – that clearly points to a political career” ([www.working-minds.com/GBSquotes](http://www.working-minds.com/GBSquotes)). Said sarcastically, Shaw does make a point! This research will result in political leaders gaining knowledge about their stakeholders and knowing something about their perceptions.

The Figure 4 research model represents the development of the survey instrument that was used for the surveying the various stakeholder groups.




Figure 4. Survey development methodology



## CHAPTER II

### REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

#### Introduction

According to Jean –Jacques Rousseau (1762) “Politics and Morals cannot be separated, and he who wants to study one without the other is bound to misunderstand both” (Kolm, 1996, p. 117). This quote is the starting point to analyze, review, and integrate the literature and then briefly review the concepts presented in Chapter I. The researcher further discussed the models developed in Chapter I and the relationships it has on generating the hypotheses and implications for this study through this literature review.

Prior to reviewing the Chapter I concepts review, the researcher will demonstrate through existing literature the relevance of applying agency theory to the political realm. The application of agency theory, which becomes the major focal point of this dissertation, will focus on a representative democracy, such as the United States, and concentrate on examples in Illinois, but which also is applicable to any other state in the union.

Governments have always mattered to business organizations by the establishment of legal frameworks and enforcement of laws, and regulations that provide structures of actions for managers and their organizations (Buchholz & Rosenthal, 2004). Surprisingly however, little research has been done from the political side of applying agency theory to government. Lord (1995) stated, “In political science, the problem of

governance by representative agents is a pervasive theme because the interests of the government representatives and those represented often diverge. This divergence of interests is the setting for a classical agency problem” (p. 396). Long before management scholars discovered and exposed principal agent-models, James Madison discussed the problems at length in the Federalist Papers. He posited because government representatives are vested and entrusted with specific institutional powers and those political agents may then act to benefit themselves while neglecting or acting contrary the interests of their constituents who elected them (Madison, 1787). Carey (1994); Goff and Grier, (1993) indicated the literature on the dilemma of shirking by legislators is quite extensive.

Lord (1995) stated, “the emphasis on pursuit of self-interest which is at the crux of agency theory provides a useful bridge between the management literature and the prevailing views of legislative behavior in political science” (p. 396). Lord asserted elected leaders-legislators have a strong interest for remaining in office. To remain in office, legislators need to maintain a stream of power, influence, pay, prestige, and benefits emerging from incumbency. Therefore, legislators must serve their constituents interests and needs properly in order to be re-elected again. Fenno (1978) and Mayhew (1974) both indicated the quest for re-election becomes a fundamental motivator for legislative behavior. However, for self-interested legislators, the interests of all constituents need not be considered as legislators concerned only with getting re-elected, need only concern themselves with the interests of a large enough group to get re-elected (Grier & Munger, 1991; Keim & Zeithaml, 1986).

Regular elections are the ways in which constituents can enforce the agency contract (Carey, 1994). Finally, legislative agents act in accordance with the constituents to gain or maintain support of the majority of the principals who in reality vote (Lord, 1995).

Legislators are elected to serve the interests of their constituents. However, there are three important agency issues as Lord (1995) identified. First, the political agency contract is flawed, as constituents have the difficult task of monitoring the behavior of their elected official. This process becomes encumbered, as the constituents do not have the time, resources, or expertise to monitor public policy processes. Second, even if the constituents have the necessary information to monitor their representative, additional costs would incur for the enforcement of the agency contract. In effect, this precludes most constituents from monitoring, and the consequences of this dilemma, is that only a small percentage of constituents actively engage in political activities, and only a fraction actually votes. Third, an agency problem exists when legislators face a lack of information about what their constituent's preferences are regarding public policy.

Legislators face the issues of lack of information, limited personal staff time, ambiguity, and resources regarding the constituent's preferences regarding public policy. Legislative agents then fall into the trap of failing to act in the interests of their constituents, not because of *intentional shirking*, [italics added] but due to lack of knowledge.

Political agency problems occur when the above-mentioned items come into play. Lack of knowledge, monitoring and enforcement costs, between the constituent who is the principal, and the legislator whom is the political agent are important factors in agency and the feedback process. Lord (1995) articulated that politically active constituents become the relevant group who active support of legislators must mature in

order to win re-election and maintain their incumbency. This becomes an essential issue in understanding agency theory.

Agency theory and stakeholder theory are thereby, tied together in this political sphere, and those stakeholder groups who are involved in the political process. Lord (1995) stated, these major constituent groups are those who “exercise a disproportionate share of influence over legislators” (p. 397). Legislators look at these indicators to ascertain how their legislative behavior will affect those stakeholders groups who vote and the likelihood of that stakeholder group’s activity between elections and during the election process. Illinois Governor Pat Quinn, stated in his July 31, 2009 budget address, state Government belongs to the people not to the office holder (Quinn, 2009). This becomes the starting point for applying agency theory to the political realm. When the agent – the political leader assumes or inverts his or her role to that of the principle, an interesting dilemma occurs. Recent statements made by 11th District Republican candidate, David McAloon, in which he stated, highlight this concept:

People have to remember, government works for them, even though at times it feels like people are here to serve politicians. It is time to reclaim our government and tell them “no more”. We have to tell them, this is not your country. You work for us... Do not be silent anymore. We have to get involved. (Provost, 2009, p. A1)

Finally, Buchholz and Rosenthal (2004) argued that with stakeholders representing so many divergent interests in business, bureaucratic maneuvering would increase as well as wasteful political practices that are the hallmark of democracy. Thus, corporate decision-making will become more like the decision-making that characterizes

the federal and state governments. They further stated, “Government must use its power of coercion when necessary to see that the system is not undermined by self-serving managers or other stakeholders” (p. 149). This view is contrasted by Machiavelli who stated:

Any man who tries to be good all the time is bound to come to ruin among the great number who are not good. Hence a prince who wants to keep his authority must learn how not to be good, and use that knowledge, or refrain from using it as necessity requires. (Greene, 2000, p. xxiii)

This begins the dilemma for the political leader who comes into office with ethical standards and having to balance those interests with those who do not have those intentions for good governance. This researcher will explore and develop models exploring this inversion of agent-principle and show the consequences of such actions as illustrated below.

### *Chapter I: Concepts Review*

The researcher developed a proposed Model of Corrupt-Unethical Behavior (CUB) - see Figure 1, to describe and differentiate between unethical, corrupt and corrupt illegal behavior. The researcher has postulated that as political leaders move deeper into the CUB circles the level of corruption increases from unethical behavior to corrupt behavior and finally to corrupt-illegal behavior which leads to indictments and prison sentences. Corruption is prevalent in the U.S. and throughout Illinois. In addition, the researcher has developed a second model on political communications. This model (see Figure 2) examines how the communications process between stakeholders and political leaders are influenced and are affected by the following variables: media influence,

mistrust, distortion of facts, prior experiences, and the level of interactions between stakeholders and political leaders. Whether stakeholder groups perceive political leaders as ethical or corrupt is critical in this research for the formulation of communication strategies to promote better governance.

Building on these concepts from Chapter I, the researcher will review major literature streams as promoted by Davis and Parker (1997) who suggested a stream of research approach as a method guide to the literature review and research process. They further suggested a process that identifies the academic field, the area of interest, the stream of research, and the theory base. As an introduction to the literature review, the researcher will identify these areas. This is discussed in further detail and the research hypotheses will flow directly from the literature.

#### *Theoretical Foundation*

This section includes an overview of the theoretical foundations that informs the research questions. Several research streams are investigated, along with antecedent research that informs these constructs. These include the following major themes:


- Stakeholder theory
- Principal agency theory and moral hazard
- Corruption

The following are supporting and ancillary themes:

- Good governance
- Public choice theory
- Political motivations
- Narcissism

- Resource dependency theory
- Power theory
- Congruence theory
- Trust and perceptions
- Cynicism
- Ethical leadership
- Communication theory and mass media base
- Demographics
- Self Reporting Bias

These essential streams of literature in Chapter 2 provided context to investigate the phenomenon of differences of perceptions within and between in various stakeholder groups. This resulted in the hypothetical suggestions of how political leaders can develop communication strategies to reduce negative perceptions and thereby increase good governance. From an action research perspective, this will assist the researcher to and frame the research methodology in Chapter 3.



*Figure 5.* Factors affecting political-unethical behavior

Figure 5 indicates the factors that affect and a political leader's unethical behavior. The statements shown in the boxes are indicative, of the thoughts or actions by a political leader, and therefore, move the political leader towards unethical behavior.

*Concept 1: Stakeholder Theory*

This section provides a literature review of stakeholder theory and associated factors that are related to stakeholder theory.



### *Stakeholder Formation*

Stakeholder theory is utilized to explain and guide the structure and operation of the defined political organization (Piatt, 2009). It aids in understanding the organization by determining which participants matter and what are their interests (Donaldson & Preston 1995). “Stakeholder analysts argue that all persons or groups with legitimate interests participating in an enterprise do so to obtain benefits and that there is no prima facie priority of one set of interests and benefits over another” (Donaldson & Preston, p. 68).

A stakeholder approach to strategy emerged in the mid 1980’s (Piatt, 2009). Freeman’s (1984) seminal work in stakeholder management formulated a framework by which managers could deal with unprecedented levels of environmental turbulence and change (as cited in Piatt). Freeman defined a stakeholder as “any group or individual who can affect or is affected by the achievement of the organization’s objectives” (p. 46, as cited in Piatt). In contrast, Clarkson (1995) defines stakeholders as those who have placed something at risk in a relationship with the organization, whereas Freeman and Evan (1990) speak of stakeholders as contractors or participants in exchange relationships (as cited in Piatt). In addition, management should explore its relationships with all stakeholders to develop business strategies and long-term success (Freeman & McVea, 2001, as cited in Piatt). However, key stakeholders may use various types of influence strategies to make known their priorities to the organization in their decision making process (Frooman, 1999, as cited in Piatt). Bryson (1995) further explained that stakeholders are of particular importance in public and non-profit organizations, which have a more diverse and divergent group of stakeholders than private-for-profit

organizations making it more difficult to identify key strategic issues (as cited in Piatt, 2009). This is of particular relevance since the present research focuses on the public sector.

### *Stakeholder Approach*

Stakeholder theory attempts to answer a fundamental question in a systematic way (Mitchell, Agle, & Wood, 1997). Which groups of stakeholders deserve the special attention of management and which do not? Who then are stakeholders? Stakeholders can be persons, groups, neighborhoods, organizations, institutions, societies, and even the natural environment (Mitchell et al., as cited in Piatt, 2009).

In addition, Phillips (2003) contended that stakeholder theory is organizational since organizations have constituencies (as cited in Piatt, 2009). Furthermore, organizations are dependent upon these constituency groups for their continued success (as cited in Piatt). Constituencies are therefore stakeholders in an organization (as cited in Piatt, 2009). A fundamental tenant of stakeholder theory is that decision makers must continually keep the interests of different stakeholders in balance (Freeman, 1994, as cited in Piatt).

Advancing this notion, Mitchell, Agle and Wood (1997) contended that the ultimate aim of stakeholder management is for the organization to consider if the firm is system centered. In activities as complex as a political system, the causes for unethical and corrupt behavior are numerous, complicated, interdependent, and often enigmatic, making the political reformer's job exceeding difficult (as cited in Piatt, 2009). However, from a systems perspective, the reformer must look at the organization as organic (Piatt). In this organic model, change is seen primarily as an adaptive response by the system,

acting as a whole or through a subsystems, with specific functions to maintain itself in balance with a shifting environment (Beeson & Davis, 2000, as cited in Piatt).

Do managers gain information from all stakeholders for the purposes of the organization's survival, economic well-being, coalition building and factors that bring opportunities to the organization? Balancing stakeholder interests is a process of assessment and addressing the competing claims of those who have a stake in the organization. The desire to balance stakeholder interests is a key component in the ability to keep score in the organization (Freeman, 1984). Furthermore for managerial survival, the distribution of resources in a reasonable fashion among relevant stakeholders is critical and as a matter of legitimacy. If the manager does not meet occasionally with certain stakeholder groups he or she can lose their support. Thus, it is in the interest of the manager or political leader to insure that stakeholder interests are somewhat balanced (Reynolds, Schultz & Hekman, 2006).

A significant question arises. Can an entity be in a stakeholder relationship with an organization without having any actual relationship with it? Mitchell, Agle and Wood (1997) argued these potential relationships can be as relevant as the actual ones. Clarkson (1994) views the idea of involuntary stakeholders of those individual's interests who are not at risk within the organization.

Closely related is systems theory that was developed by Ackoff and Churchman (1947), which emphasized the external links that are part of every organization. Organizations that are described as open systems are part of a much larger network and are not stand-alone independent entities. This theory explores the relationships and identification of both stakeholders and the interconnections in the organization or

network. Using system theory, problems in an organization can be solved only with the support of all of the stakeholders or members in the collective network of the organizations (Freeman & McVea, 2001).

These ideas represented in stakeholder theory have mainly been a concern of management literature, but have also drawn interest in the public sector. However, due to stakeholder analysis and the applicability of recognizing the needs of various competing stakeholder groups in the organization, stakeholder analysis and these concepts can be applied to political organizations, and governments as well as not-for-profit organizations (as cited in Piatt, 2009). Stakeholder theory holds true to all types of organizations that comprise divergent stakeholders seeking scarce resources. In reiterating this concept of applying agency theory to politics, Lord (1995) stated, “In political science, the problem of governance by representative agents is a pervasive theme because the interests of the government representatives and those represented often diverge. This divergence of interests is the setting for a classical agency problem” (p. 396).

By emphasizing a stakeholder approach to strategic management, Freeman (1984) postulated that management must formulate and implement a process by which all groups that have a stake in the organization must be satisfied (as cited in Piatt, 2009). The long-term success of the organization is dependent upon the management and integration of the relationships and interests of all stakeholders in the organization (as cited in Piatt). A stakeholder approach emphasizes active management of the organizational environment and the furtherance of relationships of shared interests (as cited in Piatt, 2009).

Many traditional views of strategy have overlooked or marginalized some stakeholders and have consistently traded-off the interests of those stakeholders with the

more favored stakeholders (as cited in Piatt, 2009). In stable environments or non-turbulent times, this approach may seem appropriate but in times of chaos or in a constantly changing environment the interests of the stakeholders must be integrated into the goals of the organization, and stakeholder relationships must be managed in a logical and strategic fashion (Freeman & McVea, 2001, as cited in Piatt).

From this viewpoint, Schendel and Hofer (1979) developed the theory of enterprise strategy, which described the relationship between the organization and society by answering the question, what do we stand for? Looking at a stakeholder approach in its original form as an enterprise strategy was important but neglected the question of which type of values are the most important (Freeman & McVea, 2001).

Political leaders can gain a better understanding of characteristics of a stakeholder approach as developed by Freeman and McVea (2001). They outlined which major concerns for a stakeholder approach to be successful in the political organization or any other organization. The major relevant issues that are germane to this researcher's project as developed by Freeman and McVea are listed below:

- A stakeholder approach can provide a single strategic framework, flexible enough to deal with environmental shifts without requiring managers and political leaders to adopt new strategic paradigms. (p. 9) Given the developments of stakeholder literature, Freeman and McVea have hypothesized that this can likely be applied to political leaders as well.
- A stakeholder approach is a strategic management process rather than a strategic planning process. Strategic planning focuses on predicting the future environment and then independently developing plans for the

organization to exploit its position. (p. 9)

- Conversely, strategic management actively seeks a new direction for the organization and considers how the firm can affect the environment as well as how the environment may affect the firm or governance. (p. 10)
- A stakeholder approach as it relates to survival of the organization and as Freeman described as “the achievement of an organization’s objectives. (p.10) Management in turbulent times must direct the course of the firm, not merely optimize current output. Therefore, understanding stakeholder relationships is as important as achieving the organization’s objectives, which is in, turn a matter of survival. This concept can be summed up in stakeholder management is a never-ending task of balancing and integrating multiple relationships and multiple objectives. (p. 10)
- A stakeholder approach encourages management to develop strategies by looking out from the firm and identifying, and investing in, all the relationships that will ensure long-term success. Diverse collections of stakeholders can only cooperate over the long run, in spite of their differences, if they share common set of core values. For this approach to work, values must be incorporated within the strategic management process. (p. 10)
- A stakeholder approach is both a prescriptive and descriptive approach, rather than purely empirical and descriptive. It integrates economic, political and moral analysis in the strategic management process. Stakeholder management relies on the fact that stakeholder relationships

can be created and influenced, and not taken as a given. (p. 11)

- A stakeholder approach emphasizes “names and faces” for stakeholders rather than analyzing particular stakeholder roles. Management then can create a level of understanding, options and strategies that have the support of all stakeholders. (p. 12)
- A stakeholder approach calls for an integrated approach to strategic decision making. Managers and political leaders must set strategy that optimizes ways to satisfy multiple stakeholders simultaneously and not by stakeholder by stakeholder. This strategy is successful if it integrates the perspective of all stakeholders rather than offsetting one against another. (p. 12)
- Not all stakeholders will win with this strategy but managers and political leaders must develop strategies that distribute harm in a manner that ensures the long-term support for all stakeholders. Stakeholder interests over time must be managed in the same direction. (p. 13)

More broadly, what then are the implications for political leaders as described above by Freeman and McVea (2001)? How then does management implement a stakeholder approach? Evan and Freeman (1993) developed a justification of a stakeholder approach based on Kantian principals. In its simplest form, this stakeholder approach is based on the manager’s or political leader’s ability to treat people as ends unto themselves. Incumbent upon managers and political leaders is to make decisions respecting stakeholders well being rather than treating them as a means to an organization’s end. Phillips (1998) advanced a different perspective in a stakeholder

approach in the principle of fairness. When stakeholder groups or individuals enter voluntary into cooperative agreements they create an obligation to act fairly. From this viewpoint, normal business transactions create a moral obligation for organizations to treat stakeholders fairly and thereby consider their interests when making strategic decisions.

*A Stakeholder - Approach to Corporate Governance and Organizational Theory*

Continuing a pattern of applying stakeholder theory in the political organization, this stream of stakeholder theory has been advanced as a contrast to the traditional view that it is the fiduciary duty of management to protect the interests of the shareholder. The stakeholder model argues that management and political leaders should make decisions for the benefit of all stakeholders in the organization (Freeman & McVea, 2001).

Williamson (1985) utilized a transaction costs framework to promote shareholders over stakeholders because of asset specificity. Williamson further argued that a shareholder's stake was eminently tied to the success of the organization and would have no residual value if the firm failed, unlike those of the labor of a worker. Evan and Freeman (1993) contended that by utilizing corporate governance policies, stakeholder relationships could be explained. Many other stakeholders have stakes that are somewhat firm specific. As shareholders can exit more easily due to the financial (stock) markets than stakeholders, asset specificity alone does not grant a prime responsibility towards stockholders at the expense of other stakeholder groups (Evan & Freeman, 1993).



As restated earlier, Lord (1995) stated, “In political science, the problem of governance by representative agents is a pervasive theme because the interests of the government representatives and those represented often diverge. This divergence of interests is the setting for a classical agency problem” (p. 396). This divergence of interests between the constituent and the political leader is essential in understanding and applying stakeholder theory to the political realm.

What implications does that have for various stakeholder groups who cannot exit out of the organization such as a disenfranchised taxpayer or voter who cannot leave the political organization or government (as cited in Piatt, 2009)? A taxpayer can leave one community and move to another, but there is a monumental difference if the taxpayer moves from the United States to France. A complimentary view to the stakeholder approach was advocated by Goodpaster (1991) in which he developed the theory that management appears to have a contractual duty to manage the firm in the interest of the stockholders and at the same time management appears to have a moral duty to take stakeholders into account (as cited in Piatt, 2009). In the political sense, stockholders represent those primarily taxpayers and voters. Other various stakeholder groups include being “insiders” to the political organization such as lobbyist or other special interest groups with businesses, business organizations, chambers, unions, schools, and other trade organizations.

Others attempts have been made by researchers to expand stakeholder theory into what Jones (1995) has referred to as a central paradigm that links agency theory, transaction costs and contracts theory into a coherent whole (Jones; Clarkson, 1995). Due to these factors and “the accommodating framework the stakeholder concept provided an

opportunity to develop an overarching theory that could link together such concepts as agency theory, transaction costs, human relationships, ethics and even the environment” (Freeman & McVea, 2001, p. 16).

*A Stakeholder Approach to Social Responsibility and Social Performance*

One aspect of stakeholder theory that has been called into question is the problem of identifying stakeholders. Phillips and Reichart (1998) stated that, “stakeholder theory is often unable to distinguish those groups or individuals of stakeholders from those who are not” (p. 185). Phillips and Reichart further contended, “Stakeholder theory nevertheless exists within a backdrop of social and moral rules and mores that also dictate behavior both inside and outside the organizational and managerial frame of reference” (p. 191).

In turn, the defining critical question in stakeholder theory happens to be: is there such a thing as an illegitimate stakeholder, and if so, how should legitimacy be defined? Agle, Mitchell and Sonnefield (1999) have taken a different slant on this question and have conducted an empirical study to identify which stakeholders’ management or political leaders actually considers legitimate. Their research offered a theory of stakeholder identification and salience that suggested that managers perceptions of three key stakeholder attributes – power, legitimacy and urgency. Mitchell, Agle, and Wood (1997) further suggested that researchers might be able to identify stakeholders by applying sorting criteria to the field of possibilities (who and what really is a stakeholder). Mitchell et al. (1997) further argue that legitimacy (a claim on a firm, legal contract, legal right, legal title, moral right, or moral interest) is required to narrow the definition of a stakeholder. They further argued that power to influence the organization’s

behavior whether or not they have a legitimate claim must also be taken in account to keep the stakeholder definition broad. Finally, they argued that urgency - a stakeholder's claim that requires immediate action by the organization-must also be considered in the definition of who is a stakeholder. "The inclusion of urgency adds a catalytic/dynamic component to the process whereby stakeholders attain salience in the minds of managers" (Mitchell et al., 1997, p. 864). In the political process, how political leaders define stakeholders is relevant to their impact on the political organization. The stakeholder approach above clarifies these characteristics and concepts. This explains the success and influence of the stakeholder concept within the fields of business ethics, society and government.

Utilizing the concepts as presented by Ronald, Bradley, and Donna (1997) stakeholder power exists where one actor, A, can get another actor, B, to do something that B, would not have otherwise done. Legitimacy is the assumption that actions of the entity (stakeholders) are desirable and fit into the realm of norms and beliefs and that stakeholder urgency is when claims made by the stakeholder are both important and delaying attention to the stakeholder is unacceptable. Consequently, society does grant authority (legitimacy and power) to political leaders and as Davis (1973) stated, "In the long run, those who do not use power in a manner which society considers responsible will tend to lose it" (p. 314, as cited in Mitchell, Agle, & Wood, 1997).

### *Stakeholder Theory Goals*

Donaldson and Preston (1995) approached stakeholder theory through their central theses, which they summarized as follows:

- Stakeholder theory is descriptive and provides a model of what the organization is. It describes the organization as a compendium of co-operative and competing interests possessing intrinsic values (p. 66).
- Stakeholder theory is also instrumental. It establishes a framework for examining the connections, if any, between the implementation of stakeholder management and the achievement of goals of the organization (pp. 66-67).
- Stakeholder theory is also normative and incorporates the idea that stakeholders are persons or groups with legitimate interests in the technical and on-going operations of the organization and are identified by their interests in the organization whether or not the organization has any resultant useful interest in them (p. 67).
- Stakeholder theory can be described as managerial in that it moves beyond describing existing situations or predicting cause and effect relationships; but advocates attitudes, structures and practices that, taken together, constitute stakeholder management. Furthermore, stakeholder management requires as its key trait, simultaneous attention to the legitimate interest of all appropriate stakeholders (p. 67).

Donaldson and Preston (1995) looked at the integration of the above-mentioned concepts and further analyzed stakeholder theory by contrasting and combining approaches. The descriptive aspect of stakeholder theory considers and promotes past, present, and future states of affairs of the organization and its stakeholders.

Instrumental uses of stakeholder theory fuse the connection between stakeholder approaches and commonly desired objectives of the firm.

Political leaders can view stakeholders from three categories as described by Donaldson and Preston (1995) and Mitchell, Agle, and Wood (1997): descriptive, instrumental, or normative. A descriptive theory would indicate that the organization has stakeholders; an instrumental theory would promote the idea that successful organizations consider their stakeholders; a normative theory would describe why organizations should consider their stakeholders.

Kochan and Rubenstein (2000) concluded that stakeholder organizations will materialize when stakeholders hold critical assets, expose those assets to risk and have both influence and voice. Stakeholders must not only be understood at the present-time, they must be managed over the long run (Freeman & McVea, 2001).

#### *Multiplicity of Stakeholder Theory*

Stakeholder theory began as a response to the belief that shareholders of stock in an organization should be the prime beneficiaries of the organization's activities. The organization should maximize the wealth of the shareholders. Stakeholder theory relies on the multiplicity of groups having a stake in the operation of the organization, all of whom should receive consideration in the managerial decision making process (Phillips, 1998).

From a systems perspective, Neville and Meguc (2006) stated, "While stakeholder theory has traditionally considered organization's interactions with stakeholders in terms of independent, dyadic relationships it has been suggested through recent scholarship that organizations exist within a complex network of intertwining relationships" (p. 377). The

complexities demonstrate that stakeholder formations are often complex within the political environment.

Further development of stakeholder theory indicates that stakeholder groups sometimes compete against each other; secondly, that stakeholder groups forge strategic alliances, or may cooperate with each to increase the persuasive power of their combined efforts; and thirdly, the stakeholders potential to influence other stakeholders and the organization is determined by their actual nature of the role (Neville & Menguc, 2006).

To measure stakeholder influence Mitchell, Agle, and Wood (1997) theory of stakeholder identification and salience suggests that managers will prioritize stakeholder claims according to their relative legitimacy, power and urgency. However, Neville and Mengue (2006) argued that the notion of the traditional, dyadic stakeholder-organization relationship has been too narrow in focus and introduced the concept of stakeholder multiplicity. Considering the stake in which stakeholders have in the organization, how then are stakeholders defined? Stakeholder theories tend to view stakeholders as unidimensional, homogenous groups and construe their behavior in the pursuit of interests that are defined by their stake in the organization. Consequently, few stakeholder theorists have looked at the motives, identities, ideologies and tactical choices of organizational stakeholders and their effect on the organization (de Bakker, 2008).

From this viewpoint, stakeholders who are considered secondary by management or political leaders impact the organization in various ways. Secondary stakeholders “are diverse and include those who are not directly engaged in the organization’s economic activities but are able exert influence or are affected by the organization” (Savage, Nix,

Whitehead & Blair, 1991, p. 62). Fringe stakeholders are those groups, which lack a formal contractual bond with the organization and do not have a direct legal authority over the organization, and thus find themselves having a weak bargaining position with the organization (Clarkson, 1995; Easley & Lenox, 2006). Due to these fringe stakeholders' lack of power in the organization, stakeholder theorists have largely ignored their existence. Mitchell, Agle, and Wood (1997) further stated that:

Demanding stakeholders, those with urgent claims but having neither power nor legitimacy, are the 'mosquitoes buzzing in the ears' of managers: irksome but not dangerous, bothersome but not warranting more than passing management attention, if any at all. (p. 875)

Political stakeholders therefore must make their voices known to political leaders so they are not ignored and viewed as fringe stakeholders in the political system.

Up to this point, researchers have taken two approaches to stakeholder management. A demographic approach in identifying key stakeholder attributes, or a structural approach as a focal point between the relationship of the organization and the stakeholder (Frooman & Murrell, 2005). Hirschman, (1970) advanced the idea of that stakeholder management can be redirected to secure the loyalty of relevant stakeholders to the organization by offering key stakeholders the ability to express their voice and partake in the decision making processing.

de Bakker (2008) further advocated that both primary and secondary stakeholder groups undeniably exert influence over the organization through resource dependence relationships. Stakeholders influence can be directed from outside the direct relationship with the organization and thus stakeholders can claim a position of influence opposite of

the organization. Management and political leaders have limited time and resources to pay attention to stakeholder claims. As described earlier, Lord (1995) stated, the political agency contract is flawed, when constituents have the difficult task of monitoring the behavior of their elected official. This process becomes encumbered, as the constituents do not have the time, resources, or expertise to monitor public policy processes (Lord). Likewise, Lord asserted, legislative agents then fall into the trap of failing to act in the interests of their constituents, not because of intentional shirking, but due to lack of knowledge. This situation brings about a competing interest between primary and secondary stakeholders for the attention of management and political leaders. Stakeholder salience is a direct result of this occurrence and management must navigate the blurred boundaries between these two groups and determine whom to consider, whom to turn for legitimacy and whom to take into account when formulating organizational policy.

Furthermore, managers must be aware of which stakeholders are supportive of the organization's activities and those that are not, and the possibility of potential alliances that may result and form over different issues. Managers and political bureaucrats, who are also known as managers, and political leaders, must be aware of the strength of influence of interacting stakeholders and awareness of the potential strength and degree of interests these alliances bring (Neville & Menguc, 2006).

#### *The Study of Stakeholder Perceptual Differences*

Neville and Menguc (2006) concluded their analysis of stakeholder multiplicity by stating stakeholder theory provided a useful tool to understand the influence of key stakeholders in the organization. Managers and political leaders must understand the interactions of multiple stakeholders within the stakeholder network. Understanding this



framework of conflicting, complimentary or cooperative claims of stakeholders will allow managers and political leaders to understand the direction, strength and synergies within the stakeholder network.

Furthermore, Neville and Menguc (2006) stated stakeholder alliances are developed with the goal of attaining sufficient salience to influence the organization. As managers and political leaders become cognizant of multiple stakeholder groups, the salience of one stakeholder group may be ineffective in affecting the organization: However, forming an alliance partnership with another stakeholder may increase the salience of the new stakeholder group and affect the organization. Managers and political leaders must therefore not only consider independent, dyadic relationships but confuses the view of interacting stakeholders who can form alliances and affect the organization.

According to the principal of stakeholder fairness, stakeholders should have a slice of the organizational outputs and have a voice in the organization's value that is consistent with the contributions to the organization. However, stakeholder balance does not imply equality of voice or a share in the outputs of the organization. Voice and a share in the organization from a management or political leaders view should be based on the contributions of the stakeholder to the organization. The more a stakeholder group contributes to the organization the more of a voice and share of values created should be (Phillips, 2003).

Expanding on the general foundations of stakeholder theory, Sherwin (1989) advocated the general function and purpose of the organization is to act as a principal mechanism for producing and distributing economic goods; but the specific purpose is dependent upon the perspective of the organizational participants (stakeholders). The

emergent factors coming out of stakeholder theory is the view of the organization as the nexus of implicit and explicit contracts between stakeholders; the recognition of the different stakeholder interests; and finally the definition of management's role as a mediator between stakeholder interests (Harrington, 1996).

Harrington (1996) further addressed the issues of stakeholder theory by viewing the organization through the ecology of organized economic systems of relationships, which emerge through independent systems of various stakeholder groups. Each of these diverse stakeholder groups has a unique set of differences, which usually are organizationally related, but often times conflicting. The interdependence of stakeholders arises because of common goals and a stable organizational environment; however, conflicts occur over resource allocation and the possibility of the stakeholders not being treated equitably. If the organization is to remain stable then resource allocations decisions will be generally equitable over time (Harrington).

Sharman (1994) contended that no matter what their purpose, organizations play an important role in our entire social system. The organization's decision processes are affected and influenced by a range of often-conflicting priorities and interests among its different stakeholders. Trying to understand stakeholders and their varying priorities, and the reasons for their decisions, is often difficult. As noted by Sharman, individuals make choices based on differing circumstances, values and goals, and therefore, managers-leaders need to look an issue from a number of sides in order to balance these often competing and complicated priorities.

How stakeholders interact with the organization reflects their differing goals and objectives according to Sharman (1994) and in addition, within a stakeholder group,

individual differences will vary depending on their perceptions of how the organization or governmental entity's behavior will further their interests. Therefore, Sharman advocated that management or leaders balance stakeholders' needs and priorities, and set a direction for the organization. Managers and political leaders must communicate these stakeholder needs to throughout the entire organization to validate the mission. Sharman further described that the organization analyze the stakeholder groups needs and determine how well the organization is meeting those needs, and continually conduct stakeholder analysis as an integral part of the organization's mission in the strategic planning process. As political leaders implement stakeholder analysis, they will be better equipped to manage the divergent and competing interests of stakeholder groups they represent and be able to create good governance.

Stakeholder theory is an integrated approach to look at who are stakeholders, how stakeholder groups are formed - (formal, informal, voluntary, involuntary, primary, secondary, and foundational strategic alliances), and the relevancy of stakeholder groups in the organization. Building on this principal leads the researcher to move into the next closely related literature stream of principal-agency theory.

*Concept 2: Principal-Agency Theory.*

This section reviews the extant literature related to principal-agency theory. The central premise becomes how organizations and leaders can incorporate an agency perspective in solving problems having a cooperative structure. Agency theory has been widely utilized in several fields such as accounting, economics, finance, marketing, political science, organizational behavior and sociology. The relevance for agency theory as applied to the political realm is consequential for understanding what happens when a

political agent inverts his or her role to that of the principal's. When the political agent then inverts his or her relationship with the principal then the CUB model is applicable.

### *Agency Theory Defined*

Jensen and Meckling (1976) in their seminal work defined agency relationships in this context, "As a contract under which one or more persons (the principal (s) engage another person (the agent) to perform some service on the principal's behalf, which involves delegating some decision making authority of the agent" (p. 5, as cited in Piatt, 2009).

If both parties to the relationship are utility maximizers, there is a good reason to believe that the agent will not always act in the best interests of the principal. The principal can limit divergences from his interests by establishing appropriate incentives for the agent and incur monitoring costs designed to limit the aberrant activities of the agent. (p. 310, as cited in Piatt, 2009)

As discussed earlier, James Madison argued about this problem at length in the Federalist Papers. He posited because government representatives are vested and entrusted with specific institutional powers and those political agents may then act to benefit themselves while neglecting or acting contrary to the interests of their constituents who elected them (Mclean, 1788). Again, this is representative of an agency problem.

In addition, there are situations that will require the principal to pay the agent to expend resources (bounding costs) to insure that the agent will not take certain actions that could harm the principal or to insure if the agent does take such actions, the principal will be compensated (as cited in Piatt, 2009). In most agency relationships, the principal and agent will incur monitoring and bounding costs (non-pecuniary as well as pecuniary)

Jensen and Meckling, 1976, as cited in Piatt, 2009). In addition, there will be some departure between the agent's decision and those that would maximize the principal's welfare (Jensen & Meckling, as cited in Piatt).

Jensen and Meckling (1976, as cited in Piatt, 2009) further postulated there is a dollar equivalent loss for the principal (residual loss) for actions taken or not taken by the agent that is not in the best interests of the principal. This concept of agency costs is defined as the monitoring expenditures by the principal, the bonding expenditures by the agent and the residual loss (as cited in Piatt). Agency costs can further arise in any situation involving cooperative efforts by two or more people even when there is no clearly defined principal-agent relationship (as cited in Piatt).

An agency problem exists when the problem of introducing an agent to behave as if they were maximizing the *principals* [italics added] welfare (as cited in Piatt, 2009). This agency problem exists in all organizations, all cooperative efforts, mutual companies, universities, government authorities, unions, and in any defined agency relationships where there is a principal and agent (Jensen & Meckling, 1976, as cited in Piatt).

The agent thus acquires legal and economic obligations towards the principal (Eisenhardt, 1989, as cited in Piatt, 2009). The organization is no longer a single monolithic actor, but is comprised of a complex set of interactions among several individuals (as cited in Piatt). This formulation of principal-agent interactions is considered a nexus of contracts between principals and agents (Maitland, 1994, as cited in Piatt). In this context, by looking at various stakeholder groups within the political system interact, and how political agents sometimes invert their role with the principal,

U.S. Representative Tim Johnson, R-Champaign, Illinois, in a recent statement regarding the financial crisis and massive spending bailouts facing our nation, stated:

I simply cannot support expenditures of this magnitude that are patched together in haste, that are laden with special-interest sweeteners to attract votes because the package cannot stand on its merits. As stewards of the people's resources we are morally obligated to do better. I believe government does have a role in this process and shares responsibility for this crisis. I believe we must restore confidence and accountability. We are in this mess because people in privileged positions made unwise, risky decisions; I will not be part of the same mistake.

(Johnson, 2008, p. A6)

Congressman Johnson's statement illustrated the correct principal-agency relationship, as defined by the U.S. Constitution and our representative democracy political system. The agent (political leader) acts, not in self-interest, but in accordance with the moral values of the principal (taxpayers) and constitutional legal requirements.

Furthering this discussion, Bohren (1998) contended usually there are different goals and interests among individuals involved in agency relationships. Agency theory assumes that individuals are opportunistic and strive to maximize their own interests. Thus, there are no guarantees that agents will act in the best interests of the principal. Conflicting interests between principal and agent then introduce the constant temptation for agents to maximize their own interests, even at the expense of the principals. An example of this occurs when a legislative agent hires his own family members at the expense of someone who is more qualified. In the business community, this can occur when a purchasing agent obtains special favors or other valuable considerations from a

vendor to benefit them over the company, and shares bid documents with the vendor to underbid the vendor's competitor.

Agency theory and agency cost present another relevant dimension to the mix. In an organization when incomplete information and uncertainty are prevalent, two kinds of problems arise: adverse selection and moral hazard (Eisenhardt, 1989).

#### *Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard*

Adverse selection refers to agents potentially misrepresenting their ability to do the work as agreed to. Moral hazard refers to the dangers of agents shirking their tasks and not putting forth their best efforts. This divergence between the principal and agent inevitably generates costs that result in the agent's failure to maximize the principal's wealth (Eisenhardt, 1989). In the government realm, this often occurs when a governmental official hires someone due to their political party affiliation who is deemed more qualified than a person who is from the opposing political party. Another example is when a person is hired, and shirks their job duties because of their party affiliation. Both troublesome occurrences happen when hiring is done strictly on patronage and not qualifications.

Shankman (1999) advocated that the central point of agency theory is to develop procedures that ensure the alignment of interests between the agent and the principal, thus reducing agency costs. Shankman also advanced the notion that principals are required to design contracts that protect their interests and maximize their utility in cases of conflicts. Shankman argued that these contracts are made with several assumptions regarding agents including self-interest, limited rationality, risk aversion, and goal conflicts between members and information (asymmetrical).

Bohren (1998) further addressed the issues of an agent acting morally would be reasonable if it presented a greater economic incentive in terms of utility and pleasures to the contrary. Since agency theory subscribes to individualism, it reasons that every endeavor agents seek is to increase their own utility. Perez- Lopez (1991) contended if the interests of other people are not taken into account, there will be less information available and it will be difficult to make the right decisions.

Advocating the primary focus of the principal-agent literature, Eisenhardt (1989) defined what the optimal contract (behavior versus outcome) is between the agent and the principal. The simple model assumes goal conflict between principal and agent. It can be an easily measured outcome for an agent who is more risk adverse than the principal (Eisenhardt). Demski and Feltham (1978) described two aspects of agency theory. The first is a simple case of complete information where the principal knows what the agent has done (as cited in Eisenhardt). This makes the agent more risk adverse than the principal since the contract is based on behavioral outcomes. In the second case, the principal does not know exactly what the agent has done. Because the agent has self-interest and may not behave as agreed upon, an agency problem arises. The principal cannot determine if the agent has behaved appropriately as outlined in the contract.

The second case illustrates a moral hazard, where an agent seeks his or her own self-interest over those of the principal's. Moral hazard is the expectation that a person who is insulated from risk may behave differently from the way they would behave if it they were fully exposed ... (Eisenhardt). In the political realm, a legislative agent might not be so forthcoming on a controversial bill to the public. The bill might contain 1000 pages of convoluted and intertwining bills and amendments attached. The agent then is isolated from being exposed to the public by stating that they did not quite understand the



complex bill to begin with: something the American public witnessed recently in President Obama's stimulus package. The agent produces little or no effort and shirks his or her duty. For example, an agent (employee) works on a personal research project on company time where the project is so complex that the principal (management) cannot detect what the employee is actually doing.

Adverse selection according to Eisenhardt (1989) arises when an agent misrepresents his or her ability to the principal. An agent or representative of the principal, can claim abilities and skills sets that the principal cannot completely verify (Eisenhardt). For example, a research scientist asserts to possess a unique set of complex scientific skills when hired, but, for instance, and the principal (employer) cannot verify these skills sets (Eisenhardt). A political example of this is when a political hire that is deemed very qualified, but due to party affiliation is not questioned on their specific skill sets or ability to produce quality work. The manager might not be able to question the skills of the political hire due to that person coming from influential leaders in the ruling party.

A principal who is challenged with the agent's misrepresentations or lack of effort has two options according to Eisenhardt (1989), one is to discover the agent's behavior by investing in information systems such as budgeting systems, reporting procedures, and additional layers of management. These added layers of information can aid the principal in acquiring complete information and reveal the agent's behavior to the principal. The second option is to contract the outcomes of the agent's behavior (Eisenhardt). The outcome-based contract aligns behavior and preferences of the agent with those of the principal, but incurs a cost for transferring risk to the agent (Eisenhardt). When the risk for the uncertainty of the outcome is low for the agent, the cost of shifting risk are low,

and outcome -based contracts become attractive (Eisenhardt). Conversely, when uncertainty of the agent's behavior increases, it becomes more expensive to shift the risk to the agent, despite the motivational benefits for the outcome-based contracts (Eisenhardt).

As described above, agency theory deals with actions of the agent in relation to the principal. When the agent does not perform (due to lack of effort or misrepresentation of himself or herself), the principal is faced with moral hazard and adverse selection. "Democratic performance is contingent upon agents because they are employed exactly when incentives often fail, either out of inefficiency or out of subversion" (Miller & Whitford, 2006, p. 231).

The next section deals with how agency theory contributes to organizational theory.

#### *Contributions of Agency Theory to Organizational Thinking*

The further development and utilization of incentives and self-interest, agency theory makes its way into organizational thinking (Perrow, 1986). Organizational life is a factor of self-interest, and agency theory deals with common problem structures across research topics (Eisenhardt 1989). Barney and Ouchi (1986) described organizational research as being more topic than centered on theory and that agency theory further prompts us that common problems structures do exist across various research domains.

Agency theory also makes significant contributions to organizational thinking by viewing information as a commodity (Eisenhardt, 1989, as cited in Piatt, 2009). Information has costs and, as such, can be purchased. This has significance for the organization through the implementation of formal information systems, such as budgeting or management by objectives (MBO) and boards of directors; and informal

systems such as managerial supervision, a concept commonly used exclusively in organizational research (Eisenhardt, as cited in Piatt). This suggests that organizations can invest in information systems to control an agent's opportunism (Eisenhardt, as cited in Piatt). Governments can also take advantage of this organizational technique by utilizing reform commissions such as the ethical reform commission instituted by Illinois Governor Patrick Quinn. Using these techniques, government can set up governmental (MBO) relating to ethical behavior in government, and use the foundation of the commission to monitor unethical political behavior.

Furthering this concept, Fama and Jensen (1983) argued for using information systems to monitor executives (agents) behaviors via a board of directors (as cited in Piatt, 2009). From an agency perspective, boards can provide richer information and monitor shareholder or stakeholder interests. Top executives (agents) are more likely to engage in behaviors that are consistent with stakeholder's interests. From an operational viewpoint, frequent board meetings, subcommittees, members with specific industrial and managerial experience, and board members representing specific stakeholder groups add to the overall monitoring process of the agent's behaviors (Eisenhardt, 1989, as cited in Piatt).

The use of agency theory in the organizational setting is significant. Organizations that utilize and purchase information and use board meetings to constantly review and monitor an agent's behavior in the organization can reduce the effects of an agent's self-interest. The organization can further implement procedures to monitor the executive performance and insure the agent's interests are in line with the organization's.

The government's use of agency theory in the organizational setting can assist those in leadership to review, monitor, and reduce elected officials' misuse of power. Ethical reform commissions, better government associations, and the media, all can collaborate to root out the self-serving behaviors of political agents that are corrupt or illegal.

*The Validity of Agency Theory in the Organization*

When agency problems occur, a common approach from the positivist (actual knowledge is based on actual sense experiences) perspective is to identify a policy or behavior in which the stakeholder and management interests diverge, and then to demonstrate that information systems or outcome-based incentives solve the agency problem (Eisenhardt, 1989).

Advancing this concept, Eisenhardt (1989) stated that agency theory is more applicable in the organization where contracting problems are difficult and where substantial goal conflicts between the principal and the agent are possible. Two approaches are apparent in applying agency theory. One approach applies the agency structure to the organizational behavior that relates to information asymmetry or cooperative situations (Eisenhardt). Thus, agency theory can contribute to the organization by examining how self-interested behavior affects the organization and can lead to a better understanding when such behaviors are likely to occur and when they will be effective. A second approach to agency theory, according to Eisenhardt, is to expand pure forms of the behavior and outcome contracts leading to a broader range of contracting alternatives.

As top managers, through multiple compensation schemes, are rewarded, the organization can look at this phenomenon and its effects by moving away from the current focus of single rewards and the behavior consequences and moving towards monitoring the effects of a broader spectrum of contracting.

The richness and complexity of agency theory would be enhanced through this process (Eisenhardt).

Hirsh, Michaels and Freeman (1987) argued that the traditional view of economics is dominated by a single paradigm, price theory, and a single view of human nature, self-interest. In contrast, the authors contended that organizational research is a mixture of theories that result in a more realistic view of the organization. Eisenhardt (1989) agreed with Hirsch et al. to use agency theory supplemented by complimentary theories. The organization's management can gain a deeper understanding of the complexities facing the organization by examining additional perspectives in conjunction with agency theory. As Eisenhardt noted, "Agency theory provided a unique and realistic, and empirically testable perspective on problems of a cooperative effort" (p. 72).

In summary, agency theory is a useful tool in analyzing relationships of the principal-agent and agency problems in the organization. Fontrodona and Sison (2006) state the nexus of contractual relationships of the organization be defined as a community of persons, each of whom is endowed with a unique dignity, and the organization, since it is a human institution, has various members and no single owner. Finally, according to Putman (2000), new forms of organizations should give priority to persons rather than relationships and that maximum care are given so, as not to diminish social capital and that the market is not allowed to rule over the entire sphere of human relations. This applies to government as well, by giving priority to its citizens, and not just special interest groups who are in favorable relationships with those in elected office.

What are the implications, however, for stakeholders when agents reverse their roles and act or assume the role as a principal?

The next section introduces the concept of corruption and its impacts on an organization and especially on political organizations and the consequences for good governance.

### *Concept 3: Corruption*

“Read it and weep for good government gone” (as cited in Angelo, 2008, p. E3) stated former Illinois governor Dan Walker, who served time for corruption, discussing James Merriner’s book on the political life of former Governor George Ryan. Merriner (2008) argued that Ryan presided over a corrupt empire as Illinois Secretary of State.

Thus, we have the starting point for discussing political corruption in Illinois politics and the consequences it has on good governance. The researcher looked at the various streams of literature associated with corruption and its effects on the public policy. In addition, political corruption is explored through the lens of the agent and the principal, and its impact on good governance.

Political corruption in broadly stated terms is the misuse of office for unofficial ends (Klitgaard, 1998). However, research indicates that corruption correlates closely with corrupt deeds or activities that are considered morally wrong (Johnson, 1994). There are other problems with this broad definition according to The Hungarian Gallup Institute (1999) an international institute on corruption. The institute stated that the broad definition is “Largely dependent upon culture, historic age, actual social climate, and social groups whose activities can be perceived as corruptive” (p. 1).

### *Definitions of Corruption*

Heidenheimer and Johnston (2008) broke down corruption into three categories: public office-centered; market-centered and public interest –centered.

*Public Office-centered corruption:* “Political corruption is behavior which

deviates from the formal duties of a public role because of (close family, personal, private, clique) pecuniary or status gains; or violates rules against the exercise of certain types of private-regarding influence” (Nye, 1967, as cited in Heidenheimer & Johnston, 2008, p. 8).

*Market-centered corruption:* A corrupt politician regards (public) office as a (separate) business and will seek to maximize the income from the corrupt acts (van Klaveren, 1989 as cited in Heidenheimer & Johnston, 2008).

*Public-interest-centered corruption:* The pattern of corruption exists when a politician, who is a responsible office holder, is charged with doing certain things for monetary or other rewards not legally provided for. They also are induced to take actions which favor those who provided the rewards and thereby damages the publics and their interests (Friedrich, 1989, as cited in Heidenheimer & Johnston, 2008).

In a representative-democratic system, trust in the honesty of public officials is crucial. Despite the presumed essential honesty in government, however, there has been a long tradition of popular rogues who are considered dishonest and corrupt but retain their popularity for their strong and effective leadership (West & Stewart, n.d.). In the long-run public interest depends on private virtue (Wilson, 1985). On the other hand, as Robinson (1975) stated, “A democratic system cannot survive a monetary or social crisis with institutions that lack the public’s respect” (p. 97).

West and Stewart (n.d.) further contended that voters prefer honesty and leadership in leaders. Yet those politicians who are perceived as dishonest and corrupt can actually be rated high on their job performance if their leadership skills offset their lack of integrity. They described an effective leader who is perceived as honest, is considered a popular leader; one who is an effective leader and dishonest is called a

popular rogue; one who is an ineffective leader and honest is considered an unpopular leader; one who is both dishonest and ineffective is considered an unpopular rogue.

Oftentimes, politicians seek to divert attention from their misdeeds to their opponents. The accused politician employs media spin control to present their plight in a more favorable light to themselves and the public (Kurtz, 1998). “As long as the political leader is perceived as effectively managing government, providing strong direction and not paralyzed by the scandal, the voters will judge and balance the politician on honesty and leadership in their overall assessments” (West and Stewart, n.d., p. 12). However, they argued that when popular rogues face legal indictment for corruption, voters form a different perception, namely, facts, evidence and legal reasoning matter more than media-political spin and the politician has less ethical room to maneuver using these spin tactics.

The integration of political spin and the concept of government as an organization then advances the idea that “All organizations are public to some degree, because political authority affects some of the behavior and processes of all organizations” (Bozeman, 1987, p. 84). Political constraint, Bozeman’s argument is significant because it links the public interest with a broader purpose to expand the generalized constituency of an organization. Cooper (1991) stated in order for government to remain efficient, its citizens should view it as one that maximizes the full range of public-private relationships for any given inputs. This view is consistent with looking at political corruption at the organizational level.

In Acton’s famous statement “that all power tends to corrupt and absolute power corrupts absolutely” (as cited in Applewhite & Evans, 1992, p. 278), there is a political paradox of power and morals in his statement. Lord Acton focused on the moral depravity of men, which he believed was caused by power. Friedrich (1972) advanced



this by looking at what caused leaders to think no longer about what is right action or conduct, but only about expedient action or conduct that produced practices that were dysfunctional and morally corrupt. In other words, when political agents acquiring power, this can produce dysfunctional and morally corrupt behaviors and does not benefit the good of society.

Friedrich (1972) links corruption with a functional component (as it aids in buying loyalty of corrupt officials) as restated in Heidenheimer and Johnston, (2008) as:

A form of coercion, namely economic coercion. Not only the buying and selling of votes and actual monetary rewards, but all the more indirect forms, such as gifts or otherwise influencing judgment of those who exercise government functions, are instrumentalities in this sphere. (p.16)

Freidrich (1972) contended there are degrees of corruption and it is endemic in all forms of government. According to this view, corruption can serve as a check on functional or coercive power and its abuse. Complications arise when power appears to be consensual, whether it is not, or when power appears to consensual for some groups and not for others.

Caiden (1990) suggested that corruption at times may be functional (a) to speed up the legislative and administrative processes; (b) to make bureaucracy more approachable and humane for those stakeholders who have not yet adjusted to a modern way of life (third world countries); (c) to overcome excessive and inflexible bureaucratic systems; (d) to integrate alienated stakeholder groups (politically weak ethnic, religious, and radical groups) and thereby providing an alternative to violence for these particular stakeholder groups; and (e) to enable entrepreneurs to function in difficult business environments. A certain amount of corruption is tolerated when government appears to

be satisfying citizen's needs. For instance, Chicago's Mayor Daley, administration is plagued by scandals and corruption such as the hired truck scandal, and pervasive fraud in hiring and contracts, yet, it is tolerated by the citizens of Chicago and seen as a city that works.

Even though corruption may be functional, there is no apparent need to worry about this. Nye (1967) suggested a cost-benefit matrix where corruption could be considered harmful based on its impact on economic development, national integration, and governmental capacity. Heywood (1997) postulated this worsens the effects of the administration, the more it encouraged corruption and further worsened the effects of the administration (p. 427). In a contrary view, Nas, Price, and Weber (1986) used Nye's approach and suggested that if corruption has a positive effective on social welfare it is beneficial, if it has negative consequences, detrimental.

Corruption is likely to occur on every observer's list of issues that threaten sustainable development and good governance (Pillay, 2004). Heymans and Lipietz (1999) thought corruption had a dynamic core that runs contrary to accountability and the rule of law because it destabilizes governance, diminishes public trust in the credibility of the state, and threatens the ethics of government and society. Frisch (1994) agreed with Heymans and Lipietz "... corruption kills the development spirit - nothing is as destructive to a society as the rush to quick and easy money which makes fools of those who can work honestly and constructively" (pp. 60-61).

Corruption is on the upswing as evidenced by recent media reports and offers an interesting illustration on the links between corruption and good governance. Corruption violates the contract between citizens (stakeholders and principals) and public officials (agents of the principals) and has serious implications for effective government (Pillay,

2004). Most of corruption is not technically illegal but often opportunistic and referred to as rent-seeking behavior (Gallagher, 1991). Economists frequently view this in a narrow way as “the direct use or waste of economic resources for non-economic gain” (p. 31). Werlin (2002) preferred to see it as “legalized or systemic manifestations of greed” (p. 345). In addition, Werlin argued that rent-seeking behavior results from bad or weak governance and that it can be more damaging to the political and economic systems than explicit structures of corruption that are illegal.

### *Redefining Corruption and Good Governance*

Introducing another definition of corruption, Werlin (1998) wrote that corruption is the subversion of statesmanship by partnership or governance of greed and stated,

Political systems are most effective when authority is widely dispersed without diminishing the ultimate responsibility of top leadership for results. Leaders must rely upon non-persuasive forms of power (e.g., coercion, corruption, or intimidation); their capacity to delegate responsibility is limited. The more elastic the organization or political system, the softer are the more normal manifestations of power, allowing and encouraging delegation of responsibility, decentralization, widespread participation, deregulation, communication from below, and constructive criticism. Political elasticity theory is here used to overcome such persistent dichotomies in administrative literature as: leadership followership; conflict/harmony; centralization/decentralization; regulation/deregulation; private sector/public sector control; and elitism/pluralism. It is also used to reevaluate development administration literature. (p. 49)

Werlin's (2002, pp. 347-348) theory flows from the following five propositions:

- I. Government will be more successful if those in positions of authority can integrate soft forms of political power (linking incentives to persuasion) and hard forms of power (disincentives and coercion); As political leaders integrate and alternate between soft and hard forms of power, their political power allows them to delegate and decentralize.
- II. Political leaders can increase their power in various ways without losing control by expanding their influence, reliability, and predictability thereby affecting the behavior of wider circles of stakeholders.
- III. Political elasticity is comprised of political hardware ("objective" forms of the organization, regulation, procedure and technology) and political software -subjective quality of relationships between principal-agents)
- IV. Political software becomes more effective by implementing good governance (hiring qualified people, improved communication processes and morale, developing conflict-resolutions, promoting legitimacy, training and protecting independent spheres of authority). If these steps listed are not managed properly, reform efforts are difficult to implement in the governmental organization.
- V. Political software includes the balancing of the struggle for competitive advantage and the struggle for consensus.

Werlin (2002) looked at "primary corruption as excessive partisanship or greed; and secondary corruption as governmental inability to control or mitigate a situation" (p. 347). Secondary corruption becomes a delicate balance between greed and governance. As the dysfunctions and manifestations of greed increase, good governance becomes

weaker. Secondary corruption of greed is more uncontrollable as compared to the primary form, according to Werlin.

Further demonstrating the difference between primary and secondary corruption, Werlin (2002) viewed primary corruption as merely a political problem, whereas secondary corruption; as a form of political illness. Werlin stated that primary corruption is like a first degree burn (painful but not deep) whereas secondary corruption is like a third degree burn (penetrating deeper in the skin). Therefore, secondary corruption undermines an already weak government system and requires substantial political reform before punitive measures can be effective in restoring order (Werlin).

What is the significant relationship between good governance and corruption? Gardiner (1993) defined corruption as the abuse of public power and authority for private and other group gains. At the United Nations 13<sup>th</sup> Anti-Corruption Conference (1989) it was stated:

Good governance requires the highest standards of integrity, openness and transparency and was not only concerned with new forms and dimensions of corruption, but also its pervasive effect on government performance, use of public resources, general morale of public services and the legitimacy of the state and law. (p. 1)

At the United Nations Crime Congress (1990) it was discussed that dealing with corruption is important when dealing with public officials who engaged in corrupt activities, which can destroy the potential benefits of government programs, encumber development, and abuse individuals and stakeholder groups.

Therefore, good governance results is based on integrity, efficiency, the economy of the government, the effectiveness of the government, and how the governments organizational activities are directed (Doig, 1995).

Corruption negatively affects good governance by the continual outpouring of money to influence and manipulate government. Corruption is manifested in every society. It is a sign of society not managing effectively its resources for public purposes or for the overall good of its members. Corruption results in resources being privatized and appropriated for private gain by political leaders at the expense of the public that is supposed to be served by the government (Charlick, 1992-93).

In changing times the character and face of corruption change, and though corruption may be constrained through transformations of its character, most importantly it cannot be destroyed (Doig, 1995). This remains a key component in combating corruption.

In summary, political corruption and its gradients of corrupt acts and salient characteristics can be viewed through a matrix as developed by Peters and Welch (1978). A political act is corrupt when it violates some formal standard or rule of behavior set down by a political system for its public officials (Peters & Welch). According to Heidenheimer (1970), as cited in Heidenheimer and Johnston (2008), corruption is, if both the public and public officials judge it be correct and wish it to be restricted.

Peters and Welch (1978) formulated the following postulates on perceived corruption:

- When we look at a public official involved in an alleged act of corruption, was the official acting in the performance of the official's political duties? Misusing one's

political office for private gain is more objectionable than engaging in behavior outside of one's official duties.

- If a public official is in a judicial or other non-political post, certain acts are considered more corrupt than if the public official holds a political post.
- If the corrupt actor is the donor of the payoff or recipient of the political favor, and if the donor is considered a constituent, the favor will be viewed as less corrupt than if the donor was a non-constituent since the legitimacy of constituent services outweighs that of non-constituencies.
- Private favors and non-constituency favors will be seen as more corrupt than those with a large public benefit or those done for a constituent. In addition, if the favor is done in routine performance of duty rather than extraordinary service, it is less likely to be seen as corrupt.
- If a corrupt act involves a payoff, the larger the payoff, the more perceived degree of corruptness. In addition, a short-range benefit from a payoff is considered more corrupt than a longer-term yield.

From an historic view, Peters and Welch (1978) contended political corruption in America has not been subject to the rigorous analysis of other political phenomena's in recent times. Political corruption is inherently difficult to define. Peters and Welch demonstrated that the public opinion's definition is more useable by refining it to allow gradients of corrupt acts. Determining why public officials hold similar or divergent beliefs about what makes a particular act corrupt or not allows the citizens to monitor their behavior. Welch and Peters (1977) also explored the differences in perceptions of corruption based on social class and demographic variables (race, religion and sex). Patterns may merge, helping to identify which office holders, institutions, or processes,

which are susceptible to political corruption. Sources of political corruption then could be systemically identified (Peters & Welch).

In order to gain a better understanding of the effects of corruption in a political system, Merriner (2008) looks at the political behavior of former Illinois governor George H. Ryan. Merriner understood that Ryan's motives might be puzzling but that they are not opaque; the key to understanding Ryan is that he is the *son* [italics added] of a political machine. Merriner states, "A machine that runs on an intricate system of rewards and coercions, based on the values of loyalty and tribalism" (p, 1).

Merriner (2008) explored how Ryan was raised in a politically corrupt system and the negative effects it had on stakeholders for governance. An example of this is in one of Ryan's political sponsors, former state senator Edward McBroom, who distributed state jobs at the former Manteno Mental Health Center. Through unwritten and often informal agreements, citizens seeking jobs, it was clear they had to or at least believed their jobs were dependent upon purchasing a car from McBroom's Cadillac dealership (Merriner).

Although Ryan became accustomed to operating in this corrupt political environment, in its seven-year investigation of Ryan's actions in office, the U.S. Justice Department never directly accused Ryan of extorting cash for specific favors. Rather, he used his political office to curry favors and take care of himself and his friends in exchange for loyalty and personal gains (Merriner, 2008).

The initial position of former governor George Ryan differs vastly with his latest statement to President Bush in November 2008, (as cited by Zorn, 2008) when he was seeking a commutation or presidential pardon, former Governor Ryan stated:

I accept the verdict against me, and I apologize to the people of Illinois for my conduct. There is a deep shame for me in serving this 78-month sentence resulting



from my public corruption conviction. My failings have brought deep humiliation upon my family, cost me my reputation and name, brought financial ruin to me and my wife and, worst of all, caused me to be away from Lura Lynn when, in our twilight years, she needs me most. My heart is heavy, knowing that I have hurt the public, my family and my friends in failing to keep their trust. I have failed them and for that, I have profound remorse. (p. 2)

This statement differs significantly, from what Ryan told reporters in early November, 2007 as he reported for prison, “I will report to the federal corrections facility... [but] with a clear conscience.” He further stated, “I have said since the beginning of this ten year ordeal that I am innocent” (Zorn, 2008, p. 2).

The differences of these statements within one year indicate that former governor Ryan in seeking a commutation or presidential pardon changed “his tune” on his level of guilt. Agency theory once again is at play. Ryan inverted his role from political agent to principal. Again, it further demonstrates when an agent of the people acts as an principal and treats the government resources as their own. However, when reality struck and the former governor sought a commutation of his sentence he expressed remorse, “for my heart is heavy, knowing that I have hurt the public, my family and my friends in failing to keep their trust. I have failed them and for that I have profound remorse” (Zorn, 2008, p. 2). By applying agency theory to Ryan’s behavior, it is evidently clear, that he abused the trust of the citizens of Illinois and acted out of self-serving interest. Ryan believed the governor’s office was his own personal resource and inverted the agency relationship between acting as an agent of the people of Illinois to one of acting as a principal.

Kass (2008) added that,

Ryan betrayed the people, who have a right to expect honest service from their government. His corruption also left a body count. Nine people, including the six Willis children, were killed in crashes with truck drivers who paid bribes for licenses when Ryan was Illinois secretary of state. Dozens of others in his office went to prison before him, convicted of selling licenses for bribes, with much of the money going into Ryan's campaign fund so he could be elected governor. And others were ruined. (p. 2)

Kass (2008) further explored the issue of Ryan and stated, "In what universe does redemption come without cost, where cynicism so casually dresses itself up as mercy and compassion" (p. 2). Herein, lies the issues of corruption, unethical behavior, and remorse, when Ryan was faced with serving an entire prison sentence. Ryan expected mercy and compassion from the courts while engaging in unethical, corrupt, and illegal behavior. The remorse that Ryan showed at the last minute again shows the self-serving interest of his behavior. The citizens of Illinois deserved more from their imprisoned governor.

As evidenced by the previously discussed literature on corruption, the net effects of corruption directly relate to and affect the political leaders to represent their constituents. As stated previously, corruption results in resources being privatized and appropriated for private gain by political leaders at the expense of the public that is supposed to be served by the government (Charlick, 1992-93).

The next components reviewed from the literature are public choice and political motivations. A discussion on how both of these concepts are applicable to stakeholders, principle-agency theory and applicable good governance.

#### *Concept 4: Governance*

##### Governance Overview

Good governance is the foundation and prerequisite of good government. Hunter and Shah (1998, as cited in Piatt, 2009) stated:

Governance quality is enhanced, according to this theory, by more closely matching services with citizen preferences, and by moving governments closer to the people, they are intended to serve, which ensures greater accountability of the public sector. Governance is a multi-faceted concept encompassing all aspects of the exercise of authority through formal and informal institutions in the management of the resource endowment of a state. The quality of governance is thus determined by the impact of this exercise of power on the quality of life enjoyed by its citizens. (p. 2)

The central theme of governance as related to agency theory, is the when the political agent inverts the principal-agent relationships and its consequential effects on the governance system (as cited in Piatt, 2009). What happens when an elected official who is the agent of the electorate inverts their relationship to the duties or contractual responsibilities within the principal-agency relationship (as cited in Piatt)? From a perspective of governance, the elected official (the agent) represents and is put into office by the electorate (the principal). The elected- official, who is the representative, or servant of the people, is in fact running the political mansion, so to speak. However, when the political leader subverts their responsibility of the agency relationship, becomes deceitful, and inverts the agent - principal relationship becomes skewed (as cited in Piatt). The political system then enters into disequilibrium state as compared to the ideal, as

stated in the United States Constitution of a representative republic form of government of, by, and for the people (as cited in Piatt).

O' Farrell (2009) declared that "good governance leads to good government" (p. 1). Bad governance is therefore a function of a corrupt politicians' self-serving behavior and their never-ending need for power, hubris, and ownership for the electorates' resources present devastating effects on good governance strategies. Consequently, it becomes essential to restore the public's confidence in their elected officials. "Without that trust, it will be nearly impossible for government – any government to implement the needed reforms to right the many wrongs" (p. 1). In addition, O'Farrell described that the electorate should not tolerate any politician or government that intentionally misleads or withholds information, with the purposes of retaining power. He further expounded on the notion that governments often bend the truth to suit their own political advantage; therefore, the rise of political culture puts the retention of power ahead of the public interest.

#### *Concept 5: Public Choice*

Public choice is a literature stream in economics. It is best defined "as the application of the rational choice model to non-market decision-making" (Hill, 1999, p. 1). In a more general sense, it is the application of economics to political science. Buchanan (1949), one of the founders of public choice, argued, that public choice involves the science of exchanges. The substance and subject matter of public choice is the tool for political science: the theory of the state, voting rules, voting behavior, party politics, the bureaucracy, etc. In addition, the methodology of public choice utilizes economics. A basic tenant of public choice, as with economics, is the belief that man is egotistical, rational, and a utility maximizer (Mueller, 1979).

One of the interesting facets of economics is the demonstration that individuals with purely selfish motives can mutually benefit from exchange. In a simplified economics model, actor A raises corn and actor B raises cattle; both actors can then improve their welfare by exchanging cattle for corn. In conjunction with price systems, this process can accommodate assortment of goods and services in the market place (Mueller, 1979).

Hill (1999) stated that public choice views individuals in the political process as pursuing utility maximization, subject to the organizational and budgetary constraints facing them. There are no distinctions made between individuals or stakeholder groups operating in the market place or political field. The government is seen as providing goods and services to its constituents or stakeholders, and those goods and services may be difficult to obtain in the market. Hence, the equilibrium and prices are stable.

What happens, if unlike the example stated above of mutual exchange, (positive sum game), both actors enter into and pursue a situation of negative sum game behavior, in which each actor engages in stealing assets from one another? Both actors engage in stealing, in their selfish pursuits leave both actors worse off (Mueller, 1979). Olson (2000) also discussed this issue as a form of a stationary bandit, a tyrant who has an incentive to encourage a degree of economic success, since he will expect to be in power long enough to take a share of it.

Public choice becomes clearer when political leaders try to maximize their own utilities. Patronage, funding from special interest groups and the concealment thereof, and pork barrel projects all combine to form an epidemic of chronic corruption in government (Merriner, 2008). Merriner indicated that if politicians would observe section 1346 of the

U.S. mail fraud statute, *Honest service is required of public officials*, [italics added] they would not place themselves in these situations.

The public choice literature focuses on three aspects in a representative democracy: the behavior of elected officials or representatives for office, during the campaign and after elected; the behavior of the voter in choosing representatives; and the characteristics of the outcomes in a representative democracy. Public choice theory is reliant upon the condition that political leaders, like voters, are rational and seek to maximize their utilities (Mueller, 1979).

Therefore, in a representative democracy, “parties formulate policies in order to win elections, rather than win elections to formulate policies” (Downs, 1957, p. 28). Agency theory is then demonstrated by the fact the agent is trying to be re-elected for their self-serving interests, rather than formulating public policies for the benefit of society. Whereas, individuals with differing preferences engage in a cooperative effort to win an election and therefore set policies which benefit or maximize their stakeholder utilities at the individual level and goal conflict at the organizational level (March, 1962; Pfeffer, 1981).

Emphasizing public choice in the government sector suggests that certain actions taken by government officials often become biased in favor of current benefits, rather than future ones, that are hard to identify, even though the net present value of the cost is greater than the net present value of the benefits (Hill, 1999).

This cost benefit scenario has further ramifications for political leaders who seek to maximize their current utilities over ones in the future, which could provide greater utilities to the stakeholder. Hill (1999) further contended that the public choice model has

an inherent danger that may decrease civic virtues and limit the ability of stakeholders to look beyond their self- interests.

If public choice looks at how political leaders seek to maximize their own utilities, what then are political leader's true motivations for seeking political office? Are politicians seeking office to affect policy or merely to be the recipient of the benefits and rewards of that office? Political leader's motivations are addressed next in the context of how it affects stakeholders and governance.

*Concept 6: Political Motivations*

Politicians often discuss their motives for pursuing a political career, but rarely mention their desire for power, prestige, and remuneration. Instead, they claim their devotion to people, and their commitment to national, state or local interests.

They proclaim their strong sense of promoting their constituents interests and the responsibility that entails. History has shown that we should not always take their statements at face value. Skeptics assert that politicians only care about their narrow self-interests (Beniers & Dur, 2007).

Beniers and Dur (2007) also explored the importance of politicians' motivation for the quality of government decisions (governance) is not always apparent. Moral hazard and adverse selection problems in political decision-making affect policy choices and are related to politicians' motivations. Beniers and Dur addressed the issue of politicians' motivations. They indicated, "To the extent to which the politician cares about (what he perceives) as the public interest relative to the private rents from being in office indicates their motivation" (p. 30). Politicians' motivations and their competencies are not always observable. Voters and other politicians are informed through the political issues, which may draw them into the political system. In addition, multiple politicians

may be involved in policy-making and, thus, face trade-offs between the public interests and being reelected. This occurs when the politician is more concerned with being reelected rather than developing public policies that promote the common good for society.

Two sobering questions arise. First, do political office seekers view public office as a means to an end or as an end in itself? Second, do political leaders who engage in unethical acts seek office to maximize their own self-interests for power and prestige? Ethics literature points to political leaders engaged in unethical acts often justify their behavior in one or more of the following way as described by Cooke, 1986; Cuilla, 1985; Gellerman, 1986:

- The organization expects or condones unethical behavior.
- Behaving unethically is the only way to advance in the organization.
- The activity is not considered immoral or illegal.
- The behavior is in the best interests of the agent and or political organization.
- The unethical behavior will not be discovered or go unnoticed.

The leaders of the organization accept unethical behavior as it benefits the organization as a whole. Exemplifying the above is George Ryan, who when Speaker of the Illinois House of Representatives, said, “I used to say to people, you know, I even control the drapes in the house chamber” (Merriner, 2008, p. 34). Ryan also spoke of the power in the flow of legislation: “You want a bill to come out of committee, you send it to a committee you’re pretty sure you can get out of” (Merriner, p. 34). When Ryan became lieutenant governor of Illinois, he was so ambitious that he immediately upon taking office used public funds to advance his personal political campaign for Illinois



Secretary of State, which he planned to use as a launching pad for the Governor's Office. He apparently was not concerned over the impropriety or illegality of his actions (Merriner).

To consider the nature of political motivations, Frost and Hayes (1977) defined political behavior in the following way:

Political behavior (is) the activities of organizational members...when they use resources to enhance or protect their share of an exchange..., in ways which would be resisted, or ways in which the impact would be resisted, if recognized by the other party or parties to the exchange. (p. 8)

Taking this definition into consideration, Gandz and Murray (1980) reported that political leaders rarely reveal their innermost thoughts to unknown researchers. It is much more effective to ask respondents to report not on their own thoughts but on the behaviors of others, which is more revealing.

For the electorate, determining politicians' motives is difficult. Barro (1973) in his seminal article developed a model that focused on the division of interests between the public and its political representatives. When the public office holder acts to advance his own interests and those interests do not coincide with those of the stakeholders, a division of interest occurs and moral hazard results. Barro's model contends politicians acting out of self-interest will not pursue activities in the public sector in accordance with the desires of their stakeholders. Furthermore, electoral control (getting re-elected) is only partially effective to induce the politician to advance the interests of the stakeholders.

How, then, do stakeholders determine the real motivations of political leaders? As mentioned above, the literature indicates that political leaders are reluctant to disclose

their true motivations for seeking political office. Only by examining how political leaders acting as agents or stewards of the voters can the principal make a judgment. From these behavior patterns of the political leader, the voters can determine if the politician is seeking office for the best interests of the electorate or for reelection. Does the political leader allocate scarce resources for the overall good of society or use his or her position to engage in private benefit, unethical and corrupt behavior? Beniers and Dur (2007) stated, agency problems occur when voters are less informed about the effects of policies than politicians are. Politicians will behave opportunistically if they believe other politicians are more likely to behave that way also. Staying in office in a highly polarized political environment is more rewarding as it keeps politicians with differing policy preferences out of power.

Consequently, politicians who deeply care about the public interest can undo opportunistic actions by those politicians who care very little about the public interest (Beniers & Dur, 2004). When politicians can evaluate each other's policy, politicians who greatly care about the public interest will research the policy and withdraw their support. Conversely, if politicians who care little about public interest, have the opportunity to learn about the effects of a competing politicians policies, this opportunity may enable the politician, who cares little about public interest, to damage the reputation of other politicians. Opportunistic politicians do not seek out information. Highly motivated politicians do, and this can lead opportunistic politicians can claim their competitor's policy as a failure. Thereby, they can vote against efficient policies designed by other politicians (Beniers & Dur).

### *Concept 7: Narcissistic Behavior*

Researchers in strategic management and organizational theory have found that top executives often inject their experiences, preferences, and dispositions into their decision-making and in their leadership style (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1996). If this is the case, how do leaders in general and political leaders in particular, use these experiences? What are the effects on their stakeholders, and how does this relate to the quality of management and governance?

Chatterjee and Hambrick, (2007) describe narcissistic leaders as favoring bold actions that attract attention, resulting in big wins or losses for their organization. But in reality, these organizations perform no better than firms with non-narcissistic leaders. Deutschman (2005) described narcissistic leaders as visionaries who are actually innovators which help them excel in the end. Campbell, Goodie, and Foster (2004) defined narcissistic leaders as having highly inflated self-views and who are preoccupied with continuously reinforcing those self-inflated views and can be expected to engage in behaviors and make decisions that affect not only those individuals who interact daily with them but also with various stakeholder groups.

Leaders who exhibit narcissism typically behave in ways and take actions that often defy convention and can seriously affect their organization (Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2007). Political leaders who exhibit non-conventional methods to attract attention to them are exhibiting narcissistic behavior. This can impede good governance strategies if the political leader is only seeking public applause to validate his or her need for attention. Similarly and further explained by Judge, LePine, and Rich (2006), narcissism is a multifaceted personality trait that enables the individual to have an inflated sense of self. They are preoccupied with having that self-view continually

reinforced. Chatterjee and Hambrick state: “The chief manifestations of narcissism include the feelings of superiority, entitlement, and a constant need for attention and admiration” (p. 353).

Narcissistic leaders are continually seeking fuel for their self-image, exhibitionism, the devaluing of others, and “the chronic goal of obtaining continuous external self-affirmation” (Morf & Rhodewalt, 2001, p.177). Leaders who score high on narcissism are pleased with the way they are. They see no need to change or make improvements, are very confident in their abilities to take on in tasks, and are objectively overconfident (Campbell, Goodie & Foster, 2004). Since the political leader has a need for continuous external self-affirmation, the narcissistic political leader is not content with praise in the distant future, but requires applause at frequent intervals (Buss & Chiodo, 1991). Narcissistic leaders will work on tasks that will earn admiration for their public boldness and sensation seeking, yet at the same time are prone to boredom (Emmons, 1981). “Narcissists, therefore, favor the extreme, the grandiose, and the colorful. Discrete or incremental actions are not satisfying” (Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2007, p. 355).

Continuing a pattern of narcissistic behavior, the political leader may confuse the hubris hypothesis, which is the notion that a leader can run the organization better than the incumbent manager or current elected political official (Roll, 1986). A narcissistic leader can be identified by monitoring the speech patters and by their use of first- person singular pronouns reflecting self- absorption, (Raskin & Shaw, 1988).

Consistent with the above discussions on narcissism, there are other unobtrusive indicators of narcissistic political leaders: Emmons (1987) formulated conceptual elements of narcissism to predict narcissistic leaders by identifying statements such as:

- I like to be the center of attention
- I like having authority over other people.
- I like to look at myself in the mirror.
- I am an extraordinary person.
- I usually dominate any conversation.
- I am a born leader.
- I insist on getting respect that is due to me.
- I am envious of other people's good fortunes.

On the other hand, Emmon's discussed an interpretive alignment with elements of narcissism by the leader in the organization which are the summarized by the following statements, and differs in respect to the above by the leader's contention that he or she is central to the organization's purpose (p. 365):

- I am the central figure of this organization.
- I deserve to be show cased in the organization.
- I am, by far, the most valuable person in this organization.
- Leadership is a solo endeavor, not a group activity.
- I am the central figure in this organization; The organization and I are synonymous;
- I deserve more compensation than anyone in this organization does.

From this viewpoint, narcissistic leaders are easy to identify.

Zaleznik and Kets de Vries (1975), in their classic work on corporate leadership, distinguished between two types of leaders: minimum man and maximum man. A minimum man was described as a bland conformist who did not rock the boat and was a team player. Contrasted to that image is the maximum man, who is a colorful, bold, risk-

taker who is capable of making fast and far reaching decisions in the organization. The maximum man is identified as being narcissistic.

There are implications of being a narcissistic leader both good and bad. Collins (2001) described good-to great leaders with words like “quiet, humble, modest, reserved, shy, gracious, mild-mannered, self-effacing, understated, did not believe their own clippings, and so on” (p. 27). Are non- narcissistic leaders humble? Even though Collins did not equate the two concepts, a link can be drawn between the two.

Narcissistic political leaders can adversely affect good governance. Chatterjee and Hambrick, (2007) stated that the behavior of executives are often bold and risky. Their performance is either very good or very bad and can often swing between these two extremes. Narcissistic political leaders affect their stakeholders, those who work directly for them, the organization, and society. There are profound implications for narcissistic leaders in the political organization and the effects are difficult to ascertain. However, narcissistic leaders may enter into the corruption/unethical model, as their behavior is such that they believe they are the cornerstone of the organization. If this statement is true, then the political leader will act as if they own the office and corrupt and unethical behavior may ensue.

The next section addresses the literature on resource dependency, power, congruency, trust, perceptions, and cynicism theories. The researcher will review the critical aspects of these literature streams as they relate to stakeholders, principal-agency theory, perceptions, and good governance.

#### *Concept 8: Resource Dependency*

Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) work in resource dependency theory, indicated organizations are not self- sufficient that they need to acquire resources from the

environment. Consequently, organizations become dependent on those resources and relationships for their survival. The role of the manager or leader is to arrange these dependencies in the most cost- efficient and effective manner (Griffin & Dunn, 2004).

Leaders must manage dependencies predicated upon gaining (internal) organizational commitment, particularly the commitment from the dominant coalition or stakeholder group (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). Managers or leaders must make decisions within a constrained environment because of limitations in cognitive ability, (Simon, 1976) information, and increased uncertainty (Thompson, 1967). As a result, Griffin and Dunn (2004) argued that managers or political leaders who are resourced-constrained make satisficing, a seminal concept developed by Simon (1959), rather than optimal decisions. The satisficing decisions that managers or political leaders make underline the organizational routines for which information are filtered through the organization (Schuler & Rehbein, 1997). The leaders in the organization are more likely to establish formalized routines if the needs to manage dependencies are great (Griffin & Dunn).

The fundamental tenet of resource dependency is that managers or leaders attend to critical resources. Leader's and managers choices are designed to control external dependencies and secure necessary resources (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). Dependencies in the organization, specifically political leaders commitment and resource allocations, should be related to the structure of the activities of the governance of the organization (Griffin & Dunn, 2004).

Related to resource dependency is institutional theory. This theory defines the organization in which further it develops structural roles and procedures not to make the organization more efficient and to make the organization appear more efficient to external parties and stakeholders (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). Therefore, organizations are

considered legitimate if they behave in a manner in which society's expectations for that type of organization are met. In the case of a government organization, it should behave in a manner that promotes good governance on behalf of all its stakeholders (Scott, 1987). Consequently, organizations conforming to society's expectations are perceived to be legitimate and consequently gain access to the resources they need to survive (Meyer & Rowan).

Sterns, Hoffman, and Heide (1987) argued, "The primary reason organizations seek out alliances is to gain control over their environment through these alliances. This can insulate an organization from its external environment and guarantee a more stable flow of resources in times of scarcity" (p. 75). Hence, it is particularly important political leaders understand stakeholder alliances and carefully allocate resources in times of scarcity (limited budgets, etc.) so they can promote policies and procedures that benefit society. Leaders who successfully manage their environment through these linkages will not only insure their continued survival but will be more effective in government (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978).

#### *Concept 9: Power*

"Power is a property of the social relation; it is not an attribute of the actor" (Emerson, 1962, p. 32). This dyadic approach to resource dependence, as postulated by Emerson, yields two forms of power in a dyadic relationship: power imbalance and mutual dependence. Power imbalance, for example, would equate to the differences in the degree of power each actor holds over the other. The differences between the stakeholders and the political leader or the differences between two competing stakeholder groups are the essential element for the power struggle. The second component of dyadic power Emerson described is mutual-dependence, which captures



the bilateral dependencies of the dyad regardless of whether the two actors (principal-agent), in our context the political leader-stakeholders dependencies are either balanced or imbalanced. Political leaders need to be constantly aware of both the power imbalance and mutual dependence. It needs to be considered in order to produce the complete picture of the power structure in the dyad (Casciaro & Piskorski, 2005).

In general, power imbalance reduces the occurrence of exchange among social actors by reducing conflict resolution (Lawler & Yoon, 1996). Therefore, those with power advantages, such as leaders, are more inclined to argue for agreements that favor themselves or self-serving interests, whereas disadvantaged actors or stakeholders will be more likely to argue for agreements that equalize benefits (Lawler & Yoon).

This view is consistent with the stakeholder theory that divergent, less powerful stakeholder groups will tend to argue for equalized benefits. Lawler and Yoon (1996) further contended that unequal actors (less powerful stakeholder groups) will be less likely to develop mutually satisfactory exchange relationships with other more powerful stakeholder groups or political leaders when there are conditions of unequal power between the two groups.

Stakeholders are joint occupants of a network position in the organization, or a political system, and therefore a function of all dyadic ties that link one position to all other positions in the network of relationships (Lawler & Yoon, 1996). Political leaders have vast social, economic, and political power in making decisions that affect a wide range of stakeholders on the local, state and national level. Due to the dyadic and network positions of stakeholders in the organization, or a political system, the political leader must evaluate and monitor the balance or imbalance of power in the network to foster effective governance. However, a political leader can equally use this imbalance leading

to corrupt, unethical, and illegal behavior, hence, bad governance. Additionally, Greene (2000) stated, “An understanding of people’s hidden motives is the single greatest piece of knowledge you can have in acquiring power” (p. xxii). He concluded by stating, “Power is endlessly seductive and deceptive in its own way. It is labyrinth—your mind becomes consumed with solving its infinite problems, and soon you realize how pleasantly lost you have become” (p. xxiii). He further added, “The key to power, then, is the ability to judge who is best able to further your interests in all situations” (p. 13). This is something our political leaders need to take into account regarding the assent to power in their quest for political office, and in the process remember whom they work for – the electorate and not themselves. Building on power theory, the researcher will examine the next component, congruence theory, and will explore the relationship between stakeholders and political leaders in terms of organizational fit.

#### *Concept 10: Congruence*

Congruence of fit can be defined as “the degree to which the needs, demands, goals, objectives and or structure of one component is consistent with needs, demands, goals, objectives and or structure of another component” (Nadler & Tashman, 1980, p. 40). Several researchers have expounded the need to create and maintain congruence between the individual’s needs and those of the organization (Downey, Hellriegel, & Slocum, 1975). Additionally, congruence theorists have proposed that a greater degree of fit between the environmental and organization, the greater effectiveness of the organization’s behavior at multiple levels (Galbraith, 1977; Nadler & Tushman, 1980).

Congruence theory contains an element of flexibility, defined by Baird and Meshoulam (1988) as the organization’s ability to adapt in a successful and timely manner to changing or diverse demands. This can be from either the outer environment or

from within the organization itself. However, another group of researchers indicated that the nature of congruence theory essentially involves fit and flexibility. They contend both concepts are essential for organizational effectiveness (Chakravarthy, 1982).

Because the congruence between stakeholder needs and organizational climate factors is important for predicting performance, several strategies are available to the organization to utilize this information according to Downey, Hellriegel, and Slocum, (1975), these strategies include:

- Attempting to select those individuals whose needs are most congruent with the climate of the organization, which is important for predicting job satisfaction and performance.
- An organization that is open and affiliative, and rewards people for high achievement could seek individuals who desire to affiliate and tend towards sociability.
- The organization's climate can be changed to utilize fully the predispositions of managers and others.

Applying these strategies to stakeholders, political leaders, and the political system, as described in the organizational setting from advanced by Downey et al., stakeholders could select or elect those political leaders whose needs are most congruent with those of the political system and good governance. Voters can select or elect political leaders who desire to affiliate with those various stakeholders within the political system of good governance.

A final point, congruence in the political organization is the fit between the needs of the stakeholders and the political leaders. Wexley, Alexander, Greenawalt, and Couch (1980) showed that perceptual congruence is related to important organizational

outcomes, such as the congruence between the subordinate's description of the manager and the manager's self-description is significantly correlated with the subordinate's satisfaction. Applying this to the political organization, elected leaders will receive higher performance marks from the voters if the voters are satisfied with the elected leader's performance.

However, in applying Hatfield and Huseman's (1982) organizational work to the political system, the stakeholder's satisfaction with political leaders may not be as important as the stakeholder's own perceptions of factors affecting political leader-stakeholder relationship.

#### *Concept 11: Trust*

As indicated earlier, corruption is prevalent in all eras and in all areas of political and administrative systems. Brinkerhoff (2000) stated citizens (stakeholders) are demanding a more active say in the *what* and *how* [italics added] of governance and no longer endure the abuses of public trust and of the malfeasance of the past; stakeholders expect accountability and transparency from the political leaders. Public trust is not the only significant outcome of public participation (Conway, 1991). "Public participation also leads to legitimacy, a better-informed public, improved decision making, and altered patterns of political power" (Wang & Wart, 2007, p. 266).

Moy and Scheufele (2000) argued that without political trust, which includes the beliefs that the system works for the stakeholders, stakeholders will perceive any actions taken by the political leader as ineffectual. Similarly, the absence of social trust may lead stakeholders to perceive political leaders as driven by self-interest and prevents stakeholders from perceiving that others, such as political leaders, can work toward common goals or that such common goals exist (Moy & Scheufele).

Wang and Wart (2007) revealed that consensus building occurs when stakeholders and the elected leaders agree on what needs to be done. Signing the agreement does not win public trust; the fulfillment of that agreement does. They further postulated that the public administration, and political leaders, should demonstrate to the stakeholders that the participation process eventually leads to improvement of public services, and public trust increases when public officials demonstrate integrity, honesty, and moral leadership through the institutionalizing of ethics in government because of stakeholder participation.

“The sine qua non of a well-functioning system is the existence of trust” (Allum, Patulny, & Sturgis, 2007, p.1). Trust is a critical component in government. Coleman (1990) argued that trust and social capital tend to go together. If social capital is a resource that is available to individuals or stakeholders for mutual benefit, then the social capital acquired through the relationship can only be distributed, spent, or allocated between trusting individuals and stakeholders. Trust is the key component between the elected leader and the voters. Social capital is the ingredient that binds the principle-agent together in the political system. Without social capital, the relationship disintegrates.

As outlined by Newton and Norris (2000), institutional and social trust link between trust by citizens with trust in state institutions. Newton and Norris introduced institutional performance theory in the following way:

Because all citizens are exposed to government actions, confidence in political institutions is likely to be randomly distributed amongst various personality types. Government institutions that perform well are likely to elicit the confidence of citizens; those that perform badly or ineffectively generate feelings of distrust and low confidence. (p. 7)

In the view of Rothstein and Uslaner (2006), effective government enables social trust and association membership (stakeholders) to occur. Good government encourages social trust from its ability to organize individuals into groups or stakeholders and to create space for voluntary organizations to flourish (Newton & Norris 2000). What occurs when trust is broken? When a significant violation of public trust has occurred, lying is a common consequence because the wrong- doing encourages concealment by the politician (Fleming & Zyglidopoulos, 2008). The ease of lying by the politician will likely increase the deception once it has started and allow cover-ups and more lies to further increase the severity of successive lies (Fleming & Zyglidopoulos). Lack of trust can result in a decision by the stakeholder not to communicate with the political leader, and as Darley (1992) demonstrated, the covering- up of evidence from past incidents will often perpetrate the harmful practices that originated in the first place.

Looking at this from an organizational political perspective, Ferris, Russ and Fandt, (1989) defined this as behavior strategically designed to maximize self- interest. By implication, it is in conflict with the collective organizational goals or the interests of various stakeholder groups. Therefore, a decrease in loss of interpersonal trust has been associated with decreasing stakeholder involvement in the political process as well as decreasing willingness to engage in political participatory activities such as voting, or getting involved in the political process (Moy & Scheufele, 2000). The integration of trust into stakeholder theory is critical to an understanding of how political leaders can increase the involvement of stakeholders in the political process.

### *Concept 12: Perceptions*

Trust in government and public administration represents a perceptual dimension.

As presented by Ferris and Kacmar (1992) they used a cognitive approach and argued that the stronger the perception of politics by organizational stakeholders, the less likely they were to believe the organization was equitable, just, or fair. Lewin (1936) stated that people or stakeholders respond to perceptions of reality, not to reality itself. Vigoda-Gadot (2007) stated, "Politics in organizations should be understood in terms of what people think of it rather than what it actually represents" (p. 287).

Researchers have suggested that a political organizational climate may contribute to the continuation of imbalanced and unjust activities and decisions. This researcher proposes these concepts apply to political organizational governments. Stakeholders who perceive that they are unfairly treated because of political considerations or self-serving interests of public officials, will reduce their level of satisfaction with or trust in governance. This will reduce their loyalty to the government, or reduce their voluntary activities in the democratic system (Vigoda-Gadot, 2007).

Niemi, Craig and Mattei (1991) concurred with the above findings and expressed that this process may result in lower levels of stakeholders' political participation. Stakeholders have varying views on political leaders. Foti, Fraser, and Lord (1982) argued that if a leader is not effective, the leader is judged to possess a set of characteristics different from an effective leader. This included being evaluated more highly and attributed more to leadership and responsibility within the organization. As a result, if the political leader's effectiveness changes (measured by outcomes), then the stakeholders will have a different perception of that leader. Therefore, if the political leader is viewed as effective it will increase the likelihood of good governance, as the political leader's task is to be reelected.

As their performance is evaluated and monitored by stakeholder groups political leaders are perceived differently (Foti, Frazier, & Lord, 1982). Politicians align themselves to the beliefs of what leaders should be held that are by the stakeholder groups. Politicians desiring to be perceived and viewed as good political leaders may emphasize those valued characteristics that stakeholders deem necessary for the effective performance of their duties (Carver, 1979). Therefore, politicians may be judged by stakeholders as leaders, but we have many politicians who clearly are not leaders by their inability to lead, and by their actions thereof, thereby, looking at their effectiveness in governance, the stakeholders can better distinguish among them (Foti, et al.).

In describing the political leader's effectiveness and the stakeholder's perceptions, Kernell (1978) suggested a political leader, when first elected, is considered an ambiguous stimulus object, which figures positively in the stakeholder's perceptions. In essence, this means there is enough information to judge them. Foti, Frazier and Lord, (1982) described that as a president or elected official becomes better known, the stakeholders form specific and contextual judgments based on information of the political leader's performance which can further be evaluated in that light. The stakeholder's perceptions of a political candidate can or does change following the election, and this change can result in an increase of the attractiveness of the newly elected winner (Foti, et al.).

Political conflict over valuable resources, then becomes an issue over perceptions, with each side trying to convince a portion of the stakeholder's, of the correctness of their position (Koch, 1998). He expressed the view that when political elites attempt to assemble public opinion, by framing the issue in terms that will direct public opinion, in



the direction the political leader desires, there may be conflict. For political elites, the primary issue is how the stakeholders will understand the conflict. To understand how perceptions and trust affect stakeholder's ability to perceive or judge the effectiveness of political leaders, another dimension must be added to the mix, cynicism.

### *Concept 13: Cynicism*

Noticeable symptoms of public cynicism include beliefs of citizens (stakeholders) that government agencies and public officials (agents) are corrupt, inept, or out to take advantage of them (Johnson, 1993). This disenchantment, causes alienation and disengagement and are, therefore, is of particular interest to political leaders, public administration, and the resulting impact on good governance (Berman, 1997).

Cynicism is frequently discussed in the literatures of trust and social capital. Researchers such as Fukuyama (2002) have argued that all human relations and exchanges (economic, political and social) require trust. Promises of political leaders need to be honored and that individuals (stakeholders) must believe they will not be taken advantage of (Coleman, 1990). Since trust provides a sense of belonging that enhances and serves the emotional needs of the stakeholder (Berman, 1997), a definition of cynicism can be low trust, or a pervasive disbelief in the possibility of good in dealing with others (Damon, 1995).

Cynicism increases social distance and reduces the public spirit (Gore, 1994). Several authors (McClelland, 1985; Bianco, 1994; Robertson & Tang, 1995) have suggested that citizens question their relationships with government or political leaders, and therefore, become disenfranchised when these conditions occur: citizens believe that local government is using its power against them or perceivably not helping them;

citizens do not feel engaged or apart of local government, or feel misunderstood or ignored; citizens find local government services and polices ineffective. Berman (1997) argued that when citizens perceived that the government is exploiting them, they become more cynical and withdraw from participating in government. However, if the citizens perceive, these issues as a lesser form of exploitation, in terms of government or in their elected political leaders, these stakeholders may develop milder forms of cynicism.

Stakeholders develop negative perceptions of government when they see government as taxing them, charging fees and fining them, while at the same time granting special favors or considerations to special interest groups (Berman, 1997). Negative experiences with government often conflict with positive views of governance (Goodsell, 1994). In addition, most stakeholders recognize local government services only after they fail (Berman). How can political leaders overcome or modify stakeholder perceptions of cynicism? Berman argued that the government and political leaders could show citizens that government uses its power to help rather to harm or to be indifferent to them. However, many citizens are unaware of how government activities can enhance their own aims. This unawareness reduces levels of trust in government and political leaders. Political leaders must reach out to citizens and provide consistent information on how and what government does to serve their interests (Wheeler, 1994; Garnett, 1992, Denton & Woodward, 1990).

Berman (1997) argued that citizens be incorporated into public decision-making through government use of surveys, panels, and focus groups. Further, by enhancing the use of good performance measures and effective communications with stakeholders,

Stipak (1977) stressed that by communicating with citizens, they could evaluate the cost and quality of government services.

As a final point, Berman (1997) argued that economic and social conditions of citizens affect cynicism, and it is significantly influenced by their education levels and economic growth rates. Cities with larger populations are more cynical about local government, he also indentified that cities with low crime rates have less public cynicism. This is also true in communities that take pride in their city and in which stakeholder groups cooperate. He argued that political leaders must manage government-citizen relations to restore trust and reduce cynicism. To restore trust, citizens must increase their commitment to government. Citizens must believe that government can serve their needs that citizens can affect decision-making, and that government is able to deliver.

#### *Concept 14: Ethical Leadership*

Gray (1998) summarized ethical behavior as propriety of actions and intentions. Ethical problems can occur when there are different values between principals and agents, and political leaders and stakeholders. A political leader's unethical conduct can result from the means justifying the ends.

Leadership necessitates ethics because political leaders have responsibility to stakeholders. The political leaders therefore, are in a position to bring about changes in behavior that result in good governance. (Dobel, 1998). He asserted that excellent political achievements are characterized by the following outcomes. They must:

- Gain legitimacy.
- Endure over time.
- Strengthen the community.

- Unleash minimum unforeseen consequences.
- Require reasonable use of power resources.
- Endure without great violence and coercion to enforce the outcome.

“Prudent judgment identifies salient moral aspects of a political situation which a political leader has a moral obligation to attend to in making a decision” (p. 76). Political prudence captures the essence of political leaders utilizing disciplined reason, and foresight, and attention to the long-term consequences. A political leader’s deployment of power, timing, and momentum, and the proper use of the means as an end process, is essential to bring prudent and ethical decision making into governance. The political leader’s attention to the durability and legitimacy of outcomes and the consequences for the community rounds out prudent and ethical capabilities of the political leader’s governance strategies (Dobel, 1998). To develop a pattern of prudent and ethical leadership, political leaders must attend to their own power as well as to their ability to perform the problematical work of assembling power and critical resources to achieve benefits for the community (Dobel).

Gray (1998) pointed to unethical behavior that arises from the discrimination between special interest groups and end users of services. Special interest groups, for instance, can favorably influence political leaders’ decisions through political action committee (PAC) funds, and yet average citizens do not have the same opportunities. Thus, citizens often are discriminated against in the governance process.

How does a political leader’s ethical or moral leadership influence the political organization? A critical component of leadership understands the culture. For a political leader they must understand the community culture. Schein (1992) argued that leadership

and the culture are inherent and inextricably linked. He stated, “If leaders want to change an organization, they first must understand the dynamics of the culture” (p. 236).

What is the framework for understanding the political leader’s ethical decision-making process? Hunt (1986) and the Hunt and Vitell model (1993) postulated in their model that an individual’s moral philosophy or ethical ideology is a primary indicator to explain the differences in ethical judgments and behavior. They argued that a political leader’s ethical orientation is often influenced by several background factors, one of which is an individual’s personal values.

This raises an important question: Are a political leader’s personal values and ethics the same? Schwartz and Bilsky (1987) defined values as “concepts of beliefs about desirable end states or behaviors that transcend specific situations, guide selection or evaluation of behavior and events, and are ordered by relative importance” (p. 551). Great political leaders are ethical stewards who generate high levels of commitment from their stakeholders (Pfeffer, 1998, 2005; Caldwell et. al., 2008). One facet of ethical stewardship from political leaders is honoring their duties owed to stakeholders and society in the pursuit of long-term wealth creation (Caldwell, et al.). As evidenced from the above definitions, a political leader’s personal values and ethics are not always one in the same. Good governance potentially suffers when this occurs and this may results in a political leader’s decision to advance his or her own self-interest or agenda to the detriment of the citizens.

Given the need for ethical stewardship, a political leader needs to become an ethical steward and, thereby, promote better governance.

Political leaders can create long-term wealth for society and build organizational trust by

governing as ethical stewards (Caldwell & Karri, 2005; Pava, 2003).

Political leaders can apply these traits to their behavior and become ethical stewards. Political leaders create meaning and pursue outcomes that benefit everyone (Caldwell et al., 2008). As the political leader assumes the mantle of an ethical focus, the obligations to benefit society and create added value and wealth become a primary duty for the political leader. Individual needs and rights have to be considered precious, and the political leader must balance those individual rights with the collective welfare and growth of the community. Political leaders share information with their constituents to help reduce risk, improve the quality of decisions, and integrate opportunities for their constituents. The political steward weighs opportunities and risks cautiously, and their choices reflect a obligation to the welfare, growth, and wholeness for all of the community (Caldwell et al., 2008). The political leader's greatness comes from combining their stakeholder's talents to achieve community goals, such as, utilizing the strengths of community groups to assist in formulating public policies that help the political leader promote good governance for the community. Caldwell et al. argued leaders must avoid short-term priorities that hurt long-term outcomes

There are seven principals of public life is described in the Committee on Standards in Public Life , First Reports, and as found in (Gray, 1998) in which they advocated political leaders are to adhere to the following: selflessness, integrity, objectivity, accountability, openness, honesty and leadership. Political leaders' who implement decisions based on public interest over personal financial gain or material benefits for themselves, their families or friends, show selflessness and ethical behavior to their stakeholders, and in turn, promote good governance. Not placing themselves

under financial or other obligations to outside individuals or special interest groups demonstrates integrity. The transparency of decision-making processes indicates openness and a willingness by political leaders to declare any private interests relating to their public duty, and resolving these conflicts signifies to the stakeholder's honesty. Ethical leadership is the result of promoting and incorporating these principals into the political leader's daily routine.

Davis, Schoorman and Donaldson (1997, as cited in Caldwell et al., 2008) contended that the ethical steward "will not substitute or trade self-serving behaviors for cooperative behaviors but will seek to maximize utility for the organization based upon rational principals" (p. 26). Block (1996) suggested that stewardship has its roots in service over self-interest and treated stakeholders as owners and partners. In the political realm, the political leader, as a steward of the citizens, is required to place public service over self-interest. Caldwell and Karri (2005) stated:

The underlying fundamental proposition of stewardship theory is the maximization of long-term economic wealth, which will eventually serve the best interests of the stakeholders and leaders collectively, while additionally maximizing social welfare and the long-term benefits to society as a whole. (p. 251)

Leadership occurs, therefore, when political leaders exert intentional influence over stakeholders. Ethical leadership occurs when political leaders exert influence over stakeholders with the intent of maximizing social welfare and benefits to society. In the process, they reduce their own self-interest seeking behavior and thus this leads to better governance. Each stakeholder interprets the relationship based upon the subjective self-

perception (Caldwell et al., 2008). Ethical leaders are judged on their fairness, justice, and trust to their stakeholders. These perceptions are based upon individual's ethically based filters. Like all leaders, the ethical steward, is often viewed through the individual lens of each stakeholder (Primeaux, Karri, & Caldwell, 2003, as cited in Caldwell et al., 2008). The most important role for the ethical political leader is to reinforce in words and deeds the values of society. This further creates a cohesive political structure for governance (Sinclair, 1993).

Ethical leaders must become servants and debtors in honoring their ethical responsibilities as political stewards of society (De Pree, 1989). As leaders understand the implications of being ethical stewards and apply its principals, the results will include building trust in the government, improving stakeholder commitment and, creating long-term wealth (Caldwell, et al., 2008). Leaders should recognize that laws and regulations do not guide people's behavior as strongly as ethical beliefs (Huehn, 2008). "The possibility of political community depends upon trust. Trust for each other, and trust in institutions are the social resources and capital that leaders and political institutions should work to create and sustain" (Dobel, 1988, p. 79).

#### *Concept 15: Media Influence and Communication Strategies*

Considering that stakeholders' perceptions are important in evaluating political leaders policies for effective governance, the role that the media plays in affecting stakeholder perceptions of political leaders and those seeking elected office needs to be explored.



In an information and knowledge-based economy, political leaders who fail to communicate effectively with internal and external stakeholders inevitably take on considerable risk that adversely affects stakeholder perceptions of their performance and the political leader's ability to deliver good governance (Dhir, 2006).

Political leaders who have a favorable reputation can establish and expand their power base. Conversely, a political leader who has or is perceived to have a tarnished reputation, can set off a series of cyclical events that will diminish trust and morale in the stakeholder and further produce cynicism in governance (Dhir & Vinen, 2005).

Today, ethical breaches of trust by political leaders are commonplace. The media often criticizes political leaders for failing or not fulfilling their duties to stakeholders (Dhir, 2006). The news media plays a critical role in a democratic society. It must not serve only as a conduit of political information, informing the stakeholders of key events of the day, but it must also enhance public communications and instigating informed participation by citizens (Moy and Scheufele, 2000). They measured mass media through a critical indicator, which determined the extent to which each medium affects citizens' levels of trust in government and political leaders. The authors contended that data over three decades of public opinion polls indicated that Americans have expressed an increasingly pessimistic view of government.

One explanation for decline in public trust according to Moy and Scheufele (2000) is the negativity exhibited toward government and political leaders by the mass media. Utilizing content analysis, these researchers contended that negative media portrayals of political leaders in various media outlets have increased. Political candidates and elected leaders often are subjected to criticism by newspapers, radio news, network

television news and political talk radio. Becker and Whitney (1980) found that negative reporting by the media regarding political leaders, has an effect on citizens' level of political trust. An interesting trend is that reliance on television news leads to lower levels of trust in government, whereas newspaper reading resulted in higher levels of trust. Most political talk radio uses controversial content, politically incorrect and offensive terms to label politicians, its highly charged rhetoric that has the potential to delegitimize political authority, causing widespread damage to the governance process (Katz, 1996; Kurtz, 1996; Levin, 1987).

Considering the nature and extent of media influences on stakeholder perceptions, Davenport, DeLong, and Beers (1998) stated, "information combined with experience, context, interpretation and reflection: it is a high value forum of information that is ready to apply to decisions and actions" (Nolan, 2005, p. 7). For the political leader, this can be portrayed to the media by utilizing their experiences with their personal message for their constituents. Dalley and Hamilton (2000) indicated that information and knowledge are not synonymous with each other. The growth of information does not necessarily equate with the growth in knowledge. They contended contextual matters related to stakeholders acquiring knowledge and information, are continually viewed through filters comprised of cultural norms, communications, and modes of learning. Stakeholders then process information, interpret, and give meaning to the message. The implications and difficulties facing political leaders in using the media to advance their agenda is not with the information being presented per se, but in providing stakeholders a credible context to internalize the message being advocated (Nolan).

Citizens do not limit their information or knowledge of political candidates or politicians solely to television, news, and political talk radio (Moy & Scheufele, 2000). Prime-time television and entertainment programming take a dim view of the entire political process (Lichter, Lichter, & Rothman, 1994). The media has other mechanisms as well to influence stakeholders' political trust. Becker and Whitney (1980) have argued as well as some scholars, that print media can lead stakeholders to have great political trust because it increases expertise and knowledge of the political process and governance. Research also indicates that periodic framing methods often employed in television news leads stakeholders to attribute responsibility of problems to individuals rather than the political system. This leads the stakeholders to believe the political system is not responding and thus lowers the stakeholders level of political trust (Moy & Scheufele).

In their conceptualization of media effects on political and social trust, Moy, and Scheufele (2000) demonstrated that the news media plays a critical role in the political system. Their negative portrayals of governance and/or political leaders can undermine trust in democratic institutions. Additionally, different types of media content can influence social trust. Stakeholders' trust is directly related to and affected by their own political efficacy, political participation, and political trust, and media influences on social trust eventually will affect stakeholders' perceptions of political attitudes and behaviors. The media, therefore, has the ability to influence positively or negatively short-term political behavior, longer-term attitudes and behaviors, and thus, government policies (Moy & Scheufele).

### *Concept 16: Political Communication Strategies*

Political leaders are increasingly viewing political communication policies as an essential tool to support the strategic objectives and goals of public policy and good governance (van Riel, 1995). Political communication follows the corporate communication model as described by Stainer and Stainer (1997) by integrating the following three forms of communication: First, political communications by the political leader to external and internal stakeholders; second, political marketing communication to promote policies and governance strategies; and, third, political organizational communications such as internal media and public relations media. Political communications should be considered by the political leader as a performance measurement philosophy to monitor the organization's progress (which may be political), and to inform stakeholder groups what really matters (Stainer & Stainer). Staying on the cutting edge in the political marketplace comes from political leaders regarding particular stakeholder insights. This allows the political leader to develop a communication strategy that gets results. (Bodensteiner, 1993). Effective communications require both the critical resources of time and money (Blakstad, 1994).

Stainer and Stainer, (1997) point out that additional evidence suggests that there appears to be a relationship between communication, productivity and performance, this should be regarded as successful information sharing between leaders and stakeholders. If stakeholders lack information about the system, and the rationales behind a leader's decisions and performance, the stakeholder will then become estranged and resentful of the leader

Thus, effective political communication, as Francis (1987) suggested, entails sharing the political leader's vision or mission with stakeholders; integrating efforts; making intelligent political decisions; and sustaining a "healthy" community. This process allows the stakeholders to view political communications between parties as a valuable asset. Cruz (1990) argued that in an open organization, leaders and stakeholders should share information to the greatest extent possible. Thus, the open organization breeds the free flow of questions and answers. The intervention of all parties should occur within the organization without fear of interruption. Stating of matters directly and sincerely, helps keep the communication process open. This open organization should increase productivity and build trust between the parties. Berzok (1993) contended that informing and education alone does not automatically increase effective communications between parties, since it is only relevant when an emotional connection between the stakeholders and leaders brings about the desired results.

According to Stainer and Stainer (1997), the key focus for political communication is that political leaders, "should address the related ethical issues encountered, especially those affecting the outcome of image, identity and the quality of life" (p. 74). An important political communication strategy involves being persuasive and stimulates honesty and fairness which is constructed on the foundations of integrity and trust (Stainer & Stainer).

As a final point, political leaders also need to be careful about third- person perceptions in political communications. Davison (1983) coined the term the third-person effects as "individuals who are members of an audience that is exposed to persuasive communications...will expect the communication to have a greater effect on others than

themselves” (as cited in Banning, 2006, p. 785). A group with a more hostile view toward the media could be expected to have a different third-person perception level according to Banning.

There are the implications of third-person effects on political communication strategies and its effects on different stakeholder groups. Banning (2006) postulated that third-person perception levels would vary significantly by political affiliation. He demonstrated that media bias claims come primarily from conservative elites who declare a liberal bias is prevalent in the entire media spectrum. “Negative media messages have shown to increase third-person perceptions and as a result, Republicans have a higher third-person perception level than Democrats” (p. 786). Political leaders therefore need to be aware of third-party perceptions and effects they have on stakeholders. If the media creates negative images, third-party participation can reduce stakeholders’ voting and participation in the governance process. Political leaders need to contemplate both how media messages are directed at stakeholders and what people do with these messages that affect political participation by those stakeholders (Banning).

#### *Concept 17: Demographics*

Research in the fields of psychology, economics, marketing, ethics, advertising, politics, sociology, and advertising, refer to a concept called stratification or social class. Various researchers have explored the differences in demographic groups (Allmon, Page & Roberts (2000); Box-Steffensmeier, De Boef, & Lin (2004); Deshpande (1997); Glover, Bumpus, Sharpe, & Munchus (2002); Jackson (1973); Jackson (1975); Kidwell, Stevens, & Bethke (1987); Ludlum & Mascaloinov (2004); McNichols & Zimmerer

(1985); Norrandar (1997); O'Guinn, Allen, & Semenik (2006); Robideaux (2002), Serwinek (1992).

Amongst stakeholder groups and social classes, and according to McDaniel and Gates (2005), attitudes are comprised of an enduring organization of motivational, emotional, perceptual, and cognitive processes with respect to a person's environment. An attitude is a predisposition to respond in a consistently favorable or unfavorable manner toward an object or concept. Attitudes are the essence of the human change agent according to McDaniel and Gates. The relationship between social attitude and class is a topic of interest to both the sociologist and psychologist. In Centers (1949) as cited in Eysenck (1950), Centers stated:

This theory implies that a person's status and role with respect to the economic processes of society imposed upon him certain attitudes, values, and interests relating to his role and status in the political and economic sphere. It holds, further, that the status and role of the individual in relation to the means of production and exchange of goods and services gives rise in him to a consciousness of membership in some social class, which share those attitudes, values, and interests. (p. 56)

O'Guinn, Allen and Semenik (2006) related social class to a persons' relative standing in a social system. This is produced by systematic inequalities in things such as wealth, income, education, power, and status. For example, some members of society exist within a richer group (stratum) and others within a less affluent stratum. Race and gender are also unequally distributed across these strata. "Thus, a cross section, or slice, of American society would reveal many different levels (or strata) of the population

along these different dimensions” (O’Guinn et al., 2006, p. 188). Sociologists refer to this as social class. In recent times, however, sociologists have argued that the emergence of the New Class, a class of technologically skilled and highly educated individuals with great access to information and technology, has further changed the way we define social class. “Knowledge of, and access to, information may begin to challenge property as a determinant of social class” (p. 188).

Another powerful tool used in sociology is called community. “Community members believe they belong to a group of people who are similar to them in some important way and different from those not in their community” O’Guinn, Allen & Semenik, p. 199). The concept of community then can be applied to different occupational groups such as government employees, unions, elected officials, college students, and business groups. O’Guinn et al. contended these respective community groups share social meaning and serve as an important reference group for the individual belonging to that specific community. These members often share rituals and view themselves as a group of people who are similar to them in some important way, and different from those not in their community.

The concept of demographic segmentation is widely used in selecting targeting segments that include basic descriptors such as age, gender, race, marital status, income, education, and occupation. Demographic information has two specific applications according to O’Guinn, Allen and Semenik. First, demographics are commonly used to describe or profile segments that have been identified with some other variable. Thus, if the researcher is looking at demographics to show group differences it may be tied to a variable such as an ethical perception of corruption. Second, demographic categories are



frequently used as the starting point for market segmentation. In this particular case, the researcher is using demographic information to determine if the market is segmented by demographic variables such as race, education, income, age, political affiliation, and occupation. If indeed, society is segmented, this effects public policy and good governance. Since targeted groups in this study are responding to these questions or perceiving these variables differently, these variables depend on conceptual based beliefs and of the stakeholder.

*Concept 18: Self Report Bias*

A body of empirical research literature reports that most people believe they are above average in a variety of skills and abilities. “Most people believe they are more able and more skilled on a variety of tasks than most other people” (Zabojnik, 2004, p. 259). Zabojnik also reports that several researchers (Taylor & Brown, 1988; Wells & Sweeney, 1986; Campbell, 1986; Larwood & Whittaker, 1977) have also found biases in self-assessments in future performances, intelligence, as well in a range of abilities.

Baker, Jensen, and Murphey (1988) as cited in Zabojnik (2004) suggest that a bias in self- assessment may possibly explain why managers are reluctant to give employees a poor performance review. They further contended, “if someone believes he or she is above average, telling that person that they are not, can generate a lot of dissatisfaction” (p. 260). However, Greenwald (1980) as cited in Zabojnik, in looking at self-enhancement theory showed people have a desire to “ see themselves favorably and as competent human beings, which increases their feelings of personal satisfaction and worth” (p. 260). Greewald, further argued “these individuals distort information processing so as to select, interpret, and recall information in a way that supports a

positive self-image” (p. 260). Korman (1970) as cited in Zabojnik, illustrated this concept by looking at consistency theory. “People will distort information processing to preserve their prior beliefs and theories because inconsistency in self-image is psychological uncomfortable,” according to consistency theory (p. 260). “Conceptual disagreement exists when various raters use different conceptual frames of reference for evaluating performance” (Zabonjnik, p. 2).

Cheung (1999) argued self-other rating disagreement (S-ORD) is the extent, which one’s self-rating performance is different from other people’s ratings. Cheung further demonstrated that most Fortune 500 firms are using multirater or 360-degree appraisals of manager performance. The premise of a 360-degree appraisal is to provide feedback from multiple raters to guide the personal development of rates (Tornow, 1993). Conceptual disagreement occurs when raters use a different conceptual frame of reference for evaluating a performance according to Murphy and Cleveland, 1995. Therefore, one would expect that those individuals (political leaders) self-reporting ratings would be different from the population who would rate them on the same constructs. The concept of social desirability is intermingled with the notion that there are social norms governing behaviors and attitudes. Political leaders may misrepresent themselves to appear to comply with those norms.

### Conclusion

What are political promises worth from politicians with debts or political favors to pay? Kass (2008) in his *Chicago Tribune* article discussed this very point and stated:

Corruption the Chicago Way does not only waste money and burden tax- payers.

This is not only about isolated instances of graft and amusing, earthy rascallions.

This is a cartoon. The reality is that Illinois political corruption is an infection that spreads. The people either are numbed or deny it, or they feel pressured to suck up to their overlords. That is not American. That is positively medieval. (p. 2)

The overarching assumption for this research is that corruption is prevalent through out Chicago and Illinois. Sabato and Simpson (1996) stated that corruption and reform are a phenomena of class, ethnic, partisan and even religious conflicts. They further contended, “Corruption is nurtured by the political culture, which depends heavily on what average voters will tolerate from their elected officials” (Merriner, 2008, p. 171). Rich Juliano, a Ryan operative, stated that “anything that belonged to state government that could be used for political purposes, as Scott Fawell, Ryan’s top lieutenant, wanted them used for” (Merriner, p. 172). Noted political scientist, Banerfield (1968) as described in Merriner (2008):

The situation where a political boss, must, if he is to keep his organization from falling to pieces, look the other way to avoid seeing the inevitable corruption. If the political boss sees the corruption, he would have to put a stop to it, and thus weaken both his personal political position and the whole structure of government power. He further stated that, personal political position and the whole structure of government power are powerful gods whom few wish to offend. (pp. 173-174)

A final epitaph for unethical and corrupt politicians is best stated by British statesman, J. Enoch Powell, in Joseph Chamberlain, “All political lives, unless they are cut off in midstream at a happy juncture, end in failure” (Powell, 1977, p. 151).

In summary, the overall theme in the Chapter 2 literature review revolved around an agent (political leader-politician) acting as if they are the principal. When this occurs,

ethical dilemmas ensue and corruption is often the result. When politicians behave in ways counter to their elected role as agents (stewards) of the principal (citizens – stakeholders), this results in the politician behaving in a manner maximizing utility over those whom they represent. Bad governance is the result of these unethical and corrupt behaviors of the politician that can result from the agent/principal role reversal. Additional theories, such as adverse selection, moral hazard, corruption, public choice, political motivations, narcissistic behavior, resource dependency, power, trust, perceptions, cynicism, ethical leadership, and media influence and communication strategies have been explored. They all interact and are dependent upon each other in helping to understand how good governance strategies can be developed by the political leader. The compendiums of theories that are interrelated and intertwined form the basis for effective communication strategies between political leaders and their stakeholder groups. If ignored, this can result in poor governance.

The investigator has reviewed major disciplines such as economics, business, strategy, leadership, ethics, sociology, public administration, and psychology. The following major theories or streams of literature have been drawn upon: stakeholder theory, principal – agency, adverse selection, moral hazard, corruption, public choice, political motivations, narcissistic behavior, resource dependency, power, congruence, trust, perceptions, cynicism, ethical leadership, media influence, and communications strategies. The researcher's hypotheses are developed as a result from these major literature streams, which the researcher introduced in the model development. These are illustrated and summarized in Tables 1 -5.

*Model Development*

This next section proposes exploratory hypotheses generated from the literature streams and research investigations based on relevant studies previously cited and presented in this table-matrix format.

Table 1

*Exploratory Hypotheses 1A-E Mapped to Literature Streams*

---

Exploratory hypothesis	Literature stream
H1a: There will be significant perceptual differences between stakeholder groups regarding political leaders' ethical behavior.	Stakeholder Theory Principal-Agency Resource Dependency Theory
H1b: There will be significant perceptual differences between stakeholder groups regarding political leaders' trust.	Power Theory Congruence Theory Ethical leadership Narcissistic Theory
H1c: There will be significant perceptual differences between stakeholder groups regarding political leaders' unethical/corrupt behavior.	Corruption Theory Trust and Perception Theories
H1d: There will be significant perceptual differences between stakeholder groups regarding political leaders' ethical relativism.	
H1e: There will be significant perceptual differences between stakeholder groups regarding political leaders' communications.	

---

Table 2

*Exploratory Hypotheses 2A-E Mapped to Literature Streams*

Exploratory hypothesis	Literature stream
<p>H2a: There will be significant perceptual differences between stakeholder groups based on key demographics (age, gender, and political affiliation) regarding political leaders' ethical behavior.</p>	<p>Stakeholder Theory Principal-Agency Resource Dependency Theory Power Theory</p>
<p>H2b: There will be significant perceptual differences between stakeholder groups based on key demographics (age, gender, and political affiliation) regarding political leaders' trust.</p>	<p>Demographics Ethical leadership Narcissistic Theory Public Choice Theory Communication Theory</p>
<p>H2c: There will be significant perceptual differences between stakeholder groups based on key demographics (age, gender, and political affiliation) regarding political leaders' unethical corrupt behavior.</p>	<p>Corruption Theory</p>
<p>H2d: There will be significant perceptual differences between stakeholder groups based on key demographics (age, gender, and political affiliation) regarding political leaders' ethical relativism.</p>	
<p>H2e: There will be significant perceptual differences between stakeholder groups based on key demographics (age, gender, and political affiliation) regarding political leaders' communication.</p>	

Table 3

*Exploratory Hypotheses 3A-E Mapped to Literature Streams*

Exploratory hypothesis	Literature stream
<p>H3a: There will be significant differences between political leaders and all other stakeholder groups regarding ethical behavior.</p>	<p>Self-Reporting Bias Political Motivation Stakeholder Theory</p>
<p>H3b: There will be significant differences between political leaders and all other stakeholder groups regarding trust.</p>	<p>Principal agency Theory Ethical Leadership Narcissistic Theory</p>
<p>H3c: There will be significant differences between political leaders and all other stakeholder groups regarding unethical/corrupt behavior.</p>	<p>Public Choice Theory Communication Theory Corruption Theory</p>
<p>H3d: There will be significant differences between political leaders and all other stakeholder groups regarding ethical relativism.</p>	
<p>H3e: There will be significant differences between political leaders and all other stakeholder groups regarding communication.</p>	

Table 4

*Exploratory Hypothesis 4 Mapped to Literature Streams*

Exploratory hypothesis	Literature stream
H4: There will be a significant difference between stakeholders and politicians regarding their level of communications.	Stakeholder Theory Trust Theory Power Theory Resource Dependency Theory Communication Theory

Table 5

*Exploratory Hypothesis 5 Mapped to Literature Streams*

Exploratory hypothesis	Literature stream
H5: Political leaders will perceive their level of trust and ethics higher than the various stakeholders who will perceive those same qualities. This implies that the public is more cynical than the political leaders who feel they are justified by their experiences as political leaders.	Cynicism Theory Trust Theory Cynicism Theory






Figure 6. Concept map for literature review

Figure 6, concept map for literature review, indicates the relationships between the various streams of literature. The arrows moving in both directions indicate the streams, which are related, or interact on each other. Arrows moving in one direction, indicate the relationship from one stream to another. This concept map is exploratory in nature, and a simplified/clarified map is advanced, because of this research.

## CHAPTER III

### METHODOLOGY

#### Introduction

As the literature review revealed, there is sufficient research to suggest that stakeholder's perceptions are associated with political leader's organizational governance strategies. Similarly, stakeholder's perceptions are affected by the mass media which can positively or negatively affect stakeholder's perceptions and participation in the governance process. In addition, an overarching theme as presented in Chapter II is that when a politician acts as a principal instead of an agent of the people, unethical and corrupt behavior can occur. This is an inversion of agency theory. This inversion of agency theory, as proposed by this researcher, may present a significant contribution to the literature stream and for this research project. Since the literature does not currently address this inversion of agency theory, it has the potential to open up significant areas of study relating to this principle.

This research is based upon the following theories are interrelated and interdependent: stakeholder theory, principal-agency, adverse selection, moral hazard, public choice, narcissistic behavior, resource dependency, power, congruence, trust, perceptions, cynicism, ethical leadership, media influence and communication strategies. These all play an important role in the researcher's CUB model and communications model for effective good governance by the political leader.

This researcher derived hypotheses from the Chapter 2 literature review. The researcher illustrated this by developing the conceptual map for the literature review. This indicated the complex interdependencies of the literature streams discussed and additionally, showed how it related to the exploratory hypotheses.

This dissertation is considered action research, one of the many streams of collaborative research. It is viewed as:

... An emergent inquiry process in which applied behavior and organizational sciences are applied to solve real business problems. It is simultaneously concerned with bringing change in organizations, in developing self-help competencies in organizations, and adding to the scientific knowledge. (Shani & Pasmore, 1985, p. 439)

In addition, “action research brings about the challenge of balance and interdependence between researchers and organizational members, between academic research and actual applications, between knowledge creation and problems solving, and between inquiry from inside and inquiry from the outside” (Coghlan & Shani, 2005, pp. 533-534). Reason and Bradbury (2001) further elaborated that action research cannot be classified as one single methodology, but rather it includes a wide range and levels of inquiry approaches, activities and methods. Coghlan and Shani additionally stated that:

Action research is viewed as a holistic process that comprises several sequential dimensions: strategic of policy choices to focus on simultaneous action and research in a collaborative manner, design requirements that can make the policy choices operational, and design dimensions that bound and specify the requirements and lead to a realized design, all of which set the context with which an action research develops. (p. 534)

Coghlan and Shani (2005) additionally stated that action research is not an impersonal approach and that action researchers engage in action to influence outcomes. Bell (1998) argued as such, the researcher needed to be self-reflexive about their vulnerability, and to have realistic expectations, tolerance, to be able to listen and above all, to have an openness and ability to learn.

From this viewpoint, Abnor and Bjerke (1997) described that “it is important for a researcher to go through a process of self-analysis to define who they are and that this influences the way the researcher views reality and affects their intellectual identification with a specific defining paradigm” (p. 7). More broadly stated, the researcher’s beliefs become a significant factor on the way the researcher views the subject matter and the way the research questions are stated (Marinaccio, 2007).

In a similar vain, Choudhuri, Glauser and Peregoy (2004) described their guidelines for qualitative research, it is required that a researcher “include a self-reflexive description of the researcher’s role, location and perspective; this may have relevance to the conduct of this research” (p. 444). From this perspective, it is constructive to describe the researcher of this dissertation. First, the researcher was raised in a middle-class, blue-collar family. My father was a union-pipefitter who worked for state institution. At an early age, this researcher saw politicians giving out state jobs based on party affiliations, paying political dues or monthly contributions, and even purchasing new or used automobiles to keep your job. This resulted and formulated the researcher’s belief system that a hard-working individual, like my father, was dependent upon a political system that was corrupt in order to keep his job and provide for his family. Second, the researcher is a state employee with 26 years of government experience who has witnessed corruption on the local, state and federal level. He has personally witnessed the former governor of

Illinois convicted for corruption, and a host of mayors and trustees imprisoned for extortion all in the name of self-serving political interests. These politicians sought self-interests and personal greed over the interests of their electorate (stakeholders). These self-seeking politician's personal interests resulted in poor governance and imposed a hidden corruption tax on citizens (stakeholders). Third, the researcher is involved in an Ethical Leadership Doctorate program, and the investigation of this subject matter is paramount to assisting political leaders with governance and communications strategies to reduce negative perceptions and cynicism of stakeholders and further good governance. The researcher believes in ethical political leaders who are stewards of government resources that enable them to govern effectively for the benefit of all of the electorate.

Because of this study, the researcher, as well as those participants who were in the stakeholder groups deemed the necessary traits for effective political leaders are as follows: they act ethically, communicate with their stakeholders, and are true stewards of the governments resources entrusted to them by the electorate (stakeholders). Ethical political leaders do not maximize their own self-interest, but maximize the utilities of the electorate (stakeholders) in a fair and equitable way, which further produces good governance strategies. To summarize, the researcher has developed an overall research question:

#### Overall Research Question

What are the significant perceptual differences across stakeholder groups relating to perceptions of ethical behavior of elected officials, and what are the implications for communication strategies aimed at producing good governance?

### *Exploratory Hypotheses*

Many recent examples of exploratory case research have framed broad questions but have not stated formal hypotheses (Ancona, 1990; Garud & Rappa, 1994; Isabella, 1990). The use of exploratory hypotheses, as demonstrated by Daake (1995), acts as a helpful guide and can be a concise summary of the questions raised by the literature in Chapters 1 and 2. Five exploratory hypotheses were developed and tested within the content of the overall research question. These five exploratory hypotheses postulated the overall effects of stakeholder's perceptions of political corruption and unethical behavior between elected officials and all other stakeholder groups, and its consequential effects on promoting good governance strategies for political leaders.

#### *Five Exploratory Hypotheses:*

H1a: There will be significant perceptual differences between elected officials and stakeholder groups regarding political leaders' ethical behavior.

H1b: There will be significant perceptual differences between elected officials and stakeholder groups regarding political leaders' trust.

H1c: There will be significant perceptual differences between elected officials and stakeholder groups regarding political leaders' unethical/corrupt behavior.

H1d: There will be significant perceptual differences between elected officials and stakeholder groups regarding political leaders' ethical relativism.

H1e: There will be significant perceptual differences between elected officials and stakeholder groups regarding political leaders' communications.

- H2a: There will be significant perceptual differences between and stakeholder groups based on key demographics (age, gender, and political affiliation) regarding political leaders' ethical behavior.
- H2b: There will be significant perceptual differences between stakeholder groups based on key demographics (age, gender, and political affiliation) regarding political leaders' trust.
- H2c: There will be significant perceptual differences between stakeholder groups based on key demographics (age, gender, and political affiliation) regarding political leaders' unethical corrupt behavior.
- H2d: There will be significant perceptual differences between stakeholder groups based on key demographics (age, gender, and political affiliation) regarding political leaders' ethical relativism.
- H2e: There will be significant perceptual differences between stakeholder groups based on key demographics (age, gender, and political affiliation) regarding political leaders' communication.
- H3a: There will be significant differences between elected officials and all other stakeholder groups regarding ethical behavior.
- H3b: There will be significant differences between elected officials and all other stakeholder groups regarding trust.
- H3c: There will be significant differences between elected officials and all other stakeholder groups regarding unethical/corrupt behavior.
- H3d: There will be significant differences between elected officials and all other stakeholder groups regarding ethical relativism.

H3e: There will be significant differences between elected officials and all other stakeholder groups regarding communication.

H4: There will be a significant difference between all stakeholders groups and elected officials regarding their level of communications.

H5: Elected officials will perceive their level of trust and ethics higher than the various will stakeholders who will perceive those same qualities. This implies that the public is more cynical than the elected officials who feel they are justified by their experiences as political leaders.

*Conceptual Mapping of Exploratory Hypotheses to Survey Questions:*

H1a: There will be significant perceptual differences between elected officials and stakeholder groups regarding political leaders' ethical behavior. (Questions mapped to this hypothesis - q75, which is a linear combination of questions 37, 41, and 43; 70, which is a linear combination of questions 1, 4, 9, 18, 19, and 20; 53d, 56d, 60, 59, 57a-f.

H1b: There will be significant perceptual differences between elected officials and stakeholder groups regarding political leaders' trust. (Questions mapped to this hypothesis -18, 21, 28, 35, 41 and 54)

H1c: There will be significant perceptual differences between elected officials and stakeholder groups regarding political leaders' unethical/corrupt behavior. (Questions mapped to this hypothesis -72, 56a, 56b, 15, 34, 44, 47b, 47a).

H1d: There will be significant perceptual differences between elected officials and stakeholder groups regarding political leaders' ethical relativism. (Questions mapped to this hypothesis - 73, which is a linear combination of questions 38, 39, and 40).



H1e: There will be significant perceptual differences between elected officials and stakeholder groups regarding political leaders' communications. (Questions mapped to this hypothesis - q74, which is a linear combination of questions 19, 20, 45, 46, and 55).

H2a: There will be significant perceptual differences between elected officials and stakeholder groups based on key demographics (age, gender, and political affiliation) regarding political leaders' ethical behavior. (Questions mapped to this hypothesis - 75, which is a linear combination of questions 37, 41, and 43; 70, which is a linear combination of questions 1, 4, 9, 18, 19, and 20; 53d, 56d, 60, 59, 57a-f).

H2b: There will be significant perceptual differences between stakeholder groups based on key demographics (age, gender, and political affiliation) regarding political leaders' trust. (Questions mapped to this hypothesis - 18, 21, 28, 35, 41 and 54).

H2c: There will be significant perceptual differences between stakeholder groups based on key demographics (age, gender, and political affiliation) regarding political leaders' unethical corrupt behavior. (Questions mapped to this hypothesis -72, which is a linear combination of questions 22, 23, and 24; 56a, 56b, 15, 34, 44, 47b, and 47a).

H2d: There will be significant perceptual differences between stakeholder groups based on key demographics (age, gender, and political affiliation) regarding political leaders' ethical relativism. (Questions mapped to this hypothesis - question 73, which is a linear combination of questions 38, 39, and 40).

H2e: There will be significant perceptual differences between stakeholder groups based on key demographics (age, gender, and political affiliation) regarding political leaders' communication. (Questions mapped to this hypothesis - question74, which is a linear combination of questions 19, 20, 45, and 46; and 55).

H3a: There will be significant differences between elected officials and all other stakeholder groups combined regarding ethical behavior. (Questions mapped to this hypothesis - q75, which is a linear combination of questions 37, 41, and 43; 70, which is a linear combination of questions 1, 4, 9, 18, 19, and 20; 53d, 56d, 59, 57a-f, and 60).

H3b: There will be significant differences between elected officials and all other stakeholder groups combined regarding trust. (Questions mapped to this hypothesis - 18, 21, 28, 35, 41, 54 and 71, which is a linear combination of questions 1, 4, 18, 19, and 20).

H3c: There will be significant differences between elected officials and all other stakeholder groups combined regarding unethical/corrupt behavior. (Questions mapped to this hypothesis - questions 15, 34, 44, 47a-b, and 72 which is a linear combination of questions 22, 23, and 24).

H3d: There will be significant differences between elected officials and all other stakeholder groups regarding ethical relativism. (Questions mapped to this hypothesis - questions 38, 39 and 40).

H3e: There will be significant differences between elected officials and all other stakeholder groups regarding communication. (Questions mapped to this hypothesis - questions 74, which is a linear combination of questions 19, 20, 45, and 46; 55, and 62).

H4: There will be a significant difference between stakeholders and elected officials regarding their level of communications. (Questions mapped to this hypothesis - questions 80, which is a linear combination of questions 26, 36, 45, and 46).

H5: Elected officials leaders will perceive their level of trust and ethics higher than the various stakeholders who will perceive those same qualities.

This implies that the public is more cynical than the political leaders who feel they are justified by their experiences as political leaders. (Questions mapped to this hypothesis-questions 85, which is a linear combination of questions 18, 21, 23, 27, 30, 33, and 35).

The literature review revealed that there are varieties of theories that can be utilized as possible explanations of what is and what are political leaders unethical and corrupt behavior, and its underlying effects on good governance. This researcher has identified two major theories contributing to understanding these political phenomena, as described in stakeholder theory and agency theory. Stakeholder theory as described by Freeman (1984) is concerned with how stakeholder groups are formed and identified in the organization. The central premise being stakeholders are often divergent and compete for scarce resources in the organization. In this case, the researcher is applying stakeholder theory in the political-governance organization.

Agency theory as developed by Jensen and Meckling (1976) defined “how to structure the contractual relation between the principal and agent to provide appropriate incentives for the agent to make choices which will maximize the principal’s welfare, given that uncertainty and imperfect monitoring exist” (p. 7). This researcher has taken agency theory and turned it on its head by investigating the phenomenon when a political leader who is the agent of the electorate (stakeholders) acts in a manner inconsistent with their designated agent role and instead acts as a principal. When this situation occurs, as the agency literature suggests several interesting factors come into play, namely, cynicism from the stakeholder and narcissistic behavior from the political leader. Other antecedent theories come into play: resource dependency and power relationships, these affect the balance of power between the principal (stakeholder) and the agent (political

leader) when principal-agent roles are reversed and governance is affected. Furthermore, when a political leader acts as a principal and not as an agent of the electorate (stakeholders), the political leader assumes the mantle of power and believes government is their personal entitlement with the requisite rewards for their own personal self-satisfaction. Unethical and corrupt behavior often is the result of politicians reversing the agent-principal role.

Stakeholder's perceptions are constantly being evaluated and internally reviewed. These perceptions are affected by a politician's action of personal entitlement and self-seeking behavior, which maximizes the politician's personal interests over those of the electorate (stakeholders). Communication strategies are inherently important to political leaders, as they need to communicate their willingness to represent the values and ideas of the electorate (stakeholders). Political leaders must be aware of the perceptual problems of stakeholders viewing them as pursuing their own political self-interests. The researcher has developed this initial and preliminary model of the factors affecting political-unethical behavior as described in Figure 7.




Figure 7. Factors affecting political – unethical behavior

### Research Design

This study followed the sequential exploratory methods model (Creswell, 2003). Creswell delineated the sequential, exploratory mixed-methods model, approach as useful to the researcher who “wants to explore a phenomenon but also wants to expand on the qualitative findings” (p. 216). The sequential exploratory mixed methods model involves collecting the data in stages. One data collection is followed by a second data collection. These data sets are used to illustrate an explanatory follow-up design. A qualitative first step is followed by a quantitative second step to generalize the results to the population, different and more participants are utilized in Stage 3 (Creswell & Plano Clark, 2007).

Further, the qualitative data collection used was from a smaller sample than the quantitative data collection as described by Creswell and Plano Clark, “as the intent is not to merge or compare the data, as in concurrent procedures, so unequal sizes are not as much of an issue in a sequential design” (p. 123).

The position of the researcher is to gather themes conducted from various elected political leaders (U.S. congressman, state senators, state representatives, mayors, village trustees, state’s attorney and judges) as it relates to their specific views on perceptions of corruption as seen through their eyes. In addition, how the various political leaders see themselves as compared to how other relevant stakeholder groups perceive the elected official’s behaviors and attitudes. These themes as identified by the researcher from the qualitative interviews will then be designated into the qualitative survey used to measure perceptions of various stakeholder groups and politicians. (See Figure 7, p. 155, for an illustrative model of this exploratory research model.)

Furthermore, the researcher utilized methodological triangulation as described by Denzin (1978). For example, in which the use of multiple methods to study a single problem, such as utilizing interviews, observations, questionnaires and documents were used. Denzin further elaborated on the logic of triangulation and stated that:

No single method ever adequately solves the problem of rival casual factors...

Because each method reveals different aspects of empirical reality, multiple methods of observations must be employed. This is termed triangulation. I now offer as a final methodological rule the principal that multiple methods be used in every investigation. (p. 28)

This researcher developed the sequential exploratory mixed methods model as delineated in Chapter 1, Figure 3. Piatt research model. This research model was developed to address the exploratory hypotheses. The action research process stems from an effort to differentiate how stakeholder groups and political leaders view perceptions of ethical and unethical behavior. The object of this research is to determine if differences in perceptions relating to ethical and unethical behavior, trust, communications, and cynicism exist between stakeholder groups.

The degree to which various stakeholder groups perceive ethical and unethical behavior is crucial in the overall research question. Do different stakeholder groups perceive politicians differently than those politicians' self-perceptions? The next step was to interview a select group of political leaders and ask them to discuss any differences. These differences and why did they think there were differences between themselves and the other stakeholder groups. The steps used in developing the survey instrument are displayed in Figure 8.





Figure 8. Sequential exploratory mixed-methods model





*Figure 8.* Sequential exploratory mixed-methods model (continued)

### *Instrument Design*

This survey instrument utilized an exploratory design as defined by Creswell and Plano Clark (2007) with the intent of developing and testing the research instrument (taxonomy), and dealt with the information that was most useful in designing and developing this research instrument and the procedures used in the process. The qualitative data analysis yielded specific quotes from political leaders, which were coded by the researcher, and generated general themes that resulted from these categories. The quotes from the political leaders then resulted in the formulation of several questionnaire items. In addition, these quotes were used to refine, confirm, and clarify previous research literature. The categories were designated by variables measured by multiple items, and the themes represented larger scales of the instrument (Creswell & Plano Clark).

Second, the researcher implemented sound psychometric properties and good scale development procedures in developing this survey instrument. DeVellis (1991) described proper scale development procedures that must be incorporated in the scale design: 1) A determination what the researcher wants to measure, is grounded in the theory, and constructs to be addressed and related qualitative findings. 2) The researcher then generates an item-pool using short items, an appropriate reading level, and questions that ask a single question. 3) The researcher must make a determination of the scale of measurements for the items used, and the physical construction of the research instrument. 4) Have the items pool reviewed by experts. 5) Consider the validated items from other scale or instruments. 6) Administer the instrument to a sample for validation. 7) Evaluation of the items (e.g., item-scale correlations, item variance, and reliability. 8) Optimization of scale length based on the item performance and reliability checks.

Finally, Creswell and Plano Clark (2007) suggested that the researcher “review and examine previously published mixed methods studies that use an Exploratory Design with the intent to develop an instrument, to learn the procedures used in generating the survey instrument from qualitative data” ( p. 124). The researcher utilized the procedures as outline by DeVellis (1991) by collecting discussion group data and personal interviews with political leaders to help form a questionnaire. Other unpublished sources were also utilized. The researcher then formed focus groups of knowledgeable market research students where participants were asked to evaluate the clarity of the questions. The resulting questionnaire was used in a pilot test with participants (college-students) similar to those students used in the study. The questionnaire content of the survey instrument was validated by a number of experts in the political, academic, and business sectors and checked for basic validity and reliability.

As identified by Creswell and Plano Clark (2007) and DeVellis (1991) the researcher incorporated these processes into the research instrument. Exploratory journal articles, multidimensional scales, and doctoral dissertations (Daake, 1995) were reviewed. Further, as described by Green, Caracelli, and Graham (1989), the two-phase Exploratory Design resulted in the first method (qualitative) personal interviews, can help or develop the second method (quantitative). This researcher utilized an exploratory design as described by Creswell and Plano Clark based on the premise that an exploration was needed. Current measures or instruments were not available, the variables are unknown, and there were no guiding framework or theory for this research design.

Because this design began with a qualitative approval, it was best suited for exploring a relatively unknown phenomenon. This design is particularly useful when a researcher needs to develop and test an instrument because one is not available (Creswell, 1999; Creswell, Fetters & Ivankova, 2004).

The Exploratory Design used, helps to connect a qualitative, quantitative, mixed-method approach. This researcher chose this variant of Exploratory Design due to the need to develop a quantitative instrument informed by qualitative findings. In this design, the researcher first qualitatively explored the research topic with a few participants such as political leaders and other knowledgeable informants. The qualitative findings (personal interviews with political leaders and others), then guided the researcher in the development of items and scales for a quantitative survey instrument. This was done in conjunction with other procedure such as literature review, scale review, and brainstorming with academic experts. In the second data collection phase, the researcher implements and validates the instrument quantitatively. In summary, this researcher's survey design, the qualitative and quantitative methods are connected through the development of the instrument items. "Researchers using this variant model, often emphasize the quantitative aspects of the study" (Creswell & Plano Clark, 2007, p. 77).

In summary, a mixed- method study as proscribed by Creswell (2003) was used. This resulted in this exploratory investigation of stakeholder perceptions of political leader's behaviors and outcomes as it relates to corrupt and unethical behavior. A triangulation mixed method design was used, a type of design in which different but complimentary data was collected on the same topic. Specifically, in this study, perceptions of corruption and ethics were used to validate the proposed Corrupt-Unethical- Behavior (CUB) model.

The survey was designed to assess general perception and attitude levels of stakeholders and political leaders based on ethical and unethical situations. After a thorough review of the literature, the researcher concluded that no one instrument had been developed and validated for measuring stakeholder and political leader's perceptions on ethics and corruption. As described by Daake' and Anthony's (2000) study that developed original scales, this researcher developed a survey instrument that was based on two sources. First, the researcher reviewed and partially adapted two previously used general scales "The perceived role of ethics and social responsibility: A scale development" (Singhapakdi, Vitell, Rallapalli, & Kraft, 1996), and "A validation and extension of a multidimensional ethics scale" (Cohen, Pant, & Sharp, 1993). Secondly, and more importantly, that having been said, after an extensive analysis, the researcher, had to develop his own survey scales as were specifically related to his research questions. Thirdly, the researcher created original scales as an outflow of the larger on-going action research process. The researcher designed the questionnaires and survey instrument from interviews with key political leaders, relevant literature, and consulting with subject matter experts. The reason for collecting both qualitative and quantitative data is to bring together the strengths of both forms of research to compare and validate results for this study. The goal is to bring together both forms of data to enrich the design the survey instrument.

#### *Reliability of Survey Instrument*

Prior to discussing the reliability of the survey instrument, a definition of measurement as suggested by Blaclock (1968) who observed that:

Sociological theorists often use concepts that are formulated at rather high levels of abstraction. These are quite different from the variables that are the stock-in-trade of

empirical sociologists... The problem of bridging the gap between theory and research is seen as one of measurement error (p. 6; 12).

In other words, measurement is most usefully viewed as the “process of linking abstract concepts to empirical indicants” (Carmines & Zeller, 1979, p. 10), “as a process involving an “explicit” organized plan for classifying (and often quantifying) the particular sense data at hand-the indicants-in terms of the general concept in the researchers mind”(Riley, 1963, p. 23).

Carmines and Zeller further clarify the above definition by stating that:

It makes it apparent that measurement is a process involving both theoretical as well as empirical considerations. From an empirical standpoint, which the focus is on the “observable response” whether it takes the form of a mark on a set of self-administered questionnaire, the behavior recorded in an observational study, or the answer given to an interviewer. Theoretically, interest lies in the underlying unobservable (and direct immeasurable) concept that is represented in the response. (p. 10)

Therefore, as enumerated by Carmines and Zeller (1979), measurement focuses on the crucial relationship between empirically grounded indicator (s) – the observable response, and the underlying unobservable concept (s). When this relationship is a strong one, analysis of empirical indicators can lead to useful inferences about the relationships among the underlying concepts. Similarly, if the theoretical concepts have no empirical referents, then the empirical tenability of the theory essentially remains unknown (pp. 10 -11). From this perspective, Carmines and Zeller presented an auxiliary theory “denoting the relationship between the concepts and indicators is equally important to the researcher as the substantive theory linking concepts to one another” (p. 11).

Carmines and Zeller's (1979) definition of measurement, leads the researcher to determine the extent to which a particular empirical indicator (or a set of empirical indicators) represents a given theoretical concept. In this particular case, the researcher is using empirical indicators of perceptions, trust, cynicism, narcissism, and power.

Reliability of this researcher's survey instrument focused on the extent to which a measuring procedure yielding the same results on repeated trials. Reliability therefore is the result of the consistency found in repeated measurements of the same phenomenon. The more consistent the results given by repeated measurements the higher the reliability of the measuring procedure (Carmines & Zeller, 1979).

The concept of reliability is important to this researcher. The researcher's survey instrument was pretested with college level seniors in a strategic management and policy class, doctorate level students, and business and community leaders, to determine the reliability of the survey instrument. A test and retest was administered within two months of each other.

#### *Validity of Survey Instrument*

The survey instrument must also be valid. The researcher's survey instrument is considered construct valid, if it measures what it is intended to measure. A valid measuring instrument is the degree that it measured this theoretical concept rather than some other phenomenon. "While reliability focuses on a particular property of empirical indicators-the extent to which they provide consistent results across repeated measurements – validity concerns the crucial relationship between concept and indicator" (Carmines & Zeller, 1979, p. 12).

Cronbach (1971) stated, "One validates, not a test, but an interpretation of data arising from a specified procedure" (p. 447). Cronbach indicated that the distinction is

central to validation as the survey instrument can measure one kind of phenomenon and be valid but can be invalid for assessing other phenomenon. Additionally, according to Cronbach, the researcher does not validate the measuring instrument itself, but rather the measuring instrument in relation to the purpose for which the researcher constructed it to be used to measure the theoretical constructs.

In turn, the researcher focused on construct validity as described by Cronbach and Meehl (1955) who observed “construct validity must be investigated whenever no criterion or universe of content is accepted as entirely adequate to define the quality to be measured” (p. 282). At its core, construct validity is the extent to which a particular measure relates to other measures consistent with theoretically derived hypotheses concerning the concepts (or constructs) that are being measured (Carmines & Zeller, 1979).

Construct validity according to Carmines and Zeller involves the following steps: First, the theoretical relationships between the concepts themselves must be specified. Second, the empirical relationship between the measures of the concepts must be examined. Finally, the empirical evidence must be interpreted in terms of how it clarifies the construct validity of the particular measure. (p. 23)

As further described by Carmines and Zeller (1979) the process of construct validation is theory-laden. It is almost impossible to validate a measure or concept unless there are existent theoretical network that surrounds the concept. Without this network, it is impossible to create theoretical predictions, which, further directly lead to empirical tests involving measures of the concept (p. 23). Construct validation follows the logic and implies that the relationship between multiple indicators which are designed to represent a given theoretical concept and theoretically relevant external variables should be similar



in terms of direction, strength, and consistency (Carmines & Zeller). They further argued the use of construct validity has generalized applicability in the social sciences. Thus, this researcher assessed the construct validity of the survey instrument by looking at the performance of the scales, and then determining if it they were consistent with the theoretically derived expectations. The theoretical concepts as discussed in Chapter 2 were used to derive hypotheses. The qualitative aspect of interviewing political leaders allowed the researcher to identify themes that were incorporated into the survey instrument and analyzed quantitatively. The theoretical streams of related literature included the following theories: stakeholder, agency, adverse selection, moral hazard, corruption, public choice, political motivation, narcissistic behavior, resource dependency, power, congruency, trust, perceptions, cynicism, ethical leadership, media influence and communication strategies. Since this is an exploratory descriptive study, the researcher designed the instrument not to predict behavior of political leaders but to assess the perceptual differences among stakeholder groups.

As previously stated, the researcher utilized and modified existing scales. To reiterate though the vast majority of the scaled were original. The survey instrument was pre-tested with a women's business group in addition to college students. The researcher requested and received permission to utilize and modify two existing scales, "A validation and extension of a multidimensional ethics scale" (Cohen, Pant, & Sharp, 1993) and "The perceived role of ethics and social responsibility: A scale development" (Singhapakdi, Vitell, Rallapalli, & Kraft, 1996). However, after reviewing the existing scales, only two questions were used, but the researcher informed by these existing instruments developed the remaining survey.

## Population

### *Sampling Procedures*

Due to the nature of this exploratory study, the researcher used purposeful strategic sampling of the target populations. The underlying principal common to purposeful sampling according to Patton (1987) is selecting information rich cases. Patton elaborated on this concept by stating, “The general purpose takes its specific focus from the information needs of primary stakeholders and decision-making context of the particular program being evaluated” (p. 145).

Additionally, Patton indicated that there are no specific guidelines for determining the size of the purposeful sample, and that this is a matter for negotiation with stakeholders, decision-makers, and information users. “The sample should be large enough to be credible given the purpose of the evaluation, but small enough to permit adequate depth and detail for each case in the sample” (Patton, p. 58).

In addition, the researcher also utilized opportunistic sampling with political leaders. This allowed the researcher to take advantage of on-the-spot opportunities with political leaders. For instance, the researcher was able to interview political leaders at business after hour’s events, community forums, presentations, etc., where these political leaders were at and in which the researcher would not have access to them that easily at a later date in time.

### *Demographics of the Population*

Leedy and Ormond (2005) described purposive sampling as “choosing people who we have decided as typical of a group or those who represent diverse perspectives on an issue” (p. 206). Thus, the researcher identified typical stakeholder groups that

represent diverse perceptions of political leaders. The researcher has identified the appropriate stakeholders and political leaders.

*Political leaders:* The researcher utilized a representative sample in identifying the major elected officials in Illinois. U.S. Congresswoman, state senator, state representative, county executive, county board chairperson, county state's attorney, circuit judge, mayors, trustees, council members, county board members. These political leaders represent the range of the major elected officials in Illinois. The political leaders are all elected officials in Illinois. This study relied on their participation to answer the interview questions and participate in the survey. These political leader's self-perceptions are crucial in defining where they view themselves compared to how their stakeholders view them.

*External stakeholders:* The researcher has identified several relevant and diverse major stakeholder groups to be included in this study. These stakeholder groups are representative of groups that are affected by political leader's decisions. The researcher has identified these external stakeholders, identified and are listed below.

*College students:* The researcher obtained approval from two college professors in two college political science departments. The researcher did not know any of the students who completed the survey. The students were from two distinct higher educational institutions in the approximate ages 18-25 and had similar levels of political science and economics. One institution is a private four-year college and the other is a public junior college. Students sampled represented diverse demographics.

*Businesses:* The researcher administered several surveys to local chambers of commerce, women organizations, and service groups such as Rotary and Kiwanis. The business organizations represent a diverse sample of business people in the region.

*Unions:* The researcher identified two major unions in the area that comprises the largest unions in the region. The researcher administered the surveys to union members at their monthly local labor meeting. The unions surveyed are representative of union memberships throughout Illinois. These unions employ building-trades, which are comprised of laborers, carpenters, pipefitters, truck drivers, masons, painters, electricians, and other miscellaneous building trade workers. In addition, other unionized groups such as fire fighters, postal workers, teachers, and government union workers, which were separate from the non-union government workers, were also added to complete the union category. The surveys for the union workers were also distributed to their union-steward, who forwarded the survey to their respective membership to complete. Once completed, I picked up those surveys that were completed.

*Government employees:* The researcher administered surveys to government employees that included federal, state, and local government employees. They included employees from governor appointments to clerical workers and everyone in between which were identified as non-union. The researcher identified government workers through his 26 years of government experience, and utilized purposeful sampling of government employees.

The final sample included 471 individuals who were broken down by the following categories as identified in Tables 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10.

Table 6

*Occupation Demographics*

Occupation	Frequency	Percent
Government Employee	104	22.1
Elected Official	65	13.8
Union-Building Trades	75	15.9
Business Professional	99	21.0
College Student	128	27.2
Total	471	100.0

Table 7

*Ethnicity Demographics*

Ethnicity	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent
Caucasian	404	85.8	85.8
African American	43	9.1	9.1
Hispanic	19	4.0	4.0
American Indian/Alaska	5	1.1	1.1
Total	471	100.0	100.0

Table 8

*Gender Demographics*

Gender	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent
Male	247	52.4	52.4
Female	224	47.6	47.6
Total	471	100.0	100.0

Table 9

*Age Group Demographics*

Age Groups	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent
18-24	128	27.2	27.2
25-44	133	28.2	28.2
45-54	93	19.7	19.7
55 & Above	117	24.8	24.8
Total	471	100.0	100.0

Table 10

*Political Affiliation Demographics*

Political Affiliation	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent
Republican	174	36.9	36.9
Democrat	179	38.0	38.0
Independent	112	23.8	23.8
Libertarian	6	1.3	1.3
Total	471	100.0	100.0

Data Collection

The researcher collected the data by meeting with the various stakeholder groups in two different ways. First, the researcher personally administered the survey instrument to specific stakeholder groups containing selected business groups and certain union-building trades. Second, in some cases, the surveys were distributed ahead of the stakeholder group and organizations' meeting. The head of the organization was given the survey to distribute to their members and once completed, the researcher picked up the completed responses. General instructions were given on the survey instrument but no further justification was made to make sure the researcher did not bias the results. After the participants completed the questionnaire, the researcher briefly explained the significance of the study and offered to present the finding to the specific stakeholder groups if requested. IRB forms were given to the leaders of each respective group and to

each of the participants. In some cases, the designated group representative signed the IRB release form on behalf of their members. The researcher in giving instructions to each stakeholder group discussed with each stakeholder group that this was a voluntary survey. If the respondent did not feel comfortable answering any of the questions, they were told that they could skip or chose not to complete the survey. The results of the surveys were confidential and no names were used to identify any participant. Basic demographics including occupation was the primary demographic variable which formed the basis of stakeholder groups was included in was used to test various hypotheses. If the participant did not complete the demographic section or list their occupation the survey was not used. In examples of participants not answering a question, which was less than three percent of the cases, a mean substitution imputation model (Hair et al., 2006) was used for variables that had missing data. Since missing data was minimal 14 cases out of 471, and only on sporadic questions, the researcher had no additional concerns that any dependent variable was dissimilar based on whether other variables contained missing data or not.

The researcher collected the data over a period of five months between May – September 2009. The stakeholders groups as identified by their respective occupation were contacted by the researcher to obtain administration dates. After the respective leaders of those stakeholder groups agreed to allow the researcher to conduct the survey, times and locations were mutually agreed upon and then scheduled. The participants were given the research instrument and were allowed at least 40 minutes to complete. Most surveys were completed with the time range of 15-25 minutes. However, some groups



were given the survey in advance of their meeting, and completed surveys were turned over to the researcher at that time.

Data was collected over this period to coincide with stakeholder group availability. In surveying college students, it was necessary to survey them while they were in class. For some elected officials it was important to survey them while they were not in legislative session in Springfield, Illinois. Mayoral caucus groups and mayoral associations meet monthly or quarterly and it was necessary to schedule the administration of the survey instrument to these groups based on their availability. The researcher was concerned about a high-level of cynicism by stakeholder groups with the announcement of former governor Rod Blagojevich impeachment and removal from office. The researcher waited for the media hype to die down for a period before administering the remaining surveys, as to reduce the intense media presence and bias regarding corruption by elected officials.

After the researcher received the appropriate approvals from each stakeholder group, the survey instrument was administered to each willing participant. Again, the researcher assured the participants of confidentiality, and no names were requested or used on the survey. This assured the participants complete anonymity. In cases where respondents submitted their response to the researcher electronically by email, the researcher printed the survey without the name, or covers memo email identifying the sender, and placed the survey with all of the others to be entered to assure confidentiality. The researcher administered the test in a well- lighted and comfortable meeting room. Participants were told that if they needed a break or needed refreshments they could take the time needed. The participants were voluntary and agreed to take the test. The

researcher only made brief remarks regarding the test and asked if there were any questions regarding how to complete the survey. Participants were asked to follow the instructions on the survey, and use their best judgment in answering the questions. Additionally, all participants were informed that there was no right or wrong answers on the survey.

### Analytical Methods

According to Argyrous (2005), the following statistical procedures are appropriate for analyzing Likert scales, ratings and ranking scales. The following statistical methodologies and procedures were used to analyze the data from the survey instrument included: descriptive statistics (frequencies, means, and standard deviations), univariate statistical analysis, bivariate correlations (interval/ratio data), frequencies, cross tabulations, Chi-squares for nominal data, independent-samples t-tests, checking for normality (histograms, skewness and kurtosis), and One-way analysis of variance (ANOVA). Analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) was used to determine if the covariant political affiliation had an impact on the results. These tests were performed by using the above-mentioned statistical tests used to measure the perceptual differences between stakeholder groups for my research instrument. In addition, the researcher wanted to pursue not only the significant statistical differences, but also the practical differences. This analysis was performed on each exploratory hypothesis that had a significant mean difference. The American Psychological Association is now requiring that effect size be reported in addition to the results of the hypothesis testing (Kirk, 1996).

Utilizing the Cohen's *d*, which utilized measurements called standardized mean differences, and was calculated by the difference between two means divided by the

overall standard deviation (Cohen, 1992). Partial Eta squared for effect size, was conducted for ANOVA and ANCOVA, in conjunction with Cohen's d for paired comparisons of means. All of the hypotheses were checked for practical significance by performing these appropriate effect size measurements.

### Limitations

The first limitation of this survey instrument is that it is a newly developed scale. As in all newly developed instruments, there are limitations. One obvious limitation is that the scale may be considered too long and might be construed as being multi-dimensional in nature. Further reduction of scales or the combination of constructs could be addressed by using factor analysis; the scales for each construct could be appropriately addressed. This would result in a shorter survey instrument measuring single constructs versus perceived multiple constructs.

The second limitation was the use of forced choice Likert scales. The researcher utilized forced choice scales to allow the participant to make a decision based on the strongly disagree, moderately disagree, somewhat disagree, somewhat agree, moderately agree, strongly agree. Amongst researchers, there is some disagreement as to using odd versus even Likert scales and it is based on the contextual research of the study.

The third limitation of the survey instrument is reliability such as test-retest. Since the researcher could only give the test once to participants, the reliability of the instrument needs further analysis in testing for all of the constructs being measured. A longitudinal study could assist in reviewing the reliability over a longer period.

Reliability measures could be addressed at this time and incorporate larger stakeholder groups. Ultimately, internal reliability can be performed once sub-scales are identified through further testing such as factor analysis.

The final limitation of this study is this study was conducted it over a highly volatile period of cynicism and high incidents of corruption on the federal, state, and local levels. As discussed in the second limitation of this study, a longitudinal study would average out the levels of cynicism over longer periods. There is a need for a more refined survey instrument, measurement of one-dimensional constructs versus perceived multiple, and a larger more inclusive sample that is representative of the entire electorate.

The survey instrument was quite extensive and covered a multitude of complex concepts and questions for future research. As stated earlier, the researcher had only one chance to survey these groups. If the researcher had better access to larger groups, a larger sample would have been more appropriate. Due to time constraints and access to these groups, the samples were adequate, but the researcher would have preferred to sample more targeted and diverse groups. Accessing groups via the internet and posting on-line surveys using Survey Monkey would have allowed the researcher to capture a larger and possibly more diverse sample, with the intention of capturing a true random sample of stakeholder groups. However, in the end, this is typical of conducting exploratory research.

## CHAPTER IV

### FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

#### Introduction

This section discusses the results. Perceptions are unique, in that everyone has one. The crux of this study is to determine different stakeholder groups' perceptions regarding the perceptions of ethical behavior of political leaders/politicians. The researcher utilized a purposeful sample of selected groups that exerted considerable influence on the political process. The researcher identified stakeholder groups based on shared characteristics such as voting patterns and special interests, advocating for government reforms, and expressing a general interest in better governance. Consequently, the researcher identified stakeholder groups, which have considerable impact on government. These stakeholder groups included government workers, elected officials, union- building trades, business -professional groups, and college students (one of the reasons the researcher used students was due to their impact on the last presidential election.)

This chapter details the findings and conclusions regarding the different stakeholder groups in this exploratory study. The nexus of this research study was based on stakeholder and agency theory. Agency theory advocates there are principals and agents. In government, the agent is the elected official and represents the principal - the electorate. This study explored the consequential effects of the stakeholder interests

wherein distinct stakeholder groups are competing for scarce resources. In this case, stakeholders are competing for government resources, programs and services. Elected officials behaviors are considered important for effective governance. Therefore, the researcher analyzed stakeholder's perceptions regarding elected official's behavior. However, new potential propositions emerged from this study, namely, the inversion of agency theory. This researcher proposed that the agent – the elected official, inverted his or her relationship with the principal and acted as the principal not as the agent. When an elected official's behavior is one that inverts agency theory, the elected official's unethical behavior could move towards corrupt behavior, which could then translate into illegal corrupt behavior (see CUB Model as described in Chapter 1.) This chapter reports findings of the exploratory hypothesis set forth in this research study.

The following exploratory hypotheses were tested using SPSS, and summarized in the findings: There are five major hypotheses with the first three hypotheses containing multiple parts. The major hypothesis for H1 is that there will be significant perceptual differences between elected officials and political leader's behaviors. The hypotheses are broken down in five parts to look at differences in ethical behavior, trust, unethical/corrupt behavior, ethical relativism, and communications between stakeholder groups and elected officials for the first three hypotheses. Hypothesis 4 looked at differences between stakeholders and elected officials on communications. Hypothesis 5 looked at differences between stakeholders and elected officials on the dimension on trust and ethics. An alpha level of .05 was used for all statistical tests, and all independent-samples t-tests used a two-tailed test.

The exploratory hypotheses are described in this section.

*Hypotheses H1-H5*

H1a: There will be significant perceptual differences between elected officials and stakeholder groups regarding political leaders' ethical behavior.

H1b: There will be significant perceptual differences between elected officials and stakeholder groups regarding political leaders' trust.

H1c: There will be significant perceptual differences between elected officials and stakeholder groups regarding political leaders' unethical/corrupt behavior.

H1d: There will be significant perceptual differences between elected officials and stakeholder groups regarding political leaders' ethical relativism.

H1e: There will be significant perceptual differences between elected officials and stakeholder groups regarding political leaders' communications.

*Hypotheses H2A-H2E*

H2a: There will be significant perceptual differences between stakeholder groups based on key demographics (age, gender, and political affiliation) regarding political leaders' ethical behavior.

H2b: There will be significant perceptual differences between stakeholder groups based on key demographics (age, gender, and political affiliation) regarding political leaders' trust.

H2c: There will be significant perceptual differences between stakeholder groups based on key demographics (age, gender, and political affiliation) regarding political leaders' unethical corrupt behavior.

H2d: There will be significant perceptual differences between stakeholder groups based on key demographics (age, gender, and political affiliation) regarding political leaders' ethical relativism.

H2e: There will be significant perceptual differences between stakeholder groups based on key demographics (age, gender, and political affiliation) regarding political leaders' communication.

*Hypotheses H3A-H3E*

H3a: There will be significant differences between elected officials and all other stakeholder groups regarding ethical behavior.

H3b: There will be significant differences between elected officials and all other stakeholder groups regarding trust.

H3c: There will be significant differences between elected officials and all other stakeholder groups regarding unethical/corrupt behavior.

H3d: There will be significant differences between elected officials and all other stakeholder groups regarding ethical relativism.

H3e: There will be significant differences between elected officials and all other stakeholder groups regarding communication.

*Hypothesis 4*

H4: There will be a significant difference between all stakeholders groups and elected officials regarding their level of communications.

*Hypothesis 5*

H5: Political leaders will perceive their level of trust and ethics higher than the various stakeholders who will perceive those same qualities.



## Findings

Initially, and prior to testing the exploratory hypotheses, the researcher performed descriptive statistics on the 46 Likert scale questions by occupation. Stakeholder group means were calculated for each question, as well as total overall group means combined. The 46 Likert questions are described in Table 11.

Table 11

### *46 - Likert Questions*

---

Questions
1. Most politicians/political leaders really try to do the right thing for the citizens (electorate).
2. I consider most politicians/political leaders to be ethical in their behavior.
3. Politicians/political leaders usually promise more than they can deliver.
4. Politicians/political leaders are more honest than the public gives them credit.
5. I trust the media more than I trust politicians/political leaders.
6. I think a politician/political leader can actually be unethical without technically breaking the law.
7. In general, I believe Republicans are more ethical than Democrats are.
8. I believe that politicians/political leaders who are perceived as “religious” generally are more ethical than those who are not religious.
9. Most political leaders/politicians are dishonest.
10. I consider politicians/political leaders who use their own political office to help family, friends, and special interest groups as ethical.
11. Employees of government agencies are generally more ethical than the politicians/political leaders for whom they work.
12. Business leaders are more ethical than politicians/political leaders.
13. In my opinion, the news media generally is too easy on politicians/political leaders.
14. A politician/political leader who says what the public wants to hear to be elected is unethical.
15. A politician/political leader who purposely breaks their promises after being elected is unethical.
16. A politician/political leader who uses or engages in negative campaigning to purposely distort an opponent’s views or positions is unethical.
17. I believe that politicians/political leaders who withhold important information from the public are unethical.
18. Politicians/political leaders generally can be trusted.
19. I believe that politicians/political leaders generally keep their promises
20. Politicians/political leaders generally understand my needs.
21. Most politicians/political leaders who betray the public trust would lie to conceal their wrongdoing.
22. I believe politicians/political leaders who are unethical are also corrupt.
23. I believe that politicians/political leaders who are self-promoting are unethical
24. Politicians/political leaders who seek their own interests over the citizens I consider corrupt.

---

Table 11 (continued).

*46 Likert Questions*

---

Questions
25. Politicians/political leaders favor those special interest groups who can get them re-elected or contribute to their campaign.
26. I think politicians/political leaders should take more polls of their constituents to better understand and serve their needs.
27. Politicians/political leaders who favor one group or special interest group over another are unethical.
28. I consider a politician/political leader who sacrifices his/her own personal interests over those of the electorate (citizens) to be highly ethical.
29. Politicians/political leaders who blame the media or their staff for their own personal mistakes are unethical.
30. I consider politicians/political leaders who use their office to help family, friends as unethical.
31. I consider politicians/political leaders who use their office to help family, friends, and special interest groups as illegal.
32. I believe that good ethics is good politics.
33. If the survival of the politician/ political leader's career is at stake, most politicians/political leaders will compromise their ethics.
34. For a politician/political leader to remain competitive in the field of politics, they will sometimes have to disregard their personal ethics.
35. I believe that the most important concern for a politician/political leader is making sure their personal interests are met even if it means bending or breaking the rules.
36. Communication between the politician/ political leader and voter is important to the effectiveness of government.
37. I believe that politicians/political leaders commitment to ethical behavior is essential for long-term governance strategies.
38. What is ethical varies from how one views the situation.
39. Questions of what is ethical for the politician/ political leader can never be resolved since what is ethical is up to the individual.
40. Whether a politician's/political leader's behavior is judged to be moral or immoral depends upon the circumstances surrounding the action.
41. A politician/political leader must place the interests of society over his/her own political self-interest.
42. For me a politician/political leader's ethical behavior is a critical factor in voting for them.
43. A self-promoting political leader is viewed by me as more "effective" than a non self-promoting political leader.
44. A politician/political leader who ignores individuals or groups who did not contribute to their political campaign is considered unethical.
45. I am satisfied with the level of communication with my politician/political leader.
46. I am satisfied with my ability and access to communicate with my politician's/political leaders.

---

Table 12

*46 Likert Questions - Means by Stakeholder Groups*

Question	Government Employees n = 104 <i>M</i>	Elected Officials n = 65 <i>M</i>	Union- Building Trades n = 75 <i>M</i>	Business Professionals n = 99 <i>M</i>	College Students n = 128 <i>M</i>	*Overall Mean (Mean of Means) <i>M</i>
1	3.89	4.57	3.37	3.79	3.77	3.85
2	3.35	4.49	3.16	3.39	3.51	3.53
3	5.13	4.68	4.56	5.16	5.13	4.98
4	3.49	4.48	3.13	3.33	3.26	3.47
5	2.75	2.49	2.88	2.74	2.8	2.75
6	4.76	4.91	4.4	4.65	4.55	4.64
7	2.89	2.82	2.23	2.93	3.63	2.99
8	2.79	2.88	2.95	3.13	3.87	3.19
9	3.51	4.55	3.45	3.64	3.37	3.63
10	5.06	4.40	4.55	4.89	4.25	4.61
11	4.15	2.83	3.92	3.74	3.72	3.73
12	3.31	2.86	3.11	3.67	3.39	3.31
13	3.08	2.82	3.47	3.56	3.34	3.28
14	4.38	4.02	4.75	4.31	4.39	4.38
15	4.78	4.68	5.03	4.78	5.27	4.94
16	4.97	4.80	4.88	5.11	4.99	4.97
17	4.69	4.40	5.21	4.69	4.90	4.79
18	3.45	4.02	3.23	3.45	3.45	3.49
19	23.18	3.95	3.15	3.36	3.27	3.35
20	3.19	3.74	3.11	3.25	3.27	3.29
21	4.95	4.72	5.15	5.18	4.99	5.01
22	4.59	4.23	4.89	4.66	4.37	4.54
23	3.61	3.40	4.01	3.43	3.54	3.59

\*Mean of all stakeholder groups combined, N=471 for total stakeholder groups

Table 12 (continued).

*46 Likert Questions - Means by Stakeholder Groups*

Question	Government Employees n = 104  <i>M</i>	Elected Officials n = 65  <i>M</i>	Union- Building Trades n = 75  <i>M</i>	Business Professionals n = 99  <i>M</i>	College Students n = 128  <i>M</i>	*Overall Mean (Mean of Means)  <i>M</i>
24	4.58	4.32	4.85	4.69	4.83	4.68
25	5.17	4.58	4.97	5.12	5.04	5.01
26	4.79	4.38	4.99	4.82	4.83	4.78
27	3.81	3.68	4.11	3.73	4.07	3.89
28	4.75	4.80	4.92	4.62	4.94	4.81
29	4.45	4.62	4.77	4.45	4.76	4.61
30	2.09	2.86	2.16	2.16	2.60	2.36
31	3.98	3.18	4.24	4.11	3.70	3.86
32	5.21	5.38	5.35	5.14	4.99	5.18
33	4.74	4.03	4.89	4.58	4.95	4.69
34	4.00	3.37	4.07	3.55	4.28	3.90
35	2.92	2.35	3.45	2.62	2.86	2.85
36	5.58	5.45	5.43	5.52	5.39	5.47
37	5.40	5.35	5.16	5.38	5.14	5.28
38	4.11	4.09	4.20	4.08	4.23	4.15
39	3.36	3.28	3.51	3.07	3.73	3.41
40	3.55	3.54	3.95	3.44	3.87	3.68
41	5.30	5.26	5.19	5.51	5.27	5.31
42	5.39	5.29	5.05	5.44	5.18	5.28
43	2.99	2.86	3.28	3.21	3.73	3.27
44	4.13	4.32	4.65	4.48	4.47	4.41
45	3.57	3.94	3.53	3.57	3.15	3.50
46	3.71	4.51	3.59	3.82	3.12	3.66

\*Mean of all stakeholder groups combined, N=471 for total stakeholders

Table 13

*46 Likert Questions – Standard Deviations by Stakeholder Groups*

Question	Government Employees n = 104 <i>SD</i>	Elected Officials n = 65 <i>SD</i>	Union- Building Trades n = 75 <i>SD</i>	Business Professionals n = 99 <i>SD</i>	College Students n = 128 <i>SD</i>	*Overall Standard Deviation <i>SD</i>
1	1.343	1.089	1.206	1.304	1.029	1.243
2	1.406	1.033	1.209	1.316	1.057	1.276
3	1.089	1.133	1.287	.0987	0.896	1.084
4	1.269	1.032	1.212	1.478	.0974	1.271
5	1.305	1.359	1.162	1.209	1.219	1.247
6	1.347	1.057	1.405	1.272	1.241	1.281
7	1.625	1.638	1.321	1.402	1.577	1.585
8	1.384	1.452	1.365	1.426	1.286	1.435
9	1.526	1.426	1.255	1.396	1.135	1.391
10	1.221	1.344	1.527	1.245	1.436	1.384
11	1.305	1.098	1.271	1.084	1.027	1.216
12	1.141	1.248	1.122	1.051	.0974	1.116
13	1.426	1.333	1.388	1.394	1.307	1.385
14	1.303	1.566	1.164	1.299	1.449	1.372
15	1.206	1.393	1.026	1.282	1.113	1.216
16	1.127	1.416	1.219	1.228	1.245	1.236
17	1.239	1.272	.0891	1.137	1.169	1.217
18	1.276	0.960	1.321	1.281	1.114	1.218
19	1.022	0.981	1.193	1.102	1.070	1.093
20	1.175	1.004	1.269	1.223	1.174	1.189
21	1.056	1.364	1.049	.0962	0.818	1.032
22	1.187	1.235	1.085	1.081	1.135	1.157
23	1.226	1.272	1.202	1.231	1.212	1.236

\*Standard deviation of all stakeholder groups combined, N=471 for total stakeholders

Table 13 (continued).

46 Likert Questions – Standard Deviations by Stakeholder Groups

Question	Government Employees n = 104 <i>SD</i>	Elected Officials n = 65 <i>SD</i>	Union- Building Trades n = 75 <i>SD</i>	Business Professionals n = 99 <i>SD</i>	College Students n = 128 <i>SD</i>	*Overall Standard Deviation <i>SD</i>
24	1.305	1.552	1.182	1.131	1.191	1.226
25	0.908	1.014	0.93	0.848	0.891	0.925
26	1.094	1.366	1.084	1.073	0.957	1.104
27	1.488	1.371	1.279	1.316	1.237	1.343
28	1.252	1.460	1.136	1.426	1.209	1.293
29	1.245	1.195	0.981	1.402	1.063	1.192
30	1.200	1.413	1.151	1.037	1.336	1.259
31	1.481	1.784	1.496	1.362	1.465	1.531
32	1.021	0.896	0.993	1.116	1.076	1.042
33	0.903	1.237	0.924	1.089	0.942	1.047
34	1.351	1.269	1.417	1.543	1.273	1.406
35	1.772	1.556	1.742	1.695	1.601	1.77
36	0.664	0.771	0.932	0.919	0.907	0.847
37	0.854	1.082	0.987	0.955	0.994	0.971
38	1.564	1.411	1.252	1.433	1.4	1.42
39	1.421	1.463	1.288	1.547	1.519	1.475
40	1.506	1.448	1.283	1.52	1.377	1.441
41	1.042	0.871	1.023	0.72	0.945	0.931
42	0.829	0.931	0.985	0.798	1.023	0.925
43	1.153	1.402	1.300	1.416	1.29	1.338
44	1.539	1.572	1.180	1.328	1.397	1.414
45	1.593	1.059	1.554	1.472	1.459	1.476
46	1.562	1.033	1.517	1.431	1.378	1.473

\*Standard deviation of all stakeholder groups combined, N=471 for total stakeholders

Table 14

*46 Likert Questions - Means and Standard Deviations by Gender*

Question	Male	Male	Female	Female
	n= 47	n=247	n= 224	n=224
	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>
1	3.96	1.145	3.72	1.327
2	3.72	1.183	3.32	1.347
3	4.92	1.079	5.05	1.087
4	3.66	1.236	3.27	1.282
5	2.70	1.232	2.79	1.266
6	4.67	1.295	4.62	1.265
7	3.10	1.548	2.86	1.619
8	3.21	1.354	3.17	1.521
9	3.78	1.368	3.47	1.401
10	4.48	1.431	4.76	1.317
11	3.73	1.207	3.72	1.229
12	3.23	1.199	3.40	1.011
13	3.22	1.407	3.33	1.362
14	4.28	1.364	4.49	1.372
15	4.90	1.189	4.98	1.247
16	4.98	1.181	4.96	1.298
17	4.79	1.159	4.79	1.281
18	3.59	1.179	3.39	1.255
19	3.42	1.056	3.26	1.123
20	3.34	1.154	3.23	1.226
21	5.02	1.044	5.00	1.022
22	4.53	1.154	4.55	1.162
23	3.60	1.245	3.57	1.229

\*N=471 for total stakeholder group

Table 14 (continued).

*46 Likert Survey Questions - Means and Standard Deviations by Gender*

Question	Male	Male	Female	Female
	n=247	n=247	n=224	n=224
	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>
24	4.76	1.215	4.49	1.316
25	5.04	.912	4.99	.940
26	4.65	1.176	4.93	1.000
27	3.88	1.356	3.91	1.331
28	4.91	1.288	4.69	1.291
29	4.49	1.189	4.74	1.186
30	2.45	1.299	2.27	1.209
31	4.03	1.469	3.68	1.580
32	5.09	1.104	5.29	.960
33	4.62	1.097	4.76	.986
34	3.91	1.425	3.89	1.388
35	2.83	1.660	2.86	1.747
36	5.40	.905	5.55	.774
37	5.26	.881	5.31	1.063
38	4.15	1.361	4.15	1.466
39	3.43	1.463	3.39	1.491
40	3.69	1.452	3.66	1.431
41	5.35	.898	5.27	.966
42	5.23	.922	5.33	.928
43	3.28	1.367	3.25	1.309
44	4.38	1.397	4.44	1.435
45	3.52	1.487	3.47	1.467
46	3.62	1.528	3.71	1.411

\*N=471 for total stakeholder group



Table 15

*46 Likert Survey Questions - Means and Standard Deviations by Political Affiliation*

Question	Republican n=174 <i>M / SD</i>	Democrat n=179 <i>M / SD</i>	Independent n=112 <i>M / SD</i>	Libertarian n=6 <i>M / SD</i>
1	3.90/ 1.08	3.88/1.29	3.76/1.38	3.17/1.33
2	3.41/ 1.20	3.68/1.27	3.48/1.39	3.17/1.17
3	5.16/ .994	4.75/1.57	5.05/1.05	5.67/.816
4	3.35/ 1.26	3.61/1.30	3.49/1.24	2.67/1.03
5	2.55/ 1.27	2.93/1.25	2.72/1.19	3.33/.516
6	4.75/ 1.15	4.56/1.27	4.60/1.43	4.67/2.16
7	4.10/ 1.43	2.01/1.18	2.75/1.28	4.00/1.67
8	3.81/ 1.35	2.66/1.32	3.09/1.37	3.00/1.55
9	3.52/ 1.27	3.93/1.46	3.38/1.38	2.67/1.37
10	4.67/1.37	4.45/1.42	4.80/1.34	4.17/1.17
11	3.72/1.07	3.64/1.22	3.93/1.37	2.83/1.47
12	3.56/1.04	3.17/1.06	3.16/1.27	3.33/.516
13	3.39/1.41	3.10/1.37	3.32/1.33	4.33/1.63
14	4.43/1.32	4.41/1.39	4.21/1.42	5.0/1.01
15	5.08/1.16	4.90/1.20	4.77/1.31	5.17/.983
16	4.93/1.23	4.98/1.22	5.03/1.24	4.50/1.87
17	4.68/1.23	4.78/1.19	4.98/1.19	4.50/1.05
18	3.49/1.97	3.65/1.89	3.29/1.27	2.67/1.21
19	3.35/1.02	3.44/1.32	3.23/1.11	2.67/1.21
20	3.33/1.11	3.46/1.19	2.98/1.22	2.50/1.63
21	4.95/.957	5.03/1.11	5.05/1.03	5.50/.837
22	4.54/1.08	4.62/1.24	4.40/1.13	4.83/1.17
23	3.63/1.24	3.61/1.27	3.52/1.18	3.00/1.10

\*Note N=471 for all stakeholder groups

Table 15 (continued).

*46 Likert Survey Questions - Means and Standard Deviations by Political Affiliation*

Question	Republican n= 174 <i>M / SD</i>	Democrat n=179 <i>M / SD</i>	Independent n=112 <i>M / SD</i>	Libertarian n=6 <i>M / SD</i>
24	4.84/1.12	4.46/1.39	4.75/1.25	5.00/.984
25	5.09/.911	4.90/.949	5.06/.903	5.33/.816
26	4.72/1.22	4.93/1.02	4.65/1.04	4.50/1.05
27	3.90/1.26	3.93/1.25	3.82/1.57	3.83/1.94
28	4.94/1.27	4.59/1.39	4.97/1.13	4.17/.983
29	4.59/1.17	4.61/1.21	4.62/1.22	4.83/.753
30	2.45/1.28	2.31/1.18	2.30/1.37	2.17/.983
31	3.82/1.49	3.80/1.59	4.03/1.49	4.00/1.67
32	5.28/.982	5.12/1.09	5.16/1.04	4.67/1.21
33	4.73/1.09	4.59/1.01	4.76/1.04	5.17/.983
34	3.82/1.44	3.91/1.39	4.05/1.37	3.67/1.51
35	2.79/1.68	2.93/1.71	2.83/1.71	2.33/2.07
36	5.45/.838	5.55/.750	5.40/1.00	5.00/.632
37	5.30/.952	5.27/.940	5.27/1.07	5.33/.816
38	4.15/1.54	4.15/1.29	4.12/1.44	4.67/1.03
39	3.37/1.56	3.38/1.40	3.35.1.48	3.67/1.37
40	3.64/1.43	3.83/1.42	3.46/1.47	4.17/1.33
41	5.30/.946	5.30/.904	5.37/.968	5.00/.632
42	5.39/.864	5.23/.917	5.18/1.03	5.50/.548
43	3.30/1.42	3.36/1.27	3.04/1.31	3.67/1.03
44	4.32/1.43	4.56/1.32	4.31/1.54	4.17/1.33
45	3.36/1.45	3.84/1.42	3.21/1.51	2.67/1.03
46	3.49/1.46	4.04/1.45	3.37/1.42	2.83/.983

\*Note N=471 for all stakeholder groups

Table 16

*46 Likert Survey Questions - Means and Standard Deviations by Age Groups*

Question	Ages (18-24) n= 128 <i>M / SD</i>	Ages (25-44) n= 133 <i>M / SD</i>	Ages (45-54) n= 93 <i>M / SD</i>	Ages (55 & above) n=117 <i>M / SD</i>
1	3.84/.946	3.75/1.24	3.82/1.33	4.00/1.44
2	3.50/1.00	3.48/1.35	3.41/1.28	3.71/1.44
3	5.09/.926	4.93/1.17	4.84/1.16	5.03/1.07
4	3.27/.978	3.45/1.23	3.42/1.42	3.76/1.43
5	2.84/1.17	2.63/1.17	2.70/1.19	2.80/1.45
6	4.57/1.22	4.73/1.19	4.28/1.49	4.91/1.20
7	3.60/1.57	2.76/1.63	2.45/1.38	2.86/1.50
8	3.80/1.32	3.09/1.38	2.86/1.29	2.91/1.53
9	3.38/1.01	3.44/1.39	3.60/1.54	4.05/1.48
10	4.23/1.35	4.62/1.41	4.82/1.34	4.85/1.35
11	3.67/1.01	3.93/1.22	3.57/1.17	3.68/1.42
12	3.43/1.01	3.35/.993	3.24/1.09	3.21/1.36
13	3.26/1.28	3.17/1.36	3.40/1.54	3.32/1.41
14	4.25/1.42	4.44/1.32	4.42/1.28	4.41/1.44
15	5.20/1.18	4.95/1.01	4.85/1.29	4.71/1.35
16	4.98/1.20	4.77/1.25	5.15/1.13	5.03/1.32
17	4.87/1.21	4.77/1.20	4.74/1.29	4.76/1.20
18	3.47/1.09	3.44/1.28	3.52/1.29	3.56/1.23
19	3.26/1.01	3.34/1.03	3.34/1.15	3.45/1.20
20	3.32/1.14	3.16/1.22	3.34/1.22	3.35/1.18
21	4.93/.825	4.92/1.00	5.12/1.09	5.12/1.21
22	4.32/1.14	4.54/1.18	4.70/1.11	4.66/1.17
23	3.47/1.18	3.60/1.15	3.61/1.36	3.68/1.29

\*Note N=471 for all stakeholder groups

Table 16 (continued).

*46 Likert Survey Questions - Means and Standard Deviations by Age Groups*

Question	Ages (18-24) n= 128 <i>M / SD</i>	Ages (25-44) n= 133 <i>M / SD</i>	Ages (45-54) n= 93 <i>M / SD</i>	Ages (55 & above) n=117 <i>M / SD</i>
24	4.80/1.19	4.61/1.17	4.68/1.41	4.62/1.32
25	4.99/.883	5.00/.905	5.06/.818	5.01/1.07
26	4.77/.941	4.78/1.09	5.01/1.03	4.61/1.31
27	4.01/1.24	3.65/1.24	3.97/1.38	3.98/1.50
28	4.90/1.22	4.71/1.27	4.55/1.42	5.02/1.26
29	4.71/1.21	4.47/1.08	4.51/1.33	4.74/1.17
30	2.59/1.32	2.23/1.12	2.28/1.27	2.32/1.30
31	3.61/1.49	4.00/1.36	4.18/1.54	3.74/1.70
32	4.87/1.14	5.09/1.09	5.42/.812	5.44/.941
33	4.87/.931	4.58/1.02	4.72/1.08	4.58/1.15
34	4.17/1.24	3.91/1.42	3.82/1.50	3.68/1.46
35	2.87/1.55	2.76/1.67	2.80/1.87	2.96/1.77
36	5.42/.759	5.41/.986	5.65/.564	5.45/.942
37	5.05/1.05	5.24/1.01	5.45/.730	5.44/.960
38	4.22/1.31	4.35/1.26	4.09/1.50	3.89/1.61
39	3.69/1.51	3.39/1.28	3.28/1.51	3.24/1.59
40	3.87/1.35	3.85/1.29	3.55/1.55	3.36/1.56
41	5.26/.916	5.20/1.11	5.44/.758	5.39/.851
42	5.17/1.01	5.20/.959	5.29/.916	5.47/.738
43	3.66/1.21	3.30/1.37	3.05/1.14	2.97/1.49
44	4.42/1.31	4.23/1.48	4.51/1.28	4.51/1.55
45	3.19/1.39	3.52/1.62	3.70/1.38	3.66/1.43
46	3.21/1.40	3.57/1.48	3.98/1.41	4.01/1.46

\*Note: N=471 for all stakeholder groups


The midpoint for the Likert scale is 3.5 which equates to the point between somewhat disagree and somewhat agree. These scales did not include a neutral response and are based on a six-point Likert scale. The higher the response the more agreement there is, and conversely, the lower the score the more disagreement. The scaling for the instrument was 1 - strongly disagree, 2 - moderately disagree, 3 - somewhat disagree, 4 - somewhat agree, 5 - moderately agree, 6 - strongly agree.

Occupational group as identified in Figures 10 - 54, graphs the 46 Likert scale questions. These included means for each individual stakeholder group, and the overall stakeholder groups means for the total groups. The overall group stakeholder means were calculated by dividing each stakeholder group by the total n size of 471 divided by 5 - the number of stakeholder groups.

For illustrative purposes, the stakeholder groups were graphed against each other including the overall stakeholder group means. These graphs give the reader a quick snapshot of how each stakeholder group (government employee, elected official, union-building trades, business professionals, and college students) answered the questions. Further statistical analysis of mean differences were conducted to test the exploratory hypothesis. The level of practical significance utilizing a Cohen's *d* was calculated when appropriate. According to Cohen (1988), the standard interpretation is .8 or larger = large (8/10 of a standard deviation unit); .5 = moderate (1/2 of a standard deviation); and .2 = small (1/5 of a standard deviation). As presented in the findings summary table, statistical significance is reported as well as Cohen's *d* - practical significance.


The next section reports the mean differences between stakeholder groups on the 46 - Likert questions. Using descriptive statistics, the 46 Likert questions on the survey

instrument were graphed by stakeholder groups: government employees, elected officials, union-building trades, business professionals, and college students. The following Figures 9 - 54 graphically illustrated the means of stakeholder groups. Elected officials were different from all other stakeholder group on each of the 46 Likert questions. These graphs reflected the overall differences between stakeholder groups and elected officials. Subsequently, the findings showed statistical differences using a variety of statistical techniques.



*Figure 9.* Occupational stakeholder group breakdown percentage

The next section illustrates the 46 Likert questions for all stakeholder groups. For purposes of this research study, the researcher did not differentiate the differences between political leaders and politicians in these 46 Likert questions, as not to skew the results from some respondent's perceptions of politicians as having a possible negative connotation. In all of the 46 Likert questions politicians are denoted as POL and political leaders are PL.



Strongly Disagree    Moderately Disagree    Somewhat Disagree    Somewhat Agree    Moderately Agree    Strongly Agree

1                    2                    3                    4                    5                    6

Figure 10. Question 1 - most pol/pl really try to do the right thing for the citizens.




Figure 11. Question 2 - I consider most pol/pl to be ethical in their behavior.




Figure 12. Question 3 - pol/pl usually promise more than they can deliver.




Figure 13. Question 4 - pol/pl are more honest than the public gives them credit for.






Figure 14. Question 5 - I trust the media more than I trust pol/pl.




Figure 15. Question 6 - I think a pol/pl can actually be unethical without technically breaking the law.




Figure 16. Question 7- in general I believe Republicans are more ethical than Democrats.




Figure 17. Question 8 - I believe that pol/pl who are perceived as “religious” generally are more ethical than those who are not religious.




Figure 18. Question 9 - most pol/pl are dishonest.




Figure 19. Question 10 - I consider pol/pl who use their office to help family, friends, and special interest groups as ethical.




Figure 20. Question 11 - employees of government agencies are generally more ethical than the pol/pl for whom they work.




Figure 21. Question 12 - business leaders are more ethical than pol/pl are.




Figure 22. Question 13 - in my opinion, the news media is generally too easy on pol/pl.




Figure 23. Question 14 - a pol/pl who says what the public wants to hear to be elected is unethical.




Figure 24. Question 15 - a pol/pl who purposely breaks their promises after being elected is unethical.




Figure 25. Question 16 - a pol/pl who uses or engages in negative campaigning to purposely distort an opponent's views or positions is unethical.




Figure 26. Question 17 - I believe that pol/pl who withhold important information from the public are unethical.




Figure 27. Question 18 - pol/pl generally can be trusted.




Figure 28. Question 19 - I believe that pol/pl generally keep their promises.




Figure 29. Question 20 - pol/pl generally understand my needs.






Figure 30. Question 21 - most pol/pl who betray the public trust would lie to conceal their wrongdoing.




Figure 31. Question 22 - I believe that pol/pl who are unethical are also corrupt.




Figure 32. Question 23 - I believe that pol/pl who are self-promoting are unethical.




Figure 33. Question 24 - pol/pl who seek their own interest over the citizens i consider corrupt.




Figure 34. Question 25 - pol/pl favor those special interest groups that get them re-elected or contribute to their campaign.




Figure 35. Question 26 - I think pol/pl should take more polls of their constituents to better understand and serve their needs.




Figure 36. Question 27 - pol/pl who favor one group or special interest group over another is unethical.




Figure 37. Question 28 - I consider a pol/pl who sacrifices his/her own personal interests over those of the electorate (citizens) to be highly ethical.




Figure 38. Question 29 - pol/pl who blame the media or their staff for their own personal mistakes are unethical.




Figure 39. Question 30 - I consider pol/pl who use their office to help family, friends as unethical.




Figure 40. Question 31 - I consider pol/pl who use their office to help family, friends, and special interest groups as illegal.




Figure 41. Question 32 - I believe that good ethics is good politics.




Figure 42. Question 33 - if the survival of the pol/pl career is at stake, most pol/pl will compromise their ethics.




Figure 43. Question 34 - for a pol/pl to remain competitive in the field of politics, they will sometimes have to disregard their personal ethics.




Figure 44. Question 35 - I believe that the most important concern for a pol/pl is making sure their personal interests are met even it means bending or breaking the rules.




Figure 45. Question 36 - communication between the pol/pl and voter is important for the effectiveness of government.






Figure 46. Question 37 - I believe that pol/pl commitment to ethical behavior is essential for long-term governance strategies.




Figure 47. Question 38 - what is ethical varies from how one views the situation.




Figure 48. Question 39 - questions of what is ethical for the politician can never be resolved since what is ethical is up to the individual.




Figure 49. Question 40 - whether a pol/pl behavior is judged to be moral or immoral depends upon the circumstances surrounding the action.




Figure 50. Question 41 - a pol/pl must place the interests of society over his/her own self-interest.




Figure 51. Question 42 - for me a pol/pl ethical behavior is a critical factor in voting for them.




Figure 52. Question 43 - a self promoting pol/pl is viewed as more “effective” than a non self-promoting political leader.




Figure 53. Question 44 - a pol/pl who ignores individuals or groups who did not contribute to their political campaign is considered unethical.




Figure 54. Question 45 - I am satisfied with the level of communication with my pol/pl.




Figure 55. Question 46 - I am satisfied with my ability and access to communicate with my pol/pl.

Further analysis was performed on the variables using Analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) to test for homogeneity and intergroup differences in perceptual differences between stakeholder groups regarding political leaders' ethical behavior. In this analysis, a number of significant dynamics were identified to test for each hypothesis. As identified by Mertler and Vannatta (2005):

Analysis of covariance parallels the above procedure of ANOVA, with one additional component: The adjustment of the dependent value scores. Initially, the covariant is measured prior to the manipulation of the independent variable. Following the implementation of treatments, the dependent measures are collected. The initial phase of the analysis involves the statistical adjustment of the dependent variable group means in order to control for the effects of the covariant on the dependent variable. (p. 100)

In this research study, the findings were analyzed utilizing several techniques: descriptive statistics, Chi-square, independent- samples t-tests, One-way analysis of variance (ANOVA), Cohen's *d* for practical significance is also calculated and reported next to the mean differences. ANCOVA was run using political party affiliation as the covariant. Summary tables for the five exploratory hypotheses show the major findings with the appropriate effect sizes.

Cohen's *d* is an important consideration in that many disciplines are placing increased emphasis on reporting effect size (Kirk, 1996). While statistical hypothesis testing provides a way to tell the odds that differences are real according to Kirk, effect sizes provide a way to judge the relative importance of those differences. "For example, the American Psychological Association (APA) are now requiring that effect sizes be

reported in addition to the results of the hypothesis tests” (Kirk, p.103). The results of the Cohen’s *d* test are defined as effect size of .2 small, .5 medium, and .8 large (Kirk).

The next section describes the statistical analysis for each exploratory hypothesis.

### *Hypothesis H1*

H1: There will be significant perceptual differences between elected officials and stakeholder groups regarding political leader’s behaviors. There are several parts to this overall hypothesis, which is broken down by H1a-e and described below.

H1a: There will be significant perceptual differences between elected officials and stakeholder groups regarding political leaders’ ethical behavior. (Questions mapped to hypothesis – 75, 70, 53d, 56d, 60, 59, 57a-f.) Note: (\*) is significant at the .05 level. All questions used to answer the exploratory hypotheses are derived from the researcher’s survey instrument.

- Question 75, was a composite of questions 37 - I believe that politicians/political leaders commitment to ethical behavior is essential for long-term governance strategies, question 41 - A politician/political leader must place the interests of society over his/her own political self-interest, and question 42 - For me a politician/political leader’s ethical behavior is a critical factor in voting for them. A linear combination was formed by running correlations on items in the survey instrument that matched the general perception being measured. Linear combinations were utilized if the question that matched the overall perception being measured resulted in a correlation score of 4.50 or higher, and based on the researcher’s judgment using face validity. Since this was an exploratory study

and the researcher developed an original scale, which was tested for the first time, factor analysis was not conducted. Future research would include factor analysis.

- Composite question 75 showed there were significant differences between stakeholders groups utilizing a One-way ANOVA,  $F(4, 466) = 2.667, p = .032$ . A Bonferroni post hoc test, found no significant means differences between groups. Additionally, running these questions individually, there were no significant differences between groups. A final test, utilized ANCOVA to determine if there were significant differences remaining after adjusting for political party affiliation as a covariant.

The ANCOVA procedure can only be used if several conditions are met. SPSS was used to provide a statistical test (specifically, an F-test) of the assumption of homogeneity of regression slopes. According to Mertler and Vannatta (2005) they stated,

The null hypothesis being tested in this case is that all regression slopes are equal. If the researcher is to continue to use the analysis of covariance, the researcher would hope to fail to reject that particular null hypotheses, thus indicating that the assumption is tenable and that analysis of covariance is the appropriate technique to apply. In SPSS, this is determined by examining the results of the F-test for the interaction of the Independent Variables (IV's) by the covariate(s). "If the F-test is significant than ANCOVA should not be conducted" (p. 98).

ANCOVA was tested for homogeneity of slopes, if interaction between factors and covariate was not found, a univariate ANCOVA was conducted with political affiliation as a covariant. After adjustments by the covariant of political affiliation were made the significant differences at the .05 mean level between elected officials and other



stakeholder groups were reported. The ANCOVA results are reported only for the mean differences with the ANCOVA contrast model with the partial eta squared. The ANCOVA effects sizes are reported for significant differences in the summary tables H1-H5. In addition, the assumption of homogeneity of regression lines was examined and reported if found tenable.

- Question 75 composite, and running these questions independently (37, 41, and 42) there was an interaction and therefore, ANCOVA could not be run.
- Question 70 consisted of a linear combination of questions 1 - Most politicians/political leaders really try to do the right thing for the citizens (electorate), question 4 - Politicians/political leaders are more honest than the public gives them credit, question 9 - Most political leaders/politicians are dishonest, question 18 - Politicians/political leaders generally can be trusted, question 19 - I believe that politicians/political leaders generally keep their promises, and question 20 - Politicians/political leaders generally understand my needs of the survey instrument.
- Question 70, there was a significant difference with the One-way ANOVA showed  $F(4, 466) = 11.60, p = .01$ . Using a Bonferroni post hoc test, it found that there was a significant means difference between elected officials and government employees (4.6\*) with a Cohen's  $d$  of .864, union-building trades (5.9\*), with a Cohen's  $d$  of 1.07, business professionals (4.5\*), with a Cohen's  $d$  of .793, college student (4.9\*), with a Cohen's  $d$  of 1.05. Since this was a linear combination of six

questions the magnitude of mean scores are composite and are not averaged. ANCOVA was run on composite question 70, and there was an interaction, and could not proceed.

- Running these questions individually with a One-way ANOVA, showed significant differences between all groups. Question 1 - Most politicians/political leaders really try to do the right thing for the citizens (electorate), a One-way ANOVA was run,  $F(4, 466) = 9.038, p = .01$ . Using a Bonferroni post hoc test, it was found that there was a significant means difference between elected officials and government employee (.675\*), with a Cohen's  $d$  of .556, union-building trades (1.196\*), with a Cohen's  $d$  of 1.044, business professionals (.781\*), with a Cohen's  $d$  of .649, and college students (.796\*), with a Cohen's  $d$  of .755. ANCOVA was run and there was an interaction and could not proceed.
- Question 4 - Politicians/political leaders are more honest than the public gives them credit for, was run with a One-way ANOVA,  $F(4, 466) = 14.112, p = .01$ . Using a Bonferroni post hoc test, it was found that there was a significant means difference between elected officials and government employee (.987\*), with a Cohen's  $d$  of .855, union-building trades (1.344\*), with a Cohen's  $d$  of 1.19, business professionals (.1144\*), with a Cohen's  $d$  of .902, and college students (.1.219\*), with a Cohen's  $d$  of 1.21. ANCOVA was run and there was an interaction and could not proceed.

- Question 9 - Most political leaders/politicians are dishonest. A One-way ANOVA was run,  $F(4, 466) = 9.440, p = .01$ . Using a Bonferroni post hoc test, it was found that there was a significant means difference between elected officials and government employee (1.044\*), with a Cohen's  $d$  of .704, union-building trades (1.101\*), with a Cohen's  $d$  of .818, business professionals (.917\*), with a Cohen's  $d$  of .644, and college students (1.187\*), with a Cohen's  $d$  of .915. ANCOVA was run and there was an interaction and could not proceed.
- Question 18 - Politicians/political leaders generally can be trusted, A One-way ANOVA was run,  $F(4, 466) = 4.075, p = .003$ . Using a Bonferroni post hoc test, it was found that there was a significant means difference between elected officials and government employees (.563\*), with a Cohen's  $d$  of .504, union-building trades (.789\*), with a Cohen's  $d$  of .684, business professionals (.561\*), with a Cohen's  $d$  of .503, and college students (.562\*), with a Cohen's  $d$  of .548. ANCOVA was run and there was an interaction and could not proceed.
- Question 19 - I believe that politicians/political leaders generally keep their promises, A One-way ANOVA was run,  $F(4, 466) = 6.723, p = .01$ . Using a Bonferroni post hoc test, it was found that there was a significant means difference between elected officials and government employee (.771\*), with a Cohen's  $d$  of .803, union-building trades (.807\*), with a Cohen's  $d$  of .759, business professionals (.590\*), with a

Cohen's *d* of .628, and college students (.680\*), with a Cohen's *d* of .690.

ANCOVA was run and there was an interaction and could not proceed.

- Question 20 - Politicians/political leaders generally understand my needs.

A One-way ANOVA was run,  $F(4, 466) = 3.022, p = .018$ . Using a

Bonferroni post hoc test, it was found that there was a significant means

difference between elected officials and government employee (.546\*),

with a Cohen's *d* of .503, union-building trades (.632\*) with a Cohen's *d*

of .550, business professionals (.486\*), with a Cohen's *d* of .437, and

college students (.473\*), with a Cohen's *d* of .430. ANCOVA was run

and there was an interaction and could not proceed.

- Question 53d - Studies in the past have rated how honest and ethical

various public professional groups are. Please rate the following

professional groups in a scale of 1-7 with 1 being unethical and 7 being

completely ethical. Table 17 shows the results of these rankings.

Table 17

*Rankings of Different Professions Perceived as being Ethical*

Question Number	Occupation	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>
Q53C	Nurses	5.58	.956
Q 53H	Clergy	5.50	1.251
Q53A	Teachers	5.42	.960
Q53B	Medical Doctors	5.28	1.004
Q53M	Non-Profit Executives	5.22	1.146
Q53J	Small Business Owner	4.86	1.041
Q53L	CPA	4.81	1.245
Q53N	College Students	4.51	1.176
Q53F	Gov. Employees	4.40	1.209
Q53G	Union-Labor Leaders	3.96	1.503
Q53O	Lawyers	3.65	1.411
Q53K	Executive - Large Corp.	3.62	1.272
Q53D	Politicians	3.51	1.226
Q53E	News Media	3.44	1.271
Q53I	Car Dealers	3.00	1.302

\*Professions are ranked from highest to lowest in terms of being perceived as ethical. Highly ethical =7 and lowest =1

Figure 56 is a graphical representation of question 53 regarding the data of occupational rankings from highest to lowest in terms of being considered ethical.




Figure 56. Occupational group rankings in descending order from most to least ethical

\*Note: Highly Ethical = 7, Not Ethical = 1

- Question 56d - Do you feel if a politician changes his or her mind (from an ethical to some questionable position) to get something done for your community that this compromise is considered ethical? The Chi-square study showed  $\chi^2(4, N = 471) = 14.84$   $p = .005$ , indicating there was no independence between groups relating to ethical behavior. Note: Independence means that knowing how one group answers the question will not tell you how the other group will answer the question. Dependence means knowing how one group answers the question will help you know how the other group will answer the question.

- Question 56a - Do you feel if a politician changes his or her mind (from an ethical to some questionable position) to get something done for your community that this compromise is considered unethical? The Chi-square study showed  $\chi^2 (4, N = 471) = 12.73, p = .013$ , indicating there was no independence between groups relating to unethical behavior.
- Question 56b - Do you feel if a politician changes his or her mind (from an ethical to some questionable position) to get something done for your community that this compromise is considered corrupt? The Chi-square study showed  $\chi^2 (4, N = 471) = 19.99, p = .001$ , indicating there was no independence between groups relating to corrupt behavior.
- Question 59 – A high-ranking elected official borrows \$200,000 from a local developer to purchase land. The developer asks for a zoning on his land to be changed from residential to commercial. The elected official contacts the local zoning department and asks for the zoning to be changed from residential to commercial. The zoning is changed at the request of the elected official's request. In your opinion, your reaction to this request from the elected official to the zoning department was: a) this is completely ethical; b) conflict of interest; c) unethical, corrupt, and possibly illegal; d) this happens all the time most politicians would assist in this request. The Chi-square study showed  $\chi^2 (12, N = 471) = 57.10, p = .000$ , indicating there was no independence between groups regarding this question.

- Question 60, which measured what percentage of elected officials believe they act ethically? Utilizing a Chi-square test between all stakeholder groups the results of  $\chi^2 (100, N = 471) = 122.48, p = .063$ , indicates there is independence between groups regarding this question. Percentage testing were conducted on occupational groups and the reported the percentage for government employees (75.26), elected officials (80.22), union-building trades (67.63), business professionals (72.38), and college students (68.09). Another way of looking at this is the percentage of how the groups thought the elected official would rate themselves.
- The second part of question 60 measured what percentages of elected officials believe they act unethically? Utilizing a Chi-square test between all stakeholder groups the results  $\chi^2 (96, N = 471) = 115.23, p = .088$  indicates there is independence between groups. Percentage testing were conducted on occupational groups and the reported percentages for government employees (24.57), elected officials (19.78), union-building trades (30.36), business professionals (27.33), and college students (31.52).

H1b: There will be significant perceptual differences between elected officials and stakeholder groups regarding political leaders' trust. (Questions mapped to this hypothesis - 18, 21, 28, 35, 41, 54.)

- Question 18 - Politicians/political leaders generally can be trusted. A One-way ANOVA was run and there were significant differences between stakeholders groups and elected officials,  $F(4, 466) = 4.075, p = .003$ .



Using a Bonferroni post hoc test, it was found that there was a significant means difference between elected officials and government employees (.563\*), with a Cohen's *d* of .504, union-building trades (.789\*), with a Cohen's *d* of .684, business professionals (.561\*), with a Cohen's *d* of .503, and college students (.562\*), with a Cohen's *d* of .548. ANCOVA was run and there was an interaction and could not proceed.

- Question 21 - Most politicians/political leaders who betray the public trust would lie to conceal their wrongdoing. A One-way ANOVA was run,  $F(4, 466) = 2.389, p = .05$ . Using a Bonferroni post hoc test, it was found that there was a significant means difference between elected officials and union-building trades (-.424\*), with a Cohen's *d* of -.353, business professionals (-.459\*), with a Cohen's *d* of -.389, and college students (-.269\*), with a Cohen's *d* of -.240. ANCOVA was run and there were no significant results between groups.
- Question 35 – I believe that the most important concern for a politician/political leader is making sure their personal interests are met even if it means bending or breaking the rules. A One-way ANOVA was run,  $F(4, 466) = 4.383, p = .002$ . Using a Bonferroni post hoc test found that there was a significant means difference between elected officials and government employees (-.569\*), with a Cohen's *d* of -.341, union-building trades (-1.1099\*), with a Cohen's *d* of -.666, and college students (-.506\*), with a Cohen's *d* of -.323. ANCOVA was run and there was an interaction and could not proceed.

- Question 41 - A politician/political leader must place the interests of society over his/her own political self-interest. A One-way ANOVA was run and there were no significant differences between groups,  $F(4, 466) = 1.520, p = .195$ . ANCOVA was run and no significant results were obtained.
- Question 54 - Many studies show a vast majority of the public are concerned about ethics and corruption in politics today. While not illegal, a politician/political leader might have to compromise some of their values and principles to pass a bill benefiting their community. In looking at how trust was perceived by stakeholder groups for this compromised values by their elected leader to do something that would benefit the community, the Chi- square study showed  $\chi^2 (8, N = 471) = 17.81, p = .023$ , which indicated there is no independence between stakeholder groups.

H1c: There will be significant perceptual differences between stakeholder groups regarding political leaders' unethical/corrupt behavior. (Questions mapped to hypothesis 72, 15, 34, and 44).

- Question 72 (corrupt scale), which was a linear composite of questions 22 - I believe politicians/political leaders who are unethical are also corrupt. Question 23 - I believe that politicians/political leaders who are self-promoting are unethical. Question 24 - Politicians/political leaders who seek their own interests over the citizens I consider corrupt. A One-way ANOVA was run on question 72 and showed there was a significant difference between stakeholder groups,  $F(4, 466) = 3.686, p = .006$ .

Conducting a Bonferroni post hoc test, the study found that there were significant mean differences between elected officials and union-building trades (-1.806\*), with a Cohen's *d* of -.277. ANCOVA was run and there were no significant results between elected officials and other stakeholder groups.

- These questions were run independently and there were significant differences for question 22 - I believe politicians/political leaders who are unethical are also corrupt, a One-way ANOVA was run,  $F(4, 466) = 4.018, p = .003$ . Conducting a Bonferroni post hoc test, the study found that there were significant mean differences between elected officials and government employees (-.356\*), with a Cohen's *d* of -.297, union-building trades (-.663\*), with a Cohen's *d* of -.567, and business professionals (.4.26\*), with a Cohen's *d* of -.370. ANCOVA was run and there were no significant results between elected officials and other stakeholder groups.
- Question 23 - I believe that politicians/political leaders who are self-promoting are unethical, a One-way ANOVA was run,  $F(4, 466) = 4.636, p = .016$ . Conducting a Bonferroni post hoc test, the study found that there were significant mean differences between elected officials and union-building trades (-.613\*), with a Cohen's *d* of -.492. ANCOVA was run and there were no significant results elected officials and other stakeholder groups.
- Question 24 - Politicians/political leaders who seek their own interests over the citizens I consider corrupt. A One-way ANOVA was run and

there were no significant differences between groups,  $F(4,466) = 2.279$ ,  $p = .06$ . ANCOVA was run and there were significant differences between subject effects,  $F(5, 465) = 2.051$ ,  $p > .05$  between elected officials and union building trades ( $-5.47^*$ ), with a Cohen's  $d$  of  $-.459$ , business professionals ( $-.406$ ) with a Cohen's  $d$  of  $-.335$ , and college students ( $-.524^*$ ), with a Cohen's  $d$  of  $-.415$ . The ANCOVA contrasts show,  $F(4,465) = 2.412$ ,  $p = .048$ , with a partial eta squared of  $.020$ .

- Question 15 - A politician/political leader who purposely breaks their promises after being elected is unethical. The One-way ANOVA showed there were significant differences between stakeholder groups,  $F(4, 466) = 4.273$ ,  $p = .002$ . Conducting a Bonferroni post hoc test, the study found that there were significant mean differences between elected officials and college students ( $-.597^*$ ), with a Cohen's  $d$  of  $-.467$ . Running ANCOVA showed no significant results between elected officials and other stakeholder groups.
- Question 34 - For a politician/political leader to remain competitive in the field of politics, they will sometimes have to disregard their personal ethics. A One-way ANOVA was run and there were significant differences between elected officials and other stakeholder groups,  $F(4, 466) = 6.977$ ,  $p = .01$ . Conducting a Bonferroni post hoc test, the study found that there were significant mean differences between elected officials and government employees ( $-.631^*$ ), with a Cohen's  $d$  of  $-.480$ ,

union-building trades (-.697\*), with a Cohen's *d* of -.520, and college students (-.9.12\*), with a Cohen's *d* of -.726.

ANCOVA was run and no significant results between elected officials and other stakeholder groups were obtained.

- Question 44 - A politician/political leader who ignores individuals or groups who did not contribute to their political campaign is considered unethical. A One-way ANOVA showed there were no significant differences between stakeholder groups,  $F(4, 466) = 1.738, p = .140$ . ANCOVA was run and showed no significant results between elected officials and other stakeholder groups.

H1d: There will be significant perceptual differences between elected officials and stakeholder groups regarding elected official's ethical relativism. (Questions mapped to hypothesis - 73.)

- Question 73 (ethical), which was a linear composite of questions 38 - What is ethical, varies from how one views the situation. Question 39 - Questions of what is ethical for the politician/ political leader can never be resolved since what is ethical is up to the individual, and Question 40 - Whether a politician's/political leader's behavior is judged to be moral or immoral depends upon the circumstances surrounding the action.
- The One-way ANOVA study showed there were no significant differences between stakeholder groups on question 73,  $F(4, 466) = 2.341, p = .054$ . However, when the questions were run individually utilizing a One-way ANOVA, question 39 - Questions of what is ethical for the politician/

political leader can never be resolved since what is ethical is up to the individual, the results were significant,  $F(4, 466) = 3.164, p = .014$ . Conducting a Bonferroni post hoc test, the study found that there were significant mean differences between business professionals and college students (-.457\*), with a Cohen's  $d$  of -.305. ANCOVA was run on question 39 and there were significant differences between subjects, elected officials, and college students (-.457\*), with a Cohen's  $d$  of (-.312). The ANCOVA contrast model indicated,  $F(4, 465) = 2.686, p = .031$ , with a partial eta squared of .023. ANCOVA was also run on questions 38 and 40 and no significant results were obtained.

H1e: There will be significant perceptual differences between stakeholder groups regarding political leaders' communications. (Questions mapped to this hypothesis -74, 55.)

- Question 74 (communications), which is a linear combination of questions 19 - I believe that politicians/political leaders generally keep their promises, question 20 - Politicians/political leaders generally understand my needs, question 45 - I am satisfied with the level of communication with my politician/political leader, and question 46 - I am satisfied with my ability and access to communicate with my politician's/political leaders. A One-way ANOVA study showed there were significant differences between stakeholder groups,  $F(4, 466) = 7.746, p = .01$ . Conducting a Bonferroni post hoc test, the study found that there were significant mean differences between elected officials and government

employees (2.485\*), with a Cohen's  $d$  of .692, union-building trades (2.765\*), with a Cohen's  $d$  of .710, business professionals (2.138\*), with a Cohen's  $d$  of .591, and college students (3.334\*), with a Cohen's  $d$  of 1.010. ANCOVA was run and no significant results were obtained.

- Question 45 - I am satisfied with the level of communication with my politician/political leader, was run with ANCOVA, and produced significant results between subjects, with elected officials and college students (.789\*), with a Cohen's  $d$  (.537), with an ANCOVA contrast model,  $F(4,465) = 2.608$ ,  $p = .035$ , with a partial eta squared of .022.
- Question 55 - If a politician/political leader changed their political promises or values to get something done, what in your opinion is the best way for the politician to communicate why they changed their mind or voted that way? The Chi-square study showed  $\chi^2(12, N = 471) = 31.38$ ,  $p = .002$ , indicated there was no independence between groups.

The breakdown of the individual stakeholder groups by percentage are identified in Table 18 and Figure 56.

Table 18

## Best Way Elected Official's Communicate if Changed Mind on Votes

Occupation		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Government employee	Media	53	51.0	51.0	51.0
	Political newsletter	18	17.3	17.3	68.3
	Town hall meeting	28	26.9	26.9	95.2
	Personal invite	5	4.8	4.8	100.0
	Total	104	100.0	100.0	
Elected official	Media	18	27.7	27.7	27.7
	Political newsletter	14	21.5	21.5	49.2
	Town hall meeting	23	35.4	35.4	84.6
	Personal invite	10	15.4	15.4	100.0
	Total	65	100.0	100.0	
Union-building trades	Media	35	46.7	46.7	46.7
	Political newsletter	14	18.7	18.7	65.3
	Town hall meeting	19	25.3	25.3	90.7
	Personal invite	7	9.3	9.3	100.0
	Total	75	100.0	100.0	
Business professional	Media	55	55.6	55.6	55.6
	Political newsletter	22	22.2	22.2	77.8
	Town hall meeting	13	13.1	13.1	90.9
	Personal invite	9	9.1	9.1	100.0
	Total	99	100.0	100.0	
College student	Media	80	62.5	62.5	62.5
	Political newsletter	17	13.3	13.3	75.8
	Town hall meeting	21	16.4	16.4	92.2
	Personal invite	10	7.8	7.8	100.0
	Total	128	100.0	100.0	






Figure 57. Best way for elected leaders to communicate if changed mind

The next section reports the results of support for H1a-e hypotheses

*Hypothesis 1a-e*

H1a: There will be significant perceptual differences between elected officials and stakeholder groups regarding political leaders’ ethical behavior (*partially supported*).

H1b: There will be significant perceptual differences between elected officials and stakeholder groups regarding political leaders’ trust (*partially supported*).

H1c: There will be significant perceptual differences between elected officials and stakeholder groups regarding political leaders' unethical/corrupt behavior (*partially supported*).

H1d: There will be significant perceptual differences between elected officials and stakeholder groups regarding political leaders' ethical relativism (*partially supported*).

H1e: There will be significant perceptual differences between elected officials and stakeholder groups regarding political leaders' communications (*generally supported*).

The next section addressed the second hypothesis of this research study. The overall hypothesis 2 is the same as hypothesis 1 with the exception of age, gender, and political affiliation, were tested. All elected officials were removed from Hypotheses 2.  
*Hypothesis H2*

H2: There will be significant perceptual differences between stakeholder groups regarding political leader's behaviors with respect to age, gender, and political affiliation. There are several parts to this overall hypothesis, which is broken down by H2a-e are described below.

H2a: There will be significant perceptual differences between stakeholder groups based on key demographics (age, gender, and political affiliation) regarding political leaders' ethical behavior. (Questions mapped to this hypothesis -70, 53d, 56d, 59 60, q75)  
Note: elected officials were removed from all hypotheses in H2's as the hypothesis were testing demographic differences between stakeholder groups (government employees,

union-building trades, business professionals, and college students) on age, gender, and political party affiliation.

Additionally, ANCOVA was conducted only on age differences, ANCOVA was run on age and the covariant is political affiliation as in Hypothesis 1 (a-e). Finally, ANCOVA was not run on differences for political affiliation since that is the covariant, and politicians were removed from these hypotheses. The main exploratory research for hypothesis 2 was to look at how stakeholder groups differ from each other with elected officials removed.

- Question 75, which is a linear combination of question 37 - I believe that politicians/political leaders commitment to ethical behavior is essential for long-term governance strategies, Question 41 - A politician/political leader must place the interests of society over his/her own political self-interest, and Question 42 - For me a politician/political leader's ethical behavior is a critical factor in voting for them. A One-way ANOVA was run and there were significant differences between stakeholders groups regarding age,  $F(3, 402) = 3.969, p = .008$ . Conducting a Bonferroni post hoc test, the study found that there were significant mean differences between ages (18-24) and (55 and above) at  $(-.970^*)$ , with a Cohen's  $d$  of  $-.462$ . ANCOVA was run and showed no significant results between age groups.
- Questions (37, 41, and 42) were run independently with a One-way ANOVA, and there were only significant differences for question 37,  $F(3, 402) = 4.014, p = .008$ . Conducting a Bonferroni post hoc test, the study found that there were significant mean differences between ages 18-24 and 45-44 at  $(-.38^*)$  with a

Cohen's  $d$  of  $-.433$ , and between 18-24 and 55 and above at  $(-.400^*)$ , with a Cohen's  $d$  of  $-.398$ . ANCOVA was run and showed no significant results between age groups.

- Regarding gender, an independent- samples t-test was conducted on question 75 and there were no significant differences between gender,  $t(404) = -1.068$ ,  $p = .286$ . Additionally, these questions were run independently, and there were no significant differences for question 37, 41, and 42. Regarding political affiliation, a One-way ANOVA was run and there were no significant differences between groups,  $F(3, 402) = .352$ ,  $p = .788$ .
- A One-way ANOVA was run individually for questions 37, 41, and 42, and there were no significant difference regarding political affiliation.
- ANCOVA was run on question 37, 41, and 42. Question 42 produced significant results on question 42 which indicated age differences 18-24 and 55-above at  $(-.279^*)$ , with a Cohen's  $d$  of , The ANCOVA contrast model indicated,  $F(3, 401) = 1.805$ ,  $p = .146$ , with a partial eta squared of  $.013$ .
- Question 53d - Studies in the past have rated how honest and ethical various public professional groups are. Please circle your unethical/ethical rating on each of the following groups on a scale of 1-7 with 1 being unethical and 7 being completely ethical regarding how Politicians/political leaders/elected political leaders. A One-way ANOVA was run and there were no significant differences between age groups,  $F(3, 402) = .764$ ,  $p = .515$ .
- Question 53d, regarding gender, an independent- samples t-test was conducted and there was no significant difference between gender,  $t(3) = 1.860$ ,  $p = .064$ .

- Question 53d - regarding political affiliation, a One-way ANOVA was run and there were significant differences between groups,  $F(3, 402) = 9.490, p = .01$ . Conducting a Bonferroni post hoc test, the study found that there were significant mean differences between Republicans and Democrats (-.706\*), with a Cohen's  $d$  of -.613. ANCOVA was run and showed no significant differences between groups.
- Question 56d - Do you feel if a politician changed his/her position (from an ethical to some questionable position) to get something done for your community that this compromise is considered ethical. The Chi-square study showed  $\chi^2 (3, N = 406) = .590, p = .899$ , indicated that there was independence regarding age groups. Regarding gender, a Chi-square study showed  $\chi^2 (1, N = 406) = 1.659, p = .198$ , indicated that there was independence between gender groups. Regarding political affiliation, a Chi-square study showed  $\chi^2 (2, N = 406) = 9.645, p = .022$  which indicated that there was no independence between groups regarding this question.
- Question 59 - A high-ranking elected official borrows \$200,000 from a local developer to purchase land and the developer asks for zoning on his land to be changed from residential to commercial. The elected official contacts the local zoning department and asks for the zoning to be changed from residential to commercial. The zoning is changed at the request of the elected official's request. In your opinion, please indicate your reaction to this request from the elected official to the zoning department.

The Chi-square study showed  $\chi^2 (9, N = 406) = 56.94, p = .000$ , which indicated that there was no independence between age groups.

- Question 59, regarding gender, a Chi-square study showed a  $\chi^2 (3, N = 406) = .252, p = .969$  which indicated that there was independence between groups.
- Question 59, regarding political affiliation, a Chi-square study showed  $\chi^2 (9, N = 406) = 6.88, p = .650$ , indicated that there was independence between groups.
- Question 60 - In your opinion, what percentage of politicians/political leaders believe they act ethically? Regarding how groups responded to political leaders acting ethically, the Chi-square test between age groups,  $\chi^2 (75, N = 406) = 142.1, p = .000$ , indicated that the age groups were not independent of each other.
- Question 60, regarding gender, the Chi-square results showed  $\chi^2 (25, N = 406) = 35.00, p = .88$ , indicated there was independence between groups.
- Question 60, regarding political affiliation, the Chi-square results showed  $\chi^2 (75, N = 406) = 71.79, p = .584$ , which indicated there was independence between groups.
- Question 60 - second part - In your opinion, what percentage of politicians/political leaders believe they act unethically? Regarding age, the Chi-square results showed  $\chi^2 (72, N = 406) = 130.53, p = .000$ , indicating the groups were not independent.
- Question 60-second part, regarding gender, the Chi-square results showed  $\chi^2 (245, N = 406) = 26.63, p = .198$ , indicating there is independence between gender.

- Question 60 - second part, regarding political affiliation, the Chi-square result showed  $\chi^2 (72, N = 406) = 63.02, p = .766$ , indicating there is independence between groups.
- Question item 70, was a composite of questions 1 - Most politicians/political leaders really try to do the right thing for the citizens (electorate), question 4 - Politicians/political leaders are more honest than the public gives them credit, question 9- Most political leaders/politicians are dishonest, question 18 - Politicians/political leaders generally can be trusted, question 19 - I believe that politicians/political leaders generally keep their promises, and question 20 - Politicians/political leaders generally understand my needs.
- Question 70 was run using an independent- samples t-test (two-tailed test), there were no significant difference between gender, with males ( $M = 20.97, SD 5.54$ ) and females, ( $M = 19.84, SD = 5.82$ ),  $t(404) = 2.011, p = .045$ . There were no significant differences running a One-way ANOVA, on age and political affiliation. Furthermore, running an ANCOVA showed no significant results between age groups.
- Additionally, running these questions independently, there were no significant difference regarding age for questions 1, 4, 9, 18, 19, and 20. ANCOVA was run on these questions independently and produced no significant results between age groups.
- Regarding gender, running an independent-samples t-test there were significant differences between gender for question 4 - Politicians/political leaders are more honest than the public gives them credit, males, ( $M = 3.50, SD = 1.21$ ), and

females, ( $M = 3.13$ ,  $SD = 1.23$ ),  $t(404) = 3.025$ ,  $p = .003$ , with a mean difference of (.366\*), with a Cohen's  $d$  of .301.

- Regarding political affiliation, running a One-way-ANOVA, there were significant difference between groups for question 4,  $F(3, 402) = 2.987$ ,  $p = .031$ . Conducting a Bonferroni post hoc test, the study found that there were no significant mean differences between political affiliations.
- Question 9 - Most political leaders/politicians are dishonest, a One-way ANOVA found,  $F(3, 402) = 4.745$ ,  $p = .003$ . Conducting a Bonferroni post hoc test, the study found that there were significant mean differences between political affiliations between Republicans and Democrats (-.43\*) with a Cohen's  $d$  of -.338, and between Democrats and Independents (.51\*), with a Cohen's  $d$  of .399.
- Question 20 - Politicians/political leaders generally understand my needs, a One-way ANOVA was run and found,  $F(3, 402) = 3.641$ ,  $p = .013$ . Conducting a Bonferroni post hoc test, the study found that there were significant mean differences between political affiliations between Democrats and Independents (.445\*), with a Cohen's  $d$  of .372.

H2b: There will be significant perceptual differences between stakeholder groups based on key demographics (age, gender, and political affiliation) regarding political leaders' trust. (Questions mapped to hypothesis -18, 21, 28, 35, 41 and 54).

- A One-way ANOVA was conducted on questions 18, 21, 28, 35, 41. The only significant question was 21 - Most politicians/political leaders who betray the public trust would lie to conceal their wrongdoing. Regarding age, the One-way ANOVA for question 21 found,  $F(3, 402) = 4.387$ ,  $p =$



.005. Conducting a Bonferroni post hoc test, the study found that there were significant mean differences between age groups for 18-24 and 45-54 at (-.391\*), with a Cohen's *d* of -.467, and 18-24 and 55 and above at (-.291\*), with a Cohen's *d* of -.290, 25-44 and 45-54 at (-.402\*), with a Cohen's *d* of -.430, and 25-44 and 55 and above at (-.302\*) with a Cohen's *d* of -.278.

- ANCOVA was run on questions 18, 21, 28, 35, 41, and there were significant age group differences between subjects for question 28 - I consider a politician/political leader who sacrifices his/her own personal interests over those of the electorate (citizens) to be highly ethical, resulted in significant differences between age groups 45-54 and 55-above at (-.511\*), with a Cohen's *d* of -.414. The ANCOVA contrast model indicated,  $F(3,401) = 2.457, p = .063$ , with a partial eta squared of .018.
- Question 35 – I believe that the most important concern for a politician/political leader is making sure their personal interests are met even if it means bending or breaking the rules, the ANCOVA showed significant results between subjects age groups, with 25-54 and 55-above at (-.536\*), with a Cohen's *d* of -.313. The ANCOVA contrast model indicated,  $F(3,401) = 1.694, p = .168$ , with a partial eta squared of .013.
- Question 41- A politician/political leader must place the interests of society over his/her own political self-interest, was the only other significant question in this hypothesis The only other significant question

in hypothesis 2b, running ANCOVA was question 41. The age differences between 25-54 and 55-above at (.277\*), with a Cohen's *d* of .486. The ANCOVA contrast model indicated,  $F(3, 401) = 2.089$ ,  $p = .101$ , with a partial eta squared of .015.

- Regarding gender, an independent-samples t-test (two-tail test) was conducted on the above questions (18, 21, 28, 35, and 41) and there were no significant differences for questions 18 - Politicians/political leaders generally can be trusted, question 21 - Most politicians/political leaders who betray the public trust would lie to conceal their wrongdoing, question 28 - I consider a politician/political leader who sacrifices his/her own personal interests over those of the electorate (citizens) to be highly ethical, question 35 - I believe that the most important concern for a politician/political leader is making sure their personal interests are met even if it means bending or breaking the rules, question 41 - A politician/political leader must place the interests of society over his/her own political self-interest.
- Regarding political affiliation, there were no significant differences between questions 18, 21, 28, 35, and 41.
- Question 54 - Many studies show a vast majority of the public is concerned about ethics and corruption in politics today and yet, we know there are many honest politicians/political leaders are doing the right things. While not illegal, a politician/political leader might have to compromise some of their values and principles to pass a bill benefiting their

community In my opinion, regarding this situation a politician should:

(circle one)

- 1) Never compromise principles
- 2) Sometime should compromise principles
- 3) Compromise principles

- The Chi-square study on question 54 showed there was a significant differences between stakeholder groups regarding age,  $\chi^2 (62, N = 406) = 14.24, p = .027$ , which indicated there was no independence between age groups.
- Regarding gender on question 54, the Chi-square showed  $\chi^2 (2, N = 406) = 2.568, p = .277$ , which indicated that there was independence between gender.
- Regarding political affiliation on question 54, the Chi-square statistic showed  $\chi^2 (6, N = 406) = 19.16, p = .004$ , which indicated that there was no independence between political affiliation.

H2c: There will be significant perceptual differences between stakeholder groups based on key demographics (age, gender, and political affiliation) regarding political leaders' unethical and corrupt behavior. (Questions mapped to this hypothesis -72, 56a, 56b, 15, 34, 44, 47b, 47a).

- Question 72, which was a linear composite of questions 22 - I believe politicians/political leaders who are unethical are also corrupt, question 23 - I believe that politicians/political leaders who are self-promoting are unethical, and question 24 - Politicians/political leaders who seek their own interests over the citizens I consider corrupt. A One-way ANOVA was run on age and

showed there were significant differences between stakeholder groups,  $F(3, 402) = 2.752, p = .042$ . Conducting a Bonferroni post hoc test, the study found that there were no significant mean differences between age groups.

- ANCOVA was run also run question 72 and showed significant age group differences between subjects, between 18-24 and 55-above at (-1.069\*), with a Cohen's  $d$  .394, and 25-44 and 55-above at (-.865\*), with a Cohen's  $d$  of .319. The ANCOVA contrast model indicated,  $F(3,401) = 3.029, p = .029$ , with a partial eta squared of .022.
- Question 22 - I believe politicians/political leaders who are unethical are also corrupt, was run independently with a One-way ANOVA, and found,  $F(3,402) = 6.00, p = .001$ . Conducting a Bonferroni post hoc test, the study found that there were significant mean differences between age groups 18-24 and 55 and above at (.654\*), with a Cohen's  $d$  of -.189, 18-24 and 45-54 at (-.410\*), with a Cohen's  $d$  of -.372, 25-44 and 55 and above at (-.429\*), with a Cohen's  $d$  of -.389, and 55 and above and 18-24 at (.654\*) with a Cohen's  $d$  of -.603. ANCOVA was run and there were no significant differences between age groups.
- Question 23 - I believe that politicians/political leaders who are self-promoting are unethical, produced significant results running ANCOVA for between age group subjects,  $F(4,401) = 1.292, p > .05$ , and there were no subsequent significant differences between age groups.
- Regarding gender for question 72, an independent- samples t-test (two tailed test) was conducted and there were no significant differences in gender,

$t(404) = 1.368, p = .172$ . Regarding political affiliation, a One-way ANOVA was run and there were no significant differences between political affiliations,  $F(3,402) = .717, p = .542$ .

- Question 56a – Do you feel if a politician changed his/her position (from an ethical to some questionable position) to get something done for your community that this compromise is considered unethical. A Chi-square test was conducted on age,  $\chi^2 (3, N = 406) = 2.24, p = .525$ , indicated that there was independence between age groups.
- Regarding gender for question 56a, the Chi-square test showed  $\chi^2 (1, N = 406) = 1.63, p = .201$ , indicating that there was independence between gender.
- Regarding political affiliation for question 56a, the Chi-square results showed  $\chi^2 (3, N = 406) = 6.71, p = .082$ , indicating that there was independence between political affiliation.
- Question 56b - Do you feel if a politician changed his/her position (from an ethical to some questionable position) to get something done for your community that this compromise is considered corrupt? A Chi-square test was conducted on age  $\chi^2 (1, N = 406) = .669, p = .083$ , indicated that there was independence between age groups.
- Regarding gender for question 56b, the Chi-square statistic  $\chi^2 (1, N = 406) = 4.523, p = .033$ , indicating that there was no independence between gender.
- Regarding political affiliation for question 56b, the Chi-square showed  $\chi^2 (3, N = 406) = 4.50, p = .212$ , indicating that there was independence between political affiliations.

- Question 15 - A politician/political leader who purposely breaks their promises after being elected is unethical, which looked at the concept if an elected official purposely breaks their promises after being elected is unethical. A One-way ANOVA was run by age, and showed there were no significant differences between stakeholder groups by age,  $F(3, 402) = 1.778$ ,  $p = .102$ .
- Question 15 regarding gender, an independent-samples t-test was conducted and there were no significant differences between gender,  $t(404) = -.586$ ,  $p = .558$ .
- Regarding political affiliation for question 15, a One-way ANOVA was run, and there were significant differences between political affiliations,  $F(3,402) = 3.302$ ,  $p = .020$ . Conducting a Bonferroni post hoc test, the study found that there were significant mean differences between Republicans and Independents (.434\*), with a Cohen's  $d$  of .359. ANCOVA was run and produced no significant results on this question 15.
- Question 34 - For a politician/political leader to remain competitive in the field of politics, they will sometimes have to disregard their personal ethics. A One-way ANOVA was run by age, and the study showed there were no significant differences between stakeholder groups,  $F(3,402) = 1.272$ ,  $p = .284$ . ANCOVA was run and produced no significant results on this question.
- Regarding gender for question 34, an independent- samples t-test (two-tailed) was conducted and there was no significant difference between gender,  $t(404) = -.493$ ,  $p = .622$ .

- Regarding political affiliation for question 15, a One-way ANOVA was run and there were no significant differences between political affiliations,  $F(3, 402) = .869, p = .457$ .
- Question 44 - A politician/political leader who ignores individuals or groups who did not contribute to their political campaign is considered unethical. A One-way ANOVA was run by age and there were no significant differences between stakeholder groups,  $F(3, 402) = 1.310, p = .271$ . Additionally, running an ANCOVA produced no significant results on this question.
- Regarding gender on question 44, an independent- samples t-test (two-tailed) was conducted and there were no significant differences between gender,  $t(404) = -.995, p = .320$ .
- Regarding political affiliation for question 44, an ANOVA was conducted and there were no significant differences between political affiliations,  $F(3, 402) = 1.107, p = .346$ .
- Question 47a – Helping a friend or family get a job in government that they might not otherwise get on their own is unethical? A Chi-square study by age showed  $\chi^2(3, N = 406) = 1.116, p = .773$ , indicated the groups were independent of each other. Regarding gender,  $\chi^2(1, N = 406) = 1.303, p = .254$ , indicated that there was independence between gender.
- Regarding political affiliation for question 47a,  $\chi^2(3, N = 406) = .927, p = .819$ , indicated the groups were independent of each other.

- Question 47b – Helping a friend or family get a job in government that they might not otherwise get on their own is corrupt? The Chi-square study by age,  $\chi^2 (3, N = 406) = 16.50, p = .001$ , showed the groups were not independent of each other.
- Regarding gender for question 47b, the Chi-square showed  $\chi^2 (1, N = 406) = 1.446, p = .229$ , indicating the groups were independent of each other.
- Regarding political affiliation for question 47b, the Chi-square showed  $\chi^2 (3, N = 406) = 9.517, p = .023$ , the groups were not independent of each other.

H2d: There will be significant perceptual differences between stakeholder groups based on key demographics (age, gender, and political affiliation) regarding political leaders' ethical relativism. (Question mapped to this hypothesis -73).

- Question 73, which was a composite of questions 38 - What is ethical varies from how one views the situation, question, 39 - Questions of what is ethical for the politician/ political leader can never be resolved since what is ethical is up to the individual, and question 40 - Whether a politician's/political leader's behavior is judged to be moral or immoral depends upon the circumstances surrounding the action. A One-way ANOVA was run by age, and there were significant differences between stakeholder groups by age,  $F(3, 402) = 2.943, p = .033$ . Conducting a Bonferroni post hoc test, the study found that there were no significant mean differences between age groups. ANCOVA was run on question 73, and produced no significant results.
- ANOVA was run individually on questions 38, 39, and 40, and there were no significant differences. ANCOVA was run and significant age group differences



were found on question 38, differences between age differences between 25-44 and 45-54 and above at (.436\*), with a Cohen's  $d$  of (.306). The ANCOVA contrast model indicated,  $F(3,401) = 2.059, p = .105$ , with a partial eta squared of .015.

- Question 39 - Questions of what is ethical for the politician/political leader can never be resolved since what is ethical is up to the individual, ANCOVA found significant age group differences between 18-24 and 55 and above at (.475\*), with a Cohen's  $d$  (.321). The ANCOVA contrast model indicated,  $F(3,401) = 2.161, p = .092$ , with a partial eta squared of .016.
- Question 40 - Whether a politician's/political leader's behavior is judged to be moral or immoral depends upon the circumstances surrounding the action, ANCOVA found significant age group differences between ages 18-24 and 55-above at (.475\*), with a Cohen's  $d$  of (.331) and 25-44 and 55-above at (.410\*), with a Cohen's  $d$  of (.286). The ANCOVA contrast model indicated,  $F(3,401) = 2.437, p = .064$ , with a partial eta squared of .018.
- Regarding gender on question 40, an independent-samples t-test was conducted and there were no significant differences in gender,  $t(404) = 1.367, p = .173$ , and no significant differences were found on questions 38, and 39.
- Regarding political affiliation on question 40, a One-way ANOVA was conducted and there were no significant differences between political affiliations,  $F(3, 402) = .924, p = .429$ .

H2e: There will be significant perceptual differences between stakeholder groups based on key demographics (age, gender, and political affiliation) regarding political leaders' communication. (Questions mapped to this hypothesis - 74, 55)

- Question 74 was a linear composite of questions 19 - I believe that politicians/political leaders generally keep their promises, question 20 - Politicians/political leaders generally understand my needs, question 45 - I am satisfied with the level of communication with my politician/political leader, and question 46 - I am satisfied with my ability and access to communicate with my politician's/political leaders. A One-way ANOVA was run by age, and the study showed there were no significant differences between stakeholder groups,  $F(3, 402) = .875, p = .454$ .
- Regarding gender on composite question 74, an independent- samples t-test (two – tailed) was conducted and there were no significant differences between gender,  $t(404) = .085, p = .933$ .
- Regarding political affiliation on question 74, a One-way ANOVA produced significant differences,  $F(3, 402) = 6.22, p = .01$ , between Republican-Democrats (-1.425\*), with a Cohen's  $d$  of (-.348) and Democrat – Independent (1.9.53\*), with a Cohen's  $d$  of (.453).
- ANCOVA was run on question 45 - I am satisfied with the level of communication with my politician/political leader. The between subjects, with respect to age and political affiliation,  $F(4, 401) = 1.196, p > .05$ , and produced significant age group differences between 18-24 and 45-54 at (.457\*) with a

Cohen's *d* of (-.300). The ANCOVA contrast model indicated,  $F(3, 401) = 1.805$ ,  $p = .146$ , with a partial eta squared of .013.

- Question 46 - I am satisfied with my ability and access to communicate with my politician's/political leaders. ANCOVA was run and showed significant age group differences between 18-24 and 45-54 at (.602\*), with a Cohen's *d* of (-.450), and 18-24 and 55-above at (.582\*), with a Cohen's *d* of (-.394). The ANCOVA contrast model indicated,  $F(3, 401) = 3.713$ ,  $p = .012$ , with a partial eta squared of .027.
- In addition, running these questions (19, 20, 45, and 46) independently, there were no significant differences relating to these questions on gender.
- Regarding political affiliation on question 46, the One-way ANOVA study showed there were no significant differences between stakeholder groups,  $F(3, 402) = .952$ ,  $p = .415$ .
- Question 20 - Politicians/political leaders generally understand my needs, was run with a One-way ANOVA, and was significant,  $F(3, 402) = 3.641$ ,  $p = .013$ . Conducting a Bonferroni post hoc test, the study found that there were significant mean differences between Democrat -Independents (.445\*), with a Cohen's *d* of (.374), and Republicans and Independents (.317\*), with a Cohen's *d* of (.264).
- Question 46 - I am satisfied with my ability and access to communicate with my politician's/political leaders was significant for political affiliation. A One-way ANOVA was significant,  $F(3, 402) = 6.834$ ,  $p = .01$ . Conducting a Bonferroni post hoc test, the study found that there were significant mean differences between

Republicans-Democrats (-.620\*), with a Cohen's *d* of (-.418), and Democrat-Independents (.704\*) with a Cohen's *d* of (-.489).

- Question 55 - If a politician/political leader changed their political promises or values to get something done, what in your opinion is the best way for the politician to communicate why they changed their mind or voted that way? The One-way ANOVA showed that there were no significant difference between age of stakeholders and how elected leaders could better communicate with them. Chi-square was run,  $\chi^2(9, N = 406) = 5.89, p = .750$ , indicating independence between age groups.
- Regarding gender on question 55, the Chi-square results indicated,  $\chi^2(3, N = 406) = 2.09, p = .554$ , indicated there was independence between gender. Regarding political affiliation, a Chi-square  $\chi^2(9, N = 406) = 12.671, p = .178$ , indicated independence between political affiliation groups.

The next section shows Tables 19 – 21 that indicate the percentage of how stakeholder groups answered question 55 by age, gender and political affiliation.

Table 19

*Q55- Best Way Politician would Communicate if they Changed their Mind on a Vote.*

Age		Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
18-24	Media	78	60.9	60.9
	Political newsletter	17	13.3	74.2
	Town hall meeting	22	17.2	91.4
	Personal invite	11	8.6	100.0
	Total	128	100.0	
25-44	Media	61	49.6	49.6
	Political newsletter	23	18.7	68.3
	Town hall meeting	29	23.6	91.9
	Personal invite	10	8.1	100.0
	Total	123	100.0	
45-54	Media	40	51.3	51.3
	Political newsletter	17	21.8	73.1
	Town hall meeting	16	20.5	93.6
	Personal invite	5	6.4	100.0
55 and above	Media	44	57.1	57.1
	Political newsletter	14	18.2	75.3
	Town hall meeting	14	18.2	93.5
	Personal invite	5	6.5	100.0
	Total	77	100.0	

Table 20

*Q55- Best Way Politician would Communicate if they Changed their Mind on a Vote.*

Gender		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Male	Media	124	50.2	50.2	50.2
	Political newsletter	37	15.0	15.0	65.2
	Town hall meeting	59	23.9	23.9	89.1
	Personal invite	27	10.9	10.9	100.0
	Total	247	100.0	100.0	
Female	Media	117	52.2	52.2	52.2
	Political newsletter	48	21.4	21.4	73.7
	Town hall meeting	45	20.1	20.1	93.8
	Personal invite	14	6.3	6.3	100.0
	Total	224	100.0	100.0	

Table 21

*Q55- Best Way Politician would Communicate if they Changed their Mind on a Vote.*

Political affiliation		Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
Republican	Media	92	62.6	62.6
	Political newsletter	20	13.6	76.2
	Town hall meeting	22	15.0	91.2
	Personal invite	13	8.8	100.0
	Total	147	100.0	
Democrat	Media	72	48.0	48.0
	Political newsletter	27	18.0	66.0
	Town hall meeting	38	25.3	91.3
	Personal invite	13	8.7	100.0
	Total	150	100.0	
Independent	Media	56	54.4	54.4
	Political newsletter	23	22.3	76.7
	Town hall meeting	20	19.4	96.1
	Personal invite	4	3.9	100.0
	Total	103	100.0	
Libertarian	Media	3	50.0	50.0
	Political newsletter	1	16.7	66.7
	Town hall meeting	1	16.7	83.3
	Personal invite	1	16.7	100.0
	Total	6	100.0	

The next section reports the results of support H2a-e hypotheses.

*Hypotheses 2a-e*

H2a: There will be significant perceptual differences between elected officials and stakeholder groups based on key demographics (age, gender, and political affiliation) regarding political leaders' ethical behavior (*partially supported*).

H2b: There will be significant perceptual differences between elected officials and stakeholder groups based on key demographics (age, gender, and political affiliation) regarding political leaders' trust (*partially supported*).

H2c: There will be significant perceptual differences between elected officials and stakeholder groups based on key demographics (age, gender, and political affiliation) regarding political leaders' unethical corrupt behavior (*partially supported*).

H2d: There will be significant perceptual differences between elected officials and stakeholder groups based on key demographics (age, gender, and political affiliation) regarding political leaders' ethical relativism (*partially supported*).

H2e: There will be significant perceptual differences between elected officials and stakeholder groups based on key demographics (age, gender, and political affiliation) regarding political leaders' communication (*partially supported*).

The next section addressed the third hypothesis of this research study. The overall hypothesis 3 is the same as hypothesis 1, with the exception all stakeholder groups are combined (government workers, union-building trades, business-professionals, and college students) were tested against elected officials.



### *Hypothesis H3*

H3: There will be significant perceptual differences between elected officials and all other stakeholder groups combined regarding political leader's behaviors. There are several parts to this overall hypothesis, which is broken down by H3a-e are described below.

H3a: There will be significant differences between political leaders and all other combined stakeholder groups regarding ethical behavior (Questions mapped to hypothesis 75, 70, 53d, 56d, 59a)

- Question 75, which is a linear combination of question 37 - I believe that politicians/political leaders commitment to ethical behavior is essential for long-term governance strategies, question 41 - A politician/political leader must place the interests of society over his/her own political self-interest, and question 42 - For me a politician/political leader's ethical behavior is a critical factor in voting for them.
- Question composite 75 was run with an independent- samples t-test (two tailed), there were no significant differences between elected officials and all other stakeholders groups combined,  $t(469) = -.136, p = .892$ . Running these questions independently, there were no significance differences on questions 37, 41, and 42.
- Question 70, was a composite of question 1 - Most politicians/political leaders really try to do the right thing for the citizens (electorate), question 4 - Politicians/political leaders are more honest than the public gives them credit, question 9 - Most political leaders/politicians are dishonest, question 18 - Politicians/political leaders generally can be trusted, question 19 - I believe that

politicians/political leaders generally keep their promises, and question 20 - Politicians/political leaders generally understand my needs.

- Question composite 70, was run utilizing an independent-samples t-test (two-tailed), and there were significant differences between elected officials and all other stakeholder groups combined was significant, all non political stakeholder groups combined, ( $M = 20.41, SD = 5.70$ ), and elected officials, ( $M = 25.31, SD = 4.70$ ),  $t(469) = -6.575, p = .01$ , with a composite mean difference of  $(-4.901^*)$ , with a Cohen's  $d$  of  $-.935$ .
- Questions 1, 4, 9, 18, 19, and 20, were run independently, and were analyzed with an independent-samples t-test.
- Question 1 - Most politicians/political leaders really try to do the right thing for the citizens (electorate), there were significance differences between elected officials and all other stakeholder groups combined was significant, all non-political stakeholder groups combined, ( $M = 3.73, SD = 1.22$ ), elected officials, ( $M = 4.57, SD = 1.09$ ),  $t(469) = -5.180, p = .01$ , with a mean difference of  $(-.835^*)$ , and a Cohen's  $d$  of  $-.724$ .
- Question 4 - Politicians/political leaders are more honest than the public gives them credit, was significant, all non- political stakeholder groups combined, ( $M = 3.31, SD = 1.23$ ), elected officials, ( $M = 4.48, SD = 1.03$ ),  $t(95.753) = -8.203, p = .01$ , with a mean difference of  $(-1.164^*)$ , with a Cohen's  $d$  of  $-1.029$ .
- Question 9 - Most political leaders/politicians are dishonest, was significant, all non- political stakeholder groups combined, ( $M = 3.49, SD = 1.33$ ), elected

officials, ( $M = 4.55$ ,  $SD = 1.43$ ),  $t(469) = -5.958$ ,  $p = .01$ , with a mean difference of  $(-1.069^*)$ , with a Cohen's  $d$  of  $-.769$ .

- Question 18 - Politicians/political leaders generally can be trusted, was significant, all non- political stakeholder groups combined, ( $M = 3.41$ ,  $SD = 1.24$ ), elected officials, ( $M = 4.02$ ,  $SD = .960$ ),  $t(101.321) = -4.510$ ,  $p = .01$ , with a mean difference of  $(-.604^*)$ , with a Cohen's  $d$  of  $-.551$ .
- Question 19- I believe that politicians/political leaders generally keep their promises, was significant, all non-political stakeholder groups combined, ( $M = 3.25$ ,  $SD = 1.09$ ), elected officials, ( $M = 3.95$ ,  $SD = .981$ ),  $t(97.324) = -5.729$ ,  $p = .01$ , with a mean difference of  $(-.705^*)$ , with a Cohen's  $d$  of  $-.703$
- Question 20 - Politicians/political leaders generally understand my needs, was significant, all non- political stakeholder groups combined, ( $M = 3.21$ ,  $SD = 1.20$ ), elected officials, ( $M = 3.74$ ,  $SD = 1.00$ ),  $t(95.876) = -3.796$ ,  $p = .01$ , with a mean difference of  $(-.524^*)$ , with a Cohen's  $d$  of  $-.478$ .
- Question 53d - Studies in the past have rated how honest and ethical various public professional groups are in regards to politicians being ethical. An independent-samples t-test showed that there was a significant difference between elected officials and all other stakeholder groups combined, all non- political stakeholder groups combined, ( $M = 3.38$ ,  $SD = 1.22$ ), elected officials, ( $M = 4.29$ ,  $SD = .931$ ),  $t(103.069) = -6.992$ ,  $p = .01$ , with a mean difference of  $(-.912^*)$ , with a Cohen's  $d$  of  $-.837$ . A Chi-square was run on this question and indicated,  $\chi^2(1, N = 471) = 14.01$ ,  $p = .000$ , indicating there was no independence between elected officials and all other stakeholders combined.

Table 22 shows the percentages of how elected officials answered this question to all other stakeholders combined.

Table 22

*Question 53d - How Ethical or Unethical are POL/PL's*

Q76_plvsotnerstakeholders	others =1	political=2	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Non political stakeholder	1		20	4.9	4.9	4.9
		2	82	20.2	20.2	25.2
		3	121	29.8	29.9	55.1
		4	103	25.4	25.4	80.5
		5	68	16.7	16.7	97.2
		6	9	2.2	2.2	99.3
		7	3	.7	.7	100.0
	Total		407	100.0	100.0	
Politician		2	3	4.6	4.6	4.6
		3	8	12.3	12.3	16.9
		4	25	38.5	38.5	55.4
		5	25	38.5	38.5	93.8
		6	4	6.2	6.2	100.0
	Total		65	100.0	100.0	

Note: (1 = completely unethical, 7 = completely ethical)

- Question 56b - Do you feel if a politician changed his/her position (from an ethical to some questionable position) to get something done for your community that this compromise is considered corrupt. A Chi-square was run  $\chi^2(1, N = 471) = 11.88$   $p = .001$ , indicating there was no independence between elected officials and all other stakeholders combined.

- Question 59a - A high-ranking elected official borrows \$200,000 from a local developer to purchase land. The developer asks for zoning on his land to be changed from residential to commercial. The elected official contacts the local zoning department and asks for the zoning to be changed from residential to commercial. The zoning is changed at the request of the elected official's request. In your opinion, please indicate your reaction to this request from the elected official to the zoning department if this is completely ethical. A Chi-square was run  $\chi^2(3, N = 471) = 13.67, p = .003$ , indicating there was no independence between elected officials and all other stakeholders combined.

The next section, Table 23 shows the percentages of how elected officials versus all other stakeholders combined answered this question.

Table 23

*Question 59 – Scenario Regarding Politician – Developer*

Group		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Non- political stakeholder	A-completely ethical	21	5.2	5.2	5.2
	B-conflict of interest	153	37.7	37.7	42.9
	C=considered unethical/corrupt	156	38.4	38.4	81.3
	D-happens all the times- assists	76	18.7	18.7	100.0
	Total	406	100.0	100.0	
Politician	A-completely ethical	1	1.5	1.5	1.5
	B-conflict of interest	35	53.8	53.8	55.4
	C=considered unethical/corrupt	27	41.5	41.5	96.9
	Total	65	100.0	100.0	

H3b: There will be significant differences between political leaders and all other combined stakeholder groups regarding trust. (Questions mapped to hypothesis - 18, 21, 28, 35, 41 and 54). Significant results are reported.

- Question 18 - Politicians/political leaders generally can be trusted. An independent- samples t-test (two tailed) was conducted, all non- political stakeholder groups combined, ( $M = 3.41$ ,  $SD = 1.24$ ), elected officials, ( $M = 4.02$ ,  $SD = .960$ ),  $t(101.321) = -4.510$ ,  $p = .01$ , with a mean difference of  $(-.604)$ , with a Cohen's  $d$  of  $.551$ .
- Question 35 - I believe that the most important concern for a politician/political leader is making sure their personal interests are met even if it means bending or breaking the rules. There was a significant difference between elected officials and all other stakeholder groups combined, all non- political stakeholder groups combined, ( $M = 2.93$ ,  $SD = 1.56$ ), elected officials, ( $M = 2.35$ ,  $SD = 1.56$ ),  $t(469) = 2.534$ ,  $p = .012$ , with a mean difference of  $(.572)$ , with a Cohen's  $d$  of  $.355$ .
- Question 54 - Many studies show a vast majority of the public is concerned about ethics and corruption in politics today and yet, we know there are many honest politicians/political leaders are doing the right things. While not illegal, a politician/political leader might have to compromise some of their values and principles to pass a bill benefiting their community. A Chi-square was calculated  $\chi^2(2, N = 471) = .125$ ,  $p = .939$ , indicating there was independence between elected officials and all other stakeholder groups combined.

H3c: There will be significant differences between political leaders and all other combined stakeholder groups regarding unethical/corrupt behavior. (Questions were mapped to hypothesis - 15, 34, 44, 47a-b, and 72).

- Question 72, which was a linear combination of questions 22 - I believe politicians/political leaders who are unethical are also corrupt, question 23 - I believe that politicians/political leaders who are self-promoting are unethical, and question 24 - Politicians/political leaders who seek their own interests over the citizens I consider corrupt. An independent- samples t-test was conducted on composite question 72 and there were significant differences between elected officials and all other combined stakeholder groups, all non- political stakeholder groups combined, ( $M = 12.94$ ,  $SD = 2.72$ ), elected officials, ( $M = 11.95$ ,  $SD = 3.36$ ),  $t(469) = 2.623$ ,  $p = .009$ , with a mean difference of (.990\*), and a Cohen's  $d$  of -.323.
- Questions (22, 23, and 24) were run independently, and there were significant difference between elected officials and all other combined stakeholder groups for question 22 – I believe politicians/political leaders who are unethical are also corrupt. The independent- samples t-test showed all non- political stakeholder groups combined, ( $M = 4.59$ ,  $SD = 1.14$ ), elected officials, ( $M = 4.23$ ,  $SD = 1.24$ ),  $t(469) = 2.343$ ,  $p = .020$ , with a mean difference of (.360\*), with a Cohen's  $d$  of -.303.
- Questions 15 and 44 were not significant. Question 34 - For a politician/political leader to remain competitive in the field of politics, they will sometimes have to disregard their personal ethics. An independent-samples t-test was conducted and



showed a significant differences between elected officials and all other combined stakeholder groups, all non- political stakeholder groups combined, ( $M = 3.99$ ,  $SD = 1.41$ ), elected officials, ( $M = 3.37$ ,  $SD = 1.27$ ),  $t(469) = 3.342$ ,  $p = .001$ , with a mean difference of (.621\*), with a Cohen's  $d$  of -.462.

- Questions 47 a - Helping a friend or family get a job in government that they might not otherwise get on their own is unethical. The Chi-square results showed  $\chi^2(1, N = 471) = .006$ ,  $p = .940$ , indicated that there was independence between elected officials and all other stakeholder groups combined. The second part of question 47 b- Helping a friend or family get a job in government that they might not otherwise get on their own is corrupt. The Chi-square results showed  $\chi^2(1, N = 471) = 19.52$ ,  $p = .01$ , indicating that there is no independence between elected official and all other stakeholder groups combined regarding corrupt behavior.

H3d: There will be significant differences between political leaders and all other combined stakeholder groups regarding ethical relativism. (Questions mapped to hypothesis - 38, 39, and 40).

- Questions 38 - What is ethical varies from how one views the situation, question 39 - Questions of what is ethical for the politician/ political leader can never be resolved since what is ethical is up to the individual, and question 40 - Whether a politician's/political leader's behavior is judged to be moral or immoral depends upon the circumstances surrounding the action. An independent- samples t-test showed there were no significant differences between elected officials and all other combined stakeholder groups for questions (38, 39, and 40).

H3e: There will be significant differences between political leaders and all other combined stakeholder groups regarding communication. (Questions mapped to hypothesis - 74, 55, and 62).

- Question 74, which was a linear combination of questions 19- I believe that politicians/political leaders generally keep their promises, question 20 - Politicians/political leaders generally understand my needs, question 45 - I am satisfied with the level of communication with my politician/political leader, and question 46 - I am satisfied with my ability and access to communicate with my politician's/political leaders. An independent-samples t-test was conducted on composite question 74, and there were significant differences between elected officials and all other combined stakeholder groups combined, all non- political stakeholder groups combined, ( $M = 13.42$ ,  $SD = 4.19$ ), elected officials, ( $M = 16.14$ ,  $SD = 2.83$ ),  $t(114.979) = -6.67$ ,  $p = .01$ , with a mean difference of (-2.270\*) with a Cohen's  $d$  of .760.
- Questions (19, 20, 45, and 46) were run independently with an independent-samples t-test, and there were significant differences between elected officials and all other combined stakeholder groups.
- Question 19 - I believe that politicians/political leaders generally keep their promises, all non- political stakeholder groups combined, ( $M = 3.25$ ,  $SD = 1.09$ ), elected officials, ( $M = 3.95$ ,  $SD = .891$ ),  $t(97.324) = -5.729$ ,  $p = .01$ , with a mean difference of (-.705\*), with a Cohen's  $d$  of .703.
- Question 20 - Politicians/political leaders generally understand my needs, all non- political stakeholder groups combined, ( $M = 3.21$ ,  $SD = 1.20$ ), elected officials,

( $M = 3.74$ ,  $SD = 1.00$ ),  $t(95.876) = -3.796$ ,  $p = .01$ , with a mean difference of (-.524\*), with a Cohen's  $d$  of .478.

- Question 45 - I am satisfied with the level of communication with my politician/political leader, all non- political stakeholder groups combined, ( $M = 3.43$ ,  $SD = 1.52$ ), elected officials, ( $M = 3.94$ ,  $SD = 1.06$ ),  $t(11.376) = -3.366$ ,  $p = .001$ , with a mean difference of (-.510\*), with a Cohen's  $d$  of .389.
- Question 46 - I am satisfied with my ability and access to communicate with my politician's/political leaders, all non- political stakeholder groups combined, ( $M = 3.53$ ,  $SD = 1.49$ ), elected officials, ( $M = 4.51$ ,  $SD = 1.03$ ),  $t(111.700) = -6.632$ ,  $p = .01$ , with a mean difference of (-.981\*), with a Cohen's  $d$  of -.761.
- Question 55 - If a politician/political leader changed their political promises or values to get something done, what in your opinion is the best way for the politician to communicate why they changed their mind or voted that way?

(Circle one): Media (TV, radio, newspaper, internet)

- Personal political newsletter
- Town Hall meeting
- Personal invitation to meet personally with you or specific interest groups

A Chi-square was calculated and the results showed  $\chi^2 (3, N = 471) = 18.54$ ,  $p = .01$ , indicating that there is no independence between elected officials and all other combined stakeholder groups regarding this question.

Table 24 indicated the best way politicians/political leader should communicate if they changed their mind on votes

Table 24

*Q55 – Best Way POL/PL’s should Communicate if they Changed their Mind on Votes*

Groups		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Non political stakeholder	Media	223	54.9	54.9	54.9
	Political newsletter	71	17.5	17.5	72.4
	Town hall meeting	81	20.0	20.0	92.4
	Personal invite	31	7.6	7.6	100.0
	Total	406	100.0	100.0	
Politician	Media	18	27.7	27.7	27.7
	Political newsletter	14	21.5	21.5	49.2
	Town hall meeting	23	35.4	35.4	84.6
	Personal invite	10	15.4	15.4	100.0
	Total	65	100.0	100.0	

Figure 58 indicates graphically illustrates the best way a politician/political leader should communicate if they changed there mind on votes.




Figure 58. Best way pol/pl would communicate if changed mind on votes

The next section reports the results of support H3a-e hypotheses.

*Hypotheses H3a -e*

H3a: There will be significant differences between elected officials and all other stakeholder groups regarding ethical behavior (*partially supported*).

H3b: There will be significant differences between elected officials and all other stakeholder groups regarding trust (*partially supported*).

H3c: There will be significant differences between elected officials and all other stakeholder groups regarding unethical/corrupt behavior (*partially supported*).

H3d: There will be significant differences between elected officials and all other stakeholder groups regarding ethical relativism (*partially supported*).

H3e: There will be significant differences between elected officials and all other stakeholder groups regarding communication (*partially supported*).

The next section addressed Hypothesis H4 regarding differences between stakeholder groups and elected officials regarding their level of communications.

#### *Hypothesis*

H4: There will be significant differences between stakeholders and elected officials regarding their level of communications. (Question mapped to hypothesis - 80 is a linear combination of questions 26, 36, 45, and 46).

Question 80, is a composite of question 26 - I think politicians/political leaders should take more polls of their constituents to better understand and serve their needs, question 36 - Communication between the politician/ political leader and voter is important to the effectiveness of government, question 45 - I am satisfied with the level of communication with my politician/political leader, and question 46 - I am satisfied with my ability and access to communicate with my politician's/political leaders.

- Question 80 composite, was run with a One-way ANOVA, and there was a significant mean difference between groups regarding their total overall level of satisfaction with their elected officials,  $F(4, 466) = 5.233, p = .01$ . Using a Bonferroni post hoc test it was found that there was a significant mean difference

between elected officials and college students unions (1.793\*), with a Cohen's  $d$  of .685. ANCOVA was run and there was an interaction and could not proceed.

- Running these questions (26, 36, 45, and 46) individually with a One-way ANOVA, showed significant differences for question 45- I am satisfied with the level of communication with my politician/political leader,  $F(4, 466) = 3.432, p = .009$ . Using a Bonferroni post hoc test, it was found that there was a significant means difference between elected officials between elected officials at college students at (.789\*) with a Cohen's  $d$  of .619. ANCOVA showed significant differences between elected officials and college students at (.789\*) with a Cohen's  $d$  of .537 The ANCOVA contrast model indicated,  $F(4, 465) = 3.483, p = .008$ , with a partial eta squared of .029, and a Cohen's  $d$  of (.537).

Table 25 illustrates the overall mean for the linear combination for the level of communication between elected officials and all other stakeholders combined.

Table 25

*Overall Mean for Linear Combination - Question 80*

	N	Min	Max	Mean	Std.		Skewness	Kurtosis		
					Deviation	Std. Error		Statistic	Std. Error	
Q80_commcomb	471	8	24	17.41	.135	2.941	-.249	.113	-.188	.225
q80-linear										
combination of										
overall										
communication										
Valid N	471									
(listwise)										

\*Note: Midpoint of scale is 3.5. Overall mean 17.41/4 (questions) = 4.353

Government employee mean (17.64/4) = 4.410

Elected official mean (18.28/4) = 4.570

Union- Building trade mean (17.53/4) = 4.383

Business professional mean (17.72/4) = 4.430

College student mean (16.48/4) = 4.120

- Group Comparisons regarding level of satisfaction regarding communications between elected officials and stakeholder groups were conducted. The overall mean for all of the groups combined is (4.353) in addition; the mean of means was taken of all stakeholder groups to eliminate unequal variances between groups with a mean of means of (4.38), for government employees (4.410), elected officials (4.570), union-building trades (4.383), business professionals (4.43) and college students (4.120). This indicates that all groups rate their level of satisfaction regarding their level of communications with elected officials as



positive, with the exception of college students who rate their level of communications under the group mean of (4.353).

The next section addressed the level of cynicism between all stakeholder groups including elected officials as illustrated in Table 26.


Table 26

*A Visual Comparison of Composite Question 80*

---

Cynicism by occupational stakeholder groups

---



1 = strongly disagree, 2= moderately disagree, 3 = somewhat disagree,  
 4= somewhat agree, 5= moderately agree, 6= strongly agree

---

The next section reports the results of support H4 hypotheses.

*Hypothesis 4*

H4: There will be a significant difference between all stakeholders groups and elected officials regarding their level of communications (*partially supported*).

The next section addressed Hypothesis 5, which looked at political leaders perceived their level of trust and ethics higher than the various stakeholder groups who perceive those same qualities. This implies that the public is more cynical than the political leaders who feel they are justified by their experiences as political leaders.

### *Hypothesis 5*

H5: Political leaders will perceive their level of trust and ethics higher than the various stakeholders who will perceive those same qualities. (Question mapped to hypothesis question 90, which was a linear combination of 21, 23, 27, 33, and 35.)

- Question 90 was a composite of question 21- Most politicians/political leaders who betray the public trust would lie to conceal their wrongdoing, question 23 - I believe that politicians/political leaders who are self-promoting are unethical, question 27 - Politicians/political leaders who favor one group or special interest group over another are unethical, question 33 - If the survival of the politician/political leader's career is at stake, most politicians/political leaders will compromise their ethics, and question 35 - I believe that the most important concern for a politician/political leader is making sure their personal interests are met even if it means bending or breaking the rules.
- Question 90 composite, was run with a One-way ANOVA and there were significant differences between elected officials and stakeholder groups,  $F(4, 466) = 7.356, p = .01$ . Conducting a Bonferroni post hoc test, the study found that there were significant mean differences between elected officials and government employees (1.844\*), with a Cohen's  $d$  of -.456, union-building trades (-3.429\*), with a Cohen's  $d$  of -.881, business professionals (-1.351\*), with a Cohen's  $d$  of -.341, and college students (-2.222\*), with a Cohen's  $d$  of -.642. ANCOVA was run on composite question 90, and no significant differences were obtained.
- Question 23 - I believe that politicians/political leaders who are self-promoting are unethical. A One-way ANOVA was run and there were significant differences

between elected officials and stakeholder groups,  $F(4, 466) = 3.088, p = .016$ .

Conducting a Bonferroni post hoc test, the study found that there were significant mean differences between elected officials and union building trades at (.613\*) with a Cohen's  $d$  of -.492.

- Question 33 - If the survival of the politician/ political leader's career is at stake, most politicians/political leaders will compromise their ethics. A One-way ANOVA was run and showed there were significant differences between elected officials and stakeholder groups,  $F(4, 466) = 10.140, p = .01$ . Conducting a Bonferroni post hoc test, the study found that there were significant mean differences between elected officials and government workers (-.710\*), with a Cohen's  $d$  of -.655, union building trades at (-.863\*), with a Cohen's  $d$  of -.787, business-professionals (-.545), with a Cohen's  $d$  of -.471, and college students (-.915), with a Cohen's  $d$  of -.836.
- Question 35 - I believe that the most important concern for a politician/political leader is making sure their personal interests are met even if it means bending or breaking the rules. A One-way ANOVA was run and there were significant differences between elected officials and stakeholder groups,  $F(4,466) = 4.383, p = .002$ . Conducting a Bonferroni post hoc test, the study found that there were significant mean differences between elected officials and union building trades at (-1.099\*), with a Cohen's  $d$  of -.605.
- Questions (21, 23, 27, 33, and 35) were run independently with ANCOVA and question 27 - Politicians/political leaders who favor one group or special interest group over another are unethical, produced the only significant difference

between elected officials and union-building trades (-.469\*) with a Cohen's  $d$  - .520, and elected officials and business professionals at (-.440\*) with a Cohen's  $d$  of -.437. The ANCOVA contrast model indicated,  $F(4, 465) = 2.32, p = .055$ , with a partial eta squared of .020.

The next section reports the results of support H5 hypothesis.

#### *Hypothesis 5*

H5: Political leaders will perceive their level of trust and ethics higher than the various stakeholders who will perceive those same qualities (*partially supported*).

The next section will address the summary of the significant findings for the five exploratory hypotheses.

#### *Summary of the Findings*

Summary Tables for the five hypotheses are reported indicating the questions, statistical technique, effect size, and if hypothesis was supported or partially supported. Only the significant differences mean differences between elected officials and other stakeholder groups are reported. All significant results are reported in this section. Additional ANCOVA tables are illustrated in Appendixes B-G.

Table 27

*Summary of Major Significant Findings for Hypothesis 1A*

Hypothesis 1a	Statistical technique	Significant means differences or % differences between groups	Effect size Cohen's <i>d</i> Note: Cohen's <i>d</i> effect size (.2 small, .5 medium, .8 large)	Supported/Partially Supported
Question 60 – % of elected leader's acting ethically	Chi-square (.063) no independence between groups	% response by group: Gov emp. (75.26) Elect off. (80.22) Union-Bt. (67.23) Bus prof (72.38) College st. (68.09)	Cannot be run on Chi-square	Partially Supported
Question 60 Part 2- % of elected leader acting unethically	Chi-square (.088) No independence between groups	% response by group: Gov emp (24.57) Elect off (19.78) Union-Bt (30.36) Bus prof (27.33) College st. (31.52)	Cannot be run on Chi-square	Partially Supported
	*ANOVA was run on all questions and there were significant findings, however, when ANCOVA was run, there were no significant differences, meaning political party affiliation overwhelmed the ANOVA results.			ANOVA results partially supported, ANCOVA results not supported.

Table 28

*Summary of Major Significant Findings for Hypothesis 1B*

Hypothesis 1B	Statistical technique	*Significant means differences at the .05 level between elected officials and other groups	Effect size Cohen's <i>d</i> - Note: Cohen's <i>d</i> effect size (.2 small, .5 medium, .8 large) Partial eta squared	Supported/Partially Supported
Question 21: Most pol/pl's who betray the public trust would lie to conceal their wrong doing.	ANCOVA	Union-building trades (-.401*) Bus prof (-.449*)	-.387 -.435 Partial eta squared (.019)	Partially Supported

Table 29

*Summary of Major Significant Findings for Hypothesis 1C*

Hypothesis 1c	Statistical technique	*Significant means differences at the .05 level between elected officials and other groups	Effect size Cohen's <i>d</i> Note: Cohen's <i>d</i> effect size (.2 small, .5 medium, .8 large) Partial eta squared	Supported/Partially supported
Question 24: Pol/pl who seek their own interests over citizens I consider corrupt.	ANCOVA	Unions (-.547*) Business (-.406*) College st.(-.524*)	-.459 -.335 -.415 Partial eta squared .020	Partially supported

Table 30

*Summary of Major Significant Findings for Hypothesis 1D*

Hypothesis 1d	Statistical technique	*Significant means differences at the .05 level between elected officials and other groups	Effect size Cohen's <i>d</i> Note: Cohen's <i>d</i> effect size (.2 small, .5 medium, .8 large) Partial eta squared	Supported/Partially supported
Question 39:	ANCOVA	College st.(-.457*)	-.312 Partial eta squared .027	Partially supported
Questions of what is ethical for thePol/pl can never be resolved since what is ethical is up to the individual.				



Table 31

*Summary of Major Significant Findings for Hypothesis 1E*

Hypothesis 1e	Statistical technique	*Significant means differences at the .05 level between elected officials and other groups	Effect size Cohen's <i>d</i> Note: Cohen's <i>d</i> effect size (.2 small, .5 medium, .8 large) Partial eta squared	Supported/Partially supported
Question 45:	ANCOVA	College st.(.789*)	.537 Partial eta squared	Partially supported
		I am satisfied with the level of communications with my pol/pl.	.029	

Table 32

*Summary of Major Significant Findings for Hypothesis 2A*

Hypothesis 2a	Statistical technique	*Significant means differences at the .05 level between age groups with politicians/political leaders (pol/pl) removed.	Effect size Cohen's <i>d</i> Note: Cohen's <i>d</i> effect size (.2 small, .5 medium, .8 large) Partial eta squared	Supported/Partially supported
Question 42:	ANCOVA	18-24 and 55 & above (-.279*)	(.309)	Partially supported
For me a pol/pl's ethical behavior is critical factor in voting for them.			Partial eta squared (.013)	

Table 33

*Summary of Major Significant Findings for Hypothesis 2B*

Hypothesis 2b	Statistical technique	*Significant means differences at the .05 level between age groups with politicians/political leaders (pol/pl) removed.	Effect size Cohen's <i>d</i> Note: Cohen's <i>d</i> effect size (.2 small, .5 medium, .8 large) Partial eta squared	Supported/Partially supported
Question 28:	ANCOVA	45-54 and 55-above		Partially supported
I consider a pol/pl who sacrifices his/her own political interest over those of the electorate (citizens) to be highly ethical.		(-.511*)	(-.414) Partial eta squared (.018)	
Question 35:	ANCOVA	25-54 & 55-above		Partially supported
I believe that the most important concern for a pol/pl is making sure their personal interests are met even if it means bending or breaking the rules.		(-.536*)	(-.313) Partial eta squared (.013)	
Question 41:				
A pol/pl must the interests of society over his/her own political self-interest.	ANCOVA	25-54 & 55-above	(.486) Partial eta squared (.015)	Partially supported

Table 34

*Summary of Major Significant Findings for Hypothesis 2C*

Hypothesis 2c	Statistical technique	*Significant means differences at the .05 level between age groups with politicians/political leaders (pol/pl) removed.	Effect size Cohen's <i>d</i> Note: Cohen's <i>d</i> effect size (.2 small, .5 medium, .8 large) Partial eta squared	Supported/Partially supported
Question 72: (linear combination of questions 22,23, and 24)	ANCOVA	18-24 - 55-above (-1.069*) 25-54-55-above (-.865)	(.394)  (.319)  Partial eta squared (.022)	Partially supported
Question 23: I believe that pol/pl who are self-promoting are unethical.	ANCOVA	18-24 -55-above (.372*)	(.302)  Partial eta squared (.011)	Partially supported

Table 35

*Summary of Major Significant Findings for Hypothesis 2D*

Hypothesis 2d	Statistical technique	*Significant means differences at the .05 level between age groups with politicians/political leaders (pol/pl) removed.	Effect size Cohen's <i>d</i>  Note: Cohen's <i>d</i> effect size (.2 small, .5 medium, .8 large)	Supported/Partially supported
Question 73: Is a linear combination of questions 38, 39, 40.	ANCOVA	18-24 – 45-54 (1.034*) 18-24 -55-above (1.253*) 25-44-55-above (1.024*)	(.299) (.363) (.297) Partial eta squared (.022)	Partially supported
Question 38: What is ethical varies from how one views the situation	ANCOVA	25-44 -55-above (.436*)	(.306) Partial eta squared (.015)	Partially supported
Question 39: Questions of what is ethical for the pol/pl can never be resolved since what is ethical is up to the individual.	ANCOVA	18-24 -55-above (.475*)	(.321) Partial eta squared (.016)	Partially supported
Question 40: Whether a pol. behavior is judged to be moral or immoral depends on circumstances of the situation.	ANCOVA	18-24 – 55-above (.475*) 25-44 – 55-above (.410*)	(.331) (.286) Partial eta squared (.018)	Partially supported

Table 36

*Summary of Major Significant Findings for Hypothesis 2E*

Hypothesis 2e	Statistical technique	*Significant means differences at the .05 level between age groups with politicians/political leaders (pol/pl) removed.	Effect size Cohen's <i>d</i> Note: Cohen's <i>d</i> effect size (.2 small, .5 medium, .8 large) Partial eta squared	Supported/Partially supported
Question 45:	ANCOVA	18-24 – 45-54		Partially supported
I am satisfied with the level of communications with my pol/pl.		(.457*)	(-.300) Partial eta squared (.013)	

Table 37

*Summary of Major Significant Findings for Hypothesis 3A*

Hypothesis 3a	Statistical technique	*Significant means differences at the .05 level between politicians/political leaders (pol/pl's) and all other stakeholder groups combined.	Effect size Cohen's <i>d</i> Note: Cohen's <i>d</i> effect size (.2 small, .5 medium, .8 large)	Supported/Partially supported
Question 70: Linear combinations of questions 1,4,9,18, 19, and 20)	Independent-samples t-test.	(-.4901*) $t(469) = -6.575, p = .001.$	(-.423)	Supported
Question 1: Most pol/pl really try to do the right thing for the citizens (electorate).	Independent-samples t-test	(-.835*) $t(469) = -5.180, p = .001.$	(-.724)	Supported
Question 4: Pol/pl are more honest than the public gives them credit for.	Independent-samples t-test	(-1.164*) $t(469) = -8.203, p = .001.$	(-1.029)	Supported
Question 9: Most Pol/pl are dishonest.	Independent-samples t-test	(-1.069*) $t(469) = -5.958, p = .001.$	(-.769)	Supported

Table 38

*Summary of Major Significant Findings for Hypothesis 3B*

Hypothesis 3b	Statistical technique	*Significant means differences at the .05 level between politicians/political leaders (pol/pl's) and all other stakeholder groups combined.	Effect size Cohen's <i>d</i> Note: Cohen's <i>d</i> effect size (.2 small, .5 medium, .8 large)	Supported/Partially supported
Question 18: Pol/pl generally can be trusted	Independent-samples t-test.	(-.604*) $t(469) = -4.510$ $p = .001$ .	(-.551)	Supported
Question 35: I believe that the most important concern for a POL/pl is making sure their personal interests are met even if it means breaking the rules.	Independent-samples t-test	(.572*) $t(469) = 2.534$ , $p = .012$ .	(.355)	Supported



Table 39

*Summary of Major Significant Findings for Hypothesis 3C*

Hypothesis 3c	Statistical technique	*Significant means differences at the .05 level between politicians/political leaders (pol/pl's) and all other stakeholder groups combined.	Effect size Cohen's <i>d</i> Note: Cohen's <i>d</i> effect size (.2 small, .5 medium, .8 large)	Supported/Partially supported
Question 72:	Independent-samples t-test.	(.990*) $t(469) = 2.623$ $p = .009$ .	(-.323)	Supported
Question 72 is a linear combination of questions 22, 23, and 24.				
Question 22:	Independent-samples t-test	(.360*) $t(469) = 2.343$ , $p = .020$ .	(-.303)	Supported
I believe pol/pl who are unethical are also corrupt.				
Question 34:	Independent-samples t-test	(.621*) $t(469) = 3.342$ , $p = .001$ .	(-.462)	Supported
For a pol/pl to remain competitive in the field of politics, they will sometimes have to disregard their personal ethics.				

Note: There were no significant findings for Hypothesis 3d.

Table 40

*Summary of Major Significant Findings for Hypothesis 3E*

Hypothesis 3e	Statistical technique	*Significant means differences at the .05 level between politicians/political leaders (pol/pl's) and all other stakeholder groups combined.	Effect size Cohen's <i>d</i> Note: Cohen's <i>d</i> effect size (.2 small, .5 medium, .8 large)	Supported/Partially supported
Question 74:	Independent-samples t-test.	(.2.720*)	(-.760)	Supported
Question 72 is a linear combination of questions 19, 20, 45, and 46.		$t(114.791) = -.668,$ $p = .001.$		
Question 19:	Independent-samples t-test	(-.705*)	(.703)	Supported
I believe that pol/pl generally keep their promises.		$t(97.324) = -5.279,$ $p = .001.$		
Question 20:	Independent-samples t-test	(-.524*)	(.478)	Supported
Pol/pl generally understand my needs.		$t(95.876) = -3.796,$ $p = .001.$		
Question 45:	Independent-samples t-test	(-.510*)	(.389)	Supported
I am satisfied with the level of communications with my pol/pl.		$t(111.376) = -3.366,$ $p = .001.$		
Question 45:	Independent-samples t-test	(-.510*)	(.761)	Supported
I am satisfied with the level of communications with my pol/pl.		$t(111.376) = -6.632,$ $p = .001.$		

Table 41

*Summary of Major Significant Findings for Hypothesis 4*

Hypothesis 4	Statistical technique	*Significant means differences at the .05 level between elected officials and other groups	Effect size Cohen's <i>d</i> Note: Cohen's <i>d</i> effect size (.2 small, .5 medium, .8 large) Partial eta squared	Supported/Partially Supported
Question 45:	ANCOVA	College students		Partially Supported
I am satisfied with the level of communications with my pol/pl		(.789*)	(.537) Partial eta squared (.029)	

Table 42

*Summary of Major Significant Findings for Hypothesis 5*

Hypothesis 5	Statistical technique	*Significant means differences at the .05 level between elected officials and other groups	Effect size Cohen's <i>d</i> Note: Cohen's <i>d</i> effect size (.2 small, .5 medium, .8 large) Partial eta squared	Supported/Partially Supported
Question 27:	ANCOVA	Unions building trades (-.469*) Business professionals (-.440*)	(-.520)  (-.437) Partial eta squared (.020)	Partially Supported

The next section will discuss the conclusions of this research study. All results are reported in the previous section in the summary of findings.

## Conclusions

The purpose of this research was to expand the understanding of the role stakeholder's perceptions play in how they view elected officials' behavior. Five stakeholder groups rated their perceptions of elected officials. These perceptions were then compared to how elected officials rated themselves. Since this was an exploratory study, a purposeful sample of stakeholder groups was conducted. Stakeholder groups were selected to represent a wide diversity of the population. Thus, stakeholder groups were chosen as representative samples of the general electorate. These included government employees, elected officials, union-building trades, business-professionals, and college students.

The most significant contribution provided by the current study is its evidence that the concept of perceptions played a critical role in how different stakeholders viewed the behavior of the elected official. The study originated with the interests in the concepts of the stakeholder and agency theories. Donaldson and Preston (1995) argued that, "all persons or groups with legitimate interests participating in an enterprise do so to obtain benefits and that there is no prima facie priority of one set of interests and benefits over another" (p. 68). Freeman (1984) defined stakeholders as "any group or individuals who can affect or be affected by the achievement of the organization's objectives" (p. 46). The researcher postulated these theories could be applied to the government and electorate. Therefore, the stakeholder groups chosen for this study have different interests in the achievement of governance strategies. However, in the political realm, this researcher argued that there is a disparity between how relevant or special interest groups are treated

compared to the ordinary citizen. This study looked at how different stakeholder groups perceived elected official's behaviors.

The second major theoretical influence looked at how agency theory affected the electorate. Agency theory is the relationship between a principal (owners) and the agent of the principal (organizational managers). One interesting benefit produced from this study is the potential for future research, namely, a possible inversion of agency theory. This occurs when the agent acts to takes on the duties of the principal. In the political context, this occurs when an elected official (agent of the electorate) takes on the duties of the principal (electorate). When an elected official takes on the role of the principal, this inversion occurs.

The media is replete with stories of unethical and corrupt politicians. For example, former Illinois governor Jim Edgar stated, "Our place, in terms of being considered one of or the most corrupt state in terms of politics, is pretty secure" (Edgar, 2010, p. A1). To restate, this research study was an exploratory study looking at how relevant stakeholder groups (government employees, union-building trades, elected officials, business-professionals, and college students) viewed ethical and unethical behavior of elected officials. The researcher reviewed the extant literature for existing scales. The investigator identified two research instruments, but they lacked the necessary questions to test the hypotheses for this study. Therefore, the researcher developed an original survey instrument. The research instrument was developed and refined by generating questions from the literature, focus groups, expert panel groups, and elected officials. Once the survey instrument was finalized, the examiner conducted preliminary reliability and validity tests.

Construct validity was verified by the expert panel group and various elected officials who reviewed the questions to determine if the questions were measuring what they were intended to measure, and they confirmed the questions appeared to be valid.

To review, the researcher administered the survey instrument to the various stakeholder groups. Here are the most significant findings.

First, the 46 Likert scales showed that all stakeholder groups had different group means than the elected official. As described in the above narrative, some were significantly different and some were not. The group means indicated that stakeholder groups perceived elected officials differently than elected officials perceived themselves in this study. In most cases, the elected officials rated themselves or viewed themselves more favorably than other stakeholder groups perceived them.

Second, all of the exploratory hypotheses were at least partially supported with the exception of hypothesis 3d, which had no significant differences between groups when ANCOVA was applied. There were significant mean differences at the .05 level for all exploratory hypotheses; however, upon closer inspection the researcher ascertained that political affiliation could confound the results. Therefore, ANCOVA was conducted on all of the exploratory hypotheses controlling for political party affiliation. Subsequently, as outlined in Tables 27 - 42, the results for the differences between groups were significantly reduced. Political party affiliation was a major factor in the group mean differences between all stakeholder groups.

Third, the researcher was interested in the level of cynicism among stakeholder groups. Due to the constant media barrage of unethical and corrupt elected officials being indicted and going to prison, a cynicism index was developed as a sub-set of the 46

Likert questions. All stakeholder groups exhibited higher than average levels of cynicism, assuming a midpoint of 3.5 on a 6 point Likert scale. The overall group mean (combination of all stakeholder groups) was 4.006, which was an unweighted mean. The lowest reported cynicism group was elected officials at 3.636. The highest was union-building trades at 4.322. Due to relatively high levels of cynicism of all groups, to find significant mean differences between stakeholder groups became more difficult. However, there were still significant differences between stakeholder groups.

Fourth, the level of satisfaction for communication between stakeholder groups and elected officials only produced one significant group finding that of the college students. The remaining other groups were not satisfied with the level of communications with their elected officials. This perhaps indicates that elected officials have considerable work to do to improve their communications with various stakeholder groups.

This study revealed some interesting and unexpected findings, for example, the patterns of perceptions of unethical behaviors of the elected official. High levels of stakeholder cynicism along with the perception that some elected officials may bend or break the law is interesting. The two constructs of cynicism and elected official's personal self-interest seemed related. The high level of distrust by all stakeholder groups of their elected officials contributed significantly to this phenomenon. In particular, this exploratory study affirms the importance of studying stakeholder's beliefs about elected officials ethical behavior, communication, and trust.

Additionally, a compelling finding of this study was the results of how stakeholders rated various occupations in terms of being ethical, (on a scale of 1-7 with 1-



being not ethical at all and 7 - highly ethical). The professions ranking from highest to lowest in terms of being rated as ethical are displayed in Table 4.88.

Table 43

*Rankings of Professionals*

Occupation	Rankings
Nurses	5.58
Clergy	5.50
Teachers	5.42
Doctors (Medical)	5.28
Non-Profit Executives	5.22
Small Business Owners	4.86
CPA's	4.81
College Students	4.51
Government Employees	4.40
Labor (Unions)	3.96
Elected Officials	3.62
News Media	3.44
Car Dealers	3.00

\*7=Highly ethical, 1=Not ethical at all

Elected officials are ranked just above news media professionals and car dealers in terms of being considered ethical. While the relative ranking of car salesman is no surprise, the media's low ranking is a disturbing finding, given the fact that in a democracy we rely on the media to be the watchdog of government.

## Implications and Recommendations

A significant result of this research study was the development of a new survey instrument to measure the perceptions of how various stakeholder groups view the behavior of elected officials. There were no satisfactory existing research instruments available to measure the perceptions of stakeholders of elected official's behavior. To the extent this instrument is valid and reliable; there are significant contributions to the study of ethics and perceptions of elected official's behavior. Going into this study, the researcher postulated there would be big differences between stakeholder groups, however, (government employees, elected-officials, union-building trades, business-professionals, and college students) was more aligned than initially postulated. However, there were significant differences between stakeholder groups and elected officials.

Political leaders frequently publically announce their intention to work for the greater good of the public. For example, former U.S. Congresswoman Debbie Halvorson from Illinois publically stated, "Congress should be beyond approach when it comes to ethics and accountability" (D. Halvorson, personal communication, March 4, 2010). Ethics and accountability are central to good governance, and this research study explored the various perceptions of stakeholder groups regarding elected officials behavior. Interestingly, elected officials who took the same survey perceived or rated themselves as being more accessible and more ethical than various stakeholder groups perceived them to be in the same survey. While not totally unexpected, this is one of the first empirical tests of this type of disconnect.

There was a disparity between how the elected officials perceived themselves versus how various stakeholders viewed them. Given these findings, elected officials have work to do to increase how they are perceived regarding ethics and accountability.

This research study was grounded on the concepts of stakeholder and agency theory. However, as previously stated above, some initial conclusions can be drawn regarding agency theory and the possible inversion. Nevertheless, more theoretical-empirical work needs to be conducted regarding the inversion of agency theory. It appears that elected officials, who are the agents of the principals (electorate), act or invert this agency relationship, good governance is affected. An example of an elected official inverting the agency relationship was Elected Official A, an Illinois legislator, who explained his position as state representative:

I am elected to represent those who voted for me. As such, and as a policy expert, I tell my constituents what I need to tell them, as I am the expert. They have elected me to do what is right for them as I know more than they do. (Elected Official A, personal communication, February, 5, 2010)

This statement represents a possible inversion of agency theory. The elected official acted as if he *owned* [italics added] the office and those who elected him worked for him. The severe consequences of inverting agency theory are illustrated by the indictment of former Illinois governor Rod Blagojevich. He was indicted for trying to sell a US senate seat. Former governor Blagojevich, who is the agent for the people that elected him, seems to have inverted the relationship.

On the other hand, many elected officials do understand their position. Elected Official B stated, “The people of my district sent me to Springfield to fight on their

behalf for more open government that is accountable to the taxpayer , and that is what I am trying to do” (Elected Official B, personal communication, May 5, 2010). Elected Official C stated, “We realize always, that is about them keeping their power” (Elected Official C, personal communication, June 7, 2010). Finally, Elected Official D stated, “Politics and governing should not be about fear and anger, it should be about what is right for the voters” (Elected Official D, personal communication, June 8, 2010).

It is unlikely that most elected officials ever realize that they are trying to invert the agency relationship. However, when they think they own government resources for private-personal gain or implement policies that they think their constituents want without actually asking them good governance is comprised. The implications of this type of agency inversion by elected officials can have severe consequences for the electorate. Elected officials who invert the agency relationship are more prone to unethical, corrupt, and corrupt-illegal behavior as indentified in the CUB model. Future confirming research on this construct of inversion of agency theory needs to be done.

As with all research, there are limitations. One potential limitation of this study was the length of the survey. Even though it took participants roughly fifteen to twenty minutes to complete, a more appropriate test should have been completed within ten minutes. Future research utilizing this survey instrument could be scaled down through factor analysis. Potentially, once the scales have been factored analyzed, the scales can be substantially reduced in number.

Another potential limitation of this study was the purposeful sampling techniques utilized in this exploratory research study. Stakeholder groups were chosen based on their participation in the governing process. Even though students seemed less engaged and

informed they are the future electorate. These stakeholder groups (government employees, elected officials, union-building trades, business- professionals, and college students) were selected to be a representative sample of stakeholder groups that influence governance policies. However, these groups might not be representational of all voters in Illinois. Future research would benefit from a more random sample of the electorate. The results would be more generalizable to the population rather than to specific stakeholder groups that were used in this study.

### *Final Thoughts*

Future research could hone in on certain aspects of ways in which elected officials could communicate better with the electorate. The researcher found that the concepts of ethics have different connotations to those surveyed. A more delineated and simplified scale on ethics, ethical behavior, and trust needs to be constructed to reduce ambiguous meanings of the items being measured. In addition, future research would focus on surveying other states such as Florida, Iowa, California, New York, Kansas, and New Jersey, (with the same type of stakeholder groups) and see if the results are similar or different to this study conducted in Illinois.

In conclusion, Rose-Ackerman (1999) described corruption as a relationship between the state and the private sector. Sometimes state officials are the dominant actors; in other cases private actors are the most powerful ones. This exploratory research study set out to determine the nature of perceptions regarding ethical behavior and corruption for elected officials.

Rose-Ackerman argued that high levels of corruption limit investment and growth and lead to ineffective government. She additionally postulated that corruption is not just an economic problem, but it is intertwined with politics.

The initial conclusion about a new construct, the inversion of agency theory was developed. The development of a new survey instrument to study the perceptions of stakeholders regarding elected officials behaviors was an important contribution, finally, understanding the complex nature of perceptions as it relates to ethics and good governance was also delineated. The goal of understanding corruption is not to remove the bad apples and punish them; rather it is establishing credibility by punishing highly corrupt officials (Rose-Ackerman). Additionally, Kass (2010) illustrated this concept of good governance by stating:

Perhaps you have heard of it. Invented by my noble ancestors, the Greeks, it is a system of government by which free people debate ideas sometimes vigorously, sometimes rudely. They elect leaders who are expected to give reasons for their actions. The leaders must form a consensus before they can spend the people's money. Yes, it is indeed a weird system of governance, relatively unknown in these parts. It is called democracy. (p. 2)

In particular, this study is the first attempt to comprehend how the electorate perceived ethical and unethical behaviors of elected officials. Future structural reforms need to be implemented to reduce the unethical and illegal behavior of elected officials. Recently, Chicago's Mayor Richard Daley announced his retirement from office for the last 20 years stated, "This office doesn't belong to me, this office belongs to the people of our city" (Kass, 2010). Now if only our politicians would believe this.

## REFERENCES

- Abnor, I., & Bjerke, B. (1997). *Methodology for creating business knowledge* (2nd ed.). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
- Ackoff, R., & Churchman, C. (1947). An experimental definition of personality. *Philosophy of Science, 14*, 304-332.
- Acton, L. (1887). *Quotations by author*. Retrieved April 2, 2009 from [http://www.quotationspage.com/quote/lord acton](http://www.quotationspage.com/quote/lord_acton)
- Allmon, D. E., Page, D., & Roberts, R. (2000). Determinants of perceptions of cheating: Ethical orientation, personality, and demographics. *Journal of Business Ethics, 23*, 411-422.
- Allum, N., Patulny, R., & Sturgis, P. (2007). Re-evaluating the links between social trust, institutional trust and civic association. *SAPT briefing paper No. 2*. Retrieved on March 20, 2009 from <http://www.uptap.net/project21.html>
- Ancona, D. G. (1990). Outward bound: Strategies for team survival in an organization. *Academy of Management Journal, 33*(2), 344-365.
- Angelo, P. (2008, October 12). Illinois politics without polish. *The Kankakee Daily Journal*, p. E3.
- Agle, B., Mitchell, R., & Sonnenfeld, J. (1999). Who matters to CEO's? An investigation of stakeholder attributes and salience, corporate performance, and CEO values. *Academy of Management Journal, 42*, 507-525.

- Anthony, R. N. (1965). *Planning and control systems: A framework for analysis*. Boston: Harvard University Graduate School of Business.
- Applewhite, A., & Evans, T. (1992). *And I quote: The definitive collection of quotes, sayings, and jokes for the contemporary speech maker*. NY: St. Martins Press.
- Argyrous, G. (2005). *Statistics for research with a guide to SPSS* (2nd ed.). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
- Ashforth, B. E., Gioia, D. A., Robinson, S. L., & Trevino, K. (2008). Reviewing organizational corruption. *Academy of Management Review*, 3, 670-684.
- Ashforth, B. E., & Anand, V. (2003). The normalization of corruption in organizations. *Research in Organizational Behavior*, 25, 1-52.
- Atler, C., & Hage, J. (1993). *Organizations working together*. Newbury Park, CA: Sage .
- Baird, L., & Meshoulam, I. (1988). Managing two fits of strategic human resource management. *Academy of Management Review*, 13, 116-128.
- Baker, G. P., Jensen, M. C., & Murphy, K. J. (1988). Compensation and incentives; practices vs. theory. *Journal of Finance*, 43, 593-616.
- Banning, S. A. (2006). Third-person effects on political participation. *Journalism of Mass Communications Quarterly*, 83(4), 785-800.
- Barney, J., & Ouchi, W. (1986). *Organizational economics*. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
- Barro, R. J., (1973). The control of politicians: An economic model. *Public Choice*, 14, 19.
- Becker, L. B., & Whitney, D. C. (1980). Effects of media dependencies: Audience assessment of government. *Communication Research*, 7, 95-120.
- Beeson, I., & Davis, C. (2000). The emergence and accomplishment of organizational change. *Journal of Organizational Change Management*, 13(2), 178-189.



- Bell, C. (1998). Self-reflection and vulnerability in action research: Bringing forth new worlds in our learning. *Systemic Practice and Action Research*, 11(2), 179-191.
- Beniers, K. J., & Dur, R. (2004). Politicians' motivation, political culture, and electoral competition. (CES info Working Paper 1228). Munich, Germany.
- Beniers, K. J., & Dur, R. (2007). Politicians' motivation, political culture, and electoral competition. *International Tax Public Finance*, 14, 29-54.
- Berman, E. M. (1997). Dealing with cynical citizens. *Public Administration Review*, 57(2), 105-112.
- Berne, R. W., & Freeman, R. E. (1992). *Ethics and affirmative action: A managerial approach*. In R. W. McGee (Ed), Business ethics and common sense. Westport, CT: Quorum.
- Berzok, R. M. (1993). Recipe for effective communication. *Communication World*, 10(9), 22-25.
- Bianco, W. T. (1994). *Trust: Representatives and constituents*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
- Blakstad, M. (1994). Talk to your people, but not too much. *Director*, 47(6), 40-41.
- Blalock, H. M. (1968). The measurement problem, pp. 5-27 in H.M. Blalock & A. Blalock (EDS.), *Methodology In social research*. New York: Hill.
- Block, P. (1996). *Stewardship: Choosing service over self-interest*. San Francisco: Berrett-Kohler.
- Bodensteiner, C. (1993). Knowledge = powerful communications. *Agri-Marketing*, 31(9), 40-43.

- Bogart, L. M., Benotsch, E. G., & Pavlovic, J. D. (2004). Feeling superior but not threatened: The relation of narcissism to social comparison. *Basic and Applied Social Psychology, 26*, 35-44.
- Bohren, O. (1998). The agent ethic's in the principal-agent model. *Journal of Business Ethics, 17*(7), 745-755.
- Bollens, J. C., & Schmandt, H. J. (1979). *Political corruption power, money, and sex*. Pacific Palisades, CA: Palisades.
- Bowler, S., & Karp, A. (2004). Politics, scandals, and trust in government. *Political Behavior, 26*(3), 271-278.
- Box-Steffensmeier, J. M., De Boef, S., & Lin, T. (2004). The dynamics of the partisan gender gap. *American Political Science Review, 98*(3), 515-528.
- Bozeman, B. (1987). *All organizations are public*. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
- Braithwaite, J. (1989). *Crime, shame, and reintegration*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Brinkerhoff, D. W. (2000). Assessing political will for anti-corruption efforts: An analytic framework. *Public Administration & Development, 20*(3), 239-252.
- Bryson, J. M. (1995). *Strategic planning for public and non-profit organizations*. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
- Buchanan, J. M. (1949). The pure theory of government finance: A suggested approach. *Journal of Political Economy, 57*, 496-506.
- Buchholz, R. A., & Rosenthal, S. B. (2004). Stakeholder theory and public policy: How governments matter. *Journal of Business Ethics, 51*(2), 143-153.
- Buss, D. M., & Chiodo, L. M. (1991). Narcissistic acts in everyday life. *Journal of Personality, 59*, 179-215.

- Caiden, G. E. (1990). Official corruption and political stability. *Sri Lanka Journal of Development Administration*, 7(1), 142-166.
- Caldwell, C., & Karri, R. (2005). Organizational governance and ethical choices: A covenantal approach to building trust. *Journal of Business Ethics*, 58(1), 249-259.
- Caldwell, C., Hayes, L. A., Karri, R., & Bernal, P. (2008). Ethical stewardship-implications for leadership and trust. *Journal of Business Ethics*, 78, 153-164.
- Callander, S. (2008). Political motivations. *Review of Economic Studies*, 75, 671-697.
- Campbell, A., Gurin, G., & Miller, W. (1954). *The voter decides*. Evanston, IL: Row & Peterson.
- Campbell, J. D. (1986). Similarity and uniqueness: The effects of attribute type, relevance, and individual differences in self-esteem and depression. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 50, 281-294.
- Campbell, W. K., Goodie, A. S., & Foster, J. D. (2004). Narcissism, confidence, and risk attitude. *Journal of Behavior Decision Making*, 17, 297-311.
- Carey, J. (1994). Political shirking and the last term problem: Evidence for a party-administered pension system. *Public Choice*, 81, 1-22.
- Carmines, E. G., & Zeller, R. A. (1979). *Reliability and validity assessment*. Newbury Park: Sage.
- Carver, C. S. (1979). A cybernetic model of self-attention processes. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 37, 1251-1281.
- Casadesus-Masanell, R. (2004). Trust in agency. *Journal of Economics & Management Strategy*, 13(3), 375-404.

- Casciaro, T., & Piskorski, M. J. (2005). Power imbalance, mutual dependence, and constraint absorption: A closer look at resource dependence theory. *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 50, 167-199.
- Centers, R. (1949). *The psychology of social classes*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press Club.
- Chakravarthy, B. S. (1982). Adaptation: A promising metaphor for strategic management. *Academy of Management Review*, 7, 35-44.
- Charlick, R. B. (1992-93). Corruption in political transition: A governance perspective. *Corruption and Reform*, 7(3), 177-187.
- Chatterjee, A., & Hambrick, D. C. (2007). It's all about me: Narcissistic chief executive officers and their effect on company strategy and performance. *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 52, 351-386.
- Cheung, G. W. (1999). Multifaceted conceptions of self-other ratings disagreement. *Personal Psychology*, 52(1), 1-36.
- Choudhuri, D., Glauser, A., & Peregoy, J. (2004). Guidelines for writing a qualitative manuscript. *Journal of Counseling and Development*, 82, 443-446.
- Clark, H. D., Feigert, F. B., Seldon, B. J., & Stewart, M. C. (1999). More time with my money: Leaving the house and going home in 1992 and 1994. *Political Research Quarterly*, 62, 67-85.
- Clarkson, E. B. M. (1995). A stakeholder framework for analyzing and evaluating corporate social performance. *Academy of Management Review*, 20(1), 92-117.
- Clarkson, M. (1994). A risk based model of stakeholder theory. Proceedings of the Second Toronto conference on stakeholder theory. Toronto: University of Toronto Centre for Corporate Social Performance & Ethics, Ontario, Canada,

- Clarkson, M. (1995). A stakeholder framework for analyzing and evaluating corporate social performance. *Academy of Management Review*, 20, 92-117.
- Coghlan, D., & Shani, A. B. (2005). Roles, politics, and ethics in action research design. *Systemic Practice and Action Research*, 18(6), 533-546.
- Cohen, J. (1988). *Statistical power analysis for the behavioral sciences* (2nd ed.). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
- Cohen, J. (1992). A power primer. *Psychological Bulletin*, 112, 155-159.
- Cohen, J., Pant, L., & Sharp, D. (1993). A validation and extension of a multidimensional ethics scale. *Journal of Business Ethics*, 12(1), 13-26.
- Coile, Z. (2008, August 1). Pelosi blocks offshore drilling vote GOP wants. *Chronicle Washington Bureau*, p. A5.
- Coleman, J. S. (1990). *Foundations of social theory*. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press.
- Collins, J. (2001). *Good to Great*. New York: Harper Collins.
- Connor, M., & Bush, R., (2006, April 17). *Ryan convicted on corruption charge*, Retrieved July 5, 2009 from [www.chicagotribune.com.local/chi-060417ryantrial](http://www.chicagotribune.com.local/chi-060417ryantrial)
- Conway, M. M. (1991). *Political participation in the United States* (2nd ed.). Washington, DC: CQ Press.
- Cook, K. S. (1977). Exchange and power in networks of interorganizational relations. *The Sociological Quarterly*, 18, 62-82
- Cooke, A. (1986). Is business ethics an oxymoron. *Business and Society Review*, 58, 68-69.

- Coombs, W. T. (1995). Choosing the right words: The development of guidelines for the selection of the "appropriate" crisis-response strategy. *Management Communication Quarterly*, 8, 447-476.
- Cooper, T. L. (1991). *An ethic of citizenship for public administration*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
- Court turns down former Illinois governor. (2009). Retrieved August 8, 2010 from <http://abclocal.go.com/wlsstory?section=localic>
- Corporate Crime Reporter (2004, January 16). *Public corruption in the U.S.* Retrieved April 3, 2009, from <http://corporatecrimereporter/corporatereport.pdf>
- Creswell, J. W. (1999). Mixed-method research: Introduction and application. In G.J. Cizek (Ed.) *Handbook of educational policy* (pp. 455-472). San Diego, CA: Academic Press.
- Creswell, J. W. (2003). *Research design: Qualitative, quantitative and mixed methods approaches*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
- Creswell, J. W., Fetters, M. D., & Ivankova, N. V. (2004). Designing a mixed methods study in primary care. *Annals of Family Medicine*, 2(1), 7-12.
- Creswell, J. W., & Plano Clark, V. L. (2007). *Designing and conducting mixed methods research*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
- Cronbach, L. J. (1971). Test validation. In R. L. Thorndike (Ed.) *Educational measurement* (pp.443-507). Washington, D.C.: American Council on Education.
- Cronbach, L. J., & Meehl, P. E. (1955). Construct validity in psychological tests. *Psychological Bulletin*, 52, 281-302.

- Cruz, J. C. (1990). The corporation as an open organization, in people in organizations-ethical responsibilities and corporate effectiveness. (pp. 43-48). In Enderle, G., Almond B. and Argandona, A. (Ed.) Dordrecht, Netherlands. Kluwer Academic .
- Cuilla, J. B. (1985). Do MBA students have ethics phobia? *Business and Society Review*, 53, 52-54.
- Daake, D. (1995). An investigation of the utilization of information in strategic planning within a loosely held coupled organization. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, Florida State University, Tallahassee.
- Daake, D., & Anthony, W. P. (2000). Understanding stakeholder power and influence gaps in health care organization: An empirical study. *Health Care Management Review*, 25(3), 94-107.
- Dalley, J., & Hamilton, B. (2000). Knowledge, context and learning in the small business. *International Small Business Journal*, 18(3), 51-59.
- Damon, W. (1995). *Greater expectations*. New York: Free Press.
- Daley, J. M. (1992). Social organizations for the production of evil. *Psychological Inquiry*, 3(2), 199-218.
- Davenport, T. H., DeLong, D. W., & Beers, M. C. (1998). Successful knowledge management projects. *Sloan Management Review*, 39(2), 43-57.
- Davis, G. B., & Parker, C. A. (1997). *Writing the doctoral dissertation* (2nd ed.). Hauppauge, NY: Barron's Educational Series.
- Davis, J. H., Schoorman, F. D., & Donaldson, L. (1997). Toward a stewardship theory of management. *Academy of Management Review*, 22(1), 20-47.

- Davis, K. (1973). The case for and against business assumption of social responsibilities. *Academy of Management Review*, 16, 312-322.
- Davison, W. P. (1983). The third-person effect in communication. *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 47, 3.
- de Bakker, F. G. (2008). Introducing the politics of stakeholder influence. *Business & Society*, 47(1), 8-20.
- De Pree, M. (1989). *Leadership is an art*. New York: Dell.
- Demski, J., & Feltham, G. (1978). Economic incentives in budgetary control systems. *Accounting Review*, 55, 336-359.
- Denton, R. E., & Woodward, G. C. (1990). *Political communication in America*. Westport, CT: Praeger.
- Denzin, N. K. (1978). The logic of naturalistic inquiry. In N. K. Denzin (Ed.), *Sociological methods: A sourcebook*. New York: Hill.
- Deshpande, S. P. (1997). Managers' perception of proper ethical conduct: The effect of sex, age, and level of education. *Journal of Business Ethics*, 16(1), 79-85.
- Deutschman, A. (2005). Is your boss a psychopath? *Fast Company*, 96, 44-52.
- DeVellis, R. F. (1991). *Scale development: Theory and applications*. Newbury Park, CA: Sage.
- Dhir, K. S. (2006). Corporate communication through nonviolent rhetoric. *Corporate Communications: An International Journal*, 11(3), 249-266.
- Dhir, K. S., & Vinen, D. (2005). Managing corporate respectability: Concept, issues and policy formation. *Corporate Communications: An International Journal*, 10(1), 5-23.



- Dickson, P. H., & Weaver, K. M. (1997). Environmental determinants and individual-level moderators of alliance use. *Academy of Management Journal*, 40, 404-425.
- DiMaggio, P., & Powell, W. (1983). The iron cage revisited: Institutional isomorphism and collective rationality in organizational fields. *American Sociological Review*, 48, 147-160.
- Dobel, J. P. (1988). Reflection and good reasons in policy analysis. In Edward Bryan Portis and Michael B. Levy, (Eds.), *The handbook of political theory and policy science* (pp. 29-44). New York: Greenwood Press.
- Dobel, J. P. (1998). Political prudence and the ethics of leadership. *Public Administration Review*, 58(1), 74-81.
- Doig, A. (1995). Good government and sustainable anti-corruption strategies: A role for independent anti-corruption agencies. *Public Administration and Development*, 15(2), 151-165.
- Donaldson, T., & Preston, L. E. (1995). The stakeholder theory of the corporation: Concepts, evidence, and implications. *The Academy of Management Review*, 20(1), 65.
- Downey, H. K., Hellriegel, D., & Slocum, H. W., Jr. (1975). Congruence between individual needs, organizational climate, job satisfaction and performance. *Academy of Management Journal*, 18(1), 149-155.
- Downs, A. (1957). *An economic theory of democracy*. New York: Harper.
- Easley, C., & Lenox, M. J. (2006). Firm responses to secondary stakeholder action. *Strategic Management Journal*, 27, 765-781.
- Eckstein, H. (1997). *Congruence theory explained*. Retrieved on March 25, 2010 from <http://democ.uci.edu/publications/papersseriespre2001/harry2.htm>

- Edgar, J. (2010, August 11). Opinion. *The Kankakee Daily Journal*, p. A1.
- Eisenhardt, K. M. (1989). Agency theory: An assessment and review. *The Academy of Management Review*, 14(1), 57.
- Emerson, R. M. (1962). Power-dependence relations. *American Sociological Review*, 27, 31-40.
- Emmons, R. (1981). Relationship between narcissism and sensation seeking. *Psychological Reports*, 48, 247-250.
- Emmons, R. (1987). Narcissism: Theory and measurement. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 52, 11-17.
- Epstein, E. M. (1973). Dimensions of corporate power, pt.1. *California Management Review*, 16(2), 9-23.
- Ethics Resource Center, (2005). *General ethics resource articles*. Retrieved on April 2, 2009, from <http://www.ethics.org.resource/general-ethics-resource-articles>
- Evan, W., & Freeman, E. (1988). *Stakeholder theory of the modern corporation: Kantian capitalism*, In *ethical theory and business*, T. Beauchamp & N. Bowie (eds.). Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.
- Evan, W., & Freeman, E. (1993). *Stakeholder theory of the modern corporation: Kantian capitalism* (5th ed.). Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.
- Eysenck, H. J. (1950). Social attitude and class. *The British Journal of Sociology*, 1(1), 56-66.
- Fama, E., & Jensen, M. (1983). Separation of ownership and control. *Journal of Law and Economics*, 88, 288-307.
- Fenno, R. E. (1978). *Home style: House members in their districts*. Boston: Little.
- Ferrell, O. C., & Fraederich, J. (1991). *Business ethics*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.

- Ferris, G. R., & Kacmar, M. K. (1992). Perceptions of organizational politics. *Journal of Management, 18*(1), 93-116.
- Ferris, G. R., Russ, G. S., & Fandt, P. M. (1989). Politics in organizations. In R.A. Giacalone and P. Rosenfeld (Ed.). *In impression management in the organization* (pp. 143-170). Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.
- Finey, H. C., & Lesieur, H. R. (1982). A contingency theory of organizational crime. *Research in the Sociology of Organizations, 1*, 255-299.
- Finkelstein, S., & Hambrick, D. C. (1996). *Strategic leadership: Top executives and their effects on organization*. New York: West Publishing.
- Fitzgerald, P. (2002) Citizens for George Ryan top aids Fawell and Juliano indicted on alleged corruption charges involving SOS offices and campaigns. Retrieved on August 1, 2009 from [http://www.justice.gov/usao/iln/pr/chicago/2002/pr0402\\_01.pdf](http://www.justice.gov/usao/iln/pr/chicago/2002/pr0402_01.pdf)
- Fitzgerald, P. (2003, December 17). U.S. Attorney, Patrick Fitzgerald, press statement, Chicago, IL, American Broadcast Company
- Fitzgerald, P. (2008, May 17). U.S. Attorney, Patrick Fitzgerald, press statement, Chicago, IL, American Broadcast Company Chicago
- Fitzhenry, R. I. (1993). *The Harper book of quotations* (3rd ed., pp. 351-360). New York, NY: Harper Collins.
- Fleming, P., & Zyglidopoulos, S. C. (2008). The escalation of deception in the organization. *Journal of Business Ethics, 81*, 837-850.
- Fleming, R. R. (2001). Ethics and politics: Idealistic political systems need innovative ethics systems. *Journal of Power and Ethics: An Interdisciplinary Review, 2*(2), 123-129.

- Fontrodona, J., & Sison, A. G. (2006). The nature of the firm, agency theory and shareholder theory: A critique from philosophical anthropology. *Journal of Business Ethics*, 66, 33-42.
- Foti, R. J., Fraser, S. L., & Lord, R. G. (1982). Effects of leadership and prototypes on perceptions of political leaders. *Journal of Applied Psychology*, 67(3), 326-333.
- Francis, D. (1987). Unblocking organizational communication, Aldershot, Gower, cited in Oram, M. and Wellins, R.S., Reengineering missing ingredient- the human factor (1995), Institute of Personal and Development, London, p. 204.
- Freeman, R. E. (1984). *Strategic management- a stakeholder approach*. Boston: Pitman.
- Freeman, R. E. (1994). A stakeholder theory of the modern corporation. In T.L.Beauchamp & N.E. Bowie (Eds.), *Ethical theory and business*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
- Freeman, R. E., & Evan, W. M. (1990). Corporate governance: A stakeholder interpretation. *Journal of Behavior Economics*, 19, 337-359.
- Freeman, R. E., & McVea, J. (2001). *A stakeholder approach to strategic management*. (Working paper No. 01-02). Retrieved on October, 2008, from <http://ssrn.com/abstract=263511>
- Friedrich, C. J. (1972). *The pathology of politics: Violence, betrayal, corruption, secrecy & propaganda* (pp. 127-141). New York: Harper & Row.
- Friedrich, C. J. (1989). Political corruption. In A. J. Heidenheimer, M. Johnston & V. T. Levine, (Eds.), *Political corruption: A handbook* (pp. 3-23). New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction.

- Frisch, D. (1994). Effects of corruption on development in corruption. Democracy and Human Rights in West Africa Leadership Forum, Cotonou, Benin, 60-61.  
Retrieved on 10/15/10 from  
[http://www.ukm.my/pkaukm/BUKU%201%20&%202/PDF\\_buku%201/B8\\_Saifu1\\_Good%20Governance%20For%20Fighting%20Corruption%20In%20Aceh.pdf](http://www.ukm.my/pkaukm/BUKU%201%20&%202/PDF_buku%201/B8_Saifu1_Good%20Governance%20For%20Fighting%20Corruption%20In%20Aceh.pdf)
- Frooman, J. (1999). Stakeholder influence strategies. *Academy of Management Review*, 24(2), 191-205.
- Frooman, J., & Murrell, A. J. (2005). Stakeholder influence strategies: The roles of structural and demographic determinants. *Business & Society*, 44(1), 3-31.
- Frost, P. I., & Hayes, D. C. (1977, September). *An exploration in two cultures of political behaviors in organizations*, Paper presented at the Conference on Cross Cultural Studies in Organizational Functioning, Hawaii.
- Fukuyama, F. (2002). Social capital and development: The coming agenda. *SAIS Review of International Affairs*, 22(1), 23-37.
- Galbraith, J. R. (1977). *Organizational design*. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.
- Gallagher, M. G. (1991). *Rent-seeking and economic growth in Africa*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
- Gandz, J., & Murray, V. (1980). The experience of workplace politics. *Academy of Management Journal*, 23(2), 237-249.
- Gardiner, J. A. (1970). *Politics of corruption-organized crime in an American city*. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.

- Gardiner, J. A. (1993). *Defining corruption in Punch*. Devanter, Netherlands.
- Garnett, J. L. (1992). *Communicating for results in government: A strategic approach for public managers*. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass.
- Garud, R., & Rappa, M. A. (1994). A socio-cognitive model of technology evolution: The case of cochlear implants. *Organization Science*, 5(3), 344-362.
- Gellerman, S. W. (1986). Why good managers make bad ethical choices. *Harvard Business Review*, 64, 85-90.
- Gioia, D. A. (2002) Business education's role in the crisis of corporate confidence. *Academy of Management Executive*, 16(3), 142-144.
- Glover, S. H., Bumpus, M. A., Sharpe, G. F., & Munchus, G. A. (2002). Gender differences in ethical decision making. *Women in Management Review*, 17(5/6), 217-227.
- Goff, B., & Grier, K. (1993). On the (mis)measurement of legislator ideology and shirking. *Public Choice*, 76, 5-20.
- Goffman, E. (1959). *The presentation of self in everyday life*. Garden City, NJ: Doubleday Anchor.
- Goodpaster, K. (1991). Business ethics and stakeholder analysis. *Business Ethics Quarterly*, 1, 53-73.
- Goodsell, C. (1994). *The case of bureaucracy* (3rd ed.). Chatham, NJ: Chatham House.
- Gore, A. (1994). Cynicism or faith. *Vital Speeches (October 1995)*, 645-649.
- Grant, B. (2006). Politically correct procurement (The ethical dilemma). Retrieved on October 10, 2010 from [http://govpro.com/resource\\_center/gov\\_imp\\_27797/](http://govpro.com/resource_center/gov_imp_27797/)
- Gray, A. (1998). Editorial: Public service ethics. *Public Money & Management*, 3-4.

- Green, J. C., Caracelli, V. J., & Graham, W. F. (1989). Toward a conceptual framework for mixed-method evaluation designs. *Educational Evaluation and Policy Analysis, 11*(3), 255-274.
- Greene, R. (2000). *The 48 laws of power*. New York: Penguin Books.
- Greenwald, A. G. (1980). The totalitarian ego: Fabrication and revision of personal history. *American Psychologist, 35*, 603-618.
- Grier, K. B., & Munger, M. C. (1991). Committee assignments, constituent preferences, and campaign contributions. *Economic Inquiry, 29*, 24-43.
- Griffin, J. J., & Dunn, P. (2004). Corporate public affairs: Commitment, resources and structure. *Business and Society, 43*(2), 196-220.
- Gupta, A. K., & Lad, L. J. (1983). Industry self-regulation: An economic, organizational, and political analysis. *Academy of Management Review, 8*, 416-425.
- Hair, J. F., Black, B., Babin, B., Anderson, R. E., & Tatham, R. L. (2006). *Multivariate data analysis* (6th ed.). Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall.
- Harrington, L. (1996). Ethics and public policy analysis: Stakeholders' interest and regulatory policy. *Journal of Business Ethics, 15*(4), 373-382.
- Hatfield, J. D., & Huseman, R. C. (1982). Perceptual congruence about communication as related to satisfaction: Moderating effects of individual characteristics. *Academy of Management Journal, 25*(2), 349-358.
- Heath, J., & Norman, W. (2004). Stakeholder theory, corporate governance and public management: What can the history of state-run enterprises teach us in the post-Enron era? *Journal of Business Ethics, 53*, 247-265.
- Heidenheimer, A. J., & Johnston, M. (Eds.). (2008). *Political corruption concept & contexts* (3rd ed.). New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction.

- Hewlin, P. (2003). And the award for best actor goes to...: Facades of conformity in organizational settings. *Academy of Management Review*, 28(4), 633-642.
- Heymans, C., & Lipietz, B. (1999) Corruption and development. *ISS Monograph series*, 40, 9-20.
- Heywood, P. (1997). Political corruption: Problems and perspectives. *Political Studies*, XLIV, 417-435.
- Hibbing, J. R., & Theiss-Morse, E. (1995). *Congress as public enemy: Public attitudes toward American political institutions*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Hill, C.W., & Jones, T. M. (1992). Stakeholder-agency theory. *Journal of Management Studies*, 29(2), 131-154.
- Hill, P. J. (1999). Public choice: A review. *Faith & Economics*, 34, 1-10.
- Hirsch, P, Michaels, S., & Freeman, R. (1987). Collaboration or paradigm shift? Economic vs. behavioral thinking about policy? *Academy of Management*, 31-35.
- Hirschman, A. O. (1970). *Exit, voice, and loyalty. Responses to decline in firms, organizations, and states*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Huehn, M. P. (2008). Unenlightened economism: The antecedents of bad corporate governance and ethical decline. *Journal of Business Ethics*, 81, 823-835.
- Hunt, S. D. (1986). A general theory of marketing and ethics. *Journal of Macromarketing*, 8, 5-16.
- Hunt, S. D., & Vitell, S. J. (1993). The general theory of marketing ethics: A retrospective and revision. In N.C. Smith & J. A. Quelch (Eds.), *Ethics in marketing* (pp. 775-784). Homewood, IL: Irwin.



- Hunter, J., & Shah, A. (1998). Applying a simple measure of good governance to the debate of fiscal decentralization. (Policy Research Working Paper 1894), World Bank, Washington, DC.
- Isabella, L. A. (1990). Evolving interpretations as change unfolds: How managers construe key organizational events. *Academy of Management Journal*, 33(1), 7-41.
- Jackson, J. E. (1973). Intensities, preferences, and electoral politics. *Social Science Research*, 231-246.
- Jackson, J. E. (1975). Issues, party choices, and presidential votes. *American Journal of Political Science*, 19(2), 161-185.
- Jacobs, D. (1974). Dependency and vulnerability: An exchange approach to the control of organizations. *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 19, 45-59.
- Jensen, M. C., & Meckling, W. H. (1976). Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure. *Journal of Financial Economics*, 3(4), 305-360.
- Johnson, M. (1994, August). Comparing corruption conflicts, standards and development, *Conference paper prepared for the XVI World Conference of International Political Science Association*, Berlin, Germany.
- Johnson, P. (1993). *Frames of deceit: A study of the loss and recovery of public and private trust*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Johnson, T. (2008, October 10). Guest viewpoint. *The Kankakee Daily Journal*, p. A6.
- Jones, C., Hesterly, W. S., & Borgatti, S. P. (1997). A general theory of network governance: Exchange conditions in social mechanisms. *Academy of Management Review*, 22, 911-945.

- Jones, T. M. (1995). Instrumental stakeholder theory: A synthesis of ethics and economics. *Academy of Management Review*, 20(2), 404-437.
- Judge, T. A., LePine, J. A., & Rich, B. L. (2006). Loving yourself abundantly: Relationship of the narcissistic personality to self- and other perceptions of workplace deviance, leadership, and task and contextual performance. *Journal of Applied Psychology*, 91(4), 762-776.
- Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1984). Choices, values, and frames. *American Psychologist*, 39, 341-350.
- Kaler, J. (2006). Evaluating stakeholder theory. *Journal of Business Ethics*, 69, 249-268.
- Kass, J. (2008, November 2). Fitzgerald's future tied to election results too. *Chicago Tribune*, p. 2, Section 1.
- Kass, J. (2010, September 8). For Daley, it's been time for a long time. *Chicago Tribune*, p. 2, Section 1.
- Kass, J. (2010, September 10). Obama gets a little bossy about Daley's successor. *Chicago Tribune*, p. 2, Section 1.
- Katz, D., & Kahn, R. L. (1966). *The social psychology of organizations*. New York: Wiley.
- Katz, J. L., (1996). The power of talk. *Governing*, 38-42.
- Kernell, S. (1978). Explaining presidential popularity. *American Political Science Review*, 72, 506-522.
- Kidwell, J. M., Stevens, R. E., & Bethke, A. L. (1987). Differences in ethical perceptions between males and female managers: Myth or reality? *Journal of Business Ethics*, 6(6), 489-493.

- Kiem, G. D., & Zeithaml, C. P. (1986). Corporate political strategy and legislative decision-making: A review and contingency approach. *Academy of Management Review, 11*, 828-843.
- King, W. R. (1978). Strategic planning for management information systems. *MIS Quarterly, 2*, 27-37.
- Kirk, R. E. (1996). Practical significance: A concept whose time has come. *Educational & Psychological Measurement, 56*, 746-759.
- Klitgaard, R. (1998). International cooperation against corruption. *Finance & Development, 35*(1).
- Koch, J. W. (1998). Political rhetoric and political persuasion. *Public Opinion Quarterly, 62*(2), 209-229.
- Kochan, T., & Rubenstein. (2000). Toward a stakeholder theory of the firm: The Saturn project. *Organizational Science, 11*(1), 367-386.
- Kolm, S. (1996). Moral public choice. *Politics and morals, 87*, 117-141.
- Kuratko, D. F., Goldsby, J. S., & Hornsby, J. S. (2004). Ethical perspectives of entrepreneurs: An examination of stakeholder salience. *Journal of Applied Management and Entrepreneurship, 9*(4), 19-42
- Kurtz, H. (1996). *Hot air: All talk, all the time*. New York: Times Books.
- Kurtz, H. (1998). *Spin Cycle: Inside the Clinton propaganda machine*. New York: Free Press.
- Larwood, L., & Whittaker, W. (1977). Managerial myopia: Self-serving biases in organizational planning. *Journal of Applied Psychology, 62*, 194-198.
- Latane, B. (1981). The psychology of social impact. *American Psychologist, 36*, 343-356.

- Lawler, E. J., & Yoon, J. (1996). Commitment in exchange relations: Test of a theory of relational cohesion. *American Sociological Review*, 61, 89-108.
- Leedy, P. D., & Ormond, J. E. (2005). *Practical research planning and design* (8th ed.). Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson, Merrill Prentice-Hall.
- Levin, M. B. (1987). *Talk radio and the American dream*. Lexington, MA: Lexington Books.
- Lewin, K. (1936). *Principals of topical psychology*. New York: McGraw-Hill.
- Lichter, S. R., Lichter, L. S., & Rothman, S. (1994). *Prime time: How tv portrays American culture*. Washington, DC: Regency.
- Lord, M. D. (1995). An agency theory assessment of the influence of corporate grassroots political activism. *Academy of Management Journal*, 396-400.
- Ludlum, M., & Mascaloinov, S. (2004). Right and wrong and cultural diversity: Replication of the 2002 NAS/Zogby poll on business ethics. *Journal of Education for Business*, 79(5), 294-298.
- Madigan, M. J., & Cullerton, J. C. (2009, February 6). Letter to the Editor. *The Kankakee Daily Journal*, p. A7.
- Madison, J. (1787) *Federalist: A collection of essays volume I*. New York: Hanover-Square
- Maitland, I. (1994). The morality of the corporation: An empirical or normative disagreement? *Business Ethics Quarterly*, 4(4), 445-458.
- March, J. (1962). The business firm as a political coalition. *Journal of Politics*, 24, 662-678.
- March, J. G, & Simon, H. A. (1958). *Organizations*. New York: Wiley.

- Marinaccio, M. J. (2007). Organizational structure and its impact on the power/politic dynamic a mixed method exploration of senior management perceptions of formal and virtual organizations. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, Capella University, Minneapolis, MN.
- Maxwell, A. E., & Winters, R. F. (2004). *Political corruption in America*. Midwest Political State Association and as part of the Morton-Kenney Lecture Series at Southern Illinois University, Carbondale, Il. Retrieved on March 5, 2009 from <http://www.dartmouth.edu/~govt/docs/Winters.pdf>
- Mayhew, D. R. (1974). *Congress: The electoral connection*. New Haven, CT: Yale.
- McClelland, D. C. (1985). *Human motivations*. Glenview, Il: Scott, Foresman.
- McCuddy, M. K., & Perry, B. L. (1996). Selected individual differences and collegians' ethical beliefs. *Journal of Business Ethics*, 15(3), 261-272.
- McDaniel, C., Jr., & Gates, R. (2005). *Market Research* (6th ed.). Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons.
- Mclean, J. A., (1788). *Federalist Papers*, Retrieved on April 2, 2009, from <http://www.constitution.org/fed/federa00.htm>
- McLeod, R., Jr. (1995). Systems theory and information resources management: Integrating key concepts. *Information Resource management Journal*, 8(2).
- McNichols, C. W., & Zimmerer, T. W. (1985). Situational Ethics: An empirical study of differentiators of student attitudes. *Journal of Business Ethics*, 4, 175-180.
- Meadows, D. H. (2008). *Thinking in systems*. White River Junction, VT: Chelsea Green.
- Merriner, J. L. (2008). *The man who emptied death row-governor George Ryan and the politics of crime*. Carbondale, Il.: Southern Illinois University Press.

- Mertler, C., & Vannatta, R. A. (2005). *Advanced and multivariate statistical methods* (3rd ed.). Glendale, CA: Pyrczak .
- Meyer, J., & Rowan, B. (1977). Institutionalized organizations: Formal structures as myth and ceremony. *American Journal of Sociology*, 83, 340-363.
- Mill, J. S. (1906). *Utilitarianism*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Miller, G., & Whitford, A. B. (2006). The principal's moral hazard: Constraint on the use of incentives in hierarchy. *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory*, 17, 213-233.
- Mitchell, R. K., Agle, B. R., & Wood, D. J. (1997). Toward a theory of stakeholder identification and salience: Defining the principal of who and what really counts. *Academy of Management Review*, 22(4), 853-886.
- Monsma, S. (2008). *Healing for a broken world*. Wheaton, IL: Crossway Books.
- Morf, C.C., & Rhodewalt, F. (2001). Unraveling the paradoxes of narcissism: A dynamic self-regulatory processing model. *Psychological Inquiry*, 177-196.
- Morgan, G. (1998). *Images of organizations: The executive edition*. San Francisco, CA: Koehler.
- Moy, P., & Scheufele, D. A. (2000). Media effects on political and social trust. *Journalism and Mass Communications Quarterly*, 77(4), 744-757.
- Mueller, D. C. (1979). *Public choice*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Murphy, K. R. & Cleveland, J. (1995). *Understanding performance appraisal: Social organizational, and goal -based perspectives*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
- Myrdal, G. (1968). Corruption: Its causes and effects, In G. Myrdal, *Asian drama: An enquiry into the poverty of nations*. (pp. 937-58). New York: Twentieth Century.

- Nadler, D., & Tushman, M. L.. (1980). A congruence model for diagnosing organizational behavior. In R. Miles (Ed.), *Resource book in macro organizational behavior* (pp. 30-49). Santa Clara, CA: Goodyear.
- Naz, R., Price, A. C., & Weber, C. T. (1986). A policy-oriented theory of corruption. *American Political Science Review*, 80(1), 107-120.
- Neville, B. A., & Menguc, B. (2006). Stakeholder Multiplicity: Toward and understanding of the interactions between stakeholders. *Journal of Business Ethics*, 66, 377-391.
- Newman, N. J. (2000). *Asymmetric threats to British military intervention operations*. Whitehall Paper 49, Royal United States Institute, London. Retrieved on March 5, 2009 from <http://hdl.handle.net/10068/675013>
- Newton, K., & Norris, P. (2000). Confidence in public institutions: Faith, culture, or performance. In S.J. Pharr & R.D. Putman (Eds.), *Disaffected democracies: What's troubling the trilateral countries?* (pp. 52-73). Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Niemi, R. G., Craig, S. C., & Mattei, F. (1991). Measuring internal political efficacy in the 1988 national election study. *American Political Science Review*, 85(4), 1407-1413.
- Nolan, T. (2005). Engaging with SMEs: Power, politics and communications. *The International Journal of Sociology and Social Policy*, 25(8), 1-17.
- Norrander, B. (1997). The independence gap and the gender gap. *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 61(3), 464-476.
- Nye, J. S. (1967). Corruption and political development: A cost-benefit analysis. *American Political Science Review*, 80(1), 417-427.

- Nye, J. S. (1989). Corruption and political development: A cost benefit analysis. In A. J. Heidenheimer, M. Johnston and V.T. Levine, (Eds.). *Political Corruption: A handbook* , (pp. 963-983). New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction.
- O'Farrell, B. (2009). Restoring good governance. Speech to the Sydney Institute, March 12, at the NSW State Parliament House. Retrieved on October 1, 2009 from <http://barryofarrell.com.au/documents/speeches/restoring-goodgoverancespeech-090312.pdf>
- O'Guinn, T. C., Allen, C. T., & Semenik, R. J. (2006). *Advertising and integrated brand promotion* (4th ed.). Mason, OH: Thomson South-Western.
- Oliver, C. (1990). Determinants of interorganizational relationships: Integration and future directions. *Academy of Management review*, 15, 241-265.
- Olson, M. (2000). *Power and prosperity: Outgrowing communist and capital dictatorship*. NY: Basic Books.
- Parker, M. (2008, May 27). *U.S. court rejects Ryan appeal*. Retrieved April 28, 2009 from [www.cbschicago.com/politics/ryansupremecourt.2.73653html](http://www.cbschicago.com/politics/ryansupremecourt.2.73653html)
- Patton, M. Q. (1987). *How to use qualitative methods in evaluation*. Newbury Park, CA: Sage .
- Pava, M. (2003). *Leading with meaning: Using conventional leadership to build a better organization*. New York: Palgrave MacMillan.
- Perez-Lopez, A. J. (1991). *Teoria de la accion humana en las organizaiones: La accion personal*. Madrid: Rialp.
- Perrow, C. (1986). *Complex organizations*. New York: Random House.
- Peters, J. G., & Welch, S. (1978). Political corruption in America: A search for definitions and a theory. *American Political Science Review*, 78, 974-984.



- Pfeffer, J. (1981). *Power in organizations*. Marschfield, MA: Pittman.
- Pfeffer, J. (1998). *The human equation: Building profits by putting people first*. Boston, Harvard Business School Press
- Pfeffer, J. (2005). Producing sustainable competitive advantage through the effective management of people. *Academy of Management Review* (19)4, 95-108
- Pfeffer, J., & Salancik, G. (1978). *The external control of organizations: A resource dependence perspective*. New York: Harper & Row.
- Phillips, R. (1998). Stakeholder theory and a principle of fairness. *Business Ethics Quarterly*, 7, 51-66.
- Phillips, R., & Reichart, J. (1998). The environment as a stakeholder: A fairness-based approach. *Journal of Business Ethics*, 23(2), 185.
- Phillips, R. (2003). *Stakeholder theory and organization ethics*. San Francisco: Bennett-Koehler.
- Piatt, E. (2009). *Towards an integrative model of systems, agency and stakeholder theories related to good governance*. Unpublished manuscript, Graduate School of Education, Olivet Nazarene University, Bourbonnais, Illinois.
- Pierson, R., & Kidwell, D. (2009, February 15). How to reform Illinois. *Chicago Tribune*, p. A4.
- Pillay, S. (2004). Corruption - the challenge to good governance: A South African perspective. *The International Journal of Public Sector Management*, 17(6/7), 586.

- Pinto, J., Leana, C. R., & Pil, F. K. (2008). Corrupt organizations or organizations of corrupt individuals? Two types of organizational-level corruption. *Academy of Management Review*, 33(3), 685-709.
- Porter, L. W. (1981). The politics of upward influence in organizations., In L.L. Cummings & B.M. Straw (Eds.), *Research in organizational behavior* (pp. 109-149). Greenwich, CT: JAI Press.
- Powell, J. E. (1977). *Joseph Chamberlain*. London: Thames & Hudson.
- Primeaux, P., Karri, R., & Caldwell, C. (2003). Cultural insights to organizational justice. *Journal of Business Ethics*, 46(2), 187-199.
- Provost, L. (2008, May 28). Ryan to ask for pardon. *The Kankakee Daily Journal*, p. A1
- Provost, L. (2009, September 14). National Health Care Debate, Tea Party. *The Kankakee Daily Journal*, p. A1.
- Putman, R. D. (2000). *Bowling alone: The collapse and revival of American community*. New York: Simon & Schuster.
- Quinn, D. P., & Jones, T. M. (1995). An agent morality view of business policy. *Academy of Management Review*, 20(1), 22-42.
- Quinn, P. (2009, March). *Illinois budget address*. Retrieved on March 31, 2010 from <http://illinoischannel.blogspot.com/2009/03/text-of-gov-quinns-budget-address.html>
- Raskin, R. N., & Shaw, R. (1988). Narcissism and the use of personality pronouns. *Journal of Personality*, 56, 393-404.
- Reason, P., & Bradbury, H. (2001). *Handbook of action research*. London: Sage.

- Reynolds, J., Schultz, F. C., & Hekman, R. (2006). Stakeholder theory and managerial- decision- making: Constraints and implications of balancing stakeholder interests. *Journal of Business Ethics, 64*, 285-301.
- Riley, M. W. (1963). *Sociological research: A case approach*. New York: Harcourt Brace, & World.
- Robertson, P. J., & Tang, S. (1995). The role of commitment in collective action: Comparing the organizational behavior of rational choice perspectives. *Public Administration Review, 55*, 67-80.
- Robideaux, D. R. (2002). Party affiliation and ad attitude toward political ads. *Journal of Marketing and Practice, 10*(36-45).
- Robinson, M. (1975). American political legitimacy in an era of electronic journalism. In Douglas Carters and Richard Adler (Eds.), *Television as a social force* (pp. 97-141). New York: Prager.
- Roll, R. (1986). The hubris hypothesis of corporate takeovers. *Journal of Business, 59*, 197-216.
- Ronald, K. M., Bradley, R. A., & Donna, J. W. (1997) Toward a Theory of Stakeholder Identification and Saliency: Defining the Principle of Who and What Really Counts. *Academy of Management Review, 22*, 853-886.
- Rose-Ackerman, S (1975). The economics of corruption. *Journal of Public Economics, 4* (2), 187-203.
- Rose-Ackerman, S. (1999). *Corruption and government- causes, consequences, and reform*. Cambridge, NY: Cambridge University Press.

- Rothstein, B., & Uslaner, E. M. (2006). *All for all: Equality and social trust* (Discussion paper No.15). London: Quality of Government Institute.
- Rotter, J. B. (1966). Generalized expectancies for internal versus external control of reinforcement. *Psychological Monographs*, 80(1).
- Rousseau, J. J. (1913). *Du contrat social*. London: Trans G.D.H. London: Dent.
- Sabato, L. J., & Simpson, G. R. (1996). *Dirty little secrets: The persistence of corruption in American politics*. New York: Times Books.
- Samuelson, P. (1954). The pure theory of public expenditure. *Review of Economics & Statistics*, 36, 387-389.
- Savage, G., Nix, T., Whitehead, C. & Blair, J. (1991). Strategies for assessing and managing stakeholders. *Academy of Management Executive*, 5(2), 61-75.
- Schartz, S. H., & Bilsky, W. (1987). Towards a universal psychological structure of human values. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 53(3), 550-562.
- Schein, E. H. (1992). *Organizational culture and leadership*. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
- Schendel, D., & Hofer, C. (Eds.) (1979). *Strategic management: A new view of business policy and planning*. Boston: Little Brown.
- Schuler, D. A., & Rehbein, K. (1997). The filtering role of the firm in a corporate political environment. *Business & Society*, 36(2), 116-119.
- Scott, W. R. (1987). The adolescence of institutional theory. *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 32, 493-511.
- Secter, B. (2009, February 15). A history of insatiable greed. *Chicago Tribune*, pp. A1, A4.
- Serwinek, P. J. (1992). Demographic & related differences in ethical views among small businesses. *Journal of Business Ethics*, 11(7), 555-566.

- Shani, A. B., & Pasmore, W. A. (1985). Organizational inquiry: Towards a new model of the action research process. In D. D. Warrick (ed.) *Contemporary organizational development: Current thinking and applications* (pp. 438-448). Glenview, IL: Scott.
- Shankman, N. E. (1999). Reframing the debate between agency and stakeholder theories of the firm. *Journal of Business Ethics*, 43, 21-31.
- Sharman, P. (1994). A stake in the business. *CMA*, 68(8), 17-19.
- Sharpe, M. L. (1993). Public relations = ethical social behavior. *PR Update*, April 3.
- Shaw, G., (n.d.). *Working minds*. Retrieved April 3, 2009, from <http://www.workingminds./GBSquotes.htm>
- Sherman, L. W. (1980). Three models of organizational corruption in agencies and social control. *Social Problems*, 27, 478-491.
- Sherwin, D. (1989). The ethical roots of the business system. *Harvard Business Review*, November/December, 183-192.
- Shleifer, A., & Vishney, R. W. (1993). Corruption. *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 108 (3), 599-617.
- Shleifer, A., & Vishney, R. (1999). The Quality of government. *Journal of Law, Economics, and Organizations*, 15(1), 222-279
- Simon, H. (1959). Theories of decision making in economics and behavioral science. *The American Economic Review*, 253-293
- Simon, H. (1976). *Administrative Behavior* (3rd ed.). New York: Free Press.
- Simonin, B. L. (1997). The importance of collaborative know-how: An empirical test of the learning organization. *Academy of Management Journal*, 40, 1150-1174.

- Sinclair, A. (1993). Approached to organizational culture and ethics. *Journal of Business Ethics*, 12(1), 63-73.
- Singhapakdi, A., Vitell, S. J., Rallapalli, K. C., & Kraft, K. L. (1996). The perceived role of ethics and social responsibility: A scale development. *Journal of Business Ethics*, 15(11), 1131-1140.
- Smith, A. (1914). *Wealth of Nations*, edited by C. J. Bullock. Vol. X. The Harvard Classics. New York: P.F. Collier & Son. Retrieved on March 10, 2009 from [http:// www.bartleby.com/10/](http://www.bartleby.com/10/)
- Smith, B. (2001). Davidson, irrationality, and ethics. *Philosophy Today*, 45(3), 242-253.
- Stainer, A., & Stainer, L. (1997). Productivity and performance dimensions of corporate communications strategy. *Corporate Communications*, 2(2), 70-75.
- Sterns, T., Hoffman, A., & Heide, J. (1987). Performance of commercial television stations as an outcome of interorganizational linkages and environmental conditions. *Academy of Management Review*, 30(1), 71-90.
- Stipak, B. (1977). Attitudes and belief systems concerning urban services. *Political Opinion Quarterly*, 41, 41-55.
- Taylor, S. E., & Brown, J. D. (1988). Illusion and well being: A social psychological perspective on mental health. *Psychological Bulletin*, 103, 193-210.
- The Hungarian Gallup Institute. (1999). Basic methodological aspects of corruption measurement: Lessons learned from the literature and the pilot study. Retrieved on April 3, 2009 from [http://www.unodc.org/pdf/crime/corruption\\_hungary\\_rapid\\_assess.pdf](http://www.unodc.org/pdf/crime/corruption_hungary_rapid_assess.pdf)
- Thompson, J. D. (1967). *Organizations in action*. New York: McGraw-Hill.

- Thompson, J. R., & Ingraham, P. W. (1996). The reinvention game. *Public Administration Review*, 56(3), 291-298.
- Tornow, W. W. (1993). Perceptions of reality: Is multi-perspective measurement a means or an end? *Human Resource Management*, 2, 221-229.
- Transparency International (2007). Retrieved on August 16, 2009 from [http://www.transparency.org/policy\\_research/surveys\\_indices/CPI/2008](http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/CPI/2008)
- Treisman, D. (2000). The causes of corruption: A cross-national study. *Journal of Public Economics*, 76(3), 399-457.
- UCLA Academic Technology Services. (n.d.) Retrieved June 15, 2010, from <http://www.ats.ucla.edu>
- United Nations. (1989). Department of Technical Cooperation for Development and Centre for Social Development and Humanitarian Affairs. *Corruption in government*, report of an interregional seminar. Retrieved on August 1, 2009 from [http://mirror.undp.org/magnet/Docs/efa/corruption3/o\\_UN-07b\\_Con%3DRef.pdf](http://mirror.undp.org/magnet/Docs/efa/corruption3/o_UN-07b_Con%3DRef.pdf)
- United Nations. (1990). Crime prevention and criminal justice in the context of development: Realities and perspectives of international cooperation: Practical measures against corruption. 8th United Nations Congress on the prevention of crime and the treatment of offenders, Cuba. Retrieved on August 3, 2009 from <http://www.google.com/#sclient=psy&hl=en&q=development:+Realities+and+perspectives+of+international+cooperation%3A+Practical+measures+against+corruption.+8th+United+Nations+Congress+on+the+prevention+of+crime+and+the+treatment+of+offenders%2C+Cuba.&aq=f&aqi=&aql=&oq=&psj=1&fp=2d73bcec2e6e3c54>

- Valasquez, M. (1992). Policing transnational commerce: Global awareness in the margins of morality. *Business Ethics Quarterly*, 2(1), 27-40.
- van Klaveren, J. (1989). The concept of corruption. In A. J. Heidenheimer, M. Johnston, and V. T. Levine (Eds). *Political Corruption: A handbook*. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction
- Van Leuven, J. K., & Slater, M. D. (1991). How publics, public relations, and the media shape the public opinion process. *Public Relations Research Annual*, 3, 165-178.
- van Riel, C. B. M. (1995). *Principles of corporate communications* New York: Prentice Hall.
- Verba, S., Schlozman, K. L., & Brady, H. E. (1995). *Voice and equality-civic voluntarism in American politics*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Vigoda-Gadot, E. (2007). Citizens' perception of politics and ethics in public administration: A five-year national study of their relationship to satisfaction with services, trust in governance, and voice orientations. *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory*, 17(2), 285.
- Wang, X., & Wart, M. W. (2007). When public participation in administration leads to trust: An empirical assessment of manager's perceptions. *Public Administration Review*, 67(2), 265-278.
- Watson, G. W., Freeman, R. E., & Parmar, B. (2008). Connected moral agency in organizational ethics. *Journal of Business Ethics*, 81, 323-341.
- Weinberg, G. M. (2001). *An introduction to general systems thinking*. New York: Dorset House.



- Welch, S., & Peters, J. G. (1977). Some problems of stimulating responses to mail questionnaires: Controllable and non controllable aspects. *Political Methodology*, 4, 139-152.
- Wells, L. E., & Sweeney, P. D. (1986). A test of three models of bias in self-assessment. *Social Psychology Quarterly*, 49, 1-10.
- Werlin, H. H. (1998). *The mysteries of development: Studies using political elasticity theory*. Latham, MD: University Press of America.
- Werlin, H. H. (2002). Secondary Corruption: The concept of political illness. *The Journal of Social, Political, and Economic Studies*, 27(3), 341-362.
- West, D., & Stewart, K. (n.d.). *Popular Rogues: Citizen opinion about political corruption*. Retrieved on August 3, 2009 from <http://www.insidepolitics.org/PopularRogues.doc>
- Wexley, K. N., Alexander, R. A., Greenawalt, J. P., & Couch, M.A. (1980). Attitudinal congruence and similarity as related to interpersonal evaluations in manager-subordinates dyads. *Academy of Management Journal*, 23, 320-330.
- Wheeler, K. M. (1994). *Effective communication: A local government guide*. 1:3-14, *Municipal Management Series*. Washington, D.C.: International City/County Management Association.
- Wheeler, S., & Rothman, M. L. (1982). The organization as weapon in white-collar crime. *Michigan Law Review*, 80, 1403-1426.
- White, L. G. (1976). Rational theories of participation an exercise in definitions. *The Journal of Conflict*, 20(2), 255.
- Wijnberg, N. M. (2000). Normative: Stakeholder theory and Aristotle: The link between ethics and politics. *Journal of Business Ethics*, 25(4).

- Williamson, O. E. (1985). *The economic institutions of capitalism*. New York: Free Press.
- Wilson, J. Q. (1966). Corruption: The shame of the states. *Public Interest*, 28-3.
- Wilson, J. Q. (1985). The rediscovery of character: Private virtue and public policy. *The Public Interest*, 81, 16.
- Worsham, J., Eisner, M. A., & Ringquist, E. J. (1997). Assessing the assumptions a critical analysis of agency theory. *Administration & Society*, 28(4), 419-490.
- Zabojnik, J. (2004). A model of rational bias in self-assessments. *Economic Theory*, 23, 259-282.
- Zaleznik, A., & Kets de Vries, M. (1975). *Power and the corporate mind*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.
- Zorn, E. (2008, November 16). Keep Ryan and his conscience locked up. *Chicago Tribune*. Retrieved on December 7, 2008 from [http://blogs.chicagotribune.com/news\\_columnists\\_ezorn/2008/11/keep-ryan-and-his-conscience-locked-up.html](http://blogs.chicagotribune.com/news_columnists_ezorn/2008/11/keep-ryan-and-his-conscience-locked-up.html)

## APPENDIX A

Cronbach's Alpha – Reliability Statistics Questions 1 - 46

Cronbach's alpha measures how well a set of items (or variables) measures a single unidimensional latent construct. When data have a multidimensional structure, Cronbach's alpha will usually be low. Technically speaking, Cronbach's alpha is not a statistical test - it is a coefficient of reliability or consistency For the entire likert scale (46 questions) Anything over .6 is considered relevant, but most researchers like to have .7 and above (UCLA Academic Technology Services-[www.ats.ucla.edu](http://www.ats.ucla.edu)). Chronbach's Alpha Summary Table 42 is described in the next section.

Table 44

*Cronbach's Alpha – Reliability Statistics Questions 1-46*


---

Question	Cronbach's Apha	No. of Items
1-46	.677	46
Question 70 (ethical behavior)	.876	6
Linear combination		
1, 4, 9, 18, 19, 20		
Question 71(trust)	.894	6
Linear combination		
1,2,4,9,18,19,20		
Question 72 (unethical/corrupt behavior)	.670	3
Linear combination		
22,23,24		
Question 73 (ethical relativism)	.723	3
Linear combination		
38, 39 40		
Question 74 (communication)	.793	4
Linear combination		
19, 20, 45, 46		
Question 75 (ethical behavior and voting for them)		
Linear combination	.706	3
37, 41, 42		
Question 90 (unethical behavior and voting for them)	.602	5
Linear combination		
21, 23, 27, 33, 25		

---

APPENDIX B

ANCOVA Test for Linear Combination Question 70

Table 45

*ANCOVA Test for Linear Combination Question 70*

Dependent Variable: Q70ETH\_BEH ETHICAL BEHAVIOR

Source	Type III Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Corrected Model	1190.410 <sup>a</sup>	5	238.082	7.502	.000
Intercept	32990.968	1	32990.968	1039.535	.000
OCCUPATION *	1190.410	5	238.082	7.502	.000
POL_AFFIL					
Error	14757.361	465	31.736		
Total	225300.000	471			
Corrected Total	15947.771	470			

a. R Squared = .075 (Adjusted R Squared = .065)

Note: There was an interaction and cannot proceed with the post hoc test

## APPENDIX C

### ANCOVA Test for Linear Combination Question 71



Table 46

*ANCOVA Test for Linear Combination Question 71*

Dependent Variable: Q71\_TRUST TRUST

Source	Type III Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Corrected Model	1733.619 <sup>a</sup>	5	346.724	7.973	.000
Intercept	44114.232	1	44114.232	1014.382	.000
OCCUPATION *	1733.619	5	346.724	7.973	.000
POL_AFFIL					
Error	20222.280	465	43.489		
Total	307252.000	471			
Corrected Total	21955.898	470			

a. R Squared = .079 (Adjusted R Squared = .069)

Note: There was an interaction and cannot proceed with the post hoc test

APPENDIX D

ANCOVA Test for Linear Combination Question 72

Table 47

*ANCOVA Test for Linear Combination Question 72*

Dependent Variable: Q72\_UNETHCO UNETHICAL-CORRUPT

Source	Type III Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Corrected Model	118.240 <sup>a</sup>	5	23.648	2.992	.011
Intercept	12458.681	1	12458.681	1576.328	.000
OCCUPATION *	118.240	5	23.648	2.992	.011
POL_AFFIL					
Error	3675.178	465	7.904		
Total	81044.000	471			
Corrected Total	3793.418	470			

a. R Squared = .031 (Adjusted R Squared = .021)

Note: There was an interaction and cannot proceed with the post hoc test

APPENDIX E

ANCOVA Test for Linear Combination Question 73

Table 48

*ANCOVA Test for Linear Combination Question 73*

<b>Tests of Between-Subjects Effects</b>					
Dependent Variable: Q73_ETHREL ETHICAL RELATIVISM					
Source	Type III Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Corrected Model	100.556 <sup>a</sup>	5	20.111	1.674	.139
Intercept	9075.842	1	9075.842	755.469	.000
OCCUPATION *	100.556	5	20.111	1.674	.139
POL_AFFIL					
Error	5586.285	465	12.014		
Total	65146.000	471			
Corrected Total	5686.841	470			

a. R Squared = .018 (Adjusted R Squared = .007)

Table 48 (continued).

*ANCOVA Test for Linear Combination Question 73*

Dependent Variable: Q73\_ETHREL ETHICAL RELATIVISM

(I) OCCUPATION	(J) OCCUPATION	Mean Difference (I-J)	Std. Error	Sig. <sup>a</sup>	95% Confidence Interval for Difference <sup>a</sup>	
					Lower Bound	Upper Bound
Elected official	Government	-.283	.536	.597	-1.336	.769
	employee					
	Union-building	-.663	.556	.234	-1.756	.430
	trades					
Business	professional	-.001	.542	.998	-1.067	1.064
	College student	-1.084*	.530	.042	-2.126	-.042

Based on estimated marginal means

a. Adjustment for multiple comparisons: Least Significant Difference (equivalent to no adjustments).

\*. The mean difference is significant at the .05 level.

APPENDIX F

ANCOVA Test for Linear Combination Question 80

Table 49

*ANCOVA Test for Linear Combination Question 80*

**Tests of Between-Subjects Effects**

Dependent Variable:q80\_comm q80\_linear combination of 26, 36, 45 ,46

Source	Type III Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.	Partial Eta Squared
Corrected Model	171.848 <sup>a</sup>	5	34.370	4.106	.001	.042
Intercept	22158.868	1	22158.868	2647.164	.000	.851
OCCUPATION * POL_AFFIL	171.848	5	34.370	4.106	.001	.042
Error	3892.420	465	8.371			
Total	146894.000	471				
Corrected Total	4064.268	470				

a. R Squared = .042 (Adjusted R Squared = .032)

Note: interaction cannot proceed with post hoc test



APPENDIX G

ANCOVA Test for Linear Combination Question 90

Table 50

*ANCOVA Test for Linear Combination Question 90*

**Tests of Between-Subjects Effects**

Dependent Variable: q90\_cynicisism q\_90 revised cynicism scale

Source	Type III Sum of					Partial
	Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.	Eta Squared
Corrected Model	385.240 <sup>a</sup>	5	77.048	4.962	.000	.051
Intercept	29050.379	1	29050.379	1870.855	.000	.801
OCCUPATION *	385.240	5	77.048	4.962	.000	.051
POL_AFFIL						
Error	7220.455	465	15.528			
Total	196486.000	471				
Corrected Total	7605.694	470				

a. R Squared = .051 (Adjusted R Squared = .040)

Note: interaction cannot proceed with post hoc test