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Media consumption, identity and the Pakistani diaspora

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Abstract

This research seeks to address the issue of media consumption and the formation of diaspora identity within second and third generation British-born residents of Pakistani origin. In recent years there has been much debate centred on this group within the context of domestic and wider international geopolitics of winning hearts and minds, the ‘war on terror’ and the rise of the internet and social media as unrestricted spaces of self-expression. This has had a profound impact on the sense of belonging that transcends national boundaries and becomes a more transnational experience creating new communities of interest.

The role of the media and other forms of communication may be a key or important determinant in how these groups, represented by the Pukhtoon and Punjabi in this study, not only see themselves but view representation of their identify and sense of self to a wider public arena. The perceived relationship between Islam and the ‘war on terror’ as formed by the media has had a profound impact on perceptions and mindsets of many of the diaspora. New technology has created a new smartphone generation able to reassess and reaffirm their emerging hybridity set within a new discourse of equal rights and respect for cultural and religious values within a transnational context.

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Chapter 1

Introduction

The research aims to understand and analyse the construction of Pakistani diaspora identity through mass media consumption. Its objective is to assess whether the range of media consumption has an impact on the creation and development of a single or multiple identity amongst the British-born Pakistani populations of Luton and Oxford, of Punjabi and Pukhtoon backgrounds.

The study will encompass gender, class, and socio-economic variations that also contribute to a personal sense of belonging in Britain. The impact of all forms of media will be assessed, including television, radio, newspapers, cable and satellite broadcasters and new media formats such as the plethora of social media and what can be described as existing and emerging ‘smartphone’ technologies.

With respect to the Pakistani population in Britain, there exists a body of literature on aspects of their cultural, social, political, economic, religious and racial status through the generations. These are past and present representations, whether as early migrants or as British-born citizens of Pakistani origin. This has all been recorded and analysed in the context of work signified by, amongst others, Husband (1994, 1996), Lewis (1991, 2003), Shaw (1994) Ansari (2002), Modood (2003, 2005, 2010), Alam and Husband (2006) Samad (2006), Samad and Sen (2007), Malik (2006) and Manzoor (2007).

Many have focused on the relationships these communities have with their space in contemporary Britain. There is some literature available on the media in respect to British Muslims as a whole (Poole 2002, 2006; Ahmed 2006). However, there is little written about the role and impact of the media on these specific cultural groups within the Pakistani diaspora community. They are a distinct group in their own right that form the majority of the Pakistani population in Britain. They retain a sense of common belonging to the sub-continent and inherited attitudes to their reflected cultural identities.

In essence, this study seeks to examine and deconstruct a number of key issues and themes that relate to two specific cultural communities – Punjabi and Pukhtoon (or Pashtun) – of the Pakistani diaspora. The aims and objectives of the research question therefore provide a route map of this exploration as it seeks to:

- Investigate the type and range of mass media utilised by the Pakistani diaspora within two specific cohort groups, namely the Punjabi and Pukhtoon, and consumption of new forms of media by second and third generation Pakistanis, by gender and class.
- Assess the impact of the range of media consumption on the formation, redefinition or enhancement of identity.
- Assess any differentials based on cultural variations within the two specific cultural cohort groups (Punjabi and Pukhtoon) of British-born Pakistanis.
- Investigate whether the media plays a significant part in the reinforcement of personal and/or group identity within the Pakistani diaspora and how this is reflected and translated on a day-to-day level.

Inevitably, across the globe, the media is playing an increasingly dominant role in society. Yet it has a specific significance in relation to the Pakistani diaspora within this research, conducted at a time of much complexity in their lives; mass media attention on Muslims, animosity towards the Iraq war, perceptions of scapegoating and apprehension in those they can trust in their own communities, Islamaphobia. They all contributed to a sense of rejection articulated through the narratives. Associated within this discourse is the importance of increasing technological advances within new media, equipment and the means of mass communication. This includes the internet, smartphones, 4G and growing social media developments such as Facebook and Twitter. This has created a clear divide between age groups, between those who are the youthful ‘smartphone generation’ and the ageing population who are more likely to be technophobic in this new media age, unfamiliar, if not willing to engage, with instant messaging and video or music downloads generally.

The Leveson Inquiry (2012) findings also provide a useful backdrop and examination of the role, functions and relationships of the press in Britain with power, the political class and corruption, and the ability to influence and control news. Its televised proceedings and appearances of politicians, celebrities, news media editors and proprietors provided an insight to the public at large into the day-to-day and behind-the-scenes modus operandi of this powerful and intrusive medium.

The evidence given in the Leveson Inquiry is part of the discourse on the changing nature of diasporas that have themselves been subject to much media attention and analysis, among them the Pakistani and Muslims in Britain. At the heart of this discourse on changing nature is an understanding of the evolution of multiple identities forging a new Britishness that is not one single component but made up of many symbiotic elements that make up this hybridity of identity, a process in which mass media representations play a role.

These elements can be considered as the essential building blocks of this study that together will provide some understanding of the subject of investigation. As part of that process, this introduction will set out the context and structure of the population group, namely the Pakistani diaspora in Britain, and relate it to a strong sense of religious obligation to the Islamic faith. For the purposes of this research question, the terms ‘sample diaspora’ and ‘diaspora’ may be used to signify the respondents recorded in this study. This qualification is necessary, as the interviewees are a small segment of the British Pakistani diaspora and therefore, while providing their thoughts, perceptions and analysis of their media consumption, cannot be concluded as representing the totality of the British Pakistani diasporic community.

A comparison is made between how these two groups of British-born Pakistanis of Punjabi and Pukhtoon backgrounds utilise the mass media and how the mass media, in turn, defines their presence and contribution to British society as citizens. The study reveals a difference in approach and emphasis in how the Pukhtoon and Punjabi draw a distinction between each other within a wider

Pakistani community setting, a difference that could shape and reinforce a sense of cultural, political and social identity within a transnational context, as reflected in the literature.

1.2 Thesis outline

Chapters address the key issues that have emerged from the data. Chapter 1 introduces the study itself, setting out the rationale for the chosen research question, the value of the investigation and its overall aims and objectives, as they relate to the specific area of interest, namely the Pakistani diaspora. The chapter also provides data on current media consumption in the UK as a backdrop to the discussion that is the focus of this research.

Chapter 2, ’Transnationalism, media, identity and hybridity’, sets out the body of literature reviewed for the purposes of the research. It encapsulates the wider discourse on identity, the relationship with hybridity and connections with transnationalism. It also seeks to assess the relationship of the specific diaspora with issues associated with culture, and Islam as the dominant faith and belief system that interrelates to personal, if not, group identity reflecting the societal culture defined by Kymlicka (1995). It provides an overview of the South Asian communities’ early presence in Britain and settlement.

In addition, the chapter has sections that explore the role and function of the mass media and its relationship with power, capital and special interest groups considered inter-dependent, as assessed by some commentators, within a wider and global political, economic and social sphere. The evidentiary nature of the Leveson Inquiry (2012) is also discussed, to emphasise the current public interest and concern with media intrusion, which reinforces elements of racial and religious demonisation of particular minority groups. This is then related to the role of Orientalism and the impact of Islamophobia, in an attempt to assess their contribution to the wider discourse related to media consumption and interpretation of information by the diaspora, as expanded upon in Chapter 4. The importance and differences between new and social media are also mentioned in this Chapter 2, providing a better understanding of their significance to the diaspora in the context of this study.

Chapter 3 sets out the methodological framework and pathway in its entirely, with a step-by-step elucidation of the approach used and techniques adopted in gathering the data for this study. This account moves from initial overtures in recruiting individuals, to enhancing confidence between the researcher and interviewees, to coordinating the respondent Pukhtoon and Punjabi cohort groups in the two fieldwork sites of Oxford and Luton. The theoretical basis of this investigation is also elaborated upon in this chapter, supported by literature as to why this method was found to be the most appropriate for the investigation. A risk analysis is also addressed within this section and how any adverse interventions can be mitigated. In the final paragraphs, personal reflectivity is explained as providing a positive input into this study and a more profound empirical insight into the research data and analysis. Ethnography and emic/etic approaches are contributed also. Some final assumptions are made regarding how the analytical process may produce certain outcomes from the data captured and reviewed, and how the process of enquiry may be repeated, in line with the grounded theory approach.

Subsequent chapters are shaped by the analysis of the data collected from the respondents. Chapter 4 focuses in more detail on the key issue of Islamophobia, exploring its impact through the media prism, guided by respondent perceptions. The impact of religious, cultural and racial stereotyping perceived by the diaspora is analysed in this section, with commentary provided by respondents highlighting their experiences in this regard. How this has impacted on their sense of identity within Britain is examined further and analysed to provide a basis of understanding of whether these observations are accurate.

Chapter 5 addresses issues related to media production. It provides an overview and analysis of how programming and information within mass media bodies are created, formatted and disseminated, with observations and perceptions made by respondents. The analysis is related to the prevailing literature in seeking to validate the data captured and analysed. A brief account is given of attempts to elicit a response from media stakeholders and government, for purposes of objectivity and right of reply.

In this way the scene is set for Chapter 6, in terms of exploring the consequence of discrimination leading to a sharper sense of a transnational identity that also relates to a collective and personal sense of safety and security. The role the media has played and is playing in this process is discussed in this context, with an explanation of how new social media and the internet have allowed the diaspora to find new meaning in their religious and cultural identity through global connectivity with similar communities of interest across the world. This process has allowed a new assertiveness to form and grow that encapsulates a cultural and religious identity combined with a more modern, if not Westernized, outlook and value base. Within this development, the class differential between more affluent and economically disadvantaged members of the Pakistani diaspora is analysed.

In the final stage of this investigation, Chapter 7 focuses the discussion on a number of key issues that have emerged from the research findings. Included is an analysis of the impact of the media on the Pakistani diaspora community resulting from the data and analysis of the Pukhtoon and Punjabi subgroups in Oxford and Luton. Observations by the principal, also referred to as the lead researcher; describing myself, are included and aligned to the literature to consolidate the arguments raised. Conclusions follow as to how the media has had function and form in the evolution and definition of Pakistani diaspora identity. This will be interpreted with regard to what this means for the Pakistani diaspora in the study, but also more widely. In so doing, it is hoped that the overall aims and objectives of the investigation will have been met and the research question itself given much more amplification and understanding. It is also hoped that it will have contributed a new angle to the discourse related to these specific groups that enhances the current published literature.

There has also been scope within this study to identify any gaps within the research methodology and, more fundamentally, within the analysis of the data.

Possible gaps in the analysis were assessed during the important stages of discussion of themes that were generated. Furthermore, based on the empirical data, a vital component to enhance the analysis from the point of view of the researcher was to gain further explanation through the continual interaction with interviewees over the long duration of the investigation.

In summary, this study has a specific focus on two distinct Pakistani communities of the diaspora and their consumption of a range of media including engagement with new media. The data analysis indicates some key elements to consider in how British-born Pakistanis regard their status and future within Britain. This research seeks to offer a unique contribution to the study of British Pakistanis as a diverse set of cultural groups with a shared societal culture. The impact of their media consumption in formulating their shared or unique identities is the subject of discussion and examination.

As a result, this study provides weight to the central argument that media representations of the British Pakistani diaspora, and of their faith, have impacted on their sense of safety and security as citizens of their country of birth. This, in turn, has created an insecurity of belonging aided by very strong perceptions of Islamophobia that reinforce wider feelings of discrimination which in turn fuel alienation from mainstream society. As a response, new media and smartphone technologies are being utilised to reassert a sense of British Muslim identity that is transnational and supported by the wide use of the internet, social media and opportunities for self-expression through for example YouTube, The role of new media in creating a new assertiveness cannot be overemphasized. It has allowed what Bhabha (1994) refers to as the evolution of hybridity and third space. This has allowed the diaspora in this study to locate to transnational virtual space as the ‘smartphone’ diaspora generation.

1.3 The comparative approach and definitions

The Pakistani population is not homogenous. It spans a number of traditions and heritages that relate to the four geographical regions – Punjab, Sind, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Baluchistan – of the nation state called Pakistan. It forms, as Kymlicka (1995) has argued, a societal culture whereby:

> ‘a culture which provides its members with meaningful ways of life across the full range of human activities, including social, education, religious, recreational, and economic life, encompassing both public and private spheres. These cultures tend to be territorially concentrated, and based on a shared language. I have called these ‘societal cultures’ to emphasise that they involve not just shared memories or values, but also common institutions and practices.’ (p.76)

The concept of a societal culture is also relevant within the Western context, relating to the early migrants from South Asia to the present diaspora. It incorporates an accommodation between East and West; acceptance and valuing of the culture of the host society by learning the language, while, to date, not letting go of a past history and culture that is relevant also in the of the new generation’s identity. This will be explored further in the chapters.

The Punjabi and Pukhtoon sub-populations differ in their languages (Punjabi and Pashto respectively) and main areas of concentrations in Pakistan (Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Punjab) but share English as a vernacular for both in Britain and also share a faith, and alignment of inherited traditions and cultures. This broad grouping – Pakistani, British and Muslim – relates well to the wider diaspora and will be the focus of this research; the sub-populations and their diaspora share a common lexicon, group norms and practices that make them distinct in their own right.

Diaspora may be referred to in the following way, using a definition provided by Connor (1986) – ‘that segment of people living outside the homeland’ (p.16) – that is enhanced by Safran (1991, p.83) where the concept of diaspora may be applied to

> ‘expatriate minority communities whose members share several of the following characteristics:

> 1) They or their ancestors have been dispersed from a specific original "center" to two or more "peripheral" or foreign regions;
> 2) They retain a collective memory, vision or myth about their original homeland – its physical location, history and achievements;
> 3) They believe they are not and perhaps cannot be accepted by their host society and therefore feel alienated and insulated from it;
> 4) They regard their ancestral homeland as their true, ideal home and as the place to which they or their descendants would (or should) eventually return when conditions are acceptable.'

Alternatively, the researcher recognises a diversity of meanings for diaspora, from early Jewish dispersal to the movement of labour and capital referred to by Vertovec and Cohen (1999). Others have related it to the spatial politics of culture identity and hybridity recognised by Hall (1992) and Blunt (2005) amongst others quoted by Bonnerjee et al. (2012, p.13). There is of course a strong correlation with transnationalism, given the nature of the relationship with home and place in another land. The above definition for this research seems to be the most appropriate for the subject matter. Additionally, in the context of this research, therefore, the mass media plays into the configuration of identity and hybridity referred in the literature referred to above.

1.4 Background: Development of new media

As already stated, this investigation has its roots in an interest in the development of the Pakistani community in Britain and more specifically, in the rise of the British- born generation of Pakistani origin who now regard Britain as their home and base for meeting existing and future aspirations.

The size of this population nationally remains low in comparison with other ethnic groups in Britain, despite large concentrations of the Pakistani community in some major cities and conurbations. Ethnic classification became a recorded element of the national census in 1991. From 1993, in line with discrimination legislation and analysis of migration, the Office for National

Statistics (ONS), police, health authorities and others have used the ‘16 + 1’ categorisation (16 classifications of ethnicity such as White, Black, Asian with sub categories such as, under Asian, Indian, Pakistani and Bangladeshi, plus one category for ‘not stated’) This is the standard formula used throughout public bodies and agencies) to record the size of minority communities in Britain. The Pakistani population represents 2% of the make-up of the Asian community, around a million people, just below the Indian population at 2.4% (1.4 million) (ONS, 2012). The data also suggests a continual and steady inflow of migration from South Asia, namely India, Pakistan and Bangladesh, that maintains the cultural patterns of these communities through marriage, kinship and extended family relationships.

These continual links to South Asia also illustrate the strong cultural and social connectivity of the British-born diaspora with the homeland of their parents, often reinforced by regular visits to Pakistan and through daily communication via telephone, email and, now, through Skype and expanding social networks such as Facebook and Twitter.

For this group of people, the media plays a dominant, if not intrusive, role in their everyday lives that exemplifies and amplifies the expansion and proliferation of new media communications at a global level; a daily way of life for a vast majority of young people (Livingstone and Helsper, 2007; Jorgensen, 2010; O’Keeffe and Clark Pearson, 2011; Cohen et al., 2012; ONS, 2012; Smith, 2014; Watkins, 2014; Chan-Olmsted et al., 2015). For the Pakistani diaspora this is becoming an increasing area of interaction and interest, in formulating a diasporic identity that seeks to accommodate both Eastern and Western modes of behaviour within the scope of anxieties concerning public policies relating to community cohesion and the potential that some may become radicalised young British Muslims. As a consequence of these perceptions and fears of the diaspora, related to belonging in Britain, the role of the internet and new media platforms is an important element of their personal and group narratives. They are vehicles for not only self-expression but also methods of networking and validation within alienated members of the Muslim communities of which the Pakistani diaspora are part.

Within the terminology, it is important to differentiate between the terms mass media and new media within this study, to ensure greater clarity of meaning when referring to the two. It is also essential to realise the distinctions within both meanings of what has been traditional media forms such as television, newspapers, radio and so forth and new media, which has become of age to a wider and more diverse populace and societies.

‘Mass media’ is therefore defined in parallel with the term ‘mass communications’ and refers to the ‘organised means of communicating openly, at a distance, and to many in a short space of time’ (McQuail 2005, p.4).

New media ‘refers to a wide range of changes in media production, distribution and use. These are changes that are technological, textual, conventional and cultural.’ (Lister et al. 2009, p.13)

Furthermore, new media is, as set out by Lister et al., placed in discourses that define its characteristics as ‘digital, interactive, hypertextual, virtual, networked and simulated’ (ibid.). In addition, new media are a tool by which the user can independently promote social, political and other issues of concern and interest, much more so than is the case in traditional mass media.

Within this sphere, the researcher seeks to explore the evolution of the diasporic identity of the British-born Pakistani whereby, in a context of innovations and new technologies, a new form of accessibility has opened up to explore multiple identities within a wider transnational setting.

Also, within these more efficient networks and channels of transnational communications, via texting (short message service, or SMS), instant messaging, mobile internet and applications devices (apps), the diaspora seeks to explore its own sense of belonging that links past heritage to future aspirations. It is this smartphone generation that presently is so reliant on personal iPhones and android smartphone systems, which are of great interest within the parameters of this study. Within the 16-24 year age group between

2002 and 2007 there was a sustained increase in the use of the internet for news from 36% to 56% (Ofcom, 2013).

The importance of the internet and value to the user is articulated by the regulator in the following terms:

> ‘It acts as both a push and pull mechanism for news stories and allows users to tailor their own news interests. Within online, social media is becoming a valuable source for breaking news in its “word-of-mouth” role, as many users learn of breaking news through friends’ posts. It also offers a space to contribute to the story or debate with others.’ (Ofcom, 2012, Annex 4, p.5)

In fact, the use of cellular or electronic forms of interaction has increased so greatly in the last decade that it will be more advanced and available than any other form of mass communication. According to the official UK regulator Ofcom, 76% of the adult population has fixed or mobile internet connections (Ofcom, Q4, 2012), whilst 50% of the adult population use social networks (Ofcom, Q1, 2012) and 39% of people use their mobile phone to access the internet (ibid.). An overwhelming mass of the population rely on mobile phones, with 92% in 2011 owning or using such hand-held devices and on average sending 200 texts a month across the range of systems (Ofcom, Q4, 2012). Data from comscore.com, a company that measures people’s digital viewing habits, highlights YouTube as the dominant video viewing source in the UK, exceeding more established knowledge media bases such as the BBC or independent television.

As Figure 1.1 illustrates, in terms of consumption, 2,415,292 people accessed YouTube as opposed to 79,416 viewers utilising BBC sites and just over 39,000 people using ITV sites for internet viewing (comScore, April 2009). This is evidence of a clear dominance of this new form of media that is user-led in many ways and is so outstripping traditional viewing habits and networks.

Figure 1.1 Number of videos viewed, by owner of 10 most used sites, April 2009



Note: Among Google sites YouTube has the most recorded hits. Source: comScore (July 2009)

Also of interest is the increasing role and influence of digital television within this analysis made by the official national regulator (Ofcom, 2012); over 96% of the population with digital television watches on average a total of just over four hours of television per day, whilst radio listening is less than half that figure, at 42% (Ofcom, Q1, 2012). The data shows a significant increase in those using this form of media to source key information, whether, news, sports or light entertainment and movies. Its dominance is evident in wider society, as is its potential influence, as this study investigates.

The increase in digital television viewing has also allowed an increase in a range of cable and satellite channels that relate to the specific cultural, social, political, economic and material needs of different global communities of interest based on a range of shared attributes. A plethora of small and specialist broadcasters exists to inform transnational communities, related to the wider discourse of British Muslim identity that has been highlighted by Modood (2003), Samad (2006), and Ramadan (2006), for example.

1.5 Specific research questions

Within this research, a number of key lines of enquiry sought to collect information from the participants:

1. Defining participants’ personal identity at the time of investigation and during the stages of this research study, to assess modifications.
2. The specific characteristics of group identity.
3. What national, transnational and international media were consumed.
4. The range of media sources utilised by the diaspora and the reasons for the choice made.
5. The role of new media and how is it utilised.
6. How differences within the Pakistani diaspora are distinguished.
7. How cultural and religious practices are reflected in this formation of identity.
8. Impact of the media in reinforcing or deconstructing this identity, in particular new media.
9. The major responses to mass media, if any, with respect to identity formation.
10. The role of new media within this construct.

These key points developed supplementary queries that enhanced the study and further clarified the research question. It was essential, however, that the data formed the basis of this study and that participants were allowed to explore the subject matter within their own sense of awareness and understanding of the mass media. Their interpretations and understandings were important, in how these had manifested themselves in their own sense of status. The questions therefore had been ‘open’ to elicit wider debate and co-operation, in order to ensure the discussions were fruitful and significant in providing meanings and understanding of the diasporic viewpoint.

1.6 Methods of research

It is imperative therefore that the methodology, as set out in chapter 3 was in tune with the desired outcomes as set out above.

A qualitative approach was the best framework to take this study forward as the researcher believed this was the most adaptable and flexible method of having analysed the data within the context of grounded theory. The cyclical nature of the data collected in the fieldwork phase and the following on-going analysis shaped the pathway of this investigation. This then led to semi-structured cessations with cohort member's and one to one interviews that enhanced the study further through probing and enhancing the narratives collected from the Punjabi and Pukhtoon participants. In all respects, this was an evolutionary process that assisted in building trust and relationships with cohort members that benefited the research as a whole.

It is also within this model that the researcher understood the significance of the diversity within this community of study, in terms of political, economic and social constructs that defined individuals within the Pakistani diaspora that maintained a sense of transnational allegiances, out of a desire for self-awareness and understanding of their heritage. The study allowed the researcher to validate or reject personal assumptions and hypothesis that were formed in line with the environmental conditioning and history of the Pakistani communities and migration to Britain. Empirical data therefore provided additional support to this specific area and had informed the on-going analysis as part of the theoretical approach.

Chapter 2

Transnationalism, media, identity and hybridity

There are a number of key interlocking themes this chapter intends to consider in relation to the available literature, which will provide a greater overview of the issues and debates related to the research question. The issues of media and identity are considerations within a much broader context that need to be addressed, as they collectively impact on the investigation.

The wider discourse of the British Muslim and the Pakistani and their role and purpose in British society has been amplified and invoked in many column inches and television scripts. It is highlighted in the newspaper headline ‘How would you describe your identity?’ (Guardian 2004). This sentence resonates with the research question in this study. It seeks to address the fundamental relationship, in its newspaper columns, between a racial minority presence and Islam in Britain. This chapter aims to contribute further to the existing body of work on the particular diaspora of interest, the Pakistani British Muslim.
(Modood et al1994, 1997, Modood 2003, 2010, Poole 2002, Ansari 2002, Alam and Husband 2006, Shaw 1994, Bologani and Lyon 2011 Samad 2006, 2013).

This chapter therefore sets out the interlinks between faith, identity, transnational belonging, ethnicity and diaspora. Through subjective and objective definitions, it evokes a complex set of emotions and relationships between spatial environments and a sense of being as a citizen. In adding to the wider literature, it emphasises the role of the media in how it relates to Islam and to the Pakistani diaspora. The impact of geo-political situations is also addressed within the arena of transnationalism and hybridity impacted upon by international media representations. The final summation will focus on how new technologies can source alternative meanings to identity that are assertive, global and empowering to the subjects in question.

2.1 South Asians in Britain

There is already a robust body of literature on the early arrival of South Asian communities in Britain and their settlement. (Woods 1960; Desai, 1963; Dahya, 1974; Saifullah Khan, 1977; Ballard, 1982; Barton, 1986; Eade, 1996, 1997, 2007; Ansari, 2006; Singh, 2006). It highlights the arrival of the Pakistani, Indian and Bangladeshi communities to begin a new life in Britain, pre- and post-independence. They referred to their early identity in Britain as Indians until partition gave them compartmentalised cultural belonging that became separated by faith (Brah, 2006). The ranged from the seafarers of pre-partition India, who remained to provide labour for the production of armaments for the war effort, to the rural dwellers of newly formed Pakistan and Bangladesh (Mirpur and Sylhet respectively) who came to work in the industrial centres of Bradford, Birmingham and London (Eade, 1996; Ansari, 2006; Abbas, 2007). Two other centres of settlement documented by the researcher in more detail in this work are Oxford and Luton.

The patterns were similar in other cities across Britain where South Asians first made their homes, with predominantly male settlement, before spouses and children followed later, and before new immigration laws imposed further barriers (McLoughlin et al., 2014). These were the poor areas or ‘zones of transition’ left vacant by well-to-do locals taking ‘white flight’ (Abbas, (2007, p.3).

In placing this section in context, the researcher does not intend to set out a chronological anthology of migration and settlement from the Indian sub-continent. The study aims, rather, to provide an overview of the social and cultural reception and recorded accounts of those early periods of transition and accommodation into new ‘societal cultures’ (Kymlicka, 1995; see previous chapter, 1.3).

It sets out the argument that is a central theme throughout this research analysis of the South Asian migrant and the future diaspora, evidenced by the experiences of the sample Pakistani diaspora in this study, of being the continual outsider, being repeatedly reminded of their external status.

Furthermore, the researcher feels that the shaping of the ‘other’ in these initial periods of migration pre- and post-independence, was embedded early on within mainstream society arising from colonial legacies (Kabbani, 1987), perceptions of which have impacted on the diaspora generations, as set out below and analysed in the main body of this work.

In those early years, the dual elements of racism and exclusion were a feature of the lives of these people of colour, moving into class-based mono-cultural urban cities of Britain. This began with an existing racial and cultural stereotype exported through negative narratives of former colonial masters who policed and managed the old empire (Brah, 2006). Accordingly, interactions between new migrants and the indigenous community were framed within a colonial legacy and framing, by what Zubaida has referred to as ‘returning working class soldiers and middle class administrators’ (Brah, 2006, p.36, quoting Zubaida (1970)). This created myths and misrepresentations that reinforced the ‘inferiority and servility of “native” populations’ (ibid.). In these very early stages, the visualisation of the ‘other’ is already taking hold in the minds of mainstream British society, aided by the discourse of Orientalism (Said, 1978a) and exoticism of the East in the early British understanding of these ‘other’ peoples.

Animosity towards them would become further exacerbated and entrenched at times of economic and political crisis that are emphasised and adapted to increase tensions (Brah, 2006; p.36, quoting Zubaida (1970). From the outset, status, sense of home and security, were tenuous for the South Asian migrant. Allied to this was the language of hate, of Asians smelling of curry or living collectively in large groups, and simply being ‘here’ (Brah, 2006; Sivanandan, 1986) that reinforced a ‘them and us’ mentality at its crudest level. The growth of the far right, the National Front, increased tensions and fears amongst the immigrant populations with marches in predominantly South Asian areas to raise tensions and anxiety among new settlers. It was a period the researcher recalls when he was growing up in Bradford, with white groups chanting ‘Paki out’ as parents reminded children firmly to remain indoors and not even look out of the window.

This was the period of the first generation of the diaspora growing up, attending British schools and receiving a British education. Identity formation seeking to align East and West was emerging within these early British South Asian diasporas. Such development had, however, created an academic and societal discourse of a so called ‘culture clash’ (Brah, 2006, p.52) within this new growing generation. Brah (2006) argues that this is problematic on a number of fronts as it is based on the premise that there are only two specific dominant cultures within this frame. He contends that there is no one British (referring to middle-class and working-class) culture or equivalent single Asian culture (differentiated by a range of identifiers, such as caste, religion, regional culture, language). Brah’s viewpoint is evidenced by partition of the Indian sub-continent. Brah (ibid.) also offers several other counter arguments on this subject. The term ‘culture clash’ disallows ‘cultural interactions’ (ibid., p.53) whereby cultures can be joined and merged, that relate to the development of hybridity in diaspora communities more widely (Safran, 1991; Samad, 2013). Brah also points to the falsehood of the debate on transmigration as being only one way. There is a failure to recognise earlier centuries of trade and relationships between the then India and the West, both before and during colonial rule.

Brah (ibid.) ends with two key points in his argument against this notion of cultural clash and identity crisis within the South Asian youth. First, there is a lack of evidence in this regard, and although limited numbers may have personalised cultural conflicts, this cannot be hypothesised across the wider diaspora generation. Second, other contributors of anxiety, such as racism, gender variations and even issues of sexuality are not factored into this equation. In general terms, there are also periods of transition for young people from adolescence to adulthood, fraught with their own anxieties and concerns; similar to Western youth.

What Brah (ibid.) addresses is the continual emphasis on difference, on the alien world the South Asian belongs to, the antithesis of British values and norms. Hutnyk (2006) also identifies with this view by stating how anthropological studies of South Asians have tended to reinforce conservative stereotypes. He argues:

> ‘To assume that caste, kinship, arranged marriages and religious traditions are the main keys to comprehension of the social and political experience of South Asians in Britain is a common delusion, born from the work of anthropologists bent on finding rural and village subjects conveniently replicated in metropolitan settings.’ (pp.75-6).

There is, therefore, a tendency through such studies (and through the lens of the media, as is the subject of this study) to reinforce a framing of the South Asian in what has been described as a ‘double strategy, either as demons, or exotica’ (ibid., p.77). What Hutnyk (ibid.) seeks to do is to readdress the balance of the discourse on South Asians created within the field of anthropology and to ‘reconstruct this absent history’ (p.77). It signifies how these ‘myths of the orient’ (Kabbani, (1987) have become so entrenched that even British-born South Asians of the diaspora generation can still be viewed as the ‘other’. This typology, the researcher would argue, exists within present discourses on South Asian communities, particularly those more socially excluded, as is the case of the Pakistani and Bangladeshi population.

Indeed the cities with which South Asians have become predominantly associated with – Bradford, Leicester, Birmingham and London – have at times acquired names more associated with the Indian sub-continent: Little Mirpur, Little India or Brad-istan (McLoughlin, 2006; Singh, 2006). These racialised terms seek to reflect the impact of faith and elements of conservative culture more akin to village life than urban living, even though the major cities of the Indian sub-continent personify modernity at its best (Brah, 2006).

However, the South Asian diasporas made in, and of, Britain, unlike their parents, have grown up challenging racism rather than accepting or denying it. The second and third generations of the diaspora have signified a mélange of identities that capture both East and West.

In addition, the politicised youth were at the ‘vanguard of black struggle’ (Sivanandan, 1986, p.140) articulated through the creation of Asian youth movements in the 1970s and 1980’s, in Southall and Bradford for instance, as an anti-racist movement response to police indifference, inaction and institutionalised racism. These were political responses across the country by a more assertive youth, who were also challenging the widely prevailing discourse of that time, the ‘between two cultures analysis’ (Alexander, 2006, p.259; Brah, 2006; Singh, 2006). These ‘BrAsian’ (Ali et al., 2006, p.1) communities were shedding the need to conform or acquiesce to the prejudices and animosity of the majority culture that had defined the lives of the first migrants from the Indian sub-continent.

For many young people, the new assertiveness was perceived as self-defence against an onslaught of racism expressed in the rise of the National Front. It was also a bold statement of intent: We are British and we are here to stay. It was echoed two decades later in the mid 1990s in the streets of Bradford in the Manningham riots, with young British Asians protesting against perceived Police brutality and racism, as well as wider socio-economic marginalisation and discrimination (Foundation 2000, 1995). Six years later, the much analysed riots in Burnley, Bradford and Oldham (Cantle, 2001) can also be seen as a new diasporic response to far-right extremism attempting to march into areas with significant Asian populations. Many did not wish to repeat the experiences of their parents nor would they allow far-right foot soldiers to shout abuse on their doorsteps. More importantly, they wished to defend their status as British citizens the equal of their opponents (Jan-Khan, 2001). The prevailing discourse in political and social policy was marked by what Cantle (ibid.) referred to as minority and white communities living parallel lives. The emphasis placed on minorities to conform was another reminder of the ‘other’ within British society two generations on (Kundnani, 2014).

Yet the political consciousness of the diaspora youth has been assessed by Alexander (2006) as a time of transforming the term Asian itself, from a multi-ethnic meaning, encompassing many of the Indian sub-continent of many faiths to one referring to ‘essentialising religio-cultural identities (ibid., p.265), setting the Islamic traditions of Pakistani and Bangladeshi against the Indian, of the Hindu and Sikh faiths. The politics of the sub-continent have indeed created sectarianism based on religion, where Islamic political identity has now replaced what was once a collective Asian sense of belonging (McLoughlin, 2006). Ironically, this is a division also perpetuated by the English Defence League with its anti-'Islamisation of Britain' campaigns that also signify the rise of cultural racism after 9/11 and London bombings in 2005. (Silverman and Yuval-Davis, 1999; Kassimeris and Jackson, 2015)

In that sense, the South Asian experience has split across socio-economic, as well as religious, lines, with the Indian communities in the main prospering economically and educationally, while the Pakistani and Bangladeshi performing worst on many social and economic indicators (Cabinet Office, 2003; Thandi, 2006 Atkin, 2006). An exception is educated and affluent Pakistanis and Bangladeshis (McLoughlin, 2006).

The Pakistani and Bangladeshi communities have similarities in terms of socio-economic positionality within British society. The faith of Islam and being a British Muslim unites them, even if the communities were divided by the split of East Pakistan from Pakistan to form Bangladesh. For instance, the work of Eade (1996, 1997) on the Bangladeshi community of East London highlights that the 'firm grounding of individual personality is dependent here on a composite social identity where Islam holds pride of place and cultural traditions do not contradict Islamic injunctions' (1977, p.153)

As this research study will highlight, Islam and the religious identity of the Pakistani diaspora are integrated into the hybridity of these Muslim diasporas emerging British identity. This correlates to the transnational movement of people, the mix of cultures and wider global events that impact locally and thus interlink and impact on the lives of diverse communities (Eade, 2007).

In looking at the literature of Alam (2002), Eade (1996, 1997), Abbas (2007), Alam et al. (2009), and Alam and Husband (2011), on the development of the

Pakistani and Bangladeshi communities and diasporas in Bradford, Birmingham and London, the complexity of belonging is highlighted. Internal personalised debates on being British, Muslim, Pakistani, and Bangladeshi are simultaneously taking place in these urban centres. They not only provide the historical setting of these populations but also their continuing place in their locale, centred on extended family networks of generations residing in the same vicinity. Such narratives may include the decline of the early thriving industries, the rise of unemployment, and localised skirmishes between minorities and the majority population, as in the Abbey Mills Mosque dispute (Eade, 2007).

The insider/outsider approach is highlighted as important, if not essential, in this analysis of how these specific communities are not only written about but personified (see Brah and Hutnyk above). McLoughlin (McLoughlin et al. 2014, p.38) points out the critique of liberal discourse on Muslims by Alam and Husband (2006) in their analysis of first-hand narratives of Bradford's Muslim diaspora following the London bombings in 2005. Like Poole (2002) and Poole and Richardson (2006) commenting on media representation of Muslims, Alam and Husband speak of an equally negative research discourse of demonising British Muslim culture as problematic, through liberal (Eurocentric) interpretation of British Muslim lives.

This symbolises for the researcher the modernity to date of the continuation of the 'other' that emerged with the first wave of non-white migrants into Britain, the way the Pakistani and Bangladeshi Muslim within many urban cities of Britain is portrayed, maintaining a specific anthropological interpretation pointed out by Hutnyk (ibid.).

As an alternative and counterbalance, the edited volume of narratives of Pakistani young men 'made in Bradford' (Alam, 2006) provides a remarkable insight into the reality of the lives and identity of British-born Pakistani citizens in that city. This approach seems to correlate with the internal debates on identity occurring within the Bangladeshi diaspora in London (Eade, 1997) as well as in places such as Birmingham (Abbas, 2010; Isakjee, 2012). It signifies, in many respects, the continual 'insider/outsider' interest in and impact of South Asian communities of the past, the present diaspora and future generations living in Britain. It is such a level of examination, often academically forensic and persistent, playing a spotlight on specific South Asians of Muslim faith, that has generated this research question.

Indeed, it is these two South Asian groups, Pakistani and Bangladeshi, that now form an important part in localised (urbanised) global cities and that also relate to the growth of greater diversity (Eade, 1997; Samad, 2013; Vertovec, 2010). The global city is marked by international business and a transnational society that, as Eade (2010a) points out, facilitates diasporas to have belonging to a range of homes according to their centres of origin. In addition, hybrid culture is enhanced through film, television and other art and virtual forms, and national governments are powerless to disallow these international connections that maintain a dominant role in developing diasporic identities and transnational relationships (Gajjala, 2010; Rinnawi, 2010).

It is in this context that the Pakistani diaspora and media consumption and identity are explored further in this study. Commencing with an analysis of the literature in this chapter, the study then initiates some key debates emerging from the wider literature. This aligns to the analysis of the data collected from the two fieldwork sites, in Chapters 4-6.

2.2 Defining identities

As Hall (1997) has argued, identity is a construction of many facets, including language and other internal and external characteristics. It is apparent that identity within minority communities reaches a sense of crisis and is the cause of much agonising, because of overtly negative feelings that prevail in society against the ‘Other’ (Hall, 1997). The Government Office for Science report *Future identities* (2013) defines identity as being a set of characteristics setting out who and what an individual is, containing perceptions of oneself that also may be aligned to, or different from, other people’s views.

An alternative approach is put forward by Anthias, who speaks of the limited empirical value of concepts of identity and rather engages in ‘narratives of location and positionality’ (Anthias, 2002, p.491) that relate to notions of collective identity. She argues that there is more value in this method of investigation of belonging. It directly relates to assertions and acknowledgments made by individuals about their position in society and about their sense of belonging, in totality or in part, to wider society. This supports a better comprehension of broader social relationships that make up and are constituted in this process (ibid.).

The researcher believes this concept to be the core element that relates to the Pakistani diaspora in this study. It corresponds to the wide body of literature but also to the data captured amongst respondents within the sample diaspora.

The use of language in identity is also an important element in how it symbolises community connectivity, as argued by Barker and Galasinski (2001) within their work on discourse analysis. Language use creates codes and signals that become established within identity. This is clearly the case for the groups involved in this research, both Pukhtoon and Punjabi, via their use of fusion language in their daily interactions and sub-culture.

This range of views highlights the complexity of settling on a definition of the term identity and interjects a stronger sense of elasticity in how individuals can or cannot relate to a sense of belonging within a given territorial boundary. This discourse will be revisited later in this chapter.

The relationship with the media is set out within the following concept, where Chul-Byung (2002) challenges the cultural imperialism view of viewers as passive recipients of news. He suggests that public audiences are active participants in media consumption, utilising global media mechanisms to be creative. In many respects, this rather reflects the empowering nature and process of self-framing within the context of media growth and representation, rather than acquiescence to the rigid roles and rules set at the behest of capital, as argued by Herman and Chomsky (1994). It is Chul-Byung’s analysis that corresponds with the sample diaspora and the central argument in this research, of how the Pakistani diaspora are becoming active citizens via new technologies to promulgate their transnational hybrid identity.

There is also an explanation offered of how personal and public identity can be articulated within wider society. Chul-Byung refers to this as the intimacy and informality of what is known as the 'back region' or 'back stage' as opposed to the image portrayed to others in the 'front region' (Goffman, 1969, in Chul-Byung, 2002). The boundary between the two can be blurred, given societal circumstances and experiences of the affected groups. There would also be fear of further alienation and animosity if private feelings were reflected within the public arena. This may be true of the experiences of many of the diaspora reflected in this study and addressed in the following chapters. The researcher recognises the power of the current dominant media conglomerates (News International, Time Warner) in relation to independent operators such as Democracy Now. However, social media provides a strong lever for more citizen activism to challenge media hegemony (Wasley, 2009) and is an area to monitor in the future.

Consistent with this viewpoint is the important role and impact of the 'state' as espoused by Sen (2009), who speaks of a theory of impartiality that is confined exactly within the borders of a sovereign state. It proceeds along territorial lines that do, of course, have legal significance but may not have similar political or moral perspicuity. This is not to deny that individuals often think of their identities in terms of groups that include some and firmly exclude others. However, the sense of identities – in fact people have many – is not confined within the borders of the state. People identify with individuals of the same religion, same language group, same race, same gender, same political beliefs, or same profession. In other words, even within specific boundaries such as those of England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland there exists diversity in terms of geography, language, ancestry and other traits that relate to a transnational hybridity within the British state.

Other attributes contribute to this diversity of identities, that are cultural, faith-based rituals described as symbols by Parekh in a report commissioned by the Runnymede Trust (2000) on the future of multiethnic Britain; they are associated with specific group personalities that are essential components within the scope of a multicultural society (ibid.). However, in recent decades in Britain, these are frequently viewed as challenging a sense of an indigenously dominant cohesiveness and Britishness (Fekete, 2011a).

This is in many respects a challenge to the Sen argument (2009) whereby, through state intervention in the direction of civil society, individual and group identification is subject to standardisation of status and citizenship by legal and other regulation. The citizenship test is one such example, as are policies set up to promote community cohesion between minority communities and indigenous-origin populations. It places the emphasis on minorities fitting into a societal norm and conforming to the rules of society as directed by the majority (Poole and Richardson, 2006).

Such an approach is distinct from promoting a sense of minority rights as Kymlicka (1995) has argued and is related instead to the importance of societal culture within the Western context. It is that Asian culture – the Islamic faith, the language of their parents fused with English, Hollywood and Bollywood, Pukhtoon, Punjabi, or just Pakistani – that is so important to the diaspora individually and collectively. This is their expression of neo-societal culture in a British setting that relates to their need to have their rights not only recognised but enshrined institutionally as a matter of justice and equality. As Kymlicka (ibid.) argues, the culture of origin provides an anchor for migrant communities adapting to majority culture. This was the case for the South Asian workers described in section 2.1. It is also relevant to the present diaspora, who feel marginalised and subject to discrimination and close media examination. The continual discourse of conforming to British values and of integration, as well as the portrayal of the 'other', has led the British-born diaspora to find solace in their heritage, faith and evolving Britishness. Using Kymlicka's (ibid.) framework of minority rights in this context requires that the diaspora be provided with legal protection to tackle inequality and discrimination. However, as pointed out in

Chapter 4 (4.1), current legal safeguards are inadequate to address the specific concerns of the diaspora, or non-existent.

Similarly, Turner (1994) correlates with the right of citizenship closely tied to a sense of belonging to society. It underlines the relevance of Anthias's concept in this analysis. In the current discourse of policy making, these communities would be redefined as 'aliens' in their own society. This reinforces a sense of 'separateness' and segregation and a need for alternative affirmation that, as a consequence, creates a link with transnational and cultural networks (Samad, 2013). These parallels are a common trait of diaspora population groups although Samad (n.d.) has highlighted the different emphasis of meaning and strata of transnational movement. This fluidity in meaning is also represented in the work of Engbersen (2007) referring to a multi-level of status in society, from citizenship to denizen. He refers to the

> 'transmigrant [who] does not move from one society to another, but is someone who is part of both societies at the same time'. (p.124)

Engbersen (ibid.) argues that this type of person is part of a new cross-border transnational community rather than remaining or integrating into the host society. The emerging diaspora, may, in part, be more attuned to this paradigm of fixation within a 'no man's land' with a perception that they are not welcome or at home in the country of their birth and are also seen as interlopers in their country of origin. This is a key area of exploration using Engbersen's study of migrants in the Netherlands (ibid.); concepts of which, in the view of the researcher, relate to the empirical analysis and perceptions of the Pakistani diaspora in a new media age.

Engbersen (2007) speaks of migrants operating between two worlds, the host country and place of birth. Movements across these two are related to networks, affiliations, economic and political interest, and familial connectivity through communication and limited visits back to the place of origin. As Engbersen states, 'this involves fundamental questions surrounding admission, integration and identity formation' (2007, p.124). This, the researcher would argue, is true for the Pakistani diaspora in Britain, reflecting their status in their 'home' society. In the data analysis, they too maintain an economic and political interest in their 'other' land, Pakistan. This is evident through property-buying or renovations on existing family homes, handed down through generations and now modernised with Western comforts (electric generators, en-suite bathrooms with flush toilets), and through the adoption of a Western approach of having closed houses with a roof and floors, as opposed to a series of rooms built around an open courtyard). In a political sense, they have an interest in the political parties of Pakistan such as the Muslim League (MLN), Pakistan's Peoples Party (PPP), and the more recent Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI, Pakistan Movement for Justice, all with noticeable and charismatic leaders such as Nawaz Sharif, Asif Ali Zardari and his Oxford-educated son, Bilal Zardari Bhutto. The involvement of a former cricket star turned politician, Imran Khan, has been the driving force for the PTI, which has much appeal amongst the young in Pakistan and the diaspora in Britain. The vexed question of Kashmir and dislike of Indian occupation of part of that region is also a political issue uniting transnational communities and identities (Werbner, 2000; Ali, 2003; Ellis and Khan, 2010).

The relationship with the extended families in Pakistan is evident in the empirical data in the use of smartphone technology, instant messaging (Whatsapp, Viber, and Tango), social media (Twitter, Facebook) and face-to-face visualisation through Skype or Facetime. In addition, cable and satellite television informs on a rolling basis with news and information from the provinces as well as the capital of Pakistan. In a slight deviation from Engbersen (2007), this collectively raises fundamental questions of acceptance, integration and identity formation for the diaspora in this study.

The relevancy of the term 'transmigrant' within a new media age for the Pakistani diaspora is set within the literature of exploring diasporas and transnationalism. In their work on *Diaspora and Transnationalism, Concepts, Theories and Methods*, Baubock and Faist (2010) discuss the related literature on this subject. For the researcher, the idea of the 'transmigrant' is enhanced by Dahinden's (2005a, 2005b, 2008, 2009) suggestion of 'diasporic transnationalism'. This refers to 'the ties of migrants and their collectives who entertain sustained social formations across borders while being settled in countries of immigration, thereby forming transnational fields or spaces' (Baubock and Faist, 2010, p.17).

The Pakistani diaspora reflects that definition as they articulate their concerns, anxieties and relationships with the country of origin whilst residing in the country of their birth. This fits in with Safran's view that 'diasporas exist in a triangular socio-cultural relationship with the host society and the homeland. It is above all the ties among dispersed people with each other that have significance' (1991, p.20).

It is, as the researcher will expand upon in later chapters (4-6), their lack of security and discrimination (see chapters 4,7) that aids this new form of transmigrant; for some a return to the homeland as a response to insecurity of living in their settled home, explored in 4.7. They regard themselves as in a type of 'no man's land' of belonging that relates back to cultural, political and social heritage through new media that channels their evolving sense of being. This relates directly to new definitions of identity, diaspora and transnationalism so to the work of Safran (1991) and Dahinden (ibid.) that, together with Engbersen's (ibid.) narratives, reshape and redefine how the Pakistani diasporic generation perceive themselves to be. It is a place of origin and place of destination that is being explored and evolving, within which new media plays a dominant role in defining a new form of transmigrant of the media age. Thus a sense of community is provided, and also a space and locale that relates to the global context and more widely to globalisation (Gajjala, 2010).

It is within this sphere that hybridity related to these special concepts of attachment is evolving. Bhabha (1994) refers to hybridity as a third space and speaks of cultural production being most creative when it is indecisive; this may be true of the Pakistani diaspora in assessing its own sense of hybridity. The media has impacted and precipitated this process within the last decade for these specific groups.

Therefore, proactive involvement in what have been referred to as ‘transnational social fields’ undertaking ‘transnational activities’ (Engbersen, ibid.) is a prerequisite for someone to be defined as a transmigrant. In the context of this discussion, a transmigrant might be said to have one foot in each of two camps, East and West, in a kind of no man’s land. However, this concept has to be explored within a new age of technological advances and media expansion, as to whether a new form of media savvy transmigrant exists within a virtual world. With the use of such technologies for new purposes, one has to consider these new developments within the framework of the emerging diasporic identity amongst young men and women who may wish to create their own self-defining public sphere. Whether this formulation leads to yet another redefining of the term new transmigrant, is an interesting issue.

As an example, Naficy (1993), in discussing Iranians in Los Angeles, writes about the continued processes of social and cultural fusion that are the essential elements of these groups The Pakistani diaspora can be seen in a similar light. This is the opposite of the ‘ghettoisation’ within the new media age as articulated by Akhtar (BBC News, 2006a) in the portrayal of these diasporas as imposing self-isolationism upon themselves. They may, in fact, be embracing what Downing and Husband (2005), in their analysis of race and media, have referred to as a process of ‘cultural negotiation of dual nationality and dual citizenship of past and present’ (ibid. p.57).

Appadurai (1997) argues that media and migration are linked, particularly for migrant populations arriving in a foreign land. In many ways, Appadurai highlights the re-energising of identities and the media input into that process via specifically cultural media rather than the indigenous homegrown equivalent. sentiments echo Vertovec’s (2003) view supporting transnationalist networks that give a sense of being part of a nation, not dependent on the legality of status or rights but based on a real sense of membership of society with a validated common bond. Cultural media and other forms of transnational modes of communication and cross-border affiliations are an essential element of minority self-affirmation and endorsement. As Sauter (2003) reflects, they provide a much desired cultural anchor as well as a place of refuge in an antagonistic and alien environment many miles from home.

Furthermore, the impact of globalisation and new mass media proliferation through new technologies such as the Internet and mobile phone communications are potential vehicles to promote, disseminate and seek membership of wider transnational networks (Eade, 2006). This includes social, political and economic spheres that reflect sameness, with a desire to investigate, and find, much needed global validation of specific group identity. This may be more than apparent within the emerging diaspora seeking space of their own to accommodate and co-exist with their intended personal composition and state boundaries. It is perhaps best described as retaining a legal sense of residency without an attached sense of belonging to that nation.

Correspondingly, Vertovec (2003, 2009, 2010) recalls and reinforces this idea as he refers to these sets of transnationalist communities within the context of increased world technologies. They connect people together via modems, calling cards, cultural cable channels based overseas that provide an easier and more economical way of keeping in touch with kin abroad that is cross generational, albeit in a different form. Whilst for early migrants from Pakistan, cross-continent tape recordings and airmail letters were always anticipated in advance, these have now been replaced and made redundant by the visual interface created by Skype and instant messaging for the diaspora. The ability and adaptability of new technologies have spurred a new generation to think and act more creatively. From the early arrivers from the East, of whom Kabbani has spoken as ‘transplanted communities’ (1987, p.5), moving from rural agrarian cultures to city life, have emerged the diaspora. They are a growing modern generation wishing to explore and contribute to the wider discourse that is conceptualised in what Downing and Husband (2005) have referred to as ‘diasporic public spheres’ (p.45).

In essence, seeking to define a new public sphere of the diaspora’s making is a difficult challenge within a mainstream media and societal setting, given the recent global geo-political situation. What may emerge, either as part of a new transnational cultural discourse set as ‘hybridic Asianness’ (ibid.) may yet be seen as a developing process. It is this potential for the growth of a fused identity bred within an East-West experience that has shed the politics of old cultural dogma, caste, regional or tribal loyalty and replaced it with the politics of modernity and self-identity, that is referred to in the narratives and analysis of the data. In addition, new street language is created through the use of what can only be described as a mix of Urdu, Punjabi and Pukhto with English, thus creating a new currency of communication amongst sections of the diaspora, namely the more socially excluded related to their contributions to this study. It is also significant of the cultural and racial differences in the use of social media that are now beginning to form. (Shivers 2014, Watkins 2014)

This method of creating this synthesis culture mirrors an analysis provided by Krieg’s (1999) exploration of identity and hybridity through the novels of Salman Rushdie. He highlights multiple identities that organically grow as opposed to evolving identity that requires constant analysis. A comparison can be drawn with Sauter’s (2003) work with young Turkish people in Frankfurt, who link home and attachment to security. For the British Pakistani Muslim there is a similar feeling of referring to a place as home that they feel secure and accepted within.

The relationships between these levels of ambivalence and insecurity may symbolically express a much sought after assertiveness, as well as raise a heightened sense of ‘political’ identity and awareness through art forms that are subliminally, rather than overtly, political expressions of identity. This is akin to the early development of hip-hop as a medium for social action within the discriminated-against and marginalised black communities of urban America (Samy-Alim, 2005).

Similarly, the Pakistani diaspora has utilised mobile phone video imagery via new media smartphone technology to depict and express transnational and traditional cultural traits with inserted Western music. These are symbolic interpretations exploring multiple identities through a form of asserted social action in a new media age. What also emerges from this process is a distinct class divergence of the diaspora between the street-smart diaspora and those more educated, aspiring middle-class members of the Pakistani community also born in Britain.

As an example, the riots in Britain of August 2011, when materialist consumption was in mind for the vast majority of looters, were strategically aided in their movements by new media. Indeed, the smartphones of youth outsmarted the law enforcement agencies and exemplified the new means of mass communication as a flexible and available tool for organised protest (Guardian, 2011). The ‘Arab Spring’ in the Middle East, particularly Egypt, also illustrates this trend in using new media as a form of assertive social action and civil disobedience (Campbell and Hawk, 2012). Additionally, this has created a strong link with highlighting perceived injustices to emphasise within this modern sphere the need for minority rights and grievances to be addressed, which relates directly to the views of Kymlicka (1995).

It could be argued that the formation of minority privileges and developments in the new media age are intrinsically linked, as they embody an assertive element of self-identification. This is achieved through a range of new media visual and audio forms that the early dispersed settlers did not have at their instant disposal to communicate with loved ones in distant lands.

There is a further element of this hybridity that needs equal consideration for the Pakistani diaspora in this discourse. Within the media, and social and political commentary, it is currently in vogue to speak of Muslim identity, and more so within British society, where much interest has been ignited in what this really means and relates to. The media has played a dominant role in contributing to this debate, through reporting, framing and subjective representation (Poole, 2002). It has therefore added to negative perceptions, articulated by political commentators and extremist groups (Gardiner, 2010; Az and Mo Productions, 2012). This has in turn created uncertainty and re-awakening of the diaspora in its own notions of British Muslim and Pakistani identity within a wider transnational context.

Some have argued that religious identity has come to the fore as a reaction to the increase in the right-wing movement that has created insecurity within the diaspora. The polarisation and increased sense of crisis has been seen as one explanation for the rise in the concept of asserting Muslim identity (Moussa 2004). It personifies the evident rise of cultural racism as a new tool of targeting this specific racial and religious group. An increased sense of spiritual identity for the diaspora, therefore, is a way of dealing with these animosities.

Furthermore, the significance of being Muslim in Britain is an essential component of their own sense of Britishness; as it is so inherently linked to the specific population groups who are the focus of this investigation. The plurality of identities, class distinctions, economic and social empowerments are also considered within this sphere. The related issues of race, perceptions of discrimination and anti-Islamic sentiment, within a wider global geo-political framework also provide an important context to the data analysis featured in later chapters.

The overt emergence or re-affirmation of a distinct religious identity with a political edge (Modood, 2003) has resulted from what many see as a malign discourse on Muslims in the wider and dominant Western media. It is characterised by a forensic examination of the cultural aspects of race, rather than the biological differences that were a previous preoccupation of community and race relations in Britain (Silverman and Yuval-Davis, 1999).

The global ‘war on terror’ and the importance of Pakistan in this equation have created an element of instability amongst the Pakistani British diaspora, subjected to superficial debates on loyalty inspired by politicians and the media. This was echoed at the time of 9/11, the London bombings of 2005 and more recently in the context of Syria and some British Muslims fighting against Syrian government forces in the name of Islam (Malcolm Rifkind, BBC Radio 4, 2014).

Their defensive response to this interpretation would bring about a stronger sense of asserting their right of presence in Britain, as well as their cultural and religious identity being heightened as a consequence. As Werbner (2004) has argued, group identity is heightened at times of personal or social group instability if not insecurity; this would apply to the British Pakistani diaspora in the current political environment. Within these discourses there has been a strong emergence of faith as a central element of how the sample diaspora view their own world around them and perceive their reality. Identification as a follower of Islam is an important part of their lives, as emphasised in the data, and it would be useful to define this strong religious affiliation.

2.3 What is a Muslim?

According to Sardar (2006), the term Muslim refers to believers of Islam who make a declaration known as the shahada, translated in the literal sense as ‘witness’ or ‘testimony’ of reciting the words, ‘there is no god but Allah and Muhammed is his prophet’ (ibid., 1). This simple statement provides an affirmation of faith not only as to the religion but to the belief in one god, that being Allah, the most beneficial and merciful. In that regard he is an all-powerful god is entrusted with life and death, and creator of all things. Muhammed is regarded as the final prophet in a long line of prophets including Adam, Abraham, Moses, Jesus and others, who are also respected and acknowledged by Muslims. As the final prophet, Muhammed brought the word of god onto earth through the Quran, which is in itself a literal text from god via the angel Gabriel.

The word Islam has a two part meaning of ‘peace’ and ‘submission’ that relates to the faith being a complete way of life, governing legal, economic, political, social and personal norms of living and adherence. These are reinforced by the Sunnah, which is ultimately referred to as the sayings and the actions of the prophet Muhammed during his life. Muslims are also asked to use the prophet as a role model for their conduct and behaviour in day-to-day living; this includes committing oneself to the five pillars of Islam: prayer, fasting, hajj (pilgrimage to Mecca), shahada (declaration of faith) and zakat (giving part of a person’s income to the poor and needy). Sardar (2006) and (Ramadan, 2004) have argued not only for diversity within the faith to encompass a range of branches of belief, but also for followers to critique and debate the religion as Islam itself requests. Such an internal and external discourse amongst Muslims allows for an individual's faith to be made much stronger through analysis and understanding of the religion itself. Islamic identity can be more universal as part of the wider Ummah (Said, 2008) whilst Muslim identity is much more personal and can encapsulate cultural beliefs that become part of the faith, although these may not be prescribed in the Quran; often criticised by modernisers such as Ramadan (2006). It is such interpretations that often cause much debate within Islam and its followers as these chapters highlight.

There is also of course, much disagreement and tension within Islam itself, most openly evident by the split between Shias and Sunnis. This is often exemplified in sectarian violence seen in Pakistan, Iraq, Bahrain and other parts of the Muslim world. These strains are historical and derived from the succession of the son-in-law of the prophet Muhammed, Ali, following his murder in what is modern-day Iran over two thousand years ago. There are theological differences in the branches between those who are referred to as Deobandis and Barelvis, the former being more orthodox in their interpretation of the faith, the latter revering the prophet more enthusiastically through chanting after prayers, a practice despised by the Deobandis. Sufis, also known as mystics, are a popular branch of Islam who believe that god is all present in all things and they focus on the spiritual nature of Islam. These differences highlight the complexity and relationships in the faith as a whole and the diverse belief systems that are eclectic to Islam's millions of followers. These believers exist not only in the 57 states that define themselves as Islamic republics, but also in the non-Muslim world, where they are major population groups, as in Russia, China and India. (Said 1997, Ramadan 2004, 2006, Sardar 2006, 2010).

Most up to date research suggests Islam being the fastest growing religion and on course to reach parity with Christianity by 2050 (Pew Research 2015). The illustration below provides a diagram of the changing global village based on demographic changes.

Figure 2.1



Projected Annual Growth Rate of Country Populations, 2010-2050

Source: The Future of World Religions: Population Growth Projections, 2010-2050

PEW RESEARCH CENTER

This global diversity, which crosses borders, cultures, traditions, and political, economic and social systems, is seen by Sardar (2006) as reflecting his view that each ethnic community brings with it its own historical customs and cultural practices, which are often seen as their ‘Islamic identity’ (ibid., p.8). This view clearly aligns with the rise of the Pakistani diaspora in Britain which signifies diversity, not only in terms of faith but also in cultural groupings, as in this study of the Pukhtoon and Punjabi. Being a Muslim is not an added extra of identity, the researcher would argue, but an integral part of the human essence of an individual that governs their lives in their totality, daily and universally. It relates to and enhances their sense of transnational and hybrid identity that is a more modern interpretation of their understanding of their faith and fitting in with modern, specifically Western society. This in turns plays into a wider evolving, if not complex, identity.

However, identity may remain a personal issue and subject to many individual constraints and choices in life, based on a whole range of indicators and facets.

In the current climate, these are not only national but also global in outlook, redefining not only the term Muslim but also Pakistani Britishness, as one media insider, the film producer Naveed Akhtar, has described:

> “British Muslim” is a title with an empty page; we have a good opportunity to start defining it.’ (Akhtar, 2005)

In that respect, there are many issues that need consideration on that page, which relate to the wider geo-political focus on the Pakistani diaspora, the British Muslim and the world at large.

2.4 New class and identity

Within that plurality; of wider British Muslim communities as well as the Pakistani diaspora, there are, of course, class divisions that need to be recognised that align with media consumption. Before opening a wider discussion arising from analysis of the data in this work, it should be noted that there are those who have already set the scene in this direction. Moll’s (2007) study is further articulation of this path of construction in which distinct class-based Muslim identity is played out within the new and emerging media formats. In essence, these authors are evolving a sense of British Muslim identity that may respond to what is perceived as a bias, adopted by mainstream Western mass media (Poole, 2002; Poole and Richardson, 2006).

By analysing two specific media periodicals, *Emel* and *Q-News* (now no longer functioning), Moll has outlined their dual role in setting a Muslim agenda for those of the diaspora and, in doing so, in reshaping British Muslim identity in the context of Islamic modernity.

There is much debate as to whether this identity is constructed organically or manufactured to introduce a uniformity of purpose and conformity for all British Muslims. It may be setting defined parameters of inclusion, mostly epitomised by the specific readership of these publications. The class basis of this movement is thus not only defined by economics but also by education and would, in most cases, create a separation between those most economically, socially and politically disenfranchised and the formation of the new diasporic cosmopolitan elite. In addition, the need by politicians and media for uniformity of purpose of the Muslim diaspora places an emphasis on what has been described as a ‘culture-free Islam’. As an acceptable post-modernist concept that would also reflect class distinctions:

> ‘Deculturalised Islam is a means of experiencing a religious identity that is not linked to a given culture and can therefore fit within every culture. (Roy, 2002, p.24)

In the vanguard of this approach is a new breed of academics who emphasise and endorse the new age thinking that espouses a more Westernised form of religious, if not sanitized, identity, that significantly corresponds with the political discourse of diaspora allegiances to their country of birth. Notably Ramadan (2006), Arkoun (2001), Talbi (1986) and Wadud (2002) are all referred to in the *New Voices of Islam* compendium of thoughts on this subject (Kamrava, 2006). The new approach is characterised in the opening pages of this volume of work:

> ‘There is a dramatic intellectual struggle between modernists and traditionalists for the legacy of the Islamic heritage….’ (Dorraj, 2006, quoted in the preface to *New Voices of Islam* (Kamrava, 2006))

Such a revealing statement could also be attached to the wider Muslim fraternity around the world. This is referred to in this chapter with respect to the current impetus of mass media to project a global struggle involving intolerant, old Islam, with a more endearing image of Western liberal democracy and values of freedom (Dabashi, 2008).

Some may question this type of manufactured British Islamic identity as a promulgation of a liberal version of Islam, in line with those who believe in a new Islamic renaissance based on a European and Western Islamic hybridity (Ramadan, 2004). It seeks to strip away predefined cultural belonging that relates to embedded beliefs and rituals of certain Muslim societies, namely, those least educated or of a certain class. For it is these groups the researcher would argue, have amalgamated their national and regional cultures with their faith. This was clearly evident in the discussions with cohort group members and in the final stages of analysis. One may instinctively consider this as an elitist redefinition of an eclectic mass of humanity spanning many shades of opinion, ethnicities and cultural relationships as already referred to by Sardar (ibid.).

Furthermore, it would seem to eradicate the importance of specific Muslim populations reflected within British society as a whole, to be replaced with a vague pan-European or Westernised Islamic uniformity. It would negate the totality of experiences and transnational structure of communities such as those of the Pakistani and Bangladeshi. The diaspora in that respect would be asked to show allegiance to a wider European Muslim identity, however that may be manufactured or constructed or defined, although no one has yet defined this European Islamic identity given the cultural, social and political complexities of Europe itself.

Clearly this discourse is intended to be more in tune with the interests of the most socio-economically advantaged and in institutionalised arenas; it is possible that this perspective is disconnected to the reality of wider diaspora life. It is here that a parallel and contradictory debate is being constructed within urban settings by the streetwise, smartphone self-defining and re-emerging Pakistani diaspora. This assessment would concur with the analysis of both Moll (2007) and Modood (2003), who speak of a discourse of ownership, where Muslims, such as the diaspora, themselves are reasserting their sense of belonging to this country utilising enlightened media forms. They are not ultimately absorbed or captured in new age periodicals such as, for the Muslim populace of Britain, *Emel*, *Islamic Times*, *Passion Islam*, *Muslim News* and others. This may be a passing trend, as suggested by the demise of *Q-News*, which ceased publication in 2007 due to the lack of a viable following.

A distinction has to be made between what have been termed ‘lifestyle’ publications, such as *Emel*, and newspapers and sites providing information on Islam and an Islamic way of life. The ownership of identity is therefore predisposed on social stratification and class-based identification with specific mass media consumption. These two realities sit side by side in the Pakistani diaspora with the new sense of ownership also determined by the level of attachment each member of the new generation feels towards his or her own environment and status.

What is clear, however, is how the mainstream use of imagery and language has created a lexicon that is viewed by both affluent and low-income members of the Pakistani diaspora as culturally racist. This is not often displayed in the overt messages that are so often the principal diet of right-wing groups, but in more subtle uses of techniques and language aimed at wider society.

2.5 Islam and the media – understanding the discourse

It is the understanding of the use of language and the signs and metaphors in common use daily that are of primary interest here. This section sets out the methods used by the mass media to achieve their objectives vis-à-vis Islam. As argued previously, Muslim identity is a central tenet of the Pakistani diaspora personality. Current national and international debates on the religion, as articulated by Western newspapers, magazines, journals, television and radio, have a profound impact on the generation in question.

Language is an important element of how society and cultures function; it is not only the lexicon of communication but also the innate object of human society with all its vast breadth of diversity. Linguistic analysis is related to the wider examination of text, the actual word that is disseminated within literature and in this modern age across the globe through virtual and other media and forms of mass communication. This is the main area of interest that signifies media discourse analysis. Discourse is defined using Van Djik’s (1983) thought process of referring to the spoken or written word that in the wider sense can provide space for words of meaning that are often articulated in different ways and meaning. Van Djik (1993) also refers to the concept of elite racism whereby 'through influential text and talk elites manufacture the consent needed to legitimate their own power and leadership in maintaining the dominance of the majority ethnic group.' (ibid., p.2). Van Djik (ibid.) argues this is a familiar process of elite racism played out in business, the political sphere, in education and wider academia to construct a dominant power balance.

This phenomenon may be further explained in terms of giving 'recognition that our social practice in general and our use of language in particular are bound up with causes and effects which we may not be at all aware of under normal conditions' (Soefner and Zifonum, 2008, p.57).

In other words, the use of language is an important element in the practice of power in how people relate to each other. This often leads to the creation of hierarchies and cognitive dissonance in delivery of key messages, opinions and thoughts, similar to media output post 9/11 (Pintak, 2006). These conversations are vehicles of ideological meaning; they convey key signals and metaphors of how relationships are, and should be conducted, and in many ways shape identities.

In examining media discourse critically, one has to engage with the dual elements referred to as communicative events and the order of discourse that once analysed highlights the discursive elements related to power, inequality and prejudice. How the media shows events displays a bias, with power elites setting the agenda, as evident in tabloid headings, television programmes and news presentation. Anti-Muslim sentiment is elicited through the portrayal of a villain, a Muslim terrorist, for instance.

The order of the language within the discourse is also important as it signifies the trajectory leading to cultural and social changes that put together classifications and dialogues that are then organised according to their meanings. In its entirety, it is the dissecting of the language that is used and displayed, the rules of language and the syntax that overtly and covertly give authority to corresponding phonology. These are all facets of how journalists and broadcasters construct their output to fit within a social, political and economic agenda. Examining this technique will enhance the debate in relation to the research question itself and provide some vital evidence of how manipulative if not controlling mass media has become.

This is a framework, related to and assimilated in Anthias's (ibid.) conceptual thinking, within which to investigate the role and function of the British and Western media in relation to the Pakistani British Muslim of the diaspora.

Examination of grammar used is itself interesting, given the role of text and language in placing ideologies and the practice of society towards targeted groups, within a narrow and deliberate context. It could be that this has been the case with members of the Pakistani community and the wider Islamic fraternity in Europe and further afield. The use of words such as 'Muslim' or 'militant' could be suggestive and emotive terms as would be 'Al-Qaeda' and 'Osama Bin Laden' within this discourse. This has been best exemplified in the work of Lewis (1971, 1990, 1991, 2003).

Abdullah (2009) has drawn attention to the terms 'holy war' or 'jihad' as synonyms of 'Muslims' that are part of the daily repertoire of Western reporters commenting on Islam and extremism.

Another element often ignored in this analysis of how words and meanings are played out, is how it affects the private space of people's lives and the conversations they engage in with friends, family, colleagues and others within their social and professional networks. Often at work or in the home it is said: 'Did you see that programme on the television last night?' which encourages what Bourdieu has analysed as a

> 'complex dialectic [that] seems to exist between the media and the conversational discourse of everyday life.' (1977, p.64)

For Said (1997) this development in how mass communications have influenced the public’s mind is referred to as ‘media conditioning’ (Said, 1997, p.55), which depicts and generates the ‘Other’ in a way that is not complimentary.

The relationship between capital and ideology is also important to consider in this context. The conceptual framing is based on what Poole (2002) has articulated as the dominant capitalist power representing society through its own values and interests. The media as part of that global system is thus not objective but subjective, as journalists are constrained and embedded within that capitalist system (ibid., p.28).

This convergence of international policy and the role of the media within it has been mirrored in the work of Herman and Chomsky (1994), who pronounce such attributes as conducive to perpetuating a ‘propaganda model’ that personifies power and disparity within society, based on wealth and how these different levels impact on mass media interests and choices. They assess the role of capitalism through its use of money and power actively to ‘filter’ out information they wish to conceal and, by so doing, sideline critics and allow the ‘dominant elites’ – government and private interests – to disseminate their key messages to the general public, without much opposition. In their assessment, key strands of this theory relate to the size and possession of mass media organs that are financed predominantly by the right to promote via advertising. This is aligned to sourcing news that also requires mechanisms to deflect dissension within a supposedly 'democratic' society that in many ways highlights the tolerance of alternative views. There is also a strong anti-communist stance in this paradigm, which denotes the wider geo-political context at the time. As argued previously, to some extent, since the demise of communism, this has been replaced by Islam as the new threat to 'Western interests and values'.

The significance of these filters is further emphasised by authors who elucidate on how they are orchestrated, as they clearly set the agenda, subjectively assessed as worthy of coverage, that can be redefined as minor propaganda campaigns that seek to influence the prevailing mindset in society (Herman and Chomsky, 1994).

Furthermore, the filters are controlled by the ideology and interests of ‘gatekeepers’ who define what is to become important news and what is not. Those who do not support the prevailing capitalist ideology, it is claimed, do not receive any attention or focus. The relationship between corporate business and advertising determines what is seen on the media outlets to advance the interests of big business. Public broadcasting programmes that are critical of these groups are often marginalised with funding cut or taken away, by removing vital advertising revenue from independent media providers that do not support the key messages of corporate America or the government (ibid.).

This analysis is based on detailed investigation of the available data on media outlets and the production of news items across the globe, on less diversification and more large-scale media conglomerates controlling the airwaves and printed pages, crossing boundaries, cultures, languages and societies, often without hindrance.

This is self-evident in how mass media globally is controlled by only 24 big corporate organisations that are in turn financed by advertising revenue supplied by big corporate business. Another element is how the media is sourced through linkages and networks between journalists and government and private sector media departments. This close relationship harnesses news output with journalists being constantly supplied with information and intelligence. Such sources have prestige and credibility and are often not thoroughly checked out, except on the rare occasion by a reputable investigative journalist. The so called ‘dodgy dossier’ on Iraq and its ‘weapons of mass destruction’ is a case in point, with information fed by government to the media (Prince, 2009). The power of major news conglomerates, such as News Corporation, was highlighted in Britain by the phone-hacking scandal and corrupt practices involving the Metropolitan Police and journalists that were much scrutinised in the Leveson inquiry (Guardian, 2012).

The final filter of the propaganda model, the former threat of communism so present during the Cold War now replaced by an equal nemesis of ever increasing present-day Islam, was recently echoed in Poole’s (2006) work. It is the external threat to Western civilisation portrayed by image, language and subtext, to remind audiences of the 'other' within the wider global community. The 'evil empire', the 'Islamic militancy and terrorist' have all become synonymous with these ideas (Dabashi, 2008).

The aftermath of the Second World War created new power allegiances that were either pro-communist or pro-Western and in turn created allegiances between old foes, such as Germany, Japan and America. The philosophy of communism, anti-capital and anti-private business, struck at the heart of American values. The constant Cold War between these foes kept the world on standby for potential conflict between two mighty superpowers, the Soviet Union and the United States of America, each seeking to increase its power and patronage. The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the end of the Soviet Union ended much of that fundamental animosity that threatened capital and the interest of big business. The bogeyman of the West had capitulated and a new force of hate had to emerge to capture the thinking of the power elites. Islam could be considered as that new communism, challenging the West, its power, capital and influence, competing for resources and the spirit of millions. The concept would support a pro-American, Western value-based ethos playing in the information age a key role in foreign policy (Drake and Metzl, 2001).

There is also concern, within this argument, with the pretence of objectivity that provides further cover to the media and journalists in their daily work, as iterated by Herman and Chomsky (1994). Government machinery is often highly influential in how it can control information and content globally whilst giving the impression of media impartiality. The funding of the BBC World Service and Arabic channels direct from the Foreign Office budget was one area of influence (such control is now more indirect since the World Service was taken in-house).

Another is the Voice of America and its daily output across the globe, highlighting the importance of a strong hand in the ‘information war’ and ‘winning hearts and minds’ that Tatham (2006) and Heimann and Ozer (2005) have iterated.

The literature as set out below will provide further weight to this argument within the analysis of media discourse, by demonstrating the role of the media as proactive in the spheres of economic, social and political life, rather than as a passive and independent observer of a complex global social space. Within these works, the level of hostility, animosity and ambivalence is reflected upon. The impact on the Muslim minorities viewed as the ‘Other’ supports Bhabha’s conceptualisation (1994) of how diasporic groups seek to create new social spheres framed within their own sense of identity, multiple or otherwise. It is their response to the media and its depiction of their faith which in turn reflects on their status and sense of security within what they consider as home.

Wider geo-political issues feed into this insecurity and in turn lead to the culturally racist ideology perceived by Muslim minority populations in Western countries. It is not only these media depictions but the relationship between power and political intentions and objectives that will now be considered.

2.6 Global thinking, local impact

It is perhaps also essential to discuss the relationship between the present wider political context and the research question. The global political environment has a principal bearing on the attitudes of the Pakistani diaspora and their media consumption that requires explanation and exploration within this thesis. It is important to acknowledge that the global political environment has cast a shadow over this investigation and that global events have a local impact within the transnational setting. The world in many respects changed after 9/11 when the neo-conservative agenda and ideology were catapulted onto the world stage. This has been described as an American manifestation of preemptive global military power, aligned to capital and the conglomerate enterprise that is defined by imperialist power and media manipulation (Sardar, 2006; Dabashi, 2008).

The importance of the media and its uses and effects within the new age of communication has created some useful models to support this research. Gilboa (2001) has reviewed the role of media in diplomacy and statecraft through a range of models and techniques used to win over minds in hostile environments. This echoes the work of Rawnsley (1996) in how radio was used previously via the BBC and Voice of America (VOA) as a propaganda tool in the Cold War era. This strategic element is emphasised in the work of Wilcox et al. (1992), who charted the role of public relations within state policy making as a tool for premeditated advancement of ideology. O'Heffernan (1993) is of the view that these relationships between the government and media conglomerates are systems for mutual benefit, particularly in US external relations where stakes may be high in winning influence with global societies. These various models are very similar in espousing the role of media in an extension of a nation's foreign policy objectives that use marketing and media advertising techniques to sell their brand of ideology or political doctrine, which is now turned on Islam (Poole and Richardson 2006; Dabashi, 2008).

Underlying that framework is the assumption of the superiority of the West and a continuation of the Orientalist philosophy defined by Said and now reinvented as neo-orientalist dogma (Said, 1997). The mantle is now assumed by writers such as Dabashi (2008) who, many may argue, chiefly among them the neo-cons he attacks, is a polemical anti- American writer who condemns America's liberal values. However, he argues the falsehood of the prevailing right-wing orthodoxy, and the much promoted neo-con narrative, that has perpetuated the myth of the clash of civilisations. This has created the ambiguous, loaded and antagonistic declaration of war in the discourse of 'Islam and the West' (Lewis, 1990; Huntingdon, 1993; Mansur 2006; Dabashi, 2008).

At its height, the political and ideological manifestation of this ideology fed the W. Bush administration with its practical implementation of neo-con doctrine in renewed American global power-play post 9/11. This was achieved through its many advocates at the heart of government: Cheney, Rumsfeld, Wolfowitz, chiefly amongst others. The approach was characterised within a lexicon reminiscent of past crusades as the ‘war on terror’. Conquest soon followed in wars in Iraq and Afghanistan that cost the lives of not only Americans but also countless poor Iraqi and Afghani men, women and children. An extension of this war was in parallel play, spearheaded within the new media age and referred to as ‘winning hearts and minds’. It was coordinated and sponsored by the American state and the vast powerhouse of American mass media. The Fox network and others who hold political views on the right of the political spectrum were 'on message' with Islam at war with the West. The state role in promoting this agenda was more than apparent and fuelled the Western media appetite to be critical of Islam as a whole and of Muslims in particular (Said, 1997; Goodman and Goodman, 2006; Halliday, 2006; Gottschalk and Greenberg, 2008).

A rise in anti-Muslim hysteria was coupled with an increase in Muslim anger towards what was seen as a global crusade against their faith, bringing into sharp reality the Huntington theory of conflict between two monolithic faiths and societies (Said, 1997).

The Pakistan diaspora has become embroiled in close identification with this war on terror, given the proximity and direct involvement of Pakistan, its loose connection with Al-Qaeda, terror camps and the importance of the transnational movement of the diaspora. This is evident in a statement by then UK Prime Minister, Tony Blair, articulating his opinion, and by default government perception, that ‘What happens today in Pakistan matters on the streets of Britain’ (Blair, 2007)

The death over half a decade later of Osama Bin Laden, found and killed in Abbottabad in Pakistan, not only raised questions about the validity of that country’s commitment to the war against terrorism but suggested its active support of extremist violence via its intelligence service and the state (Hasan, 2011a). The ramifications extended with yet more suspicion directed towards Pakistanis in Britain and the diaspora following the attacks in London in 2005 and continued warnings over British-born Muslim recruits attending terrorist training camps near the border with Afghanistan (Council for Foreign Relations, 2011).

This heightened sense of unease and semi-paranoia give rise to many examples of false accusations and reprisals. In one such case, Rizwaan Sabir, a doctoral student based at Nottingham University, was arrested for alleged terrorist offences but released later after evidence provided by his supervisor, Dr Rob Thornton. Dr Thornton was then suspended for allegedly implicating the University of Nottingham in Sabir’s arrest for suspected terrorism offences (Fekete, 2011b).

There are of course many other cases of British Muslims and some of Pakistani origin that have been arrested under terrorism laws and later released. Arrests of Pakistani students in Manchester, Bradford and elsewhere (IRR, 2003; Wilkinson, 2009) also highlight what many have come to believe are injustices that have led to a heightened sense of personal awareness and need for understanding of a dual inheritance. The impact of racial profiling has been immense and profound on Muslim communities and young men in particular, including those of the diaspora (Fekete, 2006), as has the race talk (see next section) within the media lexicon, continually promoting the Muslim as the ‘Other’.

2.7 Talking race

The emphasis placed on race by the media plays a pivotal role in how wider society views people of colour and members of minority communities. It reinforces and adds to the wider combined elements of societal exclusion and suspicion of minorities, including their allegiance to societal norms and values that the majority defines. The racialisation of specific minorities within the media, where there is no compulsion to refrain from stereotypes, is reinforced and played out on a daily basis, in what hooks (1995) has defined as ‘race talk’, defined as:

> ‘The explicit insertion into everyday life of racial signs and symbols that have no meaning other than pressing African-Americans (or other minorities) to the lowest level of racial hierarchy’. (p.3)

It is in through this representation of people of colour within the media that the philosophy of race talk is immersed within popular culture, film, cinema, advertising, literature and television (Balkran, 1999; Poole and Richardson, 2006), continually citing the racial minority in a negative light. The work of Downing and Husband (2005) emphasises the appearance of a racist typology within mainstream media that now places the Muslim as the new threat of the 'Other' (Korhan, 2006), also found in the domain of cultural racism (Poole, 2002). This depiction is relevant to what Malik (2006) speaks of as ‘Muslims in diaspora’ (ibid., 6) so evident of the British-born Pakistani within the current political landscape in the wider context of the ‘war on terror’. As an example of these perceptions that persist within minority communities and people of colour, Alice Walker, a Pulitzer award-winning Black writer, spoke of her experiences of the media and reasons for visiting Russia during the Cold War at the height of the Cuban missile crisis in October 1962:

> ‘I had a sense that I was being badly informed. I never trusted the media ever, and part of that was because they had lied always about black people so there was no reason to think it would tell the truth.’ (Walker, 2013)

This quote emphasises a long-established concern about bias within dominant Western media that has historical significance for many generations who believe that it has portrayed people of colour in most negative terms in the mainstream of broadcasting and news. As previously stated, this media discourse has now extended into the realms of cultural racism that is manifestly creating an emphasis for transnational relocation within the Pakistani diaspora.

2.8 The media's Islam

The elasticity of the language used to signify Islam as the ‘enemy' parallels that of the Cold War era of East–West animosity. A continuous battle of ideas and information through the mechanisms and medium of mass communication is fought on the airwaves, in legions of print media and a cacophony of audio and visual investigative reporting and book launches, which the liberal media itself fears:

> ‘In a climate of anti-Muslim prejudice, their disproportionate and sensationalist treatment can only feed ethnic tensions.’ (Milne, 2007)

The typology and rationale has been analysed by leading commentators on Islam who reflect on this wider media configuration. Said, celebrated for his work on Orientalism (1978) analysing and challenging post-colonial assumptions of the East, has used that same prism to forensically examine the depiction of Islam within mass media. In *Covering Islam: How the Media and the Experts Determine How We See the Rest of the World* (1997), he highlights how Western media, in particular, has articulated, or rather reinforced, an Orientalist view of Islam.

A study by Zick and Pollack in Germany (2013) further emphasises this feeling of the lack of Western compatibility of Islam. In this ten-year study, the authors find many Germans and Europeans regarding Islam as a threat to the West. Within the report comparisons are made between the lack of contact with Muslims, Hindus Jews and other minority faiths among mainstream Germans, but Islam is the only religion regarded with hostility. The role of the media is emphasised as the key element in this finding (ibid.). Similar studies in other Western countries have highlighted corresponding findings of the fear of Islam and the dislike of Muslims in particular (Gottschalk and Greenberg, 2008).

Said (1997) and Dabashi (2008) have argued that this is set within a narrative of Islam as a threat to Western civilisation that is supported by a phalanx of academics, so-called experts and journalists alike. These cumulative opinions add weight on a daily basis to the commentary of individuals such as Samuel P.

Huntington and his much-publicised paper on the ‘clash of civilisations’. Primarily articulated in a lecture at the American Enterprise Institute, it found voice and favour as a published article in *Foreign Affairs* (Huntington, 1993) that led to much international debate via the Western media. The title of his thesis, first used by Lewis, whom Said describes as a prominent Orientalist, became a rallying call. The article argues that cultural and religious identities will be a source of conflict in the post-Cold War arena as summed up in this critique:

> ‘Huntington’s observations about “the friction between Islam and every single culture with which it is in contact” are even more pertinent in a globalised world; Islam is distinguished by the “penury, servitude, violence and mediocrity of Muslim societies worldwide.” ’ (Sardar, 2010, p.46)

This has been the foundation of the continuing resentment between the West and the East, expanded after the 9/11 attacks in New York in 2001 (Said, 1997) with much political patronage under and during the time of the Bush administration (2001-09). Said has described this as the division of the world into two, the Orient and Occident, that is part of a wider political process by Western powers, particularly America, to imprint their own values and way of life onto other non-Western states. It is this manifestation and obsession with that goal which, he argues, sets out the ‘misinformation, repetition and avoidance of detail, an absence of genuine perspective. All of this can be traced, not to Islam, but to aspects of society in the West and to the media which this idea of “Islam” reflects and serves’ (Said, 1997, p.44).

The correlation made between the New York bombings and those in London four years later has by virtue of these narratives and commentary conflated and embedded Islam with terrorism in the public imagination. Additionally, within that mix has been a concerted programme to harness the power of the media, public relations and opinion against this mindset that so unjustifiably links the two together, most notably with Islamic militancy at the fore (Snow, 2006).

Islam, as a global faith, has therefore become a central topic of interest for the media. There is widespread daily reporting of an atrocity committed in the name of this overarching faith. The reporting has been, in the main, adverse to its 1.5 billion followers, specifically those resident in the West and following events such as 9/11 and the London bombings in 2005 (Poole, 2002; Halliday, 2006; Gottschalk and Greenberg, 2008). This section intends to focus on that reporting and the discourse related to media depictions and representations.

The media messages are often framed to be suggestive, rather than assert direct responsibility, in subtle ways which are open to interpretation by the viewer and or listener. For instance, a BBC headline seemed to focus less on a factually based reporting but instead emphasised the ‘Trimmed Bin Laden in a media-savvy war’ (BBC News, 2007). The emphasis on the neat beard may all be too intentional, in depicting the image of the mullah of the East, or even Pakistani nationality, although he was of Yemeni origin. The emphasis, and the language relating to it, are essentially reserved for one faith and in one faith alone. This small but essential misrepresentation is reflected upon by Conte, who comments:

> ‘We interpret Bin Laden’s distorted imaginations as “true Islam” whereas other religious cults with charismatic leaders are regarded as beyond the scope of Judaism and Christianity. American TV evangelists are derided as fraudsters but Bin Laden is regarded as a true representative of Islam.’ (Conte, 2001)

There is an emphasis placed on other charismatic terrorist leaders using the name of religion to promote a predominantly political agenda as Conte further reflects in his work (ibid). These and other examples further embody what has often been described as anti-Muslim racism (Ramadan, 2006), which has become more vociferous and gains daily momentum that feeds into wider resentment.

As will be elaborated in a further chapter, the Runnymede Trust in 1997 defined this as Islamophobia – hatred and fear of Islam (Muslims by definition) – by investigating the impact of anti-Muslim feeling and hostility, defining it as:

> ‘the practical consequences of such hostility in unfair discrimination against Muslim individuals and communities, and to the exclusion of Muslims from mainstream and political affairs.’ (Runnymede Trust, 1997, p.5)

The role of the media is therefore inevitably an area to be further researched given its influence on wider society.

The Islamic Human Rights Commission, in its report *The British Media and Muslim Representation: The Ideology of Demonisation* (Ameli et al., 2007), found much evidence of negative media portrayals of the Muslim and Islam, with language and narratives that accompanied images of terror. Investigations undertaken by Islamic interest groups reiterate this and the wider body of opinion. For instance, the report *Muslims in Britain* by the Minority Rights Group International is a fairly robust overview of life for Muslims in Britain in the social, political, economic, educational and other spheres of everyday life (Ansari, 2002).

The reports referred to above not only reflect an internal fear of the deep underlying animosity towards their Muslim faith, but also wider societal discrimination, as referred to in earlier sections. It is within the media frame that the images, words and constructs act like a catalyst to compound these fears and prejudices prevalent in dominant groups.

The Commission on British Muslims and Islamophobia also reported that Britain was ‘institutionally Islamophobic’ (BBC News, 2004a). The chair of the Commission acknowledged this fact after hearing evidence from Muslims across Britain, highlighting intense insecurity concerning how media depictions threatened their existence as citizens of Britain. This has been perpetuated by continual ignorance of not only the faith, its diversity and belief systems, but also of its followers and minority communities (Doward and Hinsliff, 2004).

In more recent times, Owen Jones writes of the experiences of a fellow Muslim journalist stating:

> ‘To be a prominent Muslim means suffering a daily diet of bigotry and even outright hatred. This week, Mehdi Hasan – who, other than my colleague Yasmin Alibhai-Brown, is Britain's only prominent Muslim journalist – wrote of how, every day, he is attacked as a “jihadist” and a “terrorist”. He has been described as a “dangerous Muslim shithead”, a “moderate cockroach”, and worse. The message from his critics is clear: Muslims have no legitimate place in public life.’ (Jones, 2013)

The discourse is therefore ongoing and in many respects increasing with much ignorance, placing all Muslims as a homogenous group and failing to see the significance of the fact that the 9/11 hijackers may have defined their religious identity as followers of Islam yet, at the same time, were in all manners, economically, traditionally and culturally, set apart from the established Muslim communities in Britain.

There is also, as stated before, a proliferation of think-tanks and special interest groups that seek to perpetuate the negative image of the Muslim in parallel with the media. For instance, legislation to deal with the aftermath of 9/11, such as the 2000 Terrorism Act and the 2001 Anti-Terrorism Crime Security Act, has fuelled concern in local communities. Figures showed 35,000 Muslims were stopped and searched in 2003 with less than 50 being charged, compared to only 2,000 similar stops three years previously. The Muslim prison population has also increased from 731 in 1991 to 6,095 in 2001 making them 9% of the prison population, whilst making only 5% of the British community (Berman and Dar, 2013). According to one organisation that aims to be ‘a non-partisan, not-for-profit international policy council and think tank dedicated to educating the public about what the mainstream media fails to report’, the Muslim prison population has been said to have increased to 13% and accounted for a 200%

increase from 1997 (Kern, 2013). It promotes a sense of independent data being used to emphasise a specific message that in this case is concerned with terrorists and or potential terrorist within the British Muslim community being dealt with. It is, as Poole (2002) relates, a frenzy created by the media to allow politicians to give the impression of having dealt with an external threat.

The facts as reported therefore often do not mirror the myths that perpetuate the high-profile raids that have been in the media spotlight across a country where, under the new terrorist laws, religious and racial identity is perceived as a reason to be targeted. As one investigator has found, those convicted out of the raids conducted under these new laws are predominantly white loyalists and/or racists, not Muslims (IRR, 2003). One investigator found that, following 9/11, 609 people were arrested, 99 were charged under the 2000 Terrorism Act and there had been only 15 convictions as of June 2004 (IRR, 2003). Poole (2002) has described this as an ideological construction of the media within wider social representation that signifies the continued threat of the external Muslim challenging British norms and values (ibid., p.23).

Indeed, Poole's (ibid.) research emphasises the sensational reporting of Muslims in Britain by media, including the liberal press, that gave conflicting messages of the rights of freedom of expression and liberal rights, the former when artists protested at the extension of hate crime to cover Islam, the latter over arrest and holding of individuals without charge (ibid.).

For Pakistani Muslims in Britain, what is often referred to as the 'London bombings' have resulted in greater scrutiny not only by the security services but by the British and global media as a whole. It has perpetuated sentiments such as the following:

> 'The 9/11 hijack trial has revealed an Al Qaeda "conveyor belt" for young men who hate the West. British prisons, mosques and Imams are fertile ground for recruitment and motivation of terrorists. How much is foreign culture beneficial to British society?' (BBC Radio 4, 2006b)

The debate has at times been framed in emotive language that has sensationalised the depiction of the British Muslim as the benign saboteur within their midst. It is the ultimate in racial stereotyping within religious representation (Poole 2002; Poole and Richardson, 2006) that is so powerful a script in the public domain. As another example, a prominent *Dispatches* documentary (Channel 4, 2014) entitled ‘Undercover Mosque’ that seemed to highlight radicalisation within a Birmingham mosque as a recruitment hub for alleged 'fundamentalists', was itself soon the subject of a West Midlands police investigation raising concerns of overzealous editing. The use of isolated and highly charged statements and of out-of-context images shown to reinforce the ‘militancy’ of ‘Islam in Britain’ was of much concern (*Islamic Times*, 2007). These incidents are not isolated and collectively add to a wider process of disseminating information to convey many meanings and interpretations to feed into the existing conditioning of distrust of Muslims in Britain. Such episodes also reflect of Chomsky’s view, as a seasoned observer of Western media, that:

> ‘In the media you can easily find systematic biases about what’s permitted, what’s not permitted, what’s stressed, what isn’t stressed.’ (2005, p.142)

The political reality is reflected in the account, reported in a leaked secret memo, of talks between Blair and Bush about coverage of Iraq by Al-Jazeera, where Bush discussed bombing the Qatari-based headquarters of the Arab media organization in retaliation (Goodman and Goodman, 2005, p.191). If such sentiments had been expressed about the BBC, Fox or CNN or any other Western network, a much stronger response from Western media may have ensued.

In essence a number of key components synergise to make the lexicon into a powerful discourse that combines many parts of media production into a single entity through a stepped approach. As described by Said:

> ‘One is that a specific picture – for it is that – of Islam has been supplied. Another is that its meaning or message has overall continued to be

> circumscribed and stereotyped. A third is that a confrontational political situation has been created, pitting “us” against “Islam”. A fourth is that this reductive image of Islam has had ascertainable results in the world of Islam itself. A fifth is that both the media’s Islam and the cultural attitude to it can tell us a great deal not only about “Islam” but about institutions in the culture, the politics of information and knowledge, and national policy.’ (Said, 1997, p.44)

It is interesting to note how Said has distinguished between the reality of the faith and what he has referred to as the ‘media's Islam’, which provides a useful separation of the myths from the facts about the religion and the attached phraseology. Poole (2002; Poole and Richardson, 2006) has reinforced Said’s observations within an Orientalist framework and describes it as a ‘Eurocentric discourse’ (ibid., p.31) which in totality encompasses the strategic and vital interests of the Orient and Islam (Al-Azm, 1981) through stereotyping and depictions that have led to what Sardar (1999) refers to as neo-Orientalism, whereby the breadth of modern mass media and communications are at play to remind society of the differences between the Orient and the Occident.

The lexicon, as referred to earlier, is couched in the phraseology of ongoing conflict and rage in terms such as 'holy wars', ‘jihad’, ‘extremist’, ‘anti-Western’ and an ‘uncivilised’ if not a barbarian creed. This staple contribution of grammar is fed into the worldview that has distinguished Islam as a religion that is monolithic as opposed to other major belief systems. It is what Halliday (2006) speaks of as ‘Islam fulfilling [the] Western need for a menacing but subordinated other’ (ibid., p.3).

It is essentially the same mechanistic form that accompanied the flow of information about the communist bloc during the Cold War era. The vogue terms in that period resemble those of the present; politicians spoke then of the ‘evil empire’, as stated famously by the then President Ronald Reagan (Reagan, 1983) of his view and ideological dislike of the Communist countries and principally of the USSR.

It was an important element then, as it is now, to ensure success in the battle for hearts and minds that is an integral part of domestic and foreign policy. This is and was represented, that within the media of communication, by the Voice of America and the BBC. The recent coverage of strife within Muslim countries – Libya, Egypt and Syria – has exemplified how this force, at various levels, precipitates the media into an obsessive and compulsive frenzy (Hamza, 2012).

This ‘cultural apparatus’ (Said, 1997, p.47) is the mode of how information is delivered to the mass public. Islam is therefore seen through audio and visual networks, daily circulations, whether they be the so-called red tops or ‘quality’ broadsheet newspapers, through magazines, and cinematography all of which reinforce the imagery of the ‘Other’ and of foreign lands. It is accordingly the

> ‘communal core of interpretations providing a certain picture of Islam and, of course, reflecting powerful interests in the society served by the media. Along with this picture, which is not merely a picture but also a communicable set of feelings about the picture, goes what we may call its overall context. By context I mean the picture’s setting, its place in reality, the values implicit in it, and, not least, the kind of attitude it promotes in the beholder.’ (ibid.)

Supporting this process in recent years has been the increasing use of ‘experts’ on Islam within the media domain. They elucidate and pronounce on the ‘war on terror’, the Taliban, Pakistan, Al-Qaeda and related subjects. They have increased dramatically in number and have been provided with air time and column inches to give us their ‘expert’ opinion from their academic, political, social or cultural perspective. They are often Western by either birth or residence and are often used repeatedly to raise their profile but also meet a specific media agenda. Their assessments of political Islam have at times created the level of cognitive dissonance of Western media (Pintak, ibid.) within Muslim populations. The experiences of the Pakistani British Muslim diaspora are also real and essential in shaping their own ideas of media representation within their religious sphere. British news reporting has exemplified this media narrative as cited earlier by the Muslim Human Rights Commission report on demonisation (Ameli et al., 2007) and fits within the cultural racialisation of minorities (Downing and Husband, 2005; Korhan, 2006) illustrated in the minor case study that now follows.

2.9 The case of Bradford

The Manningham disturbances in Bradford between 9 and 11 June 1995 were a response to the perceived insensitivity of local policing and resulted in demonstrations and a standoff between the predominantly white officers and the largely Pakistani youth of the diaspora. This racial divide only fuelled the interest of the media, which added to it a religious and 'Islamic' twist, as observed by community groups (Foundation 2000, 1995).

The area of Manningham itself was considered as one of the most deprived localities in the district. Within this electoral area, the Pakistani population amounted to over 55% of the population as opposed to a white population at over 26%. The youth element was estimated at over 54% under the age of 25 and the youth were blighted by economic inactivity and an unemployment rate of over 31% (Bradford West Area Profile, 1995 quoted in Foundation 2000, 1995).

More recent data indicates that the level of unemployment amongst young people from the Pakistani community remains high and that the population itself is increasing year by year. At the district level, the Asian community currently accounts for 20% of the population with the Pakistani population being the highest within that group at just over 16%. Those under 16 are stated to be 34% of the population, compared to the Bangladeshi population at 37% and white population 19% (Bradford Observatory, 2010).

This is reflected in Manningham, where the poverty levels remain high, with children on free school meals twice the national average, and with most adults on benefits. The incomes of households in the area are on average two thirds less than the district average, alongside poor housing and low employment (Bradford City Council, 2011).

The media interest generated by the 1995 disturbances was recorded in a post-riot community response report, *The Voices Must Be Heard* (Foundation 2000, 1995), which stated that the media not only perpetuated the ‘Asian and *Muslim’* characteristics of the majority of participants, but they also seemed to portray the British-born youth as seen through an Eastern and militant prism, by asking them to place scarves over their faces to depict them as archetypical Muslim mujahedeen on the streets of Bradford.

The tabloid and assembled national media wished to draw further parallels between Bradford and a Muslim state by claiming that the existing community campaign against prostitution was an Islamic-inspired attempt to cleanse the local area. The murder of a local prostitute at the time of the disturbances was also linked to this false belief (Foundation 2000, 1995).

In essence, there was an attempt by the media to characterise Bradford as a Muslim entity and minor caliphate in all but name. The burning of Salman Rushdie’s book, the *Satanic Verses*, in 1989 added to this fixation on what some sections of the media refer to as ‘Bradfordistan’. Bradford through the book burning signified a disconnect with Islam and liberal values that challenged the liberal consensus that accommodated multiculturalism (Poole and Richardson, 2006). The minor depicted 'clash of civilisations’ was defined to include, as one senior police officer remarked, a generation gap between parents and the diaspora (Moyes and Cusick*,* 1995).

A specific narrative was therefore shaped and reinforced through imagery and commentary of angry, out-of-touch and rebellious Pakistani ‘Muslim’ youth who broke the law. The mass disturbances in Bradford were shown in the same light as the Rushdie book-burning in 1989, depicting a radicalised Muslim minority that were anathema to Western liberalism. Future riots in Bradford, Burnley and Oldham became fundamental elements of a policy change seeking community cohesion to what were described as parallel lives (Cantle, 2002). It reinforced once again this backward and localised Orientalist positioning of predominant Muslim youth, the emerging diaspora, as the subversive ‘Other’.

Inevitably, it is this interlinking discourse of how identity and faith are reported that impacts on the Pakistani diaspora in question. The outcome has been to create an assertiveness that has turned to new media as a vehicle for self-expression and active citizenship, which Chul-Byung (2002) speaks of.

2.10 New media, new challenges

The term new media and social media are often interchangeable in everyday dialogue and vocabulary. They have become common phrases used by mass media, the public at large and many corporate conglomerates.

Over the last 20 years, social media has grown rapidly as a phenomenon that has different meanings, according to Pridmore et al. (2013), who regard new media as a term that reflects modernity within newspapers, television, radio and books, which themselves are often spoken of as the ‘old media’, for which they prefers the term ‘traditional media’ (p.1). This argument is based on the belief that it is the mechanism of distribution that separates the old and new media. The analogue signalling of television is now replaced by digital; the system of printing newspapers and distributing them to wholesalers and then newsagents to sell has changed with the advent of new media. Images and data can be sent via the internet and mobile smartphones through wi-fi connectivity rather than transmission towers defacing local landscapes. Indeed this technological revolution of the age is similar to what Manovich (2001) has described as the integration of the computer and mass media that began in the early 21st century, with the arrival of moving and talking cinematography.

The terms ‘new media’ and ‘social media’ therefore are synonymous with an emphasis on the emergence of innovative technologies and advancing societies’ engagement and interactions with one another in a virtual world. It is what Everett (2012) describes as ‘ “old” versus “new” media ecologies’ (p.151) that have not only challenged the hegemony of the traditional mass media but also allowed media production, in most basic terms, to be accessible to the many. This is evident today through new smartphones, laptops, MP3 players, tablets and other fast-changing technological devices in our fast-paced world.

According to Chan-Olmsted et al. (2013) ‘social media is a collective term describing a great number of applications that enable users to connect, interact, and share contents’ (p.150). It is this two-way conversation that is an important element of social media as opposed to the old media, where the consumer was always a recipient of information prepared and edited by established broadcasters and the print media. In the social media arena, individuals are themselves engaged in responding to, creating and distributing information to a wider group of consumers. Mayfield (2008), a new media entrepreneur advising corporate brands on marketing products via this new technological revolution, sets out some of the key characteristics that he believes define social media.

Primarily it is about participation that seeks a two-way dialogue and does not separate the recipient from the provider, as is the case of traditional or ‘old media’. There is much more ‘openness’, therefore, that further enhances social media for the audience to use as a tool for feedback and engagement. In addition, social media is not restricted by any form of control or arbitrary protection that limits input and involvement by others. The process allows ‘conversation’ as a free-flowing element that is an alternative to media transmitted by larger organisations to an audience. It therefore allows ‘communities’ to be created and grow with key interests and shared attributes based on a shared interests, such as those with a keenness on collecting stamps, or taking photographs, or following a group or band. These communities have special interests that can be shared with like-minded individuals across borders and also virtually. In doing so, social media enforces the final element, according to Mayfield (ibid.), of ‘connectedness’ that creates relationships with other sites, individuals and resources. The four features (openness, conversation, community, and connectedness) are in his view the essential building blocks that drive this new technological empowerment. The range of applications that has seen significant increase in use by are placed in a number of categories that include social networking sites, blogs, wikis, podcasts, forums, content communities, and micro-blogging. They all offer the same characteristics as highlighted by Mayfield (2008), yet have different features and functions for members that, as will be described later, are, according to Ellison (2013, p.3), ‘social and technical affordances’, so aligned to social media.

Clearly, in defining the terms ‘new media’ and ‘social media’, one can clearly state that the former is much more of a technological advance within a digital arena that has changed the process of communication drastically, and that social media tools and applications are the vehicles of use. The researcher intends to focus within in this study on the latter – that is, social media and an assessment of its use in creating new public spheres for the diaspora that are transnational and affirm their personal, political and wider community identity.

The most popular tool or application in social media is social networking through sites such as Facebook and Myspace. Social networking sites are the fastest-growing and most popular tools of the social media revolution. Annual research conducted by Pew Internet – a project of the wider Pew Research Center that specifically focuses on the use and changes in social media, highlights the rise in uptake of social marketing sites. Although the study focuses on the use of social media in the United States, the trend is relevant to young people across the globe. 73% of teenagers using the internet belong to a social networking site. For instance, over half of the youth online (55%) used social networking sites in November 2006, a figure that increased to 65% by February 2008. 72% of online young people aged 18-29 utilise social networking sites according to the data (Pew Research Center, 2010). In Britain, studies conducted by the Office for National Statistics (ONS) as part of their opinions and lifestyle survey indicates that 87% of young people aged 16-24 are active on social networking sites. Internet use in Britain among adults has risen significantly from 16 million in 2006 to 33 million in 2012, making the UK second only to the Netherlands in the use of social networking by all individuals across Europe as a whole (ONS, 2013).

Table 2.1 Proportion of UK social network users by age group (%)

16-24	90%
25-44	74%
45-54	44%
55-64	29%
65-74	19%

Source: ONS, 2013.

2.11 Variations in social media use

Although Livingstone and Helsper's (2007) research highlights the lack of a social divide among young people, unlike adults, in accessing and using the internet, there do exist societal differences as the new media develops and grows. There are differences as regards gender, with boys more active than girls, and differences in types of use, although there does not seem to be a large socio-economic divide in accessing social media and the internet. However there is a gap in the platforms utilised (Pew Research Center, 2015b). There is also still a small percentage of around 5-7% who have no access to the internet, whether out of choice or because of cost.

There is a global north/south division based on access to resources and technology, with poorer nations being most disadvantaged (Raffer and Singer, 2001). Different patterns in use, depending on different regions of the globe, have also been distinguished in research by Jorgensen (2010) looking at empowerment in Uganda using ICT in urban and rural settings. His analysis found that the internet and modern technology have allowed economic and social connectivity for urban dwellers, while for women in the countryside it has provided access to conventional media and 'creation of spaces for conversation and dialogue' (ibid., p.4). It has in these case studies allowed marginalised women a public voice and a level of participation in economic, social and political life. This discourse speaks of a 'media diffusion' referred to by Beechman Petersen (2006a, 2006b) whereby 'focus is directed towards the role and interaction of the various media across platforms' (Jorgensen, p.6). In this context, both old and new media are utilised interactively for information and in developing spaces for active citizenship. This, the researcher would argue, would also be the case for some marginalised communities who feel excluded and disenfranchised from mainstream society, corresponding with Jorgensen's (ibid.) case studies and work of Karim (2010).

In other countries, social media applications have served for open and free opposition to the established political regime. The Arab Spring is a good example of citizen social media power being critical of the status quo. Wasley (2009) argues that this type of citizen uprising via social media also brings with it dangers of further repression, arrest and beatings in less open states such as China, Uzbekistan, Iran and Jordan amongst others. The case of Raif Badawi, the Saudi blogger sentenced to 1,000 lashes for writing a blog critical of the state, is cited (Black, 2015). The internet and social media applications, have allowed the outside world and predominantly Western media to obtain pictures and videos uploaded by citizens of nations where anti-government protests are banned and or repressed by force. The Orange Revolution in Ukraine coined a new media term, the 'flashmob', signifying instant group protests orchestrated via social media, text and instant messaging (ibid.).

In the 'free world', social media has been instrumental in releasing material that governments have not wished to share with their public. Wikileaks is a case in point, with its release of classified American intelligence material that has led to severe criticism of the site by American and Western politicians critical of its 'irresponsible' approach to national security (Sydney Morning Herald, 2010)

These issues highlight that no government, whether described as 'free and democratic' or 'authoritarian', is immune to the openness of new media and the range of social media platforms that allow a much wider free flow of information to reach the mass public globally, without restriction. The empowering process is their ability to allow citizens to comment, articulate and even demonstrate concern over state actions and political leaders.

Another feature of social media has been the view that many users of social media are categorised as ‘echo-chamber’ users who significantly are attracted to information that relates to them – the ‘Dailyme’ syndrome (Kahne et al., 2011, p.3). In other words, ‘individuals increasingly watch, read, or comment in forums that align with their perspectives, and it may mean that there are fewer forums that speak to a diverse public’ (ibid., p.3). However, their research also found that users with ‘political sophistication and political interest’ (ibid., p.4) were more likely to source both information that they would relate to and alternative opinion.

A paper in the journal of the American Academy of Paediatrics highlights research providing evidence of societal behaviour online that exists in the real world. According to O’Keeffe et al. (2011), this includes bullying, the forming of cliques and sexual experimentation among young people. It has resulted in cyber-bullying, the lack of privacy and ‘sexting’ in addition to internet addiction, a lack of sleep and even what they describe as ‘Facebook depression’ (p.800). The lack of regulation itself can lead to dangers, as relationships develop between unsuspecting young people and predators that can lead to violent outcomes, as in the case of Breck Badnar, a 14-year-old stabbed by a 19-year-old online predator (BBC News Essex, 2014).

There are also cultural and racial differences related to social media and how different communities utilise these new forms of expression. Pew Research indicates that in the United States there exists a ‘black/white divide’ that relates more to the differential platforms used by racial groups but also to socio-economic issues and access to the internet. There is a class differential, with affluent African-Americans similar to their white counterparts, while poorer blacks have less access to the technological revolution at home (Smith, 2014), like economically disadvantaged whites (Pew Research, 2015).

Racial hierarchies also seem to exist in the usage of specific social networking sites that highlight racism among some young people. For instance, research in the United States highlights MySpace as being regarded as an area referred to by some white teenagers as for ‘ghetto kids’ (Boyd, 2012, p.203). This racialisation of social media again seeks to reflect wider societal prejudices as a whole, as people access platforms that relate to their own set of values and types of user.

On the other hand, Twitter is a platform much used by young African-Americans that has resulted in what is referred to as ‘Black Twitter’. Black Twitter is a dynamic set of practices that are marked not only by race but also by class, gender, geography, social experience, and varying degrees of social capital (i.e. social networks) and cultural capital (i.e. style, linguistic practices and prestige) (Watkins, 2014). Its importance, according to Watkins, lies in how it is used by young black people to challenge media stereotyping and stigmatisation of black people in America. The media’s images of Michael Brown, the young black man shot by police in Ferguson, led to riots and protests across America; this was a catalyst that created a popular critique and response to the mainstream media. Under the hashtag #if they gunnedmedown, African Americans responded to the negative images of Brown and others in the press by countering negative photos with positive ones and, as Watkins (2014) argues, provided a response to the discourse of black criminality.

This event emphasised two important elements of social media use: the increasing use of smartphone technology (Pew Research, 2015b) by an often ignored and socially excluded racial minority, and a challenge to the narrative of digitally poor and internet-illiterate black youth. The use of Twitter as Black Twitter has formed a movement of artistic and assertive black young African Americans micro-blogging as a means of protest and a new form of civil action. It has been described as the equivalent to rap music in its time, a lyrical protest against injustice, and reference is made to ‘social media as the CNN of Black America’ (Watkins, 2014). Additionally, the election of a black president in 2008 was partly the result of African Americans challenging the racial status quo via new media in the digital form that continues to stand up to the deep-rooted structural racism in America (Everett, 2012). In every way, this is a form of new media civil rights campaigning in process that seeks change in modern America, providing a voice to millions of disenfranchised and economically disadvantaged people in black communities.

Cohen and Kahne (2012) have referred to ‘participatory politics as interactive, peer-based acts through which individuals and groups seek to exert both voice and influence on issues of public concern’ (ibid., p.vi). More importantly, the researcher would argue, in this new media age, new media is providing young people across the globe with an important voice to address their concerns and promote their interests – without controls being placed on them. It has allowed grassroots communities to speak up and to act up to assert local, national and international injustices. It is described, as quoted in Cohen and Kahne (ibid.), by one US congressman as ‘individual citizens rising up’ (p.v). The same thing is evident within South Asian communities in Britain, in the use of social media as a means of articulating concerns, to challenge stereotypes, and create and communicate with transnational networks (Karim, 2010).

This is a new protest media for mainstream youth of the new generation, that is virtual and powerful for excluded youth of minorities in asserting racial expression. As Shivers (2014) states, ‘Social media allow racial and ethnic groups to establish an online identity pre-scribed by them; they also furnish a space where groups can connect and mobilize interests in ways that were previously difficult, especially for marginalized populations’ (p.1052). In fact, it allows the initiation and development of connections with like-minded people within the shared cultural frameworks (Shivers 2014).

However, this sense of cultural identification has a partly negative connotation in the discourse of some young participants. The uninhibited and unregulated social media has also created forums for racial and religious abuse. Using street culture slang, the racially loaded terms of ‘Nigger’ and ‘Paki’ have been highlighted as being among 10,000 racist and offensive tweets posted each day in the UK (Bartlett et al., 2014). Similar cultural groups, such as those of Pakistani origin, have used the derogatory term in daily communication, as a self-deprecating descriptor of their own cultural identity. This allows others to be more polemical in their views of minorities and of faiths, with anti-Muslim messages in particular being posted on Facebook and Twitter suggesting Muslims should be hanged or are rapists (Twist, 2015), particularly when high-profile issues arise, exemplified by the Rotherham sex cases[1], or terrorism and violence by Muslim extremists. This new form of racism is referred to as cyber-racism [2] and new terms such as Troll have been created for individuals who use bad language and abuse other users on social media.

2.12 Exploitation of social media

Other areas of the real world have been attracted to new media: the use of social media can assist unlawful and illegal causes. Internet crime is a fast-growing phenomenon, with cyber-crime estimated to cost $400 billion globally a year (Durbin, 2014), Companies and even governments are hit by what is described as 'hactivism' (ibid.) with online attacks by individuals and groups seeking to disrupt global business and state security.

Many people use internet banking both on laptops and on mobile phones as well as using these to book flights and buy a range of consumer items. Credit card details are often placed within cyberspace and have been the subject to hacking by criminal gangs. A recent example involved one of the world's largest online hotel booking sites, Bookings.com. Nearly 10,000 customers were subject to what is known as 'phishing scamming' whereby bogus emails purportedly from the company went to customers asking for payment in advance for hotel bookings. (The company as a rule asks customers to pay the hotel on departure, rather than pay the booking agency in advance as is common practice with most other reservation sites.) (BBC Radio 4, 2015).

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[1] A number of Pakistani men were sentenced for raping and sexually exploiting a number of young girls (Caucasian) in 2014 in cities such as Rotherham, Oxford and elsewhere. There was much debate in the media of the men's ethnic and religious characteristics.

[2] Cyber racism is most commonly defined as racism which occurs in the cyber world. This includes racism which occurs on the internet such as racist websites, images, blogs, videos and online comments, as well as racist comments, images or language in text messages, emails or on social networking sites.
Online activities or published material that result in offensive comments in relation to a person's race, colour or national or ethnic origin have the same effect as similar offline activities. Cyber racism may present as racial hatred or cyber bullying. (Australian Human Rights Commission, 2011)

Criminals had been able to obtain usernames, passwords and financial details that were all intended to be secure. Companies and security experts are increasingly, and at huge cost, looking at ways to safeguard personal and other sensitive information in the growing virtual world of e-commerce and e-government. There is not only increasing alarm at the sophistication of criminal activity but also a fear of terrorist threats on cyberspace and in the use of new media to promote extremist ideology and propaganda.

The use of online social media for ‘terrorist’ purposes has become not only a new field of research but also of much concern to politicians and law enforcement agencies alike. The video clips of Osama bin Laden on the internet accepting responsibility for the 9/11 attacks in New York seem now to be outdated in comparison to Twitter and other instant messaging and micro-blogging techniques. Terrorism and terrorists, like the mass of the population, have turned their attention to new social media as a means of furthering political and ideological ends (Kunkle, 2015) The group Al-Shabaab, based in Somalia and deemed a terrorist organisation, found Twitter a useful tool to plan and claim responsibility for the Nairobi bomb attacks in May 2014 (Ishengoma, 2013). A terrorist site illustrates bomb-making techniques on its website as well as other lethal methods of harming other (ibid.). The World Wide Web and social media have become intrinsically linked to the organisation and preparation of violence, much as much the Kalashnikov is recognised as the choice weapon or tool of fighters.

Terrorists, like corporate multinationals, use social media because of its global spread and ease of access to peoples of the world. Its uniqueness lies in its unrestricted and unregulated global role as a simple tool of communication aided by smartphone and other new technologies. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, in its report on the *Use of the Internet for terrorist purposes* (UNODC, 2012) states its importance as a ‘network with a truly global reach, and relatively low barriers to entry. Internet technology makes it easy for an individual to communicate with relative anonymity, quickly and effectively across borders, to an almost limitless audience’ (p.3). The ease within which terrorists can therefore operate transnationally is not lost upon UN member states, specifically the United Kingdom, a sponsor of the UN report, which is acclaimed within it as at the forefront of tackling online cyber terrorism (ibid.). The report highlights six key areas in which the internet is of use to terrorists: propaganda (including recruitment, radicalisation and incitement to terrorism), financing, training, planning (including through secret communication and open-source information), execution, and cyberattacks (ibid., p.3).

In its most modern form, the terrorist group calling itself Islamic State IISIL, ISIS), has been the most innovative of the terrorist groups to use social media as a means to promote its ideology and attract followers. It is claimed they hijacked the hashtag #worldcup2014 at the same time it was used by supporters of the game worldwide (Edelman, 2014). ISIS is claimed to have recruits who are computer literate and multi-lingual, including University of Massachusetts, Boston-educated Ahmad Abousamra, their telecommunications expert. ISIS has, for instance, created specific Twitter hashtags related to hostages who are subject to beheading (ibid.).

As an example of ISIS's operation, a former German politician and writer who travelled to Iraq and Syria to meet IS under a safe passage guarantee, spoke of his application to visit as a sophisticated media operation. This included making contact via Facebook with known jihadists in Germany and through them with the IS media centre, which organised the permission to visit, including a safeguarding pass sent out via Twitter to ISIS fighters by the leader of the so-called Caliphate (Tödenhofer, 2015).

More recent reports of British Muslims and others from Europe attending training camps in Syria and fighting for IS have precipitated concerns of British-born jihadists ready to attack British cities (Whitehead, 2014). This growing extremism and fundamentalism within European cities is seen to be aided by the internet and social media.

The interesting corollary within some communities has spawned the use of social media to denounce terrorists, as evident by the hashtag #STOPISIS as well as the accounts of how Kenyans responded to the Nairobi attacks by using social media to support victims and raise money (Ishengoma, 2013; Edelman, 2014).

This highlights the value and reach of social media and its use t for social, political and economic as well as terrorist actions. As such it has become the modern tool for expression that is instant and accessible to millions across continents and types of societies. This includes the diaspora in this study, which examines its use in developing and enhancing their identity.

2.13 Social media and identity

Guo-Ming and Chang (2010) argue that globalisation has resulted in a change from the old society to a new one that allows much diversity of competition but also the need for cultural co-existence. Globalisation has thus redefined the sense of community as it was in the traditional sense, so that it is now one where local is more global, allowing citizens to transform their identities. New media has synergies with globalisation, further allowing ease of communication at a transnational level that impacts on the nurturing of cultural identity.

A more specific technical approach on social media and identity was provided by Ellison (2013) for the publication *Foresight*. It provides a description of the dynamics of social media and identity. She argues that on social media social network sites (SNSs), identity markers can be masked, hidden and even reinvented. What are described as ‘social and technical affordances’ (p.3) affect identity in that the settings can be used to provide the external world with a picture of you as you wish to be seen. In that sense, the researcher would argue, the technology is open to abuse as a vehicle for potentially criminal activities. SNSs allow the user to frame his or her identity as they may like to be seen, even a fantasy image appealing to external audiences and denying their true identity.

Social media therefore offers the opportunity to ‘share self-presentation’ as well ‘branding’ leading to micro celebrity – the commitment to deploying and maintaining one's online identity 'as if it were a branded good, with the expectation that others do the same' (Ellison, p.5 quoting Senft, 2012).

Karim (2010) points out that diasporas also use the internet not only to source specific cultural references but also for medical conditions such as sourcing bone marrow from same-ethnic-group donors. Additionally, communities seek such cultural consumption as an alternative to the mass output of the dominant culture, such that 'using online media can participate to some extent in cultural production rather than merely consume media content' (ibid., p.163). Transnational groupings by diaspora are evident, as is the use of social media sites such as MySpace and Facebook by groups dispersed over generations seeking to make cultural contacts with their ancestry. Karim (ibid.) highlights Sindhis who were separated by the partition of India and Pakistan and are now using internet chat rooms to facilitate acquaintances across the world.

The online virtual world Second Life is another example, where followers are linked to Indian clothing shops and clubs aligned to Bollywood music (Gajjala, 2010).

Political action is also a feature of both the internet and social media. According to Karim (ibid.), it is used to challenge misrepresentations of communities as well as attack other hostile websites virtually. For many migrant groups as well as diaspora populations, the internet and social media have provided an important and integral tool to not only promote their identity and transnational connections, but also to correct erroneous and malicious representations that damage their standing in society.

Multiple identities of an individual, therefore, can be presented through different networks and accounts and may not be in line with the offline identity. For others, social is an opportunity to promote and share their true cultural identity with like-minded others, and to source transnational networks.

In many ways it is the need for a sense of a relevant 'community' that defines the locale for the Pakistani diaspora (whether in Oxford, Luton or Birmingham, or in Attock, Punjab and Mirpur) in this situation, as it does for other South Asian diasporas (Gajjala, 2010). Accordingly, permanent residence is not fixed but ‘two-dimensionality of memory and nostalgia’ may be sought (Karamcheti, 1992, quoted in ibid., p.211). The world of the internet and social media offer what Gajjala (ibid.) refers to as ‘cyberspace contact zones’ for ‘cyborg diasporas’ that are essentially ‘digital diasporas’ that ‘occur at the intersection of local-global, national-international, private-public, off-line-online, and embodies-disembodied’ (ibid., p.211).

Accordingly, the internet and social media are a space for a diversity of representations that bring together media modernity defined by the new media age and one-to-one connectivity and dialogue place between diasporas. Despite being described as merely ‘virtual’, such relationships are in themselves actual communities in their own right (Watson (1997) quoted in Gajjala (2010, p.214).

This development of hybridity and evolution of transnational identity within the media frame for many South Asians of the diaspora relates specifically to the primary subjects of the research question of this study.

2.14 Summary

The growth of the Internet and technology such as YouTube video uploads are an area to watch, as is new mobile phone technology, which is easily accessible and fast-flowing for an image-conscious diaspora, keen to be in touch with the latest gadget craze

This global intrusion is welcomed by many, particularly in developing countries and those with little material comfort and in relative poverty. It is a way of connecting communities by informing, educating and reinforcing values and systems of conformity, particularly with regard to capital. The rise of new interactive and engaging media has, however, brought not only more awareness but political activism, especially amongst the younger generation, with independence of mind and an anti-capital and anti-big business philosophy. Internet broadcasters such as Democracy Now and the Palestinian Youth Association for Leadership and Rights Activation (PYALARA) are two examples of direct public reporting media. The *Huffington Post* is a similar but alternative format online publication promoting public journalism through open access engagement.

In addition, the increasing use of YouTube and social media generally has allowed many to assert a more political identity (Lawrence, 2010) through short snippets of self-made video films with a global reach. Such mini documentaries articulate a new exchange of minds and ideas within the same cultural and social groups that go beyond borders and boundaries.

A study by the public relations and communications conglomerate Burson-Marsteller (Burson-Marsteller, 2012) highlighted the significance of the dominance of social media as a fast-growing medium, with audiences of 500 million for Facebook, 100 million for Twitter and 250 million for YouTube respectively (ibid.). These are now becoming a more dominant global force that is challenging large media corporate power and interests to create a new self-designed political reality and relevancy. The recent acquisition by Facebook of Whatsapp – an instant Internet-based messaging service – highlights this vertical integration and importance of new media (Kuchler and Bradshaw, 2014).

Such technologies have facilitated easy access to global cultural, social and religious networks and not only evoked a new sense of identity but also increased transnational links between similar affiliated groups, whether social, political, religious or cultural. This has allowed much more freedom of expression and avoided state regulation and censorship for individuals and groups who feel targeted or insecure as a result of the attention given to them by the media and the authorities and functionaries of the state. This is a positive aspect of new media that has empowered people with minority and majority interests, and allows self-expression and a right to reply to dominant mass media, becoming part of a growing mosaic that is itself part of an expanding interest base of modern youth culture. It is these new additions to the mass media world that are allowing much more independence of mind and assertiveness for many excluded and disenfranchised groups, whose voices are often sidelined by mainstream media. It is an opportunity for such communities and groups to articulate and develop ideas, concepts and their own realities that also create security and virtual or fixed locations, to which they belong. It may offer security and ambivalence at a time of conformity and dominance of mainstream media.

This chapter has therefore focused on the complexity of identity and its evolving nature, which is not always situated within defined and specific borders. There are multiple identities at play that relate to ethnic, racial, gender and other social variations that are also influenced by political situations and global events. The dual issues of location and feeling secure, as the literature suggests, are essential components in the making of a citizen, of whatever characteristic.

Within that paradigm is the role of the mass media in influencing and setting perceptions of the ‘Other’ and of difference in society. Its influence rests within geo-political, law enforcement and corporate organisations that seek to maintain the status quo with which they are so familiar with and secure about. The relationship with specialist paid interest groups supports a symbiosis that plays a consistent role in information management which is not suspected by the mass audience, as articulated by writers cited in the chapter. The production of the media and its broadcasting of key messages is not a passive process of entertainment or just reporting, it is a complex structure in the art of corporate management, a business lobby that validates its own self-interest and portrayal of independence.

Its core powerhouse is the legion of journalists presenting Western values of liberal democracy and freedom that pursue a capitalist agenda in the pursuit of profit. Additionally, the mechanisms used to promote specific messages within the minds of audiences encourage indifference and hostility to the ‘Other’. For the specific diaspora, these have all impacted on their sense of identity, resulting in a transnational sense of belonging that is creating an evolving hybridity. At its core is the concept of location and security that reaffirms and reassures such transmigrant populations of their place and acceptance within wider society. The role of the media is therefore pivotal in perpetuating representations that can lead to animosity and alienation. In this case it leads to the lexicon of race and cultural racism set within a more global political and economic context viewed as anti-Islam and Orientalist.

In respect to the diaspora, there is a better understanding of these issues and dilemmas that results in a creative response and exploration of transnational multi-ethnic media. This is reinforced by the rise of hand-held devices and ‘apps’ that allow greater utilisation of these niche broadcasters as well as alternative video and graphic technology that provide distinct cultural social spaces.

This will in many respects result in the formation, if not the extension and increasing rise, of the media age generation, or in this case the diaspora, engaging with their multiple identity within a wider framework of mass communication, easily accessible at the touch of a screen. This will no doubt place a new emphasis on hybridity and transnationalism, perhaps consumed within one single transnational meaning of identity. There is a clear importance and vitality in the new media in potentially enabling the diaspora to articulate a more positive and assertive transnational sense of belonging.

Chapter 3

Methodology

This chapter sets out the methodological approach used to carry out this research investigation. Having considered a number of options for the theoretical basis of this study, the researcher came to the conclusion that grounded theory was the most appropriate way forward in exploring the construction of Pakistani diaspora identity. This took place through '*hypothesis generating'* (Robson, 1993, p.19) once the primary source data had been collected and analysed; in other words, generating an initial hypothesis from the primary data helps form the next methodological stage,

Another way of stating this is outlined by May (1997), in what he refers to as '*induction theory'*, whereby the data emerging from any investigatory aspect of community life is used to develop a hypothesis which itself is interpreted in line with the literature to form a theoretical argument.

An additional benefit is to ensure a non-Eurocentric methodological basis of inquiry that has the flexibility to take into consideration social and cultural nuances related to the specific group of subjects, in order to explore transnational hybrid identity. The researcher will show that a new discourse can be seen in the interpretation of the data and the cyclical analysis of the themes and emerging issues. To support this, *discourse analysis* was an essential element in deconstructing the way the media articulates its message and how the interviewees assess the media they consume on a daily basis within their own realms of identity. This approach is seen as *critical*, in the following sense:

> ' "Critical" is a recognition that our social practice in general and our use of language in particular are bound up with causes and effects which we may not be at all aware of under normal conditions. (Bourdieu, 1977)

The researcher also considered the use of language and visual aspects of news stories via *semiotic analysis* as espoused by Hartley (1982), including the use of visual codes to depict key presentations that use a range of camera angles, emphasising different shots, the use of categorisation of stories and use of linguistic codes that can define and set the news agenda. Examples of this emerged from the data collected and from case studies of media articles and broadcast material as set out and discussed in the literature review. Critical linguistic and social semiotics is a process where text is investigated as ‘multifunctional, always simultaneously representing the world (ideational function) and enacting social relations (interpersonal function)’ (Fairclough, 1995, p.5). This is where the text is vital to the construct of social ideas and ultimately leads to ideological definition. Newspaper headlines in tabloids or the red tops are simplified text that gives great meaning to a few words to a wide audience base and ultimately have an impact in the daily lexicon. The phrase ‘the war on terror’ has perhaps become one of the most utilised headline terms that are without meaning, as has the phrase ‘winning hearts and minds’. These powerful metaphors can be framed within an ideological doctrine that sets the accepted political boundaries for an unsuspecting and unquestioning audience.

Having considered such variations within the study of language, the researcher concluded that discourse analysis was the most appropriate vehicle to achieve this aim.

This is particularly the case given the researcher’s interest in the work of Van Djik (1983) and the development of a social cognitive model. This moves the focus away from text and in the direction of discourse analysis, of how the operations of news programmes, and the understanding of news, fit within socio-psychological phenomena. Thus news is constructed through mechanisms of production which then define how the news is consumed. This conveyor belt of creating a news item from the headline, to the images and content, and to its meaning and understanding, is in Van Djik’s view an integrated framework in which values define how a story is set and interpreted.

The adoption of this method also aids clearer understanding and acceptance that assumptions can be made about a range of issues, including race and identity, people, society, culture and so forth, as language is often related to the issue of power and how that is constructed within society. It is important to ensure that such assumptions relate to the data and literature, to validate and provide reasoning. Discourse is thus an integral part of how roles and situations are played out in the wider world, particularly in the media, where information and news are framed to tell a story; consequently Fairclough refers to such discourse as ‘spoken or written language use’ (1995, p.2).

As a further enhancement of such discourse, visual imagery, such as photography, film, video, diagrams and gestures, utilised in conveying a meaning or message are analysed as part of this study. Using this broad sweep, the researcher took the liberty of extending this wider definition, to include new forms of technologies such as the internet, and cellular communication such as text messaging and video downloads. These forms of social media dialogues are essential in modern society, particularly within youth culture which has its own set of parameters and abbreviated signalling techniques that are redefining cultural and social identities created by the ‘*smartphone* generation’. Within media discourse more specifically, Fairclough (ibid.) speaks of ‘communicative events’ when a specific television programme or newspaper editorial promotes a forthright opinion, sets the agenda and/or influences the wider public. These processes are all considered within the body of this work, in particular, in the context of the issues emerging from the analysis of the data.

The related issues of religious and cultural identity cannot be avoided given their interdependence in this study and how correlations exist with race and identity. In that realm, the researcher wishes to assess, in particular, how the media reinforces stereotypes and images to highlight difference and the ‘other’ in society, within the parameters of biological and cultural racism (Hall, 2001; Said 1977; Downing and Husband, 2005).

As part of that paradigm, whereby race, religion and culture are inter-related in this investigation, critical analysis of the media is a relevant and vital methodological component in this research. This analysis is related to the Pakistani diaspora’s identity in the different existing generations. This examination of ethnicity, race and the role of the media includes an assessment of how language is utilised within the media to construct positive and opposing views in order to alienate some and promote others. As a related consequence, words have important meanings presented jointly with precise imagery for audiences to make instant connections. For instance, the words ‘terrorist’, ‘suicide bomber’ and ‘Muslim’ will symbolise a distinct meaning for the average viewer if they are used alongside the showing of an image of the remains of an destroyed building or repeated footage of the 9/11 attacks. This is explored in Chapter 2, ‘Transnationalism, media, identity and hybridity’, on the review of literature on this subject as a whole.

Other assumptions also require further exploration. For instance, it is often taken for granted that the reporter is an independent witness to events and reports such as an objective observer, without any personal emotion, ambivalence, prejudice, or attachment to personal values and moral value base, whether religious, cultural, political or other. This is in itself quite a task and, as argued by the personal account of Robert Darnton in his 1975 article, 'Writing news and telling stories' (Darnton, 1975), it is a misleading expectation. Darnton in this revealing testimony speaks of the pressures on the reporter, and closeness of the principal actors – the reporter and the source, in the quest for news. Close relationships are developed and nurtured as a consequence that will be considered mutually beneficial, as exemplified in the lobby network of the British press and Number Ten, Downing Street and as exposed by the Leveson Inquiry (2012). Lines are often blurred in this relationship: the one seeking information is often contributing to the construction of the story itself. The researcher will cite examples within the body of this work and discuss its relevance to the developed perceptions of cohort members who contributed to this research.

3.1 Conceptual framework and theory

The investigation of this evolving nature of identity feeds into a conceptual framework that seeks to provide a rationale for this diasporic development and to offer wider insight and explanation related to different trends and relationships. In order to achieve the optimum level of analysis from the data, and to shape the hypothesis, the approach in this work is based on the principles of grounded theory that allow the data to be used by the researcher to construct a possible and valid conceptual framework. It is important not to fix on a specific theoretical structure as this investigation is unique in how it seeks to clarify to what degree the media influences the defining of status and inclusion within a territorial space.

Grounded theory is described as ‘the discovery of theory from data systematically obtained and analysed in social research’ (Glaser and Strauss, 1967, p.1); and alternatively, as ‘theoretical constructs derived from qualitative analysis of data’ (Strauss and Corbin, 1998, p.1). This is the hypothesis-generating process employed in the research.

Although contrary views of this process exist, as highlighted by Thomas and James (2006), it remains a valid theoretical basis of research. The investigation set out by May (1997), for instance, illustrates its usefulness as does work done by Butler and Stokes in 1969 where more manual workers vote Labour than Conservative, in which May observes:

> ‘It is not a theory or explanation of the pattern of behaviour observed, but a statement of observation on voting behaviour collected by asking people.’ (May, 1997, p.31)

Similarly, any research taking place into a complex and multi-faceted community needs to adopt a methodological process that acknowledges the validity of the data at the time for interpretation and analysis. The researcher considers grounded theory as providing that overarching framework within which the various data strands were explored. It provided the elasticity of analysis that allowed the exploration of new ideas and themes encompassing a dual relationship between East and West and issues of identity interplayed with culture and sense of religious belonging set within contemporary British society.

The researcher used the Strauss and Corbin (1998) school of grounded theory that allows for a much more valuable analysis of the data to generate the relevant hypothesis. A caveat is to note the fragmentation of the Strauss and Glaser schools of thought that have become more adversarial than complementary or supportive. The researcher focused on the most appropriate literature in this subject area, which related to work undertaken by Strauss and Corbin (1998).

Theory has been defined as:

> ‘A set of well-developed concepts related through statements of relationships, which together constitute an integrated framework that can be used to explain or predict phenomena.’ (Strauss and Corbin, 1998, p.15)

There were of course a number of stages involved in this investigation, which required not only capturing the data, but also analysing it, and repeating this over a period until the information was exhausted and conclusions reached.

After the initial period, the data was captured from the focus groups and one-to-one meetings within the two areas. The first step was comparative analysis of the data that aided the creation of a theory (Glaser and Strauss, 1967). The tape recordings were transcribed onto the computer word for word, so as not to miss any comment and nuance from the respondents. Their comments were then colour coded, according to the main themes and issues emerging, with headings developed and recorded. The comparisons were broken down and filtered into a number of sets and properties. This included using basic parameters such as age and gender, for instance, between the two cohort groups that allowed some comparison.

Another area examined was the context of religion and culture, although there was some linkage in these two variables.

This initial attempt at analysing the contributions helped in the early stages of formulating a line of enquiry that was a precursor to theorising, and sits within the wider framework of conceptual ordering (Strauss and Corbin, 1997 p.19-25). The key themes raised with this first batch of data analysis informed an on-going process of interaction and dialogue with the research participants through the continuation of focus groups and on- to-one interviews. Inevitably, there were minor tensions in this technique, as some participants felt it to be time consuming and repetitive while others found it frustrating. However, the continual involvement of, and explanation of the rationale for the use of this method to, the cohort members ensured continued and enthusiastic cooperation. This was also a sign of the trust gained and confidence of the participants in contributing to the study.

3.2 Practicality of data collection

With respect to the process of data collection itself, the researcher was conscious of the sensitivity and political nature of the research question as well as its topical nature during the fieldwork. There was initial skepticism and distrust to overcome among members of the community during the commencement of the fieldwork, specifically from some of the Pakistani diaspora. The use of community influencers was one option used, as these can facilitate wider links with second- and third-generation British-born Pakistanis.

However, this had some limitations, as some of the most excluded group of young people did not prefer this approach and did not welcome the intervention of older members of the community or, in some cases, the intervention of those working with young people on the behalf of public funded organizations, such as the local authority, which they mistrusted. Some were confused as to whether this study was a creation of government initiatives such as ‘community cohesion', the ‘Respect’ agenda and ‘Prevent’ (violent extremism), all of which were viewed by respondents as counterproductive in developing trust for independent research such as this.

A range of approaches were then considered to engage proactively with the relevant group of people in the most appropriate manner. The use of networks and personal introductions was therefore essential in the first instance. This approach developed trust and a level of credibility that would not have been achieved through formal processes such as letter writing, cold calling or using what were referred to by some young people in the study as ‘so-called community leaders’; these were seen as often more senior and potentially out of touch with younger members of the community.

Some respondents even considered such people as potential agents of public organizations, given direct funding links and political patronage built over many decades to serve the interests of specific political groups, as highlighted by Malik (1995) in his investigation on some minority leaders’ links to political patronage and securing of electoral success. Clearly, some of the diaspora felt that this approach was now outdated and did not reflect the changing political and social consciousness of the British-born diaspora, keen to advance on their merits.

The implications of this selection procedure were to ensure better representation of the Pakistani diaspora, free from any form of gate-keeping by people who were considered, by some of the diaspora, as unrepresentative: that might have tainted the data collection, as specific individuals may have been recruited via community leaders with little experience and/or knowledge of current concerns and issues facing the wider Pakistani diaspora.

An element of personal reflectivity was also introduced into the arena at this point. The researcher comes from the Pakistani diaspora and can provide a level of empirical data to enhance the research in a wider context. There was, as part of the data collection process, a shared cultural and religious understanding which provided a unique and affirming perspective of how respondents felt within a social, cultural and political environment surrounded by discourses on religion, race and citizenship. This personal reflectivity also required a level of objectivity, so as not to influence the data analysis with any potential for bias. The researcher was aware of this possibility and took it into consideration throughout the analytical process.

The essential element of this approach was not only to validate the data but also to enhance the interpretations from a specific cultural and religious point of view. In that sense, it placed the researcher, of the same ethnicity, at an advantage. It provided greater clarity to the meanings derived from the key themes arising from the fieldwork, as well as making greater sense of culturally appropriate observations and experimentation within the cohort group discussions. These experimentations were in the form of specific cultural prompts that allowed much open comment from the interviewees, whilst reinforcing a deeper sense of trust between the researcher and principal subjects of the investigation.

Another phase of engagement was through the use of modern forms of communication and technologies, mainly text messaging, to support the building of relationships once an introduction had been made. From this confidence-building measure, one-to-one interviews were set up and conducted with individuals from the two geographical areas, namely Luton and Oxford. Both males and females were interviewed. Where this was not appropriate culturally, in respect to gender sensitivity, a research assistant was recruited, inducted and trained to facilitate the one-to-one interviews and women-only focus groups. As stated, this was more relevant to women within the Pukhtoon community, given the traditional nature of purdah as custom and practice. The female assistant was recruited from within the relevant community and helped build trust, developing an easy rapport with the interviewees. Furthermore, engagement by word of mouth was a crucial factor in this regard and worked well.

There was another consideration given to the recruitment of an assistant to support the data-collection process. Having the ability to understand the mother tongue of cohort group members was important. The study was fortunate to recruit an individual who understood both the Pukhtoon and Punjabi languages and could therefore appreciate the nuances within the discussions, when participants used specific Punjabi or Pukhtoon terminology to emphasise a cultural point. Both sets of interviewees used specific cultural terminology when referring to their consumption of cultural and transnational media, including the internet. Their remarks could be better analysed by the principal researcher with the help of the linguistically able research assistant. The key element that was recorded within this specific process was the use of fusion language, a mix of Punjabi or Pukhto with English, as well as inserted Urdu grammar, mostly acquired from the viewing of Bollywood movies.

3.3 Interview process and ethics

A series of semi-structured interviews schedules were used for the one-to-one sessions. The approach was made as flexible as possible in order to elicit the most useful data related to mass media consumption and its potential impact on the formation of the respondents' identity. This semi-structured approach was important, as too rigid an approach might have been seen as too bureaucratic and time-consuming. This is also important in respect to the use of grounded theory, as the use of this particular mechanism of enquiry allowed for a much more efficient use of limited time with participants, within a framework that allowed more freedom to articulate issues and concerns and thereby create a more engaging debate.

The efficient use of time was a key issue in managing the two sites, the number of respondents, gender and cultural issues and the wider processes associated with the use of grounded theory. The intention was not to allow the quality of the discussion to suffer because of time constraints that the researcher had placed on the data-collection period. Furthermore, it also eased the process of transcribing interviews and discussions at relevant and frequent intervals, as required by adopting the theoretical and practical implementation of grounded theory techniques and approach.

Interview data was then analysed and used as a basis for some initial work related to what has been referred to as a precursor to developing a theory, although this systematic stage of fieldwork and analysis took some considerable time (6-9 months) within the longer six-year timescale of the project.

Some of the key ideas and concepts arising from this initial exploration of data assisted in the development of a second semi-structured set of questions or key discussion points to be used as prompts for a second round of focus groups.

The nature of the focus group membership is also relevant to mention within this section. There were up to six people in each group in two areas of Oxford and Luton. The groups surveyed were facilitated by the lead researcher and by the research assistant where necessary for cultural and gender purposes. Prior to running these sessions, the lead researcher and the female research assistant met and held supervisory training discussions, to assess the most appropriate strategies in conducting the planned focus groups. This ensured that the right techniques were available in the skills set with the assembled respondents and were in line with the methodological aspects of the use of grounded theory.

In addition, the method of inquiry was explained to all participants in order to ensure that they were fully aware of and engaged in the work, so as to elicit appropriate responses in the data gathering. It was important to facilitate and engage in the most appropriate and professional way possible, not only to minimise any potential for conflict, but also to remain within ethical boundaries.

In fact, the way in which the data was to be captured and the whole methodology of recruiting and working with cohort group members in the fieldwork phase of this research had been presented to the Bradford University’s Committee for Ethics in Research in the first instance. Permission was then granted to move forward with the designed approach with risks assessed and mitigated accordingly. For instance, the focus groups were conducted along gender lines with separate male and female groups in operation. There were a number of factors for this reasoning, chief amongst which was the need to maintain cultural and social boundaries between the sexes, so as not to break cultural taboos or disrespect values or norms, expected as part of the unwritten contract between the investigator and the cohort members. This was to be interpreted not as any form of barrier between the participants, or as unilaterally enforcing a certain religious or cultural orthodoxy, but as a practical and appropriate situational response in order to gain the trust of respondents and ensure the robustness of the data gathered.

The alternative would have caused great offence to both male and female cohort group members, created mistrust and animosity between the lead researcher and interviewees, and delayed the research, if not taken the fieldwork immensely off track. In relation to this point, having separate focus groups enhanced the respondents' ability to take part without feeling intimidated by the opposite sex, or feeling uncomfortable or uneasy, as it observed cultural norms they viewed as important in Pakistani society and Islamic doctrine.

On reflection after this period of data collection based on empirical evidence, this point was as important for the males as for the females, in the experience of the researcher. The females said that they would have felt embarrassed in speaking in the presence of the men and would not have participated. For the men they, too, would have felt constrained and embarrassed in speaking in front of the women, as they later confessed. This would have placed a severe constraint on the data being collected. It is also questionable whether information arising from mixed cohort groups would have been useful, accurate or even purposeful, or have led to necessary or beneficial analysis from which to construct any relevant and reliable first base theory. The separate and gender-relevant focus groups ensured that respondents, from whatever background, felt able to articulate their concerns in a forum conducive to open and honest dialogue, allowing the free flow of thought and expression relevant to their own experiences and feelings about the impact of the mass media on their sense of belonging.

In addition, for the benefit of the researcher and for accuracy, and for other practical considerations, an electronic recording device was used to record the interviews, unless a focus group or individuals explicitly refused such an intrusion. At the start of each interview and/or focus group discussion, participants were asked for permission for the tape-recording device to be used. Informed consent was sought to ensure that individuals were aware of the format of the research process and agreed to take part in the investigation on that basis. There was some initial hesitation, of course, and some concern about the use of a machine to record comments made in private. Given the concerns expressed, this was taken into serious consideration and respondents were continually reassured over the use of the device. The rationale for its use having been explained, that is, to ease the transcribing process and ensure that all views were captured, all of the respondents agreed with this request. Strict confidentiality was observed at all times; age, ethnicity and gender were recorded, but not names; recordings and transcripts were secured in a locked drawer with the lead researcher retaining sole access and use of the data.

For the researcher, what was useful and important about these negotiations were the real insecurities felt by respondents. This was not clear at the outset, but became apparent through the discourse in focus groups and one-to-ones as the field work progressed. Many respondents remained unsure about the intentions of the researcher, the research per se, and of whether there might be repercussions from them taking part. Even in this context, it seemed that the framing of their identities by society at large and by the media mattered to these participants. These thought processes were echoes of the anxiety many felt about their sense of belonging in Britain, a central thread that emerged in this study. Even before the main thrust of the data collection had commenced, a shadow of perceptions hung over the heads of some of the participants. It became more crucial, if not vital, for the researcher to install confidence in the interviewees, confidence not only in his credentials but in the importance and value of their contribution to the research question. If did not occur within a short time frame, the researcher feared a large dropout rate of respondents in both localities, resulting in an adverse impact on this crucial part of the investigation. Fortunately, trust was established and, as stated previously, the sample diaspora responded well to the time commitment required.

The questions put to participants were also adapted and readapted following focus group sessions, as further pointers in the data were required to clarify issues raised by participants, and to further probe some of the responses, again in line with the principles of grounded theory methodology.

This ensured that the data was as rich and appropriate as possible to interrogate with more detailed analysis from the conversations that took place in focus groups where members often spoke candidly, without fear of any adverse comeback that could have led to a tarnished experience of this research journey and disallowed any further involvement. The participants' ongoing commitment to this grounded theory process of gaining data through different stages was essential to keep the investigation alive. Without their active participation, the whole theoretical basis of this work would have stalled, at best, and at worst it would have ceased. This was clearly another risk to the whole study, but one that was sufficiently mitigated in the view of the lead researcher.

In fact, the element of caution in preparing the research was an appraisal of what interviewees would have considered as merits in taking part in the group or individual research sessions; whether the sessions would be considered to be abstract or without any relevance in the daily lives and life experiences of the participants, within the context of media consumption. It would have been of great concern to the researcher if the principal actors within the investigation had no investment or genuine interest in the subject-matter. This was considered as potentially the biggest risk within the methodological framework, not only in terms of making sense of the data captured but also the possibility that the nucleus of the facts might have been limited and not substantive enough to allow the formation of any meaningful theory or to allow any form of hypothesis to emerge.

The researcher highlighted this as a key area of concern and one that required careful selection of respondents to take part in the research. The one to one discussions held with individuals at the inception of the recruitment process aided this and allowed screening of respondents genuinely interested in taking part. The continual development of the relationship between researcher and respondents further enhanced trust and interest in the body of research that reassured both sides of the research project.

In the event, if such an eventuality had occurred there would have been an early indication of it and it could have been catered for, through repeating the process of engagement and ensuring there were enough reliable respondents available to form the key components in the research infrastructure. But the fact would have remained, that the pool might have been tainted significantly, by the close-knit Pukhtoon community of Oxford specifically, rendering this element of the investigation redundant and pointless to pursue. Fortunately, this was not to be the case and the entire process was achieved with the full support of both cohort groups.

3.4 Cohort structure

As stated previously, the two sites that were selected as the primary areas for data collection and are referred to in this document are Oxford and Luton. They were selected partly for their history of migration representing the two cultural groups within the Pakistani diaspora in Britain specific to this research. They are unique in representing two separate traditional and cultural strands of the British Pakistani diaspora, in two contrasting cities, each with its own distinct characteristics and environments. The cohorts of people included and involved in this investigation were from diverse backgrounds, economically, socially, politically and culturally, a diversity that formed the backbone of this research question.

Those selected were recognised as part of a specific population with cultural traits forming key components of their ethnicity and language, and religion an additional component of the make-up of these subject communities. Through active footwork in both cities, a core group of participants was set up to engage fully with in this process, despite their having some of the doubts raised earlier.

The sampling and testing out of members of the Punjabi and Pukhtoon sub-populations, although time-consuming, was at the same time invigorating in that the methods of enquiry were shaped with the help of people best suited for the purpose. The criteria used were simple: an invitation to participate was extended to British-born citizens of Pakistani origin, either Pukhtoon or Punjabi. For the latter group, definition was widened in allowing participants from Azad Kashmir who defined themselves as Punjabi and/or Kashmiri. In addition, potential participants had to have an interest and be active in consuming mass media and be willing to take part in the grounded theory approach that required sufficient time commitment and concentration. This was achieved, to the relief of the principal researcher, quite easily during the interview that was part of the initial recruitment process and reinforced once the fieldwork went live. The use of existing contacts in the communities in Luton and Oxford allowed introductions to be cascaded to their friends and relatives who then met with the researcher.

Because of the commitment asked of participants, the sample sizes were modest, and this is reflected in the two groups themselves, which then fed into the focus groups and, in turn, into the one-to-one interviews.

This chosen pathway helped maintain the rigour and discipline required of a methodology as complex as grounded theory. At the same time, it remained exciting and demanding as a series of actions that elaborated upon the key questions used in the data collection process.

It also enabled a broad age-range of participants to be involved in the research, and an overall balanced representation based on age and gender within the cultural group of interest, whether Pukhtoon or Punjabi, that resulted in a reliable and rich data set. Therefore, as well as the numbers of participants being realistic given the time available and travel required between the locations., they reflected realistically assumption the contacts that were made in the two sites and those who were willing to take part in focus groups and one-to-one interviews. There were some who dropped out and these numbers are accounted for by natural self-removal of some of the respondents during the repeated, if not the early, stages of the research. However, the number was limited. The following tables set out the numbers of respondents and the process type for the data collection, and include age range by location and gender.

Table 3.1 Total number of interviewees in Luton and Oxford

Location	*Group*	*Sex*	*No.*	*Type*
Luton	Punjabi	Males	15	3 focus groups with 5 participants each. Followed by one-to-one interviews with 5 respondents in total.
		Females	15	
Oxford	Pukhtoon	Males	15	3 focus groups with 5 participants each. Followed by one-to-one interviews with 5 respondents in total.
		Females	15	
Total number of participants: 60 people of the Pakistani diaspora				

Table 3.2 Age range and gender by location

Location	*Age range*	*Male*	*Female*
Luton	18-19	3	2
	20-24	7	6
	25-29	3	5
	30-34	2	2
	Total	15	15
Oxford	18-19	3	1
	20-24	*8*	*6*
	25-29	*3*	*6*
	30-34	*1*	*2*
	Total	*15*	*15*

The data collection phase also included a focus on what was meant by personal identity, with each candidate being asked to state their own ethnicity and race, as they personally perceived it to be. Although ethnicity was set in broad terms for the two specific interest groups and categorised as two sub-sets of the wider Pakistani population, there was also an interest and focus on the part of the researcher on the way individuals view themselves. Additionally, distinctions and nuances within and between the Punjabi and Pukhtoon communities of course emerged and were recorded. For instance, as regards the language used by each group, Pukhtoons were more likely to interact in Pukhto with their Pukhtoon counterparts, whilst the Punjabis interacted more in English. Further, Islamic terminology, such as ‘inshallah’ (god willing), was used more by the Pukhtoon than by the Punjabi cohort. The researcher also observed amongst the Pukhtoon a stronger sense of community bond than that observed among the Punjabi. For example, some Pukhtoons attended the ‘one-to-one interviews’ in groups rather than as individuals, in order to offer support and encouragement to each other; this was not observed in the Punjabi cohorts apart from one or two exceptions.

This area of self-identification or self-affirmation was important in building up a more comprehensive picture of the diaspora, in particular, how they viewed their own relationship with the notion of multiple identities and sense of belonging. What was observed challenged some assumptions that the researcher may have had at the outset of the study. The researcher recognised during this phase that such feelings of personal identity within the two separate cohorts were recognisable but not alike. Inevitably they were not consistent with the feelings, aspirations and motivations of the generation that came before them.

When, at the initial point of data collection, the respondents were asked to self-define their own ethnicity, they were invited to do so as they best preferred, rather than being offered one selected or presupposed for them by the researcher or study question. A questionnaire was developed and given to each participant. It was anonymous and sought to gain an insight into the diversity of self-identification. In that way, exact personal ethnicity was not determined by assumptions and loose terminology, which may exist in the literature, but from participants themselves. This self-identification was then aligned to the literature and data analysis itself.

A concerted effort was also made to ensure equal representation of men and women in this study, given the cultural issues raised earlier. This was centrally important as it not only made the data collection balanced, but also gave it validity in encompassing both gender sets from the subject communities.

There is a further point to be made in this regard, which relates directly to differences of opinion based on the sex of the contributor within the two male and female cohorts. The difference in how these two groups related to one another but also to their own specific gender identity group is another dimension of interest within masculine and feminine diasporic identity, itself part of their wider hybridity. The difference assisted in illuminating, if not breaking down, some of the wider generic and often stereotypical views held of Asian and Pakistani (Islamic) women in particular, within society and Western media.

Additionally, the gender breakdown ensured parity of male and female representation, promoting a sense of equity in the process itself. The only remaining reservation initially held by the researcher was set within the backdrop of cultural sanction as to the limitations or strength of Pakistani female diaspora involvement. This could have limited the gender-specific data input, and been emphasised as a key risk factor. However, in the end there was as much involvement from females as from males, an outcome aided by the decision to use a female and culturally specific research assistant, fluent in Pukhto and Punjabi, who was available to take part and travel to and within the two cities of choice.

Even concern, during the planning stage, of possible fluctuating commitment on the part of the women due to the dilemmas of family life and childcare having a possible adverse impact in the fieldwork did not materialise to any large extent. There was no requirement for crèche facilities to be available or for more time for consultation with women being built into the programme as it developed. At the time when the fieldwork was beginning, with the programme of engagement and involvement of respondents from both sexes, these issues were assessed as emerging. Yet the assumptions made were not borne out by the reality on the day and following weeks. Both males and females involved in the data collection became familiar with the work and methods of investigation during the data collection phase and did not require any drastic or urgent support, such as emergency childcare provision or meeting the demands of a career, or family issues.

The number of respondents selected was also flexible and dependent on the strength of the data gained. As part of the grounded theory approach, it could have been increased depending on the concepts and early hypotheses generated by the data. As stated previously, this process of working in cycles ensured that the information gained and analysed developed organically, had validity and purpose, whilst maintaining relevance to the grounded theory literature.

On a note of caution, it was always difficult to quantify the number of participants for this research study that would be necessary in order to consider the validity of this system of enquiry. In the end, there was adequate representation to form a strong nucleus of individuals, which provided the appropriate momentum of interest and involvement throughout the period of data collection. Even the initial guarded caution of members of the Pakistani diaspora either unwilling to contribute or not finding the subject matter of interest, did not persist. From the initial meeting, many had an existing interest in this issue and had many thoughts on this subject that allowed them to articulate and explore their inner concerns.

An initial concern that there might be a lack of interaction or debate in the early stages of data collection was mitigated by the respondents themselves. This made the task of the researcher simpler and less antagonistic and distrusting. This further positive outcome was of advantage to, and an endorsement of, the overall approach and outweighed the numerous risks assumed and anticipated at the planning stage.

There was, in the mind of the researcher, a continual need to maintain the trust and confidence of the cohort group members, male and female. This was integral to the success of the investigation as well as to the integrity of the principal researcher. Any potential for conflict in the discussions, or minimising of the narratives of the individual participants, could lead to respondents exiting from the research due to mistrust. Confidence grew within the cohort groups, and in the principal researcher, the more the respondents opened up to elucidate their concerns and amplify their comments. Evidence of this also arose in the focus groups, as discussion became more animated and exuberant. Participants showed themselves willing to be prompted on elements of personal media consumption they felt others would consider as amusing. In one such forum, a Pukhtoon male, for instance, spoke of his deep interest in watching old British Ealing comedies of Alec Guinness; another confessed to a liking for Australian soaps. These were a sign of the confidence of the respondents to engage with the research question and offer further insight into their range of media consumption, including specific personal interests that defined their own individual identity.

3.5 The process of analysis

Once a first stage theory was conceptualised, it was tested out amongst the participants. The analytical procedure and findings were also shared with the interviewees to affirm their validity and verification. Once these discussions had taken place, the first step concepts were then broadened out and articulated further to give more meaning. This also had the benefit of maintaining the procedure of analysis within the cyclical programme set out by grounded theory methodology as recommended within the literature. The open coding process identified multiple codes that were also multi-layered. It was the role of the researcher to make sense of these layers and illustrate the range of codes available and acceptable, and to acknowledge similarities and differences. In the case of the Pakistani diaspora, codes included belonging, culture, religion, discrimination and others relating to sense of multiple or singular identity. These themes were the codes utilised that then related to sub-codes such as Punjabi or Pukhtoon culture, or practising Muslim or not. There was recognition at this stage of the many codes generated which expanded into larger themes, or codes. It was valuable to capture all of these and convert them into more tangible and useful results. This nearly became a complex mosaic of information needing editing and further categorisation, the obvious role and function of the principal researcher. However, this did not happen, as there were many similarities between the two cohort research groups, thus making the task slightly simpler in practice.

A classification system (the codes) was set up to draw out the themes emphasised repeatedly within the two ethnic cohort groups or by individuals. The elucidation of these themes contained detailed discourses. Mainly descriptive in nature, they often related to a personal or group story.

The ordering of this information was purposefully hierarchical and assisted the researcher in assigning more relevance to some of the analysis, while allowing reclassification or dismissal of other dimensions that were not seen as valid or relevant. This then facilitated semi-formal discussions with the participants to shape the primary data analysis.

Another feature of the initial data analysis was to assess what comparisons could be made between the two groups, Pukhtoon and Punjabi, involved in the investigation. In some cases, there was little description or detail within certain comments, a mere fact being reported or mentioned in passing. Other descriptions coming from the analysis were more vivid and thorough. This information was then collated and classified further, according to importance and credibility. It was also appropriate to apply relevant ethnographic experiences that enabled the subsequent stages of theorising supporting the development of a much wider database of information than that categorised in codes. It allowed for a different perspective to be sourced, enhanced the data-capturing process itself and allowed the researcher to better understand the group dynamics.

Ethnography is very useful in this respect, as Robson (1993) states. It allows the ethnographer to study the rules and traditions of a group and aims to create a theory of how this group interacts. This is explained further in the next section providing more detail of its importance within the context of emic and etic approaches. In addition, personal reflections of ethnographic experiences are therefore referred to in the summary sections of chapters 4, 5 and 6, as well as in the conclusion in chapter 7.

A manual data log was created that recorded words and phrases, cultural norms and sayings that assisted in linking key concepts and ideas that seemed to link across the two cultural groups: for instance, religious and/or cultural sayings familiar to both cohort groups that enhanced internal and group cultural understandings. Variations within the data picked up by this process allowed further interrogation of the statistical evidence generated.

A number of elements of the theories were then developed, following a second stage of analysis and discussion with participating groups. The theory was further refined in one-to-one interviews conducted with male and female members of the forums. Again, similarities and disparity were filtered and coded appropriately, which assisted in developing theorising codes or, as stated before, was a precursor to hypothesising. The researcher applied these codes further to define a broader emerging hypothesis that was then enhanced, if not verified, by one-to-one interviews and feedback sessions with respondents. It was crucial to assess during this stage whether respondents were not fatigued or feeling over-researched. Over-participation might have resulted in members losing interest and the methodology being compromised by a lack of proper and effective representation. This was not the case, as respondents remained keen to contribute at all stages of the data collection and analysis process.

The hypothesis-generating stage was therefore an active process involving the respondents, who had given so much time to the research and were therefore offered the additional benefit of a sense of ownership in the final phase of the investigation. An emerging hypothesis was articulated by the researcher and debated by the members of the two groups in focus groups and one-to-one interviews where possible. During this continuation of the data collection and analysis process, further comparisons were made between the two diasporic cultural groups. These juxtapositions offered further insight into whether the hypothesising was accurate and relevant to the findings of the research.

For the proposed suppositions to work, the codes were grouped together with the other sets of data to develop concepts. In essence, for any hypotheses to hold validity it should meet certain requirements. The ideas espoused within this research should link into the data. The key themes drawn out from the analysis should be reflected in the hypothesis that is the outcome for this work. It is necessary to ensure that the reference group – a representative number of volunteer participants – spans the interviewed clusters and ethnicity (Pukhtoon and Punjabi, and cultural differentials). The outcome itself has to satisfy the precondition that it is comprehensible to lay people.

The general premise developed by the researcher is generic enough to meet a range of dimensions and situations. The construction makes the hypothesis relevant to the wider diaspora communities and its articulation is therefore not a meaningless abstract devoid of any real-life meaning in the day-to-day world. A final criterion the researcher believes has been met in adapting this specific method to aid the enquiry is the real belief that the person utilising the hypothesis is not only empowered by the approach but also derives some positive experience or solution from it.

The flexibility of the concepts and the ideas developed here has allowed the element of direction to be a central plank for success. The researcher would assert that, given the level of concerns of the diaspora with the media's identification of them as 'the Other', the summation proposed is a solution-focused one with relevance to the lives of those who played such a crucial part as respondents in this study. The theory also gives much greater validity and justification for the use of grounded theory as an analytical and hypothesis-generating tool. Its innate value is its beneficiary role in 'analysis of how a problem is resolved or processed by participants in a particular problem area'. (Miller and Brewer 2003, p.133). The theory has achieved its overall objective of responding directly to the question in hand but also facilitating a supportive framework in which group members and others of the diaspora can believe in a sense of achievement through their active participation in the data-collection phase.

3.6 The value of ethnography

As stated above, the addition of ethnography was a useful contributor in the analysis of the data arising from the two cohort groups. The most important element was that the researcher had the same cultural, racial and religious demographics as the respondents. In that regard, the responses are better understood in the wider context of respondents being a minority community and how they are potentially perceived. Ethnography relates well to the grounded theory approach in how the data (via the cyclical process) tells a story. For the researcher, the approach is not tainted with an existing structured hypothesis that the data is expected to relate to. It allows the data to take its own journey through the fieldwork and narratives of the respondents. At the same time, the researcher can observe, as well as participate in, exchanges based on community of interest.

However, a weakness of ethnography in adding to theory as well as seeking and analysing new research data, arises when personal ideas are not checked (Hillyard, 2010). It has been argued that, at worst, statements made with this approach can be constructed, even ‘manufactured’, to highlight a particular social reality, thus making it redundant (Brewer, 2000). The framing of data is a serious matter. Comparisons are even made, according to Brewer (ibid.), between the ethnographic approach and the work of journalists, even writers of novels. However, these are extreme views that express the unreliability of and antagonism towards ethnographic research. Any research methodology adopted by an external or internal investigator can be subject to criticisms regarding impartiality, or subjectivity and personal influence. In this context, it is important that the methodology is open to scrutiny by others to ensure its validity and the integrity of the data and subsequent analysis. The researcher feels that the use of both grounded theory and ethnography within the context of an emic approach has met this requirement for this specific study.

This type of ‘insider’ (emic) research is seen as important for studies of ethnic minorities by our own communities (Foster, 1994, p.130). It brings with it a different set of perspectives and knowledge of that same community that enhances the data collection and analysis during the fieldwork. Generally, all research has a bias related to the researcher’s own values and belief systems. Like journalists, in the context of this study, as expressed by Darnton (1975) (referred to above), researchers interpret what they encounter (Stevenson, 1990; Matlay, 2005; Beyers et al., 2009). The racial and cultural bias of researchers (Banks, 1995) is also an area that can impinge on objectivity, a discourse much amplified within educational researchers and referred to as ‘epistemological racism’ (Scheurich and Young, 1997, p.4). These debates on either side will continue to take place and the researcher does not wish to expand that discussion, except to cite its existence and importance, and to exemplify a racial divide in who undertakes such approaches and how is the research data is analysed within the context of personal, political, social and cultural experiences and realities. Indeed, Scheurich and Young (ibid.) have argued that the lack of understanding as to why ‘race’ is important is in itself a critical factor in epistemologies From the point of view of mainstream researchers, why should it matter, is it perhaps not an issue, and can it not be ignored (ibid.)? From such a point of view it would follow that the use of an *etic* (‘ousider’) ethnographic approach would negate any form of bias albeit the method may be subject to white academic racism, as argued by Scheurich (2002), which also relates to findings on the impact of institutional racism (MacPherson, 1999).

The emic approach allowed the researcher to move away from a more Eurocentric approach, as stated, to one that was more in tune with the participants. It helped the data to evolve with the analysis and therefore supported the grounded theory approach. It allowed the respondents to speak of their experiences as a minority group without any assumptions or theoretical frameworks installed at the start of the process. It aligned closely with the grounded theory approach in its use of the data and its continual analysis to draw conclusions. It gave voice to the concerns, anxieties and perceptions of an excluded group of people who feel marginalised by society. In that respect, as Foster (1994) states, ‘voice is a multifaceted concept’ (132). Its contribution in the form of narratives and life histories provides much more meaning to the ethnographic approach than any etic process. This research study addressed two cohort groups that were more open to an emic approach that created a safe space to talk openly and feel that the researcher not only empathised with their concerns, but understood the context in which they articulated them. The element of trust was crucial to this research’s success, through an insider approach that allowed not only cultural understanding but also compassion in the way conversations were constructed, conducted and recorded.

There remains debate on the values of these two approaches (Headland, 1990; Helfrich, 1999), and as to whether the insider can seek the key data that is required without personal conflicts of interest and interpretation. However, the external method of using an existing structure of explanation would limit the nuances and realism of the experiences, context and data in the fieldwork. These are issues the researcher had to think through and debate when assessing the main methodological approach at the initial planning stage of the research question itself. The approach adopted, therefore, seeks to mitigate these concerns at an early stage and ensure the data was accurate and meaningful throughout.

Ethically, in working with specific vulnerable groups, it is also necessary to ensure that the respondents are not influenced, coached or even directed through specific prompts, to make certain statements. In the frame of this study, issues of trust were be paramount, given the suspicion of outsiders, of people not belonging to the respondents’ immediate proximity, unknown or not related by kin or cultural network.

There is of course a juxtaposition, in undertaking research with vulnerable groups, between ensuring their voice is heard but not producing any improvement in their concerns. For instance, research with lesbian and gay communities accessing healthcare is valuable to determine how services do not meet their needs, but this may not result in health provision getting any better (James and Platzer, 1999).

The power dynamic is also in favour of the researcher, who can hold sway over respondents, highlighting how the research will improve their lives, when in fact it may not. This may be especially true in research undertaken in developing countries (Scheyvens et al., 2003) or with specific marginalised communities, such as women, children or refugees. In essence, concerns of exploitation are important in assessing research with such groups as it could be that middle-class researchers cannot relate to the subject constituents and deemed an outsider (Bridges, 2002). This anthropological approach is addressed in the previous chapter relating to the work of Hutnyk (2006). In addition, some minorities have been concerned about being over-researched and defined in a Western community context (Jan-Khan, 2003). Such ethical considerations need to be reviewed during each element of the investigation, ensuring participants not only provide informed consent but also are informed of their right to leave the research study at any time. The cyclical process adopted allows such a mechanism to exist.

These considerations were made explicit to all respondents during the initial interview and involvement in this study, in order not only to ensure good ethical practice but also to maintain the confidence of all participants.

The researcher viewed the ethics of adopting an emic or etic process very seriously. This was not only to ensure the lack of bias but of ensuring no adverse psychological impact was placed on respondents. As part of the group and one to one discussions, respondents were asked of how issues impacted upon them. This included discussion their bad experiences encountering prejudice as well as talking about anti-Muslim hate and racism. Concerns were not raised by respondents. The researcher; having worked for many years professionally in the health and mental health field, did not observe any signs of anxiety or distress during group discussions and personal interviews. Respondents would have been referred to support services if this had indeed arisen, with the researcher clear of his ethical responsibilities towards all those taking part in the study. It was important that such participants who perhaps saw themselves as marginalised or disenfranchised, has the required support.

3.7 Data collection locations

As discussed above, the two locations of Luton and Oxford formed the basis for selecting individuals that were the essential element in acquiring the required set of opinions for this investigation. The further rationale for selecting Oxford and Luton as the primary sources for fieldwork and data collection was twofold. First, the principal researcher had familiarity with both locations and the make-up of their local Pakistani communities, residing in one and having close family in the other. A second rationale relates to the first, in that the choice made the two locations accessible for the recruiting of respondents to take part in the research question. Also, the two places selected are in the South-East and Eastern regions of England, far removed from the sprawling cities often cited for their extended industralised links and history of mass primary migration of Pakistani communities over many decades, such as Birmingham, Bradford and Manchester.

The borough of Luton is a city with a history of Pakistani migration and settlement, attracted by an industrial complex and, like Oxford, based around car manufacturing. Similarly, the Punjabi and Pukhtoon communities have selected these places as home as a result of internal migration from the North of England, escaping Bradford, or Burnley, for more aspiring southern cities and higher incomes at a time of economic decline in their primary settled places: ironically, a form of internal diaspora within a north–south divide.

The following sections provide a brief introduction to these places to give better context to the research question and data analysis. These synopses, although in parts quite different, do have similarities within social, cultural and religious realms, as well as shared patterns of economic disadvantage and exclusion from mainstream society, within wider social classifications.

3.8 The Luton cohort

The strength of the minority ethnic base has allowed the already well-established and long-serving Pakistani members to be an essential part of the social and political life of Luton, now forming nearly 10% of the total population of the city, and in some electoral wards representing over 50% of the population.

Punjab, home of the great majority of the Pakistani immigrant population, is the second-largest province of Pakistan with 56% of the total population living in that province with its capital Lahore, a cultural and political hub. The province is bordered by Kashmir (Azad Kashmir, Pakistan, and Jammu and Kashmir, India) to the north-east, the Indian states of Punjab and Rajasthan to the east, the Pakistani provinces of Sindh, Baluchistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa to the south and west, and the Islamabad capital territory to the north. This geography results in both similarities and differences with the Oxford cohort (see below).

In Luton, the areas known as Dallow, Biscot and Saints are wards with a high Pakistani population and represent the urban centre of Luton, stretching from the city centre to the highly commercialised Asian business and community sector known as Bury Park. Manzoor (2007), in an autobiographical depiction, narrates his family’s experiences in Bury Park and some of the life of the Pakistani community. He highlights the cultural and community aspects as observed through his father’s contact with the Pakistani population and work at the Vauxhall car plant. Although the author is somewhat detached from the traditional Pakistani way of life, the publication illustrates the strong sense of communal fraternity that existed in the city and the reliance placed on better educated individuals to support other Pakistani migrants adapting to life in Britain.

It is a centuries-old tale of the migrant and of dislocation from home, to seek one’s fortune outside the place of birth. Dispersal from the homeland to another land is where the modern diaspora emerges. The early settlers came not en masse but in stages, the men usually being the first wave of workers to arrive, forming their own distinct brethren and societies that replicated the allegiances and honour systems of back home and shared experiences through collective living. This growing cultural group gave much inspiration to individual enterprise in a way similar to any dispersed migrant society miles away from their natural base, through the creation of outlets supplying cultural foods, religiously sanctioned meat and the much-needed spices to maintain an Eastern diet. This pattern emerged throughout Britain where Pakistani groups settled and began to form a strong nucleus of an existence that paralleled the life of districts of Pakistan. These were not the elite and educated city dwellers of their parent country, but labourers from rural societies, as discussed by Kabbani (1987) in her work on transnational populations of the Orient.

As a result of this postwar demographic change, Luton has a diverse ethnic mix, with a significant population of Asian descent, mainly Pakistani (9.8% of the population, 17,012), Bangladeshi (4.3%), and Indian (4.2%). The 2005 Office of National Statistics figures revealed the town had a total white population of 68% (of which white British amounted to 61.3%), with an Asian population of 19.3% (Luton Borough Council, 2006). The largest minority religious group was Muslim at 14.3% with smaller Hindu (2.7%), Sikh (0.8%) and other religious groups. Regionally, within the East of England the Pakistani population is comparatively small at 38,790, compared to the South-East (58,520). In updated figures there is a decline in the white population (71.9% to 65.4%), while there is an increase in the Pakistani population (18.3% to 20.6%) (Luton Borough Council, 2011b). At the time of writing, the official 2011 census data brings the Asian population in Luton to nearly 19%, of which the Pakistani group make up the vast majority of that population (ONS, 2014). More recent projections sourced from the local authority indicate a significant increase from the existing 24,200 to 34,500 by 2030, indicating an increase of 43% (Luton Borough Council, 2012). This emphasises both the youthful nature of the population and the high fertility rates within the Pakistani and Bangladeshi sub-populations. Table 3.3 illustrates the breakdown by age.

Table 3.3 Pakistani population of Luton by age from 2010 to 2030

Ethnicity/age range	*2010*	*2020*	*2030*
Pakistani 0-4 years	*3,600*	*3,050*	*3,800*
Pakistani 5-15years	5,900	7,500	6,600
Pakistani 16-64 years	13,650	17,150	21,950

Source: Luton Borough Council, 2012a.

Historically, the borough saw the rise of the migrant population in the 1950s and 1960s, with the Pakistani community, making it one of the first minor cities in which Pakistanis made their home. Compared with the northern towns and cities, Luton offered a different attraction, being not far from London and home to a major industrial base. The car manufacturing industry, like the industrial cities in the North, was perhaps a key factor in enticing the early immigrant workers from the Indian sub-continent. It was a venue of transitory settlement purely for monetary wealth with no intention of a longer commitment at that time. Again, as in many of the large cities of the time, the largest Pakistani network to settle in Luton is predominantly from the Punjab region of Pakistan, as well as from Azad Kashmir, from outlying villages and from the city of Mirpur.

Economic and social disadvantage is well recorded within the district, with official figures highlighting that under half of all Pakistani adults in Luton have qualification (OCSI Survey, 2007), and a lack of access to employment, currently standing at 67%, well below the 78% figure for the region as a whole. Additionally, the annual population and Labour Force Survey (ONS, 2008) reveals a deteriorating picture since 2002. The minority ethnic population is considered to be over-represented among job seeker allowance (JSA) claimants, at 47.2%, nearly half of the claimants, within the East of England, whilst it makes up less than a third of Luton's population (OCSI, 2007). Significantly, two wards with a majority representation of Pakistanis are emphasised as having considerably higher levels of unemployment (see table below). Dallow has a higher level of long-term unemployed than any other part of Luton (Luton Borough Council, 2012a). The youth unemployment rate is also of concern.

Within the working population of 16–74 years of age, 63% are employed; this figure includes students, the self-employed and those who are in part-time employment, 11% are retired, 8% look after the family or take care of the home and 7% are unemployed, according to the Office of National Statistics (2012). The landscape has changed from one dominated by engineering and manufacturing to one dominated by the service sector, as evident in the Pakistani community in a change from 24-hour working in car plants making Luton vans, to 24-hour working within the taxi ranks.

This is compounded by poor figures for achievement, indicated with attainment figures for Pakistanis being below the national average (measured at 5 GCSE's or more at grade C or above) and lower than any other local authority area within the regional boundaries (Luton Borough Council, 2011a). Given the size of the Pakistani community, there is also an adverse impact on healthcare, with Pakistanis considered to experience much worse health than other communities, including specific ailments such as diabetes, cardio vascular disease, and low uptake of screening for cancers (Luton Borough Council, 2011a). These echo national figures referred to in a later chapter.

It is self-evident that the group that is the subject of this study is growing within the borough and will continue to do so, based on forecast projections. In common with other cities with large minority groupings and in particular, where peoples of Pakistani origin have made their home, they will form a strong and sizeable force of that local society. Furthermore, the social element in respect to a growing youth and ageing Pakistani section of the population will require addressing either through employment or through social support and access to existing public services.

As referred to earlier, the principal researcher, through family contacts, was able to harness interviewees to take part in the discussions throughout the data-collection and analysis processes, so vital to the success of this work.

This existing family network in the city of Luton was useful in ensuring that a wider spread of individuals were accessed as part of the process of assessment and recruitment of respondents for inclusion in the investigation. It gave further credibility to the research, as the facilitators had vouched for the authenticity of the work as well as satisfying any concerns that the project involved interloping or false intentions.

There were, of course, safeguards in respect to conflicts of interest, such as knowing some of the participants and their families. These were dealt with by ensuring a strict level of confidentiality for the group and in particular for the individual discussions, and for the comments made in the fieldwork. This, the researcher believed, outweighed any potential barriers. These issues were reflected in both sites in this work.

3.9 The Oxford location

In contrast to Luton, Oxford is a city 60 miles west of London with a population of just under 165,000, with 151,000 living within the district boundary, although 2009 figures show a drop in this size to 149,300 (Oxford City Council, 2008). Black and minority ethnic communities make up 19.6% of the total population with Asians being the largest group within that section. Further breakdowns indicate that Pakistani residents account for 2.4% (3,600) of this small diverse ethnic mix. There is a higher number within the 0-15 age range (3.8%) than in the 16-64 band (2.4%) emphasising the further development of the future Pakistani diaspora. There has been an increase in this specific population over time resulting in it being the largest within the black and minority ethnic data set for Oxford (Oxfordshire Data Observatory, 2010). This is clearly evident in the 2011 census, which indicates the growth of the black and minority ethnic population to 22%, the largest group being Pakistani at 4,825 people accounting for nearly 5% of the population in the city, representing an increase in size (Oxford City Council, 2013). However, there are no breakdowns for diversity within diversity in terms of Punjabi and Pukhtoon groups.

This small Pakistani resident population is contained within the wider Oxford city boundaries, rather than, as in many other conurbations, within a specific geographical entity often characterised by the highest indices of multiple deprivation. In Oxford, unlike Luton, although there are pockets of deprivation (Oxfordshire Director of Public Health, 2013) largely contained within a number of housing estates on the outskirts of the city, they are far removed from the internationally renowned colleges and visiting tourists. Oxford is not an inner city locality in the same sense as some boroughs of London or northern cities.

In respect to the specific community of interest, the Pukhtoon is a minority within a minority, and may be referred to with the definition of Garner and Bhattacharyya (2011), in their assessment of smaller minorities within a range of cities, as a less segregated ethnic group that reflects the term of 'best distribution' (i.e. concentrated in less deprived areas, as a whole (ibid., p.14).

They fit within that mould of dispersal given their relatively low numbers and are resident in many parts of the city, with a main presence in the area known as Cowley This may have some historical significance given its proximity to the car factory (now BMW), a workplace for many newly arrived migrants.

Thus, the Cowley Road and surrounding areas are symbolic of the wider diversity of Oxford reflected also in part through its international student numbers and in part to the plethora of minority and mainstream businesses, mosques, churches and other premises belonging to those of a mosaic of multiculturalism. There is also a presence within housing estates such as Blackbird Leys and Rose Hill, more so in the latter than the former. Statistically, the low numbers of Pakistanis and the sub-category Pukhtoons make detailed analysis of this group difficult. What information there is reflects the wider economic and social inequalities that these minorities are commonly associated with in the national picture. This is also evident within the health domain and indicates the perpetuation of the inverse care law where ‘the availability of good medical care tends to vary inversely with the need for it in the population served’. (Hart, 1971, p.405; Oxford City Council, 2011; Oxfordshire Director of Public Health, 2013; Ahmed, 2006).

Economic activity is based on the traditional pattern of self-employed trading in the retail and grocery sector, dominated by fast-food outlets and halal meat shops. There is limited employment within the public sector of health and academia that is significant in the city. The most favoured, flexible and lucrative vocation remains chauffeuring or taxi driving. In Oxford there is Pukhtoon entrepreneurial dominance in this area, signified by the growth and success of the Pukhtoon-owned Royal Cars private hire business.

As a society, again as in the Pakistani communities in Luton, there is a transnational connection to Azad Kashmir and the wider Punjab, although this is not as dominant and all-consuming as in many other conurbations. The unassuming Pukhtoon has been a feature of this migration from the North-West areas of Pakistan bordering Afghanistan, home to a range of tribal agencies and peoples with a heritage of proud Islamic tradition and independence, as indicated by the name change from the North West Province to Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.

The modern Khyber Pakhtunkhwa is spread over 74,521 sq km that conveys a contour of immense changes in the landscape. It has a population of over 22 million people, from ethnically diverse backgrounds. (There is an overlap with bordering regions of Afghanistan with ethnic peoples that relate genetically, politically and socially). Khyber Pakhtunkhwa comprises of three major administrative parts. The first, with the great majority of the people, are ‘settled areas’, are mainly city areas which are traditional yet cosmopolitan in outlook, although religious orthodoxy prevails, particularly in the smaller towns and villages. The second part, the PATA (Provincially Administered Tribal Areas) has a population of 831,000. It includes the state of Amb, now submerged in the Tarbela Dam reservoir. (A somewhat similar predicament was faced by those living within Azad Kashmir in relation to the building and extension of the

Mangla Dam.) The social and emotional upheaval caused by the development of the dam was reflected in Azad Kashmir with the building and extension of the Mangla Dam there. The displacement in these two regions of Pakistan induced many local residents to consider a working life in Britain, so that areas of the Punjab and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa became a source of unskilled labour for British manufacturing industry.

The third part, the FATA (Federally Administered Tribal Areas), is spread over 27,220 sq km with a citizenry of 3,764,000. It comprises seven tribal agencies and six frontier regions. These areas are often seen to be a law unto themselves and in recent years have been subject to external insurrection by the Taliban and other extremist elements fighting not only the West but the Pakistani army. These three areas of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa signify the complex mosaic of cultural, political and social hierarchies that exist within this region.

Oxford was not subject to mass immigration from the sub-continent in the early years as were northern cities and London. Instead, a handful of families arrived to make the city their home as recounted by Shaw (1994). However, at a micro level that did mirror the community hierarchies amongst newly arrived migrants seen in the larger cities. There was one who spoke English and interpreted for others and offered them advice and voluntary form-filling, reflected by Manzoor (2007) in his autobiography. These individuals were essential anchors for these emerging communities in the Western world.

Another and more recent addition to the Pukhtoon population has been the arrival of families moving from the North of England to the South. As mentioned previously, the primary immigration to early hubs such as Bradford, Burnley and Oldham soon translated into a secondary internal migration to cities that were seen to be less economically disadvantaged or less subject to what was perceived, as a result of the impact of drugs and crime, as the declining moral standards of these initial anchors,. The existing and small embryonic kin roots were now being exploited by relatives who felt displaced by distance and a lack of attachment to their sense of family, extended or otherwise. These Pukhtoon citizens were seeking not only better conditions for their children and for themselves but also a sense of social and economic harmony, an ironic reflection of the rationale for the Pukhtoon pioneers. In Oxford their numbers, as stated, are not officially recorded. For the purposes of this investigation, the researcher has been able to estimate that nearly 50% of the Pukhtoon community living in Oxford have experienced this shift from what has been recorded officially as the economically declining North to the more prosperous South (Giles and Neville, 2013).

Additionally, as Pukhtoon is not considered a separate category within the census classifications nor in local population projections, nor as a sub-set within the official 'Asian' classification, the researcher had to conduct alternative fieldwork to determine the size of this group. As part of the Pukhtoon audit, a numerical census was conducted that highlighted over 500 people of Pukhtoon heritage, using a self-defining term and assessed numbers through the existing networks, which enumerated the number of families present in Oxford and then each family member, to support this research. This was possible because of the close social network of the Pukhtoon community and the inter-relationships that extend to financial, personal and moral support of one another, reinforced by the Pukhtoon language, or Pukhto, religion and clan loyalty.

There are of course the more recent arrivals of refugees from Afghanistan, fleeing their conflict-ridden homeland, who may add to this community, but in all consideration, they would exist as a separate entity, not as part of the Pakistani diaspora, having no familial ties and only connected through a common lexicon and shared ancestry, in all but name. Their presence may increase the demography of this particular group but not by any significant amount, and for that reason were ruled out from this research study.

The relationship of the Pukhtoon group to the wider Pakistani and Muslim fraternity does not preclude it from the issues that enforce a sense of exclusion and inequity within the wider public arena that was reflected in Luton. Given the relatively small numbers, there is a danger of a lack of representation of their distinct needs within the public sphere, which can perpetuate the myth of the Other. As will be illustrated in a later chapter, the Pukhtoon is viewed unfavourably by many of the Punjabi population, which reinforces a prejudiced and cultural stereotype based on regional affiliations ingrained within the larger and more dominant Punjabi society. It is similar to how some of the English view the Irish, if not the Scottish or Welsh citizen.

There is a real sense of exclusion within exclusion for the Pukhtoon group, often viewed as an assimilated and integrated member of the wider Pakistani body politic and diaspora alike. These issues became more evident during the research and reflect the prevailing discourse within larger discussions related to belonging and attachment of individual or group identity.

Table 3.4 Pakistani population of Oxford and percentage of total population

2001 census	2,625	1.8%
2006 estimates	3,000	2.0%
2011 census	4,825	3.5%

Source Oxford City Council (2006, 2013)

Figure 3.1 Proportion of people with Pakistani ethnicity, Oxford 2001


Pakistani
Proportion of population
🟨 0.0% - 1.3%
🟩 1.4% - 4.2%
🟦 4.3% - 8.9%
■ 9.0% - 20.2%
WOLVERCOTE
Port Meadow
SUMMERTOWN
A40 Northern Bypass
Marston Ferry Road
A34 Western Bypass
BARTON
SANDHILLS
MARSTON
HEADINGTON
RISINGHURST
JERICHO
City Centre
A420
Botley Road
High Street
QUARRY
South Park
OSNEY
BOTLEY
A34 Southern Bypass
COWLEY
ROSE HILL
BLACKBIRD LEYS
LITTLEMORE
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Oxford City Council. Licence No. 100019348.
Data source: 2001 Census, Office for National Statistics

Source: Oxford City Council (2013)

A most useful mitigating factor was the presence of the lead researcher within the community of Oxford. This allowed existing relationships and networks with the resident Pukhtoon population to be exploited and contacts created with the younger Pukhtoon generation, facilitated by local elders. Given the small nature of the total Pukhtoon community in Oxford, this was useful as otherwise it would have been immensely difficult for the principal researcher to act independently and could have jeopardised the research and its wider aims.

Additionally, the younger members of the Pukhtoon community were cautious of not only an outsider interloping within their networks but wary also of anyone seeking responses to questions of media consumption and identity. As was elaborated upon within the analysis, there was much mistrust created by specific government initiatives that responded to Islamic extremism, which had an adverse impact on the perceptions of many young Muslim men.

3.10 Summary

It was clear that, within the methodological framework, grounded theory was the most appropriate vehicle to pursue this enquiry. It offered the best use of the data to refine the key questions, via the focus groups and one-to-one interviews, with the respondents who are the subject of this investigation. By developing a hypothesis from the data, the researcher has ensured a robustness of the fieldwork and validity of the views of the interviewees, who shaped and reshaped the final conclusions.

There is always concern if measures adopted do not come to fruition. However, a pragmatic approach was embraced without being over-cautious or so pessimistic as to place a cloud over the whole data-collection technique. This would have been unfortunate and counter-productive to achieving the key objectives of this academic exploration. Such problems did not arise, and the fieldwork was rewarding in itself. Grounded theory therefore responded directly to the concerns of the cohort group members as well as providing a coherent framework formed from the analysis.

The addition of ethnography has complimented this approach, taking into consideration its merits, value and concerns in working with vulnerable groups. Accordingly, the ethical dimensions have also been addressed within these pages and the approach taken has proven to be effective in maintaining the confidence and reliability of cohort members to remain involved, through honest and open articulation of the key questions of the research. Furthermore, it proved to be an empowering process for many and has offered much more insight into their developing and future evolution of identity in respect to media consumption. Such outcomes have reinforced the methodological approach as a valuable and well thought-out process that mitigated any potential risks and responded to ethical considerations.

With respect to the two locations, they offered great scope in attracting the right respondents based on their specific cultural background as members of the Pakistani diaspora. The sites, although economically and socially different, contained the relevant community make-up and had a similarity in terms of chronology of migration and settlement. Both places were easily accessible and saved time, cost of travelling, and other additional expenses. The existing contacts supported greater community facilitation and avoided unnecessary obstacles that were not within the researcher’s control, such as the prevailing social and political environment. They offered the most realistic and pragmatic options for collecting data as robustly and accurately as possible, without much hindrance and delay. It needs to be stressed that the areas selected, if not the segment of the communities themselves, were novel and provided direct comparisons within the analysis phase of this research. It is inevitable that some correlations were made; however, it was also evident that differences emerged from these two groups, providing an important sample upon which to build up a relevant and probable hypothesis that has some merit.

Central to that hypothesis were the expressions and voices of the cohort members provided throughout this study. The researcher saw the nurturing impact of the respondents’ involvement in the data collection phase. Their attitude evolved from initial apprehension about taking part, due to concerns of media and societal depictions and assumptions about them as citizens, to a better understanding of reasserting themselves. As they progressed, they understood more the role of the media and relationships with the wider global economic, social and political landscapes. They began to question and interrogate not only the media they consumed but also themselves, in how it impacted on who and what they were and where they lived. It raised a consciousness amongst them that many previously felt did not exist or about which they had been in denial or in a form of deep sleep. They began to realise that their use of new and social media was indeed a useful and practical approach to asserting their own sense of hybrid identity – British Muslim Pakistan, British Muslim Pukhtoon – or other amalgamation they felt defined them as individuals but within a collective. In the cohort groups, they became aware that they were not alone in these thoughts of alienation and insecurity. Through shared experiences, the gained strength to promote and explore their identity via the World Wide Web and make links with similar diasporas in other parts of the world. This was a start from moving away from their perceptions of victimhood to one of active citizen in a globalised new media, technologically advanced and connected world. In other words, to a perception of themselves as the smartphone generation of the diaspora. Rather than take information from the media for granted, they would question, interrogate and source additional facts, before they consider the reality of what they consume; from predominantly Anglo-Saxon media. This may be essential in how they consume media and relate it to their evolving identities in the future.

To conclude this methodology section, the researcher considered the key goals necessary to ensure a robust and systematic process for analysis that could receive a positive evaluation. By selecting the relevant research design and instruments for examination and determination, this aspiration was achieved in the broadest sense and had some utility of purpose.

Chapter 4

The impact of Islamophobia

The role Islamaphobia has played within this discourse is an important feature of the analysis, both of the literature and the data gathered from the cohort groups. It is a central thread as it relates to the sample diaspora through the data collection and analysis of statements. It is these powerful contributions that have singly and collectively formed strong perceptions of discrimination towards the Pakistani British-born Muslim that is explored further here.

A number of key elements form this sense of anti-Muslim feeling that proliferates into wider animosity and negative judgement of this minority, from many sections of the majority indigenous-origin community. These lines of expression relate strongly to a recurring theme in this thesis, that of having a sense of security and belonging. It reinforces and reflects the literature on transnational and hybrid identity of the transmigrant, referred to by Engbersen (2007). These strong feelings of the diaspora also fit into the paradigm of Orientalism stated by Said (1978) and, within that, the emphasis of adverse media representation of the Muslim as the ‘Other’, echoed by Poole (2002; Poole and Richardson, 2006) in her research of the British media’s articulation of the Muslim in Britain. This topic is addressed further later in this chapter.

What the analysis reveals is that within many of the discussions with cohort members in private and within the space of this research, there is a sense of continued anxiety over their presence in Britain. This has been translated into what the researcher can only describe as the returning diaspora. Some respondents expressed the wish, in the one-to-one interviews and focus groups, to buy property, acquire land or other assets, or modernise existing residences built by their parents, in Pakistan. In addition, some spoke of taking up dual citizenship. What is articulated by some of the respondents, as reported in this chapter, signifies the insecurity and anxiety of current British Muslim life. This sentiment is particularly present among the male respondents, while for many females Britain remains as home and the most important place for raising their children, providing them with a good education and ensuring a better future for their families. There is also, as will be explained later, a class difference in how belonging is reflected by the diaspora. Those who feel they have been denied vocational ambition in Britain are the keenest to seek an alternative life in Pakistan. This appears, for the researcher, to be an instant response to a complex problem, a passive affirmation of the discrimination they face without proactively challenging perceived inequalities and injustices.

The focus of this chapter therefore is to undertake a causative analysis focus on employment and relations with the police as two examples of where the diaspora feel strongly that Islamophobia has had an impact and fed into a wider sense insecurity. The former relates to the lack of opportunity, with subjective analysis from indigenous-origin work colleagues in mainstream employment. Even the alternative of self-employment does not safeguard individuals from anti-Muslim sentiment, as will be illustrated through a specific trade (taxi driving) favoured by male respondents in this study.

Relationships with the police also create immense feelings and displeasure that for many reinforce their depiction of the ‘Other’ in their own country through the abuse of power and specific legislation. However, both employment and relations with police fit within the wider context of media representations that relate to the fear of Islam, its militancy and its followers, corresponding to the ‘war on terror’, the continual subtext that impacts on this diaspora. It is evidenced in what is referred to in this chapter as the perception by the majority population of an ‘acceptance of extremism’. It creates further animosity towards them because they – the diaspora – are not seen as speaking out against ‘Islamic militancy’ and are therefore viewed by non-Muslims as potential traitors in their midst.

This is continually emphasised, in the view of the diaspora, as the increasing visualisation of British Muslims, regardless of their ethnic disposition, as one homogenous grouping opposed to the values of Western society, representing a potential internal threat to the security of the nation. This, in turn, perpetuates the discrimination and Islamophobia felt by the respondents that exacerbates their sense of a lack of territorial security and personal safety as citizens.

At the outset, the researcher believes it useful and important to define the term Islamophobia before considering the issue of wider discrimination and safeguards within the British legal context.

The Runnymede Trust has since 1968 promoted a sense of civic friendship and shared identity, and is one of the most prominent and well respected independent bodies working on issues of race. Its Commission on Islamophobia was at the vanguard of researching and defining the idea of anti-Muslim feeling in Britain, if not the West as a whole. A consultation paper released in 1996 outlined some of the key concerns and concepts related to the strong "feelings of prejudice and discrimination felt by Muslims in everyday life" (Runnymede Trust, 1997, p.2). The initial announcement and public discussions were in themselves much of a focus for the media. The Commission trained a spotlight onto an element of discrimination that was moving away from racial prejudice to the beginnings and acknowledgment of cultural racism, whereby religion and culture (rather than origin or colour) constituted the most important signifiers of racialisation as recorded by Asad (1990), quoted by Silverman and Yuval-Davis (1999, p.8).

The Runnymede Trust report produced a year later articulated wider issues and concerns of Muslims related to their religious and cultural identity, which, the majority of their fellow British citizens saw as a threat to their own liberal value base. Although not a publicly funded inquiry, such as MacPherson (Home Office, 1999), which defined institutional racism, the Runnymede report did carry the gravitas of a reputable assessment, analysis and recommendation by the body conducting the investigation. Like Macpherson, therefore, it allowed a specific minority community to have validated specific perceptions and feelings of animosity against them, and to have them recognised as part of the discrimination and bigotry they encountered in everyday British society. Such findings have echoes in Lea's (2000) analysis of the impact of indirect discrimination that used Macpherson's definition of institutional racism as a basis of enquiry.

Since then, Islamophobia has been widely recognised. It has also been railed against and reviled as a catch-all challenge to liberal thought and free speech (Poole, 2002). The term has global reach and implications, as evident from the work on Islamophobia in America by Gottschalk and Greenberg (2008), for instance, within the media and public domain. They refer to the concept as 'social anxiety towards Islam and Muslim cultures that is largely unexamined by, yet deeply ingrained in, Americans' (p.5). Furthermore, within the wider body of psychological conditions that arise from terrible and damaging experiences, Islamophobia differs in that, 'this phobia results for most, from distant social experiences that mainstream American [and other] culture has perpetuated in popular memory, which are in turn buttressed by a similar understanding of current events' (ibid., p.5). This sense of, what can only be described as mainstream cognitive dissonance has therefore filtered into daily interactions between Muslims and non-Muslims that, as stated above, include media representation, visualisation, framing and suspicion of the outsider through stereotyping and prejudices against the Orient.

The importance of these definitions is that the concept of Islamophobia is an international phenomenon that has grown rapidly within current international political discourse, and that it has implications for people of transnational identities. The Pakistani diaspora is one such group and therefore the wider global ramifications and repercussions of Islamophobia are present in the British context.

The strong sense of cultural racism that seems to be ever present in society is leading to a much deeper feeling of separation, alienation and of discomfort, that are evidenced by the data and analysis of the sample of the diaspora in this study. This reflects the literature of Poole (2002), Ramadan (2006), Modood (2010), and Samad (2013). It relates to a strong sense of racialisation and cultural demonisation that is often evident of racial minorities, as referred in the literature by hooks (1995) and Dabashi (2008).

Current discourses on the clash of civilisations, based on cultural and religious fault lines and superiority, are also entrenched in historical depictions of the ‘Other’ and, in particular in the West, of what is seen as the backward and inferior Muslim. This is evident in, for example, the writings of Matthews (1926), who refers, much earlier, to a clash of civilisations of the inferior Arab and the superior Western traveller. It is these legacies of racialisation that continue within new means of communication, such as global media, that are intricately linked to power and capital. This is reflected upon by the respondents as present in the worldwide quest for mineral resources. In an international sense, it reflects Sardar’s (1999) description of neo-Orientalism at play against specific non-compliant nations, supported by mass media as a vehicle to promulgate and visually enhance this message. At a more local level, it then translates into what Al-Azm (1981) has referred to as ‘ideological superstructures with an apparatus of complicated assumptions’ (p.5) that feed into daily anti-Muslim feelings in the mass of the population that then perpetuate what is reflected by Ramadan (2006) as Islamic racism.

In analysing the research data, these issues are significant. Even though the two cities in this study retain separate characteristics, the participants echo similar sentiments about the complexity and dichotomy of their lives in an often hostile landscape.

For instance, in Luton, robust inner city dynamics have created a strong right-wing political backlash personified by the creation and emergence in that city of the English Defence League (EDL). The EDL is openly Islamophobic, seeking to counter what it views as the Islamisation of British cities (Az & Mo Productions, 2012). This has had a profound impact on the cohort groups within Luton and caused much unease within the Muslim community that will be discussed later. Oxford, on the other hand, does not have this overtly anti-Muslim atmosphere, but retains a less volatile political temperament familiar to its much smaller but widely diverse Muslim population. However, cohort group members shared similar experiences bonded by culture and transnational identity as a consequence of their daily perceptions of anti-Muslim sentiment, translated into much wider discrimination, resulting in a need for constant assessment and reassessment of their status in Britain. This experience reflects what Poole has described as the ‘race reporting and religious representation’ (2002, p.28) that is so damaging to the diaspora. It is articulated in this comment made in the focus group discussions that took place on this issue:

> ‘Someone will talk about Islam or say something and it might be racist, then they try to defend it by saying, “Sorry mate I’m not English too”, to justify their comments. Then they will start to make stupid amends by saying “But you speak proper English and do not wear a turban like the Taliban”. You end up getting vexed [angry].’
>
> young Pakistani male, Luton.

In addition there was increasing alarm among the sample diaspora at the grouping of the diverse range of Muslims with differing nationalities and spiritual beliefs as one homogenous global brand. The media has contributed to this practice of discrimination, as reflected by Sardar (2006) and Poole (ibid., p.21), as the continual focus on communities viewed as challenging, which then engenders negative views and stereotyping that, in turn, regularise attitudes of the majority against the minority. This was not been lost on the diaspora contributing to this study as commented upon below:

> ‘Inside it makes me feel that, especially as Muslims, I don’t think the media understands the religion if you are a Muslim. Islam, the way we are portrayed in the media is completely wrong, especially on the BBC. I think the way they pick and choose their words is very bad, especially from the current politicians. I think instead of bringing people together in this country it’s causing more divides. I can’t remember this happening ten years ago. This I would say is more or less in the last eight years, before that no problems. That is not just my feeling, that is the feeling with quite a few Muslims, whether they be Pakistani, Somalis, Chinese, African, they all feel very similar, in that we are marginalised and in a way labelled.’
>
> Pukhtoon male, Oxford

> ‘You know the media is being biased, why? You’re watching, you don’t actually click on they’re doing it, do you understand? It’s so powerful the way they put the message across, you will be, like, or alright, so this is happening, alright, and then you will go somewhere else and someone else will be saying something different, then you start thinking, hold on, one news source is saying something so you start looking into it, then you finally realise there are four news sources saying the same thing and there is one on one side like with BBC and Sky and they’re on one side saying something different. You realise they are being biased. That is how powerful the media is, even we’re saying they’re biased, sometimes we be watching we won’t be realise they be biased. It’s the way the media is to us, to be honest.’
>
> Punjabi male, Luton

> ‘Well, everyone seems to think with the media, even if it’s not right. They tend to send a signal out there, yeah. It’s Muslims who are like this, and then you are looking at yourself as one individual person, but they are looking at you as one community, as Muslims, all Muslims are terrorists according to them.’
>
> Pukhtoon male, Oxford

In such circumstances, many of those interviewed felt their membership of mainstream society was continually eroded by subjective framing, based on their religious and cultural identity, rather than their status as British citizens. For many, a strong correlation was made between what was viewed in the media and what was reflected back at them through work and in daily interactions. This was summed up in this comment typical of the view held by many of the respondents interviewed:

> ‘Most of the racists and anti-Muslims, they believe everything they see or read, I mean they don’t even question whether it is true or not.’
>
> Punjabi female, Luton.

There was a consensus amongst the interviewees in both sites and across genders, about what was perceived as the real ignorance of many of the indigenous-origin communities concerning Islam. Many participants concluded, after much debate, that this was typical of many populations in Europe whose interpretations of Islam were viewed through the mass media. The daily coverage provided in news channels and newspapers was not favourable towards Islam as a whole or for Muslim communities in Western countries. This was despite the existence of legal measures that tackle elements of discrimination, making it unlawful.

4.1 Discrimination and legislation

It is important, therefore, to review more closely how the present legal frameworks relate to this diaspora's perceptions and, for example, to the wider issues of tackling discrimination within employment. This also relates to the issue of minority rights as set out by Kymlicka (1995) and in chapters 1 and 2 above, in what the researcher has described as neo-societal culture and the importance of legal safeguards for minority communities**.**

Discrimination is defined by the United Nations as less favourable treatment of persons (UN, 2001). This treatment can limit the rights of an individual or groups to opportunities, often due to attributed rather than actual characteristics. The UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs (2001) recognises that discrimination develops when groups of people encounter strangers, or rather it involves being presented as the 'Other'.

The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union adopted in 2000 stipulates that any discrimination based on grounds such as sex, race, colour, ethnic or social origin, genetic features, language, religion or belief, political or any other opinion, membership of a national minority, property, birth, disability, age or sexual orientation, shall be prohibited (EU, 2000, article 21).

In Britain, discrimination, direct and indirect terms, is defined within the Equality

Act 2010 (HMSO, 2010) as occurring where an individual is treated less favourably, either overtly or in subtle forms that often exist through custom and practice. These may be based on traditions that include attending the pub after work or buying gifts at Christmas, for instance.

Early race legislation was placed on the statute book as a response to racial discrimination against black and minority ethnic immigrants in housing and services. Thirty years later, the murder of a black teenager, Stephen Lawrence, in London led to an amendment to the Race Relations Act, following a landmark public inquiry (Home Office, 1999) that defined institutional racism as a barrier to advancement and access to employment and equal treatment in public services. The Race Relations (Amendment) Act (2000) was a central piece of primary legislation that enshrined a level of minority rights in public service provision. It gave the then Commission for Racial Equality (CRE) strong powers of investigation and to make a statutory order to take action to tackle racial discrimination. The creation of the Equality and Human Rights Commission (EHRC), followed by the Equality Act of 2010, dissolved the CRE and its powers into a new single equality regulatory body.

Although this section is not a detailed critique of the changes in equality legislation or the reconstitution of bodies enforcing the Acts, many have criticised the lack of performance of the EHRC in addressing race equality in practice and principle (Hepple, 2010). There is a belief, as outlined by Hepple (2010), that there has been constant political undermining of that body, which has led to a sustained deterioration in confidence in it among the communities themselves. This is signified in the diaspora by their lack of confidence in legal redress for their experiences and perceptions of discrimination. Most importantly, concerns relate to how cultural racism, most significantly Islamophobia can be challenged.

However, recent attempts to amend legislation to reflect hostility to Islam and Muslims have been opposed, for instance the blasphemy legislation or tackling anti-Muslim hatred. For many, such changes are anathema to British liberal values, as is argued by some in the arts and entertainment community led by the comedian, Rowan Atkinson in 2004 (BBC News, 2004b), reinforced by the media (Poole, 2002). Current discrimination legislation would seem not to protect Muslims from Islamophobia, placing them at a risk of anti-Muslim sentiments from the media and press generally. The current equality legislation, including the public duties on religion, would seem to address this anomaly in that the Equality Act (2010) has religion as a protected characteristic and within that covers Islam and a requirement not to discriminate against Muslims. However, the Act only refers to the provision of goods and services, not speech or expression. As one respondent put it:

> ‘We can have laws to protect other religions but for Muslims it becomes about freedom of speech, this is so hypocritical.’
>
> Punjabi male, Luton

These laws do not fulfil a need to quell wider issues of anti-Muslim sentiments expressed specifically within the realm of mass media. Even with the Leveson Inquiry (2012) challenging media intrusion, there is little emphasis placed on Muslim concerns. These issues would seem only to exacerbate wider elements of inequality that have an adverse impact on the Pakistani diaspora itself, leading to visible forms of prejudice as discussed below.

4.2 Employment discrimination

Inevitably, these feelings of the participants in the research fed into a wider and deep-rooted anxiety that many felt manifested itself through extended forms of discrimination. The role this played in employment was seen by many as a worrying trend that was becoming much sharper given the economic downturn. It was perceived in a lack of opportunities for the Pakistani male that also signified a higher rate of unemployment within this group than for their indigenous-origin and some other ethnic counterparts. This is recorded by official Cabinet Office figures in 2010 and by analysis conducted by Simpson et al. (2006). Inevitably, as Poole (2002) has argued, this leads to further exclusion from society and deeper disempowerment, which the researcher would argue is echoed in the diaspora, through compounded exclusion and discrimination. The danger is that these perceptions become self-fulfilling prophecies that limit the ability to move beyond the exclusions and are manifest in an internalised anxiety that then further exacerbates individual concerns and lack of esteem.

Most recent evidence reinforces this concern (All Party Parliamentary Group on Race and Community, 2012). In particular, this emphasised discrimination against Muslim women seeking employment. Black, Pakistani and Bangladeshi-heritage women faced higher levels of discrimination than their male counterparts. In some examples, Muslim women even changed their appearance in order to conform and obtain employment, and one witness changed her Muslim-sounding name to the same end. In the present study, men too have provided similar biographies, many believing that their Islamic name associates them with images of terrorism and negative stereotyping of Muslims in the wider social and political arena. Given the relatively high Pakistani presence in the young generation emphasised in the statistical demography of Britain, this is alarming for the future.

In the cohort groups, there was a powerful range of contributions made on this subject that again signified concern about future employability. The discussions in the research also led many participants to reflect on the experiences of their parents on arrival into Britain and the racism they often spoke of encountering in society.

> ‘My dad always told me about incidents where they were not respected at work and white managers in the mills spoke to them in a racist way like “curry man” or something else rude, when they could not pronounce their names.’
>
> Punjabi male, Luton

For numerous members of the diaspora of working age, employment is an important daily interaction between individuals in society. Apart from providing monetary value, it can also give mental stimulation and create a sense of fulfilment within a daily structure that promotes individual wellbeing and wider economic inclusion. This has been highlighted within national strategic thinking, as emphasised in the work of Lord Layard (2013) assessing the economic cost of unemployment weighed against prevalence of depression and anxiety. It provides much credible evidence concerning the relationship between good mental health and work.

Although there is not much significant unemployment data available for specific ethnic groups, overall data for black and minority ethnic unemployment is recorded at 18.2%, higher than the national average for Caucasians (Perton, 2012). Discrimination in relation to employment has an impact on an individual’s health and wellbeing. It could be argued, therefore, given the epidemiology of mental health issues, that the diaspora would have a higher incidence of poor mental health. This is significantly reflected within Patel and Heginbotham (2007) amongst others.

For the respondents, in their personal assessments and testimonials about employment, there was a clear and continual association between consumption of the media and how they perceived they were viewed in the external world. This manifested itself in what can only be described as internalised anxiety, usually invisible to the public eye but that became visible in this study and these exchanges as one recorded here:

> ‘It gets you down. You fill in so many applications and don’t even get one interview. I mean it really stresses you out when you think it’s because of your name.’
>
> Pukhtoon male, Oxford

The participants revealed practice that was discriminatory even within relevant legislation, which is intended to provide equality of opportunity for all. Yet in this case, the individual’s Muslim characteristic and persona were subjected to specific subjective examination, explored as part of these formal and objective processes. Most participants recounting their experiences in this study concluded that this situation arose because of media depictions of Muslims. Irrelevant connections were made with the name of the Prophet, on occasions much covered in the press, as exemplified in the Danish cartoon incident in 2005. This direct correlation made has been supported in the work of Gottschalk and Greenberg (2008) in linking Islamophobia and the role of the media in negative representations during this specific episode. It is also reflected within the work of Downing and Husband (2005) signifying the representation of the ‘Other’ within racial framing that also reinforces negative realities of Muslims in wider society.

It is important to recognise that having a working career was vital to the diaspora, as became evident within the dialogues in this section. Many of the respondents, around 60%, felt that fitting into wider society and achieving acceptance would come through the workplace with interactions between them and the indigenous--origin communities, even though this meant encountering animosity towards them from some fellow workers. This mirrors recent work by Nandi and Platt (2013) on Muslim identity in Britain that outlines how Muslims are perceived negatively by fellow employees. The issue was seen by many participants as an increasing challenge in itself for those already in work: there was also a feeling of strong resentment concerning how they were viewed by some of their, predominantly white, colleagues. A graduate professional working for a government agency stated:

> ‘You think these are supposed to be educated people you work with, but they come out with some idiotic things, like, “Do you hate white people or the West?” or they ask you about how some Muslims treat women to try to catch you out.’
>
> Pukhtoon male Oxford

These issues inform the pursuit of and need for self-employment and the setting up of small businesses that are monocultural and serve the local community. This is an option preferred to working for a potentially discriminating employer as perceived by the cohort groups. However, this approach can by default easily reinforce further alienation and separateness, if not disenfranchisement from mainstream economic, social and political life. This has partly been reflected by Chang (2010) in his work on Asian Americans in urban settings in the United States. The Luton interviewees spoke of this as the realism of the city, an attitude paralleled, on a smaller scale, by the respondents in Oxford.

These sentiments highlight the tensions that exist between communities within a diverse demographic base, as in many disadvantaged cities. The campaigns of the EDL reinforce this view with the vilification of Islam, which is of great concern to the diaspora. Such tension is demonstrated in newspapers such as the *Daily Mail* (Levy, 2010) in the use of emotive language in the reporting of Muslims in Luton, for instance.

The EDL was of particular concern to the Luton cohort group members, who felt their presence more strongly than the Oxford participants did. This was not surprising, given the rise of the organisation within that city and the anti-Muslim activity consequently and frequently displayed to local residents. Many participants spoke of constantly being vigilant in public, given the air of concern and animosity created by the EDL in the town. They felt that there was much sympathy for the extreme viewpoints of this body that consequently impacted on their employment and other prospects in the city. They also viewed as hypocritical the media who personified Muslim extremism as the only threat to social order in Britain. Although the males were more vociferous in this segment of the debate, in these discussions there was not much discrepancy between the sexes, with both men and women raising concerns of an equal nature. They include the following:

> ‘You really get nervous when out with your kids and in a white area because you think they may be EDL supporters, especially if you are wearing a hijab.’
>
> Punjabi woman, Luton

> ‘You don’t want to be walking home late at night because some drunk guys might abuse you in the city centre. Some of my friends have been called racist names and they were sure they were EDL.’
>
> Pakistani male, Luton

Some of the women in Luton spoke of their concerns about being visible through wearing the hijab at work and did not know if work colleagues were sympathisers of the EDL, particularly when anti-Muslim comments were made amongst indigenous-origin colleagues. One spoke of how demonstrations by the EDL in the city also made her children anxious, with one child asking repeatedly why they hated Muslims so much. The women, as mothers, collectively felt the anxiety of their families, and their children specifically, in daily interactions with the predominately white community at school and in public spaces, particularly after the murder of the British soldier Lee Rigby in Woolwich (BBC News, 2013) and previous incidents recorded by the Institute for Race Relation (Fekete, 2011a). Attacks on mosques and other acts showed how Lee Rigby's death was exploited by far right extremist parties such as the British National Party and English Defence League (Walker, Taylor and Siddiqui, 2013). The researcher would offer caution as the term 'white' covers a large and diverse British population and that perceptions of fear amongst cohort members need to be set in context of the situation. There are of course a minority of people from the indigenous community who subscribe to the views of extremist parties and groups.

This was echoed in this comment:

> 'It really frightened me when that soldier got murdered and then those groups started demonstrating and even attacking mosques. I was scared to go out because someone might swear at me in the street.'
>
> Pakistani woman, Luton

The female respondents gave much insight into their perceptions and feelings of living in a city such as Luton with these tensions constantly in the background Their accounts correlate with the findings of the British Social Attitudes Survey (Clements, 2011) about attitudes towards Muslims, which that give rise to further apprehension within the diaspora concerning their present and future role and presence in Britain. This issue of acceptance is clearly linked to a sense of belonging by respondents in both Oxford and Luton that was apparent in the data collection and subsequent analysis. It reflects the work of Engbersen

(2007) in similarities with his work on the Turkish diaspora in Germany, where a strong sense of security translates into a stronger sense of belonging. It is this essential need for validation that is important to the Pakistani diaspora; in many of their eyes, it gives them the sense of a legitimacy of presence. There is a strong fear that media depictions of Muslims, by contract, reinforce a sense of illegitimacy of belonging and being British.

Time and time again, for this sample diaspora, issues of racism and Islamophobia are seen as inspired by the media. This is also illustrated by findings from sources such as the Muslim Council of Britain (2014) and expanded upon by Kundani (2014). It is the continual extension of being seen as the ‘Other’ that then reinforces a constant negotiating of identity and belonging, despite their status of being British-born.

Within these experiences, among female participants there were also those who spoke of being more liberated and Westernised in their outlook, signifying a more modernist and free minded independent spirit, compared with their fellow Muslim women. As recorded earlier in the findings of the Runnymede Trust and All Party Parliamentary Group on Race and Community (2012), the choice of Western or Eastern clothing played a role in depicting this sense of fashion-conscious British Muslim women and aided their low visibility in wider society.

Female participants spoke of their pragmatic approach to conformity in the adoption of Eastern or Western traditions of dress being utilised for employment prospects, indicated in these statements:

> ‘This might sound silly, but I try not to look Muslim and just wear trousers and a smart top to work. I even Westernise my name at work so people don’t think I am Muslim, otherwise it will be a pain working there.’
>
> Pakistani female, Luton

> ‘I am very Westernised at work just to get on with people. It saves all the Hassle, really.’
>
> Pakistani female, Luton

This mirrored the findings of the All Party Parliamentary Group on Race and Community hearings (2012). However, some female participants concluded that, after much experimenting and experience, they still felt subject to the prejudice that was inevitably associated with their names and identity. This continually reinforced the widely held view of Luton cohort members that the city itself was full of prejudice.

As a consequence, London as an employment hub was therefore more appealing, given the open diversity reflected within the majority of workplaces, compared with continued marginalisation due to the lack of opportunities afforded within the mainstream labour market in their home city.

Experience of direct encounters with anti-Muslim feeling in an area of employment is explored further below in respect to a specific group of the respondents, taxi drivers in Oxford.

4.3 Views of direct discrimination

The cohort group members felt that direct and indirect forms of malicious behaviour that presently go unchallenged required addressing. Such behaviour was viewed as continually feeding into media scapegoating of British Pakistani Muslims for the elements of extremism in Islam. This personification of the prevailing media imagery and press discourse in the West echoes the work of Bourdieu (1977), Conte (2001) and Dabashi (2008) amongst others, who speak of the powerful constructs that result as a consequence of this imagery. The primary fact remains within this analysis, that through the personification of the global war on terror, many of the diaspora highlight feelings of insecurity and an avenue to eradicate discrimination. The visual symbolism of Islam, such as the wearing of traditional clothes and having a beard, are subject to constant animosity. One respondent relayed his experience of visiting a market town near Oxford. He was visible by his beard, which he assumed to be the reason for someone shouting out the word ‘terrorist’ as he walked by. He naturally felt that media depictions had played a role in this open display of hatred and bigotry. Others spoke of being ignored in stores in shopping centres after the attacks in New York and London, specifically. As they cited personal examples they believed were the realities of their daily lives, many felt that such direct and indirect forms of discrimination were experienced by Muslims of the diaspora generally.

Probing this further, some perceived an anti-Muslim threat in the expressions and behaviour of local indigenous-origin people they had met and what they felt was characteristic of their behaviour towards them in public, such as the way they were being stared at, or spoken to in a certain shop. Some of these non-verbal communications may be interpreted in a number of ways. However, given the context at the time, it would seem more than plausible that genuine hostility towards was being expressed towards this group, given their observance of traditional cultural norms, especially highly visible clothing which they felt would protect their modesty and support Islamic observance, as numerous women did.

A reluctance to report or speak up was not limited to the male respondents. It was equally felt by some of the Pukhtoon women, who spoke of isolating themselves at home due to the indirect prejudice felt when out shopping. Many had thought Oxford to be safer, given its international reputation and student make-up from around the world, yet there was still unease, as this comment illustrates:

> ‘There are parts of Oxford I would not go to as you can tell I might be sworn at, I see it in their eyes when I get the bus home and you get really dirty looks from some of the people who live on the estates.’
>
> Pukhtoon female, Oxford

The comment referred to above were also attributable to a wider group of the Pukhtoon inhabitants. Men were particularly incensed by their treatment, but more so by the attitude displayed towards their spouses, mothers and sisters as they undertook a simple role such as shopping in a supermarket. There was much more sensitivity within this group of males about how the women were treated, which also signified a sense of responsibility in protecting the family from any criticism or ill-feeling. This may also denote the strong sense of traditional values of the Pukhtoon in regard to gender roles within their communities and more conservative observance of cultural, if not Islamic, customs and norms.

For the Punjabi community in the Luton cohort, there were similar experiences although with a different intensity, given the rise of the EDL and given the much larger Pakistani population base in the city. These were explored earlier in order to provide some focus on the reality of life, but it is significant to note the level of direct and indirect discrimination and stereotyping faced by contributors in this research study. It is also interesting to note the passive nature of participants who, on many occasions, silently accepted the level of hostility displayed in the comments recorded.

In respect to gender variations, there were no major discrepancies in the opinion formed by the two sexes. There was unanimity within the sexes with regard to news reports they viewed on the main terrestrial channels or Sky News. Women, like the men, felt strongly that British media provided a misleading representation of the Pakistani Muslim population through imagery and depiction of what they often described as the fundamentalist element within the community, and so smearing the wider diaspora community.

As one respondent stated,

> “The impact creates a frustration in me. I don’t have much faith in the media. Some of the information I believe is hearsay, media not the same as before, creates more misunderstanding amongst people about us Pakistanis.’
>
> Punjabi male, Luton

Some felt this prevailing attitude explained some of the animosity levelled against them both in the public arena and in much of the commentary in society, often displayed in newspaper articles and wider press.

In a similar way to the men, some women concluded that their passive presence within this society might encourage the dominant community to feel that they accepted the militancy of their faith:

> ‘In Luton you feel it more sometimes when, say, a soldier is killed in Afghanistan who may be from here and the newspaper and local news carries a picture of him and of their family. I think people then look at us and hate us, really. They think that we are part of that same group of people in Afghanistan because they see people with beards or women in non-Western clothes.’
>
> Punjabi woman, Luton

Whether these self-assessed perceptions showed a heightened state of sensitivity due to the prevailing climate, was a question asked of the groups, in order to understand how these opinions were arrived at. Both sexes elaborated upon their feelings by connecting images and news stories and language used in the media reporting during tense periods in society, such as in the London bombings, and even during government warnings of an imminent threat. On these occasions and periods of insecurity, they felt the need to reassess their Pakistani inheritance and British Muslim identity. This indicates that such media reporting and subsequent societal views stated had a dire impact on this group.

It was interesting to note in these discussions that there seemed to be no formal outlet for this sense of overwhelming discrimination that respondents described. Their silence and placid acceptance of such unfavourable treatment was a reflection of the deep malaise within this group. It was significant that there was no assertive response or challenge to this prejudice. However, it may be that this was more that they did not wish to exacerbate the situation by complaining or seeking remedy through legal structures, which they may consider as time-consuming and not necessarily fruitful. It was also an important reflection of the lack of confidence in what they describe as the ‘system’ – public institutions, particularly the police, that also, as they viewed it, reinforce negative social and political constructions of their presence in British society.

The researcher believes that these issues of visibility were directly related to their cultural and religious identification and proximity to cities with large ethnic and specifically Muslim communities. However, although one would assume a higher prevalence and incidence in Luton, there were profound examples in Oxford, where the Pukhtoon, a minority within a minority, felt victim to direct prejudice. As mentioned earlier, the private car hire industry is one with a high proportion of Pakistani men working as self-employed drivers. The case of the Pukhtoon in Oxford was highlighted in the following short case study of the impact of cultural racism that many drivers come across on a day-to-day basis in their work.

As an occupation, car hire driving allows members of the diaspora to meet as customers many indigenous-origin people from all walks of life. This is particularly the case when most customers seem to be inebriated following nights out and are more talkative and willing to engage in honest, albeit stilted, conversation with their drivers. The same may be the case with hackney carriage drivers in Luton. However, they did not form a significant part of the cohort group in that city involved in the fieldwork during the data collection period of the research. To the driver respondents in Oxford, the experience at work offered a barometer of feeling towards Muslims in Britain generally. It also gave them the opportunity to witness, at first hand, the prevailing debates related to topical news items that aired in mainstream media. The following collection of statements highlights the respondents' wider concerns and represents only a small number of contributions made by cohort members. The statements also signify the unease of the respondents during these exchanges that could have profound repercussions on their income and their chosen employment. They manifest the level of direct discrimination felt by some respondents and are therefore valuable to record in this manner.

Respondent 1

> 'Some of the customers when they come into our cars [taxis] they don't

> think we are Pakistani or Asian as our skin is much less dark than say some of the other Pakistanis you see in Oxford. They then start talking to you about those “Pakis” and start saying that Muslims are against white people and don’t deserve to get jobs in this country. I just sit there silently not wanting to argue with a passenger, you don’t know what might happen. I would say something if it was really bad, I wouldn’t stand for that.’

Respondent 2

> ‘I’m a taxi driver. Like say, for instance, someone gets in the car and then ask how you are this and that, think I’m English because I’m quite light skinned, they’d be going on about the Muslims, doing this and terrorists are doing this and that and you tell them, “Oh, I’m actually like Asian from Pakistan”, and so on, they start talking to you differently and stuff like that, the first thing they say is, “Oh we not racist we've got plenty of black friends…” ’

It is clear from these exchanges that members of the British white community in these scenarios misjudged the person to whom they were relating their own viewpoints.

Many of the respondents in these situations felt disadvantaged in not being able to respond adequately to these stereotypes and false representations. Some focus group members spoke of not only their sense of vulnerability in these situations, but of the need for passive discipline to avoid any potential for conflict with a customer that would result in a complaint to the taxi licensing authorities, and a potential loss of their private hire licence. Many felt this to be a double-edged sword that not only subjected them to personal forms of cultural racism from clients, but also the potential for institutional discrimination from the local regulator, who would most likely side with the complainants. This would only add to the anxiety these respondents would feel on a daily basis in these situations, which are not only complex but also potentially violent. There were, of course, more openly hostile statements made by patrons within such confined spaces that on occasions created much unease.

Respondent 3

> ‘I have had customers that say, “What is your motive in this country?”’
> I said, “What you mean?”
> “You’re a Pakistani?”
> “Yeah, but I’m a British Pakistani. I was born in this country, this is my country as well.”
> “Oh, no, what is your motive here, why are you here?”
> You know these kind of questions, you don’t even know what to say, you don’t know how to answer them, you just think, “What shall I say to you”, ‘cos if you get someone come on the racist vibe particularly in my job, then you have to be careful.’

It also became apparent in the focus group discussions that those working in this field, who had to face such harmful and prejudicial comments, would not report these incidents to the police or anyone else. They felt no one would believe them against a white person making such statements who, if presented with these allegations, would deny them. In this scenario, many felt they knew who would be believed. The researcher pursued further this line of investigation and the responses revealed a lack of trust in the police which will be addressed in the next section of this chapter. It provides some relevance to the statistical evidence provided in Chapter 2 that highlighted the over-representation of people of colour within the criminal justice system as a whole.

4.4 The police and discrimination

In essence, the personal familiarity of members of Britain’s ethnic minorities with the police service does not endear the agents of law and order to them, nor does it encourage then to seek solace in the law itself. Past experiences reinforce a sense of mistrust in what they see as yet another agency of state, principally associated with their sense of injustice. This is clearly reflected in the

Macpherson report (Home Office, 1999) and within the literature in Quinton et al. (2000), McQuail (2005), Sharp and Atherton (2007), which defines the close relationships between state, law enforcement and the media. Again, the Leveson Inquiry (2012) provides further insight into this mosaic of relationships that seem to be interdependent and in need of further focus. The experiences with the police also directly link into the literature related to the 'war on terror' and anti-terror legislation, which have resulted in the anxiety based on daily experiences and interactions with law enforcement. It is yet another essential element of the perceptions of wider discrimination felt by the diaspora as analysed through this investigation and need further explaining as a consequence.

The ever-increasing rise in the Muslim population in custodial establishments signified in the work of the prison inspectorate (HM Inspectorate of Prisons, 2013) is useful to reference here. It bears out the concerns expressed by participants in the research about overzealous policing and use of stop and search under terrorism and other powers, as studied by the IRR (Fekete, 2011b). Again this has to be set within the wider context of current policy frameworks and strategic thinking on anti-terrorism, community cohesion and curbing radicalisation which, collectively, have had implications and a profound impact on cohort members. This is exemplified by the following statement of how respondents see media reporting of crime overall:

> 'When a white person commits a crime, they don't say he is white or Christian, but when it's someone of colour, they say black and or Muslim, just to highlight the person – you read it and see it all the time".'

Punjabi male, Luton

The statistical insight provided by the numbers of Asian people stopped and searched under these powers is revealing, particularly during times of high tension, because of heightened security, perceived threat or actual incident, reinforced by media speculation and interest. One such episode was the case of the 'shoe bomber', a nickname coined by the British press for Richard Reid, later sentenced in 2002 in the United States for attempting to blow up a jet airliner with bombs hidden in his shoes (Elliott, 2002), which triggered a national state of high alert for possible copycat attacks.

As stated earlier, it is this framing of specific racial minorities by mass media in this context that has been explored by Downing and Husband (2005), Conte, (2001, 2007), Goodman and Goodman (2006) and Korhan (2006) amongst others. Racialisation of Muslims has also followed in this trajectory of media representation, with the personification of the so-called ‘Islamic terrorist’. This has led to the increasing surveillance of Muslim youth and, in cities with large Pakistani communities, of groups of the Pakistani diaspora, as witnessed in Birmingham and reported in the *Guardian* newspaper (Lewis, 2010).

The findings from the data analysis relate persistently with these narratives of the role of law enforcement in perpetuating a level of discrimination, as experienced by respondents and the wider diaspora. They also align to concerns of racial profiling. Many of the cohort group members felt the police were targeting them specifically for stop and search and being asked where they were intending to go to in the city. These perceived racially motivated stops were deemed also to be aggressive and intrusive. A constant related concern was how respondents felt about people from the majority community not being targeted based on their skin colour, an issue that caused much resentment.

Individual experiences from both Luton and Oxford respondents were familiar to others in the cohort groups in both cities, emphasising a high degree of frustration amongst both communities. If one person was providing testimony of their experience, others in the focus groups would nod in agreement and unsolicited comments of “that’s awful, they shouldn't do that " would follow from others in the discussions who instantly empathised with fellow respondents. Each individual had their own story in this regard, whilst those who did not nevertheless knew of friends or family members who had gone through much of the same embarrassing exposure to what they considered as unwarranted prejudice against the Muslim. The prominence of this theme was evident in the one-to-one interviews where, once again, many felt their rights had been abused in order to promote an image of the police within the public mind of being assertive in the face of faceless and hidden terrorist threats.

Some of the respondents, relating to this specific issue in the research, argued that their experiences reflected numerous encounters with the police, not just one or two, where they were subject to degrading treatment in their eyes, in full gaze of predominantly white bystanders. Many felt that this was done on purpose to shame people of colour, in particular Muslims, with some feeling this approach was to make Muslims look inferior in front of the majority population. They concluded that they were only being stopped because of their race and culture and not because the police had a genuine reason to detain them in public places.

There were also incidents where many felt persecuted by these powers when travelling in major cities such as London for work with other colleagues who were not identified as a person of colour. These specific incidents were not only highlighted as embarrassing but a flagrant violation of what they considered were their human rights, which often affected their professional credibility.

One interviewee, a Pukhtoon male, recorded this experience during a work situation when travelling with Caucasian colleagues and being stopped by the police at a major railway station. He felt humiliated in front of his colleagues and felt the police officer was behaving inappropriately in stopping a ‘Muslim in a suit’ to make a point of it. He surmised that the police had not learnt from the Stephen Lawrence inquiry and that its recommendations had no profound impact on the police. He commented further in a one to one interview:

“I felt so mad, it was so humiliating the way they ask you in front of other people to open your bag and ask you to take things out. I can see why some in our community hate the Police so much. I think he liked doing this it seemed to give him a kick asking a professional brown faced person like me in a suit. They are so full of themselves even after the beating they got over Stephen Lawrence”
Pukhtoon male Oxford

The alarming conclusions reached by interviewees who speak of such interactions, is that they are considered as potential terrorists without an alternative rationale that might be plausible in these scenarios. Again, this plays into the heightened sensitivity of these cohort members that was indicative of the pressures they felt they were under at the time within the prevailing political and social context. Many of the respondents had spoken privately of the potential impact on their mental well-being precipitated by the level of pressure they felt upon them, in what they often described as the multi layers of oppression. Indeed, the testimonies of some of those participating in this work showed some indication of strain that they felt was a consequence of their experiences of discrimination related to their faith.

The researcher cannot oversimplify or understate the status and strength of these remarks during a themed discussion that was promoted by cohort members in their own right. In one incident, a contributing taxi driver spoke of an example, where a police officer asked a private hire operator of Bangladeshi origin, ‘Where did you get the colour of your skin from?’ This specific anecdote had become a part of Oxford taxi folklore and symptomatic of the problems in trusting the police.

In general, this was more of a preoccupation of the male members of the research groups than of the females, who had limited contact with law enforcement agencies and therefore did not reflect any obvious experiences, except in expressing concern over the issue, as it related to their spouses or male siblings, who had shared their fears.

It would seem evident from these exchanges that there still seems a resistant culture of institutionalised racism within this high-profile public body. This is evidenced by ongoing investigations into the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) and a long-standing culture of racism within its ranks. A *Guardian* article (Mulholland, 2012) brought attention to 51 complaints of racism against the force in two months; this only contributes to the mistrust in minority ethnic communities. Additionally, more recent allegations have surfaced of the MPS infiltrating the Stephen Lawrence campaign members and finding evidence of political extremism within the work of the organisers. (Channel 4, 2014).

The racial and cultural profiling of individuals and groups is of much public concern, as articulated by Kundani (2014), for instance, as well as within this sample diaspora, group who personified the police as a partial agent-provocateur. The expression provided in this short section relates to the work of Fekete (2006), which draws on the significance of racial profiling and its relationship to the ‘war on terror ‘as a political doctrine that has impacted on Muslims in Britain. For the researcher, the role of the police is also significant as it increased the low morale and anxiety of these communities during such episodes, which are continually disempowering and embarrassing under the public gaze.

4.5 ‘Accepting of extremism’

As a consequence of media influences, there existed in the minds of many of the respondents, a correlation between not speaking out against, and therefore in some way being seen as accepting extremism within their midst. It seemed to be exacerbated, in their view, by the political establishment, as this comment illustrates:

> ‘The media work with the British and American governments to promote an ideological message that puts Islam and Muslims as the enemy within, It then uses the Union Jack to promote a nationalist message, uniting British people behind a threat of their own making. You feel like you just don’t belong here’
>
> Punjabi male, Luton

Society thus expects a more vociferous condemnation of what were perceived as Muslim-inspired extremism and terrorism.

It could be regarded as a form of passive extremism through denial and failure to recognise its real impact. This is consequently seen as tacit agreement for the actions of those that perpetuate violence, whether at home or abroad. It corresponds with views held, for instance, by Patrick Basham on CBS News online, who exemplifies debate that openly questions the loyalty of British

Muslims. As he concludes one article, he remarks on where individuals of the diaspora show their allegiance, namely to other Muslims around the world.

> ‘The UK embraced taxpayer-subsidised multiculturalism and has paid a very dear price, indeed. The result – cultural apartheid – has encouraged a significant number of Muslims to exhibit more loyalty to fellow Muslims outside of the UK than to their fellow Britons.’ (Basham, 2006)

Such a view reinforces the belief in the homogeneity of the Muslim faith that reflects Poole’s (2002) study into media depiction of Islam as a monolithic structure that is mono-cultural rather than diverse in the make-up of its over 1 billion followers. It is this prevailing view that continues the media myths that perpetuate the Islamaphobic discourse within the public sphere, a discourse that is mirrored in the views of the diaspora in the cohorts.

Again, it was this thought process, so pervasive within the public media sphere that concerned cohort group’s members, as expressed in the debates in this investigation. They felt it apparent that such contributions in mainstream media were framed to achieve a clear divide between those of Muslim faith and majority society, that to all intents and purposes sought to affirm, if not reinforce, a differentiated status amongst these two groups of British citizenry. Many regarded it as further evidence of the cultural racialisation of the narrative that further fuelled scepticism that the media was being objective in reporting Muslims and Islam accurately or fairly. An added fear amongst the diaspora was that this critical and often forensic examination and suspicion of their right to belong had infected the main body-politic of the public sphere, which predominantly supported views held by Basham and countless others such as Haras Rafiq referred to in the *Daily Mail* (Black, 2007). The same concern is perhaps best characterised by Said’s (1997) reflections on the use of this ‘cultural apparatus’ examined in his chapter focussing on media production (see Chapter 5). As stated there it is a process utilised by the mass media to frame these communities within this radicalised model of representation referred to by Poole (2002), Halliday (2006) amongst others.

Associated with this apprehension among participants were subsidiary concerns related to how Muslims are viewed by other minorities within their localities, who might share the mainstream viewpoint, given the vast coverage of militant Islam and attacks against Western targets. This was particularly an acute area for the two both cohorts given the ideology of the English Defence League, to target Islam rather than any other faith and cultural groups. In addition, it also played into the perceived lack of support for British soldiers fighting in Afghanistan that added to the self-fulfilling prophecy of disloyalty to the British state. In this context, the proximity and relevance of Afghanistan signified, for many Muslims of the sample diaspora, the personification of peoples connected to that region, Pakistanis in particular, as potential terrorists or sympathisers of such individuals. One respondent stated:

> “Pakistan is always seen as terrorist central in the media, even in films and dramas now. If you tell them at work you are going on holiday to Pakistan they think you’re off to a training camp”
>
> Pakistani male Luton

Yet, despite their efforts to promote a specific Muslim threat, right-wing bodies perpetuated racist hate to all communities of colour and faith, as perpetrators could not differentiate between Sikh, Hindu or Muslim as distinct minorities, as reported by the Institute for Race Relations (IRR, 2005).

All this added to what many participants assessed as a continuation of the media deceit, as articulated by one female member of the focus group:

> ‘They keep playing the same images of Muslims, bombings, the Taliban in Afghanistan and Pakistan killing innocent people and then they say we support them because we have some link because of our ancestry, it’s just lies and more lies.’
>
> Pukhtoon female, Oxford

This has also clearly been borne out by comments made by politicians and opinion formers criticising Muslim communities as well as, at some level, Muslim leadership for not publicly speaking out against the fanatics amongst their midst. As this respondent stated:

> ‘Politicians were perpetuating the anti-Muslim and anti-cultural messages that we were not playing our part as British citizens, by supporting the terrorism, not their wars [Iraq].’
>
> Pukhtoon male, Oxford

Such remarks were made by many including Tony Blair and advocated by some leader writers such as the political editor of the *New Statesman,* Mehdi Hasan (Hasan, 2011b). The onus has been on the Muslim population of Britain to actively distance itself from a perceived threat from those with whom they share a cultural and religious association. This caused much resentment amongst cohort group members, who assumed this to be a decisive test of their allegiance to Britain, if not Western values, that has been a preoccupation of the media and of the establishment. There were some in the groups who spoke of how many had spoken out but were often ignored as the media did not want to promote this element of the news story. They felt that no matter the frequency of their condemnations, they would be continually ignored and viewed in a less favourable light. This is also documented in the work of Gottschalk and Greenberg (2008) in their study of Muslim groups’ response to September 11. Despite proactively issuing press releases and comments opposing extremism and violence as anti-Islamic, American Muslim organisations have often been ignored by mainstream media outlets, who continually condemn their silence on Muslim violence.

For the members of the diaspora taking part in this study, the major significant event in London related to terrorism placed them in a much-disliked spotlight for the media, politicians and wider society. The Luton cohort group members acutely felt this given the significance of the town as a staging post for the London suicide bombers. This period was seen to be the single most volatile moment for the diaspora in both cities, and brought home to many the dire relationship between their identity and that of the perpetrators of the London bombings, adding to their anxiety, as this comment highlights:

> ‘After the London bombings, we as Muslims were asked to condemn the terrorist, which we all did like everyone else in our minds and hearts but we had to show our anger out in the open, it was like telling us that if we didn’t we were in favour of what those people did in London’
>
> Punjabi male, Luton

Another member of the group gave an example that preyed on many minds that corresponded with a widely held view of the duplicity of the values and freedoms politicians and media at large expressed in their statements:

> ‘If anyone expressed an opinion that was not totally condemning the bombers or trying to rationalise the attacks, we were seen just as guilty as these people because we were seen as sympathisers even if we said that what they did was wrong. We were not allowed to have any other opinions, or even have a debate on the subject. So much for freedom of speech; it is totally different when Western people attack the prophet; total double standard.’
>
> Punjabi male, Luton

Another respondent commented:

> ‘I was in London on the day when the bombings happened. It was awful and my heart went out to the families. We were all in this together as British people, but we were not made to feel like that, we’re always seen as separate.’
>
> Pukhtoon male, Oxford

For the researcher, this was evidence of a strong British identity that highlighted the abhorrence of the attacks on what many considered as *their* towns and cities, feeling as repulsed as any other citizen. This view was not often recorded within the wider mass media narratives on the subject or reporting and created a need for self-justification by some members of the diaspora interviewed and assessed through empirical data sources.

There was inner reflection on these issues by members of the diaspora who discussed this issue at length within the focus groups and that also indicated strength of feeling on this matter. Many in the discussions felt that during the height of the terrorist attacks by Irish republicans; Northern Irish Catholic's supporting the Republican cause specifically, were not asked to engage in a process of self-blame or publically reminded to declare allegiance to Britain. Like the Muslim the Catholic population is not homogenous and similarly to followers of Islam, these 'terrorists' who practiced Catholicism were small in relation to the global community of faith. This guilt by association was seen as hypocritical and demeaning to the Muslim community at large. Such parallels were not only important for the diaspora to make but essential in rationalising the differentials made between various monolithic faiths of the world. The conclusion was that the standard set for Islam was, in their minds, arbitrary and predisposed towards growing antagonism.

The Pukhtoon members also felt a distinct sensitivity in this relationship that was separate to the main thrust of the arguments attested above. They found much solace in their long-established heritage with both Afghanistan and Pakistan that reinforced a positive and dynamic transnational element to their personal identity. However, they felt that this might also be a potential source of suspicion placed on them, as assumptions might be made of their association with the tribal regions of Afghanistan and Pakistan and therefore a close relationship with the Taliban and wider extremism. Although there was no factual basis for this fear, it was, however, felt by many of the Pukhtoon respondents who offered this concern within the study. There was a genuine fear of being viewed as potential suicide bombers with an overriding hatred for British values and norms, so defined by the popular press.

Many felt that there were good reasons why individuals should not speak out on these issues, including possible misinterpretation and distortion of views. On the one hand, this could be viewed as sign of further insecurity in their status as legitimate and equal citizens, but on the other it could be viewed as a pragmatic approach to dealing with this discourse in wider society. The consensus amongst the interviewees remained to keep quiet and to keep their heads down and focus on their daily lives. In making statements of any kind, they felt these would be ignored and misrepresented by the media regardless. They did not wish to further fuel and or perpetuate this negative discourse which they felt was orchestrated and managed by the media.

There was strong support for these types of reflections made by individuals in the focus group discussions which reinforced an existing and strong view of not going public during a heightened sense of Islamophobia engulfing the country. Many held the view that to do so would feed into the wider media stereotypes of extremists within the cities of Britain and would therefore create further animosity towards them and their families. For many of the respondents, around 80% of the sample interviewed, there was a clear demarcation point in how they viewed themselves and how they felt others personified them or indeed see them, on a daily basis. Again, the issue of remaining silent, even obedient, as characterised by one interviewee, was therefore mandated by a fear of further persecution and alienation from society. This subsequently fed into strong perceptions of the levels of discrimination felt by the sample diaspora as well as feelings of an increase in media attention that they viewed as media hype and frenzy that would inevitably prolong and exacerbate the existing adverse debates surrounding Muslims in Britain.

Respondents articulated this in their own words:

> ‘When they see, you know, this happened with the Muslim and this Muslim did that, and Mohammed something did this and Mohammed, that’s all they’re pushing. The reason I used to read the Daily Mirror and Daily Express and I just thought you know what, I mean, there’s too much persecution of Muslims in here, just like as if that’s all they want to do to sell their newspapers, so it’s not, they don’t provide you with a true picture.’
>
> Pukhtoon male, Oxford

This was quite clear in the data analysis and in the wider reflections made by the diaspora within that process, which related back to the literature on this subject, and highlighted that a heightened defence mechanism was in play. It also signified a separation of conformity from that of their parents and those elders they regard as outdated representatives reinforcing institutional and societal discrimination that further perpetuates anti-Muslim feeling, without adequately or responsibly representing them. They also considered the actions of some elders as reinforcing stereotypes through poor command of English and representing the colonial past of subservience to the ‘white man’ – a phrase used by some cohort members. This fed into wider generational differences between these two groups based on age and experience of modern British living and growing up.

4.6 Generational reflections of the diaspora

As mentioned, a concern for the diaspora was suspicion of certain actors in the midst of their own Pakistani population, who accommodated the needs of the political decision-makers, contrary to the interests of their own communities. They referred often to the role of so-called community leaders who they considered to be self-selected and self-serving, who considered themselves as ambassadors of local organisations influencing the local minority ethnic population. For the diaspora in the research, there was a view that there was a fine line between facilitating the consultation or interaction of the organisation and being an interloper who had no understanding of the needs of the emerging generations. This was especially the case when they considered most of these representatives to be older members of the community who provided deference to the institutions they worked with, and were unable to verbalise the concerns of the diaspora, due to their limitations in speaking English. Some of the respondents, around 20%, described them as ‘poodles jumping up and down’ whilst others feared that they were ‘keeping an eye on us for the police or MI5’. This latter view was quite common within the context of the government ‘Prevent’ strategy. It signified the level of suspicion felt by a section of the diaspora sample interviewed in this research of members of their own communities. In further discussion, some of the sample group spoke of seeing such individuals in regular contact with the police and this had raised concerns.

These doubts about the trustworthiness of individuals in their local populations caused much resentment amongst the cohort group members, who felt no justification in some of the elders of the Pakistani community validating their presence in Britain. For the younger generation, this added to their concerns of sacrificing their own group loyalty in order to conform to dominant culture. For some of the participants, this represented a colonial vestige of the Raj, when the White Man was the dominant political colonial power and no equality existed between those in power and those colonised. In other words, people of colour were subjugated by the British through the use of force and political patronage, as depicted in films such as *Gandhi* (1982) or novels such as Forster's *A Passage to India* (1924).

Some respondents commented as follows on this issue:

> 'Our community leaders are not interested in our community, just self-interest. They still look up to the white politicians and officials as if they were back in India before partition.'
>
> Punjabi male, Luton

> 'It's a bit racist to me when they [politicians, police officers] go to our elders for advice about us, trying to keep us in control and not speaking out. It's same as the British empire when we were told what to do by the British. I think some in our community still live like that.'
>
> Pukhtoon male, Oxford

> 'Some of them still bow down to the white man and say "yes sir".'
>
> Punjabi male, Luton

Another intense feeling shared by both cohorts was how outdated and illegitimate these representations on their behalf were. As self-appointed leaders of the community, it was felt that they were undemocratic and only interested in obtaining an OBE or MBE. One member of the group ironically concluded how British soldiers fight for democracy and freedom abroad but in British minority communities the politicians are happy to listen to unelected people who damaged, in their view, their standing, if not interests. This has been recorded by Malik (1995), who highlights the close working relationships between politicians and community leaders to harness electoral success that then creates interdependency to the detriment of the wider community. There was a danger that such misrepresentations would not only polarise the Pakistani community but also send a confused signal to the outside world of tensions and internal strife between the old guard and emerging and assertive generations.

It is these elements described above collectively, if not individually for some, that have caused much reassessing of their place as citizens in Britain. This anxiety of place relates to personal experiences that also correspond to group perceptions and feelings within the cohorts. It is these multiple layers of discrimination perceived by many of the sample diaspora that, for the researcher, perpetuate their own myths of returning to the ‘homeland’ Pakistan, and to their ancestry. As one respondent commented:

> ‘At least in Pakistan you can be a Muslim without people abusing you and the media attacking you all the time.’
>
> Punjabi male, Luton

In many respects this is how they have been illustrated by the media and society at large, as pointed out by Poole (2002), Hutnyk (2006) and McLoughlin et al. (2014), in what Alexander (2006, p.265) has referred to as ‘essentialising religio-cultural identities’. The emphasis on this has led to a strong sense of Islamaphobia and discrimination echoing in the narratives in this chapter. There is within these voices a strong wish to escape from this anxiety and ultimate fear of rejection, repatriation by another name that has filtered down through their parents’ experiences of arrival and living in Britain. Their solution is a return to ancestral lands and what Kymlicka (1995) has referred to as societal culture. It is here that the researcher feels that a romanticised relationship with their heritage has been created. This sample of the diaspora, as Kabbani's (1987) title suggests, has created its own 'myths of the Orient', reinforced by their media consumption as well as their need for security.

Allied to this, the researcher would argue, is a sense that no one is speaking up for them. Yet they are too afraid, disillusioned and/or apathetic to speak up for themselves, or even articulate their need for stronger minority rights, feeling so disempowered by media representations and wider society's acceptance of these. Inevitably, it is a process where their self-esteem has been gradually eroded, resulting in a sense of victimhood that may lead to wider alienation from mainstream society.

Within that frame is an additional element of class distinction that separates them from others who reflect an alternative discourse of belonging, based on their social mobility and fulfilled aspirations.

4.7 Class distinctions

It was the case therefore, that a smaller number of two or three individuals, more socially mobile and in many ways more economically advantaged, did not share this pessimistic even, myopic, viewpoint. This group differed in its opinion of media stereotypes and the impact on their own sense of awareness as British Muslims of Pakistani origin. According to the 2001 census in Britain, 13.8% of the total population were deemed to be in managerial positions, whilst overall in London and the outer regions of the capital, 45% were defined as middle class, indicating an increasing trend in this regard in what is considered as the more prosperous South (ONS, 2008).

Those within these sets can be deemed to have a middle-class predisposition, based on income, education and professional status. They may have a more confident and assured belief in being British without being immersed in a state of self-doubt or uncertainty in balancing their dual heritage and religious faith within a modern Western context. This additional level of security and esteem may be acquired through education and networks that are not exclusively related to family or same cultural and religious group relations and identities. These individuals can easily move between societies and have an assertive outlook that has to some extents deculturalised and even neutralised their allegiance to the values and of their parents, in favour of those of liberal Western societies. This is reflected in the work of Manzoor (2007) and Moll (2007) signifying the interest in niche Asian magazines as an expression of a modernized identity, whilst Ramadan (2006) and similar writers seek a post-modernist Islamic identity.

The minority voice within this discourse has often spoken of the need to support the country of birth whilst acknowledging a religious obligation to tackle extremism that harms the reputation and standing of the wider Muslim populations in Britain and globally. There is no deviation from this belief that is based on their legal right as British citizens, affirmed in law. They do not see themselves as having any different entitlements to rights and responsibilities enjoyed by indigenous-origin communities. In fact, some insisted that as taxpayers they contributed towards the welfare system that included many non-working white residents as well as members of their own community. Their sense of self-assured secularism characterised in this statement:

> ‘We have nothing to be afraid of as we are truly British and these extremists are using the name of Islam to harm all of us. We need to make sure that we don’t support these kinds of people who are bad for our communities and make us all look bad, these religious fanatics who do not represent Islam or us.’
>
> Punjabi male, Luton

In many respects, this division based on class places the Pakistani diaspora in two significantly opposing arenas that are also indicative of the level of inclusion or exclusion felt in wider mainstream society. Those most articulate and more socially mobile within a Western liberal context feel the cultural domination of their faith to be an unnecessary adjunct to their lives, although they retain the religious traditions and principles within a purely private domain without much symbolism, in the functioning of their daily lives.

Furthermore, among this group of participants, articulation of their faith remains discreet and not subject to inquiry by any other person, thus personifying the character of their Islamic faith. As stated before, there is also a stronger affirmation of citizenship and belonging to Britain, which transcends any notion of transnational escapism to the homeland. For this small group of middle-class respondents there is no desire to permanently leave Britain and seek a romanticised sense of sanctuary abroad, especially Pakistan, for which they hold no idealist view as a place of future migration or major investment. This is clearly borne out of their sense of not belonging and yearning for a place they feel secure in. Again it is this juxtaposition of the two worlds they feel they belong to.

Instead, Pakistan is part of a past familial legacy that is not in tune with their current sense of presence in a global world. This is contrary to those not belonging to this social stratum, as discussed above, who seem nailed to the premise, if not fear, of rejection by a British society perceived to be against them, anti-Muslim, racist and anti-Pakistani. They reflect those who feel that media stereotyping has played a role in determining their presence in Britain as well as being party to continual assessment by majority communities as part of the internalised threat.

These are the forgotten groups of people of the diaspora within the Punjabi and Pukhtoon communities who already feel rejected, marginalised and without a stake in society. Although their experiences of Pakistan are limited to family holidays and a sense of self-importance acquired by their wealth compared with kin in Pakistan, they maintain ambitions of making Pakistan a secondary home, a place of sanctuary and potential refuge from their perceived sense of alienation from British society. The researcher believes that this self-defined insurance is based on a false pretence of feeling secure in Pakistan rather than challenging, or amending, their current perceptions of adverse life in Britain.

In many ways, this belief in living in Pakistan and the insecurity of present living in Britain has created a vacuum between two cultures in their transnational identity, a no man's land that resembles the 'transmigrant' state, as articulated by Engbersen (2007). It has led to a sense of insecurity of being British and Muslim rather than British and Pakistani that is at the heart of this concern. The rise in terrorist activity and use of political Islam across the globe has, in the main, significantly added to this perception of the unacceptable 'Other' within the thoughts of some of the diaspora, particularly those marginalised and dislocated from mainstream society. It has clear echoes with Husband's (1996a) description of the multiple layers of exclusion and prejudice that tainted the Pakistani community set within a transnational and outdated paradox. It is essentially this third space that is so reminiscent of Bhabha's (1994) work on identity and belonging that is echoed within these narratives.

As a Punjabi female respondent stated:

> 'We are British and proud but Pakistani Muslim British, but there's still racism against us and we are not made to feel this is home. At least being Pakistani too gives you another option to travel to Pakistan and have family there.'
>
> Punjabi woman, Luton

Once again, the role of the media has added to this mindset, placing discussions of identity in the spotlight by reinforcing perceptions of the type of Muslim that is present in Britain. Linked to this discourse is the perception among the sample diaspora of the British Pakistani and his or her familiarly with militant Islam set within an Eastern context with images of fundamentalist and extremist architects of hate, depicted at war with the more tolerant and innocent West. This enduring script line has played to millions globally as well as within British society. These caricatures are then played out in the daily interactions with minorities deemed similar. It is testament to how strong and powerful these messages are that have led to the majority of the diaspora, in this study, voicing their concern and experiences. They also disturb the notions of community cohesion that has determined recent social policy towards minority populations that continually feed into the debate on identity and belonging. For these cohort groups, therefore, there is a complexity within this challenge of identification that is set within the prism of the media with its cultural, racial and religious characteristics. This is now also combined with an emerging class division, needing further clarification and elucidation, into something more tangible and meaningful for each participant.

4.8 Summary

The impact of Islamophobia is profound as a central theme of anti-Muslim feeling as perceived by the respondents throughout the investigation. It relates to the core elements of identity and belonging, set within a wider global context of the ‘war on terror’ and tackling extremism, that now receives 24 hour rolling media coverage. However, these all become confused within the minds of the majority of people in the West as principles of Islam and its followers, which translate into day-to-day hostility, ambivalence and self-defining of the ‘Other’. The media therefore plays a crucial role in that classification of this British citizen of Pakistani origin becoming the outsider at home. It is profoundly impacted upon by the media consumption of the sample Pakistani diaspora and society at large, who shape their views of the world accordingly.

The resulting impact of Islamophobia on the sample diaspora is articulated in these pages. The anti-Muslim feeling has become a daily preoccupation for the diaspora in this study that also extends into employment of whatever form. It then perpetuates other forms of discrimination and prejudice as seen by the example in stop and search and law enforcement agencies that reinforce a sense of alienation captured by Fekete (2006).

It also relates much to the work of Kundani (2014) at the Institute of Race Relations (IRR) and Poole’s (ibid.) research for instance, which highlights the significance of the level of concern about Muslims in Britain in general and via the media in particular as evident in the *New Statesman* debate of February 2010 (New Statesman, 2010). Perceptions amongst the diaspora are thus reinforced by continuing exclusion within the labour market that is then underpinned by other disadvantage. This is referred to and underscored by the work of Abbas (2002) and Archer and Yamashita (2002) related to educational achievement, which is enhanced by the work of Blanchflower (2010) highlighting the over-representation of Muslim youth among the unemployed. This marginalisation is perhaps indicative of the many personal and bleak assessments contained within the data analysis that have marked and tainted the aspirations of participants in the research. The negative media representations of this diaspora that they, the diaspora, also consume on a daily basis provide further anxiety and exclusion.

Furthermore, the concerns of the participants are increased by the resulting framing, within the media, of the mono-typical Muslim militant stereotype. This is analysed by Downing and Husband (2005), who speak of how such media representations play into the ideology of discrimination, of which participants spoke freely.

It is inevitable therefore that the constant deconstruction and reconstruction of this discourse has been a preoccupation of many of the diaspora in this study. This has signified their response to what they believe is an ongoing prejudice that mirrors the perceptions of Said (1997), who reiterates the Orientalist nature of this mainstreamed debate played out daily within the British media. It is also a quest for equal citizenship and rights, echoed in the work of Kymlicka (1995) that is essential for a sense of security as Engbersen (ibid.) has acknowledged for the Turkish equivalents in Germany. It is the associated representations with terror, so damaging to this community of interest, that participants have alluded to in this discourse. An alleged lack of assertive repudiation is seen as denial at best and complicity at worse with the element of Islamic militancy so familiar on television screens. This is not only evident on a national basis but is caught up in the international and complex media diplomacy at work, referred to by Gilboa (2001). There is not only a quest for new resources but, reminiscent of the Cold War and reflected within the administrations of George W. Bush and Tony Blair, a perpetuation of neo-conservative values that accordingly have led to a new form of neo-Orientalism that Sardar (1999) has articulated are represented within mass media and in literature representing the East as alien, backward and anti-Western.

These ideas and processes have collectively and individually reinforced the wider clash of civilisations that, in turn, has catapulted Islamophobia into the international sphere. The outcome has been a severe and detrimental impact on Muslim communities and populations in predominantly Western countries. It has contributed to their sense of a lack of worth and pf dislocation from mainstream European and British society that has a detrimental impact on community cohesion and multiculturalism at the same time.

It has also led to the continual development of the transnational search for meaning of his or her multiple identities for the British-born Muslim of Pakistani origin, who is continually seeking responses to these dilemmas and constraints as a result of fears of future discrimination and animosity. For those who feel most excluded, it is a genetic disposition that perpetuates at its extreme, their expulsion from their country of birth. Instead of challenging this misconception there is a desire to lay the foundations for a return to the ‘homeland’. It signifies the real insecurity of belonging of their parents despite their legal status as citizens. It is a pessimistic constraint on aspiration and assertiveness that requires change. Optimistically, the new media may allow such an opportunity for personal and group growth that encourages a stronger sense of British Muslim identity that also accommodates cultural signifiers and modern religious meaning into one robust state of mind and presence; as it does for the more affluent middle-class Pakistani diaspora.

Such perceptions correspond to the work of Guo-Ming and Chang (2010) whereby narratives setting out perceptions of discrimination relate the global impact of the ‘war on terror’ to individuals’ local experiences. Accordingly, globalisation has allowed ease of transnational communication which in turn has allowed the nurturing of a cultural identity that enhances their faith and nationality as primary identifiers – British and Muslim in this context. Social and new media provides an opportunity for self-branding and creating profiles that are relevant to hybrid identity, as reflected in the work of Ellison (2013). In addition, the narratives expressed the view that identity was modified and ‘Westernised’ as a response to discrimination in seeking employment. Profiles on public-facing personal sites (LinkedIn, MySpace) could be modified to reflect this to provide a more mainstream image to potential employers, as Ellison (ibid.) reflects. Social and new media helped reframe images of the diaspora to the external world as a pragmatic and resourceful approach to tackling animosity towards them. In addition, the internet supported the search for cultural references and transnational diasporic networks, as well as aiding in rebutting negative images of cultures and communities that Karim (2010) points out. There is an element of this within the Pakistani diaspora taking part in this study and as observed by the researcher throughout the investigation in dialogues with the participants. Social media may well be the vehicle with which to articulate concerns about racism and Islamaphobia that include police injustice and perceptions of criminality, so evident in the work of Watkins (2014) in the use of ‘Black Twitter’ to challenge overzealous police actions against black communities in America. There is much opportunity to afford such socially excluded groups as the Pakistani diaspora in this study an opportunity for a voice to challenge what they perceive as injustice and unfairness. This is reflected in the wider social media research analysed by the Pew Research Centre (2015).

In adding these personal reflections within the context of ethnographic experiences, the researcher could relate to these perceptions. The ‘insider’ value that is expressed by Foster (1994) provides much in the use of the emic approach as part of the wider methodology of enquiry. The researcher could relate to the experiences of discrimination and the increase in feelings of a growing sense of Islamaphobia. As this research progressed, the researcher felt more aware of the media depiction of Islam, in both in the written press and radio and television. He became more aware that he was often tuning out negative messages of Islam and the diaspora when these appeared in the mass media. The researcher personally describes this as a process of ‘switching off and switching on’, whereby he would turn off the radio on hearing what he perceived as biased news items, then switching on again once the news item had passed. Like the respondents, he too was becoming sensitised to the media reporting of Islam and so-called ‘war on terror’. He could appreciate the hurt and anger felt of longitudinal elements of life in Britain: schooling, employment and going abroad. Culturally there was much empathy in feelings of resentment at being singled out in stop and searches, particularly at the airport when travelling in numbers to Pakistan. In this specific area of analysing the impact of discrimination on the diaspora in their daily encounters and lives, the researcher, in a way, could feel their pain, and questions over belonging, acceptance and measures of integration. It follows that the feeling of being a ‘transmigrant’ (Engbersen, 2007) within a modern age is a feeling he could identify with. Additionally, he felt a strong sense of British identity, coupled with a faith and culture that needed to be asserted. It was, for the researcher, a case of evolving self-management of the contradictions of diasporic living in Britain as a result of media consumption but also media illustration.

Such ethnographic experiences and use of the emic method also reinforced the validity of the data, allowing a more enhanced analysis of the narratives and contributions of the respondents. The fact that the researcher felt conscious of these elements and issues, and the impact of discrimination on his own personal journey, ensured that objectivity remained paramount. This chapter also is also testament to the strong character of the diaspora in dealing with multiple discrimination, both overt and subtle, and not becoming too antagonistic towards those who perpetuated feelings of insecurity and rejection.

In a final summation on the themes of this chapter, the researcher seeks to align these key issues with Kymlicka’s (1995) framework of minority rights that has been expressed in previous chapters and in the opening section of this. They not only provide a fundamental cultural safety net for minority communities but also allow evolving hybridity that encapsulates aspects of majority and minority culture and values. Even Kymlicka’s critics acknowledge some of his rationale:

> ‘He [Kymlicka] rightly notes that Western theorists too often forget the West's own historical development (and, I would add, current practices)

> when it is assumed that other cultures are inherently illiberal and incapable of change.'
>
> (McDonald, 1996, p.303)

Legal safeguards go some way to create a level playing field to encourage equality and inclusion. However, minority rights have gradually declined as a priority in political and social policy, replaced by the need to prevent extremism and promote British values (Kundnani, 2014). There is no clamour to offer Islam and its followers the same protection as that provided to other faiths on blasphemy. Cultural racism is more apparent than ever under the EDL banner heading of 'stop the Islamicisation of Britain' (Kassimeris and Jackson, 2015).

The Race Relations (Amendment) Act of 2000 imposing a positive duty on promoting race quality created from outrage over the murder of Stephen Lawrence and the findings of the Macpherson Inquiry (1999), supplemented with new powers for the Commission for Racial Equality (CRE), have both ceased, to be replaced by the Equality Act (2010) and Equality and Human Rights Commission, both of which are ineffective through political undermining (Hepple, 2010). In fact, New Labour also recreated the political language promoting 'equality of opportunity and fairness of outcome' (Beech, 2006, p.154) that inevitably relate to 'priority and sufficiency conceptions of equality and not the strict egalitarian conception of equality' (ibid., p.155). This New Labour concept was ironically made relevant for British Muslims and particularly to the diaspora by one of its own, offering 'fairness not favours' to 'reconnect with British Muslims' (Khan, 2008, front cover). This Fabian paper sets out the case for compatibility of British values and Islam and the virtues of the Single Equality Act (2010) as a positive step towards challenging religious (anti-Muslim) discrimination. It also sets out a blueprint for a modernised British Muslim citizen of the diaspora (ibid.).

Despite such political philosophy, however, for many of the diaspora of the first, second and even third generation, there is still a sense of insecurity brought from daily interactions with the majority culture so evident in this study. Their response has been to reinvent a neo-societal culture that allows them to assert their diasporic identity within a unified cultural, linguistic and religious environment. In their narratives, there is a link between their heritage, whether Pukhtoon or Punjabi or Pakistani, and their present hybridity of Britishness. It corresponds to the work of Safran (1991), Eade (1997, 2007), Alam (2006) and, as has been noted above, to Alexander's (2006) reference to 'essentialising religio-cultural identities' (p.265). Within that, the media, traditional and new media, have also reinforced the anti-Muslim, culturally racist narrative of the diaspora (Poole, 2002; Karim, 2010). In addition, the understanding of this neo-societal culture is misinterpreted and distorted through outsider anthropological insights and liberal interpretation as being of deficit to what is deemed as British society. (Alam and Husband, 2006; Hutnyk, 2006; McLoughlin et al., 2014).

For the diaspora, it is bound up by fusion language, cultural modernity and ideas formed by being 'made in Bradford' (Alam, 2006) – or Luton, Oxford, Birmingham, London or Britain as a whole. In that regard, the respondents' narratives are important to provide a realistic assessment of life and policy-making in Britain. It is reminiscent of the words of a former bishop of Durham, who stated, 'Statistics need to have faces and faces need to have voices, voices need listening to, that is what is lacking…'.
(Jenkins, quoted in Foundation 2000, 1995)

Chapter 5

Media production and identity

The previous chapter focused on discrimination arising from the impact of Islamaphobia, which was a foundation for examining wider elements of prejudice felt by the respondents on a daily basis. Media production was seen as a factor contributing to how depiction of the Muslim mainly depicted as the 'Other' was so prevalent within mainstream media.

Participants in the research emphasised a perceived lack of impartiality of the media as part of a systematic process of promulgating a news agenda dominated by elites, business and political interests aided by professionalised news promoters, as reflected in the work of Dreier (1982), Chomsky (2005), Poole (2006), Dabashi (2008). The processes that are utilised in making news had a direct and profound bearing on the views of the respondents within the diaspora cohort groups and on their sense of a personal and group identity. In essence, the role of the media in Britain was a nucleus of concern amongst the cohort group members in the research. Their collective views place considerable emphasis on the role of strategic communications that operate behind the scenes and away from public eyes and scrutiny. It increased their need for alternative sources of accurate information and insight into global events. As stated by one respondent:

> "you really don't know who controls the media in the West and what lies they tell you so we need to find it from other places, just so we know it's not truth and not made up for propaganda purposes"
>
> Punjabi male Luton

This chapter therefore, seeks to make a number of links within the literature that relate to the perceptions of the respondents of how news is produced in the main and stories articulated in the public domain. This had an impact on the diaspora and their confidence in major broadcasters of the West that led to specific responses and alternatives being developed that reinforce a transnational identity.

The literature review in Chapter 2 to some extent provides an insight into the mechanisms of media production as they relate to the issues of identity and specifically to Islam in a world context. In many respects, the present chapter reinforces the view expressed by McQuail (2005) that media production is not necessarily an objective process in reporting information in the public domain. It makes a contribution to the body of work by articulating related issues raised by two specific groups of the Pakistani diaspora who, as a consequence of their experiences, had developed alternatives. These options reinforced their transnational identity and provided a positive counterbalance to the negative portrayals of their communities in the British and other Western media.

The media is not necessarily the objective observer of events and conduit for a flow of impartial information, as is the received wisdom, is therefore highly relevant in this discussion. There are, of course, many powerful interests that relate to how media is produced for the benefit of specific interests and to its powerful role within the global socio-economic and political environment, and these are reflected in the work of Molotoch and Lester (1974), Tunstall (1970), Sigal (1974) and McQuail (2003).

In these pages, to enhance the analysis further, the term ‘media production’ is used to mean “to publish or mediate between authors and original sources and the eventual audience or public” (McQuail, 2003, p.4), the end result allowing the facilitation of information to the public at large. ‘The media’ refers to the wider act of organisational roles and means by which to disseminate information or publication as the final outcome. The term ‘publication’ in this sense refers to output in its widest form, which includes print, audio and visual production and dissemination of information. ‘Media’ in the current world is a proliferation of outlets that produce information for the public en masse; it includes not only tradition television, radio and news papers but new social media such as Twitter and Facebook. They are all mechanisms for placing information to millions of communities across the world.

The researcher will, via data analysis, assess and draw links with capital in the first instance, followed by an examination of the role the media plays in reinforcing capitalist and Western hegemony through the construction of an external threat: communism on the past and Islam at present. The use of what Said (1997) defined as ‘cultural apparatus’ will be explored in the context of how Muslims and subsequently the diaspora, are framed and visualised within this structure, which includes race talk, associated lexicon, the role of journalists and Orientalist ideology. These will be further explored through the contributions of the Pakistani diaspora represented in this work and two specific case studies, in order to elucidate the perceptions of the diaspora based on real-life experiences, the empirical data in this study.

The process of media production can have an impact on the editorial decision-making process of news gathering, setting and broadcasting through the use of sophisticated and highly influential operators as argued by Sigal (1974). Additionally, professionalised public relations agencies and media relations events, press releases, press conferences and lunches with editors and journalists reinforce this process of assimilation and institutionalisation of news providers and gatherers, referred to by McQuail (2005). The perceptions of the diaspora are aligned with the articulation by Montgomery et al. (1989) of how the news media function to safeguard the interests of the media networks, which relates to the need for advertising revenue and core reasons of existence in a competitive corporate media community. It is an essential link with the role of capital within media production that is emphasised.

This seamless and carefully engineered interconnection mainly motivated by profit is supported by corporate conformity in the mainstream media. Given that control of media production rests with a few major players, this has a significant input into the output of large business enterprises such as News International, Time Warner, and even the publically funded BBC. Their income and budgets are more robust and excessive than those many small countries and are often free of legal restrictions to cross borders in the information age, as reflected in the work of McQuail (2003) addressing issues of accountability.

The relationships between journalists, government and private-sector media are also a matter of concern, given how they breach any notion of impartiality in their interdependence, as assessed by Goodman and Goodman (2006) and Prince (2009). This was a theme repeatedly picked up in the narratives of members of the cohort groups, who significantly highlighted an understanding of these relationships, which reinforce strong perceptions of organised misinformation at play in relation to aspects of their faith and identity. As this quote exemplifies:

> ‘The truth is that the Americans want to dominate the world with business, and big media companies use their power to dictate to the rest of the world. Muslims are rising up and defending themselves. That is not what they really like.’
>
> Punjabi female, Luton

An essential element of this relationship between mass media and powerful interests is also observed through the sophisticated art of 'spinning'. Former journalists work as heads of press relations for corporations, interest groups and governments to aid this relationship of mutuality (McQuail, 2005). This was exemplified by Alistair Campbell, principal ‘spin master’ for the Blair government, according to his own testimony (Campbell, 2007). The respondents in the research connected him to the development of the Iraq dossier which was a precursor to war. The dossier persuaded the public of the imminent destruction of the West by the weapons of mass destruction supposedly held by Saddam Hussein. Poole (2002) describes how the media played a significant part in the sequence of events, and their part in the ‘reproduction of political power’ (p.3). Poole portrays the broader scene and the rules set out by the political elites at a time of coming war or potential conflict.

The relationships between capital, media interests and governments have become much more public through the role of Andy Coulson, the former newspaper editor from News International as David Cameron’s press spokesperson. His subsequent resignation and trial for phone hacking (Wintour and Davies, 2011) has served as a high-profile case study of this interdependence, close working and lack of objectivity of the media as a whole. The example has given clear reinforcement to the views expressed by respondents on this subject of close association between government policy and media portrayals of their communities, their heritage, their status and intentions as British Pakistani Muslims.

There is no doubt about the level of expertise and contacts that former journalists and media specialists can bring to business and government in the framing of news items and stories that can influence or set the daily news agenda and promote their interests. Indeed, such corporate media advocates can drip-feed the media with relevant and 'exclusive' information to ensure maximum interest and coverage of a specific news story or message they wish to broadcast. This practice was also picked up by the respondents in many of the focus group interviews in assessing how stereotypes are utilised and frames created by the media that seek to promote the desired agenda. Respondents stated:

> "when something awful happens against the West it's breaking news and it comes and goes all the time but if bombings in Muslim countries happen, then its normal news or not mentioned at all"
>
> Punjabi male Luton

> "They [media] feel really proud when they have a story about a terrorist who they get an exclusive interview with, they like playing that again and again saying it's a Muslim bomber arrested by the Police in a raid".
>
> Pukhtoon male Oxford

The Leveson Inquiry (2012) provided better insight into these powerful relationships than was possible before, through strong case studies of close working relationships between the press and senior politicians in government (Guardian, 2012).

Correspondingly, media production and the thirst of twenty-four-hour news providers itself mean there is much more reliance on news agencies and professional public relations experts to create headlines that develop the stories deemed worthy of airing. The systemised and well-developed process of internal news production conferences, editorial meetings and scripted anchors reinforce specific, often Orientalist, messages as elaborated by Said (1997), where media output can be a form of social control for compliance with what is deemed as the national interest, as defined by the strongest pressure groups. These issues were not lost on the viewpoints of the diaspora, as illustrated by this comment:

> ‘I think the majority of people from the young to the old are aware of how biased the media is and understand how powerful a tool it is, and the people do understand, people know how biased it is, people have an understanding, have an idea .... This kind of media is not the full picture.’
>
> Pukhtoon male, Oxford

Strong feelings were expressed by the cohort members that the media always provided a subjective analysis in how they gathered and edited information to create news stories. Such views, typical of the initial responses of participants recorded in focus group forums, did not change over time in the re-emerging data and analysis within the grounded theory methodology adopted. A common concern was often stated as:

> ‘The BBC and Sky always are the worst in showing us Muslims as bad British citizens and as terrorists around the World.’
>
> Punjabi male, Luton

> ‘How do the media know what these terrorist organisations are really like when they don’t speak to them directly. It’s sometimes just made up for television.’
>
> Pukhtoon male, Oxford

> ‘The news and television, they also show us as being radicals, calling us fundamentalists as if we British Muslims are going to attack them. Just watch out if you’re called Mohammed in Luton, then you might be a secret enemy.’
>
> Punjabi male, Luton

At the same time, this insight also revealed the role the media played in the lives of these contributors on a daily basis. They consistently and on each day viewed terrestrial media news they found of interest. By doing so, they assessed and linked negative media depictions of Muslims, nationally and internationally, to their own personal identities and experiences.

It is significant to highlight that such deeply held views were fixed at a period of much upheaval and political turmoil during a partisan period defined by the Bush and Blair administrations that related to the ‘war on terror’ that so polarized world and opinion, as these comment signify:

> ‘I felt really uncomfortable during the war in Iraq. I didn’t want to voice my opinion too much because you don’t know who is listening. I mean, they didn’t listen to everyone marching against the war, why would they listen to us Muslims here?’
>
> Punjabi male, Luton

> ‘I had an Indian work colleague ask me why Muslims were always creating problems and trouble in the world. It’s the way he said it really that got to me, “Why do you lot always cause problems for us all? Some of us want to live here peaceful.” ’
>
> Pukhtoon male, Oxford

5.1 Islam equals communism

The role of the neo-conservatives in emphasising the Islamic threat and the closeness of the American media to the Bush administration were a central theme of the respondents’ discourse. The commentary of the respondents is mirrored in the study of the media by Goodman and Goodman (2006), which reflects the role big business played in perpetuating, via the media, the misinformation on Saddam Hussein’s weapons of mass destruction. In particular, these authors how the media was used to sell the Bush message on Iraq and the ‘war on terror’ whilst limiting the freedoms in America of anyone critical of that approach and of reporting not reflective of the American ‘reality’.

This view was elucidated by many of the diaspora taking part in this study in what their perception of an orchestrated programme to equate Islam with terrorism. They cited how George Galloway, an advocate of the opposing view, was given little media attention and within the cohort groups was considered to have been sidelined by powerful media organisations, because he was not on-message.

> ‘They don’t like what people like Galloway has to say. He is [too] clever for them, so they just ignore him, but he knows what he’s talking about.’
>
> Pukhtoon male, Oxford

The Pukhtoon cohort groups were of a stronger opinion on this issue. Their contributions included reflections on the invasion of Afghanistan after the September 11 attacks and they drew comparisons with the Soviet invasion in 1979. It is these connections that have replaced communism with Islam as the new enemy depicted by the media in the West, a global threat to a Western way of life and liberal, democratic values, just as communism was at the height of the cold war.

President Bush clearly outlined the heart of this philosophy in the 2006 National Security Strategy of the United States in which he stated:

> ‘America is at war. This is a wartime national security strategy of the United States required by the grave challenge we face – the rise of terrorism fuelled by an aggressive ideology of hatred and murder, fully

> revealed to the American people on September 11th, 2001.' (quoted in Ostergard, 2006, p.44)

This ideology, according to Ostergard (2006), is radical Islam, which he describes as the new hot war based on the cold war maxim of 'them and us'. He argues that former cold war policy-makers were searching for what he describes as 'the next enemy, or the next grand purpose' (p.45) post 9/11. It is an echo of the words of James Woolsey, the former director of the CIA speaking at Chatham House, at the Royal Institute for International Affairs, in 2003. Woolsey stated his view that the United States and the West are at war with 'fascist Middle East governments and totalitarian Islamists" (Woolsey, 2003). His comparison between what he describes as extreme Islam and the democracies of the West parallels the military and ideological wars with communism, such as the Korean War (1950-53), or misinformation to undermine Marxist-Leninist thought (Ostergard, ibid.). In the modern era, the Western mass media is an essential element within this construct, as captured in the work of Said (1997) and in the Orientalist discourse (ibid.,1978) that underlines this emerging political philosophy. Its emphasis was further made clear by Cohen (2001) in an article in the *Wall Street Journal* describing this new war as the Fourth World War, WWIII have been staged at the time of the cold war. The construct encapsulates a strong policy shift in Western foreign policy that entrenches Islam, its followers and their diverse cultures as all potentially enemies of Western states, framed within Huntingdon's (1993) 'clash of civilisations' metaphor. Enhanced and proliferated by Anglo-Saxon media, this has become the prevailing discourse within many Western societies (Said, 1997; Poole, 2006). It was followed by the call to arms leading to military interventions in Afghanistan and its personification in the media strapline of the 'war on terror'. It was precisely these parallels drawn between Islam and communism that were regarded as objectionable by the sample diaspora.

For the Pukhtoon community in particular, the successful struggle of the Mujahedeen against the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 was a cause célèbre. It was, in their view, an example of Muslims asserting themselves against a major superpower and one they could particularly identify with because of the Pukhtoon heritage spanning both Pakistan and Afghanistan. As this comment illustrates:

> ‘The Pukhtoons really gave those Russians a lesson in Afghanistan. At that time, the West was on their side and giving them guns and the lot. Now they want to show the Mujahedeen as bad as the Russians and what they believed.’
>
> Pukhtoon male, Oxford

These participants recognised the role of media depiction and production in portrayal of that struggle that had the overt support of the West in fighting communism. The media played an essential part in leading criticism of the former Soviet Union within wider global public opinion. Hollywood’s depiction of a sole American hero taking on the Red Army in Afghanistan in the film *Rambo* reinforced the evil of the Russian campaign. What is familiar to the Pukhtoon respondents is the role of the largely Western media, which once depicted the Mujahedeen as heroes and now reverted to showing them as terrorists. The period epitomised, in their view, the emphasis placed on the ‘war on terror’ philosophy, inherent in the political doctrine of the administrations of George Bush and Tony Blair. For some of the diaspora, this was characterised as Western media’s on-going play on emotions aroused by of 9/11, aligned with the discourse of an impending Muslim threat, described by Goodman and Goodman (2005, p.6) as a policy of perpetuating fear. As a cohort member stated:

> ‘When so many Muslims and others have died around the world in wars and Western bombings in Iraq or even in Palestine, they keep on focussing on 9/11 as the only event that is important – as the only terrorist attack that has taken place in history.’

Punjabi male, Luton

This has also been reflected in the work of Poole (2002) and Gottschalk and Greenberg (2006) in detailed analysis of media representations of Islam in Britain and America, Additionally, the respondents echoed what Herman and Chomsky (1994) have described as the workings of a ‘propaganda model’ that perpetuates a capitalist ideology, strengthening disparity and inequality within wider society as a consequence. Yet the respondents went further in discussing how it denies and sidelines fairness as an end in itself, through its use of money to influence the media. According to the diaspora in this sample, the use of the new bogeyman of Islam was a re-packaged formula to be used in the quest for foreign resources and minerals by the West: oil in Iraq and Syria, for instance.

Respondents also referred to the lack of information on the number of civilian casualties in Iraq as an example of propaganda to frame the media production of winning the ‘war on terror’, a war that personifies Islam as a new threat, as related by Said (1997) and Dabashi (2008), and is closely aligned to Western foreign policy (Drake and Metzl, 2001).

The concern of the interviewees was with how media production continually and profoundly impacted on them as it placed them at risk from extremist elements and fellow citizens in their local communities. Such concerns have been reflected in the work of Poole (2002), where she speaks of how the internal seeks to remind people of the external threat (ibid., p.3) – in other words, how the Muslim and the diaspora are so closely associated with the fanatical and destructive elements of political Islam depicted by the media on a daily basis.
A number of participants commented that:

> ‘They think we are some kind of sleepers who will attack the country, that’s what it makes you feel like sometimes.’
>
> Punjabi male, Luton

> ‘The media and the EDL want to show to other people who are not Muslim that we are here to cause problems and make trouble and they keep showing Muslims with guns and as terrorists. You think, “What are other people thinking of me when they see those pictures on TV?”’
>
> Punjabi woman, Luton

That media production was also an instrument used by right-wing organisations in Britain such as the EDL was not lost on the respondents, particularly those in Luton. This process was referred to by some of the respondents as ‘their paranoia feeding into our paranoia’. It is summed up in this statement by an interviewee:

> ‘Politicians and the mass media in the West were perpetuating the myths about us and our religion. This shows all us Muslims as the enemy and against Britain.’
>
> Pukhtoon male, Oxford

It is these images of bearded men shouting repeatedly ‘God is great’, accompanied at times with the carrying and discharge of heavy military equipment that is the standard footage of choice. Images of the carnage of September 11 in the attacks in New York are seldom forgotten within this discourse that characterises Islam and its followers as often feudal, militant and uncivilized, as noted by Said (1997) in his essays on media representations of Muslims. This was not lost on the respondents to this study, who offered a more personal viewpoint that reflects that of the wider diaspora and indeed the assessment made by Poole (2002). The impact on identity caused by the resulting sense of vulnerability is part of the experience of the evolving diaspora and recorded frequently within the narratives of participants.

Media alignment to big business and hence capitalism was also a theme picked up by many respondents. For many, Western media promoted Western foreign policy, which many respondents felt was aligned to the Blair and Bush administrations. In particular, the quest for natural resources was frequently discussed in the cohort groups:

> ‘It is about oil and wanting it from the Arab [Muslims] countries they call terrorist and something the media always tells us, such as Iran.’
>
> Punjabi female, Luton

> ‘It’s always about business at the end of the day. I mean, they’re invading these countries to make money and get the oil and natural resources in Afghanistan. Look at all those American companies in there that are raking it in.’
>
> Punjabi male, Luton

> ‘Corporations are bigger than some countries, they can control governments I think. Look at Pakistan, it seems to be run by mobile companies that is all that you see on TV over there on the ads. Iraq [the invasion] is all about American companies making money. That’s what Bush is all about, I think.’
>
> Pukhtoon male, Oxford

The views of the participants in this respect echo sentiments expressed by writers such as Gandy (1982) and Dabashi (2008), who have referred to the strong role of capital in the control of public information, in order to protect the dominant cultural, social and political status quo. The rise of Islam is equated by the respondents as a legitimate threat to Western hegemony, given the rise of the faith within its own borders and in challenging the Christian basis of the dominant society. As a result, they argue, the use of the media to promote negative images and depictions of Islam as the only militant religion amongst the diversity of faiths is an active preoccupation of Western elites. It has had a direct adverse impact on the diaspora itself, as articulated in their contributions in this research, in particular on their sense of belonging in Britain. It also articulates the cultural apparatus that is so dominant within Anglo-Saxon media

5.2 Cultural apparatus

The term ‘cultural apparatus’ has been employed by Said (1997, p.47) to denote a method in which media production is created and remains the mode by which information is delivered to the mass public. It seeks to enforce, time and time again, key messages such as those described previously within the sphere of media production and the systemised manner in which news is formulated and despatched. The researcher has adopted the term to use as a platform to explore further the impact of the media consumption of respondents on their perceptions of their identity.

Islam and its followers are chiefly seen through audio and visual networks, and the dailies – either so-called redtops or the broadsheets. The former are known not just for their masthead colour, but also for their showbiz gossip, celebrity and political scandalising. There is more appeal to the mass of the populace in this approach focused on human interest stories than in-depth analysis or features on public affairs, and this distinguishes redtops from the substance and the column inches of the broadsheets (Palmer, 2000). All (magazines and cinema included) reinforce the imagery of the 'Other' and representations of hate directed from a foreign land. The images displayed are not set in isolation, they are accompanied with feelings that create emotions and stir strong sentiment within the viewer, reinforcing moral codes, values and assumptions, implicit within that short but powerful frame that also distinguishes between right and wrong for the beholder, as reflected upon by Said (ibid.).

The realism of the planes colliding into the twin towers, accompanied by Osama Bin Laden's beaming smile, are precisely such images that personify Islam in a way that allows those not familiar with the faith to claim it as the new enemy of the West. This has been assessed and analysed in the work of Conte (2001), which echoes the concerns of the respondents as referred to earlier and further in this chapter. The following is a sample statement made by a respondent:

> 'They always show a Muslim with a beard, wearing traditional clothes and always blowing things up, never peaceful, and then these people like Bin Laden are seen to represent our religion – it's all propaganda.'
>
> Punjabi male, Luton

The significance of the literature is in how it resonates with the experience of diaspora participants, as illustrated by the research data and analysis of voices articulating concern, anxiety and even fear of the intentions of the British media. Participants in the research spoke of a number of specific issues which heightened their sensitivity to how media production and those in control of media organisations defined the agenda. They related specific concerns over the approach of the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) and Sky, in particular how trust was a major concern in how these two bodies operated and disseminated information.

One particular incident amongst many stood out for the diaspora and caused much anxiety and exasperation within the participant community, during the time the interviews were being conducted. The events in Gaza in 2010 were fresh in the minds of the respondents as they were a topical news story at the time. As one interviewee commented:

> “Gaza and Palestine was the only important issue for all us Muslims at the time but as usual the media made it about terrorism by Palestinians”
>
> Punjabi male Luton

The decision by both the BBC and Sky not to broadcast an appeal for aid by the Emergency Appeals Committee, a collective grouping of British charities and the Red Crescent, was felt by the vast majority of respondents to be an overtly political decision by these news outlets. It raised great emotion, frustration and anger amongst the cohort groups, who repeatedly spoke of a biased BBC and Sky, not interested in the truth in respect to the Muslims concerned in this case, with many feeling that these broadcasters had openly sided with the Israeli State. To many, it was yet another personification of ‘bad’ Islam, which added to the sense of an Islamophobia they viewed as increasingly present and growing in Britain. There was a strong feeling in both cohort groups of how controlling the two media organisations were, in not highlighting the suffering of the Palestinians; faced with the major superior force of the Israeli state.

The controversy over the BBC and Sky’s decision not to broadcast the Gaza appeal was significant in the extent to which these providers lost credibility amongst the diaspora audience. It reinforced existing conspiracy theories and perceived pro-Israeli stance of these broadcasters, which were also perceived to be anti-Muslim in not highlighting the plight of the Palestinian Muslims.

Participants also recognised that people suffering in that region were portrayed as prolonging their own misery by supporting a government (Hamas) that was proactively campaigning against Israeli state actions. This corresponds with the view of Horsti (2007), who argues that such assessments end up blaming the victim for the oppression they endure.

Respondents made similar comments as the following:

> “Palestinians are the victims here but they (media) don’t show that do they? It’s because they are Muslims and Muslims only do bad things, that is what they want to show”
>
> Punjabi female Luton

There were many other polemical comments that ranged from disgust to incredible disbelief over the actions of the BBC in particular, given its public broadcasting role and reputation for impartiality, which it considers as central to its philosophy and public service ethos. It also instilled in the diaspora in this study a much stronger affirmation not only of their faith but also of their personal identity and sense of allegiance. Many spoke of their close solidarity with the Palestinians’ struggle and feeling that the media response was part of the wider adverse portrayal of the impact of Islam in the world. Many felt very angry and saddened by the reaction of the main broadcasters at this time of need for the suffering Palestinians. Some respondents came up with their own term for the BBC as this statement highlights:

> “so much for an independent BBC they keep going on about, it’s the Biased Broadcasting Corporation just like it was the Blair Bush Corporation during the Iraq war, just like Sky”
>
> Pukhtoon male, Oxford

There was a lack of comprehension of the stance taken by the two broadcasters, given that others, such as ITV, did broadcast the appeal. It was not only seen as a dereliction of duty by many, but as a proactive case of censorship that many in the groups felt was not being challenged. Participants felt that the commercial interests of the two media broadcasters might be a factor, also influence behind the scenes to encourage a lack of representation of the Palestinian viewpoint. There was much conjecture in this respect that echoed the continued discourse of anti-Muslim feelings being perpetuated by these actions.

The participants' reactions in this case could highlight significant awareness of how the media formulates ideas and depicts information, and an understanding of the shaping of the news agenda and what this means for individuals and groups of the diaspora. However, it could also represent a lack of factual basis for these assumptions given the political sensitivities of this issue on both the Palestinian and the Israeli side,

For the majority of the diaspora participants, however, the Palestine issue was placed on a par with the Kashmir, Chechnya and other liberation struggles, as these were considered by most of the respondents to be similar struggles where Muslims were seeking independence. For many, following more probing, such views reflected thought processes handed down to them from their parents and peer groups on a subject they had debated and argued over for many decades. This clearly had an impact on their identity as it echoed with them on a daily basis and represented a significant concern for those of the same religious persuasion, emphasising a stronger sense of Muslim community globally. There is also, in this context, much more empathy for independent or liberation movements that have an Islamic influence and seek to champion the cause of Muslims in different parts of the world. It is a reminder of the influence of the parental contribution of their version of the colonial experience under British rule in India and what is now Pakistan is. The legacies of empire in the Middle East and elsewhere provide yet another perspective on this theme.

This statement echoes this overall view:

> 'My parents always went on about Kashmir and I never understood what was so important but with Gaza I do, it's the same in Chechnya and even Bosnia, it's about pushing down Muslims who want their own freedom.

> But Muslims around the world stay united and that is something they don't understand or care about.'
>
> Punjabi male Luton

Parallels were also drawn between what the BBC said and the government's stated position on national and international events, particularly, many felt, reflecting on Pakistan and as a consequence, on the Pakistani population resident here. Within that association was a subtext on Islam and Muslims, synonymous with the lexicon of terrorism. Many spoke of how BBC news stories about Pakistan or British Muslims were always negative: examples of forced marriages were represented as common and as evidence of the downtrodden state of the veiled Muslim woman in need of Western liberation, as identified in Said's *Covering Islam* (1997).

The interviewees expressed a view, that they were aware, that in any community these issues were prevalent, including in British Pakistani society. However, they objected to the lack of balance in reporting and to the framing of these issues within a narrow racial and social context. Many spoke of how it reinforced stereotypes of their communities widely held by the public and how it was used against them in daily interaction with indigenous-origin communities, particularly for those who had close contact with a range of non-Muslim social groups, such as young Pakistani male taxi drivers who took part in this investigation. These taxi drivers often spoke of how white passengers, in ignorance of their faith, had questioned them on Islam and their cultural heritage whilst alluding to terrorism, implying difference and a perception that they did not belong in Britain. For example, as cited in Chapter 4 on Islamophobia, some taxi drivers spoke of being asked, explicitly or implicitly, of their reasons for being in the country. These incidents have parallels with the literature in how the 'Other' is personified when cultural practices are viewed as alien and contrary to a perceived British way of life, as echoed in the work of Hall (2001).

There was much time including follow-up reflection spent on this area, with respondents stating repeatedly that news reporting from the BBC and Sky was fundamentally misleading in comparison to other terrestrial media such as ITV and Channel Five, although, rarely viewed. Alternative channels such as Al-Jazeera English and the Iranian London-based English news channel, Press TV, were viewed as less biased and more reliable. In both these examples, it was felt that the production of news information, the associated content and framing were more balanced or evenly slanted in relation to Islam rather than against it. The anti-Western stance of Press TV, in particular, appealed to sections of the cohort group members who felt at ease with a level of negative reporting of Western governments, which they considered was denied to them by mainstream media.

However, it is also important to note that the genuine concern over the plight of the Palestinians and their treatment was formed independently by the diaspora. This was through alternative audio and visual consumption of independent reports on Palestine and also anecdotes from fellow Muslims, who had travelled in food convoys to besieged cities in that region. The role of YouTube and the internet played an important role in this regard, as they provided topical and uncensored personal accounts and documentaries that were not available in mainstream media production. It is a wider recognition of how diversified the global and new media has become that it has allowed these alternatives to exist. Importantly, this diversification also signals a potential lack of dominance of Western media broadcasters, where much richer non-Western based media outlets are beginning to grow in confidence and challenge the ‘natural’ media order. This development includes production companies from Asia and the Middle East funded by oil rich countries and leaders, to provide alternative voices to the world. The diaspora in this study were gradually realising this and taking advantage of the alternatives that the global media village now had to offer.

A respondent stated:

> ‘So many countries have English speaking news so we can make sure we get information from elsewhere not just CNN or BBC, we can get it from Russian news, Iranian television, Pakistan and other Muslim countries too, so it’s good for us.’
>
> Punjabi female, Luton

It became apparent that, for many within the cohort groups, their concerns over specific broadcasters were based on their own viewing interpretations of organisations they had felt would be more objective in their reporting. This illusion of the independence of the media, drilled into them from early on as consumers of information, had been challenged as a response to the attention given to Islam and to consequently them.

In probing further for the rationale in reaching these conclusions, it became evident that many of the respondents felt that editorial content was too pro-Western, with depictions and discourse reflecting a language of difference that was reinforced in interviews with people who often promoted an anti-Muslim and racist discourse. This experience mirrors work done by Conte (2001) on media representations of Muslims and also Poole (2003; Poole and Richardson, 2006). As this respondent stated:

> ‘Come on, you can’t tell me it isn’t planned by the media that they want to show us as not liking the West. I mean, look how they twist people’s words, we don’t know what they’ve really said. We are outsiders here, even if we were born here and this is our home and they keep reminding us.’
>
> Pukhtoon male, Oxford

Again, the scripted text accompanying the short clips of such interviews also disturbed the contributors, who compared the lexicon at play for news items featuring militant Christianity and those for militant Islam. The gentler term of ‘evangelist’ was always utilised in media reports of strong and dominant Christian personalities who attacked Islam with much rhetorical zeal, whilst Muslim preachers were described as either fundamentalist or extremist in holding similar views of Christianity, as Conte (ibid.) has recorded. This is also appropriate to consider within the wider racialisation of minorities emphasised in the work of Downing and Husband (2005) that impacts on the diaspora.

5.3 Race talk

The manner in which the media articulates key messages and frames members of the diaspora community and Pakistani British Muslims, as viewed by respondents, within the wider context as racial minorities, has created much anxiety and insecurity. The diaspora were clearly aware of how the dominant media was depicting them, they were conscious of this fact in their day-to-day activities, and sourced other media to reaffirm their identity.

Clearly, this awareness was in itself a key finding in that it displayed a present anxiety amongst this group concerning their negative image within wider British society that, an anxiety that, in the eyes of many participants, greatly affected their sense of belonging in their place of birth. It was their belief that the elements of production and editorial control sought to promote specific aspects of the emerging Pakistani diaspora, and to place them within a very narrow set of parameters, which increases a sense of siege and alienation, which in turn is amplified by stereotypical and racialised framing serving to stress their minority status and feelings of insecure tenure as citizens. Some participants spoke of how this was meant to make them ashamed of being Pakistani and Muslim because of the actions of a minority of extremists, again highlighting the portrayal of Islam as being a homogenous faith rather than diverse one that crosses cultural barriers, as referred to by Poole (2002). The racialisation of Muslims also impacted on the sample diaspora, as reflected by the work of Downing and Husband (ibid.), who speak in the same terms of the role of media in depicting negative racial identity in the production of news that is expanded into religious life for the diaspora.

Again, the respondents acknowledged that supposed homogeneity of the British Muslim population is presented within the media frame, rather than an acknowledgement of the diversity of the global Muslim population that is reflected in the United Kingdom. This struck a particular cord with the participants, who felt that diversity was significantly played down within British media to display a continued homogenous unity of all within the faith of Islam. By doing so, the media in their view branded each Muslim with the same guise as a potential suicide bomber and anti-Western collaborator with terrorism. This understanding further elucidates the deep-rooted insecurity felt amongst this section of society, which is perhaps internalised rather than overtly expressed within the public domain. As this comment highlights:

> 'All Muslims are not the same. I mean, there are millions of Muslims from around the world, we all don't get on with each other, but they just show us all together as one big club of Muslim fanatics, but I think they meant to do that.'
>
> Punjabi male, Luton

Accordingly, some 90% of those in the respondent groups were of the opinion that they had very little or no faith in the mass media to report information and stories objectively or even honestly. Their perception was of a media that was more interested in highlighting their racial and religious identity to characterise them as lacking a sense of Britishness and conformity to the norms of Western society. This was an extension of the discourse on cultural racism that has become so prevalent and has led to Islamophobic sentiment gradually becoming part of normality as perceived by the diaspora.

These issues clearly relate back to news production in many ways. They reflect editorial decision-making as to how a story is to be presented and aired. The ethnicity of individuals would in most cases be irrelevant, but here it is personified to a larger extent to boost the story and frame the item for maximum impact, the item then being disseminated through the potential reinforcement of existing media and audience prejudices as argued by Said (1997), McQuail (2005), and Downing and Husband (2005) as part of the systematic organisation of mass media production. Again, this perception was reinforced by many cohort members, who interpreted their own consumption of media production and information reflecting specific group ethnicity, which seemed to focus more on the British-born Muslim of Pakistani origin being seen as the 'Other'.

Additionally, some participants took the opportunity to reflect on their past encounters with the media in situations where race, culture and religion were a key factor. For the Pukhtoons, who had undertaken internal migration from one city, Bradford, to another, Oxford, the memories and associations with journalists seeking sensationalism was all too apparent. The inner city disturbances of 1995 and 2001 in Bradford were reflected upon in this study and, for some, cast a shadow over their continued apprehension of the mass media.

The deprived area of Manningham in Bradford, home to a large Pakistani community, was the scene of riots in 1995 that brought it to national prominence; the events of 2001 with riots in Oldham, Bradford and Burnley brought further attention to the Pakistani diaspora in national and international media. Some of the respondents recalled how the media was more assimilated within the agencies of law enforcement and seemed to articulate their concerns. In one such incident, rather than address issues of police harassment, the media focused on the police version of events that described the disturbances as generational issues. This analysis was captured in a community-based response entitled *Voices must be heard: a community response to the Manningham disturbances* (Foundation 2000, 1995).

These local findings summarised news reporting in terms of perpetuating the Muslim radical, as journalists at the scene directed representation for the following days' papers and related headlines, as captured later by one respondent in this comment:

> 'I saw how the media asked young Muslim men to put scarves over their heads and act militant so they can take pictures of them as some kind of warriors. It was wrong, it gave the wrong impression but it made me understand to some level, how the media operate with our communities. It makes you think.'
>
> Pukhtoon male, Oxford

In such circumstances, past experiences of interaction with the media, as well as consumption of media, had increased sensitivity and heightened a sense of bias in journalistic practices that in the past focused on culture and colour and now included a stronger focus on their faith.

The data revealed that it had become common practice for respondents to analyse the press on a daily basis, again, informed by their sensitivity to critical output by the media in general. Cultural racism and the whole element of racialised language, they argued, was a key component in many news items. It perpetuated, in their minds, the language of difference and cultural racialisation of Pakistanis and Muslims as separate from mainstream society. Some in the groups commented on how religion was referred to in a media report when a person was Muslim, yet this was not the case for an Anglo-Saxon Christian, who might have committed the same crime. This replicates the writings of hooks (1995), who speaks of ‘race talk’ in everyday use within the media to reinforce the inferiority of the minority person and or community. As this comment shows:

> ‘I remember the Bradford riots they wanted to show Pakistani’s as breaking windows and looting but why would we do that from our own shops, but that is what they wanted to tell everyone, it was lies.’
>
> Pukhtoon male, Oxford

> ‘Bradford, man, when it lit up in ’95, I mean, they wanted to show it as jihad or something, the Muslims attacking the white coppers, crap man.’
>
> Pukhtoon male, Oxford

Participants felt that the media increasingly played up the Islamic identity of any offender whilst minimizing it when they were a victim. And with international coverage, many felt that the images that accompanied the story-lines, for example, yet again, Muslim women clad in hijab and men with beards and prayer hats, fitted the Western stereotype of a tribal Muslim person more familiar in the East than in the streets of Britain. The strong perception was of a purposeful attempt to depict British Muslims of the diaspora as predominantly backward and alien in their own homegrown environment. This is in many ways, as Said (1997) and Poole (2002) have reflected, the Orientalist approach of media production that continually depicts Muslims as the Other, their culture and belief systems minimised as anti-Western and anti-liberal in a more progressive Eurocentric age. It is a depiction of the inferior civilisation reminiscent of the writings of Matthews (1926) documenting his journeys in the Arab and Eastern worlds, a discourse reflected upon by Lewis (1990) and Huntingdon (1993).

Such perceptions among participants are significant in another respect, as they show this cohort group was aware of the nature of the news information that they consumed, rather than being passive and benign recipients of media information. By doing so, they were able to remain alert to an increasing threat to their well-being and potential for harm in times of increased anti-Muslim feelings. The distortion of objective reality by the media as echoed in the work of Gieber and Johnson (1961) was an element they felt a need to be vigilant of.

It was also clear in the data analysis that this fed into a sense of alienation, which became clear as the study and interviews progressed. It assisted the researcher to develop the empirical data that fed into the wider discourse and analysis of this subject, that, in essence, the participants represented and encapsulated a significant body of experience of media consumption of British media providers.

These are all powerful intersections within the diaspora’s understanding of their own struggle for identity. It is a search to resolve a complex relationship with transnationalism and an evolving hybridity that conflates the religious with the cultural, as mirrored by Samad (2013).

For the vast majority of the respondents this was a constant shadow they lived under, with continuing media attention concentrated on this agenda, in mainstream British media, satellite and cable news channels.

Yet again, the anti-Islam message was seen as part of this strategic formation, as pointed out by Lippmann as far back as 1922. It emphasises the prevailing political doctrine at the time, ‘regime change’, as the panacea to combating and preventing terrorism against the West (Dabashi, 2008).

The respondents felt strongly that there was less concentration on this relationship between Islam and terror within culturally specific media (see below), given the links of the diaspora to the Indian sub-continent and Pakistan in particular. Indian news programmes did, however, contain such stories, and the diaspora participants reflected on the animosity between Pakistan and India as at issue here, rather than the British Muslim. Their comments included the following:

> ‘If you watch Pakistani news, you always see them bad mouthing India, and then you look at Indian news and it’s the same. Usually over Kashmir and terrorists, they don’t like each other.’
>
> Pukhtoon male, Oxford

> ‘Indian TV news especially, if you watch STAR News, seems to have a go at Pakistan and you can tell it’s not positive, always linking terrorism and Pakistan, even when I am in Pakistan, people hate India.’
>
> Punjabi male, Luton

Within these wider discussions, such sentiments echo the work of Herman and Chomsky (1994), Goodman and Goodman (2006) and Dabashi (2008) that indicates the political power play at work, whereby the media is an active participant within global political strategic thinking promoted by the West.

With such wide access to mass media provided by the plethora of satellite and cable broadcasters, there was now a choice of relevant and wider global diverse news and information channels (see next section). Participants were interested in news from Pakistan and news of what was happening to other Muslim populations around the world with which they could identify most easily. As one respondent stated:

> ‘It’s amazing what you can find out when you just go through all the news channels, Russian and Chinese English-speaking channels, you can get a different side to the stories the West gives you.’
>
> Punjabi male, Luton

In that context, the diaspora has created its own response to this sense of media bias, by searching and consuming alternative forms of media. This media was more in tune with their own development of identity, which included transnational cultural and religious relationships with a wider diasporic community, part of what Gajjala (2010) refers to as ‘digital diasporas’ (p.211).

5.4 Alternative media

The use of alternative media is a key response to the bias within media production perceived by many of the respondents. As already stated, broadcasters such as Al-Jazeera English and Press TV were viewed with more openness than existing British-based news providers such as the BBC and Sky. This comes with greater use of cable and satellite services, as echoed in the work of Gajjala (ibid.) in respect to South Asian diasporas and that of Rinnawi (2010) in relation to Muslim diasporas. Consequently, it has led to the cross-referencing of material between networks and other sources, such as YouTube and the global internet and other diaspora transnational networks located through web-based search engines and word of mouth. YouTube was a much favoured medium for gathering information and insights into events that were of keen interest to the diaspora, as in Gaza and other trouble spots, including news of Pakistan that bypassed mainstream news sources. This resource also allowed access to specific linguistic and cultural context for both the Punjabi and Pukhtoon communities, through documentaries and discussion shows such as *Ghairati Pukhtoon* on Apna (our) TV.com or accessed through Pakfiles.com. Again this highlights a need for religious and cultural enrichment, as pointed out by Gajjala (ibid.) and Rinnawi (ibid.) in relation to media consumption of such diasporas.

According to participants:

> ‘The internet has given us the chance to see what is really out there culturally and politically. We can just google and find all kinds of media that we can see on YouTube or internet. I can check news from around the world to know what is really going on.’
>
> Punjabi male, Luton

> ‘Getting Pukhtoon music and dramas is amazing. It really helps me to know more about my culture and understand my background.’
>
> Pukhtoon male, Oxford

This cross-referencing of news material was not only enterprising but also showed an assertive response to what was perceived to be a lack of objectivity in Western media circles. It was born out of frustration with the content of predominantly British and American news content, which many of the diaspora did not consider reliable. Additionally, they felt strongly that such broadcasters perpetuated the stereotypes of the Muslim terrorist and of the internal Muslim threat that so impacted on them individually and collectively as the Pakistani diaspora.

They considered the internet as providing them with more open access to engage with similar diasporas across the world such as the Pakistani–US alumni network www.facebook.com/PakAlumni but more importantly, through Facebook, with other Pakistanis in Pakistan, Canada and elsewhere. Many had come across forums and discussion sites that allowed them to relate their transnational identity to others across continents.

This was clearly evidenced from the range of focus groups and the one-to-one interviews held with each participant, a strong sense being expressed that other sources of news information had to be researched in order to achieve a balanced viewpoint of world events. Participants also felt that there was a need to be better informed in order to challenge the unbalanced media representations offered to the British audience and as such, to their work colleagues and people they interacted with. This relates to a clear process of self-awareness and self-education, articulated in the work of Modood (2005), Moll (2007) and Samad (2013), which reflects the interviewees' concerns with media manipulation and distortion in reporting.

As stated previously, many participants expressed their concerns about how news media seek to reinforce stereotypes of specific groups. This then promotes an image of the internalized threat from a minority population that does not conform to Western standards, however these may be defined. There is, of course, the contrasting view held by cohort group members that news is blatantly invented at some level to promote a specific political agenda, as documented in the literature (Molotoch and Lester, 1974; Goodman and Goodman, 2006).

The analysis reveals that the diaspora is politically aware and conscious of the limitations of the British media, even more so in light of such events as Leveson (2011) and the trials of former *News of the World* editors and journalists on charges of phone hacking (*Independent*, 2014).

This was notable in the period of time respondents were involved in the research, as these comments show:

> 'I think I am more aware of how the media operates because I think about the news and media when I am watching it. It's not what I did before.'
>
> Punjabi male, Luton

> 'You have to be careful what the news and television tells you, it's not always real news.'
>
> Punjabi female, Luton

> 'I always thought the media was, you know, telling the truth, but the more I have thought about it, I think they are just full of it.'
>
> Pukhtoon male, Oxford

In ending the discussion of this specific theme, it is important to note that these concerns were aired anonymously in private conversations with cohort members who did not wish to place such views in the public domain. They preferred non-attributable commentary to highlight these issues of how media production affected their identity. There was, indeed, a sense that such narratives might elicit unhelpful comments from others who might consider such thoughts to be in the realm of unfounded conspiracy theories and as extreme. Yet their contributions do have value in aiding this research study related to their media consumption and its impact on identity, which was profound.

The desire for anonymity reinforces one of the prevailing themes of these conversations, that of deep-rooted insecurity about how participants were viewed and accepted by society as a whole. It could also mean that cohort members did not wish to add more controversy to a debate they see as futile and uninterested in their viewpoints, given the dominance and power of the media in addition to a fear of misinterpretation.

These fears are important in their own right as the data reveals a high degree of concern about personal safety as a result of the way media has represented participants. It results from those images that are so powerful in setting, within the mind of the viewer, a picture and thought process of the external threat within the internal boundaries, by people who are of another culture but of the same place. In doing so, they have allowed ignorance to develop and extremism of the anti-Muslim variety to flourish to the detriment of the British-born Pakistani diaspora, who continue to assess the consequences.

5.5 Media stakeholders

The researcher made several attempts to contact a range of media providers, including Sky, the BBC and cultural broadcasters serving the Pakistani communities in Britain. In addition the Foreign Office was also contacted with respect to the findings of the emerging data. The researcher felt it important to give these organisations the opportunity to feedback on the concerns and anxieties of the respondents. No engagement was forthcoming or possible to continue this line of enquiry and it seemed too time-consuming to pursue**.**

5.6 Summary

The importance of media production was not lost on the diaspora within this study, nor its association with perceived bias against the Muslim in Britain and globally. This is reflected widely in the literature through Poole (2002), Poole and Richardson (2006), Gottschalk and Greenberg (2008) and others who stress the role of media in framing the Muslim as the 'Other' on a daily basis. It is this thought process that leads to the Orientalist approach so identified by the diaspora in this study, who seem to be most sensitive and aware of its impact on their identity and status.

The contributions of the respondents relating to media production support points made in the literature concerning how media consumption has reflected on diaspora identity. The literature echoes the lack of objectivity in media observed by interviewees that is part of the daily editing and framing of news and global information that is aligned to the interests of power (McQuail, 2005, Downing and Husband, 2005, Dabashi, 2008). These may be big business or government at large, as argued by Goodman and Goodman (2005) and Herman and Chomsky (1994), which have a direct impact on the formation and dissemination of news and information to an often unsuspecting world-wide audience. This is in line with the concerns of the participants who argued that the quest for oil is the real motivation for invasions and actions in Muslim countries, such as Iraq and Afghanistan. This was reflected in their media consumption that draws them to Press TV, an Iranian news broadcaster they feel can provide an alternative viewpoint, more in tune with their own.

In addition, many participants considered that this interest in resources is supported and often aligned to government agendas that maintain the interests of capital in conjunction with the media. The 'war on terror' and build-up to the war in Iraq in response to the 'weapons of mass destruction' were two specific examples. The management of information, therefore, was considered by participants to be a political strategy to ‘win hearts and minds’. These political actions leading to military interventions that are so interlinked with the ‘embedded journalist’ in the war zone are referred to by Poole (ibid.) as a form of media performance. This is where foreign policy drives through an agenda that creates a heightened sense of an external threat that is then addressed to the satisfaction of the public at large.

The process of cross-referencing was thus a response employed by the diaspora to challenge this distorted and biased view they encountered each day. The proliferation of media organisations and news broadcasters globally aided this approach, as did the internet and rise of new social media to create a specific diaspora public sphere, reflected in the work of Downing and Husband (2005). This is clearly related to the impact of ‘race talk’ on this group and the continuing cultural racialisation of the Muslim in Britain as ‘the Other’. As argued by Gottschalk and Greenberg (2008), this framing of Muslim and anti-Muslim feeling has come about as a result of information fed to the public at large. It is also emphasised and continued within the wider arts and cinema world through negative depictions that place a racialised and negative view of people of colour articulated by Hooks (1995) and Walker (2013).

For the interviewees, these perceptions of them had an impact on their relations within communities and society in Britain, which created discrimination founded on Islamophobia, that in turns only added to a sense of isolation and continued alienation. Additionally, it fuelled resentment and political action from right-wing bodies such as the EDL that reinforces uncertainty and animosity from mainstream society.

Therefore, there was an overwhelming feeling, amongst both cohort groups, of being under constant attack by Western media through undermining their Islamic perspective and casting doubt on the peaceful nature of Islam as a major religion. Western media displayed Islam in a purely confrontational manner that reinforced a world view of Islam as hating the West and what it stood for, a view contrary to the reality of Islam’s true nature as stated by Said

(1997), who has often challenged these neo-conservative views, reflected by Lewis (1990). To many, Islam was the new global threat to Western hegemony if not civilization, because of its reach across cultures, communities and societies that are so diverse and unified by the teachings of Islam. This anti-Muslim discourse was therefore framed in the same image and language that was reserved for communism in the past. This has been referred to by Goodman and Goodman (ibid.) as a policy of promulgating fear.

It is inevitable that participants' response to the challenge was a more assertive process of seeking alternative media that reinforced their own personal and group identity. The use of web-based information including YouTube increasingly offered them the opportunity to reaffirm their Islamic and British identity and so to enhance the evolution of their hybrid diasporic identity. The diaspora were also using the web to challenge the media production of the elite organisations by creating their own images and representations for uploading onto YouTube and social media. This also enhanced their transnational sense of identity through connectivity with similar diasporas across the World.

This reinforces the close connectivity and aids a deep-rooted sense of belonging that is being negotiated, as suggested in the literature of Modood (2005), Moll (2007) and Samad (2013) amongst others. This new assertiveness present among British Muslims – despite the sense of discrimination they consider brought on by the media and how it signifies them in society – is their positive response to what they have perceived, as revealed by the data, as media production that undermines their presence and positive contribution to the economic and social life of a country they consider as their home: Britain.

In observing the participants, the researcher was slightly concerned by some conspiracy theories that some of the respondents believed. The predominant one concerned how Jewish people had orchestrated 9/11, and the media complicity in denial of this. At times these accounts seemed farfetched and challenged. It felt that these assumptions that were circulated through networks and hearsay were taken for granted, rather than assessed by some respondents. To the researcher, this felt like denial by these particular cohort members that Muslims could undertake such an act. Alternatively the researcher was somewhat surprised by how aware respondents were of the perceived media bias in the production of news, in particular their response to this. The cross referencing they undertook by using the internet to search similar news stories by a range of global providers. They were not passive recipients of the media but actively critiquing their personal media consumption of Anglo-Saxon media. In addition there was a strong interest in cultural media with gender and cultural differentials. Some of the assumptions of the researcher were therefore not only challenged but re-programmed in light of these observations. The male respondents spoke with much passion and at times, much excitement of how they recognised media bias and anti-Muslim sentiment. The females were more refrained when speaking of their consumption and not subject to the same excitement or competition to all speak at once; as was with their male counterparts.

In these exchanges and on this specific topic related to media production strong correlations and a firm belief was made between British foreign policy and media production; the Iraq war being often cited as the major example. This then fed into what many considered as Government inspired propaganda that relates to the work of Goodman and Goodman (2005) and Herman and Chomsky (1994). The researcher was also interested to note in these discussions of the immense respect and support for the Iranian State funded Press TV. For both the Pukhtoon and Punjabi cohort groups, male and female, they prided on their consumption of this predominantly anti-Western broadcaster. They ignored the association of Shia Islam with this brand; especially the Pukhtoon who were regarded by the researcher, as strict observers of Sunni Islam. It perhaps typified the old political maxim of – the enemy of my enemy is my friend – within a new media world. For the researcher it also attested to the fact, that Press TV was perhaps the only medium cohort members could identify with as challenging Western media hegemony, Al-Jazeera English was seen as a poor relation in this light, given its over reliance on journalists who had previously worked for Western media outlets. The wearing of headscarves for instance by female presenters on Press TV was seen as a reflection of that provider’s pro-Islamic stance and for many female respondents, one they could easily identify with.

This then asserted itself in a call for more media production that reflected their presence in Britain, with positive characteristics of their faith, culture and contribution to being British. This, the researcher felt, was for many an assertion of their British hybrid identity. However, it was not a call for action but of expressing concern and complaint, of current Western media production they consumed. Once again, the researcher felt that these respondents were highlighting feelings of insecurity and concerns of their status in British society – the transmigrant nature of their perceptions was once again, all too present in this discourse.

This provides a specific diasporic contribution to the wider debates on new and social media and diasporic identities. The primary concern among the Pakistani diaspora in this study is the perceived anti-Muslim bias of the predominant Anglo-Saxon media. The element of cross-referencing links relates well to the work of Karim (2010) on how diasporas use the internet to challenge mis-representations, in this case by sourcing alternative media to counterbalance Western editorials. In addition, the consumption of the Iranian-based Press TV, Al-Jazeera English and Peace TV as well as specific Pukhtoon and Punjabi dramas and music via the internet are all, as Karim (ibid.) highlights, forms of cultural and religious consumption that seek alternatives to the mass output of the dominant culture. The search for Islamic education and understanding that the second and third generation of the Pakistani diaspora seek for their children correlates with Rinnawi's (2010) work with Muslim Arabs in Germany. It thus aids what Karim (ibid.) regards as cultural production, which extends as part of the analysis in this research, where fusion music and video-clip making related to cultural practices are norms of diasporic cultural production related to hybrid identity. The plight of the Palestinian population in Gaza also created a politicisation and frustration that was channelled through new and social media as an outlet of resentment towards the BBC and Sky refusing to broadcast a Disasters Emergency Committee appeal. It became an opportunity for transnational networks and groupings to challenge the dominant Western corporate media hegemony referred to by Watkins (2014). A sense of ‘community’ was created that Gajjala (2010) refers to as contact zones. The diaspora is becoming more digital, globalisation creating new spaces that link local, global and transnational communities that share same group dynamics to form new virtual worlds. These are in themselves real online communities as related by Gajjala (ibid.) that denote the present evolution of the Pakistani diaspora participants in a new media format.

Chapter 6

Transnationalism and identity affirmation

The previous chapters set the wider context of prejudice and discrimination felt by the British Pakistani diaspora, which included perceptions of bias in the general media. This contributed to a sense of alienation and a form of separation from mainstream society as a result. This chapter seeks to offer a response to how the diaspora addressed their concerns about the mass media within a wider transnational context, which allowed the sample diaspora to affirm a specific hybrid identity which they sought to articulate to the wider British population.

Furthermore it is within this section that the rationale of transmigrant in a new media age is further amplified through the narratives of the respondents. This feeling of being neither belonging to one nation of origin nor one of birth is symptomatic of their perceptions of negative status and place in society.

The impact of the ‘war on terror’, as it has been referred to within the political and media lexicon, is a central cause of anxiety for the diaspora that has resulted in a search for and negotiation of transnational sense of belonging. It is within that context that a particular response of the diaspora’s own making has surfaced, articulated by respondents in this study as a desire to maintain cultural and religious affirmation through connectivity with a sense of dual homeland, encompassing Britain and Pakistan, which will be explored here.

These explorations, as will surface within the analysis, create clear contradictions in the role and impact of the media, and between East and West, in a struggle between competing values, for example corruption being more overt in Pakistan than in Britain. The outcome has been a growing Muslim assertiveness that is using the medium of the internet as a method of developing transnational communities of interest, a process in which new technologies and new media play a critical part. As one respondent stated:

> ‘We don’t have to accept what Western media tell us. The internet helps us find our real identities, the best of two worlds, British and Pakistani. I can explore all of that on the internet and on my mobile.’
>
> Punjabi male, Luton

The discussion here contributes new research and ideas to enhance the existing body of literature.

It is within these parameters, the researcher would argue, that the diaspora have created their own sense of worth and responses to their perceived insight of media vilification. This has resulted in a determination to create a social and political identity they feel comfortable and secure within.

Primarily, the ‘war on terror’ was a key process of media and political alignment that created much apprehension revealed within the data and analysis. More specifically, the media interest in Muslim communities in Britain and Pakistan was seen as part of the wider coverage and analysis guided by the philosophy prescribed by George Bush. The term ‘war on terror’ refers to a virtual concept of war that denotes a lack of a theatre of warfare taking place in the conventional sense of two armies in battle. This phraseology resembles the political lexicon used on the ‘war on drugs’ by politicians, poignantly used in the 1980s in the West, a war that often has no visible enemy or chain of command. It does however; create within the public mind a need for political leadership and action to deal with this perceived menace and/or threat.

The sample diaspora in the research, like many others, drew comparisons between reactions on the part of the dominant broadcasters to Western victims of violence and those in Pakistan. A strong distinction was perceived in the levels of reporting of these two contrasting landscapes, with Pakistan seen by participants in the research to be as much a recipient of terror bombings as the West, or more. In the participants’ view, this had often been ignored as a matter of fact by Western and British media.

A cohort group member summed it up in the following words:

> ‘We don’t really matter to the West. If it’s a Pakistani killed, well, it’s okay, they were probably a Taliban anyway, we all are, that is how they see us, in Britain and in Pakistan.”
>
> Pukhtoon male, Oxford

This point was important as it signified and reinforced wider societal perceptions of whether the Pakistani population as a whole were responsible for the actions of a few terrorists. These then resulted in stereotyping of the Muslim as ‘Other’ at best and the enemy at worst. Within the cohort groups this was a reoccurring theme, with much animated discussion within both male and female research groups. For some this led to a feeling of not belonging expressed in these comments:

> ‘They make you feel that you don’t have a home, they don’t accept us here and they don’t accept us in Pakistan, it’s like being between two worlds.’
>
> Pukhtoon male, Oxford

> ‘My dad used to say that they’re [British] are gonna send us back home. But it’s not home for us, this is, not sure it is, don’t know where is, then.’
>
> Punjabi male, Luton

Allied to this specific media portrayal, as assessed by respondents, was the portrayal of Pakistan within a global terrorist network associated with Al-Qaeda and the Taliban never far removed from media commentary and international analysis. This included commentary from global think-tanks such as the Council for Foreign Relations (2011a) and intelligence sources based in the West.

The daily discussions and comments the diaspora encountered within their work places and amongst associates inevitably reflected this impression which has become deeply embedded in the mainstream population. The diaspora are therefore not only alert but sensitive to what the media depicts and broadcasts;

it then relates to how respondents analysed their personal media consumption. It corresponds to Poole's (2002) description of the relationship between policy and media framing that evidently sees Islam as the enemy. It adds further to this feeling of alienation. A respondent stated:

> 'They think we are stupid if we don't think they planned to
> target Islam, and make us to be the enemy in our own country.'
>
> Punjabi female, Luton

This process of how the 'war on terror' is packaged has created a real sense of insecurity for the Pakistani diaspora through the transnational association between their current territory and their land of origin. In terms of the sample diaspora's own allegiance to Pakistan within the context of 'war on terror', they have summed it up in the statement: 'Pakistan too has suffered.'
A number of cohort members expressed the view that:

> 'People and children are dying in Pakistan killed by bombs but we
> do not hear much about that. If we did in the British media, then
> they'd see we are all victims.'
>
> Punjabi female, Luton

This was an obvious statement to make but one which many of the respondents felt required amplification as feelings on this issue existed at a number of levels for participants. They empathised with the victims of terror in Pakistan, with whom they associated culturally if not genetically, as mostly innocents of the Pakistani population caught up in the carnage that was in some parts of the country a daily occurrence. This was specifically relevant for the Pukhtoon cohort group who, given their proximity and relationship with the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province of Pakistan, were more acutely aware of the impact of extremist violence. The Pukhtoon participants often spoke of their closeness to the violence and how on their regular visits they had to be more vigilant than most.

For both Pukhtoon and Punjabi cohort groups, there were also anecdotes recorded by parents or elder relatives back from their visits to the homeland that gave rise to much compassion from both sexes. It was, however, evident in the analysis that for female members of the cohort groups this impacted at a much deeper level that corresponded to affinity with same -gender victims and loss of children in particular.

They would often use the term ‘we’ to signify the oneness with the Pakistani population and relatives in Pakistan. This also had significance in how they associated this transnational identity with their media consumption at a time of turmoil in Pakistan. This related to consuming more Pakistani satellite media that provided a sense of association with the Pakistani people and their plight in Pakistan. The clear empathy they had with the people of Pakistan brought their identity into more focus and personal analysis, the researcher would argue. As this comment highlights:

> ‘I can relate to people in Pakistan. When I see it on ARY, it’s like my own family was involved and it feels so close.’
>
> Pukhtoon male, Oxford

The repeated concerns over the reporting of these issues by Western news providers and over how images were framed remained the central element of concern in this context. Additionally, they felt the Western media did not make the facts as transparent as possible nor did it analyse the effect on the country and its society as a whole, or on the diaspora, in respect to their transnational identity. For the participants, there existed this void of explanation that many felt compelled to speak out against in creating a more balanced understanding of the global issues of terrorism. This may have been an unrealistic ambition of the sample diaspora, given how news is more responsive to events within a fast-moving global and competitive news media.

Again, within the frame of the ‘war on terror’, there was a united feeling among the participants that no distinctions were made between those fighting against the Taliban, mostly the Pakistan army, and the Taliban or other subversive elements. Amongst the chief concerns was how Osama bin Laden, a Saudi national of Yemeni origin, was often confused as a Pakistani by mainstream British society. Given his prominence in the 9/11 attacks and his role as head of Al-Qaeda, there was a fear that many in the West considered Pakistan as the head office for anti-Western terrorism. The attack on his compound in Abbottabad in Pakistan and his death only seemed to reinforce this message to a wider global audience.

It was this continuing view of Pakistan as a hub of terrorist activity which, through these accounts, affected the diaspora. It corresponds to the views of Tony Blair, the then prime minister, who commented in an interview in *The Economist*: ‘What happens today in Pakistan matters on the streets of Britain’ (Blair, 2007). The collective experiences of the group of taxi drivers in Oxford in this study provide realistic testimony to this fact. Their experiences narrated encounters with ordinary people who, as passengers, wished to speak openly about the subject to elicit conversation with what they perceived to be a white taxi driver. This ‘race talk’, addressed in an earlier chapter, is aligned to imagery associated with violence and the Muslim. It is, as hooks (1995) and Walker (2013) have referred to it, how many people of colour feel about the negative impact of the media on racial minorities, echoed at a transnational level.

The sample diaspora viewed this as an aspect of the malaise of indifference towards them in the majority society that they were compelled to accept. They gave examples of how often they had to take part in memorial rituals at work or in public spaces for mostly Western victims of extremism. Their personal views in this matter were not openly displayed for fear of further accusations of insensitivity, if not treachery. Yet many felt quite strongly on this issue and considered it to be another example of racism and a sense of superiority expressed by the majority. This feeds into Ansari’s (2002) and Abdullah’s (2009) discussion of Muslims’ fears of discrimination following the 9/11 attacks.

Research participants also made comparisons with the coverage of the bombings in Mumbai in November 2008 which, some felt, gained much more attention from the Western media and politicians than daily atrocities carried out in Pakistan. Some felt that the media interest in this specific story was to reinforce the message that Pakistan instigated the bombings by supporting Muslim terrorist groups abroad. This fuelled the existing perception amongst some of the cohort group members of a bias in favour of India in the British media, some participants speculating that India's rise as an economic power helped it gain a better press, linked to its economic activity and commercial interests. They also highlighted the connection between the Indian-based STAR TV network and its parent company, News International, the owners of Sky News. This fact was considered most relevant in reaching their conclusions, once again highlighting their extreme frustration within this complex geo-political situation.

Respondents also expressed concern over their personal safety and that of family when in Pakistan, a perception conditioned by the level of casualties covered minute-by-minute on multi-ethnic Pakistani news channels broadcasting into the homes of the British-based diaspora. These images and repeated visualisation of violence had a clear impact on these viewers. The association with a strong sense of frustration was once again mirrored with resentment over the lack of home-grown coverage, or only passing mention, of the mayhem. The conclusion was often drawn that Pakistani society, and by implication the diaspora, were not equal victims of terror, but were framed within a purposeful discourse of the Muslim as both perpetrator and saboteur, responsible for their own demise. As one female respondent stated:

> 'It makes you feel like you are a second class person.'
>
> Pukhtoon female, Oxford

Alternatively, despite these feelings of concern for the Pakistani citizen, they also felt unsafe with Pakistan being a permanent place of residence at a personal level. Many respondents echoed these sentiments:

> 'With all that violence and the way the country is, I don't think I would like to live there or have my kids experiencing that.'
>
> Punjabi male, Luton

The analysis of this issue is revealing, as it depicts the diaspora rooted in a strong political connection with a Pakistani identity and showing allegiance at some level to the heritage of that nation state, despite personal reservations. In addition, the objectivity of the respondents on this issue seemed to be also influenced by current and historical antagonisms between India and Pakistan passed down by their elders and at some level articulated in these discussions. Their defensive attitude to Pakistan, in respect to this issue, highlighted a strong attachment to their culture and the prevailing discourse of animosity towards India embedded amongst many of the elder generation and unfortunately inherited by some of the diaspora in this study. However, it is also accounted for by semi indoctrination by the anti-Indian state shaped by the legacies of two wars between India and Pakistan, by memories of partition and a divided Kashmir, all of which are drip fed into the system from an early age, by parents, by the wider Pakistani establishment at home and during visits to the region.

This was most evident within the Punjabi cohort group and reflects the relationship some had with Azad Kashmir and views of what they described as ‘Indian-occupied Kashmir’. It was less so for the Pukhtoons, who rather looked towards Afghanistan as a source of enmity and solidarity, depending on who was in power.

Again the researcher would argue that these views need to be assessed in line with the constant negotiating taking place amongst the sample diaspora. They were seeking to accommodate aspects of culture handed down from previous generations with a more modern outlook. This is the nature of evolving identity, reflected in the work of Sauter (2003) concerning the Turkish diaspora in Germany, for instance. It is reflected in the following:

> ‘You never know, they might just throw you out of Britain using the excuse of terrorism and sending us back to Pakistan, they just need an excuse.’
>
> Punjabi male, Luton

> ‘Even in Pakistan they don’t like us or want us there. We don’t really fit in and our children hate it.’
>
> Punjabi female, Luton

Within the media sphere, there was a desire to relate media output to this evolving sense of hybridity that is transnational. Accordingly, this may reflect a desire for organisations such as the BBC and Sky News to provide, in mainstream television, more coverage with which the diaspora can identify.

Interestingly, however, from the data it became evident that respondents were avid viewers on visits to Pakistan of both the BBC and Sky, through their international affiliates, BBC World and Sky News, transmitting to a global audience that includes Pakistan. This was the only English-speaking medium they related to whilst abroad, and was watched to accentuate their separateness and sense of elitism over Pakistani-born relatives. This may be another example of the contradictions within some of the data and responses of the participants, which perhaps highlights the continual and evolving search for meaning in their transnational identities, revealing the ongoing negotiations and understandings taking place, mirrored in Samad (2013). Again, it brings into focus the discourse related to the notion of ‘diasporic transnationalism’ (Baubock and Faist (2010) p17, Safran (1991).

It was also revealing that, again, on a more personal level, many of the diaspora privately felt strong animosity towards the political establishment in Pakistan, including the military and civilian administrations. Participants spoke of the level of corruption and negative personal experiences when in the country on regular family visits. In other words, within the public sphere a more defensive tone was adopted to support the Pakistani people as victims participants could identify with, whilst in private conversations they expressed a contradictory view of the state of the political and economic make-up of Pakistan. This view of many participants was summed up by one Pukhtoon respondent, who reflected on the words of an uncle in Pakistan, in summing up the country: ‘Good people, bad government’. This raised much laughter but also vigorous nods of agreement within the focus group at the time. Indeed, this was the prevailing view, that Pakistan’s civil society is better than the institutions that define the state. It provided further empirical evidence of the sense of being a transmigrant to which the researcher refers in Chapter 2. Many respondents commented in terms similar to the:

> ‘Come on, we know all the politicians in Pakistan are corrupt, not
> building the country but themselves. They hate us for having the
> reds [slang for British passport].”
>
> Punjabi male, Luton

The view was expressed in a context that is liberal democratic context, despite experiences of Islamophobia and discrimination in Britain, and refers to principles of meritocracy rather than nepotism and openly corrupt practices.
Through their consumption of Pakistani news and political issues there was interest in the political parties of Pakistan but not active participation. These statements represent a range of views:

> ‘I think Zardari cares about anyone else apart form number one, he is totally loaded but I think Imran [Khan] is a good guy.’
>
> Punjabi male, Luton

> ‘Nawaz Sharif is a business man so he knows how to run the country and builds things but he and Musharraf really hate each other isn’t it ? ’
>
> Punjabi male, Luton

> ‘Imran hopefully might change things if he gets into power, but the
> old politicians and parties don’t like him.’
>
> Pukhtoon male, Oxford

This was about seeking to accommodate the two halves of their existence, inevitably set as it is in a transnational context that places them in two distinct ideological systems, traditions, cultures and societal norms, arising from two separate hemispheres. The media, through its focus on issues related to the ‘war on terror’ has impacted on this trajectory defined by a hybridity captured in the literature of Krieg (1999), Faist (2000), Chul-Byung (2002), Engbersen (2007), Gayer (2007) and Samad (2013; n.d.).

The constant negotiation of transnational and new meaning in an evolving hybridity is linked to a sense of personal and group security, so vital in this equation. In this process, the perception of Pakistan as a place of sanctuary, reflected in Bhabha’s (1994) notion of ambivalence arising from doubts within the diaspora of their place in British society, is aiding that transnational quest. It was clear that within the sample diaspora this had created an awareness of a need to consume much more diverse media in order to assist aids this transition between identities or working towards accommodating the ambiguities and transmigrant nature they sought to reconcile within an East-West discourse. Evident also was the profound influence the media had had on a sense of political awakening as a result of their daily mass media consumption.

6.1 Political awakening and response

An examination of the new political consciousness or awakening experienced by the sample diaspora is useful in assessing the role of media and its impact on the diaspora, given that participants argued that media bias impacted greatly on their identity. The researcher would argue that this strong perception raised a robust political edge and consciousness within many of the cohort members.

This political awakening was a subsidiary response to the diaspora study sample’s view the mass media was growing more extreme in its hostility to their faith and, as a consequence, to them as visible minorities. It can be argued that further political awakening, or what Modood (2005, 2010) has referred to as ‘Asian assertiveness’ (2010, p.134), can even be translated as ‘Muslim political awareness’ capturing the hearts and minds of many of the diaspora sampled in this study. In fact, many participants were highly politically aware of global issues and international relations specifically related to Muslims and Islam.

Within this paradigm the trigger for many was their consumption of a greater range of media, both Western and other, that framed this raised consciousness and led to greater alertness of what the media were saying. In turn, this created a form of assertive action in acknowledging and validating their own sense of being, as British and as Muslim. This was in many respects a continuation of their journey of self-exploration into who and what they were, with the media raising much consciousness and debate and impacting on their day-to-day reality.

As a consequence, they developed a daily practice of continual cross-referencing within an international dimension, between by global news media both from the East and West, which was then echoed in the discussions with respondents and featured in nearly all interviews that conveyed their key opinions on these specific matters.

The following comments, the first of which has already been quoted, offer some insight from some of the female interviewees that emphasises a growing political awareness of international issues and the media. Again, they are reflective of the immense concern and anger felt over a range of issues they maintained are targeted at Muslim nations by stronger Western states:

> ‘The truth is that the Americans want to dominate the world and use their power to dictate to the rest of the world. Muslims are rising up and defending themselves. That is not what they really like.’
>
> Punjabi female, Luton

> ‘I don’t really care what they think about me, I am proud to be British, Pakistani and be a Muslim. If they don’t like it, it’s their problem.’
>
> Pukhtoon female, Oxford

The women also explained their irritation over the much-abused term ‘jihad’, which was interpreted in the extreme sense by Western press and politicians alike. In their view, jihad denoted a movement against injustice rather than one for war; the latter was the sense embodied in Western depictions of militant Islam. In many of the focus groups and one-to-one interviews, these women maintained the opinion that their new political awareness had come about because of this international discourse that had been reinforced, at some level, by their own experiences. Foremost in their minds was their perception of American aggression and active interference in other countries' affairs, often denied or not mentioned in the mainstream media. This corresponds to the research undertaken by Rinnawi (2010) into the Arab Muslim diaspora in Germany where he touches on the term 'McArabism – a kind of instant nationalism' (p.268). It also relates to the tensions between globalisation and localism referred to by Gajjala (2010). In this context, the researcher would argue, a sense of instant Muslim nationalism is being shown by these respondents as a consequence of their consumption and analysis of Western media.

The role the media played within in this, in particular the BBC and Sky networks, were often referred to, as this comment, reflected in many others, demonstrates:

> 'The BBC and Sky still want to show us as bad Muslims blowing up the world, but they ignore murder in Palestine, makes me very angry.'
>
> Punjabi female, Luton

It is apparent that the wider global political dimension was understood by individuals of both sexes and both ethnic cohort groups. They perceived the role played by the dominant superpower as all-pervasive, its strength being used to ensure compliance with its own interests, economic and political. This directly corresponds with the work of Herman and Chomsky (1994) and Dabashi (2008), who have argued on the relationship between Western capital in seeking global domination and the media as a key instrument to further economic goals and power. This seems to be an extension of the 'propaganda model' advocated by Herman and Chomsky (1994) which relates to the respondents' perception of the power of oil companies in influencing the invasion of Iraq and business interests seeking mineral resources in

Afghanistan, as reported by Risen (2010) in the New York Times. These views of the participants also reflect Poole (2002) in connecting political policy with media performance. The work of Gilboa (2001) in seeing how media diplomacy is a tool used to promote international relations aligns to the views of the interviewees, who referred to the media as a principal actor in promoting and advocating Western foreign policy objectives. As this comment states:

> 'You can tell the British media are peddling what the Government want them to. Look at what they are saying about Iran. Don't tell me it's not part of the government agenda.'
>
> Punjabi male, Luton

The sample diaspora also articulated the perception of certain international institutions, such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and United Nations, not only being used to perpetuate Western interests, but of the inadequacy of such organisations and their ineffectiveness in helping poorer and weak nations. The United Nations was primarily viewed with hostility as a vehicle for promoting American and Western foreign policy. Participants also emphasised what they considered as Western duplicity in manipulating the UN when it was deemed appropriate to obtain validation for military action, whilst on occasions ignoring the institution when the West's agenda was not served. The cohort gave Iraq as the tangible example, whilst highlighting Chechnya as a comparison. The role of the media was seen as complimenting this power equation by reinforcing the key messages promoted by Western political administrations.

This opinion of double standards in the West was quite common amongst the interviewees, who felt strongly that Britain and America were preaching democracy and freedom on the one hand, whilst undermining Muslim nations on the other. The researcher found evidence of deeply embedded attitudes towards Western media and their political affiliations. Some participants spoke of the relationship and power of Rupert Murdoch and close workings with Western administrations. This has now been borne out by the Leveson Inquiry (2012), which highlighted the closeness between News International and the

British government, if not its institutions. Others focused on the way the media as a whole was perceived as anti-Islamic in its rhetoric, tone and imagery, constantly reminding viewers of the militant Islam they wished to personify as the new global demon, whilst ignoring the peaceful nature of the religion as articulated by respondents time and time again. As one interviewee stated:

> ‘Politicians always want to please Murdoch so he doesn’t slate them, but they never say anything positive about Islam, it’s always about violence. It’s all a game with politicians and newspapers working together.’
>
> Punjabi male, Luton

These perceptions were embedded within the diaspora’s own developing feelings of identity, encompassing faith, multiple identity and culture to merge in a more Westernised outlook, albeit one with a sharper political edge. It is perhaps more than a sense of a cultural and religious familiarity that binds the diaspora to a distant place. That connection reinforces a sense of transnationalism, an aspect which may have been eroded with the arrival of new generations, although this was evidently not the case for participants in this research. The global political dimension reinforced a more personalised political awareness that shaped their own frameworks of the world, giving expression to strong sentiments of distrust in the large volume of information provided by the Western press. Consequently, this new politically heightened sensitivity had become more critical, analysing every nuance and storyline as part of the participants’ personal assessment of their credibility and validity. By doing so it developed into a proactive and conscious response to perceived media distortions of their communities. As this comment illustrates:

> ‘We really have to stand up for ourselves as a community, otherwise the media, the EDL and the rest of them will push us down. We have to think of the future generations who shouldn’t put up with this.’
>
> Punjabi male, Luton

A proactive response, therefore, had been for many, on these numerous occasions of doubt, to seek alternative forms of media and information sources. The use of the internet, in particular, afforded scope to search the web for what participants believed to be more objective reporting and analysis of news. For some, this had become a preoccupation. The internet allows consumption of relevant cultural, religious and social programming to meet personal or group needs. It signifies a much stronger political alertness to the messages, frames and techniques deployed by the media to provide a form of social construction of society, as McQuail (2005) has theorised. The findings in this research also relate to the work of Said (1978) on the cultural apparatus, referred to in Chapter 5 on media production.

The process of cross-referencing, referred to earlier, the researcher would argue, is in itself a strong sign of self-assertiveness and political action, initiated and engaged in by diaspora members. It shows a constructive response to the lack of trust and sense of frustration and resentment felt by many, of much of what they viewed, read and listened to, in predominantly Western media. The multi-channel satellite and cable outlets on the airwaves provided them with alternatives and choices that were global and easily accessible.

The role of the Iranian-based Press TV was discussed with the cohort groups who had an interest in this network. The researcher felt it useful to probe with participants the reliability of this source, given the divergence of faith between Sunni and Shia Islam, the latter of which Iran embodied. Some questioned the merit of the query itself and felt uncomfortable; however, others stated quite clearly and categorically that they were cognisant of this fact and aware of their reasons for consuming this specific news media as an alternative source.

They argued quite passionately about the role of this unconventional broadcaster in helping them to evaluate British and Western media in particular, including how the news items were framed and in what order. These comparisons were vital, they added, to give them a better balance of information that did not reinforce a sense of alienation or feelings of low morale as negative storylines were continually thrown at them. There was a small sense of pride in how Iran was challenging the dominance of the Western media itself and that this was a source of some inspiration, aiding their own political self-development.

Participants made some comparisons between Press TV and Al-Jazeera English, the Qatari-based station. Many felt Press TV to be more outspoken and sharper in its coverage of global news, whilst Al-Jazeera presented a more Eurocentric outlook, although editorially it was considered as objective and informative. The difference in these two regional networks was their relationship to the West and it was these political considerations of Iran challenging America, that were viewed as tangible evidence of true independence of mind. This is in itself interesting, given the sectarianism that is often quite vehement amongst Sunni's and Shias in the wider Muslim world, and so evident in Iraq, Bahrain, Pakistan and Syria with much sectarian bloodshed taking place. That this element was not considered as vital for the sample diaspora when consuming this specific broadcaster perhaps indicates the diaspora's strong frustration with the mainstream media they consume and the lack of alternatives available. As this respondent indicates:

> 'Al-Jazeera is better than the BBC, but Press TV is better than Al-Jazeera. But that is the only two I tend to watch. I can't stand CNN or Sky.'
>
> Pukhtoon male, Oxford

This viewing of non-religious significant press is further evidence of the transnational nature of media consumption that has become a political and social response to what is considered subjective Western coverage. This was demonstrated within the lengthy exchanges that took place in both cohort groups at different periods of the research. It was a strong indication of how more politically aware the participants had become over the course of the research project in their viewing of news media. The views were quite outspoken in this respect and again the association with the British establishment and political agenda was stressed, although there were a minority who were vociferous in this analysis, whilst others remained silent.

In hindsight, such a discussion was valuable, as at the time of writing there is much global political debate about Iran and its nuclear development. A ramification of this growing hostility may have been the closure of Press TV in London (Sweeney, 2012). The growing media war between the BBC and Iranian authorities with respect to its Persian service led to accusations against Iran of press control (BBC News, 2012). These are all key factors at play that have provided an additional contribution to this debate, in what has been described as an emerging 'cold war' by the British foreign secretary (Quinn, 2012). However, the researcher concludes that if Western media compliance with their respective governments is involved, as is the diaspora’s perception of what they consume, then this is surely also the case for other media they entertain, such as Iranian (Press TV) and channels operating in Pakistan. In the case of the latter two, there are no independent regulatory bodies that would ensure the separation of state and media.

Many participants did not distinguish a conflict of interest in state involvement in broadcasting news and information, directly or vicariously. Many had not even considered the role of Voice of America within a mainstream Pakistani broadcaster such as Geo News consumed regularly by many of the diaspora. This reflects a lack of awareness on this specific issue and signifies the sample diaspora’s interest in the content rather than the ownership.

Because of this wider global picture, a correlation between the political and the social for this group of the diaspora is apparent. Although many respondents felt that they had been aware of politics and semi politicised at an early age by the disputes over Kashmir, Afghanistan and Palestine, events and changes in the international political landscape had given them much more impetus to be alert. The only evolving difference was how close groups and individuals felt to the issues abroad. The Pukhtoon cohort felt more aligned to their traditional border areas near to Afghanistan, hence had a wider interest in this region and its people. For the Punjabi groups, there was a wider concern over the Punjab which also related to the political issue of Kashmir. The Pukhtoon interviewees were, however, more inclined to research and analyse the interconnections with their identities in relation to both Pakistan and Afghanistan, whilst for many of the Punjabi interviewees there was a split between those with links to Azad (free) Kashmir and the wider Punjab.

Consequently, this new self-awareness has led respondents to source alternative information bases, as well as construct media images that define their own sense of hybrid belonging. In doing so they are finding new platforms to assist in becoming more assertive in their own right and seeking new media as a process by which to articulate this desire to be a transnational citizen.

6.2 Political alertness and new media

This section will develop some awareness of how this political aspiration is structured within these specific groups. It is not developed into political agitation or explicit political action through confrontation on issues they feel strongly about. It is, as already stated, a political act of Asian assertiveness that has formed a political understanding of how to resolve some of the constant and inevitable negotiations taking place in relation to their evolving identity. In the context of the media, this has played out with what the researcher has described as active cross-referencing with other data sources. This is in itself an enterprising development and shows some independence of mind in investigating the objectivity of news items many feel compelled to disbelieve. The process also acts as a valuable funnel to channel a range of frustrations and emotions that are amalgamated with these strong feelings of media misrepresentation. For participants this proactive process of researching other media to validate Western produced information, is a positive contribution to their own quest for understanding of transnational identity. It therefore highlights a level of confidence in their dual heritage and sense of kinship with two different worlds that share cultural and religious affiliation at some level. It has allowed self-expression with the medium of new technologies and has articulated their own sense of belonging and achievement, as the following statements highlight:

> ‘I’m always on WhatsApp with my cousins in Pakistan and we send

> messages in Punjabi English, if you know what I mean. They send me jokes and I send them to my mates.'
>
> Punjabi male, Luton

> 'I can send messages on Facebook to my cousins in Pakistan and Viber them for a chat, they go to a pizza place to use their wi-fi.'
>
> Punjabi male, Luton

> 'I Skype my aunties now and we can chat about family, films and fashion and they send me clothes that I like.'
>
> Punjabi female, Luton

Within this wider discourse of the cohort groups, however, is a lack of active political citizenship in advocating these concerns within a more public sphere. Many in the cohorts have argued that this is not a failure, such as that of elected representatives who share the same cultural characteristics but do not speak out about growing Islamophobia, but a sign of their own personal strength in building their confidence as transnational citizens, who take pride in their multiple inheritances. Their political awareness and awakening is reflective of their desire to support personal development rather than engage in external political activity to bring societal change. In many respects they are no different from mainstream society and the lack of trust and confidence in it for politicians and the political system.

It is also at some level an acknowledgment of their own personal limitations and a desire not to inflame what they consider as existing tensions within communities, where they form a visible minority. In effect, they do not wish to be recognised within the public or media eye, so great is the concern over stereotyping and further recrimination that has impacted on their lack of esteem and confidence in wider society.

It is also perhaps a reflection of what has stagnated the diaspora in this regard, the fear of continued marginalization, discrimination and animosity based on their culture and faith that has led them to remain silent and in many ways subservient within mainstream society. Although this may feed into the cycle of victimhood, it is also a self-preservation mechanism they consider essential in the prevailing climate and media discourse. So, there is one mask for public viewing and one for private contemplation that focuses the minds of the members of the diaspora. This comment speaks for itself:

> ‘What is the use of being political? Nothing is going to change and it’s not really worth the agro – just get on with it.’
>
> Punjabi male, Luton

Yet some would consider this to be a self-effacing rationale for not engaging actively through political campaigning in addressing their grievances. Within many of the discussions held with cohort members, it was evident that most, although interested in wider politics in Britain and abroad, were unfamiliar with the workings of British politics and or its institutions. Many were not even aware of using their Member of Parliament as a vehicle to address their concerns. These passive sentiments reflect comments reported earlier concerning a sense of insecurity in being British and a reluctance to speak against what are perceived as injustices against them or their communities. In essence, individuals would rather maintain a public silence and only speak in hushed voices or in private conversations, as the following section indicates.

An illustration of the political articulation and manifestation of using new technologies to advance cultural and religious hybridity was evident after the death of Osama Bin Laden on 2 May 2011, which in itself could have resulted in inner reflection and critical outer perspectives being formed. However, the knee-jerk rejoinder was a bright and brilliant display of comical genius that showed the British-born Pakistani diaspora offering a taste of its cultural prowess in the age of the new media and Smartphone technological era. These are highlighted in the following examples of this flair that further signifies, if not enhances, the transnational concept of this formation within a Western prism that is evidently nurtured and proclaimed as part of this process.

> ‘President Bush tried, and failed. President Clinton tried and failed.

> Obama tried and succeeded. The moral of this is …
> If you want someone done, hire a black man.'

> 'Osama Bin Laden sends Barack Obama a coded message to let him know that he was still alive: "—37OHSSV -0773H----------"
> Barack is baffled. The FBI, CIA and NSA cannot decipher it. They ask Britain's MI6 for help but MI6 could not do it, so they sent it to ISI HQ in Islamabad,
> They replied within hours: "Tell the President he's holding it upside down." '

There are also a number of examples of intentional self-deprecation intended to highlight the contradictions within the British-born Pakistani diaspora, of which the following is one:

> 'My name is Sheikh Surfi Mufti Imran Muzaffar Khan Chowdhury, bros, just to remind you need to book your hire cars early from Dream Car Hires as demand amongst local bad boys is high this year. You will receive a free Pakistani flag for Eid day to wave around like morons, (while stocks last). Don't forget that it is cheaper to drive up and down Alurock Road or Cov Road because there are more hills so u can roll your cars down, saving on petrol. Michaels drink stop will give 10% discount to anybody who walks in without hiding their silly patterned haircut under their oversize hoodies. Fake designer gear also available from Ali's corner shop. Credit will be available to those awaiting their jobseekers allowance. Plz bring your Pakistani nadra cards as proof of age and caste.'

Question:	What do you call a Pakistani Elvis impersonator?
Answer:	Amal Shukup.

A further example: The release of the film, *The Four Lions* (2010) ignited much interest and debate amongst the British-born Pakistani diaspora by touching a central chord of feeling within this community.

The British-made film, set in the northern steel city of Sheffield, with a respectable Pakistani community, tells the story of a group of men seeking to become Muslim suicide bombers. The uniqueness of this black comedy was its significant emphasis on multi-lingual dialogue that the diaspora could relate to, whilst setting out the wider global geo-political situation about the ‘war on terror’ and perceived role of British Muslims. This caricature of British Muslims and Pakistani diaspora Muslims simultaneously highlighted the absurdity of terrorism whilst emphasising the anger over international issues, such as Gaza or Kashmir. It also revealed the minority nature of this extremism and depicted victims on the streets of Britain of such professed religious zealotry as being from all backgrounds, ethnicities, religions and racial groups, including diaspora British Muslims. For many of the diaspora, as evident in the discussions with respondents, this specific film touched a sense of familiarity.

In many ways, for participants the film highlighted the complexity of the internal debates on extremism and terrorism as related to their specific communities and in particular their own identities in Britain. There was much empathy with the root causes of resentment by Muslim youth and wider population and equally an abhorrence of terrorism as a means of seeking justice. Although these views were captured after the main fieldwork had been completed, the researcher felt it important to gain the views of participants on this film.

An additional feature of this data collection was that it was done through a different process of engagement. Text messaging and Whatsapp instant messaging were used as the method of conducting this small additional research. The use of this new technology as a mechanism for data collection in this example highlighted how much of a resource these techniques have become for the diaspora. It also reiterated how such new techniques were becoming vogue as an expression of their transnational identity. Within the wider analysis however, there remained many vehement concerns that were expressed more privately than through any public medium or technology.

6.3 The public and private face of identity

This section examines further another aspect of the continual negotiation taking place amongst the sample diaspora, as illustrated by these private contributions. In many ways, these conversations were the most revealing in the investigation, as the inner thoughts of the respondents, which became more apparent in needing to be expressed as the data collection period progressed.

It was therefore important for the researcher to have an opportunity to discuss these embedded feelings. This was to allow expression to what the researcher sensed as participants' feelings of semi-persecution by the media of their personality and presence in Britain. This was seen to be exacerbated by the organs of state, such as the police or intelligence services, by government and national politicians. For the participants, this spotlight was not only uncomfortable but added to the pressure not to place the totality of their views 'on the record'. Already acknowledged in the methodology chapter as a risk arising in this research, this now seems to have some validity.

The hesitancy of some respondents masked a concern over what was acceptable to be recorded and what was considered as too delicate to state within a public sphere in any study. However, these non-attributable comments were deemed important to help shape a greater understanding of the diaspora mindset at the time of data collection. They have been summarised anonymously and generally, to help understand the key issues but also maintain discretion. Interviewees agreed to the use of these conversations without their being identified, an ongoing concern in this context. It was considered important to have these sentiments recorded, as they are as important as the comments made on tape.

The researcher found that, following formal completion of the formal interviews and once the recording device had been turned off, some of the participants became more engaged in expressing their anxieties about the media and how it impacted on their personal space and identity. These 'snapshots', taken within an anonymous and safe space and not formally recorded, were much more animated and revealing. Many participants felt less inhibited and stated their opinions more forthrightly and much more assertively, complaining of the vast media bias, in their view, in depicting Islam that made many of them vehemently opposed to British media reporting. Views were further amplified in these private sessions of the 'so-called war on terror' being a bogus front for Western imperialism, with Western media actively in support of this policy. The BBC was seen as an active advocate of the British government whilst at times pretending to be critical of ministers and the political establishment. The reporters were often viewed as potential masters of espionage working for the British intelligence services and only seeking out stories that inflamed anti-Muslim feelings amongst wider British society. As respondents stated:

> 'We don't want to say it on tape because you don't know where it will end up and who is listening these days.'
>
> Punjabi male, Luton

> 'I'd rather not say it on the tape or have it recorded. I don't want to tell anyone how I really feel about all of this.'
>
> Pukhtoon male, Oxford

An interesting view about the media expressed by participants reflected that found in the work of Goodman and Goodman (2006) about the links made between reporters and the CIA. Correspondents in general could not be trusted and those working for Sky or BBC News were held in particular contempt. Mention was often made of the pro-Israeli conspiracy theory about the power of the Jewish lobby, aided by the hand of America behind such attempts to mislead the global public through its widespread control of media machinery.

Many participants articulated what they perceived was the real motivation in the West and in respective government circles for this Islamophobia expedition on a global stage: the growth and power of Islam that was spreading across the world. Western converts to Islam were increasing, as were Muslim populations in these countries, who were not only feared, but also seen as potential disloyal citizens within predominantly Christian states. The role of the previous Pope

Benedict XV1 in seeking to halt Turkey’s admission to the European Union was cited as one example of this concerted push to make the religion less popular and weak in Europe. Some also cited the examples of reports of one Cardinal Turkson, who questioned the growth of Islam in Europe, and of the Catholic Church’s response to this growing Muslim demography (O’Leary, 2012).

These sentiments are aligned to the role Islam may play as the new ‘bogeyman’ following the collapse of the Soviet Union that has led to much discourse on the role of the faith and relations with the West. This is reflected in the work of Bernard Lewis on Islam (Lewis, 1971, 1990, 1991, 2003, 2012).

In assessing these issues, there was some element of belief in the existence of a continued conspiracy against Islam and Muslims, both in the West and worldwide. It would perhaps be simpler to view this conspiracy as anti-Islam hysteria rather than analysing the complexities of Islam and its various sects and branches of belief. Many of the respondents would prefer not to be critical of Islam itself, however practised and demonstrated, given their strong faith. In some cases it was an instant reaction to the critique of Islam or its followers, after a high-profile event, such as the bombings in New York, London or elsewhere.

There was a view that those who called themselves Muslims and carried out atrocities were not adopting Muslim values that abhorred such violence. Alternatively, participants suggested that some may have been indoctrinated at some level by intelligence agencies and that Western agencies such as the CIA had a hand in such activities. This polemical view echoes the work of Goodman and Goodman (2006), which refers to subversive activities of intelligence services, including media infiltration. This thought process emerged clearly from the data as well as observations made by the researcher. In that respect, it was a theory framed with inductive logic that some of the sample diaspora felt needed to be aired. This comment highlights what was repeated often and again, by various respondents:

> ‘We’re really not accepted here. They also tell us to integrate, but to

> what? They want us to stop being Muslim and lose who we are.'
>
> Punjabi male, Luton

It is interesting to note that, although many of the respondents consistently referred to their wariness of Western media, they often cited such press and news agencies as evidence to reinforce their own theories. Interpretations such as the impact of the Jewish lobby, the anti-Muslim embedding of the BBC and news reports that are therefore, in the main, misleading and ill-informed, were reflected in the collective theorising amongst groups of young people among the respondents.

A natural extension of concern was the perception of an intentional programme to malign Islam globally. This was said to be exemplified within the area of public policy by strategies to combat violent extremism and increase a sense of community cohesion, such as Prevent and Respect (Parliament 2012), which were viewed with much disdain and hostility by many cohort group members. They were assessed as marketing ploys openly constructed to pacify the white majority communities after the riots in the Northern cities in England during 2001. This view was coupled with a fear that, within the Muslim and Pakistani community, there were people who acted on behalf of the security services as informants to keep an eye on suspected troublemakers or community activists. Some even gave names of individuals in the two cities whom they suspected of being such minor agents of the state, concluding that most people in the community, through word of mouth, knew them. Therefore, many avoided or side-lined such suspected informers, even acknowledging that some people, aware of their dubious allegiances, fed them false information they knew would rebound back on such interlopers.

This lack of confidence is reflected in Fekete (2006) on how one aspect on the 'war on terror' has been the impact of stop and search on Muslim men and overzealous policing. There were claims by the sample diaspora that this just added to resentment in the diaspora and did not help the case of the government or law enforcement agencies. In this line of thought, there was an additional concern and criticism levelled at what they referred to as some so-called Muslim converts from the West who attended their mosques. They were viewed with suspicion as another potential source of intelligence-gathering present in these places of worship.

The respondents also questioned the representativeness of bodies such as the Muslim Council of Britain, which many considered as leaning towards government admiration rather than speaking out for the interests of Muslims and emerging diasporas. A feature of such groups is to claim to represent the whole Muslim interest, which participants considered as contradictory, given the diversity and tensions within Islam itself. The British Muslim population is extremely diverse based on religious discipline, branch of faith, class status, geographical differences and so forth, and on that basis such national bodies cannot in totality be the spokesperson for such a wide body of opinion or community. Another feature of complexity in this discourse, which some respondents had not considered, was for government perhaps to have several, rather than just one, body representing Muslims to engage with. It mirrors Poole's (ibid.) view of the constant media portrayal of Islam as a monolithic faith that is also framed within political circles. The following was a common perception in both cohort groups:

> 'Asian politicians, especially the Muslim ones in parliament, are complete wankers, just making a name for themselves. They haven't the guts to speak out.'
>
> Punjabi male, Luton

In essence, such concerns add to the researcher's perception of insecurity of identity as a recurring theme, together with a need to continually assert the right to belong within the narratives of being born in Britain, yet being treated unfairly and, as they perceived, as second-class citizens. Consequently, some participants considered that their views were misrepresented by what they, once again, considered as unrepresentative individuals and groups seeking to speak for the very cosmopolitan groups of Muslim communities in Britain. Many of the participants felt that no one safeguarded their interests or spoke up for their concerns of discrimination and anti-Muslim feeling. Those who were often invited to speak to the media on their behalf were seen as middle-class individuals who would not and could not relate to the mass of disadvantaged Muslim youth represented, for example, by Pakistani Muslim young people or other marginalised people, such as Bangladeshi youth. This yearning for equal treatment and equal rights was a sub-theme of this wider analysis in parallel with other threads of thinking.

There was a strong sense of emotion during these exchanges paralleled by a reluctance to speak out or campaign against what they felt was such injustices. When pressed on this matter, the same defeatist response came back: “What’s the use, who’s going to listen to us anyway, no one really cares what we think.” This increasing sense of isolation and withdrawal may have similarities with that of young people in mainstream society. This was put to participants, who argued that their experience was unique as the level of animosity towards them was considered premeditated and orchestrated by the media to reinforce a global image of the Muslim adversary. At some level within this discourse, there was a strong reinforcement of their parental fears, intravenously fed into their thoughts and sub-conscious. Unrealistic parallels such as the expulsion of Ugandan Asians by Idi Amin in 1972 were drawn to reinforce this fear of one day being thrown out of Britain for not being British. Again, this was a view promoted and held by parents and elders, who continually seem to pass on their own sense of insecurity of British tenure to their offspring, despite their legal status as British-born citizens. This heightened insecurity exacerbated the need to have a place to belong and, in some of the diaspora’s minds, made Pakistan attractive not only as a refuge but also as a haven from all the prejudices and injustices they perceived in the West: a naïve viewpoint given their overall concern for the rule of law and sense of justice – core values instilled in them as part of their British citizenship – which they felt were denied in Pakistan.

It may also be argued that, given the mixture of weakness and strength within the sense of Muslim Britishness, these contradictions and indecisions signify a continual personal and group struggle, and are part of the process of formation of a new hybrid identity. It is a reminder of the constant negotiations taking place within the diaspora, at a deep personal level and in group interactions. In that sense, these juxtapositions are inevitable, if not needed, to test out their experiences and exploration and potential affirmation of hybrid identity.

The perceived and actual discrimination felt by some women frightened them, as they felt increasingly powerless, despite legislation to combat religious discrimination. Similarly to the male interviewees, many of the women felt that no one was speaking up for them and that their concerns were not being addressed. Some spoke of not wishing to raise their voices in case enmity from mainstream society increased; this was repeated often by respondents.

The women specifically spoke strongly of how anti-Muslim sentiments they perceived had made them resilient in their beliefs that were completely absorbed into their identity as a whole. The Pukhtoon women, particularly, were of the opinion that Islam was a complete way of life with no distinction made between their culture and religion. The media vilification of their faith globally was misleading and only as a Muslim could one appreciate the falseness of such claims and portrayal. The shared experiences of Muslims around the world were emphasised as being evidence of a single community of faith or Ummah, whilst their British Muslim personality provided them with an affirmed sense of being rooted in Britain.

They were well aware of the opportunities afforded in Britain rather than Pakistan. This also demonstrates a strong allegiance to being British as the most fundamental element to their transnational sense of history. In many respects it also emphasises the reality of life, as many would struggle with living in Pakistan on a permanent basis, given the lack of meritocracy, the bureaucracy and endemic corruption that is openly visible in most daily interactions with officials. The researcher would further argue that many of the diaspora only return to Pakistan for short breaks out of necessity, often complaining about the lack of electricity and respect from relatives who see them as too ‘English’. In fact, it is a world removed from their own Western experiences and values that would not be economically sustainable or even materially comfortable as a place to live for the vast majority of the diaspora. It is perhaps more a romanticised aspiration than a reality that will actually take effect. It is also perhaps a knee-jerk response to what are perceived as small injustices in Britain reinforced by the lack of real knowledge about modern Pakistan and its many political, social and economic complexities. It is for some a much desired safety net. In this context, in the summary of this chapter (6.6), the researcher refers to a new form of transmigrant with class distinctions. Inevitably there is no plan b as Britain is home and this is reflected in the wide range of quotes contained in this document.

Although these discussions in private were animated and revealed an overwhelming sense of frustration and level of resentment, there was no sense that this anger would lead to any form of retaliation or public display of animosity towards other communities and peoples of alternative faiths. There was a silent irritation and acceptance, as highlighted before, of this status quo.

In these cases, there is a need to argue that this shared experience resulted in a desire to understand not only Islam but also their sense of heritage that builds their esteem and pride. Yet the researcher cannot help but conclude that perhaps those making these contributions needed to assess the validity of their claims as ordinary members of society, taking into consideration the many intricacies of the global geo-political situation, rather than maintaining an over-sensitivity to a critique of political Islam itself.

Without doubt, for the researcher, this segment was one of the most interesting parts of the fieldwork process, as it revealed different views presented in different circumstances behind the discourse that both groups engaged in. It also highlighted the level of anxiety felt by the diaspora in openly discussing real feelings for fear of animosity from the majority of inhabitants in Britain as well as not seeking to reenergise stereotypes of fellow Muslims, if not of themselves. These were exceptional comments aired within a private domain that were cautiously and hesitantly offered as a part of their reality of life and perception of everyday media consumption and their identity. Clearly, many areas of concern and pessimism are attached to their viewing and consumption.

These anxieties found some transformation into a more assertive and proactive search to obtain a more positive and personalised media that depicts a constructive self-image through self-learning. In making use of new and emerging technologies, participants believed they might find a new beginning, an empowering process to tackle perceived media bias. The researcher would again argue for some re-evaluation of the conclusions they reached in generalising about all Western media promoting anti-Muslim bias.

The role that media and new smartphone devices can play in promoting the positive nature of the faith is more demonstrable for the sample diaspora. They spoke of using media images, texting and the internet to develop and disseminate positive images of Islam. For them this exemplified how the use of such media promotes not only a sense of active citizenship but hybrid assertiveness. This directly related to their defined sense of identity and added strength in enabling them to feel being both comfortable and confident in their own skins, at the most basic level of interpretation. It was this new-found optimism and vehicle that allowed a new phase of self-awareness and articulation of their troika of identities – British, Pakistani and Muslim – communicated through a new inter-linking lexicon that comprises all three major aspects of who and what they are, and want to become. It is within this sphere that confidence is expected to grow and the response to their sense of victimhood to be continually be addressed.

6.4 Language and use of new technologies in generational identity

The increasingly fast pace of development of new technologies provided, in many respects, a unique and stabilising influence on the diaspora, as represented within the research cohort groups. It created an opportunity to challenge their often-told frustrations by a new method of communication, which has a profound effect on their identity. This produced a new assertiveness through the patronage of new flexible forms of communication such as easy messaging, social media and downloading. The resourceful use of language connecting past and future individual characteristics metamorphosed into a growing diaspora sub-culture spanning an Eastern heritage combined with Western modernity. By doing so, it found a niche to strengthen a transnational affirmation as part of an on-going contribution to personal and group hybridity.

There seem to be a number of relevant and important sub-themes emerging from this analysis. In the first instance, there was an interest and fascination in Pakistani culture *per se*. Second, there was a new distinction and demarcation being made between the diaspora born and brought up in Britain and others of their own heritage, within their own communities, whom participants considered as representatives of the past. These individuals were out of touch with what they defined as a new diasporic space or sphere. It reflected the differential between those ‘made in Britain’ and newly arrived Pakistani immigrants, brought here either through marriage or migration. A third element of class distinction is also at play here and needs recognition, indicated in the following:

> ‘You see these yardies [slang term for those newly arrived from Pakistan] with their oiled hair and chains on, look like real chavs.’
>
> Punjabi male, Luton

The separation and compartmentalisation of members of their own sub-population into a class-based categorisation was a new trend. This movement also signified at some level the growth of a self-designated process of embourgeoisement where one group has asserted a self-proclaimed superiority over another, regardless of their same group dynamic. It is the new diasporic sense of modernity that is at the heart of these arguments, similar to the thoughts of Ramadan (2006), encompassing an element of a British-inspired Pakistani Muslim faith, created and being evolved by the diaspora. It also relates, again, to Engbersen’s notion of transmigrant as referred to in Chapter 2 that amongst others raises key questions on identity formation (2007).

This growing sense of class-consciousness was a major theme in the responses of some elements of the sample diaspora who were beginning to identify with certain values and beliefs, associated with wider consumption, material or otherwise, of which new technologies are an important part. Indeed, the ability to purchase modern forms of smartphones and multi-functional portable gadgets such as iPhones and iPads is part of this emerging material difference.

Aspects of this new sense of modernity and class-consciousness relate to what Bhabha (1994) has referred to as mimicry, the adoption of Western values and dress as more accepted within mainstream society, which will be explored further later. The researcher would argue that the significant use of modern technology by the sample diaspora relates to Bhabha's (ibid.) work on hybridity and construction of a new third space for negotiating insecurities and doubts on identity that also leads to affirmation and assertiveness.

Of the two sample cohorts, the Pukhtoon were at an advantage. Many were able to speak Urdu and Punjabi as well as Pukhto (while the Punjabis could not speak or understand Pukhto), so they had wider access to bi-cultural and bi-lingual material, whilst also retaining information in English. Cultural languages for the Punjabi, such as Urdu, were not used as much as Pukhto was by the Pukhtoon, who seemed to move easily between their own cultural languages and interacted readily in their mother tongue. Both groups, however, used English as the preferred language throughout the data collection period.

In this light, new technologies were seen as a tool to increase understanding of separateness and togetherness by acknowledging a level of diversity within difference itself, evident by the linguistic mix referred to above. This included slang words in English, Punjabi, Pukhto and Urdu that became the new language of communications that evolved into text and word speak amongst the diaspora. It was a new hybrid transnational shorthand for these diasporic groups creating new diasporic spheres of communication and interaction. The internet, smartphones and web searches all provided a strong and positive medium in which to explore their emerging sense of Britishness and being Asians. As respondents stated:

> 'You can get these videos of Pakistani life with music and all these sounds – looks backward but it's really funny.'
>
> Punjabi male, Luton

> ‘I listen to Pushto music on my phone and just download it. I really like the songs in my language as well as the Hindi ones.’
>
> Pukhtoon male, Oxford

> ‘My kids are always messing with my iphone and downloading Bollywood songs, and when I need to use it my battery is dead.’
>
> Punjabi female, Luton

Respondents spoke of how the new information tools equipped them as transnational citizens to reinforce multi-identities and provide a sense of heritage and understanding which their parents did not have, nor could provide. One mother spoke of how the internet and Google maps allowed her to show her children the home of her forefathers.

> ‘I show the kids the village their grandparents came from and also the cities near the family house in Pakistan. It’s really good.’
>
> Punjabi female, Luton

Another spoke of how it provided cultural reinforcement through learning Urdu or learning about the Quran from the internet. Others spoke of its value as a research tool to undertake the cross-referencing referred to earlier of media stories of Muslims around the globe.

An emerging theme within the discussion was the use of new-generation tools such as smartphones, WAP browsing services and other accessories that are personalised modes of mass communication, through texting, videoing, editing and other aspects of transmission of language, images and voicemail. They allowed members of the diaspora to create items that included videos mimicking Pakistani and English culture, and multi-lingual text messaging in English and English Hindi or Urdu and Pukhto, to celebrate religious festivals and personal moments. On a lighter note, jokes were been engineered that poked fun at traditional cultural or family practices that are considered outdated and out of step with this new breed of cultural entrepreneurs. All these contributed in their own way to this newly designed identity of the future.

For instance, there was been a proliferation, within this media form, of small clip videos and anecdotes that combined cultural aspects with modern audio and visual formats. These included video images of traditional Pakistanis dancing to Western rap music, or mimics of Western nursery rhymes spoken in English with a heavy Pakistani accent and accompanying sitar music, most notably, ‘Twinkle, Twinkle, Little Star’. Amongst other innovations are Punjabi and Pukhtoon spoofs of prank-calling Asian businesses and orchestrating banter and cultural profanity in these incidents that are then shared with others nationally, if not internationally, through diaspora networks and cultural contacts.

Again, an interesting variation within the diaspora is how in the case of the Punjabi prank calls there is an overt use of Punjabi profanity that is common in the vocabulary signifying class differentials. Amongst Pukhtoons, there is no swearing, again highlighting a cultural difference in tone and expression. The role of the Pukhtoon as the ‘Other’ in Pakistani society also emerges within these examples, with the Punjabi often chastising the Pukhtoon for his their perceived backwardness. This is another indication that the prejudices of the past are inherited in this modern age for some elements of this generation, and also represent the class variations of the wider diaspora.

It is inevitable, in a way that the pattern emerging is of a split along gender lines, with the male respondents strongly associated with this use of bad language, which was non-existent among the females.

Such vignettes offer an insight into the multi-layered functioning of identity amongst these interviewees. They also show how they looked back on a previous generation that they believed represented their lost past heritage and legacy. This was truer of the Pukhtoons than of the Punjabis, and represents ancestral links to Afghanistan and Pakistan that connect languages and cultures of that region. Participants also spoke of how new inventions such as Skype and Facetime on iPads, had replaced calling cards to keep them in touch with family in Pakistan. It was important for them to keep lines of communication open at a time they felt attached to their origins, an impulse reflected in the work of Appadurai (1997).

These discussions also reflected an assertiveness of participants' transnational identity, which throughout the study the researcher perceived to be a burden on or incompatible with their evolving sense of Britishness. It was in these forums that many spoke strongly of the value of their transnational role and of being British and Pakistani at the same time. Importantly, many derived strength from this reasoning given the overwhelming thrust of the discourse in the data that spoke of open hostility and prejudice that had left many deeply scarred and lacking in confidence and a sense of their own self-esteem. This made a distinct impression with the researcher who felt much empathy and understanding of this group given that he too was also part of this diaspora community in his own right.

This multiple heritage in many ways give them pride, albeit cautiously defined within their own parameters of understanding that often highlighted the dichotomy apparent through cognitive dissonance of who and what they really were. Such issues all fed into what can be best termed as a complex mosaic of identity formation within these groups, that in many ways may well be the last vestiges of cultural and linguistic links with parents and grandparents born and brought up in rural Pakistan. It may be that the third and subsequent diaspora generations will be different both linguistically and culturally. A pattern is emerging of fourth- and fifth-born children having no or very limited knowledge of Urdu or Punjabi, and not wishing to utilise it in day-to-day communication, except in very rare cases. The old discipline of speaking to one's parents in their mother tongue has become a past relic, with most verbal dialogues conducted in English, signifying the predominance of the diaspora, now set in the reality that, for most, the mother tongue is indeed English and thus does not pose the same cultural and social dilemma it did for their parents. That said, for the Pukhtoon there was a stronger allegiance to their language as, for them, it represented a wider transnational relationship not only with Pakistan, but with

Afghanistan also. To this group, therefore, new technologies offered a unique opportunity to reconnect with a historical dispersal from this primary and natural home, in which language was preeminent, more so than for the Punjabi cohort. As these respondents stated:

> ‘I use the internet on my phone and help the kids with their homework and show them verses from the Quran and Mecca when it is Eid.’
>
> Punjabi female, Luton

> ‘I think it’s important my children speak Pushto and I encourage them, even looking at things on the internet that are useful.’
>
> Pukhtoon female, Oxford

The new inventions of the media age had a clear impact on the defining and redefining of future character of many of the cohort group members. As part of that process, participants were forming a unique mould of being British, that is not a replication of their parents’ experience. The development of fusion music, images and anecdotes that circulate the cellular networks are a reminder of how inventive the diaspora has become in investigating their own personal and group identity, by provoking and challenging cultural and social stereotypes.

Such stereotypes include the Pakistani male spouse arriving in England wearing 1960s clothes; Pakistani rural life is mimicked and old-fashioned dialects are accompanied by rap lyrics. This promotes greater differences within a diversity that is continually redefining its value base and assertiveness through creative form and expression. This example closely relates to the work of Samy Alim (2012), where hip-hop originated in the ghettos of America to give poor blacks a voice and form of expression against considered injustices in their neighbourhoods and in society generally.

An alternative use of this new media has been to cross-reference media in respect to reinforcing pride into their Muslim origins. YouTube and other forms of easy-access media have allowed people to not only research but augment their cultural and religious identity by providing evidence of a more enlightened and educational global Muslim fraternity.

Feelings of guilt by association have now been turned into membership of groups with common Islamic understanding that are challenging and redressing the negative global image of the faith. The vanguard in this respect is a wider worldwide Pakistani diaspora, more educated and becoming more elite in some countries with a higher social standing, as in the United States and Canada. In using such methodologies to reinforce transnational cultural and religious validation, both the Punjabi and Pukhtoon are transforming through a lexicon of their own choice related to their personal perceptions, as one essential feature of belonging. In so doing, they are enhancing their sense of assertiveness and shaping their presence within modern British society. Allied to this is a need for media consumption that reflects this changing personality and order. The diaspora in this research became the architects of their own defining of transnational hybridity or of a new Pakistani diaspora set within a Western context in the public sphere. This clearly signifies a search for viable options that reaffirm their own sense of being and understanding.

6.5 The search for an alternative and responsive media

Inevitably, this led for a clear call by the diaspora participants for a more representative media to aid this new emerging hybrid identity, and so facilitate a greater understanding of their specific diaspora needs. This would include a proactive articulation of positive aspects of the people of the diaspora that included their faith, culture and contribution to Britain.

This, they believed, would enhance the reputation of this community of interest and give further expression to the formation of new British multi-individuality, encompassing their faith and culture. This would in time become self-evident and established within British mainstream society and would promote a plural society. It is in many ways an acceptance of multiculturalism in its most holistic form that reflects the work of Kundani (2014) in valuing this approach. In turn, some participants felt the manifestation of anti-Muslim feeling prevalent in the media itself would thereby be challenged. There is much scope for debate as to the merits of whether the bias perceived by the sample diaspora could be indeed challenged by the adoption of a self-sourced alternative media discourse.

In reality, with such a diverse international media now in existence, there may not be a need for this at all; the growth of global markets has created more competition within the cable and satellite industry. This has allowed most nations of the world to operate some form of transnational media broadcast, not only for their selected diasporas but for wider international consumption promoting positive messages of their nations. It also enhances international stature, exemplified by China’s English-speaking international channel CNC World, launched in July 2010 and termed a ‘multibillion pound soft power push’ (Tania, 2010). This is not dissimilar to the Voice of America that existed to perpetuate the foreign dominance and policies of the United States during the Cold War era, and which in changed formats still exists.

However, for the British Muslim diaspora of Pakistani origin, as sampled in this study, such media outlets may well be irrelevant, as they have no impact on the British public and their framing of the diaspora. It is media consumption within Britain, so present and real, and with such adverse impact on their status in British society, that matters.

A clear response to that analysis was that they wished to source media that matched their specific needs and desires to counter that negative element in their place of birth. At the same time, respondents recognised that current combinations of media consumption, whether terrestrial, cable and multi-ethnic, did not cater for their quest for a reaffirmation of this transnational entity which they so longed for. Within that paradigm of representation and affirmation was not only the need for positive media reinforcement but also consumption that catered for their evolving transnational hybridity, in a format that recognised their Britishness. As these comments signify:

> ‘It would be good to have more dramas that are of Pakistani culture in English. At least I could understand them.’
>
> Punjabi male, Oxford

> ‘I wish they had more Pukhtoon things on television for us.’
>
> Pukhtoon male, Oxford

> ‘There is nothing that shows us as positive people. We have done so much in this country.’
>
> Punjabi female, Luton

Participants argued that there had been and would be many documentaries and discussions on extremism and terrorism associated with their culture and religion, as argued earlier, that had framed them unhelpfully, yet there remained little that was inclusive of them. There were no positive elements within this current model of representation, which so frustrated and incensed many of the contributors. The internet gave them the ability and opportunity to assess and reassess information to cross-reference facts averred and assumptions made by British and Western media.

The only deviation on this subject came in part from members of the Pukhtoon cohort who felt a need for a distinct broadcaster tied into their own sense of heritage. This specific request was intended to reinforce and personify a predominant Pukhtoon character through the consumption of a Pukhtoon media provider. The need for specific cultural and linguistic channels was more than apparent in comments by interviewees, inevitably to address the perceived cultural deficit that they existed as they grew up and lived in the West. There was a strong desire to have a channel or media that would marry these sets of ideas to provide them with one alternative range of viewing to meet this East-West trajectory of personal understanding. Many spoke of how valuable it would be to have programmes that represented young British Muslims as part of British society, with a distinct youth culture and British way of life. Many of this diaspora felt the media they visualised would enhance their status as citizens of Britain rather than as denizens as reflected in the work of Engbersen (2007).

The relationship to personal identity of individual viewing habits was a strong determinant in how participants built up their personal profile to enhance their hybridity, whilst at the same time seeking to screen out the bias they believed so prevalent in mainstream broadcasting. Moll (2007) has demonstrated how important a role positive media portrayals of Muslims of the diaspora has had on this development and given an important vehicle for assertiveness.

The diaspora in the study felt it incumbent on the British media to show, in particular, constructive images of their communities that would also further a validation of their presence and sense of place in the country. In that respect, their focus was the mainstream of British society and changing perceived mis-representations impacting on their daily functioning as ordinary citizens. However, these were statements of aspiration without any intention of follow-up action to promote their interests in this regard, and indicated a lack of political and/or social action to achieve this goal.

The respondents articulated a view of the limited choice available to them within the terrestrial medium that demonstrated the diversity of many urban cities, or incorporated content specifically commissioned to suit minority communities. What existed was limited to what they described as tokenistic gestures, such as the odd outdated Bollywood film in the early hours of the morning. Other British films, such as *East Is East*, depicted for many yet another stereotypical overview of a Pakistani traditional way of life. However, this production could be seen as an attempt at describing the generation gap between the diaspora and their parents in an enlightened manner.

Within radio, the creation of the BBC Asian Network was a move towards addressing the gaps in established media for this unique population, but it remained specialist, not mainstream. This, more than any other medium, signified a more proactive, Westernised style of media consumption combining elements of Indian sub-continental culture that engaged with a much more energetic youth culture, mixing news and entertainment.

The BBC's toying with the closure of its Asian Network, although it was reprieved, was given as further evidence of a lack of enthusiasm for cultural programming. Such behaviour also fuelled a perception that there is no real commitment within the mainstream programming and broadcasting elite to the needs of minorities, as has been argued by Downing and Husband (2005), for instance. This Asian Network station, however, represents a very small segment within the wider BBC portfolio and of course it is limited to radio.

Western media tends to cater for a wider audience which spans millions rather than small minorities: that is the reality of the global media. To exist, it needs to increase its revenue and return to shareholders, if it is to survive in a cut-throat global competitive market. Yet in Britain, with the exception of *Channel 4 News*, there are very few representatives of the diaspora in front of the camera on terrestrial television, a fact that authenticates the respondents' concerns.

Accordingly, most respondents in this study remained switched off from the majority of terrestrial viewing and therefore solely relied on cable television and cultural channels to meet their needs, which remained largely unfulfilled. There remains a vacuum in this medium for this specific generation of Pakistani British Muslims, seeking reassurance and a form of endorsement, which in many ways instils a stronger sense of belonging. The Pakistani satellite broadcasters were not English-speaking channels and that was important to the diaspora. As this comment stated:

> 'At the end of the day we are British, so they need to have more channels or shows for us that we can understand and other people can also see.'
>
> Punjabi male, Luton

To hope for positive representations in mainstream media might be a false expectation, arising from a psychological sense of insecurity seeking recognition through the placing of positive mainstream visualisation of their identity in front of wider society. Such an aspiration perhaps also recognises that their needs would be a recognition of their importance as a distinct community with specific needs as consumers of media information.

In the meantime, within this mosaic of cultural and religious media, there were notable channels that attracted the attention of the sample diaspora to meet the vacuum of self-identification. For instance, in respect to greater understanding of religious identity, Peace TV, an Islamic channel, was considered a positive influence, giving information on Islam in English which was accessible by new generation adults and the growing third generation.

Such religious and cultural channels (ARY, Geo TV, STAR) allowed participants to explore and comprehend their faith within their own homes in the vernacular of choice, as explained by this young mother of four:

> ‘Peace TV makes you understand about the Quran because it’s in English not like other programmes in Urdu or Arabic. Dr Zakri Naik[3] is really good because he explains in English to you and answers your questions about what is written in the Quran, word for word. Before it was Arabic waffle on TV and I didn’t understand the answers to some of my own questions.’
>
> Punjabi female, Luton

Clearly, there remains an audience and unmet demand for a combination of media that satisfies the thirst for knowledge to reinforce a transnational hybrid personality and key challenges facing young Pakistanis of the diaspora. Within the mainstream, there is no relevant vehicle at this stage that can assist them in this process, except a journey of self-discovery aided by individual taste in programmes of interest that could also be eclectic for each person.

Analysis of the data showed up a further interesting division significantly based on gender. Most females watched a range of cultural media related to

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[3] ‘Dr Zakir Naik is a medical doctor by professional training. He is renowned as a dynamic international orator on Islam and comparative religion. Dr Naik clarifies Islamic viewpoints and clears misconceptions about Islam, using the Qur’an, authentic Hadith and other religious scriptures as a basis, in conjunction with reason, logic and scientific facts.’ – Islamic Research Foundation website: http://www.irf.net/drzakirnaik.html

Bollywood dramas, talent shows and music videos. Religious programming also featured within that mix, most specifically during cultural events such as Ramadan or the festivals of Eid. Religious media networks were considered most useful for information and increasing awareness of religious events as well as being educational for their children.

As reported above, based on the discussions and observations within this research, the data shows that there is a continual process of assessing and reassessing viewing that then supports the growth of a sense of hybrid identity, aided by a phalanx of multi-media channels. However, there is a stronger sense within the female cohort groups, especially from those who were young parents, that this search for their own identification with certain media had supported their children in retaining a strong sense of multiple heritage, which they considered an important role for them to fulfil as mothers in the new media age. This was an interesting point of fundamental difference between the sexes, where the males talked more of the language of self, related to their personal interests of choice (football, car buying), whilst the discourse for the women focused on family and the future development of their offspring. This point is significant in relating to a feminist approach to discourse analysis and highlighted in the work of black and minority feminist writing such as Walker (2013) and hooks (1995).

On the other hand, for the males, there is not much appetite for the random selection of channel hopping favoured by their sisters, mothers and spouses. Some males opted for the pre-ordered and predictable Western menu of programmes that catered for their personal sense of British identity. At the same time, however, many of the males spoke of a need to retain their own cultural language, whether Pukhto or Punjabi, as an essential element related to the progression of generations. This correlates with the work of Hall (2001) in how communities interlink and make sense of the world and what Barker and Galasinski (2001) have spoken of as language and culture being naturalised through codes and signs into a form of cultural coding (ibid., p5). This is further evidence of a need to maintain the quality of a personality entrenched within their Pakistani Asian being. However, as part of these viewing patterns, the females were much more confident and assertive in speaking cultural languages than the males, particularly Urdu, which accounts for the primary role of mothers as teachers of the mother tongue to their children. As respondents stated:

> ‘My husband’s Urdu isn’t brilliant, so I speak to the kids. I tell him to watch the Indian movies, but he doesn’t like them that much.’
>
> Punjabi female, Luton

> ‘I want to teach my kids both Pushto and Urdu as it’s important for
> the future that they know.’
>
> Pukhtoon female, Oxford

What one can see from this is a myriad of programming accessed by these communities all related to group or individual desire, supported by the increasing role of cable satellite broadcasting. Such a choice allows each individual to select a multitude of viewing that can feed into a personal profile and development of hybridity. This multiple viewing takes place within households and within the broad range of audiences. This is the new age sphere of communication that has been reflected in the work of Vertovec (2003, 2009). However, there is still a demand for a new media that addresses the formation of this new identification which remains elusive. This is the key paradox for the participants who, in many ways, are struggling with this developing distinctiveness. It is ironic, that awareness of this unmet need it is due to this diversity of media provision which allows the diaspora to explore and modify their identity within a construct that is personal and political and of their own choice.

The plurality of mass media has allowed much greater consumption of a range of information that previously did not exist. It has provided a unique space in which to construct a transnational identity that combines ethnicity, nationality, faith and race amongst many other human characteristics. It is now aided by smartphone technology, on hand anywhere, for instant use of the internet and messaging, including downloading of hundreds of applications (apps) available for the diversity of special and other interests, that has widened consumption to a far broader set of tools than the old-style television ‘box’.

In all senses, the internet and use of YouTube have contributed a vast amount in the new media age in nurturing and developing a sense of personal identity, forming a valuable library from which to gain various strands of information that help shape personal hybridity in defining the individual. This is evident in the figures referred to in the introduction to this research. It is useful to consider that this format is seen to be more impartial than any state or private sector media conglomerate broadcasting to these audiences. The videos placed on YouTube are from individuals wishing to share information within the World Wide Web and not connected to government or officialdom in terms of control of output but, rather, using new media as more a process and vehicle of self-determination.

It is important to note that this also indicates a genuine desire to understand the past or heritage to create a new future self that remains evolving at this stage, utilising new forms of media that fill a vacuum left by mainstream and satellite media. In other words, the internet addresses a gap and appetite for self-discovery that has not been met by the plethora of cable and satellite channels that seek to cater for every need imaginable. The ease with which one can search thousands of search engines on the web gives the individual much more freedom and scope to study, if not consume, new formats that are relevant to them at a particular time and space. This would seem to make the diaspora’s need for consumption of diverse and appropriate media on their screens redundant. However, their argument of a need to ensure indigenous-origin communities see more positive framing of them on national television remains a compelling argument.

This search for relevant cultural, if not hybrid, programming, has created an agency that did not previously exist and by so doing has given much more self-awareness and interest in multi-dimensional identity. This is profound, as reflected by Morey and Yaqin (2011), in looking at the range of media and Muslim representation.

There was further significance of this need for new representative media as it provided access to global peer reviews of self-identity from young people of the Pakistani diaspora, across other continents, seeking their own alternative meaning to belonging and wishing to marry Eastern tradition with Western living.

Consequently, it will be interesting to note how far this medium will enter into the lives of the diaspora hand-in-hand with social networking sites such as Facebook and Twitter, as well as other emerging technological developments.

The main point, however, is the importance of these new vehicles that are creating more and more interest and activism through outlets that are open to the diaspora for exploitation without being confrontational to mainstream society. What remains a personal and silent revolution within the diaspora itself is aiding their own growth of what they may consider as a new form of multi-national hybridity and sense of belonging. In many respects it is about combining the many facets of their individual uniqueness into a single form that not only achieves recognition but is accepted as part of society as a whole. This is not only a juxtaposition in the argument but also the dilemma that is the reality of growing up in two worlds and trying to achieve the appropriate balance and much-needed affirmation.

In all respects therefore, the data raised a number of key issues that required exploration and elaboration. They highlight the parallels between the two cohort groups based in their respective cities. The issues raised in the main highlight significant and very similar concerns, which in themselves are a fascinating and revealing phenomenon. The divergence in opinion came across through a cultural and religious prism related to their own experiences and regional heritage, impressed upon them by their parents and elders, reinforced by infrequent visits to and experiences of Pakistan. These were enhanced by cultural-specific media consumption in Britain. What is clear is that these narratives are real, they exist as a daily fact for many. They view the mainstream media, chief amongst them the BBC and Sky, as primarily agent provocateurs, and often considered oppressive, prejudicial and divisive in intention and nature. Although they are regarded with much concern, they remain relevant viewing. This is the narrative that relates to the ‘war on terror’ that manifestly defined these concerns of the diaspora and led to this reassessment of the media and its depiction of their present identity. It created a shared grievance amongst this sample diaspora as part of their devotion to their faith, whilst also creating cultural group differences.

Apparent in this chapter have been some of the ethnic differences between Pukhtoons and Punjabis that also correspond with gender and differences in linguistic ability and geographical boundaries of history. This is not the monolithic Muslim fraternity that is so often reported within the media discourse that impacts on this subject group so greatly. Within this dynamic, as the males seemed more vociferous about concerns that related to their sense of belonging and exclusivity, the females expressed silent concern at the future of the next generation of the diaspora, namely their children, in a context of Islamophobia and racism. The prevailing shadow of the repercussions of wider society’s perceptions of a Muslim Pakistani association with terrorism was a constant reminder echoing in the numerous conversations.

These were some of the complexities arising from the research question that required some response, to what participants saw as an onslaught by the means of communication, on global audiences that so infringed their collective and evolving diaspora identity. Their response to this virtual ‘war on terror’ was to engage with the virtual media to counter the rejectionism they perceived from the dominant broadcasters of the West.

The discourse of the respondents in the diaspora sample reflected the literature of Husband (1994), Ahmed (2006), Modood (2003), Samad (n.d.), bringing together the ideas of the media racialising minorities and the evolving nature of hybrid and transnational identity. This discourse gradually became more assertive and challenging of such media stereotyping in part through developing the practice of cross-referencing through active critiquing and analysis of media reporting of Islam, Muslims and British Pakistanis in Britain.

Foremost in their minds were the historical legacies of colonialism, early migration and resentment at their continuing settlement and development in what is now, for the diaspora, home (see section 2.1), as these comments highlight:

> ‘My grandparents used to tell me what it was like under British rule. It was a really massive empire and you can see what they did to India and Pakistan before and after partition.’
>
> Punjabi male, Oxford

> ‘My grandad was a solider in the army in India, well, we didn’t have Pakistan then, but he wasn’t treated nice. My dad told us all those stories his dad had told him”
>
> Punjabi male, Oxford

> ‘You just have to watch films like *Gandhi* to see how bad the British were in India and how Pakistan was created, really badly.’
>
> Pukhtoon male, Oxford

“What is clear is that the diaspora, through their parents’ experiences, are constantly reminded of this initial journey within a pessimistic discourse reinforced by the language of rejectionism and yearning for an ideal they refer to as ‘home’, meaning security. This is fixed in distant memories that have no association with present-day modernity of the sub-continent.

These inherited rural traits for the mass of the Pakistani population echo in the words of Kabbani (1987), who has written of how migrants displaced from rural life of the East to cities of the West have found this transnational uprooting to have caused much cultural and social upheaval. It is this burden of their children adopting signs of Western culture, whether through dress, language or attitude, that further adds to the high level of insecurity and perception of self-denial that are embedded with the psyche of the older generation.

A number of males and a few of the females spoke of how important it was for their parents that they married someone from the homeland, particularly from the village their ancestral families belonged to. As one commented:

> ‘My dad comes from a small village near Gujar Khan and wants me to marry a village girl, but it’s so backward there, when I go I don’t feel happy. It’s not like the cities in Pakistan, especially Lahore and Pindi. They’re all a bit TPish [slang term for typical Pakistani] in the village.
>
> Punjabi male, Luton

Experiences of rural life were also represented in discussions of the building of new homes that some, like their parents considered important.

> ‘We’re about to build a house in our village because at least it’s something better to stay in when we are there. I want to do it for my parents when they go to stay for a few months a year.’
>
> Pukhtoon male, Oxford

This is at odds with a small group of the respondents, emboldened by their economic and social success, who have only affirmative experiences and attitudes to strengthen their sense of Britishness.

Yet the reality remains that, for the vast majority of British-born Muslims of Pakistani origin, there is a consistent truth in their assertion of wider society’s unease and ill-feeling towards them, persistently elaborated upon within British and other Western media. This sense of animosity by mass media reinforces the view held by the Commission on British Muslims and Islamophobia which heard testimony across Britain to that affect (Runnymede, 1997). It also corresponds to what has been described by Doward and Hinsliff (2004) as the unsettling fragility of Muslim populations being eroded by 'ignorance and intolerance' (p.10). An adjunct to this are fears placed within the discourse of perceived tenuous links with terrorism within the wider diaspora population.

Comments such as: ‘The attitude among the majority of the population is that terrorists are Asian’, articulated by Professor Angell in a public debate in 2010 only seek to reinforce this animosity in the wider public domain. It is the mindset that has been precipitated by media framing and imagery that personifies Islam, in a way Conte (2001) has alluded to, as the only global faith with an element of militancy. In addition, organisations wishing to exploit this division, such as the English Defence League and British National Party, create more animosity between the races that is blatantly Islamophobic and culturally racist in intent and action.

These perceptions of the sample diaspora echo Dabashi (2008), who refers to the challenge of Western capitalist interests that have defined terrorism within an Islamic resistance to economic interests. This in turn, he argues, has resulted in the increase in warfare, supported by Western media that articulates and reinforces this complex power play, picked up by the respondents in the diaspora, who see such a construct as so damaging to their identity and status as British citizens.

6.6 Summary

This summary will draw upon some of the key issues debated within this chapter and aligned to the relevant literature on the subject. Foremost in the researcher’s mind has been how best to respond to a question posed in the *Guardian* of 30 November 2004, of defining one's identity as a British Muslim. It is a central point of debate in this investigation and perhaps best answered by the article itself in the following words: ‘It’s not about what people feel, but what they are allowed to feel’ (The Guardian, 2004). In that sense it corresponds to the empirical data in this study in how the sample diaspora feel as a new transmigrant of the modern age that are based on their profound perceptions and experiences of living as citizens in Britain. Thus their media consumption has defined their response to their identity that within modernity has been facilitated by new and social media; as vehicles of expression and affirmation.

As Gajjala (2010) points out, new media has created new spaces and locales within which South Asian diasporas operate. The sample diaspora in this research relate well to the idea of a 'digital diaspora' utilising social media to engage with their hybridity. By doing so, they are also creating transnational networks and communities, culturally, socially and politically that relate to their sense of home. Furthermore, their politicisation corresponds to Karim (2010) in how they seek to defend their faith from external demonisation by creating counter cyber representations of themselves, their culture and faith via Facebook, MySpace and uploads of videos on YouTube.

Gender differences are also important to note as they continue to show the diaspora as diverse, non-homogenous and containing varied thought processes on identity. Similar to the work of Rinnawi (2010) on Arabs in Germany, faith is an integral element of the Pakistani diaspora hybridity that is not only a primary identifier for many, but a source of strength. As for the female Arab diaspora in Germany, cultural media is an essential tool in maintaining cultural reference points, including language and religious events for future generations. As the narratives in this research have indicated, the Punjabi and Pukhtoon women were keen that their children should be aware of their Islamic faith and cultural heritage. New and social media are now emerging as the principal mechanisms for that to occur among the diaspora: for example, the learning of the Quran via the internet with the student in Oxford, and the Imam based in Pakistan versed in both Arabic and English to facilitate this transnational connection and network.

It is within this context also that the women in this study spoke of the use of the term 'jihad' as one of dual meaning for the West and for the diaspora. This is further explored by Rinnawi's (2010) work. He argues that the term has dual interpretations based on localism and tribalism that are not related to the West's portrayal of 'holy war'. He argues its place as a 'struggle' or 'effort' internally, against the power of the ego. As such:

> 'the penetration of new media technologies into the Arab (South Asian) world and their expansion via the transnational media have

> created a confrontation between the localism and tribalism of Jihad and globalisation forces.' (p.268)

This is reflected by the Pakistani diaspora in this investigation in their consumption of and analysis of Western media output and their struggle for meanings that, as Gajjala has expressed (as stated in section 2.13), 'occur at the intersection of local–global, national–international, private–public, off-line–online, and embodied–disembodied' (ibid., p.211).

The impact of globalisation and new media has therefore, as Guo-Ming and Chang (2010) state, redefined notions of community where local is more global and whereby citizens can adapt their identities. Communities are not only about proximity and fixed location; as Gajjala (ibid.) points out, virtual communities are also real ones. This is true of the sample diaspora as analysed through the narratives, ethnography and one-to-one discussions.

The realisation of transnational and diaspora rites of passage has led to the evolution of a global citizenry defined by a geography that is symbolised by its pliable nature and support for international affiliations, as reflected upon by Samad (2013) in respect to the Pakistani diaspora and by Eade (2010) on his work on the Bangladeshi generations. This version of the global city, so closely interrelated to transnationalism and diaspora, identities a manifestation of a future that differentiates and categorises hybridity within the wider geopolitical parameters of globalisation. It is a new coming of digital age that has not only created new communities linking similar diaspora globally but also become borderless. It has also constructed, or reasserted a stronger sense of Ummah within Western Muslims (see section 2.3). This may have created a 'McIslamism' similar to the McArabism referred to by Rinnawi (2010) – a kind of instant Muslim patriotism (ibid., p.268) within diaspora Muslims in response to negative Western media consumption, and as an assertive response to it. In that respect, in an increasingly technologically advanced and virtual world, there is a single global 'mega' city.

The discourse will therefore continue this trajectory of reassessing and reframing these personalities that is so revealing of the cohort group members who are, as the researcher reiterates, transmigrant(s) of a new media age.

This has been confirmed in the process of observing the cohort groups over a long period of data collection. The researcher felt the term ‘transmigrant’ referred to by Engbersen (2007) was repeatedly a central theme of how many of the diaspora felt. It related to strong contradictions of belonging, on the one hand British, but without a sense of a firm footing in their place of birth. Alternatively, they looked to Pakistan as a destiny for an escapism that offered sanctuary from isolation, marginalisation and discrimination and being made to feel the ‘Other’ by mainstream society. Yet, in the place of their parent’s birth, this was coupled with anxieties of corruption and being seen as the foreign outsider. It became clearer that this sense of not belonging to either world had become a transmigrant characteristic in a new media age. Diaspora members were thinking through who and what they were and where they felt was home. Key to this assessment was the degree of a sense of security. Those feeling the most marginalised felt a much stronger sense of vulnerability and instability, while the opposite was true of the more educated, middle-class generation with strong roots and occupations in Britain. In this latter group there was no sense of fragility in their identity and status, they were strongly embedded in British citizenry and strong enough to repel any notions of outsider status. For the researcher, this came across strongly in the one-to-one interviews and interactions with other cohort group members within the focus groups.

It clearly links into the narratives of the Pakistani diaspora and the analysis from the wider data including ethnography and observations. It is within this paradigm that a fluid British diasporic identity is evolving for this specific group, facilitated by internal and external debates that relate to status, inclusion, participation and belonging.

It is inevitable, as Moussa (2004) claims that the rise in this sense of British Muslim identity has come about because of a sense of crisis within this population. This sense of crisis is evident through the narratives in this study related to anxieties of belonging and a sense of insecurity, all perceived through discrimination and Islamaphobia, as discussed in Chapter 4. This sense of crisis, for the researcher, is related to their evolving hybridity and defining who they are. It can also relate to the work of Rinnawi (ibid.) on the internal battle of the ego that is described as ‘jihad’, within the context of globalisation, materialism and adherence to faith.

This follows on from the work of Modood (2003, 2010) and Samad (2013; n.d.), who provide an insight into this new emerging assertiveness of the British Muslim and their dilemmas as characterised by respondents themselves.

The sense of personal discovery and self-awareness through accessing certain media has manifested a dual juxtaposing analysis. On the one hand, it signifies the dispiriting representation of the British Muslim by the mass media; whilst on the other, it provides an opportunity for greater self-awareness and creativity in setting the boundaries for one's identity. This is; in tune with what Goffman (1969) has referred to as the 'back' and ‘front’ region, displaying the public and private image, a concept familiarised within this data through the voices of the participants.

The participants’ search for global diaspora similarities led to the awakening of positiveness and even pride in their culture and faith that so eluded them in the earlier stages of debate. It mirrors what Chul-Byung (2002) has interpreted as the opposite to what has been described as the cultural imperialist view of media consumption. They are thus not passive consumers but armchair analysts of what they watch. The sample diaspora, in this regard, has overcome some of its demons to articulate a stronger sense of this new-found and creative personal British Muslim individuality through new and social media spaces. The growing transnational element is a clear marker of what many of the diaspora see as a growing assertiveness of their combined Islamic religion and cultural associations, that give them not only familiarity but strength in their daily lives. There is much ease, therefore, in this on-going belief in global solidarity supported by faith and a common set of values and purpose that transcends national borders or a single space that is defined as the sole place of belonging. It corresponds to how Dahinden (2005a, 2005b, 2008, 2009) suggests ‘diasporic transnationalism refers to the ties of migrants and their collectives who entertain sustained social formations across borders while being settled in countries of immigration, thereby forming transnational fields or spaces’ (Bauböck and Faist (2010), p.17).

Again, this global movement is now facilitated by the new media age, as illustrated in the data findings that makes the world a much smaller and accessible place at the touch of a button. Once, as Appadurai (1997) has emphasised, it was calling cards and other partly or largely superseded means of communication that were important to the generation preceding the diaspora, they have now been replaced by the smartphone community, evident by the use of iPhones, iPads, YouTube, the internet, instant messaging and social networking sites, Skype, Facetime, Facebook and Twitter amongst the most important, to harness, facilitate, construct and affirm this transnational citizenship that goes beyond formal limits. It correlates with what Hall (2001) has emphasised as the multi-faceted development of individual personality that takes into account language, cultural features and what he describes as internal and external distinctiveness.

Additionally, the experiences and testimonials recounted in this chapter give weight to the arguments of those within the literature who speak of this evolving nature of hybridity that places diasporic groups into a place of two worlds. This is mirrored in the work of Turner (1994), Naficy (1993), and Vertovec (2003), which has created a body of literature with Downing and Husband (2005) emphasising the elements of the media impact on racial discourses and follows on with Samad (2013; n.d.), Engbersen (2007), Sen (2009) and Modood (2010), linking the specific Pakistani diaspora with new transnational movements and political identity.

The literature also provides evidence, within the above body of work (again corresponding to the data), of what Engbersen (2007) has called 'transnational social fields' that are participating in 'transnational activities' through proactive involvement in Muslim networks in the predominantly English-speaking world, specifically in the United States and Canada, both with sizeable diaspora population groups. Such organised and sporadic systems of connections through these new media mediums further reinforce what Modood (2003) refers to as ethnic assertiveness that plays a pivotal role in moulding their ‘hybridic Asianness’ (ibid., p.78). The power of this stronger self-awareness is depicted in the level of ownership that the diaspora seem to be taking of the development of their identity, gaining security in the process. Their sense of belonging is directly linked to their feeling of security, similar to the experience of Turkish young people in Germany, represented in Sauter (2003), who define their own personal safety within that European setting closely allied to a sense of attachment and familiarity they are comfortable in. The Pakistani diaspora, therefore, in showing that same trait, are creating the public and private space within domestic British society to become more secure and aligned.

Their tools within this evolving hybrid development relate closely to the rise in fusion rhythm, and the use of smartphone technology and multimedia creativity that are retranslating this hybridity into a stronger affirmation of who and what they are. This is their new modus operandi that is seeking a resolution to internal investigations of their transnational identity.

The streetwise sense and traditional background born of inner city experiences that have shaped their lives echo the experiences of black impoverished Muslims in the poorest districts of America (Samy Alim, 2012). The use of new media as a form of social action, short of full and overt political action, has been instrumental in giving these disenfranchised people the voice and much needed self-esteem and confidence that are perceived to be denied by mainstream society.

These alternatives are now taking shape and hold within diaspora groups who are setting out their road map of self-discovery and realisation. The research indicates a powerful attachment to cultural and religious symbiosis within this group, with little distinction of nationalities made in this growing development. Both are uniquely blended and married together; Islam and being Pakistani are evidently the source of this self-pride defined in their Pukhtoon and Punjabi inheritance. This transforming identity is also symbolic of the desire to avoid the discourse of deculturalised Islam that has become so in vogue in recent years.

This new thinking on Islam is reflected in the writings of Talbi (1992), Arkoun (2001), Ramadan (2006) and Wadud and Mernissi embodied within an edited volume entitled *The New Voices of Islam* (Kamrava, 2006). As part of that search for meaning, there is a need to understand the competing theological interpretations that for the modernist is what Kamrava (2006) has set out as a prevailing view of some writers on Islam, who state that the faith should not be ‘linked to a given culture and can therefore fit within every culture’ (ibid., p.24). This proposition would negate current thinking of the majority of the sample diaspora in how they seek to define their own specific transnational hybrid identity.

Instead of a culturally specific, organically grown, multi-identity, this intellectual difference emphasises the fluidity and importance of the current debate on Islam set within the wider philosophy of winning hearts and minds, so troubling Western political elites. Instead of challenging the cultural racialisation, they may be seeking to ‘eurocentricise’ Islam to accommodate and or assimilate into a Western framework. Alternatively, the framing of the diverse Muslim fraternity within these defined boundaries of descriptive semantics negates the self-discovery of this diaspora to seek self-determination and awareness within their own perceived struggle. Furthermore, it creates a clear distinction between the intellectualised middle-class Muslim elite and the wider and more impoverished Muslim communities of Britain and the rest of Europe. It is perhaps an attempt to deflate the ‘McIslamism’ spoken of earlier, where instant Muslim nationalism occurs as a response to perceived international attacks on Islam or Muslims as a global community. The Palestine issue and case study being a case in point.

For the sample diaspora, their lack of interest in this class-structured debate is evidence itself of the disconnection between these two worlds of philosophical thought and actual experienced living, as voiced by the respondents. What has emerged is how the media itself has been an enabler of the respondents in this study, self-generated through what Moll (2007) and Modood (2003) have, in many ways rightly, assessed as a discourse of ownership, which has reasserted their sense of belonging to Britain through the innovative use of smartphone technologies and the internet, and the use of tools and methods, such as YouTube.

The British Muslim, particularly of Pakistan origin, described as ‘a title with an empty page’ by Naveed Akhtar (Akhtar, 2004), is gradually taking responsibility for being the architect of his or her own construction of this meaning of transnational hybrid identity that will continually evolve and emerge within the private and public sphere, to ensure a greater ownership of presence in wider society. This remains in most regards an on-going journey on a transnational pathway of exploration within a changing, challenging and complex world that sees mass media proliferating at an increasing rate to meet consumer appetites for news, information and new ways of connectivity.

The diaspora have the opportunity to influence society at large. Whilst some are taking on this exciting new adventure of self-discovery, others remain self-exiled from these new trends of modernity, uninvolved except at a low peripheral level. How these transnational concepts will emerge in the future will be the most illuminating part of this work in defining a future generation within a new media and technological age, far removed from the first arrivals to Britain from the developing towns and agrarian societies of Pakistan.

In essence, the researcher could appreciate both positions yet also felt that those feeling insecure about their presence in Britain had to assert their right of birth to belong. An extension of this, for the researcher, was that such feelings of insecurity and instability should not exist in the first instance, as they fed into the media depictions and discourse of the British diaspora of Pakistani origin.

It seems more helpful to see operating between transnational spaces as set out by Dahinden (ibid.) as a natural evolution of hybridity and constant negotiating of multiple identity, often referred to by Safran (1991) and Samad (2013), for instance.

It is no surprise that these feelings of being a transmigrant should exist within the main body of the diaspora in this study, based on their consumption of the Anglo-Saxon media that dominates their current spheres of life and society around them. In that sense, the researcher felt it may therefore be a weakness in their status as British citizens and in asserting this right. However, this perception, for the researcher, has also now evolved as a natural and positive contribution to the diaspora, individually and collectively, as a stronger evolving sense of Britishness.

It is a celebration of all their identities – British, Pakistani, Muslim, Oxonian, Lutonian, former Yorkshiremen and women, Punjabi, Pukhtoon – into a new sense of being made in Britain.

In that regard, Alonso and Oiarzabal (2010) in their edited volume of work on diasporas in the new media age have referred to diasporas mapping out an atlas of identity that is diversified by language, location and different ideological constructs as well as levels of integration and transnational links with similar groups and what was once the homeland. The internet and new media provide the opportunity to sustain and maintain these reference points as well as facilitating new ones in a globalised world. Distance as such has no meaning in a technologically advanced society, nor is time a constraint in ‘cyborg diasporas’ that are also asserting not only global affirmation of their identities but also a new form of political activism challenging traditional power structures. In the final analysis, it is these elements, individually and collectively reflected in this study, that offer a specific contribution to the available literature on the discourse on identity and new media. The researcher hopes that such voices have made a lasting and reflective impact on the discourse of British Muslim identity.

Chapter 7

Conclusion

This research has taken a journey to explore, and at some level determine, the nature of identity for the Pukhtoon and Punjabi diaspora as they consume everyday media. It is a passage that has included the researcher as an insider, making sense of the internal and external debates and perceptions of cohort group members. The grounded theory approach, as well as ethnographic evidence, has provided important empirical information on the basis of which to make some key findings. At its heart has been an attempt by the researcher to ensure a non-Eurocentric anthropological approach to the question in capturing the participants' views. In that same vein, mindfulness of the need to challenge the Orientalist discourse has also been central in the analysis and conclusions of this final chapter. In that regard, the literature of Said (1978) and Hutnyk (2006) has been important in providing guiding posts. Furthermore, this study is, as McLoughlin (2014) observes of Alam and Husband (2006), an attempt by the researcher to challenge the prevailing liberal discourse on Pakistanis and their faith, if not place, in Britain. The researcher feels it important to emphasise this in this last chapter the value of the emic approach in making a distinct contribution to the life of this study. This final summation of the key discussions, data, the literature and insight, provides a final narrative on this subject area. By doing so, it not only relates the literature to the key themes emerging from the respondents' viewpoint but also captures the nuances of the wider socio-economic and political world that many respondents feel they not only relate to, but also are part of.

The contribution made by this study intersects between identity and new media and the emerging relationship between identity and new media as set within the literature (Eade 1977, 2010a, 2010b; Hall 1997; Chul-Byung 2002; Poole 2002; Alam 2002, 2006; Modood 2003, 2005, 2010; Ali 2003; Ali et al. 2006; Poole and Richardson 2006; Ansari 2006; Alexander 2006, 2010; Brah 2006; Engbersen 2007; Samad and Sen 2007; Abbas 2007; Alam and Husband 2009;

Gajjala 2010; Alonso and Olarzabal 2010; Rinnawi 2010; Samad 2013; Kundnani 2014).

In essence, Anthias's (2002) view that little value is placed on empirical data on identity is asserted here. Much emphasis has therefore been placed on the narratives of location and positionality applied by Anthias (ibid.). These correspond strongly to the views, perceptions, anxieties and future aspirations of the sample British Pakistani diaspora who engaged in this investigation. Many felt a sense of semi-persecution by depictions within Western media of their faith and belonging in Britain. These undermined their sense of citizenry in Britain and in consequence their sense of security of place in their home. As set out in Chapter 4, the level of discrimination felt, the impact of Islamaphobia and perceptions of state high-handiness (via law enforcement agencies) all contributed to these perceptions of alienation, and to a sense of being viewed as 'different', even of being the 'Other'.

Additionally, language is an integral internal group feature that provides community connectivity for the diaspora, as argued by Barker and Galasinski (2001), and bonds them culturally and socially at some level. The researcher has referred to this and defined it as a clear example of societal culture, as espoused by Kymlicka (1995). Language was characterised as Pukhto and Punjabi for each group, while Urdu and fusion – a mix of English, Hindi, Urdu and cultural street slang – were synergised for wider use. Yet English remained the language of choice, particularly abroad on visits to Pakistan, when it not only reinforced their Britishness but also provided them with a sense of assertiveness in a country where they understood the cultural norms less and disliked the everyday corruption they witnessed. The watching of English-speaking news channels (BBC World, Sky) was an example of this, cited in the preceding chapters, as well as the reported narratives of a politically corrupt Pakistani system. Their personal experiences at airport arrival and departure in Pakistan were often mentioned in discussions.

At another level, language was also a signifier of representation used extensively by mass media that impacted on this specific diaspora. Van Djik's

(1993) work on discourse analysis relating to such minorities refers to the spoken and written word that provides space for words of meaning, articulated in different ways, that perpetuate what he refers to as ‘elite racism’ (p.2). In other words, ‘through their influential text and talk, [elites] manufacture the consent needed to legitimate their own power and leadership in maintaining the dominance of the majority ethnic group’ (ibid.). This elite racism is carried out within business interests, in the political sphere, education and academia, to construct a dominant power balance. This further correlates with what Said has historically referred to as Orientalism (1978), a concept that in the new media age has been refreshed by Sardar (1999, p.37) as a neo-orientalism that continually and systematically perpetuates the superiority of the West over the inferior Orient. Global media, largely owned by Western capitalist interests, is a main vehicle for perpetuating this ideology. This has ultimately manifested itself in a discourse of Islam being at war with the West that has signified the political doctrine of the ‘war on terror’ as a rallying call for global action against an unseen enemy. It relates closely to the work of Poole (2002; Poole and Richardson, 2006), which assesses in detail modern-day depictions of Islam by British media in particular. This recalls the political ideology that was prevalent within neo-conservative thinking during the Bush presidency in the 1990s.

This was clearly reflected in the statements of the respondents who spoke continually of being associated with ‘terrorists’ perpetuating ‘jihad’ against the West. The experiences of the taxi drivers in Oxford provide much evidence of these concerns of how the sample diaspora, British Muslims, were viewed by elements of wider society. Their purpose and allegiance to Britain were being questioned and doubted in these recorded testimonials. The respondents felt it underlined how they were depicted within Anglo-Saxon media, particularly in times of tension. The attacks on New York and the London bombings were often cited as key pressure points resulting in anti-Muslim feeling felt by the sample diaspora at work and in public. Headlines and column inches in mainstream newspapers and other news media have also provided testimony to this fact, as highlighted in Chapter 2 and set out in chapters 4-6.

Thus, the study illustrates power of the media has been utilised to maintain the information war to remind millions of viewers of an external threat against Western modernity and civilised liberal values, echoed in the work of Lewis (1990) and Huntingdon (1993). Media representations have created the cultural apparatus defined by Said (1997) that portrays Islam, and Muslims globally and in the West, as particularly the ‘Other’, suspected of being benign saboteurs promoting extremism and hostility. Again, this relates strongly to the narratives of the respondents in both Luton and Oxford on the impact of the EDL and philosophy promoting cultural racism.

Accordingly, for the Western Muslim and for the British Pakistani Muslim diaspora, this has resulted in a growing sense of insecurity and instability, leading to what Hall (2001) has described as a crisis of identity. It has also led to a more asserted Muslim identity as an enhanced response, described by Moussa (2004), because of the growing sense of Islamophobia and wider discrimination felt by the diaspora and recorded by the respondents. For some, this daily adverse reality they encounter in their working and social environment has gradually eroded their own sense of esteem and self-worth as British citizens. The concerns of the women, for instance, were for the future of their children in growing up within this sense of hostility towards their faith and presence in Britain. These psychological feelings developed further, to be interpreted and aligned into a sense of being a transmigrant citizen, part of two societies, as reflected upon by Engbersen (2007). In other words, for the diaspora, this may mean Pakistani and British, East and West, Islam and semi-secular, a hybridity that has involved the cultural negotiating of their presence and their status in Britain as a response to perceived media bias. It is what Downing and Husband (2005) have referred to as ‘diasporic public spheres’ (p.45), an appropriate state for the sample diaspora in this context. It is these new spheres that the Pukhtoon and Punjabi cohort members described in their contributions and narratives that default into lines of separation and segregation leading to self-sourced links with transnational and cultural networks that Samad (2013) has related to. They feel that they are between two worlds competing at a global level (as played out in the media) and with divided loyalties that they are seeking to accommodate. In that sense, the term ‘transmigrant’ is fitting within a new media age where transnational relations and anchors for this diaspora remain essential, as survival mechanisms, while they work through this paradigm of belonging. The ‘researcher believes the ‘trans’ element of the ‘trans-migrant’ concept, is important to emphasise as it relates to the ease of movement and communications in a new media age, across borders.

Such global relationships input further into hybridic transnational identity, as identified in other diasporic communities such as the Iranians in Los Angeles researched by Naficy (1993) and Turkish young people in Frankfurt as reported by Sauter (2003). They also provided a natural response to the feelings of isolation, social exclusion and alienation precipitated by Islamophobia and right-wing ideologies and political parties in Europe espousing cultural racism as the new xenophobia. As such, these transnational spheres bring with them a stronger sense of security and stability that supports a psychological attachment related to a positionality and locality described by Anthias (2002) that corresponds closely with the voices of the respondents in this study. Take, for instance, the interest in cultural media and Pakistani cable and satellite television as a means of understanding their historic legacies.

In the final sequence of in the journey of this study, meaning is offered through the work of Bhabha (1994) on hybridity and identity that refers to a third space and its parallel in the analysis of this sample diaspora. Most importantly, this third space is a virtual entity created by the smartphone generation embracing new media to combat negative representations by the old media. The internet, YouTube and social media are the new vehicles used to create the assertive British Muslim who enhances his or her evolving hybrid and transnational outlook. This is shared with a similar international fraternity and diasporic community of interest that provides not only validity but also much needed security as a present and future citizen of Britain, of their own choosing.

In a modern arena and set within this ‘third space’ is the role new and social media has played in maintaining and solidifying an assertive transnational identity. This is the ‘digital diaspora’ referred to by Gajjala (2010), who explore, reaffirm and promote their own specific hybridity through these new media. It corresponds with Ellison (2013) on the impact of social media on identity formation.

These new social spheres and cyber spaces are at present unchallenged by elites and governments, state institutions and law enforcement. They not only defend their own identities but their faith and culture, as has been addressed by Karim (2010). Their simplicity is the availability of this resource to anyone, especially the disenfranchised and those who perceive themselves as socially excluded. The new 'space' has allowed the diaspora and others to challenge what they perceive as injustices. Its use in the 'Arab Spring', a media-inspired term in itself, in 2010 and 2011 was a case in point, as was its recent use by Chinese citizens to expose corrupt officials pointed out by Hollister (2013). It has emphasised the role of the citizen journalist and is reflected in new opportunities for the citizen to provide alternative viewpoints. The Huntington Post and Democracy Now are two such examples of people-power media opportunities for self-journalism and self-expression and, as often repeated in this study, they form part of the smartphone generation.

At its best, the new media is a tool of empowerment and active citizenry, and at its worst, it is a license to abuse, accuse and incite. In a religious context, for the sample diaspora Muslims, new and social media has aided a sense of 'McIslamism' that is an instant Muslim reaction to global events, referred to by Rinnawi (2010). In elements of the sample diaspora it has, as he argues, created an internal 'jihad' of the ego. The researcher would contend this is a struggle between Western modernity and their Eastern legacies and traditions. Each member of the diaspora feels this sense of 'personal crisis' and seeks to redefine their amalgamated identity – again reinforcing this concept of the new 'transmigrant' within a media age. Here cable and satellite television as well as the internet and new media have played a part to help them maintain their cultural, religious and even political reference points – in other words, to create new the societal culture(s) Kymlicka (1995) speaks of, which are elaborated on in Chapter 1. In the third space, this digital diaspora remain between two societies, two cultures and two hemispheres, and maintain transnational affiliations and communities. For some it may remain a constant journey of exploration. Others may feel that this ‘safe’ space is where they wish to remain and perpetuate their new media ‘transmigrant’ status, obtaining the best of both worlds and maintaining a fluid identity. Others, particularly the most advantaged of the diaspora, will continually affirm their status in Britain, with faith being discreet and deculturalised, relating well to the work of Talbi (1992), Arkoun (2001) and Ramadan (2006). Such a group may reflect the mimicry of Western culture and social norms Bhabha (1995) refers to, as well as consuming new lifestyle magazines catering for this upcoming group – *Vogue* for a middle-class aspiring Muslim audience, as reflected in the work of Moll (2007). However, whether such specific magazines (*EMEL*, *Q News*) will maintain a presence, interest and circulation in a new and social media world remains to be seen. Additionally, their transnational links will be minimal, through few or no visits to Pakistan and even when on such visits, remaining in Western style hotels and comfort, rather than the modest homes of distant relatives, if contact is indeed maintained.

This is the essential journey of discovery for the Muslim of the diaspora, where religious identity is linked to cultural association and Britishness. It is where strength of purpose is found in evolving their hybridity, a process on which the mass media has impacted as a consequence of wider political ideologies and interests. Despite the stated anxieties contained in this work and epitomised by the narratives of the sample diaspora, there was a new strength in how their new-found identities were asserting themselves. This was a non-threatening articulation of multiple identities developing the combination of being a British Pakistani Muslim. It was an accommodation of past heritage and experienced learning from elders and parents with enhanced future aspirations and a sense of belonging as permanent and respected residents of Britain, albeit with a transnational edge. In that respect, they were not unique but typical of similar diaspora communities and traditions across the world.

Furthermore, they are similar to the experiences of the wider Asian communities reflected in Chapter 1 that also mirror class variations. The communities of Bradford, Birmingham and East London are very similar in how generations evolve and redefine their status through multiple identities, reflected in the work of Ballard (1982), Eade (1996, 1997, 2007), Ansari (2006), Singh (2006) and Abbas (2007), for instance. The elements of difference, as outlined in Chapter 1, related to racial inferiority and as the 'Other' placed within the indigenous community during and post- empire, as referred in the work of Zubaida in Brah (2006). It is this deeply embedded genetic subjective view of Asian populations perpetuated within society and institutionally that is then articulated widely by the media. The Muslim, placed within the wider global arena of the 'war on terror', holds a preeminent position in the minds of many in mainstream society, as the potential and perceived enemy within. For the Bangladeshi and the Pakistani diaspora of South Asian communities more specifically, this continually provides unease about presence and further insecurity not only about belonging but also about being accepted. It is a narrative often reinforced by the media. The most recent cases of Muslim 'takeovers' in schools in Birmingham in 2014 and Lutfur Rahman being stripped of his elected mayor status in Tower Hamlets in 2015 (*Daily Telegraph* 23 April 2015) remain examples of how race and faith remain integral to mainstream media reporting of South Asian populations.

That said, the researcher believes, as evidenced in this investigation, that such diaspora is much more resilient and, as the smartphone generation, will continually assert their multiple identities and challenge, in their own way, discrimination and Islamaphobia. Furthermore, transnational identities and communities are aided by the concept as Guo Ming and Chang (2010) emphasise, the strong relationship between cultural identity and globalisation, its changing nature and positive contribution. With new and social media, communication and networks are borderless and unrestricted, creating a virtual 'one mega city'. This is not lost on the sample diaspora who connected with their like-minded diaspora in the United States, Canada and Europe, communicating via Twitter, IMO, Viber, MySpace, to name a few of the growing 'apps' used to support these transnational networks.

Additionally, many of the respondents spoke of how their involvement in this investigation provided a reflective approach, not only to their media consumption but also to an evolving identity. To many, it validated their perceptions that at some level they instinctively felt Western media bias in reporting Islam, Muslims and their own communities. For the researcher, this reflectivity of the sample diaspora signalled further validation of the insider mode of research, and of the anthropological approach adopted purposefully as accounted in the experiences of Foster (1994). These In short exemplified the value of someone from the same community undertaking research with that community.

This approach also, in every sense of the word, supported the aims and objectives of the research question that were set out in the introduction. These are revisited here briefly. They were to:

- Investigate the type and range of mass media utilised by the Pakistani diaspora within two specific cohort groups, namely the Punjabi and Pukhtoon, and consumption of new forms of media by second- and third-generation Pakistanis, by gender and class.
- Assess the impact of the range of media consumption on the formation, redefinition or enhancement of identity.
- Assess any differentials based on cultural variations within the two specific cultural cohort groups (Punjabi and Pukhtoon) of British-born Pakistanis.
- Investigate whether the media plays a significant part in the reinforcement of personal and/or group identity within the Pakistani diaspora and how this is reflected and translated on a day-to-day level.

These key aims related to the research question as a whole, with specific areas needing to be examined in more detail that focused on ten key points of investigation:

1. Defining participants’ personal identity at the time of the investigation and during the stages of this research study, to assess any modifications.
2. The specific characteristics of group identity.

3. What national, transnational and international media were consumed.
4. The range of media sources utilised by the diaspora and the reasons for the choice made.
5. The role of new media and how is it utilised.
6. How differences within the Pakistani diaspora are distinguished.
7. How cultural and religious practices are reflected in this formation of identity.
8. Impact of the media in reinforcing or deconstructing this identity, in particular new media.
9. The major responses to mass media, if any, with respect to identity formation.
10. The role of new media within this construct.

The researcher feels that the aims and objectives of the research have been met.

In participating in this process, the sample diaspora has in many ways been transformed, encompassing the key characteristics of diaspora defined by Safran (1991) at the outset of this research, within the digital and cyber age.

The researcher feels that he has addressed the key issues as set out above in ‘The process of analysis’ (section 3.5), where it is stated, ‘In essence, for any theory to hold validity it should meet certain requirements. The theory espoused within this research should link into the data.’ Clearly, the diaspora feel a sense of alienation and insecurity due to the media portrayal of Islam and Muslims globally and in Britain. This detrimental impact has resulted in an assertiveness demonstrated in a new media age, as exemplified by the *Happy British Muslims* video on YouTube (Honesty Policy, 2014). Within this diaspora landscape, there is a diversity of status, first, those who feel like new age ‘transmigrants’, either still on a journey of discovery, or content with this ambivalence. Others are rooted in a purely Western approach of a model citizen, comfortable in their income, status and presence in Britain. Finally, there is the transnational diaspora citizen who, whether as part of the global city concept or fixed in his or her multiple identity, wishes to maintain like-minded networks and communities across continents.

In addition, as quoted in Chapter 3 on methodology, ‘The key themes drawn out from the analysis should be reflected in the hypothesis that is the outcome for this work.’ As discussed in this chapter, this has been achieved by using what has been stated as ‘necessary to ensure that the reference group – a representative number of volunteer participants – spans the interviewed clusters and ethnicity (Pukhtoon and Punjabi), and cultural differentials)’ (Chapter 3). Their empowerment in understanding the research question and fully participating in the grounded theory approach is evidence of this contribution at the various stages of the fieldwork. This has allowed the added objective of ensuring that ‘the theory itself has to satisfy the precondition that it is comprehensible to lay people’ (Chapter 3). The conclusions reached are not complex or daunting but realistic in using the data effectively to assert meaning in the voices of British-born Pakistani Muslims of the diaspora that will undoubtedly make a difference to their own and others’ perceptions of them and of the world.

What is equally important is the future development of the diaspora, given that the media focus remains on this group and Muslims in Britain. This is within the context of the rise of Islamic State (IS), their ease in connecting with the Muslim diaspora globally and in many respects, offering not only an asserted Muslim identity but a so-called caliphate for the Muslim Ummah. To some this is attractive, yet for the vast majority of Muslims, it remains abhorrent and un-Islamic.

The present emphasis on preventing extremism and ensuring young Muslims of the diaspora are resisting the IS call to arms may well create a continual sense of insecurity and feelings of injustice. In addition, the continual and more forensic examination of the communities by security agencies may further alienate the diaspora. There is a danger that, with perceptions of state animosity towards the diaspora and suspicions of their intentions, many of the new generation may become more vulnerable and excluded further. The aptitude of IS to utilise social media to promote their message and promote mass appeal has its dangers, as do new laws to collate data from users of social media. How the diaspora respond to these challenges will be of interest to many interested in this field.

In the final analysis, however, the researcher feels that the diaspora itself, as diverse as it is, will utilise social media to not only assert their identity and right to belong at home in Britain, but reinforce their faith-based multiple character. In doing so, they will seek to challenge the Islamaphobia, suspicion and discrimination from within, but also challenge those misinforming the world of the values and principles of their faith. In that sense, not only should their voices be heard, but their status in British society should be valued and respected, that of equal British citizens.

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