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**SECURITY PROVISION AND GOVERNING PROCESSES IN FRAGILE
CITIES OF THE GLOBAL SOUTH**

The case of Medellin 2002-2012

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Abstract

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Security Provision and Governing Processes in Fragile Cities of the Global South: The case of Medellin 2002-2012

Key words: Urban security, urban south, governmentality, Medellin, urban violence, ungoverned areas, state-building

The incidence of violence and the configuration of areas of instability, which have accompanied rapid urbanisation processes in the global South, have led to a wide range of responses by state authorities at different levels. These responses include attempts to control, prevent and/or manage various forms of violence and crime. An emerging literature on urban security aims to improve our understanding of public security provision in volatile urban contexts in the global South. This literature has so far been dominated by policy-oriented and state-centric analyses, as well as by critiques of the way neoliberal governance is shaping responses to urban instability. These analytical approaches tend to ignore the political aspects and governmental consequences of security provision in fragile cities. This thesis argues that Foucault's work on governmentality and ethnographic methodologies offer analytical and methodological tools that can help us address limitations in predominant analytical frameworks and contribute to fill gaps in the literature. The thesis develops an alternative critical approach to the study of urban security using those tools and employs it to investigate security provision in Medellin. This alternative approach focuses on the way security shapes governing processes in particular contexts and on their implications for those who are most vulnerable to urban fragility. Moreover, the thesis uses this innovative approach to investigate the security strategy implemented in Medellin since 2002, as part of what has come to be known as the 'Medellin Model'. By exploring this particularly relevant case, this thesis highlights the significance of undertaking empirical explorations of the rationality of security

strategies in different urban contexts and the importance of taking into account people's differentiated experiences of security provision. Furthermore, this thesis argues that this alternative approach helps us understand the way power is exercised for particular purposes and on particular subjects in an attempt to deal with urban violence and insecurity. It also argues for the inclusion of these dimensions in contemporary studies of urban security in the global South.

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Introduction

This thesis is about the analytical approaches used within the emerging literature on urban security to understand public responses to rising violence, crime and instability in fragile cities of the global South. It is also about developing a new way of exploring security provision in these volatile contexts which could enhance our understanding of the processes that shape security responses in particular contexts and of their implications for those who are most vulnerable to urban fragility.

What I offer in this thesis is a different avenue for the study of security responses in fragile urban contexts, and an example of how an alternative approach informed by Foucault's work on power and using methods drawn from ethnographic approaches sheds light on aspects that other predominant approaches have overlooked. The thesis sets out to put this critical analytical framework into practice in the exploration of a particularly influential case: the security strategy used in Medellin as part of what has come to be known as the 'Medellin Model'. In studying the case of Medellin through this alternative critical approach, I aim to problematise predominant analytical approaches and contribute to the literature on urban security in the global South.

This thesis argues that we need an analytical approach which allows for critical and empirically rooted explorations of the interface between security provision and governing processes, in order to be able to interpret the wide range of responses authorities are implementing to contain, prevent or manage rising levels of violence and insecurity. I argue that we need to acknowledge and engage critically with the way power is used to govern, because this is a key determinant of urban security. Additionally, we need more empirical explorations of how the state interacts with different sectors of the population, constructing them as subjects of its power. This is necessary to be able to recognise the particular ways in which people are

affected by urban instability and to understand what kind of security is being delivered to them on the ground.

As I analyse further in chapter one, there are three predominant approaches within the current literature on urban security in the global South, and in particular on security provision in fragile cities. The first one is a policy-oriented approach that focuses on the design, implementation and assessment of security policies, and on the institutional factors that affect their outcomes. A second state-centred approach that looks at the impact that security governance has on the strengthening of weak or fragile states, and finally, a critical approach that is concerned with the way neoliberal governance has affected the implementation of security responses and the meaning of security itself in urban contexts.

Through these analytical approaches, different analyses of urban security in various cities of the global south have contributed to our understanding of some of the challenges that authorities are facing when dealing with violence and insecurity and some implications of the security strategies they have implemented. However, the focus and methodological tools used within predominant approaches have led to important gaps in the literature concerned with urban security provision in the global South. The aim of this thesis is to offer a different theoretical starting point that can help to fill some of these gaps. I focus on three of them which I consider particularly important. The first one is a limited understanding of the way power works and flows through the security provision process; the second is the little knowledge of which economic, social and institutional processes, beyond neoliberalism, affect the configuration of security responses in particular contexts; and, finally, the lack of understanding of how people experience security provision on the ground, especially those who are most affected by urban violence. I argue that until these dimensions are brought in to studies of urban security, our understanding of the crafting, performance and implications of contemporary public initiatives designed to deal with urban violence, crime and instability remains very limited.

In chapter two I argue that Foucault's extensive work on power provides useful analytical and conceptual tools to develop an alternative analytical approach that can help to fill those gaps. Through his historical and empirical studies of power relations in the west and, in particular, on the complex processes and techniques involved in the management of European societies, Foucault developed an innovative approach for investigating power, government and authority, which could be applied in different contexts. In this thesis, I use his notion of governmentality to put the issue of power right at the heart of the study of security responses in fragile cities.

The notion of governmentality was first used by Foucault to denote a way of thinking about and exercising power which emerged in Europe in the late 18th century in response to problems generated by the expansion of urban areas. It referred to a new form of governing populations through 'apparatuses of security' which included not only armies and police forces, but also health, welfare and education systems, with the objective of ensuring the optimal functioning of economic and social processes (Foucault 2007). Foucault's definition of governmentality later became the foundation of an analytical approach to studying government practices in contemporary societies. This approach departs from the assertion that power is always exercised guided by a rationality, or a 'form of thinking' that defines 'who can govern; what governing is; what or who is governed' and for what purposes. Within the governmentality approach, government, or the 'conduct of conduct' as Foucault defined it, is regarded as an attempt to shape, regulate or control human conduct undertaken by multiple actors (authorities and agencies), using different techniques and forms of knowledge in the search of particular ends (Dean 2010).

By using governmentality as a lens to explore security provision, I intend to highlight that the design and implementation of security initiatives implies a process by which authorities identify and define particular problems as a field for governmental intervention and action. It also involves the process of choosing particular strategies to deal with those governmental problems, based on specific ways of understanding the nature and causes of such problems, and exercising power over certain groups based on their relation

to those problems –as victims, perpetrators, or groups at risk, for example. Through the use of governmentality I aim at highlighting that security policies in fragile cities of the global South are part of wider processes of governing in these cities, by which power is exercised in a particular way, for a particular purpose, and on particular subjects.

Within predominant analyses of security provision in the global South, security responses are regarded either as apolitical strategies to deal with violence and crime, as a means to achieve the consolidation of the state, or as a consequence of the advance of neoliberalism. By using governmentality, I aim at articulating an alternative approach that allows us to uncover and unpack the political aspects and governmental consequences of urban security. This alternative approach allows us to investigate the assumptions and calculations that lead to changes in security strategies in particular contexts, as well as the technologies of power that are used on particular objects and subjects in the process of containing urban violence and dealing with urban crime. In other words, I suggest an alternative analytical approach that allows us to research empirically the logic or rationale of governing processes concerned with urban security. The application of such approach enabled me to ask the following questions: how is urban fragility being governed in a particular context? Which processes lead to the configuration of a particular form of governing violence and insecurity? What is the rationality that guides the implementation of security strategies in a particular context? What are the imaginaries that lead those in power to choose certain strategies over others? How are specific communities, groups or citizens constructed as subjects of state intervention within security strategies? And what are the implications of a particular rationality for those subjects?

In order to answer those questions, I have developed a three-step analytical strategy that enables studies of public security strategies –policies, programmes, initiatives– in different fragile urban contexts. The strategy involves: (i) identifying political, social and economic processes that produce changes in the way security problems are framed and understood; (ii) analysing the governmental responses to those problems using critical

discourse analysis to look in particular at how those problems are understood by authorities and how these lead to the use of particular strategies; and, finally, (iii) analysing the kind of security that these ways of understanding and techniques produce on the ground, from the perspective of those who become subjects of state intervention.

Given that rationalities of government are geographically and historically specific and that they can change, the alternative analytical approach I suggest starts with explorations of shifts in the way authorities, at different levels, think and respond to acute problems of urban violence and instability. As I discuss in the first chapter, some scholars have interpreted changes in authorities' responses to urban violence and insecurity in different cities as a consequence of the urbanisation of capital and the entrenchment of neoliberalism. These analyses raise our awareness of the way economic and political manifestations of neoliberal governance shape policy makers' imaginaries and strategies in a wide range of fields, including crime control and security provision. I argue, nevertheless, that we need an analytical strategy for a study of urban security provision that does not restrict the analysis to neoliberal forces. Using Foucault's suggestion that it is possible to analyse governing processes by breaking them down into the multiple processes that constitute them (Faubion 1994:227), I suggest that the first step to study urban security in a particular context is to make visible relations, neoliberal and non-neoliberal processes, contingencies and factors that have influenced authorities' imaginaries of urban security problems. In this way, it is possible to undertake a genealogical analysis of the strategies policy makers implement at a specific point in time.

In chapter two, I explain how I develop this analytical approach using Foucault's contributions and, in particular, the governmentality framework which provides conceptual tools to investigate power relations. In that chapter, I argue that different methods of data collection and analysis provide better access to underexplored aspects of the provision of security in cities of the global South. The use of discourse analysis, for example, serves to uncover the assumptions and the way in which expert fields of knowledge and language frame the choices and practices of those who are in charge of

dealing with security problems. I also argue that ethnographic methodologies, which have been neglected within analyses of security provision in the global South, can be used to undertake empirical observations of the implications that particular rationalities have on the way security is delivered. This involves engaging with the experiences of those who are constructed as subjects of particular forms of power and whose identities are recreated during the implementation of security strategies. By recognising and analysing their voices and their own realities, it is then possible to unravel the impact of security policies and programmes from the perspective of those who are most vulnerable to urban fragility, as well as to track ways in which people resist governing processes that are set in motion in the process of dealing with security problems.

The combination of these types of methods as a means to undertake empirical examinations of rationalities of government that guide the implementation of security strategies in fragile cities constitutes an innovation for urban security research and thinking. I claim that the analytical and methodological strategy suggested here not only enriches the quality of the analysis of urban security in particular contexts, but it also allows us to see contradictions and unforeseen consequences of security initiatives that other approaches fail to recognise. In order to demonstrate the workings of this critical approach, its advantages as well as its limitations, I have used it to analyse security responses implemented in Medellin between 2002 and 2012. In chapter three I discuss the research strategy I used to study this particular case. This methodology drew heavily on ethnographic approaches and relied on the combination of discourse analysis and participant observation as main methods of enquiry. In the same chapter I also offer an analysis of some of the main challenges I faced during the implementation of this research methodology in an urban context characterized by high levels of violence and insecurity.

The examination of this case through this distinctive analytical and methodological approach has enabled me to provide new insights about a security strategy that has gained recognition as a promising way of dealing with problems of violence in fragile urban contexts. Throughout the 2000s

national and local authorities in Medellín articulated an integral security strategy that has been credited with an impressive decrease in levels of urban violence, major improvements in indicators of quality of life for residents and an urban miracle (Maclean 2015; Hermelin et al 2010, Cerda et al. 2012). In chapter four, I provide an analysis of the history of security provision in this city, so as to understand the context in which this strategy emerged. Furthermore, I provide an analysis of this strategy's components which include a wide range of initiatives such as pacification techniques, socioeconomic programmes and opportunities for groups at risk, participatory forms of governance, community policing strategies, infrastructural investments in some of the most marginalised communities of the city accompanied by improved access to services¹, innovative solutions to improve urban mobility, and efficient management and planning practices under principles of good governance.

With the support of development agencies, international organisations and donors (such as the IADB, UNDP, World Bank, OAS and cooperation agencies), the city's authorities were able to marketise what is known today as the 'Medellin Model', and to position the city globally as a laboratory of good practices (Alcaldia de Medellín 2011), and as test-bed for urban innovation and a model Latin American city (The Guardian 2012). The so-called 'Medellin model' has become a benchmark for policymakers² and the city's experience has influenced the debate on urban security in the global South (UN Habitat 2010), with policy programmes and state interventions carried out in some of the most marginalised communities of this city put

¹This type of state intervention was coined as 'social urbanism' by Medellín's local authorities.

² Local authorities from various cities often visit the city to learn from Medellín's experience. The European Forum for Urban Security, for example, organised a study visit for mayors of seven Guatemalan municipalities to Medellín and Bogotá. The aim was to allow the Guatemalan mayors to learn from these cities' experience in implementing citizen security and crime prevention policies (see: <http://efus.eu/en/about-us/our-partners/partners/8554/>). The governor of Rio de Janeiro, who was credited with the implementation of the integral security approach in that city, visited Medellín on several occasions, as well as Mexican policymakers who have been trained in the Medellín model. Alliances with other local governments have entered into order to promote the application of the lessons learnt from the state initiatives implemented in Medellín.

forward as successful and even replicable in other urban contexts (Acero ND).

By using an alternative analytical approach to research the configuration of the mixed security strategy implemented in Medellin throughout the 2000s, this thesis offers a new perspective on the 'Medellin Model'. I have used the governmentality informed approach, and a combination of critical discourse analysis and methods drawing from ethnographic approaches to analyse some of the processes and factors that have led to the configuration of such integrated security strategy in Medellin. I have also unpacked the rationality of security efforts revealing the assumptions and calculations that steered interventions in marginalised urban communities and finally, exposed the contradictions of this security approach through resident's experiences of security provision in these urban communities.

The research has revealed that the combined security strategy used in Medellin as part of a wider urban transformation and development effort originated in the construction of marginalised urban communities as 'ungoverned areas'. These were considered areas of particularly high levels of vulnerability which were also strategic sources of instability and illegality. From the perspective of policymakers and security authorities, these areas, which displayed the lowest levels of quality of life and extreme poverty, needed to be integrated into the city. The state had for too long been absent and unable to exercise control of the means of coercion in these areas and, in their view, this had enabled illegal armed groups to exercise territorial and social control of the communities.

In chapter five, I show how, in order to be integrated into what has been regarded as the prosperous city order, these ungoverned areas and their populations were seen by policymakers and security agents as being in need of state transformation, control and normalisation. The wide range of initiatives implemented in marginalised urban communities intended to serve these purposes and made the residents of these communities subject to different forms of state power. Through increased police and military presence, the state intended to regain control of these historically neglected

areas (Felbab-Brown 2011). Simultaneously, through slum upgrading initiatives, socioeconomic programmes and initiatives targeting 'at risk' groups, it sought to address extreme levels of poverty and inequality (Echeverri and Orsini 2010; Devlin and Chaskel 2010) and reduce endemic levels of violence (Maclean 2015). The analysis also revealed that once subject to multiple forms of state intervention and power, these ungoverned areas were constructed as useful exhibits for the internationalisation of the city, for the attraction of capital and the marketisation of a so-called innovative model of urban transformation.

The analysis revealed that the configuration of the 'Medellin Model' during the 2000s and its multifaceted security strategy in particular represented a different way of imagining the city, its marginalised populations, the role of the state and the causes of urban violence. These new ways of understanding were influenced both by local and national processes. In this regard, in chapter five I argue that the security strategy implemented, often attributed to the visionary leadership of two consecutive independent mayors, was partially shaped by the advance of a neoliberal development agenda carried out by local elites which made it necessary to reconsider the way of handling high levels of violence and crime in order to favour the attraction of investors. This, however, was not the only process leading to a new way of understanding and delivering security in the city. The mixed security strategy in Medellin was also shaped by the national security strategy implemented by the Uribe government (2002-2010), which focused on defeating insurgent groups across the country by employing military means. This national security strategy made the taking back and occupation by the state of territories historically controlled by illegal groups a national priority. Finally, another important factor influencing local authorities' willingness to focus public spending on marginalised communities and to open opportunities for citizens' participation was the role played by the city's strong civil society and by community-based organisations rooted in marginalised areas. These actors had been articulating an alternative discourse on development and developing alternative forms of dealing with chronic violence in these areas since the 1990s. With the arrival of two

independent candidates to the Mayor's Office, they took the opportunity to advocate for a progressive urban agenda in the city and to influence the way policymakers interacted with residents living in these areas.

Shaped by these multiple forces and processes, the security strategy in Medellín prioritised the establishment of a permanent state presence in neighbourhoods, the reduction of homicide rates and the improvement of the state's capacity to occupy urban space, in order to transform illegal cultures in marginalised urban communities and persuade those seen as prone to violence to not engage in such. Inspired by ethnographic methodologies, I used participant observation and informal conversations to access insights on residents' daily experiences of this type of state presence and power which constructed them as 'ungoverned citizens'. Complemented with semi-structured interviews and focus groups, these observations revealed that the combination of repressive and preventive interventions did not lead to changes in problematic entrenched police practices which perpetuate the stigmatisation of vulnerable groups and violence at the neighbourhood level.

In chapter six, I provide evidence of how some of the mechanisms used by the state to try to pacify and transform these communities unleashed processes that allowed violent illegal actors to deepen their influence on these communities and created unforeseen challenges to community actors and residents who strived to resist violence and build democratic forms of citizenship in these contexts. I argue that an unexpected outcome of state efforts to govern the 'ungoverned areas of Medellín', as a means to secure the city, was the creation of conditions that favoured the preservation and consolidation of a complex social order characterised by still chronic but less visible levels of violence and insecurity. In this social order, men, women, children and young people from marginalised communities are forced to navigate multiple perils and insecurities daily, while legal and illegal actors simultaneously exercise their authority and multiple forms of power on them.

The research revealed targets, assumptions, calculations, techniques and forms of knowledge on which the authorities in Medellín relied with a view to exercising power on 'ungoverned communities'. These constituted a new

logic of governance of urban insecurity in the city and as such I argue that it also revealed the way the state intended to build its authority and legitimacy in this urban context. In chapter seven, I unpack the governmentality of urban insecurity and what it suggested regarding the process whereby the local state sought to address urban fragility in Medellin. I also argue that in order to address the most visible symptoms of state weakness and urban instability, the local state focused on pacifying large proportions of the urban population that remained excluded from the legal economy and from the benefits of neoliberal urban development. By categorising certain populations as 'ungoverned', the state justified the implementation of 'special' interventions in these areas, which aimed at constructing passive and loyal citizens. Through coercion and control, but also through socioeconomic incentives and a limited form of integration into the city, the state intended to pacify these areas, develop new ways of managing urban violence while projecting to those living outside these communities an image of efficiency and diligence.

Based on the evidence I collected in Medellin, I suggest that although the pacification and government of 'ungoverned areas' allowed the state to develop its capacity to exercise power –even though this power was not all-encompassing or unchallenged– and marketise the city as a hub for investors, it nonetheless left residents in precarious living conditions and amidst chronic levels of insecurity and risk. By the end of the decade and following the implementation of a multifaceted security strategy, residents of marginalised urban communities experienced a limited form of citizenship and were subject to both illegal and legal forms of coercion on a daily basis.

The aim of my study of the Medellin case through an alternative analytical approach is to demonstrate the relevance of exploring the interface between security provision and governing processes, and to offer a new approach to study urban security which takes into account the role that socio-political relations play in the provision of security in fragile cities. The analysis developed here concentrates on the governmental consequences of the way in which authorities, in a global city of the global South regarded as 'successful', chose to deal with violence and urban fragility. Through an

analytical approach based on Foucault's work on governmentality and combining methods of analysis, I was able to undertake an empirical examination of the workings of security policies and programmes in Medellin, in terms of their aims and methods and from the perspective of those who were targeted by the state in the process of making the city safer. The approach allowed me to unpack the way power was exercised through a wide range of mechanisms and for which purposes, but it also highlights important dynamics taking place at local and community level that are invisibilised within predominant approaches to urban security in the global South. For example the way children, women and young people experience multiple violences, the role illegal economies and their brokers play in marginalised urban areas and people's experiences of multifaceted forms of public security.

The insights produced demonstrate that studying urban security provision using this alternative analytical approach provides a better understanding of how security responses are crafted and of the way they affect the construction of state power and legitimacy in particular contexts. When compared to policy-focused and state-centred approaches, the alternative critical approach developed in this thesis is better equipped to shed light on the governmental implications of security provision in different contexts. It also provides a more nuanced understanding of how particular security approaches are experienced by those who become targets of public efforts to contain, prevent or manage urban violence in fragile cities.

Chapter 1

Urban Security in Fragile Cities: A Critical Review

Introduction

This chapter presents a critical overview of the emerging literature on urban security in the global South. It argues that the preponderance of three main analytical approaches has led to important gaps in this literature regarding the political aspects and governmental consequences of security provision in fragile urban contexts. The chapter also argues that analytical and methodological innovation is needed in order to fill these gaps and to address some of the limitations of existing approaches. The chapter starts with an overview of urban violence and instability in the global South and an analysis of the type of responses that authorities are implementing to address such challenges. The chapter then concentrates on three analytical approaches that seem predominant within the urban security literature: a policy oriented approach, a state-centred approach and a critical approach focused on the impact of neoliberal governance on security provision. The chapter pays especial attention to the limitations of these approaches in grasping contemporary security responses in cities affected by chronic levels of violence and insecurity.

The Urban Present and Future

Cities have been critical to the configuration of contemporary societies. As Tilly's historical analysis demonstrated, urbanization processes and concentration and circulation of capital and coercion associated with European cities were crucial to the consolidation of modern states in the west (Tilly 1990). Cities have also been hubs for the incubation and transmission of culture, key sites for the circulation of capital (Harvey 1985), sites in which struggles and renegotiations of meanings and practices of citizenship continuously take place (Holston and Appadurai 1999; Bayat and Biecart 2009) and strategic places where local, national and transnational forms of political and economical power converge (Hobsbawn 2005; Lefebvre 2003).

The importance of cities in the definition of human future can only be expected to increase in this century given current urbanization patterns. The global urban population is steadily rising at an annual growth rate of 2%, which is expected to bring the world's urban population to around 5 billion in 2030 (UNFPA 2007). The urban transformation of the planet that is underway has however a socio-spatial particularity: it is being driven by the global South. Since 1950s most of the urban growth has taken place in the South at an astonishing pace and it will continue to do so in the next three decades of this century. On average, 7.1 million people are expected to join urban areas in Latin America and the Caribbean every year, 15 million in Africa and around 43 million in Asia. At this growth rate, by 2030, 80% of the world's urban population will inhabit cities in the Global South, especially African and Asian cities (Chant and McIlwaine 2009:97).

This unprecedented urban turn led by the global South has come with opportunities but also with huge challenges. In the context of globalization, southern cities have grown fast in the absence of adequate planning, with retreating states and with urban economies unable to support the arrival of millions of new dwellers (this is what Gilbert 1995 calls hyperurbanisation³). The outcome is the configuration in contemporary cities, of profound internal divisions and borders that separate the majority of the urban population who are 'prevented from, or restricted in, the fulfilment of their basic needs because of their economic, social or cultural status, ethnic origins, gender or age', from minorities who 'benefit from the economic and social progress that is typically associated with urbanization' (UNHABITAT 2010/2011). This urban divide manifests itself in the form of space inequality, inequality of opportunities, economic divides (income) and social divisions that are likely to produce 'social instability and high social and economic costs not only to the urban poor but the society at large' (UNHABITAT 2010/2011:viii).

Approximately three quarters of economic activities worldwide currently take place in cities (Muggah 2012), however the incidence of poverty in urban areas has increased, as have various forms of inequality. A major driver of

³ As referenced by Chant and McIlwaine 2009:102

urban poverty and inequality was the implementation of structural adjustment programmes imposed on developing countries during the 1980s and 1990s. These produced job losses on the public sector, reductions in public investment and an increase in the cost of services that had a special impact on fast growing cities (McIlwaine 2002; Portes and Roberts 2005). As many as one billion people have ended living in slums with chronic physical, social, economic and political deprivations. One in three urban dwellers lives in inadequate housing and 90% of them live in slums located in the global South⁴ (UN-HABITAT 2007, Chant and Mcillwaine 2009:113). Although urban poverty levels are still lower than in rural areas, the difference has narrowed in the last three decades and urban inequality levels have become extremely high and pervasive in many cities in Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean⁵.

In southern cities poverty has its own particularities; poor people are not only consistently pushed towards greater dependency on informal economies, but they are also sentenced to experience high levels of insecurity. Residents of poor urban communities are affected by high insecurity in tenure of land, they are also vulnerable to environmental hazards, to natural or man-made disasters, to infectious diseases which are more likely in densely populated communities and also exposed to increasing levels of violence and crime (UNHABITAT 2007, 2010/2011:84).

Urban Violences and the Emergence of 'Fragile Cities'

The number of international and intra-state conflicts has been in decline globally (Harbom and Wallensteen 2009) and today more people die violently in countries that are not experiencing conventional wars or where successfully negotiated peace agreements put an end to internal conflicts

⁴ it seems that the overall proportion of people living in slums in developing regions declined since 1990s, however the number of people is huge and it is projected to increase.

⁵ Based on selected samples across different regions, the UNHABITAT found that African cities are the most unequal with an average Gini coefficient of 0.58, followed by Latin American cities with 0.52 (UNHABITAT 2010/2011: XIII). Despite that Asian cities show a lower degree of income inequality (Gini average of 0.384) the economic urban divide is widening in that continent too.

such as in Central and South America, the Caribbean and parts of Sub-Saharan Africa (Geneva Declaration Secretariat 2011). During the 2000s, in Latin America and the Caribbean alone, 1,4 million people lost their lives as a result of violent crime (Casas-Zamora and Dammert 2012).

According to the 2011 World Development Report, one and half billion people live in areas affected by fragility, conflict, organized criminal violence, civil unrest and terrorism, which also create 'cycles of repeated violence, weak governance and instability' (World Bank 2011). Those cycles of violence are mostly taking place in non-conflict settings and specifically in urban areas of the global South. The incidence of urban terrorism has also been suggested to be greater in cities of less developed countries which contributes to what Beall called 'a shift from peasant wars of the 20th century to the urban wars of the 21st century' (Beall 2007:2).

In many countries in Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa, some cities have become favourable sites for the reproduction of multiple and chronic forms of violence and have homicide rates up to 70 percent higher than rural areas (World Bank 2011). In Mexico for example, where 10 of the 50 most violent cities in the world were located in 2013 (Citizen Council for Public Security and Criminal Justice 2014), the homicides rates in some urban areas surpassed by as much as three times the national rate and in countries like El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Jamaica, urban violence causes more victims than the armed conflict causes in Afghanistan (Geneva Declaration Secretariat 2011; Small Arms survey 2007; World Bank 2011).

Cities like San Pedro Sula, Johannesburg, Goma, Ciudad Juarez , San Salvador, Karachi, Rio de Janeiro, Cape Town, Caracas, Guatemala, Detroit, Kingston, Kabul, Bagdad, Lagos and Medellin represent a new type of urban category within the security and development literature, these are the *fragile* cities of this century (Mugahh 2014a; Muggah and Savage 2012; Koonings and Kruijt 2007, 2009). These cities are seen as urban spaces where 'a failure of localized social contracts binding governments and citizens and a declining ability to regulate and monopolise legitimate violence across their territories' (Muggah and Savage 2012; Mugaah 2014b) produce chronic

levels of instability and violence. In this type of city it is common to find high levels of inequality, marginalisation of large portions of the population, social disorganisation, underinstitutionalisation, hybrid forms of authority and multiple layers of coercion being exercised by a wide range of armed actors and entities (Mugahh 2014b). Some of these fragility affected urban areas are increasingly regarded as 'ungoverned spaces' which remain at the margins of state control and that have at least three features: First, they are characterised by long periods of weak institutional presence, in which representatives of law and order are absent or only symbolically present (Koonings and Kruijt 1999; Clunan and Trinkunas 2010; Pion-Berlin and Trinkunas 2011) and by state institutions' incapacity 'to control violence, to offer protection, and to respond to the demands of its citizens'(OECD 2009:24). Second, ungoverned spaces are areas where powerful non-state actors are in control of means of coercion and violence with priority to the state (Davis 2009; Koonings and Kruijt 1999), and third, where social and institutional conditions (such as impunity) facilitate the emergence of violence and security threats (OECD 2009).

One of the most dramatic and unsettling manifestations of urban fragility are endemic levels of violence. Urban violence in fragile cities is very complex. In few cities it is still the result of confrontations between state forces, insurgents and foreign troops, but in the great majority it includes a mix of delinquency, violence exercised by a wide range of armed groups⁶, intra-family and gender-based violence, ethnic violence, interpersonal and communal violence, vigilantism and different forms of state violence. Although these diverse expressions of violence have been categorised according to political, economic, institutional and social motivations (Moser 2004), there is increasing recognition that it is more accurate to talk about the existence of different forms of urban conflict in fragile cities of the global south (Beall et al 2013; Moser and McIlwaine 2014). In these contemporary urban conflicts, multiple forms of violence interlink, overlap, and reinforce each other (World Bank 2011).

⁶ Such as youth gangs, organised criminal groups, militia groups and paramilitary groups.

The most salient characteristic of violence in fragile urban contexts is the existence of processes by which different forms of violence interact systemically via 'knock-on effects', creating what Moser and Rodgers have described as violence chains (Moser and Rodgers 2012). The processes involved in the reproduction of urban violence and insecurity are influenced both by social, economic and political structural factors, as well as by particular local conditions (Winton 2004). Additionally the actors associated with some of the most visible forms of urban violence, such as youth gangs and organised criminal groups for example, are engaging in ever more complex relations with the state, society and the legal economy. Arias' research in Rio de Janeiro's favelas for instance, illustrates the way contacts between criminal actors, members of the police, civic leaders and politicians create networks that offer protection and political influence to criminals (Arias 2006). Violent actors in cities of the global South are also interacting in ways that make distinctions between them very blurred, as Winton's analysis of gang networks reveals (Winton 2014).

It is very difficult to understand contemporary urban violence dynamics by looking at victimisation levels and at the number of violent deaths occurred over particular periods of time. However homicide rates have become key indicators of the problem or urban fragility. Although these quantitative measures of violence do not capture the complex way in which violences interact and are distorted by underreporting from public institutions, they illustrate incidence and spatial distribution patterns of the problem. They also allow for some basic comparative analyses. Homicide rates in cities across the globe for example, show that Latin American, Caribbean and Sub-Saharan African cities are the most severely affected by lethal violence, with Latin America exhibiting the fastest growing pattern since 1999 (UNODC 2011). In 2014, the list of the 50 cities with the highest levels of homicides in the world included 43 Latin American cities, 3 in South Africa and 4 in the United States (Citizen Council for Public Security and Criminal Justice 2014). Despite annual fluctuations, other studies have also shown the prevalence of urban violence in Central and South America, the Caribbean and Sub-Saharan Africa (Muggah and Savage 2012; UNODC 2011).

Quantitative indicators also demonstrate that urban violence is very unevenly distributed. Homicide rates vary greatly among cities in the same country, but also between neighbourhoods and population groups in the same city. In general, the poorest and most marginalised communities are the most affected by violence and insecurity (Winton 2004; McIlwaine and Moser 2007; Briceño-León and Zubillaga 2002). In some cities there are neighbourhoods with homicide rates under the global average of 6.9 and other neighbourhoods where homicides rates are of up to 3 digits. The later ones generally endure higher levels of urban poverty too. For example, the three most prosperous neighbourhoods in Cape Town concentrated 1% of the total homicides occurred in the city in 2004, while the three poorest concentrated 44%. In the most marginalised neighbourhoods, the homicides rates reached up to 200 homicides per hundred thousand inhabitants (City of Cape Town 2011).

Another key feature of lethal violence in fragile cities is that it especially affects young men from marginalised communities. In Brazilian cities for instance, the highest victimization rates are among young black males from the poorest neighbourhoods. In 2007 the national homicide rate in that country was 25 per 100.000 inhabitants, but the rate for black youths reached 66 per 100.000 (OECD 2011a). In general, global homicides rates show that fatal violence mostly affects men⁷. However victimisation among women is growing in some cities. Additionally, the differences on victimisation levels based on gender substantially drop when forms of non-lethal violence are taken into account (World Bank 2011). In the case of nonfatal physical, sexual and psychological abuse for example, women disproportionately endure the highest levels of victimisation⁸.

In addition to chronic levels of violence affecting urban areas in non-conflict settings, such as San Pedro Sula, Caracas, Chihuahua, Kingston , Rio de

⁷ It is estimated that sixty percent of the deaths caused by homicides in 2012 were of men between 15 and 44 years (WHO 2014) In addition, men commit the majority of violent crimes, from domestic violence to homicide.

⁸ According to the 2014 Report on Violence Prevention by WHO, UNODC and UNDP, one in five women reports having been sexually abused as a child and one in three women reports having been a victim of physical or sexual violence by an intimate partner at some point in her lifetime.

Janeiro, Johannesburg and Ciudad Juarez; armed confrontations in the context of conventional conflicts and terrorism also constitute important sources of violence in some southern cities like Gaza, Baghdad, Fallujah, Kandahar, Tripoli or the Syrian city of Aleppo. Cities are important battlefields in conflicts involving state security forces, rebel groups (and western forces) and experience as a result, high numbers of casualties. The strategic role that cities still play in traditional and modern forms of warfare are leading some security experts in the North to identify them as the primary sites of this century's wars and forms of combat (Hills 2004; Vautravers 2010; Muggah and Savage 2012; Beall 2007; Rodgers 2007).

Urban violence in fragile cities whether as a consequence of diffuse forms of violence or conventional wars, has profound repercussions on people's wellbeing and huge human, social and economic costs⁹. In contexts where levels are chronic, violence produces forced migrations, constant fear, stigmatisation and discrimination against those who reside in the most affected communities. Violence also reduces growth and produces negative social impacts, it affects relations, erodes trusts and social cohesion, limits access to employment and education and reduces mobility of people and capital (World Bank 2009; World Bank 2011; Chant and McIlwaine 2009:60). Urban violence impacts on peoples' livelihoods by distorting family, social and community relations, by limiting people's ability to access resources for survival (Moser 2004) and by reducing people's and communities' possibilities to overcome marginalisation and poverty. It also limits citizenship for those who reside in violence-affected areas and are unable to exercise their formal rights and freedoms in a meaningful way (Pearce 2007). Calculations of the direct economic costs of urban violence on national productivity and development, which take into account losses due to deaths and disabilities, to property crimes and to disincentives to local and foreign

⁹ In human lives: in 2008 alone, in Latin America and the Caribbean more than 130.000 people died by firearms (UNODC 2011, UN-HABITAT 2012:75)

investment, also show that the losses represent in some cases an important percentage of countries' GDP¹⁰.

Multidisciplinary research on violence in the global South has highlighted that the impact of urban violences, as well as people's perceptions and experiences of insecurity differ massively according to gender, age, class, ethnicity and race (McIlwaine and Moser 2007; Hume 2009; Moser and McIlwaine 1999, 2004; Orjuela 2010¹¹). Experiences of violence, insecurity and fear are, as Moser and McIlwaine suggest 'specific and shaped by wider political and socioeconomic power structures and by individual identity formation' (Moser and McIlwaine 2014). The differentiated consequences and experiences of urban violence reveal the paradoxes inherent to life in fragile cities. For example, in the case of women's safety, cities in the global South seem to offer simultaneously conditions that act as triggers and risks of gender-based violence (such as poor living conditions associated to urban poverty), and also opportunities for women to cope better with violence (such as easier access economic resources and institutional support, compared with rural areas (McIlwaine 2013). Although the differences in experiences and risks of urban violence based on gender, have tended to be sidelined within mainstream policy and academic debates on violence and security (Hume 2004), in the decade in question, they slowly started to be noticed and to be integrated into global discourses on urban safety. Qualitative and participatory research has also highlighted the agency of those who are vulnerable to urban violences in the global South (Pearce 2009). Although people living in marginalised communities are exposed to some of the most dramatic manifestations of urban violence and live with high levels of fear, they also develop a wide range of responses to insecurity and violence (Auyero and Kilanski 2015). Some of these responses reproduce violence (for example when they involve taking 'justice' in their own hands and in

¹⁰ The World Bank calculated that the economic cost of insecurity and violence in Central America represented almost 8% of its GDP. In Guatemala violence cost the country more than 7% of GDP in 2005, more than twice the damage caused by Hurricane Stan the same year (World Bank 2011:5)

¹¹ For an example of how perceptions of security and development vary among different minorities in Colombo, Sri Lanka.

extreme cases lynchings (Godoy 2004); but others responses are non-violent in nature.

Urban insecurity has also been identified as a powerful force shaping cities both spatially and socially (Caldeira 1996, 2000; Rodgers 2004). As panicked citizens who can afford to live in proliferating gated communities try to escape from real and perceived levels of insecurity and large sectors of society identified as dangerous get excluded from the enjoyment of urban space and life; spatial and social divisions widen in fragile cities of the global South.

Today urban violence and instability are not only recognised as development problems (World Bank 2011; Moser and McIlwaine 2006; Moncada 2013a) and as posing huge challenges to the consolidation of democracies in several states¹² (Casas-Zamora and Dammert 2012; Ungar 2011), but also as sources of security threats to western democracies and to the international community as a whole (OECD 2009; Diggins 2011). Increasing concerns with terrorism, drug trafficking and transnational criminal networks are driving attention towards fragile cities, most of which are located in the global South. In particular, the capacity of non-state actors to thrive in fragile urban areas is especially worrying for policymakers, military and security experts and international organisations (Norton 2003; Lamb ND).

With a growing tendency towards conceptualising contemporary forms of global risk as the result of the existence of spaces of non-governance or mis-governance at national and urban levels (Mitchell 2010; Clunan and Trinkunas 2010; Diggins 2011) this attention is translating into a wide range of public interventions and security initiatives.

¹² In Latin America for example, the reduction of citizens' trust in the state's capacity to protect citizens' basic rights is weakening support for democratic institutions and fostering a move towards more authoritarian attitudes.

Contemporary Security Responses to Urban Instability

Urban violence and other symptoms of urban fragility are now a key concern for citizens (Latinobarometro¹³), and an essential area of intervention for policymakers, planners, development agencies, security experts, international and regional organizations (Jütersonke et al 2009; UN-HABITAT 2007; Caldeira 2000) and more recently, humanitarian organisations (Muggah and Savage 2012; Reid-Henry and Sending 2014). The last decade in particular has seen an important surge in efforts to contain and prevent urban violence and crime in Latin America, the Caribbean, Sub-Saharan Africa and South and Southeast Asia (OECD 2011a, 2011b; UNDP 2012, 2010a).

In Latin America and the Caribbean for example, where levels of violence are especially dramatic¹⁴, there is an impressive record of public initiatives -as shown by the recent mapping exercise by the Igarapé Institute¹⁵ which registered 1,300 interventions across the region since the 1990s. The explosion in the number of interventions aimed at dealing with urban violence and improving security in the cities of the global South has only intensified since the mid-2000s. The global assessment of armed violence reduction initiatives by the OECD (2011a) registered the increase in number and scope of crime prevention and urban violence reduction initiatives in Latin America, the Caribbean, Sub-Saharan Africa and South and Southeast Asia. The report shows that there has been an important surge in policies and programmes over the last decade, and an explosion in the number of interventions since the mid-2000s. In only six countries used as case studies,

¹³ Violence and delinquency are the most pressing worries for Latin Americans, together with unemployment, corruption and poverty (Latinobarómetro 2011)
<http://www.latinobarometro.org/latino/latinobarometro.jsp>

¹⁴ Only in Latin America and the Caribbean 1,4 million people lost their lives as a result of violent crime during the past decade (Casas-Zamora and Dammert 2012) The region also has the highest homicide in the world, and murder is the most prevalent cause of death in various cities in countries like Brazil, Colombia, Venezuela, El Salvador and Mexico (UNDP 2012:25)

¹⁵ Undertaken with the support of the Inter-American Development Bank and InSight Crime
<http://igarape.data4.mx/>

as many as 570 armed violence reduction and prevention interventions were identified between 1990 and 2012, including 179 in Brazil, 45 in Burundi, 219 in Colombia, 44 in Liberia, 58 in South Africa and 25 in Timor-Leste. Around two-thirds of these programs were implemented between 2006 and 2010. Many of the interventions implemented in cities in Brazil, Burundi, Colombia and South Africa since the 1990s were found to 'have combined enforcement with conflict prevention, peace building, crime reduction, and citizen security priorities' (OECD 2011a:32).

Although many efforts by national, state and local tiers of government have relied on the use of hard fisted measures, there is undoubtedly increasing interest, among policy circles and support -from cooperation, international and development agencies, for the implementation of responses that are wider in scope, objectives and tactics. Many initiatives are led by local and national authorities and public institutions, but others by civil society actors or involve public-private collaborations with the support of international agencies. Urban security strategies are intended to contain, reduce, manage and in some cases, prevent urban violence, especially in poor and marginalised urban areas and are now at the heart of the way security is provided in southern cities.

Public responses to urban violence and instability, meaning the security policies, programmes and initiatives implemented by local, regional or national authorities, can generally be located somewhere on a wide spectrum that goes from hard-coercive techniques to soft-preventive initiatives. The specific location of security initiatives on that spectrum depends on how the problem of violence is understood by authorities, the tools chosen to deal with it and the objectives public security initiatives seek to achieve.

Coercive and Military-based Approaches

Urban security strategies relying on the use of coercion and the repressive capacity of police and military institutions, such as the Mano Dura (Iron Fist)

policies implemented in Central America¹⁶ and Mexico during the 1990s, have been widespread across cities struggling with high levels of urban violence. Militaristic initiatives have been widely used in Latin America to deal with gang related violence and with the expansion of drug trafficking, but are also the dominant response to urban problems in other regions (such as south Asian cities for example¹⁷). These coercive responses rely on the deterrent capacity of harsh punishments and emphasise the individual responsibility of those who commit crimes but do not aim at transforming structural factors producing violence and insecurity in these contexts.

The involvement of western powers in conflicts which have cities in the global South as battlefields have also contributed to militaristic approaches being still very present in the security agenda (Graham 2010). Concerns with the increasing power of criminal organisations and terrorist groups in urban areas have motivated the adaptation of military strategies and tactics to deal with security threats in urban contexts and the further involvement of military forces in the provision of public security (for the case of Mexico see Meyer 2013). To some military and security analysts the type of warfare that has taken place in the last decade in some Iraqi, Afghan, Mexican and Brazilian cities, represents a new type of armed conflict (Peterke 2010). Violence in these urban contexts varies and it can involve very different actors, such as insurgents, militias, gangs, drug cartels, state forces and foreign troops, but in all cases it takes place in densely populated areas of the urban South with intensity, fatalities and levels of organisation that resemble, and in some cases surpass, that of traditional conflicts.

An emerging interpretation of this phenomenon is that we are witnessing the 'urbanization of warfare and security' (Coward 2009). Contemporary military doctrine, especially in the west, is responding to this phenomenon with what Graham calls 'military urbanism' (Graham 2010). This is leading not only to the increasing blurring of previous clear distinctions between internal and

¹⁶ See Hume (2007a) for an analysis of the use of this kind of policies in El Salvador, in response to youth gangs.

¹⁷ See IDS 2014

external, and between military and policing areas of action (Bigo 2005; Abrahamsen and Williams 2009; Mitchell 2010), but also to the securitisation and militarisation of cities in the global South (Muggah and Savage 2012).

In cities affected by increasing levels of urban violence and insecurity, changes in military strategies, doctrines, training and equipment (Vautravers 2010) are leading to novel forms of intervention. Policing and military interventions in urban spaces are now focusing on the management and administration of space (Moser and Rodgers 2005), as well as on the effective administration and control of everyday life. As some interventions in cities of the global South reveal, contemporary security practices include simultaneous attempts to control territory, to keep order in streets and efforts to manage populations' welfare (Dillon 2004; Duffield 2007). The use of technology, such as computer mapping technologies and systems like COMPSTAT and surveillance cameras is becoming increasingly useful for these purposes.

Police and military interventions attempted during the 2000s in cities like Medellin (with the Operation Orion), Rio de Janeiro (with the Pacification Police Units (UPP), Ciudad Juarez, Tijuana and West Kingston (Felbab-Brown 2011), are examples of such processes by which more traditional security goals merge with biopolitical projects. Based on theories of social disorganisation, these interventions aimed at improving urban security by guaranteeing state's effective control of ungoverned spaces have increasingly relied on a combination of pacification techniques, community and problem-solving oriented policing, socio-economic initiatives and efforts to improve delivery of services in marginalised urban areas. In some cases pacification efforts have also included initiatives targeting 'at risk' groups, as well as slum renewal and environmental design projects.

These strategies make use of military and heavy-armed police operations to physically retake spaces ruled by criminal groups. Policing in these contexts focuses on the consolidation of territorial control by public authorities and on weakening non-state actors' influence. However it also aims at winning local populations' allegiance and combines socioeconomic programmes,

community policing and wider engagement with social networks in those areas (Felbab-Brown 2011; Muggah 2012). That is why these types of security strategies often require the participation of a wide range of institutions and actors in the form of public-civil and public-community partnerships, as well as adapting security forces' roles, tactics and functions. This means that police officers are often asked to take on new tasks and in some cases to act as 'social workers, civil engineers, schoolteachers, nurses and boy scouts' (Muggah and Mulli 2012:65) in ways that analysts regard as strikingly similar to counterinsurgency strategies (Muggah and Mulli 2012 for Rio and Jensen 2010 for Cape Town).

These new security strategies characterised by the combination of security and development measures tend to specially target the urban poor. Through the construction of police stations in strategic areas and in some cases by creating special military-police operations with increased reaction capacity in marginal areas, authorities seek to create conditions for the arrival of other state agencies. On a more routine basis, security tactics of territorial control such as raids in problematic areas, check points and routine stop and search tactics continue to take place while accompanied by socio-economic programmes in intervened communities.

Preventive Approaches and the Move towards Mixed Security Responses

As the examples above illustrate, security provision in fragile urban contexts is becoming increasingly more complex and diversified in its strategies and instruments as attempts have been made to contain and manage urban violence. Public security provision is gradually moving away from the exclusive use of hard fisted responses, towards more integrated approaches combining reactive measures and a wide range of crime and violence prevention policies (UNDP 2010a, 2010b; UN HABITAT 2007).

Drawing inspiration from different theories developed in European and American contexts¹⁸, but also inspired by local understandings of urban problems, urban security initiatives in fragile and violence affected cities of

¹⁸ Such as social disorganization and broken-window theories

the global South have included sector-specific approaches focusing on improving urban governance, criminal justice reforms and intelligence and community policing. Programmes for youth at risk inspired by public health approaches, social capital and cohesion promoting programmes, conflict transformation, urban renewal, situational prevention and slum upgrading¹⁹, and more recently, gang truces²⁰, are also part of the wide range of measures being used to deal with urban violence (Moser 2004; Muggah 2012; Muggah 2014).

In many countries security provision still is dominated by militarised strategies and by sporadic repression of problematic communities and groups, as a means to address security problems. Punitive security approaches are highly institutionalized, massively supported by the public and continuously reinforced by international campaigns like the wars on drugs, on terrorism and on organised crime. However in various cities of the global South local policymakers, civil society organisations, local elites, donors and development agencies have started to turn towards these wide range of preventive initiatives (OECD 2011) and towards 'integrated and holistic approaches' (Moser 2004).

This highlights a new trend regarding urban security responses in the global South. Halfway through the second decade of this century coercive and preventive approaches are increasingly used in combination with urban planning strategies which take into account existing socio-economic and spatial fractures in cities. This means that the number of actors involved in dealing with the problem is diversifying, as well as the strategies used (Moser and McIlwaine 2014; Muggah 2012; UN–Habitat 2007; Rojas 2010).

Shifts in the kind of responses used to deal with violence and insecurity in fragile cities throughout the 2000s illustrate the merging of different global,

¹⁹ For example the Urban Integrated Projects implemented in poor communities of Medellin, the Violence Prevention through Urban Upgrading (VPUU) project implemented in Khayelitsha in Cape Town, the urban regeneration project implemented in Ciudad Juarez (Todos Somos Juarez) and the Favela Barrio project in Rio de Janeiro.

²⁰ These have been used in San Salvador, Medellin, Kingston, Port-of-Spain, São Paulo and Tijuana to reduce violence.

regional and local security agendas with traditional geopolitical narratives, global discourses on urban development and security and local practices. Western security doctrines and donors have supported reforms to policing and public security provision in the global South, with the intention of reducing the risks associated with the lack of effective administration of space and people by states (Mitchell 2010). International organisations have also been promoting a broader security agenda for the cities. The 2007 UN-HABITAT Global report which focused on urban security, suggested for example an agenda based on the notion of human security (UN-HABITAT 2007). This agency together with other developmental agencies like the UNDP, the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank, as well as the European Union have also supported a wide range of initiatives aiming at preventing crime and reducing violence in cities. These have focused on the promotion of good governance arrangements especially at local level and on the involvement of civil and community actors in strategies to improve urban security (UNDP 2010b; IADB 2003; World Bank 2011). At local level there have also been changes, with local authorities and elites paying more attention and slowly changing their attitudes and ways of engaging with marginalised communities (see UN-Habitat 2011; Riley et al 2001).

In Latin America and the Caribbean the combination of a wide range of programmes and initiatives is especially visible. In this region the adoption of Citizen Security as opposed to the state centred notion of national security (*seguridad nacional*), has created some space for the promotion of an interdisciplinary look at the problem and awareness to the need of linking human rights and the rule of law to the provision of security. This has led to some progress in terms of policy design, to the inclusion of preventive mechanisms and social policies and the promotion of efforts to exchange ideas and learning across the region on how to deal with institutional challenges (Dammert 2013; Abello Colak and Angarita 2013)²¹. Security

²¹ The systematisation of successful initiatives across the region supported by the IADB and the creation of a citizen security database of public security and safety programmes and projects in Latin America and the Caribbean are examples of these efforts
<http://igarape.data4.mx/#>

sector reforms and police reforms in particular have also taken place in the search for forms of public security provision that respond to citizen needs. These reforms aimed at improving institutional accountability and police legitimacy through community oriented approaches for example (Dammert 2007b; Ungar 2011), have faced major obstacles and have yielded unequal results across the region (Uldriks 2009; Fruhling 2009). Latin America and the Caribbean has also been a key site for the implementation of more comprehensive initiatives integrating urban planning and environmental design into efforts to make cities safer.

Recently, some analysts have started to warn of signs that security responses to urban violence might be moving towards the management of security (Moser and McIwaine 2014; Abello Colak and Pearce 2015) given the limitations of existing approaches to effectively control and eliminate the problem of violence. The mounting anxiety of local authorities and urban elites who seek to promote the integration of their cities to global flows of capital favours the adoption of management strategies. The consequences of implementing management oriented security initiatives, such as the brokering of truces between powerful gangs or criminal groups, which might produce temporary de-escalations of urban violence, yet which leave the power of armed groups and structural factors fuelling urban instability untouched, need to be further researched. This is the case, especially given the risk of deepening existing gaps between the kind of security provision available to different sectors of society (Abello Colak and Pearce 2015).

Urban Security Thinking in Fragile Cities: A Critical Review

The initiatives being implemented in the fragile cities of the global South to improve urban security are key to reducing and addressing the devastating impact of urban violence and instability. They are also important for other social, economic, political and cultural urban processes that will define the prospect of human development and peace in this predominantly urban century. There is, however, for the time-being, insufficient knowledge on how

a wide range of security responses to urban violence and instability come about and on their impact and outcomes. In this regard, a recent overview of the state of theory and knowledge on the interconnection between urbanisation, poverty and violence, funded by Canada's International Development Research Centre (IDRC) and the United Kingdom's Department for International Development (DFID), recognised that there is insufficient knowledge regarding the effectiveness of interventions designed to mitigate and reduce insecurity in medium and lower income cities (Muggah 2012:vi).

A body of literature focused on the provision of security in cities is only emerging and consolidating now, with academic contributions from different disciplinary corners like criminology, urban studies, urban sociology, urban geography, anthropology and political science. Compared to the now extensive multidisciplinary literature on urban violence, the literature on urban security is much limited, especially regarding security provision in cities of the global South. Paradoxically, the security studies field has been relatively absent from the knowledge production around security provision in urban contexts. The increasing importance of dynamics taking place in fragile cities and spaces in the global South will however put urban security right at the centre of the security agenda in the near future.

In the next section I explore analytical approaches that seem predominant within the existing urban security literature, placing special attention on how scholars and a wide range of international bodies have attempted to study public security responses in cities affected by chronic levels of violence and instability.

Analytical Approaches to the Study of Urban Security

Existing studies of contemporary forms of security provision in cities struggling with urban violence and instability can be broadly clustered into three different groups based on their analytical choices and focus: Policy oriented analyses, State-Centred analyses and Critical Analyses of Urban security and neoliberalism. Each of these groups encompasses a number of contributions which have engaged with the task of studying security

initiatives while focusing on particular issues and using particular analytical lenses. In this section I identify the general characteristics of these three broad analytical clusters and provide an analysis of some of their advantages and limitations. Table 1 provides a summary of this analysis.

Table 1. Predominant Analytical Approaches to the Study of Urban Security in the global South

Main Analytical Approaches for the Study of Urban Security in Fragile Cities	Main Focus	Advantages	Limitations
Policy-Oriented Analyses	Policy design Policy Implementation Policy Results (impact/effectiveness) Institutional aspects that affect security provision in cities	Provide Context specific information on existing institutional capacities Context specific evidence of impact on violence and (in)security (what works and what does not work as intended) Potential for comparative analyses	Tendency to rely on the most visible indicators of violence while ignoring more complex processes reproducing urban violences There is little engagement with issues of power Security provision is studied as a technical process with little connection with socio-economic, political, and cultural urban processes
State-Centred Analyses of Security Provision	State/Urban	Draws attention to the way security	Tendency to rely on western notions of state that do not capture dynamics in the global South Overlooks human centred notions of security

	Fragility State building Security-development nexus	provision affects state-building processes in fragile contexts (specially legitimacy, monopoly of coercion and territorial sovereignty)	Ignores differentiated experiences of (in)security and people's responses Does not recognise how security is constituted by social actors Does not question structural factors, including the impact of neoliberal processes
Critical Analyses of Urban Security and Neoliberalism	Neoliberalism Urbanisation of Capital	Illustrates the way security is connected to socio political and economic processes	Tendency towards generalizations and deterministic explanations No space for contingency and agency in the analysis It does not recognise the role of non-neoliberal dynamics

Policy Oriented Analyses

This type of analysis mainly focuses on the policy characteristics of security initiatives and responses as well as on their effectiveness. Analyses under this category are primarily concerned with an exploration of the design and implementation aspects of security responses, but also with assessments of the impact these security programmes and initiatives have. The most common questions guiding analyses in this category are: what are the best ways to contain, prevent, or manage violence and insecurity in cities? What affects, whether positively or negatively, the implementation of security responses in fragile urban contexts? Do particular security initiatives work at reducing violence, crime and insecurity? And what are the intended and unintended effects of particular security policies or initiatives, taking into account the stated objectives of those policies?

Examples of these policy oriented analyses include studies and broad reviews of policy responses in contexts of urban violence produced by institutions like the Inter-American Development Bank, studies and reports

on urban (in)security produced by United Nations dependencies such as UN-Habitat, UNODC and UNDP, by the World Bank and the WHO, as well as the rapidly expanding literature on crime and violence prevention (International Centre for the Prevention of Crime 2012, OECD 2011b). This type of studies are becoming highly influential in the definition of policies among a wide range of local authorities, especially in African and Latin American cities, given the efforts by international bodies to support knowledge transfer among cities and institutions.

This category also includes region specific literatures, such as the 'citizen security' literature produced in Latin America (Basombrio 2012, 2013) or the literature on security and justice provision in South Africa (Van der Spuy 2012; Burger and Boshoff 2008). In the case of the prolific citizen security literature which rapidly expanded since the 1990s when the first books were published, it has predominantly focused on the role played by dysfunctional systems of law and order and state institutions on the impressive increases in violence levels during the last two decades in this region. It includes country specific analyses of security policies implemented by national and local governments (Llorente 2005b²²; Ruiz 2013²³; Bobea 2012²⁴) and of existing institutional arrangements for the provision of citizen security and their shortcomings (Diamint 2004; Llorente and Rubio 2003). The citizen security literature also includes analyses of security sector reforms attempted in the region and their mixed results, with particular attention to police institutions and criminal justice systems (Bailey and Dammert 2005; Dammert 2007b; Fruhling 2009; Uldriks 2009; Campesi 2010). These analyses highlight important obstacles to reform processes in the region, for example the politicization of the police forces (Ungar 2011) and the existence of adverse political conditions that reduce incentives and create constraints to institutional democratic reforms to the security sector (Fuentes 2009).

²² See for an analysis of the citizen security policies implemented in Bogota.

²³ See for a study of violence prevention and slum upgrading policies implemented in Chile.

²⁴ See for an analysis of a comprehensive citizen security policy in Dominican Republic.

More recently, analysts of citizen security in Latin America and the Caribbean have started to focus on the sophistication of organised crime and the challenges this poses to national and citizen security across the region (Thoumi et al 2010; Garzon Vergara 2012; Jaramillo and Perea 2014; Garay-Salamanca & Salcedo-Albarán 2011; Abello Colak and Guarneros-Meza 2014). This keeps the regional policy agenda on urban security focused on state institutional capacity (Mathieu and Nino Guarnizo 2012,) and on the limitations faced by the state in the face of new configurations of urban violence and crime. In this context the citizen security literature is dominated by the question of what is the best way in which the state can handle what is seen as a growing 'security gap' in the region (Pion-Berlin and Trinkunas, 2011).

This body of literature, as well as contributions from scholars' observations in other contexts have contributed to our understanding of the characteristics of existing institutions currently involved in the provision of security in cities (police institutions, local authorities, justice system and the penal system) and the factors that hamper their capacity to address the reproduction of multiple violences and the mutation of violent actors (Townsend 2009 for the case of Trinidad and Tobago for example). The academic literature has made evident for example how underfunded, undertrained and easily corrupted police forces are contributing to security problems (Macaulay 2002), and the tendency towards the privatisation of security (Abrahamsen and Williams 2007). It has also provided evidence of the limitations faced by local authorities during the implementation of preventive oriented approaches (Hoppert-Flamig 2013). These analyses have highlighted how local leadership, bureaucracy efficiency, multi-level institutional coordination and better public management practices can lead to more effective management of security provision in some cities (Leyva Botero 2010 for the example of Medellin).

Although the number of rigorous evaluations of violence and crime prevention and reduction initiatives is limited (Muggah 2012), there is increasing demand for the production of reliable data on urban security and for more evidence based studies on what works and what does not work in

terms of improving urban security. There is growing interest among policymakers, international agencies and scholars in undertaking policy and programme evaluations (for example the IADB 2013; Moestue et al. 2013). The private sector in some cities has also shown interest and supported this type of policy-oriented analyses (for example in Central America the private sectors funded a study on Medellín´s citizen security strategy²⁵).

Policy-oriented analyses undertaken by academics in different fields have provided important insights and evidence into the working of security responses and crime prevention initiatives in particular contexts and into their unintended consequences. From those types of analyses we know for example, that weak institutional capacities have been a major obstacle for the implementation of effective public policies to tackle urban violence in Latin America (Fruhling 2012). Also that punitive solutions, including military interventions, have been in most cases incapable of sustainably diminishing homicide rates and have instead worsened security problems (Aguilar 2006; Jütersonke et al 2009; Peace Studies Group 2011) while also resulting in numerous human rights violations. We also know that security policies implemented in the context of the war on drugs have contributed to the current crisis of many penal and justice systems in Latin American countries (Uprimny Yepes et al 2012).

Analyses of preventive approaches have also started to suggest that in certain contexts combined security approaches have helped reduce some forms of urban violence. Recent studies, some of them inspired by the notion of resilience²⁶ suggest that some initiatives have begun reversing some of the manifestations of fragility and promoted resilience in low- and medium-income settings. The most promising initiatives, it is argued, tend to privilege consultation and dialogue with communities, coordination among different layers of government, a proactive approach to urban safety and comprehensive multisectoral approaches which target macro- and micro-

²⁵ See Mejia-Restrepo 2013

²⁶ Understood as the process by which urban systems, individuals, communities, authorities and private and civil society adapt, cope and recover and transform from risks, hazards and shocks such as chronic levels of violence, without resorting to violence and with minimum damages to security, and key public social and economic institutions (Muggah 2014)

level risk factors as well as political, economic and social drivers of urban violence (Muggah 2014:352; Davis 2012; Bellis et al. 2010; Falkenburger and Thale 2008). A comparative evaluation of the implementation of five Interamerican Development Bank supported citizen security projects in Central America and the Caribbean found out that the most successfully implemented projects were those which included mechanisms for communities' participation, situational diagnostics, trained practitioners and protocols, presence of community officers and simple project design with limited number of state institutions involved and more direct routes to service delivery (IADB 2013). These are common elements highlighted within the specialised policy-oriented literature; however there is also evidence that more comprehensive security efforts to tackle violence and crime, can also bring socio-economic investment, urban development, civil society participation and transformations of the built environment right into the centre of urban security practices in ways that are often problematic and pose the risk of 'criminalizing social policy' (Dixon 2006) or even 'criminalising urban governance' (Meth 2011).

Case specific analyses provide important insights regarding contemporary forms of security provision and their time and territorial impacts. For example in the case of Rio de Janeiro's pacification efforts since 2008, policy-oriented analyses highlight that the combination of coercive police intervention followed by social programmes reduced gang related violence, but it also increased living costs in some communities. The impoverishing effects of these state interventions have created conflicts between residents and the state in these areas (Werling 2014; Vieira da Cunha and Da Silva 2011).

The importance of policy impact focused analyses is unquestionable. They offer possibilities for undertaking comparative analyses for example. However these analyses have some limitations too. One is the criteria they use to evaluate security policies. As Werling (2014) argues for the case of Rio, assessments of policy intervention often rely on 'macro-level' administrative data or community 'case studies' and these data do not capture other real changes on the ground. Policy analyses also tend to rely exclusively on the most visible indicators of violence for impact evaluations.

Homicide rates as well as high impact crimes, such as robberies and victimisation levels are commonly used as measures of shifts in urban security. These types of quantitative measures facilitate comparative efforts, but limit our capacity to recognise and address other manifestations of urban violence and insecurity, for example, domestic violence, non-lethal violence against certain population groups (women, children, the elderly, or minority groups) or underreported forms of intimidation such as extortion and forced urban displacement. Within policy-oriented analyses of urban security, these types of security problems are easily eclipsed.

The complex interaction between different types of violence and the diverse processes and factors that might drive fluctuations in quantitative indicators of urban violence are also difficult to acknowledge and explain within policy oriented analyses that try to comprehend the policy impact of security responses. An example of this type of limitations is the way homicide rates reductions have been attributed to public policies in statistical analyses²⁷, in cases where these reductions were driven by other factors, such as the hegemony achieved by a powerful criminal actor in particular areas and the resulting reduction in violent competitions for criminal control of territories and illegal economies²⁸.

Another limitation of policy oriented analytical approaches is that they do not tend to engage critically with questions of power, such as who participates in the definition of security policies and who is excluded? Who defines what is to be secured and how? Whose security is privileged or neglected in the process of providing security? Within policy-oriented analyses, security policies are often regarded as technical and apolitical interventions to deal with violence and crime, and in consequence these approaches do not have suitable tools to explore the political economy of security provision, the wider political, social and economic context in which security provision is inscribed,

²⁷ for example in the case of Medellin an epidemiological based study argued that a considerable reduction in homicides rates in the 2000s was the result of the construction of Metrocable (an aerial cable-car system used for public transport in hilly zones of the city).

²⁸ Reductions in levels of urban violence due to this process have been reported in Medellin and Ciudad Juarez.

or to even question what kind of crime and violence are considered policy priorities and why.

The importance of the inclusion of politics and the political economy dimensions in analyses of the way security policies are crafted and their outcomes in the global South is highlighted by contributions revealing that the level of integration of cities in licit and illicit global economic flows affects both patterns of violence and political responses to it (Moncada 2013a). A number of scholars has studied urban security responses in connection with the functioning of political systems and political processes in different contexts (Muller 2012; Meth 2011; Moncada forthcoming; Fuentes 2009; Gutierrez-Sanin et al. 2009; Fourchard 2012; Maclean 2014). Their analyses show that powerful actors' interactions as well as socioeconomic dynamics deeply impact on the nature, shape and trajectory of public responses to violence in each context. In the case on Mexico city for example, Muller shows how informal political negotiations, bargaining processes and power-sharing arrangements between central state and local power centres, produce politically negotiated forms of local policing, as well as fragmented and selective security provision (Muller 2012). In this respect, Hills finds that in post-conflict cities policing can take different forms in particular contexts according to power relations; power struggles and negotiations (Hills 2009:53).

Along the same lines, analyses of changes in the repertoire of security policies implemented in the three main Colombian cities in the last decade have pointed to the formation of coalitions in larger municipalities with an influential middle class (Gutierrez et al 2009; MacLean 2015) and to the political role played by the private sector (Moncada 2013b) as the key forces shaping local policy responses to urban violence in these cities. Moncada's research shows that depending on their relation to urban space and violence the private sector in these cities either endorsed or opposed particular security approaches and helped to determine the type of responses implemented by local authorities in each of these cities (Ibid). These are important contributions that bring in to the analysis of urban security, questions regarding the role of politics. However as it will be highlighted later

in this chapter, still little attention has been paid to the power structures in which security is inscribed and on the actual working of power within security provision and its implications for the kind of security that is delivered on the ground.

State-Centred Analyses of Security Provision

The growth of the 'fragile, 'weak' and 'failed states' literature, during the last decade (Boas and Jennings 2005; Fukuyama 2004; Koonings and Kruijt 2004; Krasner and Pascual 2005) and the merging of security and development discourses and agendas in what some refer to, as the security-development nexus (Duffield 2001, 2010; Stern and Ojendal 2010;) illustrate the consolidation of a framework that has come to dominate academic and policy agendas regarding security and development.

This analytical and policy framework, calls for increasing attention, assistance and intervention in fragile states in the form of state-building projects which combine economic development with security strategies (Clunan and Trikunas 2010). These attempts to increase states' capacity to exert effective sovereignty, especially in 'problematic' areas, include not only traditional recipes such as training the police, equipping military forces and building state bureaucracies' capacities, but also include increasing local populations' access to social services, promoting economic development and civic and community involvement. These last aspects, previously ignored within the security studies agenda, are now regarded as key factors in the production of local, national, regional and international security.

The 'fragile state literature' focuses on the state's incapacity or unwillingness to exert a monopoly of violence, on territorial fragmentation and political instability in countries of the global South, and suggests that these conditions constitute a major challenge to contemporary foreign policy and a threat to global stability (Diggins 2011). In the context of the consolidation of 'mega' slums across the global South, where it is assumed that state weakness can create enabling environments for the emergence of potentially violent and hostile non-state actors (Norton 2003; Rapley 2006) and with levels of insecurity and violence rising in some cities, there seems to be growing

preoccupation with the configuration of 'fragile cities' where authorities and public and civil institutions struggle to regulate and monopolize legitimate violence across their territories (Muggah and Savage 2012; Muggah 2014b).

This analytical framework built around the notion of weakness and fragility has brought the state back to the centre stage in the security studies agenda. A functioning state, capable of delivering security and enabling economic growth and welfare is regarded as the cure to security problems emerging from the global South (Clunan 2010). In that context war-torn and post-conflict societies have seen the deployment of multiple efforts to create, rebuild, or strengthen states' capabilities to deliver services at different levels, including at the urban and neighbourhood level.

Today urban dynamics are seen as decisive for state-consolidation in the rapidly urbanising global South. In the same way that European cities shaped the development of state configurations in the global north (Tilly 1992), cities in fragile states have started to be recognised as strategic sites for the development or deterioration of state core functions. Comparative research on cities and states at LSE suggests for example that the way different types of conflict are managed in cities, can promote or prevent the unravelling of the state through processes of state erosion, consolidation or transformation (Beall et al 2011).²⁹

Concerns with 'state fragility' and 'state-building' processes have inspired analyses of urban security in the global South which focus on the relation between security provision and state consolidation, by looking in particular to how the delivery of services such as security and justice in cities might affect efforts to strengthen the state (Kaplan 2014). These analyses adopt a state-centred approach in their study of security governance arrangements and of security policies, programmes and initiatives, and tend to focus on the impact security responses have on state legitimacy, on its monopoly of coercion and its capacity to exercise territorial and social control. An example of such approach is Felbab-Brown's analysis of the pacification and socio economic

²⁹ See the Cities and Fragile States project at LSE, available at <http://www.lse.ac.uk/> also Tipping Point of Urban Conflict project, available at <http://www.urbantippingpoint.org/>.

strategies undertaken in Rio, Medellin, Ciudad Juarez and Kingston, which focused on how these security responses intended to address the lack of territorial control exercised by the state in urban areas controlled by violent actors and the low legitimacy of the state among local urban communities (Felbab-Brown 2011).

Given that the delivery of security and justice has been regarded as a determinant of state legitimacy in fragile and post-conflict contexts, a key concern for scholars in this cluster is with improving efficiency in the delivery of these services. Some analysts have explored the role played by non-state actors in the provision of security and justice in the context of institutional shortcomings and slow improvements at state level. Some of them have argued that donors interested in improving justice and security provision in fragile contexts, need to incorporate these non-state actors in their programmes (Scheye 2009).

Other scholars have explored the role played by local responses to urban insecurity and violence in the development of national security promotion efforts. For example Muggah and Colleta's analysis of a wide range of urban security promotion activities undertaken in Sudan, Haiti, EL Salvador, Brazil, Venezuela and Colombia, such as community security mechanisms, at risk youth and gang programmes and urban renewal and population health programmes (Colletta and Muggah 2009), or Carranza-Franco's exploration of municipal policies in Medellin Colombia regarding reintegration of ex-combatants (Carranza-Franco 2014). These analyses suggest that security responses at city level can underpin, redefine, support, reinforce and enhance national security promotion efforts, such as Demobilisation and Reintegration programmes (DDR) and Security Sector Reforms (SSR).

Compared with policy-oriented analyses, state-centred analyses provide a more complex understanding of what urban security entails in contexts of fragility. They draw our attention to the impact security provision has beyond violence indicators and crime rates and on state-society relations. Within these analyses the provision of urban security is studied as a key determinant of state stability and as a means to advance state-building

processes. This is an important contribution given the proven impact security provision has on the state's capacity to deliver other services and on the rule of law, law enforcement and good governance; however this state focus also entails some limitations.

On the one hand state-centred analyses of security have led to functionalist notions of security provision in which security policies and institutions are regarded simply as tools meant to allow the state to accomplish two main ideal attributes: legitimacy and capacity to exert monopoly of violence within a given territory. Security provision is in consequence studied as the process of achieving the control and centralisation of the means of coercion, and as a set of strategies used to deal with actors competing with the state for legitimacy (for example Pion-Berlin and Trinkunas 2011). This minimalist and instrumental notion of security impedes us from seeing security provision as a result and as a reproducer of much more complex social dynamics and of relations and structures of power with a given society.

On the other hand, the degree to which states achieve the ideal attributes inspired by Weber's definition of the state, has served to measure the success or failure of state building processes across the south (Muller 2012:15). As critics of the 'state fragility framework' suggest, the notion of state failure and fragility uses western democracies as a point of reference in the analysis and this limits our capacity to comprehend existing state configurations and social processes in the global South on their own merit (Muller 2012; Zurcher 2007). It also contributes to the reification of the state as a 'universal a priori predicate to our social existence rather than a product of our social existence' (Bratsis 2006:9³⁰) by ignoring the historicity and particularity of state formation processes and democratic consolidation in the west. By comparing the south to the supposedly ideal state model in the north, the fragility literature has as a result produced a very prescriptive agenda for state-building orientated interventions and promoted notions of 'good governance' and 'effective sovereignty' based on the western state of the 20th century, that also limits our understanding of what security provision

³⁰ cited in Muller 2012

means and entails in alternative forms of social, economic, cultural and political organisation in the global South and under the impact of globalisation (Clunan and Trinkunas 2010:18).

Because they tend to overlook the way security provision is embedded in the working of particular social orders and shaped by historical and socioeconomic processes and trajectories of state consolidation as they unfold in non western societies, state-centred analyses have limited analytical tools to explore and understand security provision in fragile cities in their own context. The importance of this criticism is highlighted by analyses of democracy and state in the context of rising violence in the global South which suggest that the chronic levels of violence that have been catalogued as a failure of democracy or a failure of the state in Latin America for example, might be on the contrary an 'integral part of the current model of development' (Moser and McIlwaine 2014), a necessary element in the configuration of democratic governance and forms of resistance to it (Arias and Goldstein 2010) and the result of the working of the state (Muller 2012; Pearce 2010).

State-focused analyses of security provision tend to ignore security problems and forms of violence that do not seem to affect the state's ability to effectively govern territories and populations. The focus on the state risks reinforcing traditional notions of security at the expense of human centred notions that could bring into the debate the different ways in which people experience (in)security on the ground and how they develop strategies and articulate responses to overcome contexts of insecurity (Luckham and Kirk 2012).

Finally, state-centred analyses of security provision seem unable to grasp the social, political and economic realities in which insecurities are inscribed (Abello Colak & Pearce 2009, Luckham 2009) and the complex interactions between state and non-state actors as they evolve in the global South. In this regard an expanding body of literature focusing on hybridity in security provision (Willems 2015; Luckham and Kirk 2012; Boege et al 2008; Abrahamsen and Williams 2009) has called for more empirical research on

hybrid security arrangements. This is relevant to the study of security provision in urban contexts. It could help us understand the wide range of interactions and negotiations that take place among formal and informal actors for the daily provision of security and welfare in the global South, and the overlap and complex interactions between 'traditional, personal, kin-based or clientelistic logics with modern, imported or rational actor logics' in governance processes (Luckham and Kirk 2012:13).

Critical Analyses of Urban Security and Neoliberalism

A limited number of academics have explored security provision in the context of social and economic dynamics unleashed by neoliberal urban development in the global South (Freeman 2012; Humphrey 2013; O'Neill and Thomas 2011; Samara 2010; Jensen 2010; Campesi 2010; Orjuela 2010; Kairos 2012; Muller 2012). Their analyses are representative of a critical approach to the study of urban security which takes into account contemporary forms of neoliberalism and their impact on state and popular responses to security problems.

Neoliberalism as an economic and political project has been shaping cities in the global North and South since the 1980s. The implementation of neoliberal economic policies for example has reduced state intervention in a wide range of areas and restructured urban economies³¹. It has also led to the adaptation of urban space to the needs of global capital. Neoliberal discourses and practices are characterised, according to Harvey, by their ideological commitment to pursuing 'human well-being...by liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills' (Harvey 2005:2). However through processes of deregulation, privatization and commodification, neoliberal capitalist globalization has accentuated levels of inequality and exclusion, creating contemporary 'cities of extremes' (Bayat and Bierkart 2009). In these cities the better off seek shelter in gated communities while the urban poor are pushed to live in areas where prices of land are cheaper and police control tighter. In what are seen today as neoliberal cities of the global South, privatization has also created disparities in citizens' access to

³¹ By producing shifts from manufacturing to services

a wide range of services and accentuated processes of informalisation. Driven by neoliberal logics, these types of processes have been recognised as having a profound impact on the way security is provided and on the meaning of urban security itself.

Some analysts suggest for example that neoliberalism has contributed to the configuration of forms of security provision that ignore structural causes of insecurity and emphasise the individual responsibility of those who commit crimes. This contributes to legitimising the use of punitive solutions to security problems, including hard fisted measures, military interventions and in some cases, even social cleaning campaigns and lynching. As Muller argues for the case of Mexico City (Muller 2013), the consequences of such responses to urban insecurity involve the criminalisation of poverty and the configuration of a neoliberal form of penal state which responds to crime, insecurity and violence through the punitive government of urban marginality.

Critical analyses of urban security in the global South have argued that neoliberal urban development has reduced security to the protection of economic growth and to the preservation of capital accumulation processes. This is the case because the advance of neoliberalism is often accompanied by the framing of crime as a threat to market lead growth and of the poor as dangerous and threatening for the city's economic development and its social stability. This leads to the implementation of different forms of security provision in affluent areas and in marginalised areas. Widening gaps in the provision of services among sectors of the population are also evident in cities where renewal plans undertaken by mixed coalitions of public actors and private investors seek to create business districts and strategic areas to attract tourism and revitalise local economies. The creation of such neoliberal enclaves often produce the physical, material and subjective exclusion of certain groups who cannot be consumers or who are regarded as threatening or undesirable. Veliz and O'Neill (2011) provide evidence of such processes of exclusion in Guatemala City, where informal vendors faced forced removal from the historic city centre due to renewal projects aiming at increasing security and promoting economic development in the

city. The exclusion from the city centre not only affected street vendors, but also their working class clients who depended on the informal economy.

By recognizing the way economic processes affect the identification of security threats and the design and implementation of security strategies; these critical analyses open security research to new dimensions. Analyses within this analytical approach highlight the way security discourses and practices influenced by the advance of neoliberalism impact on the nature of citizenship and on parameters of social and economic inclusion. For example, through the construction of categories of dangerous citizens, or what O'Neill and Thomas (2011) call the 'anticitizens of a neoliberal social order', security policies produce and justify the privatisation of public space. This often occurs through the implementation of safety programmes and particular forms of policing (Jensen 2010). As an example, urban regeneration efforts in Cape Town and the security policies and 'clean up strategies' accompanying it have produced the exclusion of homeless youth (Van Blerk 2013) and the displacement of marginalised young black people (Samara 2011) from the city's streets.

These contributions highlight the importance of studying security provision empirically and in relation to particular power relations, hierarchies and socio-economic processes that shape cities in the global South. As security provision is studied in the context of processes and dynamics as they unfold in the urban South, opportunities appear to recognise that security governance can reciprocally have an impact on the power relations and on socioeconomic and political processes that shape it. In this regard Mitchell's analysis of state practices, broken windows policing and zero tolerance narratives in Iraq, shows us for example that security provision can have profound impacts beyond indicators of violence and insecurity. Policing practices in this case helped to produce new forms of governance and opened 'ungoverned' spaces and populations to market forces, facilitating the entrenchment of neoliberal practices such as privatisation entrepreneurialism and responsabilization (Mitchell 2010).

These critical analyses of responses and discourses of security governance in cities of the global South, have made a great contribution to our understanding of the way institutional, economic, cultural and social processes associated to the expansion of neoliberalism have greatly influenced urban security. However they are also confronted with some limitations. These analyses tend to lead to linear and over deterministic explanations of processes of social change where the only recognised shaping force is the expansion of neoliberalism and the market society. This ends in simplistic analyses that do not account for other non-neoliberal forces, factors and processes involved in the configuration of urban realities. By only focusing on the forces unleashed by the urbanisation of capital and the market, analyses of changes in responses to urban violence in this cluster, end up ignoring the role of contingency and also the complex processes by which many social and political actors influence the configuration of urban security in these contexts.

This criticism is particularly relevant for the analysis of contemporary forms of urban security which combine coercive strategies, preventive programmes and efforts to integrate marginalised sectors of the population to the city proper. These comprehensive responses seem to be associated to changing attitudes and practices by a wide range of institutional, social and economic actors with different interests, objectives and agendas, but also to long standing demands of inclusion by local communities, which have been made more visible and influential through processes of democratisation.

An analytical approach circumscribed to neoliberal processes risks ignoring the influence of processes of resistance that always accompany the advance of neoliberalism, as well as the role played by agency (Caldeira 2009). Contemporary responses to urban violence in fragile cities signal the appearance of new ways of engagement with the poor and marginalised sectors of society; these might be shaped by neoliberal forces but also by local and community processes that are often underestimated. Local forms of contestation and resistance influence state responses, because governmental intervention are dialectic processes shaped by quotidian practices (Perez Fernandez 2010:55) and not only by global discourses and

practices. I argue that taking into account local forms of resistance in the analysis of urban security responses, can thus help us avoid oversimplifications or generalisations over the way neoliberal forces are shaping security governance in the global South.

Addressing Limitations in Existing Analytical Approaches and Filling Some Gaps in the Urban Security Literature

From the previous analysis of the contributions and limitations of predominant analytical approaches to the study of urban security in the global South, three main vacuums in the emerging literature of urban security stand out: i) we know very little about the way power works and flows through the security provision process; this is due to the lack of engagement with issues of power beyond the role of politics and political actors; ii) absence of explorations of economic, social and institutional processes that affect the configuration of security responses which take into account, but are not only restricted, to the influence of neoliberalism; and iii) the lack of empirical explorations of the realities and experiences of security provision on the ground, from the perspective of those who are targeted by security responses. I argue that until these dimensions are brought in to the study of urban security, our understanding of contemporary initiatives to contain, manage or prevent violence and insecurity is incomplete.

Existing analytical approaches to urban security in the global South have not engaged with the question of how notions of security and insecurity are constructed and continually reimagined, and what the implications of this process are for security provision. As critical security thinkers have argued since the late 1990s, both security and insecurity are socially constructed³² through processes that reflect and respond to power structures in our societies³³ (Tickner 1995; Booth 2005, 2007; Wyn Jones 1999; Buzan 2007). Through analyses of traditional concepts and methodologies in security

³² the Copenhagen School and other critical security thinkers for example, have pointed out how securitization processes allow social actors to portray certain issues as a threat and to legitimise a wide range of security and military actions do deal with them.

³³ Uncovering the political dimensions of security has been a key priority for critical security thinkers since the late 1990s.

studies for example, critical security thinkers have challenged the assumed objectivity of security ideas and practices, demonstrating that security studies is not an apolitical form of expert knowledge on how to tackle threats.

The question of how problems of urban violence, crime, urban fragility and instability are understood in historical and geographically specific moments is crucial to be able to understand the working of power, rather than the working of politics and the role of political actors, within security provision. As security problems are defined by authorities and experts, these problems become governmental categories, or issues that demand governmental intervention and action. The process of defining security problems in consequence has profound implications for the way authorities design responses to them and for how these are implemented and assessed. It defines for example whether security problems are seen as an issue requiring military and police action, or interventions that involve other fields of social governance, such as urban planning, community development and social welfare, etc.

It is only when we question the formulations of the problems and the presuppositions about their nature and causes and also how certain groups are seen in relation to those problems, that we can recognise security provision as constitutive of forms of government; as a process by which power is exercised in a particular way and for particular purposes. This leads to questions regarding the working of power which remain underexplored within predominant analytical approaches. For example how are urban violence and instability being governed in a particular context? What are the imaginaries that lead those in power to choose particular strategies? How are those imaginaries influenced by neoliberal and non-neoliberal fostered processes and by political, economic, social and cultural changes? How do particular understandings of urban problems lead to different forms of controlling, managing or preventing violence? And what implications these have for the kind of security that gets delivered on the ground?

Within current analytical approaches of urban security in the global South, security tends not to be regarded as a contested object of analysis and this

facilitates neglecting this type of questions (an exception is Rodgers 2006³⁴). However, security responses have important governmental implications as it has been demonstrated by criminological studies in the north (for example Stenson 2008). They are results and reproducers of socio-political relations of power and not only technical processes of containing violence and strengthening the state, or consequences of the urbanisation of capital. Security practices are the result of political processes and lead to particular ways of exercising power in our societies. They also impact on social relations and political orders (Nunes 2012).

In order to overcome these limitations we need analytical approaches that enable a more comprehensive understanding of how power is embedded in the provision of security and affects the way security gets delivered in different contexts. An analysis of urban security which takes into account power dynamics provides a better understanding of the way power works through security responses to achieve certain goals, the way this power is legitimised and how people become subjects of it when they are beneficiaries, or not, of security policies.

Security provision involves the definition of what is to be secured, against whom, for what purposes and by which means; in that way security also implicates particular conceptions of self and others and produces identities (Hultin 2010). As feminist contributions to security thinking in international relations have already highlighted, security discourses and practices, contribute to the crafting of identities and subjectivities (Stern and Wibben ND). Being able to explore the way security responses help construct particular subjectivities is ever more important in contexts of marginalization and exclusion, such as the ones that characterise the urban existence of millions of residents of cities in the global South. As certain sectors of the population are associated with urban violence and instability as victims, or

³⁴ Rodgers' analysis of state responses to violence in Metropolitan Managua in the late 20th and early 21st century shows how the elite-captured Nicaraguan State used 'biopolitical forms of governmentality' and states of exception to build a protected exclusionary 'fortified network' across the city for the elites, while offering security in the form of violent raids and state interventions characterised by arbitrary power, for the poor (Rodgers 2006).

perpetrators, or at risk groups; security responses shape the way these groups are being governed by the state. Analyses of urban security in fragile urban contexts need in consequence, to be better attuned to the way security impacts not only on living conditions, but also on experiences of citizenship among different sectors of populations.

As illustrated by the previous analysis, predominant analytical approaches to urban security do not particular engage with empirical explorations of what kind of security gets delivered on the ground, from the perspective of those who are targeted by security initiatives and programmes. Urban security research and thinking continue to be developed within policy focused, state-centred and top-down approaches which lack methodological tools suitable to explore security as it is daily experienced at the grass root levels.

Making use of qualitative methodologies, ethnographic fieldwork and participatory research methods, scholars from different disciplines in the social sciences have made important contributions to our understanding of the way violence and insecurity are daily experienced (for example, Auyero et al 2015; Moser and McIlwaine 2004; Hume 2009; Orjuela 2010). Urban security research can benefit greatly from these contributions and from dialogue among disciplines which value empirical explorations of peoples' experiences, especially those who are more affected by insecurity and violence.

The emerging field of urban security and security thinking in general, need methodological innovation in order to get closer and grasp local realities (Hönke and Muller 2012; Lemanski 2012; Orjuela 2010; Ackerly et al 2006; Abello Colak and Pearce 2009, 2015)³⁵. Recognising the voices and experiences of those who are increasingly subject to different forms of security provision in the global South, not only provides a better understanding of what kind of security is being produced in different contexts, but it also contributes to produce knowledge that is relevant to

³⁵ Some methodological innovations have been made within critical security thinking with scholars' turning to ethnography, discourse analysis and analyses of fields of practice, of the body and of objects in their explorations of security (Salter and Mutlu 2013).

policy design (Abello Colak and Pearce 2015). In this regard the use of interpretative ethnography is particularly relevant. As Hönke and Muller (2012) suggest, it certainly allows security studies to overcome the limitations emanating from the almost exclusive use of statistical surveys, 'abstract formal models' and secondary data.

Conclusion

This chapter offered a critical review of current public responses to urban insecurity in the global South and especially of the way these tend to be studied within the emerging field of urban security. It highlighted the need for an alternative and critical approach to security research, and showed that dominant analytical approaches to the study of urban security, especially in fragile cities of the global South, have concentrated on the relationship between security provision and state-building processes, on security institutions and policy performance, and on neoliberal processes as determinant of contemporary security governance. These are important contributions. However, within dominant analytical approaches, the role of power and the way it is exercised on different subjects remains neglected. As a result, mainstream urban security thinking is unable to engage empirically with the flow and workings of power through the process of providing security. This limits our understanding of the way security provision is shaped not only by powerful actors and their interests and agendas, but also by their understanding of what power is for and how they use it to govern certain populations.

By highlighting the strengths and limitations of policy-oriented, state-centred and neoliberal-concerned analyses of security, this chapter suggests that a new approach that re-focuses on power and that resorts to alternative methods of exploration can be better equipped to fill important gaps in our current understanding of security provision in the global South, especially regarding the implications of the exercise of power on the lives of people. This is important given the growing interest in and emphasis on improving security management in cities experiencing chronic levels of violence and insecurity. While security policies' impact and results are increasingly assessed against a number of measurable indicators, the profound impact

that security provision has on the meaning of citizenship itself and on the type of state-society relations that are in the process of configuration in the global South remain unexplored.

Dominant analytical approaches, as the chapter suggested, are unable to capture important aspects of security provision, partly due to methodological choices. Mainstream security research is not concerned with understanding security provision as it is experienced on the ground, especially by the most vulnerable. Articulating an alternative analytical approach is, in consequence, key to moving the academic and the policy debates on security forward. To move urban security thinking beyond the state, policy assessments and the boundaries of neoliberal processes, new conceptual and methodological tools are needed. In the next chapter, I suggested a new way of exploring security provision which aims at filling these gaps and enabling a better understanding of how security provision is crafted, delivered and experienced in the most insecure contexts.

Chapter 2

Developing an Alternative Critical Approach: Governmentality as a Lens to Theorise Security Provision in Fragile Cities

Introduction

In this chapter I present an alternative approach to study urban security which could be applied to different urban contexts. The approach aims to overcome the limitations of existing frameworks within the urban security literature in grasping the interface between security provision and governing processes in fragile cities. In this chapter, I suggest that Foucault's work on power, and, in particular, his notion of governmentality offers analytical and conceptual tools that enable the exploration of the governmental consequences of security provision in fragile cities. I also argue that it is necessary to undertake empirical explorations of the kind of security provision that gets delivered on the ground and suggest the use of ethnographic informed methodologies in order to do it from the perspective of those who are most vulnerable to urban violence and insecurity. The chapter begins with an overview of Foucault's work and of what is known as the 'governmentality approach'. It then analyses what the use of governmentality as a lens offers in the study of urban security. The chapter finally describes the analytical approach that I develop based on Foucault's contributions and how it was used to research the case of Medellin.

Foucault's work on Governmentality

In his Lectures on Security, Territory and Population at the Collège de France (1977-1978) Foucault analysed some of the problems and processes that arose with the emergence of towns in Europe in the early modern period, such as the planning of spatial distributions, scarcity of grain, and contagion and risk of small pox epidemics (Foucault 2007). He centred his analysis on the general frameworks that were used to think about these urban problems and the actions and techniques used to deal with them in this particular context. These lectures were a continuation of Foucault's interest on historical and empirical studies of power relations in the west and

in particular, on the complex processes and techniques involved in the management of European society.

Foucault's work and especially his 'governmentality lectures', as they are commonly known, have been especially influential in at least two ways. On one hand, they provided a new perspective on state building processes and shed new light on the workings of economic liberalism in Europe. And, on the other hand, they laid out the foundations for an innovative approach for the study of power, government and authority, which as Saar argues, should 'not be read as a radical refutation or replacement of intellectual political history, but as a radical methodological challenge to it'(Saar 2011:6).

Foucault's notion of governmentality, which he used in his later works to describe the way of thinking about and exercising power that emerged in Europe in the late 18th century in response to 'specific economic and political problems posed by the expansion of urban areas in Europe' (Foucault 2007:98-110) constitutes a key contribution to the study of government. This new 'art of government' which Foucault saw as a 'major mutation...in the history of human societies' (Foucault 2007:64), constituted a way of regulating society that was different from the ones used during medieval times and during most of the early modern period. Governmentality in the late 18th century focused on governing populations, not on exercising power or imposing laws on subjects of the state as a way of guaranteeing the sovereign's control over the territory, as it was the case during medieval times. It also involved the use of what Foucault called 'apparatuses of security' to govern populations. These apparatuses included not only armies and police forces but also health, welfare and education systems, and differed from the disciplining techniques prevalent during the 17th century which focused on shaping the conduct of people in schools, workhouses, armies and hospitals. The main objective of governing populations in this way was to ensure the optimal functioning of economic and social processes and constituted the birth of '**biopolitics**' or 'power over life' (Foucault 2007:369) which Foucault recognised as a key factor in the formation of the modern European state.

In Foucault's words, this new rationality of government -or governmentality, was the 'ensemble formed by institutions, procedures, analyses and reflections, calculations and tactics that allow the exercise of this very specific and complex power that has the population as its target, political economy as its major form of knowledge and apparatuses of security as its essential technical instruments' (Foucault 2007:108-9). This definition highlights the importance Foucault ascribed to theoretical and discursive articulations and to forms of knowledge in the configuration of forms of political and social government. It also shows his relational notion of power which focuses on processes by which power is exercised on individuals. Foucault's notion of governmentality became the foundation for a compelling analytical framework used and developed by a wide range of scholars across various disciplines. As it will be argued below this framework offers advantage points for undertaking security research and in particular, for studying the sort of security interventions that are being implemented in cities of the global South to arrest chronic levels of insecurity and violence.

Governmentality as an Analytical Approach

Since the late 1970s 'governmentality' has been developing as an analytical framework used by those interested in the multiple ways in which power is exercised in our societies. Governmentality can be understood as a set of analytical tools, rather than a theory (Walters 2012). Inspired by Foucault's methodological strategy of studying power through an observation of its rationalities, techniques, programmes and knowledge fields; political scientists, sociologists, philosophers, social workers, anthropologists and criminologists have used governmentality as a lens to analyse a wide range of socio-political phenomena in the context of changing economic and social relations and political structures in the global North. Their work encompasses what is now known today as governmentality studies. Under this umbrella a wide range of issues have been studied, such as public policy, statehood, citizenship, education, welfare policies, community safety and crime control, among others.

Governmentality has become a useful approach to study relations of power and government practices in contemporary societies at different levels. The

approach departs from the assertion that government, is an attempt to shape, regulate or control human conduct undertaken by multiple actors (authorities and agencies) using different techniques and forms of knowledge in the search of particular ends (Bröckling et al 2011; Burchell et al 1991; Dean 2010). Whether power is exercised on individuals, groups, populations, a corporation or ourselves, it is guided by a rationality, or a 'form of thinking which strives to be relatively clear, systematic and explicit about (...) how things are or how they ought to be' (Dean 2010:18-9). A rationality in other words is a system of thinking that defines who can govern; what governing is; what or who is governed and for what purposes.

Those who use the governmentality analytical framework assume that it is possible to empirically study rationalities to make them intelligible by looking at the working of the technologies that make government possible, of programmes or plans that guide interventions according to particular objectives, and of the identities that are used and produced by a particular rationality. Along these lines, governmentality can be understood as the study of rationalities of government, or the study of how in a particular context and moment in history, authorities and those involved in practices of government have reasoned or thought about, calculated and responded in a more or less systematic way to a particular problem (Dean 2010:24).

Rationalities give rise to and are underpinned by discourses and forms of knowledge or expertise. Governmentality studies are, as a result, concerned with uncovering the way institutional practices and programmes are based on theories, concepts and ideas emerging from fields of expertise -such as economics, geopolitics, psychology, epidemiology, etc. By revealing how particular forms of knowledge provide those involved in governing with discursive and material tools to construct taken for granted truths regarding who needs to be governed, how and for what purposes; the governmentality framework helps to uncover the way knowledge supports the exercise of power.

In any given society there are multiple rationalities at work guiding the way we are governed and the way we govern ourselves. These rationalities can

intersect, compete with or support each other. Moreover they require different institutions that together make institutional systems, such as the justice, criminal or health system, to work in a joint manner. However the focus of the governmentality approach is not on the working of such systems or of particular institutions, but on the rationale guiding their practices, programs and responses to specific problems. And also on how rationalities change or are maintained under certain circumstances. In order to unpack the rationalities behind practices of government, it is key to examine their elements, to understand the processes and relations that they rely on, to identify the particular forms of knowledge that assemble their elements together, and to analyse the characteristics of the institutions, techniques and mechanisms they use to achieve specific goals.

This approach is also concerned with exploring what happens when a rationality or way of governing is exercised in the search of constructing a particular type of society or community. For example it is of special interest for those using the governmentality approach, to analyse what identities and subjectivities are formed in the process for governing. Rationalities not only presume particular attributes and capacities on those who govern (politicians, bureaucrats, professionals, police officers), but also problematisations of certain aspects of the conduct of those to be governed and seen as in need of being regulated, controlled or shaped (workers, pupils, criminals) (Dean 2010).

Governmentality as an analytical approach suggests a methodological challenge to traditional studies of power and government practices, which tend to focus on the functioning of institutions or on the legitimacy of those who exercise power and authority. Inspired by Foucault's approach to historical analysis (Foucault 1972, 1994, 2007, 2008), the governmentality approach proposes an exploration of the genealogy of relations of power. In other words, governmentality enables analysts to undertake what Dean calls a critical genealogy of our present (Dean 2010). Among the potential advantages of using this approach are the possibility of (i) undertaking critical analyses of power, (ii) acknowledging the complexity immanent in social and political phenomena, (iii) recognising points of resistance to the exercise of

power and (iv) exploring the form and consequences of governing processes at different levels of analysis.

The critical edge of the governmentality analytical framework derives from the possibility of revealing taken for granted ways of thinking about and doing things. By unpacking the assumptions and discourses that underpin governing processes, analysts using this approach can not only reveal the limits and implications of such ways of governing, but also question whether there might be alternative ways of framing and acting upon the social phenomena being targeted by governing processes. Governmentality also provides tools to uncover the dissonance between the stated objectives of programmes, policies and interventions and the governing logic.

The governmentality approach is informed by two related analytical tools used by Foucault for the examination of ways of governing societies, which can be applied to different levels of analysis. The first one is what he called 'eventalization' and the second is the 'multiplication of analytical 'salients'' (Foucault 1994:226-7). The first tool refers to the process of treating as an 'event' ways of governing that might otherwise be regarded as expected and evident. Eventalization is the process of making visible the singularity of ways of thinking and acting that are assumed as natural or that tend to be regarded as 'a historical constant, an immediate anthropological trait, or an obviousness' (Foucault 1991:226). Foucault provides examples of how 'eventalization' allowed him to 'breach' the tendency in historical and political analysis to assume self-evidences, by showing that the fact that 'mad people came to be regarded as mentally ill (...), or that the only thing to be done with a criminal was to lock him up (...), or that the causes of illness were to be sought through the individual examination of bodies' was not self-evident (ibid). By questioning the self-evidence of things that support our knowledge and practices and by 'rediscovering the connections, encounters, supports, blockages, plays of forces, strategies, and so on, that at a given moment establish what subsequently counts as being self-evident, universal and necessary', this analytical tool enables the critical potential of the governmentality approach.

The second tool used by Foucault refers to the process of 'analysing an event according to the multiple processes that constitute it' (Foucault 1994:227) and further breaking down those processes. This progressive method of breaking down the 'event' under investigation into the processes that constitute it is what Foucault calls the multiplication of analytical 'salients', as if the analyst was building a 'polyhedron'. This process is intended to help make the elements that are brought together, the relations and the domains of reference that are involved in a particular 'event' (ibid 228) visible. Foucault saw this analytical way of exploring governing processes as critical for questioning the inevitability that is commonly ascribed to and assumed of socio-political phenomena. This analytical strategy is also useful to grasp the complex interconnection of factors shaping power relations in a particular moment and context.

This approach helps to construct a more complex picture of what activities like educating, managing, punishing, protecting, governing or providing security might actually entail in contemporary societies. This is the case because it shifts the attention away from the workings of particular institutions involved in governing processes and their stated functions and focuses instead on the assemblage of procedures, analyses, fields of practices, knowledges, institutions, calculations and techniques involved in the exercise of power. It is through this type of analytical focus that governmentality as an approach also allows us to recognise different forms of power and how they might be used in the pursuit of different objectives. Based on Foucault's analysis of conceptions and practices of government in Europe, the governmentality approach has helped scholars distinguish between sovereign and bio-political power for example. While the first one is the repressive, prohibitive and disciplining form of power traditionally exercised by rulers over subjects' life, the second is the form of power that is exercised on and through the administration of processes that are seen as vital for the life of populations. According to Foucault bio-power is a form of power concerned with the administration of the way the population live which has been exercised since the eighteenth century; this means administrating the social, cultural, environmental and economic conditions under which

humans live and die (Foucault 2008; Dean 2010:119). Bio-political interventions target the living and working conditions, lifestyle, urban environment, housing and health and education levels of different populations.

An additional advantage of using the governmentality lens for the study of processes by which power is exercised, is that it does not circumscribe the analysis to the strategies of those who govern, but it also prompts the identification of those moments and forms by which the governed resist power, as it is exercised on them. Foucault's notion of resistance suggests that resistance is connected with the processes of subjectification produced by power (Foucault 1980). As power is exercised it constructs particular forms of subjectivity, it creates for example disciplined, rational and productive subjects, but in response to the imposition of such particular forms of subjectivity there is always some resistance (Pickett 1996). In consequence as Dean highlights, the analysis of governmentality is inseparable from analysis of corresponding forms of **resistance** or counter-conducts (Dean 2010).

The governmentality approach offers an alternative set of tools that can be used to explore security provision in different contexts. In the next sections I analyse some of the advantages and implications of using this framework to pursue security research and thinking. I also provide details of how it is used in this thesis to articulate an alternative critical approach which helps to fill existing gaps in our knowledge about security responses implemented in response to chronic levels of violence and instability in cities of the global South.

Governmentality as a Lens to the Study of Urban Security

Given the global patterns of urbanisation and insecurity, the study of security provision requires approaches that can work at different levels of analysis; including the urban local level. The governmentality approach is suitable for carrying out empirical studies of security at multiple sites, including at local and community levels. Anthropologists, criminologists, political scientists and social workers for example, have used analytical and conceptual tools from

the governmentality approach to explore social ordering practices and processes in modern cities of the North. Their analyses have uncovered important shifts in local governance and community safety (Stenson 2008 for example) and the emergence of 'spatial forms of governmentality' in these cities (Perry 2000; Engle 2001). This form of governmentality was found to target spaces rather than persons and to focus on excluding dangerous or undesired behaviours and regulating access to particular spaces in order to create urban areas that appear safe³⁶.

The use of the governmentality approach to investigate security responses in the global South is however very limited, although few scholars from different disciplines have confirmed its usefulness to unpack different forms of regulation in urban contexts. For instance Rodgers' analysis of governmentality in Nicaragua revealed the nature and logic of state violence and social ordering at the urban level (Rodgers 2006). Others have used this approach to unpack the role of religion in governance and social order in urban Brazil (Garmany 2010), and the effects of new technologies, such as surveillance cameras, used to govern urban populations (Kanashiro 2008). These studies confirm the suitability of the governmentality approach to undertake analyses of governing processes and responses to insecurity and violence in southern urban areas.

As argued in the previous chapter urban security studies require the use of analytical approaches that do not neglect issues of power, but that on the contrary are able to provide tools to better understand the way insecurity factors and security governance are embedded in particular social, political and economic processes and shaped by power relations. The governmentality approach enables studies of (in)security that uncover the political dimensions of security provision. Through the notion of governmentality security policies can be studied not as pseudo technical responses to violence, crime and insecurity; but as components of

³⁶ Scholars have associated the use of architectural design and security devices which are used for the regulation of urban spaces (Shields 1989) and changes in policing techniques for the management of risk (Ericson and Haggerty 1997) to the emergence of spatial forms of governmentality, especially but not exclusively in cities in the north.

assemblages of government in our societies. This approach highlights the fact that security policies play a key role in the daily exercise of power as part of the authorities' attempt to reduce criminality and urban violence. Security responses imply the use of techniques that aim at controlling or shaping the conduct of a wide range of actors (potential or actual criminals, communities, particular groups, victims, etc.) and in the process they shape their subjectivities and identities.

As discussed in the previous chapter, studies of security provision in fragile cities have tended to reduce security provision to a functional process of containing or preventing violence or dealing with security threats. Analyses of security provision in the global South have also focused on the state's institutional capacities and performance as a way to explore the limitations or potentialities of security responses. By using governmentality as an analytical framework it is possible to look beyond institutional issues to include the role of power relations in the analysis. Hence, governmentality offers the opportunity to answer the question of how are violence and instability being governed in a particular urban context.

Using the governmentality approach to study security provision in fragile cities enables us to use our reflexive capacity not to evaluate the positive or negative aspects of security policies or the working of state security institutions, but to better understand how power relations shape security provision and how power is exercised through the implementation of security policies; on whom, through which instruments, for what purposes and under which assumptions. It also helps us uncover the role that security provision plays in the exercise of power in society and to make more the rationality of broader processes of governing cities in the global South more intelligible.

Another important contribution of the use of the governmentality approach for the study of security provision in the global South is the fact that it calls into question the role played by knowledge production in the configuration of particular responses to insecurity and violence. As Foucault argued, forms of knowledge can affect modes of exercising political power because they define the objectives that must be attained in the process of governing

populations and also the way to achieve them. In other words, fields of knowledge help to define who and what is to be governed and how they must be governed. His analysis showed for example how the enlargement and increased scope of a new science of the state known as 'statistics' and of political economy as a field of expertise, played a key role in the configuration of new forms of governing the population in Europe (Foucault 2007). By the same token, governmentality can help security analysts to question the forms of knowledge that are implicated in exercising authority through security policies and programmes and to analyse how particular fields of knowledge affect the visibility and framing of certain issues and actors within urban security agendas.

It is important to bear in mind that the relation between knowledge and governing processes is often reciprocal. As Dean suggests, the problems raised by government practices can also give rise to theoretical and expert knowledges that are in turn used to refine such practices (Dean 2010). This is relevant to the recent expansion of expert fields such as crime and violence prevention and military urbanism, which has accompanied the increase in levels of violence in some urban areas in the global South. These expert knowledges are not only prompted and reproduced by the limitations of the existing security arrangements in such contexts, but they also help to shape forms of governing especially in fragile cities.

This thesis argues that governmentality contains analytical tools that help us unpack the theoretical, conceptual and discursive articulations within contemporary responses to urban security problems. This framework helps to respond questions such as: How are security problems defined, and the areas and strategies for intervention identified? Which actors (whether civil, private, institutional, community, local, national or international) shape security agendas and practices in a particular context and which actors are ignored? What forms of knowledge and expertises are involved in the implementation of urban security policies? How are particular ways of understanding urban violence and fragility translated into techniques for addressing these problems?

Using governmentality as an analytical lens, we can explore how security problems are constantly re-imagined and re-constituted as fields for action. Also how historically and geographically specific understandings of security and insecurity lead authorities to govern in different ways and in relation to different objectives. I argue that this type of analysis can reveal important insights regarding the way states are attempting to consolidate their authority in the global South.

Security Provision and State Building through the Governmentality Lens

As analysed in the previous chapter, the consolidation of the state is a major concern within studies of security provision in the global South. A predominant analytical approach within the urban security literature regards security provision as a determinant of the state's capacity to achieve its key core functions: legitimacy, monopoly of violence and territorial control. I argue that this type of approach limits our understanding of the particularities of state configurations in the global South and that governmentality provides conceptual tools that enable analyses of urban security in relation to the state from a better perspective.

Through the governmentality lens, security provision is considered part of the assemblages of power, or part of the processes by which power and authority are exercised. This means that we can study security policies not as effective or ineffective instruments used to achieve an ideal type of state, but as integral parts of rationalities of government that are specific to a particular moment in history and unique to empirical realities. The unpacking and understanding of those rationalities allows us to reveal key aspects of state building and state consolidation processes in particular contexts.

Analyses inspired by Foucault's work do not neglect the issue of the state; however they depart from examinations of the microphysics of power and not from the state itself. Foucault suggested that the study of power should begin from below, by exploring the mechanisms and the specific forms of exercising power as they take place in different institutional sites and then move upwards through the analysis to explore whether these forms are

linked to the production of broader societal configurations (Foucault 2007, 1994). Governmentality thus opens an opportunity for innovation in security thinking by first examining the working of power relations and governing processes as they take place at locally, and from there moving upwards to analyses of statehood in particular contexts.

The governmentality approach does not imply or impose a particular view on how authority should be exercised, or on how security should be delivered, because it is not founded on a static or normative notion of state. On the contrary, the governmentality concept was used by Foucault to denote that states are 'ever-changing formation(s)', that they are not an 'eternal identity' but the 'mobile effect of a regime of multiple governmentalities' (Foucault 2007:382; Foucault 2008:77). From a Foucauldian perspective, the state's nature, attributes, organisation and activities are shaped by continuous reconfigurations of forms of exercising power through a multiplicity of "institutions, procedures, analyses and reflections, calculations, and tactics" (Foucault 2007:108) which are guided by governmental rationalities. With this perspective Foucault challenged the traditional focus of state analyses that looked at its functions and institutions and refocused the analysis on how relations of power are formed, developed, multiplied and transformed by multiple processes creating different types of state forms.

The Foucauldian state notion allows us to overcome the limitations of prevalent definitions that regard the state as a unified and primary material actor. Within traditional security studies for example, the state is often considered a unique and centralised actor capable of central decision making. However the state is not a coherent unitary actor, but a set of institutions in pursuit of multiple and often conflicting objectives. As a number of scholars have argued the state is also a mix of multiple layers of social structures embedded in power relations (Hunt and Wickham 1994). Additionally, the state it is not only defined by the materiality of its institutions, but also by institutionalised symbolic, ideological and discursive processes and by condensations of social relations (Holsti 1996:84; Muller 2012; Jessop 2001, 2008; Migdal 2001).

Governmentality studies are concerned with constructing genealogies of power. This means uncovering the rationalities that bring together and grant logic to the processes and relations that give shape to the state. By looking at the procedures and practices involved in the emergence, reproduction or demise of particular forms of exercising power in fragile cities; governmentality based analyses of security provision can provide important insights into contemporary state formations. This approach is compatible with the move towards 'processes-centred' analyses of statehood that according to a number of scholars (Muller 2012; Migdal and Schlichte 2005;14) uncover the multiple routes and processes by which states in the global South attempt to centralise and exercise authority and that do not necessarily always follow the patterns of western democracies.

In this context, one last advantage of using governmentality as an analytical lens to analyse security practices in fragile cities of the global South, is that it offers the opportunity not only to unpack the complex relation between security provision and ongoing processes of state building in the global South, but also to drive our understanding of the nature and characteristics of state configurations there further. The possibility of researching issues of statehood from an urban perspective also represents an opportunity to expand the critical security studies agenda. As Muller suggests, these issues as well as those regarding state-society relations are rarely analysed at the urban level by security scholars (Muller 2012:25).

Constructing a Critical Approach to the Study of Urban Security

In the previous chapter I argued that predominant analytical approaches to study urban security in the global South have been unsuccessful in engaging with the way power works within security governance arrangements. Moreover they have provided a very limited overview of the economic, social and institutional processes that affect the configuration of security responses in particular contexts, by restricting the analysis to the influence of neoliberalism. I argue that the conceptual and analytical repertoire of the governmentality approach can be used to construct an alternative way of studying urban security which addresses these limitations in existing approaches.

Governmentality can be used to explore how practices of government emerge. This means that it can be used to study which processes affect ways of thinking about security problems. In addition to how authorities' understandings of urban problems may lead to particular security strategies and practices of power. Looking into these issues requires a research process focused on critically examining the way state authorities and security experts articulate and justify new forms of state intervention. Following Foucault, governmentality studies normally rely on analyses of texts and discourse analysis as a way of researching ensembles of ways of thinking and techniques of power.

As a step in the process of developing an alternative analytical approach I suggest using discourse analysis to uncover the assumptions and the way in which expert fields of knowledge and language frame the choices and practices of policy makers and security authorities. As Foucault argued, policy objectives, principles and procedures are established according to 'truth discourses' which also lead to calculations and reflections (Foucault 2007:238). In exploring discursive practices involved in the provision of security I argue that it is possible to undertake a critical analysis of urban security which takes into account the way power works and is exercised through the implementation of security responses.

I also suggest using the analytical strategies used by Foucault to try to 'rediscover the connections, encounters, supports, blockages, plays of forces, strategies' and the multiple processes that lead to new ways of responding to violence and urban fragility. By using his 'multiplication of analytical 'salients' in particular, we can move beyond generalizing critiques of neoliberalism as the only shaping force behind changes in the way authorities are responding to urban insecurity in these contexts. By looking at processes that affect the way policy makers and security experts understand and re-imagine urban insecurity in a particular context, we can recognize a wider range of social, political, institutional and economic factors that might have led to changes in security strategies.

I also highlight in the previous chapter that existing analyses have neglected empirical explorations of realities and experiences of security provision on the ground, especially from the perspective of those who are targeted by security responses. In order to be able to understand how those targeted by security policies and programmes experience them, and what kind of security is delivered on the ground through particular techniques of power, I suggest the use of methods inspired by ethnographic approaches, such as participant observation. I argue that ethnographic methodologies provide urban security researchers tools that can allow them to observe social relations and local realities in ways that deepen our understanding of the meaning and daily experiences of security provision on the ground. Through immersive research and long-term engagement with those who are at the receiving end of state security interventions in contexts of chronic violence, it is possible to access aspects of community life and personal experiences that would otherwise remain undisclosed or obscured. The focus of ethnographic fieldwork on 'listening for the unsaid, looking for the visually unmarked, sensing the unrepresented, and thus seeking for connections among parts of the obvious which locally remain unstated' (Dresch and James 2000: 23) makes it a great tool to explore security provision and its uncharted governmental consequences. The use of ethnographic informed methods can also help address valid criticisms to governmentality studies, which have been accused of becoming repetitive, too focused on the discourse analysis of programmatic texts and not sufficiently engaged with 'the real' and with 'contestation and politics' (Rose et al 2006).

Ethnographic methodologies have been more widely used in the examination of violence in fragile urban contexts in the global South (Auyero et al 2015; Hume 2009, Jaffe 2009 for example), producing important contributions to our understandings of its multiple manifestations, of complex dynamics involved in its reproduction and of how people experience it. However ethnography has been rarely used in the study of security provision in fragile urban contexts (an important and recent exception is the work of Auyero et al 2014). The advantages of using ethnography to study security are multiple, as some critical security scholars (Shepherd 2013) and anthropologists

(Goldstein 2010) have recently begun to recognise. On the one hand, ethnography allows to 'humanise the research on security by bringing people's stories and emotions in (Wilkinson 2013, Salter and Mutlu 2013) and on the other, as Goldstein argues, a critical ethnography of security can facilitate explorations of the different ways in which security is configured and deployed by a wide range of actors (states, communities, groups and individuals) and can 'reveal not only the ways in which global discourses are situated and manipulated in the face-to-face contexts of ethnography—it can transform the way security itself is conceptualized as a historical and contemporary global reality' (Goldstein 2010).

Convinced that governmentality offers its best potential, as an analytical approach to undertake critical analyses of urban security, if accompanied by a methodology which allows the combination of methods, I suggest using both critical discourse analysis and participant observation. As Hönke and Muller suggest, combining 'discourse approaches in the empirical research traditions of a Foucauldian analytics of governing with a methodological 'practice turn' that directs attention to competing rationalities of governing (in)security and to everyday forms of practice and local agency' (Hönke and Muller 2012), is one of the strategies that could help improve contemporary security studies scholarship.

The use of governmentality as a lens and the combination of critical discourse analysis and ethnographic informed methods intend to achieve a two-fold aim: to be able to build genealogies of governmental rationalities for the government of urban insecurity in different contexts, and to study their impact on those who are targeted by such governing processes. The former method serves to unpack the rationality of security policies and programmes, while participant observation can be used to unravel the impact of security provision on people, as well as forms of resistance that might emerge in response to state initiatives. I argue that this mixed approach leads to a better understanding of the interface between security provision and governing processes in particular contexts, as well as of state consolidation processes.

The critical analytical approach I suggest here to put security provision under the microscope of power dynamics and people's experiences can be used in different urban contexts by following a three step analytical process:

1. The first step is to identify political, social and economic processes that might have generated changes in the way security problems are framed and understood.
2. The second step is to analyse governmental responses to those security problems using critical discourse analysis to look at how those problems are understood and justified by authorities and how these lead to the use of particular techniques.
3. The final step is to use ethnographic methods to analyse what kind of security these understandings and techniques lead to, from the perspective of those who become subjects of state intervention.

This analytical strategy aims at enabling critical studies of security provision in fragile cities. Before I explain how I put this strategy to work in the analysis of a particular case, I need to make explicit the influence that Critical Security Studies and Peace Studies have had on my understanding of what a critical approach should aim at. The critical edge of this approach is deeply influenced by critical security studies' commitment to challenging the assumptions of traditional security thinking and to revealing the way notions, studies and practices of security are imbued with 'politics' (Booth 2005, 2007, Salter and Mutlu 2013, Shepherd 2013). It is also informed by the principles of peace studies research. Although there is no consensus regarding what a 'peace research approach' is, peace scholarship at the University of Bradford has developed under general principles. These principles have informed my analytical and methodological choices and could be seen as the source of a 'multidisciplinary approach to research, that is critical, rigorous and oriented towards practice; guided by a normative framework that intentionally seeks to generate knowledge that contributes to finding ways of action, organisation and interaction...that can make less recurrent and viable the use of violence and enable positive social change' (Abello Colak 2013:48).

Using the Critical Analytical Approach to the Study of the Medellin Case

In order to demonstrate the importance of bringing in these new dimensions to the study of urban security through an alternative analytical approach, I used the analytical strategy presented above to explore urban security in Medellin between 2002 and 2012. The recent history of security provision in Medellin presented what could be called, following Foucault, a problematization. According to Foucault there are 'domains of acts, practices and thoughts that seem (...) to pose problems for politics' and these can be examined (Foucault 1998:112). In other words, in a specific situation and context, governing can be called into question, with various actors posing the question of how to govern a particular problem (Dean 2010:38). In Medellin, at the beginning of the 21st century, national, regional and local authorities were faced with very high levels of urban violence and unrest and felt compelled to articulate new strategies to deal with insecurity and violence.

The security responses they implemented through the 2000s included the largest military intervention ever undertaken in a Colombian city, expansion of security infrastructure in city's peripheral communities, socio economic programmes targeting vulnerable groups, a DDR programme, improved delivery of basic services such as education and health, participatory forms of governance, community policing strategies, and massive infrastructural investments and large scale works. All of these targeted areas fragmentally controlled by illegal arms groups and inhabited by some of the poorest residents. In an attempt to make the city 'governable' and competitive (Alcaldia de Medellin 2004), these diverse programmes and interventions intended to allow the state regain control of historically neglected areas (Felbab-Brown 2011), address extreme poverty and inequality (Echeverri 2008; Devlin 2010) and reduce endemic levels of violence (Maclean 2015).

The implementation of these state initiatives resulted in the physical renovation of key urban spaces, in some marginalised areas as well as in other economically important areas of the city. It also coincided with an impressive reduction of homicides rates (Giraldo 2008) and with some improvements in indicators of quality of life for residents (Alcaldia de Medellin

ND). These achievements led to the international recognition of this city as a laboratory of good practices in 2009 (Alcaldia de Medellin 2008-2011). The combination of programmes and security responses implemented in this city has been presented as a model of urban development responsible for a miraculous transformation of Medellin (Maclean 2015, Bahl 2012). With the support of development agencies and donors (such as IADB, UNDP, World Bank, OAS and cooperation agencies) the city's authorities have been able to marketise what is now known as the 'Medellin Model', and to position the city globally as a test-bed for urban innovations and as model Latin American city (The Guardian 2012).

As I conduct a more detailed analysis in chapter four, the 2002 -2012 period represents indeed a turning point in the history of security provision in this city. During this period not only did the type of strategies and programmes aimed at tackling violence and insecurity in the city changed, but also a new way of understanding the problem, its causes and its effects for the economic future of the city emerged. Through the critical approach that I developed, I aimed at analyzing the configuration and effects of security discourses and practices during this period, as a way to better understand the logic of government targeting marginalized urban communities living at the periphery of the city. Through the lens of governmentality and the combination of discourse analysis and ethnographic methods, the study looked at assumptions, calculations and forms of knowledge that led to new practices, programs and tactics.

This study of urban security in Medellin focused on the transformation of strategies, calculations, objects, subjects and technologies of power, and not on an assessment of security institutions' performance, or on policy evaluation. In other words, I intended to undertake research on the logic or rationale of new governing processes that began to be used in Medellin since 2002, and that are being portrayed as a promising new way of dealing with urban fragility. Although the so-called Medellin model has been advertised and promoted through systematizations, international events and knowledge exchange among policy and practitioners circles in the region and beyond, few academic studies have focused on the particularities of the

security approach used as part of the Medellín Model³⁷. Most of the contemporary analyses available of Medellín's experience focus on the 'social urbanism' component (Davila 2012, Brand 2013, Echeverri and Orsini 2010), and on policy aspects and implementation processes (Bahl 2012) rather than on outcomes and impacts. This is despite the fact that the security strategy in this city was implemented not only for the purpose of containing violence and improving security, but with broader aspirations of fostering socio cultural transformations, and as the Mayor of Medellín stated, with the aim of changing the social contract in the city (Coupe et al 2012). Using a state-centred approach, some analysts have argued that Medellín's experience has led to the construction of the local state (Leyva 2010), while others have argued that what happened in Medellín represents the entrenchment of a neoliberal project (Hylton 2007). Within existing analyses of the Medellín case, the way power was exercised through the implementation of security initiatives and the experiences of those who are most vulnerable of such initiatives, remain neglected. Although some studies have recently attempted to unpack some of the political aspects of the Medellín model (Moncada 2013b, Maclean 2014,2015), no studies have focused particularly on the interface between security practices and governing processes in this context. This research offers a new perspective on the so-called 'Medellín Model' by focusing on such unexplored dimensions.

The use of the alternative analytical approach allowed me to explore the recent history of security provision in Medellín by looking not only at factors and processes that made this security approach, and its rationality possible, but also to use empirical observations to understand the way these interventions were experienced by targeted communities. By looking at the security strategy and its actual manifestation on the ground, this research contributes to our understanding of the way the state exercised power and attempted to construct authority in this context. It also helps to expose some of the contradictions of security provision in Medellín.

³⁷ There is a short case study report on the security strategy used in Medellín commissioned by a private sector initiative in Central America (see Mejia-Restrepo 2013).

Conclusion

This chapter presented an alternative approach to study urban security which uses the Foucauldian notion of governmentality and a combination of methods of data collection and analysis as a means to overcome the limitations of dominant analytical approaches. The critical approach designed here uses a three-step analytical strategy to enable studies of public security strategies in different urban contexts. The chapter suggested that this approach allowed us, first, to unpack the complex processes (political, social, institutional and economic) that affect the way security problems are framed and understood by those in power; second, to deconstruct security responses in order to understand how particular imaginaries of urban problems lead to specific policy strategies; and, finally, to re-focus the analysis on the impact of security initiatives from the perspective of those who are particularly vulnerable to urban insecurity.

The chapter emphasised the innovative edge of this analytical approach as it opened the possibility of investigating the governmental consequences of security provision. By looking at security policies as part of processes through which power is exercised on people, the analytical approach suggested here offers the opportunity to uncover the way in which certain communities and groups are governed in the process of dealing with urban violence and insecurity, and what this means for people's lives.

Inspired by Foucault's work, and using critical discourse analysis and ethnographic methods, I intended to place power and people's differentiated experiences of security provision at the very heart of the empirical study of security in the global South. This is important because in cities struggling with high or chronic levels of violence, where efforts are being made to deal with the problem, security policies and state responses have the potential to affect not only homicide rates and the incidence of crime, but also the type of relation that states establish with citizens and communities as well as the nature of state authority and its legitimacy. Moreover, in an increasingly urbanised world, the configuration of statehood and identities, and the exercise of citizenship and of forms of resistance to power, are increasingly determined by city-level dynamics. In this context, analysing the broad

governmental implications of security provision is crucial. In the next chapter, I explain in more detail how the alternative analytical approach suggested in this thesis, which focuses on these processes, was used to study security provision in Medellin between 2002 and 2012.

Chapter 3

Research Strategy to the Study of Urban Security in Medellin through an Alternative Critical Approach

Introduction

In this chapter I present the research strategy used to investigate urban security in Medellin through an analytical approach focused on the governmental consequences of security provision. Here I describe the rationale for the combination of discourse analysis and participant observation as the main methods of enquiry and the way I analysed a resulting multiple sourced data set. The chapter also offers an analysis of some of the main challenges I faced during the implementation of this research methodology in an urban context characterized by high levels of violence and insecurity. The chapter particularly focuses on the way I dealt with concerns regarding my own safety and that of the research participants, on how I negotiated different parts of my identity during the research process and finally, on the unexpected way in which my role might have affected the dynamics and relations regarding the researched context.

Research Strategy

Following the analytical strategy developed in this thesis, I was interested in unpacking the logic guiding the multifaceted security strategy in Medellin and its impact, from the perspective of the residents of these communities. In order to construct a genealogy of the government of urban insecurity in Medellin in the decade between 2002 and 2012, using the governmentality approach, it was necessary to undertake empirical and analytical examinations of the rationality of security provision in this city. I used a combination of discourse analysis and a set of methods informed by ethnographic approaches (mainly participant observation, semi structured interviews and focus groups) in order to undertake micro-level analyses of the working of this rationality. I was particularly interested in its assemblages (these include institutions, procedures, techniques, reflections, calculations and tactics), its targets, the forms of knowledge that support it, the

apparatuses it used to exercise of power and people's experiences of such type of rationality.

I carried out participant observation in Comuna 1, a particularly relevant urban community in Medellin. This area encompasses 12 neighbourhoods in the north east of the city and is inhabited by approximately 116,312 residents. This comuna has one of the lowest indicators of quality of life and human development in the city and exhibited the typical symptoms of urban fragility. I selected this area as the main site for the observational part of the research because it has been historically one of the most violent districts of the city, with strong presence of armed actors, but also because in the 2000s it became an epicentre for some of the most iconic governmental programmes implemented in Medellin aiming at integrating marginalised neighbourhoods to the rest of the city and addressing urban violence.

Using Medellin's security response (from 2002 to 2012) as the unit of analysis of research and comuna 1 as a strategic area of the city to observe the impact of security provision on community dynamics and people's lives, I was able to examine the interface between socio-political relations and security provision at the level of everyday practices. Inspired by Foucault's work, this analysis of a contemporary governmental rationality regarding the control of urban violence in a particular renowned fragile city was carried out through an examination of its discourses and its materialities. In this section I provide details of the research strategy.

A Multiple Sourced Data Set

As analysed in Chapter 1 initiatives to control and prevent violence in the global south increasingly rely on multifaceted security responses. In the decade between 2002 and 2012, Medellin became an emblematic example of how this type of responses could be used in marginalised urban communities that demonstrated symptoms of fragility, in order to integrate them to the city proper and to transform the city and promote its internationalisation. Public interventions by national and local authorities concentrated resources and a wide range of state programmes in such marginalised urban areas which had historically been neglected by the state.

These coercive, preventive and socio spatial initiatives were recognised abroad as an innovative approach and portrayed by local authorities as successful at containing incredible high levels of violence and transforming the city into an 'urban miracle'. This led me to ask the questions: how did this particular way of approaching urban insecurity in this city emerge? What are the calculations and assumptions justifying new forms of engaging with marginalised communities? And what are its outcomes from the perspective of the residents of these communities? In order to respond to these questions different sets of data were collected in Medellin between November 2009 and August 2013.

Empirical data was collected through participant observation, but also using focus groups and semi-structured interviews. I carried out fieldwork observations of social relations at community level in Comuna 1, in particular of interactions between residents and between state agents (such as police officers and civil servants) and residents. Participant observation was conducted in this urban community, as follows. In 2010, I spent four months working as a full time volunteer at Con-Vivamos³⁸, a community organisation focused in the promotion of community development, popular education, gender equality and political participation across the northeaster neighbourhoods of the city. Additionally in 2009, and between 2011 and 2013, I travelled to Medellin as part of the academic team of the Observatory of Human Security of Medellin (OSHM), a civil society initiative that undertakes action oriented research on human security at the city level. Each of these yearly trips lasted between one and two months and allowed me to carry out follow up meetings with research participants, some of whom had been previously interviewed or participated in focus groups. While my work as a volunteer at a local community organisation constituted the main part of the observational part of the data collection process for this research, during my yearly trips to the city I undertook follow up field visits to comuna 1. These enabled me to maintain close interaction with members of Con-Vivamos and with other residents of Comuna 1 with whom I also became

³⁸ Lets Live Together (in English) <http://www.Con---Vivamos.org/>

friends. Through regular contact with research participants during the last 5 years and yearly visits to the community, I have been able to keep track of developments in the security situation in the community and in some of my research participants' lives.

This research was not carried out as a traditional ethnography. My level of immersion in community life was limited by the restricted amount of uninterrupted time I spent in Comuna 1 and by the fact that I was unable to live in the community, for reasons that will be explained later on in this chapter. However I drew heavily on ethnographic methodologies and used participant observation and informal conversations as the main method to access insights on residents' experiences of public security. This involved building long lasting and meaningful relationships with the research participants, which allowed me to establish a close rapport with some residents of comuna 1 and build enduring relationships with members of community organisations in the area. These relations eventually shaped the information exchanged during the daily interactions, as well as in interviews and focus groups.

As will be analysed later in this chapter, my long-term engagement with the research participants enabled me to gain access to the residents' experiences and aspects of daily life in this community that would have been otherwise disregarded or kept undisclosed through other methods of enquiry. Knowing of my research participants' backgrounds, ambitions and concerns helped to make the focus groups discussions and semi-structured interviews possible and much richer and produced deeper, more nuanced data. Moreover, my job as a volunteer at Con-Vivamos allowed me to play a role in the community that residents recognised as legitimate and familiar. At the same time, being an outsider also opened some doors; once people knew they could trust me they felt comfortable talking to someone who knew life in the community, but was not part of it. In this way our conversations became safe spaces to express grievances and to disclose information that participants knew would not fall into the wrong hands. As this research shows, this type of ethnographic oriented approach to data collection which is quite unfamiliar within the scope of security studies proves an invaluable

tool for producing deep and meaningful data on urban security in fragile cities.

During the research process Con-Vivamos and the Observatory of Human Security (OSHM), became the key sites where I developed two sets of social networks that allowed me to access insights regarding the way residents of marginalised communities experienced and talked about different aspects of state intervention, and the way state intervention was portrayed by and discussed within policy and security expert circles. Con-Vivamos was located in Comuna 1 and had a long record of work in the most violence affected neighbourhoods of the city. It had built a reputation at community and city levels for their 20 years of work on issues regarding violence prevention, community development, political participation and social mobilisation. I contacted this organisation in 2009 through a research colleague at Bradford University who had worked with them before and provided good references. During an initial exploratory research visit to Medellin and after carrying out a number of interviews with some of its members, as well as members of other civil society organisations and academics in the city, I decided to ask Con-Vivamos for a placement as a self-funded volunteer to which they accepted immediately. In this organisation I had the opportunity to support the work of experienced and professional staff that developed programmes for community residents. Some programmes were self-funded while others were funded through public resources and support from international aid agencies.

The other organisation, the OSHM was created in 2009 through the support of the University of Antioquia, a local NGO called IPC and the Personeria de Medellin³⁹. The team included human rights activists and academics from various disciplines with a long record of work on human rights and security. When I contacted this organisation in 2009 with the help of my supervisor Prof. Pearce, they were developing a research agenda for overseeing the security situation in Medellin from the perspective of Human Security and for promoting a human rights based security agenda in the city. I joined their

³⁹ This is the local public institution in charge of overseeing the human rights situation in the city.

team that year and later became a researcher for a project on community level security. This project was implemented in four of the most vulnerable urban communities of the city, including Comuna 1, and relied on a methodology to co-produce knowledge with residents.

These two organisations with high recognition among residents, city level authorities and civil society organisations facilitated my access to Comuna 1 and other urban communities with similar socio economic and security problems. They also facilitated my access to privileged spaces where security experts and public servants in the city discussed the best ways to address security problems. These two organisations also became my key sources of support and advice during my field work in Medellin.

The observational research carried out in Comuna 1 entailed intensive involvement in a wide range of community activities, supporting violence prevention and community building activities designed by Con-Vivamos, supporting participatory and action oriented research activities by OSHM involving residents from Comunas 1, 6, 8 and 13 and observing daily interactions of community leaders and residents promoting local development initiatives in Comuna1. Working as a volunteer within the most prominent and respected community organization in the neighbourhood allowed me to gain insight into the kind of interactions taking place between residents, local officials and gang members. My work with these two organisations also allowed me to interact with community leaders and social workers working in other urban communities.

My observations on the ground were recorded in a field diary and were complemented by observations of and participation in everyday life in Medellin which provided a broader framework for the study. Notes containing descriptions of what I observed and my own interpretations were normally written every day or right after important events had taken place. These observations intended to allow me to gain a better understanding of the way people experienced state intervention. In particular, these enabled me to better understand the way in which they interacted with state actors and how state presence and security oriented programmes influenced their perception

and experience of insecurity, their relation with the state and their notions of citizenship.

The data collection process also included 45 semi-structured interviews from which twenty four (24) interviews were undertaken with residents of comuna 1⁴⁰, eight (8) with members of civil society organisations⁴¹, nine (9) with local government officials and security experts and four (4) with police officers. I also carried out eight (8) focus groups with residents of comuna 1, 6 and 13.

The rationale for the selection of interviewees responded to the questions guiding this research. The first set of questions intended to unpack the rationality of the mixed security approach used in Medellin since 2002 and the calculations guiding security policy. The second intended to gain insights into how new forms of state engagement were experienced by residents of these communities. The interviews with government officials and police officers were, together with the documentary evidence described below, the key sources for my investigation of the calculation and thinking behind the implementation of security programmes. Interviews with members of civil society organisations provided important insights into the urban context as well as the history and dynamics of violence in the city which facilitated my understanding of the continuities and discontinuities in the history of security provision in the city.

Moreover, the interviews and focus groups carried out with residents of comunas 1, 6 and 13 were used to deepen my understanding of the impact of security programmes on residents' lives, from their own perspective. The evidence collected through these interviews and focus groups provided vital insights into people's experience of state presence and personal notions of changes and continuities in their lives in the face of state interventions in these areas. These interviewees and focus groups also served to clarify aspects, highlight issues that were obscured in my observations of daily

⁴⁰ 8 women and 16 men

⁴¹ Interviewees were members of human rights and democracy advocacy organisations and local academic institutions.

interactions and confirm my views or debunk my beliefs surrounding such interactions. Through semi-structured interviews and focus groups the research participants were able to describe their own views of reality and this enabled me to better understand the actions and interactions I was observing through participant observation.

As will be explained later, the participants in this research were selected and contacted with the help of members of the two organisations I worked with. A significant number of the residents I interviewed (13 of them) were either community leaders or actively involved in community activities. Although they had key knowledge of the community and the security situation in the area, they certainly were not representative of the majority of the residents of Comuna 1 who did not participate so intensively in community development oriented activities. As will be analysed further, it was necessary for me to contact potential participants for this research through trustable gatekeepers and informants, many of whom worked with me at Con-Vivamos. This meant that many people I interviewed had some relation with the organisation. I was able to interview residents who were not directly involved in any community work (11 of them), but they had indirect contact with the organisation I worked with. Some for example would be occasional participants in cultural activities organised by the organisation, or had their children attending the free activities and workshops offered by the organisation in the area. This did not represent a particular bias in my selection of participants for the research, but was rather the result of the difficulties I encountered while undertaking research on security in a very volatile and unsafe urban context where residents were wary and feared speaking about security with people they were not completely sure they could trust. That trust, as will be explained later on, took me time and effort to build.

The relationship that some of the participants had with the organisations I worked with did not, in my judgment, affect their experiences and views regarding state security programmes. Additionally, the interviews and focus groups with residents were analysed together with my own observations of community dynamics. The combination of data sources served as a means

to triangulate key evidence collected. This helped to enhance the quality of the data in terms of finding converging ideas and testing my findings.

Most of the interviews and some of the focus groups were digitally recorded and transcribed. However a significant number of residents chose not to be recorded for the whole, or segments of the interview. They were concerned with the potential risks associated with discussing security issues that involved local armed actors and corrupt state agents. In these cases I took notes during and after the interview had taken place. Furthermore, all the participants in this research, except for public officials who gave their consent for their names to be used in this research, or whose quotes were taken from public addresses, had their names changed. Anonymity in transcripts and in the reporting of findings was necessary to protect the identity of the participants who disclosed sensitive information that if made public, would put them in danger, and also to protect the participants' privacy.

Regarding the interviews carried out, it is worth highlighting that the number of interviews with police officers was much lower than I had initially envisaged. The reason became evident to me over the course of the fieldwork. As analysed in Chapter five, the levels of distrust and constant suspicion of police officers being co-opted by local armed groups were very high in this community. The more I collected evidence, the clearer it became that contacting and interviewing police officers working in this community would endanger my relationship and the trust that I was slowly building with the residents. Being associated in any way with police officers in the community, would also have also been detrimental to my own safety and that of the participants I had already spoken with, given that local armed actors were increasingly suspicious of anyone who could be providing the authorities with information. Their willingness to impose harsh punishments on residents, including death, for such activities was well known. In this context, I decided to try to contact police officers working in other areas of the city through highly trusted contacts. My previous participation in an exchange programme with police officers from Medellin and Bradford organised by Prof. Pearce few years before was key for that purpose.

Through this programme I was able to stay in contact with a number of police officers that my supervisor and I trusted and who were very helpful in introducing me to community police officers working in other communities with a very similar security context as the one in *Comuna 1*. Finally, the data set also included a wide range of documentary data, including the official security strategies implemented by each local government in Medellin since 1990; publicly available reports on state programmes' implementation, neighbourhood security plans for comunas 1, 8 and 13⁴², reports on the security situation published by state institutions and civil society organisations; minutes of meetings and of public events organised by civil society organisations and public institutions where security experts discussed the security situation in the city and public responses to it; minutes of the City Council sessions in which security issues were discussed, official publications that attempted to systematize policy initiatives and numerous academic publications on the dynamics of urban violence and security issues in Medellin, and on the history of the city and the marginalised urban communities of the city.

Data Analysis and Reporting of Findings

As Foucault suggested, the study of power should start in those points where it is exercised. Studying security provision in Medellin, using governmentality as analytical approach and a combination of methods, meant exploring power relations and the rationality of security responses in this city as well as their impact on residents of an urban community specially targeted by a wide range of state initiatives. This analysis aimed at an exploration of the discursive and material features of security provision in Medellin 'from below'. It intended to serve as an empirically informed analysis of a renowned approach to urban security which included the voice and experiences of those who are most vulnerable to urban insecurity. The research methodology used in this critical study of security governance in Medellin from 2002 and 2012 facilitated the task of locating the voice and experiences of those who are targeted by security discourses and practices,

⁴² These are called '*Planes Locales de Seguridad y Convivencia*' in Spanish.

right at the centre of the process of knowledge production regarding urban security.

The process of analysing the documentary and empirical evidence collected in Medellin was conducted in different stages. One stage of the process involved carrying out discourse analysis not only of official texts and documents containing depictions of security strategies implemented by local and national tiers of government and descriptions of security initiatives and programmes, but also of transcripts of interviews and minutes of meetings and conversations with public officials, police officers and security experts. All the public officials I was able to interview worked directly in the design and implementation of security policies and programmes at the Mayor's Office, some of them at the highest level. The security experts had also been advisors to the Mayor's office on the design of citizen security programmes.

These data were considered as containing the statements that constituted a particular discourse on security and were analysed following the key principles of Foucauldian discourse analysis. This type of discourse analysis commonly involves an identification of the object or area of knowledge that is discursively produced, of the logic that guides the construction of the terminology used, who authorises it and the goals that are being pursued in the discourse (Diaz-Bone et al 2007, Graham 2005). Additionally, key to Foucauldian discourse analysis is the process of tracking the development of such discourse over time, and identifying the social, economic and political context which promotes its development.

Through this approach a first step in the analysis of the data collected, was to recognize the discursive process that justified the implementation of different state programs and interventions in Medellin's marginalised areas. This step also involved identifying some of the key social institutional and economic processes that enabled the configuration of a mixed security strategy that supposed a different type of engagement with these communities. This stage in the analysis allowed me to capture the contingency and contextual particularities of the security response in Medellin. As analysed in Chapter five I identified three particularly influential

dynamics that fostered changes in the security discourse in the 2000s: (i) the neoliberal turn in urban governance in the city since the 1990s, (ii) the implementation of a national led strategy called 'democratic security' throughout the decade in question, and (iii) the consolidation of forms of community and civil organisation and participation that created opportunities to influence the local agenda.

Another step in the analysis process was to look at the constitutive elements of the security discourse in the city. This meant examining the statements made in official documents and reports, in interviews with state officials and police officers and in their public accounts, in search for the explanation of the problem, the construction of truths, the formation of objects and subjects of power produced, the knowledge /power configurations that supported and reproduced the official truths, and finally, any challenges to those truths. The use of Foucauldian discourse analysis was useful to tease out the articulations of power contained in discursive constructions of security in the city. The official descriptions of the problem of violence and lack of governance in the city and their assumptions regarding particularly marginalised urban communities, as well as the role played by particular population groups in such problems, allowed me to see the subjectification process of such communities as 'ungoverned spaces', and the logic that justified the implementation of a wide range of state programmes.

Using this type of analysis, in Chapter five, I was able to make the rationality behind the security discourse in Medellin since 2002 intelligible. The discourse analysis revealed that residents of these areas were seen as special citizens in need of state control, pacification, government and transformation and that security oriented initiatives and programmes made them subject to demands and incentives to become passive, loyal and pacified citizens. To illustrate the findings I selected the passages and quotes from policy makers, security experts and police officers that in my judgment better articulated and illustrated their commonly held assumptions, calculations and justification for the implementation of coercive, preventive, social and physical interventions in marginalised communities.

The next stage in the analysis process focused on exploring my observations of neighbourhood level dynamics in Comuna 1, in order to understand the residents' experiences of state presence and multifaceted interventions there since 2002. The analysis of interviews and focus groups carried out with residents, as well as of the empirical data collected through participant observation, was guided by my desire to understand the residents' perceptions and experiences of insecurity, violence and state presence. I was particularly interested in how people interacted with state actors such as police officers and in their perceptions of public programmes aimed at tackling violence. In Chapter six, I develop this analysis taking into account the views of different population groups (children, young people and women for example). During the reporting of my findings I deliberately made the decision to highlight the experiences of these population groups not only because, as in the case of young people, they were seen as key subjects of policy intervention within the security discourse, but also because these groups' particular experiences of insecurity and views on security tend to be ignored within debates on public security.

The analysis also focused on tracking the implications for residents of different programmes and state initiatives, and finally on identifying alternative views, if any, to those held by state officials. Following Foucault's work, I called these alternative articulations, points of resistance to the security governing processes.

The analysis and reporting of the findings of the ethnographic oriented work undertaken in comuna 1 did not focus so much on the self-depiction of my own experiences and my cultural encounter with the local context, like traditional ethnographic accounts tend to do, but on the experiences of the residents. My participant observations included self-reflection of my encounter with the community's reality, but the focus of my analysis was on how residents who lived in urban communities subject to new forms of state intervention experienced and witnessed the presence of the state in its multiple forms and on the way they interacted with, perceived and talked about state intervention. My own experience was crucial to the research process. For instance, it allowed me to gain a better understanding of young

women's daily experiences of insecurity, and of the power and influence of local armed actors in this community. However, I deliberately chose to privilege the voice of the residents that are often underrepresented within security research and public debate.

In Chapter six where I analyse the residents' narratives, I chose the passages from my field diary and quotes from interviews and focus groups that better illustrated people's most common experiences. Since the data collected was originally in Spanish I translated those passages and quotes into English myself and with the help of a professional translator in those cases in which I was not sure of the equivalent expression in English. This type of analysis allowed me to shed light on their perception of (in)security, and on the unexpected implications of coercive and preventive security initiatives, for people living in what public officials saw as 'ungoverned spaces'.

Facing Some Challenges

As is common to research undertaken in the field of peace studies, this study on urban security was not exempt from ethical, methodological and logistical challenges. These emerged as a result not only of the high levels of violence and insecurity in the city at the time the fieldwork was carried out, but also due to the subject under investigation itself. The following section analyses some of these challenges in detail:

Safety Concerns

Studying security provision in a fragile city like Medellin was particularly challenging. My field work coincided with a particularly difficult time for the city in terms of the security situation. As is explained in detail in Chapter 3, after a period of relative tranquillity characterised by an impressive reduction in the levels of homicidal violence in the city (from 2002 to 2008) which had reinforced the perception that Medellin had overcome its historical and dramatic problems of urban violence and instability, by the end on 2008 the security situation started to rapidly deteriorate. The extradition to the United States of a key figure within the criminal underworld led to fierce competition between criminal factions for control of illegal economies and

neighbourhoods. This translated into deadly gang battles in many neighbourhoods of the poorest communities of the city, with many fatal victims including bystanders, and tight controls to the movement of residents across their communities. There was also an increase in forced and voluntary recruitment of children and young people by criminal fractions, and forced displacements and threats to residents. The situation in Comuna 1, where I carried out most of the observational research, was particularly difficult. Access to many neighbourhoods was restricted for outsiders. The risks were very high, both for residents and outsiders, due to armed clashes and the risk of harm, or even death for crossing borders imposed by gangs or for not complying with their imposed curfews.

After my first exploratory visit to Medellin in 2009, I became very conscious of the risks involved in undertaking ethnographic research in Comuna 1 and other communities located on the side hills of the city. It was clear that the safest way to gain access and in depth knowledge of residents' experiences and community life was with the backing and support of the most respected community organisation in the area. Luckily I was able to get in touch with the OSHM and with Con-Vivamos fairly quickly, and in 2010 I was accepted by the latter, as a volunteer. Their members had in depth knowledge of local dynamics and recognition among residents and local officials. This was important in terms of building contextual knowledge which allowed me to take better decisions regarding my safety and that of the research participants. Building strong relations with my colleagues at Con-Vivamos and then at the OSHM allowed me to have deeper knowledge of the community and to be able to make risk evaluations of the context. They became key gatekeepers and informants and helped me to understand the situation on the ground, to map relevant actors and to have an idea of the potential for armed confrontations. In addition to weekly meetings at these organisations, which included analyses of the security situation in different areas, my colleagues in both organisations were always keen on advising me on any developments in the situation that would require particular precautions.

In these organisations I met people I trusted and on whom I could rely if I needed help. It was always difficult to predict and plan how every situation would unfold, but asking for their advice helped me to avoid risks. My colleagues with whom I quickly built a friendship, were very much aware of the risks to my safety and were always keen to help me stay safe. During activities for example it was common that a colleague would take their cap with the institutional logo of the community organisation and asked me to wear it to make sure everyone would associate me with their team (eventually I even got my own t-shirt). They would also offer to walk with me numerous times, if I needed to go to a place they thought might be unfamiliar to me.

Working at Con-Vivamos as a volunteer was particularly significant in terms of having privileged access to *comuna* 1 in a role that provided me with the opportunity to develop some basic protection mechanisms. My job as a volunteer at this organisation, allowed me to visit different neighbourhoods in relatively safer conditions, than if I had been on my own. This job gave me opportunity to undertake participant observation; however I needed to be able to talk with people about issues that people did not normally talk about during daily interactions. 'Talking about security' was nonetheless very dangerous. One of the protection mechanisms people had developed to survive in this volatile context characterised by intermittent urban conflicts was not to discuss or not to be seen discussing issues regarding the security situation. That meant that creating spaces where residents were safe and felt safe took time, support from the two organisations I was working with and long term engagement and careful consideration on my part.

The first obstacle I faced was trying to invite people to interviews and focus groups. This was difficult not only because people were so fearful of talking about security in this context, but also because it was dangerous for me to ask residents informally if they wanted to participate in the research. As it is better analysed in chapter six, the intelligence gathering activities carried out by security agents in the area and the competition between gangs meant that local armed actors were very distrustful of unfamiliar faces and of anyone

asking questions about security issues. In this regard armed actors' strong social ties with the community meant they were informed very quickly by relatives, friends or neighbours if anyone was asking 'suspicious' questions. In this context describing the object of my research became a challenging process requiring the utmost care. I needed to describe the purpose of my study in a way that I would not be regarded as collecting intelligence. I also had to invite people to interviews and focus groups through trusted informants and gain research participants' trusts and confidence.

My daily work as volunteer⁴³ was very useful because it allowed me to interact with residents and to slowly gain their trust. My presence at many of the organisation's activities made my face familiar among people in the neighbourhood, including relatives of armed actors. At the beginning I noticed people would not be too keen to talk to me (even starting casual conversations was hard at times, despite the talkative and welcoming spirit of paisas (people from Medellin). However the more people associated me with Con-Vivamos and the more time I spent in the area beyond working hours, the more people would feel comfortable and relaxed talking to me about their lives. Later on, some of them would invite me to their house. This was a clear sign that they trusted me. In order to contact and invite residents to interviews I relied on the help of key informants from Con-Vivamos and the OSHM.

Keeping participants safe was a key concern so in most cases the interviews would take place in a room at the community organisation where I worked. I would explain to the participant the aim of the research and ask for their consent to participate reassuring confidentiality and asking their permission to record. In many cases during the interviews people would request the recorder to be stopped before discussing something they thought was especially sensitive. Residents who accepted the invitation to the interview or focus group would normally feel safe to talk to me in this space, but they

⁴³ Helping to organise events, supporting the logistical aspects of community activities and demonstrations, collaborating with the communications strategy of the organisation, helping to write reports and to design activities for children and young people.

would still take precautions so as to not label our 'conversations' in front of other residents, as an interview about security or security policies in the community. I noticed this a number of times when someone would knock on the door or ask us what our meeting was about, and the participant would rush to explain that I was interviewing them about their community work, or the history of community, etc. I understood their well funded fear of being associated with a research on security and did everything to avoid putting them in danger. This included protecting the data I collected by saving it in an external drive I would not carry with me, deleting the audio files from the recorder so it would not pose a risk if stolen or lost and anonymising the transcripts.

Informal interactions outside spaces and activities related to Con-Vivamos were at the beginning difficult due to the volatile and dangerous security situation. However, during occasional gang truces, such as the one armed actors established during the Christmas period of 2010, I was able move around more freely and interact more spontaneously with the residents.

My safety was a key concern during the University's ethical approval process for my research. In this respect the committee made the approval subject to my commitment to take certain precautions, including that I would not live in the community and that I would not spend time there at night. These restrictions created challenges for undertaking the observational part of the research, especially given the level of immersion required for ethnographic approaches. At some point I felt that having to leave the community before night hours was reducing my capacity to develop strong relations with residents and colleagues at Con-Vivamos, something that in this context was important to access insights regarding community life, but also crucial to enhance my own safety.

Attending and participating in social events and activities that took place at night was very important to be accepted. Additionally, with the support of community organisations sometimes residents organised community activities that had the explicit aim of challenging the restrictions imposed on

them. These events strengthen a sense of community and also provided incredible opportunities to get to know the way residents, state representatives and armed groups interacted. In this context and taking into account the University's advice on always taking precautions to preserve my safety, I decided to occasionally stay in the community after my working hours if I felt this was needed so that I could take part in activities and socialise with residents at nights. In these occasions I always assessed the risks involved and informed people I trusted of my whereabouts, making sure that I would have someone I could contact in case I needed help.

This decision allowed me to build stronger relations and trust with my colleagues and some residents. The local and organisational culture meant that boundaries between professional life and friendship were much less demarcated. I also felt that social ties developed even faster in a community organisation that promoted values of solidarity and community spirit. And they often developed during social interactions that took place beyond working hours. The community centre, a three storey house in the middle of one of the very steep roads, was opened for most of the day so that residents could use the space. This was one of the few safe spaces many children and young people had in the community, at the time, given strict boundaries and restrictions in movements and in the use of public space, as imposed by armed actors. This meant that many of the staff spent most of the day there. Additionally people working at Con-Vivamos were also residents of the community. These were highly committed people who saw the activities and projects not only as their job, but as efforts to help make peoples' lives more dignified, including that of their children, neighbours and friends. I think this influenced the fact that staff would often stay late to work on or deal with residents' issues.

Negotiating my Identity

As highlighted by some researchers, social structural factors such as the researcher's age, socioeconomic position and gender can deeply influence the research process, by affecting the course of the data collection process and the content of interviews for example (Manderson et al 2006; Razon and Ross 2012; Hume 2007b). During my research I also became aware of the

way my identity (being simultaneously a young woman, a Colombian national born in the capital to a family who had just climbed to a middle income status, a foreign student, a volunteer, an academic researcher, and a naturalised British national) was influencing the data collection and the knowledge production in a context characterised by high levels of violence and insecurity.

What Razon and Ross call the fluid identity of the researcher (2012) clearly manifested itself in certain moments during this research. I found myself negotiating different parts of my identity, sometimes highlighting or discarding different parts of my identity in particular moments of the research. During interviews, as it will be described below, I found myself negotiating my Colombian identity or distancing myself from my own Colombian background, often in response to the positive reaction I received from research participants to my identity as a researcher from a British university and also in response to my intuition that by distancing myself from my Colombian background residents would feel safer talking to me.

During interviews with policy makers and police officers, I noticed how my academic credentials as a researcher from a European University not only facilitated their disposition to describe their view on the local authorities' responses to violence, but it also played a role in their effort to highlight the positive aspects and outcomes of such state interventions as if politically defending their approach. Being aware of how my identity was understood by participants as 'foreign', despite the fact that I am Colombian, and as someone with access to academic debates, and the way this could drive interviewees to highlight certain aspects and conceal others, or to portray certain interventions in particular ways, was highly relevant and also informative. It was telling of the way 'the Medellin Model' was eagerly portrayed in policy, academic and practitioner circles as a successful and innovative model of urban transformation. The analytical approach used in this research was very useful to be able to keep a critical lens in the face official accounts of security policies implemented in the city during the 2000s. As explained above, the research approach provided tools to

understand how the construction of 'truths' and the creation of knowledge supported particular forms of power.

My identity played a different role during my interactions and interviews with residents. While many of them initially meet me as a volunteer at Con-Vivamos and then (from 2011 onwards) as member of the OSHM, once I explained to them that I was also a student abroad undertaking a research on security in the city and interested in their views and experiences of the wide range of programmes and interventions the state carried out in their community in the process of reducing violence, people saw me as someone with an international reach and this created some expectations. Participants started to see me as someone who could, as one of the participants in a focus group put it, 'go out there and tell the world the truth of what we are living here' (Focus group with Older adults 16/11/2009).

Dealing with participants' expectations that might emerge from their participation in the research in a responsible way is an important aspect of an ethical research process. In this case, I felt that among the participants in the research, particularly the residents of the communities I visited, there was a sense that I could make the problems they faced and their needs in terms of security visible. In their view, this could help improve their lives by bringing the issues to the state authorities' attention. As analysed in Chapter six some of them felt their community was often portrayed as the example of a successful urban intervention, although they endured daily hardships and acute security problems. This sense of invisibility and the disparities in the narratives of public officials and residents regarding the state intervention in marginalised communities was critically analysed through the methodological and analytical strategy I developed. The fact that I was committed to analyse security responses from the perspective of residents was reassuring for both participants and me.

Additionally, as part of my commitment to critical research that is relevant to efforts to reduce violence, I plan to make the findings of this study accessible to the research participants. For this, I intend to have a summary version of this thesis translated, so that I can then share it with the participants, and

with both Con-Vivamos and the OSHM. It is my intention that through these organisations, especially through the OSHM, the findings of the research will be shared and debated with the participants and a wider audience.

As mentioned before, at the time most of the fieldwork was carried out, competition between criminal factions for the control of different areas of the community produced violent confrontations and many risks and movement restrictions for residents, especially for young men. As a young woman in this context, I was confronted with particular risks, as discussed in chapter five, but in some occasions being a woman allowed me to access certain spaces with slightly lower levels of risk and danger. As one of my colleagues commented one day before passing in front of a group of young men sat at a local shop:

'those are the *actores* (members of the local gang) in this area, but don't be afraid, relax, just walk, they won't ask us questions, you could be my cousin or a relative...you are a woman they won't feel so threatened, it would be different if you were a man' (field diary note 17/12/2015)

This event, which took place during a walk across the neighbourhood on the days prior to Christmas, when an informal truce between gangs in the area was still in place, as well as my interactions with young people in the area, made me realise that my gender favoured the observational part of the research.

Affecting the Context

There were two particularly challenging moments during the field work that are worth highlighting. One of them is analysed in detail in chapter six and took place during a participatory activity with children living in one of the most deprived neighbourhoods of Comuna 1. These events illustrate the convergence of issues I mentioned before and the limitations researchers face in dangerous contexts, despite their efforts to avoid risks. These events also made me aware of the impact that we, as researchers, have on the particular contexts and people we are academically interested in and our responsibility as researchers.

Early on during the fieldwork I had managed to arrange a visit to another community with notoriously high levels of violence⁴⁴. With the support of different local state institutions and the Mayor's office, a group of community police officers was trying to reduce violence in this community through negotiation processes and truces between gangs. Through another police officer I trusted, the community police officers agreed to meet me and show me their work. Given the risks involved in accessing the area the key informant who had helped me arrange this meeting and the police officers said I would have to come to the meeting in a police van. I initially hesitated due to the risks of confrontations between gangs and police units and the troubled relationship between residents and police officers, but I eventually accepted because I trusted the advice of my informant. On our way to the meeting, the police officers accompanying me gave me more details: we would be attending a meeting between gang members who had just agreed a ceasefire and the police officers. At that point, I decided I would be a non-intrusive observant of the meeting, to which they agreed. When we arrived the atmosphere was very tense. The absence of one of the gang's leaders had caused serious anger on the other side and threats were being made. Suddenly, the community police officers trying to deescalate the tension decided to turn the young men's attention to my presence instead. They introduced me as a foreign professional on peace and conflict resolution who had come to see the outcomes of their efforts to deescalate violence and asked the men in the room to explain to me the process that had led them to agree to a truce with the opposing group and their expectations regarding the process. With no control on the situation, I unexpectedly ended up having to play a central role in this meeting which I had not prepared for. I had an incredible opportunity at this meeting to see the interaction between police officers and gang members, to hear these young men's ideas about the problems in their community and their role and expectations, although this was certainly not the type of interview or focus group I had prepared for. The meeting ended with an agreement between the two groups to keep the

⁴⁴ This community became famous after a documentary depicting the lives of young men and women from this community was released. The documentary 'La Sierra' was very explicit in terms of the levels of violence in the area.

ceasefire and to meet again a week later. I did not attend the next meeting, and few weeks later I learnt that a subsequent meeting had ended with the killing of one of the gang leaders, something that reignited armed confrontations. This made me realise just how dangerous the situation had been.

This experience proved that despite risk assessments, protection plans and mechanisms, it would be unrealistic to believe that I could always anticipate how things would turn out. Also, it revealed that despite researchers' efforts to play a non intrusive role, we do affect dynamics and relations on the ground even in ways that are difficult to predict. Based on my experience, this must be recognised in order to be able to undertake an ethical research process. Once our impact is recognised we can then try to make sure such impact causes no harm to research participants or to other actors.

Conclusion

This chapter described the research strategy used to study the particularly interesting mix of initiatives used in Medellin between 2002 and 2012 which were aimed at dealing with high levels of violence and insecurity. The chapter also presented an analysis of the main challenges I faced during the implementation of the research methodology, especially when collecting data and using participant observation as a main method of enquiry.

I suggested in this thesis that it is important to understand how security policies take shape in particular contexts and in particular historical moments, and also that we need to investigate the implementation of security responses and their implications for people's lives beyond quantitative indicators. This chapter showed that it is possible to do this through an alternative approach that uses a combination of methods.

The detailed description and analysis of the process that was followed in order to put this approach into action in Medellin also demonstrated that studying urban security empirically and critically in contexts of chronic violence is not a straightforward process. It demands flexibility, problem-solving skills, ethical awareness and patience from the side of the researcher, as well as support from a diverse set of institutional and local

actors. These are all crucial to dealing with the many ethical, methodological and logistical challenges emerging in the research process. In the next chapter, I present the context of the case studied, focusing on the history of security provision in Medellin. This section allows the reader to locate the importance of the chronological period under investigation (2002-2012) and the complex context in which the research methodology developed was implemented.

Chapter 4

The Recent History of Security Provision in Medellín

In this chapter I provide the context for the application of an alternative analytical approach to investigate the case of Medellín. The chapter analyses the trajectory of security policies and public responses in Medellín to contain high levels of violence since the late 1980s, and argues that the 2002 to 2012 period constitutes an important shift in the history of security provision in this city. The chapter reviews the dynamics and mutations of urban violence in the city and the diagnoses that led to the implementation of particular state responses in the last two decades. It then concentrates on the particularities of the mixed approach to security provision that took shape during the 2000s as part of what has come to be known as the 'Medellín Model'.

Medellín's Violent Crises

In Colombia violence has been extensively studied as a political phenomenon and usually associated to the internal conflict concentrated mainly in the rural areas of the country (Gutierrez Sanin and Sanchez 2006). However, in the late 1980's, urban violence started to attract the attention of local academics and policymakers as a particular problem demanding not only study but particular policies of control and repression. By the end of this decade, the largest number of violent deaths in the country was taking place in the main cities and as a consequence of a wide range of kinds of social violence rather than political violence, including socioeconomic violence, socio-cultural violence and violence on territories (Comision de Estudios Sobre Violencia 1987 in Restrepo et al. 2012a:16). From the three main Colombian cities with the highest levels of urban violence, Medellín, the second biggest, became by far the most violent of the country and in 1991, of the world.

Notwithstanding a long term decline in the homicide rates since the critical levels reached in the early 1990s and specific fluctuations in the city's levels

of violence during the following two decades, Medellín's tendency to concentrate the highest rate of violent deaths in the country continued, stimulating the implementation of a wide range of security policies and programs by national and local governments. The diversity of public and civil initiatives attempted in Medellín in the last two decades, with the intention of reducing chronic levels of urban violence, makes this city's recent history of security provision one of the richest and most interesting in the region.

Since the 1980s, the security responses implemented in this city by the different tiers of the state have been shaped by prevalent diagnoses articulated by state actors and other influential actors (such as the private sector and civil society organisations) regarding the nature of the problem of violence and the causes of the urban violence crises in the city; as well as by the availability of resources, institutional capacities and leadership of national and local governments at particular moments; and, as it will be discussed later in this thesis, by wider socio-economic and political processes.

It is important to consider the trajectory and mutations of violence in this city since it attracted the attention of powerful political and social actors in the late 1980s, but most important, the way the problem of urban violence was understood and the type of responses it motivated prior to the period under study.

The First Crisis (mid 1980s to early 1990s)

This period was perceived as an exceptional moment in the history of the city. In one decade homicide went from being the 8th cause of death to the first one (Camacho and Guzman 1990; Restrepo et al 1997). In the 1980s the simultaneous decrease in the number of non lethal assaults and the increase in the number of homicides reflected a rapid escalation of violence taking place in the city. The number of homicides became the most visible indicator of the crisis, with initial studies undertaken showing lethal violence dramatically affecting young and adult men between 15 and 44 from the

poorest and most populous neighbourhoods⁴⁵ located at the city's northeast (especially zones 1 y 2), centre-east and north-western areas . Given the profile of the victims and perpetrators, and the fact that most of the homicides took place in these areas as well as in the city centre, violence was consequently associated with the marginalised young men, who were increasingly involved in more organised forms of violence and delinquency.

On one hand, the expansion and consolidation of the drug trafficking industry led the Medellin cartel to support the establishment of youth gangs and groups of paid assassins serving their needs for security and conflict management among mafia affiliates. And on the other, the guerrillas' incursion in the city facilitated the transformation of self-defence groups providing protection from criminality to communities where the state was absent, into urban militias with an insurgent agenda and military training. Together with the criminal organisations fuelled by the Medellin cartel, these militias became opportunities for social mobility and paid work for young men struggling to find jobs in the local economy, which was experiencing a massive contraction of its emblematic manufacture and textile industries, and the consequences of neoliberal reforms and the economic liberalization of the Colombian economy.

Confrontations between these groups for the control of the marginalised neighbourhoods, the emergence of death squads targeting marginalised social actors, The Medellin Cartel's war on the state and the declaration of war against drug trafficking by the national government, led to the escalation of violence that in the early 1990s positioned Medellin as the capital of murder with 381 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants (in 1991). The use of terrorism and the targeting of influential sectors of society such as politicians, judges, journalists and police officers by the Medellin cartel in its confrontation with the state, increased pressure for public responses to the crisis. In response, the national government focused the police and intelligence capacity of the security forces on dismantling this cartel. With the

⁴⁵These neighbourhoods had been rapidly expanding since the mid 1960s in the adjacent hillsides of the city with an influx of people escaping from political violence and poverty in the countryside.

obscure help of Pablo Escobar's rival drug lords⁴⁶, leaders of paramilitary groups⁴⁷, and the United States, the objective was accomplished. With the killing of Pablo Escobar and of many of his close associates in 1993 the most powerful cartel was dismantled. Terrorist attacks and the most visible indicators of violence started to recede. However, what followed was the reorganisation of the illegal industry into smaller units working as networks. The new mafia bosses, many of whom were Pablo's former enemies, were able to consolidate uncontested control of the underworld and of a wider range of illegal economies in the city during the 1990s and most of the following decade.

In response to the guerrilla activity in the country, in 1988 the national government launched a peace initiative to negotiate a peace agreement with insurgent groups, as well as to reform the constitution. This initiative that led to the demobilization of five guerrilla groups⁴⁸ in 1990 and 1991 and their incorporation into the political system also created a favourable context for negotiations with the militias that had consolidated their control of marginalised urban communities in Medellin. These negotiations produced the demobilisation of 843 militia members and the creation of a cooperative run by them in 1994, for the provision of security in those neighbourhoods under their control and influence⁴⁹. This cooperative was created with the aim of providing security to residents with the acquiescence of the state, in association with the state security forces and using public resources and equipment delivered through contracts with the Municipality. It meant the delegation of security provision in marginalised urban communities to a private actor, a practice that continued the state's traditional approach

46 The PEPES group and the Cali cartel for example.

47The Castaño brothers who later became the Commanders of the 'United Self-Defence Forces of Colombia' (*Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia- AUC*), an association of right-wing paramilitary forces created in 1997 and with fronts across the country.

48 In March 1990 the M-19 group successfully demobilised. This allowed their members political participation and created a favourable context for the later demobilization of other guerrilla groups.

49Cooperative for Security and Community Service (*Cooperativa de Seguridad y Servicio a la Comunidad- Coosercom*)

towards security provision in these areas since their appearance (Giraldo and Mesa 2013).

Within months of the demobilization process having taken place in Medellin, it was clear that the demobilization process had failed. 22,2% of the demobilised militia members were killed (187 in total) due to internal clashes and confrontations with the state security forces and with criminal bands⁵⁰. Residents also reported they were victims of abuses and indiscriminate violence committed by members of this security cooperative (Alonso-Espinal et al 2012; Angarita Cañas et al 2008). Despite a slow reduction in the number of homicides since 1992 (see graphic 1) multiple forms of violence and insecurity continued to affect marginalised urban communities. Additionally, the number of armed actors with social, coercive and territorial control in these communities was increasing.

Diagnostics and Responses in the 1990s

There was confusion among different state institutions regarding the cause of the escalating violence that took place in Medellin from the mid 1980s to the early 1990s. For the Metropolitan Security Fund (*Fondo Metropolitano de Seguridad*), violence was the result of a culture of death and violence associated to historical processes and which had become prevalent among society. Meanwhile, for the army and the police the key factor was the consolidation of drug traffickers in the city's social and political spheres. As evidence, the Commander of the police argued that 90% of the homicides in Medellin were linked to drug trafficking (Alonso-Espinal 2012).

Despite these disagreements, during the 1990s consensus was slowly built around a broad diagnosis of the problem of violence in the city which recognised different structural and immediate causal factors (Velez Rendon 2012). The development plans designed by the different municipal administrations in office from 1988 to 2002 and a strategic plan for the long term development of the city designed during this decade (Plan Estrategico de Medellin y el Area Metropolitana 2015) suggested that the causes of the

⁵⁰ Ministry of Justice, Transitional Justice Office in Giraldo and Mesa 2013:225

crisis were linked to long term processes such as unplanned and unbalanced urbanisation, fast population growth that surpassed municipal capacities, precarious employment, as well as limited access to basic services and utilities for a large proportion of the population. In addition to these structural factors, the official diagnoses recognised other key precursors of the crisis: the state's incompetence in the provision of justice and security⁵¹, a social tendency towards vigilantism, a crisis in citizen values and ethic codes, and the weakening of institutions necessary for adequate socialization, such as family and school. In this context, according to the prevalent official diagnoses during the 1990s, drug trafficking played a catalysing role for urban violence and made the case of Medellin distinct from those of other cities in the country (Velez Rendon 2012:70)

Based on this diagnosis, a series of programs and initiatives were implemented in Medellin by the national and local administrations. The national government sought to improve the state's coercive power to combat drug trafficking and to capture Medellin cartel's members by creating special police units. It also fostered peace negotiations with some of the guerrilla groups in the country and created an ad hoc entity to respond to the crisis in Medellin called the Presidential Advisory Council for Medellin (*Consejería Presidencial para Medellín*) (1990-1995). This institution served to channel resources for the implementation of programs aimed at reducing and preventing violence in the city. In order to be able to deliver public investment in poor neighbourhoods controlled at the time by local armed actors, the national government had to liaise with grassroots civil organisations. This unprecedented coalition attempted a policy response to urban violence that included addressing structural factors that maintained wide sectors of the population socially excluded and marginalised from the city's local governance. Many of these programmes focused on vulnerable youth and children, while other initiatives focused on housing formalization,

51 high levels of impunity and a deep crisis in the police were seen as evidence of such incompetence

neighbourhood improvement⁵², legalization of tenure, and on supporting community organization and participation. As Moncada's research suggests, this reformist project was met with strong opposition by the local government and by the city's powerful industrial sector (Moncada 2013b). Despite these obstacles a wide range of private, civil, community and international actors continued to mobilise in favour of the implementation of violence prevention initiatives in the city. An example of these efforts was a loan for 15 million dollars granted to the city by the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) for the development of a Plan to improve Citizen Coexistence. This loan was secured by the ascending financial sector in the city and reflected the private sector's interest in addressing the problem of violence in ways that could help transform the city's violent reputation (Ibid).

In terms of local governance, the crisis led to processes of dialogue between national and local institutions and between the state and a variety of community, civil and international actors⁵³. Administrative and political decentralization and participatory mechanisms introduced by the Constitution of 1991 created a favourable environment for strengthening not only institutional capacities, but also those of local and community actors, who actively participated in making diagnoses of the acute problems in the city and in identifying key areas and processes of intervention focusing on youth and the marginalised communities of the city.

Notwithstanding the emergence of forms of coordination between local and national governments for the implementation of violence prevention programs, during the 1990s urban security polices remained highly

52Such as the 'Integral Programme for the Improvement of Neighbourhoods' PRIMED (Programa Integral de Mejoramiento de Barrios Subnormales) .

53Through community meetings across the city policymakers, grassroots organisations, the private sector and the civil society discussed problems and potential solutions for a wide range of issues (for example unemployment, housing problems, participation and citizen security). With inputs from these public discussions 40 entities from diverse sectors built a city plan to integrate efforts by the local administration, the public sector and civil society called Strategic Plan for Medellin and its Metropolitan Area (Plan Estratégico de Medellin y su Area Metropolitana 1997).

fragmented (Restrepo et al 2012b). The national government efforts and most of the public resources were allocated to 'security' initiatives. These were understood mainly as coercive and police responses against the growing power of armed groups linked to drug trafficking and the guerrilla groups that refused to demobilise. On the other side, local governments focused on 'coexistence' (convivencia) initiatives, which referred to the promotion of peaceful resolution of conflicts, citizen values and violence prevention. These programmes were, however, considered secondary objectives within the city's security agenda.

In addition to the small budgets and weak spending capacity, local administrations justified their less active role in security policy design and implementation by arguing that security provision was the responsibility of the national government and national level institutions, such as the Police and the judicial system. They also argued that national rather than local processes were the causes of the problem of violence in the city (Giraldo 2010). Based on this understanding of the competences of the different levels of government and the perceived causes of the problem, the municipal administrations in office from 1988 to 2003 focused public intervention on:

-Promoting the peaceful resolution of conflicts: The local administrations supported mediation efforts to solve conflicts in the communities and from the mid 1990s they fostered negotiations with militias and 'non- aggression pacts and truces' involving members of gangs, criminal bands and un-demobilised militias. Sometimes these agreements included handing in arms in exchange for programmes to improve employment opportunities and training, and social investment in urban communities⁵⁴. By July 1999 mediation processes and pacts had been fostered in 86 neighbourhoods, involving 160 armed groups and approximately 3000 people (Velez Rendon 2012:282).

⁵⁴ These measures were promoted by the local administration in the mid 1990s through the Office of Peace and Coexistence until the end of 2000.

- Encouraging citizens' participation in efforts to improve security: Citizens were encouraged to participate in tackling the problems fuelling violence, even though security policy design remained highly concentrated in the hands of representatives of national security institutions, such as the Commanders of the IV brigade and the Police, the director of the Administrative Department of Security (DAS), and of special commissions made up of members of the Municipal Council (concejo municipal) and local security experts (Ibid:74). Through systems of neighbourhood resistance to social indiscipline and control, residents of marginalised communities were encouraged to get involved in policing activities in their neighbourhoods, to report crimes to the authorities and to undertake state functions (Ibid).

The following table summarises some of the most salient initiatives implemented at local level (see Table 2):

Table 2. State Initiatives Implemented in the 1990s at Local Level

Local Administration	Key Violence Reduction and Prevention Initiatives
Omar Florez (1990-1992)	Together with the Presidential Council the Programme for Peaceful Coexistence in Medellin was implemented. The emphasis was social investment, increasing education opportunities, generating youth employment, improving urban space in marginalised neighbourhoods, granting support to civil organizations , generating processes for the recognition of identity and strengthening justice and security (Restrepo et al 2012b). 20 thousand million pesos were invested in infrastructure with social impact and in citizen participation processes.
Luis Alfredo Ramos (1992-1994)	Creation of Peace and Coexistence Office in 1993 (<i>Oficina de Paz y Convivencia</i>). This agency served as advisory to the Municipality and facilitated dialogues and negotiations with gangs and militias in the city. It also promoted peaceful citizen culture. In 1994 Councils for Citizen Coexistence were created. These bodies were managed by police inspectors and commanders of local police stations and served as a means for citizens to report security problems and for the authorities to report on their progress.

Sergio Naranjo (1995-1997)	Processes of dialogue and negotiation with armed groups took place. The local authorities promoted the use of mediation and non aggression pacts as a means to reduce violence. They also supported the implementation of a participatory budgeting programme.
Juan Gomez Martinez (1998-2000)	Continuation of previous administrations' policies and implementation of the Citizen Coexistence Programme (<i>Programa de Convivencia Ciudadana</i>) with the support of the Inter-American Development Bank and the private sector.
Luis Perez (2001-2003)	This administration cancelled the previous government's programmes, including the internationally funded Citizen Coexistence Programme. The local authorities launched coercive measures in response to violence, including a military operation coordinated with the national government. It also launched a programme called 'I buy the war' (<i>Compro la Guerra</i>) that intended to disarm and reintegrate members of armed groups by offering them job opportunities. This programme was not implemented.

It was during the 1990s that planned interventions to reduce violence were for the first time attempted in the city. The state efforts focused on dealing with a violent crisis and the skyrocketing number of homicides in the city. This dramatic sign of urban violence became the key measure of success for interventions in the city and a tool to identify population groups and areas to be targeted by security policies. Although homicide rates were incapable of capturing the complexity of residents' experience of violence and insecurity in marginalised urban communities; they served to declare short-term victories once homicidal violence started to decrease in the mid 1990s (Velez Rendon 2012:82). Furthermore, during this decade the state looked for new interlocutors and mechanisms to reduce violence. However, the idea that marginalised urban communities needed to collaborate in the security effort led to the delegation of security provision and conflict resolution tasks in these areas to non-state actors that often resorted to violence.

By the end of the 1990s, when a new cycle of violence started, there was growing consensus among security experts, academics and public policymakers that the municipal responses to violence relied on what Uribe de Hincapie called the 'negotiation of disorder' through precarious

agreements and pacts (Uribe de Hincapie 1997). Leaving the management of conflict and insecurity in marginalised areas to communities and local armed groups made the state incapable of imposing a republican order and produced the privatization of security in ways that reproduced violence. This decade ended with the conviction that the state's renunciation to exercise monopoly of violence in marginalised areas and to be the primary provider of services such as security and justice had led to a trap. The state initiatives had not addressed structural problems facilitating the consolidation of armed actors in the city, nor provided sustainable relief to people's security needs. On the contrary, they created more incentives for the violent competition to provide 'security' in the communities and reinforced the 'porosity' of the state by allowing competitive, parasitic and mutualistic relations between these organizations and state institutions (Gutierrez Sanin and Jaramillo 2004). According to local experts this led to the diversification of armed actors in the periphery of the city and the entrenchment of paramilitary groups (Restrepo et al 2012b:231; Giraldo 2008).

The second Crisis (late 1990s to early 2000s): The Urbanization of Conflict and the Consolidation of Criminal Actors

The universe of armed actors in Medellin diversified with the failure of the demobilization of militia groups, the consolidation of criminal structures at the hands of a new mafia boss called Don Berna after the dismantling of the Medellin cartel, and the incursion of paramilitary forces with a counter-insurgent agenda in 1997. Guerrilla groups that had not participated in the demobilization (mainly ELN and FARC) consolidated their influence in the marginalised but strategic areas of the city. Capitalizing on the military training provided by guerrilla groups and the Medellin cartel, new youth gangs locally known as combos had also multiplied. These worked in small groups, were in control of particular territories and offered services to bigger criminal actors⁵⁵. In this context, when the dominant paramilitary association

55 By 2004 there were 201 combos with 6,030 members according to official estimates.

in the country, the AUC, decided to launch a military campaign to eliminate the guerrilla presence in the city, it decided to use many of these groups and the criminal structures in the city to combat the militias.

The outcome was an urban conflict of serious proportions with militias and paramilitary fronts competing for the control of neighbourhoods located at the periphery of the city but of strategic importance. The number of homicides, disappearances, threats, indiscriminate shootouts, intimidations and forced displacements increased in the most vulnerable areas (Angarita et al 2008). Paramilitary forces progressively challenged militias' control of territories, which was already in decline. Given their abuses and an arbitrary use of violence, militias had started to lose their legitimacy as the dominant social ordering force in marginalised communities.

In 2001, a particular paramilitary front called Bloque Cacique Nutibara gained prominence. It managed to congregate drug trafficking networks, members of criminal organizations and paramilitary members in the pursuit of the same objective: to eliminate militias and to achieve the social and territorial control of key areas in the city that would grant them monopoly of violent protection markets (Bedoya 2009), simplify the protection of their illegal economies, increase the possibility of investing in legal activities and allow them to exercise control of communities⁵⁶. They succeeded, and by 2002 this group had achieved the control of 70% of the neighbourhoods in the city (Alonso-Espinal et al 2012).

The state was entirely incapable of exercising sovereignty in marginalised urban communities. These territories controlled by urban militias of guerrilla groups with national reach, had become no-go areas for the state authorities. The armed attack on the car transporting the Mayor of Medellin through

56 For further analysis of how violent protection became a productive source of wealth for many type of groups in Medellin and how they became enterprises which not only used it as a way of waging war and protecting the narcotics industry, but also of controlling other activities like wholesales markets, gambling, liquor distribution, electronics contraband, and making profitable the 'protection' of residents, retail business and transport companies, see Bedoya 2009.

*Comuna 13*⁵⁷ in 2002, was a clear demonstration of the power achieved by these groups, especially the FARC. In this context, the newly elected president Uribe decided to launch a series of military campaigns to allow the security forces to take control of this area and defeat of militia groups.

The use of heavy weaponry in a densely populated area created uncertainty and fear among the local population, who experienced the heavy exchange of fire for days, saw their houses raided, and had at least 40 civilians injured and around 308 detained. These military interventions were carried out with the support of illegal paramilitary groups⁵⁸ that used extreme means of violence to defeat remaining militia members or those regarded as their collaborators⁵⁹. In consequence, at the same time that these military interventions marked the beginning of the state's attempt to establish permanent presence in historically marginalised areas of the city, they also allowed the consolidation of paramilitary control of these areas (Angarita et al 2008). Paradoxically the military interventions were regarded as a success by some residents, by the wider public and by the government, given that it put an end to fierce urban battles, produced the defeat of urban militias in the city and an immediate reduction in the number of homicides (see Figure 1).

57 This is a strategic area of the city with a population of around 135,000 people and comprising 19 neighbourhoods located at the western part of the city.

58 It was revealed later on that the Army Chief and the Commander in Chief of the Metropolitan Police of the time had signed an agreement with Don Berna, a mafia boss and later commander of the urban paramilitary front, to jointly implement the military intervention in Comuna 13 .

59 Paramilitary members confessed the existence of mass graves in the high part of the comuna with victims of the paramilitary takeover. The commander of Bloque 'Cacique Nutibara', Diego Fernando Murillo, known as 'Don Berna', confessed that there were more than 100 mass graves in Comuna 13. It is also estimated that between 150 and 300 people were victims of forced disappearances (Verdad Abierta 2012)
<http://www.verdadabierta.com/nunca-mas/39-desaparecidos/568-la-gran-exhumacion-en-la-comuna-13-de-medellin>

Figure 1- Evolution of Homicide Rates in Medellin




Figure 1. Graphic produced by the author using data from: National Institute of Legal Medicine (INML), Technical Investigation Team (CTI), Information System for Security and Coexistence (SISC) and Secretary of Government of Medellin.

In addition to the coercive interventions in Comuna 13, another initiative which contributed to the further reduction of homicide rates in neighbourhoods with strong paramilitary presence (see Figure 1), was the national demobilization of paramilitary forces that began in 2003 (Giraldo Ramirez 2008;). The national government undertook negotiations with the Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia- AUC, a group comprising paramilitary fronts across the country which led to the demobilisation of the Bloque Cacique Nutibara in Medellin, in December 2003.

The process was initially regarded as a success (Palau and Llorente 2009). However the DDR did not stop the consolidation of a network of criminal organizations involving ex-combatants (Rozema 2008) lead by Don Berna, the commander of the demobilised Bloque Cacique Nutibara. Residents,

local leaders and members of community-based organizations and NGOs increasingly reported that some ex-combatants were still involved in criminal activities and exerting violence in the communities. Although they avoided killing people, they continued to use other forms of violence to discipline or punish individuals, and they intimidated and threatened members of the community who challenged their authority.

Demobilised members of the paramilitary fronts in the city had become the new regulators of criminal transactions in the city. They also participated in local politics and legal activities and had access to and control of institutions and forms of community participation which allowed them to play as intermediaries between communities and the local administration, using their status as ex-combatants (Alonso-Espinal et al 2012). They also started to create their own civil and community organizations⁶⁰, which increased the perception that local institutions and civil spaces were still being co-opted by violent actors.

As seen in figure 1, the reduction in the number of homicides continued from 2003 until 2008. The rates registered during this period were the lowest the city had seen in two decades, which gave confidence to local analysts, government officials and international agencies that a structural change had taken place in the dynamic of violence in the city (Giraldo 2012; Giraldo Ramirez 2008 ; Alcaldia de Medellin 2008-2011). It is during this period that Medellin started to attract the attention of urban planners, development agencies, local government officials, police forces and security experts from across the world, as a successful story of urban renaissance.

The trajectory of the homicide rates in Medellin, shown in figure 1, certainly illustrates the fluctuations and the general descending levels of lethal violence in the city. However, it alone cannot be considered a true depiction of the security situation as there are important issues regarding its reliability. Different institutions report slightly different numbers of homicides, and even more importantly, the homicide rates do not capture the acute problem of

60 Such as 'Corporacion Democracia'.

forced disappearances. The reported number of victims of disappearances has remained high even in periods when homicides descend, as well as other forms of non lethal violence, such as forced inter and intra urban displacement and extortion, which have increased exponentially since 2008 and 2005 respectively.

Furthermore, the homicide rates do not capture other forms of violence that are inherent to the problem of violence and insecurity in the city, which need to be taken into account. The high levels of sexual violence and exploitation and recruitment of children by armed groups in the city are examples of other serious security problems that tend to be overlooked within security analysis that rely on homicides rates as the main indicator of the situation in the city. It is worth highlighting that Medellín's local authorities have indeed allocated important efforts to improve the capacity of the Municipality to collect and analyse data regarding security problems including lethal and not lethal violence, as well as crimes against property, but policy design and public debate about security tend to be dominated by the fluctuations in homicides rates. This is even more problematic given the fact that some temporary declines in the number of homicides rates have resulted from legal or illegal pacts between armed actors or by reduced violent competition between criminal actors when one of them defeats its opponents and achieves undisputed territorial, and social control of communities.

The third crisis (2008-2011): Disorganization of crime and continuity of chronic insecurity

Notwithstanding the reduction of homicides rates and some improvements in levels of quality of life in some of the marginalised areas of the city during the 2000s⁶¹, structural factors facilitating the reproduction of multiple forms of violence in the city remained unaddressed, making conditions still ripe for a

61 Poverty levels reduced during the 2000s. In 2012, 17,7% of Medellín's residents lived in poverty and 3,5% in extreme poverty. Access to primary education reached 80% of the population, the coverage of public health around 96% of the population and access to public utilities was 100% according to the Municipality the same year.

new cycle of violence in 2008. The type of urban war between armed groups that marginalised communities had endured at the beginning of this century, reignited that year after Don Berna and the main paramilitary leaders in the city were extradited to the United States. They were in control of the criminal structures and networks in the city at the time and their departure created a vacuum of power that triggered violent clashes between competing criminal factions. The restructuring of the criminal world produced fierce confrontations between local gangs allied with two opposing criminal bands who competed for the control of territories and of a lucrative portfolio of criminal activities. This included violent protection enterprises around drug trafficking activities⁶² (Bedoya 2009), but also the control of other activities like wholesales markets, gambling, liquor distribution, electronics contraband, theft and the extortion to residents, retail businesses, taxi and bus drivers and transport companies.

In the attempt to guarantee the control of strategic areas, local armed groups tightened their social and territorial control of local populations⁶³. Many residents were forced to leave their houses⁶⁴ due to indiscriminate shootouts and threats. Local gangs re-established illegal curfews and 'invisible frontiers' (*fronteras invisibles*) to limit residents' movements across neighbourhoods under the threat of death. In 4 years, from 2008 to 2011, armed confrontations between local gangs took place in 52 neighbourhoods across the city leaving 6905 people killed⁶⁵, 10612 reported victims of intra-urban displacement, undetermined number of forced disappearances, high

62 Drug trafficking within the city border alone produces approximately 5,055,611.7290 USD a month.

63 There is no consensus regarding the number of armed groups in the city. In June 2009, according to the Commander of the Police in the City, there were 123 identified groups with approximately 3.600 members, while in early 2010, according to the Public Ministry, the number of gangs and criminal groups was 343. In 2012 the local authorities recognised 10 criminal organised groups (*bandas*), 201 youth gangs (*combos*) and 5 militia groups in the city. Altogether these added up to approximately 6000 members.

64 4.375 people were forced to leave their houses in 2009 (Personería de Medellín. Human Rights Report 2009).

65 From 2008 to 2009 the homicide rate increased 107% (Medellin Como Vamos 2009)

levels of desertion at local schools⁶⁶ and the intensification of recruitment of children and young people by these groups⁶⁷.

This last crisis was a reminder that criminal actors linked to drug trafficking and benefiting from expanding illegal economies had continued to mutate and adapt in the context of Medellín's urban development and of changing forms of community governance, while retaining their social, economic and political standing (Abello Colak and Guarneros Meza 2014) and increasing their coercive power over communities. The exponential increase in the number of homicides also demonstrated that the city was still vulnerable to new cycles of armed violence and insecurity produced by confrontations among armed actors interested in the control of illegal economies and strategic areas of the city.

Although there was a slight reduction in the number of homicides in 2011 and 2012, resulting from fragile pacts between leaders of local gangs in some areas and the weakening of one of the criminal factions at war, ten years after the implementation of coercive and preventive measures, some urban communities still endured chronic levels of violence and insecurity that require humanitarian assistance (Bernal Franco and Navas Caputo 2013). Illegal armed actors continued to exert territorial control in order to benefit from illegal economies (OSHM 2012), and sporadic armed confrontations, forced displacement of residents⁶⁸, targeted killings and threats also occurred as a consequence of their continued competition. In March 2013 the Ombudsman's Office estimated that around 95000 people living in

66 Many parents stopped sending their children to schools due to the violent confrontations, which happened anytime during the day or night, or to the fact that gangs were forcing or persuading children and young people to join them. (Instituto Popular de Capacitación-IPC 2010b; Corporación Con-Vivamos 2010))

67 In some neighbourhoods, people reported that these groups recruit children as young as 9 years old. They use them to carry arms and drugs and in some cases, to commit more serious crimes. (informal conversations with residents 2010)

68 Intra-urban displacement continued to grow from 2009 to 2012. The public institution overseeing human rights violations in the city received reports of forced displacement cases involving at least 9,941 victims in 2012 (Quality of Life Report, Medellín Como Vamos 2013).

neighbourhoods across the city and the metropolitan area were at risk of threats, extortion, limitations to their movement across neighbourhoods, recruitment, armed confrontations, forced displacement, violence and sexual exploitation by armed actors in dispute for territorial control of these areas. In addition to the expansion of multiple forms of extortion across the city and the special vulnerability of young girls, women, social and community leaders, human rights defenders, displaced population, business owners, public transport drivers and people involved in social work in these communities, the report highlighted that around 18500 children and young men between 10 and 19 years old were at risk of being recruited and used by local gangs (Defensoria del Pueblo 2013).

Medellin has become a regional pole of attraction for investment and is regarded as an example of urban transformation (Navarrete 2014; EDU and BID 2014; Hermelin et al 2010; Cerda et al 2012; The Guardian 2012). Reductions in the number of homicides in the city⁶⁹ have contributed to the positive image of the city internationally. However multiple forms of violence persist in the city and the current security situation depends more on the fragile arrangements between powerful criminal organisations than on state policies. Various factors call for caution in the assessment of Medellin's security future, among them: the ongoing expansion of illegal economies, attempts by powerful criminal groups that emerged from the failure of the AUC demobilisation⁷⁰ to control them, the hardships endured by big portions of the population who find it hard to become part of the legal economy of this globalising city, high levels of corruption within security and justice institutions, the city's key location in the Colombian internal conflict and the legacy of three decades of violence. Despite the permanence of these factors the city's authorities continue to capitalise on the interventions that

⁶⁹ Homicide rates reduced 67% between 2010 and 2014 (Citizen Council for Public Security and Criminal Justice 2014)

⁷⁰ 'Los Urabenos' for example, is a group made up of demobilised paramilitary combatants and members of the paramilitary groups who did not demobilise. This group already achieved the control of key drug trafficking routes and areas across the country and is consolidating its power in Medellin.

were implemented during the 2000s in Medellin, by portraying them as a successful model of urban transformation and a reason to invest in the city.

State Security Initiatives from 2002 to 2012: The configuration of the 'Medellin Model'

Medellin had attracted national and international attention since the early 1990s as the world's capital of drug trafficking and violence, but the sudden and impressive reduction in the number of homicides which took place from 2002 to 2007 not only transformed the city's reputation, but it inspired a new wave of interest on the kind of initiatives implemented in the city during this period. Medellin not only seemed to be finding its way out of chronic levels of urban violence at a time when violence and fear of violence across Latin American cities were on the rise, but it was also experiencing a visible physical transformation and implementing new forms of state intervention in marginalized urban areas as part of what the administrations of Sergio Fajardo (2004-2007) and Alonso Salazar (2008- 2011) called a model of integral social development (Salazar 2011).

With the support of international organizations, these local administrations made Medellin's transformation during the 2000s known worldwide. The international recognition of Medellin's renaissance came through international awards to the city ⁷¹ and through increased interest in it by national and foreign investors, academics from different disciplines and urban planners⁷². The notion of a successful 'Medellin model' for public intervention from which lessons could be learnt, rapidly took hold with the visits of policy makers from other cities, such as the visit of Cabral the governor of Rio to Medellin, which partly inspired him to create the pacification initiatives in Rio.

⁷¹Medellin received the 'Habitat Honor' award in 2010 by the UN-Habitat. It was also chosen the most innovative city in the world by The Wall Street Journal and Citigroup in 2013.

⁷² See for example the ESRC funded project 'Local governance, urban mobility and poverty reduction. Lessons from Medellin, Colombia' <http://www.esrc.ac.uk/my-esrc/grants/RES-167-25-0562/read>

Big events, such as the 50th assembly of BID in March 2009, have also been used as a platform to exhibit the Medellin model⁷³. Many more visitors have come to Medellin to this day to attend training courses provided by local academic institutions that promote the notion of the Medellin model. The dissemination of Medellin's achievements at international forums, the naming of some programs implemented as 'successful practices' and efforts to systematize the policies with the aim of extracting lessons for other contexts through publications and even a website supported by the BID, are evidence of the recognition and interest in the city as a source of successful and transferable practices for other cities in the global south.

The prominence achieved by the interventions implemented in Medellin and their resemblance with those used in other cities in the last decade, makes the analysis of security provision in Medellin in the last decade a strategic platform for a critical examination of the kind of responses to urban insecurity that seem to be in configuration in the global South, as well as of their unintended effects.

A Mixed Approach to Security Provision

As a way to contain urban violence and insecurity in Medellin, national and local governments opted during the last decade for a combination of urban pacification techniques, followed by an effort to entrench community policing approaches, increase state presence and service delivery in marginalised urban areas, as well as socio-economic interventions and urban upgrading projects. These policies are in tune with changes seen in other lower and middle income cities since the 1990s regarding the way governments have started to engage with slums in the process of reducing and preventing violence and promoting urban security. In order to characterise such a

⁷³Such as the exhibition 'Medellin: A City Transformation' (*Medellin: Transformacion de una Ciudad*)

complex mix of public security initiatives implemented in Medellin between 2002 and 2012 I have broadly classified them into four clusters.

Components of the Mixed Approach to Security Provision in Medellin (2002-2011)

Cluster 1: Coercive Initiatives to Reclaim Territorial Control and Establish State Authority

The first emblematic step in the configuration of a new form of security provision in Medellin was the implementation of major military and police operations in 2002, which aimed at allowing the state forces to take control of areas dominated by non-state actors. Among those interventions Operacion Mariscal (in 21 May 2002) and Operacion Orion (in 16-18 October 2002) were the biggest military interventions ever undertaken in any Colombian city. These were carried out in Comuna 13, an urban community at the centre-west of the city and involved joint operations, more than a thousand units from the army, the police, the air force, the administrative department of security (DAS) and the prosecution office.

This type of operation, which sought to concentrate the monopoly of violence on the state forces and to physically retake urban territory in which the state had little or no presence, has also been used in other cities. In Rio de Janeiro they were used to take control of the Alemao and Rocinha favelas (in 2010 and 2011 respectively), in Kingston, in the form of a major raid against drug lord Christopher 'Dudus' Coke, and in Tijuana and Ciudad Juarez with military operations against drug trafficking groups (Felbab-Brown 2011). Once these interventions allow state forces to enter urban spaces and challenge adverse non-state actors, they are followed by measures that seek to permanently establish state authority in these areas.

In Medellin, the military and police operations implemented at the beginning of the decade aimed at challenging the dominance of militia groups in

strategic areas of the city. After 2009 these interventions have also been used in a smaller scale to dismantle criminal bands and suppress local gangs that consolidated after the failed demobilisation of paramilitary forces in the city. A particularity of these coercive interventions, which in the case of Medellin produced a sharp decrease in the number of homicides between 2002 and 2008, is their emphasis on the physical occupation of urban communities by state forces. In contrast to previous sporadic interventions, these pacification operations were followed by the construction of new police stations, the reinforcement of military bases and the deployment of an important number of police and military personnel to targeted areas, in the attempt to guarantee state's permanent presence there.

The emphasis on the physical exercise of sovereignty by the state, led to an increase in the number of police officers in Medellin in the last decade. While there were little more than 4,000 policemen in the city in 2001, between 2002 and 2008 the number increased to a minimum of 5,000 and a maximum of 5,600 men (Alcaldia de Medellin 2009:3). This has led to the militarization of some of the marginalised urban communities in the city, which tend to concentrate a higher number of police and military personnel compared to better off communities. The number of security forces rapidly increases even further in these areas when outbreaks of violence take place, as special units and reinforcements are sent to respond to particular crises.

These interventions aimed at weakening powerful non-state actors demand a great deal of intelligence gathering efforts. In the case of the military operations targeting militias carried out in 2002, most of the intelligence and even military support to the state's security forces was provided by paramilitary forces and local criminal groups. This allowed the state to successfully defeat and expel militias from the city but it also allowed new armed and criminal actors to consolidate their power in these areas.

By the end of the decade, the state has increasingly put more emphasis on collecting intelligence with the help of local residents and the use of security technology. In 2009 for example, in the midst of violent confrontations

between local gangs, police and local authorities demanded information that could assist in their fight against gang members, from residents of urban communities affected by urban battles. Community meetings and public assemblies that had served as spaces of deliberation on local development issues were used by the local authorities to demand residents' collaboration in the security effort. In this line, in 2010 the national government of Alvaro Uribe also suggested the implementation of a programme to employ students in networks of informants established by the army to gather intelligence in their fight against insurgent groups across the country. The initiative intended to pay economic rewards to students in exchange for information that could be used to capture criminals in Medellin's problematic areas. Although the local government did not support the implementation of such problematic programmes, economic rewards are widely used to encourage citizens' participation in the fight against criminal actors, especially in response to outbreaks of violence that continue to take place in the city. As an example, in the attempt to weaken the criminal bands and local gangs involved in the armed confrontations that took place since 2008, the Police offered rewards to citizens in exchange for information regarding the location of criminals or arms⁷⁴.

Coercive interventions to regain control of urban communities in Medellin were first implemented by the Uribe government as part of its national security strategy. However the city's local governments (2004-2011) also strongly supported the strengthening of the security forces' capacity to combat armed groups and to remain in these areas as a key and powerful actor. An important component of their local development plans and of their security plans for the city and the metropolitan area was to support the modernization of the security and justice agencies.

⁷⁴In 2012 the police offered around 5 thousand dollars (10 million pesos) for information on the location of high level criminals and arms. People could get paid around 400 dollars (800.000 pesos) if they give information that allows police to confiscate a rifle, 260 dollars (500.000) for a pistol, 52 dollars (100.000) for a grenade and 26 dollars (50.000) for ammunition.

The local governments invested important resources in improving and building security infrastructure in marginalised areas (police stations and Centres of Immediate Attention –CAIs), on transport and communication equipment for the police forces, on technological and logistical support and on their training too (Alcaldia de Medellin 2009). In order to facilitate coordination among security institutions, in 2008 the city's government also created the System of Information for Security and Coexistence –SISC, an institution which focuses on the collection, organization and analysis of information regarding insecurity factors such as the evolution of urban conflict, homicides and high impact crimes, the functioning of the justice system and domestic violence. These efforts led to important increases in the level of public spending on citizen security in the last decade and demonstrate the local governments' commitment to invest larger proportions of the city's budget in supporting the exercise of territorial control by the state in contested urban areas. From 1,29% of the local budget allocated in 2003 to security, the percentage increased to an average of 3,6% between 2004 and 2009 (Giraldo Ramirez 2010: 321) and to 3,9 in 2012 with the arrival of Anibal Gaviria's new government (Medellin Como Vamos 2013).

Coercive interventions to retake territorial control rely on establishing different security priorities and using different tactics in different localities. With the resurgence of armed confrontations in 2009, involving local armed groups in marginalised communities, the tendency towards the implementation of special interventions in areas that concentrate higher levels of violence, led to the identification of differentiated security provision across the city, as a guiding principle for security policies in Medellin. The influence of armed actors in marginalised communities, their military power and their capacity to bring to a halt those communities, not only served as a justification for the implementation of special security measures there, such as curfews for young people and increments in the number of police officers and special units, but also for the reformulation of the local security policy in 2009.

The new citizen security and coexistence policy called 'Safer Medellin: Together We Can' (*'Medellin mas Segura: Juntos si Podemos'*), sought to preserve the presence and authority of the state in these areas by allocating security and justice institutions' resources and institutional efforts across the city, according to the specific security problems and the incidence of violence in each community. The new security policy, highlighted by the IADB, UN-HABITAT and the Municipality of Medellin as key in the urban transformation of Medellin (Alcaldia de Medellin 2011), relied on the characterisation of urban localities according to their security problems, social fabric and socioeconomic conditions, and the design of different local security plans for particular areas. Using mapping tools the municipality classified urban areas across the city as either: safe communities, safe zones, sensitive zones or critical points. The first two were residential, commercial and industrial areas with better socioeconomic conditions affected mostly by crimes against property and social indiscipline. In these localities the municipality focused on encouraging residents and the private sector to co-fund and co-manage security with the authorities. This meant the creation of public-private alliances, social networks and committees to make diagnostics of the security situation in these areas and to implement local security plans with public and private funding and with the participation of private security companies (Angarita Cañas 2012; Alcaldia de Medellin 2011).

In the case of sensitive areas and critical points, areas highly affected by urban violence, inhabited by marginalised sectors of the population and characterised by the presence of criminal actors exerting territorial control, the security strategy focused on implementing zero tolerance measures against delinquency, promoting residents' collaboration with the security institutions in the fight against criminal actors by reporting crimes and providing intelligence, and implementing social programmes targeting poor youth in risk of being recruited by armed actors. As the Secretary of Government during the Salazar administration described:

'given that there are different problems in different communities, the best way to describe what we (the local state) do is: in safe

communities we shake hands with people, in sensitive areas we use a clenched fist and in critical areas we hit hard'

(Interview Former Secretary of Government, 4/11/2009).

This local security policy which sought to mobilise citizen support and private resources for the modernization of public provision of security, characterises a global tendency towards the territorialisation of security interventions, the focalisation of resources on key areas and the promotion of citizen participation in security programs under the principle of co-responsibility. While the security effort demanded from the most vulnerable segments of society a risky involvement in intelligence gathering activities aimed at increasing the state's capacity to challenge non-state actors, residents of better off neighbourhoods and influential segments, such as the productive and entrepreneurial sector, were consulted on security tactics that suit their needs and were asked to partner with the local state through economic contributions and investments on logistical and technological security infrastructure in their areas.

By the end of the decade, local efforts to guarantee the state's presence and authority in marginalised communities have increasingly focused on improving the security institutions' capacity to combat criminal actors. An important amount of the resources invested in security issues are now allocated to the dismantling and attack on criminal organizations⁷⁵. The local governments' efforts to territorialise security provision and to improve intelligence gathering and technological, logistical and legal capacities of security institutions during the last decade have also been embraced by the national government of President Santos. In 2010 for the first time the Colombian government launched a national policy on Coexistence and Citizen Security and a new police strategy across the country called 'National Plan for Community Surveillance by Quadrants'. In 2011 the new Colombian government also appointed a high presidential advisory entity on citizen

75 In 2012 around 48% of the local budget on security was allocated to dismantling criminal organisations

security and coexistence and obtained approval by the congress on a new Citizen Security Law.

The law sought to offer new legal tools for the security institutions to respond to criminality in the cities, emphasizing that security provision is the main responsibility of the security forces, the National Penitentiary institute – INPEC and the justice system. This law demonstrated the national government and the Congress's move towards a punitive approach to urban security that resembles what criminologists denote as penal populism (Basombrio and Dammert 2013). The law expanded the list of offences by including new types, increased sentences for existing offences, it also reformed the code ruling underage citizens in conflict with the law by increasing sentences for crimes committed by those between 14 and 18 years old and it finally widened the police's role when dealing with detained youth.

On the other side, the national police strategy launched by the new government sought to reorganise and focus the operative capacity of the police around quadrants. These are geographical sectors in which cities are divided according to their social, demographic and geographical characteristics and that receive different types of police service that range from preventive initiatives and citizen education on security and coexistence issues, to deterrence and crime control programmes (Policia Nacional 2010:24). The main objectives of this police strategy, which resembles community oriented policing strategies used in other cities, is to improve police service through the allocation of responsibilities and resources to specific territorial segments, to improve the capacity of police officers assigned to those quadrants to collect intelligence regarding insecurity factors and actors and to support police work with use of technological tools.

By 2012, the last year included in this research, the increasing importance assigned by municipal and national authorities to the use of technology was evident in the fight against crime and the exercise of state authority in marginalised areas with high presence of armed groups. Proof of such

emphasis on the use of technology is the decision of the Colombian President and the Ministry of Defence to make the Police's Central Intelligence agency (DIPOL), the leading institution in implementation of the country's new citizen security strategy, as well as to create the most modern hub of information for combating crime in Latin America. For this purpose a highly sophisticated complex was built for the collection and processing of information which allows the central intelligence agency to coordinate urban operations based on the results provided by a system inspired by those used by Europol, the New York Police and the US Department (Semana 2013). Behind this decision there is a clear intention to use the experience and skills security institutions in the country have accumulated in the long fight against guerrilla groups and drug trafficking cartels, in a new declared war against urban criminality.

At the local level, the increased use of cameras and the approval in August 2012 of the first Metropolitan Plan on Security and Coexistence for the Aburra Valley, confirms the authorities' hope that the use of technology and multilevel institutional coordination will help improve urban security. The plan signed by 10 municipalities of Medellín's Metropolitan area, the Ministry of Interior and the security forces foresee the investment of 104 thousand million pesos on technological tools, as well as the training of community leaders on security issues and the creation of an elite force within the security forces that will focus on high value targets (Cano 2012).

The move since 2009 towards national and local security strategies and interventions focused on weakening and attacking criminal actors, is being reinforced by the perception that a potential post-conflict context in the country will create big security challenges in Colombian cities. In that context, as much attention is being paid now to the state's capacity to retain territorial control and authority in urban areas, as in the early 2000s when militias and paramilitary groups dominated entire communities. At the beginning of the second decade of the XXI century and despite the security interventions described above, criminal organizations have consolidated their capacity to exert territorial, social and economic control of urban

communities in order to benefit from profitable illegal economies and also from the arrival of public resources to marginalised communities (OSHM 2012; Abello Colak and Guarneros-Meza 2014; Bedoya 2010)⁷⁶.

Cluster 2: Increased Institutional Presence in Marginalised Communities

An important aspect of the security strategy used in Medellin was the establishment of institutional referents of the state in marginalised communities which had been controlled by illegal armed actors. As in other cases across the region, pacification operations in these areas pursued the interrelated objectives of establishing the state's presence in contested territories and realigning the allegiance of the population to the State (Felbab-Brown 2011). In the particular case of Medellin, the heavily-armed military and police interventions used to physically control urban communities were complemented with efforts to increase citizens' trust in the State through their closer contact with security and justice institutions.

The action plan to improve citizen security and coexistence designed by the local government in Medellin in 2008, for example, contained programmes and initiatives to bring security and justice provision closer to residents of marginalised communities. It is with this intention that the local government continued to invest not only in communication and transport equipment for the police forces, but it also planned the construction of 5 new police stations, 5 substations, 2 forts for the mounted police, 9 police centres for immediate response in strategic areas (CAI periferico-Centro de atencion inmediata) and 5 mobile police centres for immediate response, as well an increased number of community police officers in 500 more men (Alcaldia de Medellin 2009).

⁷⁶This issue will be discussed further in chapter six of this thesis.

The security infrastructure built in marginalised areas was meant to improve the physical environment in these communities while at the same time allowing the police to respond faster to criminal groups and activities. Prior to the interventions in these communities in 2002, police were only stationed at the centre of the city and this, according to them, diminished their responsiveness to incidents occurring at the side hills of the city. As an innovative approach to this problem, centres for immediate response were specifically built in strategic areas at the margins of the city (*CAIs perifericos*). Located in the highest geographical points of the peripheral communities and with special light systems, these types of security buildings became strategic surveillance posts with panoramic views of the communities for the police forces (see photos below).




CAI Periferico 1



Photos: *CAI Periférico Medellín / EDU 03 feb 2012. Plataforma Arquitectura.*
<<http://www.plataformaarquitectura.cl/cl/02-135902/cai-periferico-medellin-edu>>

The following map shows the distribution of these and other security and justice offices across the city in 2009, with an important concentration of security infrastructure in neighbourhoods with historically higher levels of violence (at the centre-west, centre and northeast of the city).



Alcaldía de Medellín 2009

The construction of these institutional spaces and others, such as schools, libraries and parks, complemented the coercive measures used by the State to try to achieve the monopoly of violence and were also an attempt by the local government to create physical benchmarks of the State's presence in the communities. The establishment of these physical and institutional

symbols sought to make the State a recognizable, capable, trustable and effective actor in these communities (Alcaldia de Medellin 2009:19).

Regarding the access to these security and justice institutions by residents of marginalised areas, the local government decided to concentrate human, logistical and technical resources in particular locations so that citizens could find easier access to police inspections, family commissaries, local prosecution and ombudsman's offices, justice houses and conciliation centres offering access to mechanisms for alternative conflict resolution. The local authorities were willing to recognise the security needs of women and launched in 2008 a Strategy for Public Security for Women (*Estrategia de Seguridad Publica para las Mujeres*). This strategy designed with the support and input of the social movements promoting gender equality in the city and cooperation agencies, established principles, guidelines and actions to improve women's security situation and perception (Alcaldia de Medellin 2008-2011).

Although the police and the judicial apparatus remained under the national government's control and guidance, the local governments also tried to establish a closer relation with the local Commander of the Police. They also created entities for coordination between security, administrative and justice institutions at local level, such as Local Government Committees (*Comités Locales de Gobierno*) in which police and civil local authorities could coordinate the state intervention in each area and interact with the community. These committees organized Citizen Coexistence Councils (*Consejos de Convivencia Ciudadana*) to discuss security issues with the communities⁷⁷ and were in charge of making diagnostics of security problems, articulating and coordinating local plans and programs implemented by the local administration in each comuna and legitimizing the state presence in these territories. Another important institutional innovation was the creation of a permanent unit for the oversight of Human Rights at the city level.

⁷⁷ 858 Councils were organised from 2004 to 2008 in 33% of all neighbourhoods in the city.

Other deliberative spaces created in the communities for participation on issues related to local planning also became spaces for the peaceful resolution of conflicts at the local level. These served to support the creation of community discussion spaces focusing on security problems at local level called Human Rights and Coexistence Tables (*Mesas de Derechos Humanos y Convivencia*).

The stated objective of the increased institutional presence was to make the State the only provider of security and justice in these areas where those services have historically been in the hands of a diversity of armed actors. However, criminal actors still play a key role in the provision of violent forms of protection, security, private justice and conflict resolution at community level, as well as in offering means for survival to residents struggling with high levels of poverty.

After a decade of efforts to establish State authority in these communities, the permanence and power of criminal actors in these communities and especially the effects of their violent competitions for territorial control since 2008 have changed the focus of the institutional presence of police and the justice authorities in marginalised urban communities. Rather than improving the capacity of these institutions to respond to the multiplicity of problems residents face on a daily basis, the police strategy and the justice system's efforts are concentrating on combating local armed groups and capturing their leaders. This normally produces more violence in urban communities, due to increasing competition within the criminal organizations to fill the power vacuums. After the last violent crisis between 2008 and 2011, it seems that the State presence in marginalised communities is becoming less concerned with making the State capable of social and community regulation, than with winning an almost impossible war against criminal networks which are being fuelled by drug trafficking and expanding illegal economies.

Cluster 3: Prioritised Attention to Youth with Emphasis on those Directly Involved in Urban Violence

An important characteristic of the Medellín Model that started to give shape to a particular form of public service delivery in marginalised communities since 2002, was its emphasis on implementing programmes targeting young people, especially those living in marginalised communities. Since the 1990s this population group had been stigmatised as the main generator of high levels of violence in the city, and in consequence many civil society and public initiatives undertaken in the city targeted this group. The growing interest in the situation of youth in the city had led to an important civil mobilisation and the articulation of networks of civil society actors working on youth issues. With the participation of young people they designed a strategic plan⁷⁸ for the improvement of public policies concerning young people in the city. Sergio Fajardo (2004-2007), the first mayor representing an independent and civic movement in the local government and his successor Alonso Salazar (2008-2011), sought to incorporate many of the projects' initiatives from that plan into their development projects, which increased the public offer and programmes available to young people in the city.

Many of the initiatives focused on improving access to education, creating spaces for the cultural initiatives of young people, promoting youth participation in democratic processes, and promoting coexistence in the city. These two local administrations stated their commitment to facilitating the incorporation of young population to the city's project, as a crucial requirement for sustained governability and security in the city. In that line they implemented projects providing subsidies and loans to young people from families with low incomes so that they could access university⁷⁹ and

78 The 'Strategic Plan for Youth Development 2003 – 2013'

79 Such as the scholarship programme funded by the EPM Fund which started in 2007 and the 'Youth with Future' Programme (*Jovenes con Futuro*) which offered support to initiate or continue university studies to people from 16 to 29 years old from poor backgrounds (*estratos* 1,2 y 3)

supported the work of public entities working on youth issues such as the Observatory of Youth (*Observatorio de Juventud*). However, the most important of these interventions in the city were those aimed at sending a clear message to those young people who had been involved in criminal activities and those who had not, that legality was an option, in other words that 'it paid to be good'.

At the heart of the local strategies aimed at improving security in the city were programmes for those young people who had been directly involved in the urban conflict such as members of local gangs and paramilitary groups, youth in penitentiary centres and what the local government classified as youth at high risk of being recruited by criminal organizations. Taking advantage of the reduction in the levels of violence that the military interventions and the demobilisation of paramilitary forces had produced in the city until 2008, the local governments decided to include in the security strategy for the city a more preventive approach to urban crime and violence targeting these population groups. They saw in the demobilization and reintegration of members of paramilitary fronts, an opportunity to end the presence and dominance of armed groups in urban communities and to prevent the involvement of young people in criminality. In that line, they decided to invest in an ambitious programme called 'Peace and Reconciliation: Return to Legality' (*Paz y Reconciliación: Regreso a la Legalidad*).

The programme started during the Fajardo administration in 2004 and it was continued by his successor. It aimed at supporting the reintegration of demobilising members of armed groups but also at fostering processes of reconciliation with victims and creating conditions for the construction of a more inclusive and democratic society by preventing the involvement of civilians in the conflict (Alcaldía de Medellín 2011:37). Within the framework of the negotiation between the Uribe government and the AUC, and with the support of the private sector and international organizations like the Organization of American States (OAS) and the International Organisation

for Migrations (OIM), which played an oversight and monitoring role⁸⁰, this local programme aimed at supporting the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) process led by the national government.

The programme was designed to provide the beneficiaries with psychosocial support, income, education and training tailored to their needs and juridical advice. This integral approach to the reintegration of combatants gave this programme national and international recognition as an innovative model of intervention to deal with situations of complex violence⁸¹. By 2010 the number of beneficiaries had reached 5564 former combatants (Alcaldia de Medellin 2011: 45), the equivalent of around 13% of the total number of demobilising combatants in the country. However, after 6 years of implementation, only 129 of them had completed the programme which made them socially and economically reintegrated, according to the programme standards. At the same time, 294 participants had either been expelled or were in process of being withdrawn from the programme.

The use of this type of programme, which gave exceptional benefits to young people from poor neighbourhoods who had been involved in criminal activities, as an instrument to discourage illegality and reduce violence, was given a new push when violence increased again in 2008. In combination with restrictive and coercive measures implemented by the police, such as a legal curfew for underage people, restrictions to carry arms and to transport passengers in motorcycles, establishing road blocks and stop and frisk practices targeting young people in the poorest neighbourhoods, the local government responded to the last crisis by expanding a programme called Young Force (*Fuerza Joven*). The local government decided to design a

⁸⁰Other international actors supporting this initiative were European Union, the Embassy of the Netherlands, Presencia Colombo-Suiza and Technological Institute of Monterrey (*Instituto Tecnológico de Monterrey*).

⁸¹The Colombian government suggested the design of a model transferable to other regions in the country based on the experience in Medellin. Also the programme was highlighted as a distinguished practice in the Dubai International Award for Best Practices to Improve the Living Environment (DIABP).

security plan to (i) strengthen the security institutions' reactive capacity, (ii) increase the number and access to social, educational and training programs available to the youth and (iii) encourage an active citizen mobilization against violence. As it was done in the past, the municipality also supported small-scale pacts and agreements between gangs to stop the killings. In order to carry out the second component, the Fuerza Joven initiative followed the same approach of the reintegration programme and required the investment of important institutional and public resources.

Fuerza Joven included 3 different programs for young people between the ages of 14 and 29. One program called Crime Doesn't Pay Off (*Delinquir no Paga*) directed to 15000 young students from high schools, one programme called Youth at high risk, which involved 3000 young people who were considered at risk of being recruited by criminal organizations, and another called Social Intervention in Jails, for more than 2000 young people who had already come in contact with the judicial system and were either in prison or in the process of demobilization (Ibid 75). In total, Fuerza Joven directly involved 20000 young people, whom the administration classified as at risk of exercising violence or becoming involved in criminal activities.

The programme was expected to help reduce crime levels in the city by offering young people alternatives to criminal activities and incentives not to ally with armed groups. It was awarded the second place in an international contest of Good Practices in Crime Prevention organised by the Interamerican Development Bank, also recognised as a promising intervention and included in the bank of good practices for the prevention of crime in Latin America and the Caribbean. From the three programmes, the one that gained most attention in the urban communities was the one for young people at risk. The official campaign presented the programme as an opportunity for young people living in the poorest communities, where the presence of criminal groups was stronger, to access a generous subsidy (half as a voucher and the other half in cash) and admission to education, training, cultural, sportive and social activities. However, the key requirement

to be accepted as beneficiary of this generous program was to be a member of a youth gang or a group connected to an armed group.

The emphasis on targeting the young portion of the population, especially the one in marginalised communities, with state initiatives and programmes, remained as a constant over the last decade. However, as in other countries, the national and local State resorted to the combination of preventive approaches and repressive measures in order to tackle insecurity and violence. Despite the emphasis on socio-economic prevention and programmes recognising young people in these contexts as active agents of positive change in their communities, when urban violence increased in marginalised communities as a result of violent competitions between local gangs that the demobilization was not able to dismantle, the state increased the dose of coercion and restrictive security measures targeting the underprivileged youth. These measures were still highly institutionalized, massively supported by the public and continuously reinforced by the international discourse of the war on drugs and on organized crime. Although the curfew imposed on young people from affected neighbourhoods⁸² as a way to reduce violence was not sustained, the approval of the new Citizen Security Law aimed at combating crime, suggested by the national government of President Santos to the Congress, reinforced the long established assumption that the main problem of security in Colombian cities was the lack of control and a weak system of punishments for young people who committed crimes.

For some external observers of the situation in marginalised communities (such as residents of other areas of the city as well as some politicians and public servants), the fact that the local state had invested in improving the

82 The measure was implemented with the intention of forcing young people living in the neighbourhoods where violence was high to stay indoors between 6pm and 5am. The measure had been used before in times of crises and had the support of some sectors of the population. It was strongly criticized by civil society, community organizations and groups of young people. According to these groups it stigmatised young people from these communities as the cause of the outbreak of violence, it also ignored structural factors causing insecurity and the immediate causes of this outbreak of violence.

provision of services in these communities and increased the number of programmes offering opportunities to young people from these areas, and that violence could so easily erupt there despite such institutional effort, demonstrated that the problem was not related to the socio-economic conditions of young people in and of these communities, but to the weakness of the security system to deal with a problematic sector of society that needed to be controlled⁸³.

Finally, it is worth highlighting here that the implementation of programmes for young people, especially those that were executed with the intention of reducing violence and insecurity in the city, required not only an important amount of public resources but also high levels of inter-institutional coordination. Different state agencies at local level needed to establish mechanisms to work together in order to implement such programmes, just as national and local tiers of government had to coordinate their actions. An important aspect of the mixed approach to security provision that was configured in Medellin in the last decade is its emphasis on institutional development, especially at local level. The implementation of integrated approaches to deal with identified vulnerable groups, such as young people at risk, demobilised ex-combatants, displaced populations, women, minority groups, etc., as well as the process of establishing state presence for the first time in areas of the city previously neglected, led to the creation of new entities and mechanisms at local level in the last decade, that suggest an increasing bureaucratization and sophistication of the local state. The implementation of a combined approach to urban security, as the case of Medellin illustrates, implies not only the redirection of public resources, but also increasingly complex and more sophisticated institutional processes.

Cluster 4: Urban Upgrading: Social Urbanism and Social Investment in Marginalised Areas

83 These views were expressed during informal conversations, as well as in public debates concerning the security situation in the city.

Fajardo and Salazar's administrations represented a civic and independent movement that claimed that the city needed a new administrative model focused on the social inclusion of the most marginalized sectors of society. In consequence, their periods in government were characterised by attempts to 'bring the State back' to those deprived areas not only through security forces and equipment, but also in the form of public services and programmes aimed at reducing the massive social debt and the inequalities accumulated for decades in the city.

During eight years, the local governments made important investments to expand and improve service delivery in marginalised areas, especially public education, health, access to public transport and basic utilities. Programmes to reduce poverty and to assist vulnerable populations groups like the Good Start Programme (*Programa Buen Comienzo*)⁸⁴ targeting children up to 5 years old, or Solidary Medellin (*Medellin Solidaria*)⁸⁵, as well as the reduction in the levels of violence the city experienced from 2002 to 2007, led to improvements in the Human Development (HDI) and Quality of Life (ICV) Indexes in the city (Alcaldia de Medellin ND).

These programmes that constituted a key aspect of the city's new social policy were also regarded by the two administrations as an important component of an integral strategy for improving urban security (Alcaldia de Medellin 2009:17). In Medellin, as in other cities struggling with the urban marginalization of important sectors of the population and growing urban insecurity, there was a growing assumption that poverty alleviation programmes in informal settlements and slum upgrading could stimulate transformations in urban safety and security.

At the heart of slum upgrading interventions to improve urban safety, there was a combination of public investment, alliances with the private and civil society sectors and improved service delivery and the transformation of

84 This offers resources and services to children and their families during the first 5 years of life, especially if they come from disadvantaged communities.

85 This offers support to people living in extreme poverty and it consists of 118 programmes administered either by public institutions or through alliances with the private sector.

urban space in marginalised areas as a way to alter the conditions that produced violence. Examples of this kind of scheme aimed at improving living conditions and transforming urban space while affecting security could be found in Rio de Janeiro (Favela Bairro (FB) project and Morar Carioca Project), in Cape Town (Urban Upgrading Programme (VPPU) by Cape Metropolitan Council, in Caracas (Consejo nacional de la vivienda (CONAVI) and in Ciudad Juarez (Todos Somos Juarez) (Muggah 2012, 2014b; UN-Habitat 2011; Samper 2011). In Medellin urban upgrading took the form of what the municipality called Integral Urban Projects (PUI).

In addition to the construction of mayor infrastructural projects across the city that aimed at making a city competitive and attractive for tourism, for hosting big events⁸⁶ and for investors, the Municipality implemented these Integral Urban Projects in areas of the city characterised by high levels of violence and low levels of human development (Neighbourhoods in the Northeast, Northwest and Centre-east of the city). These projects aimed at physical, social and institutional improvements in these communities.

The implementation of Integral Urban Projects emphasised what the local administrations called 'social urbanism': their effort to build the best quality infrastructure in the most deprived areas of the city as a first step in achieving social inclusion, reducing inequality and violence and improving peaceful coexistence. The Municipality's emphasis on urban upgrading in marginalised areas also resulted in the construction of quality schools (*Colegios de calidad*), nurseries, library-parks, medical centres, extensions to the public transport system in order to connect communities at the hillsides with the rest of the city called Metrocable (an aerial-cable propelled system of transport) and other solutions to improve resident's mobility, such as the construction of an electric escalator in Comuna 13 (see photos below).

86 For example the 2010 South American Games and the 50th Assembly of the Inter-American Development Bank (2009)



'España Library' (*Biblioteca España*)- Comuna 1 (Northeast area)



'Las Independencias School', Comuna 13 San Javier



Electric Escalator, *Comuna 13*

With interventions inspired by social urbanism, the local administrations also aimed at solidifying the state's institutional capacity to penetrate the daily life of citizens in marginalised communities. Not only did the visibility of infrastructure act as symbols of state presence in marginalised communities, but for the local administration, the use of public space by citizens facilitated by these infrastructural improvements was also a sign of the state's capacity to reclaim control of urban areas. According to Salazar, within his and his predecessor's strategy, urban planning and urbanism were crucial to improve governance of the territory because they helped to improve security which resulted from the social construction of coexistence (Salazar 2011) In their view, improving infrastructure and transforming urban spaces could decrease delinquency and get citizens involved in preventing anti-social behaviours and social indiscipline.

The efforts to create safer urban spaces that promote peaceful social interaction, a key part of the projects inspired by social urbanism in Medellin during the last decade, were highly influenced by the planning model promoted by the Safer Cities Programme and the Campaign on Urban Governance by the UN-HABITAT. Attempts like this to reduce and prevent urban violence and crime through situational prevention⁸⁷ and environmental design (CPTED)⁸⁸ complete the picture of the kind of security provision that characterised the Medellin Model. At the beginning of the second decade of this century however, security provision in marginalised communities seems to be moving towards the use of security technology and community policing approaches that seek to increase the capacity of security institutions to combat organised crime.

Although there is evidence that the two key drivers of the massive and rapid reduction in the levels of violence in the city were produced by the defeat of militia groups achieved by the military interventions in 2002 and the demobilization of paramilitary forces in the city under the undisputed hegemony of a powerful criminal organization, the local authorities and some experts have claimed that the integral transformation in urban space in marginalised communities produced the temporary reduction in homicides rates which made the city an emblematic case (Perez Salazar 2010).

The urban uplifting of marginalised areas in Medellin was accompanied by public policies and a management model which promoted deliberation and negotiation with communities and a transparent and more efficient management of public resources. This allowed the local government to resort to highly participatory methodologies for local planning and project design (Ibid), and to use participatory mechanisms such as the participatory budget programme (PB) guaranteed in the constitution, to give voice to citizens and

87creating physical areas that increase urban safety, investor's trust and that also strengthen social and cultural interaction

88This is a model that aims at reducing the vulnerability of residents to criminality through modifications in the built environment (for example improving street lighting and installing cameras).

communities in community development and planning initiatives. From 2004 to 2011 participation and co-responsibility became key principles in local public policy implementation. Participatory programmes such as 'Participatory Budgeting' did not only enhance the knowledge and skills accumulated by residents of these areas, but it also challenged entrenched practices of clientelism between local community leaders and political parties.

The emphasis and focus of the participatory local policy changed after 2008. During the period in which homicide rates were at their lowest (between 2002 and 2007) citizens' participation remained focused in areas of urban development and planning, but since the crisis of 2008-2010 the state authorities have increasingly demanded active participation of citizens in the security effort to combat powerful armed actors that exert influence in marginalised communities. As mentioned before, increasing desperation among local authorities for controlling and reducing violence in the city had also increased demands for people's help as informants and the use of community institutional spaces as tools to gather intelligence.

It is worth highlighting that despite the highly publicised achievements of the Medellín Model in terms of social indicators, the expansion of social investment made in the poorest communities of the city and their physical transformation did not achieve major improvements in terms of reducing social inequality and chronic levels of unemployment and informality. These problems continue to sentence a big segment of the population to persistent levels of poverty and exclusion. To illustrate, Medellín's Gini index of 0,506⁸⁹ in 2013 renders the city as one of the most unequal in Colombia. Access to basic services such as water and electricity increased substantially and formal coverage is now universal, but because many residents cannot afford to pay for these services, a large number of people are still disconnected

⁸⁹ Between 1991 and 2010 income inequalities widened. During this period the Gini index increased 20% in Medellín.

from the systems⁹⁰. In combination with the prevalence of structural problems, the arrival of local government services and the legalisation of tenure in marginalised neighbourhoods often bring an increase in the cost of living for residents, which guarantee that residents still struggle for survival. It is in this context and with the continued arrival of forcedly displaced people from rural areas in need of housing and services, that the developing tertiary economy of the city is incapable of offering sufficient jobs and opportunities and that criminal groups are able to play a key role in the survival of residents and on the social ordering of urban communities⁹¹.

Conclusion

This chapter analysed the trajectory of the efforts made to contain violence and insecurity in Medellín since the late 1980s when the city experienced an increase in levels of lethal violence. It identified the mixed security strategy implemented throughout the 2000s as evidence of a shift in the history of security provision in this city. The chapter also presented the context and the evolution of state responses focusing on how the problem of violence and insecurity was understood by policy makers and security specialists, and how different crises were addressed by different tiers of government. It also provided a critical analysis of a wide range of initiatives implemented by the state as part of the so-called 'Medellin Model' and how they related to the security effort.

This analysis of the security component of the 'Medellin Model' is important because despite its international recognition as a successful model for urban transformation, and it being credited with impressive improvements in security levels, few analyses have actually focused on what the model implied in terms of security governance. The interest to position the city as a laboratory of good practices and efforts to disseminate some of the initiatives implemented has led to compartmentalised analyses of state initiatives and their results in terms of dealing with urban mobility, reducing poverty and

90A programme providing a minimum of water (2.5 m³ per person) to people who cannot afford the service began in 2009 and has reached 25,084 users (Corporación Jurídica Libertad & Fundación Sumapaz 2011).

91 This will be further analysed in chapter six

social exclusion, and improving good governance. The analysis presented here, however, recognises that the 'Medellin Model' embodied a multi-purpose approach to secure the city which relied on a combination of strategies and tactics to deal with violence and insecurity.

This chapter presented a more coherent understanding of how security provision diversified and became more complex at the beginning of this century. It also highlighted continuities and discontinuities in the way the state has sought to govern insecurity through a combination of coercive interventions to regain control of marginalised communities and new and more participatory forms of managing urban marginality. In the following chapters I used an alternative way to analyse other aspects of the security approach in Medellin, mainly the processes that led to its configuration, the rationality of security efforts that concentrated state intervention in marginalised urban communities, and the contradictions of this security approach from the perspective of the residents of marginalised communities.

Chapter 5

Theorising the ‘Medellin Model’ through an Alternative Approach: Unpacking the Government of the ‘Ungoverned’ as a Means to ‘Secure’ the City

In this chapter, I use the analytical approach developed in Chapter two to theorise the security strategy used in Medellin as part of the ‘Medellin Model’. Using Foucault’s conceptual and analytical tools and critical discourse analysis, I unpack the rationality of the government of urban violence and instability in this city. In this chapter I argue that through a process of subjectification of the residents of marginalised urban communities as ‘ungoverned’, the authorities justified the implementation of a wide range of mechanisms of power which aimed at pacifying, controlling and transforming these communities. This governing process was seen by authorities as the best way of dealing with urban violence and instability. The chapter starts with an analysis of the social, economic and political processes that helped to shape security provision in Medellin between 2002 and 2012. Through critical discourse analysis it then unpacks the rationality of security provision in the city, highlighting the assumptions and calculations of local authorities regarding the problem of violence in the city, the instruments used to deal with it, and the role of knowledge production in the process.

Governing Urban Violence and Insecurity in Medellin

As was presented in the previous chapter, a sense of urban crisis produced by the dominance of armed actors in certain areas of the city and the violent urbanisation of the conflict in Medellin, prompted the action of policymakers at national and local level in the late 1990s and early 2000s. This ‘second crisis’⁹² was characterised by the violent competition among militias and paramilitary groups for the control of marginalised communities of strategic and economic significance. It is in this context that the Medellin Model and its particular form of security provision combining a complex mix of programmes and initiatives took shape in the first decade of this century.

⁹² This is the term I used to refer to it in the previous chapter.

The mixed approach to security provision used in Medellín was built on the knowledge produced from the implementation of a wide range of public initiatives in Colombia's three major cities (Bogotá, Medellín and Cali) during the 1990s, when these cities also experienced a crisis of violence and criminality. As pointed out by Perez Fernandez (2010), many programmes adopted by the local governments in Medellín since 2004 rescued initiatives used in Bogotá, for example, those aimed at transforming citizen culture (*cultura ciudadana*) and public space, combating clientelism and corruption through a more technical local government and an ethical management of public resources⁹³, improving education and ensuring the provision of basic services in marginalised areas to reduce the social debt (Perez Fernandez 2010). Improved versions of repressive, preventive and socio-economic oriented policies, which were once used to try to contain incredible high levels of violence, as well as new initiatives aimed at transforming the urban space, culture and local planning processes, were part of the strategy used in Medellín to tackle the new crisis of violence and instability (Fajardo 2007).

Despite the similarities between some of the programs implemented in Medellín and previous attempts to halt urban violence, the security strategy used between 2002 and 2012 had a particularity: it not only took shape in the context of an acute urban conflict, but it departed from a different understanding of the drivers of the city's problems. Unlike other Colombian cities, in the late 1990s Medellín became a key battleground for the armed actors involved in Colombia's internal conflict. The situation in Medellín was regarded as one of 'balkanization' of the city's territory (Acero ND:17) with guerrilla groups, right wing paramilitary fronts and criminal organisations controlling entire communities, exercising coercive power and illegal forms of security and justice, as well as competing to expand their influence.

The city was considered to be the most representative example of the wider security crisis across the country, which security experts, academics, policymakers and growing sectors of society attributed to the state's

⁹³ These were key promises of the Antanas Mockus administration (1995-1997 and subsequently 2001-2003) and of the Enrique Penalosa administration (1998-2000)

incapacity to exercise territorial control and monopoly of violence. The following quote from one of the most influential security experts in the country illustrates the dominant view during the 2000s. In his view, the State's incapacity to exercise its authority across the territory explained the growing capacity of armed and illegal actors to replace the state and accumulate social influence:

‘ the real and hidden roots of our political violence are traumatic and painful processes of territorial occupation (still unfinished), of state building and of national integration. We have much more territory than state and that state is precarious in the administration of justice, the collection of taxes and the exercise of monopoly of force. It is in these gaps and taking advantage of these weaknesses that irregular groups have grown...have gained support in sectors of the population and exercise para-state functions in many regions’ (Rangel, 2005:21 cited in Alcatdia de Medellin 2009:12).

This understanding of the country's situation inspired a new way of thinking about the urban problems in Medellin too and led to an important change in the strategy to deal with them. Until the late 1990s, the critical levels of violence in Medellin were understood to be mainly the result of structural problems (such as chronic poverty and unequal urban development), which were buttressed by the incursion of drug trafficking. Although these problems remained present in the public agenda and the new political movement in power since 2004 recognised the existence of a huge social debt demanding the relocation of public spending to address inequality (Fajardo 2007), both social marginalisation and high levels of urban violence were attributed to the fact that the state had relinquished its duties and was incapable of exercising its authority in areas where armed groups now challenged its sovereignty.

The ‘ungovernable city’

In this line of thought, the city's development plan designed by the Fajardo administration and continued by his successor, identified the situation in Medellin at the time as one characterized by a ‘systematic crisis of

governability' that resulted in high levels of violence and the existence of armed actors exercising territorial control of particular areas (Alcaldia de Medellin 2004). This notion of urban 'ungovernability' inspired a new government model and a wide range of interventions between 2004 and 2011. To make the city *governable*, the local administrations opted for a management model based on co-responsibility and an urban development model that promoted human development. In this manner, they strived to reduce the high levels of violence and to address the state's lack of legitimacy, which was evident from people's lack of trust in state institutions.

Making Medellin a '*governable city*' implied not only a particular kind of state institution (effective and transparent in the provision of services, capable of inspiring legitimacy and credibility among citizens and of managing urban development in dialogue with people), but also a particular kind of society (a solidary society with participatory citizens, conscious of their responsibilities, respectful of rules and capable of interacting peacefully) (Quinchía 2011:134). This explains why Fajardo's development plan calling for citizen's involvement⁹⁴ contained a line of action to change citizen culture by promoting civic values like solidarity and peaceful coexistence, respect for the law and self regulation among citizens; another line of action to promote citizen participation, understood as a responsibility of citizens and civil organisations; and finally, one to achieve the transparent management of public affairs and the promotion of institutional development within institutions involved in the provision of security and justice (Alcaldia de Medellin 2004).

The notion of state weakness that the Medellin model aimed to address was accompanied by a characterisation of the urban space as a fragmented one, with areas of order and effective exercise of state sovereignty, and other feral areas controlled by armed actors and characterised by complex problems of poverty and violence. This understating of the city as a fractured entity, which has been common in other Latin-American cities as well (Rodgers et al 2011), meant that the 'ungovernability' of the city was not

⁹⁴ The Development plan was called 'Medellin, commitment of the entire citizenry'

seen as a generic urban problem, but one that could be geographically identified and visualized through georeferencing instruments. The use of maps to identify the prevalence of key problems, such as the low human development indicators (during the Fajardo administration) and occurrence of violent incidents and crimes (during the Salazar administration), allowed policymakers to identify and characterise 'ungoverned areas' in need of differentiated forms of state intervention. The following quote from the Secretary of Government during the Salazar administration illustrates the importance of this type of instrument:

'... So we created a city map, an obverse of the one Sergio did to strengthen state intervention in areas where human development index was lower... we took the city map and said 'ok this the whole city, but for the purpose of security and coexistence projects, these are the different Medellins'...we looked at what was happening in each territory and built a new map of violence in the city with problematic areas coloured in intense red and safer areas in a pale red. According to that we allocated security programs and resources...obviously you are not going to send urban control forces (highly trained units for antiterrorist combat), to areas with low violence indexes, but to areas with high levels of violence.. in intense red areas we concentrated resources, technology and investigations...that map allowed us to see where criminals, homicidal violence, crimes against property...and problems of coexistence were. Based on that map we created 4 categories and divided the city into safe communities, safe areas, sensible areas and critical areas... that way it is easier to occupy the territory little by little and to dispute territories to organised crime... One would say metaphorically that in safe communities we shake hands with people, in sensitive areas we use a clenched fist and in critical areas we hit hard'

(Interview Former Secretary of Government, 4/11/2009)

Georeferencing urban problems and profiling marginalised areas and their populations made them visible objects of public policy. Policymakers

developed and justified the allocation of resources and the implementation of particular initiatives and programmes in these ungoverned areas as a way to create paths for the inclusion of historically neglected communities, but in ways that could help the local state to build its capacity to govern and pacify the city.

A critical analysis of the security strategy implemented helps to illustrate that a wide range of public interventions seek a broader purpose beyond their immediate objectives (creating opportunities for youth, improving infrastructure and urban facilities and encouraging citizen participation in public affairs for example). The Medellin Model's form of security provision aimed at strengthening the state in the face of a material and symbolic dispute for territory and legitimacy with armed actors. In the process, the security effort contributed to the subjectification of marginalised communities as ungoverned spaces.

The mixed security model implemented in Medellin was not a detached strategy designed with the sole purpose of curbing violence and delinquency rates⁹⁵, but a key driver within a more comprehensive state-building effort that was guided by a new rationality of government that established differential power relations with areas and populations regarded as problematically 'ungoverned'. This effort, which started in 2002 with a national initiative to take territorial control of an area controlled by insurgent groups, and which was shaped by a wide range of policy initiatives implemented by two independent local administrations (2004 to 2011), has been articulated and marketed as a model of urban transformation relevant to other cities in the global south. This supposed model, which the new local government in 2012 promised to continue, has attracted considerable attention from donors, academics and policymakers, as a successful way to contain urban violence and to promote urban transformation. Although some analyses exist regarding some of this Model's programmes, little is known about the rationality of the security provision effort, of the forces that led to its configuration and of its impact on state society relations.

⁹⁵ As urban security strategies are normally intended to in other urban contexts

As a first step in the process of revealing the contradictions of this urban centred state-building process, which put marginalised communities right at the centre of the configuration of statehood, in this chapter I first undertake a genealogy of the so-called model. I do it through an analysis of some of the socio economic and politico-institutional processes that led to the configuration of the particular form of security provision in Medellin from 20012 to 2012. I subsequently analyse the logic underpinning the mixed security approach which aimed at effectively governing the ‘ungoverned’.

A Genealogy of the Model’s Rationality of Government

Based on critical security thinking and using governmentality as an analytical approach, this research analyses urban security polices as an integral part of the exercise of power in contemporary societies. Security interventions and policies are not apolitical practices. On the contrary, they are located right at the heart of power relations and of the working of particular social, political and economic orders. Therefore, as Risley argues, a fundamental task for security analysts is to critically investigate not only who promotes security measures, but how security policies form part of broader political projects and visions and contribute to constructing political authority, identities and subjectivities (Risley 2006:30).

In order to unpack what kind of wider social, economic and political processes at the local, national and global levels helped to shape the model of security provision used in Medellin between 2002 and 2012, I use Foucault’s methodological strategy called multiplication of analytical ‘salients’⁹⁶(Foucault in Faubion 1994:226-7). This allows me to identify broad processes that contributed to the configuration of Medellin’s security model, which seek to penetrate and bring ungoverned spaces and communities under state control through mixed interventions.

Following Foucault’s metaphor that analysing a socio-political phenomenon is like breaking down the phenomenon into the processes that constitute it, as if building a ‘polyhedron’; I identify the following processes as constitutive

⁹⁶ I explain this methodological strategy in chapter two.

of the polyhedron that gave rise to Medellín's model of security provision: The first one is the consolidation of a neoliberal economic model in Colombia since the 1990s, which prompted the reorganisation of Medellín's local economy according to the requirements of the global urban competition for capital. The second is the implementation of 'Democratic Security', a national government strategy focused on the strengthening of the state's military capacity with the intention of defeating and eliminating insurgent actors, establishing territorial control in their areas of influence and creating favourable conditions for the entrenching of neoliberal economic projects in the country. And the third process influencing local authorities' willingness to focus public spending on marginalised communities and to open opportunities for citizen's participation in local governance is the active role played by a wide range of civil society actors and grassroots organisations. These not only supported an alternative political movement to come to power in the city, but they also played a key role in the implementation of public policies and programmes in marginalised communities during the 2000s.

These three processes, the relations they prompted between different institutional, social and political actors and the domains of reference they suggested for the provision of security since 2002, made the emergence of a distinctive governing model in Medellín possible.

The Neoliberal Turn and Medellín's Governing Process:

In the early 1990s Colombia embraced neoliberalism through economic liberalisation, monetary and fiscal discipline, 'selective privatisation' and labour market and tax system reforms. These measures sought the flexibilisation and internationalisation of the national economy in the context of the weakening of the country's coffee sector (Estrada Alvarez 2004). This capitalist turn which prompted the further decline of the national industrial sector and the emergence of a powerful tertiary sector, continued through the second decade of the new millennium, with the creation of favourable conditions for foreign investment⁹⁷ and with the negotiation of free trade agreements with various countries⁹⁸.

⁹⁷ mainly through deregulation and tax breaks for corporations

Such neoliberal economic policies had particular manifestations and impact at the urban level. In Medellín, a city with a powerful industrial sector since the mid-twentieth century, the economic liberalisation of the 1990s accentuated the deindustrialisation of the local economy⁹⁹. Weakened by the neoliberal turn, the once powerful industrial sector was eclipsed by a prosperous financial service sector by the early 2000s. Interested in creating favourable conditions for the internationalisation of the city, the new economic elites and political centres of power in the city seek to re-organise the local economy and integrate it into global flows of capital (Betancur et al 2001). Their efforts concentrated in improving the city's competitiveness and reorienting the city's economy towards clusters and sectors with possibilities of competing in global markets and attracting capital.

In this process the local state's functions were transformed (Franco 2006). Strategic planning exercises undertaken in the city in the mid 1990s¹⁰⁰, pushed local governments to take on a more entrepreneurial role as demanded by Medellín's entry into the fierce global interurban competition. In this context, creating an urban environment propitious for businesses and the attraction of investors became a key governmental function. This required the adaptation of urban space and 'territorial marketing' to transform the image of the city from a place strongly associated with violence and drug-trafficking to an ideal hub for business, tourism and investment (Corporación Jurídica Libertad & Fundación Sumapaz 2011; Moncada 2013b).

Given that the 1990s neoliberal turn coincided with a crisis of urban violence in Medellín, state intervention in this city differed substantially, in method, from that observed in other Latin American cities (Hylton 2007). While neoliberal reforms in the region were normally associated with significant reductions in public spending, in the case of Medellín the need to create

⁹⁸ For example, the bilateral free trade agreements with Canada, US, Chile-Peru-Mexico, South Korea, European Union and Israel

⁹⁹ As in other cities in the region neoliberal policies and the contraction of the industrial sector produced a deterioration of working conditions and a substantial increase in unemployment and informal labour.

¹⁰⁰ Such as the 'Strategic Plan for Medellín and its Metropolitan Area'

conditions to increase the city's competitiveness in an urban context of extremely high levels of urban violence required social and economic interventions that targeted marginalised communities through new forms of governance (Betancur 2001). During the 2000s, this tendency continued with significant increases in social policy spending targeting marginalised sectors, especially during the Fajardo and Salazar administrations (2004-2011).

The allocation of resources to impressive infrastructural projects in the poorest communities of the city did not mean a change of direction in the city's economic trajectory, but rather a moment of acceleration under the notion of the modernisation of the local state (Corporación Jurídica Libertad & Fundación Sumapaz 2011: 181). Actually, it was during these two administrations that the economic strategy consolidated and achieved its major successes in attracting capital to specific clusters, in reorganizing urban space and promoting Medellín as a place for international events and business oriented tourism.

Evidence of the systematic effort by the local administrations in power during the 2000s, to make Medellín a competitive and attractive city is the hosting of major international events such as the General Assembly of the Organisation on American States in 2008, the South American Games in 2010 and the World Tourist Organisation General Assembly in 2015, as well as the bid to host the Summer Youth Olympic Games in 2018¹⁰¹. Other forms of proof can be seen in the proclamation in 2012 of Medellín as the most competitive city in Colombia according to the Global Competitiveness Index¹⁰², its designation in 2013 as the most innovative city in the world by the Urban Land Institute, Citibank and the Wall Street Journal, the city's move up to 85th place in the 2011 ICCA World Ranking¹⁰³ and the hosting of the 2014 World urban Forum. The consolidation of Empresas Publicas de Medellín

¹⁰¹ In this bid the city was one of the three finalists.

¹⁰² It measures economic strength, international appeal and human capital.

¹⁰³ It measures the number of international events hosted. Medellín was ranked 11th in Latin America.

(EPM)¹⁰⁴, as the biggest and most profitable conglomerate in the city, with presence in other Colombian regions and countries, is another indicator of the steady entrepreneurial role played by the local state in the last decade.

In this context, the configuration of the Medellín model and some of its key components acquire special meaning and importance. For example, social urbanism, one of the most renowned programmes implemented in Medellín, massively contributed to the reconstruction of the city's image as a progressive and innovative city (Brand 2013). The model's emphasis on the physical transformation of the urban space, as a way to improve the life of citizens in the poorest areas of the city, fitted perfectly with the need to transform and effectively manage the city's territory in ways that could facilitate Medellín's repositioning in the global market.

Neoliberal economic measures implemented in Medellín had particular implications for the provision of urban security. The security model implemented in the city since 2002 was not only shaped by policymakers' interest in addressing the conditions of insecurity and violence affecting citizens, especially in the most marginalised areas, but by the need to demonstrate that there was a clear break with the city's troubled past. The private sector played a key role in the design and implementation of state responses to local violence that did not rely only on coercive measures but that focused on changing citizen culture and the urban space. The private sector not only actively promoted reformist citizen security policies but it also aligned with civil society organisations to promote a political independent candidate to the Mayor's office who was willing to implement them (Moncada 2013b).

In the context of the city's history of violence, security policies became crucial to the process of creating a competitive city that could assure safety as well as competitive operational costs to investors and tourists

¹⁰⁴ the industrial and commercial enterprise owned by the state for the provision of public utilities (Electricity, water, gas, sanitation and telecommunication)

(Corporación Jurídica Libertad & Fundación Sumapaz 2011:182-183)¹⁰⁵. In this line, the need to show the city's transformation and the positive results in the reduction of violence led policymakers and some analysts to rely almost exclusively on the number of homicides as the indicator of urban security and the marker of the city's success. The impressive reduction of homicides rates from 2002 to 2007 being the most frequently used piece of evidence to the success of the city in dealing with chronic insecurity within official documents and policymakers' addresses.

In the context of the re-orientation of the local economy towards sectors capable of attracting capital, the perceived success of the city in dealing with high levels of violence had another impact on security provision. Not only has there been a move towards a more entrepreneurial management of security in the city, but also an increased interest in making the provision of security a source of revenue. As an illustration, the entity created by the city's council in 1982 to guarantee the provision of equipment and logistical support needed to provide security in Medellín, became in 2002 a commercial and industrial state-owned business. This has gradually become more focused on the design, development and commercialisation of security programmes and services, not only in this city but in other municipalities across the country. In 2010 the ESU (*Empresa para la Seguridad Urbana*) as it was renamed, established as one of its strategic objectives the consolidation of its trademark in the provision of security at regional and national level by expanding its services to public and private entities.

The services offered by the ESU rely heavily on the use of technology such as video surveillance¹⁰⁶, specialised software and web platforms for emergency management and reporting of security incidents, alarm systems in communities and commercial areas, networks of civilian informants (*red de*

¹⁰⁵ Through the availability of cheap labour and flexible contractual conditions with labour, tax reductions to capital, adequate infrastructure and efficient local management

¹⁰⁶ By October 2013 there were already 533 video cameras installed across the city. There were also plans for the installation of 200 more in various *comunas*. Additionally, the ESU had implemented an Automatic Vehicle Localization System -AVL- through GPS and wireless communication. This served to locate vehicles used by security and justice institutions (<http://www.esu.com.co/esu/index.php/es/72-la-esu-aporta-con-la-tecnologia-a-la-seguridad-ciudadana> accessed 06/10/2013)

cooperantes ciudadanos) equipped with radios and video streaming tools that allow them to communicate with the police, etc. This technological move towards the provision of security which has been recognised by the IADB as a remarkable example of the management of security in the region has started to attract the interest of other municipalities and security institutions around the world. This is why the Municipality of Medellín recently announced its intention to make 'security services' another strategic cluster in the city¹⁰⁷.

The attempt by local authorities to profit from some of the achievements of the Medellín model has another implication. The commodification and commercialisation of security services requires high levels of marketing and this has a profound impact on the symbolic and material provision of security in a city that still struggles with very complex problems. It distorts the notion of security as a public good making it an object of consumption to which private actors can have better access. It also makes local authorities very sensitive to fluxes of information regarding security problems given that this can affect the image of the city and in consequence be bad for business.

Democratic Security and the Medellín Security Model

Another process that shaped the model of security provision in Medellín in the last decade was the implementation since 2003 of a national defence and security policy called 'Democratic Security' (Presidencia de la República 2003). This was implemented by President Uribe Velez during his two consecutive terms in office (2002-2010) and continued with some modifications by his successor President Santos (since 2010). This national level security policy which became the national government's flagship for almost a decade, responded to the generalised disappointment caused by the failure of the peace process pursued by the previous administration with the FARC and to the perception that the country was on the brink of

¹⁰⁷ The Municipality of Medellín and The Commerce Chamber defined six clusters that aim at increasing the city's productivity: Electric Power, Construction Sector, Textiles/Fashion and Design, Business Tourism/ Events and Conventions, Medical Services and Information and Communication Technologies. The seventh cluster would be Security.
http://www.elcolombiano.com/BancoConocimiento/M/medellin_perfila_un_septimo_cluster_en_seguridad/medellin_perfila_un_septimo_cluster_en_seguridad.asp(accessed 06/10/2013)

becoming a failed state. The simultaneous strengthening of guerrilla groups and the consolidation of paramilitary forces supported by powerful sectors of society and enabled by the tacit approval of the Colombian military forces contributed to this perception.

The Democratic Security Policy promised to address the Colombian state's weakness and to build its capacity to establish order, impose its authority, exercise territorial control and defeat the illegal armed groups. It relied on a hard fisted approach to combat insurgent groups which were associated with the security threats the government considered priorities (such as terrorism, kidnapping, extortion, drug trafficking and homicides), not only because they affected the lives of citizens, but because they were an obstacle for the economic performance of the country and the possibilities of attracting investment. While the government focused all its efforts on the military defeat of the guerrillas, it undertook a different approach with the paramilitary forces across the country. In 2002, after paramilitary groups declared a cease fire, a problematic peace negotiation leading to their partial demobilisation began.

Although the democratic security policy focused on the security situation in rural areas as epicentres of the Colombian protracted conflict, this policy also had a profound impact on the way security would be provided in Colombian cities in the 2000s. It reshaped security institutions across the country (police, military and the intelligence agencies), it promoted a particular notion of security that guided their performance and practices and it defined a new role for society in the public provision of security. In the particular case of Medellin, key components of the mixed approach to security provision used between 2002 and 2011, were the direct result of the implementation of the Democratic Security policy and of the way it reshaped the security debate and practice across the country. One example could be the initiatives to retake territorial control of marginalised urban communities and the demobilisation of an important number of paramilitary members in the city.

The national security strategy aimed at strengthening a particular form of state authority and at guaranteeing the necessary conditions for the

consolidation of the neoliberal economic model in the country (Angarita Cañas 2011). The state function was conceived as mainly concerned with the exercise of authority through law enforcement agencies over portions of the territory under the influence of illegal armed actors. In consequence it produced the militarisation of the state's role and of national life. The armed forces were regarded not only as the main agents in the war against drug trafficking, terrorism and insurgent groups across the territory, but also as the embodiment of the state and of its symbolic and material power and legitimacy. This explains the massive effort made by the national government to increase the state forces not only in numbers but in capacity, equipment, intelligence and power. With the financial and logistical support of the United States and the private sector, there was a substantial increase in the number of security personnel and increased bureaucracy in the country. The number of military and police forces went from 313.406 men in 2002 to 426.014 men by the end of Uribe's presidency in 2010 (Leal Buitrago 2010)¹⁰⁸. This enlargement and the improvement in equipment and logistical resources demanded a huge increase in public spending in the defence and security budget¹⁰⁹, to the detriment of investment in other sectors.

The rapid increase of security forces was not accompanied by equivalent attempts to address a long history of malpractices within these institutions that had led to a long record of human rights violations and cases of misconduct. On the contrary, the extreme pressure exerted by the president to show results in the battle field reinforced entrenched practices that led to the perpetration of dreadful crimes by the military forces with the help of the paramilitaries, such as the extrajudicial killings of more than two thousand civilians who were presented as deaths in combat¹¹⁰ in exchange for

¹⁰⁸ In cities the number of police officers increased substantially, from 112000 to 145871 in 2009 (El Tiempo 2009).

¹⁰⁹ The national private sector, multinationals with presence in the territory and the resources transferred by the USA made additional contributions to the spending in this area. En 2010 the budget of the Ministry of Defence was more than 15 billion pesos (63% was allocated to the Military and the rest to the Police) (Leal Buitrago 2010:35).

¹¹⁰ In 2009 The Prosecutor's Office calculated that the number of citizens murdered by the army reached 2077, including underage children and women (Lopez 2009:2 cited in Angarita

institutional rewards and promotions. This is one of the most dramatic examples of how the criteria used to evaluate the performance of the security personnel instead of promoting the protection of citizens became an incentive for further disregard of human rights by the armed forces. This explains why despite its acclaimed initial successes, in terms of decreases in the number of homicides, kidnappings and massacres, the protection of main highways and military presence in several municipalities previously besieged by guerrilla forces, the Democratic Security Policy also led to a rise in violations of human rights such as arbitrary detentions, disappearances¹¹¹ and forced displacement, especially in areas of 'rehabilitation' targeted by the state (Cinep 2009 in Angarita Cañas 2011:286).

It was as a consequence of the implementation of the Democratic Security Policy that the emphasis of the security effort and of the state consolidation process across the country focused on securing control over territories that were considered of strategic importance for the national neoliberal economic project underway¹¹². In the process, the government's implementation of the democratic security policy reinforced the notion that rights and democratic values could be sacrificed if needed, in the search for security and the reestablishment of order and state authority.

Another profound impact this policy had on security provision both in rural and urban areas, was that it suggested and demanded a particular role from citizens in the security effort. The national government's doctrine assumed that the democratic state was being threatened by the terrorism exercised by armed actors and that citizens needed to demonstrate their alignment with the state by contributing to the elimination of security threats. Unrestricted

2011:295) According to CINEP there were 1.119 extrajudicial killings between 2001 and 2010.

¹¹¹ According to the UN in the last three decades there have been more than 57200 disappearances in Colombia. According to The National Institute of Legal Medicine the number of people reported as disappeared is 106108 and 22366 of these cases are believed to be victims of forced disappearances.

¹¹² For example areas given to multinational for exploitation, areas where mega productive projects are implemented or where there are illicit crops (Angarita 2011)

citizen support to the state and its armed forces, as well as civilian participation in the combat against state enemies through the provision of intelligence, was regarded as a form of proven patriotism. A massive network of civilian informants and collaborators who provided information to the security forces, sometimes in exchange of payments, was created¹¹³, disregarding the dangers this posed to civilians in the context of an armed conflict. The direct involvement of non combatants in the war against armed groups not only constituted a violation of international humanitarian law as denounced by international¹¹⁴ and local organizations, but it contributed to the damage of the social fabric and of civic values within communities. Additionally, it constituted another tool of the many used by the government to stigmatise dissident voices and critics of the government who were accused of siding with terrorists and illegal armed groups.

The Democratic Security Policy concentrated on the war against insurgency and it did not contain special considerations for the provision of security in the cities; in the process it blurred the differences between military and police functions. While it broadened the functions of the military forces, it demanded the police forces to undertake highly militaristic tasks, creating confusions and blurring lines between their jurisdictions. On the one hand it expanded the police tasks in municipalities through the creation of rural mobile squads and fortified stations. On the other, the cities were patrolled both by army units and police units. Previous attempts to demilitarise the police in its functions, structure, and relationship with civil authorities, were dismissed by the Democratic Security Policy which regarded the police as another military force (Casas Dupuy 2005). As a result, the Police was confronted by internal tensions with deepening differences between those police units taking on increasingly military functions and other police units orientated towards traditional and preventive policing functions such as community policing. After a decade, the balance moved towards the former, which benefited from

¹¹³ The Ministry of Defence reported in 2004 that the number of members of the network of informants and collaborators was more than 2500000.

¹¹⁴ UN High Commissioner for Human Rights in Colombia.

evaluation systems that were designed in the context of the war against illegal armed groups, rather than regarding the prevention of urban insecurities and the protection of urban communities.

The absence of a citizen security strategy within the Democratic Security Policy led the Police to demand more involvement from the local authorities in the provision of security in cities. However this did not mean that local authorities could take on a leadership role, or that Police accountability towards civil authorities would increase. On the contrary, Police forces continued to develop their own security plans and initiatives independently, and demanded local authorities' contribution through investments in equipment, security infrastructure and funding for security plans.

By the end of Uribe's government, unaddressed urban security problems produced a substantial increase of violence and insecurity in the main cities. The response of the Uribe administration and of his successor, President Santos, relied on the same security model. The war against insurgency slowly transformed its rhetoric becoming a war against criminal organizations (many of which were the outcome of the failed demobilisation of paramilitary forces). Although the Police developed an initiative to address urban insecurity, 'the National Plan of Communitarian Surveillance by Quarters', and the Santos government launched the first National Citizen Security Strategy' with some prevention components, the approach used for urban security provision, relied on punitive measures, increases in the number of police forces in the streets and militarisation of civil life and urban life specially in marginalised urban communities, which became the main focus of police action.

Additionally, police forces continued to be dominated by the military orientation imprinted on them by the Democratic Security Policy which makes them highly impermeable to civil control, prompt to respond with reactive rather than preventive approaches, highly distrusted among citizens and communities especially in areas that police forces regard as problematic. Police and security forces continue to have a predominant role in the

provision of security in Colombian cities; they are expected to address complex security problems with the collaboration of communities who distrust them. In the fight against criminal organisations they have become more and more orientated towards the use of technology, intelligence, technical and human, through the use of economic rewards for information.

It is important to recognise the impact of the Democratic security policy in the analysis of the processes that configured the mixed security model in Medellín. Not only local forces, but national and institutional dynamics, as the ones described, shaped the mixed intervention targeting ungoverned areas in Medellín. The urban model that is normally presented as a novel way of approaching urban problems relied on the implementation of measures inspired by traditional and restrictive notions of security. The implementation of the Democratic security policy for example, led to the military intervention in *Comuna 13*, to the occupation of urban territories and the establishment of alliances with paramilitary forces to weaken insurgent groups. The resulting reductions in homicides levels in the city allowed the local authorities to concentrate resources and attention on other components of the security model (social urbanism for example). In other words, the most progressive components of the security strategy in Medellín relied on the partial results of a highly traditional security approach.

Community Resilience and Agency and Local Governing Structures

The third process that led to the consolidation of a novel form of governing marginalised communities, combining forms of coercion with normalizing forms of biopower, has its origins in the often ignored history of the forms of organisation and participation that exist in these communities. A broad analysis of the way communities and civil organisations in the city created their own forms of participation and their own agenda for urban transformation illustrates that many of the public policies and interventions that have been regarded as democratic and progressive within the so-called Medellín model were not created by policymakers. These were in fact the result of a broader political process that brought together grassroots

organisations, civil society, critical academic circles and various forms of political mobilization since the 1990s (Uran 2012:35). This political process and the active role of residents and community actors in the implementation of government programmes during the 2000s, denotes that those subject to state power played a key role in shaping that power and the governing process that configured in Medellin during that period.

Since the formation of communities at the margins of state influence in Medellin's surrounding hillsides, their residents have articulated multiple forms of self organisation and self management which could be regarded as organic forms of participation that have been evolving and adapting to the city's context and history. Many of these forms of self organisation, inspired by the residents' desire to survive and flourish in a city that did not welcome their mass arrival from rural areas, responded to the legacy of the campesino and indigenous culture of association and organisation and to expressions of local customs and way of life from their places of origin (Gomez et al ND). Several of the original participation practices aimed at strengthening community links in the context of difficult economic situations (for example the '*convites*'¹¹⁵), while others aimed at making communities visible to the state and to the rest of the city (for example neighbours assemblies). In general, community organisations and social participation have been motivated by two aspirations: Firstly, the recognition of these territories and their populations as part of the city, as a way to improve residents' lives (which are severely affected by poor employment, lack of income, poor education, deficit in health centres and poor housing conditions). And secondly, resisting the coercive influence of armed actors in these areas and developing alternatives to the urban conflict and the high levels of social violence associated to it (Interview with Community Leader Comuna 8, 2009

¹¹⁵ A form of shared work and solidarity gatherings where neighbours work together to solve problems and difficult situations. Through these '*convites*' residents collectively constructed streets, houses, community centres, health centres and churches and basic utilities like electricity connections. (Many residents talked about this type of gatherings during informal conversations, especially older adults who participated in these activities)

and Informal conversations with Community Leaders Comuna 8, Comuna 1 and Comuna 6, 2010).

In addition to these forms of self management and non institutionalised forms of community support, which were key to the early development and improvement of residents' living conditions, other forms of community participation took the form of demonstrations to promote and rescue community identity and protests against violence, impunity and in favour of peace. Some forms of organic participation evolved into more organised forms of agency at community level, with the help of development agencies and NGOs. The difficult situation of violence in the 1990s in the country also made the state and powerful sectors of society favourable to the opening of spaces for citizen participation in the administration and management of the city, as a way to regain legitimacy. Community sectors with a long history of self organisation took this as an opportunity to achieve state recognition beyond Community boards and became more institutionalised in the form of youth clubs, elder's life clubs, housing committees, etc.

The 1990s was the decade in which community mobilisation transformed into youth movements, women groups, participatory planning processes in various *comunas* (6, 13, 4 and 1) and initiatives like 'a week for peace' in the northeast comunas, which aimed at protecting public space and defending community and social organisations from threats from extreme right and left and from criminal organisations. These community practices, especially those around planning processes, some of which could be representative of what Holston calls insurgent forms of citizenship (Holston 2008; Uran 2012), became more and more structured and administratively organised¹¹⁶.

These forms of participation which emerged in marginalised neighbourhoods since their inception, as well as multiple civil organisations and NGOs promoting human rights in the city have constantly interacted with local tiers

¹¹⁶ Some of these have evolved into initiatives that help to improve human security as the research by the OSHM found out (OSHM 2014).

of government. They have impacted municipal level politics and helped to shape institutions and policies that are key to the development of the city. Through agreements and contracts with different administrations for example, community and civil organisations have helped to formulate plans for the ordering of the urban space¹¹⁷ since the 1990s, and have also trained community residents and strengthened the organisational and participatory capacity of these communities.

Strategic alliances between community forms of participation, for example civic boards, and NGOs, civil society organisations, the private sector and some local universities, have also impacted on the urban agenda. These alliances led to the consolidation of a movement which promoted an alternative discourse around urban issues in the city, promoting citizen participation and the democratisation of planning processes as a way to meet residents' basic needs. This movement was crucial for the institutionalization of a Municipal Planning System in 1996 and the promotion and implementation of the Participatory Budgeting process in 2004. It was also the force behind the arrival of Sergio Fajardo and Alonso Salazar to the Mayor's office in 2004 and 2008. The programmes associated with social urbanism, the most prominent component of the so-called Medellin Model, and their planning and participatory components, were shaped and strengthened by this movement and by the demands, experience, capacities and community processes that had been consolidating in various communities for decades, as a result of the work of civil and community organisations. During the 2000s civil society leaders assumed key positions in the local government and from various municipal offices they promoted progressive policies in a wide range of areas. In other words, both civil

¹¹⁷ For example through the Plan for Territorial Ordering (*Plan de Ordenamiento Territorial-POT*) which is an instrument to plan and order the city's space. It defines the environmental, physical, and functional dimensions for the development of the city and the way the space is inhabited.

society and citizen participation were powerful forces shaping the most progressive components of the model¹¹⁸.

In the recent history of community organisation and self management in Medellin there are examples of community initiatives which were later adopted by public agencies as governmental programmes (OSHM 2014, Interview with Community leader *Comuna 8*, 2010). However, the role played by residents and community forms of agency in the consolidation of a new form of governing these areas is invisible in official documents and international depictions of the Medellin Model. This obscures the fact that residents of these areas are not passive beneficiaries of governmental intervention and that they have the power to construct their own subjectivities, but also, that sometimes the state instrumentalises that power to improve its capacity to exercise power and to normalise and control these areas regarded as 'ungoverned'.

Throughout the 2000s for example, the relationship between community actors and the local state changed substantially, as efforts to strengthen the state capacity to 'govern' these areas intensified. Since 2004 with the articulation of community plans in different areas of the city, the local state and other agencies promoting development used civil society, especially community and social organisations and NGOs with a long history of community work, to deliver many services that the state was not capable of delivering, such as education, recreation, environment, culture, etc. Rather than on direct intervention, the state building process in this urban context relied heavily on contracts with community and social organisations for the implementation of programmes orientated to community development. Through these contracts the state performed as a contractor and auditor and community organisations performed as operators in the implementation of programmes. State institutions also used these organisations not only as

¹¹⁸ For example the creation in 2007 of a high level Municipal office for the promotion of public policies to improve gender equality in the city (*Secretary for Women-Secretaria de las Mujeres*) was highly influenced by the advocacy of the women's social movement in the city.

sources of information and deliberation, but also as means to legitimate their presence and interventions.

This type of interaction has allowed the state to deliver many aspects of the governing model in areas where it did not have institutional capacity or legitimacy. It has also led to the progressive normalisation of many organic forms of community participation by forcing them to meet institutional practices and technicalities (Gomez et al ND:104). By forcing them to meet certain standards, the governing process of marginalised communities has reduced the level of autonomy of community organizations and increased the competition among them for access to public resources. As it will be analysed in the following chapter the state entry to 'ungoverned areas' has also created unforeseen incentives to illegal actors to try to co-opt community spaces and forms of organisation.

Recognising the importance of political and popular forms of organisation and participation allows for the construction of a more nuanced picture of the configuration of the Medellin model. As it has been discussed in this section, its different components, dimensions and programmes were the result of a complex combination of particular processes taking place at community, local and national level. Unpacking the configuration of the governing process marginalised communities have been subject to in the last decade and of the Medellin model which embodies it, reveals that it was shaped by the combination of multiple processes, such as the neoliberal turn in the economic orientation of the city, the implementation of a national security strategy focused on strengthening the state's anti insurgent capacity and the consolidation of the capacity of civil society and community actors to articulate an alternative agenda for the democratisation of urban development.

The impact of these processes in the configuration of Medellin's approach questions the assumed replicability of this model in other urban contexts. It also demonstrates the way security provision is shaped by political and socio-economic and institutional processes. In the next section, we advance

on the analysis by dissecting the rationality of the Medellin model through a critical examination of the discursive practices it relies on. This will reveal its assumptions and calculations, the instruments and mechanisms it used to exercise power on ungoverned communities and the subjectivities it created in the process.

Unpacking the Rationality of Medellin's Security Approach

I analyse the rationality guiding the security strategy within the Medellin model, using critical discourse analysis of not only official texts and documents describing security policies and programmes¹¹⁹, but also of interviews and conversations with public officials, police officers and security experts. I also analyse public addresses of key municipal officials and high ranked police officers at local and international events. The public officials and security experts interviewed were involved in the design and implementation of the security strategy in Medellin during the 2000s, many of them at the highest levels -for example as Secretary of Government or Secretary of Social Development, while others were responsible for key programmes. The critical discourse analysis of these data helped to unpack the Medellin model's rationality of government targeting 'ungoverned spaces'. It revealed the assumptions and calculations it was based on, and the instruments and mechanisms it used to exercise power on particular communities in order to create security and stability in the city, as the following blurb from the official Security Master Plan for the City (*Plan Maestro de Seguridad Defensa y Justicia para Medellín y el Valle de Aburra*) illustrates:

¹¹⁹ This included for example: the Development Plans designed by different administrations and official documents detailing the security policy strategies and its results, minutes of the city Council meetings, minutes of meetings and events at which public officials were invited to report on policies implemented.

'When the mayor took office in 2004, he considered important and a priority for his government to have a security and coexistence plan for the city that would allow not only the reduction of violence and criminality indexes, but to improve the presence of state institutions in different areas of the city that had been controlled by illegal groups. He also thought it was important that the plan focused on modifying the citizens' behaviours that privilege the use of indiscriminate violence and the acquisition of goods through illegal means...the foundations of that plan were: coordinating the municipality's work with that of security agencies (mainly police, IV brigade and DAS) and justice institutions (Fiscalia general and INPEC), making the state legitimate through its presence and the territorial control exercised by state authorities, and through citizen participation in the city's decisions, impacting on citizen culture and promoting culture of legality and the social reintegration of demobilised armed actors. (Alcaldia de Medellin 2006:1-2)

The security and coexistence plan outline above captures key aspects of the Medellin Model and its emphasis on strengthening the state's capacity to exert its sovereignty in particular areas of the city, as well as the diversity of spheres of intervention and instruments that were seen as relevant to that purpose. This plan addressed the problem of urban violence and insecurity in a different way based on particular assumptions and calculations. This research reveals the thinking behind Medellin's security approach through an exploration of the way those in charge or influential in its design and implementation articulate it. It is important to highlight that this research is concerned with the transformation of strategies, calculations, objects, subjects and technologies of power, and not with an assessment of the security institutions' performance, or with policy evaluation.

Assumptions about marginalised communities and their populations:

The first key assumption is that urban development and prosperity is related to the integration of ungoverned spaces and communities 'to the city'. The recognition and characterisation of these neglected areas was the first step

to their integration. The official discourse focused on the identification of the problems of these areas (lack of development, poverty, low levels of quality of life, violence, informality, isolation). These are *portrayed as areas of absence* (lack of the state presence and services for example), as areas of disorder, violence and illegality, the state was then set out to intervene them. *Integrating* these areas in the view of policymakers means bringing state institutions and services there, exerting effective control of the territory (and their populations) and transforming these communities.

The ungoverned areas are attributed, within the official discourse, particularities that make them a source of instability and danger to what is considered the urban order. These communities become objects of state intervention not only due to their vulnerabilities and low levels of human development, but because they are regarded as spaces produced by armed actors and by political actors and illegal and questionable practices that supposedly contradict the principles and the legal order that are associated with the ideal notion of state and democracy (Quinchia 2013:128). The characterisation of these marginalised areas through what is missing and problematic in them, from the perspective of those who represent the legal and prosperous 'city', tends to ignore their socio-spatial and cultural richness and justifies differentiated forms of state intervention as the following quote illustrates:

'...in a city of 2 and half million people with 16 comunas and 5 rural areas there are very particular security problems to each territory...those problems are the result of the way that territory was socially built and of the cultural and social characteristics of its population, so security cannot be thought and provided in a generic manner, it cannot be delivered the same everywhere, security has to be delivered in a flexible, adaptable and creative way in each area...if you look at the territory you will find different security problems ... comunas like Castilla, the northwest and Robledo, they were populated long time ago and the population is mostly middle class and workers with permanent income, legal homes, there is a social fabric there that has been

developing for some time, in that case you see particular forms of social organization, criminality and violence and these are completely different from those you find in the northeast comunas where we have unfinished settlement processes, people coming from rural areas forced by violence who have not been in the city for more than a generation...so if you understand these particularities in the territory...you see that those particularities demand a security intervention according to those differences' (Interview with Municipal official at Secretary of Government 10/02/2010)

The urban integration process of these ungoverned areas had a strong spatial connotation. In the view of policymakers, key indicators of these communities' integration to the city is that their territory is not exempt from legal regulation and forbidden to state institutions, especially the police, and other outsiders (such as residents of other areas and tourists), but accessible through public infrastructure (such as the metro cable). However, the transformation of these ungoverned areas, through state intervention, is meant to be not only a spatial transformation, but also an alteration of communities' practices, values and culture. As in the following quote from the Secretary of Social Development, there is a recurrent allusion in the public discourse to the aspiration of transforming citizens:

'...we have talked about Medellin, about social urbanism, about public buildings and integral urban projects. All that has a north (*norte*): to make education and culture the key tools in the transformation of our city, of our society...the result then is not only a new building, or a new space for culture. The main outcome that we seek is a new citizenry, new citizens who are conscious of their rights and duties, participatory, responsible for their surroundings, committed to the present and future of their most immediate environment: their neighbourhood; citizens with the responsibility and the conviction that starting from the neighbourhood, from each one of them, we continue transforming the city.' (Melguizo, 2009, Presentation by

Secretary of Citizen Culture at an International Event organised by the Mayors' Office of Medellin)

Education and culture were regarded in the Medellin Model, as key instruments for the transformation of citizenry in general and of behaviours that were seen as vicious and prone to violence and illegality in particular. Many policymakers and police officers referred to the 'cultural problem' that in their view accounted for the prevalence of illegal practices and actors in the city. The next quote illustrates this common view:

'...the priorities for public policy and public spending in Sergio and Alonso's administrations are education and culture, we believe these are key tools in the transformation of the city, we are convinced that what we have to do is to generate inclusion factors and more justice, we really believe that in this city poverty is very much associated with violence, although some people disagree, there is a cultural problem here. Colombians have a 'easy money' (*'facilista'*) culture, but specially in Medellin, paisas (people from Medellin) are used to cheating and breaking the norms for their personal gain and whoever does that is admired...the one who cheats, gets involved in illegality and succeeds, well that person is someone to look up, it is big problem that we have a very flexible culture regarding illegality '(Secretary of Social Development, presentation at local event on security challenges in Medellin, 06/11/2009)

In the official discourse and state practices, education was often spoken about, not as a right, but as tool that could eliminate referents and practices of violence, especially in marginalised communities. Given that the problem of violence was strongly associated with the prevalence of a damaging culture, reducing it was often regarded as a matter of re-educating people, almost as a pedagogic endeavour that often targeted young people. The following description of community police officers' activities illustrates this:

Community Police officer 1: 'let me give you an example of the things we have done: one day we brought coffins to the

communities and made a funeral march on the streets. We put mirrors inside the coffins and invited young people to see who was inside the coffin. To their surprise they saw their own faces...This was a campaign to send a strong message to young people...we asked them if that is where they wanted to end up...

Commander of Community Police Unit: Yes, preventive activities like this help them to become aware ('tomar conciencia'). We need to help them change their culture...in that respect we also implemented another programme, we invited young people from the gangs that did not have criminal records and invited them to do a sort of military service. More than 1000 people signed up to the programme...these were all young guys who extorted residents of their communities and were involved in assaults and robberies, these were the kind of crimes these guys committed... They entered our programme but we did not give them military training, nor therapies, they just attended workshops on human rights and civility. (Conversation at International Symposium on Coexistence, Medellin. 24/11/ 2010)

The emphasis on the transformation of these communities denotes an important aspect of the Medellin Model, its effort to normalise¹²⁰ these areas through the righteous use of the urban space, through education and the promotion of civic values and of respect and acceptance of the state institutions as legitimate, exercising control over the lives of actors or as a last resort, through the threat of punishment. Even the creation of 'opportunities' for vulnerable populations like youth, which seek to discourage young people from getting involved in illegal and criminal activities, work in the Model as a tool for the normalisation of a population group that is perceived as prone to violence and illicit behaviours.

The impact of drug trafficking has been felt across all sectors of Colombian society since its rapid expansion in the late 1980s, with the highest sectors of

¹²⁰ In a foucaultian way, this refers to the construction of what behaviour, and therefore who, is considered 'normal' in the population.

society as well as political, economic, security and judiciary institutions infiltrated by mafias and criminal organisations. However the official discourse tends to overemphasize young people from the poorest neighbourhoods as those who represent the culture of illegality and violence in the city. There seemed to be a generalised perception, among police officers and some policymakers, of young people as a 'risk group' that has to be persuaded or threatened into following the 'right path'. The 'persuasion' of young people took the form of a generous DDR programme and other programmes targeting youth (such as the Fuerza Joven programme described earlier) which offered especial benefits to gang members or guys at risk of being recruited by gangs, at key moments when violence escalated in the city, while at the same time coercive measures aimed at controlling young people in marginalised communities were also implemented (curfews for underage people, stop and search police practices and illegal recruitment of young people).

'The operative capacity of the police is very important and efforts should be put in so that we make criminals feel they are being chased...from around 18,700 captured people, 2,493 are adolescents, this tells us that there is a huge problem with the youth, this current generation is lost...I think also parents are giving up on their responsibility to educate and control their children, we should have some legal tool that allow us to put parents in jail too when their children are caught on illegal activities, they have a responsibility' (Interview Commander of the Metropolitan Police, Medellin 12/11/2009)

'We offer the carrot to those that follow the norm, that is why we give opportunities to those that want to change...and to those that disturb the peace, well, we offer the stick.. The 'promotores de vida programme' for example is in that direction, we know that there are so many young people inadequately educated (mal educados), doing nothing, we open the door of the military service to them... (Commander of the Community Police Unit

Medellin, Public address at International Symposium on Coexistence, Medellin 24/11/2010)

In the official discourse associated with the Medellin Model, the people in ungoverned areas are portrayed as passive beneficiaries of state intervention (Uran 2012), as areas disconnected from (rather than problematically and perversely connected to) what is considered the physical, political, economic, institutional, social and representational area of influence of the state. This highly territorial understanding of the relation between the state and these ungoverned areas, not only ignores (i) the many ways in which these communities have interacted and helped to shape the state, and (ii) that they are already part of the city and influence it as citizens, including through their participation in the election of its leaders; but it also renders the benefits and rights attached to their citizenship, conditional on state recognition and their cooperation with state institutions. The following quote from a security expert who has served as adviser and contractor to the local government illustrates the conditionality and the passive nature of citizenship that is commonly assumed regarding marginalised communities targeted by the Medellin Model:

‘The city has brought the security forces to the comuna, made robust social investments and built impressive infrastructure, however we still have communities opposing police actions and led by 20 year old gang leaders with 15 to 20 people in their groups, these constitute considerable sectors of society committed to violence... this shows the state still has not yet achieved legitimacy, generated enough trust, strengthen social fabric and motivated people’s cooperation... that is why I have suggested that the families from these comunas who receive subsidies continue to do so but on the condition of keeping their children in schools and cooperating with the authorities to improve security...people have to be asked something in exchange... (Giraldo, 2013 quoted in EIColombiano 2013)

With the pacification and 'integration' process of marginalised communities to the 'city' that is supposedly achieved through the Medellín Model, these communities play another role. Within public discourses and practices these become a (vitrina) 'display cases' of the so called Medellín Model, which facilitate the internationalisation of the city and become useful in the effort to attract capital whether in the form of investments or loans. The processes and transformations that take place in these communities are presented as unique, innovative and as a direct consequence of a new form of state intervention, which serves to attract interest within political, academic, policy and economic circles beyond the city.

These intervened communities serve as showcases to demonstrate the success and achievements of the urban state-building process and project an image of a strengthened and efficient local state to outsiders (to policymakers, cooperation agencies, investors, tourists). This is regardless of the fact that multiple forms of violence and insecurity remain part of people's lives and that from time to time armed violence resurges.

The importance that intervened marginalised areas have for the marketisation of the Medellín model and the internationalisation of the city is illustrated by the way the Urban Integral Project in the north east area of the city and the housing project of the Juan Bobo stream¹²¹ have served to attract the interest and resources of cooperation agencies. These two projects which have attracted a great deal of interest among urban planners across the world, were among the first interventions the municipality undertook in the most marginalised areas of the city and have become the most emblematic examples of the type of socio, spatial and participatory form of intervention the local state implemented as part of social urbanism. The two projects have been widely documented and have been used by the municipality to promote Social Urbanism internationally as a successful strategy for urban transformation. The systematisation of these two projects, published by the local state owned Urban Development Company (EDU) with

¹²¹ 'Proyecto Urbano Integral de la zona Nororiental' and 'Proyecto de consolidación habitacional en la quebrada Juan bobo' in Spanish.

the support of the French development agency as ‘an example for other cities in the world that can replicate these good ideas and make sustainable and socially responsible urban development possible, illustrates the extent to which community interventions have become part of an exportable model:

‘Present in Colombia since the late 2009, the AFD (French development agency) found in Medellin one of its most important allies, from the first day. In a few months the agency approved a loan for 250 million dollars to the Municipality for the partial funding of the Integral urban project in the centre east part of the city; beyond the funding the agency developed an important strategic alliance with Medellin based on an ambitious technical cooperation program...one of the key topics of this alliance is the ‘innovative model of urban development of Medellin, the famous ‘social urbanism’, whose excellent results contribute...to transform not only the city but the image of Medellin and Colombia abroad. From the beginning, the AFD decided to promote the diffusion of this model in France, in its countries of intervention and across the world, through the support to presentations in events for experts’ exchanges and through an important exhibition in the Pabellon del Arsenal de Paris... the experience of Medellin was also included as one of the 7 emblematic projects in an exhibition celebrating the agency’s 70 years of history presented in the main French cities and in agencies of the AFD across the world’. (Alcaldia de Medellin et al., 2014:10-11)

Assumptions regarding the State:

During the 2000s the local authorities in Medellin recognised that state’s bad practices (such as inefficiency, corruption and clientelism) had contributed to its low credibility among citizens. Thus they decided to implement a new management model based on transparency and a security strategy that privileged the occupation of the territory by state security forces and

agencies. This strategy contained a highly paternalistic understanding of the state –society relation. The control, government and management of marginalised areas by the state was assumed to bring a solution to urban communities' problems and in consequence improve state legitimacy and foster stability, peace, security and development to the whole city.

Even the existence of some of these communities whose households often do not appear in official maps, is recognised, legalised (through the legalization of property rights for example) and somehow dignified only as a result of state intervention:

'In Medellin we have to build the most beautiful buildings in the places where state presence has been minimal. The first step towards quality education is the dignity of the space, when the poorest child in Medellin arrives in the best classroom in the city; we send a powerful message of social inclusion. If we give the most humble neighbourhoods beautiful libraries, those communities will feel proud of themselves, we are also saying that library or that school, with spectacular design, is the most important building in the neighbourhood and we send a clear message of social transformation. That is our revolution' (Mayor Fajardo 2007 in Newsweek 11/10/07)

The arrival of public resources and state institutions that are meant to permanently occupy the territories (police and military personnel and bureaucrats), is assumed to be good in nature and capable of producing positive processes in these communities. This however ignores the existence of entrenched institutional practices that contaminate and make their relations with local populations problematic (for example corruption, recurrent use of violence and their collusion with violent actors for pacification purposes).

'Police officers are often held accountable for the fight against crime but the Police has other functions too. The police officer is also a role model of citizenship and a point for reference for society, that is why our presence and attitude is so important for

citizens' happiness and community harmony... for example the Police is responsible for the happiness a citizen experiences when he sees the police officer remove the drug addict from the corner...this function is also important. However crime and delinquency exist in communities; the question is what should we do so that people stop breaking the law? And also what can we do so that those who break the law become good citizens? Well, the Community Police with its programmes comes like 'a phoenix' to these comunas...' (Commander Community Police Presentation at International Symposium on Coexistence, Medellin. 24/11/ 2010)

Another key assumption within the official discourse and shared by some academics and local security experts is that increasing the presence of state institutions, especially of those associated to security (the police, the army) and making them permanent would increase state legitimacy and reduce that of non state actors¹²². The assumption that the 'entry' of the state to these areas meant the weakening of these actors and their role in these communities and the achievement of the state's monopoly of violence, as will be illustrated in the next chapter, was problematic. This assumption ignored the many ways in which these actors were able to accommodate to the permanent presence of the state and even benefit from it.

...In August 2002..the decision of intervening Comuna 13, one of the communities in dispute and with dominant presence of FARC guerrilla was taken. It was intervened with the action of security and justice institutions. After the intervention this community passed from 717 homicides in 2003 to 173 in 2004, this event which exemplifies the legitimate use of force and authority, marked the beginning of the return of institutions to territories dominated by illegal and criminal groups....in this context ...the mayor Sergio Fajardo not only continued but strengthened the

¹²² As one resident commented: 'One thing is that the state institutions are present here, another different is if they are the ones who rule... Illegal actors are the ones who rule around here.'

institutional state presence in the comuna 13... with his development plan and especially with his Coexistence and Citizen Security Plan, designed with the advice of PNUD experts, and the work of the security institutions has managed to reduce violence and improve coexistence, he has also managed to make legitimate institutions present across the whole city and these institutions are the ones providing security and justice to citizens now..(Acero sf: 17-18)

In order to make state authorities the ones that provide security and justice in all comunas of Medellin what we did was to strengthen the metropolitan police so that they can have permanent and active presence in all comunas and to create interinstitutional spaces of justice closer to citizens that implement and promote alternative mechanisms of conflict resolution and different programmes to promote citizen coexistence....we now have police officers patrolling some neighbourhoods that until very recently were patrolled and controlled by illegal actors...we (mayor's office) signed an agreement with the police so that the number of junior police officers could be increased, now we have 670 more of them who live in the same neighbourhoods where they serve, this gives you an idea how the state is now present and providing security to all its citizens. (Interview Municipal official at Secretary of Government 18/11/2009)

It is important to highlight that the security strategy within the Medellin Model was modified by the end of the 2000s in order to deal with the increased levels of violence produced by a new war between criminal factions for the control of illegal economies. This moment in the history of the Medellin model can be regarded as a critical conjuncture, a moment in which the Medellin model was called into question by a new crisis that rendered marginalised communities as battlefields full of young casualties. The way the security strategy was adjusted to cope with this crisis that affected the areas that had been the epicentre of state intervention for 7 years, reveals more clearly the

way in which the Model combined biopolitical and sovereign forms of power to intervene 'ungoverned' areas and populations.

On the one hand the local authorities supported the increase in police numbers and the creation of special units that were meant to restore order by capturing those involved in gangs and criminal bands, and on the other, they tried to widen the participation of citizens in the security effort and expanded programmes for young people involved in the conflict as a means of offering incentives to stop fighting and to prevent more youngsters from joining gangs.

An important strategy we have implemented in these areas (marginalised communities affected by violence) is the 'encounters promoting life', we have done at least 10 events like this. It is an all day event, in the morning a group of around 30 people from the different dependencies of the municipality walk around the community house by house, shop by shop talking to people and asking them what are the security problems, what can we do about them in their neighbourhood, then at 2 pm we put up stands and offer information regarding the 41 programmes the municipality offers to residents and the 88 programs we have for young people...it is like bringing the municipality, bringing the state to these neighbourhoods...we have done this in the most problematic areas, for example in borders separating areas controlled by opposing gangs, we go there and try to reach out to guys from the gangs, their families, mums, aunts and grand mums and convince them they should stop fighting...we offer opportunities for them. We don't get involved with the dangerous criminal bands using these kids, those whom young guys work for, we (the mayor's office) leave that to the police. (Secretary of Social Development, presentation at public event 06/11/09)

Processes of Subjectification: Constructing the 'Ungoverned' Subject

The rationality of government analysed above creates particular conditions for the inclusion of communities and population groups into what is regarded as the prosperous and desirable city order. Their integration depends on the construction of particular subjectivities regarding the nature and role of the state, of these communities and of young people. The subjectivities produced by the Medellín model did not necessarily eliminate the roots of stigmatisation that these sectors of society are subject to and that perpetuate their marginalisation.

Within the Medellín model the *state* was discursively constructed as the exclusive driver of the deep social and urban environmental transformations the city experienced since 2002. Its policies were seen as unidirectional, and not as the result of a dialectic process involving communities and civil actors who demanded them, promoted them and sometimes resisted them and transformed them. The state, portrayed as benefactor whose presence was regarded as intrinsically good for historically neglected communities, was assumed to become the ordering actor once its permanent presence was established in peripheral communities.

Marginalised *communities* on the other side were discursively constructed as problematic, vulnerable and dangerous (if not untamed) for the urban order and the city's development. State intervention through a wide range of mechanisms and tools targeted these communities as 'ungoverned areas'. Once subject to state control and influence, they became useful 'showcases' to demonstrate to outsiders the state's capacity to keep order, stability and control of the city and to materially protect the urban space and fluxes of people and capital. However when violence resurges in its most visible forms (through armed confrontations and homicides), some policymakers and other sectors of society tend to assume that these communities or particular groups within them are unfixable. They assume communities choose to resort to violence as a way of life instead of becoming beneficiaries of substantial public investment. This dominant perception of ungoverned communities is particularly true for *young people* living in these areas, who continue to be seen as a potential risk to society and as subjects that need control, disciplining and persuasion in order to avoid criminality.

This is despite the fact that, as the public official's quote below illustrates, there is evidence of the agency and the positive contributions the majority of young people make to their communities:

'Youth has been a key target of state intervention since the 90s, interestingly a lot of youth organisations, community organizations, and NGOs have been working on youth issues in the city, making proposals and trying to push the state to create a public policy on youth. During the last two administrations we have made some progress and developed policies that recognise young people as subjects with rights...In my work I have discovered so many youth initiatives that promote peace and resistance to violence in the city promoted by young people, civil society, youth organizations... these are initiatives to escape from gangs and violence but they are ignored, invisible to the mayor offices, they are not interested so much in them because they see in these young people a radical and critical discourse... I think we should strengthen them and protect them, but it is difficult to get my colleagues in other secretaries to understand these initiatives and their importance...it is not lack of interest, the problem is the security approach...here security is not associated with rights. Although in Medellin there are around 501663 young people and the number of those involved in gangs is no more than 5000, the idea here is that young people are dangerous. The majority are not involved in illegal activities...I keep quoting these numbers, but the stigmatization is so strong, we generalize young people as dangerous all the time...it is very hard to convince people in the municipality and the police that young people are not a problematic sector of society, dangerous and violent...that is why they keep implementing control policies for young people...(Interview Municipal Official at Secretary of Youth, 10/07/11)

A closer look at the diversity of tools, instruments and mechanisms used by the local and national tiers of government to contain the high levels of

violence produced by the 2008-2010 crisis and to preserve the Model's widely advertised achievements, illustrates the way 'ungoverned' areas were subjected not only to coercive forms of state power, but also to forms of biopower.

Instruments and Mechanisms to Govern the 'Ungoverned' Subjects:

Permanent presence and constant increases in the number of security personnel

As mentioned before, the wide range of programmes and interventions targeting marginalised areas of the city seek to integrate and transform these communities in ways that could guarantee the exercise of state sovereignty over the urban space. The ultimate purpose of the pacification efforts, of the new government model promoted by the local authorities and of the integral transformation of marginalised areas was to make the city and these areas in particular 'governable'. As many policymakers recognised, the security forces worked as the first and primordial tool in the symbolic and material conquest of these untamed and feral areas by the state.

'The basic and uncontested principle was that 'the' power had to be in hands of the legitimately constituted authorities and our first tools to recover that type of power was the police; that is why we (the municipality) had to have good relations with the Police and to demand from them efficiency and a fight against corruption. That is why we supported the police forces so much, we gave them tools and equipment and funding to help them be more efficient, but this is also the reason why we supported the community police work, in order to get closer to the local communities' (Interview Security Adviser to Municipality of Medellin and Coordinator of City Security Strategy 05/02/10)

The first step in the process of **achieving state control** over these areas was to make the presence of police officers and soldiers permanent in these areas. Their main function was to occupy places that had been historically left in the hands of illegal armed forces. The construction of police stations and military bases in strategic areas –in the same places that had served as

headquarters of illegal groups for example¹²³, as well as the later installation of cameras, served as a symbolic demonstration of the state presence and of its intention to exercise territorial and other forms of social control.

The permanent presence of police and military personnel in these communities was meant to facilitate the entry of other state institutions to these communities. By the end of the decade, when armed violence was resurgent, the security personnel placed in these areas and new forces sent in response to the crisis were meant to serve as deterrent to violent confrontations between gangs and as a mean to weaken criminal groups through captures and prosecutions of their members. Through tight controls of residents' movements, they were also meant to contain violence and prevent it from spreading to other areas.

The presence of security forces in these areas meant the increase of daily interactions between the state and residents who distrusted these institutions and between the state and illegal actors who exercised social and territorial control of neighbourhoods. It also led to the use of urban space in ways that could facilitate the exercise of state control, even if that occasionally became problematic for residents, as the local representative of the Municipality in a neighbourhood of Comuna 1 recognised:

'When I arrived in the comuna in November 2009 the situation was very hard. There were daily confrontations and homicides between the 38 gang, the Galera gang in La silla area... I even had to deal with the displacement of 17 families that were forced to leave by gangs...These areas were like ghost neighbourhoods. Although there was a tense calm in December, in January the situation deteriorated again so the Mayor came with the Fiscalía (Public Prosecutor's Office), the Police and other authorities. We made a security council up there in Santo Domingo and the Mayor even worked from there. Our strategy was to retake the four areas affected by our institutional offer.

¹²³ As in the case of Comuna 13 where a police station was built in the same house that insurgent militias had used as a headquarter.

With a team of people from the Secretary of Social Development, secretary of government, of civil order, of citizen culture and metrosalud was dispatched to these areas, we did vaccination campaigns, provided medical attention, and from the police station the Mayor oversaw the situation to reassure people the state was here. We had to take social centres that were administered by social development dependencies and establish police stations there instead. We took those social centres and used them to develop investigations, to launch special police operations in the area to capture criminals... People who were using those social centres resisted when we took them and there were even confrontations and many tensions with those whom we took the centres from, but for the community what we did was something very good....That is why there is a sense of tranquillity now, it was not only due to negotiations with the armed groups'....(Interview Municipal Social Work Specialist in Comuna 1, 12/06/ 2010)

Transforming the Ungoverned through Spatial Interventions

Based on the assumption that physical transformations of the urban space can produce deep social, democratic and cultural transformations, the municipality used social urbanism for the normalisation and government of areas regarded as chaotic and violent. Through modifications in the environment, construction of aerial transport systems, the improvement of housing conditions and the availability of local services and infrastructure; local authorities tried to reduce violence and to establish new relations among citizens and between them and the state. The metro-cable transport system for example, while connecting residents of these communities with the rest of the city, imposed on them certain types of social norms and rules of behaviour, it also made them subject to daily forms of surveillance and policing, which Brand and Davila found most residents accepted as something positive or necessary, even though they also provoked a discomfort, inconformity and resistance (Brand and Davila 2011) .

As the quotes below illustrate urban spatial transformations were often directed to the transformation of residents' perception of their quality of life and of their level of inclusion 'in the city', but not necessarily accompanied by structural changes that could also mean a beneficial economic and social integration of marginalised communities in the city's development.

...The previous administration from which this administration is a continuity, made a huge emphasis on social urbanism, that is directing resources and articulating the work of all dependencies and secretaries of the mayor's office to impact particular territories with substantial transformations... we have empirical proof of that when the urban space is transformed, also people are transformed, their conducts, behaviours and the way they relate to each other changes...if you transform the surroundings and the public space with high social impact infrastructure projects(obras) you generate more public space, more citizen encounters and more democracy...that experiment proved that there is an absolutely evident relationship that can be tested empirically , that if you improve the environment, the space ..this by the way is not the same as the 'broken windows' approach, we are talking about interventions with social oriented infrastructure in the territory and public spaces but agreed with the residents (Interview, Municipal official at Secretary of Government 20/07/2010)

'We were a honest political party without commitments, that is why we could invest the money where it was most needed, not where commitments were established before being elected...in addition to a transparent use of public resources, we started to transform the city with the PUIs, the integral urban projects, these were projects for physical and social upgrading of all kind done with communities, these improved participation and quality of life, for example the Juan Bobo stream, an extremely poor area where houses were on the stream and people did not have sewage. We got the money and created an urban boulevard with

apartment buildings for those people, that dignifies anybody's life...it was like 250 thousand million pesos more or less put in an area with the lowest quality of life index, an area that was the birth place of the militias... an abandoned area ...what we did was to go there to meet and connect those people..there was metro cable already so we connected the metro cable above with the poverty under, development could not pass over there without touching those people...with upgrading, libraries, boulevards, parks, synthetic football pitches, all that creates a pole of development for the city, but it also transforms the life of very poor people...that transforms the perception of quality of life of those people...the social and integral content is what transforms people...it is not that the municipality goes and builds whatever it wants there, it is through workshops with residents that we make people feel they own those new communities... (Interview Municipal official at Secretary of Government 18/11/2009)

The transformation of public space and the enhancement of public buildings in these areas also served as a mechanism to symbolically and materially position the state as an institutional and social referent for intervened communities. Many policymakers spoke of the importance of constructing impressive buildings in these neglected areas in the process of changing the perception citizens had of state presence and power in these communities:

“We pledged to change the skin of the city. Where there was once violence, fear, criminals, today we have the most beautiful buildings, buildings of the best quality so that we can all gather around science, culture and education...Given the dimension, relevance and number of physical works we have done since 2004...it is important to mention the meaning, the transforming power that public buildings have for us; physically, public buildings have been the image of a precarious state...the existing buildings projected an image of a deteriorated and illegitimate state with insufficient presence, due in part to the fact that

constructions were obsolete and inadequate. These lacked minimal spaces and were uninviting...At least in Medellin, this was the case of a great deal of public buildings destined...to education and culture in the poorest neighbourhoods. We conceived public building as fundamental referents of a transparent government which treats everybody with dignity and in equal conditions and without restrictions'' (Interview Municipal Official at Secretary of Social Development 25/11/09)

Involving Citizens in the Governing Process

The governing process of historically neglected areas contained mechanisms through which citizens could help the state consolidate its influence and improve its capacity to deliver services. The promotion of citizen participation was a key and differentiating aspect of the Medellin model. The Fajardo administration not only designed its development plan for the city with the participation of residents and civil society, but it also facilitated the involvement of citizens in the implementation of certain urban projects and on the allocation of public resources for community development through participatory budgeting. Citizen's involvement in public affairs became part of the model's distinctive feature, but more importantly, it became a key instrument in the process of improving state legitimacy and promoting good governance, as the quote below illustrate:

Citizens' participation, as a strategy and as a public policy, is part of Medellin's brand (sello) today...the transformation that people live in Medellin today and that is recognised by those who visit the city, is also a transformation in the way of governing and in the strategies and the approaches that boost the community's participation. With the improvements in the mechanisms of participation, we aim at greater institutional legitimacy, so that the participation is real and not only in paper, so that participation is not only substantial in quantity but in quality... All secretaries and decentralised institutions have mechanisms for the effective participation of citizens. In 84% of the

municipality's offices a great deal of the normal work is done under the influence of citizen participation. Today we assume participation as a political task for the transformation of traditional leaderships and for the creation of new leaderships... (Secretary of Social Development, presentation at public event 12/11/09)

The use of citizen participation in the process of making the city governable, demonstrates that within the Medellin model, the subjects of the governing project were expected to play a key role. The process of pacification, normalization and integration of marginalised areas did not rely solely on the use of coercive sovereign power, but on other forms of power and processes that aimed at making citizens accept state power and collaborate in its consolidation. Citizens were expected to help the state-building effort not only through self-regulation and the transformation of their culture and daily practices, but through their active participation in institutional spaces made available by the local state, such as communal workshops, councils, participatory budgeting exercises.

The local state facilitated different formats and scenarios for people's participation, which a great deal of community and civil society actors were keen on using to advance their vision of community development. However, citizens' participation appears in the official discourse as something the state concedes to citizens, and as a means to help the state pacify and govern these areas, rather than as a right. By making invisible the multiple forms of agency and participation communities have accumulated and the way they have contributed to shape planning processes in the city, the official discourse assumes the participation of communities only exists in the format the state establishes. This type of state fostered participation is not oriented to exercising oversight of state institutions, to holding bureaucrats and officers accountable, or to influencing the strategic future of the city. Citizen participation is assumed to work as an instrument to increase the legitimacy of the governing process of marginalised communities; and this is evident in the policymakers' insistence of 'co-responsibility' as a principle for the management of urban affairs.

...one of our bets for this social urbanism is that the planning needed to be done with people so we did imaginative workshops to see how people imagined their surroundings based on what they wished for, this inputs helped in the designing of the infrastructure we did...so people said it would be nice to have a park here and a school there, or a library...so community's participation is key for social urbanism.... now, a few months ago the local government presented a security strategy that aims at responding to the current crisis and to reducing the high levels of violence we saw last year ...we had to revise the development plan for the city that we had because it was done assuming that things would continue in the same way but the narcotraffic and the violent fights within the criminal world for the control of criminal economies... forced us to revise that. The new security strategy now has three components: first, social mobilization which demands citizens participation, second, creating opportunities and third, improving the capacity of security institutions like police and justice... (Interview Municipal official at Secretary of Government 18/11/2009)

Citizen participation was not circumscribed to social urbanism and community development projects; it also became key to improving security provision. Throughout the 2000s decade, both national and local tiers of government promoted the active involvement of citizens in the security effort and the fight against criminal actors. People were called to 'participate' in the security effort by informing against other residents involved in gang related activities and providing intelligence to the authorities. This type of participation which became a test of citizen's loyalty to the state was meant to regain state control and influence in these areas and to facilitate the pacification of comunas.

Regarding the difficult security situation in the city, we are trying to encourage people's participation, this responds to what the development plan established. We preach that security is a matter ruled by co-responsibility: this means security forces, the

local state, citizens, we are all responsible for preserving and maintaining the security levels we had, without security it is impossible to exercise rights and freedoms, so with the security strategy there are two ways in which we materialise citizens participation...in problematic communities we have implemented control measures and called people directly to contribute with information that help authorities prosecute criminals...what we demand from citizens in safe communities is to organise themselves to improve security through 'security fronts'¹²⁴ for example...the municipality and the police support them with cameras and technological tools, permanent assistance and by allocating community police officers to those areas. Also by creating training programmes on community security, there is a lot of dialogue between authorities and communities in these areas...the idea is to protect safe areas that do not require armed force police... that type of armed force is allocated to more complex and difficult areas (Interview Secretary of Government, Medellin 4/11/2009)

We have different programs that allow the participation of citizens in this effort, such as the 'citizen security schools', these are spaces of interaction with the community in which we teach them norms so that communities and the decent citizens respond to their duty and to the principle of corresponsability and inform the police when there are security problems. We also have 'local security fronts' that help us work with citizens to respond to insecurity problems, through this programme people receive alarms and technological tools. We have a programme called 'DARE' to educate young people in schools and reduce the consumption of drugs in schools, because the problem in Medellin is the illegal drugs. We have the 'civic juvenile police', a

¹²⁴ These are organisations at community level created with the leadership of the Police. It brings citizens together with police officers and together they develop strategies to improve security in a neighbourhood or a community.

programme that helps us educate young people and children in principles and values. We also organise workshops for parents of children who attend these programmes. At the moment there are like 2,778 young people in this programme...We also have 98,765 citizens as members of an informants network. Through this network we pay economic rewards to good citizens who help the authorities in the fight against crime ...these are all important programmes for the participation of citizens (Interview Commander of the Metropolitan Police, Medellin 12/11/2009)

The institutional spaces created and regulated by the state for citizen participation in the security sphere, envisaged a particular form of participation that was not meant to allow citizens to hold the state accountable for the type of interventions implemented in their communities. They stripped it from its more democratic nature, making it at the same time a duty and a concession from the state, rather than a citizen or community right which has long been demanded by these sectors of society.

Incentives and Negotiations to Pacify ungoverned areas

Considered a neglected and potentially dangerous population group, youth from marginalised areas were subject to particular tools in the process of governing 'ungoverned' spaces. In addition to the increased daily controls through curfews and stop and search police techniques, for example, the local state designed special programmes for them. These were meant to offer those involved in armed groups and in risk of joining gangs, incentives and opportunities to reintegrate to communities and to engage in legal activities. However in the context of competition with illegal armed actors for influence in these marginalised areas and efforts to make the state capable of controlling violence erupting from these areas, both the generous DDR programme and preventive programmes targeting youth implemented by the local government were seen by officials as tools to pacify the city in times of crisis and to reduce the growing power of armed actors, especially after the 2008 crisis, as the official description of the programme illustrates:

In the context of the demobilisation of the AUC since the late 2003 -and as a result of national politics-, the Fajardo administration needed to urgently formulate from scratch municipal polices that would be coherent...The administration instead of crossing its arms perceived the challenge of reintegration (of these combatants) as an opportunity for Medellin to end the presence of paramilitary groups that in the same way that guerrilla militias had attacked life and rights of inhabitants of wide areas of the city for a long time. The Mayor's office created then the municipal programme Peace and Reconciliation, as an institutional space to take 4,163 men and women out of violence and conflict. Departing from the conviction that the city had to be responsible for its young people, there was still need to establish a preventive work, this consolidated from 2007 with the Alonso Salazar administration through a programme to meet the needs of youth at risk (Alcaldia de Medellin 2009:18)

These programmes were often seen by policymakers, bureaucrats and police officers as a tool to reduce the number of fighters available to criminal organisations, rather than as means to address the complex problems affecting young people's lives in marginalised areas. The value of these programmes was often assessed from the perspective of the state war against powerful criminal organisations and the need to reduce homicides rates, not from their capacity to address structural unemployment, poverty, discrimination, etc. In their view, the subsidies and opportunities to obtain support and training from the state offered to young people served to reduce confrontations and to 'steal' people from the gangs' ranks:

To those young people (members of gangs) we are offering direct and immediate opportunities to them, we offer them education, training, employment and opportunities without requesting their disarmament. Look, last Saturday we managed to get 4 gangs in 'Las Independencias, Los Conquistadores, and El Salado in Comuna 13 to sign a 'non aggression pact'. We

invited 65 guys and 41 of them signed the pact. The idea is that this pact leads later to their demobilization ...many of those guys are in those groups because they are being paid to work. They take care of drug selling points, they are given a weapon and 1 million and a half or 2 million pesos a month, instead we are offering them much more, we offer them much more support... I think Medellin is the only city in Colombia where the reintegration process is working. From 5 thousand people who demobilised, more or less 10% of them are dead, 10% are in jails, but many more are studying or trying to find a job...it is very hard to compete with an illegal business that produces 10 thousand million pesos a month, that is the criminal organisations profit in Medellin, but we are confident of this opportunity and we are offering young people opportunities...To those who criticise the Municipality for investing all this money in this programme targeting guys involved in the conflict, I tell them that we prefer those guys signing pacts. We are giving them support so that they stop shooting at each other in the streets. It is because of these pacts that homicides stop in Medellin... (Secretary of Social Development, presentation at public event 06/11/09)

Although these types of programmes were tailored to a particular group of young people in these communities, to those involved in illegal activities¹²⁵, they were often spoken of as the key programmes available to young people in marginalised areas, under the assumption that the only reason why young people in these areas joined armed groups was that they had nothing else to do. This denotes a common over simplification of the dynamics and forces facilitating the growth of recruitment in these areas.

‘As a result of our (police) efforts and programmes, we managed to convince 7 gangs from the Manrique area to give up their

¹²⁵ As it was mentioned before, membership to an armed group or proof that one is member to a gang was one of the requirements to be eligible to these programmes.

arms (knives) voluntarily in exchange for some training opportunities, this year more than 20,000 arms were handed over voluntarily ... we understand the situation is very hard: there are like 250 gangs in Medellin, that is the equivalent of 4,500 youngsters working for 6 or 7 bigger criminal bands in Colombia and ready to die...we know that if young people have nothing to do they will go to those groups that is why Coronel Rojas has tried to find opportunities for those young people and help them to join the 'promoters of life initiative' that allows them to make their military service at the police and to get some training at the SENA...once they hand in their weapons, they can access the opportunities...one day there were 23 women in the queue ready to hand in arms, we sent some of them to the Fuerza Joven programme, others were given a place in the SENA in other regions, this shows you women are playing a bigger role in the violence, even as mums they legitimise the illegality of their sons....' (Commander Community Police Presentation at International Symposium on Coexistence, Medellin. 24/11/ 2010)

In addition to these programmes and in the context of resurgent violence, local authorities relied on fostering pacts among gangs and offering their members incentives as a mean to discourage them from fighting. These pacts which included benefits and entry to state programs to gang members, aimed at stopping the confrontations, but were very fragile and offered no medium or long term benefits for communities. These pacts that were seen as a means to bring peace to communities meant that state actors, including police officers, were authorised to dialogue, negotiate, persuade and make agreements with members of illegal groups in these communities. As the community police officer in charge of fostering one of these pacts between gangs in La Sierra, one of the communities most affected by the gang wars of the late 2000s describes, these pacts meant tacit recognition of the important role played by gang leaders in these communities.

...talking to the leaders of the bands is not very nice...to be able to meet them you have to bring clear and very precise ideas that can convince them...I had the support of my commanders and of the mayor's office...The gang leader is someone's brother, someone's son, so when you talk to them you have to bring clear ideas and recognise the communities problems...the municipality has the Fuerza Joven program and the Peace and Reconciliation programme (DDR programme) for paramilitary and guerrilla ex-combatants...those youngsters had been beneficiaries of those programs...but because they continue their way of life they stopped attending and were retired from the programme...in any case, there are those programmes for youngsters who...are waiting in the corners for something to do, so that they can bring food to their houses, so my proposal was to open this program to them... I sat with Yair the leader of La Sierra...he has more or less 60 youngsters and with Antonio from Villa Turbay he has 20 or 30 people...you cannot just small talk them so what I did...I explained to them the community police programme...and the community problems and why people needed the police ... I was telling them that they should let us work in the community...that we bring things that benefit residents..Yair also told me his and his guys' problems and how they felt, so I suggested Fuerza Joven programme to him. I explained that it was a big problem that homicides were so high again after the big drop... it was hard to convince them that it was a good idea to talk about security...but they have this idea that they are leaders and that they take care of the community, and they are, they do, but in a bad way, violating others' rights, displacing people for example...so I told them if you are leader, then work as a leader...I think the key point was that I recognised his potential and that people in the community believe in him...I started taking them to community meetings... they control the community boards behind the scenes so people were very scared in the beginning, but my presence there helped... when I started

meeting with them I had to organise some meetings to explain to residents that I was not meeting with them to arrange extortions, but to help the community but people still talk...(Interview Community Police Officer based in Comuna 8, 19/11/09)

The incentives and opportunities offered to those involved in illegal activities through the DDR process, preventive initiatives targeting youth at risk and through pacts between gangs, clearly exceeded those available to other young people who did not get involved in criminal activities and even those available to young people who organised peaceful initiatives in these communities in the attempt to prevent children and young people from joining gangs. The fact that these programmes were under the responsibility of the Secretary of Government¹²⁶, instead of the Secretary of Youth¹²⁷ reveals that these programmes were seen as tools in the pacification of communities. They were meant to improve security conditions by taming the most dangerous and powerful community actors, not to address the problems affecting the development of youth. The tensions created by the differences in the budget available for these type of programmes and those for the wider youth population is registered in the account of an official working at the Secretary of Youth:

...During the last two administrations (Sergio and Alonso's) some opportunities opened, so many of the youth groups creating peace initiatives managed to access some resources through the participatory budgeting programme. My secretariat and *metrojuventud*¹²⁸ had to work a lot to support them and offer these young people training so that they could participate in the PB programme. It was hard because the traditional leaders often

¹²⁶ This is the municipal agency in charge of advancing policies regarding citizen security, coexistence and culture. It is also in charge of supporting the judicial system and promoting the credibility of local institutions and the security forces.

¹²⁷ This Secretariat is in charge of 'contributing to the integral human development of youth'.

¹²⁸ This is a specialised office at the Secretary of Citizen Culture in charge of integrating the offer and programmes offered by the Municipality to youth. It promotes the implementation of programmes to improve the life conditions of young people in the city.

ignored them and undermined them ...so we trained them so that they could present their initiatives and youth projects... we saw an increasing number of youth initiatives accessing public funding, this gives you an idea of the potential there..However it is hard and problematic when you compare the budget we (secretary of youth) have for these kind of programmes, with the amount of resources invested in the Fuerza Joven programme (for members of youth gangs and managed by the secretary of government) ...if you compare the amount of money invested in members of gangs and the investment in say, programmes for displaced victims and the rest of programmes we have available to young people who are not involved in crime (like youth clubs and Participatory Budgeting for Youth), an impressive percentage of the public budget is spent in Fuerza Joven. This created a big tension in the city because we ended up offering subsidies, education and incredible opportunities to the 'bad guys' and not much to those who have nothing to do with illegality...we have tried to address this, especially because of social pressure...we are designing a programme now to offer scholarships and subsidies to other young people.. (Interview Municipal Official at Secretary of Youth, 10/07/11)

'Expert Knowledge' Production and the Governing Process

Governing process and practices are justified and reproduced through the production of particular fields of intervention (Foucault 1980, 2007; Dean 2010) and 'expert' knowledge. In the case of Medellin, urban space and citizen culture, especially those values and practices associated with illegality, became key fields of governmental action to which multiple tools and mechanisms were directed in the process of governing marginalised communities.

The kind of governmental practices and tools that targeted these communities since 2002 were not originally conceived and delivered as a coherent model of urban transformation, but as a combination of programmes, initiatives and interventions implemented by different

government agencies and tiers of government in the process of making marginalised communities governable and controllable by the state. The notion of the existence of a 'Medellin model' emerged later on, by the end of the decade, accompanied by the consolidation of supposedly innovative concepts.

Knowledge produced around the urban transformation of Medellin has been adding notions to the urban planning jargon used in the region and beyond, such as the 'social urbanism' concept¹²⁹. This knowledge has also contributed to the more recent marketization of different interventions in ungoverned areas as a 'model'. Certain academic circles and institutions, as well as international cooperation agencies have played a crucial role in the production of 'expert' knowledge regarding social urbanism, regarding the impact of urban physical interventions on violence levels, and regarding the effectiveness of violence prevention initiatives and programs. In the process they have helped to make Medellin a hub for learning for policymakers across the region.

Local and international academics of different disciplines, security experts and public officials have helped to disseminate the achievements of some interventions as promising tools for other cities. The publication of articles, systematizations of successful interventions and programmes implemented in the city since 2004, trips of municipal officials to other cities in the region to share their knowledge and experience in the implementation of programmes in marginalised areas, visits to Medellin by public officials from other cities with the aim of learning from the Medellin Model and numerous academic and expert events (including the creation of a summer school programme to study the urban and social transformation of Medellin'¹³⁰ and workshops¹³¹),

¹²⁹ Social urbanism appeared a posteriori, as a tag that referred to the urban interventions in neglected areas of the city and interventions that meant to address urban problems by producing quality public space with citizen participation (Quinchía, 2011)

¹³⁰ The summer school is provided by the 'Centro de Estudios Urbanos y Ambientales' Urban – EAFIT and is entitled: 'Social urbanism in Medellin: urban and environmental processes. It aims at sharing the kind of transformation Medellin experienced in recent years <http://www.eafit.edu.co/escueladeverano/cursos/Paginas/urbanismo-social-en-medellin.aspx>

have all played a role in legitimising and reproducing governing efforts on marginalised communities that are still regarded as vulnerable, outside state influence and at risk of violence.

The Colombian Ministry of Education's account of one of the international events organised in Medellin by the municipality and a higher education institution to discuss Social urbanism with architects and policymakers from Argentina, México, Ecuador, Brasil y Colombia, is telling of this process ¹³²:

'After the event the implicit message is that Medellin has become an example of social intervention and political will in the transformation of marginalised or fragmented communities. A reality that, according to the former dean of the Universidad Catolica de Quito, is transversal to all Latin-American cities...for the participants to the debate, this model of urbanism has resignified the way architecture was being thought of in Latin America, where until recently, cities highlighted structural icons, such as emblematic private buildings, highways and stadiums, which represented a high cost, but were delinked from the inhabitants' needs and in some cases from the city...Medellin is an example of the symbolic resignification of the high neighbourhoods and of transformations in the urban space which dignify people's living conditions. After this event it is very likely that favelas and marginalised neighbourhoods in the southern cone countries adopt some of the intervention and management models that, since the administration of Sergio Fajardo Valderrama, gained strength in the city (EAFIT/Ministerio de Educacion 2010)

¹³¹ Such as the one organised by the development planning unit at UCL in association with Colombian universities <http://www.bartlett.ucl.ac.uk/dpu/programmes/summerlab/2014-series/medellin>

¹³² The event was organised by the Municipal owned Empresa de Desarrollo Urbano (EDU) and the 'Centro de Estudios Urbanos y Ambientales' at EAFIT University.

This expert knowledge that presents the processes taking place in marginalised communities as special and replicable has also reinforced particular criteria for defining the success of state interventions in these areas. As Foucault argues, knowledge is key to governing processes because it justifies certain governmental practices and establishes particular measures of success (Foucault 1980). At the same time that improvements in some indicators of quality of life became the official evidence that the Medellín model was improving people's lives¹³³, in terms of security, reductions in homicides rates, especially the one occurred between 2003 and 2007, became the evidence, according to officials, that the state had succeeded in exerting control of ungoverned areas; this disregarding the fact that none of the more than 300 gangs in the city working for sophisticated criminal organizations disappeared as a consequence of state action.

In Medellín, within the public and academic discourse the number of homicides in particular, as well as what the authorities call 'high impact' crimes, became the key measure of success for state interventions. An example of the way academic circles helped consolidate this quantitative indicator, as a dominant tool for arguing the success of certain state interventions, is the highly publicised publication of an academic article in the *American Journal of Epidemiology* which argued, based on quantitative evidence, that changes in the physical infrastructure in neighbourhoods (in particular the construction of a public transit system in 2004 connecting low income neighbourhoods to the city's centre, and improvements in infrastructure) had produced a decline on the homicide rate of 66% in intervened neighbourhoods (Cerdeira et al. 2012).

This type of academic study exclusively based on quantitative indicators, did not take into account other forms of violence affecting residents (such as disappearances, intra-urban displacement, sexual violence, extortions, etc.), nor did it consider relevant the role of other variables, such as the hegemony exerted by armed actors on reductions in homicides and armed

¹³³ Sergio Fajardo's development plan established as measurement of success the Quality of Life Index.

confrontations at community level. However it reinforced the notion of homicides rates as a reliable measurement of policy implementation. Based on this indicator of lethal violence, municipal authorities have claimed the success of state interventions and the solution of community problems, although residents continue to endure chronic levels of insecurity, as it will be illustrated in the next chapter.

What becomes evident is a reliance on expert knowledge that allows authorities to defend the implementation of controversial programmes and resist or discredit criticisms from civil society and community organisations. Previous to the 2008 crisis for example, when community residents and civil society organisations criticised the implementation of the DDR programme claiming that communities were still subject to the violent control exercised by beneficiaries of the state programme, officials discredited these accounts by arguing among others, that homicides were still low. It was only in 2009 when violence spiralled producing exponential increments in the number of homicides that the municipality decided to revise their security strategy.

In the case of Medellin governing process, expert knowledge was also influential in the way public officials directed their efforts to building state institutions as a way to deal with complex security problems in marginalised communities. Security experts have been reiterative of the need to improve state institutions' performance as a way to deal with increasingly sophisticated criminal networks. As the quote below suggests, institutional development is considered the best way to improve citizen security and to handle recurrent violent crises in the city:

Until now municipal administrations in Colombia have various institutions intervening and dealing with security and coexistence issues. This produces in some cases disconnection and lack of coordination among those different institutions; this also affects the required integral administration of citizen security....it is important that municipal governments build an administration system to deal with coexistence and citizen security, in which the mayor, as highest authority in the municipality...coordinates the

security, justice and coexistence institutions. These in turn will have to answer to citizens for their respective constitutional and legal responsibilities. The administrative structure suggested for this purpose includes the creation of four directions: 1) one dealing with security, 2) one dealing with justice and human rights, 3) one dealing with coexistence and citizen culture and 4) another dealing with administrative issues. Additionally, there should be a security fund...and an observatory of violence... (Acero quoted in MCV 2012:4)

Expert and policy debates around urban security in the city tend to be focused on local institutional development and on improving crime statistics and measure mechanisms of security levels. This has encouraged local public efforts to develop better security data systems as a mean to improve security provision and decision making, but it has also eclipsed discussions around structural factors fuelling urban insecurity which remain unaddressed.

Local knowledge produced around the Medellin Model and the way it improved urban security in particular, also determines the criteria used to evaluate the results of public security initiatives in the city. Recognising the role knowledge production plays in the articulation and legitimization of particular forms of exercising power, brings our attention to the question of who participates in the definition of these criteria and who does not. In the case of Medellin, expert analyses on security do not tend to take into account the voices and experiences of residents of the most affected areas where violence and insecurity are chronic. In this thesis I intend to unpack the rationality of security provision in Medellin, but also to recognise and understand such experiences. I argue that people's notions and daily experiences of the kind of governing processes they have been subject to throughout the 2000s, can help us build a more complete picture of the consequences and contradictions inherent to the process of making this city of the global South safer by means of constructing marginalised areas as 'ungoverned'.

Conclusion

This chapter offered an alternative perspective on the 'Medellin Model'. Using the Foucauldian notion of governmentality and critical discourse analysis, I revealed that the security strategy in Medellin was guided by the idea that security could only be improved as long as the state succeeded in governing 'ungoverned' urban areas. The analysis of the calculations, assumptions and justifications that guided policy-makers and state representatives involved in the implementation of state initiatives showed security not only as a process for dealing with violence, insecurity factors and criminal actors, but also as a more complex process for governing certain populations.

The chapter illustrated how security responses profoundly affected state-society relations and shaped the subjectivities of particular population groups in the process of dealing with violence. The security provision process that took place in Medellin from 2002 to 2012 is revealed as a process through which people's identities were constructed and re-constructed based on assumed attributes of both the state and marginalised urban communities. By classifying certain groups as 'ungoverned', for example, special instruments and mechanisms to transform, control and normalise them were justified. The security provision resulting from this differentiated interaction with urban communities with higher levels of vulnerability was key not only in reducing certain indicators of violence but also in facilitating the internationalisation of the city and the attraction of capital.

This section presented a more nuanced understanding of the complex factors that had influenced the design and implementation of security policies in Medellin. The origin of the mixed security strategy rested not in the single political will and visionary leadership of local municipal officials, as it is often portrayed in other analyses, but in the complex interconnection of local and national processes. In much the same vein, the chapter demonstrated how neoliberal urban processes, national-level dynamics and institutional change, and community-level agency shaped the 'Medellin Model'. In the next chapter, I advance the analysis further, focusing on the experiences of those who were targeted by governing processes unleashed by the type of security provision that took shape in Medellin throughout the 2000s. This reveals

some of the contradictions and unexpected consequences of the 'Medellin Model'.

Chapter 6

Security Provision and Governing Processes on the Ground:

An ethnographic informed account of state-society relations in 'Ungoverned Communities'

Last month the minister of defence came here with the governor of Rio...they were calling the intervention here (*comuna* 13) a success and I could not believe it...one thinks f...I felt so much impotence because we live here and we have to endure very heavy things daily you know: murders, violence...seeing the security forces lending their rifles to the combos (gangs)... it is like they (state authorities) are selling the city...(Interview Young male resident *Comuna* 13, 11/06/2012)

Introduction

In this chapter I use a set of methods informed by ethnographic methodologies to investigate the governmental consequences of the security strategy used in Medellin, from the perspective of residents of marginalised urban communities. This chapter reveals the contradictions and unexpected consequences of the 'Medellin Model'. Based on the way state security initiatives were experienced, witnessed and talked about by residents of the 'ungoverned spaces', I argue that the Medellin Model allowed the state to exercise its permanent presence and some forms of power, but it did not address chronic problems of insecurity affecting residents of these areas. Not only were people living in fear of armed violence, but also armed actors had augmented their capacity to exert control of communities. The chapter also reveals the way in which some techniques used to address violence and insecurity reproduced stigmatizing state practices and created opportunities for armed actors to increase their influence and power. The chapter starts with an analysis of residents' daily experiences of insecurity and violence despite state presence. It then discusses people's interactions with state agents, especially with police officers, as well as residents' experiences of

state initiatives and programmes used to govern urban violence. The chapter concludes with evidence of the agency of residents of these areas, who were constructed as passive subjects of state power by the state, but who also found ways to resist such subjectification process.

Using Ethnographic methods to Investigate Security Provision in Medellin

As the previous chapter illustrates, the last decade saw the emergence of a particular rationality of government for dealing with the urban crisis Medellin experienced at the beginning of the XXI century. This rationality sought the integration of areas that were regarded as outside state dominance into 'the city' through a wide range of power mechanisms. The exercise of power over historically neglected communities meant a subjectification process that constructed them as 'ungoverned areas and populations' needing special forms of state intervention and security provision. This chapter reveals how the exercise of power materialised on the ground and shaped state-society relations.

Using participant observation and semi structured interviews and focus groups with residents of *Comuna 1* and other marginalised urban communities, I illustrate the contradictions underlying the governing process that entrenched in the city since the early 2000s. The field observations focused on capturing community level dynamics, relations and experiences concerning the provision of security and services and the implementation of a wide range of state programs in marginalised communities. The evidence was mainly gathered in *Comuna 1*¹³⁴, an area in the north-eastern side hills of the city which encompasses 12 neighbourhoods¹³⁵ and is home to approximately 154853 people. Most of this urban community's population is young (73.4% of the population is younger than 39) and the great majority of

¹³⁴ Although data collection activities (such as interviews, focus groups and field visits) were also carried out in other urban communities with similar characteristics (*Comuna 6- Doce de Octubre*, *Comuna 8-Villa Hermosa* and *Comuna 13-San Javier*)

¹³⁵ Santo Domingo Savio N° 1, Santo Domingo Savio N° 2, El Popular, Granizal, Moscú N° 2, Villa de Guadalupe, San Pablo, El Compromiso, Aldea Pablo VI, La Avanzada, La Esperanza N° 2, Carpinelo

its residents live in low (75.4 %) and very low (24.6%) socioeconomic conditions¹³⁶.

Much like the other marginalised areas of the city, this comuna became a main hub for migrants escaping violence, poverty and hardships in Colombian rural areas since the 1960s. The history of its neighbourhoods and its residents' lives have been particularly shaped and impacted by the cycles of violence the city has experienced since the late 1980s. Not only was this comuna famous for having been home of many of Pablo Escobar's young hit men during the consolidation of his criminal empire, but it has also been a strategic stronghold for all the illegal armed actors that have emerged and mutated during this city's recent history (among them self defence groups, militias, street gangs, paramilitary groups and criminal networks linked to drug trafficking and other illegal economies).

Due to its turbulent history, the low quality of life in this area and its strategic location, Comuna 1 was also a key epicentre of state intervention in the 2000s. Some of the most renowned interventions done by the state in the process of pacifying and transforming the city were either implemented in this comuna or targeted their residents. Some examples are: the construction of aerial cable-cars system (metroable) connecting neighbourhoods to the rest of the city as well as an emblematic library park (parque biblioteca España), the implementation of urban upgrading programmes¹³⁷, the increase in number of state security forces and construction of police stations and also the implementation of participatory planning exercises, the demobilisation process and programs focused on children and youth, etc.

As analysed in the previous chapter, according to the official discourse these type of interventions in marginalised areas intended to curtail very high levels of violence and put an end to the presence of illegal armed groups that challenged the state, its monopoly of violence and its capacity to effectively

¹³⁶ According to the Colombian socio economic system of classification of residences: *Estratos* 1 and 2

¹³⁷ Including the 'Granizal Sport Complex' built in this area.

govern the city. Through impressive infrastructure, increased social investment and strengthening of state institutions and permanent state presence, local authorities sought the physical renovation of what policymakers saw as particularly vulnerable and unruly urban areas, as well as the social and cultural transformation of their residents. This was seen as necessary for their effective integration into the successful and legal 'city', and for making Medellin a 'governable' and competitive city.

By the end of the first decade of this century, when the field work for this research was undertaken (2009-2012) policymakers spoke of communities like comuna 1 as areas that had stopped being 'no-go zones' for the state and as epicentres of promising public policies and security and coexistence models that could and were being replicated in other cities. While this was somehow true, the ethnographic work undertaken uncovered that despite the consolidation of state presence in these neighbourhoods, daily experiences of chronic insecurity and violence were common occurrences for residents.

State intervention in Comuna 1's neighbourhoods had diversified the type of relations between residents and state institutions but also between them and illegal armed actors and between the armed actors and the state in ways that not necessarily meant a sustainable improvement in levels of community and personal safety. In the next sections I illustrate the security context in the neighbourhoods of this particular comuna, and then the nature of the multiple interactions taking place between residents and state agents, especially security forces which became the most visible and foremost face of state power in these areas. I also identify the unexpected consequences of some of the tools and mechanisms of power that intended to transform socially and culturally the 'ungoverned communities'. And finally I analyse some forms of resistance that were emerging in these contexts.

Life in a 'governed area'

'Yes, yes, there is state presence in these neighbourhoods, there are not 'forbidden' areas for the state anymore, but there are still armed groups here, one does not understand what happens, we still have to pay 'vacunas' (extortions), there are invisible

frontiers and still people use gangs to solve their conflicts and problems'... (Interview Young male resident Comuna 1 interview, 09/10/2010)

The following segment extracted from my field note diary describing a participatory activity undertaken with children in La Avanzada neighbourhood, illustrates the complex context in which residents found themselves living after a decade of state intervention in their territory. In this neighbourhood at the highest eastern end of the Comuna, from which the famous and imposing 'Biblioteca España' could be seen, one of the innovative peripheral police stations had been built recently to improve the reaction capacity of the police. Home to some of the most recent newcomers residents of the city, this neighbourhood had been selected by the community organisation I was working with as a volunteer to benefit from a programme which hoped to prevent recruitment and sexual exploitation of children by gangs and to promote human rights and non-violence. The programme consisted of a series of weekly workshops for children between 6 and 13 years old¹³⁸ delivered by social workers. The following is my account of a particular workshop I helped to design to identify actors, places and practices children associated with safety and insecurity based on their daily experiences:

'...We asked children to collectively build a boy and a girl using different materials. They named the dolls they built 'John' and 'Luisa'. In separate groups we then asked boys and girls to identify actors and places of their neighbourhood where they thought Luisa and John would feel safe and happy and others that would make them feel scared and in danger. Children initially spoke of places. The girls identified the park for example as a place of danger because there were too many arms and drugs there and also because there they could be hit by bullets and they could meet bad people. Some children agreed hospitals

¹³⁸ Sometimes they bring siblings between 1 and 3 years old who are left under their supervision.

could be dangerous because they could be caught in shootouts or execution attempts against people being taken there after armed confrontations...while girls spoke of their house as a safe place where they could be safe from shootings, two boys agreed that their house was a place of danger because as they said 'all bad things happened there'. Later, one of the teacher explained to me that some of these children's relatives were gang members and used their homes to hide weapons and drugs stashes. Because children did not mention any actors in particular, I asked, what about the police officers? Do they make you feel safe? And my colleague added, or 'the guys' (referring to the gang members), how do they make you feel? When we asked that in the boys group, they looked at each other and went quiet. Then a boy asked me 'profe, why do you ask that to us? That cannot be discussed'. Another boy insisted 'profe, if you want to live don't talk about that, that is not something to talk about, that is something you cannot ask, and if they hear us talking about that they can come and kill us...' Maria, the most experienced social worker intervened and said 'don't worry. We can talk about that because we are not pointing at any particular group, we are just talking in general, about everybody: the teachers, the doctors, the soldiers, the police officers, even the guys (gang members), we all live here in our neighbourhood'. Boys relaxed a bit and then agreed that police officers, soldiers and 'the guys' should be listed both under actors that protect them but also in the list of actors who put them in danger. According to children these actors all have weapons and sometimes protect them and sometimes they do bad things too... In terms of the perception of safety for these children there seems to be no qualitative difference between a police officer and a gang member, except for the fact that some of the gang members are people they know better and have grown up with' (Field diary note, 13/09/ 2010)

The following week, while we were doing the next workshop, members of the local gang came to the school's door and hung around there looking at us and the children the whole time. Although children did not seem affected by their presence, the school teacher, the other social workers and I felt observed and intimidated. The school teacher was sure that gang members had asked the children about the activities. According to her, some children were relatives of gang members and others were being used by gangs as '*carritos*' (little cars) or '*vigias*' (lookouts). Residents would later confirm that children as young as 5 or 6 years old were being used by gangs as informants, telling them when police or other gang members were around or to transport weapons, ammunition or drugs around the neighbourhood in exchange for petty money children then used to play in coin machines.

This incident illustrates the difficulties discussed in chapter two regarding the process of doing research on security in intervened communities where the state was now present and continually undertaking intelligence activities. Through interviews and conversations with residents I later discovered that a wide range of community activities and meetings organised by local leaders and organisations had become a source of distrust for gang members. State institutions had fostered local events to provide information to residents about state services and to promote programmes, but at the same time they had used some of these events, including those for children, to gather intelligence regarding local gangs. In consequence residents were discouraged by gang members from attending events and local leaders who facilitated the entry of state actors to the community were warned 'not to bring problems to the neighbourhood' (focus group male residents Comuna 1, 2009).

More importantly, what happened at the workshop revealed the vulnerability children were still subject to in this community context, although these very children from marginalised communities had been specially targeted by state programmes. Public policies and initiatives focused on children included the Buen Comienzo programme (Good Start), the construction of quality schools (Escuelas de Calidad), improved access to school restaurants, sport schools (Escuelas Populares del Deporte) and play centres, as well as a subsidy

programme by the national government (Familias en Accion) . The community police was also in the process of implementing a preventive programme for children called youth civic police (policia civica juvenil)¹³⁹. These state programmes were appreciated by residents, but in their view they did not address the underlying problems affecting them and putting children at risk of armed violence.

With the arrival of state forces to these communities and with increasing competition for the control of illegal economies, gangs adapted and designed new strategies to avoid persecution. In the process they had increased the use of even younger children to move illegal goods around the community, to collect intelligence and to undertake surveillance activities. These put children in constant danger of recruitment and increased the risk of retaliation from gangs if they broke certain codes or if they were believed to be helping the authorities.¹⁴⁰ Children, as the account above illustrates, were conscious of that danger and had naturalised certain secrecy codes to minimize it in a context of urban conflict.

Residents, members of civil organizations and community organizations in this area recognised an increase in the capacity of armed groups to use children for illegal activities such as drug trafficking and sex exploitation networks. Strategies used by the gangs to attract children included promoting drug addiction even within their own schools, but also forced recruitment. Many residents spoke of their fear of their children being dragged into gangs as one of the main reasons why families were being forced to leave their homes. A male resident and father of five children expressed his dilemma during one of the focus groups:

¹³⁹ Around 240 children were part of the Juvenile Civic Police programme in Comuna 1.

¹⁴⁰ Two children (11 years old) were murder in Comuna 13 in February 2013. They were attacked with machetes and their bodies thrown to a grave for crossing the border between neighbourhoods controlled by opposing gangs. This happened in the *comuna* with the highest number of security personnel in the city (at the time there were more than 300 soldiers patrolling the streets daily, one police station and 3 police mobile stations in this comuna).

'They (local gang) are going to take my youngest boy to one of those groups...they keep saying he has to join the war. I asked what could I do in order to leave the area because they almost killed him the other day, he cannot even look through the window because they start shouting things at him...people in the neighbourhood told me I have to leave as a displaced person, but that has consequences..they say they will call me to attend face-to-face meetings to denounce who was trying to recruit my son, and if I identify someone, then they will do something to me or the rest of my family...so I better leave the area by my own means, even if that means losing my house, but I better think of my family's life first...'(Focus group with male adult residents Comuna 1, 26/11/2009)

Other studies and community organisations' reports confirm the increased incidence of recruitment of young people and children in Medellin and other Colombian cities (Springer 2012), the increasing impact of armed violence on schools in Medellin¹⁴¹, and also the recruitment of girls for abuse and sexual exploitation which made them objects of dispute (COALICO, 2012). Various civil society organisations reported increasing levels of sexual exploitation of children living in marginalised communities, especially of young girls whose virginity has become a lucrative merchandise to be sold by members of criminal organisations. Even the municipality's secretary of government recognised that since 2009 there was an increase in the number of children and adolescents killed in the city (in 2010 children were the victims of 9% of homicides committed while between January and March of 2011 children accounted for 14% of 472 homicides committed)(Secretaria de Gobierno de Medellin). According to the same governmental dependency, 81% of homicides of children were consequences of the action of criminal groups that had been in fierce competition for the control of communities and illegal economies since 2008.

¹⁴¹ schools were used as a market for drugs and arms by illegal armed actors

The research undertaken in Comuna 1 revealed that even though communities like this had experienced the most important reduction in levels of homicides from 2003 to 2007, which led policymakers to declare them as pacified examples of Medellín's successful transformation, the state intervention had not had an impact on the military capacity of local gangs, nor their willingness to engage in urban wars for the control of lucrative economies. Their power over community life on the contrary, had been growing despite a decline in levels of lethal violence for five years. The military, social, territorial and economic influence of these armed groups only became more visible to outsiders to the community during the 2009-2010 crisis.

Although homicide rates did not reach the unspeakable levels of the early 1990s, residents of comuna 1 identified this urban crisis as 'one of the worst' they had experienced in the last 25 years. The following segment from my field diary illustrates:

'...after we finished the meeting a few residents had to stay with us. Someone had received a call to his mobile phone from home alerting him that a shootout was taking place around his house...Don Sergio lamented that his house seemed to be located in an strategic place, right at the border separating the territories controlled by opposing gangs... he and other 6 people stayed at the community centre and waited to see if the gun fire ceased...while we had lunch residents exchanged information on the location of last night's shootouts. Don Sergio said 'I don't know how is that we don't get more ill with this situation, I have lived hard wars here, the one with the militias for example, but this war is getting crazy, it is miracle I am talking to you now, last night death came real close, I had already taken the bed apart so that we could all sleep on the floor, thank God I did it, because if we would have been sitting on the bed then, the bullets that crossed the room would not be on the wall but on me or the children'...The other residents looked at him as if they knew what he was talking about. It turns out that all of them and their

children are sleeping under their beds for fear of being hit by stray bullets ... Another lady added 'my house is full of bullet holes, every day my children find one more, every day I get sick to think that when I get home I am going to find that something bad happened to my children or my mum'...(Field note diary, 28/11/2009)

Between 2008 and 2011 6.663 homicides occurred in Medellin and a great majority of those were linked to armed confrontations between gangs for the control of communities (Personeria de Medellin 2011). The fierce battles between gangs were accompanied by more threats to residents, forced displacements, recruitment of children and young people, forced disappearances. In Comuna 1 alone, between 2009 and 2010 the homicide rate reached 102 people per 100 thousand inhabitants, and around 29 families (aprox. 101 people) were forcibly displaced due to threats or the murder of a family member¹⁴². Due to the confrontations, the local armed groups tightened their controls over the population. Armed actors established strict controls over communities in order to protect their illegal activities and lives in the midst of confrontations with other gangs. Limits to people's movements within and across neighbourhoods were established through invisible borders or 'fronteras invisibles' that were protected with lethal force. Other forms of social and economic control that had been in place also became more visible and exploitative. Members of these groups imposed higher 'vacunas' (extortions) on residents, shopkeepers, suppliers of goods and bus and taxi drivers. They also increased their control on who was allowed to enter or live in each neighbourhood, until what time people were allowed to be in the street, leave or come back to their own homes, who had to abandon his/her home, what kind of behaviour was appropriate and what kind of deviance from their imposed rules was punishable and how, etc. (OSHM 2012).

¹⁴² The number of people violently forced to abandon their homes and becoming displaced persons within the city limits has continued to increase despite reductions in homicides rates. From 5.098 victims of displacement in 2010, the number reached 8.434 people in 2011. The number of forced disappearances has also increased in the last 4 years.

Young people were especially vulnerable to the controls imposed by armed actors. Young men for example found it very hard to move around their neighbourhoods due to the risk of being mistaken by a gang member or forced to join a group. In this context residents had to adapt and designed self-protection measures to reduce their risks; this included adjusting their schedules and daily activities according to the geography of the gangs' war and trying to avoid forbidden areas. The naturalization of survival practices and of the violence people experienced daily was explained by Yonny during an interview:

'...for example in my family, in my house, we know that there is an armed conflict right? We know the territories and where the combats are, so every time that we have to take the younger brothers to the school or cross the area that is in dispute, the young men of the house stay at home, they don't go, only the women in the house go out...but it cannot be any woman either, because if it is one of the girls that is linked somehow...for example, a cousin of mine that is going out with one of the guys from the San Pablo gang and he has a cousin on the other side that knows her...she cannot go there, if the guys from the combo on that side see her...no! We are very conscious of the conflict and of all those relations in order to find ways to move around the area' (Interview young male resident Comuna 1, 09/10/2010)

The recurrence of armed violence and homicides often concealed the rise in other forms of violence that was taking place in the neighbourhoods, for example interpersonal and domestic violence¹⁴³ involving women¹⁴⁴. Some of the chronic levels of insecurity experienced by female residents emerged early on during my first field visit while I was trying to get to know the local context and design protection mechanisms to reduce my risks. One

¹⁴³In 2011 more than 5.949 cases of domestic violence were reported to public institutions (comisaría de familia) from which 26% (1.557) involved children.

¹⁴⁴ In 2011 the number of women murdered reached 114.

afternoon while I was explaining the purpose of my research to a group of young women at the community centre and discussing with them the best way to be safe in the neighbourhood, the women's advice revealed the kind of risks they were enduring even though they lived in areas supposedly pacified and subject to state control. In addition to the dangers described by other residents, female residents also spoke of the possibility of being sexually assaulted and of the special restrictions imposed on them:

'Vivian who is 27 years old recommended to me to be very cautious where I walk. She said that, but not only referring to the shootings... three blocks from where we are they tried to abuse her. Yesterday after the celebration we were attending, after we said goodbye and she walked home...she walked past quickly the corner and one of the guys started to chase her shouting 'come here come here right now'. She said she ran as fast as she could and managed to get home before he could reach her... she said it is exactly the same place where they tried to abuse her sister some months ago... one of the guys that is always in the corner grabbed her, the guy tried to kiss her but she resisted and they struggled until the guys from the San Pablo combo (gang), from the other corner where she lives, came down and forced the guy to leave her alone...when I asked if she or her sister had talked to the police or any state authorities, she said they did not want to denounce because they felt embarrassed and thought going to the authorities would cause them a bigger problem... Jennifer, who is 26 years old, also asked me to be very careful; according to her the guys (gang members) are very jealous. She said 'the guys should not see you with one guy and another guy later '. She says she takes extra care that the guys who control her street don't see her kissing anyone because they are very jealous and if they like a girl and then see her walking with guys to her house, immediately they make claims that she should be with them too...she says girls get easily raped here for that reason...when there are girls in the neighbourhood they like,

even if they don't date gang members, they don't allow them to be with anyone else...Jennifer said that she does not let her male friends come to her house. She tries to meet them in the city centre or far from home and if they come to her house she asks her brothers and sisters to say hello to them in ways that the guys 'who watch her street' understand they are family friends. She said the guys (gang members) are always watching... and they do whatever they want... she said they tried to rape her once and she had to talk to 'el duro', the boss who controls things in her neighbourhood... a neighbour advised her to talk to him... When I asked why she did not go to the police, she said 'ohh no that would have been worse!...but talking to 'el duro' helped because he gave the order that none of them could come near me, specially the 'twin', the one who tried to rape me'...(Field note diary, 30/11/ 2009)

Forms of violence, sexual abuse and social control particularly exerted by local armed groups on women are strongly connected to their competition for the territorial control of these communities (IPC 2010c). However the multiple forms of violence and insecurity women face in these contexts do not necessarily follow the same trajectory of homicides levels and armed confrontation. For example, in Medellin homicides started to drop in 2011; by the end of 2012 armed confrontations had substantially reduced in Comuna 1 due to the hegemony achieved by one of the criminal factions over this area¹⁴⁵. This reduction in the number of shootings was however not an indicator of a reduction of the capacity of armed groups to exert control on people's lives and women's bodies (OSHM 2012).

Living with the State in the 'governed areas'

State intervention in Comuna 1, as in other marginalised areas of the city, relied on the use of different instruments of government and on the combination of coercive as well as normalising forms of biopower. As analysed in chapter 3, an important aspect of the approach used in Medellin

¹⁴⁵ however confrontations were still taking place in other communities

to contain urban violence was its objective to pacify and integrate historically neglected communities and populations by making them objects of a wide range of public policies. In the next section I illustrate some of the interactions among community actors fostered by these state interventions used to bring people under the influence of the state.

I first analyse residents' experience of the increased number of security personnel stationed in these areas. This worked as the first and primordial tool in the symbolic and material conquest of these untamed and feral areas by the state and as a way to control and pacify their populations. Then I analyse other state initiatives aimed at the social and cultural transformation of residents of these communities, especially programmes targeting youth and involving citizens in urban upgrading and security provision.

On the Exercise of Sovereign Power and the Reproduction of Insecurity

As some of the previous accounts suggest, in this community context the permanent presence of police officers and other state institutions was not necessarily associated with an improvement in people's safety. Residents rarely spoke of state institutions as providers of solutions to their daily security problems. Although the state was regarded as present in the area, especially in the form of security forces (both police officers and soldiers), it was not necessarily understood to be there with the main purpose of dealing or solving their problems. As an example, during a meeting with young people from the comuna 1 who wanted to join the youth support programme at the community organisation where I worked, one of the boys from the Santo Domingo neighbourhood lamented:

'It does not matter that there are tombos (slang for police officers) everywhere; they are not here to protect us, but to take care of the concrete block (referring to the emblematic library park) and the metrocable. You can see them...when something happens, right next to the metro stations is where you can see them... but they won't come to protect us; no, we still cannot come down, it is too dangerous...' (Field diary note, Youth Meeting 16/09/2010)

Residents from these neighbourhoods found it very difficult to see state security agents as willing, capable and preferred providers of their security. This was the result of a complex mix of factors, among them: high levels of corruption within the police forces, entrenched violent practices that characterised their interactions with residents, and also closely related, a perceived closeness and even resemblance between the state security forces and the illegal coercive actors present in the area.

'When the shootings start, the police run and hide but do not confront those who are spraying bullets, the tombos avoid the confrontations...the other thing, look we all wonder if there are only 7 access roads to enter the north eastern area and in all those roads they have installed police roadblocks, so how are all those arms and ammunition for the combos entering?...this just makes evident the corruption in the police forces...in front of San Blas all people know that the commander and some police officers have facilitated the entry of armament for the combos they protect, they not only help them logistically, but they also give them information where to move, etc ...so with that corruption police here is more like an agent of insecurity, not of security (Interview Community Leader Comuna 1, 05/11/2009)

Regarding corruption, during interviews residents reported that local police officers were easily bribed by the local gangs and bigger criminal organisations and that some police officers even worked for those groups. As the interview segment above illustrates, people's distrust of the police forces emerged from what they saw as neglect and from the fact that many police officers benefited from the illegal activities undertaken by the local gangs. One such example would be a form of illegal tax charged by corrupt officers to the armed groups on the money they collected from drug trafficking and extortions (Focus group with female and male residents Comuna 1, 12/11/2010).

This widespread problem, rarely discussed openly by policymakers, contributed to an emerging sense of ambiguity among residents regarding

security forces and their relation with illegal armed actors. Different from the official discourse in which the local gangs and criminal organisations were portrayed as the enemies of the state and threats to society, in the community context where police forces were sent to combat these actors, a more complex set of interactions was established between illegal and legal actors beyond antagonism.

In order to keep levels of violence under control, some members of the police force established some forms of cooperation with local armed actors. For residents of one of the neighbourhoods of Comuna 1 for example, it was clear that during the 'last war' (2009-2011), the police at some point made an alliance with the 'la silla' and 'la 38' gang in order to defeat 'la galera' gang (informal conversations with residents Comuna 1, 06/10/2010). Establishing agreements like this allowed police forces to reduce the competition between gangs that increased the possibility of violent clashes in the area and higher homicide levels, the key measurement of police performance. Other indicators like the number of homicides and other high profile crimes, as well as captures and the number of arms and drugs seized, were used to evaluate the success of police work in the area. Additionally, police forces were under constant pressure to keep violence under control, from both local and national governments. All this contributed to the establishment of problematic relations between them and criminal actors. In one of the neighbourhoods residents reported for example that there had been a case of an 'arranged' capture, that allowed police officers to show their success in the fight against crime, in exchange of allowing the gang to continue their activities in the area (informal conversations with residents and social worker Comuna 1, 02/12/2010).

In practice it seemed that to govern these communities, not only state, and presumably legitimate, power was being used. The illegal and coercive power of local armed actors was useful to state security forces too. The fact that the state arrival to these areas in 2002 was facilitated by and coordinated with paramilitary forces was only the beginning of the further consolidation of problematic relations between state actors and illegal ones throughout the decade. The process of establishing a permanent state

presence in marginalised urban communities was accompanied by the consolidation of existing and new armed groups that emerged from the incomplete demobilization of paramilitary forces in the city. These actors linked to illegal economies were able to strengthen their territorial, social and economic power in urban communities and this power could not be ignored by police officers stationed there. On the contrary, it was often acknowledged by state officers, as the following field diary segment illustrates:

‘Susana, a colleague at the community centre was an hour late to our appointment. We had arranged to meet to discuss the details of next week’s activities. When she finally arrived, she was accompanied by her friend Bianca. Both looked upset...The reason why they were late was that while they were walking towards the community centre in the company of another friend a young guy had stolen their mobile phone. Since they were close to the police station they decided to report the crime... When they managed to finally talk to one of the officers and explained what had happened, the officer told them there was no point in making a report there for something like that, they would not do anything about a stolen phone, however he suggested they go and talk to ‘el duro’ (local gang leader). In the police officer’s view he could do something about it...he would get her phone back in a couple of hours’ (Field diary note, 20/08/ 2011)

According to various residents, sometimes police officers used the influence, power and coercive capacity of armed actors. They mentioned in informal conversations that it was not uncommon for police officers to threaten young residents with sending them or handing them to local armed groups. These incidents illustrate some of the complex relations that security agents had established with illegal actors in the process of controlling and pacifying the ‘ungoverned communities’. These problematic relations also contributed to increase the influence and legitimacy of illegal armed actors.

The role of state forces as legitimate security providers in the community was also severely undermined by the recurrent use of violence by some of the

officers in their daily interactions with residents, especially, but not exclusively, by those from the Special Forces that were the leading effort in the fight against criminals in communities. Despite their fear of talking about it, young people and other residents reported that violent encounters with police officers were very common. Young people felt stigmatised by police practices and especially vulnerable to police abuses, as the segment from a focus group illustrates:

Young man 1: 'One is always pointed at because one is from this area and young, so for them (police) that means that you are a drug addict, a thief, or a trafficker..and they treat us just like that as if we are criminals...

Young Man 4: 'What the public force does generates resistance from the community...especially when they come with violence or when they take the lads in illegal raids in the street...just for being in the street they take you and then leave you in another part of the comuna where they know you cannot be...they know that those who live in one area cannot go to the other area because they will get killed, so what the police do, they take lads from one area and leave them in the other...they once took a friend at 10pm and left him and others at 4am in the other neighbourhood, although they know it is so dangerous, that is real evil, but things like that happen here... (Focus group with young residents Comuna 1, 12/08/2011)

Being illegally recruited by the army or the police was a particular concern for young residents of these communities. It was very common that young men older than 18 were stopped in the streets and taken by force to military bases by the army if they did not provide evidence of having done their compulsory military service¹⁴⁶. The next account of what I saw at the metro station while doing an interview to a public official in another area of the city demonstrated that this happened all across the city:

¹⁴⁶ The Constitutional Court in Colombia declared illegal these raids by which the army recruited and forced young men to do their military service.

'while we were talking in a café near the metro station, a group of soldiers located themselves strategically at the entrance of the station. Fernanda kept looking at what they were doing and after a while she said she needed to go there because something wrong was happening.. The soldiers were gathering a group of young men, around 7 guys were there waiting for something. Fernanda said she needed to go and check what was going on. When we got close we saw the soldiers asking for the guys' IDs. Fernanda approached one of the soldiers and said 'excuse me, what you are doing is illegal, recruiting these guys is illegal'. The soldier looked at her and said 'these are my Major's orders' and continued collecting the guys' Ids... The guys in the group looked very nervous and started to tell us that they have done nothing wrong, there were just going to work...while Fernanda insisted that the soldier stop this procedure, she also reached her phone and called a colleague at the personeria. She spoke loud so that the soldiers could hear that she was requesting a team from personeria to be sent to the metro station to check what was happening... While she was on the phone the cabo came and asked her who she was. Fernanda explained she worked at the mayor's office and that what his soldiers were doing was illegal. She then explained that a group from personeria was on its way to check the situation, to check if the rights of those guys were being endangered...The Cabo tried to sound conciliatory and explained that they were checking the 'guys' situation'. He said 'we are here to protect the citizens and are doing our job'...Fernanda insisted that what he was doing was illegal...She also kept telling the guys, who were visibly nervous, not to worry...After waiting almost half an hour there the cabo ordered the soldiers to give the IDs back to the guys...he then explained to us that none of them were found with criminal records so they were free to go... the young guys quickly left the area....Fernanda later explained to me that this was the second time in two months that she had had to use her credentials to

prevent either the police or the army from taking young people illegally... Since the police had increased their presence...her office kept receiving complaints of young men being forced and taken to do military service or mistreated by security officers... She said, the police and army end up targeting guys who leave the comunas mostly looking for work in the construction sector in el poblado and the southern part of the city ... (Field diary note, 02/06/2012)

Although older residents stated during interviews that they would like to see more police officers in their neighbourhoods, and that people valued the work of community police officers who were thought to do more preventive work, young people feared the police. Their daily interactions with police officers were very often violent and abusive. This made it difficult to differentiate them from other coercive illegal actors that imposed curfews and restrictions to them. Violent practices were at the end the recurrent behaviours of both security forces and gangs when dealing with residents problems.

On Changing the Illegal Culture and the Unexpected Consequences of other Forms of Biopower

The model targeting the 'ungoverned' subjects of marginalised communities implied the normalisation of residents and the transformation of particular traits that seemed to be obstacles for their integration to the city; in particular, their supposed tendency towards illegality. In this context, at the same time that the local state built its capacity for service provision in these neglected areas, it facilitated the implementation of new governance arrangements and programmes that aimed at promoting a culture of legality and allegiance to the state among the local population.

In the view of policymakers, the implementation of integral urban projects, participatory planning exercises, of a comprehensive demobilization programme and youth violence prevention initiatives (such as Fuerza Joven) meant convincing residents of the ungoverned areas that compliance with the law and loyalty to the state were not only viable, but also preferable to the benefits offered by illegal actors and activities. However, as it is

illustrated below, some of these state initiatives not only created challenges to existing forms of citizenship that had promoted non-violent and positive values, but in some cases unexpectedly increased the recognition and influence of illegal actors and reinforced the perception that illegality paid off.

'It does not pay to be good'

One of the most important programmes the local government invested resources in was the Disarmament Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme. It was regarded by public officials as an opportunity to weaken and dismantle armed actors in the city and to discourage young people from joining these groups and participating in illegal activities. Through this programme ex-combatants became beneficiaries of state benefits and were encouraged to participate in community development initiatives. This programme and others targeting youth at risk were considered an effective way to demonstrate to young people from marginalised communities that it was better to play by the rules and that a life away from criminality could pay off and bring benefits. Although these types of state initiatives benefited an impressive number of people through subsidies, training workshops and opportunities to improve their skills, education and even to find a job; the cultural transformation that policymakers expected to produce with them did not seem to be taking place on the ground. On the contrary, the message for many residents of the community was the opposite: that those involved in criminal activities were always in a better position to make a living and also to get concessions and support from the state in moments of crisis.

While many members of the armed groups joined the demobilization programme, this did not mean that they had ceased their participation in illegal activities or renounced the use of coercion in the community. Instead some were using the benefits granted through the state programmes as an opportunity to increase their legitimacy, to economically benefit and to venture in other spheres of community life. As residents agreed during a focus group: it seemed that 'desmobilizados (demoblised) have just changed their strategy, now some of them focus on social activities in the community and the other ones focus on military ones, and they are more powerful than ever' (Focus group with Older adults 16/11/2009).

Residents and members of community and civil organizations from various comunas denounced that some of the economic benefits received by the beneficiaries of the DDR and other programmes were used to buy drugs and arms. Numerous residents from comuna 1 also regarded as a problem the fact that those whom they understood as still being members of powerful illegal organisations were receiving support and recognition from the state. The DDR programme which was later recognised as a partial demobilization, did not achieve the dismantling of criminal structures in the city and instead seemed to be contributing to the informal legitimisation of illegal actors, as the following segment from an interview with a young woman of the comuna 1 reveals:

'They (the gangs) have more power now, the government allowed them to demobilise but I don't see in which way they demobilise, it is the same thing, here paracos have the control...The guys who are always in the corner (local gang members), are supposedly demobilised and were trying to reintegrate to community but that is false. They were still armed, the only difference is that they were receiving a monthly salary...I don't know what for ...supposedly for taking care of the neighbourhood... so I don't know, it is like the state is authorising them to control who enters and to control what happens in the neighbourhood right?...in my neighbourhood sometimes I arrive late...and they still stop me and ask me 'skinny where are you going to, why are you arriving late', they know me so they let me pass but they still warn me that I should take care of myself (Interview Young female resident Comuna 1, 14/11/2009)

Interactions with residents also revealed that the implementation of young violence prevention initiatives like Fuerza Joven, which aimed at discouraging young people at risk of joining armed groups and illegal activities, was problematic. Although public officials spoke of these programmes as serving the youth in marginalised areas, the economic and social benefits offered by the state seemed to be in actuality directed to a minority of young people who were part of armed groups. These incentives

seemed to disproportionately benefit and reward those who had been involved in criminal activities, in comparison to the majority of young people from these communities who, despite hard circumstances, tried to find ways to survive without resorting to illegal means. This seemed to reinforce the perception among residents in poor communities that armed groups were not only powerful actors due to their coercive capacity and their access to the profits produced by illegal economies, but also because they were capable of negotiating with the state and obtaining better benefits for their members. This was causing many residents, especially young people, to conclude that in their context 'it did pay off to be bad'. The following segment from a focus group illustrates that one of the unexpected consequences of this type of programme was that young people who were not members of local gangs were encouraged to consider approaching these groups as a way to access state benefits:

Adult Man1: 'where I live there are many good kids but many of them tell me: 'look It is easier to make a living and even to get a job if you are a criminal, than if you are a honest man'... and that is true, what can I tell them, it is true, haven you seen how those guys (gang members) get paid?, they get paid by the government to quit the conflict but they are still there'

Young man1: 'that's true man...look, people say 'there is no job, so I can go and hang around with this combo (gang) for a month and then I go and say that I am working with them so that I can join the programme... many people who were not involved in the conflict went there and put their names in the list of demobilised just to get benefits (Fuerza Joven programme)'

Young woman1: 'there are no jobs here but if people go and say in the municipality that they are demobilised, they will immediately give them a subsidy and things... it is difficult to understand, as a single head of the household I can get a subsidy but I have to go and pass many requirements to get it, it is like a calvary to get a few pesos for my children, but if you are

a demobilised things are so much easier...the police say criminality does not pay off, but of course it does! Look, one of my neighbours, she has many economic problems and has young children and I know she is not in any armed group, but she went and borrowed money to buy a gun so that she could demobilise...she went to the municipality and now they are going to send her money for food and they are going to help her to study at nights'...(Focus group with residents from Northeast Zone (Comunas 1,2,3,4 and 8), 20/09/2009)

The Medellin model of urban transformation seemed to treat young people from poor neighbours as potential criminals and as 'ungoverned' subjects to be pacified not only through restrictive measures, but through economic incentives. In that logic certain groups of citizens were being granted privileged access to rights based on the risk they were theoretically posing to the security situation in the city, while levels of inequality and poverty in the communities remained very high. The implementation of programmes for young people linked to armed groups, without addressing the structural problems affecting them in these particular contexts, especially those causing chronic levels of youth unemployment, contributed to distorted state efforts to distance young residents of marginalised areas from armed groups. The following segment of my conversation with a young leader in Comuna 1 illustrates this:

'these programmes are like little efforts to contain the overflow of violence youth is involved in, we are the visible face of the war because we are easily co-opted by mafias, because we have the energy but we don't have a salary, we finish school at 19 years old and nobody is going to hire us because we have no experience, the education system does not give us any particular skills so that we could go and work somewhere, additionally we have a stigma on us. People think that because we are from here we are criminals, that is what people outside these neighbourhoods think of us...look, when you are between 15 and 19 you have to confront this question, let's say you are

studying, but sometimes in your house there is no food, your mum is unemployed and so on and you face the youth dilemma, do I continue studying and make the effort to try to make an ethical living knowing that there will be great difficulties?, or should I just take things easier as the context offers me and join an armed group?... they (criminal organisations) will give me around hundred thousand pesos and additionally the state might even get me opportunities...that is so contradictory, the state prefers to invest public funds in paying lads that supposedly demobilise, than investing in improving programmes for integral youth development right? So I wonder, what is the message the state is sending to the community?...That criminality and illegality at the end does pay off, look you will get not only the money your weapon will generate, but also the privileged position in the community the state will give you because you demobilise...(Interview Young Community Leader Comuna 1, 14/11/2009)

However, even in this difficult context many young residents resisted the idea of joining armed groups and some even actively tried to prevent violence and other young people from joining groups by promoting non-violence and community values of solidarity. Some of them tried to use the spaces opened by the municipality through participatory planning and other youth programmes to strengthen their initiatives and get economic support and recognition. Compared to the support available to youth groups involved in peaceful, artistic and non-violent initiatives across the city, the programs targeting young people in armed groups certainly seemed to offer unexpected and disproportionate incentives related to involvement with these; as explained by a member of a youth group in Comuna 13:

'we have a group of 16 members...we use theatre as a tool to make people and children aware of the importance of valuing life and promoting nonviolence... while we were given a 1 million pesos in total for all the activities...imagine, these are 16 potential families and all our friends in our school involved and

benefiting from our initiative in favour of peace; each guy who sings up for Fuerza Joven gets around more than 500.000 a month, they are the ones who have been involved with the armed groups and promoting criminality here...you see, of course lads would prefer to join an armed group, it looks like delinquency is rewarded here. Those of us who chose to put our energy on promoting alternatives to war and crime get nothing...we are even doing the type of work the State should be doing here but the state does not appreciate that...'(Interview Young resident and member of youth group in Comuna 13, 15/11/2010)

The quote above illustrates the impact that the relationship that the local state established with members of armed groups through programmes that were supposed to promote legality, had on other community actors that existed in these contexts. As analysed in the previous chapter, these communities had seen the emergence of a number of community organizations and citizen initiatives; these had tried to promote community development, contain the reproduction of violence and challenge the influence of illegal actors through meaningful forms of citizenship, since the 1990s. With the arrival of the state to marginalised areas with the intention of pacifying, transforming and integrating their populations, such community actors were confronted with opportunities to engage the state in ways that could give them visibility and access to resources, but also with huge challenges.

During the 2000s the implementation of integral urban projects as well as participatory budgeting exercises opened opportunities for community organisations and citizens to participate in the implementation of state initiatives targeting the ungoverned areas of the city. Participatory forms of urban management allowed the local state to augment the offer of services and programmes for these communities by relying on local and community organisations with a long record of community work for the implementation of a wide range of initiatives. The allocation of public resources to local organizations through contracts meant an important push to some of these

organisations by allowing them to advance their agendas and materialise their projects. However it also created a great deal of conflicts at the community level by increasing the competition among community actors around the acquisition of contracts for the delivery of community services. Soon after the implementation of participatory budgeting exercises for example, not only residents, but also civil organisations overseeing the participatory planning process in the city reported the proliferation of community organisations opportunistically created to co-opt public funds. Although these organisations met regulations and requirements established by the law for contracting with the state, they lacked local support and experience in community work (Gomez et al ND:263).

Paradoxically the allocation of public resources locally also created incentives for armed actors to venture into new scenarios of community life. Illegal organisations started to either create community organisations they could control or infiltrate and co-opt existing ones in order to get access to public funds. Traditional organisations in Comuna 1 found themselves competing with these new actors which had the backing and coercive support of armed groups. As the following account illustrates, residents recognised the existence of these new organisations controlled by illegal groups and the increasing legitimacy and social recognition they allowed them to accumulate:

‘... some of the residents who are elected through popular vote to a seat at the JAL¹⁴⁷ manage resources for the organisations of the armed actors so that they can benefit from those resources. Rarely you will hear about that because people won’t talk about it, people are very scared and if you report that, well, you die fast...Now many resources are going to the corporations controlled by the gangs, some of those corporations are fake and

¹⁴⁷ Local Administrative Boards (*Juntas Administradoras Locales*) are public corporations made up by a number of citizens who are democratically elected. These boards work as channels between communities and local authorities. They help to design municipal plans and programmes; they oversee the delivery of services in their communities and make proposals to the local authorities on how to invest public funds.

others work and manage resources...the problem is that they use some of those resources for their things (illegal activities)... Here (Comuna 1) the distribution of resources is done through votes in neighbourhood assemblies, according to the votes it is decided which projects get funding...the guys (gang members) did not influence how people voted...most people voted for projects related to health and social protection because in this area people depend on subsidies...but the sports and culture related projects are the ones that leave more profits to the armed groups..they are mostly young men so they tend to get involved in those type of projects and then other residents say 'oh the guys (gang members) organised this game and let me play or this activity' and that is how they (gangs) win legitimacy...people legitimise them and now with the arrival of the state its like they have won more legitimacy' (Interview Female Community Leader in Comuna 1, 12/03/2012)

Through the exploitation of community organisations and institutions, but also through coercion, intimidation and forced participation criminal actors linked to drug trafficking and other illegal economies started to economically benefit from public funds too. Simultaneous to the state intervention in the community, these actors became more involved in governance arrangements and community processes that were meant to serve local development (Abello Colak & Guarneros-Meza 2014) and increase state legitimacy. During interviews with community leaders and informal conversations with residents they described the way local armed groups forced local leaders to contract services provided by these groups' organisations, or to give them percentages when implementing community projects allocated through participatory budgeting. This was the case of Doña Gloria and Blanca, both community leaders in Comuna 1 who described their experiences with members of local gangs:

'I used to be very active here, organising activities with other residents to help our community improve, but I had a bad experience and since then I had to keep a low profile and take

my distance from these processes...What happened was that we organised an activity for children and their families here in the comuna. We had to provide refreshments too, so we hired a local resident we knew and trusted. He had a local food business with his family... We had not yet received the money from the Municipality to pay him for that, when three armed guys knock on my door and asked me for 2 million pesos (around 1 thousand US dollars). They said it had been established that from all the projects implemented, they (local armed group) were supposed to receive a share...They were so angry that we had not hired the refreshments with their people. They have people working in their organisations and providing this kind of services you know, so now either you pay them a share or contract services with their organisations... in any way they get the money and the recognition for doing community activities...Those men gave me one day to find the money, which I had to borrow... I did not want to pay but they threatened my family...when I went to pay them, they had the poor man we had initially hired there...God knows what they told him because pale and shaking he told me 'don't worry, you don't owe me anything for the refreshments, just pay them, just pay them. (Interview Female Community Leader in Comuna 1, 04/08/2012, cited in Abello Colak and Guarneros-Meza, 2014)

'Blanca arrived at the community centre visibly nervous. When I asked her if she was ok she said she did not know what to do. Two men from the local gang approached her yesterday to ask for a share of the grant she is going to get for the Christmas celebrations with children. They also told her that two of their members will be attending and participating in these activities. I asked what her reply was to these men's requests. She said she told them that she did not know why she was supposed to give them money which was meant to serve the community. She also told them that she would not receive the money until early next

year. Blanca is visibly angry, she thinks this is unacceptable: 'Why do I have to give them money? We went through a long process to get this approved by the community. We wanted to do things different this Christmas; take the children to the river side to see the Christmas lights and do recreational activities. We are tired of seeing the Christmas parties those guys [gang members] organise; they slaughter a pig and give money to people to win their favours'. When I asked Blanca if there was something the Municipality could do to help her she sighed and said she had just been talking to the social worker delegated by the state to promote and control the use of public resources for the project: 'He told me I will probably have to give them the money and let some of their people pretend they were involved. Not doing it is too dangerous. Can you believe him? . Apparently this is also happening in other comunas'. Blanca is visibly outraged by the idea of having to give money to armed actors who, in her view, badly affect her community. 'How can I give them money that they are going to use to buy arms to give then to our children and drugs to make them addicted? But what can I do? Should I make myself get killed for this?' Blanca looks powerless. (Field diary note, 05/08/2010. Cited in Abello Colak and Guarneros-Meza, 2014)

In this context, as illustrated above, the work of local leaders and members of community organisations became even more dangerous and the state seemed incapable of offering effective protection mechanisms to those who tried to resist violent actors' influence. The harassment of existing community organisations and leaders by armed groups certainly questioned the democratising potential of participatory processes (Ramirez Gallegos 2008), and also the capacity of the state to weaken illegal actors in intervened areas. The state seemed to have increased its bureaucratic and institutional capacity in ungoverned areas, without reducing the power of illegal groups or effectively promoting a new culture of legality.

Dangerous participation

During the course of the fieldwork there were specific moments in which the state seemed to explicitly attempt to deal with the armed actors' capacity to exert coercion in communities. These, however, tended to coincide with moments in which competition between these actors had led to increases in levels of violence, especially in homicide rates. Public responses in this context revealed other types of unexpected consequences of the entry of the state and its effort to pacify and 'govern' these areas.

One of the first responses to the violence produced by armed confrontations between local gangs in intervened comunas were police raids and substantial increments in the number of military and police personnel. The purpose was to contain violence and weaken these groups by capturing their leaders. These anti-gang police operations had undesirable consequences for residents in Comuna 1. Both community residents and public agencies like the Personeria reported that after police operations took place, gangs tended to retaliate, especially when these operations produced captures or deaths of their members. In these cases gangs threatened and displaced residents who were suspected of having helped the authorities. This was the case of a group of families threatened and displaced in 2012 after gang members were captured in the area. Additionally, captures often created new vacuums of power within these groups that lead to violent competitions, fractures and increasing violence.

In order to weaken local criminal organisations the security forces and the civil authorities put a lot of effort into intelligence activities and for that they requested the cooperation of local residents. These kinds of activities increased levels of distrust among residents and certainly made the attitude of gang members towards residents even more volatile. Two young residents explained this during an informal conversation:

' ...on our way to Bibian's house we met Johan, he asked us where we were going and when we told him, he said it was better to wait a bit and not to go up the street because an operation was taking place. He said it was better to stay away

and wait until it was all over...he said he saw men from security forces dressed in civilian outfits but armed and asking for people's IDs. Johan seemed scared because there was a truck without plates and people were being put in there...We all decided to wait in a near grocery where I had the chance to ask them further about this type of operations. Bibian said people were reporting this type of actions in the area, she said some people that seemed to be security agents were entering the neighbourhoods as civilians and renting a house in order to collect information. This was then followed by the sudden arrival of security forces to the area to make raids and capture people or confiscate drugs...the problem according to Johan was that this was making the guys from the combos distrustful with people they had never seen before in the area, he said this is leading to selective killings and it is making it more and more dangerous to move around because now as he says 'if they see you around and nobody knows you, they don't give you time to explain they just leave you (kill you) there, immediately because you might be a detective'...Bibian agreed with Johan, she said in this moment everybody distrusts everybody, there is a widespread distrust and everyone is a potential enemy...especially because many people are facing a difficult economic situation and the police is offering to pay for information, and this makes things worst...'

(Field diary note, 10/08/2010)

Involving residents in intelligence gathering activities through public appeals for collaboration and through economic rewards for information¹⁴⁸ had drastic effects on levels of trust among community residents; it also weakened even

¹⁴⁸ In the midst of another serious outbreak of violence in a community at the centre-west of the city, the Police offered to pay citizens 10 million pesos to those who give information regarding the location of criminals or arms. The paradox is that these measures resembled the strategies used by the armed actors; as the Commander of the National Police recognised, the leaders of one criminal band were offering 100 million pesos to people who help them kill one of the gang leaders who had apparently started the new cycle of violence by switching sides after killing one of his men.

more the social fabric. The authorities demanded the help of residents of these areas by providing information and reporting criminals to the authorities so that they could be prosecuted. Public community meetings started to be used to collect intelligence on the activities of the local gangs and this raised the risks associated to attending or participating in this type of democratic spaces. Residents as mentioned before were very reluctant to talk about security issues and had been forced to develop informal protocols and protection mechanisms to protect their lives in this context. One of the most important ones was not to be seen as an informant and that was what the state demanded from residents.

Paradoxically the number of crimes reported by citizens tended to diminish at the same time that violence increased. In comuna 1 denouncing gangs' activities resulted in threats to people's lives or to their families, in assassinations, disappearances, public punishments or forced displacements. People who dared speak up despite high levels of distrust with the security institutions, were immediately targeted by the criminal actors. In interviews and conversations with residents they mentioned how frustrating it was for them to be asked by the authorities to come forward with information, especially because the lack of collaboration from residents was normally interpreted and portrayed by the state authorities as a demonstration of disloyalty with the state and as a proof of the residents' permissive attitude towards criminality.

'But what do they expect us to do? the police officers in my neighbourhood are friends with the combos, the police knows where they are, who they are, where they sell their stuff...but the police come and ask us to denounce and if you report those things they kill you so what can we do? (Interview with female resident Comuna 1, 15/11/2009)

Look there is a sort of confrontation between the state and the community, the problem is that when the state comes to make those raids even the Mayor comes here to say 'this community is a permissive community and that attitude is sponsoring

delinquency, the community has to report the criminals and if you don't denounce then it is your fault that there is violence and insecurity'...can you believe it? I cannot believe the state gives the responsibility to citizens for the security situation...the police, the other day was distributing this little card that said 'it is the community's responsibility to be safe or not', meaning that residents had to denounce so that captures of criminals could be effective, but that strategy won't work here, everybody knows that if you go and denounce and a guy is captured, then they tell him who reported him and then a week later when he is back in the streets you are screwed, it is very complex.. (Interview Young male resident Comuna 1, 11/12/2010)

The way residents of these areas were pressured to collaborate with the state in exchange providing them protection and safety differed massively from the type of participation in the security effort demanded from other sectors of society less vulnerable to insecurity but political and economically more powerful. It also demonstrated a lack of understanding of the complex and ambiguous role played by armed actors in the community. As a young community resident explained during an interview, gang members were not outsiders or members of occupying forces in these territories, but young members of the community. They were born and raised there and this meant they had strong family and social ties:

'They (state authorities) don't understand what happens in the family or the neighbourhood if someone decides to denounce a guy (gang member), that guy is a neighbour's son and reporting him will cause confrontations immediately, relations between the families will get broken and then solidarity links that help families survive in these difficult economic contexts get broken, so yes the Mayor and the police officers accuse people of condemning criminality but they don't go and see what happens socially and economically in the neighbourhood when people denounce, they don't see that that guy (gang member) is the one who brings food to the table, he is the one that supports 4 or 5 children, the

one that helps economically other neighbours'; the authorities say that because there is participatory budgeting now that they are providing everything here, but they lie to themselves... (Interview Young male resident Comuna 1, 11/12/2010)

The guys from the gangs give people money to pay the bills, they also give them money to buy food for a while...the truth is that they do help families. Sometimes people go to them but sometimes the guys (gang members) also come to offer their help. That happens because the economic situation here is very difficult...this is so common and people see that as normal...people accept as given that if there is a patron and he has money he normally helps people... (Interview female resident Comuna 1, 10/03/2012)

The ambiguous and often contradictory roles exercised by armed actors in Comuna 1 were in no way exclusive to the Medellín context. Studies undertaken in other urban contexts across the global south have also shown armed actors' capacity to simultaneously exercise violence and provide valuable services to residents of marginalised communities (Moser and McIlwaine 2004; Arias 2006; Rodgers 2006). However a distinctive and paradoxical aspect revealed by this research undertaken in Medellín's intervened communities is that armed actors' social recognition and influence in these contexts were sometimes favoured, rather than weakened, by state intervention in the process of governing these communities.

State initiatives for the physical and social transformation of the ungoverned areas and populations certainly helped the local state achieve recognition and increase its legitimacy nationally and internationally. These have been regarded by outsiders as examples of state efficiency and institutional capacity and portrayed as a successful state led form of urban transformation; however as the evidence provided above demonstrates, that success did not mean increasing state legitimacy within the targeted communities. The paradoxical and unexpected consequences of some of the security initiatives implemented by the state confirmed that the local state

was able to build its service delivery capacity and its ability to exercise coercion in these areas, without necessarily challenging the power and recognition of other violent actors.

Ungoverned or poly-governed?

One of the most paradoxical aspects of living in a community subject to state intervention and considered by policymakers and outsiders as integrated and 'governed' by the state, is that residents were now subject to multiple forms of power exercised at the same time by the state and by coercive violent actors. People had to find ways to navigate this social order characterised by the combination of legal and illegal and formal and informal forms of authority in a context characterised still by high levels of vulnerability and exclusion. Those once regarded as detached and ungoverned areas of the city had become key showcases of the city's renaissance. These areas were the scenario of the local state's consolidation while also being epicentres of the consolidation of armed actors and criminal networks capable of exercising high levels of social, economic and territorial control. The following segment from an interview and the note from my field diary illustrate:

'there are around 50 combos in this area (Comuna 1) and each controls its own territory and in their territory each group controls the payment of vacunas (extortions), they control who can cross the territory, how justice is done or not, who is respected and why is he respected... and we (residents) have to respect those many controls' (Interview Young male resident Comuna 1, 20/11/2010)

'some of the guys who participate in the youth initiatives at the community centre where I work decided to organise a lunada¹⁴⁹ 'get together under the moon light' in one of the parks of the neighbourhood and I offered to help them. This is a social and music event for residents, especially young people, where a small stage is installed and young people play music, read

¹⁴⁹ These are gatherings where young people and the community residents in general can meet and enjoy art and music performances.

poems and reflexions and youth groups from this and close by neighbourhoods show their talents (mostly break dancing and rap). The organisers wanted to walk to the venue with candles and a few music instruments but were still debating about the venue. John suggested the sport area in the X neighbourhood which seemed perfect for the event, but Juan replied that to do the event there they will need to ask for permission. According to John they did not need permission to go there, the park was a public space and they had right to be there. This however did not convince Juan and the other young organisers. Andrea intervened and said that she had a friend who could arranged things and get the permission, but the debate heated up...Given that the park was located in front of the neighbourhood's police station I asked if that was the institution providing permissions for activities like that in a park. The girl next to me smiled and said 'no, it is not the police, it is the paracos (members of paramilitary groups who dominated the area) the ones that control who enters and uses that park, people have to ask their permission'...at the end they agreed that asking for these actors' consent to use the park was legitimising them and their violent actions, so it was better to do the event in another area'...(Field diary note, 25/11/2010)

The strict control armed actors imposed on the daily activities of residents was revealing of their coercive power despite the permanent state presence in the community. However the armed groups' capacity to control communities was also linked to the fact that they provided valuable services such as coercive forms of protection, safety and justice, acted as mediators in community and interpersonal conflicts, supported recreational and social activities in the community, and were also very efficient at raising steady incomes for their families. The following accounts of a resident during a focus group and of a psychologist working in a local community organisation illustrate some of the different roles gang members exercised in the community:

Last year the police had to be transferred from my neighbourhood to another area and the situation became difficult, people were being robbed in each corner; girls were getting their purses taken, their mobile phones; so people organised themselves and brought guys from other neighbourhood, from a 'combo' [local name for a gang]. We paid them so that they will guard the area...So look, if the police and the government, don't give us security, people look for ways, even if it is by creating combos... I wonder, if things continue like this, when are we ever going to see an end to this gang problem? (Focus group with residents West Area (Comunas 5,6,7,13), 12/11/09 Cited in Abello Colak and Guarneros-Meza, 2014).

We try to encourage people not to go to the armed actors to solve their problems or to legitimise them, but to use the state institutions available in the area. We try to support them in the process when they do, but it is very hard for people to comply with all the formalities and procedures involved, plus these processes can take a long time and often end up in impunity..Instead the tough guys [gang leaders]are there in the street and will offer fast solutions...Yesterday, for example, Julio [a boy in the neighbourhood] came to tell me his dad is coming home drunk and hitting his mum, he is scared he is going to kill her one day, so he wants to ask the tough guy to intervene. When I told him that we can talk to the police or family services, he begged us not to do that because social services might take him away from his mum and nothing will be done about his dad... Instead, the local gang can 'punish' his dad in a way he will be too scared to beat his mum again. (Interview with Professional working in Comuna 1, 07/09/2009 Cited in Abello Colak and Guarneros-Meza, 2014)

These multiple roles made residents ambivalent towards gang members and state authorities. In an interview, a community leader tried to make sense of the situation:

'The legitimacy that the combos (gangs) have achieved comes from residents' acceptance of their control. People accept their authority and go to them to solve their daily problems...people resort to those actors when something gets stolen in the neighbourhood, when there is a street quarrel, when there are family conflicts or fights among couples; people go to them and give them permission to intervene in those moments; however if the gangs exceed certain levels of coercion then people resort to the state authority such as the police...when there is only one illegal armed actor exercising its power in the community, residents tend to accept its authority; however when that actor is in confrontation with other armed actors, then residents demand more police presence and state action. At the end people distrust both: police and gangs. Residents still expect and demand state presence in the neighbourhood, at the same time that they resort to the armed actors and distrust the way they often abuse their power...this is very related to the widespread notion that to increase safety there must be increments in the number of police forces and permanent presence of state security forces (Interview Community Leader Comuna 1, 05/11/2009)

Although many people disapproved of the disturbances that gangs' violent confrontations caused to their lives, many people respected their members, feared them and occasionally sanctioned some of their actions. The prevalence of structural problems perpetuating social exclusion and inequality also worked in favour of the armed actors' influence in this comuna. Despite the physical improvements in the area, some of which made access to and from these areas easier, and despite improvements in programmes targeting children, access to education and expansion of basic utilities, state interventions did not address chronic levels of unemployment and precarious housing. Many residents now had access to state services

such as water, electricity and sewage and some of them had even legalised their properties, but they still struggled to find ways to pay for those services and the taxes that came with their integration to the city. For some families this even meant increments in their cost of living. In this context people resorted to informal and sometimes illegal means of support offered by armed actors, as residents explained:

‘when Gloria, Dora, Ines and me were sitting outside Dora’s house a young guy rang the bell of a house close by, when Ines saw him she said ‘oh its pay day in that house’. When I asked them who that guy was and what she meant. Dora said ‘he is the one who comes to collect the pagadiario’. She explained that it was very common for residents to borrow money from the guys (local gangs). She said when people needed cash they could go to them and ask for loans. They all say it is very common. Ines’ neighbour for example, has a three floors house, and when the guy (gang member) comes to collect the instalments 6 people in his family come out, that means 6 people from the same family have debts with the gangs. Apparently it is a very organised system, if a resident has been recommended by another user of the system then the guys (gang members) will lend that person whatever he/she needs, otherwise they will lend a first time borrower maximum 200 thousand (around US\$109). They charge 20% interest and each person decides how they want to pay the debt. Once the person proves that he or she is capable of paying the instalments on time, his/her limit is increased... I asked what happens if you cannot pay, they said ‘You can ask them to give you some time and a new due date is given, but they add 20% to what you did not pay that month’...Then I asked if people are not scared to have debts with those guys and Gloria said: ‘yes people are scared of being killed if they don’t pay their debts and that is why one pays!’ (Field diary note, 18/07/ 2011)

‘...many people are struggling to pay their bills, it is so stressful to see your bills accumulating when you don’t have money to

pay and they end up cutting off your services... a friend of mine and other neighbours are now getting smuggled water¹⁵⁰ and installing prepaid card systems to pay for electricity. They pay these and the gas with the help of 'pagadiarios' (illegal credit system provided by local criminal organisations)...Consuming and then paying the bill is impossible, so instead people prefer to top up their cards with 5000 pesos in electricity which last like three days... The majority of people having to sort out these kind of problems are women...the truth is that situation is hard and people cannot live with a minimum wage, the only activities that give money here are the ones armed actors are involved in . A minimum wage is like 560.000 (230 us dollars aprox) and with that it is impossible to sustain a family of four members. So you have to have two jobs but if you are lucky to have one job in the private sector you will be working from 8 am till 6pm and you won't have time to get a second job somewhere else. On the other side the guys here working for the guys (gangs) earn very good, they even get money for a bike and all the things young guys aspire to have... (Interview Female Resident 02/03/2012)

Even though they were portrayed in official discourses as criminal and predatory actors, and generated insecurity and exploitative practices for residents indeed, gang members also exercised other functions in the community which granted them recognition and legitimacy. Many residents had naturalised the presence of armed groups; these groups were integrated by young men whom they saw growing up, they were their neighbours' sons and people felt close to them. Sometimes they even felt the need to help them when they seemed in danger by allowing them to hide in their houses for example. Their legitimacy did not mean however that people did not value state presence; many residents had become very dependent on state programs and subsidies and they often demanded more state presence,

¹⁵⁰ Once the service is suspended due to lack of payment, some residents pay bribes to employees of the public service company so that they reconnect the service but arrange it in ways that the meter does not read their actual consumption.

even in the form of police forces. In the search for means of subsistence people constantly navigated their way in the midst of multiple forms of legal and illegal authority and power.

Building another type of citizen?: Resistance to subjectification processes in ungoverned spaces

‘...The citizen that the local administration promotes is the citizen that is unconditionally loyal to the state, the citizen that participates, that cares about the city issues, but that is not critical of the state, the citizen that participates to validate what the state does...a politically malleable citizen...for example why don’t they respect and protect the right to be a conscientious objector in this city? Why don’t they value the citizen that not only seeks the recognition of his rights but goes further and suggests changes to structural problems? the citizen that denounces the ‘false positives’¹⁵¹ does not have space in this country, neither the citizen that says this political model does not work...those kinds of citizen don’t work for the state...’ (Interview Young Community leader Comuna 13, 11/06/2012)

As the quote above illustrates, there were some voices that resisted the subjectification of residents from these communities as unruled sectors of society in need of control and government. Forms of resistance were relevant to this study of governing process given that, as Foucault recognised, power relations are shaped by the way people resist subjectification processes (Foucault 1980:142). Despite chronic levels of violence, in the community context depicted throughout this chapter I found examples of what Pearce calls meaningful forms of citizenship (Pearce 2007) which targeted the State and also challenged violent actors. These emerged from people’s everyday experiences and daily interactions with powerful actors.

¹⁵¹ Extrajudicial killings of civilians by the army.

Some residents had developed methods to exercise their citizenship in ways that kept civil spaces opened to promote democratic values, nonviolent forms of interaction and solutions to the difficult problems affecting urban communities. They were often members of community organisations with a long history of community work in the communities. Some of these forms of citizenship emerged when residents organised themselves and mobilised to demand solutions to their problems or more participation, or to resist excesses and arbitrariness of legal and illegal forms of authority and power. In many cases their actions de-sanctioned the use of violence in intervened communities and defied imposed restrictions and codes of behaviour through creative means. The following segments of a focus group with young members of a community organisation and an interview with a community leader help to illustrate the way some of these expressions of citizenship materialised:

Young man 1: 'Young people are becoming more and more aware of the historic conditions in this context that affect their lives, they understand that the state has not guaranteed their rights or that the urban conflict affect their rights due to murders, recruitment and displacements, limitations to their right to move in the territories and some of them decide to act in many different ways, some choose to directly denounce these problems, others use art to denounce things reducing the risks, others resist the model of development in the city, others resist particular governmental decisions that affect them...people resist many things, in this comuna (13) for example, people are working for memory, non violence and peace promotion...the exercise of memory for example seek to resist and challenge the official versions of the conflict in this comuna, of the operacion Orion and what followed for example, we resist to forget what has happened here, we resist not to forget those who have fallen and those who disappeared...

Young man 2: There are also direct actions in the context of violence...if they killed someone then we go there and bring

music, try to accompany the affected community...we organise festivals, if there is an area people cannot cross then we go and organise a youth carnival..in 2008 for example we made an action called 'because limits are not frontiers'. For a long time we could not go to some neighbourhoods due to the confrontations between combos (gangs), so we dressed in costumes, put on makeup and entered those areas dressed as clowns and jugglers and with music, we did not ask permission to anybody...it was a symbolic occupation of those areas, we were like 50 young people attacking with art and music the power of actors who impose restrictions and say nobody crosses these areas...using culture and art we were telling the residents of those areas they should not legitimise these restrictions , we were saying we don't agree and we don't comply ...it was not about defeating them, it was about transmitting a message to the community...the biggest struggle is in the cultural sphere, we need to bring down the structures that have been created...last year we did another action called 'even in the midst of the darkness' it was called like that because some of the combos (gangs) in the X neighbourhood had destroyed the public lights in the neighbourhood and the whole area was in darkness, so we went there with music with graffiti artists and around 9pm we turned up some lamps and candles in the darkest area... those groups (gangs) are not the only ones who have legitimacy and power here, the community organisations have another type of power and influence in the community...we don't fight against them we fight against situations that create this context of violence we live in, and try to find solutions...(Focus group young residents Comuna 13 at youth group, 10/08/2011)

We (a group of local organizations) had to design a protection strategy in X neighbourhood when the local armed group threatened the lives of some of the local leaders... the strategy contained different elements, it had a psycho-social, a social, a

political, a legal and a communication component. The idea was to protect the life of the threatened residents...the community got together and organised in a way that all helped to guarantee that nothing happen to them...residents decided to have a communication strategy to inform if they saw weird movements or people in the neighbourhood, we created a network of partners from outside the neighbourhood that could made dissuasion...it was decided as part of the strategy police forces were not allowed to enter the area, because this was an additional insecurity factor ...the strategy relied on the use of social networks and the community's capacity to protect their leaders ...we also had to talk to the armed actors. Members of the armed group were invited to a neighbourhood assembly and there with the whole neighbourhood present, the residents questioned why they (armed group) were going to attack their representatives to the JAC¹⁵²...on that occasion the community defended their leaders and pressured the armed group to give up any intention to attack the residents of the neighbourhood...the community faced its own problems without resorting to violence or to intermediaries and created measures to protect themselves...this was a alternative action in moments of emergency ...it was very hard to deal with the police's reaction... for the security forces it was uncomfortable because their principle is that there are not forbidden territories for the state anymore , so when residents put conditions to them they react with suspicion, the police tried to stigmatise this community as allies of insurgent actors, so representatives of the community had to talk to the Secretary of government and he is the one who understood the complexity of the situation and why bringing shock troops was not a good idea...he decided to only allow the

¹⁵² Community Boards (Juntas de Accion Comunal) are civic organisations made up by residents who work to promote the development of their communities and citizen participation. These boards are recognised by the Constitution as part of citizens' rights to association.

entry of community police officers who had a very different relation with the community...not founded on intelligence or repression....(Interview Male Community leader, 05/11/2009)

These initiatives demonstrate people's agency and willingness to exercise their rights in these community contexts, even if state or illegal actors do not recognise them and even violate them. As a recent study by the OSHM demonstrated (OSHM 2014), in many communities of the periphery of Medellin there are countless examples of meaningful forms of citizenship using sport, art, recreational, religious and cultural activities to protect peoples' lives in the midst of armed confrontations, to demand respect for peoples' rights, to promote nonviolent forms of interaction, to encourage the state to recognise citizens as legitimate interlocutors and to empower people to articulate their demands, to make their own diagnosis of local problems, and to formulate solutions to their community problems based on their needs.

These initiatives challenged the subjectification of residents of marginalised communities as either helpless victims of state abandonment who passively wait for state institutions to go and solve their problems, or feral inhabitants that needed to be controlled, educated, and transformed into law abiding citizens. Their actions constantly called power into question and in the process, the governing process.

Conclusion

This chapter revealed an underexplored aspect on the 'Medellin Model'. It uncovered how the mixed security approach used in this city was experienced by the residents of the marginalised communities who became subject to various forms of state power and intervention in the process of securing the city. Through an analysis of the data collected through participant observation, informal conversations, semi-structured interviews and focus groups carried out with residents of Medellin's *comunas*, this chapter revealed that the exercise of territorial presence by the state in these areas did not necessarily mean that the state was able to address residents'

differential and chronic security needs, or that it was able to reduce the influence of illegal economies and their brokers in marginalised communities.

Although security problems became less visible, especially for those living outside marginalised communities, problematic state practices and social practices associated with illegality continued. The power of criminal actors also increased. The evidence presented here confirms that governing processes in Medellín resulting from the effort to pacify and transform what were regarded as problematic communities paradoxically created opportunities for violent actors to deepen their influence in these contexts. Although the reproduction of violences and insecurity at the neighbourhood level continued, the analysis also revealed that some residents were able to articulate alternative notions of their own subjectivity and of the role of the state in ways that challenged stigmatisation and violent practices.

This analysis is important because it not only reveals what security provision in a global city of the global South such as Medellín means for people on the ground, but also because it highlights the contribution that the use of ethnographic methodologies can make to security thinking by improving our understanding of differential experiences of urban security in contexts of chronic violence. Based on this analysis, in the next section I unpack the logic of governance of urban insecurity in Medellín throughout the 2000s and what the attempt to pacify ‘ungoverned’ areas meant for the construction of state authority and its legitimacy in this particularly challenging urban context.

Chapter 7 Conclusions

In this thesis I have attempted to develop and apply a critical analytical approach for the study of public security responses and initiatives implemented in urban contexts affected by chronic levels of violence and instability. This analytical approach aims at filling existing gaps and overcoming some of the limitations of predominant approaches within the emerging literature on urban security in the global South. I have argued that an analytical approach that looks carefully at the working of power in security provision processes and that incorporates the voice and experiences of those who are targeted by security initiatives and programmes, is better placed to reveal the political aspects and governmental consequences that security interventions have for particular populations.

The critical approach suggested in this thesis, uses analytical tools based on Foucault's work on governmentality and complements them with a combined methodology that puts security responses under the microscope of power and of people's experiences of security. The alternative analytical approach I suggest in this thesis enables analyses of public interventions aimed at dealing with violence and instability in urban contexts, in three steps: (i) the first step focuses on identifying political, social and economic processes that might have affected changes in the way security problems are framed and understood, (ii) as a second step, the governmental responses to those problems are analysed; this includes using critical discourse analysis to look at how those problems are understood by authorities and how these lead to the use of particular techniques, and finally (iii) the critical approach includes an ethnographic analysis of the kind of security these understandings and techniques lead to on the ground, from the perspective of those who become subjects of state intervention.

In this thesis I use this alternative analytical approach to investigate the configuration of a mixed security strategy in Medellín, which has attracted international attention for its contribution to promoting urban transformations and reductions in historically high levels of violence in this city. The insights that emerged from the analysis of the Medellín case using this analytical approach demonstrate that bringing in these dimensions (power, people's

experiences and a wide range of economic, political and social processes) to the study of urban security, can illuminate aspects of the provision of security which remain overlooked within the existing literature. Based on this analysis I argue that this critical approach can contribute to **academic** and **policy** debates on urban security in fragile cities.

In the next section I present an overview of what the use of this alternative analytical approach revealed in the case of Medellin, before drawing some more general conclusions of this thesis.

Medellin's Security Strategy through a Critical Analysis of Power

The analysis of the Medellin case started with a review of the recent history of security provision in Medellin, which revealed that a great deal of preventive and coercive security policies had been implemented in this city since the 1990s. During that decade the state had used repressive measures to weaken and dismantle armed and criminal actors, it had also started to target poor communities and youth with socio-economic interventions, and even negotiated and supported the demobilization of armed groups in order to reduce violence. Many of these interventions and initiatives, as well as the learning they produced, served as actual foundations for the implementation of an integral security strategy a decade later. However a key difference between previous efforts to halt urban violence and the sort of security provision that took shape during the 2000s in this city, is that the wide range of programmes and interventions implemented by the state and targeting marginalized communities, were guided by a different way of thinking about the problem of violence in the city, as well as new calculations and objectives.

While during the 1990s there was a broad consensus that high levels of violence in the city were the result of the complex combination of structural factors (such as an unequal urban development, chronic poverty, cultural traits that facilitated the reproduction of violence and high levels of impunity) and detonator factors (such as the expansion of drug trafficking); by the beginning of the 2000s there was growing consensus in the city -and the country, that the problem of violence responded to the state's incapacity and

unwillingness to exercise its sovereignty and authority in peripheral areas of the city, where non-state actors had been granted space and power. The assumption that the main problem was the state's incapacity to act as the main social ordering force in marginalized communities led to a new way of understanding the function of security provision in the city. It also led to the construction of different relations with residents of these communities who became subjects of a wide range of governmental efforts.

The research process allowed me to identify some of the factors that led to this shift in local imaginaries of insecurity in the city. The alternative approach and Foucault's analytical tools allowed me to take into account neoliberal processes, such as local elites' efforts to prepare the city for attracting investors and hosting mega events; but also other factors that had been overlooked in existing analyses of the Medellin Model. For example, the implementation of a national security strategy focused on defeating insurgent groups and recovering territorial control across the country and local civil society's agency and influence in shaping the local agenda. This was an important step because it allowed me to explore the security strategy used in Medellin in the last decade, in the context of a wide range of processes which were particular to this city.

The second step in the analysis which consisted of unpacking the rationality of the government of violence in the city through critical discourse analysis, revealed the assumptions and calculations that steer interventions in what were regarded as 'ungoverned communities'. As discussed in chapter five, the combined security strategy used in Medellin, as part of a wider urban transformation and development effort, departed from the construction of marginalised urban communities as areas of vulnerability and as sources of instability and illegality. In order to be integrated into what was regarded as the prosperous city order, these ungoverned areas and their populations were seen by policymakers and security agents as in need of state transformation, control and normalisation, and for that purpose a combination of sovereign and biopolitical forms of power was put in place. Once subject to multiple mechanisms of state power, these ungoverned areas became **useful displays for the internationalisation** of the city, for the attraction of

capital and the marketization of a so called innovative model of urban transformation.

As it was analyzed in chapter five and six, the construction of the problem of urban violence in terms of state weaknesses and the characterization of these communities as neglected and ungoverned, permitted the preservation of security discourses and practices that stigmatized their residents and particular population groups, even within an urban development model that promoted their integration to the city proper. Young people from poor communities for example, received more attention from the state, but were still regarded as potential risks to society and as subjects that needed control, disciplining and persuasion in order to avoid criminality. This led, for example, to the implementation of violence prevention programmes that were widely perceived as favoring a minority of young people linked to illegal economies, while the majority of young people living in marginalized areas received comparatively few state incentives and continued to be exposed to legal and illegal forms of coercion and to structural forms of marginalization and exclusion.

Making explicit the assumptions behind public security programmes, identifying them and critically analyzing them, allowed us to see security policies from a new perspective and to reveal their governmental implications. Critical discourse analysis of authorities' assumptions showed that the approach to provide security in Medellin involved a process of subjectification of residents of marginalised communities as 'ungoverned citizens'. In the authorities' view this justified the use of multiple mechanisms of power to bring these communities under state influence and to transform them physically and culturally. In this context, state intervention aimed at reducing the likelihood of violence, but also at constructing law abiding and loyal citizens of the state in historically ungoverned areas. The evidence collected showed that once subject to state multifaceted intervention, these subjects were expected to become loyal citizens whose assumed support to illegal actors would be replaced by allegiance and support to the state in the fight for dominance in these areas.

It was important to reveal the way in which power was exercised on residents of marginalised communities in order to achieve particular objectives. While other analyses of state interventions in Medellin during the last decade have overlooked the governmental implications of efforts to contain violence, the critical approach used in this research allowed us to recognise them. It revealed that residents of marginalised areas became subjects of new forms of state power as a result of a security strategy which prioritised the establishment of state permanent presence in neighbourhoods, the reduction of levels of homicides and the improvement of state's capacity to occupy urban space, to transform illegal cultures and to persuade those regarded as prone to violence.

The third step of the critical analysis of the security strategy in Medellin exposed some of the unforeseen impacts the implementation of this security approach had on targeted communities from the perspective of its residents. Accessed through ethnography, resident's daily experiences of this type of state presence and power revealed for example that the combination of repressive and preventive interventions **did not lead to changes in problematic** entrenched police practices which helped reproduce stigmatization of vulnerable groups and violences at the neighbourhood level. Also that some of the mechanisms used by the state to try to pacify and transform these communities, **unleashed processes that allowed violent illegal actors** to deepen their influence in communities and created unforeseen challenges to community organisations and residents who challenged violence and strived to build democratic forms of citizenship in these contexts.

These contradictory aspects of the state intervention in marginalised communities were often disregarded by security experts and authorities in the city who measured the security effort in terms of state's capacity to exercise permanent presence in these areas and reductions in the most visible indicators of violence. Revealing the problematic role of knowledge production around security provision in the city played in highlighting some outcomes and obscuring others, is another important advantage of the use of the analytical approach used here. The critical analysis of the way

knowledge production supported governmental practices in Medellín revealed for example that the emphasis on homicides rates and state permanent presence in marginalized areas as main indicators of success in the security effort, contributed to making invisible in the public debate the persistence of structural factors that continued to reproduce violence and insecurity in intervened urban communities. It also revealed that those targeted by the mixed security approach however, had little capacity to influence the assessment of its alleged success in reducing violence and insecurity and continued to face huge difficulties in building dignifying lives. As evidence presented in chapter six suggests, they continued to endure high levels of insecurity and violence, at the same time that illegal violent actors continued to find opportunities to consolidate their capacity to exercise social, economic, and territorial forms of control over these communities.

The critical analytical approach developed in this thesis also revealed an unexpected outcome of state efforts to govern the ‘ungoverned areas of Medellín’ as a mean to secure the city. Despite increments in public spending and urban upgrading efforts, governmental efforts by the state in these communities led to **the creation of conditions** that favoured the consolidation of a complex social order characterised by still chronic, but less visible levels of violence and insecurity, in which legal and illegal actors continue to simultaneously exercise forms of authority on citizens. In this urban order many urban dwellers continue to be subject to the violent control and influence of armed actors, while at the same time their communities are epicentres of forms of state intervention that favor the consolidation of Medellín as a global city.

The Government of Insecurity and the State in Medellín

The critical analysis of the rationality of government of urban violence in Medellín in the 2000s also exposed some aspects of the state and the way it seeks to exercise power in this urban context. The security approach was not only about reducing violence, but about rendering ‘ungoverned spaces’ and their communities governable by a capable and efficient local state which was in the process of advancing an urban development agenda focused on the city’s integration to the global economy. Concerns with signs of state

fragility and the characterization of the urban space as fragmented, with orderly, prosperous and effectively functional areas on one side and feral areas with complex problems of poverty, violence, entrenched cultures of illegality, and in hands of armed actors on the other, led policymakers at national and local level to justify the implementation of special measures in the latter.

Constructed as 'ungoverned' and vulnerable, marginalized communities, and their populations, were made visible as objects of public policy. Their inclusion to the city order was seen as strategic for building the state's capacity to govern and pacify a city with a global reputation for violence and crime, but with global economic aspirations. In this context, these historically neglected urban communities became the epicentre and stage for a state consolidation process, with an emphasis on the institutional strengthening of the local state and its efficient management of urban space.

As Foucault and other scholars have noted, the state's nature, attributes, organisation and activities are shaped not only by the materiality of its institutions, but by reconfigurations of forms of exercising power (Foucault 2007:108) and by institutionalised symbolic, ideological and discursive processes and by condensations of social relations (Holsti 1996:84; Muller 2012; Jessop 2001,2008; Migdal 2001). As analysed through this thesis, security programmes and initiatives used to reduce violence in Medellin, also intended to build a stronger and capable state and produced new forms of interaction between state, citizens and a diversity of community and local actors.

By looking at these differential relations of power, it is possible to identify some attributes of the consolidating local state. The security strategy did not necessarily allow the state to achieve legitimacy within marginalized urban communities. State institutions still are not the main providers of justice and security either; however a multifaceted security approach allowed the state to be present in these areas, exercising some forms of authority and power. This became useful in the management, rather than elimination, of urban

violences in the context of efforts to pursue neoliberal urban development agenda.

This security strategy also allowed the state to project to those living outside these communities an image of efficiency and diligence, in other words, it allowed it to be seen as less fragile. The local state in Medellin is considered today one of the most robust and efficient entities in the country, capable of delivering services to its citizens and innovative solutions to acute urban problems and as successful at adapting the city to the requirements of a global status city. While these are important aspects, these do not tell us much about the way the state exercises its authority while becoming a less fragile entity. The analysis of the government of insecurity in the city in the last decade, on the other hand allows us to identify the emergence of a particular form of governmentality focused on pacifying the survival of big proportions of the urban population which remain excluded from the legal economy and from the benefits of neoliberal urban development.

In their analyses of social structuration, Foucault and Agamben have suggested that the exercise of power in modern societies relies on the categorization of different types of citizens and on the enactment of different forms of engagement with these citizens (Foucault 1994; Agamben 2005). Agamben for example suggested that through the staging of 'states of exception', special forms of regulation are exercised over particular populations, often regarded as 'invalid' citizens (Agamben 2005). In Medellin, the categorization of certain populations as 'ungoverned', abandoned by the state and prone to illegality and violence, also justified the implementation of 'special' interventions in these areas regarded as vulnerable, but also dangerous for the urban order. It also led to the use of biopolitical forms of power to construct passive and loyal citizens of the state in these areas. However, in Medellin, the intention of establishing such differential relations and interactions with 'ungoverned citizens', was not to attack or eliminate them, as critics of neoliberal processes suggest it is often the case with the way the state engages with 'surplus populations'. The categorization of this type of communities and citizens and the state interventions this led to,

served instead to pacify as much as possible their convulsive survival in a highly exclusionary urban order.

This form of governmentality is a key feature of the way the state has attempted to consolidate its authority in Medellin in the last decade. This approach to build state power has proven useful in this case, especially in the context of increasing expectations that cities aspiring to become prosperous enclaves are governed through the parameters of good, democratic and inclusive forms of governance. Through the pacification of the precarious life of 'ungoverned citizens', the local state in Medellin was able to build its capacity to exercise power –although not encompassing or unchallenged. It was also able to develop its institutional capacity for the delivery of services and implementation of a wide range of programmes at local level. And finally, the local state could also pursue the internationalization of the city in a context of fierce urban competition for capital and marketise its approach to urban development.

The evidence analyzed in this thesis suggests however that despite the advantages that this form of governmentality represented for the state, it only enabled a limited integration to the city for marginalized communities, given that it left untouched existing patterns of accumulation and distribution of capital. It also constructed residents of these areas as highly visible for policy purposes, but as passive subjects of state power. As the research revealed, the experience of this type of state power and limited form of citizenship for residents of marginalised communities, was still plagued by chronic insecurity, risks, precariousness and illegal and legal forms of coercion.

General Conclusions

This research offers a new perspective on the role that socio political relations play in the provision of security in fragile cities and the interface between security provision and governing processes in these contexts. It also develops an analytical approach which allows us to critically explore the way urban security problems are understood and addressed in fragile cities and what this means for the kind of security that is delivered to the most vulnerable sectors of the population. The analysis of urban security provision

through this alternative analytical approach provides a better understanding of how security responses are crafted in particular contexts and of their profound impact on the way state power and legitimacy are constructed. It also provides a more nuanced understanding of how particular security approaches are experienced by those who become targets of public efforts to contain, prevent or manage urban violence in fragile cities.

This research highlights the importance of incorporating these dimensions to analyses of the processes by which violence, crime and instability are being addressed in cities of the global South. The knowledge produced through a critical exploration of security provision which takes into account the role of power and the experiences of those who are subject of state power through the implementation of security initiatives, is relevant for academic and policy debates on urban security, but also for the expansion of the research agenda and methodological innovation within the emerging field of urban security.

Building on Foucault's work on power, this research encourages us to 'denaturalize' the assumptions that support security policies, crime prevention programmes and security management initiatives and to reveal the political aspects of such interventions. This means, understanding how these assumptions have governmental consequences and serve to achieve governmental purposes. Through the analysis of the Medellin case, this thesis demonstrated the advantages of undertaking studies of security that look at the rationality and techniques of government involved in the provision of security. For example, the possibility of uncovering how forms of social governance used in the process of reducing violence impact on the way states attempt to build legitimacy and authority in challenging contexts, such as those characterised by rapid urbanisation and multiple forms of violence.

The trend towards the use of more complex security strategies, to deal with acute problems of urban violence and instability in the global South, highlights the importance of moving beyond predominant analytical approaches for the study of urban security. Forms of state intervention, combining coercive, preventive, social and spatial components, have been promoted as promising strategies that can be replicated in different urban

contexts, by international organizations, cooperation agencies, by local and national authorities or by security consultants. This is often the case because policy oriented analyses of urban security have tended to rely on a limited and often quantitative set of indicators to assess the impact of security responses. By showing a more complex picture of the multiple processes affecting the configuration of security responses and their contradictions in particular contexts, this thesis calls for caution on the replication of strategies to deal with complex problems of violence and insecurity in different urban contexts.

Critical analyses developed through the approach suggested in this thesis, could provide a better understanding of how security strategies emerge and develop under particular social, economic and institutional conditions and how these are experienced by those who were targeted by the initiatives, before or despite a particular security approach is constructed as a replicable model, circulated through academic and policy expert circles and legitimized as promising. The analysis of the security component of the 'Medellin Model' developed in this thesis, is an example of how a critical investigation of the discursive practices involved in the provision of security and ethnographic engagement with people's experiences of the outcomes of those practices, can reveal contradictions in security approaches which are normally assumed to have a positive impact on the integration of historically marginalised urban communities, while responding more efficiently to their security needs. The analysis of the Medellin Model in particular, showed that integral security strategies can also reproduce stigmatizing discourses and practices and invisibilise people's voices and needs, while drawing attention away from prevailing structural conditions that reproduce urban violence. This was the case in this city given that the multifaceted state intervention to tackle security problems was built on the assumption that urban insecurity was a consequence of lack of government and state presence in certain feral areas, and this led authorities to prioritise state's capacity to control urban territory over other issues.

These are all aspects that cannot be explored through the analytical approaches that dominate urban security thinking in the global South at the

moment. They only become apparent when other analytical lenses and conceptual and methodological tools are used. In this context, this thesis demonstrates the importance of incorporating critical discourse analysis informed by Foucault's work on power, and ethnographic approaches to research and analysis in the emerging field of urban security. These can help to expand the research agenda in this field and enhance our understanding of security provision, and of how similar security responses might lead to different outcomes in different urban contexts.

Until now the analytical approaches that dominate the knowledge production in urban security in fragile cities have not recognised the importance of looking at discourse practices as key aspects of the security provision process, even though these have become recurrent objects of analysis in other fields of study, including critical security studies. Similarly, the use of ethnography as a mean to explore the nature of the provision of security in fragile cities has also been very limited. Through the use of participant observation in this research, this thesis demonstrates how the experiences and narratives of those who tend to be ignored within academic and policy debates on urban security, can lead us to a better understanding of how security policies work and impact on local contexts, often in contradictory ways.

As was analysed in chapter three, the advantages of using methods inspired on ethnographic methodologies to investigate security provision do not come without significant challenges. In contexts of chronic levels of violence and insecurity, ethnography demands researchers' disposition to undertake constant assessments of the ethical implications of the research process. It also demands her/his capacity to develop protection mechanisms for those involved in the research, patience and capacity to overcome logistical problems common in highly volatile contexts, as well as support from a wide range of institutions –including local organisations with deep knowledge of local contexts for example. This research demonstrates that the advantages of using ethnographic approaches to critically interrogate contemporary forms of security in cities are worth the effort of dealing ethically with these challenges.

Finally the type of analysis developed here does not presuppose the form that security should take -in its objectives and subjects, or the forces shaping security in a particular context—as critical analyses through the lens of neoliberalism often do; neither does it assume the political effects that the government of urban insecurity might have in a particular context. On the contrary, the alternative critical approach to urban security developed in this thesis, allows us to see security as a result of imaginaries, assumptions, and processes that are geographically and historically specific. It also encourages us to see security as a ‘contestable’ notion. This is particularly important because thinking about security on those terms opens opportunities for policy innovation in a field that urgently needs to provide relevant insights on how rising levels of violence and crime can be addressed bearing in mind different urban contexts. If we see security responses as the result of particular ways of thinking about urban problems, then it is possible to question if there are other ways of understanding such problems which might lead to other type of responses.

Through the analysis of the Medellin case, this critical analysis of urban security made visible the existence of local forms of resistance to governmental process unleashed by security responses. This points to the existence of spaces where alternative understandings of what it means to be secure and how to build urban security in fragile contexts are constantly developed. Expanding the research agenda of the urban security field to include analyses that recognize and value such local processes of resistance can have profound academic and policy implications and constitute my suggestion and commitment for future research in this area.

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WP8-Gangs-Guns-Governance-Trinidad-Tobago-2009.pdf](http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/F-Working-papers/SAS-WP8-Gangs-Guns-Governance-Trinidad-Tobago-2009.pdf)

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Appendix 1

Interviews with Community Residents

Jose. Interview Male Community Leader Comuna 1, 05/11/2009

Soraya. Interview Young female resident Comuna 1, 14/11/2009

Antonio. Interview Young Community Leader Comuna 1, 14/11/2009

Gerardo. Interview Male Community leader, 05/11/2009

Teo. Interview with Male Community Leader Comuna 1, 05/11/2009

Gloria. Interview with female resident Comuna 1, 15/11/2009

Alvaro. Interview with Professional working in Comuna 1, 07/09/2009

Yonny. Interview Young male resident Comuna 1 interview, 09/10/2010

Omar. Interview Young resident and member of youth group in Comuna 13,
15/11/2010

Manuel. Interview Young male resident Comuna 1, 20/11/2010

Rodrigo. Interview with Male resident Comuna 1, 05/08/2010

Carlos. Interview Young male resident Comuna 1, 11/12/2010

Sara. Interview with Female resident Comuna 1, 12/09/2010

Juana. Interview with Female resident Comuna 1, 16/10/2010

Fabio. Interview with Male resident Comuna 1, 10/09/2010

Simon. Interview with Male resident Comuna 1, 20/10/2010

Martin. Interview with Male resident Comuna 1, 12/08/2011

Francisco. Interview with Male resident Comuna 1, 06/08/2011

Pepe. Interview Young male resident Comuna 13, 11/08/2012

Luisa. Interview Female Community Leader in Comuna 1, 12/03/2012

Andrea. Interview Female Community Leader in Comuna 1, 04/08/2012

Alicia. Interview female resident Comuna 1, 10/03/2012

Margarita. Interview Female Resident Comuna 1, 02/03/2012

Pablo. Interview Young Community leader Comuna 13, 11/06/2012

Interviews with Local Government Officials, Security Experts and Police Officers

Former Secretary of Government, Interview Medellin 4/11/2009

Commander of the Metropolitan Police, Interview Medellin 12/11/2009

Municipal official at Sub-Secretary of Government, Interview Medellin 18/11/2009

Municipal official at Secretary of Government, Interview Medellin 10/02/2010

Municipal Official at Secretary of Social Development, Interview Medellin 25/11/09

Security Adviser to Municipality of Medellin and Coordinator of City Security Strategy, Interview 05/02/10

Municipal Social Work Specialist in Comuna 1, Interview Medellin 12/08/2010

Municipal official at the Research Centre for Security and Coexistence, Interview Medellin 20/07/2010

Former Coordinator of Security and Coexistence Plan, Department of Antioquia, Interview 06/10/2010

Municipal Official at Secretary of Youth, Interview Medellin 10/07/2011

Community Police Officer based in Comuna 8, Interview Medellin 19/11/2009

Community Police Officer based in Comuna 10, Interview Medellin
21/11/2010

Police Officer based in Comuna 9, Interview Medellin 06/09/2010

Interviews with Members of Civil Society Organisations

Professor at University of Antioquia (Department of Law and Political
Sciences), 12/11/2009

Human Rights Defender at Corporacion Region, Interview Medellin 15/11/09

Director of NGOs Association in Medellin, Interview 18/11/2009

Human Rights Defender at IPC, Interview Medellin 20/11/2009

Director of Civil Society Organisation (Viva la Ciudadania), Interview Medellin
22/11/2009

Senior Researcher at IPC, Interview Medellin 12/10/2010

Professor at University of Antioquia (Department of Sociology and Political
Sciences), 12/10/2010

Senior member of IPC, Interview Medellin 18/10/2010