Commanding Texts: Knowledge-ordering, Identity Construction and Ethics in 'Military Manuals' of the Roman Empire

Contents

Introduction

This thesis is about military manuals—synoptic pedagogic texts on military matters – produced in the first few centuries of the Roman imperial period. These are not the most popular of Classical texts, often described as dry, practical, and straightforward, but this thesis argues that they merit far more attention and appreciation than they have received in the scholarship so far, and will explore some of the areas in which this more sustained scrutiny is particularly fruitful. Before doing so, however, it is worth providing a short summary of the present state of the field, since the study of ancient military manuals has been associated mainly with the discipline of military history and has altered as that discipline itself has changed over the last decades, and since Classics itself also extended its textual horizons over the same time frame. This thesis builds on this recent work, as well as developing themes and questions about empire and identity, power and knowledge in the Roman world that have emerged from other areas of ancient historical enquiry.

1. Different approaches to military manuals

'Traditional' military history focuses mainly on topics that have to do with campaigning, in particular strategy, tactics, battle formations and weapons. Military historians usually take a strictly utilitarian approach, being interested in the very practical aspects of all these components. Such an approach, which has been applied to the Classical world as well, is reinforced by the belief popular amongst military historians that certain parameters remain constant, irrespective of cultural background and time period, and that similar methods of investigation will yield similar results.[1]

Ancient military manuals – from Aeneas Tacticus' fourth-century B.C. work on how to survive a siege to Vegetius' fourth or fifth century A.D. epitome of the military art (and beyond) – have been considered rich sources, because they provide precisely the sort of information sought out by this line of inquiry. But the traditional military historians' relationship with the manuals has

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[1] Köchly and Rüstow (1852), Droysen (1888), Delbrück (1920), Kromayer and Veith (1928), Anderson (1970).

been limited, with little attention paid to the potential agendas and overall projects of these texts.

In recent decades, military history and its approaches have evolved and diversified. Arguably, the publication of John Keegan's *The Face of Battle* in 1976 revolutionised the way scholars looked at battle and warfare, through its focus on the personal experience of the soldier – on what one would have done and felt on an individual level.[2] Many of his methods and approaches, his questions and ideas, have since been applied to the Classical world.[3] Subsequently more complex issues of warfare, such as the psychology of the battlefield, post-traumatic stress, morale, the depiction of the self and the enemy, and the relationship between social, cultural and practical factors in different types of war-related practices have attracted attention (with the Greek phalanx receiving particular attention). Methods from psychology, anthropology and sociology have been deployed in order to understand ancient warfare and warriors in a more rounded way. Scholars have moved away from the 'traditional' utilitarian analysis of military history, to think more deeply about how combat was conceptualised and whether the ways in which men fight are dictated by factors other than efficiency, such as social norms, expectations and reputation, with even the traditional topics of tactics and weapons being scrutinised from this viewpoint.[4]

Although military history has branched out, its relationship with military manuals has remained limited. Indeed, they have actually faded in importance – or worse, became even more decontextualised, bundled together with other sources in attempts to (re)create the aforementioned 'face of battle'. With their apparent focus on tactics, formations and weapons, they have not seemed to offer the data relevant to the new directions being taken, and scholars

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[2] Keegan (1976); for a good overview of Keegan's method and impact on the writing of military history see Ostwald (2012), thought he seems to have been mainly influential in anglo-saxon literature and Ostwald mentions that French scholarship has had a "long-standing preference for 'war and society' studies".

[3] Victor Hanson's (1989) book brought Keegan's approach to ancient history, but see also Philip Sabin's (2000) article for a similar approach with respect to the Romans, Goldsworthy (1998), (2007) and Daly (2002).

[4] Hanson (1989) and van Wees (2004) are perhaps the most influential. Also Crowley (2012) and Kagan and Viggiano (eds.) (2013) for a mixture of old and new approaches and theories. But cf. French scholarship, always interested in the more social aspects of warfare; for example Ducrey (1968), Harmand (1967), Vernant (1968) Garlan (1972) and (1989), Le Bohec (1998). For understandable reasons, German scholarship after World War II has taken little interest in warfare. For a more complete discussion see Hanson (1999).

have looked more to writers of historical narrative for answers about psychology, cultural connections and individual experience in ancient warfare.[5]

In as far as ancient military manuals have attracted recent scholarly attention this has, broadly speaking, taken two forms, both of which are connected to a wider move within classical studies, a move to extend and challenge the literary canon, to find value and interest in traditionally non-canonical works from the Greek and Roman worlds, and to be more holistic in approaching ancient culture. Thus, a range of more or less obscure and overlooked texts, including some on how to build artillery engines, fortify a military camp, and command an army, on strategy and tactics in warfare, have received new editions, translations, and commentaries, and been more generally discussed by those focusing on particular treatises or authors.[6] Secondly, military manuals have been caught up in the recent outburst of activity around ancient technical literature, as it treats an array of subjects, in an array of styles.[7]

In the first case, the quality of editions and translations, studies and analysis has been mixed. Everett Wheeler and Peter Krentz's translation and commentary on Polyaenus' *Strategemata*, for example, published in 1994 is very useful, and has helped the work achieve a higher profile in scholarship more broadly.[8] Others, such as James DeVoto's edition and translation of Arrian's *Taktika* and *Ektaxis*, and Christopher Matthew's of Aelian's *Taktika*, are marred by inaccuracies, a poor understanding of the manuscript tradition, and a tenuous grasp of the Greek language.[9] Similarly, although some recent articles and essays have strong individual points to make, others are more superficial and summary in their treatment, and the discussion remains rather

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[5] For example Lee (2013) relying mainly on Xenophon, Thucydides and Herodotus; Heckel (2013) on Diodorus; Sage (2013) on Polybius and actually faulting 'military manuals' in not being useful in recreating the 'actual' history of tactical developments.

[6] Whitehead (1990), (1992), Burliga (2008), on Aeneas Tacticus, and Garlan (1977) on siege warfare more generally, Milner (1993) on Vegetius, Grillone (2012) for Ps-Hyginus, Stoll (2012) on Xenophon's *Hipparchikos*. No new English translations of Frontinus' *Strategemata* have been attempted since Bennett's (1925) but there are relatively new Italian and French editions of the text; Laederich (1999) for the French one and Galli (1999) for the Italian one. See also Petrocelli (2008) and Sestile (2011) for new Italian editions of Onasander's and Aelian's treatises.

[7] Formisano (2017) on Vegetius and Onasander, König (2004) and (2017) on Frontinus, Roby (2016) on the 'artillery manuals'.

[8] Krentz and Wheeler (1994); also more recently Broadersen (2011).

[9] DeVoto (1993); Matthew (2012) with Wheeler (2016) for the numerous problems of the edition.

disparate and fragmented, underdeveloped and un-joined up, so far.[10] The most important contributions have been Philip Stadter's and Brian Bosworth's discussions of Arrian's military texts in the context of his other works, of his complete oeuvre, and of the author himself,[11] Everett Wheeler's attempts to discover the purpose of Arrian's *Taktika* and analysis of it in the context of his relationship with Hadrian, and Delfino Ambaglio, James Chulp and Christopher Smith's articles on Onasander, discussing his focus on psychology and the moral aspect of generalship, as well as his emphasis on 'just warfare' (Smith also tackles the background of the author and of his patron, Q. Veranius).[12]

In the second case, scholars have moved away from regarding technical literature as simply a factual 'source' from which to cull 'accurate information' and have focused on the rhetoric, self-positioning and overall agenda of the authors.[13] Scholars have explored the way knowledge is ordered and presented and how authors present themselves as experts and compete with each other, and how (Greek) 'knowledge' and (Roman) 'power' and the different types of knowledge and expertise related to one another.[14] Military manuals have been partially integrated in this discussion, but there is more to be done, as there has been no overall analysis of the whole 'genre' of the ancient military manual, nor have they been treated as a whole in any way.[15] This thesis brings the two aforementioned approaches together in a holistic way, examining a series of texts from the Empire in a thematic manner, dealing with both their practicality and with questions asked about technical literature in more general terms.

2. A holistic approach to military manuals

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[10] Stadter (1978) and Dain (1946) attempt a parallel between Aelian, Arrian and Asclepiodotus as the 'parent text'.

[11] Stadter (1980); Bosworth (1993).

[12] Ambaglio (1981), Chulp (2014), Smith (1998).

[13] Most recently König and Woolf (2017). For rhetoric in the history of science see Latour (1987); Gross (2006); Pera (1994). König (2004) 6-7 points out that 'texts about technical knowledge are generally considered to be simple' and do not constitute 'the object of reflection', scholars considering that 'they do not carry ethical or political values' and that they are 'not an essential part of the culture that produced them'; also Cuomo (2000); on Frontinus especially being read as a practical, no-nonsense guy Laederich (1999) 34; Campbell (1987) 28.

[14] For all these themes see König and Woolf (2017) 1-17, Whitmarsh and König (2007) 5-6; Barton (1994); Nutton (2009); von Staden (1997); van der Eijk; for excessive *philotimia* as negative König and Woolf (2017) 16-25; for competition between different kinds of expertise Formisano and van der Eijk (2017), Parry (2007); Rihl (1999) 13-16; A. König (2017); for (Greek) 'knowledge' vs. (Roman) 'power' Wallace-Hadrill (1988); Whitmarsh (2005); Barton (1995), J. König (2009), A. König (2009).

[15] See esp. König and Woolf (2017).

This thesis will examine Frontinus' *Strategemata*, Arrian's *Ektaxis* and Arrian and Aelian's *Taktika*, Onasander's *Strategikos* and Polyaenus' *Strategika* in an attempt to flag up some of the bigger themes and problems that have been discussed in relation with other, more prominent technical texts, and show how 'military manuals' are an integral and significant part of the history of knowledge and have much to contribute to the discussion about experts and expertise in antiquity.

The approach that I take here has been inspired by Brian Campbell's 1987 article which brings all the texts that I consider in this thesis together and treats them as a 'genre' or at least a distinctive group, raising issues such as their potential audience, purpose and comparison to other *Lehrbucher* but also asking more traditional questions related to their practicality and usefulness.[16]

Comparison of the texts considered here to *Lehrbucher* or 'manuals' raises the question of their practicality for instructing readers about warfare and generalship, as does the label of 'technical text' or technical literature.[17] Indeed if one reads the second half of Arrian's *Taktika*, one might wonder whether there is anything to be learned from the description of 'parade' cavalry drills, or whether we should place more emphasis on the way that military knowledge is constructed, presented and evaluated.[18] At the same time, we cannot disregard Campbell's observations about the lack of an actual system of instruction for generals and officers in the Roman Empire (i.e. a 'Roman military academy') so the practical value of the texts cannot be so readily dismissed, especially when they do not necessarily fit into our own scheme of what constitutes a manual.[19] Having an agenda need not be seen as excluding an intended practicality.[20] My intention in bringing 'military manuals' into the frame of 'technical texts' is to deploy in relation to these military works the more sophisticated, complex analyses that have been used with regard to other technical texts, analyses that do not assume that the authors were only writing practical guidelines on how to perform a specific task or master a specific discipline, but show

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[16] Campbell (1987).
[17] Also Formisano and van der Eijk (2017) esp. 2-11.
[18] For example A. König (2017) investigates Frontinus' discourse on practical know-how and theoretical expertise.
[19] Campbell (1987) 22.
[20] Campbell (1986) 24.

how the works reflect the authors' broader concerns about learning, knowledge, its (and their) position within the political world, among other things.

The texts that have been discussed as part of 'technical literature' are varied in nature, spanning both topics that are considered traditionally 'technical' – such as mathematics, architecture and medicine – and topics dealing with law, historiography and philosophy.[21] One of the primary arguments which has emerged from this comparative approach concerns the importance of the way in which knowledge is ordered in these treatises, especially in relation to texts and authors of the Roman Empire (which is also concerned with ordering), but also in relation to the accumulated knowledge of the past.[22]

The 'military manuals' have been overlooked in this approach and indeed their concern with *ordering knowledge* will constitute one of the main guiding threads of the thesis. We shall see that the ordering and categorising done by the military manuals is not just an ordering of the topic(s) discussed and the information available, but also a cross-cultural ordering and ranking of Greek and Roman knowledge, with particular focus and attention to precedence. In doing so, the authors not only build up and compare 'empires of knowledge' with the physical Roman empire 'of power', but square off different Greek and Roman 'empires of knowledge' against each other, often using 'Greek knowledge' to define Roman identity – but also their own identity as authors – and to point out and explain diversity. So ordering and presenting knowledge are also interconnected with authority and competition, and, as König and Woolf assert in introducing their recent collected volume on *Authority and Expertise in Ancient Scientific Culture*, 'scientists' in the Ancient world had to work much harder at making themselves authoritative because there was no formal institution that could accredit them as experts, and they, therefore, worked just as hard to construct authoritative authorial personas, emphasising – in the first person – their own knowledge and expertise.[23] Rhetoric and rhetorical persuasion are therefore an important part of 'handbooks', not only for self-

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[21] König and Woolf (2017) 1-3.
[22] For example Whitmarsh and König (2007) 5-6.
[23] König and Woolf (2017) 1-2. Despite this competitive element, Whitmarsh and König (2007) 21-22 point out that even though oftentimes authors create parallel 'empires of knowledge', they do not always have to compete with the political empire of Rome, their agendas playing a much more complicated game of 'subversion' and support.

promotion but also for the promotion of the content therein, and the way in which material is presented against other similar material is often the greatest source of authority (and this is especially true for a body of knowledge which at first seems very similar). [24]

We shall therefore examine, in the second chapter (after the first chapter which will contextualise and provide more information about each text, engaging with issues such as the identity of the author, the intended audience of the work, and the 'genre' to which the work belongs), how authors tackle the issue of 'Greek' and 'Roman' knowledge, categorising and ranking it and, in doing so turning it into a tool of self-promotion. We shall see how Roman knowledge is both undermined and subverted but also praised, and how Greek knowledge is at the same time placed above Roman knowledge and integrated into a narrative of continuity with it, in an attempt to bolster the authorial personas of the authors and to create both a ranking and a unified concept of military 'science'.[25] We will discover in Arrian and Aelian's *Taktika* how different rhetorical strategies are used to persuade the reader not only of the prominence of a certain type of 'military knowledge' but also that a particular author can offer the best interpretation of this said knowledge.

This type of discussion will also tie closely into existing debates about the relationship between 'knowledge' and 'power' in the ancient world (especially between 'Greek knowledge' and 'Roman power) – or knowledge-ordering and politics.[26] The ways in which authors approached their dedicatee(s), and positioned their expertise with respect to these persons of power and influence, which has been explored in new – and more nuanced – ways in other texts, will now also be examined with respect to 'military manuals' throughout chapters two and three – but especially in the latter with a special focus on the relationship between Arrian and Hadrian.[27]

The theme of identity will also feature prominently in chapters two and three in light of the explicit polarisation in the texts of 'Greek' and 'Roman' knowledge, but chapter three in

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[24] For example A. König (2009) about the presentation of architecture in Vitruvius.
[25] For self-promotion and self-defacing in technical literature see König and Woolf (2017) 2; 7-9; they give the example of Galen as a classic one of self-assertion with Barton (1994); Nutton (2009); von Staden (1997); for excessive *philotimia* as negative König and Woolf (2017) 16-25.
[26] For example Wallace-Hadrill (1988); Whitmarsh (2005); Barton (1995).
[27] J. König (2009); esp. A. König (2009) for the relationship between Augustus and Vitruvius.

particular will focus on the use of Greek knowledge in the construction of Roman identity, of the identity of Arrian himself but also the identity of the Roman Empire. However, because structural divisions are often artificial, the theme of order and ordering will not be too far from this latter chapter either, and we shall see how Arrian uses Greek knowledge to give shape and to organise his Roman world.

A brief look at Aelian's preface will give a taste of how all these themes are an essential part of his agenda and demonstrate how they have so far been overlooked and how they can contribute to and inform recent debates in scholarship on technical literature:

> Τὴν παρὰ τοῖς Ἕλλησι τακτικὴν θεωρίαν ἀπὸ τῶν Ὁμήρου χρόνων τὴν ἀρχὴν λαβοῦσαν, αὐτόκρατορ Καῖσαρ υἱὲ θεοῦ Τραϊανὲ σεβαστέ, πολλοὶ τῶν πρὸ ἡμῶν συνέγραψαν οὐκ ἔχοντες, ἣν ἡμεῖς ἐν τοῖς μαθήμασιν ἐπιστεύθημεν ἕξιν ἔχειν.

> 'Imperator Caesar son of the deified [Nerva] Traianus Augustus, tactical theory among the Greeks goes back as far as the time of Homer, and has been written by many whose standing in scholarship was not reputed equal to mine'[28]

In one sentence we see how the importance of Greek knowledge on the matter is being flagged up and placed before an existing body of knowledge, but also how the author is emphasising his own role in the ordering of said knowledge because of his superior scholarly skills (ἐν τοῖς μαθήμασιν ἐπιστεύθημεν) and implicitly putting himself first in the order of those πολλοὶ τῶν πρὸ ἡμῶν, 'many before him', who had written about the topic. So we see how in just three lines Aelian talks about Greekness, about his own authority in ordering Greek knowledge and – by addressing the emperor Trajan – about his importance in the 'order' of the empire and for ordering the empire. The mention of Greekness here – and of the knowledge coming from Homer – is essential and ties into broader discussions of the social acceptability of a certain kind of knowledge and how Greek knowledge in some forms was treated with suspicion and skepticism. As Whitmarsh and König emphasise, 'elite Romans had to tread a delicate balance

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[28] Ael. *Tact.* Pr. 1, all translations by A.M. Devine, unless specified otherwise.

between excessive devotion to Greek knowledge and ignorance of it' and this is particularly true for the military sphere. [29]

As mentioned, the second approach in this thesis will be connected to more traditional preoccupations of military history, namely ascertaining if the texts were in any way practical or didactic, and I turn to this particularly in the last chapter of the thesis, with a focus on ethics. Studies such as Pierre Ducrey's *Traitement des prisonniers de guerre dans la Grèce antique: des origines à la conquête romaine* ask whether there was a code of battle conduct in the Classical world, but make no systematic use of 'military manuals' as sources of information, despite the need for a comparison between 'practice' and 'theory', and do not ask whether certain types of practices that have deep cultural connections are considered unethical or whether there are ethical taboos/recommendations that transcend the boundaries of 'Greekness' and 'Romanness'.[30] Therefore, the fourth and final chapter will attempt first to determine whether there was indeed an ethical code of conduct in battle in the Classical world – and if yes, whether it was shared by both Romans and Greeks and/or different from general ethical norms. I shall then examine whether these texts engage in any way with this 'code', whether their individual approaches have anything in common, or whether there are fundamental differences.

My aim in this thesis is to deepen our understanding of these – in a way – much used texts but also to diversify our approach to them and fit them into the broader questions and problems of cultural history.

I. Authors, Projects and the Tradition of 'Military Writings'

In what follows I will discuss in some depth the authors and their works which are the focus of this thesis. The main issue tackled will be whether the authors operate within a specific, pre-existing category of writing which conditions or influences their choice of topics and material,

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[29] Whitmarsh and König (2007) 23.
[30] Save in Gilliver (2011).

that is whether there were several established groups or 'genres', of military writing, and how they relate to other traditions of technical texts. Questions of audience, both the audiences these texts construct for themselves and which the broader history of the Roman world suggests for them, will also be addressed and finally the issue of their practicality. This will also lead to the justification of the specific choice of authors which has been made in this thesis, as the contrast between our texts and others which also might be considered 'military manuals' will become clear. Chronology will be secondary to the discussion, though information about when the authors lived and worked will be provided.

We shall see, however, that answering all these questions, providing context and definition, is not an easy task because of the scarcity of material that survives, and the uncertainty about what has been lost. While I shall be providing several interpretative suggestions, in dialogue with previous scholarship on these matters – and express my preference for one of them – I will in no case discount the other possibilities.

1. The authors and their work

Before even approaching the more complicated topic of 'genre' or 'genres', we can start by noticing that the texts we are discussing can be grouped into three categories in terms of their scope. The first one, represented solely by Onasander' *Strategikos*, is characterised by a general approach to military matters, where topics which can be considered more 'specialised' – such as battle formations and manoeuvres – are discussed together with more 'general issues', such as what qualities a general should possess, what men make the best generals and what the psychological factors that influence warfare are. I am putting Onasander in his own category simply because, as we shall see later on, there are other earlier texts (such as Aeneas Tacticus' *Poliorketika*) which are very similar. The second group is represented by Frontinus' and Polyaenus' collections of stratagems – that is short anecdotes about the deeds of famous generals – and I will attempt to elucidate the history and origins of this type of, apparently, more innovative, composition in what follows. The last – and perhaps the most interesting – group of texts is represented by Arrian and Aelian's *Taktika*, both very detailed accounts of how to marshal and arm one's troops (and Arrian's *Ektaxis* could also be included here, though it is a

particular case that it needs discussion in and of itself), which exclude most other matters, such as examples, and it is on these and their authors that we shall focus first.[31]

As mentioned in the introduction, Arrian is the better known of the two.[32] Born in Nicomedia, he was a senator and then consul at Rome, perhaps in 125 or 126 A.D. (but more likely in 129 A.D.), a protégé of one of the most prominent senators under Trajan, C. Avidius Nigrinus.[33] After holding the consulship he went on to become the first Bithynian provincial governor and one of the few Greeks in charge of a province with legions – Cappadocia – where Cassius Dio tells us he repelled an attack of the Alans (although it is less certain that there was an actual battle).[34] Following his governorship, he retired to Athens, where he held the office of eponymous archon in 145/146.[35] But Arrian – as Stadter points out – was also 'a philosopher and a hunter, a general and a historian'.[36] He was equated with Xenophon even in antiquity, engaging in the same activities as he did and writing about it, but also referring to himself as Xenophon repeatedly (whether that was his given name or one he took up).[37] In a Xenophontic manner, he wrote a treatise on hunting (*Kynegetikos*), meant to be read alongside that of Xenophon, a history of Trajan's wars against Parthia as part of his *Parthica* (which is now lost, along with his *Events after Alexander*, the local history *Bithyniaka*, the *Alanike*, and his biographies, *Dion*, *Timoleon* and *Tillorobus*), an account of the teachings of the Stoic philosopher Epictetus of whom he was a student (and he was a Stoic 'philosopher' himself, as was well known in antiquity) and the *Techne taktike* here in question, composed in the

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[31] I acknowledge that the titles of the works are sometimes problematic. For example modern scholars refer to several of the Roman treatises on warfare as *de re militari* without knowing whether that was their actual title. In this thesis, the titles used are those that have been traditionally accepted, for the sake of brevity and convenience, and with the *caveat* that sometimes the works would have perhaps been called differently by their respective authors. For the same purporse of brevity, the 'military manuals' of both Aelian and Arrian will be referred to as *Taktika*. Moreover, all the abreviations of the titles of the works and names of the authors are those used by the Liddell-Scott-Jones Greek Lexicon and the Lewis and Short Latin Dictionary. The only exception is Arrian's *Ektaxis kata Alanōn*, where I have preferred the abbreviation *Ektax.* to the Latin one *Alan.=Expeditio contra Alanos*.

[32] For a detailed account of Arrian's life see Stadter (1980) 1-17; for a comparison between Aelian and Arrian see Stadter (1978) 118-119.

[33] Stadter (1980)1; 7-8; 11.

[34] D. C. 69.15; also Stadter (1980) 47; Devine (1993) 313.

[35] Arr. *Cyn.* 1.4; Stadter (1980) 15; 17.

[36] Stadter (1980) 1.

[37] Stadter (1980) 2 believes Xenophon was his actual name and not one he took up; but see note 11 in Stadter for the view not being a widely accepted one, as well as the more detailed discussion in chapter III of this thesis.

twentieth year of Hadrian's reign, 136/137 A.D. (therefore after he had become governor of Cappadocia). [38]

On a non-Xenophontic note, but relevant for our purposes (and Xenophon never being too far away), there are his other literary works. Arrian wrote a *Periplus* documenting his circumnavigation of the Black Sea during an inspection tour of his province and very similar to his *Indike* –a story of Nearchus' journey on the Indian Ocean to Babylon. He also produced the *Ektaxis*, a detailed but literary account of his battle plan against the Alans, which will also be discussed in a following chapter, whose date of composition is not certain – we only know that the expedition happened in 135 A.D. so naturally the work would have been written after that time.[39]

So it is clear just from a brief outline of his life and work that Arrian is very consciously positioning himself as part of a certain tradition of Greek writing, and by his association with Xenophon, linking himself to a particular strand of Greek military writing. Knowing what we do of Xenophon's own more 'technical' military texts, such as the *Hipparchikos* – where he combines practical advice with that which falls into the category of 'battlefield psychology'– it is thus notable that Arrian excludes an important component of warfare – psychology – from his text altogether. So, there is a sense in which he is also trying to distance himself from Xenophon in the *Taktika* and locate himself somewhat differently. This difference, as will be explored is connected to the Roman Empire in which he lived and wrote, though whether Stadter's description of him as a 'man of two worlds', both 'Greek' and a 'Roman', is helpful will be left open for the moment.[40]

While we have a significant amount of information about Arrian which helps us understand and contextualise his works, we are not so fortunate in the case of Aelian, as everything we know about him comes from his own *Taktike theoria*.[41] From his reference to his more learned nature

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[38]For the lost histories see Stadter (1980) 166-153; Devine (1993) 314-315 for Arrian being better known as a philosopher than a historian and his identification as the 'New Xenophon'; also Bosworth (1993) 272-275.
[39] For Arrian's complete works see Stadter (1980) 32-163 and for his minor works Bosworth (1993).
[40] Stadter (1980) 1.
[41] For the date Arr. *Tact*. 44. 3; Devine (1993) 315; Stadter (1980) 41; see Dain (1946) 20-23 for different figures with the name Aelian.

and from the general tendency of philosophers to include warfare in the activities they theorised about (as for example Asclepiodotus, Onasander and not least of all Arrian himself) we might deduce that he too was a philosopher.[42] We also know that he was a close friend of Frontinus – a Roman general and official of the late first century A.D. discussed further below – but he himself emphasises that he had no experience as a commander.[43] He also mentions in the preface that it is mostly due to Frontinus that the work was completed, as it was the latter's advice and encouragement during their meeting at Formiae which enabled him to go through with the project. However, we know of no other works by Aelian and even the date of his *Taktike theoria* is problematic, not least of all because of the aforementioned story of the meeting with Frontinus.

The problem stems from the fact that the manuscript tradition preserves two versions of Aelian's text: a shorter version, present in the oldest manuscript available, the Laurentianus 55.4 (which was also copied in other later manuscripts), and a longer version, preserved in the Codex Venetus Marcianus 516 and another manuscript once in the Library of St. Mark's Cathedral, Venice, now lost.[44] All of the surviving manuscripts give Hadrian as the Emperor to whom the work is dedicated, but the philologist Andrew Devine has argued (following the French Hellenist and Byzantinist Alphonse Dain), that the mention of the emperor's deified father Nerva in the preface, of the emperor's skill in battle and of his excellence in 'great wars' make it more likely that the manuscripts are corrupt, and the work was in fact dedicated to Trajan.[45] According to him then, the text should be dated between 106/7 A.D. – the end of the Dacian wars – and 113 A.D. – the beginning of Trajan's Parthian campaign.

The ancient military historian Christopher Matthew, however, has a different view. According to him, the two versions of the text represent two different stages of composition. He bases this on Aelian's account (in the preface of the *Taktike theoria*) of how he had started composing the work, but set it aside because he did not think himself worthy, then, after meeting with

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[42] Matthew (2012) 135; Stadter (1978) 118; see below for the possibility of him being a Stoic.
[43] Ael. *Tact.* pr. 1-2; Devine (1989) 31.
[44] Devine (1989) 33.
[45] Ael. *Tact*. pr. 3 for Nerva; Devine (1989) 31; Dain (1946) 18-19.

Frontinus, he was reassured and decided to finish it. [46] The Codex Laurentianus thus contains the incomplete, pre-Frontinus draft, which he started under and dedicated to Trajan, while the fuller versions reflected his completed, post Frontinus work which he then rededicated to Hadrian, changing only the name of the emperor.[47] The rest – Matthew continues - fitted Hadrian as well so did not require any additional changes: Trajan – Hadrian's adoptive father - was Marcus Ulpius Nerva Traianus, having been adopted by Nerva, and the 'great wars' which the emperor commanded could refer to Hadrian's military activities ranging from Britain to the Near East.

However, it must be noted that this is a clarification of Matthew's argument, as one struggles to understand exactly what he is trying to put forward.[48] This is mostly because Matthew does not seem to have examined any manuscripts when putting together his new edition of Aelian's text, but refers mostly to printed editions – in fact giving most credence to Robertollo's 1552 *editio princeps*, calling it the 'best edition'.[49] The reason behind this is that it included the longest version of the text, with chapters not found in any of the subsequent editions, and of course also missing from the oldest manuscript, the Laurentianus 55.4. However, Devine follows Dain in arguing that the 'missing chapters' are in fact interpolated mid-tenth century Byzantine comments meant to 'elucidate the material in the shorter authentic recension by incorporating additional material from other Hellenistic tactical manuals, now lost', which presents a big problem for Matthew's theory.[50] I believe Devine's view must be the correct one, not least because the shorter version of the Laurentianus 55.4 was copied in subsequent manuscripts, while the 'interpolated version' exists only in two, one of which is lost.[51] I also believe Devine is right in thinking the emperor to whom the work is dedicated is indeed Trajan, as all the current manuscripts have 'Hadrian' as the name of the dedicatee, which makes it easier to believe that there was confusion between the two emperors and 'Trajan' was replaced with 'Hadrian',

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[46] Matthew (2012) 135-136.
[47] Matthew (2012) 137.
[48] Also Wheeler (2016) 580-581.
[49] Matthew (2012) xvi; Devine (1989) 33.
[50] Matthew (2012) xvii-xviii.; Devine (1989) 59; Dain (1946) 77-115 puts forth a more detailed analysis of the interpolated recension; see esp. 88-89 where Dain follows Köchly's demonstration.
[51] For a very good review of Matthew's use of manuscripts and printed editions see Wheeler (2016) 578-581.

whereas, in order for Matthew's interpretation to work, the names of both emperors would have to appear in different manuscripts, since the 'shorter version' would be dedicated to Trajan whilst the 'longer' would be dedicated to Hadrian. The former hypothesis of the confusion is supported by Wheeler as well, who points out that early manuscripts (especially those containing military texts) have a very hard time differentiating between Trajan and Hadrian, so we could easily believe that this is the case here as well.[52] Irrespective of whom the text is dedicated to, it is clear that it precedes that of Arrian.[53]

Since we mentioned Aelian's connection with Frontinus, it is only fitting that we continue the discussion with the collections of stratagems, one of which bears his name, his *Strategemata*, together with Polyaenus' *Strategika*. We are fortunate in knowing far more about Sextus Iulius Frontinus than we do about Aelian.[54] He was probably born in Narbonese Gaul sometime in Tiberius' reign and we first learn of him being *praetor urbanus* in 70 A.D., though his early career is not known. He then went on to become consul three times (in 73, 98 and 100 A.D.), two of which were together with the Emperor Trajan, which led some scholars to believe he must have played a significant role in Trajan's succession of Nerva as emperor.[55] He also held the most prestigious post of proconsul of Asia and that of curator of the water supply, all amounting to a very impressive career.[56] Perhaps more importantly, Tacitus speaks very highly of him as governor of Britannia (in 74 A.D.), praising him for dealing with the raids of the very powerful and bellicose Silures despite the difficulties of the terrain.[57] This would only have been a part of his very successful military career, which most likely involved him being *legatus legionis* during the Rhineland revolt in 70 A.D., since he himself states he accepted the surrender of the Lingones, but Tacitus' praise is remarkable considering that his father-in-law

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[52] Wheeller (2016) 380-381.

[53] For all the copies of the text in the Laurentianus 55.4 see Devine (1989) 33; Dain (1946) 19 thinks the manual was offered to Trajan in the first decade of the second century A.D.

[54] For a detailed account of his life and career see Rodgers (2004) 1-5.

[55] E.g. Syme (1958) 16-17, Eck (2002) 219-226 and Rodgers (2004) 4.

[56] Bennett (1925) xiii-xviii; Laederich (1999) 5-15.

[57] Tac. *Agr.* 17.4.

Agricola was Frontinus' successor in Britannia, and this adds weight to Frontinus' reputation and skill as a commander.[58]

So one way we can understand the *Strategemata* – though far from the only way, as we shall see – is as the work of a highly proficient general interested in passing on his expertise, and naturally interested in the military deeds of other great commanders. As for the work itself, based on internal evidence – namely references to Domitian as Germanicus, a title acquired in 83 A.D. – the first three books were most likely composed between 84 and 96 A.D.[59] It also comes, of course, as part of a larger literary output, including a treatise on aqueducts, *De Aquis,* one on land surveying, and most importantly a treatise on 'the art of war', *De re militari*, to which he refers in the preface of the *Strategemata* but which is now lost to us. It seems his military expertise was highly valued particularly because of this more general treatise, as Vegetius refers to it twice in his much later *Epitoma rei militaris* – a work promising to put together Roman military expertise from the past alongside that of the author's present. Vegetius emphasises that he is merely summarising Frontinus' words, the implication being the same as Aelian's exercise in modesty, that the *De re militari* is far superior to their own works and cannot really be improved upon.[60]

We only have a brief entry on Frontinus' counterpart, Polyaenus, in the *Suda*, which the Classical military historians Peter Krentz and Everett Wheeler use to reconstruct his career along with 'some scattered fragments and personal references in the prefaces of the *Strategica*'.[61] According to them he was born in Bithynia in around 100 A.D. to an elite family of Macedonian descent– but everything else in their reconstruction seems to be a matter of guess-work, except the fact that by 161 A.D. he was pleading cases in the courts in Rome, and therefore was most likely a Roman citizen who knew Latin and Roman law.[62] Krentz and Wheeler assume that, like many other of his ambitious Bithynian countrymen, Polyaenus too left his home 'to pursue fame and fortune, seeking literary patronage and work as a teacher of

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[58] Rodgers (2004)1.
[59] Bennett (1925) xxi.
[60] Rodgers (2004) 3; Veg. *Mil.* 1.8, 2.3.
[61] Krentz and Wheeler (1994) ix.
[62] For the full account see Krentz and Wheeler (1994) ix-xvi.

rhetoric or an advocate in the courts'.[63] There are surviving fragments of a Greek speech of his, *On Behalf of the Macedonian Assembly,* which suggest his wider rhetorical prowess. In the preserved fragment of his *On Thebes* (also mentioned in the *Suda*) he calls himself 'Athenian', which makes the way in which he constructs his identity that much more interesting, because – like Arrian – he could choose to highlight whichever aspect of his identity was more suitable for him at a given time: Athenian, when he was delivering speeches and Macedonian when he was writing about war (which is not to say he did not spend time in Athens).[64]

Polyaenus' arrival at Rome cannot be dated. However, the date of the composition of the *Strategika* – a collection of stratagems written in Greek – is given by his reference to the Parthian war of Marcus Aurelius and Lucius Verus. As Krentz and Wheeler point out, Lucius Verus' departure to the East in 162 A.D. is noted in the preface to book six, so the first five books must have been written by then, especially since they believe that Polyaenus will have been very enthusiastic about the opportunity to dedicate his work to the emperors at such a moment, to offer a treatise that could serve as a guidebook in this war.

The last category of texts, namely the 'general manual' is – as previously mentioned – represented by Onasander's *Strategikos*. As for the author himself, we do not have much information except an entry in the Suda stating that he wrote a commentary on Plato's *Republic* (which has not survived), so we might suspect that he was a philosopher like Asclepiodotus and Aelian – though attempts to reconstruct his Platonic views from the actual *Strategikos* have been less successful.[65] His *Strategikos* is a work on generalship written in Greek dedicated to Quintus Veranius, one of the consuls of 49 A.D., who died 10 years later in 59 A.D. Because of this the philologist and historian Charles Oldfather reasonably considered the latter as the *terminus ante quem* for the composition of the treatise.[66] The *Strategikos* is made up of forty-two chapters containing military principles on various themes ranging from the choice of the best general and the factors that should influence it, to the importance of psychological factors

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[63] Krentz and Wheeler (1994) x.
[64] Krentz and Wheeler (1994) x.
[65] Smith (1998) 152; for the different variations of Onasander's name see Oldfather (1923) 345-347.
[66] Oldfather (1923) 347; for a detailed account of Quintus Veranius' career and his relationship to Onasander see Smith (1998) 152-156.

and battle formations. Unlike Aelian's text this is addressed to 'professionals' (to the extent to which any Roman general can be called professional) and the chapters are somewhat self-contained, each discussing a topic that is not necessarily related to the previous or subsequent one.[67]

2. The works and the 'tradition' of military writing.

The particular texts discussed in this thesis do not stand alone but come as a part of a larger group of surviving military writings from the ancient world and as an even smaller part of what we may call 'technical writings' more broadly. These latter are texts which present a certain type of knowledge required for a specific field of activity, whether intended for other experts and/or a broader audience. They may also, as already mentioned, be much more than 'technical' in their oulook and content, often engaging with broader ideas and problems of empire, power and knowledge.

I refrain from using words such as 'tradition' and 'genre' at this point about the military writings because, as we shall see, we do not possess enough extant texts to establish what this 'tradition' might have been and whether there is indeed a norm that 'military manuals' follow. We shall, therefore, further divide the discussion into two sections. In the first part we shall examine the 'military manuals' which survive from before the middle of the first century A.D., that is which precede the composition of the texts which are the main focus here, and those earlier texts which we know about (or suspect the existence of) but are now lost both in Greek and Latin. We shall also look at a group of related texts that scholars have generally studied separately from 'military manuals', namely artillery manuals. In the second section, we will continue the discussion of both military manuals and artillery manuals with those written in the Roman Empire that include our own texts, and try to establish some relationships between these various groups and traditions. On what grounds are military and artillery manuals distinguished? To what extent can the variation visible within the set of surviving military writings from the early Roman Empire already mentioned be traced earlier? How far do the later works seem to follow patterns and how far do they seem to take different paths?

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[67] Onos. Pr. 1.

2.1 Earlier texts, extant and lost.

There are three surviving, earlier Greek texts which might be considered to come under the rubric of the military manual: Aeneas Tacticus' *Poliorcetica*, Xenophon's *Hipparchikos*, and Asclepiodotus' *Taktika*. There are naturally other Greek historical texts that engage with the specifics of warfare, such as Polybius' *Histories*, and other Greek technical texts on other military matters, namely the artillery manuals mentioned before and we shall discuss them all briefly in what follows.[68]

Aeneas Tacticus wrote a 'manual' about siege warfare in the fourth century B.C. (sometime between 370 and 346), mixing in very detailed technical knowledge about how to lock gates and how to prevent mining operations under fortifications, with insights into the psychology of a besieged city and the need to beware of plots and 'the enemy within'.[69] Written closely in time to Aeneas' text is Xenophon's *Hipparchikos*.[70] Addressed more specifically to the holder of the office of cavalry commander at Athens, the text also combines practical advice, with tips on how to use deception and take advantage of perception. Paul Cartledge contends, however, that the main emphasis of the text is on the morality of the man who would occupy the commander's role, focusing more specifically 'on the moral and religious qualities required to lead men as a cavalry commander in any situation, place or time', something that we also find in Onasander's later text.[71]

While arguably the two aforementioned texts refer to more specific circumstances, Asclepiodotus' *Taktika* seems to be putting forward general principles to be followed in any situation. Asclepiodotus was a first century B.C. philosopher and disciple of the Stoic Poseidonius.[72] His text is divided into twelve chapters (each with respective subchapters) and it

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[68] For a survey of all the texts in this section see Spaulding (1933).
[69] For the name of Aeneas' treatise see Hunter-Handford (1927) x-xi; for a detailed discussion Whitehead (1990) 5-17; for the dating see Whitehead (1990) 8-9. For plots and 'the enemy within': chapters 1 to 5, 10 to 14, 17 to 32 and 40; gates: 28; mining operations: 37.
[70] For the date see Cartledge (1997) 65-66; Marchant (1925) xxviii-xxix.
[71] Cartledge (1997) 66; for the purpose of the text also Stoll (2012).
[72] Oldfather (1923) 233-234.

discusses the very practical matters of organising, marching and manoeuvring troops, without the added elements of psychology or morality.

Aeneas Tacticus himself talks about two of his other books, one on 'preparations' (ἐν τῇ Παρασκευαστικῇ βίβλῳ) and one on supplies (ἐν τῇ Ποριστικῇ βίβλῳ), and Aelian adds that Aeneas put together many books on generalship (στρατηγικὰ βιβλία ἱκανὰ συνταξάμενος) which may have included more general matters, since Aelian also tells us that Aeneas discussed the definition of tactics.[73] This is in relation to a dispute with Polybius on the subject, and Aelian mentions a τακτικὰ by 'Polybius the Megalopolitan, a man of great learning and a companion of Scipio' while Arrian names him as one of the writers 'about such things' (ἔστι συγγράμματα ὑπὲρ τούτων […]Πολυβίου; presumably military matters, though the beginning is lost).

 Obviously, Polybius includes many military specifics in his histories – most notably his description of the Roman army in book six, but also the later comparison between the Roman legion and the Macedonian phalanx, which might overlap with a more general military work to which he refers in his *Histories*, and which is no doubt the one that Arrian and Aelian are referring to. [74] Moreover, the material has echoes in Asclepiodotus. Again we learn from Aelian and Arrian that Poseidonius 'the stoic philosopher' also wrote a treatise on warfare and the argument has been made that it is Polybius who was the inspiration for this.[75] Furthermore, it has been argued that the text of Asclepiodotus is actually an 'edited' version of his master's manual, which might be the reason why he is not named among the authors of *Taktika*, whilst Poseidonius is. It is this Poseidonian treatise, then, which would have been the original source for the *Taktika* of Arrian and Aelian.[76]

There are other Greek authors mentioned by Aelian and Arrian such as Cyneas the Thessalian, Pyrrhus the Epirote and his son Alexander, Clearchus, Pausanias, Evangelus, Eupolemus and Iphicrates.[77] However, the existence of some of these texts is put into question by the desire of

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[73] Aen. Tact. 7.4; 14.2, Ael *Tact*. 1.2 and 3.4 but this could also be part of any work so is in no way a clear indication of the existence of a separate treatise.
[74] Plb. 9.20.4 and Walbank (1972) 15.
[75] Arr. *Tact.* 1; Ael. *Tact.* 1.2; Devine (1980) 33 and (1993) 318.
[76] The discussion is summarized in C.H. Oldfather and W.A. Oldfather (1923) 233-238; also Devine (1993) 318.
[77] Ael. *Tact*. 1.2.

the two later authors to fit into a Greek tradition of writing about warfare and to establish the precedence of Greek military science (this shall be explored in depth in chapter II). It seems almost too good to be true – although not entirely implausible – that several famous Greek generals such as Pyrrhus, Alexander, Pausanias and Iphicrates (although Arrian mentions that this is not in fact the Athenian general, something not found in Aelian) all had literary preoccupations and happened to write treatises on military matters. The habit of writing under the name of a famous figure in the field, or in history, was a well-established one in the ancient world, as the rich range of surviving pseudepigraphic work attests.[78] Arrian and Aelian may have been particularly susceptible to such material, wishing to demonstrate that the Greeks too had men of action whose wisdom stands the test of time. At the same time, we cannot discount the possibility that such works contained worthwhile material, regardless of their authorship.

On the Latin side little is preserved, unfortunately. There are the vestiges of Cato the Elder's *De re militari* (of an unknown date), sections of which have survived but not enough to tell us how he treated his subject matter and what he discussed, and while Vegetius – who used Cato, as pointed out by Astin and Milner – is extant, it would be difficult and dangerous to argue from it which parts may or may not originally have been in Cato's text, since it is 'virtually certain that he did not have access to Cato's work'.[79] The six books *de re militari* by Cincius, an antiquarian author probably writing in the first century B.C., are cited by Aulus Gellius in his erudite third century A.D. miscellany, the *Attic Nights*.[80] Judging from Gellius, its contents ranged from how a legion was arranged and the names of its component parts to the recruitment of soldiers. Vegetius also mentions the encyclopaedist Celsus among the early Roman military writers.[81] A book on military matters was part of his encyclopaedic *Artes*, composed in the reign of Tiberius, and also encompassing five books on agriculture, seven on rhetoric, perhaps six on philosophy, and, of course, the almost intact eight books on medicine for which he is most well-known.[82]

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[78] As is the case of medical texts such as Ps-Pythagoras and especially Ps-Democritus.
[79] Astin (1978) 184 (for the quote) that is to say he did not have direct access, but read digests of Cato; 184-185 for the treatise in general; Milner (1993) xviii.
[80] Gell. 16.4; see also Kierdorf (2006) accessed on 1/6/2017.
[81] Veg. *Mil.* 2.8.
[82] On Celsus see Langslow (2000) 41-48, particularly 41-44 for the organisation of his work and its dating.

Then there is a group of texts from the same period that focused specifically on the construction of artillery, giving very technical details and specifications. Surviving are Biton's *Construction of War Engines and Artillery*, Philon's *Belopoeica*, Athenaeus' *On Machines* in Greek, and the book on siege machines in Vitruvius' *De architectura* in Latin.[83] Little is known about the first but the work is addressed to a certain Attalus of Pergamum which Eric Marsden, writing a history of Greek and Roman artillery (and publishing the texts of Biton, Philon, Heron and Vitruvius), identifies as Attalus I based on technical factors in the description, therefore dating the treatise to the 240s B.C. The work addresses the construction of several engines: a stone-throwing engine, a giant siege-tower, a Sambuca, a belly-bow catapult and the mountain belly-bow. Marsden also dates Philon's *Belopoeica* to the last third of the third century B.C. based on the fact it seems to draw on Ctesibius, an Alexandrian author in the mathematical and mechanical traditions active in the earlier third century, the manual containing a very technical description of existing artillery but also some ways to improve it.[84]

However, it must be noted that Philon's *Belopoeica* comes as a part of a larger work on mechanics, the *Mechanike Syntaxis* of which there would have been nine books: 1. *Introduction*, 2. *The Lever* (*Mokhlika*), 3. *Harbor Construction* (*Limenopoiika*), 4. *Artillery Construction* (*Belopoeika*), 5. *Pneumatics* (*Pneumatika*), 6. *Automaton Construction* (*Automatopoeika*), 7. *Siege Preparations* (*Paraskeuastika*) 8. *Siege Craft* (*Poliorketika*) and 9. *Stratagems* (*Strategemata*). Books five, seven and eight are extant (though fragmentary), and the latter two on sieges focus specifically on the positioning and use of siege machines such as catapults, but also on more general aspects to do with preparations for a siege and on the psychology associated with sieges.[85] Therefore, given this multiple focus on different aspects – some of which we encounter in 'military manuals' as well, such as the importance of betrayal in sieges, found both in Aeneas Tacticus and Philon – Philon's *Mechanike Syntaxis* when taken as a whole (based on what we can deduce from the *Belopoeika*, *Paraskeuastika* and *Poliorketika*)

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[83] Marsden (1971) 1-14.
[84] Marsden (1971) 6-9.
[85] See Tybjerg (2008) 654-656; Campbell (2004) 159-162 and 188 for an example of the different topics treated in Philon.

demonstrate the sometimes artificial ways in which we differentiate between 'artillery manuals' and 'military manuals' which will be explored further below.[86]

Athenaeus probably wrote his treatise *On Machines* sometime in the later half of the first century B.C. It starts with a history of simple siege equipment as far as Alexander and then goes on to detail the construction of several machines such as portable towers, tortoises, sambucas and rams, and then describes the *pithekion* ('little ape)*, forwheel goblet-joint and city-taker in a category which the same scholars call 'innovation'.[87] Interestingly, much like Aelian and Arrian, Athenaeus also gives a list of previous authorities in the field of war-machines: Deimarchus, Diades and Charias, all of whom went on Alexander's expedition and wrote *Poliorketika* and then Pyrrhus the Macedonian who wrote on *Siegecraft Equipment*.[88] But Athenaeus lavishes the most praise upon his – and Vitruvius' – master, Agesistratus, from whom he says he learned everything mentioned in his book. We learn – from both Athenaeus and Vitruvius – that he was a technical innovator, creating catapults with more range by modifying designs for spring-frames.[89]

All of these later texts are now lost but it is interesting that Pyrrhus of Epirus is also identified as a writer of an 'artillery manual', which could mean that either famous commanders viewed 'military' and 'artillery' manuals as closely related and chose to engage with both topics indiscriminately, or that authors writing in the two 'genres' sought to construct the tradition of their particular expertise in similar ways – in this case by invoking the involvement of famous commanders with their topic. Both of these possibilities again show that the two categories of texts could be seen as more closely related than modern scholarship has tended to give them credit, but we should also not ignore the importance of certain tropes and methods of constructing authority that – as we shall see below – seem to transcend categories and genres, that are more widely shared and so make all divisions problematic.

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[86] For Philon on betrayals and psychology see Campbell (2004) 161.
[87] For a detailed discussion see Whitehead and Blyth (2004) 15-19; for the structure 32.
[88] Ath. Mech. 5-6; Whitehead and Blyth (2004) 69-71 for the identification of these figures.
[89] Ath. Mech. 8; Vitr. 7. Pr. 14.

Amongst the most significant artillery works that have been lost are those of the aforementioned 'most famous of Alexandrian engineers' Ctesibius (in fact none of his works are extant, although we do know he was a prolific writer).[90] Marsden points out his importance to the other artillery writers by emphasising that his name is present in the title of Heron's *Belopoeika,* that is 'Heron's edition of Ctesibius' *Construction of Artillery*' from which we naturally deduce that Ctesibius had also written a *Belopoeica*, and Marsden also argues that Heron's description of the *gastraphetes* was based closely on Ctesibius' *Commentaries*, also now lost.[91]

The Roman Vitruvius wrote one book on artillery as part of a larger work in ten books entitled *De Architectura* and dedicated to Augustus. This work covered a variety of topics – in the words of Alice König – 'stretching well beyond what we usually define as "architecture" today', and amongst which are the suitable sites for the foundations of cities, bulding materials, construction of temples, supply of water and clocks and sundials.[92] König goes on to say that it has been pointed out that the text goes beyond even contemporary conceptions of the subject indicating the author's professional, intellectual and literary ambition, and we might note here again the variety of authors who choose to write on military matters as well as their different background and interests.[93] All these literary traditions were flexible and adaptable.

These are the main texts – both extant and lost – that we know of from before the mid-first century A.D., but military writing continued in the Roman Empire and we shall now turn to the directions it took and try to ascertain whether there is any reason to believe there were several 'genres' with different characteristics and audiences. So far we have evidence of the existence of a variety of texts. These include *taktika* such as that of Asclepiodotus (and perhaps Poseidonius and Aeneas)*,* works on generalship such as Xenophon's, as well as more specific works on different topics such as that of Aeneas on sieges, but also preparations for warfare and supplies. On the Roman side there were the 'military' works (*de re militari*) of Celsus, Cato and Cincius, whose subject matter is harder to determine but which also seems to have been

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[90] Marsden (1971) 2.
[91] Marsden (1971) 2.
[92] A. König (2009) 31; her article is a good starting point for recent bibiography on Vitruvius, especially note 5.
[93] A. König (2009) 31.

quite broad, spanning from recruitment to training and tactics. There were also works on artillery, some more narrow in scope, such as Biton's, and others containing information that could be said to pertain more generally to the field of war-machines, such as Philon's *Mechanike syntaxis* which also discusses sieges and the preparation for them. So far, however, we shall see that there is no evidence for individual collections of stratagems, and this will be discussed below.

2.2. Later texts, extant and lost

Among these later texts are, of course, our particular texts but also, in the category of 'military manuals' the most important absentee is Frontinus' lost *De re militari* which he refers to himself in his preface and which Vegetius also mentions in his treatise.[94] The literary tradition of the artillery manual also continues in the Roman imperial period, with Heron of Alexandria and Apollodorus of Damascus, whose works are extant. Heron wrote two quite different works in the first century A.D. The *Belopoeica* describes the construction of the earliest non-torsion arrow-shooting engine, the *gastraphetes,* but also presents a constructional history of torsion catapults, while the *Cheirobalistra* is essentially a list of components for a recently introduced type of machine.[95] Apollodorus wrote a quite technical and machine-oriented *Poliorketika* dedicated to the emperor Trajan, which talks about how to protect the attackers in a siege, excavations against fortifications, rams and their effects, towers, ladders and an assault raft for crossing rivers.[96]

In what follows, therefore, we shall attempt at first to make the case why we should indeed be talking about 'military manuals' and 'artillery manuals' as separate categories, after which we will establish – given all we know about both earlier and later texts – whether we can talk about different 'genres' of military manuals.

2.2.1 'Military' and 'artillery' manuals

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[94] Veg. *Mil.* 2.8.
[95] Marsden (1971) 1-2.
[96] Whitehead (2010) 17-24.

As I have hinted on a couple of occasions now, the distinction between 'artillery' and 'military' is to a certain extent a modern choice made in order to help with classification, and one could point out that the 'military' in fact encompasses the 'artillery'. But there are some fundamental differences that, despite the similarities, make it worthwhile for us to think of this type of texts as perhaps serving a different purpose and addressing a different audience than the 'military manuals'.

One of the fundamental differences between the 'artillery texts' and the 'broader military manuals' (both the earlier ones and those discussed in this thesis) is the level of technicality. All of the former describe in detail how to construct and assemble various pieces of artillery for what one might assume was an audience made up of 'specialists', since they seem little concerned with accessibility.[97] Indeed, there seem to be certain centres where artillery making was focused – such as Alexandria and Rhodes – and it appears that authors interact in one way or another with such centres and discuss their work and designs with other experts. We see this in the case of Philon of Byzantium who visited Alexandria and would have spoken to those who worked with the artillery expert Ctesibius.[98] Philon also seems to make this explicit in his treatises. His *Belopoeica* is addressed to a certain Ariston the identity of whom is unknown but who – judging from the context – could be another 'expert' or at least someone more familiar with artillery construction:

> τὸ μὲν ἀνώτερον ἀποσταλὲν πρὸς σὲ βιβλίον περιεῖχεν ἡμῖν τὰ λιμενοποιικά. νῦν δὲ καθήκει λέγειν, καθότι τὴν ἐξ ἀρχῆς διάταξιν ἐποιησάμεθα πρὸς σέ, περὶ τῶν βελοποικῶν, ὑπὸ δέ τινων ὀργανοποιικῶν καλουμένων […]ὅτι μὲν οὖν συμβαίνει δυσθεώρητόν τι τοῖς πολλοῖς καὶ ἀτέκμαρτον ἔχειν τὴν τέχνην, ὑπολαμβάνω μὴ ἀγνοεῖν σε

> 'The book we sent you before comprised our 'Making of Harbours'. Now is the time to explain (in accordance with the programme we laid out for you) the subject of artillery

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[97] Cf. Roby (2016).
[98] Marsden (1971) 6.

construction [...] I understand that you are fully aware that the *techne* contains something unintelligible and baffling to many people'[99]

The subject matter described would seem more complicated as well and requiring significant knowledge of engineering. For example, Philon writes:

ἔστω γάρ τις εὐθεῖα δεδομένη τῆς διαμέτρου, ἧς λόγου χάριν δεῖ εὑρεῖν διπλασίονα κύβῳ, ἡ Α· διπλασίον' οὖν ταύτης ἐθέμην αὐτῇ πρὸς ὀρθὰς τὴν Β, καὶ ἀπ' ἄκρας τῆς Β ἐξέβαλον πρὸς ὀρθὰς τὴν Β, καὶ ἀπ' ἄκρας τῆς Β ἐξέβαλον πρὸς ὀρθὰς ἄλλην τὴν Γ ἄπειρον, καὶ κατήγαγον ἀπὸ τῆς γωνίας, ἐφ' ἧς Θ, εὐθεῖαν τὴν Κ, καὶ διεῖλον αὐτὴν δίχα καὶ ἔστω τὸ διαιροῦν σημεῖον κατὰ τὸ Κ.

'Let there be a straight line, *A*, given of this diameter, of which, for the sake of argument, we must find the double to the power three. I put a line, *B*, double *A* and at right angles to it; from the end of *B* I drew at right angles another line, *Γ*, of unknown length. From the corner *Θ* I drew a straight line, *K*, and dissected it; let the point of bisection be *K*.[100]

Heron addresses his *Cheiroballistra* to a knowledgeable audience, Marsden pointing out that he 'assumes a different role, that of a technical expert writing for the benefit of other experts a detailed specification for a new or recently introduced type of machine'.[101] Indeed, Heron does not include a preface to his work instead going directly into the very technical building specifications:

Γεγονέτωσαν κανόνες δύο πελεκινωτοί, οἱ ΑΒ ΓΔ, ἐν τετραγώνοις πελεκίνοις, ὧν θῆλυς μὲν ἔστω ὁ ΑΒ, ἄρρην δὲ ὁ ΓΔ. Καὶ τὸ μὲν μῆκος ἐχέτω ὁ ΑΒ πόδας τρεῖς καὶ δακτύλους τέσσαρας, τὸ δὲ πλάτος δακτύλους ΓΣ, τὸ δὲ πάχος δακτύλους ΔΣ.

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[99] Ph., *Bel.*, 49-50, all translations from Biton, Philon and Heron are by E.W. Marsden.
[100] Ph., *Bel.*, 52.
[101] Marsden (1971) 2.

Fashion two dowetailed boards, *AB* and *ΓΔ*, with quadrilateral dovetails, of which let *AB* be the female and *ΓΔ* the male. Let *AB* have a length of 3 ft. 4d, a breath of 3½d, and a thickness of 4 ½ d.[102]

Heron also takes a different approach in other treatises, playing a double role. His *Belopoeica*, for instance, is much more similar to Aelian's *Taktika* in terms of stated intention, Heron claiming in the preface that he aims to make his work more accessible:

Ἐπεὶ οὖν οἱ πρὸ ἡμῶν πλείστας μὲν ἀναγραφὰς περὶ βελοποιικῶν ἐποιήσαντο μέτρα καὶ διαθέσεις ἀναγραψάμενοι, οὐδὲ εἷς δὲ αὐτῶν οὔτε τὰς κατασκευὰς τῶν ὀργάνων ἐκτίθεται κατὰ τρόπον οὔτε τὰς τούτων θεται κατὰ τρόπον οὔτε τὰς τούτων χρήσεις, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ γινώσκουσι πᾶσι τὴν ἀναγραφὴν ἐποιήσαντο, καλῶς ἔχειν ὑπολαμβάνομεν ἐξ αὐτῶν τε ἀναλαβεῖν καὶ ἐμφανίσαι περὶ τῶν ὀργάνων τῶν ἐν τῇ βελοποιίᾳ, ὡς μηδὲ ἴσως ὑπαρχόντων, ὅπως πᾶσιν εὐπαρακολούθητος γένηται ἡ παράδοσις.

'Writers before me have composed numerous treatises on artillery dealing with measurments and designs; but not one of them describes the construction of the engines in due order, or their uses; in fact they apparently wrote exclusively for experts. Thus I consider it expedient to supplement their work, and to describe artillery engines, even perhaps those out of date, in such a way that my account may be easily followed by everyone.'[103]

This claim to clarity is not the only similarity between Aelian's text and Heron's. An antiquarian interest is manifest in both, as Marsden points out that Heron in fact reproduces Ctesibius' outdated ideas instead of newer practices, and this might be done with the purpose of preserving a Greek tradition and showing its continued importance and relevance. Aelian and Biton's work also have in common dedication to an emperor and king respectively, and – although less explicit in Aelian perhaps – the express desire that the information contained in the text be of use:

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[102] Hero, *Cheiroballistra*, W123.
[103] Hero, *Bel.* 73.

Λιθοβόλου ὀργάνου κατασκευὴν ἐπιβέβλημαι γράψαι, ὦ Ἄτταλε βασιλεῦ· καὶ μὴ σκώψῃς, εἴ τινα ἑτέραν αὐτοῦ εἰς ὑπόθεσιν πίπτοντα τυγχάνει ὄργανα, ... δι' ὧν πέπεισμαι, ὅτι ταῦτα τὰ κατὰ τὰς προσβολὰς τῶν πολεμίων ὄργανα ῥᾳδίως ἀναστρέψεις, ἀντιστρατευόμενος ταῖς ὑπογεγραμμέναις μεθόδοις.

'I have set out, king Attalus, to describe the construction of a stone-throwing engine; and do not scoff at me if some engines perhaps belong to a type different from this. I am convinced that, with their assistance, you will easily repulse those engines employed in the offensives of your enemies, if you counter attack by the methods described below.'[104]

But as Campbell points out, there are other technical texts which display similarities with both 'military manuals' and 'artillery manuals'. While the topics of these are varied, it is agricultural manuals that Campbell thinks are the closest because they also claim to be of practical use to the reader.[105] The difference is – much like with 'artillery manuals' – that the agricultural authors claim to be drawing on personal experience, which is only true for a part of those writing 'military manuals', and they do offer specific and situational advice on farming, something which again the 'military manuals' do not do.[106] However, we cannot discount the fact that many of these apparent similarities can also be viewed as tropes that extend to an even broader range of texts – such as the claim that one's text will give clarity and order to a seemingly complicated field, or the statement that one is writing at the behest of someone else (or for friends), as is the case with Polyaenus and Apollodorus, or claims of lack of competence – such as is the case with Aelian.[107] Therefore, while these tropes do connect 'artillery manuals' and 'military manuals', one has to note that these similarities in presentation are of a broader, more general nature. Then, we have to ask ourselves whether the addressees of a text and their dedicatees, their level of technicality, their presentation or they way in which they construct authority should be in any way left to dictate or separate categories, or that they rather play out across categories as different authorial strategies in general.

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[104] Bito, 43-44.
[105] Campbell (1987) 18-19.
[106] Campbell (1987) 19.
[107] J. König (2009) 41-44.

The texts and traditions discussed so far do themselves suggest a self-conscious distinction between 'military' and 'artillery' manuals: that these were considered different if connected traditions at the time. First, there are indications that our 'military manuals' were viewed as being broader in scope and reach than more specialist artillery texts. I believe there is no coincidence in the fact that both Cato and Celsus wrote on military matters as part of larger projects dealing with more *artes* and perhaps we have to understand that the 'military arts' are part of a broader category of knowledge that would be useful to a cultured Roman, as part of – for lack of a better word – their 'general education, whereas the very technical aspects of artillery building were not. Then there is the fact that these also seem to refer back to different authors and different traditions of writing 'military' and 'artillery' manuals respectively. Aelian and Athenaeus, as mentioned, listed a distinct set of previous authorities, also signalling that the ancients themselves perhaps believed these to be two different strands. The only notable exception is Pyrrhus of Epirus, who – again if Aelian and Athenaeus are to be believed – wrote both a 'military' and an 'artillery' manual. However, this is perhaps simply meant to show that artillery was regarded as part of the general's necessary preoccupations (as the dedication of Apollodorus' text to Trajan – keen on cultivating the image of an accomplished general – would also indicate), alongside other issues in 'military' manuals. The distinction lies in the fact that, while a general **had** to be interested in both artillery and the issues we find in other manuals, the 'educated Roman' only needed to be concerned with the more general issues. The presence of Pyrrus in both traditions, therefore, is to be ascribed to him being a general and naturally at the intersection between two kinds of knowledge.

The manuscript tradition mentioned before also supports the view of different traditions since the majority of the texts we call 'military manuals' (except Frontinus, obviously being Latin) are grouped in one great manuscript, the Laurentianus 55.4. So it is clear that at least in for tenth century Byzantine copyists and/or readers (and perhaps earlier ones too) they were a group, to the exclusion of others.[108] To put it differently, they perhaps constituted the elementary level of knowledge which any general needed in order to be successful, and the fact that they were copied and commented on thoroughly in the Middle Ages supports the idea.

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[108] The Laurentianus 55.4 contains the *Excerpts of Polyaenus*; see Krentz and Wheeler (1994) xix-xxi.

2.2.2 Different 'genres'/groups of 'military manuals'

To summarise my argument so far, we have seen that there are different types of texts that precede our own 'military manuals', and that we can perhaps draw a very thin line between 'artillery' and 'military' manuals due to their different levels of technicality, different scopes and because of the way in which they position themselves relative to a tradition of military writing. Closely related to the issues of technicality and diversity of subject matter we should ask the question whether within 'military manuals' there are multiple 'genres' or groups of military text. I am wary of applying the term 'genre' too firmly, hence the scare quotes. What I am really interested in, rather than getting bogged down in complex issues related with the much debated definition of genre, is whether the specific categories in which texts operate impose certain rules or patterns from which the texts cannot (or should not) deviate.[109]

This question was first prompted by the great similarity in subject matter and organisation of the *Taktika*, which scholars have repeatedly pointed out, and seems to mark them apart from the other texts. As we shall see, while all the other authors seem to take a more varied approach to their content, including both more technical aspects such as battle formations and marching orders alongside considerations of a more moral and psychological nature and what could also be characterised 'common sense military knowledge', the *Taktika* restrict their subject matter to weapons, the divisions of the army, how to and arrange troops in formations and how to march them. It is therefore my aim to determine if the *Taktika* in particular constitute a group, separate from all else, which should contain only this kind of information and nothing more. However, following my investigation of the *Taktika*, I discovered that there is another category of texts which resembles them in their 'single-mindedness' of presentation, focusing on conveying knowledge through examples, namely collections of stratagems, but these are not so restricted in subject matter, since the stratagems contain both moral and psychological aspects. I shall therefore also consider whether the *Strategemata* are a separate group as well and if so when they originated.

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[109] For genre see Kroll (1964), Depew, M. and Obbink, D. (eds.) (2000), Conte (1996), Farrel (2003).

As previously mentioned, Aelian sets his tactical 'manual' up by explaining how it will be clearer than those of his predecessors (some of which he names) – something which the use of figures and pictures will aid – and is not only aimed at those who are already familiar with the terminology and with what is described.[110] If one sets aside the chapters which Dain and Devine consider to be late interpolations, his treatise is a description of what is primarily Alexander's army, with a focus on infantry and cavalry (and some mention of chariots and elephants), their divisions and weapons, the names of their particular units and officers (with emphasis on the number of men each unit must contain) and how they are drawn up, their manoeuvres, types of marches and finally how to give them commands and a chapter on the importance of silence.[111]

While Arrian's preface and potential explanation for writing is now lost to us, and his text is in many respects similar to that of Aelian, unlike the latter it is divided into two distinct sections. The first, comprising chapters 1-32, deals with roughly the same Alexander-type army and discusses the same topics as Aelian, but with some significant differences, notably the discussion of current Roman practices alongside Greek ones. Then, chapters 33 to 44 tackle the contemporaneous Roman cavalry, with a focus on its drills. [112] The treatise ends with an exhortation to the emperor emphasising his role in ever improving the Roman army. Scholars have argued that the first part of the treatise is an abbreviation of the same kind of information found in Aelian, which Arrian tries to liven up with examples, and that the second part is where Arrian really comes into his own, as he is describing practices with which he is accustomed.[113] But Arrian's reasons for the curious choice of pairing cannot be as easily explained away as some have tried to, because of the lack of the preface and a lacuna in the manuscript in chapter 32, where Arrian did offer some reason for it, so this will need to constitute the object of another discussion.

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[110] Ael. *Tact.* 1.5-6.
[111] Ael. *Tact.* Pr.6. for the army described as Alexander's, 22-24; 2.3-2.12; 8.3-9.10 and 15-20; 3-23; 24-34; 36-39; 35, 40 and 42.1; 41.
[112] Bosworth (1993) 257-258 for current practices discussed alongside ancient ones.
[113] Bosworth (1993) 254-255.

The great similarities between Aelian and Arrian's treatises do indeed warrant the question of whether they constitute a separate 'genre' or group which is operating under certain restrictions or assumptions, but such questions are difficult to answer mainly, as we have seen, due to a relative scarcity of surviving texts. Still, I shall attempt to provide at least partial solutions by examining the texts that are extant. There is a clear opposition between the subject matter in the *Taktika* (including that of Asclepiodotus') and the texts of Aeneas, Xenophon and finally Onasander. The last is a good example of a work that spans a diversity of topics such as characterise all three texts, ranging from the moral qualities which a general needs and the psychological aspects of warfare – such as how to encourage a frightened army and how to show courage when facing adversity – to the more practical aspects of warfare such as how to make camp, battle formations and how to give watchwords.[114] Nor is there a clear separation between these larger themes within the text itself, as Onasander discusses practical issues such as pursuing the enemy and receiving messengers, then moves on to the psychology of troops and how to encourage them, only to return to battle formations and the use of skirmishers and again to psychology, discussing how to announce favorable news and how to make sure friends fight next to friends in order to inspire courage.[115]

It seems, then, that there is a category of surviving Greek 'military' writings which generally have a different emphasis than Aelian's and Arrian's texts, favouring a more varied approach, but they are by no means in the majority. So based on the limited evidence that we do possess, we could argue that some authors of earlier Greek texts believed a general should possess a more varied skill-set than just practical knowledge of the marshalling of troops, such as Aelian and Arrian present, or, at least, they write that way. However, because we have so few 'military manuals' in general, it is hard to establish what constitutes the norm and the exception. Even if we take the examples mentioned, there are three texts that mix psychology and practical knowledge, and there are also three texts that only focus on practical aspects, so hardly enough to draw any serious conclusions.

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[114] Also Oldfather (1923) 348; Onos. 2 for moral qualities, 14 for encouraging the army, 13 for courage in the face of adversity, 8 for making camp, 15 for battle formations and 26 for watchwords.
[115] Onos. 11 for pursuing and messengers, 17 for skirmishers, 23 for news, 24 for friends fighting together.

So then how are we to understand these two apparent strands of 'military manuals'? Two solutions could be presented. The first is that the *Taktika* is a particular type of text with a long pedigree, going back to the Classical period, which only dealt with the marshalling of troops – psychology *et alia* falling outside of its scope. This is in fact what Vegetius suggests:

> *Lacedaemonii quidem et Athenienses aliique Graecorum in libros rettulere **conplura** quae tactica uocant; sed nos disciplinam militarem populi Romani debemus inquirere, qui ex paruissimis finibus imperium suum paene solis regionibus et mundi ipsius fine distendit.*

> The Spartans, it is true, and the Athenians and other Greeks published in books much material which they call *tactica*, but we ought to be inquiring after the military system of the Roman People, who extended their Empire from the smallest bounds almost to the regions of the sun and the end of the earth itself. [116]

It is not clear though what *conplura* actually represents, however. Nor what the content of these works was, that is what Vegetius thought 'Tactica' comprised. For Vegetius himself takes quite a broad approach on occasion.

If we had Aeneas' work (presumably also a *Taktika*) which Aelian and Arrian include in the tactical category, then matters would become clearer. But the disagreement between Polybius and Aeneas on the very definition of tactics, as seen in Aelian – with the latter describing it as 'the science of military movements' and the former as 'whenever anyone takes an unorganised crowd, organises it, divides it into files, and grouping them together, gives them a practical training for war'– makes it less likely that the lost *Taktika* of the two were that similar, and so they may not be part of the same group.[117] There could have indeed been different variations permitted within the group of the *Taktika* as long as certain information – such as organisational patterns – was present. The hypothesis of the *Taktika* as a separate 'genre'/group dealing with only certain aspects of warfare could also be supported by Aeneas Tacticus' reference to his two other books, on *Preparations* and on *Supplies*. While we cannot possibly know how these two topics were dealt with (and it is possible – though perhaps less

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[116] Veg. *Mil*.8; all translations are by N.P. Milner, unless specified otherwise.
[117] Ael. *Tact.* 3.4.

likely – that Aeneas included very refined references to human psychology there as well), the existence of these two categories makes us think that there were authors who divided the subject matter in such a way as to make it more mangeable. This eventually gave birth to different groups of military writings with material specific to each group that had to be presented in a certain order and perhaps in a certain style. This would explain why the *Taktika* are written in a more 'dry', 'objective' style than, say Onasander's *Strategikos*. Aelian certainly emphasises that Aeneas had written many books which had been epitomised, so for all we know there could have been several works *On Supplies* by several authors with some variations, just as there were several *Taktika* later on.

Going back to the *Taktika* of Arrian and Aelian, it is Polybius' definition of tactics that is the one that more closely describes them, which brings us to the second possible solution to understanding them. That is, as part of a distinct strand of military writing starting with Polybius – as the 'parent text' – which emerged due to the intrusion of the Romans in the Greek world.[118] This would not mean that they are not a separate 'genre', but simply provides a reason why said 'genre' appeared. This type of military writing then, so dissimilar to Xenophon and Aeneas' line (if we indeed believe that he took an all-inclusive approach in all his texts), could have started to serve Roman needs of knowing more about their enemies' way of fighting but also Greek needs to 'show off' their own tactical organisation and discipline in response to the mighty manipular legion. Considering the latter, it is interesting that Polybius compares the self-same manipular Roman battle array to the Macedonian phalanx, in an attempt to find out which one is better, but also that it is the Macedonian phalanx that both Aelian and Arrian describe, with Arrian also placing it in an – albeit different – comparative context alongside the Roman cavalry.

Ultimately it would be difficult to ascertain which interpretation is more justified. There is also a third possibility - though less likely in my view, despite modern scholars arguing for it - that what appears to be a separate group/'genre' is in fact one text which is being copied and slightly altered by different authors, starting with Asclepiodotus copying Poseidonius, Aelian

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[118] For Polybius as the ultimate source of the manuals of Asclepiodotus, Aelian and Arrian see Devine (1995).

copying Asclepiodotus and Arrian copying Aelian. The apparent similarities between the three *Taktika* we possess may also come from the fact that the source material that writers of *Taktika* have to deal with is much drier and more confined, so they will always look repetitive, whereas when one discusses psychology and morale, there are more possibilities and more material to expand on. In any case, it seems certain that the *Taktika* follow a certain organisational pattern (presentation of the types of troops, their weapons, their arrangement and manoeuvres) which must always be present, but that they allow for variation, interpretation and addition.

On top of this, one might also ask the closely connected question whether or how Roman tactical writings themselves might have influenced the development of such different strands of Greek military writing. Unfortunately again, it is impossible to have a definitive answer because, as we have seen, we possess no early Roman military manuals. Based on the passage of Vegetius quoted above, however, we can say that there does seem to be a reaction to Greek military knowledge manifested in the author's desire to return to the old Roman teachings. Indeed previous Roman authors who wrote on military matters are mentioned, including Frontinus, Celsus and interestingly Paternus:

> *Haec necessitas conpulit euolutis auctoribus ea me in hoc opusculo fidelissime dicere, quae Cato ille Censorius de disciplina militari scripsit, quae Cornelius Celsus, quae Frontinus perstringenda duxerunt, quae Paternus diligentissimus iuris militaris adsertor in libros redegit, quae Augusti et Traiani Hadrianique constitutionibus cauta sunt.*

> 'This requirement made me consult competent authorities and say most faithfully in this opuscule what Cato the Censor wrote on the system of war, what Cornelius Celsus, what Frontinus thought should be summarised, what Paternus, a most zealous champion of military law, published in his books, and what was decreed by the constitutions of Augustus, Trajan and Hadrian.'[119]

This may mean that our Greek 'military manuals' did have a significant impact on how Romans thought about warfare and while it does not tell us much about how Latin texts would have

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[119] Veg. *Mil.* 2.8; Milner renders *de disciplina militari* as 'the system of war' but it could also just as well mean 'military discipline'.

influenced Greek ones, it perhaps implies they were somewhat different in focus. Despite this, Vegetius' treatise seems to be similarly discussing psychology alongside organisation, as well as moral expedients (which are also present in Onasander), so either his argument seeks to again emphasise Roman superiority, or earlier Latin texts emphasised different aspects – practical, psychological, moral – in different proportions, with perhaps more focus on the moral. This might be likely because of Vegetius' insistence on the moral decline of his present (although this theme is never too far from Latin authors in general), for example when discussing the current status of recruits or the loss of tradition:[120]

> *Sed huius rei usum dissimulatio longae securitatis aboleuit. Quem inuenias, qui docere possit quod ipse non didicit? De historiis ergo uel libris nobis antiqua consuetudo repetenda est.*

> But the illusion of a long-lasting safety abolished the practice of this subject. Whom can you find able to teach what he himself has not learned? We must therefore recover the ancient custom from histories and (other) books.[121]

Perhaps Roman 'manuals' placed more emphasis on discipline – something we shall see as well in respect to Frontinus in a later chapter – and it is not insignificant that the first chapter heading of the first book of Vegetius is *Romanos omnes gentes sola armorum exercitatione uicisse*/'That the Romans conquered all peoples solely because of their military training/disicipline'.[122] This is also important in terms of reaction to Greek manuals and pre-eminence, as we shall see that Aelian chooses to start his manual with a chapter Ὅτι Ὅμηρος πρῶτος περὶ τῆς ἐν τοῖς πολέμοις τακτικῆς θεωρίας ἔγραψεν/'That Homer was the first to write about tactical theory in war'. Focus on discipline is also confirmed by the interesting reference to Paternus. According to Milner, he was *ab epistulis Latinis* to Marcus Aurelius in the 170s, then *praefectus praetorio* to Marcus Aurelius and Commodus (180-182 A.D.). He wrote a 'juristic work on the Roman army' of which we have a few fragments, mainly in Justinian's *Digest*, one of which indeed refers to discipline and its importance:

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[120] Veg. *Mil.* 1.7 for the deplorable state of recruits.
[121] Veg. *Mil.*1.8. I have slightly altered the first line of Milner's translation.
[122] Vegetius refers to the chapter headings in Pr. 5, showing they are indeed authentic.

Paternus quoque scripsit debere eum, qui se meminerit armato praeesse, parcissime commeatum dare, equum militarem extra provinciam duci non permittere, ad opus privatum piscatum venatum militem non mittere. nam in disciplina augusti ita cavetur: " etsi scio fabrilibus operibus exerceri milites non esse alienum, vereor tamen, si quicquam permisero, quod in usum meum aut tuum fiat, ne modus in ea re non adhibeatur, qui mihi sit tolerandus".

'Paternus has also written that a general who is mindful that he commands armed troops ought to grant leave very sparingly, ought not to permit a stallion belonging to the army to be taken outside the province, nor dispatch a soldier on his own private business or out fishing or hunting. For in the *disciplina Augusti* provision is made in these words: 'Even though I know that it is not inappropriate for soldiers to be employed on jobs as craftsmen, I nonetheless fear that if I should permit any such thing to be done for my convenience or yours, limits tolerable to me would not be imposed on this practice'[123]

But in the remaining fragments, especially in John Lydus' *De magistratibus*, Paternus focuses more on questions of hierarchy and different positions in the Roman army. He discusses the position of the *tirones* in relation to the other soldiers and how those holding a certain position in the army (such as doctors, craftsmen, bowmakers, hunters etc.) were exempt from the more burdensome *munera*.[124] So indeed this might mean that the Roman manuals had a more legalistic focus, unsurprising given the general Roman interest in law and procedure, and this is perhaps something that Vegetius wants to preserve and expand upon as – along with discipline – it reflects a higher level of order and organisation that the Greek manuals lacked.

Coming back to the influence of Roman writings on Greek ones, I believe there is no greater influence than in the elaboration of collections of stratagems. *Strategemata* have not been mentioned as part of the pre-existing 'military' tradition because there is a serious possibility

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[123] *Dig.* 49.16.12, all translations by T. Mommsen, P. Krueger, and A. Watson.
[124] Joan. Lyd. *De mag.*, 1.47.

that they originated with Frontinus – and this is what we shall look at next, starting with the way the surviving texts in this category are organised and respond to each other.[125]

Frontinus *Strategemata* is divided into three books organised thematically, as the author himself explains in the preface to book one:

> *Quo magis autem discreta ad rerum varietatem apte conlocarentur, in tres libros ea diduximus. In primo erunt exempla, quae competant proelio nondum commisso; in secundo, quae ad proelium et confectam pacationem pertineant; tertius inferendae solvendaeque obsidioni habebit* στρατηγήματα; *quibus deinceps generibus suas species attribui.*

> 'Moreover, in order that these may be sifted and properly classified according to the variety of subject-matter, I have divided them into three books. In the first will be examples for use before the battle begins; in the second, those that relate to the battle itself and tend to effect the complete subjugation of the enemy; the third contains stratagems connected with sieges and the raising of sieges. Under these successive classes I have grouped the illustrations appropriate to each.'[126]

To these, a fourth book has been added with a different thematic approach – focusing on what Alice König refers to as 'ethics' – which modern scholars now believe is authentic and written by the author himself.[127] Moreover, as Laederich has observed through comparison with Polyaenus' work, Frontinus' treatise is very structured, providing guidance to the discussion in the form of categories and chapter headings which he points out in each of the four prefaces, and the authenticity of which we have no reason to doubt.[128]

By contrast, Polyaenus' work is not organised thematically, but in eight books which contain individual stratagems named after their protagonist, sometimes arranged in chronological order. The author does not at any point manifest any intention to organise his material thematically; however Krentz and Wheeler have picked up on some patterns in its presentation.

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[125] Also see Wheeler (2010) 19-23.
[126] Front. *Strat.*1. Pr.; all translations are by C. Bennett unless otherwise specified.
[127] König (2004) 117; Laederich (1999) 36-37 cf. Bennett (1925) xix-xxv.
[128] Laederich (1999) 35 comments on Polyaenus: 'mais c'est un inextricable fouillis où le lecteur ne discerne aucune méthode, aucune logique, aucun ordre comparable à la rigueur de Frontin.'

According to them each book was published separately and Polyaenus did not review the whole work after its publication, and each covers 'a central people, theme, or chronological period' despite these getting blurred because of the author's rush to publish. They consider that book one best reflects Polyaenus' original design 'for a universal stratagem collection' and presents stratagems in chronological order from mythical times to the return of the Ten Thousand. Book two loses its internal logic and chronology, but starts with fourth century Spartans and Thebans, then various peoples of Dorian origin. Books three and four are about Macedonians, while book five would have intended to treat Sicilian history and book six shows an ethnographical pattern. Book seven is entirely about barbarians whilst book eight contains the stratagems of Romans and women.[129]

Modern authors have assumed that there were Hellenistic collections upon which Frontinus and Polyaenus later drew. Thus Roth states: 'Much of the technical Greek military writing of the period (i.e. Hellenistic) was devoted to the collection of such stratagems' and he references Wheeler's *Stratagem and the Vocabulary of Military Trickery*, but the latter discusses the terminology of Greek stratagem in Polyaenus, Polybius, Plutarch, Thucydides, Xenophon and other authors (with mention of Philo of Byzantium though), with no references to actual Hellenistic collections of *strategemata*, conceding that even the term itself is quite rare in Greek literature.[130] Hornblower also seems to assume a Hellenistic date for collections of stratagems, comparing them to fourth century B.C. works such as Aeneas Tacticus' *Poliorketika*, and the Aristotelian *Oeconomica*, a book about economic devices, both of which present examples alongside theory.[131] The same assumption is made by Krentz and Wheeler in their introduction to Polyaenus, stating that 'both authors (namely, Frontinus and Polyaenus) drew either directly or indirectly upon numerous earlier collections.'[132]

There are two reasons why we could think that there were stand-alone collections of stratagems before that of Frontinus, which would constitute a separate group of military texts. Firstly, we have the mention of book nine of Philo of Byzantium's *Mechanike Suntaxis* entitled

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[129] Krentz and Wheeler (1994) xiv; also Wheeler (2010) 19 who names Frontinus as the first known author.
[130] Roth (2006) 369; Wheeler (1988) 3; 7 for Philo.
[131] Hornblower (2007) 51.
[132] Krentz and Wheeler (1994) viii.

Strategemata. But we know nothing of the actual contents of this book and one could assume, in a treatise on mechanics, that the focus would again be on war-machines and perhaps quite different from the *exempla* of famous generals found in Frontinus and Polyaenus. Moreover, we need not assume that anything entitled *Strategemata* necessarily contains *exempla* in the same way as Frontinus' and Polyaenus' collection, since Onasander refers to the theoretical principles in his text as περὶ τῶν ἐν τῷδε τῷ λόγῳ **στρατηγημάτων** ἠθροισμένων – 'the acts of generals collected in this book'. Also, we cannot ignore the fact that book nine is simply a part of a larger work containing both theory and examples, and that in this respect it would not differ from the Aristotelian and Aeneas' works. Moreover, we have Valerius Maximus' *Memorable Deeds and Sayings* in which one section of book seven is dedicated to stratagems (with examples of cunning behaviour from other contexts being dealt with under different categories), so if the inclusion of *strategemata* in a wider collection constitutes evidence for the existence of a separate group/'genre' then indeed we would not need to look any further than that, but I do not believe this is the case.[133] The argument could be made that there is a potential difference between Valerius Maximus' and Aeneas Tacticus' works, which could more easily be read together as a whole, and the various books of Philon in the *Mechanike Syntaxis* which – as we have seen in the case of the *Belopoeica*, *Paraskeuastika* and *Poliorketika* – could work as individual pieces. Furthermore, we could say, based on Frontinus' preface and his advertising of the *Strategemata* and his more theoretical work together, that they too are part of a larger framework and need not be that different conceptually from Philon's *Syntaxis*. However, it is clear in Frontinus' case that the *Strategemata* is meant to function separately and that it is not part of the same overarching work. Besides the fact that Valerius' work could also easily be read piecemeal, it is also difficult in the absence of all the books of Philon to see how these would have worked together and complemented each other, and therefore we may be easily tricked into seeing them as functioning as individual texts because we do not possess the entire treatise. So book nine of the *Mechanike Syntaxis* proves only that there was interest in such tricks before Frontinus (especially since we do not really know what kind of tricks would have been included in it) but not necessarily that there was a whole 'genre' dedicated to them.

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[133] See Langlands (2011) for an example of using examples situationally as well as for bibliography on Valerius. Bloomer (1992) and Morgan (2007) are also good bibliographical starting points.

The second piece of evidence that has led scholars to believe there were such stand-alone collections before Frontinus' appears to be only a brief comment in his preface.[134] Thus Frontinus states:

> *At multa et transire mihi ipse permisi. quod me non sine causa fecisse scient, qui **aliorum libros eadem promittentium** legerint.*

> 'And so I have purposely allowed myself to skip many things. That I have not done this without reason, those will realise who read the books of others treating of the same subjects.'[135]

Thus the *aliorum libros eadem promittentium* have been interpreted as books of stratagems, but doing this means taking the phrase out of context. In the previous paragraph Frontinus hints that, although historians and writers of *notabilia* included such examples of stratagems in their work, he was the first to systematise them into a single compendium.[136] Thus, while it is not entirely clear what he means when he mentions the *aliorum libros eadem promittentium* and he may indeed be talking about other collections of stratagems, it is more likely that he is referring to those histories and books collecting *notabilia* which he had mentioned before. Therefore the *eadem* is more likely to mean *exempla* than *strategemata*, as otherwise he would be contradicting his statement about originality, and indeed we have other collections of examples such as Valerius Maximus'.

While it could be argued that claims of originality need not necessarily mean anything (in fact Frontinus also claims to be the only one who has systematised the *res militaris* while there were several known Greek manuals of tactical theory before his own) the fact that we have no explicit evidence for stand-alone collections of stratagems before that of Frontinus adds strength to his claim. Though examples feature as part of other manuals, and the practice of collecting examples was established in the Greek tradition, especially in pinacography and

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[134] Wheeler (1988) 18.
[135] Front. *Strat.*1. praef. 3
[136] Front., *Strat.*, 1.praef.2.

paraxodography, these which seem to me to be a separate manner. Frontinus could, of course, have been influenced and inspired by all these collecting practices.[137]

The idea expressed by Krentz and Wheeler that 'most of the earlier stratagem collections must have circulated privately without formal publication' is puzzling to say the least.[138] While one could understand such a practice if *strategemata* were regarded as some sort of arcane knowledge, the fact that a general would become famous for his stratagems and they were present in several historians – as Frontinus himself points out – clearly shows this was not the case. Even if one chooses to believe that there were similar collections before Frontinus' there would have been nothing to stop him from organising his material in whichever way he liked, as we have Polyaenus' collection which is centred on figures and not themes. If one thought that it was traditional to approach the subject thematically, there would still be no reason to believe that Frontinus could not have chosen any examples he wanted in order to fill those categories, for instance focusing only on Roman figures for the entirety of the treatise, or on Greek figures for one section and Romans for others.

Thus the organisation of Polyaenus's text may be deliberately aimed to be different from that of Frontinus, in order to subvert his authority, and that the group/'genre' of the stand-alone *strategemata* may have been in fact 'created' by Frontinus and then challenged by Polyaenus.[139] It is very plausible that Polyaenus was reacting to Frontinus' text since he could read Latin as a lawyer in the Roman courts, and would also have known that Frontinus' sister had been married to Marcus Aurelius' great-great grandfather. The connection between the family of the emperor and Frontinus would have made Frontinus' text a must-read on two accounts, firstly because of the similarity of topics approached and secondly it would have boded well to read a similar work written by someone in the extended family of the emperor.

Also, the invention of the *Strategemata* as a distinct group would not be uncharacteristic of someone, namely Frontinus, who claimed to have systematised all knowledge about warfare. We could say that Frontinus did the same thing with the *strategemata* that he had done with

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[137] Cf. Wheeler (1988) 19; Krentz and Wheeler (1994) vii.
[138] Krentz and Wheeler (1994) viii.
[139] Krentz and Wheeler (1994) xiii.

the *res militaris* in his previous manual, in that he took an existing concept and/or category and reorganised it, making it both Roman and his own.[140] This rediscovery and incorporation of a Greek concept into a Roman superstructure may explain what Wheeler calls 'the "golden age"' of *Strategemata*', as Frontinus' claim to be the authority in collecting and ordering stratagems would have encouraged other Greek authors, such as Hermogenes son of Charidemus and the Athenian sophist, Melesermus, to write collections of their own, which also may have sought to challenge this newly asserted *Romanitas* of stratagems. Unfortunately, since none of these has been preserved, it is impossible to tell for sure what their approach would have been.[141]

The final text which will be discussed in this thesis is Arrian's *Ektaxis kata Alanon.* I have deliberately not included it in any category because it seems to resemble no other known text. It is simply a series of orders in the imperative and infinitive, divided into thirty-one chapters, which are meant to make up a battle array against the imminent attack of the Alans. As such, it reads more like a written-down oral account of what Arrian would have actually said to his officers at the time of battle. However, as we shall see in a following chapter, this apparent orality is a carefully constructed image which is meant to allow the reader to step into the author's world but also to allow Arrian to step into a different – and yet similar – world.

Therefore, we could say that there are several 'genres' or groups that impose certain restrictions upon authors in this larger universe of topics relating to generalship, and the reason for the choice of subject matter and style in the case of each is only one interesting aspect of works which are more complex than they have been given credit for. This is especially the case for the *Taktika* which have been called 'strictly utilitarian'.[142] The works also have to be read in the broader context of technical literature in general and as a part of similar texts about knowledge, such as those of Celsus and Strabo. While there are of course many differences, there are also problems which can be clarified by the comparative approach, such as the issue of precedence of knowledge, of Greek knowledge in the Roman Empire and of its positioning.

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[140] See especially A. König (2017) 158.
[141] Wheeler (2010) 19; he dates Hermogenes' work 'somewhere in between' Polyaenus and Frontinus, while Melesermus is dated first century A.D. or later.
[142] Bosworth (1993) 264. See also Stadter (1978).

I am also not unaware that such a discussion of the 'Greekness' and 'Romanness' of 'military science' begs the question of how we should read these texts in relation to the movement which has been dubbed the 'Second Sophistic' by Philostratus (and modern scholars have followed suit), especially since Arrian himself is considered an important representative of its historiographical component.[143] This will also be tackled in a subsequent chapter, where I will discuss why Arrian and Aelian chose to write in this particular 'genre' and to describe Hellenistic armies – and Alexander's in particular – something which lies outside the Classical period (although Arrian does make some Classical references, the Macedonian phalanx is still the centrepiece of his work) which Bowie argues constituted the most prominent go-to timeframe for Greeks writing about their past glory.[144] However, the questions of whom these texts are written for and whether they are practical are more basic and immediately pressing. So this is what we shall turn to in the last two sections of this chapter.

3. Audience: The emperor, Greeks, Romans, 'general audience' and 'specialists'

All texts construct an internal audience, either explicitly, for example by referring to a person/group that the work is dedicated to in the introduction, or implicitly, by the choice of language, subject matter or level of technicality – as we have seen in the case of the artillery manuals. Our authors are no different in setting up such an audience, and for most it seems to be commanders – as is the case for Frontinus and Polyaenus – or in some sense 'experts' (though what an expert at warfare is might or might not differ considerably from, say, an 'expert' in medicine) as is the case of Onasander, but there is also the desire to engage the interest of a broader group of people as we have already seen in the case of Aelian.[145] The constructed audience is also sometimes explicitly a double one, as in the case of Polyaenus who dedicates to both emperors and their commanders, or Aelian who dedicates his *Taktika* to both Trajan and a more general audience.

Needless to say the 'real' audience of the text need not be limited to the audience the authors themselves refer, and there are often other factors at work in shaping how a text positions

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[143] See Bowie (1974) 191-195.
[144] Bowie (1974) 170-174 for sophistic themes; for Athens in particular 195-203.
[145] Front. *Strat.* 1.praef.1, Polyaen. 1. pr. 1-2, Ael. *Tact.* 1.1-4, Onos. pr. 1.

itself. The claim to clarity, for instance, is a topos, and thus needs to be read with care. There is also no reason why a 'general' text would not be used by a more specialised audience, or why something like Onasander's *Strategikos* would not provide a sort of 'general specialised knowledge', aimed at commanders who might just be starting their careers. Ideally we would be able to corroborate the use of such texts with external sources, such as in the case of Frontinus' treatise on warfare where Aelian's and Vegetius' later references let us infer that it was indeed known and read widely by 'experts' (or at least those purporting to elaborate military theory).[146] But such examples are rare, and most of the time we are left in the dark about a text's 'real' audience. It is nonetheless possible to guess that it might have been broader in some cases than others. So, Frontinus and Polyaenus deal in *exempla,* a means of teaching common to both Greek and Roman *paideia*, which could have been understood and interpreted by more than commanders, and that might suggest wider reach. It is, moreover, possible to speculate further about the social and cultural characteristics of a possible audience, who the 'commanders' reading these books might be. Therefore, in what follows I shall first examine how the texts themselves construct and address their audience, beginning with their dedications and the problems associated with them, then think more broadly and examine more specifically who their audience might have actually been comprised of.

Some scholars have argued that the main reason for the composition of some of the treatises, such as Arrian's *Taktika* and Polyaenus' *Strategika*, is to gain favour with the dedicatee, namely the emperor.[147] However, dedicating one's work to the emperor was not an unusual practice, nor – given the number of authors doing this – should we expect a close relationship between said author and the emperor or indeed that the emperor would have read everything dedicated to him, let alone granted any tangible benefit to any of these authors based on what was written (as Wheeler argues about Arrian's hopes of having his command in Cappadocia prolonged in virtue of the expertise displayed in the *Taktika*).[148] If anything, it seems that perhaps authors who have a close relationship with emperors, such as Frontinus with Trajan – perhaps the most well regarded Roman author of a 'military manual', at least if Vegetius is to

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[146] See also Wheeler (2010) 11-14 for Polyaenus audience and being read by the emperors.
[147] Wheeler (1978) 363-365.
[148] Cf. Wheeler (2010) 12.

be believed – do not dedicate their work to them. Of course we do not have Frontinus' *De re militari* which might have been addressed to Domitian (although it could be even earlier than that), or the beginning of Arrian's *Taktika* (which does mention Hadrian at the end), but it does seem that perhaps those confident in their expertise and social standing did not feel the need to 'ingratiate' themselves with the emperor, as Wheeler seems to suggest.

This is not to say that authors did not seek patronage by the emperor or other members of the elite, especially since, as Jason König argues, 'so many different areas of knowledge were at least in theory dependent on the Emperor's patronage, in a society where ideals of Imperial omniscience and ubiquity were so prevalent.'[149] We should also then perhaps understand that on many occasions authors believed it almost compulsory to dedicate their works to the emperor, playing into this image of him as an all-encompassing expert. But even in the context of patronage we should not view the texts as simply contributing to an 'imperial agenda', thinking that they always hold and promote an 'official line' (or to any kind of agenda for that matter).[150] Often the relationship between emperor and author is more complex, as Alice König argues of that between Vitruvius and Augustus in his *De architectura*, where Vitruvius uses the same rhetoric to describe the emperor and himself (and other architects), exploring ideas about authority and power in the newly established empire, while at the same time both contributing to the Augustan programme and challenging it.[151] In König's own words Vitruvius, 'as a subject, client and author, is not simply toeing the party line but fighting for power of his own by borrowing it from his patron'. Therefore, while we might suspect that, given Trajan's interest in military matters and Hadrian's care to cultivate a military persona that matched that of his predecessor, Aelian and Arrian too are trying to appeal to the emperor's interests and at the same time gain his patronage and share in his authority, it is exactly this type of fluid relationship where positions seem to be constantly adjusted and renegotiated that we shall see in their texts as well.[152]

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[149] J. König (2009) 38; also Kenney (1982) 10-15.
[150] For example see A. König (2009).
[151] A. König (2009) 36-41.
[152] A. König (2009) 41.

While, as I mentioned, generally there is no reason to believe the emperor is actually reading all texts dedicated to him, sometimes authors make more explicit reference in their text. Polyaenus, for instance, mentions in the preface to his fifth book that the emperors Marcus Aurelius and Lucius Verus commended him on his work.[153] In cases like this in particular – but also in others where we have imperial dedications – dedicating to the emperor is perhaps more a way of addressing the elites more generally. Polyaenus is a good example because he explicitly mentions in the preface to book one that his book will be useful not only to the emperor but also to his envoys, who will have been part of the elite:

προσφέρω, ὅσα τῶν πάλαι γέγονε στρατηγήματα ὑμῖν τε αὐτοῖς πολλὴν ἐμπειρίαν παλαιῶν ἔργων, τοῖς τε ὑπὸ ὑμῶν πεμπομένοις πολεμάρχοις ἢ στρατηγοῖς ἢ μυριάρχοις ἢ χιλιάρχοις ἢ ἑξακοσιάρχοις

'I offer past stratagems as an experience in the deeds of old, both to you and those sent by you, polemarchs and generals or tribunes or commanders of ten thousand men or those of six hundred men.'[154]

It is not only the elite in general that Polyaenus is referring to here, but more specifically the military elite and military commanders. So is it reasonable to believe that the elites, military or otherwise, would have reason to read Polyaenus books and 'military manuals' more generally? Firstly, it is clear that technical literature of all sorts had a wider appeal, circulating and being read by more than just 'specialists', and authors tried to position themselves as writers of something that was broader than a simple *techne*.[155] If we think of the possibility of 'military manuals' being read by the 'Roman elites', we have to remember that the Romans considered that they were superior than all others when it came to warfare, as Virgil, among others, points out at the end of the sixth book of the Aeneid:

Excudent alii spirantia mollius aera,

credo equidem, vivos ducent de marmore voltus,

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[153] Polyaen. 5. Pr.
[154] All translations are by Krentz and Wheeler.
[155] Wolf and König (2017) 10-15; Whitmarsh and König (2007) 24-27.

orabunt causas melius, caelique meatus

describent radio, et surgentia sidera dicent:

tu regere imperio populos, Romane, *memento;*

hae tibi erunt artes; pacisque imponere morem

parcere subiectis, et **debellare superbos***.*

'Others, I doubt not, shall with softer mould beat out the breathing bronze, coax from the marble features to the life, plead cases with greater eloquence and with a pointer trace heaven's motions and predict the risings of the stars: you, Roman, be sure to rule the world (be these your arts), to crown peace with justice, to spare the vanquished and to crush the proud.'[156]

While others might be better at the *artes* – and although they are not named, the allusion here is surely to the Greeks – the Romans are the best at what really matters, namely war, peace and rule.[157] The fundamentality of this view of superiority is proven by the fact that Vegetius still argues it – albeit perhaps from a desire to return to original Roman practices due to recent Roman failures – much later.[158] He says no one would doubt that the Greeks conquered the Romans so far as the *artes* and *prudentia* were concerned (*Graecorum artibus prudentiaque nos vici nemo dubitavit*) but that the Romans were better and won against all other peoples by being better at every aspect of warfare: 'careful selection of recruits, instruction in the rules, so to speak, of war, toughening in daily exercises, prior acquaintance in field practice with all possible eventualities in war and battle, and strict punishment of cowardice' (*tironem sollerter eligere, ius, ut ita dixerim, armorum docere, cotidiano exercitio roborare, quaecum evenire in acie atque in proeliis possunt omni in campestri meditatione praenoscere, severe in desides*).[159]

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[156] Verg. *Aen.* 6.851-52, trans. H.R. Fairclough and revised by G. P. Goold.
[157] Whitmarsh (2005) 13.
[158] Vegetius, *Mil.*, 2.5-8; Milner (1993) xvi –xviii for Vegetius' urge for reform; for the dating of Vegetius see Milner (1993) xxv-xxix and Reeve (2004) v; viii-x who summarise the debates around it.
[159] Veg. *Mil.* 2. 6-7.

So because of this view, a member of the Roman elite would have surely wanted to have some knowledge of the intricacies of warfare so that he may at least be able to converse on the topic, and confirm the assumption about Roman superiority in these matters. A member of the elite might turn to texts such as Frontinus' *Strategemata* to show familiarity with deeds of foreign and Roman commanders and perhaps use the examples in different ways and for different purposes, rhetorical or conversational. The same elite might also perhaps use the knowledge contained in the *Taktika* or parts of it to show that they still possessed the kind of detailed knowledge of warfare that made the Romans so great. At the same time, however, some of the self-same Greeks that Virgil was alluding to were also part of the 'Roman elite', and some even held military posts and had been decorated for their service.

If we look at the equestrian order, which would have initially been based on aristocratic military participation but whose membership soon came to be based primarily on wealth, one observes 'Greeks' as much involved as 'Romans', as early as the Julio-Claudian period. Such as is the case of C. Stertinius Xenophon, from Cos and Ti. Claudius Balbilus, from Ephesus.[160] The former was a medic and personal physician to Tiberius, but also a *tribunus militum* in Claudius' expedition to Britain (46 A.D.) decorated with a golden crown and lance for his service, and later named in charge of the emperor's Greek correspondence, which made him into a *de facto* liaison with the Greeks (*ad responsa Graeca*).[161] Balbilus has a similar *cursus*, starting out as a *praefectus fabrorum* then also was decorated with a *corona muralis* and *hasta pura* for his service in Britain, and finished his career by occupying the most prestigious magistracy an equestrian could attain – the *praefectura Aegypti*.[162] Later under the Flavii, T. Flavius Varus Calvisianus Hermocrates, a member of a prominent family of Phocaea, both held a series of local offices in his own native town and was commander of a cohort and tribune of a legion, both in Cappadocia.[163] T. Iulius Alexander Capito, part of the wealthy and prestigious priestly family of Sardes, was also a *tribunus legionis* and a *praefectus alae*, both in Egypt, but also procurator of

[160] The history of the equestrian order is a complicated and unclear one; for an introduction see Brunt (1983) and (1962), Lintott (2006), Nicolet (1974).
[161] Pflaum (1960) 41-44; Devijver (1989) 290; 296.
[162] Pflaum (1960) 34-35; Devijver (1989) 295.
[163] Devijver (1989) 286 and 297.

Achaia and Asia under Nerva/Trajan.[164] Whether they saw actual military service or not, or whether people such as Xenophon and Balbilus were just decorated symbolically is not particularly relevant, as these 'Greeks' would have also been interested in engaging with the same topics as the 'Romans' since they too were now part of this elite which had a strong military tradition.[165] One could argue that they would want to assert their military knowledge even more if they did not actually engage in military activities, and would need to engage more with literature that could teach them about warfare and compensate for their lack of 'real world' experience. If we also consider their Greekness, manuals such as the *Taktika* of Aelian and Arrian would be all the more appealing, as they would allow them to bring both aspects of their cultural identity together, namely Greekness and Romanness. The *Taktika* would then give them knowledge of past Greek military practices (but also the opportunity to compare their Roman present to the Greek past) which they would be able to use as a 'cultural currency', showing how Greek knowledge can also inform and educate on military matters.

Thinking about the equestrians is the perfect way of transitioning from a 'general elite' audience to a more 'specialised' one, since many of the 'officers' that Polyaenus mentions would have come from their ranks. Is there then reason to believe that his text, along with those of the others, would appeal to a more 'specialised' audience? Firstly, as Brian Campbell has pointed out, there was no 'military academy' in ancient Rome which would teach one how to command, or even the basics of warfare. [166] Ever since the Republic, the Romans had relied on doing and observing in order to learn, and Polybius mentions that young aristocrats had to participate in ten military campaigns before they could enter the *cursus honorum*.[167] According to Rosenstein, they would have had the opportunity to observe the general and the workings of camp life in these ten years, but even so commanders in the Republic were often inexperienced and were expected to rely on the expertise of 'officers' such as centurions for advice on more practical matters.[168] Later on in the empire, participation in the military sphere became slightly

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[164] Devijver (1989) 287 and 298.
[165] Maxwell (1981) 114; 160-164.
[166] Campbell (1987) 22.
[167] Plb. 6.19; De Blois (2007) 169.
[168] Rosenstein (2007) 139; 141.

more specialised, and equestrians tended to be the ones more involved in military commands and more interested in military careers, though by no means exclusively.[169] Thus, the *tres militiae* came into being early into the empire to regulate the carreers of equestrians interested in military posts. This was a succession of military commands whereby equestrians would start as the prefect of a cohort, move on to the military tribunate of a legion and then to the prefecture of an *ala*.[170] This does not mean that career paths were separated, and it was still common for 'military' and administrative posts to be present in the careers of the elites, equestrians included, despite the existence of some figures who focused on more on one or the other.[171]

Still, since now there was a clearer military career path for the elites and somewhat more specialisation, there would have been more interest in acquiring military knowledge. The interest could have been practical, and there were perhaps members of the elite who, having chosen to try their luck at a military post, would have wanted as many opportunities for learning as possible. Indeed, earlier on, in the consular elections, Sallust's Marius had contrasted his experience in the field with the knowledge of his rivals, which had been acquired from books.[172] However, this would not mean that 'actual commanders' would have been less interested in the military knowledge expressed in 'military manuals' as 'cultural currency'. Even more as a general, one might have been expected to know how different armies drilled and marched, and be familiar with the deeds of the past generals of a tradition that they were now part of. The same interest in comparing and contrasting Greek and Roman armies and finding the significance of Greek military knowledge, that we have mentioned before, would have been greater in Greeks who were very active in the military field, men such as the famous Pergamene aristocrat C. Iulius Quadratus Bassus.[173] He, among other military charges, was right in the thick of the Dacian wars both as a *praepositus vexilationis legionis Scythicae et legionis XII fulminatae* in 101-102 A.D., and as *adlectus inter comites Augusti* in the second expedition in 106 A.D., but

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[169] Adams (2007) 214-215.
[170] Adams (2007) 214, Brunt (1983a) 52, Eck (2006).
[171] Adams (2007) 2015; Campbell (1975).
[172] Sall. *Jug.* 85.11-12; Rosenstein (2007) 139.
[173] Pflaum (1960) 48-49.

also a governor of provinces with legions, Syria in 115-117 A.D. and Dacia in 117 A.D.[174] As a man of vast military experience, he would have been the perfect ambassador for Greek knowledge, but also interested in the intertwining of Greek and Roman traditions that the *Taktika* and the *Strategikos* presented.

Besides commanders in various forms, with different degrees of specialisation, there was also another category of more specialised officers which constituted the backbone of the Roman legions and who would have been perhaps interested in the 'manuals', namely centurions. Centurions had begun to form a somewhat separate class since at least the campaigns of Caesar, who relied on them heavily for different tasks and missions.[175] They continued to be the core-officers in the empire, and overall could be considered the most experienced officers in the army. They would often be promoted from the ranks of soldiers, though there were other channels of appointment, such as patronage, and they could also come from the equestrian order, while higher up centurions such as the *primi pili* also attained equestrian rank.[176] Therefore they also constituted a somewhat mixed group, and while the majority probably would have had significant experience of warfare, there were also some with very little, and Pliny the Younger mentions that he secured the appointment of such a centurion with no prior experience in one of his letters.[177] We might imagine that those equestrians who had been appointed centurions were literate, but there is also evidence of literacy as an overall requirement for appointment.[178] Furthermore, there are several examples of centurions engaging in literary activities and composing hexameter poems, such as those of Quintus Avidius Quintianus and M Porcius Iasucthan found at the outpost of Bu Njem in Africa and dated to the early 200s A.D., with the poem of Iasuchtan talking about camp life specifically.[179] There is also evidence of them being more generally interested in literature but also of bilingualism, several centurions dedicating inscriptions in Greek and Latin.[180]

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[174] Halfmann (1979) 119-120; Salmieri (2000) 57; Campbell (1984) 322.
[175] De Blois (2007) 174-176.
[176] Gilliver (2007) 191; also Dobson (1974) 426.
[177] Plin. *Ep.* 6.25; Gilliver (2007) 191.
[178] Gilliver (2007) 191.
[179] Adams (1999).
[180] Adams (1999) 129-133.

Considering all of this it is not unlikely that this category would have made use of 'military manuals'. Those centurions with limited experience would have looked to them as potential sources of making up for it in an environment where most of their peers would have had intimate knowledge of warfare over a significant number of years. However, the reverse is probable as well, and given the literary interests and bilingualism of some of the centurions from the lower classes, they would have perhaps used 'manuals' to build up an 'encyclopaedic' knowledge of warfare, which would have served them when moving up the ranks. Those who would look to enter the ranks of the equestrians would perhaps have found the knowledge contained in 'manuals' particularly useful in presenting themselves as a sort of 'cultured' expert, who was well-versed in all kinds of practices and curiosities of warfare.

So then we must understand Polyaenus' audience of 'commanders' – but also the ones of the other texts – as a far more diverse one then we would have thought. We must also understand that it is partly because of the backdrop of alleged Roman superiority, but also of the blurred boundaries between Greeks and Romans in terms of participation in military endeavours that Greek authors were willing to write about a topic which could be considered exclusively Roman. Coming back to the dedication of Polyaenus, we see how by talking about the 'experience of old' he might expect the text to be useful in some practical way to his audience. We have already hinted at some of the uses that these texts might have had for different types of audience, but we shall now delve more deeply into the question of their practicality.

4. Military manuals and practicality

The most common modern assumption about 'military manuals' has been that they are practical tools. Scholars have emphasised their usefulness for generals in understanding formations and weapons from the past and how to potentially deploy them in the field.[181] Victor Davis Hanson, one of the leading figures in the history of Classical warfare, starts his chapter on modern historiography of ancient warfare in the *Cambridge History of Greek and Roman Warfare* by stating that 'originally fourth century B.C. essays such as Xenophon's

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[181] For example Stadter (1980) 42-43; Devine (1993); Wheeler (1978) 353 esp. n. 12. For a different way of approaching practicality see Formisano and van der Eijk (2017) 1-2.

Cavalry Commander or Aeneas Tacticus' *On the Defense of Fortified Positions* were probably intended as pragmatic guides for commanders in the field'. He then goes on to explain that 'by Hellenistic and Roman times formal contemplation about war-making became more academic and theoretical, both in the scientific realm [...] and on matters tactical (Poseidonius and Asclepiodotus concerning the Macedonian phalanx) – in addition to becoming simply antiquarian, such as the collections of stratagems by Frontinus and Polyaenus'.[182] There is extensive analysis of how diagrams – such as those used by Asclepiodotus – are supposed to make generals better able to get to grips with the information explained therein and how clearer, more accessible, explanations were meant to make knowledge from the past more easily applicable and relevant.[183] The historian Rosemary Moore emphasises the practical role of these manuals, but also – as Hanson hints more subtly – makes the point that they provided 'a traditional component of an elite male's education' and were meant to provide 'a basis of knowledge to officers presumably less experienced than the soldiers they were ordered to command' while at the same time 'such works were doubtless also meant to entertain, and perhaps were never intended to be applied completely in the first place.'[184]

This section does not need to reprise arguments and examples about practicality extensively. At the same time, recognising that these texts are not always meant to be practical in the strictest sense, but educational and entertaining, opens the door to looking at them in much more nuanced ways. Realising that the texts are meant to stir up some pleasure makes us think of them perhaps as 'practical' in the sense of pieces of conversation in a 'banquet-type' situation, much like in Athenaeus' *Deipnosophistai*. We can see manuals as aids in debating Greek and Roman military achievements in a more 'academic' way – such as we find in Livy's and Polybius' discussions of Alexander versus the Romans or the legion versus the phalanx.[185]

One could wonder, then, whether these texts were in any way part of a general *paideia* and whether not knowing certain facts included in them might be perceived negatively. Although as

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[182] Hanson (2007) 3.
[183] E.g. Devine (1993) 318ff for a comparison in terms of practicality and ease of access between Arrian and Aelian's texts.
[184] Moore (2013) 472.
[185] Liv. 9.18-19; Plb. 18.29.

far as I can tell no author mentions any 'military manual' explicitly, the case could be made that the authors of manuals would have intended for them to be a useful part of a general education or to be used in discussions of a more general, intellectual nature. An example of this sort of discussion is comparisons between Alexander's military success and that of the Romans, which were quite popular in the first century A.D: Livy and Plutarch provide a few significant examples. Livy's comparison of Alexander and the Romans and their respective battle arrays as a significant deciding factor is precisely the kind of scenario where the information found in 'military manuals' would be particularly useful:

> *statarius uterque miles, ordines seruans; sed illa phalanx immobilis et unius generis, Romana acies distinctior, ex pluribus partibus constans, facilis partienti, quacumque opus esset, facilis iungenti.*

> 'Both armies were formed of heavy troops, keeping to their ranks; but their phalanx was immobile and consisted of soldiers of a single type; the Roman line was opener and comprised more separate units; it was easy to divide, wherever necessary, and easy to unite.' [186]

The level of technicality in Livy's analysis is worth noting. He discusses (albeit very generically) the kind of information we find in Aelian, Asclepiodotus and Polybius, about units, mobility and fighting order. Livy claims that some Greeks state that Alexander was greater than the Romans, implying that this was a popular topic of discussion, and the fact that he brings in very technical military details to show how this was not true means that these were the sort of counter arguments which were usually deployed in this kind of intellectual discussions.[187]

With this in mind we might wonder whether Aelian's very specific statement that his reader 'will observe Alexander the Macedonian's efforts in marshaling his troops' (τοῦ Μακεδόνος Ἀλεξάνδρου τὴν ἐν ταῖς παρατάξεσιν ἐπιβολὴν) is not in fact also intended to make his text attractive to those members of the elite who might want to be able to engage in such intellectual discussions, since marshalling and battle order is precisely the point in Livy's

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[186] Liv. 9.19.9, all translations are by B.O. Foster.
[187] Liv. 9.18.6.

chapter. Thus we might say that Aelian wishes his *Taktika* to be part of a more general type of education and also, as he claims, to appeal to an 'educated' audience rather than an 'expert' one (of course the two are not mutually exclusive).[188]

Several chapters in Aulus Gellius' *Attic Nights* also show us how the information in our 'military manuals' could be interesting and useful for a wider audience and therefore might have been considered as part of *paideia*. We find that Gellius and Antonius Julianus, his rhetoric teacher, discussed whether hurling spears and missles from below makes them more accurate or whether it is more efficient to throw from above – a topic close to Arrian's description of the throwing of spears on horseback.[189] The fact that this is a discussion between Gellius and his teacher encourages us to believe that such specifically technical military topics were considered important also in rhetorical training and in 'general education'.

Similarly, Gellius also analyses the description of the historian Quintus Claudius Quadrigarius of the battle of Titus Manlius Torquatus and the Gaul, where we see that Claudius pays attention to the details of combat, such as how the Gaul advanced according to his method of fighting, 'with shield advanced and awaiting an attack' (*suo disciplina scuto proiecto cantabundus*).[190] Gellius also pays attention to how the Roman army was drawn up and what the names of the formations were.[191] Therefore, it is not unreasonable to assume that our more techinal texts would have been read as more than just specifically 'technical', as pieces which provided information for the construction of arguments in more general debates and arguments on warfare, or at least would have tried to present the information they offered as such. The fact that Gellius is interested in the organisation of the Roman legion, and the detailed names of its weapons and formations, and debates their usage, would explain why authors such as Arrian parallel Roman weapons and formations with those of the Greeks. This can be seen, in my view,

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[188] Ael. *Tact.* pr. 6.
[189] Gell. 1.11; 9.1; for Gellius see Holford-Stevens (2016).
[190] Gell. 9.13.
[191] Gell. 10.9, 10.25.

as an attempt to include Greek military practices as well into this sphere of educated learning which would have focused mainly on their Roman conterparts.[192]

How else is then one meant to use a 'military manual'? Do they encourage certain patterns of thought and a certain mindset, being didactic in a more active way than in a scholastic way which simply involves the memorising of certain practices which the general might 'pull out' of his bag of tricks at an appropriate time, or briefly implement in his army? How would one use texts such as Arrian and Aelian's *Taktika*? It is difficult to believe they could simply be pulled out on the battlefield and consulted, and the more likely – and obvious – interpretation is that – as Hanson points out that 'manuals' slowly make the transition to 'more analytical' – they might have constituted tools of 'research', to be consulted beforehand and then discussed with other like-minded individuals.[193] If we should give any credence to Plutarch, this is the case with Brutus, who, whilst on campaign, spent his evenings studying Polybius' writings.[194] But there is perhaps more to be learned – in terms of practicality – from all these works if one goes beyond what the hard facts could teach and think about the essence of the treatise and whether it contributes in any way to building up a certain mindset of generalship.

If we look at all the *Taktika* we see that their essence is – not unexpectedly – a focus on order and discipline, and their practicality is perhaps simply to drill into the general the idea of order and its importance in the past, and continued importance. There is great emphasis on mathematics, precision and numbers in Aelian, and even the ideal number of men in a phalanx is established at 16,384, as this would enable its optimal division into smaller units.[195] The different marching orders are also proportionally connected to the number of troops, and emphasis is placed on the exact space that troops occupy when marching.[196] This should be understood as part of the central message of the text, that a well-marshalled army wins battles, so a focus on absolute precision in formations is what any general should have in mind – even if

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[192] For names of Greek and Roman weapons and Greek formations in Arrian see *Tact.*2-10.
[193] Hanson (2007) 3.
[194] Plu. *Brut.* 4.4.
[195] Ael. *Tact.* 9.10.
[196] Ael. *Tact*. 4; 8; 11; also 15-16.

he does not use the particular order expounded by the text itself. Arrian's treatise also has at its core the importance of order, and he explicitly emphasises this at the beginning:

πρῶτον μὲν δὴ καὶ μέγιστον τῶν ἐν στρατηγίᾳ ἔργων παραλαβόντα πλῆθος ἀνθρώπων ἀθρόον καὶ ἄτακτον ἐς τάξιν καὶ κόσμον καταστῆσαι.

The first and most important job in generalship is to take a disordered crowd of people and arrange it in order and formation.[197]

Apart from that, by paralleling Greek and Roman practices, Arrian also emphasises the practical importance of adaptability and blending the old and the new. This is the case that has been made about the *Ektaxis,* that it is a practical expression of the principles expressed in the *Taktika*.[198]

The mindset that Onasander encourages in the general is similar, by suggesting adaptability and keeping an open mind. We can see this exemplified in the chapters on the selection of the general. While there are certain criteria, they act more like guidelines and it is a man's skill that is essentially the most important factor. Others – such as wealth or belonging to a famous family – are secondary when making a choice for a general:

Φημὶ δὲ μήτε τὸν πλούσιον, ἐὰν ἐκτὸς ᾖ τούτων, αἱρεῖσθαι στρατηγὸν διὰ τὰ χρήματα, μήτε τὸν πένητα, ἐὰν ἀγαθὸς ᾖ, παραιτεῖσθαι διὰ τὴν ἔνδειαν· οὐ μὴν χρή γε τὸν πένητα οὐδὲ τὸν πλούσιον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸν πλούσιον καὶ τὸν πένητα· οὐδ᾽ ἕτερον γὰρ οὔθ᾽ αἱρετὸν οὔτ᾽ ἀποδοκιμαστέον διὰ τὴν τύχην, ἀλλ᾽ ἐλεγκτέον διὰ τὸν τρόπον.[…] Προγόνων δὲ λαμπρὰν ἀξίωσιν ἀγαπᾶν μὲν δεῖ προσοῦσαν, οὐ μὴν ἀποῦσαν ἐπιζητεῖν, οὐδὲ ταύτῃ τινὰς κρίνειν ἀξίους ἢ μὴ τοῦ στρατηγεῖν, ἀλλ᾽ ὥσπερ τὰ ζῷα ἀπὸ τῶν ἰδίων πράξεων ἐξετάζομεν, ὅπως εὐγενείας ἔχει, οὕτω χρὴ σκοπεῖν καὶ τὴν τῶν ἀνθρώπων εὐγένειαν.

'A wealthy man in my opinion must not be chosen general on account of his wealth, if he has not these qualities; nor must a poor man, provided that he be competent, be rejected on account of his poverty. It is not necessary that the general be rich or poor; he may be

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[197] Arr. *Tact.* 5.
[198] Stadter (1980) 46; for Greek and Roman parallels in the text Arr. *Tact*.11; 18; 19.

one or the other. Neither the one nor the other must be chosen nor rejected on account of his fortune in life, but must be tested by the standard of charater. […] An illustrious family name we should welcome if it be present but if lacking it should not be demanded, nor should we judge men worthy or unworthy of commands simply by this criterion; but just as we test the pedigrees of animals in the light of the things they actually do, so we shold view the pedigrees of men also' [199]

The most important principle, therefore, that comes out of Onasander is that one has to be adaptable, not prejudge a situation and take the moving variables into consideration. This is also apparent in what he thinks about pre-conceived plans, and there might have been a bigger debate on the importance of learning from examples and planning ahead in 'military science' as opposed to thinking on the spot, as we shall see when comparing it with Frontinus' recommendations:

Τῶν δ ἐκ προλήψεως καὶ πρὶν ἢ συμβαλεῖν ἐπινοουμένων στρατηγοῖς αἱ παρ αὐτὸν τὸν τῆς μάχης καιρὸν ἐπίνοιαι νίκης καὶ ἀντιστρατηγήσεις ἔστιν ὅτε καὶ πλείους καὶ θαυμασιώτεραι γίγνονται τοῖς τὴν στρατηγικὴν ἐμπειρίαν ἠσκηκόσιν, ἃς οὐκ ἔστιν ὑποσημῆναι λόγῳ ἢ προβουλεῦσαι.

'Plans and counter stratagems for victory that are originated at the very moment of battle are sometimes preferable to those which are conceived and contrived by generals in anticipation and before the engagement, and they are sometimes more worthy of remark, in the case of those made by men who are skilled in military science, thought they are things which cannot be reduced to rules or planned beforehand'[200]

The primary thrust of the passage must surely be that it is better to be adaptable than to have a preconceived plan. It also implies that it is less useful to try to apply certain tricks learned in advance, such as stratagems of past generals, thus making the listing of such examples pointless. Onasander emphasises this point using the simile of the pilot who fits his ship with everything before a voyage: when a storm hits he does not do what he wants, but what is

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[199] Onos. 1.19; 21, all translations by the Illinois Greek Club.
[200] Onos. 32.9.

necessary, 'and calling to their aid no memory of their past practice but assistance appropriate to the existing circumstances'.[201] He goes on to say that 'just so generals will prepare their armies as they believe will be best, but when the storm of war is at hand repeatedly shattering, overthrowing, and bringing varied conditions, the sight of present circumstances demands expediences based on the exigencies of the moment, which the necessity of change rather than the memory of experience suggests' (οὕτως οἱ στρατηγοὶ τὴν μὲν δύναμιν ἐκτάξουσιν, ὅπως σφίσι νομίζουσι συνοίσειν, ἐπειδὰν δ' ὁ τοῦ πολέμου περιστῇ χειμὼν πολλὰ θραύων καὶ παραλλάττων καὶ ποικίλας ἐπάγων περιστάσεις, ἡ τῶν ἀποβαινόντων ἐν ὀφθαλμοῖς ὄψις ἐπιζητεῖ τὰς ἐκ τῶν καιρῶν ἐπινοίας, ἃς ἡ ἀνάγκη τῆς τύχης μᾶλλον ἢ ἡ μνήμη τῆς ἐμπειρίας ὑποβάλλει).[202]

Frontinus' approach is slightly different. He states that he feels it is his duty to collect the examples of commanders as a completion of his previous work:

> *deberi adhuc institutae arbitror operae, ut sollertia ducum facta, quae a Graecis una* στρατηγημάτων *appellatione comprehensa sunt, expeditis amplectar commentariis.*

> 'I still feel under obligation, in order to complete the task I have begun, to summarise in convenient sketches the adroit operations of generals, which the Greeks embrace under the one name *strategemata*.'[203]

We might object that any agenda and essence that the text has is obscured by this statement because the *Strategemata* is only a counterpart of his more theoretical work and cannot be considered to have any stand-alone value. However, I believe Frontinus' statement simply means that the two works will constitute a conceptual whole, and if Frontinus had wanted to illustrate his principles with examples he could have done it in the same work, the way we see Aeneas Tacticus do. Therefore, it is pretty clear that he wanted the book of examples to be a text in its own right from which commanders could learn without reference to any other theoretical framework, and this is what he essentially states:

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[201] Onos. 32.10.
[202] Onos. 32.10.
[203] Front. *Strat.*, 1.praef.1.

> *Ita enim **consilii quoque et providentiae exemplis** succinti duces erunt, unde illis excogitandi generandique similia facultas nutriatur*

'For in this way commanders will be furnished with specimens of wisdom and foresight, which will serve to foster their own power of conceiving and executing like deeds'.[204]

What it seems to me that Frontinus is trying to prove here is that reading examples of other stratagems can provide you with a particular mind-frame adept to trickery –'the power of conceiving and executing like deeds'/*generandique similia facultas* which is essential for warfare. Therefore he does not encourage the repetition of the same devices irrespective of context, but the possibility of thinking along the same lines when the situation calls for it.[205]

So both Onasander and Frontinus believe that a general should have a particular frame of mind which he can apply in the moment of battle. This frame of mind is built with the help of knowledge, although Onasander perhaps believes more in the importance of general principles while Frontinus is an advocate of both general principles and examples.

Polyaenus' approach is different. What his treatise seems to suggest in terms of practicality is that there are certain patterns that repeat themselves, and that there are certain set solutions that have a broader applicability. As the stratagems are presented, they read as a long list with no real theme except Greekness. Most of the time, at least the modern reader struggles to identify all the figures named, especially since some only appear once, and some are really generic figures such as for instance a certain Lacedaemonian Harmost who is not even named and who is faced with an Athenian siege.[206]

This example is particularly interesting because we cannot tell from any sort of internal evidence which war this is, when it was waged and what was at stake. Certainly, some figures would have been famous and – as in the case of Frontinus – the readers would have been able to form their own judgements and interpretations based on their previous knowledge, but some – as is the case of the aforementioned Harmost – would have been hard or impossible to

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[204] Front. *Strat.* 1.praef.1.
[205] Also see König (2017) 176-177.
[206] Polyaen. 2.18.

identify (especially some minor commanders of the fourth century B.C.). There is perhaps much truth in Krenz and Wheeler's statement that Polyaenus seems in a rush to finish his work, and thus frequently any organisation that he might have had in mind is obscured.[207] What could also be argued from the lack of context is that context is sometimes not important for Polyaenus because it is only the specific deed that is described that must be valued. Thus, his readers should not care who the protagonists were, when the events happened and what the eventual outcome was, but only take what was related at face value and perhaps integrate this stratagem more efficiently within multiple situations. If we consider the lack of context correlated with the case of the repetition of a certain stratagem, it becomes even clearer that the essence of the stratagem, namely what was actually done as opposed to who did it, is what is supposed to shine through. Certainly, the repetition might also mean that this is a stratagem which has historically been often deployed to good effect, hence its inclusion in the collection, but it does not take anything away from the possibility that Polyaenus might be endorsing this message. Therefore, as opposed to Frontinus, the message in many cases in Polyaenus may be that the success of certain stratagems does not depend on the person who is performing it, but that they are generally applicable and performable. Therefore, one should always be on the look out for recognisable patterns for which a certain set of answers already exists.

Therefore, I believe that, beyond the very technical and precise aspects of the treatises, they also have an overall message that has to do with practicality, a nucleus that is meant to provide the reader with a general principle to follow beyond the specifics, that he can take away and apply on the battlefield or when planning and organising a campaign.

Conclusion

To conclude, I have established that, despite the similarities in presentation and the use of similar *topoi*, we can talk still about 'military manuals' and 'artillery manuals' as separate groups, and therefore an analysis of the former group in this thesis is justified. This is partly because of the different traditions that they themselves claim to belong to but also in part because of the different audiences they seem to address, despite the audiences intersecting in

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[207] Krenz and Wheeler (1994) xii-xiv.

the case of generals. We have also seen that we can perhaps talk about different groups within military manuals themselves, and the *Taktika* and *Strategemata* seem to constitute particular groups of text that place restrictions on their authors in terms of subject matter and style. The *Taktika* exclude psychology and moral aspects among others and are perhaps meant to be written in a certain, more objective style, while the *Strategemata* are meant to be collections of generals' deeds, with little interpretation or commentary.

We have also established that the audience of these texts would have been a broader one than might be expected. They could be used in various ways by a more specialist audience, either as tools of learning or self-promotion, as well as having a wider reach. The practicality of the texts then varies from a more general, 'intellectual' practicality, meant to give the reader the possibility of engaging convincingly in intellectual conversation on a topic that was considered the principal domain of the Romans, namely warfare, to a more 'specific' practicality. This latter, also general in a sense has more to do with a central message or mindset that the texts attempt to convey, rather than with the actual application of the details of the texts in real life.

II. Ordering 'Military Knowledge' in a New World: Integration and/or Opposition?

The battlefield is the place where the Romans considered themselves most at home, so naturally they would regard their own knowledge about military matters very highly. How would Greek writers rank and order their knowledge in response to this? Do Greek and Roman authors such as Aelian and Frontinus really think of Greek and Roman knowledge as opposed? Do they rank them – and implicitly themselves – as higher and lower? Or do they try to place them together, as equal and equivalent, and if so how and why? Are there authors that blur the boundaries between 'Greek' and 'Roman', and can we see a theme of identity underlying knowledge? Finally, does the ranking of knowledge reflect back upon the authors themselves

and their position as experts, or, conversely, do their claims to expertise and authority alter the way in which knowledge is ranked? The questions that this chapter sets out to answer have long preoccupied cultural historians, as they are framed by several overarching themes such as the process of ordering knowledge and its political ramifications, how authority and expertise are constructed and the relationship between 'Greek knowledge' and 'Roman power'.

As Whitmarsh notices, the Greeks were keen on representing themselves as lacking in power but compensating by *paideia* (not that this self-representation reflected in any way a real division, with power being the preserve of the Romans and culture that of the Greeks), and Roman authors too – most notoriously Vergil and Horace – presented the interactions between the two along those same lines.[208] However, Swain pointed out that 'the Greek past was not the preserve of the Greek elite alone, but was open to use by other groups, including non-Greeks' and I believe in studying our 'military manuals' we can see both how aspects of Greek 'identity' can be blended with Roman practices and made universal, but at the same time how authors can use it to reject a unitary conception of military knowledge, or present a picture of both subversion and integration.[209] We shall also see how our authors navigate the problem of potentially subverting the established order of power and knowledge, as Wallace-Hadrill argues that certain disciplines within Greek *paideia* might do, and we shall specifically focus on whether the subject matter of military manuals subverts the Greek culture/Roman power dichotomy by expanding the boundaries of normal Greek *paideia* with something which is considered a Roman domain, namely the art of generalship, and whether they do so in a manner that is meant to reconcile and not threaten.[210]

To briefly sum up my analysis then, I will show how authors of military manuals seem to take three different approaches to the problem of ordering and organising 'military knowledge'. Firstly, a non-ethnic/political and non-differentiating (and perhaps integrating, as I shall attempt to prove) approach is represented by authors such as Onasander and Frontinus. By this I mean that they seem to give the same importance to Greek and Roman knowledge, without

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[208] Whitmarsh (2001) 12.
[209] Swain (1996) 7.
[210] Wallace-Hadrill (1988) 231.

ranking them or emphasising the importance of certain Greek or Roman figures. An 'exclusive' (and even divisive) approach is represented mainly by Polyaenus who gives prominence to Greek figures and Greek knowledge, while Arrian and Aelian could be said to take an approach that combines the two.

To explain further, Onasander announces in his preface that his material will all be Roman, but chooses to describe practices that are recognisably Greek alongside recognisably Roman ones, without explicitly designating them as such. By doing so, I believe he wants his audience to understand how Greek and Roman theory about warfare constitutes a unitary whole. Frontinus' approach seems to be an integrative one as well, as examples of both Roman and Greek generals performing stratagems are placed alongside each other as equivalent, but also together with Persian and Carthaginian commanders. Polyaenus' text seems to be reacting to such ideas of integration by organising its collection of stratagems prosopographically rather than thematically, and Polyaenus tries to prove the prominence of Greek figures by tackling roughly the same themes as Frontinus, but illustrating them with Greek examples. Finally, Aelian and Arrian's *Taktika* seem to emphasise the pre-eminence of Greek knowledge in various ways – one of which being to show how much older and more complete it is – thereby challenging Roman knowledge, but at the same time integrate the two into a continuum of knowledge.

We will also have time to explore how these approaches relate to the authors' self-presentations, and the construction of authority in their texts. We will see how Frontinus appears as reinventor, both when it comes to the *techne taktike* but also with the *strategemata* in that he redefines and appropriates a concept which he himself identifies as Greek, investing it with his own authority, and how his 'real life' authority impacts on the way in which he does this but also, more generally, shapes the presentation of his text. Onasander does the same with Greek and Roman knowledge, showing how he as an author is in the position of choice and inclusion, and that what recommends him as a writer, what demands respect from his audience, is that he is able to put this mixed Greco-Roman theory together. The authorial strategy of Arrian and Aelian is one of challenge and of incorporation. They make themselves

authoritative by being the vehicle of transmission of a still relevant Greek knowledge, and being part of a Greek tradition, but also by drawing authority from Roman figures such as Frontinus and relying on personal experience, in the case of Arrian.

In terms of the organisation of the chapter, for each of the approaches and authors who represent them we will have a section where we discuss the presentation of the material in the texts and the relationship between Greek and Roman knowledge, and then move on to how this presentation shapes the construction of their authority and authorial personas.

1. Integration by uniformity: Onasander – Greeks and Romans or Greeks as Romans

In the first section of this chapter dedicated to ordering, comparing and ranking, we will first look at how Onasander purports to derive his theory from the deeds of the Romans but then proceeds to present principles that are derived from mainly Greek practices, but also mixes in theory that could be identified as Roman and practices that could be considered both Greek and Roman. In the second section we will see how this is done purposely in order to construct a continuum of knowledge that integrates both Greek and Roman ideas, and how this is Onasander's way of creating his own authority and of presenting himself as an expert at putting together a new type of theory of warfare and in evaluating what should be included in this theory.

1.1 Presenting the material: Greek principles as Roman and mixing the 'Roman' and the 'Greek'

Onasander explains twice in his proemion how the practices that he will describe are based on the personal experience and deeds of Romans:

ἡγοῦμαι περὶ τῶν ἐν τῷδε τῷ λόγῳ στρατηγημάτων ἠθροισμένων τοσοῦτο προειπεῖν, ὅτι πάντα διὰ πείρας ἔργων ἐλήλυθεν καὶ ὑπὸ ἀνδρῶν τοιούτων, ὧν ἀπόγονον ὑπάρχει Ῥωμαίων ἅπαν τὸ γένει καὶ ἀρετῇ μέχρι τοῦ δεῦρο πρωτεῖον. οὐθὲν γὰρ ἐσχεδιασμένον

ἀπολέμῳ καὶ νεωτέρᾳ γνώμη τόδε περιέχει τὸ σύνταγμα, ἀλλὰ πάντα διὰ πράξεων καὶ ἀληθινῶν ἀγώνων κεχωρηκότα μάλιστα μὲν Ῥωμαίοις

'I consider it necessary to say in advance, about the acts of generalship (*stratēgematōn*) collected in this book, that they have all been derived from experience of actual deeds, and, in fact, of exploits performed by those men from whom has been derived the whole primacy of the Romans, in race and valor, down to the present time. For this treatise (*to syntagma*) presents no impromptu invention of an unwarlike and youthful mind, but all the principles are taken from authentic exploits and battles, especially of the Romans.'[211]

Despite the purported origin of the material, as Smith notes, 'all examples can be traced back to Greek history', but what he means is that they can be identified in several Greek authors.[212] However, Onasander himself does not call anything 'Greek' or 'Roman' *per se* and there are no names of generals, peoples or cities or actual examples of any deeds or battles as such present in the treatise. I do not fully agree with Smith's contention either, and I think sometimes we can perhaps see 'Greek' and 'Roman' practices together despite the overall impression that the general Onasander has in mind is working primarily within a Greek framework. We shall see, by going through a few examples, how the world in which we are operating seems to be primarlily a Greek one, but also how this changes gradually when practices whose origins cannot be clearly established and which could be considered both 'Greek' and 'Roman' are introduced. When reading Onasander's text, in the case of some passages, both a Greek and Roman reader would be able to relate to what was put forward and consider it a 'Greek' or 'Roman' principle respectively. This is simply because at least part of the subject matter was chosen by Onasander particularly in order to create this effect.

Ambaglio and Smith have both written detailed analyses of the treatise, showing how the material presented is very Greek in spirit, and how Onasander finds inspiration in Xenophon,

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[211] Onos. pr. 7. Also Onos. pr. 2: εὐτυχοίην τ' ἄν, εἰ, ἃ δὴ Ῥωμαίοις δυνάμει καὶ δι' ἔργων πέπρακται, ταῦτ' ἐγὼ λόγῳ περιλαβεῖν ἱκανὸς εἶναι παρὰ τοιούτοις ἀνδράσι δοκιμασθείην ('I should be fortunate if I should be considered capable, before such men, of making a summary sketch of what the Romans have already accomplished by their mighty deeds).
[212] Smith (1998) 156; a full list of exempla derived from Greek material is discussed by Ambaglio (1981) 358 ff, with Xenophon being a great influence. See also Smith (1998) 162.

Asclepiodotus and Aeneas Tacticus.[213] Therefore, in what follows we shall only refer to a few examples that illustrate this Greekness, and then move on to examine the more 'ambiguous' material that I believe elicits this response of recognition in both Greek and Roman readers.

Thus at the very beginning of the treatise we see that the world of Onasander's *strategos* is one where the priests are chosen according to their birth – as opposed to them being co-opted, as was Roman practice at least at the end of the Republic.[214] Also, his reference to gymnasiarchs and the comparison of the general to a wrestler make one think of Greek wrestlers, since at least some more traditional Romans had poor views of gymnasia, such as Tacitus who chastises Nero for establishing a gymnasium 'where oil was furnished to knights and senators after the lax fashion of the Greeks' (*praebitumque oleum equiti ac senatui Graeca facilitate*).[215] For Onasander, on the contrary, the general's appropriation of the qualities of a wrestler is meant to be viewed positively:

> διόπερ καθάπερ ἀγαθὸν παλαιστὴν προδεικνύειν μὲν καὶ σκιάζειν εἰς πολλὰ μέρη δεῖ περισπῶντα καὶ ἐπισφάλλοντα δεῦρο κἀκεῖσε πρὸς πολλὰ τοὺς ἀντιπάλους, ἑνὸς δὲ ζητεῖν ἐγκρατῶς λαβόμενον ἀνατρέψαι τὸ πᾶν σῶμα τῆς πόλεως.

> 'On this account, just as a good wrestler, the general must make feints and threats at many points, worrying and deceiving his opponents, here and there, at many places, striving, by securing a firm hold upon one part, to overturn the whole structure of the city.'[216]

The fact that the generals are few (ὡς ὀλίγους αἱρουμένους στρατηγοὺς) would again lead us to think Onasander is thinking about a Greek context, whereas his focus on psychology – particularly on fear and the difference between reality and impression – throughout the treatise is very similar to Aeneas Tacticus', and his attention to mathematical precision reminds

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[213] Ambaglio (1981) 358-361; for a detailed analysis of the influence of the theory of Asclepiodotus and Aeneas on Onasander's writing see Smith (1998) 160-166. Also Petrocelli (2008) 5-17.
[214] Rüpke (2006) 227.
[215] For example, Tac. *Ann.* 14.47 for gymnasia promoting lax Greek morals.
[216] Onos. 42.6.

of Asclepiodotus. [217] We can see both these preocupations in the following example, Onasander discussing the 'mathematics of the camp', and the difference between appearence and reality:

Ὁράτω δὲ καὶ τὴν τῶν πολεμίων παρεμβολὴν ἐμπείρως: μήτε γάρ, ἐὰν ἐν ἐπιπέδῳ καὶ κατὰ κύκλον ἴδῃ κείμενον βραχὺν τὴν περίμετρον καὶ συνεσταλμένον χάρακα, δοκείτω τοὺς πολεμίους ὀλίγους εἶναι — πᾶς γὰρ κύκλος ἐλάττω τὴν τοῦ σχήματος ὄψιν ἔχει τῆς ἐξ ἀναλόγου στερεομετρουμένης θεωρίας, καὶ πλείους δύναται δέξασθαι τὸ ἐν αὐτῷ περιγραφόμενον εὖρος, ἢ ἰδὼν ἄν τις ὄψει τεκμήραιτο

'The general should skillfully inspect the camp of the enemy. If he sees a circular palisade contracted into a small circumference, lying in a plain, he should not conclude that the enemy are few in number; for every circle appears to contain less than it actually does by the theory of proportionate geometrical contents, and the space enclosed within a circle can hold more men than one would think to see it.'[218]

The same belief that theoretical mathematics has many applications in marshalling troops is found in Asclepiodotus:

Περὶ διατάξεως τῶν ἀνδρῶν καθ ὅλην τε τὴν φάλαγγα ἢ κατὰ τὰ μέρη Διατέτακται δὲ ἥ τε ὅλη φάλαγξ καὶ τὰ μέρη κατὰ τετράδα, ὥστε τῶν τεσσάρων ἀποτομῶν τὴν μὲν ἀρίστην κατ ἀρετὴν τοῦ δεξιοῦ κέρατος τετάχθαι δεξιάν, τὴν δὲ δευτέραν ἀριστερὰν τοῦ λαιοῦ καὶ δεξιὰν τὴν τρίτην, τὴν δὲ τετάρτην τοῦ δεξιοῦ λαιάν. οὕτω γὰρ διατεταγμένων ἴσον εἶναι συμβήσεται κατὰ δύναμιν τὸ δεξιὸν κέρας τῷ λαιῷ: τὸ γὰρ ὑπὸ πρώτου καὶ τετάρτου, φασὶ γεωμέτριοι, ἴσον ἔσται τῷ ὑπὸ δευτέρου καὶ τρίτου, ἐὰν τὰ τέσσαρα ἀνὰ λόγον ᾖ.

'The entire army as well as its units is disposed on the basis of a fourfold division, so that of the four half-wings the bravest holds the right of the right wing, the second and third in point of valour the left and right, respectively, of the left wing and the fourth the left of the right wing. For with the units ordered in this manner the right wing will have the same

[217] Onos. 1.21 and 42. 6; but see Smith (1998) 154 for Q. Veranius being of plebeian origins, hence the insistence on this.
[218] Onos. 10.16.

strength as the left, since, as the geometricians say, the product of the first and the fourth will equal that of the second and third, if the four be proportionate.'[219]

The attention to the difference between impression and reality is another characteristic of Greek military theory, and is also shared with (or maybe derived from) Aeneas Tacticus and Xenophon, especially the *Hipparchikos*.[220] For example, we see how retreats of the enemy should be treated suspiciously and how a general should pay attention to the terrain when he is pursuing them, so as not to be drawn into an ambush.[221] The general must not confuse impression with reality; the former may be that the enemy is afraid, whilst in reality he is leading the general into a trap. The importance of the same distinction is also emphasised by Xenophon:

οὐδὲ δόρατα μὴν παραλείψω ὡς ἥκιστα ἂν ἀλλήλοις ἐπαλλάττοιτο. δεῖ γὰρ μεταξὺ τοῖν ὤτοιν τοῦ ἵππου ἕκαστον σχεῖν, εἰ μέλλει φοβερά τε καὶ εὐκρινῆ ἔσεσθαι καὶ ἅμα πολλὰ φανεῖσθαι.

'I will add a word on the position in which the lances should be held to prevent crossing. Every man should point his lance between his horse's ears, if the weapons are to look fearsome, stand out distinctly and at the same time to convey the impression of numbers'[222]

The final two examples perhaps illustrate two of the most Greek military principles masquerading as Roman. The first is that lovers should fight beside lovers in the battle line:

Περὶ τοῦ οἰκείους πρὸς οἰκείους καὶ γνωρίμους πρὸς γνωρίμους τάττειν Φρονίμου δὲ στρατηγοῦ καὶ τὸ τάττειν ἀδελφοὺς παρ' ἀδελφοῖς, φίλους παρὰ φίλοις, ἐραστὰς παρὰ παιδικοῖς: ὅταν γὰρ ᾖ τὸ κινδυνεῦον τὸ πλησίον προσφιλέστερον, ἀνάγκη τὸν ἀγαπῶντα φιλοκινδυνότερον ὑπὲρ τοῦ πέλας ἀγωνίζεσθαι: καὶ δή τις αἰδούμενος μὴ ἀποδοῦναι

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[219] Ascl. 3.1., trans. Illinois Greek Club.
[220] For this also see Ambaglio (1981) 359.
[221] Onos. 11.1-5
[222] X. *Eq.Mag.* 3.3.

χάριν ὧν εὖ πέπονθεν αἰσχύνεται καταλιπὼν τὸν εὐεργετήσαντα πρῶτος αὐτὸς ἄρξαι φυγῆς.

'It is the part of a wise general to station brothers in rank beside brothers, friends beside friends, and lovers beside their favourites. For whenever that which is in danger nearby is more than ordinarily dear the lover necessarily fights more recklessly for the man beside him. And of course one is ashamed not to return a favour that he has received, and is dishonoured if he abandons his benefactor and is the first to flee.'[223]

This recommendation perhaps reveals Onasander's Platonic influences, the idea being most famously expressed in Plato' *Symposium*:[224]

εἰ οὖν μηχανή τις γένοιτο ὥστε πόλιν γενέσθαι ἢ στρατόπεδον ἐραστῶν τε καὶ παιδικῶν, οὐκ ἔστιν ὅπως ἂν ἄμεινον οἰκήσειαν τὴν ἑαυτῶν ἢ ἀπεχόμενοι πάντων τῶν αἰσχρῶν καὶ φιλοτιμούμενοι πρὸς ἀλλήλους, καὶ μαχόμενοί γ' ἂν μετ' ἀλλήλων οἱ τοιοῦτοι νικῷεν ἂν ὀλίγοι ὄντες ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν πάντας ἀνθρώπους.

'So that if we could somewise contrive to have a city or an army composed of lovers and their favourites, they could not be better citizens of their country than by thus refraining from all that is base in a mutual rivalry for honour; and such men as these, if they actually fought alongside each other, one might almost consider able to make even a little band victorious over all the world.'[225]

The second one is the discourse on standing one's ground and fighting in line as opposed to deserting, which has a definite Greek ring to it, especially in the indication that those who flee will die shamefully whilst those who remain will die gloriously, which evokes the *rhipsaspia* – the crime of abandoning one's shield:

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[223] Onos. 24.
[224] Also other Greek authors such as Xenophon; see Oldfather (1923) 343-344
[225] Pl. *Smp.* 178e-179a, trans. W.R.M. Lamb.

οἵ τινες γὰρ πεπεισμένοι τυγχάνουσιν ἐν ταῖς παρατάξεσιν, ὡς φεύγοντες μὲν αἰσχρῶς ἀπολοῦνται, μένοντες δ᾽ εὐκλεῶς τεθνήξονται, καὶ χεῖρόν ἀεὶ προσδοκῶσιν ἐκ τοῦ καταλιπεῖν τὴν τάξιν ἢ ἐκ τοῦ φυλάττειν, ἄριστοι κατὰ τοὺς κινδύνους ἄνδρες ἐξετάζονται.

'For the men in the lines who chance to believe that if they flee they will perish shamefully while if they remain in rank they will die a glorious death, and who constantly anticipate greater dangers from breaking the ranks than from keeping them, will prove themselves the best men in the face of danger.'[226]

One might also note the use of εὐκλεῶς as part of the Homeric concept of glorious death, reserved for those who preserve the ranks of the phalanx, as a particularly Greek concept.[227]

So it seems that Onasander's promise to base his material on the practical experience of the Romans is a false one, and what we are in fact dealing with is a hypothetical general operating in a generic Greek world, and the presentation of Greek practices and principles as Roman ones. As I hinted before, I believe that some of the practices and ways of talking about warfare chosen by the author are deliberately ambiguous, and one would be able to describe them as either Greek or Roman (or both), with some clearly of more Roman inspiration – and it is to these that we shall turn to now.

Chapter fourteen, where the author discusses the importance of a balance between courage and fear, reminds us of a similar discussion in Aristotle:

Καθάπερ γε μὴν ἐν καιρῷ στρατεύματος ἀναθάρσησις ὤνησεν, οὕτως καὶ φόβος ὠφέλησεν. ὅτ᾽ ἂν γὰρ ῥαθυμῇ στρατόπεδον καὶ ἀπειθέστερον ᾖ τοῖς ἡγουμένοις, τὸν ἀπὸ τῶν πολεμίων ὑποσημαίνειν δεῖ κίνδυνον, οὐχ ἥκιστα φοβεροποιοῦντα τὴν ἐκείνων ἐφεδρείαν· οὐ γὰρ δειλοὺς ἔσται ποιεῖν οὕτως, ἀλλὰ ἀσφαλεῖς· ἐν μὲν γὰρ ταῖς δυσθυμίαις θαρρεῖν ἀναγκαῖον, ἐν δὲ ταῖς ῥαθυμίαις φοβεῖσθαι· τοὺς μὲν γὰρ δειλοὺς ἀνδρείους ποιεῖ, τοὺς δὲ θρασεῖς προμηθεῖς. ἀμφότερα δὲ συμβαίνει στρατοπέδοις, καὶ οὕτως καταπεπλῆχθαι πολεμίους ὥστε μηδὲν ἐθέλειν τολμᾶν, καὶ οὕτως καταφρονεῖν

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[226] Onos. 32.7-8
[227] For the *rhipsaspia* see Hanson (2000) 63-65.

ὥστε μηδὲν φυλάττεσθαι· πρὸς ἑκάτερον δὲ δεῖ τὸν στρατηγὸν ἡρμόσθαι καὶ εἰδέναι, πότε δεῖ τἀντίπαλα ταπεινὰ καὶ λόγῳ καὶ σχήματι ποιεῖν, καὶ πότ' αὐτὰ δεινὰ καὶ φοβερώτερα.

'Just as the recovery of courage at a crucial moment benefits an army, so also fear is advantageous. For whenever an army becomes idle and inclined to disobey its officers, the general should suggest the danger from the enemy, especially by representing their reserves to be formidable. It will not be possible thus to make the soldiers cowardly but only steady, since in despondency it is necessary to be of good courage, but in idleness to fear; for fear makes cowards bold and the rash cautious. These two misfortunes happen to armies, to become so terrified of the enemy that they are unwilling to attempt any offensive, and so bold that they are unwilling to take any precautionary measures. With regard to each the general must arrange his plans, and know when by voice and look he must make the enemy appear weak, and when more threatening and formidable'[228]

The importance of preserving a balance between fear and courage is also apparent elsewhere (φόβος γὰρ εὔκαιρος (well-timed) ἀσφάλεια προμηθής, ὡς καὶ καταφρόνησις ἄκαιρος εὐεπιβούλευτος τόλμα/ Well-timed fear is wise precaution, as ill-timed contempt is recklessness that invites attack) and resembles a similar discussion in the *Nicomachian Ethics*:[229]

περὶ μὲν οὖν φόβους καὶ θάρρη ἀνδρεία μεσότης [...]ὁ δ' ἐν τῷ θαρρεῖν ὑπερβάλλων θρασύς, ὁ δ' ἐν τῷ μὲν φοβεῖσθαι ὑπερβάλλων τῷ δὲ θαρρεῖν ἐλλείπων δειλός

'The observance of the mean in fear and confidence is courage [...] he that exceeds in confidence is rash; he that exceeds in fear and is deficient in confidence is cowardly'[230]

While Aristotle's description of courage as virtue of the mean is most famous, as is his emphasis on the usefulness of fear, the idea could be just seen as part of a common-sense military thinking that we also find in Caesar's *Bellum Gallicum* for instance. Caesar frequently portrays himself as being afraid in a pre-emptive, rational way that leads to the avoidance of danger,

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[228] Onos. 14.
[229] Onos. 36.2.
[230] Arist. *EN* 2.7.2-3, trans. H.Rackham also Smith (1998) 160-161.

while showing how excessive courage can lead to excessive fear. Therefore, in Caesar's view, both are negative since they lead to the loss of reason, but so is the lack of fear which can also lead to a disaster.[231] So whilst a 'Greek' reading the passages on fear in Onasander might choose to see them as inspired by Aristotle, a 'Roman' reader less familiar with Aristotle would perhaps see them as common sense knowledge about warfare.

Similarly, there is Onasander's insistence on just war, and in particular on the necessity for the war to be a defensive one:

> Τὰς δ ἀρχὰς τοῦ πολέμου μάλιστά φημι χρῆναι φρονίμως συνίστασθαι καὶ μετὰ τοῦ δικαίου πᾶσι φανερὸν γίγνεσθαι πολεμοῦντα: τότε γὰρ καὶ θεοὶ συναγωνισταὶ τοῖς στρατεύουσιν εὐμενεῖς καθίστανται, καὶ ἄνθρωποι προθυμότερον ἀντιτάττονται τοῖς δεινοῖς: εἰδότες γάρ, ὡς οὐκ ἄρχουσιν ἀλλ ἀμύνονται, τὰς ψυχὰς ἀσυνειδήτους κακῶν ἔχοντες ἐντελῆ τὴν ἀνδρείαν εἰσφέρονται, ὡς, ὅσοι γε νομίζουσι νεμεσήσειν τὸ θεῖον ἐπὶ τῷ παρὰ τὸ δίκαιον ἐκφέρειν πόλεμον, αὐτῇ τῇ οἰήσει, κἂν μή τι δεινὸν ἀπὸ τῶν πολεμίων ἀπαντήσειν μέλλῃ, προκατορρωδοῦσιν.

> 'The causes of war, I believe, should be marshalled with the greatest care; it should be evident to all that one fights on the side of justice. For then the gods also, kindly disposed, become comrades in arms to the soldiers, and men are more eager to take their stand against the foe. For with the knowledge that they are not fighting an aggressive but a defensive war, with consciences free from evil designs, they contribute a courage that is complete; while those who believe an unjust war is displeasing to heaven, because of this very opinion enter the war with fear, even if they are not about to face danger at the hands of the enemy.'[232]

These are ideas which can be found in earlier Greek authors as well (as in many other traditions too), and it would be fairly reasonable to assume that no one would like to be portrayed as carrying out an 'unjust war' or as being the aggressor. So, again a 'Greek' reader might think

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[231] For Caesar fearing pre-emptively e.g. *B.C.* 3.46.4; *B.G.* 4.5.1; *B.G.* 5.23.5; for lack of fear Caes., *B.G.* 5.30-33; 5.41; for excessive courage and fear B.G. 1.36.7 and Caes. *B.G.* 1.52.3.
[232] Onos. 4.1-2; for Onasander and just war also see Chulp (2014).

that Onasander is simply drawing on a Greek tradition found in many authors before. [233]A
'Roman' reader, however, might also rightfully think that what Onasander was putting forward
was nothing else but the Roman *ius fetiale* and the belief that the enemy had to be given the
opportunity to give redress and, should he not do so, that a war should be formally declared,
which was at the core of Roman thinking about warfare.[234] Again, Onasander's text caters to
both needs.

The following discussion about close formations, although not mentioning it by name, also
quite clearly reminds the reader of the Roman *testudo*:

> Εἰ δὲ αὐτὸς μὲν ἐνδεὴς εἴη τῆς τῶν ψιλῶν συμμαχίας, οἱ δὲ πολέμιοι ταύτῃ πλεονεκτοῖεν,
> οἱ μὲν πρωτοστάται πυκνοὶ πορευέσθων ἔχοντες ἀνδρομήκεις θυρεούς, ὥστε σκέπειν ὅλα
> τὰ σώματα τοῖς μήκεσιν, οἱ δὲ μετὰ τούτους καὶ οἱ κατόπιν τούτων ἄχρι τῶν τελευταίων
> ὑπὲρ κεφαλῆς ἀράμενοι τοὺς θυρεοὺς τέως ἐχόντων, ἄχρι ἂν ἐντὸς γένωνται βέλους:
> οὕτως γάρ, ὡς εἰπεῖν, κεραμωθέντες οὐθὲν πείσονται δεινὸν ὑπὸ τῶν ἐκηβόλων.

> 'If the general himself should lack an auxiliary force of light-armed troops while the enemy
> has a large force of them, the front rank men should advance in close formation, with
> shields the height of a man, tall enough to protect the whole body, and those who follow
> and the ones behind them, even to the last rank, should carry their shields above their
> heads, while they are within bowshot of the enemy. For thus roofed in, so to speak, they
> will suffer no danger from missiles.'[235]

The word designating shields here θυρεούς, makes it clear that he is referring to the Romans in
particular as it was they who used long, oblong/rectangular shields and we see this equipment
described as such in Dionysius of Halicarnasus, though the Greek word for *testudo*, '*chelone'*
does not appear anywhere in his text.[236] But one might also think that the Greeks used close
formations and locked shields in the *synaspismos*, although perhaps not quite in the same way.
Furthermore, Onasander also talks about the necessity for intervals within the ranks of the

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[233] E.g. X. *Cyr.* 1.5.13-14; D. H. 2.72.30; Th. 2.74.
[234] For the *ius fetiale* and *rerum repetitio* see Liv. 1.32.5-14 and Rich (1976).
[235] Onos. 20.
[236] D.H. 4.16-18; cf. Liv. 8.8.2-3

army so that light armed troops can retire after they have discharged their weapons.[237] This seems to be particularly Roman, as we know that the earlier manipular legion used skirmishers at the beginning of battle, which would retreat through the gaps between the units, although the Romans should not be thought of having a monopoly over this kind of practice.[238] Certain training exercises - namely the provision that soldiers must be armed with 'staves or shafts of javelins' and led against each other in sham battle, when they can also throw clods at each other – could also be identified as either 'Greek' – if one compares them to a passage of Xenophon's *Cyropaedia* - or 'Roman' when read against a similar passage in Vegetius, if one thinks that Vegetius is keeping his promise and draws only upon earlier Roman material.[239]

So we see that Onasander seems to present both Greek practices and more ambiguous practices which can be seen as both Greek and Roman and could cater to both Greek and Roman readers – or which could be identified by readers as Greek or Roman or both. Therefore, in the following sections we shall turn to the question of what were are to make of this mixture in light of what the author promises in his preface, that the material he presents is extrapolated from the deeds of the Romans.

1.2 Presenting one's authority: Onasander as master of a continuum of knowledge

As we have seen, there is a clear preference for Greek practices and a Greek way of thinking in Onasander's manual, but at the same time an inclusion of practices that blur the line between Greek and Roman, perhaps with some being more clearly identified as Roman. With this in mind, would it be legitimate to ask whether and why Onasander is trying pass off the Greek as Roman? Can it just be the 'pride of authors in the Second Sophistic', as Smith argues?[240] Or is

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[237] Onos., 19.
[238] Oldfather (1923) 350 also notes that this is particularly adept to the Roman army.
[239] Onos.10.4; cf. X. *Cyr.* 2.3.17-18 and Veg. *Mil.* 2.23, with Oldfather (1923) 350 and Schellenberg (2007) 189-191.
[240] Smith (1998) 156.

the 'Roman framework' merely an opportunity for him to fit this Greek knowledge into a category of the existing order.[241]

One the one hand, using a Roman framework helps him challenge the paradigms of *paideia* and of culture and power, by still working within them. As a 'Greek', Onasander should have been concerned with other *artes* – as Vergil points out – and not write about something which would have been considered the domain of Romans who had political power. But by acknowledging the Romans as the masters of warfare and passing off Greek knowledge as Roman, he can freely advertise the former because he can make the case that the Romans already possessed it. Thus Greek military knowledge becomes knowledge already mastered as opposed to 'newly advertised', when presented in this framework of 'Roman experience'.

However, what Onasander is doing is more than just saying Greek practices are actually Roman ones – he is making the Greek universal. By particularly choosing examples which constitute a natural link between practices, he places emphasis on their homogeneity and on the suspension of boundaries. In Onasader there is 'Greek', 'Macedonian' and 'Roman' and his skill lies in describing practices which have both Greek and Roman correspondences and which could be seen as both Roman and Greek, the result being a blend of knowledge that is neither Roman nor Greek but both.

Vegetius' treatise emphasises that in his day there was a continuum of military knowledge, which starts with the Athenians and Spartans and ends with the Romans:

> *Lacedaemonii quidem et Athenienses aliique Graecorum in libros rettulere conplura quae tactica uocant; sed nos disciplinam militarem populi Romani debemus inquirere, qui ex paruissimis finibus imperium suum paene solis regionibus et mundi ipsius fine distendit.*

> 'The Spartans it is true and the Athenians and other Greeks published in books much material which they call *tactica*, but we ought to be enquiring after the military discipline of

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[241] Wallace-Hadrill (1988) 232-233.

the Roman people, who extended their Empire from the smallest bounds almost to the regions of the sun and the end of the earth itself.'[242]

All this knowledge of the Spartans and the Athenians is incorporated and has been taken further by those who had attained mastery over the world and this too is Onasander's message, that the Romans have now incorporated the Greek tradition into a universal discourse on war. By building this discourse and putting Greek and Roman together and naming it Roman, Onasander is also showing how the Greek tradition is now equally part of the Roman Empire, serving it, and that there is no need to separate the two. Onasander demonstrates how this communal knowledge works, by putting together two examples of seemingly generic battle displays that are meant to teach a general how to use formations and the environment. The first is an example of how one should place one's army either next to a river or in a mountainous district:

> Ἀγχίνους μὲν στρατηγός τις πολλοὺς ὁρῶν τοὺς πολεμίους αὐτὸς ἐλάττοσι στρατιώταις μέλλων κινδυνεύειν ἐξελέξατο καὶ ἐπετήδευσε τοιούτων ἐπιτυχεῖν τόπων, ἐν οἷς ἢ παρὰ ποταμίαν ὀφρὺν ταξάμενος ἀπωθεῖται ταύτῃ τὴν κύκλωσιν τῶν πολεμίων, ἢ παρώρειαν ἐκλεξάμενος αὐτοῖς τοῖς ὄρεσιν ἀποκλείσει τοὺς ὑπερκεράσαι βουλομένους, ὀλίγους ἐπιστήσας ἐπὶ τῶν ὑψηλῶν τοὺς ἀποκωλύσοντας ὑπὲρ κεφαλὴν ἀναβάντας γίγνεσθαι τοὺς πολεμίους. […] τῶν ὄντων μέντοι τοὺς ἀμείνους ἐκλέξασθαι καὶ τοὺς συνοίσοντας ἐννοῆσαι φρονίμου.

> A shrewd general who sees that the enemy has many troops when he himself is about to engage with fewer, will select, or rather make it his practice to find, localities where he may prevent an encircling movement of the enemy, either by arranging his army along the bank of a river, or, by choosing a mountainous district, he will use the mountains themselves to block off those who wish to outflank him, placing a few men on the summits to prevent the enemy from climbing above the heads of the main army. […] To choose the

[242] Veg. *Mil.* 1.8.

better positions, however, from those at hand, and to know which will be advantageous, is the part of the wise general'[243]

The second teaches generals how to advance in a crescent and trap their enemies:

Πολλάκις δὲ εἰώθασιν οἱ μεγάλῃ δυνάμει καὶ πολυάνδρῳ κεχρημένοι μηνοειδὲς σχῆμα ποιήσαντες τῆς παρατάξεως ἐπιέναι, νομίζοντες ὅτι προσάγονται τοὺς πολεμίους καὶ κατ' ἄνδρα βουλομένους συνάπτειν, εἶτα κατὰ τὸ ἡμικύκλιον εἰς ὁδὸν κυρτουμένους ἐναπολήψονται τῷ περιέχοντι κόλπῳ, τὰς ἰδίας κεραίας ἐπισυνάπτοντες ἀλλήλαις εἰς κύκλου σχῆμα.

It is often the custom of generals who are in command of a powerful and numerous army to march to battle in a crescent formation, believing that their opponents also wish the battle to come to close quarters and that they will thus induce them to fight; then as their opponents are bent back into the road at the points of the crescent, they will intercept them with their enveloping folds, joining the extremes of their own wings to form a complete circle.[244]

Upon closer examination however, despite not referring to them specifically, the two examples remind the readers of two very famous Greek and Roman battles, namely Thermopylae and Cannae (although, of course, at Cannae it was the Carthaginians who were doing the enveloping), where those manoeuvres where used. Interestingly enough, neither the Greeks, nor the Romans were on the winning side and the Romans were in fact the ones who fell into the trap of Hannibal's crescent formation. In suffering defeat the Romans learned, just as the Greeks learned how to use the mountain pass of Thermopylae to their advantage, so these two practices from the Greek and Roman experience are joined together to teach further generals – who are Romans of senatorial rank (if Onasander is to be believed at all). Further credence is added to this by Onasander's hidden reference (in the same chapter) to another Greek battle, Leuctra, and Epaminondas' innovative battle formation, which clearly provides a Greek solution to the Roman problem at Cannae:

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[243] Onos.21.3.
[244] Onos. 21.5.

οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ εἰ λοξῇ πάσῃ τῇ ἰδίᾳ φάλαγγι προσβάλλει κατὰ θάτερον κέρας τῶν πολεμίων, οὐκ ἂν ἁμάρτοι πρὸς τὴν ἐκ τοῦ μηνοειδοῦς σχήματος κύκλωσιν οὕτως ἀντεπιών

'However, if he [the general] advances with his whole phalanx obliquely against one wing of the enemy, he will make no mistake in attacking in this manner, as far as the encircling movement of the crescent formation is concerned'[245]

Therefore the suggestion might be that Greek and Roman experiences have to be blended together, in a universal kind of wisdom for the new world, as it is no longer relevant to refer to them as Greek or Roman.

At the same time it is equally important that the one who builds this new type of knowledge is Onasander himself, marshalling together and ordering Greek and Roman knowledge based on his own skill. The possible identification of the practices as Greek or Roman or both and the lack of concrete examples means that Onasander himself is the utmost authority because he is the one who decides what is worthy of inclusion into this continuum of military knowledge and what is not.

As previously mentioned, Onasander's text is dedicated to Quintus Veranius, but also more generally to the Romans, and what the author also implies is that they are the warriors *par excellence*, because just as manuals about fishing should be addressed to fishermen, and those on hunting to huntsmen, a text dealing with warfare has to be dedicated to the Romans:

Ἱππικῶν μὲν λόγων ἢ κυνηγετικῶν ἢ ἁλιευτικῶν τε αὖ καὶ γεωργικῶν συνταγμάτων προσφώνησιν ἡγοῦμαι πρέπειν ἀνθρώποις οἷς πόθος ἔχεσθαι τοιῶνδε ἔργων, στρατηγικῆς δὲ περὶ θεωρίας, ὦ Κόϊντε Οὐηράνιε, Ῥωμαίοις καὶ μάλιστα Ῥωμαίων τοῖς τὴν συγκλητικὴν ἀριστοκρατίαν λελογχόσι καὶ κατὰ τὴν Σεβαστοῦ Καίσαρος ἐπιφροσύνην ταῖς τε ὑπάτοις καὶ στρατηγικαῖς ἐξουσίαις κοσμουμένοις διά τε παιδείαν, ἧς οὐκ ἐπ᾽ ὀλίγον ἔχουσιν ἐμπειρίαν, καὶ προγόνων ἀξίωσιν.

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[245] Onos. 21.8.

'It is fitting, I believe, to dedicate monographs on horsemanship, or hunting or fishing or farming to men who are devoted to such pursuits, but a treatise on military science, Quintus Veranius, should be dedicated to Romans, and especially to those of the Romans who have attained senatorial dignity, and who through the wisdom of Augustus Caesar have been raised to the power of consul or general, both by reason of their military training (in which they have had no brief experience) and because of the distinction of their ancestors.[246]

Therefore, not only does Onasander identify his target audience as exclusively 'Roman', but also, and in this he differs from Arrian and Aelian, as military experts. He is not looking to clarify matters for his readers but already expects them to have a good understanding of what will be discussed, as seen both above and in the following:

ἀνέθηκα δὲ πρώτοις σφίσι τόνδε τὸν λόγον οὐχ ὡς ἀπείροις στρατηγίας, ἀλλὰ μάλιστα τῇδε θαρρήσας, ᾗ τὸ μὲν ἀμαθὲς τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ τὸ παρ᾽ ἄλλῳ κατορθούμενον ἠγνόησεν, τὸ δὲ ἐν ἐπιστήμῃ τῷ καλῶς ἔχοντι προσεμαρτύρησεν.

'I have dedicated this treatise primarily to them, not as to men unskilled in generalship, but with especial confidence in this fact, that the ignorant soul is unaware even of that in which another is successful, but knowledge bears additional witness to that which is well done.'[247]

Onasander, by being the one who chooses out of all the material available what he considers useful, becomes indispensable because only he can construct this unity of knowledge. In virtue of this he becomes an expert himself – perhaps not necessarily in military matters, but an expert at ordering and ranking the available knowledge – and therefore is an expert addressing other experts, presenting his take of what constitutes essential military knowledge. The implication is that the reader has to possess this new compilation of knowledge because he is supposed to be experienced in all matters of warfare, therefore his 'universal knowledge' – and Onasander himself by association – becomes indispensable. The fact that the kind of experience

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[246] Onos. Pr.1.
[247] Onos.Pr. 2.

presented is based on 'real life events' and is superior to other types of 'book learning' that other authors might present makes Onasander's 'universal knowledge' and implicitly Greek knowledge all the more authoritative because it does not derive from abstract principles, but was gained in the field. [248]

2. Integration by exempla: Frontinus' Strategemata

As before, we will first examine how Frontinus sets up his material and his *exempla* and how they can be considered to take an inclusive approach to knowledge, all the commanders having something to teach irrespective of their background or ethnicity. Then, we will move on to look at the interconnected relationship that this presentation has with Frontinus' own authority as an expert, and we shall argue that he can only afford to take such an approach due to his very real military expertise.

2.1. Presenting the material: diversity in stratagem

Frontinus himself states that his project is to hunt down examples of notable deeds and use them to illustrate general principles 'in order to complete the task' which he had begun with his more theoretical work on 'military science'.[249] Much like Onasander, Frontinus' *Strategemata* makes the case for a 'combined knowledge' by giving examples of the deeds of not only Greek and Roman generals, but also Carthaginians, Celts and others.

There are two potential objections against reading the text in such a manner or at least considering this a purposeful and conscious strategy. Firstly, the assumption that collections of *strategemata* had existed from the Hellenistic age onwards, so Frontinus was simply writing in a specific 'genre', hence the scope and style of his work was determined by said 'genre' and not by the author's own preference. Secondly, the fact that Frontinus' text might come as a completion of his treatise on the *res militaris* mentioned in his preface, to illustrate the general principles laid out there, so any grouping of examples might just have been arbitrary and

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[248] For the dichotomy between practical expertise and 'book learning' see Woolf and König (2017) 12-14.
[249] Front. *Strat.* Pr. 1.

intended to provide similar material for each theme. Both objections, however, have been addressed at length in the first chapter, so nothing more needs to be said about them here.

The *Strategemata* is meant to offer a particular kind of knowledge and the way it does this is by discussing the *sollertia **ducum** facta*, which will turn out to be the deeds of **all generals**.[250] While Frontinus does not specifically state or emphasise in any way that he is discussing all generals and not just Greek or Roman ones, what he does emphasise is the division of the subject matter by themes which are presented in the preface.

Let us take as an example the chapter on distracting one's enemies, *De distringendis hostibus*.[251] We see here that there is a sense of diversity in the origins of commanders, with five being Roman (Manius Curius, Titus Didius, Coriolanus, Fabius Maximus and Scipio), one Carthaginian (Hannibal) and three Greek (Antiochus, Dionysius of Syracuse and Agesilaus).[252] As König notices, each chapter in the *Strategemata* begins with the name of a commander. She points out that this 'contributes further to the overall impression of consistency and control, making the presentation of each stratagem – like his indices – formulaic, and thus reinforcing the sense already established in his preface of systematic organisation'.[253] However, I believe it also emphasises the diversity of the roster of generals even more. In particular it shows that the *facultas*, the critical ability of a commander to think up and put into practice similar devices, which Frontinus is nourishing (*consilii quoque et providentiae exemplis succincti duces erunt, unde illis excogitandi generandique similia facultas nutriatur*/ 'commanders will be furnished with specimens of wisdom and foresight, which will serve to foster their own power of conceiving and executing like deeds') can be present in any figure.[254] In fact, the first two examples of the chapter are essentially the same stratagem applied by a Roman and a Carthaginian commander:

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[250] Front. *Strat.* Pr. 1.
[251] Front. *Strat.* 1.8.
[252] However, Frontinus does not explicitly label any of the commanders as 'Roman', 'Greek' or 'Punic'.
[253] König (2004) 129.
[254] Front. *Strat.* 1. pr.

Coriolanus, cum ignominiam damnationis suae bello ulcisceretur, populationem patriciorum agrorum inhibuit, deustis vastatisque plebeiorum, ut discordiam moveret, qua consensus Romanorum distringeretur.

Hannibal Fabium, cui neque virtute neque artibus bellandi par erat, ut infamia distringeret, agris eius abstinuit, ceteros populatus. Contra ille, ne suspecta civibus fides esset, magnitudine animi effecit, publicatis possessionibus suis.

'When Coriolanus was seeking to avenge by war the shame of his own condemnation, he prevented the ravaging of the lands of the patricians, while burning and harrying those of the plebeians, in order to arouse discord whereby to destroy the harmony of the Romans.

When Hannibal had proved no match for Fabius, either in character or in generalship, in order to besmirch him with dishonour, he spared his lands when he ravaged all others. To meet this assault, Fabius transferred the title to his property to the State, thus, by his loftiness of character, preventing his honour from falling under the suspicion of his fellow-citizens.' [255]

One might also notice that not only the trick is identical, but so is Frontinus' judgement on both commanders, that neither of them had a particularly good character; Hannibal is less virtuous and skilled than Fabius Maximus, and Coriolanus tries to wash away the shame of his exile in warfare. It is questionable whether Frontinus is interested in the moral characters of the two here, and perhaps what comes out more is that the same strategy was used by two men of a similar disposition and therefore *facultas*, so the same stratagem could be used by someone else, in the future, who is also similar to the two, just as the preface advertised.[256] To further emphasise the idea of the importance of the diversity but also of the unity of knowledge, there does not even have to be a specific general associated to a stratagem. In the same chapter, 'some cities in the Punic Wars' are the protagonist, thus reinforcing the idea that the stratagem itself is part of a communal effort, knowledge and skill:

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[255] Front. *Strat.* 1.8.1-2.
[256] König (2004) 157 for the fourth book as an addition meant to fill this ethical void.

***Bello Punico quaedam civitates**, quae a Romanis deficere ad Poenos destinaverant, cum obsides dedissent, quos recipere, antequam desciscerent, studebant, simulaverunt seditionem inter finitimos ortam, quam Romanorum legati dirimere deberent, missosque eos velut contraria pignora retinuerunt nec ante reddiderunt, quam ipsi reciperarent suos.*

'**In the Punic War certain cities** had resolved to revolt from the Romans to the Carthaginians, but wishing, before they revolted, to recover the hostages they had given, they pretended that an uprising had broken out among their neighbours which Roman commissioners ought to come and suppress. When the Romans sent these envoys, the cities detained them as counter-pledges, and refused to restore them until they themselves recovered their own hostages.'[257]

The ratio of Roman to foreign figures is also not always tipped in favour of the Romans, as we saw above, but seems to fluctuate, with chapters which are pretty even (such as *De evadendo de locis difficillimis*/ 'On escaping from difficult situations' with thirteen Romans versus fourteen foreigners) and those where foreign commanders are clearly in the majority (such as *De transducendo exercitu per loca hosti infesta*/ 'On leading an army through places infested by the enemy' with three Romans versus fourteen foreigners).[258]

Frontinus, does not even draw the line at the traditional enemies of Rome, as we see Hannibal appear twice against the Romans just in the chapter discussed above, and being successful against them on several occasions, as for instance in the following example where he utterly humiliates the Romans:

Hannibal, ut inquitatem locorum et inopiam instante Fabio Maximo effugeret, noctu boves, quibus ad cornua fasciculos alligaverat sarmentorum, subiecto igne dimissit; cumque ipso motu adolescente flamma turbaretur pecus, magna discursatione montes, in quos actum erat, conlustravit. Romani, qui ad speculandum concurrerant, primo prodigium opinati sunt; dein cum certa Fabio renuntiassent, ille insidiarum metu suos castris continuity. Barbari obsistente nullo profecti sunt.

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[257] Front. *Strat.* 1.8.6; see also 1.2.2 and 1.2.3 where the Carthaginians are the protagonists.
[258] Front. *Strat.* 1.5 and 1.4.

'Hannibal on one occasion was embarrassed by difficulties of terrain, by lack of supplies and by the circumstance that Fabius Maximus was heavy on his heels. Accordingly he tied bundles of lighted faggots to the horns of oxen, and turned the animals loose at night. When the flames spread, fanned by the motion, the panic-stricken oxen ran wildly hither and thither over the mountains to which they had been driven, illuminating the whole scene. The Romans, who had gathered to witness the sight, at first thought a prodigy had occurred. Then, when scouts reported the facts, Fabius, fearing an ambush kept his men in camp. Meanwhile the barbarians marched away, as no one prevented them.'[259]

The Celts are also offered as an example worthy of following, as seen in the example of Viriathus.[260] As König argues, Frontinus' project and message are not triumphalist and do not champion Roman imperialism, and by mixing all type of figures he distorts both the chronological and ideological narratives to which the Romans were accustomed.[261] Furthermore, as König points out, in the preface Frontinus relinquishes control over who should be in his collection to the reader:[262]

> *At multa et transire mihi ipse permisi. Quod me non sine causa fecisse scient, qui aliorum libros eadem promittentium legerint.* **Verum facile erit sub quaque specie suggerere.**

> And so I have purposely allowed myself to skip many things. That I have not done this without reason, those will realise who read the books of others treating of the same subjects; **but it will be easy for the reader to supply those examples under each category.**

This means that whomsoever his readers consider worthy can and should be added to the list of stratagem-makers, thus making the possibilities of diversity and inclusion limitless.

The universality of the *duces* is quite striking when compared to someone who has been identified as a predecessor to Frontinus, namely Valerius Maximus.[263] Valerius not only writes about the *notabilia* acknowledged by Frontinus but also has a chapter specifically on

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[259] Front. *Strat.* 1.5.28.
[260] Front. *Strat.* 2.5.7.
[261] König (2004) 149.
[262] König (2004) 114.
[263] For example A. König (2017) 159.

stratagems.[264] Moreover, when we compare the prefaces of Frontinus and Valerius we can see there are striking similarities. Both put forth the same kind and apology for not being exhaustive because of the vast quantity of material in both Greek and Latin, express the desire to be selective, and boast about composing a manual for those for whom brevity is paramount.[265] The difference is that while both discuss examples of famous men, Valerius divides his example between the deeds of Romans and external people (*Urbis Romae externarumque gentium facta*), whilst as we have seen already Frontinus discusses them all together. Surely Valerius is more interested in moral qualities, whilst Frontinus perhaps somewhat neglects the moral dimension, but this is not what is most important, rather the different approach in the division of the subject matter is what counts here.[266] In fact Frontinus is quite unique when it comes to military writers themselves in his mixture of examples of different ethnic origin, with authors usually either deciding for a particular origin of their examples or otherwise imposing a clear division. Arrian, for example, discusses the practices of Greeks and Macedonians in the first thirty-two chapters whilst he allocates the last twelve chapters to the Romans, while Aelian manifests his preference for Alexander the Great and Vegetius, as we have seen prefers the deeds of the Romans. This comparison gives further credence to the idea that Frontinus' division is intended to emphasise that military knowledge is universal, and it is only the specific topics that matter and not the people accomplishing the deeds.

2.2. Presenting one's authority: Frontinus, 'reinvention', different voices and 'real' authority

When it comes to how Frontinus articulates his own project contained in both the *Strategemata* and his more theoretical treatise, the preface to book one of the former states:

> Cum **ad instruendam rei militaris scientiam unus** ex numero studiosorum eius acceserim eique destinato, quantum cura nostra valuit, satisfecisse visus sim […]

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[264] Val. Max. 7.4.

[265] Val. Max. praef. 1. cf. Front. *Strat.* praef.3. ; Val. Max. praef. 1. cf. Front. *Strat.* praef. 2; König (2004) 120.

[266] For Valerius' examples as being morally charged see esp. Morgan (2007) 122-159 and Bloomer (1992).

'Since I alone interested in military science have undertaken to reduce its rules to system, and since I seem to have fulfilled that purpose, so far as pains on my part could accomplish it [...]'[267]

Therefore he presents himself as the first to systematise military science (lit. *instruo* = to draw up, to organise), and therefore as a (re-)inventor (of sorts) of the discipline – quite strangely so, given Cato's and Celsus' previous texts, if we consider the Roman side alone.[268] However, his position as (re-)inventor is a carefully crafted authorial strategy, as he was well aware of the existence of other 'military manuals', both Greek and Roman.[269]

Alice König has treated the subject of Frontinus' authority in great detail very recently, and this section intends to build on some of her points, but also to discuss the matter more contextually, relating Frontinus' self-presentation as an author to that of Onasander and foreshadowing that of Polyaenus and Arrian.[270] König makes the point – both in her PhD thesis and in her most recent article – that 'each *exemplum* in the *Strategemata* begins with the name of the commander whose stratagem is being recorded, reinforcing the sense that it is they who are the authorities here, in both a military and didactic sense'. In opposition to this Frontinus 'almost never interjects to offer any commentary of his own' and for all intents and purposes remains in the background; in König's words 'he departs the arena and leaves it to the generals'.[271] But this seems to contrast with his assertive way of presenting the stratagems, whereby he takes a Greek concept and 'reinvents' it from a Roman perspective.[272] König's phrasing that 'he is not merely adopting a Greek model, but besieging and taking it over' is very appropriate.[273] So how can the two authorial strategies of Frontinus – as conduit to the stratagems of others and as reinventor – be reconciled?

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[267] Front. *Strat.* 1. pr.
[268] See Laederich (1999) 47 for *instruo* as a military metaphor. According to Astin (1978) 36 n. 22, Frontinus even quotes Cato.
[269] Especially in A. König (2017) 157-160.
[270] See A. König (2017).
[271] A.König (2017) 161.
[272] He explains in the preface to book one that the examples he is using are defined by the name 'stratagem' in Greek, *quae a Graecis una* στρατηγημάτων *appellatione comprehensa sunt*.
[273] A.König (2017) 158.

I believe the answer lies in Frontinus' 'real' – for lack of a better word – authority, which has been pointed out ever since the text has been studied. As we have seen earlier, Frontinus was a very accomplished general and most likely helped Trajan in the matter of his succession. König emphasises his practical military skill in her analysis of Aelian's reference to Frontinus, namely that it is Frontinus' actual experience which makes Aelian point to him as an authority.[274]

It is precisely this practical authority which allows Frontinus to position himself as one who can 'make order' in the self-same long tradition of Greek writings that Aelian discusses, because he is not only himself an accomplished author – as Vegetius points out much later – and general, but a general in the *new* world of warfare represented by the Romans. Aelian himself refers to the old knowledge of the Greeks as compared to the new knowledge invented by the Romans and the implication is surely that Frontinus is an exponent of this new knowledge and practice:

> Τῆς δὲ παρὰ Ῥωμαίοις περὶ τὸ μέρος τοῦτο δυνάμεως καὶ ἐμπειρίας οὐκ ἔχων γνῶσιν—δεῖ γὰρ ὁμολογεῖν τἀληθῆ—ὄκνῳ κατειχόμην περὶ τὸ συγγράφειν καὶ παραδιδόναι τὸ μάθημα τοῦτο, ὡς ἀπημαυρωμένον καὶ τάχα μηδὲν ἔτι χρήσιμον τῷ βίῳ μετὰ τὴν ἐφευρεθεῖσαν ὑφ' ὑμῶν διδασκαλίαν.

> 'But in view of my own ignorance – the truth of which must be admitted – of that form of theory and practice current among the Romans, I was prevented by diffidence from handing down this knowledge, forgotten and moreover long out of use since the discovery of the other system (*didaskalia*) by your people.'[275]

Therefore his expertise is not only practical, but also very relevant and 'cutting edge'.[276] Much like Onasander, Frontinus too in virtue of this martial prowess is best fitted to bring the Roman *disciplina* and organisation which we have seen characterised Roman military manuals to beacon a Greek topic that he presents as quite scattered and disorganised. He notes that the deeds of generals are recorded in 'some fashion' (*aliquo modo*) which not always has 'consideration for busy men' (*Sed, ut opinor, occupatis velocitate consuli debet*) and that it is

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[274] A.König (2017) 155-156.
[275] Ael. *Tact.* Pr. 2.; trans. A.M. Devine, slightly altered.
[276] A.König (2017) 155 for Vegetius' presentation of Frontinus and 160 for Frontinus' self-presentation as hinting to this military experience.

tedious 'to hunt out separate examples scattered over the vast body of history' (*Longum est enim, singula et sparsa per immensum corpus historiarum persequi*).[277] He then uses this Roman framework of systematisation and discipline – and there is no coincidence that, as we shall see below he dedicates so many chapters to *disciplina* – to incorporate and explain a Greek concept. This is the exact opposite of what Onasander does, who *de facto* uses a Greek framework to organise the 'Roman experience' he referred to in his preface and to universalise military theory. Perhaps Frontinus was indeed not ignorant of Onasander's text given the debate between using pre-planned tricks versus thinking on the spot, where Frontinus seems to challenge Onasander's more theoretical approach.

Frontinus' 'real' authority also explains his presentation, his attitude towards the generals in his *exempla* and towards the reader. Frontinus is keen to relinquish his authority and not only allow the generals to speak for themselves but allow the reader to provide examples in each category because he is confident in his own practical experience and military prowess. His 'modesty' is therefore only apparent and an exercise in self-deprecation that is meant to bolster his actual textual authority. He takes a step back and allows the reader to judge the examples for himself only because he is confident that he is the best general of the lot, who is in possession of all of the experience of these past generals and also of the most recent kind of experience. He is able to allow the generals to speak because he is the one who organises the **categories** in which they speak, therefore marshalling and organising all of their experience just as a general would use *disciplina* on the field to organise his real troops. He only allows the readers to add examples to the existing categories (*verum facile erit **sub quaque specie suggerere**/*'it will be easy for the reader to supply examples **in each category**) but not to invent further categories because they simply do not have the practical experience to judge which categories would be useful, as he has systematically done (*circumspectis enim generibus, praeparavi oportuna exemplorum veluti consilia*/ 'for having examined the categories, I have in

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[277] Front. *Strat.* 1.Pr.

advance mapped out my campaign, so to speak, for the presentation of illustrative examples).[278]

We will see Frontinus' strategy of incorporating Greek *strategemata* in a Roman framework reversed in Arrian's *Ektaxis*. Arrian, just like Onasander, again uses a Greek military structure – in this case the phalanx – to show how Roman knowledge about war can be organised and disciplined in very much the same way as Frontinus does for the *strategemata*. We shall also examine next how Polyaenus too reacts to Frontinus' kind of authority by constructing his own experienced persona and in his case bringing the weight of his generals to give force to his creation. But more importantly, we shall see how the construction of authority is linked across military genres and employs similar tools, regardless of the precise aims and combination.

3. Separation by exempla: *Polyaenus'* Strategika

We will again examine in the first section how stratagem is used by Polyaenus to create a divisive approach to knowledge with a focus on the ethnic origin of commanders. Then we will move on to how this presentation of the *exempla* shapes his own authority, and how he constructs an 'experienced' persona but also draws upon the expertise of the generals and of Homer to make up for his own lack of 'real' experience.

3.1. Presenting the material: uniformity in stratagem.

As many scholars have pointed out, the majority of figures discussed in Polyaenus' *Strategika* are Greek and Macedonian with only a small number of Romans, and they are confined to a part of book eight.[279] Polyaenus never emphasises explicitly the ethnicity of a particular general. He never refers to, for example, 'The Greek general Iphicrates', though he does so for groups of people – including the 'Romans'.[280] However, we should not take this to mean that the Romans are differentiated in a positive way, since the Roman chapter only has three subchapters and there are many other chapters in book six named after Greek peoples (Aetolians, Chalcedonians, Lampsacenes, Argives, Ambracians, Samians). Some individually

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[278] Front. *Strat.* 1.Pr.
[279] Bowie (1974)189 contra Krentz and Wheeler (1994) xiv-xv.
[280] Polyaen. 8.25.

have the same number of subchapters as the Romans do such as 'The Lacedaemonians', 'the Messenians' and 'the Plataeans', so Rome is effectively equated to a single Greek polis. What is more important, however, is that the treatise is organised by individual general not theme, as Frontinus did. For example, we have a chapter which is all about Iphicrates and his various stratagems, the focus being on the person and expertise of Iphicrates.[281]

Also like Frontinus, Polyaenus begins each subchapter, that is each discussion of a stratagem, with the name of the commander but this time around this presentation serves to further emphasise the figure performing the stratagem. This is done by means of the uniformity the repetition of the name produces in conjunction with the chapter heading, which is opposed to the way in which each theme in Frontinus was illustrated with the examples of several generals and the variety of their names showed their diversity. This is best illustrated by an example; the chapter about Iphicrates is only about him, and we have his name towering over smaller versions of the same name which begin the subchapters:

3.9 ΙΦΙΚΡΑΤΗΣ.

(1) Ἰφικράτης ἐπὶ τοὺς πολεμίους προῆγε τὴν φάλαγγα […]

(2) Ἰφικράτης τοὺς πολεμίους ἐς φυγὴν τρεψάμενος εἵπετο σχέδην ἄγων τὴν φάλαγγα καὶ παραγγέλλων […]

(3) Ἰφικράτης νύκτωρ κατελάβετο πολεμίαν πόλιν […]

(4) Ἰφικράτης ἐν Θράκῃ ἐνέβαλλεν.[…]

3.9 Iphicrates

(1) Iphicrates was leading the phalanx against the enemy […]

(2) Iphicrates, after routing the enemy, used to follow by leading his phalanx thoughtfully and give these orders […]

(3) Iphicrates one night captured a hostile city […]

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[281] Polyaen. 3.9.

(4) Iphicrates invaded Thrace. […]

This is of course true for all commanders, even Roman ones, but because the ratio is so favorable to the Greeks, it only works to build them and their practices up. Even comparisons between famous Roman and Greek commanders leaves the former at a disadvantage, as we see Scipio's name mentioned eight times in a row in his chapter, while Iphicrates' is mentioned fifty-four times.[282] Also, if we believe that the books were published separately, the impact of the prosopographic presentation would have been even greater, as readers would have been overwhelmed by an avalanche of Greek names.

Polyaenus not only has this disparity in the text, but also claims to be exhaustive in his study, boasting to the emperors that he has gathered in the book 'as many stratagems of past commanders as came into being' (ἀλλὰ τῆς στρατηγικῆς ἐπιστήμης ἐφόδια ταυτὶ προσφέρω, ὅσα τῶν πάλαι γέγονε στρατηγήματα), as opposed to Frontinus who excuses himself for his omissions (*Huic labori non iniuste veniam paciscar, ne me pro incurioso reprehendat, qui praeteritum aliquod a nobis reppererit exemplum*).[283] This means that the disparity is presented as not only a result of Polyaenus' choice – as he is a great authority on the matter – but also reflecting historical reality. Therefore, through this focus on himself as a Macedonian writing about warfare and then on his figures, Polyaenus' message is clear – Greek and Macedonian military knowledge must be taken separately from that of the Romans and is ultimately superior.

Just like Frontinus, Polyaenus too has examples of identical stratagems, such as the one performed by both Phormio and Iphicrates.[284] It involved seizing a bit of land from the enemy (the Chalcidians and the Samians, respectively), then pretending to be called back home and anchoring somewhere nearby. This would lead the enemy to believe they were in no danger and allow the general (Phormio and Iphicrates, respectively) to attack and plunder the unexpecting countryside. But, again, due to the focus on Greek figures, most of these repetitions simply show that, if there is something of a *facultas* along Frontinus' lines, it is

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[282] Polyaen. 3.9 and 8.16.
[283] Polyaen. pr. 2; Front. *Strat*. Pr. 3
[284] Polyaen. 3.4.1 and 3.9.36.

shared between Greek generals, or if we are dealing with a certain type of knowledge, it too has mostly been passed on among the Greeks. There is a hint that the author wishes to emphasise this in his explicit mention in the chapter on Iphicrates that Phormio had performed the same stratagem before (τοῦτο καὶ ὁ Φορμίων πρότερος ἐποίησε Χαλκιδεῦσιν/'Phormio did the same thing earlier to the Chalcidians').[285] There are also examples of Roman stratagems that are identical to others, such as Tarquinius flogging his son and sending him as a deserter to the Gabinians which is similar to the mutilation of Siraces.[286] However, I believe this is connected to the idea of the Roman propensity to imitate, appropriate and perfect the practices, skills and artefacts of other cultures, which is explored by many authors such as Polybius, Diodorus Siculus and Arrian as well.[287] Polyaenus brings this up when discussing how Numa convinces the Romans to turn from war to peace by means of rhetoric, commenting:

δοκεῖν δὲ ἐμοὶ ζηλωτὴς ἐγένετο Μίνω καὶ Λυκούργου· καὶ γὰρ οὗτοι τοὺς νόμους, ὁ μὲν παρὰ Διὸς, ὁ δὲ παρὰ Ἀπόλλωνος μαθόντες ἢ μαθεῖν φάσκοντες ἔπεισαν αὐτοῖς χρῆσθαι, ὁ μὲν Κρῆτας, ὁ δὲ Λάκωνας.

'In my opinion he became an imitator of Minos and Lycurgus, and in fact the former persuaded the Cretans and the latter the Laconians to observe laws, after learning or alleging to learn them – the one from Zeus, the other from Apollo'[288].

Normally such praise is positive though it can also be read as negative, and it seems that Polyaenus' tone here is not particularly appreciative of the Romans. So we might think that while 'imitating' Greeks in stratagems might be a good thing, it can never be more than imitation, and the practices of the Greeks will always be superior (again, if not according to anything else, then by dint of their superior numbers in Polyaenus' pages). With all this in mind, I believe Polyaenus is at the other end of the spectrum from Frontinus and Onasander, showing how Greek and Roman military knowledge are separate and disassociated from each other.

3.2 Presenting one's authority: Macedonian Polyaenus and channeling authority

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[285] Polyaen.3.9.36.
[286] Polyaen. 7.12 and D.S. 8.6.
[287] E.g Plb. 1.20.8-16; D.S. 23.2
[288] Polyaen. 8.4

Polyaenus' strategy of constructing authority is radically different from that of Frontinus. From the very beginning of his preface we can see how the emphasis is placed quite differently. The context of the work is Marcus Aurelius' and Lucius Verus' Persian war, and Polyaenus points out clearly that he is a Macedonian, accustomed to fight Persians:

ἐγὼ δὲ Μακεδὼν ἀνήρ, πάτριον ἔχων τὸ κρατεῖν Περσῶν πολεμούντων δύνασθαι, οὐκ ἀσύμβολος ὑμῖν ἐν τῷ παρόντι καιρῷ γενέσθαι βούλομαι. ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν ἤκμαζέ μοι τὸ σῶμα καὶ στρατιώτης πρόθυμος ἂν ἐγενόμην Μακεδονικῇ ῥώμῃ χρώμενος.

'I, a Macedonian man, who has inherited the ability to conquer the Persians in war, want to do my part at the present critical time. If my body were in its prime, I would be an enthusiastic soldier using Macedonian strength.'[289]

So immediately there is a shift from the deeds of commanders that we saw in Frontinus, to the person of the author, which he himself emphasises. Polyaenus then goes on to say that since fighting personally is not possible, he will provide the emperors with the knowledge of past generals. By setting this up the way he does, it is clear that he means the authority of his text to come from his own person, from the fact that he is part of a tradition (which is not Roman) that makes him good at warfare. So his presentation diverges from that of Frontinus, who chooses to emphasise his 'literary persona', asserting – in König's words – the 'literary and scholarly foundations of his own expertise', while Polyaenus chooses to assert his potentially very practical means of contribuiting to the coming war.[290] He is Macedonian and could actually physically fight, were he not too old. But surely the image that Polyaenus is trying to project is due to a lack of 'real' authority – he is not a general but a lawyer (as he himself states) and as far as we know had no real experience of war, so what he is in fact trying to do is overcompensate by showing how his Macedonian blood is just as valuable as real experience because it carries within it the legacy of past commanders. The position of Polyaenus is then a reversal from Frontinus', and while the latter let the figures speak for themselves, the former has to choose the figures that fit into this legacy and 'make' them speak for him. The authority

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[289] Polyaen. Pr. 1.
[290] A. König (2017) 156.

that flows from Polyaenus will then be only as good as the authority 'his' generals bring, whereas that of Frontinus supercedes all because of his recent expertise and his implicit position as 'best general'. The fact that Polyaenus selects which commanders are worthy of being included in his book and especially the proportion of Roman and foreign commanders, greatly contrasts with the freedom of choice that Frontinus wants his readers to have and demonstrates his insecure postion as a 'military authority'. Closely related to that is Polyaenus' statement that his work is exhaustive, discussing 'all the stratagems of earlier generals' (ὅσα τῶν πάλαι γέγονε στρατηγήματα, lit. 'as many stratagems of previous [generals] as came into being').[291] Unlike Frontinus, he cannot afford to allow his readers to contribute because they might bring examples that throw off the balance of Greek and Macedonian figures therefore unbalancing his own legacy and authority.

We see this insistence on the fact that stratagem is Greek and has been practised by Greeks since mythical times in order to both bolster his own authority but also to counter Frontinus' claim on and appropriation of stratagem. Polyaenus makes, in bringing Homer, another key move in this respect, to prove the point and to channel his authority. So he adds this cultural cornerstone to his roster, a Greek figure par excellence. He starts his treatise with Homer, and continues to quote him at length in the preface, showing how both he and the poet have the same opinion about stratagem:

ἄριστον δὲ καὶ τὸ ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ παρατάξει μηχανᾶσθαι, ὅπως ἂν ἡ γνώμη τὸ κρατεῖν ἐπισπῷτο προλαβοῦσα τὸ τέλος τῆς μάχης

'It is best even during a set battle to contrive, so that intelligence, having anticipated the outcome of battle, may induce victory'[292]

He then immediately points out:

δοκεῖ δ' ἔμοιγε ταῦτα συμβουλεύειν καὶ Ὅμερος· ὅταν γὰρ πολλάκις ᾄδη

.... ἢ δόλῳ ἠὲ βίηφι

[291] Polyaen. Pr. 2.
[292] Polyaen. Pr. 3-4. Trans. Wheeler & Krentz.

ἄλλως οὐ παραγγέλλει ἢ τέχναις καὶ στρατηγήμασι χρήσασθαι κατὰ τῶν πολεμίων·

'Homer also seems to me to make this recommendation, for when he says frequently

"…by trickery or force"

he encourages nothing other than the use of art and stratagem against the enemy'[293]

So, by agreeing with Homer, Polyaenus assumes the mantle of his authority, causing both himself and his knowledge to become more worthy to be listened to, but he then also uses Homer to begin channelling the authority of Greek figures and generals. He shows the reader how the first man to use deception and trickery was a Greek, Sysyphus, and then continues to give Greek examples – also from Homer – which parade all the Greeks who continued this practice: Hermes, Proteus and of course he culminates with Odysseus who takes up the greatest part of the preface.[294] It is difficult not to read this against Frontinus' earlier text and think that these figures are just the first in a line of many who contribute to Polyaenus' authority, their number and Greekness building up his aforementioned 'strength'.

Not only does Polyaenus 'borrow' his authority from Greek figures and from Homer, he also borrows it from the emperors to make it unquestionable. In the preface to his fifth book Polyaenus states:[295]

οὐχ οὕτως ἐμαυτὸν ἄξιον ἐπαίνου ἡγούμενος ἐπὶ τῷ συγγράφειν, ὡς ὑμᾶς ἐπὶ τῷ σπουδάζειν ἀναγιγνώσκειν τοσαῦτα συγγράμματα τοσαύτης ἀρχῆς προεστηκότας

'I think that I do not deserve so much praise for the writing as you do for the diligent reading of such large works, rulers as you are of such a large empire'

The fact that the emperors are reading his book is clearly a confirmation of his value and of that of Greek learning, and the mention of them as rulers of a large empire is also meant to bring the same kind of 'hands-on' military experience to the treatise. No one could challenge that – at

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[293] Polyaen. 1. Pr. 4.
[294] Polyaen. 1. pr. 5-13. Also Wheeler&Krentz (1994) xii for the inclusion of Odysseus to appeal to the emperors' Stoicism.
[295] Polyaen. 5. Pr. 3-5 with Wheeler (2010) 11.

least in theory – emperors were the supreme commanders and had the best grasp of military matters. In fact, this is emphasised by Polyaenus in the preface to book three:

> ὑμεῖς δὲ τὴν αὐτοκράτορα ἀρχὴν ἔχοντες καὶ τῶν ὅλων προεστηκότες ἀεὶ μετὰ στρατηγικῆς ἐπιστήμης βουλεύεσθε τὰ συμφέροντα τοῖς ἀρχομένοις·

> 'You, who have autocratic power and govern the whole world, always consider with a general's knowledge what is advantageous for your subjects.'[296]

It is clear then that the emperors are the ultimate generals because they rule the world and are always in a general's mindset.

4. A mixed approach to military knowledge: Arrian and Aelian's Taktika

We will again begin by discussing issues of presentation of the material, but because of the nature of the texts it will also be more fitting to make some comments on authority in these sections. Following the previous plan however, there will be shorter sections at the end of the discussion of the presentation where I will make more targeted comments about the way in which Aelian and Arrian construct their authority.

I shall argue that the approach which Aelian and Arrian take is one that could be read in two ways but is ultimately unitary, in both suggesting the precedence and superiority of Greek military knowledge when compared to the Roman, but at the same time showing how the Roman incorporates the Greek and that in fact they are essentially part of the same superstructure, and equally useful. If we consider that their audience would have been not only the emperor – to whom Aelian (and most likely Arrian) dedicates his treatise – but the elites as well, who comprised both Romans and Greeks participating in the military sphere together, it would have made sense from the point of view of the authors to point out where the 'art of marshalling troops' came from and thus appeal to the Greek side of the audience, but also construct an image of continuity between Greece and Rome, and thus appeal to everyone.

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[296] Polyaen. 3 pr.

4.1.1. Presenting the material: Aelian – Homeric precedence, integration and 'empires of knowledge'.

Much like Onasander, Polyaenus and Frontinus, Aelian too gives a reason for the composition of his work, and this reason is mainly Frontinus' encouragement:

Τῆς δὲ παρὰ Ῥωμαίοις περὶ τὸ μέρος τοῦτο δυνάμεως καὶ ἐμπειρίας οὐκ ἔχων γνῶσιν—δεῖ γὰρ ὁμολογεῖν τἀληθῆ—ὄκνῳ κατειχόμην περὶ τὸ συγγράφειν καὶ παραδιδόναι τὸ μάθημα τοῦτο, ὡς ἀπημαυρωμένον καὶ τάχα μηδὲν ἔτι χρήσιμον τῷ βίῳ μετὰ τὴν ἐφευρεθεῖσαν ὑφ' ὑμῶν διδασκαλίαν.

Ἐπεὶ δὲ ἐπὶ τοῦ θεοῦ πατρός σου Νέρουας παρὰ Φροτίνῳ τῷ ἐπισήμῳ ὑπατικῷ ἐν Φορμίαις ἡμέρας τινὰς διέτριψα δόξαν ἀπενεγκαμένῳ περὶ τὴν ἐν τοῖς πολέμοις ἐμπειρίαν, συμβαλὼν τ'ἀνδρὶ εὗρον οὐκ ἐλάττονα σπουδὴν ἔχοντα εἰς τὴν παρὰ τοῖς Ἕλλησι τεθεωρημένην μάθησιν, ἠρξάμην οὐκέτι περιφρονεῖν τῆς τῶν τακτικῶν συγγραφῆς, οὐκ ἂν ἐσπουδάσθαι παρὰ Φροντίνῳ δοκῶν αὐτήν, εἴπερ τι χεῖρον ἐδόκει τῆς Ῥωμαϊκῆς διατάξεως περιέχειν.

'But in view of my own ignorance – the truth of which must be admitted – of that form of theory and practice current among the Romans, I was prevented by diffidence from handing down this knowledge, forgotten and moreover long out of use since the discovery of the other lesson (*didaskalia*) by your people.

After coming to pay my respects to your deified father Nerva, I was able to spend some days at Formiae with the distinguished consular Frontinus, a man of great reputation by virtue of his experience in war. Discovering in conversation with him that he had no lesser regard for Greek theorised knowledge, I began not to despise their tactical writing, thinking that it would not be treated with respect by Frontinus if he indeed considered it to be worse in any way than Roman tactical disposition'[297]

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[297] Ael. *Tact*. Pr. 2-3, trans. Devine, altered.

At first sight it would seem Aelian is somewhat disparaging of Greek military knowledge in favour of the Roman, but the passage is better understood by reminding ourselves of Frontinus' own claims of (re-)invention. It is clear then that, even before setting out to write his own work, Aelian had to deal with these claims, compare himself to his Roman friend and justify his reason for writing. This explains the line taken, as Aelian goes about legitimising the continued usefulness of Greek military science – and his manual – in two ways.

The first, which we have already seen, was by saying that Frontinus himself – a Roman authority on the matter (albeit a self-proclaimed one) – still considered Greek knowledge relevant and useful. Aelian calls the Greek tradition a μάθημα that is ἀπημαυρωμένον, 'obscured', 'faded' and 'no longer useful in life since the invention of another' by the Romans (μηδὲν ἔτι χρήσιμον τῷ βίῳ μετὰ τὴν ἐφευρεθεῖσαν ὑφ' ὑμῶν διδασκαλίαν) and only by conversing with Frontinus did he gain confidence to write about it and a justification of its relevance. The 'invention' or 'introduction' (however one might want to take ἐφευρεθεῖσαν) of another *didaskalia* is thus the acknowledgement of Frontinus' own statement of (re)invention. However, upon a closer look at Aelian's statements we can see that he is in fact sidestepping – if not denying completely – the issue. Frontinus did not organise the *scientia rei militaris* altogether as he claims, but the Romans came up with their own version of it, with their own set of practices different from the ones of the Greeks. So, on the one hand, Aelian is accommodating Roman needs of supremacy in terms of military knowledge, but on the other – despite couching it in the guise of modesty – he explicitly differentiates between Greek *theoria* and Roman *didaskalia*, allowing for an interpretation that Frontinus was the one to organise the latter, but not the former, nor *scientia rei militaris/taktike theoria* as a whole.

This brings us to the second way in which Aelian justifies writing about Greek military practices, namely by discussing the true – Greek – origins of the *taktike theoria/scientia rei militaris.* In the very first lines of the preface, in the dedication to the emperor, when looking for the beginnings of the *taktike theoria* he goes beyond the Romans, immediately bypassing any claims they and Frontinus might have had. By using a strategy similar to that of Polyaenus, he

shows the readers that Greek knowledge on the matter not only precedes the Roman one, but can be traced back to the age of Homer:

Τὴν παρὰ τοῖς Ἕλλησι τακτικὴν θεωρίαν ἀπὸ τῶν Ὁμήρου χρόνων τὴν ἀρχὴν λαβοῦσαν,

'Tactical theory among the Greeks goes back as far as the time of Homer'[298]

The use of the word *theoria* – unusual, since *techne* is preferred by the other military authors – is clearly as a counterpart to *scientia* used in Frontinus' own preface, thereby meaning that what is being put forward in his treatise is on the same level as Frontinus' teachings. It is also significant here that Aelian does not phrase the issue in terms of Greek *theoria* as opposed to Roman *scientia*. He does not make reference to Ἑλληνικὴ τακτικὴ θεωρία, but talks about παρὰ τοῖς Ἕλλησι τακτικὴν θεωρίαν, so about a unified *theoria* that first originated with the Greeks, while at the same time, as we have seen above, naming the Roman discipline *didaskalia*. This does indeed suggest that Roman practices are more recent, and current, but one cannot ignore that in fact the word *theoria* suggests something that is more carefully considered and planned.[299]

Not only does the preface start with Homer, but the first chapter of the treatise as well, and Aelian takes one further step than Polyaenus in making him the 'father' of his discipline. He explicitly singles him out as the first to have discovered (ἐπεγνωκέναι) the *taktike theoria*, a statement which would have been in stark contrast to Frontinus' **ad instruendam rei militaris scientiam unus** *ex numero studiosorum eius* […]*satisfecisse visus sim*:

Πρῶτος μὲν ὧν ἴσμεν δοκεῖ **τὴν τακτικὴν θεωρίαν Ὅμηρος ἐπεγνωκέναι** θαυμάζειν τε τοὺς ἐπιστήμονας αὐτῆς,

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[298] Ael., *Tact.* Pr. 1.
[299] While there is significance in the terms used, one cannot push the point too far as several different terms might simply be used to avoid repetition. For the concept of *theoria* see Volpi (2006), for *techne/ars* see Görgemanns (2006), for *didaskalia* Zimmermann (2006).

'**Homer** seems to be the first, at least that we know of, **who discovered tactical theory** and admired men imbued with such knowledge'[300]

Also, if any credence is to be given to Devine's contention that the 113 chapter headings in the Codex Laurentianus graecus 55.4 were indeed the ones that Aelian refers to in the preface as being set up for easy browsing, it is significant that the first lines a reader would have seen – before the preface and Aelian's justifications – were Ὅτι Ὅμηρος πρῶτος περὶ τῆς ἐν τοῖς πολέμοις τακτικῆς θεωρίας ἔγραψεν, 'That Homer was the first to write about tactical theory in war'.[301] That there is no mention of a division between Greek or Roman *theoria* here reinforces the idea that the Greek *theoria* which Homer wrote about is the 'original' *theoria*.

In an almost perfect symmetry, the manual also ends with Homer, in a chapter about silence, which contrasts the noisy advance of the Trojans to the silent one of the Greeks:

διὸ δεῖ πρὸ πάντων παραγγέλλειν σιωπὴν κελεύσαντα προσέχειν τῷ παραγγελλομένῳ, ὅπερ καὶ Ὅμηρος ἐν τοῖς μάλιστα ἐσημειώσατο·

'But above all silence is to be commanded so that attention can be paid to the orders. As Homer observed in the strongest words […]'[302]

These references to Homer are particularly remarkable because Asclepiodotus – the text indicated as one of the two most likely direct sources for Aelian's manual – does not contain anything similar, though it is of course possible that Poseidonius' *Taktika* (if it indeed was different from Asclepiodotus' own) did.[303]

Aelian is not alone in going back to Homer as the father of his discipline. The same move was made by the geographer Strabo in his own preface, following a long tradition which included his predecessors:

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[300] Ael., *Tact.* 1.1.
[301] Ael. *Tact.* Pr. 7 and Dain (1946) 53-54; Devine (1989) 34.
[302] Ael. *Tact.* 41.
[303]Cf. Stadter (1978) 122 who thinks that authors of military texts possibly quoted Homer in general, despite the lack of any evidence apart from Arrian and Aelian.

καὶ πρῶτον ὅτι ὀρθῶς ὑπειλήφαμεν καὶ ἡμεῖς καὶ οἱ πρὸ ἡμῶν, ὧν ἐστι καὶ Ἵππαρχος, **ἀρχηγέτην εἶναι τῆς γεωγραφικῆς ἐμπειρίας Ὅμηρον**, ὃς οὐ μόνον ἐν τῇ κατὰ τὴν ποίησιν ἀρετῇ πάντας ὑπερβέβληται τοὺς πάλαι καὶ τοὺς ὕστερον, ἀλλὰ σχεδόν τι καὶ τῇ κατὰ τὸν βίον ἐμπειρίᾳ τὸν πολιτικόν

'And first, I say that both I and my predecessors, one of whom was Hipparchus himself, **are right in regarding Homer as the founder of the practice of geography**; for Homer has surpassed all men, both of ancient and modern times, not only in the excellence of his poetry, but also, I might say, in his acquaintance with all that pertains to public life.[304]

Strabo elaborates on Homer's versatility in book one, demonstrating how his poetry was a kind of elementary philosophy, and portrays him as the possessor 'of vast learning', which includes geography, generalship, agriculture and rhetoric.[305] So by claiming Homer as the *protos heuretes* of the *taktike theoria*, a figure thought to be an ancient authority in so many disciplines, Aelian not only shows how much older the Greek *taktike theoria* is than the Roman and dwarfs any claims of originality or reinvention – such as we might read in Frontinus – but questions Roman claims of superiority in that field, such as expressed by Vergil and Livy (and of course much later by Vegetius).[306] He pushes this argument further by highlighting that the first names on his list of other authors who had written about tactical theory – and Frontinus himself was among them – were all still indebted to Homer and made reference to what he described (τῆς καθ' Ὅμηρον τακτικῆς),:

καὶ περὶ τῆς καθ' Ὅμηρον τακτικῆς ἐνετύχομεν συγγραφεῦσι Στρατοκλεῖ καὶ Ἑρμείᾳ καὶ Φρόντωνι τῷ καθ' ἡμᾶς ἀνδρὶ ὑπατικῷ.

'And concerning the subject of tactics in Homer, we have the writings of Stratocles, Hermeias and of Frontinus, the consular of our own time.'[307]

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[304] Str. 1.1.2. all translations by H.L. Jones, here slightly altered.

[305] Str. 1.2.3; for Homer's importance to the Stoics in particular see Dueck (2000) 62 and 62-69 for Strabo as a Stoic.

[306] Liv. 9.19, will be discussed below.

[307] Ael. *Tact.* 1.2. Arrian too chooses to end his Greek section of the Taktika with (almost) the same Homer quotations in Aelian's manual. While Stadter (1978) 122 argues that this is because both Arrian and Aelian used

If its precedence, going back to Homer, was not enough to show that Greek military knowledge was perhaps superior to that of the Romans, Aelian has Frontinus as the only Roman name, lost in an avalanche of Greeks.[308] We can also see from the language used that many of these earlier authors had already done what Frontinus boasted to have done, a long time before him:

> καὶ περὶ τῆς καθ᾽ Ὅμηρον τακτικῆς ἐνετύχομεν συγγραφεῦσι Στρατοκλεῖ καὶ Ἑρ-μείᾳ καὶ Φρόντωνι τῷ καθ᾽ ἡμᾶς ἀνδρὶ ὑπατικῷ. ἐξειργάσαντο δὲ τὴν θεωρίαν Αἰνείας τε διὰ πλειόνων ὁ καὶ στρατηγικὰ βιβλία ἱκανὰ συνταξάμενος, ὧν ἐπιτομὴν ὁ Θετταλὸς Κινέας ἐποίησε, Πύρρος τε ὁ Ἠπειρώτης τακτικὰ συνέταξε καὶ Ἀλέξανδρος ὁ τούτου υἱὸς καὶ Κλέαρχος· ἔτι δὲ Παυσανίας Εὐάγγελός τε καὶ Πολύβιος ὁ Μεγαλοπολίτης ἀνὴρ πολυμαθὴς Σκιπίωνι συγγενόμενος, Εὐπόλεμός τε καὶ Ἰφικράτης· ὁ δὲ στωικὸς Ποσειδώνιος καὶ τέχνην τακτικὴν ἔγραψεν

> 'And concerning the subject of tactics in Homer, we have the writings of Stratocles, Hermeias and of Frontinus, the consular of our own time. And the following perfected military theory at length, Aeneas publishing many volumes on warfare that were abridged by Cyneas the Thessalian; likewise Pyrrhus the Epirote set forth the art of war in writing, as did his son Alexander, as well as Clearchus, Pausanias, Evangelus, Polybius the Megalopolitan (a man of great learning and a companion of Scipio), Eupolemus, Iphicrates, and Poseidonius the Stoic philosopher.'[309]

The sense of ἐξεργάζομαι, 'to treat fully, at length' is particularly strong and shows that indeed there had been other – Greek! – writers that could be said to have 'ordered' the *taktike theoria* and quite successfully, as we see in Aeneas' publication of many volumes and their digest by Cyneas.[310]

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the same source, we cannot believe Arrian's composition process came down to mindless copying of the source material. Devine (1993) 320-321 points out the many differences between the two, despite their drawing upon the same text(s), so I believe a case could be made for it being a conscious choice on the part of Arrian, which may reflect his desire to create a unified approach and make the case for a body of unified Greek knowledge.
[308] Arrian's preface does not even include any Roman names, but since the beginning of it is now lost us, it is impossible to tell if he mentioned any.
[309] Ael.*Tact.* 1.2.
[310] Also König (2017) 156.

But as I hinted before, I do not believe Aelian emphasises Homer and the Greekness of the *taktike theoria* only within a comparative, competitive frame, and a parallel with the preface of Celsus' *De medicina* will prove useful. Celsus, although Roman, is not afraid to show the origins of medicine as Greek, or to indicate that all peoples possess medical skills in some form or another:

> *Haec nusquam quidem non est siquidem etiam inperitissimae gentes herbas aliaque promta in auxilium vulnerum morborumque noverunt. Verum tamen apud Graecos aliquanto magis quam in ceteris nationibus exculta est, ac ne apud hos quidem a prima origine, sed paucis ante nos saeculis.*

> 'Nowhere is this art wanting, for the most uncivilised nations have had knowledge of herbs, and other things to hand for the aiding of wounds and diseases. This art, however, has been cultivated among the Greeks much more than in other nations — not, however, even among them from their first beginnings, but only for a few generations before us.'[311]

Surely, here the precedence is important – as Celsus admits that the Greeks beat the Romans to medicine merely by a few generations – but the more interesting way of reading this passage is as a succession of 'empires' of knowledge, with the same medical knowledge being shared between Greeks and Romans, and the 'empire' of the former giving way to that of the latter.[312] This does not mean that the medicine practised by the Greeks is less important – as we can see from the long discussion which ensues – but that the Greeks have passed the torch, and that their knowledge is now contained in that of the Romans. If we consider Aelian's preface again, we see that we might interpret his argument in a similar way. The reference back to Homer and emphasis on him and on the many Greek authors writing about tactical theory was then necessary in order to establish their precedence in a field which the Romans thought they dominated, but then the reference to Frontinus and the 'new theory' invented by the Romans could also be taken to show the self-same succession of the two empires. Therefore, just as the Greeks were physically incorporated into the Roman Empire, so too was the Greek *techne*

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[311] Celsus, *De Medicina*, 1. pr; trans. W.G. Spencer.
[312] See Flemming forthcoming.

taktike incorporated in the Roman empire of knowledge by Frontinus, with his acceptance of it as 'not inferior to that of the Romans' (τι χεῖρον ἐδόκει τῆς Ῥωμαϊκῆς διατάξεως περιέχειν.). Consequently, even if we can read Aelian as emphasising Greek theory as older and perhaps better, we can also see in his preface the idea that there is no need for competition between the two, but integration. In fact when he refers to 'this teaching' (τὸ μάθημα) being the most important, one can both take it to mean Greek *techne taktike* – as the reference to Plato would suggest Ὅτι μέντοι τὸ μάθημα τοῦτο πάντων ἐστὶ χρειωδέστατον, λάβοι τις ἂν ἐξ ὧν ὁ Πλάτων/'Certainly that this science is of all sciences the most useful is comprehended by among others Plato') – but also *techne taktike* in general, and he is perhaps purposely ambiguous about whether it is the Roman or Greek that he means because they are essentially continuous.[313] Furthermore, he recommends the testing of the Greek precepts expressed in his book, and not just their blind application:

> δεῖ δὲ ὡς ἐν πράγμασι περὶ τῶν ὅλων διαφέρουσιν οὐκ ἀπεσχεδιασμένην γενέσθαι τὴν παράδοσιν, ἀλλ' ἐν τοῖς καθημερινοῖς γυμνασίοις ἕκαστον τῶν σχημάτων πολλάκις δοκιμάσαντα καὶ τὸ εὐχερέστερον καὶ τὸ ὠφελιμώτερον γνόντα, τότε καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ἀληθείας χρήσασθαι.

> 'It is necessary, as in things that differ wholly, not to rely carelessly on the precept, but to try out frequently each of the formations in the daily drills, and thus get to know the most suitable and useful for actual fighting'[314]

If we accept Devine's translation of ἐν πράγμασι περὶ τῶν ὅλων διαφέρουσιν then the things that 'differ wholly' can only be the two *theoriai/scientiae*, the Greek and the Roman, and thus Aelian must mean that the two must be combined and fitted together as best as possible, by actual experimenting.

Furthermore, Strabo goes back to Homer to show that the origins of geography are Greek, and, like Aelian, continues to discuss the Greeks who helped develop it, such as Anaximander of Miletus, Hecataeus, Democritus, Eudoxus, Dicaearchus, Ephorus, Eratosthenes, Polybius and

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[313] Ael. *Tact.* 1.7.
[314] Ael. *Tact.* 21.2.

Poseidonius.[315] It is also clear that the Romans would have much to gain from using this Greek science of geography, especially in military terms, as Strabo sees it as something meant to aid the statesman and the general:

ἐάσας δὲ τὰ παλαιὰ τὴν νῦν Ῥωμαίων στρατείαν ἐπὶ Παρθυαίους ἱκανὸν ἡγοῦμαι τούτων τεκμήριον· ὡς δ᾽ αὕτως τὴν ἐπὶ Γερμανοὺς καὶ Κελτούς, ἐν ἕλεσι καὶ δρυμοῖς ἀβάτοις ἐρημίαις τε τοπομαχούντων τῶν βαρβάρων καὶ τὰ ἐγγὺς πόρρω ποιούντων τοῖς ἀγνοοῦσι καὶ τὰς ὁδοὺς ἐπικρυπτομένων καὶ τὰς εὐπορίας τροφῆς τε καὶ τῶν ἄλλων.

'But leaving antiquity, I believe that the modern campaign of the Romans against the Parthians is a sufficient proof of what I say, and likewise that against the Germans and the Celts, for in the latter case the barbarians carried on a guerilla warfare in swamps, in pathless forests, and in deserts; and they made the ignorant Romans believe to be far away what was really near at hand, and kept them in ignorance of the roads and of the facilities for procuring provisions and other necessities'[316]

Although the Romans did not by any means invent geography, as Dueck points out, Strabo makes the point that the expansion of their empire has in turn contributed to the advancement of geographical knowledge, as had that of Alexander the Great and that of the Parthians:[317]

καὶ γὰρ δὴ πολύ τι τοῖς νῦν ἡ τῶν Ῥωμαίων ἐπικράτεια καὶ τῶν Παρθυαίων τῆς τοιαύτης ἐμπειρίας προσδέδωκε, καθάπερ τοῖς μετὰ τὴν Ἀλεξάνδρου στρατείαν

'The spread of the empires of the Romans and of the Parthians has presented to geographers of today a considerable addition to our empirical knowledge of geography, just as did the campaign of Alexander to geographers of earlier times.'[318]

There is an idea of succession of empires of knowledge here too, with the empire of Alexander being succeeded by that of the Romans and pushing the boundaries of geographical knowledge further and further. If one turns to Aelian, we can also interpret the transition from the

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[315] Str. 1.1.1.
[316] Str. 1.1.17.
[317] Dueck (2000) 109-110.
[318] Str. 1.2.1

'original' Greek *theoria* to the Roman, as a similar service. The Romans then, although they were not the inventors of military science, by their military prowess have furthered it, and as in the case of geography in Strabo, the physical empire has furthered the 'empire of science'.

If we think of the potential audience of Aelian, one could make the argument that such an approach would have been satisfactory for all its members. The overemphasis on the Greek origins of tactics (to recapitulate, Homer starts off the treatise in the chapter headings, followed almost immediately by Plato, then Homer again leads the introduction, the first chapter and also ends the treatise) would have given the Greek members of the elite (and Roman army) a tool to contend with Roman claims to be 'masters of war', and of integration within Roman 'militarism', whilst for the 'Romans' it would have been seen as proof that the relatively recent Greek 'addition' did indeed deserve its place in an elite environment – such as the equestrian order – where military service was very much a fundamental component. At the same time – as we shall see in the case of Arrian – the unifying message of the whole treatise would have allowed both Greeks and Romans to identify as important contributors to the military sphere.

Therefore, we have seen how Greek discourse about military science in Aelian is shaped to respond to Roman ideas of superiority, by going back to the Homeric origins of Greek *taktike theoria*, discussing Greek 'tacticians' alongside Romans and showing how much older and more distinguished Greek *theoria* was. At the same time, we have seen how Aelian integrates the self-same Greek science within a framework of continuity with Roman science, suggesting that in fact the passing of the torch from one 'empire' to the other *de facto* makes the two one unit to be practised and learned together.

4.1.2. Presenting one's authority: Aelian, Homer, Greek tactical authorities, Alexander and Frontinus

The authority game that Aelian plays is not that dissimilar from Polyaenus's approach. As we have observed, Aelian too appeals to a long line of Greeks who have written about tactics before him to the point where he is perhaps no longer critical about the authenticity of specific authors and their works, and simply wants to build this bulk of Greek scholarship, with him as

its spearhead. He then becomes part of a long Greek tradition of writing and is self-interested in building it up because it helps further himself and his text.

The difference between him and Polyaenus is that he is interested only in more 'historical' authors. It is no coincidence perhaps that there are many names of generals amongst the writers of *Taktika*, and no mythological figures, because he wants the expertise he brings to be of a practical, 'real' nature. The only exception might be considered to be Homer, but we have seen that apart from Homer also being considered an expert (not only in warfare but in all matters), he is invoked to show the legitimate character of Greek military knowledge.

Aelian has Homer θαυμάζειν, literally 'admire' those with tactical knowledge and then appreciates himself those who possess this skill, Frontinus (ἀπενεγκαμένῳ περὶ τὴν ἐν τοῖς πολέμοις ἐμπειρίαν/'a man of great reputation in virtue of his experience in war') and Trajan (διὰ τὴν ἐμπειρίαν, δι' ὧν πάντας ἁπλῶς τοὺς πώποτε γενομένους κατὰ πόλεμον στρατηγοὺς ὑπερβάλλεις/'on account of your experience [...] through which you excel all generals who have ever been at war') in particular, but also the Romans and the Greeks in general, and in doing so he subtly equates himself with the poet, sharing in his authority.[319]

The other two sources of authority on which Aelian bases his own are Frontinus – as we have already previously seen – and Alexander. We already discussed the 'cutting edge' factor that Frontinus brings to the table and we can easily understand how channeling his authority injects this type of expertise into one's own treatise. We can also see upon a closer reading of the preface of Aelian that he emphasises that Frontinus does not disparage Greek theoretical learning (οὐκ ἐλάττονα σπουδὴν ἔχοντα εἰς τὴν παρὰ τοῖς Ἕλλησι τεθεωρημένην μάθησι/' he had no lesser regard for Greek theorised knowledge') which helps suggest that the lack of practical experience of Aelian is unimportant.[320]

I believe Alexander's name shows the same concern with 'hands-on' experience as the inclusion of Frontinus and the comment on the acceptability of 'theorised knowledge'. Thus, in the preface to his work Aelian states:

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[319] Ael. *Tact.* 1.1, Pr. 3; Pr. 4.
[320] Ael. *Tact.* Pr. 3.

ἐὰν δὲ ὡς Ἑλληνικὴν θεωρίαν καὶ γλαφυρὰν ἱστορίαν, ἐν ᾗ καὶ τοῦ Μακεδόνος Ἀλεξάνδρου τὴν ἐν ταῖς παρατάξεσιν ἐπιβολὴν θεωρήσεις, ψυχαγωγίαν παρέξει σοι τὸ σύγγραμμα.

'If you should think of it as a Greek theoretical work and and a polished dissertation, the book will afford you an evocation of the dead, since in it you will observe Alexander the Macedonian's efforts in marshalling his forces'[321]

We see that Aelian is concerned that his work will be perceived as impractical and not based on any military experience – since he himself admits he possesses none – and it is precisely the latter that Alexander brings to the table. Just as Aelian borrowed from Frontinus' personal authority, here too he is borrowing from Alexander, one of the most accomplished warriors, by describing his army and how he would recommend that troops should be marshalled. The gap in Aelian's 'real' authority is then filled with Alexander's, which literally 'comes alive' in the pages of his book. He almost becomes one of Frontinus' generals who is allowed to speak. In this case – as in the case of Polyaenus – Alexander is made to speak for Aelian and the long Greek tradtition of 'real' tactical writers to which Frontinus is added, to back them both up, creating a mixture of 'book learning' and 'hands-on experience' but also of Greek and Roman authority which comes together at the fingertips of Aelian.

4.2.1 Presenting the material: Arrian – competition, 'succession of empires' and rehabilitating Greek knowledge.

Arrian has similar views of the importance of Greek knowledge, and I believe he argues, similarly to Aelian, for the continued importance and usefulness of the Greek *taktike theoria*. He does so by integrating it in both a competitive frame and in a 'succession of empires' of knowledge, but also by showing how some of its aspects that might be criticised are in fact most useful.

Some scholars, such as the historian Brian Bosworth and Philip Stadter, have already argued that the latter wrote the *Taktika* primarily out of practical reasons. They believe that Arrian is

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[321] Ael. *Tact*. Pr. 6.

interested in filling the lacunae of Aelian's text, by focusing on the practicalities of and real need for training and adapting the source material in order to make Hellenistic practices potentially useful to a contemporary commander.[322] Bosworth sees the use of Greek material as directly linked to this, which in his opinion 'highlights the exercises of the Roman army and places them alongside the Hellenistic military theory as a specifically Roman contribution equal in excellence'.[323] In other words Greek knowledge is only used to emphasise and praise Roman knowledge, and in fact Bosworth thinks Arrian takes a rather belittling approach to the former, and only feels obliged to summarise the tradition for those who would want to know about it.[324]

Such an approach does not fully do justice to the general view which Arrian has of Greek knowledge, and while Arrian is indeed arguing for a balance between Greek and Roman practices, in his presentation he is using the comparison to highlight both the latter and the former. I also consider Bosworth's stricltly practical view of Arrian's text misleading, and while practicality is significant, so is the more general message about the importance of Greek knowledge and the debt that the Romans have to it.

Appreciation for what Greek learning and Greek tradition have to offer can be seen in all of Arrian's texts and is most obviously expressed in him being named the 'second Xenophon' even in his own lifetime. He himself played on the equivalence, as we see in his treatise about hunting: [325]

> ταῦτα λέξω, ὁμώνυμός τε ὢν αὐτῷ καὶ πόλεως τῆς αὐτῆς καὶ ἀμφὶ ταὐτὰ ἀπὸ νέου ἐσπουδακώς, κυνηγέσια καὶ στρατηγίαν καὶ σοφίαν·

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[322] Bosworth (1993) 259; Stadter (1980) 43; cf. Wheeler (1978) 364-365 who sees it aslo as an encomium to Roman rule, arguing that Arrian, with the aid of the text, aims to ingratiate himself with the emperor and have his command prolonged.

[323] Bosworth (1993) 259.

[324] Bosworth (1993) 258 and esp. footnote 165.

[325] Bosworth (1993) 272-275; Stadter (1980) 1-18 esp. 2 for 'Xenophon' as a given name or a nickname; Devine (1993) 313.

'I will speak about these things, having the same name as he (i.e. Xenophon) and being of the same city, and having shared the same interests from youth – hunting, generalship and philosophy'[326]

In the whole of the the *Kynegetikos* we discover Arrian's more general views of the information relayed by Xenophon (and implicitly about past Greek knowledge), namely that he does not think his initial treatise obsolete, nor does he view himself as an innovator in the field:

Ξενοφῶντι τῷ Γρύλλου λέλεκται μὲν ὅσα ἀγαθὰ ἀνθρώποις ἀπὸ κυνηγεσίων γίγνεται, καὶ οἱ παιδευθέντες ὑπὸ Χείρωνι τὴν παίδευσιν ταύτην ὅπως θεοφιλεῖς τε ἦσαν καὶ ἔντιμοι ἀνὰ τὴν Ἑλλάδα, λέλεκται δὲ καὶ καθ᾽ ὅ τι ἔοικεν τῇ πολεμικῇ ἐπιστήμῃ ἡ κυνηγετική, καὶ ἥντινα ἡλικίαν ἔχοντα χρὴ ἐλθεῖν ἐπὶ τὸ ἔργον, καὶ τὸ εἶδος καὶ τὴν γνώμην ὁποῖόν τινα: καὶ περὶ ἀρκύων δὲ καὶ δικτύων καὶ ἐνοδίων ὁποῖα χρὴ παρασκευάσασθαι, καὶ πάγας ὅπως ἱστάναι τοῖς θηρίοις, ὅσα πάγῃ ἁλωτά. […] [4] **ὅσα δὲ ἐλλείπειν μοι δοκεῖ ἐν τῷ λόγῳ**, οὐχὶ ἀμελείᾳ ἀλλ᾽ ἀγνοίᾳ τοῦ γένους τῶν κυνῶν τοῦ Κελτικοῦ καὶ τοῦ γένους τῶν ἵππων τοῦ Σκυθικοῦ τε καὶ τοῦ Λιβυκοῦ, **ταῦτα λέξω**

'Xenophon, son of Gryllus, has written of the benefits which come to men from hunting, and how those educated in this discipline under Chiron were loved by the gods and honoured throughout Greece; he also states in what respect hunting is like the science of war, and at what age one should approach this activity, and what physique and mental attitude the huntsman should have; he also gives instructions on what kind of purse nets, gate nets and long nets one must prepare, and how to set up snares for the creatures that are to be caught by snares […] 4. **What this treatise lacks**, as it seems to me, not through carelessness, but through ignorance of the Celtic breed of hounds and the Scythian and Libyan breeds of horses, **I will cover** […]'[327]

By summarising Xenophon's work in the preface, Arrian presents his own treatise as a commentary and an improvement on Xenophon's treatise, not a refutation of previous

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[326] Arr. *Cyn.* 1.4, all translations from the *Kynegetikos* are by Phillips and Willcock.
[327] Arr. *Cyn*. 1.1-4.

knowledge, and this attitude is clear in his comment on how Xenophon himself dealt with Simon's work on horsemanship:

έπεὶ καὶ αὐτὸς ἐκεῖνος, **ἃ Σίμωνι περὶ ἱππικῆς ἐνδεῶς λελεγμένα ἦν, ᾤήθη δεῖν ἀναγράψαι**, οὐχὶ ἔριδι τῇ πρὸς Σίμωνα, ἀλλ᾽ ὅτι ὠφέλιμα ἐς ἀνθρώπους ἐγίγνωσκεν.

'for he himself did the same, **thinking he ought to write up what was lacking in the writing of Simon about horsemanship**, not through competitiveness with Simon, but because he saw that it would be helpful to readers.'[328]

This desire to keep using past knowledge makes Arrian emphasise that he agrees with and merely complements Xenophon even when it is clear that their overall views are different, as is the case in the matter of which types of hounds are best for hunting.[329] He also repeatedly reminds his audience that the advice which he gives is also that of Xenophon, with Xenophon's personal exploits featuring as well.[330]

While this might be taken to mean only reverence for Xenophon and not for Greek knowledge in general, in his *Periplus*, Greek myth and knowledge are ever present, making the 'new' eastern Roman world almost seem frozen in time.[331] The circumnavigation of the Black Sea is made ever richer by information from the Greek world which provides guidance and familiarity. Thus Arrian and his men make port in a place called Athens in the Black Sea, which takes its name from a sanctuary of the goddess which existed there.[332] We find out how the territory of Apsaros was once called Apsyritos, because that was where the latter was killed by Medea and his tomb stood testimony, and similarly he talks about how Tyana, was named Thoana after

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[328] Arr. *Cyn.* 1.4-5.
[329] See Phillips and Willcock (1999) 181 for Arrian disagreeing with Xenophon, especially in 4; 16.6-7 is the only example where Arrian openly disagrees with Xenophon, insisting that the hare should not be killed, but he quickly excuses Xenophon by blaming different circumstances and the unavailability of fast running dogs, which would have made the catching of the hare more difficult and thus more spectacular.
[330] Arr. *Cyn*. 3.5, 25.4 and 30. For Xenophon's expoits see Arr. *Cyn.* 24.2.
[331] For the – now unquestioned – authenticity of the entirety of Arrian's *Periplus* see Silberman (1995) xvii-xxiv and (1993) 287-290, as well as Bosworth (1993) 243. As far as I am concerned, the structure of the texts fits in perfectly with Arrian's style, and while other *periploi* (such as *Periplus Mari Erithrei*) only give very practical information, he intersperses myth and anecdotes in the *Indika* as well (which is not quite a *periplus* but still the description of a sea voyage, with moorings and places one could find water), the authenticity of which is not contested.
[332] Arr. *Peripl.M.Eux.* 4-5.

Thoas, the king who, in pursuing Orestes and Pylades died, in that place, of disease.[333] We also find out about the people whose territories Arrian had traversed, and by comparison with Xenophon we discover that the most bellicose people in the region are the same Drilles, but which are in Arrian's time called Sannoi – so the Romans can know what to expect – and they are still very hostile to the Trapezontins.[334] The difference, however, is that they now pay tribute to the Romans![335] Going farther Xenophon again warns about the wild beasts in the forests near Kalpe and mentions the Bithynian Thracians, who inhabit the territories bordering the Parthenios river and are the most bellicose of Asia, having given the Greek army much trouble.[336] The Romans are again mentioned and we learn that the river Halys, which once ran between the kingdoms of Croesus and the Persians, now flows under Roman sovereignty.[337] Almost at the end of the trip, Xenophon again gives valuable advice on the dangers of navigating the waters around Salmydessos because of the lack of a good harbour.[338]

From all these examples it is clear how the world which Arrian describes is much better understood by making an appeal to Greek knowledge, as it is essentially a Greek world over which Roman authority has been superimposed – and is indeed very faintly present. Arrian is almost suggesting that the masters have changed but the world has stayed the same, so the Romans can learn much about it from the Greek past. Not least about their potential enemies and troublemakers, as seen in the Sannes/Driloi and Bithynian Thracians examples.

This reverent attitude towards Greek knowledge is useful in understanding the *Taktika*, not as a text which in any way disparages of or discounts the importance of Greek military science, but as a part of the Xenophontic model combining philosophy, hunting, generalship and also of a general framework of usefulness of Greek knowledge.

In this respect, if we set aside Bosworth's argument that Arrian is trying to flesh out snippets of useful information from a dated Hellenistic tradition, we can see in fact how Arrian is keen on

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[333] Arr. *Peripl.M.Eux.* 6.3-4.
[334] Arr. *Peripl.M.Eux.* 11.
[335] Arr. *Peripl.M.Eux.* 11.2
[336] Arr. *Peripl.M.Eux.* 12.5, 13.6.
[337] Arr. *Peripl.M.Eux.* 15.
[338] Arr. *Peripl.M.Eux.* 25.

emphasising how (at least some) Roman practices actually derive from Greek ones and are therefore indebted to them, just like in the *Periplus* the Romans were inbedted to the Greeks for having explored the Black Sea.[339] Thus he discusses the disposition of the phalanx by depth and length at Leuctra and Mantinea, but in these historical examples the present creeps in by the juxtaposition of what one should do when fighting the Sarmatians, in a very apparent symmetry of phrase:

καθάπερ Ἐπαμεινώνδας ἔν τε Λεύκτροις αὐτοὺς Θηβαίους ἔταξε καὶ πρὸς Μαντινείας τοὺς πάντας Βοιωτοὺς ὥσπερ ἔμβολον ποιήσας καὶ ἐπάγων τῇ τάξει τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων

'as Epaminondas arrayed the Thebans themselves at Leuctra and the Boetians at Mantineia, as he was creating a wedge and leading his troops against the array of the Lacedaemonians'

which is mirrored by:

καθάπερ πρὸς τοὺς Σαυρομάτας τε καὶ τοὺς Σκύθας, χρὴ τάσσειν

'as it is necessary to draw up your troops against the Sauromatai and Scyths'[340]

More than just putting forth a situation from the past that could be adapted to the present, by the use of the historical examples Arrian is trying to show how practices of his present are indeed possible due to Epaminondas' innovations in the past. This is even clearer in the discussion of the *synaspismos* and the Roman *testudo* in the same chapter. The latter is both presented as the next logical step (and hence a matter of praise for the Romans) but at the same time it is made clear that it would not be possible without the former: καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦδε τοῦ συνασπισμοῦ τὴν χελώνην Ῥωμαῖοι ποιοῦντα 'and from this the Romans make a tortoise'. While it is apparent that this also refers to the mechanics of the manoeuvre, namely that you have to lock shields, then go into the *testudo*, the ἀπὸ τοῦδε τοῦ συνασπισμοῦ in the genitive strongly suggests origin, and indicates that it was the *synaspismos* that allowed the Romans to develop their manoeuvre.

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[339] Bosworth (1993) 257-258.
[340] Arr. *Tact.* 11.2.

Surely Bosworth is right in seeing these passages as attempts by Arrian to show the continued usefulness of Hellenistic tactics, but I believe he is missing the big picture that it is not only these particular few examples that could still be of use, but Greek 'military science' in general. This emphasis that Greek *techne taktike* is just as important (if not more) as Roman *scientia* could also be seen in the division of the subject matter. Just like Polyaenus, Arrian's section dealing with Greek practices is larger than that dealing with the Roman cavalry, namely thirty-two Greek chapters as opposed to twelve Roman ones. While this again could be attributed to the source material and Arrian's wish to summarise everything, it has been pointed out that he chooses to leave out a significant amount of available information.[341] That everything he includes, he believes to be absolutely important and unknown to the reader is clear from his opinions on repetition in the *Indika* and his reluctance to include facts that are γνώριμα:

> ἐγὼ δὲ ὅτι αὐτός τε πολλοὺς ὀπώπεα καὶ ἄλλους ἐπισταμένους ᾔδεα τὸν ὄρνιθα, οὐδὲν ὡς ὑπὲρ ἀτόπου δῆθεν ἀπηγήσομαι· οὐδὲ ὑπὲρ τῶν πιθήκων τοῦ μεγάθεος, ἢ ὅτι καλοὶ παρ᾽ Ἰνδοῖσι πίθηκοί εἰσιν, οὐδὲ ὅκως θηρέονται ἐρέω. καὶ γὰρ ταῦτα γνώριμα ἐρέω, πλήν γε δὴ ὅτι καλοί κου πίθηκοί εἰσι.

> 'But I having seen several, and knowing others acquainted with this bird, shall not dilate on them as anything remarkable; nor yet upon the size of the apes, nor the beauty of some Indian apes, and the method of their capture. For I would only say what everyone knows, except perhaps that the apes are anywhere beautiful.'[342]

Furthermore, his emphasis on the importance of the Greek *techne taktike* is also seen in the sentence concluding the Greek section:

> τάδε μέν, ὥσπερ ἐν τέχνῃ, δι᾽ ὀλίγων ἐδήλωσα ἱκανὰ ὑπέρ γε τῶν πάλαι Ἑλληνικῶν τε καὶ Μακεδονικῶν τάξεων, ὅστις μηδὲ τούτων ἀπείρως ἐθέλοι ἔχειν·

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[341] Stadter (1978) 125-126.
[342] Arr. *Ind.* 15.9. trans. P.A. Brunt.

'These things about Greek and Macedonian formations of old, as in the *techne*, I have explained sufficiently in a few words, for whomever would not want to be ignorant of such things either.'[343]

Bosworth picks up on the μηδὲ thinking it pejorative, and that Arrian is in fact dismissing the Greek *techne*, but in fact I believe he is being modest, just as Aelian is in his proemion, and the δι᾽ ὀλίγων is even ironic given the already discussed Greek to Roman ratio.[344] Surely Stadter is right in reading this statement in connection to the beginning of chapter 33, which is an excursus on Roman borrowing, that explains how the Romans took so much from others, including, weapons, laws, customs and gods.[345] Thus the σφίσιν ἐποιήσαντο reminds of the ὅστις μηδὲ τούτων ἀπείρως ἐθέλοι ἔχειν and the reader is indeed encouraged to follow the Roman pattern of embracing (or keeping using) Greek knowledge as well, in keeping with Roman tradition, and the reference to Greek law and Greek customs, as things the Romans have also picked up, comes to strengthen this message.

But while chapter 33 can be read as praise for the Romans, there does seem to be an opposition between the clearly defined 'formations of Greeks and Macedonians of old' (γε τῶν πάλαι Ἑλληνικῶν τε καὶ Μακεδονικῶν τάξεων) and Roman ones. Arrian expresses difficulty in explaining the names of Roman *taxeis* because they had borrowed so much from others:

> καίτοι οὐκ ἀγνοῶ χαλεπὴν ἐσομένην τὴν δήλωσιν τῶν ὀνομάτων ἑκάστων, ὅτι οὐδὲ αὐτοῖς Ῥωμαίοις τὰ πολλὰ τῆς πατρίου φωνῆς ἔχεται ἀλλ᾽ ἔστιν ἃ τῆς Ἰβήρων ἢ Κελτῶν, ἐπεὶ τὰ πράγματα αὐτὰ Κελτικὰ ὄντα προσέλαβον, εὐδοκιμήσαντος αὐτοῖς ἐν ταῖς μάχαις τοῦ Κελτῶν ἱππικοῦ

> 'And yet I am not unaware that the revealing of each name will be difficult, because, in the case of the Romans themselves, many of them are not in their native language. Rather they are in that of the Iberians or the Celts, since they took practices which were Celtic

[343] Arr. *Tact.* 32.2.
[344] Bosworth (1993) 258.
[345] Stadter (1980) 45.

themselves because it seemed to them that the Celtic cavalry was remarkable in combat.'[346]

The distinction is made clear by the use of the **ἐδήλωσα** ἱκανὰ ὑπέρ γε τῶν πάλαι Ἑλληνικῶν τε καὶ Μακεδονικῶν τάξεων and καίτοι οὐκ ἀγνοῶ **χαλεπὴν ἐσομένην τὴν δήλωσιν** τῶν ὀνομάτων ἑκάστων, and therefore one might read that what is Roman is more ambiguous and harder to define, as it is at the same time Celtic or Iberic. While this could also be interpreted as an attempt to say that what is considered 'Greek' is and has to be part of what is 'Roman' – just as we saw above in the case of Aelian – the aforementioned opposition perhaps sets the Greeks apart as having a more unified, clear and coherent tradition than the Romans. Those wanting to argue against the latter would of course bring up the numerous authors praising Roman borrowing in just this way. However, while borrowing is presented as positive in the majority of examples, we have seen its negative connotations in Polyaenus' text and Cicero suggests as well that it can be more ambiguous. In his *Respublica*, he makes Manlius rejoice that Romans have been made *eruditi* not by 'foreign arts' but through their own virtues: [347]

Ac tamen facile patior non esse nos transmarinis nec **inportatis artibus** *eruditos, sed genuinis domesticisque virtutibus*.

'Yet I am not sorry that we Romans got our culture, not from arts imported from overseas, but from the native excellence of our own people.'[348]

Surely enough Scipio corrects him, showing how the Romans have indeed taken things from others, but Manlius' voice is sufficient to show that some at least may have thought it better to succeed through their own means rather than by taking from others and the much later Aurelius Victor expresses the same idea, perhaps in a more hostile tone:

Ac mihi quidem audienti multa legentique plane compertum urbem Romam externorum virtute atque insitivis artibus praecipue crevisse

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[346] Arr. *Tact.* 33.1.
[347] E.g. Plb. 1.20.8-16 (although Polybius himself points out that Roman knowledge would not have been sufficient to defeat the Carthaginians), 6.25.11 and D.S. 5.40. 1-2 and D.S. 23.2. Also Wheeler (1978) 361.
[348] Cic. *Rep.* 2.15.29.

'And to me at least, from the many things I have heard and read, it is perfectly clear that the city of Rome grew great in particular through the qualities of outsiders and imported talents'[349]

At the same time however, while perhaps marking this difference, Arrian tries to bring the Greeks closer to Roman practice, showing the communal elements between them and thus the need for the study of both *technai*. One of the ways in which this is done is by discussing the case of Jason of Pheirai, who, according to Arrian, did not actually invent the cavalry wedge but simply made it famous after borrowing it from someone else, just as the Romans borrowed – commendably – so many things:

> τῇ μὲν δὴ ῥομβοειδεῖ τάξει τὸ πολὺ Θεσσαλοὶ ἐχρήσαντο, καὶ Ἰάσων, ὡς λόγος, ὁ Θεσσαλὸς τὸ σχῆμα τοῦτο πρῶτος ἐξεῦρεν, ἐμοὶ δὲ δοκεῖν, προεξευρημένῳ πολλῷ χρησάμενος ἀπ᾽ αὐτοῦ ηὐδοκίμησεν.

> 'Thessalians mostly use the rhomboid formation and Jason the Thessalian, as it is said, first invented this shape, but it seems to me that, making use of something discovered much earlier he became famous from it.'[350]

So in mentioning borrowing he both raises the question of its value and emphasises Greek military tradition as more coherent than the Roman, but also brings the Greeks closer to the Romans by saying some Greeks also took manoeuvres from others in a very Roman fashion. The idea that both Greeks and Romans borrowed practices from others is on the one hand similar to Frontinus' inclusion of the same stratagem being performed by commanders of different ethnicitites which was meant to present a unified front of knowledge. But on the other hand, in Jason's example, the fact that the Greeks borrow from most likely other Greeks, reminds of Polyaenus' repetition of stratagems by different Greek commanders which highlighted the idea that it is the latter who are the masters of trickery, and demonstrates how Arrian migh have played with different possible ways of interpretation.

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[349] Aur. Vict. *Caes.* 11.
[350] Arr. *Tact*. 16.3.

Therefore, as in the case of Aelian, Arrian's message is not one-dimensional and the usage of past practices in the present – such as Epaminondas' manoeuvres and the *synaspismos* – can also be seen within the same framework of passing the torch to a new 'empire of knowledge', with the Romans perfecting practices which they had inherited from the Greeks (and this is made even more explicit than in Aelian by the actual mentioning of Roman borrowing). Therefore, alongside arguing for the continued importance of Greek knowledge and Roman indebtedness to it, Arrian is also making the point that Romans have taken Greek practices even further than their inventors had intended. Epaminondas invented the wedge formation against infantry – the Romans took it further by using it against cavalry as well. The Greeks invented the locking of shields to create a united battlefront – the Romans had developed it into a near impenetrable shell. The Thessalians borrowed techniques from other Greeks – the Romans took everything that was good about the military practices of others and incorporated it into their own. This type of message can be found in Diodorus Siculus as well, who recounts how the Romans borrowed several things from the Etruscans, such as the lictors, the *sella curulis* and the toga with a purple band and then improved them (καὶ πρὸς τὸ κάλλιον αὐξήσαντες), but also closer to our own interests, how they learned siege tactics from the Greeks and perfected them to such a degree that they managed to use them against the former and defeat them (τὰς πόλεις τῶν διδαξάντων ἠνάγκασανποιεῖν τὸ προστατ τόμενον).[351]

Therefore my intention is not argue that Arrian is disparaging the Romans – nor could he have done so, being Roman himself – but rather to show that by comparing and contrasting the two *technai* he is reasserting the value of the Greek military tradition, but also presenting Greek and Roman *technai* as integrated parts of a succession of 'empires of knowledge'. This type of dual approach can be explained in the same way as in the case of Aelian, if we consider that their audiences were indeed similar. If we accept that Arrian too is writing for the Greco-Roman elites, and that at least some were engaging in military activities, then we can see how he is simply more explicitly including Greek – particularly Alexander's/Hellenistic – military theory alongside contemporary Roman theory in order to appeal to men like Quadratus Bassus for example, who was a highly successful commander from an old Greek royal family who would

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[351] D. S. 5.40.1 and 23.2.1; also Wheeler (1978) 361.

have valued the traditions of that world as well as the achievements of the Romans. At the same time, not only would ideas of Romans incorporating Greek practices have appealed to Greek elements in the elites, but their improvement under Roman rule would have appealed to the Roman members of the same elite.

However, I believe Arrian also discusses and redeems alleged negative Greek elements of military practice, aiming to refute criticism of them and of the elites more generaly. If one looks at the *Panegyricus* of Pliny the Younger, the speech given in 100 A.D. in honour of the emperor Trajan, we see the current elites being criticised for allowing themselves to be corrupted by Greek *mores*, and losing their own valour in the process:

> *Hac mihi admiratione dignus imperator <uix> uideretur, si inter Fabricios et Scipiones et Camillos talis esset; tunc enim illum imitationis ardor semperque melior aliquis accenderet. Postquam uero studium armorum a manibus ad oculos, ad uoluptatem a labore translatum est, postquam exercitationibus nostris* **non ueteranorum aliquis cui decus muralis aut ciuica, sed Graeculus magister adsistit.**

> 'Such were the great generals of the past, bred in the homes of Fabricius, Scipio and Camillus; if they have a lesser claim upon my admiration it is because in their day a man could be inspired by a keen rivalry with his betters. But now that interest in arms is displayed in a spectacle instead of personal skill, and has become an amusement instead of a discipline, when exercises are no longer directed by a veteran crowned by the mural crown but by some petty Greek trainer.' [352]

Greek influence then transformed Roman virtues into exercises geared towards pleasure – and the *ad oculos, ad voluptatem* reminds one of the *artes* mentioned by Vergil – thus causing Roman discipline to be lost in the process. This idea is of course more famously expressed by Horace, who describes the loss of Roman ferocity to the *Greek artes*: *Graecia capta ferum victorem cepit et artes/ intulit agresti Latio* ('Captive Greece captured its fierce victor and

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[352] Plin. *Pan.* 13.5.

brought the arts to wild Latium).[353] This kind of idea might have been considered unpleasant to both Greek elements in the elites – especially seasoned commanders in the mould of Quadratus Bassus and Ti. Julius Alexander – who would have resented the trope of Greek practices as encouraging moral laxness, but also to the Romans more generally, for assuming they have been corrupted in such a way. As a Greek member of the Roman elite and military commander Arrian would have interested in presenting such conceptions in a more nuanced way.

Keeping this in mind, it is quite peculiar that the Roman cavalry drills described in the second part of Arrian's text would fit Pliny's *ad oculos, ad voluptatem* category quite easily. As such, visual pleasure is accentuated in several places: the appearance of the standards (ταῦτα τὰ σημεῖα οὐ **τῇ ὄψει μόνον ἡδονὴν ἢ ἔκπληξιν παρέχει**/'these standards not only bring pleasure and consternation to the eye'), the colour and beauty of the standards and the manoeuvres (καὶ οὕτω ποικίλαι μὲν αἱ ἐπιστροφαί, πολυειδεῖς δὲ οἱ ἐξελιγμοί, πολύτροποι/'thus the colorful wheelings about, the multiform folding back again, and the versatile charges here and there'), the beauty of the turn (τὸ δὲ κάλλος τοῦ δρωμένου ἐν τῷδε ἐστίν), the posture of the rider (ἥ τε καθέδρα ἡ ἐπὶ τοῦ ἵππου αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἱππέως ἀεὶ εὐσχήμων καὶ ὀρθὴ/'the posture of the rider is always elegant and straight') which enables the 'weapons' brilliance, the horses swiftness and the good curvings in the turn' (τῶν ὅπλων ἡ λαμπρότης καὶ τῶν ἵππων ἡ ὠκύτης τε καὶ τὸ ἐν ταῖς ἐπιστροφαῖς εὔκαμπές), to be seen, the rider being graceful at (εὐσχημόνως), and the rider's blow being astounding and the countermarch appearing graceful (ἐκπληκτικός, καὶ ὁ ἐξελιγμὸς ἐν τῷ τοιῷδε εὐσχήμων φαίνεται).[354]

This emphasis on beauty contrasts the functional, dry description of the phalanx in the first part (1-32), which shows that the Greeks 'of old' were just as disciplined (if not more) than the Romans which Pliny mentioned. This contrast is most evident when the Macedonian phalanx is described as 'fearsome' also by its appearance, τοι καὶ ἡ Μακεδονικὴ φάλαγξ φοβερὰ τοῖς πολεμίοις οὐκ ἐν τῷ ἔργῳ μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ **ἐν τῇ ὄψει** ἐφαίνετο, as opposed to the standards of

[353] Hor. *Ep.* 2.1.156-57.
[354] Arr. *Tact.* 35.5, 35.7, 36.4, 38.3, 38.4, 40.7.

the Roman cavalry which bring 'pleasure to the sight' (τῇ ὄψει [...] ἡδονὴν).[355] Also, if Wheeler is right in believing Arrian is in fact describing the 'sporting exercises' called *ludi castrenses*, which were performed on festive occasions, then the antithesis is even stronger between function and pleasure and Arrian's choice for the latter more interesting. [356] Surely the explanation for it is partly Arrian's pride and enthusiasm for the cavalry of which he was himself commander, but by opposing the functional description of the Greek phalanx and cavalry (1-32) to the visual pleasure invoked by the Roman cavalry (34-44), Arrian shows that the emphasis on beauty was not necessarily brought about by a 'Greek corruption' as Pliny suggested, and might have existed independent of that.[357] Furthermore, as a Greek himself, he makes a point out of saying he does not appreciate performance for performance's sake, and he praises the man who can perform his task properly rather than him who tries to attract the viewers' attention:

> ἀλλ᾽ ἔγωγε πολὺ μᾶλλον ἐπαινῶ τὸ ἐννόμως δρώμενον ἥπερ τὸ ἐς ἔκπληξιν τῶν ὁρώντων σοφιζόμενον.

> 'But I rather praise the one who does things properly rather than one who devises things cleverly for the amazement of the viewers.'[358]

 At the same time he defends not only himself and the Greeks in the elite, but the elites altogether, by showing that visual splendour is not necessarily a sign of moral corruption in the example of the colourful banners of the cavalry, which are both beautiful but also vital in allowing the riders to maintain unit cohesion:

> καὶ ταῦτα τὰ σημεῖα οὐ τῇ ὄψει μόνον ἡδονὴν ἢ ἔκπληξιν παρέχει, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐς διάκρισιν τῆς ἐπελάσεως καὶ τὸ μὴ ἐμπίπτειν ἀλλήλαις τὰς τάξεις ὠφέλιμα γίγνεται.

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[355] Arr. *Tact.* 12.6.
[356] Wheeler (1978) 357-358.
[357] Stadter (1980) 43; Pliny and Arrian were friends, so the former's ideas would surely have been known to the latter; see Spaulding (1933) 665.
[358] Arr. *Tact*. 40.12.

'And these standards not only furnish pleasure and amazement to sight, but become useful even for distinguishing the parts of the charge and so that the formations do not collide into each other.'[359]

Therefore, in combining and contrasting beauty and functionality Arrian accomplishes two things at the same time: he dissociates himself and the Greeks from the practices mentioned by Pliny, and also defends the elites criticised by him altogether and the self-same practices by showing how visual pleasure, even if introduced by the Greeks, is not to be seen as a sign of moral decline but as a useful element in the evolution of warfare.

To conclude, I have shown how Arrian's text can both be seen as re-asserting the importance of the Greek *techne* by showing how it influenced Roman *scientia* and how it was perhaps in some ways superior, but also how he – similarly to Aelian, but in a more explicit way – integrates the two by making the argument for a succession of knowledge, from the Greeks to the Romans, thus rendering the need for competition pointless. Just like Aelian, he is mindful of the mixed Greco-Roman elite he is addressing and refutes the supposed negative attributes which come with Greek practices, thus defending it against accusations of moral corruption.

4.2.2. Presenting one's authority: Arrian, Xenophon, Greek scholarship and personal authority

The authority that Arrian constructs is somewhere between that of Frontinus and Aelian. Like the latter, he too discusses previous authors who had written *taktika* before him and positions himself as part of this very literary tradition. However, just from looking at the presentation of these figures we see that 'real' authority, that which contains military experience, is very important to him. Among the writers we see two who sound very familiar to us:

<Πύρρος τε ὁ Ἠπειρώτης τακτικὰ συνέταξε καὶ Ἀλέξανδρος> ὁ Πύρρου παῖς καὶ Κλέαρχος, οὐχ ὁ τῶν μυρίων Ἑλλήνων ἐπὶ βασιλέα ἡγησάμενος, ἀλλὰ ἄλλος οὗτος Κλέαρχος. […]συγγέγραπται ἄττα ὑπὲρ τούτων καὶ Εὐπολέμῳ καὶ Ἰφικράτει, οὐ τῷ Ἀθηναίων στρατηγῷ, ἀλλὰ ἄλλῳ τούτῳ.

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[359] Arr. *Tact*. 35.5.

Pyrrhus of Epirus composed a *taktika*, Alexander, Pyrrhus' son and Clearchus, not the leader of the ten thousand Greeks against the king but this other Clearchus. […] And some things were written about this by Eupolemos and Iphicrates, not the Athenian general but this other one.[360]

Iphicrates and Clearchus are famous generals but Arrian is quick to explain that these are actually not the generals that we know – who would bring their own experience and therefore authority to the texts – but other authors with the same name, who implicitly do not possess this kind of authority. So Arrian, although part of this tradition, is also superior to it because he does possess the military experience that the majority of them do not. He is also quick to emphasise this, as we have seen, in the second part of his treatise where he describes the cavalry drills with the precision of an eye witness but, just like Frontinus, does not directly emphasise the fact that he has 'real' experience because he does not need to. As we have also seen Arrian is equated to Xenophon and is therefore in a unique position. He actively draws upon the authority of this historical general and builds upon it, as we have seen in the *Periplus* and *Kynegetikos*, and **is** himself a general, therefore so much better fitted to bring the latter's experience to life in the pages of his manual – unlike Aelian who can only 'invoke the dead'.

Conclusion

I believe I have sufficiently proven here that there are some authors who take an integrative and others that take an exclusive approach to military knowledge. However certain issues might raise the question whether these approaches are ever going to be so clear cut – or if we can read them as such. Onasander's rejection of the use of any examples in conjunction with the claim to draw upon the Roman tradition, which placed great value on them, and then his use of a majority of identifiable Greek practices might also be read as ironic and indicative of his view of the superiority of these latter practices. His example of the wedge formation (of which the most famous was Epaminondas') right after the description of an encirclement manoeuvre (arguably to Onasander's day the most crushing Roman defeat at Cannae) might also serve to prove the superiority of Greek military science. In turn, Polyaenus' repetition of stratagems

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[360] Arr. *Tact.* 1.1.

across 'ethnic' boundaries might also be an argument in favour of universal knowledge, and Frontinus' claim to be the first to systematise military science one in favour of Roman superiority in the field.

I have also shown how Aelian and Arrian write against a specific background and with a specific audience in mind, with Roman ideas of superiority in the field of warfare as the background, as well as with Frontinus' writings in view which seem to claim originality and the reinvention of military science. Therefore, in answering the implicit question of 'What would the Greeks have to teach the Romans about warfare?' the authors construct an answer which focuses both on proving the precedence and perhaps superiority of the Greek *techne tactike* but also on integrating it within a framework of succession of 'empires of knowledge' in which the Roman empire (both physical and symbolic) takes over from that of the Greeks and becomes the guardian of said knowledge. Aelian makes a point out of emphasising the Greekness of 'military science' by appealing to Homer as its inventor, and to other Greeks who had tackled it, while Arrian more explicitly parallels the two sciences, but nevertheless the message in both is that Greek knowledge is to be used alongside the Roman in a complementary not a competitive way, despite perhaps the superiority of the former.

All the treatises and their respective approaches are also better understood if one considers that their audience would have been made up of both Greeks and Romans, in the general elite sphere and also more specifically in the military sphere. Views which emphasised the Greekness of tactics and the historical role of the Greeks in warfare (such as we see in Arrian) would then have appealed to Greek members of the elites, who, as relative newcomers to the Empire, had to compete with men who considered the *res militaris* their exclusive domain. But the very same views would have helped the latter Romans gain a new perspective on the Greeks and help in viewing them as an integral – and fitting – part of the imperial elite.

We have also seen how the presentation of the material and the construction of authority in each author constitute a circle, with one reflecting and influencing the other. We have seen how all the authors construct their authority in different ways, by downplaying existing practical experience which they possess (as in the case of Frontinus) or by augmenting certain

innate traits they have to make up for it (such as Macedonian descent, in the case of Polyaenus), by drawing upon the authority of the past or on that of other experts. However, we have also seen how all the authors seem to be interested in having practical experience on their side in one form or another. Onasander draws upon that of the Romans, Aelian on that of Alexander, Arrian and Frontinus on themselves, while Polyaenus brings in his persona and the experience of the emperors.

III. Tactics, Identity and 'Roman' Greece

In this chapter I will use Arrian's *Taktika* and *Ektaxis*, a text which is usually dismissed as a simple description of Arrian's operations in Cappadocia, to develop the themes set out in the previous two chapters.[361] The two texts will constitute a case study for the exploration in greater depth of how 'military manuals' approach empire, power and authority, but also how they deal with, shape and use the past in the 'Second Sophistic'. As will have already become clear, more varied pasts are put to more varied uses than suggested in Ewan Bowie's classic article, *Greeks and their past in the Second Sophistic.*

In what follows I will examine the two texts as tools of creating identity, both for Arrian and for the Roman Empire as a whole. I will explore Arrian's self-presentation in the *Ectaxis* and argue that he is constructing his identity in a similar way to the performers of 'sophistic' historical *meletai*, where the speaker assumes the persona of a famous figure from the past. I will then read this against Antony Spawforth's analysis of Augustus' and Hadrian's interactions with Athens and argue that the goal of Arrian's self-presentation is to become part of an accepted Roman view of Greekness (just as Spawforth argues that his move to Athens constitutes such an attempt), but also that he is using the prestige of the Classical period to augment his own reputation.[362] Then, by looking at both the *Taktika* and the *Ektaxis* I will explore how they play a part in constructing the identity of the Roman Empire, fitting into a picture of unity in

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[361] Stadter (1980) 46.
[362] Spawforth (2012) 262.

diversity which the Romans themselves – including Hadrian – are trying to promote. I then will look at how Arrian's *Taktika* contributes to Hadrian's self-presentation as a commander and helps him build up his reputation as a general, but also at how Arrian's and Aelian's *Taktika* choose a particular subject matter that also conforms to a Roman view of Greek identity, and how this subject matter is meant to advertise Greek knowledge to the emperors by using the same means of integration and competition seen in the previous chapter.

1. Ektaxis – *rhetoric and impersonation*

In terms of its form, the *Ektaxis* is essentially a series of orders expressed in the third person imperative and infinitive meant to explain Arrian's battle array against the Alans who attacked the borders of Cappadocia after they had plundered Albania and Media Atropatene at the behest of king Phrasmanes of Iberia (in the southern Caucasus).[363] Because the text breaks off in mid-sentence, the question has been raised as to whether this was an individual piece or part of the *Alanike* - another monograph of Arrian which Stadter assumes would have been 'a geographical and ethnographical work similar to the *Indike*'.[364] Stadter rejects the latter hypothesis and argues for the *Ektaxis* as an independent text in close relation to the *Taktika* (as hinted in the introduction), stating that he could not imagine a work of history which would have contained this piece, because of the strange style in which it is written.[365] Bosworth, however, compares it with Xenophon's *Cyropaedia*, where Xenophon gives the Persian king a long homily when Cyrus marches to deliver Gadates from Assyrian attack, and composes this mainly of third person imperatives, with particular attention given to the names of the commanders.[366] Despite suggesting that the *Cyropaedia* could have been Arrian's model, Bosworth, unlike Wheeler, also thinks that the *Ektaxis* 'is hardly likely to be an extract from a formal history' mainly because, just like the passage in Xenophon, it would have to be part of a harangue, but it is already longer than any direct speech in Arrian's only extant historical work, the *Anabasis*, and would also make for a distinct lack of balance in any other longer historical

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[363] For the highly literary aspect of the text see Stadter (1980) 46; Bosworth (1993) 247; for the Alan invasion see Bosworth (1977) 219.
[364] Wheeler (1978); Stadter (1980) 45 and 163.
[365] Stadter (1980) 45-46.
[366] Bosworth (1993) 265. Wheeler (1978).

work.[367] Furthermore, according to Bosworth, the very existence of an *Alanike* is questionable, and only based on a reference in Photius and a 'suspect attestation in John the Lydian'.[368]

Stadter's contention as to the position of the work in the Laurentianus 55.4 manuscript also makes it more likely that it is a stand-alone piece. He suggests that, since pages were removed from the manuscript for their blank parchment, and the work which followed the text in the manuscript – Onasander's treatise on generalship – began at the top of the verso of the same missing folio, it is likely that the recto containing the end of the *Ektaxis* had a blank space, which is why the folio was torn out.[369] This would mean that, since a folio of the manuscript contained about forty Teubner lines, no more than twenty lines would be missing.[370]

For our purposes the debate does not make much difference. However, if this is a stand-alone work, the reasons for its publication become even more interesting, because we are presented with a whole piece where Arrian is advertising his own achievements in the Roman army and his position within the empire. As we have seen in the previous chapter, Arrian was compared to Xenophon even in his lifetime, but I believe his portrayal in the *Ektaxis* goes beyond just likening himself to Alexander and Xenophon, as Bosworth argues, and that he is deliberately assuming the persona of Xenophon and, in the context of the work, becoming Xenophon. [371] This is an interesting mix, therefore, of classical Greek and Roman themes.

Arrian's portrayal is – not unintentionally – very similar to the way in which 'sophists' perform historical declamation. As Berry and Heath point out, the composition of hypothetical or imitation speeches was a Greek invention which 'probably provided the earliest vehicle for the transmission of rhetorical theory', Antiphon's *Tetralogies* and the *Helen* and *Palamedes* of Gorgias being notable instances from the classical period.[372] Ancient historians of rhetoric believed the practice originated in the late fourth or early third century B.C., but by the first

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[367] Bosworth (1993) 266.
[368] Bosworth (1993) note 206.
[369] In fact, as far as I can tell, Wheeler is alone in arguing for the work being part of the *Alanike*.
[370] Stadter (1980) 207, note 38. The beginning of Onasander is preserved in the other manuscripts so a cross-reference can be made; see the 1923 Illinois Greek Club edition, 371 and 363-365.
[371] For Alexander alone see Bosworth (1977); for both see Bosworth (1993) 266-267.
[372] Berry and Heath (1997) 406.

century B.C. it had already reached Rome and we see that many of the hypothetical cases in Cicero's *De Inventione* and the anonymous *Rhetorica ad Herennium* become themes later on.[373] Declamation became particularly popular in the second and third centuries A.D., as we can see from Philostratus' *Lives of the Sophists*, and Schmitz makes the point that historical declamations were 'by far the most important class of *meletai*' and that in them 'the speaker impersonated a well-known figure of classical Greek history'.[374] This too is illustrated by Philostratus with plenty of examples, such as Hippodromus of Thessaly (holder of the chair of rhetoric at Athens in 209-213 A.D. and Philostratus' master) declaiming as Demades against revolting from Alexander, Apollonius of Athens speaking as Callias against the burning of the Athenian dead, and Alexander of Seleucia (born c. A.D. 115) impersonating Pericles and urging the Athenians to keep up the war.[375]

Philostratus' quotations from some famous speeches show exactly how the impersonation worked. So Alexander of Seleucia addresses Xerxes directly as if he were his contemporary: "Let the Danube of the Scythians flow beneath **your** feet, and if he gives your army a smooth crossing, do him the honour of drinking his waters' (ὑπορρείτω **σοι** ὁ Σκυθῶν Ἴστρος, κἂν εὔρους τὴν στρατιὰν διαγάγῃ, τίμησον αὐτὸν ἐξ αὐτοῦ πιών).[376] Again, Marcus of Byzantium (possibly a rhetoric teacher of Marcus Aurelius) takes on the persona of a Spartan citizen advising the Lacedaemonians not to receive the men who had returned from Sphacteria without their weapons: '**As a Lacedaemonian** who has kept his shield till old age, I would gladly have slain these men who have lost theirs' (**ἀνὴρ Λακεδαιμόνιος** μέχρι γήρως φυλάξας τὴν ἀσπίδα ἡδέως μὲν ἂν τοὺς γυμνοὺς τούτους ἀπέκτεινα).[377] Furthermore the 'sophists' who impersonate a certain character also pretend they are an integral part – for the duration of the speech – of the same circumstances as the original speaker, and we see this in Alexander's

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[373] Berry and Heath (1997) 406-407.
[374] Schmitz (1999) 72. For Philostratus see Anderson (1986), Bowie and Elsner (2009), Kemezis (2014), J.König (2014), Jones (1974).
[375] Philostr. *VS.* 2. 27 620; Philostr. *VS.*20 602; nothing more is known of Apollonius of Athens.
[376] Philostr. *VS.* 2.5. 575, all translations by W.C. Wright.
[377] Philostr. *VS.* 1.24.528.

impersonation of Pericles for example, who speaks in front of a fictional Athenian assembly made up of his very real current audience.[378]

The case of Lollianus of Ephesus may be the most interesting and relevant here, as I believe that through his self-presentation he – just like Arrian – is trying to achieve two goals: first, to become part of what might be called a Roman-sanctioned (particularly Hadrianic) view of Greekness and second to use this Roman-sanctioned Greek past to augment his prestige. Most of the information we have about Lollianus again comes from Philostratus' *Lives of the Sophists*, but several inscriptions confirm his historicity. Philostratus tells us that he was not only appointed to the chair of rhetoric at Athens but 'also governed the Athenian people, since he held the office of hoplite general in that city' (προΰστη δὲ καὶ τοῦ Ἀθηναίων δήμου στρατηγήσας αὐτοῖς τὴν ἐπὶ τῶν ὅπλων), and we know from an inscription that by 142/43 A.D. he was also a priest there.[379] Philostratus continues to explain how the responsibilities of the hoplite general 'were formerly to levy troops and lead them to war, but now he has charge of the food supplies and the provision market'(ἡ δὲ ἀρχὴ αὕτη πάλαι μὲν κατέλεγέ τε καὶ ἐξῆγεν ἐς τὰ πολέμια, νυνὶ δὲ τροφῶν ἐπιμελεῖται καὶ σίτου ἀγορᾶς) and then also tells us that when a cargo of grain came from Thessaly and there was no money in the public treasury to pay for it, he bade his pupils to contribute and paid for it himself.[380] This is interesting because, in one of the declamatory speeches, Lollianus, speaking as Demosthenes, denounced Leptines on account of his law, because the supply of grain had failed to reach the Athenians from the Pontus.[381] Lollianus, as Schmitz argues, is not merely saying what Demosthenes would have said, but, for all intents and purposes, at the moment of the speech, **is** Demosthenes.[382] So we have someone in charge of the city grain supply who had actively provided for it and saved it on one occasion, speaking as Demosthenes, a major political figure of the fourth century B.C., who

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[378] Philostr. *VS.* 2.5.575 and Schmitz (1999) 78.

[379] Philostr. *VS.* 1.23.526.; Bowie (2006); we also see how one of the inscriptions on the statues which Philostratus tells us were dedicated to him has survived – EpGr 877, praising his declamation and forensic speeches.

[380] Philostr. *VS.* 1.23.526.

[381] Philostr. *VS.* 1.23.527.

[382] Schmitz (1999) 78 'in their declamations they actually embodied the great figures of the past; at least for the duration of their speeches, they turned into these classical authorities.[…] It is important to note that in these speeches, the personality of the sophist would completely disappear behind the figure he was embodying; when he said 'I' this pronoun referred to, say, Demosthenes not to himself'.

also spoke for Athens and tried to ensure its grain supply.[383] Furthermore, an inscription from one of the bases of the two statues dedicated to Lollianus which Philostratus mentions has survived, and we see how it praises the 'sophist' for both his *meletai* and his actions in the law-courts.[384] Lollianus is certainly not the only one of Philostratus' 'sophists' to have dabbled in the actual judicial process, but if this is taken together with his political role at Athens and his speech 'as' Demosthenes, one could infer that he actively associated himself with the fourth-century orator. The reasons for this have to do mainly with an attitude towards Greece in general and Athens in particular which, Spawforth argues, starts with Augustus and is continued by Hadrian.[385]

Spawforth contends that Augustus' focus on Athens with his building programme and especially with the Agrippeum in the Agora deliberately promoted an image of Greece that conformed to Roman values.[386] To summarise his argument, he explains how the position of the new Odeon at Athens commissioned by Augustus linked it closely to the newly established temple of Ares. Ares was a deity not traditionally worshipped in Athens, but his Roman counter-part, Mars, was obviously an important part of Roman identity, so that anyone who used the Agrippeum/Odeon would have been encouraged to think about the martial glory days of Classical Athens. Thus Augustus was re-creating an Athens that was in line with Roman moral values, of martial virility and victory; in Spawforth's own words: 'The Atticising décor, the statues of Greek/Athenian warriors and the newly arrived cult of Ares: this use of analogy signaled the donor's [i.e. Agrippa's] stylistic preference for the Attic muse and his ethical linkage of the style with the *virtus* and *bellica laus* of Classical Greece.'[387] Furthermore, the only recorded purpose of the Agrippeum was to stage declamatory performances and, by setting it up in the Agora, Augustus wanted to indicate both that the rhetorical tradition of Athens was being recognised and also that there was a correct, non-subversive way of using it. Spawforth points out that in the late

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[383] As Wright (1952) 100 points out, this fictitious speech is based on Demosthenes, *Leptines* 30 (but also see 31-34), delivered by the orator in 355, where Demosthenes emphasises that, if Leptines' law was in force then Athens would be left without grain from the Bosporus.
[384] EpGr 877.
[385] Spawforth (2012) 60-80.
[386] Spawforth (2012) 62.
[387] Spawforth (2012) 70.

republic Greek politicians had used 'Asian'-style (as opposed to Attic) oratory 'to inflame opinion at civic assemblies against the Roman interest', most notably when the philosopher Athenion persuaded the Athenians to join Mithridates of Pontus in an alliance against the Romans.[388] The setting of the Agrippeum and encouragement of oratory in the Attic style signalled the imperial regime's 'low esteem for crowd-pleasing political oratory in the prevailing "Asian" manner' and its 'preference for […] the fictional themes delivered in the decorous speech-register of Classical Athens'.[389]

Hadrian too gave special place to Athens when it came to Greekness, as seen in his attention to the physical shape of the city but also to Athens' place in relation to the Greek world in general.[390] The latter is most obvious in Hadrian's creation of the Panhellenion, a cultural league of cities which had Athens as its leader and whose membership was granted based on Greekness.[391] However, as Spawforth argues, Hellenism was ranked by Hadrian using a very particular conception of the place of Greece, with places that were in mainland Greece or colonies of such states being considered more 'Greek' than others (Athens and Sparta being in the centre). This view also favoured Greekness by birth and descent to 'cultural Greekness', meaning that some cities and communities – particularly in Asia Minor and the Roman near east – which did not have a strong connection to mainland Greece and had adopted the Greek 'way of life' and *paideia* were considered less 'Greek'.[392] While there were cities such as Pergamum, Ephesus and Smyrna who were ostensibly not part of the Panhellenion, and individuals who were very proud to be from Asia Minor and rejected 'Atticism' (most notably Plutarch), there are also many examples of people seeking to align themselves to this Hadrianic view of 'true Greece'.[393] Spawforth points out that there was a rush of Greeks from Asia to mainland Greece, such as the Roman senators A. Claudius Charax of Pergamum and C. Claudius Titianus Demostratus of Ephesus who were both *patronomoi* at Sparta, M. Iulius Apellas of Carian Mylasa who was archon of the Eumolpidae, an anonymous citizen of Smyrna who held

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[388] Spawforth (2012) 78.
[389] Spawforth (2012) 79.
[390] Geagan (1979) 392-393; 398; Shear (1981) 374-377; Thompson (1987) 9-15.
[391] Boatwright (2000) 148-150; Jones (1996); Spawforth (1985) and (1999).
[392] Spawforth (2012) 253-254; Romeo (2002).
[393] Spawforth (2012) 261; 265-267; Whitmarsh (2005) 47-49.

priestly office at Plataea, and Arrian himself who moved to Athens.[394] But a willingness to be associated with the 'true Greece' can also be seen in the case of entire cities struggling to demonstrate a 'true' Greek descent, such as Aezani in Phrygia, accepted into the Panhellenion only because they proved that they were founded by Arcadians.[395]

It is against this background that we should examine Lollianus' and Arrian's techniques of presentation. Since Lollianus was from Ephesus, his interest in declamation, his political activity in Athens and his intention of being associated with Demosthenes will all have served to align him to this self-same – to use Spawforth's terms – *vera Graecia*. But, as I hinted before, I believe Lollianus is also using the prestige of Demosthenes to augment his own prestige as the words and actions of the two blend together in a blur of past and present – which at the moment of the declamation were both in the mind of audiences, as Webb argued.[396] I would dare push her argument even further, and suggest that the audience judged not only the sophistic performance but also the sophist himself, and thus by his choice of theme and comparison to Demosthenes, Lollianus is encouraging them to think of him also in the context of current Athenian civic life, suggesting that his actions rivalled those of the great orator and deserved similar credit.

While in Lollianus' case we can only suspect his desire to be associated with Demosthenes, in Arrian we have a clearer example, in a text which is in some ways similar to a 'sophistic' speech, of him actually impersonating Xenophon for similar reasons.

Firstly all the commentators have noticed that Arrian, as he does before in the *Kynegetikos*, calls himself Xenophon in the *Ektaxis*:

> **ὁ δὲ ἡγεμὼν** τῆς πάσης στρατιᾶς **Ξενοφῶν** τὸ πολὺ μὲν πρὸ τῶν σημείων τῶν πεζικῶν ἡγείσθω

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[394] Spawforth (2012) 262.
[395] Spawforth (2012) 262.
[396] Webb (2006) 45.

'And let the leader of the entire army, Xenophon, mostly command in front of the infantry standards.'[397]

In all other texts Xenophon is identified as a figure distinct from Arrian, either implicitly or explicitly. For example, in the beginning of the *Periplus* Arrian calls him 'that Xenophon' (ὁ Ξενοφῶν ἐκεῖνος) and later on he is named 'Xenophon the elder' (Ξενοφῶντι τῷ πρεσβυτέρῳ; Ξενοφῶν ὁ πρεσβύτερος).[398] In the *Taktika* he is not named 'the other' but it is clear that he is a different person from Arrian in a passage is about other authors ('some […] others […]'/ οἳ μὲν […]οἳ δὲ), while in a different passage he is called Xenophon son of Gryllos, just like in the preface to the *Kynegetikos*.[399] There, Arrian also explains that he and Xenophon have the same name, but makes it very clear that they are two different people.[400]

In the *Ektaxis*, however, the 'old Xenophon' does not appear; perhaps the reader is left purposely wondering which Xenophon this is – the old or the new? Or are they here the same person? The issue would be clearer if Xenophon were Arrian's actual given name, as perhaps there would not be that much room for interpretation. This is what Stadter argues, thinking it does not appear in inscriptions because there he uses his official Roman name, and also thinking it must be a given name because Arrian says it is.[401] But, as Bosworth notes, the epigraphic evidence does not support this and I must add that, in the case of other individuals named Xenophon, such as Claudius' physician, C. Stertinius Xenophon, the Greek name **does** appear in official epigraphic contexts, thus weakening Stadter's argument.[402] Furthermore Stadter's parallel with Plutarch's Roman name – Maestrius – which we only know from an inscription at Delphi, does not quite work, because in that inscription his Greek and Roman names appear together, just as in the case of Stertinius.[403]

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[397] Arr. *Ektax.* 10.
[398] Arr. *Peripl.M.Eux.* 1; 12; 25.
[399] Arr. *Tact.* 6, 29.
[400] For the clear differentiation between the two see Stadter (1967) 157 who points out that Arrian uses words to distinguish himself from the fourth century author.
[401] Stadter (1967).
[402] Bosworth (1977) 248 and note 128.
[403] SIG3 829a.

As for the argument that it must be his real name because Arrian himself calls himself that, it would seem that the question of identity is slightly more complicated if considered against the earlier issue of Lollianus and what I took to be a desire to avoid being associated with Asia Minor through his activities at Athens. Arrian also claims to be from Athens, although we know he was originally from Nicomedia and only became a citizen of Athens when he retired there after his imperial career. However, what he chooses to highlight is different because, as Spawforth argues, he wants to be associated with 'true' Greece.[404] We also see the same play with identity in Polyaenus' case. He is also from Nicomedia but chooses to highlight his Macedonian descent (whence his family might have come originally) to give authority to his text, as Macedonian blood counted a lot towards expertise in warfare (or so he believed).[405] So, in the end, the fact that Arrian says he has the same name as Xenophon does not count for much, as he could easily have chosen to highlight it after having appropriated it. I therefore agree with Bosworth, who states that Arrian's reference to himself as Xenophon in the *Ektaxis* 'is a part of the literary affectation whereby Arrian represented himself as the New Xenophon, and it is hardly likely that he would have kept up the affectation in an official document."'[406]

Arrian not only encouraged the thought that in some sense he was Xenophon, he also adopted Xenophon's language. This was not merely a matter of using the correct Attic vocabulary, in the way that declaimers do, but a matter of adopting a vocabulary of battle which was out-of date and archaising. One aspect of this has been pointed out by Bosworth and Stadter – the use of phalanx for legion, but there is more.[407]

First, there is the indication as to how the legionaries should raise the warcry: πελαζόντων δὲ ἤδη ὡς μέγιστον καὶ φοβερώτατον ἀλαλάζειν σύμπαντας τῷ Ἐνυαλίῳ/'and let all approach and raise a cry to Enialios as loudly and terrifyingly as possible'.[408] By its mention of Ares' epithet Enyalios, the passage reminds one of hoplite battle, as described by Xenophon himself: καὶ ἅμα

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[404] Spawforth (2012) 262.
[405] See chapter I.1 and Krentz and Wheeler(1994) ix-xvi, but contra Morton (2010) 112.
[406] Bosworth (1977) 248.
[407] Bosworth (1977) 249; for the common ways to refer to legions in Greek see note 135; Stadter (1980) 46.
[408] Arr. *Ektax*. 25.

ἐφθέγξαντο πάντες οἷον τῷ Ἐνυαλίῳ ἐλελίζουσι/'at the same moment they all set up the sort of war-cry which they raise to Enyalios, and all alike began running.'[409]

Second, we have the description of Arrian's entourage: **οἱ δὲ ἐπίλεκτοι ἱππῆς ἀμφ᾽ αὐτὸν Ξενοφῶντα ἔστων, καὶ τῶν ἀπὸ τῆς φάλαγγος πεζῶν**/'And let chosen men from the cavalry surround Xenophon and from the infantry of the phalanx'. This closely resembles Xenophon's use of picked troops and his own entourage, as seen twice in the *Anabasis*: συνέπεσθαι δ᾽ ἐκέλευσεν αὐτῷ καὶ τοὺς τριακοσίους οὓς αὐτὸς εἶχε **τῶν ἐπιλέκτων** ἐπὶ τῷ στόματι τοῦ πλαισίου /'he also ordered the three hundred picked men under his own command at the front of the square to join Xenophon's force' and **ὁ δὲ Ξενοφῶν ἔχων τοὺς ἐπιλέκτους** ἐν τῇ ὑπὸ τὸ ὄρος ἀνωτάτω κώμῃ/'while Xenophon with his picked men took quarters in the uppermost village below the summit'.[410]

This is not to say that Arrian's *epilektoi* were not real troops (which goes for all the troops in the text, as we shall see below) - surely Bosworth must be right in seeing the Roman *equites singulares* in the **οἱ δὲ ἐπίλεκτοι ἱππῆς** and Polybius, earlier on, uses the term to refer to the Roman *extraordinarii*.[411] However, by very subtly describing himself as operating in a way similar to Xenophon, surrounded by picked men which can be seen as both the Roman *equites singulares* and Xenophon's *epilektoi*, he is bringing together Greek and Roman practices and makes the connection between his army and Xenophon's. Furthermore, by choosing to describe the entire army and himself in an archaising way which reminds the audience of the fourth-century Xenophon and his troops, but without at any moment giving the impression that what he is describing is anything but a Roman provincial army, Arrian is at the same time explaining his actions in his present but also re-creating a Classical past. Just as we saw Lollianus of Ephesus as an Athenian official, pretending to be Demosthenes in an Athenian law-court whilst in front of an audience in the theatre at Athens, Arrian is also at the same time Flavius Arrianus the Roman governor leading his provincial army and Xenophon son of Gryllos, the general from Athens.

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[409] X. *An.* 1.18.18.
[410] Arr. *Ektax.* 22; X. *Anab.* 3.4.43 and 7.4.11, translations by C.L. Brownson.
[411] E.g. Plb. 6.26.

As in the case of Lollianus, the reasons for Arrian's impersonation of Xenophon are twofold. The first simply takes Spawforth's point about him trying to fit into the Roman idea of 'true' Greece further. Not only, as Spawforth argues, does he move to Athens in his old age and become archon there, but before this, as serving Roman official, he is trying to construct an identity which is – from a Roman imperial point of view – incontestably Greek, using techniques similar to declamation, which is in itself a Roman-sanctioned practice.

But second, just as in the previous chapter, we can perhaps see in this attempt at integration within the empire also a competition, this time between himself and the Greek past represented by Xenophon, and – again perhaps like Lollianus – an attempt to use this competition both to augment his own achievements and to put them into perspective. So, can we think that, as in Lollianus' case, Arrian would have wanted to boost his reputation? If so, for what reasons? Cassius Dio's account of the war with the Alani makes it clear that it was not a particularly dangerous affair (as Arrian's preparations would have us believe), and it appears that there was no actual battle. Dio tells us that the Alani were simply frightened and turned away by the governor's forces (τὰ δὲ καὶ Φλάουιον Ἀρριανὸν τὸν τῆς Καππαδοκίας ἄρχοντα φοβηθέντων/'but were also frightened by Flavius Arrianus, the governor of Cappadocia').[412] Bosworth is perhaps right in believing there was only a skirmish, and states that 'it is questionable whether the Alani ever posed a serious frontier problem for the Romans. Their previous history, in so far as it is known, suggests that their depredations in general served the interests of Rome.'[413]

No doubt repelling them was essential, but given that they had been on a booty expedition doing so could not have been hard and the threat to Cappadocia was minimal. Therefore, Arrian would perhaps have wanted to augment his success by blending past and present and presenting himself in the persona of a successful general such as Xenophon, and associating his prestige with Xenophon's to create a stronger impact in regard to an otherwise minimal threat. However, in terms of overall competition with Xenophon it could not have escaped Arrian that the fourth-century general fought as a mercenary for a Persian (and not even legitimate) ruler,

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[412] D.C. 69.15.
[413] Bosworth (1977) 220.

Cyrus the Younger, and then for the Spartans at the battle of Coronea in 394 B.C. against his own city of Athens, for which he was exiled. In comparison, Arrian not only served Athens in his old age as archon, but defended the borders of the Roman Empire from however little a danger, so the comparison between him and Xenophon need not only place him in a positive light by virtue of Xenophon's prestige. In other words, it shows how Arrian had the heritage and skills of a Xenophon but also was more successful than him, both in a Roman moral framework and in a Roman-approved Greek one, by serving both his *patriae* - the Roman Empire and Athens – successfully, unlike Xenophon. But, in talking about Xenophon and himself, Arrian is also talking more broadly about Greeks and Romans and ideas of empire and this is what we will turn to now.

2. The Ektaxis *and the geography of the army*

'Why would you "publish" the *Ektaxis*?' This seems to me to be one of the fundamental questions in understanding the text and the bigger issues behind it. This is clearly not meant to be a 'manual' or 'handbook' in the same sense in which one might read the *Taktika* because the situation described is too specific to allow any generalisation. At best this could be read as a case-study following Stadter's line, but the idea that it demonstrates how the principles described in the *Taktika* can be applied cannot be dissociated from the personal advertising of Arrian as the man doing the applying. If we then start thinking about 'publication' as a form of advertising – and we have clearly seen how Arrian 'advertises' himself as Xenophon – we might wonder what else apart from the author might be advertised. I believe the answer to this question is 'the Roman Empire', for if one examines the troops described in the *Ektaxis* and Arrian's position in the middle of this all, one gets the idea that it presents a microcosm of empire with its particular geography, but also with great emphasis on diversity.

First of all, it must be said that there is no reason to doubt that the troops mentioned in the *Ektaxis* are real. The units of troops deployed have now long been identified by Grotefend and more definitively by Ritterling, and if Arrian's agenda was to make a greater point about the Roman Empire, it would have made sense to use existing units, even if the description of his

battle array was highly literary.[414] Having said this, the very fact that scholars have needed to go to so much trouble to figure out the exact units to which Arrian is referring makes it quite clear that he is not primarily interested in enabling real-life troops to be identified. Unlike in the *Taktika*, where, as Busetto shows, he goes to great pains to translate into Greek the exact terms used by the Roman army (sometimes having to resort to periphrases), in the *Ektaxis* Arrian uses various ways of referring to the units – not just the one which would make it easiest for a reader simply interested in military facts to understand, namely giving the name and number of the troop in question.[415] Arrian uses this latter technique only twice, in paragraph one, to differentiate between the two Rhaetian cohorts: οἱ τῆς σπείρας τῆς τετάρτης τῶν Ῥαιτῶν, identified by Ritterling as the riders of the *cohors IIII Rhaetorum equitata* shown as stationed in Analiba in the *Notitia dignitatum*, and the οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς πρώτης Ῥαιτικῆς, that Ritterling assumes are the horsemen of a *cohors I Rhaetorum equitata*, but which is not in the *Notitia* nor can be identified with certainty.[416] Unit numbers – without their full designation – appear concerning only two more bodies of troops, the legions: ἡ πεζικὴ φάλαγξ ἡ πεντεκαιδεκάτη identified as the XV *Apollinaris*, and the τὸ σημεῖον τῆς δωδεκάτης φάλαγγος, 'standard of the twelfth phalanx' which according to Ritterling is the *XII fulminata*.[417] Arrian's preferred way of referring to troops is by their 'ethnic' names (but also names which relate to their status, such as the οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς ἴλης ᾗ ὄνομα Κολῶνες/'those from the *ala* whose name is *Coloni*') sometimes in conjunction with the type of unit, e.g. ἡ ἴλη τῶν Γετῶν, but most of the time just simply as the 'Celtic horsemen', οἱ Κελτοὶ ἱππῆς or simply 'the Italians and Cyrenians' οἵ τε Ἰταλοὶ καὶ Κυρηναίων.[418] Ritterling makes the point that, when it comes to the cavalry, when Arrian uses just the 'ethnic' names he is referring to the horsemen of a *cohors*, rather than an *ala*, which he

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[414] Grotefend (1867); Ritterling (1902). For the history of scholarship see Bosworth (1977) 232-233.
[415] Busetto (2013) 237.
[416] Ritterling (1902) 369.
[417] Ritterling (1902) 361.
[418] Arr. *Ectax.* 8; 2; 3.Ritterling (1902) 362 for the ἡ ἴλη τῶν Γετῶν as the *ala I Ulpia Dacorum*; 364 for the οἱ Κελτοὶ ἱππῆς as the riders of the *cohors I Germanorum*; for the Italians and Cyrenians 365 as the *cohors I Italica voluntariorum civium Romanorum* and respectively 366 as a *vexillatio* of the *cohors III Augusta Cyrenaica sagittariorum equitata*. Also Bosworth (1993) 265 for Arrian's insistence on national names as a parallel to Xenophon's text, but the purpose is similar in both, namely to emphasise the many peoples in the service of the emperor in the former and Persian king in the latter.

always names.[419] While this may be true, the terminology used throughout the treatise is much too inconsistent to be considered as a well thought-out system – at least in the sense of precise identification.

The insistence on 'ethnic' epithets emphasises the diversity of peoples present in the Roman army. Thus we see the Aurianoi and Rhaetians being led by a Corinthian named Daphnes (ἐπὶ δὲ τούτοις ἐπιτετάχθων οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς ἴλης ᾗτινι Αὐριανοὶ ὄνομα. συντετάχθων δὲ αὐτοῖς οἱ τῆς σπείρας τῆς τετάρτης τῶν Ῥαιτῶν, ἧς ἄρχων Δάφνης Κορίνθιος).[420] Following them are the Iturians and Cyrenaeans (συντετάχθων δὲ αὐτοῖς Ἰτουραῖοι καὶ Κυρηναῖοι)[421], also led by someone with a Greek name – Demetrius – and after these are deployed the Celts (ἐπὶ τούτοις δὲ οἱ Κελτοὶ ἱππῆς), who are preceded by the infantry which is made up of Italians and Cyrenians, under the leadership of an Italian, Pulcher (οἵ τε Ἰταλοὶ καὶ Κυρηναίων οἱ παρόντες. πάντων δὲ ἡγείσθω Πούλχερ, ὅσπερ ἄρχει τοῖς Ἰταλοῖς).[422] All of these are all real troops, but the way in which Arrian presents them, by using their 'ethnic' names first and foremost, but also in the case of Daphnes emphasising their commander's origin, gives a very strong sense of the unique geographical diversity of the empire. A reader who understands that all these different peoples, although so diverse, had come together to fight for the empire under Arrian's command, comes to see Arrian's army as representative of the Roman Empire as a whole, with Arrian being a surrogate for the emperor/commander.

This recognition of the diversity but also the unity within the empire is further augmented by this very way in which Arrian refers to them, not only by using the dry name and number designation – of which he is clearly aware – but by emphasising that these are real people in the empire: Celts, Italians, Cyrenians, Corinthians. By presenting different ways in which one can describe troops, Arrian is also revealing the way in which the empire recognises their uniqueness and individual existence outside of the units; so the Rhaetians are part of the fourth

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[419] Ritterling (1902) 362.

[420] Arr. *Ektax*. 1; Ritterling (1902) 361 the *ala II Ulpia Auriana* and respectively 369, the *cohors IIII Rhaetorum equitata*.

[421] Arr. *Ektax*. 2.

[422] Arr. *Ektax*. 3; Ritterling (1902) 367 for the more problematic cohors of Ituraioi, which is not identifiable in any inscription; and also Grotefend (1867) 24 for the difficulty in identifying the two.

speira but they are still Rhaetians, and a legitimate way of referring to them would be just 'the Rhaetian infantry' or the 'Rhaetian cavalry' just as Arrian refers to the πεζοὶ[…] Ἰταλοί, the Βοσπορανοὶ […]πεζοὶ or the Κελτοὶ ἱππῆς. Along the same lines, in using periphrases such as οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς ἴλης ᾖ ὄνομα Κολῶνες, 'those from the *ala* whose name is *Coloni*', Arrian is perhaps also emphasising that not all of the members of the *ala* are *coloni*, since new members may have been recruited from different areas due to casualties, and so the make-up of the unit may have been more diverse than its name implies, and one needed to recognise that.[423]

Unity in diversity of the Roman Empire is also emphasised by targeting the army in particular in Hadrian's coinage. In the EXERCITUS series we see the provincial armies being honoured locally, with the name of the province (Britannia, Cappadocia, Dacia, Dalmatia, Germania, Hispania, Mauretania, Moesia, Noricum, Rhaetia, Syria and Thracia) but without any iconographic particularities. So, 'although honoured under local names, the armies remain Roman throughout'.[424] The idea that Arrian is supporting the emperor's policy of 'unity in diversity' is also apparent at the end of his *Taktika*, where Hadrian is commended for incorporating 'barbarian' tactics in his army but most importantly because he allowed the 'ethnic' contingents to fight in the ways in which they were accustomed, preserving even their shouts in their own language:

> ὁ βασιλεὺς δὲ προσεξεῦρεν καὶ τὰ βαρβαρικὰ ἐκμελετᾶν αὐτούς, ὅσα τε Παρθυαίων ἢ Ἀρμενίων ἱπποτοξόται ἐπασκοῦσι, καὶ ὅσας οἱ Σαυρομάτων ἢ Κελτῶν κοντοφόροι ἐπιστροφάς τε καὶ ἀποστροφάς τῶν ἵππων ἐν μέρει ἐπελαυνόντων, **καὶ ἀκροβολισμοὺς ἐν τούτῳ πολυειδεῖς καὶ πολυτρόπους καὶ ἀλαλαγμοὺς πατρίους ἑκάστῳ γένει**, Κελτικοὺς μὲν τοῖς Κελτοῖς ἱππεῦσι, Γετικοὺς δὲ τοῖς Γέταις, Ῥαιτικοὺς δὲ ὅσοι ἐκ Ῥαιτῶν.

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[423] Gilliver (2007) 193 'Auxiliary units were initially raised from Rome's provinces and were identified by their tribal or geographic origin, but gradually local recruitment where the units were stationed diluted much of their ethnic identity and in the second century A.D. citizens were serving in the auxiliary units as well as legions'. However, I do not want to push this point too far as the difference in name here might only be due to stylistic reasons and the desire to avoid repetition or alternatively it might just be the only way in which one could refer to these troops as the *Koloni* were not a people nor were the *Aurianoi* in line 6 of chapter 1, whose unit is presented in the same way.
[424] Mattingly (1936) clxxiii.

'but the king devised besides that they should also train in the ways of the barbarians, such as the Parthian and Armenian mounted archers practice, and the wheeling around and turning back manoeuvres which the Sarmatians and Celts engage in, driving their horses upon one another, **and that they should also include in their training the skirmishing of many forms and many turns, and the shouts which are native to each race**, the Celtic ones for the Celtic horsemen, the Getic ones for the Getae, and the Rhaetians for the Rhaetians.'[425]

These traditions are therefore placed – by Hadrian – on the same level as τοῖς Ῥωμαίων ἱππεῦσι τὰ συνήθη τε καὶ ἐκ παλαιοῦ ἀσκούμενα, the 'customary exercises of the Romans and their practices of old', and the Roman Empire's recognition and appreciation for 'foreign' imports, as discussed earlier in the *Taktika* complements this image. [426] But the emphasis there was mostly on the past and on how in the early days of Rome this was common practice, whilst in the discussion above Arrian is demonstrating how Hadrian is in fact upholding this fine Roman tradition in his present day. Therefore, while in the *Ektaxis* this idea of unity in diversity is perhaps suggested, it is more clearly expressed in the *Taktika*.

However, allowing for diversity is not restricted merely to Hadrian's 'programme', but is part of a more general Roman 'imperial programme'. After all, as has been pointed out many times, Roman identity – down to its core in Rome's foundation myth – is inclusive, and Greg Woolf has shown, with respect to Greeks and Romans in the empire, that in their rule the latter were interested only in upholding a certain set of morals and practices and did not try radically to alter the identity of those being ruled. In his own words: 'Greeks remained Greeks, at least in part, because Romans allowed them to. By valuing the Greek past and permitting the Greek language to operate as an official one throughout the early empire, Romans made no assault on the central defining characteristics of Hellenism.'[427] The same argument could be made about Arrian's presentation of Hadrian's 'reforms' and the army mentioned above: the Romans organised their troops to fight in specific units (such as *alae*, cohorts, *numeri*), each

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[425] Arr. *Tact.* 44.
[426] Arr. *Tact.* 33.
[427] Woolf (1994) 131.

commanded by a Roman (citizen), but they were perfectly happy to allow them to preserve the particularities of their fighting styles which made them very efficient and useful to the empire in the first place.[428]

In keeping with the theme of past and present, the geography of the empire in the *Ektaxis* also comprises the past, further augmenting the feeling of diversity in the Roman empire and stressing its permanence, because it spans over so many peoples and over so much time. This is evident in the self-same archaising which Bosworth talked about, namely in the incorporation of the tactics of the Greek phalanx in the Roman legion:

> τετάχθων δὲ ἐπὶ ὀκτώ, καὶ πυκνὴ αὐτοῖς ἔστω ἡ σύγκλεισις. καὶ αἱ μὲν πρῶται τέσσαρες τάξεις ἔστων κοντοφόρων, ὧν δὴ τοῖς κοντοῖς μακρὰ καὶ ἐπίλεπτα τὰ σιδήρια προῆκται. καὶ τούτους οἱ μὲν πρωτοστάται ἐς προβολὴν ἐχόντων, ὡς εἰ πελάζοιεν αὐτοῖς οἱ πολέμιοι, κατὰ τὰ στήθη μάλιστα τῶν ἵππων τίθεσθαι τῶν κοντῶν τὸν σίδηρον

> 'Let the ranks form eight deep and in close order; Let the first four ranks be made up of those who have *kontoi* (long pikes), and whose *kontoi* have long and light iron tips attached. And these the men in their first ranks should have projecting forward, so that if the enemies approach them, the iron of the spears will be driven into the horses chests.'[429]

This is perhaps more than just a way in which the formations described in the *Taktika* can work in real life, but it is recognition of the importance of the traditions of the Greeks and a demonstration of how the Empire still acknowledges and keeps them alive, just as in the case of the Celts, Getae and Rhaetians. But the Greek phalanx also becomes a tool, showing how Greek knowledge can still help order the Roman Empire more generally, and the Roman army more specifically, with Arrian being both possessor of said knowledge and the one who orders it.

This recognition of diversity in the Roman Empire comes into sharp contrast with the view we get of Alexander's 'empire' in the *Anabasis*, when Arrian discusses the latter's military reforms. In this case too we see Persians incorporated in the structures of the Macedonian army (καὶ

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[428] For auxiliary units being commanded by Roman officers see Goldsworthy (2003) 64; for *numeri* Gilliver (2007) 195.
[429] Arr. *Ektax.* 15-16.

πέμπτη ἐπὶ τούτοις ἱππαρχία προσγενομένη, οὐ βαρβαρικὴ ἡ πᾶσα, ἀλλὰ ἐπαυξηθέντος γὰρ τοῦ παντὸς ἱππικοῦ κατελέγησαν ἐς αὐτὸ τῶν βαρβάρων/'Furthermore, a fifth hipparchy had been created: it was not entirely barbarian, but when the whole cavalry was increased in size, barbarians were enrolled in it') but instead of their fighting styles being welcomed, they were in fact forced to accept those of the Macedonians, most evident in the replacement of their 'barbarian javelins' with 'Macedonian spears' (καὶ τούτοις δόρατα Μακεδονικὰ ἀντὶ τῶν βαρβαρικῶν μεσαγκύλων δοθέντα).[430] It is almost certain that Arrian wrote the *Anabasis* after the *Taktika*, but I believe that his portrayal of Alexander's empire may have been influenced by his image of the one he was living in and serving under, and vice-versa, and thus felt the need to emphasise the 'correct' ways in which some things were being done by the Romans.

But along this line, it is interesting that in the same way in which Hadrian focuses on Athens as a symbol for the whole of Greece, therefore creating a certain view of Greekness, so too Arrian and Aelian focus on the phalanx in reconstructing its military tradition, and this is what we shall address next.

3*. The* Taktika*, Alexander, Greek phalanxes and the emperors' military image*

In the previous section we have briefly considered Hadrian's attention to the incorporation of 'foreign' military practices into the Roman army, as emphasised by Arrian in his *Taktika*. In what follows I will try to show how the *Taktika* of Arrian fits into an image of the perfect commander which Hadrian was clearly trying to create, showing how he has mastered Roman practices but also implying that he either is or should be the possessor of Greek knowledge. Then, by looking more closely at their subject matter, I will demonstrate why Arrian and Aelian chose to write *taktika* and how they are trying to advertise them as texts which are worthy of being read by the emperors, as they could give them an edge when it came to military knowledge.

3.1. Arrian's Taktika *and Hadrian 'the commander'*

After Trajan's expansion of the empire, Hadrian had to deal with rebellions in the newly conquered provinces, which led to the evacuation of many of them, such as Mesopotamia,

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[430] Arr. *An.* 7.6.1-6.

Greater Armenia, Assyria and to the abandoning of Trajan's bridge over the Danube.[431] Opper believes that this 'must have come as a profound shock, breeding instant resentment in some of the senators and the Roman public at large'.[432] Indeed the *Historia Augusta* informs us that 'Hadrian abandoned many provinces won by Trajan, and also destroyed, contrary to the entreaties of all, the theatre which Trajan had built in the Campus Martius. These measures, unpopular enough in themselves, were still more displeasing because of his pretense that all acts which he thought would be offensive had been secretly enjoined upon him by Trajan (*Inter haec tamen et multas provincias a Traiano adquisitas reliquit et theatrum, quod ille in Campo Martio posuerat, contra omnium vota destruxit. et haec quidem eo tristiora videbantur, quod omnia, quae displicere vidisset Hadrianus, mandata sibi ut faceret secreto a Traiano esse simulabat.*)'[433]

Even allowing for the unreliable nature of the *Historia Augusta* and for Opper's exaggeration, given his recent succession and military setbacks, it is understandable that Hadrian would have wanted to cultivate a strong military image of a successful and experienced commander, in order to support his policy of consolidating the empire's boundaries rather than expanding them.[434] As Opper points out, this was done in part through iconography, with statues representing the emperor as Mars (such as the one in the Capitoline Museum at Rome) or depicting him in a military cuirass and with his foot on a defeated barbarian (the colossal statue from Hierapytna), and partly through his engagement with the troops.[435] One of the places where we find the latter demonstrated is the *Historia Augusta*, which depicts Hadrian with the common trope of the good commander, sharing the burdens of service with the soldiers just like figures from the Roman past:

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[431] Birley (1997) 78-79; Opper (2008) 66-67.

[432] Opper (2008) 67 but cf. Campbell (1984) 398-400 for a more balanced impression amongst the senators of Hadrian's policies. For Hadrian's reign see Birley (1997), esp. 75-92; for Hadrian's attention to the troops and his military image Campbell (1984) 47-48.

[433] *SHA*, *Hadr.* 9, all translations by D. Magie. Opper (2008) 237 also relies on Eutropius relaying rumors spread by Hadrian's critics in his 'absurd assertion that Hadrian's actions were due to his envy of Trajan's successes (Eutropius 8.6.2) and on Fronto's 'carefully veiled criticism' in a letter to Marcus Aurelius, saying that 'due to his love of peace, Hadrian refrained even from justified actions'.

[434] For the general unreliable nature of the *Historia Augusta* see Syme (1970) 1-16.

[435] Opper (2008) 70.

pacisque magis quam belli cupidus militem, quasi bellum immineret, exercuit tolerantiae documentis eum imbuens, ipse quoque inter manipula vitam militarem magistrans, cibis etiam castrensibus in propatulo libenter utens, hoc est larido caseo et posca, exemplo Scipionis Aemiliani et Metelli et auctoris sui Traiani, multos praemiis nonnullos honoribus donans, ut ferre possent ea quae asperius iubebat. si quidem ipse post Caesarem Octavianum labantem disciplinam incuria superiorum principum retinuit.

'Though more desirous of peace than of war, he kept the soldiers in training just as if war were imminent, inspired them by proofs of his own powers of endurance, actually led a soldier's life among the maniples, and after the example of Scipio Aemilianus, Metellus, and his own adoptive father Trajan, cheerfully ate out of doors such camp-fare as bacon, cheese and vinegar. And that he troops might submit more willingly to the increased harshness of his orders, he bestowed gifts on many and honours on a few. For he re-established the discipline of the camp, which since the time of Octavian had been growing slack through the laxity of his predecessors.'[436]

But by far the most important evidence for Hadrian's portrayal of himself as an experienced commander is the Lambaesis inscriptions, the perfect demonstration that Hadrian wanted not only to have a close relationship with the troops but also for this to be recorded for future reference.[437] This was set up as part of a monument outside a legionary fort in North Africa, in the province of Numidia, and records Hadrian's speeches to the troops he inspected in 128 A.D.[438] Although the text is very fragmentary, we can still see that, just like Arrian's *Ektaxis*, it constitutes a means of self-presentation and advertising for Hadrian, and in it we notice the same relationship between the emperor and his troops as emphasised in the later *Historia Augusta*:

[Catullinu]s leg(atus) meus pro causa ves[tra a]cer est, ve[rum, quae argu]-

[e]nda vobis aput me fuissent omnia mihi pro vobis ipse di[xit, quod]

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[436] *SHA Hadr.*10.2.
[437] Opper (2008) 70-71; for Lambaesis 85-87. Campbell (1984) 77-80.
[438] Opper (2008) 85.

cohors abest, quod omnibus annis per vices in officium pro[con]=

sulis mittitur, quod ante annum tertium cohortem et qui [nos]

ex centuris in supplementum comparum tertianorum dedis-

tis, quod multae, quod diversae stationes vos distinent, quod

nostra memoria bis tantutm mutastis castra sed et nova fecis-

tis. Ob haec excusatos vos habe[rem si q]uid in exercitatione cessas-

set. Sed nihil aut cessavis[se videtur aut est ulla causa cur]

vobis excusatione [aput me opus esset - - - ca. 26 - - -]

retis val[- - - ca. 48 - - -]

'Catullinus, my legate, is keen in your support; indeed, everything that you might have had to put to me he has himself told me on your behalf; that a cohort is away because, taking turns, one is sent every year to the staff of the Proconsul; that two years ago you gave a cohort and five men from each centuria to the fellow third legion, that many and far-flung outposts keep you scattered, that twice within our memory you have not only changed fortresses but built new ones. For this I would have forgiven you if something had come to a halt in your training. But nothing seems to have halted, nor is there any reason why you should need my forgiving'[439]

But Hadrian also insists on his ability to evaluate and correct in his address to the *cohors II Hamiorum*, chiding the riders for not being careful in maintaining formation (*tarde iunxistis* […] erumpetis veh[ementius]/'You were slow to close ranks - - you will break out more briskly').[440] He also displays detailed understanding of the minutiae of cavalry warfare in commending the *ala I Pannoniorum* for their complex manoeuvres: *Omnia per ordinem egistis. Campum de[cu]rsionibus complestis, iaculati estis non ineleganter, has[tis usi q]uamquam brevibus et duris/* You did everything according to the book. You filled the training ground with your wheelings, you threw spears not ungracefully, though with short and stiff shafts.'[441] It is clear

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[439] Spiedel (2006) 8.
[440] Spiedel (2006) 12; see also Opper (2008) 85.
[441] Spiedel (2006) 14.

that the emperor wanted emphasise his military knowledge and his skills as a general and I believe the *Taktika* is trying to help Hadrian to do so and perhaps reconcile it with his more philhellene interests.

Connections between the Lambaesis inscriptions and Arrian's *Taktika* have already been pointed out by Busetto, although I would not go as far as her in saying that the latter is simply a literary transposition of the former. In looking at the two we could argue not only that Arrian actively paid attention to the language preferred by the emperor to present himself as a good commander, but that he chooses to give the same – albeit commonsensical – advice as him concerning cavalry matters, thus emphasising Hadrian's correct knowledge in this respect.[442] This is most apparent in their agreement that the best military exercises are the ones that best simulate the realities of combat, and we see Hadrian making this point to the riders of the same *cohors II Hamiorum – laudo quod convertuit vos ad hanc exercitat[ionem…quae verae di]micationis imaginem accepit et sic exercet [vos - - - ca. 12 - - - ut lau]dare vos possim./*'I praise him for having brought you over to this manoeuvre that has taken on the looks of true fighting, and for training you so well - - - that I can praise you' and also Arrian in the *Taktika* καὶ ἥτις ἐπέλασις τοὺς πλείστους παράσχοιτο τῶν λογχῶν τῇ βολῇ διαπρέποντας, ταύτην ἐγὼ μᾶλλον ἤ τινα ἄλλην ἐπήνεσα, ὡς πρὸς ἀλήθειαν τῶν πολεμικῶν ἔργων ἠσκημένην./'and this charge would reveal the most eminent of the spearmen when it comes to throwing, and I praised it above any other, as an exercise similar to the real ways of warfare'.[443]

Moreover, it seems that in the *Taktika* the emperor's point of view is given a prominent role in the evaluation of the drills performed by the troops. The *basileus* is mentioned in chapter 42 and his clear role as assessor means he possesses the necessary skills to be able to critique even the most specific manoeuvres. This is emphasised by his mention three times in the text: he is the one in front of whom the customary manoeuvres are performed (τὰ ἔννομα καὶ πρὸς τοῦ βασιλέως τεταγμένα), then we see how he added to these latter manoeuvres by commanding a third target to be set up which the horsemen must hit (ἐς τὸν ἄλλον σκοπόν, ὃν ἐπ' αὐτῷ δὴ

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[442] Busetto (2013) 239; for the closeness between the two, 238; also Birley (1997) 212 who even believes Arrian might have been next to Hadrian as he was addressing the troops.
[443] Spiedel (2006) 13, field 26; Arr. *Takt.* 42.5, 42.4.

τούτῳ κατὰ πρόσταξιν τοῦ βασιλέως ἐς ἐκδοχὴν τῆς τρίτης λόγχης ἱστᾶσιν.), and finally how the emperor's contribution pushed the troops into being faster and wanting to perform better (ἤδη δέ τις ὑπὸ ὀξύτητός τε καὶ φιλοτιμίας καὶ τέσσαρας λόγχας ὀρθῷ τῷ ἵππῳ ἐπὶ τὸν πρῶτον σκοπὸν ἐξακοντίσαι ἤνυσεν, ἢ τὰς τρεῖς μὲν ὀρθῷ τῷ ἵππῳ, τὴν τετάρτην δὲ ἐπιστρέφοντι, ὡς ὁ βασιλεὺς ἔταξεν/'Indeed, someone driven by sharpness and ambition managed to throw four spears at the first target with his horse going straight, and the fourth as it was wheeling about, as the king ordered').[444]

Although Hadrian is not mentioned by name here, it is safe to assume that Arrian is thinking about him, since the end of the treatise concludes with a praise of Hadrian's military innovations.[445] This image of the emperor observing and evaluating his troops is strikingly similar to the Lambaesis inscription, so one might safely conclude that Arrian is very keen to contribute to Hadrian's depiction of himself as a very skilled commander. If we accept this, then the first thirty-two chapters containing Greek military practice come as a completion to this depiction, and one could argue that by their inclusion Arrian is either trying to present Hadrian as possessing this Greek military knowledge as well, or to suggest that incorporating it into his already vast knowledge of warfare would make him an even more complete commander. Aelian too dedicates his treatise to the reigning emperor, and as we have seen before this is most likely Trajan. However, in order to both contribute to Hadrian's creation of an image of a successful military commander and in order to offer a work containing military advice to Trajan, an already accomplished commander, one would have to choose the subject matter of the work very carefully. In the case of Arrian, it would have to be something that is clearly set up as not only an addition to the Roman practices described in the second part of the manual, but also a worthy rival of them. In the case of Aelian, who chooses to discuss only Greek practices, it would have to be something worthy to be read by an emperor who had seen first-hand the efficiency of the Roman army. It is precisely to what this topic had to be that we will turn now.

3.2 The Greek phalanx: advertising Greek military achievements and building up the emperors' military knowledge

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[444] Arr. *Tact.* 42.2; 4.
[445] Birley (1997) 288-289.

We have seen before how Augustus created an image of 'true Greece' and how warfare and victory was a very important part of this image. This is very clear in Spawforth's example of the Augustan choice to highlight a militarily victorious Classical Athens which would correspond to an even more victorious Rome. Lamberton argues that Plutarch also contributes greatly to constructing this image and to the building up of Athens as a rival even for imperial Rome, an image that hails both as leaders of empires, but with Rome being a larger, more successful version.[446]

Arrian's *Taktika* emphasises Athens and its influences, and we can see in it how the Romans borrowed one of the defining elements of *romanitas* – their laws – from the Athenians (καὶ μὴν τῶν νόμων, οὓς ἐν ταῖς δώδεκα δέλτοις τὰ πρῶτα ἐγράψαντο, τοὺς πολλοὺς εὕροις ἂν παρ᾽ Ἀθηναίων λαβόντας).[447] I believe that with their choice of subject matter, Arrian and Aelian push further the parallelism of military achievement of the Romans and the Greeks more generally, by the same means of integration and competition which we have seen in the previous chapter.

This parallelism in the military sphere, whether at a macro scale when comparing the military achievements of Athens and Rome, or at a micro scale when discussing whether Greek or Roman practices were better, was problematic. Unlike geography and medicine, which were considered Greek disciplines, the Romans having only a later claim to them, the primacy of Greek military science was contested by the Romans. So, as we have already seen, any author who wanted to emphasise Greek military achievements would not only have to contend with Roman claims of superiority, but would have to point out a great military accomplishment of the Greeks. The way to do this was by choosing something as a topic of focus which could both stand as a token for all Greek military achievements, but also relate to the Romans on the same kind of personal level as the Athenian laws, in that it could be considered both foreign and part of their Roman culture. It had to be something which, like Athenian laws and like Greek medicine, the Romans had adopted and perfected, and that was the phalanx.

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[446] Lamberton (1997) 153-158.
[447] Arr.*Tact.*33. 5, 12.5.

It is clear, then, that while both Arrian and Aelian include information about cavalry and light infantry, the centrepiece of both works is the phalanx. In Arrian's *Taktika*, chapters five to eight, part of nine, ten to twelve, all deal in some way with it. Chapter thirteen discusses the light troops but in relation to the phalanx, which the other troops are meant to support. Chapters twenty to twenty-six tackle manoeuvres, but again with the phalanx as the main focus. Aelian's topics are similar, with even less discussion of other troops. Three to fifteen refer only to the phalanx, the numbers it should have in its files and its officers. Twenty-four to thirty-four again discuss the manoeuvres of the phalanx (after briefly tackling the cavalry and light infantry in sixteen to twenty-one). Thirty-six to thirty-nine talk about the order of march, again with the phalanx at the forefront, and even the commands in chapter forty are written with the phalanx primarily in mind. What is perhaps even more interesting is that the authors have a particular type of phalanx in mind. Thus, while Arrian offers some classical examples, the battle array which he is discussing is clearly a Hellenistic phalanx, meaning an improved version of a Macedonian one (ταύτῃ τοι καὶ **ἡ Μακεδονικὴ φάλαγξ** φοβερὰ τοῖς πολεμίοις/'thus, **the Macedonian phalanx** seemed fearsome to its enemies'; τὸ δὲ μέγεθος τῶν σαρισῶν πόδας ἐπεῖχεν ἑκκαίδεκα/ the length of the sarisae was of sixteen feet**).**[448] Aelian not only describes the Macedonian phalanx, but that of Alexander the Great, as he explicitly states (ἐν ᾗ καὶ τοῦ Μακεδόνος Ἀλεξάνδρου τὴν ἐν ταῖς παρατάξεσιν ἐπιβολὴν θεωρήσεις/'in which you will observe Alexander the Macedonian's approach in marshalling his men').[449]

On the one hand, this could be seen as a departure from the 'Classical Greek past' and Greekness as well, and one might question how 'Greek' were the Macedonians anyway. But Alexander's conquest of the Persian Empire was one of the prevalent and recurring historical themes in the 'Second Sophistic', and while he could be seen as a tyrannical figure, he was also represented as 'an icon of Hellenism', depending on the context and the author referring to him.[450] Unlike Aelian, who lumps Alexander together with Greek theory, Arrian, in the conclusion of his first section of the treatise does explain that he has 'revealed enough about the Greek and Macedonian formations of old' (ἱκανὰ ὑπέρ γε τῶν πάλαι Ἑλληνικῶν τε καὶ

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[448] Arr. *Tact.* 12.5.
[449] Ael. *Tact.*Pr. 6.
[450] Whitmarsh (2005) 66; 68-70; Bowie (1974) 170-172; Russell (1983) 117-119.

Μακεδονικῶν τάξεων), and therefore refers to both traditions.[451] So the phalanx, although a Greek invention was perfected by the Macedonians, and by none to such extent as Alexander – and this is what Aelian choses to highlight.

We could also read this discussion of a joint Greco-Macedonian token battle array as a way to refer to the same 'true' image of 'Greece' as martially victorious which we saw Augustus try to construct. The Macedonians would then be included because they fit into the Roman ideal of martial virility. It is clear that ever since the Middle Republic, the Macedonians were considered worthy of being compared to the Romans, especially because they had perfected the phalanx. Polybius compares the phalanx and the legion in an attempt to find the reasons for the success of the Romans in battle, examining how 'the Roman and Macedonian equipment and formation/ […] differ for the better or worse' (τοῦ καθοπλισμοῦ Ῥωμαίων καὶ Μακεδόνων, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τῆς συντάξεως τῆς ἑκατέρων, τί διαφέρουσιν ἀλλήλων πρὸς τὸ χεῖρον καὶ τί πρὸς τὸ βέλτιον).[452] He advertises the Macedonian phalanx as an invincible force and (under ideal circumstances) superior to the Roman because one Roman soldier faces an impenetrable wall of pikes which is very difficult to attack.[453] The reason the phalanx cannot always win is, according to Polybius, because it cannot always adapt to all the circumstances and terrain dictated by battle.[454] The comparison between Roman maniples and phalanx reaches its climax when we see the reasons why the Romans are able to win, which can be attributed to their flexibility – precisely what the phalanx lacked:

> ἡ δὲ Ῥωμαίων εὔχρηστος· πᾶς γὰρ Ῥωμαῖος, ὅταν ἅπαξ καθοπλισθεὶς ὁρμήσῃ πρὸς τὴν χρείαν, ὁμοίως ἥρμοσται πρὸς πάντα τόπον καὶ καιρὸν καὶ πρὸς πᾶσαν ἐπιφάνειαν. καὶ μὴν ἕτοιμός ἐστι καὶ τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχει διάθεσιν, ἄν τε μετὰ πάντων δέῃ κινδυνεύειν ἄν τε μετὰ μέρους ἄν τε κατὰ σημαίαν ἄν τε καὶ κατ᾽ ἄνδρα. διὸ καὶ παρὰ πολὺ τῆς κατὰ μέρος εὐχρηστίας διαφερούσης, παρὰ πολὺ καὶ τὰ τέλη συνεξακολουθεῖ ταῖς Ῥωμαίων προθέσεσι μᾶλλον ἢ ταῖς τῶν ἄλλων.

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[451] Arr. *Tact*. 32.2.
[452] Plb. 18.28 ff, all translations by E.S. Shuckburgh and W. Patton; see also Walbank (1967) 585-592.
[453] Plb. 18.32.9-10.
[454] Plb. 18.31.

'The Roman order on the other hand is flexible: for every Roman, once armed and on the field, is equally well equipped for every place, time, or appearance of the enemy. He is, moreover, quite ready and needs to make no change, whether he is required to fight in the main body, or in a detachment, or in a single maniple, or even by himself. Therefore, as the individual members of the Roman force are so much more serviceable, their plans are also much more often attended by success than those of others.'[455]

Despite that, the phalanx remains more than a worthy challenger to the Roman battle array, and Polybius' description of its charge as nearly invincible is striking:

ἐξ ὧν εὐκατανόητον ὡς οὐχ οἷόν τε μεῖναι κατὰ πρόσωπον τὴν τῆς φάλαγγος ἔφοδον οὐδέν, διατηρούσης τὴν αὐτῆς ἰδιότητα καὶ δύναμιν, ὡς ἐν ἀρχαῖς εἶπα.

'Therefore it may readily be understood that, as I said before, nothing can withstand the charge of the phalanx as long as it preserves is characteristic formation and force'.[456]

But already in Polybius it seems that the phalanx is becoming obsolete and that the Roman legion is what the phalanx once used to be – just like one might say about Athens being a smaller version of what Rome was to become. After all the Roman constitution – including its military organisation – is Polybius' explanation for why the Romans managed to conquer so much of the known world.[457]

However, as briefly hinted before, picking the phalanx as a symbol provided the advantage of inclusion and common ground. Just as the Roman tradition claimed that they had taken their laws from the Athenians, it also asserted that, at the beginning of their history, they borrowed their phalanx style of fighting from the Greeks. Indeed, the equipment which Livy says the Romans used after Servius Tullius' reforms was strikingly similar to that of Classical Greek hoplite soldiers:

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[455] Plb. 18.32.9-12.
[456] Plb. 18.30.11.
[457] Plb. 6.2.

arma his imperata galea, clipeum, ocreae, lorica, omnia ex aere, haec, ut tegumenta corporis essent. tela in hostem hastaque et gladius.

'The armour which these men were required to provide consisted of helmet, round shield, greaves, and breast-plate, all of bronze, for the protection of their bodies; their offensive weapons were a spear and a sword.'[458]

Then, in a later passage, he more explicitly mentions the Macedonian phalanx:

Clipeis antea Romani usi sunt, dein, postquam stipendiarii facti sunt, scuta pro clipeis fecere; et quod antea phalanx similis Macedonicis, hoc postea manipulatim structa acies coepit esse.

'Before, the Romans used round shields but after they started to receive pay they replaced the round shields with oblong ones, and what was before a phalanx similar to the Macedonian ones, afterwards became a battle line organised in maniples.'[459]

It is true that the equipment described by Livy in the first passage would have made sense for both the Classical Greek and the Macedonian phalanx, while in the second passage he might have chosen to talk about the Macedonian phalanx simply because it was better known to his readers. Alternatively, he might be ambiguous in terms of the equipment because he considered both Macedonian and Greek versions of the battle array suitable for inclusion within the Roman tradition, and it made no difference which one the Romans used as long as it belonged to suitably warlike people. So, in this incorporation of the phalanx we could also see the same idea of 'succession of empires' and perhaps Livy chooses to highlight both Greek and Macedonian versions of it in order to suggest this. The Greeks invented the phalanx, the Macedonians took it further but it was the Romans who led it to perfection and ultimately surpassed it, and we see this exact idea being expressed by Diodorus with respect to all things

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[458] Liv. 1.43.2-3 with Ogilvie (1965) 166-171.
[459] Liv. 8.8 with Oakley (1998) 451-476.

pertaining to warfare which the Romans borrowed and then perfected, including the phalanx, the manipular array, siege weapons and Carthaginian ships.[460]

The phalanx then would have been part of Romanness itself, just like Athenian law, but also represented an important competitor in Roman history as seen in Polybius. Most importantly however, this 'succession of empires' culminates with Hadrian and we have seen how Arrian shows how the phalanx is kept alive within his Roman army, both symbolically, by naming the legions phalanxes (after all they were seen as its 'descendants') and also more practically by acting it out against the Alans. But also we see how in the end of the *Taktika* it is the age of Hadrian that is praised as that described by Terpandros 'where the spears of young men thrive' (ὥστε ἐς τήνδε τὴν παροῦσαν βασιλείαν, ἣν Ἀδριανὸς εἰκοστὸν τοῦτ' ἔτος βασιλεύει, πολὺ μᾶλλον συμβαίνειν μοι δοκεῖ τὰ ἔπη ταῦτα ἤπερ ἔς τὴν πάλαι Λακεδαίμονα **ἔνθ' αἰχμά τε νέων θάλλει** καὶ μῶσα λίγεια, καὶ δίκα εὐρυάγυια καλῶν ἐπιτάρροθος ἔργων.') and not that of the Lacedaemonians.[461] In light of the fact that chapter forty-four is concerned with tradition, as seen above, we could easily see how Hadrian is the one who enables the preservation of this tradition of the phalanx but also how this Greek knowledge of warfare represented by it completes him as a commander.

As for why Alexander's phalanx is being highlighted by Aelian, the answer again has to do with integration and competition. Alexander and his army also presented an interesting counterbalance to the Romans, and Livy indeed addresses this issue in book nine of his history. The discussion is part of a larger exercise in imagination on which Livy embarks when talking about L. Papirius Cursor, namely what would have happened had Alexander met the Romans in battle.[462] While the essential factors in the clash would have been, according to Livy, the valor and number of the soldiers, the abilities of the commanders and Fortune, the two actual battle arrays constitute an important term of comparison as well, and we see how Livy is picking up on Polybius' earlier parallel:

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[460] D.S. 23.2.
[461] Arr. *Tact*. 44.3.
[462] Oakley (2005) 184-261.

***statarius uterque miles, ordines seruans**; sed illa **phalanx immobilis** et unius generis,*
***Romana acies** distinctior, ex pluribus partibus constans, facilis partienti, quacumque opus*
esset, facilis iungenti.

'Both armies were formed of heavy troops, keeping to their ranks; but their phalanx was immobile and consisted of soldiers of a single type; the Roman line was opener and comprised more separate units; it was easy to divide, wherever necessary, and easy to unite.' [463]

It is interesting that emphasis is placed on the fact that both armies would have been made up of many *statarius miles, servans ordines*, so the focus in the analysis is again on heavy infantry, not cavalry or any other branch – which is central to both our *Taktika*. Unlike Polybius' analysis though, Livy is clear on the fact that the Romans would have won, and makes no mention of the phalanx being formidable on level ground. He instead insists – as one would expect him to – on the moral superiority of the Romans, yet again we have a situation where the phalanx (along with its 'technical specifications') is worth mentioning as an adversary of the Romans and would constitute an important part of the fight. But what is more interesting is that we get the impression that the face-off between Alexander and the Romans is picking up a topic that was debated, with some Greeks naturally claiming that the former would have come out victorious:

id vero periculum erat, quod levissimi ex Graecis, qui Parthorum quoque contra nomen
Romanum gloriae favent, dictitare solent, ne maiestatem nominis Alexandri, quem ne fama
quidem illis notum arbitror fuisse sustinere non potuerit populus Romanus.

'but there was indeed the danger —as the silliest of the Greeks, who exalt the reputation even of the Parthians against the Romans, are fond of alleging —that the Roman People would have been unable to withstand the majesty of Alexander's name, though I think that they had not so much as heard of him.'[464]

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[463] Liv. 9.19.9.
[464] Liv. 9.18.6. Oakley (2005) 188-189; 193.

Despite Livy acknowledging Alexander as a great commander (*haud equidem abnuo egregium ducem fuisse Alexandrum*), the Romans would ultimately have possessed more of the technical qualities of warfare which would have allowed them to win:[465]

> *id vero erat periculum, ne sollertius quam quilibet unus ex iis,* **quos nominavi, castris locum caperet, commeatus expediret, ab insidiis praecaveret, tempus pugnae deligeret, aciem instrueret, subsidiis firmaret.**

> 'and I suppose there was the danger that Alexander would display more skill than any of these whom I have named, in selecting a place for a camp, in organising his service of supply, in guarding against ambuscades, in choosing a time for battle, in [marshalling his troops, in providing strong reserves!'[466]

The prominence of Alexander as a great figure who might have opposed the Romans can also be seen in two of Plutarch's dialogues as well, *On the Fortune of the Romans* and *On the Fortune or the Virtue of Alexander*.[467] Briefly, the first one argues that Fortuna aided and guided the Romans in acquiring their empire and obtaining their position as masters of the world. The latter does just the opposite, showing how Alexander succeeded through his own qualities, even when Fortuna was against him. Jones and Hamilton point out the rhetorical purpose of these speeches, and that Plutarch did not actually see Alexander as perfect or was trying to set him up as a paragon of Greek virtue (as evidenced by his treatment in the *Lives*). [468] They also emphasise that Plutarch was not trying to say that Alexander won by virtue while the Romans triumphed by sheer luck, and while I do agree with both points I do not agree with Hamilton in thinking that the speeches have no value whatsoever because they do not represent Plutarch's views.[469] I rather think Plutarch is picking up on themes which were debated by Greeks and

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[465] Liv. 9.16.19.
[466] Liv. 9.17.15.
[467] Oakley (2005) 234-243.
[468] See Whitmarsh (2005) 68-69; Hamilton (1969); Jones (1971) 67-70.
[469] For Fortuna as providential see Whitmarsh (2005) 69; Swain (1989) 506-507; Swain (1989) 508-510 on the closeness of *De Fortuna* to Plutarch's ideas elsewhere. Hamilton (1969) xxxi argues that the the two speeches are 'epideictic display pieces', devoid of any serious purpose.

Romans alike – as evidenced by Livy's earlier text as well – which he leaves open for more debate by emphasising the comparison.

This is true in particular for the end of the *On the Fortune of the Romans* where Plutarch – again, like Livy before him - also wonders what would have happened had the Romans and Alexander fought. Even though he leaves the question unanswered, differently from Livy this time, he suggests that Alexander would have won or at least that the Roman state would have had a very difficult time, as we can parallel the Fortuna that takes Alexander's life (**ἐγὼ δὲ <ταύτης>** [i.e. τῆς Τύχης in the previous sentence] τίθεμαι καὶ τὴν Ἀλεξάνδρου τελευτήν/'And to Tyche I ascribe also the death of Alexander) to the Fortuna that saves the Romans from destruction at the hand of the Gauls, for example (Τί δέ; οὐχὶ καὶ περὶ τὰς μεγίστας συμφορὰς ὤρθου τὴν πόλιν ἡ Τύχη; Κελτῶν μὲν περὶ τὸ Καπετώλιον στρατοπεδευόντων καὶ πολιορκούντων τὴν ἀκρόπολιν/'**And why not admit that Tyche also retrieved the city** in times of the greatest disaster? When the Gauls were encamped round about the Capitol and were besieging the citadel').[470]

Alexander is then another peril against which Fortune defends the Romans, and in any case Plutarch sets him up as a viable contender for supremacy:

'οὐ γὰρ ἀναιμωτί γε διακρινθήμεναι οἴω,' (Od. 6.149)

 συμπεσόντων ὅπλοις ἀνικήτοις φρονημάτων ἀδουλώτων.

'"Not without spilling of blood could this matter, I deem", have been settled had the great aspirations of these **two unconquered peoples with their invincible arms** clashed with each other.'[471]

Therefore even if we do not take Plutarch seriously when it comes to the general message of the speeches, it would be difficult to disagree with Whitmarsh in seeing Alexander as a hyper-Greek figure and with Spencer who argues for a resurgence of the figure of Alexander especially in the second century A.D. Spencer also emphasises that Alexander 'could stand for the cultural

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[470] Plu. *Moralia*, 326 A10-B5; 324 D4-6, trans. F.C. Babbitt.
[471] Plu. *Moralia* 326 C3-4.

supremacy of Greece, and **Greek military prowess**, and his fame could demonstrate the lasting greatness of Greece over Rome'.[472] So, when put together, Alexander and his phalanx constitute one very powerful token of Greco-Macedonian military achievements.

Coming back to Aelian's dedication of his treatise to Trajan, if Cassius Dio is to be believed Trajan envied Alexander and wanted to portray himself to the senate as having surpassed him:

> κἀντεῦθεν ἐπ' αὐτὸν τὸν ὠκεανὸν ἐλθών, τήν τε φύσιν αὐτοῦ καταμαθὼν καὶ πλοῖόν τι ἐς Ἰνδίαν πλέον ἰδών, εἶπεν ὅτι "πάντως ἂν καὶ ἐπὶ τοὺς Ἰνδούς, εἰ νέος ἔτι ἦν, ἐπεραιώθην". Ἰνδούς τε γὰρ ἐνενόει, καὶ τὰ ἐκείνων πράγματα ἐπολυπραγμόνει, τόν τε Ἀλέξανδρον ἐμακάριζε. καίτοι ἔλεγε καὶ ἐκείνου περαιτέρω προκεχωρηκέναι, καὶ τοῦτο καὶ τῇ βουλῇ ἐπέστειλε, μὴ δυνηθεὶς μηδὲ ἃ ἐκεχείρωτο σῶσαι.

> 'Then he came to the ocean itself, and when he had learned its nature and had seen a ship sailing to India, he said: 'I should certainly have crossed over to the Indi, too, if I were still young.' For he began to think about the Indi and was curious about their affairs, and he counted Alexander a lucky man. Yet he would declare that he himself had advanced farther than Alexander, and would so write to the senate, although he was unable to preserve even the territory that he had subdued.'[473]

If then Trajan was indeed worried about surpassing Alexander, how could one better aid him in doing it than to offer him all of Alexander's military knowledge. Aelian should be seen as trying to help the emperor by dedicating to him a text which would not only give Trajan a description of Alexander's phalanx, the 'code' of Alexander's success, but also the key to breaking it, namely Aelian's clarifications.[474] In reading Aelian's very detailed analysis, with technical points that matched those in the debates found in Livy and Polybius, the emperor would be able to analyse and appreciate all the strengths and weaknesses of the phalanx. Gaining an understanding of Alexander and his army, which, as we have seen, were considered worthy contenders to the Romans and their legions, would have enabled Trajan himself to become a

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[472] Whitmarsh (2005) 67-69; Spencer (2002) 37.
[473] D.C. 68.29.1, trans. E. Cary.
[474] For Trajan and Alexander see Spencer (2002) 41 ff.

master of the most important aspect of Greek military knowledge, just as Arrian intended for Hadrian. The choice of writing *Taktika*, then, was precisely to present two emperors who were very concerned with generalship with the best example of Greek military knowledge, proving its overall use and value, improving their generalship.

Conclusion

To conclude, we have seen how 'military manuals' approach identity, both the identity of their authors, in the case of Arrian's *Ektaxis*, but that of the Roman empire more broadly. We have seen that, similarly to sophists, Arrian adopts the identity of a figure from the past, namely Xenophon. He uses this figure and engages with the past in order to augment his own reputation, and to create a positive comparison between Xenophon and himself.

The *Ektaxis* and the *Taktika* also talk about identity more generally, celebrating the diversity of the Roman army and of the troops that make it up, effectively praising the Roman Empire because it encourages the preservation of tradition and incorporates the practices of all its peoples. Arrian's *Taktika* also approaches the question of the identity of Hadrian and portrays him as a knowledgeable commander in the same way as the Lambaesis inscription, showing his intimate acquaintance with drills and training practices. But the same *Taktika* suggests, by incorporating Greek knowledge in the first half, that Hadrian needs to be well-versed in Greek practices.

These practices are advertised by both Arrian and Aelian decision to write *taktika* which portray the most significant military achievement of the Greeks, the phalanx, as a symbol for all Greek knowledge. This choice is made because of the status of the phalanx as both part of the Roman military tradition and as a redoutable adversary to the Roman legions, and both of those aspects make it worthy of discussion. Furthermore, Aelian chooses to advertise Alexander's phalanx, thus combining his status as a hyper-Greek figure and commander with the prestige of the phalanx into one token showing the prestige of Greek military knowledge. Arrian and Aelian do this to advertise the importance and relevance of Greek practices to Hadrian and Trajan, both emperors interested in generalship and concerned with their military image.

The ways in which these texts use the past is not unlike other texts of the period, focusing here specifically on figures from 'Classical Greece' – such as Xenophon – but also on Alexander, another popular character in the 'Second Sophistic'. To obsess over why one should chose Alexander over any other, more 'Classical' example, or the other way around, only reveals the sometimes pedantic nature of modern scholarship on these themes. It is likely that authors of 'military manuals' such as Arrian and Aelian were more concerned with highlighting important figures in the tradition of Greek warfare, as witnessed by the generals they refer to in their prefaces. These are both 'Classical' and 'Hellenistic', and what connects them is military prowess, so it is safe to say that fame, skill, and Greekness would have been more important in the choice of examples by different authors – each with their own specific preferences – than the period in which they operated.

IV. Ethics and Moral Qualities in 'Military Manuals'

In previous chapters we analysed how 'military manuals' engage with the Greek and Roman tradition about warfare and how they present and often reimagine this tradition. For a range of purposes in this chapter we examine whether and in what ways, they engage with Greek and Roman ideas about 'correct ethical' behaviour in warfare, which are both part of this tradition and to some extent stand above it. We will do so in dedicated discussions which take general principles of morality, the general principles which should govern human behaviour, as their starting point.

There are two main issues I wish to tackle. First, whether our authors include any 'moral' qualities which would be necessary or even indispensable for individuals in warfare. Second, whether they prescribe or proscribe actions for the general and his troops on moral or ethical

grounds. In the modern world issues of military ethics are treated as of universal applicability, and the question of whether in the ancient world there was any equivalent is worth asking.[475]

I shall argue that while our authors' approaches might differ somewhat, the majority of texts engage with aspects of what might be called an 'ethical code' for Greek and Roman warfare. While none of the authors makes any programmatic statements or comment upon it directly, our texts describe both behaviour that can be considered to have ethical components which are driven by moral determinates, discussing the virtues necessary in warfare, and also examples which diverge from the 'rules of warfare' as treated by other authors. We shall also see that there is nothing to indicate that one type of behaviour should exclude the other, and what seems to be implicit is that the correct course of action depends both on the situation faced and on the individual making the decisions. What the texts always seem to highlight implicitly is that success is the ultimate goal, and of the course of action followed is of less importance.

This kind of 'instrumental ethics' in which the right action is determined by the right results ties in with an important theme in much of ancient ethics, especially Stoic ethics, but also shared more widely, sometimes described as a form of moral relativism or 'situational flexibility'.[476] Actions have to be adapted to the circumstances, principles are guides to be actively engaged with by the moral subject, not unbreakable rules which have any kind of value in and of themselves. Though specific philosophical, even Stoic, influence on the military manuals is unlikely, the general classical approach to ethics can be seen in them; and, of course, these texts are all about successful generalship, success in military matters, a goal which is inherently in tension with what one would be expected to do, what might be deemed the most virtuous conduct in a certain situation in warfare. War is a complex activity, in which many moral and pragmatic factors were involved, as ancient authors were well aware.

There will be some reference to religion in this discussion, but this chapter does not set out to explore in any way the complex relationship between ethics and the gods in general. However,

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[475] For ethics in contemporary warfare see for example Lee (2012), Johnson (1999), Paskins and Dockrill (1979) and Guthrie and Quinlan (2007); for 'just warfare' see issues *Journal of Military Ethics* 2/2007, 3/2009, 3/2011; for 'military virtues' see 3/2007; for deception see Maddox (2002).
[476] See e.g. Meyer (2008) 141 and Rowe (1976) 132.

the breaking of promises and oaths – of which the gods are guarantors – and the treatment of people/prisoners under the protection of a divinity (for example those taking refuge in a sanctuary) or of sacred places in war involves religious considerations, amongst others, and these topics will be considered.

Since I will be discussing the inclusion of 'moral qualities' and *exempla*, I must address the question of whether the authors are interested in the morality of actions, the link between moral attributes and historical figures or both? In other words is the emphasis placed on the individuals in the *exempla* or on their actions? We shall see that the answer is not necessarily the same for all our authors, with genre and the magnitude of the project also being important. For example, we have already seen that Polyaenus chooses to focus on historical figures – rather than categories of action – so we might expect emphasis on the personnel not the specific actions described. Moreover, since Polyaenus' project seems to be so broad, claiming to encompass all stratagems in history, we might wonder whether he is really in a position to be selective about his 'ethical' agenda, or whether he has to include examples which are apparently contradictory. Frontinus takes a different approach, with great emphasis on order in his structure and on different themes, promising to provide guidance on what to do before, during and after battle. Onasander addresses the Roman aristocracy, and his text aims to discuss all that makes a good general, ranging from the moral to the practical aspects.

Keeping all this in mind, the following discussion will be divided into three sections. In the first, I shall briefly summarise what might be called the ancient 'military ethical code of conduct' with particular reference to the most important recent scholarship.[477] In the second, I shall address the relationship between our texts and the first major 'component' of the code, namely fairness. I will also discuss the special cases of oaths, tyrants and just warfare in relation to fairness. In the final section I shall discuss how the remaining ideas identified in the first section are approached – namely treatment of the enemy and especially prisoners – and the part that moral virtues play in this approach.

1. A Greek and Roman 'ethical code of conduct' in war?

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[477] Gilliver (1996); Ducrey (1968).

Modern scholars have previously addressed the issue of ethics in ancient warfare. Some, such as the historian Doyne Dawson, have done so in a broad manner, focusing mainly on inter-state relationships and imperialism, but since 'military manuals' tend to address only what could be considered the *minutiae* of warfare, such aspects – although important – will not figure in this discussion.[478] Gilliver in her key article 'The Roman Army and Morality in War' promises 'a brief survey of the rules that governed the actual waging of war in antiquity, the conduct of the Romans in war and, when they can be ascertained, the reasons behind their conduct.'[479] Since these aims are much closer to what this chapter sets out to investigate, I shall use her claims as a starting point for the discussion. As for the Greek side, as far as I am aware, there has been no detailed treatment of 'battlefield ethics' corresponding to Gilliver's, but related issues are raised in Kendrick Pritchett's *The Greek State at War*, Coleman Phillipson's perhaps now dated *The International Law and Custom of Ancient Greece and Rome* (written from a lawyer's perspective) and, most usefully, Pierre Ducrey's 'Traitement des prisonniers de guerre dans la Grèce antique: des origines à la conquête romaine'.[480]

Gilliver starts off her article by stating that 'there was no international law concerning the waging of war such as we have today but there were some rules'.[481] She proceeds to emphasise that the Romans had the *ius fetiale* which was concerned with the declaration and conduct of war and that there was 'also a series of conventions and unwritten laws covering warfare', which were referred to as the *mores belli* by Cicero and the *ius belli* by Sallust, that is a distinct, collective entity.[482] The ancient sources used by Gilliver to discuss this framework are mostly Cicero's *On duties* and Polybius' *Histories*, which will therefore also be my main points of focus. The agendas of these two works and of our 'military manuals' are different and perhaps conflicting. Cicero's *De officiis* has been described as a practical morality guidebook very much

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[478] Dawson (1996) 65-77; 123-141.
[479] Gilliver (1996) 219.
[480] Pritchett (1974) 177-189; (1985) 94-261; Ducrey (1968) 289-311; Phillipson (1911) 62-63; however Hans van Wees (2004) 20-12; 118-127 also tackles some aspects of the rules of Greek classical warfare, especially when it comes to religion.
[481] Gilliver (1996) 219.
[482] Gilliver (1996) 219-220 and note 4. There is ample literature on the issue of 'just war', for example Rich (1974) and (2011), Yakobson (2009), Reichberg (2006) for a more comparative frame, esp. ch. 4. However, it is of little interest to us since it mostly deals with diplomacy and actions before war (though Onasander's take on 'just war' shall be discussed briefly below).

in the fashion of the Stoic philosopher Panaetius (Cicero himself often says that he is following Panaetius). [483] It is hardly surprising – not least because of the chronological gap –that this project differs from Polybius', who is interested in presenting the Roman 'way of warfare' in a particular way, with special emphasis on Roman fairness and the transfer of this fairness from the Greeks to the Romans as part of an explanation of why the latter managed to conquer all of the known world, an argument he would make not least because of his proximity to Scipio Aemilianus and his Roman circle.

Gilliver also references the 'military manuals', Onasander's *Strategikos* and Frontinus' *Strategemata*, in establishing what this Roman ethical code was, and argues that they present an alternative perspective. This is problematic, as will be discussed below, and there are obvious issues of circularity in terms of whether texts are considered to be laying down rules, demonstrating practice or both.[484] In addition, we also quickly understand that there is no 'official document' containing all these 'rules' and that what one chooses to include in any sort of 'code' will always be – to a certain degree – a matter of interpretation. It is apparent, however, that there are certain points in respect to the rules of war that seem to be common to both Greeks and Romans, across a range of authors in a range of times and places, and are also reflected in modern concerns about what one should and should not be able to do in warfare. These can be roughly divided into two categories: those that concern general 'fairness' on the one hand, and those that concern the treatment of the enemy, in particular of prisoners and those who surrender, on the other.

This idea of fairness is certainly one of the cornerstones of the Roman *ius fetiale*, part of which was a ritual performed by priests called *fetiales*, who both formally demanded redress from a wrongdoer and declared war overtly and officially.[485] Livy also shows admiration for a fair way of fighting, where the best may win without any trickery, and he projects this onto a 'golden

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[483] E.g. Cic. *Off.* 2.16; for Cicero and Panaetius see Miller (1913) xi-xi, Tieleman (2007) esp. 116-120, for Cicero's *De officiis* Schfield (1995), Long (1995), Griffin and Atkins (1991) ix-xxxvii, for Polybius see Walbank (1974), Gibson and Harrison (2013).

[484] Gilliver (1996) 220-222.

[485] Gilliver (1996) 219; Cic. *Off.* 1.36; and Liv. 1.32. 5-14.; For the *fetiales* see for example Watson (1993) and Rich (2011).

age', when the older senators reprimanded the 'tricking' of Perseus, who was persuaded by guile to give the Romans a respite in which to better prepare for war, saying that the Romans of old did not fight using ambushes and at night, but declared war openly.[486] Polybius also emphasises that the external perception (albeit not unanimous) of the Romans was that they were 'a civilised people, and that their peculiar merit on which they prided themselves was that they conducted their wars in a simple and noble manner, employing neither night attacks nor ambushes, disapproving of every kind of deceit and fraud and considering that nothing but direct and open attacks were legitimate for them' (ἕτεροι δὲ καθόλου μὲν πολιτικὸν εἶναι τὸ Ῥωμαϊκὸν ἔθνος ἔφασαν καὶ τοῦτ᾽ ἴδιον εἶναι καὶ ἐπὶ τούτῳ σεμνύνεσθαι τοὺς Ῥωμαίους, ἐπὶ τῷ καὶ τοὺς πολέμους ἁπλῶς καὶ γενναίως πολεμεῖν, μὴ νυκτεριναῖς ἐπιθέσεσι χρωμένους μηδ᾽ ἐνέδραις, πᾶν δὲ τὸ δι᾽ ἀπάτης καὶ δόλου γινόμενον ἀποδοκιμάζοντας, μόνους δὲ τοὺς ἐκ προδήλου καὶ κατὰ πρόσωπον κινδύνους ὑπολαμβάνοντας αὐτοῖς καθήκειν).[487] He too praises this type of open warfare that the 'ancients' practised and points out how the Romans are now the 'moral descendants' of the ἀρχαῖοι and of this 'golden age' of warfare, still preserving some of this fairness:

> βραχὺ δέ τι λείπεται παρὰ Ῥωμαίοις ἴχνος ἔτι τῆς ἀρχαίας αἱρέσεως περὶ τὰ πολεμικά: καὶ γὰρ προλέγουσι τοὺς πολέμους καὶ ταῖς ἐνέδραις σπανίως χρῶνται καὶ τὴν μάχην ἐκ χειρὸς ποιοῦνται καὶ συστάδην.

> 'Some slight trace, indeed, of the old principles of warfare still lingers among the Romans; for they do proclaim their wars, and make sparing use of ambuscades, and fight their battles hand to hand and foot to foot.'[488]

But perhaps more importantly this idea of fairness in battle is, in Cicero and in Polybius, as Walbank has pointed out, part of a wider discussion about justice, as in fact the main concept behind the *ius fetiale* is that a war needs to have a just cause.[489] This is significant because it reveals that for Cicero, at least, there is no separate ethical code for warfare; ethical rules that

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[486] Liv. 42.47.5.
[487] Plb. 36.9.9; also Pritchett (1974) 178-179.
[488] Plb. 13.3; also Ducrey (1968) 293.
[489] Walbank (1974) 90-91; Cicero *Off.* 1.15ff.

should normally be followed apply in warfare as well, hence justice on the battlefield is merely an extension of the justice which any principled man must manifest in his life. Thus in the *De Officiis* he makes the point that conflict and justice are closely intertwined:

Sed iustitiae primum munus est, ut ne cui quis noceat nisi lacessiturus iniuria.

'The first office of justice is to keep one man from doing harm to another, unless provoked by wrong'[490]

Then he goes on to talk about how injustice arises, making specific reference to warfare:

Exsistunt etiam saepe iniuriae calumnia quadam et nimis callida, sed malitiosa iuris interpretatione. […] ut ille, qui, cum triginta dierum essent cum hoste indutiae factae, noctu populabatur agros, quod dierum essent pactae, non noctium indutiae.

'Injustice often arises also through chicanery, that is, through an over-subtle and ever fraudulent construction of law […]like the man who, when a truce has been made with the enemy for thirty days, ravaged their fields by night, because, he said, the truce stipulated 'days' not nights.'[491]

We see here the same kind of *noua sapientia* as in the earlier Perseus example and how even this kind of trickery involving manipulation of words is considered unjust. In fact earlier on, Cicero explains how 'the foundation of justice, moreover, is good faith – that is truth and fidelity to promises and agreements', so fairness in deeds as well as in words.[492] Certainly keeping one's word applies to the enemy as well:

Atque etiam si quid singuli temporibus adducti hosti promiserunt, est in eo ipso fides conservanda

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[490] Cic. *Off.* 1.19; all translations from the *De officiis* are W. Miller's, unless otherwise specified.
[491] Cic. *Off.* 1.33.
[492] Cic. *Off.* 1.23: *Fundamentum autem est iustitiae fides, id est dictorum conventorumque constantia et veritas.*

'Again, if under stress of circumstances individuals have made any promise to the enemy, they are bound to keep their word even then'[493]

This is made explicit in the example of Regulus who, in the first Punic war, keeps his word and returns to the Carthaginians after going to Rome to negotiate a hostage exchange.[494] This 'fairness in words' dictated by justice is immediately followed in the text by fairness in action, as Cicero himself comments:

> *Maximum autem exemplum est iustitiae in hostem a maioribus nostris constitutum, cum a Pyrrho perfuga senatui est pollicitus se venenum regi daturum et cum necaturum, senatus et C. Fabricius perfugam Pyrrho dedidit. Ita ne hostis quidem et potentis et bellum ultro inferentis interitum cum scelere approbavit.*

> 'Our forefathers have given us another striking example of justice toward an enemy: when a deserter from Pyrrhus promised the senate to administer poison to the king and thus work his death, the senate and Gaius Fabricius delivered the deserter up to Pyrrhus. Thus they stamped with their disapproval the treacherous murder even of an enemy who was at once powerful, unprovoked, aggressive and successful'.[495]

He also insists on having a peace without guile which further emphasises the idea that justice dictates fairness in all dealings with the enemy, and points out that 'no one has attained to true glory who has gained a reputation of courage by treachery and cunning; for nothing that lacks justice can be morally right.'[496]

In Cicero the discussion of justice encompasses more than just the idea of fairness. It encompasses all aspects of warfare, especially those to do with conduct towards the defeated, where justice recommends restraint and moderation:

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[493] Cic. *Off.* 1.39.
[494] Cic. *Off.* 1.39.
[495] Cic. *Off.* 1.40
[496] Cic. *Off.* 1.35: *Mea quidem sententia paci, quae nihil habitura sit insidiarum, semper est consulendum* (In my opinion at least, we should always strive to secure a peace that shall not admit of guile). Also 1.62: *Quocirca nemo, qui fortitudinis gloriam consecutus est insidiis et militia, laudem est adeptus; nihil enim honestum esse potest, quod iustitia vacat.*

*Et cum iis, quos vi deviceris, consulendum est, turn ii, qui armis positis ad imperatorum fidem confugient, quamvis murum aries percusserit, recipiendi. **In quo tantopere apud nostros iustitia culta est, ut ii, qui civitates aut nationes devictas bello in fidem recepissent, earum patroni essent more maiorum.***

'Not only must we show consideration for those whom we have conquered by force of arms but we must also ensure protection to those who lay down their arms and throw themselves upon the mercy of our generals, even though the battering ram has hammered at their walls**. And among our countrymen justice has been observed so conscientiously in this direction, that those who have given promise of protection to states or nations subdued in war become, after the custom of our forefathers, the patrons of those states.'[497]**

So, as mentioned before, for Cicero there is no particular distinction between what constitutes ethical behaviour in warfare and in life in general, as the same guiding elements should rule everything, and justice, as well as the moderation that is shown here towards enemies, are two of them.[498] Gilliver points out that Cicero also recommends that a general should control his troops strictly and not let them plunder for his personal gain and show mercy to those who surrender.[499] He also underscores that protection must be granted (from Roman soldiers) to those who surrendered and that nothing should be done without good cause or from cruelty in the destruction and plundering of cities, the general's duty being to punish the guilty and spare the rest.[500]

The same ideas of justice and temperance underlie the whole discussion, as even before tackling issues of prisoners and the defeated, he is keen to make it clear that one must only go to war *in extremis*, in order to settle a dispute, since war the use of physical force is characteristic of brutes.[501] We are reminded that war is only a means of achieving peace, and that by nature one should not behave carelessly towards others, ergo moderation should be as

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[497] Cic. *Off*. 1.35.
[498] Cic. *Off.* 1.15.
[499] Cic. *Off.* 1.34-36.
[500] Gilliver (1996) 220. Cic. *Off.* 1.82.
[501] Cic. *Off.* 1.34.

much of a key component of warfare as it is of our daily lives.[502] Gilliver compares Cicero's advice to Polybius' emphasis on the importance of showing generosity to the defeated, and self-restraint when plundering cities, which as Walbank points out is also based on notions of justice, while Ducrey also highlights how Polybius condemns the massacre at Mantinea of the non-aggressive Achaeans by referring to a tradition which prohibited such actions and later comments that the killing of an ambassador was a contravention of ἀνθρώποις ὡρισμένων δικαίων, 'what has been defined as just for men' – all advice that is very similar to Cicero's views.[503]

Ducrey also argues that, for the Greeks, the principles regulating war were doubled by a veritable religious and moral code referred to by Greek authors as 'the laws of the Greeks', and that these laws include respect for sanctuaries and those who look for asylum. There was also a provision that even the defeated had to be allowed to collect their dead, and van Wees emphasises that war was banned during sacred periods as well. [504] As an example of the importance of religious places, Ducrey brings up the occupation of the sanctuary at Delion by Athenian soldiers in 424 B.C., which angered the Boeotians to such an extent that they did not allow the Athenians to collect their dead.[505] He also comments on the stories of Xenophon admiring Agesilaus for letting 80 Theban soldiers go who had taken refuge in a temple and of Dionysius of Syracuse who urged men women and children to take refuge in sanctuaries to escape death, both showing that at least in theory those who took refuge in a sacred precinct were supposed to be spared. The killing of supplicating prisoners was also considered an atrocity, as Ducrey points out again with an example from Thucydides where Plataean prisoners are supplicating the Spartans.[506] Despite the added religious component, the principles remain the same as before, with fair treatment of prisoners and reverence for certain locations such as temples.

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[502] Cic. *Off.* 1.80; 1.98.
[503] Gilliver (1996) 221-222; Plb. 2.58.5-8 and Ducrey (1968) 292; Ducrey (1968) 301-302; Plb. 2.8.12; also 5.11.3.
[504] Van Wees (2004) 119.
[505] Ducrey (1968) 294-295.
[506] Th. 3.58.3; Ducrey (1968) 300.

We have seen that ideas about fairness in warfare and behaviour towards one's enemy share a common trait among authors such as Polybius and Cicero, namely their link to a general notion of justice and moderation which should be practised in daily life as well. Such a consistency in approach suggests that these ideas were widely shared. However Gilliver argues that military manuals present an alternative to this 'code', observing that Frontinus recommends terrorising one's enemy into submission, and she goes on to show that combinations of clemency and brutality were not uncommon in Roman practice.[507] She comments: 'the reality lies with both [i.e. clemency and brutality] [...] Onasander advises the general to show mercy to the enemy but goes on to suggest that this quality should be used along with brutality when necessary. Frontinus provides examples of the use of both methods to achieve objectives'.[508] However here Gilliver seems to abandon the distinction that she made at the beginning of the article between 'rules' and actual 'conduct', by including practical experiences in a theoretical framework. For example, Agricola's very practical use of clemency and violence in Britain and Corbulo's in Armenia seem to be personal choices that are fitting for a certain situation rather than prescriptions on what how one should act.[509] As for Frontinus and Onasander, as we shall see, there is clearly a difference in 'genre' but also in approach from Polybius, Cicero and Livy.[510] Gilliver herself admits that 'Cicero's admonishments tend to be rather abstract and sometimes of a purely moralistic nature' while 'those of Onasander [...] include suggestions for their application'.[511] So the question arises whether it is really productive to consider that they are both part of the same theoretical framework. It is more likely that there is one category of texts, represented by Cicero's *De Officiis*, which are concerned with the 'best case scenario' and behaviour that can perhaps exist only in an ideal situation, and another containing the 'manuals' of Onasander and Frontinus, which are actually concerned with the realities of warfare and how to navigate between ideal and efficient practice.

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[507] Front. *Strat.* 2.9.2-5
[508] Gilliver (1996) 221.
[509] Gilliver (1996) 221.
[510] Gilliver (1996) 221.
[511] Gilliver (1996) 220.

There is also an alternative way to understanding the link between texts such as Cicero's, on the one hand, and Onasander's and Frontinus' on the other, and this has mainly to do with the way in which Greek and Roman codes of ethics work. Looking at the ethical norms of Cicero's *De officiis*, we notice that they are not strict prescriptions of the 'thou-shalt-not' type, but are instead closer to guidelines. This means that their breach does not entail any sort of concrete punishment – divine or earthly – but simply the personal realisation that one has strayed from the right course of action. For instance, Cicero makes the point that a person who breaks an oath is not to fear punishment from the gods but the loss of his inner balance, having strayed away from the guidance of justice (*Iam enim non ad iram deorum, quae nulla est, sed ad iustitiam et ad fidem pertinent/* 'For the question no longer concerns the wrath of the gods (for there is no such thing) but the obligations of justice and good faith').[512]

Therefore, the breach of any existing customs in warfare, which would be perceived along the same lines as Cicero's prescriptions, would not attract any sort of 'real' punishment. Hence one might understand why generals might be able to take some liberties in practice, but also that Onasander and Frontinus had more leeway when elaborating their precepts.

Furthermore, if we look again at Cicero's text and his prescriptions we see that – just as in the case of Stoic ethics (and Cicero states that he is following Panaetius) – there is a certain degree of relativity. Simply put, what one is supposed to do varies greatly depending on the situation one is in and on one's own character. For example, Cicero explains that a promise should not be upheld if doing so would harm the one to whom it was made:

> *Nec promissa igitur servanda sunt ea, quae sint iis, quibus promiseris, inutilia, nec, si plus tibi ea noceant quam illi prosint, cui promiseris, contra officium est maius anteponi minori*

> 'Promises are, therefore, not to be kept if the keeping of them is to prove harmful to those to whom you have made them; and, if the fulfilment of a promise should do more harm to

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[512] Cic. *Off.*3.104.

you than good to him to whom you have made it, it is no violation of moral duty to give the greater good precedence over the lesser good'[513]

Similarly, a certain course of action – such as suicide – may be the right one for a one individual, say Marcus Cato, while for another it might be completely the opposite, and Cicero recommends that one always keep in mind one's character and endowments when making choices, and not witlessly imitate anyone:

Sed quoniam paulo ante dictum est imitandos esse maiores, primum illud exceptum sit, ne vitia sint imitanda, deinde si natura non feret, ut quaedam imitari posit.

'But whereas I said a moment ago that we have to follow in the steps of our fathers, let me make the following exceptions: first, we need not imitate their faults; second, we need not imitate certain other things, if our nature does not permit such imitation'.[514]

Referring more specifically to warfare, Cicero uses his earlier argument about the greater good, and how one's actions should always bear that in mind, to explain the destruction of Carthage and Numantia.[515] It was done for reasons that had to do with the future welfare of the Roman state, and so in this case it was acceptable to break the rule of moderation:

at Carthaginem et Numantiam funditus sustulerunt; nollem Corinthum, sed credo aliquid secutos, opportunitatem loci maxime, ne posset aliquando ad bellum faciendum locus ipse adhortari.

'but they razed Carthage and Numantia to the ground. I wish they had not destroyed Corinth; but I believe they had some special reason for what they did – its convenient situation, probably – and feared that its very location might someday furnish a temptation to renew the war'.[516]

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[513] Cicero, *Off.* 1.32.
[514] Cic. O*ff.* 1.112-113; 121.
[515] Cic. *Off.* 1.32.
[516] Cic. *Off.* 1.34.

Therefore, the type of justification given about breaking promises is actually embedded within the discourse on the ethics of warfare. Cicero says that Numantia and Carthage were destroyed to prevent any future war, and this is similar to breaking a promise that would actually cause more injury to both parties than do good. In the latter case, there is a greater sense of justice if one breaks said promise, which becomes irrelevant in the grand scheme of things, and so does the preservation of a city in this case.

Moreover, when it comes to oaths in warfare, Cicero says they must be generally obeyed: 'for an oath sworn with the clear understanding in one's mind that it should be performed must be kept'. However, 'if there is no such understanding, it does not count as perjury if one does not perform the vow.'[517] He then explains how if one does not keep one's word when ransoming someone from pirates one is not actually breaking it, because pirates are not considered lawful enemies.[518] However, if Regulus had broken his word, it would have been perjury:

Cum iusto enim et legitimo hoste res gerebatur, adversus quem et totum ius fetiale et multa sunt iura communia

'For the war was being carried on with a legitimate, declared enemy; and to regulate our dealings with such and enemy, we have our whole fetial code as well as many other laws that are binding in common between nations'[519]

Cicero also explains that there are different types of warfare and one should behave according to what he is trying to achieve; if the war is fought for supremacy one has to be more moderate than if one is fighting for actual survival.[520]

Therefore, it seems that Cicero is suggesting a multi-layered approach. There is a standard 'correct' set of actions, generated by basic principles, but their validity might differ when certain complications arise, or depending on certain situations and perpetrators of these actions. If we then consider that the authors of our 'manuals' are operating within similar

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[517] Cic. *Off.* 1.107: *Quod enim ita iuratum est, ut mens conciperet fieri oportere, id servandum est; quod aliter, id si non fecerit, nullum est periurium.*
[518] Cic. *Off.* 1.107
[519] Cic. *Off.* 108.
[520] Cic. *Off.* 1.38.

parameters to those dictating ethical behaviour in Cicero, we might argue that there is no real contradiction between their recommendations and the latter's – or between 'theory' and 'practice' – but merely that the theory is more situational and adaptive than some have suggested.

Despite a shared situational flexibility, we should not retroject the views expressed by Cicero on earlier periods, nor assume that all authors of military manuals embraced similar ideals. In fact, we have evidence that ancient authors were themselves aware that the principles of warfare had changed over time. What we could perhaps come back to with more certitude is the difference between theory and practice, and the realisation that what constitutes 'correct' behaviour does not always yield the best results. Consequently, what texts particularly interested in warfare would recommend might be more focused on success than in following conventional rules. Polybius himself makes this point, claiming that the fairness which the ancients abided by was not considered productive in his own age:

νῦν δὲ καὶ φαύλου φασὶν εἶναι στρατηγοῦ τὸ προφανῶς τι πράττειν τῶν πολεμικῶν.'

'But nowadays people say that it is the mark of an inferior general to perform any operation of war openly.'[521]

As Gilliver points out, Sallust also feels the need to justify the killing of the inhabitants of the town of Capsa, despite its surrender 'because the place was of great advantage to Jugurtha, and difficult of access to us [i.e. the Romans]/ *quia locus Iugurthae opportunus, nobis aditu difficilis*.[522] This highlights the same difference between practice and theory, but also that the theory is important enough for such actions to be justified. It demonstrates that Roman generals had at least an informal 'ethical code of war' that would normally influence their decisions to some extent, even if in practice it would not have been what mattered most in a situation.

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[521] Plb. 13.5.6.
[522] Sall. *Jug*.91, trans. J.C. Rolfe and J.T. Ramsey; Gilliver (1996) 220 and 224.

To conclude, it is clear that both the Greeks and the Romans had the same key concerns, and we can distinguish some ideas that make up a kind of 'code of battlefield ethics' which shows an aspiration towards a model of fairness in warfare. However, it is also clear that this is different from the realities of combat. In theory this 'code of conduct' should guide actions in war, in practice it does not always do so; the ways in which it does so are flexible, and its breach does not entail any 'real' punishment. Ducrey's conclusion perhaps best expresses this: 'Mais l'important n'est-il pas que ces usages aient éxisté et que le droit ait cherché, vainement parfois, à prendre place à la force? Plus que des balbutiements juridiques, c'est l'esquisse d'un véritable code des lois de la guerre qui se profile derrière le déchaînement des violences. Que ces lois, que ces progrès aient sans cesse été effaces ne doit pas faire omettre leur réalité.'[523]

2. Fairness and 'military manuals'.

In the following section I shall examine how Frontinus, Onasander and Polyaenus deal with the ideal of fairness which we have found to be a guiding thread through all the texts that address the question of 'correct behaviour' in warfare. I shall look at the difference between trickery and stratagem, but also at the interplay between moral virtues and fairness. I shall argue that our authors take a situational approach to fairness, in particular the circumstances and the perpetrator of an action are extremely important. Though not explicitly stated, fairness and the moral qualities linked to it seem to appear only in contexts where they lead to success, and it does not seem that they are a goal in themselves.

While there are many ways in which the discussion can be organised, I will first look at the relationship between the ideal of fairness discussed in the previous section and stratagem, something which might be conceived of as intrinsically unfair, but which could also be considered one of the staples of good generalship. The discussion will be centred on Frontinus, who decided to write about stratagems, thus posing himself a particular challenge in respect to the ideal of fairness. In the second part of the discussion I will examine the importance of more particular aspects of fairness such as just warfare, the interplay between fairness and tyranny, and how oaths and promises – and especially their breach – go together with fairness. Each

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[523] Ducrey (1968) 302.

problem will also be connected to a specific author who is either the only one to deal with it – as is the case of Onasander and just warfare – or who allocates more space to it than others do – such as Polyaenus in the case of oaths and tyrants.

2.1 Fairness, stratagem and trickery: the case of Frontinus' Strategemata.

As we have seen, the Roman concept of *bellum iustum* is based on a certain notion of openness and fairness to the enemy, and Cicero's statement that 'if under stress of circumstances individuals have made any promise to the enemy, they are bound to keep their word even then' perhaps best captures its spirit.[524] But we have also seen that there is a certain tension between fairness and efficient practice, a tension at its highest when discussing military practices which involve some form of trickery.

Still, Polybius commented that the Romans were the heirs and guardians of a certain model of fairness, using ambushes sparingly (βραχὺ δέ τι λείπεται παρὰ Ῥωμαίοις ἴχνος ἔτι τῆς ἀρχαίας αἱρέσεως περὶ τὰ πολεμικά: καὶ γὰρ προλέγουσι τοὺς πολέμους καὶ ταῖς ἐνέδραις σπανίως χρῶνται καὶ τὴν μάχην ἐκ χειρὸς ποιοῦνται καὶ συστάδην), and Livy chastised the use of trickery, saying of the Romans:[525]

> *non per insidias et nocturna proelia nec simulatam fugam inprovisosque ad incautum hostem reditus nec ut astu magis quam vera virtute gloriarentur.*

> 'not by ambushes and battles by night nor by pretended flight and unexpected return to an enemy off his guard, nor in such a way as to boast of cunning rather than real bravery, did our ancestors wage war.'[526]

Therefore, there can be no question that trickery in warfare was poorly regarded. But is stratagem the same as trickery? The question is not so easily answered. Cicero in his *De officiis*, despite recommending fairness in all dealings with the enemy, praises Hannibal and Fabius Maximus for using stratagem:

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[524] Cic. *Off.* 1.39.
[525] Plb. 13.5.7.
[526] Liv. 42.47.5.

Callidum Hannibalem ex Poenorum, ex nostris ducibus Q. Maximum accepimus, facile celare, tacere, dissimulare, insidiari, praeripere hostium consilia.

'We read that Hannibal among the Carthaginian generals, and Quintus Maximus, among our own, were shrewd and ready at concealing their plans, covering up their tracks, disguising their movements, lying in ambush, forestalling the enemy's designs.[527]

However, these qualities are praised only when it comes to these two men, and the broader discussion is again about how one has to make the best use of the attributes that he possesses. In fact, Cicero goes on to say:

Sunt his alii multum dispares, simplices et aperti. qui nihil ex occulto, nihil de insidiis agendum putant, veritatis cultores, fraudis inimici, itemque alii, qui quidvis perpetiantur, cuivis deserviant, dum, quod velint, consequantur, ut Sullam et M. Crassum videbamus.

'Then there are others, quite different from these, straightforward and open, who think that nothing should be done by underhand means or treachery. They are lovers of truth, haters of fraud. There are other still who would stoop to anything, be submissive to anybody if only they may gain their ends. Such we saw, were Sulla and Marcus Crassus.'[528]

It all comes down, then, to how virtues and vices are perceived, at least according to Cicero, and then ultimately it is left to the readers to discern and make their own choice. As such a judgement hinges upon the situation and the person's character, being liable to both interpretations. Cicero emphasises this:

Innumerabiles aliae dissimilitudines sunt naturae morumque, minime tamen vituperandorum.

'Countless other dissimilarities exist in natures and characters, and they are not in the least to be criticised'[529]

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[527] Cic. *Off.* 1.108.
[528] Cic. *Off.* 1.109.
[529] Cic. *Off.* 1.109.

Then he adds:

> *Admodum autem tenenda sunt sua cuique non vitiosa, sed tamen propria, quo facilius decorum illud, quod quaerimus, retineatur. Sic enim est faciendum, ut contra universam naturam nihil contendamus, ea tamen conservata propriam nostram sequamur, ut, etiamsi sint alia graviora atque meliora, tamen nos studia nostra nostrae naturae regula metiamur.*

> 'Everybody, however, must resolutely hold fast to his own peculiar gifts, in so far as they are peculiar only and not vicious, in order that propriety, which is the object of our inquiry, may the more easily be secured. For we must so act as not to oppose the universal laws of human nature, but while safeguarding those, to follow the bent of our own particular nature'.[530]

Therefore, stratagems might be acceptable, but only for some men. Valerius Maximus holds a similar line. As Clive Skidmore argues in his monograph on Valerius Maximus (arguing against Martin Bloomer), Valerius has a well-constructed moral universe of virtues, which are rewarded by public recognition (*laus*), and vices, which are subject to reprimand (*reprehensio*).[531]

However *strategemata* do not fit the categories of virtue and vice, but lie somewhere in between; whilst stratagem is not a vice, Skidmore rightly emphasises that Valerius 'does not lavish upon it the elaborate praise in the treatment of other virtues' and this can be seen as 'a residual element of moral doubt' which marks 'the lesser importance of these chapters'.[532] Indeed, although Valerius tries to present stratagem as something more positive than actual trickery, describing it as 'a laudable part of cunning far removed from all censure', generally there is still some wariness about it.[533] For instance, in his account of Hannibal's ambush at Cannae, ambush is still presented as an ambivalent procedure, Valerius' comment being essentially in favour of overt courage:

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[530] Cic. *Off.* 1.110.

[531] Skidmore (1996) 55ff and Bloomer (1992); for Cicero and *exempla* van der Blom (2010), for *exempla* in Latin historiography Roller (2009).

[532] Skidmore (1996) 69-70.

[533] Val. Max. 7.4.pr: *pars calliditatis egregia et ab omni reprehensione procul remota*; all translations by D.S. Shackleton Bailey.

quae nunc certissima circumventae virtutis nostrae excusatio est, quoniam decepti magis quam victi sumus

'That is now the surest excuse for our hoodwinked valour, since we were deceived rather than vanquished.'[534]

We also see that Jupiter allows stratagem, even though courage was preferable, and it is Roman *prudentia* and *virtus* that eventually aid Claudius Nero and Livius Salinator in vanquishing Hannibal and Hasdrubal, despite the use of a stratagem by which they tricked the Carthaginians into thinking they would only fight a single army.[535]

No text raises the issue of the ethics of trickery more than Frontinus' *Strategemata*. Given that, as we have seen, Valerius Maximus explicitly presents stratagems as something ambivalent, when Frontinus decided to put together his collection he must have been aware that some of the stratagems presented might conflict with Roman ideas about fairness in warfare. However, he rarely comments on what he relates explicitly. More often than not, the reader has nothing more to go on than the chapter heading and the juxtaposition of Roman and foreign figures performing similar deeds that fit a certain category, and there is no 'moral guidance' which reprimands or praises generals. What Frontinus does highlight is that he is discussing *exempla*:

Ita enim consilii quoque et providentiae **exemplis** *succinti duces erunt, unde illis excogitandi generandique similia facultas nutriatur.*

'For in this way commanders will be furnished with specimens of wisdom/planning and foresight, which will serve to foster their own power of conceiving and executing like deeds.'[536]

Examples of the deeds of famous men traditionally have a deep and complex moral charge, as we can see best in Valerius' work, and while equating *strategemata* with *exempla* might constitute a problem, for Frontinus it is also a solution. By highlighting the equivalence, he is in

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[534] Val. Max. 7.4.ext.2.

[535] Val. Max. 7.4.3: *misertus est tunc profecto Iuppiter Romanae virtutis, praesidium ab astutia mutuanti* / Surely Jupiter took pity then on Roman valour, as it borrowed aid from cunning; for Salinator and Nero see 7.4.4.

[536] Front. *Strat.* Pr.

fact arguing that *strategemata* should be considered as legitimate and acceptable as any other *exempla*. It is important that the commanders shall not only be provided with examples of the remarkable deeds of other famous commanders, but with examples of *consilium* – planning or wisdom – and *providentia* – foresight. Thus the *sollertia ducum facta* i.e. the *strategemata* to which he refers, are simply an expression of these abstract qualities of generals, a manifestation of their *consilium et providentia*, and are to be actively judged by readers.

Consilium and *providentia* are precisely the moral qualities appreciated by Valerius Maximus in his own chapter about stratagems. Thus, in describing the ruse of the Romans who threw bread from the Capitol when besieged by the Gauls to make them think they had enough supplies, he underscores the excellent planning of the ancestors:

> *Illud quoque maioribus et* **consilio** *prudenter et exitu feliciter prouisum*

> 'The following measure too of our ancestors was shrewd in the planning and fortunate in the result.'[537]

In his next *exemplum consilium* and *providentia* are emphasised together:

> *hinc Claudii Neronis* **uegetum consilium**, *illinc Liui Salinatoris* **inclita prouidentia** *effect*

> 'On the one hand the vigorous planning of Claudius Nero, on the other the celebrated foresight of Livius Salinator achieved this'

and then Jupiter's approval of the planning of the consuls:

> *Iuppiter postea praestantissimorum ducum nostrorum* **sagacibus consiliis** *propitius aspiravit*

> 'Jupiter later propitiously favoured the sagacious plans of our foremost generals.'[538]

I suggest that Frontinus focuses on planning and foresight in order to give his stratagems grounding in admirable moral qualities (as seen in Valerius) and at the same time in order not

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[537] Val. Max. 7.4.3.
[538] Val. Max. 7.4.4.

to get bogged down in any debates about what is 'ethical' on the battlefield and what is not, or whether stratagems are 'fair' or not. It is almost as if the existence of these underlying qualities justifies any advice that might follow. Having said that, Frontinus' position on fairness also seems to be situational and what seems to be implicitly emphasised are the results of a certain action. His recommendations often suggest working within the rules without actually breaking them, but also disregarding fairness when necessary. His example of Philip changing the terms of the peace during a negotiation in order to get the upper hand, while not exactly what Cicero had in mind by being fair to the enemy, is 'breaking no word' *per se*, but treads a very fine line:

> *Tractaque per magnum tempus postulatione, cum de industria subinde aliquid in condicionibus retexeret, classem per id tempus praeparavit eaque in angustias freti imparato hoste subitus evasit.*

> 'While the negotiations dragged on for some time and Philip purposely kept changing the details of the terms, in the interval he got ready a fleet, and eluding the enemy while they were off their guard, he suddenly sailed into the straits'.[539]

Similarly Hasdrubal by dragging on negotiations manages to escape a dangerous position and when Sulla takes advantage of a truce to escape the enemy it is not clear whether he could be said to be 'breaking' that truce.[540] The best example of a challenge to the rules of 'fairness' is Frontinus' subchapter on ambushes.[541] Ambushes are perhaps the most negative component of stratagem due to their clear breach of the ideal of direct, face-to-face combat. Pritchett points out that on several occasions Polybius comments on their rarity among the Greeks and Romans and characterises the *enedra* – one of the two Greek words used for ambush – as 'a violation of the ancient sense of military honour.'[542] Polybius goes on to say that the Cretans are irresistible in ambushes 'and all petty operations which require fraud, but they are cowardly and down-hearted in the massed face-to-face charge of an open battle' (καὶ πάσας τὰς μετὰ δόλου καὶ κατὰ μέρος χρείας ἀνυπόστατοι, πρὸς δὲ τὴν ἐξ ὁμολόγου καὶ κατὰ πρόσωπον φαλαγγηδὸν

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[539] Front. *Strat.* 1.4.13.
[540] Front. *Strat.* 1.5.18 and 2.5.
[541] Front. *Strat.* 2.5.
[542] Pritchett (1974) 178.

ἔφοδον ἀγεννεῖς καὶ πλάγιοι ταῖς ψυχαῖς).[543] Whilst Polybius might not be representing a unanimous view, Pritchett points out that Greek attitudes towards ambush would have been seen as ambivalent at best, and one cannot deny that there would have been some discomfort for Frontinus in approaching this very important component of stratagem.[544]

Despite this, ambushes are by far the largest topic treated in the entire work and this suggests that the author is making a point of showing that – despite grounding his stratagems in traits that can be considered 'moral' as we have seen before – adhering to a certain 'code of battlefield ethics' is not the main aim of his collection, and that in order to be successful and maximise the chance of victory regardless, one has, at times, to suppress ideas of fairness.

There is indeed no sense of wrongdoing or hint of cowardice in the actions of Romulus, who constitutes the first example, destroying his enemy near Fidenae by setting up an ambush and then feigning retreat. It is in fact the enemies of Rome who are slightly badly judged for their lack of tactical awareness as Frontinus refers to them as following 'rashly' (*temere*).[545] This is indeed the tone that all the stratagems concerning ambush seem to have in common, where it is good generalship and the poor judgement of the enemy that is subtly emphasised, often leading to total annihilation. Such is the case of Sempronius Gracchus fighting the Celtiberians in 179 B.C., who also by a feigned retreat managed to lure them into an ambush and destroy them (*cecidit*), the emphasis being on the disorder of the enemy (*inordinatos*), or of Thamyris who managed to 'win a complete victory' (*devicit*) in 529 B.C. by using the same apparent fear to lure Cyrus' troops into an ambush.[546] The lack of *providentia* on the part of the enemy is repeatedly implied, as with the enemies of the Egyptians who advanced too swiftly over unfamiliar ground (*rapidus per ignota invecti loca*) and ended up surrounded, or the Romans fighting Viriathus – the leader of the Celtiberians – between 147-139 B.C. who too were ignorant of their surroundings (*ignaros locorum*) and were destroyed in a swamp.[547]

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[543] Plb. 4.8.11; also Pritchett (1974) 179.
[544] Pritchett (1974) 186-187.
[545] Front. *Strat.* 2.5.1.
[546] Front. *Strat.* 2.5.3; 2.5.5.
[547] Front. *Strat.* 2.5.6; 2.5.7.

Therefore, what Frontinus seems to highlight is good generalship, whilst perhaps suggesting – rather than saying it outright, like Polybius – that the ideal of fighting according to a certain code, although noble, is not particularly useful to a commander. A perfect example of this can be found in Frontinus' inclusion in this category of the legendary single combat between Melanthus and Xanthus. The story goes that there was a conflict between the Athenians and Boeotians (either over Oenoe and Panacton or over the deme of Melainai) which the two sides decided to settle by *monomachia*. Since the Athenian king Thymoites was too old, another warrior – Melanthus – took it upon himself to answer the call and fight Xanthus, the Boeotian king, with the promise of succeeding Thymoites to the Athenian throne.[548] Frontinus narrates what happened next:

> *Melanthus, dux Atheniensium, cum provocatus a rege hostium Xantho Boeotio descendisset ad pugnam, ut primum comminus stetit, "inique", inquit, "Xanthe, et contra pactum facis; adversus solum enim cum altero processisti." Cumque admiratus ille, quisnam se comitaretur, respexisset, aversum uno ictu confecit*

> 'Melanthus, the Athenian general, on one occasion came out for combat, in response to the challenge of the king of the enemy, Xanthus, the Boeotian. As soon as they stood face to face, Melanthus exclaimed: "Your conduct is unfair, Xanthus, and contrary to agreement. I am alone, but you have come out with a companion against me." When Xanthus wondered who was following him and looked behind, Melanthus dispatched him with a single stroke, as his head was turned away'[549]

Monomachia had deep roots in Roman military tradition and was considered a straightforward, fair way of ending a war.[550] Despite the original meaning of the story (which surely would have had something to do with unconventionality and victory by surprise), by presenting an 'unfair'

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[548] See Vidal-Naquet (1986) 109-112.

[549] Front. *Strat.* 2.5.41.

[550] For the Roman tradition of single combat see Widemann (1996), Oakley (1985). For the contrast between trickery and hoplite fighting see Vidal-Naquet (1986) 111. This story about Melanthus is where Vidal Naquet's *Black Hunter* gets his name from. It is also worth noting that the story became the aitiological myth for the Athenian *Apatouria*, precisely in order to derive *Apatouria* from *apate* (deceit) – although that is in fact a false etymology; see Graf (2006).

element – namely Melanthus' deception – as part of an ultimately fair means of conflict resolution and by including the example in a category – ambush – which was not well regarded in Roman warfare, Frontinus is subverting the rules and expectations of 'fairness in war', ultimately showing that perhaps the most important element in warfare is victory.

However, just as in the case of Cicero's *De officiis*, Frontinus' examples can also be interpreted in a relative way within the moral universe of his audience. The latter would for the most part be aware of the context of the events being related and of the moral characters of the figures being discussed, and have pre-formed judgements about them. Surely Hannibal carrying out an ambush, for example, would have been perceived differently than Fabius Maximus, since one would expect the first to behave in a less straightforward way, and it would have been more acceptable and in character for him as a Carthaginian, than for Fabius, to bend the rules of fairness. This would mean that – again similarly to Cicero's advice – a general would not mindlessly emulate any stratagem but perhaps consider whether he himself had the same character as the general whose stratagem he emulated, and whether he was in the same circumstances, especially since the audience would be likely to know the eventual outcome of the war/battle and would therefore be able to draw conclusions about the effectiveness of a certain stratagem based on that as well.

2.2 Just war

Onasander is the only one of our authors who explicitly discusses 'just warfare', surely because the format of Frontinus' and Polyaenus' treatises gives them less freedom to treat such theoretical matters but also because 'just war' issues arise primarily over going to war, so treatments that are interested in how wars are fought are not going to be concerned them. One of his self-contained chapters is dedicated to the way in which war must be defensive and how a general must have the support of the gods.[551] There is engagement with the idea of just war but, in many ways this is directed at the soldiers' psychology not principles, and at making them believe that they are fighting for the right cause. Thus, although the author mentions the

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[551] Onos. 4.

support of the gods, it becomes quickly apparent that it is desirable mainly because of its effect on the morale and psychology of the soldiers. Consider the following:

> εἰδότες γάρ, ὡς οὐκ ἄρχουσιν ἀλλ ἀμύνονται, τὰς ψυχὰς ἀσυνειδήτους κακῶν ἔχοντες ἐντελῆ τὴν ἀνδρείαν εἰσφέρονται, ὡς, ὅσοι γε νομίζουσι νεμεσήσειν τὸ θεῖον ἐπὶ τῷ παρὰ τὸ δίκαιον ἐκφέρειν πόλεμον, αὐτῇ τῇ οἰήσει, κἂν μή τι δεινὸν ἀπὸ τῶν πολεμίων ἀπαντήσειν μέλλῃ, προκατορρωδοῦσιν.

> 'For with the knowledge that they are not fighting an aggressive but a defensive war, with consciences free from evil designs, they contribute a courage that is complete; while those who believe an unjust war is displeasing to heaven, because of this very opinion enter the war with fear'[552]

In other words, it is important to fight a defensive and just war not necessarily for the sake of an 'ethical code' or of an ideal of fairness, but because, if they believe in the war they are fighting, it makes men better fighters. So, one of the more important points that Onasander seems to make – both here and in the rest of the treatise – is that perception is more important than reality, and emphasis is placed on the soldiers and their point of view, with perception being assumed as their reality. The general needs to appear to be doing his best to fight defensively; whether he actually does so is irrelevant – and this exact point is made by Polybius as well:

> πολὺ γὰρ δὴ τούτου τοῦ μέρους ἐφρόντιζον Ῥωμαῖοι, καλῶς φρονοῦντες· ἔνστασις γὰρ πολέμου κατὰ τὸν Δημήτριον δικαία μὲν εἶναι δοκοῦσα καὶ τὰ νικήματα ποιεῖ μείζω καὶ τὰς ἀποτεύξεις ἀσφαλεστέρας, ἀσχήμων δὲ καὶ φαύλη τοὐναντίον ἀπεργάζεται

> 'For the Romans very rightly paid great attention to this matter, since, as Demetrius says, when the inception of a war seems just, it makes victory greater and ill-success less perilous, while if it is thought to be dishonourable and wrong it has the opposite effect.'[553]

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[552] Onos. 4.2.
[553] 3Plb. 36.2.3. and cf. Onos. 4.

As for how Onasander's general should fight we find Onasander's advice in the context of capturing cities through treachery. After having stressed the importance of capturing everyone who might warn the inhabitants of the approach of the army, he makes the more general point that a commander needs to find the mean between open declaration of warfare and surprise, between justification and utility:

> ἐπελθόντα δ᾿ ἐξαίφνης ἀπροσδοκήτοις χρή, κἂν μὴ κατὰ προδοσίαν μέλλῃ λαμβάνειν, ἀλλ᾿ ἐκ προρρήσεως ἀγωνίζεσθαι διὰ μάχης, μὴ ἀναβάλλεσθαι, ἀλλ᾿ ὡς ὅτι μάλιστα φθάνειν προσβάλλοντα εἴτε φρουρίῳ εἴτε χάρακι εἴτε πόλει, μάλιστα δ᾿ ὅτ᾿ ἂν ὀλίγον εἶναι δοκῇ τὸ φίλιον στράτευμα καὶ τῶν ἐχθρῶν ἐλαττούμενον

> 'He must fall on an unsuspecting enemy, even if he is not expecting to seize the towns through treachery but to fight openly after a declaration of war, he must not hesitate but strive in every way to attack fort or camp or town before his advance is known, especially if he knows that his own army is small and inferior to that of the enemy.'[554]

Open declaration of warfare does not, therefore, mean that the general must forgo his tactical advantage and strategic thinking: he must fight within the rules however, taking any advantage that is permitted. Hence, in Onasander's view 'just war' does not mean marching openly into enemy territory and joining battle at a designated time and place, but operating within the parameters of fairness whilst still employing intelligent generalship.

2.3 Oaths, tyrants and fairness

Polyaenus seems to have similar views about rules and his examples often suggest either bending them or, less frequently, breaking them. This mostly happens in the case of oaths and promises – which feature in far greater number than in Frontinus' collection, but we shall also discuss the special place that tyrants hold in his collection (again as opposed to Frontinus) and how their actions relate to fairness.

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[554] Onos. 39.5.

However, the analysis of his text must come with a caveat due to the express provision in his preface that he is trying to be exhaustive. As I mentioned before, Polyaenus claims that he has gathered in the book 'as many stratagems of past commanders as came into being', so one must wonder what kind of agenda could fit into in this kind of 'unselective' approach.[555] We have also seen that the text is not organised thematically, but prosopographically, so apart from the stratagems being about a certain person they do not follow any other structure, despite certain practices being common to all the figures (for example the use of surprise). On top of this if we examine the entirety of his text we see that sometimes examples are included which would only barely qualify as 'stratagems', at least when compared to Frontinus'. Most of these are in book eight, the first part of which is about the deeds of Romans, and the second describing 'stratagems' of women. It is in this section that Polyaenus' desire to include as many instances of 'wit and cleverness' as possible becomes most clear. For example, the chapter on Mania simply describes her life, how she was the wife of Zenis the ruler of the cities near Dardanus and after his death she contrived his rule, went to battle in a chariot and acted as a general, eventually dying at the hand of her new husband, Medias, who assassinated her in her chambers.[556] In these circumstances we might wonder if Polyaenus cares at all about ethics in this work and whether the contradictions that we see are not simply the result of a lack of selectiveness, dictated by an overriding desire for exhaustiveness. Surely his desire to minimise the Roman contribution is also behind this, the inclusion of perhaps less significant stratagems of women being a very efficient way of achieving this goal. Nevertheless, his compilation will have been read and measured against the same set of norms and, irrespective of whether he would have intended it or not, I will also attempt to read it in a similar way.

Thus, an extreme example of rule-breaking appears in the chapter dedicated to Lysander in book one, and as part of the succession of examples of Greek commanders. Lysander breaks the promise made in the temple of Hercules not to kill pro-Athenian sympathisers, by proceeding to have their throats cut. Beyond breaking a promise to an 'enemy', this is also against the general expectation that a captured city should be shown mercy, as at this stage the

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[555] Polyaen. 1.pr.
[556] Polyaen. 54.

Thasians were already in the power of Lysander and his action also violates a sacred space and sanctuary. [557] It also follows the general principle expressed by Lysander in the previous chapter, namely that 'boys must be deceived with knuckle-bones, enemies with oaths.'[558] The fact that this saying follows a stratagem that involves a naval battle and has nothing to do with oaths indicates that what is being expressed is a general principle which Polyaenus adheres to, simply because it is so disconnected from everything else. Indeed, he includes many other examples of manipulating oaths and promises similar to this one, such as the one of Thrasyllus and the siege of Byzantium. When the Byzantine generals feared that the city would be taken by force, they agreed to hand the city over at a certain time, but, after setting sail for Ionia, Thrasyllus' men broke the terms, returned and captured Byzantium by force the same night.[559] Similarly we see Clearchus retreating with the Ten Thousand after the defeat of Cyrus to a village with unlimited provisions. When Tissaphernes promised that they could stay there after handing over their weapons, Clearchus at first pretended to accept, hoping that the Persians would disperse to the villages. However he then broke the treaty at night and then marched ahead of Tissaphernes.[560]

Once again, the tension between working within the boundaries of an 'ethical code' and bending it can be noticed. For instance, when Dercyllidas swore to Medias the tyrant of Scepsis that if he came for a parley he would be allowed to return shortly to the city, he threatened to kill him if he did not open the gates. He then upheld his promise but only after coming in with his army and thus treading a fine line between keeping and breaking the oath.[561] This pushing of boundaries is almost identical to the example of Thibron besieging a fort in Asia, where the garrison commander was persuaded to come out and negotiate a truce with the promise that if they did not agree, Thibron would escort him back into the fort. This gave Thibron's forces a

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[557] Polyaen. 1.45.4
[558] Polyaen. 1.45.3: Λύσανδρος παρήγγελλεν ἐξαπατᾶν χρῆναι παῖδας μὲν ἀστραγάλοις, πολεμίους δὲ ὅρκοις.
[559] Polyaen. 1.47. 2
[560] Polyaen. 2.2.2
[561] Polyaen. 2.6.

chance to attack the fort and take it, whilst indeed the garrison commander was led inside the fort – as promised – but then killed.[562]

In all these examples the promises are not broken *per se* but they are bent in a way which allows the commander to gain an advantage. This idea of manipulation of words might attract Polyaenus' rhetorical side, which may be why he includes so many similar examples, such as Paches' identical stratagem when he was besieging Notium, only this time it was Hippias, Pissuthnes' general, who was killed. [563] Can this repetition be considered Polyaenus' endorsement? The question is not easily answered because Polyaenus never comments explicitly either to rebuke or to commend and there is no thematic unity or guidelines which would help a reader makes sense of the collection.

Turning to the context provided – or the lack thereof – can prove illuminating. If we take the case of breaking oaths, promises and truces, the reason why it might be justifiable to break them is to bring significant advantages, and this seems to be what Polyaenus is suggesting in Agathocles' words:

> Ἀγαθοκλῆς, Σικελίας τύραννος, ὁμόσας τοῖς πολεμίοις παρέβη τοὺς ὅρκους καὶ κατασφάξας τοὺς ἁλόντας ἐπιχλευάζων πρὸς τοὺς φίλους ἔλεγεν 'δειπνήσαντες ἐξεμέσωμεν τοὺς ὅρκους'.

> After breaking the oath he had sworn to his enemies and killing his prisoners, Agathocles, the tyrant of Sicily, said scornfully to his friends, "After eating let us vomit up the oaths" [564]

The fact that this comes at the beginning of the chapter on Agathocles, again disconnected from anything else could mean that it is the author's own judgement. Furthermore, one may again wonder who Agathocles is. Is he the same tyrant of Syracuse who appeared in book two? If so, why does he get another chapter? Or is it his son or his grandson, with the same name? Given what was said before about the seeming unimportance of context in Polyaenus, it is

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[562] Polyaen. 2.19.
[563] Polyaen. 3.2.
[564] Polyaen. 5.3.1.

more likely that it does not matter which Agathocles this is because what Polyaenus wants to emphasise in the first place is this specific attitude towards oaths.

This leads onto the matter of tyrants more broadly. There is a special and most peculiar category of stratagems, stories about tyrants, many of them ending with the killing of a segment of the population of a city, and thus posing particular problems in relation to fairness. Tyrants are certainly a complicated topic in the ancient world, as are the lessons that can be drawn from their *exempla*, so their inclusion here is striking for several reasons.[565]

Firstly, if we again turn to Cicero's *De Officiis*, we see that there are certain categories of opponents to which the rules of 'lawful warfare' do not apply. One of these is pirates, Cicero commenting that if one breaks his word towards them it would not be considered a transgression because they are not 'lawful enemies'.[566] Tyrants too are in one of these categories and hurting or killing them is considered acceptable under any circumstance:

> *Saepe enim tempore fit, ut, quod turpe plerumque haberi soleat, inveniatur non esse turpe; exempli causa ponatur aliquid, quod pateat latius: Quod potest maius esse scelus quam non modo hominem, sed etiam familiarem hominem occidere? Num igitur se astrinxit scelere, si qui tyrannum occidit quamvis familiarem? Populo quidem Romano non videtur*

> 'For it often happens, owing to exceptional circumstances, that what is accustomed under ordinary circumstances to be considered morally wrong is found not to be morally wrong. For the sake of illustration, let us assume some particular case that admits of wider application: what more atrocious crime can there be than to kill a fellow-man, and especially an intimate friend? But if anyone kills a tyrant—be he never so intimate a friend—he has not laden his soul with guilt, has he? The Roman People, at all events, are not of that opinion'[567]

Also, as opposed to Cicero's explanation that men are linked by bonds of fellowship and must act accordingly, a tyrant is not protected by these:

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[565] For an overview of tyranny in the ancient world see Lewis (2006), (2009), Andrewes (1971), McGlew (1993).
[566] Cic. *Off.* 3.18.
[567] Cic. *Off.* 3.19.

Nulla est enim societas nobis cum tyrannis, et potius summa distractio est, neque est contra naturam spoliare eum, si possis, quem est honestum necare, atque hoc omne genus pestiferum atque impium ex hominum communitate exterminandum est.

'We have no ties of fellowship with a tyrant, but rather the bitterest feud; and it is not opposed to Nature to rob, if one can, a man whom it is morally right to kill;—nay, all that pestilent and abominable race should be exterminated from human society.'[568]

Under these circumstances, Polyaenus' inclusion of numerous examples where tyrants achieve personal power – by murdering prisoners or the inhabitants of a city – strikingly distinguishes him from Frontinus and Onasander. One such case is that of Theron, the son of Miltiades, who, when the Selinuntines were fighting the Carthaginians promised to bury the bodies of the fallen if he was given 300 slaves to cut wood, construct a pyre and then erect a burial mound. However, he persuaded the slaves to kill their masters and also of citizens in their sleep, thus capturing the city and becoming tyrant.[569] Similarly, Polyaenus gives the example of how Clearchus, the tyrant of Heraclea wanted to kill many citizens but had no pretext, so he enlisted those between the ages of sixteen and sixty-five, took them out into marshy ground and waited for them to die of pestilence.[570]

The inclusion of many deeds of tyrants which encompass actions against one's own citizens begs the question of interpretation: what are we – and what were the ancient readers – supposed to make of all these examples that go against ideas of clemency and seem to emphasise the use of violence for personal gain? Polyaenus offers no explicit comment in any of the chapters and leaves the impression that everything is to be emulated. This is certainly the implication in the preface:

ἀλλὰ τῆς στρατηγικῆς ἐπιστήμης ἐφόδια ταυτὶ προσφέρω, ὅσα τῶν πάλαι γέγονε στρατηγήματα, ὑμῖν τε αὐτοῖς πολλὴν ἐμπειρίαν παλαιῶν ἔργων, τοῖς τε ὑπὸ ὑμῶν

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[568] Cic. *Off.* 3.32.
[569] Polyaen. 1.28.
[570] Polyaen. 2.30.3; also 1.42.1.

πεμπομένοις πολεμάρχοις ἢ στρατηγοῖς ἢ μυριάρχοις ἢ χιλιάρχοις ἢ ἑξακοσιάρχοις ἢ ὅσαι ἄλλαι ὅπλων ἀρχαὶ, διδασκομένοις ἀρχαίων κατορθωμάτων ἀρετὰς καὶ τέχνας.

'I offer this guidebook of military knowledge, all the stratagems of earlier generals, both to you as a collection of past experiences and to those sent by you, polemarchs, generals, legates of legions, tribunes, prefects of cohorts and other officers, teaching the merits and skills of ancient victories to their troops'[571]

In the preface to book two he describes the stratagems as meant to give 'concise aid' (ὠφέλειαν σύντομον), though it is not exactly clear how and whether they provide examples of what one should as well as should not do. Is all this supposed to mean – as perhaps in the case of oaths – that good generalship must be taken at face value irrespective of its context? It seems that the implication is that a clever trick must be recognised as such, even if performed by a tyrant: the value of trickery in and of itself is clearly underscored in the preface:

ἀνδρεία μὲν γὰρ, ὅστις ἀλκῇ χρησάμενος πολεμίων μαχομένων ἐκράτησεν, εὐβουλία δὲ, ἀμαχεὶ τέχνῃ καὶ δόλῳ περιγίνεσθαι· ὡς ἔστι πρώτη δεινῶν στρατηγῶν σοφία κτᾶσθαι τὴν νίκην ἀκίνδυνον.

'For it is courage whenever one conquers an enemy in battle with strength, but it is good planning to win without a fight by art and trickery, so that it is the first wisdom of clever generals to achieve victory without risk'[572]

So whilst Frontinus tries to dissociate stratagem from trickery and associate it with more 'positive' qualities, Polyaenus takes the opposite approach, and uses trickery to give a positive spin to examples which might be considered more negative. The usefulness and prestige of trickery is also marked out in the preface by connection with legendary figures such as Autolycus, Proteus, Irus and Odysseus: Greek myth is used to give his argument force.[573]

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[571] Polyaen. Pr.2
[572] Polyaen. Pr. 3; he goes on to discuss Greek figures that all used trickery successfully.
[573] Polyaen. Pr. 4-12.

Thus, while differing from Frontinus and Onasander in degree and approach – the deeds included by Polyaenus are more extreme – one might also say that the latter, through valuing trickery irrespective of context and consequence, also encourages a utilitarian attitude centred on immediate victory which supersedes any 'rules of warfare'.

We shall see a similar approach in the following section, dedicated to how one should behave towards one's enemies and allies after the war has started.

3. Ius in bello. *Virtues and dealing with the enemy.*

I will now examine how our authors approach the second major component of the code, namely dealing with the enemy and in particular with prisoners and those who surrender. Since the issue is closely intertwined with notions of clemency and justice, the question of whether a general should possess certain virtues will also be addressed here. The line I will hold will be similar to that of the previous subchapter, namely that our authors suggest that the general should place success above all else and that any action he takes should be geared towards this.

In the case of this section, because of the intricate agendas of the different authors, it is better to discuss each of their views separately, rather than go for a thematic approach which would single out specific virtues. Thus, I will discuss Frontinus' views and agenda first, followed by Polyaenus' and Onasander's. The virtues that we shall be focusing on are those that are linked closely to the 'ethical code', specifically clemency, justice and self-restraint, since they are the ones most consistently related to how a general behaves towards the enemy but also towards prisoners or inhabitants of a captured city. Other virtues, such as courage, will not feature here simply because an investigation into why it is essential to warfare and why the texts emphasise it would be superfluous. Our aim will be to see whether our authors in any way suggest that these virtues are useful in an abstract sense and that any 'good general' should possess them or whether they are also linked to certain situations and should play a specific role, and discipline is perhaps one of the best examples of this (whether it is a virtue in the same sense as clemency, for instance, is a different matter).

Before we enter a discussion about each individual author, we should briefly consider whether the virtues necessary in warfare are the same as those needed in life in general, or whether they are in any way different. Again Valerius Maximus' *Memorable Deeds and Sayings* constitutes a good starting point, for a more general enquiry. The question might, however, be considered wrongheaded for a Roman world in which there is a close mix between 'civilian' and 'military', little distinction made between the two. Indeed, the notion of the 'civilian' might be thought to be absent. Certainly, it would seem that some of the values discussed by both Frontinus and Valerius would be useful outside warfare. However, even those such as *fortitudo*, which one might think is most relevant in battle is considered by Valerius to be equally important in the 'civil' sphere, as he comments:

> '*Togaque quoque fortitude militaribus operibus inseranda est, quia eandem laudem foro atque castris edita meretur.*

> 'Bravery in the toga calls for mention among military exploits. For bravery deserves the same praise whether shown in Forum or camp.'[574]

Indeed, there are equal examples of *fortitudo* in public life as there are in warfare, and the same can be said about *iustitia*, where the most notable are the almost identical prosecution of Scaurus by Cn. Domitius and the offer by Scaurus' slave to furnish charges against his master ('public' sphere), and the offer by Pyrrhus' slave to poison him ('military' sphere).[575] Valerius' chapters on *Abstinentia et continentia* also present the military stories of Scipio and Cato, juxtaposed to the domestic story of Drusus and his wife Antonia, and also that of Fabricius Luscinus, who refuses gold from the Samnites (but not as a result of warfare) juxtaposed to that of Manius Curius who refused the Samnite bribes.[576] So based on the qualities that we find in both Frontinus and Valerius we could say that there is no specific way of applying 'moral qualities' to warfare, and no difference between civil and military virtues. What one could say however is that warfare is perhaps a better arena for displaying such qualities, as we do see

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[574] Val. Max. 3.2.17.
[575] Val. Max. 6.5.5 and 6.5.1d.
[576] Val. Max. 4.3.1-2 vs. 4.3.3; 4.3.5a vs. 4.3.6a.

that in most cases the examples that pertain to warfare outnumber those pertaining to public life, as for instance in *abstinentia* et *continentia*.

3.1 Frontinus

Gilliver is right in saying that, when it comes to the enemy, Frontinus goes for an approach that encourages both violence and clemency, but there is an important distinction to be made in terms of structure.[577] In books one to three there is very little commentary on the moral virtues associated with correct treatment of prisoners and enemies, and when these issues do appear they seem not to be there in their own right but simply part of a bigger picture. The clearest examples where two moral traits are actually named and commented upon is in book two which, in Frontinus' own words, deals with:

> *quae in ipso proelio agi solent, et deinde ea, quae post proelium*

> 'those things that are usually done in the battle itself, and then those that come subsequent to the engagement.'[578]

These virtues are magnanimity and justice. The first two 'stratagems' are virtually identical examples of the honourable treatment of a beautiful woman captured by Scipio Africanus and Alexander respectively, whilst the final 'stratagem' is an example of the justice of Domitian in compensating the Cubii for their lost grain. They are part of the chapter entitled *De Dubiorum Animis in Fide Retinendis* ('On Ensuring the Loyalty of Those Whom one Mistrusts'):

> *Scipio Africanus in Hispania, cum inter captivas eximiae formae virgo nubilis [alias et nobilis] ad eum perducta esset omniumque oculos in se converteret, summa custodia habitam sponso nomine Alicio reddidit insuperque aurum, quod parentes eius redempturi captivam donum Scipioni attulerant, eidem sponso pro nuptiali munere dedit. Qua multiplici magnificentia universa gens victa imperio populi Romani accessit.*

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[577] Gilliver (1996) 222.
[578] Front. *Strat.* 2.pr.

'When Scipio Africanus was warring in Spain, there was brought before him among the captive women a noble maiden of surpassing beauty who attracted the gaze of everyone. Scipio guarded her with the greatest pains and restored her to her betrothed, Alicius by name, presenting to him likewise, as a marriage gift, the gold which her parents had brought to Scipio as a ransom. Overcome by this manifold generosity, the whole tribe assented to the rule of the Roman people.'

Alexandrum quoque Macedonem traditum est eximiae pulchritudinis virgini captivae, cum finitimae gentis principi fuisset desponsa, summa abstinentia ita pepercisse, ut illam ne aspexerit quidem. Qua mox ad sponsum remissa, universae gentis per hoc beneficium animos conciliavit sibi.

'The story goes that Alexander of Macedon likewise, having taken captive a maiden of exceeding beauty betrothed to the chief of a neighboring tribe, treated her with such extreme consideration that he refrained even from gazing at her. When the maiden was later returned to her lover, Alexander, as a result of this kindness, secured the attachment of the entire tribe.'

Imperator Caesar Augustus Germanicus eo bello, quo victis hostibus cognomen Germanici meruit, cum in finibus Cubiorum castella poneret, pro fructibus locorum, quae vallo comprehendebat, pretium solvi iussit; atque ita iustitiae fama omnium fidem astrinxit.

When the Emperor Caesar Augustus Germanicus, in the war in which he earned his title by conquering the Germans, was building forts in the territory of the Cubii, he ordered compensation to be made for the crops which he had included within his fortifications. Thus, the renown of his justice won the allegiance of all.[579]

Nowhere does Frontinus say that virtue for its own sake is not to be praised, and the two examples could easily be interpreted as virtue being rewarded. However, what is highlighted beyond that is the commanders' *providentia* for realising the strategic advantage of being well-disposed towards one's enemies. In each situation the person carrying out the stratagem gains

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[579] Front. *Strat.* 2.11.5-7.

a tangible benefit, namely the cooperation of a people that could otherwise prove potentially hostile and this is what Frontinus' final comment reflects: in the case of Scipio we see that the *munificentia* leads to *universa gens victa imperio populi Romani accessit*, in that of Alexander his *beneficium* wins an alliance with the whole tribe (*universae gentis animos conciliavit sibi*) and finally Domitian's *iustitiae fama* wins the good faith of all (*omnium fidem astrinxit*).

Oftentimes, however, readers are at a loss when trying to identify what is being emphasised in a particular stratagem. Guidance is provided by the author's own description in the heading of the subchapter, and we quickly realise that many of these stratagems could fit under several headings, or that they are indeed interchangeable. For example chapters that are essentially about an encircling manoeuvre, become, because of Frontinus' classification, means of terrorising the enemy and there are also identical stratagems under different headings, which makes the reader wonder what warrants the inclusion in one category or the other.[580] The only thing that makes the same stratagem an example of *constantia* in book four – a chapter dealing with how one should be determined and not give up in warfare – whereas in book one it can be found under the chapter-heading *de evadendis ex locis difficillimis* ('On escaping from Difficult Situations') is the author's own emphasis of different aspects of the same story.[581] Coming back to our earlier examples, the heading under which we find *iustitia* and *magnificentia* is *de dubiorum animis in fide retinendis* so it becomes even clearer that it is not these qualities and the behaviour associated with them that Frontinus wants emphasised, but how to restore trust.

The only 'moral quality' that is included in a chapter title in books one to three is *constantia*, but again, as is the case for *iustitia* and *magnificentia*, it seems to be a means to an end, which is again made clear by the title of the chapter, *De Restituenda per Constantiam Acie* ('On restoring the battle line by firmness'), with the emphasis on the restoration of the battle line. Therefore, in the same fashion indicated in the preface, where readers are invited to supply examples of their own to Frontinus' text, so too in placing moral qualities in the background he is also inviting his readers to find them wherever they like and judge their importance for

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[580] Front. *Strat.* 2.4.2 and 2.4.4; identical chapters 4.5.9 and 1.5.14.
[581] This is again 4.5.9 and respectively 1.5.14.

themselves, whilst he himself chooses to show how they can primarily be a means to achieving one's goals.

However, in book four of the *Strategemata* there is a fundamentally different approach, which not only includes but stresses the self-same moral qualities that were not at the forefront before. This is one of the reasons why the authenticity of the book was called into question at the end of the 19th century, whereas more recent scholarship accepts that it was written as a later addition by Frontinus.[582] Moral attributes head the chapters in book four and we can see many correspondences with Valerius Maximus' own chapter headings, which again show the same virtues present in both 'military' and 'civil' life. For example Frontinus' chapter *De Disciplina* ('On Discipline') is found in Valerius' *De Disciplina Militari* ('On Military Discipline').[583] *De Continentia* ('On restraint') in Frontinus is found in *De Abstinentia et Continentia* ('On abstinence and restraint') in Valerius.[584] Froninus' *De Iustitia* ('On Justice') has an identical parallel in Valerius, and Frontinus' *De Affectu et Moderatione* ('On Good Will and Moderation') corresponds to Valerius' *De moderatione* ('On Moderation').[585]

This leads me to believe that if Frontinus indeed wrote this book, he considered himself constrained to add it, thinking that his original plan had failed and that one cannot exclude the ethical component from warfare. Even if he is not the author of the book, its adding still shows that a similar concern was addressed by one of his contemporaries, once again revealing the importance of 'the code' for the Romans.

What does make me believe that this book is a later addition by the author is that it ends with a category called *de variis consiliis* ('On different plans'), which is the second largest subchapter after that on *disciplina*, and again reveals Frontinus' interest in *consilium*, as seen in books one to three. These indeed show no other moral quality but the *consilium* which Frontinus mentions in his preface and would therefore make a fitting ending for his book, as such a chapter would

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[582] For a discussion of authenticity see Bennett (1925) xix-xxv; Laederich (1999).
[583] Frontin. *Strat.* 4.1 and Val. Max. 2.7.
[584] Frontin. *Strat.* 4.3 and Val. Max. 4.3.
[585] Frontin. *Strat.* 4.6 and Val. Max. 6.5; Front. *Stratag.* 4.6 and Val. Max. 4.1.

prove that although ethics are necessary, what is most important is a quality is not only part of the moral repertoire but also a practical skill.

Despite talking about justice and benevolence, Frontinus also questions the fair treatment of prisoners and recommends their use as 'huuman shields' to defend against the enemy attacks, if the situation calls for it.[586] As Gilliver points out, he does not condemn the use of violence against the besieged and has no qualms about recommending to presenting those encircled with the heads of their dead on spikes.[587] Nor is he against executing prisoners individually, if it helps the general achieve victory, and it does not seem to matter whether the general performing the recommended stratagem is Roman or foreign.[588] So it seems that Frontinus' approach focuses more on utility, and on what will enable a general to achieve victory, being less worried about the theoretical confines of an 'ethical code'.

3.2 Polyaenus

Moral qualities appear in Polyaenus' text as well, especially, but not only, when it comes to dealing with the enemy. As in the case of Frontinus, Polyaenus presents them in situations where they bring a tangible benefit and one possible interpretation is that one should know when to display virtue appropriately; however, unlike Frontinus, virtue seems to be sometimes emphasised for its own sake.

For example in the war against the Falerians, a school master led the Falerian children outside the wall under the pretext of exercise and handed them over to Camillus. He refused to take them hostage, instead ordering them to tie up the schoolmaster and take him back to their fathers, considering him a traitor. We can read this example as Camillus' virtues being rewarded, but we can also see him as very shrewd in displaying clemency and piety in order to gain the trust of the Falerians to surrender:

> Φαλέριοι τὸν μὲν διδάσκαλον αἰκισάμενοι κατέφθειραν, τοῦ δὲ Καμίλλου θαυμάσαντες τὴν εὐσέβειαν καὶ τὴν δικαιοσύνην σφᾶς αὐτοὺς ἄνευ μάχης παρέδωκαν·

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[586] Frontin. *Strat.* 1.4.1; also 1.4.2.
[587] Frontin. *Strat.* 2.9. 3; the same is done by Arminius in 2.9.4; see also Gilliver (1996) 222.
[588] Frontin. *Strat.* 2.9.5 and 3.5.1.

'The Falerians tortured and executed the schoolmaster, but astounded at Camillus' piety and justice, they surrendered without battle.'

Polyaenus' comments make explicit that here the *eusebeia* is useful when and because used in an appropriate stratagem:

Κάμιλλος δὲ τοὺς πολλῷ χρόνῳ ἁλῶναι μὴ δυναμένους εὐσεβεῖ στρατηγήματι παρεστήσατο

'Camillus, unable to take them by force, won them over by a pious stratagem.'[589]

In the same way Mucius Scaevola's display of 'endurance' (καρτερίαν) by placing his hand into the sacrificial fire, after his failed assassination attempt of the Etruscan king Porsena, helps him coerce Porsena into a peace. It is also the case of Alexander who, by pouring the water out during a long march, manages to persuade his troops to carry on through the dessert.[590] Polyaenus again comments on this:

οἱ Μακεδόνες ἀλαλάξαντες ἐκέλευον αὐτὸν ἡγεῖσθαι τῆς ὁδοῦ, πρὸς τὸ δίψος εὐρώστως ἀντέχοντες διὰ τὴν τοῦ βασιλέως ἐγκράτειαν.

'The Macedonians shouted and ordered him to lead on, holding out against thirst more firmly because of the king's self-control'[591]

Again, this could be read as Alexander's virtue being rewarded but it is also possible to read it as a means of exploiting certain virtues in certain situations, the emphasis being on the fact that his men held out against thirst more firmly as a result.

There is also a greater focus on discipline in the chapters about the Romans where, as we shall see next, it sometimes seems to be emphasised for its own sake, not because it brings tangible benefits. Of course the question of whether discipline is a virtue in the same way as clemency or justice can reasonably be posed. Valerius Maximus certainly considers it a virtue:

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[589] Polyaen. 8.7.1.
[590] Polyaen. 8.8; 4.3.25.
[591] Polyaen. 4.3.25.

Tenacissimum vinculum, in cuius sinu ac tutela serenus tranquillusque beatae pacis status acquiescit

'the tenacious bond [...] in the bosom and protection of which rests our serene and tranquil state of blessed peace'[592]

Frontinus also clearly considers discipline a similar kind of virtue to *iustitia* and *constantia* by including it amongst these latter qualities in book four. In any case we do see presentations that differ in Polyaenus, although he never explicitly mentions discipline, but rather behaviour that can be associated with it. Firstly, he presents discipline as something that leads to tangible benefits, such as in the example of Scipio when he learned that the enemy arrived without food and thus restrained his men in camp, only to join battle when the enemy was starving. [593] Secondly he covers situations in which actions that have discipline underlying them are appreciated for no other reason than their intrinsic value. Such is the case with Julius Caesar:

Καῖσαρ τὰ ἁμαρτήματα τῶν στρατιωτῶν οὐ πάντα παρεφύλασσεν, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ τοὺς ἁμαρτάνοντας κατὰ τὴν ἀξίαν ἐτιμωρεῖτο, τὴν συγγνώμην ἀνδρείας ποιητικὴν ἡγούμενος. εἰ μέντοι τις ἐστασίασεν ἢ τὴν τάξιν ἔλιπεν, οὐκ ἂν τοῦτον ἀτιμώρητον παρῆκεν.

'Caesar did not pay close attention to all the soldiers' infractions of regulations, but he also did not fully punish violators, as he thought pardon capable of producing courage. If, however someone mutinied or deserted his post, he would not let him go unpunished'[594]

The importance of discipline for Augustus again shows no other benefit, something which is surely connected to his attempts to restore the *mos maiorum*:

Σεβαστὸς τοὺς ἐν ταῖς μάχαις καθυφιεμένους οὐκ ἀνήρει πάντας, ἀλλ' ἐδεκάτευεν.

Σεβαστὸς τοῖς διὰ δειλίαν ἀπολιπομένοις κριθὰς ἀντὶ πυρῶν ἐκέλευε μετρεῖσθαι.

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[592] Val. Max. 7.pr.
[593] Polyaen. 8.16.2 cf. 8.16.1.
[594] Polyaen. 8.23.21.

Σεβαστὸς τοὺς ἐπὶ στρατοπέδου τι ἁμαρτόντας ἐκέλευσε πρὸ τοῦ στρατηγείου λυσιζώνους ἑστάναι, ἔτι δὲ ὅτε καὶ πλινθοφορεῖν δι' ὅλης ἡμέρας.

Augustus used to execute not all who slackened in battle, but every one in ten. Augustus ordered barley instead of wheat to be distributed to cowardly deserters. Augustus ordered offenders of some regulations in the camp to stand without their belts in front of the general's tent and sometimes to carry bricks all day.[595]

It seems therefore that there are times where military discipline is truly important in its own right, as in the chapter Frontinus dedicates to it in book four, and one might argue on the basis of König's analysis of the *Strategemata* that the whole treatise manifests a kind of 'metadiscipline' in that it is very clearly and neatly organised.[596]

But then we might also ask ourselves whether emphasis on discipline in its own right in warfare needs to be questioned further, just as one might not question why courage is considered useful in its own right. The reason might be that it is an integral and indivisible part of the Romans' conception of warfare. This would also explain why Frontinus needs to have a whole section dedicated to discipline, where he both juxtaposes the lack of it and its results, but also presents a traditional view of the various Roman figures who enforced it for its own sake. However, just as in the previous chapter, it is also important to remember that Polyaenus is not interested in highlighting certain topics, but in historical figures, so the treatment of discipline might also be a result of this very approach and his desire to be exhaustive. Also, as already mentioned, in some of Polyaenus' stratagems it is difficult to identify what is being highlighted or what the stratagem is, as he is particularly fond of rhetoric and clever sayings.[597] When one claims to talk about all the stratagems in history, as Polyaenus does, avoiding contradiction is just not possible.

Similarly what seems to be a special focus on discipline in the Roman chapters as opposed to the Greek ones might be simply because there are more examples of discipline in Roman

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[595] Polyaen. 8.24.1-3.
[596] König (2004) 116-130.
[597] For example 8.16.4, when Scipio, seeing a soldier taking pride in his decorated shield points out how it is shameful that a Roman trusts in his left hand rather than his right.

sources. At the same time, it is strange that most examples of trickery come from the Greek world – with the emphasis on its legendary Greek roots, as the case of Greek heroes – whilst those of discipline come from the Roman world. It is almost as if Polyaenus were suggesting that stratagems are the domain of the Greeks and must be seen as such, whilst the Romans have the discipline which is specific to them but they should not be considered equal in terms of trickery – nor perhaps would they want to be considered as such, given their reputation of fighting fairly.

Furthermore, as hinted before, we cannot ignore the fact that the moral qualities that are presented in Frontinus and Polyaenus are always linked to a historical figure. Therefore, just as Frontinus might want the reader to choose where to find moral attributes, so too Polyaenus at times wishes his readers to judge which moral attributes fit their own character and situation, and therefore not mindlessly emulate the historical figures presented, even if on other occasions he seems to emphasise the deeds more than the people performing them.

3.3 Onasander

Onasander also provides commentary on the virtues necessary to a general in a similar way to Frontinus, showing how they help achieve victory or make the general more efficient. For instance, temperance helps prevent the general from being distracted by pleasures and enables him to focus on important matters.[598] Vigilance allows him to work better (ὅπως ἐπαγρυπνῇ ταῖς μεγίσταις πράξεσιν) and frugality is important because one must not waste the resources of one's army (λιτὸν δέ, ἐπειδὴ κατασκελετεύουσιν αἱ πολυτελεῖς θεραπεῖαι δαπανῶσαι χρόνον ἄπρακτον εἰς τὴν τῶν ἡγουμένων τρυφήν).[599] Like Frontinus, by starting his manual on generalship with these virtues he seems to legitimise any of the actions recommended for the general by virtue of the fact that he possesses them, and consequently he is a good man, whilst also showing that even men who can be described as 'good' make decisions that differ from what one might think is correct simply because the situation dictates it.

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[598] Onos. 1.2: σώφρονα μέν, ἵνα μὴ ταῖς φυσικαῖς ἀνθελκόμενος ἡδοναῖς ἀπολείπη τὴν ὑπὲρ τῶν μεγίστων φροντίδα ('The general must be temperate in order that he may not be so distracted by the pleasures of the body as to neglect the consideration of matters of the highest importance').
[599] Onos. 1.3-8.

Having said that, we can clearly see Onasander's similar interest in 'perception' when he discusses what a general should allow his army to do to his enemies, but also to his allies. We find out that:

Διοδεύων δὲ συμμαχίδα γῆν παραγγελλέτω τοῖς στρατεύμασιν ἀπέχεσθαι τῆς χώρας, καὶ μήτ᾽ ἄγειν τι μήτε φθείρειν.

'when passing through the country of an ally, the general must order his troops not to lay hands on the country, nor to pillage or destroy'[600]

Onasander quickly tells us why, namely that 'small reasons alienate allies or make them quite hostile'[601] Therefore it could be said that showing restraint and composure is important when it comes to the allies because it might give them a certain perception of the general and his troops, which might in the long run hurt the war effort. In other words, one must treat one's allies well in order to win a war, and not necessarily because of the inherent rules of war.

Dealing with the enemy is a different story, but again one should ruin the enemy's supplies and country not out of principle but because it puts an end to the war more quickly:

τὴν δὲ τῶν πολεμίων φθειρέτω καὶ καιέτω καὶ τεμνέσθω: ζημία γὰρ χρημάτων καὶ καρπῶν ἔνδεια μειοῖ πόλεμον, ὡς περιουσία τρέφει.

'the country of the enemy he should ruin and burn and ravage, for loss of money and shortage of crops reduce warfare, as abundance nourishes it.'[602]

This is further reinforced by Onasander's statement that the general must let the enemy know of his intentions because 'the expectation of impending terror has brought those who have been endangered, before they have suffered at all, to terms which they previously not wished to accept'.[603] Therefore there is no sense of cruelty or justice in Onasander's words, but simply

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[600] Onos. 6.10.
[601] Onos. 6.10-11: μικραὶ δὲ προφάσεις ἢ ἀπηλλοτρίωσαν συμμάχους ἢ καὶ παντελῶς ἐξεπολέμωσαν.
[602] Onos. 6.11.
[603] Onos. 6.11: πολλάκις γὰρ ἡ τοῦ μέλλοντος ἔσεσθαι δεινοῦ προσδοκία συνηνάγκασε, πρὶν ἢ παθεῖν, ὑποσχέσθαι τι τοὺς κινδυνεύοντας ὧν πρότερον οὐκ ἐβουλήθησαν ποιεῖν.

cold calculation, which reinforces the sense that he too holds quite a utilitarian view of 'battlefield ethics'.

Onasander also seems to give advice about plundering that resembles Cicero's, namely that it should not be done indiscriminately and after every battle:

> Τὰς δ ἀρπαγὰς οὔτ ἐπὶ πάσης μάχης ἐπιτρεπτέον, οὐδ αἰεὶ πάντων, ἀλλ ὧν μέν, ὧν δ οὔ, τῶν δὲ σωμάτων ἥκιστα: ταῦτα δὲ πιπράσκειν τὸν στρατηγόν.

> 'Plundering should not be permitted after every battle nor in the case of all kinds of property, but only in the case of certain things, and least of all of prisoners, for these should be sold by the general'[604]

However, if deemed essential and if the war effort requires it, the general might proceed as he thinks fit, even taking and selling everything (including prisoners). The question of treatment of prisoners is then subject to the same utilitarian ethics, although Onasander does not postulate the same principles in every situation. For example, in one instance the idea of fair treatment of prisoners is done away with and they only seem to matter in order to assert one's power and encourage one's frightened army. The author suggests that one should capture a few of the enemy soldiers and if they are strong they should be killed, if not they should be paraded in front of the troops to lift their morale.[605] A slight change in view seems to occur later on, when what Onasander appears to say is that prisoners should be naturally protected because of a higher sense of fate (much as we saw in Ducrey's examples of the Greek law of war), which is not kind to those who kill prisoners indiscriminately. Despite this, it seems that Onasander again justifies their killing if it brings a definite edge to the general:

> μὴ κτεινέτω, μάλιστα μὲν τῶν πρὸς οὕς ἐστιν ὁ πόλεμος, κἂν δοκῇ οἱ, τοὺς συμμάχους ἀναιρεῖν, ἥκιστα δὲ καὶ τοὺς ἐνδοξοτάτους καὶ λαμπροὺς παρὰ τοῖς πολεμίοις, ἐνθυμούμενος τὰ ἄδηλα τῆς τύχης καὶ τὸ παλίντροπον τοῦ δαιμονίου φιλοῦντος ὡς τὰ πολλὰ νεμεσᾶν

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[604] Onos. 35.1.
[605] Onos. 14.3.

'Prisoners, if the war is still in progress, the general should not kill – at the very most he may kill, if he thinks best, the allies of those against whom the war is directed, but least of all those who stand in highest repute and position among the enemy, remembering the uncertainties of chance and the reversals caused by providence, which usually brings retribution'[606]

The chapter dealing with the treatment of surrendered cities perhaps best expresses Onasander's ethical views on the matter:

Ταῖς δὲ προσχωρούσαις πόλεσιν, εἴ τινες ἐπιτρέποιεν αὐτὰς ἀρξάμεναι, φιλανθρώπως καὶ χρηστῶς προσφερέσθω: προσαγάγοιτο γὰρ ἂν οὕτως καὶ τὰς ἄλλας.

'If any cities should open their gates in surrender early in the war, the general should treat them in a manner both humane and advantageous, for thus he would induce the other cities also to submit.'[607]

This shows that while care for human life is displayed – here and in other parts of the treatise – what eventually prevails is utility and the advantage that such clemency brings. Therefore, by treating surrendering cities in a humane manner is it more likely that other cities will surrender, making it easier for the general to win the war, as he explains further, bringing us to the issue of the prevalence of perception over reality, and how one wants his actions to be perceived as 'correct', rather than be 'correct'. [608]

Conclusion

To conclude, it seems that although our authors are aware of the existence of ethical rules of conduct in warfare, they come back to the dilemma pointed out by Polybius that closely adhering to such rules in not equivalent to good generalship. Therefore, there is a marked need to navigate between an ideal way of fighting and a useful one, between the symbolic importance of an ethical code and the practical importance of having a winning strategy that is

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[606] Onos. 35.4.
[607] Onos. *Strateg.* 38.1.
[608] Onos. *Strateg.* 38.3-11.

deeply grounded in the practicalities of warfare. They also seem to suggest a situational approach, where the right course of action is dictated by the circumstances with which a general might be faced, but also perhaps by the general himself and his own character and predisposition. This means that there is an underlying assumption that the reader will play an active part, and that he will be a partner to the author, able to 'construct' his own subset of the manual which best suits his needs, rather than mindlessly emulate anything without any critical thinking.

However, authors such as Polyaenus also seem to emphasise actions over figures – at least at times – and unlike Frontinus, to use trickery as the focal point of stratagems rather than shying away from it. While this does not exclude the focus on figures (clearly important for Polyaenus, whose chapter titles are in fact names of generals), it does allow the author to underscore certain principles which he may consider more important than others. Perception also plays a pivotal role in the interplay with the ethical code, and one of Onasander's main thrusts is that the perception of one's actions is more important than their intrinsically 'ethical' character. Perception is also critical in the presentation and manipulation of history. Whilst it might simply be a matter of availability of material, it is somewhat peculiar that Romans seem to be associated with discipline in Polyaenus whilst the domain of the Greeks is trickery – and it is plausible that Polyaenus himself would have wanted to portray the two in such a way.

V. Conclusions

I believe that this thesis has proven that military texts lend themselves to a variety of readings and that there is much to be gained from a parallel examination of the texts, of the different ways in which they interact with each other when constructing authority and discussing 'military knowledge'. Much more could be done with such texts, and this thesis has only opened up a field of discussion that can be further explored, raising some major issues with respect to the cultural history of the ancient 'military manual'

Its first contribution lies in understanding the variety and development of technical writing dealing with military matters. Recently, a move away from studying military texts in isolation has occurred, with scholars stressing the importance of reading several works together. Nonetheless, the categories of 'artillery' and 'military' manuals set out by Campbell have persisted, even in the most recent efforts of Roby and Formisano.[609] While I have shown that there is ground to justify such a distinction, as both strands have their own writing tradition, specificity and level of technicality – I believe that they are much better understood by breaking down the barriers that modern scholarship has established. It is reasonably clear that generals, such as Pyrrhus, were interested in writing both 'military' and 'artillery' texts, and that knowledge of both was necessary to the definition of good generalship. It is therefore much more likely that there was a specific *paideia* both before and during the Roman Empire which pertained to those interested in pursuing a military career.

This brings us to the next two major issues raised here, namely the role of military knowledge and the possibilities of reading military knowledge in the Roman Empire. It is obvious that, in Roman society, warfare would have been much more central than many of the topics of other technical texts. Therefore, demonstrating that one possessed military knowledge would have had greater appeal than, for example, purporting to be familiar with medicine, so they must have been more widely read and more significant than previously recognised. However, while scholars such as Moore and Campbell have hinted at the more general educational potential of 'military manuals' and mentioned their 'entertainment value', their precise place and role has not yet been discussed.[610] This thesis has made clear that the topics contained in 'military manuals' were of more general interest to educated elites, since certain aspects of them were part of broader intellectual debates and arguments. We have seen how the audience of the texts could have been broader and more diversified than expected, comprising both 'amateur' and 'specialised' readers, and how these readers could have used the knowledge therein for more than one purpose. Swain's point that the Greek past could also be used by non-Greeks to achieve their own goals can be extrapolated and applied to 'military knowledge': it was not only

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[609] Campbell (1987) 13, note 2. Formisano (2017), Roby (2016).
[610] Moore (2013) 472, Campbell (1987) 22.

the preserve of 'military experts', it could also be used to channel military expertise on more general occasions, or, on the contrary, in the case of centurions, it functioned as a sort of 'cultural currency' that could be used in order to help them become part of an elite who would have had different cultural expectations.[611]

Therefore, while scholars such as Bosworth, Stadter and Wheeler have placed great emphasis on the practicality of these texts, assuming that they were only meant to teach obsolete manoeuvres to those who wanted to experiment with them, their 'practicality' can be understood in a much broader sense, and oscillates between their value as 'cultural currency', their encouragement of a general mindset and their strict application.[612] This general mindset or framework is a type of *facultas* – to use Frontinus' phrasing – that the texts aimed to convey to its readership, whether it be a focus on discipline and order or keeping an open mind, and we can perhaps see how different authors disagreed as to what that *facultas* should be.

The other important contribution of this thesis is to demonstrate that 'military manuals' are also concerned with ordering knowledge, tradition, identity and power. König and Whitmarsh underscore that the texts discussed in their voume 'are embedded within the overarching hierarchies and patterns of thought of the Roman-empire and society and within the power relations and power struggles of specific disciplines'.[613] They go on to say that the treatment of Greek intellectual material depended on struggles for 'political and cultural authority within the Roman elite', and that the same applied to Roman forms of expertise and cultural authority.[614] This struggle is also evident within military manuals, but is one between the Greek and Roman versions of the same discipline. Under the guise of self-deprecation, common amongst technical writers, Greek authors use various strategies to show the pre-eminence of Greek military science with respect to its Roman counterpart, on the one hand, and to integrate the two in a framework of continuity, creating a succession of 'empires of knowledge' but also a universal sense of military knowledge, on the other.[615] This approach is brought about by the

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[611] Swain (1996) 7.
[612] Stadter (1980) 42-43; Devine (1993); Wheeler (1978) 353.
[613] König and Whitmarsh (2007) 7.
[614] König and Whitmarsh (2007) 25.
[615] König and Woolf (2017) 7-9; König (2009) 43-44; König and Whitmarsh (2007) 17-20.

high esteem in which the Romans held themselves when it came to warfare: claims of usefulness of other military practices would both be treated with suspicion, and welcomed in the name of the integrating nature of the Romans. Therefore, the way in which military knowledge is presented by authors such as Onasander fits the pattern of superimposition of certain core Roman values and preservation of cultural particularities argued for by Woolf.[616] However, at the same time, the approaches of Arrian and Aelian perhaps create a unique type of 'science', where the position of primacy of either 'Greek' or 'Roman' knowledge is constantly renegotiated and adjusted under the umbrella of one uniform superstructure of succession which makes primacy itself irrelevant. The creation of this type of knowledge corresponds to an equally mixed elite, also jostling for position.

This brings us to the next previously ignored aspect of military manuals: their role in constructing identity. Similarly to long-standing arguments about sophistic performance, we have seen how the *Ektaxis* contributes to the construction of Arrian's identity, an identity which corresponds to Hadrianic (and perhaps more broadly Roman) ideas of Greekness.[617] More generally, the texts engage with the identity of the Roman Empire and of the emperors, the two *Taktika* picking out an aspect of Greek military identity – the phalanx – which brings something significant to the construction of the emperors' image as military commanders. Arrian stresses how the Roman Empire recognises diversity and inclusiveness, recreating a microcosm of empire within the pages of the *Ektaxis*, and paralleling his portrayal as a commander to that of Hadrian as emperor, and, in the words of Jason König, entwining his 'own self-representation with images of Imperial authority'.[618] However, the identity that Trajan and Hadrian wanted to project, which emphasised military prowess, directly encouraged the writing of 'military manuals' and influenced the type of 'manual' authors choose to write similarly to the way in which the patronage of Augustus and the more general political context around him stimulated the growth in popularity of astrology and horoscopy.[619] This is not only noticeable in the composition of the two *Taktika*, but also in Apollodorus' dedication to Trajan of his *Poliorketika*,

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[616] Woolf (1994).
[617] Schmitz (1999); Spawforth (2012).
[618] J. König (2009) 37-38; A. König (2004).
[619] König (2009) 37.

which is also meant to contribute to this image of the emperor as a proficient commander and reinforces the idea that there was a specific *paideia* required of any successful general. I have also pointed out that Arrian also borrows the authority of Xenophon, and that of the Greek past more generally, as do Aelian and Polyaenus. Their use of the Greek past, though, seems less restrictive and focused than Bowie argued, and while the Classical past does figure extensively, there seems to be little interest in selecting examples or figures from a specific period, instead the emphasis being placed on military skil and 'military tradition'.[620] Arrian and Aelian refer to generals that one would consider both 'Classical' and 'Hellenistic' when establishing the Greek tradition of the *taktika*, while Polyaenus alternates between mythological and real figures, between 'Classical', 'Hellenistic' and unidentifiable Greek figures. In his text, one could even argue that we are faced with an almost 'generic Greekness', as seen before in the example of a certain anonymous Harmost or in figures that would be almost impossible to identify (or differentiate from each other) without extensive research.

The final point supported by this thesis is that 'military manuals' hold a place in the discussions about ethics on the battlefield, and that a clear distinction between theory and practice must be made, a distinction that is somewhat missing from Gilliver and Ducrey's approaches.[621] I have shown that there were clearly 'rules of warfare' that should be followed, and that these rules did not differ much from general notions of fairness and justice present in other authors, such as Cicero. However, military manuals are more concerned with success in battle and the application of such rules is situational. They should be followed when they bring an advantage but can also be ignored if necessary. Some authors (like Onasander) make this more explicit, whereas others (like Frontinus) even suggest that not to take advantage of procedures that might be considered unethical is an instance of poor generalship.

Finally, the strongest point that I wish to make is that, when dealing with military manuals, it is crucial to understand that all these aspects and facets worked together. A text need not be exclusively practical or only discuss the importance of knowledge or of constructing identity, but it can simultaneously cover all these aspects, which would have a different impact and

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[620] Bowie (1974).
[621] Gilliver (1999); Ducrey (1968).

appeal to different readers. In the same way in which an animated film has different layers of significance, and contains both a generally accessible storyline and themes which cater more to adults, so too the reader of 'military manuals' must jostle through an intricate web of meanings, and a more educated reader would be able to bring all these aspects together.

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