

*State of the Federation 2017, ULB Brussels*

## **Is all politics indeed local? A comparative study of dual mandate-holders' representative role attitudes and behaviours in parliament**

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### **Abstract**

The practice of *multiple office-holding* i.e. the simultaneous occupation of a directly elected political mandate at the (sub)national and the local level, is understudied in the international-comparative literature. Dual officers embody the most direct link between local and central government, yet research has disregarded whether they actually feel and act as local ambassadors in parliament. In this paper we study the representative role attitudes and behaviour of dual mandate-holders in nine European countries, using PARTIREP Comparative MP Survey data. Drawing on the literature on parliamentary roles, we expect dual-mandate holders to have highly localized representative foci compared to other legislators, partially due to a double electoral incentive. Moreover, we also assume that dual mandate-holders will display a local reflex in their intra-parliamentary activities by devoting more time and effort into defending local interests. The estimated multilevel regression models demonstrate that multiple office-holders indeed perceive themselves as local brokers, even when controlling for various systemic, party and individual level factors. On the other hand, they struggle to translate their localized attitudes into localized parliamentary behaviour, which could call one of the main arguments in favour of multiple office-holding into question.

**Keywords:** dual office-holding, parliamentary roles, representative focus, members of parliament, legislative behaviour

## 1. Introduction

Dual office-holding, i.e. the simultaneous occupation of a directly elected political mandate at the (sub)national and the local level of government<sup>1</sup>, is generally associated with a number of archetypical cases such as France or Belgium. In contrast to conventional beliefs, however, the practice of dual-office holding is rather widespread. Research shows that it occurs in at least 16 European countries, with the number of local officers in (sub)national parliaments ranging from about five to almost eighty per cent (Navarro, 2013).

Research on this phenomenon is, however, scarce and international-comparative work is practically non-existent, as most studies tend to focus on countries where dual mandate-holding is the rule rather than the exception. Early scholars have approached the topic from a normative perspective (Debré, 1955; Mény, 1992) or attempted to determine the scope of *cumul des mandats* by describing the number of local officers in parliament (Caille, 2000; Knapp, 1991). Only recently scholars have started to question the consequences of dual office-holding in terms of electoral outcomes (Foucault, 2006; Ragouet & Phélippea, 2013), parliamentary activity and time-allocation (Bach, 2012; François & Weill, 2016; Hájek, 2017). What remains particularly underdeveloped, is how and to what extent dual mandate-holding affects individual legislators' attitudes and substantive behaviour in parliament. Unravelling this puzzle is essential as it would contribute to our understanding of broader democratic processes including parliamentary decision-making and political representation.

Drawing on the literature on parliamentary roles (e.g. Blomgren & Rozenberg, 2012), this paper analyses the representative role attitudes and the self-reported behaviour of dual mandate-holders in nine European countries. With regard to role attitudes, we adhere to the seminal work of Eulau et al. (1959) and their conception of the *representative focus*. Whom do legislators (ought to) represent: the entire electorate or alternatively, a geographically or functionally defined segment of the population? Assuming that dual-mandate holders seek both (sub)national and local re-election, and are often characterized as ambassadors of their locality, we expect them to adopt more localized foci compared to MPs without a local office. Additionally, we presume that dual mandate-holders will devote more time in parliament advocating local interests. We estimate their local reflex by assessing legislators' sources of inspiration for parliamentary initiatives and the advertisement of pork-barrel politics (i.e. drawing public resources to the locality).

Our analysis, based on Partirep Comparative MP survey data (Deschouwer et al., 2014), reveals that local officers and mayors in parliament indeed prioritize representing the local area, even when controlling for a number of systemic, party- and individual-level variables in a multilevel regression model. On the other hand, cumulards do not seem to convert their local mentality into localized behaviour, which may call one of the main advantages associated with the practice into question.

In what follows, we discuss the reach and extent of dual office-holding in Europe and contend how a dual mandate might shape the role orientations of legislators. Afterwards, we describe the data and methodology and set out our results on the attitudes and intra-parliamentary behaviour of dual-mandate holders in Europe.

## 2. Dual office-holding in Europe

The practice of dual office-holding or *cumul des mandats* is far from a marginal phenomenon in European parliamentary democracies. In a recent attempt to provide a comparative overview of the frequency and scope of multiple office-holding, Navarro (2013) uncovered that double mandates are more mainstream than often assumed. Dual mandate-holding was found in 16 out of the 29 European countries under study and occurs in a number of Southern European countries (Spain, Portugal) as well as in some Central (e.g. Germany, Belgium, and Luxembourg), Northern (e.g. Finland, Sweden) and Eastern European states (e.g. Hungary, Slovenia).

Of course, the extent and specific form of ‘cumul’ does vary considerably between political systems. First, the sheer number of local officers in parliament differs across countries. A dual mandate is most frequently found in France, Belgium, Luxemburg or Finland (Navarro, 2013; Sandberg, 2013), where more than three quarters of the legislators exercise a secondary position. In countries like Hungary, Sweden, Portugal or Germany, local officers also make their way to the legislative arena, without dominating parliament. Percentages here range from about 25 to 50% (Navarro, 2009; Várnagy, 2012). In other parliaments, where less than one fifth combines offices, for example in the Spanish senate or the Swiss cantonal parliaments (Boudon, 2010; Mueller, 2013), dual mandate-holding plays a more limited role.

Second, the type and specific level of the local and (sub)national mandate vary as well, which is generally stipulated by legislation. The local part of the double mandate usually refers to a legislative (councillor) or executive function (alderman or mayor) at the municipal level. In certain countries, however, local government comprises several political tiers, some of which permit multiple office-holding. German regional and federal representatives, for instance, might simultaneously occupy a municipal position and reside in the *Kreistag*, the council of the rural district encompassing several communes. Similarly, other countries allow MPs to occupy a function at the directly elected intermediate tier, for example in France (*Région* or *Départements*) or Hungary (*Megyék*). The supralocal counterpart, on the other hand, could entail either a mandate at the national (or federal) or at the regional level when directly elected, as for example in Belgium (*Gemeenschap* or *Gewest*) or Spain (*Comunidad autónoma*)<sup>ii</sup>. Despite the rich diversity of dual mandate types, the specific configuration of local and (sub)national positions is inessential for our purposes because we are only interested in the cognitive mechanism that dual office-holding provokes. As discussed in more detail below, we hypothesize that multiple office-holding influences the attitudes and parliamentary behaviour of legislators, irrespective of the specific mandate-mix.

The potential consequences of multiple office-holding have only recently gained academic attention. Some authors have focused on the electoral implications, examining the assumed electoral bonus of dual mandate-holding (Foucault, 2006; Ragouet & Phélippea, 2013). Others have directed their efforts towards the institutional consequences such as the cumulards' time-allocation (François & Weill, 2016; Hájek, 2017). Logically, dual officers are obliged to devote some time to their local mandate and are, as such, unable to fulfil their parliamentary mandate to the fullest. Empirical evidence tends to confirm that dual officers are generally less active in parliament, although the negative correlation was primarily detected among executive deputies. Particularly in countries where multiple office-holding is omnipresent, the absenteeism of its practitioners has vital repercussions for the organisation and daily functioning of parliament.

Another promising research topic is the prevalence of local interest representation among legislators with a local function. Traditionally, the combination of political mandates is regarded as the most direct pathway from local authorities to the central government (Sharpe, 1970). Especially in a context where localities have few competences and limited functional autonomy, this direct form of access to the central decision-making level enables local deputies to represent parochial interest in parliament (Page & Goldsmith, 1987). To estimate the empirical validity of this assumption, scholars have assessed the use of formal parliamentary instruments for topics with a local dimension. Bach (2012, pp. 72–73), for instance, identified various issues as 'local' and tallied French cumulards' presence in those discussions. Vaesen (2006) adopted a similar logic. He analysed parliamentary questions and interpellations in the Brussels regional assembly and regarded the use of 'municipal affairs' in the title as evidence for local interest representation.

This 'formal approach', however, also has its limitations. First, the scope of what is conceived as 'local' or 'municipal' is often limited. In reality, local interests are not confined to a specific theme or activity but omnipresent and can relate to any policy theme or issue. Quantifying local interests in formal parliamentary instruments, therefore, is delicate and might lead us to underestimate the importance of local themes. Especially plenary work and the use of formal instruments are typically strictly regulated by political parties. Parliamentary party groups create the boundaries within which legislators can operate. They do not only influence what MPs say, through their hierarchical structures and discipline, but also affect on what subjects MPs can take initiatives, through an internal division of labour. Hence the mere presence or participation in standing committees on local affairs, to give one specific example, is a less appropriate indication of local interest representation. Lastly, other factors, including whether or not representatives belong to a governing party, could also affect the shape and content of parliamentary work and should therefore be taken into account. Objectively quantifying basic and formal parliamentary activities thus offers a valuable first insight on how dual mandate-holders function in parliament but also suffers from some limitations. Subsequently, it should be complemented with alternative ways to expose local advocacy. One possibility is to adopt a

more ‘subjective’ approach, by examining how legislators themselves perceive and interpret their roles as representatives and their functions in parliament.

### 3. Roles in parliament

For decades, the main point of interest in the literature on parliamentary roles has been how MPs fulfil their mandates and why they do so in a specific manner. The concept of ‘roles’ is multidimensional and complex, which becomes apparent by looking at the abundance of definitions given to the concept (e.g. see Biddle, 1986). Often cited definitions are Searing’s (1994, p. 369), who approaches roles as “*composite patterns of goals, attitudes and behaviours that are characteristic of people in particular positions*”, or that of Strøm (1997, p. 157) who defines them as “*behavioural strategies conditioned by the institutional framework*”. Andeweg (2014, p. 66), on the other hand, argues in favour of disentangling the concept by making a clear distinction between role attitudes and behaviours. The former are ‘*an individual’s perception of what is generally expected of her as a holder of her current institutional position*’, which subsequently can be translated into characteristic behaviour in parliament.

Roles are shaped by individuals’ personal goals or preferences, as well as by the institutional setting that expresses a number of (formal or informal) norms and expectations regarding how to exercise a particular position. They are ‘*the application of a particular institution’s ‘logic of appropriateness’ (March & Olsen, 1989) to the level of individual inmates of that institution (Andeweg, 2014, p. 66)*. The primary purpose of studying roles is then ‘*to make sense of the uniformity and regularity of individual behaviour that results from a position in society and/or from the incorporation of collective norms*’ (Blomgren & Rozenberg, 2012, p. 8). From this perspective already, dual mandate-holding might invoke a number of incentives or expectations that drive legislators to adopt a particular role in parliament.

Applied to the parliamentary arena, Blomgren and Rozenberg (2012) distinguished two analytical approaches on roles. *Representative roles* revolve around *whom* legislators represent. Roles here are often reconstructed deductively (allowing for cross-national comparisons) by focusing on the responsiveness of representatives, as agents, towards their multiple and potentially adversarial principals. *Legislative roles*, on the other hand, focus on *how* legislator represent and organize their activities. Scholars here do not use predefined role sets as they believe that ‘the best way to understand the role of politicians, is to understand them as they do’ (Searing, 1994, p. 10), which often results in repertoires of roles highly specific to the parochial features of a particular legislature (see Costa & Kerrouche, 2009). In this contribution we concentrate on the first approach: we are particularly interested in the representative role orientations of dual mandate-holders and how their attitudes interfere with their parliamentary behaviour. Somewhat surprising, the representative roles of dual mandate-holders have hardly received any scholarly attention, even though a dual office could be conceived as the ‘ultimate interconnection’ between national and local politics, and is hence inherently linked with

processes of representation. ‘Cumulards’ are agents with outspoken and potentially competing principals at the national (e.g. party leaders) and the local level (e.g. the municipal voters).

The seminal work on representative roles is that of Eulau et al. (1959) who, departing from Edmund Burke’s historical speech to the electors of Bristol, famously distinguished between the ‘focus’ and ‘style’ of representation (see also Eulau & Karps, 1977). The representative focus revolves around whom representatives believe they ought to represent: the entire electorate or a specific geographically (e.g. the constituency, the region, the municipality) or functionally (party voters, certain social groups) defined part of it. The representative style looks at how representatives should come to their decisions: by following their own conscience (as Burkean ‘trustees’) or by following the instructions of a principal, most notably voters (as ‘delegates’). Despite some recurrent normative (Pitkin, 1967; Rehfeld, 2009) and empirical critiques (Andeweg & Thomassen, 2005; Converse & Pierce, 1979; Searing, 1994), the work of Eulau et al. (1959) continues to inspire empirical studies to this date (Blomgren & Rozenberg, 2012).

When looking at dual mandate-holding, particularly the focus of representation is relevant. A Burkean logic would argue in favour of a universal representative focus, seeing parliament as “*a deliberative assembly of one nation, with one interest, that of the whole; where, not local purposes, not local prejudices, ought to guide, but the general good, resulting from the general reason of the whole*” (Burke, 1774). In daily political practice, however, MPs are inclined to incorporate a specific territorial dimension. Legislators often favour a more constituency-oriented focus to secure re-election, something Burke ironically failed to do himself (Andeweg, 2014, p. 267). It has been argued that posing as ambassador of the constituency and advertising attempts to defend those local grievances in the legislature increases the chances of re-election (Cain, Ferejohn, & Fiorina, 1987; Carey & Shugart, 1995; Heitshusen, Young, & Wood, 2005; Mayhew, 1974). Or as a British MP once summarized it: “If you look after the constituency, they will look after you” (Searing, 1994, p. 146).

We argue that multiple office-holding affects a legislator’s representative focus because it shapes both the MP’s personal goals and the expectations of their own functioning, in line with the basic definition of representational roles (see above). First, a dual mandate probably co-determines legislator’s personal goals. Cumulards generally have a double electoral incentive as they seek both national (or regional) and local re-election. As such, one could argue that looking after the needs of the local area in parliament does not only pay off at the (sub)national elections, but also maximizes the local electoral performance, possibly further ‘localising’ their representative focus. Second, a double mandate could also transform the expectations towards that legislator’s functioning in parliament. Intergovernmental theory portrays the phenomenon as a compensation mechanism, especially valuable for local governments with few competences and little autonomy. Local deputies in parliament, then, are primarily local ambassadors, using their direct access to the centre to guarantee that local interests are taken into consideration in

the decision-making process (Hesse, 1991; Page & Goldsmith, 1987). It is plausible that these expectations towards cumulards shape their actual role orientation (see above), by further underscoring their local representative reflex.

The theoretical link between multiple office-holding and representational role orientations, however, is currently met with empirical contradictions, presumably due to the misspecification of geographical dimension. While Brouard and colleagues (2013) could not discern whether French MPs with a local position focus on their district, Brack et al. (2012) conversely did find Belgian cumulards to emphasize their constituency more often. It is worth noting that both studies examine the causes of territorial foci and introduce dual mandate-holding as one of the many control variables argued to impact role orientations. Both case studies adopt different methodological designs as well, and a comparative analysis could provide more insight into the general effect of multiple office-holding on role attitudes. Furthermore, we believe that the conflicting findings might originate from a (too) broad conception of the geographical dimension, which is operationalized in terms of the entire constituency. We contend that dual mandate-holders will not be concerned more with the entire district compared to other MPs, but rather relate to their municipality. This is particularly relevant when the boundaries between an MP's constituency and commune differ vastly. Such a narrow, municipal focus could pay off in both local and national elections. At municipal elections voters are likely to reward politicians who have shown a keen interest in promoting local grievances at the higher levels of government. A narrow local focus might contribute to national electoral results too, as a strong electoral base in the constituency starts with strong municipal foundations. As such we expect that:

*H1: Dual mandate-holders will be oriented more towards their municipality than other MPs.*

Studying representative roles as attitudinal constructs offers limited added value when they are not linked to observable and congruent behaviour (Müller & Saalfeld, 1997; Searing, 1994). Even though the work of Eulau et al. (1959) has been criticized due to its limited ability to explain behaviour, several studies have demonstrated that the representative focus of legislators does matter. Gallagher and Holliday (2003), for example, confirmed that a geographical role orientation determines the amount and the nature of constituency work, and Andeweg (2014, p. 275) concurred that role patterns motivate legislators' behaviour, albeit mainly related to extra-parliamentary activities such as constituency work. Although intra-parliamentary behaviour is often strongly influenced by party-level or systemic contextual factors, we argue that individual MPs with a local mandate feel strongly connected to their municipality, inasmuch that they will adopt their performance and activities in parliament and reassure that enough time and effort is put in looking after the needs of the local area.

*H2: Dual mandate-holders will show a stronger local reflex in their intra-parliamentary behaviour compared to other MPs.*


#### 4. Data and method

Our analyses are based on data from the PARTIREP Comparative MP Survey (Deschouwer, Depauw, & André, 2014) which was conducted among a random sample of national and regional MPs in Europe. We excluded parliaments without a single dual mandate-holder. Our sample is, therefore, restricted to 62 parliaments in 9 countries (Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Portugal, Spain and Switzerland)<sup>iii</sup>. In every country at least 10% of the surveyed MPs declared to occupy a local office, and every parliament contained at least one double mandate-holder. The data were weighted by party in each parliament and by country to compensate for the overrepresentation of Swiss MPs. As a result, our analysis is restricted to 1475 MPs, of which 45,5 % could be regarded as dual mandate-holder. 35,2 % of our sample held a ‘regular’ local mandate, entailing any directly elected political mandate except for the position of mayor. 10,3 % of the respondents specifically declared that they occupied the function of mayor.

Table 1 illustrates that dual mandate-holding is more prevalent than often assumed, but also shows that the frequency of dual mandate-holding varies considerably between countries. In any case, the practice is far from just a French idiosyncrasy (François & Navarro, 2013). Nevertheless, French and Belgian MPs still rank first with high numbers of local officers and mayors in parliament. About half of the German and Austrian legislators exercises a secondary function as well, but the German *Ämterkumulation* is known to be a sporadic variant. Dual office-holders hold their local position only temporarily and withdraw from the latter a few months or years after their supralocal election (Navarro, 2009). In the other five countries, close to one quarter accumulates. Hungary stands out due to the popularity of the mayor-MP combination. It must be acknowledged, however, that intra-country variations also exist. For example, regional representatives in Austria and Germany are more likely to accumulate political mandates compared to their federal colleagues. As discussed above, however, the specific combination of local and national mandates is not relevant for our purpose, as we aim to assess the general effect holding several mandates. Multiple office-holding, our central independent variable, is consistently introduced as a categorical variable with mutually exclusive categories (0 = without local mandate, 1 = local office, 2 = mayor).



**Figure 1.** Percentage of dual mandate-holders in 9 West European countries ( $N = 1475$ ).



To account for cross-country variations and calculate intra-class correlations, several multilevel regression models were estimated. Our main dependent variables in the role attitude models, i.e. *municipal* and *constituency focus*, are constructed using a survey item asking respondents to indicate how important it is for them personally to represent the interest of their constituency or municipality on a 7-point rating scale (1= not important, 7= very important).<sup>iv</sup> The constituency model functions as a benchmark to compare the effects of multiple office-holding on the municipal focus.

To assess the local reflex in a legislator's behaviour, we propose to look at two different indicators. We purposely do not focus on roll call votes or other formal instruments as the most important manifestations of parliamentary behaviour. The former are less useful as indicators of individual role behaviour due to high levels of party unity in European parliaments, while the latter might indicate how productive a representative is, but possibly overlooks the local dimension in his/her actions. Even more, comparing formal tools across countries might prove problematic due to parliamentary regulations influencing the frequency and goals of such tools (Russo & Wiberg, 2010). We will, therefore, focus on *MPs' sources of inspiration for parliamentary initiatives*, which is not only related to a fundamental part of legislators' everyday work in parliament, but can also be expected to follow a similar dynamic for MPs both within and between countries. We contend that cumulards share a strong local

embeddedness, which will impact their inspiration for legislative activities. Research has already established that deputies with a strong local base are more policy-independent and, consequently, rely less on their party's input for their own parliamentary work (Tavits, 2009). In line with this idea, we expect that dual mandate-holders will more often than other MPs rely on their own personal experience and on direct contacts with individual citizens as the main source of inspiration for their initiatives in parliament.<sup>v</sup> This approach allows an alternative possibility to evaluate localized behaviour and should expose more leeway for MPs to report individual accents in their actions, especially compared to the formal tools. Furthermore, we believe that the traditional parameters of constituency service, such as the amount of time spent in the district or holding surgeries, would grant a competitive advantage to dual office-holders. The latter are mechanically linked to the district through their elected local mandate, which requires at least some baseline attention. Moreover, it is impossible to distinguish time spent as a national representative in the district from time spent as a local deputy.

Our second operationalization involves a specific action, often connected to multiple office-holding in the literature. It is assumed that the practice is not only a direct pathway for localities to influence central policy-making, but also to facilitate resource gaining (François, 2013). In that sense, dual office-holders that effectively aim to draw national (financial) resources to their municipality, often termed 'pork barrel politics', will also be likely to advertise these attempts in the media. We argue, therefore, that legislators with a local position will flaunt their national success in obtaining local benefits more often compared to single office-holders (measured on a 6-point scale, from 1 = never to 6 = once a week).

To assure the robustness of our results, a number of traditional control variables were introduced in all regression models. On the macro level, political system factors incentivize legislators to focus on a specific territorial area (Heitshusen et al., 2005, p. 33). Particularly electoral rules are relevant. The ballot structure is important as candidate-centred ballots, allowing voters to cast preference votes on individual candidates, can motivate legislators to cultivate a personal vote (Pilet, Freire, & Costa, 2012). Additionally, district magnitude might be important as small electoral districts decrease the proportionality of an electoral system and often direct legislators to more voter-oriented representative foci (Dudzinska et al., 2014; Scholl, 1986; Weßels, 1999). Lastly, we control for regional MPs as they could be expected to defend parochial interests more intensely because the region is geographically closer to the municipality. On the meso-level, a number of party-level variables might be relevant, although research on their impact on representative roles has not always lead to unequivocal results. We include ten party family dummies and control for parties' government status (0= opposition, 1= government party). Moreover, intra-party candidate selection procedures might influence MPs' attitudes and behaviours. Exclusive or centralized selection processes are expected to lead to more party-oriented roles, reinforcing party cohesion, as MPs are inclined to satisfy party leaders' demands rather than pleasing voter or constituency interests (Costa & Kerrouche, 2007; Hazan & Rahat, 2010). Finally, we control for a number of basic individual characteristics, such

as sex, age, parliamentary seniority and whether or not MPs hold a prominent position in parliament such as Speaker, committee chairman or PPG leader. The latter could be expected to exploit their national status more, making them less obliged to defend communal interests.

## 5. Results

### *Municipal focus*

Table 1 illustrates that the municipal and constituency focus of respondents are heavily left-skewed: a large majority of the representatives declared that both are of great importance. Overall, representatives are sensitive to the concerns of their home district and their home town, with few exceptions. Accordingly, cross-country differences remain rather limited and hard to discern. Due to the limited variation within the dependent variables, we subdivide respondents into two groups to distinguish between representatives with a (very) strong local reflex (MPs that scored higher than the average on the municipal or constituency focus) and deputies with a relatively weak local focus (MPs below the average municipal or constituency focus). A multilevel logistic regression is used to explain these dichotomies.

The results from Table 1, however, already indicate that a dual mandate ‘localizes’ an MP’s representative foci. Additionally, bivariate correlations (not in table) signal that multiple office-holders value territorial interests highly. Particularly mayors stand out: they attribute significantly more weight to promoting the collective interests of the municipality than single officers ( $p < .001$ ) but also compared to representatives with any other local position ( $p = .001$ ).<sup>vi</sup> Conversely, a similar analysis does not reveal significant differences between the constituency focus of single and dual office-holders.

Table 1. Average municipal and constituency representational focus of MPs in 9 West European countries (N = 1475).

<i>Additional mandate</i>	<b>Municipal focus</b>			<b>Constituency focus</b>		
	<i>None</i>	<i>Local office</i>	<i>Mayor</i>	<i>None</i>	<i>Local office</i>	<i>Mayor</i>
Belgium	4.80	5.46	6.02	4.48	5.10	5.50
France	5.45	5.53	5.64	5.64	5.51	5.32
Austria	5.92	6.32	6.79	6.04	6.34	6.00
Germany	5.57	5.88	5.60	5.95	6.12	6.60
Switzerland	5.26	5.60	5.98	5.21	5.26	5.68
Hungary	6.06	5.69	6.73	5.57	5.43	6.00
Portugal	5.55	5.74	7.00	5.72	6.28	6.00
Spain	6.15	6.30	6.75	6.10	6.50	7.00
Italy	5.76	6.18	6.00	5.28	5.45	7.00
Total	5.58	5.79	6.15	5.56	5.74	5.73

The multilevel models (Table 2) clearly support the first hypothesis and demonstrate that multiple office-holders adopt more localized representative foci than other MPs, but also that they favour representing municipal interests over constituency interests. Both mayors and other dual-mandate holders stress their municipal focus, even when including a number of control variables, providing more robust support for the bivariate results. The model estimates that local officers are about 1.87 more likely to label representing parochial interest as very important. Mayors are even 4.24 times more likely to stress their strong local reflex. Both coefficients are significant at the 1% level. We do not find similar effects of dual-mandate holding in the second model estimating the constituency focus. Holding all control variables constant, we find that local officers are about 1.03 times more and mayors around 1.16 times more likely to have a strong constituency focus but neither of those coefficients are statistically significant ( $p = .191$  and  $p = .286$  respectively).

Table 2. Odds ratios of the logistic regression for municipal and constituency focus (weak vs strong) among national and regional MPs in 9 European countries.

	Municipal	Constituency
<b>Dual office-holding (ref = no local office)</b>		
Any local office, expect mayor	1.871***	1.027
Mayor	4.244***	1.159
<b>Political system</b>		
Preference voting	1.640	0.782
District magnitude (logged)	1.039	0.775***
Regional level MP	1.254	1.254
<b>Political party</b>		
Member of majority	0.752	1.031
Candidate nomination (ref = local level)		
At the regional level	1.068	0.766
At the national level	0.625	1.049
Selection by party leader(s)	2.466*	1.268
Party ideology (ref = Christian democratic party)		
Social democratic party	1.192	0.574*
Communist party	3.687	0.417
Conservative party	1.154	0.988
Ecologist party	0.312*	0.234**
Far right party	0.288**	0.358*
Liberal party	0.924	0.623
Regionalist or ethnic party	0.549	0.319
Other	1.893	0.364
<b>Personal characteristics</b>		
Sex (ref = male)	1.434*	1.098
Age	0.999	0.995
Parliamentary experience	0.975	0.973*
Prominent position	1.123	1.676*

Intercept	0.733	8.541**
N	1340	1359
Between-country variance	0.202	0.149

\*p<.05, \*\*p<.01, \*\*\*p<.001

In sum, multiple office-holding does impact the role attitudes of regional and national legislators. Whereas many studies find that representative foci are predominantly determined by institutional features such as the electoral system or the party one belongs to (e.g. Brack, Costa, & Teixeira, 2012; Dudzinska, Poyet, Costa, & Weßels, 2014; Weßels, 1999), our results suggest that individual characteristics also matter. In addition, our analysis demonstrates that territorial interests should not be defined too broadly. The municipal role orientation appears to be a distinct variant of the territorial focus. At least when it comes to dual-mandate holding, local interest representation should be operationalized in terms of a municipal focus rather than a constituency focus as other studies often tend to do.

The multilevel models additionally confirm that legislators within countries demonstrate similar tendencies, as the intra-class correlations are substantial in both models. The between-country variance amounts to more than 20% in the municipal focus and almost 15% in the constituency focus model. This illustrates that a lot of variance is explained at the country-level, by (possibly intangible) elements such as the political culture or parliamentary habits. The country-level clusters consequently adjusted the significance levels of our control variables. In the municipal focus model most macro and meso-factors did not have a significant effect.<sup>vii</sup> The effect of an exclusive candidate selection procedure even contradicts our expectations, as candidates that were selected by the party leader(s) are more inclined to pursue local grievances. A possible explanation might be that the party elite favours successful local notables and thus indirectly encourages the representation of local interests. MPs from the both ecologist and far-right parties seem to disregard the importance of place-bound issues, which could be attributed to their ideological opposition towards the practice of dual mandate-holding or the relatively weak embeddedness of their legislators. Furthermore, females seem to favour a local role orientation, whereas experienced MPs find it less important. The second model is similar but does illustrate that the district size is negatively related to constituency service.

### ***Municipal oriented behaviour***

As discussed above, scholars have claimed that legislative attitudes are (or should be) inherently linked to behaviour, both in- and outside parliament (Müller & Saalfeld, 1997; Searing, 1994). In line with the assumption that local officers will represent the collective interests of their municipality in parliament (François & Weill, 2016), we expect that multiple office-holders will translate their localized attitude in localized behaviour in parliament (*hypothesis 2*). Our three dependent variables that should detect this local reflex, i.e. the appraisal of pork-barrel

politics and the sources of inspiration for parliamentary initiatives (contacts with citizens and personal experience), were rescaled into dichotomies to estimate similar multilevel logistic models. Analogous to the municipal and constituency focus, deputies that scored above the mean are considered to have strong localized behaviour.

Table 3. Odds ratios of the logistic regression for parliamentary activities (weak vs strongly localized) among national and regional MPs in 9 European countries.

	Pork barrel advertisement	Legislative inspiration: citizen contact	Legislative inspiration: personal experience
<b>Dual office-holding (ref = no local office)</b>			
Any local office, expect mayor	1.302	1.006	1.323
Mayor	1.360	0.678	1.443
<b>Political system</b>			
Preference voting	1.218	1.275	1.830
District magnitude (logged)	0.783*	1.226*	0.980
Regional level MP	1.168	0.880	0.965
<b>Political party</b>			
Member of majority	0.989	0.634*	1.228
Candidate nomination (ref = local level)			
At the regional level	1.752	0.537*	1.742
At the national level	1.522	0.238***	0.983
Selection by party leader(s)	0.871	1.128	1.294
Party ideology (ref = Christian democratic party)			
Social democratic party	1.105	0.549**	1.259
Communist party	1.596	0.465	0.607
Conservative party	2.032*	0.645	0.833
Ecologist party	0.220**	0.156***	0.670
Far right party	0.403	0.505	0.179**
Liberal party	0.665	0.564	1.126
Regionalist or ethnic party	0.436	0.122**	0.303
Other	10.785	0.612	0.346
<b>Personal characteristics</b>			

Sex (ref = male)	1.061	0.865	1.128
Age	0.988	1.006	1.034
Parliamentary experience	0.978	0.982	1.043
Prominent position	1.736*	1.105	0.960*
Intercept	2.119**	2.321**	0.155**
N	1347	1168	1165
Between-country variance	0.093	0.210	0.045

\*p<.05, \*\*p<.01, \*\*\*p<.001



Table 3 illustrates that neither local deputies nor mayors show indications of localized behaviour. Instead of acting in accordance with their representative attitudes, legislators struggle to translate the municipal focus into parliamentary actions. Representatives with a secondary local function do suggest that they advertise obtaining grants for their local area more often, but the effect sizes are far from significant. In the inspiration-models as well, no significant effects were found. Direct contact with individual citizens does not inspire parliamentary initiatives significantly. Similarly, dual mandate-holders do affirm that they rely on personal experience as a source of inspiration in their day-to-day parliamentary activities more often than others, but this positive relation again is not statistically significant. This does not mean, however, that parliamentary behaviour is unpredictable. To the contrary, our models are compliant to earlier results and demonstrate that existing variation is explained by institutional factors on the macro and meso-level. Not surprisingly, MPs from larger districts and those participating in government behave differently. A lot of variance is party-related, which is in line with the idea that political parties dominate the parliamentary arena in contemporary party democracies (Andeweg, 2014).

Why then do dual office-holders struggle to practice what they preach? First, existing studies have suggested as well that role attitudes and behaviours are not as strongly interconnected as theoretically assumed. While some contribute this to a suboptimal conceptualisation of the (representative) role categories itself (e.g. Searing, 1994), others propose that behaviour is more constrained by contextual factors. If we accept that various obstacles hinder the translation of attitudes into behaviour, a strong representational role might not necessarily inspire legislative work. For example, manifest or latent expectations and rules inherent to the parliament or the party group can canalize individual actions (Louwerse & Otjes, 2016). Parliamentary activities often follow a collective logic: initiatives are only seldom drafted by a single MP. Instead they are mostly discussed within and controlled by the parliamentary party group (or even by the extra-parliamentary party). This, together with high levels of party discipline in parliament (Carey, 2007; Depauw, 2003), impedes the ability to stress individual preferences in parliament, potentially discouraging multiple office-holders to favour the interests of their commune. Legislators are expected to comply, regardless of their local background and their desire to act for their municipality. Hence, instead of assuming an infallible mechanical link between the both, pre-existing attitudes should be regarded as one of the motivations for behaviour, but certainly not as the only fundament.

Second, the operationalization of our dependent variables, together with general issues of socially desirable answers in survey research, probing into the inspiration for general parliamentary work, might just be too broad. Research has demonstrated that legislators do emphasize parochial concerns in specific, yet largely symbolic, activities such as oral and written parliamentary questions, which are less subject to party control (Martin, 2011). Vaesen (2006, p. 56) concurs and even recognizes an electoral motive. The symbolic value of parliamentary questions, together with their large visibility, grants the dual officer a possibility

to demonstrate his preoccupation with local issues and to satisfy his municipal rank and file. Beside these formal and institutional instruments, cumulards could opt to pursue the collective interest through an informal path. Representatives can attempt to persuade ministers or other government officials to consider certain grievances by email or even outside parliament. Alternatively, dual officers can appeal to their network, consult party colleagues or try to influence fellow legislators. Studying their extra-parliamentary behaviour could be another fruitful approach (see for example De Winter, 1997). Representatives have considerable more breathing room outside parliament and cumulards could seize this arena to circumvent the extensive party control on intra-parliamentary activities.

## **6. Conclusion**

This study provides one of the first attempts to study the consequences of multiple office-holding in an international-comparative context. Our analysis, based on survey data on 1475 national and regional legislators in Europe, supports our hypothesis that multiple office-holders predominantly concentrate on representing the needs of their municipality, a specific variant of the geographical focus of representation. Whereas many studies find limited evidence for the impact of individual characteristics on representative role attitudes (Brack et al., 2012; Dudzinska et al., 2014), as these roles appear predominantly shaped by institutional features, our study shows a dual mandate does make a difference.

Notwithstanding their conviction to emphasize municipal interests, however, dual office-holders struggle to behave accordingly. Even more, in contrast to the substantial effect on representational role attitudes, we could not identify any significant differences in the self-reported parliamentary activities between single and dual officers. Translating localized attitudes into localized behaviour thus appears difficult. Expectations, norms and rules within parliaments and party groups seem to restrict dual officers in displaying their local reflex. Even though multiple office-holders perceive themselves as local ambassadors, their actions do not support the traditional assumption that they actually represent their municipality in the parliamentary arena, which evokes the question whether local deputies are drawn to alternative routes to promote local issues.

Some final reflections are imperative, as the comparative survey design eliminates several problems of existing research, but simultaneously exposes some additional limitations. While we have established a general empirical link between multiple office-holding and legislative attitudes, future research should sharpen the operationalization of both. A dual mandate, for instance, can entail various combinations that could influence parliamentary attitude and behaviour differently. Next to mayors, other local executives could emphasize parochial concerns more heavily. The municipal or regional context could shape the perception of a national function as well. The mayor of regional city might very well have a different perspective, compared to a mayor of small countryside commune. On the other hand, our

dependence on the self-perception of MPs to assess their behaviour might not perfectly reflect reality either. Whereas focusing on the objective measures of parliamentary activities could be regarded as an underestimation of the individual freedom of MPs, concentrating on their own appraisal and attitudes could lead to an overestimation. Therefore, we suggest to complement the dominating quantitative studies with a qualitative approach to provide a definite answer to the question of whether and how cumulards do actually represent local interests in parliament.

Finally, if multiple office-holders do not suit their actions to their words, the democratic benefit of the practice itself could be challenged. The main advantage of dual-mandate holding is its potential to counterbalance hierarchical central-local relations and to ensure the inclusion of place-bound concerns in central decision-making. Dual-mandate holding grants local officers direct access to the centre and allows them to defend local issues in parliament, which might be deemed important particularly in systems where municipalities have limited autonomy and few competences. However, when dual mandate-holding has no substantial effect on parliamentary behaviour and when cumulards do not prove to act as local brokers in parliament – which is to be further explored - the question rises whether sufficient arguments remain to support the practice. Of course, dual-mandate holders can still be active in parliament, striving to voice other functional interests, but the added value of such privileged access to the centre becomes rather limited in that scenario. Especially when accounting for the negative implications of the practice – i.e. power concentration, inefficient resource allocation and absenteeism – and in the light of the already declining value of *cumul des mandats* in pluralistic and governance networks (Pinson, 2010, pp. 78–79), the disadvantages might even outweigh the benefits.

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## 8. Notes

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<sup>i</sup> We focus exclusively on vertical cumul, which implies a combination of directly elected functions across several levels of government. This paper concentrates on a specific variant: the accumulation of mandates at the national (or regional) and local level. Conversely, horizontal cumul is disregarded here, which encompasses the combination of an elected position and other (semi-)public or private functions.

<sup>ii</sup> Members of the European parliament are allowed to exercise certain local positions simultaneously, but this variant of multiple office-holding is disregarded here.

<sup>iii</sup> Only three regional parliaments were excluded due to the lack of multiple office-holders: the Austrian regional parliament of Vienna, the Italian regional parliament of Valle d'Aoste, and the Swiss regional parliament of Obwalden.

<sup>iv</sup> The question that probed for a municipal focus literally stated: "How important do you, personally, find it to promote collective interest like these of a particular local area, and what would that area be? Municipality". The question concerning the constituency focus stated: "How important is it to you, personally, to promote the views and interests of the following groups of people? All the people in your constituency".

<sup>v</sup> The pork-barrel question stated: "Mentioned below are some of the many different things that Members of Parliament do to keep in touch with constituents. [*publicizing your successes in attracting business and obtaining government grants for the local area*], do you actually do it outside election campaign periods, might you do it, or would you never?" The initiative question stated: "Of the initiatives (e.g. bills, written and oral questions) which you personally raised in Parliament last year, roughly what proportion of these did you respectively derive from [*meeting with individual citizens*] and [*personal experience*]?"

<sup>vi</sup> Mann-Whitney U tests were used due to nonparametric data.

<sup>vii</sup> Two identical logistic models without multilevel clustering indicated that most macro- and meso-level factors were significant, while maintaining the strength and significance levels for the impact of multiple office-holding. This implies that a lot of variance can be attributed to country differences.