



MITCHELL'S CONCEPT OF HUMAN FREEDOM

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by

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SUMMARY

In this thesis, I have attempted an exposition of Sir William Mitchell's philosophy of human freedom.

An exposition was deemed necessary, since Mitchell's readers, including his reviewers had found both "The Structure and Growth of the Mind" and "The Place of Minds in the World" obscure, an obscurity increased by the fact that neither book contained an index.

I have attempted to show that Mitchell's concept of human freedom has, as its essential basis, the psychology set out in "Structure and Growth of the Mind". The outline of the argument runs like this:

(1) The concept of seeking leads to the conclusion that every creature that can seek, is free.

(2) Compared with human freedom, this is a low grade freedom.

(3) To talk in terms of grades of freedom is to introduce the concept of value, and value is only explicable in terms of a direct account of experience.

The direct account of experience is analysed in Part One.

Part Two.

(4) It is only when we pass beyond sensory intelligence, and perceptual intelligence and reach the stage of conceptual intelligence that the possibility of human freedom emerges.

(5) Human freedom is shown to be the freedom of morally responsible persons.

(6) This freedom is only possible in a world where determinism exists.

(7) This determinism which exists in nature allows room for the freedom to be bound by reason.

This is the paradox to which this thesis leads.

STATEMENT.

This thesis contains no material which has been accepted for the award of any other degree or diploma at any university.

To the best of my knowledge and belief, the thesis contains no material previously published or written except where due reference is made in the text of the thesis.

The author consents to this thesis being made available for photocopying and loan.

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