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Colombian peace process likely to succeed

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Colombian Peace Process Likely to Succeed

An Honors College Project Presented to
the Faculty of the Undergraduate
College of Integrated Science and Technology
James Madison University

by Kayla Graves

Accepted by the faculty of the Department(s) of Integrated Science and Technology and Modern Foreign Language, James Madison University, in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Honors College.

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
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Colombian Peace Process Likely to Succeed

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Regional Peace Vote Results and FARC Presence



On 2 October 2016, Colombians voted on a referendum to “end the conflict and establish stable and enduring peace” between Las Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia, FARC, and Colombia’s democratic government. The referendum was rejected by a narrow margin—49.8% of voters in favor of the peace deal and 50.2% opposed.¹ The image above created in ArcMap represents the results of the referendum regionally and also indicates where FARC has an established presence. Following the referendum several terms were revised and the peace accord was approved by Colombian Congress on 30 November 2016.² Now, the transition to peace begins.

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Colombian Peace Process Likely to Succeed

The Colombian peace process will likely be successful in the near future following an immediate period of increased threat from armed actors. Colombia and FARC have remained dedicated to establishing peace within the country since 2012 and the Colombian government's priority at present is to counter threats to disrupt the post-conflict transition from armed actors including opposing paramilitary groups and criminal organizations known as BACRIMs. The peace process is likely to be successful in the long run as Colombia focuses on reestablishing its presence and providing access to basic services including education and healthcare for rural Colombian citizens. US assistance to Colombia during the post-conflict transition will help ensure success of the peace process in the long run.

Background of the Colombian Conflict:

Las Fuerza Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia, The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia or FARC began as a Marxist-Leninist political movement in rural Colombia in 1964. FARC was founded following a decade of political violence within the country known as La Violencia (1948–58).³ FARC's primary goal was to represent the rural poor, advocating for equal access to land, healthcare, and education. Nevertheless, FARC's efforts eventually led to attempts at overthrowing the Colombian government and the group rose to become Colombia's most violent insurgency.⁴ FARC rebels took control of many rural territories within Colombia and grew in membership and influence. Conflicts between FARC and the Colombian government have led to the deaths of over 220,000 citizens and the displacement of over 5.7 million.⁵ The US Department of State designated FARC as a foreign terrorist organization (FTO) in 1997.⁶

Impact Thus Far —Colombia and FARC Dedicated to the Peace Process

Following the peace agreement's failed referendum several terms were revised making it more likely to succeed during implementation. The revised peace agreement is approximately 15 pages longer than the original agreement and contains around 500 additions, amendments, or changes notes Mario Murillo, a Colombian activist in an interview with the Real News Network.⁷ The revisions are intended to address the concerns of Colombian citizens positioned to oppose the peace process on the grounds that the terms are not harsh enough on FARC leaders. Those opposed to the previous terms argued justice should not be sacrificed for peace.⁸ The Colombian Embassy reported President Juan Manuel Santos met with a negotiating team for the "no" vote when working on revisions to the accord to take these considerations into account.⁹ The revised agreements now require all FARC assets and money to be used to pay victims of the conflict. Additionally, FARC leaders will not be granted automatic amnesty but they will go before a special court for a hearing. From Colombia Reports, in the original agreement FARC was guaranteed 10 seats in Colombia's Congress—5 in the Senate and 5 in the House¹⁰ but the revisions note that these representatives cannot run in newly created districts from former conflict zones.¹¹ The peace agreement now has more special precautions built in to keep FARC, as a political party, from gaining disproportionate power or influence. Revisions to the peace accord strengthen its application and give Colombia less ambiguous guidance on how to ensure

the peace process is successful in the future.

FARC fully supports the peace process and most militias have arrived at their designated demobilization zones. Colombia's High Commissioner for Peace, Sergio Jaramillo Caro, announced on 18 January in a press release that all demobilization zones, or peace camps, were ready for FARC's arrival.¹² Since his announcement, at least 14,000 FARC members have arrived in one of the 26 demobilization zones according to reports from the Washington Office on Latin America.¹³ The United Nations has also become involved to help oversee the day to day functioning of these peace camps.¹⁴ Peace terms dictate that FARC rebels must lay down all weapons within 180 days from the signing of the final agreement.¹⁵ FARC's willingness to enter the demobilization zones at this stage of the peace process indicates their full support and increases the likelihood that the rebels will lay down their weapons in the upcoming months.

The Colombian government has planned for FARC's societal integration, making the peace process more likely to succeed. The Colombian Agency for Reintegration (ACR) offers a program for former rebels to receive the assistance of a social worker, a small monthly stipend, and opportunities for education or vocational training.¹⁶ FARC's demobilization will bring the Agency's biggest wave of participants but a framework is in place to ensure all FARC members have the resources they need during the transition. Former FARC members can eventually join the Colombian workforce, participate in politics, promote economic growth, and contribute to the overall success of the peace process.


During FARC's demobilization and disarmament, the Colombian government will likely work to make modern infrastructure, education, and health services available to rural citizens. In doing so, Colombia's peace process will almost certainly gain greater support and approval. Long term success is more likely when the peace process has gained momentum. Researchers for Georgia State University's Transcultural Conflict and Violence Initiative find public opinion towards outcomes for the peace process "crucial" in its success.¹⁷ While Colombia's plan to provide these services will take many years, it can be accomplished sooner and more efficiently when a majority of Colombians support it.

Under the terms of the peace agreement, the Colombian government and FARC are working together to establish better infrastructure in the rural countryside. This cooperation between the two groups will ensure a lasting peace as 300 FARC members arrive to Colombia's Agua Bonita zone as a part of the peace deal to lay down arms.¹⁸ The Colombian peace deal has been largely successful at this point as a majority of FARC rebels lay down their weapons and assist Colombia in breaking down former FARC cocaine labs and locate coca fields. In return, for their cooperation, the Colombian government has promised to work towards providing FARC with better access to education and healthcare in their poor, rural departments. By providing such amenities and infrastructure, it is less likely that citizens in those areas will resort to joining rebel or armed groups.

Colombia's National Unit for Victims' Attention and Reparation will likely advance the success of the peace process. Colombia's National Unit for Victims was established in 2011 following the Victims and Land Restitution Law.¹⁹ To date, over 6.3 million Colombians are registered with the Unit but only 297,000 have been approved to receive reparations.²⁰ Figure 1 illustrates

the disproportionality between those registered and those approved with the National Unit for Victims. Previously, Colombia’s government did not have the resources necessary to undertake such a large project but now that peace terms have made explicit the condition that FARC’s assets will be used to repair these registered victims, the project is highly likely to make considerable progress.²¹ The National Unit for Victims works to ensure FARC’s assets are being used in a way that will support Colombia’s peace in the long run.

**Colombian Conflict Victims:
Those Registered with the Government, and Those Approved for Reparations**



Source: Colombian Government Victims’ Unit: <http://bit.ly/2kfy1p>

Figure 1: Colombia’s National Unit for Victims

Outlook—Armed Actors Threaten to Expand in FARC’s Void

FARC agreeing to disarm, demobilize, and reintegrate into Colombian society has created a territorial void into which armed groups are likely to attempt to move into the abandoned territory. The Colombian government faces major challenges in establishing state presence and rule of law in areas once controlled by FARC before other armed actors and criminal organizations are able to gain power or influence. Given FARC’s commitment and success thus far in the transition from conflict to peace, the Colombian government is likely enabled to shift attention and energy from countering FARC to countering criminal bands known as BACRIMs. Certain BACRIMs of significance in Colombia include Los Urabeños, Los Rastrojos, and the Popular Revolutionary Anti-Terrorist Army of Colombia (ERPAC).²² The threat posed by these BACRIMs is immediate following FARC’s move into demobilization camps.

As FARC members move to designated disarmament sites, former FARC territories are highly vulnerable to exploitation from BACRIMs. Los Urabeños are widely considered to be the most powerful criminal organization in Colombia currently and would likely benefit from FARC abandoning their territory.²³ Los Rastrojos, another BACRIM group, consists of 310 members; however, the group maintains alliances with a majority of the armed groups which allows them to continue criminal activities in drug trafficking and extortion.²⁴ BACRIMs within Colombia

are not the only rebel organizations interested in former FARC assets: external groups from nearby countries are fighting for FARC's external assets as well. The Colombian peace deal with FARC is also affecting nearby countries as 70 percent of FARC assets are based in countries like Venezuela, Ecuador, Costa Rica, Panama, and Mexico according to Insight Crime.²⁵ Lack of strong governmental presence in certain rural districts following FARC's recent demobilization creates an opportunity for BACRIM to gain control of former FARC territory and assets.

Many BACRIMs have expressed interest in seizing control of previous FARC territories and are highly likely to make attempts at doing so. There are many opportunities for BACRIMs to gain new areas of influence given FARC has a large amount of territorial assets within Colombia. The amount of assets, as well as the type of assets controlled by FARC is extremely diverse. FARC has been involved in everything from extortion and illegal mining, to every aspect of the drug trade including growing of coca, production, and distribution of cocaine according to independent research conducted by the Wilson Center's Latin America Program.²⁶ This has allowed FARC to amass an estimated \$10 billion in assets and money, believed to be stored in foreign banks.²⁷ With a power vacuum now open, other armed groups will be swift to try and move into former FARC territory. For these reasons, the Colombian government plans to work just as fast to move into the rural areas and establish a strong presence where FARC used to be. This strong presence will likely prevent rebel and armed groups from amassing control and power over former FARC assets.


Over the last couple of years coca production has seen a dramatic increase, offering yet another incentive for armed actors and criminal organizations to capitalize on FARC's exit from the drug trafficking. From 2014 to 2015 the coca crop area increased 40%, up from 69,000 hectares to 96,000 hectares, as represented in figure 2 from the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime.²⁸ With an increase in production, and an exit of FARC control in this process, BACRIMs will seize this opportunity and likely expand into FARC's void. These armed groups will be able to move into the recently vacated FARC strongholds and exploit the opportunity of the increased production of coca. This will likely allow armed actors to exponentially increase their assets, funding, and power, making them even more powerful and a larger potential threat to the Colombian government.

Importance of Coca:

Coca is the raw crop used in cocaine production. The crop can also be consumed through chewing the leaves or as an extract in tea. Coca is grown as a cash crop in the Andean regions of Argentina, Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru. Within Colombia, according to the *Coca cultivation survey of 2014* by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, coca cultivation areas are most concentrated in the departments of Nariño, Putumayo, Norte de Santander, Caqueta, Cauca, Guaviare, and Meta.²⁹

Coca became an especially profitable crop for FARC in the 1990s as Colombia quickly became the world's number one producer of coca and cocaine.³⁰ FARC was involved in every step of cocaine production from the taxation of coca farmers to the trafficking of the final product beyond Colombia's borders.³¹ The United States became increasingly concerned and

initiated Plan Colombia with the Pastrana administration as a way to respond to the drug problem. Methods of eradication under Plan Colombia included aerial fumigation and slash and burn techniques.³²



Gráfica 1. Serie histórica de área con coca a 31 de diciembre, 2001 - 2015

Figure 2: Coca Cultivation Increases in 2015

Extortion is another opportunity BACRIMs are likely to pursue for profit and power following FARC's movement into demobilization camps. Colombian citizens, once extorted by FARC, are now at heightened risk of being taken advantage of by other BACRIM groups. As criminal organizations attempt to seize former FARC territory and assets they will likely continue the traditions FARC has followed for 52 years—extorting local farmers, shop owners, and businesses. According to Colombia Reports, rates of extortion rose in 70 of Colombia's 233 municipalities in 2016.³³ These 70 municipalities were formerly under FARC control, suggesting BACRIMs have already initiated involvement in extortion. BACRIMs continue to threaten and harm those who stand in their way and they will likely continue to bring violence and crime to the region. The Colombian government's newly established presence in these rural areas will be crucial in ensuring the protection of Colombian citizens. By limiting the amount of extortion and restricting BACRIM control over local populations, the Colombian government can effectively break down the capabilities of armed groups in the short term to make lasting peace more likely in the long run.

A major factor in the success of the Colombian peace deal relies on the ability of the Colombian government to counter BACRIM expansions. The Colombian government is not only aware of this condition but is addressing it as a priority.³⁴ In recognizing this the Colombian government is likely to maintain strong defense and security sectors, at least in the short term. The defense and security sectors are key in eradicating BACRIM groups. Strong defense and security sectors will likely utilize intelligence gained from FARC cooperation to counter the expansion of other armed groups and BACRIMs more efficiently than before the peace deal.

The limitation and eventual eradication of armed groups by Colombia’s defense and security sectors will likely allow the government to establish strong rule of law in former FARC territories. Once the Colombian government has established this strong rule of law they will almost certainly refocus their resources to establish better infrastructure throughout the country, as well as more rurally accessible schools, hospitals, roads, and transportation systems. There is already a plan in place by President Juan Manuel Santos’ administration to invest billions of Pesos into the infrastructure of the nation. This investment is estimated to produce more than 200,000 jobs, many of which will be in the rural countryside.³⁵ By addressing infrastructure and employment needs in these regions, the Colombian government will be addressing several underlying issues driving armed groups participation in illicit activities. These initiatives are likely to reduce the influence of armed groups and help stabilize the region, creating lasting peace.

Implications—US and Colombian Relations Likely to Remain Strong During the Peace Process

Colombia still requires financial aid from the United States for their military budget and is therefore likely to maintain its close relationship with the United States during the transition to peace. Figure 3 from the Washington Office on Latin America shows the amount of US foreign aid to Colombia that has directly assisted Colombia’s military and police forces.³⁶ From 2000 to 2016 71% of US aid to Colombia went to the defense and security sectors. Following peace agreements, the Colombian government has already begun to shift their strategies from focusing on FARC to other armed groups as they attempt to limit their expansion. This shift in strategy provides the United States with an opportunity to continue bilateral relations with the Colombian government as they attempt to mitigate the threat posed by armed groups or BACRIMs in the short term.




Figure 3: US Aid to Colombia 1996-2016

The United States is highly likely to continue supporting Colombia's goals for peace under the "Paz Colombia" framework. "Paz Colombia", enacted in February 2016, is a follow-on economic support package to Plan Colombia.³⁷ "Paz Colombia" or Peace Colombia is set to allocate \$450 million to Colombia's peace process over the next ten years, according to Telesur Network.³⁸ Paz Colombia aims to balance funding for military assistance and humanitarian aid moving forward.³⁹ The framework is built upon three "pillars" most likely to bring about stable and lasting peace in Colombia. The first pillar involves increased security, counternarcotics, and FARC's societal integration. The second pillar emphasizes reestablishing state presence in rural areas; and finally, the third pillar establishes justice for victims of the conflict.⁴⁰ Together, the initiatives of "Paz Colombia" accounts for increased threat from armed actors and BACRIMs in the short term and set up for lasting peace in the long run.

The primary focus of "Paz Colombia" will likely be rural development to guide US-Colombian efforts toward long-term success of the peace process. Financing under the Paz Colombia framework will likely be used for social programs to help develop the rural countryside, creating more jobs in Colombia in the long term. Rural development is a massive undertaking so investment in this area will likely bolster the success of the peace process proportionally. Investments in social programs and rural development will likely help ex-rebels find jobs and integrate more effectively.

Continued investment and aid from the United States under the Paz Colombia framework will ensure a successful transition of FARC members into Colombian society, making it better off than before the peace agreement. Under this framework the US has pledged \$450 million to Colombia in aid. In order for this money to be beneficial to the peace process it needs to be put to social and rural development, not just to narcotic eradication and military spending.⁴¹ If the money given to Colombia under the Paz Colombia framework is used for social programs and helps develop the rural countryside, more jobs will be created and help Colombia in the long term. Rural development is a massive undertaking and major factor in the success of the peace deal, so further investment into these areas will likely bolster the success of the deal, and help out Colombian citizens in the long term as well. This investment into social and rural programs will also help not only ex-FARC rebels get jobs, but provide more opportunities for BACRIM members to legitimize as well. It is more likely however that many of these BACRIMs will instead try to take control of previous FARC territory and assets in the power vacuum left behind.⁴²

For the peace deal to succeed FARC members cannot join BACRIMs as this will likely create more obstacles for the Colombian government to overcome. Conventional wisdom argues that the lack of other opportunities such as legitimate jobs, as well as psychological effects from the conflict such as built up emotions can drive ex-combatants back into criminal or violent activity. These factors are relevant and need should be addressed in any plan moving forward. A recent study conducted by three college professors from the University of Notre Dame, the University of Pittsburgh, and New York University found that pre-existing criminal networks play a major part in ex-combatants returning to violence/crime.⁴³ This research found that pre-existing criminal networks have a huge impact on ex-combatants. Higher ranking officials of organizations were found to be the first to move back to crime or violence, then recruiting lower ranking members through their networks. In order to prevent ex-FARC members from joining

BACRIMs, the US and Colombian government should consider the importance of breaking up these networks and ensuring high ranking FARC officials transition into legitimate careers. Gaining the trust of ex-FARC leaders is a big part of this peace deal. The authors highlight the fact that “Re-socializing commanders into legal norms of society and bringing commanders into legitimate political and social leadership spots could be a huge help.”⁴⁴ By ensuring the high ranking officials become and stay legitimate, lower ranking members are more likely to follow their lead.

The United States will likely broaden its training of Colombian forces in counternarcotics and counterinsurgency to include tactics and strategies in demobilization, disarmament, and reintegration (DDR) organization, demining, and alternative development. The shift in terms of training procedures accounts for an increased threat from BACRIMs in the short term while also planning for long term peace in Colombia. Colombia’s long term prospects for peace hinge on FARC’s ability to demobilize, disarm, and reintegrate into society. As previously mentioned, FARC has already begun moving into demobilization camps and laying down arms and will likely continue in the process. Now, US training of Colombian forces will likely emphasize assistance in societal integration for the FARC. Another focus of US-Colombian training will be procedures for demining. Colombia is the

world’s second most heavily land mined country following Afghanistan, according to the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) in 2015.⁴⁵ Demining is a prerequisite to rural land development and is therefore a priority for Colombia at present. Figure 4 from the Presidential Program for Integrated Action Against Antipersonnel Mines (PPAICMA) maps the land mined zones of Colombia, most recently published in 2008.⁴⁶ Lastly, US-Colombian training will likely account for alternative land development. The USAID Land and Rural Development Project, initiated in 2013, will incorporate training for Colombian forces to restitute land to victims of the conflict, ensure rural property rights, and mobilize public services—education and healthcare in rural areas.⁴⁷ In the long run, these US-Colombian efforts will increase the likelihood of success for establishing governmental rule of law in rural Colombia.




Figure 4: Georeferenced Mined Zones of Colombia 1990-April 2008

Agreements between FARC and the Colombian government will likely be successful in driving down conflict related deaths. As seen in figure 5 from the Buenos Aires Herald, homicides have declined 25 percent since 2012 when peace talks began.⁴⁸ President Santos attributes this decline to the impacts of the peace process. Final peace terms establish a “definitive” ceasefire between FARC rebels and Colombia’s military forces. Thus far, only two FARC rebels have been killed by Colombian forces since the signing of the peace terms, according to a military press release.⁴⁹ With FARC militias moving into demobilization camps and entering the initial stages of disarmament, conflict related deaths will likely continue to decline. As the ceasefire stands, Colombia can refocus its military strength and resources to countering other short term threats.




Figure 5: Homicides Decline in Colombia 2002-2016

Joint US-Colombian efforts to stop armed groups from filling FARC’s void will likely limit the amount of narcotics available in the global drug market, primarily the cocaine supply. FARC formerly controlled 70 percent of coca crops in Colombia and controlled around 40 percent of the total world supply of cocaine.⁵⁰ The Colombian government is continuing its counternarcotics programs with the United States in addition to entering agreements with FARC leaders to eradicate coca cultivation and replace crops for local farmers, according to a FARC-EP web source.⁵¹ FARC leaders will likely help Colombian forces to locate coca fields and cocaine production labs and find suitable agricultural alternatives for local farmers. Financial assistance from the United States may assist these military operations. Colombia will be more likely to block armed groups and BACRIMs from gaining control of former FARC assets with the assistance of FARC informers and United States aid.

The United States and Colombia will both likely benefit from maintained relations. Coca production has increased in Colombia by 40% between 2014 and 2015⁵², driving up the potential amount of cocaine that will likely be trafficked on the world market. Colombia is once again the

world's largest producer of coca.⁵³ This increase has continued into 2016 and is a major concern for the US and Colombian governments. Other rebel and armed groups will be looking to seize control of these areas to increase their power/influence in the region. With an increased presence in the rural countryside where these coca fields are located, the Colombian government will likely be able to reduce the amount of coca production in the coming years. In order to help establish a strong presence in the countryside however, continued cooperation and investment from the United States is critical. Lastly, cooperation from FARC members will likely give the Colombian government an advantage in locating coca fields and cocaine production centers, allowing them to slow down coca cultivation and eradicate cocaine production more efficiently.

It is highly likely that the U.S. would support Colombian peace process in order to ensure the political stability in Colombia. The violence in Colombia has decreased since the adoption of the peace treaty with FARC however, neither the Colombian government nor the United States can remain complacent as community activists and rural organizers are being targeted by criminal organizations.⁵⁴ The presence of U.S. government will ensure that the Peace treaty will continue to succeed and represent more than the success of FARC disarming, demobilizing, and reintegration into society. Due to the Peace treaty FARC is abandoning their coca resources and territories causing BACRIMs to take over the FARC assets.⁵⁵ The U.S. has an opportunity assisting Colombia's post-conflict transition by showing a powerful message by supporting civil society organizations and community initiatives thus making political participation safe for all in Colombia.⁵⁶ The U.S. government will still be able to benefit from the relationship with Colombia and ensure that the establishment of the peace treaty will last.

In conclusion, the Colombian peace process will likely be successful in the long run following an immediate period of increased threat from armed actors. Since 2012 Colombia and FARC stand committed in creating a peace throughout the country. In the post-conflict transition Colombian forces have been active in confronting armed actors and BACRIMs. The peace process will likely be successful as Colombia reestablishes rule of law in rural areas and provides opportunities for all Colombian to access education and healthcare. There are several opportunities for the United States to maintain its relationship with Colombia to ensure the long term success of the peace process.

Confidence Statements:

A moderately high level of confidence is justified in the underlying sources given their quality of information and corresponding corroboration.

A moderate level of confidence in analytical conclusions is justified with strong inferences, supported use of structured analytic techniques, and a low possibility of denial or deception.

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Analytic Methods and Techniques

Appendix A: Key Assumptions Check

The first Structured Analytic Technique our group implemented was the Key Assumptions Check. The Tradecraft Primer defines a key assumption as “any hypothesis that analysts have accepted to be true and which forms the basis of the assessment.” Due to the fact that key assumptions carry so much importance in Intelligence Analysis, we started our project with a Key Assumptions Check to explicitly bring forward any assumptions, supported or unsupported. We used the Key Assessment Check several times throughout the analysis when situational dynamics changed. For example, a previous key assumption held was that the original Colombian peace terms between the Santos administration and FARC would pass referendum. However, this key assumption was ultimately incorrect because on October 2, 2016, 50.2% of Colombian voters rejected the agreement. The Key Assumption Check was one of our most foundational and useful SATs in the analytic process.

The Key Assumptions Check was a relatively straightforward and easy to implement method. As a group we discussed what ideas about the Colombian peace process we believed to be true. From there we listed key assumptions underlying our judgements. Our key assumptions were that Colombia and FARC are dedicated to establishing lasting peace in Colombia; the transition from conflict to peace will be gradual; FARC will not gain immense political support in the months to years following the peace agreements; Colombia will restructure its defense and security sectors in the post conflict context; other criminal actors will attempt to become involved in coca production and the cocaine trade; Colombia will maintain a strong military presence following peace agreements to ensure the state gains credibility in territories once controlled by FARC; the demobilized, disarmed, and reintegrated (DDR) process will face challenges; and the Santos administration—FARC example will encourage other armed groups in Colombia (for example, the ELN) to join peace talks. The final step in our Key Assumptions Check was to evaluate each key assumption as supported or unsupported. Most were well supported so we looked for sources to reference when asserting that assumption into our analysis.

Appendix B: Analysis of Competing Hypotheses

The second SAT our team chose to implement was Analysis of Competing Hypotheses (ACH). Highlighted in the Tradecraft Primer as a diagnostic technique, ACH is also taught in the Intelligence Analysis Program as a way to generate multiple, competing hypotheses about *what is happening*. ACH is used to check evidence against multiple hypotheses to disprove, rather than prove, any given hypothesis. ACH is an effective team practice because together the analysts brainstorm possible hypotheses then prepare a matrix to determine if existing evidence on the topic is consistent, inconsistent, or not applicable to each hypothesis. Our team chose to implement ACH early in the project sequence to ensure multiple hypotheses were considered and that those hypotheses covered a wide enough range to answer our questions about the Colombian peace process. We also wanted to begin preparing a comprehensive list of the evidence/facts we had discovered through our research. ACH was useful in highlighting information gaps.

Traditionally, ACH is employed during the hypothesis testing phase of analysis as a way to describe what is happening *at present*. Evidence included in an ACH matrix counts for or against hypotheses that describe what has happened until that present moment. There is no evidence about the future so typically hypotheses would not be forward looking or contain the modal verb “will”. Nevertheless, in this analysis we have a thorough understanding of what is happening in the present in Colombia but we are more interested in outlooks for the peace process. Our consumer specifically asked us about outlooks for Colombia’s DDR process. Even though ACH is taught for hypothesis testing in the present, we thought a future-modified ACH could promote good discussion within the group and provide more insights for our consumers. In this way, ACH served as an introductory brainstorming exercise to our central SAT, scenario generation. Our future-modified ACH includes “will” statements about the future as a means to explain how the Colombian peace process is most likely to progress. Implementing this modified ACH was rather straightforward. We evaluated each piece of evidence and considered whether it would be likely or unlikely to bring about the future hypotheses. Likely scenarios were labeled as consistent and unlikely scenarios were labeled as inconsistent. The C/I and ? placeholders were indeterminate. As expected, the value in this modified ACH was more in the discussion it promoted among our team and less in the conclusions.

To get started with ACH we reviewed an exercise from Professor Walton’s Hypothesis Testing class on the Wen Ho Lee case. We followed the ACH matrix built during this exercise as a guide for our own on the Colombian peace process. As a group we generated 8-10 hypotheses then we considered ways in which the hypotheses were similar or different. After some discussion we were able to arrive at only 5 hypotheses, each broad enough to entail the ideas from our 8-10 original hypotheses. We also made the null hypothesis explicit. Our null hypothesis is that nothing changes; or in other words, the Colombian situation remains as-is. Another competing hypothesis we included is that “Peace negotiations will be successful”. In this hypothesis Colombia and FARC adhere to the terms outlined in the peace treaty to advance change in Colombia. FARC members successfully transition back into society; FARC gains political representation; Colombia restructures its defense and security sectors accordingly; and levels of violence and poverty in Colombia decrease. A third hypothesis we considered is that “A power vacuum will allow other rebel organizations (BACRIM, paramilitary groups) to gain influence within Colombia.” This hypothesis could be true whether or the peace process in Colombia is successful or unsuccessful, and therefore it stands by itself. A fourth hypothesis is that “Citizens will have backlash from the lack of punishments on FARC members”. Already, peace negotiations were rejected in a Colombian referendum, in large part because many citizens felt FARC leaders were “getting off too easy” in the terms. After renegotiation and modification the peace treaty went to Colombian Congress where only 130 of 166 members voted to pass the terms. The other 36 Congressional members opposed the peace deal and walked out of the chamber before voting took place. The last hypothesis we included is that “The 2018 Colombian Presidential Election will affect the success of the Peace Treaty”. FARC has stated that they do not wish to nominate a candidate in the 2018 election but they will support a candidate that plans to advance the peace process.

Next, we compiled a list of evidence from our research. We selected 20 data points (evidence), with each team member adding his/her own evidence as to be sure information was not being “cherry-picked” to support any given hypothesis. Here the utility of ACH in overcoming the

confirmation bias was especially useful. Selecting evidence was the most challenging part of this technique for our group because it was sometimes difficult to distinguish fact from opinion in new articles and academic sources. There is also the issue of conflicting evidence. For example some sources say the legislation for amnesty for FARC leaders is in place. Yet, other sources say the amnesty legislation has yet to pass. We could not make a determination either way so ultimately we assumed that since the peace treaty has been signed by FARC leaders the amnesty protection is indeed in place. Additionally, there is so much information on the Colombian case that we had to select the evidence points we deemed to be most significant. Lastly, we used the Quality of Information Check to ensure all our evidence was up to date since the Colombian peace process is a quickly developing situation. After we all added our best evidence to the running list we checked over it to make sure we were not repeating evidence or including contradictory evidence.

The last step of ACH involved the most group discussion. Together we compared each point of evidence to the 5 hypotheses and determined whether it was consistent (C) or inconsistent (I) with that hypothesis. Foreshadowing our next structure analytic technique, we began thinking about how the evidence could be projected into future scenarios. In some cases the evidence was entirely unrelated to the hypotheses so we included a question mark (?) in the matrix to represent uncertainty either way. For example, Congressional opponents of the peace treaty claiming too little time to review changes to the terms is deemed unrelated to a power vacuum forming in previously FARC-controlled territory. In other cases, we framed arguments for the evidence to be consistent with the hypothesis in question or inconsistent with it. At three points on the matrix we included a consistent/inconsistent (C/I) comment to represent our reasoning.

Lastly, we added up the “I”s from each hypothesis down the columns to arrive at a total number of inconsistencies for each each. Since the goal of hypothesis testing is to disprove rather than prove hypotheses, the hypothesis with the fewest number of inconsistencies is the accepted explanation. The conclusion with the fewest inconsistencies (two) was “The 2018 Colombian Presidential Election will affect the success of the Peace Treaty”. The next hypothesis with seven inconsistencies was that “A power vacuum will allow other rebel organizations (BACRIM, paramilitary groups) to gain influence within Colombia”, followed by the hypothesis that “Peace negotiations will be successful” with eight inconsistencies. At the conclusion of our exercise it seems prospects for the Colombian peace process are likely to be successful, but we have remained open to analytic judgements drawn from other analytic methods/SATs. ACH was beneficial to us as a group exercise because it enabled us to generate, organize, and evaluate many hypotheses, rather than accepting one agreed upon hypothesis from the start of the project. Our final ACH Matrix is included here.

	H1 Peace negotiations will be successful	H2 Peace negotiations will NOT be successful	H3 A power vacuum will allow other rebel organizations to take power	H4 Citizens will have backlash from the lack of punishments on FARC members	H5 2018 Colombian Presidential Election will affect the success of the Peace Treaty
E1: The initial referendum was voted “No” by the people.	I	C	?	C	C
E2: The referendum was passed by Congress.	C	I	C	C	?
E3: The internal dispute has been waging for 52 years.	C/I	C/I	C	C	C
E4: Congressional opponents claim too little time to either comment or review the changes.	I	C	?	C	C
E5: Congressional opponents of the deal had walked out of the chamber in protest before the vote took place.	I	C	?	C	C
E6: The peace agreement guarantees rebels representation on congress (10 seats?)	C	I	C	C	C
E7: The peace agreement	C	I	I	I	C

bans rebels from running in newly created districts in former conflict zones.					
E8: The disarmament/ demobilization of rebels will be taken under by the United Nations.	C	I	I	?	?
E9: Only 130 of the 166 members of congress voted (130-0).	C	I	?	C	C
E10: The deals lays out revisions to revamp Colombia's primitive countryside through major infrastructure investments.	C	I	I	I	C
E11: 58 activists in support of the Colombian peace process (Marcha Patriótica) killed in 2016.	I	C	C	C	C
E12: To date, Colombia has not set up demobilization camps for FARC, overseen by the UN (27 concentration areas planned).	I	C	C	C	?
E13: FARC assets will be used to compensate victims of the war/crimes by	C	I	?	I	?

guerrillas.					
E14: FARC has yet to disarm until immunity for their actions is implemented.	I	C	I	I	?
E15: Congress passed an amnesty law that will protect thousands of guerrillas who committed minor crimes during the war from prosecution.	C	I	C	C	C
E16: FARC leaders who committed human rights violations or war crimes are not protected by this amnesty law	C	I	C	I	C/I
E17: Peace talks between the Colombian government and the ELN are set to begin within the next month.	C	I	I	I	C
E18: In the “Integrated Agrarian Development Policy” the FARC and Colombia agree to work at reducing rural poverty.	C	I	I	I	C
E19: Coca crop area increased from 69,000 hectares (ha) in 2014 to 96,000 ha in 2015 according to the most	I	C	C	?	I

recent UNODC report					
E20: The Colombian government has set ambitious goals for coca eradication in 2017, including incentives for farmers to plant other crops and fumigation.	C	I	I	I	C
E21: FARC members have been willing to cooperate with the Colombian government in eradicating coca as well as other aspects of the demobilization	C	I	C	I	C
Total:	8	14	7	9	2

Appendix C: Scenario Generation

Our team decided to implement scenario generation as a way to think about how the Colombian peace process might develop. Our consumers are most interested in the prospects for success of the demobilization, disarmament, and reintegration (DDR) process with in Colombia following the final agreements. We decided to use scenario generation to analyze the DDR process specifically, oriented toward the future. The value in using scenario generation is essentially that it lets us explain how the peace process could go “right”, how it could go “wrong”, and indications that any one outcome is coming to be.

Scenario generation typically involves selecting drivers that are highly significant and highly uncertain in their outcomes. These drivers are typically the variables in which analysts feel least confident “making the call”. The significant and uncertain drivers are placed on a matrix and assigned two extreme, but plausible endpoints. These endpoints should be more than yes/no or high/low—they should be descriptive. Next, the endpoints are combined to form plausible paths forward. Scenarios for each plausible path forward are written from the present and may follow a standardized plot. Scenario generation is typically referred to as “quadrant analysis” because when using two drivers analysts can create a quad-chart or matrix of the four individual scenarios. However, we modified our scenario generation to include three drivers. Thus, we arrived at 8 individual scenarios.

Dr. Hendrickson advised us throughout our futures analysis on the scenario generation methodology. To begin, our team followed handouts from Dr. Hendrickson’s futures analysis


class on *The Process of Scenario Generation* and we reviewed Peter Schwartz's *Art of the Long View* as a refresher on the steps to follow in scenario generation. Although *Art of the Long View* is written from a business analytics perspective it helped us get started with our issue. First, we reconsidered the decisions faced by our consumer and made a list of the factors relevant to each of those decisions. Our list included 20 factors: US recent change in administration, US/Colombian diplomatic relations, US foreign aid to Colombia, influence of other Colombian guerrilla groups, levels of coca production/growth, number of deaths related to guerrilla violence, political representation for FARC members, future Colombian elections/political results, citizens of Colombia public opinion on the deal, predetermined/inherent opinions of the conflict, compliance of FARC members, ability of UN to provide the needed supplies/infrastructure/resources, infrastructure of Colombia, ability/determination of FARC members to integrate into society, assassinations committed from paramilitary groups causing FARC to retaliate, willingness of ELN to become involved in peace talks, landowner compliance, cultivating FARC territories to livable lands/crop productions, success of the "Integrated Agrarian Development Policy", and illicit gold mining reform. Some factors were repetitive but others got at different aspects of the same issue.

Next we evaluated the degree of certainty for each variable. We assigned a more uncertain/less uncertain indicator to all of the variables and ultimately had more "more uncertain" variables than "less uncertain". Next we thought about the significance of the "more uncertain" variables. We asked which variables matter most in the DDR process and which variables would be most important in setting Colombia up for peace in the long run. The drivers assessed to be "more uncertain" and most significant were contestants for drivers in the scenario generation. We wanted to make sure these drivers were not too similar to one another, had distinct end points, and would create interesting scenarios for our consumer. We discussed using FARC's ability to reintegrate into society, the influence of other Colombian guerrilla groups, and US aid to Colombia during the transition. Dr. Hendrickson reminded us that it is best practice not to use variables which the consumer has direct control over. Therefore we eliminated US aid to Colombia. Before moving into scenario writing, we thought about whether or not FARC's ability to reintegrate into society and the influence of other criminal organization would build interesting scenarios. Dr. Hendrickson suggested we add a third variable that would assess how former FARC territory will be used in the transition to peace. We termed this variable "use of former FARC assets".

Next, we determined endpoints for all three variables. The end points for the influence of other criminal organizations are "to stagnate" and "to grow quickly". With this variable we are analyzing the speed in which criminal organizations move to fill FARC's void. They can become stagnant because the Colombian government established its power or they can grow quickly by taking advantage of FARC's previous criminal enterprises. The second variable, use of former FARC assets, has endpoints at "assets used by government for economic gain" and "assets used to establish peace camps and invest in Colombian citizens" Essentially, this variable gets at whether or not the Colombian government has the best intentions for the peace process. The last variable, ability of FARC to reintegrate into Colombian society, ends with "failure to integrate and societal disconnect" on one side and "large scale-assimilation" on the other. The visualization below provides all three variables with their endpoints to show how we built our 8 scenarios. We also assigned a unique name to each scenario, attempting to play on its main idea.

Finally, we wrote our scenarios beginning from the present and projecting into the future. Note, when we refer to FARC assets we mean all assets to include land, coca fields, ranches and farms, shops and businesses, even construction companies. We also decided on indicators and implications for each scenario. The indicators suggest to our client that in the case these indicators occur, that scenario is coming to be a more likely future than any other future scenario. We wanted our indicators to be very specific and useful as a reference for our consumers. Also we included implications to the US for each scenario. The implications are not necessarily scenario specific but they would be true if the scenario comes to be in the future.

Scenario Generation: Assessing the Colombian Peace Process



Scenario 1: "Too good to be true"

Colombian Congress passes revised peace accord. Colombian forces and the United Nations (UN) began setting up "peace camps" for the demobilization and disarmament of FARC rebels. Former FARC assets, including land and funds for the construction of buildings and facilities, are used to establish these peace camps throughout Colombia's districts. FARC's assets are also invested in Colombian citizens as reparations for the victims of FARC violence. Reparations are provided for the victims and victims' families of bombings, kidnappings, extortion, and displacement. In doing so, there is widespread support for the Colombian peace process among citizens. As FARC hands over its assets to the Colombian government, including weaponry and funds gained from the illicit market for coca, the Colombian government is able to establish a

strong presence in areas formerly controlled by FARC. The Colombian government establishes a strong military presence in areas once deemed “lawless”. Initially FARC and the Colombian government work together closely, providing crop alternatives to coca farmers, fairly distributing land, providing accessible education and healthcare to rural Colombian citizens and setting an example of the successful peace transition to other rebel groups. With the increased enforcement of rule of law throughout Colombia and the effectiveness of the FARC-Colombia partnership in rural reform, criminal organizations are unable to gain a foothold in FARC’s previous criminal undertakings. Criminal organizations do not grow in any way from FARC’s void in the illicit coca and cocaine markets or in the business of illicit gold mining. Instead, criminal organizations remain stagnant. However, after the immediate “peace camp” utility and transitional activities come to cessation, former FARC rebels are not sure where to turn for employment or societal fulfilment. The demobilization and disarmament of FARC has been deemed a success but reintegration poses certain challenges. Former FARC rebels are uneducated and untrained for most civilian jobs and find little excitement or purpose in a post conflict context. There is a disconnect between Colombian citizens and former FARC rebels in society. Former FARC rebels question their role in post-conflict Colombia and grow restless. Many former FARC rebels turn back to criminal operations and the Colombian peace is undermined as violence rises once again.

Indicators:

- The setup and operation of Colombian peace camps proceeded smoothly
- Colombian government regains rules of law in former FARC districts within Colombia
- No new jobs are created for former FARC rebels

Implications:

- US aid to Colombia remains proportional to the military force scaling in a post-conflict context
- Former FARC rebels facing a societal disconnect may form splinter guerrilla organizations
- Colombia will likely look to the United States for guidance in the “Agrarian Land Reform”

Scenario 2: “Shifting Power for the Coca”

The influence of other criminal organizations increases as FARC steps away from crime and formerly own territory. A power vacuum is created allowing smaller criminal organizations fighting for FARC assets to enter, assisting their organizations’ development. FARC’s former control of 90 percent of Colombia’s cocaine will be available for other criminal organizations to control or be destroyed by the government of Colombia. FARC’s territory can be used to establish “Peace Camps” in order for them to assimilate to society and disarm. These camps are used by the UN to monitor the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of FARC. Former FARC assets such as land and funds will not just be used for peace camps but for reparation. Colombia will give the assets to the victims and the victims’ families. The Colombian government will use former FARC territory to invest in Colombian citizens as a way to compensate for loss of property or loved ones due to past confrontation with FARC. However, the majority of FARC members fail to assimilate into Colombian society. The people of Colombia hold the mentality that FARC will always be the enemy.

Indicators:

- The setup and operation of Colombian peace camps proceeded smoothly
- Small crime organizations grow as they take control of former FARC assets
- No new jobs are created for former FARC rebels

Implications:

- US aid to Colombia remains proportional to the military force scaling in a post-conflict context
- Former FARC rebels facing a societal disconnect may form splinter guerrilla organizations
- Colombia will likely look to the United States for guidance in the handling the growing influence of external and internal criminal organizations.

Scenario 3: “All is well until assets are misused”

Colombian Congress passes revised peace accord. Colombian forces and the United Nations (UN) began setting up “peace camps” for the demobilization and disarmament of FARC rebels. Initially FARC and Colombian forces work closely together to limit coca farming and encourage alternative crops. They also work together on “Agrarian Land Reform” and being making education and healthcare more accessible to rural Colombian citizens. As Colombia prospers, criminal organizations become stagnant, without enough power or influence to expand into the criminal operations once undertaken by FARC. However, FARC assets are not dedicated entirely to the Colombian peace transition or to reparations for victims of FARC violence. The government misuses FARC assets for economic gain by selling land to wealthy individuals or foreign companies. Former FARC rebels witness the government's abuses and question compliance with the DDR process. The misuse of FARC assets actually disadvantages former FARC rebels from finding jobs. Levels of unemployment among former FARC fighters rises; and accordingly, FARC fails to successfully integrate into society.

Indicators:

- Levels of coca production fall
- Higher numbers of foreign companies move into Colombia on lands/architecture purchased from the government
- Overall levels of unemployment in Colombia rise

Implications:

- US aid to Colombia will no longer be focused on breaking down the illicit drug market, priorities will shift to using aid to build schools and medical facilities
- Landowners who buy land from the government will have undue influence in certain districts of Colombia and may be able to manipulate former FARC rebels
- Colombia’s actions may lead to diplomatic strains with the US and other countries

Scenario 4: “Can’t win for losing”

The influence from other criminal organization increases while FARC attempts to integrate into society. A power vacuum is created allowing smaller criminal organizations fighting for FARC assets to advance their organizations’ development. FARC formerly controlling 90 percent of

Colombia's cocaine will be available for other criminal organizations to control or be destroyed by the government of Colombia. Colombian government chooses to keep the formerly owned FARC territory and sells it to those that can afford the territory. The former FARC territory is used for economic gain for the Colombian government. The Colombian government uses the FARC territory to sell to citizens that can afford it or companies wanting to use the land for profit. By doing this, Colombia creates programs that allow citizens to live in less populated areas. The Colombian government sells the former FARC territory to companies that want to invest in extracting natural resources or creating factories. This can benefit Colombia financially, as well as, increase trading offers. However, the majority of FARC members fail to assimilate and are largely excluded from receiving jobs in these factories.

Indicators:

- The setup and operation of Colombia distributing former FARC assets to corporations or citizens in order for economic gain for the government.
- Former FARC districts within Colombia taken over by external and internal criminal groups.
- No new jobs are created for former FARC rebels

Implications:

- US aid to Colombia remains proportional to the military force scaling in a post-conflict context as other criminal organizations move in
- Former FARC rebels facing a societal disconnect may form splinter guerrilla organizations or join other growing criminal organization
- Colombia will likely look to the United States for guidance selling former FARC assets for economic gain

Scenario 5: "Prosperity for Colombia"

A power vacuum is created by the demobilization of the FARC but other Colombian criminal organizations are unable to rise to power quick enough to fill the vacuum. The level of criminal activity continues to decrease throughout Colombia in transition of the peace process. The United Nations and Colombian government successfully establishes peace camps to help the demobilization of FARC members. Former FARC assets are used to help establish these peace camps, and are also invested back into the development of the Colombian countryside. Former FARC assets are also used as reparations to victims of FARC crimes. These reparations help increase the national support for the peace transition and increase public opinion on both the Colombian government and FARC members. These peace camps aid former FARC members in assimilating into society on a large-scale. This integration into society eases the peace process and raises its chances of long-term success. The investment into the countryside and more rural areas helps FARC members find work easier, decreasing the number that turn back to organized criminal activities they used to take part in. The reparations given to victims of FARC crimes also helps those suffering from former FARC wrongdoings to transition into the peace era.

Indicators:

- Continued decrease in the amount of crime in Colombia
- Decreased levels of unemployment
- Increased public opinion of FARC

Implications:

- Decreased funding to fight other criminal groups
- Increased US investment into Colombian businesses
- Colombia becomes the main ally to the US in the region

Scenario 6: “Everyone deserves a second chance”

The influence of other criminal organization grows as FARC disarms, demobilizes and attempts to reintegrate into society in the peace camps established by the UN. A power vacuum is created allowing smaller criminal organizations fighting for FARC assets to enter that will assist in their organizations’ development. FARC formerly controlling 90 percent of Colombia’s cocaine will be available for other criminal organizations to control or be destroyed by the government of Colombia. This provides the small criminal organizations an opportunity to move it and take over assets as a way to increase income, influence, and draw in more recruits. A hand full of cocaine labs have been destroyed by a joint operation between FARC and the Colombian government; however, there are still opportunities for other criminal groups to fill the void. The former territory belonging to FARC is converted into peace camps and used to benefit the people of Colombia by paying the families affected by FARC’s previous activities. FARC will be able to successfully assimilate back into Colombian Society due to their determination to disarm and follow their end of the deals established in the peace treaty.

Indicators:

- The setup and operation of Colombian peace camps proceeded smoothly and FARC member comply
- Colombian government regains rule of law in former FARC districts and properly distributes the assets to families affected by FARC’s behavior in the past
- New jobs are created for former FARC rebels as the peace camps offer training for the modern and Colombian citizens allow them to work alongside them

Implications:

- US aid to Colombia remains proportional to the military force scaling in a post-conflict context due to rise in other criminal organizations
- Former FARC rebels experience societal assimilation given training and other programs that allow them to find work in society
- Colombia will likely look to FARC for continued help in breaking down cocaine labs

Scenario 7: “Crime Doesn’t Pay, but Others Will”

Other Colombian criminal groups are unable to rise to power and fill the power vacuum left behind by the FARC. Nevertheless, the Colombian government uses confiscated FARC assets for its own economic gain by auctioning off plots of land and selling other former FARC possessions. This takes away money and assets that were originally planned to be invested into the development of the Colombian countryside. The UN peace camps are also not as expansive as they would be if the former FARC assets were used properly. The Colombian countryside is not developed as it was planned to be, creating less jobs and infrastructure for the rural poor. Former FARC assets are also not used for reparations to victims of former FARC crimes. The peace deal moves along however as many citizens still want peace in their country. Former

FARC members are able find jobs and have large-scale assimilation into society due to pressure from the Colombian government.

Indicators:

- Peace talks are started by other criminal groups
- Public opinion of the peace process/deal decreases
- FARC members stay out of criminal organizations

Implications:

- Decreased funding by the US to fight other criminal groups
- Uneasy relationships in more rural areas could lead to increased violence in those areas
- Increased investment into Colombian businesses

Scenario 8: “Odds are Against Them”

A power vacuum is created by the demobilization of the FARC. Other criminal organizations quickly take advantage of this and rise to power, filling the void left by the FARC. The level of criminal activity increases throughout Colombia as these organizations take up the former responsibilities and dealings that FARC once had. The Colombian government also uses FARC assets for their own economic gain. They sell off former FARC lands and ranches to outside investors and the highest bidders. This takes away from investment into the countryside, allowing other criminal groups to continue their rise to power. Former FARC assets are not used for reparations to victims of former FARC crimes either, leaving those in the countryside more unsatisfied with the peace transition process. Still, FARC members largely assimilate into society. They demobilize under the terms of the peace deal and look for jobs throughout the country. They are able to assimilate into society due to internal pressure from the government.

Indicators:

- Increased crime/violence
- Increased corruption in the government
- UN demobilization camps are not set up properly and are not as successful

Implications:

- The spread of the newly powerful criminal organizations into surrounding regions would cause the continued spread and distribution of illegal narcotics into the US
- Decreased investment into Colombian infrastructure and businesses
- Inability of the government to take control of the rural countryside from criminal organizations

Following the drafting of these scenarios we met with Dr. Hendrickson one last time to receive his feedback and suggestions for improvement when communicating our analysis to our consumers at the symposium. Hendrickson suggested we adjust the drivers to account for temporal factors. For example, we changed “influence of other criminal organizations” to “rate of expansion of other criminal organization”. However, in our analysis we chose not to just include criminal groups but all armed groups. By using the broader “armed groups” we can account for paramilitaries, opposition groups, and FARC faction groups as well. Dr. Hendrickson emphasized the idea that certain FARC splinter groups may join and give rise to other criminal organizations/armed groups in the upcoming months.

He also suggested that we might rewrite our scenarios following a standardized plot to make the storylines somewhat more interesting. Given our time constraints, we decided not to do this since the text of the scenarios would not be included in the analytic conclusions section of our capstone. Lastly, he suggested we change the way we were thinking about our indicators. Dr. Hendrickson said each endpoint can have one indicator attached to it. For example, an indicator of FARC's failure to integrate would be levels of unemployment rise in Colombia. This indicator can be listed every time a scenario ends with FARC failing to integrate into society. Ultimately each scenario has two standard indicators and a third one (by our crafting) unique to it.

The last step of our scenario generation was to think about which scenarios are more interesting/more plausible than the others. Out of our 8 scenarios, we found 3-4 interesting and plausible. We reread through all scenarios to determine which stand out from the rest and which have the most important or useful implications for our consumer. In the capstone presentation we plan to brief out scenarios 4, 5, and 6. These scenarios are not redundant and offer the best implications and indicators. Scenario 5 is our "best case scenario" in which FARC's assets are used to build peace camps and pay reparations to victims of the conflict, criminal organizations become stagnant as the Colombian government asserts its authority, and finally FARC has wide scale assimilation into society. The DDR process is successful. This scenario tells the story of how the peace process could be a success. Consumers will likely ask how this scenario can come to be more likely than the others. Scenario 4 is our "worst case scenario" in which FARC's assets are used for economic gain leading Colombian people to further distrust their government, criminal organizations grow and become involved in violent activities, and FARC fails to reintegrate into society. Colombia returns to extreme conflict and the government loses credibility. This scenario tells the story of how the peace process could fail. Scenario 6 is our most plausible future or path forward in which FARC assets are used to establish peace camps and pay reparations to victims of the conflict and FARC experiences large scale assimilation into society but criminal organizations grow. Scenario 6 most closely lines up with our main analytic claim or thesis. Scenario 6 guided our conclusions through the impact thus far, outlook, and implications sections. Colombia's peace process is likely to work in the future following a period of increased violence from armed groups in the short term because *criminal organizations grow*. This scenario tells the story of the Colombian peace process succeeding after some initial threats to its progress.

Appendix D: Red Team Analysis

Another structured analytic techniques we used was red team analysis. Red team analysis provided us with not only a new perspective but also prevented us from reasoning with mental fallacies such as mirror imaging. Red team analysis is an imaginative thinking technique that adds creativity and rigor to understanding the views of many actors within Colombia.

The use of this imaginative thinking technique allowed us to see multiple perspectives through the eyes of the actors that have been affected by the Colombian peace deal, such as the views of those that support peace with FARC or the views of those that refuse to allow FARC assimilate back into society. Nevertheless, we used this technique to focus on the perspectives of armed groups, FARC, and the Colombian government in a post-conflict context after the acceptance of

the peace deal in December of 2016. Red team analysis allowed us to understand how Colombia, FARC, and armed groups would react to the peace deal and what opportunities would be made available for the United States.

When utilizing Red Team on the armed groups we focused on multiple groups interested in filling the void within FARC's assets in Colombia. The armed groups consist of paramilitary and criminal organizations. The majority of the focus was aimed towards BACRIMs (Criminal Bands) including groups like Urabenos, Rastrojos, and the Popular Revolutionary Anti-Terrorist Army of Colombia (ERPAC). Understanding their origin, current manpower, location in Colombia, and capabilities allowed us take into consideration their ability to obtain and maintain FARC's assets.

Each organization within the armed groups are completely different from one another and each demonstrate a unique culture that makes them stand apart. Each group can benefit from FARC's absence in drug trade but they have their own strategies carrying out their motives. For example, Rastrojos are a very small criminal group and rely heavily on alliances with bigger groups in order to survive. This benefits them as they are most likely able to move under the radar as others will be noticed by Colombian government due to their size and brutality. National Liberation Army (ELN) was considered at first, however, given their attempts to create their own peace deal with Colombian officials we decided to not include them with the other armed groups.

It is highly likely that armed groups would fight to control formerly owned FARC territory due to the group's culture and opportunity. As FARC members move to peace camps monitored by the UN as part of the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration process, the guerrilla group's assets and territory are vulnerable to armed groups. The Colombian government needs to be active in protecting these areas as they are not protected by FARC any longer. The free territory and abandon resources provide an opportunity for armed groups to grow financially, recruit more members, and spread influence in drug trafficking.

Through the use of Red Team to understand the perspectives of the FARC leadership, we found that FARC members fear betrayal from the Colombian government and job security. FARC leaders fear that the current peace deal would take a negative turn similar to past agreements where the government went on an all-out offense attacking FARC members despite the active truce at the time during the 1970s. As of right now things are operating smoothly between FARC and the Colombian government since the adoption of the peace agreement last December 2016.

FARC leadership ensures that FARC members are able to reintegrate into society by keeping tabs on the involvement of Colombian government in establishing programs that aid the reintegration process. As FARC disarms, demobilized, and reintegrated into society, FARC leaders ensure that their members receive the training and educational opportunities. This training and educational activity would allow FARC members to be able to obtain and maintain a job or create a future for themselves and their families.

FARC members want to ensure that Colombian officials stand by their word and allow them to have proper representation in the government. They want to be able to project their voice as well as ensure there is no corruption in redistributing the former FARC territory. It is less likely for a

majority of FARC to fall back into the life of crime by joining the BACRIM, however, it is possible for a few members that fail to reintegrate to move back into the lives of crime.

We approached the Colombian government's perspective by looking at relevant measures like the homicide rate, presence in standing military, and relations with the United States. The first referendum of the peace agreement failed with a majority voting no. The failure of the peace process came as a shock but with the push for peace by Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos and FARC leadership the peace deal was approved in December of 2016. President Santos won the Nobel Peace Prize and his approval rate increased. This increase would prove beneficial with the United States. The United States will most likely maintain bilateral relations with Colombia and the high approval rate with the current administration can help influence nearby countries in South America.

Colombia will need to maintain the steady financial aid from the United States to combat the armed groups as they attempt to move into formerly owned FARC territory. The Colombian government needs to be present in the FARC territories in order to prevent criminals from moving in. The military presence can also act as protection for the local population. The military can be used for guarding when officials come in to establish an economy and educational programs for the rural areas of Colombia. The Colombian military's presence can aid in destroying the coca crops and government programs can provide resources for farmers to begin planting new crops in the area.

In *Analytic Culture in the US Intelligence Community* Dr. Rob Johnston suggests that Red Team Analysis should be conducted by specially constructed groups including members with experience living in the culture of discussion. There should also be anthropologists, economic analysts, scientists, engineers, historians, political scientist, military representatives, etc. Those involved in the Red Team analysis should know the culture's religion, beliefs, and morals exceptionally well for the most effective analytic exercise. Cultural diversity is the best way to work at overcoming ethnocentrism. Although no one on our team has lived in Colombia, or even visited for that matter, we researched as much as possible to really put ourselves in the shoes of a Colombian, whether from the government, FARC, a BACRIM, or a rural village. The use of Red Team allowed us to take on new perspectives and mitigate mental fallacies like mirror imaging. The perspectives of FARC leadership, the Colombian government, and the armed groups in Colombia played an important role in our analytic process.

Appendix E: ArcMap Visualization

We used several visualization methods not only to convey our message to our audience, but to help us understand the issues more clearly. A strategy for doing so was using ArcMap technology. ArcMap is a visualization and analytic software developed by Esri GIS. A key use for ArcMap was mapping out where populations who voted "No" in the initial referendum are located. This is critical to showing where Colombian populations who put up opposition to the integration of FARC members into society are located, and critical areas that might need more attention by both the UN and Colombian government during the demobilization process. We overlaid these areas with the largest cities in Colombia to do a comparison of where large populations are, and where the "no" voters are located.

In order to create our map using ArcMap, an Esri GIS software, we first had to go on campus to use the computers with ArcMap software. We then ran into several challenges finding datasets and shapefiles that would help us reach our conclusion.

We were able to find the shapefiles we wanted to use on ArcGIS Online, and online version of ArcMap by Esri. We were able to find three helpful files. We ran into some initial difficulty as many of the descriptions about the files were in Spanish, but Kayla's fluency in Spanish was a huge help. We ended up choosing three separate files. The first file was a distribution of Colombian areas known to be under the influence or control of the FARC. The second file was a distribution of how Colombian citizens voted, broken down by "Departments" (the Colombian equivalent of states or provinces). This breakdown showed which departments voted "Si" (yes) for the peace deal with the FARC, and which departments voted "No." Lastly we found a file that mapped many of the larger cities in Colombia (Bogotá, Cali, Medellín, Cartagena, etc.). We then overlaid all of these files on top of each other. This layover enabled us to see what areas in Colombia had a high presence of FARC and how those areas voted on the plebiscite for peace. This was a very crucial tool for us in seeing how the different demographics of the country felt about the initial peace deal that was proposed. Overlaying it with the major cities in the country was a useful way in comparing the urban densely populated areas to the rural countryside where FARC has a strong presence and influence.

We also looked into making another map depicting where the demobilization camps in Colombia were located to give us a better sense of how far the FARC members would have to travel and where they would be located for roughly the next six months. Unfortunately we were unable to find such data, as we believe it may be a security risk. Our map is featured on the cover page of this project package.

Appendix F: Netlytic

Netlytic was the next method we attempted to use in our analysis. Netlytic is a social network analysis and visualization tool that collects data from social networking websites such as twitter to get a sense of how the general public is reacting to the changes taking place in near real time. By taking actual data from citizens in Colombia we attempted to get a better understanding of some of the sentiments and opinions that those most affected by the peace deal have. Public opinion will have a huge impact on the success of the peace negotiations, so by looking at the public opinion we collect we hoped to generate more accurate analysis.

Netlytic was not as helpful as we had initially hoped it would be, as there were several issues we ran into while implementing this technology. We first logged into Netlytic and linked our account to one of our Twitter accounts. We then went to the "New Dataset" tab on the Netlytic website to start a new search with parameters based on our question. We named our new dataset, and entered in key search terms we agreed would give us the type of information we wanted. We entered key terms such as "FARC" "peace" "demobilize" and "Juan Manuel Santos". We also narrowed down the geographic parameters of the search to ensure we were only getting posts or information from Colombian citizens, and not the international community. We narrowed down the parameters so it would only collect tweets "near: 'Colombia' within: 15 miles." Lastly we

enabled data to be collected from our linked Twitter account every 15 minutes, for the next 7 days. We hoped this would give us a decent amount of time to collect a sizable sample group of “tweets” or posts. Once collection began we waited the 7 days for it to finish, and then checked to evaluate our sample.


Unfortunately once our sample was collected we ran into issues. First, the Netlytic search was only able to collect 7 separate tweets, giving us an extremely small sample size to work with. In total our collected posts only had 43 unique words, meaning a majority of the words were considered “popular topics” due to the frequency algorithm Netlytic employs, and the lack of a large sample size with many more unique words. We created a “Words Cloud” on Netlytic to show the “popular topics.” Our Words Cloud displayed a minimum of 30 words, meaning almost every word from the tweets was used. The most frequent word also only appeared three times, the next most popular two times, and every other word once. A final problem we ran into with Netlytic was all of the posts that we got back were in Spanish. This ended up not being a huge problem as Netlytic has a built in translator and Kayla was able to help translate the connotations and meanings behind many of the words. Ultimately Netlytic was not helpful in reaching our analytic conclusions.

Appendix G: Semantica Pro

Semantica Pro is a data and network analysis software. This software, much like analyst notebook, allowed us to create networks, or webs, of the many different factors involved in the Colombian peace process. We utilized this software in order to map out how the many different factors are inter connected, and show the intricacy of the situation. This was helpful in looking at the broader picture and seeing how outside influences such as the Department of Defense and United Nations are involved in the process. Below is a picture of the overall network we created.

In order to create our web we first made a list of all the relevant factors/actors we found in our analysis. We broke these factors down into entity types such as “Assets”, “Groups”, “Governments”, etc. We put all of our actors into the categories, and then started making our web. When connecting all of our factors together when then had to label how they were related. This can be seen in the connections between factors on our web. Lastly we changed to icons of each factor to the most appropriate icon we could find. This was more for aesthetic appeal and to make our web look more professional, but it helped us identify factors faster when using our map to compare groups or factors later on in our analysis.

When we were finished with our map we used to it look at the overall influence different factors, groups, and assets had on each other. This was helpful in the beginning of our analysis because it allowed us to take on larger view of everything involved in our situation/problem. This gave us a better idea of what we were dealing with and how everything was so interrelated before we started our full analysis.



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Appendix H: International Relations Theories Helpful When Analyzing the Colombian Peace Process

Kayla Graves

International Relations theories are helpful to students insofar as they help break down complex problems and make apparent the reasoning for choosing one analytic approach over another. In *Thinking about IR Theory*, Paul Viotti and Mark Kauppi introduce IR theory as “not just what is studied, but how it is studied.”⁵⁷ IR theories provide multiple frameworks to reorient the way in which students analyze problems and arrive at conclusions; or they at least provide a means for thinking about *how* any given problem is being studied. IR theories are especially helpful in the process of Intelligence Analysis. Many IR theories can be applied to develop thinking during the implementation of four key analytic tasks: hypothesis testing, causal analysis, counterfactual reasoning, and strategy assessment.

The four key analytic tasks are derived from a unique approach to critical thinking in Intelligence Analysis. In *Critical Thinking in Intelligence Analysis*, Noel Hendrickson offers four procedures to help analysts overcome cognitive challenges and the problems of data insufficiency, irrelevancy, indeterminacy, and instrumentality.⁵⁸ The first procedure or key analytic task, hypothesis testing, answers the question, what happened? The second key analytic task answers the question, why did it happen? Answering this question allows the analyst to evaluate the relevance of factors driving the situational dynamics. The third key analytic task, counterfactual reasoning or futures analysis, answers the question, what could happen? Counterfactual reasoning offers the analyst a structured framework for thinking about the future. The fourth and final key analytic task, strategy assessment, answers the question, what can be done about it? Strategy assessment ensures the analyst is on target to provide well-justified conclusions and insights to decision makers. Sequentially these key analytic tasks drive the entire analytic process.

A current, complex issue particularly well-suited to analysis through the key task and IR theory is the Colombian peace process. Colombia and Las Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia), or FARC, have signed a peace treaty to bring an end to 52 years of civil unrest in the country. Outlooks for the peace process are muddled by the multiple actors with conflicting interests involved and the many variables and factors at play. In the first stage of analysis, hypothesis testing, IR theories presented in Graham Allison's *Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis* and Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall's *Power in International Politics* aid in generating and evaluating multiple hypotheses about the peace process at present. In the second stage, causal analysis, theories from Kenneth Waltz's *Explaining War: The Levels of Analysis*, Robert Putnam's *Diplomacy and domestic politics: the logic of two level games*, and Daniel Byman and Kenneth Pollack's *Now Let Us Praise Great Men: Bringing the Statesman Back In* allow deeper consideration of the underlying causal factors influencing the peace process and the plurality of actors involved. The third stage of counterfactual reasoning is best applied with help from Robert Jervis's *Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma* and Benjamin Barber's *Jihad vs. McWorld* theories. The fourth and last stage of analysis, strategy assessment, benefits from attention to theories from Caroline Hartzell and Matthew Hoddie's *Institutionalizing Peace: Power Sharing and Post-Civil War Conflict Management* and Robert Jervis's *Hypotheses on Misperception*. Together, these IR theories applied during the analysis process help break down the complexity of the Colombian situation and guide a more holistic understanding of the problem at hand.

Hypothesis Testing

The first major analytic task is hypothesis generation and hypothesis testing. Hypothesis generation and hypothesis testing build a base for the entire analysis. Hypothesis testing techniques include key assumptions checks and analysis of competing hypotheses. IR theories help facilitate the task of generating and testing hypotheses.

To begin, Graham Allison introduces three theoretical models in *Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis* that an analyst can use to break down thinking about the Colombian peace

process and arrive at multiple hypotheses. As Allison explains, in breaking down complex problems conceptual models help guide analysis and close information gaps: “Conceptual models both fix the mesh of the nets that the analyst drags through the material in order to explain a particular action or decision and direct him to cast his net in select ponds, at certain depths, in order to catch the fish he is after.”⁵⁹ Closing the existing information gaps is the first step any analyst should take when thinking about a problem. The analyst may ask him/herself, what do I already know? What do I need to know? What does my decisionmaker or client need to know? These questions guide the analytic process that follows. To summarize Allison’s theory, the Rational Policy Model, the Organizational Process Model, and the Bureaucratic Politics Model may correctly explain what happened during the Cuban Missile Crisis. Likewise, we can use each of the three models to think about the Colombian peace process. Model I, the Rational Policy Model, explains how states act as “unitary, rational decisionmaker”(s). Model II, the Organizational Process Model, acknowledges that governments are made up of several sub-organizations, in which decisions are made “less as deliberate choices of leaders and more as outputs of large organizations functioning according to standard patterns of behavior”. Model III, the last model known as the Bureaucratic Politics Model, goes even farther to discuss the “bargaining games” among leaders from all different divisions of government authority. In this model there are many decisionmakers, arguing and compromising, sharing power, to arrive at “intra-national political outcomes.” These three models force analysts to generate alternative hypotheses according to Rational Policy, Organizational Process, and Bureaucratic Politics. Hypotheses are foundational to the analytic process and they serve as stand-alone judgements about the current situation. Hypotheses should not be “guesses” but they should be evidence-supported and informed according to applied IR theory.

Allison’s conceptual models theory is helpful when generating hypotheses about the Colombian peace process. We can think about decision-making and direction in the Colombian peace process in three distinct ways, arriving at multiple hypotheses within each model. With respect to the Rational Policy model, Colombia can be conceived as a “unified” and “rational” decisionmaker. In the peace process, the Colombian government, as a sum of all its branches and supporting organizations, and FARC have come together to act as one Colombia and make decisions in the best interest of the country. Juan Manuel Santos, the current Colombian president, stands as the chief decision maker in Model I. In the Organizational Process Model, an analyst may begin to form hypotheses about Colombia generally, thinking broadly about Colombia as a whole rather than a sum of its individual parts. However, an analyst must also think about the separate governmental branches, organizations, and sub-organizations under the Santos administrations. The many branches and organizations have their own demands, interests, and agendas. Certain organizations have a notably stronger pull on decision making at the “Rational Policy” level. There are also great differences in the interests of districts within Colombia to be accounted for in hypothesis generation. For example, in the most densely populated district within Colombia, Bogotá, citizens mostly support the peace process but in more rural districts like Boyacá and Cauca citizens are less likely to understand the implications of the peace process and support it. Following the Organizational Process Model II, each of these considerations should be brought into the analytical discussion as a set of hypotheses. Finally, in

the Bureaucratic Politics Model, details of the “bargaining games” among leaders in each of the previously mentioned governmental divisions are analyzed. These “bargaining games” constitute a push and pull dynamic between the many interests groups involved in the Colombian peace process and decision makers at the “Rational Policy” level. At this point, hypotheses may come into conflict with one another and hypothesis testing should be utilized to arrive at the “best” judgement. One way of doing this is through a structured analytic technique known as Analysis of Competing Hypotheses or ACH.

Another IR theory that proves itself useful in hypothesis generation and testing is introduced in *Power in International Politics*. Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall argue that students and scholars of International Relations should give more attention to analyzing power in all of its forms: compulsory, institutional, structural, and productive.⁶⁰ Intelligence analysts can benefit from analyzing these power forms in breaking down complex problems as well. Traditionally, when power is mentioned in an International Relations context it is in the compulsory form meaning that one state uses its power to control what another state does, regardless of the other state’s will. The compulsory form of power bring rise to one set of hypotheses while institutional, structural, and productive forms bring rise to others. When we refer to compulsory power we are referring to *direct* control of one actor over another. Most initial hypotheses will fall within this power form but overall analysis is advantaged if hypotheses in the other forms are generated as well. Institutional power, on the other hand, is the *indirect* control of one actor over another. Institutions or actors use rules, procedures, and resources to influence situational outcomes. Structural power is explained in terms of social capacities and interests inherent in any rigid relationship. Barnett and Duvall give the examples of capital-labor and master-slave relations. Like the structural power form, productive power is informed by social processes. However, unlike structural power productive power does not entail direct relationships.

The application of all four power forms to Colombia produces interesting insights that may have otherwise been overlooked without IR theory to guide the hypothesis generation and testing task. Beyond the compulsory form, institutional, structural, and productive power forms all lead the analyst to think more deeply about the ways in which a situation may play out. The power forms introduced by Barnett and Duval explain why situations do not always play out the way we would have initially expected them to. Within Colombia, the government is expected to have direct control over all its districts and municipalities. With this assumption, an analyst may generate hypotheses according to the compulsory form of power. Yet moving on to the institutional power form, there is more to consider. Colombia also controls its districts and municipalities in indirect ways, through resource allocation, social programs, and security initiatives. The structural and productive power forms allow an analyst to think about all actors influencing the push and pull between Colombia and its districts and municipalities. Various political movements and political parties, security and defense forces, FARC, ELN, and BACRIMs should not be overlooked during the hypothesis generation and testing task. Interplay between the specific IR frameworks mentioned here and hypothesis testing as an analytic task provides a solid grounding for the next step in analyzing the Colombian peace process.

Causal Analysis

The next major analytical task involves identifying and explaining the behavior of underlying situational dynamics, or circumstantial *causes*. IR theories give analysts different, well-structured ways of thinking about causation.

To start with best-suited theory for causal analysis, Kenneth Waltz's *Explaining War: The Levels of Analysis* helps analysts considerably in thinking about problems from multiple perspectives or "images".⁶¹ Waltz outlines three levels of analysis—the first image: international conflict and human behavior, the second image: international conflict and the internal structure of states, and the third image: international conflict and international anarchy. Each image builds outward. The first image asserts that war is rooted in man's aggressive behavior, down to the individual level. The second image holds that human nature (this aggressive behavior) explains many things—not just war, so there must be another factor. A state's organization promotes or demotes its internal unity and consequently, the likelihood of war. Finally, the third image discusses the international system's disposition to anarchy, irrationality, and war. An analyst should not take strictly one image though, as to limit his or her understanding of the issue but rather combine all three images for a much deeper understanding: "So fundamental are man, the state, and the state system in any attempt to understand international relations that seldom does an analyst, however wedded to one image, entirely overlook the other two. Still, emphasis on one image may distort one's interpretation of the others" (Waltz). The best causal analysis considers all three images or levels.

Consequently, causal analysis of the Colombian peace process according to all three of Waltz's images is in order. Application of Waltz's images to the Colombian situation is especially well suited because "to explain how peace can be more readily achieved requires an understanding of the causes of war."⁶² We will start here with an analysis of the *causes* of the Colombian civil war according to each image. On the individual level, Latin America's longest-running civil war is caused by man's natural aggressive behavior. Aggressive behavior is reflected in the high levels of violence within Colombia. When FARC formed in 1964, an estimated 50 percent of Colombians lived in poverty.⁶³ FARC's objectives were to bring awareness of the widespread poverty into politics, advocate for equality for rural Colombian citizens, and to provide healthcare and education to those without access. However, without the funds and resources needed for such ambitious goals, FARC turned to numerous illicit activities including cocaine trade, extortion, and kidnapping for ransom to make money. FARC created many enemies along the way. With conflicting interests, human nature toward aggressive behavior has wreaked havoc in Colombia leading to the deaths of more than 220,000 and displacement of 7 million.⁶⁴ On the state-level, Colombia is significantly divided and has not stood as a "unified" actor in the past. Even in regards to the most recent peace negotiations, the 2 October 2016 peace agreement referendum failed with 50.2 percent of Colombian votes against it and 49.8 percent of votes in favor of it.⁶⁵ More recently, Colombian Congress passed re-negotiated terms to the peace treaty⁶⁶ but opposition to the peace process within Colombia remains. Following Waltz's second image, the limits on state organization and disunity between Colombia and FARC could promote the continuance of war in Colombia. The prospects of the current peace agreement are directed toward re-organizing the state in a way that Colombia and FARC can work together, making

lasting peace more likely. The last image to address deals with international anarchy. Aside from Venezuela's previous support for FARC⁶⁷, Colombia's conflict is domestic. Yet this does not mean external pressures should be excluded in analysis. States providing aid to Colombia must be considered, as well as, neighboring South American countries, and diplomatic partnerships worldwide. Our capstone discusses implications specifically for the US following causal analysis of the peace process under the heading "US- Colombian Relations Likely to Remain Strong During the Peace Process".

Robert Putnam's *Diplomacy and domestic politics: the logic of two level games* also helps when analyzing the complex Colombian situation from multiple levels during causal analysis. Putnam analyzes the "puzzling tangle" of domestic politics and international relations.⁶⁸ His conclusion is neither that domestic politics influence international relations or that international relations influence domestic politics. Instead, domestic politics and international relations influence each other, simultaneously. Putnam's argument captures the justification behind causal loop diagramming, a technique often applied in causal analysis. Causal loop diagramming is an attempt to break down any "puzzling tangle" of factors by mapping out each factor and its relationship to other factors.

Putnam offers the two-level game as a metaphor in understanding international negotiations. On level one, the national level, governments weigh (and act in favor of or against) the interests of various domestic groups seeking political influence. On level two, the international level, governments satisfy domestic pressures to the extent that they do not cause adverse foreign developments. Putnam emphasizes "The political complexities for the players in this two-level game are staggering. Any key player at the international table who is dissatisfied with the outcome may upset the game board, and conversely, any leader who fails to satisfy his fellow players at the domestic table risks being evicted from his seat". Factors influencing the balance between these two levels are dynamic. Therefore, breaking down domestic politics and international relations into two-level games helps make apparent the factors driving each and can then help an analyst better understand the "puzzling tangle".

Two-level games have much utility when applied to the "puzzling tangle" that is the Colombian peace process. Putnam's theory allows analysts to identify and isolate the most relevant factors in the peace process on the domestic and international levels. Proving its value, two-level games theory has been applied to Colombia previously albeit in a different context. Victor J. Hinojosa's *Two Level Games and International Narcotics Control: Cooperation between the United States, Mexico, and Colombia, 1977-2000* looks at Colombia on level one in regards to its various drug trafficking organizations and on level two in regards to US-Colombian relations in the years leading up to the implementation of Plan Colombia.⁶⁹ The ramifications of Colombia's drug market on US-Colombian relations is still a relevant topic to consider but it is different in scope from the Colombian peace process topic. For our purposes in applying two-level game theory to the Colombian peace process, level one represents discussions held within the opposing groups and level two negotiations are the official negotiations between the opposing groups. At level one, FARC must consider the thoughts, opinions, and intentions of all members. Members are not standard. There is a military branch and a political branch within FARC. FARC's Central High

Command, consists of 25 political leaders. Militarily, FARC has several operational regions throughout Colombia consisting of blocs. Within a bloc, there are five or more fronts. Within a front there is one or more columns. Within a column, there are two or more companies, each consisting of ~50 guerrillas.⁷⁰ Current concerns of these guerrillas are how to transition into society; how to find jobs; how to maintain a sense of security after disarmament. FARC guerrillas that have been charged in relation to the civil conflict are asking for amnesty before agreeing to peace terms. These and many other concerns are deliberated at level one with “Timochenko” Rodrigo Londoño, FARC’s lead negotiator. On the other hand, the Colombian government is pulled in many ways by support for the peace process and opposition to the peace process. The Colombian government must consider how to protect both urban and rural citizens, wealthy land owners and the poor, farmers and businesses. On level two, FARC and Colombia must bring their individual sides of discussion into the negotiations to reach final agreements. There are demands for agrarian land reform, coca reduction, political representation, and reparations for victims of the conflict.⁷¹ Through Putnam’s two-level games, the numerous and often conflicting factors driving decision-making in the Colombian peace process become more apparent.

Thus far in our causal analysis we have considered factors influencing the international system, individual countries, organizations, and groups. Another theory from Daniel Byman and Kenneth Pollack in *Now Let Us Praise Great Men: Bringing the Statesman Back In* allows us to analyze factors influencing individuals. Here, Byman and Pollack make a case for the importance of individuals in International Relations. The authors build an argument for bringing personality analysis into International Relations Studies where other scholars and political scientists have failed to do so. Historical cases of individual leaders shaping international relations include “Germany under Hitler, the contrasting the contrasting impact of Chancellor Otto von Bismarck and Kaiser Wilhelm II on European politics, France under Napoleon Bonaparte, a comparison of Iraq under Saddam Hussein and Syria under Hafiz al-Asad, and the behavior of Iran in its war with Iraq under Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini.”⁷² Byman and Pollack conclude by saying that “Giants still walk the earth” (145). These “giants” are the key decision makers and personalities shaping international relations today. In understanding today’s complex problems, analysts can benefit from taking Byman and Pollack’s advice to “rescue men and women, as individuals, from the oblivion to which political scientists have consigned them” (109). An individual level analysis contributes to greater understanding on all other levels of analysis previously discussed. Leaders, as individual personalities, are too significant in International Relations to exclude from causal analysis.

Byman and Pollack’s individual level analysis is especially helpful in further breaking down the Colombian peace process. It is noted, “Individuals also shape many of the drivers identified by other theorists, such as the balance of power, domestic opinion, and bureaucratic politics. These paradigms suffer when individuals are ignored” (146). Therefore, causal analysis at the individual level also strengthens the application of other theories mentioned in this paper. Personalities worth analyzing at the individual level in the Colombian peace process include Colombian president Juan Manuel Santos, FARC’s leader Rodrigo Londoño Echeverri (known as Timochenko), FARC’s lead negotiator Ivan Marques, the leader of Colombia’s peace

negotiation team Humberto de la Calle, and the former Colombian president now leading the opposition against the peace terms Alvaro Uribe. An analyst might ask how “risk-tolerant” are each of these leaders? How delusion or predictable are these leaders? What kinds of visions do these leaders hold? How concentrated or dispersed is power in the Colombian peace process? How fluid are the circumstances in this situation? In what ways have these leaders (individually) influenced the second image? In what ways have they influenced the third image? Are these aligned? To become a subject matter expert (SME) in personality analysis an analyst could benefit from studies in political psychology. Nevertheless, at the surface level events and decisions can portray many insights about individual leaders’ personalities. For example, Juan Manuel Santos won the Nobel Peace Prize in 2016 for his efforts in ending the Colombian civil war and bringing an era of peace. In his acceptance speech he remarked, “I have served as a leader in times of war, (and) from my own experience, it is much harder to make peace than to wage war.”⁷³ From his actions during his terms in office, we can conclude Santos is somewhat risk-tolerant in deciding to enter peace negotiations with the country’s largest guerilla group. He has also been very predicable in his actions. He has followed an outline for the peace process very closely. His immediate vision is for Colombia to transition successfully from conflict to peace. His overarching vision is that Colombia will become unified and more successful militarily, politically, economically, and diplomatically as a result. Power in the negotiations was moderately concentrated to Santos. Finally, Santos’ determination to pass the peace treaty greatly influenced the second image, and by extension the third image. Different facts can be noted about each of the main “personalities” in the peace process. Identifying the most important decision makers and thinking about the factors influencing them is an important step in causal analysis that should not be overlooked. Byman and Pollack’s theory provides a well-organized framework for doing so.

Counterfactual Reasoning

Counterfactual reasoning is the next analytical task that involves thinking about the near future and how any given situation might develop. Approaches to counterfactual reasoning, also known as futures analysis, include trend identification, “what if” analysis, and scenario generation. IR theories offer analysts effective means of thinking about the future and approaching counterfactual reasoning.

Robert Jervis’s *Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma*, while focused on the international system, can still be applied to the Colombian peace process internally to analyze the concept of cooperation. In his work, Jervis asks what makes cooperation possible in a world of anarchy?⁷⁴ He begins by explaining Rousseau’s “Stag Hunt” in which men can choose to cooperate for the mutual gain of a stag by entrapping it together, or refuse to cooperate in chasing individual rabbits, leading to an outcome of lesser preference. Jervis argues states behave much like the men in Rousseau’s “Stag Hunt” and they must constantly question the cooperation of other players (states) involved. The two main variables that determine “what makes cooperation more likely” are the offensive/defensive balance and the ability to distinguish between offensive and defensive postures. These variables intersect to form four possible strategic environments in the security dilemma. States do have the ability to influence these variables. Jervis continues, there

are some way to adjust factors making cooperation more likely—for example, “increase the gains that will accrue to the other from mutual cooperation”, “lower the other's incentives to defect”, and “convince the other that it thinks that the other is likely to cooperate”. In doing so, states may be able to cooperate in a world of anarchy. In his own theory Jervis creates a matrix similar to that any an analyst would create in a scenario generation exercise. Jervis’s scenarios are in fact hypothetical constructs about future environments.

The theory introduced in Jervis’s *Security Dilemma* has been applied to the Colombian conflict previously. Veronique Dudouet, Hans J. Giessmann, and Katrin Planta “shed light on the nature of the security dilemma during the transition processes after war.”⁷⁵ However, as the two sides most directly involved with the Colombian peace process are domestic in Colombia—as opposed to neighboring states, the current Colombian administration and FARC represent the security dilemma dynamic in this case. Cooperation, between FARC and Colombia, will be absolutely necessary for a successful transition to peace for the country. Both sides seek peace but this peace may be difficult to achieve in actuality. A point raised by Jervis is that sometimes even shared objectives are unattainable: “although actors may know that they seek a common goal, they may not be able to reach it.” At the control of Colombian forces during the process of demobilization, disarmament, and reintegration (DDR) former FARC rebels may feel vulnerable to exploitation, in turn making them less likely to cooperate. This has happened in the past. There were three failed attempts at negotiations between Colombia and FARC between 1982 and 2002.⁷⁶ In 1984 then Colombian President Belisario Betancur opened peace negotiations with FARC resulting in the signing of the *Uribe Accord* later the same year. Following the *Uribe Accord* FARC formed a leftist political party known as the Union Patriótica (Patriotic Union) and was able to gain seats in Colombian Congress. Still, Union Patriótica faced more opposition than support both inside Congress and out from important economic groups, and the military. In 1987, the situation worsened. 3,000 members of the Patriotic Union were murdered by death squads and paramilitaries. Camilo Gonzalez Posso iterates, “It would have a significant impact on the dynamics of the conflict, increasing the FARC’s skepticism of politics and negotiations as an alternative to the armed struggle, and resulting in a shift in the balance between the political and military wings of the organization.”⁷⁷ According to Jervis, “The fear of being exploited [...] most strongly drives the security dilemma.”⁷⁸ FARC, in its political representation Patriotic Union, has been exploited in the past and still fears the possibility of its reoccurrence now. The security dilemma presents itself as the offensive/defensive posture becomes unbalanced. FARC has agreed to disarm, thereby reducing both offensive and defensive capabilities. What this means for the Colombian peace process is that there is more to be gained—enduring peace—with cooperation from both sides.

Thinking about outcomes of the Colombian peace process from the perspective of the security dilemma raises important considerations for analysts. How could the peace process go wrong? How could the peace process go right? These questions require forward thinking and counterfactual reasoning. The security dilemma has major implications for the future of the Colombian peace process and is therefore a critical element of analysis. Our capstone project

includes a discussion of outlooks for the Colombian peace process and scenarios generated to help explain how the process may develop in the *Scenario Generation* appendix.

Another IR theory helpful in counterfactual reasoning is Benjamin Barber's *Jihad vs. McWorld*. This theory presents many interesting ideas about future scenarios. In *Jihad vs. McWorld* Barber discusses two forces pulling International Relations in opposite directions: the Jihad, representing ethnic, cultural, and ideological divisions, and the McWorld, representing globalization in technology and media and commercialization. Globalization theory, as introduced in Viotti and Kauppi's Chapter 2 on Realism, is the process through which the world system is becoming ever more connected economically, technologically, politically, and culturally. Globalization drives the McWorld.⁷⁹ In this simultaneous push/pull on states, the international system is driven to anarchy.⁸⁰

The Jihad vs. McWorld theory is broadly applicable to Colombia and should at least be considered in any counterfactual reasoning about the future of the peace process. Within Colombia, both the Jihad and the McWorld forces are present and weigh on decision-making and policy. The ethnic, cultural, and ideological divisions are important to FARC and make up the essence of being Colombian. In the past, FARC has pushed for Colombia to return to its "jihad" with minimal foreign involvement.⁸¹ The Colombian government, on the other hand, has pushed toward McWorld, connecting Colombia to other states in the international system economically, politically, and militarily. Augusto Ramírez Ocampo with Conciliation Resources believes international support (or McWorld) will be necessary for Colombia's peace process to be successful.⁸² Barber's theory offers analysts a way to think about the future in which the peace process gravitates toward either of these extremes.

Strategy Assessment

The final analytic task is strategy assessment in which the analyst considers threats and opportunities for the decision maker or client. Strategy assessments analyze existing or planned strategies and evaluate the likelihood of desired outcome under given strategy. Strategy assessment techniques include policy analysis, strategic warning, and complex environment analysis. IR theories help analysts think about how desired outcomes can most readily be achieved.

In *Hypotheses on Misperception* Robert Jervis introduces many ways in which individuals may misunderstand other states' intentions. Misunderstood intentions can lead to misguided strategy; therefore, this IR theory is especially applicable in strategy assessment. Certain IR theories and models fall short in predicting real-world events. Jervis's hypotheses on misperception play into inherent human bias. Fourteen hypotheses deal with how information, messages, and intentions are perceived or misperceived between decisionmakers at any level.⁸³ Generally speaking, how decisionmakers perceive incoming information (about other states) depends on their existing theories and images. Decisionmakers tend to assume that their messages and intentions are well understood by others. Decisionmakers tend to view other states as more hostile than they are and forget that evidence can support more than one view. In knowing how decisionmakers misperceive international relations, an analyst can be cautious not to do the same. Even though

previous theories have built a solid framework for breaking down complex problems, misperceptions could undermine their utility.

Jervis' hypotheses are applicable to counterfactual reasoning in the Colombian peace process. When analyzing the negotiation process between Colombia and FARC, there are likely misperceptions on both sides of the table. Jervis' hypothesis 8 states "there is an overall tendency for decision-makers to see other states as more hostile than they are" (475). Historically, Colombia and FARC have had a difficult time trusting one another. In the process of disarming, exFARC rebels must overcome their fear about the hostility of Colombia. Similarly, Colombia's defense and security sectors are scaled to the threat *perceived* from FARC and must re-scale in the post-conflict context. Hypothesis 9 hold that "actors tend to see the behavior of others as more centralized, disciplined, and coordinated than it is" (475). This hypothesis is significant when thinking about how the various factions of FARC will respond to finalized peace agreements. Certain factions of FARC may splinter away and refuse to follow the terms outlined in the treaty. Perhaps the Colombian government has misperceived the power FARC leaders have over the individual fronts and guerilla companies. Hypothesis 12 follows, "when actors have intentions that they do not try to conceal from others, they tend to assume that others accurately perceive these intentions" (477). As a criminal organization, FARC operated with denial and deception toward the Colombian government. There was an intentional effort to conceal intentions involving coca growing, cocaine production, cocaine trafficking, illicit gold mining, and kidnapping. Now, following final peace agreements, Colombia and FARC have promised to be open with one another. As FARC makes the transition from concealed intent to open intent, they will assume Colombia accurately perceives their actions. However, it may not be that simple. An awareness and understanding of these misperceptions may help can help guide strategy assessment and strategy planning.

Moving on to theory about the end of conflict, Caroline Hartzell and Matthew Hoddie explore what makes peace last following negotiated settlements in *Institutionalizing Peace: Power Sharing and Post-Civil War Conflict Management*.⁸⁴ Strategy to establish enduring peace within Colombia may be informed through ideas presented in this IR theory. Hartzell and Hoddie employ statistical methodology of data on previously resolved civil conflicts through negotiated settlements to arrive at the conclusion that the more dimensions of power sharing established in a peace agreement, the more likely peace will endure. There are many forms (or dimensions) of power sharing including political, territorial, military, and economic forms. A peace negotiation that addresses power-sharing among all four of these dimensions is more likely to be successful and lasting than a negotiation that only addresses one or two of the dimensions. Far too often, states make agreements on the most pressing issues following civil conflict, but neglect other dimensions. Over time, dimensions that went unaddressed may become problematic once again. Likewise, analysts sometimes break down only one dimension of the issue at hand. Analytical approaches like PEST—political, economic, social, technological or STEEMP—social, technological, economic, environmental, military, and political encourage analysts to think through many aspects of the issue. Hartzell and Hoddie are making a similar suggestion that

analysts should think about power-sharing in a post conflict context across many dimensions, namely the political, territorial, military, and economic dimensions.

Hartzell and Hoddie's post-conflict power sharing theory is perhaps the most relevant theory to strategy assessment given its timeliness at this stage of the Colombian peace process. Hartzell and Hoddie put forth several hypotheses on how power sharing institutions (and terms in peace treaties) might best be designed to stabilize the transition from conflict to peace. An analysis of the power-sharing dimensions addressed in the "Acuerdo Final" or the "Final Agreement for the end of conflict and the construction of a stable and durable peace" and application of the proposed hypotheses gives a more robust understanding of Colombia's post-conflict transition and its implications moving forward. Hypothesis 1 states "The more extensive the power-sharing arrangements called for in a negotiated civil war settlement, the more likely it is that the peace will endure in the long run" build on the underlying assumption that "the greater the number of dimensions of state power that any one group is prevented from dominating, the more secure other parties are likely to feel and as a result remain committed to the maintenance of peace" (322). The Acuerdo Final⁸⁵ includes power-sharing arrangements in the political dimension as FARC is guaranteed at a minimum 5 seats in the Colombian Senate and five in the lower chamber through the creation of new voting districts.⁸⁶ Along the territorial dimension, FARC has agreed to give up its power in certain rural districts to permit the democratic governance once again. Other territorial agreements have established that FARC will work with Colombia in agrarian land reform—including providing coca crop alternatives to farmers. Along the military dimension, exFARC rebels are in the process of disarming at peace camps set up by the UN. FARC and Colombia will not use military force against one another. Finally, according to the economic dimension, FARC's assets will be used to repay victims and victims' families of the violence. FARC, as a political group, cannot use any assets or monetary funds gained during the conflict to advance their political agenda. Hypothesis 3 holds that "Wars of long duration should increase the likelihood that parties will commit to an enduring peace". This hypothesis suggests Colombia should arrive at enduring peace given the determination of both sides to do so following 52 years of civil conflict—Latin America's longest running civil war. Yet, hypothesis 4 actually contradicts lasting peace in Colombia: "Settlements of civil wars characterized by high casualty rates are unlikely to yield a durable peace". Colombia's National Centre of Historical Memory has found that more than 220,000 people have died in Colombia's civil conflict since 1958.⁸⁷ Hypothesis 5 follows, "Settlements that call for third-party enforcement are more likely to produce a durable peace than those that make no provision for enforcement by third-party actors." At the beginning of the peace process in 2012, Colombia's peace talks were facilitated in Cuba. Today the United Nations Security Council has become involved in Colombia with "commitment to supporting implementation of the ceasefire agreement, cessation of hostilities and the laying down of arms".⁸⁸ Thus the UN's third-party enforcement falls mostly within the demobilization and disarmament stage of the peace process. Additionally, the UN Peacebuilding Fund will give \$3 million to Colombia in efforts of establishing last peace. With the exception of hypothesis 4, Hartzell and Hoddie's hypotheses suggests that Colombia's strategy for ending conflict is likely to create stable and lasting peace within the country. Our capstone creates a compelling argument for this conclusion.

Limitations

Many IR theories support the process of analyzing the Colombian peace process but others do not. Several theories add knowledge to the area of International Relations studies but were not incorporated to the analytic tasks here. Certain theories are too broad to fit within one individual analytic task while others are off topic for this question. In breaking down complex problems, an analyst should always begin by determining which IR theories are best suited to the question and the task. Whereas, well suited IR theories simplify the analysis, ill suit theories could complicate or distort the analysis.

Stuart Kaufman's *Fragmentation and Consolidation of International Systems* theory seems too broad for application to the Colombian peace process. In his theory, Kaufman lays out four hypotheses to explain how states expand to consolidate power and fragment to disperse power over time.⁸⁹ His first hypothesis is that stronger states have incentive to overpower weak ones. His second hypothesis is that economic interdependence promotes cycles of system consolidation and fragmentation overtime. The third hypothesis acknowledges that principles of unit identity determine the types of units in the international systems. Empires, nations, and proto-nations are provided as examples of these units. The last hypothesis is that unit size depends on the administrative technologies available. Kaufman's hypotheses might be useful when thinking about the historical fragmentation and consolidation of states in Latin America but it does not yield particularly valuable insights to the Colombian peace process.

Charles Glaser's *The Security Dilemma Revisited* expands Robert Jervis's theory from *Cooperation Under The Security Dilemma* by talking about rational state actors, "greedy" state actors, and states' knowledge of other states' motives.⁹⁰ Glaser's theory adds knowledge to the counterfactual reasoning task but it is largely repetitive so Jervis's theory was sufficient for the question. While groups within Colombia can be rational, greedy, and/or knowledgeable of groups' motives, Glaser's ideas in *The Security Dilemma Revisited* are best applied at the international level. Recalling that Jervis' *Security Dilemma* was applied to the Colombian peace process to help break down thinking about the problem, it was reframed to look inside Colombia and consider the Colombian government and FARC as the actors. The same might be done with Glaser's *Security Dilemma Revisited* but it would not add much to an analyst's understanding of the Colombian peace process beyond Jervis' theory.

Steven Metz introduces another interesting theory in *Rethinking Insurgency* but it is not suited to the analytic process given the current progression of the transition to peace. *Rethinking Insurgency* discusses successful and unsuccessful counterinsurgency strategies.⁹¹ Metz argues military and defense communities should reorient thinking about insurgencies from a Cold War era perspective to a post-Cold War period perspective in which "the dynamics of contemporary insurgency are more like a violent and competitive market than war in the traditional sense where clear and discrete combatants seek strategic victory." Metz makes several valid points that could be applied to the FARC insurgency from around 2000-2006 when FARC had the highest number of members and posed the greatest threat to the Colombian state.⁹² Now, however, FARC has lost members and influence and discussions in Colombia have shifted from

counterinsurgency strategy planning to ensuring the Colombian peace process is successful. Other theories, for example Hartzell and Hoddie's *Institutionalizing Peace: Power Sharing and Post-Civil War Conflict Management*, are most opportune to analysis at this stage of the peace process.

Another theory mismatched topically to the Colombian peace process is Benjamin Lessing's *The Logic of Violence in Criminal War*. Benjamin Lessing analyses conflict between states and criminal drug trafficking organizations.⁹³ In Colombia as recently as 2016 FARC controlled 70% of coca growing territory and was heavily involved in cocaine trafficking.⁹⁴ However, there is one main difference between "criminal war" and civil war that discounts FARC in the analysis. By definition, "criminal wars" are those in which the group opposing the state is not politically motivated or possess intentions of overthrowing or succeeding from the state. Lessing's theory then would apply to drug trafficking organizations such as Las Aguilas Negras, Los Rastrojos, and Los Urabeños but not to FARC. In the peace process, FARC's aim to gain seat in Congress and political voice makes apparent *The Logic of Violence in Criminal War* is not a suitable theory to this analysis.

Finally, anthropological theories may have benefited this analysis, integrating several disciplines for a more rigorous analytic process. An in depth study of civilizations and culture would likely offer different perspectives on the Colombian peace process and add value to analytic reasoning. Anthropological theories could also augment the four key analytic tasks. Unfortunately, time limitations prevented the application of anthropological theories in this project but this is may be an area of interest moving forward. In so far as theories, whether from International Relations, Political Science, Anthropology, or others, are able to complement analytic tasks and IA methodology they help break down complex problems and externalize thinking.

Conclusion

Many IR theories have proven helpful in the process of Intelligence Analysis, especially in their application to the Colombian peace process. IR theory greatly complements analytical methodology in breaking down complex problem. For the deepest understanding of the Colombian peace process, an analyst can use IR theory and IA methodology as part of one integrated process. Many IR theories build upon one another, as do the tasks in IA. Each key analytic task—hypothesis testing, causal analysis, counterfactual reasoning, and strategy assessment—can be aided by multiple IR theories. Using both IR theory and IA methodology an analyst studying the Colombian peace process may come to have a more thorough understanding of the fundamental causes, likely outcomes, and most effective strategies. Additionally, IR theory helps scale the analysis. IR theories suggest how any given problem should be framed or scaled, then IA methodology can be implemented. Consequently, the analyst's focus is narrowed (or broadened) and guided methodology and structured analytic techniques are applied to arrive at a more clear-cut analytical conclusion. Analysts arrive at their strongest, highest confidence judgements after making deliberate efforts to apply the best-suited approaches/theories/methodologies/techniques to their problem. The many advantages of using

IR theory and IA methodology to break down thinking about complex problems suggests that analysts should use the integrated framework whenever possible.

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