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Nationalism in Afghanistan: Colonial knowledge, education, symbols, and the World Tour of Amanullah Khan, 1901-1929

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Nationalism in Afghanistan: Colonial Knowledge, Education, Symbols, and the World

Tour of Amanullah Khan, 1901-1929

Jawan Shir

A thesis submitted to the Graduate Faculty of

JAMES MADISON UNIVERSITY

In

Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements

For the degree of

Master of Arts

History

May 2012

Dedication

To Afghanistan's mountains, rivers, trees, and animals; whose existence is more Afghan, whatever 'Afghan' means, and more human than nationalism

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I owe thanks and appreciation to a number of people that provided me helpful and critical support in making this thesis possible. I am grateful for the support and questions of the History Department faculty members and my graduate classmate colleagues. I owe much, intellectually *and* professionally, to my thesis director, Professor Shah Mahmoud Hanifi. Without Professor Hanifi, I would have never written this thesis (and perhaps would have never tried to know about its subject). My Thesis Committee Members were Professors David Owusu-Ansah and Timothy J. Fitzgerald. Their questions and notes have improved significantly this work. I am thankful to Professor Steven Reich, the coordinator for the Graduate Program. He has been supportive throughout my stay as a graduate student. I would like to also thank Dr. David Jeffery, Dean of the College of Arts and Letters; Dr. Lee Sternberger, Executive Director of the Office of International Programs; and Ms. Pamela Hamilton, the Coordinator of the Adult Degree Program. They all made it financially possible for me to complete my graduate studies at James Madison University. I am also thankful to Hiran Dinavari, the Reference Librarian of the Iranian World at the Library of Congress where he helped me to find Afghanistan's sources that are not yet catalogued, unfortunately.

Although I discussed my thesis throughout the process with my father and I received important intellectual support from him, I am thankful to all of my family members whose distance from me like all distances of Afghanistan was part of what I tried to understand and write in this thesis.

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Abstract

Nationalism in Afghanistan has not received attention from the scholars of the country despite its significance, at least locally. Using a post-modernist analysis of nationalism, this thesis will study nationalism in Afghanistan in the context of colonial knowledge, class, and cultural institutions between 1901 and 1929. Chapter one is about colonialism and its impact on nationalism in Afghanistan. In the nineteenth century, colonial activities constructed the political, epistemological, and territorial foundation of Afghan nation. Chapter two shows how previous studies of nationalism in Afghanistan have explained nationalism in the country. As the review of the previous studies of nationalism in Afghanistan will show, the previous explanation is hegemonic and state-centric. Chapter three, the primary findings of this thesis, is a study of the reforms in education and its relationship to development of nationalism in Afghanistan. As a result of the reforms in education, the Afghan state was able to produce and patronize a well-composed class of *roshanfekran* or elites in Kabul. Chapter four is about the symbols and Amanullah Khan's eight month world tour that became useful tools of the Afghan state and the nationalists to legitimate their nationalistic programs inside and outside Afghanistan. In the conclusion, the thesis draws attention to its findings, and suggests that further studies of nationalism in Afghanistan will be useful; especially studies that will address the relationships between class, ethnicity, and language and nationalism in Afghanistan.

Introduction

(Figure 1)
Afghanistan's and its Surrounding Countries Political Map



1

¹ "Afghanistan Maps - Perry-Castañeda Map Collection - UT Library Online." University of Texas Libraries. <http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/afghanistan.html> (accessed February 22, 2012).

The Argument

This thesis's argument is twofold. One is that nationalism in Afghanistan was a colonial idea, though the Afghan state and nationalists adopted it locally as an Afghan idea. The creation of an Afghan nation was more a British, Russian, and Persian consensus than an Afghan one. Throughout the nineteenth century and long afterwards, it was these colonial powers, particularly the British, who arranged among themselves to create *an* Afghanistan. Indeed, the area that is "now known as Afghanistan," as one study wrote, "had no previous existence as a united, independent political unit" before the beginning of the twentieth century.³ Another study has also concluded that "Afghanistan is in fact a colonial construct in political, economic, and intellectual terms, at least."⁴ A last but not least argument is made by a scholar of the country that the very labels "Afghan" and "Afghanistan" are constructed by the foreigners, not the Afghans themselves.⁵ However, Afghan nationalists rejected the argument that Afghanistan was constructed colonially. They claimed that Afghanistan existed as a nation not only in the nineteenth century but also since "man came down from the caves and hills to the fertile banks of rivers and civilized valleys, which the soil of Ariana, the ancient Afghanistan, was one of these valleys."⁶ The second part of this thesis's argument is that nationalism

³ Benjamin D. Hopkins, *The making of modern Afghanistan* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 11-13.

⁴ Shah Mahmoud Hanifi, *Connecting Histories in Afghanistan: Market Relations and State Formation in a Colonial Frontier* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011).

⁵ Mohammad J. Hanifi, "Editing the Past: Colonial Production of Hegemony Through "Loya Jerga" in Afghanistan," *Iranian Studies*. 37, no. 2 (2004), 322

⁶ Ahmad Ali Kohzad, *Tarikh-e Afghanistan: The History of Afghanistan* (Kabul: Matb-e Maiwand, 2008), 12. For a similar and more specific assertion by the Afghan nationalists see Mir Ghulam Mohammad Ghoobar's *Afghanistan Dar Masir Tarikh: Afghanistan in the Course of*

in Afghanistan was a state-sponsored and elitist idea. Its practitioners—the nationalists—were a small elite group that was patronized by the state. Unfortunately, this thesis will not focus on the ordinary people. Rather, it concentrates on the Afghan elites and their nationalistic works. Therefore, the entire discussion about nationalism in Afghanistan is not about the ruled Afghans, the dominated Afghans, and the unknown Afghans. The only hope, which this thesis has, is to find out about them and remember them while it discusses the ruling, the dominating, and the known Afghans.

Defining Nationalism in Afghanistan

From the turn of the twentieth century until the year 1929, nationalism in Afghanistan was noticeable in the hegemonic institutions of the Afghan state—schools, newspapers, laws, and national public ceremonies such as the National Unity Day, Independence Day, *Loya Jerga* or the Grand Assembly—and writings of Afghan nationalists. The concept of “hegemony” means here “that man is not ruled by force alone, but also by ideas.”⁷ Indeed, when the twentieth century started, the Afghan state began not only to legitimate its rule by force, but also by ideas. These ideas were instituted in the state’s hegemonic institutions such as the schools, the army, and the ceremonies that propagated an ‘Afghan’ national idea. The country’s first constitution (1923) defined and territorialized Afghan nationality in its article eight: *har sekha nafar-e che pa mulk da afghanistan ka de, pa har din aw mazhab che wee, tabean aw da rayat da afghanistan balal kizhee*. This new national idea, “that everybody who was residing in Afghanistan without regards to

History (Kabul: Markaz Nashr-e Enqelab, 1987), 9 and 36-38. In these pages Ghobar dates the history of Afghanistan as old as 2,500 B.C.

⁷ Thomas R. Bates, “Gramsci and The Theory of Hegemony,” *Journal of the History of Ideas*, 36, no. 2 (1975), 351

their religious beliefs and affiliations was an Afghan citizen,” is one example of the development of nationalism in Afghanistan during the early decades of the twentieth century.⁸

While this new national idea that everybody-is-Afghan and Afghanistan is *da afghanano watan* or the homeland of Afghans was propagated by the Afghan nationalists as the foundation for national unity and identification,⁹ they also disregarded the argument that Afghanistan was a colonial construct. *Eein watan-e aziz Afghanistan or* this dear homeland of Afghanistan, wrote *Kabul*,¹⁰ “has been neither the land of Persians, nor Turks, nor Indians, and nor Chinese.”¹¹ This kind of expression that Afghanistan has always been an Afghan land was in clear contrast with the country’s historical and political as well as intellectual characterization. It has been traditionally identified and argued by the *outsiders*¹² that Afghanistan was a creation of the British and Russia. In the nineteenth century the British view or policy was to create the modern territory of Afghanistan as a ‘buffer’ polity between British India and Russia to prevent any Imperial Russian advances eastward towards India. Russia, on the other hand, viewed the creation of a ‘buffer’ Afghanistan as a barrier to keep the British away from Central

⁸ Government of Afghanistan, *Asasi nizammamah da luwar dawlat Afghanistan: Afghanistan’s Constitution*, (Kabul: Matb-e Shirkat-e Rafiq, 1923), 5

⁹ Ghobar (1987), 794

¹⁰ *Kabul* was the literary magazine of Anjuman-e Adabi Kabul, the Kabul Literary Society that was established in 1931. *Kabul magazine* and *Salnamah-e Kabul*, Kabul Annual, the two Persian publications of Anjuman-e Adabi Kabul, were established to “reform and consolidate the methodologies and forms of literature” in Afghanistan and “write” the history of the historical poets of Afghan nation. See Anjuman-e Adabi Kabul’s *Salnamah-e Kabul* (1932) 109.

¹¹ Ghulam Jilani Khan Azimi, “Nazar-e ba Jughrafya-ye Watan: An Opinion about Geography of the Homeland,” *Mujala-e Kabul*, (1932-33), 42

¹² Hopkins (2008), 61-62 and 108-110. See also Vartan Gregorian’s *The Emergence of Modern Afghanistan* (California: Stanford University Press, 1969), 118. Gregorian offers a useful but short discussion of the “buffer” idea of an Afghanistan.

Asia. However, the Afghan nationalists rejected the argument that Afghanistan was created by Britain and Russia. For them, Afghanistan was a *tarikhi-e Afghanistan* or the ancient Afghanistan, which existed as a nation prior to the nineteenth century's British and Russian colonial activities in the country. They argued that Afghanistan's "ancient name was Ariana; the oldest name of Afghanistan that lasted from 5,000 B.C until the fifth century A.D." In addition to Ariana that was Afghanistan's ancient name, the Afghan nationalists argued that "Afghanistan's other historical name was Khurasan that lasted from the fifth century A.D until the nineteenth century."¹³ Crafting and inventing history for Afghanistan and making the country an ancient place, which belonged always to Afghans, were important activities of the Afghan nationalists and the state in order to make a national history far older and historical than colonialism. As a matter of fact, the Afghan nationalists and state preoccupied themselves throughout the period under study here with the attempts to disregard politically and intellectually the fact that Afghanistan was a colonial construct.

Mir Ghulam Mohammad Ghobar (1897-1978), the foremost Afghan historian, introduces his famous book *afghanistan dar masir-e tarikh* or Afghanistan in the Course of History with the argument that it is a manufactured view to argue that Afghanistan is a colonial construct. He wrote in the preface of the book "that the orientalist and their imitators played with the history of nations of Asia and made it ardent toy of colonialism. They defamed the historical facts and events with lies and fallacies and drew a slanderous picture of them." However, what was most important for Ghobar, to note here, was not

¹³ Ghobar (1987), 9

the history of nations of Asia and elsewhere. He was concerned and preoccupied more with the characterization, representation, and understanding of Afghanistan's history. He wrote that Afghanistan's history was slandered by the orientalist who defined it as:

A new born country; created by the desires of the two imperial governments of Russian Tsar and British Empire. This new born country, with thousands heterogeneous tribes, tens of different languages and religious sects, has no history before the eighteenth century. And...and...and. These kinds of colonial propaganda and fabrications, which various books adopted them in depicting Afghans and Afghanistan's history, especially the British and later the western writers who took them as granted, and even also were enacted in the official minds and writings of our Asian neighbors, became a fatal epidemic disease.¹⁴

As it can be observed from Ghobar's aggressive disregard of the idea that colonialism constructed Afghanistan, the Afghan nationalists introduced Afghanistan as an ancient country, and rejected the idea that Afghanistan was a colonial construct in order to invent locally a national idea.

The Organization

This thesis has four chapters. Chapter one, *Colonialism and Nationalism in Afghanistan*, will address nationalism in Afghanistan in the context of colonialism during the nineteenth century. The main purpose of this chapter is to introduce how certain colonial activities created the very foundation of nationalism in Afghanistan. Chapter two, *Studies of Nationalism in Afghanistan*, will review the historiography of nationalism in Afghanistan. The goal is to explain how previous scholarly works have approached and characterized the development of nationalism in Afghanistan. The core discussion of the thesis is presented in chapter three, titled *Reforms in Education*. The intention in this chapter is to discuss the relationship between nationalism in Afghanistan and education between 1904 and 1929. Chapter four, *Symbolizing Afghanistan*, is about the symbols and

¹⁴ Ibid, 1-2

ways, which were used by the Afghan state and the nationalists to project a national identity inside and outside Afghanistan. At the end of this thesis, the section of *conclusion* will summarize the findings of the research. The specific time frame for this paper is 1901-1929.

Theorizing Nationalism

Because of flaws in its historical imagination, dissimilarities and contradictions in its meaning and context, and ambiguities in its definition, it is assumed here that ‘nationalism’ is an idea, and nationalisms, like nationalism in Afghanistan, are modern ideas.¹⁵ The idea of an Afghan nation, therefore, is a modern phenomenon. As a matter of fact, the phrase “Afghan Nation” appears in the subtitle and table of contents of Afghanistan’s first major colonial account, *An Account of the Kingdom of Caubul* in 1842.¹⁶ There is no usage of such a phrase as “Afghan nation” before its appearance in the *Account of the Kingdom of Caubul*, though Henry Vansittart and Sir William Jones, the two British colonial officials who have written commentary articles on Afghans, use in their writings the term “nation” to refer to Afghans. However, they do not have used like the author of *An Account of the Kingdom of Caubul* the phrase Afghan nation. Also,

¹⁵ See Michael Hechter, *Containing Nationalism* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 5-9. Hechter talks about the difficulty of having one origin, one meaning, and one definition for “nationalism.” He writes that it was Johann G. Herder, the eighteenth century German thinker who first used the term “nationalism” in one of his texts. However, it has never been given a clear definition to what nationalism is. Therefore, since then it has been an ambiguous term, which has in turn motivated many writers, whose various definitions have allowed them, to “offer quite different assessments of it,” 6.

¹⁶ This thesis’s author has not seen the first edition of *An Account of the Kingdom of Caubul* which was published in 1815, and its second edition in 1839. So, whether those editions had the phrase “Afghan Nation” in their subtitles and table of contents is not known to him. The phrase, which the author, Mountstuart Elphinstone, of *An Account of Kingdom of Caubul*, spells it, is “Afghaun Nation.” The *Account* and Elphinstone’s impact on nationalism in Afghanistan will be fully discussed in the first chapter.

the first person to use intellectually the word ‘nationalism’ in reference to Afghanistan was Hans Kohn (1891-1971).¹⁷ Kohn, a subject of Hapsburg Empire, historian, lawyer, and an active Zionist,¹⁸ published apparently one of the first intellectual works on nationalism, especially with specific reference to Asia. He commented on nationalism in Afghanistan in his book, *A History of Nationalism in the East* (1929). Although he treated collectively nationalism in Iran and Afghanistan under one title, “Changes in Persia and Afghanistan” without an explanation to how they were alike and or different, his argument was that “the Afghan tribes, warlike and barbarous, have always been animated by a spirit of primitive nationalism and independence.”¹⁹ He suggested however that “even-today the government, industries, and social institutions of Afghanistan are all together medieval, as they were in Persia until quite recently. The spirit of rationalism, and democracy, and capitalism [that are pre-conditions for existence of nationalism] has hardly touched these countries and their populations.”²⁰ However, beyond the primitive and medieval character of nationalism in Afghanistan, what made nationalism in Afghanistan really interesting for Kohn were the westernization and modernization reforms of the Afghan ruler, Amanullah Khan (r.1919-1929). Under “Aman Ullah Khan,”

¹⁷ Hans Kohn, whose and several other nationalism theory pioneers’ works and analyses were found biased, Eurocentric, and incomplete, wrote a seven page description of nationalism in Afghanistan. For Kohn’s and other pioneers’ biased analyses of ‘nationalism theory,’ see Anthony Smith, *Nationalism and Modernism* (London: Routledge, 1998), 16-18.

¹⁸ For biography of Kohn, his Zionist writings and activism, and works on nationalism, see Leo Baeck Institute Collections at the Center for Jewish History, “Hans Kohn Collection, Papers of Hans Kohn,” Identification Number AR 259/MF 493, <http://findingaids.cjh.org/?pID=121445> and <http://www.cjh.org/p/93?action=searchPartners&partner=3> (accessed 12, Jan, 2012).

¹⁹ Hans Kohn, *A History of Nationalism in the East* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1929, 341

²⁰ *Ibid*, 319

wrote Kohn, “a period of reforms imposed from above began in Afghanistan, similar to what Peter the Great attempted in Russia and the Turks in their country.”²¹

However, Kohn’s explanation of nationalism was classical. According to the new studies of nationalism, classical theories and explanations of nationalism were incomplete and biased because many of them were first of all Eurocentric, and second of all they did not have in consideration a lot of the changes in the studies of postcolonized societies whose nationalisms needed new kinds of analysis. Therefore, this thesis uses a postcolonial, modernist, and post-modernist approach to its analysis of nationalism in Afghanistan. The approach is adopted from the works of three nationalism theorists: John Breuilly 1994, Benedict Anderson 1991, and Anthony Smith 1998.

In contrast to the primordial and perennial theories of nationalism, the modernist and post-modernist theory of nationalism argues that nationalism and nation are modern concepts.²² However, the primordialists of nationalism theory argue that nations always existed naturally in the past. The task of a nationalist at the present is to “remind his or her compatriots of their glorious past, so that they can recreate and relive those glories.”²³ Like primordialists but also different from them, the perennialists of nationalism theory argue that nationalism has a perennial character: “nations and ethnic communities are

²¹ Ibid, 342. Amanullah Khan (r. 1919-1929) is the key personality in this thesis along with a number of other individuals. He and his works will be discussed in all of the five chapters: especially 3 and 4.

²² For a comprehensive survey of modernist theory of nationalism see Smith (1998), especially chapters 1 through 6.

²³ Anthony D. Smith, “Gastronomy or Geology? The role of nationalism in the reconstruction of nations,” *Nations and Nationalism*, 1, no. 1 (1994), 18.

cognate, even identical phenomena.”²⁴ What distinguishes primordialism from the perennialism theory of nationalism is that the former sees nations naturally born and insists on the natural difference of one nation from another while the latter does not see nations as naturally born.²⁵

However, Breuilly (1994) and Smith (1998), the two modernist and post-modernist theorists of nationalism, reject the assumptions that nations and nationalisms always existed in the history. “Those historians who claim that a national consciousness existed in medieval Europe or that there were patriots active in the sixteen century,” Breuilly writes, “their claims should not be labeled as nationalism.”²⁶ Like Breuilly, Smith also suggests that “before the modern epoch, nations were largely unknown, and human beings had a multiplicity of collective loyalties.”²⁷ A person had to be loyal to his or her religious community or to a city or an empire or a monarch. In addition to the view that modern nation-states did not always exist, the post-modernist theories of nationalism argue that “the outlook of most human beings was strictly local” before the emergence of the modern nation-states. Therefore, the modernist and post-modernist theory of nationalism suggests that nation is a modern phenomenon, and its creation goes to the emerging high culture of the industrial societies. The high culture is the situation that in order to be a nation, the people of a certain territory need to have access to mass public education system as this kind of system was becoming popular and increasing with the

²⁴ See Smith (1998), chapter seven, pages 146-169 where he discusses the theories, and problems of primordialism and perennialism nationalisms.

²⁵ Ibid, 159.

²⁶ John Breuilly, *Nationalism and the State*, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994), 3.

²⁷ Smith (1998), 146.

emergence of the modern nation-states. The high culture then has had “certain kind of literate which could only be forged and sustained by exo-socialisation.” Exo-socialisation was the idea that modern nation-states unlike the pre-modern societies have had a new kind of public education that had a standardized national curriculum.²⁸

This post-modernist explanation of nationalism is a departure from the classical and romantic assumption that a people could be a nation if they had a common language. Germany and France are, for instance, the two often examples that historians provide when they describe the relationship between nationhood and common language. The classical and romantic explanations of these two countries are that France and Germany achieved a sense of nationhood because Germans and French were able to unite themselves around a common language. For example, Labbe (2007) argues that the Prussian state in the nineteenth century tried to make a German nation by institutionalizing German language in schools and churches. The schools and churches were registering a person according to his or her mother tongue.²⁹ However, the modernist and post-modernist theorists of nationalism do not share the views of the classic theorists of nationalism. Today many people share a common language, though they are not one nation. Americans and Brits speak, for example, English while they form two different nationalities.

Because of the above discussed problems of the primordialism and perennialism theories of nationalism, and the comprehensiveness of a grand narrative and all-

²⁸ Ibid, 29-41

²⁹ See also Boyd C. Shafer's *Nationalism: Myth and Reality*, (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1955). Shafer's work is a classic explanation of nationalism that emphasizes the role of linguistic commonality in the creation of nations. Shafer, for example, argues that France and Germany were able to becoming nations because each had a common language.

encompassing analysis of the modernist and post-modernist approach, this thesis has found no data or evidence to prove that the modern nation of Afghanistan has always existed in the past, and or it was given in nature. Therefore, applying the post-modernist theories of nationalism, this thesis does not assume that there was always a country, “Afghanistan,” in the history. In fact, Afghanistan as it is now known has been a modern polity that was constructed by colonialism in the long nineteenth century, 1808-1919. Only after 1901 did an *identity* in the modern sense of the word such as “Afghan” began to be imagined. This was as a result of several sociopolitical developments such as the establishment of a new kind of education and emergence of a small *roshanfekran* or the elite class in Kabul. For example, in 1923 when the Afghan nationalists designed the country’s first national constitution, they homogenized the diverse ethnic identity in the country where they now emphasized a homogenous national identity as “Afghan” over ethnic identities such as “Pashtun” or “Tajik” or “Sunni” or “Shia” and or “Hindu.” Everybody who was residing in Afghanistan was “imagined” as *Afghan* without regards to their religious beliefs and affiliations and ethnic identities³⁰

In here, the concept of “imagined” is used from Benedict Anderson’s *Imagined Communities* (1991). Anderson suggests that nationalism is imagined because nationals of a country, whether representing a big or a small nation, will never know or meet or hear each other. What this mean is that it would be impossible for a national of a country, say an Afghan, to know or meet every single countryman or countrywoman in his or her nation, though they would still imagine a shared community, the nation. In addition to the

³⁰ Government of Afghanistan (1923), 5

imagination of nationalism, Anderson suggests that nationalism is “limited” because there are several competing nationalisms in the world such as nationalism in Afghanistan and nationalism in Iran or nationalism in India and nationalism in China. Therefore, according to Anderson, nationalism is inherently limited to a particular nation. Last but not least, Anderson also suggests that nationalism is “sovereign” because its creation is new in the human history. It originated when the nation-states and the tools of the high culture such as “print-capitalism” or newspapers and public spaces began to appear, which then replaced previous forms of legitimacy and loyalty such as the divine-authority and or the church.³¹ In Afghanistan too, individuals such as emir Amanullah Khan and the Afghan nationalists such as Mahmud Tarzi (1865-1933), Mir Ghulam M. Ghoobar, Ghulam Muhyiuddin Anis (died, 1938), and Abdul Hai Habibi (1910-1984) “imagined” a nation of Afghanistan and propagated it in the early twentieth century.

To conceptualize this imagination and propagation of a national idea and nationhood, the four chapters below will address the following queries: how the modern nation of Afghanistan came about; where to locate the origins of nationalism in Afghanistan; who played significant roles in its creation; and how did the Afghan nationalists imagine Afghan nation in the period between 1901 and 1929.

³¹ Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, (New York: Verso, 1991), 6-7.

Chapter One: Colonialism and Nationalism in Afghanistan

We are at a point in our work when we can no longer ignore empires and the imperial context in our studies.

Edward Said, 1993³²

The Origins of Nationalism in Afghanistan: Empire, Colonial Knowledge

What brought about the modern nation of Afghanistan is not a selective question because it is a necessary and appropriate one if one wants to study nationalism in Afghanistan. Ernest Renan (1823-1892), the French writer, titled his widely renowned essay with a question, “What is a Nation?” His answer was that the modern nation is a “historical result that is brought about by a series of convergent facts.” Its creation is sometime the work of particular individuals, sometime due to the existence of a direct will among its creators, and sometime because of the formation of a general consciousness of its participants.³³ The origins of the modern nation of Afghanistan also involve a series of convergent facts, which are to be found in the annals of the nineteenth and early twentieth century Afghanistan.

The nineteenth and twentieth centuries are crucial periods for studies of nationalism, especially for nationalisms of the colonized societies. These two centuries witnessed the rise and fall of the great multinational states. Empires were built and ruined by nationalisms; the French, British, German, Japanese, Russian, and others including the imperial and un-imperial nations of Americas. New nations were founded and disintegrated by local and global nationalisms. Because nationalism became also a

³² Edward Said, *Culture and Imperialism*, (New York: Vintage Books, 1993), 6.

³³ Ernest Renan, *Becoming National*, ed. Geoff Eley and Ronald Grigor Suny (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 45. Renan mentions that Kings of France played important role in bringing about the modern nation of France while because of the existence of a will among the various linguistic and ethnic provinces, Switzerland and Belgium became nations. In the case of Germany and Italy, Renan mentions, it was more a general consciousness than the role of kings or will among Germans and Italians.

fanciest and racist ideology, and produced atrocities, it was soon to be condemned by serious academic works and individuals later in the twentieth century due to its flaws and violent as well as authoritarian character and history. It was for these flaws that some have characterized nationalism as defining an invented phenomenon and an imagined community. Such observations are notwithstanding, nationalism still remains a popular topic that attracts the attention of scholars who seek to examine the role that nationalism had played in the making and unmaking of empires and nations in these two centuries.³⁴ Take for example the role that the British Empire or British nationalism played in its confrontation with several nationalisms in the world during and after nineteenth and twentieth centuries. These crucial incidents continue to play a role in the national memories of various communities who experienced them. They happened from the valleys, mountains, plains, and passes of Bamian, Charikar, Kabul, and Jalalabad in Afghanistan to the plains of Punjab and shores of Persia as well as East Africa, South Africa, West Africa, Jamaica, and China. For example, some of these incidents were but not limited to the First Anglo-Ashanti War 1823-1831; Opium Wars in China 1839-42; First Anglo-Afghan War 1838-1842; Second Anglo-Afghan War 1878-1880; Third Anglo-Afghan War, 1919; 1840s wars against South African “Kaffirs”; New Zealand Maoris War; Conquest of Punjab; the Crimean War 1854-6; Conquest of lower Burma 1854; Second China War 1856-60; Anglo-Persian War 1857; Suppression of Indian Mutiny 1857; Governor Eyre Suppression of the Morant Bay Rebellion 1865; Decisive Campaign against Ashantis 1874; Conquest of Egypt 1882; Partition of India and

³⁴ Ibid, especially pages 3-37 where there is a useful provision of survey of studies of nationalism.

Palestine 1947; and creation of nations of Ghana and Kenya 1957 and 1963. As it seems here, it is only a partial group of incidents that the British Empire had with various nationalities and nations of the world in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.³⁵

Noting, therefore, the involvement and impact of empire and colonial activities on creation and suppression of nationalisms in the world during the nineteenth and twentieth century, it will become clear to notice how colonialism laid the very foundation of nationalism in Afghanistan from 1808 to 1919. The imperial colonial activities of the nineteenth century, both by the British and Russia, created the foundation of nationalism in Afghanistan. These activities took several forms. They were in the forms of colonial diplomatic treaties, overt and covert colonial missions, colonial conferences, colonial wars, and colonial writings. They defined and territorialized the very name “Afghan” and the territory that is now known as Afghanistan. All of them helped to construct the colonial imagination and identification of Afghans as a wild tribal people and mapped Afghanistan’s modern territorial boundaries. Take for example the following survey of colonial activities in and about Afghanistan during the nineteenth century: Afghanistan’s ten enthroned rulers of this period receive or allow entering into Afghanistan twelve overtly known colonial diplomatic, spying, and commercial emissary missions.³⁶ The

³⁵ For a theoretical analysis of “empire,” these incidents, and nations, see Said (1993), 105-132.

³⁶ These enthroned rulers—kings and emirs—were Shah Mahmud (r. 1800-1803, 1809-1817); Shah Shuja-ul-Mulk (r. 1803-1810, 1839-1842); Emir Dost Muhammad (r. 1826-1838, 1842-1863); Emir Shir Ali Khan (r. 1863-1866, 1868-1879); Emir Mohammad Afzal (r. 1866-1867); Mohammad Azam Khan (r. 1867); Emir Mohammad Yaqub Khan (r. February-October 1879); Emir Abdur Rahman Khan (r. 1880-1901); Emir Habibullah Khan (r. 1901-1919); and Emir/King Amanullah Khan (r. 1919-1929). For a genealogical biography of these kings and emirs and their “claim” to the throne of

purpose of each mission was to collect and produce information about Afghans as a people and their territory as a polity, and bind them to the colonial conventions of friendship, alliance, obligation, and do-business. These widely known missions were Mountstuart Elphinstone Mission to the Kingdom of Caubul, 1808-1809; Alexander Burns First Mission, 1831-4; Alexander Burns Second Mission to the Court of Dost Mohammad Khan, Kabul 1837; Russian Mission to the Court of Dost Mohammad Khan, 1837; Alexander Burns Third Mission with the Army of Indus to Afghanistan, 1838-1841; Goldsmid Mission 1870-72; The Ottoman Mission to Afghanistan, 1877; Russian Mission to Kabul, 1878; Sir Neville F. F. Chamberlain British Mission to the Court of Shir Ali Khan, 1878; Sir Peter Lumsden Mission to Herat 1884; Dane Mission 1905; and German-Ottoman Mission 1915. As a result of these twelve known and widely accepted colonial missions between the years 1808 and 1915, Afghanistan was placed practically and systemically in the orbits of the nineteenth century imperial-colonial apparatuses where the people and its territories were literally defined and imagined by the colonial officials who wrote about and characterized the history of Afghanistan, the culture of Afghanistan, and the territory of Afghanistan. They wrote who an Afghan was and was not. They decided where Afghanistan's boundaries could and could not be. For instance, Elphinstone in his *An Account of the Kingdom of Caubul* established the very parameter of Afghanistan. He designated that "Afghaunistaun" was the area that was inhabited by the Pashtuns and Pashtuns were the real Afghans, and their kingdom was "the kingdom of Caubul." He instead designated places and other ethnic groups such as "Bulkh" or

Afghanistan, see Ludwig Adamec, *Dictionary of Afghan Wars, Revolutions, and Insurgencies* (Lanham: Scarecrow, 2005), 240, 347, 353, 85, 254, 255, 391, 6, and 147.

Balkh or “Uzbeks” as “dependencies” of Afghanistan not part of Afghanistan and Afghans.³⁷

In addition to the twelve overtly known colonial missions to Afghanistan, Afghanistan’s ten enthroned rulers sign nearly thirteen binding treaties with colonial powers, mainly with the British Empire and or its patronized commercial enterprise, the British East India Company. The treaties, which determined the fate of boundaries of Afghanistan, its political sovereignty, and commercial flows of goods and services, made Afghanistan a client state of the colonial powers.³⁸

Beside the twelve colonial missions, thirteen Afghan-Colonial Powers Treaties, and five inter-colonial powers treaties, Afghanistan’s rulers or its emissaries attended and or were uninvited to five major colonial diplomatic conferences that were held to address

³⁷ Mountstuart Elphinstone, *An Account of the Kingdom of Caubul and Its Dependencies, in Persia, Tartary, and India; Comprising a View of the Afghaun Nation and a History of the Dooaraunee Monarchy* (London: Richard Bentley, 1842), 181

³⁸ Tripartite Treaty 1838, Ranjit Sing, the Sikh ruler of Punjab, Shah Shuja, the exiled ruler of Afghanistan, and British East India Company; Anglo-Shah Kamran Treaty of Herat 1839; (Gregorian, p. 100); Anglo-Afghan Peace Treaties, called also Treaties of Peshawar, 1855 and 1857 (p. 103-104 coz 1857); Anglo-Afghan Agreement 1869 (p. 106); Treaty of Gandamak 1879; Durand Agreement 1893 (Adamec p. 86-7 and 399-408); Anglo-Afghan Agreement 1905 (Adamec p. 463); Afghan-German Treaty of Friendship 1916 (Adamec p. 178-82); Anglo-Afghan Treaty 1919, also known as Rawalpindi Treaty; Anglo-Afghan Friendship and Commercial Treaty 1921 (Adamec p. 183); Treaty of Friendship Soviet-Afghan 192. It is useful to note that these thirteen colonial treaties were only between Afghanistan and each colonial power. At least five inter-colonial treaties were enacted among the colonial powers themselves, which affected Afghanistan but Afghanistan’s consent was either ignored or rejected. These were Treaty of Finkenstein 1807, Anglo-Persian Treaty of 1809, and Treaty of Tehran 1814 (British bound Persians to attack on Afghanistan in case Afghans make troubles in India); Russo-Persian Treaties of Gulistan 1813, and Treaty of Turkmanchai 1828. Shah Mahmoud Hanifi’s *Connecting Histories in Afghanistan: Market Relations and State Formation in a Colonial Frontier*, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011) is an excellent read on how British colonialism in South Asia and beyond made Afghanistan in the nineteenth century from an independent self-sustainable polity into a dependent, colonially-client, and intellectually-defined polity.

the political and territorial status of Afghanistan in the second half of the nineteenth and early twentieth century. The conferences were the Anglo-Russian Negotiations of 1869-1873, Ambala Conference of 1872, Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907, Mussoorie Conference of 1920, and Kabul Conference of 1921.

The Russo-Anglo negotiations of the late nineteenth century on Afghanistan was of particular interest here as an intercontinental negotiations that the European imperial powers had in order to address the so-called “Eastern Question.” Ottoman Empire was in decline and to protect and expand their imperial interests in the Ottoman held dominions such as in Egypt and in the Balkans and Asia Minor, the imperial powers of Europe had to enter into some sort of negotiations in order to prevent a total intercontinental war. For example, Russia was already gaining new territories and influences in the Balkans, Caucasus, and Central Asia. In 1873, the Khanate of Khiva, to the north of Afghanistan, was captured by the Russians; five years later in 1878, this Russian advance in Central Asia triggered the British to instigate a second invasion of Afghanistan, known as the Second Anglo-Afghan War. To protect India, British entered into negotiations with the Russia. Although the negotiations of 1869-1873 failed to stop Russia from expanding its imperial holdings in Central Asia, the negotiations resulted in assurances from the Russians to the British—not to the Afghans—that both imperial powers will recognize the British interest and “sphere of influence” in and over Afghanistan. In addition, Imperial Russia agreed with the British that they would recognize the Afghan emir Shir

Ali Khan's claims over Afghanistan's northern and northeastern boundaries.³⁹ Like the first major colonial conference of 1869-1873 where Afghanistan was mapped to become a "nation," the other four colonial conferences of the nineteenth and early twentieth century completed the construction of modern nation of Afghanistan, at least territorially.

The impact of the twelve colonial missions to Afghanistan, the thirteen Afghan-Colonial powers treaties, five inter-colonial powers treaties, and five major colonial and inter-colonial conferences on the Afghan nation is obvious. Each of these colonial missions, colonial treaties, colonial conferences, and colonial wars had everlasting impact on nationalism in Afghanistan. While the very foundation of the idea of an Afghan nation was constructed by these colonial activities, Afghan nationalists took it for granted and made it into something local and un-colonial. The Afghan nationalists denied this very historic reality that Afghanistan was a colonial construct. Afghan nationalists have rejected the argument that colonialism was the maker of modern Afghan nation because for them Afghanistan existed as a nation before the colonial era. This Afghanistan was, for them, in reality a *tarikhi-e Afghanistan* or the ancient Afghanistan.

To analyze critically and understand better this transformation of nationalism in Afghanistan from a colonial concept into a local idea, one of the twelve colonial missions—the Mountstuart Elphinstone Mission to the *Kingdom of Caubul* 1808-1809—

³⁹ For how the Anglo-Russian Negotiations of 1869-1873 affected the territorial boundaries of Afghanistan, and what role they played in creation of modern nation of Afghanistan, see A. P. Thornton, *Afghanistan in Anglo-Russian Diplomacy, 1869-1873* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1955).

will be examined thoroughly here to shed light on the role and power of colonial knowledge in construction of nationalism in Afghanistan⁴⁰

Mountstuart Elphinstone: Baba-ye Afghan, the Father of Afghans Invented

Mountstuart Elphinstone (1779-1859), the Scottish-born colonial official of the British East India Company, has continuously remained the main architect and the high authority of Afghan knowledge since 1815 when his book *An Account of the Kingdom of Caubul* was first published.⁴¹ Elphinstone is important not only because he was the first European colonial official to visit an Afghan ruler, Shah Shuja (r. 1803-1810, 1839-1842) and secured an eternal friendship treaty from him to the British Empire. He also organized, simplified, and standardized what is now known of Afghans, as a people, and Afghanistan, as a country.⁴² To critically understand Elphinstone's role in the construction of colonial imagination of Afghans and assess how much intellectually important he was in establishing the very foundation of nationalism in Afghanistan, it is necessary to analyze his *An Account of the Kingdom of Caubul* rather his mission to the court of Afghan ruler.

Although Elphinstone was the first colonial official who visited an Afghan ruler and secured from him the first pact that an Afghan monarch signed with a European colonial

⁴⁰ Elphinstone Mission is chosen here because it provides a useful framework of analysis, which can help the reader to understand broadly while notice specifically the complexity of "empire," its intellectual power, and impact on the formation of nationalism in Afghanistan.

⁴¹ See Shah Mahmoud Hanifi's 2012c, "Quandaries of the Afghan Nation," in *Under the Drones: Modern Lives in the Afghanistan-Pakistan Borderlands*, Shahzad Bashir and Robert D. Crews, eds. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press. (expected spring 2012), about the importance of Mountstuart Elphinstone's *An Account of the Kingdom of Caubul* for the construction of Afghan nation. Also see Hopkins (2008), especially pages 13-33 where he talks about the very important role that Elphinstone played in definition and characterization of Afghan nation.

⁴² Hanifi's 2011 and 2012a-c.

power, the British East India Company, he was not the first colonial official to establish correspondences with Afghans' rulers, and write about Afghans. The first written colonial contacts took place between the British colonial state in India and Ahmad Shah Abdali/Durrani (r. 1747-1773), the so-called *baba-ye Afghan* or the father of Afghans during the years 1760-1761. In the pre-Elphinstone colonial contacts with Afghans, Henry Vansittart, a colonial officer of the British East India Company, and Sir William Jones (the famous orientalist and founder of the Asiatic Society of Bengal who also authored the theory of the Indo-European Language Family), were instrumental in producing the early colonial imagination of Afghans.⁴³ Vansittart and Jones both studied and commented on history and genealogy of Afghans. For example, they examined philologically Pashto language, one of the major languages of Afghans, in relation to the other Indo-European languages.

They made two major inventions about Afghans that later played important role on nationalism in Afghanistan and resonate even today with the public and official minds both inside and outside Afghanistan. One invention, which later captured the attention and entered into the writings of several colonial officials, was that the Afghans were one of the ten lost tribes of Israel. Although the Jewish Descent Theory of Afghans did not receive much support from the Afghan nationalists, it became part of the Afghan and

⁴³The Indo-European idea, by Sir William Jones, basically argued that communities such as Indians, Persians, and Europeans have all the same ancestral lineage. He compared philologically the languages of Europe and Sanskrit as well as Persian, and drew a conclusion: all these languages had a common lost ancestor. The premise that Jones established was that since the languages of Europeans, Indians, and Persians were the same, they were also genealogically one people of the same lost ancestor. For a review of Jones' theory and its impact on the colonial construction of history of India, and "Indians" and other related communities in South Asia, see Thomas R. Trautman, *The lives of Sir William Jones. Sir William Jones, 1746-1794: a commemoration*, ed. by Alexander Murray, 93-121 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998).

outsider's minds, at least.⁴⁴ However, it was the second colonial invention that Jones made of and for Afghans, which later impressed Afghan nationalists who took it as fact and adopted it locally and propagated it in the official and un-official institutions of the state power. This was the view that Afghans were *Aryans* and Afghanistan was the real main homeland of Aryans, who then spread across the world.⁴⁵ These pre-Elphinstone colonial imaginations of Afghans are important but they did not carry substantial and widespread consequences.

It is Elphinstone's *An Account of the Kingdom of Caubul* that most fully structured the colonial imagination of Afghans—an imagination that Afghan nationalists re-documented and re-enshrined in the idea of Afghanistan.⁴⁶ The most important thing that Elphinstone did was that he defined “Afghans” and Afghanistan.⁴⁷ In other words, he

⁴⁴ See Ali Khan, Mohammad, *History & Geography of Afghanistan (Lahore: Matb-e Mufid Amman, 1927)*. This was a secondary education textbook in which the author talks about Afghans being the descendants of Jews. One reason, that the Jewish Descent Theory did not really impress Afghan nationalists, was perhaps because of Afghanistan's Islamic heritage.

⁴⁵ For Henry Vansittart and Jones's construction of Afghans Jewish Descent Theory and Aryan Theory, see Shah Mahmoud Hanifi's 2012a, c, and d.

⁴⁶ This re-documentation and re-enshrining of Elphinstone's characterization on Afghans will be shown in chapter 2, 3, and 4.

⁴⁷ Elphinstone by Afghans meant the Pashtuns/Pathans who lived (and live) predominately in the areas what are now known as Afghanistan (mostly, its eastern and southern parts) and northern India (in particular, the North Western Frontier Province, as it was named by the British Raj). The terminologies of “Afghan,” “Pashtun,” and “Pathan” are problematic. This problem is because of the historical problem of identification of various ethnic communities in Afghanistan. Supposedly, “Afghans” means “Pashtuns,” who are the “largest” ethno-linguistic group in Afghanistan. They speak Pashto, which is different from Persian, Uzbeki, Nuristani, Pashahi, and other languages of Afghanistan. Each of these latter languages has its own ethnic community. The Persian speakers, who are estimated to be the second largest ethnic group in Afghanistan, are known as Tajiks or Farsiwans. However, this identification of Tajiks or Farsiwans is also problematic because several other ethnic communities also speak Persian as their mother tongues: for example, the Hazaras or Aimaq peoples who are of their own ethnic communities. Apart from this complexity of different ethnic groups in Afghanistan, the terminology “Afghan” or “Pashtun” is problematic in itself. Because a “Pashtun,” who is an ethno-linguistic community and inhabit a large part of Afghanistan and Pakistan, can be all of the

explained who Afghans were and were not. His account is full of descriptions of Afghans' characteristics, religion, society, culture, politics, and so on. He also discussed the Afghan government, provinces, mountains, and anything else colonial officials needed to know about the people of Afghanistan and their homeland. He even labeled the tribes and categorized them. For instance, he differentiated between the tribes with territorial boundaries and the tribes without. "Naussers" were introduced as a tribe that had no territories like "Eusofzyes," and they had a "wandering life."⁴⁸

Although everything that Elphinstone documented in his *Account of the Kingdom of Caubul* about Afghans has in one or another way a place in understanding nationalism in Afghanistan, his characterization of Afghans as a people will shed light here about how much significant his impact was on the very knowledge that people now have of Afghans and Afghanistan. He characterizes individually and collectively all of the various peoples of the country. But, what becomes interesting and questionable is how he takes samples and characterizes Afghans. For instance, he writes that he was characterizing "all of the manner and characters of Afghans," by describing the characters of the "Eastern tribes—the Berdooraunees," and from among them, "Eusofzyes" who "display many of

three: "Afghan," "Pashtun," and "Pathan." However, an "Afghan," who lives currently in Afghanistan, does not want to be called and is not referred to as "Pathan" because "Pathan" is an ethno-linguistic community, whose ancestors are identified as "Pashtuns," and they are spread all across South Asia; mostly in India and Pakistan, and there is not such a community as "Pathan" in Afghanistan. A Pashtun can be a "Pathan," an "Afghan," and a "Pashtun" while a "Pathan" cannot be an "Afghan" and a "Pashtun." This is because the Government of Afghanistan does not recognize a "Pathan" community in Afghanistan. However, a "Pathan" can be a "Pashtun" but not an "Afghan" in Pakistan. This is the real complexity of identifying who is and who is not an "Afghan." Nevertheless, for the sake of discussion in this paper, "Afghan" or "Afghans" mean those people who are identified as "Afghan Nationals" who are now residing in the country what is now known as Afghanistan. See Shah Mahmoud Hanifi's 2012c.

⁴⁸ Elphinstone (1842, Vol, 2), 174.

the peculiarities of their nation in more perfection than any other tribe.” “In consequence,” Elphinstone continues, “we find the Berdooraunees brave, but quarrelsome; active, industrious, and acute, but selfish, contentious, and dishonest. They are more bigoted and intolerant than the other Afghans, and more under the influence of their Moollahs. They are also more vicious and debauched, and some among them are, in all respects, the worst of the Afghans.”⁴⁹

These contrasting images of Afghans as people who were “brave, but quarrelsome; active, industrious, and acute, but selfish, contentious, and dishonest,” drawn by the power of colonial ink, continued in the official and public minds of both foreigners and Afghans since Elphinstone published his *An Account of the Kingdom of Kabul*. For example, Lowell Thomas, the American journalist who amazed the public and official minds in imperial metropolises after World War One by photographing T. E. Lawrence and transforming an ordinary British Colonial Army officer into a “Lawrence of Arabia,” went to Afghanistan in 1920s. He continued in the style of Elphinstone by publishing an account in which he exoticized Afghanistan and Afghans. In his *Beyond Khyber Pass into Forbidden Afghanistan* (1925), he paraphrased Elphinstone’s characterization of Afghans:

The Afridis, and in fact all Afghan-Pathan peoples, abhor stupidity, indecision, and hair-splitting (except in theological controversy) and will follow only a leader with courage and dash. Warm-hearted to those they love; they are brutally cruel to their enemies. Impulsive to a fault, they will wait patiently for years in order to get revenge. They are hospital, yet canny, and excessively conceited, but feel a humble resignation to the will of Allah. They have also the

⁴⁹ Ibid, 1-2

germ of that spirit of travel and adventure that has made every great nation and is the hope of the world.⁵⁰

Reading Lowell Thomas's account and the narratives of other writers, both Afghans and foreigners, one immediately recognizes the impact of Mountstuart Elphinstone Mission (1808-1809) and his book *An Account of the Kingdom of Kabul*. It structured the foundation of what now is known of Afghanistan. Elphinstone's impact is nicely summarized by one study as the following:

“Elphinstone's conceptual episteme did not simply frame subsequent understandings of Afghan society as tribal. It also narrowed ideas of what constitutes legitimate political order and community in Afghanistan. This narrowing exerted a formative effect over both colonial policy and colonial knowledge, and it continues to influence international efforts in Afghanistan today. Once the space occupied by the Afghans had been cognized in terms of the Elphinstone episteme, the colonial state began to contour that space with political expectations. Having constructed the Afghan political entity as essentially South Asian in character, the Company, and later the Crown, expected the Afghans to act like other political entities with which they interacted in the subcontinent.”⁵¹

As Elphinstone showed that empire and colonial knowledge had something to do with nationalism in Afghanistan, it was not only Elphinstone as a colonial official who defined and characterized Afghans and their homeland, Afghanistan. It was “a series of the convergent facts” as Ernest Renan indicated that could result in creation of a nation. This was true of nationalism in Afghanistan's colonial legacy, which had these series of convergent facts in its trajectory.

Indeed, when Elphinstone was traveling through the plains and valleys of northern India all the way up to Peshawar looking for and after Afghans to ‘record’ for the British colonial state in India in 1808, one of his Scottish fellowman, William Blackwood (1776-

⁵⁰ Lowell Thomas 1925, 39. It is useful to note that Thomas is not the only person who imitated the views of Elphinstone.

⁵¹ Hopkins (2007), 23.

1834), founded Edinburgh Encyclopedia in the same year to record Edinburgh, the capital of the “Scottish Nation.”⁵² Late in the nineteenth century, exactly sixty-four years after the first publication of *An Account of the Kingdom of Caubul*, another Scottish colonial officer, Major George Frederick Blackwood who was the grandson of William Blackwood came to Kandahar, the capital of southern Afghanistan. Blackwood was badly sick in 1879 when he heard that Sir Pierre Louis Cavagnari, the Italian-French born and a British naturalized citizen and colonial officer had been killed in his Colonial Residency in Kabul in September 3rd, 1879.

Although Major Blackwood was still sick in India, he could not accept the possibility that the Second Anglo-Afghan War (1878-1880) might become another lost battle for the British Empire similar to the First Anglo-Afghan War (1839-1842). Consequently, Major Blackwood left India to Afghanistan to avenge the killing of Cavagnari, the British Envoy in Kabul. When he arrived in Kandahar, he was one of the several colonial officers to assist Abdur Rahman Khan (r. 1880-1901), the celebrated “Iron Amir,” the state-builder, and unifier of the modern nation of Afghan nation and a British subsidized ruler. Major Blackwood wanted to keep in power Rahman’s appointed governor, Wali Shir Ali Khan in Kandahar, and take revenge of the killing of Cavagnari. However, in July 27 of 1880 Major Blackwood was also killed in the Battle of Maiwand, the most

⁵² The author has learned about the Scottish Nationalism and William Blackwood and his publishing and printing activities in Scotland, from several conversations with Brian Duncan, a graduate fellow in the history department at James Madison University. For more specifically on Blackwood, see "William Blackwood (Scottish publisher) -- Britannica Online Encyclopedia." Encyclopedia - Britannica Online Encyclopedia. <http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/68653/William-Blackwood> (accessed February 14, 2012).

memorable battle that Afghan nationalists would recall from their experiences with the British colonialism in Afghanistan.⁵³

As Elphinstone established the Afghan figure “Ahmed Shauh,” the founder of Afghanistan,⁵⁴ so did Major George Frederick Blackwood death in the Battle of Maiwand in turn create another Afghan figure, Malalai—this time the female Afghan figure of nationalism in Afghanistan. As part of the colonial-nationalism narrative in Afghanistan, the story goes that Malali, who is locally known as *da Maiwand Malalai* or Malalai of Maiwand, along with her father and fiancé participated in the Battle of Maiwand, which occurred during her wedding day. She was then martyred in the battle. In the annals of the battle when it was turning in favor of the British, it has been written that Malalai shouted:

"Young love! If you do not fall in the battle of Maiwand, by God, someone is saving you as a symbol of shame!"

"With a drop of my sweetheart's blood, shed in defense of the Motherland, Will I put a beauty spot on my forehead, such as would put to shame the rose in the garden."⁵⁵

This call, the story goes, from an “Afghan woman” upon the Afghan men who were supposedly losing the Battle of Maiwand to the British turns the battle in favor of Afghan

⁵³ For Major George Frederick Blackwood’s biography and his participation in the Maiwand Battle, see Sir Leslie Stephen, and Sir Sidney Lee, "Dictionary of national biography - Sir Leslie Stephen, Sir Sidney Lee - Google Books." Google Books. http://books.google.com/books/about/Dictionary_of_national_biography.html?id=DdgpAAAAYAAJ (accessed February 11, 2012). For Cavagnari, Maiwand Battle, and Second Anglo-Afghan War, see Garen Ewing, "The Second Anglo-Afghan War 1878-1880: The British in Afghanistan." The Second Anglo-Afghan War 1878-1880: The British in Afghanistan. <http://www.angloafghanwar.info> (accessed February 11, 2012).

⁵⁴ Elphinstone (1842), 282.

⁵⁵ For an English piece on Malalai, see Garen Ewing, "Malalai -Afghan heroine of Maiwand." <http://www.garenewing.co.uk/angloafghanwar/biography/malalai.php> (accessed February 11, 2012).

and results in a victory for Afghanistan. Malalai, who is the heroine of the Battle of Maiwand, provided nationalism in Afghanistan with the imagined, real, and mythical realities that *all* nationalisms need to foster a sense of nationhood. Since Malalai's participation in the Battle of Maiwand and identification of her as a female figure of nationalism in Afghanistan have become part of the popular and local narrative in the country, she is now honored throughout Afghanistan by naming after her Malalai High School, Malalai Hospital, and Malalai Magazine. In addition to these institutions, thousands Afghan parents have named (and continue to name)⁵⁶ their daughters as "Malalai" after Malalai of Maiwand.

The end of the Battle of Maiwand and the construction of Malalai as Afghanistan's nationalist icon commenced the twentieth century. By this time, Elphinstone's *An Account of the Kingdom of Caubul* was already more useful and more necessary than ever for Afghan nationalists. They were ready to use any sources, no matter Elphinstonian knowledge and or its locally adopted and modified forms to imagine Afghanistan. Exactly one hundred eighteen years after Elphinstone published his *An Account of the Kingdom of Caubul* where he designated 'Ahmed Shauh' the founder of modern Afghanistan, Mir Ghulam Mohammad Ghobar, one of the prominent Afghan nationalists of the era agreed with Elphinstone's designation of Ahmad Shah as the founder of Afghanistan. However, what Ghobar did different from Elphinstone was that he did not only designate Ahmad Shah as the founder of modern Afghanistan, but he also designated him as *Ahmad Shah Baba-ye Afghan* or Ahmad Shah the Father of Afghans.

⁵⁶ It is useful to note here that the current internationally and U.S backed-president of Afghanistan Hamid Karzai named Malalai his second child, a daughter, who was recently born in March 15, 2012.

Chapter Two, Studies of Nationalism in Afghanistan

In addition to the theoretical and contextual problems associated with the study of nationalism in Afghanistan, there is also the issue of scarcity of scholarship on the subject. The associated problem is the fact that the Euro-American scholars of the country have not demonstrated dissimilarity in their approach and argument. There is no difference of opinion about and of nationalism in Afghanistan among them. They have collectively identified the tenets of nationalism in Afghanistan between 1901 and 1929 in a hegemonic way and they have labeled this period as an era of “reform and rebellion” in Afghanistan. Considering the number of studies that are produced about nationalism in Afghanistan and their hegemonic treatment of nationalism in Afghanistan through one kind of narrative, one kind of tale, and one kind of description, it is safe here to review them also monolithically rather than individually.⁵⁷

In here, the review of studies of nationalism in Afghanistan introduces certain personalities of nationalism, certain events of nationalism, and the general characteristic of nationalism in Afghanistan. The metaphor that would guide the discussion in this chapter is called “A Hegemonic Narrative of Nationalism in Afghanistan.” This narrative is woven around individual nationalists and their time:

Habibullah Khan, r. 1901-1919

The narrative, which the previous studies have told of nationalism in Afghanistan, starts with “great men” and “hegemonic institutions” such as Emir Habibullah Khan (r.

⁵⁷ The major scholarly works, which have characterized the era, 1901-1933 as a period of “reform and rebellion,” and have offered a monolithic explanation of nationalism in Afghanistan and reforms, are Kohn (1928, half-chapter), Wild (1933, a book); Dupree (1964, an article); Gregorian (1967, an article and later developed into a book); Ghobar (1987, two and half chapter); Poullada (1973, a book); Schinasi (1979, a book); Nawid (1999, 2009 a book and an article); and Sakhavarz (2007, a book). These works are standard sources for studying nationalism in Afghanistan.

1901-1919) and Habibya College.⁵⁸ Although Habibullah Khan or *Siraj al-Millat wa'Din*, the Torch of Nation and Religion, was born in Samarqand (then a colonized Central Asian Khanate of the Russian Empire where his father Abdur Rahman was living), he as the Crown Prince of Afghanistan inherited the throne in 1901 when Rahman died. His father, who ruled Afghanistan with coercion and cruelty for twenty one years, 1880-1901, left for him a colonially established state with a territorially unified polity. As he began his rule, the British Colonial State in India also continued bankrolling him, as the heir of the Afghan throne. This patronage was in recognition of the fact that his father, Rahman, was the signatory of several treaties with the British. The British continued to grant subsidy in return for recognizing British to control and protect Afghanistan's foreign relations.⁵⁹

However, what becomes important to the development of nationalism in Afghanistan, as the narrative tells, is that Habibullah was different from his father. This difference was seen in many actions and activities of Habibullah while he ruled Afghanistan. He was a man of modern ideas and modern ways of running a state and a country. He was, as one study of nationalism in Afghanistan wrote, a person with an “enterprising nature ... [and]...curious about technology and mechanics.”⁶⁰ For instance, he was not shy to be photographed; a new fashion of identification that became more popular among the elites

⁵⁸ Habibya College is the subject of discussion in chapter three.

⁵⁹ For a discussion of British's subsidy to Abdur Rahman, see Shah. M. Hanifi, “Impoverishing a Colonial Frontier: Cash, Credit, and Debt in Nineteenth-Century Afghanistan,” *Iranian Studies*, 37, no. 2 (2004), 199-218

⁶⁰ May Schinasi, *Afghanistan at the beginning of the twentieth century: nationalism and journalism in Afghanistan: a study of Seraj ul-akhbar, 1911-1918*, (Naples: Istituto universitario orientale (1979), 29. However, it is important to note here that Habibullah's father, Rahman, was also interested in technology and mechanics. It was Rahman who introduced for example minting machines and several other kinds of machineries in Afghanistan in 1890s.

of Kabul in the early twentieth century.⁶¹ He also did not hesitate to introduce for the first time motor cars (*see the figure below*) in Afghanistan. He even went to India to join secretly a British Colonial Freemasonry in Calcutta, Lodge Concordia No. 3102; a colonial club “with a small but exclusive membership, restricted to British Civil and Military Officers of high standing.”⁶²

⁶¹ See *Siraj al-Akhbar* 2nd Year, No. 1, where *Siraj ul’Akhbar*’s first photo publication is an image of Habibullah Khan. It is useful to note here that in 1912, Habibullah Khan encouraged a “Photography Competition,” the first in Afghanistan, where the princes of the Royal House took part. In the competition, Prince Enyayatullah, Habibullah’s eldest son, won the best photo. His picture was the “Entrance Gate of the Royal Garden House of Jalalabad,” the Eastern Province of Afghanistan. See SA 2nd, No. 20, p. 12; and SA 2nd, No. 21, p. 11-12.

⁶² Although understood as rumors Habibullah’s freemasonry membership, he indeed joined secretly the Lodge Concordia No. 3102 in Calcutta. One of the colonial officers, Henry McMahon (then, the Chief Commissioner of Baluchistan), who was appointed in charge of Habibullah’s visit to India in 1906, has documented that Habibullah “begged” for joining the freemasonry. After several denials, he was made a freemason through colonial diplomacy. While having an official dinner with the colonial Commander-in-Chief of India (Lord Kitchener) who lobbied his membership into the Freemasonry, and approval by the Duke of Connaught, the Grand Master of the lodge, Habibullah alone was driven to an emergent meeting of the Lodge on February 2, 1907 at 9:45 p.m. Unable to speak English, the oath, ritual, and proceedings had to be translated for him in Persian. Becoming a full member of the Lodge, he left the meeting at 12 p.m, and made a last wish; if he could establish Freemasonry in Afghanistan. For a full description of how Habibullah became a freemason, and how this “Colonial Freemasonry Diplomacy” became invaluable for the British during World War One in taking Habibullah’s favor, see Henry McMahon, “An Account of the Entry of H. M. Habibullah Khan Amir of Afghanistan Into Freemasonry.” (London: Favil, 1936).

(Figure, 3)



The Persian text beneath the image reads as following: "The car, which is the personal vehical of His Majesty, *Siraj ul' Millat Wa Din*, is the best car among the Royal House's cars. Engine 40 to 50 Power. Speed, 60 Miles Per Hour."⁶³

However, what really made Habibullah different from his father, more so than the introduction of motor cars and membership of the colonial freemasonry in India, was his decision to offer political amnesty to the thousands Afghans who had been exiled by his father. This amnesty, as conveyed by the hegemonic narrative of nationalism in Afghanistan, made possible for Afghanistan to start experiencing modernization reforms because of the return of the exiled Afghans. Since the exiled Afghans had spent times in places such as Damascus, Cairo, Istanbul, and colonial cities of British India, they were well aware with reforms and modernization efforts of the governments and nationalists in those places. When Habibullah invited them to come to Afghanistan, they came back. But when the exiled Afghans, chief among them Mahmud Tarzi's family arrived and saw the

⁶³ SA, 5th year, No. 7, p. 5.

backwardness of their fatherland, they raised questions about Afghanistan's past historical achievements in the Perso-Islamic world, its present-status of backwardness, and raised questions about the solutions for its future: *Chea bodeam* (what were we); *Chea shodeam* (what we became); and *Aya Che Bayed Kard*, (what ought to be done)?⁶⁴ *Aya Che Bayed Kard* was the Persian title of a book (1912) that was written by Mahmud Tarzi the so-called "father" of nationalism in Afghanistan.

Tarzi (1865-1933) was one of the exiled Afghans who returned to Afghanistan when Habibullah issued the amnesty.⁶⁵ *Aya Che Bayed Kard* is praised by the previous studies of nationalism in Afghanistan because it shows the development of national consciousness in Afghanistan and the attempts of Afghan nationalists to reforming the country. *Aya Che Bayed Kard*'s main (and hegemonic) argument is that the advancement of a country depends how much loyal the people of that country are to the ruler and the state, and how much the ruler favors his people. According to Tarzi, it was possible for Afghanistan to progress. However, there were certain ways to achieve progress in Afghanistan. "To progress," Tarzi suggests a hegemonic premise:

One way is that the ruler should favor reforms for [his] country, especially the rulers of the Abode of Islam because a Muslim sees necessary the existence of a ruler. And he obeys him, and sanctions himself in service of the ruler....We [Afghans] are thankful for the Almighty God who has favored the Afghan nation with a just ruler, Habibullah, *Siraj ul-Millat Wa Din*. Another way to advancement and progress of a nation is through education, which has been made possible by the Holiness, the Necessary Being, Habibullah.⁶⁶

⁶⁴ Mahmud Tarzi, *Aya Che Bayad Kard: What ought to be Done?* (Kabul, Matb-e Darul Sultana, 1912), 2.

⁶⁵ He is an important figure to note of him in order to examine nationalism in Afghanistan. The limited numbers of studies, which are produced on nationalism in Afghanistan, place Mahmud Tarzi at the center of their analysis in discussing the modernization reforms and development of nationalism in Afghanistan in the early decades of the twentieth century, are Dupree (1964), Gregorian (1967), Schinasi (1979), Nawid (2009), and Sakhavarz (2007).

⁶⁶ Tarzi (1912), 3-7.

The exiled Afghans such as Tarzi, whose local and global modernist consciousness was the result of their immigration, access to information, and interaction in the wider world outside Afghanistan, became *nationalist* Afghans once they came back to their fatherland. The hegemonic narrative of nationalism in Afghanistan tells that it were these nationalist Afghans who began to help Habibullah to bring about a number of modernization reforms in Afghanistan. For example, Habibiya College, a modern school with a new standard curriculum of education besides the religious education, was opened in 1904.⁶⁷ In 1911, the Afghan nationalists now led by Tarzi published *Siraj ul-Akhbar Afghaniya*, “the Torch of Afghan News.” Publication of *Siraj ul-Akhbar*, as the first modern newspaper in Afghanistan, promoted a nationalistic and modernist idea whose writers and readers were Afghan elites in Afghanistan and pan-Islamic and pan-Asian nationalists outside Afghanistan.⁶⁸

However, before *Siraj al-Akhbar*, Afghanistan had also a newspaper that was called *Shams Al’Nahar* or “the Sun of the Day” that was published supposedly between 1873 and 1877. Unlike *Siraj Al-Akhbar*, very little is known of *Shams Al’Nahar*—answers to such basic questions as whose idea was it and where the printing presses were brought from, and why it stopped publishing all elude the researcher. The current knowledge about *Shams Al-Nahar* is all based on the 16 page copy that exists: its editor was Mirza Abdul Ali who worked in the court of emir Shir Ali Khan. It was published in Persian. Internal evidence from the available 16 pages of *Shams al’Nahar* indicates that its

⁶⁷ Habibiya College is the subject of analysis in chapter three, “Reforms in Education.”

⁶⁸ See Schinasi (1974) for a discussion of *Siraj al-Akhbar* and the role of Mahmud Tarzi in the development of nationalism in Afghanistan.

sources of information were mostly newspapers of South Asia origins. The scripts would be copied and reported. Some of the South Asian newspapers' names that appear in *Shams al'Nahar* are "Newspapers of Rajputana," "Newspapers of Moradabad," "Newspapers of Lahore," and "Newspapers of Punjab."⁶⁹ The world news appeared first in the bulletin and the domestic news came in second. Some of the news reports were on such topics as "an English man who divorces his old wife after meeting a girl, and promises her marriage. However, after a while he does not marry her but remarries his old wife. This creates a bad name for the girl. Now the courts have asked him to pay a fine of 30,000 rupees to the father of the girl so that he can marry his daughter to somebody else."⁷⁰ Some of the news headlines were reports *Khabar az London* or News from London and *News from America: the New World*, which included stories about the railway construction programs that were being undertaken in the United States. Other news reports were on topics like *new ways to know a child*: "it has been reported from China where they have found out a new way to know about legitimacy of a son. They take some blood from a son, and some from a father, and put them in a cup or bowl. If the bloods mix, it means that the son is the legitimate son of the father. Otherwise, if the bloods don't mix, there was no relationship between them."⁷¹

⁶⁹ *Shams al-Nahar* (1873-1877), 6-16.

⁷⁰ *Ibid*, 6-7.

⁷¹ *Ibid*, 7. The other major interesting news reports were: "News from Prussia: Gold Robbery in Prussian State," "the English Man Conversion into Islam in Lahore," "the Muslim Imam Conversion into Christianity in Delhi," "News from Mecca," and "News from Sultan of Rum: his disputes with the Austria-Hungary Empire on the issue of jazya over the Sultan's Christian Subjects in Bosnia." According to *Shams ul-Nahar*, there were also emphasis by the Afghan court on the courtiers to learn English, Urdu, and Arabic. In addition, to the languages; the studies of history, math, and geography were encouraged because they were bringing

Although *Shams al-Nahar* was the first known newspaper of Afghanistan in the nineteenth century and *Siraj al-Akhbar* started its publication in 1911, Afghanistan began to have a growing culture of *print-capitalism* after the country was made independent in 1919. In the years after 1919, the Afghan nationalists or *roshanfekran* or the elites as they were known and referred to themselves locally, had access to foreign magazines and newspapers as well as several other domestic publications. For example, unlike the period 1901 until 1918 when there was only *Siraj al-Akhbar*, in the period between 1919 and 1929 there were at least thirteen major newspapers in the country. Every one of these newspapers represented a region of the country: Southern, Eastern, Northern, Western, and Central Afghanistan including the capital, Kabul. For example, *Etehad-e Mashriqi*, ‘eastern unity’ (1920), represented the eastern provinces of Afghanistan. In 1922, *Etehad-e Khan Abad*, ‘Khan Abad unity,’ was founded, representing northeastern region, *Qataghan* Province. *Bedari*, ‘awakening,’ and *Etehad-e Islami*, ‘Islamic unity’ were founded in the city of Mazar-e- Sharif in the northern region. *Setar-e Afghan*, ‘Afghan star,’ was established in Charikar, the capital of Parwan Province in central Afghanistan. In 1921, *Tulu-e Afghan*, ‘the rise of Afghan,’ started its publication in Kandahar city, representing southern Afghanistan.⁷²

All of these printing-publications show that the Afghan nationalists had more and more access to *new* information such as the concepts of nationality or nationhood and modernity that were made possible by what Benedict Anderson called *print-capitalism*.

Although Afghanistan’s printing-publications were not as many as its neighbor countries,

consciousness about “the maps and famous peoples of the world; kings of England, Persia, Russia, and etc.” see Ibid, 5.

⁷² See Gregorian (1969), specifically page 245 for a list of these newspapers.

such as British India, the Afghan *roshanfekran* or the elite class still had access to various regional and global printing-publications that allowed them to read about new information that was not only divine or theological but also secular and modern. For example, Mir Ghulam Mohammad (1897-1978), who grew up and self-educated himself during this period, writes that the Afghan *roshanfekran* were having access to foreign and domestic publications that provided them with secular and modern information about the “political, social, and economic affairs” of the world.

The *roshanfekran* class, according to Ghobar, composed of three kinds of people: the liberals, the young Afghans, and individual *roshanfekker* or elite. The first two groups were connected directly with the royal court where they were advocating for reforms within the state. However, the difference between the liberals and the young Afghans, the first two groups, was that the latter wanted to change the absolute monarchical regime into a constitutionalist monarchy. The third group of *roshanfekran* who were outside the state had independent personal relationships among themselves such as sharing information about the state of affairs of Afghanistan and the world.⁷³ What becomes interesting here is to note that these small groups of elites had increasing access to print-publications from both outside and inside Afghanistan, which was made possible by Afghanistan’s growing and regional *print-capitalism* market.

During Habibullah Khan’s reign, the major printing source of information was *Siraj Al-Akbar*, the main publication of Afghanistan that advocated a nationalistic and modernist idea in Afghanistan. In this publication, the exiled Afghans including Mahmud

⁷³ See Ghobar (1987), especially pages 716-727 where he talks more in detail about these groups of Afghan *roshanfekran*.

Tarzi who had returned to the country received strong support from Habibullah. He patronized the newspaper and its editor, Tarzi, to publish on the sociopolitical state of affairs of Afghanistan and the world.

However, the printing-publications soon became a problem for Habibullah who felt threaten and thought that his monarchial power was challenged by the Afghan nationalists who demanded faster and more reforms and changes in Afghanistan. In a way nationalism gets entrenched with rising sentiments of the Afghan nationalists. It became so in the sense that the Afghan nationalists, unlike Habibullah, wanted faster and more changes in the state and status quo of Afghanistan. This was especially true for those who disagreed with the internal and external policies of Habibullah Khan and demanded a complete change, for example, in the Anglo-Afghan Relations. This group is popularly characterized by the local Afghan historians as *Mashruta'khwahan* or the constitutionalists.⁷⁴

Habibullah therefore felt suspicious and threatened by the Afghan nationalists who were demanding faster and more changes in the state, its internal and foreign policy, and above all, in the status quo of the country. The status quo of the country was related particularly to Afghanistan's foreign policy which was still controlled by the British. When Habibullah refused to agree with the call for change and thereby demoralized the ambitions of the emerging Afghan nationalists, he was assassinated in 1919 when he was at a seasonal hunting trip in Laghman in Eastern Afghanistan.

⁷⁴ For a detailed discussion of the Afghan constitutionalists, see Habibullah Habibi, *Junbesh-e Mashruta'khwahan dar Afghanistan: The Constitutionalist Movement in Afghanistan* (Peshawar: Sazman-e Mahajeerin Musulman-e Afghanistan, 1999).

There are several arguments with regards to Habibullah's assassination. There is a religious argument. There is the speculation that the Afghan religious elites, led by Nasrullah Khan, Habibullah Khan's brother, sponsored his assassination because he kept Afghanistan neutral during World War One when the British were fighting the Islamic Caliphate, the Ottoman Empire. How much convincing this argument is will be hard to prove, though it is accepted and narrated by the major works on nationalism in Afghanistan.⁷⁵ Another is the nationalism argument that purports that he was assassinated by Afghan nationalists because he did not only stay neutral during World War One but because he was still receiving subsidy from the British in exchange for allowing them to control the foreign policies of Afghanistan.⁷⁶ Whether Habibullah was assassinated because of his neutrality in World War One or because of his agreement to grant British control of Afghanistan's foreign policies, the hegemonic narrative tells that though Habibullah was the pioneer of modernization reforms that paved the way for nationalism in Afghanistan, he was not *too* much nationalist. This is in the sense that he did not bring enough change in the status quo of Afghanistan from a British controlled backward polity to an *independent* modern polity.

Amanullah Khan, r. 1919-1929⁷⁷

⁷⁵ See for example Senzil Nawid, *Religious response to social change in Afghanistan, 1919-29: King Aman-Allah and the Afghan Ulama* (Costa Mesa: Mazda Publishers, 1999), 34-42; and Gregorian (1967), 215-223.

⁷⁶ Schinasi (1979), 35-36.

⁷⁷ Amanullah Khan's full name and title take various forms and spellings. They are all of the followings: Amanullah Khan, Aman Ullah Khan, Aman-Allah, Aman Allah, emir Amanullah Khan, emir Amanullah, Shah Amanullah, Shah Amanullah Khan, King Amanullah, King Amanullah Khan, Ghazi Amanullah, Ghazi Amanullah Khan, and Shah Ghazi Amanullah Khan. For the sake of consistency, this thesis will use "Amanullah Khan," referring to the emir/king Amanullah throughout the thesis.

The hegemonic narrative picks up its tale of nationalism in Afghanistan by telling that when Habibullah was killed in 1919, his son Amanullah Khan who may have played a role in assassination of his father came to the throne after a short power struggle between him and his uncle, Nasrullah Khan. What is useful to note here is that the hegemonic narrative exoticizes and romanticizes Amanullah's nationalism more than ever. Amanullah is identified, for example, as the champion of nationalism in Afghanistan because he did not want to only reform Afghanistan but he wanted to do it faster and drastically. After his enthroning, Amanullah freed Afghanistan from British control in the 1919 War of Independence or known also as the Third Anglo-Afghan War. The freedom and reforms of Afghanistan were inevitable when Amanullah was enthroned because he was someone, as one study of him wrote:

[Whose] heart was bred with a burning flame of nationalism which was not to be found in the heart of any other Afghans. He saw the flatters of other lands, and he heard the soft arguments of many nationalities. He learnt how beneficial it would be for Afghanistan to link her fortunes with the Germans and the Turks. He was intent upon showing to the world that Afghanistan could not be regarded as the pathetic little 'buffer-state' towards which the Great Powers could show a benevolent tolerance."⁷⁸

When Afghanistan was made free, he started to modernize it rapidly and drastically because he was "the true Afghan." It is argued by the hegemonic narrative that:

He knew the country better than most. He knew he had the personality to lead, and to lead as far as dead. He had brain, and he was sea-green incorruptible. He was not smug. But he was arrogant. He was now in the position to set in motion the ideals which had born in his heart. In many moments of reverie, he thought of the backward condition of his people. Even the tenets of the religion which were taken for granted in his country, came up for review in his vigorous brain. The women, for instance; few dared to brave the wrath of Allah and the temporal disapproval of the mullahs by thinking freely about the *purdah* system. Few questioned the right of men to imprison women all their lives in the enveloping clock of custom. But Amanullah did....Amanullah's energy and ambitions

⁷⁸ Ronald Wild, *Amanullah, Ex-King of Afghanistan* (Quetta: Nisa Traders, 1978), 25.

were entirely guided by good intentions. [He was someone] that nothing swerved him from his path of violent nationalism.⁷⁹

The above passage is from Ronald Wild, a Scottish reporter for the Daily Telegraph of London. Wild is the only person who has produced a useful and only biographical account of Amanullah, *Amanullah: Ex-King of Afghanistan* (1933). Wild, like many other Western journalists, was astonished to witness first-hand the modernist reforms of Amanullah. In 1928 he went to Kabul to observe the reforms in person because he wanted to know whether the media reports out of Afghanistan were true or an exaggeration of the modernization programs of Amanullah. Wild finds Afghanistan still a place “untouched by civilization... [where in its capital, Kabul]...all around were the noisy dramas of Eastern buying and selling. In the actual thoroughfare, donkeys, and mules and skeleton ponies struggled and bumped their way through. ‘Kabadar! Kabadar!’ yelled the men who tend them. ‘Make way, make way.’ And with a continued shouting for room, obeyed by none, the merchandise of the entire East would pass.”⁸⁰ Despite of the backwardness of “this God-forsaken corner of a harsh and cruel land...[where]...the so-called evils of modernity had never penetrated, and might never penetrate,” Wild’s account of Amanullah like many studies of Afghanistan still draws a hegemonic and romanticized picture of Amanullah, and praises him throughout his book for standing against and modernizing a “savage land.”⁸¹

⁷⁹ Ibid, 23-46.

⁸⁰ Ibid, 72. It is important to note here that Wild has anglicized wrongly the phrase “Kabadar! Kabadar!;” Make Way, make way. The phrase is Khabardar! Khabardar!.

⁸¹ Ibid, 19 and 131. It is helpful to note that Wild was not the only correspondent who went to Afghanistan to observe and romanticize the reforms of Amanullah. Lowell Thomas, the American journalist, and also several others such as Andree Viollis of the Paris daily, *Le Petit Parisien*, went also during Amanullah’s reign, 1919-1929. Thomas is one of the most famous

Although Amanullah is praised for his radical nationalism sentiments, the hegemonic narrative concludes with the observation that Amanullah was ignorant and yet too radical for the modernization program for Afghanistan. He could not understand the conservatism and natural backwardness of his traditional society; therefore he failed in his nationalistic reforms of Afghanistan. His failures were because he had a country, Afghanistan, that was (and “is”) an *inward-looking society* that opposed progress and reforms, which the true Afghan, Amanullah, envisioned for it.

According to the hegemonic narrative of nationalism in Afghanistan, Amanullah was overthrown and exiled in 1929 following an uprising against his modernist progressive reforms. There are two historiographical arguments that the studies of Afghanistan offer in regards to the fall of Amanullah’s regime. One is the argument of the foreign scholars. They argue that since Amanullah was swift and extreme in his modernization and nationalism reforms, he failed because he could not understand the religiosity and inward-looking characteristic of Afghan society. However, another argument is the local Afghan nationalist-narrative which presents Amanullah as a modernist Afghan who wanted to modernize Afghanistan. However, it was not the Afghan people who dethroned him; it was rather the British Government in India/Britain that plotted against his regime.⁸²

ones, who has also written an account about Afghanistan: *Beyond Khyber Pass: Into Forbidden Afghanistan* (New York: the Century Company, 1925).

⁸²See for example Ghobar (1987), pages 808-826; Mohammad Wali, *tawtaya-e englees dar suqot-e dawlat-e ala’ hazrat Amanullah Khan: The English Plot in Falling of H.M. Amanullah Khan’s Government* (Peshawar: Alqalam Press, 2009); Hasan Kakar, *da padshah Amanullah Wakmana-e ta yaw naway-e katana: A New Opinion about King Amanullah’s Regime*, (Germany: Afghanistan Literary Society, 2005); and Abdul Khaliq Ikhlas, *Isteqlal Aman-ya: The*

This is, as it was explained above, how one would understand nationalism in Afghanistan; like a tale that is told and is retold and retold. It all starts from Habibullah's enthroning, his reforms, Habibiya College, and *Siraj Al-Akhbar* to Habibullah's assassination. The tale picks up again from Amanullah, his War of Independence against the British, and his radical reforms to his exile.

The Problems of Studies of Nationalism in Afghanistan

It is evident from the above hegemonic narrative that previous studies of nationalism in Afghanistan lack a theoretical analysis of the subject. It is like a folk tale. The entire narrative is about "great men" such as the "Iron emir," Abdur Rahman Khan, the moderate emir, Habibullah Khan, the "true Afghan," Amanullah Khan, and modernist Afghan, Mahmud Tarzi. This "great men" history has several weaknesses that are rooted in how these studies are done. In fact, the theories of postcolonial studies, such as the subaltern, post-modernism, and hegemonic theories as useful analytical tools of postcolonial studies of nationalism, are absent of Afghan history. For instance, the subaltern theory could talk about the very ordinary people for whom the nationalists claimed equality and inclusiveness while in reality they were marginalized, used and abused. A useful collection of essays on the subject of nationalism and subaltern communities is *The Forging of Nationhood* (2003), edited by Gyanendra Pandey and Peter Geschiere. The essays offer a subaltern postcolonial view and critique of modernity and nationalism, which has been so far neglected by the previous studies of nationalism

Independence of Amanullah (Kabul: Matb-e Bayhaqi, 2005). For a discussion of Amanullah's reforms and his failures to modernize Afghanistan in the face of the so-called tribal and conservative society of Afghanistan, see Leon Poullada, *Reform and Rebellion in Afghanistan, 1919-1929: King Amanullah's Failure to Modernize A Tribal Society*, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1973).

in Afghanistan. Their argument is that nationalism as an idea that positions itself for justice and inclusion excludes many people in whose names the nationalists propagate their agenda. In Afghanistan, for example, it is not clear how ordinary people felt about the nationalist activities and the manner such actions influenced the Afghan state. Thus, previous studies of nationalism in Afghanistan do not explain whether or not the ordinary Afghans shared similar views about the Afghan state or the reforms about modernization that were central to the conversation. As it will be showed in chapter three (“Reforms in Education”), nationalism was an elite project in Afghanistan during the period 1901-1929.

The Afghans who propagated an Afghan national idea formed a small elite class in Kabul, the capital of the country, and other urban centers. In addition to the problem of elitism, the other serious problem which the studies of nationalism in Afghanistan encounter is the lack of definition of what constituted nationalism in Afghanistan during the period under study. In other words, these studies talk about the opening of new school and reform of the education system, in which new subjects such as history, geography, and chemistry were taught. However, it is not explained how the school was organized, what were the forms of order and disciplines by which the schools were regulated, what kind of “Afghan history” they taught in the school, and how the Afghan state used the hegemonic institutions of education to expand its power and control the populace.

By focusing on the modernization reforms only, the previous studies of nationalism in Afghanistan neglected the very meaning of nationalism. As Breuilly states in the opening of his *Nationalism and the State* (1994), “nationalism is above and beyond all else, about

politics and that politics is about power. Power, in the modern world, is principally about control of the state. The central task [for a nationalist or the state] is to relate nationalism to the objectives of obtaining and using state power.”⁸³ By attending to question of power, class, and cultural institutions, this thesis will use subaltern and post-modernist theories to address its main question: how did the Afghan state and Afghan nationalists used modernist reforms in education to propagate a national idea for Afghanistan?

⁸³ Breuilly (1994), 1.

Chapter Three: Reforms in Education

Few years ago [before 1919], you were unaware. In everywhere, you were to be identified in the name of *others*. Even when you were going to pilgrimage to Mecca, you were traveling as Iranians and Turks because you did not have Afghan Passport and *Tazkara*.⁸⁴ Now [since 1919] that you have an independent [country, Afghanistan], I wish you freedom until the Resurrection... Therefore; you must get passport and *Tazkara*. I have been informed that you have said; if you have gotten a passport or if you get one, you will be enlisted in the army and etc. This is not true. Don't perceive bad the benefits of having *Tazkara* and passport.⁸⁵

A limited but important number of studies have already engaged the topic of modernization reforms in Afghanistan. However, the study of nationalism in Afghanistan and reforms is incomplete and problematic. The attempt is here to re-examine critically nationalism in Afghanistan in the context of the reforms that occurred in educational system in Afghanistan between 1901 and 1929. Therefore, although the Afghan state implemented a number of reforms in the army, bureaucracy, laws, and education, the reforms in education will be assessed thoroughly here. The issue central to the discussion is education reform in Afghanistan as it was implemented from 1901 till 1929. Before a discussion of nationalism in Afghanistan and education is examined in this chapter, an explanation of the relationship between modernity and nationalism is offered in order to conceptualize the question of why the Afghan nationalists thought that the reforms in education were needed for Afghanistan.

⁸⁴ **tazkara*, which is an Arabic word and means “mentioning” or “recalling” is the literal name of National ID Card in Afghanistan. In its Persianized form, *tazkara* literally could mean all of the followings: biographer, biography of one person, a collection of biographies, and it can also specifically mean “passport.”

⁸⁵ This is a portion of Amanullah Khan's statement to Afghans who were living in Mumbai or as it was known during the British Raj as Bombay. Amanullah Khan gives a speech when he visits India as part of his grand tour of Europe and a number of other countries during the 1927-1928. His meeting with “Afghans of Bombay” was arranged by the Afghan Consulate and Afghans' community there. His trip will be fully discussed in chapter four, “Symbolizing Afghanistan.” For the full text of the speech, see Aziz'ul-ddin Wakil Popalzai, *Safarhay-e Ghazi Amanullah Shah: dar duwazdah keshwar-e asya wa europa. The Trips of Shah Amanullah Ghazi: In Twelve Countries of Asia and Europe, 1928-1928*, (Kabul: Matb-e Dawlati, 1985), 37-39.

Conceptualizing Modernity

The concept of modernity is not an unambiguous term. First, there are terminological difficulties and ambiguities with the term. Terms such as “pre-modern,” “modernity,” “postmodernism,” and “anti-modernism,” “Western,” or “Western modernity,” “Muslim modernity,” “Japanese modernity,” and “Turkish modernity” are conceptually vague constructs. Second, modernity does not have a clear temporal date. In other words, the periodization of modernity is a subjective selection. For example, in world history “modernity” can be located in and beyond the sociopolitical developments of industrial capitalism as Max Weber would argue. The Byzantine, Chinese and Islamicate modernities (Ottoman, Safavid, and Mughal Empires) of 1000-1900 A.D are famous examples. These empires were highly bureaucratic, sophisticated, and thus quite *modern*. Additionally, there is not an intellectual consensus on approaches of modernity too.⁸⁶

In order to simplify the concept of modernity in this thesis, this chapter approaches modernity from the perspective of “reform nationalism.” Reform nationalism is the perspective that many non-European countries copied and adopted European social and political institutions such as *national* anthem or *national* army and or *national* education in order to claim national sovereignty, identity, and territoriality, though they rejected the cultural superiority of the west. In this process of reforming, small classes of the local elites were the pioneers. Their desires and expectations to modernize their countries

⁸⁶ Two useful articles that describe the multiple “modernities,” and history of modernity are by Hefner Robert, “Multiple Modernities: Christianity, Islam, and Hinduism in a Globalizing Age,” *Annual Review of Anthropology*, 27 (1998), 83-104; and Peter V.D. Veer, “The Global History of Modernity,” *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient*, 41, no. 3 (1998), 285-94.

along the European lines were based on their experiences, observation, and knowledge that they have developed from living in, reading about, traveling to, and having connection and interaction with Europe and Europeans. Because of the Europe's advanced military might, the local elites and their state invested locally to reform first the military. However, they then also began to reform other institutions of the state such as education system.⁸⁷

In Afghanistan too, the Afghan nationalists used reform nationalism in propagating a sense of national identity, and they did it by imitating the European sociopolitical institutions. Below, the Afghan nationalists' reforms in education system are thoroughly explored with emphasis on making of a modern curriculum and the organization of the schools between 1904 and 1929.

Mohammad Abid: The Indian Muslim Spy, Traveler, Teacher?

Mohammad Adib, a Muslim Indian, arrives in “the holy land of Afghanistan” sometime between 1904 and December 15, 1916. While it is difficult to ascertain the exact date of his arrival, it is evident from the sources that Adib was subsequently invited to the *Darul Sultana-e Kabul* or the Royal Court of Kabul. Because he lacked knowledge of the Persian language, which was the state language, he “was not able to become aware and assess the real progress and changes in the educational improvement of *this* Islamic country.” Although he spends his time in Kabul around and associated with state officials, he never articulated his reasoning for coming to Kabul. It can be speculated that he was sent by the British Raj as a spy to produce a report of educational changes in

⁸⁷ See Breuilly (1994), chapter 11, for a useful discussion of “reform nationalism.” The chapter offers three case-studies of reform nationalism about Japan, China, and Turkey.

Afghanistan. There was also the possibility that he came on an educational or political mission to Afghanistan on behalf of Muslims of India. In fact, the first two decades of the 20th century was a period of increased Indian Muslim contacts with Afghans. Politically, many Indian Muslims had embraced the idea of Pan-Islamism and had expressed concern about the fate of the Ottoman Empire as the seat of the Caliphate. Obviously such a position challenged to the colonial state in India. It will therefore also not be out of place to think that Mohammad Adib came to Afghanistan to help the Afghan nationalists to further reform their education. On the professional level, he could have been contracted by the Afghan state to produce an assessment of the educational reforms in Afghanistan. Lastly, it was also possible that Adib could have been one of the many Indian Muslim teachers hired in Afghanistan between 1904 and 1929 to teach at primary and secondary schools. The Indian Muslims connection with Afghan nationalists was important between 1904 and 1929. When Habibullah went to India in 1907, he established a Translation House in Calcutta where translators were paid to render new European scientific books into Persian for use at the newly built schools in Afghanistan.⁸⁸ This notwithstanding, these Indian teachers in Afghanistan could have served as British spies.⁸⁹

⁸⁸ See SA 2nd, No. 21, p.6. Although this source does not provide any other information about who were these translators and how much they were paid, and what books they translated, it only mentions that the translated books were sent to Kabul.

⁸⁹ For a useful and informative article about Indian Muslims' pan-Islamic and nationalism activities in Afghanistan, and how Islamic modernity including the Urdu Modernity and nationalism of South Asia has influenced the development of nationalism in Afghanistan, see Nile Green, "The Trans-border Traffic of Afghan Modernism: Afghanistan and the Indian 'Urdusphere,'" *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 53, no. 53 (2011), 470-508.

Specifically to Mohammad Adib, there is evidence of the specific duties he performed once he arrived in Kabul. Mawlawi Abdul Rab Khan who was the Principal of Kabul Teacher Training Institute and also Head of Afghanistan's Primary Schools officially invited Adib to observe and assess a students' exam day in one of the primary schools in the city. Since Adib "was very interested in observing the schools [of Afghanistan] because schools are the pillars of progress for every nation," he accepted the invitation to observe one of the exams on December 15, 1916. After a half hour walk with Mawlawi Abdul in the center of Kabul city and to the surprise of Adib, the two arrived at the school's big gate. He had "never thought nor was told, and nor remembered that there were these many organized and modernized primary schools in the heart of Kabul city." Adib wrote in his account when he entered inside the school, he was so much shocked by the school's discipline, order, and regulation. Adib spent some two hours in the inspection office of the school where "(130) students were taking exams in Quranic studies, Persian literature, math, and etc."⁹⁰

During this visit, Adib learned that there were "many other modernized schools in Afghanistan." He recorded his observation of his visit as follows:

[he] was entirely convinced that the savior and advancement of every nation and government were its schools. Especially, if the schools' teachers were to be from that country's people because the students could be more patriotic. Patriotism is the love of religion, nation, state, and the king. Realization of this love is an obligation of every person, without exception. Once realized, it will flow in the blood of every person. Without doubts and questions, these [the love of religion, nation, state, and the king] are the first foundation of any nation, which wants to live free forever.

⁹⁰ The fact that Adib stayed in the Inspection office of the school tells that he was most likely an educational inspector who was contracted by the Afghan state to assess the schools.

Since Adib was shocked and surprised when he observed the discipline, order, and awareness of the Afghan students in Kabul, he wrote that these achievements in education were the results of the well-wish, high vision, and patriotic feelings of emir Habibullah Khan. A more detailed observation of Adib of the educational reforms and educational development in Afghanistan was published as an article in *Siraj Al-Akhbar*.

He wrote:

I would like to give my humble and neutral final observations by praising and wishing-continuity for the Government of His Majesty *Amir ul'Muminin*⁹¹ (*Siraj ul' Millat Wa Din*), who is the cultivator of the seeds of education in Afghanistan. It is an absolute obligation for all of the decent people of Afghanistan to be thankful of the Almighty God who has granted them and their country with such a just, progressive, and patriotic king.⁹²

There are two main issues that Adib raises in his discussion of the schools in Kabul that frame this chapter's examination of reforms in education and nationalism in Afghanistan. One is the attempt of the Afghan state and the nationalists to establish a new kind of education system, which would be public rather than entirely theological and religious. Before 1904, education was solely available either in a madrasa, mosque, and or at-home where a family member, usually the father, taught their children. There was no public school system based on a state-sanctioned curriculum. The curriculum of the

⁹¹ Apart from many terminological problems (such as usage of emir, padshah, and shah that produce conflicting meanings because the latter two are pre-Islamic Persian titles while emir is Islamic), Adib uses the title of Amir Ul'Muminin, the Commander of the Faithful, for Habibullah who did not have that title. His official title was *Siraj ul' Millat Wa Din*, the Light of the Nation and Religion. Since the position of the Ottoman Sultan, (Mehmed V, r. 1901-1918) as the Caliph of Islam was soon to disappear during World War One when the Ottoman Empire was defeated, Muslims of India, the so-called Khilafat Movement, was considering the Afghan emirs (Habibullah Khan, and Amanullah Khan) to command the Muslims because they were ruling an 'Independent' Sunni-Muslim State in Afghanistan. The Shah of Iran, whose State was 'Independent' too, was not an option for the Khilafat Movement because of Iran's Shiaism. For a discussion of Pan-Islamism and Afghanistan's role during World War One, see Gregorian (1969), especially pages 215- 223 and 234-239.

⁹² SA, 5th year, No 10, p. 3.

madrassa, mosque, and in-home education covered subjects such as *Quran*, *fiq*, Islamic jurisprudence, *hadith* or the traditions of the Prophet Muhammad, and Perso-Islamic literature such as *Diwan-e Hafez Shirazi* (the Persian collection of poems from Hafez Shirazi who was a fourteenth century Iranian poet). This curriculum content could help students learn the skills of reading and writing in Persian.⁹³ Subjects, such as history or geography that became popular with nationalism programs and nationalists, were absent before 1904. Another issue which Adib raised was the order, discipline, and love-of the homeland and the king that were emphasized in the new state-sanctioned curriculum in Afghanistan. In the examination of the new state-sanctioned curriculum and the organization of the schools in the section immediately below, three questions are explored—the examination of the reformed-curriculum, the organization of the schools, and how the Afghan state and the nationalists addressed nationalism in Afghanistan in the context of reforms in education. Before doing that, it is however useful to know how education and nationalism are related nationalistically.

The variables such as religion, language, geography, and history have strong appeals to scholars, and they are important to studying nationalism. But, “a man’s education,” as Ernest Gellner explained of the relationship between nationalism and education, “is by far his most precious investment, and in effect confers his identity on him.” The fundamental output that education produces, according to Gellner, is loyalty of the citizens to a nation. This is only possible in a modern nation-state; Gellner calls it “Industrial Society.” The pre-condition to such an output is a standardized curriculum,

⁹³ *Diwan-e Hafez Shirazi* is locally and colloquially known in Afghanistan as Khuja Hafez. It still is one of the primary textbooks for literacy education in the mosques, religious, and private homes across Afghanistan.

“especially in national subjects like literature, geography, history, and physical education.” Since loyalty is gained through the standardized curriculum, the state, the monarch, and the nationalists will do everything possible to establish such a curriculum in order to instill loyalty to the state, monarch, and nation.⁹⁴ In Afghanistan too, the state and the nationalists tried to establish such a kind of education, which could produce loyalty to the state. As a matter of fact, if there was one theme that most thrilled (and kept busy) the Afghan nationalists to propagate it throughout the period, 1901-1929, it was the importance of modern education for Afghan people.

The Importance of Education

The Afghan state and the nationalists propagated that modern education, like the one that Europeans had, was necessary for Afghan nation in order to progress. It was neither against Islam. It is said, for example, that when Habibullah went to India in 1907, in one of his speeches in Lahore he had said: “o my Moslem brethren, endeavor to acquire knowledge, so that you may not wear the cloths of the ignorant. It is your duty to acquire knowledge. After your children have thoroughly acquainted themselves with the principles and laws of the faith of Muhammad, turn their attention towards the acquirement of the new sciences, as unless you acquire Western knowledge, you will remain without bread.” Habibullah is quoted again thus: “there are those who utter solemn warnings in your ears, who urge that Mohammedans have nothing to do with modern philosophy, who disclaim against Western sciences as though they are evil. I am not among them. I am not among those who ask you to shut your ears and your eyes. On

⁹⁴ Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983), 19-52.

the contrary, I say pursue knowledge wherever it is to be found.”⁹⁵ After two years of its establishment, *Siraj Al-Akhbar* published an article by Mahmud Tarzi, now the chief editor under the title of *alem wa ma'rafat* or Education & Awareness.⁹⁶ “Education means to be knowledgeable,” wrote Mahmud Tarzi. He continued that education “is the ability to distinguish, and to have awareness. Its benefits are obvious from how much holy and precious these words are. A nation is like a [human] body, its soul is education. A nation is asleep, education awakens it. No nation or a people can neither progress nor awake and can't also survive without education.”⁹⁷ In another occasion, he published an article under the title of “*Khuwab dar tariki* or Asleep in Darkness.” In the article, he goes on to praise the value of modern education for advancement of a nation, and its importance specifically to the Afghan nation. He says that Afghans have to learn from Japanese. “Take for example,” he writes, “the Japanese who had nothing. Now after some years, they have everything. They have knowledge and expertise in society, politics, and [political] parties. What did they do? They sent their children all over the world after education. Like bees they spread all over the fields of the world. Now, they have industry. They have no darkness. This means that their mind has awakened. With education and art gained, they have benefited their homeland.”⁹⁸

In addition to Mahmud Tarzi who was the pioneer of modern education, and wrote on its importance to Afghan nation, several other nationalists also wrote about the importance of education. Among them were individuals such as Enayatullah Khan (the

⁹⁵ Gregorian (1969), 187.

⁹⁶ SA, 2nd year, No. 4 p. 8-9.

⁹⁷ SA, 3rd Year, No. 1, p. 5.

⁹⁸ SA 2nd year, NO 20, p. 12-14.

eldest son of Habibullah), Amanullah Khan, (who later becomes king and enlarges the scope of reforms), Abdul Hadi Dawi (bureaucrat, poet, educator, and diplomat), Muhyiuddin Anis (journalist, writer, and educator), and many more. What is important to note here is that the modern education based on a new state-sanction curriculum was emphasized for the sake of progress of the Afghan nation as well as for its making of Afghans in serve and hold loyalty to the state and the king. To understand the nature of the content of this new education and how it was organized, Habibya College's curriculum and administration will be thoroughly examined.

Habibya College, 1904

In 1904, Habibullah Khan opened Afghanistan's first secondary school, called "Habibya" College. The level of education and translation of the name of "Habibya" into English are problematic. First, there is no consensus on whether "Habibya" was an elementary or a secondary school. Many writers have agreed that it could be generally labeled as a "college" level institution where both primary and secondary educations were offered. Second, many of the textbooks that were taught at "Habibya" classified the school variously thus adding to the confusion. For example, all of the following names appear in various textbooks for Habibya College: *Baytul 'ulum-e Mubarak-e Habibya* (The Holy Education House of Habibya), *Madrassa-e Habibya*, (Habibya School), *Madrassa-e Mubarak-e Habibya-e Darul Sultana-e Kabul* (The Holy Habibya School of the Royal Court of Kabul), *Maktab-e Habibya* (Habibya School), and *Lycee Habibya* (Habibya High School). The third designation, *Madrassa-e Mubarak-e Habibya-e Darul Sultana-e Kabul* appears in Habibya's *Nizamnamah* or Law Concerning Habibya (1913).

Because of various designations for Habibya, it can be assumed here that there were corresponding changes in the school's curriculum. For example, Habibya was offering eleven subjects between 1904 and 1919. In 1929, it offered at least thirteen subjects.⁹⁹ For the sake of simplicity about the name of Habibya and its level of education, this thesis will refer to Habibya as "Habibya College." The mission of Habibya College was to produce loyalty to the emir, "who was just and progressive, and wanted to advance the nation" of Afghanistan. In addition to being loyal to the emir, its graduates "would provide services that are needed by the government of Afghanistan."¹⁰⁰ Habibya, as it was the first modern educational institute in Afghanistan and was named after Habibullah himself, had two features that distinguished it from the religious schools. One was that its education was based on the state-sanctioned standardized curriculum. Its other feature was the organization of the school.

Curriculum

Unlike madrassa, mosque, and in-home education where one was offered religious and literacy education, Habibya (and later in the 1920s other schools to follow,) offered classes also in science, art, and social sciences such as drawing, history, geography, and foreign languages such as Urdu and English. The curriculum was divided into two main levels: primary and secondary. The primary level that could take four years to complete covered five subjects: *Dunyat* or Islamic-Teaching, Language (*Dari*, the Afghan Persian), Math, Geography, and *Mashqo-Khat* or Writing. *Daraja-e rashidya* or the secondary

⁹⁹ These subjects are discussed in detailed in the section of "curriculum."

¹⁰⁰ See SA 2nd year, No. 22, p. 7-9 where Prince Enayatullah, who was the chief of Afghanistan's Education Association, talks to the students and teachers of Habibya College while visiting the college.

level that could last four years had at least thirteen subjects. These were *Quran-e Karim*, *Dunyat*, *Akhlaq wa Malumat-e Madina* or Ethics and Citizenry Information, Language, Writing & Calligraphy, History, Geography, Mathematics (Algebra, Trigonometry, and Geometry), Physics, Chemistry, Natural History (Animals, Plants, and Geology), Painting & Drawing, and Music. Some of these subjects were offered collectively. For example, *Quran* and *Dunyat* or Math and Algebra were taught at one session. For the first three years of the secondary level, the students were to learn the science, social science, and religious subjects. The fourth year was devoted to learn linguistic and technical subjects. For languages, in the secondary level education, one could take one of the following languages: Dari, Pashto, Turkish, Arabic, Urdu, and English. What is interesting here is that “Pashto,” one of the two main languages of Afghanistan (the other being Dari/Persian), was listed next to English as a foreign language. Ghobar, who grew up during this time in Kabul and was later in touch with students of Habibya, mentions that this was a work of Indian Muslim teachers who were hired to teach at Habibya. They used the English textbook that was taught in India where the British taught Pashto and English as foreign languages. Ghobar wrote that “the contents of the English textbook about Afghan history were pejorative.” More than that, he argues that the Indian Muslim teachers were not effective and productive because in India as “Muslims, they were not having access to technical, chemical, and scientific education such as mineralogy, engineering, and political philosophy. They only had two options as Muslim students: either study religious or Arabic linguistic studies.”¹⁰¹

¹⁰¹ See Ghobar (1987), 702-3. See also *Porgram-e makateb-e rashidya: Secondary*

Aside from science and technical subjects, Habibiya and other schools found social science subjects such as history, geography, and literature more interesting because they related to nationalism. In Habibiya, for example, the new curriculum was to make it possible for an Afghan to study the history, geography, and literature of not only Afghanistan, but also other nations. To understand the new state-sanctioned curriculum and discuss its relationship to the development of nationalism in Afghanistan, few of the textbooks that were used in Habibiya and other schools are thoroughly explored below. In here, two social science subjects are examined: history and geography.

In *Geography & History of Afghanistan*, a primary textbook for secondary and higher education students including students of Habibiya, the goal was to introduce the *history* and *territory* of Afghanistan. Mohammad Ali Khan, the author of *Geography & History of Afghanistan*, was a teacher in Habibiya. He wrote in his introduction of the book that he had used English sources for writing *Geography & History of Afghanistan*. Therefore, everything could not be granted as true. However, he thought that it was still necessary to write a textbook about the history and geography of Afghanistan. Ali Khan had used twenty sources, mostly books that were produced in British Colonial India by the colonial officials. From the twenty sources, thirteen of them are famous colonial accounts including Mountstuart Elphinstone's *An Account of the Kingdom of Caubul (1815)*, Alexander Burns' *Travels Into Bokhara (1834)*, and *Encyclopedia Britannica*.

Geography & History of Afghanistan is divided into two parts: part one talks about the territory of Afghanistan while part two is about the history of Afghanistan.

Education Curriculum, (1923), 2-3 for the list of subjects that were taught in the secondary level.

“Afghanistan is located,” reads chapter one of *Geography & History*, “in the center of Asia. Its three neighbor countries are Hindustan, Bokhara, and Russia. Since many of its people are Afghans, which is why it is named Afghanistan.”¹⁰² The book then talks about rivers, mountains, passes, mineral mines and resources, climate, animals, plants, agricultures, crafts, and merchandises of Afghanistan. Take for example Afghan crafts and industry. When it introduces the crafts and industry that are available in Afghanistan, the book writes: “for the progress and improvement of the country, the government had enacted laws that intend to promote the crafts and industry in the country. At the same time, it encourages people to purchase goods of *watan* or the homeland rather than foreign.” “Well-liked goods of” Afghanistan, the book lists, are “carpets, silks, and karakuls.”¹⁰³

After situating the territorial location of Afghanistan in Asia and its neighbor countries, the chapter of *Geography & History*, “History of Afghanistan,” introduces the ancient, medieval, and modern history of Afghanistan. It introduces Afghans as a people who ““before Islam, identified themselves as descendent of Saul, the King of Israel.” However, Afghanistan “was known to Greeks as Aria or Arianna, Afghanistan’s ancient name. Afghans had always lived independently. They have defended their country against Alexander, Genghis Khan, Tamerlane, Nadir Afshar [eighteenth century Turkic-Persian Shah of Iran], and British.”¹⁰⁴ The rest of the chapter on the history of

¹⁰² Mohammad Ali Khan, *History & Geography of Afghanistan (Lahore: Matb-e Mufid Amman, 1927)*, 7.

¹⁰³ *Ibid*, 50-2

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid*, see pages 56-58. For a historiographical Theory of Afghans beings one of the Ten Lost Tribes of Israel, see Jewish Virtual Library, <http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/vjw/Afghanistan.html> and for contemporary history

Afghanistan narrates the same traditional introduction of Afghanistan's history:

Afghanistan is ancient Ariana, the main-home of Aryans. When Alexander conquered Persia, the Greek Kingdoms established themselves as Greek-Bactrian Kingdoms in the second and first century B.C in Afghanistan. Afterward, the Buddhist Kushan Empire was established in Afghanistan from where it ruled up to India, and "Afghan and Indian Buddhist monks spread Buddhism to China."¹⁰⁵ However, later, Islam spread and Afghanistan became a Muslim country. After becoming Muslim, Afghanistan experienced several foreign invasions such as "when Mongol Barbarians invaded" it.¹⁰⁶ However, Ahmad Shah Abdali created modern Afghanistan in 1747. Then, Afghanistan had several confrontations with the British in the nineteenth century in which "people of Afghanistan never lost, and lived free."¹⁰⁷

In addition to the *Geography & History* of Afghanistan which was taught in the 1920s in Habibiya and other schools in Kabul, Mahmud Tarzi had published an earlier secondary education geography-history textbook, *Mukhtasar-e Jughrafya 'ya-e Omomi: A Brief Introduction to General Geography* (1915). Tarzi's book, *General Geography* is

of Jews in Afghanistan, see Erich Brauer, "The Jews of Afghanistan: An Anthropological Report," *Jewish Social Studies* 4, no. 2 (1942), 121-138. It should be noted that the Jewish Theory is in complete contradiction to the "generalized" theory that Afghans are Aryans, and that is so because their country was the original "native" homeland of the "Aryan Race." As it was addressed in the introduction of the paper, the Afghan Jewish Theory was a colonial imagination of Sir William Jones, and other colonial officials in India. In here, the point to note is that the Afghan nationalists dropped the Jewish Theory in favor of "Aryan" Theory.

¹⁰⁵ See Kohzad (2008), 481.

¹⁰⁶ Khan (1927), 59

¹⁰⁷ Ibid, 56-61. This is the traditional narrative of Afghanistan's history that was taught at schools in the 1920s. Like Mohammad Ali Khan's textbook *Geography and History of Afghanistan*, see for example Sayed Mohammad Hashim's *Khulasa-e Tarikh-e Watan; A Brief History of the Homeland* (1921), which has similar narrative. Hashim's *Brief History of the Homeland* was prepared for elementary-primary schools while Mohammad Ali Khan's was for secondary and higher education students.

more interesting than Mohammad Ali Khan's *Geography & History* for three main reasons. One is that it introduces Afghan nation against *other* nations, which becomes important for self-identification.¹⁰⁸ Second, the book was prepared for high schools, and specifically it was taught in the newly established Military School (1904-6 or 1909?) where Tarzi was offered a class to teach geography and history.¹⁰⁹ Third, *General Geography* could have been appropriately named a "World Geography" or "Atlas of the World" rather than *General Geography* because of its in-depth coverage and provision of so much ethnographic, geographical, and historical information about the world and its people.

Tarzi had the contents of *General Geography* divided into seven parts: Afghanistan, General Geography, Europe, Asia, Africa, America, and Australia. Each part had several lessons; for example, Australia had four lessons while Europe and Africa had each 19 and 21 lessons. At the end of each part, there was a table that had a list of famous cities, lakes, rivers, islands, mountains, and a map of the particular continent (*see figures below*). Then, all the way to the end of each part, there was a list of questions that students had to answer.

¹⁰⁸ In chapter four, "Symbolizing Afghanistan," the subject of self-identification and representation of Afghan nation against "other" nations will be discussed thoroughly.

¹⁰⁹ Mahmud Tarzi, *Mukhtasar-e Jughrafya'ya-e Omomi: A Brief Introduction to General Geography* (Kabul: Matb-e Tipugraphi, 1915). 4. The date of establishment of *Madrassa-e Harbiya-e Sirajya, The Sirajya-e Military School*, is not at least exact. Ghoobar mentions that it was established in 1909 while Gregorian (using Siraj ul 'Akhbar) mentions that it was established between 1904 and 1906. Regardless of which date, in this paper, the focus is not on military reforms of the era, 1901-1929, which make a complex and completely different topic of its own for study, though of course, they have their own connections and implications for studies of nationalism in Afghanistan.

Take for example, its eleven lessons of the continent of Asia, twenty one lessons of the continent of Africa, and nineteen lessons of Europe. Once these three continents' geographical and ethnographic information, names of the countries, population, famous cities, rivers, and mountains were taught to students, then, the students were evaluated for content knowledge.

Asia, "Exam Questions:"

1. How much is the total area of Asia?
2. How many countries exist in Asia?
3. How many people live in Asia?
4. Name the countries [of Asia]?
5. How many governors Anatolia had?
6. What are Anatolia's famous cities?
7. How many people lived in Arabia?
8. Where is Mecca located and how many people live there?
9. What is the capital of Yemen?
10. How much is the total area of Afghanistan?
11. How many people live in Afghanistan?
12. What are the provinces of Afghanistan?
13. Where is located Prophet Muhammad's cloak,¹¹⁰
14. In which river's bank the city of Herat is located?
15. In which part of [Afghanistan] the Afghan Turkestan Province is located?

¹¹⁰ It is believed that a cloak, which was brought to Kandahar, Afghanistan's Southern Province by Ahmad Shah, the so-called "founder" of Afghanistan in 1760s, was worn by Muhammad.

16. Where Jalalabad is located, and are there any other provinces [in Afghanistan]?
17. Is Siam a country and is it controlled by another foreign country?¹¹¹
18. Where in Asia Japan is located?¹¹²
19. How many people live in Japan, what are its famous cities, and what have been the reasons for its advancement and development?
20. What is the capital of Iran?
21. What are the famous rivers of Asia?
22. What are the famous mountains of Asia?¹¹³

¹¹¹ This question has a lot to do with nationalism in Afghanistan because Afghan nationalists' view was that Afghanistan was not a colonized nation, and so like Afghanistan, Siam (modern Thailand), was one of the only Asian countries that could hold its sovereignty over its territories and people against the rising colonial activities of the European colonialism in Southeast Asia. For an excellent but also theoretical discussion of Thai Nationalism and Colonialism, see Benedict Anderson's *Imagined Communities: Reflection on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism*, especially pages 171-175.

¹¹² Like Siam, Japan had a special place among Afghan nationalists between 1901 and 1933, and then beyond up to now. They saw Japan and Siam along with Afghanistan as independent nations of Asia against European colonialism. Japan was an example for the reforms, development, and modernity of Afghanistan. As matter of fact, Mahmud Tarzi, translated several volumes of the history of Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905 when an Asia power defeated and destroyed a European imperial power. The Russo-Japanese War actually became an important event for many nationalisms of Asia such as the Indian, Iranian, and others. See two useful articles on the role of Russo-Japanese War and nationalisms in Asia by B. Nicolaevsky, "Russia, Japan, and the Pan-Asiatic Movement to 1925," *The Far Eastern Quarterly*, 8, no. 3 (1949), 259-295; and Paul Rodell, "Southeast Asian Nationalism and the Russo-Japanese War: Reexamining Assumptions," *Southeast Review of Asian Studies*, 29 (2007), 20-40.

¹¹³ There are 24 more questions about Asia. See Tarzi (1915) pages 38-39 for the complete list of the questions.

Map of Asia, used in Afghanistan's Education System, 1915-1929
(Figure, 4)



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Africa, "Exam Questions:"

1. How much is the total area of Africa?
2. How many countries exist in Africa, and how many people live in Africa?
3. Which countries [in Africa] are under the Ottoman Empire?
4. Which are the "Berberestan" [the Berbers'] countries and in which part of Africa they are located?
5. Which are the Sub-Sahara countries?
6. What countries exist in East Africa?
7. What are the famous rivers, lakes, and gulfs of Africa?
8. Which Government is ruling in Madagascar?
9. Where in Africa Hopetown is located?
10. In which country the Atlas Mountains are located?
11. Where does the Nile River fall?¹¹⁵

¹¹⁴ Ibid. See page 40 for the map of Asia.

¹¹⁵ Ibid, p. 48. It is said by Ghoobar that by 1928 Afghanistan signed a diplomatic treaty with Liberia, which was along with Ethiopia, an "independent" country in Africa where she was

*Map of Africa, used in Afghanistan's Education System, 1915-1929
(Figure, 5)*



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Europe, "Exam Questions"

1. How many countries exist in Europe? Mention their capitals and population.
2. On which side of Europe Atlantic Ocean is located, and what are the famous seas of Europe?
3. Where is and who owns Shetland Island?
4. In which Sea the Gulf of Bothnia located, and where is the Malta Island?
5. The Baltic Sea is made of which ocean?
6. In which country the Balkan Mountains are located?
7. What is the name of the strait that is between Spain and Africa?

not colonized. See Ghobar (1987), p. 789. Where this treaty took place, who signed them on behalf of Liberia and Afghanistan, why, and what does this explain about the nationalism activities in Asia and Africa among the so-called uncolonized nations of Asia and Africa, are questions that are yet unstudied. In chapter four, "Symbolizing Afghanistan," Afghanistan's foreign relations and their relationship to nationalism in Afghanistan between 1901 and 1929 will be discussed.

¹¹⁶ Ibid, p. see page 49 for the map of Africa.

8. Where is Caspian Sea?
9. If you would travel to London from Istanbul, what seas you will travel through?

*Map of Europe, used in Afghanistan's Education System, 1915-1929
(Figure, 6)*



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Tarzi in his *General Geography*, and Mohammad Ali Khan in his *Geography & History of Afghanistan*, provided the tips here to situate the kind of curriculum the Afghan state sanctioned in the new educational system between 1904 and 1929. Mahmud Tarzi and Mohammad Ali Khan were not the first people to write a historical-geography textbook in Afghanistan. In 1905, a textbook, *Marat'al Arz* or the Earth was prepared and printed in Lahore, then British India, for elementary schools in Kabul. The book is something like a World History-Geography textbook, which introduces first the shape,

¹¹⁷ Ibid, see page 23 for the map of Europe.

size, and movement of the earth, and then the continents, and then continents' location, population, religion, and language of individual country. Like all of these individuals, several other publishers made available other textbooks to the newly state-sanctioned curriculum that introduced the geography and history of Afghanistan in relation to the world. Sayed Mohammad Hashim, for example, published *Khulasa-e Tarikhi-e Watan* or the Brief History of the Homeland in 1912.

In addition to Afghanistan's people, geography, rivers, mountains, provinces, and lakes, these textbooks covered pan-Islamic ideas (e.g. "which countries in Africa are under the Ottoman Empire"), pan-Asian nationalism (e.g. the political independences of Japan, Siam as opposite to the colonized nations of Asia), and ethnographic information (e.g. population, lakes, and races). But more than the newly state-sanctioned curriculum, it becomes interesting to review and understand the organization and administration of schooling in Afghanistan between 1901 and 1929: how schools and students were organized, ordered, and controlled?

Organization

The education, progress, and ethics of the people of [Afghan] nation depend on [how successfully] the administration of the primary schools of the government [is carried out] where dear students of *watan*, the homeland, can learn the required needs of education and the world, and develop intellect and ability to enter into secondary and higher education. . . . As per His Majesty, *Siraj ul 'Millat wa Din's* [attention], the educational reforms and education are improved in some degree. Unlike the past [where only mosques and madrassas existed], the primary and secondary schools are increasing more and more in the heart of *Darul Sultana* [Kabul city] where many students are educated. However, there was a need to have a separate law concerning the enforcement of rules and disciplines, and administration of primary schools.¹¹⁸

¹¹⁸ This is a portion of a preface from *Nizamnamah-e Makateb-e Iptidaya: Law Concerning the Elementary-Primary Education* (1914).

From 1904 until 1929, the organization of schools was becoming more ordered and regulated. In 1911 when *Anjuman-e Maref* or the Association of Education, the predecessor of Afghanistan's Ministry of Education was established, the educational system was already regulated and ordered. In 1913, *Nizamnamah Madrasa-e Mubarak-e Habibya Darul Sultana Kabul* or Law Concerning Habibya College was passed. A year later in 1914, *Nizamnamah-e Tashkilat-e Maktab-e Iptidaya* or Law Concerning the Primary Schools was passed, and in 1921 it was re-enacted. In 1923 when Amanullah Khan's regime created the so-called "Afghanistan's First Constitution," primary education for both boys and girls was made compulsory.¹¹⁹ In the same year, *Nizamnamah Maktab-e Khanagee* or Law Concerning Home-School was passed. In 1928, the government enacted educational *Hidayat wa Majazat* or Guidelines and Punishments in education, which defined and created punishment and types of punishments for students who committed offences such as incomplete homework or frequent absentees. There were five kinds of punishments: rebuking, suspension, over-assignments, after-school work, and physical punishment.¹²⁰

To understand the organization, administration, and how schooling and students were ordered, supervised, and eventually controlled, between 1901 and 1933, Habibya College's *Nizamnamah* (1911) is examined thoroughly.

In 1911 after nine years from its establishment, *Nizamnamah Madrasa-e Mubarak-e Habibya Darul Sultana-e Kabul* ordered Habibya. There was now an established chain of supervision. Any wrongdoings against or failures to enforce Habiby's *Nizamnamah* were

¹¹⁹ Government of Afghanistan (1923), 68th article of the 1923 constitution.

¹²⁰ Later, these punishments will be explored more in detailed.

unacceptable because the *Nizamnamah* was “approved by His Majesty, *Siraj ul Millat wa Din*, who has cared, supported, and paid attention to the administration and improvement of education and schools for the education of the people of Government of Afghanistan. And Habibya College of *Darul Sultana Kabul* has been special for him since his enthroning. Therefore, for the betterment and reforms of the rules and regulations of the college, the articles of this law are created by the collective consensus of the Association of Education of Government of Afghanistan.”¹²¹ Upon the enactment of the *Nizamnamah* for Habibya, the following appointments were made for the school: a General Inspector, a *Sarashta Dar* or Principal, a Librarian, a *Tahweeldar-e Omomi* or General Accounting-Procurement Official, a *Tahweeldar-e Saman-e Tabiyat* or a Printing-Publishing Official, a School Doctor, and Clerks. According to the newly established academic and penal codes, students and teachers were responsible for their assigned duties both inside and outside of the school.¹²²

The General Inspector was responsible for making sure that the rules and regulations of the *Nizamnamah* were enforced. Without any notice to the school and students, the inspector visited Habibya once a week. He was also to inspect twice a year all of the school’s accounting or cash-offices, *tahweel’khana’ha* and operations. If there were any shortcomings or changes in the operation of the school, the inspector had to find the causes. For instance, if *Sarashta Dar* or the Principal of the school was absent

¹²¹ *Nizamnamah Habibya, Law Concerning Habibya*, (1911), 2.

¹²² *Ibid*, 3

without reason, the inspector had to deduct from his salaries for days that he was absent.¹²³

Sarashta Dar was responsible for the supervision and management of Habibya and also other primary schools. Between 1904 when Habibya was established and 1919 when Habibullah was assassinated, there were only six primary schools in Kabul city. According to one source, all of the six were “branches of Habibya College.”¹²⁴ *Sarashta Dar* was also responsible to inform, consult with, and recommend to the Education Association of Afghanistan about the replacement of textbooks, performance of each staff including teachers and their promotion, and selection of needy children who could be supported by the local elders of Kabul districts. In addition, *Sarashta Dar* was to track the presence and absence of the staff and teachers, determine their payroll scales, and make sure that the library and offices were kept clean. At the end of each academic year, he was to have a general meeting with the teachers to seek and collect their advices and suggestions about the school. In short, *Sarashta Dar* was to inform the Education Association about everything that took place in Habibya including supervision of the exams. In effect, he presented a “fully detailed-three monthly report” about the quality and improvement of exams and everything that affected the school.¹²⁵ Like the General Inspector and *Sarashta Dar*, all other staff and teachers were hierarchically supervised.

¹²³ Ibid, 3-4.

¹²⁴ Ghobar (1987), 702. Ghobar provides the names of these schools: Maktab-e Iptidaya or primary school of Bagh-e Nawab, Tanor Sazi, Khafiha, Paranchaha, Khudam Hozur-e Aali, and Hanud. Hanud was a Sikh’s school. The author could not find any information about what subjects were taught, who were the teachers at this school since the Sikhs were (and are today) a different religious and ethnic community in Afghanistan unlike the predominantly Muslims population.

¹²⁵ *Nizamnamah Habibya* (1911), 4-5

In fact, the chain of supervision of the administration and supervision of Habibya went all the way up to the emir: the emir was informed of developments in the school by the Education Association, whose head was Enyayatullah, *Muin 'ul Sultana* or Assistant to the Emir, who was also Habibullah Khan's eldest son. The Education Association supervised *Sarashta Dar*, who in turn supervised Habibya's staff, teachers, and students.¹²⁶

For students, their activities in classrooms and in their homes were also supervised and ordered. A student could not be admitted first of all at Habibya College unless he had the permission of his guardians, was between six and fifteen years old, had already finished primary education, and was fully healthy. After a student was admitted at Habibya, there were both rewards and penalties for him. Students who were decent and paid attention to their studies were rewarded as their assignments were evaluated on a scale of "well-done, excellent, and awarded prizes." For example, a student could earn 60 points for a subject every week. From the 60, 30 to 40 points gained, a student received an assessment of "well-done". Additional 40 to 50 points could give him "excellent," and the additional of 50 to 60 extra points could make it possible for him to win a "prize." In order to be eligible to earn the rewards, which were one rupee for elementary-primary student, two rupees for secondary education student, and three rupees for high school student, a student needed 12 prizes.¹²⁷

¹²⁶ For more information about the roles and responsibilities of each staff (*Sarashta Dar*, Assistant to *Sarashta Dar*, Publisher, Accounting and Procurement Official, Inventory Official, Doctor of School, and Clerk), see *Nizamnamah Habibya* (1911), 4-8 and 18-22.

¹²⁷ *Ibid*, 8-9

In addition to these prizes, there were two other main kinds of awards. One was the annual awards that were given to three students who earned the first, second, and third ranks in their classes. The other was the monthly award, in the form of financial aid for an eligible student. *Figure 7* (below) is one example of these awards that were offered for primary education students who could take first, second, and third ranks in their classes. It is useful to note that there was no award offered for the first year students of primary education without regards to their rank in the class.¹²⁸

(Figure 7, Awards' Chart for Primary Education Students)

(عطيه درجه ابتدائيه)		(عطيه ندارد)	
اول	۵ روپيه	سال اول	
دوم	۴ روپيه	سال دوم	
سوم	۳ روپيه		
اول	۶ روپيه	سال سوم	
دوم	۵ روپيه		
سوم	۴ روپيه		
اول	۸ روپيه	سال چهارم	
دوم	۶ روپيه		
سوم	۵ روپيه		

(Awards for Primary Education)	
First Year	(There is no Award)
Second Year:	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 1st Rank—5 Rupee • 2nd Rank—4 Rupee • 3rd Rank—3 Rupee
Third Year:	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 1st Rank—6 Rupee • 2nd Rank—5 Rupee • 3rd Rank—4 Rupee
Fourth Year	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 1st Rank—8 Rupee • 2nd Rank—6 Rupee • 3rd Rank—5 Rupee

Conversely, students were punished to bring in order to enforce the disciplines and establish order in the institution. Overall, there were three main kinds of punishments: physical, verbal (in front of teachers and students), and ousting from the school. Either of the following situations could bring physical punishments to a student: if he was absent or went out of school or class without permission, though the student was not to be

¹²⁸ Ibid, see pages 14-15 for tables of the awards for students of secondary and higher education.

punished if he had gone for prayer; If he had not done the homework; and or if he had fought, either physically or verbally with other students of the school in and or outside the school premise or in the bazaars. A student could miss a day if he had a written notice submitted the next day for the teacher or assistant of *Sarashta Dar* from his parents.¹²⁹ However, this notice will be valid only for three days of absences. Decision for a week of absence was left to the discretion of only *Sarashta Dar*. For a month, only the General Inspector could allow students to be absent. However, for more than a month, *Muin'ul Sultana* or the Assistant to the Emir will make the decision.¹³⁰ A student could be verbally punished in front of teachers and students if he had committed the following wrongdoings: smoking; gambling; fighting; and showing carelessness to the teacher and parents. A student was to be expelled from the school if he had been verbally punished three times in front of teachers and students, and or if he had conducted or caused immoral activities at school and to his classmates. However, if a student was to be expelled, the school could not do it by itself. Several teachers along with *Sarashta Dar* had to make a collective decision, and then inform the Education Association where the Assistant to the Emir was to make the final expelling decision.¹³¹

In addition to the administrative and academic supervision of Habibya College and students, and rewards and punishments, *Habibya's Nizamnamah* established rules and regulations for the conduct of exams, library administration, registrar office, and the leaves. For example, articles 38 and 39 of *Habibya's Nizamnamah* regulated and ordered exams to take place three times a year—two of them written and one verbal-written

¹²⁹ Ibid, 17.

¹³⁰ Ibid

¹³¹ Ibid, 8-10

exam. The two written exams were only for secondary and higher educational (Teacher Training) students. Written exams were conducted twice a year while the one verbal-written exam was conducted once a year. The written exams did not have to last more than one week. Other articles, 39 to 52, created additional rules and regulations that ordered and regulated the exams, students, and the school.¹³²

Chapter three, conclusion

Between 1904 and 1929, the Afghan state brought about a number of reforms primarily in the educational system in Kabul, the capital of Afghanistan. These reforms were later extended to other major urbanate provinces. The Afghan state and the nationalists propagated the importance of modern education (in addition to the religious learning) for Afghans in the name of modernizing and progress. The new education had a state-sanctioned curriculum and laws that aimed at cultivating Afghan loyalty to the state, and to serve it. The students were required to behave orderly and regularly in accordance to the established rules and codes. Failures to do so and successes to accomplish the rules, regulations, and laws of the curriculum and school could bring punishments and rewards. Throughout the era, 1904-1929, Habibya College remained a model to be imitated by other schools in Kabul and the country. However, in addition to Habibya and its six branches in Kabul, many other reforms in education took place and laws were enacted to regulate and order them. In the 1920s, three other secondary schools, one French (*Aman-ya*, 1922), another German (*Amani*, 1923), and Ghazi (1927, with English as the language of medium instruction) were established in Kabul. Observing that the

¹³² Ibid, see pages 10-12 for articles and 37-52 that deal with rules and regulations of exams.

neighboring and Muslim countries such as Iran had already been sending their nationals to study in Europe, in 1921 and 1922 a total of 80 students (from “upper-class families”) were sent to study in France and Germany.¹³³ In the 1920s, the state opened girls’ schools too.¹³⁴ These reforms and laws were enacted in order to help the Afghan state to establish a new kind of education that was to be regulated and ordered so that Afghanistan could progress as a modern nation where students could serve the state.

¹³³ Gregorian (1967), 242. On the issue of observing the neighboring countries, *Tulu-e Afghan*—the Rise of Afghan, the first newspaper of Afghanistan’s southern province, Kandahar (established in 1921), published an article under the title “Sending of Iranian Students [to Europe].” In the article, the author suggests to its readers that “Afghanistan’s neighbor Iran had decided to send a large number of students to Europe for education. Iran has already sent a group of ten students. They are now in Constantinople on their way to Europe.” See *Tulu-e Afghan*, 1st Year, No. 25, p. 2. Interestingly, this is the same year as Amanullah sends 80 Afghan students to France and Germany.

¹³⁴ See Gregorian (1967) pages 243-244 for a discussion of girls’ education in the 1920s in Afghanistan.

Chapter Four: Symbolizing Afghanistan, 1901-1929

I would like to inform you my dear country fellow brothers about my trip so that you and other brothers of mine should become aware of why Amanullah traveled to foreign countries. The purpose of my trip to foreign countries is known in some degree among those of you who are the servants of the government because on the day of my departure, November 30, 1927, I announced it, and you agreed with me. The idea to traveling to Europe was suggested to me by the Cabinet Ministers Council. Of course, you the conscious group better know that my purpose was to examine the scientific progress and establish friendly relations with the foreign states in order to let the world become aware of Afghanistan's state of affairs and we would become fully aware of the world. It is very hard to live alone in the world. A people must form relationships with other international human community, and ought to live according to the conditions, science, and technology of the time. Today, Europe is the center of material progress. Of course, we are not lesser than anybody in our integrity, and we consider our holy religion Islam better than everybody's. And we don't need to imitate anybody in this. However, in regards to the material progress of the world, we have to imitate the materially advanced centers of the world.¹³⁵

The above passage is a portion of Amanullah's statement that was delivered to students and employees, who were brought near the newly constructed building, *Qasr-e Stor* or the Star Palace, the building of the Foreign Ministry to hear from Amanullah about his trip to a number of countries in Asia and Europe.¹³⁶ For the Afghan state and the nationalists in Kabul it was important to symbolize Afghanistan because symbolization of the country legitimated their nationalism both inside and outside Afghanistan. In here, symbolization or symbols are used to designate a situation in which one state or a people claim sovereignty over a territory and culture. This was indeed the situation with the Afghan nationalists who constantly tried to introduce Afghanistan as a sovereign country that had its *own* territory, people, and culture. For instance, Habibullah created a National Unity Day, which functioned as a symbol of unity of Afghan people. Afghans were encouraged to appreciate and celebrate the day and "feel obligated to be thankful for his majesty, and love the just, progressive, and thoughtful king of the Afghan

¹³⁵ Popalzai (1985), 289

¹³⁶ In the second part of this chapter, Amanullah's trip will be fully discussed.

nation.”¹³⁷ Although during Habibullah’s reign (1901-1919) a number of efforts were carried out in order to symbolize Afghanistan as a nation of its own among *other* nations of the world, the major efforts in symbolization of Afghanistan were carried out between 1919 and 1929.

Therefore, this chapter will focus on the symbolization efforts of the Afghan state and nationalists during this period, 1919-1929. The chapter is divided into two parts. Part one will discuss the symbolization efforts that were carried out inside Afghanistan. Part two will discuss the external symbolization efforts of the Afghan state and the nationalists.

Part One: Internally Symbolized Afghanistan

The period between 1919 and 1929 can be safely characterized as an era of incruited state symbols in Afghanistan. The symbols were created to symbolize Afghanistan both at home and abroad in order to legitimate the “Afghan state” in the eyes of people. At home, the symbols appeared generally in two forms. One was ceremonial celebration of national themes and days, and another was tangible symbols such as flags. The National Day of Independence, the National Anthem, the National Holiday, the National Education, the National History, and the Father of Nation were major symbolic ceremonies and constructs while “The National Medal,” “The National Flag,” and “national currency” became tangible symbols of the state. For instance, between 1922 and 1929, there were at least ten ‘national’ medals invented to decorate the Afghan nation. Six out of the ten national medals (*see figures below*) were ceremonial and relevant to the symbolization of Afghanistan. These were *Nishan-e Lemar* or the Sun

¹³⁷ SA, 2nd year, No 21, p. 2-3.

Medal, *Nishan-e Isteqlal* or the Independence Medal, *Nishan-e Stor* or the Star Medal, *Nishan-e Wafa* or the Loyalty Medal, *Nishan-e Loy Khan* or the Great Khan Medal, and *Nishan-e Shuja 'at* or the Bravery Medal.¹³⁸ For example, *Nishan-e Lemar* was the highest medal of Afghanistan. It was given to a person, Afghan or foreigner, who had provided an exceptional service either militarily or politically in and or outside Afghanistan, which had improved significantly the situation and status of Afghan people, and had increased the greatness of the kingdom.

When Amanullah went to Egypt, as part of his grand tour of Asia-Africa-Europe, he honored Fuad I, King of Egypt (r. 1917-1936) with a *Nishan-e Lemar*, though this author has not found anything that could reveal what did Fuad I had done to “improve significantly the situation and status of Afghan people” in order to receive the *Nishan-e Lemar*.¹³⁹ However, it could be possible that he was honored for his reception and welcoming of Amanullah and his delegation in Egypt.¹⁴⁰ Persons nominated to receive *Nishan-e Lemar* were introduced to the king by the Minister’s Council. In addition to its actual ornamented metallic symbol, *Nishan-e Lemar*’s prize was two kinds. One could earn the highest honor of *Lemar* or the high honor of *Lemar*. For the highest honor, the prize was five hundred *jerib* lands (one *jerib* equals to 10,000 square meters) with 50,000 rupees cash. And *Lemar*’s high honor prize was two hundred fifty *jerib* lands with 15,000 rupees cash.¹⁴¹

¹³⁸ For the complete list of the medals, see *Nizamnamah-e Nishanahay-e Zeenishan Dawlat-e Aalay-e Afghanistan: Law Concerning the Medals of Government of Afghanistan (1922)*

¹³⁹ See Popalzai (1986) page 72 for *Nishan-e Lemar* that was given to Fuad I of Egypt.


¹⁴⁰ Later in this chapter, Amanullah’s visit to Egypt is discussed in detail.

¹⁴¹ *Ibid*, 2-3.


Another medal, for example, that had a local symbolic appealing inside Afghanistan was *Nishan-e Loy Khan* or the Great Khan Medal. This was to be given to a person who had accomplished some kind of patriotic works and had improved brotherhood relations among Afghans inside Afghanistan. Its prize was the title Loy Khan with forty *jerib* lands.¹⁴²

(Figures, 8 and 9: Lemar Highest and High Honor Medals)

8, Highest Lemar



9, High Lemar




نشان لمر عالی - در سال ۱۳۹۸ ش از طرف شورای دولت افغانستان تصویب شده است .

The Persian text beneath figure 9, right image, reads: “*Nishan-e Lemar Aali*, Lemar High Medal—is created in the year 1920 by the Council of the Government of Afghanistan.”


(Figures, 10 and 11, Independence Medals)

10




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11



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


نشان استقلال افغانستان

¹⁴² Ibid, 13: in 1928 when Amanullah was satisfied with the preparation, arrangement, and planning of his visit in Egypt and Turkey, Ghulam Jilani Charkhi (1886-1933), who was Afghanistan’s Minister to Turkey, was “honored” with *Nishan-e Lemar Aali* or *Nishan-e Lemar*’s High Honor. see Ibid, 92.

(Figure, 12: *Nishan-e Loy Khan or the Great Khan*)

12



*The Persian beneath Figure 12, above image, reads: "Nishan-e Loy Khan—is created in the spring of 1920 by the Government Council."*¹⁴³

In addition to the medals that became tangible symbols of nationalism in Afghanistan and represented and legitimated the state power, the Afghan state and the nationalists changed Afghanistan's flag four times between 1919 and 1929 in order to find a 'national' flag. When Amanullah came to power in 1919, he abolished the previous government and personal flags that existed in the country. In the first attempt, the flag was decorated with a royal insignia on the top of a domed mosque with two crossed swords beneath it. The whole flag was positioned within a circle, and was surrounded by rays, which in turn made the flag an eight-pointed star.¹⁴⁴ This was also the first official or national flag of Afghanistan because it was adopted in 1919 when Afghanistan became an independent country. The second attempt was in 1926 when the 1919 flag was modified, in which the two crossed swords, the royal insignia, and the eight-pointed star were replaced with wreath, though the domed mosque still stayed in the center of the

¹⁴³ For a list of all medals with their images, see the Images Section of Popalzai (1985).

¹⁴⁴ According to Habib Borjian (1999), this eight-pointed star was an imitation of the Ottoman Royal flags of the 1900s. This could be possible because Mahmud Tarzi, who had spent many years in the Ottoman Empire, became instrumental after 1919 when he was appointed as Foreign Minister of Afghanistan. See Habib Borian's informative and useful entry, "Flags of Afghanistan." *Encyclopedia Iranica*. <http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/flags-ii> (accessed February 16, 2012).

whole flag. In 1928 when Amanullah came back from Europe where he saw that the European countries' flags (e.g. France's flag) were tricolor and non-religious and represented 'progress,' he also changed Afghanistan's flag. Now, the mosque was replaced, and the new tricolor (black, red, and green) flag had a chain of mountains, a rising sun from behind the mountains, a star, and two sheaves of wheat.¹⁴⁵ Apparently, the black color represented Afghanistan's past anti-colonial opposition. Red showed the struggle of Afghans during and for independence and the green, optimism, was about the future of Afghanistan. In 1929 when Nader Khan was enthroned, he replaced the mountains and the rising sun with the mosque and an eight-pointed star, though he kept Amanullah's tricolor.

(Figure, 13: Afghanistan's 1919-1926 Flag)



¹⁴⁵ The role of "sheaves of wheat" has a symbolic significance among the Afghan nationalists. The story goes that in 1747 "after nine days of talk during an assembly of the Afghan tribes, Ahmad Abdali [the so-called "founder" of Afghanistan] was enthroned by Saber Shah-e Kabuli....Saber, who was a religious and political Sufi, stood up in the assembly and introduced Ahmad Abdali as the king and placed a sheaf instead of a crown in the hat/turban of him." So, since Ahmad Abdali, whom is characterized as the "father of nation," was enthroned with sheaf or sheaves wheat, the nationalists also adopted the sheaves in important symbolic and ceremonial occasions of Afghanistan. For enthroning of Ahmad Shah Abdali/Durrani, see Ghobar (1987), 354-355.

(Figure, 14: Afghanistan's 1928-1929 Flag)



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Besides the symbolical construction of the medals and the flags that symbolized and legitimated the state power inside Afghanistan (presumably representing the influence of the Afghan elites), the symbolic *ceremonies* of the period between 1919 and 1929 become more interesting. This is so because it was during these occasions that the state and the nationalists propagated Afghanistan as a nation among *other* nations of the world. It was in these symbolic ceremonies where people were brought, lined up, and grouped to listen to and watch Afghanistan's *modern* statesmen.

The ceremonies themselves varied because there were many kinds of symbolic ceremonies. For instance, they could be from the birthday or wedding ceremony and celebration of a royal family member or the celebration of the departure or arrival of Afghan students from and to abroad.¹⁴⁷ However, the major symbolic ceremonies of the

¹⁴⁶ For the images of the flags that were adopted in Afghanistan between 1901 and 1933, see Borjian (1999). His piece also offers a useful description and the images of the flags of Afghanistan after 1933 until the Taliban who had a simple plain white flag.

¹⁴⁷ In 1922 when Afghanistan's first 40 students (all of them from the upper class families) arrived safely in Paris, the Government had asked people in the center of provinces to gather together and pray and wish for their successes in Europe. One of those occasions, for example, took place in the provincial town of Farah where the judges, government officials, and

era were *Jashan-e Isteqlal* or Celebration of Independence Day (August 19), *Loya Jirga* or the Great Assembly, *Eid'ul-Fitr* (the three-day celebration that takes place after Ramadan), *Eid'ul-Adha* (the three-day Sacrifice Celebration), and *Nawruz* (New Year's Day, March 21st in Afghanistan). In order to understand the proceedings of these symbolic ceremonies and how they were used by the Afghan state to symbolize Afghanistan and what kind of people attended and where the ceremonies took place, one of *Jashan-e Isteqlal*'s ceremonies is thoroughly explored here.

The 1928 celebration of *Jashan-e Isteqlal* was commemorated as Amanullah Khan returned to Afghanistan following an eight month trip abroad where he went to symbolize Afghanistan in the world. Amanullah's trip will be first explored and through it, the *Jashan-e Isteqlal* of 1928. Amanullah's visits of India, Egypt, Germany, and Russia are thoroughly explored. The main reason behind this is because a full discussion of Amanullah's trip needs more time and space, which are limited in this thesis.

Amanullah traveled to various countries in Asia, Africa, and Europe. However, Amanullah and his delegation visited, saw something, and did something in every following cities, seas, and ports of Asia, Africa, and Europe where they traveled to and from: Kabul, Ghazni, Muqor, and Qandahar cities in Afghanistan; Quetta, Karachi, and Bombay in British India; SS Rajputana, the Passenger Carrier Ship in the Arabian Sea; Ports of Aden and Said in Yemen and Egypt; Cairo in Egypt; Naples, Rome, Vatican, and Milan in Italy; Paris, Leon, and Lyon in France; Brussels in Belgium; Zurich and Geneva

government employees of both the military and civilian administrations gathered. "The people of Farah," *Tulu-e Afghan* reported, "thanked the Afghan students for studying in Europe, wished them success, and were grateful for Emir Amanullah Khan." See the full article, "Maref Khawhay'ha-e Farah: Educational Support of Farah," *Tulu-e Afghan*, 2nd Year, No. 1 (1922), p. 2.

in Switzerland; Berlin, Leipzig, and Dresden in Germany; London, Birmingham, Manchester, and Ireland in the United Kingdom; Warsaw in Poland; Minsk in Belarus; Leningrad (now, St. Petersburg), Moscow, Kiev, and Crimea Tatars in Soviet Union; Black Sea, Istanbul, and Ankara in Turkey; Tbilisi, and Baku in Soviet Union again; Caspian Sea, Rasht, and Tehran in Iran; and Herat, Farah, Qandahar, Muqor, Ghazni, and Kabul in Afghanistan.

(Figure 15, *Amanullah's Approximate Trip Routes, 1927-1928*)



His Tour started southward from Kabul, Afghanistan, above shown by the Home Sign, went into British India, the First Railway Sign, from there to Bombay, and from Bombay via Arabian Sea and Red Sea to Cairo, Egypt, from there to Naples Italy, show above the Second Railway Sign, and from there, he visited France and its several cities, from France to Belgium to Switzerland, from there to Germany where visited its several cities, and from Germany back to Belgium and France, and from France to UK where he stayed in London and visited several cities, then he came back to France to Germany, and from Germany to Poland to Belarus and to Russia where he also visited its several cities, and from Russia through Ukraine and Tatars to Black Sea, and eventually arrived in Turkey where he stayed in Ankara and Istanbul, and from Turkey, he moved towards Georgia and Azerbaijan, from Baku through Caspian Sea to Iran where he stayed in Tehran, from Tehran eastward he traveled to Herat, western Afghanistan, and from there, arrived back to Kabul.

Part Two: Externally Symbolized Afghanistan

Between 1919 and 1929, one of the main objectives of the Afghan nationalists was to sell and symbolize Afghanistan abroad. The new flags, the new medals, the new schools, and the new *roshanfekran* or the elites who by now made a well-composed class of diplomats, writers, poets, and government employees had to become “serviceable and

useful to the country and nation so that the Government and nation of Afghanistan may make a name and gain great renown in the civilized world and take its proper place among the civilized Powers of the world.”¹⁴⁸ Among the “civilized Powers of the world,” Russia was the first to recognize Afghanistan as an independent sovereign country in 1919 when Afghanistan’s War of Independence, known also as the Third Anglo-Afghan War, ended. After Russia, several other countries followed. According to Mir Ghulam Mohammad Gobar, who himself became a symbol and also symbolizer of *Afghanistan-e jadid* or new Afghanistan in the 1920s and 1930s, the Government of Afghanistan established diplomatic relationships with nine foreign countries between 1919 and 1928.¹⁴⁹ These countries were Iran, Soviet Union, Britain, Germany, France, Poland, Switzerland, Liberia, and Japan. In addition to these nine, Afghan Government signed a treaty with Italy in 1921 and several treaties with Turkey in the 1920s. They sent a delegation to the United States too, however; the United States did not establish diplomatic relationships until the late 1930s.¹⁵⁰

The mega effect of recognition of Afghanistan as a sovereign state by foreign countries happened when Amanullah Khan as a sovereign *oriental* monarch visited Europe. Although Amanullah’s trip is remotely studied and widely popularized by the

¹⁴⁸ *Amanullah’s Proclamation*; available in Ludwig Adamec, *Afghanistan, 1900-1923: A Diplomatic History* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967), 212.

¹⁴⁹ Gobar (1987), 789. Mir Ghulam Mohammad Gobar (1897-1978) was a prominent Afghan historian whose book *Afghanistan dar masir-e tarikh* or Afghanistan in the Course of History that was first published in 1967 remained one of the very important historical works in Afghanistan. It was Gobar who invented the title *Ahmad Shah Baba-ye Afghan* or Ahmad Shah the Father of Afghans in 1932. Since then Gobar’s invention, Ahmad Shah who is identified by historians of Afghanistan as the founder of the country is referred to as father of Afghans.

¹⁵⁰ For a useful discussion of Afghanistan’s Foreign Relations between 1910-1929, see Adamec (1967).

Afghan historical narratives,¹⁵¹ there is not yet available a careful and satisfactory explanation of the trip's complexity, its significance, and its implication for nationalism in Afghanistan. Therefore, the hope is that this chapter will shed some lights on the trip's complexity, significance, and implication for nationalism in Afghanistan.

From the departure of Amanullah and his delegation from Kabul to their arrival back to Kabul, everything related to and happened during and in the trip had a *special* significance to the Afghan nationalists: Amanullah was representing an independent nation, Afghanistan. Even before leaving Kabul, the Afghan state had already planned a grand farewell ceremony for Amanullah and his delegation. On November 29, 1927, Amanullah gathered about 12,000 people in the newly built palace, *Del Kusha* or Heart's Delight where he offered his farewell statement. The people present at the event were civilian and military personnel including students from the various schools of Kabul. Some of the people were brought as far as six kilometer away from Kabul city. In the ceremonial speech, Amanullah downplayed the existence of several diverse ethnic communities in Afghanistan. He rather impressed upon people that they were all *Afghans* without regards to what ethnic and tribal group to which they belonged. "Afghanistan did not have," Amanullah stated, "ethnic and tribal communities such as Hindu, Hazara, Shia, Sunni, Ahmadzai, and Popalzai. Afghans are all one people, and that is Afghan." This farewell statement was reported to be emotional and apparently made Amanullah and the attendees to cry several times.¹⁵² After talking about the importance of independence of Afghanistan and the necessity of the trip to introduce Afghanistan to the

¹⁵¹ See for example Kakar (2005), 66-79 and Gregorian (1969), 256-258.

¹⁵² Popalzai (1986), 3

world and saying-goodbye to the people, he and his delegation left Kabul to Quetta, then the Afghanistan's southern border town between the country and British India

Amanullah Khan's World Tour: India, Egypt, and Europe

Once Amanullah and his delegation crossed Afghanistan's border and took the British-provided railway from Quetta towards port cities of India, Karachi and Bombay, his trip became more political, more nationalistic, and above all, more symbolic. While in Bombay, he did not only symbolize himself as an "Afghan monarch" but he also preached Pan-Islamism and nationalism. In Bombay, from December 12, 1927 until December 17, he had several official dinners with the senior British colonial officials in India including the city's governor. He and his delegation also toured the city; visited several Indian Muslim mosques, associations, and schools; and above all, met in person and communicated through letters with the Afghan diasporic community of Bombay, Pathans of India, Turkic-Perso community of Qizilbashes, and Indian Parsees' community.¹⁵³

For Pan-Islamic outreach, the Indian Muslims' Khilafat Movement that sought Pan-Islamic Unity after the decline of the Ottoman Empire as the seat of Khilafat organized a special event for Amanullah on Friday December 16, 1927. Amanullah was

¹⁵³ The Turkic Qizilbash Community was partly a military, partly a civilian, and partly a religious Turkic group who were brought to Afghanistan and India during the seventeenth century when the Perso-Turkic King, Nader Shah Afshar (r. 1736-1747) campaigned there. As they were important in Iran, the Qizilbashes later played very important role in making and unmaking of Afghan Kings, and administration of the state. In his meeting with the Qizilbashes community in India, Amanullah was reminded by the community about their historical role in Afghanistan, and the commonality of Persian language between Afghans and Qizilbashes. See *Ibid*, 51-53. Historically, Qizilbashes are introduced by historians as "King-makers." See for the importance of Qizilbashes Stephen Dale, *The Muslims Empires of the Ottomans, Safavids, and Mughals* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 253-258.

scheduled to speak for nearly 3,000 people who had gathered in a large open area. They had a chair placed in the middle of the venue where Amanullah was asked to sit. Then, each representative from the Khilafat Movement read their speech, and praised Amanullah Khan, *Padsha-e Isteqlal Bakhsha-e Afghanistan* or the king and giver of Afghanistan's independence. The Muslims of India stated that Amanullah "is not only the young, brave, and *ghazi* king of Afghans, not only wants independence and progress of his valiant nation but he was also a person who wants independence, unity, and progress of all Muslims. We call upon him as it is also his desires to ask for independence and rights of all Muslims, and we all believe in his spiritual and thoughtful ability to do so."¹⁵⁴

When the speeches of Indian Muslims were finished, Amanullah stood and delivered a Pan-Islamic speech (in Persian via an Urdu translator) in which he asked for unity, brotherhood, education, and support among Muslims. After the event, Amanullah went back to his residence in the Government House of Bombay, and within hour after the lunch, Amanullah appeared back in Bombay's Grand Friday Mosque where he offered the Friday *Khutbah*, the sermon and led the prayers.¹⁵⁵

However, in contrast to the Pan-Islamic importance of Amanullah's meetings with Muslims of India, his meeting with "Afghans of Bombay" and "Pathans of India" makes his stay in India more interesting and more nationalistic. One day before his meeting with the Muslims of India, the Afghans who were residing in Bombay had

¹⁵⁴ Popalzai (1986), 42.

¹⁵⁵ For Amanullah's interaction and activities with and among the Muslims of Bombay and India, see pages 41-46 and 48-51 of Popalzai (1986). After meeting with the Khilafat Movement and leading the Friday Prayer, Amanullah also had an all-afternoon session with the "Islamic Association of Bombay." See *Ibid*.

arranged a special evening with Amanullah and his delegation in the Afghan Consulate. It was at this three-hour meeting that Amanullah asked Afghans who were residing in India to take Afghan passports and *tazkaras* in order to become Afghan citizens so that they could not be branded wrongly “as Turks and Iranian.” During the meeting, Amanullah talks about Afghanistan’s independence and reforms, and their importance to Afghans both inside and outside Afghanistan. He told the Afghans in India:

If Afghanistan was not the name of a holy homeland, I would have not been respected and honored by anybody. The Indian brothers and the Government of India would have not honored me this much. You cannot depend on anybody, except your God and your *holy watan*, homeland. If you are away from your homeland, what do you need: God and country? You have both. Obey Him first. Although this advice is unnecessary because I have heard that Afghans are increasingly getting closer and consolidated, I still ask you to do good and be good towards people, make clean deals, do good so much that people would not take you to courts.....Although I can recognize from your harsh eyes, unhappy foreheads, and your black eyebrows that you are Afghans, not everybody knows you. Therefore, get yourself passport and *tazkara*.....this is a necessity that the entire world have gotten it. You also get it.... Sacrifice for your country....and I am thankful for God that Afghans are healthy, courageous, and patriotic. I ask God to have you dignified and exalted. Long Live our Dear Afghanistan.¹⁵⁶

In addition to his meeting with Afghans in Bombay, Amanullah exchanged letters with Muslims of Rohila. It is studied that Muslims of Rohila are considered to be of Afghans’ descendants. It is argued that the communities of Pashtuns-Pathans-or Afghans who lived (and live) in India were the Afghans who spread throughout South Asia before the establishment of the modern state of Afghanistan in the eighteenth century. These Afghans traveled there for trade or they were part of the military expeditions of the Muslim rulers. Although they integrated themselves with the cosmopolitan environment

¹⁵⁶ For the full text of the speech, see Ibid, 36-39.

of India, they kept their Afghan tribal and religious identity through *tazkara* or genealogy.¹⁵⁷

In their letter to Amanullah Khan, the Muslims of Rohila expressed their support to him and his nationalism programs for Afghanistan. According to Popalzai (1986), in 1920 when Mahmud Tarzi then the Foreign Minister of Afghanistan went to India to settle the final negotiations of the peace treaty of 1919 with the British, he was informed by the Muslims of Rohila that the “border” between Afghanistan and British India had to be “Rohila, a land that is in reality a part of Afghanistan but located in Hindustan.”¹⁵⁸

After touring the city of Bombay including its municipality, attending an air show, leading a Friday Prayer in the Bombay’s Grand Mosque, meeting with Afghans of Bombay, and exchanging letters with Muslims of Rohila, Amanullah and his delegation boarded the SS Rajputana, the British Passenger Carrier Ship. They traveled through the great Arabian Sea and on December 21, after a four-day trip via the Arabian Sea the Rajputana, arrived in the Port of Aden where Sir Francis Henry, the British envoy to Kabul who was accompanying Amanullah and his delegation, had already planned the activities of Amanullah and his delegation. In Aden, he was met by the British Colonial officials of Port Aden and the Governor of Aden.¹⁵⁹

From Aden, Rajputana traveled to Port Said in Egypt where Amanullah was greeted by Fuad I, King of Egypt, and Governor and the Head of Police of Suez. From

¹⁵⁷ For a very useful and informative article about the history of Afghans in South Asia, particularly in India and in Rohila, see Nile Green, “Tribe, Diaspora, and Sainthood in Afghan History,” *The Journal of Asian Studies*, 67, no. 1 (2008), 171-211.

¹⁵⁸ Popalzai (1986), 57.

¹⁵⁹ For details of all activities that Amanullah has done from Bombay to Aden via Arabian Sea where he celebrated, for example, the Christmas Eve with inboard passengers and watches a boxing match in the ship, see *Ibid*, 58-62.

there they went to Cairo by train. He was welcomed in Cairo by a cheering crowd that the government had assembled. Amanullah, the *Padsha-e Isteqlal Bakhsha-e Afghanistan*, with a reputation as Pan-Islamist, anti-colonial and nationalist calls was well received in Egypt where Egyptian nationalism was in a critical period. The struggle for full self-determination against the British and their desire to modernize further provided similarities between Afghanistan and Egypt. However, this interaction of Egyptian nationalism and nationalism in Afghanistan did not convey the fact that Egypt has been far earlier impacted by the intellectual and material ideas of the Europeans dates back to the 1790s invasion by Napoleon. Egyptian reforms of Muhammad Ali and his successors in 1800s until its occupation by the British in 1882 presented a history of nationalism in Egypt. Yet, according to the Egyptian nationalists, the difference between Egypt and Afghanistan was that Afghanistan, as a Muslim country, was free and independent from colonialism while Egypt was not. Popalzai (1986) writes that on December 24, a day before Amanullah arrived in Egypt, Egypt's second oldest newspaper, *Al-Ahram* or the Pyramids had an article about Amanullah's and his delegation's arrival to the country. The newspaper's report read as follows: "O' you people who seek independence! O' you people who love freedom. O' you people who call for the independence of people. Tomorrow, in your homeland, the independent king is going to arrive. The courageous Afghan who admires independence, freedom, and the desires of people, then, honor and admire him." ¹⁶⁰

¹⁶⁰ Ibid, 63. See also pages 64-70 about the other newspapers' of Egypt that had written about Amanullah's arrival to Egypt, and the preparation for his arrival in Cairo.

During his thirteen-day stay in Egypt, in addition to all formalities of the politics and diplomacy that took place between Fuad I and Amanullah, the Afghan ruler also did a number of symbolic activities that intended to represent Afghanistan in Egypt and beyond.¹⁶¹ For instance, to learn about the modernization or nationalism of Egypt, Amanullah and his delegation visited almost all of the popular established symbols of Egypt such as Museum of Egypt, the Pyramids, National Bank of Egypt, Ministry of Education, Egyptian Library of Cairo, and several primary, secondary and higher educational institutions of Cairo including Al-Azhar. They even went to see both the old and new parts of Cairo where new roads and new houses had been built.¹⁶² Additionally, Amanullah was invited to attend one of the sessions of Egypt's Parliament, and held a grand meeting with the members of Egyptian Media. In both of these sessions, the talks were about the Islamic unity, anti-colonialism, and progress of the Muslim nations.¹⁶³ On January 6 of 1928 when Amanullah's thirteen-day visit finished in Egypt, he embarked an Italian passenger ship in Alexandria from where he started his tour of Europe.

Naples was the first port of entry for Amanullah in Europe. He and his delegation traveled to nine European countries that included Italy, France, Belgium, Switzerland, Germany, United Kingdom, Poland, Belarus, and Soviet Union. For the narrative in this work, no one country will be highlighted over the other. Rather, his trip to Europe will

¹⁶¹ For political activities that Amanullah was part of in Egypt such as having state dinners, visiting the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Egypt, and other activities, see Ibid 71-72.

¹⁶² Apparently, when Gamal Abdel Nasser came to Afghanistan on April 1955, he is reported to have said that he and along with other youths of Egypt was influenced by and remembered Amanullah's anti-colonial, pan-Islamic, and nationalist calls. See Ibid, 83.

¹⁶³ For full details of Amanullah's visit of the Egyptian Parliament, see Ibid, 85 and for his meeting with the members of press from Egypt, see pages 88-91.

be discussed as a European trip rather than an Italian or French or Russian or English one.¹⁶⁴

The European tour had a number of symbolic meanings for Amanullah, for the Afghan nationalists, for the pan-Islamic Muslims, and for the European themselves. For the Europeans, Amanullah himself becomes a symbol. In each of the countries and particular cities that he visited, the official and public understanding was the arrival of a modern *progressive Oriental* monarch with his wife and delegation to Europe—a continent that was itself recovering from its major inter-imperial and inter-European war, World War One.

Amanullah was not the first *Oriental* monarch to have gone on a European State visit. In 1867, Khedive Ismail of Egypt was invited by Napoleon III to visit France where he toured the *Exposition Universelle*. When the Khedive came back, he tried to build large open boulevards like Paris in Cairo and implement other symbols and innovations similar to those he observed in France. In 1873 Naser al-Din Shah of Persia toured Europe where he saw the symbols of Europe's urbanate infrastructure. When he came back to Iran, he tried to make Tehran, Persia's capital, like Paris. Amanullah's grandfather, Abdur Rahman (r. 1880-1901) wished to travel at least once to the United

¹⁶⁴ The treatment of Amanullah's visit to Europe as a European rather a French or German or Polish or Russian does not mean that Amanullah's visit and impression were the same in each of these countries. There were differences, which will be pointed in the course of the discussion.

Kingdom/Europe. However, he never made it, though his son and Amanullah's uncle, Nasirullah Khan, traveled to London in 1895.¹⁶⁵

Each of the countries in Europe where Amanullah Khan went tried to take advantage of his visit and use it as some-kind of a diplomatic symbol in order to increase their inter-European and post-World War One political and imperial status. For example, on April 29, 1928 when Amanullah arrived in Poland, which had become an independent nation-state in 1918 after a century and half rule and "partition" by imperial powers, Russia, Austria-Hungary, and Prussia, the visit was highlighted by the host country as evidence of their newly won sovereignty of the nation-states.¹⁶⁶ In France, for example, the French government used the royal visit to show its glory and hospitality as a European power. It is recorded that the government removed from Musée du Louvre Napoleon's bed and offered it to Amanullah to sleep in it because the French had said to Amanullah "we want you to be comfortable on this bed." However, the report continues that Amanullah did not accept it, and replied: "I am a soldier. My ancestors during Napoleon's time were also soldiers, and like me they also lived in discomfoting and difficult situations."¹⁶⁷ When Amanullah refuses to sleep on Napoleon's bed, it surprises the French so much, as the story goes, that they symbolize him as Napoleon by saying

¹⁶⁵ For Khedive Ismail's and Naser al-Din Shah's visits of Europe, see Afshin Marashi *Nationalizing Iran: Culture, Power & the State, 1870-1940* (Seattle: University of Washington Press), 18-48.

¹⁶⁶ For how Poland took advantage of Amanullah's visit by boosting its own status as an Independent Nation in Europe where Poland could now enter into diplomatic relations without consulting its former imperial invaders, Russia, Germany, and other European imperial powers, see Popalzai (1985), 192-193. For a useful work on the subject of "symbols" and their use by the Polish Nationalists to boost Poland's independence in Europe, see Jan Kubik, *The Power of Symbols Against the Symbols of Power: The Rise of Solidarity and the Fall of State Socialism in Poland* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania, 1994).

¹⁶⁷ Popalzai (1986), 102-103.

that “Napoleon of the East at this time is this person. He should sleep in Napoleon’s bed since he came to his country as guest.”¹⁶⁸ Apart from this symbolization the French praise Amanullah’s reforms back in Afghanistan. During the speeches, they remind him that it was under him that Afghan students were sent abroad for studying and it was Amanullah who thought about opening up Afghanistan’s doors to the outside world and admired his appreciation of the material progress of Europe. A large number of Afghan students lived in France at the time of Amanullah’s visit. France had also an exclusive right in the discovery of Afghanistan’s ancient symbols as well. In 1922, Afghanistan granted France’s archeologists an exclusive right to look for Afghanistan’s ancient historical symbols and societies. Their researches and findings of Afghanistan’s past became so symbolically important for Afghan nationalists, and some of the nationalists were taught and educated by the French. One of such persons was Ahmad Ali Kohzad (1907-1983), who was educated by the French Archeological Delegation to Afghanistan. Kohzad and Afghan historians used the findings of Afghanistan’s past by French scholars in late 1920s, early 1930s, and 1940s to construct a modern national history of Afghanistan’s ancient, medieval, and contemporary times.

Amanullah’s progressive view was praised throughout his stay in France. During his visit of Paris Municipality, the city’s mayor described the Afghan monarch as “the enlightened monarch and a lover of progress. Paris is happy to host such a firm and steady monarch, who from the onset to the throne in Afghanistan had shown friendly signs to our country. Your visit of us has made us happier. Your noble country

¹⁶⁸ Ibid

Afghanistan, which only brings good and no harm to us, is the champion of the Orient. At one time, around the name of Alexander the Great, there were shared commonalities of civilization.”¹⁶⁹

In addition to the symbolization of Amanullah as the Napoleon of the East and reminding him of Afghanistan’s ancient history, the French arranged for him to visit many of the French national symbols so that he could remember France’s achievements while visiting *other* European countries. Amanullah visited University of Paris; France National Library; National Museum, Louvre; France’s Military Academy in Saint-Cyr; and Allied Club in Paris. Additionally, Amanullah was invited by Paris’ Orientalists to speak for them. In the Paris Orientalist club, they served Amanullah “only tea,” the symbol of the Orient.¹⁷⁰ He also visited several schools in France including Lycee Michelet where Afghan students (and among them, Prince Hedayatullah Khan) were studying.¹⁷¹

Like the French who used Amanullah to impress him and his delegation of the achievements of France as a European power, and the Poles who used him to further their cause of independence in a shaky and unstable post-World War One Europe, other European heads of state and monarchs used Amanullah as well. Germany that was using all symbols and possibilities available to recover her losses of World War One and to find ways to pay the post-war reparations tried to use Amanullah’s visit to boost its diplomatic

¹⁶⁹ Ibid, For the full text of the speech by the Mayor of Paris, see pages 100-102.

¹⁷⁰ Ibid. For Paris Orientalists’s invitation of Amanullah, see page 117.

¹⁷¹ Ibid, 99,111, and 95-122.

status as a power in Europe and beyond.¹⁷² Germans arranged for Amanullah and his delegation to attend several official state-dinners. They also arranged for him to visit air shows, several warfare factories, and Berlin's Municipality. During his visit of Technical University of Berlin, he was granted an honorary doctorate for being "a progressive, conscious, and peace-loving king of Afghanistan who had really and meaningfully gained the right of a doctorate and professorship in the modernization of human civilization."¹⁷³ Additionally, Amanullah visited many other cities of Germany such as Potsdam, Leipzig, and Dresden where he went to see particularly the warfare factories. As he did in Paris, he also toured Berlin's Museum, Library, and met in person in several occasions with Afghan students who were studying in Germany.¹⁷⁴

Like France and Germany where Amanullah and his delegation became symbols of modernity, progressivism, and reforms, the United Kingdom and Soviet Union tried also to use Amanullah and his delegation. In the United Kingdom, in addition to his official diplomatic meetings and attending air shows, he took flights over London city. Furthermore, even though Afghanistan is a landlocked country and has no use for

¹⁷² Francis r. Nicossia has done a small but useful study of Afghan-German Historical Relations. He argues that Germany's policy was to expand its economic activities in Afghanistan and Iran in order to rapidly recover from the losses of World War One. However, their final assessment about Afghanistan's economic opportunity was that there were not too much to gain from Afghanistan's market. Nicossia also tells that during Amanullah's visit, Germans, without knowledge of Amanullah and his delegation had to assure British and Russians that they were to keep the visit a low profile. See Francis Nicosia's article, "Drang Nach Osten Continued? Germany and Afghanistan during the Weimer Republic," *Journal of Contemporary History*, 32, no. 2 (1997), 235-257.

¹⁷³ Popalzai (1986), 146-147.

¹⁷⁴ For details and all activities of Amanullah in Germany, see Ibid pages, 130-162. It is useful to note here that in contrast to other European countries, Amanullah bought a number of things from Germany, which had given him six million marks in loans. These materials were warfare equipments and ammunitions, industrial and technical machines and factories. For the list of all the materials, see Ibid, pages 159-162.

submarines, Amanullah was granted such a tour. He also visited British Museum and library and traveled to several other cities across the United Kingdom. In addition to the doctorate degree that he received in Germany, the Oxford University honored him with a second honorary doctorate degree; this time the degree was in law. And finally, as the French had symbolized him as the Napoleon of the East by the French, Amanullah was praised by the British who compared the Afghan ruler to Peter the Great of Russia because of his reforms.¹⁷⁵

Unlike Western European countries where Amanullah was symbolized as a modern progressive oriental monarch, in the Soviet Union he was introduced as an anti-imperialist statesman who freed Afghanistan from the imperial domination of Britain. In the Soviet Union, his visit was symbolized more as an anti-colonialist and less as a nationalist. After arriving in Moscow on May 4, 1928, Amanullah had official dinners with the Soviet Union leaders including the president, then Mikhail Kalinin. During the dinner address, the Soviet President mentioned that Soviet Union was “proud and happy to recall that it was the first government to recognize the new government of Afghanistan, and became happy as the country became independent.”¹⁷⁶

Amanullah toured the Kremlin. He attended a horse race tournament—an occasion the Soviets named it *Independent Afghanistan*.¹⁷⁷ In addition, Amanullah toured an “Afghan Military Exhibition,” which was held in the Red Army’s headquarter where

¹⁷⁵ It was this impression of the British Media that led the classical nationalism theorist, Hans Kohn, to include in his famous book (1928), *A History of Nationalism in the East*, a half chapter description of nationalism in Afghanistan where he also identified Amanullah as “Peter the Great” of Russia.

¹⁷⁶ Popalzai (1986), 202.

¹⁷⁷ Ibid, 211.

there was a sign that read: “Long Live Afghanistan’s Independence.” In the exhibition, there were Afghan symbols that were brought from Kabul Afghanistan. According to Popalzai (1986), the symbols were “maps of Anglo-Afghan Wars, maps and copies of treaties, Afghan military outfits, Amanullah’s decrees including his decree that banned slavery in Afghanistan, and pictures of Afghan military generals and Kabul that showed the new city, *Darul Aman*.” In addition to the military exhibition, there was also “Afghanistan Press Exhibition” where articles and publications of Russian press and Afghan Press were put to display.¹⁷⁸

The visit to the Soviet Union and the other European countries ended on May 16, 1928 when the king and his delegation traveled via a southern route from Moscow towards the Crimea and Black Sea and entered Turkey. Amanullah’s European visits had multiple symbolic meanings. The Europeans used and manipulated Amanullah and his delegation as a symbol in the post-World War One state of affairs. Amanullah also took advantage of his trip. He used his trip in every European country to symbolize Afghanistan as an independent nation in the world that was still divided among and dominated by the European imperial powers. Therefore, in Europe, Amanullah’s trip became symbolically important for Afghan nationalists and significant for Islamic nationalists in demonstrating the new pan-Islamic anti-colonial nationalism. This was at least the impression of nationalists and the press, anti-colonialists, and pan-Islamists in Afghanistan, Egypt, Iran, and India.

¹⁷⁸ Ibid, 200-201.

Take for example the report of Captain Wickham, the Military Attaché of the British Legation in Kabul from where he wrote to London his impression about how Amanullah's trip was received by the Afghans and Iranians: "The *Aman-i Afghani*," wrote Captain Wickham, "has published an extract from the Persian newspaper *Sitarah-i Iran*, dealing with the king's visit to the Pope in Rome. In this article emphasis is laid on the fact that the King departed from the usual custom of kissing the Pope's hand. In the writer's opinion, King Amanullah by his action has proved to the world the greatness of modern Islamic nations and the fact that they are equal to European nations. This very illogical article concludes with the sentence: The Pope, who outwardly has nothing to do with politics, has obviously realized this point (i.e., greatness of the modern Islamic world), and it would be much better if the politicians of Europe would understand it too."¹⁷⁹ In addition to *Aman-e Afghani*, other newspapers of Afghanistan covered the trip from country to country where Amanullah and his delegation traveled.¹⁸⁰

Amanullah's pan-Islamic nationalism and modernism calls were received well in Turkey where he and his delegation arrived from Soviet Union. Turkish nationalists including Mustafa Kemal Atatürk were already aware of Amanullah's state-building efforts in Afghanistan where Turkish teachers and military officers were hired to train the Afghan forces. When Tawfiq Big, Turkish Minister to Soviet Union, was interviewed in Moscow about Amanullah's visit to Turkey, he replied that "Afghanistan and Turkey were friendly and brotherly countries.... the Afghan nation is progressing through the

¹⁷⁹ Government of Great Britain, *Afghanistan Strategic Intelligence* (British Records, 1919-1928), 886.

¹⁸⁰ See, for example, *Tulu-e Afghani*, 7th Year (1928), No. 39, p. 1; No. 41, p. 1-2; and No. 46, p. 3-4

educational programs of Amanullah Shah Ghazi. Amanullah Shah is a big person, and his works are for the good of his own nation. In Turkey, there will be a very celebratory and warm welcome for His Majesty the King of Afghanistan.”¹⁸¹ After meeting Ataturk and going through all of the diplomatic formalities and statements, Amanullah and his delegation went to Istanbul where they spent a week. Since they could not go to Iran through Turkish borders because of some disputes between Turks and Iranians, he took the Asia Minor route where they went first to Tbilisi and then to Baku in Azerbaijan. From there via the Caspian Sea, they arrived in Iran.¹⁸² The visit in Iran was short. Since Afghanistan had (and has) a large Shia community that had religious and cultural connections with the religious and cultural sites and institutions in Iran, Reza Shah Pahlavi, the Iranian ruler suggested to Amanullah during his visit of Iran to “allow Afghan Shias to have freedom in celebrating their religious rituals.” It is said that Amanullah replied to Reza Shah that “all Afghans have equal rights without regards to their religious sects.”¹⁸³

From Iran, Amanullah and his delegation enters into Herat, Afghanistan’s western province. Once Amanullah’s and his delegation tour ended in the foreign countries, it was now the turn to Afghanistan where Amanullah and his delegation had already arranged the preparations to propagate and symbolize the trip to Afghan people. In Herat, which was having its summer season in June of 1928, Amanullah did not stay for more than a night because the weather was hot. Upon his arrival in Herat and in his honor and safe

¹⁸¹ Popalzai (1986), 235-236.

¹⁸² Apparently, in Iran, Amanullah mediates between Turks and Iranians to resolve the border issue. See Ibid page 252 where Popalzai mentions that Amanullah’s mediation was instrumental in resolving the Turkish-Iranian border disputes.

¹⁸³ Ibid

return, thirteen cannons were fired. From Herat, the trip took an eastern route towards Qandahar, Muqor, and Ghazni. To symbolize and propagate effectively *the arrival of the king*, a twenty-four member Reception Committee was created in Kabul. The committee made sure that on the king's route to Kabul, in each stop—Farah, Qandahar, Muqor, and Ghazni—triumphal arches were to be erected and covered with Afghanistan's flags. Every city where the king was to arrive had to be illuminated and kept clean. In every city, all of the government employees, both civilian and military personnel as well as the district and provincial governors, students and teachers, and the mayor, had to be present to welcome the king. In the provincial capital during the first night of the arrival, the governor had to arrange an official dinner for the king and his delegation. The Governor of Kabul along with fifty students, military commanders of Kabul Corps, and two military divisions had to be present in Muqor and Ghazni where they were assigned to welcome the king, and have arranged two planes to sprinkle flowers and escort the king and his delegation to Kabul.

In Kabul the government employees, students and teachers both female and male, and the mayor were assembled in lines from Dehmazang until Qasr-e Del Kusha to welcoming back the king. The city was symbolized with Afghanistan's flags and was illuminated for three days and three nights. The first three days of the king's arrival were announced as national Eid holiday. Representatives were invited from all the provinces to Kabul in order to welcome and honor the king. The Kabul Government, Municipality and Ministry of Foreign Affairs arranged official banquets and entertainments for the first

four days upon the king's arrival. The religious leaders and mullahs were rewarded for the king's safe return.¹⁸⁴

When Amanullah's departure to and arrival from abroad were signified as a 'national' symbol of *Afghanistan-e jadid/nawa-e Afghanistan* or the new Afghanistan, he himself was now more than ever committed to celebrate that symbol. After a month and half in Kabul, where he and his delegation arrived on July 1, 1928, Kabul was now soon to celebrate another grand symbolic event: the annual symbol, *Jashan-e Isteqlal* or the Independence Day on August 19. This year's *Jashan-e Isteqlal*, however, was in so many ways different from the previous ones. First, this year's *Jashan* was planned to coincide with another symbol of Afghanistan, which in theory and also practice supersedes all symbols of Afghanistan. This was the grand assembly or *Loya Jirga* of 1928. *Loya Jirga* is a problematic but important institution in Afghanistan. *Jirga*, if to look at it locally and culturally, means assembly or gathering or meeting. In this *local* context, *Jirga* has a non-political, non-hegemonic, and non-militaristic purpose. It is usually used by the local Afghans to resolve their local and community problems. However, when it comes to *Loya Jirga* or Grand Assembly, it takes a political, hegemonic, and militaristic purpose because the Afghan state has been using *Loya Jirga* to produce legitimacy in the national and international levels.¹⁸⁵ The second difference of this year's *Jashan* was because of the king's return from abroad, and the new symbols he had brought with himself.

¹⁸⁴For full details of activities and preparations for Amanullah's and his delegation arrival back to Afghanistan, see Popalzai (1986), 257-288. Also see Government of the Great Britain (1928), 889-902.

¹⁸⁵What is *Loya Jirga* and what are its historical background and how the Afghan state has used it as a political, hegemonic, and militaristic tool are important questions. However, in here, in this thesis due to limits of time and space, the focus is not on *Loya Jirga*. For a critical

According to Ronald Wide, the British journalist who attended 1928's *Jashan-e Isteqlal*, Amanullah was ready to symbolize this year's *Jashan-e Isteqlal* with more joy and new symbols as he had learned about them from traveling abroad. "Three days before the annual celebration of Independence Day, August 1928," wrote Wide, "great things were expected when that day dawned. The king was to speak, and it was thought that he would have something further to say of the programme for his kingdom. He would detail the events of the past few months [about his trip], and tell the delegates to his annual *jirga*, or meeting, of the honours that had been heaped upon him in all the cities of the West."¹⁸⁶

As matter of fact, his trip abroad had already turned into a symbol—a series of films—which were shown for three consecutive weeks in the newly opened cinema—a symbol of modernization that Amanullah brought to Afghanistan from abroad. Who watched exactly the films is not clear. However, there is a high chance that the audience of the films was the Afghan government employees and other officials.¹⁸⁷ In addition to the display of the films and tennis tournaments, which were running consecutively days before this year's *Jashan-e Isteqlal*, the venue of this year's *jashan* was even different from its usual place. This year it was to be celebrated in Paghman, a foothill valley about 12 miles northwest of Kabul where Amanullah was born and where there now was standing a triumphal arch, *Takhta-e Zafar* similar to that of Arc de Triumph in Paris.

and important study of *Loya Jirga*, see Mohammad Jamil Hanifi's "Editing the Past: Colonial Production of Hegemony through the Loya Jirga in Afghanistan," *Iranian Studies*, 27, no. 2 (2004), 295-322.

¹⁸⁶ Wild (1933), 151.

¹⁸⁷ Popalzai (1986), 190.

Takhta-e Zafar was built to celebrate Afghanistan's fallen men who fought during the Third Anglo-Afghan War, known also as War of Independence in 1919.¹⁸⁸

What is more interesting than *takhat-e zafar* to observe of this year's *Jashan-e Isteqlal*'s is the range of several other activities, which had symbolic meanings to Amanullah and the Afghan nationalists. In addition to having invited the diplomats of several countries to observe the symbols of Afghanistan in Paghman, Amanullah invited a German Mobile Opera company to play in Paghman. The company, was initially first invited by the British colonial government in Peshawar, however, the Afghan state arranged for them to come to Afghanistan for the *Jashan* as well. According to Wild (1933), who was present in the *Jashan*, the opera's actors were a German Jew and his wife, a South African Dutch. Their son and daughter, one born in Paris and the other in South America, were in the cast. There was a husband of the daughter, a New Yorker, and an additional property man who was distinctly Italian. For Amanullah it was important to symbolize not only Afghanistan in Afghanistan but in the world.

¹⁸⁸ Although Amanullah and his delegation visited major symbols of Paris, the author could not find any sources to mention that Amanullah had visited Arc De Triumph in Paris. Therefore, it is only assumed here that he had visited it, which was likely possible. But *Takhta-e Zafar* in Paghman, where it was built by Amanullah, becomes very important in nationalism imaginations of Afghan nationalists. If one looks at the publications of the 1930s and 1940s, he would note that how Afghan nationalists dramatize, romanticize, and imagine "Paghman," its location, its valley, its rivers, and its buildings in describing their feelings about Afghanistan. For instance, Habibullah Khan Tarzi, Mahmud Tarzi's son who had accompanied Amanullah in his trip, publishes a romantic, dramatic, imaginary, and confusing article, *Yak Shab Dar Paghman: One Night In Paghman* (1932). "It is night," Tarzi writes, "I am sitting next to the flowing and beautiful river. My eyes are stuck with the selected poems of Alfred [the nineteenth century British poet]. My little lamp is burning the yellow flames, and is illuminating half of the page of my book...the cold weather has its own flavors. The murmurs of the water make beautiful music while the water flows.... I am with my small desk, my book, loneliness and the silent universe....thanks God, what a beautiful scene...." Tarzi goes on talking about mountains, rivers, stars, and other poetic and un-poetic essence of man and universe. See his article on *Kabul*, 2nd Year, no. 4 (1932), 17-20. For similar imagination of Paghman, see Qari Abdul Khan's *Tabloya-e Shaheran-e Paghman: The Mirror of Poets of Paghman*, *Kabul*, 2nd Year, no. 4 (1932), 20-21.

“Appropriately,” wrote Wild, “it seemed the international atmosphere of the new Afghanistan was being maintained” by having invited foreign diplomats in the *Jashan* and playing for them Western opera in an oriental land.¹⁸⁹

But still more interesting this year’s *Jashan* was to see the fruitfulness of the educational reforms that the Afghan state had undertaken in Kabul and beyond in the country. Now, during the *Jashan*, the students could easily symbolize themselves, the king, and the Afghan nation. As part of many symbolic activities that were arranged for the *Jashan*, a combined group of 98 students were collected from several schools of Kabul to prove to Amanullah that he could be confident that Afghanistan had now a well-composed class of citizens who could represent the country at-home and abroad. Out of these 98 students, 95 of them represented Afghanistan’s first educational symbol, Habibya College. The 95 students from Habibya were divided into four groups, 20, 20, 20, and 25. The first 20-student group had to collectively read aloud for “His Majesty the King,” their article, *Khair-e Maqdam Isteqlal* or the Beginning of Independence.¹⁹⁰ The second 20-student group of Habibya also had their article read aloud, which was about the praise of Amanullah’s works for Afghanistan: “*Shah Ghazi emir Amanullah Khan: de adel-aqel-amel-kamel; mulke-mahkam de qawi de Afghanistan; wurka isteqlal watan ta padshah: kamal-jamal-jalal-afzal*—Amanullah, the just, wise, doer, and accomplisher; Afghanistan is the strong homeland; the king has given the homeland independence;

¹⁸⁹ For how the opera cast was brought to Kabul, see Wild (1933), 180-186.

¹⁹⁰ The article, which was written in the form of poems, welcomes the celebration of the day of independence; *Jashan de isteqlal beya raghil, waqt da az o’ jalal beya raghil*: The festival of independence has begun again, the time of celebration has begun again; praises Amanullah, and pledges the students’ loyalty to the King and the state.” For the article, see *Porgram Maref Jashan-e Isteqlal: the Program of Ministry of Education for the Independence Celebration* (1928), 46-50.


Amanullah: his accomplishment, magnificence, majesty, and excellence.”¹⁹¹ And the third group, fourth group, and other students continued, individually, with their articles read aloud in front of and to the king and the audience. Each student had individual articles assigned on a different subject. For example, one had written his article on “the importance of chemistry,” another on “structure of sentences in English,” another on “Turkish Language,” another on the “geography of Kabul,” another on “Pashtu language,” and so on many other subjects.

When *Jashan-e Isteqlal of 1928* was ended after a week of celebration and symbolization of Afghanistan where now a European opera could play and tennis tournament could be held, “Amanullah was pleased.... [and was] congratulated.” wrote Wild. “His country [Amanullah thought],” Wild continued, “was already civilized.”¹⁹²

¹⁹¹ For full article, see *ibid* p. 94-98.

¹⁹² Wild (1933), 183.


(Figure, 16: Amanullah Speaking in Jashan-e Isteqlal 1928 in Paghman)



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¹⁹³ "Williams Afghan Media Project: Item Viewer." Crowd Gathered at the Amphitheater. http://contentdm.williams.edu/cdm4/item_viewer.php?CISOROOT=/wamp&CISOPTR=939&CISOBOX=1&REC=7 (accessed March 7, 2012).

(Figure, 17: Amanullah's brother, Enayatullah Khan, left with the white coat and crossing legs, during the Tennis Tournament in Paghman)



Conclusion

Nationalism in Afghanistan: A Colonial, Elite Idea

As it was discussed in the four chapters of this thesis, nationalism in Afghanistan was a colonial idea, and the Afghan nationalists or *roshanfekran* such as Mahmud Tarzi or Amanullah Khan or Mir Ghulam M. Ghoobar adapted and adopted this idea into an Afghan idea. Using a post-modernist analysis of nationalism, this thesis argued that the definition of an Afghan nation and therefore the subsequent nationalism in Afghanistan were colonial constructs. Its foundation, such as the boundaries of Afghanistan, was territorialized and mapped by colonial activities in the nineteenth century. Before the colonial construction of Afghanistan, the country that is now known as Afghanistan did not have any existence. Of course, like many other countries in the region, the modern territory of Afghanistan and its people the Afghans were part of the sociopolitical communities that existed in the region and the Afghans interacted with the wider world. However, the ancientness of the modern territory of Afghanistan does not necessarily institute, as the Afghan nationalists claimed, *an* Afghanistan that was always “Afghanistan.”

What made the modern nation of Afghanistan were a set of convergent facts that were associated with the colonial activities and efforts in the nineteenth century. Some of these colonial activities that were discussed in this thesis were Mountstuart Elphinstone Mission 1808-1809 and his book *An Account of the Kingdom of Caubul (1815)*; the colonial wars such as the Second Anglo-Afghan War and the Battle of Maiwand (1878-1880), and the colonial treaties such as the Anglo-Russian Negotiations of 1873. These colonial activities constructed the very foundation of nationalism in Afghanistan. This

foundation was the name, territory, and history of Afghanistan. They were constructed, labeled, and defined by the power of colonial knowledge, especially the British.

The traditional explanation of the studies of nationalism in Afghanistan is hegemonic. This is so because the story represents the narrative of the role of great men such as Habibullah Khan, Mahmud Tarzi, Amanullah Khan, and other Afghan personalities of the period. Habibullah is praised for his initiation of small but important reforms in Afghanistan and his son Amanullah is depicted as the champion of nationalism in Afghanistan because of his *exceptional* modernist reforms in an inward-looking conservative society. The Afghan state's reforms, which were an imitation of the colonial-European sociopolitical institutions, allowed people such as Ghoobar to foster a national idea that Afghanistan was an ancient country; its old names were Ariana and Khurasan; and Afghan people had their *own* territory, culture, and history. That is why, above all, Ghoobar was successful in inventing the idea of *Baba-ye Afghan*, designating Ahmad Shah Abdali-Durrani, the so-called founder of Afghanistan, as the father of Afghans.

This national idea was propagated in the hegemonic institutions of the state. Institutions such as army, bureaucracy, and the education system provided avenues to the propagation. Especially, the education system, which was discussed in this thesis, was the key for the propagation of a national idea. For schools such as Habibya College, the first modern secular school in Afghanistan, the Afghan state created a modern state-sanctioned curriculum in which a national idea was propagated through subjects such as "history of Afghanistan," "geography of Afghanistan," and "literature of Afghanistan."

Additionally, the new state-sanctioned curriculum established a new kind of organization of the schools, which emphasized order, discipline, and compliance. Once these schools were established and were able to produce a well-composed patronized class of elites for the Afghan state, these institutions were used to symbolize Afghanistan at-home and abroad. Amanullah and his delegation, for example, in their eight-month tour of Asia and Europe did not only symbolize Afghanistan, but they also themselves became symbol of the country.

The study of nationalism in Afghanistan has not yet addressed the relationship between those who promoted nationalism ideas, and those who consumed nationalism ideas in Afghanistan. Many Afghans were illiterate in the period between 1901 and 1929 when the newspapers, such as *Siraj al-Akhbar* or its successor *Aman-e Afghan*, appeared. Nationalistic ideas such as the concepts of nationality, nationhood, and modernity were propagated by newspapers and Afghan nationalists. However, whether or not those concepts were useful and delicate for ordinary Afghans is not clear. Much of the nationalism activities happened in Kabul, a Persianate place that was connected intellectually and materially to other regional and global Persianate and urban centers. In this process, a certain class of Afghans, such as Mahmud Tarzi and Nader Shah and his family who had access to external resources, played important roles.

The Afghan nationalists' activities in this period were also similar in many ways to nationalistic programs of countries such as Iran, Turkey, and nationalists in South Asia. Amanullah's reforms are, for example, mentioned to be similar to those of the reforms

that Reza Shah and Mustafa Kamal Atatürk implemented in Iran and Turkey. A future comparative analysis of them will be useful.

In addition to the *problem* of Kabul, a city that did not (and does not) represent Afghanistan, the Afghans were (and are) a multiethnic, multiracial, multicultural, multi-linguistic, and multi-religious people. This diversity makes nationalism in Afghanistan a complex subject to study in addition to the problem of Kabul, problem of illiteracy of the majority of Afghan people, problem of elitism, and problem of state-sanctioned nationalism. For example, a complexity of nationalism in Afghanistan is the skewed relationship between nationalism and language in Afghanistan. Many writings of Afghan nationalists and the state printing publications were in Persian, which was the primary language of the state and the elites. Although the relationship between language and nationalism is not discussed in this thesis, it would be fruitful and will fill the gap of the historiography of Afghanistan to conduct such a study to examine the role of language in nationalism in Afghanistan because not all ethnic groups such as Nuristanis, Uzbeks, Pashtuns, and others spoke Persian.

From what is discussed in this thesis, it can be concluded that nationalism in Afghanistan was a colonially constructed idea. Locally, it was an elitist-state-sponsored and symbolic idea that was consumed by a certain class of Afghans in Kabul. Therefore, because of its elite character and elite consumption, nationalism in Afghanistan did not permeate the larger society that was not a part of the so-called *roshanfekran* class that emerged between 1901 and 1929 in Kabul.

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