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The Role of Civil Affairs in Mine Action

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The Role of Civil Affairs in Mine Action

The
Application
of Civil-Military
Capabilities To
Humanitarian
Demining
Challenges



April, 2000

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A study sponsored by the Department of Defense,
Defense Security Cooperation Agency and conducted
by the Mine Action Information Center.

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Executive Summary

The landmine threat to innocent civilians around the world is personally tragic, but it also represents a massive challenge to the development and infrastructure of nations at risk. Landmines have recently been used to target civilian populations and refugees, creating crisis situations regarding agriculture, indirect health consequences, and developmental choices.

Mine action is a series of activities which, taken together, attempt to ameliorate the effects of landmines. Mine action components include landmine clearance, mine awareness, and victim assistance and support activities. These diverse, and sometimes unrelated, operations are undertaken by numerous organizations, which are not typically under the control of any one organization. Coordination of effort, therefore is extremely difficult.

The US government humanitarian demining program is predicated on providing limited support to countries which request aid, and designing the US response to produce a sustainable, host nation-run demining program as soon as possible. The Interagency Working Group has devised a series of procedures so that when appropriate, a requesting country can be supported by the Department of Defense and the Department of State in an effective and efficient manner.

The regional Commanders-in-Chief include humanitarian demining country plans in their umbrella peacetime strategy of Theater Engagement. Humanitarian demining is one of the family of humanitarian assistance missions covered by the Overseas Humanitarian Disaster and Civic Assistance (OHDACA) authority.

Special Operations Forces, including Special Forces, Psychological Operations and Civil Affairs (CA) units possess unique cultural as well as specialized skills which allow them to perform civil military operations (CMOs), to include humanitarian demining operations. Reserve CA forces, in particular, possess functional specialties, which mirror civilian professional skills relevant to infrastructure support and restoration. CA capabilities: planning, coordination, training, and advising can be applied to various aspects of a mine action campaign.

CA soldiers can coordinate with non-governmental organizations, other US agencies, for-profit companies, the UN, and other demining players. They can also help the host nation determine appropriate measures of effectiveness, demining plans and priorities, transition points, and support the creation of a National Demining Office.

The use of CA reservists, however, is constrained because of the relative importance of demining as a mission, the perceptions of the CA reserve force, the accessibility of reserve CA personnel, the configuration and size of CA units, and the funding of reserve forces in support of the demining program. Nevertheless, these constraints can be overcome and CA can support humanitarian demining operations effectively, if elements are activated in small teams and for short periods of time. This is especially true if CA units are expanded (as planned) and if DOD demining funds can be applied to support of CA reservists performing those missions.

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Foreword

The recent proliferation of peacetime missions for the Department of Defense and the development of peacetime activities required under the rubric of CINCs' Theater Engagement plans has been the motivation for bringing forth this study. In particular, the use of reserve Civil Affairs (CA) assets, the most accessed and deployed of all reserve force capabilities, has prompted it.

This study, "The Role of Civil Affairs in Mine Action," is not intended to be read from cover to cover by most users. It has been researched and written with three target audiences in mind: 1) the Mine Action official who would like to learn more about the application of Civil Affairs capabilities to humanitarian demining activities, 2) the Civil Affairs officer who would like to learn more about challenges and actions within the realm of humanitarian demining operations, and 3) US military officials who have a responsibility for, or an interest in, the proper unit design and uses of CA forces.

For someone who is interested in determining the capabilities and constraints of the Department of Defense and its Civil Affairs forces, Sections III, IV and V will provide just such a tutorial. For those CA soldiers interested in understanding more about the threat of latent landmines and what that means to the US in terms of national security policy and support actions, Sections I, and II will give the necessary background.

Sections VI and VII are analytical studies, which evaluate both the pragmatic and conceptual methods of applying CA capabilities to the demining mission. These sections should help a force designer or planner to understand the real requirements and environment in which CA elements function.

This study has tried to avoid being a polemic, but one of the authors being a retired Civil Affairs soldier; it is highly unlikely that biases have not broken through. Therefore the authors request your indulgence and solicit all comments and criticisms of this work, and will try to respond to such feedback.

Section I. The Nature and Scope of the Landmine Threat

1. Demining – A Multi-Faceted Issue

Humanitarian demining operations encompass numerous activities related to the relief of human suffering, which invariably arises in nations at risk from the landmine menace. However, mine clearance—the physical removal or destruction of landmines or unexploded ordnance (UXO)—is only a portion of the comprehensive set of actions which comprises the universe of “Mine Action.” In order to grasp the totality of the demining challenge one must first understand that the problem is not merely technical, or even humanitarian, but instead a core concern of the *developmental* scheme for the affected nation. “Landmine contamination,” President Clinton has observed, “is not only a pressing humanitarian problem, but it affects virtually every aspect of life in countries recovering from civil war or armed conflict.”¹ Therefore the President’s goal for eliminating the threat to civilians posed by landmines, is tied to agricultural, medical, infrastructure, educational, economic, and social challenges which are collateral consequences of the personal tragedies of landmine accidents.

2. The Nature of the Threat

Civilians as Targets

Mines are not used simply to defend strategic areas, which for the short-term might be cordoned off such as the World War II mines in Egypt. They have been used recently to target civilians by mining farmland, irrigation systems, freshwater sources, roads, riverbanks, etc. Landmines have also been used as weapons of terror. The Department of State in its report, *Hidden Killers 1998: The Global Landmine Crisis* noted that landmines “are largely a rural, third-world problem.” Typically, forces withdrawing from a region will mine the rural infrastructure. “Unfortunately, such tactics mean that when combat moves on, the former inhabitants of the town are left to live in a minefield.”²

Unusable Land

Hidden Killers made specific findings that the relevant measure of the landmine problem is not the number of landmines in a country, but the amount of land “rendered unusable by the presence or *suspected* presence of landmines.”³ Consider the effect that only a few mines can have on a village:

“In 1996 Norwegian People’s Aid cleared a village in Mozambique, after it had been abandoned by the entire population of around 10,000 villagers due to alleged mine infestation. After three months of work, the deminers found four mines. Four mines had denied access to land and caused the migration of 10,000 people.”⁴

Collateral Costs

The amount of land rendered unusable is only one of the problems posed by landmines. *Hidden Killers 1998* highlights hidden costs, in addition to those of mine removal (\$300–\$1,000 per mine) and prostheses (\$100–\$3,000 per device). Hidden costs are associated with diverted medical resources, impediments to the return of refugees, destruction of livestock, the disruption of economic

patterns, and inhibited tourism (e.g. in the vicinity of Victoria Falls).⁵ In hindering travel, the presence of landmines inhibits the mobility of teachers, technicians, doctors, and limits access to polls, thus diminishing democratic participation and development. The report further noted that in war-torn areas demining facilitates the demobilization of soldiers and the return of refugees, while helping to reestablish community services: “meaningful employment, the availability of goods and services, particularly food, and the restoration of normal community services (schools, electricity, water supply, roads, and other communication systems).”⁶

Former Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict (SO/LIC), H. Allen Holmes, also has noted the impact of landmines:

“The failure or inability of a country to address the proliferation of anti-personnel landmines, beyond the obvious personal suffering, denies farmers use of their fields, which stymies the resumption of agricultural production, denies access to markets, reduces public confidence in fledgling governments and creates many other hurdles for a nation trying to heal the wounds of war. So beyond the injuries inflicted and the medical expenses incurred, *mine fields drive whole societies into helpless poverty with no obvious way out.*

Humanitarian demining is one of the most fundamental humanitarian missions that the United States—and special operations forces, including civil affairs—can be involved in and is a high priority for the Clinton administration.”⁷

A Worsening Problem

The broad impact of landmines is not hard to trace. Even the mechanics of landmine removal become difficult because of the social dynamic impact. Colonel Lionel Dyck of MineTech described the social dynamic impact of mines as it applies directly to landmine removal:

“Throughout the world, where mines are planted, be it one mine on a soccer field or two hundred mines in an agricultural area, the local people are the ones who are affected and denied this ground. They are the ones who “more or less” know where the mines are. Thus, they don’t go there. In time this area becomes totally moribund with re-growth and there is no marking. For safety reasons, the locals give a wider and wider berth to the problem area. The overgrowth gets thicker and thicker and spreads, and more and more ground is denied for agriculture, building, or any other form of development. The deminers’ greatest problem is born.”⁸

Without the bush, “the clearance and removal of the mines becomes a routine exercise to deminers. Deminers, in the main, are constantly seeking a safe and effective means for penetrating the bush.”⁹ The presence of landmines alters human behavior in ways both obvious and subtle, which make the removal of landmines more difficult.

Indirect Health Consequences

The social dynamic impact of landmines also produces indirect health consequences. While the most visible victims of landmines are the amputees, their families and others also typically suffer greatly. Malnutrition, cholera, and the spread of polio and malaria are some indirect health consequences due to the presence of landmines. The following table illustrates typical, indirect effects of a landmine threat.

Influence Point	Condition(s) or Behavior Altered	Diseases Especially Increased
Agricultural land, water canals mined	Farming activities decrease causing food scarcity	Malnutrition-related diseases
Access to drinking water and firewood limited because of mines	People drink contaminated water	Waterborne diseases such as bacterial diarrhea, Amoebiasis, Giardiasis, etc.
Roads, bridges, and access to public places mined	Mobile vaccination teams avoid the area	All six childhood killer (but preventable) diseases
Increased amputation and injury requiring blood infusion	Increased demand and frequency of blood transfusion	Contaminated blood transfusion diseases (HIV, trypanosomiasis, malaria)
Mined roads prevent food transport	People subsist on local food products that may be iodine deficient	Iodine deficiency disorders

*Probable Indirect Public Health Consequences of Landmines*¹⁰

Developmental Consequences

In addition to those social and health issues stemming from landmine contamination, the consequences for development must likewise be considered. J. Brian Atwood, the Director of US Agency for International Development (USAID) , has described the landmine problem from the developmental perspective. His concern is development—the transition of a war-torn society to a democracy. “This usually means inserting peacekeeping forces, demobilizing soldiers, reintegrating them into civilian life, creating alternative media outlets that encourage peace and reconciliation and encouraging people at the community level to work together on small projects that are both vital in returning the society to normal and in demonstrating that people can participate together in deciding on and implementing of positive change.” At each step, he says, landmines have to be considered.¹¹

Similarly, the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) has described the nature of mine action as more than landmine removal:

“It is not so much about mines as it is about people and their interactions with a mine-infested environment. Its aim is not technical—to survey, mark and eradicate landmines—but humanitarian and developmental—to recreate an environment in which people can live safely, in which economic, health and social development can occur free from the constraints imposed by landmine contamination, and in which victims’ needs are addressed.

A distinction has sometimes been made between operational mine action (i.e. mine action in support of operations mandated by the [United Nations] UN Security Council), humanitarian mine action and mine action in support of reconstruction and development. The United Nations does not adhere to this distinction since it does not reflect the fact that there is considerable overlap between the various aspects of a country’s recovery (peacekeeping and peace-building, reintegration of refugees and [Internally Displaced Persons] IDPs, revival of communities, reconstruction and development), and that what really matters is the establishment of clear priorities in relation to the needs of the affected populations.”¹²

In seeking to address the impact of landmines on a society’s development, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) has applied its expertise towards the “building of sustainable, national mine action institutions” and to “supporting efforts to integrate mine action into development planning.” Successful mine action programs are seen as being “well integrated in rural development and infrastructure programmes.”¹³

Development Options Suggested by the Landmine Threat

Likewise, the World Bank sees a broader picture, affirming that to survey, detect, and remove “is the most sustainable and direct response to mine pollution.” The World Bank also notes the further need for “planning for other sectors in reconstruction. Mine pollution affects the comparative expense and value of differing strategies for repairing of roads and infrastructure, rehabilitating agricultural production and other areas of reconstruction.” The following questions illustrate the dilemma:

“Is it cheaper and more effective to clear mines from an affected area which pre-conflict was a major cultivation zone? Or is it more practical, at least in the short run, to bring other land into production? If a given population is at risk from mines in a local wooded area due to their need to collect firewood, should the area be demined, or should they be offered a different source of wood through fast-growing tree crops or an alternate source of fuel? Should a heavily mined road be demined or should a new road be built or a lesser road upgraded? Should refugees be resettled in mine-free areas or should their original homes, heavily mined during the conflict, be demined?”¹⁴ Consideration of these questions is necessary if one hopes to develop an effective comprehensive mine action program.

3. Mine Action Programs

Major Mine Action Components

The component parts of a mine action campaign include the following:

- management systems development (creation of a demining administration);
- mine awareness;
- geographical surveys;
- socio-medical surveys;
- prioritization and host nation planning;
- mine removal or destruction; and
- victim assistance.

Rarely, are these functions planned and even more rarely are they implemented as part of a comprehensive plan, whether by one organization or as a coordinated effort by many organizations. Nevertheless they are constantly identified by demining subject matter experts (at both the strategic and operational level) as necessary components of a successful demining program.

The Phases of a Mine Action Program

While there are differences of opinion as to the evolution of a mine action plan, there is a general consensus that the phases of a demining campaign should include:

- planning;
- training;
- deployment of personnel and equipment;
- operations;
- program evaluation; and
- transition of operations to the host nation (HN); sustainment.¹⁵

Mine action, whether understood as tied to development or not, must be implemented at the local level. This was emphasized by Ben Lark, mine action coordinator for Handicap International.

“The only way we can understand the way mines and UXO are impacting these people is to get into those villages at ground level and spend a lot of time with them; not just the headman. Talk to the women’s groups; talk to the chief of police; talk to the veteran’s society, it really doesn’t matter. They all have different problems. This has to be done because only when we understand (their problems) can we understand how best to tackle them.”¹⁶

¹President Clinton, “Statement to Humanitarian Demining Conference,” 20 May 1998,

<http://www.usia.gov/topical/pol/armstrl/poclin.htm>.

²*Hidden Killers: The Global Problem with Uncleared Landmines*, 2–4, 7; the topics of “The Nature of the Problem,” by David Gowdey, and “Mine Warfare,” by Alan Epstein, are chapters one and two in the report. And the terrorizing of civilians is expected to continue. The United States Commission on National Security/21st Century, *New World Coming: American Security in the 21st Century*, 6.

³Department of State, *Hidden Killers 1998: The Global Landmine Crisis*, Executive Summary, http://state.gov/www/global/arms/rpt_9809_demine_summ.html, 29 June 1999. The Mine Ban Treaty defines a mined area as “an area which is dangerous due to the presence or the suspected presence of mines.” Quoted in International Campaign to Ban Landmines. “Landmine Monitor Report 1999: Humanitarian Mine Action.” <Http://www.icbl.org/lm/1999/english/exec/Execweb1-03.htm>

⁴“Landmine Monitor Report 1999: Humanitarian Mine Action,” <http://www.icbl.org/lm/1999/english/exec/Execweb1-03.htm>.

⁵Department of State, *Hidden Killers 1998: The Global Landmine Crisis*, Executive Summary, and http://state.gov/www/global/arms/rpt_9809_demine_summ.html, 29 June 1999.

⁶*Hidden Killers, 1998*, http://www.state.gov/www/global/arms/rpt_9809_demine_ch2.html

⁷H. Allen Holmes, “Civil Affairs: Reflections of the Future,” remarks at the Worldwide Civil Affairs Conference, Chicago, 6 June 1997, *Defense Issues* 12 (no. 32), <http://www.dtic.mil>, 5 October 1999, emphasis added.

⁸Colonel L. Dyck, “Claim and Reality: Mechanically Assisted Demining,” *The Journal of Mine Action* 3 (no. 1, summer 1999), 13 August 1999, http://www.hdic.jmu.edu/hdic/journal/3.2/focus/dyck_claim/dyck.htm.

⁹Colonel L. Dyck, “Claim and Reality.”

¹⁰Faiz Kakar, Ph.D., Direct and Indirect Consequences of Landmines on Public Health, World Health Organization, July 1995, available at <http://www.demining.brtrc.com/contents.htm>.

¹¹J. Brian Atwood, Remarks at the Washington Conference on Global Humanitarian Demining “Post Conflict Transitions: The Landmine Challenge,” *Speeches and Testimonies*, 20 May 1998, http://www.info.usaid.gov/press/spe_test/speeches/spb69a~1.htm, 30 July 1999.

¹²United Nations, United Nations Mine Action Service, “Mine Action and Effective Coordination: The United Nations Policy,” 30 July 1999, <http://www.un.org/Depts/Landmine/policy.htm>,

¹³“UNDP & Mine Action—Questions and Answers,” <http://www.undp.org/erd/devinitiatives/mineaction/mineq&aext.htm>.

¹⁴“The World Bank and Mine Action Programmes,” Annex E in UN Mine Action Service, *Mine Action and Effective Coordination: The United Nations Policy*,

[Http://www.un.org/Depts/Landmine/policy/annexE.htm](http://www.un.org/Depts/Landmine/policy/annexE.htm) (5 August 1999). Some extend the definition of a mine victim quite broadly and thereby the definition of mine action. The German Campaign to Ban Landmines and the Bad Honnef guidelines defined victims as “all human beings impaired in their physical, psychological, or social integrity” and included “all human beings . . . who, due to the threat of mines, could not or cannot pursue their normal activities.” “Guidelines for Mine Action Programmes from a Development-Oriented Point of View: The Bad Honnef Guidelines,” Annex F in *ibid*.

¹⁵See TC 31-34, 4-1 to 4-3 for a very brief discussion in terms of Civil Affairs. The phases have also been listed in “A Nominal Plan for a Demining Campaign,” Stephen H. Stewart, JMU MAIC, as Planning, Deployment, Operation, Sustainment, End State, and Evaluation. These phases have been identified based on the experiences of operators. JP 3-57 identifies the phases of CMO as mission planning, deployment, operations, and transition. (IV-15).

¹⁶Quoted in Susan Ellis, “Defense, State, NGO Officials Cite Demining Priorities,” 17 June 1998, <http://www.usia.gov/topical/pol/armsctrl/uxo.htm> (20 November 1999).

Section II. US Government Support of Humanitarian Demining

1. Initial US Responses to the Humanitarian Demining Challenge

After the recent promulgation of its humanitarian demining program (1993-4), the US government began to integrate various components of mine action into all its activities designed to facilitate infrastructure development. At the same time they aimed to foster a sense of host nation indigenous demining sustainability.

In 1992 Congress found that mines in war-torn regions such as Afghanistan and Somalia were hindering refugee repatriation and other humanitarian programs. On the basis of this finding, Public Law, 102-484, Section 1364, directed the President to prepare a report assessing “mine clearing needs in countries to which refugees and displaced persons are now returning, or are likely to return within the near future, including Cambodia, Angola, Afghanistan, Somalia and Mozambique, and an assessment of current international efforts to meet the mine clearing needs in the countries covered by the report.” The report, later published as *Hidden Killers: The Global Problem with Uncleared Landmines*, also was to include “an evaluation of the availability of technologies and assets within the United States Government which, if called upon, could be employed to augment or complete mine clearing efforts”, in the war-torn countries¹⁷.

The initial assessment of the problem posed by landmines began by attempting to determine the number of uncleared landmines. Quickly the enormity of the problem became apparent. Not only were there scores of millions of uncleared mines, but developmental problems associated with the landmine menace were standing in the way of the most basic kinds of recovery and normalcy.

2. Demining as a Function of National Security

Demining is part of the US national security strategy for peacetime engagement. This strategy views globalization as a process of accelerating integration in which the United States will be affected by events beyond our borders. “As governments lose their ability to provide for the welfare of their citizens, mass migration, civil unrest, famine, mass killings, environmental disasters and aggression against neighboring states or ethnic groups can threaten US interests and citizens.”¹⁸ Consequently that national security strategy asserts “our citizens have a direct stake in the prosperity and stability of other nations.”¹⁹ This leads to the “imperative of engagement” and the strategic approach that:

“...we must lead abroad if we are to be secure at home, but we cannot lead abroad unless we are strong at home. We must be prepared and willing to use all appropriate instruments of national power to influence the actions of other states and non-state actors. *Today’s complex security environment demands that all our instruments of national power be effectively integrated to achieve our security objectives*”.²⁰

To influence events and prevent crises—to shape the international environment—the US has diplomacy, military force, and our other foreign policy tools, but these “must be closely integrated.” The “threats and their consequences cross agency lines, requiring close cooperation among federal agencies, state and local governments . . . non-governmental organizations and others in the private sector.”²¹ Among the other tools available for shaping the international environment, and which must be integrated, is international assistance, which supports sustainable development programs and averts crises.²² “The methods for assisting emerging democracies are as varied as the nations involved”²³ and the assistance is through both USAID and the military.

“We assist other countries in improving their pertinent military capabilities, including peacekeeping and humanitarian response. With countries that are neither staunch friends nor known foes, *military cooperation often serves as a positive means of engagement, building security relationships today that will contribute to improved relations tomorrow.*”²⁴

Part of this engagement to shape the security environment is demining. Demining in Angola, Mozambique, Namibia, Rwanda, Ethiopia and Eritrea is part of the strategy for countering transnational threats of “terrorism, narcotics trafficking, international crime, environmental damage and disease.”²⁵ In 1995, the Joint Staff and Unified Commanders unanimously supported demining as a means to further their peacetime engagement strategy.²⁶ Although this describes demining as a means to support national security interests, it also may occur “because our values demand it.”²⁷

3. Policy - Country Program Goals

The purpose of the United States Government (USG) Humanitarian Demining Program (HDP) “is to assist selected countries to relieve human suffering and develop an indigenous demining capability while promoting US interests.”²⁸ The Department of State (DoS) has estimated that there are approximately sixty million landmines in place worldwide causing civilian casualties. US Secretary of State Albright noted that ninety percent of wartime casualties are now civilian.²⁹ Landmines are increasingly “targeted against civilians—to deny them their livelihoods, to uproot them from their lands, and to exploit political instability.”³⁰ In addition to being a cause of death and maiming, landmines deter the return of refugees and rebuilding of society, preventing the full use of agricultural land and economic recovery

The HDP aims to relieve human suffering associated with landmines through mine awareness and train-the-trainers, so as to develop an indigenous national demining office (NDO); thus promoting US foreign policy, security and economic interests.³¹ The demining of roads, farmland and other areas of society reduces civilian casualties and impediments to refugee repatriation, to agriculture, and to commerce while strengthening the country’s social, economic, and governmental infrastructure. According to national security strategy, “every dollar we devote to preventing conflicts, promoting democracy, and stopping the spread of disease and starvation brings a sure return in security and savings.”³²

Demining benefits are to be achieved while promoting the security interests of the host nation and of the United States. “No member of the armed forces” is to engage in the “physical detection, lifting, or destroying of landmines” when providing humanitarian and civic assistance and not supporting a United States military operation.³³ The “train-the-trainer” program is therefore designed for humanitarian and not military purposes; policy allows US forces to train military members for *humanitarian* demining.³⁴ To “minimize long-term US involvement and to ensure that the host country is capable of sustaining operations, training is conducted using the ‘train-the-trainer’ methodology.”³⁵

US foreign policy, security, and economic interests are advanced by strengthening US relations with other governments, and the host country’s democratic institutions, and by improving US military training opportunities and US economic ties.³⁶ The strategy is long-term and comprehensive, and it seeks to coordinate “with other programs and activities—such as the UN, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and private voluntary organizations (PVOs).”³⁷ The US program involves both the Department of State (DoS) and the Department of Defense (DOD). President Clinton’s goal is “the elimination, by the end of the next decade, of the threat posed by landmines to civilians.”

4. The Approval Process

The role of the DOD in general, and Civil Affairs (CA) specifically, can be understood more fully within the context of the formal Interagency Working Group (IWG) approval process. This process creates the framework and connectivity among the various elements and demonstrates the liaison activities necessary to achieve a unity of effort within the program. The IWG has been mandated by Congress, in part because humanitarian assistance operations rendered by the military “shall complement, *and may not duplicate*, any other form of social or economic assistance which may be provided to the country concerned by another department or agency of the United States.”³⁸

The approval process for providing humanitarian demining support to a requesting nation begins with coordination between the HN and the US country team. Either may initiate the coordination for obtaining US approval for demining support. The US country team then sends a proposal to the Department of State, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs (DoS/PM), which in turn informs the members of the Interagency Working Group (IWG). The IWG is the coordinating body for the US government demining program with the power to approve or disapprove proposed demining programs. Approval is based on its assessment of US policy and strategy, review of the demining proposal, a country assessment, and the project’s requirements as determined by the geographic Commanders-in-Chief’s (CINC) site survey.

The approval process necessarily includes political assessments. Under Secretary of State Thomas R. Pickering’s comments on civil-military operations apply to demining. “We have become more deeply involved in intra- and inter-state politics, realizing full well that security within a country can affect the stability of a whole region and the interests of the United States.”³⁹ As stated in JP 3-57, “because of the politico-military nature and sensitivity of CA activities undertaken by US commanders . . . their conduct should be governed by deliberate policy developed and promulgated

by the NCA.”⁴⁰ Policy set by National Command Authority (NCA) allows for continuity and consistency that is “essential to the success of CA activities, in light of their inherent complexity and political sensitivity.”⁴¹ Indeed, being involved in the site survey and Host nation (HN) liaison activities, CA personnel confront political factors originating from the DOS policy assessment including the “responsibilities of the HN,”⁴² resource estimates, mission constraints, and an exit strategy.

5. The Interagency Working Group and Policy Assessment

Department of State at the request of the National Security Council (NSC) formed the IWG.⁴³ Among the objectives of the IWG are to:

- Establish a comprehensive database of countries requiring demining assistance;
- Develop a strategy for encouraging other governments—especially those that have previously participated in mining activities beyond their borders—to participate or lead in demining operations;
- Develop a prioritized list of countries requiring USG demining assistance;
- Determine the form of demining assistance to be provided;
- Integrate, where appropriate, USG demining assistance programs with similar programs run by the United Nations (UN), other international organizations (IO), and various non-governmental organizations (NGO); and to
- Oversee the allocation of USG demining assistance resources.⁴⁴

The Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Political Military Affairs (DOS/PM) chairs the IWG, and the vice-chair is the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Policy and Missions, Office of Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict (OASD SO/LIC). Additionally, the IWG consists of representatives from the:

- National Security Council;
- White House Office of Science and Technology Policy;
- Department of State, Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration;
- Department of State, regional bureaus;
- Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the geographic CINCs and services;
- United States Agency for International Development;
- United States Information Agency (USIA); and the
- Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).

The IWG reviews, and applies the National Security Strategy, the National Military Strategy, legislation and other policy guidance to demining, national strategy and policy as given in Presidential directives. The IWG seeks to ensure that demining contributes to national goals.⁴⁵

6. Proposal Review and Country Selection

Each country accepted by the US into the program should exhibit both a political will to support demining operations and a realistic chance of achieving lasting results. Each of the following conditions should be considered likely if a US-sponsored humanitarian demining program is approved. The IWG considers the proposal and determines selection based on these factors:

- US Government Interests.
 - Promote human welfare
 - Promote stability, democratic process, and economic growth
 - Encourage compliance with weapons control policies and conventions
 - Facilitate rapid repatriation of refugees
 - Access and training opportunities
- Severity of the problem
 - Extent of the landmine problem
 - Impact on family income and sustenance
 - Impact on development of local and national economies
 - Impact on agricultural viability
- Impact of US assistance
 - Potential to attract other donors
 - Opportunity to leverage USG efforts with existing programs
 - Opportunity to provide resources, equipment, and training
- Other factors
 - Host country capability and willingness to devote resources toward a sustainable demining program
 - Threat of renewed conflict and the prospect of new mining after old mines are destroyed
 - Issuance of a Presidential Determination to allow for security assistance
 - Safety of USG personnel.⁴⁶

The IWG develops goals and objectives for the assistance effort, an exit strategy, and a transition plan for transferring the program to the host nation. The exit strategy is based on the country's capabilities, the scope of the effort, funding sources and availability, and the continuing involvement of NGOs and PVOs. The Country Team takes the initial lead, "assess[ing] the country's capabilities and willingness to sustain the humanitarian demining program."⁴⁷ The country team is headed by the Chief of the diplomatic mission and, as he chooses, the senior members of the represented departments and agencies of the mission.

After a country has been selected for US support, the Joint Staff (JS) Operations Directorate, Special Operations Division (SOD) coordinates with the geographic CINCs and the Special Operations Command (SOC) and to build a Humanitarian Demining Operations (HDO) package.⁴⁸ The package

is submitted to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) and is used by the IWG during the policy assessment visit.

7. The Policy Assessment Visit

The Department of State conducts a policy assessment visit (PAV) to the host nation.⁴⁹ DOS/PM coordination for the visit, with OASD SO/LIC as the deputy lead, includes the Country Team, USAID, United States Information Agency (USIA), the geographic CINC, and host nation. The team seeks to clarify issues such as the scope of the proposed program, support requirements, and US expectations with the host nation officials. Additionally, the assessment visit is designed to introduce key program personnel from both governments and to prepare for the site survey. The assessment team reviews the security and political conditions of the host nation and determines “whether the USG will enjoy the cooperation of the host country.”⁵⁰

8. Site Survey

The CINC’s Role

Following a positive policy assessment, the geographic CINC is given the responsibility for conducting the site survey under the auspices of the country team. The IWG requests the site survey through the OASD SO/LIC and the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (OJCS). The regional CINC provides the results of the policy assessment visit (policy concerns, program objectives, resource estimates, mission constraints and an exit strategy). The CINC is understood to have the best perspective for assessing US military participation in a demining program.⁵¹ As with any civil-military operation (CMO), assessments should consider the “organization and degree of effectiveness of the host nation government, the condition of the economy, the nature of cultural and social institutions, and the prevailing perceptions and attitudes of the population.”⁵²

The *Strategic Plan* lists possible team members for the Site Survey:

- Geographic combatant commander demining staff officers.
- Geographic combatant commander-appointed program manager.
- Representatives from:
 - Special Operations Forces (SOF): Special Forces (SF), Civil Affairs (CA), and Psychological Operations (PSYOP).
 - The non-SOF community (e.g., logisticians, engineers, Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD), US Marines Corps (USMC), doctors, physiotherapists, and US Navy Seabees, as appropriate).
 - Supporting units.
 - USAID.
 - US Information Services (USIS).⁵³

Goals of the Site Survey

The goals of the site survey, as defined by the IWG are to:

- Identify resource requirements, including funding, personnel, and equipment;
- Identify logistic requirements (e.g. transportation);
- Identify infrastructure requirements;
- Determine survey and marking requirements;
- Assess ongoing efforts (e.g., by the host country; IOs, NGOs, and PVOs; and other countries);
- Identify factors that will effect development of the course of action (COA) (e.g., desires of the ambassador). Again, coordination with the country team and desk officers is critical. For example, the USIS can provide recommendations on the best way to proceed with demining efforts based on cultural peculiarities and can conduct public opinion surveys in advance of the team’s arrival;
- Validate the security and political environment of the country;
- Clarifies the policy concerns, goals, objectives, and exit strategy determined by the IWG, if necessary;
- Resolves administrative issues, and.⁵⁴
- Determines logistics requirements, which are driven by the “nature and extent of the mine and UXO problem.”⁵⁵

Tasks Appropriate for a Site Survey

Some specific tasks for the site survey team are the general determination of the “nature and extent of the mine and UXO problem” and a consideration of those critical or time-consuming tasks listed in TC 31-34 as follows:

- Training requirements for HN personnel in mission planning and organization, mine awareness, and demining techniques.
- HN logistical support capabilities and processing requirements for contracts.
- HN rules of engagement (ROEs) and security of US forces, including weapon restrictions in-country and restrictions on communications security (COMSEC) material or communications structures.
- Clearance requirements and suspenses. (*Note: Clearances for a demining operation are very time-consuming and political. The clearances for transporting explosives must go through US channels and possibly UN and HN bureaucracy.*)
- Overflight requirements and landing restrictions due to explosives. (*Note: Only certain airfields and countries allow aircraft with explosives to land, refuel, or stay overnight.*)
- Arms embargoes or restrictions on the HN. (*Note: An arms embargo by the UN can only be removed or amended after it has been voted on by the UN Security Council.*)
- A soil sample to determine mineral content. (*Note: The test allows one to determine if the mine detector will be effective in this type of environment.*)⁵⁶
- TC 31-34 notes that the site survey is an appropriate time to initiate coordination with NGOs for possible integration of efforts. The NGOs may fulfil the following roles:
 - Transitioning a HN program effectively from Army Special Operations Forces

(ARSOF) training operations to live minefield clearance operations, which US forces are prohibited from performing.

- Providing long-term liaison and oversight functions that are essential for maintaining continuity in demining operations, yet severely impact the operating tempo (OPTEMPO) and personnel tempo (PERTEMPO) of US forces.
- Conducting proofing of cleared minefields to verify 100 percent removal from selected areas for safety and program assessment purposes.⁵⁷

Survey Results and Plan Formulation Results of the mission assessment are sent to DoS and the IWG via the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (OJCS) and OASD SO/LIC. Using the survey results and other information, the IWG establishes project size, measures of effectiveness (MOE), project restrictions, and participant roles.⁵⁸

Assuming resolution of the project parameters and IWG approval of the project, the theater CINC develops plans under the policy guidance of the OASD SO/LIC and the JCS. The theater team then prepares a concept plan (CONPLAN). This plan “identifies the HN organizational structure, demining training team composition, and specific objectives and requirements for each team component, . . . a training plan for HN personnel that integrates national-level headquarters (HQ) operations, mine awareness, and mine clearance training.” The CONPLAN includes a request for deployment of forces and a time line, which the CINCSOC submits to CJCS for adequacy, feasibility and compatibility. The J3 SOD staffs the plan to the IWG for comments and approval.⁵⁹

The IWG is responsible for resolving major issues, identifying resources and gaps, and developing a resource package. This must be done by taking into account not only DOD operations and maintenance (O&M) funds, and humanitarian assistance funding, but also Foreign Military Financing through the Defense Security and Cooperation Agency (DSCA), and coordination with USAID whose funds are not controlled by the IWG. Following IWG, CJCS and Secretary of Defense approval, CJCS transmits the deployment order and the CINCSOC executes the plan.⁶⁰

¹⁷US Department of State, Political-Military Affairs Bureau, Office of International Security Operations, *Hidden Killers: The Global Problem with Uncleared Landmines*, July 1993, 1.

¹⁸*National Security Strategy*, 7.

¹⁹*National Security Strategy*, 1.

²⁰*National Security Strategy*, 1, emphasis added.

²¹*National Security Strategy*, 7f. Similarly, the US Commission on National Security/21st Century concluded that the shaping of the international environment must use “all the instruments of American diplomatic, economic, and military power.” *New World Coming: American Security in the 21st Century: Major Themes and Implications*, 15 September 1999, 7.

²²*National Security Strategy*, 8.

²³*National Security Strategy*, 34.

²⁴*National Security Strategy*, 13, emphasis added. Closing the circle is the perspective that prosperity not only requires engagement, prosperity strengthens diplomacy by maintaining “the attractiveness of our values abroad,” p. 27.

²⁵*National Security Strategy*, 55.

²⁶“What the Joint Staff and Commanders-In-Chief (CINC) Say About Demining,” [Http://www.demining.brtrc.com/policy/news/cincmine.htm](http://www.demining.brtrc.com/policy/news/cincmine.htm) 11/13/1999.

²⁷*National Security Strategy*, 5. This places demining in the “humanitarian and other interests” category, or third after “vital interests” and “important national interests”.

²⁸The Interagency Working Group On Humanitarian Demining, *US Government Interagency Humanitarian Demining Strategic Plan*, undated, ch. 1, p. 1; hereafter *Strategic Plan*, ch.1, p. 1.

²⁹*Hidden Killers 1998: The Global Landmine Crisis*, Preface and Executive Summary.

³⁰TC 31-34, 1-1.

³¹*Strategic Plan*, Chp. 2, pp. 1f.

³²The White House, *A National Security Strategy for a New Century*, IV, October 1998.

³³10 USCS §401(a)(1), (a)(4); TC 31-34, 1-1; and JP 3-57, I-2.

³⁴The requirement that the demining be *humanitarian* is from 10 U.S.C. §401(a)(3) that “Humanitarian and civic assistance may not be provided under this section (directly or indirectly) to any individual, group, or organization engaged in military or paramilitary activity.” Training military members appears acceptable if the purpose is *humanitarian* though the “issue is not free from doubt.” See CPT Glenn Bowen, JA, US Army Peacekeeping Institute, *Legal Guide to Peace Operations*, 1 May 1998, 566f.

³⁵*Strategic Plan*, App. A, p. 13.

³⁶*Strategic Plan*, Ch. 2, p. 1ff.

³⁷TC 31-34, 1-2.

³⁸10 U.S.C. §401(2), emphasis added.

³⁹Quoted in JP 3-57, *Doctrine for Joint Civil-Military Operations*, Draft February 1999, I-1.

⁴⁰JP 3-57, II-9.

⁴¹JP 3-57, II-11.

⁴²TC 31-34, 1-4.

⁴³Letter from William H. Itoh, Executive Secretary, National Security Council, to Marc

Grossman, Executive Secretary, Department of State, 13 September 1993, reproduced in *Strategic Plan*, Appendix G, pp. 3-4; hereafter NSC letter, 13 September 1993.

⁴⁴NSC letter, 13 September 1993; the IWG originally also had responsibility for landmine control but that was removed in 1995. The IWG objectives are also in *Strategic Plan*, Ch. 1, p. 1.

⁴⁵*Strategic Plan*, App. A, p. 4.

⁴⁶*Strategic Plan*, App. A, p. 6.

⁴⁷*Strategic Plan*, App. A, p. 4--6.

⁴⁸TC 31-34, 1-4.

⁴⁹For the United Nation's perspective, see "Terms of Reference for Assessment Missions," <http://www.un.org/Depts/Landmine/Policy/annexC.htm>.

⁵⁰*Strategic Plan*, App. A, p. 7.

⁵¹TC 31-34, 1-4; *Strategic Plan*, App. A, 7-8.

⁵²JP 3-57, III-5.

⁵³*Strategic Plan*, App. A, p. 8. The assessment team, according to TC 31-34, 3-1., ideally includes at least the following: A CINCSOC theater program manager, an SF unit representative, a CA unit representative, a PSYOP unit representative, and an on-site country team.

⁵⁴*Strategic Plan*, App. A, p. 8.

⁵⁵TC 31-34, 1-6, 3-1.

⁵⁶TC 31-34, 1-6, 3-1. Appendix B contains Pre-Mission Checklists for use during the CINC assessment and the pre-deployment site survey that follows approval and tasking and precedes the actual deployment for the HDO.

⁵⁷TC 31-34, 2-2.

⁵⁸TC 31-34, 1-6, and *Strategic Plan*, App. A, p. 9.

⁵⁹TC 31-34, 1-6, 1-9, and *Strategic Plan*, App. A, pp. 9-10, and Figure A-3.

⁶⁰TC 31-34, 1-6, and *Strategic Plan*, App. A, pp. 11-12, and Figure A-3.

Section III. The Role of the Department of Defense and Civil Affairs

1. Overview

The Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict (SO/LIC) established the DOD Humanitarian Demining Program with FY94 funding appropriated specifically for humanitarian demining efforts, and provides high-level guidance for demining within DOD's worldwide peacetime engagement policy.⁶¹ The Defense Security and Cooperation Agency oversees the program requirements of the effort. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff helps the CINCs with planning and execution of support for humanitarian demining operations (HDO). The goal of the DOD mission is:

“... the establishment of indigenous, self-sustaining, national-level programs within those countries approved for support by the joint Department of State/Department of Defense (DoS)/DOD Interagency Working Group (IWG) for Humanitarian Demining. To achieve this end not only must training and equipment for all facets of the programs be supplied directly to the host nation (HN), but also the coordination and facilitation of additional support from non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and private voluntary organizations (PVOs) must be integrated.

HD operations have significant dual benefits such as providing urgently needed humanitarian support and enhancing US military readiness. Regional CINCs and USCINCSOC will support demining activities that provide benefit to US national and regional objectives in peacetime engagement, regional stability, promoting democracy, and economic development.”⁶²

The Commander-in-Chiefs of the geographic commands conduct the demining operations within their respective area of responsibility (AOR) and use their Theater Engagement Plans to prioritize and synchronize peacetime activities. The US Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) provides the geographic CINCs with Special Operations Forces (SOF) to train mine clearance, leadership, communications, and emergency medical treatment skills.⁶³

2. Demining as a Civil-Military Operation

The Nature of Civil-Military Operations

Humanitarian demining is part of the civil-military operations (CMO) family. CMO are described in Joint Publication (JP) 3-57 (Joint Civil Affairs Doctrine) as follows:

“CMO encompass the activities that JFCs [Joint Force Commanders] take to establish and maintain relations between their forces and the civil authorities and general population, resources, and institutions in friendly, neutral, or hostile areas

where their forces are employed. JFCs plan and conduct CMO to facilitate military operations and help achieve politico-military objectives derived from US national security interests. Establishing and maintaining military-to-civil relations entail interaction between US, multinational, and indigenous security forces, and governmental, non-governmental organizations (NGO), and international organizations (IOs) as part of missions tasked to a JFC. These activities occur before, during, subsequent to or in the absence of other military actions. The term “civil-military operations” is a broad term used to denote activities of a commander that establish, maintain, influence or exploit relations between military forces and civil authorities, both governmental and non-governmental, and the civilian populace in a friendly, neutral, or hostile operational area to facilitate military operations and consolidate operational objectives. Civil Affairs may include performance by military forces of activities and functions normally the responsibility of local government. These activities may occur prior to, during, or subsequent to other military actions. They may also occur, if directed, in the absence of military operations.”⁶⁴

Cultural Expertise as a CMO Asset

Cultural difficulties including religious and political issues are assessed during the pre-mission survey and corresponding matters such as proper dress and code of conduct, once established, are closely followed. Knowledge of issues such as fasting during Ramadan, appropriateness of alcohol consumption, and fatalistic beliefs regarding those injured by landmines, all affect the ability of the operator to do his job more effectively.⁶⁵ Governing bodies, religious leaders, documents, statutes, military leaders, police, ethnic groups, country and community needs assessments, are all good sources of information as well as key decision-makers and facilitators.⁶⁶

Since cultural, linguistic, and liaison skills can contribute to mission success at the strategic, operational or tactical level, “dedicated CA forces, by virtue of their area and linguistic orientation, cultural awareness, experience in military-to-host nation advisory and assistance activities . . . are essential.”⁶⁷ At any given time, CA personnel may be involved in a CMO (such as a demining campaign) at various levels,:

“At the strategic level planners may be focusing on the exit strategy while operational and tactical level commanders are planning and conducting activities in support of immediate operations. The successes of the near-term operational and tactical level activities enable the execution of a successful exit strategy.”⁶⁸

Effective Planning and Coordination of Civil-Military Operations

Planning and coordination at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels is important for achieving the maximum synchronized effect. As emphasized in JP 3-57, “*Close coordination and cooperation with these groups should reduce costs, prevent duplication, lessen the friction of potential rivalry, and improve results.*”⁶⁹ The focus at the strategic level is national security as well as those larger, long-term, regional issues “such as economic development and stability, national or host government infrastructure.”⁷⁰ As with all Foreign Humanitarian Assistance (FHA) the aim is to relieve or reduce

threats to “life or loss of property [...] by conducting operations limited in scope and duration.”⁷¹ The “primary focus of [foreign humanitarian] assistance is to foster self-reliance.”⁷² And, by statute, the operation is to promote both “(A) the security interests of both the United States and the country in which the activities are to be carried out; and (B) the specific operational readiness skills of the members of the armed forces who participate in the activities.”⁷³

Planning for demining operations requires accurate assessments of the HN. Typically in CMO, CA elements help to ensure that surveys are conducted to provide accurate assessments.⁷⁴ Operational Plans (OPLANs) “should clearly delineate responsibilities, constraints, and limitations in light of other agencies’ established parameters and should emphasize the *importance of coordinating CMO concerns and intent*.”⁷⁵ This planning “*may entail research, surveys, planning, and coordination of both DOD and non-DOD organizations and agencies*.”⁷⁶

Establishing Measures of Effectiveness

The formulation of a coherent strategy prior to operations “is imperative to achieve success” in the mixed environment of military, UN agencies, IOs, and NGOs. A “concise strategy will facilitate the measurement of the level of success . . . through appropriate measures of effectiveness (MOE), as well as measure the level of improvement in the quality of life of the populace through normality indicators.”⁷⁷

Establishing MOE builds clarity of purpose and unity of effort. They help all those involved in the demining effort to gauge the progress of the mission and understand their contribution. JP 3-57 gives the following description:

“*MOE provide a baseline of indicators on how well the military achieves its specific (possibly limited) goals according to its mission statement. Such measures are situation dependent, often requiring readjustment as the situation changes and higher level guidance develops. MOE normally are discrete, quantifiable, and helpful in understanding and measuring progress . . . They help identify effective strategies and tactics and points at which to shift resources, transition to different phases, or alter or terminate the mission.*”⁷⁸

In developing MOE, several factors have been suggested as guidelines.⁷⁹ MOE are expected to be appropriate to the situation and audience; mission-related; measurable, or, if qualitative, clearly stated to prevent misinterpretation; few in number to avoid collection efforts that outweigh their value; sensitive to changes and useful for guiding responses to those changes. While eliminating landmines is the grand objective and the number of landmines removed can be a MOE, other measures have been identified as more relevant to the practical demining effort.⁸⁰ These measures include drops in mortality rates, specific areas demined, amounts of productive agricultural land rendered useable, etc. MOE are useful not only at the strategic level but also at the operational and tactical levels.

At the operational level, planning is for the full range of activities from deployment to redeployment.

CA needs to synchronize support for tactical commanders, conduct liaison activities with other agencies, and, where possible, integrate them into the operations. As joint doctrine makes clear, “maintaining routine access and dialogue with DoS representatives, senior leaders, and the interagency community is critical.”⁸¹

CA liaison, however, is no less critical at the tactical level where dealing with local officials can be very personal. Military humanitarian activities, in turn, can have a more direct impact on the local populace than on more elevated (and thus less affected) inhabitants and officials. For instance, performing a civic action mission, such as digging a well, may seem to be elementary until one realizes that land values, market sites, and local politics may be impacted greatly by the site of that well. The responsibility of operational commanders includes allocating and distributing resources to “enable subordinate commanders to execute CMO.”⁸²

Tactical level CMO are more narrowly focused and may include “local security operations, distribution of food and water, processing and movement of refugee and displaced persons, and basic medical support.”⁸³ At this level the various phases of a demining operation are often performed by special operations forces or active duty CA forces.

The Interagency Context of CMO

Multiple agencies interacting with the US military requires developing procedures for effective cooperation. The guidance given in JP 3-57 is that, “*obtaining coordinated and integrated effort in an interagency operation should not be equated to the C2 [command and control] of a military operation.* The various agencies’ different and sometimes conflicting goals, policies, procedures, and decision-making techniques make unity of effort a challenge.”⁸⁴ Several agencies may be involved in a country’s demining effort; unity of effort may be achieved best by applying the leadership principle that “*action will follow understanding.*”⁸⁵

All US government personnel in a country, except those assigned to a combatant command, are under the control of the Ambassador, designated as chief of mission. Assisting the Ambassador is the US country team, from which the demining program approval process began. The Country Team is “*the foundation for rapid interagency consultation, coordination, and action on recommendations from the field and effective execution of US missions, programs, and policies.*”⁸⁶ Political, economic, administrative, consular, public affairs, regional security officers, and communications staff along with attachés from DOD, Department of Agriculture typically form a Country Team. Also represented are other agencies, such as United States Agency for International Development (USAID), that provide economic development and humanitarian assistance to advance US economic and political interests overseas. Coordination keeps the involved elements informed and is essential to achieve unity of purpose.⁸⁷ Indeed, it has been argued that “the link between mine clearance and economic development could be maximized by closer cooperation among US government agencies throughout the process.”⁸⁸ Others to be included are military liaison and other agency personnel from the HN, as well as NGOs and IOs.

3. Army Special Operations Forces

Force Types and Tasks

The Army Special Operations Forces (ARSOF) are assigned to the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), which includes the Army Special Forces (SF) groups, Psychological Operations (PSYOP) and Civil Affairs (CA) units, in addition to some Army Rangers, Navy sea-air-land (SEAL) teams and Air Force special operations wings. These forces support the National Military Strategy by performing certain core tasks. USSOCOM has prioritized these tasks and determined that all are either increasing in relevance to the strategic environment or are at a steady state.⁸⁹

<u>Task</u>	<u>Trend</u>
Counterproliferation	Increasing
Counterterrorism	Increasing
Foreign Internal Defense	Increasing
Special Reconnaissance	Increasing
Direct Action	Steady State
Psychological Operations	Increasing
Civil Affairs	Steady State
Unconventional Warfare	Steady State
Information Operations	Increasing

The skills necessary for the tasks of Foreign Internal Defense, Civil Affairs, Psychological Operations and Information Operations “fully support” the national security objectives of shaping the international environment.⁹⁰

SOF Demining Tasks

In the US DOD demining program, SF teams typically “train-the-trainers” to increase host nation mine clearance capabilities, PSYOP supports the development of popular mine awareness campaigns, and CA contributes interagency, social structure, and management training expertise. The ARSOF are used not only because they have the technical, public affairs, and social structure expertise, but also possess “unique qualifications of language, cultural awareness, and area orientation.”⁹¹

Upon IWG’s approval of the resource plan, the theater assessment team provides CINCSOC with a detailed OPLAN.⁹² Whether conducting a principal or collateral operation, “SOF must be incorporated into—and must fully support—the regional and country plans of the geographic CINCs and US ambassadors.”⁹³ As one of their collateral activities, SOF support demining operations in all geographic areas of responsibility, conducting demining operations around the world, including Honduras, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Mozambique, Namibia, Rwanda, former Yugoslavia, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Yemen, Jordan, Laos and Cambodia.

ARSOF is uniquely suited for conducting missions such as strategic reconnaissance, unconventional warfare, foreign internal defense, civil affairs, psychological operations, and humanitarian assistance.⁹⁴ SOF have the language and technical skills to train HNs and assist them in developing their social infrastructure to remove landmines so that harm to innocent civilians may be prevented, victims assisted, and land may be returned to productive use.

Training and Readiness Benefits

The program allows SOF to hone their skills in countries that may not otherwise be accessible to US forces. The Special Operations Commander for the Pacific, Brigadier General Schwartz notes, “The training and skills of SOF are in high demand. The fact that SOF personnel are ready, mature, professional, and culturally aware underwrites our involvement throughout the pacific region, supporting the CINC strategy of engagement.” This training is seen as “a significant, relatively low-cost tool in the strategy of engagement.”⁹⁵

“ARSOF engaged in other nations during peacetime will acquire and sustain situational awareness in regions where US interests exist or emerge expediently. Close contact in military-to-military settings or contact with the local populace will enhance respect, establish or improve relations, reduce tension, and when required, facilitate coalition operations. Continued *emphasis on joint and interagency interoperability will be paramount for ARSOF peacetime engagement activities. ARSOF peacetime engagement in 2010 will provide a low-key presence that is politically acceptable and readily convertible to military operations.*”⁹⁶

Similarly, Army Reserves can play a significant role in supporting peacetime engagement. In USPACOM, reserve engineer and medical units are the principal actors in Humanitarian Assistance/Civic Action projects whose activities “have significantly improved the quality of bilateral relationships with the host nations.”⁹⁷ While HDO provide training benefits, the Army also points out that these operations have “...significantly improved the quality of bilateral relationships with the host nations.”⁹⁸

⁶¹TC 31-34, 1-1.

⁶²Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3207.01, 1 March 1999, 1–2.

⁶³CJCSI 3207.01, B-1. The geographic CINCs “in coordination with the chiefs of the US diplomatic missions,” shall:

a. Plan, support, and conduct civil affairs activities in their areas of responsibility. These activities shall be designed to achieve the following:

- (1) Support the Unified Combatant Commander’s missions and objectives.
- (2) Support the goals and programs of other US Government Agencies related to civil affairs consistent with those authorities governing DOD involvement.

(3) Provide for training of US civil affairs forces within their areas of responsibility. Coordinate the training with the Commander in Chief, US Special Operations Command (USCINCSOC), for civil affairs units and personnel assigned to the US Special Operations Command (USSOCOM).

(4) Effect coordination and liaison with other US Government Agencies operating in their areas of responsibility.

b. Ensure the integration of civil affairs activities into military plans.

c. Designate a staff element with responsibility for coordinating civil affairs activities.

DODD 2000.13.

⁶⁴JP 3-57, I-2-3, 5. The last part is the definition of Civil Affairs given in Department of Defense Directive 2000.13, Civil Affairs, June 27, 1994, ASD (SO/LIC).

⁶⁵JMU MAIC, Task 3, 77.

⁶⁶JMU MAIC, Task 3, 78.

⁶⁷JP 3-57, I-7.

⁶⁸JP 3-57, I-9.

⁶⁹JP 3-57, III-9, and see I-11.

⁷⁰JP 3-57, I-9.

⁷¹JP 3-57, I-18.

⁷²JP 3-57, I-18.

⁷³10 USCS § 401(a)(1). Accordingly, DOD Directive (DODD) 2000.13 states that “before civil affairs activities are conducted, the long-term impact on current US security policy goals and objectives in general and on the host country in particular will be considered.”

⁷⁴JP 3-57, III-12. The collection of information is always important, and also noted here is the integration information into command intelligence programs.

⁷⁵JP 3-57, III-9.

⁷⁶JP 3-57, III-9.

⁷⁷JP 3-57, I-13.

⁷⁸JP 3-57, III-35, 36.

⁷⁹JP 3-57, III-36, 37.

⁸⁰“Hidden Killers 1998: The Global Landmine Crisis,” Department of State, [Http://www.state.gov/www/global/arms/rpt_9809_demine_summ.html](http://www.state.gov/www/global/arms/rpt_9809_demine_summ.html)

⁸¹JP 3-57, III-2.

⁸²JP 3-57, I-10.

⁸³JP 3-57.

⁸⁴ JP 3-57, IV-4. Indeed, “some NGO may, in fact, have policies that are purposely antithetical to both the US military forces and US government agencies.” And while “*there is no overarching interagency doctrine,*” some guidance is found in PDD-56, “Managing Complex Contingency Operations.” On interagency coordination see chapter IV, *passim*.

⁸⁵JP 3-57, IV-6.

⁸⁶JP 3-57, IV-8.

⁸⁷JP 3-57, IV-9.

⁸⁸Col. Carl T. Sahlin, Jr., “Global Mine Clearance: An Achievable Goal?” *Strategic Forum*, no. 143, August 1998 <http://www.ndu.edu/inss/strforum/forum143.html>

⁸⁹US Army Special Operations Command, *Strategic Planning Guidance: Into the 21st Century*, May 1999, 13–14.

⁹⁰US Army Special Operations Command, *Strategic Planning Guidance: Into the 21st Century*, May 1999, 15.

⁹¹TC31-34, iii.

⁹²TC 31-34, 3-1.

⁹³US Special Operations Forces, Posture Statement, 1998, p. 7.

⁹⁴10 U.S.C. 167.

⁹⁵*US Special Operations Forces, Posture Statement*, 1998, pp. 28, 33.

⁹⁶US Army Special Operations Command, *Army Special Operations Forces: Vision 2010*, 7 April 1997, 5, *emphasis added*.

⁹⁷“Humanitarian Assistance/Civic Action Projects,” <http://www.usarpac.army.mil/docs/haca.htm>, 11/13/1999.

⁹⁸TC 31-34, Preface.

Section IV. Civil Affairs Capabilities

1. The Basic Civil Affairs Mission

It is Department of Defense (DOD) policy to “maintain a capability to conduct a broad range of civil affairs activities necessary to support DOD missions and to meet DOD Component responsibilities to the civilian sector in foreign areas in peace and war throughout the range of military operations.”⁹⁹ “Civil Affairs activities” include actions that “coordinate military operations with civilian agencies of the US government, with civilian agencies of other governments, and with non-governmental organizations . . . provide expertise in civilian sector functions that normally are the responsibility of civilian authorities. This expertise is applied to implementing DOD policies that advise or assist in rehabilitating or restoring civilian sector functions.”¹⁰⁰ The Civil Affairs role must be considered when plans are made. The commanders of the Unified Combatant Commands have the responsibility to “ensure the integration of civil affairs into military plans.”¹⁰¹ CA activities ultimately are directed toward achieving “an orderly and prompt transition of civilian sector responsibilities from the DOD Components to non-DOD authorities.”¹⁰²

Civil Affairs activities include: civil assistance; civil administration in friendly territory; civil administration in occupied territory; populace and resource control; foreign nation support; humanitarian assistance; military civic action; and emergency services. These activities are carried out initially by the 96th Civil Affairs Battalion, which is the only active component (AC) unit with about 200 assigned personnel at Fort Bragg, NC. The remaining 97 percent of civil affairs personnel are in the reserve component (RC) consisting of about 5500 personnel in 36 units situated throughout the US.

2. The Active Component Civil Affairs Mission

The AC largely consists of generalists who deploy quickly and support immediate CMO needs and conduct area assessments to lay the groundwork for functional specialists who are reservists. The 96th Bn has the capabilities to:¹⁰³

- Plan, train, and prepare US and foreign national (FN) military forces to execute CA activities in support of CMO;
- Conduct CA activities in support of SOF and conventional forces;
- Provide cultural and linguistic expertise to the supported command;
- Plan and coordinate populace resource control;
- Plan and coordinate military civic action;
- Plan and coordinate humanitarian assistance;
- Plan and coordinate emergency services;
- Plan and coordinate foreign nation support;
- Provide support and assistance to interagency, NGO, international organization, and FN agencies;

- Supplement IO and PSYOP plans;
- Deploy with classified/unclassified communications links (LAN/WAN [local area network/wide area network], global phone, SATCOM);
- Rapidly deploy within 24-96 hours by all means of infiltration; and
- Operate independently in austere environments, within the constraints of force protection, with minimal support.

3. The Reserve Component CA Mission

The Reserve Component, Civil Affairs (RC CA) units are organized into 36 units, which are regionally trained, assigned, and apportioned. Traditionally, the rank structure of RC CA is very high owing to the advanced civilian-acquired skills, which are often required of CA missions. Units and assigned personnel are recruited, trained, and organized to provide expertise in 16 functional areas – areas of a professional nature and found primarily in the civilian world. The Civil Affairs Special Functions fall into one of four categories: Government Function; Economic Function; Public Facilities Function; and Special Functions.

<p>Government Function</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Public Administration Public Education Public Health Public Safety Legal 	<p>Economic Function</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Civilian Supply Economic Development Food & Agriculture
<p>Public Facilities Function</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Public Communications Transportation Public Works & Utilities 	<p>Special Functions</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Civil Information Cultural Relations Dislocated Civilians Emergency Services Environmental Management

The capabilities of these functional specialists are as follows:

Public Administration

- Provide technical expertise, advice and assistance in the identification and assessment of foreign national (FN) public administration systems, agencies, services, personnel, and resources.
- Determine capabilities and effectiveness of public administration systems and how these impact CMO.
- Develop plans and provide operational oversight/supervision for the rehabilitation or establishment of public administration systems, agencies, and resources.
- Liaison and coordinate with FN government administrators and agencies in support of CMO.
- Advise and assist in the restoration, establishment, organization and operation of public government systems and agencies.
- Advise and assist in developing technical administrative requirements, policies and procedures for

providing government services to the local population.

Public Education

- Provide technical expertise, advice and assistance in the identification and assessment of FN public, parochial and private education systems, agencies, services, personnel, and resources.
- Determine capabilities and effectiveness of education systems and how these impact CMO.
- Develop plans and provide operational oversight/supervision for the rehabilitation or establishment of public education systems, agencies, facilities and resources.
- Advise and assist in establishing the technical requirements for the public education system to support government administration (primary, secondary, and post-secondary educational systems).
- Advise and assist in the rehabilitation, establishment and maintenance of public education systems and agencies.
- Assist in the coordination of FN, international organization, NGO and US assistance and resources to support local government education systems as part of CMO.

Public Health

- Provide technical expertise, advice and assistance in the identification and assessment of FN public and private health systems, sanitation systems, agencies, services, personnel, resources and facilities.
- Determine capabilities and effectiveness of health and sanitation systems and how these impact CMO.
- Develop plans and provide operational oversight/supervision for the rehabilitation or establishment of public health systems, agencies, equipment, and facilities.
- Coordinate the use of FN government and private health resources for military use, CMO and in support of government administration.
- Advise and assist in establishing the technical requirements for public health services and resources to support government administration (clinics, hospitals, pharmacies, food preparation & storage, transportation (ambulance), skilled personnel, education, etc.)
- Advise and assist in the rehabilitation, establishment, delivery and maintenance of government public health systems and agencies.
- Assist in the coordination of FN, international organization, NGO, US government assistance and resources to support local government public health systems as part of CMO.
- Advise and assist FN, international organization, NGO, US government agencies in the prevention, control and treatment of diseases (education, immunization, and sanitation).

Public Safety

- Provide technical expertise, advice and assistance in the identification and assessment of FN public safety systems, agencies, services, personnel, and resources.
- Determine capabilities and effectiveness of public safety systems and how these impact CMO.
- Develop plans and provide operational oversight/supervision for the rehabilitation or establishment of public safety systems, equipment, and facilities.
- Advise and assist in establishing the technical requirements for government public safety systems to support government administration (police/law enforcement administration, fire protection, emergency rescue, and penal systems).

- Advise and assist in the rehabilitation, establishment and maintenance of government public safety systems and agencies.
- Assist in the employment of public safety resources to support government administration, CMO, and military use.
- Assist in the coordination of FN, international organization, NGO, US government assistance and resources to support local government public health systems as part of CMO.

Legal

- Provide technical expertise, advice and assistance in the identification and assessment of FN legal systems, agencies, services, personnel, resources, laws, codes and statutes.
- Determine capabilities and effectiveness of legal systems and how these impact CMO.
- Assist the Staff Judge Advocate (SJA) in the education and training of US personnel in the FN legal system, obligations and consequences.
- Advise and assist the SJA in international law issues.
- Coordinate with the SJA to assist and advise local FN judicial agencies.
- Liaison and monitor the local FN judiciary system, to de-conflict differences in administration of laws, agreements and policies.

Public Communications

- Provide technical expertise, advice and assistance in the identification and assessment of government and commercial communication systems, agencies, services, personnel, resources, and facilities.
- Determine capabilities and effectiveness of communication systems and how these impact CMO.
- Develop plans and provide operational oversight/supervision for the rehabilitation or establishment of communication equipment, facilities and systems.
- Advise and assist in establishing the technical requirements for government and commercial communications resources to support government administration (postal services, telephone, telegraph, radio, television, computer systems, and print media).
- Advise and assist in the rehabilitation, establishment and maintenance of government communications systems and agencies.
- Assist in the employment of public communications resources to support government administration and CMO.

Public Transportation

- Provide technical expertise, advice and assistance in the identification and assessment of FN public and commercial transportation systems, agencies, services, personnel, and resources.
- Determine capabilities and effectiveness of transportation systems and how these impact CMO.
- Develop plans and provide operational oversight/supervision for the rehabilitation or establishment of transportation equipment, facilities and systems.
- Coordinate the use of government and commercial transportation resources for military use, CMO and in support of government administration.
- Advise and assist in establishing the technical requirements for government and commercial transportation resources to support government administration (motor vehicles and roads, trains and railways, boats and waterways, aircraft and airports, and pipelines).

- Advise and assist in the rehabilitation, establishment and maintenance of government transportation systems and agencies.

Public Works and Utilities

- Provide technical expertise, advice and assistance in the identification and assessment of FN public and commercial works and utilities systems, agencies, services, and facilities.
- Determine capabilities and effectiveness of public works and utilities systems and how these impact CMO.
- Develop plans and provide operational oversight/supervision for the rehabilitation or establishment of works and utilities equipment, facilities and systems.
- Advise and assist in establishing the technical requirements for government and commercial works and utilities resources to support government administration (electric power, natural gas, water production and distribution; sewage collection, treatment, and disposal; sanitation; public facilities, etc).
- Advise and assist in the rehabilitation, establishment, operation and maintenance of government works and utilities systems and agencies.
- Assist in the employment (coordination) of public works and utilities resources to support government administration and CMO.

Food and Agriculture

- Provide technical expertise, advice and assistance in the identification and assessment of food and agriculture systems, agencies, services, personnel, resources, and facilities.
- Determine capabilities and effectiveness of food and agriculture systems and how these impact CMO.
- Develop plans, policies, and procedures and provide operational oversight/supervision for the rehabilitation or establishment of food and agriculture systems and agencies for production, processing, storage, transportation, distribution, and marketing, etc.
- Coordinate the use of FN government and commercial food and agriculture resources for military use, CMO and in support of government administration.
- Advise and assist in establishing the technical requirements for food and agriculture resources (livestock, poultry, grain, vegetables, fruit, fish, fiber and forestry) management to support government administration.
- Advise and assist in the rehabilitation, establishment, delivery and maintenance of food and agricultural systems and agencies.
- Assist in the coordination of FN, international organization, NGO, US government assistance and resources to support food and agricultural systems as part of CMO (i.e. crop and livestock improvement, agricultural training and education, etc.).

Economic Development

- Provide technical expertise, advice and assistance in monitoring and assessment of the FN economy, economic systems, commercial activities, agencies, services, personnel, and resources.
- Determine capabilities and effectiveness of economic systems and how these impact CMO.
- Develop plans, policies, and procedures and provide operational oversight/supervision for the

rehabilitation or establishment of economic and commercial systems, agencies, and resources.

- Advise and assist with budgetary systems, monetary and fiscal policies, revenue producing systems and treasury operations.
- Advise and assist in price control and rationing programs.
- Develop and implement plans to prevent black-market activities.
- Liaison and coordinate with local government administration agencies and commercial enterprises in support of CMO.
- Advise and assist in the restoration, establishment, organization and operation of economic and commerce systems, agencies and organizations.
- Advise and assist in the technical administrative requirements of employing economic controls (i.e. price controls, rationing programs, prevention of black-market activities, monetary/fiscal policies, and labor).
- Advise and assist in the employment of local commercial resources, to include labor, to support government administration, CMO, and military use.
- Assist in the coordination of FN, international organization, NGO, US government assistance and resources to support local economic development as part of CMO.
- Advise and assist the SJA and contracting officials in FN cultural intricacies. Ensure compliance with international laws and conventions regarding use of labor.

Civilian Supply

- Provide technical expertise, advice and assistance in the identification and assessment of public and commercial supply systems, agencies, services, personnel, resources and facilities.
- Determine capabilities and effectiveness of civilian supply systems and how these impact CMO.
- Determine availability of local supplies.
- Identify private and public property available for military use.
- Develop plans and provide operational oversight/supervision for the rehabilitation or establishment of government and commercial supply systems and facilities.
- Coordinate the use of government, commercial and private property, facilities, supplies, equipment and other resources for military use, CMO and in support of government administration.
- Advise and assist in the rehabilitation, establishment and maintenance of government and commercial supply systems and agencies.
- Advise and assist in the technical administrative requirements for government and commercial supply resources to support government administration (transportation, storage, distribution to include rationing, and use of captured and salvaged items).
- Advise and assist the SJA and contracting officials in FN cultural intricacies when acquiring and using local resources (i.e. supplies, equipment and facilities).
- Establish policies and procedures concerning custody and administration of public and private property.
- Assist in the coordination of FN, international organization, NGO, US government assistance and resources to support local civilian supply needs as part of CMO.

Emergency Services

- Provide technical expertise, advice and assistance in the identification and assessment of government

emergency services capabilities and resources to respond to the employment of nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) weapons and hazardous material (HazMat) incident.

- Determine capabilities and effectiveness of emergency service systems and how these impact CMO.
- Develop plans and provide operational oversight/supervision for the rehabilitation or establishment of emergency services systems, equipment, and facilities.
- Advise and assist in establishing the technical requirements for government emergency services systems to support government administration during an NBC or hazardous material (HazMat) incident (police/law enforcement administration, fire protection, emergency rescue, restoration of other vital services, etc.).
- Advise and assist in the rehabilitation, establishment and maintenance of government emergency services plans, policies and procedures.
- Assist in the coordination and employment of emergency services resources to support government administration, CMO, and military use (i.e. mitigation, detection, warning, response and recovery).
- Assist in the coordination of FN, international organization, NGO, US government assistance and resources to support local government emergency-service systems as part of CMO.

Environmental Management

- Provide technical expertise, advice and assistance in the identification and assessment of FN environmental and pollution control systems, agencies, services, personnel, resources, and facilities.
- Determine capabilities and effectiveness of environmental and pollution control systems and how these impact CMO.
- Develop plans and provide operational oversight/supervision for the rehabilitation or establishment of environmental resource management systems, agencies, equipment, and facilities.
- Coordinate the use of FN government and private environmental management resources for military use CMO and in support of government administration to mitigate, prepare, respond and recover to environmental activities.
- Advise and assist in establishing the technical requirements for environmental management services and resources to support government administration (plans, policies and procedures to protection natural resources, and provide pollution control etc.)
- Advise and assist in the rehabilitation, establishment, delivery and maintenance of government environmental management systems and agencies.
- Advise, assist and support the coordination of FN, international organization, NGO, US government assistance and resources to support local government environmental management as part of CMO.

Cultural Relations

- Provide technical expertise, advice and assistance on FN social and cultural matters and how they impact CMO.
- Assist in the familiarization, education, and training of US personnel in the FN social, cultural, religious, ethnic characteristics, codes of behavior and language.
- Advise and assist in the locating, identification, preservation and protection of significant cultural property.
- Develop plans and provide operational oversight/supervision for the protection, preservation, and restoration of significant cultural property and facilities (religious buildings, shrines, and consecrated

places, museums, monuments, art, archives, libraries, etc).

- Advise and assist in establishing the technical requirements for government, community and private systems and agencies to protect preserve and restore cultural property.
- Advise and assist in the rehabilitation, establishment, operation and maintenance of cultural property systems and agencies.
- Assist in locating, identifying, determining ownership, and safeguarding cultural property.
- Assist in the coordination of FN, international organization, NGO, US government assistance and resources to support local government relations as part of CMO.

Civil Information

- Advise and assist in the development and coordination of public relations activities to support government administration, CMO and the “single voice” message.
- Advise, assist, develop plans and provide operational oversight/supervision for the employment of civil information (mass media) agencies and resources to support CMO (radio, TV, print/newspaper) both public and private.
- Assist PSYOP forces in the planning, development, and dissemination of proclamations, ordinances, and notices.
- Advise and assist the public affairs officer (PAO) in maintaining cultural awareness while dealing with the media.
- Recommend information control and civil censorship policies.

Dislocated Civilians

- Provide technical expertise, advice and assistance in the identification and assessment of dislocated civilian activities.
- Develop plans and provide operational oversight/supervision for the protection, care, control, process and repatriation of dislocated civilians in support of CMO.
- Assist in the planning, organization, and coordination of FN, international organization, NGO, US government assistance and resources to support local government care, control, processing and repatriation of dislocated civilians as part of CMO.

4. Recent Applications of Civil Affairs Capabilities

From the rescue operation in Grenada in 1983 and continuing through nine deployment cycles in Bosnia (into the year 2000), the Army CA force, consisting of various combinations of active component (AC) and reserve component (RC) soldiers, has been employed in almost all significant US military operations.

Civil Affairs forces (including a volunteer CA task force) were instrumental in conducting emergency feeding and shelter operations, as well as government restoration operations, in Panama during Operations JUST CAUSE and PROMOTE LIBERTY. CA forces were again called upon during Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM (this time via Presidential call-up), and operated displaced civilian camps in Saudi Arabia, planned with the Kuwaiti government for the rebuilding of the infrastructure of that country, and worked as high-level government advisors to the

re-established government of Kuwait.

During the relief operations in Kurdistan (Operation PROVIDE COMFORT), CA forces were again deployed to create a temporary infrastructure for returning Kurds, and to coordinate relief efforts with many international players along the Turkish-Iraqi border.

CA planners helped devise methods for the US amphibious support to Bangladesh (operation SEA ANGEL) in the wake of its devastating typhoon, and CA AC and RC soldiers teamed up once again to bring order and stability to the Haitians during Operation RESTORE DEMOCRACY; a high-ranking team of Reservists also created a plan for the reorganization of the judicial system there.

But the most continuous use of CA reservists has been in the former Yugoslavia. CA reservists have undertaken numerous civil-military and liaison tasks beginning in 1995 and continuing through the present day. Most of these activities have taken place in Bosnia, Macedonia, and Kosovo, supporting UN, international, and security force missions.

The recent use of CA has been widespread and multi-faceted. During the past 17 years, CA soldiers have performed menial (distributing humanitarian assistance supplies) but more often, strategic (planning major civil-military operations and acting as advisors at the Presidential and Ministerial levels) tasks. CA advisors have offered support in most of their functional areas, including public law and safety, public administration, public transportation, banking, agriculture, electric power, contract negotiations, medical support, education, and the care and treatment of displaced persons and refugees.

⁹⁹Department of Defense Directive 2000.13 Civil Affairs, June 27, 1994, ASD (SO/LIC). Civil Affairs is defined as follows: “The activities of a commander that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces and civil authorities, both governmental and non-governmental, and the civilian population in a friendly, neutral, or hostile area of operations in order to facilitate military operations and consolidate operational objectives. Civil affairs may include performance by military forces of activities and functions normally the responsibility of local government. These activities may occur prior to, during, or subsequent to other military actions. They may also occur, if directed, in the absence of military operations.”

¹⁰⁰DODD 2000.13.

¹⁰¹Department of Defense Directive 2000.13, Civil Affairs, D.3.b.

¹⁰²DODD 2000.13.

¹⁰³US Army Field Manual 41-10 (Draft, May 1999).

Section V. Civil Affairs Capabilities Applied to Demining

1. Humanitarian Demining as a Civil-Military Operation

Civil Affairs (CA) is a capability designed exclusively for civil-military operations (CMO). Demining is an activity, essentially civil-military in character, that can be enhanced in many ways by skills which validated CA personnel possess. Therefore, it is not surprising that as the US demining program began, CA was seen as having “a key role in relating to local demining entities and helping them to develop sustainable programs.”¹⁰⁴

Civil Affairs missions may impact directly or indirectly on mine action operations: civil assistance; civil administration in friendly territory; civil administration in occupied territory; populace and resource control; foreign nation support; humanitarian assistance; military civic action; and emergency services.

CA and Demining Requirements

CA missions may be matched with humanitarian demining requirements, such as developing coordinated and comprehensive plans conducting successful demining operations; ascertaining the sufficiency of infrastructure to support deployment; establishing rudimentary management systems; creating mechanisms for coordinating operations; ensuring sustainability of future programs; and achieving a successful transition to the host nation. *[Note: Appendix A contains tables which indicate levels of support appropriate to mine action tasks, by phase.]*

The general role of CA in demining operations is described in draft demining doctrine as follows: CA assets conduct humanitarian demining operations as part of an integrated effort with Special Forces (SF) and Psychological Operations (PSYOP) forces to support US government and theater command objectives. CA supports demining activities by *assisting in training the national HQ staff and by conducting liaison activities with the host nation (HN) infrastructure, the UN, and international or local NGOs. CA assistance focuses on training leadership skills, management techniques, and staff procedures required for the HQ to command, to control, and to communicate effectively with its subordinate organizations. CA assistance is provided to integrate the national demining office (NDO) into the HN infrastructure.*¹⁰⁵ CA activities ultimately are directed toward achieving “an orderly and prompt transition of civilian sector responsibilities from the DOD Components to non-DOD authorities.”¹⁰⁶

In the following sections, the key requirements and activities of Mine Action campaigns are analyzed to determine if CA capabilities can conduct or support that action.

2. Prioritization and Plans

Early and Integrated Planning

Achieving unity of effort among all agencies involved in mine action requires early planning and

coordination. Presidential Decision Directive 56 (PDD-56) states that “to maximize the effect of judicious military deployments, the civilian components of an operation must be integrated closely with the military components.[...] Integrated planning and effective management of agency operations early on in an operation can [...] create unity of effort.”¹⁰⁷ It is also true that planning at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels is important for achieving the maximum effect, and CA is involved at all three levels. Therefore, the commanders of the Unified Combatant Commands have the responsibility to “ensure the integration of civil affairs into military plans.”¹⁰⁸

“It is important that Civil Affairs plans and considerations be incorporated into the front-end planning process for US operations abroad. Civil Affairs activities must be a part of an overall national strategy, formulated and managed at the interagency level cascading down into theater and/or regional level plans and operations . . . *Routine access to senior leaders at all levels of this interagency environment is critical.*”¹⁰⁹

Planning and Prioritizing

Planning for a mine action campaign is not a linear process. Indeed, most planning needs to be done by describing an end-state (typically for mine action, the end-state is the time when a host country can sustain a mine action program with only minimal outside help) first and then working in reverse chronological order. Attention also has to be paid to the transition, or hand-off, point. Therefore, it is important that CA plans and considerations be incorporated into the front-end planning process for US operations.¹¹⁰

Setting priorities is directly related to understanding the problem. This comprehension is often derived from listening to discussions with host nation personnel, donors, NGOs, and other US government agencies, all of whom may have operating plans, or at least insights of their own.¹¹¹

Another reason for considering each level of planning early in the process is that the prioritization of mine action projects is critical. Demining projects and schedules must reflect goals and developmental objectives of the host nation. These plans and priorities will direct NGOs, contractors, deminers, logistic support personnel, mine awareness teams, victim assistance activities, etc. While the host nation is responsible for planning, integrating, and prioritizing its demining efforts, this is not always possible. The host nation may not have an effective national demining office (NDO), likewise, it may be incapable or unwilling to take on that task. Nevertheless there remains the “need for an objective analysis of the requirements of affected communities, and structuring and conduct of operations to meet these requirements.”¹¹²

CA: Flexible but Constrained

If this is the case, a CA liaison officer may be of great benefit in helping indigenous people and their leaders to develop a set of selection criteria for areas to be surveyed, cleared, or attended. Not only is CA charged with being able to conduct administration and government activities (in the absence of legitimate or competent authority), but with the knowledge of key infrastructure characteristics (functional specialties of CA). This gives CA soldiers the ability to apply their expertise about institutions, services, agriculture, medical, and other attributes, which must be taken into

consideration when planning and prioritizing demining projects. Civil Affairs personnel should also facilitate the participation of US operators in the host nation assessments and other activities which could further the total planning and coordination effort.

Initial contact between CA personnel and other organizations, (HN, IOs, NGOs, etc.) must be made and relationships developed. These other organizations may well have been working in the country for months or years and may be “uniquely suited to help the military regarding local conditions.”¹¹³ In Bosnia, the 353rd CA Command found a mature NGO infrastructure which “had been at work more than four years and had developed an extensive network of which CA soldiers could take advantage.

The relationships between CA and other agents will vary because, in general, “the organization and command relationships for conduct of CMO are highly variable.”¹¹⁴ There are times when an NGO will refuse to coordinate with Army personnel. Conversely, there may be times when it may be wholly inappropriate for US forces to work with particular demining organizations. This range of scenarios, as well as the wide scope of CA activities “necessitates flexibility in organization, planning, and execution”¹¹⁵ – a particular characteristic of special operations policies.

Although “CA forces and personnel continue to be the ‘bedrock’ that facilitates the application of these specialized forces”¹¹⁶ and the coordination of civil-military actions, the “activities of CA forces should be limited, where possible, to those involving coordination, liaison, and interface with existing or reestablished civilian authorities. Maximum use of local or indigenous resources should be made consistent with the satisfaction of minimum essential civil requirements.”¹¹⁷

The Planning Process

As part of the planning process, an estimate of the situation is made. Included, as priorities are an assessment of “host nation current capabilities, especially engineering training and equipment” and “identification of CA and PSYOP requirements and support for the mission.”¹¹⁸

Officers and Non-Commissioned Officers assigned to the team conduct a pre-deployment site survey (PDSS) three to six months before deployment. Civil Affairs and PSYOP personnel are expected to be included in the PDSS.¹¹⁹ In the pre-deployment phase the CA team may be asked to:

- Assess training requirements;
- Assess facilities to determine if construction or upgrading is required;
- Identify personnel, equipment (training aids, furniture, computers, vehicles), and budgetary requirements
- Procure necessary equipment and complete contracting requirements; and to
- Identify potential sources of additional support, i.e., the UN, NGOs, contractors, Office of Secretary of Defense (OSD), or Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA).¹²⁰

CA soldiers can support work on deployment plans, host nation sustainability (hand-off) and transition plans, while also supporting plans for implementation of the train-the-trainer, mine awareness, and if applicable, victim assistance operations.

3. Coordination and Integration

US Goal: Coordinated Effort

Humanitarian Demining Operations (HDO), as a subset of Civil-military operations (CMO), attempts to achieve politico-military objectives. Conducting successful military-to-civil relations entails interaction among US, multinational, and indigenous security forces, as well as US government agencies, non-governmental organizations (NGO), the host nation, for-profit organizations, and international organizations (IOs).

Coordination amongst these agencies is difficult for several reasons. One reason is, of course, the multiplicity of agencies involved; numerous agencies exhibit very diverse purposes. One must consider the different purposes of donor countries, NGOs, UN agencies, for-profit organizations, and the host nation government itself and match these against a backdrop of cultural or national factors. In addition to multiple players, another difficulty stems from the wide scope of demining activities which make up the panoply of a comprehensive mine action program. One typically encounters activities involved in the functions of mine awareness, mine clearance, and victim assistance. At the same time, however, there is universal recognition of the necessity for “increased collaboration among all agencies” to improve efficiency.¹²¹

Therefore, to shape the environment and bring order to an almost always complex scenario, the US faces two similar tasks: to achieve unity of purpose among US government players, and to coordinate with other demining organizations. Coordination with these groups is not just desirable; it is essential.

Diplomatic, military, and other foreign policy tools must be closely integrated, since not only the threat (the effects of anti-personnel landmines) crosses agency lines, but so do functional and organizational concerns and authorities regarding a mine action program en toto.¹²² A key goal for such a highly coordinated program is to keep all the involved elements informed.¹²³

Until recently, peacetime military operators and planners often considered coordinating activities with the UN and NGOs to be counterproductive, or perhaps a waste of time. However, as a result of the numerous operations conducted in conjunction with these organizations in the 1990s, there is a general belief among civil-military planners that such coordination maximizes cost-effectiveness and efficiency, avoids costly duplication, identifies capabilities, and avoids misunderstandings and friction. Today, one of the first things to be done in a peacetime mission is to make or develop relationships among these various participating groups.

Furthermore, such an “all-inclusive” strategy is valuable because it allows planners to develop a

comprehensive and long-term plan, even though the US portion may be short. In humanitarian demining operations, for example, “the US can plan for an end -state (e.g. hand-off to a UN mine action center or the host nation) without taking perpetual responsibility for future actions.”¹²⁴

Problems with Coordinating Demining Operations

Coordination of mine action activities is difficult. No one is totally in charge. While the host nation may try to exercise control, there are many instances in which it is simply not capable of exercising effective management of numerous and diverse organizations. The demining organizations themselves: NGOs, for-profit companies, military elements, UN organizations, donor country agencies, etc. do not always have an institutional penchant for coordination. Demining organizations working in the host nation may come from all over the globe and reflect differences in culture, ideology, methodology, donor accountability, and goals. And finally there is the matter of authority; old ways die hard, and many organizations are just not ready to “take orders” from anyone else.

Given the difficulty in coordinating mine action activities, one might hope that the UN could step in and manage country operations. However, the UN plays important roles of sponsoring demining operations, overseeing the staffing of Mine Action Centers, monitoring demining events, and promulgating demining standards. Some feel that the very presence of the UN may serve to undermine the indigenous quality of a demining program, while others feel that the UN must go further in developing more coordinated efforts.¹²⁵ If the UN were to pursue an authoritative role in a host country, not only would there be organizations who would oppose it, but the other demining roles played by the UN may be compromised. Therefore, in spite of the coordination problem, the UN probably will continue to play its role as a neutral and respected arbiter of mine action programs.

Finally, we must deal with mine action as a comprehensive term which encompasses a diverse number of activities, such as mine clearance, surveying, marking and monitoring, mine awareness, land reduction (declaring some areas “safe”), logistics, and victim assistance. Indeed, one may say that a typical demining NGO of today must promote “increased collaboration among all agencies” in order to improve programmatic efficiency.¹²⁶

The Conundrum: How to Coordinate When No One is In Charge

There is a general assumption that “the more agencies work together from the start, the more coordinated the larger effort,”¹²⁷ yet a demining organization may be loathe to give up any of its autonomy. Certainly each organization is searching for its own “identified point of contact; known funding mechanisms, geographic and program interests, etc. in their area of interest.”¹²⁸ Therefore, NGOs along with Special Operations often recognize the need to identify a “program manager” in the geographic area.

It seems then, that while experience leads most demining operators to conclude that the establishment of a “national-level demining [program] is a task best accomplished in peacetime by a single-purpose organization [...] standard national demining authority can [not] oversee humanitarian demining operations, as each host nation organization varies significantly based upon its unique strengths, capabilities, and limitations.” A single-purpose organization has been suggested

because demining “is an extremely slow, labor-intensive task that consumes an inordinate amount of manpower,” however reality dictates that no single organization can “be in charge.”¹²⁹ Therefore, the ability to coordinate, communicate, and integrate with all viable players continues to be the best hope for concerted and effective mine action.

The US Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) has been involved in demining because of its skills in dealing with country-specific and cultural difficulties. Cultural difficulties are assessed during the pre-mission survey. USSOCOM establishes religious, political, dress, and code of conduct guidelines that are closely adhered to and based on information obtained from governing bodies, religious leaders, documents, statutes, military leaders, police, ethnic groups, country needs, and community needs.¹³⁰ Even with good planning, a continued assessment of cultural factors is useful. “Having a Liaison Officer in-country allows eyes on target and constant communication with host nation as to cultural and country specifics.”¹³¹

CA and the Coordination of Demining Efforts

When coordinating within a demining context it must be understood that an interagency operation cannot be compared to the command and control of a military mission. There is no accepted, autonomous or unified responsibility for the whole of any demining effort. Indeed, many organizations (for reasons both good and bad) bristle at the thought of a military authority in charge (some NGOs equate the origins of the landmine presence with a military activity and have a difficult time accepting military oversight). However, it is felt, and has been shown to some extent, that Army Special Operations Forces (ARSOF) [and perhaps most especially CA forces] provide a low-key presence that is politically acceptable and yet readily convertible to military operations. The US Army Special Operations Command states that a “continued *emphasis on joint and interagency interoperability will be paramount for ARSOF peacetime engagement activities.*”¹³²

Application of CA capabilities range from the strategic to the tactical. Joint Staff doctrine recognizes the need for the application of CA at each level, including support of coordination within and between agencies and other players. JP 3-57 states that such efforts will result in, “*close coordination and cooperation with these groups [which] should reduce costs, prevent duplication, lessen the friction of potential rivalry, and improve results.*”¹³³

Similar Applications of CA

CA personnel have, in the past, played leading roles in the planning and implementing of civil-military operations in Panama, Kuwait, Kurdistan, Haiti, and Bosnia. The political-military dimension of CA has been a catalyst setting in motion the activation of many of the CA reservists, attached to high level planning cells. Indeed, many officials in the Department of Defense and the Department of State have come to know, and rely on this capability. During these operations, US Army Reserve CA advisors have had “routine access to senior leaders at all levels.”¹³⁴ Therefore, it is logical to extend this application of CA skills to the planning and implementation of humanitarian demining which calls for similar civil-military coordination, interagency planning, international coordination, and staff augmentation. It has been suggested, for instance, that the *format* of assessments may be standardized at the Interagency Working Group (IWG) level and that

experienced CA personnel could assist with this process.¹³⁵

CA Doctrine and Coordination

Draft doctrine for humanitarian demining also recognizes the value of coordination efforts undertaken by CA, and notes that its actions may facilitate better relations with NGOs et al. Furthermore, it is possible that the advance work of a CA team during the site survey, might also pave the way for frictionless clearance requirements and easier deployment of US demining forces into the host country. This work can be done simultaneously with preparations for future integration of effort with NGOs. CA contributes interagency, social structure, and management training expertise to this effort, but also applies its “unique qualifications of language, cultural awareness, and area orientation.”¹³⁶

Joint CA doctrine points out that “CA forces and personnel continue to be the ‘bedrock’ that facilitates the application of these specialized forces.”¹³⁷ In such a complex demining scenario, CA forces may indeed be a facilitating factor in the synchronizing and coordinating of planned and recommended actions.

Other CA Coordination Roles

A key area for coordination among demining players is in the development, training, and operation of a National Demining Office (NDO). This is a critical activity, more fully discussed in the following section of this report.

A perennial problem arising from demining support operations is the need for greater support from the host nation in helping to solve logistical problems, both for the program itself, and for the support of a US team deployed to support the mission. There has been a general lack of understanding of the countries participating in the US demining program, of the commitment necessary to support a demining program. “Coordination with all [host nation] officials, military, national and local, and the support of those officials is needed to support demining operations.”¹³⁸ To coordinate with a host nation in which the US government is conducting a civil-military operation, is a traditional and often-exercised CA function.

Another challenge facing the US while participating in a demining operation, is the ability to disengage at the proper time and conclude the mission. NGOs have been central in enabling military forces to withdraw from CMO, such as PROVIDE COMFORT, (aid to the Kurds in the aftermath of Operation DESERT STORM) and PROMOTE DEMOCRACY (Haiti). While most NGOs are not centrally concerned with the needs of the US military, they are indeed interested in their own goals, successes, and operations. CA personnel have often been able to get NGOs to see the congruence of their activities with those of the US. By coordinating the actions of US demining personnel with the activities of the NGOs, CA operators can help empower the NGOs to achieve their goals, while monitoring hand-off and transition milestones for US military forces.¹³⁹

As an example, CA coordination was identified as a key to the success of PROVIDE COMFORT by assuring that integrated civilian and military management structures were formed with representation

from the military forces and civilian government agencies from several nations, international governmental or quasi-governmental organizations, and private voluntary organizations.¹⁴⁰

Limitations of CA Coordination Support

Planners of a demining program, however, must take care not to rely too heavily on CA expertise, allowing those forces to usurp the authority of the commander, country team or host nation. “Activities of CA forces should be limited, where possible, to those involving coordination, liaison, and interface with existing or reestablished civilian authorities. Maximum use of local or indigenous resources should be made consistent with satisfaction of minimum essential civil requirements.¹⁴¹” CA team leaders must be imbued with the fact that they are the eyes and ears of the commander, and are not decision-makers, unless specifically delegated with such power.

Conversely, because of the above-mentioned concern, US military doctrine stresses the ability of CA forces actively to integrate the actions of other organizations and agencies into CMO. There has been reluctance among military planners and commanders to exercise this application rigorously or consistently. “CA teams or task forces have rarely moved far beyond the rudimentary concept of interagency cooperation.”¹⁴²

4. Training and Management

Given the comprehensive nature of demining, there are numerous times when management, leadership, and training skills need to be applied to host nation needs. Demining guidance lists leadership, record keeping, database skills, computer knowledge, staff organization, and conducting training exercises as capabilities which CA forces may help the host nation develop.¹⁴³

One of the greatest challenges in demining is to train indigenous personnel how to manage the comprehensive national or local program. If there is to be an indigenous demining program, there has to be leadership for it. That leadership may have to be developed “from the ground up” and may entail management training along with education about mines. Just as ‘train-the-trainer’ activities occur before operations, so must management training. Often, countries with serious demining problems also have functional, infrastructure, and management problems which make this training all the more critical.

One outspoken demining operator has pointed out that, “The office side of humanitarian demining is always weak. It has always been weak. The field side is good. The management for mine clearance operations is very normal everyday basic civilian skills, [while] technological knowledge of mine clearance is absolutely irrelevant...”¹⁴⁴

CA assistance therefore, can focus on “...training leadership skills, management techniques”¹⁴⁵ and staff procedures so that “...the management hierarchy of the host nation demining office can assume greater control of its subordinate organizations and of the problem [the landmine threat] itself.”¹⁴⁶

Since CA is often charged with performing activities and functions normally the responsibility of

local government, it is expected to maintain management and administrative training skills. The application of these skills has been undertaken as a result of recent operations in Panama (police training) and Haiti (judicial training). The problem is that training host nation personnel effectively usually assumes a long-term commitment, while US policy aims at a short US military presence.¹⁴⁷

5. The National Demining Office

The Importance of the National Demining Office

One aspect of demining which has become axiomatic is the need for a central, coordinating office to manage and oversee the demining efforts of a nation, province, or district at risk from the landmine threat. Whether it is called a Mine Action Center (MAC) or a National Demining Office (NDO), it not only provides the “home” for demining management, prioritization, record keeping, and liaison, but also becomes a direct manifestation of the host nation’s willingness to devote time, focus, and resources to the demining program.

An NDO is the appropriate office for coordinating all actions of a mine action campaign, including the efforts of the US government and NGOs. “Coordination and liaison with all involved agencies and government [is necessary] to maintain sustainability of a trained demining organization.”¹⁴⁸ It should coordinate component activities of the demining effort with a view to sustaining those efforts when the US (and other demining players) re-deploys. US assistance in developing an NDO can be crucial because, as a reflection of host nation resolve and commitment, it may determine the fate of the program.

An NDO is ideally responsible for planning, integrating, and prioritizing the country’s demining effort. “Components of the national HQ include safety and quality-assurance officers (who report directly to the director), as well as liaison officers (LNO) from other national entities and related agencies, such as NGOs.”¹⁴⁹ Also, part of an NDO typically includes command, administrative, data management, historical research, operations and training, and logistics sections¹⁵⁰.

The ability of an NDO to prioritize effectively efforts depends on knowing and monitoring areas of suspected or proven infestation.¹⁵¹ As the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has noted, because the “urgent situations are most often to be found in the communities and provinces” a mine information system for prioritizing efforts “is first and foremost a local, pragmatic, in-country mechanism. By standardizing the flow and analysis of data within a country, needs and constraints are more readily identified, coordination among the various actors is enhanced, the establishment of operational priorities facilitated and the overall effectiveness of mine action increased.”¹⁵²

An NDO, then is at the heart of mine action *when mine action is understood as a broad public health and developmental issue*. Pragmatically, the mine problems are local, but the resources for addressing mine problems often are not, and national socio-economic concerns may need a NDO to direct the demining efforts. Many factors such as the national government’s structure, its ability to control its provinces, the extent of the landmine problems, availability of managers with skill and ambition, etc. can influence the role that a NDO can play in the demining effort.

NGOs and the National Demining Office

Demining NGOs generally have reached the point where they believe that despite institutional and national differences, coordination of effort is necessary for the mine action program to be most effective.¹⁵³ The beginning point for concerted action (from a NGO perspective) is having an identified place where funding, planning, prioritization, programmatic, and demographic issues are coordinated.¹⁵⁴ The NGOs, as well as the US military element supporting demining operations, would therefore like to deal with a clearly identified and authoritative program manager.

NGOs may be reluctant to request help, or even coordination, from military organizations or commercial businesses; they are more likely to respond to requests from an NDO based on their understanding of the mine problem and their organizational philosophy.¹⁵⁵ Therefore, there is an almost universal desire to see the establishment of an effective NDO. An effective NDO allows host nation to solicit assistance more confidently, organizations of all stripes to be more receptive, and alleviates suspicion that an outside organization may be controlling the situation. If the host nation says, “we’ve got a demining program set up here, what kind of help can you give us? The NGOs and PVOs are more apt to jump in and say okay. Everything has to be seen as a concerted effort; everything has got to support the national objective”.¹⁵⁶

Consequently, the degree to which a host nation can maintain an effective, independent NDO depends on its political strength—its legitimacy, trustworthiness, and stability. Even proxy management requires the cooperation of the host nation. This cooperation needs to be fostered and cultivated. The objectives of the host nation must be understood in the proper context and demining activities must be effective in order to maintain support of the citizenry.¹⁵⁷

The US and the National Demining Office

As stated above, the US has reason to desire the creation of an NDO in the host nation. An NDO is the appropriate focal point for coordinating US government and NGO activities—it must assume the responsibility for sustaining the demining effort after the US government’s train-the-trainer program ends. US assistance in developing an NDO is crucial because the office and host nation support for the program will determine the fate of the effort. Coordination and liaison with all agencies and relevant government agencies is needed to maintain sustainability “of a trained demining organization.”¹⁵⁸

A functioning NDO is normally the best way to assure the success of the US exit strategy. Having an organized NDO coordinating all mine action activities and schedules allows the exit strategy to unfold, by preparing other organizations to take over after US mine action activities are completed.¹⁵⁹

The transition, however, is not automatic. Those overseeing the establishment of the NDO must monitor the situation and implement plans according to milestone achievements or transition points.¹⁶⁰ An NDO is also the appropriate office for “coordinating US government and NGO activities.”¹⁶¹ NGOs have years of experience in the countries and possess locally hired staff;¹⁶² their expertise should be recognized and coordination with those agencies cultivated within the context of an NDO. Without a sustainable NDO, some NGOs undoubtedly will continue to operate, as they

have operated in the past—though without the benefit of a coordinated effort. This long-term NGO commitment is one solution to a problem identified by some in the US military. The problem is achieving a balance between “teaching and providing equipment to host nation, while it assumes responsibility for the program.”¹⁶³

CA and the National Demining Office

In conception, operation, and goals, NDOs are remarkably similar to Civilian Military Coordination Centers (CMOC): organizations described in recent CA doctrine and activated in such CMOs as PROMOTE LIBERTY (Panama), RESTORE DEMOCRACY (Haiti), and in Bosnia. These CMOCs have fostered coordination, communication, and collaboration among various civil-military organizations, and have created a method for allowing civilian and military plans to be integrated and de-conflicted.

CA soldiers have operated within CMOCs and have been trained to act as liaison officers within them, performing coordinating, monitoring, and integrating functions with organizations “outside the wire.” Having a talented liaison officer (LNO) in-country allows for maximum flexibility to establish reliable “real-time” communication with the host nation and other involved organizations.¹⁶⁴

CA support then, in an NDO context, allows the US military to coordinate with all demining organizations in a geographic area, coordinate operational efforts (such as train-the-trainer, mine action, and medical assistance or training), support the host nation, leverage complimentary actions, and plan for transition and hand-off milestones.

6. Measures of Effectiveness

One of the most critical elements in the entire process of implementing a successful mine action plan is determining the measures of effectiveness (MOE). Donors have driven this concern; those who financially support demining operations expect some evidence of success. This concern for accountability appropriately focuses attention on the purpose of the demining and priorities.

More and more, donors, supporting agencies, host nations, and especially the demining operators themselves, are concerned with establishing a definition of mine action success and a means for measuring such. In order to assess progress in operations, plan transitions, establish end state goals, and design a host nation-run sustainable program; goals and objectives must reflect desired outcomes. These outcomes must be objectively assessed and should make some claim to be viable.

What is the right measure of effectiveness for a demining program? While there is no single answer, the common ones such as, number of square meters cleared and decline in mortality rates and other indicators, do provide quantifiable data. Donors expect that their donations will make a difference and there is the sense that “if you give a million dollars to help remove mines there should be some discernible difference.”¹⁶⁵

The Evolution of Demining MOE

Inevitably the first measures of success, based on the number of mines (or unexploded ordnance) removed or destroyed, were the easiest to measure and to report. However, demining agencies quickly determined that the amount of land cleared was a greater indication of success. Yet this measure too, was quickly relegated to secondary consideration, when the same agencies observed that the amount of productive or key land returned to use was more important than the aggregate number of acres cleared.

Currently, it is considered more important to relate mine action goals to drops in mortality and casualty rates, public confidence, freedom of movement, resettlement of displaced persons, a recovering economy, opened schools, and land under cultivation,¹⁶⁶ than listing pounds of ordnance cleared. One of the most effective and respected of landmine operators Hendrik Ehlers of MgM, at a global demining conference told his audience that in the last analysis, his measure of success was, "...the smiles which he now sees on the faces of the people in Angola."¹⁶⁷

A large number of people in the global demining community now agrees that measures of effectiveness are multi-faceted. They declare that the "other" two pillars of mine action (mine awareness, and victim assistance) can have an immensely important impact on the success of a mine action campaign, and can sometimes claim parity with mine clearance for effectiveness.

The Difficulties in Determining MOE

One problem with determining the effectiveness of a mine action program is dealing with "measures" that are not measurable in the conventional sense. Someone who is a subject matter expert must somehow develop criteria for measuring effectiveness (success) from results which are not always conducive to numerical interpretation. While the socio-economic impact of mine action operations cannot be empirically measured, it is nevertheless important to develop a methodology that tries to refine and improve this process. It may be counterproductive to claim that one set of measures is either more relevant than, or superior in other ways, to another set, but discussions of such, based on the experience of demining organizations remain important as they contribute to a body of knowledge on this subject. This facilitates a more methodical and effective way to organize and codify procedures and results.¹⁶⁸

Civil Affairs and MOE

During the past fifteen years, CA doctrine has undergone innovative changes almost continuously. One of the most creative and timely is the subject which humanitarian demining agencies have been dealing with –MOE.

As described in Section III of this paper, Joint Civil Affairs doctrine places the subject of MOE at the very heart of civil-military operations, requiring CA planners and operators to be familiar with the requirements and importance of that mission.¹⁶⁹ MOE guidelines and parameters are discussed in various CA doctrines and "think" pieces, which could be applied to humanitarian demining MOE challenges. Further, CA officers have been trained to apply their expertise (civilian professional functional specialties) to the overarching concept of reconstitution, restoration, or reconstruction. In

this way they are expected to contribute to the whole of the national fabric in order to assure the overall infrastructure of success. To a large degree, this is what the relatively new dynamic of humanitarian demining is developing: a way to define and recognize overall success from a series of monitored actions and milestones.

7. Infrastructure Restoration

Demining As A Precursor to Development

As noted previously, the landmine threat increasingly is seen as part of the developmental challenge facing a country, rather than as an isolated problem. Many affected countries are facing incredible infrastructure, governance, societal, and health problems, in part because they are incurring demining accidents. Many have come to realize that other health risks, displaced civilian problems, market ills, and agricultural disasters are created or at least exacerbated by the landmine threat. The World Bank, for instance, notes that, “Mine pollution affects the comparative expense and value of differing strategies for repair of roads and infrastructure, rehabilitating agricultural production and other areas of reconstruction.”¹⁷⁰ While (or perhaps, because) landmines are a very discrete and identifiable threat, they were, as a relatively new phenomena, treated as an isolated threat, rather than one whose effects – and remedies – cut across societal boundaries.

Today, the trend is to treat the mine threat as one of a series of basic developmental challenges, which must be approached in an integrated way. For example, at first it was thought that landmine victims needed special clinics and health care; recent thought however, accepts that landmine victims have many of the same problems as auto accident victims, people who have suffered debilitating diseases, etc.¹⁷¹

The Requirements for Infrastructure Support

Demining operators face two levels of infrastructure challenges. First, a US deployment must have its own logistical base and infrastructure. Without a logistical, communication, and subsistence “tail,” the military demining support team will be ineffective; especially in a country with a primitive support infrastructure.

Secondly, is the need to identify, develop, integrate, or recreate those infrastructure activities, which will both facilitate the demining effort, and link the benefits of mine action to the restoration of aspects of normal living (e.g. the clearing of farm lands, the relocation of displaced civilians, the establishment of markets, the re-opening of schools, etc.). The role of the US military in this effort (normally, short-term) must be clearly understood by both the host nation and US forces, ensuring effective transition of infrastructure responsibilities to other organizations which will perform sustained long-term operations in-country.¹⁷²

CA in Support of US Demining Deployments

One lesson learned from recent demining operations is that, “the host nation does not typically understand the planning, logistics, and other support necessary for the demining program to succeed.”¹⁷³ Indeed the general lack of logistical and infrastructure support often results in the

deployed demining organizations performing such rudimentary work as the digging of wells and providing for sewage—and then facing a power struggle to keep the facilities for the demining team.¹⁷⁴

A central CA doctrinal mission is to identify resources such as funding, personnel, and equipment, logistic support systems (e.g. transportation) for military operations. Of course the logistics and support requirements are driven by the availability of host nation resources, and by the “nature and extent of the mine and UXO problem.”¹⁷⁵ CA participation in the national assessment and the site survey can help determine sources (or the need for) such support.

CA in Support of Reconstituting the Host Nation Infrastructure

CA has engaged in numerous infrastructure restoration efforts since 1983. In doing so it has addressed virtually all of the functional specialties required by basic CA doctrine. In each case the task of CA has been to tailor the infrastructure needs of the host nation to that which could be rendered by the US. In Panama, for instance, CA personnel determined that police training and financial systems restoration were needed most. Likewise, restoring the electrical grid and fire fighting capabilities in Kuwait; the judicial system in Haiti; the restoration of clan and family support systems in Kurdistan; and the movement of displaced civilians in Kosovo.

CA is often called upon by the CINCs to apply its knowledge of functional specialties in order to facilitate obtaining or creating the necessary support. Sometimes that has meant direct consultancy by CA specialists with host nation counterparts, other times it has meant that CA identify the sources of required goods or services. CA units and individual personnel have been particularly noticed and awarded for performing such activities. CA soldiers have become especially adept at brokering and linking funds, personnel, and equipment to the task and at processing requirements for [support] contracts such as in Kuwait and Sarajevo.¹⁷⁶

CA, therefore can help develop a comprehensive approach for integrating equipment, technical data, and support into the host nation humanitarian demining program. CA can also help identify, select, and support the transfer of equipment and information to the host nation (ideally through the National Demining Office). Furthermore, CA personnel can select and support global, technical, and operational databases, and oversee the effective transfer of information and equipment to the host nation, US agencies, the UN, NGOs, and private sector organizations. CA could help effect “the link between mine clearance and economic development ... maximized by closer cooperation among US government agencies throughout the process.”¹⁷⁷

CA can support demining activities by working with host nation agencies that are concerned with infrastructure matters and with encouraging people at the community level to work together on small projects. These kinds of activities will not only help integrate demining activities into the host nation’s developmental plans, but will “encourage economic activity, stability, and the growth of national infrastructure.”¹⁷⁸

CA Infrastructure Support – A Short Term Solution

A danger inherent to CA teams performing infrastructure support activities, is that the host nation, or other agencies may come to rely on it for long-term solutions. The host nation or a recognized surrogate must predicate long-term sustainability and follow-up assessment plans on the maintenance of the program. US civil-military operations can assist by helping to establish a foundation for these in the short term; however, they cannot maintain a long-term sustainability effort, which is more suited for NGO or PVO support, possibly funded and monitored by the US country team.¹⁷⁹

The long-term commitment of the NGOs, Mine Action Centers overseen by the UN, and other organizations allows them to engage more completely in developing individual leadership skills, community based organizational development, and nation building than is possible – or desirable - with the DOD demining program. NGOs want to develop “community based organizations that complement government and UN activities.”¹⁸⁰ From their perspective, what is needed is the “integration of demining activities into development work when applicable. This is most suitable for NGO support.”¹⁸¹

A major problem, however, is that, “demining organizations are attempting to do development work, but do not possess the skills or assets to do so.”¹⁸² Therefore, the CA support to this process, done while facilitating the establishment of the US military demining effort, seems to be a productive, timely, and appropriate, as well as doctrinally sound application of CA.

8. Exit Strategy: Transition to Host Nation Sustainment

The Goal: Building Indigenous Capacity

In many post-Cold War operations, selecting the moment to end US military participation has proven to be a tricky business. In essence, senior leadership must define success outside the realm of normal combat operations. We have investigated the phenomena of success - that is, determining and applying measures of effectiveness in demining operations - earlier in this section. However, there must be more attention paid to the specific process of planning and preparing for the end of a humanitarian demining operation.

Virtually all demining organizations agree that building an indigenous capability is the ultimate aim of demining support. The best guarantee for sustaining a demining operation is the ability and willingness of the host nation to support the program. That commitment to a national effort is all but required to maintain coordination and linkage among the NGOs. Therefore, there is a need to determine how to integrate the activities of a US humanitarian demining effort into a viable host nation effort, which offers the best chance to continue and sustain it. To put it simply, the host nation (or a recognized surrogate) should assume ownership of the program.

General criteria for termination or transition includes, achieving previously determined milestone events, arriving at agreed-to measures of effectiveness, assessing the availability of resources, and establishing key or specific dates.¹⁸³ Consequently, as the US “hands-off” its demining activities to the host nation, it must be confident of the real abilities and liabilities of the host nation. There may

be others there to help, most notably UN agencies and NGOs, but US forces should be clear as to which activities are the purview of the host nation, and which are under the rubric of others. It is reasonable to expect that a nation will not “go it alone”, but will accept help from NGOs, the country team, the UN, regional players, contractors, donors and others.

Continuous Planning

One way to reach and control the difficult concept of “hand-off” is to plan early for it. The planning, with all of its difficulties, needs to anticipate the desired end-state, including provisions for outside support, if necessary, to continue the program. This involves anticipating some way to incorporate NGOs. The US and the host nation should agree on the End State at the very beginning, i.e. during the country assessment.

Detailed plans have been found to “greatly reduce the turmoil typically associated with transition. Typically, “termination plans should be prepared simultaneously and in conjunction with the deployment plan.”¹⁸⁴ Because the transition may involve the UN and NGOs, it needs full and continuous coordination with all involved organizations. Each transfer of control will be situationally dependent, and each plan will have different requirements.¹⁸⁵ The transition entails the transfer of active projects and coordination, points of contacts, possible resources and any additional information that may facilitate the transition.¹⁸⁶ A comprehensive transition plan includes, “specific requirements for all elements involved in the transition, summarizes capabilities and assets, and assigns specific responsibilities.”¹⁸⁷

A checklist for termination planning should address the following questions:¹⁸⁸

- Has the End State been achieved?
- Have stated operations objectives been accomplished?
- Have pre-existing national systemic obstacles to demining been addressed?
- Has the commander identified redeployment requirements?
- Has coordination for redeployment been conducted with appropriate commands, agencies, and other organizations?
- Has consideration been given as to when Reserve component forces will be released?
- Has transition planning been accomplished in the event that operations are transitioning to another military, regional or United Nations, or civilian organization?
- What arrangements have been made with other organizations to accomplish demining activities?

A clear End State of the DOD demining training program, measures of effectiveness, and DOD exit strategy must be established at the very beginning in the DoS policy assessment process. The assessment team must look at its task in two ways: the short-term US military objectives and the long-term US sustainability plan. They must be clearly understood by both the host nation and US forces to ensure effective transition of responsibilities, from the establishment of basic infrastructure

to sustained long-term operations in-country. A long-term sustainability and follow-up assessment plan increases the likelihood the host nation will maintain the program. Military programs can assist and establish a foundation in the short term, however, they should not maintain a long-term sustainment effort that is more suited for NGOs or other support, possibly with US funding and monitoring by the US country team.¹⁸⁹

Creating an indigenous, sustainable demining program is usually not easy, because many at-risk countries do not have the capabilities, resources, and commitment to succeed. While it is tempting to require US forces simply to coordinate with the National Demining Office (NDO) in order to hand-off responsibilities and activities; common sense and a realistic appraisal of the multiple challenges faced by threatened nations, leads us to the conclusion that a nascent national demining organization is usually incapable of solving complex landmine related problems effectively. Also, methods used to achieve success in one nation do not guarantee success in another. Therefore each program must be tailored to a specific nation's capacity to support a demining program, and a realistic appraisal should be made. Pertinent transition questions include:¹⁹⁰

- Who determines when the transition begins and/or is complete?
- Who funds the transition?
- Which US forces, equipment, supplies, and resources will remain behind?
- Who will support US forces that remain behind?
- Can incoming forces and organizations share intelligence?
- Will ongoing operations be discontinued or interrupted?
- Will the United States be expected to provide communications or logistical capabilities to the incoming force or organization?

The CA Role in Planning and Coordinating the Exit Strategy

Just as Civil Affairs personnel can help plan and coordinate various social, economic, and political aspects of demining operations, they can appraise the same elements to help plan the transition and exit strategy. Indeed, "termination plans should be prepared simultaneously and in conjunction with the deployment plan."¹⁹¹ Since CA activities ultimately are directed toward achieving "an orderly and prompt transition of civilian sector responsibilities from the DOD Components to non-DOD authorities," planning and support of the transition and exit strategy are direct applications of core competencies.¹⁹² They can also appraise and analyze approved measures of effectiveness to track, monitor, and gauge relevant developmental milestones.

CA forces are also cognizant of NGO and other demining organizations' roles, having coordinated their efforts throughout the deployment and implementation phases. Since NGOs will probably continue to enable military forces to withdraw from demining operations, CA staff can work to achieve voluntary cooperation among participants during transition stages. By "...coordinating the availability of agency services with the needs of the population, CA operators empower the NGOs to achieve their goals." The CA teams thereby fulfill their role as facilitators.¹⁹³

Since the departing US team should introduce the host nation demining leadership to US personnel

who will “monitor the long-term sustainment objectives,” and conduct a post-mission evaluation prior to redeployment,¹⁹⁴ CA liaison officers may be useful. The theater Special Operations Commander may request further training as is “required to sustain the host nation program. The departing CA team should provide specific recommendations to modify the theater CINC sustainment plan regarding funding, training, maintenance support, and supply requirements.”¹⁹⁵

As JP 3-57 notes, a successful exit strategy is facilitated by successes in operational and tactical level activities.¹⁹⁶ Changed or unforeseen political conditions, however, may necessitate changes to the exit strategy. As with other CMO, the termination or transition occurs “when either the mission has been accomplished or when the National Command Authority so directs.”¹⁹⁷ The program evaluation is continual and comprehensive, encompassing all phases, including the exit strategy.

¹⁰⁴US State Department, *Hidden Killers 1994: The Global Landmine Crisis*, Chapter V: Demining—The US Response,” at http://www.state.gov/www/global/arms/rpt_9401_demine_ch5.html (29 June 1999).

¹⁰⁵TC 31-34, 4-1.

¹⁰⁶DODD 2000.13.

¹⁰⁷A copy of the unclassified version is in CPT Glenn Bowens, *A Legal Guide to Peace Operations*, US Army Peacekeeping Institute, 371ff.

¹⁰⁸Department of Defense Directive 2000.13, Civil Affairs, D.3.b.

¹⁰⁹USAJFKSWCS, “Civil Affairs into the 21st Century”, 29.

¹¹⁰USAJFKSWCS, “Civil Affairs Into the 21st Century”, 18.

¹¹¹JMU MAIC, Task 3, 84.

¹¹²Handicap International, Mines Advisory Group, and Norwegian People’s Aid, *Portfolio of Mine-related Projects 1998*, cited in “Landmine Monitor Report 1999: Humanitarian Mine Action,” <http://www.icbl.org/lm/1999/english/exec/Execweb1-03.htm>. The statement also notes the “need to support the principle of transfer of capacity to the affected communities.”

¹¹³JP 3-57, IV-10, IV-14.

¹¹⁴JP 3-57, II-1. On interagency coordination an operations at the national level see Chapter IV, section 1.a.

¹¹⁵JP 3-57, II-13.

¹¹⁶JP 3-57, I-2.

¹¹⁷JP 3-57, II-12.

¹¹⁸TC 31-34, 3-2, 3-3.

¹¹⁹TC 31-34, 3-6.

¹²⁰TC 31-34, 4-1, 4-2.

¹²¹JMU MAIC, Task 71.

¹²²*National Security Strategy*, 7f. Similarly, the US Commission on National Security/21st Century concluded that the shaping of the international environment must use “all the instruments of American diplomatic, economic, and military power.” *New World Coming: American Security in the 21st Century: Major Themes and Implications*, 15 September 1999, 7.

¹²³JP 3-57, IV-9.

¹²⁴TC 31-34, 1-2.

¹²⁵JMU MAIC, Task 3, 64.

¹²⁶JMU MAIC, Task 71.

¹²⁷JMU MAIC Task 3, 88.

¹²⁸JMU MAIC, Task 3, 107.

¹²⁹TC 31-34, 2-2.

¹³⁰JMU MAIC, Task 3, 78.

¹³¹JMU MAIC, Task 3, 82.

¹³²US Army Special Operations Command, *Army Special Operations Forces: Vision 2010*, 7 April 1997, 5, emphasis added.

¹³³JP 3-57, III-9, and see I-11.

¹³⁴USJFKSWCS, *Civil Affairs into the 21st Century*, 18.

¹³⁵TC 31-34, 1-7

¹³⁶TC31-34, iii.

¹³⁷JP 3-57, I-2.

¹³⁸JMU MAIC, Task 3, 60.

¹³⁹Lord, *Civil Affairs*, 46–47.

¹⁴⁰Lord, *Civil Affairs*, 8.

¹⁴¹JP 3-57, II-13.

¹⁴²Lord, *Civil Affairs*, 45.

¹⁴³TC 31-34, 4-2.

¹⁴⁴JMU MAIC, Task 3, 37.

¹⁴⁵TC31-34, iii.

¹⁴⁶TC 31-34, 1-9.

¹⁴⁷ JMU MAIC Task 3, 38

¹⁴⁸ JMU MAIC, Task 3, 44.

¹⁴⁹ TC 31-34, 4-4.

¹⁵⁰ TC 31-34, 4-5.

¹⁵¹ Jan De Wilde and Martin Barillas, "Landmines and Refugees," 26, in *Hidden Killers: The Global Problem with Uncleared Landmines*, 1993.

¹⁵² "Mine Action and the International Committee of the Red Cross," in "Mine Action and Effective Coordination: the United Nations Policy," <http://www.un.org/Depts/Landmine/Policy/annexG.htm>, 5 August 1999.

¹⁵³ JMU MAIC Task 3, 88.

¹⁵⁴ JMU MAIC, Task 3, 107.

¹⁵⁵ JMU MAIC, Task 3, 83.

¹⁵⁶ JMU MAIC, Task 3, 63.

¹⁵⁷ JMU MAIC, Task 3, 11.

¹⁵⁸ JMU MAIC, Task 3, 44.

¹⁵⁹ JMU MAIC, Task 3, 63.

¹⁶⁰ JMU MAIC, Task 3, 72–73.

¹⁶¹ JMU MAIC, Task 3, 44.

¹⁶² JMU MAIC, Task 3, 82.

¹⁶³ JMU MAIC, Task 3, 41.

¹⁶⁴ JMU MAIC, Task 3, 82.

¹⁶⁵ JMU MAIC, Task 3, 45.

¹⁶⁶ "Hidden Killers 1998: The Global Landmine Crisis," Department of State, Http://www.state.gov/www/global/arms/rpt_9809_demine_summ.html

¹⁶⁷ Wintergreen Demining Conference, Oct, 1998, Hendrik Ehlers, *Meschen Gegen Minen*, presentation

¹⁶⁸ International Campaign to Ban Landmines. "Landmine Monitor Report 1999: Humanitarian Mine Action." <Http://www.icbl.org/lm/1999/english/exec/Execweb1-03.htm>. The only socio-economic impact made was the study United Nations Mine Action Program for Afghanistan, *Socio-Economic Impact Study of Mine Action Operations Afghanistan*, Interim Report by Mine Clearance Planning Agency, October 1998, cited in *ibid*.

¹⁶⁹ JP 3-67, I & III

¹⁷⁰ "World Bank and Mine Action Programmes", Annex E in UN Mine Action Service,

Mine Action and Effective Coordination: The United Nations Policy,
[Http://www.un.org/Depts/Landmine/policy/annexE.htm](http://www.un.org/Depts/Landmine/policy/annexE.htm) (5 August 1999).

¹⁷¹ Standing Committee of Experts, Mine Awareness, Social Development, and Victim Assistance, Geneva, Switzerland, September 24, 1999

¹⁷² TC 31-34, 1-7, 1-8.

¹⁷³ JMU MAIC, Task 3, 60.

¹⁷⁴ JMU MAIC, Task 3, 30.

¹⁷⁵ TC 31-34, 1-6, 3-1.

¹⁷⁶ JMU MAIC, Task 3, 49.

¹⁷⁷ Col. Carl T. Sahlin, Jr., “Global Mine Clearance: An Achievable Goal?” *Strategic Forum*, no. 143, August 1998 <http://www.ndu.edu/inss/strforum/forum143.html>

¹⁷⁸ JP 3-57, I-9.

¹⁷⁹ TC 31-34, 1-7, 1-8.

¹⁸⁰ JMU MAIC, Task 3, 42.

¹⁸¹ TC 31-34, 1-7, 1-8.

¹⁸² JMU MAIC, Task 3, 75–76.

¹⁸³ JP 3-57, III-20.

¹⁸⁴ JP 3-57, III-21, *passim*.

¹⁸⁵ JP 3-57, III-23.

¹⁸⁶ JP 3-57, III-25.

¹⁸⁷ JP 3-57, III-20.

¹⁸⁸ Based on Figure III-5. Sample Checklist for Termination Planning, JP 3-57.

¹⁸⁹ TC 31-34, 1-7, 1-8.

¹⁹⁰ Taken from Figure III-6. Transition Criteria Issues, JP 3-57.

¹⁹¹ JP 3-57, III-21, *passim*.

¹⁹² DODD 2000.13.

¹⁹³ Lord, *Civil Affairs*, 46–47.

¹⁹⁴ TC 31-34, 3-29.

¹⁹⁵ TC 31-34, 4-3.

¹⁹⁶ JP 3-57, I-9.

¹⁹⁷ JP 3-57, III-19.

Section VI – Constraints, Variables, and Opportunities

Thus far this report has dealt with requirements, capabilities, and applications. In so doing, it has attempted to show congruencies, which exist within the universe of humanitarian demining and US Army Civil Affairs forces. But the simple matching of capabilities to requirements is a sterile exercise if it does not take into account other “real-world” influences. It is the purpose of this section of the report to analyze those factors.

1. National Security Policy and Humanitarian Demining Guidance

The Importance of Humanitarian Demining

The humanitarian demining program is not a national security issue, which touches upon vital or even strategic national interests. As such, few would argue that it should be pursued within the DOD at the expense of war fighting capabilities. General Shalikashvili, no stranger to humanitarian missions, has cautioned that the Defense Department should “...focus on its war-fighting missions...DOD is judged on its ability to win war, not by how many hectares of foreign soil have been cleared.”¹⁹⁸

Nevertheless, there seems to be enough potentially valuable benefits of the program to warrant making it a significant part of the regional commanders’ peacetime engagement strategy. Former Secretary of Defense Perry, when giving directions for the implementation of the humanitarian demining program, called for the Department of Defense to, “...significantly expand its humanitarian assistance to train and assist other countries in developing effective demining programs.”¹⁹⁹ At the conclusion of the instruction memo (to agencies within his department), Secretary Perry himself alluded to this challenge when he concluded that, “The new policy on anti-personnel landmines *strikes an important balance between military and humanitarian purposes.*”²⁰⁰ Therefore, there exists a healthy tension, not only within the Department of Defense, but also among various US government entities, as to the proper role and level of American participation in the demining program. [Note: the portion of this section dealing with Congressional funding demonstrates the dichotomy among Senate and House members on this issue.]

Demining, of course, is not the only civil-military or humanitarian mission undergoing policy development. Since the end of the Cold War, the US military (particularly the Army) has been involved in almost constant redefinition of roles and goals. The trend of such policy reviews; however, has been to support a major peacetime engagement “plank” in national security policy. In various forms, it has been asserted that the peacetime engagement of the US military is not only appropriate, but of significant value in preserving regional stability, while allowing for a cost-effective and constructive way of preparing for possible war fighting scenarios.

Demining, however, brings together many other characteristics, which are even more complex and less in tune with US traditional military planning. Some characteristics of demining (e.g. no one being “in-charge” of some mine action programs, NGOs exercising operational authority, the inclusion of “for-profit” demining organizations, various participating levels of UN organizations,

and the intangible effects of having the US position on the anti-personnel landmine treaty [the “Ottawa Treaty”] brought into the issue); have singled demining out as a special case of US humanitarian assistance missions.

Support for Humanitarian Demining

It is important then, to consider the dynamics and consequences of the development of this aspect of national security policy. Many US government leaders support the demining program because it is basically humanitarian. But there are others who approve of it because it promises to alleviate causes of instability, and others who endorse it because it provides US military personnel participation with appropriate training and readiness opportunities. Then of course, there are those in Congress (and elsewhere) who believe that US military participation in humanitarian demining is an inappropriate application of scarce war fighting capabilities. There are, therefore, four general sets of opinions as to the correct application of US forces in a humanitarian demining operation, and these perceptions have given rise to a diverse and complex set of opinions –and authorities –involved in the oversight of US participation in this effort.

The result of the differences of opinion - as well as the normal challenges inherent in initiating a new civil-military program (beginning in 1994) - have given rise to a continual reexamination of the funding, training, equipping, budgeting, and deployment parameters of the US military demining program. Of course, CA is not the only component of the DOD demining program, which has experienced uncertainty. However, the focus of this report is on CA, which has (observed or unobserved) been affected by the evolution of the humanitarian demining policy, a development exacerbated by CA’s own institutional and doctrinal turbulence. [See below.]

Demining and the CINCs’ Theater Engagement Plans

Even though humanitarian demining has brought with it a number of new challenges, the regional commanders-in-chief (CINC) have generally embraced it as one of the interlocking activities which can help make up the entire fabric of their Theater Engagement Plans. Humanitarian Demining has been placed within the family of military humanitarian operations, which is governed by the Overseas Humanitarian Disaster and Civic Assistance (OHDACA) (appropriation).²⁰¹

However, implementing this program has not been easy for the CINCs. Not only have there been normal growing pains, which come with any new program, but also various Congressional and funding impacts on the program have resulted in an inconsistent approach to implementing it. For instance, 10 U.S.C. §401, has been variously interpreted and changed with respect to the limits of types and costs of equipment that can be left behind with the host nation after US trainers have departed.²⁰² On balance, however, the greatest challenges to implementing CINC-level demining operations, are that landmine problems, which usually lie at the heart of host nation development and health problems, are invariably country and scenario specific, and therefore lend themselves to case-by-case solutions.

Differences in CINCs’ Demining Operations

The lack of standardization means that the responsibility rests with the geographic command for

creative management, “scrambling around at the CINC level trying to figure out how you’re going to get a widget in the country.”²⁰³ Complicating this challenge is the fact that the humanitarian demining budget is separate from exercise funding,²⁰⁴ even though both serve the military purpose of honing operational skills during peacetime. Standardization, some think, needs to be “across the board at the CINC level...how we do business, how we get equipment, how we get trainers in countries should be the same.”²⁰⁵

On the other hand, CINCs have created demining Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) which are “fairly definitive” but which “may vary vastly if [taken] to Angola or Cambodia.”²⁰⁶ Moreover, there is the difficulty of trying to standardize procedures for countries, which have totally different needs, culture, or climate. The fact that there are differences among the geographic commands in developing demining procedures does not mean that the Special Operations Commands (SOC) are disengaged. It means, to the contrary, that the SOC is engaged for execution and training to support the CINC’s objectives and is taking host nation and local operational characteristics into account.²⁰⁷ Accounting for these differences lies at the very heart of what makes Special Operations, special. Over zealous development of SOPs can be counterproductive, stifling flexibility, creating red tape, and hindering rather than facilitating implementation of US policy. “Even procedures based on extensive experience cannot replace sound judgment. Situations vary. Standards applied across the board may unnecessarily restrict operators.”²⁰⁸

Demining “Doctrine”

Perhaps nothing reflects the “neither...nor” characterization of humanitarian demining as a DOD activity than the development and status of operational guidance. For, while the mission orientation is directly applicable to the capabilities of Army Special Operations Forces, there exists no official doctrine.²⁰⁹ The John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School has prepared the *Humanitarian Demining Operations Handbook* under the proponenty of the Training and Doctrine Command. This publication provides information and guidance on conducting demining operations, and was submitted for qualification as a field manual but was not so categorized because humanitarian demining has not been recognized as an Army mission.

However, since the CINCs are expected to conduct humanitarian demining activities as part of their Theater Engagement Plans, the Joint Staff has prepared “near-doctrine” when it issued the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3207.01 (1 March 1999), Military Support to Humanitarian Demining Operations.

2. Civil Affairs – Perceptions and Reality

CA a Unique Army Capability

Only one branch of the US Army is solely in the US Army Reserves: Civil Affairs. The reason for this is that the capabilities necessary at the higher skill levels of CA are not trained or cultivated in the Active Component; they are civilian-acquired, professional skills. [See Section 3.] Rank in these units is higher per number of soldiers than any other branch, and Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) qualification is more difficult to recruit, qualify and quantify than more traditional military or

combat skills. The average age of the CA soldier is higher because the requirement for high level civil-military tasks demands more maturity, flexibility, and professional achievement.

What have these differences meant to CA as its practitioners are trained to support US military objectives? First, CA has been the most utilized of all USAR capabilities over the past fifteen years. Civil Affairs units or teams have participated in operations: JUST CAUSE (Panama); PROMOTE LIBERTY (Panama); DESERT SHIELD (Kuwait); DESERT STORM (Kuwait); PROVIDE COMFORT (Turkey and Iraq); Guantanamo I; PROVIDE RELIEF (Hurricane Response); RESTORE HOPE (Somalia); PROVIDE PROMISE (Yugoslavia); CONTINUE HOPE (Somalia); PROVIDE RELIEF (Rwanda); UPHOLD DEMOCRACY (Haiti); MAINTAIN DEMOCRACY (Haiti); Guantanamo II; JOINT ENDEAVOR (Yugoslavia); JOINT GUARD (Yugoslavia); JOINT FORCE (Bosnia), and JOINT GUARDIAN (Kosovo). For seven of these operations, CA reservists were mobilized under conditions other than voluntary; a situation encountered only six times previously in the twentieth century.

Activated CA soldiers deal with a multitude of civil-military challenges, including processing refugees, advising senior military and political leaders, restoring national infrastructure, providing basic necessities to host nation civilians, supporting disaster relief operations, conducting civic action projects, setting up Civil Military Operations Centers, and minimizing civilian interference with US or combined military operations. Reserve CA units are now entering for their ninth rotation into Bosnia and have recently processed over a half million refugees in Kosovo helping them to return to their homes.

Uncertainties Concerning the Employment of Reserve CA Assets

A defining moment for CA occurred during the refugee operations in Kurdistan in the wake of OPERATION DESERT SHIELD. CA staffing was identified as key to the success of the relief effort – OPERATION PROVIDE COMFORT - in which the CA task force integrated civilian and military activities, formed organizations with representation from the military forces of several nations, integrated the work of civilian government agencies from several nations, and worked with international governmental, quasi-governmental organizations, and private voluntary organizations. Despite general agreement on the need and the mission, CA participation did not come easily.²¹⁰

Virtually every time a US Army Reserve (USAR) CA unit has been force-listed, or planned to support an operation, it has been slowed in its assignment or deployment because of military and civilian leaders, who did not know – or did not have confidence in - the roles, doctrine, and capabilities of the Reserve CA force. As a result, in numerous operations, CA has been activated in forms, which have deviated significantly from its doctrinal, war fighting, and training standards. CA elements, have been deployed without their commanders, been placed in temporary command of an Air Force staff officer and a Navy Admiral, had units placed under the command of other branch Active Duty officers, or been given missions unrelated to CA capabilities.

This has happened for several reasons. One reason is that the CA force, being small and in the USAR, has not entered the common working vernacular of many civilian and military organizations.

Even within the USAR, CA was until recently, classified with history detachments and band units, in the lowest level of authorized over strength allowed. Secondly, when Americans are mobilized for deployment, there has been an overriding concern for safety and efficiency; there have been those who have felt that the older USAR CA soldiers were not considered as sustainable or as dependable in austere or hostile situations as AC soldiers.

Thirdly, it was feared that with its suspected “outside the box” and civilian attitudes, that CA soldiers would not understand, or would flaunt, Regular Army doctrine, hierarchy, and authority. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, planners and commanders generally have been reluctant to rely on CA reservists to apply capabilities, which the commander did not understand, to key and sensitive tasks within an area as potentially volatile as the a foreign national.

Special Forces and Active Component Civil Affairs Activities

Special Forces (SF) soldiers are selected and trained to bring language and cultural knowledge to bear on their missions. They are creative problem solvers whose flexibility and cross training in several of the military arts, make them very effective in dealing with partisans or host nation contacts. As such they are trained to conduct basic CA missions. Many SF soldiers are at some time assigned to the Army’s only AC CA unit, the 96th Civil Affairs Battalion. Thus SF and active duty CA soldiers are prepared to conduct rudimentary CA activities until reserve CA elements are deployed, or in their absence, until the mission is completed.

Since USAR deployments have, in the past, been delayed or modified, SF and active duty CA personnel have simply accomplished CA tasks in the absence of the reservists. This condition is perhaps even more prevalent in demining operations in which SF troops are already deployed as trainers. This has become the pattern in US demining programs; SF and 96th Battalion personnel often perform coordination and liaison duties which ordinarily (that is, in a mobilization scenario) would be the purview of reserve CA personnel. However, in many instances, advanced or complex coordination and advisory activities which CA reservists would perform, are simply not conducted.

CA Doctrine - Background

For many years after World War II, Civil Affairs continued as an extension of its activities during that conflict; that is, CA was seen as “military government.” While the Cold War developed, and especially as it was winding down, CA was viewed by many leaders (both in and out of the military) as an anachronism. It was during that era that CA was relegated to the “back burner” of the Army and Reserve unit types.

While some officials sought to eliminate the capability, others sought to modify its mission to make it more pertinent to the post-World War II era, and then the post-Cold War era. They argued that the application of professional infrastructure and administrative skills was still a valuable tool for the commander, for as has been pointed out, it is a rare military operation, which does not have to consider the impact of civilians on its mission.

In the mid-80’s two events further stimulated and framed the development of CA’s future. One was

that the very spirited debate among Army leaders over the fate of CA resulted in the cutting, but not the elimination of the CA reserve force. The other was the 1983 rescue operation in Grenada, which made critical use of active duty and reserve CA forces. The Army Training and Doctrine Command took notice of both developments and began an energetic effort to redesign USAR CA units and to rewrite its doctrine based on the emerging family of operations other than war, as well as conventional war fighting support. [Note: The section on accessibility will address unit design.]

CA Doctrine – Recent Development

Therefore, CA doctrine in both the Army (FM 41-10) and the Joint Staff (JP 3-57) was written using both war fighting and peacetime operations as frames of reference. Often the doctrine attempts to cover these separate scenarios with identical guidelines. They have been in a state of almost constant modification ever since. [Note: As this paper is being written, both documents are undergoing another revision.] The Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan, which sets the parameters of CINCs' forces and plans added a separate annex for CA, and war planners were required to complete a civil affairs annex for every plan. Civil Affairs, it would seem, had re-entered the military lexicon, but was still suffering from the nebulous nature of its mission.

If CA doctrine has not always made guidance to the commanders and to its practitioners clear, it is no wonder. First of all, CA deals with an issue which is difficult to quantify or to gauge; the sum of the spirit, morale, stability, humor, friendliness, and nature of an indigenous people. Secondly, CA has been caught up in the same great national security questions of the 80s and 90s which the Services writ large, have been wrestling with, e.g. What role does Low Intensity Conflict play in US military plans? What elements should our peacetime engagement strategy contain? How do we perform operations other than war?

The conduct of CA activities encompasses two broad functions: (1) Those *activities* of a commander that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces and civil authorities, both governmental and non-governmental, and the civilian populace in a friendly, neutral, or hostile area of operations in order to facilitate military operations and consolidate operational objectives; and (2) Those activities that provide specialized CA *advice* to US military commanders, U.S. government departments and agencies, local governments, allied or coalition forces, and non-governmental or other organizations.²¹¹ Therefore CA officers may expect to either conduct civil-military operations or act as advisors. As noted in *Civil Affairs into the 21st Century*, the definition does not distinguish the active “doer” role from the more strategic advisory role.²¹²

Difficulties of Implementing CA Doctrine

In spite of the fact that the development of CA doctrine has taken great strides forward and is very helpful and illuminating, it still presents the CA soldier, and his operational commander, with a double conundrum. CA personnel, must master scenarios which entail the complex, sensitive, and high-level world politico-military situations; while simultaneously deriving its mission role (advisor, operator, support) and organization from discussions with the commander. This process has invariably led to an awkward “negotiating” phase in the formative stage of an operation – a time when a commander can ill afford to lose time and focus. The resultant organizations have rarely

maximized CA effectiveness, although they have allowed for CA capabilities to be deployed and to begin operations. In addition to civil-military missions that arise out of “normal” military operations are the activities that occur when “directed, in the absence of military operations.” This caveat serves to make the definition of CA open ended, if not circular, by defining Civil Affairs as whatever CA does when directed, which does not give a commander firm guidance about the best, or even legal, use of CA assets.²¹³

An operational or task force commander may find himself confused when discovering that a CA element has been added to their assets. In addition to having a reserve team with a plethora of civilian skills thrust upon him, he, depending on his situation, may receive very little pertinent guidance for their application when he consults Civil Affairs doctrine. Recent Civil Affairs guidance not only deals with dual roles of CA personnel, but treats those roles across the operational spectrum. Further, the commander exercising operational control over CA may receive them in teams, task forces, detachments, or as individuals. It is seldom that an entire unit is activated, even though that is how they are configured prior to mobilization. Therefore the commander may use CA personnel as unit commanders, staff augmentees, in indirect support, to conduct direct CA operations, or as advisors to work with host nation officials. Even such an experienced and accomplished Army commander as General Max Thurman, observed after his experience in Operation JUST CAUSE in Panama, that he underestimated the CA implications of the mission and did not know how to use his CA units to their best advantage.²¹⁴

3. Accessibility of CA

The desirability of using Civil Affairs forces is offset by the difficulty of getting them.²¹⁵ One of the great challenges to utilizing any capability in the reserves, is discovering how to gain access to it. Methods for accessing reserve elements are varied, complex, and intertwined with concepts of national will and the rights of service members. These factors often cause employing CA assets to be seen as “more trouble than it’s worth”.

The Presidential “Call-Up”

When most people consider the use of reserve forces, they may think about a Presidential “call-up,” which during the Cold War, presaged a major threat or invocation of national will. The reluctance to use Presidential authority reached its zenith during the Vietnam War, when the political decision not to mobilize the reserves, had far-reaching, and perhaps dire consequences for the US effort in Southeast Asia.²¹⁶

Since then, the reluctance to use Presidential authority to activate reservists has undergone gradual and steady erosion. With the decision to call to arms troops for operations in the Gulf War, Haiti, and Southeast Europe, the political fear of a reserve call-up has effectively evaporated. That is not to say that a call-up decision is easy or without political consequences, merely that it can be done in an almost routine manner when sufficient reasons exist for activation.

Part of the reason for the acceptance of Presidential call-up, is that it no longer connotes a general

mobilization, but can be (and has been) invoked to access certain capabilities, e.g. Civil Affairs, within the reserve structure. Still, for small operations, the President is unlikely to use his authority to call up reservists without their consent, “even for large operations, such an involuntary call up may not occur until the operation is well underway.”²¹⁷

Limited Activation Authorities

Less drastic, and more common, means of activation have become the norm for accessing certain capabilities that a CINC or other force “user” may need to accomplish the missions. These lesser means can activate reservists either as volunteers, or as personnel ordered to active duty for short periods of time. Volunteer reservists can be placed on active duty under 10 U.S.C. §12301(d) while reservists can be ordered active for 15 days under 10 U.S.C. §12301(b) and for up to 270 days per operation under 10 U.S.C. §12304(a).

These means of activating Reservists (Temporary Tours of Active Duty or performance of annual training) give the CINCs the ability and flexibility to plan for the best use of all forces required for mission accomplishment. The lead-time allows reserve (e.g. CA) units the time to identify and activate requested assets. Most reserve support to CINC operations comes about as a result of creative and aggressive use of these legal authorities.

While defense officials are concerned about the possibility of angering reservists, not to mention their families and employers, because of frequent activations, to date there have been no major political or legal outcries because of the operational use of reservists. Although there are continuing, and even growing, concerns about “burning out” CA assets, and about employer relations, re-employment rights, etc. the rigorous use of USAR CA assets has not yet resulted in a breakdown in morale. Indeed, the opposite seems to be true. There is much anecdotal evidence to show that a CA reservist would rather support a “real-world” mission than engage in the kind of static and often contrived training which characterized many annual training situations before 1983.

OPTEMPO and PERSTEMPO

One of the greatest concerns about employing CA personnel today is the unusually high operational and personnel tempo at which the force has been engaged. CA assets are limited, and strained by numerous deployments, which now include nine rotations to Bosnia and the deployment to Kosovo—Operation JOINT GUARDIAN. High operational tempo is difficult to manage and creates challenges both for the CA commanders and the forces and commands which they support. These challenges include: maintaining force capability to meet CINCs’ end-state vision; accessing reserve CA soldiers quickly, managing unit member attrition; maintaining language and Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) qualification; and minimizing the impact of deployments on the families and jobs of reservists.

The fear, of course, is that the high OPTEMPO will discourage CA reservists from remaining active in the military and create challenges for maintaining CA capabilities. Retention, therefore is a major concern and Congress has taken steps to encourage re-enlistment and retention.²¹⁸ This issue is especially sensitive because it can have a direct influence on the morale and manning of the unit, and

can become the object of media or political focus. One danger of high OPTEMPO is the risk of losing good and qualified Reservists and replacing them with people who are underemployed or are seeking adventure.

The Chief of the Army Reserves, Major General Plewes, and the commander of the United States Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command (USACAPOC) have recently spoken to this issue. General Plewes reported to the Civil Affairs Association that CA, “must remain accessible as the most-deployed part of the force.”²¹⁹ He also said that the USAR CA force possesses “knowledge that no other force in the world has,” and reported that it was “91% deployable,” a fact which suggests that it is in “greater readiness than ever before.”²²⁰ General Plewes observed that recently the “tempo has come down a little” but nevertheless suggested other ways to alleviate the OPTEMP problem [discussed in the following discussion on CA units and design].

Brigadier General Bingham, the USACAPOC commander, reported that in spite of the fact that CA deployments were currently underway in four CINCs’ regions, for the past two years CA has met its end strength objectives, although an officer shortage is starting to be felt. Officer qualification was reported at 83 percent (a relatively high figure). General Bingham’s Mobilization Officer reported that reserve CA officers exhibit a high state of morale and are remaining in their units.²²¹ This assertion is shared by MAJ Amy Johnson, the editor of the Civil Affairs Journal and Newsletter, who observed, after researching this topic, “...that despite the ever-increasing OPTEMPO, [CA] retention has never been higher...”²²²

4. Civil Affairs Units

Command and Control of CA

There are 36 USAR CA units consisting of approximately 5,500 reserve soldiers. These units are apportioned to the theater CINCs for operational control and are commanded by the US Special Operations Command, although they are administered by the Office of the Chief, Army Reserves. Traditionally, CA units have supported conventional Army units. They continue to play that role, although since 1989, Civil Affairs units have joined Special Forces and Psychological Operations in the family of Special Operations Forces. Thus CA, as a consequence of its diverse nature and applicability across the spectrum of operations, answers to Army reserve, conventional and special operations hierarchies.

CA Unit Designs, Apportionment, and Assignments

It should come as no surprise to learn that with the number of roles expected of them, CA units have been considered for redesign and reapportionment. In fact, since 1987, CA unit designations, designs, and numbers have been scrutinized almost as often as its doctrine. In a very far-reaching attempt to design CA units for both conventional and special operations, the Combined Arms Committee at Ft. Leavenworth upgraded the traditional units into commands, brigades, and battalions. This TRADOC effort reflected greater rank structure and “diplomatic” capabilities of unit personnel, which were then deemed necessary. It also created a new CA type unit - the Foreign Internal Defense/Unconventional Warfare (FID/UW) battalion – designed to support low-intensity conflict

missions.

USAR CA units have used these general unit designs to meet the numerous demands placed on them in the past decade. Since the majority of peacetime requirements have not required the activation of entire units (with the notable exception of Operation DESERT STORM), CA personnel have been reorganized into detachments, elements, teams, and civil-military task forces. These CA elements, repositories of professional functional specialties; regional knowledge; and, coordination skills, have been utilized almost continuously since Operation JUST CAUSE in 1989.

Over the past four years nine different rotations of CA teams have been deployed to Bosnia. This effort, conducted while other requirements continued apace (e.g. Macedonia, Kosovo, and East Timor), caused the USACAPOC to go outside the regionally apportioned CA units to fulfill the Bosnia mission. It is this constant effort which has focused attention on CA and its ability to continue to function successfully.

Plans for Expansion and Reconfiguration of USAR CA Units

It is in this context that Generals Plewes and Bingham made their remarks to the Civil Affairs Association in January 2000. They reported that the USAR is planning to create 1,128 new CA personnel spaces over the next six years. Between 8-15 slots will be created in the 36 existing units, while three new battalions, and a FID/UW battalion will be created. In addition, ten CA tactical teams, and a language team will be created for more flexible response to operational requirements.²²³

In order to make it clear that size alone will not solve the challenges facing CA, General Bingham announced that a new policy is now in effect which will allow CA reservists to be deployed for 180 days vice the 279 days which had been the norm previously. General Plewes also stated that his force planners need to be asking themselves, “What do we really need for your [CA] force? Since we are involved in small scale contingencies, maybe we should re-think the types of units, and perhaps consider a new structure.”²²⁴

5. Funding for CA Demining Support

The Complex Nature of DOD Demining Funds

The unique nature of the humanitarian demining mission makes its funding path complex. Humanitarian demining does not reflect a core-war fighting capability, nor (surprisingly) is it very much akin to military mine clearance and breaching. While Congress has appropriated a generous amount of money for the implementation of the program, interpreting and implementing the authorization for spending those funds has proven to be more problematic. Not only does demining money have to “pass muster” for its applicability to the family of activities countenanced under the ODHACA umbrella, but it must also account for the unique idiosyncrasies of humanitarian demining as well.

LTC Jan Papra of the 350th Civil Affairs Command has observed that US military has defined taskings under Title 10, and identified funding sources for these taskings. The military taskings are

naturally focused on war fighting, while the US State department retains the lead for global Humanitarian Assistance.

LTCPapra points out, however, that situations arise when the US Government requires (or the Department of State requests), military participation in what is determined to be a humanitarian undertaking. Both special federal legislation and special funding procedures initiated which authorize the use of military elements, for humanitarian purposes and funding for their participation.

The military authority and funding for humanitarian demining is described under section 2551 of US Law. When deployed by the Secretary of Defense under this law and this funding, the military is properly and legally engaged.

The Active Component of the Army, in particular the Special Operations Forces community, has been engaged in conducting humanitarian demining regularly. The Army Reserve Special Operations community, consisting of CA and PSYOP has not been engaged. Consistently Reserve elements are authorized to conduct such missions under title 2551, as their active component brethren are. One reason that they have not supported this mission, however, is that the deployments generally last longer than the traditional two week reserve Annual Training period [Title 2551 only provides travel and per-diem and it was assumed that the reserve force would not be capable of supporting the salaries necessary.] therefore, the Active Component has until recently been relied upon to execute the mission without reserve augmentation.

Now however, in an attempt to access the reserves to support the HDO mission, and to allow the m to shoulder some of the mission load which has gradually become too much for the active component, new legislation seeks to allow greater for reserve participation. By allocating some demining dollars for reserve use, and allowing those funds to pay for reserve salaries as well as per-diem, reserve CA forces can be employed more effectively.

The Legislative Attempt to Fund CA Support of Humanitarian Demining

In 1997 Secretary of Defense Cohen stated his intention to “seek to remove legal impediments to reservists participating in demining programs” and noted that “Civil Affairs/PSYOPS personnel . . . are key to mine awareness and demining training support.”²²⁵ The General Counsel of the Secretary of Defense, proposed a legislative change (in letters to the House and Senate, dated 16 April 1999,) recommended by the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict (OASD SO/LIC), which would have allowed 10% of the funds fenced for humanitarian demining purposes (under 10 U.S.C. §401(e)(5)), to be used to cover reservist pay and allowances. The analysis for the proposed section read in part as follows:

“The proposed amendment would help ease the OPTEMPO pressure on Active Component (AC) Civil Affairs/Psychological Operations (CA/PSYOP) forces imposed by HD missions . . . The vast majority of support was performed by AC personnel (14.77 man-years) rather than [Reserve Component] RC personnel (1.24 man-years) . . . Politico-military developments around the world could easily require

commitment of the entire AC civil affairs and PSYOP capability on short notice, leaving planned HD operations without support. In FY 96, 12 countries were receiving humanitarian demining assistance; in FY98, 21 countries received assistance with additional countries seeking approval for demining programs from the United States. The number of countries projected for approval in FY99 is 28.”²²⁶

Based on this information, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000 bill in the Senate, (S. 1059), contained a provision for allowing humanitarian assistance funds to be used for reservist pay, and was passed by the Senate on 27 May 1999, 92 to 3.²²⁷ It read:

“SEC. 312. Use of Humanitarian and Civic Assistance Funding for Pay and Allowances of Special Operations Command Reserves Furnishing Demining Training and Related Assistance as Humanitarian Assistance. Section 401(c) of title 10, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following:

(5) Up to 5 percent of the funds available in any fiscal year for humanitarian and civic assistance described in subsection (e)(5) may be expended for the pay and allowances of reserve component personnel of the Special Operations Command for periods of duty for which the personnel, for a humanitarian purpose, furnish education and training on the detection and clearance of landmines or furnish related technical assistance.”²²⁸

However, the House version (H.R. 1401), did not contain the provision, though the DOD had proposed the same legislation to both the House and the Senate. In the joint conference, the House opposed the Senate on the provision, and the Conference Report merely states that the Senate “receded.”²²⁹

Possible Methods for Funding of USAR CA Support to Demining

While the recent legislative effort to make funds available to access RC CA has not yet come to fruition, other means may exist for resourcing reserve CA personnel to support DOD humanitarian demining activities. These include the possibility of:

- The OASD SO/LIC, which spearheaded the first effort to change the legislative authority, to renew its efforts in Congress.
- The USAR using some of its allotted funds for Temporary Tours of Active Duty (TTAD) specifically for supporting CA demining activities. [The problem with this approach is that the limited amounts of TTAD money are usually budgeted in advance and are prioritized by the Army Special Operations Command.]
- Using the CINC’s Initiative Fund. In October, Congress provided Public Law 106-79 \$25,000,000 for the CINC Initiative Fund Account.²³⁰ The CINC’s Initiative Fund “shall be in addition to amounts otherwise available for that activity for that fiscal year,”²³¹ and may be used for the following purposes (several of which may include

support the funding of CA personnel to carry out demining activities for the CINC):

- (1) Force training;
- (2) Contingencies;
- (3) Selected operations.
- (4) Command and control.
- (5) Joint exercises (including activities of participating foreign countries);
- (6) *Humanitarian and civil assistance*;
- (7) Military education and training to military and related civilian personnel of foreign countries (including transportation, translation, and administrative expenses);
- (8) Personnel expenses of defense personnel for bilateral or regional cooperation programs; and
- (9) Force protection.²³²

[The problem with this approach is that CINCs' Initiative Funds are also limited and are usually used as of way for the CINC to endorse a special program or to show support for a particular nation in his area of responsibility.]

- Using the CINC's Initiative Fund. Under 10 USCS § 168, *Military-to-Military Contacts and Comparable Activities*, "The Secretary of Defense may conduct military-to-military contacts and comparable activities that are designed to encourage a democratic orientation of defense establishments and military forces of other countries." Authorized activities include:
 - (1) The activities of traveling contact teams, including any transportation expense, translation services expense, or administrative expense that is related to such activities.
 - (2) *The activities of military liaison teams.*
 - (3) Exchanges of civilian or military personnel between the Department of Defense and defense ministries of foreign governments.
 - (4) Exchanges of military personnel between units of the armed forces and units of foreign armed forces.
 - (5) Seminars and conferences held primarily in a theater of operations.
 - (6) Distribution of publications primarily in a theater of operations.
 - (7) Personnel expenses for Department of Defense civilian and military personnel to the extent that those expenses relate to participation in an activity described in paragraph (3), (4), (5), or (6).
 - (8) *Reimbursement of military personnel appropriations accounts for the pay and allowances paid to reserve component personnel for service while engaged in any activity referred to in another paragraph of this subsection.*²³³

[The problem with this approach is that these contacts are scrutinized very carefully by the Congress, which has a great interest in how "mil-to-mil" contacts are generated and what they yield.]

¹⁹⁸Sahlin, “Global Mine Clearance.”

¹⁹⁹William Perry, Memorandum, “Implementation of the President’s Decision on Anti-Personnel Landmines” 17 June 1996,

²⁰⁰William Perry, Memorandum, “Implementation of the President’s Decision on Anti-Personnel Landmines” 17 June 1996,

²⁰¹CINC’s comments on Humanitarian Demining, OASD(SO/LIC), April, 1996.

²⁰²10 U.S.C. §401, (c)(3) limits the cost of equipment, services, and supplies to \$5,000,000; JMU MAIC, Task 3, 30.

²⁰³JMU MAIC, Task 3, 35.

²⁰⁴JMU MAIC, Task 3, 30.

²⁰⁵JMU MAIC, Task 3, 35.

²⁰⁶JMU MAIC, Task 3, 13.

²⁰⁷JMU MAIC, Task 3, 35.

²⁰⁸JMU MAIC, Task 3, 30.

²⁰⁹TC 31-34, 1-7.

²¹⁰Lord, *Civil Affairs*, 8.

²¹¹“Civil Affairs into the 21st Century”, 61. An older definition from JCS Pub 1-02 (1989) defined Civil Affairs/Military Government as: those phases of the activities of a commander which embrace the relationship between the military forces and civil authorities and people in a friendly country or area or occupied country or area when military forces are present. Civil affairs include, inter alia: all matters concerning the relationship between military forces located in a country or area and the civil authorities and people of that country or area usually involving performance by the military forces of certain functions or the exercise of certain authority normally the responsibility of the local government. This relationship may occur prior to, during, or subsequent to military action in time of hostilities or other emergency and is normally covered by a treaty or other agreement, expressed or implied; and b. military government: the form of administration by which an occupying power exercised executive, legislative, and judicial authority over occupied territory.

²¹²“Civil Affairs into the 21st Century”, 52.

²¹³By contrast, U.S. Special Operations Command in “Joint Special Operations Awareness Program Reference Manual,” 15 July 1994, p. A8.2.1, omitted the last part of the definition.

²¹⁴Richard Schulz, “Civil Affairs in Panama – Operation JUST CAUSE”, DOD, March 1993, 44.

²¹⁵Lord, *Civil Affairs*, 11.

²¹⁶ Sorley, Lewis, "A Better War". Harcourt Brace, 1999, 288.

²¹⁷ Lord, *Civil Affairs*, 11.

²¹⁸ 106 P.L. 65 §514. For an overview of reserve related items designed to address recruiting and retention, see "Authorization Act is 'Landmark Legislation' for the National Guard and Reserve," 12 October 1999, http://raweb.osd.mil/news/press_resleases/NDAA.htm (22 November 1999).

²¹⁹ Thomas Plewes, Civil Affairs Board of Directors' Meeting, Washington D.C, January 22, 2000.

²²⁰ Plewes

²²¹ Bruce Bingham, Civil Affairs Board of Directors' Meeting, Washington D.C, January 22, 2000.

²²² Amy Johnson, *Civil Affairs Journal and Newsletter*, "CAPOC CG: Despite OPTEMPO, Retention at All-Time High", May/June 1999

²²³ Bruce Bingham, Civil Affairs Board of Directors' Meeting, Washington D.C, January 22, 2000.

²²⁴ Thomas Plewes, Civil Affairs Board of Directors' Meeting, Washington D.C, January 22, 2000.

²²⁵ "Statement by Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen," 17 September 1997, http://www.defenselink.mil:80/news/Sep1997/b09171997_bt494-97.html.

²²⁶ "Additional Legislative Proposals Submitted to Congress on April 16, 1999," <http://www.defenselink.mil/dodgc/lrs/docs/natlsecurity.doc>.

²²⁷ 145 *Congressional Record* S 6274.

²²⁸ 106th Congress, 1st Session, S 1059 [Report No. 106-50].

²²⁹ 106th Congress, 1st Session, House Report 106-301, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000 S. 1059. The conferees appointed were: Mr. Spence; Mr. Skelton; Mrs. Tauscher; Mr. Cunningham; Mr. Kind; Mr. Kingston; Mr. Romero-barcelo; Mr. Engel; Mr. Hoeffel; Mr. Reyes; Mr. Andrews; Mr. Moran of Virginia; Mr. Underwood; Mr. Delay; Mr. Lewis of Georgia; Mr. Metcalf; Mr. Gejdenson; Mr. Weldon of Pennsylvania; Mr. Pomeroy; Mr. Davis of Florida; Mr. Hunter; Mr. Markey; Ms. Delauro; Mr. Kuykendall; Mr. Hayes; Mr. Larson; Mr. Arney. 145 *Congressional Record* H5206, Thursday, July 1, 1999.

²³⁰ 106 P.L. 79. The Foreign Appropriations (see H.R. 3196 and 145 *Congressional Record* H 11567, 5 November 1999) included \$35 million for demining and another unspecified \$35 million for the "Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining and Related Programs."

²³¹ 106 P.L. 79. The Foreign Appropriations (see H.R. 3196 and 145 *Congressional Record* H 11567, 5 November 1999) Subsection (e)(2) is a limitation; it says that "funds may not be provided under this section for any activity that has been denied authorization by Congress."

So if “activity” does not encompass the specification of reservists, the money may be used.

²³²106 P.L. 79. The Foreign Appropriations (see H.R. 3196 and 145 *Congressional Record* H 11567, 5 November 1999) Subsection (c) to: “(1) requests for funds to be used for activities that would enhance the war fighting capability, readiness, and sustainability of the forces assigned to the commander requesting the funds; and (2) the provision of funds to be used for activities with respect to an area or areas not within the area of responsibility of a commander of a combatant command that would reduce the threat to, or otherwise increase, the national security of the United States.”

²³³106 P.L. 79. The Foreign Appropriations (see H.R. 3196 and 145 *Congressional Record* H 11567, 5 November 1999) Subsection (c) to: “(1) requests for funds to be used for activities that would enhance the war fighting capability, readiness, and sustainability of the forces assigned to the commander requesting the funds; and (2) the provision of funds to be used for activities with respect to an area or areas not within the area of responsibility of a commander of a combatant command that would reduce the threat to, or otherwise increase, the national security of the United States.”

Section VII – Conclusions: Options for the Application of Civil Affairs Capabilities to Mine Action Operations

The conclusions of this report attempt to suggest pragmatic applications of CA to the humanitarian demining mission. Before informed options can be suggested concerning appropriate roles for CA in mine action, however, it is necessary to examine CA humanitarian demining capabilities (assessed in Section V), in light of the external factors (discussed in Section VI).

This analysis can be accomplished best by suggesting first how the identified humanitarian demining applications of CA capabilities might be accomplished in terms of the relevant CA mission areas:

- Planning Humanitarian Demining Operations
- Conducting Humanitarian Demining Operations
- Supporting Humanitarian Demining Operations
- Advising Humanitarian Demining Operations

These CA mine action roles are then analyzed based on the possible impact which external factors are likely to have on them. The major external factors bearing on CA in support of mine action activities are:

- US humanitarian demining policy, guidance, and political will
- CA as part of the demining force structure
- The accessibility of CA elements
- The CA force and unit configuration
- Funding for CA demining support

1. Notional Applications of CA to Humanitarian Demining Operations

Planning Humanitarian Demining Operations

The analysis of Civil Affairs capabilities suggests that CA planners be involved in HDO planning in: the pre-deployment phase, the development of measures of effectiveness (MOE), the establishment of milestones and hand-off points, the formulation of the exit strategy, and post deployment evaluation. It is clear that doctrine expects CA planners to integrate civil-military activities at all operational levels, and to coordinate US military efforts with other US agencies, the host nation, NGOs, the National Demining Office, and other state (and even non-state) players.

CA planning cells are typically not large. It does not take a 125-man unit to help develop milestones, hand-off points, MOEs, or even an exit strategy. It must be remembered that CA is not in the lead in developing a CINC plan, but CA planners integrate civil military considerations with other plans, i.e. the SF train-the-trainer program, PSYOP mine awareness plans, etc. But it does call for a planning cell which knows the host country, knows the functional specialties which are required in the country's development plans (or needs), and has the ability to draw from pertinent areas of expertise

within the CA unit or from other sources.

A CA planning cell, therefore, is typically a small team, which can do much of its preparatory (and monitoring) work at its home station while not on active duty at all. When the cell does deploy, it need not be activated for 279 or even 180 days. If the cell utilizes effective means to stay in touch with the CINC staff prior to visiting the host nation, it can use annual duty for training (ADT) for two to four weeks a year, to accomplish actual on-site coordination, “eyes-on-target” assessments, and necessary collaboration with the CINC.

Conducting Humanitarian Demining Operations

CA activities, in which soldiers perform actions directly in the area of operations, often have to do with the care, feeding, movement, and provision of emergency medical aid to a civilian population; often consisting of displaced civilians or refugees. Normally this is done by the active component CA unit, Special Forces teams, or other US military units which may be on the scene. However, there are times (such as when emergency aid was provided to the Kurds in Northern Iraq at the end of the Gulf War, in Operation PROVIDE HOPE), when because of the scope of the problem, or political sensitivities, USAR units are employed. This can also occur because health or safety issues require more of a CA presence (Operation PROMOTE LIBERTY in Panama), or the application of a specific functional specialty (restoration of penal and legal systems in Haiti during Operation RESTORE DEMOCRACY).

Since the above operations were the result of contingency operations which engaged the top US national military authorities, *they do not fall into the realm of CA actions which one would expect to see in the support of normal humanitarian demining country operations.* Country plans for demining should be deliberate, occurring in a benign and peaceful environment, and should be characterized by the evolutionary development of the host nation infrastructure. That is not to say that a demining operation in a country could not uncover greater problems than envisioned initially or that an emergency could not occur during a demining operation, but these would be exceptions. While USAR CA forces may be used by the CINCs to apply their skills to the above tasks, these emergency missions would not come under the aegis of the Humanitarian Demining Program, but perhaps other components of the OHDACA family of humanitarian activities.

Within the context of HDO, the following SOF roles exist. Special Forces teams are charged with conducting ‘train-the-trainer’ operations, PSYOP teams are charged with training and conducting mine awareness campaigns, and reserve CA units can be charged with training management, computer, administrative and other staff skills to host nation representatives. This mission, while not currently being exercised often, could be very valuable to a demining operation. Just as SF and PSYOP ‘train the trainers’, CA could be called upon to ‘train the managers’. This is no insignificant task where the sustainability of the program by the host nation, and incidentally the running of the National Demining Office, is seen as a critical yardstick for success.

Therefore, the possibility of accessing and using identified members of CA units to conduct relevant management, computer, and administrative training with host nation demining officials should not be

overlooked. Indeed, with the current reliance on information management, personnel selection, coordination requirements, the complex nature of demining operations, and especially the desire to have the US turn over the demining mission to a host nation, *the management training mission should not be taken lightly.*

The selection of small management training cells should be relatively easy for a USAR unit to accomplish, and as in the case of planning teams, they can accomplish much preparation within the home unit and deploy only for short periods of time. Indeed, class schedules could be coordinated with the home unit so as to minimize unit turbulence and to synchronize training events with other CINC-planned activities (demining or other) in the supported country. Training sessions should not be unduly long, given the rudimentary and basic nature of the US commitment, i.e. these are not nation building missions. While trainers should return for refresher and next-cycle training, they need not be present continuously.

While most HDOs will probably only require small CA teams, there is a possibility of a country in such need that the CA team might need to consist of 15-30 soldiers to ensure a full, comprehensive program.

Supporting Humanitarian Demining Operations

Civil Affairs support operations are those activities which CA does not have the responsibility to carry out, but which they prepare, facilitate, and support through various actions and services. Much of this work comes under the all-important CA activity of coordination. In many ways, liaison actions form the lifeblood of CA. While some may think of coordination, as subsidiary or even unnecessary work, it is basis on which most peacetime civil-military operations agreements and plans are made – and the foundations, on which those operations often stand or fall.

Coordination is a critical need in keeping demining operations efforts synchronized. The large number of organizations and functions involved in a mine action campaign can be monitored, and to a degree synchronized, by the performance of CA liaison and integration tasks. CA liaison officers can begin coordination activities among US DOD agencies, but must also integrate US military plans with other USG agencies, NGOs, UN agencies, for-profit companies, and host nation officials, as appropriate.

CA can coordinate with various kinds of organizations, and it needs to begin these liaison activities before the deployment of US forces, and it must continue performing them throughout the mission. Proper CA coordination can start an operation in a positive manner by facilitating an efficient entry into the host nation, while it can send a clear message as to the goals the US will pursue and what support the host nation is expected to give. Coordination needs to occur at the highest levels of the host nation, and also at the operational and tactical levels.

Proper coordination can lead to a consensus of transition and milestone points, areas of congruity and partnership, logistical support, logical prioritization of clearance efforts, burden sharing, the effectiveness (or even existence) of the National Demining Office (NDO), and appropriate

measurements of and reporting of MOEs. In short, while coordination efforts in classic combat operation may not ultimately depend on coordination among so many non-military players, the more complex and sensitive a civil-military operation, such as humanitarian demining, the more critical are the coordinating tasks.

CA liaison and coordination actions can take place during the Policy Assessment Visit, the Site Survey, during implementation of the project, during key transition or hand-off phases, and during the exit stage. CA rank structure makes possible liaison at the very highest levels of government, to the very lowest local operations.

CA liaison officers are usually employed as individuals, even though they may be deployed with other CA elements of their home unit. As such they are also deployed singly, or in small teams. While liaison officers should be employed at various phases of the operation and at various layers, these facilitators need not stay in country for very long. Their job is to broker agreements, partnerships, convene meetings, suggest procedures, etc. Therefore once these “start-up” activities are done, the job is temporarily completed. Other liaison officers can visit periodically to reinforce and reinvigorate initial agreements, or the same officer can return to maintain continuity. This is one area where maintaining a small cell, ideally in the NDO, might pay great dividends, and would repay the resources incurred by a 180 day activation.

Advisors to Humanitarian Demining Operations

Civil Affairs personnel have often been called upon to provide expert opinions and recommendations to civil and military officials. Operations in Panama, Kuwait and Haiti have been characterized by this unique CA capability. A team of functional experts from the CA unit, or more usually, from a number of units (if possible from units assigned to that region of the world), have been formed to provide high level advice on the condition, restoration, development, or analysis of various portions of the national infrastructure. Usually the functional teams are designed based on perceived needs of the host nation. Panama was identified to have a need for civilian police training and neighborhood rebuilding. Kuwaitis needed help identifying and setting up contracts. Haiti required the redesign of its penal and legal system.

Humanitarian demining operations are typically the first steps in the development of a region, which is devastated or dysfunctional. Before meaningful mine clearance operations begin, surveys, plans, and priorities must be conducted. These missions can be facilitated by functional specialists who can evaluate the development needs of the country, in terms of the market economy, health considerations, education, public transportation, agriculture, etc. It is also necessary to identify areas of priority for clearance, mine awareness, marking and monitoring, victim assistance, and other mine action steps based on infrastructure needs. In one country, for example the Sudan, there may be a strong emphasis on restoring basic agricultural activities. In Angola, the great need may be for resettlement of refugees and displaced civilians. In Croatia, the overriding requirement may be for home construction.

The host nation then must prioritize areas scheduled for mine action, and plan for developmental

activities to be planned and carried out in conjunction with them. This is an area where the individual CA functional specialists can work with local or national officials to suggest, not only prioritization of actions and areas to be cleared, but specific restoration, reconstitution, and development steps and sequences.

As with the other applied capabilities (planning, training, and coordinating) CA support should come in the form of a small team or probably, one individual. It has not been unusual, in previous CMOs, for CA advisors to become trusted friends to supported host nation officials. The CA advisor, as with the other roles which have been examined, would be employed best for short activation periods, probably two of three weeks at a time, but complement these periods of deployment with follow-up evaluations and reports.

2. The Effect of External Factors on Applications of CA to HDOs

The Effect of US policy, guidance, and political will on CA Planning

US policy does not regard humanitarian demining operations as engaging vital or strategic American interests. Therefore, *it is not reasonable to expect that the US would employ USAR CA personnel to support HDO, if such employment would deplete DOD, or CA resources significantly.*

However, we have also determined that the national security policy assumes that a modest effort in the nature of planned, deliberate, and modest mine action campaigns can support various goals, chiefly under the rubric of the CINCs' Theater Engagement Plan. If CA reservists can be utilized in small numbers and for relatively short periods of voluntary activation, thus avoiding a high profile mobilization, resource-intensive taskings, and non-voluntary call-up authorities, the effort would seem to justify using CA assets to conduct and support demining missions. Accepting the parameters of demining operations described above, the support of these operations should not create a high political or financial profile.

CA Place in the Demining Force Team

CA soldiers are part of the SOF team. It is axiomatic that the more synchronized and represented the team is, the better it functions. SF, PSYOP, and CA planners should plan together whenever feasible. Therefore, using CA planners is a goal to be desired at any time within the SOF context, and should bring quite a lot to the overall CINC demining team.

While it is true that SF and active component CA soldiers are trained to perform CA duties, these duties are of the tactical (emergency services, feeding, housing, refugee movement, etc.) variety, and not of the advanced planning, coordination, or advisory nature. Such actions frequently require the application of functional specialty and negotiating skills. It has been accepted as a truism, that the method of applying CA "civilian" skills in tandem with other SOF teams, enhances the tactical and public awareness missions undertaken by those (SF and PSYOP) elements.

Using CA reservists, however, is however, one of the activities which has often has often been characterized by confusion or hesitation. However, most commanders today pay great attention to

civil-military (or G-5) issues, especially since OHDACA missions form a great part of the CINCs' Theater Engagement activities. Nevertheless, one must anticipate that a commander will give more credence to his dedicated (fulltime) staff and commanders, than to his apportioned USAR CA unit. This is understandable. However, if the mission is basically civil-military in character, then one would hope that the field or operational commander would defer to his USAR CA commander/advisor for trusted advice. This situation can be assured by creating a strong bond between CA units and the CINCs which they support, through routine and continuous training and exercise play.

USAR CA units need to receive guidance from staff elements of the CINC, or to units to which they are assigned or attached; even though those assignments may be predicated on large-scale (or "wartime") operations. In a typical humanitarian demining scenario, CA officers normally would receive instructions and provide feedback through the J-5 section of the CINC (or SOC) staff and report their actions there. Often the CINC demining team will be a small force, and the CA officer will report to the local commander in charge of the demining operation. The commander can delegate negotiating and CMO responsibilities to CA officers, but their principal duties will be to create support and linkages among demining organizations that the CINC, or his designated operation commander, desires.

Accessibility of USAR CA Personnel

Gaining access to CA individuals or small teams on a short-term basis should not be a problem. As stated earlier, given the basis for demining operations, there is no need for an entire unit or even a large team to be activated. There should seldom, if ever, be a need to activate a planning cell under the rubric of a Presidential call-up authority. Small teams should be able to plan without being activated for long periods of time, utilizing temporary tours of active duty, or annual training for duty, authorization.

What is necessary, however, is that CA units apportioned to a CINC possess sufficient resident functional specialty skills, civilian professional expertise, military experience, and regional knowledge to enable the CINC to plan for these capabilities with confidence. This is a challenge, which the CA community takes very seriously, and is a perennial concern of CA, SOF, and Army commanders. The "evergreen" issue of CA functional specialty qualification is the key to success in an environment, which is fluid, complex, and not prone to schoolbook solutions. The evidence, as a result of CA participation (and accolades) in the operations mentioned previously, is that CA, when called upon has performed civil military duties with distinction.

One other consideration must be made when contemplating the use of CA personnel, and that is OPTEMPO. Given the number of times that USAR reserve forces have been activated over the past decade, it may be that any given unit may be unable to access unit members who have the requisite functional area or regional skills, because they will have been "used up." In accessing the few members of the unit required for demining support, however, it is unlikely that all CA personnel with the required skills will be deployed or non-deployable. And even if this were the case, the USACAPOC headquarters has proven most adept at identifying personnel with similar skills in other

CA units. The OPTEMPO issue should recede as the planned and gradual expansion of the force takes place (see below). However, that assumption only holds true if CA is not called upon for increased participation in military contingencies.

Gaining access to the few CA unit members should not be a problem, except when too many teams are employed at the same time; either in support of demining, or other missions. Therefore, it would be necessary to plan and synchronize even the short deployment periods so that the unit is able to function as a unit at all times, and to maximize the teams' interoperability. The key point is that CA officers need not be activated for long periods of time, although frequent returns to the host country may pay dividends. Even in a very active demining program where constant coordination is necessary, a very few voluntary activations of 180 days should be sufficient.

If CA is tasked to support many different demining operations simultaneously, OPTEMPO may grow as an issue. While the CA force itself could probably resource demining coordination needs, other CA missions may suffer, or conversely, other more important CA missions may override the requirement for CA to support some demining country programs. These questions of priority can be suggested in planning sessions, policy fora, and the like, but in the last analysis, the CINC must decide how to utilize his assets best.

CA Unit Configuration and Integrity

CA cells are sometimes organized as definite entities within the unit, sometimes they are task-organized from various parts of the CA unit or units. While elements comprising a cell are drawn from the unit, neither it nor the unit should find its organic capabilities seriously depleted if the cell is deployed separately from the home unit for a short time. In the time that an ADT period occurs, the team may have missed no or only one drill period(s). Further, the unit's understanding of the CINC's plans and operations should be enhanced by the feedback, which the planning cell can impart to its home unit upon its return. The employment of liaison officers in support of a demining operation, therefore, does not mean that the integrity of the unit will be destroyed, although it might be marginalized if other teams (planning, advisors, trainers, etc.) are activated simultaneously. If planning is done properly, CA teams can stagger their deployments to minimize strain on the entire unit. This presupposes good internal planning on the part of the unit, and cooperation and timely guidance from the CINC's staff.

In a way which often seems ironic to non-reservists, short active duty assignments, such as CA demining support can actually enhance personnel retention. There are those, who for employment, family, or other reasons, cannot personally be activated for long periods of time, but who sincerely wish to make a contribution to national defense. Many reservists find that supporting "real world" missions during short activations can be a very gratifying way to fulfill their service obligations and responsibilities. If mine action missions can offer shorter periods of activation which still allow unit members to contribute in a definite and meaningful way, unit retention, as well as morale may rise.

It is also a simple truism that as the expansion of CA units occurs over the next five years, there will simply be more personnel, teams, and units to take on these tasks. The unit will be able to absorb the

short term loss of such cells more easily, as larger units and the addition of newly configured teams, will enable the CA force to accept these kind of missions more routinely.

Funding for CA Demining Support

If CA planning cells are small and can conduct their tasks at home station and during short periods of active duty, especially ADT, the financial impact should be minimal. Indeed funds should be no more than if the cell performed during an exercise in the CINC's area of responsibility. Nevertheless, it would alleviate even this small support effort, if ODHACA funds were made available to reserve forces supporting a CINC's humanitarian demining activities. And if the number of demining efforts required of CA goes up significantly, this kind of support may be necessary.

While the CINC may decide to use discretionary funds to support these demining activities, or the USAR may fund them, it would seem most satisfactory to apply funds appropriated to DOD specifically to support demining missions for Reserve support of humanitarian demining. Therefore support of demining activities would probably be planned, integrated and implemented if ODHACA funds were made available to Reserve SOF personnel required to support the CINCs' humanitarian demining program.

3. The Decision to Apply USAR CA Capabilities to HDOs

When the US first entered the humanitarian demining operations arena (1993-4), demining activities generally centered around mine clearance activities; that is, the process of detecting and neutralizing landmines. As such, the perceived needs were narrowly described: training future deminers how to probe for landmines, then how to blow them in place. Shortly thereafter, greater attention was paid to mine awareness as a way of avoiding accidents, and then victim assistance, as a way of helping people cope with accidents.

The concept of prioritizing "mine action" (a fairly new term for the panoply of actions now contemplated under the term humanitarian demining) activities, and coordinating those plans with other organizations in a general development scheme, is a more recent phenomena. Therefore, it was natural to assign SF and PSYOP teams to demining missions, while the need for CA was generally not yet felt. When the need was discerned, the natural resistance to using reservists had to be overcome. But at the time, reserve CA forces were being activated at a dizzying pace for other peacetime contingencies. Therefore, most of the demining missions, which could have made valuable use of CA were either accomplished by the active duty CA unit, the 96th Battalion, SF soldiers, other units on the scene, or were simply not done.

Humanitarian demining is a limited scope activity. US officials do not intend it to be a nation building exercise, although there is the realization that rudimentary development must drive mine action activities if their results are to be lasting. Therefore, it has been easy to overlook the participation of CA. However, the current situation suggests that the role of reserve CA capabilities in support of the US humanitarian demining program should be reviewed. USAR CA forces are uniquely qualified to perform key CMO, which can literally frame a demining operation. CA

personnel possess negotiating and functional specialty skills, which can help define and prioritize development goals at the core of demining efforts. CA can facilitate country clearances and arrange logistical support for the local DOD demining operation.

The cost of utilizing the CA assets does not seem to be high. The deliberate nature of humanitarian demining lends itself to time-phased planning, while the short duration of activation for CA teams does not require the authority of a non-voluntary call-up of reserves.

The use of CA reservists seems all the more attractive as one considers that the force is due to be expanded significantly in the next five years. If a way is found to apply funds set aside for US humanitarian demining operations, to fund the pay and allowances of participating CA reservists, then the force could be employed with even more imagination and flexibility.

Appendix A

Civil Affairs Functions in Support of Mine Action Requirements

Humanitarian Demining Operations (HDO) are generally organized into phases, which have been analyzed and modeled notionally by JMU in *Accessibility of Information and Materials Required to Conduct Humanitarian Demining Operations – Task 3*. The HDO phases have been further broken down into a hierarchy of component tasks. The following tables depict each phase of a typical HDO, and relate possible civil affairs support in relation to each component task within that particular phase.

The following chart should be used when referring to the tables in the appendix, to interpret the type of support, which might be rendered by Civil Affairs units, teams, or personnel.

Support Level	Support Role	Role Description
1	Conduct	Performs Mission*
2	Support	Supports Mission Actively
3	Indirect Support	Supports Mission through reports or other passive means

*Does not assume that Civil solely is necessarily responsible for the task.

- **Table A-1**, *Civil Affairs Support to the Planning Phase of a Humanitarian Demining Operation*
- **Table A-2**, *Civil Affairs Support to the Deployment Phase of a Humanitarian Demining Operation*
- **Table A-3a**, *Civil Affairs Support to the Operations-Clearance Phase of a Humanitarian Demining Operation*
- **Table A-3b**, *Civil Affairs Support to the Operations-Victim Assistance Phase of a Humanitarian*

Demining Operation

- **Table A-3c**, *Civil Affairs Support to the Operations-Mine Awareness Phase of a Humanitarian Demining Operation*
- **Table A-4**, *Civil Affairs Support to the Sustainment Phase of a Humanitarian Demining Operation*
- **Table A-5**, *Civil Affairs Support to the End State Phase of a Humanitarian Demining Operation*
- **Table A-6**, *Civil Affairs Support to the Evaluation Phase of a Humanitarian Demining Operation*

