

Det här verket har digitaliserats vid Göteborgs universitetsbibliotek.
Alla tryckta texter är OCR-tolkade till maskinläsbar text. Det betyder att du kan söka och kopiera texten från dokumentet. Vissa äldre dokument med dåligt tryck kan vara svåra att OCR-tolka korrekt vilket medför att den OCR-tolkade texten kan innehålla fel och därför bör man visuellt jämföra med verkets bilder för att avgöra vad som är riktigt.

This work has been digitised at Gothenburg University Library.
All printed texts have been OCR-processed and converted to machine readable text.
This means that you can search and copy text from the document. Some early printed books are hard to OCR-process correctly and the text may contain errors, so one should always visually compare it with the images to determine what is correct.



Sweden and the European Miracles

Conquest, Growth and Voice: a survey of
problems and theories

Erik Örjan Emilsson

RAPPORT FRÅN EKONOMISK-HISTORISKA INSTITUTIONEN
VID GÖTEBORGS UNIVERSITET

10

Erik Örjan Emilsson

SWEDEN AND THE EUROPEAN MIRACLES

Conquest, Growth and Voice:
a survey of problems and theories

GÖTEBORG 1996

© Erik Örjan Emilsson
GÖTEBORG 1996

Ingår i serien Rapporter från Ekonomisk-historiska
institutionen vid Göteborgs universitet

Published within the series:
Reports from the Department of Economic History
Göteborg University
ISSN 0283-006X

Abstract:

The purpose of this licentiate dissertation¹ is to explore the complexities of relating Swedish history to general and European history, and to argue the necessity of doing so. This perspective requires that Swedish history must be understood as European history, and that European history - in particular economic/historical/social-scientific *theorization* of this history - has to assimilate the Swedish experience, in order to fully realize its explanatory potential.

To substantiate these claims I point out a number of important aspects where Sweden's position in this wider context is crucial, exceptional or contradictory enough to warrant inclusion into the problematization.

I also present a re-conceptualization of the 'Rise of the West' or 'European Miracle' as *three* separate, but presumably interconnected 'miracles' (unique, *prima facie* inexplicable and advantageous transformations) that *constitute* Europe as a system of societies *vis á vis* the rest of the world.

I label them 'Conquest', 'Growth' and 'Voice'.

From among the theories and empirical generalizations addressing this problem complex, I select six synthesizing projects for closer scrutiny, on the basis of two criteria: They have to take on *more than one* of the three 'miracles', and they must attempt explaining the diversity of European development as well as the singularity.

The approaches chosen are those of: Barrington Moore, Douglass North, Perry Anderson, Immanuel Wallerstein, Charles Tilly and Robert Brenner.

Finally, I discuss in what contexts these theories might be useful for discerning and analyzing problems of Swedish history, and point out arguments for why these models need to include the Swedish example.

¹The published version is somewhat revised, as the arguments of Ronald Axtmann, who acted as opponent, made me realize that I had to clarify my standpoints concerning theory. I have also made other additions and clarifications after discussing the contents with Lars Herlitz, Carl-Johan Gadd and Jan Jörnmark at the department of Economic History, and Mats Andrén and Martin Peterson at the European Studies Project. For helpful suggestions and important facts, I also owe thanks to Göran Therborn, Urban Herlitz, Martti Rantanen and Christina Dalhede.

CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION: Peculiarities of the Swedish	1
PART ONE: THE PROBLEMS	3
I:1 The 'Rise of Europe' - a Recurrent Debate	3
I:1.2 One, two or three miracles?	4
I:2 The relevance of 'smaller country' history	6
I:2.1 'Marginal' innovators	7
I:2.2 Or even: A key role for Sweden?	8
I:2.3 Part of the system - part of the miracle	8
I:3 Sweden as the 'Most Drastic Modernizer'	10
I:3.1 The disappearance of the peasants	10
I:3.2. From military state to centennial peace	13
I:3.3. From household inquisition to empty churches	13
I:4 SUMMING UP: Why bother about Sweden ?	15
I:5 SUMMING UP: The Triple Miracle of Europe	18
I:6 EXCURSUS: Why stop at Three Miracles?	20
PART TWO: THE THEORIES	23
II:0.1 The early 70's - a time to grasp for wide-ranging explanations	23
II:0.2 Trajectories and systems - a preliminary survey	24
II:1 BARRINGTON MOORE: Political Destinies and Social Origins	27
II:1.1 The agrarian foundations of modernity.	27
II:1.2 The Three Routes to Modern Society	28
II:1.3 Five conditions for democratic development	33
II:1.4 The dangers of backwardness: a Gerschenkronian undertext	33
II:1.5 Critiques and revisions	34
II:1.6 John D. Stephens: revising the reactionary route	34
II:1.7 Peter Katzenstein's 'democratic corporatism'	37
II:1.8 Timothy Tilton's addition: the 'radical liberal route' of Sweden	39
II:1.9 Sweden's place in Moore's typology: questions to confront	42
II:2. DOUGLASS NORTH: Property Rights and Transaction Costs	45
II:2.1 From efficient institutions to path dependence	45
II:2.2 Winners or losers - trajectories as game results	47
II:2.3 Where does Eastern Europe come in?	49
II:2.4 What about Sweden?	51
II:2.5 Institutional discussions of Sweden - Sandberg and Myhrman	53
II:3 PERRY ANDERSON: State-building as Feudal Centralization	59
II:3.1 What is the economic basis under feudalism?	59
II:3.2 The uniqueness of Europe	60
II:3.3 The division of Europe, the Ancient heritage and the Rise of Capitalism	61

II:3.4 The Two-dimensional Divergence of Europe's Feudal Trajectories	62
II:3.5 Sweden according to Anderson - unclear and questionable points	66
II:3.6 Criticism against Anderson	71
II:4 IMMANUEL WALLERSTEIN: <i>Division of Labour as a World System</i>	73
II:4.1 Development theory and global history	73
II:4.2 Structure as explanation	73
II:4.3 Growth as redistribution	76
II:4.4 Trajectories as positional careers	77
II:4.5 Sweden as the first <i>rising</i> semiperiphery	80
II:4.6 Important critiques of Wallerstein	82
II:5 CHARLES TILLY: <i>Statemaking through Coercion and Capital</i>	87
II:5.1 Warmaking and diversity	87
II:5.2 Power, Plenty or both	88
II:5.3 China as a contrast	91
II:5.4 The position of Sweden	92
II:6 ROBERT BRENNER: <i>Property Relations as Class Reproduction</i>	95
II:6.1 Class struggle and comparative transition	95
II:6.2 East vs West and the 'Brenner paradox'	95
II:6.3 England vs France - the medieval background	96
II:6.4 Brenner's typology of Europe	97
II:6.5 Important points of criticism against Brenner	99
II:6.6 Once again: Sweden - eastern or western?	100
II:7 EXCURSUS: <i>Michael Mann and the 'four sources of social power'</i>	102
PART THREE: THEORIES CONFRONTING PROBLEMS - A PRELIMINARY APPRAISAL	103
III:1 <i>Agenda and balance-sheet</i>	103
III:2 <i>Theories confronting each other - and the miracles</i>	104
III:2.1 My selection of theories - a defense	104
III:2.2 Economic history or historical sociology ?	105
III:2.3 The Miracle of Growth - Adam Smith revised from two directions	106
III:2.4 Very long-term growth: Deeper European roots	110
III:2.5 The logic of violence and the 'Miracle of Conquest'	112
III:2.6 The deeper roots of Voice - Downing and Koenigsberger	113
III:2.7 What is the connection between Voice and the other 'Miracles'?	116
III.3 <i>The theories confronting Sweden: Preliminary assessments</i>	118
III:3.1 The utility of synthetic perspectives for the comparative study of Sweden	118
III:3.2 Summing up: The necessity of integrating the exceptional case	124
BIBLIOGRAPHY	127
INDEX	139

CHARTS AND MAPS

<i>Chart 1: The disappearance of the peasants. Europe 1880-1938 and 1946-86</i>	<i>12</i>
<i>Chart 2: Religiosity and secularization in Europe and the US.....</i>	<i>14</i>
<i>Map 1: Moore's three roads to modernity plus residual categories</i>	<i>30</i>
<i>Chart 3: Moore's three roads to modernity plus residual categories</i>	<i>31</i>
<i>Chart 4: Moore's "five conditions for democracy" in the countries discussed by him and in Sweden</i>	<i>41</i>
<i>Map 2: North-Thomas' typology of Europe.....</i>	<i>50</i>
<i>Chart 5: Institutional change in England, France and Sweden:.....</i>	<i>52</i>
<i>Chart 6: Comparative financial ratios - time-lags relative to England-Wales.....</i>	<i>54</i>
<i>Map 3: Anderson's European categories.....</i>	<i>64</i>
<i>Chart 7: Anderson's typology of feudal trajectories.....</i>	<i>65</i>
<i>Map 4-5 : Wallerstein's modern world system in the 16th to 18th centuries, and in the 1970's</i>	<i>79</i>
<i>Map 6: Europe according to Tilly.....</i>	<i>90</i>
<i>Chart 8: Tilly's typology of European state-building trajectories</i>	<i>91</i>
<i>Map 7: Brenner's typology of Europe.....</i>	<i>98</i>

INTRODUCTION:

Peculiarities of the Swedish

Sweden has often been considered exceptional in a variety of ways, and as long as international - or European - history is interpreted in a unilinear fashion, this merely reinforces the tendency to view European and international developments as exogenous factors influencing a largely endogenous Swedish development, which now and then may exercise an exogenous influence on the rest of the continent or of the world.

That Sweden is also part of Europe and part of the world, which makes *all* Swedish developments internal to the larger systems, should be self-evident, but requires a double perspective combining a European eye on what happens in Sweden with a 'Sweden-including' overview of what happens in Europe. In my present search for such a perspective I have been led to explore the latest (or is it already the second latest?) generation of socio-historical synthesis, largely sparked off by similar concerns from other national (or continental) horizons.

The debates over the 'peculiarities of the English' or the German '*Sonderweg*' are symptoms of the same problematic², and there is a tension between the necessity of a historiography accepting the multilinearity of national histories (the realization that every path is a *Sonderweg*), and the yet undiminished need of theoretical tools for handling the magnitude of modern social, economic and political change (within which at least the Western *Sonderwege* tend to converge)³. Out of the attempts to render this tension manageable new theoretical syntheses have emerged and in this essay I will discuss advantages and limitations of some of those approaches in the light of:

- (1) a proposed perspective on what are the most essential aspects of the singularity of European modernity in a global context, and
- (2) their relevance and potential fruitfulness for achieving the double perspective I require: to see what is European in Sweden and what is Swedish in Europe - all of this as part of a sustained argument for the necessity of such an endeavour.

²Maybe also Braudel's refocusing from 'The Perspective of the World' to '*L'Identité de la France*'. cf Anderson: 'Fernand Braudel and National Identity'(in 1992b:251-78)

³As their diversity also tends to pale beside their contrast with the non-Western world.

As I cannot try out these propositions within the confines of this dissertation, it is to be regarded as a reconnaissance tour through the theoretical and historiographical grounds of possible relevance to my discussion: a preliminary survey of problems and available theories.

PART ONE: THE PROBLEMS

I:1 The 'Rise of Europe' - a Recurrent Debate

The question of how to explain Europe's spectacular rise to world dominance through the modern era, has been a central problem ever since ambitions of scientific explanation first appeared within historical and social sciences. The classic approaches of Smith, Marx and Weber still dominate the field⁴ at least as building-blocks for new syntheses. Until the failure of the modernization paradigm grew obvious in the sixties, the European experience was generally expected to be replicated with nothing more than a time-lag throughout the rest of the world, and thus the question of its origin did not seem too relevant to present-day concerns. The sudden wave of new attempts at explanatory synthesis in the middle of the seventies⁵ was largely sparked off by attempts to handle the *diversity* of historical development paths, which neither conventional development theory nor traditional historical materialism had taken into account.

A forceful restatement of the uniqueness of the European experience was made by E L Jones in *The European Miracle* (1981), where the very title seemed to signal a renewed historical self-assertedness after a period of Western bad conscience and self-denigration. When the same expression was used as the title of a symposium in Cambridge⁶ Ernest Gellner tried to give it a less arrogant twist: the miracle is not Europe, but something that happened to Europe⁷, and an important aspect of the miraculousness is that it happened in such an unlikely part of the world. Interpreted in this way, 'miracle' is a rather useful designation of the problem; the historical development often described as 'the Rise of the West' does indeed qualify as a *miracle*: a unique, advantageous⁸, and *prima facie* inexplicable transformation of a relatively marginal portion of the civilized world, into a dynamic centre *capable of transforming the rest of the world*⁹.

⁴Sombart might also still qualify, at least as an indirect influence, and Hintze's star has been steadily rising during the last decades. I will, however, *not* discuss any of these classics (and as such we would also have to count at least Schumpeter and Polanyi) in this essay, but only present-day attempts to confront the problem in the full dimensions apparent to us today.

⁵North-Thomas 1973, Anderson 1974a,b, Wallerstein 1974, Tilly (ed) 1975, and Brenner 1976.

⁶Published as 'Europe and the Rise of Capitalism' (1988; eds: Baechler-Hall-Mann)

⁷'...[W]e do not know what hit us. We cannot take credit for it.' (*op cit* : 1)

⁸At least to Europeans, although Wallerstein would probably disagree.

⁹*Cf* Hobsbawm in Hilton(ed) 1978

I:1.2 One, two or three miracles?

On closer inspection, the miracle threatens to decompose into two or three separate miracles, all as unique, inexplicable, and advantageous: *The miracle of conquest*, which from the end of the 15th until the early 20th century put almost the entire planet under European¹⁰ control, and *the miracle of growth*, which successively has made economic growth an imperative objective of all modern societies, as well as the necessary foundation for their existence, but which originally was an exclusive feature of a few European societies. Both of these advantages must be part of the explanation of European global dominance, and neither seems possible to derive from the other in any obvious way¹¹. The same thing goes for the third miracle I will consider: the transformation of political participation ultimately resulting in *democracy*. Although not in itself constituting an advantage *of power*, in the way of the first and second miracles, we cannot but consider democracy an advantage for the population of Europe¹². Equally unique, equally difficult to explain and with an equally transformative influence over the rest of the world, democracy - despite the definitional problems involved - will have to be considered as much of a miracle as world conquest and economic growth.

It might be thought fully sufficient to relate the 'success story' of Europe only to the modes of supranational power competition - military and economic - as the relation between these categories is complex enough by far, and the development of democracy might at most have an indirect bearing on performance within the arena of international power play. Still the covariance between democracy and the other miracles is both striking and contradictory¹³, and what makes this aspect of the problem most difficult to ignore, is the fact that *even when not explicitly confronted, it's one of the fundamental motives behind this kind of endeavour*.

Among the theorists I am about to discuss, Anderson, Wallerstein, Brenner and Tilly are engaged in finding explanations for diversity in development for reasons that are as sensitive to the questions of political freedom and influence as are those of authors explicitly discussing the question of democ-

¹⁰Whenever applicable, I will assimilate European settler-states like the USA and Australia into the definition of Europe without further specification.

¹¹On this question there is no consensus - at least Wallerstein would argue a virtual identity of the two processes; we will have to return to this question.

¹²In this respect - as an internal advantage - it resembles Growth but not Conquest.

¹³The groups of countries involved - over the long run - in the three 'miraculous processes' are largely congruent, although the accumulation and concentration of military power is often directly contrary to any development towards democracy (Cromwell, Napoleon). There are also many instances where economic growth has proved to be quite compatible with even a reversal of democratization processes (the Third Reich was more economically successful than was the Weimar Republic; Chile under Pinochet or China after the Tien-an-min massacre are other cases in point).

racy: Moore and North. Noticing this, I could not but apply the same conclusion to myself: of course the origins of Swedish democracy must be every bit as crucial to an understanding of the interrelation between Swedishness and Europeanity as Swedish economic growth and Swedish militarism-turned-pacifist. Thus I will have to begin to confront this issue, even though I had originally intended to limit myself to only the period in which the separate trajectories leading up to present nation-states are established¹⁴, and the 'European Miracle' will have to be considered as *three* separate but (presumably) interrelated processes.

I propose this conception of a triple miracle as a context for discussing the unique success story of Europe and the various theoretical models offered as explanations for it. I will in principle limit myself to discussing macro-historical approaches ambitious enough to take on more than one of the miracles, and inclusive enough to also take on the problem of diversity within the European development¹⁵.

The general approaches I will consider are those of Barrington Moore, Douglass North, Perry Anderson, Immanuel Wallerstein, Charles Tilly, and Robert Brenner. I do not aspire to the role of umpire between these magnificent storytellers, but will focus my attention on the part played by one of the minor actors in the plot: Sweden.

My fundamental motivational questions are:

- *In what ways might these theories give us a picture of Swedish history more intelligible and less accidental than conventional national history usually proves to be?*

and

- *In what ways can the example of Sweden throw a different light on the processes of the triple miracle, and on the different theoretical approaches considered here?*

The first question might obviously be of interest at least to Swedes, but will even the second question be of interest to anyone else? Is there any reason to suppose that the subplot of Swedish history will have any bearing on the main plot, or will it only confuse the issues? Before moving on to the discussion of the different theories, it may be necessary to argue for the rele-

¹⁴Reasonably later 16th to early 18th century, thus stopping far short of any democratic breakthrough.

¹⁵The first delimitation excludes purely political analysts like Reinhard Bendix, and the second one excludes E L Jones. Michael Mann certainly qualifies, but not unequivocally before the appearance of part II of *Sources of Social Power*. As I had not yet had time enough to digest part II it was by far too late to revise the structure of discussion in order to make place for his approach as well. I will return to his case in the end of the second part of this essay.

vance of including Sweden in the discussion, especially as one of the analysts explicitly denies this.

1:2 The relevance of 'smaller country' history

Barrington Moore squarely refuses to consider 'smaller countries' in his general model on the grounds that his focus is on the countries that have led the way, not on 'the spread and reception of institutions that have been hammered out elsewhere'. Smaller countries are seen as dependent on the 'big and powerful ones' and therefore 'the decisive causes of their politics lie outside their own boundaries'¹⁶. Perry Anderson, on the other hand, argues - against Heckscher's similar dictum that peculiar developments in 'countries of second rank' should not be allowed to complicate the discernment of general evolutions - that the 'differential character' of 'a region that controverts many of [historical science's] accepted categories' forms a necessary control for historical generalizations and typologies¹⁷.

Beginning with Moore's arguments, we can see that they are in practice self-defeating, because although he claims that the 'risk of anti-peasant bias' that his exclusion of Switzerland, Scandinavia and the Low Countries might be thought to entail, is vitiated by his general method of combining generalization with analysis of specific cases (the 'larger countries' pioneering different lines of development), we can later on notice that the disowned example of these 'smaller client democracies' proves necessary as one of the points of reference in his discussion of possible (and impossible) options for India. Thus the 'larger countries' simply do not provide the necessary range of examples and analytical concepts, despite Moore's protestations that 'the question of commercial agriculture among the peasants has less relevance for democracy'¹⁸.

His object of analysis is the web of interconnections between agriculture, bureaucratization, commercialization and the growth of democracy or dictatorship from the early modern period until the 20th century. Outdefining all economic and political lines of development that have not led to great power status in the 20th century cannot be legitimized by describing the excluded countries as 'marginal'.

¹⁶Moore 1967:xii f. As Skocpol (1973) has pointed out, external influence is every bit as important in the analysis of 'larger countries'.

¹⁷Anderson 1974a:173n1,173.

¹⁸*Loc cit* and p 422f; also on p 430. To the extent that successful land reforms might prove to be a necessary condition for third world economic growth (Taiwan and Chile are cases in point) the relevance or lack of relevance of peasant-based commercialization will be a question of utmost relevance.

I:2.1 'Marginal' innovators

In fact, many of them were far from marginal in the beginning of the period, and many of the institutions examined were 'hammered out' before this century - largely by today's 'smaller countries':

- England borrowed key economic institutions from Holland¹⁹, as well as agricultural techniques, and although England was the first country to carry through an industrial revolution, the close second, and the only other country that has been suggested as a possible case of an independently developed industrial revolution, was not any of the 'larger countries' but Belgium²⁰. Swedish institutions generally lagged behind both Holland and England, but Sweden was the first country to open a central bank (in 1668), and it was also the first country in Europe to introduce paper money.
- In early modern Europe the innovations of the greatest immediate social impact - those in the military field - were diffused from successive pioneering countries: first Switzerland, then Holland, then Sweden²¹ whose military and administrative methods were studied and copied by neighbours feeling threatened (notably Prussia and Russia)²².
- Within the political and ideological fields the Swiss confederacy provided examples for democrats and republicans²³, the Dutch carried through what is widely considered to be the first bourgeois revolution²⁴, and Sweden made the first experiments with a system of parliamentary party government²⁵.

¹⁹North/Thomas 1973:146, Tilly 1992:57, Wallerstein1980:77. Even Moore himself puts Holland before England in his list of countries successively developing the 'institutional complex' of capitalism: 'Italy, Holland, England, France and the United States.'(p 427)

²⁰Senghaas (p 28f); the third country in the 'first generation of industrial nations' was also a "smaller country": Switzerland.

²¹Finer 1975:105-7, Roberts 1967:196-204

²²Cf Anderson 1974b:199-202, Roberts 1967:65, 1979:57, Downing 1992:82

²³Brady 1991:140

²⁴E.g. Tilly 1992:65,73-6, Anderson 1974b:75, 1992:110; also cf quotes in Wallerstein 1974:201-11.

²⁵Although Whigs and Tories predate Caps and Hats the English cabinet was not made responsible to Parliament until the 1830's. (Metcalf 1987:131f)

I:2.2 Or even: A key role for Sweden?

Returning to Anderson, we can conclude that his standpoint that theories with pretensions to general validity should be able to explain not only the easily assimilated cases, but also, and more importantly, those that are most difficult to subsume under a generalized model, would be hard to oppose in a convincing way using Moore's arguments²⁶.

Also Anderson's more specific discussion of the Swedish case reveals further reasons to reject explanations that do not take Swedish history into consideration; according to his claims, Sweden is not only a unique combination of western and eastern European traits, but also *a key element in the very definition of the contrast*: while western absolutism is endogenous, a consequence of internal class conflict, the eastern variant is exogenous - a response to external military pressure. This pressure, though supposedly derived from western absolutism is - paradoxically - transmitted through the threat of *Swedish* military expansion. Thus Sweden is, to his explanation, *central*, and not marginal.

In Wallerstein's model Sweden also plays an important role: as the first country to *rise* to semi-peripheral status in the world economy (Venice, Spain and Portugal *sank* to that level from a formerly more central position) it succeeded to make use of a favourable natural resource endowment to escape marginalization ('the OPEC of its time'). That is: *Sweden is an example of how the 'development of underdevelopment' can be avoided - a most central concern in a theory about the rise of international dependence.*

I:2.3 Part of the system - part of the miracle

These examples refer to Sweden's role in the interaction of European states, and if the sharply divergent standpoints involved in the revitalized debate on 'the Rise of the West' can be said to have reached a consensus on anything, it would be this:

*Europe as a system of interacting but independent and competing states had a much higher potential for dynamic development than traditional-style empires that typically tend to aspire to self-sufficiency*²⁷

²⁶Did the historical formation and social structure of the 'smaller countries' appear to be nothing but permutations of traits from the 'larger countries' it might carry some conviction, but, as I have tried to demonstrate, this is not the case.

²⁷Theda Skocpol observed (1977) this aspect as a common feature of the Anderson and Wallerstein syntheses (both 1974), as well as of essays in Tilly (1975). Jones (1981) put this argument into the centre of his explanation and Michael Mann has generalized this dynamic into his concept 'multi-power actor civilizations' (1986:534). That it is now widely accepted as an indispensable central component of any explanation, is evidenced by Pearson and Brady in Tracy 1991 (pp48 and 120); see also Holton (1985), Hall (1985:133-141 and 1988) and North(1993b). The renewed interest in Hintze is connected with this awareness of state-system dynamics.

In the formalization of this state system at the treaty of Westphal, Sweden played one of the leading roles. A system-dynamic approach also allows us to consider *indirect* contributions to the miracles:

1. The 'military revolution' where Sweden is usually acknowledged to be one of the pathbreaking countries²⁸ was crucial to the possibility of world conquest. Portuguese hegemony over trade in the Indian Ocean was largely won through the key military advantage of ships armed with cannons - increasingly imported from Sweden during the 17th century²⁹.

2. In the achievement of full democracy, Sweden can hardly be considered a pioneer. Among the core OECD countries surveyed by Therborn (1977), Sweden shares fifth place with Austria, at 15 years after number 1 (Australia), and at only one year before the median. Still, this is ten years before Britain³⁰, which is often conventionally assumed to have led the way in the development of democracy.

Obviously this development has been a lot more complex and uneven, with different countries acting as '*reference societies*'³¹ at different times, inspiring or justifying breach of tradition and precedent. The 'social laboratory' image of post-Second World War Sweden has made it a reference society in a variety of social, economic and political respects, but already in early modernity Sweden could serve as a reference:

- in justifying peasant freedom and autonomy as compatible with lawabiding Christianity (Switzerland in early modern times³²),
- as an example of representative government and freedom of press cited by political theorists of the French and Italian Enlightenments³³

3. Within the 'miracle of growth', Sweden has been considered as a 'late starter' but also as one of the most dramatic examples of 'catching up'³⁴. Recent research has tended toward the position that the foundations of this rapid economic development must have been laid during a long time 'underneath' the visible surface of measurable indicators. The importance of the degree of growth should be obvious, but also the obscurity of its emergence.

²⁸Roberts 1965:65, Parker 1988:24f, Downing 66-7,71-3, Finer 1975:107.

²⁹Cipolla 1965:56.

³⁰Or the same year but for both sexes while the UK still kept women outside politics. In the US and Switzerland non-discriminatory suffrage was not achieved until the late 60s-early 70s . (Therborn 1977)

³¹The term is coined by Reinhard Bendix (1978:292).

³²Blickle 1989.

³³Cf Roberts 1986:59 for the high opinions of Swedish liberty held by Voltaire, Mably and Rousseau, and Mastellone 1989 for Italian discussions of Sweden - together with Venice - as an example of the republican state form.

³⁴Still in 1990 it can be claimed that: 'From 1870 to 1950 the per capita GNP growth rate in Sweden seems to have been the fastest in the world' (Lindbeck)

1:3 Sweden as the 'Most Drastic Modernizer'

A drastic and far-reaching modernization is part of the received image of Sweden, but the extent of it might still be underestimated. Even though the picture of Sweden as a poor and regressive backwater suddenly bursting into unprecedented growth may be considerably exaggerated³⁵, there are several aspects where Sweden moves from one end of the scale to the opposite, 'outmodernizing' its competitors in such fundamental dimensions of the modernizing process as de-agrarization, de-militarization and secularization.

1:3.1 The disappearance of the peasants

From having been a country overwhelmingly dominated by peasants, Sweden has been transformed into a society where 'self-employed' farm operators are scarcer than in any European country save Great Britain, and maybe Belgium³⁶

Of course any predominantly agricultural society - which all early modern European societies were - can be described as dominated by peasants, but within the scope of diversity possible during this period, I would consider it quite obvious that in no other European country west of Russia peasants predominated to a higher degree than in Sweden. As the evidence is sparse and not very compatible, we have to mix inferences of indirect and direct nature:

A higher degree of urbanization, a more numerous nobility and a larger proportion of landless people among the rural population are factors that infer a lower relative proportion of peasants.

1. Starting with urbanisation: De Vries (1984) - counting only cities over 10,000 - puts Scandinavia at 0,9 % in 1500. As Copenhagen is the only city counted in this index, Sweden and Norway would stay at 0%, together with Ireland and Poland. Other European countries are at 3% upwards, except for Switzerland, Scotland and Austria-Bohemia, all at 1,5-1,7.

Using Bairoch's (1988) wider definition (cities over 5,000) Scandinavia rises to 2,2%; Sweden (including Finland), with only Stockholm qualified, could not lie far above 1%. This is not only far lower than Switzerland (6,8%) and Austria-Hungary-Czechoslovakia

³⁵Therborn's observation (1989:81) that Sweden moved from having been, in the late 19th century, the poorest country in western Europe north of the Pyrenées (Ireland excepted) to one of the richest, is based on Maddison's historical data, which have been put in considerable doubt. Still, even if Sweden was a lot less poor at the starting-point than is usually imagined, the further development remains impressive.

³⁶See the table below. Depending on from which figures Belgian peasant population is computed, the 1989 figure will come out at 2.3, 2.5 or 2.8, even using only official EC statistics (*The Agrarian Situation...*). According to ILO it might be even lower.

(4,8), but also than Poland at 6%, European Russia (5,4%) and Rumania (3%). Ireland, on the other hand, would only reach 0,8% (using Bairoch's database together with de Vries' total population figure), and Norway probably something similar.³⁷

2. The Swedish nobility comprised no more than 0,5% of the population, as against 2% in France and in England (including the gentry), and more than 5% in Poland, Spain and Hungary³⁸. Apart from sheer weight of numbers, we have to consider economic and political importance, etc: Peasants dominated by their landlords will of course have a smaller impact on society, than independent peasants. In this respect few countries would be comparable to Sweden. Switzerland, of course (*cf* Blickle), and reasonably Norway.

3. The rural proletariat in Sweden cannot have been very numerous in comparison to other European countries, at least not before the 19th century, when the decisive polarization into landless and proprietary strata seems to have taken place (Winberg 1990). Myrdal-Söderberg show that the 16th century was - contrary to what is taken to be the common pattern in Europe - *not* a period of growing peasant differentiation in Sweden; in fact, rather the opposite (1991:ES525). Gadd (1990) counters the stereotype of Sweden's poverty by observing that its peasants were rather affluent compared to conditions in other countries - it was the upper classes that were (relatively) poorer.

The development from 1880 until today is described in the table below. Of course the reliability of all such statistics is highly debatable, and I have to emphasize that I do not want to take responsibility for all the information appearing in it: *My only purpose is to convey the extreme proportions of the transformations* - from one end of the scale³⁹ to the other.


³⁷As the names of the units imply, both of the authors define them primarily from present borders. which makes their relevance debatable.

³⁸Samuelson 1993:49f, ES*270. (For some reason the gentry is only described as 'large in numbers' in the English summary). The Polish nobility has even been estimated at 8-10% (in the 17th century; Braudel 1981:376), and the Spanish at 11%(in late 16th century; Wilson-Parker 1977:58).

* I will use the letters ES to designate references to English summaries within works written in Swedish. Whenever a relevant passage can be found in the English summary, I have chosen that place of reference.

³⁹And 1880 is not a very suitable year to begin with, as the compatibility of the compared figures at that point is quite uncertain. However, going further back, as I argued above, we can find a much more unequivocal point of extremity.

**Chart 1: The disappearance of the peasants.
Europe 1880-1938 and 1946-86⁴⁰**



* The curve breaks off at 1980 as I could find no compatible Swiss figures after that year, which has moreover been adjusted in proportion to the more comprehensive 1976 figures.

⁴⁰Figures computed from data in Flora et al 1987 - for the later years also from EC and ILO statistics - as well as from Swedish official census statistics.

I:3.2. From military state to centennial peace

From having been a thoroughly militarized society where:

- all other needs were subordinated to the requirements of aggressive military expansion⁴¹
- a higher proportion of the population - 8% 'at its peak toward 1710'⁴² - was placed in the military than in any other known instance
- the degree of militarization as indexed by the status of military officers relative to other social groups was higher than or equal to that of Prussia still in the middle of the eighteenth century⁴³,

Sweden has been transformed into a country holding the current world record in unbroken peace. The reasons usually given for this development are standard arguments applicable to the evolution of developed states *in general*⁴⁴. They *might* be sufficient for an argument about why modern 'nation-states' have evolved from a military state stage to a more civilian one, but they cannot explain why a country at one end of a ranking-list ranging from war-makers to peacekeepers can move to the other extreme, thus overtaking all other countries moving in the same direction from similar reasons.

I:3.3. From household inquisition to empty churches

After the reformation and a period where remaining catholic sympathies were discredited by association first with Sweden's last large-scale peasant rebellion, and then, in the dynastic struggle between king Sigismund and Duke Charles, with the losing side, with Poland and pretensions to aristocratic independence, Sweden was molded into extreme religious conformity - 'the Lutheran Spain' according to Roberts⁴⁵; all other religious beliefs were outlawed, and orthodoxy was scrupulously controlled down to household level

⁴¹S A Nilsson 1973:165.

⁴²Tilly 1990:123.


⁴³Artéus 1982:141-2.

⁴⁴Artéus 1982:390 lists the decline of aristocratic dominance, the loss of the military monopoly of violence through the increase in the number of civilians trained in the use of arms, the increase in state revenues made possible by industrialization and growing trade and the growing civilian administration necessitated and financed by these factors, the wider scope of non-military career possibilities for upper-class youths and the shrinking percentage of officers within the upper classes etc; the only specifically Swedish component is the lack of counterbalancing militarizing tendencies evident in those countries that continued to get involved in warfare. However, why Sweden didn't, despite its antecedentia, is the very problem requiring explanation.

⁴⁵1979:64. See also Roberts' comments on compulsory catechetical instruction and the control of orthodoxy (1973:140,168-170).

through the institution of *busförhör* ⁴⁶. Today (early 1990's) Sweden is the only country in western Europe where the majority of the population professes not to believe in God, and where the level of at least monthly church service attendance is the lowest - approached in this respect only by the other Nordic countries. Only Russia, Belarus and Bulgaria rank as more secularized than Sweden on both counts, and even the figures for Eastern Europe as a whole indicate a considerably higher level of religious belief *and* church attendance than in Sweden.

Chart 2: Religiosity and secularization in Europe and the US



⁴⁶Explained as 'catechetical meetings or household examinations' in Nilsson 1988:34

I:4 SUMMING UP:

Why bother about Sweden ?

Consequently, I plead that large-scale modernization history theorists have to find a place for Sweden in their models to be fully convincing, and I consider the attempts made by some of them to be suitable test-cases for evaluating their approaches. My demand for a European history capable of integrating Sweden, can be summed up thus:

1. If part of the mystery surrounding the reasons for Europe's 'Rise' lies in that such a marginal part of the then civilized world suddenly came to the fore - then *marginal civilizations must be very important to analyze*. Portugal, England, Holland and Sweden - all among the countries furthest away from the old civilizational heartlands - emerged one after the other as important powers (Roberts 1979). Sweden, as the *most* marginal one, cannot be considered to be of marginal importance to the phenomenon of 'the rise of marginal regions'.
2. If the *system* of states is crucial to the explanation, Sweden as one of the powers blocking an imperial solution and establishing a balance of forces cannot be left outside the analysis⁴⁷.
3. Sweden's crucial role in the military revolution is necessary to analyze in a European perspective as it had important direct and indirect consequences for:
 - a. divergent development in eastern Europe (Anderson 1974b)
 - b. the development of efficient state machineries (as above, and Roberts 1979)
 - c. the military balance between Europe and the rest of the world (Parker 1991)
4. Sweden's role as a pioneer of parliamentary rule and civil rights in the 18th century (Metcalf, Roberts) and the exceptional wideness of its constituency at a very early date make it impossible to overlook in a discussion of the antecedents of democracy. In 1809⁴⁸ its electorate

⁴⁷Tilly 1990:166-7 Anderson 1974b:52,199. Even if its role in this context might only have been as a catalyst, the need for one, and the timely appearance of this particular catalyst, need to be explained.

⁴⁸And there is no reason to believe that there had been any numerically significant broadening of the electoral basis since the Age of Liberty. On the contrary, the loss of Finland should have

comprised around 13% of the adult population, a figure that Britain, often conventionally assumed to lead the way towards democracy, did not surpass until 1869. In 1831 the comparable figure for Britain was less than 4%, in the US by 1820 it was less than 8, and in Europe no country reached a higher figure before the revolutions of 1848 (if we do not count the single universal male franchise election to the Convention of France in 1792)⁴⁹.

Rueschemeyer, Stephens and Stephens argue that the central aspect of democracy is 'the extent of the suffrage, and in particular the extent to which it transcends class boundaries' (1992:44).

In this perspective Sweden's Age of Liberty becomes even more exceptional: representation through separate Estates was undoubtedly very unequal, yet it would be hard to claim that it did not transcend class boundaries.

5. Another important reason to study Swedish development is the contradiction between the precocious development of political and economic institutions, and the belated realization of their potential (Sandberg, Therborn). In this context the "cultural level" established during the Imperial Age must be of great importance. Cultural factors are difficult to define adequately - they easily tend to get invoked as a catch-all residual, but the importance for institutional development of such factors as a shared conception of the world or a common frame of reference is inescapable⁵⁰. The scrupulously enforced religious homogeneity undoubtedly has had important beneficial consequences on literacy, but we also have to consider the question of which of the following contrasting factors that has had the greatest impact on Swedish culture and general development:

increased the relative weight of noble-owned land, and thus decreased the proportion of freeholders and Crown peasants in the population.

⁴⁹International figures are taken from Flora 1983 (adult population defined as at least 20 years of age), except the US figure which is computed from the 4% notation in Eisenstadt-Rokkan (p 193: Table A) and the age structure information in U S Bureau of the Census 1966. The Swedish figure is calculated from Wohlin 1909 (freeholding peasants), *Studier över ...* (nobility, burghers) and Agardh-Ljungberg 1857 (burghers, clergy, crown peasants), complemented by age structure statistics in SCB 1860. Norway from 1815 lay on a slightly lower level than Sweden, but as the degree of representativity was decreasing in both systems it might have surpassed Sweden at some point before Sweden's reform of representation in 1865-66. Hardly by more than 1%, though.

⁵⁰Anderson1974b:426-8, Jones 1981:111-7, Mann1986:363-71, North 1993c.

- (a) the negative consequences of not experiencing the intellectual stimulus of religious debate - obviously of great importance in England and Holland, or
- (b) the positive advantage of having a consensual ideological basis?

The sudden development of a precocious parliamentary party system after the failure of absolutism and the contemporaneous flowering of Swedish science seem to prove that the advantages at least must have outweighed the risk of intellectual suffocation.

6. That Sweden was incorporated into the intra-European economic system as a producer of raw materials, without getting marginalized (*cf* the accounts by Wallerstein, Karlsson, Åström referred to in section II:VI below)
7. Sweden's sudden, fast and drastic modernization is a challenge to any generalizations about modernization processes, and the various dimensions and temporalities of its transformations raise important questions about the interconnection of different aspects of the process.
 - a. The speed, suddenness and formidable success of (at least the decisive stage of) the economic transformation⁵¹
 - b. The drastic and very complete de-agrarization of one of Europe's most peasant-dominated countries.
 - c. The transformation of a thoroughly militarized society into a totally non-belligerent one.
 - d. The absolute secularization of a religiously extremely homogenous and orthodox nation.

⁵¹Whether the 'spurt' started from as low a level as traditionally presumed, or from a level of slowly accumulated 'invisible' wealth, and whatever are the proportions between "true growth" and "increasing statistic visibility of already existing wealth" within these figures, the *degree of transformation*, of whichever type, remains extreme.

1:5 SUMMING UP:

The Triple Miracle of Europe

I have argued that to explain the 'Rise', 'Advantage' or 'Miracle' of Europe we have three distinct questions to answer:

1. *How could Europe conquer the world?*
2. *Why and how did sustained, long-term growth develop to become the foundation of society and why did this happen in Europe?*
3. *How come public participation in the selection of authorities developed and successively widened to eventually encompass the whole population - and why did this also happen in Europe?*

We can immediately notice a certain asymmetry between the miracles: the miracle of conquest refers directly to the relation between Europe and the rest of the world, while the other two refer to (apparently) internal processes⁵². There is another asymmetry distinguishing the first two miracles, which refer to objective advantages in the military/political and economic areas, from the more subjectively defined achievement of democracy which does not automatically entail any superiority in international competition.

A possible line of argument would be to claim that democracy leads to stronger forces of cohesion in a society, and in that way confers a superior strength upon the democratic states *vis-à-vis* non-democracies. Unfortunately this hope-inspiring argument hardly holds up to scrutiny, even though the eventual triumph of democracy all over Europe as a culmination of the whole modernization process would seem to imply some kind of long-run relationship between:

- (1) a state tenable under military competition,
- (2) an economy capable of encouraging and sustaining productivity growth, and
- (3) a political system conferring legitimacy in the eyes of the citizens⁵³.

The impossibility of giving a strictly objective definition of democracy weakens the case, and it is further undermined by the disappointing fact that the degree of state legitimacy as subjectively perceived by the citizens (or subjects), and as an incentive for them to willingly risk their lives in its defence, shows no appreciable correlation with the formal definitions of a democratic

⁵²The question of whether growth and/or democracy may be in some sense contingent upon world conquest will have to be considered later.

⁵³Note that these three aspects coincide with the typical Weberian categories of power: political power (conventionally defined by military strength), economic power and ideological power (better: *normative* power, to follow the suggestion of Poggi 1990:4).

polity⁵⁴. In the absence both of an objectively valid definition of democracy, and of a convincing argument for identifying subjectively cohesive power (“legitimacy” or “normative consensus”) with democracy however defined, I will use Hirschmann’s less absolute concept ‘Voice’ to denote the miracle or tendencies toward it.

Democracy in the full sense might be subdivided into four factors:

1. *Inclusion* 2. *Equality* 3. *Responsibility* and 4. *Efficiency*.

If (1) all of the population are not included in the system, if (2) all of them don’t carry the same weight in the forms of decision-making, if (3) the leadership do not carry full responsibility towards those it represents or if (4) the procedures for decisionmaking do distort the opinions they are supposed to transmit - or the premises for forming relevant opinions - then we do not have democracy in the ‘full’, ideal sense⁵⁵. The variable most difficult to assess is obviously the last one - efficiency. ‘Legitimacy’ can be interpreted as a reflection of whether the population considers the efficiency of democracy adequate or not.

The degree of *inclusion* into the political system corresponds to the *extent* of voice; otherwise the vocabulary remains unchanged.

⁵⁴Otherwise we would have no instances of dictatorial rule established as a consequence of democratic elections, as in the Third Reich, and we would also have to explain why Danes did not fight more valiantly than Japanese during World War II.

⁵⁵This definition is of course nothing but an asymptotic ideal, and, as I just argued, like all alternative definitions it cannot be applied with objectivity. The advantage, for my purposes, of this particular formulation, is that it admits separation between factors that are amenable to objective assessment, and those that aren’t. Putnam 1993 attempts to measure the elusive efficiency factor through interviews and comparisons between stated goals and objective results. (cf ch.3: measuring performance). The high degree of consistency in his results suggests that the efficiency factor corresponds to objective realities. Dahl’s distinction between the two dimensions of *participation* and *contestation* is analytically very useful, but the very concept of Voice includes the notion that those who have voice, can contest. Participation can - in a narrow interpretation - be equated with inclusion (or ‘inclusiveness’, as Dahl does in 1971:7), or - more widely understood - with inclusion as modified by degree of equality and efficiency. However, Dahl uses these concepts to define the more limited real-life occurrence of *polyarchy*, and states that ‘democracy may involve more dimensions than [these] two’ (p8). Rueschemeyer *et al* employ a three-dimensional definition: (1) universal suffrage, (2) responsibility of state, and (3) civil rights and freedoms; (1) comprises my first two categories, while (3) are conditions for efficiency. As I do not believe that even the fullest civil rights and freedoms can *guarantee* efficiency, I prefer to employ an openly subjective definition for that dimension.

I:6 EXCURSUS: *Why stop at Three Miracles?*

There are, of course, other aspects of European history that might also be considered 'unique'. A Weberian would, for example, claim *rationality* to be the central problematic and might point to the particular European development of the modern state, or to the varying roles of religion and ideology as more fundamentally important lines of inquiry. *That*, however, is just the point. With a pre-chosen theoretical paradigm the problem is posed *in those terms which that particular theory is designed to handle*. I attempt to approach the question 'Why Europe?' with a mind open enough to consider the debate in as full a scope as is manageable, starting from the most wide-ranging synthetic perspectives. My point of reference is the double perspective of Sweden as part of Europe and Europe including Sweden. To also choose a preconceived theoretical or methodological point of departure would be to introduce a rival organizing and demarcational principle, limiting the range of relevance for what conclusions I might be able to reach.

'Rationality' is a proposed *answer* - like 'truck and barter' or 'class struggle'. I would want to know: *What* particular kind of rationality, truck and barter or class struggle, in *what* particular subprocess within the totality constituting the European advantage? The provisional theoretical agnosticism I impose on myself in an attempt to do justice to a wide range of attempts at theoretical synthesis is neither a form of naïvete, nor a 'chickening out'⁵⁶ Theoretically innocent 'facts' are not easy to find, but *I believe that the 'interparadigmatic' debates over the 'Rise' of Europe have created enough of a common ground to accommodate the kind of discourse I want to pursue* - to keep the the larger debate going while at the same time discussing how developments in one part of the definitional area relate to the entire problem complex.

Thus I want to subdivide Weber's 'Old Question' into questions of equal importance to have answered, not into stages of a preconceived explanation. To equate 'Conquest' with colonialism, 'Growth' with capitalism, and 'Voice' with constitutional procedure, would in my view be to mix up questions with answers. The modern nation-state is obviously part of the explanation for Conquest and it is also the very context within which Voice has evolved. I cannot, however, find anything particularly 'miraculous' about this state *per se*. 'Rationality' in a wider sense is by no means limited to the Western world or to the period of the 'Rise', and if we start to specify *what* kind of rational-

⁵⁶That I would any day choose the egalitarian stance of Marx over the elitism of Weber or the complacent self-interest of Smith, is just an even stronger argument for avoiding premature conclusions about the validity of their theories - or their followers' theories. Reiterating the trajectory of dogmatization is hardly amenable to attempts at 'understanding the world' - and even less to 'changing it'. Self-delusion would be a far more likely outcome.

ity, we get entangled in all of the three 'miraculous' subproblems. Between them, I would expect that all of the aspects necessary for delimiting a specifically 'Western' form of rationality⁵⁷ would be covered.

Likewise, I expect that ideological development would enter into the arguments on many decisive points, but I can see no reason for formulating more than three 'miraculous' problematics. On the other hand I can see no way of reducing the number, except by taking some 'boldly' reductionist standpoint. At this stage of the debate, though, I suspect that reductionisms have already delivered their contributions.

Thus I maintain that there are three 'miracles' to explain:

Conquest, Growth and Voice.

⁵⁷Or, alternatively: all the aspects necessary for *rejecting* the concept of a specifically 'Western' form of rationality.

PART TWO: THE THEORIES

II:0.1 *The early 70's*

- a time to grasp for wide-ranging explanations

Most of the theories to be considered here belong to the 'sudden wave of new attempts at explanatory synthesis in the early seventies' I mentioned in the beginning of part one:

North-Thomas' *Rise of the Western World* (1973), Anderson's *Passages from Antiquity to Feudalism* and *Lineages of the Absolutist State* (1974a,b), Wallerstein's *The Modern World-System* (1974), Tilly's *The Formation of National States in Western Europe* (Tilly (ed) 1975; based on seminars held in 1970 and 1971), and Brenner's *Agrarian Class Structure and Economic Development in Pre-Industrial Europe* (first published in 1976; an earlier version was delivered to seminars in 1974). The actual timespan between the original studies is so short that they hardly even mention each other's theories except in a few final editorial additions⁵⁸

This is a very important aspect, as the five approaches are *parallell attempts* to address what is fundamentally the same problem, but through applying widely contrasting perspectives and methods. Still there is a considerable potential for compatibility between the models, as their theoretical foundations are largely built upon various combinations of Smith, Marx, Weber and - in some cases - Hintze, and their factual bases derive from similar lists of sources⁵⁹. Moreover, in the further development of the various models - and in all of these cases I consider additions published well into the 90's - these theorists have had considerable influence on each other, at least through an awareness of the competition.

As the aspect of democracy is not really discussed by these authors - excepting a recent and quite tentative article by North (1993) - I have added

⁵⁸Brenner has a short footnote criticism of North-Thomas, and Tilly mentions Wallerstein in his introduction and conclusion. Wallerstein is the only one to make positive use of concepts and discussions from the other theorists - transaction cost arguments from North-Thomas' 1970 theoretical article, and the concept of 'stateness' from draft copies of Tilly's chapters for the 1975 anthology.

⁵⁹Barraclough, Bloch, Blum, Cipolla, Dobb, Duby, Lane, Postan, Schlicher van Bath and Tawney figure prominently in almost all of the accounts, as well as, everywhere Sweden is mentioned: Roberts and Heckscher. Among the theorists Weber and Hintze have hardly influenced Brenner at all, except maybe through Weber's concept of patrimonialism, and Smith's influence on Anderson or Tilly must be negligible.

Barrington Moore (1966)⁶⁰ to the list of relevant models. His approach is also valuable here because different authors have tried to apply his model to Sweden, or revise it to incorporate the Swedish route⁶¹. I will also to some extent consider those attempts, of course.

Expounding these different theories, I will begin by discerning two fundamental explanatory dimensions:

- (1) the '*trajectory*' aspect - *i e* the actual single-society chains of events and developments that finally resulted in those particular states we encounter at the point in time our analysis refers to.
- (2) the '*system*' aspect - here confined to the supranational level: a system of states and/or a trans-societal system of economic interconnections.

As long as the general development is seen as one-dimensional, as in simplistic versions of modernization theory or historical materialism, it just provides a blueprint for analyzing the individual trajectory of any country. When we have to admit that all societies are not necessarily travelling in the same direction the relations between system and single trajectory become considerably more complex.

II:0.2 Trajectories and systems *- a preliminary survey*

Moore groups the dominant trajectories into 'routes' leading to different forms of society (democracy or dictatorship of either a fascist or a communist type), but does not bring the system level into the discussion except in one - admittedly very important - aspect: the temporal order of the modernizations of different countries.

North and Thomas 1973 take world market formation into account as a matter of course, and also take notice of the role played by military rivalry in the emergence of modern Europe. Still, these are secondary features and do not yet lead to much theoretical reflection. Market relationships are not problematized and the emphasis falls on endogenous removal or persistence of obstacles to growth. In *North's* later development of this theory, these factors are pursued much farther and he has recently (1993b) also adopted *Jones'* view of state-system development.

The full emphasis on system dynamics does not appear until *Anderson's* and *Wallerstein's* macrohistorical projects are both launched in 1974.

⁶⁰Quotes are from the British edition, Moore 1967.

⁶¹Tilton 1974, Katzenstein 1985, Stephens 1989, Winberg 1990, Downing 1992, Aronsson 1992.

Anderson pays close attention to the specificity of individual trajectories, while at the same time making broad generalizations and discerning crucial conceptual subdivisions. The general character of his proposed system is a system of military redistribution, based on the 'feudal dynamic' of a productivity-raising tug-of-war between lords and peasants about the control over the agricultural surplus. Through identifying 'extra-economic coercion' as the *economic* foundation of feudalism (and the centralized version of it, that he considers absolutism to be) he has succeeded to find a formula for integrating economics and politics (maybe at the price of complicating the question of transition to capitalism beyond disentanglement, as his projected third volume on bourgeois revolutions has not yet appeared, although now twenty years have gone by since the publication of the first two parts).

To *Wallerstein*, on the other hand, the balance between individual trajectory and the system as a whole, or between economic factors and political, are not allowed to present any problem. The system as a whole has absolute priority in his analysis, where individual trajectories are but movements between different positions in the system, and economic and military/political power are treated as definitionally congruent. The descriptive force of his holistic model (the 'Modern World-system') derives from the square identification of the process of conquest with the creation of the modern world.

As the division of wealth and power in the world of today still bears an uncomfortable resemblance to the division of roles within the drama of world conquest, his model cannot be lightly dismissed, despite its lacunae - the miracles of Growth and Voice are treated as epiphenomena by postulate - and even if the European (in the wide sense) dominance has eroded somewhat in recent years, his model is still the only one with a built-in mechanism for rise and fall within the system, and should thus in principle be capable of accommodating any "rises and falls of great powers".

Tilly started out propagating a state-building paradigm with warfare providing the motive force and taxation systems the mechanisms for transforming the economy, but has successively refined it into a two-sided war-and-trade model contrasting 'capital-intensive trajectories' with 'coercion-intensive' ones, and making them converge through a competitive warfare system.

Brenner's model is basically a typology of endogenous trajectories, primarily determined by class and property relations, although his research on the role of merchants in the English revolution⁶² suggests that a key role may still be necessary for exogenous factors.

After this brief introductory overview, I will describe the contending approaches one by one, emphasizing:

⁶²The latest version of his argument is summed up in Brenner 1993.

- *Their explanations for the European advantage*
- *Their viewpoints concerning the dynamics of the system, and the relations between Conquest, Growth and Voice.*
- *Typologies of trajectories, and the defining features of these, with special notice taken of the divergence between the Eastern and Western halves of Europe, and between England and France.*
- *The place for Sweden - if any - within the model.*

I will continue discussing these theorists in the rough chronological order of their first interventions into the debate, that is: as above.

II:1 BARRINGTON MOORE:

Political Destinies and Social Origins

II:1.1 The agrarian foundations of modernity.

Barrington Moore (1966) tries to analyze the emergence of modern society and the wide divergence of resultant political systems in the major countries. As he regards the transformation of agrarian societies into industrial ones as the basic content of modernization (xi), he draws attention to the structure of agrarian society and the conditions under which it is transformed, as the key to the divergence between different variants of modern industrial society. This means focusing on the roles of 'Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World' (the subtitle of 'Social Origins'), rather than on urban classes:

'We seek to understand the role of the landed upper classes and the peasants in the bourgeois revolutions leading to capitalist democracy, the abortive bourgeois revolutions leading to fascism, and the peasant revolutions leading to communism. The ways in which the landed upper classes and the peasants reacted to the challenge of commercial agriculture were decisive factors in determining the political outcome.'(xvii)

As some form of commercialization of agriculture seems to be the more or less unavoidable shape, which any 'transformation of an agrarian society' into one compatible with industrialization will have to take (the theoretically possible road of a state-led organization of agriculture coordinating it with an industrial sector without market production playing any significant role in the process, has so far hardly proved to be a convincing alternative), the significance of Moore's approach should be obvious, as well as the importance of his questions concerning the genesis of political systems.

The time of appearance of his analysis puts him halfway between conventional modernization theories, and the "new syntheses" of the early seventies. Where the neo-synthesists start from the realization that extra-European modernization is not simply a delayed repetition of Europe's development (and go on to draw quite diverging conclusions from this) Moore is still posing the question. In his endeavour to encompass European and Asian developments he identifies Germany and Japan as parallel cases⁶³

⁶³An interesting parallel comparison from a Japanese historian can be found in Takahashi's discussion of Marx' concept of 'two roads to capitalism' in his 1952 intervention in the Dobb-Sweezy debate (Hilton(ed)1978). In a totally different context, the present-day economic systems of Japan and Western Germany have been compared as typifying a 'pattern of economic action' described as 'institutional co-operation', in contrast to 'the laissez-faire economies of Great Britain and the United States, the family entrepreneurship economies of Italy and Taiwan, and the state-

and China as following the same route as Russia. The serious problems appear with India as an Asian example of the democratic path.

The 'fourth pattern' of incomplete modernization he has to devise for the Indian case is an admission of the problem that will continue to provoke several new macrohistorical analyses within less than a decade. In my term it might be phrased like this: *Why has the combination of Growth and Voice been possible to extend outside the continent of Conquest only in a very weak form?* Moore himself offers no explanation for this - he analyzes and defines the European road to democracy, and leaves the fate of India an open question, which is an important reason why his model is not yet obsolete and still invites attempts at revisions. These we will have cause to return to.

First, though, Moore's own theory:

II:1.2 The Three Routes to Modern Society

1. *The bourgeois revolutionary route*, leading to the combination of capitalism and political democracy. There are two or three variants: either the peasants are eliminated and landowners join the bourgeoisie in commercializing agriculture, as in England, or else the landowners oppose this development and are eliminated, as in France. The US turns out to be something of a mixed case: the landowning and slaveholding elite in the South are defeated in the Civil War⁶⁴, a bit like the French case; as the Northern bourgeoisie allies itself to the Western farmers, the outcome will more or less coincide with the English. If an alliance between slaveholders and Northern industrialists had taken place instead, the result would have been a 'reactionary alliance' like in Prussia.

2. *The reactionary capitalist route* leading to a 'revolution from above', is typified by Germany and Japan. A bourgeoisie too weak to take power by itself⁶⁵ allies itself as a junior partner to the 'militarized fusion of royal bureaucracy and landed aristocracy'(436). This 'reactionary alliance' between landowners and bourgeoisie, amounts to a common front against peasants and workers. If this coalition is economically successful, a 'semiparliamentary' authoritarian regime develops, and, if successful enough, a 'conservative modernization' is carried through as a 'revolution from above'. This means removing "feudal" obstacles to industrialization', and to the extent it leads to democracy, this will be a weak and unstable democracy unable to withstand

orchestrated economies of France and India'(Orrù 1993)

⁶⁴The real democratic revolution, according to Moore, who claims that the original anti-English Revolution 'did not result in any fundamental changes in the structure of society'(112)

⁶⁵In one of the most condensed versions of Moore's argument 'abortive bourgeois revolutions'(xvii) is said to lead to fascism.

the challenge of fascism, which is essentially the mass alternative to democracy of a 'reactionary alliance' increasingly dependent upon militarism.

3. *The revolutionary communist route* is a result of the double failure of the two earlier routes. If the bourgeoisie is not only too weak to seize power on its own, but even too weak to be of much use as an ally for the landed classes, then reactionary movements (the 'Black Hundreds' or the Kuomintang) won't be successful either as modernizers, nor in establishing a mass base among those threatened by modernization. This means peasant resistance to traditional exploitation will remain the strongest threat to the stability of the society, and when a peasant revolution is exploited by disappointed modernizers, as in Russia or China, it has resulted in a communist regime, proceeding to 'make the peasants its primary victims'(xvi) by carrying through a radical version of 'modernization from above'.

4. A '*fourth general pattern*' with only a '*weak impulse toward modernization*' is found in India, where no revolutionary transformation has been carried through, neither from below nor from above. This is partly due to the inheritance from Mogul India, leaving little room for the development of a strong trading class or an independent aristocracy, and partly to the British rule, which pre-empted the reactionary solution through its own alliance with the landed upper classes, but without any ambition to modernize. Instead it enforced free trade to the advantage of British export, stunting handicrafts and generating urban resentment. The anti-British movement therefore could develop a democratic ideology, and neither repression nor revolutionary resistance has ensued. On the other hand, neither has democracy been successful in transforming society, but has rather conserved existing deadlocks. Thus: democracy but no real modernization.

Map 1: Moore's three roads to modernity plus residual categories




Chart 3: Moore's three roads to modernity plus residual categories

<p>I. BOURGEOIS REVOLUTIONARY ROUTE <i>Democracy through revolutionary break with royal authority</i></p>	<p>I A. PEASANT ELIMINATION ENGLAND: Landlords evict peasants and take up commercial agriculture in co-operation with bourgeoisie. Through parliament their alliance opposes royal 'interference with the landlord's property rights' (17), culminating in revolution. The USA converges with this path through a very different trajectory</p> <p>I B. NOBILITY ELIMINATION FRANCE: Agricultural commercialization parasitic on peasant production plus feudalization of bourgeoisie stifle economic progress and undermine state authority, culminating in a revolution leading to an unstable combination of capitalism and peasant society. (105-108)</p>
<p><i>(theoretically unassimilated category)</i></p>	<p>I C. PEASANT COMMERCIALIZATION SCANDINAVIA, SWITZERLAND, 'THE LOW COUNTRIES'</p>
<p>II. REACTIONARY CAPITALIST ROUTE <i>Revolutions from above lead to Fascist dictatorship (unfulfilled revolution)</i></p>	<p>II A. FASCIST MODERNIZATION GERMANY, JAPAN, ITALY, (SPAIN?) Agricultural commercialization through reactionary alliance between landlords and (weaker) bourgeoisie using state power to control peasants and workers.</p> <p>II B. AUTHORITARIAN STAGNATION (SPAIN?), POLAND, RUMANIA, HUNGARY, GREECE</p>
<p>III. REVOLUTIONARY COMMUNIST ROUTE <i>Peasant revolutions lead to Communist dictatorship</i></p>	<p>USSR, CHINA With a bourgeoisie too weak and a landed élite too conservative to commercialize agriculture, a reactionary coalition fails to achieve both development and a mass following; radical modernizers exploit revolutionary sentiments among peasants, who become the primary victims of the revolution.</p>
<p>IV. UNFULFILLED MODERNIZATION <i>No revolution from below or above</i></p>	<p>INDIA Formal democracy introduced despite insufficient commercialization of agriculture. As landed élite was compromised by its collaboration with the British, this both weakened it and prevented a reactionary alliance with urban classes. Thus no basis for a fascist-type development, nor any need to revolt to prevent it.</p>

Residual Categories

As observed in part I, Moore argues against having to consider the trajectories of 'smaller countries', although he still has a need for "peasant commercialization" route as an analytical category when discussing the whole spectrum of possible developments. There (422) he briefly outlines a road where 'peasants have become part of democratic systems by taking up fairly specialized forms of commercial farming, mainly dairy products, for the town markets'. Scandinavia and Switzerland are referred to as examples, and in the introduction 'the Low Countries' are added to a similar list (xii), which makes it appear somewhat puzzling that in the same context, and as an explicit contrast to this "peasant road", he keeps insisting that 'By and large, the elimination of the peasant question through the transformation of the peasantry into some other kind of social formation appears to augur best for democracy'.

That he considers the political instability of democracy during large parts of the post-revolutionary history of France to be due to the survival of the peasantry as a social class he has stated elsewhere (105-8,426), but in what way has Scandinavian, Swiss or Dutch democracy proved more unstable than English or US-American? The 'anti-peasant bias' he tries to disown in the introduction, is all too obvious to the reader. The existence of a peasantry *has* to signify economic backwardness and the presence of a 'massive reservoir ... to serve the reactionary ends of the landed upper classes', which 'England's "final solution of the peasant question" through the enclosures' saved her from (426). We will have to return to the question of peasant-based modernization, and to Moore's prejudices.

Another residual category only tentatively sketched, is the subcategory of reactionary states that didn't make it all the way through to a revolution from above, but where a more traditionally conservative variant of authoritarian rule led to stagnation instead of modernization (438). Poland, Hungary, Rumania and Greece belong to this group, while Spain hovers on the border toward the countries of true reactionary modernization: Germany, Japan and - less successfully - Italy.

An open question: the post-war world

Moore doesn't discuss post-war democratization at all in his book. An interesting but tantalizing hint is given in a late review article on Japanese peasant struggle, which he ends with a short comment to the effect that democratization in Japan was brought about not by its internal development (*e.g.* the struggles of its peasants), but by the defeat in the Second World War and the American occupation. 'Under certain conditions, defeat in war can act as a substitute for a revolution'(1988). Still, there is no real discussion of the fact that the fascist solution didn't endure, and that route two in the longer run has proved to lead to democracy as well. Today, though, not only

routes from fascism to democracy, but also to 'communism' and from 'communism' to democracy, would have to be considered.

II:1.3 Five conditions for democratic development

In his discussion of India's still unresolved route to modernization, Moore formulates five conditions - based on the discussion of England, France and the US - that he considers necessary for the development of democracy (430-1):

- (1) The development of a balance to avoid too strong a crown or too independent a landed aristocracy
- (2) A turn toward an appropriate form of commercial agriculture either on the part of the landed aristocracy or the peasantry
- (3) The weakening of the landed aristocracy
- (4) The prevention of an aristocratic-bourgeois coalition against the peasantry
- (5) A revolutionary break with the past

I will return to these conditions after discussing the post-Moorean development of this line of inquiry. But first I want to challenge their relevance from a quite different angle.

II:1.4 The dangers of backwardness: a Gerschenkronian undertext

Partly hidden within the argumentation, there is a secondary line of reasoning relating to the timing of industrial breakthrough. The 'reactionary alliance' essential to route 2, is a response to the threat of a growing industrial proletariat *and* to the necessities of standing up to the challenge of world market competition. English development faced very different conditions:

'the English bourgeoisie from the seventeenth through much of the nineteenth century had a maximum stake in human freedom because it was the first bourgeoisie and had not yet brought its foreign and domestic rivals to their full powers' (424).

That France did not develop along a reactionary route is explicitly credited to the Revolution, to the radical urban crowds and to the temporary coincidence of their interests with those of the peasants (109), while the non-appearance of a reactionary coalition between Southern slaveholders and Northern industrialists in the US is ultimately attributed to the civilizational gulf between the South, and the West, whose compatibility with the North was much greater⁶⁶ Still, another perspective also crops up:

⁶⁶In fact, the division into three separate cultures is the key(132-6, 141, 152).

{[Firstly:]} The absence of any strong radical working-class threat to industrial capitalist property in the North. Secondly, the United States had no powerful foreign enemies. In this respect, the situation was entirely different from that facing Germany and Japan, who both experienced their own versions of political modernization crises somewhat later'(140-1).

Thus, distilling a set of conditions for democracy no longer supposed to be valid by 1868-71 obscures an important part of Moore's conception.

*Once again: to be of any possible relevance for present-day modernization and democratization the later transitions to democracy also have to be considered*⁶⁷

II:1.5 Critiques and revisions

Although Moore's model is the oldest one reviewed in this essay, the discussion opened by him is still very much alive. I will consider some⁶⁸ of the later contributions here: Timothy Tilton (1974), because he tries to integrate Sweden; Peter Katzenstein (1985), because he purports to formulate a general path for the residual 'small countries' category; John D. Stephens (1989) because he sums up important criticism and suggests useful emendations. Brian M. Downing's (1992) attempt to integrate the 'military revolution' and the question of absolutism into Moore's problematic, I postpone treatment of until part III, where I will make use of it in the comparative discussion. The other contributions I will discuss in reverse temporal order, as that will allow me to narrow in on the Swedish question.

⁶⁷Compare this perspective to Anderson's discussion in 'The Notion of Bourgeois Revolution' of 'two temporalities' in the series of bourgeois revolutions, where 1848-49 marks the watershed between old-style '[p]olitical alliances against the old order mingling proto-capitalist and pre-capitalist forces' and the 'epoch of revolutions from above' where the political risk of arousing masses now increasingly industrial - and thus potentially anti-capitalist - was no longer to be taken (1992a:116-8). In essence the perspective seems identical, as Moore also calls the American Civil War 'the last revolutionary offensive on the part of what one may legitimately call urban or bourgeois capitalist democracy'(112).

⁶⁸One of the critiques that I will *not* discuss here, is the arguably most influential one - Skocpol 1973 - as she proposes not a revision of categories, but an entirely different perspective. Although her approach might be developed into a fullscale competitor (as suggested in Skocpol 1976), she has not (yet?) done so. Another very interesting contribution which I will not discuss here, is Gale Stokes' 1989 analysis of the 'small countries' of Eastern Europe. Any full-scale revision of Moore would have to come to terms at least with Czech democratic development (briefly discussed also by Stephens as a 'counterfactual' to the Austrian case), as well as the typical examples of the 'authoritarian stagnation' subvariant: Poland (not treated by Stokes), Hungary and Rumania.

II:1.6 John D. Stephens: revising the reactionary route

Stephens (1989) attempts to test the validity of Moore's argument through comparing the instances of democratic breakdown in Western Europe 1870-1939 with those countries that did remain democratic, applying Moore's criteria to the cases discussed. He also discusses the factual basis for Moore's analyses, and sums up important criticisms. Rueschemeyer, Stephens and Stephens (1992) includes this article and extends the analysis to a larger number of countries, and to a higher level of generalization. Here I will only refer to Stephens 1989, though, as the points I want to discuss are already present there⁶⁹.

1. Moore overrates bourgeois contributions to democratic development and neglects the crucial importance of working-class demands for universal suffrage (cf Therborn 1977; further developed in Rueschemeyer *et al*).

2. Moore follows the conventional misrepresentation of the German bourgeoisie as 'supine' and politically dominated by the Junkers. However, Stephens concludes, this 'reactionary coalition' was perfectly compatible with bourgeois interests and in fact the initiative would rather have come from the bourgeoisie (references to Blackbourn, Eley, Calleo).

3. Stephens claims that Moore's thesis has to be revised in the case of modernization, as neither Spain nor Austria carried through any 'revolutions from above'. Moore himself, however, is also doubtful about modernizing tendencies in Spain, and suggests the residual 'authoritarian stagnation' category as an alternative. Austria is not mentioned, and might also be a borderline case, although its "failure" can be questioned. Stephens also rejects the label 'fascist' for the authoritarian regimes of these countries. Moore's equation of authoritarian capitalism with fascism is, however, tied to the 'revolution from above' analysis.⁷⁰

⁶⁹Important additions in (1992) are the concept of democracy as advanced by the *contradictions* of capitalism, rather than by 'the capitalist market or capitalists as the new dominant force' (7, 302) and the reconceptualization of 'Moore's "labor repressive" landlords as "landlords dependent on a large supply of cheap labor".(288)

⁷⁰Cf Mann 1993:333f - the 'failure' of Austrian-Hungarian modernization is also questioned by Stephens himself. Stephens also discusses Skocpol's criticism (1973) that Moore neglects state 'strength' as a necessary variable, and concludes that this is only required if the reactionary coalition tried to carry out a "revolution from above", a project of rapid economic development (1073). This is exactly what Moore discusses, though, and the difference between 'fascist modernization' and 'authoritarian stagnation' should be observed. Stephens' assertion that only Germany fully meets the criteria neglects Japan, and Moore never claims a full-scale reactionary modernization for any other countries - Italy is considered an only partial success, and Spain is explicitly treated as a borderline case - even less successful but not as obviously stagnant as Poland, Hungary and Rumania. Stephens' ambiguous analysis of Austria might imply a position similar to either Italy or Spain)

4. Stephens' analysis confirms that 'late industrialization in [Germany, Italy, Spain and Austria] was associated with tariff policies and state intervention in the economy that facilitated the formation or strengthening of Moore's landlord-state-bourgeoisie coalition, and in case this was further reinforced by an armaments policy that made heavy industry very dependent on the state and imperialistic policies' (1070), and in Stephens' reinterpretation, this provides an alternative to Moore's 'bourgeois dependence on landlords' argument: *the bourgeoisie had solid economic reasons to choose a reactionary coalition rather than push for a democratic development.*

Small countries - a homogenous group?

In the table where Stephens compares 'social and historical factors leading to authoritarianism' for the countries discussed, the 'small countries' are treated as a homogeneous group, with no differentiation recorded on any of the criteria. There are several questionable points in this list:

(1) A politically significant landed upper class, historically engaged in labour-repressive agriculture, existed at least in Denmark⁷¹

(2) The bourgeoisie is supposed to have been more politically powerful than the 'landed class' in all of the small countries. As the Swedish bourgeoisie still by the early 20th century lacked an appropriate political party representation, this is hardly correct for Sweden, and probably even less for Denmark⁷².

(3) None of the states is considered to be 'strong'; at least for Sweden, this is doubtful. Of course this depends on the period discussed and, even more, on the definition of strength. However, the strong state evidenced in the present century as well as during the imperial era suggests a continuity of at least potential strength.

(4) No 'revolutionary break with the past' in any of the cases. For Belgium, this is clearly wrong (Palmer 341-57), and also for the Netherlands (*cf* Anderson, Tilly). The discontinuities of Finnish history are drastic enough to qualify for at least one revolutionary break. The case of Sweden I will shortly return to.

⁷¹The labor obligations of peasants in the Danish realm, and especially in Holstein, were possibly the heaviest in all Europe.' (Blum 1978:54)

⁷²Therborn 1989 argues that they therefore had to choose between two inadequate alternatives: The Right was a heterogeneous gathering with 'an eloquent pre-capitalist element of academics, craftsmen, landowners, officers and officials' and the Liberals were 'in most places dominated by either smaller farmers or craftsmen with a radical bent, often engaged in the temperance, dissenter or anti-militarist movements or (in Stockholm) by intellectual radicals, doctrinary parliamentarists and social reformers'.(167; my translation)

II:1.7 Peter Katzenstein's 'democratic corporatism's'

Katzenstein aims to complement Moore's analysis of 'the conditions that favored the emergence of democracy, fascism, and communism in the twentieth century' with an investigation of 'conditions that differentiate democratic corporatism from other forms of democracy' (183). 'Democratic corporatism' is, according to Katzenstein, the form that the political systems in the 'small European states' have had to evolve because of their economic openness and dependence on the world market.(34)

Although it was the experiences of depression, fascism and war during the 30's and 40's that forced this development, it also required historically transmitted conditions enabling these societies to successfully meet the new demands set by the new international context⁷³. Though the countries he discusses correspond to Moore's list of 'small client democracies' (plus Austria), his analysis is not a further specification of the 'peasant commercialization route' hinted at in *Social Origins*. Despite his invocation of Moore, their criteria diverge considerably, and, furthermore, he specifies not one but *two* democratic corporatist routes, with Sweden as an in-between case: liberal and social corporatism.

Two variants - liberal and social corporatism

In both cases a crisis situation forced a political compromise between Center-Right and Left. In liberal corporatist regimes - Switzerland, Belgium and the Netherlands - the 'traditional consociational strategy for coping with conflicts between minorities'(174) was extended to incorporate the Left into the 'culture of compromise' because of 'the threat of war, the war itself, or Nazi occupation'(189). In the social corporatist regimes of Scandinavia, it was the 'increasingly strong labor movement' that had 'prevailed because it [had] constructed successful alliances with farmers' which, in order to deal with the effects of the Depression, opted for a 'truce in class conflict'.(173f,189)

This reflects fundamental differences in the 'historical determinants' that have 'shaped business and labor':

- (1) 'less radical labor movements' (a consequence of early industrialization, which is measured by the size of industrial workforce and industrial production per capita at the turn of the century)
- (2) international orientation (encouraged by 'war avoidance' and/or 'possession of an overseas colonial empire')
- (3) cultural heterogeneity dominating over social division (measured by 'ethnic and linguistic division' and 'religious division').

These factors made for a liberal corporatism, and their opposites for the social variety. Austria after 1945 converged with social corporatism,

⁷³He cites Britain in the 60's and Poland in the 70's as examples of how political systems are not always able to recast themselves in response to changing conditions.

Katzenstein argues with support of his indicators (those mentioned within parentheses above), which are also supposed to show that Sweden tends to fall into an 'intermediate position': 'Its labor movement approximates the pattern of social corporatism, while its business community resembles the pattern of liberal corporatism'(177). The adequacy of his indicators, though, appears to be questionable.⁷⁴

Democratic corporatism - common features

Katzenstein defines democratic corporatism through three distinctive traits:

- (1) an ideology of social partnership expressed at the national level,
- (2) 'a relatively centralized and concentrated system of interest groups', and
- (3) 'voluntary and informal coordination of conflicting objectives through continuous political bargaining between interest groups, state bureaucracies, and political parties'⁷⁵

Central to the formation of this system are the 'cross-class' compromises struck in the 30's. These were made possible by two factors distinguishing the smaller countries from the larger:

- (1) a Right that was 'weaker and more divided', and
- (2) closer 'links between different economic and social sectors' due to export specialization.(137)

⁷⁴Katzenstein's indicators - following the 'expected ranking' with an accuracy of 88% according to his 'detailed pairwise comparison'(181) - do not seem too convincing. The high degree of trade-union militancy in Belgium is an inconsistency throwing doubt both on the causal relationships involved in the explanation and the value of the carefully compiled 'neat rankordering' (for some reason this is crucial to Katzenstein - see 177). His *ad hoc* explanation - focusing on industrial structure - neither saves the credibility of the correlation (among the three 'first generation industrializers', it holds only for the third one - Switzerland) nor of the rankordering. (Belgium's early industrialization is counted into the 88% successful predictions in the rankordering, although this variable enters into the analysis only because of its supposed effect on the degree of radicalism in the labour movement - which is the variable integral to the explanation.) Some of the other variables also seem untrustworthy: the index for 'War avoidance since 1815' is -7 for Switzerland and -3 for Sweden, indicating that Sweden should have been at war at some point during this period; as each negative point represents '25 years of peace and declared neutrality', there are two explanations: either Norway's peaceful secession from the union with Sweden is somehow defined as equivalent to war, or else the absence of a formally declared policy of neutrality is considered to invalidate the effects of peace. Neither explanation inspires much confidence in Katzenstein's use of sources. Similarly, the index for 'possession of an overseas colonial empire', supposed to reflect the importance of the colonies for the extroversion of the economy, is 1.0 for Belgium and 0.3 for the Netherlands. In sharp contrast to this valuation, Bairoch's figures for 1913 (Bairoch 1993) show that the ratio of colonial exports to the exports of the motherlands was 66.6% for the Netherlands against only 1.6 % for Belgium (computed from Table 7.2, p 83)

⁷⁵(32f)these traits make for low-voltage politics', he states, without specifying his standard of comparison. Are US politics more high-voltage?

II:1.8 Timothy Tilton's addition: the 'radical liberal route' of Sweden

Tilton has tried to complement Moore's model with the example of Sweden. Going through Moore's five conditions for the rise of democracy, he considers point (1) - balance between crown and aristocracy - to be amply fulfilled through the strength of each of the two contending hereditary-monarchical and aristocratic-constitutional traditions 'mutually check[ing] any enduring claims to absolute rule' (references to Roberts).

Condition (2) - turn toward commercial agriculture - he finds more questionable as Moore's example of peasant-led commercialization explicitly refers to specialization in dairy products. He argues however, that the function of this condition in Moore's model, is to 'produce a sound economic base for the peasants' rendering them 'impervious to Fascist and Communist appeals'. As the Swedish enclosure movement led to a considerable extension of the rural proletariat, emigration became the Swedish solution to what Moore calls 'the peasant problem'.

Point (3) - a weakening of the landed aristocracy - is provided by the reduction, and by Gustav III:s devaluation of noble privileges 1789, and (4) - prevention of reactionary coalition - is taken more or less for granted through the emergence of new professional categories encroaching on the noble prerogatives.

Condition (5) - the 'revolutionary break with the past' - on the other hand, 'simply does not appear'. There was wide-spread fear of revolution underlying Conservative capitulation for the demands of suffrage reforms, Tilton observes: 'Swedish democracy had triumphed without a revolution, but not without the *threat* of a revolution'. From the Swedish example, he modifies Moore's five conditions to allow for what he defines as the *radical liberal model of democratic development*:

His first three conditions are essentially equivalent to Moore's conditions (1), (3), and (4), while the remaining two hold double, alternative options:

(IV) Elimination of the peasant problem through massive emigration and/or the growth of commercial agriculture as a means of eliminating a financially unstable and politically dangerous peasantry.

(V) In the absence of a revolutionary break, radical reform can substitute under four conditions:

(a) the availability of parliamentary institutions in which concessions can be extracted

- (b) the absence of a professional standing army available for repressive purposes
- (c) the presence of massive unrest and some minor outbreaks of violence
- (d) the conviction among the elite of the possibility of revolution and also of the possibility of a peaceful resolution to grievances⁷⁶

To make evaluation easier I present a chart comparing the different countries in Moore's model with his five conditions, adding two versions of Sweden: in Tilton's interpretation - including his alternative conditions - plus a column expressing possible alternative viewpoints on Swedish conditions. I will only discuss these points quite tentatively, as any real discussion of Sweden's position in the various models would require a much more comprehensive analysis of Swedish history.

Here I am only making a sketch of the theoretical preconditions, but as Moore's and Tilton's models have been challenged by Winberg and Aronsson, I seize the opportunity to list other questionable points as well.

⁷⁶The ruling elements have to have both the *incentive* and the *possibility* to settle affairs short of revolution; they would not grant reforms willingly, but only as the choice of lesser evils

Chart 4: Moore's 'five conditions for democracy' in the countries discussed by him and in Sweden

country:	England	France	USA	India	Japan	Germany	Russia	China	Sweden 1	Sweden 2
condition:									Tilron	alternatives
1 Balance between Crown and Nobility	yes	yes (?)	(irrelevant)	no	no ¹	yes later: no	no ²	no	yes	at times
2 Turn towards a commercial agriculture	lords and farmers (partnership)	lords (parasitic)	planters and farmers	no	lords (parasitic)	lords (manorial)	lords (in parts of Russia)	no	emigration substitutes	manorowners and peasants (transformn?)
3 Weakening of landed upper classes	transformation		1861	yes	no	no		Chinese	1680, 1789	transformation?
4 Prevention of a reactionary coalition	revolutionary coalition 3	1789	- 1865	yes	no	no	1917	revolution	yes	revolutionary coalition?
5 Revolutionary break with the past / revolution fr. above	1641, 1688			no	1868	1867 1871 1945 ⁵			threat of revolution	1680? 1719? 1809? 1865?

1 'Feudalism did arise in Japan, but with heavy stress on loyalty to superiors and a divine ruler. It lacked the conception of an engagement among theoretical equals' (416) cf Anderson's similar discussion of Japanese feudalism!

2 Ivan the terrible 'broke the back of the independent nobility' (416)

3 A coalition between landed aristocracy and a rising bourgeoisie, in opposition to royal bureaucracy and with a certain rivalry as well as economic independence between the groups, would be favorable to the growth of parliamentary democracy. This happened in England, but is unlikely to occur except at an early stage of development. (424f)

4 'Defeat in war can be a substitute for revolutionary change, as well as a prelude thereto. To exaggerate only slightly, it was the atomic bomb and MacArthur's occupation, not the peasants, that broke the shackles of Japan's ancien régime' (Moore 1988:326f)

5 cf the note for Japan

II:1.9 Sweden's place in Moore's typology: *questions to confront*

It would be premature to attempt an analysis of Sweden at this stage: the Moore model can probably not be extended without revision to any other societies than those explicitly analyzed in it. This means that different possible standpoints as to the Swedish case have to be discussed along with the question of what kinds of revision that will be necessary. Here I will only point out some of the complexities that will have to be confronted in the context of the 'five conditions':

1. Sweden's ambiguous position with both a strong constitutional heritage, as the *Ständestaat* lineage of many of its democratic institutions makes obvious, and an absolutist authoritarian heritage.

2. 'The transformation of the peasantry into some other kind of social formation appears to augur best for democracy' Moore argues (422) explicitly *not* referring to Scandinavia; however, there is a widespread if theoretically rather heterogeneous notion of the transformation of the Swedish Estate of Peasants into a class of freeholders (or rather a polarization into a class of agrarian proprietors and a landless agrarian proletariat) which might be interpreted as another 'kind of social formation'. Somewhat different versions of this line of argument are cited against Tilton by Winberg (1990:56,63) and against Moore by Aronsson(343).

As there *was* a turn towards commercial agriculture among the peasants in Sweden - and why would only dairy products count? - I don't really see why the emigration argument has to come in *at this point*. Obviously it is important, but inserting it into an argument based on other factors will hardly help us to evaluate its specific contribution to the development at this time. There *is* a trait of 'peasant elimination', though, in this massive exit, but rather, it seems, of the sub-freeholder stratum of crofters (*cf* Bäck) than of peasants proper⁷⁷.

Substituting emigration for this condition also removes the central variable in Moore's theory. It is the form of agrarian commercialization that most decisively determines the social development, and thus forms a crucial nexus between economic development and political form (i e between Growth and Voice). In this context one of the most important peculiarities of Swedish development is also located: an at least partly peasant-led commercialization neither under a dominating influence of a landed upper class nor under that of a bourgeoisie.

⁷⁷However, we should be wary about too facile equations of peasant status terms from different societies, especially over time.

3. The contention that the landed upper class was not politically dominant in Sweden around the turn of the century would require more careful specification. *What* class could be considered dominant at this time? Hardly the bourgeoisie. (cf Therborn 1989 as cited above). However, the transformations of the traditional nobility and the military corporation may require a thorough reappraisal of the 19th century upper-class structure.

4. Some kind of 'revolutionary coalition' along the lines of Moore's English argument can be envisioned for the proposed 1719 revolutionary break⁷⁸. Per Nyström's 1680 suggestion would require a very different kind of coalition between the royal bureaucracy and the rising bourgeoisie against the aristocracy.

5. Besides the possible revolutionary dates just mentioned, 1809 has been suggested as the year of the Swedish 'bourgeois revolution' by A S Kan, and 1865 is Göran Therborn's suggestion - but as a 'revolution from above' (Therborn 1989:31). If the concept 'bourgeois revolution' is interpreted in the somewhat revisionist sense of 'destroying constraints', rather than 'grasping power'⁷⁹ both of these solutions are worth taking very seriously. Anderson's redefinition of a 'bourgeois revolution' as 'a series of successive ruptures with the existing settlement' (1992a:155f) suggests that the datings may not have to be mutually exclusive.

6. What is actually meant by a 'revolutionary break' in Moore's model, is not altogether obvious. A large part of the post-Moore discussion takes for granted that his 'revolutionary break with the past' has to signify the bourgeoisie wresting social power from the landed upper classes. Strong elements of what Brenner (1993) calls the 'traditional social interpretation' of the English (as well as of the French) Revolution are undoubtedly present, and in the US case Moore's argument is obviously that the 'weakening of the landed aristocracy' through the Civil War (the only "real" American revolution according to Moore) is what makes it a 'revolutionary break'. In the English case, on the other hand, his argument evidently refers to a break with the 'royal absolutism' or 'agrarian bureaucracy' (as landowners and bourgeoisie ally against the crown). In the French case the revolution seems to serve both purposes. As the 'weakening of the landed aristocracy' is already taken care of by condition #3, there seems to be no reason for a further condition unless it has some other significance - *e g* breaking the power of the crown.

⁷⁸1719 is considered among the 'democratic revolutions' of Europe by RR Palmer (1959:31). Michael Roberts (1986:1ff) and Gunnar Artéus (335-7) also consider it a revolution. and Roberts also cites other examples of this viewpoint (1986:59).

⁷⁹Blackbourn-Eley 1984:89. This view is perfectly compatible also with a North-inspired framework: cf Rosenthal 1992.

We can, however, approach the problem from another direction: The result of the revolutionary break should be democracy, and Moore describes this as 'a long and certainly incomplete struggle to do three closely related things: 1) to check arbitrary rulers, 2) to replace arbitrary rules with just and rational ones, and 3) to obtain a share for the underlying population in the making of rules'. (Notice that in this definition, democracy is a *process*, not a goal!)

As this was more or less achieved in Sweden during the Age of Liberty⁸⁰, 1719 should reasonably be considered a revolutionary break. However, the 19th century Swedish regime would maybe rather correspond to his 'semi-parliamentary authoritarianism'. Still it succeeded to make the transition to a stable democracy, instead of to an unstable democracy unable to withstand the challenge of fascism. Stephens argues that the lack of 'an agrarian upper class with an electoral base in the countryside' as a strong enough alliance partner for a reactionary bourgeoisie too weak by itself to effectively resist democratic reform, is what makes Swedish development deviate from German (1047-8). If we also take his Finnish example into consideration, we can see that a smallholding peasantry having 'mobilized autonomously' in the 'absence of a strong landed upper class'(1056) is the crucial factor in this explanation.

If this is valid for Sweden, the decisive factor should be that the peasants were not dispossessed, and the most reasonable explanation for this would seem to be that their social and political position during the Age of Liberty had become so entrenched, that royal autocracy could only regain power through mobilizing peasant resentment against the nobility.

⁸⁰Obviously (1) and (3) were, and the *conditions* for achieving (2) were established. The realization of this goal is much more debatable, but that goes for any democracy.

II:2 DOUGLASS NORTH:

Property Rights and Transaction Costs

II:2.1 From efficient institutions to path dependence

The next approach to be considered is the 'property rights' or 'transaction cost' approach to institutional economic theory as developed by Douglass North. In *'The Rise of the Western World'* (1973) - written together with Robert Thomas - he explained economic growth as the result of efficient institutions. Changes in relative prices - in RWW attributed to population growth as a triggering influence - creates incentives to construct more efficient institutions, particularly better defined property rights, which are seen as the fundamental prerequisite for economic growth.

The basic idea is the simple *homo oeconomicus* assumption that any economic activity has to be rewarding enough in order to be undertaken; what's new is the focus on the preconditions necessary for the benefits to accrue to the same person that makes the choice to undertake that activity - otherwise material incentives will not elicit the responses assumed.

North does not really create any typology of different development paths as Moore, Anderson and other of these theorists do - indeed explaining diversity is the main stumbling-stone of RWW, and his later revisions are primarily motivated by the difficulty of explaining 'the persistence of inefficient institutions'. His examples are - at least before the 90's - strictly limited to 'the Western World', not even Eastern Europe is seriously considered, and his central problem is that even within this rather narrow comparative universe the contrast between Anglo- and Latin American institutions seems inexplicable. The latter seem to be taken over from the Spanish colonizing power, despite their lack of efficiency. How come?

In *'Structure and Change in Economic History'* (1981) he 'abandoned the efficiency view of institutions' and explained the prevalence of inefficient property rights from the observation that 'rulers devised property rights in their own interests', and that this tended to lead to high transaction costs and therefore to an inefficient economy. This change of perspective brought another question into focus: 'Why wouldn't competitive pressures lead to the elimination of inefficient institutions?'

In *'Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance'*(1990) he reformulates his case in terms of 'the difference between institutions and organizations, and the interaction between them' (1990:7). As his central explanatory mechanism for divergence, the concept of 'path dependence' is introduced: the pattern of interaction between organizations ('the players') and institutions ('the rules') becomes self-reinforcing, leading toward greater efficiency, as in the case of England, or conserving inefficient property rights

in a structure of vested interests, as in the cases of Spain or France. The difference between a discussion of individual trajectories as following the logics of their own particular paths, and a cumulation of *ad hoc* explanations is not always easy to pinpoint; although *ad hoc* argumentation still dominates at this point, elements of path-dependence reasoning appear already in the RWW discussion of differential development in the late 17th century: 'winners, like Holland and England, 'also rans' like France, and clear losers such as Spain, Italy and Germany.' (1973:103) Primarily, though, this line of reasoning is found in the discussion of England, which follows the logic of rising efficiency⁸¹

The 1981 discussion of differential development is considerably more sophisticated, and as later developments in general have been concentrated to a more abstract level, I will largely stick to this version in the following exposition. There he explicitly states that 'the nature of the property rights that had developed' was the result of 'the particular way each nation-state developed', especially of how the growing state costs were funded, and that this variance was the reason for 'differential growth' (148). The underlying cause is found in forms of government, and the 'bargaining process' between rulers and constituents. Ultimately, 'the key to future differential development ... within Europe' boils down to the fate of the "representative" bodies (North's quotation marks) with whom the crown had to bargain (Parliaments, Estates General and the like): *whether these bodies succeeded to 'retain this privilege', or whether they lost it*. Three factors are advanced as determinants of relative bargaining strengths, and thus of the direction of the whole development:

- (1) Extent of potential gains to constituents from letting the state take over the protection of property rights (from local authorities or voluntary organizations)
- (2) Ability of rivals of the state to provide the same service
- (3) Cost/benefit structures of the various types of taxation available to each state ⁸²

Essentially, this is an argument linking Voice and Growth, as is made clear in a recent paper where he observes that 'the pioneers of modern economic growth, the Netherlands and England, were also the pioneers in the development of representative government and civil freedoms' (1993b:2). This claim is not really substantiated, as his focus is put on the development of *property* rights, and although the argument that 'well specified and enforced property rights are only secure when political and civil rights are secure'

⁸¹Ekelund-Tollison's 'rent-seeking paradigm' offers a more substantial analysis endorsed by North (1981:149n, 156n). The application of *homo oeconomicus* self-interested postulates to already privileged individuals yields what is in essence a class interest analysis.

⁸²*Op cit* (141). The same factors are present already in 1973:100 and are still emphasized in 1993b:21

(1993b:1) is not to be slighted, a strong position for property owners might as well ensure the same without any wide-spread extension of liberties. Oligarchy can be quite sufficient, and the likelihood of any further development into democracy would have to be argued in closer detail.

Extra-European Conquest is discussed mainly in the context of its negative (!) impact on the development of Spain (see below), but the development of military technology through intereuropean warfare during the late Middle Ages is emphasized as an important factor behind the emergence of nation-states. The argument is that changing military technology - seen as a form of change in relative prices, leading to significant economies of scale - will lead from a competitive equilibrium towards an oligopoly solution. Thus the formation of centralized nation-states is interpreted as a kind of "oligopoly in the protection industry"(1973:94-96,1981:137-9,1993b:6).

II:2.2 Winners or losers - trajectories as game results

There is a strong game-theory flavour to this kind of institutional efficiency theory - organizations are 'players' playing according to the 'rules': 'humanly devised constraints that structure human interaction', *i e* institutions. 'They are composed of formal rules..., informal constraints..., and the enforcement characteristics of both.'(1993a:7) This model is considerably more sophisticated, than any of his applications so far, where the language suggests simpler kinds of games: states are described as 'winners' (the Netherlands and England), 'also-rans' (like France) and 'losers' (Spain, Italy Germany).(1973:103)

France: War-induced chaos makes it necessary to reconstruct the country. The Estates General are called in to vote emergency taxes. Somehow the king acquires the power to go on levying these taxes without repeated consent. Why the Estates General accepted this is not satisfactorily explained⁸³. Rising military costs ('economies of scale') and tax exemption for nobility and clergy ('to neutralize potential rivals') leads to 'trading property rights for taxes' which requires a growing bureaucracy. As regional disparity makes uniform taxation extremely difficult, the crown utilizes the 'already developed infrastructure for raising fiscal revenue' of the guilds. 'The French economy remained regional in nature, and ...gains from a growing market were sacrificed...As a consequence, France did not escape the Malthusian crisis of the seventeenth century.'(148-50)

Spain is a similar case, with the Cortes relinquishing control over taxation⁸⁴, and the granting of monopoly rights becoming the major source of income. External sources of income (Netherlands, Naples, America) makes possible a

⁸³No explanation is offered as to why their 'fervent desire ...[for] end to chaos' should 'outlast the emergency'.(149)

⁸⁴Anderson argues that this was possible because the nobility were not taxed.

huge unproductive sector: church, army, government, in effect discouraging productive activities.

The *Netherlands*, on the other hand, developed into an international market place, where economies of scale in transaction costs encourage the growth of the market, and property rights 'foster[ing] the growth of trade' are protected (and can afford to pay for protection, without too much loss of efficiency!). This argumentation makes sense for describing the mechanisms encouraging growth of centralized market areas, but how did the Netherlands get started on this positive, self-reinforcing road, and how come other market zones - Northern Italy, say - did not develop in a similar way?

The representative assembly - the States General - had a 'make-up' favoring legislation protecting efficient property rights - this reasonably means that an assembly of business people (the States General was an indirect assembly - made up from representatives of local estates assemblies - city-councils, more or less) protects business interests. Was it that prosperity made them too tempting targets for plunder and/or taxation? Then the military defense capacity must be crucial. 'The ever-more exacting demands of Philip II led to the successful revolt of the seven northern provinces', North tells us. It figures.(152-4)

England, finally, is a more surprising case, not having the initial advantage of being a market centre. The Tudors attempted to use the same methods as French kings, 'as opportunistic in their dealings with property rights as any continental king', and eventually it all boils down to the question of Parliamentary power to tax: 'a group whose interests were to halt restrictive practices and ensure private property rights and competition by constraining the powers of the king' had gotten decisive control over taxation.

This is really the crux of the matter: 'the key to future differential patterns of development' in Europe, North has already told us, is the fate of the late medieval representative bodies taking shape during bargaining over the taxation necessary to pay for the rising military costs. 'In some instances [they] retained this privilege; in others, they lost it.'(141) His explanation for the English case is conventional and not very convincing:

- The geographical position insulating it against rivals.

(If the Channel didn't protect France from England, why would it in the other direction?)

- Internally, there were often several contenders for the throne, limiting the power of the king or queen.

(This argument is contrary to the earlier one - is rivalry positive or not? Why is it overcome in one country, but not in the other?)

- The nature of the economy led to a dependence on an export staple, wool, which was easily measured and taxed.

(Why didn't the wool export of Spain produce a similar effect?)

Finally it boils down to the argument that : 'The power to grant property rights increasingly fell [!] to a group whose own interests were best served by private property and elimination of crown monopolies'(154-6) 'Fell', how? Despite all the talk about 'bargaining strength' and a 'shift' in power, the 'effective opposition' from Parliament in the end - as Moore points out - required a revolution and the beheading of a king to ensure that no English king would dare 'to take royal absolutism seriously again' (Moore 1977:16-7) Similarly, without the successful revolt against Philip II ('the first bourgeois revolution', according to Anderson and Tilly), the Dutch merchants would not have been allowed to define their own property rights structure.

Without ever discussing the question of 'bourgeois' revolutions, North's arguments still require that these events took place. The French revolution he never refers to, but his evaluation of the constraints upon the French economy during the *Ancien régime*, makes it obvious that a drastic change was necessary. Closely related to this lacuna in the argumentation, is his ambiguities about class interests⁸⁵.

II:2.3 Where does Eastern Europe come in?

In (1971) and (1973) the manorial system of the Middle Ages is described as a form of 'contractual' relationship. The massive criticism against this rather absurd description (*e g* Kahan 1973, Fenoaltea 1975) made North back off, and in (1981) he instead describes the medieval 'warrior class' as 'analogous to the Mafia in extracting income from the peasantry' (130-1). He does not, however, make any corresponding adjustments in his theory about the effect of demographic change:

In North-Thomas (1971,1973) the rising land/labour ratio during the late medieval crisis was seen as a fundamental cause of the strengthened position of the peasants, as lords compete to attract and retain tenants, lower rents and relax servile obligations. The opposite development occurred in Eastern Europe where the lords instead increased rent pressure and bound the tenants to the soil under the so-called 'second serfdom'. These contradictory developments⁸⁶ were insulated from each other as pertaining to different systems of labour: for the Eastern case, they referred to Evsey Domar's model (coercive labour-systems like slavery and serfdom, correspond to a high land/labour ratio), but maintained that this logic did not apply in Western Europe, as the serf-seigneur relationship was not exploitative, but


⁸⁵J-L Rosenthal (1992) has made an interesting interpretation of the French Revolution as a fundamental revision of property rights structure, published in a series co-edited by North. I will return to the question of North's implicit class considerations in III:2.3.

⁸⁶Emphasized by Dobb, they form the basis of the 'Brenner Paradox' (see below, section VI), pointing out the diametrical contradiction between demographically based explanations for Eastern enserfment and for Western emancipation. A J Field's criticism of North-Thomas parallels Brenner's argument in this respect(1981:190ff).

contractual(1971). Having once abandoned this argument, North is left without any explanation for the divergence and does no longer mention these aspects of it. His only reference to 'the late serfdom in eastern Europe' in (1981) is, though, to Witold Kula's model of the 'feudal economy', where the scattered strips structure in the open-field system is interpreted as a device for monitoring the output and keeping peasant holdings at a minimum size to increase demesne production. This means that the divergence between Eastern and Western Europe can no longer be explained by the presumed given difference⁸⁷ in institutional preconditions, and is instead quietly subsumed under the general contrast between Western Europe and Oriental cultures. North's growing tendency to fall back on traditional cultural explanations (*cf* North 1993b) may have been partly caused by this retreat.

The map below refers to the earlier model.

Map 2: North-Thomas' typology of Europe



⁸⁷Of course *other* given differences might be substituted. North hasn't (yet) done that.

II:2.4 What about Sweden?

Sweden is not mentioned by North, but if we look at the treatment of 'winners and losers' the criterium for success is escaping the Malthusian 17th century crisis⁸⁸. The most fundamental cause of differential development is the survival or destruction of parliamentary control over taxation. As to the question of parliamentary survival versus absolutism, Sweden is a borderline case - undoubtedly one of the absolutist states and undoubtedly possessing a surviving parliament as well⁸⁹.

Of course the crucial aspect in North's model is the incentive structure provided by the institutional constraints of the society - do they minimize the difference between social and individual cost or not? The importance of Estate assemblies and their survival depends on their being the locus for the bargaining process between 'ruler and constituents', in which institutional innovations in the interest of those who stand to gain by efficient property rights, are traded for financial support of the state.

We should therefore be able to evaluate Sweden's position through an assessment of its institutional development. No real check-list of what North considers to be the essential institutional innovations has been presented after the summary relating to 17th century England in (1973)⁹⁰:

- (1) 'the first patent law' (the Statute of Monopolies 1624)
- (2) 'the elimination of many of the remnants of feudal servitude, with the Statute of Tenures' (probably referring either to the Tenures Abolition Act of 1660, or to its 1656 predecessor)
- (3) 'the burgeoning of the joint-stock company, replacing the old regulated company'
- (4) 'the development of the coffee-house, which was a precursor of organized insurance'
- (5) 'the development of the goldsmith into a deposit banker issuing bank notes, discounting bills and providing interest on deposits'
- (6) 'the creation of a central bank'.

With the help of a checklist drawn up by Charles P. Kindleberger in his *Financial History of Western Europe* - where he estimates French financial insti-

⁸⁸ It is hard to find clear-cut statements on whether Sweden underwent such a crisis. De Vries 1976:4-22 is wary of the Malthusian explanation, but counts Sweden into the North-Western European area least affected, and also explicitly excepts Sweden (together with the Dutch Republic) from the general *economic* decline (at least until 1660).

⁸⁹ But note Downing's attempt (*cf* below, section III:2.6) to distinguish between absolutism and the 'populist militarism' of Swedish Caroline absolutism, Dutch Stadhouder rule and (with certain reservations) Cromwell's protectorate.

⁹⁰ North-Weingast 1989 adds conditions for political stability as a guarantee that the positive institutional "rules of the game" will not be overturned by an unrestrained state power.

tutions to lag behind England roughly a hundred years on average - we can make the following tentative comparisons between some of the factors enumerated⁹¹:

Chart 5: Institutional change in England, France and Sweden:

	England	France	Sweden
patent law	1624	1791	1819
abolition of feudal restrictions on property rights in land	1645, 1656, 1660 ⁹²	1789	1680, 1720, 1789 ⁹³
insurance	Lloyd's coffee-house 1680 * 'the big expansion taking place in 1720'	marine: early 18th century fire,life: regularly after 1815 *	marine insurance law 1667 companies, incl. fire: 1730-40's ⁹⁴
widespread use of bank notes	18th century *	after middle of 19th century *	(attempted 1661-4) continuously from 1726
central bank	1694 *	1800 *	1668

⁹¹To make comparison between the dates for when joint-stock companies superseded regulated companies in England, on the one hand, and for when *aktiebolag* companies were established in Sweden (during mid-19th century) would be grossly misleading, as the categories are not comparable. The Encyclopedia Britannica lists four defining features of the modern corporation: (1) Limited liability (2) transferability of shares (3) juridical personality and (4) indefinite duration. As the last legal obstacles to this were not removed until well into the 19th century, even in Britain, the precise property-rights implications of early forms of corporations would have to be assessed much more precisely before any relevant comparison could be made. One maybe overrated but still interesting factor is the early Swedish example of negotiable shareholding in *Stora Kopparbergs Bergslag* already in medieval times.

* Kindleberger 1985

⁹² Halsbury's Laws of England, §318

⁹³ Winberg 1985

⁹⁴ Söderberg 1935:135-7

II:2.5 Institutional discussions of Sweden - Sandberg and Mybrman

Sweden as an 'impoverished sophisticate'?

Kindleberger discusses Sweden only briefly, taking exception to Lars G Sandberg's conception of mid-eighteenth century Sweden as an 'impoverished sophisticate', with 'human capital stocks ... wildly disproportionate to income levels around 1850'⁹⁵ Their difference of opinion centers on the assessment of the banking system around 1850. Kindleberger bases his objection on general statements about the level of development of Swedish banking culled largely from Swedish business historians⁹⁶, while Sandberg, as he emphasizes in his reply, discussed 'sophistication' as compared to relative level of per capita income.

Though Kindleberger based his own criticism against cliometric reassessments of the French economy on the institutional time-lags charted in his table of comparison (see above), he made no real attempt to put the evidence for Sweden into the same context (it certainly doesn't appear to share the 'hundred year lag' imputed to France), and it is a bit surprising that he does not even discuss Sandberg's quantitative support for his thesis.

Inserting Swedish data into Rondo Cameron's survey of the growth of 'comparative financial ratios' (total bank resources relative to national income) against a composite time scale relative to the start of modern economic growth, he shows that whether 1850, 1860 or 1870 is chosen as 'time zero', the Swedish development rate is more impressive than even the

⁹⁵Sandberg 1979:237, Kindleberger 1982, 1985:132f; Sandberg's reply is in (1982a).

⁹⁶And, of course, from Heckscher, who formulated what was to become the conventional view of Swedish economic history so forcefully, that it wasn't seriously challenged until in the last decades. Hammarström's 1956 questioning of the 'medieval' characteristics of Gustavus Vasa's reign had a delayed impact, and the reevaluation of Swedish peasant agriculture during the 18th and 19th centuries (summarized in Winberg 1990) was carried through during the 1970's and -80's. Heckscher's evaluation of Swedish banking might also be due for reassessment: Bredfeldt (1994) has shown that at least during the 17th century the Bank of the Estates (later the *Riksbank*) was not so irrelevant for commercial credit as Heckscher believed, as the owners of ironworks were frequent borrowers and in many cases also depositors.(132-166; E188), taking four times their proportionate share of the loans, which were 3,5-4,7 times the size of other borrowers' loans. (Figures for 1693-5; cf 150). For the end of the next century, the *Riksbank* - together with the 'discount banks' figuring in the Kindleberger-Sandberg exchange - is assessed thus by Sven Fritz (1990:50f): 'In the late eighteenth century, Sweden had got a certainly very small but advanced banking system. Most remarkable is perhaps that the Bank of Sweden to an amazing degree acted as a bankers' bank, thus integrating the organized sector of the credit market and giving it a higher liquidity and capacity than would otherwise have been the case. The considerable deposit business of the discounting firms ... is also surprising in view of the conditions of other comparable Scandinavian and central European countries'.

Japanese and Scottish ones, and 'resembles [Cameron's theoretical optimum of] a logistic curve at least as much' as do the curves of those countries.

As the selection of different years zero 'introduces an element of arbitrariness'(as Cameron himself admits: p307), and the composite time scale compares countries in very different international economic contexts, I will instead transform the comparison into time lags:

Chart 6: Comparative financial ratios - time-lags relative to England-Wales

Time lag (in years) since England-Wales reached the same comparative financial ratio level:

Year:	Sweden	Belgium ⁹⁷	France	Prussia	USA	Japan
1850		75 +				
1855				75		
1860	35					
1865				35		
1870	25 +	25 +	95 -		45 +	100 +
1875						
1880					35 +	
1885						90

(If we instead compare the financial ratios of other countries to Sweden around the turn of the century, we find that countries like the USA, Japan and Austria lag behind Sweden by something like 15-20 years⁹⁸.)

Kindleberger's hundred year time lag for France seems to be supported by this table, but it also shows that Sweden is nowhere near such a level, but much closer to Belgium. If these figures are reliable, Sandberg's case remains convincing.

⁹⁷ Not really comparable as only joint-stock banks are counted; Cameron estimates that including private banks would raise the ratio for 1875 to 'the vicinity of 60 per cent'(303), a level Sweden didn't reach until 1883-4.

⁹⁸The time-lags compared to Sweden are: USA (1897-1901): 14 ± 1 Japan (1898-1902): 18 ± 2 Austria (1901-3): 15 ± 1 . Scotland's development is by far in advance of other countries and its last recorded figure, 80% for 1865, was not approached by Sweden until just before the turn of century. On the other hand, even the US didn't quite reach that level before the second World War.

The more general characterization of Sweden's 'sophistication', especially the exceptional level of early literacy⁹⁹, and the high level of education is not disputed by Kindleberger. Within Sandberg's argumentation, this 'sophistication', is interpreted as a legacy of Sweden's imperial past¹⁰⁰. This also goes for the role of the 'cultural factors' of literacy and a 'very strong "taste" preference' (*i.e.*: not economically motivated) for the 'production and accumulation of human capital'(238). This sophisticated cultural level made the population capable of quick acceptance of new economic institutions, thereby lowering transaction costs (1982a:921 n3 and above). That is also what is measured by Cameron's 'comparative financial ratio' curves, he argues¹⁰¹.

These ideas obviously are important to our discussion, as are also the interesting implications for late industrialization, that he draws, putting the arguments into the context of Gerschenkron's 'relative backwardness' hypothesis. Arguing that 'the large governmental role predicted by Gerschenkron for countries exhibiting a high degree of backwardness' (1979:229) is related to the need for human investment and institutional innovation, and that the 'relatively small role played by government in Swedish industrialization' is a consequence of these factors being in advance of the demands made by industrialization¹⁰². In (1982b) he proposes a revision of Gerschenkron's thesis, by subdividing the concept of

⁹⁹Sandberg 1979:229-31,1982b:687f.

¹⁰⁰Eighteenth and Nineteenth-century Sweden inherited a set of institutions and a bureaucratic class and tradition that had been created to administer a great seventeenth century empire. Without the Great Power Era, these institutions would not have evolved, at least not at that time' (1979:241).

¹⁰¹Another challenge to his thesis, based on the upward revision of Swedish 19th century GNP figures was posed at the 1990 economic history congress. The criticism is only available through his own report to the congress, but his counterarguments are worth quoting: 'The question is, what would happen if the national income accounts of the other countries were to be subjected to the same kind of scrutiny? Is it credible that *only* the Swedish data, previously thought to be very good, were grossly inaccurate? How was it that the earlier figures showing Sweden to be so relatively poor were accepted without objection when they were produced?'(232-3) If a revision of the other countries would yield similar results, Swedish development would remain exceptional in its quantitative aspects; if not, this would seem to indicate that the *qualitative transformation* of the social and economic condition was exceptional in a comparative perspective.

¹⁰²As far as I understand, he does not claim that these institutional factors 'led' industrial development, only that *they were at hand at the beginning of industrialization so that the process did not have to be unduly retarded by high transaction costs.*(1979:232, 1982a). This means that Fisher-Thurman's (1989) test of Swedish 'financial sophistication', concluding that 'the Swedish financial sector followed rather than led the Swedish economy as it rapidly industrialized'(624) is misdirected; indeed they admit that: 'we have not been able to deal directly with the first proposition, Sandberg's, that Sweden's rapid growth during its industrial take-off was related to the extraordinary relative size and quality of its financial capital stock around 1850' and they 'do, however, feel that the idea has merit and that the Swedish financial sector, although small in size, was indeed sophisticated in 1850'(633).

backwardness into two components: 'poverty' and 'ignorance'. Through a comparison of literacy and income levels in 19th century Europe, he can show that data appear to be compatible with this revised theory: while economic backwardness represents an opportunity for rapid industrialization (provided a lack of natural resources did not inhibit such a process), the ability to make use of this opportunity will be seriously hampered by a lack of human capital, and in those cases heavy government intervention to reduce 'bottlenecks' will be required.

Or as a case of delayed credibility?

Johan Myhrman (1994) has tried to apply North's analysis to Swedish economic development, ascribing it to the enclosure movement, to a growing organizational power and political impact of 'progressive businessmen and farmers', and to three (rather vaguely separated) waves of reforms (1) liberalizing 'exchange activities', (2) diminishing entrepreneurial risk through money-value stabilization and more reliable banking and credit market institutions, and (3) establishing a 'credible commitment' through fundamental law and parliamentary reform.(103f). The last point is emphasized as the most decisive one, as the willingness to make large investment depends on guarantees against confiscation of the resultant profits. This is a somewhat puzzling argument in the context of Sweden in the 1860's. Are we to suppose that potential entrepreneurs were afraid of getting their fortunes confiscated during the first two thirds of that century, and therefore were reluctant to make investments? This analysis - explicitly referring to North-Weingast's analysis of the Glorious Revolution and its consequences - seems to have taken over the whole implicit context of English 17th century conditions along with the theoretical argument.

The crucial importance that North-Weingast attach to 'credible commitment to secure rights' is directly related to the political context: In 1640 the Crown had 'seized £130,000 of bullion which private merchants had placed in the Tower for safety, causing numerous bankruptcies'(812). Although this was 48 years bygone at the time, and a Civil War had removed the monarchy for a large part of the intervening period, the reign of the Stuarts had been restored in 1660, and the pattern of 'political struggle with constituents' tending to result in 'the king's arbitrary encroachment' was repeating itself, while the Crown seemed well on its way to eradicate political opposition through manipulating parliamentary franchise(815). Is there anything in Swedish society during the nineteenth century that would correspond to the quite rational motives to fear for the security of property rights that businessmen held in Restoration England according to North-Weingast?

In several respects, the modernizations of Swedish institutions was delayed, in other ways it was quite precocious, which is the paradox Sandberg is addressing, and which Myhrman skirts by (1) stressing the very latest part of

the reforms as decisive, and (2) emphasizing the role of natural resources¹⁰³ in Sandberg's model, thus being able to bracket him with the 'traditional viewpoint' on Swedish industrialization.

Both of these authors, however, are stuck within the Heckscherian conception of a backward peasant agriculture, and although enclosures and rising agricultural productivity have a crucial position in the very beginning of Myhrman's series of factors(90-2,103) their property rights implications are hardly even discussed¹⁰⁴.

¹⁰³Neither does he do justice to the subtlety of Sandberg's argument, stressing that the *relative international market value* of Sweden's natural resources had been in deep decline until there was 'a large exogenous increase in the international value and economic usefulness' of forests, rivers and the 'enormous deposits of phosphoric iron ore...useless until the development of the basic process in 1878.'(1979:227)

¹⁰⁴An amazingly misleading passage about noble exemption from land tax (64) suggests that he hasn't looked very far into this question; apart from a certain terminological confusion, he seems to claim that the nobility lost this privilege in 1809; what happened in 1809 was only that the last restrictions on selling tax-exempt land to commoners were removed, which transformed tax-exemption into a saleable commodity. The tax-free status of such land remained in effect during the rest of the century.

II:3 PERRY ANDERSON:

State-building as Feudal Centralization

II:3.1 What is the economic basis under feudalism?

In Perry Anderson's synthesis over the specificity of European historical development¹⁰⁵, he attacks the traditional Marxist concept of the feudal mode of production: the diluted definition which describes as feudal just about any society combining large-scale landowning with small-scale peasant production, as long as it isn't based on slavery or wage-labour. Anderson argues that if the theory of modes of production is going to have any explanatory power it has to identify the distinguishing features and dynamics of that particular kind of society which developed into capitalism:

'No historian has yet claimed that industrial capitalism developed spontaneously anywhere else except in Europe and its American extension', and if the economic system preceding capitalism in Europe was common to just about 'the whole land mass from the Atlantic to the Pacific', then this divergence has to be explained through differences in the superstructure, and the dismissal of 'Laws and States' as secondary phenomena is contradicted by the necessity to appeal to them for explanation: 'A colour-blind materialism, incapable of appreciating the real and rich spectrum of diverse social totalities within the same temporal band of history, thus inevitably ends in perverse idealism'. (1974b:403)

The solution Anderson proposes, is that as *all* pre-capitalist modes of production 'extract surplus labour from the immediate producers by means of extra-economic coercion', this means that the different pre-capitalist modes can only be distinguished through the particular form of coercive appropriation and the institutional structure through which it is effected. As Anderson expresses this in terms of the super-structure defining the base he has been widely denounced as an idealist even by Marxists who in practice draw similar conclusions. Today the question of heresy will probably seem irrelevant even to his former critics, but what is more important is to notice the definitions actually included in his model: no wholesale incorporation of 'superstructural' features, but of organizational forms of control over property, labour and power resources¹⁰⁶

¹⁰⁵The *autobiography of Europe* Agnes Heller calls it in her review. (*Telos* 33)

¹⁰⁶This broadening of the concept of what factors are 'economic' can be seen as a parallel on the Marxist side to a similar widening of neo-classic conceptions of 'economic' in the work of North and other neo-institutionalists.

II:3.2 The uniqueness of Europe

The question of Europe's unique development is of course by no means a new problem, but within the Marxist tradition there was a taboo on discussing that matter, as long as traditional historical materialist orthodoxy - stipulating one and only one necessary line of development - held sway. Marx' early attempts to formulate a stagnant 'Asiatic mode of production' contrasting against the European experience had been resurrected as an anti-Sovietic argument by Karl Wittfogel - who used the notion of an 'Oriental despotism' to outdefine Russia from the European history - and was therefore contaminated by reactionary connotations until reintroduced in a less chauvinist context by Marxist anthropologists.

However, the attempt to solve the uniqueness problem by using this concept for a bifurcated development path has stranded due to the contradictory definitions involved in order to fit all of the great non-European civilizations under one label. Anderson writes a scathing obituary of the concept, and makes the appropriate demand that any theoretical conceptualizations of these societies must start from a close scrutiny of each particular historical trajectory in its own right, and not from defining them through their contrasts with Europe: 'It is merely in the night of our ignorance that all alien shapes take on the same hue.'(549)

This offers no escape from the problem itself, though, and Anderson's *motivations* may not be all that far from those advocating the concept of 'asiatism'. He emphatically defines Russia as part of Europe, but on the other hand he makes a sharp master division of Europe's historical trajectories into a Western and an Eastern branch. This division leads to a clear disjunction between the Western development leading through bourgeois anti-feudal revolutions to democracy and the Eastern development, leading through feudal reaction and second serfdom, where the Russian absolutism is not destroyed until the proletarian revolution of 1917, *which thus has no relevance to the prospect of socialism in the West*¹⁰⁷ Eastern Europe is separate and different from Western Europe, but it forms an integral part of Europe and the two halves share a common history.

Still, there is one region outside Europe that qualifies as feudal even in Anderson's sense. Japan is seen as a true feudal society - the claim is backed by Bloch and Boutruche as well as by Marx - although the lack of an ancient heritage made it unable to develop an autochthonous capitalism. Yet the structural parallelity with Europe allowed it to emulate the capitalist system faster and more completely than any other non-European country.

¹⁰⁷This neo-Marxist declaration of independence from Bolshevism is clearly homologous to his propagation of the concept of a 'Western Marxism', forming a heritage parallel to, but separate from, the Comintern tradition, and including Luxemburg, Lukacs and Gramsci.

II:3.3 The division of Europe, the Ancient heritage and the Rise of Capitalism

The proximate source of the division of Europe, determining the contrasting pattern of their modern histories, is the different forms that absolutist state-building took in the two sections. In the West, it was the *internal* development of feudal society, the emancipation of servile peasants and the growing strength of cities, that necessitated a concentration of feudal power, shifting 'politico-legal coercion' upwards, towards the summit of the feudal pyramid. (18-22)

In the East, on the other hand, it was an *external* military pressure brought about by the intensified interfeudal warfare that had escalated up to state level, that forced the Eastern aristocracies to develop 'equivalently centralized state machine[s], to survive' (197-8). This led to the formation of a state-system encompassing both of the halves of Europe, but without making them homogeneous, as can be seen from the contrasting trajectories described above. 'The consequences of the division ... are still with us', as Anderson remarks.(431)

Even if these contrasting processes of absolutist centralization have determined the form of the divergence, they are not the fundamental reason for the division. The different starting-points are the consequences of early medieval development: the original feudal synthesis in the West combined Roman and Germanic institutions into a decentralized poly-structural society, which slowly diffused into Eastern Europe through colonization. However, the heritage from the ancient slave societies and the political and economic institutions created there, only indirectly affected the East, but when feudalism was restructured into absolutism in Western Europe, surviving fragments of the institutional heritage from Antiquity were still available for new syntheses within the multiplicity of interconnected structures that constituted feudal society.

If I'm reading Anderson correctly, the further development of capitalism was also dependent on this exceptionally wide set of available institutional models which was further expanded through the Renaissance. To what extent this matrix of evolutionary possibilities was also diffused to the parts of Europe lacking a direct Ancient heritage - Eastern and Northern Europe - and to what extent later capitalist development in these regions were only imported adaptations onto a still feudal base - as in the case of Japan - Anderson doesn't tell us, as he still hasn't delivered the third volume of his project.

As the independent Western cities are important as loci for the survival of Ancient practices, and Anderson stresses the relative weakness and dependence of those in the East, he probably sees Eastern Europe as an in-between case. In another, weaker form the heritage is there, through the interaction of the

European state-system, while Japan's development is only structurally parallel, but completely separate¹⁰⁸.

II:3.4 The Two-dimensional Divergence of Europe's Feudal Trajectories

The different trajectories of European states described by Anderson diverge in two dimensions: the difference between Western and Eastern Europe discussed above, and the difference between countries where an absolute state was successfully developed, and countries where this did not happen, but a feudal fragmentation survived into the modern era. This gives us four categories, heading for widely contrasting destinies in the era of bourgeois revolutions :

- (1) The successfully formed absolute states of Western Europe were to be 'defeated or overthrown by bourgeois revolutions from below' (Spain (!)¹⁰⁹, England and France)
- (2) The fragmented principalities of those Western areas where absolute states did not develop, were 'eliminated by bourgeois revolutions from above, belatedly.' (Italy, Germany)
- (3) In the East, on the other hand, where absolutism was necessitated by external military threat, failure to develop an absolute state led to annihilation. (Poland)
- (4) The successfully formed Eastern absolute states were to have a longer life, as the whole development in the East was delayed. They were also to face more diverging destinies: Prussia drifted over towards the West through its fusion with Rhine-Westphalia and effected the 'revolution from above' uniting Germany, but Austria - on the contrary 'pushed eastward' through its failure in the Thirty Years' War - was destroyed by nationalist revolutions at the end of the First World War, and Russia by a proletarian revolution.(431).

One country is included in Anderson's discussion without really being integrated into any of the alternatives. Sweden is seen as a kind of in-between case combining weak towns - like in the East, with free peasants - like in the West. Although he concludes that peasant freedom is the dominating variable, and that Sweden thus is incorporated in the West, it doesn't easily fit into category (1) - where is the bourgeois revolution? Göran Therborn¹¹⁰ has

¹⁰⁸Among the developments unique to European feudalism, and absent in Japan, Anderson enumerates the municipal freedom of cities, a separate Church, the Estates system, the development of an absolutist state, the concept of absolute private property and - in general - the phenomenon of the Renaissance (422-8).

¹⁰⁹Spain must be the country 'defeated', by the Dutch revolution which Anderson considers 'the first bourgeois revolution'.

¹¹⁰Who is an important contributor to Anderson's *New Left Review*.

argued that the Swedish Parliamentary Reform of 1866 should be seen as a 'revolution from above'. This may sound more likely, but then Sweden, one of the earliest unified states of Europe and a very successful absolute state, would end up together with the surviving cases of feudal fragmentation.

If we reverse the opinion on East-West implacement we might consider it a parallell to Prussia in some ways, but no class of Junkers can be found, and the survival of parliamentary freedoms make the comparison absurd. Neither is the fate of Poland comparable, by any stretch of imagination. On the contrary, Anderson bestows the role of 'Hammer of the East' on Sweden, being the medium through which the military pressure of Western absolutism is applied to Eastern Europe, and he considers Sweden to have had a decisive formative impact on all the considered Eastern cases. Obviously the situation is even more complex, and Sweden seems to end up in a category all its own. This will have to be investigated.¹¹¹

¹¹¹The further discussion of his account of Sweden is largely adapted from Emilsson 1991.

Map 3: Anderson's European categories





Chart 7: Anderson's typology of feudal trajectories



II:3.5 Sweden according to Anderson - unclear and questionable points:

1. External pressure caused by external pressure: Genesis of the Swedish state

Anderson asserts that 'the emergence of the new state was precipitated from outside'. In 1520, when Christian II's army marches in the opposition is united by 'the prospect of a strong foreign monarchy imposing itself on Sweden'. Under the leadership of Gustavus Vasa Denmark is defeated and he can go on to found a 'stable monarchical state'(173).

Comment: Not only does the Swedish state - supposed to transmit the external military pressure of Western inter-absolutist rivalry onto Eastern Europe - itself arise in response to external pressure, but the picture is further complicated by the source of this pressure, emanating not from any of the original Western absolutisms, but from Denmark. Not only does nationalism appear to be a somewhat anachronist explanation¹¹², and, to the extent that it might have existed, necessary to relate to the preceding 123 years of Scandinavian Union.

Furthermore this entails a *two step mediation* of military pressure, as Christian II:s disintegrating Danish state would hardly fit the description of a 'political apparatus of a more powerful feudal aristocracy, ruling [a] more advanced societ[y]' (197f). Denmark's role would also have to be analysed, and, as Østerud has pointed out, Denmark is as exceptional as Sweden, but in an antithetical way: 'suppressed peasants and growing cities'¹¹³.

2. An absolutism on pre-feudal foundations?

This hybrid absolute state is erected on a foundation which Anderson hesitates to consider feudal, as a 'small-holder peasantry of a pre-feudal type'(178) occupied half of the arable land. Still he concludes that the other half - 'the royal-clerical-noble complex' - was dominant, and that the extraction of dues and services through 'extra-economic coercion' justifies defining it as feudal, despite the lack of serfdom and 'full-scale parcellization of sovereignty'.

¹¹²It was 'foreign to the inmost nature of Absolutism' Anderson asserts, and in the cases where a 'diffuse existence of a popular proto-nationalism' appears - as in Tudor England - it is 'basically a token of bourgeois presence within the polity'(38-9)

¹¹³Rokkan has observed that this opposition can be extended into a tripolar contrast between the three Scandinavian countries: among the three secular Estates, the peasants had a much weaker position in Denmark, the burghers were unusually weak in Sweden, and the nobility in Norway.

Comment: His arguments are not convincing¹¹⁴ and in any case it would be unreasonable to make an analysis of Sweden ignoring half of the arable land and a corresponding part of the population¹¹⁵. If Sweden is to be considered feudal, then tax-paying peasants, i.e. freeholders, must be integrated into the argument - either as part of the feudal society or as a non-feudal element, in which case their role would have to be specified and analysed.

3. An absolutism without motivation?

'Since depression of the peasantry was not practicable', as it was in the East, and 'control of the towns was not arduous', as it was in the West, there was no 'strong internal need for a centralized absolutism', and as the nobility was 'small and compact' without any 'entrenched regional divisions' it could easily adapt itself to centralization. Taken together, this leads to an 'unusually stable' social order, a 'comparatively dormant class configuration', ensuring that Sweden, 'alone in Renaissance Europe', could build its army on conscription.

All in all, this implies a 'fundamental underdetermination of Swedish absolutism'. The absolute state was 'to a certain extent a facultative state' for the nobility, that could 'convert backwards and forwards to it without undue emotion or discomfort'. This leads to a remarkable 'pendular trajectory' between royal autocracy and a 'representative' state-form, where 'the absolute monarchy suffered recurrent reverses whenever there was a royal minority, and yet later regained lost ground no less recurrently'(182-5).

Comment: This 'oscillation' is Anderson's argument for concluding that absolutism was optional to the nobility, but what kind of evidence to the contrary could he possibly demand? That no minorities would occur, or that they would lead to usurpations? Hardly; what he could demand is that central state power would remain in firm grasp of the person maintaining concentrated monarchical power during the Regency, i.e. someone like

¹¹⁴It may be safely assumed that productivity and output were generally higher on the larger noble and royal estates - the normal rule in Europe'. If normal Western European patterns are valid in the Swedish case, is what this discussion really is about, and only a few sentences later he points out that 'Demesne consolidation was very limited'. Surveys of manorial economy tend to refute the "safe assumption" both for Sweden in the 18th century (Magnusson 1980:145) and Normandy 1350-1550 - reasonably an area where 'normal Western European patterns' should be expected to prevail. (Bois 1984:249)

¹¹⁵A stronger case for the dominance of the feudal sector can be inferred from Herlitz' observation that noble and church landowning were dominant in the political core areas, while most of the freeholders were concentrated to northern Sweden and Finland. Excluding Finland, Norrland, Dalecarlia and Bergslagen (the 'mining law' districts) - where more than three quarters of the freeholders lived in 1560 - the figures for that year would be 36% freehold cadastral units against 28% noble, 19,5 % clerical and 9% royal domain (compiled from Forssell 1869, appendix II, pp 24-33).

Mazarin, and that royal power would be restored on majority. That it was, and that Oxenstierna (1632-44) and - maybe less convincingly - De La Gardie (1660-72) did not attempt to redecentralize state power, rather indicates the *strength* of the motive forces behind the absolutist impulse¹¹⁶.

What can be questioned, though, is the 'un-absolute' widened usage of the term pioneered by Anderson, but if we accept it, the fact that the *de facto* (Tudor-like) absolutism of Gustav Vasa steadily kept recurring until the late declaration of *de jure* absolutism in 1680 shows that the motive forces *did* exist throughout this period. Another way of interpreting the 'oscillation', is to say that the strong control apparatus made it possible to maintain state power even under councillor governments¹¹⁷. The internal peacefulness is also highly exaggerated, and the stability of the social order was achieved through repression rather than harmony of interest.¹¹⁸

4. War for no reason?

The military expansion becomes quite difficult to explain, if we follow Anderson's analysis. That an absolutism lacking any endogenous impetus would fulfil its mission as 'hammer of the East' transforming the whole of Eastern Europe as the result of an original impulse from Western European interabsolutist military competition somehow transmitted through Denmark - although the propulsive force from this impulse had already petered out, so that the 'pendulum' had had time to swing back to some kind of aristocratic constitutionalism during Gustavus Adolphus' Regency - this, is a causal chain removed so many steps as to lose any vestige of explanatory force.

Still, *for some reason*, Sweden really did more or less what Anderson claims: flowing out over its borders though poor in men and money, defeating richer and more populous adversaries, revolutionizing warfare, shocking neighbours into forced armament and coercive state-building, in the process conclusively thwarting the traditional pretender to imperial hegemony over Europe. If this is an exaggeration, half of it, or a quarter, would be far too much to explain as pure accident.

Wallerstein (1974:312f), on the contrary, adopts Malowist's contention that it is the poverty and inadequate agricultural resources of Sweden that

¹¹⁶Anderson's comment about Charles XII being 'able to spend eighteen years abroad, nine of them in Turkish captivity, without the civil administration of his country ever being seriously challenged or disrupted in his absence' doesn't quite fit in with his general description either: if anything was 'facultative' to the nobility, it would seem to have been representative government.

¹¹⁷S A Nilsson (1989:38); cf Anderson's notion of a '*concurrent* centralization, both of royal power, and of noble representation' in medieval English development (114).

¹¹⁸The 'liberation struggle' against Denmark was also, and maybe primarily, a civil war between those who considered the Union to serve their own interests and those who didn't. Peasant rebellions were quenched with utter ruthlessness, and capital punishment was used as an efficient deterrent against any form of opposition.

turns her into a 'parasite living on the weakness of her neighbours'. By 'weakness' Malowist means that the 'enormous growth in the power of the nobility' won through the profitable grain export to Western Europe, weakens the power of governments, and thus also of the defence against military aggression. A higher relative exploitability of neighbouring countries might provide enough of an explanation even without the inadequate agriculture component (criticized by Myrdal-Söderberg 1991:486)

5. 'Easy come - easy go'? Donations and reduction.

Anderson's picture of of an ambivalent nobility who can take or leave the absolute state, is closely bound up with his unsatisfactory treatment of the Reduction¹¹⁹ and its prehistory: the extensive donations made especially during Christina's reign. Anderson explain these as caused by the Queen's irresponsibility: 'Her reckless donations were made in peace-time' he points out, and claims that the fact that they could be reclaimed by the Crown with the consent of the nobility through the Reduction, prove that they 'corresponded to no objective need of the monarchy'. Neither were they important to the nobility, he claims: 'Won without effort by the higher aristocracy, they were abandoned without resistance'.(188n23)

Comment: That some of the abalienated crown estates could be retrieved without too damaging consequences for the position and composition of the nobility does not signify that these donations had been unnecessary¹²⁰. Warfare had to be financed, and as war was largely made on credit, the full burden of payment did not appear until peace had come.

6. Sweden between East and West?

Anderson vacillates between on the one hand describing Sweden as an in-between case, and on the other including it among the Western absolutist states. Here I will use key indicators derived from his descriptions of the contrast between the Western and Eastern variants in an attempt to more closely determine Sweden's place in the system:

I. Peasants: free or servile?

Swedish absolutism is neither a 'compensation for the disappearance of serfdom', nor a 'device for the consolidation of serfdom'(195), and therefore

¹¹⁹A 'reduction' in older Swedish political usage signifies a restoration to the Crown of land given in fee to the nobility. When not further specified, the term refers to the great Reduction of Charles XI where he assumed full absolutist power and succeeded to make even the nobility accept a reduction as a lesser evil than loss of the tax-exemption privilege (Ågren 1973).

¹²⁰Sven A Nilsson has criticized the traditional 'moralizing' criticism against the 'prodigality' of Christina's donations. He considers them to be part of 'a system, a way of paying for war service and at the same time binding the nobility to the state.'(1988:22)

the free peasants is not an entirely Western trait: it might as well be a case of Eastern development cut short.

II. Towns: 'Ascendant' or 'subjugated'?

In the West feudalism 'had to adapt' to an 'increasingly urban economy which it did not completely control', while in the East the cities had already been 'curtailed and repressed' by the nobility. The similarity to the Eastern pattern is thus only in appearance, as to the Western on the former point. Though trade had long been of great importance to Sweden, no important city sector had emerged - *within* the country, that is.

III. Control over cities or over the countryside?

In the West it was control over cities that was the 'arduous' problem; in the East control over the countryside, and in particular peasant mobility, was more fundamental. For Sweden, Anderson states that neither objective is imperative, and thus 'the internal urgency of a centralized Absolutism was not great'(181, 206f). As I implied on the former point Sweden was enmeshed into an 'increasingly urban economy which it did not completely control', although this was located outside its borders.

IV. Exogenous or endogenous absolutism?

In the West the causes of absolutism were internal (the "displacement towards the top of the pyramid"); in the East it was caused by an external - military - pressure. Anderson explicitly claims that there was no internal necessity for Swedish absolutism (*cf* above), and that it was 'precipitated from outside'(173).

Still: whether a cause is to be seen as internal or external depends on the how the area of analysis is defined. Sweden and Denmark as separate states might arguably be seen as the *result* of the state-building process culminating in absolutism, rather than a precondition.

V. Degree of militarization

The 'influence of war' on the 'structure [of the Eastern Absolutist State] was even more preponderant than in the West, and took unprecedented forms'(212). As Anderson and others have observed, both Prussian and Russian state and military apparatuses were originally modeled on Swedish examples. The degree of militarization is of course difficult to quantify (but see the facts quoted in I:3.2). However, to judge from Nilsson's description of the reign of Gustavus Adolphus: 'a time of violent exertion, of attempt at total enrolment of the population for fiscal and military efforts and of a next to total depletion of resources' (1973:165; my translation), the influence of war could hardly have been more massive.

VI. Sale of office or service nobility: The 'modes of integration of the nobility into the new bureaucracy created by [the absolute monarchies]' constituted another 'critical difference between the Eastern and Western variants': sale of

offices in the West, service nobility in the East (216-8). This is not easy to determine: although Charles XI's system appears to conform to the description of a service nobility, prefigured in parts already during Gustavus Adolphus, it was also possible to achieve promotion through buying off the earlier holder of the appointment (Artéus 1982:318 n50). Neither system can probably be said to typify 'the nature of the functional relationship between the feudal landowners and the absolutist monarch[y]' of Sweden. The integration of the Swedish nobility into the state was problematic: as 'almost all held some form of office' (Nilsson 1988:25) *there was a potential conflict between a nobleman's interest as a landholder and as an officeholder*. This conflict of interests is probably the main reason why the Reduction was accepted by the nobility - if there was no clear-cut line of division between those who would lose and those who might gain.

II:3.6 Criticism against Anderson

Criticism of Anderson's synthesis¹²¹ has focused on:

- The inconsistency of explaining the rise of capitalism emphasizing absolutism, the Renaissance and Roman Law, when these factors are not very typical for the country that *did* develop capitalism: England¹²². However, as can be inferred from his account of 'the first bourgeois revolution in history'(75): the Dutch revolt against the 'absolutist reforms' of Philip II, no linear endogenous descent of capitalism is being claimed, and this would probably hold for his projected analysis of the English transition as well.

- His teleological tendencies have been widely questioned, most severely by *Hirst*, who insists that the problem of Europe's 'uniqueness' is totally of Anderson's own creation. As Europe developed capitalism first, Anderson has no way of knowing that other parts of the world wouldn't have done it otherwise. Hirst seems to be perfectly certain that they would, though, and appears thus to merely hold a different teleology.

- *Fulbrook-Skocpol* have criticized his contradictory use of the concept of feudalism: on the one hand a 'synthetic, totalizing conception ... closely identified with medieval Europe', and in cross-epoch usage, a more general and partial notion stressing 'private landed noble property and the use of extra-economic coercion to appropriate peasant surpluses'. In order to be able to claim that absolutism was feudal he has to stretch the concept as thin as in the conventional Marxist cross-cultural usage he has criticized.

¹²¹I will not discuss the wide-ranging controversies about his analysis of latter-day British retrogression here.

¹²²The 'weakest and shortest absolutism' according to Anderson himself (1974b:113). Different variants of this criticism has been put forward by Runciman 1980:169f, Østerud 1980:147, and McFarlane 1988:189.

Comment: Anderson's dynamic concept of feudalism implies a shift of emphasis from the composition to the evolution of social structures. 'Feudalism' in his analysis becomes *a category of trajectories* ('destined pathways' in the apt formulation of Fulbrook-Skocpol) rather than a category of societal structures.

Interpreted in this way, the contradiction observed by Fulbrook-Skocpol may be possible to resolve. Even though there is a considerable amount of verbal legerdemain involved in Anderson's alternately generous and restrictive usage of the term, a 'dynamization' of the concept along the lines suggested here would seem to be the interpretation most appropriate to his overall model and maybe to the 'miracle-discussion' as a whole. After all: in the wider historical perspective it is that *type of society which developed into capitalism* - whatever label we may care to put on it - that would be the most important to classify and analyse, and: What Anderson attempts to do is just that.

The teleological traps remain, though.

II:4 IMMANUEL WALLERSTEIN: *Division of Labour as a World System*

II:4.1 *Development theory and global history*

Immanuel Wallerstein's vision of the rise of modern capitalism is as a system of interdependence through the growth of specialization for trade - an emerging international division of labour, where the benefit is not mutual, as in Ricardo's theory of comparative advantages, but asymmetric, as the 'core' countries were complete economies with an internal division of labour and the 'peripheral' areas were drawn into the system as monocultures subservient to the needs of the 'core'.

The key ingredients to his synthesis are - probably not in the order he conceived it, and certainly not in the order he expounds it, but in the order in which I find it most easy to reassemble:

- (1) Marian Malowist's description of early modern Eastern Europe as standing in a 'colonial' relation to Western Europe, with this 'colonial' situation interpreted through:
- (2) Andre Gunder Frank's concept of development and underdevelopment as 'two sides of one coin' and this concept of a system of unequal trade used to resolve:
- (3) the problem of the exogeneity of the trade factor in Sweezy's alternative to Dobb's endogeneous explanation of the rise of capitalism in the *Science and Society* debate through taking the whole trade-connected 'world' as his unit of analysis

finally identifying this unit with

- (4) Fernand Braudel's holistic conception of the totality of the outward-reaching European world and of this world's 'material civilization', whereupon capitalism was to be built.

II:4.2 *Structure as explanation*

This holistic unit of analysis is extremely important, as the definition of the system is almost identical with the analysis and the conclusions: Today's world *is* the extension to the whole planet of the Modern World-System' that took shape somewhere around 1450. The early system shows us the real power structure of today's world and today's world shows us the real significance of the economy of the emerging system. Of the 'three miracles' I want to discuss, only Conquest and Growth have a place in Wallerstein's model, and it's more or less the same place. 'Growth' is the growth of the

system, the extension of the 'world-economy' or system of division of labour. 'Conquest' is just how this extension took place.

This identity between the forcible subjection of the rest of the world, and an economic exploitation holding today's Third World in continued subjection to the Developed World, is inherent in the analysis through a structure designed to describe both systems, and the changing careers of separate countries in the course of the last semi-millennium. Although the structure of the model is static, its constant extension, and the competitive movement between the structural positions, leave plenty of room for dynamics, but put very strict constraints on *what kind of dynamics* that can be accommodated. Most importantly: 'Growth' as growth of productivity, and 'Voice' as an increase in the extent of people included in the definitional base of a society, make no real sense in his model. They are more or less outside the context.

Even if productivity growth "gets a hearing" in vol III through his surveys of the large debates on the 'agricultural revolution' and the 'industrial revolution', and even if the question of 'Voice' is at least touched upon in the similarly charted debate on the French revolution, he dissolves productivity growth into a drawn-out secular development (and thereby into the 'growth of the system') while the entrance of the masses on the stage of Paris turns into the first attempt at anti-systemic revolution, and as such rather the beginning of a struggle not yet resolved, than any breakthrough for the interests of the majorities of this world.

The beginning of the story

Expansion is the key - but in contrast to what he disparagingly refers to as 'schoolboy textbooks' Wallerstein emphasizes the need to supplement scarce necessities during the late medieval crisis, rather than the lust for luxuries, as the crucial impulse. The old and well-established Mediterranean trade networks, and the emerging North Sea-Baltic trade, were eventually connected as Portugal, stretching out into the sea in search of fish, also started colonising the Atlantic islands to grow cereals, sugar, dyes and wine, buying wheat and eventually timber from as far away as the Baltic, while also having links to the old trading cities of Genoa and Venice as well as being a neighbour to the highly monetized Islamic world. (1974:38-52)

Portugal was thus well placed as a spearhead for the expansion that Europe, according to Wallerstein, needed¹²³, and having 'achieved moderate

¹²³Why is not very clear, as 'There was physical room for the population, even the growing population, in Europe' (48). This meant that the land/labour ratio favoured the peasants, which was 'one factor in the decline of seigniorial revenues, in the crisis of feudalism'. How this argument connects to the need for expansion is never properly clarified. Wouldn't internal expansion have lowered the land/labour ratio, and brought about the conditions for the rents to rise again? Evidently the strength of the peasantry is an important factor as they cannot be

political stability at least a century earlier than Spain, France and England' it also had enough internal cohesion to embark upon that course.

This is the beginning of the establishment of the new world-economy, requiring:

- (1) 'an expansion of the geographical size of the world in question'
 - (2) 'the development of variegated methods of labor control for different products and different zones of the world-economy'
 - (3) 'the creation of relatively strong state machineries in what would become the core-states of this capitalist world-economy'
- (38),

where the success of the first point is an important condition for the others. The expansion brought new areas into the system, where more coercive (but less efficient) forms of labour control were being used to produce necessities for the core: slave plantations produced sugar in the Azores and Madeira¹²⁴ and later in the Americas, while wheat was increasingly produced on the large demesnes in eastern Europe using the methods of forced labour usually described as the 'second serfdom'. Wallerstein coins the term 'coerced cash-crop labor' to cover these methods, as well as those used in the Hispano-American *encomienda* and similar systems, used for cattle-breeding and mining.

Thus we have a beginning division of labour, where the production in core areas has been complemented with more exploitative production methods in the peripheries, and the road to a further development into zones of intensive high-wage production and extensive low-wage production, *i e* the 'developed countries' and the 'Third World' of today, has been opened.

East vs West as development of underdevelopment

An important difficulty central to this account, is the reasons for divergence between the eastern and western halves of Europe, having started out with very similar forms of society. Wallerstein argues on the one hand 'in terms of the factors - geographical and social - which accounted for the spurt of western Europe', and on the other 'in terms of specific characteristics of eastern Europe': the weakness of the towns relative to the west - an originally small difference growing into a big one - and the higher degree of vacancy of land.

Wallerstein argues that 'the inclusion of eastern Europe and Hispanic America into a European world-economy in the sixteenth century not only provided capital (through booty and high-profit margins) but also liberated some labor in the core areas for specialization in other tasks.' (102) Thus the

expected to give up what they have gained: 'what the nobility (and the bourgeoisie) needed, and what they would get, was a more tractable labour force.'*(loc cit)*

¹²⁴The Genoese having transferred production there from Sicily (43n.100)

core areas tend toward 'variety and specialization', increasingly having to use free labour, while the peripheries tended toward monoculture and different forms of forced labour.

England vs France- the struggle for hegemony

In Wallerstein's account of the 'struggle for hegemony' between England and France following the decline of the Netherlands, the common internal factors are rising agricultural incomes and price level, and the differential development is explained through the contrast between which strategies proved most successful for landlords attempting to capture as large part as possible of these gains. In England enclosures proved more successful, and in France rent-raising.(III:64f)

II:4.3 Growth as redistribution

Looking only to the characteristics of the system as a whole, productivity growth is seen as inconsequential as it cannot be shown to have improved the relation between total labour expended and total rewards enjoyed for the total sum of household members within the aggregate work-force of the world¹²⁵, and similarly democracy is seen only in the perspective of how anti-systemic movements are *integrated* into the system¹²⁶.

While this fundamental challenge to received conceptions of the present world merits very careful consideration, his revision of the traditional Marxist perspective in order to restore the full impact of its passion for social justice, at the same time sacrifices an important part of its analytical incisiveness. If the growth of productivity makes egalitarian redistribution a realizable goal, as Marx argued, then the question of to how large an extent rising profits are dependent on rising productivity, and to what extent on immiserating redistribution, cannot be irrelevant to the discussion of social justice, as it is crucial to the question of feasibility.

Still, to define power relations as the basis of economic relations is a quite arguable position, and not impossible to rephrase within a Marxist discourse, even if it's pedigree can rather be found in the sociological or politological traditions. This does *not* mean, that the books do not discuss economy, on the contrary the largest part of the discussion are taken up by economic factors, but there is a continuous and very consistent treatment of economy and politics as congruent. Anderson's remark that mercantilism represented the

¹²⁵On the contrary, Wallerstein argues that 'the one Marxist proposition which even orthodox Marxists tend to bury in shame, the thesis of the absolute (not relative) immiseration of the proletariat' holds when applied to a global perspective. (1983:99-105)

¹²⁶1983:107-110. He suggests that the reason that we do not apprehend this is because of a simultaneous reduction of inequalities within the 'middle classes' of the world: 'that ten to fifteen percent of the population of the world-economy who consumed more surplus than they themselves produced'(104f)

conceptions of a still feudal ruling class' 'outlook on the unity of what Francis Bacon called 'considerations of plenty' and 'considerations of power'(1974b:36) seems strangely apposite as a characterization of Wallerstein's style of argument. As, in *his* eyes, mercantilism expressed the interests of a formerly feudal ruling class transformed into a capitalist one, this is maybe just consistent.

There is an identity in motivation for both political and economic power, but there is also a separation between the two kinds of power, which is what makes the 'growth of the world-economy' possible. This is that the economy has a wider reach than political power can grasp - exactly because of the 'failure of empire': that no single power has succeeded to take control over the whole system, in contrast to what happens in China and other 'world-empire' systems.

II:4.4 Trajectories as positional careers

Within Wallerstein's format, the particular trajectory of a single country (despite his denunciation of using national borders to define units of analysis, he in practice usually discusses in terms of the conventional 'countries' that we usually project backwards into history) is in essence defined by its movements through the positions of the world-economy's structure.

The World-System comprises three (or four¹²⁷) categories. Besides the exploitative *core states* and the exploited *peripheral areas* of the world-economy, and the *external arena* which is not (yet) part of the system, but has some contact with it, there is the important in-between category of the *semi-periphery*, to which a lot of the dynamics in the model are due. As the distinction between core and periphery originally comes from Latin American structuralist development theory (Prebisch' center/periphery model) and the 'dependency school' that grew out from it (Gunder Frank's metropolis/satellite theory), the concept of semi-periphery is probably derived from the theory of 'sub-imperialism' (usually applied to Brazil) at that time current within similar circles.

Core-states have high wages and a diversified production structure, a strong state machinery and define themselves through a national culture. As unqualified labour is cheaper and more vulnerable to all-out exploitation in the peripheries, labour-intensive low-technology production tends to be moved there if transport costs and the general conditions of production permit, and production requiring more capital, technology and qualified labour tends to concentrate in the core. Inside the core countries, however, there can be 'internal peripheries' where conditions are very different. The normal state of the system's core is that of a balance of power between the dominant countries, but temporarily one state may succeed to dominate the

¹²⁷For the concept of hegemonic powers, see below.

whole system as a *hegemonic power* (or simply 'hegemon'). Only three examples exist so far: 'the United Provinces in the mid-seventeenth century, ... Great Britain in the mid-nineteenth, and ... the United States in the mid-twentieth.'(1983:58)


In the *peripheries* raw materials (primary products) are typically produced for the benefit of consumption and production in the core. Originally slavery and 'coerced cash-crop labor' (labour under serf-like conditions, like in early modern Eastern Europe) are the typical forms of labour control. Wallerstein is very careful to emphasize that these forms of labour are not signs of different modes of production. Under capitalism - and the Modern World-economy is capitalist - capital is invested where the profit is greatest, and in many countries and in many branches of production it is more profitable to invest in production using coercive forms of labour control¹²⁸. However, this does not mean that another mode of production is involved. The purpose of investment (to maximize profit), the imperatives put on production (minimizing costs), and the use made of the profit (to accumulate and reinvest) are the same. Today low wages and semi-proletarian labour force (largely deriving their subsistence outside capitalist production and therefore cheap) are characteristic of the peripheral areas.

Semi-peripheral countries¹²⁹ occupy an in-between position, being both exploiters and exploited. They can be ascending powers, that have succeeded to move up from the periphery (Sweden, Prussia), or descending: former core-states who have lost their competitive edge (Spain, Portugal). Competition between powers aspiring to move up into the core is especially keen, as those who succeed do so 'not merely at the expense of some or all core powers, but also at the expense of other semi-peripheral powers.'(1979:100-1)

¹²⁸Marx' contention that slavery in the American South was a part of the capitalist system is one of the fundamental sources for this standpoint.

¹²⁹Only countries can occupy a semi-peripheral position as it presupposes an active state . The periphery, on the other hand, tends to have weak or non-existent states.

Map 4-5: The World-system: 16th century to 1970's



II:4.5 Sweden as the first rising semiperiphery

Sweden's career as a great power has an important position in Wallerstein's model, as it is the first case of a country rising from the periphery into the semi-periphery, even coming near to making it up into the core. As such it should be an interesting test case for the credibility of the model's internal dynamics. Also the failure of Sweden as a core-status pretender leading to a decline paralleling that of Spain, downwards into the periphery again (although it would eventually make a re-entry through fast economic growth and industrialization; we do not know when Wallerstein would place the second rise, but this time Sweden made it all the way up into the core (1979:83).

A semi-periphery is a state both exploiting others, in the periphery, and being exploited, by the core. It's also a kind of 'middleman' between core and periphery, transferring surplus and getting a cut of it as it passes by. Wallerstein describes the tolls Sweden was able to collect during parts of the Thirty Years' War - the 'Prussian licences' - in this way (1980:208). Also, Sweden was a very important producer of raw materials, especially copper, then also iron, and tar.

Although raw material producers are supposed to become dependent and peripheral, Sweden succeeded in improving its position due to a 'piece of resource luck': dominance in the copper production, unusually high quality in iron production, and the right combination of large forests and available labour to produce great quantities of tar, essential to shipping at this time. This gave Sweden a position of near-monopoly in copper, high-quality iron and tar, which it used as the basis for a 'strong bargaining position' as against core powers. 'Sweden was in a sense the OPEC of its time' (211)

These considerations are of course very important. They refer to the possibility of manoeuvre, and counterbalance the strong emphasis on structural determination in the theory. For the analysis of Sweden it is necessary to disentangle Sweden's role in the emerging world-economy from its role as a military power. When Sweden falters and slips down towards peripheralization, it 'should' find itself at the mercy of its core trading partners. Instead bar iron production was subjected to increasingly severe restrictions during the very period of decline from Great power status.

Heckscher interpreted this as an attempt at monopolistic price-setting, which does not sound like an act of a country being peripheralized. According to a study by Per-Arne Karlsson, this was a long-term policy which does not seem to have been affected by changing trade situation, and thus must have another explanation. His conclusion is, that there was a conscious effort at keeping a sort of 'balance' between iron production and agriculture. *This means that the degree of dependence upon integration into the world-economy cannot have been very important at this time.* If Heckscher is right, Sweden's trade partners should have been more dependent upon the iron

trade than Sweden was, and if Karlsson is right, it is due to some kind of dissociation policy. This is even more interesting: what are the possibilities for manoeuvre in a declining situation, and what internal effects may dissociation have had?

Credit or debt peonage?

In Wallerstein's model, dependence should be expected to increase and leave smaller opportunities for self-determined endogenous strategies like those described. An important component in his equation between early modern Eastern European relations with the West, and (neo)colonial dependency on the European mother countries, is an identification between: (1) the system of credit trade used by Hansard merchants to tie up their suppliers and avoid competition¹³⁰, and (2) the permanent indebtedness ensuring the subjugation of the workforce in the Latin American *hacienda* system. 'Debt peonage', is his designation for both of these systems, or, when the credit chains cross borders, 'international debt peonage'(1974:121f,190)¹³¹.

A direct counter-example to this 'debt peonage' interpretation of credit trade, is found in Sven-Erik Åström's description (1977) of the (Swedish-)Finnish tar trade, where he argues that a purchase system based on similar principles could preserve elements of 'reciprocity' due to the independent personal juridical status of the tar-burning peasants, and to the fact that debts had to be sued for at local courts with peasant jurors taking part¹³². Wallerstein doesn't mention the tar trade in this context, but as to the other two 'quasi-monopolies' he clearly considers that: 'The familiar pattern of international debt peonage was taking hold.'(1980:206), in the copper trade with Holland, and in the iron industry he claims that 'small ironmakers' were reduced 'to semi-proletarian status through a *Verlagssystem*, by which they were indebted to foreign merchants'(210). A local study of mining peasants in 18th century Sweden (Sjöberg 1993) comes to the conclusion 'that the mining peasants' economic activity ... was not subordinated to the ironworks to the extent that previous research has argued. The majority did not,...,renounce

¹³⁰Described by Malowist (1960), who considered this system to be one of the factors underlying enserfment in Poland.

¹³¹This vocabulary in turn implies a parallelism between international debt crisis stranglehold on present-day Third World countries, and the situation of the early modern Baltic Area *vis à vis* the contemporary financial centres where the networks of credit obligations converged. However, an outright comparison would presuppose that the relationship between economics and politics is constant, though it is the shift in its character over time and the diversity between the initial conditions of this change, that is one of our central problems.

¹³²Side effects of the tar production may also be of interest. Villstrand (1992) considers the rising tar production to be partly an effect of increasing need for cash among the peasantry, indirectly caused by war and conscription (a conscript peasant had the possibility of paying someone else to take his place).

their independence. With support from the legislation the mining peasants retained their property.'(E254)

From the Swedish examples, it seems quite evident that credit trade, *Verlagssysteme* etc, will have different social consequences in different social contexts¹³³. More generally, *how* are the different economies tied together in the system? What kind of products create what kinds of dependence? Sweden produces goods of crucial importance for warfare (copper, iron, tar - but also *e g* cannons) and trade (tar, mastwood, copper as a coin material¹³⁴), but when it starts slipping downwards it is replaced as a major semiperipheral power by Prussia (there is only 'room for one [such] in central Europe'(225)). Prussia is primarily a grain exporter - like the peripheral Poland. It cannot possibly replace Sweden in its *economic* function in the system.

Obviously the economic roles and the positions of relative power are disjunct to a much larger extent than Wallerstein claims. How they articulate must be crucial to the entire concept of a dynamic system.

II:4.6 Important critiques of Wallerstein

The most influential critiques of Wallerstein's model, appear to be those formulated by Theda Skocpol (1977), Robert Brenner (1977) and Patrick O'Brien (1982). Skocpol's criticism centers on reductionism and the role of the state; Brenner's on the deficient conceptualization of capitalism, while O'Brien questions the underlying assumption that the profits of colonialism were essential to the industrial revolution.

Skocpol's Critique

argues that Wallerstein's model 'is based on a two-step reduction': (1) 'socio-economic structure' is seen as determined by 'world market opportunities and technological production possibilities', and (2) 'state structures and policies' are seen as determined by 'dominant class interests'. Thus Wallerstein can argue that the dominant classes of the different zones of the system 'adopt' different 'modes of labor control' in order to maximize possible profits from world market production under given conditions. Although internal exploitation is postulated as a matter of course¹³⁵, the whole emphasis is put on world scale exploitation: the 'appropriation of surplus of the whole world-economy by core areas', effected through 'the operation of "unequal exchange" which is enforced by strong states on weak ones'¹³⁶

¹³³Which Malowist also contends in a later article (1981).

¹³⁴About the importance of Spanish copper *vellón* minting see Anderson 1974b:183.

¹³⁵Although Skocpol claims that 'his reliance on liberal economics' leads to 'a nonexploitative picture of the process of income distribution within the world system'.

¹³⁶Skocpol 1977:1079 quoting Wallerstein 1974:401.

State strength, in its turn, depends on the strength of the economy, and on the world market interests of the ruling class. These reductions, Skocpol argues, weakens the explanatory potential of the model:

1. As the only dynamics of the model are market processes, he has no way of explaining 'developmental breakthroughs': the original emergence of the 'capitalist world system' is incongruously discussed in terms of 'how the crisis [of feudalism] "had to be solved" if "Europe" or "the system" were to survive', and the consequences of the Industrial Revolution 'are much discussed, but not a word is said about the causes'.
2. Treating 'labor control' as a market-optimizing strategy of the dominant class, leaves the relationship between classes and the 'potential of collective resistance from below' outside the picture. (She refers here to Brenner's discussion of the divergence between Western and Eastern Europe as a contrast to Wallerstein's trade-centered explanation)
3. Wallerstein's statement that 'strong states' was a fundamental feature of core position is contradicted by historical fact: the Dutch government ('a federation of merchant oligarchies') cannot be described as a 'strong state', and as the English Tudor state was weaker than the Spanish, French or Swedish, Wallerstein has to resort to *ad hoc* explanations, she claims.(1084f)¹³⁷

Comment:

As should have become obvious by now, I share Skocpol's objections to the reductionist character of Wallerstein's analysis, although I understand it as a reduction of economy to power politics instead of the other way around. Many reviewers have discerned a 'change of emphasis' or even a fundamental revision of his standpoint between volume I and II, as well as between volume II and III¹³⁸, drifting towards an ever greater emphasis on interstate power relations.

However, interpreting also his earlier work in the light of the discussion in (1983) and (1992), it seems to me that his fundamental understanding of capitalism is as a zero sum redistribution based on political power, and that he sees the imperative of ceaseless accumulation of capital as a pathological result of the destruction of social constraints rather than the triumph of 'progress', 'productive forces' or whatever¹³⁹. If this interpretation is correct, then his earlier 'economism' might just be an impression created by a borrowed terminology, which he has since step by step revised; the most important aspect, though, is the *identification* of economy and political power.

¹³⁷If we accept Mann's distinction between two kinds of state strength: *Despotic power*, or power over civil society, and *infrastructural power*, or the power to coordinate civil society. (1986:477, 1988:5-11), then Wallerstein's notion of state strength might be equated with infrastructural power, and Skocpol's criteria with despotic. The controversy over Sweden cannot be solved by this reconceptualization, as its infrastructural power might be fully equal to its despotic.

¹³⁸In Mann's review of volume III, he concludes that this change of emphasis have gone so far that 'writers like Skocpol, Tilly and me ... have been outflanked by a more committed militarist!' (1990:198)

¹³⁹He quotes Weber on the irrationality of a businessman 'existing for his business, and not the other way around', and Polanyi on the capitalist system being one where 'instead of economy being embedded in social relations, social relations are embedded in the economic system'(1992:616).

Brenner's criticism

is to some extent parallel to Skocpol's, although the thrust of his arguments is consistently economic: Wallerstein's defective conceptualization of capitalism makes him blind to the difference between economic exploitation in general, and competitive capitalism:

1. As serf lords could not be 'put out of business' by more efficient competitors (71), *there is no objective economic imperative forcing a pre-capitalist upper class to maximize profits*, and thus the notion of 'selecting' the most profitable system of 'labour control' in each zone, is absurd: in fact 'throughout this period, serf peasant plots maintained significantly higher productivity than did the lords' demesnes' (69). Still this didn't lead to the selection of other forms of labour control: 'Serfdom remained as incapable as ever of developing more efficient means of production, but showed no signs of being replaced by competitors'(70). Also, how to explain the instances where the lords tried to (re)introduce serfdom, but failed?
2. This also makes it impossible to pose the problem of transition to capitalism: If systems of labour control are chosen by exploiters in order to maximize profits, the appearance of possibilities to make these profits (through trade) becomes the decisive turning point, but then the exploiters must already be profit maximizers at least in potential. 'In other words, the rise of trade determines the emergence of capitalists and capitalism; 'transition' becomes the *result* not the source of capitalism'(79; Brenner's italics). Also the mechanics of 'unequal exchange' according to Arghiri Emmanuel's theory, invoked by Wallerstein to explain the emergence of the core/periphery dichotomy, explicitly presuppose an '*equalization of profit rates in all regions and lines of production*' (63, RB's italics), which in turn requires a 'free mobility of capital throughout the system'. As this is a tendency only (if anywhere) of fully developed laissez faire capitalism, it cannot be part of the *preconditions* of the original appearance of the capitalist system.
3. Because of this lack of a conception of the central motive power of capitalism, 'productivity of labour as the essence and key to economic development'(91) is also neglected, and thus autarky becomes the logical political alternative, leaving no options for overcoming Third World misery.

O'Brien,

finally, takes a totally different angle, trying to make a quantitative estimate of to what extent the industrial revolution might have been dependent on 'peripheral' profits. focusing on England in the early stage of the industrial revolution. Commodity trade between core and periphery is estimated to account for not more than 4% of aggregate GNP for Western Europe around 1780-1790, and O'Brien argues that '*if* a very high proportion (say 50 per cent) of the value of the turnover (exports plus imports) accrued as profits to core capitalists, and *if* they reinvested 50 per cent of their profits; then the outer bound for the contribution of these trades amounts to only 1 per cent of GNP. And that could perhaps equal no more than 10 per cent of gross investment' (5).

This exercise should only be seen as an attempt to establish the upper limits of orders of magnitude, O'Brien is at pains to emphasize, and using the most optimistic estimates for savings rate and reinvestment rate during this

period, he concludes that at the very highest, 'commerce with the periphery generated a flow of funds sufficient, or potentially available, to finance about 15 per cent of gross investment expenditures undertaken during the Industrial Revolution.'⁽⁷⁾

O'Brien concludes that 'since Britain traded with and invested in other continents on a far larger scale than any other European country (with the possible exception of Holland)', historians have 'exaggerated the impact of intercontinental trade', because they have not related it to the scale of total economic activity, and because they have judged the profitability of tropical trade only from success stories, failing to take account of the high risks and frequent losses lowering the *average* rate of profit, which O'Brien takes to be around or below 10% in the long run.⁽⁸⁾

In a later contribution to this discussion, Bairoch (1993) concurs with O'Brien's argument (80-84), but points out that 'If the West did not gain much from colonialism, it does not mean that the Third World did not lose much', and proceeds to attempt a quantification of the negative effects of European colonialism: de-industrialization, export crop specialization, speeding up of population increase and growing global difference of income ¹⁴⁰

O'Brien himself in a later article (1992) emphasizes that although the significance of trade was not 'as overwhelming as Wallerstein, Braudel and the World Systems school implicitly assume', it was neither 'as expendable as cliometricians suggest'¹⁴¹. He also points out that the theoretical maximum level of gross investment expenditures that could have been funded by profits generated in oceanic commerce - now more closely specified at 16,5% - 'may have been *sufficient* to have funded almost all gross fixed investment expenditures in mining, quarrying and manufacturing industry undertaken in the 1780s', and he poses the question if 'those profits were sufficient to raise net investment rates in Britain above those achieved by the French and other rival economies?'(501-2)

The relevance of O'Brien's critique for the Modern World-System model can be questioned, as Wallerstein explicitly includes also Eastern Europe within the periphery. Still, the conception of colonial wealth accumulating in the core as the basic advantage making possible the meteoric rise of British capitalism is a keystone in his system, as it clinches his identification of Conquest, beginning in late 15th century, with Growth, beginning with an indus-

¹⁴⁰The Third World, which around 1750 produced some 70-6% of the world's manufactures, produced only 7-8% around 1913.' and 'there had been hardly any increase in the Third World's average living standards between 1800 and 1950' (88-98).

¹⁴¹He points out that the 'great merit of Wallerstein's research has been to integrate political with economic factors behind the growth of a global economy', and takes care to criticize naive comparative advantage models as well as dependency theory. Referring to Rosenberg/Birdzell's *How the West Grew Rich*, he asks if they really 'are prepared to believe that payments for slaves on the coast approximated to the capitalized values of black workers' outputs over their lifetimes'.

trial revolution in 18th century, or with an agrarian in the 17th, as One Process and One System. O'Brien's sobering devaluation of the *scale* of external appropriation is a useful admonition against facile generalization, but as he himself (nowadays) emphasizes, the matter is in no way settled.

Two further observations:

(1) Those figures that are available for this type of quantification are obviously very uncertain. Still, from selections out of similar source material, Bairoch and Steensgaard can come to quite different conclusions as to the relative importance of extra-European trade within the British economy:

Bairoch states that extra-European trade 'represented some 33-9% of total British trade' (82), while Steensgaard concludes that 'more than half of English foreign trade by the middle of the eighteenth century directly or indirectly [re-exports] depended on the intercontinental trade' (1990:145).

(2) Indirect effects are very difficult to assess. H H Nolte (1992:32f) points to the very low interest rates in England, and to the significance of emigration outlets for the internal development of core countries¹⁴² O'Brien himself mentions 'the savings and skills of merchants acquired in overseas trade which found their way into industrial enterprises', maybe more often via banking, 'creation of transportation and other forms of social overhead', and the demonstration and diffusion of 'advanced industrial techniques and commercial practices to other sectors of the economy'(1992:495).

Even Robert Brenner, who very consistently stresses internal factors, identifies 'colonial interlopers' as a key category in the English Revolution (1993:113-6, 159-61 684-6). These were 'new men' from a much lower social background than the privileged company merchants, who monopolized the most lucrative trades. As this barred out newcomers, the 'New Merchants' had to make do with the relatively high-risk and low-profit (and therefore competitive rather than monopolized) colonial trade.

The very existence of a colonization project is thus part of the social and economic basis for a revolutionary transformation of society as well as for the shift from rent-seeking to profit-seeking within commercial capitalism.

¹⁴²An important point for Sweden as a part of the core; Sandbergs quantifications of the economic success and language-learning ability of Swedish US immigrants relative to other categories (1979:234-7) clearly indicate that the cultural and educational level of Swedish immigrants contributed to their relative success. Reasonably, this must be an important factor behind the *possibility* of using emigration as a safety-valve.

II:5 CHARLES TILLY:

Statemaking through Coercion and Capital

II:5.1 Warmaking and diversity

Charles Tilly might appear in just about any discussion on comparative political development as a historian, as a sociologist, as a sharp-eyed critic of comparativist endeavours or as an editor of important contributions in this field. Here, though, I will primarily refer to his own interventions in the debates on '*Big Structures, Large Processes {and} Huge Comparisons*'¹⁴³, and in particular his most general and elaborate synthesis so far '*Coercion, Capital and European States. AD 990-1990*'¹⁴⁴ It represents a fundamental revision of the positions he and his colleagues, a group of distinguished sociologists, economists, historians and political-scientists, had put forward in '*The Formation of National States in Western Europe*'¹⁴⁵ There the development of European states was interpreted as the outcome of the interrelated activities of warmaking, taxation (to raise money for warfare), repression (against popular resistance to warmaking and taxation) and state-building (to organize war, taxation and repression)¹⁴⁶.

Although he does not seem to have abandoned this viewpoint, he now (1990) considers it too unilinear. The 'organization of coercion and preparation for war' (p 14) is still crucial to his analysis, but the *diversity* of forms this has produced among the European states has become the central question: '*Why were the directions of change so similar and the paths so different?*' (p 190). In search of an explanation, he pursues the development of various forms of interplay between political and economic factors in different parts of Europe from AD 990 to 1990, and the analysis he comes up with is based on a two-dimensional concept of development: the 'logics of capital and coercion' (pp 16-20).

Capital,

in Tilly's wide and rather unspecified usage, represents all economic assets, and 'the processes that accumulate and concentrate capital also produce cities'. Capital, capitalists and cities are connected to each other within the 'realm of *exploitation*', where surpluses arising in the relations of production and exchange are captured by capitalists¹⁴⁷.

¹⁴³To borrow the title of one of his books (1984).

¹⁴⁴Tilly 1990. All references in this section not preceded by year refer to that book.

¹⁴⁵Edited by Tilly, this book was published in 1975 as the outcome of seminars held in 1970-1.

¹⁴⁶His most lucid explication of this model can be found in Tilly 1981.

¹⁴⁷Tilly emphasizes that capitalists existed before capitalism, "the system in which wage-workers produce goods by means of materials owned by capitalists". This system did not arise until "after

Coercion

is his complementary fundamental concept in the political sphere, and it defines the 'realm of domination'. States are produced 'when the accumulation and concentration of coercive means grow together'. The logic of coercion appears to be a more abstractly worded rephrasing of his old catchword: 'War makes states and states make war'¹⁴⁸.

II:5.2 Power, Plenty or both

The model basically boils down to the proposition that in areas dominated by cities and commercial activities war made states of a 'capital-intensive' type, while in rural areas military pressure eventually had to be met by extracting the means of warfare from agriculture, which led to a more repressive 'coercion-intensive' development. In other words: the coercion-intensive states have to finance the build-up of their means of coercion through applying this coercion to their own people - *i e.*: their peasantry.

The division of Europe into contrasting regions dominated by *capital-intensive* or *coercion-intensive* development provides the dynamic force in the European states-system, and eventually those countries which tread a narrow middle way, balancing coercion with capital and vice versa, take the lead and become models for the *nation-state* that the different trajectories tend to converge upon. The reason for this is that the form of nation-state confers a competitive advantage in interstate warfare, as it is capable to raise money more efficiently *and* less oppressively than the typical coercion-intensive state, while the increasing scale and frequency of warfare also renders obsolete the mercenary warfare system which capital-intensive states rely upon. This category of state-building is described as 'capitalized coercion'.

His typology of European developments thus comprises three major categories of state-formation: *coercion-intensive*, *capital-intensive* and *capitalized coercion trajectories of state formation*.

Coercion-intensive states

State formation in high coercion areas, with 'few cities and little concentrated capital' was sparked off by military pressure. State-building was financed by using land to reward military and bureaucratic personnel. This 'encouraged a

1500, as capitalists seized control of production"(*loc cit*); the 'transition to capitalism' is thus explained in a rather off-hand manner, and the role of exploitation before capitalism is quite puzzling. The conventionally Marxist standpoint would be that exploitation was not effected through capital, but in other ways, until production was under its control. A non-Marxist view of capital would typically consider it to be productive rather than exploitative. Maybe Braudel's conception of 'capitalism' as the level of making profits by manipulation of the money flows caused by trade is something like what Tilly has in mind.

¹⁴⁸Tilly 1981.

strategy of conquest in which territorial lords simultaneously leagued together against common enemies and fought each other for priority within their own territory, with the leading lord ceding control over land and labor to his fellows in exchange for military assistance.' This strategy 'left little space for an autonomous bourgeoisie' or for 'accumulation and concentration of capital outside the state'.

Three varieties are described:

1. Areas where 'warrior nobles retained great power, including the ability to install and depose kings.'

Examples: Poland and Hungary.

2. Areas where 'a single power managed to establish priority by constructing a state bureaucracy that gave nobles and clergy great privileges with respect to the commoner population, but committed them to service of the state.'

Examples: Sweden and Russia.

3. Areas where noble absentee landlords draining resources to their residence in the capital co-existed with state officials reaching out into the provinces to execute royal policy with the help of priests and local nobles.

Examples: Sicily and Castile.

Capital-intensive states

The availability of capital permitted these states - typically city-states, city-empires or urban federations - to wage war in the interests of their commercial enterprise and expansion *without* having to build up bulky administrations or permanent concentrations of military power that might emerge as alternative power centres. Instead they were run by efficient, 'slim' organizations, and representative but oligarchic institutions.

Examples: Venice, Genoa, Ragusa, Milan, Florence, Holland, Catalonia and the Hanse.


Capitalized-coercion states

Although these states are the central explanatory category for Tilly's model of European development - it is the dynamic interplay between 'concentration and accumulation of coercion' and 'of capital' typical for such states that constitutes the European advantage - he has surprisingly little to say about how this interplay came about and how it functioned. Areas where 'the concentrations of capital and coercion occurred in greater equality and tighter connection with each other', is as close to a definition as he gets.

The general path of the national state¹⁴⁹, though, once it has been developed by this pioneer category, sets the pace for the military survival struggle in Europe, and forces all other countries to adopt methods of warfare 'whose support generated as by-products centralization, differentiation, and autonomy of the state apparatus'. This clarifies the picture a bit:







'Those states took that step in the late fifteenth century both because they had recently completed the expulsion of rival powers from their territories and because they had access to capitalists who could help them finance wars fought by means of expensive fortifications, artillery and, above all, mercenary soldiers.'(183)

Map 6: Europe according to Tilly



¹⁴⁹Tilly now (1992) explicitly rejects the concept of 'nation-state', as an ideal category maybe 'approximate[d]' by present-day Sweden and Ireland, and very few others throughout history. 'Great Britain, Germany and France - quintessential national states - have never met the test [of a shared linguistic, religious and symbolic identity]'(3)

Chart 8: Tilly's typology of European state-building trajectories

CAPITAL-INTENSIVE interior zone 	CAPITALIZED COERCION intermediate zone 	COERCION-INTENSIVE exterior zone 
city-states: MILAN FLORENCE RAGUSA	ENGLAND FRANCE ARAGON then SPAIN	Warrior nobility variant: ¹ (A) POLAND HUNGARY SERBIA? ² 
city-empires: VENICE CATALONIA GENOA	later also PRUSSIA (incl. Rhineland) PORTUGAL? ³	Service nobility variant: (B) SWEDEN RUSSIA DENMARK BRANDENBURG? 
city federations: THE HANSE DUTCH REP. SWITZERLAND	EVENTUALLY NATION-STATES CONVERGE ONTO THIS PATH	Nobility & State officials variant: (C) SICILY CASTILE 

¹ Cities sparse, slow accumulation and concentration of capital lead to state formation without collaboration or opposition of capitalists (132)

² Mentioned as a coercion-intensive state (142) but not explicitly placed in any of the subcategories. Position here chosen after the definition in the preceding note.

³ No explicit definition in (1990), but described as 'sharply divided between Lisbon and its profoundly rural hinterland'(188) and shown as closer than Aragon to the middle category in a diagram (60); in Tilly 1992, however, it's classified as coercion-intensive.

II:5.3 China as a contrast

Tilly's conception of the European advantage also hinges on this articulation of military and economic competition¹⁵⁰ He contrasts the European system of cities (capitalist) and states (coercive) to G W Skinner's model of imperial China characterized by

'the intersection of two sets of central-place hierarchies. The first, constructed largely from the bottom up, emerged from exchange; its overlapping units consisted of larger and larger market areas centered on

¹⁵⁰Although the economic dynamic is never really specified. Its taken for granted as a matter of course.

towns and cities of increasing size. The second, imposed mainly from top down, resulted from imperial control; its nested units comprised a hierarchy of administrative jurisdictions. Down to the level of the *hsien*, or county, every city had a place in both the commercial and the administrative hierarchy. Below that level, even the mighty Chinese Empire ruled indirectly via its gentry. In the top-down system, we find the spatial logic of coercion. In the bottom-up system, the spatial logic of capital. We have seen two similar hierarchies at work repeatedly in the unequal encounter between European states and cities.'(127)

I quote this passage at length because it not only puts his categories into a comparative perspective, but also contains some interesting implications for the further discussion. First, though, the uniqueness of Europe:

The bottom-up structure, the interconnecting network of trading cities has during the post-Roman period had enough time to develop enough of independent diversity that no top-down power structure ever succeeded to get a full grasp over the whole network. On the other hand - and after a long process - a number of different top-down structures of coercion eventually succeeded to establish stronger states and in those most successful in the long run we eventually find the interrelated interests of ruling warmakers needing money and urban moneymakers needing protection constructing national states.

For Tilly, it is this dynamic collusion between commercial and coercive power that has conferred a military and financial advantage upon Europe. In China political and economic power were more disjunct, with political power holding on to the central power, but leaving commercial interest fairly free hands in the periphery of the system. The relationship between Conquest and Growth are thus at the very center of his model. What's lacking is any conception of Voice. Reviewers of Tilly (1990) have primarily objected to the wide and varied category of 'coercion-intensive' states, comprising the Scandinavian states as well as the eastern European. McNeill concluded that this example shows that two variables aren't enough, and Claessen has suggested 'legitimacy' as a third.

II:5.4 The position of Sweden

There is in fact a considerable ambiguity in Tilly's handling of the Swedish example. Within the very chapter where he defines the three types of trajectories, he first distinguishes the Scandinavian states as a sub-category of their own, describing the varieties of their developments, but finally concludes that they all 'cluster round the coercion-intensive path', and when he sums up the variants of the coercive path the Scandinavian road is forgotten and he emphasizes the similarities between Sweden and Russia instead.

In his subsequent book, however, *European Revolutions, 1492-1992*, in his depiction of Europe at the beginning point, he describes it as still dominated by its

'well-connected network of mercantile cities, most of them having substantial hinterlands that combined small-scale manufacturing with commercial farming. The rest of Europe divided into two kinds of regions: those of warrior-landlords ... who extracted their revenues from peasant households, and other regions in which small-holding farmers, fishermen and foresters coexisted with merchants, soldiers, priests and officials. Hungary exemplifies the first, Scandinavia the second.'(26)

This picture is very different from his standard three-path one, but then the road towards the modern state has barely started. Military reorganization for inter-state competition forces rulers to 'augment... the power of their states at the cost of extensive bargaining with their national populations'. 'Where great concentrations of capital appeared' - primarily around the central urban band - 'merchants and financiers played central roles ...[in] financing state activities, especially war', but try to do without standing armies, bureaucracies and powerful centralization. In 'zones of herding and subsistence agriculture' with capital 'slight and dispersed', cities and trade being 'choked by magnates' the only way to build a strong state was 'by seizing or co-opting the private armies formed by great landlords', resulting in 'the paradoxical combination of large, privileged nobilities and substantial state bureaucracies. Russia, Hungary, Poland, Portugal and Castile illustrate different versions of this *coercion-intensive* path.'

The path of Sweden is not very easy to recognize in this version of the story. One path remains:

'In between lay those regions that combined some concentrated capital with substantial armed force in the hands of autonomous landlords - areas to which historians of the Middle Ages have most comfortably applied the word 'feudal', and those of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the word 'absolutist'. They typically interlaced networks of trading cities with large agricultural areas that produced surpluses (including domestic manufactures) for the urban market. In such environments, rulers could often expand their power by pitting the bourgeoisie against the nobility only to fuse them eventually in service to the crown.' This is, of course, the path of *capitalized coercion*(31), and - at least by this description - it can hardly include Sweden.

What has happened to Sweden? Have we been excluded from the map? It is not likely that Tilly considers Scandinavia marginal, as Moore does. In his criticism of his (Norwegian!) friend, colleague and co-worker Stein Rokkan, whose influence on his own model he is very explicit about, he points out how Rokkan's diagrams of correlated social and geographical patterns fail to

capture the full variety of historical trajectories, taking as his example - Sweden:

'But Sweden, to take an obvious instance, is not simply a 'case' located somewhere in the northern reaches of a giant cross-tabulation. The Sweden that appears on Rokkan's conceptual map is a shrunken remainder of the expansive power that at one time or another dominated Norway, Finland, Estonia, Livonia and other important parts of the North. Can we reconstruct the political development of Sweden - or, for that matter of Norway, Finland, Estonia and Livonia - without taking this into account?'(1984:139)

The answer is still - I think - no. I think this is also a strong indication that we cannot leave the problem of Voice outside the discussion - that would just produce historically insensitive conclusions. Another interesting element that would be worthy of careful consideration, is Tilly's discussion of 'top-down' and 'bottom-up' structures. He far too easily identifies the 'bottom-up' structuring principle with trade, and thus with merchants, cities, capital and bourgeoisie. What about the 'bottom-up' structures for adjudication and conflict-resolving? At some level these structures articulate with a 'top-down' structure that is more or less identical with the coercive apparatus, but the forms for this is probably extremely varied. Here specific traits in the position of the Swedish peasantry¹⁵¹ might be possible to identify and correlate with the presumed more 'objective' forces of 'capital and coercion'

As Sweden's position in the early state- and nation-building processes and its role in the inter-state rivalry intensifying militarization and promoting the form of the nation-state (*cf* Anderson's analysis!), corresponds more closely to the road of capitalized coercion, than to the coercive category where Tilly has situated it, the problem might lie in the definition of the concept 'capitalized coercion'. It is also reasonable to presume that Sweden's role as a producer of copper and iron gave it a much greater access to 'means of war-making', than its 'nugatory cities' (in Anderson's words) would make apparent.

¹⁵¹In Sweden the top-down structure of bailiwicks (*fögderier*) was adapted to the bottom-up structure of hundreds (*bårader*) by the Crown during the 16th century (Wirsell 1968:15); *cf* Aronsson, Gustafson and Österberg on local self-government; also compare with other countries: Hilton on rural communes in France, Blickle on peasant communalism in Germany and Switzerland, Brenner's discussion of the relative strength of peasant resistance and Moore's distinction between 'conservative and revolutionary solidarity' among peasants.

II:6 ROBERT BRENNER:

Property Relations as Class Reproduction

II:6.1 Class struggle and comparative transition

Robert Brenner entered the discussion on transition from feudalism to capitalism through a sharp criticism of trade-centered as well as demographically based explanations of *divergent* development, focusing on contradictory tendencies of development and arguing class interests as the basic reason for these divergences (1976). Although the main focus in his earlier articles was polemic - he criticized 'commercialization models' and 'demographic models' in (1976), transition theories implicitly presupposing capitalist market competition within the pre-capitalist society in (1977), inconsistencies within Dobb's theory of transition in (1978)¹⁵² - from the beginning he has also propagated an alternative theory, focusing on the 'class struggle' conception of historical materialism¹⁵³ and attempting a comparative explanation of the transition problem, most ambitiously in his 1982 article where he defends his positions against a formidable array of opponents from diverse traditions. A more theoretical discussion of the problems can be found in (1986), and the most comprehensive survey of his present standpoints, including his first full typology of European development, is presented in (1989). His research on the role of merchants in the English Revolution (1993) opens perspectives which he has not yet endeavoured to integrate into his general model, and will therefore be left outside the discussion. (But *cf* above, section II:4.6!)

II:6.2 East vs West and the 'Brenner paradox'

Brenner's crucial argument in his original article is most obviously pinpointed in what we can call the 'Brenner paradox', *i e* the contradiction he has pointed out between attempts to use the late medieval fall in population to explain *either* the disappearance of serfdom in Western Europe, (as labour becomes the scarce factor, peasants find themselves in a stronger bargaining position and eventually succeed to win their freedom), *or* the imposition of the 'second serfdom' in Eastern Europe (as labour becomes scarce, the lords have to tighten their grip over their peasants, in order not to lose them¹⁵⁴).

¹⁵²He has also continued in this polemic vein through critiques against the 'techno-determinist' Marxism of Cohen in (1986) and against the French 'regulation school' in (1991).

¹⁵³As against 'structural-determinist', 'techno-determinist' and 'circulationist' variants. This means taking up the Dobb-Hilton tradition from the transition debate, but Brenner's version of this theory has also been criticized from within this tradition: for 'voluntarism' (Bois in Aston-Philpin 115) or for neglecting the peasant contribution to the development of capitalism (Katz).

¹⁵⁴The first explanation is attributed to Postan and Schlicher van Bath, the second to Carsten and Malowist. (Aston-Philpin 34f)

Nota bene that noone has claimed that both of these cases can be explained with demographic conditions as a sufficient cause, and the counter-attacks against Brenner tend to defend the first proposition through disclaiming validity (or relevance) for the second one¹⁵⁵ claiming that conditions were not comparable. What Brenner offers is, though, an attempt to explain in what way they were not comparable, and a logical explanation for how it is *possible* for two sets of historians to use the same argument to explain contradictory developments. The theoretically fundamental question is therefore:

if changing demographic conditions (land/labour ratio) can be argued to have a decisive influence on the development of a society, how come the same demographic development (falling l/r) can be used as explanation for two diametrically opposite developments (emancipation and enserfment)?

Brenner's explanation is that the changing situation can be resolved in either of two ways: in the interest of the peasants (because the scarcity of labour strengthens the peasants' bargaining position), or in the interest of the lords (who have to take control over peasant mobility in order not to lose their workforce). What then decides the outcome must be the relative strength of the contending classes.(76:34f)

II:6.3 England vs France - the medieval background

As to the question of England versus France, Brenner emphasizes the early centralization of power under mutual dependence between monarchy and aristocracy in England, ensuring an efficient domination over the peasantry, versus full feudal fragmentation in France leading to a weaker position vis-a-vis peasant communities, where the competitive exploitation forms of taxes and rents exacerbated the late medieval crisis, eventually making the aristocracy converge around the more efficient alternative of taxation, compensating declining rents by getting a slice of the state revenue through taking up office.

The end result would eventually arrive in the form of the absolute state, the 'tax/office state' in Brenner's term. Meanwhile the English aristocracy were not really hit by the late medieval crisis until more than half a century later than the French, but when it did arrive, even if the rent level was maintained surprisingly long, peasant resistance made a full 'feudal reaction' alternative unfeasible, and there was no emerging centralized state tax machine to turn to. The result, after the eventual failure of the attempt to solve the problem at the expense of France was civil war (1982:269-72). For the following development, see below.

¹⁵⁵Ladurie claims that his model is regional to western Europe (Aston-Philpin 104), Postan-Hatcher that eastern serfdom was caused by economic factors and not demographic ones (66).

II:6.4 Brenner's typology of Europe

Western Europe: Peasant proprietorship and the Absolutist state

In the old Carolingian heartlands, where feudal relations had first evolved, they also appeared in their most primitive, decentralized forms. Centuries of 'village-by-village struggle' had evolved a strong communal solidarity, that won them a great degree of autonomy and eventually made the peasants *de facto* proprietors, *i e* customary holders with full rights of inheritance and fixed seigneurial dues. Through inflation landlords faced falling revenues while at the same time inter-seigneurial rivalry increased.

Upholding military competitiveness demanded stronger resources and the need for feudal lords to hold their own through this 'political accumulation'¹⁵⁶ resulted in a tendency towards state-building, making feudal property relations reorganize around monarchs and princes, collecting centralized taxes and providing their followers with means of reproducing themselves through holding offices as military leaders, judges or administrators. (1989:40f) Essentially, this 'tax/office state' is a reconstructed feudalism, based on the same foundation of 'extra-economic compulsion', and subject to the same kind of cyclical dynamics.

Northeastern Europe: the landlords' solution

Feudal property relations were spread through a colonization process into East Elbian Germany and Poland, where easy terms were offered to attract colonizers. To compensate themselves, landlords tended to go in for continuous expansion, requiring a more or less constant flow of immigrants. As this dried up during the late medieval crisis, landlords turned against each other, organized for external warfare, and tried to tighten control over peasants. This led to a downward demographic-economic spiral similar to the crisis in Western Europe¹⁵⁷ in the end resolved through the success of a common landlord front against the peasants, tightening control, raising dues and finally turning to enlarged demesne farming based on *enserfed* labour and geared to export production.

Brenner ascribes peasant defeat to their less entrenched position compared to Western European villages, to the lords' control over the colonization process, and to the more individualized and dispersed settlements, less conducive to the development of strong village self-management. These processes of

¹⁵⁶To gain and retain the loyalty of their followers, the overlords had to feed and equip them and, in the long run, competitively reward them. Minimally, the overlord's household had to become a focus of lavish display, conspicuous consumption and gift-giving, on par with that of other overlords. (1987:312)


¹⁵⁷Brenner makes reservations about how far this is valid for Poland, but as the beginning and end results are parallel to the East German case, he presumes the mechanisms at work to be similar as well.

increasing oppression are self-reinforcing and tend to erode the productive forces of the system through systematically increasing demesnes at the expense of peasant plots (1989:42-5).

Southeastern Europe: local possession under a distant state

This is really a variant of the tax/office state, but the special situation of directly replacing a decentralized rent-taking structure with a centralized tax system unleashed the productive potential of the peasantry, who were given full effective possession of the land, when the old local aristocracies were eliminated by the conquering Ottoman regime. Guaranteed possession, lower surplus extraction and peace led to rapid growth, until the Malthusian ceiling was reached and the tensions between stagnating growth and increasing state requirements - in response to external military pressure as well as to the need of tightening internal control in order to effect the extraction of ever increasing amounts of surplus, thus eroding the basis of agricultural productivity.(1989:45-7)

Map 7: Brenner's typology of Europe



Early Modern England: A Breakthrough to Development

In the wake of the War of the Roses, reconstruction of the English state did not provide the ruling class with the options of reenservicing the peasantry or supplementing rents with a stake in taxation, open, respectively, to the nobilities in Northeastern and Western continental Europe. The extraeconomic control capacity of the lords was already broken by peasant resistance and mobility, but the landlords had retained relatively broad demesnes, and held on to their property rights, enclosing, evicting or waiting out peasants and leasing out their land to commercial farmers, thus in effect creating a capitalist system of agriculture, where tenants - often the more successful freeholders - competed for the best leases, while landlords had to compete for the best tenants.

II:6.5 Important points of criticism against Brenner

- *His description of English landlords as strong enough to maintain full property rights against customary tenants (as opposed to their French counterparts), while at the same time they were too weak to impose a 'neo-serfdom' (as in Northeastern Europe) has been attacked as contradictory.*

Either the landlords were stronger than the peasants or they were not, the argument seems to be. Even if we accept the somewhat one-dimensional conception of 'strength' indicated by this line of reasoning, gradations should be possible: English landlords could be stronger than the French, but weaker than the Prussian and Polish ones. This would be a bit misleading, though, as *different* aspects of class power were implied in the different conflicts discussed.

Even more fundamentally: Class power is a *relationship between classes*, not a quality intrinsic to the powerholding class. Though Brenner's crucial argument is that you must analyze both sides of a class conflict (cf the 'Brenner paradox') he has left himself open to attack by relapsing into a one-sided argument on this point. To be fully consistent with his overall perspective his argument would have to be refocused in this way:

The English lords were unable to achieve their most favourable outcome: to re-enserv their peasants (as in Eastern Europe), but the English peasants were also unable to achieve their most preferred solution: full property rights in customary holdings (more or less what happened in France, according to Brenner).

In both of the other examples either of the contending classes had the advantage of a superior level of class organization, but in England both sides were well enough organized to block the other class' most preferred alternative. That the English landlords succeeded with the slower but safer strategy of waiting out their tenants and strengthening formal ownership also in part depended on the consequences this process had among the peasants. The solidarity among the peasants was undermined by growing differentiation, and

freeholders and richer peasants with insufficient land would have common interests with the lords in this respect. (cf Hilton, Katz)

• *He underrates the potential of peasant production and overrates the importance of large-scale agriculture.*

This objection seems largely valid to the extent that he tends to overrate the possibility of economies of scale in agriculture. However, this is not *the* basis of his argument concerning the superiority of the English system with its 'trinity' of landlords, capitalist tenants and agricultural workers:

its fundamental advantage lies not in the scale of production, but in that the requirements of class reproduction are based on production for a competitive market and thus conducive to economic growth, while peasant reproduction creates incentives for diversification rather than specialization and for labour-intensive rather than capital-intensive production.

However, these discussions are closely tied to the question of forces behind the *transition* to capitalism; what happens when production for a capitalist market has become the norm, is a totally different question. The question of peasant productive performance under market pressure (mediated through bank-loans for equipment, *e g*) may fall outside the scope of the transition question, but the productive potential of peasant agriculture under rent and tax pressure hardly enters the picture either.

This is somewhat surprising, as Georges Duby, Rodney Hilton and Perry Anderson, all of whom he refers to for his fundamental theory of 'political accumulation', all emphasize the importance of rising rent pressure forcing peasants to intensify and develop production. Claudio Katz' version of a class-struggle interpretation of the Marxian theory of the transition to capitalism¹⁵⁸ closely parallels Brenner's, but also integrates a Hiltonian conception of the internal dynamics of the peasantry; to assimilate this standpoint with Brenner's theory would hardly demand much restructuration as it is implicit in important parts of his source material.

II:6.6 Once again: Sweden - eastern or western?

If Brenner's argument about the east/west divide holds water, one of Anderson's distinctive factors is undermined: the role of the cities. Looking for clues regarding Sweden's placement in Brenner's model, we might expect some relevant data to appear in the findings of the 'Scandinavian Research Project on Deserted Farms and Villages'. Eva Österberg, one of the leaders of that project, has used some of its results in a discussion of '*Peasant Upheavals, Economy and Ownership*'(1991:ch.9). Though this article doesn't touch

¹⁵⁸Katz 1989,1993.

upon questions concerning the east-west contrast¹⁵⁹, some of her arguments have parallels within that debate.

Thus she claims that 'significant rent reductions at the end of the fourteenth century or the start of the fifteenth century should probably be seen as an expression of a situation where the tenants were able to push the rents down because the landowners could not risk losing their labour', *i e* the Postan-Schlicher van Bath argument, as in Western Europe, (*cf* the 'Brenner paradox' above), although there was, especially in Denmark and Sweden 'also indications that the landowners tried to offset the fall in rents by imposing new duties in the fifteenth century' and 'the sources convey a definite impression that the large landowners had a labour shortage and was anxious to keep their tenants on the farms'; statutes and provisions to that effect are known from Sweden, Iceland and Denmark.

This appears quite compatible with Brenner's synthesis of the two demographic models, where a lowered population pressure leads to a situation where the peasantry attempts to exploit their 'scarcity' to improve their situation, while the landlords try to sharpen their control over the peasants in order to prevent this. Which side that succeeds will 'come down to a question of power, indeed of force' as Brenner comments.

The 'peasant risings in the fifteenth century', which according to Österberg 'occurred at a time of economic improvement for this category', and that she - with strong reservations - views as a possible corroboration of the theory of uprisings associated with Tocqueville, might in Brenner's context receive a much simpler explanation: direct conflict between the manifest economic interests of peasants and landowners¹⁶⁰. As Brenner concludes the cited passage: 'in fact there was intense Europe-wide lord/peasant conflict throughout the later fourteenth, fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries, almost always over the same general issues: first, of course, serfdom; second, whether lords or peasants were to gain ultimate control over landed property, in particular the vast areas left vacant after the demographic collapse.' (Aston-Philpin 34f).

In Brenner's perspective Scandinavia would follow the western pattern, but the picture is rather unclear - particularly in the case of Denmark. Despite certain doubts Österberg includes Denmark in her generalization of the situation as a fall in rents has been observed to occur *before* the later imposition of *vornedskab* (a kind of adscription). Otherwise this would rather imply an 'Eastern' development, but the reasons for the delay would have to be investigated.

¹⁵⁹Her discussion deals with theories of social unrest, and the relationship between economic situation and propensity to revolt.

¹⁶⁰I find it more reasonable to explain tendencies to social revolt from the perspective of the relations *between* the parties of the conflict, rather than searching for general correlations between the conditions of *one* of the parties and *this side's* propensity to resort to violence.

II:7 Excursus: Michael Mann and the 'four sources of social power'

Michael Mann has attempted a 'grand synthesis' encompassing almost all earlier theories of 'social power' which turns out to be an attempt at synthesizing economic history, political history and intellectual history as well. As his model avoids a priori contentions about the relative importance and interrelationships of his four 'forms of power': ideological, economic, military and political, any attempt at a capsule summary will be unfair. It is a model at least fully as audacious as any of those I have treated, but its explanatory ambitions are partly of a very different kind: where the other theories each in its own way can be described as reductionist (this applies the least to Moore and Anderson), Mann's ambition is to avoid reductionism as far as possible, which means a balance act on the brink of chaos - a 'patterned mess' is his conception of history.

Though his account is full of interesting conceptual distinctions, and the scope and level of totalizing ambition in his undertaking is only rivalled by Wallerstein, I will *not* introduce it here as a seventh model (which I had originally planned). Although at heart a neo-Weberian model, it strives to integrate the perspectives found in other analyses - including all of those considered in the present discussion - as well. In other words, what Mann attempts to do is a kind of 'synthesis of syntheses', but where he is using the concept of four different forms of power as an organizing principle for his metasyntesis I will try to use the Swedish perspective as a guideline for formulating my own conditions, and the concept of a triple miracle to set the scope of the inquiry. Thus it would seem more appropriate to use Mann's theory as a counterpoint in my discussion of how to reconcile the six perspectives with each other in the Swedish case.

I therefore adjourn a closer scrutiny of his model to a later stage in my exploration of the Swedish problem: the confrontation between theory and the realities of Sweden's history, for which purpose the final part of this essay will complete my reconnaissance tour.

PART THREE: THEORIES CONFRONTING PROBLEMS - A PRELIMINARY APPRAISAL

III:1 Agenda and balance-sheet

Through scrutinizing modern-era Swedish history in the light of these concepts and models, I hope to gain new insights not only

(1) regarding the specific position of Sweden's development within the range of those interactive society-specific trajectories that have constituted 'Europe' as a distinct part of the world, and at the same time constituted the separate states of Europe and the conditions for political and economic reproduction over the whole planet,

but also (2) regarding the complexities of the processes involved in these developments and the degree of sophistication required in any serious attempt at macrohistorical synthesis.

To anticipate the results by advancing conclusions - however preliminary - at this stage, would put an unwarranted constraint on the scope of this open-ended enterprise. Therefore I will at the moment limit myself to suggesting lines of inquiry generated by the confrontation between the analytical perspectives discussed here, and problematic features of the Swedish example. A full comparative evaluation of the models must await the results of such an inquiry, but there are similarities and divergences in their treatment of the three 'miraculous' problem complexes that need to be summarized.

Therefore I will start by discussing the contributions of the various theories in the context of their competition, and of the 'Triple Miracle'.

III:2 Theories confronting each other - and the miracles

III:2.1 My selection of theories - a defense

To begin with, I have to confront the question of selection: What kind of theories have I chosen to discuss, and why these particular six? The 'new syntheses' of the early seventies were symptomatic of a shift from deductive exemplification to exploration of contrasting historical trajectories and attempted theoretical reintegration. Admittedly, North-Thomas start out with the ambition of proving the validity of a widened-scope version of neo-classical economics as an explanation of historical change and diversity, and similarly Anderson's enterprise purports to revive the explanatory potential of Marxian historical enquiry through an explicit repudiation of the concept of orthodoxy. Still their wrestling with the complexities of the actual historical record persistently tugs them over into inductive reasoning. Moore's inquiry is the sharpest contrast to deductive explication. His method has been described as 'analytic induction'¹⁶¹ or 'macro-causal analysis'¹⁶²

In Skocpol's typologies of comparative theories, Brenner 1976 and her own comparative study of revolutions (1979) are cited as additional examples of the same category. Anderson 1974b is treated as a hybrid between 'parallel' and 'contrast-oriented comparative history' (1980) or between 'general model application' and 'interpretive sociological history' (1984). The latter description covers Wallerstein as well. Still they both argue their cases from 'bounded comparisons' similar to those explored by 'macro-analyses'. Thus the combination of generalization and contrast common to all the theories cited here, tends to break up the categories¹⁶³. In Tilly's differently organized typology comparisons can be *individualizing*, with the purpose of grasping the peculiarities of each case, *universalizing*, in order to establish the general validity of an explanation, *variation-finding*, to explain systematic differences, or *encompassing*, which signifies integrating the different instances into a self-explanatory structural totality (1984:81-83 and *passim* for the remainder of the book). *The encompassing category seems to correspond fairly well to the kind of theories I have been discussing, and to those difficult to pinpoint in Skocpol's scheme.*

¹⁶¹Rueschemeyer *et al* 1992:36-38 and n14.

¹⁶²Skocpol-Somers 1980; Skocpol's 'analytic historical sociology', applied to Moore in 1984:377-80, is a virtually identical concept. To simplify the language of reference I will not explicitly credit Somers' contribution to the closely related typologies in these two articles.

¹⁶³As Skocpol puts it, 'the most ambitious of comparative historical analysts end up borrowing emphases from our two first strategies of historical sociology to help them frame their questions and results in more encompassing or epochal ways' (1984:385).

What I endeavour to situate Sweden in, is the field of discourse defined by two comparative dimensions: the singularity of the European experience and the divergence within it, and three aspects of the uniqueness: the level and efficiency of the organization of extroverted violence, the dynamic non-circularity of economic development, and the expanding inclusiveness of political organizational forms. Each of the theories, models, approaches or perspectives I use to locate this discourse without *a priori* committing myself to any one of them, attempts to grasp over the whole field, more or less. I can think of no other synthetic enterprise, with the important exceptions of Stein Rokkan and Michael Mann¹⁶⁴, that tries to cover - or 'encompass' - as large a part of this multidimensional problem complex

III:2.2 Economic history or historical sociology ?

Discussion of this kind of general-level questions is often nowadays classified under the label of 'Historical Sociology'. I would rather consider it to be the home ground of Economic History: surely the transformation of a society of peasants and aristocracies into one of firms and workers is almost part of the definition of our discipline, and although the rise of the modern state has usually not been problematized, it is inescapably part of that transformation.

Barrington Moore is a sociologist analyzing the origins of political systems, but his central explanatory concept is variation in the form of commercialization of agriculture - quintessential economic history. Douglass North is an all-out economic historian, but he is - within his economic argumentation - prepared to concede considerable decisive influence to factors like military technology, secure political and civil rights and even 'a unified belief structure' (1993b:3). Like the four remaining authors he struggles with the question of 'Why in Europe?' as well as with explaining diversity within the modernization process, and with clarifying the relations between statemaking,

¹⁶⁴Stein Rokkan has, particularly in his 'conceptual maps of Europe' (1975:578-9, 1981:54; also in Tilly1984:133-4), systematized the question of diversity in a striking and thought-provoking way. When, however, position in a grid defined by variation in church-state relations on one axis, and in economic resource base (defined by the combined effects of city networks and 'territorial incorporation of primary-producing peripheries') on the other, is squarely identified with geopolitical location, the factors are locked so tightly into their places that change seems all but impossible. 'The time dimension' (1975:570-5) has to be imposed from outside - *i e*, independent of any dynamics inherent in the map variables; this means that the factors driving the four-phase development of state- and nation-building have to be insulated from the factors explaining the scope of its variation. This accounts for the 'remarkable flatness' and 'lack [of] dynamism' observed by Tilly (1984:139). I consider that Tilly's attempt to follow up his criticism through developing the original insights of Rokkan into a more historically conscious synthesis (1984:139-143 reads like a draft for Tilly 1990) gives me an open enough access to Rokkan's contribution without having to take on the deadweight of his functionalist premises. Mann I have discussed at the end of part I.

armed struggle and economic development - *and* the sociopolitical implications of these processes.

Thus questions concerning the 'Miracle of Voice' are at least implicitly touched upon also by Anderson (institutional preconditions and 'bourgeois revolutions'), Wallerstein ('antisystemic movements'), Tilly (forms of collective action, mobilization and revolutions) and Brenner (organizational strength of class interests)¹⁶⁵. Dynamics of internal military competition are, although they also appear in the argumentations of North, Brenner and Wallerstein, most heavily stressed by Anderson and Tilly, where they are seen as preconditions of the 'Miracle of Conquest', and, at least in Anderson's case, also of the 'Miracle of Growth'¹⁶⁶. The weakest spot common to the sociologists - Moore, Wallerstein and Tilly - is a deficient conceptualization of economic growth, which is usually treated as an unquestioned given. For a problematization of economic growth we have to turn to the economic historians - North and Brenner¹⁶⁷.

III:2.3 The Miracle of Growth

- Adam Smith revised from two directions

If we're looking for an identifiable discontinuity in the development of economic growth - a true Miracle - the industrial revolution has been the classic point to search. Recent estimates of growth in England during this period (roughly identified as 1760-1830, give or take a decade) have undermined the traditional view of a sharp break with the past (Crafts, Harley), indicating a

¹⁶⁵Tilly 1990, however, is only concerned with the repressive aspects of power and with the constraints imposed on this by the necessity of making compacts with constituents in order to survive in the long-run interstate competition. This is because he has explicitly restricted his argument to what can be explained by the interplay of capital and coercion. Wallerstein seems to consider democracy as part of the 'relatively dramatic flattening of the curve between the very top' and the rest of the 'ten to fifteen per cent of the population of the world-economy who consumed more surplus than they themselves produced'(1983:104).

¹⁶⁶This is explicitly formulated only by Anderson. Tilly takes the growth of commerce and the 'concentration of capital' into the cities for granted as the second master process shaping European history besides the 'accumulation and concentration of coercion' indispensable to state-building. As only a balanced interaction between these processes - 'capitalized coercion' - is successful in the long run, the coercive dynamics appear to be necessary for long-run growth as well, although he doesn't spell it out in this book. In Tilly 1985, however, he employed Lane's theory of 'protection rents' to argue this necessity.

¹⁶⁷Brenner does not appear to be an economic historian by department affiliation, but as his doctoral dissertation dealt with the importance of imports and reexports for the commercial expansion in Elizabethan England, as he has presented papers to the Economic History Association as well as to the American Historical Association, and he has published in *Journal of Economic History* and *Cambridge Journal of Economics* as well as in historical and political journals, I think it's fair to consider him as an at least *de facto* economic historian, especially as the main focus of most of his production is on problems of economic development.

much longer and slower transition. Harley concludes that 'Growth probably began to accelerate in the last years of the seventeenth or the early years of the eighteenth century' and that 'Modern economic growth became fully established in Britain only in the railway age.' (1993:208). This seems to move the decisive step much further back in time¹⁶⁸. As Mokyr points out '*The Wealth of Nations* was a century out of date when it was published: What it advocated had already largely been accomplished'¹⁶⁹. If we thus move back to the seventeenth century, we encounter the arguments of Brenner and North. To both of them (neo-) Malthusian dynamics are relevant to medieval and (very) early modern Europe in general, and both of them identify England's and the Netherlands' success in 'breaking through the Malthusian ceiling' during the 'crisis of the 17th century' as the decisive indication that the threshold has been passed¹⁷⁰.

In some ways they might also be able to complement each other. In order to make the two perspectives more compatible, hidden class arguments of North have to be dragged out into the open:

There is an inherent uneasiness about *classes* within North's body of works. In principle he rejects argument by class ('too large and varied a group to serve as a primary unit of action') in favour of the 'individualistic calculus of neoclassical economics', but argues that aggregation by 'commonality of interest', even up to class scale, is a more flexible substitute (1981:61). In practice, he sometimes slips into using the word, sometimes talks about 'groups' or implies class interest without specifying the subject. When (in 1981) he tries to explain differences between various national evolutions: the 'successful countries' England and Holland vs the 'less successful countries' France and Spain, he argues more or less as if the different incentive structures condition everyone in the same way. If this were so, then all the members of a society would *either* have incentives to 'direct ... resources into inventive and innovating activity' *or* they would all have incentives to 'do just the opposite'. In other places, when discussing how the different property rights structures were established, class argumentation is at least implicit:

¹⁶⁸In his discussion of the beginning of this drawn-out growth period, Harley emphasizes 'greater separation of ownership, entrepreneurship and labor' in agriculture, and more rapid 'release... [of] factors of production to other activities' (224 and 194f, where he ascribes this argument to Brenner 1976), and to the British state's 'provi[sion of] security in a turbulent international environment' and 'creat[ion of] an institutional framework that supported growth' (NB an argument congruent with North's). For different reassessments of the concept of industrial revolution, see Mokyr 1993, Landes 1993 and Hudson 1992.

¹⁶⁹Except for its strictures against the state's intervention in foreign trade'(1993:48f)

¹⁷⁰North 1981:157, Brenner in Aston-Philpin (51f, 225, 325). On this point Le Roy de Ladurie agrees with his adversary Brenner, but concludes that France reached the same point slightly earlier than Brenner thinks - after about 1720. (Aston-Philpin:104f)

In the British case, the crown tried to use continental-style economic strategies - trading monopolies etc - *but* it 'ran into effective opposition' in the form of 'a group whose own interests were best served by private property and elimination of crown monopolies' (156). In France it was the emergency situation towards the end of the Hundred Years' War that 'allowed the crown to seize the right to tax without ... consent' (149) but the choice of directing taxation towards exploiting the existing fiscal extraction 'infrastructure' of the guilds and neutralizing potential rivals in the "protection market" through tax exemption for nobility and clergy (*ibid*) locked France - as well as Spain that had developed along similar lines - into a path where the nobility acquired increasing vested interests in the preservation of this property rights structure¹⁷¹ If we try to sum up the implicit arguments, we see that:

- *groups* having different economic incentives and preferences *oppose* each other in more or less effective ways in order to preserve or transform the existing property rights structure.

What is this but a class argument? As soon as we admit this, we have to take into account not only different property rights structures but also different classes whose interests are 'best served' by different property rights structures. North argues that secure property rights are essential to growth, but what then about Brenner's argument that secure property rights *for the peasants* became an obstacle to growth in France? Then the question is not only which property rights structure 'fosters efficiency' but also *which* classes will be 'best served' by a property rights structure fostering efficiency, and why exactly *those classes'* interests would be congruent with the goal of general economic growth?

Here we come close to Brenner's discussion of under which conditions Smithian causes of economic growth are operative (1986:23-26), and of the necessity of a correspondence between the conditions for class reproduction and the conditions for economic growth. Actually North and Brenner are attempting to make complementary qualifications for under which circumstances the Smithian explanation of economic growth is valid:

If the fundamental Smithian standpoint is that specialization, costcutting and innovation under competitive pressure lead to continuous economic growth, North would add that the economic actors need stable rules that allow them to profit from their profit-maximizing behaviour, while Brenner would add that as long as the pre-existing economic system makes other reproduction strategies rational, the actors have no incentive to invent Smithian strategies.

In other words: at the point of transition between two contrasting economic systems the Smithian explanation refers to the distinctive mechanism of eco-

¹⁷¹That 'hidalgos had an aversion for trade and commerce and a preference for careers in the church, army, or government suggests that they were rational men.'(151)

conomic growth characteristic of the new system, but as soon as Smith's pre-supposition of market growth as a necessary explanation of the transformation is rejected, the contrast between the new system - where these mechanisms are operative - and the old system - where they aren't - has to be explained. Both North and Brenner reject the growth of market theorem, but they *focus on preconditions on opposite sides of the point of transition:*

*North on the preconditions necessary for the dynamics of the new system to start operating, and Brenner on those necessary for the old system to stop operating*¹⁷²

These versions of the crucial breakthrough tend to equate growth with capitalism, although North would usually call it 'efficient economic organization'.

¹⁷²That the increased economic efficiency of capitalism as such could be a sufficient reason for pre-capitalist mechanisms to stop operating is emphatically rejected by Brenner, especially in his critique of Cohen's 'techno-determinist' interpretation of Marxism (*op cit* 40-48, esp.46 n13); his fundamental point is that establishing capitalist productive relations requires a break-up of the institutionalized relationships that ensure the reproduction of lords as well as of peasants.

III:2.4 Very long-term growth: Deeper European roots

Extensive and intensive growth

There is, however, an alternative, much longer lineage of European dynamics, stretching back to the early medieval economic growth identified by Duby (1974). Some theorists would claim that this is the period where the decisive advantage is located; none more resolutely than Michael Mann, who claims that 'each and everyone' among a long list of 'popular factor explanations' of the European dynamic are deficient 'as a general explanation of the European miracle, for one reason: They start *too late* in history.'¹⁷³ In a similar vein, the claim of 'very long-term economic change' as the essence of the 'European Miracle', made by E L Jones (1981: 225) was revised by himself in (1989). There he turns the whole conception on its head by insisting on *extensive* economic growth as a normal and general condition, with an ever present potential of developing into *intensive* growth¹⁷⁴, though permanently chased by the parallel development of rent-seeking stimulated by widening possibilities. Somehow there developed a 'positive feedback between *intensive* growth once it started and the erosion of the more brutal forms of pie-slicing'(193), at least in Europe and Japan, where 'political competition [in contrast to its more general destructive role] diverted enough energy into fostering market growth for long enough to make a real difference, to change the world, no less.'(191) The envisioned tug of war between economic growth (whether extensive or intensive) and rent-seeking opens the door for an amalgamation between North's winner/loser categorization, Jones' revised theory, and the 'rent-seeking paradigm' of Ekelund-Tollison (1981). To argue such a theory without taking the logic of violent redistribution and the competitive growth of military potential¹⁷⁵ into account would result in a neoclassical parallel to the naïve economism of traditionalist Marxism, open to the same challenges of underestimating the realities of violence-backed state power. (Lane, Tilly 1981).

North *does* discuss the role of military competition in the context of the rise of the nation-state. To that we will have to return, but the roots of this process stretch as far back into the medieval shadow as do the roots of the 'very long-term growth'. The question of how these cumulative processes interact takes us back to the fundamental issues concerning the nature of pre-capitalist European society.

¹⁷³(1986:500f; cf 1988) His notion that Europe 'was leaping ahead by A.D. 1000' in the 'range of [*intensive*] power achievements ... especially in agriculture' has been sharply criticized, cf Anderson 1992b:85 and Wickham 1988

¹⁷⁴*I e.* growth *per capita*

¹⁷⁵*I e.* the dynamics eventually making the 'Miracle of Conquest' possible.

Long-term growth and the dialectics of Conquest and Growth

In the *Science & Society* debate over 'the transition from feudalism to capitalism'¹⁷⁶ Sweezy posed the question whether feudal society had an endogenous driving force propelling its development, analogous to the dynamic of capital accumulation in modern society. Hilton's suggestion that the requirements of inter-feudal competition and of overcoming the peasants' unwillingness to part with their surplus led to the necessity of perpetually strengthening seigniorial coercive power, has later been developed in somewhat different ways by Anderson and Brenner. In Anderson's version of the 'feudal dynamic' (1974a:II, ch4), the need for increasing revenues leads to a 'tug-of-war' forcing the peasants to raise their productivity. In Brenner's analysis these factors, which, he insists are essential to the lords' reproduction as a class, lead to the necessity of strengthening lordly power individually, but also collectively, and thus he defines 'political accumulation' as more or less identical to 'state-building' in a wide sense. Although he refers to Anderson as well as Hilton and Duby, he does not seem to share their view that rising pressure on the peasants would tend to raise productivity¹⁷⁷

However they may differ, Anderson and Brenner both consider these mechanisms as characteristic of the feudal economy. What happens to this independent logic of violence under capitalism?¹⁷⁸ Tilly has criticized (1981) Marxists for assimilating the logic of warfare to the economy, and non-Marxists for ignoring it or treating it in an *ad hoc* manner. The logical connection between the successive steps of war -> taxation -> protest -> suppression -> state-building that he describes in that article, is obviously supposed to be valid up to recent times, and as far as I can understand, his double dynamic of capital and coercion in (1990) more or less incorporates the earlier standpoint.

On the question of war and economy, Anderson makes an interesting contrast between the 'zero-sum game' of inter-state warfare as the most efficient

¹⁷⁶Hilton(ed)1978

¹⁷⁷To this extent, he seems to accept the 'Neo-Malthusian cum Ricardian' arguments of Le Roy Ladurie and others. Karl Gunnar Persson (1988) has argued a general tendency of long-run endogeneous technological progress, where population growth 'generated factors that countervailed diminishing returns in agriculture' (88) through more intensive methods of land use, higher labour inputs and gains from specialization. In his analysis this progress is not necessarily always visible as rising per capita production - increased leisure and land-saving techniques can conceal a rising productivity (2-3) which might not emerge until it becomes necessary. This theory might provide an explanation for the potential for rising productivity implicitly assumed in Anderson's 'feudal dynamic'.

¹⁷⁸Colin Mooers, who has applied the concept of 'political accumulation' to the development of capitalism in France and Germany seems to regard Bismarck and Napoleon III as perpetrators of what is still in essence pre-capitalist, political accumulation, although the incorporation of production into 'the circuits of international capitalism had ultimately eroded the social relations upon which the extra-economic surplus extraction depended' (1991:147)

way to increase accumulated surplus under feudalism and absolutism while the 'additive' logic of capitalism permits competitors to expand at the same time (1974b:31). North and Thomas make a somewhat similar observation in (1973:80f), but do not draw the full implications for the contrast between different kinds of societies. Otherwise North mainly assimilates warfare to the economy (as Tilly accuses Marxists of doing), even to the extent of claiming that changes in military technology, which have a very important role in his explanation of late-medieval change, can be analyzed as 'changes in relative prices' (along with demographic change etc). This hardly seems too convincing, as military success and failure cannot be reduced to functions of how much money is invested on either side. The military efficiency of the technology cannot be abstracted away, like productive efficiency of competing firms, precisely because of the difference between military-redistributive ('feudal') and productive ('capitalist') competition noted by Anderson.

Wallerstein, as argued earlier, rather makes a contrary assimilation of economy to military-political power through reducing economic growth to the growth of the system and employing military-political status as his prime indicator for position within the *economic* system of international division of labour. This interpretation is corroborated by his zero-sum conception of capitalism in (1983) and (1992).

III:2.5 The logic of violence and the 'Miracle of Conquest'

To Wallerstein, I have already argued, the conquest of an increasing part of the globe is more or less identical to that 'growth of the system' which is the unitary 'miracle' - or rather 'malady' (1992) - analyzed in his model. The process of strengthening the state internally and externally is essential to core-states as their economic advantage has to be defended against competitors.

In Moore's model extra-European conquest has no independent role. Neither has it in Brenner's, although the key role that interloping colonial 'new merchants' play in his endeavour to formulate a 'new social interpretation of the English revolution' (1993) suggests a possible connection between the 'political accumulation' of warlike state-building, and a developing struggle between rent-seekers and profit-seekers¹⁷⁹The notion that world conquest was made possible by the cumulative process of military competition is common to Anderson and Tilly, who stress the leading role of the early national states/absolutisms - Spain, France and England - in setting the pace of this state-building process¹⁸⁰; North's vision is rather similar, although described

¹⁷⁹Cf the discussion of interlopers in Ekelund-Tollison 1981:142-4. Their view of absolutist state power (24-5) also seems compatible with Brenner's 'political accumulation'.

¹⁸⁰I will return to these questions later.

in terms that might be summarized as “economies of scale in the protection business”.

The essential question, though, must be how this cumulative build-up of military force could lead to military superiority over the rest of the World, *i.e.* the *miracle* of Conquest.

To get a perspective on this, the miracle may have to be disaggregated. From Geoffrey Parker’s (1988, 1991) accounts of the military balance between Europe and the rest of the world, we can distill the following decisive turning-points:

Three stages of Conquest:

- (1) the discovery and more or less immediate conquest of areas on a lower level of military development¹⁸¹,
- (2) the military revolution, which gave Europe the necessary advantage to over-come the previously highly competitive military apparatuses of the moslem world, and
- (3) the further advantages in military technology and logistics made possible by the industrial revolution, without which the both technologically and organizationally advanced East Asian powers (China, Japan and Korea) could not have been vanquished¹⁸².

Considered like this, we may have to conclude that Conquest (1) was in one respect a windfall and a result of a geographical advantage - the Iberian peninsula and the Atlantic islands were well positioned to discover America from - but in another perspective we would still need an explanation of the outward expansivity of the countries involved. Conquest (3) - on the other hand - would rather be interpreted as an epiphenomenon of Growth. The essential problem would then be Conquest (2) and the military revolution, reasonably propelled by the internal mechanics of the state-system. This, of course, would make Sweden’s role even more crucial.

III:2.6 The deeper roots of Voice

- Downing and Koenigsberger

Among the theorists considered, Moore is the only one to whom this problem complex is the central concern. Still he doesn’t say much to clarify *why democracy developed*, although he discusses at length under what conditions this

¹⁸¹By 1650 the West had achieved military mastery of four separate areas: central and northeastern America, Siberia, some coastal areas in sub-Saharan Africa and some parts of the Indonesian-Philippine archipelago. At this stage Europeans merely exploited an advantage of military technology which they had found that they possessed. (Parker 1991)

¹⁸²Similarly, the conquest of tropical Africa etc, required a mastery of climatic disadvantages achieved through advances in medicine, building technology, communications (reducing the necessary amount of constant on-location presence for supervision) *etc*

could happen. Condition 5, the 'revolutionary break with the past' seems to be the point most crucial to him, as he seems to take for granted the traditional liberal-Marxist consensus about democracy being somehow in the interest of the bourgeoisie¹⁸³. However, the revisions of 'traditional social interpretations' of the English and French revolutions have severely undermined this perspective. One of Moore's followers has instead tried to put condition 1 into the centre of the explanation.

Brian M. Downing (1992) emphasizes the role of medieval constitutionalism as a precondition for later democratic development¹⁸⁴ - and of autocratic destruction of such institutions as an explanation of later authoritarianism. Stated in my terms inclusion (the extent of voice among the population) was successively widened in early modern Sweden, although there was no equality of voice, little responsibility towards it and not much efficiency - especially not for the peasants we might suspect¹⁸⁵ Downing distinguishes the 'Caroline absolutism' of 1680-1718 from what he terms the 'military-bureaucratic absolutism' of France, Prussia, Russia and Austria.

Because Swedish absolutism did not destroy the participatory forms of inherited medieval constitutionalism, but instead exploited lower-class resentment against the aristocracy and thus at least symbolically widened participation¹⁸⁶, he describes it as a 'populist-military absolutism' or 'caesarism', and compares it to Dutch development under the stadholders. England under the protectorate is seen as a partly similar but more idiosyncratic case - more like some sort of temporary aberration - but the final result of surviving constitutionalist traditions permitting a further development towards democracy is the same.

¹⁸³Cf Stephens' criticism against the factual basis for this. See also Therborn 1977, as well as my observations above about North's attempt to argue the point theoretically (p45).

¹⁸⁴The argument is similar to those of Joseph Strayer and Gianfranco Poggi.

¹⁸⁵On the other hand the mere fact of having an institutionalized outlet for their grievances might have lowered the threshold for the crown's attentiveness to possible causes of public unrest and its ability to prevent it (cf Österberg 1990). This discussion concerns the national level of representation - on the local level peasant interest must have had a much stronger position (cf Österberg, Aronsson, Gustafsson). As to the conception of voice as something *extended* from a narrow aristocratic oligarchy to broader segments of the population: I only wish to express the simple fact of a wider definitional base, but one important reason to use 'extent of voice' instead of 'inclusiveness of democracy' is that 'democracy means nothing if not a share of political power controlled by the many', as Rueschemeyer *et al* put it, polemizing against the concept that 'First democracy is set up ... and then it is extended to broader and broader parts of society' (1992:44). To use the expression voice for aristocratic constitutionalism as well as for peasant political influence does not have to carry the same contradictory implications, though: each class has very different interests to voice. The *Miracle of Voice*, though, is this very extension, that changes the very meaning of politics through including the formulated interests of non-privileged categories.

¹⁸⁶This interpretation is supported by the fact that active influence from the Estate of Peasants hardly appears in the Swedish Riksdag until after the collapse of absolutism.

This comparison between Sweden, England and the Netherlands has a parallel in Koenigsberger's discussion (1989) of similarities between the Swedish Riksdag, the English Parliament and the Dutch States General, where he tries to identify the conditions necessary for parliamentary survival during the time of growing monarchic power. These assemblies, despite their differences, 'all won their long-term struggles with their monarchies', and it should therefore be possible to identify the necessary conditions for parliamentary survival:

- (1) the medieval constitutional principle of *dominium politicum et regale* (as distinct from *dominium regale*) must have existed in the 16th century
- (2) the existence of a 'myth of parliament': 'the conviction that, in times of crises, these assemblies were the best venue to solve the country's problems and that ... [it] had of itself a legitimate authority, independent from that of the monarchy'
- (3) a major crisis provoking strong resistance to the monarchy. In the Netherlands this crisis came after 1572, in England after 1640. Koenigsberger concludes that 'the crisis of the last decade of the sixteenth century was not as deep as the crises in Netherlands and in England' because both the royal and the representative authority was divided (Sigismund vs. Duke Charles and Riksråd vs. Riksdag), and therefore the conflict did not develop into a polar opposition which could have driven the representative assembly 'to make claims for its authority which went beyond the norms of *dominium politicum et regale*.

However, when the next crisis of monarchical authority came the situation was different. 'Charles XI, by breaking the autonomous authority of the Riksråd in 1680, left a strong myth of the Riksdag intact, even though he had tamed it as an institution. There was therefore a united opposition to the monarchy at the next major crisis when the dramatic loss of empire coincided with a problematical succession.' Thus, the crisis of 1719 - which, Koenigsberger argues, might be regarded as part of the 'extended seventeenth century' - could lead to the victory of the Riksdag. It should be noticed that this kind of survival of representative assemblies conforms to North's condition for a positive institutional development in early modern Europe¹⁸⁷.

¹⁸⁷Furthermore, the Swedish case at least partly conforms to what North identifies as the 'most important' difference between 'England's political institutions' and 'those of its neighbors on the continent': the 'unity of its parliament. There was a single parliament for the entire country; no regional estates as in France, Spain, and the Netherlands'(1993b:18). In this respect, Sweden resembles England, although not in the absence of a 'division into towns, clergy, and nobility' noted in the same discussion.

III:2.7 What is the connection between Voice and the other 'Miracles'?

North's argument links the survival of Voice to the preconditions for Growth in the cases of England and the Netherlands. If Sweden falls within the same category, as the arguments from Downing and Koenigsberger suggest, we will have to analyze the composition of the Swedish Riksdag from what is really a class perspective: what kind of property rights structure would serve the interests of Sweden's parliamentary classes best, and is this a structure 'fostering economic growth'? If not, this calls for some revisions in North's explanation.

Although Downing's discussion of parliamentary survival is inspired by one of Moore's conditions for democratic development, in Moore's own exposition the most important linkage goes the other way, connecting Growth - as an unspoken precondition for 'commercialization of agriculture' - to Voice. To clarify this relationship we have to specify different stages of Voice. Moore's argument can be reconstructed thus: without a starting point including voice for the aristocracy, a later development, where the commercialization of agriculture caused by Growth opens possibilities for the extension of voice, will not be possible.

As to the connection between Voice and Conquest the notion that voice for the peasants is a precondition for employing them for military purposes is present as an implicit assumption in many contexts, as well as stated outright by Anderson (concerning Swedish peasants) etc.

Conversely, Voice is widely understood as a consequence of war mobilization, as participation in a war effort is often seen as an argument for civil and political rights¹⁸⁸.

Rueschemeyer, Stephens and Stephens (1992) argue that 'capitalist development is associated with democracy because it transforms the class structure, strengthening the working and middle classes and weakening the landed upper class. It was not the capitalist market nor capitalists as the new dominant force, but rather the contradictions of capitalism that advanced the cause of democracy.'⁽⁷⁾ Their perspective is thus quite different from Moore's as well as North's. If we accept their well-documented conclusions about democratic breakthroughs, the early institutional heritage of Sweden may seem to be beside the point. On the other hand - might not the relationship between capitalist production and the density of civil society work in the other direction too, as an interactive process?

Robert D. Putnam (1993) has studied the contrast between Northern and Southern Italy, trying to quantify and explain differences in the performance

¹⁸⁸E.g. Therborn 1977 Rueschemeyer *et al* 1992:70f. Anderson 1974a makes similar points about Ancient democracy.

of political institutions, and has come up with surprisingly strong correlations implying not only that the widely varying present-day potential for democratic efficiency in different regions is strongly conditioned by 'civic traditions' reaching as far back as the city republics of Northern Italy and the 'feudal monarchy founded by the Normans in the Mezzogiorno'(133), but also that 'economics does not predict civics, but civics does predict economics, better indeed than economics itself.'¹⁸⁹

Putnam's arguments, including the concept of 'social capital'¹⁹⁰ would obviously be relevant for Sweden's contradictory combination of institutional precociousness and late, but - when finally arrived - very rapid and thorough, modernization. His emphasis on traditions of cooperative behaviour in horizontally organized communities versus traditions of corruption and strategies of distrust, in vertically organized ones, as the fundamental divergence between North's vicious and virtuous cycles of path dependence also seem consonant with Brenner's description of the fundamental differences between peasant collective power in Western and Eastern European villages.

¹⁸⁹The ratings on 'civil involvement' during the first decade of this century is a better predictor than the ratings on 'socioeconomic development' during the same time, not only of civil involvement in the '70s, *but also of socioeconomic development during the '70s!* 'Institutional performance' in the '80s is also much better predicted by civic involvement than by socioeconomic development. These very striking results should not be taken at face value, though, as 'socioeconomic development' turns out to mean 'size of industrial workforce' combined with decrease of infant mortality. The 'civic involvement' variables may simply be more adequate indicators of what we might call "socioeconomic sophistication" as they include incidence of cooperatives and membership in mutual aid societies.(152-8,205) Such a 'weak' interpretation of the results would, however, still retain force as an argument for close interaction between economic and civic development.

¹⁹⁰NB: this concept is *not* to be confused with Bourdieu's homonymous concept, which is a metaphor for an individual asset: the economic advantage of social status, while Putnam's concept is a collective asset: the economic advantage of being able to cooperate. See 167-176 and 241 n20.

III.3 The theories confronting Sweden: Preliminary assessments

Two fundamental questions have motivated this discussion: (1) what use can we make of this kind of generalizing perspectives within the study of Swedish history, and (2) how would these theories be affected by including the Swedish experience?

To answer these questions would require undertaking a full integration of the Swedish case into each of the analyses, thereby modifying theory as well as historiography. My ambition here is far more modest: I will only summarize my arguments as to (1) why each of these approaches is relevant to the discussion of Sweden and should be capable of yielding important insights¹⁹¹, and (2) why each of these models should be obliged to integrate, or in some cases to reconsider, the Swedish example, in order to fully realize its explanatory potential.

I start with the first question, but as the challenges posed by the different theories overlap, my discussion will be somewhat peripatetic:

III:3.1 The utility of synthetic perspectives for the comparative study of Sweden

In *Anderson's* analysis of the two halves of Europe, Western absolutist development - eventually leading to capitalism and to democracy - is explained by the internal dynamics of feudalism, and the need for the noble ruling class to consolidate their power as economic growth leads to stronger cities and freer peasants. When legal-coercive power is thus displaced towards the top of the feudal pyramid, inter-feudal rivalry is also raised onto a higher regional level, as is the scale and intensity of warfare. In Eastern Europe, where the lords had succeeded to suppress the peasants and undercut the position of the towns¹⁹², absolutist statebuilding did not grow out of internal compulsion, but became necessary for national survival under external military pressure. This military pressure is applied by Sweden, which, as I have tried to show, does not conform very well to *Anderson's* description, except in one way: as an in-between case. On this very point, he backs off, though, and redefines it as predominantly Western.

Whatever we may think of *Anderson's* argument:

¹⁹¹Of course many of these questions have been raised before, often requiring no synthesizing perspectives to be formulated, but to my purpose the important thing is to raise them *in this double context* - as problems of European history as well as of Swedish.

¹⁹²The rise of manorial economy decreased the utility of towns to landlords, to whom the towns became rivals for labour power, for monopoly revenues and ultimately also for control over the export market.(1974a:251-60)

(A) *The contrast between Western and Eastern European development is a well-established historical fact*¹⁹³

(B) *Sweden's intermediary position in the aspects noted by Anderson is incontrovertible*

Thus it seems to me that:

• *The political implications of what historical implacement we ascribe to Sweden should be of particular interest in the present situation*¹⁹⁴

Here Brenner's analysis also comes into the picture, giving a different perspective on (essentially) the same divide:

• *What patterns of class conflict and class conflict resolution conditioned the formation of the Swedish state? Patterns similar to the English-Dutch, the French-Western German or the Northeastern? Or still another variant, conferring what historical legacy ?*

• *What conflicting requirements for class reproduction, implying what various dynamics of development, conditioned these class conflicts ?*

As to the question of economic dynamics, Brenner's insistence that it is ultimately the threat to class reproduction - in the final instance bankruptcy as a result of not keeping up with competition - that ensures the dynamic development of productivity under capitalism, might give us reasons to view the Swedish tax-peasants in a different light. The institution of *skattevrak*, ('tax eviction') making a peasant lose his freehold if he failed to pay his taxes for three years (Herlitz 1974:156n29), put a similar kind of pressure on the freeholder - especially in conjunction with the recurrently increasing level of taxation during the first stages of Sweden's rise to Great Power status¹⁹⁵.

¹⁹³cf Chirot (ed)1989, *passim*.

¹⁹⁴*I e:* At a time when Sweden's relationship to the EC is hotly debated, and when the East-West tension is (temporarily?) dissolved, but the historical and political conclusions to be drawn from this development have hardly yet reached the stage of formulating the relevant questions. That the historical roots of the modern East/West conflict dimension are an important motivation behind Anderson's analysis should be evident, as the roots of today's North/South conflict dimension are traced by Wallerstein, and the danger of reversal from democracy is a central concern of Moore's. The traditional neutrality of Sweden is now being questioned, as is the entire "Swedish model" of societal development. That the twin dangers of self-devaluation and self-complacency tend to polarize the discussion is a reflection of a mode of thought where the context of Sweden is kept separate from the context of the world. [comment: this note was written a few months before the EU membership referendum]

¹⁹⁵There is some historical evidence indicating that peasants could succeed to raise productivity in face of the increasing burden of war-time exactions, both taxes and conscription.(Lindgren 1980:ES302-3). Although 'evicted' peasants generally were allowed to stay on as tenants of the crown (or of the nobility, if the farms were enfeoffed), the security of allodial property rights were so important to the peasants that the crown could get buyers even for incomplete birthrights at high prices during the reign of John III.(cf Loit 1979) This is of course not a matter of life and death, but neither is bankruptcy. A totally different problem of class (?) reproduction with complex implication is traced by Artéus, who shows that there were strong material incentives for

And, as we have seen, *North's* approach - despite the contrasting political bias - also implies class interest as an unacknowledged last instance determinant, though his indicators as well as his mechanisms are quite different.¹⁹⁶ Thus we should also ask:

• *What kind of property rights structure developed in Sweden, as a result of which development of transaction costs, implying what economic consequences, being in the interest of what social group (class) ?*

The system of different kinds of property rights in land¹⁹⁷ peculiar to Sweden, and the redefinition of property rights structure/property relations entailed by the Reduction and the Allotment system (should offer a rich material for analysis within transaction cost as well as class reproduction perspectives. The complexities are not to be slighted: what may at first look like payment in kind, like in the tax rolls closely specifying dues in rye, eggs, tallow, dried pike, manure, iron, hops and whatever, might very well turn out to have been paid in cash, but the sums of taxes due converted into money is conventional and may bear little relation to what was actually paid according to regularly revised local prices-current. This system, though unwieldy, offered great opportunities for shifting the burden of transaction costs, or, conversely, the opportunities for making realization profits. Although in principle suited to preserve real value in the face of inflation, its rigidities might conceal considerable inflationary redistributions.

The role of this transaction cost problem complex facing the early modern Swedish state, *first* in making it move towards a sort of "national house-holding partly in kind" under Gustavus Vasa¹⁹⁸ *then*, during the period of impe-

officer breadwinners to avoid war(364) during the 18th century; although he gives plausible evidence for his view that the military during this time were so powerful that they 'did away with three constitutionally established systems of government - Carolean absolutism, the parliamentary rule of the Liberty era, and the Gustavian autocracy - which had become detrimental to their vital interests as a corporation', he also describes the average 18th century Swedish officer as 'more of a country squire ... than a soldier'(415 ;English in original).

¹⁹⁶But, as we have also seen, his criteria for a society conducive to economic growth are congruent with Brenner, as is his identification of *which* societies that were.

¹⁹⁷Different kinds of *jordnatur* ('land nature') 'constituting totally different kinds of property in land', according to Herlitz, who argues that to own *skatte* land (tax-peasant or freehold land) is to own the right to pay rent/tax to the crown, while to own *frälse* land ('free', *i e* noble land) is to own the right to receive rent. (Herlitz 1974:145-6; the system is described in English on pp 382-3 and in Herlitz 1982) Other 'natures' of land were *krono* land (Crown land) where the Crown received rent from tenants with various degrees of security of tenure, and *skattefrälse* where freeholders payed their tax to a nobleman holding the tax, but not the land, in fief.

¹⁹⁸Heckscher's opinion that this represented a survival of medieval practices and that it was an indication of low level of economic development - taken at face value by Roberts and through him Anderson (178-9) and Wallerstein (1974:312-3,1980:203-4) - has been re-evaluated by historians emphasizing that this policy was deliberately chosen for economically rational reasons. Repaying loans from Lübeck in butter, *e g* was not a sign of primitive economic level, as Heckscher believed, but motivated by favourable relative prices, the possibility of levying extraordinary

rial expansion, for its attempts to solve the problem of financing warfare by enfeoffments, sale of privileges *etc*¹⁹⁹, and, once again, in finally necessitating the change of system heralded by the Reduction. Over the entire period there was a slow, gradual, but for a long time reversible, drift from taxation in kind (including allotted taxes; the same thing holds for rents²⁰⁰ to monetized taxes. Both the long term consequences and the possibilities of shifting the costs and benefits of the system at various points in this development would require a lot more of investigation. The question of how to finance warfare moves us over into *Tilly's* domain. It is crucial to his theory that military competition exposes the superiority of the national state - understood as the form of state characteristic of the capitalized coercion path - and thereby forces other countries to converge onto this path²⁰¹ In 1555 'only France and England resembled our conventional models of national states'(31), he claims. However, so did Sweden, to *at least as great an extent*. despite being classified as a 'coercion-intensive state'.

• *How can we reconcile the precocious form of the Swedish state with its supposed economic backwardness, and its similarities in repressive state-building to what is essentially Anderson's and Brenner's Eastern pattern*²⁰²? *This paradox is closely related to the contradictory coexistence of*

taxes in kind and the reluctance to deplete the treasury.(Hammarström 407-25, 465-7). Myrdal-Söderberg conclude that the Swedish economy during late 16th century was more varied and dynamic than Heckscher, Malowist and Wallerstein believed: *e g* were Swedish long distance transports in the internal cattle trade of comparable relative dimensions as those in continental Europe.(483-7,532-5). On this last point Christina Dalhede - who has studied the continental European trade in oxen - has expressed serious doubts (personal communication).

¹⁹⁹Lindgren 1985 argues that converting crown incomes into internationally negotiable form to finance warfare was *the* central objective for national economic policy during this period - even to the extent of incurring substantial nominal losses (*e g* through tax exemption) in order to acquire products with internationally acceptable exchange-value. This problem complex I have discussed elsewhere in terms of a 'feudal realization problem' (Emilsson 1992)

²⁰⁰Compare Brenner's criticism of Bois' 'falling tendency of feudal levy', where he observes that inflation loss because of fixed rents in money could have been averted if the landlords had had the power to revert to rent in kind (Aston-Philpin 246). In Sweden noblemen were very aware of this problem and tended to avoid money rent (Munktel 1982:106).

²⁰¹'Why didn't Venice or Russia become England?. The question is not absurd; it follows from the recognition that European states in general moved toward greater concentrations of capital and coercion, converging on the national state. Part of the answer is: they did. The Russian and Italian states that entered World War I had far more of the traits of national states than had their predecessors... But even the successor states bore marks of their previous identities'(160).

²⁰²The different logic of Tilly's typology and his inclusion of Castile and Sicily into the same pattern makes no difference to the basic problem of Sweden's impalement. His nation-state or capitalized-coercion category is of course congruent to Anderson's 'Western absolutism' pattern: England, France, Spain - and Prussia after incorporation of the Rhineland (to Tilly this is a fusion of coercive and capitalist trajectories, like Castile-Aragon-Catalonia; to Anderson it is at least the beginning of a 'westward drift')

*an - in an international perspective -unusually high degree of control over individuals with an unusually wide extent of personal freedom.*²⁰³

Tilly's nexus between lack of easily taxable monetary flows and necessity of repressive tax exploitation is made more conditional in Downing's analysis (78f), where 'advanced economy' is but one of four factors that can soften the repressive consequences of war-induced tax-financed absolutist statebuilding. Geography/topography is not all that relevant to the Swedish case²⁰⁴, but alliances and mobilizing foreign resources through conducting war abroad are both highly pertinent factors²⁰⁵ This reinforces the questions about Sweden's role within the wider European system, whether in an Andersonian or Wallersteinian sense. First, let us return to the opening discussion in this overview, and the problem of Sweden's role within the European inter-state militarizing dynamic:

• *Are the reasons for Sweden's military expansion connected to an internal European dynamic of militarization, and, in that case, how? What European and Swedish causes lay behind the 'Military Revolution' and how were they connected? Is Sweden's formative influence over eastern European development purely accidental or is it somehow part of the general dynamics of European development, whether Anderson's model holds or not?*²⁰⁶

The post-idealist range of explanations for Sweden's military expansion have comprised²⁰⁷: (1) *geopolitical necessity* - the traditional viewpoint, revived by Roberts, (2) *trade-control rivalry* - most forcefully argued by Attman (1979) - and, now and then appearing as a heretical counterpoint, (3) *externalization of class struggle*. (Strindberg, Lindgren).

The second variety is of course the one most easily assimilated into a model like *Wallerstein's*. As we have seen, though, the mechanisms of trade, exploitation and dependence are not unilinear: even in exploitative exchange relations there is an element of mutual dependence which either side can try

²⁰³The personal freedom and independent legal status of Swedish peasants, which *e g* made it possible for freeholders to hold their own against noblemen who had been awarded their tax in fief. (*cf* *Bördor, bönder, börd*...). Their political representation and participation in local political self-government in parish and hundred assemblies (*cf* Österberg, Aronsson, Gustafson). On the other hand the personal registration of the population and their place of birth, age, domicile, religious orthodoxy *etc* (Roberts 1973:168-70, Nilsson 1988:34).

²⁰⁴A parallel to the traditional English or Swiss arguments about protected geographic position equalling less need of a standing army and less risk of internal repression would not make sense in this context - after all, Sweden *did* raise an army of record-breaking proportions.

²⁰⁵Åström 1973:82-5

²⁰⁶In Tilly's model the *early national states* set the pace for coercive accumulation in the same way as Sweden does for the east in Anderson's model.

²⁰⁷These categories roughly correspond to Roberts' division of Swedish scholarly opinion into an 'Old School', a 'New School' and a more 'tendentious' social interpretation (1979,ch.1).

to turn to its greater advantage, and where outcome will be contingent both on the institutional context (*cf* North) and on the strength of the parties (*cf* Brenner).

• *How should we evaluate Sweden's (conditional?) early integration into the European and extra-European "division of labour" as a semi-monopolist supplier of strategic products²⁰⁸, the mutual dependence relations inherent in these trade relations, and in the chains of credit/advance/investment connecting buyers and suppliers with each others and with financial centres?*

Interpreting every step in the chain either as 'debt bondage' or as 'commercial credit' or as 'capital investment' would probably be totally misleading. We cannot take for granted that even a single step was interpreted in the same way by both sides, or even, that in such cases, one of the parties would be objectively 'in the right'²⁰⁹. Comparing early Swedish forms of credit and investment with those of other European economies will be necessary²¹⁰. Essential to the possibility of a 'reciprocal' rather than purely 'exploitative' relation in these contexts is some form of independence: personal (as in the case of Åström's tar-burners compared to Malowist's Polish peasants), or national (as in the case of 18th century Sweden compared to a (neo)colonial primary product producer). This takes us back to the question of Swedish peasant freedom, and, since we are still within the domain of

²⁰⁸Note that copper, bar iron and tar are by no means raw materials, but intermediate products with a considerable value added component - especially by the standards of the time. Among finished products, the role of Sweden's arms industry should be of importance in this context. (*cf* Cipolla)

²⁰⁹This would require that there was a general rule system that was 'appropriate' or 'legitimate' for the whole range of societies affected. The limited degree of integration between economies, and the uneven and unparallel development of these, renders such speculations quite pointless.

²¹⁰Adamson 1966 discusses the relations between merchants and ironmasters during the earlier 19th century throwing considerable doubt on the presumption that merchant credit put ironmasters in a state of dependence. He also surveys discussions of similar arrangements in international literature, but observes that the disparity of source material and treatment makes it difficult to reach any conclusive results. His general evaluation is that no *a priori* assertions about the role of merchant credit and the role of middlemen can be upheld (*cf* similar conclusions in Malowist 1981). Rita Bredefeldt confirms the picture for the 17th century: mortgage loans were a common form of financing iron production, and the relations between ironworks owners and credit grantors was in general businesslike and non-exploitative. As to the mining peasants during the same century, Maria Sjöberg compares their situation to petty producers involved in putting-out systems in other parts of Europe, and to specialized peasants in the Netherlands (de Vries), concluding that the independent social position of the producers, and the development of local and regional markets, are important factors in an explanation of their successful resistance to merchant capital control. (194-9) Maria Ågren's (1992) study of credit regulation reform observe a certain improvement of creditor protection, but emphasizes the growing impersonal and formalized character of debt regulation. Also *cf* the studies by Karlsson and Åström referred to earlier.

power politics, the relation between coercion abroad and strict constraints on internal coercion should have to be explored:

• *What connection is there between Swedish peasant freedom and external aggression? Was the inclusion of peasants into the constituency a precondition for the expansion (as Anderson would have it), a cause (Lindegren) or maybe a result (if we date factual peasant inclusion to their appearance as an articulate political force in the mid-17th century) ?*

This is a question of Voice, and thus Moore's problematic is brought to the fore. If we accept Hall's useful but brutal summarization of his central argument, the political system of a society is shaped by its 'style of peasant dispossession', or 'the way it loses [or disciplines] its peasantry'(149-50).

The Swedish peasantry has been disciplined rather than dispossessed²¹¹. This was effected by the state (as in Moore's Russian and Chinese examples), though not in a third stage modernization spurt by a totalitarian state brought about through political manipulation of 'revolutionary peasant solidarity', but by an *Ancien Régime* making use of (or creating?) what Moore has called 'conservative peasant solidarity', which derives its cohesion by 'tying those with potential and actual grievances into the prevailing social structure' thereby 'provid[ing] a legitimate if lowly status for those with little or no property both in modern and premodern times'(476,477)²¹². Such an interpretation could serve as a counterbalance to an otherwise maybe too easily idealized interpretation of early peasant representation. As to full democracy, and the appearance of a working class demanding franchise: This new actor appears on each national stage not until the setting is in place, and the casting is done. The question is: what kind of roles exist? A tradition of 'conservative solidarity' among the peasants supplies a model for patriarchal integration possible to extend to workers as well.

III:3.2 Summing up: The necessity of integrating the exceptional case

These roundabout movements through problems and peculiarities that comparative historical approaches might render more amenable to analysis, are of course at the same time an argument for comparativists to rise to the challenge of accepting these aspects as parts of the *explicanda* of international and general European history as well. I will, however, also return to the more precise question of why I consider this to be *necessary* for each of the theoretical approaches I have discussed.

²¹¹ Unless we speak about the crofters, which we probably also should.

²¹²This is a feature of his Indian and Japanese examples, except for the early role of the state. There is also a variety called 'weak solidarity' typified by France and Western Germany.

Thus I argue that the failure to fully integrate the example of Sweden leaves:

- *Moore's* theory without an answer to how democracy can have developed anywhere after the industrial revolution, and thus in its present form largely irrelevant to those questions of contemporary world politics, that must have given it its original impetus

- *North's* analysis without having to confront the contradictory and vacillating trajectory of a country neither on the 'dead-end path pursued by Spain and Portugal', nor consistently on 'the successful paths to evolving more efficient institutions pursued by the Netherlands and England'²¹³

- *Anderson's* model bereft of his crucial link between the endogenous forces creating Western absolutism and the exogenous military pressure enforcing an Eastern counter-absolutism

- *Wallerstein's* system without consistent mechanisms for changes of position in the structure, and without consistent criteria for identifying these structural positions

- *Tilly's* analysis unable to discriminate between sharply contrasting trajectories in the emergence of political systems, and hiding a glaring inconsistency within its crucial identification of the national state, the path of capitalized coercion and the European advantage,

and, finally,

- *Brenner's* theory escaping the obligation to confront a full-scale challenge to his large-estate bias²¹⁴.

²¹³ Although he in the quoted passage argues that 'Path-dependency suggests that we can learn as much' from both kinds of paths (1991:36), he does not really confront the possibility of any middle ways. The strict dichotomy of *either* vicious or virtuous circles is not allowed to be broken up by any discussion of mixed cases - not even in the case of France.

²¹⁴ In this last case, as in many of the others, Sweden by no means provides the sole counterexample. I believe that similar claims of uniqueness could be made for many other 'small countries', although I doubt that any of them would have moved along quite as contradictory a trajectory as Sweden - with the possible example of the Netherlands. Jan de Vries' analysis (1974) of the dynamics of specialization among peasants is an important challenge to many of the presumptions made in the models treated above, but it is formulated according to conditions in such a singular case (hegemonic core power, capital-intensive, bourgeois revolutionary or whatever) that the full force of the challenge hits the models in different weak spots than a 'Swedish peasant model' might (but cf Myrdal-Söderberg's attempt to adapt his model for Swedish use 1991: 35-8, 53, 517-9).

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Adamson, Rolf 1966: *Järnavsättning och bruksfinansiering 1800-1860*. Meddelanden från Ekonomisk-historiska institutionen vid Göteborgs universitet 7. [Summary (untitled): pp 169-175]
- Agardh-Ljungberg 1857: *Försök till statsekonomisk statistik över Sverige*, 3:2. (Carlstad)
- The Agrarian Situation in the Community* 1991. Commission of the European Communities.
- Ågren, Maria 1992: *Jord och gäld. Social skiktning och rättslig konflikt i södra Dalarna ca 1650-1850* Studia Historica Upsaliensia 166
[Zusammenfassung: Boden und Schuld. Soziale Schichtung und rechtlicher Konflikt im südlichen Dalarna um 1650-1850. (pp 273-279)]
- Ågren, Kurt 1973: 'The *reduktion*.' In Roberts (ed) 1973
- Anderson, Perry 1974a: *Passages from Antiquity to Feudalism*. (London: NLB)
- Anderson, Perry 1974b: *Lineages of the Absolutist State*. (London: NLB)
- Anderson, Perry 1976: *Considerations on Western Marxism*. (London:NLB)
- Anderson, Perry 1992a: *English Questions*. (London, New York: Verso)
- Anderson, Perry 1992b: *A Zone of Engagement*. (London, New York: Verso)
- Aronsson, Peter 1992: *Bönder gör politik. Det lokala självstyret som social arena i tre smålandssocknar, 1680-1850*. (Lund: Lund University Press)
[English Summary: Peasants Making Politics. Local Self-government as a Social Arena. The Småland Parishes of Bergunda, Öja and Älmeboda, ca. 1680-1850. (pp 345-351)]
- Artéus, Gunnar 1982: *Krigsmakt och samhälle i frihetstidens Sverige*. (Stockholm: Militärhistoriska Förlaget) [Summary: Military and society in Sweden during the Liberty era (1719-72)]
- Aston, T H - Philpin, C H E (eds) 1985: *The Brenner Debate*. (Cambridge: CUP)
- Åström, Sven-Erik 1973: 'Swedish Economy and Sweden's role as a Great Power 1632-1697.' In Roberts (ed) 1973
- Åström, Sven-Erik 1977: 'Majmiseriet. Försök till en historisk och konceptuell analys.' *Historisk Tidskrift för Finland*
- Attman, Artur 1979: *The Struggle for Baltic Markets. Powers in Conflict 1558-1618*. Acta Regiae Societatis Scientiarum et Literarum Gothoburgensis. Humaniora 13 (Göteborg)
- Bäck, Kalle 1992: *Början till slutet. Laga skiftet och torpbebyggelsen i Östergötland 1827-65*. (Klockrike: Noteria) [Summary (untitled) pp132-136]

- Baechler, J - Hall, J A - Mann, M (eds) 1988: *Europe and the Rise of Capitalism*. (Oxford, Cambridge MA: Blackwell)
- Bairoch, P - Batou, J - Chèvre, P 1988: *La population des villes européennes. Banque de données et analyse des résultats*. (Genève: Librairie Droz)
- Bairoch, Paul 1993: *Economics and World History*. (Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf)
- Blackbourn, David - Eley, Geoff 1984: *The Peculiarities of German History*. (Oxford: Oxford University Press)
- Blickle, Peter 1989: 'Peasant Political Representation in Sweden and Switzerland - A Comparison.' In Stjernquist (ed) 1989
- Blum, Jerome 1978: *The End of the Old Order in Rural Europe*. (Princeton: PUP)
- Bois, Guy 1984: *The Crisis of Feudalism: Economy and Society in Eastern Normandy*. (Cambridge: CUP)
- Bois, Guy 1985: 'Against the Neo-Malthusian Orthodoxy.' In Aston-Philpin (eds) 1985
- Bördor, bönder, börd i 1600-talets Sverige*. (Redaktörer: Margareta Revera och Rolf Torstendahl. Uppsala 1979. Distribution: Studentlitteratur, Lund)
- Brady, Thomas A 1991: 'The Rise of Merchant Empires, 1400-1700: A European Counterpoint.' In Tracy (ed) 1991
- Braudel, Fernand 1981: *Civilization and Capitalism. Vol 1: The Structures of Everyday Life: The Limits of the Possible*. (New York: Harper and Row)
- Bredfeldt, Rita 1994: *Tidigmoderna företagarstrategier. Järnbrukens ägar- och finansieringsförhållanden under 1600-talet*. Stockholm Studies in Economic History 19 (Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell International) [Summary: Early modern entrepreneurs. Ownership and financing of the Swedish ironworks in the 17th century. (pp 182-191)]
- Brenner, Robert 1976: 'Agrarian Class Structure and Economic Development in Pre-Industrial Europe.' In: Aston-Philpin (eds) 1985
- Brenner, Robert 1977: 'The Origins of Capitalist Development: a Critique of Neo-Smithian Marxism.' *New Left Review* 104
- Brenner, Robert 1978: 'Dobb on the Transition from Feudalism to Capitalism.' *Cambridge Journal of Economics* 1978:2
- Brenner, Robert 1982: 'The Agrarian Roots of European Capitalism.' In: Aston-Philpin (eds) 1985
- Brenner, Robert 1986: 'The Social Basis of Economic Development.' In: John Roemer (ed) 1986: *Analytical Marxism* (Cambridge: CUP)
- Brenner, Robert 1987: 'Feudalism'. Article in: *The New Palgrave: A Dictionary of Economics*. (London and Basingstoke: Macmillan)

Sweden and the European Miracles

- Brenner, Robert 1989: 'Economic Backwardness in Eastern Europe in Light of Developments in the West.' In: Chirot (ed) 1989
- Brenner, Robert 1993: *Merchants and Revolution. Commercial Change, Political Conflict, and London's Overseas Traders 1550-1653*. (Princeton: PUP)
- Chirot, Daniel (ed) 1989: *The Origins of Backwardness in Eastern Europe. Economics & Politics from the Middle Ages until the Early Twentieth Century*. (Berkeley, Los Angeles, Oxford: University of California Press)
- Cieslak, E - Olszewski, H (eds): *Changes in two Baltic Countries. Poland and Sweden in the XVIIIth Century*. (Poznan: UAM)
- Cipolla, Carlo M 1965: *Guns and Sails in the Early Phase of the European Expansion*. (London: Collins)
- Claessen, H J M 1992: 'Coercion, Capital and European States AD 990-1990, by Charles Tilly.' *International Review of Social History* Vol 37:P1, pp 99-102
- Dahlgreen, Peter 1986: *Polsk feudalisme? En historiografisk oversigt*. (Roskilde)
- Downing, Brian M 1992: *The Military Revolution and Political Change. Origins of democracy and autocracy in early modern Europe*. (Princeton: PUP)
- Duby, Georges 1974: *The Early Growth of the European Economy: Warriors and Peasants from the 7th to the 12th century*. (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson)
- Eisenstadt, S E - Rokkan, S 1973: *Building States and Nations. Models and Data Resources. Volume I*. (Beverly Hills, London: SAGE)
- Ekelund, Robert B - Tollison, Robert D 1981: *Mercantilism as a Rent-Seeking Society. Economic Regulation in Historical Perspective*. (College station)
- Emilsson, Erik Örjan 1991: 'Sverige mellan Öst och Väst? En diskussion om svårigheterna att inordna Sverige i bilden av det moderna Europas framväxt, med utgångspunkt i Andersons Den absoluta statens framväxt.' (mimeo) Department of Economic History, University of Gothenburg
- Emilsson, Erik Örjan 1992: 'Mellan modellerna eller utanför utvecklingslinjerna? Något om de Europeiska olikheternas orsaker och de Svenska säregenheternas svårförklarlighet.' (mimeo) Department of Economic History, University of Gothenburg
- Fenoaltea, Stefano 1975: 'The Rise and Fall of a Theoretical Model: The Manorial System.' *Journal of Economic History* XXXV 386-409
- Ferm, Olle 1990: *De bögdliga godsens i Sverige vid 1500-talets mitt - geografisk uppbyggnad, väntestruktur, godsdrift och hushållning*. Studier till det medeltida Sverige 4 (Stockholm: Riksantikvarieämbetet)

- [Summary: The Aristocratic Estates in Sweden at the middle of the 16th Century. (pp 473-477)]
- Field, Alexander James 1981: 'The problem with Neoclassical Institutional Economics: A Critique with Special Reference to the North/Thomas Model of Pre-1500 Europe.' *Explorations in Economic History* 18, 174-198
- Finer, Samuel 1975: 'Military Forces and State-making.' In: Tilly (ed) 1975
- Fisher, Douglas - Thurman, Walter N 1989: 'Sweden's Financial Sophistication in the Nineteenth Century: An Appraisal' *Journal of Economic History* Vol. XLIX, No. 3: 621-34
- Flora, Peter 1983: *State, Economy and Society in Western Europe 1815-1975. Volume I: The Growth of Mass Democracies and Welfare States.* (Frankfurt:Campus)
- Flora, Peter - Kraus, Franz - Pfenning, Winfried 1987: *State, Economy and Society in Western Europe 1815-1975. Volume II: The Growth of Industrial Societies and Capitalist Economies.* (Frankfurt:Campus)
- Forssell, Hans 1869: *Sveriges inre historia från Gustaf den förste. Första delen* (Stockholm: P A Norstedt & Söner)
- Fritz, Sven 1990: 'Commercial Banking in Late Eighteenth Century Sweden.' in Cieslak - Olszewski (eds) 1990
- Fulbrook, Mary - Skocpol, Theda 1984: 'Destined Pathways: The Historical Sociology of Perry Anderson.' In: Skocpol (ed) 1984
- Gadd, Carl-Johan 1990: 'How Poor was Sweden? On the Agrarian Revolution in Sweden and Its Conditions.' In: Cieslak - Olszewski (eds) 1990
- Gellner, Ernest 1988: 'Introduction.' In: Baechler-Hall-Mann (eds) 1988
- Gustafsson, Harald 1994: *Political Interaction in the Old Regime. Central Power and Local Society in the Eighteenth Century Nordic States.* (Lund: Studentlitteratur; Bromley: Chartwell Bratt Ltd)
- Hall, John A 1985: *Powers and Liberties. The Causes and Consequences of the Rise of the West.* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell)
- Hall, John A 1988: 'States and Societies: The Miracle in Comparative Perspective.' In: Baechler-Hall-Mann (eds) 1988
- Halsbury's Laws of England*, 4th ed. 1982 (London: Butterworth's)
- Hammarström, Ingrid 1956: *Finansförvaltning och varuhandel. Studier i de yngre Sturarnas och Gustav Vasas statsbushållning.* (Uppsala: Almqvist & Wiksell)
- Harley, C Knick 1993: 'Reassessing the Industrial Revolution: A Macro View' in Mokyr (ed) 1993

- Heller, Agnes 1977: Review of Perry Anderson: 'Passages from Antiquity to Feudalism' and 'Lineages of the Absolutist State' *Telos* 33
- Herlitz, Lars 1974: *Jordegendom och ränta. Omfördelningen av jordbrukets merprodukt i Skaraborgs län under frihetstiden.* Meddelanden från Ekonomisk-historiska institutionen vid Göteborgs Universitet 31 [Summary: Land Ownership and rent. The redistribution of the surplus of agriculture in the province of Skaraborg during the Freedom Time. (pp 378-387)]
- Herlitz, Lars 1982: 'Large Estates and Small Holdings, Lords and Peasants in Scandinavia: Sweden' in *Grand domaine et petites exploitations en Europe au Moyen Age et dans les Temps Modernes: Rapports Nationaux.* (Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó)
- Hilton, Rodney H (ed) 1978: *The Transition from Feudalism to Capitalism* (London: NLB)
- Hirst, Paul 1975: 'The Uniqueness of the West.' *Economy and Society* 4(4)
- Holton, R J 1985: *The Transition from Feudalism to Capitalism* (Houndmills, London: MacMillan)
- Hudson, Pat 1992: *The Industrial Revolution* (London: Edward Arnold)
- ILO 1990: *Year Book of Labour Statistics 1945-1989. Retrospective Edition on Population Censuses.* (Geneva)
- ILO 1993: *Year Book of Labour Statistics 1993.* (Geneva)
- Jones, E L 1981: *The European Miracle. Environments, economies and geopolitics in the history of Europe and Asia.* (Cambridge: CUP)
- Jones, E L 1988: *Growth Recurring.* (Oxford: Clarendon Press)
- Kahan, Arcadius 1973: 'Notes on Serfdom in Western and Eastern Europe.' *Journal of Economic History* XXXIII: 86-99
- Kan, Aleksander S 1982: 'Kapitalismens uppkomst och den borgerliga revolutionen i Sverige.' *Häftan för Kritiska Studier* Nr 4, årg 15
- Karlsson, Per-Arne 1990: *Järnbruken och ståndssambället. Institutionell och attitydmässig konflikt under Sveriges tidiga industrialisering 1700-1770.* Jernkontorets Bergshistoriska skriftserie N:r 25 (Stockholm) [Summary: Sweden's early industrialization 1700-1770; conflicts between institutions and attitudes within the society of estates. (pp 260-264)]
- Katz, Claudio J 1989: *From Feudalism to Capitalism. Marxian Theories of Class Struggle and Social Change.* (New York: Greenwood Press)
- Katz, Claudio J 1993: 'Karl Marx on the transition from feudalism to capitalism.' *Theory and Society* 22:363-389
- Katzenstein, Peter J 1985: *Small States in World Markets: Industrial Policy in Europe.* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press)

- Kindleberger, Charles P 1982: 'Sweden in 1850 as an "Impoverished Sophisticate": Comment.' *Journal of Economic History* XLII:4
- Kindleberger, Charles P 1985: *A Financial History of Europe*. (London: George Allen & Unwin)
- Koenigsberger, Helmut G 1989: 'Riksdag, Parliament and States General in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries.' In: Stjernquist (ed) 1989
- Landes, David S 1993: 'The Fable of the Dead Horse; or, The Industrial Revolution Revisited.' In: Mokyr (ed) 1993
- Lane, Frederic C 1975: 'The Role of Governments in Economic Growth in Early Modern Times.' *Journal of Economic History* XXXV: 8-17
- Le Roy Ladurie, Emmanuel 1985: 'A Reply to Robert Brenner.' In: Aston-Philpin (eds) 1985
- Lindbeck, Assar 1990: 'The Swedish Experience.' *Seminar Paper No. 482. Institute for International Economic Studies*. (Stockholm)
- Lindgren, Jan 1980: *Utskrivning och utsugning. Produktion och reproduktion i Bygdeå 1620-1640*. *Studia Historica Upsaliensia* 117 (Uppsala; Distributor: Almqvist & Wiksell International, Stockholm) [Summary: Conscriptio and Exploitation. Production and Reproduction in the Parish of Bygdeå 1620-1640. (pp 292-303)]
- Lindgren, Jan 1985: 'The Swedish "Military State", 1560-1720.' *Scandinavian Journal of History* 10
- Loit, Alexander 1979: 'När kronans jord blev böndernas. Bördsrättsköpen under Johan III:s tid.' In: *Bördor...*
- Lundahl, M - Svensson, T (eds) 1990: *Agrarian Society in History: Essays in honor of Magnus Mörner*. (London: Routledge)
- Magnusson, Lars 1980: *Ty som ingenting angelägnare är än mina bönders conservation... Godsekonomi i östra Mellansverige vid mitten av 1700-talet*. (Uppsala) [Summary: "As my greatest concern is the conservation of my peasants"... Estate economy in eastern Sweden in the mid-18th century. (pp 146-9)]
- Malowist, Marian 1960: 'A certain trade technique in the Baltic countries in the 15th-17th centuries.' In: *Poland at the XIth International Congress of Historical Sciences* (Warsaw: Polish Academy of Sciences)
- Malowist, Marian 1981: 'Merchant Credit and Putting-out.' *Review IV*
- Mann, Michael 1986: *The Sources of Social Power, Vol I: A History of Power from the Beginning to A.D.1760*. (New York: CUP)
- Mann, Michael 1988: 'European Development: Approaching a Historical Explanation' in Baechler-Hall-Mann (eds) 1988
- Mann, Michael 1993: *The Sources of Social Power, Vol II: The rise of classes and nation-states, 1760-1914*. (Cambridge, New York, Melbourne: CUP)

- McNeill, W H 1992: 'Coercion, Capital and European States AD 990-1990, by Charles Tilly.' *Journal of Modern History* Vol 64:3, pp 583-4
- Mastellone, Salvo 1989: 'Italian Enlightenment and the Swedish Constitution during the Age of Liberty (1719-1772).' In: Stjernquist (ed) 1989
- Metcalf, Michael 1987: 'Parliamentary Sovereignty and Royal Reaction, 1719-1809.' = Chapter 3 in:
- Metcalf, Michael (ed) 1987: *The Riksdag: A History of the Swedish Parliament.* (Stockholm: Bank of Sweden Tercentenary Foundation)
- Mokyr, Joel 1993: 'Editor's introduction: The New Economic History and the Industrial Revolution' in:
- Mokyr, Joel (ed) 1993: *The British Industrial Revolution. An Economic Perspective.* (Boulder, San Francisco, Oxford: Westview Press)
- Mooers, Colin 1991: *The Making of Bourgeois Europe. Absolutism, Revolution, and the Rise of Capitalism in England, France and Germany.* (London, New York: Verso)
- Moore, Barrington 1967 (1966): *Social Origins of Democracy and Dictatorship. Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World.* (London: Allen Lane)
- Moore, Barrington 1988: 'Japanese peasant protests.' *International Review of Social History*, XXXIII (pp 312-328)
- Munktell, Ing-Marie 1982: *Gods, godsägare och landbor 1450-1520. Meddelanden från Historiska Institutionen i Göteborg, Nr 22* (Gothenburg)
- Myrdal, Janken - Söderberg, Johan 1991: *Kontinuitetens dynamik. Agrar ekonomi i 1500-talets Sverige.* Stockholm Studies in Economic History 15 (Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell International) [Summary: Dynamics of Continuity: the Agrarian Economy of Sixteenth-Century Sweden. pp 523-535]
- Nilsson, Sven A 1973: 'Hemlandet och de stora krigen under Gustav II Adolfs tid.' *Saga och Sed* 1973
- Nilsson, Sven A 1988: 'Imperial Sweden. Nation-Building, War and Social Change.' In: *The Age of New Sweden* (Stockholm: The Royal Armoury)
- Nilsson, Sven A 1989: 'På väg mot militärstaten. Krigsbefällets etablering i den äldre Vasatidens Sverige.' in *Tre Karlar. Karl X, Karl XI och Karl XII* (Stockholm: Livrustkammaren)
- Nolte, H H 1992: 'Europe in global society to the twentieth century.' *International Social Science Journal* 131

- North, Douglass C- Thomas, Robert P 1971: 'The Rise and Fall of the Manorial System: A Theoretical Model.' *Journal of Economic History* XXXI
- North, Douglass C- Thomas, Robert P 1973: *The Rise of the Western World: A New Economic History*. (Cambridge: CUP)
- North, Douglass C 1981: *Structure and Change in Economic History*. (New York: WW Norton)
- North, Douglass C - Weingast, Barry R 1989: 'Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England.' *Journal of Economic History* XLIX:4
- North, Douglass C 1990: *Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance*. (Cambridge: CUP)
- North, Douglass C 1991: 'Institutions, Transaction Costs and the Rise of Merchant Empires.' in Tracy (ed) 1991
- North, Douglass C 1993a: 'The New Institutional Economics and Development.' (available on Internet from University of Washington)
- North, Douglass C 1993b: 'The Paradox of the West.' (available on Internet from University of Washington)
- North, Douglass C 1993c: 'Shared Mental Models.' (available on Internet from University of Washington)
- O'Brien, Patrick 1982: 'European Economic Development: The Contribution of the Periphery.' in *Economic History Review* XXXV:1
- O'Brien, Patrick Karl 1992: 'The Foundations of European Industrialization: From the Perspective of the World.' in José Casas Pardo (ed): *Economic Effects of the European Expansion, 1492-1824*. (Stuttgart: Steiner)
- Orrù, Marco 1993: 'Institutional Cooperation in Japanese and German Capitalism.' in S-E Sjöstrand (ed): *Institutional Change: Theory and Empirical Findings*. (Armonk NY, London: M E Sharpe)
- Österberg, Eva 1990: 'Compromise instead of conflict? Patterns of Contact between Local Peasant Communities and the Early Modern State: Sweden in the 16th to 18th Centuries.' In: Lundahl - Svensson (eds) 1990
- Österberg, Eva 1991: *Mentalities and Other Realities. Essays in Medieval and Early Modern Scandinavian History*. (Lund: Lund University Press)
- Østerud, Øyvind 1981: 'Configurations of Scandinavian Absolutism.' in Torsvik (ed) 1981
- Palmer, R R 1959: *The Age of the Democratic Revolution*. (Princeton: PUP)
- Parker, Geoffrey 1988: *The Military Revolution. Military innovation and the rise of the West, 1500-1800*. (Cambridge: CUP)

- Parker, Geoffrey 1991: 'Europe and the Wider World, 1500-1700: The Military Balance.' In: Tracy (ed) 1991
- Pearson, M N 1991: 'Merchants and States.' In: Tracy (ed) 1991
- Persson, Karl Gunnar 1988: *Pre-Industrial Economic Growth. Social Organization and Technological Progress in Europe.* (Oxford, New York: Basil Blackwell)
- Putnam, Robert D 1993: *Making Democracy Work. Civic Traditions in Modern Italy.* (Princeton: PUP)
- Poggi, Gianfranco 1990: *The State. Its Nature, Development and Prospects.* (Cambridge: Polity Press)
- Roberts, Michael 1967: *Essays in Swedish History.* (London: Weidenfield and Nicolson)
- Roberts, Michael 1973: 'The Swedish Church.' In:
- Roberts, Michael (ed) 1973: *Sweden's Age of Greatness 1632-1718.* (London, Basingstoke: Macmillan)
- Roberts, Michael 1979: *The Swedish Imperial Experience.* (Cambridge: CUP)
- Roberts, Michael 1986: *The Age of Liberty. Sweden 1719-1772.* (Cambridge: CUP)
- Rokkan, Stein 1975: 'Dimensions of State Formation and Nation-Building: A Possible Paradigm for Research on Variations within Europe.' Chapter 8 i Tilly (ed) 1975
- Rokkan, Stein 1981: 'The Growth and Structuring of Mass Politics.' Chapter 3 in *Nordic Democracy.* (Copenhagen: Det Danske Selskab)
- Rosenthal, Jean-Laurent 1992: *The Fruits of Revolution. Property rights, litigation, and French Agriculture.* (Cambridge: CUP)
- Rueschemeyer, Dietrich - Stephens, Evelyne Huber - Stephens, John 1992: *Capitalist Development and Democracy.* (Cambridge: Polity Press)
- Samuelson, Jan 1993: *Aristokrat eller förädlad bonde? Det Svenska frälsets ekonomi, politik och sociala förbindelser under tiden 1523-1611.* (Lund: Lund University Press) [Summary: Aristocrat or Refined Peasant? The economy, politics, and social connections of the Swedish nobility in the period 1523-1611. (pp 265-272)]
- Sandberg, Lars G 1978: 'Banking and Economic Growth in Sweden before World War I.' *Journal of Economic History* XXXVIII:3
- Sandberg, Lars G 1979: 'The Case of the Impoverished Sophisticate: Human Capital and Swedish Economic Growth before World War I.' *Journal of Economic History* XXXIX:1
- Sandberg, Lars G 1982a: 'Sweden as an "Impoverished Sophisticate": A Reply.' *Journal of Economic History* XLII:4

- Sandberg, Lars G 1982b: 'Ignorance, Poverty and Economic Backwardness in the Early Stages of European Industrialization: Variations on Alexander Gerschenkron's Grand Theme.' *Journal of European Economic History*
- Sandberg, Lars G 1990: 'Education and Economic Growth: Voices from Valencia (The Developed Countries)' Report from sessions for theme A5 in Van der Wee - Aerts (eds): *Debates and Controversies in Economic History. A-sessions*. Proceedings. Tenth International Economic History Congress. Leuven, August 1990. (Leuven: Leuven University Press)
- SCB 1860: *Bidrag till Sveriges officiella statistik. A) Befolkningsstatistik. Ny följd I:3. Statistiska Central-byråns underdåniga berättelse för åren 1851 med 1855. Tredje och sista afdelningen.*
- Senghaas, Dieter 1985: *The European Experience*. (Lemington Spa, Dover NH: Berg Publishers)
- Sjöberg, Maria 1993: *Järn och jord. Bergsmän på 1700-talet*. (Stockholm: Stads- och kommunhistoriska institutet) [Summary: Iron and Land. Mining Peasants during the 18th Century. (pp 247-255)]
- Skocpol, Theda 1973: 'A critical review of Barrington Moore's *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy*.' *Politics and Society*, 12 (2)
- Skocpol, Theda 1977: 'Wallerstein's World Capitalist System: A Theoretical and Historical Critique.' *American Journal of Sociology* Vol 82:5 (1075-90)
- Skocpol, Theda - Somers, Margaret 1980: 'The Uses of Comparative History in Macrosocial Inquiry.' *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 22, no.2 (april 1980):174-197.
- Skocpol, Theda 1984: 'Emerging Agendas and Recurrent Strategies in Historical Sociology.' In:
- Skocpol, Theda (ed) 1984: *Vision and Method in Historical Sociology*. (Cambridge:CUP)
- Söderberg, Tom 1935: *Försäkringsväsendets historia i Sverige intill Karl Johanstiden*. (Stockholm: P A Norstedt & Söner)
- Steensgaard, Niels 1990: 'The growth and composition of the long-distance trade of England and the Dutch Republic before 1750.' In: Tracy (ed) 1990
- Stephens, John D 1989: 'Democratic Transition and Breakdown in Western Europe, 1870-1939: A Test of the Moore Thesis.' *American Journal of Sociology* Vol 94:5 (1019-77)
- Stjernquist, Nils (ed) 1989: *The Swedish Riksdag in an International Perspective*. (Stockholm: Bank of Sweden Tercentenary Foundation)
- Stokes, Gale 1989: 'The Social Origins of East European Politics.' In: Chirot (ed) 1989

- Studier över den Svenska Riksdagens sociala sammansättning*. Skrifter utgivna av Statsvetenskapliga föreningen i Uppsala VII. (Uppsala 1936)
- Therborn, Göran 1977: 'The Rule of Capital and the Rise of Democracy.' *New Left Review* 103
- Therborn, Göran 1989: *Borgarklass och byråkrati i Sverige*. (Lund: Arkiv)
- Therborn, Göran 1994: *European Modernity and Beyond. The Trajectory of European Societies 1945-2000*. (London: SAGE) [forthcoming]
- Tilly, Charles (ed) 1975: *The Formation of National States in Western Europe*. (Princeton: PUP)
- Tilly, Charles 1981: 'The Sinews of War.' In: Torsvik (ed) 1981
- Tilly, Charles 1984: *Big Structures, Large Processes, Huge Comparisons*. (New York: Russell Sage Foundation)
- Tilly, Charles 1985: 'War Making and State Making as Organized Crime.' in Evans - Rueschemeyer - Skocpol (eds): *Bringing the State Back In*. (Cambridge: CUP)
- Tilly, Charles 1990: *Coercion, Capital and European States AD 990-1990*. (Oxford: Basil Blackwell)
- Tilly, Charles 1993: *European Revolutions, 1492-1992*. (Oxford, UK & Cambridge, USA: Blackwell)
- Tilton, Timothy 1974: 'The Social Origins of Liberal Democracy: The Swedish Case.' *The American Political Science Review*, Vol 68:561-571
- Torsvik, Per (ed) 1981: *Mobilization, Center-Periphery, Structures and Nation-Building. A volume in commemoration of Stein Rokkan*. (Bergen, Oslo, Tromsø: Universitetsforlaget)
- Tracy, James D (ed) 1990: *The Rise of Merchant Empires . Long-distance trade in the early modern world, 1350-1750*. (Cambridge: CUP)
- Tracy, James D (ed) 1991: *The Political Economy of Merchant Empires*. (Cambridge: CUP)
- U S Bureau of the Census 1966: *Historical Statistics of the United States, Colonial Times to 1957*. (Washington DC)
- Villstrand, Nils Erik 1992: *Anpassning eller protest. Lokalsambället inför utskrivningarna av fotfolk till den svenska krigsmakten 1620-1679*. (Åbo: Åbo Academy Press)
- de Vries, Jan 1974: *The Dutch Rural Economy in the Golden Age*. (New Haven, London: Yale University Press)
- de Vries, Jan 1976: *The Economy of Europe in an Age of Crisis, 1600-1750*. (Cambridge: CUP)
- de Vries, Jan 1984: *European Urbanization 1500-1800*. (London: Methuen)
- Wallerstein, Immanuel 1974: *The Modern World-System. Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the European World-Economy in the Sixteenth century*. (New York: Academic Press)

- Wallerstein, Immanuel 1979: *The capitalist world-economy*. (Cambridge: CUP)
- Wallerstein, Immanuel 1980: *The Modern World-System II. Mercantilism and the Consolidation of the European World-Economy, 1600-1750*. (New York: Academic Press)
- Wallerstein, Immanuel 1983: *Historical Capitalism*. (London: Verso)
- Wallerstein, Immanuel 1989: *The Modern World-System III. The Second Era of Great Expansion of the Capitalist World-Economy*. (San Diego: Academic Press)
- Wallerstein, Immanuel 1992: 'The West, Capitalism, and the Modern World-System.' *Review XV,4* :561-619
- Wilson, Charles - Parker, Geoffrey (eds) 1977: *An Introduction to the Sources of European Economic History, 1500-1800*. (Ithaca, NY: Cornell)
- Winberg, Christer 1985: *Grenverket. Studier rörande jord, släktskapssystem och ståndsprivilegier*. Rättshistoriskt Bibliotek 38 (Stockholm) [Summary: Ramifications. Studies of land, kinship systems and privileges. (pp231-243)]
- Winberg, Christer 1990: 'Another route to modern society: The advancement of the Swedish peasantry.' In: Lundahl - Svensson (eds) 1990
- Wirsell, Gunnar 1968: *Om kronans jordeböcker 1541-1936*. (Lund: P A Nordstedt & Söner)
- Wohlin, Nils 1909: *Den jordbruksidkande befolkningen i Sverige 1751-1900. Statistisk-demografisk studie på grundval af de svenska yrkesräkningarna*. =Emigrationsutredningen Bilaga IX (Stockholm: P A Nordstedt & Söner)

Index

A

- Absolutism*..... 8, 25, 34, 61, 68
and 'capitalized coercion' (Tilly).....
.....93, 121
Brenner.....96
Moore.....43
populist-military absolutism
(Downing).....51, 114
agrarian commercialization (Moore).27
the Swedish case.....42
Anderson.....6, 23f, 59 - 72, 118, 125
criticism of.....71f
feudal dynamic.....111
questionable analysis of Sweden
.....66, 71
Sweden's formative influence over
Eastern Europe..... 8, 68, 122
asiatic mode of production.....60
'authoritarian stagnation' (Moore)..32
not discussed by Stephens.....35

B

- Bendix*.....6
bourgeois revolution.....7
discussion of the concept.....43
Anderson.....34, 43
Moore.....34
Braudel.....73
Brenner.....25, 25, 95 - 102, 119, 125
colonial interlopers and the English
Revolution.....86, 112
compared with North.....107
criticism against.....99
critique of Cohen.....109
critique of Wallerstein.....84
political accumulation.....111f
Brenner Paradox.....49, 95, 101

C

- capital-intensive states (Tilly)*.....88
capitalism
Brenner's conception of.....100
Tilly's conception of.....87
Wallerstein's conception of.....73, 85
capitalism and democracy
Moore.....28
North.....46
Rueschmeyer, Stephens and
Stephens.....116
capitalized coercion (Tilly).....88f, 121
related to Sweden.....94
coercion-intensive states (Tilly).....88
Conquest.....20, 112, 114
in Wallerstein's model.....74
three stages of (Parker).....115
conservative peasant solidarity (Moore)
.....124
core.....73, 77
corporatism.....37

D

- debt bondage*.....123
debt peonage.....81
democracy.....4, 9, 15, 18f, 23, 114
and economic growth.....4
definitions of.....19
Moore's definition.....44
democratic corporatism (Katzenstein) 37
Denmark
related to Anderson's model.....66
diversity.....87, 105
Dobb.....49, 95
Downing.....34, 114, 122
Duby.....110

E

East/West contrast

- Anderson*.....60, 118
- Brenner*.....97
- North*.....49
- Wallerstein*.....75

economic growth.....4

- before capitalism*.....110
- Brenner and North compared*.....107
- extensive and intensive*.....110
- Smithian causes of*.....108

England vs France

- Brenner*.....96, 99
- Moore*.....28
- North*.....46
- Wallerstein*.....76

Europe (as a system).....8, 24

European Miracle.....3, 5

F

feudal dynamic (Anderson)

-25, 111, 118

feudal reaction.....96

feudal synthesis.....61

feudalism.....111

and 'capitalized coercion' (Tilly)...93

Anderson.....25, 59, 71

Brenner.....91

crisis of (Wallerstein).....74, 85

difference between European and

Japanese (Anderson).....62

in Sweden?.....67

Frank.....75

Fulbrook (on Anderson).....71

G

Gerschenkron.....55

Growth.....20, 106

in Wallerstein's model.....75

H

Heckscher.....6, 80

reassessments of his interpretation

-53, 120

hegemonic power.....78

Hilton.....111

Hintze.....8, 25

Hirst (on Anderson).....71

historical sociology.....105

husförhör.....14

I

industrial revolution.....106

J

Japan

as a feudal society.....60

parallels to Germany.....27

Jones.....3, 5, 8, 24

K

Katz.....100

Katzenstein.....34, 57f

questionable indicators.....58

Kindleberger.....52

Koenigsberger.....115

L

land reforms.....6

legitimacy.....18, 92

literacy.....16, 55f

M

Malowist.....68, 73

Malthus.....47, 51, 98, 107

Mann.....102, 105

despotic and infrastructural state

power.....85

four 'sources of social power'.....102

his model not treated here.....5, 102

multi-power actor civilizations.....8

on long-term growth.....110

on Wallerstein.....85

Marx.....3, 20, 25, 76

transition theory.....100

Marxism

Anderson's reinterpretation...59, 104

Tilly's criticism.....111

Wallerstein's reinterpretation.....76

- military revolution*.....9, 113, 122
Moore.....24, 27 - 44, 114, 124f
 'three routes'.....28
 exclusion of 'smaller countries'.....6
 five conditions for democratic
 development.....33
 neglect of the working class
 (Stephens).....35
 on India.....28
 on Scandinavia.....32
 revisions of his theory.....34 - 42
Mybrman.....56
- N**
- nation-state*.....20
 North.....46, 110
 Tilly.....88, 90, 93
North.....25f, 45 - 58, 120, 125
 assimilates warfare to economy...112
 compared with Brenner.....107
 hidden class arguments of.....107
 path dependence.....45, 117, 125
 property rights structure.....107
- O**
- O'Brien (on Wallerstein).....84
- P**
- Parker*.....113
parliamentary survival
 Downing.....116
 Koenigsberger.....115
 North.....48, 116
 Sweden.....51
path dependence (North)...45, 117, 125
peasant commercialization (Moore)..32
peasant freedom.....9, 62
periphery.....73, 78
 relative economic importance of....84
Persson.....111
political accumulation (Brenner)
 97, 111f
property rights structure (North).....107
 and French revolution.....45
- Sweden.....120
Putnam.....19, 117
- R**
- rationality*.....21
reactionary alliance.....28, 33
 Stephens' reconceptualization.....35
reciprocity.....81, 125
*redistribution*25, 76, 83, 110, 112, 120
reference societies.....9
rent-seeking.....46, 110, 112
revolution from above
 Anderson.....62
 Moore.....28
 Sweden.....63
revolutionary break with the past
 (Moore).....33, 114
 absent in small countries (Stephens)
 36
 absent in Sweden (Tilton).....39
 discussion of the concept.....43
revolutionary communist route (Moore)
 29
revolutions.....114
 Anderson.....62
 Moore.....27
 their absence in North's discussion.49
 Sweden.....43
Rokkan.....66, 105
 Tilly's critique of.....93
Rueschmeyer.....16, 35, 116
- S**
- Sandberg*.....53 - 56
semi-periphery.....77, 80
 Skocpol.....34
 critique of Anderson.....71
 critique of Moore.....6
 critique of Wallerstein.....82
 on state-system dynamics.....8
 on theories.....104
Smith.....3, 20, 25
social capital (Putnam).....117

Stephens.....16, 34 - 36, 116
on Sweden.....44
 Stokes.....34
 suffrage.....16
 Sweden
as part of Europe..... 1, 122
banking system55
control over population.....14, 122
cultural factors..... 16, 55
Eastern or Western ?....69, 100, 119
economic growth..... 9
feudal or not ?.....66
in Anderson's model...8, 62, 71, 118
in Moore's model..... 39, 44
in Tilly's model.....92
in Wallerstein's model.....8, 80
institutional precociousness
7, 15, 117
local self-government94
militarization..... 15, 70
military expansion122
peasant freedom....66f, 69, 81, 125ff
peasant productivity.....119
peasantry.....10, 44, 66
political representation....9, 15, 124
political weakness of Bourgeoisie
36, 45
Reduction.....69
related to Brenner's model...100, 119
related to North's model.....39
secularization15
transformation of the peasantry....42
 Sweezy.....75, 111

T

'tax/office state' (Brenner).....96
theories
new syntheses5, 25, 104
provisional agnosticism20
selection of..... 5, 104
 Tilly.....25, 25, 87 - 94, 121, 125
contrast between Europe and China
91
neglect of Voice92
on Sweden.....92
on theories.....104
role of the nation-state..... 88, 91
 Tilton..... 34, 39
trajectories24
transition debate95, 111
 Triple Miracle.....4f, 21

V

Voice19f, 114
 de Vries.....125, 125

W

Wallerstein...25, 25, 75 - 86, 122, 125
*assimiliating economy to military-
 political power*85, 112
conception of capitalism112
critiques against..... 82 - 86
on Sweden.....68
Sweden's rise from peripheral status
8, 80
 Weber..... 5, 18, 20, 25, 102
world-system.....25, 75, 77, 85

***Rapporter från Ekonomisk-historiska institutionen
vid Göteborgs Universitet:***

*Reports from the Department of Economic History,
Göteborg University.*

- 1 Sverker Jonsson *Norrbottnen i Sverige*
- 2 Bertil Andersson *Malmö diskont 1803-1818*
- 3-4 Urban Herlitz *Nattvaktaren, städgumman och storebror.
Kring den offentliga sektorns tillväxt*
- 5-6 Ingemar Nygren *Göteborgs kreditmarknad 1820-1913*
- 7 Lars Herlitz *Ideas of Capital and Development in Pre-
Classical Economic Thought: Two Essays*
- 8 Åke Edén *East India Company's Indienpolitik före 1773*
- 9 Stefan Falk *Structural Adjustment Programmes - a
development strategy? (Examples from Zambia and
Zimbabwe)*
- 10 Erik Örjan Emilsson *Sweden and the European Miracles.
Conquest, Growth and Voice.*

The question of why and how Europe could rise to world dominance was an 'old question' already to Max Weber. Since the early seventies the debate over this 'Rise of the West' or 'European Miracle' has been vigorously reopened from several different perspectives, without reaching any kind of consensus except on one point: the importance of the internal dynamics of the European state system.

The arguments of this book are:


- Any explanation will have to deal with no less than three 'European miracles': world conquest, economic growth and a widening public participation in the political system. It is further argued that these processes constitute Europe as a historical concept.

- The role of Sweden in these three 'miraculous' processes is, in a number of respects, so crucial, exceptional or contradictory, that it would have to be integrated into the analysis of European historical dynamics.

- Swedish history has to be understood as an integral part of European history, which poses a challenge for macrohistorical synthesis, as well as for Swedish historiography.

These questions are discussed in the context of six synthetic approaches ambitious enough to take on more than one of the miracles, and inclusive enough to also take on the problem of diversity within the European development: Those of Barrington Moore, Douglass North, Perry Anderson, Immanuel Wallerstein, Charles Tilly and Robert Brenner. According to the arguments advanced, none of these models is - in its present state of development - equipped to deal with the Swedish example.

Erik Örjan Emilsson (born 1950) is doing doctoral research at the Department of Economic History at Gothenburg University. This book is a revised version of his licentiate dissertation.



EKONOMISK-HISTORISKA INSTITUTIONEN
VID GÖTEBORGS UNIVERSITET
Skanstorget 18 411 22 GÖTEBORG