

# Energetic diplomacy and its role on creation of a new multipolar world

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## Abstract

International correlations through the last years have been remarked as dramatic in character, and very often followed through with unpredictable events, such as the Arab spring, chronic and confessional wars raging through the Middle east, than the unprincipled informal collation of the great forces merging with variety and different in character formal and less formal state-of-actors, than worth mentioning is the recent war prelude in Ukraine which on top has all been spiced and made far more constrictive indeed by the arrival of the global economic crisis in energy resources as well as naturally found ones, that has well paid so far contributing led to the overflowing of the crisis itself from the world's center towards its margins.

Since the end of the cold war, the most powerful and the most economically ascendant countries have started to promote a very new breed type of concept which deals with export and imposing of its own ideology. Diplomacy has well been turned into an instrument for realization of the external affair politics of the great powers and this diplomacy has been thus transformed from traditional in character to modern in origin, or better - public diplomacy.

But this breed of public diplomacy had its own limits in terms of its range influence which was shortcut in the days of lack of energy resources as well as naturally found pack resources in the sense of energy excavation, and thus we witnessed the arrival of the newly formed type of diplomacy in place of the public diplomacy, named energetic diplomacy.

Today energetic diplomacy is a representative of modern diplomacy or better a unique type of "stick and carrot" modulated for the weak and well developed rich states which are dependent on energy resources naturally found or not.

During the era of the predomination of traditional politics over power in international correlations, it was then the most important thing who would be the one to deal with the most military power arsenal and later economic power as well that determined supreme leading force.

Many of us would ask does this mean the reincarnation of the so called almost forgotten Cold War only now coming in such a shape that seems to be far more terrifying in character with a great deal of chance to impose the brink of a new world war and another humanitarian wash-out to humanity.

**Keywords:** energetic diplomacy; pipeline diplomacy; great powers

## Introduction

The choice of the topic for this text has been well determined by the deepening gap between the West and the East especially on the politically-economy driven variance and collision that escalates over the lack of energy resources as well as naturally found resources. The development of technology and the industry at the same as well as the competitiveness on the international market agenda have determined the need of constant apparel and whistle-up on cheap and unlimited resources of energy bedrock especially in the countries with high technical-technology shaped development. As a result, many countries have now turned into countries of major interest and importance only because those countries compose these so called energetic resources. Countries that pass on the route for the gas pipe line have now been turned into countries of great importance on the West and on the East both, although these countries have never been spared in these great geopolitical games where those very same countries run the risk of losing or gaining everything that they have following the path. However the countries that are along these route of energy resources imposed war, have been forced to dip towards some of the belligerent sides, or in case they remained neutral, than those very same countries had to pay their neutrality by territorial expropriation, which led their sovereignty and territorial integrity put into jeopardy.

For that purpose a research in quality has been conducted using analytical-synthetic method of scientific research, by using separate analyses implied on data as well as using the process of systematizing of the facts obtained in a logical compound.

The research has a final goal to openly reveal that energetic diplomacy is a sort of catalyzer present to build the new multi-polar world that will represent full reshape of current political boundaries especially in the European domain, but what is more to be able to provide new coalitions being composed and coming along, the creation of new centers of power which would base their power over foundations to access energetic resources.

## **The history of the birth of (pipeline) “tube-like diplomacy” or gas-pipe diplomacy.**

Since the beginning of the foregoing century there has been some kind of rivalry over the energy resource market. In other words, in the past, British - Russian rivalry is supposed that had been given birth of prior reason because of the discovery of the

energy resources capacity on the territory of the so called former Persia. Since those days ahead Russia is constantly keeping up pace on the energy pack exploitation. But it has not always been the case that using military arsenal would lead to a positive outcome over these particular type of war belligerent disputes. The collaboration and the built of (non) type - like formation of coalitions is always considered time sparing as well as force and means/goods sparing too, so as a result hereby we witness the arrival of this newly breed type of diplomacy setting the stage on being invented and incorporated through its communication coming along incorporated with it, which is well be determined by the need of energy resources and thus has been named energetic diplomacy.

The general definition over what happens to be energetic diplomacy or “tube-like diplomacy” does not exist, but judging on the variables and the indicators that determine its shape and appearance one could say that it represents some kind of usage of external politics in order to deliver and secure access or transport of energetic supply in demand and promotion as well (most typically bilateral and even sometimes not so scarce multilateral) cooperation on the energy sector.<sup>1</sup>

“Tube-like diplomacy” has been promoted for the first time in 2006 when as a state actor Gazprom has started to conduct its own relatively independent economical politics which has later shown that it has been nothing else but an instrument of the Russian official external politics affair bureau. So Gazprom in the reference of this has stopped at one point the gas supply to Ukraine over the so called balance that had to be calibrated and had to do with some allegedly of little importance minor regulative, but what is more this indeed has been the case whether further on Europe would be gas supplied or abandoned. It is made apparent that in the background of this there was the issue that made Ukraine lean slightly and in shame undetected towards the West which on the other hand is on the long run trace a major treat of Russia gaining access towards NATO and its western boundaries. At the same time Gazprom promotes the built of two pipelines, Northern and Southern stream in order to fully supply Western Europe in gas. The gas pipes are supposed to avoid the transit through Ukraine, Poland, Slovakia and the Baltic states, as well as the Crimea murky waters in order to reach Western Europe, which at the same time happens to be in competition with the gas line Nabuko which is Western supported and Western originated idea of a gas line stretching from the Caspian sea to the Western Europe.

In any ways taken the project Southern stream is fairly significant as a result of the long ongoing hatch conflict between Russia and Ukraine over deliverance of high-quality gas during the period from 2005-2010 through whereas a total of 18 European countries had been cut out on deliverance of the Russian gas. Because of the raging war in Ukraine where Russia gave support to home separatist forces (up to the point of

<sup>1</sup> Andreas Goldthau and Jan Martin Witte, *Global Energy Governance: The New Rules of the Game*, Berlin, 2007

the Crimea annexation) thereby sanctions getting imposed on Russia have been seen at the time, which followed through immediately when it came clear and apparent that the European Union took sides and openly rejected and opposed the Southern Stream by putting under the law the so called noncompulsory duty bound resolution that came in force, which immediately made separation of its membership states.<sup>2</sup>

The commercial character of the project Southern stream implicated on a kind of secretive diplomacy between the European countries and Russia which whatsoever moreover contributed for sharpening the negative conduct among the member states of the European union from the inside. As we all know today Russia has about 29% of the overall gas supply quantities that are to be found worldwide, which makes Russia a key player on the global energetic map getting a profit of about 20 billion dollars per year only for supplying the EU with gas. This is exactly what makes Russia use Gazprom in its main role of supplying gas to Europe, using of course high quality natural found gas reserves through the shipping process, simply because supplying inadequate quantities or improvised solution of any other kind is simply too risky and unaffordable solution to Russia in terms of economy prospect growth, and such an example is clearly made with the project establishing the free project trade deal between the US and the EU whereas US could constantly supply gas to Europe in a liquid state, gas derived not from quality gas reserves but rather extracted and manufactured from goods such as leaf stone.<sup>3</sup>

Steve LeVine the author of the book "The Oil and the Glory" (published in 2007) considers that when it comes to energetic geopolitical crucial role played by transnational companies especially the western part of it (we refer to those enterprises having their seats in some of the western countries) and which in the part concerning energetic infrastructure tightly cooperate with Gazprom just for the sake of financial issues as a main reason pointed in chief role. Under such case those enterprises can surely work even opposing external state politics (USA and Great Brittan) which would surely contribute for a discontinuity over energetic politics applied on Russia by Western powers along head USA. As under such circumstances Russia has been given dominance on the energy market standing ahead of its opposing forces, and as a second reason appointed here would be the speedy growing superior military power of Russia which makes it possible for Russia to trace the route of energy pathway by using combination of softened and hardened power both implicated.<sup>4</sup>

Also according to the author, the increase on the price of gas supplies for East European countries, especially the equal prices ratio composed compared to those of gas supply

<sup>2</sup> Konstantinos Hazakis & Filippos Proedrou, EU-Russia Energy Diplomacy: The Need for an Active Strategic Partnership, EU Diplomacy Papers 4/2012

<sup>3</sup> Konstantinos Hazakis & Filippos Proedrou. op.cit., pp.4-8

<sup>4</sup> Gagea Andreea. *Diplomacy in the Games of Power. Diplomacy of Power – Power of Diplomacy*. Bucharest Academy of Economic Studies. 2011.

prices for Western Europe have significantly contributed for a couple of revolution bursts throughout these alleged states which on the whole picture lead to imposing puppet governments representatives in those countries led by Russia itself.

At the same time if Europe is to ask for any other alternative on gas supply deliverance, Russia would then string band or export gas to Central Asia which makes Russia again the dominant power to negotiate. As Russia follows the path of being the key player for gas shipping to states consumers, China on the other hand also has its own energetic policy in terms of establishing its own diplomacy on getting hands to much cheaper and reliable gas supplies on the primes of what Europe has to negotiate with, all with a simple reason on having their own industrial and technological boom and flourish which would put China in front of Western European states ahead in role position number one talking about competition.<sup>5</sup>

Just to make an example we can surely claim that in 2006 according to reliable sources Russia took the first position in 6 other destinations found most desirable for foreign investment. This is due to the developed hybrid system of internal economy agenda and policy as well as their private sector with a tendency to establish transnational economy.<sup>6</sup> Thanks to the economic development Russia successfully managed to tie their debts to the Paris club creditor depository, which was a debt of an incredible amount counting 160 billion American dollars in value.<sup>7</sup>

At the dawn of the 21 century, Russia has the largest reserves of energetic resources manageable (gas export established in 2005 of about 152, 4 billion cubic meters, oil export value of about 470, 2 million tons), opposing Europe's reserves which on the total compose only 3% of the total world reserves found elsewhere, which puts Russia and Europe on a mutual harness conditioned by row of economical preset conditioning trade deals. As for an example Germany pays for its own gas needs for about 42% export from Russia. Italy at 32% rate, France at 30 %, Austria at 75% and the last but not the least Finland at the highest rate of dependency on Russia gas supply reserves composing a total hit of 100% stake.<sup>8</sup>

But although Russia and Europe maintain excellent partnership, the biggest of problems sorting out is the very dialog of EU on ratifying the Energetic diploma roll, which at the

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<sup>5</sup> Having become a net importer of oil in 1993, China can no longer cover domestic demand through its generic reserves, amounting to a mere 1.3 percentage of the world's total. The country consumed 7.45 million barrels a day in 2006, about twice its domestic production and 9 percent of global demand. The majority of China producing oil fields has matured. While China decreasing domestic oil production may be partially compensated by increasing volumes generated by coal to liquid plants, overall imports shares will rise from 51% in 2004 to 85% in 2030. By that times China is expected to be both the world's second largest oil consumer (behind USA and before EU) and the world second largest oil importer. As for gas, China is projected to increase both consumption and imports. As the International Energy Agency estimates, the Chinese import market will not expand beyond 106 billion cubic meters by 2030. Source: BP (2007) International Energy Agency (2007) pp.105, 118.

<sup>6</sup> John Lough, *Russia's Energy Diplomacy*, May 2011 | REP RSP BP 2011/01

<sup>7</sup> John Lough op.cit., pp.3-7

<sup>8</sup> John Lough op.cit., pp.4-9

same represents a sort of political declaration however the contract being part of this roll is considered a document of value and deliverance.

The reasons for not ratifying the roll, is chiefly the (dis) regulation of three important questions connected to the roll contract. Firstly comes the nuclear material trade, secondly the additional investment protocol and finally the transit protocol regulative.

### **Russia and the Baltic states (hard and soft power—composure of energetic diplomacy)**

With the collapse of the Soviet Union Russia has become a successor of most of the usable resources to be found in the former Soviet Union. A Large part of such reserves are also to be found in other countries such as Kazakhstan, Ukraine, Armenia, and Turkmenistan, but these countries apart from Russia have neither the financial capital nor the the technology affordable to take advantages of those resources.

Talking about the Baltic States, one could almost surely claim that they are at about 90% dependant from oil and 100 percent dependant on gas supplies from Russia.<sup>9</sup> This is due to the fact that in the past the whole of the infrastructure of these countries had been built within the Soviet Union complex, as a part of it, and so as a result these countries now withstand no other possible way affordable to supply themselves with gas and oil but Russia.<sup>10</sup>

These states however still have the possibility to fully integrate within the boundaries of the European energetic integrated system(which is by the way still in its infant stage of development), and in this way to be able to connect themselves with the gas or pipeline apart from Russia and the infrastructure built during the Soviet era. The project itself is named Baltic Connector. But the same project has been pretty much encumbered simply because Russian Gazprom controls the dominance of most of the Baltic gas/oil companies, which makes this project overall very expensive indeed.<sup>11</sup>

Russia creates energetic diplomacy (through the known formidable and well recognized components of both soft and hard power) to be able to influence the politics of both internal and external tie to its neighbor countries. There are three way of using hard power (part of the energetic diplomacy): setting embargo upon gas, oil and nuclear energy. Such is the case where the countries legislative members of the Community of independent (Ukraine Belarus and Kazakhstan) as well as the Baltic states altogether are being under the embargo or have been dictated the prices of energy resources in order to fully integrate and influence to dominance their external public affairs politics.

<sup>9</sup> Grigas, A. (2012). Legacies, coercion and soft power: Russian influence in the Baltic States. Chatham House Briefing Paper, 4.

<sup>10</sup> Estonia has started with its own production of oil from oil reserve fields giving on estimation about 55 % from the whole demand of energy for Estonia. On contrary Latvia and Lithuania are totally dependant on Russian gas and have no natural reserves for their own manufacturing of oil but still could be slightly independent if they connect to terminals to the Baltic Sea.

<sup>11</sup> Maigre, M. (2010). Energy security concerns of the Baltic states. International Centre for Defense Studies.

However, Russia is fully aware and thus cautious on the usage of hard power on the Baltic States, simply because Russia has a large financial intake on the three of the largest gas companies in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania (Eesti GaAs, Latvijas и Lietuvos Dujos).<sup>12</sup> The next reason is that there are some local non-state holder actors that could lobby within the membership of these governments. But the biggest of reason s is the reason that Russia has its own enclave (Kalingrad) which is separated by its own state and is to be found on the Baltic Sea, so the lack or shortage for energy resources on Lithuania would also mean shortage on energy resources for Kalingrad too.<sup>13</sup>

Apart from the hard power Russia also uses its soft power through the open support of minorities in these states which count to be Russian. This type of support at the same time promotes its own culture, education, sport which is especially affordable for the majority of those declared non-Russian, simply because those type of promotion and culture liberation advance offer scholarship of varieties, free education in Moscow, citizenship and such similar advantages. But the highest stake of the Russian soft power is the convenience of the Russian energetic sector with mixed character where its own share sustains Russian businessman and company holders. The nuclear energy offer at stake as well has additionally stimulated the economy of these countries which creates for the "stone tripping " on the inside internal politics of these countries.

### **Russia and the European Union**

European Union is a complex hybrid system of rule where intergovernmental and supra international elements have deeply presented the complexity on the model of its structure and energy exchange along European soil.<sup>14</sup>

The partnership between Russia and the EU has been characterized by numerous of conflicts and cooperative elements, and this is result of the fact that large quantities of these reserves that Russia holds are main factor on its economic and political stability in terms of power, and at the same time they represent the most important tool for Russia in its creation of its outside politics. Russia obtains the largest gas reserves in the world, second largest in gas and coal reserves. It is at the same time the first and largest export of natural gas country and almost comes to a draw line talking about oil export along side Saudi Arabia.<sup>15</sup>

Talking about the relation between the EU and Russia it is worth of significance to mention that their independent correlation and mutual need is based upon economic burden especially on energy filed. Although the EU is largely dependant on the

<sup>12</sup> Klevas, V. & Antinucci, M. (2004). Integration of national and regional energy development programs in Baltic States. *Energy Policy*, 32(3), 345- 355. doi:10.1016/S0301-4215(02)00296-3

<sup>13</sup> Grigas, A. (2012). Legacies, coercion and soft power: Russian influence in the Baltic States. Chatham House Briefing Paper, 26.

<sup>14</sup> Hix and Høyland 2011; Staab 2008

<sup>15</sup> Konstantinos Hazakis & Filippos Proedrou. op.cit., pp.3-7

Russian energy resources the same EU works on sort of a diversion process in order to slightly lessen the dependence and to create its own space to be able to trade energy resources. The energetic politics of its members are often seen different guided by their own interest but also impact take the non state business companies where energy politics is not national, but rather different form the foundations of the state politics or the overall EU energy politics being led. Contrary to this Gazprom is fully incorporated with the political agenda of Kremlin and have a common goal altogether. Within the EU the key role to take on outside energetic politics has the European Commission and the Council of ministry, but still the energy politics of its member states is under national treasure hold.

The role of the European Commission is constant function of the European inside market and at the same time being responsible to deregulate the national energetic market and the incline of the competition. Also according to the Lisbon agreement the European Union has the role to perform critical and crucial overlook and at the same time takes the responsibility to fundamental basis through the energy politics of the union. Although the Commission is appointed to deal with the energy negotiation dialog with Russia as well as other important supplies still the countries holding membership have their own full status and sovereignty talking about most of the energy trade aspects especially those being set to a critical phase.<sup>16</sup> The Commission tries to establish and modulate some kind of unified code model, a liberal energy market for the EU, but still has no authority to organize the assembly of what is considered to be energetic politics on the whole region and community. The goal of the commission is to grant a unique energy resource market and in this way to influence the price of the resources that is the energy resources indeed and to fully secure safety on the energy resource market. Also the commission itself is highly occupied with the process of internationalization of the energy companies, in order to efficiently direct the competition and to enhance the functioning of the internal market of energy.

Today in the EU the dominant several energy companies which of the Russian Gazprom, the German E.OH Ruhr gas the Italian Eni, the Dutch Gasunie and the Norwegian Norsk hydro.<sup>17</sup> This type of concentration of power influences the possibility to decrease the competition in case there is an economic agreement between them and at the same time it can prohibit the competition of a new company holder setting the stage.

For this purpose the EU commission offered the solution to make a split and a net possession holding as a given preterm for growth of competition and the creation of new well operating functions open in terms of a creation of a liberal market to guard against monopoly, where the dominant role will be undertaken in such way to open space for energetic climate creation apart form Russia.

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<sup>16</sup> Konstantinos Hazakis & Filippou Proedrou. op.cit., pp.6

<sup>17</sup> Konstantinos Hazakis & Filippou Proedrou. op.cit., pp.4-8



## The aggressive Russian energetic diplomacy in the age of “New” Europe

The new energetic Russian diplomacy is founded under such principles that the “New” Europe is made dependant fully on the Russian gas shipping. When I refer to the term “New Europe” I imply on the fact that although some states members of the European Union have imposed their sanctions upon Russia they have not yet stopped to cooperate in the field of shipping energy resources.<sup>18</sup> The project Northern stream has been planned to deliver natural gas to Germania via direct route avoiding Ukraine, Belarus, Poland, and the Baltic states, which makes for the full dependency of Germany on Russian gas delivery.<sup>19</sup> The Northern stream has managed Russia to maintain different breed of politics established towards both old and new Europe:

Expansion of energetic ties with the new Europe (the carrot) and at the same time putting on more aggressive approach in terms of blackmail and terms preset to the old Europe, those countries that led the sanction campaign enclosure towards Russia (the stick).

Such was the case made apparent with the embargo line being imposed on Latvian anchor Ventspils, which is mainly used for gas delivery shipping especially what was of significance during the Soviet era.

At the same time under such circumstances Russia has highly staked and clearly demanded to make a ransom for the shipyard, but it came to a decline reproach as for the solidifying of the imposed sanctions by the Western allies.<sup>20</sup>

But the effective Russian energetic geopolitics led by the principle that gas can flow only from Russia has made its zeal compete, even under such circumstances that if the shipyard would be sold to the West, without its pipeline it would represent no significant economic or commercial meaning added to its existence. The Russian expansion politics being imposed on has come to a numerous large number of countries that are willing to use Russian gas in order to pack (dis)formal alliances through different multinational corporations in order no to be put the blame on at

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<sup>18</sup> In the literature one could come across the term old or New Europe, where Old Europe is identified through the concept of the old states of Eastern Europe part of the Soviet Union. New Europe contrary is identified with the part of the European countries that are not in agreement with the official politics of the EU and have their own concepts of their own independent energetic diplomacy.

<sup>19</sup> Larsson, Robert (2006a), “Russia’s Energy Policy: Security Dimensions and Russia’s Reliability as an Energy Supplier”, FOI, Stockholm, <http://www2.foi.se/rapp/foir1934.pdf> (02.04.2007).

This deal, Slovakia and the Baltic states have compared it with the deal of the World War two between Ribbentrop for partnership between Russia and Germany on the damage of all other alleged European partners. Without any doubts this kind of deal meant that Central and Eastern Europe were weakened, and at the same time loss of significant amount of money on the countries that gas pipe lines flowed as a result of their minor geopolitical significance to come.

<sup>20</sup> Laurila, J. (2003). Transit transport between the European Union and Russia in light of Russian geopolitics and economics. Emerging Markets Finance and Trade.

fault for disrespecting the sanctions rule imposed on Russia and the same time to be able successful to provide cheap gas or transit through their own state.

## **Russia and the Balkans**

Following the trans economy for managing any kind of diplomacy one could clearly say that energetic diplomacy is a highly positioned one on the international diplomatic scene. The same is composed of five sub elements that determine success, and that is the soft power to secure a row of financial bonuses (finance and transit to lower prices in order to supply gas), attract foreign investments as a result of the political stability of the state and the enlargement of its energetic market. The fourth is the industrial development of the state and last but not the least (where hard power steps in as well) the political survival of the young and not so stable states.

Within the ranks of the energetic diplomacy the Balkans does not have to consider the fact less important that although the Balkans represents a small energetic market, still its mayor influence lies within its geo strategic location especially taken as a explicitly appropriate space that it occupies suitable for transit and gas supply to Western Europe.

After the collapse of the project Southern stream because of the Bulgarian fall out, today as a replica we have the very well renounced project called Turkish stream that takes on pipeline establishment protrude Russia through Turkey, Greece, Serbia, and Hungary in order to supply Europe with gas of high octane quality. The build up of this stream pipe line would make a lot of political as well as (strategic) economical and financial benefits for these countries making the stream affordable.

On the long run, the benefits from the transit would multiply by using the gas, and the financial incomes from the transit route, as well as the development of the home bound industry.

In the meantime taking it into consideration the fact that Balkans have been burdened by ethno national conflicts space disputes, Turkish stream is being taken as a sort of a craven egg and as for the countries they do represent in they essence of this a deep separation route being followed on their accomplice on the build and transit of the pipeline. So by governments in some states the whole project was taken a a fully anti-western project, even what is more they have managed to convince their own citizens that it is more or less the case of the "Iron curtain" stepping into power once again moving from the East towards the gates of the West. The reasons for this surely lie on the bad experience from the cold war where most of the countries were dispatched on one or the other belligerent side. It is beyond doubt that the Turkish stream has a large impact on the geostrategic game and that the same is a sort of a "midwife" upon the birth of a large new empire in a multi polar world. The governments of the states

should commit wise and right decisions on the long run continuity in order to sustain both political and energetic stability in their own countries.

## **Conclusion**

The numerous challenges determined by the new societies and world occupied process in flow have postulated another kind of (dis)institutional diplomacy called energetic diplomacy. The same is now multi dimensional and represents a sort of a conglomerate consisting economy, politics and military diplomacy.

The onset thesis suggests that energetic diplomacy on the international scene has implicated establishment of new political relation between the states that belong to a communion with states that does not belong to that very communion, but rather have their own sphere of interest of political-economic character whereas other national interest are being left over, or that is the interest of the states altogether in a community.

The integration of the energetic diplomacy on the international diplomatic scene has been seen as a process of transnational economy or struggle to access natural resources among political elites of the world energetic arena.

The energetic diplomacy is considered to be mac-effect of geopolitics, simply because the same is taken by all scientific laborers as phenomena in the world today when because of shortage of resources and energy the most vulnerable are indeed the countries that put their own advance in technology and progress on the energy resources indeed. Also the development and the innovation dominance in the world today take on the whole the military component as an instrument of energetic diplomacy (the hard power as a component) and for that purpose exactly energetic diplomacy has evolved in three direction concepts exactly.

The first concept is to develop good relationship and economic establishment relation on the countries through which the pipeline will flow. That means exactly that the exporter state of energy resources will have to create a climate to instigate mutually acceptable energetic diplomacy with the countries that would sign the deal to transit and supply gas. As an apparent example made is the case of the ongoing process between Russia, Armenia, and Turkey these days. Armenia on the occasion of 200 years of the genocide over the Armenian people done by Turkey, on the occasion of this has been claimed the world open question for it in the sense of Turkey accepting the full blame of committing war crime horrors. The same question was hold open and came to full support by the pope, which made Turkey react swiftly and sharply on it. Taking into consideration the fact that Russia took good energetic establishment soil on the premises of energetic diplomacy with Turkey and also made exclusive trade

deals to supply and transit gas to Europe, it was inevitable for Russia in this sense to hold ground upon the question openly. On the other side Russia has established good political and cultural relations with Armenia and at the same time its territory supports a reserve territory as well for the Russian gas in case there is a cut on the Turkish stream project, when the world's energetic diplomacy would most likely set the stage open.

The energy diplomacy has been said already to obtain two types of components both the hard and the soft type of power and on the whole it represents a sublimate of mixed political, economic military and cultural diplomacy in order to achieve the goal.

The second concept is geopolitical meaning on the countries that the pipe transits. It is clear that it is of great significance (especially for the smaller countries and weaker ones) to be geographical part of the route that the gas line leads, because on the long run it would mean both political stability and financial support benefits.

The third concept is creation of a common partnership blocks and union as a result of this so called transnational cooperation on the field of energetic power. Talking about unions we need to make a reminder that these natural unions (natural because of the economic burden of the countries mutually independent from the pie line and its transit flow) almost always evolve from a political- economy military alliances.

Taking into consideration the current situation on the region especially dealing with the project Turkish stream as well as the economic attraction that is being offered, it is essential to impose on the question of what would be the political discourse of Republic Macedonia in such geopolitical constellations. The cultivating of the current military neutrality could be a preset conditioning for a successful and prompt realization of the sphere of interest of the great powers. What is more energetic diplomacy could also be supported by a business corporations and for that purpose a full reform on the economy sector is needed, in other words an adequate change on the functionality and the proactive role played in within the outside or external public affair politics of the country, as a represent to lead its own independent energetic diplomacy.

It is likely that Macedonia besides the opportunity to establish part of the Turkish stream pipeline could also seek for another alternative over energetic security, so it should not exclude the possibility to join the Trans Atlantic (TAP) although the same project is to be fully implemented no sooner than 2023. Whatever the pipeline the state should affirm to go to, the basic guideline should be the regional intercepting and netting into trans frontier energetic infrastructure which will secure long term energetic stability.

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