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Marc Coester
Klaus Bott
Hans-Jürgen Kerner

Prevention of Terrorism

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Core Challenges for Cities in Germany and Europe

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Sand 7, 72076 Tübingen

Fax: 07071- 29 51 04
E-Mail: ifk@uni-tuebingen.de.
Homepage: <http://www.ifk.jura.uni-tuebingen.de>

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Preface

The European Forum for Urban Safety with headquarters in Paris, France (EFUS) has been launching, in 2006, a project on “SecuCities” with the general topic of “Cities against Terrorism - Training Local Representatives in Facing Terrorism”. This project received support by the European Commission in Brussels – Directorate General Justice, Freedom and Security, according to the Pilot Project for Victims of Terrorism Act 2005.

The project of Cities Against Terrorism (CAT) aimed, inter alia, to bring together in a couple of Member States of the European Union practitioners and policy makers having already experience with terrorist threats or having at least alternative experience in dealing with the concrete prevention of or eventually mastering actual big safety and security related events like huge sports world cups, competitions, fairs or even natural or technical disasters, which could be used to draw lessons for efficiently and effectively dealing with possible further terrorist events. Scholars were to be invited to join in, too, if and insofar they had particular knowledge in the field which could help to clarify present issues and to come to conclusions for further action being both, scientifically sound and practically applicable.

EFUS invited institutions all over Europe to take part in the realization of its project, and to co-organize a national seminar. The core members were to come from local or regional authorities, and additional competent participants could be brought in from other State or National or even foreign authorities or scholarly institutions, if they were considered to be able to add special value to the Seminar in terms of knowledge or wisdom. In the event, seminars took place in England, Germany, Poland and Portugal. A final conference of all participant institutions and persons is being scheduled for spring 2007 in Madrid, Spain.

The German Seminar has been co-organized by our Institute of Criminology and by EFUS (represented by Frédéric Esposito and Justyna Kulach) from 27-28 November, 2006 in Tübingen, under the general topic of “How to Deal with Terrorist Threats? Lokale Antworten auf terroristische Bedrohungen”. The programme provided for plenary sessions with extended presentations, followed by particular workshops related to plenary topics, and a final plenary meeting aiming at summarizing the presentations and discussions and at drawing conclusions. Simultaneous translation from English into German and vice versa could be offered for the plenary meetings and some of the workshops. The members of the audience entered always in lively discussions so the plenary sessions and the workshops alike had seemingly a considerable impact of enhancing problem consciousness as well problem solving skills among the seminar participants.

As the locally responsible co-organizers we have been expected to write, inter alia, a somehow condensed report about the Tübingen CAT Seminar, and to deliver it to EFUS. This report bears the title “How to Deal with Terrorist Threats? Major Problems and Handling Opportunities for Local Authorities?”. It will be accessible on a special EFUS website, together with other reports and documents related to the CAT project. The present volume in the TüKrim series is based on our CAT Seminar report for EFUS. Its aim is, inter alia, to fulfil repeated wishes by seminar participants and other interested persons and institutions to receive a document providing a concise overview of the issues dealt with and the problems tackled during the Tübingen seminar events.

Tübingen, January 2007: Marc Coester, Klaus Bott, and Hans-Jürgen Kerner

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1. Introduction

The threat of terrorism to Europe remains a concern. Over the past years, the level of acts committed in European countries – especially in England and Spain – has increased steadily. In July 2006 the threat became also visible in Germany, when two bombs were found on trains. "We are now working on the basis that this was the work of a terrorist group... and was an attempt to kill a large number of people", said Jörg Ziercke, the chief of the Federal Criminal Police Authority, in August 2006.¹

The slogan "*How to deal with Terrorist Threats? Major Problems and Handling Opportunities for local Authorities*" points out the aim of the Tübingen conference as well as the target audience: local authority staff and elected members, employees of police, ministries and emergency management. For two days about 50 participants from 9 European countries and the United States discussed in a very inspiring manner and focused about terrorism and its prevention in cities. Organized by the *Institute of Criminology* of the University of Tübingen, the conference is one of a series being coordinated by the European Forum for Urban Security.

Much of the work on the terrorist threat to cities and citizens has been based on a unidimensional military model ("war against terrorism"). The participants of the Tübingen conference revealed terrorism as a multidimensional phenomenon. They tried to envisage long-term strategies against terrorist threats and crisis management after an attack from the cities' perspective in an interdisciplinary way.

This report presents the main contents and results of the Tübingen conference based on lectures by international and national experts in the field of Terrorism, on working groups and a plenary discussion. After some general information about terrorism (see chapter 2), this report illustrates long-term strategies against terrorist threats on regional level in Germany and possibilities of prevention from the perspective of the Central Council of Muslims in Germany and the German police (see chapter 3). Concrete counter-terrorism measures from the cities' perspective dealing with harm reduction and emergency management after a terrorist attack are described and discussed in chapter 4. The core results of the conference are presented in the final conclusion.

¹ BBC 2006: German bombs 'mass murder' bid (<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/5263930.stm>; August 18, 2006).

2. General information about terrorism

This part of the report deals with the historical and functional aspects of terrorism in order to get a topic-overview. In the modern world neither cities nor states are safe from possible terrorist threats.

The highly developed organization of terrorist groups, their incalculability and the weakness of possible urban targets confronted with suicide-bombing terrorism are great challenges in the present time. Therefore both the analysis of certain terrorist groups and the analysis of certain techniques of terrorism are to be considered of importance.

The logistics, the acquisition of material, the financial structure as well as the techniques of recruitment of terrorist groups become better with each successful terrorist act. In this chapter results and problems arising from this fact will be analyzed and discussed.

2.1 Theoretical and practical issues in preventing terrorism²

Terrorism as a historical fact

Terrorism is not a new phenomenon, it can be traced back to the Roman occupation of Palestine, 66/73 A.D. There the first historical details of terrorist techniques can be found. Obviously, terrorism changed a lot during the centuries, and changed in different ways in several countries and areas. However, in the last decades terrorists succeeded with violent acts in a new, global and ferocious way.

The term "terrorism" (lat. terror: Fear, fright) is relatively young and is mentioned for the first time in a French dictionary from the time of the French revolution.³ Nowadays it is used for the description of violent, politically motivated acts with a Modus Operandi, which is different from usual criminality.

There is little consent over the nature and characteristic of the term terrorism in research. It is however common to all terror groups to use force in order to change political structures to their favour and intimidate political opponents as much as possible.

To prevent terrorist acts two fundamental concepts exist. The liberal view regards bad state care and abuses of power as a cause for terrorism. The conservative view sees the cause in a too liberal-democratic constitutional state and sees a solution of the problem in the development of the repressive state force.

The functionality of terrorism

Terrorism today uses the free accessible infrastructure of modern society. In this context seven factors of the western institutions are aiding – even if unwillingly – to terrorism:

- 1) Mobility
- 2) Communication

² The following comments are mainly based on the lecture "From theory to real life: Practical issues in preventing terrorism" by Silvia Ciotti-Galletti, University for Foreigners, Perugia, Italy.

³ From: www.krimlex.de

- 3) Security
- 4) Democratic legal systems
- 5) Access to arms
- 6) Vulnerability of targets
- 7) Underestimation (or misunderstanding) of threats

A growing easy and quick mobility is required by the global economy, and technical evolution in the field of communications (internet, cell phones etc.) are obvious. Freely usable and accessible, these first two factors are background for terroristic attacks and threats today. Alongside the inner security of the actual terrorist group is particularly strong and inviolable. Terrorists are aware of the possibility of undercover law enforcement agents and other intelligence risks. Every single group or cell has strict directives detailing policies and procedures regarding their security. Mostly training manuals are used by the members of the group. Moreover, every cell has a security plan and adopts secret codes for the communication. All these expedients make investigation and analysis in the field of terrorism difficult.

The democratic legal systems can aid terrorist in achieving their goals: respecting the proper investigation procedures is often time consuming, and can origin long and costly trials, in which the terrorists can use every guarantee and legal possibility to affirm themselves and their ideology (very often, in fact, they use their imprisonment to spread their ideas among the others detainees; therefore many terrorist cells are born in prison). In addition long trials lead to a loss of public interest, to less attention by the media, and witnesses can forget, die, or disappear.

Of course democratic regulations must also be applied to terrorists. Violations and cruelties as in Abu Ghraib can not be accepted. Regardless however it is important to avoid giving aid or publicity to the terrorists' ideas by legal procedures; and it is fundamental not to consent them to recruit other people while in prison, or to continue to organise attempts and criminal activities passing their orders from the prison to the accomplices remaining outside. The democratic legal system faces new challenges in times of terrorism. These have to cover the spectrum of terrorism and at the same time uphold the basic human rights.

The access to arms and weapons today is easier for everyone than it used to be. A growth in mobility and communication leads to simple ways in offering or selling weapons or specific construction manuals (many explosives are easy to prepare and to use. Manuals are available on the internet). This applies even more for persons having connections to organized crime. Moreover, it is impossible for the state to control every target, most of all because in practice everyone and everything can be a target: in fact modern terrorists consider a target not only in public or military objectives, but also the civil ones, like industries, supermarkets, offices etc.

Finally, it has to be added that the terrorist threat is often underestimated or misunderstood: the difficulty to punish the persons of an attempt as single criminals and, at the same time, investigate and to "condemn" the terrorists and criminals *behind* them, leads to a problem of political response; if terrorism is seen as a "simple" crime, not as a threat against the national security and the prevention against that phenomenon is carried out only by "traditional" police activities, it will not be possible to react appropriate to modern terrorism.

Practical approach to preventive strategies

First of all, there is a need of adequate laws at a national and an international level containing concrete and *practical* directives for law enforcement agencies. If the law is confused, useless or scarcely useful so will be the investigations. A law that is simply created after an attack, influenced by the media suggestions, without planning or coordination with previous laws, just to give a quick response to the fear of the population, it is likely to be a useless law (as it happened in Italy with the terrorism law: law 31st July, 2005, no. 155).

The creation of useful laws is a duty of the legislator. Law enforcement agencies can only give suggestions or make specific technical requests, to avoid misunderstanding during the investigations or mistakes in the identification of terrorist and simple criminal phenomena. It is fundamental to properly analyze all crimes to avoid mixing up terrorism and non-terrorist crimes.

While for the organized criminal groups the mean is violence, and the final goals are profit and power, for the terrorist groups the mean is the money, and the final goal is violence (to create fear, terror, confusion, to weaken governments and formal organizations and to affirm their power and ideas). Therefore to follow the “traces” of terrorists a good strategy is to start analyzing how they finance their activities. Studies show that in many cases the source of the money is illegal. Very often the terrorists obtain money for their purposes committing crimes just as robberies, kidnappings, drug trafficking, extortions, frauds etc. Also other crimes, as the creation or use of false or counterfeit documents are strictly connected with terrorist activities and movements.

Terrorism can be considered by two different points of view: As a *sum* of crimes or as a *whole*. Viewed as a whole terrorism is a complex and unitary phenomenon, with political goals, having political nature and requesting political solutions. As a sum of single crime incidents (robbery, homicide, kidnapping etc.) terrorism should be fought and prevented by law enforcement agencies. In this context agencies are in charge of the analysis and repression, paying attention to the single crime incident to find links to terrorist purposes. For such an analysis, law enforcement agencies can use the methodology of the Problem Solving Crime Analysis, focused on the single crime incident and integrated with the specific tools of Problem Solving Terrorism Analysis. These tools are based on

- 1) SARA (Scanning, Analysis, Response and Assessment: the four stage of problem solving by H. Goldstein),
- 2) The 5 I's (Intelligence, Intervention, Implementation, Involvement, Impact by P. Ekblom) and
- 3) TAIT (Terrorism Analysis Intensive Tools by S. Ciotti Galletti).

The use of these tools aids the agents in every fundamental stage terrorism defence planning (1. pre-incident; 2. incident; 3. post-incident).

Every national or international law enforcement unit working in the field of terrorism should have at least one Problem Solving Terrorism Analyst. Especially the creation of a network at international level to connect all analysts to provide data and support seems most important. The training of the agents to become Problem Solving Terrorism Analysts

does not require new instruments, software, hardware or weapons but just the learning of new analytical tools and a new way to look at the terrorist phenomena.

The usefulness of this methodology, and its global approach to criminal and terrorist emergence, can be seen not only in preventing future possible attempts but also in practicing by examining relevant cases that happened in the last years (as the attack in the Tokyo subway 1995 by the Aum Shinrikyo Japanese cult).

Preventing terrorism in the 21st century means to use all the infrastructure and networks possible to react to a worldwide threat and beating the enemy with his own weapons.

2.2 The structure of a terrorist organization⁴

Because terrorism is a widespread concern challenging the modern world, no nation can consider itself safe from terrorism. The phenomenon of international and also domestic terrorism has been one of the main dilemmas of the post-Cold War era especially and increasingly after the September 11 attacks in the United States. It is understood that there is a necessity for international collaboration, partnership and cooperation to work against terrorist threats. Terrorist organizations such as Al-Qaeda, Hezbollah and PKK include thousands of trained activists and members, most of whom are ready to carry out armed activities around the globe.

In this context Turkey has been plagued by frequent violence from terrorist activities since the late 1950s. Historically, various fundamental groups, including movements of both leftist and rightist organizations, as well as alleged separatist ethnic terrorists, have been responsible for terrorism in Turkey and abroad (also in the European Union). Among them the PKK has been the most well-known terrorist organization in the last thirty-five years.

The Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) as example for a terrorist group

The Kurdistan Workers Party (Kurdish: *Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan* or PKK, Turkish: *Kürdistan İşçi Partisi*), also known as KADEK and Kongra-Gel, was founded in 1978. The PKK is an armed militant group with revolutionary Marxism-Leninism and Kurdish nationalism as its ideological foundation. Its stated aim is to establish an independent Kurdish state in a territory (Kurdistan) that is constituted of parts of south-eastern Turkey, north-eastern Iraq, north-eastern Syria and north-western Iran. To reach that aim the PKK/KONGRA-GEL started an armed conflict in 1984. Up to now about 35,000 people have been killed, several of them by suicide bombing. Even the capture of the leader Abdullah Öcalan cannot be assessed as a real caesura, as the activities just changed to a small extent: on the one hand the activities generally did decrease, but on the other hand this was accompanied by a shifting of the activities into foreign countries and by a decrease of their armed forces, particularly explosives from Iran and Iraq.

The PKK and its sub-organizations

The PKK/KONGRA-GEL is structured by almost countless bogus organizations: Presently, legal and illegal activities in the European Union are organized by the umbrella for-

⁴ The following comments are based on the lecture “The structure of a terrorist organisation (PKK) and its activities in the European Union” by Ahmet S Yayla, Ankara Police Department, Antiterrorism Division, Turkey.

mation named “European People Congress”. Implementing and supervising of this formation is undertaken by another body called “Coordination of European Kurdish Democratic Union”, divided into four sections to coordinate the activities. The other most important organizations shall be briefly named: The “KON-KURD” is an ostensible humanitarian organization, but indeed an economic organization of the PKK/KONGRA-GEL, agitating in 14 different European countries with altogether 413 sub-organisations. The “Kurdish Businessmen’s Union (KARSAZ)” is a bogus organization that is established by the terrorist organization for logistic and economic reason. About 1000 businessmen are working exclusively for this organization in Europe. The “Kurdish Red Crescent” is again a body of the PKK and agitating in 7 countries. Established to conceal the activities of the terrorist organization under different types of activities such as “humanitarian aid campaign” this sub-organization supports and finance different types of terrorist activities, for example purchasing arms, explosives and medical equipment as well as recruitment activities.

The terrorist organization has been trying to carry out its terrorist activities abroad in a very large spectrum along with neighbour countries of Turkey including Iraq, Iran, Greece, and Armenia. Despite the aim of the PKK/KONGRA-GEL to establish a Kurdish state the terrorist organization does operate in EU countries as well as in Australia and Canada because many Turks live there. The international activities can be studied under three main headings: Propaganda, recruitment and financial activities.

Propaganda, recruitment and financing of a terrorist group

Media activities of the PKK have been administered and organized by the terrorist organization’s Press and Publication named “Democratic Press Union”. Directly tied to the Democratic Press Union are 6 radios, 3 TV channel, 2 news agencies, 7 newspapers and 45 magazines - 39 of these broadcasting bodies have been actively operating in Europe. The TV-network – even including music channels – tells clearly what has to be done. The global information infrastructure and agitation complicates an adequate response: if one newspaper is forbidden today, it will occur again tomorrow with the same content under another name.

The PKK/KONGRA-GEL is spreading its doctrines on the basis of civil rights. Establishing humanitarian organizations or broadcasting bodies can hardly be forbidden in constitutional states. Democratic means and civic liberties are systematically exploited.

It is well known that many Turkish reside in EU countries. The PKK takes advantage of this situation. The terrorist organization has established many affiliated and umbrella associations, unions and foundations for the purpose of so called humanitarian aid, cultural and social activities that usually target Kurdish Ethnicity among the Turkish population for its propaganda in order to recruit new members and train them ideologically and doctrinally. The new members get a local apprenticeship in training-camps even in Europe, and then are travelling to Iran (that provides 14 camps) or Iraq (that provides 35 camps) to train the handling of explosives and arms. In that way about 5000 terrorists are now menacing the South of Turkey.

All these mentioned activities swallow up an enormous amount of money. The disbursements include the apprenticeship for the members, arms and munitions, logistic infrastructure and the financing of the organs. The PKK is involved in arms trade, extortion, money laundering, human trafficking, smuggling, charges and bounties in order to get the neces-

sary financial means. But the most efficient source of money for the terrorist organization is the control of drug smuggling, especially from Syria, Iran and Iraq. For prestige reason the PKK itself does not deal with drugs.

Ways to impede and constrain the activities of the PKK can be shown. Thoughts of this kind always have to be in accordance to human rights and UN resolutions. To check the refugee status of members of the PKK is as important as to consider freezing their financial sources. One has to sensitize the medial public to reduce the effects of PKK propaganda. Referring to the last two points it is necessary to appropriate more detailed knowledge about the organization's financial and medial structure.

Considering the previous points it becomes more and more clear that (new) media and world-wide networking must be a focal point when looking at terrorism and its prevention today.

2.3 Terrorism through suicide-bombing⁵

One specific form of terrorism and a global challenge as well is the threat posed by suicide terrorism. Not only Middle East and South Asia got affected in the past but since September 11 suicide terrorism reached the western world, too.

Since the 1980s suicide attacks were witnessed in Lebanon, Kuwait and Sri Lanka, Israel, India, Panama, Algeria, Pakistan, Argentina, Croatia, Turkey, Tanzania and Kenya, USA and United Kingdom. The enhanced migration of terrorist groups from conflict-ridden countries, the formation of extensive international terrorist infrastructures and the increased reach of terrorist groups in the post Cold War period all affected the spread of suicide terrorism to Western Europe and North America.

Groups that are using suicide-bombing

Suicide operations are attractive to terrorist organizations. They result in many casualties, cause extensive damage, attract media coverage, guarantee the most appropriate time and place with regard to the circumstances at the target location, are extremely difficult to counter and require no escape plan. Today, there are about 10 religious and secular terrorist groups that are capable of using suicide terrorism as a tactic against their governments and/or foreign governments. These are the Islam Resistance Movement (Hamas), Palestinian Islamic Jihad of the Israeli occupied territories, Hezbollah of Lebanon, the Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ) and Gamaya Islamiya (Islamic Group - IG) of Egypt, the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) of Algeria, Barbar Khalsa International (BKI) of India, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) of Sri Lanka, the Kurdistan Worker's Party (PKK) of Turkey and the Osama bin Laden network (Al-Qaeda).

Suicide-capable groups differ in form, size, orientation, goal and support. Some of these suicide groups are motivated by religion, religious/ethnic nationalism, or ethnic nationalism. Al-Qaeda's religious philosophy transcends territorial borders. Hamas, the PIJ and Hezbollah are primarily religious groups, but they are also driven by ethno-nationalism. BKI is the only non-Islamic religious group. While the LTTE and the PKK are provoked by ethno-nationalism, the PKK is also infused with Marxist-

⁵ The following comments are based on the lecture "Terrorism through suicide bombings" by Maria Alvanou, ITSTIME Italian Team for Security, Terroristic Issues and Managing Emergencies.

Leninist ideology. As such, the motivation of Hamas, the PIJ and Hezbollah suicide bombers is primarily Islam. The motivation of the LTTE and the PKK suicide bombers is Tamil and Kurdish nationalism.

Tactics and perpetrators

Suicide terrorism is the readiness to sacrifice one's life in the process of destroying or attempting to destroy a target to advance a political goal. Two basic types of suicide bomber exist, the individual and the vehicular.

Each type has its own advantages and limitations. The individual suicide bombers carry the explosive device either on their body or within an object. The major limitations of individual suicide bombers are that they are only able to carry limited amounts of explosives and have a limited destruction range. Advantages of these bombers are the less demanding logistical requirements and the possibility to reach difficult targets.

The vehicular bomb includes all motorized and non-motorized vehicles on land, air and sea with the potential to be turned into a suicide bomb delivery platform. The major advantages of vehicular suicide bombing are the ability to carry large explosive payloads and the high level of mobility. Limitations of vehicular bombing are the increased logistical needs.

Most of the active terrorist groups that have engaged in suicide bombings use both individual and vehicular bombs. The general targets of all suicide bombings are the general public, police and military forces, infrastructure of a country and very important persons or symbolic venues.

The operational advantages of suicide bombings over normal terrorist bombings are six-fold:

- 1) Superior dedication to the mission
- 2) The device is precisely delivered to the target
- 3) Harder targets can be attacked
- 4) No one is left alive to interrogate
- 5) No burden of wounded comrades
- 6) Psychological impact: A terror attack is a traumatic experience and produces a feeling of unease among the population.

Suicide bomber preincident indicators

No suicide bomber profile exists so far since men, women and adolescents have all engaged in this activity. Yet, most commonly, bombers are unmarried males between 16 and 40 years old. To a lesser extent, females between 16 and 25 years old have engaged in this activity. On a terrorist group-by-group basis, much variability exists, as each group has its own tactics, techniques, and protocols. Chechen terrorist groups have used numerous female "black widow" bombers, whereas Al-Qaeda has not. There are some constraints that affect the deployment of female suicide bombers.

As mentioned above no actual suicide bomber profile exists. Consequently everybody might be suspicious. This reveals the danger of discriminating against certain groups or innocent persons.

Prior to the actual attack, suicide bombers seek to remain undetected by blending with the surrounding. This defense, based on stealth masking, is employed as they move against the selected target. It may be recognized by observing subtle items or actions that appear out of place. While any one indicator by itself may not be cause for concern, multiple anomalies will signify a potential threat and help security forces prevent a suicide bomber from carrying out an attack. There is a checklist for observing, reporting, responding and investigating suicide bombing incidents. It is not designed as a comprehensive or complete list of all considerations in these areas but is suggestive of the types of common concerns that may affect police and other emergency service responders. Things that should be observed are:

- 1) Behavior
- 2) Appearance
- 3) Smell
- 4) Equipment
- 5) Vehicles

Crossing of a terror attack

A state faced with suicide attacks must thwart these attacks through intelligence, operational (counter-terrorist) and protective (anti-terrorist) measures. What is important for the understanding of this concept is the addition of psychological measures. Intelligence is the first link in the chain of crossing any terror attack. Operational efforts should be diverted towards the application of pressure on elements involved in the overall planning and implementation of the attacks and several circles of people aware in advance of the plan (family, activists initiating the attack, recruiting, training of the perpetrator, devising the explosives, gathering operational intelligence on the target, guiding the perpetrator on the mission).

New security methods should be adopted and action taken to prevent the suicide bomber reaching the target. Increased protective measures and the exposure of the actor before the opportunity to carry out the attack at the planned target may reduce the amount of damage caused and perhaps even prevent the attack. Another important facet is countering the moral damage of these attacks, supporting and strengthening the civilian population. Faced with people who are willing to level their own lives the idea of pertaining to action sounds close and trustworthy. The argument of being more practical always involves the danger of minimization of human rights and dignity. Confronted with the death of thousands one easily classifies human beings in worthy and unworthy to live.

3. Long-term strategies against terrorist threats

Dealing with terrorism, the theoretical validity of analyses and knowledge about the terrorist groups and their methods are of particular importance. This chapter will deal with more practical issues in the fight against terrorism.

New ways of communication that are used by perpetrators as well as by official authorities can be important for preventive and long-term strategies against terrorist threats. Contingencies of working on confidence-building measures in order to reach groups with a high potential of terrorist recruitment is at the center of attention in this part of the report. Migration and its meaning to terrorist threats will also play a key role.

The co-operation between different institutions (containing elements of psychology, sociology, criminology and Islam science and dealing with terrorism) can become a solving factor in analyzing and preventing of terrorism. It is to be questioned if and how those institutions hinder themselves or in which areas they are already working together. Also the educational system should be involved in issues of terrorism prevention.

3.1 Confidence-building measures⁶

The Islam has become a world religion which will always stand in the context with terror. The central council of the Muslims in Germany (ZMD) has made a lot of experience with the subject "Security" dealing with the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 in New York.

The situation of Muslims in Germany

Particularly based on the working migration in the 1960s and 1970s, there are about 3.2 million Muslims mainly from Turkey living in Germany – about 500,000 of them are German citizens. Since the Islam has therefore become the third-biggest religious community in Germany, the construction of mosques, religious lessons for the children, funeral of Muslims and the establishment of further Muslim institutions has been developing.

But this development did not – and indeed could not – proceed completely without difficulties: natural integration problems caused by the new and therefore to some extent ambiguous situation for the German society became visible as well as conflicts for example in the working life, e.g., about the legitimacy of wearing a headscarf during labor time. With the terrorist attacks in the United States and the attacks in London and Madrid the discussion about the integration of Muslims in Western Europe's societies has reached a new intensity and quality.

Against this background Muslim organisations in Germany have appealed to the security services and pointed out that the Muslims would like to intensify the dialog with the security services and are ready to do everything within the bounds of their possibilities to guarantee a better security position in the society. The security services accepted this suggestion and invited the Turkish-Muslim organisation DİYANET İŞLERİ TÜRK İSLAM BİRLİĞİ (Türkisch-Islamische Union der Anstalt für Religion; DITIB) and the Central

⁶ The following comments are based on the lecture "confidence-building measures – co-operation between muslims and the police in Germany" by Mounir Azaoui, Central Council of Muslims in Germany.

Council of Muslims in Germany (Zentralrat der Muslime in Deutschland; ZMD) to a meeting in September 2005.

The result was the installation of the working group "confidence-building measures". This concept encloses five points which have yet been reduced to practice just to a low extend:

- 1) Installing contact persons both for the Muslims and for the security services in order to implement the decided measures and to organize an optimized interlinking of activities.
- 2) To abolish – or at least reduce – prejudices and reservations as well as to enable a free dialogue, common conversation and information arrangements should serve to inform the Muslims about the tasks of the security services and to enable the security services to get to know the self-image of the Muslims.
- 3) Supply and distribution of information in which the security services inform the population about their tasks, measures and purposes. This can be on the one hand general information about the Islamism and Islamic terrorism, but also subjects like juvenile delinquency, drugs and violence in marriage. On the other hand, publications about the Islam, the life of the Muslims and the work of the Muslim federations shall be distributed among the security services.
- 4) Suitable teaching contents – also provided by Islam scientists – should be implemented in the curricula of the advanced technical colleges, the police guidance academy in Münster etc. in order to achieve a better education and advanced training of employees of the security services and to provide a basic knowledge about the Islam.
- 5) Equipment or announcement of so-called "tip phones" especially for Muslims which offer the possibility to report under assurance of the protection of the anonymity about the preparation of terrorist attacks, trends of radicalization and close criminal offences. The ZMD and the DITIB are willing to announce these phone numbers in their municipalities and to diminish possibly existing "threshold fears".

Probably these concepts will play a major role within the study group dealing with the subject "Security and Islamism" which was founded after the Islam conference in September initiated by the Minister of the Interior Wolfgang Schäuble in order to speed up the integration of the Muslims in Germany. The specific feature of that work group is that also Muslim organizations which are observed by the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution are involved – an attempt to ensure a better collaboration also with probably radical groups.

But the collaboration of the Muslims was met with criticism: many Muslims feel discriminated against as the impression arises that all of them are potential terrorists. On the one hand, these doubts are partly understandable as many terrorists specifically appeal to the Islam. On the other hand numerous mosque searches and many unjustified personal controls cause a feeling of lacking recognition among the Muslims living their faith peacefully. While the Muslims are supposed to be a security problem in Europe the Muslims themselves sometimes feel unsafe and under general suspicion of other groups in the society. This development prevents integration.

To guarantee a load-bearing, long-term perspective for integration of the Muslims and the prevention of radicalization trends, it is important to see the Muslims even stronger than now as a partner. According to the Central Council of Muslims in Germany Muslims are

neither the reason for nor the initiator of the current problems, but they are a part of the solution.

3.2 Terrorism prevention by police authorities⁷

Preventive police work on federal level

For preventive work and co-operation in Germany a Federal State Working Group (Bundesländer-Projektgruppe; BLPG) was built as a task force which consists of deputies from the Federal Government and the government of the 16 states.

In the past years public transportation systems all around the world often had been hit by terrorist acts. For this reason, the special BLPG dealt with the enhancement of public transport safety.

Carriers of public transportation are playing an important role in safety issues. They are working especially in potential “danger-zones” of traffic stations routes and vehicles. The BLPG pointed out necessary qualifications of the employees to show them how to handle danger situations and stated the needfulness to explain the actual state protection situation. A campaign called “Attentive en Route” (“*Aufmerksam unterwegs*”) was founded in order to sensitize passengers as well as employees for ownerless pieces of luggage. The German states implemented these results of the BLPG on state and on local level.

Preventive police work on local level

Besides implementing the results of the BLPG the state of Hesse took action in the prevention of terrorism on local level. To improve the relationship between Muslims and the police, more and more police staff members with a migration background are employed. Among other tasks they shall advise their colleagues in individual cases, make contact to migrant organizations, keep in touch with them and communicate the problems which can occur by the interaction with Muslims.

Additionally they can be deployed in the project “Early Detection and Combat of Islamic Structures” (*Früherkennung und Bekämpfung islamistischer Strukturen*; FuBiS). Through this project cooperation for the fight against the world-wide networked Islamist terrorism should be facilitated. These measures should improve the internal communication within the police.

Furthermore a co-operation agreement between the police and the association of private security companies (“*Bundesverband Deutscher Wach- und Sicherheitsunternehmen*“) was set up. It was held important that for the prevention of terrorism in Germany the state authorities had to work together with private security companies to enhance preventive measures.

Another preventive strategy focused on the world-wide event of the FIFA World Cup 2006 in Germany. Concrete threats on homepages of terroristic organizations led to a German-wide security action plan. One method was the extended utilization of a so called “Helper-Card” (“*Helper-Card*”). Primarily it was designed for violence prevention and in a modified

⁷ The following comments are based on the lecture “police terrorism prevention in the state of Hesse on local level” by Gottfried Störmer, State Office of Criminal Investigation, Hesse.

form conducted to the fight against terrorism. It was given to the visitors of the soccer games. The card showed all important safety information for Germany (telephone numbers of police, fire departments, hospitals etc.).

Teamwork is necessary

The biggest challenge in this context is the co-operation of the federal and state authorities in Germany in order to advance the effectiveness of prevention.

Furthermore to take such preventive measures the police should not be left alone. Prevention is a task of society and can only be carried out within a broad societal framework. Terrorism is a danger to everyone. The society is a key player to deal with this problem.

3.3 Prevention and internal communication of authorities⁸

The Islamic terrorism is – not only among the politically motivated crime – actually the biggest challenge for the security services. Discussing this topic first of all it is important to distinguish clearly between the Islam with its more than one billion religious Muslims and the Islamic terrorism accompanied by a tendency to violence, the pursuit to establish an Islamic theocracy and the basic refusal of western values and basic rights.

Germany as target-country of “self radicalized” terrorists

Islamic terrorists are increasingly aiming at Germany. The endangerment level increases almost proportionally with the German military engagement abroad. The question is not if there will be an assault, but “when”, “who”, “where” and “how”.

The assault attempts of Dortmund and Koblenz on July 31, 2006 make clear that the menace has reached a new quality and dimension and is as concrete as never before: Two bombs were put into trains and should explode during full speed. Just a small construction mistake of their suitcase bombs has prevented the first assault in Germany. The surroundings of the site of this crime show two dangerous tendencies: firstly – in contrast to the attacks for example in Madrid or London – objectives and small places without a particular symbolism were aimed. And secondly the two assassins, who could be caught quite fast due to video surveillance at the station, again broadened the range of possible assassins.

For the criminal prosecution authorities an equivocal culprit's profile of violent Islamists is not recognizable: Beside flexible networks there are so-called "homegrown" (offenders who grew up and who were socialized in Germany), converts (mostly men who want to show by attacks the strength of their faith) and Iraq repatriates with combat experience. But as the mentioned assault attempts show, more and more “self radicalized” as those assassins who were in Germany just for a short time, who have not been eyed by the investigating offices before and who are decisive within a short time can be asserted. Those two assassins were just lone operators without any contact to terrorist networking which, of course, enormously aggravates the investigations. It is hard enough to investigate in fields of terrorist networks, but with this new kind of “self radicalized” we are now faced with

⁸ The following comments are based on the lecture “Prevention of terrorism in the state of Baden-Württemberg from the perspective of the police” by Klaus Ziwey, Steering Committee of the State Office of Criminal Investigation, Baden-Württemberg.

more or less invisible combatants. Because of the wide range of possible assassins the usability of steady patterns is quite limited.

The possibilities of ways of communication

Al-Qaeda, in the meantime, does not need education camps any more to recruit terrorists. The Internet takes this place as a “virtual training camp”: On this virtual platform Islamists find everything they need, from the spiritual indoctrination for example by audio or video messages of famous Al-Qaeda leaders up to instructions for constructing bombs.

In Baden-Württemberg – with about 600,000 Muslims living there – people are faced with a number of about 5,000 Islamists, among whom there is a low double-digit number of so called “Gefährder” (literally-translated: “endangerer”) – people who radically negotiate and combat the common values and who are therefore under steady control of security services – and a moderate number of so called “relevant associations” and “relevant persons” who are supposed to be in contact with the “endangerer”.

The internationally operating terrorists must be faced with a global answer of united security services. In Germany there are two important elements for the necessary interlinking of the security services: on the one hand the Joint Terrorism Defence Centre in Berlin, a collaboration of different national security services that provide daily reports and acts as a kind of early warning system, and on the other hand the Anti-Terror Databank, which is going to be adjusted in 2007. There pieces of information from the 38 polices and secret services will be linked and saved in two different data banks with different rights of access: basic data such as name and address can easily be requested; requesting personal data like bank details, data about travelling abroad, religious affiliation, family status and profession requires presentation of special interest.

Prevention by the police

In Baden-Württemberg the aim is to integrate all organization unities from the 250 experts working in the field of politically motivated crime to every single police officer into the fight against the Islamic terrorism, dealing with five columns of safety: Beside the complex investigations are equally relevant:

- A comprehensive information retrieval supported by Internet research to detect hidden agitating networks
- A permanent tracing and controlling pressure – including video surveillance – especially concerning the endangerer and the relevant persons - also by undercover units
- The protection of endangered objects (particularly US American bases)
- The collaboration with Muslim municipalities and associations – there are about 150 contact persons by the police for about 180 known mosques in Baden-Württemberg.

In fighting terrorism the police are furthermore more and more focusing on knowledge provided by the universities. Contacts with the universities are just at the beginning, but the high potential of collaboration between police and university as well as the necessity of a better utilization of this knowledge are recognized.

The purpose of the dialog with the Muslims is to reach a clear dissociation of the big majority of fellow Muslim citizens living their faith peacefully from the small group of violent extremists. In spite of all police efforts and measures bared on alien law, absolute security cannot be created. Particularly the high efforts of the investigations and the rising personnel costs set limits to the constitutional state. Police itself is not able to solve the problem on their own. A permanent exchange of ideas, integration sought from both sides and the attempt to attend to these problems already in the countries of origin are in great demand.

4. Counter-Terrorism measures from the cities' perspective

Beyond long-term strategies against terrorist threats in particular larger cities - as main targets of terrorist attacks – representatives on all local levels have to prepare and take steps to minimize the immediate terrorist threat on the one hand and the negative effects of an attack on the other hand.

This chapter will focus on concrete measures of urban terrorism prevention in one of the largest German cities (Munich) from a municipal point of view and all aspects of crisis management in case of a terrorist attack in a smaller city (Tübingen) from an aid organisation's point of view.

4.1 Security and order within large cities⁹

The co-operation between all local authorities is necessary in order to manage crisis situations and to reduce the success rate of and the harm after a terrorist attack. Some of the following measures are taken in all German cities; some are specific for the city of Munich.

The revision of national laws

On January 1, 2002 the new counter-terrorism law became effective in Germany and a new legal basis was created by extending the reasons for expulsion of people from so-called rogue nations. The classification of those nations was determined by administrative regulations of the Federal Ministry of Interior and the Department for Foreign Affairs.

Now identity-securing measures, e.g. the collection of biometrical data and voice recordings, are possible. In addition it is possible to co-operate with other agencies in visa procedures of members of rogue states, if there are any reasons, which would perhaps oppose a visa distribution.

According to the modified residence law an expulsion of a foreigner is now possible, if an endangerment of the Free Democratic Basic Order or the state security is detectable or if the person belongs to (or supports) a terrorist organization and/or takes part in politically motivated acts of violence. Also crimes against peace or humanity, the attempt to recruit others to join a terrorist group or agitation are valid reasons to banish someone.

If foreigners do not leave the country voluntarily or can not be banished because of several reasons, extensive monitoring measures can be arranged, which limit the radius of action of the concerned persons substantially. Foreigner authorities are responsible for the execution of the measures. The counter-terrorism law was put in action by a specialized working group of the foreigner authority in Munich. Since March 2003, 20000 security questionings have been accomplished by the local authorities. 2000 cases were examined by other security authorities. About 100 of these cases led to safety discussions within the government of Bavaria. 54 termination of residence notifications were issued, 12 suggestions regarding a termination were send to the legal supervision authority. At present three cases are su-

⁹ The following comments are based on the lecture "Safety and order in the field of non-police danger prevention in the city (Munich)" by Wilfried Blume-Beyerle, Head of the Department of Public Law and Order in Munich.

pervised and taken care of and 11 procedures are pending. In one out of 22 cases administrative judicial contentious proceedings were introduced.

In the context of the working group BIRGIT (identification and feedback of dangerous people from the range of the Islamic terrorism groups) new forms of co-operation between the authorities are being developed. The aim of this working group is the banishing of dangerous Islamic people and/or to limit their scope of action by consistent application of the current law as far as possible.

Regarding the mentioned counter-terrorism law working groups like BIRGIT have the possibility for foreigner authorities, the police and constitution authorities to cooperate in a particularly powerful way and with a short official routine. Throughout Bavaria the working group BIRGIT works on over 60 individual cases - almost all of them resulted in the expulsion of dangerous people. The consistent application of the current laws led to the fact that all observed followers of the group of Ansar al Islam had to leave Munich. This "Bavarian model", which is based on detailed questionings and an intensive co-operation with the security authorities, has been taken over by other states of the Federal Republic in the meantime.

Safety and security measures at large events

The FIFA World Cup 2006 in Germany was a large event. Numerous measures were raised and restrictions created in order to defuse the special endangerment situation as far as possible. The Public Viewing Points in the cities were fenced and the number of visitors was dependently limited to the size of the area (loudspeakers were attached for the information of the visitors). Entrance controls were intensified in order to prevent taking-along dangerous objects or weapons. It was tried to achieve a visible and clear presence of security authorities on an operational level. Also so-called wave breakers and additional emergency routes were built. It was not allowed to bring glass bottles or to sell alcohol. Besides that, video monitoring devices were operated depending on the specific area.

Video monitoring (CCTV)

Especially large events like the annual Oktoberfest in Munich or the visit of the pope in 2006 are obviously explosive. As one safety tool the video monitoring was developed and gradually improved over the last years. The importance of video monitoring has become visible after the successful identification of the suitcase bombers of Koblenz and Dortmund in July 2006 via video monitoring.

The Conference of the Ministers of the Interior is planning to intensify the monitoring of the main stations, ports and airports as well as Christmas markets of larger cities (after the successfully prevented attack on the Christmas market in Strasbourg). In Munich the Christmas market on the Marienplatz was under surveillance of video cameras.

Security concept of the public suburban traffic

After 9-11 a new safety concept for the suburban traffic was developed in Munich. Since there are about 460 million passengers per year, a strict personal and luggage control like at the airport is not possible. The concentration thereby lays on the analysis of organizational processes from the security official's point of view, on the examination of structural-

technical measures and the linkage between technical and organizational measures. Furthermore the staff was sensitized by comprehensive training courses in order to be able to recognize dangerous situations. A control committee, which evaluates risks and specifies action areas supervises conversion and writes monthly reports to the management. It is responsible for the new safety conception. So far the production of the risk matrix, as well as the new conception of the emergency and crisis management is accomplished.

Security concept of the power supply

The security situation in all ranges of the power supply, e.g. electricity, drinking water and gas is of particular importance for each city. In Munich the entrance controls to the technical plants were made safer by attaching appropriate protection devices. In case of a terrorist invasion, it is still possible to prevent an escalation with the help of the master control station.

Due to the inner city power stations, Munich has the possibility to re-establish the current basic supply after a black out independently of the European electricity networks after approximately three hours.

Within the range of the water supply there are constantly occupied control stations, which can offer a constant quality assurance and also examine the water quality with bio indicators (e.g. by fishes). Therefore an early realization of any impurities is possible and the control station can block the distribution of water directly. In addition there are workers, which can be activated immediately in case of operational disturbances and who are equipped with appropriate equipment in order to locate and eliminate disturbances.

In Munich the local authorities could react by structural, technical, organizational measures to all kinds of the supplying interruption in such a way that every interruption is waived in short time. Special attention applies thereby also for the safety of communication structures in the case of a large terrorist event. The city of Munich has two complete master control stations in order to keep up the communication in case of an emergency. Independent from the availability of the usual telecommunication structures there exists an operating radio. The present analogue operating radio is replaced by a digital system.

Bioterrorism

After 9-11 and the following anthrax threat bio terrorism was high ranked on the political agenda. In order to be able to work against attacks of bio terror, an infectiological constant call team was established, which can give comprehensive procedural instructions.

A regional authority centre and a local smallpox alarm plan were established. Now a large number of infected people can be adequately handled at the same time. The aim of the smallpox alarm plan is a fast inoculation of the entire population for the prevention of an epidemic disease with millions of dead persons. The infrastructural conditions (e.g. inoculation sites) can be used also in case of other epidemic situations and events of bio terrorism, which requires a fast inoculation or expenditure for antibiotics. The national influenza-pandemy-plan was successfully enforced on a local level. Here the linking of different participants with the goal of the maintenance of the public order and the medical supplying structures was located in the centre. These plans are applicable also in the case of an

occurrence of SARS or other natural cause - depending on which epidemic situation is present, appropriate planning modules can be accessed.

Disaster control

The disaster control, which is one of the most important work areas of the municipalities for counter-terrorism, was adapted to the new endangerment situation. A view on so-called large damage events of the last decades points out clearly the new dimension of the Islamic terrorism and underlines impressively the necessity for new security concepts. In case of emergency local level has to expect approximately 1000 hurt persons. For this purpose a sifting procedure from the cold war was led in modernized form, which is to ensure an efficient supply for the hurt people in the case of a mass accumulation (MAHP). It concerns the fast finding of massively wounded with different degrees of injury. An effective transport system from the crime scene to the hospitals was developed. Also considerations to the qualitative psychosocial support would have to be employed. An important step is thereby the improvement of the collection and bundling of personal data of the hurt, in order to improve the information system for family members and media.

Of crucial importance is primarily a technically and personnel well equipped operational control station, which can lead a large number of task forces across a long period. A reactive municipality needs therefore an administrative internal crisis staff, in which also extensive decisions with political relevance could be taken. The municipalities became an elementary component of non-police safety architecture following a regional law regulation and independently seized measures.

4.2 Crisis management in case of a terrorist attack¹⁰

Changes of the political conditions in Europe (east west relations, reunification in Germany) – both financial and structural – were accompanied by drastic changes in the civilian and disaster control, in particular the assistance structures changed within the range of the emergency service in the past years. Adjustments of the performance of the German Red Cross were therefore necessary.

Multi-functional employment units are created, which are able to be coordinated fast and flexible in a large damage event together with the emergency service and fire-brigades that already exist. Within the Red Cross the direct binding of the medical group of the employment unit to the emergency service as well as the integration of the group of care into the assistance closes the existing supply deficit between the emergency service and the disaster control.

Competencies and legal bases for the emergency services in Germany are in the hand of the federal states. The basis for the general rescue supply is regulated by the national emergency service laws regulating the equipment of ambulances, medical material and other necessities needed in a case of emergency. Personnel occupation and qualification for rescue physicians, medics, aids, first responders and honorary aids are an important and urgent task of the emergency services guarantor. Fire-brigades and relief organizations are the main emergency service providers in Baden-Württemberg. The districts in Baden-Württemberg are organized in emergency service regions. There are four large Red Cross

¹⁰ The following comments are based on the lecture “Crisis management in case of a terrorist attack” by Rainer Wizenmann, Emergency service leader at the German Red Cross, Tübingen.

rescue service areas: Tübingen, Mössingen, Rottenburg, and Ergenzingen. This chapter focuses on one of these areas: Tübingen.

A closer look at the district of Tübingen

With its size of 519 square kilometers and its 214784 inhabitants the district of Tübingen with its specialized clinics has a special stand within the rescue services. Tübingen offers an extensive medical care with its clinical center for surgery, radiology, orthopedics, neurology and anesthesia, and among others also the specialized hospital for tropical diseases and the clinic with professional association.

Even though there are many specialized clinics in Tübingen, one should not ignore the fact that just three polytraumatised patients would still mean an almost unmanageable task to the medical staff of any high profiled clinic.

Procedures in case of a mass accumulation of hurt persons (MAHP)

A terrorist attack can lead to a multiplicity of hurt persons, which are mastered by the emergency services up to a certain measure. It is important to have a definition of mass accumulation to gain insight of the problem that emergency services are confronted with. A mass accumulation follows an emergency with a larger number of hurt or sick people as well as other harmed and concerned persons which can be rescued and supplied with existing and applicable reproaching of the emergency services. In case of a terrorist attack the emergency services presume a large number of hurt people.

The main goal in the strategy of the rescue measures is to restore the individual supply of the hurt or sick persons as fast as possible. An example of a MAHP was the train derailment of Eschede, Germany, where the hurt and harmed persons were quickly rescued and brought to specialized clinics and were treated according to their injuries. In order to be able to do this, alarm and organization plans for different deployment stages are necessary.

At this point some terms must be differentiated according to the alarm code levels and the respective person in charge. Certain terms need to be differentiated according to their alarm code level and the following responsibility.

- Alarm code 1: Emergency situation is handled by the chief of staff rescue physician and the paramedics.
- Alarm code 2: MAHP is handled by chief of organization and chief of rescue physicians.
- Alarm code 3: Large damage event is handled by chief of organization and the chief of rescue physicians and the guidance troop.
- Alarm code 4: Disaster, is regarded as an act of administration and requires the declaration of the chief executive leader.

To understand the procedures and the institutions involved in all the different levels of emergency cases one need to look closer at the structure of deployment. As soon as the message of an emergency situation reaches the master center of the Red Cross in Tübingen, the level of alarm code is being determined and the appropriate service team, e.g. the police, fire-brigade, rescue teams, SWAT teams, disaster control teams are send out to the scene of damage with their respective special rescue equipment.

Different amounts of hurt people and sizes of events are regulated by different relief organizations and therefore by different laws. There are the disaster control law and the emergency service law and also the fire-brigade law.

Concrete measures after a terrorist attacks

The emergency services and fire-brigades in Germany do not have enough experience about what to do after a terrorist attack. The lack of experience is evident when it comes to the problem of self-endangerment of the task forces through explosives, biological, chemical weapons or in case of special injury samples, e.g. amputations, and with the specific characteristic of posttraumatic stress disorder of victims and rescuers alike. Other problems occur in cases with several deployment scenes, destroyed infrastructures, communication and blocked traffic routes.

Necessary measures in order to counteract this lack of experience are the concentration of the available forces for the deployment and training the rescuers in close-to-reality exercises. Another measure is the qualification of the task forces, especially all those who are not active regularly in the emergency services. Constant coordination of the deployment strategies with all safety organizations involved helps to avoid friction losses within the rescue teams. Problems may occur with too many rescuers at the scene and also untrained layman helpers. This can be avoided simply by the marking of the wanted and needed helper. In order to do that requested helper should announce themselves to the directing center before going to the scene.

With the new financial billing restraints for the hospitals (diagnosis referred lump sum) installed by the Federal Department of Health, economic profitability obligations will immensely shape medical supplying levels. A necessary reserve for the accomplishment of a mass accumulation of hurt people with hospital beds and the supply of emergency doctors and emergency surgeons from the hospitals are not at all intended in the case lump sum system and is therefore threatened to be lost. The same applies to the emergency services. The pure, at "normal" extent of utilization referred reproaching of task forces and resources, leads inevitably to the dismantling of necessary capacities for the special case of a terrorist attack. Looking at the experiences of other emergency services (in Germany and abroad) with cases of MAHP by terrorist attacks should lead to a better coordination of organizations, especially the emergency service, disaster control and German federal armed forces.

The hospitals should be equipped and trained on emergency plans for the case of a MAHP. Civilians should be trained in first aid on regular terms for the case of accidents. Very important to be looked at is the self-protection of the coordinated rescuer, also the ability in civilians to practice first-aid and knowing about simple behavior pattern in emergency situations. The media should be instructed not to give out uncoordinated information in order to avoid misinformation or even mass panic. There is urgent need for action, especially according to the fact, that security services have gone through a change of attitude towards terrorist attacks. Preparation is needed, not only prevention.

5. Conclusion

Practical conclusions for prevention and aftercare of a terrorist attack were one of the main goals of the 4th local seminar in Tübingen. In the final plenary discussion the call for international as well as national and local co-operation of agencies and authorities has been common conviction among all the participants.

One of the major subjects according to the conference is the question for the theoretical validity of models and initiatives against terrorism and the possibilities of improvement. From the practical point of view it is a strategic problem, namely the security of cities. In the face of terrorist acts the definition and perception of a city changes. Terrorists perceive cities as a system of targets, obstacles like monitoring systems and escape routes. In this way it is of utmost importance to understand how a terrorist perceives a city. Creating successful strategies of prevention with respect to that fact is a lot easier. The same goes for the whole country where there are no walls and no control measures. On the other hand Europe has got a plenty of resources. It is weak though because the European cities are not able to imagine themselves as targets. The protection of a city is not mainly based on financial support to guarantee measures of prevention. The understanding of terrorist organizations has to become more sufficient. We are still not able to identify reasons and targets (lack of profiling). The question to be asked is: what are the goals of terrorist groups? The best technical equipment to chase after potential perpetrators (like digital walls, monitoring etc.) is useless without understanding the terrorists.

Also seen as a great problem is the inexperience in terror prevention of the local police authorities. A challenge for today is to coach the responders on a local and international level because these are the levels terrorist groups are working on. This includes also the training in internet monitoring. Another problem mentioned are the extra security measures. People get disturbed in their daily life more and more through security. This should be pointed out as one of the goals of terrorists. The police authorities in the city of Munich class only 0.1 to 1 % of the Muslim inhabitants as potential terrorists. But what does this classification mean to the other 99% and the concepts of integration? Each section of the official authorities is playing its part in the integration of immigrants (education, health system, urban planning). Integration is based on a closely local level and helps to prevent terrorism.

Though there is a need of transnational cooperation (experts, material and money) the local prevention of terrorism must be adapted to the specific surrounding. One always has to keep in mind that terrorists are capable of planning an attack with very few money. Another important remark is the role of the society in education of the youth. It is needful to extinguish exclusion and triggering issues to participate a fundamental group. In that sense policy has to cooperate with Muslim groups. There is an effect of the classification "1% of the Muslims are terrorists" on the rest of the Muslim community. Cooperation with Muslim groups mustn't have the effect of spies in the mosques. Anyway there is a dichotomy between discrimination and so-called political correctness. In reference to this thought an update of instruments used in terrorism prevention is helpful. In any case, policy always has to be orientated according to human rights.

As for the traditional crime prevention scheme terrorism prevention need to focus on primary, secondary and tertiary (together with situational) prevention. All levels are of high importance to work against certain democracy hostile attitudes and acts. At the same time all societal actors must work together for the goal of the prevention of terrorism. That mean on local, city, state, nation, European and world level.

6. Appendix A

Here you can find some newspaper articles dealing with the conference:

Reutlinger Generalanzeiger, November 22, 2006

Terrorismus – Experten tagen in Tübingen

Krieg allein genügt nicht

TÜBINGEN. Lokale Antworten auf terroristische Bedrohungen finden: Unter dem Titel »How to deal with Terrorist Threats?« steht am 27. und 28. November eine Diskussion auf Einladung des Instituts für Kriminologie in Tübingen. Die Veranstaltung wird im Tagungs- und Gästehaus der Max-Planck-Institute in der Spemannstraße 36 abgehalten.

Die Tagung ist Teil einer Seminarreihe des European Forum for Urban Security in Kooperation mit den Universitäten Bristol, Katowice, Lissabon und Tübingen. Ziel ist ein europaweiter Austausch zu Strategien der Prävention und Nachsorge von Anschlägen.

Das militärische Modell »Krieg gegen den Terrorismus« soll um langfristige Strategien und unmittelbares Krisenmanagement nach einem Anschlag erweitert werden. Auch die Betreuung der Opfer ist Thema des Seminars. Neben Vorträgen von international angesehenen Experten und einer Podiumsdiskussion gibt es Workshops.

Terror aus Sicht der Städte

Die Vorträge behandeln unter anderem folgende Themen: Transnationaler Terrorismus im Kontext von multilateralen Machtverschiebungen; Polizeiliche Erkenntnisse zum Terrorismus/Extremismus und Skizzierung künftiger Bedrohungsszenarien; Möglichkeiten regionaler, nationaler und internationaler Kooperation im Kampf gegen Terrorismus; Polizeiliche Möglichkeiten der Terroristenidentifikation; Terrorismus und Extremismus aus dem Blickwinkel der Städte.

Die Gruppendiskussion sowie die Workshops werden sich hauptsächlich mit Bedrohungsszenarien aus städtischer Perspektive, Präventionsmöglichkeiten sowie Schadensbegrenzung und Notfallmanagement nach einem terroristischen Angriff beschäftigen. (a)

Schwäbisches Tagblatt, November 28, 2006

Stärke durch Gemeinsamkeit

Kriminologen-Tagung über Strategien gegen terroristische Bedrohung

TÜBINGEN (jol). Über langfristige Strategien gegen terroristische Bedrohungen und unmittelbares Krisenmanagement nach einem Anschlag berät ein zweitägiges internationales Symposium, zu dem das Kriminologische Institut der Tübinger Universität eingeladen hat.

Vier Dutzend Teilnehmer/innen aus neun Ländern, darunter Kriminologen und Kriminalisten, Sicherheitsexperten und Verfassungsschützer, sinnen seit gestern Morgen zwei Tage lang im Gästehaus des Max-Planck-Instituts über lokale Antworten auf terroristische Bedrohungen. Die praxisorientierte Tagung will nicht nur ein Podium für Spezialisten-Vorträge sein, sondern auch ein Markt, auf dem Erfahrungen und Ideen ausgetauscht werden können.

Wenngleich die Tagung vom Ansatz her ein weites Spektrum von Bedrohungslagen einschließen will, rücken angesichts der Vielzahl von Anschlägen seit dem 11. September 2001 die Gefahren durch islamistische Gruppen ins Zentrum der Szenarien. Diesen Gefahren zu begegnen bedarf einer beharrlichen Zusammenarbeit auf allen Ebenen, mahnte Tagungsleiter Prof. Hans-Jürgen Kerner in einem Diskussionsbeitrag. „Es genügt nicht, nur die Absicht zu bekunden.“

Demonstrativ war zu diesem Anlass Mounir Azzaoui als Referent eingeladen, der Sprecher des Zentralrats der Muslime in Deutschland. In seinem Beitrag „Vertrauensbildende Maßnahmen – Zusammenarbeit zwischen Muslimen und den Sicher-



Mounir Azzaoui vom Zentralrat der Muslime will mehr Dialoge. Bild: Metz

heitsbehörden in Deutschland“ wies er darauf hin, dass der Islam in Deutschland mit geschätzten 3,2 Millionen Muslimen mit Abstand die drittgrößte Glaubensgemeinschaft hierzulande ist. „Nachdem bei den Arbeitsmigranten in den 1960er und 1970er Jahren Integration keine Rolle gespielt hat, ist mittlerweile für die meisten von ihnen Deutschland zur Heimat geworden.“ Damit seien die Muslime „ein Teil Deutschlands geworden“.

Für sie sieht er ein Problem darin, dass sie – obgleich verfassungsrechtlich geboten – nicht wie die Christen gleichberechtigt ihre Religion ausüben dürfen. Dazu gehört für ihn auch, dass die Muslime quasi aus den Hinterhöfen heraus und repräsentative Moscheen bauen wollen. Dass andererseits die Angehörigen der Mehr-

heitsreligionen Überfremdungsängste haben, nehme man ernst und man übersehe auch nicht, dass die Ängste angesichts islamistischer Terror-Anschläge zunehmen. Auf der anderen Seite appellierte er, die „Integrationsdebatte nicht mit Sicherheitsproblemen zu vermischen“.

Mithin ein klassisches Feld für Dialoge. „Wir können die Ängste nachvollziehen und sehen uns in der Pflicht“, sagt Azzaoui, wünscht aber von den Multiplikatoren in Politik und Medien gleichermaßen, dass sie sich nicht „auf dem Rücken von Muslimen profilieren statt unsere guten Absichten zu verbreiten“. Dazu zählt er, dass der Zentralrat vor einem Jahr auf die deutschen Sicherheitsbehörden zugegangen sei – nicht vergeblich, wie sich inzwischen erwiesen habe.

Das Konzept, das mit Bundeskriminalamt und Verfassungsschutz entwickelt (wenn auch noch nicht voll umgesetzt) wurde, beinhaltet unter anderem „Benennung von Ansprechpartnern auf beiden Seiten und verschiedenen Ebenen“. Dazu gehören Informationsveranstaltungen, offene Türen sowie Foren über politische Ereignisse und Entwicklungen. „Wir sind bereit, uns auf der Basis des Grundgesetzes in die Gesellschaft zu integrieren“, sagt der Sprecher des Zentralrats der Muslime, der auch interne Präventionsarbeit in seinem Verband zusichert, etwa durch wiederholte theologische Verurteilung von Extremismus und Gewalt. „Es gibt eine bürgerliche und islamische Pflicht, mit den deutschen Sicherheitsbehörden zusammenzuarbeiten.“ Er erwartet aber auch die Bereitschaft, Vorurteile gegen die Muslime abzubauen.

Reutlinger Generalanzeiger, November 29, 2006

Tagung – Fachleute aus neun europäischen Ländern diskutieren in Tübingen über kommunale Strategien zur Abwehr von terroristischen Anschlägen

Risiko gezielt eingrenzen

TÜBINGEN. »U-Bahn und Parkhäuser in den Städten sind mittlerweile zu Angst-Räumen geworden«, sagt der Tübinger Kriminologe Professor Hans-Jürgen Kerner, »wir müssen uns angesichts der Bedrohung Gedanken machen, wie wir damit umgehen können.« Gedanken zur Prävention haben jetzt zwei Tage lang bei einem Forum in Tübingen rund 50 Experten aus neun Ländern – Kriminalisten, Kriminologen, Terrorismusexperten, Verfassungsschützer und Vertreter von Rettungsorganisationen – zusammengetragen. Das Ergebnis wird sich, sagt Kerner, in einem Handbuch wieder finden.

Natürlich, sagt Kerner, könne man wie in Großbritannien an jeder Ecke eine Kamera aufstellen, das Problem selber würde es nicht lösen: »Ich bin da skeptisch, Sicherheit allein durch Technik ist sicherlich eine Fehlkalkulation.« Als genauso uneffektiv betrachtet Kerner, wenn eine Kommune sich eingräbt: »Die Stadt als Bunker geht nicht.«

Permanenter Gedankenaustausch

Freilich weiß der Tübinger Kriminologe, der die Tagung ausgerichtet hat, dass die Überwachung vor allem bei Gelegenheitstätern etwas bringt. »Wir müssen das Risiko gezielt eingrenzen«, fordert er. Und ganz offensichtlich scheint das



Der Tübinger Kriminologe Hans-Jürgen Kerner rät:

»Über den Zaun blicken und sehen, wo es gute Lösungen gibt.«

GEA-ARCHIVFOTO:
SCHREIER

den Hessen während der Fußball-Weltmeisterschaft ganz gut gelungen zu sein.

So hatte Gottfried Störmer vom Landeskriminalamt in Wiesbaden auf die »Sensibilisierung« der Betreiber des Nahverkehrs verwiesen: Die Unternehmen müssen ihre Leute schulen, müssen auch die Betriebsabläufe optimieren und vor allem dann mit Polizei und Rettungsdiensten abstimmen – und immer wieder üben.

Darüber hinaus gibt es in Hessen die Institution des Ausländerbeauftragten bei den Polizeidienststellen, die die »interkulturelle Kompetenz« der Beamten verbessert und den Kontakt zu Migranten und deren Organisationen vertieft. »Permanenter Gedankenaustausch, von beiden Seiten gewollte Integration und der Versuch, Problemen schon in den Herkunftsländern zu begegnen, sind gefragt«, sagt auch Klaus Ziwey vom Lan-

despolizei-Präsidium Baden-Württemberg.

Leitpläne abstimmen

Dass in Deutschland angesichts der mehr als drei Millionen Muslime inzwischen vielerorts Ängste spürbar sind, kann der Sprecher des Zentralrats der Muslime in Deutschland, Mounir Azzaoui, gut verstehen. »Wir sehen uns in der Pflicht«, sagt er ohne Umschweife, »freilich sollte man die Integrationsdebatte nicht mit Sicherheitsproblemen vermischen.«

Kerner warnt davor, immer mehr Sicherheit zu fordern: »Je mehr Sicherheit durch Aufrüstung im öffentlichen Raum geboten wird, desto unsicherer wird die Bevölkerung.« Wenn man angemessen auf Bedrohungen reagieren wolle, dann sei es mehr als bisher notwendig, die Leitpläne für den Einsatz aufeinander abzustimmen: »Die Arbeitsgruppen vor Ort müssen in viel kürzeren Abständen miteinander im Gespräch sein.«

Wichtig ist für den Tübinger Kriminologen auch, über den Zaun zu den Nachbarn zu blicken und zu fragen, »wo es gute Lösungen gibt und ob man diese nicht auch übernehmen könnte. Das Rad muss bestimmt nicht neu erfunden werden.« (ric)

Schwäbisches Tagblatt, November 29, 2006

Strategie gegen Terror

Fazit einer Tagung: Mangel an lokalen Antworten

TÜBINGEN (jol). Im Falle eines terroristischen Anschlags wären Rettungsdienste hierzulande überfordert. Dieses Fazit zog gestern Rotkreuz-Rettungsdienstleiter Rainer Wizenmann bei der Tagung „Lokale Antworten auf terroristische Bedrohung“.

„Wo aber Gefahr ist, wächst das Rettende auch“, zitierte Rainer Wizenmann hohe Literatur und erhob damit Friedrich Hölderlin quasi zum Schutzpatron der Rettungsdienste. Doch bei großer und größter Gefahr ist es mit Sprüchen nicht getan. „Die Politik ist gefordert, die Zeit für Lippenbekenntnisse sollte vorbei sein“, mahnte der Rotkreuzmann, nachdem er zuvor gewaltige Lücken in den deutschen Sicherheitskonzepten geortet hatte.

Vier Dutzend Kriminologen und Kriminalisten, Sicherheitsexperten und Verfassungsschützer aus neun Ländern, berieten zwei Tage lang im Gästehaus des Max-Planck-Instituts über langfristige Strategien gegen terroristische Bedrohungen und unmittelbares Krisenmanagement nach einem Anschlag. Einig sind sich die Experten darin, dass den international operierenden Terroristen mit globalen Konzepten begegnet werden muss. Doch im Falle eines Fälle sollte man auch vor Ort gewappnet sein.

Dem internationalen Auditorium skizzierte Wizenmann am Beispiel des Tübinger Landkreises, mit welchen Notfällen die Rettungsdienste – hier speziell das Rote Kreuz – üblicherweise konfrontiert werden und mit welcher Logistik man darauf reagiert. Die für Helfer und technische Ausrüstung verfügbare finanzielle Ausstattung sei nichts als das Produkt von Erfahrungswerten. Unvorhergesehenes gehe in diese Rechnung nicht ein. „Aus Kostengründen sind wir nur noch für die Normalität ausgerüstet“, beklagte der Tübinger Rettungsdienstleiter. Soweit ersichtlich ist, habe man den Regelfall gut im Griff. Indes habe der Zwang zum Sparen dazu geführt, dass „notwendige Kapazitäten für den Sonderfall“ abgebaut wurden.

Terroristische Anschläge, wie sie sich in London oder Madrid ereigneten, könnten in Deutschland deshalb unabsehbare Folgen nach sich ziehen. Man müsse darauf vorbereitet sein, dass Terroristen Sprengstoff und biologisch-chemische Waffen einsetzen. Doch die Helfer seien für Einsätze unter solchen Extrembedingungen nicht geschult. Ebenso mangle es an Erfahrung mit „speziellen Verletzungsmustern“ und mit gleichzeitiger Zerstörung mehrerer Einsatzstellen. Für realitätsnahe Übungen und für ein funktionierendes Kommunikationsnetz fehle es an Geld. Wizenmann: „Es besteht dringender Handlungsbedarf.“

BwWoche, December 4, 2006 (3rd paragraph only)

An der Sicherheit gespart. Frédéric Esposito, Efus-Vertreter aus Genf, resümierte den Erfahrungsaustausch mit den Worten: „Es gibt zwei Gruppen von Städten: diejenigen, die einen terroristischen Anschlag erlebt haben, und solche, die bislang davon verschont wurden.“ In den einen werde bereits bei der Stadtplanung daran gedacht, welche Bauten möglicherweise Anschlagziele für Terroristen sein könnten. Ausgaben für Sicherheit seien selbstverständlich. In der zweiten Gruppe sei das Geld oft knapp oder werde für andere Zwecke verwendet. Er dürfte dabei auch an Deutschland gedacht haben.

Dass hierzulande überhaupt größere Investitionen in Sicherheit getätigt wurden und werden, hat unter anderem zwei Gründe: einerseits die Anschläge vom 11. September 2001 und die anschließende Verabschiedung des Terrorismusbekämpfungsgesetzes, andererseits die Vergabe der Fußball-WM für 2006. Alle zwölf Austragungsorte – also auch Stuttgart – wurden von der Fifa aufgefordert, Notfallpläne zu erarbeiten. Es sei davon auszugehen, dass bei einem Terroranschlag im Stadion zwei Prozent der Besucher tot oder verletzt sind.

Je nach Größe des Stadions wären das 1000 bis 1400 Menschen, also weit mehr als bei irgendeinem Terroranschlag bislang in Europa. In München entstand so ein Belegungsplan, der die Verletzten reihum auf die Krankenhäuser verteilt, die gerade Kapazitäten haben – unter der Annahme, dass ein Arzt pro Notfallpatient eine Stunde braucht.

Bislang seien realistische Übungen ausgeblieben, klagt Wizenmann. Außerdem kritisiert er, dass bei Katastrophenszenarien davon ausgegangen werde, dass die Kommunikation über Telefon noch möglich sei. Spätestens mit der Einführung des Digitalfunks, der 2010 den Analogfunk ablösen soll, hält er einen Zusammenbruch in der Krise für möglich.

7. APPENDIX B (CAT Program)



Institut
für
Kriminologie



Project: Cities against Terrorism (CAT) – How to Deal with Terrorist Threats? Training Local Representatives in Facing Terrorism

Conference in Germany

Date: 27-28 November 2006
 Location: Conference and Guesthouse of the Max Planck Institute Tübingen
 Spemannstraße 36 - 72076 Tübingen
 Languages: German and English (simultaneous translation provided)
 More information: <http://www.cat-tuebingen.de/gg>

27. November 2006

08.30 – 09.30 **Reception / Empfang**

09.30 – 10.00 **Introduction / Einführung**

Address of welcome to the participants
Hans-Jürgen Kerner, University of Tübingen, Germany

Presentation of the CAT-Project and the team, link between this seminar and three preceding seminars in Bristol, Lisbon and Katowice
Justyna Kulach & Frédéric Esposito, EFUS, Paris/Geneva

10.00 – 11.00 **From Theory to real life: Practical issues in preventing Terrorism**
 (Von der Theorie zur Praxis: Praktische Fragen der Terrorismusprävention)
Silvia Ciotti-Galletti, University for Foreigners, Perugia, Italy

11.15 – 12.15 **The structure of a terrorist organisation (PKK) and its activities in the European Union**
 (Die Struktur einer terroristischen Vereinigung (PKK) und ihre Aktivitäten in der EU)

Ahmet S Yayla, Ankara Police Department, Antiterrorism Division, Turkey

- 12.15** **Lunch / Mittagessen**
- 13.30 – 14.30** **Vertrauensbildende Maßnahmen – Zusammenarbeit zwischen Muslimen und den Sicherheitsbehörden in Deutschland**
(Confidence-Building Measures – Cooperation between Muslims and the Police in Germany)
Mounir Azzaoui, Central Council of Muslims in Germany
- 14.30 – 15.30** **Polizeiliche Terrorismusprävention in Hessen auf lokaler Ebene**
(Police Terrorism Prevention in the State of Hesse on Local Level)
Gottfried Störmer, Landeskriminalamt Hessen
- 15.30** **Break / Pause**
- 16.00 – 17.00** **Terrorism through Suicide Bombings**
(Terroranschläge durch Selbstmordattentäter)
Maria Alvanou, ITSTIME Italian Team for Security, Terroristic Issues and Managing Emergencies

28. November 2006

- 09.30 – 10.00** **Reception / Empfang**
- 10.00 – 11.00** **Krisenmanagement nach einem Katastrophenfall/Terroranschlag**
(Crisis Management in case of a terrorist attack)
Rainer Wizenmann, Deutsches Rotes Kreuz, Tübingen
- 11.00 – 12.00** **Terrorismusbekämpfung in Baden-Württemberg aus Sicht der Polizei**
(Prevention of Terrorism in the State of Baden-Württemberg from the Perspective of the Police)
Kriminaloberrat Klaus Ziwey, Landespolizeipräsidium Baden-Württemberg
- 12.00** **Lunch / Mittagessen**
- 13.00 – 14.00** **Sicherheit und Ordnung im Bereich der nichtpolizeilichen Gefahrenabwehr einer Großstadt am Beispiel der Landeshauptstadt München**
(Safety and order in the field of non-police danger prevention in the city (Munich))
Wilfried Blume-Beyerle, Kreisverwaltungsreferat München
- 14.00 – 14.05** **Central questions for the working groups (WG)**
(Aufgaben und Leitfragen für die Arbeitsgruppen)
Marc Coester & Klaus Bott, University of Tübingen

- 14.05 – 15.15** **WG 1: The logistic of Terrorism**
 (Die Logistik des Terrorismus)
Chair: Daniele Zotti, University Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSSI), University of Florence, Italy
Co-Chair: Herbert Müller, Landesverfassungsschutz Baden-Württemberg, Stuttgart (Kompetenzgruppe Islamismus)
- WG 2: Possibilities of optimized co-operation in preventing Terrorism**
 (Möglichkeiten der optimierten Zusammenarbeit in der Terrorismusprävention)
Chair: Gottfried Störmer, Landeskriminalamt Hessen
- WG 3: Emergency acts and crisis management after a terrorist attack**
 (Konkrete Arbeiten nach einer Terrorattacke)
Chair: Rainer Wizenmann, Deutsches Rotes Kreuz, Tübingen
- 15.15** **Break / Pause**
- 15.45 – 16.00** **Summary of all working groups (5 minutes each)**
- 16.00 – 17.00** **Plenary Discussion:**
How to deal with terrorist threats at regional level – Possibilities of prevention and emergency acts
 (Wie können sich Städte gegen terroristische Attacken schützen oder im Fall eines Anschlags darauf reagieren)
Silvia Ciotti-Galletti
Ahmet S Yayla
Wilfried Blume-Beyerle
Daniele Zotti
Mounir Azzaoui
Maria Alvanou
Chair: Prof. Hans-Jürgen Kerner
- 17.00** **Conclusion / Fazit**
- Evaluation and comments from previous workshops
Frédéric Esposito, EFUS, Geneva
- Final remarks
Hans-Jürgen Kerner, University of Tübingen
- 17.15** **End / Ende**



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Web Links

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- <http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/>

Article: BBC 2006: German bombs 'mass murder' bid. August 18, 2006:

- <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/5263930.stm>;

Homepage of The Federal Commissioner for Data Protection and Freedom of Information:

- http://www.bfdi.bund.de/nn_531516/DE/Schwerpunkte/Terrorismusbekaempfung/Terrorismusbekaempfung_node.html_nnn=true

Homepage of The Federal Criminal Police Office:

- www.bka.de

Homepage of The German-American Institute / Arab-American Dialogue:

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