

MOORE ON INTENTION AND VOLITION

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In *Act and Crime*,¹ Michael Moore defends “the voluntary act requirement” for criminal liability.² In brief, this is the view that liability to criminal punishment requires “the doing of a voluntary act.”³ Moore’s claim is that this doctrine, with one qualification,⁴ is both accurate as a description of Anglo-American criminal law and defensible as a condition on the justifiable imposition of criminal liability.⁵ Moore tries to ground this view in a conception of action that is broadly in the spirit of the nineteenth-century Austin and Holmes, among others.⁶ On this conception, actions are concrete, particular events, involving appropriate movements of the agent’s body and having appropriate mental causes.⁷ Further, it is Moore’s view that the relevant mental cause will always be an intention specifically in favor of such a movement—an intention Moore calls a “volition.”⁸

Moore’s development and defense of the Austin-Holmes theory of action is impressively thorough and rich in scholarly detail.⁹ Moore deserves great credit for bringing to the fore, with force and clarity, basic issues at the intersection of the philosophy of action and the criminal law. Moore has much to say about the two prongs of his theory of action—both the idea that voluntary action must involve a bodily movement,¹⁰ and the idea that the cause of the

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¹ MICHAEL S. MOORE, *ACT AND CRIME: THE PHILOSOPHY OF ACTION AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR CRIMINAL LAW* (1993).

² *Id.* at 5.

³ *Id.* at 4.

⁴ The qualification concerns omissions. *See id.* at 56-59.

⁵ *See id.* at 56-69.

⁶ *See id.* at 78-81.

⁷ *See id.* at 44-45 (describing the four theses which make up the “positive core of the orthodox view of the criminal law’s act requirement”).

⁸ *Id.* at 85.

⁹ *See id.* at 44-165.

¹⁰ Moore’s understanding of this idea is quite strict: to him, “bodily movement means motion (not stillness).” *Id.* at 82. On this view, if I intentionally stand perfectly still rather than reach out to stop a child from walking in front of a car, I do not, strictly speaking, perform a voluntary action. Bruce Vermazen has discussed some of the issues raised by such cases for Donald Davidson’s theory of action. *See* Bruce Vermazen, *Negative Acts*, in *ESSAYS ON DAVIDSON: ACTIONS AND EVENTS* 93,

bodily movement must be a "volition." His discussion of each of these prongs of his theory raises important questions, but in this Article I focus on the second prong. I distinguish between two Moorean views about intention and volition, and then argue that a planning theory of intention, along lines I have sketched elsewhere,¹¹ should accept one of these views but reject the other.

Moore calls the view that certain mental causes are distinctive of voluntary, intentional action the "mental cause thesis," and uses the term "volition" to indicate these causes.¹² In his exploration of what volitions are, Moore articulates two main theses. First, Moore identifies volitions with a species of intention.¹³ In particular, volitions are intentions in favor of relevant bodily movements (in a sense of "bodily movement" that does not entail that the agent acted). Second, Moore develops a general approach to intention according to which intentions are distinctive states of mind, not to be reduced to desires and beliefs.¹⁴ Let us call the second view the "*thesis of the distinctiveness of intention*," and the first the "*intention theory of volition*." I am in broad agreement about the distinctiveness of intention, but I think there are serious objections to the intention theory of volition. These objections derive from our conception of ourselves as planning agents.

Begin with the observation that we use concepts of intention to characterize both our actions and our minds: we characterize actions as done intentionally and with a certain intention, and we attribute mental states of intending, or having an intention to act in certain ways now or later.¹⁵ A common approach to intention is to begin with intentional action and action done with an intention.¹⁶ From this starting point, it is natural to see the intentional-

103 (Bruce Vermazen & Merrill B. Hintikka eds., 1985) [hereinafter *ESSAYS ON DAVIDSON*]; see also Donald Davidson, *Replies to Essays I-IX*, in *ESSAYS ON DAVIDSON*, *supra*, at 195, 220. Vermazen calls such cases "simple negative acts" and argues that they "need not be bodily movements at all." Vermazen, *supra*, at 103. Vermazen's discussion and Davidson's reply are relevant because Moore's theory of action is similar to Davidson's in significant respects, particularly in the centrality of bodily movements. See generally DONALD DAVIDSON, *Agency*, in *ESSAYS ON ACTIONS AND EVENTS* 43 (1980).

¹¹ See generally MICHAEL E. BRATMAN, *INTENTION, PLANS, AND PRACTICAL REASON* (1987).

¹² MOORE, *supra* note 1, at 45.

¹³ See *id.* at 120.

¹⁴ See *id.* at 120-21.

¹⁵ See G.E.M. ANSCOMBE, *INTENTION* § 1, at 1 (2d ed. 1963) (suggesting similar distinction of concepts of intention).

¹⁶ See *id.* § 4, at 9. Davidson concurs in this approach. See DONALD DAVIDSON,

ity of action as lying in its relation to the desires and beliefs by appeal to which we normally explain such actions.

Suppose, for example, that I want (desire) to signal for a cab and believe I can do this by raising my arm. Suppose that is why I go ahead and raise my arm. If you asked me why I raised my arm, I would tell you that I wanted to signal for a cab and thought that I would do that by raising my arm: I would explain my raising my arm by citing an appropriate relation to my relevant desire and belief. It is natural to suppose that this desire-belief explanation is what insures that my arm raising is both *intentional* and done *with the intention* of signaling for a cab. On this approach, for me to raise my arm with the intention of signaling is just for my raising it (or perhaps its rising) to stand in an appropriate explanatory relation—a relation commonly seen as causal¹⁷—to my desire and belief. Similarly, under this approach, the fact that my arm-raising is intentional consists of the fact that it stands in an appropriate relation to some such desire-belief pair. In this way we are led to see intention, at least as it figures in action, not as a distinctive state of mind, but as consisting of certain relations between actions, desires, and beliefs.

This is a reductive approach to intention in action. But what about intention for the future—for example, my intention to fly back to San Francisco in two days? As Davidson has emphasized, I can intend to do something later and yet never act on that intention;¹⁸ perhaps I die between now and then. So intention for the future cannot in general be understood as a relation between desire, belief, and intended action. Still, we could try to extend the reductive approach by identifying intention for the future with some sort of belief-desire complex.¹⁹ This was the strategy of the nineteenth-

Actions, Reasons, and Causes, in *ESSAYS ON ACTIONS AND EVENTS*, *supra* note 10, at 3, 4-8 [hereinafter DAVIDSON, *Actions, Reasons, and Causes*]; see also DONALD DAVIDSON, *Intending*, in *ESSAYS ON ACTIONS AND EVENTS*, *supra* note 10, at 83 [hereinafter DAVIDSON, *Intending*] (containing Davidson's later views on the issue). I discuss these matters further in *Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason*. See BRATMAN, *supra* note 11, at 3-9; see also Michael Bratman, *Davidson's Theory of Intention*, in *ESSAYS ON DAVIDSON*, *supra* note 10, at 13, 24 (describing and criticizing Davidson's later views on intention); cf. Davidson, *supra* note 10, at 195-200 (replying to my criticisms).

¹⁷ See DAVIDSON, *Actions, Reasons and Causes*, *supra* note 16, at 12.

¹⁸ See DAVIDSON, *Intending*, *supra* note 16, at 83.

¹⁹ See Robert Audi, *Intending*, 70 *J. PHIL.* 387, 395-96 (1973) (analyzing intending as a special complex of wanting and believing); see also J.L. MACKIE, *ETHICS: INVENTING RIGHT AND WRONG* 207 (1977) (endorsing a reductive approach to intention); Robert Audi, *Intention, Cognitive Commitment, and Planning*, 86 *SYNTHESE* 361, 362 (1991).

century Austin.²⁰

In a series of papers and in my book, *Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason*, I explore and defend a different, nonreductive tack.²¹ Rather than beginning with intentional action, I begin with future-directed intention.²² I ask about the roles such intentions play in our lives, eschewing the assumption that intention must be reducible to desire, belief, causation, and action.²³ I try to articulate the systematic relations between such intentions, other psychological states, deliberation, planning, and action, and describe a network of regularities and norms in terms of which we can understand what it is to have an intention for the future.²⁴ I take this tack because I believe that future-directed intentions play a central, coordinating role in our psychology, both individual and social, and that it is an error to ignore them in theorizing about intelligent agency.

In particular, we are *planning agents*. We frequently settle in advance on partial plans for the future, and these plans then guide and structure later planning and action. We do not only reason about what to do now, but frequently try to decide now what to do at some later time, and then figure out what to do in the interim given our decision about that later time. I deliberate, for example, about whether to go to Philadelphia next month. Having settled this question by deciding to go, I then need to figure out how to get there in a way that is compatible with my other, prior plans—for example, my plans concerning my teaching duties at Stanford. Such planning enables me to organize and coordinate my own activities over time. It also enables me to organize and coordinate my own activities with those of other agents—as I do when I make plans to meet a friend in Philadelphia.

Not all desire-belief agents are planning agents. I do not claim that it is essential to being a purposive agent that one be a planning agent. I only claim that we—normal, adult human agents whose actions are the standard concern of the traditions of criminal law at

²⁰ See 1 JOHN AUSTIN, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE 450 (Robert Campbell ed., 4th ed., London, John Murray 1873).

²¹ See generally BRATMAN, *supra* note 11; see also Michael E. Bratman, *What Is Intention?*, in INTENTIONS IN COMMUNICATION 15 (Philip R. Cohen et al. eds., 1990); Michael Bratman, *Taking Plans Seriously*, 9 SOC. THEORY & PRAC. 271, 285 (1983).

²² See BRATMAN, *supra* note 11, at 2.

²³ See *id.* at 7-8.

²⁴ See *id.* at 9-10.

issue here—are planning agents, and that this is central to the kind of agents we are.

A common strategy in the theory of action is to focus primarily on features shared generally by purposive agents, including humans, cats, and mice. This can make some version of a desire-belief model of agency seem compelling. This strategy may be useful in the pursuit of certain questions.²⁵ But it can also mislead. Our planning capacities—capacities at the heart of our ability to achieve complex forms of organization, both individual and social—mark off a distinctive species of intelligent agency.²⁶

Planning is the key to intention: future-directed intentions are typically elements of partial plans. My intention to fly back to San Francisco on Sunday helps coordinate my various activities for this weekend, and my activities with the activities of others, by entering into a larger plan of action—one that will eventually include specifications of when to leave the hotel and of how to get to the airport, and one that will be coordinated with my spouse's plans for meeting me when I arrive. Such plans are typically partial and need to be filled in as time goes by, and in stages, with appropriate specifications of means, preliminary steps, and the like.

Reasoning aimed at filling in prior, partial plans is structured by two major demands on one's plans.²⁷ First, there are demands for *consistency*: one's plans taken together need to be both internally consistent and consistent with one's beliefs. Second, one's partial plans need to be filled in as time goes by: one needs to settle on subplans concerning means and the like. At any one time those subplans must be at least as extensive as one believes is then required to do successfully what one plans. Otherwise, one's plans will suffer from *means-end incoherence*.

²⁵ Jerry Fodor is an example of a philosopher who follows this general strategy in his pursuit of a naturalistic conception of content and its role in the explanation of action. This strategy supports his assumption that "common-sense" psychological explanations of our actions are exclusively "belief/desire" explanations. See JERRY A. FODOR, *A THEORY OF CONTENT AND OTHER ESSAYS* 4 (1990).

²⁶ The need for planning to achieve complex forms of coordination and organization is, I think, rooted in part in our resource limits—in our limited resources for use in attending to problems, deliberating about options, determining potential and likely upshots, performing relevant calculations, and so on. A theory of planning will be part of a theory of what Herbert Simon calls "bounded rationality." See HERBERT A. SIMON, *REASON IN HUMAN AFFAIRS* 4 (1983); see also BRATMAN, *supra* note 11, at 10-11, 50-110; GILBERT HARMAN, *CHANGE IN VIEW* 97-113 (1986).

²⁷ For a fuller discussion of these issues, see BRATMAN, *supra* note 11, at 30-32.

Associated with these two demands are two roles intentions play as inputs into practical reasoning.²⁸ Given the demand for means-end coherence, prior intentions pose problems for further deliberation and thereby establish standards of relevance for options considered in deliberation. Given the needs for consistency, prior intentions also constrain further intentions. In this way, prior intentions provide a filter on options that can be considered in deliberation aimed at resolving the problems posed by the incompleteness of the plans.

Consider again my intention to fly back to San Francisco on Sunday evening. As part of a partial plan it poses a problem for further deliberation: how am I to get to the airport from the hotel? One solution to this problem might be to take the afternoon limousine to the airport. But this solution is inadmissible, given that I am also planning to meet an old friend in the afternoon. Other solutions include taking a cab and taking the bus, in either case after I meet my friend. Both are relevant and admissible options. But which is superior? Here I weigh relevant desire-belief reasons for and against these competing solutions; I weigh, for example, speed and convenience against cost, in order to reach a decision. This deliberation is framed by my prior, partial plan. My prior plan provides a *background framework* within which I weigh my desire-belief reasons.

For all this to work well, intentions will need to have two further features. First, when the time for action is seen to have arrived, one's prior intentions will normally guide and control one's conduct. Having planned to take a cab at 6:00 P.M., if I see that it is now 6:00 P.M., then in the normal course of events I will at least try to take a cab. This will normally involve monitoring and tracking: if I miss the first cab, I will try to get another. Second, prior intentions, while of course not irrevocable, will need to have a certain stability. If we were constantly reconsidering the merits of our prior plans, they would be of little use in coordination.

This is part of what I call the *planning theory of intention*.²⁹ I believe that once we have such a story in place little reason remains for efforts to reduce intention to some sort of belief, desire, or desire-belief pair.³⁰ In this way, the planning theory helps support

²⁸ See *id.* at 30-35.

²⁹ See *id.* at 10.

³⁰ For a spirited attempt to combine planning agency with a reduction of intention to belief, see generally J. DAVID VELLEMAN, PRACTICAL REFLECTION 109-42 (1989)

a view of intention as distinctive, or irreducible to beliefs and desires.

Let us now return to Moore's two views: the distinctiveness of intention and the intention theory of volition. In defense of his thesis of the distinctiveness of intention, Moore indicates broad agreement with the spirit of the remarks I have been making. For example, one of Moore's main arguments for the distinctiveness of intention is that

human people are non-Sartrean: they regard their decisions, resolutions, choices, etc. as fixing matters that do not again need recalculation. . . . [W]e forge some new mental state out of the prima-facie desires in conflict, because once we have resolved the conflict with a long-term decision we do not in fact experience the conflict the same way.³¹

I agree, though I would want to emphasize that in "fixing matters" one normally does not make an irrevocable commitment: there remain important issues about the conditions under which one reasonably reconsiders such a decision.³² For present purposes, though, the important point is that a "non-Sartrean" decision issues in an intention that then shapes further planning and action, thereby supporting coordination.

There may, however, also be seeds of disagreement. As I see it, the main argument for the distinctiveness of intention goes by way of the roles of intention in future-directed planning. For non-planning but purposive agents (cats, perhaps), a desire-belief conception of purposive agency may well suffice. My argument for the distinctiveness of intention, then, is *not* the argument that a distinctive attitude of intention is always needed to connect desire-belief pairs with present action. After all, nonplanning agents can also act purposively, on the basis of beliefs and desires.

Perhaps Moore would disagree here: parts of his discussion suggest that he wants to push equally both kinds of argument—both an argument from planning and an argument from the general

(arguing that intention is a special kind of self-referential belief). I believe, however, that Velleman's theory has difficulty giving an adequate account of (a) the distinction between intention and the foresight of side effects, and (b) the sense in which intentions provide reasons for action. See generally Michael E. Bratman, *Cognitivism About Practical Reason*, 102 ETHICS 117 (1991).

³¹ See MOORE, *supra* note 1, at 141-42 (footnote omitted).

³² See BRATMAN, *supra* note 11, at 60-76; Michael E. Bratman, *Planning and the Stability of Intention*, 2 MINDS & MACHINES 1 (1992) (developing a theory of reasonable reconsideration of a prior intention).

structure of purposive action—for the distinctiveness of intention.³³ For reasons that will emerge, I think such a strategy may fail to do justice to the significance of planning. (Even with my strategy, though, once intentions are introduced as distinctive attitudes we should expect them normally to play a direct role in the explanation of present action.) So for now I will proceed on the assumption that our planning agency is at the bottom of the argument for the distinctiveness of intention.

Now, when we see the distinctiveness of intention as grounded in our nature as planning agents, we have reason to be skeptical about Moore's other thesis, the intention theory of volition. To see why, it will be useful to canvass some possibilities left open by the distinctiveness of intention.

Consider, first, cases of spontaneous yet voluntary action. Suppose you unexpectedly throw a ball to me and I spontaneously reach up and catch it. My catching it is under my control and voluntary; it is not just like a mere reflex blinking of my eye. But my action is relatively automatic and unreflective, so it may seem strained to suppose that its etiology must involve a distinctive attitude of intending, given that we are understanding intending largely in terms of its role in planning. But we still have a voluntary action in the sense of the voluntary act requirement. If, instead of catching a ball, I were punching you in the nose, I would be subject to punishment.

I am unsure exactly what to say about such cases.³⁴ Perhaps such spontaneous actions are best characterized as voluntary and goal-directed, but not intentional (though not *unintentional*, either). Making room in this way for actions that are voluntary but neither intentional nor unintentional would allow us to hold onto the idea that intentional action is always grounded in some intention. But it would still entail that actions that satisfy the voluntary act requirement may involve no intention, and that is a conclusion Moore could not accept.

Let us, however, put to one side cases of spontaneous voluntary activity and consider intentional activity that is guided by an intention. Is Moore's intention theory of volition defensible for such cases?

³³ See MOORE, *supra* note 1, at 137-39.

³⁴ I discussed such cases in BRATMAN, *supra* note 11, at 126-27, and was unsure how to resolve them.

I think not. As a first step in explaining my reasons for this skepticism, it will be useful to explore some complexities in the relation between what one intends and what one does intentionally. Note first that to say that my intentionally *A*-ing was guided by an intention is not yet to say that my intention was an intention specifically *to A*. I call the view, that if I intentionally *A* then I intend to *A*, the "Simple View."³⁵ The Simple View is challenged by three kinds of cases.

(1) There are cases along the lines of the video-game case I have discussed earlier and to which Moore alludes.³⁶ I might know that I can hit either target 1 or target 2, but that it is not possible to hit them both. Knowing this limitation, I might try to hit each target. If I succeed in hitting, say, target 1, and succeed because of my skill, then I hit target 1 intentionally. Yet I need not intend to hit target 1. If I did so intend, given the symmetry of the case, I would intend to hit target 2, and so violate the demand for intention-belief consistency. So perhaps I only intend to hit one or the other of the targets, or to try to hit target 1.

(2) There are cases central to the doctrine of double effect. These are cases where one intends to bring about *M* as a means to an end *E*, knowing that a side effect of *M* will be *S*. In some such cases, if one does intentionally bring about *M*, and thereby *S*, one intentionally brings about *S*. Gilbert Harman has provided a useful example: if you are fully aware that guiding your car into the tight parking spot will scratch my car, then, if you still proceed to do so, you intentionally scratch my car.³⁷ However, you need not have intended to scratch my car.³⁸ Such an intention would bring with it, among other things, a disposition to keep track of the scratches on my car and to ensure that you do indeed scratch my car; and you need have no such disposition.³⁹ If you somehow missed my car,

³⁵ I first introduced this label in Michael E. Bratman, *Two Faces of Intention*, 93 PHIL. REV. 375, 377 (1984).

³⁶ See BRATMAN, *supra* note 11, at 111-28; Bratman, *supra* note 35, at 381-83 (containing original discussion of video-game cases); see also MOORE, *supra* note 1, at 122-23 (discussing video-game cases).

³⁷ See HARMAN, *supra* note 26, at 89 (discussing car example).

³⁸ See Gilbert Harman, *Practical Reasoning*, 29 REV. METAPHYSICS 431, 433 (1976) (arguing that one may intentionally bring about a foreseen effect without intending to bring about that effect); see also Bratman, *supra* note 35, at 375-405 (concurring with Harman).

³⁹ See BRATMAN, *supra* note 11, at 139-64 (discussing differences between intended and merely expected upshots).

you would not come back with sandpaper. So perhaps you only intend to park your car, fully expecting thereby to scratch mine.

(3) There are cases where one tries to do what one is confident cannot be done and yet, unexpectedly, succeeds. Perhaps you believe your arm is paralyzed. Nevertheless, you try to raise your arm and, to your surprise, you succeed. You raise your arm intentionally. But, though you try to raise it, you probably do not intend to raise it; if you are a rational agent, such an intention seems ruled out by your confidence that you will fail. So perhaps all that you intend is to try to raise your arm.

In each of these cases, the agent acts intentionally, and in so acting is guided by some intention. Yet, for some of the actions performed intentionally, there is reason to deny that the agent specifically intends so to act. Such an intention would be in tension with the demand for intention-belief consistency (cases (1) and (3)), or with the idea that an intention to *A* supports guidance and tracking in the direction of *A* (case (2)). So we have reasons, derived from the planning theory of intention, to deny that there is in such cases an intention to act in all the ways in which one intentionally acts. The Simple View is overly simple.

Return now to the relation between the distinctiveness of intention and Moore's intention theory of volition. Consider:

- (A) If *S* voluntarily *A*-s, then there is some bodily movement of *S*'s that is involved in her *A*-ing, and there is some intention of *S*'s that is explanatory of her *A*-ing.

One challenge to (A) may be posed by the existence of intentional omissions that involve no relevant bodily movement.⁴⁰ A second challenge to (A) may, as we have just seen, be posed by certain cases of spontaneous action. But let us put such concerns aside for now. The important point here is that even if we accept (A), we still cannot infer:

- (B) If *S* voluntarily *A*-s, then there is some bodily movement of *S*'s that is involved in her *A*-ing, and there is an intention of *S*'s that is specifically in favor of those bodily movements and that is explanatory of her action.

(B), though, is required for Moore's intention theory of volition.

⁴⁰ See *supra* note 10 and accompanying text.

One might try to argue from (A) to (B) by arguing first from (A) to

(A') If *S* voluntarily *A*-s, then there is some bodily movement, *b*, of *S*'s that is involved in her *A*-ing, and *S* intentionally causes *b*.

But even accepting (A'), we still could not move directly to (B). This is where it is important to see that the Simple View itself is problematic. If, as I propose, we reject the Simple View, we cannot simply reason from "S intentionally causes *b*" to "S intends to cause *b*."

The distinctiveness of intention, even together with (A), does not commit us to the intention theory of volition. Moore sees this problem,⁴¹ and offers further arguments aimed, in effect, at bridging the gap between (A) and (B). These arguments, he says, should begin with

the insight that there must be a causal relation between our more general intentions (or plans) and the most discrete of the bodily movements that execute such plans. . . .

. . . [T]here must be both initiating causes for each of such discrete movements and also monitoring, feedback, and correcting causes for the continuation of each such movement.⁴²

I agree. In the absence of something like such "initiating," "monitoring," and "correcting" causes, it would be a mystery why our bodies typically move in ways which, in the circumstances, promote what we intend.⁴³ But, as Moore notes, this does not show that one must have *intentions* specifically directed to these discrete movements.

Moore offers two reasons for thinking nevertheless that in intentional action, one must have intentions specifically directed to the involved bodily movements. First, we can be aware of these involved movements upon reflection.⁴⁴ Second, when we learn "complex motor routines"—for example, learning to play the piano—we usually start specifically by learning the component bodily movements.⁴⁵ But it seems to me that these observations do not suffice to establish (B).

⁴¹ See MOORE, *supra* note 1, at 149-50.

⁴² *Id.* at 150.

⁴³ See David Israel et al., *Executions, Motivations and Accomplishments*, 103 PHIL. REV. 529-30 (1994).

⁴⁴ See MOORE, *supra* note 1, at 153.

⁴⁵ See *id.*

To see why, consider a parallel with perceptual belief. When I see a chair, we may suppose, the chair is a cause of certain events in my eyes and optic nerves, events which themselves cause certain events in my central nervous system. The events in my eyes and optic nerves may well be sensory representations of an object as one of a particular shape and size. As Fred Dretske would emphasize, these events may have the function of indicating that there is such an object.⁴⁶ But it does not follow that these events are themselves a *belief*—a cognitive representation that plays characteristic roles in reasoning and action—that there is such an object or, indeed, that there is a chair. My perceptual belief that a chair exists may be caused in part by a sensory representation that is not itself a belief.

To clarify this point, consider a commonly discussed example: suppose that you are looking at a stick that is partly in water. The stick looks bent, but you know that it is not. You have a sensory representation of the stick as bent, but that representation is not a belief that it is bent. Your background knowledge of how things look when partially in water blocks a transition to a belief in a bent stick. One of the things we learn in our cognitive development is the need sometimes to block such transitions from sensory representation to belief.

Now consider intention. My intention to open the window will, if successful, cause appropriate bodily movements. The causal route from intention to bodily movements may perhaps involve events that specifically represent those movements and are also initiating causes and monitors of those movements. Indeed, if Moore's arguments show something relevant here, they show the need for some such representations. But even if there are such (as we might say, executive) representations, they need not themselves be intentions. The planning theory of intention strongly suggests that they need not be intentions. After all, I could rationally have such an executive representation directed at a certain bodily movement and yet believe that I will not so act. This seems to happen when I try to move my body in a way in which I am confident I cannot. And it seems that I could have such an executive representation

⁴⁶ See FRED I. DRETSKE, *EXPLAINING BEHAVIOR* (1988) 62-64 (explaining the role of natural systems of representation); see also FRED I. DRETSKE, *KNOWLEDGE AND THE FLOW OF INFORMATION* 141-53 (1981) (discussing the difference between sensory and cognitive representation); Fred I. Dretske, *Aspects of Cognitive Representation*, in *THE REPRESENTATION OF KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF* 101-15 (Myles Brand & Robert M. Harnish eds., 1986) (same).

directed at movement *X* and also one directed at movement *Y*, while knowing that *X* and *Y* are not possible together.⁴⁷ In both cases my executive representation does not function in a fully intention-like way. So in both cases there is good reason to reject the identification of executive representation and intention.

Moore suggests that such concerns can be circumvented by weakening the demands on intention.⁴⁸ He suggests that sometimes one can rationally intend *X* though one is confident one cannot *X*; and sometimes one can rationally intend *Y* and intend *Z*, while knowing that *Y* and *Z* are not together possible. But I do not think this strategy will get to the heart of the problem with the general identification of executive representations with intentions. The demand for intention-belief consistency reflects the ways intentions and beliefs function together in our planning. Weakening this demand a bit would leave untouched this deeper fact about the role of intention in planning. What blocks the general identification of executive representations with intentions is that the former, unlike the latter, need not be directly embedded in our plans and planning, any more than a sensory representation of the stick as bent needs to be directly embedded in our beliefs and reasoning. Perhaps, as Moore suggests, we sometimes reflect, become aware of executive representations, and incorporate corresponding intentions into our plans.⁴⁹ And perhaps we sometimes reflect on how things look to us, and incorporate corresponding beliefs into our system of beliefs. But this does not mean that all executive representations are intentions, or that all sensory representations are beliefs. A theory of belief that treated all representations in the connection from world to mind as themselves beliefs would be insensitive to distinctive features of the beliefs of cognitive beings like us. A theory of intention that treated all representations in the connection from intention to action as themselves intentions would be insensitive to distinctive features of intentions in planning agents like us.

The planning theory sees intentions as distinctive attitudes. On this Moore and I agree. Nevertheless, even in cases of intentional action involving movements of the agent's body and controlled by relevant intentions, there is no guarantee that the agent will intend

⁴⁷ Moore describes this case in terms of the ability to wiggle one's ears simultaneously. See MOORE, *supra* note 1, at 122.

⁴⁸ See *id.* at 122-23.

⁴⁹ See *id.* at 154.

specifically those bodily movements. It is a mistake to suppose that intentions specifically in favor of the involved bodily movements are needed to ensure that the agent's "more general intentions" are linked in the right sort of way with appropriate bodily movements. A theory of action for planning agents like us should, then, accept Moore's thesis of the distinctiveness of intention, but reject Moore's intention theory of volition.