

**THE INFLUENCE OF DECENTRALISATION ON COMMUNITY
DEVELOPMENT IN GASABO DISTRICT OF RWANDA**

J.K. INDOHA

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**THE INFLUENCE OF DECENTRALISATION ON COMMUNITY
DEVELOPMENT IN GASABO DISTRICT OF RWANDA**

By

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Submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of
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DECLARATION

I, Mr **Kimenyi Janvier INDOHA (213332337)**, hereby declare that this thesis is my own work and that it has not previously been submitted for assessment or completion of any postgraduate qualification to another University or for another qualification.

Signature :-

A handwritten signature in blue ink, appearing to read 'KJ INDOHA', is written on a white rectangular background. The signature is enclosed within a thin blue rectangular border.

Mr Janvier Kimenyi INDOHA

DEDICATION

I dedicate this thesis to:

My parents, for their sacrifice and encouragement for studies since my childhood.

My dear wife, Mrs KABERA Marie Goretti and our children NSHUTI Joshua, INEZA Amelia and SHEMA Joel for their unfailing love and encouragement.

My sisters, brothers, brothers-in-law and sisters-in-law for their moral support whenever I was absent from the family.

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ABREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AMC	: Africa Media Centre
Aula	: African Union of Local Authorities
CBOs	: community-based organisations
CBP	: community-based planning
CBHI	: community-based health insurance
CD	: community development
CDC	: community development committee
CDF	: Common Development Fund
CDW	: community development workers
CG	: central government
CHW	: community health workers
DDP	: district development plan
DEC	: District Executive Committee
DES	: District Executive Secretary
DHS	: District Health System
DHU	: District Health Unit
DIP	: Decentralisation Implementation Programme
DLG	: developmental local government
DPLG	: Department of Provincial and Local Government
EDPRS	: Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy
EICV	: Enquête Intégrale sur les Conditions de Vie des ménages
EWSA	: Energy, Water and Sanitation Authority
FARG	: Fund of Assistance to Genocide Survivors
FD	: fiscal decentralisation
GoR	: Government of Rwanda
IGAs	: income-generating activities
IRDP	: Institute of Research for Dialogue and Peace

LED	: local economic development
LGs	: local governments
LODA	: Local Development Agency
M&E	: monitoring and evaluation
MDGs	: Millennium Development Goals
MDR	: Mouvement Démocratique Républicain
Mifotra	: Ministry of Labour
Migeprof	: Ministry of Gender and Family Promotion
Minagri	: Ministry of Agriculture
Minaloc	: Ministry of Local Administration
Minecofin	: Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning
Mineduc	: Ministry of Education
Minicom	: Ministry of Trade and Commerce
Minijust	: Ministry of Justice
Minispoc	: Ministry of Sport and Culture
MoH	: Ministry of Health
NDIS	: National Decentralisation Implementation Secretariat
NDSF	: National Decentralisation Stakeholders Forum
NGOs	: non-governmental organisations
NISR	: National Institute of Statistics of Rwanda
NMMU	: Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University
NRA	: National Resistance Army
NURC	: National Unity and Reconciliation Commission
OECD	: Organisation of Economic Co-operation and Development
OG	: Official Gazette
PAC	: politico-administrative committee
PDC	: Parti Démocratique Chrétien
PL	: Parti Liberal
PSC	: Programme Steering Committee

PSD	: Parti Social Démocrate
Ralga	: Rwandan Association of Local Government Authorities
RCAA	: Rwanda Civil Aviation Authority
RDB	: Rwanda Development Board
RDSF	: Rwanda Decentralisation Strategic Framework
RGB	: Rwanda Governance Board
Rema	: Rwanda Environment Management Authority
RGPH	: Recensement Général de la Population et de l'Habitat
RHA	: Rwanda Habitat Authority
RMF	: Road Maintenance Fund
RLDSF	: Rwanda Local Government Development Support Fund
RPF	: Rwanda Patriotic Front
RTDA	: Rwanda Transport Development Authority
RwF	: Rwandan franc
SMC	: school management committees
SMEs	: small and medium enterprises
SPSS	: Statistical Package for Social Science
UN	: United Nations
UNDP	: United Nations Development Programme
VUP	: Vision 2020 Umurenge Programme
WBI	: World Bank Institute

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ABSTRACT

This study investigated the influence of decentralisation on community development in the Gasabo district of Rwanda. It was based on the assumption that the participation of citizens in decision-making, planning based on local needs and priorities and the implementation of development programmes associated with the decentralisation policy can improve service delivery and result in community development. It is vital that the decentralisation policy be well understood so that appropriate strategies may be adopted and implemented with the aim of maximising advantages associated with it.

This study provides, in addition to a literature review, a brief historical background of the evolution and transformation of governance in Rwanda. The country's system of governance as well as the challenges it has encountered along the way through different régimes are briefly addressed. Also, the legal and regulatory framework of the decentralisation policy and strategies adopted and mechanisms of resource transfer are explained.

The study used both qualitative and quantitative methods. Primary and secondary data were used in analysing the influence of decentralisation on community development in the Gasabo district of Rwanda. Primary data was collected through survey questionnaires, interviews and focus group discussions, while secondary data were gathered through a literature survey of relevant textbooks, peer-reviewed journals, reports and legislation.

The research findings indicated that in the Gasabo district, decentralisation has contributed significantly towards improving governance aspects such as accountability, and citizen participation in development programmes, which are prerequisite factors of development. Concerning the planning process, the research found that the district development plan (DDP) was crafted through drawing its priorities from the national development plans embedded in the Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Strategies (EDPRS) and Rwanda's Vision 2020.

However, despite the existence of the Joint Action Development Forum (JADF), created to join the development plans of development partners to the DDP, testimonies from development partners revealed that their relationship with the district is characterised by the lack of frank collaboration, leading to their not being fully associated in the planning process.

This research also found that the decentralisation policy has contributed only to a limited extent to the improvement of service delivery in Gasabo district. It was observed that effective service delivery is still hampered by the lack of skilled employees, especially in the areas of education, health and engineering, a budget insufficient for the effective implementation of development projects in such a way as to satisfy the expectations of beneficiaries.

In view of the aforementioned findings, the study recommends that the central government intervene in training district tax officers regarding mechanisms and strategies of maximising tax collection to draw sufficient funds to carry out development plans. Through building their capacity, the imbalance between the responsibilities and means allocated for carrying out their achievement can be progressively reduced.

Furthermore, to prevent development from taking place in a random manner, district authorities should receive technical support from the central government through linking the local planning process to national poverty reduction efforts. The annual performance contract system needs to be strengthened and monitored to evaluate the implementation of district development plans so as to prevent any kind of poor leadership performance, with the aim of optimising available resources.

KEY WORDS

Decentralisation, participation, accountability, planning, community development, service delivery.

CHAPTER 1

GENERAL INTRODUCTION

This research focuses on the outcomes of the policy of decentralisation and its related community development programmes in the Gasabo District of Rwanda. According to the Rwanda Community Development Policy (Minaloc, 2008), the policy's mission is to ensure the effective and sustainable participation of the community in its own development in order to reduce poverty and achieve self-reliance based on sustainable exploitation of available resources.

1.1. Background to the study

Prior to the 1994 genocide, there was a centralised system of management in the Rwandan public sector. After the genocide, political and administrative reforms were introduced. This system of governance in Rwanda can be categorised into four different stages: the pre-colonial period (before 1897), the colonial period (1897-July 1962), the post-independence period (July 1962–July 1994), and the current period since the genocide (July 1994–to date). Rwanda's decentralisation policy was adopted in 2000. This significantly altered the structure and functioning of local government. It is in view of this development that it is deemed appropriate to give a brief overview of local government in Rwanda since the 1994 genocide.

1.1.1. Local government in Rwanda since the genocide (July 1994 to date)

Following the genocide of 1994 the government, led by the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), which came to power immediately after that tragedy, inherited a chaotic situation. The country was characterised by lawlessness; insecurity inside the country's borders and beyond, destroyed infrastructure, a dislocated public services system and a displaced and deeply divided society.

During the post-genocide period, policy-makers in Rwanda recognised the importance of interdependence between political, economic, and social policies. They agreed that the processes of decentralisation, if well implemented, would be a channel through which these reforms would be carried out (Musoni, 2000).

The administrative structures at district and lower levels were short of accountability and transparency because power was concentrated in the hands of one individual (the mayor), who was appointed rather than elected. During this era, provincial governors were fully involved in district development activities, as mayors were not empowered to initiate development projects or to engage any expense without prior approval of the governor (IRDP, 2005).

In addition, the poor coordination of government programmes was another issue, especially with regard to their implementation, as there was a duplication of roles and activities. Such a situation leads to an ineffective allocation of resources, which in turn undermines the attainment of goals. This situation jeopardised local development as it was the source of endless conflicts with mayors, who were also not accountable to any organ (Kauzya, 2007).

Among its first priorities, the government of Rwanda had to restore social and economic infrastructures as well as put in place an administration that would give the Rwandan people the opportunity of determining their own destiny. Because of these factors the decentralisation policy was adopted in 2000 with the aim of increasing accountability and transparency, as well as the government's capacity to respond to local needs. It would allow for bottom-up planning, empower people through community participation and improve local capacity for sustainable development. At this inception phase, decentralisation was perceived as an instrument for political empowerment of the people, a platform for sustainable democratisation and development, and a weapon for reconciliation and social integration.

In this process, the population at large had to play a significant role in the planning and management of development projects responding to their needs and priorities with the aim of reducing poverty. The main object of this policy was to reverse the whole situation by transferring the power, authority, functions, responsibilities, and requisite resources from the central government to the local authority. In doing so, the Government of Rwanda wanted to unleash local initiative and invigorate the democratic process, which would sustain development and enhance local capacities for self-governance and quality of services (Minaloc, 2000).

Local development can be achieved by ensuring that the decentralisation policy is properly implemented. In this view, Okidi & Guloba (2006) state that decentralisation can contribute to local development if political, administrative, financial management and planning responsibilities which are transferred to the lower levels of government are accompanied by the transfer of necessary resources (human, financial, and material) to enable the empowered local government to meet its people's aspirations.

1.1.2. The structure and the relationship between central and local governments

Article 2 of Organic Law No 29/2005 of 31/12/2005 states that the country is composed of three layers of government (central, provincial and local) and of six administrative entities: the central government, the province, the district, the sector, the cell and the village. The central government is composed of different ministries. Districts are decentralised entities known as local government, divided into three administrative levels: sectors, cells and villages.

The provinces are an administrative level established by deconcentration to serve as a coordinating organ of the central government to ensure the efficiency and effectiveness of the government's planning, execution and supervision of decentralised services. As deconcentrated bodies, the provinces are not identified as local governments. The central government retains a strong degree of authority over the provinces and decision-making remains with the same level of government.

Local government entities are governed by councils whose members are all elected by the population for a mandate of five years – except the village council, which comprises all people above the age of 18 in the village. Those councils are:

- district council;
- sector council;
- cell council; and
- village council.

Article 10 of Law No 8/2006 of 24 February 2006 stipulates that the district council should be composed of the following persons:

- councillors elected at the level of the sectors that make up the district, each sector represented by one councillor;
- three councillors who are members of the National Youth Council Bureau at district level;
- the coordinator of the National Council of Women at district level;
- at least 30% the district councillors to be women.

The district has an executive committee responsible for its daily administration and for safeguarding its interests. Article 59 stipulates that the district executive committee (DEC) is composed of three persons including at least one woman:

- the chairperson of the executive committee who is also the mayor of the district;
- the vice-mayor in charge of finance, economy and development, who replaces the mayor in case of his or her absence; and
- the vice-mayor in charge of social affairs.

The central government institutions' roles (ministries and agencies) and responsibilities are mainly in policy formulation, regulation and support to local governments through capacity building, financing, monitoring and evaluation. They include the subsidisation

of local needs and other transfers, technical assistance and support in human and material resources.

The province is responsible for coordinating the district's development planning with national policies and programmes, supervising implementation of national policy in the districts of the province, coordinating governance issues in the province, and monitoring and evaluation (Ralga, 2013).

Local governments (district) are mainly in charge of the implementation of government policies and service delivery, and provide an avenue for the voice of citizens and for accountability. According to Article 5 of Law No 8/2006 of 24 February 2006, establishing the organisation of the district, the district shall accomplish its political, administrative, socio-economic affairs and cultural duties as determined by the law and shall particularly be responsible for:

- implementing governmental policies adopted;
- delivering and assisting sectors in delivering good quality services;
- elaborating, coordinating and implementing development programmes;
- promoting solidarity and cooperation with other districts.

Considering the statutory character of the City of Kigali, of which Gasabo District is a part, Article 11 of Law No 10/2006 of 03/03/2006, determining the structure, organisation and functioning of the City of Kigali, stipulates that the City of Kigali is responsible for coordinating strategic plan activities, coordinating developmental activities and following up the implementation of national policy in the districts that make up the City of Kigali.

1.1.3. Education and health service delivery before the advent of decentralisation

Though service delivery might be a crosscutting programme, we find it more related to sectoral decentralisation, which involves decentralising various services and activities previously provided at central government level.

A study of the influence of decentralisation on community development cannot overlook service delivery, especially in the health and education sectors. The choice of these sectors relies on the fact that Rwanda considers poor health and illiteracy to be the most significant negative causes and consequences of poverty.

1.1.3.1. Education sector

There are four milestones in Rwanda education history since independence: the start of national education in the 1960s, the education reform of the mid-'70s, reform revision in 1991 and post-genocide developments. At independence in 1962, almost all the schools were owned by Catholic and Protestant churches. The Ministry of Education developed an agreement with many church-owned schools to the effect that that the school would pay teachers' salaries and other recurring costs, leaving maintenance, construction, day-to-day management and administration to the church or other management body (Cooksey, 1992).

Documents from the 1980s note the confusion which reigned over the role of various ministries and church inspectors in the field, official school visitors and school managers (SNEC, 1987). This situation led to increasing tension between church and state over school management, rather than constructive collaboration. During this period, entry to all government and assisted schools was determined by ethnic and regional quotas¹ that each school had to respect. This policy of ethnic quotas was regularly monitored and analysed, even at primary level. With regard to entry to secondary school, the results of primary examinations were never published. Children were admitted or not admitted according to criteria which were not available for scrutiny.

After the genocide, the Ministry of Education summed up a chaotic situation. Sixty-five per cent of the schools had been ruined and needed urgent repair, equipment and

¹ Ethnic quotas for school admissions were based on a theoretical national population of 90% Hutu, 9% Tutsi and 1% Twa. Article 54 of the Education Act of 1985 expressly stated that students were to be selected based on their best results, while respecting ethnic and gender balance.

teaching materials were generally insufficient, many teachers had been killed and some of those who were available were not qualified. The combined effects of all these factors had a negative effect on the quality of education (Minisupres, 1994).

As stated by Unesco (2000), the restoration of an education system in a post-crisis situation is acknowledged as a strong potential force for social and national reconstruction. Rwanda and many other agencies recognised that children should have access to education as soon as possible after a crisis and that education should be an integral part of emergency humanitarian services (Sida, 2002, MoE, 2006). So the government realised that the same education that had played an instrumental role in provoking deepening division and hatred between Rwandans should also be used to rebuild social relations during the reconstruction period.

1.1.3.2. Health service

During the post-independence period, Rwanda's health system was characterised by a high degree of centralisation and free provision of services. Most of the country's infrastructure was destroyed during the genocide. According to the Ministry of Health (MoH, 2006), Rwanda's healthcare system was a strong centralised system, since health policy activities, ranging from policy monitoring to the distribution of drugs, were coordinated by the Ministry of Health and assisted by a Regional Health Office in each province.

During the genocide period, a large part of the health infrastructure was destroyed. Also the small number of medical and nursing practitioners was exacerbated by the genocide of 1994 – many were killed, others fled. As a consequence of the genocide, health outcomes worsened. The maternal mortality rate rose from 500 per 100 000 live births in 1992 to 1 071/100 000 in 2002. Infant mortality rose from 85/1 000 live births in 1993 to 107/1000 in 2004 (MoH, 1996).

Following these tragic events, Rwanda adopted a new health policy and started to rebuild and reform its healthcare system and to train healthcare professionals. In 2005, the policy was revised, based on three main strategies:

- the decentralisation of the health system using the health district as the basic operational unit of the system;
- the development of the primary health care system through its eight core components, and;
- the reinforcement of community participation in the management and financing of services.

These realities constitute a genuine barrier to Rwanda's sustainable development as detailed in its 2020 Vision and its commitments to numerous other international development plans such as the Millennium Development Goals.

1.1.4. Objectives of decentralisation in Rwanda

The government began decentralising, setting strategic objectives in five areas (Minaloc, 2000):

- enabling local participation in decision-making and project implementation;
- strengthening accountability and transparency by making local leaders directly accountable to communities;
- enhancing the responsiveness of public administration to local environments;
- developing sustainable economic planning and management capacity; and
- enhancing effectiveness and efficiency of service delivery.

The policy was accompanied by other policies with the overlapping objectives of mobilising and creating an enabling environment that would allow the population to own, support, and take part in their development process.

1.2. Problem statement

Before 1994, Rwanda's political system and administration had a high degree of centralisation, characterised by sectarianism, disunity, corruption, and nepotism. Rwandans were effectively barred from taking part in the determination of their political, social, and economic destiny. Administrative structures at lower levels lacked accountability and transparency, and encouraged the concentration of power in the hands of the leader, appointed by the president of the republic (Reyntjens, 1987).

Despite the introduction of the decentralisation policy in 2000 and the progress made in its implementation, there has been a delay in the expected positive policy outcome on community development. This has mainly resulted from substantial barriers in the implementation process. It seems that lack of administrative capacity and inadequate infrastructure, among other things, has led to poor service delivery and limited access to resources like water and electricity. Concerning service delivery, the Rwanda Citizen Report Card revealed that service delivery by local governments ranked lowest, yet this is one of the linchpins of decentralisation. A challenge remains in the education and health sectors (RGB, 2011).

The main problem to be addressed in this study is: What effect should the decentralisation policy have in local governance in order to adequately contribute towards community development in the Gasabo District and what are the barriers to an efficient and effective realisation of such an outcome?

1.3. Research questions

The attempt to answer these questions requires answering other emerging sub-questions:

- how do Gasabo District authorities integrate local needs into its development priorities?

- are the development activities run by the district well planned and coordinated to improve the socio-economic conditions of the citizens?
- what are the concrete measures taken by Gasabo district to improve the quality of service delivery?
- are available resources sufficient to support the effective implementation of the socio-economic development programmes?
- how do development partners (civil society and private sector) take part in the planning process of community development activities?
- what are the factors that hinder effective community development through the adequate implementation of the decentralisation policy?

1.4. Aim of the study

This research intends to examine the influence of the decentralisation policy on community development in the context of the Vision 2020 Umurenge Programme. In a particular way, the research seeks to find out whether the development programmes carried out by the district are well planned and coordinated to improve citizens' socio-economic conditions as well as identifying obstacles that hinder their effective implementation in Gasabo District.

1.5. Objectives of the study

The research has the objectives of:

- analysing how local needs are integrated into the district development plan (DDP);
- assessing the way services in the primary education and health sectors are delivered to citizens;
- analysing the contribution of infrastructure (feeder roads, water and electricity) to the socio-economic development of beneficiaries;

- assessing the effect of development activities run by the Gasabo District on the socio-economic development of its citizens;
- identifying factors that undermine decentralisation and community development in Gasabo district.

1.6. Rationale for the research

To end the emergency period that followed the war and genocide of 1994, the government of Rwanda began a process of political and socio-economic reforms in 2000. These were aimed at speeding up the development process, the expected results of which would include the improvement of citizens' welfare. Irrespective of the efforts made by the government, observations reveal that the reality on the ground differs from the desired outcome. Thus it becomes imperative to conduct this research by focusing on the contribution of decentralisation to community development considering how serious the Rwandan government is about community development.

The findings of this research are intended to show how the implementation of the decentralisation policy can be a catalyst for community development using the case of the Gasabo District. The study also identifies and analyses certain factors hindering the effective implementation of decentralisation.

This study is also intended to create awareness among policy makers and practitioners about the challenges and benefits associated with the decentralisation policy and its implementation at local government level. It focuses on a country where structural poverty has been aggravated by the 1994 genocide, leading to the degradation of rural areas and a high degree of vulnerability for people like widows and young orphans, the traumatised and the handicapped.

This study also covers the rural areas in an attempt to identify obstacles to the implementation of the decentralisation policy which may have negative implications to the development of these areas. All in all, the research findings are a contribution towards

facilitating the implementation of the decentralisation process in community development.

1.7. Scope of the study

This study seeks to analyse the outcome of decentralisation policy implementation on community development in the Gasabo District between 2006 and 2014. The researcher chose this district because its administrative structure comprises both purely urban sectors and rural sectors that lack basic infrastructure.

The decentralisation policy was undertaken in 2000, to be implemented in three phases. The first phase (2000-05) contributed to establishing democratic and administrative structures and attempted to build their capacities. The second phase (2006-10) saw a consolidation and deepening of decentralisation process through emphasis on service delivery to communities. The current third phase (2011-15) is a continuous process of improving, supporting and sustaining the achievements of the first two phases.

The researcher chose to focus on the years since 2006 for a number of reasons. The year 2006 marked the beginning of the second phase of decentralisation policy implementation, characterised by various political and administrative reforms and the introduction of a new planning system in local government known as *imihigo*.² This phase came into effect after a territorial restructuring in 2005, which considerably reduced the number of administrative entities from 11 provinces to four (plus Kigali City), 106 districts to just 30, and the number of sectors from 1 545 to 416. It was also during this phase that community development and fiscal decentralisation policies were adopted with the aim of enhancing effectiveness in service delivery to communities and deepening the decentralisation process.

² *Imihigo* is the plural of this Kinyarwanda word which means “vow to deliver”, and describes the pre-colonial cultural practice in Rwanda by which individuals set targets or goals to be achieved within a specific period of time, competing among each other.

This research builds on the participation approach introduced by decentralisation, by which local communities determine their own needs and priorities. So the research looks at the way the implementation of the decentralisation policy, together with the VUP, have contributed to the socio-economic development of citizens as an indicator of community development in the Gasabo district.

In terms of social development, the focus is on quality service delivery and the organisation of education and health services. The selection of the health and education sectors was justified by the fact that the Government of Rwanda considers poor health and illiteracy the most significant negative causes and consequences of poverty. A study conducted by the Ministry of Finance revealed that people at the grassroots consider health and education the most essential of community needs. Consequently, the Economic Development Poverty Reduction Strategy (EDPRS) of Rwanda puts at the centre of its priorities the promotion of health and education services, so allocating to them the largest proportion of the national budget (Minecofin, 2012).

Regarding economic development, the research has concentrated on the influence of the decentralisation policy on access to basic infrastructures and income-generating activities resulting from VUP support. This has helped in analysing how vulnerable groups are integrated into the development process and the way VUP activities help their beneficiaries satisfy their needs.

1.8. Preliminary literature review

The production and consumption of documentary data has formed a part of qualitative analyses of a range of settings because there are many research questions and settings that cannot be investigated adequately without reference to the production and use of documentary materials. Moreover, documents are social facts that are produced, shared and used in socially organised ways. They are not, however, transparent representations of organisational routines, decision-making processes or professional practices (Silverman, 2011). By exploring such materials, one becomes sure of what

they can or cannot be used for. In this regard, Lawrence (2000) identified four goals of literature review in research; they aim to:

- show the path of prior research and how a current project is linked to it;
- integrate and summarize what is known in an area ;and
- learn from others and stimulate new ideas.

This study made a broad approach to the literature review on decentralisation and community development.

1.8.1. Decentralisation

The term decentralisation embraces various concepts and is justified by policy advocates as a key element in building good governance, which is generally interpreted as facilitating greater accountability, transparency, and pluralism. According to Mashewari (2002), decentralisation means the transfer of power from a central to a smaller jurisdiction. Rondinelli (1983) also defined decentralisation more clearly as a transfer of planning, decision-making, or administrative authority from the central government to its field organisations, local administrative units, semi-autonomous and para-statal organisations, local governments, or non-governmental organisations.

In the same way, Smith (1985) highlights that decentralisation means “reversing the concentration of administration at a single centre and conferring powers on local government”. In this aspect, decentralisation becomes the opposite of centralisation or concentration of power as it involves the delegation of power or authority from the central government to the periphery.

Rwekaza (2000), defines decentralisation as decision-making and power distribution. “When all the power for decision making rests at a single point in the hands of one person, the structure is called centralised; when the power is dispersed among many people, the structure is called decentralised.” In this definition, Rwekaza focused on intra-organisational decentralisation, pushing decision-making to the lowest possible levels of

the organisation. This definition asserts that decentralisation is recognised only when power is dispersed among many people, but it does not state the legal status of either the organisation or its subordinates.

Barbara *et al.* (2001) employed a working definition of decentralisation as “any process that increases the fiscal, institutional, or political autonomy on the part of a country in relation to the country as a whole”. Broadly speaking, the decentralisation process is understood as moving the centre for decision-making and management from a central institution to institutions or organisations closer to the places those decisions affect. Barbara’s definition explains better the autonomy of institutions or organisations closer to the places where decisions affect but does not show the participation of local people (subordinates) in decision-making except their leaders.

Mutahaba (1989) defines the concept of decentralisation as the transfer of legal, administrative and political authority to make decisions and manage public functions, from the central government to field organisations of those agencies like subordinate units of government; semi-autonomous, public corporations, area-wide development authorities; functional authorities, autonomous local government, or non-governmental organisations. Mutahaba’s definition becomes clearer as it states the nature of the transferred authority (legal, administrative and political) from the central government, to the functions and types of subordinate units.

Considering the above definitions of decentralisation as given by different authors, there are major issues like mutual decisions, community participation and dispersed powers that one may consider as cornerstones of decentralisation. Therefore, we can deduce that decentralisation is a way of increasing the ability of central officials to obtain better information about local conditions, to plan local programmes more responsively and react quickly to unanticipated problems that may inevitably arise during implementation.

To implement the decentralisation policy, it is important for policy-makers to consider decentralisation from a comprehensive strategic planning perspective. Rabin (2003)

states that this perspective emphasises important policy components such as understanding political, socio-economic and institutional environments of central and local government, analysing constraints and opportunities of these governments, considering policy scope and nature; developing an action plan for decentralisation and focusing on capacity building and empowerment.

Accordingly, Mashewari (2002) points out certain requisites, in the absence of which decentralisation cannot be sustained. He believes that for better achievement, decentralisation requires a homogenous society and presupposes the spread of infrastructure facilities in the country, which implies that a region should be considered neither as extraordinarily desirable nor as a punishment station.

1.8.1.1. Objectives of decentralisation

The African Union of Local Authorities (Aula, 1998) in Rwamucyo (1999) identifies three major objectives of decentralisation that any decentralisation process may aim to achieve, *i e* political, organisational, and economic objectives.

Political objective

The political objective is to democratise local governments to empower the people and promote local participation, to encourage the participation of interest groups outside the government system, to promote political accountability and reduce their top-heavy inter- and intra-district allocation of resources.

Organisational/management objective

This objective is to build capacity at the local level. It is also aimed at nationalising and re-organising civil society to promote efficiency and effectiveness, and to enhance transparency and accountability

Economic objective

This aims to enhance local absorptive capacity, increase resource mobilisation and introduce local choice in setting priorities. This is done to reduce the local, political, organisational/management and economic objectives of decentralisation as the bases for any country to adopt decentralisation policy. It becomes more adequate to local needs and more flexible as it fits the needs of the local units, innovative as different groups are allowed to take part in development.

1.8.1.2. Forms of decentralisation

Decentralisation may be understood differently and can take different forms as identified by Rondinelli & Cheema (1984):

- devolution: is the creation or strengthening (financially or legally) of sub-national units of government in activities that are substantially outside the direct control of the central government;
- delegation: transfer of managerial responsibility for specific defined functions to public organisations that are outside the normal bureaucratic structure and that are only indirectly controlled by the central government;
- deconcentration: the handing over of some amount of administrative responsibility or authority to lower levels within the central government, ministries or agencies.

Conceptually, Crook & Manor (1998) made an important distinction between deconcentration and devolution. As regards deconcentration, local bodies are instructed to assume responsibilities that have been carried out by central line agencies. On the other hand, devolution implies that local bodies are granted political and financial authority to undertake these duties. The term decentralisation, both spatial and administrative, has the potential to contribute to a better pattern of development and government that is more efficient. This allows the researcher to examine the advantages of decentralisation in depth.

1.8.1.3. Rationale and criticisms of decentralisation

Researchers have debated the advantages and problems of decentralisation policy. On the one hand, they recognise that decentralisation policy includes emphasising administrative responsiveness, increasing political participation and promoting democratic principles. On the other hand, they believe that decentralisation policy may generate problems such as increasing disparities among regions, jeopardising economic and social stability, affecting administrative efficiency (Rabin, 2003).

Therefore, these authors conclude that such problems may result from the lack of resources and information at the local level and the low administrative skills, training, and education among local public employees. According to Ralph (1982), decentralisation presents more advantages than disadvantages. In his view, the decentralisation of decision-making contributes to the effectiveness of administrative operations because it permits adaptation to local conditions and needs. He argues that interest in this type of structure stems from the recognition that less centralised decision-making can make local governments and civil society more competent. All in all, decentralisation involves charges that dispersing responsibility weakens accountability in which operations are carried on unevenly depending on the personnel heading each of subunits and that decentralised operations are more expensive by their very nature.

Advocates and critics of decentralisation assume that it is likely to increase the power of local governments. Falleti (2004) claims that the advocates who draw from local government or fiscal federalism theories believe that decentralisation leads to higher levels of political participation, accountability, and administrative and fiscal efficiency.

The critics, on the other hand, contend that decentralisation leads to soft-budget constraints, macro-economic instability, clientelism, and the enlargement of bureaucracies (Rodden & Wibbels, 2002). Although there is no consensus on the good or evil of decentralisation, both approaches assume an increase in the power of subnational officials as the intervening variable between decentralisation and either good or bad

outcomes. However, a closer examination of the consequences of decentralisation across countries reveals that, despite the implementation of apparently similar reforms, their outcome on the distribution of power among levels of government varies widely from one country to another.

1.8.2. Community development

Community development emerged as a powerful paradigm of development during the early 1970s to address the failure of the top-down model of socio-political and economic growth. Since then, there have been a number of attempts around the world to encourage more active participation by a broad spectrum of the community in local-level governance as one of the ingredients needed to promote sustained development.

The concept of community has been defined often and is always useful when policy-makers want to attach it to questionable new initiatives, related to the participation of the population. Warbutone (1998) states that the notion of community comprises two elements: the first is relationships between people; the other the relationship between people and the place where they live. Regarding this research, the stress in community development is on a coherent and integrated state policy at national, regional, and local levels, adequate service delivery and management, finance and the involvement of non-governmental organisations.

As stated by Mubangizi (2007), development occurs when a theory or a vision informs the formulation of policies. Such policies develop programmes and projects whose objectives are then implemented through a specific set of activities. To examine the effectiveness of poverty alleviation programmes, for instance, requires an analysis of the activities involved in the programmes.

Puttaswamaih (1990) conceives community development as the improvement of the living conditions of the masses who live in rural areas with low income. At this stage, community development becomes specific as it focuses particularly on poverty and

inequality. So community development is viewed as a strategy that enables the poorest among those who seek a livelihood in rural areas to demand and control more of the benefits of development.

As stated in a United Nations publication, community development is a process that creates conditions of economic and social progress for the whole community with its active participation and the fullest possible reliance on the community's initiative (UN, 1955). In addition, Dunham (1948) ascertains that community development is "a process by which the efforts of the people themselves are united with those of governmental authorities to improve the economic, social and cultural conditions of communities, to integrate these communities into the life of the nation and to enable them to contribute fully to national progress".

The above definitions establish a relationship between the people and their location. This implies not only that community is considered as a unifying concept, the expression of common interest, solidarity, integration and consensus, but also it should not be considered as a singular concept but rather a mere umbrella with a multitude of varying interests. This definition highlights how to achieve national integration while getting communities to take on responsibility for their own development with an emphasis on self-help.

Hyden and Bratton (1992), assert that community development embodies two major ideas: i) economic, technical, and social change (development), and ii) locality; *i.e.*, planned social change in a village, town, or city. Accordingly, community development presupposes that change can be effected most effectively by involving a wide spectrum of local people in goal determination and action, and includes a composite process and programme objectives.

Although community development has been defined in many different ways, community development in the context of this research is understood as a situation through which a community consolidates efforts under prevailing socio-economic conditions for improv-

ing its living conditions through improving public services and participation. In the process of decentralisation policy, government tasks range from helping people improve their own standards of living as much as possible while local governments influence the development actors involved to work together for generating synergies and commit resources through partnerships to promote community development.

1.8.3. Community participation

Many national and international development organisations involve people in the planning and implementation of various projects concerning the transformation of their lives. It is in this vein that the concept of people's participation has become popular and a condition for many development agencies.

Kakumba & Nsingo (2008) define community participation as the involvement of citizens in a wide range of administrative policy-making activities, including the determination of levels of service, budget priorities and the acceptability of physical construction projects to orient government programmes toward community needs, build public support, and encourage a sense of cohesiveness within society.

Bayor (2010) defines the concept participation better. According to him, participation is the involvement by local population and, at times, additional stakeholders in the creation, content and conduct of a programme or policy designed to change their lives. Built on the belief that citizens can be trusted to shape their own future, participatory development uses local decision-making and capacities to steer and define the nature of an intervention.

Lane (1995) in Khan & Haupt (2006), maintain that there are good reasons for the close association of participation with a community development approach. First, meeting basic needs requires the participation of all its beneficiaries. Second, participation in implementation improves efficiency through the mobilisation of local resources. Third, the

development of the capacity of a community to plan and implement change requires greater intensity and scope of participation as the project proceeds.


Indeed, through people's participation, there is always an additional objective. Brynard (1996) outlines the following objectives of citizens' participation:

- providing information to citizens;
- obtaining information from citizens;
- improving public decisions, programmes, projects, and services;
- enhancing acceptance of public decisions, programmes, projects, and services;
- supplementing public agency work;
- altering political power patterns and resource allocation;
- protecting individual and minority group rights and interests; and
- delaying or avoiding the complication of difficult public decisions.

Regardless of the positive aspects and interests for people's participation, such participation not only has advantages but also disadvantages actors of development programmes should consider during the preparation and implementation phase.

Participation, in socio-economic development involves costs and risks as well as benefits. In fact, Khan & Haupt (2006) assert that participation is a process of give and take through which each side must surrender certain current positions and assume additional costs in the interest of a greater overall benefit.

Figure 1: Conceptual framework of decentralisation and community development



Source: The researcher's conception

From the figure above, it is believed that for decentralisation to contribute to community development, a balance of administrative, fiscal, and political decentralisation is a requirement. The transfer of powers and responsibilities to democratically elected local government authorities in line with their capacities is a requirement for them to provide effective and efficient services. Financial resources through setting effective tax collection mechanisms and grants from higher-level governments should be devolved to local governments to meet these responsibilities.

These two previous conditions should be sustained by strong accountability between elected representatives and local bureaucrats and between elected representatives and their electorates. The result of the above settings would drive towards effective resource mobilisation and allocation, and definitely improve quality service delivery – the starting point of any community development process.

1.9. Preliminary framework

The report of the study comprises five chapters presented below. Chapter 1 is a **General Introduction**. This chapter provides a study background and defines the problem statement as well as the research methodology that underpins the analytical framework of the study.

Chapter 2 is titled **Background of the decentralisation process in Rwanda** and gives a general overview of the decentralisation process in Rwanda. It also focuses on the objectives and strategies in the policy implementation process.

Chapter 3 deals with **Decentralisation and community development**. It deals with the conceptual framework by establishing the link between decentralisation and community development according to different researchers.

It also emphasises how an elaborated decentralisation policy and a defined community development programme can be supportive of grassroots community participation in the planning, management and evaluation of socio-economic development schemes.

Chapter 4, titled **Research methodology**, clarifies the research design, the survey instruments and the precise procedures and instruments that were used to collect data and analyse findings.

Chapter 5 is a **Presentation and analysis of findings**. It presents the findings and shows to what extent decentralisation and its accompanying programmes have contributed to improving the socio-economic conditions of the population.

Chapter 6, titled **Data analysis and interpretation**, analyses findings by looking at the way in which advantages of decentralisation are used as response to community development priorities. It also identifies obstacles that hinder decentralisation policy in Gasabo district.

Finally, Chapter 7 draws the **General conclusion**, highlighting the lessons learned from the research, and ends with some relevant suggestions.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1. Introduction

In this research, decentralisation is perceived as an instrument through which community development can be achieved. Supporters of the decentralisation policy contend that if well implemented, it can increase efficiency and effectiveness in service delivery and promote community participation in government affairs.

This chapter presents a theoretical background to the study. The concept of decentralisation is presented by exploring its dimensions, forms, advantages and disadvantages. Also the concept of community development is defined and focused on its principle actors and outcomes. A variety of literature is reviewed with the aim of establishing a link between decentralisation and community development. Moreover, concepts like participation and service delivery were also included in this chapter so as to better understand their meaning and the views of various authors on how they are features of decentralisation in the process of community development.

2.2. Concept of decentralisation

The term decentralisation embraces a variety of concepts and is justified by policy advocates as a key element in building good governance, which is generally interpreted as greater accountability and transparency in the process of service delivery.

The concept of decentralisation became popular in 1986 in the manifesto of the Tower Hamlets Liberal Association. The significant key matters in the manifesto were accountability and responsiveness. According to Burns (1994), the manifesto sought to abandon the old system of committees and replace it with a new set of committees related to neighbourhoods rather than professional functions. According to the manifesto, this was

justified by the fact that under the old system, councillors did not know or care about where the area under discussion was, and it did not allow the committees to contribute to the effective development of administration.

The manifesto promised an entirely new approach to political decision-making within the borough, based on a system of neighbourhood committees controlled by the councillors elected for the wards. To quote Burns (1994), the manifesto's objectives in their entirety sought to:

- restore political control to the elected councillors;
- enable the decisions affecting each community to be taken by those who know best its needs and who are accountable to it;
- make council services as accessible, open and responsive to the needs of each areas as possible;
- make council services provide value for money.

From then on, emphasis was placed on devolving control, enhancing accountability and increasing responsiveness, which was seen almost exclusively in terms of the need to relate to and serve geographical communities rather than those communities based on gender or other differences. From this perspective it is worthwhile to have a better understanding of decentralisation.

Smith (1985) points out that decentralisation means “reversing the concentration of administration at a single centre and conferring powers on local government”. Thus decentralisation becomes the opposite of centralisation or concentration of power and involves delegation of power or authority from the central government to the periphery.

Mintzberg (1979), in Rwekaza (2000), defines decentralisation as decision-making and power distribution. “When all the power for decision-making rests at a single point in the hands of one person, the structure is called centralised; when the power is dispersed among many people, the structure is called decentralised.” In this definition, Mintzberg

focused on intra-organisational decentralisation, pushing decision-making to the lowest possible levels within the organisation. This definition asserts that decentralisation is recognised only when the power is dispersed among many people, but it does not state the legal status of either the organisation or its subordinates.

On the other hand, Barbara *et al* (2001) state that decentralisation indicates any process that increases the fiscal, institutional, or political autonomy on a part of a country in relation to the country as whole. Broadly speaking, decentralisation processes are understood to move the centre for decision-making and management from a central institution to institutions or organisations closer to the places those decisions affect. This definition shows how the autonomy of institutions or organisations becomes closer to places affected by decisions but it does not show the participation of people at the grass-roots in decision-making.

Mutahaba (1989) sees decentralisation as the transfer of legal, administrative and political authority to make decisions and manage public functions, from the central government to field organisations like subordinate units of government; semi-autonomous public corporations, area-wide development authorities; functional authorities, autonomous local government or non-governmental organisations.

The above definition is more detailed as it states the nature of the transferred authority (legal, administrative and political) from central government, to the functions and types of subordinate units. Considering the different views, it is found that the power of decision-making, participation and service delivery are considered as cornerstones of decentralisation. Scholars of decentralisation assert that fair, competitive and regular elections compel local politicians to exercise power in a way that allows decentralised institutions to provide efficient and fair outcomes (Echeverri-Gent 1993; Crook & Manor 1998; Blair 2000).

Concerning the power of decision-making, Keith (2002) states that by placing responsibility for managing development at the local level rather than that of central government,

decentralisation allows citizens to have greater access to, and ability to influence, the policy- and decision-making process. In the same vein, Serdar (2008) posits that decentralisation reshapes power relations among the local residents, local governments, providers of local government services, and the central government. It sets new rules for the political game, helping new local leaders to emerge in the political competition. In this regard, the political competition among local politicians increases the chances for vulnerable groups to be included in decision-making (Lankina 2008).

The interactions between local leaders and their constituencies result in new regulatory powers over service delivery, since the decisions and actions of local governments have a greater effect on local communities. In matters of participation, Keith (2002) states that decentralisation promotes citizen participation in local governance and consequently fosters greater social cohesion and stability, and encourages reconciliation between local interest groups and a convergence around common interests. According to Keith, this process of participation helps create the conditions for collaboration and working together as it brings the various stakeholders together and helps foster better understanding of each other, thereby reducing suspicion and mistrust and creating a framework for collaboration and cooperation.

Considering the context of this research, decentralisation is viewed as an indispensable component of development strategies, especially those focusing on community development. The researcher's point of view is based on the fact that decentralisation, if well implemented, allows local entities not only to identify local needs and preferences but also to provide effective allocation of public goods and services to the people.

2.2.1. Decentralisation policy

While decentralisation denotes a process of transferring authority and responsibility for public functions from the central government to local governments, decentralisation policy denotes a set of ideological arguments, principles and rules governing the decentralisation process (Oluwu, 2001).

A decentralisation policy is implemented following a comprehensive strategic planning perspective. According to Rabin (2003), strategic planning perspective emphasises important policy components such as understanding the political, socio-economic and institutional environments of central and local governments, analysing constraints, and opportunities of these governments, considering policy scope and nature; developing a decentralisation action plan and focusing on capacity building and empowerment.

In this way, decentralisation policy is considered as a strategy of increasing the ability of central officials to obtain better and less suspect information about local conditions, to plan local programmes more responsively and to react quickly to unanticipated problems that may inevitably arise during implementation.

2.2.2. Rationale for decentralisation policy

According to Conyers (1982), decentralisation policy is based on two distinct aims: administrative and political. Administrative aims emphasise efficiency in terms of cost effectiveness in delivery of services, while political aims emphasise popular participation. Advocates of decentralisation argue that it increases the power of local governments and leads to higher levels of political participation, accountability and administrative and fiscal efficiency (Falleti, 2004).

In the same vein, Ralph (1982) highlights that the decentralisation of decision-making contributes to the effectiveness of administrative operations because it permits some measures for adapting to local conditions and needs. He argues further that interest in this type of structure stems from the recognition that less centralised decision-making can make local governments and civil society more competent. However, Mashewari (2002) warns that for its success, decentralisation policy requires a homogenous society and presupposes a more or less even spread of infrastructure facilities in the country, which implies that a region should be considered neither as extraordinarily desirable nor one that is regarded as a punishment station.

2.2.3. Objectives of decentralisation policy

The African Union of Local Authorities (Aula, 1998) in Rwamucyo (1999) identifies the three most important objectives that any decentralisation policy process may aim to achieve, namely political, organisational, and economic objectives.

2.1.3.1. Political objective

The role of the political objective is to democratise local governments. It empowers the people and promotes local participation, supports interest groups' participation outside the government system, encourages political accountability and reduces inter- and intra-district top-sided allocation of resources.

2.1.3.2. Organisational/management objective

This objective is to build capacity at the local level. It also aims to nationalise and re-organise civil society for promoting efficiency, effectiveness and to enhance transparency and accountability.

2.1.3.3. Economic objective

The underlying economic objective of decentralisation falls into the realm of welfare economics and public choice and the inability of the central government to deliver many public services efficiently. According to Helm & Smith (1987), decentralisation policy builds on the proposition that individual preferences may vary by locality. In the view of Tiebout (1956), the most efficient allocation of public resources is attained if such services are provided by local governments responsible to those most directly affected.

In addition, AMC (2012) states that decentralisation admits income to be concentrated geographically and managed; both because of the agglomeration of economies and in tandem with endowments of natural resources. If properly implemented, certain regions

find it much easier to raise significant tax revenue, thus limiting interregional tax competition.

2.2.4. Forms and types of decentralisation

Decentralisation may be understood differently and can take different forms depending what decision-makers want to achieve. (Rondinelli & Cheema 1984, and Boko 2002). Understanding their differences is important for identifying their interconnectedness for their overall success.

2.1.4.1. Forms of decentralisation

According to Rondinelli & Cheema (1984), decentralisation can appear in the form of deconcentration, delegation or devolution. To understand this better, it becomes of paramount importance to examine the various forms of decentralisation.

- *delegation* implies that there is transfer of managerial responsibility for specific defined functions to public organisations. These are outside the normal bureaucratic structure and are only indirectly controlled by the central government. Africa Media Centre (AMC, 2012) confirms that delegation entails the transfer of policy responsibility to local governments or semi-autonomous organisations that are not controlled by the central government, but remain accountable to it. There is transfer of government decision-making and administrative authority and responsibilities for carefully spelt-out tasks.
- *deconcentration* is the handing over of some measure of administrative responsibility or authority to lower levels within the central government – ministries or agencies. In the same context, Hyden and Bratton (1992) concur with Rondinelli (1984) as he confirms that deconcentration refers to the dispersing of responsibilities by a central government, for example, a policy directed to field officers. It usually leads to spatial changes and geographical distribution of authority, but does not significantly change the autonomy of the entity receiving the authority, nor that of the central body dispensing it.

- *devolution* is the creation or strengthening (financially or legally) of sub-national units of government, in the area of activities that are substantially outside the direct control of the central government.

Conceptually, Crook & Manor (1998) made an important distinction between deconcentration, in which local bodies are asked to assume responsibilities that have been carried out by central line agencies; and devolution, where local bodies are granted political and financial authority to undertake these duties.

2.1.4.2. Types of decentralisation

The literature mentions four dimensions of decentralisation, notably: political, administrative, fiscal and economic decentralisation. According to Green (1994) economic decentralisation is a form of privatisation and deregulation which consists in shifting the responsibility for provision of goods and delivery of services from the public sector to the private sector.

Considering the real meaning of decentralisation, the meaning of economic decentralisation makes it a different concept even though Rondinelli (1990) emphasises that economic decentralisation relieves the government of its fiscal burdens, rationalises its role in development and improves the administration of programmes appropriate to the public sector. Thus political, administrative and fiscal decentralisation alone constitutes the major focus of this study.

2.4.1.2.1. Political decentralisation

According to Boko (2002), political decentralisation creates or strengthens (financially or legally) the subnational levels of government that are endowed with autonomous decision-making power. Their activities are substantially outside the direct control of the central government. For this reason, Asibuo (2009) admits that the devolution of deci-

sion-making power to local authorities includes the right to enact local bylaws, and to raise and manage local revenue.

Political decentralisation focuses on deepening democracy and ensuring the existence of a public sphere for citizens to give feedback and to control government action (Fung & Wright 2001). This is based on the assumption that local elected representatives have more incentive to respond to the needs and preferences of local populations and that they are more downwardly accountable than local bureaucrats.

Political decentralisation is also associated with pluralistic politics: it represents the government, but it also supports democratisation as it gives to the citizens, or their representatives, more influence through policy formulation and implementation. The selection of representatives through local government elections allows the citizens to know their political representatives better, and this allows the elected officials to know the needs and desires of their constituents better (Litvak, 1998).

2.4.1.2.2. Administrative decentralisation

The purpose of administrative decentralisation is to redistribute authority, responsibility and financial resources so as to facilitate public services delivery at different levels of government. In line with Boko (2002), the process aims to transfer responsibility for the planning, financing and management of certain public functions from the central government and its agencies to field units of the government, semi-autonomous public authorities and agencies.

2.4.1.2.3. Fiscal decentralisation

The most common solution to financing decentralisation has been the increase of local government's share of nationally collected taxes through automatic revenue sharing. According to Fjeldstad (2003), fiscal decentralisation is the devolution by the central

government of taxing and spending powers to lower levels of government to perform specific functions.

This approach allows the central government to control tax rates and tax administration, while ensuring local authorities a higher flow of revenue. Being closer to the people, it is argued that communities are likely to be willing to pay local taxes where the amounts they contribute can be related more directly to services received (Livingstone & Charlton, 1998; Westergaard & Alam, 1995). As a result, it is expected that the level of tax revenue may be increased without excessive public dissatisfaction.

In the same context, Boko (2002) underscores that the success of decentralisation is due to a clear definition of the fiscal functions among the different levels of government. The responsibilities through which the level of government sets and collects different categories of taxes, or which tier undertakes what expenditures must undoubtedly be spelled out. A fiscal decentralisation programme must delineate whether and on what basis local governments can self-finance or recover cost through user charges in a straightforward way.

Financial and fiscal decentralisation offers the necessary incentives that can largely reduce poverty, increase economic development, foster democracy and equally boost human development (Oyos & Uys, 2008). As matter of fact, this can go through positively:

- *Increasing efficiency in service delivery.* Considering that decentralised governments are more likely to provide a better match of expenditures against local priorities and preferences, mismanagement of resources may be reduced and thus efficiency can be gained (Martinez-Vazquez, 2001);
- *Increasing sub-national accountability.* Since national expenditures are decentralised to sub-national governments, the electorate may know who is responsible for the quality and quantity of public services. Furthermore, the use of benefit-taxation increases the transparency of the use of financial resources.

- *Enhancing sub-national fiscal responsibility.* Sub-national units may be motivated to increase their tax revenue by encouraging tax compliance among citizens. Again, the decentralisation of revenue-raising power fosters decentralised governments to take care of their economic base and to promote investment in their jurisdictions;
- *Promoting healthy competition among governmental levels.* When sub-national governments are given the chance to impose their own tax rates and own policy, for example on properties, turnover and salaries, inter-regional competition is promoted and this may catalyse innovation of ideas and efficiency (Ebel & Yilmaz, 1999). Competition over sources of revenue can motivate local governments (LGs) to guarantee property rights, implement rational fiscal and regulatory policies, and provide public goods.

From this perspective, decentralising revenue-raising and spending decisions is seen as a way to improve public sector efficiency, cut the budget deficit, and promote economic growth (Bird 1993; Gramlich 1993; Oates 1993). At this point, the authors assume that the subnational governments know better than the central government the potential factors of growth, that is, their territory's needs regarding infrastructure, education or innovation and research. Thus, if they have expenditure autonomy, they can design a strategy of growth more adapted to the reality of their territory.

Inadequate fiscal decentralisation can undermine the ability of and incentives for local officials and elected representatives to perform. Similarly, even if local people take part actively in political processes when reforms are launched, they may become disillusioned and disengage from local democracy if they feel they receive insufficient benefits, a likely scenario when local officials have weak fiscal and administrative means to deliver services (LDI, 2013).

Since fiscal decentralisation requires particular attention, Ebel & Yilmaz (in Oyos & Uys, 2008) recommend that the system of intergovernmental fiscal relations should be trans-

parent and promote fiscal harmonisation, sub-national government accountability and regional equity. A comprehensive fiscal decentralisation reform approaches the three components at the same time and with each of them supporting the others. Those components are:

- The *legal basis* provides the legal framework for the expenditure and assignment of revenue – *i e*: the assignment of expenditure responsibilities and revenue sources to sub-national governments.
- *Fiscal discipline* provides the guidelines to avoid a macroeconomic threat to the nation. Since LGs are potentially inclined to act irresponsibly at a fiscal level, the central government (CG) should regulate the transfer system and borrowing capacity to ensure fiscal and monetary discipline.
- *Intergovernmental fiscal relations*: this is a way of providing support for policy objectives of sub-national governments.

As stated by Litvak (1999), fiscal decentralisation can take many forms, including:

- self-financing or cost recovery through user charges;
- co-financing or co-production arrangements through which the users participate; in providing services and infrastructure through monetary or labour contributions;
- expansion of local revenues through property or sales taxes, or indirect charges;
- intergovernmental transfers that shift general revenues from taxes collected by the central government to local governments for general or specific uses; and
- authorisation of municipal borrowing and mobilisation of either national or local government resources through loan guarantees .

According to the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP, 1999), being genuinely supportive of a decentralisation process, the basic characteristics of a system of decentralised financial management should include transparency of allocation, predictability of the amounts available to local institutions and local autonomy of decision-making on resource utilisation. Considering efficient resource allocation, Boko (2002)

argues that the delegation of fiscal power to lower levels of government may improve the efficiency of the provision of public goods since LGs are better fitted to identify community needs.

However, Picard (1996), warns that the delegation of fiscal power to lower-levels of government also increases the “the information distance between the centre and local government, thereby increasing the cost of information gathering and processing as well as monitoring cost by the central government”. In fact, the central government may fail to monitor the good organisation of LGs’ spending behaviour effectively.

In this case, reduction in revenue mobilisation efficiency may occur across government levels, which can deteriorate the government’s fiscal position. Under appropriate conditions, Litvak (1998) posits that all these forms of decentralisation can play important roles in broadening participation in political, economic and social activities in developing countries.

2.2.5. Advantages and disadvantages of decentralisation

Researchers have debated the advantages and disadvantages of decentralisation policy. On the one hand, Rabin (2003) recognises that the advantages of decentralisation policy include emphasising administrative responsiveness, increasing political participation and promoting democratic principles. On the other hand, they notice that decentralisation policy may generate problems such as increasing the disparities among regions, jeopardising economic and social stability, and affecting administrative efficiency

2.1.5.1. Advantages of decentralisation

Under appropriate conditions, it is recognised that the policy of decentralisation presents more advantages than disadvantages, and thus can play an important role in broadening participation in political, economic and social activities. The following are advantages that are associated with the decentralisation policy:

2.1.5.1.1. Improved government responsiveness

Decentralisation is associated with increased government responsiveness to real local needs. Institutional responsiveness is understood as the achievement of congruence between community preferences and public policies such that the activities of the institution are valued by the public. According to Fried & Rabinovitz (1980), the assertion that decentralisation is more responsive to the needs of ordinary citizens is derived from the notion that participation in development activity offers greater effectiveness in promoting economic development.

2.1.5.1.2. Adaptation to local conditions and needs

Decentralisation is essential on grounds of efficiency and effectiveness because local authorities are better placed to determine local needs and priorities, to mobilise local resources on a sustained basis and to engage beneficiaries in the implementation of programmes. According to Ralph (1982), the decentralisation contributes to the effectiveness and efficiency of administrative operations because it permits some measures of adaptation to local conditions and needs. The writer argues that interest in this type of structure stems from the recognition that less centralised decision-making can make local governments and civil society more competent.

In the same vein, Miller (2004) states that decentralisation increases effectiveness in service delivery and promotes innovation, human resource development, entrepreneurship and dynamism at the local level. The beneficiaries themselves have an opportunity to influence and own the development programmes their local government implement and to hold local officials accountable for their actions.

The AMC (2012) points out that decentralisation ensures that the government remains close to the people in tune with the daily needs and aspirations. In other words, the decentralised forms of development are encouraged and this allows unique and innovative methods for attacking social, economic and political problems. Decentralisation provides

effective ways of linking diverse people who are involved in a single political entity and that it is a way of resolving tensions between the centre and the periphery.

In line with Bhattacharya (1996), bringing the administration to the doorstep of the citizen and forging a direct relationship between the clients and the administration have been the driving force behind decentralisation in most developing countries. Smith (1988) contends that democratic decentralisation has been favoured for a variety of reasons, most especially because:

- decentralisation has proved to be a more effective way of meeting local needs than central planning;
- it has been particularly useful in meeting the needs of the poor and in enabling the large majority of the rural poor to participate in politics;
- decentralisation opens access to administrative agencies and acts as a corrective way to people's apathy and passivity. In this process, it has helped to secure people's commitment to development;
- it supports change through people's involvement, conflict reduction and penetration of rural areas;
- decentralisation has eased congestion at the centre, provided more speed and flexibility during implementation;
- local democracy has been satisfying for local subgroups and thus, it has strengthened national unity;
- it has served the purpose of political education of the masses; and
- local community support for government work has been possible through decentralisation. Local government has been able to harness local resources and self-help efforts for local development.

2.1.5.1.3. Improved decision-making

Decentralisation has also been approached from the point of view of organisational decision-making in the sense that when speed assumes critical importance, decentralised

decision-making is usually resorted to. Gibson (2006) states that the degree of decentralisation is greater under the following conditions:

- greater numbers of decisions are made at lower levels of management;
- decisions made at lower levels are important;
- various organisational functions are more influenced by decisions made at lower levels; and
- there is less monitoring of decisions made by managerial personnel.

2.1.5.1.4. Decentralisation is a tool of development

Decentralisation is considered as instrument for shifting attitudes, developing and deepening skills and competencies, and engaging multiple stakeholders in the development process. It is believed that it contributes to local economic development and poverty reduction by providing services which act as production and distribution inputs for citizens and the private sector, and by reinforcing a conducive legal and institutional environment.

To Katsiaouni (2005), decentralisation and poverty reduction are arguments that are usually canvassed in its favour:

- Firstly, if through decentralisation there is a greater measure of accountability and responsiveness, the costs of malfeasance and corruption in doing business, whether public or private, are reduced. Hence, transaction costs become lower in a decentralised system;
- Secondly, the mobilisation of communities with the strengthening of social capital has a better chance of being initiated and sustained in a decentralised system. Hence, socio-economic tools such as the sustainable livelihoods approach canvassed both by parts of the UN system and by some bilateral donors, presuppose or encourage decentralisation as a means of gaining their objectives;
- Thirdly, it is more difficult to sweep things under the carpet, when projects or initiatives go off-track or awry, when communities participate and get involved. This

is not purely loss containment, but empowerment of communities to act as moderators and participants in the process. It elevates standards of conduct towards the community, for they become the direct clients as well as the controllers of the service, and the providers pay more attention to local circumstances and needs.

Accordingly, Crook & Manor (1998) state that strong economic performance and sound economic policy requires a system of governance that favours planning and coherence over community participation. In this light, it is indubitable that decentralisation can lead to effective and efficient resource allocation and decisions, which reduces poverty and improves the general well-being of local residents.

2.1.5.1.5. Increase of accountability and transparency

Crook (undated) states that decentralisation provides more transparent, honest and legitimate government, not merely linked to the expected benefits of local accountability. To him, transparency is about whether the public knows more about how and on what basis decisions have been taken. Participatory activities can only influence the outcomes or performance of local government if they are mediated through mechanisms of accountability, which ensure that the governments act in accordance with the wishes of representative bodies and implement authorised spending policies correctly.

According to Gyobega (1998), a democratic decentralisation creates a new political class, which is not only responsible for public money but can also cost substantial sums insofar as allowances and other expenses have to be paid. In connection with local governments, Diale *et al* (2007) point out fundamental advantages that are associated with decentralisation policy, as it allows local government to:

- operate close to the problem;
- have intimate knowledge of the circumstances;

- act quickly, as local representatives know the exact nature of local needs and how to meet them cost-effectively;
- have direct interest in solving the problem;
- have greater flexibility and quick response to changing circumstances and customer needs;
- become more effective and innovative; and
- achieve higher morale, more commitment and greater productivity.

However, Kearns (1995) underscores that accountability is not just a “formal process and channels for reporting to a higher authority but involves a wider spectrum of local expectations and performance standards that are used to judge the performance, responsiveness and even morality of the elected local officials”. Local accountability becomes effective where local leaders are elected by their own people, hence the importance of decentralisation.

Regardless of the advantages that any decentralisation policy holds, experience from various attempts has proved that, if not well implemented, decentralisation is usually associated with certain disadvantages and risks. The next section highlights some major disadvantages associated with the decentralisation.

2.1.5.2. Disadvantages of decentralisation

Decentralisation is not a panacea, and does have potential disadvantages. According to Keith (2002), decentralisation may result in increasing inter-regional inequalities, and thus widen intra-national poverty gaps and foster politically destabilising forces. Since different regions are differently endowed in terms of natural resources, level of economic activities, land values, *et cetera*, some local jurisdictions generate more revenue than others and can offer their citizens more or better quality services than are provided in poorer jurisdictions. In the same vein, Neven (1997) warns that, if decentralisation is not well planned, the following factors may affect it negatively:

- Firstly it can result in loss of control over scarce financial resources by the central government. Weak administrative or technical capacity at local levels may result in services being delivered less efficiently and effectively in some areas of the country.
- Secondly, administrative responsibilities may be transferred to local levels without adequate financial resources, so making equitable distribution or provision of services more difficult.
- Thirdly, distrust between the public and private sectors may undermine cooperation at the local level.

Rabin (2003) maintains that these problems may result from a lack of resources and information at the local level and low administrative skills, training, and education among local public employees. Neven (1997) suggests that the central government should assess the lowest organisational level of government at which functions would be carried out before developing elaborate plans for decentralisation.

2.2.6. Influence of decentralisation on local governance

Decentralisation and local government are concepts which are very closely interrelated, but not synonymous. Even if decentralisation is considered as an important institutional setting to improve governance; it should however be understood that not every type of governance practised at a local level would constitute local governance. According to Keith (2002), local government can be said always to represent some form of decentralisation, while the decentralisation does not always have to take the form of some type of local government.

Keith (2002) defines local government as a sub-national level of government which has jurisdiction over a limited range of state functions, within a defined geographical area which is part of a larger territory. Local governance, on the other hand, refers to the processes through which public choice is determined, policies are formulated and decisions

made and executed at the local level, and to the roles and relationships between the various stakeholders making up the society.

What determines whether governance is local or not is the extent to which the local population is involved in the steering *i e* in determining the direction, according to its local needs, problems, and priorities (Kauzya 2000). In this case governance ceases to be a matter of government only; hence it brings in the notion of networking and partnership with the aim of satisfying the interests of the local community.

Relating governance to local government, Roux (2005) describes local government as the public organisations authorised to manage and govern the affairs of a given territory or area of jurisdiction. Being the closest government structure to the people, local government is expected to deliver a variety of basic but essential services to the community. Charlick (1992) and VanSant (1997) explain the relationship between governance and decentralisation as a way of the state's providing multiple centres of participation in decision-making that in turn assures better management, responsiveness and accountability, which are basic features of good governance.

In the view of Ahmad & Mansoor (2002), the outcome of decentralisation should result in a more participatory government for citizens and improved delivery of public services because of local participation and accountability. According to him, under decentralisation, public services should be performed at the lowest level of government whenever possible. Implementation strategies should include the use of sequencing decentralisation to match finances at the local level with the performance of required public functions.

Ahmad & Mansoor (2002) state that governance relates to decentralisation in two dimensions. The demand side of governance – that is, the interaction between local government and local civil society and economic actors in the process of establishing annual and medium- or long-term public preferences/priorities and plans (public investment, long-term territorial and development plans) and downward external accountability. The

supply side of governance refers to the delivery of public services by non-public means (through collective action or privately) and the role of non-public actors in improving the public and non-public efficiency and effectiveness of services (Helmsing 2002).

Hope (2000) concurs with Helmsing (2002) by reminding that the mandate of local government is to provide basic social services at the local level given that the basic assumption underpinning decentralised government is to improve the delivery of public services in a cost-efficient manner.

In the context of development – which is a concern this research, as decentralisation is a policy seeking to transfer among other things planning authority from the centre to local government councils to promote popular participation, empowering local people to make their own decisions – it becomes necessary to highlight the concept of participation and decentralised planning in the next section.

2.2.7. Decentralisation of planning

Decentralisation through the participation of local level representative institutions in the formulation of plans for development, as well as their implementation, is advocated in the interest of efficient use of resources and ensures more equitable sharing of benefits from development. The fact is that local communities themselves are most suited to identify their development needs and potentials, have better experience and knowledge about their environment and could initiate development activities that address their known needs (Minaloc, 2002).

2.1.7.1. Rationale for decentralised planning

Chandrasekhar (undated) states that there is a real danger of "bureaucratisation" at the higher levels of decision-making, which may not easily be confronted by the political environment, since very often the same agents are arbiters of the acceptable politics. Such bureaucratisation could not only lead to wrong investment decisions, influenced by

sectional rather than societal interests, but could also be replaced by objectives and rules which are not perceived by the planners as being socially accepted as best for society, but which are considered best by the planners, and not necessarily always from a societal point of view. Goldman & Abbot (2006) find that decentralisation of planning can be undertaken for different reasons so as:

- to improve the quality of integrated plans by incorporating perspectives and understanding from local communities;
- to improve sectoral plans as well as the quality of services by incorporating the information generated by and with local communities;
- to promote community action as a means of releasing the latent energy of communities or to reduce the demands on government by shifting responsibilities to communities (e.g. for maintaining infrastructure in countries where the government is seeking to reduce its responsibilities);
- to promote community control over development, either in improving local influence over decisions, or in managing development directly; and,
- to comply with policy or legislative directives for public participation in different types of plans and planning processes.

According to Patnaik (1988), experience has also made it clear that, both in terms of the ability to garner the required information and the ability to intervene effectively in pursuit of specified objectives, the centralising alternative assumed too large an "area of control" for the planner and ignored the possibility of conflicting incentives.

Considering this inadequacy, there is a real possibility that central planning may fail to deliver on many fronts, thus advocating for the decentralisation of planning. Sundaram, (1997), listed a number of sound arguments to support decentralisation of the planning process:

- First of all the practical impossibility of a single planning agency's being able to make all the detailed decisions that are required at different territorial and sectoral levels of the planning process;

- Secondly, one of the crucial elements in the planning process is the presence of an information system. Without an information system there are bound to be innumerable problems of co-ordination at both state and national levels. The presence of an information system indicates the peculiar needs of certain areas of the country;
- Thirdly, it is now realised that no planning process could hope to succeed purely on bureaucratic lines. It is essential to associate the people with the planning process at all levels. Even though there are problems, nevertheless there is very little doubt that the planning process must be sustained by the fullest possible participation of the people;

Chandrasekhar (undated) posits that decisions have to be left to the democratically elected representatives to decide, based on what they consider to be appropriate from the point of view of the people at large. The lower level, which includes districts and sectors, has a particular role in the planning exercise and are vested with the powers and the responsibilities associated with the role. According to Chandrasekhar (undated) it is hoped that, once the process begins, and the "capacity to plan" begins to be acquired at different levels, different sections of the people would also begin to acquire the vision and skills to make similar decisions.

2.1.7.2. Definition of decentralised planning

According to Renu (2014), decentralised planning is defined as a type of planning of local authorities to formulate, adopt, implement and administer the plan without interference by the central body, or simply a bottom-up model of public management that is undertaken at grassroots level since it involves people and their organisations. Brosnan & Cheyne (2010) establish a link between decentralised planning and community-based planning (CBP). This implies that there is a range of participatory planning approaches including both those led by central and local governments and those where citizens and community groups are a catalyst for community involvement.

For this reason, Goldman & Abbot (2006) concur with Brosnan & Cheyne (2010) as they state that CBP is about planning by communities for their communities, which links into the local and national government planning systems. This sounds important as it attempts to make planning and resource allocation systems more responsive to local people's needs by improving the quality of services, while deepening democracy through promoting community action and involvement in planning and managing local development. So CBP aims to improve both governmental and other services as well as to empower communities by improving accountability between local government and communities.

2.1.7.3. Conditions for successful decentralised planning

To be effective, decentralised planning requires a number of essential preconditions. Rao (1989) ascertains that statutory measures to create sub-state-level governments with adequate devolution of resources and decision-making powers, political mobilisation of the weak and the disadvantaged in the rural areas, is a key determinant of adequate planning at the local level. In this process, the staff targets to achieve inter-sectoral co-ordination through their willingness to work under the guidance of local-level political leaders. Such an environment countervails the likely growing power of the rural elite to become a new tier of government at the district and lower levels and progress towards building up administrative personnel at these levels.

In this view, Mashewari (2002) underscores that the closer the administration is to the people, the more directly it meets their needs and aspirations which are best suited to enlist people's participation. Since decentralised planning starts from the lower level, it becomes integrated with the people and is thus people-oriented, as direct involvement of people in development activities greatly eases the pressure on the central government, severely constrained by inadequate resources. Mashewari (2002) confirms that decentralised planning builds on some principles, in view of which:

- Planning should be based on people’s felt needs and maximum use of local resources;
- People should have a say in articulating needs and fixing priorities;
- The plan should focus particularly on backward regions and weaker sections of the population;
- The development targets should be sustainable; and
- Implementation should receive utmost consideration in planning; taking care at the same time, that implementation is cost-effective.

Furthermore, Goldman & Abbot (2006) contend that early evidence of effectiveness is predictable, and some areas of how the approach can be deepened should be drawn out in CBP for:

- improving linkages to the local, national, or sectoral government planning systems and developing tools for analysing information from the community plans (deepening);
- improving the quality with which the methodology is applied (for example the use of preferred livelihoods outcomes);
- a recognition that the use of community-managed funds is an essential component, either through direct funding allocation or through local revenue raising, which should be linked to a knowledge of the available funds;
- strengthening local government’s support for implementation and plan follow-up;
- improving the use of monitoring tools, and accountability mechanisms by community structures as well as local government;
- developing a mechanism for promoting budget allocations for the disadvantaged groups whose priorities can otherwise “get lost” when plans are aggregated; and,
- effective integration of traditional and opinion leaders, civil society organisations and service providers (including the private sector) in the planning process.

Genuine and effective decentralised planning is likely to fail if these preconditions are not achieved in a substantial measure, because decentralised planning depends in the long run on the soundness of its economic perspective, objectives and criteria guiding it and of information systems for feedback and learning (Rao, 1989).

As political and administrative decentralisation is advocated for and considered important for the promotion of citizen participation in governance and development, the next section explores the meaning and necessity of participation in the context of decentralisation.

2.2.8. Participation: a feature of decentralisation

Decentralisation and participation have a mutually reinforcing relationship. On the one hand, the process of decentralisation can create opportunities for citizen participation, on the other, successful decentralisation can also require some degree of local citizens' participation as one of its preconditions (Litvak, 2000). Others consider citizens' participation as a cornerstone of good governance (Omiya, 2000). For example, in a study conducted in Indonesia on participation in village-level government, Alatas *et al* (2003) revealed that households with high involvement in village government organisations had greater capacity to access information, take part in decision-making, and obtain responsive services.

The association of decentralisation with the participatory approach for development argues that "development" could only be equitable and effective if people (the beneficiaries) controlled the process themselves, rather than governments or experts. In practice, many direct participation reforms involve linking community-level activities with the formal institutions of local government (Chambers, 1983). This section develops a definition of citizen participation and the rationale for participatory development as well as highlighting the importance of participation for effective governance.

2.1.8.1. Definition of participation

Community participation connotes direct involvement of the people – especially the poor, who make up the most disadvantaged section of the population – in local development affairs, used in the sense of participatory development (Bhattachary, 1996). According to Blair (2000), the central idea of participatory development is to give citizens a meaningful role in government decisions that affect them, be it at the central or the local level. Popular input into what government does is thus exercised with the aim of improving service delivery and accountability to the population. In this view, Tshabalala (2009) states that community participation is a means of empowering people as it creates the space for them to engage in developing their skills and abilities so as to negotiate their needs in the face of forces that often appear to obstruct and discourage them.

Community participation does not take place in a vacuum, but is subject to the political, social and economic influences within which it occurs. For this to be effective, Khan & Haupt (2006) state that community participation requires the readiness of both the government and the community to accept responsibilities and activities; which implies that the value of the contribution of each group is clearly seen and used.

According to Jennings (in Bayor, 2010), participation conveys the involvement by a local population and, at times, additional stakeholders in the creation, content and conduct of a programme or policy designed to change their lives. Built on a belief that citizens can be trusted to shape their own future, participatory development uses local decision-making and capacities to steer and define the nature of an intervention.

Empowerment here refers to planned efforts that can augment and control resources by the various groups of those who are marginalised and excluded from the decision-making process, ownership and control (Rahim, 2007). In fact, the decision-making processes that are initiated at local levels allow not only the local people to claim ownership of a project, but it can significantly shrink the cost of managing and maintaining the project by creating an alternative vision of management (Rahim, 2007).

However, citizen participation does not necessarily lead to empowerment. For empowerment to happen, participation must be effective, in a way that enforces accountability and changes in behaviour within relevant government bureaucracies and ensures changes that make participation more inclusive of the poor and the underprivileged (Crook, 2003).

Van Heck (2003) points that participation is a mean in “production-oriented projects” through which beneficiaries are often involved in the implementation of pre-designed projects so as to achieve certain objectives. Conversely, participation is also seen as an end in less conventional projects, where the rural poor may have been consulted on their needs, aspirations, potentials and willingness, and may also be involved somehow in project implementation and sharing the benefits accrued from it.

2.1.8.2. Rationale for people’s participation

The major promise of democratic decentralisation and local governance is that popular participation makes government at the local level more responsive to citizens’ needs and more effective service delivery (Blair, 2000). One primary focus of participation is empowerment: disadvantaged groups like the poor, women, youth, and ethnic or religious minority groups find it difficult to have their interest represented in decision-making. But participation goes beyond empowerment: it is supposed to include all stakeholders in the policy process.

Nelson & Wright (2004), state that there are good reasons that highlight the close association of participation with a community development approach. First, meeting basic needs requires the participation of all its beneficiaries. Second, participation in implementation improves efficiency through the mobilisation of local resources. Third, the development of the capacity of a community to plan and implement change requires greater intensity and scope of participation as the project proceeds.

According to Khosa (2000), experience has shown that the more a community makes inputs into projects and participates in them, the more sustainable the development will be. So participation could range from community decision-making to hands-on construction involvement, to extend the lifespan of both the projects and the benefits received by the community.

Furthermore, the writer adds that not only projects should be integrated into national socio-economic development programmes that are fully supported by borrowers and local authorities, should also involve beneficiaries in project development and execution so that they take ownership, which certainly ensures sustainability. There is always an objective behind calling on people's participation. Brynard (1996) outlines the following as the objectives of citizens' participation:

- providing information to citizens;
- getting information from the citizens;
- improving public decisions, programmes, projects, and services;
- enhancing acceptance of public decisions, programmes, projects, and services;
- supplementing public agency work;
- altering political power patterns and resource allocation;
- protecting individual and minority group rights and interests; and
- delaying, or avoiding complicating, difficult public decisions.

Citizen participation is regarded as the best way to address the felt needs of the local population; to realise grassroots democracy; to ensure fair and equitable distribution of and access to resources; and obtaining maximum utility of local resources for development (Sharma 2000). In the context of development projects, participation is generally promoted to enhance project efficiency, cost-sharing or project effectiveness. Participation contributes to building the capacity of beneficiaries to manage and control development activities on a sustained basis. So participation is ultimately an empowering process, enabling people to have an increasing measure of control over their own lives.

2.1.8.3. Advantages of citizen participation

The nuisance factor of citizen participation can also not be denied. For Bekker (1996), the evidence indicates that citizen participation entails advantages for both participants (individuals or groups) and the government. According to Khosa (2000), the more a community makes inputs into and takes part in projects, the more sustainable the development is. Participation could range from community decision-making to hands-on construction involvement. This extends the lifespan of both the projects and the benefits received by the community, since they regard the outcome as their own initiative.

Moreover, projects should involve also beneficiaries in project development and execution so that they take ownership to ensure sustainability. Citizen participation can serve as a means of converting dependency into independence. In fact, this converts the poor from passive consumers of the services offered by others into becoming producers of those services. Bridges (1974) cites five advantages to be gained from active participation in community affairs:

1. The citizen can bring about desired change by expressing his desire, either individually or through a community group.
2. The individual learns how to make desired changes.
3. The citizen learns to understand and appreciate the individual needs and interests of all community groups.
4. The citizen learns how to resolve conflicting interests for the general welfare of the group.
5. The individual begins to understand group dynamics as it applies to mixed groups.

2.1.8.3.1. Willingness to sustain deprivation

Citizen participation fosters the feeling of involvement in and ownership of planning. Popular involvement may make the citizens accept willingly the eventuality of the gov-

ernment's not being able to render certain needed services. In the light of scarce and limited resources it makes sense, by means of co-option and co-production, to inform the citizens of – and include them in – the allocation of these resources. Cahn (1996) observes that the likelihood of citizens reconciling themselves to scarcity and deprivation is higher when these citizens have a say in how finite sources are applied.

2.1.8.3.2. Converting opponents

According to Bekker (1996), citizen participation influences opponents' behaviour positively. In this aspect, citizen participation constitutes a technique whereby opponents may be co-opted into contributing positively to programmes which traditionally have been liable to conflict. This may include the broadening of the power base of the management committee system at local level, and the formation of integrated local authorities, with the only discriminating factor being proximity, rather than ethnicity.

2.1.8.3.3. Dissemination of information

The effective and efficient distribution of accurate information is essential for citizen participation, whether it is government-sponsored or citizen-initiated. It is also essential for optional goal achievement and relationship-building (Kotzé, 1997).

2.1.8.3.4. Restraining abuse of authority inalienable rights of citizen

Participation allows fuller access to benefits of a democratic society (Wade 1989). According to Wade there is a general agreement that citizen participation needs to be pursued and encouraged for its own sake, on the basis that is the inalienable democratic right of all citizens of a country.

Cahn & Camper (1968) provide three rationales for citizen participation. First, they suggest that merely knowing that one can take part promotes dignity and self-sufficiency within the individual. Second, it taps the energies and resources of individual citizens in the community. Finally, citizen participation provides a source of special insight, inform-

ation, knowledge and experience, which contributes to the soundness of community solutions. The result is an emphasis on problem-solving to eliminate deficiencies in the community (Christenson & Robinson 1980).

2.1.8.4. Benefits of participation

The value of participation as a facilitative development process is widely acknowledged. According to Bhattachary (1996), the major benefits flowing from participation are identified as follows:

- In planning and programming stages and throughout the implementation of development projects, the participatory process provides important information, ensuring a congruence between objectives of development and community values and preference;
- By rationalising the use of manpower resources, the process is likely to reduce project cost;
- Any change brought about through development is acceptable to the community if the local people are involved in setting the stage of change, and mistakes are more tolerable if they are made by people who have to live with them;
- Monitoring is better, and the sustainability of the project is more likely, even after the withdrawal of the external agent, be it the government or an NGO;
- The community learns from its own involvement, and from this point of view, participation becomes a two-way learning process in which both the administrator and the people become co-learners; and
- Active community participation helps rebuild community cohesion and instils a sense of dignity into the community; so the people gain confidence as they emerge steadily as real actors in the development drama.

To better comprehend whether citizen participation exercises any influence on the welfare of the citizens, it would be better to indicate whether the goals envisaged by the

participants have been achieved. If citizen participation achieves the goals envisaged for it, it may be regarded as successful and advantageous, and *vice versa*.

2.2.9. Decentralisation and service delivery

Governments exist among other reasons to provide guidance in certain critical services such as safety, infrastructure, management and maintenance of public roads. A government that is more responsive to citizens' needs is essential in improving the capacity of local governments. So service delivery is an essential function in the relationship between government institutions and the citizens.

Decentralisation is expected to enhance the quality and efficiency of service provision through improved governance and resource allocation. Theory suggests that the proximity of local governments allows citizens more influence over local officials, promotes competition among local governments, reduces corruption when compared with centralisation, and improves accountability. However, decentralisation may worsen outcomes because local governments may not have the capacity or the incentive to act as theory predicts (LDI, 2013).

There are perceived advantages to decentralisation with regard to service delivery. If it is well-designed and implemented, Ekpo (2008) outlines that decentralisation could have the following advantages in service delivery:

- *Facilitating good governance* by mobilising the local communities and allowing them to take part in the decision-making process and service delivery. This allows the local community to be a watchdog over the system and ensure that public officials deliver quality goods and services (Ekpo, 2008; World Bank, 2001).
- *Improving service delivery* means that the lower levels of government could deliver services like education, water, health and sanitation more effectively and efficiently than the central government. Also, at the lower levels of government, politicians and civil servants are more aware of the needs of their community, mak-

ing them more responsive in delivering such services. The preferences of the local community are better known at lower levels of government (Ekpo, 2008).

- *Productive efficiency* means that local governments can produce the same goods and services at lower cost than the central government. As local governments are brought closer to the local communities, the cost of producing goods and services are minimized. The usual “middlemen” and bureaucracy involving contract procedures could be reduced (Ekpo, 2008).
- *Improving the efficiency of central governments*: decentralisation helps the central government to pay attention to national and international issues. The central government can concentrate on macroeconomic policies for the whole economy, rather than being preoccupied with delivering services to all the communities (Ekpo, 2008).
- *Reducing government expenditure on public services*: decentralisation may make it less difficult for government to recover the costs of public services. Services would be more demand-responsive, hence households and their families are perceived to be willing to pay for and maintain services that match their demand. Units decentralised at the same time may need less professionalization and can engage manpower from civil society, so administration costs are lower and procedures simpler (Ekpo, 2008).
- *Enhancing competition for public goods and services* may result in such public goods and services being better, but at lower prices (Azfar; 2005; Ekpo, 2008).

However, decentralisation for service delivery should not be considered a panacea. A study conducted by Juetting *et al* (2004) to examine the link between decentralisation and poverty alleviation revealed that in countries where the central government is unable to perform its basic functions due to weak institutions or political conflict, decentralisation hinders pro-poor service delivery.

2.1.9.1. Service delivery in local government

According to Van der Waldt (2008), as government institutions increasingly place emphasis on project applications for policy implementation and service delivery initiatives, mechanisms or structures should be established to facilitate clear interfaces between permanent organisations and the temporary project organisation. Such structures should enhance the governance of projects – that is, the strategic alignment of projects, the decentralisation of decision-making powers, rapid resource allocation, and the participation of external stakeholders.

This trend has been strengthened by a growth of awareness in the private sector of the imperative of meeting the requirements and expectations of the customer in an increasingly competitive market (Walsh, 1989). Walsh argues that a new management of local government should emerge with these characteristics:

- *Responsive*: continually adapting services to meet the varied and changing needs of local people;
- *Smaller and decentralised*: involving a devolution of power from the centre to place authority and responsibilities with those deliver services, and to create smaller units within large organisations;
- *Co-operative*: working with other organisations, public, private and voluntary, creating and maintaining service networks for the management of the authority;
- *Consumer-controlled*: seeking the views of consumers/clients/citizens and giving them an influence over the services provided;
- *Concerned with process*: focusing on the culture and systems of the organisation and on process as much as structure.

In response to these pressures and challenges, local authorities have introduced major reforms and innovations arising from an internal commitment to change. This commitment can be seen as involving both a political and a professional dimension as certain members and officers have sought innovative policy and organisational solutions. Effec-

tive government and public services depend on successful innovation to develop better ways of meeting community needs, solving societal problems, and using scarce resources and technologies. Innovation should be seen as a core activity to increase the responsiveness of services to societal needs and expectations.

The issue of effective governance is related to New Public Management (NPM), which in the view of Van der Waldt (2008) is regarded as an umbrella label for a wide variety of administrative reforms with the common denominator of introducing market principles in the public sector for allowing management models to replace political control as a coordinating mechanism in the public sector.

2.1.9.2. Meaning of service for local government

Sanderson (1992) states that quality in local authority services cannot be reduced to a matter of conformance to specification. As a matter of fact, and in addition to the question of defining standards, important questions come out as to whose reviews are to count in judgments about quality. This introduces the more subjective dimension of quality: the extent to which the services achieve their intended purpose. Sanderson (1992) argues that, the purpose of quality service in local government should be to:

- satisfy the wants and expectations of customers;
- meet the needs of actual and potential customers;
- meet the collective needs of local communities; and
- achieve the broader development of active citizenship.

Consequently, the discussion of quality in local governments emphasises meeting the requirements of the customers. According to Murgatroyd & Morgan (1994), quality service is value-based in that it is, inter alia, the expectation that the client holds of services which include these aspects:

- what the client is entitled to in respect of legislative prescripts and as defined in service charters;

- what the client wants;
- how the client expects to receive the service in an era of innovation and technological advancement and is entitled to in terms of legislative provisions and service charters.

In their view, citizens do not evaluate the performance of government holistically but rather in terms of isolated interactions with some, or multiple interactions over a period of time with specific departments, and consequently may generalise their experience to the public service as a whole. From this perspective, improvements in the effectiveness of local authorities and the quality of services are seen primarily in terms of getting close to customers and become more responsive to their expectations and needs, thus the justification of decentralisation mechanisms.

2.1.9.3. Characteristics of local service delivery

Service delivery at local level is characterised by a number of components that are supposed to be taken into consideration.

2.1.9.3.1. Accessibility, responsiveness and choice

By definition, the fundamental characteristic of a localised service must be its geographical accessibility. Sanderson (1992) states that the placing of a council office to make services more accessible to local residents carries assumptions such as offices must:

- be less intimidating than traditional offices;
- enable positive relationship to be built up between service providers and users;
- break down the traditional professional and departmental barriers that have tended to lead people to deny rather than to take responsibility. This breakdown would/should lead to a more integrated service, better able to respond holistically to local individual and community issues;
- build up knowledge and understanding of local needs; and

- respond to local needs more flexibly and appropriately.

If this happens, it is likely that each office develops differently, taking on different styles and characteristics. This is because the recognition and analysis of different local needs, through the responsiveness explicitly required at local level, is almost bound to produce different service patterns.

2.1.9.3.2. Local accountability and equal opportunities

A further issue, partly related to the question of delegated authority and partly to localisation, is that of accountability to both individual consumers and local residents. Sander-son (1992) realised that, as a voice and channel of communication between the council and the people, such mechanisms have been quite effective. They are instructive for officers – who have perhaps never had to account for their actions before – to learn how they are seen through service consumers' eyes. They can stimulate officers and elected members to develop more imaginative approaches to public consultation and participation.

2.1.9.4. Factors influencing quality service delivery

According to Draai & Kishore (2012), perception of quality service is largely the subjective judgment of service quality influenced by a number of factors which include:

- word of mouth, messages and critique conveyed via the mass media. These media are strong determinants of perceived positive or negative service quality where clients may have experienced service quality or hold learnt perceptions of it. The messages communicated via the mass media may be promises of improved service quality by departments in general, or critiques of poor service quality exposed by, *inter alia*, advocacy groups;
- criticism is an indication that citizens are not passive receivers of services. The citizens, being co-producers of services, can contribute to the definition of existing services and the levels of quality experienced and expected, or identify addi-

tional or new services as conditions change. Persistent negative criticism holds implications for the morale of officials as well and may cause loss of skills where committed officials feel they are not valued or making a difference;

- *Sociocultural aspects*: the heterogeneity of the clients of public service is a defining factor in analysing and establishing levels of service quality. The recipient in a service encounter may have an extremely positive experience where the service request is met in the spoken language of the client and the cultural traits that the client requires to be portrayed by the public officials. Equally, aspects of gender leave a defining imprint on the levels of service quality experienced and perceived.

For the above to be possible, in many countries, public institutions at the central level have required local governments to become more responsive to the expectations of citizens. In this regard, Masango (2000) states that the manner in which public institutions conduct their activities is determined by public policy. In his view, to ensure that public institutions deliver services efficiently and effectively, relevant legislation should be enacted and enforced. Masango (2000) suggests that it is necessary to involve employees at all stages of the programme to ensure that employees:

- perceive the process as fair and democratic;
- do not become defensive and resist the implementation of the programme; and
- develop a greater commitment with respect to the fulfilment of their respective roles.

2.2.10. Criticisms against decentralisation

Critics contend that decentralisation leads to soft-budget constraints, macro-economic instability, clientelism and the enlargement of bureaucracies (Rodden & Wibbels 2002). In this way, decentralisation policy may generate problems such as increasing disparities among regions, jeopardising economic and social stability and affecting administrative efficiency (Rabin, 2003). It becomes clear that these problems may originate from

shortage of resources and information at the local level and low administrative skills, training, and education among local public employees.

Binns *et al* (2005) caution that critics of decentralisation have argued that central government might divert from its responsibilities by shifting the burden and throw possible blame to lower tiers of government. Ralph (1982) concurs with Binns when he states that decentralisation involves charges that may disperse responsibility and weaken accountability. In this case, operations are carried on unevenly depending on the personnel heading each subunit and, implicitly, decentralised operations become more expensive by their very nature.

In reference to the process of “decentralising poverty”, Binns (2005) argues that central government may seek to mask the lack of resources by transferring various responsibilities to newly created local bodies but without the resources necessary to fulfil them”. Research conducted in Uganda and the Philippines has identified a number of problems related to the implementation of decentralisation policy (Binns, *et al* (2005) :

- local officials are able to identify local demands, but often lack the authority to adjust financial allocations at the local level, since most of their funding comes from the centre in the form of conditional grants;
- citizens often lack adequate information to participate fully;
- many local governments have very weak capacity;
- decentralisation can inhibit the delivery of public goods: for example, in inter-jurisdictional instances.

Although there is no consensus on the good or evil of decentralisation, both approaches assume that there is an increase of sub-national officials’ power as the intervening variable between decentralisation and either good or bad outcomes. In spite of this, a closer examination of the consequences of decentralisation across countries reveals that, despite the implementation of apparently similar reforms, their outcome on the distribution of power among levels of government varies widely from one country to another.

2.3. Community development

The concept of community has been defined several times and it has always been useful when policy-makers want to attach it to questionable new initiatives related to the population's participation. The first step in defining community development is to define "community". A community is about people living within a geographically defined area and who have social and psychological ties with each other and with the place where they live (Mattessich & Monsey, 2004). The major focus in this definition is the people and the ties that bind them, and secondly the geographic location.

Defining the concept "community" can then facilitate understanding the meaning of community development. Community development can be defined broadly into two categories. Academicians view community development as a process that provides individuals of a community the ability to act collectively and enhances the capacity of members within a community to improve their situation in their local area. Practitioners view community development as an outcome that improves the physical, social, economic, and environmental conditions in a community (Phillips & Pittman, 2009). In both cases, the end result is collective action in which local decision-makers and residents work together to improve the critical social, economic and environmental conditions in their communities.

With reference to community development, United Nations publications put an emphasis on the relevance of participation in the process. According to the UN, community development is conceived as a process that is designed to create conditions of economic and social progress for the whole community with its active participation and the fullest possible reliance on the community's initiative (UN 1955). So community development presupposes that change can be carried out most effectively by involving a wide spectrum of local people in goal determination and action, and includes a composite process and programme objectives.

Jones & Silva (1991) argue that successful community development efforts are more truly an integrated practice model of community development. Based on the ideas contained in the above statements, the government's tasks range from helping people to improve their own living conditions as much as possible, promote their own initiatives and introduce them to technical and other services of many kinds. Accordingly, Lombard (1991) qualifies community development as a process, a method, a programme, a movement aimed at enabling and encouraging communities to become involved in – with the necessary support from private and government sectors – improving and managing their own living conditions in all areas of development. In addition to its definitions, community development can also better be understood through its characteristics and outcomes that are deemed necessary to be described in the next section.

2.3.1. Characteristics and outcome of community development

Swanepoel (1993) clarifies the situation, and the objectives for which community development (CD) is carried out is a viable approach. Community development projects are characterised by concrete and abstract human needs, a learning process, collective action, needs- and objectives-oriented action at grassroots level, community building, creation of awareness and further development.

There are guidelines that enable a CD practitioner to understand his place and role and to add some perspective to what takes place within a group of people in a CD situation. According to Swanepoel (1997), specific forms of progress on social welfare and economic growth are the outcome of every CD.

2.2.2.1. Raising awareness

One of the most important gains for community is the awareness that CD generates. In the CD process, people become aware of themselves, their environment and their needs and resources. According to Swanepoel (1997), there is the creation of awareness in a given community, when the community sees itself not as a suffering entity but

as an active “doing” organism able to change its environment. That community has freed itself from the deprivation trap, even if poverty is still evident in its midst.

Community development fulfils both concrete and abstract human needs. This is not primarily a process through which the physical needs of a community are met. When people are striving to reach a concrete objective (*i e* a clinic) they gain in something abstract – self-reliance, self-sufficiency and human dignity. These abstract gains are the enduring and permanent results of CD which enable people to help themselves.

2.2.2.2. Further development

The progress established through CD must be managed and maintained so that it sparks off further activities. The attainment of an objective usually leads to further needs being identified, new objectives being set and further action being taken to reach the objectives (Swanepoel 1997). Each concrete need that is defined must be addressed by striving towards the realisation of a concrete objective. Because CD is born out of people’s needs, it must therefore be oriented towards an objective that addresses those specific needs. Without specific and concrete needs and without their being perceived as such, CD cannot take place.

In the view of Lele (1981), the outcome of community development programmes should be to improve the living conditions of the masses with low income living in rural areas; so this process of development can propel itself. At this stage, community development is specific since it focuses particularly on poverty reduction and addresses social inequality. So community development is viewed as a strategy that enables the poorest among those who seek a livelihood in rural areas to demand and control more of the benefits of development (Chambers 1983). In other words, the attainment of an objective does something to people as they demonstrate an enthusiasm to tackle further problems and become aware of needs in other areas.

2.2.2.3. Demonstration effect of collective action

Community development is basically a process in which ordinary people play the leading part, with government, experts and elite playing a facilitating role. This primary focus on the ordinary people makes CD unique. A successful project usually broadcasts its successes further and wider and as people become aware of needs of changes for the better (Swanepoel 1997). This implies that a community's successful project demonstrates that people who stand and work together can make a difference.

Through every step people learn how to move to the next step in a better way and find ways to improve the next project for better achievement. In this way, CD becomes a learning process if the people really take part. People should not only work but also think, seek and, discuss in order to make their decisions acknowledged. In To make CD a learning process; people should be guided and helped in the initiative they have taken.

2.2.2.4. Community building

With community development programmes, the organisation of a community becomes more appropriate, effective, and efficient and even develops its ability to expand the outcome of the learning process (Korten 1980). Midgley (quoted in Landman, 2005) states that the main aim of community is capital development or formation. This includes the building of social, human and economic capital. Although capital formation usually takes place in a community setting, it also concerns individuals.

In this way, community development serves as a vehicle for strengthening civil society and for promoting people-centred development. What people create in the process of releasing their CD objective is often used; they use it in their everyday lives. According to Swanepoel (1997), community building is manifested in such aspects as:

- *Organisation*: community organisation becomes appropriate, more effective, and more efficient and so able to expand.

- *Institutions*: institutions become adaptable and focus on development, which creates leadership.
- *Linkages*: new linkages between institutions and individuals and between communities and individuals are forged, or existing ones are improved. External linkages between communities and between communities and various authorities and agencies are either created or improved.
- *Leadership*: existing leaders are enabled to lead more effectively and new leaders are brought to the fore, either through institutions or through community activities.
- *Skills*: skills in organising, negotiating, planning and acting, or in specific tasks, are either gained or improved.
- *Life improvement*: one expects an improvement in health, education, child care, housing, and lifestyle. Income could be generated and jobs created, while crime and other antisocial behaviours could be eradicated.

The literature on community development notes that among the outcomes of community development are skills and the capacity for collective action (Mansuri & Rao 2004). These skills are instrumental in citizens' abilities to mobilise and to express their interests, advocate for their rights, and exercise democratic governance functions. Through involvement in the process of implementation, villagers acquire skills and capacity for collective action that can enhance prospects for continued progress with democratic decentralisation (Guggenheim *et al* 2004). Through their personal efforts to assert themselves and frame their agenda, individuals work to create a political space for the underclasses to acquire voice and a more empowered sense of community involvement, thereby enabling them to compete more effectively with the upper classes in all aspects of politics (Bacharach & Botwinick 1992).

From the nature and characteristics of CD discussed above, it is clear that the members of a community need to better know and understand the basic principles underlying their work. In this way, they recognise these principles; their work finds meaning because in

their daily confrontation of choices they need guidance for choosing any activity that is beneficial to their community. The principles of CD to which organisations and their leaders must commit if they want their efforts to empower and lift up the poor are explored in the next section.

2.3.2. Principles of community development

Any organisation that is involved in CD must be guided by principles that Swanepoel (1997) considers as the guiding lights on a difficult road of development. According to him, CD must respect the following principles: human orientation, participation, empowerment, ownership, release, learning, adaptiveness, and simplicity.

2.3.2. Actors in community development

Community development is not a spontaneous process; and so needs different actors to boost its activities. For decentralisation to influence community development fully, all stakeholders must embrace and engage effectively in the process, especially in setting up a political agenda. Adequate systemic conditions need to be developed and strengthened, so that all actors can make a visible and meaningful contribution to the decentralisation implementation process within their defined rights, roles and responsibilities (Galloway, 2006). The actors' role is mainly to initiate the development and so encourage the start-up.

2.2.4.1. Governmental institutions

Governmental institutions are role-players in the development of local communities. According to De Beer (2000), governments can support CD in different ways. They can provide either financial assistance or technical advice and training to enable the people to carry out their development projects.

2.2.4.2. Local people

Local people are the main actors in the development of their communities. According to Kotzé & Swanepoel (1983), people participation is the basis of CD because this directly affects the process, so they must shape and determine the direction of their own development agenda. De Beer & Swanepoel (1998) argue that community participation in development is more important than the participation of other actors.

2.2.4.3. Non-governmental organisations

Monaheng (2000) points out that community-based organisations (CBOs) are the primary actors in community development. Thus, building the organisational capacity of CBOs could have a direct effect on their involvement in the communities, as development agents as well as active citizens. Padron (1987) argues that one of the central characteristics of NGOs is that they are “not part of a government and have not been established as a result of an agreement between governments”. In other aspects, NGOs should be “non-profit seeking in that any surpluses generated during the course of activities are utilised to further the development aims and objectives of the organisation (Kane, 1990).

These institutions often contribute significantly towards helping to organise local communities by giving them financial support. Their strength lies in their ability to organise communities and in acting as catalysts, which influences government policy towards CD (De Beer, 2000).

2.2.4.4. Community development workers (CDW)

Community workers are people who either are employed by government or are volunteers employed to play a facilitating role in CD (Swanepoel, 1997). According to this wri-

ter, CDW can be resources only if their positions, goals, attitudes, and roles conform to the principles of CD.

A community worker can be a group organiser or group animator. The aim of such a person is to encourage group formation, to facilitate access to the people and to act as a source of relevant information which is not readily available among local communities (De Beer 2000). The CDW are deployed to maintain direct contact with community members and to ensure that the government improves the quality of the outcomes of public expenditure. The functions of the CDW can further be outlined as follows (Swanepoel, 1997):

- assist communities by explaining what their needs are;
- develop and support community structures;
- facilitate public participation in government development projects (for example IDP, LED, infrastructure and service delivery projects);
- identify service blockage in the community and find solutions to identified needs and blockages by interacting with national, provincial and local government structures

To assist communities fully, Agere (1981) suggests that community development workers should be trained for a few months and be expected to guide a particular community through a process of:

- identifying community-felt needs;
- prioritising these needs to determine which problem to attack first;
- obtaining resources from government and non-government agencies through village self-reliance activities;
- implementing community action to fulfil the need;
- evaluating the process so that community leaders become increasingly self-reliant.

In Agere's opinion, these types of community development programmes are much more of a welfare service in which the locally less-advantaged groups participate in planning as well as in the implementation of programmes. Although they are intended to integrate people in national and local development and are meant to reduce poverty, they do emphasise human development at the expense of increasing rural incomes. Such programmes do not tackle the social and structural constraints of development programmes intended to reduce poverty effectively (Agere, 1981).

The study also included the concept of local economic development (LED) as inter-related with the community development agenda. These two concepts are linked since they both aspire to the same overall goals of poverty reduction and improving quality of life and require the same basic condition of conducive local governance in order to pursue their objectives.

2.3.3. Local economic development as a feature of community development

Community development and local economic development (LED) are two clearly inter-related agendas and have been a focus for economic development in many countries as the process of community development contributes to success of local economic development. Shaffer, Deller, & Marcouiller (2006) describe the relationship and synergy between community development and economic development as a situation when people in a community analyse the economic conditions of that community, determine its economic needs and unfulfilled opportunities, decide what can be done to improve economic conditions in that community, and then move to achieve agreed-upon economic goals and objectives. In this process, the purpose of community development is to produce assets that may be used to improve the community, and the purpose of economic development is to mobilise these assets to benefit the community (Haines & Green, 2002).

2.3.3.1. Definition of local economic development

Local economic development refers to the process in which local governments or community-based (neighbourhood) organisations engage to stimulate or maintain business activities to create better conditions for economic growth and employment generation. (World Bank, 2003, Blakely 1994). According to Swinburn (2006), the purpose of LED is to build up the economic capacity of local entities to improve their economic future and the quality of life for all. It is a process by which public, business and nongovernmental sector partners work collectively to create better conditions for economic growth and employment generation. LED is a process by which local actors within a defined territory get together to:

- analyse their economy;
- establish where its competitive advantages lie; and
- take actions to exploit business opportunities and improve the environment for business within the locality.

In the same spirit, Rodriguez-Pose (2002) underscores that the main aim of LED is to offer local government, the private sector and the local community the opportunity of working together to improve the local economy through competitiveness that encourages sustainable growth that is inclusive.

Blakely (2010) supports the idea that local economic development is achieved when a community's standard of living can be preserved and improved through a process of human and physical development that is based on principles of equity and sustainability that can only catered for by a developmental state. It implies that the local government is assigned a developmental role, meaning that local governments are no longer purely instruments of service delivery, but are also assigned a role of economic development. So in this context, local governments are faced with the task of improving not only the quantity but also the quality of basic services being delivered to citizens.

Due to the issues related to the vicious cycle of poverty, promoting economic development at local levels has become a crucial preoccupation for so many entities. For that reason, Shawn & Jörg (2005) believe that LED is a pragmatic response to a visible need and is usually pursued for one or more of the following reasons:

- Local decision-makers try to promote economic development to raise their legitimacy with the local electorate, and possibly to improve the income stream for local government;
- National and provincial governments encourage local initiatives since they have neither the information nor the skills and funds to promote active economic development initiatives;
- In some countries, LED has become a mandatory task of local government as part of an extensive decentralisation effort; and
- From the perspective of foreign donor organisations, LED is an established practice with a long tradition in their home countries, and there is no doubt that LED is one of the important tasks of local government.

Blakely states that the goal of local economic development is to enhance the value of people and places, so the community builds economic opportunities to “fit” the human resources and maximises the existing natural and institutional resource. According to him, the goals that would be pursued by leaders in the process of LED are: providing quality jobs for the current population, achieving local economic stability, building a diverse economic and employment base, and promoting sustainability (Blakely, 2010).

2.3.3.2. Actors in LED

The LED approach strongly relies on the participation of a wide variety of stakeholders to identify local opportunities and threats, and to formulate strategies to address them. It takes place through organised negotiation processes between local actors from civil society and the public and the private sectors that seek to address the different challenges faced by the region.

The potential success of LED is highly dependent on horizontal cooperation between the local government and other stakeholders. Apart from the formal role played by local governments to stimulate the participation of a variety of stakeholders, Helmsing (2005) asserts that entrepreneurs and business associations (civil society) are expected to perform an important role in LED. Through consultation, it intends to make more efficient and sustainable use of the existing and potentially available resources, aspires to build socio-economic opportunities (such as the creation of employment and income) and tries to strengthen good local governance.

Even though LED is a locally owned and implemented programme, the national and regional environment within which a locality is embedded should create an environment which is conducive to supporting local initiatives of development (Rodríguez-Pose, 2002). As decentralisation has been considered as a useful mode of administration that delivers services to the public from convenient local centres that are close to the citizens, the next section deals with the service delivery in local government.

2.4. Relationship between decentralisation and community development

Many claims are made in favour of decentralisation, ranging from the democratising potential of increased scope for participation and accountability through development and improved service delivery. An effective decentralisation brought about by local government stimulates local economic development (LED) capable of creating the employment required for development and enabling local communities to pay for their services (Sefala, 2009).

As stated by Robinson (2007), the primary factor influencing how decentralisation affects community development is the political context in which reforms are made, at both central and local levels. This requires elected local government representatives to achieve and maintain their political power effectively. Conyers (2008) states that if services are being delivered in an environment of political patronage, decisions that could

benefit efficiency and equity are corrupted, and instead be made in favour of a few elites for personal financial or political reward.

Community development can only be executed in the context of good governance, as underdevelopment can be also an obstacle to the prevailing and sustainability of good governance. Community development requires the existence of governmental institutions, including sub-national entities, to gauge peoples' needs, and the opportunity for all citizens, including the poor, to participate in governance processes.

Nkuna (2011) states that local government should exercise its powers and functions to have maximum impact on the socio-economic development of communities, in particular meeting the basic needs, and on the growth of the economy through the provision of social safety nets to the poor and vulnerable, comprising services like social welfare services and development support programmes among others. In the same vein, Crook & Manor (1998) state that both strong economic performance and sound community development require a system of governance that favours planning and coherence over community participation. In this light, it is indubitable that decentralisation can lead to resource allocation and decisions that improves the general well-being of local residents.

In the framework of this research, decentralisation remains a fundamental aspect of governance and service delivery for community development. These concepts are not separable, nor are they independent of one another because community development can only be executed in the context of good governance.

CONCLUSION

This chapter has importantly dealt with the theoretical foundation of the concepts of decentralisation and community development. The concept of decentralisation defined as a transfer of planning, decision-making or administrative authority from the central government to its field organisations, local administrative units, semi-autonomous organisations, local governments, or non-governmental organisations. Moreover, it was noted

that decentralisation is indispensable as it leads to higher levels of political participation, accountability, and administrative and fiscal efficiency in the government process.

Various theories that show the importance, goals and conditions necessary for citizen participation were covered. These theories indicated that citizen participation is necessary as it requires some prevailing arrangements or conditions so that citizen participation becomes a reality. Furthermore, advantages of the participatory approach and the conditions required for citizens to participate in decision-making and policy implementation were identified and discussed.

Finally, since the study is about the influence of decentralisation on community development, concepts like local economic development and development local government processes were also approached. Accordingly, these processes were combined because policy informs the plan and likewise policies and planning activities overlap in the process of community development. The next chapter is about the historical background of governance and the decentralisation process in Rwanda.

CHAPTER 3

BACKGROUND OF THE DECENTRALISATION PROCESS IN RWANDA

To better understand the context in which the decentralisation policy was adopted in Rwanda, it is also first of all best to understand the historical background of governance in Rwanda in past decades.

3.1. Historical background of governance in Rwanda

3.1.1. Rwanda governance during the pre-colonial period (before 1897)

According to Reytjens, (1985), during the pre-colonial period, Rwanda was organised as a monarchy. The king had a centralised system of administration and was assisted by three main chiefs. There was a military chief responsible for the army, ensuring territorial integrity and expansion. The chief of cattle oversaw all matters pertaining to cattle-keeping, grazing and settling related disputes. Finally, the chief of land was responsible for agricultural land, production and other related affairs.

The relationship between the king and the population was sustained by an organised system of clientilism which was a kind of relationship between the landed gentry, the less landed and the ordinary subjects. From the era of the monarchy up to the arrival of Belgian authority in 1916, Rwanda was divided into regions which were also subdivided into chiefdoms. These were composed of sub-chiefdoms – it is not entirely how clear how many there were (Coupez, *et al*, 1962).

2.1.2. Rwanda governance during the colonial period (1897-July 1962)

The Belgian colonial administration started in 1916 under what was known as indirect rule. In 1920, the Belgian Minister of Colonies asserted that:

We will apply in Ruanda and Urundi a policy of protectorate. This policy is based on the respect of indigenous institutions; it uses the European as a guide and protector, it excludes direct administration. This policy is preferably suited for countries enjoying an old and remarkable organisation where the ruling class shows obvious political talent (Reyntjens, 1987).

Under this system, the main concern was about conferring some form of legitimacy on the decisions taken by the colonial administration. The concept of indirect rule was not in conformity with the reality of the practice on the ground. The annual report for 1930 revealed that the Belgian authority took care of the petty details of execution, was in constant touch with all the sub-chiefs, controlling their activities and constantly intervening to replace those whose incapacity, inertia or bad faith was blocking the development of the country (Reyntjens, 1987).

Under the colonial regime, territorial reorganisation started in 1926 without prior consultation with the royal authority and without taking into consideration the socio-economic and cultural realities of the country. Each region was in turn, divided into chiefdoms which were further divided into a large number of smaller domains. In 1927, the colonial authority embarked on a systematic policy of regrouping chiefdoms and sub-chiefdoms to form territories. In 1932, the reorganisation ended and Rwanda was divided into 65 chiefdoms and 1 043 sub-chiefdoms (Reyntjens, 1987).

While the colonial system eroded slowly the stability of the royal authority; the 1950s brought an additional number of further provocations leading to the so-called Rwanda revolution. These included (Reyntjens, 1987):

- The constant pressure of the United Nations and its trusteeship council: reports of visiting missions forced the Belgians into political reform;
- The Belgian Ten-Year Plan for the economic and social development of Ruanda-Urundi;

- A decree of 1952 introduced, albeit very timidly, the principle of the democratic election of councils at the different levels (sub-chiefdoms, chiefdoms and country);
- Clientship formally abolished in 1954;
- The emergence of counter-elites, both among the educated Hutu and progressive, reform-minded Tutsi.

This situation deprived the king of his traditional power, exacerbated by the creation of three Hutu political parties. Some members of these political parties provoked incidents with some Tutsi chiefs. This situation resulted in an uprising that culminated with the arrests and killings of Tutsi chiefs and sub-chiefs and the exile of many Tutsi families into neighbouring countries.

3.1.3. Rwanda local governance during the post-independence period

This era comprises two separate periods, namely the organisation of Rwanda from its accession to independence in July 1962 until 1994, and the emergence of Rwanda following the war and the 1994 genocide, which was stopped on 4 July, a date regarded as the beginning of a new era for Rwanda.

The first republic came to power on 1 July 1962, when Rwanda became independent. During this period, Rwanda continued to maintain the administrative structure of the colonial period. The administration was characterised by regionalism and a concentration of all political and economic power was in the hands of a few Hutu elites from the central region of Rwanda. In 1965, Rwanda was declared a one-party state under the Mouvement Démocratique Républicain (MDR), which was the architect of the racist ideology.

Due to a combination of persistent persecution of Tutsis and Hutus from other regions, coupled with economic hardships, by 1972 the MDR regime had become unpopular and vulnerable (Kagame, 1975). A coup against the ruling president in July 1973 caused the

suspension of all political activities and the proclamation of a military regime, referred to as the second republic. In 1975, President Habyarimana formed the Mouvement Révolutionnaire Nationale pour le Développement (MRND), a single ruling party (IRDP, 2005).

According to Kagame (1975), this regime undertook political and administrative reforms and as a result, the territorial organisation of the country was restructured. So Rwanda was organised into five levels of administration: prefectures, sub-prefectures, communes, sectors and cells. During this period, the country was divided into 12 prefectures, six sub-prefectures, 148 communes, 1 548 sectors and many cells. In a report by the National Assembly, quoted by Reyntjens (1987), regarding communal and prefectural administration, we find that:

“In almost all Prefectures, the Préfet, Sub-Préfet and the civil servants spy on each other instead of pulling their efforts together for the benefits of administrative efficacy (. . .). One has the impression that when appointing someone in a responsible position, the staffs attached to him are to control him and to jeopardise all his initiative. The municipal administrations were often paralysed by conflict of interest and personally, by waste of public money and by abuse of power.

The bourgomaster of the commune was only accountable to the provincial préfet, not to any other kind of council or committee. Under this regime, citizens were entirely barred from participating in the determination of their own political, social and economic destiny. The central government was responsible for all activities ranging from development and construction of infrastructures (schools, hospitals and health centres, feeder roads and the initiation of small income-generating projects) and many other welfare facilities remained in the hands and control of the central government (Reyntjens, 1987).

On 1 October 1990, the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) attacked the country from Uganda. It was largely composed of Rwandese who had helped Museveni's National Resistance Army (NRA) come into power in Uganda in 1986. They invaded Rwanda from the north and occupied several towns in the north and north-east.

Simultaneously, there was internal political discord and intense pressure on the regime to open up and allow political pluralism and the return of refugees. In June 1991 a new constitution legalising political parties was agreed to. As a result, four main opposition parties, the Mouvement Démocratique Républicain (MDR), the Parti Democratique Chretien (PDC), the Parti Liberal (PL) and the Parti Social Démocrate (PSD) were allowed to operate. These parties together with the ruling party, the Mouvement Révolutionnaire Nationale pour le Développement (MRND) formed the transitional government (Muzungu 2003).

The new transitional government and representatives of the RPF engaged in negotiations between 1991 and January 1993 and significant progress was made on both sides. A schedule for the demobilisation and reintegration of forces was agreed on and a protocol on the integration of the RPF and the government forces was duly signed. From then until April 1994, the regime repeatedly failed to resolve outstanding problems concerning the integration of the RPF in the Rwanda national force, the repatriation of refugees, and RPF demands to participate fully in a transitional government. On 6 April 1994, the 100-day genocide began (IRD, 2005).

The Government of Rwanda has since 1994 pursued clear goals of establishing a sustainable framework of good governance and prosperity based on equity and the participation of all citizens. It is from that perspective that decentralisation was adopted and launched in 2000 as the main strategy for achieving good governance and sustainable social and economic development (Minaloc, 2002). The present government believes that decentralisation and more specifically the devolution of substantial public sector responsibilities and resources to local governments would generate allocative and productive efficiencies in the use of public resources.

3.2. Decentralisation process in Rwanda

3.2.1. Phases of decentralisation implementation

Since 2000, decentralisation in Rwanda has gone through three phases. The first (2000-05) consisted of the establishment of democratic and community development structures. To facilitate the functioning of these constituencies, a number of legal, institutional and policy reforms were undertaken, especially towards promoting democratic elections.

The second phase (2006-10) was conceived after the territorial restructuring of local government in 2005. This aimed at reducing the number of administrative entities (from 11 provinces to four, 106 districts to 30, 1 545 sectors to 416, and 9 165 cells to 2 148). This process in fact consolidated progress made on national priorities, such as Vision 2020, and deepening the decentralisation process by enhancing the effectiveness of service delivery to communities.

This phase was characterised by a legal framework stipulated by Law No 29/2005, which determined the administrative entities of the Republic of Rwanda. The legal basis of the local administration reform policy adopted in 2005 had the following specific objectives:

- promoting and enhancing effectiveness in service delivery by making the sector a focal point for service delivery with adequate human, material and financial capacity, and improving the collection of data and information at this level;
- streamlining and strengthening the coordination of public services and local economic development at district level by making more technically competent personnel available, as well as financial resources, to the district to ensure sustainable decentralised fiscal regimes;
- strengthening the coordination of development activities; and

- establishing and strengthening coherent monitoring and evaluation systems as well as institutionalising accountability tools and systems.

This phase concentrated on building capacities at local levels, which included attracting competent, qualified staff. The enhanced upward accountability led to significant achievements in terms of good governance, socio-economic development, reinforced synergies, coordination and the harmonisation of interventions in local governments.

The third phase (2011-15), now in its third year of implementation, is expected to consolidate and sustain the achievements of the first two phases. Accordingly, the third phase is about focusing on the outcome of an evaluation of the decentralisation process conducted toward the end of the second phase, which indicated a number of challenges hampering the optimal functioning of the decentralisation framework. These include the legal and institutional framework, sectoral decentralisation, service delivery, fiscal and financial decentralisation, capacity building and local economic development (LED).

3.2.2. Components of Rwanda's decentralisation process

The process of decentralisation in Rwanda is characterised by various components. Politically, if these mechanisms are well integrated, they would contribute to achieving the objectives of decentralisation. These include political, administrative, fiscal, financial, legal and institutional decentralisation, and community development (Minaloc, 2002).


3.2.2.1. Political decentralisation

To Popic and Patel (2011), political decentralisation is a shift of power and resources to elected local councils or outposts of sectoral ministries with the objectives of aligning sectoral activities to local needs so as to improve service delivery. Its aim is to improve and enhance participation by the population in political decision-making. On the other hand, it refers to functional assignment, through the distribution of responsibilities, to fulfil public duties among governmental authorities at various levels. Administrative

decentralisation is usually differentiated into its three main forms (Boeckenfoerde *et al*, 2007).

Under the decentralisation policy, the organisational structures of local administration in Rwanda have been reviewed to make local governance more representative and to bring government as close as possible to the people. The figure below shows the hierarchical order of different levels of decentralised units in Rwanda as a result of the second phase of administrative reform.

Figure 2: Decentralised governance structure



Source: Republic of Rwanda (2012). *National decentralisation policy*. Minaloc, Kigali.

In this structure, the lowest administrative unit is the cell; it is followed by the sector. Sectors combine to form a district, which is the legally recognised local government unit with powers to plan and implement programmes, collect revenue and make bylaws

(laws operative at local government level). This arrangement was meant to facilitate the flow of information, community participation in local development and the monitoring and evaluation of economic activities at the grassroots level.

3.2.2.1.1. Democratic governance

The Government of Rwanda believes that if the decentralisation policy is implemented effectively, it will contribute vastly to the promotion of good governance principles. Minaloc (2007) posits that decentralisation would allow citizens to enjoy basic civil rights and the efficient integration of democratic principles into public affairs by strengthening the linkages between leaders and their electorate. This sets the basis for holding public officials accountable to communities over the use of public resources in service delivery and local development, and the extent to which development interventions are contributing to the real transformation in people's livelihoods and material wellbeing. By upholding transparency and accountability in the management of public affairs increase the trust of the public *vis-à-vis* public institutions.

3.2.2.1.2. Electoral system for local representatives

Direct and indirect adult suffrage are the two systems used to elect local government representatives in Rwanda. At the village and cell levels, elections are held in direct suffrage, voters lining up behind competing candidates. At the sector and district level, elections are done through indirect suffrage with a secret ballot. Special groups (women, youth and people living with disabilities) elect their representatives to the council through indirect suffrage using a secret ballot.

Local government elections do not follow political party affiliations. Article 125 of Law No 27/2010 of 19/06/2010 determining elections in Rwanda refers to prohibitions on candidates campaigning for leadership positions at local government level on the basis of a political organisation. A candidate found campaigning on political party grounds would

be immediately disqualified. The sector and district councils are non-partisan and are supposed to represent the entire population of the sector or district.

By law and in practice, local government elections are held every five years. Article 126 of the local election law states that the term of office and replacement of elected local government officials and the term of office for elected local administrative authorities is five years. The law also determines the process for filling vacant council seats at the district and sector levels. The elected councillors have the authority to express the views of the electorate without being influenced and compromised. So councillors have adequate authority and influence to make decisions on behalf of the local population without undue pressure from the central government or political parties or individual political heavyweights.

The law provides for the removal from office a councillor who has failed in the effective representation the people he/she is supposed to represent. Article 17 of Law No 24/06/2006 states that in the case of local residents finding that the councillor does not fulfil his/her duties effectively, they may forward their concerns to the council for examination. The policy of devolution introduced a form of direct participatory decision-making at the lowest level of the local government system. The lowest level is the village, where all its residents who have reached voting age are automatically members of the council. They elect from among themselves an executive secretary to lead the process of their decision-making and their Implementation.

As the local government system progresses to higher levels however, participation is through representation. Here the inclusion of representatives of groups formerly excluded (like women, the youth, and the disabled) is significant in the implementation of participatory decision-making. To ensure inclusive local government democracy, the local government law provides mandatory political representation of women, the youth and people living with disability, who in the past had limited participation in political activities with regard to their representation in local government councils. Legal provisions

are made to make such groups be represented in local councils and the national legislature and to promote their participation at local community level using the vote and their direct action by engaging in specific activities within the framework of decentralised governance.

On the other hand, whereas women have the freedom to compete with men for 70% of the council seats, they equally have 30% of the total district council seats reserved; through the structures of the National Women Council, only women occupy seats directly without competition from male counterparts. The youth and people living with disabilities elect their representatives in the district council through their respective national structures in terms of to the law.

3.2.2.2. Administrative decentralisation and quality of service delivery

The quality of service delivery is also another feature in Rwanda's decentralisation process. Under this component, the administrative decentralisation process in Rwanda has three main elements (Minaloc, 2002) which are:

- Deconcentration: administrative functions and corresponding technical personnel and budgetary resources are transferred to provinces;
- Delegation: as capacity increases in local governments, deconcentrated functions can be delegated, and eventually be devolved to those levels;
- The devolution of powers and functions previously reserved to the central government are delegated to local governments, and are accompanied by the transfer of corresponding budget allocations.

Law No 29/2005 of 31 December 2005 states that the district is the centre of development and responsible for basic service delivery to local people. The government is convinced that by putting power in the hands of local governments, they can work independently and better respond to the needs of local people.

Before the advent of the decentralisation policy, there was duplication of assignments where one could find different departments and stakeholders intervening to implement programmes of which the end results were similar. Since its adoption in 2000, services like the coordination of education activities and schools, hospitals and health centres, the construction of feeder roads, agriculture and husbandry activities; land administration and community development activities have been put fully in the responsibility of the districts for the effective coordination of activities and use of resources (Minecofin, 2012).

3.2.2.3. Fiscal decentralisation

Fiscal decentralisation (FD) connotes the ways in which a nation empowers various parts and levels of its government to impose and collect taxes from the private sector (Otto, 2001). In fact, this proves crucial for the success of the whole decentralisation process, making the government to attach great importance to it. The reason is that decision-making is being devolved to the local authorities, causing the local authorities to need funds to inject in the finance programmes that arise from their decisions.

Fiscal decentralisation deals with shifting responsibilities for expenditures and revenues to the lower levels of government. The local government share of total public expenditures and revenues, combined with their level of autonomy in influencing expenditure and revenue decisions, are often applied as the core indicators since they define the level of fiscal decentralisation in a country (Steffensen, 2010). However, giving additional resources to a subnational government that is not politically, managerially and technically prepared to use them responsibly can create enormous problems (Smoke, 2000).

The Government of Rwanda (GoR) recognises that the devolution of authority to manage budgets and financial resources is important if the local autonomy in decision-making is to be effective. Nevertheless, it is important to note that FD can be difficult where

local governments do not have financial and human resources to sustain their budgetary commitments.

Despite its complexity, the GoR recognises that fiscal decentralisation has some advantages. In adopting such a policy, political officials expected that fiscal decentralisation tools could maximise the efficiency benefits of decentralisation if they promote local accountability and motivate local revenue mobilisation.

In this regard, Green & Propper (2001) state that accountability requires a financial link between the costs of providing a service and the quality and quantity of the public services the local electorate demands. If local authorities have discretion over their own taxes, they can tax the fast-growing parts of their economic base more easily than the central government can. Additionally, Bahl & Linn (1992) stipulate that fiscal decentralisation could contribute to improve the country's overall fiscal position as well as that of the local government. Another advantage is that fiscal decentralisation tools have a positive effect on social equity.

In this vein, Davey & Devas (1996) state that social equity requires equal access to local public services and fair redistribution of wealth. These authors specify that social equity relates revenues to ability to pay and simply requires that poor people should also have access to local public services regardless of their ability to pay for them.

3.2.2.4. Legal components

One of the most remarkable points of departure of the decentralisation policy has been the enactment of some legal instruments and regulations related to the establishment, functioning and financing of local administrative units. The objective was to ensure an open environment that could foster development and empower LGs with the required administrative and financial powers, and hence facilitate the implementation process.

3.2.2.5. People participation

Nowadays, people participation plays a crucial role in the implementation and success of any government policy. Many developing countries are aware that if citizens are appropriately empowered, they can often manage their own local development efforts. In this view, Parker (1998) argues that the failure of many development projects during the past three decades have led those involved to consider the factors identified as undermining successful outcomes of policy implementation. Prime among these are the issues of inadequate local capacity and the excessive centralisation of decision-making. In this context, participation is a way of identifying and implementing priority community development activities through better use of existing resources.

The GoR is aware that local communities have better experience and knowledge about their environment to better identify their development needs and priorities. The decentralisation policy has been specifically designed to empower local governance structures with the appropriate autonomy to bring public administration closer to the people, and to make local governance accountable to the electorate (Minaloc, 2007).

The capacity of citizens to take part in planning, implementing, monitoring and evaluating sustainable poverty reduction and socio-economic development with their collective and individual potentials has been reinforced continuously. Article 2 of Law No 08/2006 of 24 February 2006 determining the organisation and functioning of districts, states that the district shall support activities in which the population participate. In elaborating development activities, the district shall endeavour to take its people's analysed needs into account and shall immediately coordinate all development activities.

In this context, decentralised planning involves local-level institutions through their representatives. It formulates development plans as well as their implementation to ensure that there is efficient and effective use of resources and equitable sharing of benefits from development (Kauzya, 2007).

3.2.2.6. Cooperation

The complexity of decentralisation and the obstacles to its implementation cannot be overcome in a situation of isolation. Accordingly, Visser (2005) argues that cooperation refers to a relationship of equality where the actors in intergovernmental relations operate as equal partners. So the spirit of cooperation is a prerequisite for success.

The GoR believes that cooperation between the government's institutions on one side and with local governments on the other hand can help to find collective solutions to problems that would be difficult to solve at the institutional level. In view of this, Article 158 of Law No 08/2006 of 24 February 2006 (OG, 2006), determining the organisation and functioning of the districts, states that district councils can, upon mutual consultation, decide to work in partnership to establish, organise or supervise activities of common interest.

All in all, two or more districts can hold meetings together to examine issues of common interest within the limits of their powers, after prior notice to the governor of the province concerned. According to Minaloc (2012), the decentralised planning must be elaborated and implemented by aligning its objectives and priorities with national and provincial plans as well as those of other districts.

3.2.3. Legal framework of decentralisation policy in Rwanda

The implementation of the decentralisation policy was accompanied by the adoption of legal texts related to the functioning of local governments; the financing of decentralisation, the roles and responsibilities between the decentralised structures and the deconcentrated and delegated levels of governments. These acts aim to empower districts to support activities in which the residents participate; while deciding on development activities, by considering the people's wishes and needs.

3.2.3.1. Constitutional provision

Decentralisation is enshrined in the Rwandan Constitution of 2003 (as revised). Section 167 of the Constitution of Rwanda states that public administration shall be decentralised in accordance with the provisions of the law and decentralised organs shall fall under the ministry having local government among its functions. Besides, Paragraph 4 of the same article of the Constitution specifies that districts are decentralised entities with legal status regarding the autonomy of administration and finance and are the foundation of community development. It specifies that the public administration shall be decentralised in accordance with the provisions of the law and decentralised organs shall fall under the ministry having local government among its functions. The same section specifies that districts and the City of Kigali are decentralised entities with legal status regarding the autonomy of administration and finance and are the foundation of community development.

3.2.3.2. Local government acts

Article 3 of Law No 87/2013 of 11/09/2013 determining the organisation and functioning of decentralised administrative entities states that the City of Kigali and the districts shall be decentralised administrative entities with legal personality. They shall constitute the basis for community development and shall have administrative and financial autonomy. Section 9 of this Act provides for the administrative structure of districts made up of:

- the district council;
- the executive committee;
- the executive secretary; and
- the district development committee.

To give districts more opportunities for deciding on their own orientation, a new Act establishes the organisation and functioning of the provinces. Section 20 of that Act stipulates that the governor of the province is not permitted to interfere in the manage-

ment of districts and municipalities, except in cases where decisions taken by these entities conflict with the laws, rules and regulations governing the state.

In matters of the organisational structure of local government in a process of decentralisation, details vary from one country to another. While some increase the number of districts, Rwanda has decided to reduce their number by implicitly increasing their size and their tax base. Accordingly, Organic Law No 29/2005 of 31/12/2005, determining the administrative entities of the Republic of Rwanda, was adopted and marked the second phase of the implementation of decentralisation policy by decreasing the number of districts from 106 to 30, and provinces from 12 to four, plus Kigali City which remained an autonomous entity.

Furthermore, the decentralisation policy is governed by Law No 8/2006 of 24 February 2006, establishing the organisation of districts in Rwanda. Article 2 of this Act states that a district is an autonomous administrative structure with legal status and financial autonomy. Section 9 of this Act states that the district is a structure, like all other administrative structures, for the promotion of democracy. It is also a pillar of development and responsible for upholding good collaboration between sectors of the population for their own development and that of their district. This Act empowers districts to support activities in which the population participates. While deciding on development activities, the districts must endeavour to consider the people's needs and without delay coordinate these development activities.

As far as democratic governance is concerned with the decentralisation process, Law No 31/2005 of 24 December 2005, regarding the organisation and functioning of the National Electoral Commission (NEC), was also introduced ensure that the residents play a pivotal role in the mandate of participating in elections to express their choice of leaders who can better serve them in the process of reinforcing good governance principles.

The legal reform related to decentralisation policy has also included the passage of a new Act on the operations of non-governmental organisations (NGOs). The new Act empowers the Ministry of Local Government to regulate the operations of NGOs through registration, approval and monitoring, and defines their role in the process of development. Accordingly, it becomes mandatory for foreign NGOs to prove that their programmes are in line with national policies.

This legal framework is complemented by the sectoral laws that detail how different sectors intend to fulfil their mandates and functions. Some legal texts are very specific on the role of the districts and CG, such as the Organic Law No 20/2011 of 27/07/2011, governing the organisation of education and Ministerial Order No 20/31 of 18/04/2012, determining the modalities for deployment of medical staff in the health sector, and the Rwanda Road Act.

3.2.4. Sectors of decentralisation in Rwanda

The literature on decentralisation is not specific regarding which services should be decentralised. Most theories provide only broad normative advices concerning the nature of services that would be good candidates for decentralisation. Sectors comprise a number of activities in line with national policies, although related services and activities may be delivered locally.

Andrews & Schroeder (2003) recommend that sectoral decentralisation policies should first review the nature of services and the situation of LG in order to determine whether conditions are conducive for their decentralisation. To them, a sector is a prime candidate for decentralisation if these criteria are met:

- local demands for a service vary across localities;
- there are no substantial economies of scale associated with the service;
- there are no substantial spill-overs of costs or benefits from the service;

- the service is amenable to at least partial local financing through taxes or charges;
- LG has the capacity to deliver the service; and
- the service is not meant to provide substantial redistribution of income or wealth.

Andrews & Schroeder (2003) concluded that various components of a sector may respond differently to the criteria listed; so the decentralisation of a sector may take different forms in different circumstances, with certain components decentralised in some cases and not in others, and that the existence of complexities should not however be a reason for the centralisation of services.

The World Bank Institute (WBI) warns that undertaking a sectoral decentralisation dialogue without examining the inter-governmental landscape can lead to unintended consequences, such as local corruption or growing geographic disparities (WBI, 1998). In the context of Rwanda, sectoral policies that were concerned with the decentralisation implementation process in the initial stage are summarised below.

3.2.4.1. Education sector

Education is governed by Organic Law No 02/2011 of 27/07/2011. Article 16 clearly defines the role of CG and LG in the establishment of private schools and the management of public schools. In particular, Article 23 of the education law states that public schools shall be managed as follows:

- public nursery, primary and secondary schools shall be managed by the districts;
- public technical and vocational schools shall be managed by the national institution in charge of technical and vocational training; and
- public institutions of higher learning shall be managed by the Ministry of Higher Education.

Law No 29/2003 of 30/08/2003 establishes the organisation and functioning of nursery, primary and secondary schools, all of which contain provisions of the role to be played by CG and LG.

3.2.4.2. Health sector

The health sector is also regulated by a series of laws including Law No 30/2001 of 12/06/2001, establishing a medical council, Law No 62/2007 of 30/12/2007 on community health insurance, Law No 12/99 of 2/07/1999 governing pharmacies and pharmaceuticals, and Ministerial Order No 20/31 of 18/04/2012, determining modalities for the deployment of medical staff in the health sector. This law indicates the role of districts and the Ministry of Health in the recruitment and management of staff in the health system.

The districts are responsible for the administrative supervision of health facilities and the collection of essential indicators on health services, as well as ordering, storing and distributing drugs, vaccines and consumables and the providing of health services at district hospitals and health centres. The district health system (DHS) facilitates the collection of data, the sensitisation of communities on health issues and the maintenance of health equipment. The District Health Unit (DHU) ensures monitoring, evaluation and reporting on the status of health service provision in their areas.

3.2.4.3. Finance sector

The objective of fiscal and financial decentralisation is to provide LG with adequate resources and the necessary resource mobilisation powers to implement their functions. This is provided for by the Constitution and various laws and ministerial orders. As far as fiscal decentralisation is concerned, Article 167 of the Constitution, Paragraph 4, states that a law shall determine the manner in which the government transfers powers, property and other resources to decentralised entities”.

The legal text comprises Law No 17/2002 of 10 May 2002 on taxation and local government revenue that was enacted with the aim of providing local governments with an effective financing, tax collection and financial management system. In this law, the financing of local governments' activities is expected to come from fiscal transfers from the central government to the Common Development Fund (CDF). The government also enacted Law No 20/2002 of 21/05/2002 establishing the Community Development Fund, which was conceived to support development projects at district level by considering local priorities and respective districts' financial capacity for raising funds. Article 150 of this law provides that the government shall allocate 10% of its national domestic revenue to the CDF (Law No 20/2002 of 21/5/2002), and 3% is given directly to the district's own account to support its ordinary budget.

Law No 33/2003 of 10/05/2002 establishes sources of revenues for the districts, detailing different decentralised taxes and how they are to be levied, collected and managed. This law is complemented by Law No 25/2005 of 04/12/2005 on tax procedures, which guides tax collection, Ministerial Orders No 001/2010 on procurement and disposal of assets and No 002/2007 on tax procedures also provide guidelines..

Article 20 of Law No 08/2006 of 24/02/2006 indicates further that the district council has the responsibility of establish laws, regulations, and procedures for revenue collection, management of assets and property, and approves the district action plan and budget. Articles 67, 80, 82 and 86 of the same law highlight that the district executive committee is the only authority responsible for fiscal and financial decentralisation in resource mobilisation, management, reporting and auditing.

In addition to the legal instruments outlined here, Organic Law No 37/2006 of 12/09/2006 on state finances and property, Law No 40/2008 of 26/08/2008 establishing the organisation of microfinance activities, Law No 25/2005 of 04/12/2005 on tax procedures and Law No 16/2005 of 18/08/2005 on direct taxes on income were also enacted to support the initiation of income-generating activities within local communities. How-

ever, despite the existence of all these laws, only the organic budget is explicit on the share of responsibilities between the central government and any given local government.

3.2.4.4. Infrastructure sector

The infrastructure sector in Rwanda covers five sub-sectors, namely energy, transport, habitat and urbanism, water and sanitation and meteorology. Each of these sub-sectors has its own regulatory texts such as the Road Act and the law establishing each of the subsector coordinating agencies – the: Rwanda Transport Development Authority (RTDA), the Rwanda Civil Aviation Authority (RCAA), Energy, Water and Sanitation Authority (EWSA), the Rwanda Habitat Authority (RHA), and the Road Maintenance Fund (RMF). The Road Act determines the types of roads and details the responsibilities of the CG and the district in their maintenance. The only link with decentralisation in Law No 52/2010 of 20/01/2011, governing civil aviation is stated in Article 32, requiring the RCAA to collaborate with districts in designing regulations and procedures with regard to the location and the maintenance of airdromes, their security and their use.

3.2.4.5. Agriculture sector

There are few legal texts regulating the agricultural sector, most of which are laws establishing its agencies. These texts do not address the relationship between the agencies and the decentralisation system. However this gap is filled by provisions in the document Strategic Planning for Agricultural Transformation and its implementation strategies, which call for collaboration with local governments.

3.2.4.6. Trade and industry sector

The trade and industry sector has more than 20 different legal texts such as the Companies Law, the Law on Arbitration of Commercial Matters, the Law on the Protection of Intellectual Property, the law regulating capital markets in Rwanda, the law on mortga-

ges, the law on security interest in movable property and the law on cooperatives. However, all these laws are neutral on sector decentralisation.

3.2.5. Rwanda fiscal decentralisation

The tasks under the fiscal decentralisation policy are to update and revise the legal framework and to build local capacity. Both reform and capacity building must be based on an understanding of the reality of district management.

3.2.5.1. Justification for Rwanda's fiscal decentralisation policy

Before the adoption of the present fiscal policy, the fiscal system was characterised by a narrow tax base, tax evasion, and static fiscal laws. The combined effect of that situation resulted in local governments being denied the needed funds, thus preventing them from keeping pace with changing economic situations. The following observations were made before the adoption of the fiscal decentralisation policy (Minaloc, 2001):

3.2.5.1.1. Lack of financial management system

Financial decentralisation was justified by the fact that primary financial systems like a financial control system (internal and external audits) was inadequate for the increased responsibilities that were intended to accompany decentralisation (Ralga, 2006). With fiscal decentralisation, potential system improvements include accounting on an accrual rather than the current basis, separating revenue management (accounts receivable) from expenditure management (accounts payable), a programme-based budget structure and process, and strengthening the audit function.

3.2.5.1.2. Problem of development budgets

Development budgets include items for district administration like vehicle purchases and building renovations, or social investments like school and health centre construction. In his research, Smoke (2000) pointed out that in the process of local capacity develop-

ment in Rwanda, the development budgets did not reflect a strategic approach to capital investment planning nor integration with the community development committee planning process.

Without underestimating the importance of social investments, district projects did not reflect any connection with local economic development, strategies that would provide support for the private sector, job expansion primarily and secondarily, local tax base expansion. Fiscal decentralisation in Rwanda was also justified because (Smoke, 2000):

- the general level of resources was low and there were wide disparities in revenue mobilisation among districts that was due to primarily differences in economic base;
- districts was still exploiting diverse revenue sources that corresponded to the unique economic characteristics of each district and provided for in the legal framework; and
- the district revenue base was very narrow and major economic activities within the district's jurisdictional areas was not subject to local taxation and so did not contribute directly to local income.

These observations constituted the guide for the formulation of an appropriate fiscal decentralisation policy that was needed for an effective resources mobilisation with the aim of adjusting the means to the communities' planning.

3.2.5.2. Objectives of Rwanda's fiscal decentralisation

The adequacy of resources is indeed the function of the service responsibilities that are devolved to local governments and of the efficiency by which they deliver those services. In adopting this policy of fiscal decentralisation, the Government of Rwanda had the following objectives (Minaloc, 2001):

- to foster local management responsibility;

- to ensure resources for equitable development across local governments; and
- to build an efficient resource base for local governments.

3.2.5.3. Specific fiscal decentralisation strategies

Fiscal decentralisation is particularly complex because it is linked to the politically sensitive issue of fiscal distribution. To steer the country towards full fiscal decentralisation, the government has prioritised supporting strategies (Minaloc, 2001).

3.2.5.3.1. Expanding the local government's own source revenue base

Expanding own source revenues includes providing local governments with greater rate-setting authority and shifting source revenues that are currently allocated to the central government. Further, local government involvement in identifying the tax base will help to improve revenue mobilisation. This is because tax agents in their localities are in better position to know who should pay tax and the capacity of taxpayers to pay than a person at the centre. In this policy, it is hoped that this plan will achieve its objective by taking these strategic actions:

- expanding districts' own source revenue by creating a tax-sharing arrangement on value-added tax (VAT);
- providing districts with more authority in establishing rates for local taxes, fees and licences;
- authorising local governments to levy and strengthen their ability to calculate fees based on service costs for all communal services; and
- establishing a local government property tax and transferring some taxes from the centre to local government.

The implementation of fiscal and financial decentralisation policy in Rwanda is intended to bring new functions and therefore new resource needs to districts.

3.2.5.3.2. Establishing a sustainable development finance system

When the current fiscal decentralisation policy was adopted in 2001, the districts' development programmes were funded either by small transfers from the central government's operating budget or by parallel donor funding. Clearly, this was insufficient in terms of satisfying social and economic development needs.

In fact, it was fundamental to FD the need to have consistent and coherent accounting systems at all levels of government to follow the fiscal year for the sake of consistency. According to Wright (2012), the ultimate objective was to ensure that sectoral planning and the budgeting process were coherent. In this process, districts are intended to build a development financing mechanism that combines lending, grants, communal budgetary contributions and community partners' contributions.

2.2.5.3.3. Supporting a local development budget

The policy of expanding own source revenue is intended to ensure a maximum volume of revenues for a district's operating budget, particularly in districts with a poor economic base which can still not generate sufficient transfers to development budgets to engage in the level of development investment that is required (Minecofin, 2002).

To support development projects, the Government of Rwanda has established a grant component to development finance, funded by a combination of intergovernmental transfers and donor support for the development fund. In addition to money raised from various sources – notably business licence tax, the issuing of certificates, rental property income *et cetera*; the central government transfers to districts 10% of their previous year's domestic revenue for use in development projects and 1.5% of the current domestic revenue for meeting part of their running costs.

3.2.5.3.4. Strengthening financial management and control system

Many elements contribute to sound financial management. Those elements include internal systems used within the local government, external controls that ensure that management performance is monitored and sanctions applied in the case of mismanagement, and the extent to which financial operations and performance are transparent to the public so that citizen can judge the quality and honesty of their officials (Goodfellow, 2011). In line with Bumbakare (2009), for these strategies to succeed, establishing a strong local government audit and inspection system have been found to be crucial, requiring:

- the creation of the position of internal auditor in each local government who reports directly to the district council;
- strengthening the periodic inspection capacity in all provinces; and
- making provision for periodic audits by the office of the Auditor-General.

Audit service is now one of the principal means through which proper financial management procedures are observed and public funds protected from mismanagement. Other strategic actions envisaged to support local financial management and control systems include:

- strengthening strategic planning capacity in local government;
- establishing a programme of service-based budgeting system for districts;
- strengthening district accounting systems and capacity by ensuring that systems are compatible with national standards, and preparing manuals of standard practice; and
- establishing legal requirements and operating procedures for public access to local government financial information.

3.2.5.3.5. Building human resource capacity

Building human resource capacity is critical for the success of the government's decentralisation policy. Capacity building is linked to several reforms within the system, mean-

ing that systems improvement includes first the designing of a new system policy and then building capacity at local level so as to implement the new system. The principal capacity-building topics that emerge from Rwanda's fiscal decentralisation policy appear in the table below.

Table 1: Topics in Rwanda’s fiscal decentralisation capacity building

Central level	Local level
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Local government financial analysis methods for policy analysis; – Sectoral decentralisation policy options; – Property tax models; – Development finance models; – Local government budgeting systems 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Budgeting and financial management; – Service fee analysis and awareness building; – Strategic planning for development; – Capital budgeting and project analysis

Source: Minaloc (2001), *Fiscal and Financial Decentralisation Policy*, Kigali, (p24).

Other mechanisms to support Rwanda’s fiscal decentralisation or skills building equally, include study tours, access to manual procedures and formal training using adult education techniques.

3.2.5.3.6. Defining a new role for central government

With decentralisation, the role of central ministries changes from direct service delivery, control or supervision of the local level to policy formulation, monitoring, and assistance to the local level. In terms of FD policy implementation, the Ministry of Local Government proceeds with continual legal framework revision as lessons about constraints or new opportunities are learned from its implementation (Minecofin, 2002).

3.2.6. Role players in the decentralisation process

The decentralisation implementation programme (DIP) is managed through six main structures. The role players and responsibilities are defined by Minaloc (2007) as follows:

3.2.6.1. National Decentralisation Stakeholders Forum

The National Decentralisation Stakeholders Forum (NDSF), chaired by the Minister of Local Government (Minaloc), is an annual platform for a wide range of stakeholders to review and discuss decentralisation policy implementation. Membership of the NDSF includes members and representatives of the legislative power, the executive and the judiciary, and of all central ministries and LGS, the Rwandan Private Sector Federation, civil society, universities, think tanks and research institutions. Development partners contributing to the implementation of the Rwanda Decentralisation Strategic Framework (RDSF) are associate members of the NDSF. According to the National Decentralisation Implementation Secretariat (NDIS, 2006), the NDSF meets once every six months (prior to the Programme Steering Committee meeting). Its aims and activities include:

- cultivating and assuring sustained political commitment for the implementation of decentralisation policy;
- reviewing the decentralisation policy and strategy and providing direction on how these could be strengthened;
- evaluating and where necessary agreeing on strategies to ensure the integration of decentralisation principles in all national reform programs; and
- monitoring RDSF implementation progress and challenges, including the strategic coordination of various initiatives, and deciding on the way forward, especially on fiscal and financial decentralisation issues.

2.2.6.2. Programme Steering Committee

The Programme Steering Committee (PSC), chaired by the Minister of Local Government, steers, oversees and supervises the implementation of the DIP. The PSC includes the ministries of finance and economic planning, labour and civil service, agriculture and animal husbandry, infrastructure, education, health and land and environmental protection (and other ministries as associated members), the Rwandan Association of Local Government Authorities (Ralga), and development partners involved in the implementation of the decentralisation programme. The PSC's main mission is to provide strategic advice and support for the coordination and harmonisation of all stakeholders' support to the DIP and serves as its decision-making body. The PSC meets at least once every six months and has responsibility for:

- mobilising adequate resources for DIP implementation;
- reviewing DIP work plans and approving detailed six-month plans; and
- reviewing and advising on strategic inputs to the DIP such as new policies, coordination mechanisms and financing arrangements (Minaloc, 2011).

2.2.6.3. Rwanda Governance Board

The Rwanda Governance Board (RGB) is an agency which operates under the Ministry of Local Governance and reports to the PSC. It provides secretariat services to both the PSC and the NDSF. RGB is responsible for the daily management and coordination of DIP implementation. The mission of RGB in relation to the Decentralisation Implementation Programme (DIP) is to:

- identify, coordinate and harmonise the actions and activities of all stakeholders contributing to DIP implementation, including specialised units for the implementation of decentralisation in the ministries of Finance and of Labour and Civil Service, decentralisation focal points in ministries and provinces, the private sector, the civil society and development partners;

- ensuring that the management and funding arrangements defined in the DIP are established, operational, efficient and effective;
- establishing and managing the DIP basket fund in line with the memorandum of understanding signed with contributing partners and in liaison with Minecofin;
- liaison with and support for government institutions in integrating the decentralisation process in their areas of responsibility, and in national reform programmes and policies; and
- monitoring and evaluating DIP implementation by ensuring that mandated missions, objectives, actions, and activities are adhered to; and adequately informing Minaloc and the PSC for effective decision-making (Minaloc, 2011);

2.2.6.4. Decentralisation focal points in ministries and provinces

Planning directors in ministries and provinces are designated to be focal points for decentralisation. These directors are associate members of the DC and provide support for harmonising and co-coordinating decentralised sectoral initiatives with the DIP. In relation to the DIP, the focal point is responsible for:

- providing RGB with information on DIP-related initiatives and funding to facilitate coordination and avoid duplication;
- facilitating DIP implementation in their respective areas of responsibility – including direct support to local governments;
- ensuring that their respective ministries fulfil their designated roles and responsibilities as envisaged within the DIP; and
- providing timely and relevant information to their representatives in the NDSF to support high-level decision-making with implications for the DIP (Minaloc, 2011).

2.2.6.5. Local Government Consultative Forum

The Local Government Consultative Forum (LGCF) is responsible for assuring the alignment of DIP interventions with core local government and community needs for de-

centralisation management support. It serves to exchange information and best practice between different levels of government and is convened twice a year in preparation for the NDSF (Ralga, 2008). Resolutions from these national meetings are disseminated to local governments and other lower levels of administration.

Local government staffs at all levels facilitate DIP activities in collaboration with implementing partners, including civil society and private contractors. They contribute to the monitoring and evaluation framework for the DIP through their engagement in the Joint Action Development Forums (JADF). They do so by reporting the progress of inputs and outputs in agreed formats to the RGB, facilitating and taking part in periodic field reviews and the annual joint reviews by all the DIP stakeholders.

3.3. Developmental local government strategies in Rwanda

Implementing the decentralisation policy in Rwanda is an integral part of the government's national development strategy as expressed in Vision 2020, the Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy (EDPRS), fiscal decentralisation and the Community Development Policy (Minaloc, 2004). The converging aim of all these programmes and policies is about developing and supporting a set of strategies which ensure that public and/or donor funds entrusted to local governments are allocated effectively and in a participatory manner to address local poverty-related problems and promote sustainable human development.

3.3.1. Rwanda Vision 2020 and Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy

The development process of Rwanda is geared by two other major policy documents. The first is a framework for Rwanda's development Vision 2020, presenting the key priorities and providing Rwandans with a guiding tool for the future. The second one is the EDPRS that seeks to address constraints towards achieving the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and the country's Vision 2020. It builds on achievements in human

capital development and promotes three interdependent flagship development programmes, notably sustainable growth for jobs and exports; Vision 2020 Umurenge Programme (VUP); and governance (Minecofin, 2007).

3.3.2. Community Development Fund to support development projects

The Community Development Fund (CDF) is a fund that was conceived to finance development projects at local level, to assure some efficiency and to facilitate to the CDC the coordination of their interventions. The source of funding for this national CDF is transfers from central government revenues, which are not less than 10% of national collections and support from donors, NGOs and twinning arrangements (Minaloc 2001).

It is worth mentioning that the CDC is not highly involved in the management and implementation of projects and investments financed by the Community Development Fund. This said, a significant number of projects are managed and implemented by local organisations, associations or grassroots community groups. In the DIP 2004-2008, CDF envisaged moving gradually from project funding to budget support of district development programmes (DDP). It was expected that provincial staff would support DDP to validate the technical content of the plan and the proposed projects, verify the linkage with the relevant district development objectives and the inclusion of crosscutting issues (Minaloc, 2004).

As stipulated by Rwanda's decentralisation policy, the various technical ministries are responsible for the elaboration of sectoral policies, the specification of quality standards to be followed in the process and assuring that they are respected (Minaloc 2001). Besides this regulatory role, it is intended that the technical ministries shall act as facilitators in the development of human resources, the transfer of technology to local governments. As observed, sectoral policies are being reviewed so as to be in harmony with the current decentralisation policy and to promote effective and sustainable participation by residents in their own development.

3.3.3. Vision 2020 Umurenge Programme

The Vision 2020 Umurenge Programme (VUP) is an innovative pro-poor growth programme initiated by the GoR by using the existing decentralisation system and leveraging technical and financial assistance to alleviate the rate of extreme poverty by the year 2020 (Minaloc, 2007). To release the productive capacities of people, the initiative builds on past experience which has shown that isolated interventions by sector ministries, donors and NGOs was not sufficient to lift people out of extreme poverty in a cost-effective and sustainable fashion.

The other extreme recourse to integrated development has also shown its limits in many circumstances. One of the main limitations of both isolated and integrated approaches has been the failure to address two of the most important insights of economics: i) resources are scarce and ii), people respond to incentives. In view of this, Litvack *et al* (1998) suggest that when resources are scarce compared with popular needs choices must be made. However, Azfar *et al* (1999) contends that when choices are made for people (*e g* centralised planning), there are risks of not satisfying them or distorting local incentives, and this generally leads to waste of resources. When choices are made by residents (*e g* participatory mechanisms), these risks are alleviated, but the incentives may not be compatible with the stated aim of eradicating extreme poverty.

The GoR believes that so as to capture these insights, the VUP intends to balance the central guidelines for socio-economic transformation (*i e* economic growth, job creation and extreme poverty eradication) with local participatory mechanisms. This intends to make the best possible use of scarce resources while at the same time, ensuring adequate local incentives for sustainable progress (Minaloc, 2007).

3.3.2.1. Key VUP objectives

The central principle of the VUP is the release of productive capacities of the poor so as to lift them out of extreme poverty in a cost-effective and sustainable way by improving

service delivery. According to RLDSF (2007) this aim will eventually be achieved through an acceleration in poverty reduction along the following key objectives:

- releasing the productive capacities of people and offering solutions adapted to their needs;
- improving community livelihood assets (e.g. ecosystem rehabilitation) and ensuring their sustainable usage; and
- increasing the targeting of social protection to the most vulnerable.

In general, VUP is driven by three main forces. Firstly, it releases the productive capacities of people and improves community assets resulting in the creation of off-farm opportunities because land scarcity inevitably induces people to seek alternative sources of income, thus creating employment opportunities.


Secondly, money from salaries, credits and direct support go directly into the pockets of the residents and so foster the monetisation of the economy. The money is expected to be used in buying more goods and services or increase savings. Finally, it is expected that such social protection contribute in improving the effectiveness of social protection for the benefit of many beneficiaries in an inclusive society (Minaloc, 2012).

3.3.2.2. Programme components

The VUP is organised around three components to implement client-based solutions (RLDSF, 2007):

Public works are planned using community-based participatory approaches and are intended to build productive community assets. As far as a participatory approach is concerned, Flint (2013) states that one of the government's expectations from decentralisation for poverty reduction is the creation of a framework that promotes bottom-up planning where communities decide what their development needs and priorities are, and take part in the design and implementation of development programmes based on their local needs.

Figure 3: Bottom-up information flows



At sector level, the JADF³ is the principal structure for coordination. This forum ensures the integration and harmonised development of planning and implementation by bringing together all organisations involved in development at sector level (CBOs, international partners, NGOs and various committees at grassroots level) to discuss development needs, agree on priorities and define strategies so as to ensure a coherent approach to development initiatives based on demand rather than supply. It is believed that when such benefits are clear, the community is incentivised or have a vested interest in maintaining community assets, thereby ensuring sustainability (RLDSF, 2007).

Credit packages to tackle extreme poverty and to foster entrepreneurship and off-farm employment opportunities. These packages are designed to make the best possible use of scarce public resources, involve the private financial sector, and provide people with incentives to improve their own productive capacities.

Direct supports to improve access social services or to provide for landless households with no members qualifying for public works or credit packages. Such unconditional supports seek to expand health and education coverage as well as to encourage the development of appropriate skills, handicraft or social service activities.

The programme components are implemented through a set of projects designed and coordinated at sector level and implemented at village level. Both programme components and projects are linked to technical specialists in sector ministries. This also provides strategic direction and priorities, as well as specific technical standards and policies.

³ The Joint Action Development Forum (JADF) was established by Ministerial Order No 04/2007 on 15 July 2007 as a strategy for promoting interaction between district and sector organs with representatives of private sector and civil society organisations.

3.3.2.3. *Expected future of VUP*

According to RLDSF (2007), the VUP conjectures that a combination of land credit, land labour and labour credit mechanisms is used continuously in alleviating the extreme poverty trap:

- **Land credit** describes the obvious requirement of identifying landowners and fostering their access to finance for buying inputs (*i e* seeds, fertilisers, pesticides and so on), investing in land improvement (*i e* terracing, irrigation, soil preservation and the like), or purchasing machinery and equipment so as to increase yields through credit packages.
- **Land labour** describes the requirement of identifying workers and hiring them for improving the value potential of land (*i e* managing watersheds, agro-forestry, road building, schools, health centres, training centres, village settlements and so on) through public works.
- **Labour credit** describes the requirement of identifying workers who can turn into entrepreneurs with access to finance to invest in business assets that enable the creation of job opportunities for others, through credit packages.

In the spirit of EDPRS, public investments at local level are targeted so as to induce the expansion of private investments, particularly in rural areas. Hence, beyond the critical success factors identified above, agricultural transformation, land and infrastructure management under the responsibility of the central government and districts can directly influence the degree of success of the VUP (IPAR, 2011). In a study conducted by Berglund (2012) she contended that the success of VUP would depend on the ability to properly identify the needs of those who at present have little control over the forces that condition their lives, and matching better between clients' needs and the solutions offered. Such client-based approach is usually uncommon in public programmes.

Practically, each village under a pilot sector produces a grouping of households according to landholding and ability to work with preferences to supply labour on- or off-farm.

The landless unable to work become the prime targets for direct support whereas the “above poor” who engage specifically in activities that create jobs for others is also targeted with specific entrepreneurial credit packages to allow them to become responsible employers for the benefit of the community. It is in fact, a central concern of VUP to ensure that the women and the youth are well represented as they make up the greatest proportion of the country’s productive capacity.

3.4. Community involvement in development process

The major value added by the decentralisation policy to the development process is the creation of community development committees. To ensure this, the policy provides for mechanisms to ensure that they are involved and allowed to manage their affairs in the development process. The Government of Rwanda acknowledges that local communities themselves are most suited to identify their development needs and potential, have better experience and knowledge about their environment and could initiate development activities that address their known needs. In this respect, the grassroots administration structures put in place by Presidential Decree No 3/01 of 23/12/1998, which created councils and executive committees for cells and sectors.

So that residents can be involved effectively in their development activities, Ministerial Regulation No 22/07.04/1 of 31/3/1999 was promulgated to give effect to and details on how to enforce the presidential decree mentioned above. District administrative structures are managed by an executive committee and comprise two sub-committees: the politico-administrative committee (PAC), and the community development committee⁴ (CDC) which is the technical organ of community development. In its daily activities, the CDC reports to the executive committee, which studies the positions in its turn. After examination and approval by the council at that level, it subjects it to the superior level for appropriate continuation.


⁴ CDCs are organs of local councils at all levels of local government which are responsible for coordinating community development activities.

3.4.1. Community development committees


The Constitution of the Republic of Rwanda 2003 states that decentralised entities shall be the basic foundation of community development.⁵ In this respect, the decentralised organ that embraces the domains which are beyond election of political leaders to include socio-economic decision-making in particular and community development in Rwanda is its community development committees (CDCs) which have their origin in the Community Development Policy of November 2001. According to Sekhar (2000) people's participation in their own development is the fundamental element of community development and the main solution on which all the other solutions depend in fighting poverty in a comprehensive way.

In Rwanda, the community development committees that exist at different levels of local government include all actors in the community. The composition of the CDC at district level comprises: the council executive committee, the district executive secretary; the chairpersons of CDCs at sector level, the women and the youth representatives at district level, the representatives of the joint action development forum (JADF) comprising representatives of NGOs and private business enterprises at district level. The diagram below illustrates the interrelationships between the various actors and the CDC.

Figure 4: Actors of community development in Rwanda local governance



⁵ Article 167 of the Constitution of Rwanda states that all public services shall be decentralised in accordance with the provisions of the law on the organization of community development.



Source: Republic of Rwanda (2012). National decentralisation policy. Minaloc, Kigali.

The way the CDC operates is that the different actors in development channel their ideas, technical assistance, project proposals and resources to the community development committees which, in collaboration with those actors, develop them and make proposals for decision-making to the council through the executive committees. Normally, the decision of the council is communicated back to those actors for purposes of implementation and each actor implements the activities relating to their specialisation and domain of operation.

Monitoring-evaluation and control of activities are co-coordinated by the CDC with the support of the community and other development partners. Kauzya (2007) remarks that in the interrelationship among the actors at local level in the process of planning for socio-economic service delivery and development in Rwanda, the CDC has enabled the local population to own their development destiny and to learn that local government is something beyond enforcing laws and regulations handed down from higher authority.

3.4.2. Home-grown participatory approaches

Local governments have the role to find within themselves ways to make their settlements more sustainable and build social conditions favourable for development (DPLG

1998). Considering Rwanda's cultural heritage, various programmes were adopted to tackle key development issues by engaging the people and ensuring accountability in governance.

Approaches drawn from the Rwanda traditional system and incorporated in the community development process include: the *Imihigo* Performance Contract containing development targets for the district during a given period; *Ubudehe*, a collective action of solidarity and mutual help which the government has adopted as an appropriate approach to fighting poverty at community level, and *Gacaca*, a traditional community-based justice system. *Gacaca* has played a key role in rendering justice in the aftermath of the 1994 genocide and the social dislocation caused by its effects.

3.5. Presentation of Gasabo District

The Gasabo is one of the three districts of Kigali City which constitute one of the 30 local entities formed after the February 2006 administrative reform. It is in the north-east of Kigali, the capital of Rwanda. It is bounded in the south by Kicukiro District; in the north by the districts of Rulindo and Gicumbi; to the east, by the district of Rwamagana and to the west by the Nyarugenge district.

The district's surface area is 429 266km², characterised by a dual nature of rural and urban zones. The rural zone represents over 90% of the surface of the district, with 66% of the entire population. This situation affects the pace of the district's urbanisation and development efforts negatively (Gasabo District, 2007).

3.4.1. Vision and mission

This five-year DDP provides a roadmap for the district's implementation of its priorities and policies. The district's vision incorporates the national aspirations of underpinning economic growth and reducing poverty. The district mission is: "To promote democracy as a base for development and promote the unity of the population so that they can de-

velop themselves and subsequently develop the district.” As a decentralised administrative entity having a legal personality and financial autonomy, Gasabo District is administered politically by those structures deemed necessary.

3.4.2. Demographic characteristics

The preliminary results of the fourth population and housing census (EICV, 2012) indicated that Gasabo District has a population of 530 907, representing 46.8% of the total population of Kigali City (population 1 135 428) and 5% of the country’s total population (10 537 222). More detailed population distribution by sector is indicated in the table below.

Table 2: Gasabo District population size and population density

Sectors	male	female	total	density (km²)
URBAN SECTORS				
Kacyiru	19 844	17 054	36 898	6 380
Kimihurura	11 184	9 520	20 704	4 083
Kimironko	33 398	25 914	59 312	5 234
Gisozi	23 136	20 939	44 075	5 308
Gatsata	19 346	20 073	36 897	6 128
Remera	23 531	111 051	43 424	5 977
Sub-total	130 259	111 051	241 310	
RURAL SECTORS				
Bumbogo	17 926	17 965	35 891	592
Gikomero	7 958	8 608	16 566	473
Jabana	16 422	16 970	33 392	918
Jali	11 998	12 987	24 985	669

Kinyinya	29 740	27 445	57 185	2 364
Ndera	20 954	20 831	41 785	830
Nduba	12 265	13 381	25 646	551
Rusororo	18 291	17 924	36 215	693
Rutungu	8 529	9 403	17 932	420
Sub-total	144 083	145 514	289 597	
General total	274 342	256 565	530 907	1 237

Source: NISR, Population and Housing Census, 2012

Gatsata, Kimironko, Kimihurura and Kacyiru sectors, which have high population density compared with the other sectors, are either urban or predominantly slums. On the other hand, the RGPH and EICV data indicate that the population of Gasabo district is predominantly made up of young people, the proportion of those aged 45 or less standing at 80%. This is indicative that a large number of people are migrating from rural areas to urban centres.

3.4.3. District development plan

A district development plan (DDP) is a framework that provides a source of reference for district priorities and interventions under the country's development themes of; economic transformation, rural development, accountable governance, productivity and youth employment (Gasabo District, 2013). This DDP is, for the district, a planning tool that guides the district in achieving its goals such as economic transformation and poverty reduction.

As stipulated by the EDPRS (2013), DDPs should consider the country's medium- and long-term aspirations as stipulated in the country's Vision 2020, and the medium-term Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy (EDPRS) the overall objective

of which is to increase the quality of life of all Rwandans through rapid and sustainable economic growth (11.5% a year) and accelerated poverty reduction (<30% by 2018).

3.4.4. District development priorities

Gasabo District considers five priorities to be the cornerstone of the district's economic transformation, at the same time providing a level field for private sector development and job creation. The five priorities are:

- improving the quality of rural and urban road network and connectivity ;
- improving urbanisation settlement (as per Gasabo's master plan);
- promoting private sector participation by providing a conducive environment;
- increasing access to electricity and use of other energy sources;
- improving youth skills and knowledge through TVET education (Gasabo DDP, 2013).

Under decentralisation enhancement, the identified key priorities are expected to increase the quality and timeousness of services provided at all district administration levels and significantly increase the district's credibility and accountability to stakeholders, and ultimately improving governance.

3.4.5. Administrative structures

The Republic of Rwanda is divided into provinces, districts, sectors, cells and villages.

3.4.5.1. Responsibilities of the central government

The central government is responsible for all functions that have a national dimension; the rest have been devolved to local governments. Services delivered by the central government include:

- formulation of sectoral policies and regulatory framework;
- monitoring whether the implementation of sectoral policies and regulations is respected and follows the laid-down procedures;

- management of national institutions;
- coordination of all national and regional projects;
- assisting local governments in mobilising and managing local resources.

3.4.5.2. Responsibilities of the provinces

The province serves as a coordinating arm of the central government to ensure the efficiency and effectiveness of the central government's planning, execution and supervision of decentralised services. The functions of the line ministries, formerly represented by agents, have now been taken over by the governor, who has the overall responsibility of supervising service delivery system. Activities that are now delivered by provinces are (Minaloc, 2006):

- coordination and supervision of policy implementation from line ministries, organised in six departments: Health; Gender and Social Affairs; Agriculture, Livestock and Forestry; planning and Finance; Economic Development and Infrastructures; Education, Youth and Sports; and Political Affairs and Territorial Administration;
- provincial security;
- supervision of the service delivery system in the districts.

The provincial administration is primarily responsible for ensuring that local government development planning is in line with national policies; and promoting the province's socio-economic development (Ralga, 2006). Employees of line ministries who worked at provincial level under the supervision of their respective ministries have been integrated into the provincial administrative structure. This embraces all provincial employees in the same structure and supervision.

3.4.5.3. Responsibilities of the district

The district is a legal decentralised entity, responsible for overall coordination of economic development and ensuring the coordination of planning, financing and implementing service delivery to all local government levels. Under Article 2 of the District Act, the district enjoys legal status and has administrative and financial autonomy. Gasabo District has 15 sectors, 73 cells and 501 villages as a result of merging the previous districts of Gasabo, Kacyiru, Gisozi and Kabuga. In matters of decision-making, it has a district council, a legislative body at district level, comprising:

- all councillors elected to represent sectors at district level;
- one-third of it must be women representatives from the district's sectors;
- one-third of it must be youth representatives from the district's sectors.

The district council is the only body entrusted with decision-making for the district. It is assisted by the district executive committee (DEC), responsible for the district's administration and the execution of all decisions taken by the DC. The DEC comprises:

- the mayor, who is its chairperson and the political head of the district;
- the vice-mayor for finance and economic development, who stands in for the mayor in his absence;
- the vice-mayor for social affairs.

To separate the district's political and administrative affairs, there is a district executive secretary to manage and supervise the district's technical units. Services that have been decentralised to districts include the provision of clean (safe) water, the inspection of education, revenue collection, health services and sanitation, urban planning, agriculture and veterinary services.

3.4.5.4. Sector level

Under decentralisation the sector is meant to be a centre for day-to-day service delivery. The sector coordinates the activities of its cells, which are the basic politico-adminis-

trative units of the country where local people's problems, priorities and needs are identified. Services like registration of births and marriages, provision of national identity cards, issuing of marriage, birth, and death certificates are expected to be provided by sectors rather than by the district. The celebration of civil marriage is organised and birth registration and certificates delivered at the sector level. Most sectors have a permanent employee, the executive secretary.

3.4.5.4. Cell and village levels

Cells and villages are lower administrative structures that are closer to the grassroots population and are have councils and executive committees that execute decisions taken by their councils. According to the 2006 official government gazette, the cell is a mobilisation and development entity in which basic services are delivered and coordinated between village and sector. The most noticeable services delivered at cell level include the identification and selection of very poor citizens to be supported, as recommended by the village leaders. The cell coordinator issues also recommendations to citizens seeking services at the sector.

Conclusion

A step has been taken to create an environment conducive for sectoral decentralisation. The legal and regulatory framework was implemented, policies and strategies adopted and resource transfer mechanisms to local government devised. According to Rwanda's decentralisation policy, the various technical ministries are responsible for the elaboration of sectoral policies, the specification of quality standards to follow in the process and the assurance that they are respected. Sector policies are being reviewed so as to be in harmony with the present decentralisation policy, which is regarded as a major guideline towards effective and sustainable participation of the citizenry in their own development.

Besides this regulatory role, the technical ministries act as facilitators in the development of human resources and the transfer of technology to local governments. More specifically, Minecofin as a lead ministry in national planning, together with Minaloc, should play an increased role in the coordination of the planning process to ensure sound and timely planning consultation between other ministries and districts.

CHAPTER 4

RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY

4.1. Introduction

Undertaking research on the influence of decentralisation and community development requires using a variety of research methods and techniques to ensure accuracy and objectivity. A research methodology is required in any empirical study due to its relevant contribution in designing the procedures and techniques of data collection with the aim of achieving the research objectives. The use of appropriate research methodology enables the researcher to choose and apply techniques which are suitable for addressing the research questions. So this chapter intends to clarify the research design and the target population survey instruments, and presents procedures and methods for data collection and analysis that are used in this study.

4.2. Research design

A research design is indispensable for a research project. According to Krishnaswami (2011), a research design is a logical and systematic plan prepared for directing a research study. It specifies the objectives of the study, the methodology and techniques to be adopted for achieving the objectives. As Seltiz *et al* (1969) describe, a research design is the arrangement of conditions for collection and analysis of data in a manner that aims to combine relevance to the research purpose with economy of procedure.

The decision in respect of the data to be collected, the sample to be selected, the manner in which the collected data which constitute the trunk of the research design are to be organised *et cetera*, must be based on good grounds. In this view, Nachmias & Nachmias (1976) state that a research design gives the essentials of a good research design. These are:

- a plan that specifies the objectives of the study;

- an outline that specifies the sources and types of information relevant to the research questions;
- a blueprint specifying the methods to be adopted for gathering and analysing the data;
- a scheme defining the domain of generalisability.

Krishnaswami (2011) writes that without a pre-drawn plan, a research becomes an unfocused and aimless empirical wandering, as the researcher would find it difficult and time-consuming to make adequate discriminations in the complex interplay of factors before him, may not be able to decide which is relevant and which is not, and may get lost in a welter of irrelevancies.

Considering the nature of this study, analysing the influence of decentralisation on community development requires using both qualitative and quantitative approaches so as to corroborate and complement findings. Both approaches are relevant since quantitative research is about testing theories, whereas qualitative research develops theories.

4.2.1. Quantitative approach

According to Cress (1994), quantitative research is about testing a theory composed of variables, measured with numbers and analysed with statistical procedures to determine whether the predictive generalisations of the theory hold true. The major purpose of quantitative research is to make valid and objective descriptions of phenomena by manipulating variables.

Quantitative studies maintain objectivity in their data analysis by conducting predetermined statistical procedures and using objective criteria to evaluate the outcomes of those procedures (Leedy & Ormrod, 2005). Statistical treatment of data through the use of descriptive and inferential means is used to determine whether significant relation-

ships or differences exist. The findings are then generalised to the population (Taylor 2000).

This study used a survey method that is quantitative by nature. This involved a broad quantitative survey of role-players on decentralisation policy and community development in Gasabo District by using a self-report questionnaire designed to explore how the decentralisation policy contributes to community development.

4.2.2. Qualitative approach

The qualitative approach refers to research that elicits participants' accounts of meaning, experience or perception and is concerned with understanding the subjective exploration of reality from the perspective of an insider. It is also designed to explore the human factor and cause-and-effect nuances and is best suited to accommodating factors that cannot be translated into number-based results (Fouché *et al*, 2002).

In qualitative research, a case study is a preferred research strategy to learn about how something happened and why it might have happened. Kuye (1997) highlights that case study researchers tend to work with qualitative evidence. Similarly, Nsingo (2004) asserts that a case study has the advantage of exposing the operational reality of organisations and allows one to bring out the strength and weaknesses of such organisations and enhance one's chances of engaging or suggesting remedial action for the organisations. For this reason, the use of data sources like text books, articles, questionnaires and personal interviews with various members was used to record the historical development of decentralisation policy and its influence on community development in Rwanda in general and in Gasabo District in particular.

The interviews were intended to give the researcher an opportunity to explore issues of decentralisation policy and community development more openly from the respondents' own perspective. Their views were used in the interpretation of the survey data.

4.2.3. Case study approach

The present research is conducted through an investigation which is grounded on a case study. Case studies involve in-depth, contextual analysis of similar situations in other organisation, where the nature and definition of the problem happen to be the same as experienced in the current situation. Case studies usually provide qualitative rather than quantitative data for analysis and interpretation (Sekaran, 2003). One of the advantages of this approach is the close collaboration between the researcher and the participant, while enabling participants to tell their stories (Crabtree & Miller, 1999). Through these stories the participants are able to describe their views of reality and this enables the researcher to better understand the participants' actions (Lather, 1992).

Concerning the current research, the investigator focused on the aspects of decentralisation and community development in Gasabo as one of the thirty districts of Rwanda. By circumscribing the research to Gasabo District, the researcher hoped to investigate and expose the dynamics and gaps between decentralisation discourse and the community development process in the district. This is underpinned by the fact that local entities in Rwanda are subject to the same legal framework, with the same structures, so allowing the researcher to undertake empirical investigation on one of them and generalise the findings without distorting reliability of the findings as indicated by (Okun, 2001).

With this approach, the researcher was able to identify the community development programmes and how they were planned and implemented. The researcher also came up with specific factors that hinder the effective implementation of decentralisation and community development in Gasabo district.

4.3. Study area and population

The Gasabo District constitutes the field of survey. The selection of Gasabo as a case study is obvious as its achievement with regard to performance contract targets is one

of the lowest. In Rwanda, performance contracts are considered to be the development and service delivery framework that was conceived to elaborate and implement realistic development programmes at local level in such a way that they are linked to national development priorities. The performance contract evaluation of 2012 placed Gasabo District at the bottom of the ranking, taking 29th place out of Rwanda's 30 districts.

This poor performance was attributed to the district authorities' failure to implement effectively and involve its residents in development programmes (Ngendahimana, 2013). So it made sense for the researcher to choose Gasabo District as a case study. With this in mind, the researcher wanted to find out whether the decentralisation policy was keeping the promise of providing mechanisms for empowering communities appropriately. Other criteria included these facts:

- Gasabo was the first among the three districts of Kigali City in which the VUP pilot project started in 2008;
- it comprises mainly urban sectors but also purely rural sectors that lack basic infrastructure. So this ambivalence makes the situation of services difficult in sectors of rural areas where the residents' attitudes and expectations are different from those of the urban population in terms of needs and priorities.
- the intention of learning the extent to which community development projects – funded either by the government through the Local Government Development Support Fund (Loda) or by other actors (donors and NGOs) – were under the district's direction succeeding in meeting the real needs of the local population and reducing poverty.

The survey in the district was conducted by direct consultation with different categories of people concerned with community development through the implementation of the decentralisation policy and the VUP in the district. The people concerned are district officials (councillors and staff), CBOs members working in the district and citizen beneficiaries of any VUP support that uplifts their life conditions.

4.3.1. Units of analysis

A social research project involves decisions about how to select data from various sources. When data is obtained separately from a number of individuals or social units, the researcher chooses to take either the whole population or select a sample from it. According to Blaikie (2003), a sample is a selection of elements from a population such that such elements could be used to make statements about the whole population.

Given that the population concerned with the implementation of decentralisation policy is broad and composed of various categories of people, judgmental sampling was used to choose the population to investigate. Krishnaswami & Ranganatham (2014) state that purposive sampling, also known as judgment sampling, means deliberate selection of sample units that conform to certain pre-determined criteria. This involves the selection of cases which the researcher judges as the most appropriate for the given study, depending on his objective judgment.

The basic assumption behind such judgment or purposive sampling is that with the exercise of good judgment and appropriate strategy, the researcher can handpick the right cases to be included in the sample and so develop samples that are satisfactory in relation to one's research needs (Bhandarkar & Wilkinson, 2010). So the researcher exercises his judgment to include elements that are presumed to be typical of a given population from which information is to be sought. Black (1976) points out that judgmental samples that do not involve any random selection process are less costly and more readily accessible to the researcher.

In this research, the unit of analysis comprises three units of analysis, namely district officials (mayor, vice-mayors and councillors), development partners represented by members of NGOs operating in the district and citizens who have benefited in one way or another from the VUP actions through any kind of assistance from the district or sector with the aim of changing their living conditions.

The first category of people included in the survey were officials at district and sector levels, to whom questionnaires were administered for data collection. They included district executive committee members, councillors, executive secretaries and district employees. Their inclusion in this research was deemed relevant due to their mandate in the implementation of public policies, and especially their role in the monitoring, implementation and coordination of decentralisation and development activities in the district. Councillors were included because they represent their constituencies and so are supposed to have an array of information from satisfied and dissatisfied citizens.

Article 20(6) of Law No 08/2006 of 24/02/2006, determining the organisation and functioning of the district, states that the district council is responsible for decision-taking, policies and the giving of instructions (among many other things) on its approving the development plan; and adopting the district budget. Considering that not all public officials at district and sector levels occupy positions that allow them to have the same information about the decentralisation policy, judgmental sampling basing on the position occupied was used to include some employees to take part in the survey.

NGOs, as actors in the socio-economic development of the district, constitute the second category of the target population that was surveyed. Their inclusion is also based on the fact that the guiding document of Vision 2020 Umurenge provides that NBOs are crucial partners of the Government of Rwanda in development. Their inclusion in this research was justified by the fact that they contribute to the implementation of various development programmes. They occupy a privileged position and are able to interact with local communities since their community development activities contribute towards uplifting the community's standard of living. Given that NGOs are not homogenous, the selection of those which were surveyed was limited to those having development activities operating in more than two sectors of the district and recognised for their community development role in the district.

Residents of the district, as beneficiaries of district activities, make up the third category of people to be investigated through interviews. Because many of them are semi-literate and cannot easily write their opinions, their identification was guided by choosing people in the sector from associations or cooperatives which have benefited from VUP activities through their integration in any programme of public works or district allocation of direct financial support to start up an income-generating activity.

4.3.2. Sample size

As the district is divided into 15 sectors, the sample size was determined as follows:

Table 3: Determination of the sample

Category of sample	Composition	Size	Data collection instrument used
district officials	mayor (1), vice-mayors (2), directors (8), councillors (55), sector executive secretaries (15)	Eleven (11) district officials were selected	questionnaire
members of non-governmental organisations (NGOs)	The choice of NGO members by sector was based on those who belong to Joint Action and the Development Forum at district level.	Thirty (30) members of NGOs	interview
citizen beneficiaries of	Citizen beneficiaries of VUP activities in four pilot administrative	29 beneficiaries	focus group discussion

VUP activities	sectors where VUP operates.		
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The researcher selected 81 people to whom questionnaire were administered. This aimed at assuring that the data required in the research included key and influential persons in the process of decentralisation implementation and community development.

4.4. Techniques for data collection

This study combined methodological approaches to data collection, principally primary and secondary data. Primary data was collected through survey questionnaires and in-depth interviews, while secondary data was gathered through a literature survey of relevant textbooks and peer-reviewed journals, reports and legislation. This section details the research techniques of data collection employed in this investigation and outlines the research tools applied.

4.4.1. Structured questionnaire

Data were collected from 15 sectors of Gasabo District using a structured questionnaire. Respondents were chosen using the judgmental sampling technique. To conduct the survey, data were collected by administering a structured questionnaire that included both closed and open-ended questions.

Closed questions were formulated following the Likert-type scale. Black (1976) states that closed items are convenient and cost-effective when the research concerns a large number of respondents, while open items are particularly useful when the researcher has little or no information about the sample to be studied. Burns & Burns (2008) confirm that when responding to a Likert questionnaire item, respondents specify their level of agreement or disagreement on a symmetrical “agree-disagree” scale for a series of statements. So the range captures the intensity of their feelings for a given item.

During this first phase, a broad quantitative survey used a structured questionnaire designed to explore the extent to which decentralisation influences community develop-

ment was addressed to district officials. The questionnaire was elaborated to collect information around the following sub-variables:

- *democratic governance*: this sub-variable is based on the conviction that if well managed, democracy can influence socio-economic development because it promotes accountability, civil and political rights, property rights, free information flows and the rule of law, all of which are seen as preconditions for development.
- *participatory planning*: community development depends on ensuring that a society and all its people feel that they have a stake in it and are not excluded from its mainstream. In fact, such an environment ensures that the priority needs of citizens are integrated into development plans.
- *service delivery and socio-economic assessment*: questions around this sub-variable sought information about economic activities in which both this district and CBOs district are engaged and try to assess the quality of service delivery and its socio-economic outcome in citizens' living conditions.

4.4.2. Interview technique

The interview is the most widely employed technique of data collection in qualitative research. Interview technique is a discussion session involving a researcher and respondent, the emphasis being on questions and responses on a specific topic (Morgan 2002). Interviews provide a meaningful opportunity to study and discover the social world. According to Miller & Glassner (2003), interviews reveal evidence of the nature of a phenomenon under investigation. They state that the process includes the contexts and situations in which it emerges as well as insights into the cultural frames.

With the interview technique, the researcher engaged in one-on-one verbal interaction with some members of NGOs operating in Gasabo District. This was done to gain insight into their understanding and opinions on the realities pertaining to the decentralisation policy process and community development. Interviewing members of NGOs provided important input in exploring their role in the decentralisation and community

development process by focusing on their partnership with the district and how their development plans are integrated into the DDP. Interview sessions contributed towards ensuring that the researcher obtained additional information which could not be captured through the questionnaire since they offered an opportunity to some respondents to express their opinions more openly from their own perspective.

4.4.3. Focus group discussions

Powell *et al* (1996) define a focus group as a group of individuals selected and assembled by a researcher to discuss and comment on, from personal experience, the topic that is the subject of the research. Differing from the interview, a focus group relies on interaction within the group based on topics supplied by the researcher (Morgan, 2002). Kitzinger (2005) argues that the focus group method is an ideal approach for examining the stories, experiences, points of view, beliefs, needs and concerns of individuals. The method is especially valuable for permitting participants to develop their own questions and frameworks, as well as to seek their own needs and concerns in their own words and on their own terms.

Focus groups can be used at the preliminary or exploratory stages of a study (Krueger 1988); during a study, perhaps to evaluate or develop a particular programme of activities (Race *et al* 1994). As an instrument of data collection, focus group discussions are valuable in two main perspectives (Conradson, 2005). On one hand, they offer the researchers a means of obtaining an understanding of a wide range of views that people have about a specific issue, as well as how they interact and discuss the issue. On the other hand, they are valuable for obtaining an in-depth understanding of the numerous interpretations of a particular issue common to the research participants. The researcher conducted focus group discussions with groups of citizen beneficiaries of VUP in Gikomero, Nduba, Jali and Rutunga sectors. Discussions were useful in exploring and examining what people think about decentralisation policy and VUP as a development programme aiming to achieve goals of community development.

4.4.4. Documentary technique

In a research project, the documentary technique helps in reviewing existing concepts and literatures with the aim of identifying the latest developments on the topic and related areas and gives a holistic picture of the reality under research (Babbie & Mouton, 2001). In the same vein, Flick (2002) and Olsen (2004), point out that a research project should provide an overview of related concepts by reviewing their definitions and origins as well as their related policy applications, and by critically assessing both their conceptual coherence and their utility as alternative approaches to development.

To pursue this for the purposes of this study, information was collected from documentary sources (books, articles, journals and reports by institutions). Policy documents, legislation and reports which were available at the time of conducting the empirical study were used to ground the discussion. The documentary technique helped establish the points of view of other thinkers concerning the relationship between decentralisation and community development.

4.5. Data analysis

Both quantitative and qualitative thematic approaches were used as techniques for data analysis.

4.5.1. Quantitative approach

Concerning the quantitative approach, a statistical analysis was established about the variables contained in each question of all questionnaires using the Statistical Package for Social Science (SPSS) software. To this end, results were presented in a cross-tabulation format in which values in each cell of the table describe the combination of variables and determine their frequencies as well as percentages. Data analysis was done by engaging the following phases:

- setting up the database in SPSS;

- entering the data from questionnaires;
- verifying the accuracy of entered data;
- representing the results by means of tables and graphs; and
- interpreting the results as a basis of the findings.

For some variables, a ratio between the availability of development facilities and the total number of people is established to test the statistical relationship that could exist between these two variables to better understand the quality of service rendered to them. The same approach is used in comparing the budget available to implement development programmes in the district by year since 2006.

4.5.2. Qualitative analysis

Qualitative analysis consisted in analysing data collected from interviews, and official documents from the district on decentralisation policy and its influence on community development, and then analysing its adequacy, quality and effectiveness in terms of programmes and actions being carried out. Thus, condensation of the data was prepared. The main tool of condensation was the development of a coding system for various types of information obtained from interviews.

The aim of qualitative approach in this study is to establish the relationship between the implementation of decentralisation policy and community development in terms of improving the living conditions of people in Gasabo District through VUP. Babbie & Mouton (1998) maintain that “if one understands events against the background of the whole context and how such a context confers meaning to the events concerned, they can truly claim to understand the event”. From this point of view, responses from respondents were recorded and transcribed to analyse recurring features in terms of both content and how this content was expressed. This method allowed the researcher to achieve a progressive analysis, looking initially to associate a specific datum to its corresponding code.

4.6. Ethical considerations

Any research involving human respondents must conform to ethical considerations and adhere to the principles of validity and reliability. According to Ragin & Amoroso (2011), the researcher's concern for validity is seen in efforts to verify that the data collection and measurement procedures work as claimed. Validity together with reliability help the researcher to work accurately and objectively for the answers and evidence-based results observed on the field. McNabb (2004), in Mukamunana (2007), ascertains that research ethics refers to the application of moral standards to decisions made in planning, conducting and reporting the research studies and in particular four practical ethical principles that must be respected: truthfulness, thoroughness, objectivity and relevance.

With focus on research ethical requirements, the researcher first proceeded to obtain informed consent from all participants by communicating the research objectives, benefits and procedures to them. To avoid all form of bias, the researcher communicated to respondents that participation in the survey was voluntary and assured them that their opinions would be dealt with objectively for academic purposes only. In this way, the researcher guaranteed all participants confidentiality and privacy in the research. Because of this, the names of respondents were not mentioned on the questionnaire. This was explained to them and spelt out on the duly signed consent form.

To achieve the research objectives the researcher adhered to ethical standards as stipulated by Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University's (NMMU's) research procedures. He used tools for data collection that are elaborated below, to ensure a maximum of inclusiveness of required participants to collect reliable data in the domain of decentralisation and community development. The research used comprehensive research questions, techniques for data collection as well as a thoroughly designed methodology for data analysis. Before the researcher engages in a field survey, the University Ethics Committee checked the conformity of the research proposal to the university's prescribed ethical research policy and principles.

4.7. Validity and reliability

Patton (2001) underscores that validity and reliability are two elements that any researcher should consider while designing, analysing results and judging the quality of the findings of the study. Joppe (2000) defines reliability as the extent to which results are consistent over time and an accurate representation of the total population under study. This is referred to as reliability and if the results of a study can be reproduced under a similar methodology, the research instrument is considered to be reliable. He further states that validity determines whether the research truly measures what it was intended to measure or how truthful the research results are.

For testing the validity and reliability of the findings, the researcher self-administered the questionnaire and transcribed interview opinions that probed deeper understanding rather than examining surface feature matters in the process of implementing decentralisation policy. By doing so, he identified the exaggerations of certain respondents and hence avoided bias.

4.8. Limitations of the study

The researcher should face limitations related to extraneous factors which are beyond his control. Some of them were related to respondent's honesty, personality, lack of or inconsistency in statistical data, and uncontrolled development committees at different levels.

Despite the assurance of anonymity, some respondents were resistant to give needed information. Others attempted to provide only the positive aspects of the decentralisation process and some even completely refused to respond to the questionnaire.

The researcher tried to find solutions to these problems by arranging appointments with some of the district staff after working hours. In that environment, they could provide

information after being assured that the information needed would serve academic purposes only.

Conclusion

This chapter has discussed the research design and methodology according to which the research was conducted. The chapter has explained each phase of data collection and analysis, including the research design, sampling, data collection techniques and ethical considerations. As far as the research design is concerned, the researcher chose to use quantitative, qualitative and case study approaches. By using both quantitative and qualitative data, the researcher wished to corroborate and complement findings. The research design helped the researcher establish direction to the study and to know exactly what had to be done, how and when it had to be done at every stage.

In addition, the population and sampling procedures, data collection instruments and the survey were described. Concerning the tools of data collection, questionnaire techniques, individual structured and non-structured interviews, focus group discussions and documentary analysis were explained by focusing on their relevance for this study. The following chapter presents the research findings and discusses in detail the data collected by means of questionnaires, interviews and survey.

CHAPTER 5

PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS OF FINDINGS

5.1. Introduction

This chapter presents findings of the data gathered on the influence of decentralisation on the community development process in Gasabo District of Rwanda. It assesses the manner in which factors underpinning the decentralisation policy contribute to community development. As outlined in the preceding chapter, the empirical research techniques employed in this study are questionnaires, interviews and focus group discussion. Data collected were assessed, summarised and synthesised to produce the findings detailed in this thesis.

As indicated in the research methodology, to obtain data, a questionnaire was firstly administered to district officials. In total, 81 questionnaires were administered to district officials. Out of 81 questionnaires, 64 were filled in and returned, representing a response rate of 79.01%. As indicated in the chapter on research methodology, the questionnaire used a five-point Likert scale to rate the opinion of respondents to each question.

Responses with regard to the decentralisation and community development issues were assessed, summarised and interpreted according to their meaning. Presentation and interpretation were conducted concurrently and the researcher used graphs and tables to present the data in meaningful form.

Secondly, the researcher conducted interview sessions with members of NGOs operating in the district. The organisation of interviews helped in obtaining the desired information that was not provided in the questionnaire and enabled the researcher to understand the views of NGO members on how the decentralisation policy influences community development.

Thirdly, focus group discussions were organised with beneficiaries of direct VUP support, public works programmes or funds transfer in four pilot administrative sectors: Jali, Rutunga, Gikomero and Nduba. In total, 29 individuals took part into the discussion. With focus group discussions, the researcher transcribed the respondents' answers to each question and made a judgment of their meaning. This technique helped to draw on respondents' views and experiences about the implementation of the VUP and its effects in improving living conditions its beneficiaries.

5.2. Analysis of findings from district officials

The findings presented and analysed in this section were collected using a questionnaire that was administered to district officials – the mayor, vice-mayors, the district executive secretary, councillors, sectors executive secretaries and district employees.


5.2.1. Demographic characteristics of respondents

For any research to be successful, the researcher has first of all to study the targeted population and its characteristics. As far as this study is concerned, age, gender, level of education, qualifications of respondents and position held in the organisation were necessary to explore the roles of the respondents in the process of decentralisation and community development.

5.2.1.1. Gender of respondents

Identifying the respondents according to their gender is relevant in any research. Views of a man may differ from that of a woman because of their gender-related experiences. Gender distribution as one of the important characteristics of any population was studied during this research, first for the sake of collecting opinions from both men and women, and to explore whether both women and men were taking part in decision-making in Gasabo District. This information is disclosed in the figure below:

Figure 5: Distribution of respondents by gender



Source: Primary data, August 2014


The figure above shows that 61.9% of the respondents were men and 38.1% women. Even though men were the most represented, the results prove that views were collected from both men and women.

5.2.1.2. Age of respondents

Age as a characteristic of the population attracted the attention of the researcher since, in matters of community development, age is a determinant factor in understanding why some people of a specific age are active agents of development, so their involvement in the process comes into the picture.

Age is also a very important factor that a researcher considers in terms of the maturity of the opinions expressed. This defines real information required for the study. For this reason the researcher wanted to know the age bracket of respondents.

Figure 6: Distribution of respondents by age group




Source: Primary data, August 2014

The figure above shows that research data was gathered from participants aged 26 and older. In fact, 38.1% and 29.8% of respondents lie in the tranche age groups of 41 to 45 and 36 to 40. People in these age groups are normally aware of their involvement in development processes, whether as facilitators or beneficiaries of such development. This is a point which contributed towards ensuring that the study was able to solicit more reliable responses.

5.2.1.3. Education background of respondents

The respondents' level of education was also considered in this research. This was important because the education level of the respondents could contribute towards their understanding and interpretation of development and consequently, this might influence the accuracy and objectivity of respondents' responses. The individual's level of education influences his/her decision-making. For this research, the researcher wanted to know the education background of each respondent so that he could take it into account in the data analysis and interpretation.

Figure 7: Education levels of respondents



Source: Primary data, August 2014

The district's requirement for holding a technical post of responsibility is that a candidate must at least hold a bachelor's degree (for district executive committee members) and at least a secondary education (for district councillors). The results revealed that 14.9% and 67.9% of respondents respectively held masters' and bachelors' degrees while 15.5% of them had completed secondary education. This indicates that the research was conducted among people with an educational level that might allow one to obtain reliable information.

5.2.1.4. Respondents' areas of specialisation

Knowing the domains of specialisation of respondents is of primary importance in any research, as it helps the researcher to associate the respondent's expertise with the nature of services he or she is intended to deliver.

Table 4: Distribution of respondents by domains of specialisation

Areas of specialisation	Frequency	Percentage
Management (or related sciences)	21	30.4
Economics	4	5.8
Agriculture	1	1.4
Public administration	8	11.6
Health sciences	2	2.9
Engineering	4	5.8
Education	6	8.7
Humanities	14	20.2
Law & international relations	5	7.2
Communication	2	2.8
Travel & tourism management	1	1.4
Information and communication technology	1	1.4
Total	69	100.0

Source: Primary data, August 2014

Data in the table above reveal that respondents are from diversified areas of specialisation. This data show that employees who took part in this study were predominantly qualified in fields related to management and the humanities.

Data from the district human resource management department show that the district employs 235 out of a theoretical establishment of 469 (Gasabo District, 2014). The reason for this shortage arises from a lack of resources for remunerating employees. The district executive secretary said: “The most significant problem was to find suitable, qualified and importantly experienced technical staff in the areas of engineering, health,

agriculture and animal husbandry”.⁶ This statement is echoed by Goodsir *et al* (2009) when they state that during the recruitment process for local government positions, experienced candidates do not apply, and young university graduates had strong technical skills but a lack of knowledge of planning, monitoring and evaluating contracted work and in supervising projects in general.

5.2.1.5. Positions held in the district

Knowledge held by participants due to their current occupation was also relevant and important for the study. Hence information on the distribution of respondents according to their occupation was necessary for data analysis and interpretation.

Table 5: Distribution of respondents’ occupations

Positions of respondents	Frequency	Percentage
Mayor & vice-mayors	3	3.6
Sector executive secretary	11	13.1
Directors	5	6.0
District and sector councillors	43	51.2
District executive secretary	1	1.2
Planning officer	1	1.2
Health officer	1	1.2
Women council coordinator	1	1.2
Director of Programme	3	3.6
Capacity building officers	9	10.7
Monitoring & evaluation officers	8	9.5
Total	84	100.0

Source: Primary data, August 2014

During the survey, all categories of people concerned with decentralisation and with community development were represented considering the hierarchical organisational structure of the district. They range from the top management made up of the mayor


⁶ Interview with the district executive secretary, 14 September 2014

and two vice-mayors, district executive secretaries, district councillors to the second hierarchical line constituted by the district and sector executive secretaries and department heads. In NGOs, the survey was conducted with staff in charge of programmes, capacity building and monitoring & evaluation, representing respectively 3.6%, 10.7% and 9.5% of respondents.

5.2.6. Experience of respondents

The experience of respondents was taken into consideration in this research. This is because an answer from an experienced respondent can provide insight into the understanding and analysis of a phenomenon under study.

Figure 8: Distribution of respondents by years of experience



Source: Primary data, August 2014

From the figure above, it is observed that 52.4% and 27.4% of respondents have working experience of between one and five years, and six to 10 years. This is justified, based on the fact that most of the employees of the local government entities were recruited when Rwanda began the second phase of decentralisation in 2006. Working


experience of five to 10 years for most of the respondents was helpful in the provision of information relevant to the study from the work environment.

5.2.2. Administrative structures of the district

The administrative structure of the district aims at empowering people to take part in decision-making. These decisions are then the basis of planning district development programmes.

One of the key outcomes of the decentralisation policy was the establishment of new administrative structures and the creation of new organs, and in particular the district council. This new structure was mandated to implement policies and decisions on local governance and development by giving districts more power and focusing on development planning. Respondents were asked whether they considered the district's current administrative structure to be effective or in need of improvement to deal with the district's functions.

Figure 9: Are administrative structures of the district effective?



Source: Data collected, August 2014.

Findings revealed that 40.4% of respondents agreed strongly and 33.8% agreed that the new administrative structure of the district dealt effectively with the district's functions. However, 14.6% disagreed and 11.3% had a neutral position. At the district level, two separate but complementary organs were observed. These are district council (DC) and district executive committee (DEC) whose members are elected. Technical workers at district level, like the district executive secretary (DES), departmental directors and professional officers are recruited through competitive interviews.

The responsibilities of the line ministries, formerly represented by agents in the district, have now been taken over by the mayor, who has the overall responsibility of supervising the service delivery system. The district executive secretary said: "The change in the district administrative structure has contributed a lot in improving service delivery as the new organisational structure embraces all district employees in the same structure and supervision."⁷

Even though the new district administrative structure has contributed to the improvement of service delivery, it was observed that the district and sector councils as central organs in the decentralisation process have been facing conflicts between the elected district councillors on the one hand, and between some of them and the district executive committee or employees on the other hand. This situation recalls the observation by Foster & Mijumbi (2002) when they state that decentralisation, if not well coordinated, provides scope for differences and conflicts between the administrative and political wings of local governments, in particular as civil servants receive lower salaries and allowances.

A council member revealed to the researcher that there was poor collaboration between organs at the district and sector level, and that some of them operated as if they were separate. Ralga (2010) also revealed that the Kigali City Council, as the top organ in Kigali City, has more powers than the district councils. The decisions taken by the city

⁷ Interview with the district executive secretary, 14 September 2014.

council override those taken by the district council, so jeopardising working relationships. A councillor said: “Misunderstandings between the district and Kigali City Council on some programmes to some extent hinder the district’s performance in terms of delays in delivering services to the community and a loss of citizen confidence in the district authorities, which leads in turn to poor service delivery to the population.”⁸

The conflictual relationship undermined cooperation between the district’s organs, leading to the resignation of some officials and weakening the capacity of the district council and the district’s overall performance in the decentralisation and development process. Some of these conflicts were interest-based, or otherwise based on the educational levels of some members.


5.2.3. Prevalence of democratic values

Improving the governance and quality of democratic institutions, especially of decentralised governance structures and processes, and managing the changing roles of the state and other partners in development, is central to achieving national aims of reducing poverty, sustaining the environment and promoting human development.

As Larry (1995) posits that democracy promotes civil and political rights, property rights, the free flow of information and the rule of law, all of which are seen as preconditions for achieving socio-economic progress with a reasonable degree of social equity. He maintains that individual freedom will not prevail unless the institutions, both formal and civil, are free to facilitate the exercise of that freedom by the individual. In this view, the researcher wanted to know whether democratic principles were well established and whether citizen participation in decision-making was a living reality in the district. The figure below provides opinions on the democratic process.

⁸ Interview with a district councillor, 19 September 2014

Figure 10: Views of respondents on the respect of democratic principles




Source: Data collected, August 2014.

Findings obtained revealed that 31.5% of respondents agreed strongly and 34.6% agreed, while 15.4% disagreed and 8.1% disagreed strongly. From this view, it was noted that democratic values are not fully observed in the electoral processes of local entities.

5.2.3.1. Participation of citizens in development activities

It is the aim of this study to analyse whether decentralisation in Gasabo District offers opportunities to citizens in decision-making on political and socio-economic matters. Citizen participation empowers local communities and enables them receive and use the powers transferred to them. In this view, the researcher investigated whether the decentralisation policy had allowed citizens to take part in and exercise influence over development activities that affect their lives.

Figure 11: Opinions of respondents on citizen participation



Source: Data collected, August 2014.

The opinions of the respondents revealed that 46.3% of them agreed strongly with taking part in development activities that affect their lives. Also, 22.8% agreed, 16.6% disagreed and 14.4% were neutral on the matter of citizen participation. A staff member in the Department of Good Governance said: “The district has put in place mechanisms that promote citizen participation through the establishment of various committees at grassroots level. These members are proposed by citizens.”⁹ Among these committees are those responsible for community work, education, and community development, and have the role of mobilising people to take part in development activities affecting their lives.

In Rwanda, community works known as *umuganda*¹⁰ are regarded as the major strategy, among many others, of promoting citizen participation in local affairs. As defined in Article 2 of Law No 53/2007 of 17/11/2007, community works are a way of pooling the

⁹ Interview with a staff member in the Department of Good Governance, 28 August 2014

¹⁰ *Umuganda* is a traditional Rwandan practice and cultural value of working together to solve problems in a shorter time than it would take for an individual to solve them.

efforts of many people so as to implement an activity of public interest. Following the genocide, the government was faced with the task of reuniting the Rwandan people and rebuilding the nation. *Umuganda*, as a strong traditional practice, had an appeal for carrying out the new vision for the nation. The policy states that in Rwanda, *umuganda* aims at “promoting development activities and opportunity for friendliness and conviviality among people” (Official Gazette, 2008).


Findings of a study conducted by Uwimbabazi (2012) revealed that *umuganda* is seen to have made the population responsible for public facilities, helped them to live in clean surroundings, but also controlled citizens. As stated by the decentralisation policy, mobilising citizens to take part in affairs affecting them should take a two-pronged approach: one, sensitising the citizens on their right to participate, and two, mobilising and obligating local government leadership to create an environment conducive for citizen participation, dialogue and accepting criticism (Minaloc, 2012).

5.2.3.2. Accountability of leaders before the electorate

Governance structures that allow participation are expected to promote accountability between the government on the one hand and the people, together with civil society on the other, to show promise for good governance. Accountability operates in many different ways and is sought through a multiplicity of approaches, activities, and techniques.

According to Demmke (2006), accountability should involve a relationship between those who delegate responsibility (principal) and those who are entrusted to perform the delegated function (steward). The steward is obliged, as part of the relationship, to give an account of activities and performance, inquire into and remedy faults as well as repair deficiencies. If the democratic process requires political leaders and bureaucrats to comply with people’s expectations, the researcher wanted to explore the appreciation of public accountability of both elected councillors and district staff in Gasabo District.

Figure 12: Accountability has improved under decentralization process



Source: Primary data, August 2014.

With regard to accountability, 37.5% of respondents agreed strongly that accountability had improved at district, sector and cell levels. It was acknowledged that leaders had at least learnt to be accountable for their actions before the electorate, which had not previously been the case. Indicators of accountability of local leaders before the electorate that were highlighted include faithful compliance or adherence to legal requirements and efficient use of funds, property and other resources. In the event of failure to be in conformity with the demands of the local population, one is at risk of losing the post held.

A councillor said: “Decentralisation has allowed the district council to monitor district activities more closely and attributed changes in service quality to them more easily than it used be.”¹¹ In some sectors, some leaders were found to have lost their seats due to their being unaccountable to the electorate. The deposition of non-accountable

¹¹ Interview with a district councillor, 1 September 2014.

leaders is a positive outcome that decentralisation has brought in the eyes of the local population.

Another mechanism that ensures cooperation and strengthened coordination between spheres of government and enhances dialogue geared towards improving service delivery, transparency and accountability is the National Dialogue Council.¹² The researcher wanted to explore respondents' opinions on its contribution to sustaining the culture of accountability among local leaders. A councillor had this to say: "The national dialogue forum provides a platform for local government authorities to present their cases and seek support from central government ministries and departments and citizens are given opportunities to appreciate or criticise leaders for their excellent or poor performance."¹³

As its sessions are open to the general public, citizens are invited to comment and provide input through social media,¹⁴ so allowing leaders at all levels and the people at large to debate issues related to the state of the nation, the state of local governance and national unity. Its resolutions are shared with the relevant institutions to enable them to improve their services to the people.

5.2.3.3. Transparency in decision-making

Transparent decision-making is an important factor of any decentralisation process and it was important for this research to explore whether transparency and decision-making procedures were improved in Gasabo District. The district council meetings would be

¹² The National Dialogue Council is a constitutional obligation provided for in Article 168 (Amendment No 02 of 08/12/2005) and stipulates that this council shall bring together the President of the republic, members of the Cabinet and Parliament and representatives of the councils of local administrative entities annually to scrutinise the performance of local government leaders and council representatives for the preceding year.


¹³ Interview with a district councillor, 1 September 2014.

¹⁴ Proceedings are broadcast live on national radio and television. Members of the public also take part, using Twitter, Facebook, live telephone calls, cellphone texts and e-mails.

more productive if they were planned beforehand and all district council members need to ensure that they have read documents prior to meetings and have added relevant suggestions to the agenda.

Bearing in mind that before the advent of the decentralisation policy, the power of decision-making was in the hands of the mayor, the researcher wanted to know whether the decision-making process was now transparent and whether councillors played a role in setting the agenda of formal meetings.

Figure 13: Do councillors take part in setting the agenda for meetings?




Source: Primary data, August 2014

From the figure above, 60.3% of employees and district councillors appreciated the way in which decisions were now taken. During an interview, a vice-mayor contended that consultative decision-making in the district had contributed to an improvement in transparency in the setting of priorities for the district and its sectors. This was noticed in areas like education, where residents identify poor children to be sponsored by the government through the district education fund (DEF), funded by Minaloc. The parents of pupil beneficiaries are unable to pay school fees. It was also noted that all districts now had tender boards, so eliminating fraud in the selection of bids.

5.2.3.4. *Autonomy in decision-making*

With regard to autonomy, the researcher also wanted to know whether councillors were autonomous – that is to say, free from undue influence during the process of decision-making. The figure below shows respondents' views on this matter.

Figure 14: Are district councillors autonomous, independent and comfortable in decision-making?



Source: Primary data, August 2014

Sixty-four per cent of the respondents agreed strongly that in the process of decision-making, district and sector councillors were autonomous and comfortable. However, one councillor said: “The controlling power of the councillors and the general performance of the district council are sometimes undermined by the fact that the district council chairperson may have a dominant voice, especially when supported by other councillors of the same political party.”¹⁵ Despite all this, he appreciated the powers the decentralisation policy entrusted to the district council, as decision-making now fell within its competence and capacity.

¹⁵ Interview with a district councillor, 3 September 2014.

Another complaint from councillors was that the responsibility for planning the meeting and setting the agenda lay with the district executive committee. Sometimes, they said, meetings were organised and documents concerning the agenda were sent out the day before or even delivered only a few hours before the meeting. This, they said, did not allow them enough time to examine the documents so as to add relevant observations on the agenda.

It was also found that the autonomy of councillors was hampered by the council's composition. Most of the district councillors were teachers from various schools and medical practitioners based at different health centres in the district. As they are district staff, it is difficult for them to take part in council meetings as independent persons. This has a negative effect on their participation in taking sensitive decisions that might affect their supervisors adversely. A staff member may also fear to take disciplinary measures against his/her subordinate who is a council member for fear that he could use his influence as a district councillor to exact revenge.


According to Law No 08/2006 of 24/02/2006, determining the organisation and functioning of the district, the provincial governors have the responsibility of verifying whether district council decisions comply with the laws of the land. A councillor claimed that the Kigali City Council sometimes overrode district council decisions, which minimised its autonomy and powers.

5.2.4. Consideration of local development needs by councillors

The decision-making capacity rests with the district council and its executive committee. These organs are responsible for conducting meetings and the effective taking and implementation of decisions governing the policies and activities of the district development plan.

The responsiveness of councillors to local development issues is a key factor in maintaining the reputation of the district council among the residents and assuring that its policies match the needs of the district and its people.

Figure 15: Do district councillors put forward citizens' needs effectively?



Source: Primary data, August 2014.

From the figure above, the findings reveal that 31.1% agreed strongly, 38.9% agreed, 19.3% disagreed and 10.7% of the respondents were neutral regarding the role played by the district council in putting forward the needs of the electorate. Logically, district councillors are elected to represent their constituencies. However, a councillor said that once elected, councillors ceased to represent the constituency for which they were elected, but were seen as representing the whole population of the district. From this perspective, district councillors are not seen as being bound by commitments they could have made before the election or by instructions received from their constituents.


5.2.5. Fiscal and financial decentralisation status of Gasabo District

Financial responsibility is a core component of decentralisation. If LGs are to carry out decentralised functions effectively, they must have an adequate and predictable flow of income. Fiscal and financial decentralisation includes legal provisions that empower the

district to levy and collect certain revenues made up of licences, royalties, rents and property tax to support the implementation of development projects. The underlying rationale in this strategy was that local revenues and fund transfers to the district budget would be enough to cover the district's recurrent expenses.

As responsibilities and the power of decision-making in financial matters have been devolved to local authorities, the researcher wanted to know whether fiscal and financial decentralisation allowed the district to mobilise financial resources and raise sufficient funds to cover administrative costs and finance the implementation of development programmes.

Figure 16: Fiscal decentralization has improved the district's ability to raise funds



Source: Primary data, August 2014


As indicated above, respondents provided balanced opinions about fiscal and financial decentralisation in the district. While 34.1% of the respondents felt the district had increased its ability to collect revenue, 33.1% of them disagreed. That split indicates that the district has not yet exploited all the possible avenues of maximising revenue collection.

5.2.6. Participation of local communities in Gasabo District's planning process

The principal means of planning development in the district is the preparation of a district development plan (DDP). The central government, through the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning, provides leading and overall planning for the country which is cascaded to district level to be incorporated into local development plans. In this connection, the district development plan (DDP) takes into account the country's national planning as elaborated in EDPRS 2 and Vision 2020.

The successful implementation of these priorities implies the involvement of various institutions as mentioned, with the district taking the lead to monitor and coordinate implementation on behalf of the sectors. This is crucial when needs are determined, during planning and implementation of development strategies and plans, and even in day-to-day development activities. In this regard, the researcher wanted to explore whether decentralisation had contributed to improving the planning process in Gasabo District.

Figure 17: Responses on whether the planning process has improved in Gasabo District



Source: Primary data, August 2014

While 40.6% of respondents recognise that the planning process has improved in Gasabo District, 26.5% disagree. The vice-mayor (economic affairs) said that both top-down and bottom-up approaches were used during the planning process. The district executive committee (DEC), in consultation with councillors at district level, prioritises development programmes in line with district priorities and the availability of funds, but citizens are also consulted so as to prioritise their development needs.

In this regard, the vice-mayor (economic affairs) said: “The district considers its partners and stakeholders crucial in the elaboration, implementation and monitoring and evaluation of the DDP.¹⁶ However, while “involving the community components in decision-making regarding local governance is the ideal, the process is time-consuming, and this has been difficult regarding programmes that need urgent formulation and implementation”.¹⁷


¹⁶ Interview with the vice-mayor, economic development, 3 September 2014.

¹⁷ Interview with the district vice-mayor, economic development, 3 September 2014.

5.2.6.1. Participation of local communities in setting priorities among needs

In the decentralisation process, it is a requirement that local governments elaborate their development plans in close consultation with local community representatives and NGOs. The community is represented through its elected councillors. Their role is limited to prioritising projects and endorsing them. The researcher wanted to know whether the principal needs of sectors were considered when the district development plan was worked out.

Figure 18: Involvement of local communities in setting development priorities



Source: Primary data, August 2014


There is minimal participation of all stakeholders in identifying the needs of residents and prioritising projects. In fact 17% of respondents disagreed and said the selection of projects remained the prerogative of the district councillors. It was found that while councillors at district level are fully involved in the prioritisation of projects, councillors at sector level, while they are closest to the beneficiaries, are not involved. Their non-involvement may explain the low level of stakeholder participation.

5.2.6.2. Engagement of NGOs in planning process

The acknowledgement of civil society as a partner to government throws some light on the debate about governance. According to Goran *et al* (2004), governance refers to the formation and stewardship of the rules that regulate the public realm, the arena in which the state as well as the economic and societal actors interact to make decision. This concept is closely linked with the effort to promote the good governance agenda, widely perceived as the lever for entrenching democracy and achieving sustainable development (Chisinga, 2001).

District authorities admit that NGOs are an important component of partnership that responds to the development needs of communities. That determination has attracted attention from civil society to engage in development activities as a result of the ongoing decentralisation process and local government reform aiming at socio-economic development. From this perspective the researcher wanted to find out whether the district involved NGOs to the extent that they took part effectively in district development planning by expressing their needs and setting objectives.

Figure 19: Involvement of civil society organisations in the planning process



Source: Primary data, August 2014

Civil society organisations' involvement in the development planning of Gasabo District appears not to be at a satisfactory point for raising the voices of communities in the development process. In fact, 30% and 20% of respondents respectively were either neutral or denied any involvement in the planning process. This situation leaves most of the stakeholders completely out of the planning process, so jeopardising the sustainability of their projects. The stakeholders can also not hold the council or the district responsible for their actions and *ipso facto* cannot play any role in overseeing the implementation of projects.

A staff member in the department in charge of local NGOs said: "Civil society organisations are apparently dominated by organisations claiming to act on behalf of poor and marginalised groups, but their members regard their organisation a source of livelihood for its founders. This results in a leadership problem because many of them are not democratically structured. This situation results in organisations meeting often to settle conflicts between members, instead of providing services to the communities for which they were established."¹⁸

It also appears that some local NGOs are dominated by opposition politicians who often do not support government programmes. This has given local entities a special focus on their composition, seeing them as organisations aimed at countering the intention of certain politicians to use them as a means of political influence, instead of considering them purely as a tool of socio-economic transformation, especially in the rural areas.

5.2.7. Service delivery in Gasabo district

The district level is the centre for service delivery to all local government levels to which powers, responsibilities and resources have been transferred from central government to local communities for effective service delivery. Services that have been decentral-

¹⁸ Interview with a staff member in the department in charge of local NGOs, 20 August 2014.

ised to districts include the provision of clean (safe) water, the inspection of education, revenue collection, health services (for example the coordination of mutual health centres), agriculture and veterinary services.


Before the advent of the decentralisation policy in 2000, service delivery to citizens was generally deplorable in most public institutions and particularly in local entities. Since then, the local entities have grasped opportunities opened up by decentralisation to improve the quality of services expected by residents.

Considering that service delivery is complex, the researcher made particular reference to the delivery of health and education services, not because others are less important, but because they are the most needed in the daily lives of citizens.

5.2.7.1. Citizens' accessibility to health services

Health is an important indicator from which the level of poverty reduction is assessed. Current thinking in health service management has focused on decentralisation as one of the way to address existing inefficiencies and make services more responsive to local needs. Boissoneau (1986) proposes that decentralisation management can be more flexible and adaptable when managers are closer to the sphere of influence of patients and the healthcare personnel providing their services. From this background, the researcher wanted to know whether, since 2006, citizens of Gasabo District had access to health facilities, but also to establish whether decentralisation had brought change in various aspects of health services delivered to citizens.


Figure 20: Opinions of respondents on the accessibility to health services



Source: Primary data, August 2014.

From the figure above, 65.6% of the respondents agreed that the enrolment of people to CBHI in Gasabo District had contributed to improve their access to medical services through regular preventive check-ups and improved access to treatment. However, this last aspect naturally depends on the availability of healthcare capacities and facilities and the quality of treatment received. The district has built new health centres, and renovated and equipped existing ones, so increasing the number of patients accessing health services. This pushed the researcher to discover whether the existing health centres and available health personnel in Gasabo District were sufficient to provide adequate health services. Respondents provided the following information.


Figure 21: Does the district have sufficient and adequately equipped health centres to provide proper medical care?



Source: Primary data, August 2014

From the figure above, 32.5% and 12.5% respondents felt that the single district hospital and 12 health centres covering 15 administrative sectors were not sufficient for an adequate health service. The outcome is that not only is the hospital constantly overwhelmed by patients, but so are the health centres. This complicates the working conditions of health workers and causes dissatisfaction among patients, especially those from the rural areas of the district who have to travel long distances. It was also necessary to inquire whether there were sufficient district health workers, adequately qualified to provide health services of an acceptable standard to patients. This was relevant as quality health service is dependent not only on the available facilities, but also on the number and qualifications of the health workers.

Figure 22: Do health centres have qualified human resources to provide adequate service delivery?



Source: Primary data, August 2014

Most of the respondents (41.9%) judged the number of qualified health workers (doctors and nurses) to be insufficient to satisfy the expectations of patients seeking medical assistance. This suggests that a lack of qualified and competent healthcare professionals hinders the provision of adequate healthcare to the residents, especially the poor. Poor performance resulting from the limited number of medical staff affects the quality of medical care and services rendered to patients negatively. As Hughes *et al* state: "Most performance problems can be attributed, among others, to unclear expectations, skills deficit, resource or equipment shortages or a lack of motivation" (Hughes *et al*, 2002).

5.2.7.2. Accessibility to basic education

Ignorance is the main cause of poverty among the population. It is recognised that education programmes that benefit all citizens have to be given priority, starting with the


basic level of education. At this level, the quantity and quality of schools is simply inadequate.

Availability of school infrastructures to achieve basic education

Decentralisation of education puts power in the hands of the frontline providers and the parents to improve their schools. According to Barrera-Osorio (2009), its basic premise is that people who have the most to gain or lose (pupils and their parents) and those who know what actually goes on in the classroom and school (teachers and school principals) should have both greater authority and greater accountability than they do now, with respect to school performance.

In Rwanda, primary education is a service decentralised to the district. The district council is responsible for its effective implementation. The district has an officer and an education committee in charge of the development of education and the administration of educational activities in the district. It is accountable to the district council and the Ministry of Education. From this point of view, the researcher wanted to know whether the district has enough schools to allow it to deliver a basic education.

Figure 23: Has the number of schools increased significantly to meet the need for universal primary education?



Source: Primary data, August 2014

Data collected reveal that 51.6% of the respondents agreed that the district has enough schools, allowing it to accommodate children of school age to attend classes and complete their primary education. Collaboration between the district education committee and the school management committees (SMCs) has allowed the district to produce tangible results in education. This collaboration has helped address the problem of inadequate facilities. These had not been increased in tempo with the rate of population growth. The government could not afford to solve the problem by building new schools in all the districts at the same time.


The decentralisation of the education sector and the establishment of SMC has enhanced parent participation in the teaching and performance of schools, which has resulted in the rehabilitation of existing schools and the construction of new schools. It has also contributed to improved accountability and efficient use of resources in schools.

However a councillor pointed out: “Despite the political will, remarkable changes are still needed in school organisation and especially in teaching practices that are necessary for significant learning improvements and quality education.”¹⁹

Enrolment of children in primary education

The availability of sufficient schools does not necessarily mean that parents can enrol their children in primary education. Despite the Education for All programme,²⁰ 12 years of basic education that is mandatory and free of charge in public schools, the researcher wanted to know whether all households were able to enrol their children.

Figure 24: Can households afford to enrol children in primary education?



Source: Primary data, August 2014

As shown here, 39% of the respondents agreed, and 51.6% agreed strongly, that most households could enrol their children for primary education. However, cases of school dropouts were observed in both rural and urban sectors. One of the major reasons is the poverty of parents.

¹⁹ Statement of a district councillor, 5 September 2014.

²⁰ The Education for All programme in Rwanda encompasses 12 years of basic education: six years of primary school and three years of secondary school.

The transfer of decision-making responsibilities in education from the central government to districts has allowed the district to elect or appoint school governing bodies – education committees and school management committees – which in turn have contributed to amplifying calls from parents for better education. However, it was realised that quality education remained an issue in public schools, since the district is still dependent on the central government for teachers' salaries and the acquisition of school equipment and teaching materials. In this regard, Collins (undated) warns that decentralisation can lead to confusion over education management, causing conflicting decisions or failure to carry out functions, with adverse effects on quality and efficiency.


5.2.8. Development of infrastructure

Policy changes that enhance the availability and quality of infrastructure services for the poor have a significant positive effect on their income as well as their welfare. According to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD, 2006), economic infrastructures like transport, energy, information and communication technology, sanitation, access to potable water and irrigation enhance economic activities and so contribute to growth, which is essential for poverty reduction.

5.2.8.1. Maintenance of roads

The development of the road infrastructure has often been seen as a means of improving access to goods and services, and thus as a means of community development. Having this in mind, the researcher wanted to know whether the district had invested in infrastructure development to support economic activities in the district.

Figure 25: Feeder roads linking sectors are well maintained to support economic activities



Source: Primary data, August 2014

On this question, 53.1% of the respondents agreed that the district had invested in maintaining feeder roads and building new ones. According to the district planner, investment in roads infrastructure especially involved maintaining and creating new feeder roads through the VUP component of public works. The district planning officer stated: “The lack of transport facilities was a real obstacle to the sellers of agricultural produce. It is was extremely difficult for farmers to sell their produce as well as a burden for traders in rural areas to access the produce because poorly maintained roads resulted in high transaction costs and resulted farmers selling their produce lower prices.”²¹

The Ministry of Infrastructure is still the main provider of rehabilitation services for rural feeder roads, in partnership with various donors. The road rehabilitation and mainten-


²¹ Interview with a staff member in the Department of Planning, on 23 September 2014.

ance services would have been decentralised, but the only obstacle is a lack of qualified engineers capable of integrating local needs into national planning.

5.2.8.2. Access of households to electricity

Access to electricity is seen as one of the major factors of any bid for economic development. According to Kouamé (2002) and Masse *et al* (2004), quoted in Atta (2013), the introduction of electricity in rural areas has a dual purpose: first to reduce the disparity between urban and rural inhabitants on the one hand and to respond to the legitimate aspirations of the rural population to have access to quality of life a comparable to that of urban population on the other. It also contributes to improving living conditions and to human development. In this regard, the researcher wanted to know to what extent the residents have access to electricity.

Figure 26: Households with access to electricity



Source: Primary data, August 2014

Even if district officials recognise that efforts have been made for the distribution of electricity, 21.9% and 15.6% of respondents respectively disagree or have a neutral position on residents' access to electric power. The district, in collaboration with the Elec-

tricity, Water and Sanitation Agency (Ewsa)²² has made efforts in channelling and distributing electricity in various administrative sectors of the district. However, the energy sector has its own regulatory measures and a law establishing a coordinating agency, and the district has little power to influence decisions.

The vice-mayor (economic affairs) stated: “The collaboration of the district is limited to the sensitisation of citizens to the advantages of living in grouped settlements to facilitate connectivity, and the expropriation of the land of those citizens who have been affected by the installation of electricity infrastructures.”²³ This lack of influence of the district over Ewsa, coupled with the fact that electricity is expensive, means that the limited access of residents to different sources of energy in rural areas will continue to hinder the improvement of their living conditions.

5.2.8.3. Water supply and sanitation

Closely interlinked with other development sectors, the provision of adequate WSS services is a core element of development strategies. According to the UN, many people die daily from water-borne diseases. Child-related death and disability rates are twice as high among children under 14, and some 5 000 children die daily from preventable water- and sanitation-related diseases, 90% of whom die before turning five.²⁴


Rwanda, in its vision of its future development, considered access to clean water as a crucial requirement for socio-economic development (EDPRS, 2013). The researcher wanted to learn whether the district did the best it could to improve the access of households to safe clean water in the Gasabo District.

²² Ewsa is a public agency in charge of the supply and distribution of electricity and water in Rwanda.

²³ Interview with the vice-mayor (economic development), 3 September 2014.

²⁴ UNDP, Water Supply and Sanitation, <http://www.undp.org/water/priorityareas/supply.html>.

Figure 27: Households having access to a safe source of drinking water



Source: Primary data, August 2014

Research findings revealed that 6.3% of the respondents agreed strongly and 42.2% agreed, while 17.2% were neutral and 29.9% of respondents disagreed. Improved drinking water sources include protected springs, public standpipes, water piped into dwellings or yards, boreholes, and protected wells. The findings of EICV3 (2011) revealed that 61% of households in the Gasabo District use public standpipes or water piped into the dwelling or yard. However, 15.3% of households still use unimproved drinking water. Despite this achievement, some sectors must still deal with water scarcity, particularly in rural and mountainous parts of the district.

According to the district health officer, rainwater harvesting is vital for domestic use and household practices, but unfortunately its collection in the Gasabo District is more or less non-existent. As a consequence, parasitic worms afflict many people and cause a variety of ailments, malnutrition, and anaemia. Only rainwater collection and improved sanitation facilities can help prevent the transmission of these diseases. The vice-mayor (social affairs) stated: “The collaboration of the district with Ewsa has facilitated the

accessibility of some households to safe clean water, since the distance and time that was spent on fetching water have been tremendously reduced.”²⁵

The district’s role in the process of making water accessible to citizens is limited to notification. The district creates roads and avenues in new residential areas and suggests to Ewsa the need to connect residents of that particular zone to water. Priority is given to factors like the emergence of new economic activities, socio-economic infrastructure and security. However the decision to connect is taken considering limits on available resources. The major problem that constrains the expansion of water services is the increasing rate of arrears owed by government institutions to Ewsa. Failure to pay electricity and water bills substantially affects Ewsa’s revenue and limits its expansion programmes for delivering water to other rural areas.

5.2.8.4. Construction of rural markets and development of trading centres

The rural areas of Rwanda, and those in Gasabo District in particular, were characterised by a large number of small producers/consumers and a limited number of market intermediaries. Rural producers in the district faced difficulties in reaching markets that were mostly in urban administrative sectors of the district. The relationships between traders and rural producers/consumers were not competitive but rather unpredictable and highly inequitable, as access to the markets was difficult. In this situation, rural producers became dependent on traders who came to the village to buy their agricultural produce and selling to them imports and consumer goods. These traders were unreliable. Producers had little choice but to accept the first trader’s initial offer.


Given heavy population pressure on the land, and the low level of agricultural labour productivity led the Government of Rwanda to review its settlement policy. Under that policy, two cells close to each other should choose a site to accommodate at least more

²⁵ Interview with the district vice-mayor (social affairs), 29 August 2014.

than 200 houses and to build at least a market in each sector (Minaloc, 2011). It is expected that this strategy would encourage rural citizens not to rely solely on farming activities but to get involved in non-farm income-generating activities.

To Gero *et al* (2007), non-farm activities are often countercyclical with agriculture and, as such, may serve to smooth consumption and perhaps also absorb excess labour during agricultural off-peak periods. Pertaining to this research, exploring whether the trading centres that are developing, are contributing to improve the bargaining power of producers and the development of new businesses was of paramount importance.

Figure 28: Has the district invested to develop trading centres and markets?



Source: Primary data, August 2014

It was necessary to know whether respondents felt the district had invested in developing trading centres and creating a market. The study revealed that 7.8% agreed strongly, 53.1% agreed, 23.4% were neutral and 15.6% disagreed. This implies that the district has invested in developing trading centres adequately, as the majority of the respondents added up to 50%.

During the survey the researcher realised that the emergence of trading centres had allowed rural residents to start off-farm income-generating activities. In most of the centres, activities like commerce, wood transformation, metal welding and restaurant services were observed. At this regard, the district executive secretary revealed: “The construction of markets in different sectors of the district had a double purpose. First enlarging the tax base of the district, and then motivating rural citizens to engage in off-farm activities, rather than relying on farming, as non-farm activities have a positive spill-over effect on household agricultural production.”²⁶


A member of a cooperative in Bumbogo sector testified that: the income gained from non-farm activities helped enhance the his capacity for investment in farming activities, kept families financially stable and allowed cooperative members to see to family-related needs (education and health) in good time. Due to the gradual growth of non-farm activities, changes are being observed in rural parts of the Gasabo District. Even though farming remains the main source of income for rural households, non-farm income is playing a significant role when one compares the living conditions of households engaged solely in farming activities with those that have opted to mix farming activities with non-farming activities.

5.2.9. Management of the district’s development programmes

The community development activities are entrusted to community development committees (CDCs). The CDC structure ensures that different levels are linked, at cell, sector and district level. This ensures that priorities at lower levels are incorporated in higher-level priorities. The composition of the CDCs reflects the blend of all actors in development, including interest groups like women, young people, the private sector and civil society.

²⁶ Interview with the district executive secretary, 14 September 2014.

Figure 29: The district has the technical capacity to elaborate development projects



Source: Primary data, August 2014

It was found that the operationalisation of CDCs was still weak and that most district development projects were formulated by independent consultants or development partners (NGOs). Information collected from field research in terms of development projects revealed that some associations were born out of initiatives of the local population with the aim of reducing poverty and boosting overall development. The local population sustains some of these initiatives, while others are supported by NGOs, whether local or international.


However, the Local Development Agency (Loda) prefers the district to submit development projects for funding. This condition appears to be difficult for some CDC members, who can neither formulate nor sustain projects. The CDCs still have a lot of work to do in training members of these associations so that they become innovative in the formulation of small income-generating projects.

5.2.9.1. Transfer of funds to support district development programmes

The district budget determines its investment capacity and opportunities for contracting a larger and qualified private partner, hereby facilitating local development initiatives. Considering that the districts were known to lack the financial capacity to implement the development programmes associated to the decentralisation policy, the government established the Local Development Agency (Loda), to which 10% of the national budget is transferred to support development activities and strengthening the financial capacity of districts.

The researcher wanted to investigate whether these funds were transferred in time, the context in which funds were transferred and how they were used in implementing development projects.

Figure 30: Does Loda transfer funds in good time to support district projects?



Source: Primary data, August 2014


The researcher wanted to know the opinion of respondents as to whether Loda transferred funds in good time to support district development projects. The study revealed that 28.1% agreed strongly, 42.2% agreed, 21.9% were neutral, 4.7% disagreed and 3.1% disagreed strongly. This implies that Loda transfers funds fairly to support the implementation of district projects.

Even though the amounts allocated to the districts under Loda have increased gradually over the past three years, the district vice-mayors estimated the amounts transferred to be insufficient to support community development activities. Also sector executive secretaries claimed that, up to now, the main projects that had been funded by Loda in the district were mainly the building of sector offices and markets, rather than other development actions which would have a positive outcome on the welfare of the residents.

5.2.9.2. *Involvement of development partners in the district planning process*

To sustain a programme of community development, the district was supposed to work in a holistic and coordinated manner with all development partners through public-private partnerships. This kind of collaboration helps each partner understand the state of planning in the district and so avoid duplication of projects. This is supposed to be done through exposing work plans and budgets to each other and attending meetings organised to discuss and harmonise planned activities. For this reason, the researcher wanted to know whether the district had a close relationship with the development partners and to explore each partner's position on this issue.

Figure 31: Does Loda transfer funds in good time to support district projects?



Source: Primary data, August 2014.


The information above revealed that 32.8% of respondents recognised that the district collaborated with development partners. During the research, it was observed that the district had a joint forum with development partners, but appeared not to be strong enough to contribute adequately to the effective implementation of the district development plan. This is corroborated by a district official's argument when he said: "Whenever we invite NGO representatives to share their plans with the district, most of them are hesitant to do so. It takes us time to really access such plans, although they are for the benefit of both institutions and especially for citizens who are beneficiaries of our activities."²⁷

5.2.9.3. Sustainability of development programmes and projects

The participation of local people and the contribution of their resources, knowledge and skills are essential ingredients for the sustainability of any development policy. As evidenced by Dasgupta (1990), there is a link between broad political participation and socio-economic development programmes and projects. To Oakley (1991), participation helps minimise misunderstanding or possible disagreements, and thus the time and energy often spent by professional staff explaining or convincing people of a project's benefits, can be reduced. It also increases people's sense of control over issues which affect their lives by making people examine their problems and think positively about their sustainable solutions; thus allowing the continuity of the project even when donors pull out funds. With regard to this issue, the researcher wanted to know whether the participation approach through the decentralisation policy has contributed to the sustainability of development projects in Gasabo District.

²⁷ Interview with a district officer, 14 September 2014.

Figure 32: Has citizen participation contributed to sustaining development projects?



Source: Primary data, August 2014

The findings revealed that the participatory approach introduced by the decentralisation policy has contributed to the sustainability of the development projects, as confirmed by 54.7% of respondents.


The vice-mayor (social affairs) said: “At the beginning of the process, some local leaders were not proactive in supporting government policies, including the decentralisation policy, either because the policy had reduced their powers and related advantages, or just because of their political affiliation to opposition parties. If the rate of affiliation to the community-based health insurance scheme has risen from 62% in 2006 to 93% in 2013, it is an indication of the way citizens have changed their attitudes, thus contributing to sustaining government policies through active participation.”²⁸

²⁸ Interview with the district vice-mayor (social affairs), 29 August 2014.

5.2.9.4. Employment opportunities associated with decentralised development programmes

Employment is one source of revenue and a factor in improving the socio-economic conditions of households in a country. From this statement, the researcher wanted to know whether decentralisation and its associated development programmes had created opportunities of employment for residents of Gasabo District.

Figure 33: Do decentralization and its associated development programmes offer employment opportunities?



Source: Primary data, August 2014

The figure above shows that 36.6% of the respondents disagreed strongly and 20.3% were neutral about employment opportunities brought about by decentralisation. This finding is an indication that decentralisation and its associated development programmes have not yet created an environment that offers enough employment opportunities. The EICV (2013) indicates that in the Gasabo District, agriculture is the main industry for 31% of the population aged 16 and over, followed by services (19%), trade (17%) and government services (11%).

5.2.9.5. *Monitoring and evaluation of development programmes*


The implementation of decentralisation for community development requires close and regular monitoring and evaluation (M&E) to ensure that it is having the desired outcome in helping achieve the development targets. In this view, Visser (2005) posits that the implementation of decentralisation strategies requires that the central government is empowered with instruments to correct local governments that endanger the developmental agenda.

In Rwanda, M&E is organised in the annual *imihigo*²⁹ performance contract framework to raise citizens' expectations of service delivery and ownership of their development processes. The annual performance contract is used as a management tool whereby most government ministers, on behalf of their ministries, and all the district mayors on behalf of residents, sign an annual performance contract with the President of Rwanda.

Members of the public service in turn also sign performance contracts with their managers or institution heads. In this sense, *imihigo* is a subset of the district's action plan showing priority activities to be used as a performance measure (Ipar, 2014). In this process, districts are responsible for implementing programmes while the central government assumes the task of planning and facilitating. The evaluation is done based on the extent to which targets across the socio-economic development and governance pillars have been achieved, based on verifiable indicators set out beforehand.

²⁹ The Kinyarwanda word *imihigo* (which is a plural) means "to vow to deliver" and describes the pre-colonial cultural practice in Rwanda by which individuals set targets or goals to be achieved within a specific time and competed with each other.

Figure 34: The monitoring and evaluation of activities is conducted effectively to assure that goals are achieved



Source: Primary data, August 2014

Both district officials and councillors recognised the existence of monitoring and evaluation mechanisms. Heads of department submit updates on a quarterly basis to the Rwanda Governance Board and the Local Development Agency (Loda) on the implementation of the decentralisation process and the various development programmes within the district. These institutions proceed with an annual evaluation that provides an overview of progress made and a set of recommendations aimed at improving decentralisation strategies and community development programmes.

According to the secretary of the district council, the regular monitoring helped the council to identify issues in the implementation of the district's plans as soon as they arose, and allowed the council to take timely corrective action. Despite the importance of annual performance contracts in implementing national priorities, it was shown that

there was, to some extent, a lack of synergy between national priorities and local development plans, thus making the exercise of evaluation difficult. A staff member of the Department of Planning revealed to the researcher: “Setting baselines, targets and indicators and output which are not clearly defined, and insufficient technical skills in M&E among local government and central government staff, constitute major obstacles during the monitoring and evaluation process.”³⁰

5.2.10. District support to local communities and farmers


The performance of the Rwandan economy depends mainly on the production of the primary sector, in which agricultural production, particularly of food crops, and livestock are essential. However, improving rural livelihoods has proven a challenge due to an increase in the number of rural households dependent on scarce wage labour opportunities for survival, partly due to increasing land shortages.

5.2.10.1. Technical support in intensification of crops and livestock

To this shortage, the intensification of crops by the Ministry of Agriculture (Minagri) is believed to provide a response to the necessity for integrating and diversifying crop and livestock development in each locality (Minagri, 2013). To this end it was relevant for this research to investigate the nature of technical assistance that Minagri, together with the district, provides to local farmers so as to increase production. To this question, respondents provided the following views:

Figure 35: Are farmers assisted in using modern techniques in agriculture and animal husbandry?

³⁰ Interview with a staff member in the Department of Planning, 9 September 2014.



Source: Primary data, August 2014

The study found that 20.3% agreed strongly, 48.4% agreed, 17.2% were neutral, 9.4% disagreed and 4.7% disagreed strongly. These results are an indication that Minagri, in collaboration with the district, offers technical support for farmers to improve agricultural production in the district. A staff member in the Department of Agriculture and Animal Husbandry said: “Technical assistance includes the provision of selected seeds and the distribution of fertilisers at cheaper prices to farmers, the tracing of radical terraces and popularising modern techniques which all have an effect on improving the production of local farmers.”³¹

The district agronomist revealed that the small size of the decentralised budget for financing agricultural development (RwF1.3 billion in 2013, representing 4.2% of the Minagri budget) to share among 30 districts, and the fact that current transfers are earmarked for specific activities and leave little discretion for local government, hinders crops and livestock productivity. In addition to this was the issue of a lack of clarity regarding which entities are supposed to monitor the use of decentralised funds.


³¹ Interview with a staff member in the Department of Agriculture and Animal Husbandry, on 17th October 2014.

5.2.10.2. Financial support to individuals and cooperatives

Financial support to poor households is organised under the Vision 2020 Umurenge Programme (VUP). One of the objectives of VUP is to increase the access of poor households to financial services by extending their coverage to poor and remote areas and helping poor households to join the formal financial system (Loda, 2010). Initially the intention was to sub-contract the microcredit scheme to private financial institutions, but negotiations were unsuccessful, private financial institutions anticipating that the risks and costs of transacting with the poor would be too high. VUP mainly finances off-farm income-generating activities (IGAs), but agricultural and livestock development IGAs are also eligible.

The weighing up of projects to be financed includes consideration of whether their purposes contribute to community wellbeing or are intended to relieve suffering or hardship for members of households in a cooperative within the sector. The Government of Rwanda believes that VUP is an alternative strategy for fighting poverty through the credit package it offers to poor households without any guarantee, since none of them have assets to provide as collateral. In this context, mutual trust and socio-cultural dynamics based on the value of trust and honesty are crucial for the effective functioning of the *ubudehe* credit scheme.

Figure 36: Has direct financial support to poor households contributed to creating off-farm income-generating activities?



Source: Primary data, August 2014

With regard to the financial support of poor households, the study found that 23.4% agreed strongly, 50% agreed, 15.6% were neutral, 9.4%% disagreed and 1.6% disagreed strongly. The opinions of the respondents show that financial support is provided and imply that some households have so far benefited from the credit package offered by VUP to start an income-generating activity.

To have an idea on the nature of IGAs undertaken by beneficiaries of VUP, farmers' cooperatives in Gikomero Sector shared this information with the researcher during a focus group discussion: "We are members of a cooperative (20 people) and have received a VUP Credit Scheme loan of RwF1 900 000 for a cloth handicraft project. At the beginning the process seemed complicated, since members had little idea about the procedure or requirements of application. Due to the assistance of the sector's VUP officer, the necessary guidance was given and a committee was established to put together all the documents that were required. The loan application was successful and the money was used to pay rent and buy materials to start the business. Today, the cost of a finished cloth varies between RwF5 000 and RwF7 000 with a profit margin of RwF1 500 on an average of five cloths a day and a target that each member makes a

piece of cloth each day. Cooperative members are confident that they will make enough money to repay the loan within a year as they have already liquidated a quarter of it.”³²

VUP is a good initiative working towards fighting poverty. However, the researcher observed that delays in disbursing money were a real obstacle to its effective implementation. Delays were characterised by the time beneficiaries had to wait to receive their first instalment and further instalments, as reports are required before each disbursement is made. This is done at various points in the chain from headquarters to sector.


5.2.11. Food security in the Gasabo District

The issue of food security came to the attention of the researcher, who wanted to find out whether the existing decentralised agricultural strategies had contributed to food security in the district. Benson (1986) states that household food security involves a household’s having assured sets of entitlements from food production, cash income, and a reserve of food or assets such that in time of need they are able to maintain sufficient nutritional intake for physical wellbeing. This was relevant to understand because the lack of adequate and proper nutrition is itself an underlying cause of hunger which in turn becomes an underlying cause of poverty, as quoted by the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO).³³

Figure 37: Do agriculture and livestock support contribute to household food security?

³² Interview with a member of a cooperative which benefited from VUP financial assistance. The capital served to start an income-generating project.

³³ Published by the EC-FAO Food Security Programme website: www.foodsec.org



Source: Primary data, August 2014

The findings revealed that 16% and 54% of the respondents were of the view that households had food security, while 14% were neutral and 16% disagreed. This is an indication that food security to a certain number of households within the district is still a problem despite the government determination in promoting agriculture. It was realised that the issue of food insecurity was related the land-holding status of households in the district.

Table 6: Size of land cultivated per household (in ha)

< 0.3ha	0.3-0.9ha	0.9-3ha	≥3ha	Total	Households cultivating land for crop production (000s)
66.5%	21.7%	8.1%	3.8%	100	68

Source: NISR (2012). EICV3 Gasabo District profile, Kigali, Rwanda

Data in the table above show that 66.5% live on property below 0.25ha in extent and 21.7% of people on areas ranging between 0.25ha and 1ha. Holders of properties between 0.9ha and 3ha represent 8.1%, while those with more than 3ha represent only

3.8% of the population. It is clear that most households use their land for subsistence farming to sustain their livelihoods.

5.2.12. Factors hindering decentralisation and community development

Any policy implementation process is likely to face some factors that may hinder it, particularly if the process is complex, involving many actors and transactions. Considering that implementing the decentralisation policy is complex and coupled with various development programmes, the findings and opinions obtained during the research show that decentralisation faced obstacles that are hindering its positive influence on community development. In this vein, the researcher was curious to understand the nature of factors limiting the smooth implementation of decentralisation in Gasabo District.

Table 7: What factors are hindering decentralisation policy and community development in Gasabo district?

	Frequency	Percentage
Resistance to change and corruption of local leaders	5	7.8
Insufficient budget	21	32.8
Poor coordination of activities	10	15.6
Low involvement of development partners (NGOs)	13	20.3
Inadequate capacity of staff and local leaders	4	6.3
Ineffective service delivery	7	10.9
Insufficient development infrastructures	4	6.3
Total	64	100.0

Source: Primary data, August 2014

The study sought to identify factors that hinder decentralisation in the process of community development. The findings revealed that 32.5% of the respondents said the lack of an adequate budget was a major concern. Also 20.3% of respondents identified the low involvement of development partners in formulating the district development plan as

an issue to be addressed, since it resulted in poor coordination of activities, as pointed out by 15.6% of the respondents.

It was also realised that among the NGOs operating in Gasabo District, few are involved in spheres like agriculture that could have a positive influence on the development process. Other factors included: ineffective service delivery 10.9%, resistance to change and corruption of local leaders 7.8%, and inadequate capacity of staff and local leaders, as mentioned by 6.3%.

5.3. Analysis of findings from NGO members

Members of NGOs were surveyed using the interview technique. The interview guide was conceived to collect information about their opinion on quality service delivery, collaboration between NGOs and the district, the integration of their development plans into the DDP and the challenges they faced in implementing their development activities.

5.3.1. Characteristics of NGO respondents

While NGOs are viewed as a solution for development issues, they are also criticised for lacking appropriate strategies for evaluating their programmes, particularly when these are carried out by donor organisations that might not be sensitive to the needs of local residents. For this reason, the researcher was most interested in interviewing key informants in selected NGOs who were better placed to understand and explain strategies used by the NGO in the implementation of their development programmes and to check whether they thought these strategies really addressed the needs of the beneficiaries.

5.3.1.1. Experience and position occupied by interviewees

In the framework of this research, attention was drawn principally to the NGOs' programme managers and monitoring and evaluation officers. The management, evalua-

tion and monitoring of development programmes is crucial in the sense that they help establish adequacy between the organisations' strategies with its objectives.

Table 8: Experience and positions occupied by interviewees from NGOs

Position occupied	Years of experience			Total
	1-2 years	2-5 years	above 5 years	
Programme managers	3	3	2	8
Monitoring and evaluation officers	4	5	3	12
Others	3	2	1	6
Total	10	10	6	26

In total, out of 30 members of NGOs that were to have been interviewed, the researcher managed to interview 26, among them eight programme managers, 12 monitoring and evaluation officers and seven ordinary staff, including finance or training officers. The interview with programme managers helped the researcher understand the strategies used by the NGOs in seeking to improve popular access to services provided by the district and challenges they face, while interviews with monitoring and evaluation officers were helpful to the researcher in understanding what they do to correct past mistakes and to prevent mistakes in the future.

5.3.1.2. Domains of intervention of most NGOs in Gasabo District

The role of NGOs remains a highly contentious subject, with some scholars defending their relevance as valuable agents of development, while others are more critical of their role due to the nature of the development activities they are involved in. The domains in which NGOs intervene are quite varied depending on the reasons for their creation. According to Riddell & Robinson (1995) some are directed towards influencing macro-economic policy, while others are aimed simply at empowering individuals as a means of confronting issues of inequality within a society. Considering these differences between NGOs that are often not acknowledged, the researcher wanted to know the do-

mains of intervention of the NGOs investigated so as to explore their adequacy with the development programmes in Gasabo District. The table below gives further details.

Table 9: Domains of NGO intervention in Gasabo District

Domains of intervention	Number of NGOs
advocacy	5
capacity building	8
education	4
agriculture and husbandry	4
health and sanitation	5

In assessing the information in the table above, it was realized that the NGOs' activities were mostly restricted to social activities; few of them focused on economic activities. The concentration on social projects like advocacy, health and education is an indication that, in the researcher's view, most of the community's development problems remain unsolved. This is an indication that the district will continue to face challenges in the development process, as few NGOs are involved in agriculture and economic development activities.

5.3.2. Views of members of NGOs on the role of decentralisation in improving service delivery

When asked whether decentralisation had contributed to the improvement of quality service delivery, most recognised that with the advent of the decentralisation policy, service delivery had improved immensely. This finding concurs with those of the IPAR (2014) which states that service delivery at local government level has improved significantly since 2006.

When asked what they felt about health services, they recognised that even though the quality of health services remained an issue, thanks to the decentralisation the district

had played a major role in building new health centres and renovating existing ones, thus increasing access to health services. In the education sector, they also pointed out that decentralisation had helped the implementation of Nine-Year Basic Education (9YBE) which has also contributed to increasing the rate of enrolment in primary school.

The innovation of *imihigo* performance contracts partly explains this accelerated progress in service delivery. However, they pointed out that some services were not delivered effectively and led to the district's being unable to meet its targets. Areas of concern regarding service delivery were linked to delays on the part of the parastatal responsible for water and electricity provision, over which the district has limited control.

5.3.3. Existence of collaboration between the district and NGOs

The researcher wanted also to know the nature of cooperation between the district and the NGOs. When asked whether NGO members were consulted about development matters, most of the NGOs operating in the district which had taken part in the survey revealed that they did not enjoy effective cooperation with the district council, despite the existence of a joint action development forum (JADF) that was created to promote close collaboration between the district and CSO members. An NGO project coordinator had this to say: "District authorities rarely call us in for its meetings. The only meetings they invite us to are the review of the annual budget and their work plan, for which our recommendations are rarely taken into consideration. We also have no feedback on the matters we have reviewed. We have no interest in attending local government meetings as they are characterised by a lot of bureaucracy and most of the issues they normally discuss are not of immediate interest to us."³⁴

This is a clear indication that there is no close collaboration between the district and NGO development partners. From this response, it is clear that the absence of effective

³⁴ Interview with an NGO project coordinator, 16 September 2014.

collaboration between the district and the NGOs constitutes a serious handicap in the process of community development.

5.3.4. Participation of NGOs in elaborating the district development plan (DDP)

Collaboration between the district and NGOs as development partners takes place in the framework of the Gasabo Joint Action Development Forum (JADF), in which planning is the essence of collaboration. This is crucial when needs are determined, during planning and implementation of development plans.

To the question as to whether members of NGOs play a full part in the planning process, the response was no. Responses revealed that top-down approach is observed to be the prominent approach in the planning process and there is no effective cooperation with the district council, despite the existence of the JADF, created to promote close collaboration between the district and members of CSOs. In this process, the district elaborates the district development plan, discussed and adopted by the district council, which decides on projects to be implemented at local level.

An NGO programme officer said: “It would not be an exaggeration to say that stakeholders are often invited in a consultative meeting to be informed of a development plan already adopted by the council, so that they may converge their activities in line with district priorities.”

Another NGO official said: “Various committees are appointed and used as conduits by local authorities to foster the political interests of the district council. This situation is justified by the fact that political influence drives the process of selecting members or who should be chosen, instead of being selected by the stakeholders to represent the community interest.”³⁵ This has not gone down well with all stakeholder representatives,

³⁵ Interview with a programme officer of NGO member of the JADF

some of whom are solicited to give consent to projects over which they have no say once implementation begins. This finding concurs with SNV (2009), which states that local leaders set the agenda based on their own interests without necessarily taking into consideration the interests of the other development partners. Sometimes the JADF is merely used as an information channel by local authorities to inform the development actors of district decisions.

Another issue is related to the unwillingness of NGOs to expose their source of funding. According to an NGO programme officer, revealing work plans was implicitly revealing the funds to implement such plans and their sources. Yet sources of funds were one of the key secrets that NGO officials were not willing to expose to anyone. It was established that once the source of funding was revealed, it would lead to competition for such funds, which would make the NGO lose its donors to other development partners. So it can be deduced that some NGOs are more concerned with maintaining good working relations with their donors than with the district. This kind of working relationship where NGOs are suspicious of the local government cannot help in the process of community development.

5.3.5. Effects of decentralisation on community development

When asked whether the decentralisation policy and its associated development programmes were contributing to community development, the reply was yes. It was recognised that the government had initiated various decentralised development programmes designed to reverse the poverty situation in the post-genocide period. These programmes include the Vision 2020 Umurenge Programme (VUP), the Rural Sector Support Programme (RSSP), One Cow per Poor Family, Nine Years' Basic Education (9YBE), Community-Based Health Insurance (CBHI), the Business Development Fund (BDF) and food security programmes among many others, and are key fundamentals of the government's development strategy with the vision of a better life for all.

From this response it can be deduced, even though their collaboration with the district in matters of planning leaves much to be desired, that all these programmes have a positive outcome in the living conditions of communities. Even though development strategies are different stages of planning, such positive development initiatives are offset by the realities of life for the country's vast poor population, especially in the rural areas. The development state of Gasabo District is characterised by undercapitalisation, since its rural areas rely on agriculture as their primary source of development. However, the inappropriate use of fertilisers and agricultural technologies illustrates this. Agricultural technologies are either non-existent and there is a lack of maintenance of roads needed to allow produce to be delivered to markets. Such infrastructural limitations, coupled with a lack of technical facilities, hinder the district's efforts to fight poverty.

5.3.6. Obstacles facing NGOs as development partners in Gasabo District

That implementation of the decentralisation policy and community development programmes requires the concerted efforts of all stakeholders, including civil society organisations, as development partners. Considering the weak collaboration between the district and NGOs, the researcher wanted to know the precise nature of the obstacles they faced in contributing to community development. To this question, respondents pointed out the incapacity of local NGOs to raise fund to finance their operations, which in turn had a negative outcome on their roles in decision-making in local governance. This situation matches the opinion of Mukamunana & Brynard (2005), who state that civil society organisations in poor nations, unlike their counterparts in rich countries, are financially weak and depend for the execution of their programmes on aid coming from either the government or foreign donors.

Coupled to the financial issue, respondents also mentioned the lack of technical skills which keeps civil society organisations from taking part in the planning process of the district development plan. A member of an NGO stated that the district organs (district

council and district executive committee) drove the process from the planning, disbursement of funds, selection of contractors and arranging finance to the evaluation of projects. Other stakeholders seem to not be fully involved in the process as the composition of the project committees is not diverse enough to accommodate the various interested community organisations. The consequence is that civil society organisations carry out programmes that are likely to obtain funding from donors, sometimes at the expense of the real needs of their constituencies.

5.4. Analysis of findings from residents regarding the VUP

In this section, the study has analyzed responses obtained during focus group discussions with citizen beneficiaries of development programmes implemented in the district. Discussions were held on aspects of meetings of citizens with councillors, access to service delivery – with a major focus on health and education – the nature of assistance received from VUP and the state of infrastructures in the areas.

5.4.1. Characteristics of focus group participants

Participants in the focus group discussions were beneficiaries of VUP activities. Knowing their age or level of education was not important for the researcher, as it is known that beneficiaries of the programme are mainly poor and uneducated citizens aged between 18 and 45 to take part in public works, and over 55 to be a beneficiary of direct support. Rather, the researcher’s focus was on gender and the category of poverty participants fell into so that the researcher could understand how these two variables are integrated into the VUP implementation process in Gasabo District. Among our informants the distribution is as follows:

Table 10: Gender and poverty categorization of discussants

Sectors	Poverty category 1		Poverty category 2		Total
	female	male	female	male	

Gikomero	1	3	2	3	9
Jali	2	2	1	3	8
Rutungu	2	1	1	2	6
Nduba	1	1	2	4	8
TOTAL	6	7	6	10	29

In total 29 individuals took part in the group discussions in four sectors, among whom were 12 women and 17 men. These sectors have two major characteristics in common. According to the district, choosing these sectors to serve in piloting VUP implementation was based on the fact that they are all rural sectors lacking basic infrastructure, with the highest proportion of the population living below the poverty line (Gasabo, 2008).

More men than women took part in focus group discussions. The reason given was that the physical fitness of men made them better placed to take part in public works, as women were involved in many household chores. Few of the women in the four sectors surveyed indicated that they were members of small associations or cooperatives that received VUP credit packages to start income-generating activities approved by the sector VUP committees.

Also most participants were found in poverty category 2. However none of the informants from either poverty category had enough land to grow enough food for their households. Citizens classified in poverty category 2 are known to have small plots where they cultivate crops for consumption, such as sweet potatoes, beans and cassava.

5.4.2. Meetings of citizens with their councillors

Asked whether councillors met their constituents regularly, most of those interviewed said no. Councillors met residents during election campaigns, but once elected they no longer visited their constituencies. This question is also linked to finding out whether councillors are effective in putting forward the needs of their constituents. Most also answered no to this question. In Rwanda's electoral system a councillor, once elected,

ceases to represent the area from which he/she was elected, but is seen as representing the population of the district whole. Because of this, district councillors are not bound by commitments they might have made prior to their election or by instructions received from constituents.

5.4.3. Appreciation of service delivery

Regarding the advent of decentralisation, respondents were unanimous that service delivery had improved in the district. They appreciated that services previously rendered by the district had been devolved to sector level, and that this had contributed to reducing the distance and time spent on in obtaining services.

Most felt that the district had played a major role in informing residents about the benefits of community-based health insurance (CBHI). Enrolment in the programme has helped residents to access health services at reasonable cost. However, during group discussion, a resident indicated that the cost of CBHI membership was high in relation to the purchasing power of those living below the bread line. The district does not support all those considered as being extremely poor, yet the total amount of Rwf2 000 per person per year is high, while the average of most families is seven people.

Another issue raised with regard to health services was the distance one had to travel to attend a health centre or hospital. One resident said: "The distance to the hospital is too far. Then we have very long queues for medical consultations and for administrative procedures concerning bills and the like. Depending on the number of patients and the nature of the complaint, patients are often not treated on the day they report, and have to see a doctor after an interval during which they may have become seriously ill."³⁶

To deal with the shortage of medical staff, the government employs community health workers to fill the gaps in healthcare and advice where necessary. During a focus group discussion a resident said: "Community health workers are seen as a source of informa-

³⁶ Interview with a patient attending Nduba Health Centre on 7 October 2014.

tion about health matters, balanced diet, family planning, prevention of infectious diseases like malaria, and helping women during pregnancy.”³⁷

Asked about the enrolment of children from their areas in primary school, they provided mixed answers. Some appreciated that the district, through the nine-year basic education programme, had played a major role in building new schools and renovating others, so increasing the enrolment capacities of schools. They also recognised that with decentralisation, parents were represented in the management of schools through their representation in school committees. However, they regretted that even though education in public primary schools was free, parents still had expenses in the form of notebooks and other supplies. A parent said: “Even if 12 years’ basic education was compulsory, parents still have to supplement teachers’ salaries. The continuous pressure of teachers on children who fail to boost their pay upsets some children and leads them to drop out of school, regardless of the district’s instruction prohibiting public schools from expelling children due to their parents’ inability to pay such extras.”³⁸

From this it can be deduced that the scarcity of qualified personnel in health and education, together with the vicious cycle of poverty, will continue to constrain effective service delivery in Gasabo District.

5.4.4. Benefits derived from VUP

The VUP was launched in 2008 to accelerate the rate of poverty reduction in Rwanda, with the aim of safeguarding consumption and promoting asset accumulation and investment by the most vulnerable beneficiaries. With this in mind, the researcher wanted to know whether beneficiaries had received any support in the framework of VUP in the form of public work, direct support or financial support. The answer to this question was yes, but they were not all appreciative of it.

³⁷ Interview with a resident during a focus group discussion in Gikomero sector, 16 October 2014.

³⁸ Statement of a parent concerning a proposal for 12 years’ free basic education.

While some beneficiaries of public works appreciated that their inclusion in such schemes had allowed them to acquire some assets and livestock, others said the employment was short-term while the number of eligible poor households was high. This has led the VUP to employ members of only 47% of the eligible poor households in Gasabo District (VUP, 2013). During a focus group discussion, citizen beneficiaries of VUP said: “Public works are organised but often they are not profitable to a large number of poor people, yet once the project comes to its end we have to wait a long time for another project to start. This situation does not allow us to make savings, as the wages paid are insufficient for our needs.”³⁹

This finding supports the statement by Hagen-Zanker *et al* (2011) who said there was little empirical evidence that providing poor households with income opportunities in the form of public works led to increased consumption and investment. Generally people perceive the public works wage as being too low and the work as physically demanding, which means that weaker workers are not able to perform the tasks, thus limiting the positive outcome of the programme.

Concerning financial support, the researcher wanted to know whether VUP had contributed to financing income-generating activities. Again the answer was yes. This was confirmed by beneficiaries who said that among other outcomes, VUP financial support had enabled their getting together in groups to set up small projects. The commonest types of income-generating projects that received finance included farming, livestock and wholesale agriculture. Beneficiary testimonies from a cooperative in Gikomero sector stated: “The loan we obtained through the VUP credit package helped members’ households to become familiar with banking processes and dealing with financial institutions, so helping us to save.”⁴⁰

³⁹ Views of a resident during a focus group discussion in Gikomero sector, 16 October 2014.

⁴⁰ Interview with a member of a cooperative in Gikomero Sector, 16 October 2014.

Most respondents said the process of selecting beneficiaries for these VUP activities was transparent to prevent any suspicion, despite the large number of poor household wanting to take part. During a focus group discussion in Nduba sector, citizen beneficiaries of VUP said: “It is our local leaders at village and cell level who identify beneficiaries for social protection programmes. Generally no change is brought on the list since it is approved by the district in conformity with what was originally established during the village general assembly of residents.”⁴¹

The VUP was launched in 2008, but its potential for reducing poverty still has a long way to go. A study conducted by Hartwig (2013) revealed that since the start of the programme in 2006 more than 56% of the population still lives below the national poverty line. VUP activities have allowed a limited number of beneficiaries to develop a culture of savings that has in turn allowed them to purchase assets, invest in income-generating activities, and pay school fees and health insurance. However, it was observed that management performance still left room for improvement. Specific areas for improvement include timeliness in fund transfers and planning processes, and the monitoring and evaluation of activities. Reducing delays in transfers would improve planning practices and a more consistent flow of income to beneficiary households.

41 Views of residents in a focus group discussion in Nduba Sector, 9 October 2014.

Conclusion

This chapter was about analysing the state of decentralisation as catalyst of community development in Gasabo District. The research findings revealed that political and administrative strategies were adopted to ascertain the best decentralisation outcomes in the area of community development. The laws covering decentralisation give the district wide powers regarding planning and participation in decision-making concerning socio-economic development issues. On the positive side, there are no legal or political barriers to participation in democratic local governance.

Even though the study reveals some conflicts of interest between individuals, the structures of local decentralised entities have contributed to improving the relationship between various local institutions. An important step for good governance and participation is the opportunity enshrined in the constitution that gives women, the youth, and disabled persons the opportunity of being represented in all forums from local councils to Parliament.

Considering that community development is never completely confined to a particular defined area, and that Gasabo is one of the three districts of Kigali City, it was realised that the district cannot conceive a development plan for its own area without having the major guideline provided by Kigali City on local development issues concerning the city as a whole. To some extent, this requirement has had led to the district's not fully considering the needs of residents as expressed during the consultation phase.

The research also established that the decentralisation process has contributed to improvements in service delivery. Regarding education, research findings showed that the 12-year basic education programme had allowed most households to enrol their children in school. However, with regard to health facilities, respondents appreciated that most citizens could afford to pay into the medical insurance scheme, but the major issue is the quality of medical service provided, as a result of the shortage of medical staff (doctors and nurses).

With regard to infrastructure development, the research found that the rehabilitation and construction of economic infrastructure like feeder roads was a major aspect. Respondents had a positive opinion on their proximity to socio-economic infrastructures that are crucial in helping their households gain access to opportunities associated with them. The accessibility of clean water and progress in connections to electricity have contributed to starting new income-generating activities and changing the living conditions of residents, especially in rural areas.

Despite the progress made in the process of decentralisation in Gasabo District, the research also revealed obstacles and challenges that have hampered its implementation in the area of community development. Understanding the nature of those challenges is explored the next chapter.

CHAPTER 6

DATA ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION

6.1. Introduction

This study sought to assess the influence of decentralisation on community development. This chapter provides an in-depth analysis of the findings presented in the last one. The analysis was based on the main themes, which also contained sub-themes. The themes analysed included enforcement of democratic governance and organised administrative structure; fiscal and financial decentralisation; service delivery; participation in planning, and the management of development projects.

These themes are recognised as being crucial ingredients of community development in the context of decentralisation policy implementation. To achieve community development, an appropriate decentralisation policy needs to consider simultaneously planning and implementing development programmes at the local level in the sense that political and administrative decentralisation alone cannot improve the living conditions of the poor.

6.2. Decentralised strategies for community development in Gasabo District

6.2.1. Reinforcement of democratic practices and good governance

One of the most popular hypotheses is that there is a strong relationship between democracy and socio-economic development. In this regard, Kubal (2006) states that decentralisation requires a democratic framework to function properly.

In Gasabo District, the findings revealed that not all respondents agreed about respect for democratic values. Even though most of the respondents recognised that democratic values had been sustained, 23.5% disagreed. Laws regulating and providing for the or-

ganisation of local elections were shown to contain provisions which hamper competitive democracy.

6.2.1.1. Legal framework

In Article 180 of the Constitution of the Republic of Rwanda, the national electoral commission has the responsibility of organising and conducting local government elections. The laws listed below, the prime ministerial decree and ministerial orders determine the organisation and conduct of local government elections.

- Law No 27/2010 of 19/06/2010 covers elections in Rwanda;
- Law No 31/2005 of 24/12/2005 covers the organisation and functions of the National Electoral Commission;
- Law No 02/2011 of 10/02/2011 lays out the organisation and functions of the National Women’s Council;
- Law No 24/2003 of 14/08/2003 lays out the organisation and functions of the National Youth Council;
- Prime Minister’s decree No 01/03 of 11/02/2011 determines the functions and organisational structures of the National Women’s Council;
- Prime Minister’s decree No 02/2003 of 11/02/2011 determines the functions and organisation of the National Council for Persons with Disabilities;
- Ministerial decree No 01/2003 of 09/09/2003 covers elections National Youth Council elections.

In Rwanda, local government elections are held after a period of five years. Article 126 of the law on local elections states that the term of office and replacement of elected local government officials and the term of office for elected local administrative authorities is five years and outlines the process on how vacant council seats at district and sector level are to be filled.

Since the start of five-year-term-based democratic local government elections held in 2001, local governments have held three rounds of local government elections (2001, 2006 and 2011). Law No 24/06/2006 states that the elected councillors have the authority to express the views of the electorate without being influenced or compromised and have adequate authority and influence to make decisions on behalf of the local population without undue pressure from the central government, political parties or individual political heavyweights.

Article 17 provides for the removal from office of a councillor who has failed in representing the people he/she is supposed to represent effectively, by stating that when local residents find that the councillor does not fulfil his/her duties effectively, they may forward their concerns to the council for examination. Article 125 of Law No 27/2010, determining elections in Rwanda, prohibits candidates from campaigning for leadership positions at local government level on the basis of a political organisation. A candidate found campaigning on political party grounds would be immediately disqualified.

All the factors mentioned constitute limits to some extent on independent citizens having the ability to compete for a political mandate, since he/she must first gain the approval of the political party he/she belongs to.

6.2.1.2. Election of local government representatives

Direct and indirect adult suffrage are the two systems used to elect local government representatives. Tuzin (2007) relates the universal suffrage to the right to vote as a basic human right that empowers citizens to influence governmental decision-making and to safeguard their other human rights. In this context, the legal framework must ensure that every citizen above a certain age has the right of suffrage and that every person who has the right of suffrage is allowed to exercise that right in a non-discriminatory manner on the basis of equal treatment before the law.

At the village and cell levels, elections are held under direct suffrage, voters lining up behind competing candidates. At the sector and district levels, elections are done through indirect suffrage with a secret ballot. To the question of knowing whether local government political freedom is open to all citizens, a councillor had this to say: “Freedom is not 100% granted, since many candidates have seemed to attract the support of citizens, but instead were requested indirectly by the electoral commission to withdraw their candidacy without any genuine reason.”

Considering that elections at local level do not follow political party affiliations and this hinders political competition, as sector and district council members are so-called non-partisan councillors and are supposed to represent the entire population of the sector or district. However, to ensure inclusive local government democracy, the law providing for the organisation of elections at local levels provides space for marginal groups who in the past had limited participation in politics. Women have the freedom to compete with men for 70% of the council seats, when women have 30% of the total district council seats reserved for women only, occupied directly through the structures of the National Women’s Council without competition from male counterparts. Also, young people and people living with disabilities elect their representatives on the district council through their respective national structures as determined by the law.


6.2.2. Citizen participation in local development matters

According to Kotze (1997), participation should take a variety of forms and people may take part in development activities by providing information about their communities. This may include, among others, taking part in identifying needs, problems and priorities and taking part in decision-making relating to development goals, policies and strategies for their communities.

From the research findings, the 16.6% of respondents who disagreed that there is effective participation of residents in different activities within the district indicates that there is room for improvement as far as participation in local governance activities is

concerned. This was also echoed in a study conducted by the Rwanda Governance Board at national level; its findings may also be applicable in the context of Gasabo District.

Figure 38: Levels of participation in different domains



Source: Rwanda Governance Board, Citizen Report Card, 2010

This figure shows that areas which primarily involve accountability by leaders and citizen participation in prioritising, planning, and budgeting ranked lowest, yet these are important for participation in development.

A district councillor said: “The reason for the low level of citizen participation is that participation depends more on the leaders’ initiative, yet some leaders may not have adequate confidence to subject themselves to public scrutiny by their electorate.”⁴²

⁴² Interview with a councillor, 14 September 2014

Moreover, participation in these aspects requires sufficient mobilisation and preparation time and a well-elaborated process. These are sometimes absent.

6.2.3. Involvement of development partners in the planning and development activities

Planning is a prerequisite of any development programme. The central government, through the ministries of Finance and Economic Planning, provides leading and overall planning for the country that is cascaded to district level to be incorporated into district development plans. In this connection, the district development plan (DDP) takes into account the country's planning as elaborated in EDPRS 2 and Vision 2020. The successful implementation of the development priorities implies the involvement of various institutions and the district taking the lead to monitor and coordinate their implementation.

The vice-mayor (economic development) said: "The district considers its partners and stakeholders instrumental in the elaboration, implementation and monitoring and evaluation of the DDP."⁴³ Despite the existence of the Gasabo Joint Action Development Forum (JADF) comprising local NGOs and private companies in the district, created to promote close collaboration between the district and members of the forum; the findings of the survey revealed that their relations were characterised a lack of frank collaboration with the district. An NGO programme manager said: "Revealing work plans was implicitly revealing the funds to implement such plans and their sources. Yet sources of funds were one of the key secrets that development partners were not willing to reveal to anyone."⁴⁴ The researcher realised that most development partners hesitated to reveal their development plans, in turn affecting their working relationship with the district.

It was established that fear of revealing the source of funding would lead to competition among such funds which might result to the development partner losing its donors to the

⁴³ Interview with the vice-mayor (economic development), 3 September 2014.

⁴⁴ Interview with an NGO programme manager in Gasabo District, 24 September 2014

benefit of other development organisations. This is why development organisations are more interested in maintaining good working relations with their donors than with the district. This kind of working relationship, where development partners are suspicious of the local government, cannot really help local government in the process of community development.

A member of a local NGO pointed out: “Different committees are appointed and used as conduits by local authorities to foster the political interests of the district council. This situation is justified by the fact that political influence drives the process of selecting members, instead of their being selected by the stakeholders to represent community interests.”⁴⁵ This has not gone down well with all stakeholder representatives, some of whom are solicited to give consent to projects over which they have no say once implementation is begun. This finding concurs with SNV (2009), which states that local leaders set the agenda based on their own interests without necessarily taking into consideration the interests of the other development partners. Sometimes the JADF is merely used as an information channel by local authorities to inform the development actors of district decisions.

The state of collaboration between the district and NGOs leaves much to be desired and calls for improvement. In fact, NGOs are operating in some sectors without their activities being known to the district. The outcome is ineffective coordination between activities and other service providers, leading to duplication of efforts and disjointed development activities.

6.2.4. Mobilisation of financial resources


The district is mandated to collect revenues in its jurisdiction, and is supplemented by transfers from the central government to support the implementation of development

⁴⁵ Interview with a programme officer of one NGO member of the JADF

projects. The findings of this section, analysed below, relate to the ability of the district to collect revenues, the implications of basing administrative regulations on tax estimates, and challenges faced in tax collection.

The district has various sources of funds that support district programmes. These include taxes devolved to the district and fund transfers from the central government to support the district's ordinary budget. Specifically, 62.2% of respondents revealed that fiscal and financial decentralisation had allowed the district to increase its ability to mobilise resources and collect taxes.

Figure 39: Evolution of tax collection from 2006 to 2013 (millions of RwF)



Source: Data compiled from district reports, September 2014

An analysis of the district annual reports from the financial years 2006 to 2013, based on actual revenue realisations, indicates that the district has managed to increase its ability to collect taxes. The graph shows the gradual progress made in those years. From this figure it can be seen that, even though the fiscal flow is low, the financial autonomy granted to districts by Law No 17/2002 since 2002 has allowed Gasabo District to improve its strategies for mobilising resources.

It was observed that not all sectors in the district have the same tax base, leading to lower revenue generation. The head of the tax collection department said: “Even if tax collection has been increasing in recent years, the district has not yet managed to collect its annual revenue estimates to the maximum. Out of a total of 15 sectors, only urban sectors managed to collect on average 70% to 75% of their revenue estimates. At the other extreme, rural sectors realised less than 60% of their revenue targets.”⁴⁶

During an interview, a tax officer revealed: “Sectors are unable to fully realise the revenue due to them as a result of poor administrative capacity to enforce tax regulations, taxpayer resistance and corruption.”⁴⁷ Poor forecasting of revenues and the district’s inability to collect revenue could be the factors leading to low levels of socio-economic development. Low revenue realisation could be a result of two factors: 1, the authorities are unable to forecast their anticipated level of revenue with accuracy; and 2, they are unable to collect revenues due to them.

The district’s ability to raise funds determines its investment capacity and ability to attract an appropriate number of qualified staff to facilitate local development. Between 2006 and the 2013-14 fiscal year, the district collected more taxes. That increase in tax collection, as indicated in the figure above, is attributed to the release of a proportion of the fiscal base to the district as a consequence of the law on fiscal decentralisation that came into force in 2002.

However, fiscal and financial decentralisation displays low improvement, given the urgency of financing development programmes in the district. This has led to the districts not exploiting all the potentialities available in their areas to raise more money. Field findings reveal that decentralisation has enabled the district to implement fiscal policies within its jurisdiction regardless of various hindrances. In this regard, even though there is some progress, the district is having difficulties in raising sufficient rev-

⁴⁶ Interview with the chief tax officer, 14 September 2014.

⁴⁷ Interview with a tax officer, 14 September 2014.

venues locally due to its inadequate administrative capacity to mobilise resources, and the lack of relevant local infrastructure.

6.2.1.1. Budget allocation to administrative and development programmes

Budgeting for district resources is approved by the district council, which allocates funds for community development equally across all development sectors. The rationale behind equal allocation of resources across sectors is political, and the sector is considered a centre of local development. The development priorities are ranked in order as health, education and infrastructures. The district finances the projects with its own revenues, supplemented by central government transfers.

Table 11: District budget by programme (2013-16)

Programmes	Budget
Administrative and support services	5 472 465 941
Education	2 710 718 600
Health	1 285 536 272
Social protection	1 681 111 250
Youth, sport and culture	127 612 578
Private sector development	303 689 881
Agriculture	112 854 910
Environment and natural resources	47 455 941
Energy	250 000 000
Water and sanitation	370 961 322
Urban development and land management	1 730 629 672
Transport	1 511 997 734
Total	16 668 250 926

Source: Gasabo District budget, 2013-16, May 2013.

Both councillors and district employees acknowledge that development programmes are underfinanced due to the large number of projects, reflecting the demands of the community that are yet to be addressed. According to the district executive secretary, resources are spread thinly across sectors during the implementation of projects and citizens and other stakeholders are invited to provide free manual labour and local materials. From the table above, can be seen that 32% of the budget is allocated to administrative and support services and 16% to education, while other sectors each have less than 1% of the district budget.

The high level of budget allocation to education is justified by the government's determination to achieve the millennium development goal of universal primary education, resulting in a high demand for classes resulting from increased enrolment due to free primary education. From the perspective of budget allocations, it is hard to believe that with this trend continuing, the district could achieve its community development objectives when certain key sectors like health, housing, urban development and land management are underfinanced.

6.2.1.2. Transfers of funds from central institutions to support local development projects

Transfers of funds from the central government to local governments are the dominant source of revenues for districts in Rwanda. According to World Bank (2001), the design of these transfers is of critical importance for the efficiency and equity of local service provision and the fiscal health of subnational governments.

The fiscal decentralisation policy in Rwanda provides that 1.5% of the national budget should be transferred to local governments to support the implementation of their development programmes (Minaloc, 2002). This is relevant since the amount of available funding determines a local government's investment capacity and the opportunities for contracting a larger and qualified private partner, thereby facilitating local development

initiatives. The table below indicates the transfer of funds from the central government to the district in the fiscal year 2012-13.

Table 12: Funds transferred from central government institutions to the district

Origins	Funds transferred	Fund used	Balance	Rate of utilisation
Minagri	131 209 786	131 209 786	0	100%
Rema	27 879 103	27 867 103	12 000	100%
Ralga	2 015 617	2 015 617	0	100%
Minicom	99 969 031	99 969 031	0	100%
FARG	1 326 614 690	1178 759 693	147 854 997	89%
NDIS	7 793 442	7 793 442	0	100%
RMF	4 748 541	4 748 541	0	100%
RLDSF	1 607 240 660	1 331 274 723	275 965 937	83%
Minaloc	169 297 740	168 657 259	640 481	100%
NURC	6 843 065	6 843 065	0	100%
Minijust	17 598 630	17 598 630	0	100%
MoH	1 136 621 535	1 136 621 535	0	100%
RDB	43 527 356	5 256 539	38 270 817	12%
Mindeuc	2 268 010 637	2 242 185 399	25 825 238	99%
Intrahealth	3 816 043	3 632 225	183 818	95%
CDLS	26 301 701	24 165 960	2 135 741	92%
Migeprof	415 542 713	335 911 889	2 135 741	80%
Mifotra	5 618 974	5 618 974	0	100%
Minispoc	22 945 455	22 945 455	0	100%
General total	7 323 594 719	6 753 074 866	570 519 853	92%

Source: Data compiled from district reports 2012-13.

In the process of transferring funds, the district is required to submit development projects for funding. It was realised that this condition is difficult for a district lacking employees skilled in project formulation. Even though, in principle, central government institutions allocate funds to support development programmes in the district, the district executive secretary estimated the amounts transferred to be insufficient for effective implementation of community development activities in a manner that would satisfy the beneficiaries. In addition, delays in releasing funds were also mentioned as a partial cause of ineffective implementation, which then also affected service delivery. It was realised that the delay was caused by the fact that all districts submit their sectoral projects to the central government institutions for funding. These then require additional time for thorough analysis and checking their relevance and financial affordability. Consequently, projects are implemented by contractors lacking the required expertise, which leads to delays in the completion of projects and the escalation of costs, resulting in poor quality of work delivered.

6.2.1.3. Allocation of expenses for supporting major activities

During the first phase of the decentralisation policy (2000-05), it was realised that the districts of Rwanda could not reduce their outstanding debt. On the contrary their debts have been rising over time and their revenues have largely remained static. This inability of the districts to repay their debts was justified by the fact that they lacked a fiscal base to finance both their administrative and their development functions. As a matter of fact, the 2005 report on the state of local government in Rwanda indicated a rise in salary arrears from 4% to 6% of the total district debt, resulting from the districts' inability to raise funds and pay employee salaries (Minaloc, 2005).

Even though the district has managed to pay its employees' salaries on time, data obtained from the Department of Human Resource Management indicate that the salary

structure for the district's lower- and middle-class employees is too low⁴⁸ (Gasabo District, 2014). One executive secretary said: "A few staff [directors at the district and sector executive secretaries] are well remunerated at district and sector levels, however a majority of them are not, especially the lower cadres."⁴⁹

Given that most district and sector employees are not well paid and that employees at the cell and village levels are volunteers constitutes an obstacle to the implementation of development programmes and justifies in part the district's poor contract performance. To be effective and efficient in service delivery, the district is required to foster its strategies of tax collection and as such, if it maximised its revenue targets, it could remunerate its staff well, otherwise it could reduce its staff and remunerate them well.

6.3. Improving service delivery

Due to the wide scope of service delivery and the limitations of this study, the researcher has deliberately selected health and education as the main areas of focus due to their dominant role in development.

6.3.1. Achievements of Gasabo District in health services

Before the advent of decentralisation, health services in the district were hardly accessible to citizens and ineffective due to poverty and the limited numbers of health centres and health personnel. As a result of decentralisation, the district achieved remarkable progress in introducing the people of the district to community-based health insurance (CBHI).

⁴⁸ The salary structure for lower- and middle-class employees ranges between RwF125 000 and RwF25 000.

⁴⁹ Interview with a sector executive secretary.

6.3.1.1. *Introducing citizens to community-based health insurance in Gasabo District*

Community-based health insurance⁵⁰ (CBHI) was identified as a privileged strategy allowing ordinary citizens to have access to health services, with its organisational structure aligned to the decentralised administrative structures of the country. According to the Ministry of Health (MoH, 2007), CBHI in particular allows the most vulnerable and poorest segments of the population to be integrated fully into the health insurance system, so guaranteeing inclusion of the whole community and avoiding any stigmatisation.

Due to the demands of health care, the government revisited the policy, unlike in past years, to allow patients to access medical care at any health centre or hospital in any district. In the past the flat premium payment structure has been criticised for aggravating inequality and benefiting the rich more than the poor. In the light of these concerns, as of July 2011 the annual subscription was changed from a flat fee to stratified contributions based on the *ubudehe* categories.⁵¹

The new CBHI policy provides that the contribution is individual and paid annually not later than 31 January each year. The contributions of citizens falling into the first category are catered for by the government and its partners, since they fall largely within the category of abject poverty. People in the second and third categories pay an individual annual contribution of RwF2 000, while individuals in the fourth category pay RwF 3 000 and members of the fifth and sixth categories, considered the richest, pay RwF 7 000 (MoH, 2011).

⁵⁰ Community-Based Health Insurance (CBHI) is regulated under Law No 62/2007 of 30/12/2007 relating to the creation, organisation, functioning and management of CBHI and published on 20 March 2008 in the official gazette.

⁵¹ *Ubudehe* categories are economic categories used in the country for household classification. The identification of which household belongs to which category is usually based on a community participatory approach. The current classification recognises six categories: those in abject poverty, the very poor, the poor, the resourceful poor, the food-rich and finally the money-rich.

Table 13: Population adhesion to CBHI in Gasabo District by poverty category

Health zones	Cat. 1	Cat. 2	Percentage	Cat. 3	Cat. 4	Percentage
Kayanga	17 932	1 570	8.7%	16 362	325	1.9%
Jali	13 645	757	5.5%	12 888	874	6.7%
Rubungo	41 785	4 689	11.2%	37 096	555	1.5%
Kacyiru	101 677	51 741	50.8%	49 936	1 630	3.2%
Bumbogo	35 891	4 264	11.8%	31 627	0	0%
Rusororo	36 215	3 025	8.3%	33 190	520	1.5%
Nduda	25 646	862	3.3%	24 784	597	2.4%
Kabuye	14 792	2 374	16%	12 418	0	0%
Nyacyonga	18 600	1 860	10%	16 740	1 178	7%
Gihogwe	11 340	1 245	10.9%	10 095	249	2.4%
Kimironko	102 736	17 223	16.7%	85 513	5 001	5.8%
Gikomero	16 566	2 101	12.6%	14 465	0	0%
Kinyinya	27 291	3 946	14.4%	23 345	194	0.8%
Gatsata	36 897	11 806	32%	25 091	210	0.8%
Kagugu	29 894	1 547	5.17%	28 347	480	1.6%
Total	530 907	109 010	20.5%	421 897	11 813	2.8%

Source: Data compiled from district reports, July 2014.

During the 2014 fiscal year, the district and NGOs supported 2.8% of the extremely poor households, a rate that does not cover all people living in extreme poverty (37%). According to data from the district, 85% of the population is covered by CBHI insurance. In Gasabo District, CBHI has contributed to improving the access of citizens to basic health services.

The public health officer said: “Health conditions have improved considerably as most of the population has acquired health insurance and as a result, they no longer delay consulting a doctor when they fall ill.”⁵² The only concern is with regard to some isolated

⁵² Interview with the health officer, 15 September 2014.


cases where delays are caused by certain health partners in issuing health insurance to poor households, which led to some of the beneficiaries suffering due to unplanned spending and sometimes incurring double payment. The next table gives information on the availability of health facilities in Gasabo District.

Table 14: Number and types of health facilities in Gasabo district

District hospital	Police hospital	Health centre	Dispensary	Prison dispensary	Health post	Total
1	1	16	22	1	6	47

Considering only the health facilities managed by the public sector, the district has one district referral hospital, one police hospital and 12 health centres. In addition to these health centres, the district has also 20 dispensaries and six health posts.

Figure 40: Achievements of Gasabo District in the area of health



Source: Data adapted from district health reports, August 2014.

As indicated in this figure, morbidity due to malaria has decreased from 44.7% in 2006 to 11.8% in 2013 due to public campaigns for hygiene awareness and the effective distribution of mosquito nets. Women giving birth with the assistance of health professionals have risen from 28% in 2006 to 66% in 2013 (Gasabo, health report 2013).

Table 15: Medical staff ratios in Gasabo District (population 530 907)

Government ratios	2014 staff figures	Current ratios
1 doctor/10 000 residents	15	0.2/10000 residents
1 nurse/1 000 residents	346	0.6/1000 residents

Source: Kibagabaga Hospital, 2014.

The inadequate numbers of health facilities and staff are the major hindrances to fulfilling the quality of health services. Data available reveals that the district has in total 15 doctors, 346 nurses (including midwives) and 255 administrative staff working in health facilities. The doctor-to-population ratio of 0.2 out of 10 000 habitants is an indication of the critical insufficiency of health personnel impeding quality health delivery (Gasabo annual report, 2013).

6.3.1.2. Increasing role of community health workers (CHWs)

To deal with a significant gap in human resources in the health sector, the MoH started a community health programme in 2007 with the purpose of placing four trained community health workers (CHWs) in every village in the country by 2009 to alleviate the shortage of human resources in the health sector. Since then, CHWs have contributed in linking the country's primary health care system to the community, so mitigating the country's health professional shortage by providing basic health care at the village level.

CHWs intervene in health service delivery for maternal and child health by serving as intermediaries between the community and the formal health system. In a study conducted by Gilmore & McAuliffe (2013) CHW systems have been found to be effective in im-

plementing interventions to prevent deaths among under-fives, including malaria prevention, health education, the promotion of breastfeeding, essential care for newborns and psychosocial support.

However, the work of CHWs is constrained by an irregular system of supervision and a lack of proper training that limits their effectiveness. Many of them did not have an educational background in health sciences prior to their involvement in health services delivery. Even though training sessions were organised, by observation the researcher realised that CWHS have critical skills gaps and that this is still a concern in Rwanda's health system.

6.3.2. Achievements of Gasabo District in the education sector

In the area of education, decentralisation has contributed to improving the implementation and monitoring of primary education service delivery and has expedited responses to bad performance. In its first step, the Government of Rwanda encouraged basic education to a minimum of nine years and recently, starting with the 2011 education year, compulsory basic education was extended to 12 years, corresponding to secondary education.

The collaboration of the district with citizens has contributed to the construction of classrooms, offices and toilet facilities, so increasing the number of children enrolling in primary education. This has been the result of the involvement of citizen participation in the construction of more classrooms. Today the enrolment rate has increased compared with what it was in 2006.

Table 16: Distribution of public primary schools by districts in 2014

Sectors	N° of schools	N° of pupils	Number of teachers
Bumbogo	4	4 143	61
Gatsata	2	3 090	41
Gikomero	3	3 263	36
Gisozi	2	865	2 140
Jabana	6	5 488	93
Jali	3	3 964	49
Kacyiru	2	3 650	60
Kimihurura	3	3 380	54
Kimironko	4	2 959	51
Kinyinya	3	6 173	89
Ndera	4	5 078	80
Nduba	3	4 173	58
Remera	1	1 082	16
Rusoror	5	5 044	86
Rutunga	3	2 738	41
Total	48	55 090	2955

Source: Data compiled from district report, August 2014.

In Gasabo District, the district education committee (DEC) played a major role in mobilising resources according to the existing education sector plan. Building the many classrooms that were needed has been achieved through the combined efforts of the central government and the district. The district played a major role in implementing the government programme of nine years' basic education. This is meant to benefit poor communities who find it difficult to send their children to costly and distant secondary schools.

The district's role was that of mobilising citizens through community works. The Ministry of Education provided cement and roofing materials. This close collaboration contribut-

ed to increasing the number of classrooms and improving the ratio of classrooms per school to 13:1 in primary school and 10:1 in secondary school. As result, the district has been able to reduce the pupil/classroom ratio from 1:120 in 2006 to 1:70 in 2013. Another effect has been the reduction of the mean walking distance to a primary school in Gasabo District: 25.5 minutes (Gasabo, 2013).

These findings converge with the study by Faguet & Sánchez (2006) on decentralisation in education when they found that decentralisation improved public school enrolment, and Barankay & Lockwood (2007) as they state that the degree of decentralisation was positively related to educational attainment. Despite this achievement in education, primary education in Gasabo District continues to be highly dependent on the central government for its budget. This lack of sufficient funds to run education activities led to giving priority to administrative activities and the neglect of inspection. Ineffective inspection of schools, poor teacher salaries and delays in the provision of school materials are the major gaps in education service delivery which in turn affects the quality of education as a whole.

To date the district is not able to provide teaching materials and equipment to schools, and has to wait for the Education Ministry to intervene. In some instances, the researcher observed that school management committees (SMCs) in some sectors are not very active, as some members do not understand their roles. Also some elected leaders lacked the capacity to clarify the needs of their communities and articulate educational needs at meetings, which results in many crucial educational needs going unattended.

During the survey, the researcher realised that the implementation of education activities in the district is a responsibility of the district education department (DED), while the DEC is responsible for inspection. The observation is that the inspection of education activities is not effectively monitored because not all members of the DEC are familiar with education policy and activities. As a result, education activities are poorly monitored. The inspection of schools, provision of school materials and funding of sports act-

ivities are all areas where there are delivery gaps because the district depends on the central budget for their implementation.

6.4. Implementation of decentralised development programmes

The development and implementation of development programmes in local governments is not a process done in a vacuum. Rather, it is a cumulative and integral process through which district development plans (DDPs) are elaborated by taking into account the country's economic and development policies. In the context of Rwanda, DDPs are elaborated by making reference to EDPRS II and Vision 2020. As the various development programmes are implemented at district level, the research focused on VUP, is a decentralised community development programme targeting poor households with a variety of financial and social development assistance interventions.

6.4.1. Outcomes of the Vision 2020 Umurenge Programme (VUP) in community development

The Vision 2020 Umurenge Programme (VUP) is an initiative by the Government of Rwanda in collaboration with development partners and NGOs. The programme aims to eradicate extreme poverty by 2020 by creating off-farm employment opportunities, accelerating the process of monetisation and formalisation of the economy and thereby facilitating the eventual transition to a modern knowledge-based society. The impact of this policy is its provision and focus on three significant components of development, namely:

- public works, offering short-term employment on community infrastructure projects to extremely poor households that have adult labour capacity;
- direct support, providing regular unconditional cash transfers to extremely poor households with no adult member who is able to work;

- financial services, offering low-interest loans for productive enterprises to poor individuals or borrower groups that must necessarily include people from the latter categories.

To implement these three VUP components, there is a budget set aside for each, which is disbursed through pre-determined channels to reach the target groups. The target groups are the poorest and most vulnerable households with high illiteracy rates. As it is extremely challenging to make significant change occur simultaneously and successfully for the first time in all parts of a community, to scale up an initiative Nord & Tucker (1987) suggest the use of transformation zones where a new programme or practice is implemented in a representative geographic area before it is expanded to other zones. In this vein, four rural sectors of the district were chosen by the district to function as pilot models before the programme was expanded in all sectors.

6.4.1.1. Organization of public works in Gasabo District

Public works are adopted with the aim of providing poor households with a source of income by creating temporary jobs. In the view of Ninno *et al* (2009), the output of public works is twofold: jobs of short duration for workers to increase their income, and the creation of public goods in the form of new infrastructure or improvements of existing infrastructure, or delivery of services.

In the process of helping create the conditions that can lead to significant rehabilitation of poor people, extremely poor households with no land (<0.25ha) are eligible for public works (VUP, 2009). Public works are organised so that they include the construction of different types of infrastructure, providing a potential source of paid employment on productive community asset development projects. This led the researcher to investigate the contribution of VUP in the Gasabo District.

Table 17: Fund transfers to support public works within Gasabo District

Year	Amount transferred in RwF	Amount paid to beneficiaries	Eligible households to PW	Households that have benefited		Total
				Female-headed	Male-headed	
2009-10	266 667 950	173 051 350	1 279	1 080	998	2 078
2010-11	596 693 815	382 799 879	14 532	861	797	1 658
2011-12	535 114 686	40 546 575	6 439	936	1 040	1 976
2011-13	269 536 680	206 212 700	7 184	2 597	2 550	5 147
2013-14	275 653 200	198 897 200	4 176	2 125	3 060	5 185
TOTAL	1 943 666 331	960 961 129	33 610	7 599	8 445	16 044

Source: Data abstract from Loda reports 2009-14

This table reveals that a budget of about RwF2 billion was allocated to support the development of community assets in the district, so that VUP can be considered the second sector of employment after agriculture for the category of poorest households. As indicated in the following table, the programme is contributing to improving basic infrastructure in the district.

Table 18: Nature of projects financed under VUP in four sectors of the district (2009-14)

Types of projects	Number of projects	Planned quantities
Agriculture	3	
Radical terraces	11	671ha
Water supply	9	53km
Electricity	1	not available
Construction of markets	5	not available
Rehabilitation of feeder roads	42	453km
Rehabilitation of football ground	1	14 688m ²

Source: Data abstracted from Loda reports (2009-14)

Environmental protection projects have been the most numerous, mainly anti-erosion ditches and radical terraces, ranging from 58% of the project budget in 2009 to 72% in 2014. The second-commonest type of project is road construction and maintenance, to which 42% of all public works budget projects was allocated in 2009. This had fallen to 12% by 2013. Other types of projects included building school classrooms, markets, water infrastructure, health centres and building bridges, all of which contribute to improving service delivery in the district (DDP, 2013). During an interview with the vice-mayor (economic affairs), he said: “Public works have contributed to digging radical terraces on slopes, maintaining and creating new feeder roads as well as the construction of various kinds of infrastructure, and has offered employment opportunities to poor households.”⁵³

Public works have already brought remarkable advantages to communities in the form of environmental protection. Protecting soil against erosion has led to increased agricultural productivity. Also, the communities have progressively gained access to markets, education and health facilities. The district report shows that the public works budget spent on labour wages during the four financial years in table 6.6 above, ranged between 50% and 55% of the budget, which is too low to support poor households. The remaining non-wage percentage was spent on inputs, supervision and contractor costs.

In this view, Grosh *et al* (2008) state that in countries with widespread levels of unemployment and underemployment, standard short-term public works programmes are unable to lift the chronically poor out of poverty. So achieving a higher percentage of costs spent on labour, in line with the social protection objectives of the programme and maximising the money that goes directly to beneficiary households, would be crucial in reducing poverty.

⁵³ Interview with the district vice-mayor (economic development), 3 September 2014.

6.4.1.2. Direct support to poor households of Gasabo District

The VUP system depends on the participation of the inhabitants of the sector who have been selected as the poorest in each district. They all take part in a dialogue and classify themselves according to four categories of poverty. The poorest, those with the most difficulties in supporting themselves, are placed in either category 1 or 2, which entitles them to direct support and public works. This was devised as a means of supporting labour-constrained households living in extreme poverty without a productive workforce or otherwise unable to take part in public works.

Table 19: Value of direct financial support fund to poor households

Years	Households	Budget transferred	Amount disbursed to beneficiaries
2009-10	679	28 859 675	27 576 000
2010-11	686	103 291 196	83 744 300
2011-12	679	96 721 600	88 547 100
2012-13	684	99 146 100	81 139 000
2013-14	469	122 124 000	117 139 000
Total	3 697	450 142 571	498 665 900

Source: VUP report on Gasabo District 2009-14

This direct support benefited 3 697 households between 2009 and 2014, equivalent to RwF469 665 900. A simple observation shows that from 2009 to 2014 the average amount distributed per household ranged between RwF40 612 and RwF249 763. Data obtained from respondents on the use of direct support money revealed that beneficiaries spent the money received on household consumption (food, utensils, and clothes), human capital (health, education), asset accumulation (livestock), house building and renovation, income generation (agriculture) and saving.

6.4.1.3. Credit packages to finance community income-generating activities (IGAs) in Gasabo District

A credit package is a formal contract that describes the use of the credit to finance IGAs in pre-specified activities. This contract is agreed on with and endorsed by the community, and approved by the VUP management team at sector level. Proposals for credit packages are driven by a participatory planning process so as to promote the identification and prioritisation of local agri-business as well as off-farm business and employment opportunities. The contract allows the bearer to benefit from the VUP insurance scheme (VUPIS), which facilitates credit approval and covers the default risk on approved credit packages endorsed by the community (Loda, 2007).

In this process, no credit is granted before ensuring that beneficiaries are trained before they move to the second step of applying for a loan. The training component in saving for very poor households was designed to lay the groundwork for moves towards more formal development of saving and credit institutions and business development services. The first loans were disbursed in March 2010. The table below summarises the number, type and size of loans given out between 2009-10 and 2013-14.

Table 20: Credit packages to finance income-generating activities

Years	Amount disbursed	Nature of beneficiaries		Annual reimbursement	Rate of repayment
		individuals	associations		
2009-10	141 940 000	58	129	92 588 490	64%
2010-11	138 750 000	0	34	83 711 220	54%
2011-12	55 970 000	56	63	–	–
2012-13	24 765 000	14	36	1 608 400	54%
2013-14	70 170 500	35	57	4 248 360	33%
Total	432 595 500	163	319	182 156 470	51%

Source: Data abstracted from Loda reports 2009-14)

From 2009 to 2014, Gasabo District financed RwF432 595 500 through VUP that was disbursed to finance projects of individuals and cooperatives that fulfilled the requirements for a VUP credit package. The largest proportion of loans granted were cooperative loans (70%), followed by individual loans (30%), and the average loan amount taken by a beneficiary was RwF179 500 a year. The most common types of income-generating projects that were financed include farming, livestock and agricultural wholesale. The study revealed that due to the use of credit packages, beneficiaries were no longer jobless.

Research conducted by Mpambara & Umutoni (2015) revealed that thanks to the VUP credit package employment was created, income was improved as it went from \$20 to \$40 a month. With that income the beneficiaries were able to acquire household equipment and save money, and could apply independently for loans from microfinance institutions. However, an executive secretary revealed to the researcher: "There has been a high default rate in the repayment of the loans given out because the beneficiaries have not invested them in projects for which the loan was applied for, to create the expected job, but rather regarded them as an opportunity to satisfy personal needs." If the rate of non-performing loans continues to increase, the situation is likely to result in the district inability to perpetuate the programme since financing depends on the rate of reimbursement.

6.4.2. Infrastructure development

According to Nijkamp (1986), infrastructure is one of the instruments for improving the development of a region. It can influence socio-economic activities and other regional potentialities, as well as production factors, in a direct or an indirect way. Bristow & Nellthorp (2000) define three main outcomes of infrastructure, stating that infrastructure not only has a visible effect on the environment but also directly affects welfare (through time and cost savings, increasing safety and developing the information network) and the economy (employment, economic growth).

In matters of infrastructure development, priority investments are established by the district and validated through needs assessments by the district council. Projects that have drawn the attention of the district in the past five years were the maintenance and rehabilitation of rural feeder roads, markets and assorted agro-processing facilities.

6.4.2.1. Rehabilitation and construction of new feeder roads

The rehabilitation of existing roads and the construction of new feeder roads in Gasabo District has the purpose of ensuring ongoing service in distant zones and the development of farming, the main economic driver in rural areas of the district, particularly in encouraging the transport of agricultural products to commercial outlets and facilitating access to technical support from the Ministry of Agriculture (Minagri). The main outputs in the areas of feeder roads included the construction and maintenance of 850km of feeder roads in various sectors of the district. An assessment conducted by the district indicated that numerous spontaneous outcomes have been recorded so far (Gasabo District, 2013):

- increases in the prices of farm produce like cassava from RwF5 000 to RwF10 000/100kg, maize from RwF150/kg to RwF350/kg in season, milk from RwF150 a litre to RwF200/l.
- better transport of produce, since produce buyers can access farms directly, and reductions in transportation costs and time to major towns;

A citizen in Nduba Sector testified: “The maintenance of the road linking our area to the main road has affected farming activities positively as it contributed to reducing the cost of transport and the prices of basic products, so allowing farmers to channel their produce to markets.”⁵⁴

⁵⁴ Interview with a citizen beneficiary of public works in Nduba sector, 14 September 2014


Public works organised in the framework of VUP in the construction of roads with the participation of parents contributed to reducing post-harvest losses by roughly 20% in different areas of the district, especially for perishable vegetables (cabbage, tomatoes) compared with the situation before the implementation of the programme in 2008 (Gasabo District, 2013).

6.4.2.2. Access to electricity in Gasabo District

Electrification is widely believed to contribute to the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), based on the assumption that sustainable access to modern energy services fosters socio-economic development, and leads to improvements in the quality of life (Gunther, 2010). The electrification of the rural areas is done by the Rwanda Energy Group (REG), which has the task of implementing low-cost rural electrification technology. In this process, districts plan areas that need electrification and present their need to REG to provide electricity.

The median price paid for the connection, including in-house installations, comes to RwF110 000 (\$200). Considering that this cost is relatively high for poor households, unlike the VUP credit package, the VUP committee at sector level assesses and endorses the application to cover the default risk of applicant households which can afford the reimbursement of that amount in instalments. Due to this collaboration between the district and REG, 3 000 households have been connected and electrified since 2010 in rural areas not previously electrified, and the number of electricity subscribers increased by 2% every year since 2010. The outcome is noticeable on the community (Gasabo District, 2013). The figure below presents the distribution of households in the district using electricity as their main source of lighting.

Figure 41: Source of energy in Gasabo District



Source: NISR, EICV3, 2012.

In Gasabo District, 48% of households use electricity as their main source of lighting, which means the district is third countrywide after Kicukiro (63%) and Nyarugenge (61.6%). Urban areas have 46.1% of households using electricity as the main source of lighting, while the figure is only 4.8% in rural areas and 10.8% at national level (EICV3, 2012). Progressive access to electricity significantly influenced the evolution of modern living conditions for the population at large and in socio-collective facilities. The vice-mayor (social affairs) said: “The role of the district in collaborating with REG in the distribution of electricity to the population has eased working conditions, and has facilitated working conditions in all social and economic sectors.”⁵⁵

The progressive electrification of rural areas of the district speeded up the process of distributing potable water, since electricity allowed pressure pumps to distribute water in various water tanks; so reducing the distance walked to obtain drinking water. In this respect, the executive secretary of Kinyinya Sector revealed to the researcher that the

⁵⁵ Interview with the sector executive secretary, 16 September 2014.

electrification of rural areas had contributed to resolving the issue of access to drinking water, allowed young children to save time for studying, and reduced the fights previously seen at public fountains due to the scarcity of water. Health centres can operate at night thanks to better lighting levels, as well as keeping serums, vaccines and other pharmaceutical products that require low-temperature storage. A staff member at Gikomero health centre said: “Electricity has allowed the health centre to use electrical equipment, thereby improving health services, especially medical diagnosis, care, hygiene and the conservation of drugs.”

Changes were observed in education as electrification allowed schools in rural areas to acquire electrical machines and setting up laboratories that are instrumental for improving studying conditions so that pupils and schools could perform better. The introduction of new occupations related to income-generating activities was also a success, as economic activities have dramatically increased compared with the situation before electrification. Among the connected households, 8% developed income-generating activities like sewing milling, hair salons, secretarial services, restaurants, welding, tailoring, carpentry, motor mechanics or welding. In turn these activities generated a significant number of new jobs, which also led to the emergence of micro-finance institutions to provide banking.

Electricity has allowed people to use a variety of home appliances (televisions, radios and telephones, refrigerators) and electrical equipment, providing them with the same amenities as those in the city, while domestic lighting helps pupils and students to study. The use of electrical equipment helped them save on expenses and time compared with mechanical techniques of production.

6.4.4. Construction of markets and development of income-generating activities (IGAs)

Markets are of fundamental importance in the livelihoods of most households, urban and rural alike. Markets are where, as producers, they buy their inputs and sell their

products; and where, as consumers, they spend their income from the sale of crops or from non-agricultural activities, to buy their food requirements and other consumer goods (IFAD, 2003). For these reasons, improved market access is important to all households, and especially assisting rural poor people in improving their access to markets is a critical element of the district's strategy of enabling them to enhance their food security and increase their income.

Because of this, people in many parts of the district often indicated that one reason they could not improve their living standards was that they faced serious difficulties in accessing markets. Coupled with the provision of markets, the district also began reducing the administrative procedures required to establish new businesses. As a typical example, a recent action by the district reveals the reward of the strategy of partnership between the district and actors in the private sector:

“As a result of population growth in Gasabo District, coupled with land scarcity, the migration of low-income residents from rural to urban areas became an issue for the district. Many came to start small businesses by setting up stalls along the roads and sidewalks. The situation led to traffic congestion, security and sanitation problems. Building trading centres and markets in rural areas became a priority for the district, but financing such projects was beyond the district's financial capacity. Developing a PPP was an alternative solution for the district: it involved private companies as business partners to erect markets and boutiques in the district's rural trading centres. Through this partnership, markets were provided and trading in the new markets started to generate incomes for the private companies and contributed to a higher tax base for the district.”

As a result, 10 markets were erected in rural sectors, so that each sector of the district had at least one market. As shown in the table below, the number of private businesses combining formal and informal activities has increased significantly since 2006.

Table 21: Number of private companies by major sectors

Nature of private companies	Baseline 2006	Numbers in 2013
Wholesale and retail trade, repair of motor vehicles	465	6 111
Accommodation and food service activities	733	1 666
Other service activities	424	527
Professional, scientific and technical activities	312	347
Manufacturing	289	334
Financial and insurance activities	31	46
Administrative and support service activities	54	72
Agriculture, forestry and fishing	16	25
All other (transportation, electricity, construction, etc)	192	309
Total number of private companies		9 437

Source: Data compiled from reports of the Private Sector Federation (2006-14).

The district gained by offering opportunities to residents while at the same time solving their problems, making a solution possible when it had not been possible before. The erection of markets led to a significant increase in district revenue from business and an annual increase in taxes collected. The vice-mayor (economic affairs) said: “This improvement is related to financial decentralisation, which allowed the district to take decisions in matters of resource mobilisation that were not possible before the introduction of the decentralisation policy⁵⁶.”

With the erection of markets, hundreds of self-employment jobs were created; street vendors were moved into the boutiques, traffic congestion was reduced on surrounding streets, and sanitation and security problems were eliminated.

6.4.3. Promotion of agriculture and environment protection

Agriculture is the backbone of Rwanda’s economy and the livelihood of 80% of the Rwandan population depends on land. The agricultural sector of Gasabo District is con-

⁵⁶ Interview with the district vice-mayor (economic development), 3 September 2014.

fronted by a number of problems. First, due to high population density, land is a scarce resource and as result, soil fertility has deteriorated dramatically over time, while the use of fertilisers, whether organic or inorganic, remains low.

In addition, considering the mountainous landscape of the district, land is at a high risk of erosion, not least because smallholders cultivate slopes of up to 55% to bring land under cultivation that is not well suited to this purpose. To face these problems, specialisation in agricultural activities was deemed necessary for the government to optimise agricultural production. Strategies include encouraging farmers to use fertilisers and improved seeds as well as, digging radical terraces to protect soil from erosion.

Table 22: Moderns agricultural techniques used in Gasabo District

Techniques	Baseline 2006	Rate in 2013
Fertiliser use	9.3%	14%
Soil protection	43.1%	73.2%
Use of improved seeds	8%	16.4%
Commercialisation of crops	14.6%	20.9%

Source: Data abstracted from EICV3, 2012.

Data in the table above suggests that the agricultural sector of Gasabo district is lagging behind. According to the district agronomist, the district is characterised by agrarian agriculture with low average size of household land to grow a multiplicity of crops and vegetables as indicated by the table below.

Table 23: Cultivating households producing fruit, vegetables and export crops

Various	% of HHs	Food	% of HHs	Various cash	% of HHs
----------------	-----------------	-------------	-----------------	---------------------	-----------------

fruits and vegetables	producing selected fruits and vegetables	crops	producing food crops	crops (mainly for export)	producing cash crops (for export)
Fresh beans	36.1	Green vegetables	79.7	Coffee	2.8
Avocado	42.9	Dry beans	68.6	Tea	0.0
Squash	24.9	Maize	64.7	Cane sugar	5.0
Pepper	26.2	Cooking banana	61.7	Sunflower	1.4
Papaya	21.1	Cassava leaves	55.2		

Source: EICV 3 Thematic report agriculture, 2012.

Growing a multiplicity of crops on small lands lead to the overexploitation of the soils, which rapidly lose their fertility, so that small landholders are unable to cultivate enough crops to feed their families properly. This situation has pushed the district to encourage farmers into business- and market-oriented agricultural activities by growing cash crops including vegetables, fruits, maize and green beans.

To address the issue of low incomes related to land scarcity, the government has sought to address the low levels of livestock ownership through its One Cow per Poor Family programme as an important potential source of income. The programme distributes heifers to poor families, especially in the rural sectors. To be a beneficiary, the farmer must be in the category of poor household with enough land for grass production and an adequate barn or shed for the cow.

Since 2006 the programme has provided 1 370 cows to poor households. One cow per poor family offers many advantages for poor rural people. The programme has helped rebuild the livestock sector and improve agricultural productivity in rural sectors of the

district, using a solidarity chain system for livestock. The cultivation of fodder grasses has contributed to fighting erosion, since fodder grasses help in soil conservation.

However, it was observed that the programme might, to some extent, not be benefiting very poor households since many of them are also those with small lands, and so unable to meet the conditions for hosting a cow. During an interview, the agronomist said: “Agricultural development is by nature a multi-faceted undertaking and involves policies, programmes and projects that touch on distinct areas like environmental management, infrastructure development, education, land tenure systems, financial systems and so on.”⁵⁷ So it has been difficult for the district to carry out all the interventions that have a bearing on agricultural development.


Consequently, extension services are still weak: only 15 agronomists provide farmers with mentorship at district level and 33 veterinarians in the district. An average of one agronomist to 5 206 farmers is not enough to ensure that crop and livestock disease control, or modern farming techniques are popularised around the district.

6.4.4. Encouraging NGOs in empowering local communities

Gasabo District considers its partners and stakeholders instrumental in the elaboration, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of its development plan. Apart from the government, the policy-making organ of the major district’s activities, there are a number of local and international NGOs that provide a wide range of socio-economic services. NGOs are represented at and take part in district meetings through the JADF forums, which provide a forum for a diversity of district-level actors and a space where different partners are encouraged to take part actively in joint planning, implementation and monitoring of local community development activities. The graph below indicates the intervention domains of NGOs in the district of Gasabo.

⁵⁷ Interview with the agronomist, 23 September 2014.

Figure 42: Intervention domains of NGOs



Source: Gasabo District administrative data

This figure shows that the development programmes of many NGOs are limited to training, advisory services and facilitation activities. Their interventions are mainly based on socio-economic development programmes: they empower local communities through capacity building. Knowledge acquired helps beneficiaries to go into small businesses by setting up income-generating activities using their potential.

The approach entails grouping individuals into cooperatives so as to perpetuate the skills acquired through training and implement the effects of these interventions with other needy individuals living in the same conditions. It was realised that projects conceived and implemented by NGOs aimed at community development were not only limited in number and quality since the development programmes of many NGOs are limited to training, advisory services and facilitation activities.

6.4.5. Promotion of cooperative organisations

Cooperatives are of paramount importance in the process of economic development. According to the ILO (2001), cooperatives involve the provision of opportunities for improved income to members and play an important role in facilitating access to credit,

procurement and storage, distribution of input and marketing of products, so helping to alleviate poverty. Smith & Ross (2006) posit also that cooperatives also provide opportunities for social inclusion.

Gasabo District authorities continuously encourage citizens to form cooperatives and associations to assist in their self-employment. From this perspective, the researcher was curious to know how cooperatives contributed to improving members' living conditions. The table below estimates the number of jobs cooperatives have created in the Gasabo District.

Table 24: Number of jobs created by cooperatives in Gasabo District

Description	Number of cooperatives	Average jobs per cooperative	Total jobs created
Sacco	15	4	60
Primary cooperatives	172	1	172
Unions and federations	54	3	162
Total	241	8	394

Source: District report on cooperatives, 2013.

The cooperatives undertake income-generating activities in small trading and service businesses, like grocery shops, restaurants, and repair and maintenance services. The vice-mayor (economic affairs) said: "The number of cooperatives in the district has doubled since 2006. They have created employment to their members, especially in the areas of agriculture, handicrafts and artisanal work, and the district remains determined to encourage residents in various areas of activity to form more cooperatives."⁵⁸ Information in the table above reveals that cooperatives in Gasabo District have contributed significantly to creating employment, not only for members but also for non-members.

Each Sacco in a sector has provided at least four jobs, while other cooperatives create, on average, one to three jobs depending to their nature and size. The district officer in

⁵⁸ Interview with the district vice-mayor (economic development), 3 September 2014.

charge of cooperatives said: “Cooperatives have helped members build houses, pay their children’s school fees and produce food for the family, which are all indicators of improved living conditions.”⁵⁹ The flow of income has helped cooperative members to realise tangible changes by improving the living conditions of their families and communities, compared with what things were like a few years ago.

6.4.6. Improving access to financial services

One of the objectives of the VUP programme is to increase the access of poor households to financial services by extending the coverage of financial services to poor and remote areas and helping poor households to join the formal financial system. Achievement of this objective cuts across all VUP components, since direct support and public works and credit package payments are made through the banking system.

The major objective of this strategy is to develop a saving culture which is also a component of development for the poor and a fundamental first step required before access to credit. This is beneficial since it ensures that not all wages are immediately allocated to household needs and spent. To achieve this objective, Umurenge Sacco was established in 2008 with the aim of boosting rural savings and providing access for low-income Rwandans to loans to improve their earnings and enhance their livelihoods. According to Minecofin (2012), establishing Umurenge Saccos in all sectors is a key element of the financial inclusion strategy, as having access to its products and services is only one part of financial inclusion.

The concept of the Umurenge Sacco was initiated on the understanding that classical banks are more concentrated in towns and have limited benefits for very poor households, since access to credit requires a mortgage to secure the repayment of a debt – which very often poor households do not have. Since 2009, the National Bank of Rwa-

⁵⁹ Interview with the district officer in charge of cooperatives, on 2 September 2014.

nda has issued licences to 15 Umurenge Saccos, corresponding to 15 sectors of the district, following approval of their business plans.

The development of the Umurenge Sacco scheme in the Gasabo District has equipped each sector with at least one financial institution. They contribute to developing a credit and savings culture for rural people who generally have small earnings, which would rule them out of being a primary target for large commercial banks. During the time of this research, 15 Saccos and seven IMFs were already licensed. As indicated in the table below, Sacco capital was constituted by encouraging sector residents to buy shares in their local cooperative. Their deposit accounts serve as the funding base that enables the cooperative to extend loans to its members.

Table 25: State of deposits and loans released by Saccos in the district

Sectors	Shares	Subscribers	Deposits	Credit released	Enrolment
Gatsata	6 000	1 396	71 210 601	25 408 960	6.9%
Gisozi	10 000	1 134	56 188 929	13 790 000	6.2%
Kacyiru	10 000	1 188	88 268 030	56 042 000	4.1%
Kimihurura	10 000	2 998	176 310 447	35 199 000	15.6%
Kimironko	10 000	2 144	255 394 001	116 889 952	5.8%
Kinyinya	10 000	2 197	139 584 187	54 250 000	8.9%
Remera	10 000	2 726	96 138 784	66 154 000	9.5%
Total urban		13 783	883 094 979	367 733 912	7.8%
Bumbogo	5 000	3 110	188 174 826	98 012 800	22.4%
Gikomero	1 500	2 950	75 917 514	11 267 310	34.2%
Jabana	10 000	2 424	178 307 971	91 412 570	14.9%
Jali	6 000	3 168	110 853 196	12 200 000	23.3%
Ndera	5 000	3 509	120 115 168	30 948 598	19.0%
Nduba	2 000	5 000	161 917 777	70 575 000	42.2%

Rusororo	5 000	2 450	119 874 618	39 514 295	12.4%
Rutungu	2 000	3 949	244 303 301	34 108 146	41.0%
Total rural		26560	1 199 464 371	388 038 719	23.7%
Total District		40 343	2 082 559 350	755 772 631	14.0%


Source: District annual report 2012-13.

From this table there is no doubt that the Umurenge Saccos are contributing to greater financial inclusion, mobilising savings and financial development. From January 2009 to December 2013, the amount of money deposited in the district's Saccos hit Rwf2 billion. However, it was observed that the enrolment is distributed unevenly across the district. Rural sectors registered a high rate of 23.7% residents enrolled against 7.8% in urban sectors (Gasabo, 2014). The vice-mayor (economic affairs) said: "Establishing Umurenge Saccos has contributed to reducing the gap that existed in accessing financial services for low-income households, especially in the rural areas."⁶⁰

Data from the National Bank of Rwanda (NBR, 2013) reveals that Saccos have now decreased the number of people who had no access to savings and banking services from 58% to 28%. It has instead doubled the number of Rwandans active in banking services from 21% to 42%. Another advantage linked to Umurenge Saccos is that soft loans have helped beneficiaries to start small businesses. An analysis of various projects submitted indicates that loans were invested to start income-generating activities in various areas as indicated by the figure below:

Figure 43: Nature of income-generating activities financed by Umurenge Saccos

⁶⁰ Interview with the district vice-mayor (economic development), 3 September 2014.



Source: Gasabo Sacco reports, 2014.

Umurenge Saccos' ability to finance IGAs is an indication of the great potential they have to increase access to financial services, develop a culture of saving and boost small businesses in the district.

6.5. Factors hindering decentralisation and community development in Gasabo District

The nature of any policy implementation process may encounter obstacles during the implementation, particularly if the process is long and complex, involving many actors and transactions. While progress is being made in decentralisation for community development in Gasabo District, its successful programme planning and implementation to accelerate community development is beset by several institutional, technical, political, economic and social factors.

After presenting an overview on some observable changes brought by the decentralisation policy and its influence on community development, the section below analyses factors that hinder its effective implementation.

6.6.1. Inadequate financing of decentralisation and development programmes

The major challenge of the district to the effective implementation of decentralisation for community development is insufficient budget, as expressed by 32.8% of the respondents. The government has outlined a fiscal decentralisation policy, which among other considerations has defined areas where the districts could raise revenues autonomously. It has been observed that despite 1.5% of the national budget being transferred to local governments, the district's budget is insufficient to implement development projects effectively. This contribution is too small and does not reflect the importance and the expectations that decentralisation raises in terms of the district's future development. Among the major constraints facing the VUP is the matter of insufficient funds allocated to the programme for the implementing its activities. As an example, in the financial credit package component, only 50% of the total projects that were submitted and approved for financing have benefited from this programme due to insufficient funds.

Another issue observed is that the money intended for development projects arrives to the concerned with significant delay and this leads to poor execution of projects since under normal conditions such projects must satisfy some requirements like its timelines that must match the total amount allocated to the project. During the interview, the officer in charge of the VUP said: "One major reason of this delay is related to bureaucracy, because project approval goes through various checking committees. The release of funds is subject to long administrative procedures that evidently hamper the successful completion of many projects."⁶¹

It has also been observed that public works are not continuous and as a consequence, wages that are paid have limited effect in transforming the living conditions of beneficiaries, since they have to wait more than six to 12 months between the end of a project that offered jobs and the start of a new one. The district is also unable to pay its staff a

⁶¹ Interview with VUP officer, 9th September 2014.

salary that relates to buying power, considering the rises in prices of primary goods on the market. Related to this are employees who are unsatisfied and demotivated, resulting to some extent in poor quality service delivery to the community.

6.6.2. Ineffective co-ordination of development activities

In connection with inadequate financial resources is the issue of coordination and service delivery. The planning framework for Rwanda's development process is constituted in Vision 2020 and the EDPRS. At local level, national development is expected to be built on district development plans which reflect the development needs of the people. Although many regard this approach as innovative and more adequate to bring about sustainable results, it nevertheless represents considerable challenges for local administrations, with weak management and planning skills.

The current situation is that NGO development programmes are limited mainly to empowering local communities through capacity building. They are also designed and implemented with little regard to or knowledge of who is doing what and where. The researcher observed that among NGOs, the system in place is ineffective for harmonising their projects, which has led to the duplication of efforts due to the initiation and implementation of identical projects by different organisations at local level.


In this regard the district, along with its development partners, has a major challenge: bringing about coherence in the process so as to achieve development goals effectively. This falls in the view of SNV (2009) when it states that there is insufficient understanding of the roles and responsibilities between the district and the JADF in the process of implementing development programmes, which results in poor coordination of activities. In the planning process, emerging challenges include the harmonisation of the local government's planning activities with national planning strategies and priorities. In this respect, the challenge observed consisted in adapting the national development strategies to local initiatives and realities.

6.6.3. Drop in economic investments leading to infrastructure development gap

As described by Willoughby (2004), many benefits of infrastructure have been confirmed by the UN Millennium Project (2005), which advocates a major increase in basic infrastructure investment to help countries escape the poverty trap. But to be effective in community development, infrastructure development should be coordinated with other important concerns, such as agricultural, environmental and trade policies.

Despite its clear benefits for growth and poverty reduction, infrastructure spending is far below what is needed. In Gasabo District more than 15% of households lack access to roads, 15.3% of households do not have safe drinking water, 42.7% of households lack reliable sources of energy, and 25.7% have no sanitation facilities (NSIR, 2012).

Figure 44: District budget trend 2013-14 and 2014-15



From the figure above, it is clear that spending on economic development activities in 2014-15 has declined of about more than 10% compared with the 2013-14 budget. This decline has resulted in delaying the implementation of some development projects and, as a result, some rural areas suffer from a huge backlog of needed infrastructure investment. In the absence of accessible transport, energy and water, the poor pay heavily in time, money and health. To achieve community development goals, the decline in economic development must be reversed. A significant increase in infrastructure development is needed to achieve community development goals.

6.6.4. Insufficient capital in rural areas of the district

The financial survey conducted early in 2012 to assess financial exclusion in Rwanda indicates that the percentage of adults using formal financial services and using informal mechanisms stood at 66% and 48.4% respectively in the Gasabo District (AFI, 2014). In this connection, the types of financial services provided indicate that 51.6% of adults are served by commercial banks and 42.6% by non-bank formal financial institutions.

SMEs and cooperatives are underdeveloped and cover a portion of the middle class in urban centres. In general, points of business interest are concentrated in established marketplaces distributed across the district. District data estimate the number of taxpayers at 8 580, out of whom 6.339 operate in urban sectors (equivalent to 73.9%) and 2 241 (26.1%) are in rural sectors (district report, 2012). In addition, beneficiaries of VUP credit packages grouped into cooperatives lack a spirit of competitiveness, as they seem to prepare similar projects in the same areas. The outcome of such a situation is that the financial benefits of VUP credit package beneficiaries have remained constant over a period of four years because they are sharing the same clients.

6.6.5. Insufficient and inadequate capacity of district staff and local leaders

Technical and managerial capacities and local governance development support are important for avoiding poor performance. It was observed that the district staff are in charge of implementation and district and sector development committee are in charge of monitoring development programmes. The lack of sufficient and adequately skilled personnel is one of the obstacles to development in the district. This is a serious hindrance which affects quality service delivery and the overall community development of Gasabo District.

A staff member of the district planning department said: “Many of the councillors do not have the required capacity and skills to ensure that implementation is carried out effectively, based on the fact that many of the district and sector staff lack formal training in project management.”⁶² It was observed a high level of employee turnover and a lack of formal training for project committee members placed in project management (needs identification and project prioritisation), thus constraining both performance and service delivery improvement.

⁶² Interview with a staff member in the district planning department, on 2 September 2014.

However, within the district, rural sectors are affected more than others. Among the reasons mentioned by district officials as leading to a lack of adequately qualified employees are:

- limited capacity for paying workers;
- most of the educated people are unwilling to work in rural areas. The reasons for this problem, as mentioned by respondents, include low salaries and unfavourable working conditions, for instance a shortage of office facilities.

It has been noticed that there are very few district officials experienced in the areas of health and education. The causes for the shortage of adequately experienced workers include:

- absence of basic infrastructures in the districts;
- insufficient resources or funds for a district to attract experienced workers and an inability to pay good salaries to all district workers,
- a lack of much-needed office equipment like computers, the internet, transport and accommodation in all sectors of the district.

6.6.6. Ineffective service delivery

The major limitations on effective and efficient service delivery at district level fall into two categories – coordination and supervision, as well as financial and logistical constraints. The new district structure incorporates all technical services under the district administration, which is expected to coordinate and supervise all the technical services delivered at district level. However, it was reported that the support of line ministries to districts in technical and logistical facilitation was severely limited.

The central government surrendered services to be either coordinated or delivered by the district, but the district does not have full control over funds for these services. In this regard, a district staff member claimed that sectoral budgets like those for health and education were not included in the district budget. Consequently district authorities

cannot easily coordinate or supervise the staff, who are neither employed nor remunerated by the district.

The lack of financial capacity in the district leads to insufficient logistical facilities, which also leads to a lack of motivation and poor performance among district officials. The availability of logistics and facilities in the districts depends on the interventions of development partners operating in the district. Insufficient facilities, like transport, indicates inadequate support from sector ministries, as most of them have a reasonable number of vehicles, including motorcycles, but find it difficult to make some of them available to districts.

6.6.7. Resistance to change and corruption of some local leaders

For its success, decentralisation policy requires the participation of the population. One of the obstacles hindering the decentralisation and community development process from achieving its objectives fully is the poor involvement of some local authorities, as their role is to organise meetings and mobilise the population to take an active part in its implementation, as well as in associated development programmes. The lack of conviction among some local leaders for support of the programmes makes the degree of participation of the residents in planning activities unsatisfactory, which has a negative outcome in the implementation process.

Corruption at local level has been also identified by respondents as a hindering factor, obstructing local entities in their delivery of services to citizens and implicitly affecting good governance. Volunteerism in local entities is one of the factors favouring corruption in local authorities and one of the obstacles hindering effective service delivery.

A district councillor said: "Volunteerism is encouraged. It involves spending time on unpaid activities that aim to benefit citizens seeking a particular service."⁶³ Central to this

⁶³ Interview with a district councillor, on 3 September 2014.

is the fact that volunteerism is a choice suggested by political leaders to opinion leaders in the village, who also accept this so-called determination to serve the country.

The outcome is that the village executive committee spends its time working for the interest of people in the entity they are leading, and becomes involved in corrupt behaviour or bribery over the issuing of official documents to citizens that entitle them to obtain specific services at the sector or district level.

6.6.8. Ineffective monitoring and evaluation system

The central government has put in place a performance contract system to monitor how local governments spend their resources and to evaluate their performance. On one side, it has been observed that the government relies on the annual reports of the General Auditor's office. However, it was realised that these reports are released two to three years after the financial operations have taken place, due to the number of government institutions requiring auditing. On the other side, the committee in charge of evaluating the performance contract look at the state of activities, but does not audit the financial state of affairs. This may be a source of poor utilisation of district funds.

It was also realised that citizens at large do not participate in the monitoring and evaluation of projects. Another councillor said: "A delegation from the central government, Kigali City, selected district staff and the executive secretaries of sectors carry out evaluations, as they appear to be *au fait* with realities at grassroots level. This situation leads sector executive secretaries to bring the evaluation team to visit projects which appear successful. As a result the evaluation finding may to some extent be subjective."⁶⁴ This challenge was also highlighted by Ralga, where it was noted that the lack of an effective monitoring system in most districts made it difficult for councillors and NGOs to monitor progress and so hold the administration accountable (Ralga, 2013).

⁶⁴ Interview with a district councillor, on 3 September 2014.

Conclusion

This chapter analysed the influence of decentralisation on community development in the Gasabo District of Rwanda. The research findings with respect to democratic governance revealed that decentralisation has allowed locals to elect their own leaders, so making elected leaders more accountable and more responsive to local concerns. It was noted that elected leaders do not often consult their constituents on projects to be implemented and that their autonomy is sometimes undermined by interventions, either by political parties or by the Kigali City Council.

With respect to fiscal decentralisation, attention was focused on the district's ability to raise revenue that would decrease its dependence on central government transfers. The research revealed that Gasabo District has improved capacity for generating its own revenue. However, it was observed that funds generated have allowed the district to cover its operational charges, but are by far insufficient to finance development programmes, making it depend largely on transfers from the central government.

Concerning the implementation of development programmes, the research focused particularly on the VUP and realised that the programme has offered non-permanent jobs to local citizens, and the credit packages have allowed others to start income-generating activities. Findings revealed that wages paid through direct VUP cash transfers and public works were progressively empowering beneficiaries selected from the neediest people by allowing them to invest in small income-generating activities which in turn improve their livelihoods. However it was observed that there are a number of challenges at district level, related to timely payments to beneficiaries.

Also the research investigated how decentralisation was contributing to improve service delivery in Gasabo District. In this regard, factors like availability, quality of service and accessibility were considered so as to assess their effectiveness on citizens. The research revealed that with decentralisation, service delivery had improved, at least compared with the situation before decentralisation. Concerning education, respondents

mentioned that the participation of parents and other stakeholders in the nine-year basic education scheme had contributed to improving accessibility and increased the enrolment of children in primary education. As far as health care is concern, health centres have been constructed and others renovated. The district, in collaboration with health workers, has played a crucial role in motivating citizens to join the CBHI, allowing them access to medical care. However, the insufficient numbers of facilities and staff constitute major hindrances to fulfilling policy requirements and delivering quality service in these two sectors.

CHAPTER 7

SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

7.1. Introduction

This chapter presents the summary of major findings drawn from the study, a general conclusion and recommendations, and ends by suggesting areas for further research. The study examined the influence of decentralisation on community development in the Gasabo District of Rwanda. The research was guided by research questions regarding the outcomes expected from the decentralisation policy in local governance so as to contribute adequately towards community development in Gasabo District and eliminating the barriers that hamper effective and efficient realisation of such outcomes?

7.2. Summary and conclusion

The research started in Chapter 1 of the study with the background to Rwanda's governance system. In this chapter a problem statement, scope and objectives of the study were defined, so justifying the relevance of the study in the Gasabo District as a case study. Existing literature revealed that between the Rwandan monarchy and 1994, governance in the country was characterised by a centralised system of governance in public institutions, characterised by lawlessness and a dislocated public services system. Only in 2000 did the Government of Rwanda introduce its decentralisation policy.

Chapter 2 analysed the decentralisation process in Rwanda. This chapter took an overview of the territorial organisation of Rwanda from the time of the monarchy through the colonial and post-independence eras, and since the 1994 genocide. It was realised that Rwanda's governance prior to 1994 was highly centralised, to the extent that citizen participation in state affairs was insufficient to sustain development programmes. In this chapter, the state of local government in Rwanda – which led to the decentralisation policy during the post-genocide period – was explored.

Chapter 3 dealt with literature related to decentralisation and community development. The chapter defined by extension the concepts of decentralisation and community development. From the perspective of the literature, it was realised that decentralisation had advantages, as it allowed administrative responsiveness, increased political participation and promoted democratic governance, all of which are preconditions for development.

Chapter 4 dealt with methodology. This chapter clarified the research design, the survey instruments and procedures, and an analysis of methods. Considering the nature of this research, both qualitative and quantitative research was relevant to reaching valid findings.

Chapters 5 and 6 were concerned respectively with the presentation and analysis of research findings on the influence of the decentralisation policy on community development in the Gasabo district. These chapters analysed factors of decentralisation and the district's actions aiming at sustaining community development in the district.

An important finding is that the influence of decentralisation on community development in Gasabo District is not yet at a satisfying level. Political, administrative and fiscal decentralisation, together with appropriate planning and implementation of development programmes, needs to be considered simultaneously, given that administrative decentralisation alone does not speed up community development. Through the administering of questionnaires, interviews, direct observation and document reviews, the research came up with the following major findings:

The study revealed that institutional structures had been put in place and were fully functional. These include executive committees, councils, and CDCs. Most of the leaders at various levels have benefited from training to equip them with basic skills required of them to carry out their duties. These structures have been put in place through elections. District councillors saw these elections as a move aimed at empowering them and a catalyst for overall development;

At all levels of local administration, there is an acceptable level of accountability, transparency and responsiveness. In all the areas visited, it was noted that leaders had learnt to explain their actions to the electorate. Transparency in decision-making where the local population is involved directly in major decisions regarding their welfare has been improved. The leaders have learned to respond to the needs of the population because in the case of failure to do this, under decentralisation, the law on local elections gives power to the electorate to remove them from the power. Vices such as corruption have been addressed with consultative leadership and organs such as the District Tender Committee, though there is still a need to fight this vice in the lower levels of administration such as sector, cell and village levels.

Election turnout was found to be high to choose local leaders capable of gearing development activities in the district. It was also found that the monopolisation of leadership by a single personality, which is a characteristic of centralised governments, is no longer the case. Currently, different individuals and organs at a particular level of administration share leadership roles. The district council and executive committee complement each other, but with the council acting as the controller of executive committee programmes. The sharing of responsibilities has reduced bureaucratic tendencies and improved the quality of administration, while progressively becoming responsive to the needs of the population.

As regards fiscal and financial decentralisation, due to the decentralisation policy, the district is empowered to collect some taxes within its jurisdiction to sustain local administration, and this has reduced ghost taxpayers. Apart from funds transferred by the central government to implement development programmes, the administrative functioning of the district is no longer dependent on central government funds. The district fund management responsibility is no longer in the hands of the district mayor, but with the district executive secretary and district accountants, with regular financial control ensured by district auditors and the office of the Auditor-General. It was also found that there has been improvement in service delivery. It was noted that services previously

delivered by the district had been brought closer to the population and delivered at sector level or at cell and village levels.

Testimonies revealed that community participation in various activities was noted to have increased compared with previous years. Generally, the local population takes part in meetings after community works, because decisions emanating from them have important implications on the implementation of development programmes. Citizen participation in community works has contributed significantly to the sustainability of development activities.

As far as the development programmes are concerned, the attention consisted in analysing how the implementation of VUP components answer the priorities of the poorest households at local level. The findings revealed that due to VUP in Gasabo District, there has been a shift of focus towards the adoption of pro-poor development activities. Beneficiaries appreciated the services provided through VUP which have affected the community, not only in terms of wage paid but also through the development of infrastructure like roads and bridges, health and education facilities that were built. As a result, access to these facilities has been easier than before the VUP reached their sectors. Economically, findings revealed that most VUP beneficiaries still rely on farming activities in addition to VUP-related income. However, it was noted that even though VUP contributed to improving their living conditions, particular attention was required to ensure that they may not fall back into poverty.

In this process, it was realized that land scarcity remained an issue closely linked to the vicious cycle of poverty, making it difficult for the district to achieve the objectives envisaged by the VUP, since the people needing support are at the same time those households owning very small pieces of land. Members from these households opt to migrate to urban sectors of the district to seek additional income to sustain their livelihood.

Savings are relatively good, but taking out loans has not been the culture for the poorest households. The major loan providers have been the Saccos and VUP. However, timely loan repayment has been identified as a challenge to providing more loans, especially for meeting new demands.

Even though all those efforts led me to record encouraging results in the process of community development, the available evidence shows that decentralisation has not been the ultimate solution to all developmental problems, as not all that was expected from it has yet been achieved. Despite a firm commitment from the central government and Gasabo District to make it successful and provide a valuable contribution to community development, the decentralisation policy is still affected by several factors:

As regard to the district development budget, it was realised that, over the past years it is was extremely insufficient and impeded the district ability to successfully deliver the services expected from it and to implement the development programmes required to achieve community development objectives.

In local government structures, the mayor and sector executive secretaries were found to be very influential in their respective councils, thus which has somewhat of a negative outcome on the performance of the district council, as some council members tend to act the way the mayor and the sector executive secretaries want them to act.

Rural sectors of the district are generally endowed with few resources compared with the urban sectors and the share formula of the district funds does not favour these weak sectors to facilitate their effective functioning. It was noted that these sectors are not capable of sustaining themselves, which means that decentralisation may create imbalances between sectors of the district.

As decentralisation led to the birth of youth and women's councils to serve as forums for development of these previously marginalised groups, it was noticed that other than the

existence of these structures, these specialised councils carry out only a little work, due to inadequate funds budgeted for the implementation of their planned activities.

Another important finding is the scarcity of experienced qualified employees. The findings revealed that there is still a capacity problem in Gasabo District, in terms of attracting and retaining sufficient trained and experienced staff, against a background of low pay levels and a lack of qualified staff generally. Insufficient and inexperienced staff, coupled with staff turnover, was observed within the district where some workers with scarce qualifications, like engineers, auditors and accountants, are unsatisfied with their jobs, compared with their technical counterparts who are employed in the central government civil service. Moreover, because salaries are low, few experienced candidates from such professions are willing to work in the district, especially in its rural sectors. This aggravates the problems of human resource management and remains a challenge to an effective decentralisation implementation process, as well as hindering development.

Findings revealed also that resistance to change remains a serious challenge to the decentralisation implementation process and overall development. This problem exists in both higher and lower levels of administration. At the level of ministries, there is a tendency to deal directly with corresponding technicians, instead of going through the district authorities, who should be in charge of these ministry technicians. At all levels, some leaders still behave in an authoritative way and are reluctant to relinquish powers to their counterparts or to lower-level authorities.

The recorded results are still insufficient for achieving those community development needs that remain. In terms of problem solving, there are some shortcomings and deficiencies, the correction of which should be a central concern. These include:

- many of the elected councillors, especially in rural areas of the district, do not yet have the required capabilities to follow up local programmes and development plans;

- the weakness of local resources in the financing of micro-projects;
- the question of the sustainability of project benefits;

Despite obstacles hindering its progress, the decentralisation policy is essential, especially as the central government does not have sufficient resources to fill gaps in infrastructure and services at the local level, and to cope with the needs of a rapidly expanding population. Placing decision-making on many issues at the local level and working closely with the population have made possible fast-tracked and cost-effective implementation of some programmes and increased demand for accountability. Even though the policy has contributed to establishing a basis for quicker responses to new opportunities in rural areas, the ways in which the organs of local institutions collaborate between them on the one hand, and central institutions on the other, still needs to be fully worked out.

7.3. Recommendations

Despite the great improvements brought by decentralisation, serious obstacles hinder effective implementation of the policy. As indicated in previous sections, the decentralisation process in Gasabo District is constrained by a number of hindrances. For the effective and efficient implementation of the decentralisation policy for community development, for each obstacle as identified below, the following recommendations are put forward:

Establishing the balance between means and responsibilities of the district

The concurrent fiscal decentralisation has devolved some responsibilities to local governments for effective and efficient implementation of the decentralisation policy. However, there has been an imbalance between the responsibilities and means allocated for achieving them. Budgetary expenditures and annual programmes should be reviewed at the end of each term so as to gauge the evolution of the process. In turn this requires timely re-adjustment of interventions depending on time constraints.

Even though Loda has tried to address the issue of imbalances between means and responsibilities, it is recommended that the central government intervene in training district tax officers on mechanisms and strategies of maximising tax collection to garner sufficient funds to carry out development plans. This would even help in providing some incentives to the sector and cell staff.

Effective planning and coordination of development programmes

Meetings between the district CDC, development partners and technical staff are necessary, as these technical staff help the CDC in identifying development projects that fall under their specialisation, so follow-up of these projects becomes easier. This would help in clearly defining the role of each stakeholder at the level of planning interventions, implementation and evaluation. Subsequently the re-organization and strengthening of the JDAF is in the long run indispensable. So the district might favour an integrated sector approach in the training of partner groups intervening in the same specific sector to facilitate complementarity of interventions. To address this issue, local government authorities should be technically supportive of linking the local planning process to the national poverty reduction framework.

Avoiding collision among administrative organs

The nature of responsibilities, authority, decision-making powers, competence, and lines of communication between the central government and local governments, district organs and lower levels must be defined clearly in law to avoid such collisions.

In this regard, real sectoral decentralisation is a requirement which, in the eyes of Dulani (2003), requires speeding up of the legislative process to amend existing laws that are inconsistent with the decentralisation initiative, as well as the spelling out of the institutional relationships between line ministries and local government institutions. Given that sectoral devolution is in essence at the heart of the decentralisation policy, it is imperative that these processes are undertaken without further delay.

In this regard, RGB and Loda should effectively implement the capacity-building strategies by organising training for DC and CDC members. Training of CDC members should be rational as all the members are development engineers in their respective areas. This should be all-inclusive and should target executive committees, councillors, the technical staff and the local community with the aim of equipping them with clear roles and responsibilities.

Further, it is recommended that political measures be taken to minimise the excessive influence of the district mayor and sector executive secretaries over members of the district and sector councils. Each of these organs – the executive and the council – should be independent of the others.

Continuous sensitisation to break resistance to change among local leaders

Attitudes for responsibility and accountability should be enhanced among district council members and local opinion leaders, and these through continued sensitisation of administrative officials and local communities to mitigate the resistance to change. The changing of attitudes is essential for communities to engage in self-help activities to enhance their confidence, and make them less reliant on the central government.

Permanent monitoring and evaluation

The success of the implementation of the DDP should largely depend on strong institutional mechanisms which ensure regular and permanent monitoring centred on coherence and coordination of interventions. Central government institutions should monitor regularly and evaluate the development plans so as to prevent any kind of poor performance, which may result from interfering leaders.

Regular field visits would facilitate the execution of rapid evaluation of programmes at every stage. The individual annual performance contract system needs to be strengthened, better implemented and monitored to optimise available resources. This mechan-

ism, coupled with “Open Accountability Day” sessions, would enhance the community’s sense of ownership.

Improving the partnership between the district and NGOs

Recognising the limited financial and human resources available to the district, it is important to encourage cooperation between the district and NGOs during the implementation of development programmes by working in partnership to deliver services. In this process, the district should integrate local NGOs and other development partners in the process of decentralisation for community development to empower the local population. Addressing this issue would require concerted effort and the commitment of all partners, and most importantly, NGO members in civil society working in the district. The district should consider among other things:

- the mobilisation of development partners to identify, implement and sustain community projects;
- the development of infrastructural capacity (roads and markets) to channel materials and products among consumers and manufacturers;
- promoting the awareness of legislative and other policy guidelines administered by the central government that could play a pivotal role in capacity building.

7.4. Limitations of the study and areas of further research

This study focused on assessing the influence of decentralisation on community development in the Gasabo District of Rwanda. Considering the complex nature of these two concepts, not all aspects of decentralisation and community development were analysed deeply in the course of the research and it is recommended that further research be undertaken.

The research took an overview of fiscal decentralisation, but did not explore existing strategies of budgeting and financial management in the district. Further research is rec-

ommended to investigate the mechanisms that should be adopted to improve tax collection.

Even though the research did not intend to analyse the role of all stakeholders in the decentralisation process deeply, the findings revealed that the partnership between the district and civil society organisations has not contributed enough to the development process despite the potentialities they hold. Future researchers should continue their efforts in studying the place and role of CSOs and the priority that each party gives to decentralisation as a way of supporting government development programmes.

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REPUBLIC OF RWANDA



Ref. N° 2460/07-0102/2013


CITY of KIGALI
GASABO DISTRICT
WEBSITE: www.gasabo.gov.rw
E-mail : info@gasabo.gov.rw
PO Box : 7066 KIGALI

To: Mr. INDOHA KIMENYI Janvier
Student at Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University
South Africa.
Kigali on 9th September 2013

RE: Authorization to conduct your research in GASABO District,
Gasabo District
Dear Sir,

We acknowledge receipt of your letter dated 9th September 2013 requesting to conduct research entitled: "The influence of Decentralization on community development in Gasabo District". Considering your research objectives are in line with our vision and that the expected research findings can contribute to improve the implementation of that policy in our District and after analyzing your approaches of data collection, we have the honour to inform you that the authorization of undertaking the research by administering the questionnaire to District officials, Councillors, Member of community-based organizations and conducting interviews with citizens has been granted. We hereby request that at the completion of research after its approval by the University you should provide us a copy of your findings. We wish you good Luck.

Sincerely,


NDIZEYE K. Willy
Mayor of Gasabo District

MUNARA J. Claude
V/M
DES AFFAIRES ECONOMIQUES



CC:
- H.W. the Mayor-City of Kigali
KIGALI

**SOUTH CAMPUS
FACULTY OF ARTS**

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Ref: H/13/ART/PGS-0018

18 September 2013

Student number 213332337
Mr. K J Indoha
P O Box 3145
Kigali
RWANDA
237

Dear Mr Indoha

THE INFLUENCE OF DECENTRALISATION ON COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT IN GASABO DISTRICT OF RWANDA

Your above-entitled application for ethics approval served at the RTI Higher Degrees sub-committee of the Faculty of Arts Research, Technology and Innovation Committee.

We take pleasure in informing you that the application was approved by the Committee.

The Ethics clearance reference number is **H/13/ART/PGS-0018**, and is valid for three years, from 04 September 2013 – 04 September 2016. Please inform the RTI-HDC, via your supervisor, if any changes (particularly in the methodology) occur during this time. An annual affirmation to the effect that the protocols in use are still those for which approval was granted, will be required from you. You will be reminded timeously of this responsibility.

We wish you well with the project.

Yours sincerely
Faculty Administrator

cc: Promoter/Supervisor
HoD
School Representative: Faculty RTI

INDOHA KIMENYI Janvier

Kimironko Sector

Cell Phone: 0788308791

Email: indjanvier@yahoo.com

Dear Sir/Madam,

Date: 27th April 2014

Re: Letter of Introduction for survey

Dear Sir/Madam,

I am, INDOHA KIMENYI Janvier, a student pursuing a Doctoral Degree in Public Administration at the School of Governmental and Social Sciences at Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University (NMMU) conducting a research on “The influence of Decentralization on community development in Gasabo District”.

I would appreciate if you could participate in this research by completing the attached questionnaire. Participation in answering this questionnaire is voluntary, anonymous and anyone is allowed to withdraw from the survey whenever he/she feels necessary to do so. Further, be assured that all the information provided will be treated in absolute confidentiality, and used solely for the purpose of this research project.

I will be grateful if my request is granted.

Thank you in advance.

Yours Sincerely,

INDOHA Kimenyi Janvier

SECTION A: DEMOGRAPHIC FACTORS

1. Sex Male_____ Female_____

2. Age _____

3. Level of education: _____

1. Primary level _____

2. Secondary level _____

3. Bachelor degree _____

4. Master's degree _____

5. Doctoral Degree _____

6. Other professional and training _____

4. If bachelor, Masters, and doctoral specify your domain

Qualification domains	
Management (or related sciences)	
Economics	
Agriculture	
Public Administration	
Development Studies	
Health sciences	
Engineering	
Others (Precise)	

5. Position held in the District

Mayor	
Vice-Mayor	
District Executive Secretary	
Sector executive Secretary	
Director	
Other (precise please	

6. Years of experience _____

7. Location _____

~ v ~

INSTRUCTIONS (AMABWIRIZA)

You are required to tick one of the following measurement scales for your response.



- 1=Strongly Disagree
- 2=Disagree
- 3=Neutral
- 4=Agree
- 5=Strongly Agree

SECTION B: IDENTIFICATION OF DECENTRALIZATION FACTORS

The following factors influence the decentralization policy in the process of community development within the District.

Factors	5	4	3	2	1
Political decision making					
Responsible administrative structure					
Fiscal decentralisation					
Democratic Governance					
Participatory Planning					
Development activities					
Service delivery outcome					

Give your opinion on the following statements concerning the democratic governance in the District.

Democratic Governance	5	4	3	2	1
1. Democratic principles are well established and citizens' participation in decision making is a living reality within the District?					
2. The district council members are autonomous, independent and comfortable in decision-making.					

3. District councillors perform effectively their role of putting forward citizen needs.					
4. Councillors participate in setting the meeting agenda and influence decision-making.					
5. District Councillors meet regularly citizen to beware of their problems					
6. Accountability has improved under decentralisation process					

Give your opinion on the following statements concerning the participatory planning in the District.

Participatory planning	5	4	3	2	1
1. The district has a close relationship with partners of development in the planning process.					
1. Plans are elaborated considering the priorities needs by sector.					
2. Citizens' participation has contributed to sustain the development projects?					
3. Fiscal decentralisation has allowed the District to raise sufficient fund to support development programmes and efficient allocation of resources within the District.					
4. Monitoring and Evaluation of activities are effectively conducted to make sure goals are achieved.					
5. The District Council has elaborated strategies to promote infrastructures and community development in various sectors (Roads, Health, Education and Agriculture).					
6. The District has the technical capacity to elaborate development project.					
7. The Rwanda Local development Support Fund (RLDSF) transfers funds on a timely basis to support District projects					
8. The District supports effectively community Income Generating Activities (IGA) via Vision 2020 "Umurenge" programme to improve the economic situation of citizen.					
9. Identification of the financial support and employment beneficiaries is based on objective criteria.					

Give your opinion on the following statements for development activities in the District.

Development activities	5	4	3	2	1
1. Farmers are assisted in using modern techniques in agriculture					

and husbandry (land consolidation, selected seeds, radical terracing, and fertilisers).					
2. Farmers are facilitated to obtain land-credit to buy seeds and fertilisers.					
3. Households are food secured as a result of agriculture support.					
4. Youth and women are trained in vocational centres.					
5. Direct financial support in entrepreneurial associations and cooperatives contributes to create off-farm employment.					
6. The District organises public works to offer employment opportunities and the number of local citizens involved is sufficient.					
7. The District has significantly created job opportunities that has offered public works to local citizen					
8. The District has invested to develop trading centres and markets and whoever wants a trading stand or boutique is facilitated.					
9. Feeder roads linking different centres and sectors are sufficient and well maintained to support economic activities.					

Give your opinion on the following statements for community development in the District.

Community development	5	4	3	2	1
<i>Health and sanitation</i>					
1. The District has sufficient health centres to provide proper medical care.					
2. Health Centres have qualified human resource and are well equipped to provide adequate service delivery.					
3. Hygienic conditions have sensibly improved.					
4. Households have access to community Health insurance.					
5. All households can afford health costs.					
6. Households have access to safe source of drinking water.					
<i>Education</i>					
7. The number of schools has significantly improved to meet the universal primary education.					
8. Most households can enrol children in primary and secondary education.					

Housing and shelter					
9. All households own a shelter.					
10. Most of Houses are semi-durable and durable.					
11. All houses are covered by iron sheets.					
12. The majority of households have access to source of energy					
Food Security					
13. Households have enough food for family members.					
14. There some cases of malnutrition in some households					
Income generating Activities					
15. Households practice agriculture as source of Income					
16. Households practice small businesses for income generation.					

SECTION C: CHALLENGES

1. Would you like to give some elements from the District that hindering the decentralization policy in Gasabo District?
.....
.....
.....
2. What are the challenges faced by Gasabo District to achieve community development objectives?
.....
.....
.....
3. What strategies can you suggest at the national level for improving the implementation of the decentralization policy?
.....
.....
.....
4. What are strategies do you suggest to the District for effectively contribute to community development.
.....
.....

~Thank you for your time~

INDOHA KIMENYI Janvier

Kimironko Sector

Cell Phone: 0788308791
Email: indjanvier@yahoo.com

Date: 27th April 2014

BRIEF INTRODUCTION TO INTERVIEW WITH MEMBERS OF NGOS

Dear Sir/Madam,

I am **INDOHA KIMENYI Janvier**, a student pursuing a Doctoral Degree in Public Administration at the School of Governmental and Social Sciences at Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University (NMMU) in South Africa. I am conducting a research on “**The influence of Decentralization on community development in Gasabo District of Rwanda**”. The research has the following specific objectives:

- Analysing the way local needs are integrated into the Gasabo District Development Plan;
- Assessing service delivery and activities run by the District and their impact on the socio-economic conditions of citizens;
- Identifying factors undermining decentralization and community development in Gasabo District; and
- Formulating suggestions raised from findings deemed useful for enhancing community development through the decentralization process.

I would appreciate if you could participate to this interview by allowing me to discuss with you on the above topic. Participation in the exchange is voluntary, anonymous and you are allowed to withdraw from the discussion whenever you feel necessary to do so. Furthermore, be assured that all the information provided will be treated with absolute confidentiality and used solely for the purpose of this research project.

I thank you in advance for your participation.

INDOHA KIMENYI JANVIER

PART I: INTERVIEW GUIDE WITH NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANISATIONS MEMBERS

1. Has decentralization contributed to promote frontline local services like (infrastructures development, education, health etc.) that are relevant for community development in Gasabo District.
2. Are NGOs associated in District development planning by expressing their needs and setting development objectives?
3. How do you appreciate the collaboration between your organization and the District or Sector?
4. Do Councillors meet regularly citizen to be aware of local problems
5. In a concrete way, how does partnership of the district with your organization has assisted citizens in socio-economic development activities
6. Has that assistance contributed to increase citizens' income and change the beneficiaries' life condition?
7. What challenges do you face in supporting developmental local initiatives?
8. What would you suggest the District officials to support development activities of Non-Governmental Organizations.

~Thank you for your time~

PART II: INTERVIEW GUIDE WITH CITIZENS BENEFICIARIES OF VUP

1. Do District Councillors meet regularly citizens to be aware of their problems? If yes, what kind of discussion do they do with them?
2. Do you think councillors perform effectively their role of putting forward citizens' needs? If yes, how do they proceed?
3. Have you ever understood about VUP? What is the nature of assistance have you received (if there is any) in the framework of VUP?
4. How did the assistance from VUP contributed to improve your living conditions? If yes, can you briefly explain how?
5. Does health centres provide citizens quality services in matters of medical care?
6. Can the children from poor households in your area enroll to school? If no, what do you think might be the cause?
7. What is the state of basic infrastructures in your neighborhood (water, electricity, health centres, schools and feeder roads, markets etc.)?