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A Study of Japanese International Short Wave Radio Propaganda

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SMOLL

PROPA-
GANDA

A STUDY OF JAPANESE INTERNATIONAL SHORT WAVE RADIO WAR PROPAGANDA

by

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Reasons For This Study and Its Importance

Since the beginning of the present World War, radio has become the carrier of a potent agent, which heretofore has been relatively undeveloped in its world-wide application. That agent is international war propaganda. It is playing an important role in the conquest of nations, and is a prime factor in the control and direction of opinions and even actions of a country's own nationals.

This study of Japanese war-time propaganda, beamed toward the United States and disseminated by the medium of international short wave radio, was inspired by these considerations. War-time restrictions on the press, local broadcasting, and landline facilities close the channels through which Japan can normally spread her doctrines. Even though Japan could get the desired propaganda material into a neutral country, she would have no assurance that the material would reach the ultimate objective in unadulterated form. These obvious barriers to Japan's propaganda machine raise the question: Is there any channel of communication through which Japan may direct biased information straight to the recipient, and deliver it uncensored? The answer is yes. By the use of short wave transmissions, Japan can and does

propagate information designed for American consumption. What are the characteristics of propaganda disseminated by short wave radio intended for foreign enemy? How does Japan, now a nation at war with America, employ this new propaganda device in the effort to further her war aims? A study leading to the investigation of these questions, the writer feels, affords an opportunity to do worth-while and original work in the field of applied psychology.

The importance of this study is evidenced by two considerations. First, the investigation deals with a type of propaganda that, prior to the present world conflict, has been impossible and therefore is unique. There has been little opportunity to date, for extensive study of the international war-time propaganda methods as practiced by Japan. Although there has been a considerable amount of writing done on the general subject of propaganda, its theory, its importance in directing opinion, and some actual measurement of its effect on attitude, there is still room for worth-while investigation in the field of international short wave radio propaganda as it is practiced during actual war-time conditions. In addition, the importance of a study of this nature becomes apparent when it is realized that, provided the United Nations win the war and the peace to follow, this present World War may present the last opportunity for study of international short wave propaganda technique as practiced by Japan at war. In this

connection, a compilation of Japanese propaganda material may develop historical value--value from the standpoint that the propaganda represents a concrete and authentic record covering a considerable period of time.

Nature of the Problem

The present problem is concerned with Japanese propaganda beamed on the United States by short wave radio. It is a study of propaganda examined in the light of its application.

The first objective of the study is to compile an authentic and concrete record of Japanese propaganda over a considerable period of time.

The second objective is to determine the manner in which the Japanese propagandists endeavor to attract a listening audience and then to hold that audience. These are paramount before radio propaganda can ever be effective. Conviction and ultimate action, on the part of the recipient, can never be attained unless the attention is first attracted, then held.

Next, an attempt will be made to establish the relative weights assigned the propaganda topics by the Japanese, as evidence of purpose of the propaganda. In addition, as a measure of value, an effort will be made to determine the degree that the propaganda coincides with current national events here in the United States.

Fourth, the propaganda material at hand will be analyzed for the purpose of discovering the objectives of the Japanese effort.

Finally, its effectiveness will be considered from two points of view--evidence of the probable size of Japan's propaganda audience; and the psychological values of detailed characteristics in the collected propaganda material.

CHAPTER II

LITERATURE

Definitions and the Purpose of Propaganda

The term propaganda has been variously defined. Quite often the word is so loosly used that its real meaning is confused. Webster[1] defines propaganda as: "An organized effort to spread particular doctrines or information." This definition of the word may well raise a question. What is the difference between propaganda and education? Education implies the imparting of new ideas and viewpoints, but propaganda does exactly the same thing. Says Childs[2] summarizing the relationship between education and propaganda:

> To propagandize is to propagate ideas and doctrines, to attempt deliberately to influence the minds of other people. Education is merely one type of propaganda. To educate is to instill certain attitudes into the minds of others, a philosophy, if you will, of man's mind and how to use it.

In this examination of propaganda and education, it is logical to say propaganda attempts to influence its recipients to action, in a certain direction, without an open mind or the benefit of critical analysis of all the facts. On the

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[1] Webster's Collegiate Dictionary (Springfield, Mass: G. and C. Merriam Co., 1941), p. 795.

[2] Harwood L. Childs, An Introduction to Public Opinion (John Wiley and Company, New York, 1940), p. 88.

other hand, education attempts to present doctrinal truths for analysis in the light criticism.

Lutz[3] contributes a clear concept of propaganda in war-time by stating:

> Public opinion is evolved from the composite reaction of the people at large. War propaganda has been variously defined. It is a stimulus to action in your cause with the objective of victory. It is the creation of a state of mind favorable to the particular national cause which it seeks to promote. War-time propaganda obviously implies national education with an ulterior motive: the creation of new desires, group hypnosis, isolation of counter propaganda, and saturation of the public with selected and biased information.

Propaganda, as such, has several general characteristics. Often its meaning is hidden. It is biased. It is desirous of producing conviction and action in a direction favorable to the propagandist. In short, propaganda is biased information disseminated through any channel of communication with the intention of creating ultimate action favorable to the agency from which it emanates.

Historical Survey

From the beginning of time the peoples of the earth have been to some degree at war with one another. Philosophers have pointed out that many of these conflicts could

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[3] Ralph H. Lutz, "World War Propaganda," Public Opinion and World Politics, Lectures on the Harris Foundation (University of Chicago Press, 1933), pp. 157-158.

have been averted had the people themselves only understood one another better. In this connection Riegel[4] observes:

> The Utopian philosopher of a century or two ago, had he been told that the time would come that the nations of the earth would be able to speak to one another, might well have predicted that then would men understand one another and live in peace. We are fast learning how mistaken that prophesy would have been.

Within the last century, man has invented means of communication and transportation which have shrunk this world of ours into a sphere that allows these peoples, relatively speaking, to indulge in the observation of their fellow men as if from a ringside seat. In so many instances this critical attitude has not inspired a greater understanding or appreciation of one's neighbor, but has only created the selfish desire to take what really belongs to someone else. Conquest and subjugation by military might is one method of accomplishing this end. The subtle use of so-called infiltrated "education of enlightenment" may be used as an auxiliary agent to the same end. Working together or separately, the ultimate objective is the same, namely, to enlarge one's sphere of influence. Although propaganda has been used for centuries, as a tool to spread biased ideas, it was not until the first World War that propaganda was employed on a large scale. Lutz[5]

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[4] O. W. Riegel, Mobilizing for Chaos (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1934), p. 38.

[5] Ralph H. Lutz, Op. cit., p. 159.

points out:

> Although war-time propaganda was first described over 2400 years ago by Sun Tzu in his Art of War, the oldest military treatise in the world, it was only organized in a scientific manner during the World War of 1914-18.

After this scientific beginning of propaganda, the first attempt to use a new medium for its dispersion came into being. This was the then undeveloped and miraculous radio. Riegel[6] declares that it was not until the last few months of the first World War that radio was employed by the Germans. They transmitted daily bulletins in the German, French, and English languages. However, this biased information was received by only a few persons and consequently had negligible value.

Not until the early and middle twenties had radio been developed to the extent that it was practical for general use. Even then, broadcasting was confined to the low frequency spectrum which did not lend itself to voice transmissions over long distances. The use of the short waves became a commercial reality in the early 1930's. Today its application is commonplace. Short wave radio communication, as a carrier of propaganda, has one important advantage over ordinary low frequency bands. This unique feature is its ability to span extreme distances.

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[6] O. W. Riegel, Op. cit., p. 88.

The potentialities of the short wave radio were recognized by the Germans early in its development. In 1934, Riegel[7] declares:

> Dr. Goebbels envisages a daily short wave broadcast in English and German for North American audiences. He proposed to begin with musical programs and proceed to "educational topics" after sufficiently large audiences have been built up.

War propaganda today is considered essential by the major nations of the world. Rundt[8] points out that at least fifteen per cent of the German broadcasting time, both standard and short wave, is reserved for non-German programs. Japan allots a full thirty per cent of its total time on the air to transmissions intended for foreign consumption.

Granting that our enemies use propaganda by short wave radio, and a great deal of their total time on the air for international propaganda purposes, does it necessarily follow that they have a sizable audience here in the United States? A survey has been made by the A. C. Nielson Co. Radio Index[9] which partially answers that question. Their survey, based on the use of 1000 radio sets located in the Mid-West and Atlantic coast, revealed that about one per cent of the listener's time

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[7] Ibid., p. 104.

[8] Stefan J. Rundt, "Short Wave Artillery," The Nation, 155:211, Sept. 12, 1942.

[9] "Who Listens to What?", A. C. Nielson Company Radio Index Survey, Time, Vol. XLI, No. 1, Jan. 4, 1943, pp. 62-63.

was devoted to short wave tuning. An additional survey made by the same organization estimates that there are over 30,000,000 radio homes in the United States. However, this survey does not reveal the number of persons that actually listen on the short wave frequencies. The survey does point to one fact though--Japan does have a potential audience. The actual number in this potential audience that do listen is still a moot question.

Previous Experimental Investigations

Again a question arises. Can propaganda influence attitudes to any observable degree? From experimental evidence this question may be answered in the affirmative. Chen[10] found, in his investigation on the influence of oral propaganda, that the propaganda can influence original attitudes of individuals even though they may be neutral, or opposed to it. The final shift of opinion did not have any relation to the original attitude. Propaganda material does not necessarily need to cover a number of issues but to create a vivid impression. He was surprised to find that college students were as much influenced by emotional speech as by logical presentation of facts.

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[10] William Keh-Ching Chen, The Influence of Oral Propaganda Material Upon Student's Attitudes, Archives of Psychology (New York, 1933), p. 33.

Wilke[11] carries the problem as to the effectiveness of propaganda a step further. He compared the effect of speech, loudspeaker, and printed text. His results point to the speech technique as the most effective, loudspeaker as less effective, and the printed text as the least effective. Wilke feels that an attitude opposed to the views expressed in the propaganda seemed to shift to an attitude of agreement with the propaganda rather than to shift only to a neutral position.

Wilke and Chen have evidence that propaganda does have a positive effect on the attitudes of students under experimental conditions. However, this point should be made clear. Propaganda must produce the ultimate desired conviction and action before it can be considered effective. As Russell and Wright[12] point out: "An attitude may differ both from the individual's expression of opinion about it and from his action flowing from it." In other words, an attitude is only a portion of the total mechanism leading to action, and it does not necessarily imply action in a direction paralleling the attitude expressed.

From the above paragraph, it is readily seen that the

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[11] Walter H. Wilke, An Experimental Comparison of the Speech, the Radio, and the Printed Page as Propaganda Devices, Archives of Psychology (New York, June, 1934), p. 27.

[12] James T. Russell and Quincy Wright, National Attitudes on the Far Eastern Controversy (The American Political Science Review, 27:556-76, August, 1933).

measurement of the ultimate effectiveness of the Japanese propaganda would necessitate the calculation of the overt reaction itself. Because of the circumstances under which this study was made, it was not feasible to measure the final action, but it was possible to investigate the likely effectiveness of the Japanese propaganda.

CHAPTER III

COLLECTION OF DATA

Propaganda Material

Throughout this study, JZJ and JZL-2, the short wave stations of Japan have been the source of propaganda material. Depending on atmospheric conditions, monitoring was done on Radio Tokyo's operating frequencies of 9.5, 11.8, and 15.1 megacycles. Radio Tokyo, it was found, always transmitted on two of the three frequencies simultaneously. The reason for this, no doubt, was to insure Japan the greatest possible coverage at any one time. In the course of monitoring JZJ and JZL-2, this investigator found that the stations scheduled seven English language transmissions throughout the twenty-four hours and the propaganda material contained in each of the seven transmissions, with few exceptions, dealt with identical topics. Subsequently, recordings made of any one of the seven transmissions were representative of the propaganda put out for any given day.

To secure necessary material for the immediate study as well as for future reference, Radio Tokyo's daily transmissions were recorded over a period of four months, from the latter part of November through the middle of March. These recordings were made with the facilities of a modern communications receiver which was especially adapted elec-

trically to operate in conjunction with a sound recorder, using a magnetic cutting head. The turntable capacity was limited to a twelve-inch disk. Acetate coated, paper base disks were used. The drive mechanism was dual speed and all the recordings were cut at a speed of 33 1/3 r.p.m. This speed permitted the recording of ten minutes of transmissions on one side. Since the propaganda material was usually limited to ten minutes or less, this arrangement proved satisfactory for the purpose. The recording unit was equipped with a crystal pick-up for reproducing the recordings through the audio circuit of the communications receiver. Thus the equipment served both purposes of the study.

In December, during the early stages of the collection of the propaganda material, the effort was made to locate sources that would make available to this investigator previous propaganda broadcasts of Japan. Several likely Universities, the United Press, Time Magazine, and The Field Section of the Federal Communications Commission were approached, but in each case the response was negative. Although the Federal Communications Commission does maintain full time listening posts for the interception of foreign propaganda, this agency will not release the material. In other words, as far as this writer could establish, the material was not available to students interested in the study of international short wave propaganda. This fact points to the added impor-

tance of this present collection of Japanese propaganda material.

Organization of the Propaganda Material

A systematic organization of the propaganda was needed before any attempt could be made to analyze it. This meant that the first step would be to decide on which part of the Japanese broadcast to use. Any one of the seven Japanese broadcasts was usually composed of several parts: the newscast that dealt with general information and statistics; the American War Prisoners Information Hour, and the commentaries. It was the section devoted to the commentaries that was of particular interest. Because of the nature of these commentaries, they lent themselves most readily to analysis. The commentary section appeared under several different titles: The News Commentary, News on Parade, Light From the East, and dramatizations.

The next step in the organization of the material was to segregate the collected propaganda material on a weekly basis. After the different topics had been isolated, the relative frequency of each was computed on a percentage basis (the cumulative time devoted to a topic within a given week with relation to the total time of all the topics in the week). This method of segregating the propaganda material made possible a quantitative picture of the data at hand. As a final step, the compiled data were org nized into com-

parative frequency graphs. These graphs show the propaganda topics week by week, in the light of their respective relative frequencies. Organization of the data week by week allows for a more critical analysis, especially when it is examined with the view of determining its timeliness.

Radio Listener Survey

To obtain a quantitative indication of the possible effectiveness of the Japanese propaganda, a limited short wave listener survey was undertaken.

Because of the existing transportation limitations, the survey was conducted, for the most part, by telephone. This method did have one disadvantage in that only those persons having a telephone were reached. However, there were two apparent advantages to this method; first a relative large group could be interviewed within a limited period, and second, a wide sampling of representative sections of Albuquerque could be made even under present difficult transportation conditions.

In brief, the survey was conducted in the following manner: The interviewer first identified himself by giving his name and stating that he was a graduate student at the University of New Mexico conducting a survey of radio listeners. Following this introduction, the interviewee was asked whether he would mind answering a few questions. If the reply

was favorable the questions were asked; (1) Do you have a radio in your home? (2) How many adults over twenty-one, in the immediate family, listen to your radio? (3) How many listen to international broadcasts on the short wave bands? What countries? and (4) Which do you/they listen to regularly?

The responses to the above questions should reveal several important facts: Indication of number of people in the survey that listen to shomt wave transmissions; of the number that listen regularly; and finally of the number that have listened to the short wave stations of Japan.

CHAPTER IV

THE ANALYSIS OF JAPAN'S PROPAGANDA EFFORT

Japan's Effort to Gain and Hold Attention

The propagandist, using short wave radio as the carrier agent to deliver his doctrines, must solve a difficult problem before he can actually begin his dissemination of ideas. Because the propagandist cannot come to the recipient, but in a sense the listener must go to him, he must be far-sighted and diligent in his effort to accomplish the prerequisites before starting to "apply the needle"--he must secure the subjects.

Japanese propagandists have not been short-sighted. They did not wait until the outbreak of the present conflict to begin their developmental work in the applied art of propaganda. Many years prior to World War II, Radio Tokyo was constantly putting out feelers with the object of determining the world coverage they were attaining. These early pre-war endeavors were transmitted in several foreign languages: English, Spanish, and the East Asia languages.

As early as 1936, Japan was shortwaving programs overseas. In the North American transmissions, the Japanese regularly requested reports regarding the strength and quality of their transmissions. To encourage those listening to send in the desired reports, Radio Tokyo offered to confirm reception by sending, in return, a detailed monthly program schedule of

future Japanese broadcasts of "particular interest to Americans." This investigator sent in detailed reports and received in due time the monthly phamplet promised. In fact, these phamplets came through regularly up to the present American-Japanese hostilities.

Even though Japan had to depend, to a great extent, on the reports made by short wave listeners for information on coverage, this was about the only practical way left open to check results. Nevertheless, it is not too much to say that Japan was able to gain invaluable data concerning coverage in America. In addition, Radio Tokyo undoubtedly was able to establish the time of day most favorable for reception in the various sections of the United States. This conclusion is confirmed in part by noting that Japan did beam her transmissions at the time of this study. In the early morning (Mountain War Time) all transmissions were directed to the West Coast of the United States. The late afternoon (Mountain War Time) transmissions were designed for the Mid-West and East Coast.

This brief review of the early efforts of Japan point to one important conclusion. By such actions Japan has likely gained a sizable audience over a period of years. Whether the audience is regular, now that Japan is at war with the United States, is another matter dependent on her effectiveness in holding enemy audiences.

Japan employs a powerful means of holding the attention of potential listeners. The writer feels this endeavor is unique in its application and to date never before practiced by any other nation at war. From the very beginning and throughout the period of study, a portion of each of the English language broadcasts has been devoted to that part called "The American War Prisoners Information Hour." In each of these periods, the Japanese transmitted the recorded voices of American prisoners, taken on the islands of Guam, Wake, and the Philippines. The recorded messages were always directed to some relative of the American prisoner concerned. In all cases the recordings were not current, but were sent over Radio Tokyo as much as two months late. The theme of all the messages centered around: mail received, sufficient medical attention, adequate living conditions, and the good treatment they received. Unquestionably, this news was of prime interest to the relatives and friends concerned, but this information, if scrutinized, carries with it a subtle note of prime interest to the Japanese too. The Japanese did not offer to let those prisoners speak because of a feeling of good will or because they sympathized with the relatives and friends back home concerned about their well being. As this investigator sees it, one of the fundamental purposes of the "Information Hour" was to combat the stigma placed on Japanese by reports of their barbaric treat-

ment of prisoners. In other words the Japanese attempted a form of subtle counter-propaganda--propaganda designed to counteract conflicting attitudes. Not only did this "American War Prisoners Information Hour" serve as counter propaganda but also to create a more favorable attitude, an attitude on the part of the listener that might render him receptive to future biased information.

The war-prisoner messages were not used in an unorganized manner, but systematically segregated before used. For example, on November 27, 1942, the "Information Hour" consisted of four messages. One was directed to Massachusetts, two to California, and the last to Illinois. This pointed to a sectioning endeavor or the attempt to use representative messages likely to create interest in the greatest possible area. The examination of the future "Information Hours" definitely confirmed this initial presumption. By doing this, the Japanese propagandist endeavored to keep alive the interest of <u>all</u> who might listen. To those directly concerned, it leaves the impression that there is the possibility of hearing from a loved one at some future time. Hence, these people naturally have the irresistable urge to continue listening and at the same time fall prey to the wily propagandist. The "Information Hour" serves as an instrument insuring, to some degree, a <u>regular</u> listening audience, which may frequently be subjected to other forms of propaganda

Although probably of secondary importance, several auxiliary attention and holding mechanisms became apparent. At frequent intervals in the commentary sections, the Japanese presented a "Childrens Hour." The American-born Japanese children used in this section described their lives, both here in America and in Japan, and left the impression of their similarity to American children. This use of youngsters possesses a certain amount of attraction because of its umusualness and simplicity. Another minor method of gaining attention is the use of familiar American musical strains. Interspersed throughout and introducing the various sections of the English programs, there were short renditions of "My Bonnie Lies Over the Ocean" (used to introduce and conclude the American War Prisoners Information Hour), and "Old Black Joe" (one of the most familiar American folk songs) used to introduce and conclude the News Commentaries.

Finally, the Japanese treatment of their commentaries varied. Some were presented as business-like commentaries, attempting to simulate authority and gain confidence by the use of well organized and excellently delivered talks. This method points to the attempt, on the part of the Japanese propagandists, to gain prestige and elevate themselves in the opinion of the listeners by posing as equals. In other instances, the commentaries were presented in the form of dialogues, dramatizations and satires. These last were more

obviously propaganda attempts to influence, but at the same time did have a strong appeal in the use of humor and simplicity in continuity of ideas.

The observation made in this particular phase of the Japanese propaganda effort points to a systematic attempt to fulfill the first two prerequisities before the propaganda is ultimately effective; that is, to attract and to hold the interest of prospective listeners. In this same vein, it is interesting to note the amount of time the Japanese propaganda broadcasts utilize. From monitoring Radio Tokyo's frequencies over a twenty-four hour period, it was established that the total of seven transmissions of good reception, totaled better than five hours.

The following were the transmission periods: 6:20 a.m. on 9:5 m.c., 9 a.m. on 9.5 m.c., 10:30 a.m. on 9.5 m.c., 12 noon on 9.5 m.c., 5 p.m. on 15.1 and 11.8 m.c., 7:20 p.m. on 15.1 m.c., and 12 midnight on 11.8 and 9.5 m.c.

The Timeliness of the Japanese Propaganda

The force of war-time propaganda may be increased simply by seeing to it that the material disseminated coincides with current national events. Declares Lasswell[13]: "Success depends upon traditional prejudices, objective connections be-

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[13] Harold D. Lasswell, Propaganda Technique in the World War (Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 1927), p. 192.

tween nations and the changing level of popular irritability."

In this study, the arrangement of the propaganda material in the form of a graph, served two major purposes. First, it facilitated investigation of the timeliness of propaganda. Second, the graph made possible a vivid picture of the relative amount of propaganda devoted to each topic throughout the period of observation. Superficially at least, this graphic picture is indicative of the relative importance the Japanese placed on each topic at any given time.

Based largely on the information found in the authoritative weekly news organ, Time, a systematic attempt was made to find the degree of correlation between the Japanese propaganda and national and international events.

In Figure 1, the relative weights of propaganda topics for the last week of November, 1942 are shown. The two obvious features of this graph are the extremely narrow range of topics dealt with, and the heavy weights assigned to the subjects of "American Government", and "Pro-Japanese." This trend is quite readily explained. The period in question embraces the days just prior to the anniversary of December 7, 1941. The anti-American Government propaganda was a Japanese version why America was "forced" into a war by, as Japan terms it, "the lack of foresight and unscrupulous actions of the present Washington Government." In turn, the high frequency of the "Pro-Japanese" material can be understood when one con-

COMPARATIVE FREQUENCY GRAPH
FOR NOVEMBER



FIGURE 1

siders the current national situation. The emphasis indicates an attempt to exonerate herself (Japan) from any responsibility for the present conflict. In other words Japan was endeavoring to prepare her listeners for an event that was shortly to be the foremost thought in the minds of most Americans, namely, Pearl Harbor.

Unfortunately, it was not possible to make recordings for the days of December 1-5 or 9-17, but recordings for December 6, 7, and 8 were made. Those weeks shown in Figure 2, December 6-12 and 13-19, indicate an extremely narrow range of propaganda subjects. This is due in part to the relative limited sampling. Although the sampling was limited, one conclusion may be safely drawn; on December 6, 7, and 8, Japan was trying to strike at the most opportune moment. The entire commentary sections dealt with affairs current in American thought. The propagandist dealt with the events leading up to the Pearl Harbor event; the Japanese version of the negotiations preceding the severance of American-Japanese diplomatic relations, and again attempted to place sole responsibility on the United States Government. Said Radio Tokyo, in the December 8 commentary in summary: "Future historians may well record the incredible perseverence to Japan's credit as the most outstanding effort for peace ever made by any self-respecting nation on earth."

During the week of December 28, 1942, former President

COMPARATIVE FREQUENCY GRAPH
FOR DECEMBER



FIGURE 2

Hoover proposed a plan of peacemaking after the war, emphasizing a "cooling off period." Other than that, his proposal was in agreement with those previously advocated by Wells, Wallace, and Anthony Eden. Again the propagandist arose to the occasion. Reference to Figure 3, January 1-8, shows the entrance of a new propaganda theme of decided weight: "Post War Policies." On January 3, 1943, the bulk of all propaganda emanating from Radio Tokyo, centered around the topics: "Speculative Dream of Post War Politics as proposed by the United States and Britain"; "Post War Policy of America", and "Post War Distributions." The post war problem was a greatly discussed subject in the United States at this time. Based on the material at hand, it seems reasonable to conclude that the Japanese propaganda machine was attempting to present material at the best psychological moment.

Further examination of Figure 3 revealed another interesting point. During the week of January 16-22, there is seen a narrowing of the field of topics touched on. In fact, more time was devoted to "American Government" than to any topic during a given week within the month of January. The paramount national events taking place in the United States during the week of January 13, 1943 were: President Roosevelt delivered an address to the new 78th Congress: President Roosevelt presented his new war budget, and the Chinese Ambassadors signed a treaty with the United States

COMPARATIVE FREQUENCY GRAPH
FOR JANUARY



FIGURE 3

Government abolishing this country's extra-territorial rights in China. In the attempt to coincide this propaganda with national happenings, the propagandists devoted most of their time to the subjects: "War Expenditures in the United States and Its Future Result in Economic Life", and "Lack of Integrity of Roosevelt and His Control of Congress." Here again, is indicated a correlation of events and the propaganda given out.

An examination of the comparative frequency graph for February, Figure 4, indicated an extremely wide range of propaganda topics. This fact can be attributed to the great number of national and international events that took place during this month. The subject, "Turkey" makes its initial appearance and takes first place in relative weight for the first week in February. The general character of each of the commentaries on "Turkey" brought to the fore Turkey's historical development, and Radio Tokyo concluded by pointing to the advantages (political, economic, and territorial), that Turkey would reap by remaining neutral. The propagandist attempted to leave the impression that Turkey realizes the advantage of remaining neutral and is determined to do so. The significance of these commentaries becomes apparent when it is remembered: In the week of February 1, 1943, after the Casablanca conference, Churchill returned to Britain by the way of Turkey to discuss certain political matters concerning Turkey's stand in the present European war. The relative high

COMPARATIVE FREQUENCY GRAPH
FOR FEBRUARY



FIGURE 4

COMPARATIVE FREQUENCY GRAPH
FOR MARCH



FIGURE 5

frequency of the "Pro-Japanese" and "Post War Policies" also tie in with the events that took place at Casablanca the previous week. The next week's topics, Figure 4, February 7-13, contains an entire day devoted to "Casablanca." Again it is an effort made to coincide the propaganda with timely events.

The third week, indicated in Figure 4, February 14-20, the Japanese propagandist stressed their version of why Gandhi was undertaking his fast beginning in the week of February 14. They also connected the "Anti-British" discussions with Gandhi's fast by pointing to, as Tokyo says, "England's imperialistic and selfish attitude toward India."

During the last week of February, Figure 4, 21-28, Japan still brought Gandhi's fast to the surface; however, no great emphasis was placed on the topic directly. The subject of India was dealt with primarily in connection with her economic and political problems and her place in the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.

The most noticeable feature of the last week of February, Figure 4, was the exceptionally high frequency of "China." During the week of February 20, Madame Chaing-Kai-Shek spoke for China in the Senate and the House of Representatives then later held a press conference with President Roosevelt. Japan, again attempting to make the most of such an opportunity, assailed Chinese-American relations. Japan not only declared

that the United States was using China, but at the same time denounced China for not giving the Washington Government an accurate picture of the Asia situation. It was interesting to note that the Japanese commentator made emphatic the point that he was not criticising Madame Chaing-Kai-Shek, but was "only trying to make clear some of the issues at hand." This admission in itself indicates an effort by the propagandists to avoid the pitfall of negative reaction on the part of the short wave listeners.

Although not indicated in the comparative frequency graph, Japan made another minor attempt to time her propaganda, on February 22, 1943, Washington's Birthday. The entire commentary dealt with a review of Washington's ideals and qualities of leadership. The propagandist made an effort to point out how far the present American leaders diverge from those "essential qualities of good leadership."

Based on the data at hand, it can be concluded that the Japanese propagandists do follow national and international events with the view of presenting their biased viewpoint at the most advantageous moment. But such timeliness indicated to this investigator a basic quality of Japanese propaganda. The timeliness of much of Japan's propaganda is a defense mechanism, that is, it is a response to external influence over which she has no control and therefore indicates the absence of initiative. In other words, she was fighting defensive rather than

that was United States was using China, but at the same time denounced China for not giving the American Government an accurate picture of the Asia situation. It was interesting to note that the Japanese commentator made emphatic the point that he was not criticizing Madame Chiang-Kai-Shek, but was "only trying to make clear some of the issues at hand." This admission in itself indicates an effort by the propagandists to avoid the pitfall of negative reaction on the part of the about-face listeners.

Although not indicated in the accompanying transcript, Japan made another minor attempt to time her propaganda, on February 23, 1942, Washington's Birthday. The entire commentary dealt with a review of Washington's ideals and qualities of leadership. The propagandist made an effort to point out not for the present American leaders diverge from these "essential qualities of good leadership."

Based on the data at hand, it can be concluded that the Japanese propagandists in Tokyo directed and instructed operatives with the view of presenting their Asiatic viewpoint as the most advantageous method. But such directives indicate to this investigator a basic quality of Japanese propaganda. The distinctive of much of Japan's propaganda is a defiance mechanism, that is, it is a response to external influences over which she has no control and therefore indicates the absence of initiative. In other words, she was "defiantly saying that she

an offensive action. Not possessing the initiative and being on the defensive indicates an inherent weakness, psychologically.

CHAPTER V

ANALYSIS OF THE CONTENT OF JAPANESE PROPAGANDA

In a study such as this it would be impossible to deal with all of the different propaganda topics touched on by the Japanese. The analysis of the propaganda material at hand was confined to those subjects having the highest relative frequency as shown by the comparative frequency graphs.

American Government

The consistent and relatively heavy weight given to the "American Government" subject is one of the obvious features noted in the graphs.

On November 27, 1942, Radio Tokyo asserted:

> God never asked Americans to get into this war but the individual sitting on the exalted chair of the White House did, and assuming the place of God for the Americans, it was he who deceived the American men and women and pushed them into war at no risk of his own personal danger.[14]

Again on December 8, 1942, referring to the negotiations preceding Pearl Harbor, Tokyo declared in part:

> There was a limit even to Japan's super-human perseverance. If Messrs. Roosevelt and Hull did not happen to possess that common sense, if they really had thought that Japan's patience was unlimited, it

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[14] This and all subsequent Japanese quotations are taken from actual recordings which are in the possession of the writer.

> was not the fault of Japan but the fault of their own swollen ego, or perhaps the fault of their unfortunate lack of logical thinking habits. If, however, they were sane enough to be aware of the limits of Japan's or anyone else's status and yet did persist in their arrogant insistence, they must have done so in full expectation of the consequences which happened to take place on that day [December 7, 1941.][15]

In the same vein on December 30, 1942, said Tokyo:

> The first point in American foreign policy is an American platitude as practiced by your government leaders in world politics. There has been a complete lack of thoughtfullness in the application of high sounding principles. The second predominate feature of American foreign policy is its superiority complex. The third important characteristic of American foreign policy has been threat or intimidation.

The few examples cited above are characteristic of the Japanese "American Government" propaganda.

Says Lutz[16]:

> In World War I, in the attempted control of enemy opinion, propaganda distinguished between the enemy and the people, proclaimed the certainty of victory, and stated in subtle ways that the prolongation of the war only increased inevitable disaster.

Based on this statement, it appeared as though the Japanese propagandists were using one of the more common methods of propaganda, namely, attempt to divide the American people against their government.

Japan has been employing a technique that has been used before. During the first World War, the Germans as well

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[15] Bracketed material is this investigator's own insertion.

[16] Ralph H. Lutz, Op. cit., p. 161.

as the Allies distinguished between the Government and the people in the attempt to force a wedge of suspicion between the respective governmental leaders and their nationals. Many examples may be given of this same method attempted during this present world conflict. Germany has found it to be effective, especially so just prior to an infiltration by fifth columnists. The psychological impact of uncertainty on the part of the people on the home front can do much to break down the actual military machine on the line. Japan was, evidently, from the nature of this propaganda under scrutiny, employing this very technique with the view of dividing the American people, both racially and politically. From the relative amount of time devoted to "American Government" propaganda, it was evident the Japanese felt it extremely important in their propaganda effort.

Japan turned to history in the attempt to drive home its arguments. The propagandist's treatment of the Negro problem here in the United States shows that. On December 25, 1942, the entire commentary dealt with this problem. In this connection Japan proclaimed in part:

> It is said that it is only as a war measure, in the present struggle for victory over the national and foreign Fascism, that the so called Harlem Charter has been granted--a program for the employment of negro labor, civil right, housing, and the extension of educational opportunities to the black people of America. But how sincere such a move is on the part of the American leaders can be judged by the history of the treatment of the negro. The history of the negro minority in America is as old as the

> history of the struggle of America's independence. At the same time the history of the negro people in America is as black as the God-given skin of these children of misfortune.
>
> The pronouncements as conceived and put out by the Washington Government concerning the Four Freedoms are put out as merely counterfeit ideals for mere propaganda.

To the unthinking and gullible listener, the evidence is compelling. Herein lies a portion of the strength of propaganda--its habit of leaving so much unsaid and saying just enough to leave the listener in doubt, gives it strength.

The apparent objectives of Japan in attacking the United States Government are manifold and may be considered, (1) An attempt to create an attitude of distrust of American leadership, (2) An effort to convince the American public of America's sole responsibility in bringing about the war, (3) Creation of confused national thought on what America is fighting for, and (4) Promote and sustain dissension among Americans by playing up our differences so that disunity and discouragement may impair our efforts against them.

Anti-British Propaganda

A close examination of the comparative frequency graphs revealed that the Japanese had consistently stressed the "Anti-British" theme.

In any war involving two or more allies, fighting a-against a common enemy, the assurance of their victory is de-

pendent in a large measure on complete cooperation and trust. If the germs of disunity and distrust are allowed to spread, the common front economically, politically, militarily, and psychologically, may well be shattered.

A war, such as the present one, being fought along so many geographical borders and involving nations so different in their fundamental prejudices, ideals and customs, is bound to produce minor misunderstandings. In these misunderstandings lies the soil in which the propagandist sows his seed of dissension.

Turning to the propaganda material at hand, it was not difficult to identify Japan's effort to drive a wedge between the United States and Great Britain.

On December 18, 1942, said Radio Tokyo:

> The upper class Britishers are not so stupid as to express their feelings of contempt and jealousy toward the American people because at this time they cannot afford to.

In the same commentary appeared the following:

> Your soldiers and sailors, your arms and ammunition have been sent to India, Australia, and Africa, where by no stretch of the imagination can you say they are protecting the lives and property of the Americans. But anyone with a particle of common sense can see they are defending the lives and property of the British. The British are willing to fight to the last American and are proving that at this very moment. Americans, who are you fighting for, the British?

It was declared in the December 21st broadcast:

> Britain tried every means to draw the United States into the war. Finally Britain was rewarded. This can be explained by the intense and well planned war

> propaganda of Great Britain. We can only nod at the tremendous power and possibility at the command of such propaganda machinery.

A subdued theme inherent in most of the anti-British propaganda suddenly breaks in the surface in full force--that is the question of Britain's treatment of the Indian problem. The Japanese made most of this subject by presenting it in a manner that might well irritate the average American's sense of man's right of independence. On January 15, 1943, Radio Tokyo quotes Gandhi as saying in 1918:

> I would make all of India offer all her able bodied sons as a sacrifice at the Empire's critical moment, and I know that India by this very act, would become a most favored partner and racial distinction would become a thing of the past.

Tokyo added her own comment in this connection by avowing:

> Freedom was worth that and even more. But at the close of the war to make the world safe for democracy, the British Government showed its appreciation of India's contribution by passing an act that put an end to freedom of speech and press by announcing that England had no intention of releasing her hold on India.

These above paragraphs point to Japan's effort to appeal to the American's sense of the right of independence and freedom. In the same commentary Tokyo continued:

> India needs freedom, complete freedom from Great Britain, for England has done more than oppress the people, impoverish them and enslave them. She has systematically sought to bring about her social destruction as well.

Naturally, statements such as these show only one side of the question. They leave many things unsaid, but this

characteristic tendency peculiar to propaganda makes it compelling. The subject of independence and freedom is close to the hearts of most Americans. To many, any arguments ostensibly upholding the freedom of men would seem enough reason for their acceptance, regardless of the source.

The Japanese would be excellant historians, as was evidenced by much of their propaganda material. A study of the material revealed that, for the most part, their treatment of anti-British propaganda was based on historical events, but with the added ingredient of biased coloring. Very often they tried to emphasize their point by bringing to the fore the initial strife between America and England at the time of the American Revolutionary War. These attempts to cause American ill will toward England centered around the ideals of such American leaders as Washington and others. The Japanese stressed the far-sightedness of those patriots in their work of saving the people from, as Radio Tokyo phrased it, "imperialistic Britain." Quite often, it was observed, Japan attempted to foster America's dislike for England by acknowledging the eminently righteous leadership of those colonial patriots against England.

A new version of anti-British propaganda made its appearance on January 29, 1943. In the cloak of a satirical dramatization of American troops in England, Radio Tokyo played up the contents of a book supposedly issued those United States troops, instructing them in the proper British

etiquette. The subtle interjections made in the course of the dramatization raised the issues to the effect; "Roosevelt says we are here in Britain to protect America"; "The limies are weak-kneed anyhow"; "Don't try to imitate their lingo like a lot of you mugs have been doing--it ain't etiquette"; "Oh, but definitely Sergeant, anything you say old boy, hip-hip and all that sort of thing--what!" Later in this dramatization the propagandist satirized the English manner of speaking by using a lengthy monologue in double-talk. This type of approach needs no comment as it speaks for itself.

It is this observer's contention that such anti-British propaganda had as its purpose the objective of creating in the American listener a feeling of contempt and disgust toward anything British, particularly their habits, customs and the manner in which they conduct their war effort.

In conclusion, the objectives of the anti-British propaganda appeared to be: (1) To show that Great Britain is using the United States to her own end, (2) To appeal to traditional American sense of man's right of freedom by pointing to England's abuses of India, and (3) To separate the American people from England through the use of historical data showing how these two countries are unlike in ideals.

American War Effort

In a global war, the complexity of issues strongly

tends to increase the confusion of public thought. This confusion is the propagandist's opportunity.

On December 21, 1942, the commentator stressed the question: "Americans, what are you fighting for?" A close examination of the actual material revealed a new approach. The build-up in the effort to produce the desired reaction may be described as "conditioning ideas." By this is meant concepts generally accepted by the recipient, but arranged to maneuver him into an affirmative set; that is lull him into an unquestioning attitude and perhaps thereby perceive the propaganda ideas to follow. An example of these "conditioning ideas" occurs in the Japanese transmission of December 21, 1942, as follows:

> You would not mind a little inconvenience in your daily life if it were for the good of your country. You, as loyal Americans always hated war and dictatorship. It matters little if you have to sacrifice your comforts for the time being. Independence is not something that you read in history books, but is something that has clear bearing on your daily life and your interests. That is why you want to guard your independence at any sacrifice, is it not?

Naturally, American's will agree to this. It is intended to prepare the recipient for the ideas to follow. Continues Radio Tokyo:

> If so, perhaps you can tell me why your sons and brothers are now fighting and dying on the battle fields of North Africa and in the Solomons. Can you, by any stretch of your imagination, say they are there to defend America or American interests? Did it ever occur to you that all those sons and brothers, without exception, are fighting on foreign soil? Can it be that your Army and Navy must engage in a costly war for the sake of Great

> Britain? Do you feel justified in being made to go through all sorts of present hardships and heartbreaking ordeals for a war that is being fought on foreign soil?

To the border-line individual, to one who is not firm in his convictions, such propaganda can accomplish its purpose by creating an undercurrent of suspicion and unrest. Although this particular commentary continued at greater length, the remainder was merely a repetition of the quoted part.

Further analysis revealed another interesting feature. Throughout the commentary, the propagandist pointed out that America is fighting all her battles on foreign soil, thereby supposedly nullifying her reasons for fighting for her safety and independence. He hopes to maintain consistency and logic only by virtue of the listener's inability to see farther than his arguments.

In this connection, Radio Tokyo states:

> President Roosevelt urges his people to fight for freedom. So does the War Secretary, the Naval Secretary. But whose freedom are the American people fighting for? For their own? They surrendered their freedom when they permitted their double-crossing President to drag them into a war--war he had solemnly promised to keep them out of. Or are they fighting for the British or Russians?

It is this investigator's opinion that the primary objective of the Japanese attack on the American war effort, was to leave the uncritical listener with a feeling of uncertainty of conviction; uncertainty that may in time cause

the individual to ask himself, why? A "why" that possibly will be answered in the light of the explanation presented by the Japanese. If this be the case, the propagandist has achieved his purpose--achieved it not so much through reason or logic but by a clever appeal to the listener's emotions. This appeal to the emotions is apparent in the other phases of the Japanese propaganda.

The objectives of the anti-American War Effort propaganda, based on the material at hand, appeared to be: (1) Attempt to maneuver the listener into a position of agreement with the propaganda, (2) Instill in the mind of the listener a questionable attitude, thereby undermining his original conviction, (3) Destroy the listener's faith that his war efforts and sacrifices are for a just cause.

Post War Policies of the United Nations

Most of the objectives of the Japanese propaganda previously covered were fairly obvious. But, turning to another subject apparent in the comparative frequency graph, there was discovered a different method of attack. In the January 3 broadcast Japan dealt, for the first time, with the "Post War Policies of the United Nations." The Japanese propagandist's initial development of this subject was concerned, for the most part, with discussion of the various proposals set up by the United States and Great Britain,

touching particularly on the methods of economic post war distribution and the post war police system. In this connection Radio Tokyo declared:

> Anthony Eden let the cat out of the bag when he insinuated that, although China is to have the responsibility in the conduct of the war, she is to play no part in the exercise of international police power after the war. It is safe to conclude that there exists a secret agreement between Britain and America as to their exercise of the right of supervising the whole world during the certain period of armistice after the war.

Radio Tokyo continued by implying that America and Great Britain have not in the past demonstrated the ability to assume such responsibilities as they propose. It is this writer's contention that Japan was attempting to amplify the unfairness of such a policy when left only in the hands of the Allies. On the surface of such arguments could be found the natural desire of the Japanese nation to criticize anything anti-Axis. But in this same propaganda a subtle note could be found--a note that is divorced from the purpose which, at first thought, one might be inclined to feel was to aid directly the present war effort of Japan. The February 2 Tokyo commentary further strengthens the feeling of an underlying meaning in those particular discussions. In order to preserve its true implications, the conclusions of that particular broadcast are presented in full:

> We, the Japanese, are now engaged in the greatest war the world has ever known. The world has been shaping the destinies of men and nations. It is the labor pains preceding the birth of a new world,

similar, though much greater in scale, to the pains undergone by a feudal Japan in giving birth to a new, modern Japan. While firmly retaining her national spirit, her national soul, ancient traditions of the Empire, Japan studied in a spirit of open mindedness, to learn and master the arts of western civilization and proved it to the world by her own example, the great benefits of proper cultural infusion, that universal knowledge and wisdom can belong to a nation without destroying its national character and identity. And, more, than that, it would rather strengthen its national life. In other words, Japan knows the whole world, because all the good things of the world have been infused into her national life. It is extremely doubtful that such supposedly perversive nations, such as the United States and Great Britain, know very much about the East, except very superficially, because they have never attempted, in their long contact with Asiatic countries, ever to learn from the East. Their pursuit has been primarily political and economic, to dominate the East in order to exploit the East. The leadership of tomorrow calls for a proper knowledge and understanding of the world, not by superficial observation, but by living as Japan has done and is doing, in a world of cultural environment. And, Japan has herself, aired to Eastern and Western civilizations, which she has molded into herself, possesses the qualities of leadership necessary in building the new Asia, which she is doing today, and in contributing to the happier world of tomorrow.

At first thought, such propaganda appeared just as another Japanese attempt to elevate herself in the eyes of those she hoped to influence. On the surface, one might accept it as another historical series showing the Japanese struggle for a better life. But, was that the real purpose? It is this writer's feeling that it was not. For example, the statements: "In other words, Japan knows the whole world, because all the good things of the world have been infused into her national life--The leadership of tomorrow calls for

a proper knowledge and understanding of the world--Japan possesses the qualities of leadership necessary in building the new Asia." These key sentences point to a clever attempt by the Japanese to lull the listener into the belief that the information is just a natural desire to argue their opinions. But as the supposedly wary listener guards the frontal avenue against such obvious endeavors, the propagandist may deftly implant his ulterior ideas unhindered. These suppressed ideas can be carried away by the unknowing listener only to rise and be influential in future thought, and without the origin of those thoughts being identified with the propagandist. This mechanism can be seen every day in common life--someone remarks hearing or is reminded of something but can't remember who said it.

The subtle note of this propaganda, even insidious in nature, becomes apparent if one stops to realize that the final status of nations will not be determined on the war front alone, but the final outcome is dependent in a large measure by the decisions reached at the peace table. Any effort, however small, that would enhance Japan's position at the peace table, would pay for itself many times over. Japan must realize, as well as anyone, that regardless of who wins the war, the real winners are those nations benefiting from the actions taken at the peace table alone. And too, Japan surely knows that it will be much easier to split

the United Nations at the peace table, than it will be to divide them while actually involved in a war for their very existance. For, after the fighting ceases, all the old international prejudices and racial differences will again rise and make themselves felt. In addition, the realignment of nations will again take place, based on their common economic ambitions, geographical locations, racial similarities, and historical backgrounds. All these can be influenced now so as to aid or oppose the interests of Japan at the peace table, no matter who wins the war.

To verify these observations, the writer points to the material at hand. Japan in another broadcast reminded the listener how the British "double-crossed America" after the last war by not paying back their war debt. "Does the United States", asked Radio Tokyo, "have any assurance whatsoever, in the light of Britain's past actions, that she will ever even consider paying back the lend-lease debts of this war?" Japan was driving a strong point home for all she was worth. It takes no imagination to see the strength of such propaganda. Anything said by anybody, even the Japanese, that serves to remind us of how Great Britain did hedge on the debt of the last war, will help to tangle the peace efforts and peace objectives.

It should not be difficult to understand, even from the few examples cited, that so often it is not the obvious propaganda that is so dangerous, but it is that propaganda

which is subtle and insidious in its instilling of ideas.

Riegel[17] points out:

> Through the shortwave and broadcasting channels, propaganda speeds directly from the political fountain head to the listener's ears without the intermediation of any interpreter or critic and is not subject to the steadying influence of correction or reply.

In the light of the propaganda material at hand, the following objectives were expressed in Japan's treatment of "Post War Policies": (1) An effort was made to show how the major members of the United Nations are in no position to assume responsibility in directing the Post War Policies, (2) Attempt to elevate herself in the eyes of the American people, by pointing to her assimilation of world cultures, and (3) By subtle means, tried to enhance her position not only during this present period of war, but, by pointing to her qualifications declared that she was the nation that understands Asia and consequently should have the say in the direction in its destiny as determined at the peace table.

Indications of Effectiveness of the Propaganda

In the summer of 1941, the 200th Coast Artillery, which was a New Mexico unit and comprised of 1800 men from this state, arrived in the Philippines. Soon after their arrival, amateur radio communications were established between these soldiers in the Philippines and their relatives

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[17] O. W. Riegel, Op. cit., pp. 106-107.

in New Mexico. The amateur stations were located in the Philippines as follows: Clark Field, Fort Stotsenberg, Manila, and the Island of Negros. Up until December 7, a large number of messages were transmitted to and from New Mexico and the Philippines, many of which were person-to-person two way conversations. The principal centers of interest in this activity were Roswell, Carlsbad, Alamogordo, Gallup, and Albuquerque, where amateur stations, able to contact the Philippines, were located. People from all over the state were participating in this amateur radio communication activity by sending in messages by mail, long distance telephone, and Western Union for relay via amateur radio to their friends and relatives in the 200th Coast Artillery. Also a considerable number of people traveled over the parts of the state to cities where the amateur stations were located in order to enjoy direct two-way conversation by means of amateur radio telephone communication.

Thus, the citizens of New Mexico naturally have a greater than average interest in any war prisoners news emanating from Radio Tokyo. As a result of these facts, it was decided to make a limited survey of the short wave listeners of international broadcasts in Albuquerque, in order to secure the actual number of listeners within a given number of homes. These findings should give an indication of the effectiveness of Japanese propaganda in Albuquerque and the state of New Mexico from which general conclusions for the United States might be made.

The Radio Listeners' Survey undertaken involved 328 persons in 142 radio homes in Albuquerque, New Mexico. The great majority of the radio homes, in fact 111 of the 142, had short wave radio receiving facilities. Of the 262 persons included in the 111 radio homes, only thirty-six listened to foreign short wave programs. And, of those thirty-six, five had listened to Radio Tokyo, one of which listened regularly. In other words, only one person out of the 328 in the survey listened to Radio Tokyo regularly.

Thus, the survey indicated 11 per cent listened to short wave stations, 1.5 per cent to Radio Tokyo at times, and .3 of one per cent of the people listened to Radio Tokyo regularly. This indicates that the effectiveness of Japanese propaganda is very limited, even in a state which should be abnormally sensitive to news from that source. Based on the outcome of the radio listeners' survey and assuming Albuquerque is an average city, the generalization may be made that Japan's audience over the entire United States is comparatively very small.

Other factors also limited the effectiveness of the Japanese propaganda. Chen[18] has pointed out in his experimental investigation that attitudes are not influenced so much by the number of issues involved but were swayed to a greater degree by the vividness of the impression left. In many in-

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[18] William Keh-Ching Chen, Op. cit., p. 33.

stances the Japanese commentators exhibited qualities that would tend to lessen the likelihood of their propaganda ever leaving a vivid impression: a lack of finesse of presentation; high pitched and unpleasing quality of the voice; frequent stumbling over well-known English words and names, and lack of expression which often bordered on a parrot-like conception of the material delivered. All of these factors tend to distract the attention from the content of the propaganda material. The extreme differences between the languages of America and Japan make a natural barrier, which the Japanese propagandist finds hard to surmount. In other words, those qualities that could play an important part in strengthening the personality of some of the commentators only serve to weaken it.

CHAPTER VI

Summary and Conclusions

The factors influencing the Japanese international short wave propaganda effort at the time of this study, in summary, are:

Japan began extensive work, as early as 1936, to build up an audience, and attempted during actual war time to insure herself a regular listening audience through the use of a unique device--"The American War Prisoners' Information Hour."

Japan attempted to coincide her propaganda with current national and international events. This timeliness pointed to a characteristic feature of some of the propaganda--it was a defensive propaganda.

Analysis of the propaganda material at hand indicated its main objectives: (1) Split the American people from their leaders. Cause a confused American thought and promote and sustain dissension among the American people; (2) Separate the American people from Great Britain; (3) Destroy the American people's faith in their war aims; (4) Elevate Japan in the eyes of Americans, and possibly most important of all (5) Enhance the Japanese position at the peace table following the war.

Japan does have a large potential listening audience, but although her propaganda efforts have been extensive and intensive the findings of this study indicate, for all that effort, her listening audience is relatively small. Probably less than .3 of one per cent of all the people in radio homes listen regularly to Radio Tokyo. In addition, a natural language barrier prevents to some degree, the possibility of the propaganda's ever being effective.

In conclusion, the final outstanding impressions left by this study are: The Japanese are making an extensive and strenuous but inefficient attempt to combat the American war aims through the facilities of international short wave radio propaganda, and that the greatest potentialities of Japanese endeavor lie in its possible effect upon the Allied post-war program.

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APPENDIX

APPENDIX

The Japanese subjects of "Anti-American Government" and "Anti-American War Effort" were two of the most frequently dealt with. Examples of these topics are presented in full with the purpose of making clear, typical Japanese propaganda material.

In the December 8, 1942, commentary, Radio Tokyo stated, in attacking the American Governmental leaders:

> President Roosevelt has let it be known that he desires a day of silence to mark the anniversary of the Japanese-American war. At first blush, if one may use the phrase, it may appear to be a considerable sacrifice on the part of Mr. Roosevelt
>
> A whole day of silence. But first let us examine the situation before the great pall of silence falls over the great American talkie. Why, for one day, have the American people been relieved of the voice that commands from the radio; listen, believe, and obey?
>
> We are not mind readers, but one very obvious reason for this silence immediately suggests itself. There are so many awkward, painful, and embarrassing questions for Mr. Roosevelt to answer.
>
> For example, the origin of the Japanese-American war. The United States President has told us that the war came as a result of the so called treacherous attack on Pearl Harbor. But the public facts reveal to us that the Pearl Harbor raid was the result of a chain of hostile acts taken by Mr. Roosevelt against Japan. Consider the case. Suppose, to draw an exact parallel, that Americans were fighting some country in her immediate neighborhood. Japan, from far across the Pacific, rushed to assist America's adversary. First, by supplying large quantities of supplies of modern war, and then attempting to throttle America, to save herself from being strangled, broke Japan's arm. Would America be guilty of a treacherous attack? It is common knowledge the world over that many of the United States own statements condemn Roosevelt's conduct toward Japan as an open invitation to war. As for the economic blockade, not only American statesmen, but also authorities on international law regarded it quite simply as an act of war.
>
> It is plain, in the light of these known facts, that

world opinion cannot regard Japan as the aggressor in this conflict. But to revert for a moment to the actual facts of the Pearl Harbor raid and events just immediately preceding it. Roosevelt knew, beyond question, that his actions would lead ultimately to war. Why should he warn the Army and Navy in Hawaii to be prepared for a Japanese raid? Better silence, than to be forced to answer such questions as these.

Yet another matter, that is full of unanswerable questions for Mr. Roosevelt, is the matter of false reports of war results. His report on the outcome of the Pearl Harbor raid was quite simply an insult to American intelligence. One may forgive, in a publicity ridden country, the concealing of three ships out of twenty, but Roosevelt concealed seventeen out of twenty. It may be unkind, but the conclusion is obvious. A man that is eighty-five per cent dishonest is liable to say anything when he is cornered. After squandering twenty millions of the people's money, he is liable to say that only three millions have been spent. Or after causing the death of twenty thousand men, say that only three thousand have died.

So, the question that must be in every intelligent American's mind these days: How wide is the gap between the reported casualties and the real casualties?

Mr. Roosevelt may say that his deliberate understatements have been made in order to preserve public morale. But what kind of a nation is it that cannot maintain morale unless all the news is good news? This is surely no true picture of the American people. But it is the picture that the world is being shown.

Yet another unanswerable question for Mr. Roosevelt concerns his attitude toward the people of India. Independence is the greatest heritage the American people cherish. The sons and daughters of the American Revolution are rightfully proud of the fact that their forefathers took part in a war for independence. There is surely no American living today that would not give the last drop of his blood for independence. Anyone that fights for independence then, and moreover, fights gamely against tremendous odds, must command the respect and the support of millions of Americans.

What about Mr. Roosevelt's attitude toward the peoples of India in their inspiring struggle to break the shackles of slavery? But these questions, unanswerable as they are, all pale into insignificance before these three questions, which, sooner or later, Mr. Roosevelt must answer. Why did he assume dictatorial powers and proceed forthwith to rob the American people of their rights and freedoms? Why is he compelling American boys to die in foreign lands in

tens of thousands, despite the solemn pledge made at the last election? Why did he deliberately and calculatingly plunge America into war?

The longer the war continues the more pressing will these questions become. The American people are discovering that the war is no longer a profitable game of selling supplies to other nations. It is no longer a matter of advice, commands and criticisms from the safety of the head-lines.

On March 4, 1943, said Radio Tokyo in a typical "Anti-American War Effort" commentary:

Yesterday I spoke of the gigantic campaign your propaganda machine staged to bring you around to the way of thinking that dragged you into this war. There was one point left out, and that is, in the course of the campaign, the machine thrust upon you, or rather injected into you, the disease called megalomania. Large scale everything; big figures, big production, and big business being able to win the war on their own merit is quite a long way from the truth.

The mental make-up of the nation has just as much to do with it. In injecting this disease into you, the machine lulled you into a sense of security, so that anything that happened far away from home was of little importance. This was necessary in order to keep you from suffering too much when you looked around you and saw the rest of the world engaged in killing and hating. The job was successfully carried out, so much so, that you could take all the bad news about the European war that they could give you and not feel it as much as you should. If you had felt it more you would have felt differently about actually getting into a war yourselves.

That false sense of security would have not played you falsely, and you would not have to think, as you do today, of your sons and husbands going through hell-fire and your children threatened with the task of raking away the ashes and building their homes all over again. Does it seem worth it? But the thing is, you were lulled and so weakened by the opiate of security, that Europe's running blood and Europe's failing heart meant very little. And this sense of security of yours was based on very little. It was based on big figures, men, materials, productive capacity, and capacity in wealth. That should be enough to stop anyone from becoming too stilted with the U. S. A. And even today, when you hear of the losses you are suffering in the war of Greater East Asia, you are apt to turn that aside also with almost the same lack of thought that you displayed in your reception of bad news from the

European war front, just because those losses are being dealt to you in a place far away from home. Of course, since it is your own men and materials this time, you may feel it a little harder, but still not enough to bring you fully awake and in a position to do something about this waste of life. Who takes upon himself to deal with human lives as he would a pawn on the chess board, or in other words, who takes it upon himself to play God, is the blackest criminal of all in the eyes of God and man.

The half awake battle with which you are putting up and beyond which you will not progress, and most important of all, the half awake manner in which you allow yourselves to be shoved about by your string holders, is the result of your propaganda machine efforts. And it stands to reap more from the bitter fruit from the seeds it planted. The fact that the danger point is so far off, dulls the sharp edge of danger to you; battles and defeats are far away, and once the men and materials are shipped off in the general direction of the fight, they are forgotten except by the fathers and mothers, wives and sweethearts who might have still enough of the human element left in them to feel. This excludes the string holders. But once the men and their tools of death are off to the wars, the string holders forget about them; they are no longer the responsibility of the people at home. It is left up to the poor suckers who are sent out. They are on their own now, and nothing can be done at home to help them. But yet, something can be done for them. You at home could make it so they could come back to their homes and find life and business almost at normal so that they could rest their war-weary bones and find peace for that cultured feverish mind that turn this way and that in a frantic search for relief, escape, and forgetfullness. But are you doing even that? Are they going to come back to a home that they will be proud to call a home? No, not even that. They will be coming back to the blackened, creaking ruins of what once they had called their homes, and they will have to pitch in and work their fingers to the bone. Never a moment's respite, for they will have to make their country a safe place for their children. They will want their children to grow up amidst normal conditions, away from the hates and prejudice and warped minds and death.

Your son's children, blood of his blood, flesh of his flesh. He will work his fingers to the bone for them, and kill himself in doing so. Not one thing are you doing to keep things for your sons as it was. Instead, your country is now a maze of political power mazes, of hopelessly tangled mazes of jumbled production and distribution, restrictions, rationing and shortages. The road back for young American boys will be a dark, and wet, and muddy road

and the end of the road will always be just over the horizon.

And in manpower, you face a grave problem, and every time a transport leaves your shores, please say to yourself; other mother's children being sent over-seas. And what happens; labor shortages. Yes, the military machine and industry. Both must be maintained at all cost. What do you do? You know what Abraham Lincoln would have done. Some of you think of his term as having brought about too much loss of life and property. As most of you know he left the country with the two most important and best things of life, wisdom and freedom. He would sacrifice any part of the Union for the whole of it, or would sacrifice the whole to save any part of it, but he would never sacrifice any part of it to save none of it. What part of it would you sacifice, people of America? Blood, sweat and tears. Blood of your sons and husbands, sweat of your workmen in industries and tears of the bereaved fatherless children, husbandless wives, sonless mothers and fathers. Those you would sacrifice.

And, what part of it would you save, people of America? Will you sacrifice all of it to save none of it? At what altar do you lay your sacrifices? Break out of the luxury that your propaganda machine has hypnotized you into. It can't run on forever. A dry machine must run out of fuel, it must break down some time, it must have a hole in its armor.

You can fool some of the people all of the time, and all of the people some of the time, but--------. That is all for now.

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