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Summer Welles' Mediation in Cuba, 1933

Margaret Naegle

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SUMNER WELLES' MEDIATION IN CUBA, 1933

By

Margaret Naegle

A Thesis

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CHAIRMAN

Troy L. Floyd

H. Michael Riley

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INTRODUCTION

Interest in Cuba has been at what is probably an all-time high in the United States since the Cuban revolution of 1959, when Fidel Castro overthrew Cuban strong-man Fulgencio Batista and set up a new revolutionary government. Not many anticipated that the much admired, long-overdue social reforms Castro proposed for Cuba would soon show a Communist influence; nor that the 1959 Cuban revolution would become a Communist one, as it seems to have done. Nor did many question the circumstances behind the rise to power of Fulgencio Batista, the Cuban dictator whom Castro worked so hard to drive from power. Few were interested, in 1959, in an earlier Cuban revolution--the revolution of 1933, in which Batista acquired the hold over Cuba which he maintained for nearly a quarter of a century.

This writer first became interested in the 1933 revolution in Cuba during lectures given in May, 1963 at the University of New Mexico. As part of these lectures an interesting theory was presented regarding the Communist "takeover" in Cuba. Briefly, this theory holds that behind every successful Communist revolution (Russia, China, Cuba, for examples) there has been an earlier attempt at social revolution which failed. In the case of Cuba, this would be the revolution of 1933, and especially the reformist provisional government of Dr. Ramón Grau San Martín.

Further investigation revealed a number of complicated developments in Cuba in 1933, the year of revolution. Up to that time the United States had frequently used the Platt Amendment as a basis for armed in-

tervention or thinly-veiled direct personal intervention in Cuba. President Franklin D. Roosevelt sent Sumner Welles to Cuba as Ambassador in May, 1933, with implicit instructions to implement the new Good Neighbor policy and avoid any charges of intervention, but to try to mediate the differences between the Machado government and the opposition--a radically different course from that of his predecessors. Welles' mediation efforts were proving fruitful when a general strike occurred and President Machado was removed from power by an unexpected army coup. A provisional government was selected which lasted only three weeks. Sergeant Fulgencio Batista initiated a military revolt in which non-commissioned officers forced their superiors from power in a move unique in Latin American history. Leftist liberals and university students then managed to put into office a de facto provisional government which promised genuine social revolution and advocated many strong reforms, but which did not have the support of Ambassador Welles. This government in turn was ultimately forced from power by another revolt led by Batista and approved by Welles.

The entire process of the 1933 Cuban revolution calls for an intense, detailed study that is far outside the competence of a Master's thesis. Consequently, it was decided that the scope of this thesis should be limited to a political analysis of the official mediation negotiations of Ambassador Sumner Welles (May to September, 1933) and their importance for both Cuba and the United States.

The Welles' mediation was rather controversial. There were and are many generalized and conflicting opinions of his official work in Cuba. They include the view that his mediation was successful; that it was something of a failure; that Welles had little to do with the actual fall of the Machado government; that he deserved credit for Machado's fall because of his mediation efforts; and that he exceeded his official role

as mediator and as a result had considerably more influence in Cuba in 1933 than was originally intended. In addition, Welles' official mediation in Cuba was of importance because it represented the new U.S. policy of non-intervention--in Cuba and in the Americas in general.

It was felt that a study of this official Welles' mediation, including some discussion of the earlier Cuban policies of the United States and an examination of events immediately following the official mediation, would provide a detailed picture of the mediation that might make a worthwhile contribution to future overall study of the Cuban revolution of 1933.

Sources for study proved to be as varied as the problems of the revolution. Considerable material in English was available, most of it published in the United States and reflecting an American point of view. Cuban sources proved to be rather more limited. There exist in Spanish various histories and political chronicles which include the 1933 Cuban revolution, the Welles' mediation, and succeeding events. Some proved to be quite reliable. Others, however, were biased either in favor of Machado or of Batista. Unfortunately, many of the more liberal Cuban groups did not publish books during this period, but expressed themselves only in pamphlets and occasional newspaper articles, many of which are not available outside Cuba. Cuban newspaper sources in general were somewhat limited because of the periods of rather strict censorship of the press during the Machado regime, and because many of these also are only to be found in Cuba. However, the writer was able to obtain microfilm copies of some reliable Cuban newspaper sources which provided something of a Cuban point of view to balance the more abundant U.S. sources. The published correspondence between Ambassador Welles and the U.S. Department

of State during the 1933 period also yielded a great deal of information which was not available elsewhere and which provided a valuable picture of the attitudes of Ambassador Welles during the period of his mediation.

CHAPTER I

BACKGROUND

Events in Cuba in 1933 cannot be readily understood or interpreted without some discussion of Cuba's history--her late independence, her special relationship with the United States, her political evolution, and her "monoculture" sugar economy. Cuba has long been an integral and fairly typical part of the Latin American community of nations, but her particular problems were extremely important in the political developments of 1933--and after--in that country. It is especially important to have a general picture of Cuban politics and United States' policies and interests in Cuba before 1933, for comparison with the changes which took place in these areas during the Welles' mediation.

Early History

Cuba did not win her independence from Spain in the early 1800's along with the rest of Latin America. There were several reasons for this. One of the first areas to be settled by the Spaniards in the New World, Cuba had long been committed to a pattern of large landed estates owned mostly by Spanish citizens. An increasing number of Negroes were imported to work these plantations, replacing the island's rapidly perishing Indians.[1] Cuba's small but powerful upper class greatly feared a Negro revolt or uprising should independence be gained and Spanish pro-

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[1]H. E. Friedlaender, Historia Económica de Cuba (La Habana: J. Montero, 1944), pp. 88-90.

tection be withdrawn. Spain, having lost the majority of her possessions in the New World by the middle 1820's, tenaciously held on to what remained. Consequently, Cuba remained one of the last strongholds of Spanish domination in the New World long after her neighbors had achieved nationhood.[2]

A Late Independence

Cuban patriots fought the Ten Years' War from 1868 to 1878 but did not succeed in gaining their independence. Only in 1898 were they finally freed from Spanish domination. During the long period before this, not only the United States but England, France, and other powers openly coveted the island. Apparently Cuba was never made a part of the United States (or England, or France) because none of these countries wished to see another capture the Cuban prize.[3]

United States' interest in Cuba was not disguised, however. As early as 1823 U.S. political leaders seriously considered annexing Cuba. By 1845 the United States Senate had passed a resolution authorizing the President of the United States to negotiate with Spain for the acquisition of the island. A reported $100,000,000 was offered, but was not accepted. Again in 1852, and in 1854 under the cloak of the Ostend Manifesto, the United States publicly demonstrated its intention to buy or take Cuba from Spain. This time over $130,000,000 was offered. But Spain again refused, the southern part of the United States complicated the issue by regarding Cuba as a possible new slave state, and Cuba remained Span-

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[2]Hubert Herring, A History of Latin America (2d. ed.; New York: Alfred E. Knopf, 1961), pp. 401-402.

[3]Ibid.; Russell H. Fitzgibbon, Cuba and the United States, 1900-1935 (Wisconsin: The Collegiate Press, 1935), pp. 6-8.

ish.[4]

Many isolated attempts at Cuban independence were made by inhabitants of the island and by other South American patriots, but it was only with the Ten Years' War that Cuba made a powerful, concerted attempt to gain freedom. Although the attempt ultimately failed, a second attempt in 1895 was more successful. United under the leadership of General Máximo Gómez, Cuban rebels seemed to be winning their battle when Spain sent the cruel Valeriano Weyler, "the Butcher," to Cuba as governor.[5] For two long years there was a destructive struggle between the Cuban rebels and the Spanish government. A great deal of property was destroyed, and many of the country citizens died when they were herded into the towns as a part of the Spanish "reconcentración" plan. At times the rebels seemed to be getting the upper hand, but by 1898 Spain had tightened her grip and the island remained in her possession.[6]

In 1898 the United States intervened. There were several reasons for this . Americans had already invested heavily in Cuban sugar and were suffering substantial losses because of the rebellion. The United States planned an isthmian canal and feared Spanish intervention. Yellow journalism added fuel to the flames by playing up Spanish atrocities and treatment of Cuban revolutionists.[7] President McKinley had at first wished to see Spain exert forceful control and stamp out the rebellion, but in

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[4]Graham H. Stuart, Latin America and the United States (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1955), pp. 190-198; Samuel Flagg Bemis, The Latin American Policy of the United States (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1943), p. 193.

[5]A. Curtis Wilgus and Raul D'Eca, Latin American History (New York: Barnes & Noble, Inc., 1963), pp. 368-369.

[6]Ibid.

[7]Fitzgibbon, pp. 16-22.

January of 1898 the U.S.S. Maine, sent to Havana for the protection of U.S. citizens, was blown up--it was not clear by whom. The United States Congress decided on armed intervention, although apparently Spain was almost ready to concede Cuba.[8] The resulting war was "brief, glorious, and inexpensive."[9] When the peace settlement was made official with the Treaty of Paris in December, 1898, Spain not only renounced all claims to the island, but evidently hoped the United States would annex Cuba. The American Congress had resolved to leave Cuba independent, however, and when the United States signed the treaty it pledged to leave the Cubans in ultimate control of their island.[10]

U.S. Military Occupation

From 1898 to 1902 Cuba was under U.S. military occupation, and affairs in the island were administered by a U.S. military government. Under the direction first of John R. Brooke and then Leonard Wood, this military government was directly responsible to the U.S. Secretary of War, Elihu Root. Its stated objectives were to improve the sanitary, economic, political, and administrative conditions in the country, and to pave the way for the establishment of the Republic of Cuba as an independent nation.[11] By 1900 General Wood had called a Constitutional Convention for

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[8]Dana G. Munro, The U.S. and the Caribbean Area (Boston: World Peace Foundation, 1934), pp. 1-6.

[9]Herring, A History of Latin America, p. 407.

[10]Fitzgibbon, p. 28; Munro, pp. 1-7. As part of the Treaty of Paris, the United States pledged to assume and discharge obligations under international law, with regard to protection of life and property, on the island of Cuba as a result of its occupation by the U.S. Furthermore, the United States pledged that although its responsibility would be limited to the period of military occupation, any future government of the island would be "advised" by the U.S. to assume the same obligations. (For complete text of Treaty of Paris, see Appendix I).

[11]Munro, pp. 5-7; Fitzgibbon, pp. 28-66.

the purpose of drafting Cuba's first constitution. However, the United States insisted on stipulating conditions for the independence of the island. In this way the famous Platt Amendment came into being.

The Platt Amendment

The Platt Amendment was drafted by U.S. Secretary of War Root and first adopted by the American Congress as an attachment to the Military Appropriations Bill for 1901-1902. It was "designed to place such limits upon the island republic's activities as to make her a safe and tractable neighbor."[12] Cubans bitterly protested this limitation on their new sovereignty, but when the United States made it clear that her troops would not be withdrawn until the amendment was made part of the Cuban Constitution (and subsequently included in a perpetual treaty), Cuban leaders had no choice but to incorporate the amendment into the new constitution of 1901.[13]

Briefly, the amendment restricted the power of the Cuban government to enter into any treaties or authorizations whereby foreign powers (presumably not including the United States) might obtain control over any part of the island. It restricted the government of Cuba in the contracting of public debts, and stipulated that the 1898-1902 military occupation of Cuba by the United States be fully ratified and validated. In addition, it provided for intensive sanitation measures, left the Isle of Pines ownership question to be settled at a future date, and

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[12]Herring, A History of Latin America, p. 408.

[13]Munro, pp. 9-15; Leland Hamilton Jenks, Our Cuban Colony, A Study in Sugar (New York: Vanguard Press, 1928), pp. 75-88; Carleton Beals, The Crime of Cuba (Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott, 1933), pp. 179-180.

gave the United States permission for "coaling or naval stations at certain specified points" (thus paving the way for the establishment of the Guantanamo naval base).[14] The provision that was the most bitterly resented by the recently-freed Cubans was Article Three, which read:

> III. That the Government of Cuba consents that the United States may exercise the right to intervene for the preservation of Cuban independence, the maintenance of a government adequate for the protection of life, property, and individual liberty, and for discharging the obligations with respect to Cuba imposed by the Treaty of Paris on the United States, now to be assumed and undertaken by the Government of Cuba.[15]

Some of the measures in the amendment, such as the provision for sanitation, were expressly designed to protect the interests of the United States--in this case, to protect its southern ports. Other provisions, such as the controversial Article Three quoted above, were supposedly designed to preserve Cuban independence and prosperity. Certainly they also provided the basis for the frequent intervention and/or interference by the United States in the years that followed. Some historians feel this impaired the efficiency of Cuba's early governments:

> ...the well-meant policy of the United States imposed a split personality on the presidents of the newborn republic, who were under bond to serve two masters, the Cuban electorate, and the government in Washington. In the futile effort to propitiate both masters, they could please neither.[16]

Elihu Root was careful to point out that the amendment was "'not synonymous with intermeddling or interference with the affairs of the Cuban Government, but the formal action of the Government of the United States, based upon just and substantial grounds, for the preservation of Cuban independence and the maintenance of a government adequate for the pro-

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[14]Munro, p. 11.

[15]Ibid., pp. 11-12. (For complete text of Platt Amendment see Appendix II).

[16]Herring, A History of Latin America, p. 409.

tection of life, property, and individual liberty, and adequate for discharging the obligations with respect to Cuba imposed by the Treaty of Paris on the United States.'"[17] This "Root Interpretation" of the Platt Amendment was to provide the basis for Franklin D. Roosevelt's policy of non-intervention during the Cuban Revolution of 1933, but Cubans were never happy with the amendment, which they felt was forced on them. Regardless of the "Root Interpretation," they felt that the Platt Amendment kept Cuba from enjoying complete liberty and/or sovereignty.[18] At the time Cuba accepted the amendment, one Cuban patriot predicted that if, under terms of the amendment, the United States government alone could determine when a government was "adequate," then the only governments which would survive would be those which could count on the "support and benevolence" of the United States.[19]

Cuban Politics and U.S. Intervention

In early 1902 the new republic's first presidential elections were held. On May 20, 1902, President Tomás Estrada Palma officially took office and the United States Military Government was withdrawn.[20]

During his first term (1902-1906) as president, Estrada Palma apparently governed with a fair degree of honesty and accomplished some necessary reform and economy measures, although many Cubans felt he let

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[17]Samuel Flagg Bemis, A Diplomatic History of the United States (4th ed.; New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1960), pp. 504-505 (quoted from House Doc. No. 2, 57th Cong., 2nd Sess., p. 48, interpretation by Elihu Root).

[18]Beals, pp. 181-183; Historia de la Nación Cubana (La Habana: Editorial Historia de la Nación Cubana, 1952), Vol. VIII, pp. 205-210; Miguel Jorrín, Lecture delivered Thursday, May 23, 1963 at the University of New Mexico, Albuquerque, New Mexico.

[19]Beals, p. 182.

[20]Stuart, pp. 211-212.

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[17]Samuel Flagg Bemis, A Diplomatic History of the United States (4th ed., New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1965), pp. 374-375 (quoted from House Doc. No. 2, 57th Cong., 2nd Sess., p. 8, emphasis added by Bemis Root).

[18]Barris, pp. 121-127; Historia de la República Cubana (La Habana: Editorial Ciencias de la Revolución Cubana, 1973), Vol. VIII, pp. 203-207; Miguel Jorrín, Lecture delivered Thursday, May 23, 1963 at the University of New Mexico, Albuquerque, New Mexico.

[19]Bemis, p. 127.

[20]Suarez, pp. 211-212.

himself be too much influenced by the United States. (It was during his first term that a reciprocal trade treaty with the United States favoring Cuban sugar was arranged, a form of which prevailed up to 1960).[21] When the non-partisan president affiliated himself with the newly-organized Cuban Moderate party, permitted fraudulent elections to take place in 1905, and accepted a second term as president, the Cuban Liberal party protested the elections and led the new republic's first revolt. President Estrada Palma then appealed to the United States government for help in suppressing the insurrection. William Howard Taft, U.S. Secretary of War, was sent as mediator from the United States, backed by a corps of experts, but his efforts failed. When the experts recommended that lesser officials resign and another set of more honest elections be held, President Estrada Palma resigned in protest along with his officials, and Cuba was left without a government. Taft then proclaimed himself provisional governor of Cuba, citing the Platt Amendment for the first time.[22]

In theory, this "first intervention" in Cuba was in the form of a provisional government, supposed to last only long enough to "restore peace and order and public confidence," and to permit elections to be held for a new permanent government.[23] However, Taft's 1906 successor, a Nebraska lawyer named Charles Magoon, governed until 1909. He provoked the ire of many Cubans for his handling of public funds and offices, but he did order a new census which became the basis for the 1908 provincial, municipal, and national elections, and during his term Colonel Enoch H. Crowder headed an Advisory Law Commission which ultimately gave Cuba a

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[21]Munro, p. 30.

[22]Herring, A History of Latin America, p. 410; Jenks, pp. 92-93; Harry F. Guggenheim, The United States and Cuba, a Study in International Relations (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1934), pp. 199-206.

[23]Jenks, pp. 93-100.

himself is too much influenced by the United States. (It was during his first term that a reciprocal trade treaty with the United States favoring Cuban sugar was arranged, a form of which prevailed up to 1960).[21] When the non-partisan president affiliated himself with the newly-organized Conservative party, permitted fraudulent elections to take place in 1905, and accepted a second term as president, the Cuban Liberal party promoted the elections and led the new republic's first revolt. President Estrada Palma then appealed to the United States government for help in suppressing the insurrection. William Howard Taft, U.S. Secretary of War, was sent as mediator from the United States, backed by a corps of experts, but his efforts failed. When the experts recommended that Congress authorize and another set of more honest elections be held, President Estrada Palma resigned in protest along with his officials, and Cuba was left without a government. Taft then proclaimed himself provisional governor of Cuba, adding the Platt Amendment for the first time.[22]

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[21]Ibarra, p. 30.

[22]Hurtado, A History of Latin America, p. 419; Jenks, pp. 92-93; Harry F. Guggenheim, The United States and Cuba, a Study in International Relations (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1934), pp. 122-205.

[23]Jenks, pp. 93-100.

complete new electoral code.[24]

In 1908 new elections were held, and the Liberal party elected Jose Miguel Gómez (1909-1913) as President. With Gomez began a long period of dishonesty on the part of incumbent politicians and frequent resort to violence by those out of power.[25] Under the terms of the Platt Amendment the United States interfered or intervened various times. One writer described the political situation in Cuba during and after the Gómez presidency:

> Scrutiny of Cuban politics after 1909 makes sorry reading. There was increased venality in public offices, betrayal of trust by presidents, resort to violence by disaffected factions, and, finally, gross rule by violence. Washington intervened time and time again, sometimes by sending a battleship, landing marines, or appointing an "adviser"; more often by a discreet warning delivered to the Cuban president by the American Ambassador.[26]

One occasion when the United States intervened directly was in 1912 during President Gómez' term of office, when veterans of the Cuban War for Independence threatened the government and a Negro revolt broke out. American Marines and vessels were sent when the revolt occurred and withdrawn when it was subdued.[27]

Another occasion for U.S. intervention was the re-election of General Mario García Menocal to a second presidential term in 1916. (When first elected in 1912, he had promised not to seek re-election). Both the Conservative supporters of Menocal and his Liberal opposition claimed they had won this election, and their dispute led to a serious armed revolt headed by ex-President Gómez and his followers in early 1917. When it

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[24]Fitzgibbon, pp. 135-138.

[25]G. Rodríguez Morejón, Grau San Martín (La Habana: García y Compañía, 1944), p. 34.

[26]Herring, p. 410.

[27]Stuart, p. 218; Fitzgibbon, pp. 149-150.

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> Security of Cuban politics after 1908 under every reading. There was increased versality in public offices, betrayal of trust by municipalities, resort to violence by dissatisfied factions, and, finally, grave rule by violence. Washington intervened five and nine times, sometimes by sending a battleship, landing marines, or appointing an "adviser" sent often by a distress signal delivered to the Cuban president by the American Ambassador.[27]

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[25] Fitzgibbon, pp. 135-138.

[26] C. Robertson Morejón, Open San Martín (La Habana: Círculo y Compañía, 1924) p. 24.

[27] Martínez, p. 410.

[27] Morris, p. 218; Fitzgibbon, pp. 142-50.

was clear that the United States was contemplating sending armed forces to protect property threatened by the uprising, the Menocal government decisively quelled the rebels, but not before U.S. Marines had been landed once again to "stabilize" the situation. (The U.S. also offered more arms and election supervision, but President Menocal declined, solving his own problems by the use of force).[28]

The Cuban presidential elections of 1920 were no less controversial. The administration's approved candidate, Dr. Alfredo Zayas, had formed a new Popular party which united with the Conservatives of General Menocal. The Liberals, once more in opposition, nominated ex-President Jose Miguel Gómez. To prevent a repetition of earlier disorders, both sides accepted E. H. Crowder, now General Crowder, back into Cuba to personally oversee the elections. Observers and military supervisors from the United States monitored the national elections of November, 1920, but the results were still disputed. At this point Cuba was also disturbed by economic difficulties which further complicated the situation. President Wilson sent General Crowder back to Havana again in January, 1921 as a personal representative to try to bring order. When partial new elections were held in March, the Liberals refused to go to the polls and the government candidate, Alfredo Zayas, emerged the victor.[29]

Although Zayas became President of Cuba in 1921, General Crowder stayed on until January, 1923 a a special agent of the United States government, and to a degree he "ran" the Cuban government. Many American authors refer to this period of "personal intervention" as necessary both economically and politically. Cuban authors do not necessarily share that

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[28]Munro, pp. 38-43; Beals, pp. 220-223; Ruby Hart Phillips, Cuba, Island of Paradox (New York: McDowell, Obolensky, 1959), pp. 4-5.

[29]Munro, pp. 38-43; Historia de la Nación Cubana, VIII, pp. 57-59.

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[29] Moore, pp. 38-43; Historia de la Isla de Cuba, VIII, pp. 32-33.

point of view.

In any case, General Crowder was sent, stayed, and managed to make his influence felt. During the period 1921-1923 the Platt Amendment was used repeatedly as a means of exercising pressure on the Cuban government and President Zayas, usually through Crowder. President Zayas reluctantly made some economic reforms and even accepted Crowder's choices for a reformed presidential cabinet. However, in 1923 Crowder's status was changed to that of United States Ambassador, and President Zayas proceeded to undo most of the reforms Crowder had insisted upon. Scandal over Zayas' "seige of the public treasury" became so great that by 1924 the Cuban Veterans' Association had denounced the President and undertaken an armed revolt. In a new interpretation of the Platt Amendment, the United States held that clean-up by revolution was not desirable and prevented the rebels from receiving arms. Although the revolt failed, President Zayas was discredited to such an extent that he did not run for re-election. He supported General Gerardo Machado, the Liberal candidate, who campaigned against the Platt Amendment, defeated ex-President Menocal at the polls, and was peacefully inaugurated on May 20, 1925.[30]

In summary, the Cuban governments from independence to 1925 were perhaps better known for their graft (and resort to armed violence) than for their honesty. On numerous occasions the United States exercised the "right to intervene" as provided for by the Platt Amendment. Other, more indirect pressures were frequently used by the U.S to control Cuba politically and economically when direct intervention seemed undesirable.[31]

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[30]Fitzgibbon, pp. 168-184; Stuart, pp. 220-222.

[31]Eduard O. Guerant, Roosevelt's Good Neighbor Policy (Albuquerque, New Mexico: University of New Mexico Press, 1950), pp. 3-7.

The Cuban Economy

Except in Cuba's very early history, it is difficult to separate the story of the Cuban economy from the story of American interests and investments. Since the early 1800's, Cuba's economic history is largely the story of its sugar industry. Before that time coffee, and later, tobacco, were of prime importance.[32] By the 1850's sugar had become Cuba's most important crop. As early as 1856 cane sugar producers exported 388,000 tons of sugar (the United States received 372,000 of this amount) and from then on production rose steadily. By 1860 Cuba had 1,500 sugar mills producing almost 400,000 tons of sugar yearly, and she had become the world's foremost sugar-producing area.[33]

Cuban sugar production continued to rise until the Ten Years' War, although competition developed from beet-sugar producers in other parts of the world. Ownership of many of the valuable sugar lands passed from Cuban to Spanish (and American) hands, however, during this destructive revolution.[34]

Even before the sugar industry became so important, an appreciable percentage of capital investment in the Cuban economy characteristically came from U.S. sources. As early as 1818, both American capital and American settlers were attracted to Cuba by the unenforced Spanish law against settlement of foreigners--being technically illegal, Americans in Cuba paid no taxes, land was cheap, and they were attracted by the easy profits to be

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[32]Friedlaender, pp. 121-126.

[33]Jenks, pp. 24-25.

[34]Guggenheim, pp. 110-112; Raymond Leslie Buell, et al., Problems of the New Cuba (New York: Foreign Policy Association, Inc., 1935), pp. 42-43. (Not that Cuba's only importance was the ability of her rich lands to produce cane sugar. The soil and climate were equally favorable to quick production of many other crops; mining resources existed, although they were largely unexploited; and tobacco continued to bring in important revenues and provide many jobs for Cuban laborers.)

The Cuban Economy

Except in Cuba's very early history, it is difficult to separate the story of the Cuban economy from the story of American interests and investments. Since the early 1800's, Cuba's economic history is largely the story of its sugar industry. Before that time coffee, and later, tobacco, were of prime importance.[32] By the 1850's sugar had become Cuba's most important crop. As early as 1850 cane sugar producers exported 385,000 tons of sugar (the United States received 212,000 of this amount) and from then on production rose steadily. By 1880 Cuba had 1,200 sugar mills producing almost 600,000 tons of sugar yearly, and she had become the world's foremost sugar-producing area.[33]

Cuban sugar production continued to rise until the Ten Years' War, although competition developed from beet-sugar producers in other parts of the world. Ownership of many of the valuable sugar lands passed from Cuban to Spanish (and American) hands, however, during this destructive revolution.[34]

Even before the sugar industry became so important, an appreciable percentage of capital investment in the Cuban economy characteristically came from U.S. sources. As early as 1818, both American capital and American settlers were attracted to Cuba by the unenforced Spanish law against settlement of foreigners--being technically illegal, Americans in Cuba paid no taxes, land was cheap, and they were attracted by the easy profits to be

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[32] Friedlaender, pp. 121-126.

[33] Zanes, pp. 24-25.

[34] Guerrero, pp. 110-112; Raymond Leslie Buell, et al., Problems of the New Cuba (New York: Foreign Policy Association, Inc., 1935), pp. 43-45. (Not that Cuba's only importance was the fertility of her rich lands in producing cane sugar. The soil and climate were equally favorable to quick production of many other crops; mining resources existed, although they were largely unexploited; and tobacco continued to bring in important revenue and provide many jobs for Cuban laborers.)

made. As Americans moved in, trade with Cuba became increasingly important to the United States. In the 1850's, at the height of U.S. plans for annexation of Cuba, an estimated $8,000,000,000 worth of U.S. goods was exported to Cuba annually, and over $12,000,000,000 worth was received in return.[35] The United States accounted for one third of the entire foreign trade of the island (her share was as large as that of Spain).[36]

During the struggle for independence Cuba was economically devastated. Crops and livestock had been destroyed and numerous Cubans sold out to Spanish and American investors at bargain prices. American interests had long since begun buying up or leasing Cuban lands and constructing sugar mills. In 1902, when Cuba became self-governing, an estimated 21 per cent of her sugar was produced by American citizens.[37] By 1906, when many of the original American mills were consolidated into the Cuban-American Sugar Co., some $7,500,000 in new American capital had been poured into the development of the island.[38]

At the same time, Americans enjoyed a privileged relationship in other areas of trade. During the military occupation, many types of goods were exchanged in large quantities between the two countries. A good many Americans assumed that Cuba would soon be annexed and the favorable trade relations would become a matter of course. When it became clear that Cuba was actually to become a nation (Americans living and/or investing in Cuba were among the most insistent in asking for annexation by the U.S.), delegations of both Cuban and American sugar planters were the first to ask

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[35] Jenks, pp. 16-20.

[36] Ibid.; Friedlaender, p. 547.

[37] Jenks, p. 132.

[38] Ibid., pp. 141-157.

Washington for a protective tariff. In 1903 the United States reappraised its trade with Cuba--the island had become one of its largest markets for goods--and a reciprocal treaty was rapidly legislated and ratified (December, 1903). Tariffs immediately went down.[39]

With the Platt Amendment and the protective tariffs made possible by the Reciprocal Treaty, the fact that Cuba was an independent republic did not hinder American investment or American settlement in Cuba. In 1905, the first full year under the reciprocity treaty, Cuban imports into the United States increased by nearly ten million dollars.[40] The percentage of increase in U.S. exports to Cuba was even greater, showing that "fair commercial treatment" for the island was a very profitable arrangement.[41]

By 1906, an estimated $159,500,000 of American capital had been invested in Cuba.[42] By 1910 the value of U.S. imports from Cuba were $122,528,037, and U.S. exports to the island were valued at $52,858,758. In 1920 the import total had risen to $721,693,880, and exports to an astronomical $515,208,731, almost one tenth of the entire U.S. world trade.[43]

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[40]Jenks, p. 157.

[41]Stuart, pp. 214-215.

[42]Jenks, pp. 162-163.

[43]Stuart, p. 215.

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[40]Jenks, p. 157.

[41]Scuart, pp. 216-213.

[42]Jenks, pp. 122-123.

[43]Ferrara, p. 215.

850,000 tons produced the first year of the new republic, the crop reached a high of 2,442,000 tons at the time of the First World War.[44] Since an increasing amount of Cuban sugar production was in the hands of American investors, American interest in Cuba as a source of income rose proportionately. Production kept on rising, and by 1925, when President Machado came to power, an estimated 5,189,000 tons of sugar were produced, 3,608,000 of which was sent to the United States.[45] Overspeculation after the war years brought a financial crisis, and the price of sugar dipped so low that from an average of 11.9 cents per pound in 1920, the price fell to a low of 3.10 cents by 1921. The nation did not recuperate from the speculation and the price blow for a long time, and the Cuban public gave the astronomical prices of the 1920 sugar crop a name which became legend: "The dance of the millions."[46]

The history of sugar in Cuba, essentially the history of Cuba's economy, has been one of continual ups and downs since that time. By 1925, when the Cuban people went to the polls to elect General Gerardo Machado, sugar production had risen to an estimated 5,000,000 tons, and the Cuban economy appeared to be on the rise again.[47] By that time, too, an estimated three-fourths of the sugar industry of the entire island was in the hands of American investors, and the total value of American capital investments in Cuba had reached $1,200,000,000.[48]

American investment in Cuba was not, however, limited to sugar. Great gains were made in commerce and industry in the island, with the

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[44]Fulgencio Batista y Zaldívar, Piedras y Leyes (Mexico, D.F.: Ediciones Botas, 1961), p. 239.

[45]Friedlaender, p. 545.

[46]Batista y Zaldívar, Piedras y Leyes, p. 239.

[47]Ibid.

[48]Jenks, p. 177.

greater part of the necessary capital supplied by American investors. Some public utilities passed entirely into American hands. American banks invested heavily, and one made very substantial loans to several Cuban administrations.[49] The tourist industry, based essentially on Americans visiting Cuba by ship, was second only to sugar and tobacco in importance to the national economy.[50]

When General Machado took office the United States continued to have both economic and political reasons for interest in Cuba, as events of the 1933 revolution were to prove.

The United States' Cuban Policy

On the whole, United States policy in Cuba seems to have been first oriented toward annexation and then toward maintaining the most favorable trade relations possible with the new republic. After Cuba won her independence the Platt Amendment shaped U.S. policy in Cuba to a great extent, since it provided for a greater U.S. interest in Cuban affairs than would ordinarily have been possible. The United States did not often hesitate to assert this interest, and the amendment formed either the basis for or the justification of U.S. policy in Cuba for all of the years from 1901 until 1934.

Until the presidency of General Gerardo Machado, the amendment went through several different stages of interpretation. During the time of Elihu Root, the United States was thought to be bound by treaty to intervene under certain conditions, but usually intervention was to be avoided if at all possible.[51] From about 1911 on, President Taft's "preventive

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[49] Ibid.; Guggenheim, pp. 121-127.

[50] Buell, Problems of the New Cuba, pp. 46-49.

[51] Jenks, pp. 104-105.

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[49]Ibid., Guggenheim, pp. 121-127.

[50]Morell, Problems of the New Cuba, pp. 46-49.

[51]Jones, pp. 102-103.

policy" put a somewhat different interpretation on the Platt Amendment and led to a change in U.S. relations with Cuba. It was then felt that the United States not only had the duty, but the right, to see to it that cause for intervention did not arise. This meant that even domestic affairs could give rise to intervention if life and property were threatened. Pressures were often applied by the United States to make sure that domestic affairs in Cuba never reached the stage where actual intervention was necessary. This particular attitude governed U.S. relations with Cuba until at least 1923, and fit rather well into the "dollar diplomacy" category. During these years the United States seemed to have a consistent policy in Cuba where protection of American capital interests was concerned, even if this policy included interfering in the domestic affairs of the island.[52]

It should be pointed out that, as former U.S. Ambassador Guggenheim has stressed, American capital in Cuba was badly needed after independence and after the war years, and it made possible the rapid development of the country to an impressive degree.[53] However, many writers lay primary responsibility for Cuba's "monoculture," sugar-oriented economy at the doorstep of American capital. They also feel that the interests of American capital investment in Cuba were perhaps the foremost consideration in the formulation of U.S. Cuban policy during the years to the time of Machado, with the Platt Amendment often being used to justify a policy of intervention or interference for protection of American economic interests.

It must be admitted that American "influence" in Cuba to 1925 was impressive. Up to the time of Machado Cuba was occupied by U.S. forces several times, beginning only four years after the island became

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[52]Robert F. Smith, The United States and Cuba (New York: Bookman Associates, 1960), p. 137; Jenks, pp. 106-107.

[53]Guggenheim, pp. 113-114.

history was a complete disaster in terms of the Cuban people and led to a change in U.S. relations with Cuba. It was hard for the United States not only had the duty, but the right, to use its power as cause for intervention did not arise. This meant that even drastic actions could give rise to intervention if life and property were threatened. Treasures were often supplied by the United States to make sure that domestic affairs in Cuba never reached the stage where external intervention was necessary. This particular article governs relations with Cuba until at least 1923, and its reason was into the "dollar diplomacy" category. Darling-Hammond states the United States seemed to have a constitutional policy in Cuba where protection of American capital interests was concerned, even if this policy included interfering in the domestic affairs of the island.[52]

It should be pointed out that, as James L. Sundquist observes, Washington, American capital in Cuba was easily needed after annexation and after the war years, and it made possible the rapid development of the country to an impressive degree.[53] However, many were very primary responsible for Cuba's "monoculture," sugar-oriented economy as the doorway of American capital. They also feel that the isolation of American capital investment in Cuba were perhaps the foremost consideration in the formulation of U.S. Cuban policy during the years to the point of action, even the first Amendment often being used to justify a policy of intervention or interference for protection of American economic interests.

It must be admitted that American "influence" in Cuba is indeed very impressive. Up to the time of Fidelio Cuba was ruled upon U.S. or Spanish governed lines, beginning only four years after the island became

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[52] Russell F. Weigley, The United States and Cuba (New York: Columbia University Press, 1960), p. 32, Jones, op. cit., p. 7.

[53] Sundquist, op. cit., 113-114.

a republic. Four times the supreme leader in Cuba was an appointed American official. American Marines were sent to the rescue on several occasions, sometimes against the express wish of the Cuban authorities. The United States continually sent investigating commissions, financial advisors and personal representatives to the island, both with and without invitation.

This influence drew numerous objections from the Cuban people. From the very inception of the Platt Amendment many Cubans agitated for its abrogation. It was felt that the amendment was used to justify U.S. intervention or interference in Cuba for the protection of American business interests even when Cuba's own political interests were not well served:

> American business interests and the State Department were closely connected in matters of Cuban-American relations. There were some disagreements over specific methods, but in general there was agreement concerning the basic goals of policy.... The State Department and American business groups wanted to maintain a stable Cuban Government which would protect American economic interests--trade opportunities, and investments. Political reforms and democracy were only stressed by the United States during times of crisis, as concessions to keep opposition groups from starting trouble.[54]

Over the years the Cuban people came to associate dishonesty and graft in their government with American capital protecting its interests, and they felt that the U.S. government was sometimes primarily interested in helping protect these same interests. They came to feel that U.S. intervention was almost synonymous with protection of American investment and property in Cuba.[55] And always they blamed the Platt Amendment:

> El derecho de intervención que se reservaron los Estados Unidos para sostener en Cuba un gobierno adecuado a la protección de la vida, la libertad y la propiedad, nunca sirvió para impedir revoluciones, ni tampoco ha sido útil para evitar violaciones de los más

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[54]Smith, p. 137.

[55]Beals, p. 323.

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[54]Smith, p. 137.

[55]Beals, p. 323.

sagrados derechos individuales cuando han ocupado el poder personas capaces de atentar contra ellos; y en cambio la intervención o posibilidad de intervención por parte de los Estados Unidos, se aprovechó por personas poco escrupulosas para favorecer su propia causa.[56]

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[56] Historia de la Nación Cubana, VIII, p. 220. (Quoting Estanislao S. Zeballos in a speech made in 1933 at the Institute of Political Science in Williamstown [sic]).

CHAPTER II

CUBA UNDER PRESIDENT MACHADO (1925-1933)

General Gerardo Machado defeated ex-President Mario Menocal, Conservative candidate, at the polls in 1924 to become Cuba's fifth president. Elected as a reformist businessman president, he had pledged himself to an honest administration--a program of "moralización." He started out with an effective, businesslike rule, but his methods became increasingly dictatorial.[1]

Backed by the Liberals as a candidate, President Machado had been helped into office by former President Zayas and also had the backing of American capital, especially from electric, public utility, and banking interests. (He reportedly received over a million dollars in campaign expenses from American interests alone).[2] However, he won an overwhelming majority in what was regarded as an essentially fair election. He was apparently popular with the Cuban people, and he promised honesty in his administration, public works projects to boost the Cuban economy, and no increase in the public debt. He also promised he would not seek reelection.[3]

The graft, intrigue, violence and wholesale murder which eventually came to characterize the Machado regime would fill more than one

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[1]Ernest Gruening, "Cuba under the Machado Regime," Current History, XXXIV (May, 1931), pp. 214-219; Beals, pp. 242-245.

[2]Ibid., pp. 242-243.

[3]Ibid., p. 236.

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[2]Ibid., pp. 242-245.

[3]Ibid., p. 236.

book. Of necessity only the essentials are outlined here.

Early Consolidation of Power

When President Machado began to serve in 1925, many assumed that there would be less corruption in Cuban politics during his administration than at any other time since the presidency of Estrada Palma. Apparently President Machado did get rid of some of the bandit groups that infested rural Cuba, stopped petty graft, and made an effort to overcome the economic problems caused by the collapse of the sugar industry with a program of agricultural and industrial diversification.[4] However, at the same time he also began consolidating his power in order to keep himself in office.

One of his first moves was to brutally suppress the nation's labor organizations. Most of the unions were disbanded and their leaders killed outright. As of 1927 an estimated 147 assassinations of labor leaders alone had been committed by the Machado government, and apparently in none of the cases was there a serious investigation, much less a prosecution. The few labor organizations that were allowed to continue functioning were completely under the control of President Machado. Strikes were expressly forbidden and were brutally punished when they did occur. Labor did not recover from this blow sufficiently to constitute any serious opposition to Machado for several years.[5]

Despite his promise of a "clean"administration, from the beginning President Machado employed his much-publicized public works pro-

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[4]Russell Porter, "Cuba under President Machado," Current History, XXXVII (April, 1933), p. 33.

[5]Lewis S. Gannett, "Shadows of Cuba," The Nation, February 22, 1933, pp. 209-210; Beals, pp. 246-252; The New York Times, February 6, 1933, p. 5, col. 1.

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grams to build up his power. He had secured large loans in the United States for the construction of the great series of public works he had pledged. As a result, the Cuban national debt was greatly increased, and in the spending of the funds obtained through the loans there was a notorious amount of graft and corruption which very soon evoked hostility throughout Cuba.[6] Probably the most well-known was the 700-mile Central Highway connecting Havana with all parts of the island, which had cost over $100,000,000 and which American engineers had once declared could be built for as little as $35,000,000.[7] Equally conspicuous was the $20,000,000 capitol building which Machado constructed in Havana during his administration. All such improvements were criticized as wasteful and extravagant.[8]

President Machado's judicious use of the national lottery served him equally well. As early as 1912 a Cuban amendment to the lottery law had given the president dictatorial powers of the lottery, with complete freedom from investigation and audit.[9] Machado went even further than his predecessors in winning over most of the Cuban congressmen and senators to his programs by large-scale distribution of lottery collectorships among them (which gave them the right to make up to 50 per cent illegal profits by selling tickets above their marked price). The President himself, military officers, and other favorites shared this prize, and it was estimated that the total graft from the lottery often amounted to $1,000,000 per month--over $10,000,000 a year, or the equivalent of nearly a fifth of the entire national budget.[10]

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[6]Sumner Welles, The Time for Decision (New York: Harper & Bros. Publishers, 1944), p. 193.

[7]Porter, "Cuba under President Machado," Current History, XXXVII, p. 33; Beals, p. 271.

[8]Ibid.

[9]Guggenheim, p. 245.

[10]Beals, p. 245.

Very early in his administration President Machado also made it impossible for any opposition to combat him legally at the polls. After 1926 he coerced opponents in the existing Conservative and Popular parties to yield power under his plan of "coalition control." The net result was that Machado, using public favors and concessions from the lottery to keep both elected representatives and party members in line, gained control of both the Conservative and Popular parties. With his own Liberal party, which he already dominated, he thus had almost complete control of all three existing political parties.[11] He then forced through changes in the electoral code which prevented both the formation of new political parties and any reorganization of existing parties, thereby completely blocking the entry of any independent (anti-Machado) candidates in Cuban elections.[12]

Amending the Cuban Constitution

President Machado set about extending his term of office in a businesslike way. Under his orders, in early 1927 the Cuban Congress obligingly passed a set of resolutions providing for the amendment of the Cuban Constitution of 1901. The proposed changes included a single six-year presidential term, female suffrage, and the formal incorporation of the Isle of Pines into Cuban territory. They also included proposals that President Machado's term of office be extended two years, that the term of all congressmen be extended, that the number of senators be increased, and that the office of vice president be abolished.[13]

Then in April of 1928 Machado called a Constituent Assembly and

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[11]Beals, pp. 244-245.

[12]The New York Times, August 17, 1931, p. 3, col. 3.

[13]Beals, pp. 255-256; Phillips, Cuba, Island of Paradox, p. 5.

submitted the proposed amendments to them.[14] The assembly was even more cooperative than he had hoped. The delegates passed the majority of the proposed changes without question. When it came to the proposal to prolong President Machado's term for two additional years, the delegates specified that each president would serve a single term, but that this would only become effective with the first subsequent election. Thus in effect they endorsed Machado for a second (six-year) term as president.[15]

There was generally no enthusiasm among Cubans for these reforms, and some opposition began to form in protest.[16] The three existing parties, however, nominated President Machado as a candidate for re-election. In the elections held in November of 1928 Machado ran without opposition at the polls, and he "won" re-election and another six-year term in office.[17] He was slated to continue in office from May 20, 1929 to May 20, 1935.[18]

The opposition charged immediately that President Machado's second term was illegal and that the entire government was unconstitutional. (According to the Cuban Constitution of 1901, a constitutional convention could only approve or reject the amendments proposed by congress. Machado's assembly had adopted amendments of its own.)[19] They held that 1928 was the last year of Machado's legal term in office.[20] President Machado did nothing in the face of all such protests except to take harsh steps to

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[14]Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers, 1933, Vol. V, The American Republics (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1952), p. 280 (711.37/178). Cited hereafter as Foreign Relations.

[15]Fitzgibbon, pp. 187-188.

[16]Historia de la Nación Cubana, VIII, pp. 68-69.

[17]Porter, "Cuba under President Machado," Current History, XXXVII, p. 32.

[18]Beals, p. 255.

[19]~~The New York Times~~, August 17, 1931, p. 3, col. 3.

[20]Miguel Jorrín, Governments of Latin America (New York: Van Nostrand Co., 1953), p. 275.

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[14]Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers, 1925, Vol. V, The American Republics (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1931), p. 320 (711.27/72). Cited hereafter as Foreign Relations.

[15]Fitzgibbon, pp. 187-188.

[16]Historia de la Nación Cubana, VIII, pp. 89-92.

[17]Ferrer, "Cuba under Gerardo Machado," Current History, XXXVII, p. 12.

[18]Ibid., p. 123.

[19]The New York Times, August 17, 1928, p. 2, col. 2.

[20]Miguel Jorrín, Governments of Latin America (New York: Ronald Press Co., 1953), p. 175.

silence them.

Increased Control over Opposition

He began by tightening an already strict censorship over the press. Even before his re-election President Machado had seen to it that although Havana's newspapers gave normal coverage to international news, their reporting of Cuban politics was all pro-Machado.[21] (As early as August, 1925 one anti-Machado newspaper editor had been shot on his doorstep by a Machado aide, the President having stated earlier that he"'felt badly about the necessity of having to kill him.'")[22] Originally the President officially declared that he did not propose to suppress any newspapers, but by 1929 almost every newspaper in Cuba had been suppressed at one time or another and numerous editors and newspapermen had either been murdered or had disappeared, never to be heard from again.[23] There was by that date little or no opposition press left.[24] In 1928, when President Machado's civilian Censorship Commission failed to prevent publication of photos and details of the murder of one youth by government forces, the President put censorship directly under the control of the military, and there it remained.[25] All publications in the island were thereafter subject to military control. By 1930 Cuban newspapers had received orders to refuse to handle all messages reporting alarming conditions anywhere in the island and those messages "which might cause unrest or injure the proper functioning of the administration of President Machado."[26] In 1931, one author wrote:

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[21]Gannett, The Nation, pp. 209-210.

[22]Beals, p. 273.

[23]Ibid., pp. 274-276.

[24]Gannett, The Nation, pp. 209-210.

[25]Beals, p. 274.

[26]The New York Times, September 15, 1930, p. 4, col. 3.

> He has suppressed all papers which opposed him. Never in the history of Cuban independence has the press gag been so drastically used. Public meetings have been broken up, opponents of the administration have been locked up.... In short, freedom of speech, press and assembly are nonexistent in Cuba.[27]

From almost the beginning of President Machado's term in office, Cuba's university students were in opposition to his government. Beginning in 1927 Machado closed the University of Havana at least three times when students demonstrated and protested against him. Student leaders were expelled and/or jailed in 1928 when they protested against the amendments to the constitution; they were thrown in jail again that same year during the visit of U.S. President Hoover "to avoid any protests" during his visit.[28]

When they saw President Machado was indeed serious about making the proposed amendments to the constitution and continuing a second term in office, the students of Cuba's universities and even high schools became one of the prime forces of the opposition. At the University of Havana, Eddy Chibas headed a group of student leaders who were delegated by the studentbody to form the Directorio Estudiantil Universario "to act as circumstances may demand" in the new situation.[29] As soon as President Machado heard their first protest against his government, the members of the Directorio were expelled. (One faculty member who resigned in protest was Dr. Grau San Martín).[30]

In September of 1930, the day before the reopening of the University of Havana as decreed by President Machado, students held mass

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[27]Gruening, Current History, XXXIV, pp. 214-219.

[28]Rodríguez Morejón, pp. 6, 45-48.

[29]Ibid. The Student Directorate included Eddy Chibas, Antonio Guiteras, José Elías Borges, Gabriel Barceló, and others.

[30]Ibid.

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meetings demanding university autonomy, demilitarization of education, and other concessions. At the same time they stated that it was useless to expect such reforms from Machado and that he should get out. Students and police clashed; one student was fatally wounded. Some 3,000 students marched on the University to object, and eventually President Machado closed the school permanently. Thus revolutionary tactics began in earnest with the students, who swore to keep the revolution alive and combat violence with violence.[31]

One U.S. observer had written of Machado: "It does not pay to oppose him; nobody older than a college student would do it."[32] The students were, however, joined in their fight by numerous other groups.

The Unión Nacionalista organized in 1927 to protest President Machado's plans to amend the constitution. Machado forbid the Unión to hold public gatherings, and used his army and police to disband its group meetings. He prevented the group from organizing itself into a legal political party, suppressed its newspaper, and imprisoned hundreds of its members without regard for their rights to a trial or a fair hearing.[33]

The President then sought to prohibit all meetings of any nature that the opposition might hold. He decreed that any meeting of three or more persons would be subject to police control. His opponents carried the issue to the Supreme Court in protest and obtained a decision to the effect that the presidential decree was unconstitutional--political meetings could not be prohibited. The Unión Nacionalista then held a protest demonstration

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[31]Gruening, Current History, XXXIV, pp. 214-219.

[32]Gannett, The Nation, pp. 209-210.

[33]The New York Times, August 17, 193, p. 3, col. 3.

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[31]Crosnoing, Current History, XXXIV, pp. 214-215.

[32]Gannett, The Nation, pp. 208-210.

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of some 50,000 in Havana, with no disturbances. But further meetings were broken up by the army under Machado's orders; he completely ignored the Supreme Court.[34]

In late 1930 President Machado pushed through local and municipal elections, although the opposition maintained they should not be held until the government could be reconstituted democratically. Further clashes occurred between police, opposition, and students. President Machado suspended constitutional guarantees and the elections were held as promised. The President had again clearly ignored all the objections of the opposition.[35]

The 1931 Revolt and the Aftermath

When it became clear that President Machado did indeed plan to serve out his second, six-year term as President of Cuba, revolt was almost inevitable. In August of 1931 ex-President Menocal and Coronel Carlos Mendieta led opposition forces in a rebellion that lasted for some days. The armed forces did not join the revolt as the rebels had hoped, however, and without their support the revolt was easily crushed by President Machado.[36] Mendieta and Menocal were captured and jailed, and later exiled. Many Cubans had hoped the revolt would succeed, and suppression by the Cuban government of anything that could be labeled opposition became even more ruthless and violent thereafter.[37]

For their loyalty the armed forces were rewarded generously,

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[34] Ibid.

[35] The New York Times, October 12, 1930, IX, p. 1, col.2.

[36] Historia de la Nación Cubana, VIII, pp. 75-76; Phillips, Cuba, Island of Paradox, pp. 4-6.

[37] The New York Times, August 17, 1931, p. 3, col. 3; Fitzgibbon, p. 194.

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When it became clear that President Machado did indeed plan to serve out his decree, six-year term as President of Cuba, revolt was almost inevitable. In August of 1931 ex-President Menocal and General Carlos Mendieta led opposition forces in a rebellion that lasted ten more days. The armed forces did not join the revolt as the rebels had hoped, however, and without their support the revolt was easily crushed by President Machado.[36] Mendieta and Menocal were captured and jailed, and later exiled. Many Cubans had hoped the revolt would succeed, but repression by the Cuban government of anything that could be labelled opposition became even more brutalized and violent thereafter.[37]

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[37]The New York Times, August 17, 1931, p. 3, col. 3; Fitzgibbon, p. 194.

since President Machado counted on their continued support and loyalty to keep himself in power. They were well fed and well paid, and Machado increased their numbers from some 12,000 to more than 30,000 (including rural guards and militia and Havana's police).[38] Machado came to count on his armed forces to the extent that eventually they assumed nearly all of what would ordinarily have been considered judicial and regulatory functions of a purely civilian nature. Cuban citizens were constantly subjected to military control. Special military permits were even needed to travel through the country or to leave Havana.[39]

But although President Machado and the armed forces had ruthlessly crushed the 1931 revolution, this failed to end opposition to the Machado regime. In fact, it had entirely the opposite effect. After the abortive revolution, political, economic and social conditions in Cuba went steadily from bad to worse. The Cuban people became increasingly discontented with Machado's government and his methods, and many began to turn to violence. President Machado in turn became even more ruthless and brutal.[40] One American journalist in Cuba described conditions during this period:

> Official assassinations, imprisonment without trial, and exile of political prisoners were not unknown in Cuba under previous administrations, but they were comparatively few in number, and the assassinations were isolated cases. Under the Machado regime, however, assassination has risen to the dignity of a political art. Official killings began in 1925, not long after President Machado was inaugurated for his first term. Politicians, labor leaders and editors opposed to the government were mysteriously killed--the murderers went unpunished. These killings continued, on a relatively small scale until, having emerged victorious from the 1931 revolution, President Machado embarked upon a policy of complete ruthlessness in an effort to wipe out all opposition to his government.[41]

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[38]Beals, pp. 250-251, 301-302.

[39]The New York Times, May 31, 1932, p. 10, col. 1.

[40]Porter, "Cuba under President Machado, Current History, XXXVII, p. 29.

[41]Ibid., pp. 29-30.

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The Cuban Economy under Machado

President Machado's first term was on the whole a period of general prosperity. Business activity was stimulated by the inflow of large sums borrowed in the United States for construction and other purposes and there was a notable development of the tourist trade.[42]

Under Machado, American investors prospered possibly more than did the general Cuban economy. In 1929 an estimated 69.6 per cent of the Cuban sugar crop came from American-owned or controlled land or mills. By 1932 the figure had risen to 80 per cent, and one third of Cuba's territory--nearly 90 per cent of all the cultivable lands of the island--was owned or controlled by American interests. (One eight of the sugar lands of the entire island belonged to one American company).[43] Nearly all the banks, railroads, electric plants, telephone systems and other public utilities were owned by U.S. capital. The important Cuban tobacco industry was also controlled chiefly by North American creditors.[44]

As usual, the Cuban economy generally reflected the plight of sugar. Under President Machado the price of sugar rose, fell drastically in 1929 during the depression, and finally began to rise again.[45] Production was decreased under various sugar control plans tried after 1928, but none seemed to relieve the situation.[46] In 1929 Cuba put 5,136,279 tons of sugar on the world depression market, priced at 3.82 cents per pound. By 1933, the "year of crisis," the tonnage had been reduced to almost half (2,604,292

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[42]Munro, p. 51.

[43]Beals, pp. 301-316.

[44]Ibid., p. 375.

[45]The New York Times, February 22, 1933, p. 10, col. 1.

[46]Dexter Perkins, The United States and the Caribbean (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1947), pp. 44-46.

The Gerardo Machado Years

President Machado's first term was on the whole a period of great prosperity. Business activity was stimulated by the influx of large sums borrowed in the United States for construction and other purposes and there was a notable development of the sugar industry.[42]

Under Machado, American investors prospered possibly more than did the general Cuban economy. In 1929 an estimated 63.6 per cent of the Cuban sugar crop came from American-owned or controlled land or mills. By 1932 the figure had risen to 80 per cent, and one third of Cuba's territory--nearly 20 per cent of all the cultivable lands of the island--was owned or controlled by American interests. (One eight of the sugar lands of the entire island belonged to one American company).[43] Nearly all the banks, railroads, electric plants, telephone systems and other public utilities were owned by U.S. capital. The important Cuban tobacco industry was also controlled chiefly by North American creditors.[44]

As usual, the Cuban economy generally reflected the plight of sugar. Under President Machado the price of sugar rose, fell dramatically in 1929 during the depression, and finally began to rise again.[45] Production was decreased under various sugar control plans tried after 1928, but rose enough to relieve the situation.[46] In 1929 Cuba got 3,185,175 tons of sugar on the world depression market, priced at 3.38 cents per pound. By 1933, the "year of crisis," the tonnage had been reduced to almost half (2,104,172

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[42]Pierce, p. 11.

[43]Dealy, pp. 301-316.

[44]Ibid., p. 375.

[45]The New York Times, February 12, 1933, p. 10, col. 1.

[46]Dexter Perkins, The United States and the Caribbean (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1947), pp. 46-49.

tons) and sold for only an average of 0.71 cents per pound.[47] In 1929 the Machado government had agreed to participate in the Chadbourne plan, a "gentleman's agreement" which restricted the sugar quota of participating countries for several years--and which hit Cuba especially hard after 1930, since it limited drastically the amount of Cuban sugar which could be placed on the world market.[48] The Hawley-Smoot tariff of 1930, passed in the United States, increased duty on Cuban sugar marketed in the U.S. and further hurt the industry.[49] Since 85 per cent of the Cuban national income was derived from the sale of sugar, with the U.S. as its largest market, the effects of the world depression, the tariff policies of the United States and the Chadbourne plan "rapidly brought the Cuban people to a condition of abject destitution which had never previously been equaled in the history of their independence."[50]

President Machado had borrowed heavily from American interests to finance his public works projects. In spite of depressed conditions after 1930 he refinanced the loans at exorbitant interest rates, eventually doubling the already large public debt at a time when the island could ill afford it.[51] The two largest items in the 1932-33 national budget were the $9,000,000 expenditure for the armed forces and the $7,000,000-plus consigned to debt payments. Cuban wages were cut, and inflation spread. Income, the value of the currency, and wages all declined while the cost of living increased. By 1932 the total national debt had risen to a figure

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[47]Batista, Piedras y Leyes, p. 239.

[48]Beals, p. 389.

[49]Schurz, Current History, XXXVI, pp. 545-549.

[50]Welles, The Time for Decision, p. 193.

[51]Porter, "Cuba under President Machado," Current History, XXXVII, p. 34; Beals, pp. 371-373.

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[47]Bastida, Piedras y Leyes, p. 239.

[48]Ibid., p. 289.

[49]Schwab, Current History, XXXVI, pp. 545-546.

[50]Millis, The Time for Decision, p. 193.

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well over $150,000,000.[52] In early 1933 one writer summed up the Cuban economic situation under President Machado:

> Cuba is caught in a vise between the low price of sugar and the high cost of a debt service which becomes relatively more burdensome every year in terms of the rapidly diminishing national income. She is squeezed tighter in this vise by the heavy taxation needed for the support of the military establishment which keeps the Machado government in power, and which consumes about 25 per cent of its revenues. Mounting taxes on business, including sales and consumption taxes on necessities of life and increasing customs duties on imported foodstuffs and manufactured articles have produced a state of stagnation in business. These conditions, added to the financial crisis, have reduced almost the whole population to a condition of semi-starvation.[53]

Social conditions brought about by the economic situation in Cuba were deplorable. There was increasing unemployment; by 1933 out of a total population of 4,000,000, an estimated 500,000 Cubans were unemployed. The average wage had fallen from $3.00 to 50 cents a day. Common labor was paid 20 cents a day or less. As conditions grew worse, more and more Cuban people who were normally peace-loving resorted to terrorism to try to overthrow their government.[54]

U.S. Cuban Policy during the Machado Government

The Cuban policy of the United States government changed from the "preventive" interpretation of the Platt Amendment followed after President Estrada Palma's administration to what was apparently a permissive and later a sort of "hands off" policy during the Coolidge and Hoover Administrations. Translated in terms of action, this meant that no Marines were landed and no direct intervention undertaken during the early years of the Machado regime. To the Cuban people Machado seemed to be able to do as he chose, with the full approval of the United States.[55]

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[52]Charles W. Hackett, Current History, XXXVII (October, 1932), pp. 88-89.

[53]Porter, "Cuba under President Machado," Current History, XXXVII, p. 34.

[54]The New York Times, February 6, 1933, p. 5, col. 1.

[55]Beals, p. 325; Porter, "Cuba under President Machado," Current History, XXXVII, p. 34.

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[54] The New York Times, February 6, 1933, p. 5, col. 1.

[55] Beals, p. 315; Porter, "Cuba under President Machado," Current History, XXXVII, p. 34.

Regardless of the officially stated policy of the United States government the welfare of American business interests in Cuba often continued to be its prime concern:

> The main objective of American capital in Cuba has been to reap the largest profits possible without regard for the welfare of the Cuban people; the main objective of the State Department has been to maintain the status quo, to insure stability often regardless of the wishes of the Cuban people.[56]

In spite of the official U.S. policy toward the Machado government, conditions were such that as early as 1929 the Senate Foreign Relations Committee ordered a full investigation of the Cuban situation. It had originally been intended as an investigation of charges of ill treatment of Americans in Cuba, but the final reports from the investigation committee dealt primarily with the conduct of President Machado himself. The reports charged that President Machado, who had just begun his second term, was responsible for many of Cuba's problems, alleging that he exercised a "strong personal control" over the island's affairs.[57] The Senate investigation and reports confirmed charges that the President controlled congress by means of the lottery; charges of confiscation of property and profligate extravagance that had produced governmental bankruptcy; charges of suppression of freedom of the press, speech and assembly; and charges of the existence of a military dictatorship, illegal elections, and assassination (300 official assassinations and over 4,000 "forcibly driven into exile"). It was also charged that justice had become a farce and the judiciary had been brought under the "absolutism of the political powers."[58]

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[56]Beals, p. 323.

[57]The New York Times, April 18, 1928, p. 18, col. 3; September 19, 1929, p. 2, col. 5.

[58]The New York Times, September 20, 1929, p. 1, col. 6; p. 25, col. 3; p. 18, col. 3.

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No sooner had these charges been confirmed by the Senate investigation than influential American businessmen in Cuba began sending cables contradicting the charges and endorsing Machado. Representatives of steel, insurance, automobile, sugar, and public utilities interests in Cuba sent immediate notes supporting the government of President Machado. (It is interesting to note that most of these firms cited their own "good treatment" under Machado as refutation of the charges confirmed by the investigation).[59]

Official U.S. policy continued to recognize and support President Machado:

> The original treaty between the United States and Cuba, granting the United States the right to intervene by force if in its judgment the Cuban authorities were unable to render due protection to life and property, was still in existence. The Hoover Administration closed its eyes to a situation which was fast degenerating into anarchy, and was shocking the conscience of the Western world. It limited itself to asserting that, inasmuch as the government of President Machado had been recognized by the United States as the constitutional government of the republic, no steps would be taken by the United States that could in any sense interfere with the free right of the Machado government to put down disorders by any means which it might deem fit.[60]

In view of this attitude, it was not surprising that "for the Cubans, the slightest word of an American diplomatic representative had significance, his faintest suggestion carried worlds of meaning...."[61]

The American Ambassador who represented the United States in Cuba during the first crucial years of the Machado presidency was Harry F. Guggenheim, himself a representative of a family that had made a fortune in copper in Latin America.[62] President Hoover made it clear that he had not ap-

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[59] The New York Times, September 22, 1929, p. 2, col. 6.

[60] Welles, The Time for Decision, p. 194.

[61] Beals, p. 256; Fitzgibbon, p. 195.

[62] Ibid., p. 192.

He sooner had these charges been confirmed by the Batista Government than influential American businessmen in Cuba began making subtle contradicting the charges and endorsing Batista. Representatives of Texaco, Insurance, automobile, sugar, and public utilities interests in Cuba went immediate notice supporting the government of President Batista. (It is interesting to note that most of these firms noted their own "government" under Batista as validation of the charges contained in the investigation).[57]

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[57]The New York Times, September 22, 1958, p. 2, col. 6.

[58]Wallace, The Time for Decision, p. 154.

[59]Beals, p. 256; Fitzgibbon, p. 192.

[60]Ibid., p. 182.

pointed Guggenheim as a special emissary to Cuba, as had sometimes been the case with U.S. representatives in the past. Numerous charges were made that Guggenheim, who served from October of 1929 until late 1932 and carried out the "hands off" policy of the Hoover administration in Cuba, was principally concerned with keeping the Cuban government solvent so that no debts owed to American investors would be defaulted on.[63] These charges seem to be on the whole substantiated by accounts of Cuban-American economic relations during the period.[64]

Ambassador Guggenheim showed little or no understanding of or genuine sympathy for the opposition to President Machado.[65] When he occasionally interceded in favor of a Cuban jailed or persecuted by the Machado government, Ambassador Guggenheim did so by suggesting--but never insisting--that President Machado act less harshly in a particular case.[66] He was careful to state time after time that the American Embassy as represented by him was at all times completely impartial and fair in every way, and that the charges that he was helping to keep the Machado government in power were entirely false. Many Cubans were not impressed.[67]

Even after the 1931 revolt in Cuba the official position of the United States did not change appreciably. Ambassador Guggenheim argued

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[63]The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt, Vol. III, The Advance of Recovery and Reform (New York: Random House, 1938), pp. 546-549. Cited hereafter as Public Papers, III.

[64]Fitzgibbon, p. 277.

[65]Guggenheim, p. 167. In analyzing the reason for student opposition to Machado, for example, Ambassador Guggenheim commented: "The North American must understand that the Latin American youth in the past has not found an outlet for his surplus energies and maturing ambitions in atheletics and other highly organized student activities, which are such an important part of Anglo-Saxon university life...."

[66]The New York Times, February 5, 1933, p. 10, col. 6; Fitzgibbon, p. 277.

[67]Ibid., pp. 276-277; Beals, pp. 256-258.

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[66]The New York Times, February 5, 1931, p. 18, cit. in Fitzgibbon, p. 277.

[67]Ibid., pp. 270-277; Beals, pp. 236-239.

that during the revolt the United States had remained "strictly neutral." He even suggested that the Machado government did not have the support of the U.S. after the revolt.[68] Others hardly agreed. They seemed to feel that the total result of American investments, the Platt Amendment, and U.S. policy in Cuba had contributed to the economic and political situation in the island under President Machado's rule. In support of their arguments, they pointed out that $1,750,000,000 had been invested in Cuba by Americans, and that Cuba continued to be a leading source of sugar for the United States.[69] In Sumner Welles' words:

> The Hoover administration had watched the situation develop. It had taken the ground that the Cuban people had elected Machado and must swallow their own medicine--a ground theoretically invulnerable if one were willing to overlook the practical truth that the United States government, through the influence which its treaty gave it and because of the policy which had been pursued by the Department of State in preceding years, was regarded by the vast majority of the Cuban people as fully able to rectify these wrongs if it desired.[70]

Many Cubans also pointed out that President Machado had always boasted of the support of the U.S. government and of U.S. banks, and that the people of Cuba believed he had such support. They felt that the United States was directly responsible in many respects for the difficulties of Cuba under President Machado.[71]

In summary, the attitude of the United States government toward the Machado administration, as represented by the Hoover administration and Ambassador Guggenheim, appears to have been primarily one of "let well

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[68]Guggenheim, pp. 230-234.

[69]The New York Times, September 28, 1930, VII, p. 13, col. 1; February 5, 1933, p. 10, col. 1; Beals, pp. 381-382.

[70]Sumner Welles, Relations between the United States and Cuba, address before Young Democratic Clubs of America, Washington, March 29, 1934; Department of State, Latin American Series No. 7 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1934), p. 6. (Cited hereafter as Welles, Series No. 7.)

[71]The New York Times, November 18, 1931, p. 6, col. 1.

that during the revolt the United States had remained "totally aloof."[68] He even suggested that the Machado government did not have the support of the U.S. after the revolt.[69] Others hastily agreed. They seemed to imply that the total result of American involvement, the Platt Amendment, or U.S. policy in Cuba had contributed to the economic and political situation in the island under President Machado's rule. In support of their arguments, they pointed out that 21,250,000,000 had been invested in Cuba by American and that Cuba continued to be a leading source of sugar for the United States.[69] In Summer Welles' words:

> The Hoover administration had watched the dictatorship develop. It had taken the ground that the Cuban people had elected Machado and must swallow their own medicine--a prime characteristic invariably invoked when we were willing to overlook the possible risk that the United States government, through the influence which its friendly power in Cuba had of the policy which had been pursued by the Department of State in preceding years, was regarded by the vast majority of the Cuban people as fully able to rectify those wrongs if it desired.[70]

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[70]Sumner Welles, Relations between the United States and Cuba, address before Young Democratic Clubs of America, Washington, D.C., 1934; Department of State, Latin American Series No. 9 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1934), p. 8. (Cited hereafter as Welles, No. 7.)

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enough alone as long as American capital interests are well served." The fact that the Cuban people evidently believed the United States was supporting Machado after he had become a tyrannical dictator did not seem to be of paramount importance.

Increased Opposition and Terrorism, 1932-33

After the 1931 revolution President Machado voluntarily offered to institute reforms but early in 1932 he abandoned his plans for reform and announced that he had no intention of resigning. He indicated he would remain in office until the end of his term (May, 1935) and that Cuba would be governed under martial law until that time. The result was the outbreak of terrorism.[72]

All the organized opposition groups which gained strength rapidly after 1931 were united in demanding that President Machado go. Carrying on the active opposition inside Cuba were the students, with little or no real direction, and the ABC revolutionary organization under the leadership of young Cuban professionals and intellectuals. Both groups were suspicious of the "old guard" opposition groups.[73] The latter were divided into three major groups. The strongest was the non-cooperating wing of the old Conservative party. It was headed by former President Menocal, who had led the 1931 revolt and who afterwards headed the group from his exile in Miami.[74] Another was the Unión Nacionalista headed by Colonel Carlos Mendieta, who had also taken a leading part in the 1931 revolution and who was also eventually exiled to Florida.[75] The third group, known as the "Marianista" faction,

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[72]Porter, "Cuba under President Machado," Current History, XXXVII, p. 33.

[73]Ibid., p. 31.

[74]The New York Times, February 9, 1933, p. 6, col. 2.

[75]Ibid.; Porter, "Cuba under President Machado," Current History, XXXVII, p. 37.

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All the organized opposition groups which gained strength rapidly after 1931 were united in demanding that President Machado go. Carrying on the active opposition inside Cuba were the students, with little or no real direction, and the ABC revolutionary organization under the leadership of young Cuban professionals and intellectuals. Both groups were successors of the "old guard" opposition groups.[73] The latter were divided into three major groups. The strongest was the non-cooperating wing of the old conservative party. It was headed by former President Menocal, who had led the 1931 revolt and who afterwards headed the group from his exile in Miami.[74] Another was the Unión Nacionalista headed by Colonel Carlos Mendieta, who had also taken a leading part in the 1931 revolution and who was also eventually exiled to Florida.[75] The third group, known as the "Martinista" faction,

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[72]Porter, "Cuba under President Machado," Current History, XXXVII, p. 32.

[73]Ibid., p. 32.

[74]The New York Times, February 9, 1932, 2, 6, col. 2.

[75]Ibid.; Porter, "Cuba under President Machado," Current History, XXXVII, p. 32.

was led by former Mayor of Havana Miguel Mariano Gomez, who lived in exile in New York after 1931. These three opposition groups, as well as the students and the ABC, differed over policies and political ideals but were united in demanding the removal of President Machado.[76]

The student movement consisted of hundreds of young men and women mainly from the studentbody of the University of Havana and the Havana high schools, who in 1931 had refused to resume their classes as long as Machado remained president. The motives of the students were mixed. A right-wing faction was rather idealistic and patriotic; the left-wing group was more terroristic and was closely associated with the secret terrorist organization, the ABC.[77]

Late in 1931, after the failure of the armed insurrection, a group of young professional men, mostly graduates of the University of Havana, had organized the ABC secret society as a secret terrorist organization dedicated to the overthrow of the Machado regime. Composed of all classes of the opposition including students, professional men, and labor leaders, the ABC claimed a membership of from 4,500 to 5,000.[78]

The purpose of the ABC was to "tear down everything and start all over again" in the political structure of the country.[79] They were opposed not only to the Machado government but to all the "old guard" political leaders of the opposition, whom they regarded as just as corrupt and just as likely to seize dictatorial power as was Machado. Organized into cells, the original ABC broke down into successive levels of command.

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[76]The New York Times, February 9, 1933, p. 6, col. 2.

[77]The New York Times, February 4, 1933, p. 9, col. 2.

[78]Ibid.,

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[76]The New York Times, February 3, 1933, p. 1, col. 1.

[77]The New York Times, February 4, 1933, p. 9, col. 2.

[78]Ibid.

[79]Ibid.

"A" stood for a group of ten top leaders who in turn supervised a group of ten "B's," or intermediate supervisors. Each "B" leader in turn supervised ten "C's," and when the organization grew, corresponding "D", "E" and other levels were added. As a protection against Machado's secret police, the ten members of each branch or cell were known only by fellow cell-members and by their direct higher-level supervisors.[80]

The ABC worked with the students in the underground terroristic activities against the Machado government--and especially against Machado's secret police--throughout 1932 and part of 1933.[81] They were responsible for the bombing of public buildings and the assassination of government, military and police officials which marked their calculated campaign of violence and opposition to President Machado. Toward the end of 1932 and in early 1933 killings by this group reached a climax in spectacular gun battles and bombings in which terrorists assassinated some of Machado's chief aides--including Captain Miguel Calvo y Herrera, head of Machado's hated secret police, and the president of the Cuban Senate, Dr. Clemente Vásquez Bello. They also made several futile attempts on the life of President Machado, who was always heavily guarded.[82] (These attempts were so nearly successful that the President ultimately traveled around Havana in an armored car, surrounded by bodyguards, and he rarely made public appearances.)[83]

The ABC and the student groups were represented in New York by exiled members, and together with representatives of the "old guard" opposition they formed a Revolutionary Junta which pledged to cooperate ac-

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[80] The New York Times, August 13, 1933, VIII, p. 1, col. 8; February 4, 1933, p. 9, col. 2.

[81] Ibid.

[82] Porter, "Cuba under President Machado," Current History, XXXVII, p. 31.

[83] The New York Times, February 4, 1933, p. 9, col. 2; Beals, p. 241.

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The ABC and the student group were represented in New York by unlisted members, and together with representatives of the "old guard" opposition they formed a Revolutionary Junta which pledged to cooperate un-

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[82]Porter, "Cuba under President Machado," Current History, XXXVII, p. 31.

[83]The New York Times, February 4, 1933, p. 9, col. 2; Busin, p. 21.

tively and openly to overthrow President Machado and his regime, maintaining that:

1. He had built up and was seeking to perpetuate a dictatorship through re-electing himself or dictating the election of his successor.

2. He had instituted a reign of terror through the "ley de fuga," imprisonments without trial, holding political prisoners incommunicado, exiles, and deportations.

3. He had made free elections impossible by fixing permanent control of all existing political parties in his own hands, by forbidding the organization of new parties or the running of independent candidates, and by using his army and police to manipulate elections.

4. He had prevented open opposition by prohibiting free speech, free press, and free assembly, and by closing and failing to reopen the higher institutions of learning.

5. He had suppressed the civil courts by military tribunals, which ignored writs of habeas corpus issued by the civil courts.

6. He had refused to respect decisions of the Supreme Court holding some of his actions unconstitutional.

7. His entire second term was illegal and unconstitutional.[84]

After the formation of the Junta the violence against President Machado was stepped up. Probably the most notable aspect of this increased, open opposition to Machado was the continued bombings and killings carried on predominantly by the ABC and student oppositionists. They continued to damage a good deal of property, managed to assassinate numerous government officials, and planted an enormous number of bombs around Havana and in other parts of the island.[85] Machado continued to censor the Cuban press, but usually not a day went by without reports in the American press of bombings, killings, or attempted killings in Cuba. President Machado reacted

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[84]Porter, "Cuba under President Machado," Current History, XXXVII, p. 32.

[85]The New York Times, August 13, 1933, VIII, p. 1, col. 8.

tively and openly in one-to-one fashion President Machado and his regime, maintaining that:

1. He had built up and was seeking to perpetuate a dictatorship through re-election (illegal) or altering the election of his successor.

2. He had instituted a reign of terror through the "ley de fuga," imprisonment without trial, holding political prisoners incommunicado, exiles, and deportations.

3. He had made free elections impossible by stifling personal control of all existing political parties in his own hands, by controlling the organization of new parties in the running of the presidential candidates, and by using his army and police to manipulate elections.

4. He had prevented open opposition by prohibiting free speech, free press, and free assembly, and by closing and failing to reopen the higher institutions of learning.

5. He had suppressed the civil courts by military tribunals, which imposed terms of hard labor on those by the civil courts.

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[84]Porter, "Cuba under President Machado," Current History, XXXVII p. 82.

[85]The New York Times, August 14, 1933, VXXX, p. 1, col. 2.

as might have been expected; he retaliated by increasing censorship, political killings, and imprisonments. He seemed to be determined to meet force with force and literally destroy the opposition by using even more violent methods than they did. He suspended all constitutional guarantees; he imprisoned, exiled, deported, tortured or killed many more of his political enemies; but he did not succeed in exterminating the opposition--he only drove it underground. The more ruthless his repressive measures became, the more widespread the secret opposition became.[86]

The desperateness of the situation prompted the Machado government to invoke the old Spanish ley de fuga, or law of flight, on numerous occasions so that police, who already could hold civilian political prisoners incommunicado and court-martial them, could kill many prisoners on the grounds of their resisting arrest or trying to escape.[87]

The Porra was the most famous and dreaded of the weapons which Machado used to fight the opposition. Made up largely of hardened criminals, this Porra, or strong-arm squad, was used to break up political meetings and carry out many government assassinations against the opposition. The atrocities committed were so numerous it would be impossible to list them. One description will serve as an example:

> The crude and brazen way in which many of the killings had been committed has led the public to discount official explanations. The secret police would pick up a suspect in his home, or in the street, take him to a police station and hold him there several hours for questioning, during which...torture was used to extract information.... The bullet-ridden body of the arrested youth would then be found some hours later on a road in the outskirts of the city.[88]

By 1933 President Machado had placed much of the island under the direct control of the military and the secret police. The University of

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[86]Ibid.; Porter, "Cuba under President Machado," Current History, XXXVII, pp. 32-33.

[87]The New York Times, February 19, 1933, p. 1, col. 1.

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[87]*The New York Times*, February 19, 1933, p. 1, col. 1.

[88]*The New York Times*, February 6, 1933, p. 1, col. 1.

Havana had been closed for almost three years, the Supreme Court had become ineffectual, and there were no constitutional guarantees. Cuba was torn by the conflict. Censorship was increased to include even American publications. On numerous occasions all copies of American magazines or newspapers which had printed derogatory reports of the Machado regime or of terroristic activities were confiscated.[89]

The situation became so bad by early 1933 that it was generally agreed something would have to be done. Despite the deteriorating situation, President Machado maintained that his government was not a dictatorship, that political opposition was not persecuted, and that the majority of the Cuban people were supporting him.[90] Stringent military censorship all over Cuba resulted in the closing of some publications. Strikes and disorders began in various parts of the island. In spite of their dislike of the Platt Amendment, by early 1933 many Cubans had begun to talk openly of United States intervention. American businessmen continued to support Machado, and he continued to maintain that he was on the best of terms with the United States.[91] The United States had just elected President Franklin D. Roosevelt; many Cubans and Americans waited impatiently to see what the new administration would do in Cuba after March of 1933, when Roosevelt took office.[92] Sumner Welles commented:

> With the inauguration of President Roosevelt, a slight lull occurred; both sides were waiting to see what course the New United States government would pursue....
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> The obvious solution was for our government to try to solve the

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[89] The New York Times, April 19, 1933, p. 11, col. 4; Charles W. Hackett, "Unrest and Disorder in Cuba," Current History, XXXVII (March, 1933), pp. 726-728.

[90] The New York Times, January 31, 1933, p. 1, col. 6; February 12, 1933, p. 20, col. 2.

[91] Phillips, Cuba, Island of Paradox, p. 7; Historia de la Nación Cubana, VIII, pp. 77-78.

[92] Welles, The Time for Decision, pp. 194-195.

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[90] The New York Times, January 21, 1933, p. 4, col. 3; February 12, 1933, p. 20, col. 3.

[91] Millias, Cuba, Island of Terror, p. 7; Historia de la Nación Cubana, VIII, pp. 77-78.

[92] Welles, The Time for Decision, pp. 134-135.

difficulties by negotiation and friendly mediation, while fully respecting the sovereign rights of the Cuban people and avoiding any act of official intervention.[93]

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[93]*Ibid.*, pp. 194-195.

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[53] Ibid., pp. 194-195.

CHAPTER III

MEDIATION

When Franklin D. Roosevelt was elected President of the United States in late 1932, many Cubans waited hopefully to see what the new administration's policy toward the island would be. They were especially concerned with what attitude President Roosevelt would take toward President Machado and his government. What Roosevelt did was to decide upon a new approach to Cuba under the Platt Amendment--non-intervention--and send Sumner Welles to Cuba as both Ambassador and mediator. This was directly in keeping with the Good Neighbor policy which he had decided to carry out.

The New Approach to Cuba

President Roosevelt had first set out his intention to follow the new Good Neighbor policy in foreign affairs in his inaugural address on March 4, 1933. He stated:

> In the field of world policy, I would dedicate this nation to the policy of the good neighbor--the neighbor who resolutely respects himself and, because he does so, respects the rights of others--the neighbor who respects his obligations and respects the sanctity of his agreements in and with a world of neighbors.[1]

The Good Neighbor policy had not been intended to apply only to Latin

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[1]The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt, Vol. II, 1933, The Year of Crisis (New York: Random House, 1938), p. 323. (Cited hereafter as Public Papers, II.)

America. President Roosevelt felt, however, that the policy would be especially pertinent in dealing with Latin American nations. He held the firm belief that the United States must abandon its long-standing policy of interference in Latin America, and above all its policy of military intervention.[2] For Latin America unquestionably one of the most important results in the Roosevelt administration's decision to adhere to the Good Neighbor policy was the acceptance without reservation of the principal of non-intervention.[3] The first opportunity for the new policy to be carried out came in connection with the situation in Cuba.

When President Roosevelt was inaugurated on March 4, 1933, Cuba represented the new administration's most acute problem in foreign relations. Continued political terrorism and a state of economic prostration had created an alarming situation in the island, and many Cuban people were openly talking of intervention. These conditions constituted an immediate threat to Roosevelt's new policy. The Roosevelt administration was determined to avoid further intervention in Latin America, but in view of conditions in Cuba there was doubt as to whether demands for intervention could long be resisted. Further, the continuance of the Cuban disorders would have handicapped the new administration's intention to revive export trade as one remedy for the depression in Cuba.[4]

Welles as Ambassador

To carry out the policy of the Good Neighbor in its first real application in inter-American relations President Roosevelt nominated Sumner Welles, who had recently taken office under the new administra-

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[2]Welles, The Time for Decision, pp. 192-193.

[3]Guerant, p. 68.

[4]Smith, pp. 144-145.

American. President Roosevelt felt, however, that our policy would be specially pertinent in dealing with Latin American nations. He held the firm belief that the United States must abandon its long-standing policy of interference in Latin America, and above all its policy of military intervention.[2] For Latin American nonintervention was one of the most important results in the Roosevelt administration's determination to adhere to the Good Neighbor policy was the acceptance without reservation of the principle of non-intervention.[3] The first responsibility for the new policy to be carried out came in connection with the situation in Cuba.

When President Roosevelt was inaugurated on March 4, 1933, Cuba represented the new administration's most acute problem in foreign relations. Continued political turmoil and a state of economic prostration had created an alarming situation in the island, and many Cuban people were openly talking of intervention. These conditions constituted an immediate threat to Roosevelt's new policy. The Roosevelt administration was determined to avoid further intervention in Latin America, but in view of conditions in Cuba there was doubt as to whether necessity for intervention could long be resisted. Further, the continuance of the Cuban disorders would have frustrated the new administration's intention to revive export trade as one ready for the determined in Cuba.[4]

Welles as Ambassador

To carry out the policy of the Good Neighbor in the first real application in Inter-American relations President Roosevelt nominated Sumner Welles, who had recently taken office under the new administra-

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[2]Welles, The Time for Decision, pp. 192-193.

[3]Duvernet, p. 92.

[4]Smith, pp. 144-145.

tion as Assistant Secretary of State.[5] On April 24, 1933 the Senate confirmed his appointment and he embarked on his assignment as Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to the Republic of Cuba.[6] (He did not go as a special representative of the President, as some thought).[7] President Roosevelt stated:

> When I took office, there had been continued hostility for several years to the Presidency of General Gerardo Machado in Cuba. This had been heightened by the prolonged depression in the sugar industry.... Hostilities had broken out, and the state of Cuban affairs was cause for deep anxiety to the new Administration. The question of the responsibilities and obligations of the United States Government to Cuba involved a consideration of the Platt Amendment to the Treaty of 1903 between the United States and Cuba, by which the United States had been granted the right to intervene in Cuban affairs for the purpose of maintaining "a government adequate for the protection of life, property and individual liberty."
>
> I did not believe that the conditions in Cuba constituted a just basis for the exercise of our right to intervene. Besides, intervention in the domestic affairs of other countries was decidedly contrary to the good-neighbor policy which I had determined upon with respect to foreign Nations, and particularly the other American Republics.
>
> I had hoped, however, that our Ambassador, Mr. Welles, might be able to work out an agreement between the Government of President Machado and the political groups opposing his continuation in office, which might bring about a new free election of a President.[8]

Welles seemed to be an excellent choice for the mission. Educated at Harvard, possessed of a sufficient personal fortune to enable him to live comfortably, he spoke fairly good Spanish and had served in the U.S. Diplomatic Corps from 1915 to 1922 (including for a time as Chief of the Latin American Division of the State Department).[9] He was an extremely contained, reserved personality, little given to making

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[5]The New York Times, April 22, 1933, p. 6, col. 6.

[6]Smith, p. 144; The New York Times, April 25, 1933, p. 6, col. 1.

[7]The New York Times, April 22, 1933, p. 6, col. 6.

[8]Public Papers, II, pp. 323-324.

[9]The New York Times, April 22, 1933, p. 6, col. 6; Fitzgibbon, pp. 194-195.

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> I did not believe that the conditions in Cuba constituted a just basis for the exercise of our right to intervene. Unilateral intervention in the domestic affairs of other countries was decidedly contrary to the good-neighbor policy which I had determined upon with respect to foreign nations, and particularly the other American republics.
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[8] Public Papers, II, pp. 323-324.

[9] The New York Times, April 22, 1923, p. 6, col. 8; Fitzgibbon, pp. 194-195.

public statements to the press, and he was capable of maintaining an aloofness which later would surround the mediation negotiations he carried out in Cuba. (The Cubans ultimately named him "the Sphinx.")[10] During the years 1922-1925, under Presidents Harding and Coolidge, he had served as American Commissioner to the Dominican Republic and prepared the way for the termination of the U.S. military occupation there.[11] Under his direction a provisional president and cabinet were installed, American forces were evacuated, and in 1924 relatively peaceful presidential elections were held under his direction and the American military occupation ended.[12] His experience in the Dominican Republic undoubtedly colored his expectations with regard to the outcome of his mediation in Cuba.[13]

In a statement issued shortly before his appointment was confirmed by the U.S. Senate, Welles set out in general terms his attitude toward the work he was to undertake. He denied that he was going to serve as a special representative of the President, or that he was being sent to terminate the Machado regime, and affirmed that he would observe the complete sovereignty and independence of the Cuban republic.[14] He was careful to point out, although in rather general terms, that the new ad-

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[10]Diario de la Marina, November 14, 1933, p. 3, col. 3, for example.

[11]Welles, The Time for Decision, pp. 187-188; The New York Times, April 22, 1933, p. 6, col. 6.

[12]Munro, pp. 134-137. For an account of Welles' work in the Dominican Republic see Sumner Welles, Naboth's Vineyard, The Dominican Republic, 1844-1924 (2 vols.; New York: Payson & Clarke Ltd., 1928).

[13]"Mr. Welles's Opportunity," The Nation, May 3, 1933, p. 188.

[14]The New York Times, April 25, 1933, p. 6, col. 1.

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ministration planned to deal with Cuba as an equal, whatever U.S.-Cuban relations had been in the past. He emphasized the importance of the economic relationship between the two countries:

> ....the very practical fact that Cuba is potentially one of the greatest customers of the American Continent for United States goods, and that she herself depends upon fair and generous treatment from the United States for her economic life...demand today, more than ever before, that the two nations join as equal, sovereign and independent partners in the consideration of those measures best adapted to further the economic and commercial interests of each one of them....
>
> In accordance with the policy of the Administration of encouraging reciprocal trade agreements, I look forward to undertaking detailed consideration of this vital problem at as early a date as may prove feasible to both Governments.
>
> It will be in that spirit that I shall undertake my official duties. I go to Cuba animated by a peculiar sympathy, which I have held for many years, for the Republic of Cuba and for every element of the Cuban people; welcomed by a generous message from the President of Cuba; and determined, in accordance with my instructions, to further, in every way possible, the joint interests of our two countries.[15]

A New Policy for Cuba

During the latter part of April, 1933 Ambassador Welles was carefully briefed on the situation in Cuba. The constitutional amendments undertaken by President Machado, the nature of the opposition to him which had grown up, the brutal methods Machado used for its suppression, the strict censorship and declaration of martial law, the closing of the schools, the attitude of the Cuban people toward Machado, and even the increased coverage of the Cuban situation given in the American press were outlined for him. The text and terms of the Platt Amendment were reviewed, especially with regard to the policy President Roosevelt wished

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[15] Foreign Relations, pp. 278-279 (711.37/178). Although it was stated at this time that Ambassador Welles would serve a regular term in Cuba and was not being sent as a temporary representative, at the very time Welles was leaving for Cuba the U.S. State Department informed Jefferson Caffery he was being considered as a replacement for Welles "in about three months' time." See Foreign Relations, p. 286 (123C11/316).

administration planned to deal with Cuba as an equal, whatever U.S.-Cuban relations had been in the past. He emphasized the importance of the economic relationship between the two countries:

> ....the very practical fact that Cuba is potentially one of the greatest customers of the American manufacturer for United States goods, and that she also herself depends upon full and growing trade - exact from the United States, for her material life...cement stronger than ever before, that the two nations play as equal, sovereign and independent partners in the consideration of those measures best adapted to further the economic and commercial interests of each one of them....
>
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to follow under Article III. Ambassador Welles was instructed that under this article the United States policy would be one of strict non-intervention, under the "Root Interpretation" of 1901.[16] Secretary of State Hull informed him:

> Under this interpretation, it will be evident to you that conditions in Cuba, highly unsatisfactory and even alarming as they may be, do not constitute a just basis for the formal action of the Government of the United States looking towards intervention. On the other hand, the Government of the United States cannot, in the interest of its own citizens, and because of its interest in the welfare of the Cuban people, assume that this interpretation of Article 3 of its treaty with Cuba can prevent it from experiencing grave disquiet while it sees a situation developing in the Republic of Cuba which would appear, perhaps, to result at some time either in the remote or in the near future in open rebellion against a Cuban Government, with consequent destruction of human life and property, and with the probability that there might then well be no government existing in Cuba adequate to preserve life, property, and individual liberty. This Government, on the contrary, feels it obligatory upon it to offer its friendly advice for the purpose of correcting and stemming that course of events and the potential dangers resulting therefrom.
>
> It must be clearly understood, however, that any efforts of the Government of the United States exerted in this direction are not to be construed as measures of intervention. They are, on the contrary, measures to be taken in view of the responsibilities assumed by the United States under its treaty relations with Cuba, as Cuba's nearest friend, and for the purpose of assuring the maintenance of Cuban independence and Cuban sovereignty.[17]

In view of Welles' later actions, it is important to know the detailed instructions he received regarding his mission to Cuba. Secretary Hull instructed him:

> 1. You will...express to President Machado the belief of the Government of the United States that the measures it is now suggesting to him are to be considered by the Cuban Government solely as the representations of Cuba's closest friend among nations, for the purpose of facilitating an adjustment of the various problems with which the Cuban Government is now confronted, which constitute in themselves, necessarily, a matter of intimate concern to the Government of the United States because of the provisions of the Treaty existing between the two nations.

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[16] Foreign Relations, pp. 281-284 (711.37/178a).

[17] Ibid., pp. 283-284.

2. You will point out to President Machado, in the most forcible terms, that in the opinion of your Government, there can be expected no general amelioration of conditions in Cuba until there is a definite cessation of that state of terrorism which has existed for so long a period throughout Cuba, and particularly in Havana. You will explain to him that the continuing reports of the murder of Cubans in all ranks of life by members of the armed forces of the Cuban Government have profoundly stirred public opinion in this country; that public feeling in the United States is in danger of becoming gravely prejudiced against the Cuban Government, with the resultant impairment of the high regard which the American people should rightly hold for the people of the neighboring Republic. You should state that this Government makes all due allowance for the need of the Cuban Government to undertake measures of control in view of the nature of the campaign which the opposition factions are waging against it. You will, however, express the earnest hope of this Government that the President will, at the earliest moment, enforce the strictest discipline among the members of the armed forces of Cuba so as to prevent a continuation of such atrocities as those which have so frequently been countenanced in recent months under the provisions of the "Ley de Fuga", and that the Cuban Government will, in so far as may be possible, prevent the incarceration, much more the execution, of political or press offenders.

In concluding your representations upon this matter, you will state that it is the very definite belief of your Government that the essential prerequisite in any basic improvement in Cuba is the speedy cessation both of overt acts against the Government and of extreme measures of repression by the Government.

3. You will express to the President the desire of the United States to offer, in any form deemed most suitable by both Governments, the friendly mediation of the Government of the United States between President Machado and the members of the political factions and other elements opposed to the Cuban Government. The nature of such mediation and the form in which it may be exercised, must, necessarily, be left to your discretion. You will, however, regard as your chief objective the negotiation of a definite, detailed, and binding understanding between the present Cuban Government and the responsible leaders of the factions opposed to it, which will lead to a truce in the present dangerous political agitation to continue until such time as national elections can be held in Cuba, and the responsible officials of a new constitutional government can be elected under reasonable guaranties of popular sufferage without fraud, without intimidation, and without violence.

4. Coincident with your discussion with the President of Cuba of the questions above set forth, you should express to President Machado the earnest desire of the Government of the United States to assist the Cuban Government in every feasible manner in the consideration of measures intended to ameliorate the distressing economic situation now existing in the Republic of Cuba. You will state that this Government, as a portion of its general policy of negotiating reciprocal trade agreements with other nations of the world, is particularly desirous of considering the bases of a reciprocal trade agreement between the United States and Cuba, which, in its belief, would redound to the advantage of both nations. You may say that this Government is strongly inclined to the view that a speedy improvement in economic and commercial conditions in Cuba would result in an immediate allaying of

2. You will point out to President Batista, in the same forcible terms, that in the opinion of your Government, there can be expected no general amelioration of conditions in Cuba until there is a definite cessation of that state of terrorism which has existed for so long a period throughout Cuba, and particularly in Havana. You will explain to him that the continuing reports of the murder of Cuban citizens of all ages by members of the armed forces of the Cuban Government have profoundly estranged public opinion in this country. Cuba's failing in the United States is in danger of being increasingly identified against the Cuban Government, with the resentment manifested at the high regard which the American people should rightly hold for the people of the neighboring Republic. You should state that this Government makes all due allowance for the need of the Cuban Government to undertake measures of control in view of the nature of the campaign which the opposition factions are waging against it. You will, however, express the earnest hope of this Government that the President will, at the earliest moment, enforce the strictest discipline among the members of the armed forces of Cuba so as to prevent a continuation of such atrocities as those which have so frequently been committed in recent months under the provisions of the "Ley de Fuga", and that the Cuban Government will, in so far as may be possible, prevent the incarceration, much more the execution, of political or press offenders.

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popular unrest and of political agitation, and that the Government of the United States hopes that the Cuban Government will be disposed to give the consideration of this problem preferential attention. You may likewise point out that the Government of the United States is favorably disposed to receive any suggestions from the Cuban Government as to any other manner in which the friendly cooperation of this Government might be effectively exercised in assisting the Cuban Government in its desire to bring about general commercial and economic improvement.

In conclusion, you will always bear in mind that the relations between the Government of the United States and the Cuban Government are those existing between sovereign, independent, and equal powers; and that no step should be taken which would tend to render more likely the need of the Government of the United States to resort to that right of formal intervention granted to the United States by the existing treaty between the two nations.[18]

On May 4, 1933 Sumner Welles sailed for Cuba to assume his duties as Ambassador. The American press emphasized the fiction that Welles intended to concentrate on economic problems in Cuba, "on the theory that with economic rehabilitation will come political tranquility."[19] In Cuba, the official story was that the new Ambassador would work on revision of the reciprocity treaty and try to find means of improving the economic life of the country by reviving the sugar industry.[20] But from the first, "nobody believed that his work was going to be limited to that."[21] It was agreed that he was to try to bring about a change in the Cuban administration in a constitutional manner, although this was not to be admitted publicly. Sumner Welles himself later stated:

I remember the final conversation I had with the President...the night before my departure.... He hoped that the government and the leaders of the opposition parties and groups might be persuaded to reach an agreement upon a course of procedure which would make it possible,

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[18]Ibid., pp. 284-286.

[19]The New York Times, May 4, 1933, p. 11, col. 2.

[20]Diario de la Marina, May 2, 1933, p. 1, cols. 1, 3; May 5, 1933, p. 1, col. 3.

[21]Alfonso Hernández Catá, Un Cementerio en las Antillas (1st ed.; Madrid: Imp. de Galo Saez, 1933), p. 84.

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[18]Ibid., pp. 230-220.

[19]The New York Times, May 4, 1922, p. 13, col. 1.

[20]Diario de la Marina, May 2, 1922, p. 1, note. 1, p. May 5, 1922, p. 1, col. 2.

[21]Alfonso Fernandez Cuza, La Conferencia en la Habana (Ser ed.: Madrid: Imp. de Pelo Sear, 1922), p. 7.

through the methods afforded by the Cuban Constitution, for a change of administration to take place. This would give the people of Cuba the opportunity to start afresh under new auspices.[22]

These intentions were not made public at the time, but from the first it was rumored in Cuba that the new Ambassador had arrived to "quitar a Machado."[23] Although it was clear soon after Welles' arrival in Cuba that he would officially pursue a policy of mediation and conciliation with both President Machado and the opposition forces, many Cubans felt that since Welles was not a "friend of the President," as Guggenheim had been, the new Ambassador held the solution to the entire Cuban problem.[24] They expected an early end to the crisis. In addition, Cubans were hopeful that the new policy of the Good Neighbor, so recently declared by President Roosevelt, would mean that whatever steps were taken by Welles, they would not involve direct intervention or interference in the internal affairs of the island.[25]

The First Efforts to Mediate

The new Cuban policy of the Roosevelt administration was formally initiated on May 7, 1933, when Ambassador Welles arrived in Havana with his wife. He was welcomed by a large crowd, but would make no statement to the press other than to reiterate that his first consideration as Ambassador would be with matters of an economic nature.[26]

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[22]Welles, The Time for Decision, p. 195.

[23]Alberto Lamar Schweyer, Comó Cayo el Presidente Machado, Una Páquina Oscura de la Diplomacia Norteamericana (Madrid: Espasa-Calpe, 1934), pp. 60-61.

[24]Hernández-Catá, pp. 84-85.

[25]Diario de la Marina, May 8, 1933, p. 1, col. 7.

[26]The New York Times, May 8, 1933, p. 2, col. 2.

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[22]Welles, The Time for Decision, p. 102.

[23]Alberto Lamar Schweyer, Diez Años de Franquismo Machado, Una Dictadura Causada de la Diplomacia Norteamericana (Habana: Ediciones Gallo, 1934), pp. 60-61.

[24]Hernández-Lara, pp. 80-81.

[25]Diario de la Marina, May 6, 1933, p. 1, col. 1.

[26]The New York Times, May 8, 1933, p. 7, col. 2.

At the same time President Machado apparently had decided to make friendly gestures for the new Ambassador's arrival. He had fifty-one political prisoners released on May 5, and another forty-seven set free on May 8. In addition, on May 8 the military censors were ordered to turn over their duties to the Department of the Interior. The moves were the first real untightening or relenting President Machado had shown for years.[27]

It was then officially published in the United States that Ambassador Welles had been instructed to undertake negotiations for a new commercial treaty to alleviate the distressing economic conditions in Cuba. Likewise, he was to tender his good offices--"should the opportunity be afforded" and if all political factions found it acceptable--to help to bring about a solution of the political crisis in Cuba.[28] Nevertheless, during the first few days after his arrival in Cuba Welles made no official action or comment as to this latter part of his mission.

On May 10 President Machado made another conciliatory gesture. Police were ordered to "treat Cuban citizens decently, although without showing weakness."[29] Ambassador Welles refrained from public comment.

On May 11, in his first official call on President Machado, Ambassador Welles presented his credentials to the Cuban executive. In his speech of presentation he made general references to the economic crisis in Cuba, asked the Cuban President for his cooperation in "any measures that might be taken to better the situation," and presented the President with a personal introduction and recommendation from

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[27]Charles W. Hackett, "Guerilla Warfare in Cuba," Current History, XXXVII (July, 1933), pp. 469-471.

[28]The New York Times, March 30, 1934, p. 16, col. 8.

[29]Diario de la Marina, May 10, 1933, p. 1, col. 1.

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[28]The New York Times, March 30, 1934, p. 16, col. 8.

[29]Diario de la Marina, May 10, 1933, p. 1, col. 1.

President Roosevelt. President Machado replied that the Ambassador could count on the "active, cordial cooperation" of Machado's government and the interview terminated.[30]

Although the Cuban press was allowed to report almost nothing of the meetings and negotiations, during the rest of May Ambassador Welles was kept busy in a series of conferences with President Machado and his aides and with various representatives of opposition factions. Officially Welles always maintained either that the visits pertained to purely economic matters (as in the case of his calls on President Machado), or were "purely protocol" visits (as in the case of those to opposition leaders).[31]

In his talks with President Machado, the Cuban Secretary of State Orestes Ferrara and other aides, Ambassador Welles indicated that the United States hoped to adhere to the "Root Interpretation" of the Platt Amendment, but stressed that the United States felt any permanent basic improvements in Cuba's economy could not be undertaken until "political quiet once more existed." It was suggested that censorship be lifted, the _ley de fuga_ killings cease, and that martial law be ended as soon as possible. Ambassador Welles discussed in detail with President Machado and his government the various plans for improvement of commercial relations with Cuba which were being considered by the Roosevelt administration, and held out the promise of a new reciprocal trade agreement between the two nations at an early date.[32]

President Machado finally agreed to accept "a program of concilia-

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[30]_Diario de la Marina_, May 12, 1933, p. 1, col. 3; _The New York Times_, May 12, 1933, p. 10, col. 6.

[31]_Diario de la Marina_, May 13, 1933, p. 1, col. 1; May 14, 1933, p. 24, col. 5; May 17, 1933, p. 1, col. 1.

[32]_Foreign Relations_, p. 287 (837.00/3512).

President Roosevelt. President Machado replied that the Ambassador could count on the "active, cordial cooperation" of Machado's government and the interview terminated.[30]

Although the Cuban press was allowed to report almost nothing of the meetings and negotiations, during the rest of May Ambassador Welles was kept busy in a series of conferences with President Machado and his aides and with various representatives of opposition factions. Officially Welles always maintained either that the visits pertained to purely economic matters (as in the case of his calls on President Machado), or were "purely protocol" visits (as in the case of those to opposition leaders).[31]

In his talks with President Machado, the Cuban Secretary of State Octavio Averza and other aides, Ambassador Welles indicated that the United States hoped to adhere to the "Good Interpretation" of the Platt Amendment, but stressed that the United States felt any permanent basic improvements in Cuba's economy could not be undertaken until "political quiet once more existed." It was suggested that conceivably the Sitges, the Ley de Fuga killings cease, and that martial law be ended as soon as possible. Ambassador Welles discussed in detail with President Machado and his government the various plans for improvement of commercial relations with Cuba which were being considered by the Roosevelt administration, and held out the promise of a new reciprocal trade agreement between the two nations at an early date.[32]

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[31]Diario de la Marina, May 13, 1933, p. 1, col. 1; May 14, 1933, p. 24, col. 3; May 17, 1933, p. 1, col. 1.

[32]Foreign Relations, p. 337 (933.00/3312).

tion leading towards the holding of absolutely fair and uncontrolled national elections in the autumn of 1934...." He stated that he welcomed the "unofficial good offices of the Government of the United States" in the person of Sumner Welles, and agreed to institute several reforms as proposed by the Ambassador.[33] At this point Welles set out his assessment of the Cuban situation and the policy to be pursued in a May 13 cable to Secretary of State Hull:

> I hold the very strong belief that the policy to be pursued in Cuba under present conditions should be as follows:
>
> The economic benefits to be derived from a fair commercial agreement between the United States and Cuba and even the negotiations leading towards such an agreement will assist in part in distracting public attention from politics;
>
> By acting through and with the present Cuban Government which is well aware of the fact that it could not for long remain in power were the support of the United States to be even negatively withdrawn from it, it may be possible to carry out a program of constitutional and electoral reform which will make it possible for fair national elections to be held in 1934;
>
> If the present acute bitterness of feeling against the President and the members of his Government persists or becomes intensified during the coming year it would in all probability be highly desirable that the present chief executive be replaced at least during the electoral period by some impartial citizen in whom all factions have confidence. I do not feel, however, as a practical question that any attempt should be made to anticipate such a change. President Machado is able to preserve order joined with unquestioned loyalty and discipline of the Cuban Army. If some other individual replaced him the loyalty of the Army would be questionable; the Opposition would be as it is now, divided into factions which have absolutely no common ground other than that of desiring the removal of the President. Under such conditions general chaos might well result during the course of which the first objective on the part of malcontents would be the desire to bring about intervention by the United States through the destruction of American property.
>
> I am hopeful that by a series of concessions which the President may make to public opinion and by the continuance of negotiations for commercial agreement agitation may be kept relatively quiet until such time as the Cuban Congress can make essential amendments to the electoral code and approve the needed reforms to the existing constitution, which would be later voted by a freely elected constituent assembly....

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[33] Ibid.; also see Charles W. Hackett, "Cuban Peace Prospects," Current History, XXXVIII (August, 1933), pp. 594-595.

tion leading towards the holding of absolutely fair and uncontrolled national elections in the autumn of 1954...." He stated that he welcomed the "unofficial good offices of the Government of the United States" in the person of Sumner Welles, and agreed to institute several reforms as proposed by the Ambassador,[22] as this point Welles set out his assessment of the Cuban situation and the policy to be pursued in a May 12 cable to Secretary of State Hull:

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>
> I am hopeful that by a series of compromises which the President may make to public opinion and by the contingence of negotiations for commercial agreement negotiations may be kept relatively quiet until such time as the Cuban Congress can make minor amendments to the electoral code and approve the needed reforms to the existing constitution, which would be later voted by a freshly elected constituent assembly....

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[22] Ibid.; also see Charles W. Eagleton, "Cuban Peace Proposals," Current History, XXXVIII (August, 1933), pp. [illegible].

It will be this policy that I shall attempt to carry out unless I am instructed to the contrary.[34]

Ambassador Welles met with leading members of opposition factions in the first round of conferences to ascertain their willingness to accept mediation.[35] He was assured (principally through Dr. Cosme de la Torriente) that many representatives of the various groups would accept his "unofficial" good offices in mediation. Welles then succeeded in persuading President Machado to start a series of reforms which had been planned to lessen political tensions and to pave the way for opening negotiations with opposition groups. One such step was the liberating of several hundred political prisoners.[36]

By May 25 a "truce on terrorism" had been proposed by the Nacionalistas and Marianistas. Such "action" groups as the ABC demonstrated that they were in favor of the truce and would honor it.[37] Ambassador Welles persuaded President Machado to go along with the truce and pressed him for more of the proposed reforms. He also found time to confer with Carlos Manuel de Céspedes, who subsequently announced that he would not accept a post in the Machado government's embassy in Mexico, and remained in Havana.[38] In addition, Welles saw to it that Machado appointed his Secretary of War and Navy, General Alberto Herrera, interim Secretary of State in the absence of the influential Orestes Ferrara, who left to attend an

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[34]Foreign Relations, pp. 289-290 (837.00/3512).

[35]Ibid., pp. 295-298 (837.00/3526 and 837.00/3528).

[36]The New York Times, June 16, 1933, p. 1, col. 4.

[37]The New York Times, May 25, 1933, p. 8, col. 4.

[38]Ibid.; see also Diario de la Marina, May 25, 1933, p. 2, col. 3; May 26, 1933, p. 3, col. 1.

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Ambassador Wallace met with leading members of opposition factions in the first round of conferences to ascertain their willingness to accept mediation.[35] He was assured (privately through Dr. Conde de la Torriente) that many representatives of the various groups would endorse his "unofficial" good offices in mediation. Wallace then proceeded in persuading President Machado to start a series of reforms which had been planned to lessen political tensions and to pave the way for opening negotiations with opposition groups. One such step was the liberating of several imprisoned political prisoners.[36]

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[34]Foreign Relations, pp. 287-289 (837.00/3232).

[35]Ibid., pp. 293-296 (837.00/3256 and 837.00/3262).

[36]The New York Times, June 16, 1933, p. 1, col. 4.

[37]The New York Times, May 25, 1933, p. 8, col. 6.

[38]Ibid.; see also Diario de la Marina, May 23, 1933, p. 1, col. 5; May 26, 1933, p. 3, col. 1.

economic conference in London.[39] During all these proceedings, Ambassador Welles continued to maintain publicly that any meetings or conferences with the opposition were "strictly courtesy visits."[40]

By May 29 Ambassador Welles had received positive assurances from the ABC and the smaller secret society, the OCRR (Organización Celular Radical Revolucionaria) that they would refrain from further violence "in the hope that a peaceful settlement with the Government could be reached."[41] After official urging on the part of Welles, President Machado in turn issued a statement to the press which, while it made no definite commitments, intimated that he was willing to reach a compromise by negotiation.[42]

With both secret societies and President Machado indicating that they would cooperate, it appeared that Ambassador Welles could successfully begin open mediation efforts. However, at this point he was not overly optimistic, as his report to Washington indicated:

> The principal danger in the present situation lies in the fact that while President Machado is now inclined to follow a policy of conciliation...and while the principal elements of the Opposition, both political leaders and secret societies, are making...a sincere effort to prevent for the time being any resort to open violence and terrorism, the directors of the Opposition activities are very far from possessing a complete control over all the organizations in the Opposition. Any return to violence on the part of a dissident group will bring about prompt action necessary by the Government and should

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[39] Ibid. Welles considered Herrera a prime ally in Cuba. He later commented: "I may say that General Herrera is the only member of the present Government who has unswervingly supported my efforts to bring about a peaceful solution of the political problem and that he has invariably maintained faith with me.... He is exceedingly amenable to suggestions which represent the interest of the United States Government...." (See Foreign Relations, p. 356 - 837.00/3640.)

[40] Diario de la Marina, May 23, 1933, for example.

[41] Foreign Relations, p. 297 (837.00/3528).

[42] Ibid.

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[40]Diario de la Marina, May 23, 1933, for example.

[41]Foreign Relations, p. 797 (837.00/3839).

[42]Ibid.

this then provoke counter-reprisals, negotiations might break down at any time.[43]

Official Mediation Begins

In June Ambassador Welles began active, official negotiations with the Machado government and with opposition leaders. On June 1, after a long interview with President Machado, he formally offered his "friendly and unofficial mediation" between the political groups supporting the Machado administration and the political groups and independent factions comprising the opposition, emphasizing that the offer was conditional on his services being welcomed by President Machado and the majority of the opposition leaders.[44] President Machado officially accepted the offer.

Ambassador Welles "suggested" a compromise solution to the President for solving the political situation in the island and the President "agreed with" the suggestions.[45] Briefly, Welles told the President that he felt a compromise solution would have to be worked out in accordance with the structure of the existing constitution and through the existing congress. He made it clear to Machado that he did not go along with the opposition's demands for the immediate resignation of the President and his substitution by an impartial Secretary of State. (Under the constitution this meant that national elections would have to be called within sixty days after such a resignation to elect a presidential successor, and Welles felt there would be no time to organize and hold such elections in a fair, representative manner.) He proposed to Machado that an immediate reform of the electoral code be carried out--based on the services of an electoral

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[43] Ibid.

[44] Ibid., p. 299 (837.00/3531).

[45] Ibid., pp. 299-300.

this plan provoke counter-reactions, nor relations might break down at any time."[43]

Offered Mediation Denied

In June Ambassador Wallis began seeking, official acceptance with the Machado government and with opposition leaders. For more than a long interview with President Machado, he formally offered the "friendly and unofficial mediation" between the political groups supporting the Machado administration and the political groups and individuals comprising the opposition, emphasizing that the offer was unofficial on his services being welcomed by President Machado and the majority of the opposition leaders.[44] President Machado officially accepted the offer.

Ambassador Wallis "suggested" a compromise solution to the President-elect for solving the political situation in the nation, and the President "agreed with" the suggestions.[45] Briefly, Wallis felt the President-elect had felt a compromise solution would have to be made and in conjunction with the representatives of the anti-Machado coalition and through the existing congress. He made it clear to Machado that he did not go along with the opposition's demands for the immediate resignation of the President and his substitution by an impartial Secretary of State. Wheeler has commented that national elections would have to be held within several days after such a resignation to elect a provisional government, and he felt there would be time also to organize and hold such elections in a fair, representative manner. He proposed to Machado that an immediate revision of the electoral code be carried out--based on the experience of the elections

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[43] Ibid.

[44] Ibid., p. 239 (see 00/1128).

[45] Ibid., pp. 239-240.

expert to be provided for by the government of the United States (so as to allow organization of new political parties and complete and fair representation of all government and opposition groups in the next national elections). As a subsequent step he proposed the reform of the constitution to allow for the election of an impartial vice president representative of all groups, the limiting of the term of the next president to five years with no immediate re-election, and a decrease in the number of existing senators and congressmen and a shortening of their terms, steps which he felt could all be taken within six months' time.[46]

President Machado indicated he understood the true nature of the situation by "voluntarily" offering to resign in favor of such a new vice president after the latter was elected. (Welles diplomatically agreed that it was essential that such a vice president take control before the next national elections, but at this point he refrained from any direct comment on the desirability of the President's retirement.) Welles made it plain that the United States would not "undertake to sponsor any economic reforms in Cuba" until these or similar changes in Cuba's political situation had been made.[47]

Ambassador Welles then proceeded to continue conversations with what he termed "prominent members of the opposition," whom he persuaded to accept his plans for basing all reforms upon the preservation of the existing "constitutional" government. (He informed them that he was entirely opposed to any installation of a "provisional and unconstitutional" government in Cuba.)[48] He believed that the solution he had set in motion would

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[46] Ibid.

[47] Ibid., pp. 300-301.

[48] Ibid., p. 295 (837.00/3526).

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[46]Ibid.

[47]Ibid., pp. 300-301.

[48]Ibid., p. 293 (837.00/3326).

safeguard the U.S. government from any direct official intervention in Cuban affairs, would avoid setting a bad precedent since no provisional or unconstitutional form of government would be set up, and would provide "hope for the future" in the reform of both the electoral code and the Cuban Constitution.[49]

Unfortunately, President Machado was not inclined to be nearly so cooperative as he had indicated to Ambassador Welles. A few hours after he had indicated that he would accept the Ambassador's proposals, he stated in a public interview that he had no intention of resigning until May 20, 1935 and that the "overwhelming majority" of the Cuban people supported him and his government.[50]

The opposition forces were no little disturbed at this, and Welles had to return to make further "suggestions" to the President. By June 6 it was public knowledge that President Machado had again promised to cooperate. He "invited" Professor Howard Lee McBain, of Colombia University, to Cuba to undertake a revision of the Cuban electoral code.[51] On June 7, as advised by Ambassador Welles, Machado issued a public statement in which he set out detailed plans for constitutional reform, which he pledged to carry out. The plans included restoration of the office of vice president through a constitutional amendment, the adoption of a new and more liberal electoral code, and guarantees for the reorganization of existing political groups and for the formation of new

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[49]Ibid., pp. 300-301.

[50]Diario de la Marina, June 2, 1933, p. 1, col. 1; The New York Times, June 2, 1933, p. 1, col. 5.

[51]Diario de la Marina, June 3, 1933, p. 1, col. 1; see also June 6, 1933, p. 1, col. 2.

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[50]Diario de la Marina, June 2, 1933, p. 1, col. 1; The New York Times, June 2, 1933, p. 1, col. 5.

[51]Diario de la Marina, June 3, 1933, p. 1, col. 1; see also June 6, 1933, p. 1, col. 2.

political parties.[52] President Machado presented these proposed reforms as if they had been his own idea. He emphasized his patriotic gesture in offering to conciliate with the opposition and make such reforms. However, Ambassador Welles had revised the text of his speech beforehand "in order to avoid possible confusion as to the President's intent."[53]

After this gesture of conciliation by President Machado, prospects for a solution of Cuba's problems continued to improve during the rest of June. Ambassador Welles was in constant contact with leaders of all cooperating opposition factions, working to secure their cooperation in planning official mediation negotiations between opposition factions and government representatives.

On June 9, Dr. Cosme de la Torriente, who had been in constant contact with Welles, went on record publicly as favoring mediation by the American Ambassador--this after the latter had secured President Machado's consent for publication of Dr. de la Torriente's views in the Cuban press. Dr. de la Torriente pointed out to the opposition that "there is great danger of intervention by the United States unless Cubans are willing to accept mediation...."[54] On June 13, Dr. Carlos de la Torre, representing the Revolutionary Junta in New York, countered by stating that no solution was possible which did not have as its first provision the immediate resignation of President Machado.[55]

But on June 15 the ABC revolutionary organization--probably the

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[52]Hackett, "Cuban Peace Prospects," Current History, XXXVIII, p. 594; Diario de la Marina, June 8, 1933, p. 1, col. 7; Foreign Relations, p. 305 (837.00/3539).

[53]Ibid., p. 304 (611.3731/419).

[54]The New York Times, June 10, 1933, p. 28, col. 5.

[55]The New York Times, June 14, 1933, p. 14, col. 1.

political parties.[52] President Machado promptly threw proposed reforms in if they had been his own idea. He replaced his predecessor's results by offering to reconciliate with the opposition and make much reform. However, Ambassador Welles had revised the text of his speech beforehand "in order to avoid possible confusion as to the President's issues."[53]

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On June 5, Dr. Cosme de la Torriente, who had been in constant contact with Welles, went on record publicly as favoring mediation by the American Ambassador--this after the latter had secured President Machado's consent for publication of Dr. de la Torriente's views in the Cuban press. Dr. de la Torriente pointed out to the opposition that "there is great danger of intervention by the United States unless Cubans are willing to accept mediation...."[54] On June 13, Dr. Carlos de la Torre, representing the Revolutionary Junta in New York, commented by stating that no solution was possible which did not have as its first provision the immediate resignation of President Machado.[55]

But on June 15 the ABC revolutionary organization--probably the

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[52]Hackett, "Cuban Peace Prospects," Current History,XXXVIII, p. 396; Diario de la Marina, June 8, 1933, p. 1, col. 7; Foreign Relations, p. 305 (837.00/3329).

[53]Ibid., p. 304 (811.3731/419).

[54]The New York Times, June 10, 1933, p. 23, col. 3.

[55]The New York Times, June 14, 1933, p. 16, col. 1.

most active and well thought of opposition group in Cuba--accepted Ambassador Welles as mediator. They pledged their not inconsiderable support of his negotiations and promised to refrain from terroristic or other "violence" activities while the negotiations were in progress. However, they reserved the right to withdraw their support if, in their opinion, excessive delay was encountered or the mediation should become contrary to the interests and ideals of the Cuban people.[56] In their official memorandum of acceptance of Welles, the ABC made it clear that:

> "...el ABC no puede, por ello, negarse al intento de la representación diplomática de los Estados Unidos, dado el compromiso moral que éste declara contraer, en nombre de su Gobierno, de velar porque la mediación se produzca lealmente y con la mira puesta en los ideales e intereses auténticos del pueblo de Cuba y acepta la mediación que se propone confiado en el sentido de justicia del mediador, en su compenetración con los sentimientos de la inmensa mayoría de este país y en el respeto de la Nación que representa a la libre determinación de los pueblos.
>
> "El ABC no quiere mantener una actitud intransigente que pudiera hacerle incurrir el grave responsabilidad histórica, y acepta, en consecuencia, la interposición de los buenos oficios del Embajador de los Estados Unidos, si bien quiere hacer constar que, fiel a su programa y consciente de sus deberes ante la opinión pública, se reserva el derecho de separarse del proceso mediatorio que en principio acepta, si el mismo se prolongase excesivamente, o tomase, a juicio del ABC, un sesgo contrario a los intereses e ideales del pueblo de Cuba, o se desenvolviese en circunstancias opresivas."[57]

As Ambassador Welles had anticipated, the immediate reaction to the announcement that the ABC had accepted his mediation was highly favorable. He let it be known that he expected a break-up of the New York Junta to "insure the acceptance of my mediation by all of the other factions involved."[58]

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[56] The New York Times, June 16, 1933, p. 1, col. 4; Diario de la Marina, June 16, 1933, p. 1, col. 1.

[57] Ibid.

[58] Foreign Relations, pp. 309-310 (837.00/3549, 837.00/3550).

On June 16 the OCRR and representatives of the high school professors' groups, two small but important opposition factions, formally accepted the mediation of Ambassador Welles. The university professors then advised him they expected to join mediation efforts shortly.[59]

At this point, in view of the reluctance of some opposition leaders to consent to the mediation and also for the sake of President Machado, Welles asked the U.S. State Department to reiterate that the U.S. Ambassador was acting in a purely personal capacity and not as an official mediator sent by the American government.[60] The Department complied and the Cuban press duly reported this official attitude on June 17.[61]

By June 21 the professors of Havana University, who had long been among President Machado's most vigorous opponents, had selected a committee to represent them in the mediation proceedings and had handed Ambassador Welles their formal acceptance of his good offices.[62] With the withdrawal of their representative from the New York Junta, the remaining members of the Junta conceded defeat, and on June 23 they officially disbanded "to aid peace efforts" in view of the mediation.[63] (The Junta had originally declared it would accept Ambassador Welles' efforts only if President Machado and his cabinet resigned, congress was dissolved, and a provisional government immediately established.)[64] The widely-publicized

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[59] Ibid., p. 309.

[60] Ibid.

[61] Diario de la Marina, June 17, 1933, col. 1, p. 3.

[62] Hackett, "Cuban Peace Prospects," Current History, XXXVIII, pp. 594-595; Foreign Relations, pp. 311-312 (837.00/3555); Diario de la Marina, June 18, 1933, p. 1, col. 6 and June 22, 1933, p. 3, col. 6.

[63] The New York Times, June 23, 1933, p. 4, col. 1; Diario de la Marina, June 23, 1933, p. 3, col. 6.

[64] Diario de la Marina, May 4, 1933, p. 1, col. 3.

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At this point, in view of the evidence of some opposition [illegible] to consent to the mediation and also for the sake of [illegible] Wallace asked the U.S. State Department to reiterate that the U.S. Ambassador was acting in a purely personal capacity and not as an official [illegible] sent by the American government.[60] The Department complied and the press duly reported this official attitude on June 17.[61]

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[59]Ibid., p. 302.

[60]Ibid.

[61]Diario de la Marina, June 17, 1933, [illegible]

[62]Meekers, "Cuban Peace Prospects," Current History, XXXVIII, pp. 394-395; Foreign Relations, pp. 311-312 (Wallace to [illegible] Marina, June 16, 1933, p. 1, col. 5 and June 22, [illegible]

[63]The New York Times, June 23, 1933, p. 4, col. [illegible] Marina, June 23, 1933, p. 1, col. [illegible]

[64]Diario de la Marina, May 4, [illegible]

acceptance of Welles' mediation efforts by Dr. Carlos de la Torre, President of the Junta, was reported in great detail by the Cuban press, as was the news on June 21 that President Machado had promised to release over 100 more political prisoners by the end of the week.[65]

Sumner Welles was unable, however, to convince the university students and many of General Menocal's followers. As early as June 15, while the Ambassador was "unofficially" letting it be known that negotiations were progressing satisfactorily, the Directorio Estudiantil of the University of Havana stated that the students preferred to continue their "'struggle against the Machado tyranny'" and to sacrifice their lives rather than accept American mediation in Cuba's political affairs. "'We cannot,'" they stated, "'enter into any discussion, even by proxy, with our executioners and assassins, nor acknowledge--a condition imposed by Mr. Welles--a juridical status which we will continue to consider illegal, since it emerges from the transgression of constitutional principles which we have heretofore held inviolate.'"[66] Welles discounted the importance of the Menocal stand, and he chose to ignore the students almost completely.[67]

On June 23 the important Cuban Veterans' organization gave Welles its support. On June 27 the Unión Nacionalista did likewise. On June 28 Colonel Blas Hernández, a noted revolutionary leader who had carried on

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[65] Diario de la Marina, June 20, 1933, p. 1, col. 2; June 21, 1933, p. 1, cols. 6-7.

[66] Charles W. Hackett, "American Mediation in Cuba," Current History, XXXVIII (September, 1933), p. 725.

[67] Foreign Relations, pp. 311, 315-316 (837.00/3555, 837.00/3563). Welles did, however, ask President Machado to request that Professor McBain make a re-organization study of the University of Havana, presumably in an effort to get the students to return to their studies and withdraw from participation in Cuban politics. See Foreign Relations, pp. 297-298 (837.00/3530).

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a rather solitary guerilla war against government forces ever since 1931, announced that he was suspending hostilities in favor of the mediation. Subsequently, under guarantees of safety from President Machado, he and his followers suspended hostilities and returned to their homes.[68]

There was one serious setback on June 26, when Machado's police raided a clandestine ABC radio station and reportedly found files containing information about and the names of many ABC members. The raid caused considerable uneasiness in opposition circles, especially among ABC members. They had pledged themselves not to commit any acts of violence against the government, but they feared that after this raid wholesale arrests would be made. However, such arrests did not occur, and the ABC did not withdraw from the mediation.[69]

Formal Negotiations between the Opposition and the Government

On June 30 President Machado appointed three personal representatives for the mediation proceedings--General Herrera, Acting Secretary of State; Dr. Averhoff, Secretary of the Treasury; and Dr. Ruíz Mesa, a member of congress. The opposition was represented by the following delegates: Dr. Cosme de la Torriente for the Unión Nacionalista; Dr. Martínez Saénz for the ABC; Dr. Wilfredo Albanés, for the Conservative opposition party; Dr. Santos Jiménez for the Liberal opposition party headed by Dr. Miguel Mariano Gómez; Dr. Dorta Duque for the University; Dr. Aragón for the professors of the normal and high schools; Dr. Silverio for the OCRR; and Señorita Lamar for all women's organizations.[70]

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[68]Hackett, "American Mediation in Cuba," Current History, XXXVIII, p. 724.

[69]The New York Times, June 27, 1933, p. 7, col. 1.

[70]Foreign Relations, p. 316 (837.00/3566).

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[68]Barbour, "American Mediation in Cuba," Current History, XXXVIII, p. 724.

[69]The New York Times, June 27, 1933, p. 7, col. 1.

[70]Foreign Relations, p. 316 (Sept/1933).

On July 1 Ambassador Welles formally opened negotiation proceedings by reading to the delegates the following message from President Roosevelt:

> "It is very heartening and the source of much satisfaction to me to know that the Cuban people now believe that a peaceful discussion of their country's problems is the most satisfactory means of determining their country's destinies, and that the best way of reconciling their political difficulties is to be found in the peaceable and orderly process of frank but constructive discussions. I wish the Cuban people every success in these discussions for I am convinced that the restoration of political peace is a necessary and essential preliminary step on the way to Cuba's economic recovery. The representatives of all factions may rest assured that the moral support of the American people will be behind these attempts at the peaceable adjustment of Cuban problems through the orderly procedure of Constitutional Government."[71]

In his own speech to the opening mediation conference, Welles carefully re-emphasized to all delegates, especially those representing President Machado, that he was there only at the request of the opposition and the government. He felt that General Machado should not be replaced immediately, and he stressed to the delegates his desire to prepare reforms on a strictly "constitutional" basis.[72]

As formal mediation conferences got under way between representatives of the Machado government and the opposition, there was a general feeling of optimism with regard to Ambassador Welles' efforts. President Machado had eased the formerly strict censorship of the press, and opposition organizations which to that time had been entirely secret came into the open and publicly proclaimed their acceptance of Welles and his plan. They declared to the Cuban public that all differences must be for-

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[71] Ibid., p. 311 (837.00/3556).

[72] Diario de la Marina, June 24, 1933, p. 3, col. 6. The U.S. government had given Welles a rather free hand in this respect. Accordingly, the official U.S. attitude continued to be that Ambassador Welles, in carrying out the mediation, was acting in an unofficial capacity. See Fitzgibbon, p. 196.

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> I am happy to state that there is very evident on both sides not only a conciliatory disposition but an apparent feeling of expectancy that these negotiations will have a successful outcome.[74]

During July the formal mediation negotiations proceeded without interruption, although progress was slow and President Machado continued to show himself alternately willing to accede to Welles' plans and determined not to do so. For the most part the Cuban public hoped for and indeed expected an early solution from the Welles' mediation but General Menocal continued to disparage the negotiations and the university students, under the guidance of their Directorio Estudiantil, continued to remain outside the mediation and indeed loudly denounced the efforts of Ambassador Welles.[75]

Welles repeatedly insisted that President Machado lift martial

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[73] Diario de la Marina, June 24, 1933, p. 2, col. 6.

[74] Foreign Relations, p. 311 (837.00/3358).

[75] Hackett, "American Mediation in Cuba," Current History, XXXVIII, p. 723.

law in Cuba, re-establish constitutional guarantees, promise to guarantee the safety of the opposition representatives taking part in the negotiations, and free all political prisoners still in custody.[76] President Machado made a great show of promising that he would comply with all these suggestions, and the Cuban press reported daily that the necessary steps would be taken. No such action was forthcoming, however. The opposition representatives began demanding that guarantees be granted by President Machado before they would continue to participate in the mediation negotiations. After more pressure from Ambassador Welles, Machado did carry out his agreement to grant amnesty to all the members of the opposition groups which had accepted mediation. He also invited the exiled members of these groups to return to Cuba with full guarantee of their personal safety.[77]

Publicly Ambassador Welles continued to express satisfaction with the mediation negotiations and to announce that rapid progress was being made and much was being accomplished.[78] Unfortunately, very little exact information about the proceedings sifted through to the public.[79] The Cuban people were never directly informed that the objective of the negotiations, with which President Machado had assured Welles he was fully in accord and which all representatives to the mediation fully understood, was "...the revision of the Constitution of the republic in such a manner as to permit

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[76]Foreign Relations, p. 318 (837.00/3570); Diario de la Marina, July 3, 1933, p. 1, col. 7.

[77]The New York Times, July 27, 1933, p. 5, col. 1; Foreign Relations, p. 318 (837.00/3570); Diario de la Marina, July 6, 1933, p. 1, col. 2; July 7, 1933, p. 3, col. 4.

[78]The New York Times, July 8, 1933, p. 6, col. 2.

[79]Both Cuban and American newspaper reports of June and July, 1933 make it only too obvious that Ambassador Welles considered it absolutely essential to the success of the mediation that many proceedings be kept confidential (partly, to be sure, in deference to the position of President Machado). Welles rarely gave an open, comprehensive statement to the public

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[76]Foreign Relations, p. 318 (837.00/3270); Diario de la Marina, July 3, 1933, p. 1, col. 1.

[77]The New York Times, July 22, 1933, p. 5, col. 1; Foreign Relations, p. 318 (837.00/3270); Diario de la Marina, July 7, 1933, p. 1, col. 2; July 7, 1933, p. 3, col. 4.

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the election of an impartial vice president acceptable to all factions, and the resignation of President Machado in his favor as soon as that step could be taken."[80]

From the beginning of the formal negotiations, Ambassador Welles worked continuously with government and opposition delegates but the process was was extremely time consuming, especially because of the large number of delegates at the mediation and their diverse goals and political leanings. In addition, President Machado did not cooperate as Welles had assumed that he would. Although the President did grant safety to the opposition working in mediation negotiations, he continued to balk at carrying out the other reform measures he had promised. Meanwhile the opposition delegates worked hard to agree on and draft proposals for constitutional reform for presentation to the government.[81]

On July 12 the ABC representatives threatened to withdraw from mediation proceedings in defense of some of their members who had been seized by the government in early June and never set free. Only when President Machado released these prisoners and reiterated his guarantees of total freedom to all the opposition groups participating in the mediation proceedings would the ABC consent to return to the negotiations.[82]

No sooner had this been accomplished than the university students

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on any part of the proceedings during these months, and indeed preferred that the extent of his intentions not be known even by the mediators themselves. Very few "bones" were thrown to the Cuban public in the way of concrete reports on the progress of the negotiations. The Cubans were left with many expectations but little real hope as time went on and not much progress appeared to have been made. This state of affairs eventually helped to precipitate the general strike of August, 1933, which Welles clearly had not expected.

[80] The New York Times, March 30, 1934, p. 16, col. 8.

[81] Foreign Relations, pp. 318-319 (837.00/3570).

[82] Diario de la Marina, July 12, 1933, p. 1, col. 5.

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[81] Foreign Relations, pp. 318-319 (837.00/2970).

[82] Diario de la Marina, July 12, 1933, p. 1, col. 5.

(who had remained outside the mediations but who had approached Welles privately) began further demonstrations against the proceedings.[83] They emphatically refused to lend their support to the negotiations, scorned the cooperation of the other opposition groups, and fiercely attacked Sumner Welles, claiming he was using the coercive power of the United States as a means of de facto intervention:

> "We do not want a hasty solution which in the end will blight the...ideals which now and always, we desire to hold uppermost....
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> "We students understand that the mediation proposed by the Ambassador of the United States (Sumner Welles) tacitly implies an intervention and is backed by the coercive power of the American government.... This mediation, therefore, tends to once more inveigle the Cuban people with the idea that our internal troubles may only be solved with foreign collaboration....
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> "We do not pretend to ignore the Platt Amendment...but it is no less true that the acceptance of said treaty was forced upon the people of Cuba as an indispensable condition for recognition of its independence.
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> "That the constituents of 1901 preferred a mortgaged republic to no republic at all does not prevent us from rebelling against the negation of our sovereignty and against all acts underlying such negation.
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> "The proposed mediation is no more and no less than the vaunted formula of cordiality which we have so often rejected...because it is improper to discuss or enter into agreement with usurpers."[84]

The students did, however, consent to suspend terroristic activities during the mediation, probably at the request of the ABC.[85]

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[83] Foreign Relations, p. 316 (837.00/3563). Welles never makes it clear just what the students approached him for. He intimates that it was to discuss possibilities for student representation in the mediation negotiations. However, it is apparent from reading of his correspondence that the reverse could well have been true. It may have been Welles who approached the students to try to draw them into the proceedings. In any case, the students did not join the mediation, and eventually became the most outspoken enemies of Welles in Cuba.

[84] The New York Times, July 16, 1933, II, p. 2, col. 2.

[85] Foreign Relations, p. 323 (837.00/3579½).

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[24] The New York Times, July 16, 1933, II, p. 2, col. 3.

[25] Foreign Relations, p. 323 (837.00/3278).

President Machado had still not complied with Welles' demand for a general amnesty or for the lifting of martial law, but on July 12 he did agree to permit five representatives each from the Liberal, Conservative and Popular parties to meet with the opposition in negotiations concerning the proposed constitutional reforms. (The Conservative and Popular parties, sensing the trend of the negotiations, had informed the President that they would cooperate in the mediation and expected him to do so and to later resign. He gave them representation in the mediation, although he had originally planned to appoint a congressional committee to negotiate with the opposition when proceedings had progressed sufficiently.)[86] At this, Ambassador Welles commented:

> The disadvantages of the representation in the mediation proceedings of political party committees lie primarily in the fact that since I will now have to deal with 15 additional individuals in the sessions which may be held, the opportunities for interminable discussion and protracted delay are greatly enhanced.[87]

He also reported to Washington:

> Professor McBain is proceeding very rapidly with the formulation of his recommendations for revision of the electoral code. He has conferred frequently with experts connected both with the Government and with the opposition and he finds that these representatives of both sides are in very material accord with the nature of the recommendations which he is prepared to submit.[88]

By July 14, the representatives of the three legally-constituted parties had conferred with Ambassador Welles and prepared the way for their official entry into mediation negotiations. The Cuban press reported the event with much detail as to time and place, but no mention of the topics to be discussed. It was generally understood, however, that the parties were joining mediation negotiations in spite of President Machado.[89] The

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[86] Ibid.; also see Diario de la Marina, July 12, 1933, p. 2, col. 7.

[87] Foreign Relations, p. 322 (837.00/3579½).

[88] Ibid.

[89] Diario de la Marina, July 15, 1933, p. 12, col. 1.

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[88] Ibid.

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On July 17 it was reported that the opposition committee studying constitutional reforms had completed its task and expected to present its proposals to the entire body of mediators shortly.[91] That same day President Machado abolished censorship of the press altogether.[92] He had not as yet fully re-established constitutional guarantees, however, and apparently insisted that he could not do so without risking suit over his government's actions since 1931, which he feared the opposition would undertake immediately if he restored constitutional guarantees as desired. Sumner Welles stated that the only way around this dilemma would be to pass a general amnesty bill which would necessarily have to include all members of the government as well as the opposition, although he realized that:

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[90] Diario de la Marina, July 15, 1933, p. 1, col. 7, for example. At no time did Welles himself make an open public statement to the effect that sweeping constitutional reform was being considered, nor did he ever really make public the reforms being discussed by the delegates to the mediation. Certainly he never publicly acknowledged in Cuba that he was preparing the way for Machado to step down. Other than the often-repeated "negotiations are progressing satisfactorily," all reports of the mediation in the Cuban press were gleaned from sources other than Welles.

[91] Foreign Relations, p. 322 (837.00/3579). It is interesting to note that Ambassador Welles reported to the U.S. State Department: "...the editors and proprietors of every newspaper and magazine published in Havana had previously given me their written assurance that...their publications would not publish any material which might tend to disturb public order or interfere with the successful course of the mediation negotiations." (Foreign Relations, pp. 322-323).

[92] Ibid., p. 322.

these parties let it be known that they would not only join mediation proceedings, but were prepared to cooperate actively in the proposed constitutional and electoral reforms. The JCD, however, let it be known that the proceedings were going "very slowly." When Ambassador Wallace was asked for comments, he would only report that the negotiations were progressing very satisfactorily and that such progress was being made.[90]

On July 17 it was reported that the opposition committee studying constitutional reforms had completed its task and expected to present its proposals to the entire body of mediators shortly.[91] That same day President Machado abolished censorship of the press altogether.[92] He had not as yet fully re-established constitutional guarantees, however, and apparently insisted that he could not do so without placing suit over his government's actions since 1931, which he feared the opposition would undertake immediately if he restored constitutional guarantees as desired. Sumner Wallace stated that the only way around this dilemma would be to pass a general amnesty bill which would necessarily have to include all members of the government as well as the opposition, although he realized that:

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[90]Diario de la Marina, July 15, 1933, p. 1, col. 7, for example. At no time did Wallace himself make an open public statement to the effect that sweeping constitutional reform was being considered, nor did he ever really make public the reforms being discussed by the delegates to the mediation. Certainly he never publicly acknowledged in Cuba that he was preparing the way for Machado to step down. Other than the often-repeated "negotiations are progressing satisfactorily," all reports of the mediation in the Cuban press were gleaned from sources other than Wallace.

[91]Foreign Relations, p. 322 (837.00/3919). It is interesting to note that Ambassador Wallace reported to the U.S. State Department: "...the editors and proprietors of every newspaper and magazine published in Havana had previously given me their written assurance that...their publications would not publish any material which might tend to disturb public order or interfere with the successful course of the mediation negotiations." (Foreign Relations, pp. 322-323).

[92]Ibid., p. 322.

> There will be necessarily violent objection on the part of some of the opposition factions to such whitewashing of officials of the Government but all of the more moderate members of the opposition are in favor of such a measure as the easiest way out of the difficulty in view of their realization that an amnesty bill of this character will in any event inevitably be passed sooner or later.[93]

He felt confident that President Machado would put through such a general amnesty bill.

The Cuban press reported that all participating opposition groups would meet on July 17 in a "full session" of mediation to discuss the completed plans for constitutional reform. The specifics of the reform plan were not announced, but the opposition delegates saw to it that the press was advised that the reforms would include complete freedom of the judiciary from executive control; autonomy for the national university; restoration of the right of habeas corpus; reduction of the terms of senators and representatives; and absolute guarantees of freedom of the press. No public mention was made at the time of the plans which called for Machado to give up office.[94] The President continued to liberate political prisoners, and under his guarantees to the opposition exiles began to return to Cuba.[95] In a communication to President Roosevelt of July 17, Ambassador Welles indicated his satisfaction with the reforms prepared by the opposition, which were in accordance with his plans. He reported optimistically on the mediation proceedings:

> The situation in general is distinctly encouraging, far more so than I had hoped six weeks ago.... I am happy to say that the various delegates are concentrating upon questions of principle, upon the need for changing the system rather than the individuals, and have modified very distinctly the uncompromising and unreasoning attitude which many

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[93] Ibid., pp. 322-323.

[94] Diario de la Marina, July 18, 1933, p. 3, col. 7.

[95] Ibid., p. 1, col. 6.

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[92] Ibid., pp. 322-323.

[94] Diario de la Marina, July 18, 1933, p: 3, col. 1.

[95] Ibid., p. 1, col. 6.

at first maintained.

I think there is now a good chance that through a reform of the Constitution and through the utilization of the new electoral code which Professor McBain is helping to draft, we can work out a fair and just solution of the political problem strictly within the lines of constitutional procedure....[96]

He stated that at some time within the next two or three weeks a suggestion would be made to the effect that after a vice president satisfactory to all parties had been selected and had taken office, the President should resign. This would leave the vice president in control of the government until a new constitutional government could be elected in November of 1934. In Welles' estimation, President Machado would have to permit this vice president to take control about May, 1934, although Machado's term was to expire in May of 1935. Welles felt that this suggestion, which as he put it "must necessarily be acceded to by President Machado," was both reasonable and necessary, since the opposition would not go to the polls in November of 1934 if President Machado remained in control of the government. (They felt fair elections could not be held as long as he remained in the presidency.)[97] Ambassador Welles stated:

> I have every reason to believe that President Machado will agree to take this action should he be permitted to take it of his own initiative and should it not be forced upon him as a condition by the opposition.[98]

He felt that the solution he had set out was fair to all concerned, since the President's own partywould have just as many guarantees in the person of the vice president, the new constitutional reforms, and the new electoral code as the opposition parties would have. As he saw it, the only sacrifice President Machado would have to make would be to shorten his term by

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[96] Foreign Relations, p. 323 (837.00/3579½).

[97] Ibid., pp. 323-324.

[98] Ibid.

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[96] Foreign Relations, p. 722 (837.00/3372½).

[97] Ibid., pp. 723-724.

[98] Ibid.

one year (he felt Machado should not object to this, since the constitutional reform which made the President's re-election possible had, as Welles stated, been carried out in such a manner as to leave very grave doubt as to its legality and constitutionality). Welles also felt that since the senators and congressmen had extended their own terms of office in the same constitutional reform (the amendments of 1928), these extended terms should be cut in the new reform so that the entire Cuban Senate and House would be renewed in the general elections of 1934.[99] He told Washington:

> ...if the opposition parties do not go to the elections of 1934, whoever is elected in those elections will have bitter opposition to him throughout the term for which he is elected, and, in all liklihood, we will again be confronted with a situation in Cuba identical with that through which we have just been passing.
>
> I consider the plan suggested both reasonable and eminently fair to all concerned, and I wish to urge it upon President Machado as a patriotic solution of Cuba's problems when the time comes. I wish, however, to have your specific authorization to do this and I wish, further, to be authorized to tell him that such oral representations as I make to him in this sense are being made with your full knowledge and approval....
>
> I am, of course, keeping the negotiation of the commercial treaty as a leverage until I know definitely where I stand on the political solution.[100]

He confidently predicted that he would be able to return to Washington by the end of September.[101] However, on July 19 President Machado had still not taken steps to assure passage of the general amnesty bill, nor had martial law been lifted. Apparently some members of the President's cabinet had persuaded him to oppose Welles' plan and to refuse to be eased out of power.[102] That same day Ambassador Welles informed Washington:

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[99] Ibid.

[100] Ibid., p. 325.

[101] Ibid.

[102] Ibid., pp. 325-326 (837.00/3580).

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> ...If the opposition parties do not go to the elections of 1934, whoever is elected in those elections will have bitter opposition to his throughout the term for which he is elected, and, in all likelihood, we will again be confronted with a situation in Cuba identical with that through which we have just been passing.
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> I consider the plan suggested both reasonable and eminently fair to all concerned, and I wish to urge it upon President Machado as a practical solution of Cuba's problem when the time comes. I wish, however, to have your specific authorization to do this and I wish, further, to be authorized to tell him that such oral representations as I make to him in this sense are being made with your full knowledge and approval....
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[99] Ibid.

[100] Ibid., p. 325.

[101] Ibid.

[102] Ibid., pp. 325-326 (837.00/2530).

> If martial law continues none of the delegates of the opposition will continue negotiations and none of the prominent leaders of the opposition will return from the United States in view of their well-founded fear that they would be subject at any moment to being thrown into prison.[103]

At this point his mediation work was clearly threatened. From President Roosevelt and the Department of State he asked for, and received, authorization to state that the U.S. government was in complete accord with all the requests Welles had made of Machado. Ambassador Welles then dropped all pretense of being an "unofficial" mediator and proceeded to advise the Cuban President that constitutional guarantees and a general amnesty bill must be provided immediately. He stressed in no uncertain terms that the government of the United States was in full accord with the "request" he was making.[104]

Meanwhile, the Cuban press continued to cooperate by reporting optimistically on the mediation negotiations. Great publicity was given to the proposals for reform of the constitution, although the delegates refused to disclose the exact nature of the planned reforms and urged the Cuban people to "have faith and patience."[105] When by July 22 the President had not yet taken the action requested even the mediation delegates themselves began to have doubts, and some of their numerous daily meetings were cancelled.[106]

However, on July 23 President Machado capitulated.[107] The amnesty bill which he presented to the Cuban Congress for approval not only pardoned all crimes against the government since January 1, 1927, but also

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[103] Ibid.

[104] Ibid., pp. 326-327.

[105] Diario de la Marina, July 20, 1933, p. 1, col. 4.

[106] Diario de la Marina, July 22, 1933, p. 1, col. 3; p. 2, col. 6.

[107] Diario de la Marina, July 23, 1933, p. 1, col. 2; p. 1, col. 7.

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[106]Diario de la Marina, July 22, 1933, p. 1, col. 3; p. 2, col. 6.

[107]Diario de la Marina, July 23, 1933, p. 1, col. 3; p. 1, col. 7.

pardoned offenses committed by political parties during previous elections and even pardoned the governmental authorities for all illegal acts committed since 1927.[108] As Ambassador Welles had predicted, a great many objections to this bill were raised by the opposition. In addition, since press censorship had been lifted the Havana press freely discussed what the members of the opposition factions would or would not accept in the way of a general amnesty law, their coverage and open criticism angering President Machado considerably.[109]

As a result, there was growing impatience with the lack of definite results from the mediation recently begun by Ambassador Welles. While the Cuban people had expected to see Machado go without delay once he had accepted Welles' mediation, now they were not sure whether Machado was going at all.[110] The opposition publicly expressed the opinion that the problem lay with Ambassador Welles, who had not yet clearly stated to the Cuban people what he thought should be done or what he intended to do. The unexpressed fear of the Cuban people was that President Machado would take advantage of the general amnesty and the good will of the opposition cooperating in the mediation, to prolong his stay in power.[111]

At this juncture a number of exiles still outside Cuba, in particular Colonel Carlos Mendieta and General Menocal, complicated matters by making it clear that they felt no peaceful solution of the Cuban problem was possible until President Machado was out of office, or at least stripped of his powers. In statements well publicized in Cuba, they found fault with

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[108] The New York Times, July 25, 1933, p. 6, col. 5.

[109] Diario de la Marina, July 25, 1933, p. 1, col. 3 and p. 3, col. 6; July 26, 1933, p. 1, col. 2; July 27, 1933, p. 1, col. 1.

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[110] New York Times, July 23, 1933, p. 6, col. 3.

[111] Ibid.

Welles' "constitutional" plans for reform and urged that Machado go immediately.[112]

Ambassador Welles had anticipated the opposition's protests against a general amnesty but he was far more irritated at what he termed the "utterly irresponsible attitude" of the press, who had promised they would refrain from publication of "inflammatory or seditious material" during the negotiations, but were openly attacking President Machado. In spite of his earlier statements concerning the necessity for lifting the censorship over the press, Welles felt his mediation efforts were being handicapped and he and President Machado agreed that a "very severe press law" should be passed within forty-eight hours.[113]

President Machado proceeded to see to it that the general amnesty bill he had proposed was passed by congress on July 26, 1933. As finally adopted, the law provided for the immediate release from prison of all political offenders, convicted or awaiting trial, and for the restoration of their civil rights. All political offenders in exile abroad could return, since any charges which had been made against them were thereby automatically quashed.[114] Also on July 26 the President promulgated a decree restoring constitutional guarantees in Havana, and thus throughout the island.[115] Ambassador Welles was highly pleased with Machado's attitude and actions. He outlined further mediation plans to Washington:

> Immediately...I shall call the first meeting of the Mixed Commission, composed of members of all of the existing political parties represented in Congress and all representatives of the opposition sectors, to reach an agreement upon the constitutional reforms proposed by the opposition. The project of reform proposed by the latter embraces permanent reforms and on this basis I anticipate a very speedy

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[112] Ibid.

[113] Foreign Relations, pp. 328-329 (837.00/3583).

[114] Ibid., p. 327.

[115] Ibid., pp. 328-329.

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[112] Ibid.

[113] Foreign Relations, pp. 328-329 (327.00/2523).

[114] Ibid., p. 327.

[115] Ibid., pp. 328-329.

agreement on both sides.

Once an agreement is reached I shall make an effort to obtain an agreement on the so-called transitory reforms which, of course, involve the solution of the existing political problem. The present tendency on the part of the opposition...is to suggest that inasmuch as the 4-year Presidential term is to be reestablished in the new constitution and the Vice-Presidency reestablished President Machado agree to shorten his existing term so that the Vice-President now to be selected will replace him until the end of the present Presidential term of office and further to suggest that the existing Congress consent to shorten its term to the period ending May 1934. The exact manner in which these suggestions will be proffered, however, still remains to be determined and I have stated that I was not willing to discuss the transitory reforms until a final agreement had been reached on the permanent reforms.[116]

On the morning of July 26, after putting through the amnesty bill and restoring constitutional guarantees, Machado indicated an apparent willingness to cooperate in every way with Ambassador Welles. In a long private conference, Machado emphatically assured Welles that he desired the success of the mediation negotiations and that he would "at all times and in every way" facilitate the reaching of a fair agreement. He urged Welles to do what he could to expedite the return to Cuba of Colonel Mendieta and his aide, Colonel Méndez Peñate, of the Unión Nacionalista, stating that in his opinion it was essential for them to lose no time in organizing their political strength. He stated that since constitutional guarantees had been re-established no hindrance of any kind would be put in their way for the issuance of political propaganda, the holding of political meetings or any other legal form of activity desired by them. He further emphasized to Welles that once the permanent reforms to the constitution had been agreed upon, he felt the leaders of the opposition should agree upon "five or six essential points" comprising the transitory reforms and then reach an agreement with the leaders of the political parties upon these. Once such an agreement had been reached, Machado stated, he himself would

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[116] *Ibid.*, pp. 327-328.

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[116] Ibid., pp. 327-328.

"interpose no obstacle" to carrying out the agreement and the reforms.[117]

It appeared to Welles that President Machado, with what was an amazing change of heart for one who had been so tyrannical a short time before, was now not only ready to cooperate fully in other ways but would also eventually relinquish power, thereby ensuring the success of the mediation efforts. However, Welles did comment:

> If the President's frame of mind as made evident today...were to continue unchanged there would be no possibility of an unsuccessful outcome of the present negotiations. The chief difficulty is, however, that the President changes his mind with the utmost frequency and it is impossible to foretell what his opinion may be when the transitory reforms are brought up for discussion.[118]

The Ambassador was fairly prophetic. Within four hours after having given his emphatic promise of cooperation to Ambassador Welles, President Machado had visited the Cuban Congress and emphasized that he would not give up his office.[119]

Apparently some of Machado's Liberal, Popular and Conservative party followers had demonstrated a willingness to sever connections with him and to promote their own interests by throwing their full support behind the mediation proposals for both permanent constitutional reforms and "temporary" reforma, including the withdrawal of Machado as President. Other members of his government had urged him not to give in to Welles' demands or to the mediators. They had, in fact, convinced him that he need not give up his position of power and that he had the force necessary to withstand all Welles' demands, since the United States under its new policy would avoid direct intervention in Cuba at almost any cost.[120]

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[117] Ibid., p. 327.

[118] Ibid.

[119] Diario de la Marina, July 27, 1933, p. 1, col. 2.

[120] Ruby Hart Phillips, Cuban Sideshow (Havana: The Cuban Press, 1935), pp. 40-41; also see Foreign Relations, p. 330.

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In his statement to congress, President Machado made it evident that he insisted upon pretending that Welles was acting not as an official representative of the United States, but in a purely personal capacity.[121] He emphatically declared, in spite of the permanent and temporary reforms being prepared by the mediation delegates, that his government was legal, constitutional, and had every right to remain in power until 1935. With regard to the Welles mediation, he stated at one point:

> "La razón de por que he aceptado la mediación es clara: porque iba encaminada al restablecimiento de la paz pública, a la que siempre me he propendido. No puede creerse pues que la mediación de Mr. Welles merme nuestra soberanía, porque su cooperación es de su espontánea voluntad y no obedece a instrucciones ni mandatos del Gobierno de los Estados Unidos.
>
> "Si fuera de otro modo, yo hubiera dejado de ser Presidente antes de aceptaría....
>
> "Vamos a continuar nuestras labores hasta 1935."[122]

Ambassador Welles reacted immediately. He cabled Washington to make public the fact that he had the full authority of the United States Government behind his mediation efforts. He warned the U.S. State Department:

> The President's speeches were delivered at a singularly inopportune moment and were in many passages most unfortunately worded. They will unquestionably create a very great measure of disquiet among the opposition circles and will necessarily hinder materially the rapid progress of the mediation negotiations which I had anticipated....[123]

Washington complied at once with a statement that Ambassador Welles had the full confidence of President Roosevelt, and:

> "While of course Ambassador Welles' tender of good offices has been made spontaneously, as stated by President Machado, it could not have been made without the full authorization and approval of this government."[124]

Thus the State Department was forced to go on record regarding Welles' authority, and the fiction that his mediation was purely personal was

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[121] Ibid.; Diario de la Marina, July 27, 1933, p. 1, col. 2.

[122] Ibid.

[123] Foreign Relations, p. 330.

[124] The New York Times, July 29, 1933, p. 1, col. 4.

In his statement to congress, President Harding made it evident that he insisted upon protecting that Wallace was acting not as an official representative of the United States, but in a purely personal capacity. [121] He emphatically declared, in spite of the government and congressional views being presented by the mediation delegation, that his government was "not constitutional, and had every right to remain in power until 1923. With regard to the Wallace mediation, he stated on one point:

> "La razón de por que he aceptado la mediación es clara: porque sin mediada el continuamente de la paz pública, a la que estamos no proyectado. No podía ocurrirme pues que la mediación de Wallace carece oficial, porque en conversación se lo en nuestra voluntad y se ofrecen a instrucciones al ministro del Gobierno en Estados Unidos.
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> "Si fuera de otro modo, yo hubiera llamado de mi Presidente antes de aceptarla....
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> "Vamos a continuar nuestra labores hasta 1923."[122]

Ambassador Wallace reacted immediately. He called Washington to make public the fact that he had the full authority of the United States Government behind his mediation efforts. He warned the U.S. State Department:

> The President's speeches were delivered at a strategically inopportune moment and were in very precise most unfortunately worded. They will unquestionably create a very grave situation of disquiet among the opposition circles and will necessarily injure extremely the rapid progress of the mediation negotiations which I had anticipated....[123]

Washington complied at once with a statement that Ambassador Wallace had the full confidence of President Coolidge and:

> "While of course Ambassador Wallace' powers of good offices has been made spontaneously, as stated by President Huerta, it could not have been made without the full authorization and approval of this government."[124]

Thus the State Department was forced to go on record regarding Wallace authority, and the fiction that his mediation was purely personal was

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[121]Ibid.; Diario de la Marina, July 27, 1921, p. 1, col. 2.

[122]Ibid.

[123]Foreign Relations, p. 232.

[124]The New York Times, July 29, 1923, p. 1, col. 4.

dropped.

Nevertheless, Welles carefully went on with his stated objectives. On July 27 he called the first meeting of the Mixed Commission as planned. He stressed again to them that he had full authority from the United States government to carry out the negotiations, and he restated President Roosevelt's firm intention that Cuba's problems were to be settled "through the orderly procedure of Constitutional Government," as the latter had stated in his July 1 message.[125] The meeting of the commission was indeed significant, since it was the first time in more than three years that constructive discussion between members of the opposition and the government forces had taken place.[126] Ambassador Welles reported to Washington:

> A distinctly patriotic and satisfactory spirit was shown by both sides and agreement was reached on several important features of the constitutional reform as proposed. The next meeting of this Commission will be held tomorrow and every day subsequently under my chairmanship until a final agreement is reached.[127]

President Machado's attitude, on the other hand, had begun to cause considerable unrest on the island. Almost all violence had ceased in deference to the mediation, but on July 29 police and opposition forces clashed when the latter attempted to stage a peaceful demonstration. Teachers in all parts of the island staged demonstrations protesting the non-payment of their salaries. Police broke up the meetings, creating considerable disorder.[128] By July 31 Ambassador Welles had received more than 100 protests against the treatment of the public by by Machado's

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[125] Foreign Relations, p. 331 (837.00/3587).

[126] Ibid.; (see also The New York Times, July 28, 1933, p. 16, col. 1.)

[127] Ibid., p. 331.

[128] The New York Times, July 30, 1933, p. 13, col. 1.

military forces, which still maintained control of most of the island despite the restoration of constitutional guarantees.[129]

Welles made one of his rare concessions to public opinion by giving a press interview in which he stated that the mediation's constitutional reform program would probably be in completed form by the end of the week, and then would be immediately presented to congress for approval. Nevertheless, discontent with the slow progress of the mediation increased rapidly, particularly since the actual results of the proceedings were virtually unknown to the general public.[130] After openly challenging Welles' authority before the Cuban Congress, Machado went on to harass and threaten the exiles who had returned and create increasing congressional opposition to the proposed reforms.[131] For the most part the Cuban press continued to aid Welles in his mediation efforts, reporting daily that "se avanza mucho el estudio de reformas"--without concretely stating just what the advances were. But on July 25 a strike of the Havana omnibus drivers set in motion a chain of events which Welles did not foresee. A general strike of all drivers and chauffeurs began in sympathy, and by August 1 various other groups had begun joining the strikers in what was to become the most widespread passive manifestation of discontent and unrest Cuba had ever seen.[132]

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[129]The New York Times, August 1, 1933, p. 4, col. 5.

[130]Ibid.

[131]Hubert Herring, "The Downfall of Machado," Current History, XXXIX (October, 1933), pp. 14-24.

[132]Diario de la Marina, July 27, 1933, p. 1, col. 5.

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[129]The New York Times, August 1, 1933, p. 6, col. 3.

[130]Ibid.

[131]Robert Herring, "The Downfall of Mendoza," Current History, XXXIX (October, 1933), pp. 14-24.

[132]Diario de la Marina, July 27, 1933, p. 1, col. 5.

CHAPTER IV

THE FALL OF MACHADO

Welles' efforts to mediate the Cuban political crisis had been somewhat successful when, in the course of August, 1933 the situation was changed by events which took him by surprise. In spite of this, his role as a pivotal figure in Cuban affairs did not diminish. As Fulgencio Batista later wrote:

> Desde el día en que Welles presentó sus credenciales, el 11 de mayo, hasta el 12 de agosto de 1933 en que Machado fue obligado a entregar la presidencia y a salir del país, y durante varios meses subsiguientes, Welles fue el eje alrededor del cual se desenvolvió el huracán político más violento de la historia del Caribe.[1]

August 1-3: Increased Efforts for a Constitutional Solution

From July 27 on, Ambassador Welles worked steadily on the proposed constitutional reforms (both permanent and "temporary") with the Mixed Commission.[2] By August 1 he was able to hold a meeting of all delegates to inform them in detail of the progress being made. He also made a detailed report on all work accomplished since the mediation had begun.[3] The Cuban press actually reported some of these specific advances, stating that the Mixed Commission hoped to finish all work on constitutional reform by the following week.[4]

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[1]Fulgencio Batista y Zaldívar, Respuesta... (Mexico: Imp. Manuel León Sánchez, 1960), p. 386.

[2]Foreign Relations, p. 331.

[3]Diario de la Marina, August 1, 1933, p. 3, col. 1.

[4]Ibid.

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[1] Fulgencio Batista y Zaldívar, Memorias. (México: Ediciones Ibero Manuel León Sánchez, 1960), p. 336.

[2] Foreign Relations, p. 321.

[3] Diario de la Marina, August 1, 1933, p. 3, col. 1.

[4] Ibid.

On the same date Professor McBain transmitted his completed report on electoral reform to President Machado.[5] The President requested that Welles obtain the confidential approval of opposition leaders, promising Welles that once this was done, he would send the report, together with a draft of the necessary changes in the existing laws, to congress with a general message urging immediate passage of his legislation.[6]

In his conversation with Welles, Machado voiced "growing concern" over the increasing disorders occurring throughout the island. Welles urged moderation, advising that the President order police not to interfere with public demonstrations unless the demonstrators were injuring private property or assaulting the authorities.[7]

The opposition delegates, too, were disquieted by the growing disorders, and on August 2 attempted to alleviate the crisis with a public appeal:

> "El Comite que representa la Oposición ante el señor Mediador considera favorable a los intereses de la República y a los propios trabajos de la Mediación recomendar a todos los sectores oposicionistas que por estos momentos se abstengan de celebrar actos públicos, los cuales darían lugar a desórdenes de extrema gravedad, por la acción proyectada por agentes perturbadores al servicio de elementos interesados en perjudicar la Mediación."[8]

Public disorders were to an extent avoided, but the general strike continued. On August 3 the university students, headed by the Directorio Estudiantil, issued a public statement condemning the ABC for taking part in the Welles mediation, and then joined the strike:

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[5]Diario de la Marina, August 2, 1933, p. 1, col. 6.

[6]Foreign Relations, p. 332.

[7]Diario de la Marina, August 3, 1933, p. 1, col. 6.

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> "El Comité que suscribe la Oposición más al pueblo mediante nuestra favorable a los intereses de la República y a los propósitos rectos de la Mediación recomienda a todos los sectores oposicionistas que por cada momento no acontezca de calificar nuestra política, los cuales darían lugar a desórdenes de extrema gravedad, por la acción provocada por agentes perturbadores al servicio de elementos interesados en perjudicar la Mediación."[8]

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[5] Diario de la Marina, August 2, 1933, p. 1, col. 6.

[6] Foreign Relations, p. 372.

[7] Diario de la Marina, August 3, 1933, p. 1, col. 6.

[8] Diario de la Marina, August 2, 1933, p. 3, col. 3.

La fuerza incontrastable de los hechos nos ha obligado a tomar esta determinación, cuyo motivo fundamental lo constituye la divergencia ideológica entre el citado organismo ABC y este directorio, hecha patente en la actual mediación norteamericana.

Deseamos aclarar, no obstante, que este Directorio está dispuesto a colaborar como siempre con cualquier organismo, incluso el propio ABC, en cualquier tipo de acción enérgica y eficaz destinada a dar el triunfo a nuestros ideales."[9]

Meanwhile, President Machado continued to oppose Welles' pressure for his retirement. On August 2 the United States government went on record as "putting political harmony ahead of treaty revision in Cuba." In an effort to help Welles maneuver Machado back into line Undersecretary of State Phillips publicly stated that until the Ambassador's task of attempting to solve Cuban political conflict was "brought nearer to a successful conclusion," formal negotiations for trade treaty revision could not be expected.[10] At the same time, however, Phillips denied that Ambassador Welles had insisted on Machado's resignation.[11]

These statements brought an immediate reaction from the Machado government in the person of Oscar Cintas, the Cuban Ambassador to the United States. In a public statement obviously directed at Phillips, Cintas charged that Welles was using the economic distress in Cuba, which could only be cured by a new commercial treaty, to bring pressure to bear upon President Machado. In a rather obvious effort to discredit the Welles' mediation (or even have him withdrawn) Cintas charged that the American Ambassador was pursuing a "very improper course," and warned that it would lead to "certain disaster." Either President Machado would be shot, he said, or American Marines would be landed because there would be no

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[9]Diario de la Marina, August 2, 1933, p. 3, col. 3.

[10]The New York Times, August 3, 1933, p. 6, col. 7.

[11]Ibid.; also see Diario de la Marina, August 3, 1933, p. 1, col. 6.

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Después aclarar, no obstante, que este Directorio está dispuesto a colaborar como siempre con cualquier gobierno, incluso el propio ABC, en cualquier tipo de acción conjunta y militar dirigida a que el triunfo a nuestros ideales.[9]

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other way out of the "rapidly approaching impasse." Cintas further warned that Welles' policy of dictating to President Machado was doomed to failure and that any such failure would be a great blow to the prestige of the United States.[12]

Apparently fearing charges of American intervention, Undersecretary Phillips immediately went on record to deny that any pressure was being applied to Machado and "emphatically" stated for public consumption that no economic threat was being applied to force political peace in Cuba. He also denied that the Cuban government had been informed that no commercial negotiations would be undertaken until normal political conditions were restored. The Ambassador, he explained, had been "so busy working on political matters" that he had been unable to take up the commercial negotiations.[13]

However, at the same time the Cuban press maintained that Ambassador Welles had been granted full discretion by the American government, and that American officials had kept a reserved silence so as not to increase the difficulties that faced Mr. Welles in his conciliation effort.[14]

That same day President Machado granted an interview to Welles in which he expressed regret for the speeches against the mediation which he had made to congress on July 28.[15] To Welles this appeared to be still another complete change of attitude. He reported to Washington:

> He (Machado) stated that almost invariably when he spoke in public he made statements which he did not intend. Since the truth of this assertion on the part of the President is very obvious and since it was evidently his desire to terminate the incident with this expression of

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[12]Foreign Relations, pp. 331-332 (837.00/3638).

[13]The New York Times, August 4, 1933, p. 7, col. 3.

[14]Diario de la Marina, August 3, 1933, p. 1, col. 6.

[15]Foreign Relations, pp. 332-333. (837.0131/64).

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[14]Diario de la Marina, August 3, 1933, p. 1, col. 6.

[15]Foreign Relations, pp. 332-333. (837.00/3734A).

regret I made no reference thereto beyond expressing my appreciation of the fact that he had referred to me as "a friend of the Cuban people." [16]

President Machado, seconded by leaders of his own Liberal party, then assured the Ambassador that congress would "unquestionably ratify" any agreement Welles could achieve between the government, the political parties and the opposition leaders, provided such an agreement made it possible for the President to resign his office in a "decorous" manner (such as the restoration of the office of vice president). They expressed their willingness for President Machado to resign his office immediately after the inauguration of the vice president.[17]

Apparently Welles felt Machado's "change of heart" this time could be counted on, and reported as much to Washington. He also reported that the meetings of the Mixed Commission were proceeding in a "highly satisfactory and expeditious manner," the delegates then being engaged in a discussion of the limitation of the power of the chief executive and the prohibition of his re-election.[18]

By this time, the Cuban press was reporting the meetings of the Mixed Commission in some detail; stating openly that such points as electoral procedure, re-election, etc. were being discussed. To reporters Ambassador Welles expressed himself as "frankly optimistic" regarding the work of the Mixed Commission. He stated once more that the work was progressing well and that most of the important matters were being settled satisfactorily.[19]

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[16] Ibid.

[17] Ibid.

[18] Ibid., p. 334.

[19] Diario de la Marina, August 2, 1933, p. 3, col. 3.

At the same time, there were disquieting reports that many different sectors of the nation were preparing to join the striking transportation workers.[20] At first Ambassador Welles seemed to discount the significance of the spreading strike, and limited himself to frequent reassurances about the satisfactory progress of the mediation. He apparently expected such gestures to mollify the Cuban public while he accomplished his objectives.[21]

However, by August 3 the barbers, gasoline workers, textile workers, reporters, and the Medical Federation had voted to join the strike. From Havana the strike spread rapidly to other parts of the island, and by August 3 some of the smaller cities were already paralyzed.[22] It was rumored that President Machado's aides were encouraging the strike so as to force Welles to break off mediation negotiations.[23] For the Ambassador himself, the most immediate problem was still President Machado's refusal to yield power, despite his repeated assurances to the contrary.[24]

August 4-6: The General Strike

By August 4 the strike had become general throughout the island. The omnibus operators had struck first, ostensibly against their employers but actually as a protest against the Machado government. Others rapidly joined in. The strike quickly spread and brought out the bakers, the waiters, the chauffeurs, the hotel employees, office workers, harbor

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[20] Ibid., p. 1, col. 8.

[21] Ibid.

[22] Diario de la Marina, August 4, 1933, p. 3, col. 1.

[23] Phillips, Cuban Sideshow, p. 45.

[24] Herring, "The Downfall of Machado," Current History, XXXIX, pp. 14-15.

At the same time, there were distributing reports that many different sectors of the nation were preparing to join the mounting transportation workers.[20] At first Ambassador Welles seemed to discount the significance of the impending strike, and limited himself to frequent reassurances about the satisfactory progress of the mediation. He apparently suspected such gestures to mollify the Cuban public while he accomplished his objectives.[21]

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August 4-8: The General Strike

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[22]Diario de la Marina, August 4, 1933, p. 3, col. 1.

[23]Mallinge, Cuban Sideshow, p. 45.

[24]Morring, "The Downfall of Machado," Current History, XXXIX, pp. 14-15.

workers, garbage collectors, postal clerks, railroad and telegraph workers, even some of the physicians. By August 6 there were no street car, taxicab or railroad services; there were no newspapers, no mail deliveries, no national telegraph service; hotels were open but practically without service; it was "virtually impossible to buy a meal or a cigar or a postage stamp."[25] The police kicked open shop doors, but they were closed as soon as the police passed on. As one author wrote:

> There was but one explanation. The strike was against Machado. The people had taken the decision out of the hands of the President and Congress and the American Ambassador.[26]

President Machado reacted by claiming that the striking workers were attempting to "'produce general paralyzation of the nation's mercantile and ordinary life.'"[27] He threatened the participants with the use of public force to dissolve the strikes. If this proved insufficient, he announced himself ready to declare a state of war and to have the military "adopt means necessary for public peace."[28]

His warnings were ignored. The strike continued. There were no newspapers; the dock strike had completely suspended all harbor activities; all transportation service had halted; and a food shortage threatened because deliveries had stopped. Only minor disorders occurred in Havana and in the interior; the strike continued to be a passive demonstration of resistance to Machado.[29]

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[25] Ibid.

[26] Ibid.

[27] The New York Times, August 5, 1933, p. 1, col. 7.

[28] Ibid.

[29] Ibid.

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[26] Ibid.

[27] The New York Times, August 5, 1923, p. 1, col. 7.

[28] Ibid.

[29] Ibid.

Ambassador Welles then took the attitude that there was probably governmental complicity in the general strike.[30] He was further convinced of this on August 5 when the mediation delegates from the Liberal party requested, "in view of the seriousness of the situation in the Republic," that he suspend mediation negotiations. Welles replied that such a step would only force the opposition factions to return to terrorism and revolution, which in turn might topple the government. The delegates consequently ended by assuring Welles they would continue in the mediation negotiations "with the utmost sincerity and unimpaired spirit of cooperation."[31]

After this visit Welles immediately confronted President Machado with what had happened. The President hid neither the fact that he had sent the Liberal representatives nor his own feeling that the mediation had weakened the authority of his government. However, he indicated that he felt the mediation negotiations were the only possible solution to the crisis. He apparently convinced Welles that he was ready to agree to any fair solution as long as he was not "'thrown into the street.'" He was even able to have Welles prevent the opposition newspapers from publishing complaints against the actions of the Machado government.[32]

That same day automobiles loaded with members of the Porra, Machado's violence squad, raced through the city firing guns into the air. They started a new manhunt--apparently with the authority of the President--for oppositionists who had returned under the guarantees of the government (many, however, had been warned and were in hiding).[33] By August 6

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[30] Foreign Relations, p. 364 (837.00/3601).

[31] Ibid.

[32] Ibid.

[33] Herring, "The Downfall of Machado," Current History, XXXIX, pp. 15-16.

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[31]Ibid.

[32]Ibid.

[33]Herring, "The Downfall of Machado," Current History, XXXIX, pp. 15-16.

the general strike had become a movement which Machado and his police could not control. One witness described the situation:

> This strike is a marvelous thing--an entire nation folds its arms and quits work, passively sitting still.... From the laborer in the street to the wealthy businessman they are determined to see this through, no matter what happens. There is no leadership to this strike; it is entirely spontaneous--a nation without a leader but acting in perfect accord....
>
> Machado once more ordered his soldiers to "restore public order." They are perfectly helpless in the face of the present situation.[34]

In the face of this new crisis brought on by the passive resistance of the Cuban people, Ambassador Welles apparently decided the only solution was to abandon his original plans and force Machado to retire immediately. After obtaining the approval of the opposition and the three political parties, on August 6 he presented to Machado a five-point plan calling for:

> 1. Appointment by the President of an impartial Secretary of State acceptable to all elements.
> 2. The request by the President of the (Congress) for leave of absence and authorization by him of the new Secretary of State to reorganize the Cabinet giving representation to all important political elements.
> 3. The immediate passage by the Congress of the constitutional reforms which have been elaborated by the Mixed Commission as the result of which the members of the House of Representatives will agree to shorten their terms so that half of the House will be renewed in the national elections of 1934 and those representatives remaining in the House to shorten their terms to a corresponding extent as those who will vacate in that year.
> 4. Half of the Senate is renewed in 1934 and the remaining Senators to agree to shorten their terms to a total period of 6 years.
> 5. The creation of the Vice-Presidency, said Vice-President to assume the Presidency upon his inauguration.[35]

Welles tried unsuccessfully to force Machado to agree to the five-point plan at once. He reported to Washington:

> ....I impressed upon him that if he did not accept this entirely constitutional and dignified solution as an act of patriotism and sacrifice on the part of all concerned I believed that the situation here would very rapidly degenerate into a condition of absolute anarchy

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[34]Phillips, Cuban Sideshow, pp. 49-50.

[35]Foreign Relations, pp. 336-337 (837.00/3606).

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> Machado once more ordered his soldiers to "restore public order." They are powerfully helpless in the face of the present situation.[34]

In the face of this new crisis brought on by the passive resistance of the Cuban people, Ambassador Welles apparently decided the only solution was to abandon his original plans and force Machado to resign immediately. After obtaining the approval of the opposition and the three political parties, on August 6 he presented to Machado a five-point plan calling for:

> 1. Appointment by the President of an impartial Secretary of State acceptable to all elements.
> 2. The request by the President of the (Congress) for leave of absence and authorization by him of the new Secretary of State to reorganize the Cabinet giving representation to all important political elements.
> 3. The immediate passage by the Congress of the constitutional reforms which have been elaborated by the Mixed Commission as the result of which the members of the House of Representatives will agree to shorten their terms so that half of the House will be renewed in the national elections of 1934 and those representatives remaining in the House to shorten their terms to a corresponding extent as those who will vacate in that year.
> 4. Half of the Senate is renewed in 1934 and the remaining Senators to agree to shorten their terms to a total period of 6 years.
> 5. The creation of the Vice-Presidency, and Vice-President to assume the Presidency upon his inauguration.[35]

Welles tried unsuccessfully to force Machado to agree to the five-point plan at once. He reported to Washington:

> ....I impressed upon him that if he did not accept this entirely constitutional and dignified solution as an act of patriotism and sacrifice on the part of all concerned I believed that the situation here would very rapidly degenerate into a condition of absolute anarchy

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[34] Phillips, Cuban Sideshow, pp. 49-50.

[35] Foreign Relations, pp. 336-337 (837.00/1902a).

> which would result in the loss of innumerable lives and destruction of property. I reminded him of the obligations of the United States under the permanent treaty but I told him that the whole purpose of my mission here was to avoid the United States Government having to consider the carrying out of such obligations.[36]

President Machado obstinately refused to accept the new plan. He expressed his "entire willingness" to resign, but opposed as "disastrous" the idea of asking for a leave of absence and allowing a secretary of state to carry on until the vice president was inaugurated.[37] In spite of all Welles' efforts, another impasse had been reached. President Machado finally refused to give any answer at all to the Ambassador. Instead, he told Welles that the Cuban Congress "as a matter of precaution" desired to suspend constitutional guarantees on August 7. Welles reluctantly agreed, stating that in view of the gravity of the situation he did not object provided guarantees were suspended for a limited and fixed period.[38]

Although Welles had made no comments to the press, within twenty-four hours of his visit to President Machado his new proposals were generally known in the United States and Cuba. The interview raised speculation in Havana, and in the U.S. it was reported that "...the perturbation apparent all afternoon in government circles has led to the belief that Mr. Welles demanded an immediate decision on the formula."[39]

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[36] Ibid.

[37] Ibid.

[38] Ibid.

[39] The New York Times, August 9, 1933, p. 1, col. 8. Apparently there were many rumors as to who was supposed to succeed Machado as secretary of state. The New York Times correspondent in Cuba reported "from a reliable source" that Ambassador Welles wanted to have President Machado appoint Dr. Carlos Manuel de Céspedes to replace Ferrara, but Welles makes no mention of this in any of his official correspondence to Washington on the subject.

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President Machado absolutely refused to accept the new plan. He expressed his "entire willingness" to resign, but opposed as "disastrous" the idea of asking for a leave of absence and allowing a secretary of state to carry on until the vice president was inaugurated.[37] In spite of all Welles' efforts, another impasse had been reached. President Machado finally refused to give any answer at all to the Ambassador. Instead, he told Welles that the Cuban Congress "as a matter of precaution" desired to suspend constitutional guarantees on August 7. Welles reluctantly agreed, stating that in view of the gravity of the situation he did not object provided guarantees were suspended for a limited and fixed period.[38]

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August 7-10: Machado Refuses to Go

President Machado's next reaction was one of "blind fury." He went on the air, talked grandiloquently of the Cuban war for liberty, of the irresponsibility of the American Ambassador. He called Cuba to a new crusade against imperialism. The people remained silent, shared each other's rapidly diminishing stores of canned meat and dried fish, and refused to work, sell or buy.[40]

Ambassador Welles continued to meet with the various delegates to the mediation negotiations. After it became clear President Machado would not yield, dissention among the various factions threatened. The opposition delegates became increasingly pessimistic.[41] The ABC distributed thousands of handbills stating that while they could not officially support the strike in view of their acceptance of mediation proceedings, the strikers had their full moral support.[42]

One weekly news magazine in Cuba addressed an open letter to Machado demanding resignation as a patriotic gesture, and asserting that it spoke as the voice of the nation. All copies were confiscated.[43] The entire island was ultimately left without news owing to the suspension of all publications, and rumors became more exaggerated with every telling as they circulated throughout the city. The general public was described as being "in a state of fearful expectancy."[44] One U.S. publication commented:

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[40]Herring, "The Downfall of Machado," Current History, XXXIX, p. 15.

[41]The New York Times, August 6, 1933, p. 9, col. 1.

[42]The New York Times, August 7, 1933, p. 1, col. 3.

[43]The New York Times, August 6, 1933, p. 9, col. 1.

[44]Ibid.

August 7-10: Machado Relents to Go

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[43]The New York Times, August 6, 1933, p. 9, col. 3.

[44]Ibid.

> The Cuban strike spread like wildfire today and the island's situation became a race between mediation by United States Ambassador Sumner Welles and open revolution.[45]

Havana's Chief of Police Ainciart created much excitement when with a drawn revolver and "allegedly using highly abusive language" he sped about the city of Havana attempting to force merchants to open their doors. Before his threatening attitude merchants made a pretense of obeying, but closed and barred their doors immediately after the departure of the police. Reports coming in from the suburbs and from various districts of Havana said that plainclothesmen, police and members of the Porra were riding through the streets in automobiles, attempting to intimidate the public by firing into the air and in many cases shooting at the closed doors of commercial establishments that refused to open. Reports from the interior indicated that the strikes were being supported in every town and village.[46]

In a sudden attempt to break the strike by removing what was thought to be its leadership, the government began quietly arresting labor leaders and members of the opposition known to be assisting the strikers. An estimated 100 labor leaders were detained. Forty doctors on duty in government hospitals were arrested because they "expressed sympathy for the strike movement."[47] One U.S. dispatch reported:

> ...the strike is regarded as a spontaneous expression of popular discontent, not fomented by any political party, and irresistible.[48]

In spite of the speculation over Welles' interview with President Machado on the afternoon of August 6, the Ambassador refused to comment.

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[45] The New York Times, August 7, 1933, p. 1, col. 3.

[46] Ibid.

[47] The New York Times, August 8, 1933, p. 3, col. 5.

[48] Ibid.

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[45]The New York Times, August 7, 1933, p. 1, col. 3.

[46]Ibid.

[47]The New York Times, August 8, 1933, p. 3, col. 5.

[48]Ibid.

The only radio station broadcasting was an illegal one. It identified itself as "Station ABC" and warned the people to stay indoors. The announcer called on the public to make the present strike the final effort to free the island of the Machado dictatorship.[49]

At 3 p.m. on August 7 President Machado called for a special session of congress and put the country under military rule, stating that Cuba was in "a state of intense agitation." The government telegraphers had deserted, causing a break in communications with the interior. Police searched in vain for the employees to force them to return to work.[50]

Later that same afternoon there was a faked announcement over a station pretending to be the ABC voice, to the effect that Machado had resigned and the people should go out into the streets and celebrate. It was the work of one of Machado's agents:

> The word spread like wildfire; the people poured into the square before the capitol, four or five thousand at least--a shouting, tumultous crowd, yelling "Down with Machado" and "Long Live Free Cuba." The Porra appeared, firing into the crowd, killing some 20 and wounding 80. The crowd scattered. Some went toward the palace where they were met by soldiers. There was more firing and more people were killed....
>
> ...there was no excuse for it. It was sheer wanton murder. The crowd was orderly and could have been dispersed with a fire hose. Machado was bent upon arousing the population to violence, but in vain. The people folded their arms; a terrifying calm settled upon the city, a calm which persisted day after day.... All the week the murdering continued. Porristas ranged through the streets in armored cars letting shots fly at little or no provocation. Ainciart, the chief of police, in a rage, drove about like a madman, in his armored car, machine gun mounted.[51]

The brutal attack of August 7 considerably aggravated the situation in Havana, and provoked demands for intervention from some quarters in the United States.[52] In an effort to disclaim responsibility for the

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[49]The New York Times, August 7, 1933, p. 1, col. 3.

[50]Ibid.

[51]Herring, "The Downfall of Machado," Current History, XXXIX, p. 15.

[52]Phillips, Cuban Sideshow, pp. 51-54.

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[50]Ibid.

[51]Herring, "The Downfall of Machado," Current History, XXXIX, p. 15.

[52]Phillips, Open Diplomacy, pp. 2-14.

massacre and discredit Ambassador Welles, Machado had his personal secretary send the following urgent cable to the New York Times:

> "In view of the misleading and preposterous messages sent today from this city (Havana)...I ask you in a spirit of fairnese to ponder the following facts:
>
> "First--it is absolutely untrue that President Machado has resigned.
>
> "Second--It is equally untrue that the Liberal, Popular and Conservative parties have agreed that President Machado's resignation is the only way to settle the Cuban political difficulties.
>
> "Third--No members of the Liberal party have asked him to resign.
>
> "Fourth--Just as I am wiring you, President Machado is walking through the Havana streets inspecting the police service for the protection of citizens."[53]

President Machado gave no indication that he would consider acceding to Welles' demands, although at the instigation of the latter he did remove Police Chief Ainciart, in part responsible for the August 7 massacre, from his command and replace him with another officer.[54] Machado refused to see Welles personally, saying he was "indisposed" and unable to receive him.[55] Welles reacted by cabling Washington for more pressure there:

> I think it would be helpful if the Cuban Ambassador to Washington were informed by the Department tomorrow of the President's authorization and approval as conveyed to me and of the very grave consequences which may ensue if President Machado refuses to agree to an eminently fair and patriotic Cuban solution of the political problem which every faction has agreed to including the President's own party.
>
> The killed this afternoon in Habana alone total 17 and the wounded over 100. I feel it obligatory to emphasize the extreme seriousness of the situation.[56]

The following morning, August 8, Ambassador Cintas--apparently under instructions from President Machado--countered with almost fantastic reports

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[53] The New York Times, August 8, 1933, p. 3, col. 3.

[54] Foreign Relations, p. 338 (837.00/3608); The New York Times, August 8, 1933, p. 1, col. 8; p. 3, col. 1.

[55] Foreign Relations, p. 338.(837.00/3606).

[56] Ibid.

massacre and discredit Ambassador Welles, upheld his personal secretary based the following urgent cable to the New York Times:

"In view of the misleading and preparatory measures sent under from this city (Havana)...I ask you in a matter of duty to publish the following facts:

"First--it is absolutely untrue that President Machado resigned.

"Second--It is equally untrue that the Liberal, Conservative and Conservative parties have agreed that President Machado's resignation is the only way to settle the Cuban political difficulties.

"Third--No members of the Liberal party have asked him to resign.

"Fourth--Just as I am writing you, President Machado is walking through the Havana streets inspecting the police and its for the protection of citizens."[53]

President Machado gave no indication that he would consider according to Welles' demands, although at the instigation of the Junta he did remove Police Chief Sinclair, the most responsible for the injury to massacre, from his command and replace him with another officer.[54] Machado refused to see Welles personally, saying he was "indisposed" and unable to receive him.[55] Welles reported by telling Washington for more pressure there:

> I think it would be helpful if the Cuban Ambassador in Washington were informed by the Department director of the Pan American Union of the action and approval as conveyed to me and of the very grave consequences which may ensue if President Machado refuses to agree to an eminently fair and practical Cuban solution of the political crisis which every faction has agreed to including the President's own party. The killed this afternoon in Habana alone total 17 and the wounded over 100. I feel it obligatory to emphasize the extreme seriousness of the situation.[56]

The following morning, August 6, Ambassador Clark--strangely under instructions from President Machado--countered with a clear Spanish-to-English

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[53] The New York Times, August 8, 1933, p. 1, col. 3.

[54] Foreign Relations, p. 730 (837.00/1009); The New York Times, August 8, 1933, p. 1, col. 8; p. 3, col. 1.

[55] Foreign Relations, p. 730.(837.00/1008).

[56] Ibid.

and accusations which made it apparent the Cuban President did not plan to yield. Cintas informed Undersecretary Phillips that:

> 1) There had been a meeting of the workers at the Palace and that the strike had been called off; all the workers had agreed to go back to work and complete tranquility existed throughout Cuba.
> 2) Ambassador Welles had presented Machado with a communication which meant the overthrow of the Government, and President Machado said he could not and would not be pushed out by the United States.
> 3) Machado had repeatedly told Welles he would not accept the plan suggested for the substitution of the Secretary of State and the ultimate election of a Vice-President.[57]

When Ambassador Welles finally saw Machado he accomplished very little. Welles reported to Washington:

> I had an interview with President Machado this morning. I told the President that...I handed him as mediator a solution of the Cuban political problem which represented a compromise accepted by the sectors of the opposition, by the directors of the Popular and Conservative Parties and by seven leaders of the President's own Party, the Liberal Party, including the president of that party, and which compromise would permit the Cuban people to return immediately to a state of peace and tranquility, and be enabled as a result thereof to devote themselves to the restoration of Cuba's economic prosperity. I told President Machado further that I was specifically authorized to state that the solution as proposed by me met with the full approbation of the President of the United States.
> The President immediately stated that he would not accept this solution as proposed and that I could inform the President of the United States that he would prefer armed intervention to the acceptance of any such proposal. It was obvious that he was in a state of mental disturbance bordering on hysteria which, however, later changed into a more reasonable attitude. He stated that he was as much in favor of my mediation as he had ever been and that no one could have carried out their official duties in a more friendly spirit and in a manner less calculated to injure the susceptibilities, either of the Republic or of any individual, than I had. I pointed out to him...the solution as proposed, represented neither imposition nor interference by the Government of the United States, but was a solution which had been drafted as the result of conferences between the representatives of every part of Cuban public opinion. I stated that the solution in no wise impaired the sovereignty of the Republic and was furthermore entirely in accord with existing constitutional procedure in Cuba; that it must be obvious to him that rightly or wrongly the refusal of the Cuban people to return to a state of political tranquility was due to the fact that the existing Cuban Government was charged with

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[57] Ibid. See also The New York Times, August 9, 1933, p. 12, col. 1.

and accusations which seem to separate the Cuban President and his plan to yield. Cuban informed Undersecretary, Phillips that:

1) There had been a meeting of the students at the Palace and that the strike had been called off; all the workers had agreed to go back to work and complete tranquility existed throughout Cuba.

2) Ambassador Welles had presented Mendieta with a memorandum which meant the overthrow of the Government, and "Mendieta realized that he could not and would not be pushed out by the United States."

3) Mendieta had forcefully told Welles he would not accept the plan suggested for the abdication of the Secretary of State and the ultimate election of a Vice-President.[27]

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[27] Ibid. See also The New York Times, August 9, 1933, p. 12, col. 1.

> all of the tragedies and economic disasters which had taken place during the past 3 years; that it had been my earnest hope that the President as a patriotic gesture would agree through the solution proposed to make it possible for a rapid return to normal conditions here and that it was my firm belief that unless the solution proposed or one similar to it was carried into effect, no such betterment could be possible.[58]

President Machado thereupon temporized by informing Welles he would accept the last three points of his solution, but never the first two. Ambassador Welles asked pointedly if this meant he would refuse to consider any counterproposition, and Machado replied that he would "consider the desirability" of formulating such a proposition. Welles was reduced to stating that "in view of the extreme gravity of the situation" he felt he was entitled to a reply from Machado within a very brief period.[59]

The problem Sumner Welles could not solve was how to persuade Machado to "retire."[60] Although the Conservative and Popular parties continued to support Welles' proposals, President Machado apparently could count on many of the members of the Liberal party to support him so that they would not have to agree to shorten their terms in congress and give up the lucrative privileges to which they were entitled.[61] Welles placed some hope on the influence of the other political leaders in congress and members of the President's cabinet, such as General Herrera, in getting Machado to reconsider. However, he reported, "I am...by no means hopeful of the outcome."[62] He apparently felt that Machado could not be convinced, and that the only alternative would be to withdraw

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[58] Foreign Relations, pp. 340-341 (837.00/3616).

[59] Ibid.

[60] Smith, p. 147.

[61] Foreign Relations, p. 341.

[62] Ibid., pp. 341-342.

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President as a particular question which [illegible]
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one similar to [illegible] be possible.[58]

President Ramón Grau San Martín [illegible]
accept the last three points of his solution, [illegible]
Ambassador Welles acted personally [illegible]
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[58]Cuban Relations, pp. [illegible]

[59]Ibid.

[60]Smith, p. 147.

[61]Foreign Relations, p. 141.

[62]Ibid., pp. [illegible].

recognition. He reasoned:

> I think the situation demands forceful and positive action by the Government of the United States in order that our prestige both here and in the rest of the continent may not be seriously prejudiced. If President Machado remains in power he can only continue through the exercise of the most brutal methods of repression.... It will be impossible for him to govern without a continuance of martial law and the suspension of all constitutional guarantees, which condition makes it possible, of course, for the President and the military authorities to assassinate, to throw into prison, and to deprive of "life, property and individual liberty", any citizen in the Republic.
>
> The Government of the United States has clearly demonstrated its intention to use every possible means at its disposal to further and to support a peaceful and constitutional adjustment by the Cuban people of their problem. The realization of that end is made impossible solely by the unwillingness of one man, President Machado, to retire from the office which he holds through a reelection which in its genesis is unquestionably unconstitutional. Throughout the course of my mission here, I have exerted every possible effort to avoid the creation of a situation which might result in intervention by the United States. If the present condition is permitted to continue much longer, I am positive that a state of complete anarchy will result which might force the Government of the United States, against its will, to intervene in compliance with its obligations under the permanent treaty.
>
> I should like further to emphasize...that in my own judgment the permanent treaty imposes upon us responsibilities as regards the Cuban people. I do not see how the Government of the United States can, in view of its treaty obligations, continue its formal support of a Cuban government which has consistently deprived the Cuban people of their constitutional rights, which has been guilty of atrocities which have shocked the entire continent, and which refuses to consider the acceptance of a fair and Cuban solution of this disastrous situation. I believe that intervention should be avoided at any cost except that of failing to comply with our treaty responsibilities, but on the other hand I believe that should President Machado positively refuse to agree to the solution proposed, or to one similar in character, the Government of the United States should no longer accord its moral support to the Government of Cuba and should withdraw recognition.
>
> I do not believe that the withdrawal of recognition would in all probability force us to intervene; I think that if the President himself was advised that we would withdraw recognition unless he accepted a fair solution of the problem, he would be obliged to accept such solution by most of the members of his Cabinet, by the Army and by the great majority of congress. If, however, he persists in refusing to accept any compromise after notification that recognition would be withdrawn, in such event, I do not believe that his Government would be able to maintain itself for more than an exceedingly brief period and should steps be taken by me in advance in accordance with the leaders of the political parties and with the important leaders of the opposition to provide for the installation of a stable government immediately upon President Machado's forced resignation, I have every reason to believe that the situation here would continue sufficiently within control to make it unnecessary for the United States Government

recognition, he remarked:

> I think the situation demands forceful and prompt action by the Government of the United States in order that our principles both here and in the east of the continent may not be seriously prejudiced. If President Machado remains in power he can only continue through the exercise of the most brutal methods of repression.... It will be impossible for him to govern without a continuance of martial law and the suspension of all constitutional guarantees, which conditions make it possible, of course, for the President and the military authorities to commandeer, to throw into prison, and to deprive of "life, property and individual liberty", any citizen in the Republic.
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>
> I should like further to emphasize...that in my own judgment the permanent treaty imposes upon us responsibilities as regards the Cuban people. I do not see how the Government of the United States can, in view of its treaty obligations, continue its formal support of a Cuban government which has cavalierly disregarded the Cuban people of their constitutional rights, which has been guilty of a procedure which have shocked the entire continent, and which refuses to consider the acceptance of a fair and Cuban solution of this disastrous situation. I believe that intervention should be avoided at any cost except that of failing to comply with our treaty responsibilities, but on the other hand I believe that should President Machado positively refuse to agree to the solution proposed, or to give similar guarantees, the Government of the United States should no longer accord its moral support to the Government of Cuba and should withdraw recognition.

I do not believe that the withdrawal of recognition would in all probability force us to intervene; I think that if the President himself was advised that we would withdraw recognition unless he accepted a fair solution of the problem, he would be obliged to accept such solution by most of the members of his Cabinet, by the Army and by the great majority of congress. It, however, he persists in refusing to accept any compromise after notification that recognition would be withdrawn, in such event, I do not believe that his Government would be able to maintain itself for more than an exceedingly brief period and should steps be taken by us in advance in accordance with the leaders of the political parties and with the important leaders of the opposition to provide for the installation of a stable government immediately upon President Machado's forced resignation, I have every reason to believe that the situation here would continue sufficiently within control to make it unnecessary for the United States Government

to undertake even a brief armed intervention.[63]

Thus he proposed:

> 1. That if at the end of a reasonable period President Machado has given me no indication that he will either accept the solution proposed by me as mediator or adopt some other solution equally satisfactory, I be authorized to inform him that the United States Government will withdraw recognition of the Cuban Government within a stated time unless the President consents to a solution of the character proposed and that I be instructed to declare that the action would be based upon the unwillingness of my Government to continue to lend its moral support to a government in Cuba which is maintaining itself in power by martial law and through the exercise of brutal methods of repression, and which is unwilling to agree to a compromise acceptable to every element of public opinion in Cuba existing at the present moment.
>
> 2. That I finally be instructed, upon the expiration of the period indicated...should President Machado still refuse, formally to withdraw recognition of the Cuban Government after having agreed with the political leaders and with the leaders of the opposition upon means of installation of a stable government, and to leave the Republic.[64]

He asked that he be advised of President Roosevelt's decision and the course to be pursued at the earliest possible moment.[65]

President Machado's next move (on the afternoon of August 8) was to go before a joint session of the Cuban Congress and denounce Welles in no uncertain terms. He informed congress that it was entirely false that the solution being pressed by Welles had the approval of the United States, stating that Ambassador Welles was only bluffing.[66] He then cabled the following statement to the New York Times for publication "to the American people":

> I am, and will continue to be, the President of the Republic of Cuba, exercising all of my Constitutional prerogatives. Of these I cannot relinquish the smallest part without becoming a traitor to

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[63] Ibid., pp. 342-343.

[64] Ibid., p. 343.

[65] Ibid.

[66] Ibid., pp. 339-340 (837.00/3615) and Smith, p. 146.

to undertake even a brief armed intervention.[63]

Thus he proposed:

> 1. That if at the end of a reasonable period President Machado has given us no indication that he will either accept the solution proposed by us as mediators or adopt some other solution equally satisfactory, I be authorized to inform him that the United States Government will withdraw recognition of the Cuban Government which from a strictly time unless the President concurs in a solution of the character proposed and that I be instructed to declare that action would be based upon the unwillingness of my Government to continue to lend its moral support to a government in Cuba which is maintaining itself in power by martial law and through the exercise of brutal methods of repression, and which is unwilling to agree to a compromise acceptable to every element of public opinion in Cuba outlining at the present moment.
>
> 2. That I finally be instructed, upon the expiration of the period indicated...should Free Cuba Machado still remain, formally to withdraw recognition of the Cuban Government after having agreed with the political leaders and with the leaders of the opposition upon means of installation of a stable government, not to force the Republic.[64]

He added that he be advised of President Roosevelt's decision and the course to be pursued at the earliest possible moment.[65]

President Machado's next move (on the afternoon of August 8) was to go before a joint session of the Cuban Congress and denounce Welles in no uncertain terms. He informed congress that it was entirely false that the solution being pressed by Welles had the approval of the United States, stating that Ambassador Welles was only bluffing.[66] He then called the following statement to the New York Times for publication "to the American people":

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[63]Ibid., pp. 342-343.

[64]Ibid., p. 343.

[65]Ibid.

[66]Ibid., pp. 339-340 (337.00/3623) and Smith, p. 146.

> the confidence reposed in me by the people of Cuba when they freely gave their votes to me or without diminishing the independence and sovereignty of a republic that I assisted in founding, having fought in the war for independence.
>
> The difficulties now occurring in Cuba are similar to those that are happening in other countries, but a greater importance is given to those that are unfolding here, possibly because ours is a small country and in it a great amount of foreign capital is invested....
>
> I am disposed to mediate with my political adversaries and to concede to them their just demands to any extent that will not diminish the authority or the prestige of the institutions of the republic or the head of the State....
>
> I believe the people of the United States will understand that I am working for peace and order in Cuba and defending against revolution and anarchy the independence, sovereignty and the institutions of a republic that the same people of the United States aided nobly to form.[67]

Ambassador Welles immediately countered with a request that the American government emphasize its unequivocal support of his actions, as well as its readiness to interfere in the event that the situation warranted it.

> I also beg to request that you inform Cintas that while the purpose of my mission here is to avoid the existence of a situation which would give rise to intervention by the United States if a situation of anarchy exists and there is no government in Cuba capable of protecting "life, property and individual liberty" as provided in the third article of the permanent treaty the United States will not evade its obligations under that provision. Both Cintas and President Machado have repeatedly given important leaders here the belief that I am not authorized by you to act and that the attitude I have adopted is one of bluff. I feel that it is essential if I am to succeed in procuring a solution of this very grave situation that Cintas be told by you to inform President Machado that absolutely no act of mine has been taken except with your full approval and authorization.[68]

President Roosevelt subsequently informed the Cuban Ambassador that the United States had no desire to intervene, but that it was "our duty to do what we could so that there should be no starvation and chaos among the Cuban peoples".[69] Cintas suggested that President Machado could not allow himself to be forced out, but if there were a means by which he

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[67] The New York Times, August 9, 1933, p. 12, col. 2.

[68] Foreign Relations, pp. 339-340.

[69] Ibid., pp. 347-348 (837.00/3623).

than candidates reported in as by the people of Cuba when they freely gave their votes to us or without diminishing the independence and sovereignty of a republic that I assisted in founding, having fought in the war for independence.

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I am disposed to meddle with my political adversaries and to concede to them their just demands to any extent that will not diminish the authority or the prestige of the institutions of the republic or the head of the State....

I believe the people of the United States will understand that I am working for peace and order in Cuba and defending against revolution and anarchy the independence, sovereignty and the institutions of a republic that the same people of the United States aided nobly to form.[67]

Ambassador Wilson immediately concurred with a request that the American government emphasize its unequivocal support of his actions, as well as its readiness to intervene in the event that the situation warranted it.

I also beg to request that you inform Citizen that while the purpose of my mission here is to avoid the existence of a situation which would give rise to intervention by the United States it is situation of anarchy exists and there is no government in Cuba capable of protecting "life, property and individual liberty" as provided in the third article of the permanent treaty the United States will not evade its obligations under that provision. Both Citizen and President Menocal have repeatedly given important leaders here the belief that I am not authorized by you to act and that the attitude I have adopted is one of bluff. I feel that it is essential if I am to succeed in preventing a violation of this very grave situation that Citizen be told by you to inform President Menocal that absolutely no act of mine has been taken except with your full approval and authorization.[68]

President Roosevelt subsequently informed the Cuban Ambassador that the United States had no desire to intervene, but that it was "our duty to do what we could so that there should be no intervention and chaos among the Cuban people".[69] Crowder suggested that President Menocal could not allow himself to be forced out, but if there were a means by which he

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[67]The New York Times, August 9, 1923, p. 12, col. 2.

[68]Foreign Relations, pp. 339-340.

[69]Ibid., pp. 347-348 (837.00/3227).

could "save face" then there was still hope that he could be persuaded to do so.[70] Apparently at this point President Roosevelt decided to take the situation into his own hands. He suggested that if a shipload of food could be sent from the United States to Cuba and if President Machado could step out "in order to save the Cuban people from starvation," he would not only be "saving face" but would be performing a noble act.[71] Ambassador Cintas promised to contact Machado and get his reaction to this immediately. President Roosevelt and Ambassador Cintas then issued a joint statement to the press:

> The President and Ambassador Cintas discussed the Cuban situation, especially in its economic aspects. They feel that the problems of starvation and of depression are of such immediate importance that every political problem should be met in the most patriotic spirit in order to improve conditions at the earliest moment possible. The Ambassador is communicating with his government.[72]

Nothing came of Roosevelt's rather naive suggestion. Machado made no reply at all. A day or so later, an aide in Cuba informed Ambassador Welles that the gesture was futile. The only net result of Roosevelt's effort was to allow President Machado to temporize further with Welles.[73]

President Roosevelt did not think too highly of Ambassador Welles' suggestion that diplomatic recognition be withdrawn, or of stressing the possibility of U. S. intervention.[74] He preferred to continue a course more in line with the Good Neighbor policy. Accordingly the administration publicly stated that the U.S. government continued to oppose armed

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[70] Ibid., p. 348.

[71] Ibid.

[72] Public Papers, II, p. 319.

[73] Foreign Relations, p. 348.

[74] Ibid.

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> The President and Ambassador Guiteras discussed the Cuban situation, especially in its economic aspects. They feel that the problems of starvation and of depression are of such immediate importance that every political problem should be set in the most particular aspect in order to improve conditions at the earliest moment possible. The Ambassador is communicating with his government.[72]

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[70] Ibid., p. 348.

[71] Ibid.

[72] Public Papers, II, p. 312.

[73] Foreign Relations, p. 348.

[74] Ibid.

intervention in Cuba and maintained an attitude of "official neutrality."[75]

On August 9 Secretary of State Hull cabled Welles:

> Inasmuch as Ambassador Cintas has expressed the hope that President Machado may be willing to make some counterproposal tomorrow or the next day, we think it would be desirable for you not to press him further at the moment.[76]

In his reply the same day Welles made one more attempt to have his recommendations accepted:

> ...I feel it desirable to emphasize the following points as the result of the intensive study I have made here during the past 3 months:
>
> 1. There is absolutely no hope of a return to normal conditions in Cuba as long as President Machado remains in office. No one other than the exceedingly small clique of officeholders surrounding him has any trust or confidence in him and he represents in his person to every other Cuban the cause of economic distress and personal suffering which has existed during the past 3 years.
>
> 2. So long as this condition continues there is no possible chance of improving economic conditions in Cuba, and there will be immense loss to the Cuban people themselves and as a natural corollary to all of the American interests doing business in or with Cuba.
>
> 3. The solution proposed by me as mediator represents a compromise framed by the representatives of all Cuban factions both of the opposition and of those which have in the past been cooperating with the Government and if such solution could be carried into effect I have the utmost confidence that peace and tranquility would be restored to Cuba within a week.
>
> 4. If my recommendations are adopted and recognition is withdrawn from the Machado Government I believe that the President would be forced to resign his office within a very limited period and that a stable government could be installed in strict accordance with the provisions of the existing constitution within a period of hours thereafter provided arrangements to that end are made by me before recognition is withdrawn.
>
> 5. If recognition is withdrawn there will in all likelihood be for a brief period disturbances in the city of Habana. If my recommendations are adopted and this eventuality takes place I feel that two American warships should be in Habana harbor with instructions not to land a man except in the gravest emergency the terms of which should be precisely defined beforehand.
>
> The ultimate objective, in addition to the immediate objectives above-mentioned, of the recommendations which I have formulated, is to permit the Cuban people to hold free and constitutional elections

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[75] The New York Times, August 8, 1933, p. 3, col. 5.

[76] Foreign Relations, p. 348.

intervention in Cuba and maintained an attitude of "official neutrality."[7]

On August 9 Secretary of State Hull added that:

> Inasmuch as Ambassador Guinta has expressed the hope that President Machado may be willing to make some counterproposal tomorrow or the next day, we think it would be desirable for you not to press him further at the moment.[8]

In his reply the same day Welles made one more attempt to have his recommendations accepted:

> ...I feel it desirable to emphasize the following points as the result of the intensive study I have made here during the past 3 months:
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> 1. There is absolutely no hope of a return to normal conditions in Cuba as long as President Machado remains in office. He is, rather than the exceedingly small clique of officeholders surrounding him has any trust or confidence in him and he represents in his person to every other Cuban the cause of extreme distress and personal suffering which has existed during the past 3 years.
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> 2. So long as this situation continues there is no possible chance of improving economic conditions in Cuba, and there will be immense loss to the Cuban people themselves and a natural corollary to all of the American interests doing business in or with Cuba.
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> 3. The solution proposed by the mediator representing a conference formed by the representatives of all Cuban factions both of the opposition and of those which have in the past been cooperating with the Government and if such solution could be carried into effect I have the utmost confidence that peace and tranquillity would be restored to Cuba within a week.
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[7]The New York Times, August 8, 1933, p. 7, col. 3.

[8]Foreign Relations, p. 344.

> for a new government in accordance with the existing constitution in November 1934. If President Machado remains in power even until February of next year no political parties can reorganize and none of the opposition parties will organize, with the consequence that the elections due to be held in November 1934 would once more result in the election of a government which did not come into power with the free consent of all the Cuban people.[77]

He concluded:

> You will understand, I am sure, that the recommendations I have made have been offered with reluctance and only after the most careful consideration. I can frankly state, however, that I see no other solution.[78]

President Roosevelt persisted in his position, however, and Welles had no choice but to acquiesce and wait to see what President Machado's reaction would ultimately be.[79]

> For the President.... I believe that the suggestion you made through Cintas to President Machado should be absolutely acceptable. I further believe that your idea of a gesture of generosity towards the Cuban people in this critical moment will be helpful. The situation is increasingly disquieting but I can assure you that I shall exert every effort of which I am capable to try and promote a solution by the Cubans themselves.[80]

It is interesting to note that many Cubans blamed Welles for this continued delay. He had, however, assessed the situation and the strike correctly, as he had correctly predicted the intentions of the Cuban President not to retire. The waiting decided upon at this crucial point was due to a decision made by President Roosevelt, not Ambassador Welles.[81]

By August 10, with the situation deteriorating steadily, Ambassador Welles was still waiting for Machado's reply (or counterproposition).

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[77] Ibid., pp. 344-345 (837.00/3622).

[78] Ibid., p. 345.

[79] Smith, p. 147.

[80] Foreign Relations, p. 351 (837.00/3632).

[81] Smith, p. 147.

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He concluded:

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President Roosevelt pondered in his position, however, and Welles had no choice but to acquiesce and wait to see what President Machado's reaction would ultimately be.[79]

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[77]Ibid., pp. 344-345 (837.00/3922).

[78]Ibid., p. 345.

[79]Smith, p. 147.

[80]Foreign Relations, p. 331 (837.00/3832).

[81]Smith, p. 147.

President Machado had meanwhile declared a state of war throughout Cuba and the army had taken control of the country. The national police ordered a roundup of all oppositionists, including especially the ABC revolutionaries and student groups. Some violence began to grow up again as the opposition began to retaliate. On the whole, however, the Cuban people remained calm, apparently heeding the warnings of the ABC to stay quietly in their homes. The food shortage had become acute, but the Cuban people showed little signs of relenting and the strike went on.[82]

From the United States, President Roosevelt apparently then tried to influence the situation with the weight of his own authority. He made a statement stressing his support of Welles as a mediator, but at the same time denying that Welles had actually directly suggested to President Machado that he leave office. Roosevelt expressed the determination that "the United States shall not be put in the position of telling President Machado to resign, for it is felt that such action would interfere with the freedom of Cuba."[83]

At this, Ambassador Cintas approached the State Department with the suggestion that Welles be recalled "for consultation" so that Machado would be freer to make concessions without feeling that he was being pressed by the American Ambassador. At this obvious attempt to have Welles removed from Cuba, President Roosevelt showed somewhat more force and Cintas was given to understand

> "That the President had received the message and had given it consideration, but that he was not disposed to ask Ambassador Welles to come to Washington for consultation, that once more he desired it to be understood that he had the utmost confidence in Ambassador Welles and felt sure that the Ambassador was doing everything possible

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[82] The New York Times, August 10, 1933, p. 1, col. 5; p. 10, col. 2.

[83] Ibid., p. 1, col. 8.

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At this, Ambassador Cintas approached the State Department with the suggestion that Welles be recalled "for consultations" so that Machado would be freer to make concessions without feeling that he was being pressed by the American Ambassador. At this obvious attempt to have Welles removed from Cuba, President Roosevelt showed immediate anger and Cintas was given to understand

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[22] The New York Times, August 10, 1933, p. 1, col. 5; p. 10, col. 2.

[23] Ibid., p. 1, col. 8.

to be helpful in the circumstances; furthermore...obviously the next move was up to President Machado and that move was a simple one, that certain suggestions had been presented to President Machado by representatives of the various political groups, that President Machado had turned down two of the five suggestions and that it was, therefore, now up to him to offer some counterproposal in place of these two, that the President was waiting for action by President Machado and that time was the essence of the problem."[84]

At this juncture the Spanish Ambassador, as the ranking diplomat in Cuba, officially complained to Welles of government mistreatment of Spanish citizens during the strike.[85] The British Minister did the same, thus putting the responsibility for preserving order (as provided under the terms of the Platt Amendment) squarely up to the United States. Diplomatically this offered the U.S. a perfect basis for direct intervention had the United States wished it. But the American State Department reiterated that the Platt Amendment notwithstanding, the U.S. did not desire to intervene in Cuba.[86]

President Machado stepped up the barrage of propaganda against Ambassador Welles. Attacks were made against him by radio, charging among other things that he had worked to overthrow the legally-constituted government in favor of opposition elements, that he had deliberately delayed the mediation negotiations, and that he had changed from mediator to dictator.[87] President Machado let it be known that Welles had discussed the possibility of U.S. intervention with him, and urged the Cuban Congress to pass a resolution censuring Welles for "insinuations...which constituted a violation upon our rights as a free and independent people and an

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[84]Foreign Relations, pp. 352-353 (837.00/3623).

[85]Ibid., p. 345 (837.00/3620).

[86]The New York Times, August 9, 1933, p. 12, col. 1.

[87]Ibid., p. 1, col. 8.

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[55]Foreign Relations, pp. 352-353 (837.00/[illegible]).

[56]Ibid., p. 345 (837.00/1520).

[57]The New York Times, August 9, 1933, p. 13, col. 1.

[57]Ibid., p. 1, col. 8.

aggression upon the sovereignty of small nationalities."[88]

Welles felt constrained to defend his position to the U.S. Secretary of State. He pointed out that he had only discussed the possibility of intervention with Machado, himself, and then merely to emphasize that the purpose of Welles' visit was to avoid such a necessity.[89] In the same communication he took the opportunity to once again press the Department of State and President Roosevelt for permission to use the threat of intervention to bring Machado down:

> ...if President Machado is permitted to believe as he apparently does that the United States will under no conditions and under no circumstances comply with its treaty obligations, I have every reason to believe that he will not give in until the very last possible moment. If on the other hand it is emphatically made clear to him that while the whole object of my mission has been to avoid intervention that the United States will consider intervention if it is forced to do so by the clear requirements of its treaty obligations as contained in article 3 of the permanent treaty it is much more probable that he will finally agree to the solution proposed. I cannot help but feel that it is an infinitely wiser policy on our part to state very clearly at this juncture that we will not evade our treaty obligations if we are obliged to comply with them, rather than to evade the issue and let matters slide into a state of affairs where we will have to take the only action which we desire to avoid. The President himself and those around him are confident that because of the prejudice to our own interests the United States Government will not intervene now under any conditions whatsoever. If they can be dissuaded from that belief a peaceful solution will be far more probable.[90]

In reply, Welles was admonished not to press Machado further; but rather, to await the promised "counterproposition."[91]

At this point Secretary of State Orestes Ferrara arrived back in Cuba and immediately counseled President Machado to "sit tight and call the bluff" of the United States; advising him--probably correctly--that

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[88] Foreign Relations, p. 346 (837.00/3624).

[89] Ibid., pp. 346-347 (837.00/3624).

[90] Ibid., p. 348.

[91] Ibid.

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[88] Foreign Relations, p. 366 (837.00/3024).

[89] Ibid., pp. 346-347 (837.00/3024).

[90] Ibid., p. 348.

[91] Ibid.

the U. S. would not intervene under any circumstances, and that if he held out some sort of compromise could be effected.[92]

The Popular party on August 9 had published an official resolution supporting the efforts of Welles. The Conservative party also reaffirmed its support, and together they formed almost half the membership of the Cuban Congress.[93] Nevertheless, on the morning of August 10 President Machado, with the help of Ferrara, succeeded in having the Executive Committee of the Liberal party draft a resolution rejecting the solution presented by Welles as mediator.[94] The resolution proposed:

> 1.--To reject the formula proposed by the mediator as anti-democratic and contrary to Cuban constitutional principles.
> 2.--To continue treating with members of the opposition and political parties without any foreign intervention.
> 3.--To thank the Ambassador for his personal actions and his declared formula presented as an individual and not as a representation or suggestion by the United States.[95]

President Machado then informed Sumner Welles he would not receive him, and that all further matters could be taken up with Secretary of State Ferrara.[96] With the help of Ferrara he then proceeded to initiate a new campaign designed to show that Welles had "exceeded his instructions and facilities as mediator"--a concerted effort to discredit Welles before President Roosevelt. Among other things, Machado told the Cuban people he had been given forty-eight hours within which to resign (which Welles denied).[97] His efforts to discredit Welles were such that the latter felt obliged to cable Washington to the effect that he was advising them

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[92]Phillips, Cuban Sideshow, pp. 55-56.

[93]Foreign Relations, pp. 346-347.

[94]Ibid., p. 349 (837.00/3630).

[95]The New York Times, August 11, 1933, p. 1, col. 8.

[96]The New York Times, August 10, 1933, p. 1, col. 5.

[97]Foreign Relations, p. 350.

the U. S. would not intervene under any circumstances, and that if he held out some port of concessions could be effected.[92]

The popular party on August 9 had published an official manifestation supporting the efforts of Welles. The conservative party also reaffirmed its support, and together they formed almost half the membership of the Cuban Congress.[93] Nevertheless, on the morning of August 10 President Machado, with the help of Ferrara, succeeded in having the executive committee of the liberal party draft a resolution rejecting the solution proposed by Welles as mediator.[94] The resolution proposed:

> 1.--To reject the formula proposed by the mediator as anti-democratic and contrary to Cuban constitutional principles.
> 2.--To continue treating with members of the opposition and political parties without any foreign intervention.
> 3.--To thank the Ambassador for his personal actions and his declared formula presented as an individual and not as a representation or suggestion by the United States.[95]

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[92]Millis, Cuban Sideshow, pp. 55-56.

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[94]Ibid., p. 349 (837.00/3030).

[95]The New York Times, August 11, 1933, p. 1, col. 8.

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[97]Foreign Relations, p. 350.

of all the facts because he believed the attempt would be made by the Cuban government very soon, if it had not already been made, to prove that he had exceeded his instructions as mediator.[98] In return he received a somewhat sharp cable from Secretary of State Hull:

> Out of the mass of information which has been sent to the United States from Cuba some misapprehension has arisen as to what you are doing, and there has been some adverse comment, both here and in Latin America, that the United States is attempting to coerce rather than to persuade. I of course understand the difficulties you are facing and place no reliance whatsoever on these reports; however, I trust you will bear them in mind and do what you can to correct them.[99]

Hull also reminded Welles that he was still to use his good offices in an endeavor to help the Cubans find a Cuban solution for their difficulties, and requested him to bear in mind that "you are acting as a mediator making a friendly effort to assist the Cubans to find a satisfactory solution for their problems."[100] President Roosevelt was apparently confident that Machado would accede to his own suggested plan for "saving face" and would shortly step down.[101]

As a result, the American Ambassador returned to the Presidential Palace to confer with Secretary of State Ferrara (also on August 10). Ferrara represented Machado as being unalterably opposed to Welles' plan. He offered a "counterproposition" which required: 1) An indefinite extension of time before reaching any decision, and 2) acquiescence on the part of the United States for the Cuban government to put down the general strike "by any means necessary" as a method of insuring public order in the future. Ferrara further told Welles that he felt his proposals

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[98] Ibid.

[99] Ibid., p. 354 (837.00/3637a).

[100] Ibid.

[101] The New York Times, August 11, 1933, p. 1, col. 6.

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[98]Ibid.

[99]Ibid., p. 334 (MFI.00/3537a).

[100]Ibid.

[101]The New York Times, August 11, 1934, p. 1, col. 6.

should have been put off some six or seven months.[102] Ferrara made it plain that President Roosevelt's suggestion that food be sent to the Cuban people was a "futile gesture." His proposal was that if the U.S. government would make an interest-free loan to the Machado government, proceed to an immediate negotiation of a new commercial treaty and thus revive the popularity of the President, that he, Ferrara, would then advise President Machado to resign.[103]

To these rather startling proposals, Ambassador Welles continued to insist that Machado step down without delay, although he was hampered by lack of authority:

> I replied to the Secretary of State that I could not convey any such bargain to my Government predicated on a continuance of power of the Machado administration; that I had reached the conclusion that normal conditions in Cuba could not exist so long as the present administration continued and that I believed any counterproposal advanced by President Machado should be based upon patriotism and the needs of the Cuban people and the interests of the Cuban Republic rather than upon any idea of the United States making loans to Cuba over which the existing Machado administration would have control. I stated that while I was without authority to say so it was my personal belief that as soon as there existed in Cuba a constitutional government which merited the confidence of all of the Cuban people the Government of the United States would be disposed to consider favorably any reasonable requests for economic assistance which might be advanced.[104]

Ferrara stated that he wished to think matters over, and informed Welles that he would confer with President Machado the following day (August 11) and then give the Ambassador some indication of what Machado intended to do.[105]

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[102] Foreign Relations, pp. 351-352 (837.00/3633).

[103] Ibid., p. 352.

[104] Ibid.

[105] Ibid.

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> I replied to the Secretary of state that I could not convey any such bargain to my Government primarily on account of the limitations of power of the Machado administration; that I had received the conclusion that normal conditions in Cuba could not exist so long as the present administration continued and that I believed any constitutional advanced by President Machado should be based upon guarantees and the needs of the Cuban people and the interests of the Cuban nation rather than upon any idea of the United States making itself a party to the existing Machado administration which I knew to be incorrect. I stated that while I was without authority to say so I was my personal belief that as soon as there existed in Cuba a constitutional government and which merited the confidence of all of the Cuban people the Government of the United States would be disposed to consider favorably any reasonable requests for economic assistance which might be advanced.[104]

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[102]Foreign Relations, pp. 351-352 (Oct. 00152).

[103]Ibid., p. 352.

[104]Ibid.

[105]Ibid.

August 11-12: The Army Coup

Apparently on his own initiative, Welles then adopted another plan for Machado to leave office. After conferences throughout the night of August 10 and the morning of August 11 with political leaders of all the parties and what he termed "the most prominent members of the opposition" he decided upon the following terms:

> ...if President Machado declares that he will not accept the first two points in the solution proposed by me but offers as of his own initiative as a counterproposition a request for leave of absence until a Vice-President is inaugurated and the immediate resignation of all of the members of his Cabinet with the exception of General Herrera, the latter then to become acting head of the Government until a Vice-President is inaugurated, I will personally accept such a solution; recommend it to my Government for its approval; and recommend it to the leaders of the opposition as a solution of the immediate political crisis.[106]

Herrera, who was Secretary of War and who had been Acting Secretary of State during Ferrara's absence, had agreed to this arrangement and further offered, if the agreement were implemented, to form a national cabinet representative of all political groups.[107] Sumner Welles calculated that if the constitutional reforms were immediately passed the vice president could be inaugurated not later than February, 1934 and Herrera would then retire from office, turning over the government to a new and impartial vice president agreed upon by all elements, who would hold the national elections of 1934 and govern the country until the next constitutional period, 1935.[108]

President Machado for his part continued his efforts to break the general strike. Although Cubans were losing hope that he would resign, many declared they would hold out in the face of starvation rather than

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[106] Ibid., p. 355 (837.00/3640).

[107] Ibid.

[108] Ibid.

resume their occupations until President Machado left the island.[109] In view of the rapidly worsening strike situation and in view of President Roosevelt's determination that Welles continue in the role of "friendly mediator," the American Ambassador felt his new plan might save the situation and had hopes that even without more pressure the solution would be acceptable to Machado because, as he stated to Washington:

> (1) It permits him to save his face by declaring that he has not accepted the solution proposed by me but of his own initiative appointed one of the members of his Cabinet as head of the ad interim Government to hold office until the Vice-President takes over.
>
> (2) It offers security to President Machado for the lives and property of himself and of the members of his present Government as well as of the members of his family. The fear of assassination is in my judgment the fundamental obstacle to President Machado's refusal to relinquish office under the solution originally proposed.
>
> (3) It offers absolute guarantees to all of the members of the Liberal Party who are afraid of reprisals by the opposition.
>
> (4) It insures the loyal support of the Cuban Army which is unanimously devoted to General Herrera although he is now retired from the Army and thus assures the maintenance of public order during the period entailed.
>
> (5) Some of the opposition factions will protest but the retirement of President Machado and the formation of a national Cabinet giving representation to every element will in a very short period bring acquiescence. The principal leaders of the opposition have unanimously decided to accept this proposal since in their belief it is the only method of obtaining Machado's resignation and of avoiding American intervention which in their opinion Machado is at present determined to force.
>
> (6) From the point of view of the United States government it seems to me a thoroughly satisfactory solution inasmuch as it would be a solution undertaken upon the initiative of the President of Cuba and agreed to by the political parties and the main leaders of the opposition. It is essentially a Cuban solution of the Cuban problem.[110]

Welles stressed that he had great confidence in General Herrera, and added:

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[109] The New York Times, August 11, 1933, p. 1, col. 8.

[110] Foreign Relations, p. 356.

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[109]The New York Times, August 11, 1933, p. 1, col. 8.

[110]Foreign Relations, p. 354.

> In accordance with President Roosevelt's message (to Ambassador Cintas) I shall insist upon prompt action. While the situation remains in general quiet it cannot remain quiet much longer. Any incident might provoke a general explosion.[111]

Sumner Welles never had the chance to see if his new plan would succeed. The general situation had become so bad that on the afternoon of Friday, August 11 the army broke the deadlock.[112]

For some days the younger army officers had apparently been preparing a coup, feeling that they could no longer continue to support Machado in face of the general strike and his refusal to retire. On Friday afternoon they took over the Cabañas fortress in Havana without a contest. They then took control of army headquarters at Castillo de la Fuerza, Havana. Not a shot was fired.[113] Then they summoned General Herrera to tell President Machado that he had forty-eight hours to get out of Cuba. Herrera at first refused to bear the message and was briefly imprisoned.[114] The officers persisted. They told Herrera they felt Machado's course would bring American intervention and that the only hope for a peaceful solution of the problem lay in his immediate retirement. Herrera was ordered to notify the President that the armed forces had guns trained on the Presidential Palace and would attack if he did not leave Cuba within forty-eight hours.[115]

President Machado still refused to capitulate.[116] With General Herrera and other government aides he rushed to Camp Colombia, outside Havana, to face his rebellious army and try to rally loyal officers.

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[111] Ibid.

[112] Herring, "The Downfall of Machado," Current History, XXXIX, pp. 20-24.

[113] Ibid.

[114] The New York Times, August 13, 1933, p. 22, col. 7.

[115] Herring, "The Downfall of Machado," Current History, XXXIX, pp. 20-24.

[116] Ibid.

They refused to support him. One, as spokesman, told him: "'With all due respect, General, you must resign before noon tomorrow.'" When he saw he had no other choice, the President finally gave in: "'All right, my boys, I'll resign.'"[117]

The night of August 11 the President was kept under heavy guard. On Saturday morning he received the resignations of all cabinet members except General Herrera. He signed his own leave of absence, and also signed a letter of resignation to be held in reserve (an outright resignation was not desired, as under the Cuban constitution it would have required a new election within sixty days).[118]

On Saturday afternoon, August 12, an amphibious plane took off from Havana for the Bahamas, with General Machado and four aides aboard. The men left less than one hour before a crowd of angry citizens stormed the airport to try to prevent their escape.[119]

The Cuban people were wildly exultant when they learned the news of Machado's removal.[120] Ambassador Welles was apparently completely taken by surprise when the army moved to depose President Machado, but he approved of the move and immediately went to work to see that a "constitutional" government replaced that of Machado.[121] He did not pretend to take final credit for Machado's capitulation, and informed Washington:

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[117]The New York Times, August 13, 1933, p. 22, col. 7.

[118]Herring, "The Downfall of Machado," Current History, XXXIX, p. 22.

[119]The New York Times, August 13, 1933, p. 1, col. 5. In view of the new plan he had just formulated, Ambassador Welles aided the President and his aides to escape from Havana. He also gave official U.S. guarantees of safety to Machado's family, who left Cuba shortly afterward for the United States.

[120]The New York Times, August 13, 1933, p. 1, col. 5.

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[120]The New York Times, August 13, 1933, p. 1, col. 5.

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The determination of President Machado to act with this patriotism is due to the fact that he was finally and definitely informed...that all of the ranking officers of the Army were unanimous in demanding that he leave the Presidency during the course of today. His action cannot therefore in any sense of the word be described either as the result of pressure by the United States nor as the result of a patriotic gesture on his part.[122]

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[122] Foreign Relations, p. 359 (837.00/3650).

CHAPTER V

THE CESPEDES PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT AND THE SEPTEMBER 4 REVOLUTION

Sumner Welles had not anticipated the army coup which toppled Machado from power. He ceased to be an official mediator once President Machado--to whom he had tendered his good offices--was ousted. However, Welles did not immediately cease his unofficial role of influence and "mediation" in Cuban affairs.

Céspedes as Provisional President

After the army coup had begun, Ambassador Welles quickly met with top army and civilian leaders in an effort to secure the maintenance of constitutional government.[1] In a series of exhaustive conferences which lasted from the afternoon of August 11 until 4 a.m. August 12, he met with army representatives and finally obtained their consent to the ad interim presidency of any Cuban other than Machado, who was to retire immediately.[2] Welles then proceeded to arrange matters as he had planned them before the coup.

Under his guidance arrangements were made whereby all members of President Machado's cabinet would resign except General Herrera, who was

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[1]Historia de la Nación Cubana, VIII, p. 82.

[2]Ibid.; also see Foreign Relations, pp. 358-359 (837.00/3650).

CHAPTER V

THE CARDENAS PRESIDENCY: CONTINUITY

AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF HONESTY

Batista had not anticipated the [illegible] with which Mendieta [illegible] power. He ceased to be an official [illegible] Mendieta--to whom he had tendered his good offices--[illegible]. Batista did not immediately [illegible] "mediation" in Cuban affairs.

Cespedes as Provisional President

After the army coup had begun, Batista [illegible] top army and civilian leaders in an effort to [illegible] constitutional government.[1] In a series of [illegible] lasted from the afternoon of August 11 until 6 a.m. [illegible] army representatives and finally obtained their [illegible] presidency of any Cuban other than Mendieta. [illegible] Batista then proceeded to arrange matters so [illegible] coup.

Under his solemnly [illegible] Batista's cabinet would retain [illegible]

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[1]Historia de la Revolución Cubana, VIII, p. [illegible].

[2]Ibid.; also see Jorge [illegible], pp. [illegible].

to become president.[3] However, at 7 a.m., only three hours after the army leaders had assured Welles that they would accept General Herrera as provisional president, the Ambassador was informed that they had changed their minds. They felt that although they were personally devoted to Herrera, the greater part of the opposition would not accept him as president because of his connections with the Machado government.[4]

Welles saw to it that a substitute was quickly available. At 8 a.m. General Herrera "patriotically" assured the Ambassador that in order to follow constitutional procedures, as soon as Machado's leave of absence had been confirmed by congress he would accept the interim presidency (under the existing Cuban constitution only one of the members of the cabinet could assume the presidency in such a case). Herrera promised Welles that as soon as he became president he would appoint Dr. Carlos Manuel de Céspedes as secretary of state, and immediately thereafter resign in his favor.[5]

Welles was confident that he could see to it that a constitutional provisional government was thus continued, and he predicted to Washington:

> The next few days will probably be difficult but I now have confidence that the situation has been saved and that no further action on the part of the United States government will be necessary.[6]

Later events were to prove him somewhat erroneous in this appraisal.

At that time, however, he could apparently afford to be confident. Late in the evening of August 12, under his unofficial supervision the few members of congress who had not fled or gone into hiding (reportedly only three were available) met in the darkened capitol in Havana and unanimously

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[3]Ibid.; also see The New York Times, August 13, 1933, p. 1, col. 8 and p. 22, col. 7.

[4]Foreign Relations, pp. 358-359.

[5]Ibid.

[6]Ibid., p. 359.

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[4]Ibid.

[5]Ibid., p. 359.

approved President Machado's petition for a leave of absence.[7] They then hurriedly put through a law repealing existing legislation which required that the Cuban Secretary of State be in office thirty days before becoming President pro tem. As he had promised, General Herrera then appointed Céspedes Secretary of State, and immediately resigned in his favor.[8]

Early on August 12 the Cuban people were told that Dr. Carlos Manuel de Céspedes had become Provisional President of Cuba.[9] (He did not actually take the oath of office before the Supreme Court until the morning of August 13).[10] The new Provisional President addressed a message to the Cuban people:

> He asumido la Jefatura Suprema de la Nación por la voluntad de todos los que anhelan Justicia, Paz y Amor para Cuba. Acepté este cargo porque era deber mío prestar mi más efectivo concurso en estos momentos difíciles a la obra de salvar la Patria que se halla en peligro. Mi empeño como Presidente de la República será siempre cumplir con ese deber de sostenerla y esto he de lograrlo manteniendo con dignidad sus libertades e instituciones.
>
> Pido que en mi esfuerzo me ayude el patriotismo de todos los que aman esta tierra. Quiero que ese concurso comience ya, desde este instante, colaborando conmigo todos en el restablecimiento del orden y la normalidad.[11]

Although the general strike and the Cuban Army coup had been directly responsible for President Machado's final decision to step down, as soon as Céspedes was made Provisional President Ambassador Welles immediately received high praise both in Cuba and in the United States. Both Secretary of State Hull and President Roosevelt wired Welles their "warmest

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[7]The New York Times, August 13, 1933, p. 1, col. 8 and p. 22, col. 7; Phillips, Cuban Sideshow, p. 63.

[8]Ibid.

[9]Diario de la Marina, August 13, 1933, p. 1, col. 4.

[10]Ibid.

[11]Ibid., p. 1, col. 3.

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[9]*Diario de la Marina*, August 12, 1933, p. 1, col. 4.

[10]*Ibid.*

[11]*Ibid.*, p. 1, col. 3.

congratulations" and expressed their appreciation for his accomplishments.[12] The American press, while pointing out that Welles had not ordered the general strike nor engineered the revolt of the army, was equally lavish in praising his "success in Cuba."[13]

President Roosevelt immediately made public his satisfaction with events in Cuba, and his particular gratification that the solution had been worked out "solely by the Cubans themselves."[14] He made it plain that the new government had the entire approval of the United States; that it would receive immediate economic aid from the U.S.; that the American government would assist Cuba in reorganizing its internal and external debts; and that his administration was determined to give Cuban sugar more favorable treatment in the United States market.[15] It was further pointed out that the American President was especially pleased that intervention by the U.S. had not been necessary, since it would have created antagonism in other Latin American republics and certainly not have been in accordance with the new "policy of the good neighbor" which he had determined to follow.[16]

The American press claimed that Céspedes had been the emergency choice "of all factions."[17] However, it had been rumored in Cuba for several days prior to the army coup that Dr. Céspedes, a good friend of

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[12]Foreign Relations, p. 360 (837.00/3653a). The praise was somewhat premature, as it turned out.

[13]The New York Times, August 13, 1933, p. 22, col. 1; IV, p. 1, col. 7.

[14]Diario de la Marina, August 14, 1933, p. 1, col. 2; The New York Times, August 13, 1933, p. 1, col. 7. This was in the last analysis undeniably true, since the revolt which brought Machado down had not been engineered by Welles.

[15]Diario de la Marina, August 14, 1933, p. 1, cols. 2-3.

[16]Diario de la Marina, August 13, 1933, p. 4, col. 7.

[17]The New York Times, August 13, 1933, p. 22, col. 7.

congratulations" and expressed their appreciation for his accomplishments.[12] The American press, while pointing out that Welles had not ordered the general strike nor engineered the revolt of the army, was equally lavish in praising his "success in Cuba."[13]

President Roosevelt immediately made public his satisfaction with events in Cuba, and his particular gratification that the solution had been worked out "solely by the Cubans themselves."[14] He made it plain that the new government had the entire approval of the United States; that it would receive immediate economic aid from the U.S.; that the American government would assist Cuba in reorganizing its internal and external debts; and that his administration was determined to give Cuban sugar more favorable treatment in the United States market.[15] It was further pointed out that the American President was especially pleased that intervention by the U.S. had not been necessary, since it would have created antagonism in other Latin American republics and certainly not have been in accordance with the new "policy of the good neighbor" which he had determined to follow.[16]

The American press claimed that Céspedes had been the emergency choice "of all factions."[17] However, it has been rumored in Cuba for several days prior to the army coup that Dr. Céspedes, a good friend of

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[12]Foreign Relations, p. 360 (837.00/3053a). The praise was somewhat premature, as it turned out.

[13]The New York Times, August 13, 1933, p. 22, col. 1; IV, p. 1, col. 7.

[14]Diario de la Marina, August 14, 1933, p. 1, col. 6; The New York Times, August 13, 1933, p. 1, col. 7. This was in the last analysis unfortunately true, since the revolt which brought Machado down had not been engineered by Welles.

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[16]Diario de la Marina, August 13, 1933, p. 4, col. 7.

[17]The New York Times, August 13, 1933, p. 22, col. 7.

Welles, was to become president.[18] There were some who maintained that Céspedes was the "hand-picked" candidate of Ambassador Welles, and by no means the best possible choice.[19] Although he was the son of the famous War of Independence hero, and had served as secretary of state in the Zayas administration and thereafter in numerous diplomatic posts, many felt that he was not strong enough to provide the sort of leadership Cuba needed at such a time.[20] Despite this criticism, it is doubtful whether Welles could have persuaded a stronger candidate to accept the post, since most of the other possibilities wanted to remain eligible for the presidential elections of 1934.[21]

In any event, there was considerable praise of Welles' mediation efforts, chiefly because American intervention had been avoided--that is, no American troops had been landed, and President Roosevelt could safely declare that it had been an essentially Cuban solution of a Cuban problem.[22] However, it began to be immediately evident that the situation was far from stable. The praise of Ambassador Welles' efforts was somewhat premature.

The New Provisional Government

On August 14 President Céspedes announced the formation of his cabinet. Some said the choices had been entirely dictated by Ambassador Welles. To gain the support of as many factions as possible, the cabinet

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[18]Phillips, Cuban Sideshow, p. 62.

[19]Ibid.; also see Historia de la Nación Cubana, VIII, p. 81.

[20]Diario de la Marina, August 14, 1933, p. 7, col. 4; Phillips, Cuban Sideshow, p. 62.

[21]Diario de la Marina, August 14, 1933, for example.

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included representatives of all opposition groups and political parties which had participated in the mediation negotiations, including the important ABC revolutionary group.[23] The members and represented groups were:

Gobernación: Colonel Federico Laredo Bru, Unión Nacionalista
Justicia: Dr. Carlos Saladrigas, ABC
Hacienda: Dr. Joaquín Martínez Saenz, ABC
Obras Públicas: Dr. Eduardo J. Chibas, Liberal (appointment conditional upon his acceptance upon return to Cuba).
Agricultura: Dr. Rafael Santos Jiménez, Marianista
Instrucción Pública: Dr. Guillermo Belt, Unión Nacionalista
Sanidad y Beneficiencia: Dr. Antonio Presno, University of Habana.
Communicaciones: Dr. Nicasio Silverio, O.C.R.R.
Guerra y Marina: Demetrio Castillo Pokorny, non-partisan.
Presidencia: Dr. Raúl Cardenas y Echarte, Conservative[24]

Ambassador Welles reported the choice of the cabinet to Washington with satisfaction, stressing that the entire procedure had been "strictly constitutional" according to his orders from the U.S. Department of State.[25]

Although it had been previously agreed that no official act of U.S. recognition was necessary for a "constitutional" succession, Welles immediately asked for Washington's consent to enter into official relations with the new government:

> In view of the fact that the Government now established is unquestionably constitutional in its formation and that the Cabinet is of a high class representative character, and since the situation demands that the Government receive our official support immediately, I beg to request that I be authorized at once to state that the Embassy has established official relations with it.[26]

His request was quickly granted. In addition, on August 13 President Roosevelt stressed American support by sending a special message of

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[23]Foreign Relations, p. 363 (837.00/3656).

[24]Ibid.; also see Diario de la Marina, August 14, 1933, p. 1, col. 7.

[25]Foreign Relations, p. 359 (837.00/3650).

[26]Ibid., p. 362 (837.00/3649).

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> Sanidad y Beneficencia: Dr. Antonio Freyre, University of Havana.
> Comunicaciones: Dr. Miguelito Silverio, O.C.R.A.
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[22] Foreign Relations, p. 385 (897.00/3888).

[23] Ibid.; also see Diario de la Marina, August 14, 1933, p. 1, col. 1.

[24] Foreign Relations, p. 389 (897.00/3890).

[25] Ibid., p. 387 (897.00/3889).

congratulations to President Céspedes.[27]

At this juncture, Welles apparently felt justified in reporting to Roosevelt:

> Fortunately the solution which has now been elaborated and which I have every confidence will be acceptable to the enormous majority of the Cuban people has been worked out by the Cubans themselves and represents in my judgment the expression of the volition of very nearly the totality of the Cuban people.[28]

He stated that the Cuban Army was "completely loyal" to the Céspedes government, and asked Roosevelt to have the United States do everything necessary "at the earliest moment possible" to tide the new government over financially. He reported that the new administration was completely bankrupt and "suggested" that the United States provide a small loan for emergency use. He also suggested that the U.S. obtain the consent of American bankers to a limited moratorium on the service of the Cuban foreign debt. (He appears to have been fully cognizant of the precarious financial state of the new government, and fully authorized to promise immediate U.S. financial aid, in spite of his deferent "suggestions" to Roosevelt).[29]

However, he was somewhat overoptimistic about the termination of the general strike and the Céspedes government's ability to preserve law and order on the island. He reported to Washington early on August 13 that conditions had "improved very materially," that martial law had been declared and that the military was taking a "very determined attitude" in preserving order.[30] In reality the disorder and rioting very quickly threatened to upset the new government.

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[27]Diario de la Marina, August 14, 1933, p. 1, col. 2; p. 1, col. 7.

[28]Foreign Relations, p. 359 (837.00/3650).

[29]Ibid., pp. 360-361 (837.00/3646).

[30]Ibid.; also see p. 361 (837.00/3649).

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[27] Diario de la Marina, August 14, 1933, p. 1, col. 2; p. 1, col. 7.

[28] Foreign Relations, p. 329 (327.00/2550).

[29] Ibid., pp. 325-327 (837.00/1664).

[30] Ibid.; also see p. 328 (837.00/2552).

A Slow Return to Order

The complete secrecy that had at first surrounded the military coup had caused news of President Machado's fall to filter through the island slowly. Cuban Army headquarters had broadcast the news on the evening of August 11, but the people were skeptical. As soon as they could believe what had happened, the entire populace literally went wild.[31] Throughout August 12 and 13 exultant mobs, all celebrating the fall of Machado, rioted in the streets of Havana. They stormed the Presidential Palace, looted its offices and gardens and smashed windows, while one individual tacked up a "For Rent" sign. Then they sacked and burned the properties of numerous officials and adherents of the fallen regime. They began to hunt down and kill members of the Porra with a vengeance. On the afternoon of August 12, over a thousand soldiers were ordered into Havana with instructions to use "persuasiveness and peaceful methods" in quelling the rioters. They were only partially successful. The crowds quieted somewhat, but continued to run down members of the Porra. Other crowds cheered outside the U.S. Embassy.[32] The new provisional government was hard put to preserve order. The streets were alive with soldiers, but overnight the army had become the friend of Cuba--it had overthrown Machado. The secret ABC revolutionary society came into the open. Oppositionists banded together with the striking public and continued to hunt down and destroy members of the Machado regime, especially the Porra.[33] One author described the scene in Havana:

> It was revenge, but joyful revenge.... The crowd struck at everything with which the name Machado was associated.... The houses of Machado's henchmen were sacked; there were killings and riots. There

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[31] The New York Times, August 13, 1933, p. 1, col. 5.

[32] Ibid.

[33] Herring, "The Downfall of Machado," Current History, XXXIX, pp. 16-17.

> have been shootings and manhunts.... Forty or more Porristas have been rounded up. Ainciart, former chief of police, was tracked down and committed suicide. A score of men, special targets of popular rage, have managed to slip out of the country. There will undoubtedly be swift death for many more who shared in the responsibility for Machado's reign of terror. Student leaders and others freely admit that they will not be content until retribution is meted out to the men who participated in the wanton terrorism of the past eight years....[34]

In spite of all efforts of the provisional government to restore tranquility, the volatile situation continued. Although newspapers were published again beginning August 12 and the telegraph operators had voted to go back to work, the general strike still continued. Ambassador Welles, sensing the dangers to the new government, described the "alarming situation" to Washington and suggested that United States' action was necessary. President Roosevelt first released a plea for order to the Cuban people, and then sent three American warships steaming toward Cuba.[35]

In his statement, released just as the vessels were being sent, President Roosevelt said:

> Latest advices are to the effect that domestic disturbances, including acts of violence, are occurring in some parts of Cuba among certain elements of the population.
>
> In these circumstances, I feel constrained as a matter of special precaution and solely for the purpose of safeguarding and protecting the lives and persons of American citizens in Cuba, to order certain vessels to points on the Cuban Coast.
>
> The change of Government now taking place in Cuba is in entire accord with the recognized Constitution and laws of that country, and no possible question of intervention or of the slightest interference with the internal affairs of Cuba has arisen or is intended by this precautionary step to protect, if necessary, the lives of American citizens, pending the restoration of normal conditions of law and order by the Cuban authorities.
>
> I am giving strict instructions accordingly to the Commanders of each vessel.
>
> The American people deeply sympathize with the people of Cuba in their economic distress, and are praying that quiet and strict order

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[34] Ibid., p. 17.

[35] Munro, pp. 54-55.

> may soon prevail in every part of Cuba. The American Government will lend all aid feasible, through constituted Cuban authorities, for the relief of the distressed people of the island.[36]

In taking this action, President Roosevelt repeatedly emphasized both to the Cuban and American people that armed intervention by the United States in Cuba was "unequivocally forbidden." He later stated: "The vessels were sent to protect American lives, if necessary; but I made it clear that there could not possibly be any intervention by us in the internal affairs of Cuba."[37]

However, in reality there seems to have been some discussion of the possibility of landing American forces.[38] Ambassador Welles finally concluded that there was no need for this, reporting to Washington on August 14 that the ships had arrived but in his judgment there was "no reason now to anticipate any necessity for landing even one man."[39] At the request of President Céspedes, however, Welles did take the commanders of the ships to visit the President in Havana. He apparently felt that the presence of the ships alone, coupled with their visit to Céspedes, would be enough to help restore order on the island. He reported later the same day that he felt confident the visit of the ships had been essential "for its moral effect alone." He anticipated that the general strike would be rapidly broken as a result and the ships could leave within forty-eight hours if conditions became normal.[40]

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[36]Public Papers, II, pp. 322-323.

[37]Ibid., p. 324.

[38]Foreign Relations, p. 363 (837.00/3648).

[39]Ibid.

[40]Ibid. Although other vessels were later sent to the area at Welles' request and the ships were not withdrawn for some weeks, no American forces were landed on Cuban territory. The vessels were ultimately withdrawn without the United States' ever having invaded the island. (See Welles, The Time for Decision, p. 197).

By the evening of August 14 conditions in Havana had become more calm. The U. S. State Department announced that the "most critical stage" of the Cuban revolution had passed. The Department indicated its express approval of the new Céspedes cabinet, which "included representatives of all political parties," and stated that although America had complete confidence in Cuba's ability to settle her own internal affairs, it was believed that widespread violence had been avoided at least in part by the presence of the U.S. destroyers in the Havana harbor.[41]

That same evening the transportation workers agreed to resume work, thereby breaking the general strike.[42] However, the situation was still by no means completely under control. Although the new government set to work immediately in an effort to persuade all strikers to return to work, President Céspedes was unable to gain the support of labor leaders, who insisted that he first meet all the workers' demands.[43]

At this juncture the U.S. State Department, in an apparent move to strengthen the position of the new government and combat any opposition to the manner in which Céspedes had succeeded to office, announced that "after careful study" it had been determined that the change in personnel of the Cuban government had been carried out along thoroughly constitutional lines, and that no question of recognition by the United States of the Céspedes government had even arisen. The Department further stated that the United States took the position that no change in government had taken place, but that new officeholders had merely taken the positions as provided for under the Cuban Constitution.[44]

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[41]The New York Times, August 15, 1933, p. 1, col. 7; August 14, 1933, p. 1, col. 8.

[42]Ibid., p. 1, col. 5.

[43]Ibid.

[44]The New York Times, August 15, 1933, p. 1, col. 7.

In addition, the U.S. State Department unofficially indicated that the United States viewed the Céspedes government as purely provisional, and assumed that it would order new elections in 1934 in accordance with the constitutional reforms recommended by Professor Howard McBain.[45]

President Céspedes then made a personal plea to all Cubans to "put aside the bitter passions of conflict" and work together toward the establishment of peace, order, and economic stability.[46]

The new government was faced with many immediate, pressing problems once the general strike had ended, not the least of which were an empty treasury, a lack of funds because of the failure of the Machado government to collect taxes from the boycotting Cubans during July and August, and the enormous foreign debt Machado had left behind.[47] Another problem was the absence of most of the members of the Cuban Congress. The majority of the opposition leaders who had originally taken part in the mediation negotiations apparently concluded that the new government should carry forward Welles' original reform plans, but the congress presented a special problem since most of the members of both houses were in hiding or had left the island. Welles wanted congress to consider the proposed constitutional reforms almost immediately, but it was impossible to find enough members for a quorum in either house.[48]

Many Cubans had also begun to object to Ambassador Welles' influence on the provisional government. After President Machado left no official statement had ever been made by either the Cuban or the U.S.

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[46] Ibid.

[47] Ibid.

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[46] Ibid.

[47] Ibid.

[48] The New York Times, August 14, 1933, p. 1, col. 8.

governments, and no official press reports regarding the Ambassador's status were ever published. However, Welles still seemed to be carrying out his role as mediator, since he had gone ahead with the mediation plans to provide a substitute for President Machado, and had convinced the new government that it should institute the recommended constitutional reforms and hold elections in 1934.[49] Although nothing was ever either stated or implied by Ambassador Welles himself, and although the opposition at this point made no public references to him personally, it began to be obvious that many Cubans felt the Ambassador had done enough; that he had set out to remove Machado and had done so, but that now the business of governing was up to the Cubans themselves.[50]

Demands for Reform and Reprisal

By August 16 members of the opposition and the Cuban press had openly begun to criticize the proposals of the Céspedes government and the plans for constitutional reform as previously approved in the mediation proceedings. They agitated openly for the immediate abolition of the existing congress on the grounds that the elections under which the members were sent to congress were unconstitutional.[51] Ambassador Welles was quite disturbed, since he felt that it was impractical to carry out such suggestions. If the Cuban Congress was immediately abolished, general congressional elections would have to be held in the immediate future, and Welles felt the country was in no state to stand a national political campaign.[52] He therefore urged acceptance of the same compromise which

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[49]Foreign Relations, pp. 367-368 (711.37/183).

[50]Diario de la Marina, August 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 1963. (There are numerous examples in these issues).

[51]Foreign Relations, p. 364 (837.00/3656).

[52]Ibid.

he had supported in mediation negotiations prior to the overthrow of the Machado government--namely, the retention of the existing congress until the elections of 1934.[53]

Despite his efforts, by August 16 the situation had become more than disquieting. A tremendous wave of public opinion had arisen against the continuation in office of any authorities who had held office under Machado. Many mayors and provincial governors in the island were either forced from office or violently removed.[54] Moreover, there was considerable agitation because the Céspedes government had permitted so many officials of the Machado government to leave the island (in fact, had guaranteed many of them safe conduct). The new Minister of War, Demetrio Castillo Pokorny, finally urged Ambassador Welles to have President Céspedes take immediate action because of the gravity of the situation.[55]

Welles went to President Céspedes and suggested "immediate energetic action" to combat the situation. He suggested that the Cuban president release immediate declarations to the effect that:

> 1. His Government was determined that all of those employees of the prior government who had been guilty of crime or of malfeasance in office should be brought to trial and punishment and that it was his intention that strict justice be done but that his Government would insist upon it that such punishment be administered through legal channels and through the verdict of the courts and could not for one moment permit mobs to take the punishment of guilty officials of the Machado government into their own hands.
>
> 2. The prime requisite in benefit of the Cuban people was the immediate restoration of peace and of normality and of the return to work by the Cubans; that for the time being he demanded a definite truce with regard to the removal from office of unpopular officials of the former government and that as soon as normal conditions had been restored his government would proceed energetically to carry out the will of the people through legal and orderly procedure.[56]

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[53]*Ibid.*, p. 365. [54]*Ibid.* [55]*Ibid.*

[56]*Ibid.*, pp. 365-366 (837.00/3665). The President's declaration to the people even used Welles' exact wording.

President Céspedes obediently complied.[57] But the declarations were by no means as effective as Welles had hoped. Many groups continued to complain of the slow action of the Céspedes government and to clamor for the immediate punishment of all Machado officials and the immediate dissolution of congress.[58] The weakness of the provisional government began to be particularly evident. Welles later described this period under the Céspedes administration:

> The violent termination of any brutal dictatorship, which has for years repressed an entire people and which is held responsible for the suffering and misery of thousands of families, gives rise inevitably, as history has shown, to excesses of the gravest character, particularly so, when economic distress is acute. These excesses occurred in Cuba during the latter part of August. Vengeance was wreaked upon Machado's secret police and upon the properties of those members of his administration who were held primarily responsible for the atrocities of his government. Unemployment, starvation, poverty, existed on an unprecedented scale in every section of Cuba, and the liberties which the Cuban people had now regained threatened to degenerate into license.
>
> The Céspedes government strove to correct abuses, to make effective a liberal policy of administrative reorganization for the purpose of holding national elections with the utmost rapidity to permit the people once more to be represented by a government of their own choosing after a new constitution had been adopted. But it could not move rapidly enough to accomplish the miracles which the poor and destitute, as well as the politically ambitious, demanded.[59]

In the face of growing criticism of the Céspedes provisional government (and, indirectly, of Welles) the American Ambassador counted rather heavily on the influence and support of the respected ABC revolutionary organization. Although some of the organized political groups had originally protested against its inclusion in the government, it became one of the strongest supports of the new administration. Ambassador Welles felt:

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[57] Diario de la Marina, August 16, 1933, p. 3, col. 1.

[58] Ibid., p. 3, col. 6.

[59] Welles, Series No. 7, pp. 8-9.

> The A.B.C. has a definite program and a definite purpose. This program is radical in character but includes two salient features--social reconstruction and honesty in administration with punishment by law of those guilty of malfeasance in office. If these two ideals can be carried into effect now or later nothing could be more salutary for the Republic of Cuba.[60]

The ABC exerted a good deal of constructive effort, and accomplished a good deal by persuading the Cuban people to return to work and restore the island to a normal state.[61] Even this group could not persuade some of the factions, however, and many Cubans continued to agitate for faster, more sweeping reforms.[62]

The student groups and some of the returning exiles--notably General Menocal--were among those who criticized the Céspedes government most loudly. Ambassador Welles was especially incensed at the student resistance to his plans and at their attitude toward the new government. He reported to Washington:

> The exiles who are now returning from the United States are unfortunately doing a great deal to increase agitation. They are taking the attitude that a triumphant revolution has placed the Government in power and that they are consequently entitled to dictate the policies of the Government. Furthermore, the student group which is the most pernicious element in Cuban public life is constantly issuing inflammatory proclammations and making speeches of the same character over the radio. The representation of the A.B.C. in the government fortunately will make it possible for the A.B.C. to place itself squarely against the student activities and through the extraordinary organization which it possesses probably to dominate them but at the present moment both the Government, the Army, and the organized political parties or groups of public opinion are all equally afraid of making themselves unpopular and consequently the strong action which is needed to dominate and control the utterly lawless student groups is lacking.[63]

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[60]Foreign Relations, p. 364. (837.00/3656).

[61]The New York Times, August 16, 1933, p. 1, col. 4.

[62]Diario de la Marina, August 17, 1933, p. 1, col. 5.

[63]Foreign Relations, pp. 366-367 (837.00/3665).

In order to make U.S. approval of the new government unequivocal, it was announced that official greetings had been exchanged between Presidents Roosevelt and Céspedes.[64] The U.S. State Department also let it be known that it expected the plans for constitutional reform (as worked out under the Welles' mediation) to be carried out, and made announcements to the effect that the detailed changes in the electoral code would be put into effect as soon as was feasible.[65] Then on August 17 President Roosevelt announced the formal initiation of conferences between Ambassador Welles and President Céspedes for complete rehabilitation of the Cuban economy, and pointedly suggested that he had high hopes for rapid action on the part of Cuba to readjust to the new order of things.[66]

By this time most of the outstanding Cuban leaders had returned from exile.[67] Many of them were violently opposed to further political "mediation."[68] One university group even stated that it felt the mediation negotiations had "changed character" and ought to be reorganized into a national assembly to determine the future government of the republic.[69] The demands for abolition of the congress and the immediate punishment of all remaining Machado officials grew more numerous as time passed.[70]

To this time Welles had not commented on his role in Cuban affairs after Machado's fall. Nor had any factions in Cuba publicly stated that his work was over. However, now many Cubans began to state openly that they felt his role as mediator was over, and accused him of exerting too

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[64]The New York Times, August 16, 1933, p. 8, col. 1.

[65]Ibid.

[66]Diario de la Marina, August 17, 1933, p. 1, col. 7.

[67]The New York Times, August 17, 1933, p. 1, col. 3.

[68]The New York Times, August 18, 1933, p. 7, col. 1.

[69]Diario de la Marina, August 18, 1933, p. 1, col. 2.

[70]Foreign Relations, pp. 367-368 (711.37/183).

much influence on the provisional government.[71] Welles took sufficient cognizance of this mood to suggest to Washington that Jefferson Caffery be sent to Cuba immediately to replace him, and that he himself be allowed to leave the island by September 1. For one thing, he wished to return to Washington and prepare for his planned role in the forthcoming Seventh Pan American Conference scheduled for Montevideo in December, 1933. Apparently he also felt that his personal offices were no longer as useful as before, and admitted that his position with respect to the new Cuban government had become somewhat vulnerable.[72] It is interesting to note Welles' somewhat guarded evaluation of his own position to Washington, his optimistic pride in the provisional government, and his frank comments regarding U.S.-Cuban economic relations. He cabled detailed justifications and recommendations to Washington, and concluded that in essence his task had been accomplished:

> After considerable reflection I feel that in the best interests of our own Government I should be recalled and Caffery appointed to replace me, such change to take place not later than the first of September. My reasons for this belief are as follows:
>
> 1. The Cuban people have a Government which commands their confidence. This Government is composed of capable and high-minded men who are seeking the best interests of the Republic. It seems unlikely that any grave political disturbances will take place in the near future unless unexpected events materialize.
>
> 2. This Government has for its program preparation through the passage of a new electoral code based upon McBain's recommendations... which will make it possible for a permanent constitutional government to be installed and in the meantime in frank cooperation with the United States to take all possible steps to hasten the return of economic prosperity....
>
> 3. ...I think that I should be instructed...to continue the commercial treaty negotiations so that it will be at once apparent that the nature of my mission was as much to improve the economic conditions of Cuba as to assist in bringing about a restoration of political

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[71] Ibid., pp. 367-368.

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[71] Ibid., pp. 357-358.

[72] Ibid.

peace. My successor can of course push negotiations to a conclusion.

4. My personal situation is becoming increasingly difficult. Owing to my intimate personal friendship with President Céspedes and the very close relationship which I have formed during these past months with all of the members of this Cabinet I am now daily being requested for decisions on all matters affecting the Government of Cuba. These decisions range from questions of domestic policy and matters affecting the discipline of the Army to questions involving appointments in all branches of the government.... There will very soon commence to be a large party of disgruntled office seekers who, added to the sincere opponents of American influence in Cuba and to the old-time political leaders...will constitute a very considerable mass of public opinion and who will inevitably utilize the relations which I have with the Government as a means of political attack.[73]

In my judgment the policy which this Embassy should from now on pursue is a policy which should have no connection whatever except in the event of urgent necessity with the political picture and which should limit itself to cooperating in the elaboration of constructive measures in benefit of the economic prosperity of Cuba and in benefit of American exports to the Cuban market.

5. If all goes well I should judge that the proper moment to make a change in the Embassy here should be September 1st. If as I hope the President still wishes me to return to the Department and desires me to cooperate in preparing for the Montevideo Conference I would like to suggest that if my recommendations are approved the announcement be now made that I am returning to the Assistant Secretaryship of State for that purpose and that Caffery has been designated as my successor here in order to complete with the greatest rapidity possible the negotiation of those economic and financial measures upon which both Governments may determine as of mutual benefit to our two countries.

I feel that the recommendations I have made...are in the interest of my Government. It is unwise not only from the point of view of our relations with Cuba but with the whole of Latin America as well for the American Embassy here to possess the measure of control over the Government which it now does possess owing to the peculiar developments of the past 2 months. Caffery unquestionably will obtain all of the needed influence immediately after his arrival but it will be an influence exerted behind the scenes and not apparent to the public.[74]

President Roosevelt was extremely pleased that (in Welles' opinion) political conditions had sufficiently improved to permit him to return in time to prepare for the Montevideo conference, but still wished the Ambassador to remain in Cuba until September 15. Although he did not

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[73]Welles did not report the situation quite accurately in this respect. Criticism of his role in relation to the new government had already begun.

[74]Foreign Relations, pp. 367-369.

make public the plans to send Welles to Montevideo, President Roosevelt approved of the Ambassador's suggestions regarding the Cuban economic situation and the role of the U.S. in Cuban politics. Statements were released to the effect that Caffery would soon succeed Ambassador Welles in Cuba; that Welles would return to Washington shortly; that the Roosevelt administration intended to work to immediately restore normal commercial relations with Cuba and accelerate the economic rehabilitation of the new republic; and that Ambassador Welles would resume negotiations for a new reciprocal trade agreement with the Cuban government "as soon as order is sufficiently established."[75]

President Céspedes in turn addressed a radio message to the American people stressing the necessity of joint U.S. and Cuban work for the economic reconstruction of the island, and praising the work of Ambassador Welles.[76]

The American press announced that Ambassador Welles would soon be returning to the United States and his former position in the State Department, stressing that the new provisional government in Cuba would have welcomed a longer stay by the mediator but that his "important work as Assistant Secretary of State" called him back to Washington.[77] There was more public praise of the work Welles had done in Cuba, as for example:

> "...throughout the entire delicate and difficult negotiations Ambassador Welles showed himself not only a competent diplomat but a friend of the Cuban people."[78]

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[75]The New York Times, August 19, 1933, p. 4, col. 4; Diario de La Marina, August 19, 1933, p. 1.

[76]The New York Times, August 20, 1933, p. 6, col. 3.

[77]The New York Times, August 21, 1933, p. 12, col. 2.

[78]Ibid.

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The general impression given in the United States was that Ambassador Welles' mediation had been a success, and that, his work finished, he was returning to Washington.

The Return to the 1901 Constitution

The situation in the island did not improve, however, as rapidly as Welles had predicted. By August 21 all of the popular exiled leaders had returned to Cuba except Miguel Mariano Gómez, and criticism of the Céspedes government increased. There were growing demands for abolishing congress and removing all Machado officials from even local government posts, and for changes in the provisional government itself.[79] Ambassador Welles was increasingly annoyed by this. He reported:

> A determined effort is being made now by certain...leaders in conjunction with the extreme radicals to transform the present Government of Cuba into a purely revolutionary de facto government. It is their announced intention to abolish the Congress and the existing judiciary and to remove all local, provincial and municipal officials throughout the Republic in order to replace them with their own henchmen. During the past 3 days I have repeatedly emphasized in all of my conversations with these leaders and with the leaders of the groups and parties represented in the present Government that only through the maintenance of a constitutional form of government in Cuba until the next national elections would it be possible for the Government to make effective the urgent measures required to improve economic conditions here.... Furthermore, I have made it clear that a de facto government...would not, in my judgment, be able to retain the support and the confidence of the people for any protracted period owing to the unstable conditions which obtain in Cuba and that insistence upon a revolutionary de facto form of government would in all likelihood result in general chaos.[80]

Welles did his best to protect the provisional government, intimating that an extra-constitutional regime could not expect U.S. recognition, and linking American economic assistance to support of the Céspedes government.[81]

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[79] The New York Times, August 23, 1933, p. 11, col. 2; Foreign Relations, p. 369 (837.00/3694).

[80] Ibid., p. 370.

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Despite such pressure, the situation grew worse. The Céspedes government obviously lacked the support of all groups and it grew weaker as attacks were made on it from many sides. By August 24 Ambassador Welles felt some sort of action was necessary:

> I am rapidly coming to the conclusion that my original hope that the present Government of Cuba could govern as a constitutional government for the remainder of the term for which General Machado had himself elected must be abandoned. If the solid and unwavering support of the Army could be counted on, and if the groups and parties represented in the present Government were unanimous in their support of the administration, it might be possible for the existing Government to maintain itself, pass the necessary legislation of all kinds required, and hold the general national elections in November 1934 as originally anticipated. As a matter of fact, however, a general process of disintegration is going on....[82]

He feared the Céspedes government was now incapable of enforcing public order and could not count on the needed support of the armed forces. He also felt, especially after pressures from American businessmen in the island, that further labor disturbances might result in much destruction of property and loss of life.[83]

Consequently he completely reversed himself, and decided that the 1928 constitution would have to be abandoned and congress would, after all, have to be dissolved. It was in fact acceding to the demands of the opposition factions which he had been very much against, but he seems to have felt that such change was necessary in the interests of the provisional government and would be acceptable as long as he could maintain the fiction that the changes were constitutional.[84] He reasoned:

> ...if conditions such as this continue a general state of chaos here is inevitable.... The only alternative to such a result that I can now see is for the program of the present Government to be modified

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[82] Ibid., p. 371 (837.00/3706).

[83] Ibid.; also see pp. 376-378 (837.00/3739).

[84] Ibid.

in order that general elections may be held approximately 3 months from now so that Cuba may once more have a constitutional government in the real sense of the word.... In order to accomplish this the Supreme Court will have to declare that the existing constitution under which General Machado was reelected is unconstitutional in that the constitution of 1928 came into being through illegal and unconstitutional methods as the result of which the country would once more be governed by the original constitution of 1901. I have every reason to believe that the Supreme Court will so hold. Once such a decision is rendered the existing Congress, to which public hostility is so intense that I doubt if it could meet even with military protection, would be ipso facto abolished. The President would then by decree convoke national elections to be held 3 months from such date and at the same time issue a decree declaring that the electoral law under which such elections would be held would be the Crowder code of 1919 as amended by the recommendations formulated by Professor McBain.... The parties...would then be afforded the opportunity of organizing and presenting their lists of candidates and the entire Government, executive and legislative, would be replaced as the result of such elections. After the installation of such government a constitutional convention would be called to adopt the constitutional reforms agreed upon during the mediation proceedings....

Conditions in the country of course are not ripe for general elections. I have likewise every reason to believe that during the electoral period, if the above program is carried out, disturbances will take place in many parts of the Republic. I feel, however, that a change in the policy which I had originally hoped to carry out is inevitable. I do not believe that the present Government can maintain itself in power for an indefinite period and I think that nothing would be more likely to prevent a further attempt at revolution than the prospect of elections in the near future. A solution of this character has the added advantage that it offers the hope of a constitutional and stable government in the near future rather than in the remote future and furthermore that negotiations for the commercial treaty can continue with the authorities now in power and that the individuals taking part in the next constitutional government will undoubtedly be willing to ratify beforehand any measures of financial relief that we may decide to suggest to the existing Government of Cuba.[85]

Under this new arrangement plans for constitutional reform were maintained, and fair elections were to be held even sooner than had been promised. President Céspedes' position at this point was a peculiar one, to say the least. Up to this time he was ostensibly the constitutional replacement of President Machado. In abrogating the 1928 constitution, Machado's second term would become illegal, and the provisional presidency

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[85] Ibid., pp. 371-372 (837.00/3706).

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Under this new arrangement plans for constitutional reform were maintained, and fair elections were to be held even sooner than had been promised. President Grau's position at this point was a peculiar one, to say the least. He to this time he was defending the constitutional replacement of President Machado. In supporting the 1928 constitution, Machado's second term would become illegal, and the provisional presidency

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[85] Ibid., pp. 371-372 (emphasis mine).

of Céspedes of questionable authority. However, Ambassador Welles proceeded to put his new plan into effect without delay.

He consulted with President Céspedes and members of his government, with opposition leaders including the newly-returned Colonels Mendieta and Méndez Peñate, with Dr. Cosme de la Torriente, General Menocal, and leaders of the ABC. He requested that they obtain the support of the members of their various groups for the new plan, stressing that he felt it was the only one which offered a "reasonably safe outcome for Cuba under present conditions."[86]

By the evening of August 24 President Céspedes had agreed to act, and by 4 a.m. the following morning he had his decree ready.[87] Later that day (August 25) the decree was made public.[88] Since most of the members of the Supreme Court had by that time either resigned, left the country, or were considered illegally-appointed members of the former Machado government, Welles decided that the provisional government should take it upon itself to abolish the constitution. Accordingly, President Céspedes declared the 1928 constitutional amendments illegal, and revoked them. He decreed:

> ...with the object of reestablishing constitutional legality and restoring tranquility to the country, interpreting the popular will which is clearly manifested at this time throughout the country, conscious of the national conventionalities and of the transcendency of the measures I am adopting, with my thoughts placed on the founders of the nation and on the welfare of the Republic, and having heard the opinion of my Cabinet, I proceed to issue the following decree:

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[86] Ibid., p. 373. (837.00/0716).

[87] Ibid., p. 375. (The influence of Ambassador Welles was readily evident. His mediation efforts were even mentioned as one of the reasons for abandoning the 1928 constitution.)

[88] Ibid., pp. 374-375.

1st. The text of the constitution of 1901 is reestablished in its full force and effect and consequently the constitutional amendment promulgated on May 11th, 1928, remains null and without any value or effect.

2nd. Therefore, the mandate attributed to citizen Gerardo Machado y Morales as President of the Republic is hereby terminated.

3rd. The present Congress is declared dissolved and as a consequence the mandates of the Senators and Representatives as well as the rights of their substitutes to take their places are terminated.

4th. The offices of Justices of the Supreme Court filled after May 20th, 1929, are hereby declared vacant.

5th. The mandates of all the other officials of popular election are hereby declared at an end, nevertheless, those holding such offices at the present time shall remain in the discharge thereof until the Government shall order what it deems proper in each case.

6th. On February 24th, 1934, general elections shall be held for the filling of all offices which have their origin in popular suffrage, the new Presidential term of office to be inaugurated on May 20th of that year.

7th. An advisory commission shall be created charged with the proposing of the modifications considered indispensable to carry into effect the measures contained in this decree, and the recommendations of the said commission once approved in whole or in part shall be promulgated by the Executive.

8th. The Government shall respect and give fulfillment to all international obligations contracted in the name of the Republic even though they may be dated after May 20th, 1929.

9th. All of the Secretaries of the Cabinet are entrusted with the fulfillment of this decree insofar as it may be pertinent to each of them.[89]

In spite of the weakness of the provisional government, Welles had insisted that all foreign debts be honored. He reported to Washington:

> The eighth clause of the said decree which specifically announces the intention of the Government to comply with all of the international obligations entered into by the Cuban Government from May 20, 1929 until the present date should relieve anxiety on the part of American banks which have made loans or extended credits to the Cuban Government during that period.[90]

He apparently felt that the rather extraordinary decrees issued by President Céspedes would be accepted by most of the Cuban people as further "constitutional" change.[91]

At first it seemed that the move would be met favorably by many opposition factions. There were a number, in fact, who congratulated

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President Céspedes on his wise action in dissolving congress.[92]

On August 27 Welles made a much-publicized visit to President Céspedes to tell the Cuban executive of the planned arrival of his replacement, Jefferson Caffery. Later the Ambassador made a rare public statement telling the Cuban people that his successor had been accepted by President Céspedes and was due to arrive shortly.[93] That same day he announced to the foreign correspondents in Havana that mediation was at an end.[94]

The American press interpreted this to mean that he was satisfied with the new government's efforts, and felt that economic and political affairs in the island would soon be straightened out.[95] The more conservative sections of the Cuban press lauded the American Ambassador for having "triumphed in his mission" and especially for having demonstrated that he was such a good friend of Cuba.[96] President Céspedes announced that Welles would be decorated with the Grand Cross of the Order of Independence Leader Carlos Manuel de Céspedes--the highest distinction the government could confer--for his "'meritorious service to the Republic.'"[97] Much publicity was also given to plans for immediate U.S. financial aid to Cuba, and to the fact that Jefferson Caffery would bring with him a special financial commission which would undertake the completion of formal negotiations for a new commercial treaty.[98] Apparently Welles felt he had

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[92]Diario de la Marina, August 28, 1933, p. 8, col. 3.

[93]Ibid., p. 3, col. 7.

[94]The New York Times, August 27, 1933, p. 10, col. 1.

[95]Ibid.

[96]Diario de la Marina, August 21, 1933, p. 1, col. 4; August 27, 1933, p. 1, col. 1.

[97]The New York Times, September 1, 1933, p. 7, col. 2.

[98]Diario de la Marina, August 27, 1933, p. 1, col. 7.

indeed saved the situation--or at least the provisional government.

But by August 28 many factions including the ABC had declared their dissatisfaction with the return to the 1901 constitution, and questioned the legality of the decrees of President Céspedes. The ABC went so far as to threaten withdrawal of its support from the provisional government if the latter did not carry out its revolutionary program.[99] There was increasing dissatisfaction with the provisional government, in spite of its decision to return to the 1901 constitution and dissolve congress.[100] On September 4 the final blow fell.

The September 4th Revolution

The revolution of September 4, 1933 has become famous in Cuban history. It is necessary here only to recount the essential events which led to the overthrow of the Céspedes government and dealt a final blow to the mediation efforts of Ambassador Sumner Welles.

The end of the Céspedes regime came unexpectedly at the hands of the non-commissioned officers and enlisted men of the army. On September 4, Sergeant Fulgencio Batista led a revolution from the ranks. Just as their superior officers had done three weeks before, the sergeants took command of Camp Colombia and then of Cabañas and Castillo de la Fuerza posts in a bloodless coup.[101]

The rebellion broke out while President Céspedes was absent from the capital on a visit to the regions in the north of Cuba which had been

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[99] Diario de la Marina, August 29, 1933, p. 1, col. 2.

[100] See Diario de la Marina, August 26, 27, 28, 30 and September 1, 2, 1933.

[101] Hubert Herring, "Can Cuba Save Herself?", Current History, XXXIX (November, 1933), p. 151.

devastated by a severe cyclone. Led by Batista, the revolution had begun as a sort of mutiny of the non-commissioned officers and enlisted men, apparently because of non-payment of wages and dissatisfaction with their superior officers for having collaborated with the Machado government.[102] At the last moment the leaders of the coup were joined by the students and the Directorio Estudiantil and by so-called "left wing" professors from the University of Havana, including Dr. Ramón Grau San Martín. A revolutionary junta of five men assumed the power of the chief executive. Sergeant Batista assumed the title of Revolutionary Chief of the Armed Forces of the Republic. The officers were displaced by their sergeants, and the government of Cespédes was at an end.[103]

The revolutionary junta was composed of five prominent Cubans. It included Dr. Ramón Grau San Martín and Dr. Guillermo Portela, professors of the University of Havana; Porfirio Franca, a wealthy property owner; Sergio Carbó, journalist and newspaper publisher; and José M. Irizarri, a Havana lawyer. Upon its formation the new junta immediately pledged to carry out a true social revolution for the benefit of all Cuba.[104]

President Céspedes was the last to be notified of the revolution. The five-man revolutionary junta, headed by Dr. Grau San Martín, called upon him late in the evening of September 4 to inform him that a new revolutionary government had been proclaimed, and to deliver an ultimatum calling for his resignation. Dr. Céspedes was astounded. Only a few

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[102] The New York Times, September 6, 1933, p. 1, col. 1; also see Welles, Series No. 7, pp. 8-10.

[103] Ibid.; Herring, "Can Cuba Save Herself?", Current History, XXXIX, p. 151.

[104] The New York Times, September 6, 1933, p. 3, col. 1.

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[102]The New York Times, September 6, 1933, p. 1, col. 1; Alex Wallau, Series No. 7, pp. 8-10.

[103]Ibid.; Morring, "Can Cuba Save Herself", Current History, XXXIX, p. 191.

[104]The New York Times, September 6, 1933, p. 2, col. 1.

days before he had announced that all was tranquil, and that the country was solidly behind the government.[105] "'Really, gentlemen,'" he asked, "'what is it you want?'" "'Your resignation,'" came the firm reply. President Céspedes countered by affirming his revolutionary faith, his desire to serve Cuba, but the junta would not give in.[106] Finally at 12:30 a.m. Céspedes shook hands with the members of the junta and left the palace. He did not submit a formal resignation as demanded by the junta, apparently in the hope that his government could somehow be saved, but he acknowledged that he understood the significance of the turn of events with a brief statement:

> "I have fulfilled faithfully the revolutionary program of the people. It is time for others to assume the burden of government. The responsibility will be theirs before history."[107]

The revolution had also taken Ambassador Welles completely by surprise. He had apparently been warned of an impending uprising in the armed forces some days before, but had dismissed the warning as rumor.[108]

After he learned the news of the uprising and before President Céspedes had returned to Havana, Welles made an attempt to try to meet with the President and head off his resignation. He also attempted to marshall important opposition leaders behind Céspedes in an effort to thwart the revolution, which he called a "mutiny."[109] However, before he could intercept President Céspedes the latter had returned to the

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[105]The New York Times, September 6, 1933, p. 1, col. 1; Herring, "Can Cuba Save Herself?", Current History, XXXIX, p. 151.

[106]The New York Times, September 6, 1933, p. 3, col. 6; also see Rodríguez Morejón, pp. 56-58.

[107]Ibid.

[108]Phillips, Cuban Sideshow, p. 101.

[109]Foreign Relations, pp. 383-385 (837.00/3750, 837.00/3751, and 837.00/3752).

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[illegible] The New York Times, [illegible]

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[illegible] The New York Times, [illegible]

Rodriguez Morales, op. [illegible]

[illegible] Ibid.

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The Aftermath

On August 27 Sumner Welles had announced that his mediation in Cuba was ended. With the fall of the Céspedes provisional government on September 5, his mediation efforts received a final blow--they were indeed over. The influence of Ambassador Welles in Cuba was by no means at an end, however. Although his actions during the rest of 1933, the year of revolution, are not within the scope of this thesis, it is of interest to review briefly his continuing influence and the ultimate results of his ambassadorship in Cuba.

Only two days after the September 4 coup took place, Welles met with members of the Céspedes cabinet and representatives of some portions of the armed forces in an effort to unseat the revolutionary junta. After certain proposals made to him by Cuban leaders, Welles asked Washington for permission to send ships to the island and land U.S. troops in Havana, stating that he felt sure the revolutionary government would be turned out in a few days and that this would be the only way to maintain order until the officers could once again take control of the army.[111]

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[110] Historia de la Nación Cubana, VIII, p. 82.

[111] Foreign Relations, pp. 384-386 (837.00/3757, 837.00/3764, 837.00/3756).

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[110] Historia de la Nación Cubana, VIII, p. 83.

[111] Foreign Relations, pp. 348-350 (837.00/3757, 837.00/3756, 837.00/3758).

Permission was quickly refused on the basis that such an action would constitute intervention by the United States.[112]

Welles persisted, however. Late on September 7 he was approached by Dr. Horacio Ferrer, Secretary of War in the Céspedes cabinet, who proposed to Welles that the Céspedes government be returned to power with the help of the United States. Ferrer assured Welles he had convinced the sergeants that they had been "deceived in participating in the mutiny," and stated he was confident that within a very brief period the revolutionary regime could be overthrown.[113] Ambassador Welles informed Washington that since Céspedes had not legally resigned but had given way in the face of a mutiny, it would be in the best interest of the United States to support his return to power. He once more asked Washington to land American troops--ostensibly to keep public order in the face of mutiny.[114] Later on September 7 he followed his request with another cable erroneously informing Washington that the revolutionary junta would turn over the government to President Céspedes at 10 p.m. that same evening.[115]

His request for U.S. intervention was again refused. President Roosevelt wired him:

> We feel very strongly that any promise, implied or otherwise, relating to what the United States will do under any circumstances is impossible; that it would be regarded as a breach of neutrality, as favoring one faction out of many, as attempting to set up a government which would be regarded by the whole world and especially throughout Latin America, as a creation and creature of the American government.[116]

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[112] Ibid., pp. 390-391 (837.00/3767).

[113] Ibid., pp. 396-397 (837.00/3778).

[114] Ibid., pp. 397-398. (Such an action was to entail the landing of a considerable force at Havana and lesser forces throughout the entire island, as Welles planned it.)

[115] Ibid., p. 403 (837.00/3781).

[116] Ibid.

In spite of this reaction, on September 8 Welles once more requested the U.S. government to aid in restoring the Céspedes regime, this time by "temporarily affording them the moral assistance a small number of Marines would create."[117] He was told in no uncertain terms that the proposal was not acceptable; that under Roosevelt's plan the United States would resort to "everything possible" to avoid intervention.[118]

At this Welles abandoned his attempts to reinstate the Céspedes government with the help of U.S. military reinforcements, but he did not cease to combat the revolutionary regime. One writer described his attitude:

> Ambassador Welles surveyed the wreck of his political "solution" and promptly branded the new regime as "ultra-radical" with "frankly communistic" theories.[119]

Welles' efforts were such that on September 10 the revolutionary junta decided to disband and designate Dr. Grau San Martín as de facto provisional president of the republic. This move was designed to combat the popular hostility to the "commission form" of executive government. It was also made in the hope of appeasing Ambassador Welles and securing U.S. recognition.[120]

This was not the case. Sumner Welles saw to it that during the entire period of the Grau San Martín revolutionary government--it lasted until January 15, 1934--the much-needed recognition by the United States

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[117] Ibid., pp. 405-407 (837.00/3798).

[118] Ibid., p. 413 (837.00/3940); The New York Times, September 6, 1933, p. 1, col. 2.

[119] Smith, p. 149.

[120] Foreign Relations, pp. 416-417 (837.00/3803).

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was withheld.[121] At his urging, recognition was withheld on the grounds that the government of the United States would welcome the creation of any government in Cuba which was representative of the will of the Cuban people and which was capable of maintaining order, but that these conditions did not exist under the Grau San Martín government.[122] He continually predicted the fall of the revolutionary government, and the Cuban people daily feared intervention by the United States.[123]

From reading of State Department correspondence during this period, it appears that Sumner Welles continued his efforts to unseat the revolutionary government primarily because the latter had replaced the provisional government of Céspedes, which the Ambassador himself had helped to set up and which had earned him such praise for his mediation efforts.[124] His actions brought numerous charges of American interference and intervention.[125] There was unfavorable comparison of his efforts to aid the Céspedes government both financially and with immediate U.S. recognition, and his determination to see that the Grau San Martín government got neither.

Ambassador Welles remained in Cuba until December of 1933, when he was recalled by President Roosevelt.[126] He had become the object of increasingly bitter attacks from the supporters of the revolutionary government, and he was especially attacked and ridiculed by the university

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[121]Fitzgibbon, p. 199.

[122]Foreign Relations, p. 453 (837.00/3982).

[123]The New York Times, September 16, 1933, p. 3, col. 7.

[124]Foreign Relations, pp. 384-586.

[125]The New York Times, September 16, 1933, p. 3, col. 7.

[126]The New York Times, November 24, 1934, p. 1, col. 1; p. 5, col. 1.

students.[127] Many Cubans came to feel that the Ambassador was guilty of trying to undermine the new revolutionary government and thus impeding the genuine social revolution which they felt it represented.[128] (Dr. Grau San Martín later stated flatly that his government fell because Welles would not recommend the recognition of a government which was not of his own manufacture.)[129] When Summer Welles finally left the island, it was hardly with the feeling of admiration and support for a "job well done" that the Cuban people had accorded him earlier.[130] Even President Roosevelt later stated that Welles' mediation efforts had been a failure.[131]

Ambassador Welles was not even able to return to Washington in time to prepare for participation in the Montevideo conference.[132] The conference itself was considered by the Roosevelt administration as a triumph of the Good Neighbor policy and a successful demonstration of this new policy of non-intervention in Cuba.[133] However, the Cuban delegation--appointed by the Grau San Martín government--provided an embarrassing moment for the United States when it succeeded in having the delegates to the conference sign a Convention of the Rights and Duties of

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[127] The New York Times, November 24, 1933, p. 2, col. 3; November 20, 1933, p. 1, col. 6; November 23, 1933, p. 8, col. 4. Also see Hubert Herring, "Another Chance for Cuba," Current History, XXXIX (March, 1934), pp. 656-660.

[128] Ibid.; The New York Times, November 19, 1933, p. 2, col. 1; Diario de la Marina, October 31, 1933, p. 2, col. 6.

[129] The New York Times, May 30, 1934, p. 26, col. 1.

[130] See Diario de la Marina, issues of December, 1933.

[131] Public Papers, II, pp. 263-264.

[132] Welles, The Time for Decision, pp. 199-200; Guerant, pp. 6-7.

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[128] Ibid.; The New York Times, November 12, 1933, p. 4, col. 1; Diario de la Marina, October 31, 1933, p. 2, col. 5.

[129] The New York Times, May 30, 1934, p. 26, col. 1.

[130] See Diario de la Marina, January of December, 1933.

[131] Public Papers, II, pp. 325-326.

[132] Welles, The Time for Decision, pp. 199-200; Gaston, pp. 6-7.

[133] Ibid.

States indirectly condemning the United States' non-recognition of the Grau government as a form of indirect intervention in Cuba.[134]

Upon his return to the United States in December of 1933, Welles resumed his duties as Assistant Secretary of State.[135] On January 15 he saw the Grau San Martín regime ousted by the army--again led by Batista--and ultimately saw Colonel Carlos Mendieta made Provisional President of Cuba. Within four days the Roosevelt administration had decided that the new government merited recognition, and on January 23, 1934 the United States extended "formal and cordial recognition" to the new government of Cuba.[136]

On the same day Sumner Welles, in his capacity as Assistant Secretary of State, announced U.S. plans to stabilize the Cuban economy and strengthen the position of the new Mendieta government. Welles publicly promised rapid work on four measures to help the new government: A fair sugar quota, a new commercial treaty, the stimulation of trade through a new Export and Important Bank, and a modification of the permanent treaty between the United States and Cuba.[137]

These measures for the support of the Mendieta government and the improvement of Cuban-American relations were rapidly carried out under the direction of the former Ambassador to Cuba. On May 29, 1934, the final step was taken. President Roosevelt signed a new treaty with Cuba

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[134] Diario de la Marina, December 12, 1933, p. 1, col. 2; Historia de la Nación Cubana, VIII, p. 82.

[135] Fitzgibbon, p. 199.

[136] Smith, pp. 156-157; Public Papers, III, p. 501.

[137] Stuart, pp. 226-227; Welles, Series No. 7, pp. 13-16.

which abrogated the famous Platt Amendment and established an entire new basis for U.S. relations with Cuba.[138] He stated:

> By the consummation of this treaty, this Government will make it clear that it not only opposes the policy of armed intervention, but that it renounces those rights of intervention and interference in Cuba which have been bestowed upon it by treaty.[139]

An era of official and unofficial intervention had ended in Cuba.

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[138]Fitzgibbon, pp. 199-200; Public Papers, III, pp. 270-271.

[139]Ibid., p. 270.

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSIONS

The diplomatic mediation of Ambassador Sumner Welles during the 1933 Cuban revolution can be said to have been a partial success. In terms of his long-range objectives--the overthrow of Machado, the initiation of the new U.S. policy of non-intervention, and an improvement in the prestige-status of the United States in Latin America at the time of the Seventh Pan American Conference--the American Ambassador was relatively successful. His mediation efforts, however, were in some respects a failure. He was not successful in organizing and keeping in power a constitutional government after Machado's fall, and the high regard in which he was apparently held as a mediator evaporated in the face of his activities in Cuba after his mediation efforts were officially terminated.

To begin with, the policy of the United States which led to the Welles mediation was a radical departure from earlier U.S. policies toward Cuba. The United States in the years prior to 1933 almost invariably employed either direct armed intervention or indirect personal intervention and interference in the affairs of the island under the terms of the Platt Amendment. At times this intervention was undertaken to stabilize a turbulent political situation, or (and far more often) to protect the substantial economic interests of private U.S. investors in the island. There can be no doubt that protection of American economic interests in Cuba was of great importance to the United States even after 1933. However,

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when Ambassador Sumner Welles was sent to Cuba in May of 1933 he had express instructions from the Roosevelt administration to avoid intervention. Franklin D. Roosevelt had announced early in 1933 that a course of action not including intervention would be pursued in Cuba under the terms of the new Good Neighbor policy, and when this policy of non-intervention was demonstrated in Cuba it was favorably received both there and in the rest of Latin America.

The corrupt government of President Gerardo Machado had posed an immediate political problem for President Franklin D. Roosevelt when he took office in early 1933. Machado had brought Cuba to such a state of political and financial chaos that some action on the part of the United States was inevitable, thus the Welles mediation.

Beginning with its inception in 1925, the Machado government had carried out a policy of public spending and wholesale graft which in less than a decade made a ruin of the previously prosperous Cuban economy. It had contracted a very large foreign debt, most of it owed to American bankers. Illegal amendments to the Cuban Constitution on the books by 1928 made it possible for Machado to continue in power beyond his legal term of office. Presidential elections were a farce; the opposition was not allowed to combat him at the polls. A 1931 revolt against his tyranny was crushed, and conditions on the island thereafter became almost intolerable. The United States government had virtually ignored these developments, and although many Cubans had expected U.S. intervention under the Platt Amendment from 1928 onward such action had not been taken. As a result, by 1933 the Machado government had made Cuba a land of violence and terror and reduced it to a state of economic and political collapse. With the prospects for civil war in Cuba and the resulting destruction of property and life becoming better almost daily, the United States was finally

forced to act.

When Roosevelt took office in 1933, many Cubans waited to see what action he would take with regard to the grave situation in the island. In an effort to avoid intervention under the terms of the Platt Amendment and thus initiate the new Good Neighbor policy, President Roosevelt sent Sumner Welles to Cuba as Ambassador in May of 1933 with implicit instructions to alleviate distressing conditions there but in doing so to avoid giving the Cubans or the rest of Latin America the impression that the United States was intervening in Cuba's internal affairs.

From May until early August, 1933, Welles acted as official mediator between the government of President Machado and the opposition, and succeeded in starting mediation negotiations which it was felt would ultimately bring about a peaceful solution of Cuba's problems.

One of Welles' first tasks in fulfilling his instructions was to stop terrorism on the island and to use his good offices for "friendly mediation" to conciliate the Machado government and the opposition. His ultimate goal was to arrange for fair national elections out of which it was assumed political and economic stability would emerge. Implied but not stated was the understanding that President Machado was to ultimately withdraw from office. Ambassador Welles was authorized to offer various economic inducements in order to secure the cooperation of all political factions in the mediation proceedings--and particularly to insure the cooperation of President Machado and his government. He was to take no action which could be labeled as intervention or that would "render more likely" such intervention, however.

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During the official mediation period (to August 12, 1933) Ambassador Welles worked hard in his official capacity as mediator, and seemed to do

reasonably successful. In the face of considerable opposition, he "handled Machado with care," publicly maintaining that he was in Cuba in an unofficial capacity (this of course being a fiction employed so as not to cause any affront to President Machado). At the risk of alienating many Cuban citizens, who wished to know exactly what Welles planned to do and when they could expect to see Machado leave, the American Ambassador took care to see to it that his mediation negotiations in no way discredited or embarrassed President Machado. He was careful to avoid all charges of United States intervention, especially from the Machado government, and he patiently and successfully carried on his political mediation as instructed.

In his early mediation efforts Welles succeeded in bringing together representatives of the Machado government and the opposition in what was the first constructive move to reconcile differences peacefully in some years. He also succeeded in bringing violence to a halt while the negotiations were in progress. His personal efforts undoubtedly encouraged the opposition to cooperate constructively in the mediation in the hope that Machado would retire and a solution to Cuba's political difficulties could be worked out. The success of the mediation during June and July was also encouraging to the Cuban people in general, who evidently genuinely hoped Machado would eventually be removed.

Welles' patient, correct approach to his work changed in late July of 1933, as he became convinced that President Machado was not going to yield his control over Cuba. During the last days of his official mediation Machado alternately promised to cooperate and refused to do so. At the end he attacked Ambassador Welles and asked for his withdrawal. It was at this point that Welles began deviating from his role as mediator and his instructions as American Ambassador. He requested that the

Roosevelt administration threaten a withdrawal of recognition to try to bring Machado into line, but this request was not granted. Recognizing the seriousness of the situation when a general strike began, he asked the United States government to threaten Machado with the use of armed intervention. This request was also denied. Welles received instructions that the official U.S. policy would be to wait and see if the Cuban President would voluntarily step down. Welles was later criticized for this decision to "wait while Machado stalled" during the last days of the general strike. However, the decision was not his but Roosevelt's. It is possible that had Welles had his way, the outcome of the mediation might have been different. As it was, the negotiations were cut short, and before they could be brought to a successful conclusion an army coup toppled Machado from power.

The coup which drove Machado from Cuba came as an uncomfortable surprise to Welles. He managed, however, to step in and take advantage of the situation to put into effect the latest plan for a provisional government which he had helped work out as mediator. Privately he declared he had in no way been responsible for the army coup, but the evidence suggests that his mediation probably provided at least some impetus to the officers who issued the successful ultimatum to President Machado.

While not really deserving full credit for Machado's elimination, Ambassador Welles received high praise for the events prompting the dictator's fall. The American press was especially laudatory in its praise of his mediation efforts and although, as noted, the congratulations were not altogether deserved, Welles apparently accepted them as his due.

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inconsiderable influence to help establish the provisional government of Dr. Carlos Manuel de Cespédes. He also urged that the other reforms planned during the mediation be carried out. At this point he announced publicly that his mediation was officially over, but he did not immediately cease his efforts to influence affairs in Cuba.

It is felt that the favorable impression created by Welles' earlier mediation efforts in June and July, 1933, was almost reversed because of his unofficial role in Cuban politics in late August and early September. It is true that the Céspedes provisional government was fairly representative. It must be admitted also that Welles recognized the value of the important ABC revolutionary group and drew it into the provisional government. However, he largely ignored the university students, the army, labor, and the "left wing" intellectuals. Many Cubans resented his continued influence on the provisional government and on Céspedes, and this influence was definitely outside his defined role as mediator. (Even Welles himself admitted something of this, and asked to return to Washington on September 1, 1933).

After the Céspedes provisional government had been installed and it was announced that Welles would return to Washington, he received further congratulations for the success of his mediation (although the mediation had not necessarily been originally intended to include selection of Céspedes as president). Once more Ambassador Welles was given more credit than was actually due him. The praise was also premature. When the Céspedes government fell after less than three weeks in power, Welles' success turned to failure and he began to far exceed his original position as mediator. He terminated his mediation efforts by trying to get the United States to pursue a frank course of armed intervention in Cuba.

considerable influence to help establish the provisional government of Dr. Carlos Manuel de Céspedes. He also urged that the rebel reforms already during the mediation be carried out. At this point he announced publicly that his mediation was officially over, but he did use informally some his efforts to influence affairs in Cuba.

It is felt that the favorable impression created by Welles' mediation efforts in June and July, 1933, was almost reversed because of his unofficial role in Cuban politics in late August and early September. It is true that the Céspedes provisional government was fairly representative. It must be admitted also that Welles recognized the value of the impartial ABC revolutionary group and aided it into the provisional government. However, he largely ignored the university students, the army, labor, and the "left wing" intellectuals. Many Cubans resented his emphasis influence on the provisional government and on Céspedes, and this information was definitely outside his assigned role as mediator. (Even Welles himself admitted something of this, and added in reference to Céspedes on September 1, 1933).

After the Céspedes provisional government had been established and it was announced that Cuba would return to Washington, he received further congratulations for the success of his mediation (although the mediation had not officially been completed) increased by Batista's selection of Céspedes as president). Once more Washington noting the given more credit than was actually due him. The pressure was alone premature. Once the Céspedes government fell after less than three weeks in power, Welles attempts tended to failure and he began to see crumbled his original position as mediator. He regretted his military efforts by trying to get the United States to propose a joint Cuban and United intervention in Cuba.

Such a position was expressly contrary to his instructions.

Welles had certainly not anticipated the September 4 revolution which removed the Céspedes government from power. He seems to have considered it almost a personal affront. During the first week thereafter, he worked openly to have Céspedes restored to power with the help of U.S. armed intervention. When President Roosevelt would not agree to this, Welles then persuaded him to follow a policy of non-recognition for the same reasons. Upon his recommendation, the United States refused recognition to the new revolutionary government of Dr. Grau San Martín until that government fell in January, 1934. Welles' actions in this regard were hardly those of a mediator. Due primarily to his continued urging, the U.S. continued its policy of non-recognition during the balance of 1933, and when the Grau government finally fell many Cubans felt that Welles had been primarily responsible. They thus felt that he was also responsible in part for the failure of the social revolution the Grau government promised to carry out in Cuba.

Sumner Welles' primary motivation in refusing U.S. recognition to the Grau government actually seems to have been pique at having a government of his own making overthrown. In Cuba, this action tended to create the ultimate aura of failure which surrounded his mediation. Certainly it was contrary to the role he had originally been assigned. It brought some charges of American intervention in Cuba, which did not help the Good Neighbor policy so recently announced by the United States. President Roosevelt ultimately branded the Welles' mediation a failure.

Excepting the latter weeks of August, however, it is felt that as regards the Good Neighbor policy Welles' official mediation was rather successful. When Welles was sent to Cuba in May of 1933 there had been a good deal of talk of direct U.S. intervention. Welles avoided such

such a position was especially contrary to his instincts.

Welles had certainly not analyzed the "problem" properly which caused the Batista government from power. He seemed to have assumed it almost a personal affront, and thus treated it as if it was something he would expect to have Batista resign as a result of his arrival intervention. Then-Ambassador Messersmith warned Welles to this, Welles when pressured him to talk with Batista, it was purely for the same reason. Upon his reconnaissance, the Welles mission was to the new revolutionary government of Dr. Grau San Martin after government fell in January, 1934. Welles's mission is this regard was hardly those of a mediator. Due primarily to his tactless dealing, the U.S. continued its policy of non-recognition during the winter of 1934, and when the Grau government finally fell, Sumner Welles was and been partially responsible. They also felt that he was responsible in part for the failure of the social revolution the Grau government was mixed to carry out in Cuba.

Sumner Welles' primary motivation in returning U.S. troops from the Grau government actually seems to have been right at having a government of his own making overthrown. In Cuba, this action tended to create the ultimate sure of failure which accompanied his mediation. Certainly it was contrary to the role he had originally been assigned. In fact he some charge of American imperialism in Cuba, which did not fit the Good Neighbor policy as strongly promulgated by the United States. Franklin Roosevelt ultimately brought the Welles' mediation a failure.

Scrapping the latest model of diplomat, however, it is fair that as regards the Good Neighbor policy Welles' official mediation was rather unsuccessful. When Welles was sent to Cuba in May of 1933 there was a good deal of talk of direct U.S. intervention. Welles avoided all

intervention for several weeks, and thus managed to bolster Roosevelt's policy of non-intervention. If he later opted for intervention it was prevented. No direct intervention was ever carried out in Cuba during his official mediation, nor were any American troops landed. This was in direct and favorable contrast to earlier U.S. policies in Cuba and in Latin America in general. Ultimately it strengthened the Good Neighbor policy, if only by demonstrating in Cuba the lengths to which the United States would go to avoid intervention.

With regard to the Seventh Pan American Conference in Montevideo in December, 1933, Welles' mediation was not entirely successful. Ambassador Welles helped to avoid direct U.S. intervention in Cuba during the early months of his stay, and although he later pressed for intervention it was avoided. Thus President Roosevelt was able to point with pride to the new Good Neighbor policy and to maintain that his policy of non-intervention had been successfully demonstrated in Cuba on the very eve of the conference. However, Welles' policy of non-recognition of the Grau government led to the embarrassment of the United States at the conference when the Cuban delegation pushed through an indirect censure of the U.S. for pursuing a policy of "indirect intervention through nonrecognition."

In total, the mediation of Ambassador Sumner Welles in Cuba was fairly successful until the latter part of August, 1933. However, due especially to his actions after the Céspedes provisional government was overthrown (and his official role as mediator was over), it is the writer's opinion that the Welles mediation in Cuba ultimately came to appear as having been something of a failure.

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In total, the mediation of Ambassador Summer Welles in Cuba was fairly successful until the latter part of August, 1933. However, due especially to his actions after the Céspedes provisional government was overthrown (and his official role as mediator was over), it is the writer's opinion that the Welles mediation in Cuba ultimately came to appear as having been something of a failure.

APPENDIX I

The "Treaty of Paris"

Article I

Spain relinquishes all claim of sovereignty over and title to Cuba. And as the island is, upon its evacuation by Spain, to be occupied by the United States, the United States will, so long as such occupation shall last, assume and discharge the obligations that may under international law result from the fact of its occupation, for the protection of life and property.

Article II

Spain cedes to the United States the island of Porto Rico and other islands now under Spanish sovereignty in the West Indies, and the island of Guam in the Marianas or Ladrones....

Article IX

Spanish subjects, natives of the Peninsula, residing in the territory over which Spain by the present treaty relinquishes or cedes her sovereignty, may remain in such territory or may remove therefrom, retaining in either event all their rights of property, including the right to sell or dispose of such property or of its proceeds; and they shall also have the right to carry on their industry, commerce and professions, being subject in respect thereof to such laws as are applicable to other foreigners....

The civil rights and political status of the native inhabitants of the territories hereby ceded to the United States shall be determined by the Congress.

Article X

The inhabitants of the territories over which Spain relinquishes or cedes her sovereignty shall be secured in the free exercise of their religion.

Article XI

The Spaniards residing in the territories over which Spain by this treaty cedes or relinquishes her sovereignty shall be subject in matters civil as well as criminal to the jurisdiction of the courts of the country where they reside, pursuant to the ordinary laws governing the same; and they shall have the right to appear before such courts, and to pursue the same course as citizens of the country to which the courts belong....

Article XVI

It is understood that any obligations assumed in this treaty by the United States with respect to Cuba are limited to the time of its occupancy hereof; but it will upon the termination of such occupancy, advise any Government established in the island to assume the same obligations....

(Complete text of pertinent Articles of Treaty cited. Treaty concluded at Paris December 10, 1898; proclaimed April 11, 1899).

APPENDIX II

The "Platt Amendment"

Provided...that in fulfillment of the declaration contained in the joint resolution approved April twentieth, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight, entitled, "For the recognition of the independence of the people of Cuba, demanding that the Government of Spain relinquish its authority and government in the island of Cuba, and to withdraw its land and naval forces from Cuba and Cuban waters, and directing the President of the United States to use the land and naval forces of the United States to carry these resolutions into effect," the President is thereby authorized to "leave the government and control of the island of Cuba to its people" so soon as a government shall have been established in said island under a constitution which, either as a part thereof or in an ordinance appended thereto, shall define the future relations of the United States with Cuba, substantially as follows:

I

That the government of Cuba shall never enter into any treaty or other compact with any foreign power or powers which will impair or tend to impair the independence of Cuba, nor in any manner authorize or permit any foreign power or powers to obtain by colonization or for military or naval purposes or otherwise, lodgment in or control over any portion of said island.

II

That said government shall not assume or contract any public debt, to pay the interest upon which, and to make reasonable sinking fund provision for the ultimate discharge of which, the ordinary revenues of the island, after defraying the current expenses of government shall be inadequate.

III

That the government of Cuba consents that the United States may exercise the right to intervene for the preservation of Cuban independence, the maintenance of a government adequate for the protection of life, property, and individual liberty, and for discharging the obligations with respect to Cuba imposed by the treaty of Paris on the United States, now to be assumed and undertaken by the government of Cuba.

IV

That all Acts of the United States in Cuba during its military occupation thereof are ratified and validated, and all lawful rights acquired thereunder shall be maintained and protected.

V

That the government of Cuba will execute, and as far as necessary extend, the plans already devised or other plans to be mutually agreed upon, for the sanitation of the cities of the island, to the end that a recurrence of epidemic and infectious diseases may be prevented, thereby assuring protection to the people and commerce of Cuba, as well as to the commerce of the southern ports of the United States and the people residing therein.

VI

That the Isle of Pines shall be omitted from the proposed constitutional boundaries of Cuba, the title thereto being left to future adjustment by treaty.

VII

That to enable the United States to maintain the independence of Cuba, and to protect the people thereof, as well as for its own defense, the government of Cuba will sell or lease to the United States lands necessary for coaling or naval stations at certain specified points, to be agreed upon with the President of the United States.

VIII

That by way of further assurance the government of Cuba will enbody the foregoing provisions in a permanent treaty with the United States.

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