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Joint Statehood: 1906

Donald J. Leopard

JOINT STATEHOOD: 1906 - LEOPARD

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By

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PREFACE

In this discussion of joint statehood for the Territories of Arizona and New Mexico, the primary purpose has been to show the particular attitudes and activities surrounding the jointure campaign in the Territory of New Mexico. This limitation of scope is partially dictated by the fact that the national aspect of the campaign has received sufficient emphasis in other works and partly because the discovery of new materials has prompted an intensive rather than an extensive survey of Territorial politics. The goal is to explain the reason for the acceptance, by a wide majority of votes, of jointure in the New Mexico Territory as compared to the stinging defeat dealt the bill in the Territory of Arizona.

The largest bulk of information was gleaned from papers of the late Senator from New Mexico, Holm O. Bursum. Other personal papers were investigated and supplementary matter was added but, in the main, the Bursum Papers constitute the chief source.

These papers were secured from Mrs. H. O. Bursum, Sr., of Socorro, New Mexico. The materials dealing with Mr. Bursum's early political career in New Mexico have never been winnowed, and it is hoped that some insight may be gained of the internal political affairs of the Territory

PREFACE

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Mr. Bursum occupied at the time the powerful position of Chairman of the Territorial Republican Party. By virtue of his post, he was instrumental in deciding and executing the policies of the Party. This fact makes the Bursum Papers a most important source of information in the study of the jointure campaign.

Although the strict utilization of the sources at hand necessarily limit most of the study to one political party, sufficient cognizance was given to the opposition by the Republican leader to determine the attitude of that group. It should be further noted that the Democratic Party did not exercise such power in Territorial politics as they later came to do in State affairs. In fact, it could be stated with little fear of contradiction that the Republican Party enjoyed political hegemony in New Mexico prior to, during and after the period under discussion. In the case of joint statehood, though starting late, the Republicans championed the plan as a Party measure requiring Party loyalty, and from this standpoint it may be assumed that the partisanship evoked by the appeal was a prime factor in the success of the campaign.

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CHAPTER I

1902 - 1906

A unique phase of New Mexico's long fight for statehood centered around a proposal to join the Territories of Arizona and New Mexico, thus creating one state. Historically this union was not without precedent since, until 1863, Arizona had been a part of the vast New Mexico Territory.[1] However well founded this proposal may have been historically, it enjoys a singular position in the history of enabling acts.

The long and bitter agitation for statehood in the Territories had prompted political interests to consider seriously their inclusion in the Federal Union. In 1900 the Republican Party had made an outright pledge to support actively their admission. Thus, in the interest of Party prestige it was necessary to make some attempt to fulfill platform promises.[2]

In November of 1902 the Senate Committee on Territories, headed by Senator Beveridge of Indiana, made an

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1) R. E. Twitchell, Leading Facts of New Mexican History (Cedar Rapids, Iowa: The Torch Press, 1912), Vol. I, p. 409.

2) Claude G. Bowers, Beveridge and the Progressive Era (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Riverside Press, 1932), p. 197.

investigating soiree into the Western hinterlands to determine the feasibility of allowing Oklahoma, Indian Territory, Arizona and New Mexico entrance into the Union.[3] After considering the information gleaned from the Committee's investigation, Beveridge delivered the majority report to the Senate in January of 1903. This report advocated the immediate admission of Indian Territory and Oklahoma as one state while demanding that Arizona and New Mexico's bid for statehood be indefinitely postponed.[4]

The majority report was immediately denounced by Senator Quay of Pennsylvania when he delivered the minority report which advocated the admission of all these Territories as separate states. A group opposing both Quay and Beveridge was formed which advocated jointure for Arizona and New Mexico, thus creating two states out of four Territories. This plan won the temporary approval of President Roosevelt, but possibly because of advice from Beveridge he immediately withdrew his support.[5]

The question of jointure for the four Territories was repeatedly discussed in Congress, but until his death in 1904 Senator Quay, a friend of New Mexico's delegate to

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3) Charles F. Coan, A History of New Mexico (New York: The American Historical Society, Inc., 1925), Vol. I, p. 412.

4) Bowers, loc. cit., pp. 198-199.

5) Ibid.

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3) Charles L. Coon, A History of New Mexico (New York: The American Historical Society, Inc., 1925), vol. I, p. 612.

4) Bowers, loc. cit., p. 61-62.

5) Ibid.

Congress, W. H. Andrews, successfully blocked any serious attempt to pass such measures. After Quay's death Arizona and New Mexico intensified agitation against jointure.[6]

New Mexico's stand toward jointure overtures was emphatically stated by Territorial Governor Otero on July 2, 1904. He felt that Jointure was neither permissible nor desired. The Governor cited the fact that the leading Territorial representatives, acting in accord with the wishes of their constituents, were definitely opposed to jointure.[7] This view was heartily seconded by Arizona when the Twenty-third Territorial legislature went on record as opposed to jointure in January of 1905.[8]

Although the recalcitrant Territories were not without support in Congress, the strength of the jointure movement was increasing. Debates became quite heated in both Houses of Congress. According to Prichard, the Senate

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6) Rufus Kay Wyllys, Arizona: The History of a Frontier State (Phoenix, Arizona: Hobson and Herr, 1950), p. 300.

7) Notebook No. 2 in Miguel A. Otero Papers (Coronado Room, UNM Library), pp. 121-122. Cited hereafter as Otero Papers.

8) Wyllys, loc. cit., p. 301.

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"became a theatre for many cutting if not unparliamentary remarks."[9]

Senator Beveridge was eventually won over to the jointure proposal and in a speech before the Senate on February 5, 1903 eloquently argued the feasibility of forming two states from the four Territories.[10] Beveridge's reason for repudiating his former stand was based, he contended, on the obvious desire of New Mexico and Arizona for joint statehood.[11]

This contention found a detractor in Senator Foraker of Ohio. Foraker, won to the cause of the Arizona anti-jointure lobbyists, knew that Beveridge's statements were not in agreement with the tone of sentiment in the Territories of Arizona and New Mexico.[12] Playing upon the lack of real support for union in these two Territories Foraker insisted, if a consolidation policy were to be adopted, that Arizona and New Mexico be given a choice by allowing them to vote for or against jointure at the next election.[13]

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9) Series of articles published in the Santa Fe New Mexican in the months of April, May and June of 1906. These articles are found in an album by William Prichard entitled "Building a Nation or Statehood for New Mexico." In the Prichard Folder (State of New Mexico Museum Library, Santa Fe, New Mexico). Cited hereafter as the Prichard Papers.

10) Coan, loc. cit., p. 412.

11) Bowers, loc. cit., pp. 216-218.

12) Wyllys, loc. cit., p. 302.

13) Bowers, loc. cit., pp. 216-217.

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10) Coan, loc. cit., p. 416.

11) Bowers, loc. cit., pp. 216-218.

12) Wyllys, loc. cit., p. 202.

13) Bowers, loc. cit., pp. 217-218.

From previously cited evidence, it was quite apparent that Foraker was more correct about Territorial attitudes, but it appeared that the Republican Party leaders were quite anxious to live up to the platform proposals of years past. The future course of action was made apparent when, in a letter to Senator Beveridge on November 8, 1906, Roosevelt stated that a jointure recommendation was to be a part of his message to Congress even though there was "an active intrigue against it."[14] In this manner Roosevelt launched his campaign in support of jointure.

The President's obvious interest and love for the West has been cited as a reason for his diligent efforts in the support of joint statehood.[15] This viewpoint, however, is subject to doubt or at least to modification. In a letter to Benjamin I. Wheeler, the President voiced an opinion concerning statehood that seems to indicate that his jointure policy was more pragmatically based.

> As for Arizona and New Mexico, you and I agree entirely. The only reason I want them

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14) Etling E. Morison (ed.), The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1952), Vol. V., p. 71.

15) Mary J. Masters, "New Mexico's Struggle for Statehood, 1903-1907" (unpublished Master's thesis, Department of History, University of New Mexico, 1942), pp. 12-14.

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The President's obvious interest and love for the East has been cited as a reason for his difficulty at first in the support of joint statehood.[15] This view-point, however, is subject to doubt or at least to qualification. In a letter to Benjamin I. Wheeler, the President voices an opinion concerning statehood that seems to indicate that his joint-ture policy was more pragmatically based.

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On January 22, 1906, Roosevelt, in a letter to Sir George Trevelyan, placed "joint statehood for the Territories, or at least for Oklahoma and Indian Territory," as the fifth item of a five-part list of measures he wished to accomplish while in office.[17] This statement coupled with the previous letter shows that Roosevelt, though desiring jointure, did not give it primary consideration. The President, however, did encourage the adoption of jointure. In a personal letter to Mark A. Rodgers of Arizona, he earnestly solicited the support of Arizona Republicans in support of the Administration. He stated that "for them [New Mexico and Arizona] now to refuse to come into the Union as States would be . . . mere folly."[18]

After the defeat of the jointure proposal in the Territories, Roosevelt wrote to George Curry, the President's new appointee as Territorial Governor, that the defeat prompted him to consider allowing separate statehood. The letter states clearly that the President had preferred

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16) Morison (ed.), loc. cit., January 18, 1906, Vol. V, p. 135.

17) Ibid., p. 136.

18) Ibid., June 27, 1906, Vol. V, p. 321.

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16) Harlan (ed.), Idem. cit., January 15, 1906, vol. V, p. 155.

17) Ibid., p. 156.

18) Ibid., June 27, 1906, vol. V, p. 321.

jointure and later recommended single statehood because it was the "only wise alternative . . . ."[19] Consequently, Roosevelt's sympathies with the West were not those that would allow him to advocate the proposal the West desired -- separate statehood -- until the possibility of jointure had been exhausted.

On December 5, 1905, the jointure proposal was included in the Presidential message to Congress. Roosevelt made no attempt to argue the case eloquently, but simply stated that he had carefully studied the matter and that "the advisability of making four territories into two states [had] been clearly established." His only qualification regarding the admission of the Territories concerned the abolition of licensed gambling. He wished that Congress "should by law forbid this practice, the harmful results of which are obvious at a glance."[20]

The President's official support immediately promoted the introduction by Representative Hamilton of an enabling bill (H. R. 3186) which was referred to the Committee on Territories.[21] On December 7, 1905 Senator Beveridge introduced a similar bill (S. 1158) which was likewise

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19) Ibid., October 24, 1907, Vol. V, pp. 821-822.

20) Congressional Record, 59th Cong., 1st Sess., 1905, XL, Part 1, p. 105.

21) Ibid., p. 116.

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19) Ibid., October 24, 1907, Vol. V, pp. 821-822.

20) Congressional Record, 59th Cong., 1st Sess., 1905, XL, Part 1, p. 105.

21) Ibid., p. 116.

referred to the Committee on Territories.[22] In spite of the introduction of two jointure bills and the obvious desire of the administration for this plan, W. H. Andrews, Territorial Representative to Congress from New Mexico and a Republican, introduced a bill (H. R. 7042) to enable New Mexico to be admitted as a separate state.[23]

Delegate Andrew's proposal, though out of step with Washington, was certainly in tune with Republican sentiment in New Mexico. This feeling, however, was not shared by all Territorial residents. The Albuquerque City Council, one day prior to the Roosevelt announcement, had officially endorsed the proposed union with Arizona.[24] This action created some editorial protests against the Albuquerque "joint statehood boomers" who, it was said, saw jointure as an opportunity to raise the Democrats to power.[25] Another newspaper editorial blasted the pro-jointure supporters as working for the time that Albuquerque, because of its geographical position, would eventually inherit the capital of the new state.[26]

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22) Ibid., p. 212.

23) Ibid., December 13, 1905, p. 362.

24) Albuquerque Morning Journal, December 5, 1905, p. 1.

25) Santa Fe New Mexican, December 6, 1905, p. 2. Quoted from the Farmington Enterprise.

26) Albuquerque Morning Journal, December 5, 1905, p. 2. Quoted from the Las Vegas Optic.

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22) Ibid., p. 212.

23) Ibid., December 13, 1905, p. 308.

24) Albuquerque Morning Journal, December 3, 1905, p. 1.

25) Santa Fe New Mexican, December 7, 1905, p. 2. Quoted from the Farmington Enterprise.

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This latter fear seems to have been seriously considered by editorialists as a primary reason for Albuquerque's action. The Hamilton bill, in an obvious attempt to placate Territorial pride, had stipulated that the capital of the new state of Arizona would be located at Santa Fe.[27] Unfortunately, such a compromise had little appeal to either party. The selection of Santa Fe as the capital of the new state did not compensate for the loss of the Territorial name, especially when it was feared that Santa Fe would eventually succumb in favor of the better situated city of Albuquerque.[28]

The fear of Democratic hegemony, the loss of the Territorial name, and the internal strife and jealousies concerning the location of the capital were only incidental to the basic problems that consolidation would bring. The real problem was one of uniting an agricultural, predominately Spanish-speaking people with a territory dedicated to mining and industrial pursuits. The prospects of such a jointure "horrified" Arizona railroad and mining executives who saw such a union as detrimental to their best interests.[29] These Arizona citizens protested that "union with

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27) House of Representatives Report No. 4906, Vol. I, 59th Cong., 1st Sess., 1905-06.

28) Albuquerque Morning Journal, December 5, 1905, p. 2; Santa Fe New Mexican, December 21, 1905, p. 2.; January 2, 1906, p. 2.

29) Wyllys, op. cit., p. 300.

This latter fear seems to have been artificially nourished by editorialists as a ready reason for Albuquerque's action. The Hamilton bill, in an overlong attempt to placate Territorial pride, had stipulated that the capital of the new state of Arizona would be located at Santa Fe. Unfortunately, such a compromise had little appeal to either party. The selection of Santa Fe as the capital of the new state did not compensate for the loss of the territorial name, especially when it was feared that Santa Fe would eventually succumb in favor of the better situated city of Albuquerque.[28]

The fear of democratic degeneracy, the loss of the territorial name, and the internal strife and antagonism concerning the location of the capital were only incidental to the basic problems that statehood would bring. The real problem was one of uniting an agricultural, predominately Spanish-speaking people with a territory dedicated to mining and industrial pursuits. The prospects of such a jointure "horrified" Arizona railroad and mining executives who saw such a union as detrimental to their best interests.[29] These Arizona citizens preferred that Indian and

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27) House of Representatives Report No. 4206, 61st, 59th Cong., 1st Sess., 1906-07.

28) Albuquerque Evening Journal, January 8, 1908, p. 2; Santa Fe New Mexican, January 4, 1908, p. 2; January 2, 1908, p. 2.

29) Wyllys, op. cit., p. 300.

the Territory of New Mexico would make property insecure and progress impossible in Arizona."[30]

Thus Arizona bore the brunt of criticism for its anti-consolidation action. The Albuquerque Morning Journal early launched attacks on Arizona for the selfish attitude of its special interest groups.[31] The Washington Post was more explicit in its denunciation of corporate interests in Arizona. The Post charged that these corporations were opposed to jointure because they feared that, with statehood, taxation would be increased. The editorial further contended that both Territories were guilty of selfish motives in opposing jointure and, in general, were too corrupt for admission into the Federal Union.[32]

While the opposition forces were preparing for the fight, the Hamilton Bill was reported back from the Committee on Territories on January 23, 1906.[33] The bill, in general, contained the recommendations outlined by President Roosevelt. It also called for generous land and cash grants for the establishment of educational facilities in the Territories. The new state of Oklahoma was to receive

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30) Coan, op. cit., p. 412.

31) December 20, 1905, p. 8.

32) Quoted in the Santa Fe New Mexican, January 2, 1906, p. 2.

33) Congressional Record, loc. cit., XL., Part 2, p. 1433.

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30) Coan, op. cit., p. 410.

31) December 20, 1905, p. 6.

32) Quoted in the San Juan New Mexican, January 2, 1906, p. 2.

33) Congressional Record, 1906. cit., X., part 2, p. 1433.

two sections in each township and a $5,000,000 cash grant for the establishment of schools. Arizona, because of the aridity of the soil, was to receive four such sections plus the $5,000,000 cash grant.[34]

Debate, which began on January 24, was quite heated because the Republicans as well as the Democrats protested strongly against the consolidation plan. The Democrats contended that the plan was a Republican Party measure, while Republican detractors protested it on the grounds of sectional bias. The debate threatened to devolve into a mere party squabble; but a quick vote was managed, the Bill passed with a safe margin and amendment proceedings began.[35]

The foremost amendment was that sponsored by Foraker and his supporters. This called for the jointure of Oklahoma and Indian Territory, but stipulated that Arizona and New Mexico should be allowed to decide their proposed union by vote. The Santa Fe New Mexican, anti-jointure in sentiment, aptly described this measure as an "escape clause."[36] Later, Foraker proposed, if his amendment could not be passed, to shift his support to the Burrows Amendment, named after Julius C. Burrows of Michigan, which advocated

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34) House of Representatives, loc. cit., Report No. 4906, Vol. I.

35) Congressional Record, loc. cit., XL, Part 2, pp. 1499-1506. Final vote 188 yeas to 158 nays.

36) December 21, 1905, p. 2.

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34) House of Representatives, 56th Cong., 1st Sess., Report No. 4906, Vol. I.

35) Congressional Record, 56th Cong., 1st Sess., Vol. XL, Part 1, pp. 1436-1506. Final vote was taken on the 24th.

36) December 21, 1903, p. 1.

statehood for Oklahoma and Indian Territory alone. Thus, in either case, Oklahoma would be admitted into the Union without forcing consolidation upon the reluctant Territories of Arizona and New Mexico.[37]

Before the passage of the Hamilton Bill, New Mexico citizens were somewhat puzzled by a letter written by A. A. Freeman to Holm O. Bursum and published by Freeman in the Albuquerque Morning Journal.[38] The letter, written from Washington, D. C., stated that an agreement had been reached by some New Mexico party leaders with the President. The agreement was that "if he [Roosevelt] would not disturb the party organization," i. e., if Roosevelt would reappoint all the Territorial officials then in office, the New Mexico "party machine" would support joint statehood. According to Freeman, the President agreed to this measure with the exception of Governor Otero whose replacement, H. J. Hagerman, had already been selected. The letter then asked Bursum to agree to the supposed deal in the interest of the Party and the Territory.[39]

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37) Albuquerque Morning Journal, May 26, 1906, p. 1.

38) Albuquerque Evening Citizen, January 4, 1906, p. 4; A. A. Freeman was appointed to the New Mexico Supreme Court by President Benjamin Harrison and, after retiring from this office, practiced law in Socorro and Carlsbad. He was an active Republican and even after leaving the Territory in 1908 kept up his interest in N. M. affairs. New Mexico Historical Review, Vol. I, 1926, pp. 492-493.

39) December 27, 1906. In Holm O. Bursum Papers (Coronado Room, UNM Library). Hereafter cited as Bursum Papers.

statehood for Oklahoma and Indian Territory, [illegible]. In either case, Oklahoma would be admitted into the union without forcing consolidation upon the predominantly Mexican of Arizona and New Mexico.[37]

Before the passage of the Tamiroff Bill, New Mexico citizens were somewhat puzzled by a letter written by A. A. Freeman to Holm O. Bursum and published by Freeman in the Albuquerque Morning Journal.[38] The letter, written from Washington, D. C., stated that an agreement had been reached by some New Mexico party leaders with the President. The agreement was that "if he [Roosevelt] would not disturb the party organization," i. e., if Roosevelt would reappoint all the Territorial officials then in office, the New Mexico "party machine" would support joint statehood. According to Freeman, the President agreed to this bargain with the exception of Governor Otero whose [illegible], W. H. Hagerman, had already been selected. The letter then asked Bursum to agree to the supposed deal in the interest of the party and the Territory.[39]

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37) Albuquerque Morning Journal, July 26, 1903, p. 1.

38) Albuquerque Evening Citizen, January 4, 1909, p. [illegible]. A. A. Freeman was appointed to the New Mexico Supreme Court by President Benjamin Harrison and, after resigning from this office, practiced law in Socorro and Grants. He was an active Republican and even after leaving the Territory in 1908 kept up his interest in N. M. affairs. New Mexico Historical Review, Vol. I, [illegible], pp. 398-399.

39) December 27, 1909. In Julia O. Bursum Papers (Zimmerman Room, UNM Library). Hereafter cited as Bursum Papers.

Bursum, heading a delegation of Republican leaders, was en route to Washington to discuss Territorial matters with the President.[40] Upon hearing of Judge Freeman's letter he published the following denial:

> We [the delegation] of course understood and understand today that the President is heartily in favor of joint statehood but as for any barter or trade having been made or suggested by either the President or myself or Mr. Luna as representing the Republican organization of New Mexico, this is absolutely without foundation in fact.[41]

If the delegation that Bursum headed was not the "party leaders" of whom Freeman speaks, to what group did Freeman refer? It seems incongruous to send a letter to Bursum in Santa Fe knowing him to be in Washington. The possibility of other members of Bursum's group secretly bargaining was likewise dismissed by the Chairman, thus, refuting Freeman's statements.[42] Later evidence seems to discount any possibility of such a bargain being struck.

The bargain, according to Freeman, rested on the agreement to retain Territorial officeholders in return for their support on jointure. This, however, is not borne

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40) Masters, loc. cit., p. 107. The delegation consisted of H. O. Bursum, Solomon Luna, W. J. Mills, J. W. Raynolds and W. H. H. Llewellyn.

41) Santa Fe New Mexican, January 3, 1906, p. 1; Albuquerque Evening Citizen, January 4, 1906, p. 4.

42) Ibid.

Hurwum, Hagdy, a delegation of Nyyldaen leaders, was en route to Washington to discuss territorial matters with the President. [40] Upon receipt of Chase Freeman's letter he published the following [illegible]:

> Be [illegible] of rumors [illegible] and understand [illegible] Freeman is hereby [illegible] favor of joint statehood [illegible] for any barter or trade having been made or suggested by either the President or myself or Mr. Burns as representative of the Republican organization of New Mexico. [41] It is absolutely without foundation in fact.

If the delegation that Hurwum leaded was not the "party leaders" of whom Freeman spoke, to what group did Freeman refer? It seems incongruous to send a letter to Burwum in Santa Fe [illegible] him to be in Washington. The possibility of other members of Burwum's group secretly bargaining was likewise dismissed by the Chairman, thus refuting Freeman's statements. [42] Latum evidence seems to discount any possibility of such a bargain being struck.

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[40] Masters, Jon. op. cit., p. 107. The delegation consisted of H. O. Burwum, Dolmon Ham, A. J. Mejia, [illegible] Hayvolds and W. J. H. Hawuilin.

[41] Santa Fe New Mexican, January 3, 1906; p. 1; Albuquerque Evening Citizen, January 4, 1906; p. 4.

[42] Ibid.

out by the facts. In the case of retention of offices, there is ample evidence that the reverse occurred after Governor Hagerman entered office. On March 3, 1906, the President telegraphed Governor Hagerman an authorization to remove certain officials: the Territorial Secretary, Attorney General and the Superintendent of Prisons. Roosevelt further stated, "If any of my appointees hamper you, let me know and I will remove them."[43]

Bursum, who flatly denied Freeman's statements, was himself removed from his position as Superintendent of Prisons and vigorously prosecuted for supposed mishandling of Territorial funds. This action precipitated a rift in the Territorial Republican ranks, and though he was later exonerated, this affair was an impediment to Bursum's career.[44]

As to the other aspect of the supposed agreement -- support for joint statehood -- recourse must be had to more indirect sources. The Republican Central Committee did not officially endorse jointure until October 1, 1906, and

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43) Morison (ed.), loc. cit., Vol. V, p. 177.

44) Numerous references to the penitentiary scandals are to be found in the Bursum Papers. Secondary references may be found in Coan, loc. cit., Vol. I, p. 425; Twitchell, loc. cit., Vol. II, pp. 553-554; History of New Mexico (Los Angeles: Pacific States Publishing Co., 1907), Vol. I, pp. 285-286.

out by the facts. In the case of reduction of officials, there is ample evidence that the reverse occurred after Governor Hagerman entered office. On March 3, 1909, the President telegraphed Governor Hagerman an authorization to remove certain officials: the Territorial Secretary, Attorney General and the superintendent of prisons. Roosevelt further stated, "If any of my appointees impede you, let me know and I will remove them."

Burns, who flatly denied Roosevelt's statements, was himself removed from his position as superintendent of Prisons and vigorously prosecuted for expended misdemeanors of Territorial funds. This action greatly aided a rift in the Territorial Republican ranks, here although he was later exonerated, this affair was an impediment to Burns's career.[44]

As to the other aspect of the supposed agreement -- support for joint statehood -- resources must be had to more indirect sources. The Republican General Committee did not officially endorse joint-ure until October 1, 1909, and

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43) Morison (ed.), loc. cit., Vol. 6, p. 417.

44) Numerous references to the penitentiary scandals are to be found in the Burns Papers. Secondary references may be found in Gunn, loc. cit., Vol. 6, p. 330; Walsenburg, loc. cit., vol. , p. 285-287; History of New Mexico (Los Angeles: Pacific States Publishing Co., 1907), vol. , pp. 285-286.

from December, 1905 until that date was on record in opposition to jointure.[45] Another factor is the obvious distaste for consolidation displayed by the leading Republican newspapers. The most outspoken anti-jointure supporter was the Santa Fe New Mexican.

The editor of the New Mexican, Max Frost, was a staunch Republican and a faithful correspondent with Bursum. Frost's link with the Republican Party is demonstrated by the award to his New Mexico Printing Company of a contract as the public printer.[46] Frost probably owed his position as Secretary for the Territorial Bureau of Immigration to his Republican affiliation. Therefore, it is safe to assume that Frost, through the editorials of the New Mexican, was not expressing opinions that were opposed by leading Territorial Republicans.[47]

Still another factor that displays the New Mexican's close link with Republican leaders occurred on March 9, 1906, when Max and Maude Frost turned over a total of 18,750 shares of capital stock of the New Mexican Printing Company to Solomon Luna and Bursum. Both parties purchased 9,375 shares, agreeing to pay, over a five year

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45) Santa Fe New Mexican, October 1, 1906, p. 2; Reference to the Central Committee's official stand of December, 1905 is found in the Freeman letter, Bursum Papers.

46) Contract as public printer signed by James G. McNary, March 1, 1906, Frost Folder, Bursum Papers.

47) The letterhead of the Bureau of Immigration lists Frost as Secretary. This type stationery is abundant in the Bursum Papers.

from December, 1905 until that date was an reason in opposition to jointure.[45] Another issue in the convention debates for consolidation criticized by the leading Republican newspapers. The most outspoken anti-jointure supporter was the Santa Fe New Mexican.

The editor of the New Mexican, Max Frost, was a staunch Republican and a personal correspondent with Lorenzo Frost's link with the Republican Party is demonstrated by the award to his New Mexico Republican company of a contract as the public printer.[46] Frost subsequently used his position as Secretary for the Territorial Bureau of Immigration to his Republican affiliation. Therefore, it is safe to assume that Frost, through the editorials of the New Mexican, was not expressing opinions that were opposed by leading Territorial Republicans.[47]

Still another factor that displays the New Mexican's close link with Republican leaders occurred on March 3, 1906, when Max and Maude Frost turned over a total of 18,750 shares of capital stock of the New Mexican Printing Company to Solomon Luna and others. Some parties purchased 9,375 shares, equaling to one, over a fifty year

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45) Santa Fe New Mexican, October 5, 1906, p. 4; reference to the Central Committee's official report of December, 1905 is found in the President's letter, Journal Papers.

46) Contract as public printer awarded by Miguel A. Romero, March 1, 1906, Frost Papers, Journal Papers.

47) The letterhead of the Bureau of Immigration lists Frost as Secretary. This type of letterhead is available in the Bureau Papers.

period, a total of ten thousand dollars for these stocks.[48]

The purchase of large shares of stock in newspapers and printing plants was not a new type of investment for Bursum and other party leaders. On January 30, 1905, W. H. Andrews and Bursum made a joint purchase of 128 shares of capital stock of the Optic Publishing Company. The total purchase price was $8,000 payable in eighteen months with an interest rate of 8%.[49] The editorial policy of the Las Vegas Daily Optic, owned and printed by the Optic Publishing Company, was one of opposition to jointure just as was the policy of the Santa Fe New Mexican. Thus, by association, it seems evident that they expressed, if not the opinions, at least the general philosophy of New Mexico's party leaders.[50] It shows indirectly that either no bargain had been struck, or, if an agreement was reached, it was not honored by either party.

Even the supporters of jointure were not convinced of a deal since they continued in their efforts for jointure with renewed activity. The Albuquerque supporters of statehood formed a group dedicated to the proposed union and

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48) Contract addressed to The Bank of Commerce, Albuquerque, New Mexico. Frost Folder, Bursum Papers.

49) Contract signed by W. H. Andrews and Holm O. Bursum, Newspaper File, Bursum Papers.

50) Examples of the editorial policy of the Santa Fe New Mexican have been previously cited. For an example of the editorial policy of the Daily Optic see Albuquerque Morning Journal.

period, a total of ten thousand dollars for three shares.[48]

The purchase of large blocks of stock in newspapers and printing plants was not a new type of investment for Duncan and other party leaders. On January 30, 1930, W. S. Andrews and Duncan made a joint purchase of 130 shares of capital stock of the Ciudad Publishing Company. The total purchase price was $6,000 payable in eighteen months with an interest rate of 8%.[49] The editorial policy of the Las Vegas Daily Optic, owned and placed by the Ciudad Publishing Company, was one of opposition to Jolmaire just as was the policy of the Banco in New Mexican. Thus, by association, it seems evident that they expressed, if not the opinions, at least the general philosophy of New Mexico's party leaders.[50] It shows indirectly that either no bargain had been struck, or, if an agreement was reached, it was not honored by either party.

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48) Contract addressed to the bank of Commerce, Albuquerque, New Mexico. Frank Zeller, Herman Baca.

49) Contract signed by W. S. Andrews and Duncan. Newspaper file, Surveyor's Office.

50) Examples of the editorial policy of the Banco in New Mexican have been previously cited. For an example of the editorial policy of the Daily Optic see Albuquerque Morning Journal.

B. S. Rodey, ex-Territorial Representative to Congress and an ardent supporter of statehood, was engaged by them to proceed to Washington as their lobbyist. Unfortunately, since this League failed to pay Rodey's expenses he was compelled to return to Albuquerque to raise funds.[51]

Meanwhile, in Congress the joint statehood bill was undergoing difficulty. Foraker, early in the fight, had written that the measure would probably not pass, and that he was concentrating on the measure for the admittance of Oklahoma and Indian Territory.[52] He strongly advised that New Mexico "should wait until after the next Census before making another application for statehood."[53] Frost noted the increased opposition to the Foraker amendment but thought there was still chance for its passage.[54] As the fight progressed, Frost became increasingly assured that the administration had decided to support the proposal and its passage was almost assured.[55]

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51) Frost to Bursum May 16, 1906, Bursum Papers. The letter also discussed Mr. Rodey's appointment as Judge of the District Court of Puerto Rico.

52) For a detailed account of the Congressional aspect of the Hamilton Bill see Masters, loc. cit., pp. 20-87. Miss Masters dedicated most of her thesis to the various stages of the Congressional floor fight over the Joint-Statehood proposal.

53) Foraker to Bursum, March 13, 1906, Bursum Papers.

54) Frost to Bursum, April 20, 1906, Frost Folder, Bursum Papers.

55) Frost to Bursum, May 10, 1906, Frost Folder, Bursum Papers.

R. S. Rodey, ex-Territorial representative to Congress and an ardent supporter of statehood, was engaged by them to proceed to Washington as lobbyist.[51] Unfortunately, since this league wished to pay Rodey's expenses he was compelled to return to Albuquerque to raise funds.

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51) Frost to Burrus, May 16, 1905, Burrus Papers. The letter also discussed R. Rodey's appointment as judge of the District court of Puerto Rico.

52) For a detailed account of the congressional debate of the Hamilton bill see Masters, Jan. 1906, pp. 40-47. Miss Masters dedicated most of her pages to the various stages of the Congressional floor fight over the joint-statehood proposal.

53) Foraker to Burrus, March 20, 1906, Burrus Papers.

54) Frost to Burrus, April 20, 1906, Frost Papers, Burrus Papers.

55) Frost to Burrus, May 16, 1906, Frost Papers, Burrus Papers.

Although assured that the amendment would pass, the New Mexican continued to oppose it. In a series of folksy articles by "Uncle Simeon Patience" [William Prichard], Beveridge's "Arizona the Great" was attacked mercilessly:

> Senator Small [Beveridge's] intentions are good in proposing to unite New Mexico," said Mr. Bigot, at the club. "Yes," returned Uncle Simeon, "The man who drives a knife into your heart supposing you to be a burglar, without cause, may have good intentions also. Good intentions are one thing, good judgement is another.[56]

The opposition's chief hope appeared in the form of a referendum within the Territories. W. H. Llewellyn summed up the strategem as follows, "if [F]oraker amendment adopted Arizona vote it down, then New Mexico make demand separate statehood . . ." [Quotes not author's].[57] In other words, the burden of opposing the Administration's policy would rest on the heads of Arizona leaders while New Mexico, loyally supporting statehood, would, after the defeat of jointure, be admitted on the basis of its devotion to the administration.

This plan is further elaborated in Frost's letter to Bursum of May 23, 1906. Seeing the possibility of the

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56) Loc. cit., Prichard Papers.

57) Telegram from Ira M. Bond to the New Mexican, May 17, 1906, Frost Folder, Bursum Papers.

passage of the statehood bill with the Foraker amendment attached, he advised Mr. Bursum that the New Mexican should be expanded.

> If statehood comes, we must have it in the campaign; if it does not come, we must also have it in the campaign and thereafter if we find the enlarged edition does not pay and we have no more need of it, we can cut it down to six columns after the state or Territorial legislative assembly is over.[58]

Frost also says "I am as you are. If it comes ready; otherwise ready also."[59] This assuredly meant that Frost and Bursum had discussed the issue and were in mutual agreement. However, Frost is not sufficiently clear concerning his possible backing of statehood without the Foraker amendment. Naturally, if the enabling act were passed without a referendum qualification, there would have been little use to protest, but previously cited opposition such as the Prichard essays and other editorials are sufficient to judge the prevailing attitude concerning jointure without the Foraker plan. Therefore Frost and Bursum, armed with the strategy implied in the quote from Llewellyn, were prepared to support jointure.

On June 12, 1906, an amendment allowing for a yes or

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58) Frost Folder, Bursum Papers.

59) Ibid.

passage of the abandoned bill with the referendum amendment attached, he advised Ar. Burgum that the referendum should be expanded.

> If attached cooper, as many have it in the campaign; if it does not come, we lose also have it in the campaign and therefore if we find the enlarged motion does not pay and we have no more need of it, we can cut it down to six columns after the state or territorial legislative assembly is over.[38]

Frost also says "I am as you are. If it comes ready; otherwise ready also."[39] This seemingly means that Frost and Burgum had discussed the issue and were in mutual agreement. However, Frost is not sufficiently clear concerning his possible backing of statehood without the referendum amendment. Naturally, if the enabling act were passed without a referendum qualification, there would have been little use to protest, but previously cited opposition such as the Pritchard essays and other editorials are sufficient to judge the prevailing attitude concerning joinders without the Porker plan. Therefore Frost and Burgum, armed with the strategy implied in the quote from Llewellyn, were prepared to support joinders.

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38) Frost letter, Burgum Papers.

39) Ibid.

no vote for statehood was passed by the Senate.[60] It stated that on November 6, 1906,

> "[T]here shall be submitted to said qualified electors of each said Territories a question which shall be stated in substance and form as follows:
> Shall Arizona and New Mexico be united as one State?"[61]
>
> Yes ☐ No ☐

Four days after the passage of this amendment Max Frost wrote to William J. Loeb, Presidential Secretary, that the New Mexican was now solidly behind the new law:

> The change of front was brought about after due consultation with leading Republicans and friends of the paper, principally being: Solomon Luna, Member of the Republican National Committee from New Mexico; H. O. Bursum, Chairman Republican Territorial Central Committee; Delegate W. H. Andrews of New Mexico; many other prominent citizens were interviewed and they concluded that it was best . . . to support the Hamilton law as passed and, therefore, joint statehood.[62]

Frost went on to admit that the New Mexican had been the most implacable foe of jointure in New Mexico, but he

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60) Congressional Record loc. cit., Vol. XL, Part 9, 8403. This clause was a slight modification of the Foraker amendment. The Senate, via a conference committee, changed the original proposal slightly by requiring that the selections of delegates to the constitutional convention should be placed on the ballot with the jointure proposal.

61) House of Representatives Report, loc. cit., No. 4925, Vol. III.

62) June 16, 1906, Bursum Papers.

no vote for statehood was passed by the Senate.[80] It stated that on November 6, 1910,

> "[T]here shall be submitted to qualified electors of such territories a proposition which shall be stated in substance and form as follows:
>
> Shall Arizona and New Mexico be united as one State?"[81]
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> Yes ☐ No ☐

Four days after the passage of this amendment Max Frost wrote to William H. Taft, Presidential Secretary, that the New Mexican was now solidly behind the new law:

> The change of front was brought about after due consideration of the leading republicans and friends of the press, politically being Solomon Luna, member of the republican national committee from New Mexico; H. O. Burton, Chairman Republican Territorial Central Committee; Delegate W. H. Andrews of New Mexico; many other prominent citizens were interviewed and they concluded that it was best . . . to support the Hamilton law as passed and, therefore, joint statehood.[82]

Frost went on to admit that the New Mexican had been the most implacable foe of jointure in New Mexico, but he

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80) Congressional Record Ion. cit., Vol. 43, Part 4, 8405. This clause was a slight modification of the former amendment. The Senate, via a conference committee, combined the original proposal similarly by requiring that the aspirations of delegates to the territorial convention should be placed on the ballot with the jointure proposal.

81) House of Representatives Report, loc. cit., 4525, Vol. III.

82) June 10, 1906, Frost Papers.

now realized, although a "hard pill to swallow," that it was definitely for the best.[63] This obvious bid for a return of the New Mexican into the good graces of the Roosevelt Administration is indicative of Frost's pragmatic view of the measure. Perhaps loyalty to Administration measures would weigh heavily when the opportunity presented itself. In any case, a sudden reversal of editorial policy, with full support from its Republican stockholders, was a small price to pay for possible single statehood.

If Frost's letter did not serve its purpose in ingratiating the New Mexican to the Washington Republicans, it acts as a convincing argument that joint statehood support was contingent upon the referendum amendment. The Territorial Republican Party had little to lose from endorsing statehood since, on May 28, 1906, over two weeks before the passage of the referendum measure and the posting of the Frost letter, the Democratic and Republican Parties of Arizona had, in a joint session, denounced joint statehood.[64] By this move the possibility of achieving jointure was considerably lessened, if not made impossible.

It is quite possible that the intentions of the Republicans in New Mexico were not so clear cut as has been outlined. The endorsement of the New Mexican for joint statehood was certainly not an official endorsement. The

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63) Ibid.

64) Bowers, loc. cit., p. 235.

now realized, although a "bad pill to swallow," that it was definitely for the good.[63] Arizona did for a return of the New Mexican have one good reason for the possible administration in Washington of Frost's pragmatic view of the measure. Perhaps loyalty to an liberalism measures would weigh heavily when the opportunity presented itself. In any case, a sudden reversal of editorial policy, with full support from the Republican aforementioned, was a small price to pay for possible single statehood.

If Frost's letter did not serve the purpose in clarifying the New Mexican to the Eastern Republicans, it acts as a convincing argument that joint statehood measure was contingent upon the referendum amendment. The editorial Republican party had little to lose from endorsing statehood alone, on May 25, 1906, over two weeks before the passage of the referendum measure and the posting of the Frost letter, the Democratic and Republican parties of Arizona had, in a joint session, denounced joint statehood. By this move the possibility of achieving statehood was adversely lessened, if not made impossible.

It is quite possible that the criticism of the republicans in New Mexico were not as clear cut as has been outlined. The endorsement of the New Mexican for joint statehood was certainly not an official endorsement. The

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63) Ibid.

64) Bowers, loc. cit., p. 200.

Territorial Republican Convention was not scheduled until September 29, 1906, and by that time the Party could decide what it wished to do. In the meantime an endorsement by leading New Mexico newspapers could not do the Territory any harm in Washington. In any case, the signing of the Hamilton Bill into law on June 19, 1906, launched a new phase of the joint statehood campaign.[65]

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65) Congressional Record, loc. cit., Vol. XI, Part 9, 8743.

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65) Congressional Record, 59th. 1st., 40th. Cong., Part 9, 8743.

CHAPTER II

JUNE TO OCTOBER 1906

The passing of the Hamilton proposal and the unofficial endorsement given it by leading Republicans did not mean that all New Mexican Republicans were in definite agreement on jointure. T. B. Catron had not, according to Frost, shifted his support to consolidation, and was actively engaged in promoting single statehood.[1] Party unity was also disturbed by the action of Governor Hagerman in removing various Territorial officials and in prosecuting Bursum for supposed mishandling of public funds. Thus, although unofficially pledged to support consolidation, the Territorial Party leaders found it necessary to fight a hard campaign to insure delivery of a jointure plank at the Territorial Convention in September.

Frost, via the New Mexican, directed his talents to the purpose of arousing pro-union sentiment in the Territory. With the support of L. C. Hughes of the Tucson Daily Star, the Santa Fean fabricated a scheme to blanket both Territories with pro-jointure literature. These articles were to appear in both Spanish and English to insure adequate

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1) Frost to Bursum, July 3, 1906, Bursum Papers.

CHAPTER II

JUNE TO OCTOBER 1950

The passing of the Statehood Proposal and the unofficial endorsement given it by leading Republicans did not mean that all New Mexican Republicans were in complete agreement on Joint[illegible]. T. E. Cotton had not, according to Pratt, shifted his support to consolidation, and was actively engaged in promoting single statehood.[1] Pratt[illegible] was also disturbed by the action of Governor Mecham in removing various Territorial officials and in prosecuting Eurens for supposed misconduct of public funds. Thus, although officially pledged to support consolidation, the Territorial Party leaders found it necessary to fight a hard campaign to insure delivery of a joint[illegible] Convention in September.

Pratt, via the New Mexican, directed his efforts to the purpose of arousing pro-union sentiment in the Territory. With the support of L. C. Hudson of the Lincoln County Leader, the Santa Fean fabricated a scheme to divorce Territories with pro-joint[illegible] literature. These articles were to appear in both Spanish and English [illegible]

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1) Pratt to Burns, July 6, 1950. Burns Papers.

coverage for all Territorial citizens.[2] Later Frost elaborated and expanded this plan to such a degree that, to be effective, it was estimated the cost of printing and distributing would have exceeded $10,000.[3]

While the newspapers were attempting to popularize jointure, Bursum began addressing individual appeals to Party members. In replying to the request of Judge Rodey to give his intentions regarding consolidation, Bursum said, "I shall do all within my power . . . towards securing the passage and acceptance of this bill." Although "Catron, Field, Clancy, Otero, Judge Laughlin and others" were in opposition to any union with Arizona, Bursum assured Rodey that New Mexico would deliver a 20,000 majority for statehood.[4] Convinced by this statement, Rodey gave his support to the Hamilton plan and offered his services to arouse popular sentiment for union.[5]

In writing to the Party faithful, Bursum appealed to the individual's sense of loyalty to party, economic interests and patriotism to gain support for the proposed consolidation.[6]

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2) L. C. Hughes to Max Frost, July 11, 1906, Bursum Papers.

3) Undated memo entitled, "Plan of 1906 Campaign Prepared by Max Frost," Bursum Papers.

4) Bursum to B. S. Rodey, July 27, 1906, Bursum Papers.

5) Rodey to Bursum, August 14, 1906, Bursum Papers.

6) Bursum to Joaquin Gutierrez, July 21, 1906; Bursum to Lucas E. Gallego, July 28, 1906; Bursum to Joe Brown, August 23, 1906, Bursum Papers.

coverage for all Territorial citizens.[3] Burton strongly sympathized and expanded this plan to a degree that, to be effective, it was assumed the cost of printing and distributing would have exceeded $10,000.[4]

While the newspapers were subscribing to popularize joinsure, Burton began advertising individual appeals to party members. In replying to the request of Judge Mobley to give his intentions regarding consolidation, Burton said, "I shall do all within my power . . . towards securing the passage and acceptance of this bill."[5] Although "Dutton, Field, Clancy, Otero, Lopez [illegible] and others" were in opposition to any union with Arizona, Burton assured Mobley that New Mexico would deliver a [illegible] majority for statehood.[6] Convinced by this assurance, Mobley gave his support to the Hamilton plan and increased his services to arouse popular sentiment for union.[7]

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2) L. C. Burgess to Max Frost, July 31, 1906, Burton Papers.

3) Undated memo entitled, "Plan of L. C. Burgess prepared by Max Frost," Burton Papers.

4) Burton to H. S. Mobley, July 27, 1906, Burton Papers.

5) Mobley to Burton, August 14, 1906, Burton Papers.

6) Burton to Joaquin Gutierrez, July 21, 1906; Burton to Lucas E. Gallegos, July 20, 1906; Burton to Jose Arnoldo, August 20, 1906, Burton Papers.

These appeals were not the only inducements. He stated in a letter to L. O. Fullen of Carlsbad, that jointure would eventually lead to single statehood, that is, with the aid of the representatives and senators gained by statehood, Congress could be induced to allow the State of Arizona to divide into two separate states.

More specifically, the Territories of New Mexico and Arizona would be joined as one state, but the new state would be divided into two local districts. Each district would then elect their own "Attorney General, Treasurer, Auditor, District Attorneys, Judges, and the like." Thus, while under one governor, complete local autonomy could be preserved. Then, with the aid of the state's representatives in Congress, a division could take place when opposition to single statehood waned.[7] In a letter to Daniel H. McMillan of Denver, Bursum elaborated on this thesis by advocating that in drafting the constitution for the new state an article should be inserted to make such a districting possible.[8]

This plan had first been utilized by Bursum in March of 1906, but until July he had not seen fit to use it as a serious pro-jointure inducement.[9] In fact, his allusions

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7) July 21, 1906, Bursum Papers.

8) July 21, 1906, Bursum Papers.

9) Bursum to Miguel A. Otero, March 28, 1906, Otero Papers.

These appeals were not the only indications. As stated in a letter to L. C. Julian of Durango, such jolnsure would eventually lead to single statehood, that is, with the aid of the representatives and senators gained by statehood, Congress could be induced to allow the people of Arizona to divide into two separate states.

More specifically, the territories of New Mexico and Arizona would be joined as one state, and the new state would be divided into two equal districts. Each district would then elect their own Attorney General, Treasurer, Auditor, District Attorney, Judges, and the like." Thus, while under one governor, complete local autonomy would be preserved. Then, with the aid of the state's representatives in Congress, a civil[illegible] would take place when opposition to single statehood ceased. In a letter to Daniel M. Mcallen of Denver, Burum predicted on this basis, advocating that in drafting the constitution for the new state an article should be inserted to make such a division possible.[8]

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7) July 21, 1906, Burum Papers.

8) July 21, 1906, Burum Papers.

9) Burum to Miguel A. Otero, March 20, 1906, Otero Papers.

to this "two-in-one" proposal are limited to those letters previously cited and an additional one to L. C. Hughes of Tucson. The letter to the Arizona editor was in the nature of a feeler to determine the sentiment in Arizona on such a proposal.[10]

Although this argument was used rather sparingly, it is worthy of consideration as an indication of the strategy of the campaign and the seriousness of the statehood question to the Territories involved. The possibility of the joining of two Territories with a constitutional provision allowing for the existence of two almost autonomous districts involves a question of Constitutional precedent. The United States Constitution expressly states that,

> New States may be admitted by the Congress into this Union; but no new State shall be formed or erected within the Jurisdiction of any other State; nor any State be formed by the Junction of two or more States, or parts of States, without the Consent of the legislature of the States concerned as well as of the Congress.[11]

The privilege of division, though authorized by the Constitution, has been seldom granted. In very few instances has Congress seen fit to allow the creation of a new State within the boundaries of another. One instance of this occurred when Texas was annexed to the United States. The annexation resolution of March 1, 1845,

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10) August 15, 1906, Bursum Papers.

11) Art. 4, Sec. 3.

to this "two-in-one" proposal are likely to [illegible] previously often put an additional one in D. [illegible] Tucson. The letter to the Arizona editor was [illegible] of a leader to determine the position in Arizona on such a proposal.[10]

Although this argument was used [illegible], it is worthy of consideration as an indication of the attitude of the campaign and the antagonisms [illegible] to the Territories involved. The possibility of the joining of two Territories with a constitutional provision allowing for the existence of two almost autonomous [illegible] involves a question of constitutional proportions. The United States Constitution expressly states that:

> New States may be admitted by this Congress into this Union; but no new State shall be formed or erected within the jurisdiction of any other State; nor any State be formed by the junction of two or more States, or parts of states, without the consent of the legislatures of the States concerned as well as of the Congress.[11]

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10) August 10, 1906, [illegible] Gazette.

11) Art. 4, Sect. 3.

stated that Texas would be authorized to create "New States of convenient size, not exceeding four in number, in addition to said State of Texas." West Virginia, during the Civil War, was admitted into the Union even though the area of this State was within the boundaries of the secession State of Virginia. Congress allowed West Virginia admission to the Union on the grounds that this part of Virginia "might maintain a loyal State for the government of the whole State."[12]

The unusual circumstances surrounding these pre-Civil War and Civil War acts were such that Congress obviously felt justified in granting consent to divide a State, but would it see a like justification when viewing the proposal to divide the proposed State of Arizona? If jointure were accepted, would the pro-consolidation Congress approve the Bursum proposed constitutional provision that would allow the creation of two autonomous areas within one State?

It will be remembered that after a long debate, Congress had authorized Territorial consolidation. Although the original proposal had been modified to allow New Mexico and Arizona to vote on joint statehood, it seemed highly doubtful that the Administration would approve of the total destruction of its measure by accepting such an unusual clause in the State's constitution. The remote possibility of Territorial acceptance of jointure further removed this plan

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12) Thomas James Norton, The Constitution of the United States: Its Sources and Its Application (New York: America's Future, Inc., 1946), pp. 164-165.

stated that Texas would be authorized to create "new States of convenient size, not exceeding four in number, in addition to said State of Texas." West Virginia, during the Civil War, was admitted into the Union even though the area of this State was within the boundaries of the secession State of Virginia. Congress allowed West Virginia admission to the Union on the grounds that this part of Virginia "must maintain a loyal State for the government of the whole State."[12]

The unusual circumstances surrounding these pre-Civil War and Civil War acts were such that Congress obviously felt justified in granting consent to divide a State, but would it see a like justification when vitiating the proposal to divide the proposed State of Arizona? If joint bills were accepted, would the pro-consolidation Congress approve the Bureau proposed constitutional provision that would allow the creation of two autonomous areas within one State?

It will be remembered that under a long dead-ends, Congress had authorized Territorial consolidation. Although the original proposal had been modified to allow New Mexico and Arizona to vote on joint statehood, it seems highly doubtful that the Administration would approve of the total destruction of its measure by accepting such an urgent change in the State's condition. The remote possibility of Territorial acceptance of joint-use or per-Territory bills

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(12) Thomas James Norton, The Constitution of the United States: Its Sources and Its Application (New York: American's Future, Inc., 1941), pp. 104-105.

from any serious consideration. Bursum, the fabricator of the scheme, utilized it so sparingly that one doubts if he seriously considered the matter. The extreme complexity of the plan would limit the possibility of its fruition at a time when cooperative action was not often attainable. Therefore, this argument was a positive -- if weak -- propaganda technique utilized as a sop to induce the support of jointure by dangling the lure of possible single statehood.

In his letter to McMillan, Bursum had expressed sincere doubts about Arizona's acceptance of jointure, but argued that New Mexico's support of consolidation "[would] increase her chances in securing some favorable legislation in the coming session of Congress."[13] This last argument lacks the positive appeal contained in the grandiose scheme of "separation through jointure," but it seemed to be the most practical of any of the arguments regarding the joint statehood question.

The newspapers continued to speak for consolidation, but without any hope of a miraculous transformation in the sentiment of Territorial citizens. Frost, continuing his campaign through the New Mexican, had heard rumors to the effect that the Democratic Party would endorse joint statehood,[14] but this did not change the situation of general

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13) Loc. cit., Bursum Papers.

14) Max Frost to Bursum, July 28, 1906, Bursum Papers.

from any serious consideration. Burns, the technician of the scheme, utilized it as a gimmick but did seem to be seriously considered the matter. The serious complexity of the plan would limit the practicality of its realization at a time when cooperative action was not often attainable. Therefore, this argument was a positive -- if weak -- propaganda technique utilized as a sop to induce the support of Jointure by dangling the lure of possible statehood.

In his letter to McKinley, Burns had expressed sincere doubts about Arizona's acceptance of Jointure, but argued that New Mexico's support of consolidation "would increase her chances in securing some favorable legislation in the coming session of Congress."[13] This last argument lacks the positive appeal contained in the grandiose schemes of "separation through Jointure," but it seemed to be the most practical of any of the arguments regarding the joint statehood question.

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13) Loc. cit., Burns to Frost.

14) Max Frost to Burns, July 30, 1906, Burns to Frost.

apathy towards consolidation in most areas of the Territory. Although Frost continued to circulate pro-jointure literature throughout the Territories of Arizona and New Mexico, the gains from this labor were partially off-set by anti-consolidation propaganda emanating from Arizona and New Mexico sources.[15]

Ex-Governor Otero, unreconciled to union with Arizona, engaged in writing letters to the newspapers denouncing the stand made by some prominent New Mexico Republicans in supporting joint statehood.[16] According to Frost, Otero had stated that the anti-jointure Republicans were going to organize and run Charles Springer of Colfax County for Territorial Delegate against Republican Delegate Andrews.[17]

T. B. Catron also was much disturbed over the possibility of joint statehood. Refusing to recognize the measure as a Party issue, Catron attacked jointure as a harmful proposal. In a letter to a Mr. Burns of Tierra Amarilla, he denounced the proposed land grants to schools as overvalued and, in reality, worthless. His chief complaint, however, dealt with the fear that if the consolidation took place the Anglos of Arizona would dominate and eventually disfranchise the Spanish-speaking peoples of New Mexico.[18]

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15) Max Frost to Bursum, August 11, 1906, Bursum Papers.

16) Socorro Chieftain, August 18, 1906, p. 1. Quoted from the Santa Fe New Mexican, August 14, 1906.

17) Max Frost to Bursum, August 14, 1906, Bursum Papers.

18) T.B. Catron to T. D. Burns, August 6, 1906, in Marion Dargan Papers (Coronado Room, University of New Mexico Library). Cited hereafter as the Dargan Papers.

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15) Max Frost to Catron, August 12, 1909, Catron Papers.

16) Socorro Chieftain, August 19, 1909, p. 1. Quoted from the Santa Fe New Mexican, August 14, 1909.

17) Max Frost to Catron, August 14, 1909, Catron Papers.

18) T.B. Catron to C. M. Conway, August 6, 1909, in Mexican Papers (Coronado Room, University of New Mexico Library). Cited hereafter as Mexican Papers.

With these vociferous recalcitrants to contend with, Bursum began placing more emphasis upon the Party aspect of the proposed union by calling it "a Republican measure . . . urged by President Roosevelt, who is probably the best friend the West has ever had."[19] This appeal to party loyalty was not duplicated in the Arizona Territory. In fact, on August 4, 1906, the Republican Party Convention "reiterate[d] its unalterable opposition to the proposed jointure of New Mexico and Arizona as a state."[20] Sturgess, Arizona Republican Party Chairman, in notifying Bursum of this action requested that New Mexico Conventioners adopt a similar resolution.[21] In reply, the New Mexican congratulated Sturgess on his appointment to the chairmanship but held firm in his support of joint statehood.[22]

This firmness of purpose was somewhat disputed by a letter from Charles E. Ross:

> "The New Mexican, I see has come out for Jointure, but it looks so half-hearted that reading between [the] lines and knowing what I do, I can see outcropings of your and Mr. Luna's decided wish to see jointure defeated . . ."[23]

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19) Bursum to Joe Brown, August 23, 1906, Bursum Papers.

20) W. S. Sturgess to Bursum, August 11, 1906, Bursum Papers.

21) Ibid.

22) August 21, 1906, Bursum Papers.

23) Ross to Bursum, August 10, 1906, Bursum Papers.

With these vociferous sentiments so on the wane, Burnam began placing more emphasis upon the early adoption of the proposed union by quoting, in a typical manner, . . . urged by President Roosevelt, who is ironical, the best friend the West has ever had.[19] This appeal to party loyalty was not duplicated in the Arizona Territory. In fact, on August 4, 1906, the Republican Party Convention "expressed[20] the unalterable opposition to the proposed jointure of New Mexico and Arizona as a state."[20] Everyone, Arizona's Republican Party Chairman, in notifying Burnam of this action responded that New Mexico Conventioneers adopt a similar resolution.[21] In reply, the New Mexico convention telegraphed Burnam on the appointment to the conference committee and said Arizona's support of joint statehood.[22]

This firmness of purpose was somewhat disrupted by a letter from Charles R. Hess:

> "The New Mexicans, I see has come out for Jointure, but it looks to me half-hearted that resolution, because, the time and manner, I do, I can see outcroppings of joy and Mr. Lewis's cordial wish to see jointure defeated . . . ."[23]

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19) Burnam to Lewis Frost, August 23, 1906, Burnam Papers.

20) R. S. Stroupe to Burnam, August 11, 1906, Burnam Papers.

21) Ibid.

22) August 21, 1906, Burnam Papers.

23) Hess to Burnam, August 16, 1906, Burnam Papers.

What Ross knew or thought he knew was unimportant, but it is important to note that the sincerity of the scheme was doubted by an ex-employee of Bursum's residing at that time in Havana,Cuba. Mr. Ross may have been misinformed, but it is noteworthy that such a distant observer saw an element of half-heartedness in the campaign.[24]

This note of lethargy was inevitable in a campaign that was generally conceded as foredoomed to failure. The Albuquerque Morning Journal, the earliest and often loudest supporter of consolidation, admitted freely that Arizona would block joint statehood but, as did Frost and Bursum in their personal letters, urged the support of jointure in New Mexico on the grounds of enhancing Territorial chances in pleasing the Roosevelt Administration. This display of loyalty, they hoped, would prompt the President to aid New Mexico in its desire of single statehood.[25]

The action of the Arizona Republicans in no way deterred New Mexico politicos from gathering support for statehood. Instead, it intensified activities within the Territory. The Northern New Mexico counties were particularly urged to cooperate on the issue of statehood, and special attention was paid to San Miguel County. This County could,

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24) Ibid.

25) August 3, p. 6.

what does seem or should be with an opposition, and it is important to note that the strength of the armour was doubled by an expenditure of surplus revenues, not in Havana, Cuba. Nor, as I have been told, could it be noteworthy that such a display occurred and in element of half-heartedness in the demonstration.

This note of leisurely air pervades, as a dominant theme, was generally conceived as introducing an airline. The Alburquerque Morning Journal, the editorial organ of the party of consolidation, immediately treated the airline with close joint attendance but, as did great an public in their personal letters, urged the support of joint-use in New Mexico on the grounds of annoying Territorial Delegate Lee Slaughter the Roosevelt Administration. This display, it is said, so hoped, would prompt the President to grant New Mexico the desire of single statehood.

The action of the Arizona Republicans in no way deterred New Mexico Republicans from pursuing single statehood. Instead, it intensified activities within the Territory. The Northern New Mexico counties were particularly urged to cooperate on the issue of statehood, and special attention was paid to San Miguel County. Mora County, [illegible]

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24) Ibid.

25) August 3, p. 8.

according to Bursum, balance the scales in favor of statehood.[26] The strength of jointure in San Miguel County was being undermined by an anti-consolidation faction led by Secundino Romero, of Las Vegas. With prompt action, Andrews, Bursum and Frost whipped the erring Central Committee Member into line and assured themselves of the loyalty of this important area before the meeting of the Convention.[27]

In spite of this slight gain, little enthusiasm was displayed in the Northern Counties, nor was there "a great deal of enthusiasm anywhere in the Territory with reference to statehood, either for or against."[28] This did not mean that there was no heat generated in Party ranks, but it did mean that there was no excitement in evidence among the mass of voters.

The ill-will within the Party was partially traceable to the actions of Governor Hagerman. The Hagerman Administration had, as previously noted, made it a policy to replace the officials of the previous administration with those of the Governor's choosing. This policy had generated ill feeling among Party members to such a degree that Hagerman was accused of undermining the solidarity of the

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26) Bursum to Eugenio Romero, September 8, 1906, Bursum Papers.

27) Frost to Bursum, August 14, 1906; Bursum to Frost August 21, 1906, Frost to Bursum, August 22, 1906; Bursum to Romero, September 8, 1906. Bursum Papers.

28) Bursum to Frost, August 23, 1906, Bursum Papers.

according to Burnam, balance was reduced in favor of Stitzenhood.[26] The strength of Johnson in the Lodge party was being undermined by an anti-democratic faction led by Secundino Romero, of Las Vegas, Frank Crosby, Antonio Burnam and Frost without the strong support of Stitzenhood moved into line and assured themselves of the loyalty of the important area before the meeting of the convention.

In spite of this slight gain, little enthusiasm was displayed in the northern counties, for was there "a great deal of enthusiasm anywhere in the Territory with reference to statehood, either for or against."[27] This did not mean that there was no hard campaigning in party ranks, nor did it mean that there was no bickering in evidence among the ranks of voters.

The ill-will within the Party was partially traceable to the actions of Governor Hagerman. The Hagerman administration had, as previously noted, made it a policy to replace the officials of the previous administration with those of the Governor's choosing. This policy had generated ill feeling among Party members to such a degree that Hagerman was accused of undermining the authority of the

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26) Burnam to Romero, September 6, 1906, Burnam Papers.

27) Frost to Burnam, August 16, 1906; Romero to Frost August 21, 1906; Frost to Burnam, August 22, 1906; Romero to Romero, September 6, 1906. Burnam Papers.

28) Burnam to Frost, August 22, 1906, Burnam Papers.

Territorial Republican Party and seriously threatening its hegemony in New Mexico.[29] Hagerman had also taken a definite stand in opposition to both W. H. Andrews and Bursum, and labored assiduously to block the continuance of their Party leadership in New Mexico.[30]

Pressure was brought to bear to force Bursum's resignation as Chairman of the Territorial Party. Using the scandal connected with the investigation of the finances of the Territorial Pennitentiary as a means to ease Bursum from his dominant position, requests were forthcoming to prompt a speedy resignation. Will Robinson, editor of the Register-Tribune, in a note to Bursum, via W. E. Martin, contended that, guilty or not guilty of malfeasance in office, Bursum should resign leadership in the interest of Party honor.[31] In a more public condemnation, the Albuquerque Morning Journal, whose editor, according to Bursum, had allied himself temporarily with the Hagerman forces,[32] launched a series of scathing attacks on the ex-Superintendent for his supposed misconduct in office.[33]

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29) Granville Pendleton to Bursum, August 26, 1906, Bursum Papers. Governor Hagerman had forced Pendleton to resign his post as President of the Territorial Bureau of Immigration.

30) Frost to Bursum, August 25, 1906, Bursum Papers.

31) August 25, 1906, Bursum Papers.

32) Bursum to James J. McNary, August 15, 1906, Bursum Papers.

33) Daniel H. McMillan to Bursum, September 6, 1906, Bursum Papers.

Territorial Republican Party was particularly unknown in the hegemony in New Mexico. [29] Republicans did have a definite stand in opposition to Octa [illegible], [illegible] and labored manfully to close the convenience of [illegible] leadership in New Mexico. [30]

Pressure was brought to bear [illegible] resignation as Chairman of the Territorial Party. During the months connected with the investigation of the Tiaders in the Territorial Penitentiary as a means to escape from his dominant position, requests were forthcoming to provoke a speedy resignation. Will Robinson, editor of the Santa Fe Republican, in a note to Fornoy, via R. Perkin, contended that, guilty or not guilty of activities in Tiaders, Otero should resign leadership in the interest of Party. [31] In a more public condemnation, the Albuquerque Morning Journal, whose editor, according to Otero, had allied himself temporarily with the Hagerman forces, [32] sanctioned a series of scathing attacks on the ex-superintendent for his supposed misconduct in office. [33]

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29) Granville Pendleton to Fornoy, August 20, 1906, Bureau Papers. [illegible] Republican Party [illegible] Territorial [illegible] Immigration.

30) Frost to Otero, August 8, 1906, Bureau Papers.

31) August 7, 1906, Bureau Papers.

32) Burton to James A. Armstrong, [illegible], 1906, Bureau Papers.

33) Daniel [illegible] to Fornoy, [illegible], 1906, Bureau Papers.

Mr. Robinson's request was viewed by Bursum as having been inspired by Governor Hagerman,[34] while the general tone of the newspaper attack was seen by McMillan as sponsored by the same party.[35] McMillan further contended that Hagerman had deserted to Catron and that Catron was the true schemer behind the attempt to oust Bursum from his Chairmanship and Andrews from his position as the Territorial Delegate to Congress.[36]

On September 4, 1906, Governor Hagerman issued a proclamation reapportioning the representation of each County and District.[37] This reapportionment was viewed by Bursum as harmful to the best interest of Catron since it seriously encroached upon the representative power of Santa Fe County. From this action Bursum surmised that Hagerman was more influenced by Bradford Prince than by Catron.[38]

Generally, the reapportionment, though viewed as one of doubtful legality by Bursum,[39] was a boon to the Party faithful. The preponderance of representation given to

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34) Bursum to E. A. Cahoon, August 27, 1906; Bursum to McMillan, loc. cit., Bursum Papers.

35) McMillan to Bursum, loc. cit., Bursum Papers.

36) Ibid.

37) Proclamation By The Governor of New Mexico, copy in Bursum Papers.

38) Bursum to McMillan, September 8, 1906, Bursum Papers.

39) Ibid.

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37) Proclamation by The Governor of New Mexico, copy in Burgum Papers.

38) Burgum to McMillan, September 8, 1908, Burgum Papers.

39) Ibid.

San Miguel County, plus the fact that the Republican organization in that County had been brought back into line, was viewed as a most fortunate occurrence. But the biggest boon was the fusion of Santa Fe and Sandoval Counties into the Tenth District.[40] Catron, whose party loyalty was often doubtful, had long controlled Santa Fe County, but Bursum hoped to undermine this authority by a skillful maneuver. He planned to have Alejandro Sandoval nominated for the Council. The popularity of Sandoval, thought Bursum, would be so great that he would easily carry Sandoval County, and perhaps this landslide would prompt the regulars in Santa Fe to support him.[41] This strategen was much applauded by Frost who saw it, as did Bursum, as a way to gain control from Catron and keep that district on the "regular side."[42]

On September 5, 1906, the Republican Central Committee met in Albuquerque to determine whether or not to endorse Andrews as Territorial Delegate and Bursum as Chairman. The Committee, according to Bursum, "stood up nobly" and the delegates froze out Hagerman in no uncertain terms. Hagerman had attended the meeting, said Bursum, "solely to see the Chairman of the Committee ousted."[43] In spite of the attacks

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40) Proclamation, loc. cit., Bursum Papers.

41) Bursum to Solomon Luna, September 8, 1906, Bursum Papers.

42) Frost to Bursum, September 10, 1906, Bursum Papers.

43) Bursum to McMillan, September 8,1906,Bursum Papers.

San Miguel County, plus the fact that a Democratic organization in Guadalupe County had been brought back into line, was viewed as a most fortunate occurrence. But the biggest blow was the fusion of Santa Fe and Sandoval counties into the Tenth District.[40] Burton, whose party loyalty was otherwise doubtful, had long controlled Santa Fe County, but Ortega hoped to undermine this authority by a skillful maneuver. He planned to have Alejandro Sandoval nominated for the Council. The popularity of "Sandoval", thought Ortega, would be so great that he would easily carry Sandoval County, and perhaps this Mandalite would promote the regulars in Santa Fe to support him.[41] This strategem was soon abandoned by Frost who saw it, as did Ortega, as a way to gain control from Burton and keep the District on the "regular side."[42]

On September 5, 1905, the Republican Central Committee met in Albuquerque to determine whether or not to endorse Andrews as Territorial Delegate and Ortega as Chairman. The Committee, according to Ortega, "stood up nobly" and the delegates from our Regular in no uncertain terms. Ortega had attended the meeting, said Ortega, "solely to see the Chairman of the committee onsted."[43] In spite of the attempt

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40) Proclamation, loc. cit., Ortega papers.

41) Ortega to Solomon Luna, September 5, 1905, Ortega papers.

42) Frost to Ortega, September 10, 1905, Ortega papers.

43) Ortega to Mantlan, September 5, 1905, Ortega papers.

sustained by Bursum and Andrews from the Albuquerque Journal, the Central Committee unanimously endorsed both parties. In fact, Bursum contended that he was forced to restrain his friends from passing a censure against the Governor.[44]

The success of the pro-jointure forces at the Central Committee meeting and the fortunate provisions of the reapportionment were no assurance that the Convention, scheduled for September 29, 1906, would endorse joint statehood. To this goal action was immediately addressed, but the campaign was handicapped by a lack of both funds and interest. Frost felt that the New Mexican was doing all it could to promote the issue, but wrote,

> I find that north and east of here there is very little joint statehood sentiment among the native people. Indeed, it is quite the reverse . . . . There is not a day but I talk to two or three people from different sections and they are united in the opinion given above. Of course, I doctor the interviews to make them as favorable as possible to joint statehood, but there is more wind than anything else to them. Still this is the only way to build up public sentiment and do good.[45]

The necessity of favorable publicity prompted Republican leaders to take a serious interest in the purchase and control of newspapers. The investigation of the penitentiary was receiving much publicity which did not reflect

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44) Ibid.

45) Frost to Bursum, September 7, 1906, Bursum Papers.

sustained by arrows and bullets from the *Alexandrine Lutrin*. The Central Committee immediately endorsed both parties. In fact, Zayam contended that he was forced to restrain his friends from passing a unanimous against the Government.[44]

The success of the pro-Zaghloul forces at the Central Committee meeting and the tremendous ovations of the Wafd-portionment were no assurance that the Convention, scheduled for September 25, 1926, would endorse Zaghloul. To this goal action was immediately addressed, but the campaign was handicapped by a lack of both funds and interest. Fouad felt that the *New Egyptian* was doing all it could to promote the issue, but wrote,

> I find that Sarwat and Ahmed Ziwar there is very little joint effort and enthusiasm among the native people. Indeed, it is quite the reverse . . . . Every day but I talk to two or three people from different sections and they are nothing in the opinion given about . . . . I confer for the interviews to take place as invisible as possible to joint meetings, and there is more wind than anything else to them. Still ours is the only way to build up public sentiment against . . . .

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44) Ibid.

45) Fouad to Sarwat, September 1, 1926, *Sarwat papers*.

favorably on the leadership of the Republican Party of New Mexico. Several newspapers had taken a definite stand against Bursum and therefore the leadership and goals of the Party.[46]

Of all the anti-Bursum papers the Albuquerque Morning Journal received the most attention. In a letter to Bursum, Daniel McMillan had earnestly advocated an attempt to control this paper. He stated philosophically:

> You know that the disposition of humanity in the main is to believe every charge or insinuation that is made, and this is not always corrected even by downright and positive proof to the contrary, so that in the general status of affairs in New Mexico, it seems imperative that you should control the Journal.[47]

The need to control the Journal was eagerly granted by the Chairman, but Bursum saw that it should be controlled by McMillan, who could guide it in supporting the Party. In McMillan's hands Bursum saw the Journal as a potent force in influencing Territorial voters.[48] With this reply, McMillan launched his detailed plan to obtain the Journal. According to McMillan, McPherson, the owner of the paper, was in a cramped financial situation. McPherson also owned the local waterworks and had, in April of 1906, attempted to sell it to the City of Albuquerque. This attempt was

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46) Some of these newspapers were the Springer Stockman; San Juan Democrat; Santa Fe Eagle and the Albuquerque Morning Journal. Frost to Bursum, September 10, 1906, Bursum Papers.

47) September 6, 1906, Bursum Papers.

48) Bursum to McMillan, September 8, 1906, Bursum Papers.

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(46) Some of these newspapers were the Springer Stockman; San Juan Democrat; Santa Fe Sangre and the Albuquerque Morning Journal. Frost to Burrus, September 10, 1906, Burrus Papers.

(47) September 6, 1906, Burrus Papers.

(48) Burrus to McMillan, September 6, 1906, Burrus Papers.

blocked by the Albuquerque Citizen, owned and controlled by Solomon Luna. McMillan planned with Bursum's aid to induce Luna to support the sale of this privately owned utility to the City if McPherson would consent to sell out his interest in the Journal. Of course this plan had many stipulations which would require some machination, but McMillan stated:

> I think with a reasonably small distribution of gratuities that sufficient influence can be secured to justify the Council and the people [,] by their vote, in approving the acquisition of the water works plant by the City.[49]

This scheme, though elaborate, was based on so many political "ifs" that it is doubtful whether such a plan was attempted. No letters or documents have been found to suppose that such an arrangement was reached, but whether successful or a failure, it illustrates the lengths that the participants were willing to go to gain an advantage. At this time, Bursum seriously considered the purchase of more stock in the Las Vegas Optic. Andrews and Bursum already possessed 128 shares of capital stock that had been purchased on January 30, 1905.[50] McNary, owner and editor, wished to sell his paper for $15,000 but desired to retain $3,000 worth of shares.[51] Paul A. Walter, manager of the New Mexico

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49) McMillan to Bursum, September 15, 1906, Bursum Papers.

50) Contract, loc. cit., Bursum Papers.

51) James G. McNary to Bursum, August 16, 1906, Bursum Papers.

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49) McMillan to Burnum, September 15, 1906, Burnum Papers.

50) Contract, loc. cit., Burnum Papers.

51) James O. McKary to Burnum, August 16, 1906, Burnum Papers.

Printing Company, investigated the possibilities of the Optic printing plant and, in a letter to Bursum, stated that McNary's price was too high. Walter, acting as the Chairman's agent, had offered $12,000 for the paper[52] which McNary, in his letter to Bursum, emphatically refused.[53]

Max Frost continued to urge that Bursum seriously negotiate the purchase of the Optic because he thought "the purchase [would] prove of benefit, political[ly] and financial[ly] . . . ." Frost offered to go in on the purchase[54] and later volunteered to direct the general policy of the paper if the purchase were made.[55] Delegate Andrews was also interested in this purchase[56] as were other prominent Republicans, such as Messrs. Pierce, Spies, Kelly and Judge Mills.[57] However, McNary's reluctance to sell at what he considered an unjust price seemingly killed the transaction.[58]

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52) August 11, 1906, Bursum Papers.

53) August 13, 1906, Bursum Papers.

54) Frost to Bursum, August 16, 1906, Bursum Papers.

55) August 22, 1906, Bursum Papers.

56) McNary to Bursum, August 20, 1906, Bursum Papers.

57) McNary to Bursum, September 11, 1906, Bursum Papers.

58) No further reference is given to the purchase of the Las Vegas Optic in the Bursum Papers, and no record has been found of any such purchase having been made. It is then assumed, given Mr. Bursum's penchant for carefully preserving all records of such transactions, that the deal was not, at this time, consummated.

Printing Company, investigated the possibilities of the Optic printing plant and, in a letter to Bureau, stated that McNary's price was too high. Walker, acting as the Chairman's agent, had offered $12,000 for the paper[52] which McNary, in his letter to Bureau, emphatically refused.[53]

Max Frost continued to urge that Bureau actually negotiate the purchase of the Optic because he thought "the purchase [would] prove of benefit, political [ly] and financial [ly] . . . ."[54] Frost offered to go in on the purchase and later volunteered to direct the general policy of the paper if the purchase were made.[55] Delegate Andrews was also interested in this purchase[56] as were other prominent Republicans, such as Messrs. Pierce, Spies, Reily and Judge Mills.[57] However, McNary's reluctance to sell at what he considered an unjust price seemingly killed the transaction.[58]

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The examples of the proposed purchases of prominent New Mexico newspapers illustrate the power of the press at this time. The need for more favorable propaganda outlets and the desire to silence adverse editorial comments indicate that the importance of proper press releases were neither overlooked nor depreciated. In fact, the possibility of the formation of an anti-jointure daily, the Las Vegas News, impelled McNary to urge a decisive countering action. The Optic editor suggested that political pressure be brought to bear on the editor of this paper to prevent any damage to the Party program.[59]

The scramble to buy newspapers did not mean that the existing outlets could not cope with the volume and scope of the pro-jointure arguments. A sampling of newspaper comment revealed few new developments in the arguments for consolidation. Although Bursum's comments to the press were intended to show a definite gain for jointure in Arizona, it became apparent that such was not the case.[60] Both the Santa Fe New Mexican and the Albuquerque Morning Journal voiced the sentiment that Arizona would definitely defeat

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59) McNary urged that Bursum, Spies, Mills and Eugenio Romero exercise their prestige to prevent the editor -- Secundino Romero, a member of the Territorial Central Committee from San Miguel County -- from the pursuit of this harmful policy. McNary to Bursum, September 11, 1906, Bursum Papers.

60) Socorro Chieftain, August 11, 1906, p. 1.

The examples of the proposed amendment of a constitutional New Mexico newspapers illustrate the temper of the press at this time. The need for more law-and-order propaganda outlines and the desire to silence adverse editorial comment indicate that the importance of proper press relations were neither overlooked nor depreciated. Instead, the possibility of the formation of an anti-politicians party, the Las Vegas News, impelled Hubbard to urge a cooperative advertising action. The Optic editor suggested that political pressure to bring to bear on the editor of this paper to prevent any damage to the Party program.[50]

The attempts to buy newspapers did not mean that the existing editors could not coop with the voices and hoops of the pro-politicians arrangement. A majority of newspaper comment revealed the new journalistic trend in the direction of consolidation. Although attempts failed to the press were intended to save a political life for politicians in Arizona, it became apparent that either way the case. So, in Santa Fe New Mexican and the Albuquerque Morning Journal voiced the sentiment that Prison would certainly result

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50) Mosier, op. cit., p. 1. Mosier, op. cit., p. 1. Romero explains that Hubbard, in trying to persuade the editor -- Secundino Romero, a member of the Territorial Council, committee from San Miguel County -- from the editorial or this harmful policy, pledged to support, moreover if, Romero, Pueblo Indian.

50) Socorro Chieftain, August 11, 1910, p. 1.

the union of the two Territories.[61] The condemnation of Arizona's stand was intensified in these editorials, and the familiar charge of corporate selfishness was levied with increasing fervor by these pro-consolidation advocates.[62] This villification did not reverse the recognized fact that Arizona stood opposed to joint statehood.

Perhaps no other person realized the inevitability of this defeat more than the Territorial Republican Chairman. In a letter to Charles Spies, Bursum expounded and elaborated the strategy of gaining favor with the administration:

> The President would no doubt appreciate any active co-operation on your part towards securing this plank [joint statehood] as an act of friendship to his administration. Arizona will, I believe, turn this proposition . . . down; at the same time Arizona will not be able in the future as she has not in the past received any favors at the hands of the present administration. I do not think that it will so much effect our chances for statehood which ever way the Convention might determine to act, but it will very vitally [sic] effect the standing of our representative at Washington, and our chances for receiving appropriations and favors at the hands of Congress and especially will it, in my judgment, affect the chances of Las Vegas in obtaining a substantial appropriation for a public building. Albuquerque has received, or will receive a hundred thousand dollars; there is no reason why Las Vegas should no[t] receive as much or more. You can explain the necessity of this plank to your people so that it will not hurt you with them in the local campaign.[63]

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61) Santa Fe New Mexican, September 24, 1906, p. 2; Albuquerque Morning Journal, August 30, 1906, p. 6.

62) Ibid.

63) The last sentence obviously alludes to the fact that there was considerable anti-jointure sentiment in the Las Vegas area. September 8, 1906, Bursum Papers.

the union of the two territories.[81] The condemnation of Arizona's stand was intensified in these editorials, and the familiar charge of corporate selfishness was levied with increasing fervor by these pro-consolidation advocates.[82] This vilification did not reverse the recognized fact that Arizona stood opposed to joint statehood.

Perhaps no other person realized the inevitability of this defeat more than the Territorial Republican Chairman. In a letter to Charles Spiess, Barnes expounded and discounted the strategy of gaining favor with the administration:

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82) Ibid.

83) The last sentence obviously alludes to the fact that there was considerable anti-Spiess sentiment in the Las Vegas area. September 8, 1906, Barnes Papers.

The pragmatic tone of this letter emphasized the realities of the situation. Obviously the strength of such an appeal is based on special interests. In fact, the practicability of such a maneuver discloses a grasp of fundamentals that is to be more admired than depreciated.

Bursum modified this argument in addressing other local politicos. In letters to W. F. Buchanan, of Tucumcari, and W. A. Hawkins, legal advisor to the El Paso and Southwestern Railroad, Bursum stressed the point that support for jointure would result in Presidential favor, which in turn would lead to eventual single statehood under the auspices of the Roosevelt Administration.[64]

The preceding letters, though addressed on the same day, show a definite shift of influence in regard to the former letter addressed to Charles Spies. In comparing the latter correspondence to the former letter a most surprising difference is noted. In the letter to Spies it is apparent that the Chairman feels less sure of attaining single statehood than he does in his letters to Buchanan and Hawkins. From this fact it may be surmised that Bursum adjusted his argument to appeal to the addressee's particular viewpoint. Certainly, the inducement of single statehood would excite a much wider interest than the possibility

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64) Bursum to Buchanan, September 8, 1906; Bursum to Hawkins, September 8, 1906, Bursum Papers.

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Burnam modified this argument in advocating other local politics. In letters to R. L. Dunn, of Muncatl, and W. A. Hawkins, legal advisers to the T. P. Ross Southwestern Railroad, Burnam stressed the point that support for Johnson would result in Freeman's favor, which in turn would lead to eventual single establishment under auspices of the Roosevelt administration.

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66) Burnam to Dunnam, Muncatl, T. P. Ross to Hawkins, September 5, 1906, Burnam Papers.

of the beautification of Las Vegas by virtue of a grateful and benevolent government bestowing largess to the faithful.

By virtue of the fluid policy exemplified in the Chairman's letters and the aid from the partisan press, endorsement for jointure became a more tangible hope. Socorro County, Bursum's home ground, dutifully nominated pro-jointure delegates, but other counties were not so easily swayed.[65] For example, in Bernalillo County Hubbell was urged, via Luna, to put up a fight since it appeared that opposition to Andrews and Bursum was gaining ground there.[66] The possibility of a strong opposition in Bernalillo was partially offset by the fact that Torrence, Sandoval, Lincoln and Luna Counties had conformed to the wishes of the Party dignitaries and nominated candidates pledged to support a joint statehood plank at the Convention.[67]

This good news did not reconcile the fact that many areas were still opposed to the plan of union with Arizona. Mora and other Northern Counties had not, in spite of much urging, made a definite pro-consolidation stand. Colfax County particularly was viewed as being a most doubtful

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65) Bursum to Judge M. W. Mills, September 8, 1906, Bursum Papers.

66) Bursum to Luna, September 8, 1906, Bursum Papers.

67) Bursum to Frost, August 23, 1906; Bursum to Frost, September 8, 1906; Bursum to George Sena, September 25, 1906; M. A. Pollard to Bursum, September 25, 1906. Bursum Papers.

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By virtue of the Lynn Lodge's mentioned in the Quarrelsman's letters and the aid from the artisan's union, endorsement for jointure became a practicable hope. Accorro County, Burnum's home ground, traditionally nominated pro-jointure delegates, but other counties were not so easily swayed. For example, in Carmelite County, Mabbett was urged, via letter, to put up a fight since Lambourne had spoken plain to Andrews and Burnum was crushing and early. The probability of a strong opposition in Carmelite was partially circumvented by the last hour Torrence, Sandoval, Lincoln and Lamb Counties had conformed to the wishes of the party dignitaries and nominated qualified "moral" to support a joint statehood plank at the convention.

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65) Burnum to Judge W. W. Mills, September 6, 1903, Burnum Papers.

66) Burnum to Lamb, December 5, 1905, Burnum Papers.

67) Burnum to Lamb, August 24, 1906; Burnum to Proctor, September 8, 1906; Burnum to George Lamb, September 20, 1906; M. A. Pollard to Burnum, September 21, 1906. Burnum Papers.

factor by the informed members of the pro-union group.[68]

In the realm of personalities, Otero still opposed the endorsement of a jointure plank while Catron and Hagerman were feared lest they control the Convention and forestall any resolution supporting the Hamilton proposal.[69] These instances, coupled with the fact that the August meeting of the influential New Mexico Bar Association at Cloudcroft failed to endorse joint statehood, served to dissuade Republican leaders from taking too optimistic a view of the coming convention.[70]

As the Territorial strategists negotiated for support, the national administration tendered what help it could afford. President Roosevelt, seeking to allay the fears of jointure partisans regarding discrimination at the polls, wrote, on September 20, 1906, to Arizona's Governor Kibbey:

> I am sorry to say grave charges have been made to me that under the organization of which you are the active leader there will not be a fair count of the votes on the question of statehood . . . . I have no doubt there is no truth in them; but some prominent people in the United States do believe them, and they are joined in this belief by some of the most prominent people of Arizona and New Mexico. Therefore, to

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68) Frost to Bursum, August 23, 1906; W. A. Hawkins to H. O. Bursum, September 1, 1906, Bursum Papers.

69) Frost to Bursum, August 27, 1906; Frost to Bursum September 25, 1906, Bursum Papers.

70) Santa Fe New Mexican, August 27, 1906, p. 2.

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In the realm of personalities, Otero still opposed the endorsement of a joint-ticket plank while Larson and Hagerman were feared lest they control the Convention and frustrate any resolution supporting the Hamilton proposal.[69] These instances, coupled with the fact that the August meeting of the influential New Mexico Bar Association at Clovis failed to endorse joint statehood, served to dissuade Republican leaders from taking too optimistic a view of the coming convention.[70]

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69) Frost to Bursum, August 27, 1906; Frost to Bursum September 25, 1906, Bursum Papers.

70) Santa Fe New Mexican, August 21, 1906, p. 2.

> avoid all criticism, I direct that, if you can in anyway arrange it, you have representatives of the statehood people present at the canvassing of the votes on statehood. I have sent a copy of this letter to Governor Hagerman and direct him to make the same arrangement -- that is, have representatives from both the statehood and antistatehood [sic] parties present to witness the count of the votes.[71]

The President's missive, a wrist slap to the anti-statehood rooters, did not necessarily encourage the support of jointure, but it did show that Roosevelt still retained an interest in the statehood proposal even if it were dedicated to the avoidance of a national scandal over Territorial elections. However, this letter was not of sufficient propaganda value to utilize in bringing the Party faithful into line. A definite statement emanating from the President's office would undoubtedly have made the passage of a joint statehood resolution a much easier proposition than it then appeared to be. As it was, Catron continued to argue that jointure was not a Party question and did not require the support of loyal Party members.[72]

Newspaper coverage of the Convention was scant, thus the maneuvering peculiar to such meetings was not reported. It may be surmised, however, that the Party whip was vigorously wielded by the Chairman and his cohorts. On the first

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71) Morison (ed.), loc. cit., Vol. V, p. 417.

72) This statement was issued on the eve of the Convention. Albuquerque Morning Journal, September 30, 1906, p.4.

73) Ibid.

day of the Convention, Delegate Andrews was renominated to his important post.[73] The following day saw the endorsement of the joint statehood plan. The Santa Fe New Mexican stated, "[T]he resolution in this regard is strong and to the point. In fact, it was the most visible and most timely policy to advocate and to adopt . . ."[74]

The official action of the Republican Convention demonstrated that the efforts of Party officers were not wasted. The struggle for support had required an expenditure of time and energy for those interested in joint statehood, but it would be safe to say that the real fight had yet to begin. The selling of joint statehood to the voters of New Mexico would not be a particularly easy task, but the Party was committed to try. If sufficient support could be mustered, New Mexico would deliver its pledged majority to the Hamilton Plan in the hope that such an action would gain the favor of the Roosevelt Administration.

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74) October 1, 1906, p. 2.

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[74] October 1, 1906, p. 8.

CHAPTER III

OCTOBER - NOVEMBER: 1906

With the issues of the campaign firmly established, it remained for the party leaders and workers to garner votes for Andrews and consolidation. The Central Committee established headquarters in Albuquerque, where it served as a clearing-house of information and an advisory group for the conduct of the campaign in the various counties. From this vantage point Bursum and his staff directed, cajoled and disciplined the local Republican leaders. The complexity of the campaign is amply demonstrated by the various messages directed to and emitting from headquarters, where the overall strategy of the campaign was planned and effected.

One of the first problems to be presented to the Chairman came from Frank W. Beach of Alamogordo, who revealed a rumor that the Alamogordo shops of the El Paso and Southwestern Railway Company were to be moved to El Paso. The local politicians saw this as a possible curtailment of a rich source of votes. The rumor provoked enough concern to prompt Mr. Beach to state:

> The candidates on our county ticket in Alamogordo are fearful lest the taking away of this element of voters will seriously cripple them in this fight.

Bursum was urged to "act in conjunction with Judge E. A. Mann of the 5th Judicial District," to urge W. A. Hawkins to withhold his company's intended move until after election.[1]

On October 19, 1906, Bursum wrote to Beach assuring him that he would receive free transportation to canvass his district but made no mention of the rumored catastrophe that Beach and his fellows feared. Perhaps Beach's worries were ill founded or possibly the rumored move would not have been accomplished so quickly as to jeopardize the election in Otero County.[2]

As in any campaign the problem of financing was most vexatious. On October 9, 1906, Bursum communicated with W. D. Murray, a Silver City banker, urging that Murray contribute $200 to the campaign fund. The Chairman offered an inducement to contribute by stating,

> I think I can say to you confidentially, that it will be the policy of the Republican party to place the banks of the Territory on an equal basis with other taxpayers. This I believe to be just and right and as you know will considerably benefit the banks of the Territory, who are now obliged to pay sixty per cent valuation, while

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1) October 4, 1906, Bursum Papers.

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> other property holders are making returns on a much less basis. This is of course confidential.[3]

This proposition was offered to several people in the Territory, such as L. O. Fullen, Carlsbad attorney,[4] a Mr. Knight, Santa Fe banker, and M. C. Meechem, a Tucumcari banker.[5] In a letter to E. A. Cahoon, a Roswell banker, Bursum asked for a $200 contribution from Cahoon's bank and a like contribution from a Mr. Bird, another Roswell banker. The Chairman stated, "Albuquerque and Santa Fe have agreed on $500.00 each, and I have written Raton and Las Vegas for similar contributions."[6]

M. C. Meechem, replying to Bursum's request for a contribution, wrote that the Tucumcari banks had already contributed but, if the Committee would dangle the lure of depositing some Party funds in the First National Bank of Tucumcari, additional funds might be secured from that source.[7]

Bursum's quest for funds was not directed solely toward banks and bankers. W. A. Hawkins, head of the legal department of the El Paso and Southwestern Railway, was asked to

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3) Bursum Papers.

4) Bursum to Fullen, October 12, 1906, Bursum Papers.

5) Bursum to Knight, October 12, 1906; Bursum to Meechem, October 12, 1906, Bursum Papers.

6) October 19, 1906, Bursum Papers.

7) October 15, 1906, Bursum Papers.

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[6] October 19, 1906, Burrum Papers.

[7] October 16, 1906, Burrum Papers.

contribute $5,000 to the campaign fund. In this letter Bursum mentions that the Santa Fe Railroad had been asked to contribute a like amount and that both Bursum and Solomon Luna had given, from their personal funds, $1,000 each to the Party treasury.[8]

The Santa Fe Railroad dampened Party hopes somewhat when, on October 17, 1906, H. L. Miedo wrote:

> I laid the matter carefully before President Ripley and, in view of the very severe criticism which corporations are undergoing on account of their participation in public affairs, he is indisposed to take an active part in any form at all having for its object the influencing of sentiment and especially of elections.[9]

This slight rebuff only compounded the general difficulty, always present in a fund drive. In a letter to Secundino Romero of Las Vegas the Chairman lamented the fact that W. H. Andrews was suffering financial difficulties and was unable to contribute to the campaign fund in his usually generous manner. In fact, Bursum contended, the Republicans throughout the Territory were contributing small if not insignificant amounts to the treasury. Since this letter was a refusal by the Central Committee to advance funds to the Party organization in San Miguel County, perhaps it

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8) October 14, 1906, Bursum Papers.

9) This letter was written on Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railway System stationery and, according to the letterhead, emanated from the legal department of that system. Bursum Papers.

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overemphasized the penury of the Central Committee's larder.[10] However, it was noted that Frost complained bitterly that the inability of the Party to promptly pay their printing bills was creating a heavy financial burden on the resources of the New Mexico Printing Company and the personal funds of its owner.[11] This lament gives credence to Bursum's contention that contributions were not flowing freely into the coffers of the Territorial Party.

This dearth of ready cash, coupled with the obvious futility of further propagandizing in the Arizona Territory, forced a change in campaign policy. By agreement with the Central Committee, the editor of the New Mexican ceased sending pro-jointure literature to Arizona and began concentrating on the New Mexico area, especially the Northern Counties. The editor felt that this concentration was necessary because of the numerous amount of anti-jointure articles circulating in the Territory. These pamphlets, according to Frost, were having a telling effect on the areas not yet committed to jointure. Regarding the source of this pernicious propaganda, Frost stated:

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10) October 14, 1906, Bursum Papers.

11) Frost to Bursum, October 15, 1906, Bursum Papers.

overemphasized the penury of the Central Committee's leader.[10] However, it was noted that Frost completed bitterly that the inability of the Party to promptly pay their printing bills was creating a heavy financial burden on the resources of the New Mexico Printing Company and the personal funds of its owner.[11] This lament gives credence to Burum's contention that contributions were not flowing freely into the coffers of the Territorial Party.

This dearth of ready cash, coupled with the obvious futility of further propagandizing in the Arizona Territory, forced a change in campaign policy. By agreement with the Central Committee, the editor of the New Mexican ceased sending pro-Jointure literature to Arizona and began concentrating on the New Mexico area, especially the Northern Counties. The editor felt that this concentration was necessary because of the numerous amount of anti-Jointure articles circulating in the Territory. These pamphlets, according to Frost, were having a telling effect on the areas not yet committed to Jointure. Regarding the source of this pernicious propaganda, Frost stated:

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10) October 14, 1906, Burum Report.

11) Frost to Burum, October 15, 1906, Burum Report.

> Who is doing this, I do not know, but that the money comes from Arizona and that much money is being spent against joint statehood is true as I feel it wherever I turn.[12]

Although the financial resources of the opposition seemed far superior to that of the pro-consolidation forces, the fertile imagination of the Party Chairman produced new ideas to enhance the chances of a Territorial majority for statehood. In a letter to Charles A. Spies, Bursum used an extract from the Inter-State Commerce Act of 1906 to gain allies for jointure:

> From and after May first, nineteen hundred and eight, It shall be unlawful for any railroad company to transport from any State, Territory, or the District of Columbia, to any other State, Territory, or the District of Columbia, or to any foreign country, any article or commodity, other than timber and the manufacture products thereof, manufactured, mined, or produced by it, or under its authority, or which it may own in whole, or in part, or in which it may have any interest direct or indirect except such articles or commodities as may be necessary and intended for its use in the conduct of its business as a common carrier.[13]

In the interpretation of the clause Bursum wrote,

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12) Ibid.

13) Extract attached to a letter from Bursum to Spies, October 15, 1906, Bursum Papers. The above quoted paragraph may be found in U. S., Statutes at Large, XXXIV, Part 1, 585.

Although the internal relations of the monarchies seemed far superior to that of the republics, in the fertile imagination of the Peruvian patriots ideas to enhance the glories of a Peruvian monarchy stalked. In a letter to Castilla, [illegible] extract from the Inter-State Treaties, [illegible] allies for joining:

> Iron and silver may first, [illegible] and sight, [illegible] railroad company to [illegible] State, Territory, or the District of Columbia, to any other State, Territory, or the District of Columbia, or to any foreign country, any article or [illegible] than timber and the [illegible] charcoal, manufactured, [illegible] by it, or under its [illegible], or which may own in whole, or in part, or in which it may have any interest [illegible] except such articles or [illegible] be necessary and [illegible] the consumption of its business in a common carrier.[15]

In the interpretation of the clause [illegible]

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12) Ibid.

13) Extract attached to a [illegible] Spies, October 15, 1900, [illegible]. The above paragraph may be found in U. S., [illegible], Part I, 360.

> I am of the opinion that this law would prohibit the business now carried on by either the Phelps-Dodge people or Mr. Van Houten in the traffic of coal, and perhaps the Santa Fe. If Arizona and New Mexico were joined in one state this would not be the case, for the reason that each state has the right to control its own commerce. I suggest that you bring this matter, if you think it advisable, to the attention of such people who you believe interested.[14]

A similar letter, with extract included, was sent to L. C. Hughes, editor of the Tucson Daily Star. In this letter Mr. Bursum contended that New Mexico would give a "ten thousand [vote] majority for Andrews, and fifteen or twenty thousand [votes] for statehood."[15] These two letters demonstrate the uncanny flexibility of Mr. Bursum's argumentation. The assurance given to Hughes that a majority would be delivered for statehood by New Mexico voters may not have been amiss, but there was little doubt that Arizona would defeat the measure. Certainly, the use of the Inter-State Commerce Act may have created a stir among some Arizona corporations, but it is doubtful that the interpretation given to the particular paragraph would

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14) Ibid. John Van Houten, a member from Colfax County of the Territorial Republican Central Committee, was a Vice President and General Manager of the St. Louis, Rocky Mountain and Pacific Railway Company. His chief duties were those of supervising the extraction of coal from the Company's New Mexican mines. History of New Mexico, loc. cit., Vol. II, p. 1027. The Phelps Dodge Company was actively engaged in the mining of coal at Dawson, New Mexico. Robert Glass Cleland, A History of Phelps Dodge (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1952), p. 133.

15) October 15, 1906, Bursum Papers.

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have been a sufficient impetus to promote a reversal of the prevalent anti-jointure feeling in Arizona. Probably, the extract was a device to add a bit more grist to the pro-statehood mill in that Territory.

In the case of Spies it was evident that the Chairman had ostensibly reversed his plan. As previously noted, Bursum had told Spies that there existed no hope for the passage of joint statehood, but the support of the measure should be scrupulously followed so that an advantage could be gained from a properly grateful Administration.[16] In fact, the Chairman had acted accordingly in allowing the editor of the New Mexican to cease circulating pro-consolidation literature in the Arizona Territory.[17] This reversal may be explained on the grounds that, though the extract was intended to evoke support for jointure, it did not alter the situation in Arizona. That is, the economic appeal did not alter the fact that jointure would be defeated, but the possible support from the mining interest would help New Mexico deliver a majority for the Hamilton measure. It seemed that by this maneuver the politically adroit Chairman hoped to secure a wider majority for statehood rather than seriously entertain any real desire for consolidation.

As the Central Committee issued plans and particulars and solicited funds from the occasionally reluctant Party

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16) Bursum to Spies, September 8, 1906, Bursum Papers.

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16) Burgum to Spies, September 8, 1906, Burgum Papers.

17) Frost to Burgum, October 10, 1906.

members, a continuous stream of information from county politicos poured into campaign headquarters. M. C. Meechem of neighboring Quay County reported that affairs in Guadalupe County required some consideration. From events in that area it was obvious to Meechem that assistance should be obtained from the railroads in order to carry the elections. By careful canvassing it had been determined that over 250 votes could be obtained in the railroad camps of Epris and Sunnyside if Bursum could induce the authorities to permit these men to vote on the issue. Meechem then stated, "Personally I can do nothing as I have been compelled to close the saloon at Epris." By this Meechem meant that verbal rather than liquid measures would be necessary to secure the workers' vote.[18] As regarded Quay County, Bursum's informant said:

> We are going to have a hard fight here but I think with the help of the Socialists whom we are encouraging in a quiet manner, we will be able to carry the county.[19]

The recipient of this news from Quay and Guadalupe Counties continued his able direction of campaign propaganda. In a letter to Frost, Bursum requested that the New Mexican carry more personal interviews from people interested in the election of Andrews. The interviews, Bursum said, should

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18) October 15, 1906, Bursum Papers.

19) Ibid.

members, a continuous stream of [illegible] from Sunny politicos poured into Sunnyside [illegible]. [illegible] of neighboring Gray County [illegible] Hope County required some [illegible]. From [illegible] that area it was obvious to [illegible] should be obtained from the refinery in order to sway the elections. By careful canvassing it was [illegible] that over 200 votes could be obtained in the railroad towns of Sprig and Sunnyside if Burgundy [illegible] the authorities to permit these men to vote on the issue. [illegible] stated, "Personally I can do nothing as I have been [illegible] to close the saloon [illegible]." By this [illegible] verbal rather than illegal measures would be necessary to secure the workers' vote. As reported [illegible] informant said:

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18) October 10, 1906, [illegible].

19) Ibid.

also point out that, in the best interest of the Territory, it was necessary that joint statehood receive a large majority of votes. He particularly urged that any Democrats who shared the Republican views toward Andrews and joint statehood should be extensively interviewed because, "If we can whoop her up with interviews . . . it will do a great deal towards disorganizing and disheartening the Democrats."[20]

Frost's support of Party interests was not limited to newspaper comments and advice to the Republican Chairman. His interest in developing Republican newspapers in Eddy County prompted him to write Howard Leland, Federal Land Office official in Roswell, urging him to give some of his office printing patronage to the Pecos Valley News. This Artesia newspaper, owned and operated by D. L. Newkirk, represented Republican sentiment and Frost felt that the Party organization of Eddy County desperately needed such a paper to carry the present campaign and to insure a stronger more lasting Republican influence in the Pecos Valley. The Santa Fean did not, however, request extraordinary measures to insure that the News receive financial support, but asked only that Mr. Leland extend "legitimate and proper help for the newspapers of [the] Republican faith in

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20) October 16, 1906, Burton Papers. The editorial policy of the New Mexican during the last phase of the campaign may be sampled by referring to Santa Fe New Mexican, October 2, 1906, p. 1; October 22, 1906, p. 1.

the valley."[21] Thus, by various means the Territorial Party leaders worked to create a strong, dependent organization in all areas of New Mexico.

As news from the counties continued to be channeled to Albuquerque, word was received that all was not well in Chaves County. It was reported that some local Republicans in that area were still opposed to both Andrews and joint statehood. From the tone of the message it was assumed that this opposition was limited and did not reflect the majority view, but the dissatisfaction of such prominent men as Captain Fornoff of the Territorial Police and Governor Hagerman's father showed that complete harmony could not be expected from that area.[22]

From Santa Fe County, George W. Armijo reported that "the Democratic Party [had] sold out for a consideration of money to E. A. Mien." Armijo felt that this complicated the issue, but he still believed that jointure could be carried if all the Party loyal would support it. Some usually loyal people were being persuaded by J. D. Sena to disdain jointure but, Armijo believed, Sena would probably support the measure if the Chairman would apply the proper pressures. With the elimination of this small obstacle, it appeared to the Santa Fean that the County would

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21) October 16, 1906, Bursum Papers.

22) W. H. H. Llewellyn to Bursum, October 20, 1906, Bursum Papers.

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As news from the convention commenced to reverberate to Albuquerque, word was received that Gil was not well in Chaves County. It was reported that some local Republicans in that area were still opposed to both Andrews and Dolan statehood. From the tone of the message it was assumed that this opposition was limited and did not reflect the majority view, but the dissatisfaction of such prominent men as Captain Kotroff of the Territorial Militia and former Hagerman's farmer showed that complete harmony could not be expected from that area.[22]

From Santa Fe County, Osborne W. Argyle wrote that "the Democratic Party had held out for a contribution of money to E. A. Mann." Argyle felt that this complicated the issue, but he still believed that a picture could be carried if all the Party loyal would support it. Some usually loyal people were being persuaded by A. . . Mann to disdain joining out, Argyle believed. He could probably support the measure if the Chairman would apply the proper pressures. With the atmosphere of that small delegate, it appeared to the state that the Cooper faction

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overwhelmingly support joint statehood.[23]

The affairs in Guadalupe County were again brought to light when N. V. Gallego of Tucumcari reported to Bursum the results of his canvassing tour of the railroad camps in that area. Gallego said,

> There are fifty negroes at Sunnyside who are qualified to vote and will vote our way for about $50.00. I have a man by the name of Barney Greer at Santa Rosa who can handle them.[24]

Gallego also remarked that approximately three hundred votes could be gathered from the railroad workers if they were allowed to vote, but the opposition of some of the camp managers to this canvassing necessitated some action on the part of the Chairman to convince the managers that the men should vote. Perhaps, Gallego said, Bursum could "send some good men down there to see after it."[25] If Mieto's letter to Bursum concerning the Santa Fe's policy towards interference in political matters was literally true, it is doubtful that the railway officials could have been persuaded to support Gallego's plan. However, the attitude of the managers concerning voting was certainly not the epitome of scrupulousness, so that it would seem that the

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23) October 22, 1906, Bursum Papers. Mr. Armijo was, at that time, a recent appointee to the Probate Court of Santa Fe County. Armijo to Bursum, October 4, 1906, Bursum Papers.

24) October 31, 1906, Bursum Papers.

25) Ibid.

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The affairs in Guadalupe County were again brought to light when S. V. Gallego of Tucumcari reported to Burum the results of his canvassing tour of the railroad camps in that area. Gallego said,

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25) Ibid.

workers were actually being coerced not to indulge in the personal prerogative of casting a ballot. Whatever the case, Guadalupe County, along with nineteen other New Mexico counties, delivered a majority vote for statehood.[26]

The emphasis given to affairs in the sphere of local politics seems to place the election of Territorial Delegate in a lesser light, but this was certainly not the case. The election of a Republican to Congress was as important as the passage of joint statehood to the welfare of the Territorial Party. In all levels of Party organization, this basic desire is evidenced. Even if some irreconcilables did not see jointure as a Party issue, discipline was observed to the degree that Andrews was supported, and no blatant attempt was made to undermine the chances of Andrews election.[27]

Andrews needed all the support he could muster to counter the effects of the Democratic nominee's vigorous campaign. The Democratic contender, O. A. Larrazola, had early begun to speak for single statehood. Although Larrazola had little chance in delivering this longed for blessing, the appeal carried quite some weight with the voters. By singing the tune the voters wished to hear Larrazola could harass the Republicans by showing that their support of joint-statehood was not commensurate with the desires of

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26) Santa Fe New Mexican, November 9, 1906, p. 1.

27) C. V. Safford to Bursum, October 15, 1906, Bursum Papers. Mr. Safford was the Secretary of the Territorial Republican Central Committee.

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Andrews needed all the support he could muster to counter the efforts of the Democratic machine's vigorous campaign. The Democratic candidate, O. V. Barrett, had early begun to speak for single statehood. Although Barrett had little chance in delivering only ten or fifteen counties, the appeal carried quite some weight with the voters. Singling the Dons the voters were told that Andrews intended to harass the Republicans by accusing them of support of joint-statehood was not true. Andrews, a Democrat,

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26) Santa Fe New Mexican, November 3, 1900, p. 1.

27) O. V. Barrett to Hughes, October 1, 1900, Hughes Papers. Mr. Barrett was the Democratic Territorial Republican Central Committee.

Territorial citizens. Larrazola possessed another powerful virtue in the eyes of many a New Mexican voter -- race. Unfortunately for the Republicans, Andrews could offer no such appeal to the citizen of Spanish extraction, so the Party was forced to use lampoon to counter Larrazola's bid for popular appeal. In a letter to E. A. Cahoon, Roswell banker and newspaperman, Bursum strongly urged the wide use of an anti-racist cartoon as a jibe at the Democratic nominee's stand.[28]

Albert B. Fall, an articulate and adroit politician, probably voiced the sentiment of many a New Mexican voter regarding the appeal of the opposition candidate. Although by admission, Fall was disillusioned by the promises of both Parties, he saw that if Larrazola were elected the Republican-dominated Congress would not be favorable to the wishes of a Democratic Delegate. Added to this impediment was the fact that Fall believed that the Democratic Party had, "never kept their pledges with regard to New Mexico, even as well as the Republicans which [was] saying very little."[29] By virtue of these facts, Fall felt that it would be foolish to vote for Larrazola even though he added that he preferred Larrazola as a person rather than Mr. Andrews.[30]

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28) October 26, 1906, Bursum Papers.

29) Fall to Larrazola, October 22, 1906, Bursum Papers.

30) Ibid.

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28) October 20, 1922, Burton papers.

29) Fall to Larrazolo, October 26, 1922, Burton papers.

30) Ibid.

In spite of lampoon and the logical criticism of Fall, Larrazola managed to come very close to winning the race. Although neither candidate received an impressive percentage of the total recorded vote, Andrews won by a bare 370 vote plurality.[31] The corrected and officially listed vote gave Andrew 4,817 votes as opposed to Larrazola's 4,447 votes.[32]

While the position of the Delegate was in doubt, the question of the statehood vote was one of little anxiety to Republicans on the day of election. The Santa Fe New Mexican stated that little doubt remained but that Arizona would defeat the Hamilton proposal. However, the New Mexican saw that single statehood could be had if action were quickly taken. The editorial stated,

> The best plan and the one promising immediate success, is to hold a constitutional convention at Santa Fe, next month, formulate a constitution, submit it to the legislative assembly for ratification in January, and then present it to Congress . . .[33]

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31) A total of 41,930 votes were cast for or against statehood in the New Mexico Territory while the total vote for Andrews and Larrazola was a mere 9,264 votes. Official totals found in Wyllys, loc. cit., p. 302; Santa Fe New Mexican, November 9, 1906. p. 1.

32) Las Vegas Daily Optic, November 13, 1906, p. 1.

33) November 6, 1906, p. 2.

The New Mexican was correct in stating that Arizona would vote against jointure.

> Only 3,141 votes were cast in favor of joint statehood in Arizona, as compared with 16,265 against it. In New Mexico the vote was quite different, 14,735 votes going against Union, and 26,195 for it.[34]

Taking the total votes from both Territories, it is found that the nays outweighed the ayes, but the fact remains that Arizona, as predicted, roundly defeated jointure while New Mexico gave a 11,460 vote majority for it.[35]

The Republicans had performed their jobs well in New Mexico. Only Mora, Rio Arriba, Santa Fe, Taos and Union Counties carried against joint statehood. These Northern counties had long been held doubtful by Party leaders; with the exception of Santa Fe County,[36] it probably was no surprise that anti-jointure sentiment eventually prevailed there.[37] The remaining twenty New Mexico counties loyally supported the jointure proposal with votes ranging from approximately an 1,800 majority in Valencia County to

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34) Wyllys, loc. cit., p. 302.

35) The total vote in both Territories was 31,000 votes against jointure and 29,336 votes for jointure. Ibid.

36) C. V. Safford to Bursum, October 15, 1906; G. W. Armijo to Bursum, October 22, 1906, Bursum Papers.

37) Numerous letters are extant on this subject, for example, Max Frost to Bursum, September 7, 1906, Bursum Papers; W. A. Hughes to Bursum, September 1, 1906, Bursum Papers.

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37) Numerous letters are extant on this subject, for example, Max Frost to Burrus, September 7, 1906, Burrus Papers; W. A. Hughes to Burrus, September 1, 1906, Burrus Papers.

a bare 60-vote majority in Luna County.[38]

A statement by Governor Otero serves as a partial explanation for the support given to jointure:

> I think the majority given to joint statehood in New Mexico was largely due to the fact that there was no organized opposition whatever to the proposition and the people of New Mexico generally accepted the assurances of Arizona that that Territory would give it an overwhelming majority against the measure. The people of New Mexico scarcely considered it as an issue . . . .[39]

Otero, though he states that many failed to vote on the issue, did not explain why anyone bothered to vote at all.[40] Granted that the voters probably looked upon jointure as a lost cause or even a bad cause, but a majority was delivered and this was not given proper emphasis in the Otero statement. In evaluating the election, much credit should be given to the careful guidance and adroit maneuvering of the Party organization in convincing the voters that a majority for statehood would make a favorable impression on the Republican Administration in Washington. Indirectly the Otero statement gives some credit to the political skill of the Chairman when he noted that statehood passed

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38) Santa Fe New Mexican, November 9, 1906, p. 1. These twenty counties were as follows: Bernalillo, Chaves, Colfax, Dona Ana, Eddy, Guadalupe, Grant, Lincoln, Luna, McKinley, Quay, Otero, Roosevelt, Sandoval, San Juan, San Miguel, Sierra, Socorro, Torrance and Valencia.

39) Las Vegas Daily Optic, November 8, 1906, p. 1.

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38) Santa Fe New Mexican, November 4, 1906, p. 1. These twenty counties were as follows: Bernalillo, Chaves, Colfax, Dona Ana, Eddy, Guadalupe, Grant, Lincoln, Luna, McKinley, Quay, Otero, Roosevelt, Sandoval, San Juan, San Miguel, Sierra, Socorro, Torrance and Valencia.

39) Las Vegas Daily Optic, November 6, 1906, p. 3.

40) Ibid.

in New Mexico because there existed no organized opposition. There had been some attempt to organize an opposition, but it was unsuccessful because the Central Committee managed to secure the loyalties of those people likely to join such a movement. Catron, Otero and others remained unreconciled to the jointure measure, but their protests were isolated and remained ineffective in arousing resentment against the Party platform.

Other explanations show that the majority given to joint statehood was not solely the result of strong organization and convincing propaganda. In a letter to Bursum, Ralph E. Ely, of Deming, discusses his activities on election eve in Dawson, Luna County:

> Mr. Leheigh thought that I could do some good [there] . . . . I did not attempt to talk to the people but in conversation with the leaders [I] urged Statehood and Andrews. They were all sound on Andrews but were disposed to be lukewarm on Statehood. I understand they [the leaders] marked up their tickets in favor of Statehood that night so that they were handed out right the next morning.[41]

This penchant for marking the statehood question before passing out the ballots was mentioned in a complaint submitted to Governor Hagerman by C. B. Allaire of San Antonio, Socorro County. In this instance, the complaint stated that the ballots pre-marked for statehood

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41) November 17, 1906, Bursum Papers. Luna County was listed in the Santa Fe New Mexican, November 9, 1906, as giving a very small plurality vote for jointure.

were changed by David Baca, an election official in San Antonio, during the count. Mr. Baca, according to Allaire, had moved the polls from the building usually designated and, in general, violated the election rules. When the votes were counted, it was discovered that jointure had been defeated in San Antonio. This proved to Allaire that the votes had been subject to tampering by Baca since "[He was] reliably informed that all the Bursum tickets were marked "yes" in pencil before they were issued." Mr. Allaire further stated that the ballots of the Peoples Party, an independent party, "were so marked for I [Allaire] attended to that." From these facts Allaire contended that Baca had changed the pre-marked ballots to rig the election for the defeat of jointure.[42]

The San Antonian's outburst of indignation obviously blinded him to the fact that pre-marking the ballots was not legally justifiable and, by implicating Baca in changing the ballots, he had compromised Bursum and himself for marking the ballots prior to their presentation to the voters. Mr. Allaire obviously felt that this original act of an illegal nature was in no wise comparable to the heinous crime of changing the "yes" to "nay."

Governor Hagerman forwarded a copy of this letter to W. A. Wolford, District Attorney in Hillsboro, Sierra County,

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42) November 7, 1906, Election Folder, Bursum Papers.

were changed by David Baca, an election official in San Antonio, during the count. Mr. Baca, according to Allaire, had moved the polls from the outlying usually designated and, in general, violated the election rules. When the votes were counted, it was discovered that Jolinture had been defeated in San Antonio. This proved to Allaire that the votes had been subject to tampering by Baca since "[he was] reliably informed that all the Bureau ballots were marked "yes" in pencil before they were issued." Mr. Allaire further stated that the ballots of the Peoples Party, an independent party, "were so marked for I [Allaire] attached to that." From these facts Allaire contended that Baca had changed the pre-marked ballots to rig the election for the defeat of Jolinture.[42]

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Governor Hagerman forwarded a copy of this letter to W. A. Walford, District Attorney in Hillsboro, Sierra County,

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[42] November 7, 1900, Election Ballot, Bureau reports.

with the intention of encouraging Mr. Wolford to prosecute the frauds mentioned in the Allaire missive. The Governor stated:

> While it may be difficult to secure convictions, we never can get a better state of affairs in Socorro County unless vigorous measures are taken immediately after the election . . . . to prevent the shameless methods that have prevailed in elections in Socorro County in the past.[43]

Though the Governor was dubious concerning the outcome of the prosecution if instituted, he certainly did not doubt the contents of the letter that prompted his actions. From this we may surmise that Hagerman's desire for reform prompted him to utilize any evidence to institute legal proceedings against corrupt politics. To rely solely upon this supposition, however, would neglect the oft mentioned fact that the Governor was particularly anxious to bring action against the Chairman of the Territorial Party. This may indicate that the desire for reform was intensified by a fervid wish to destroy a dangerous rival, but, whatever the case, the charges leveled by Allaire were considered within the realm of possibility.

The two instances mentioned concerning the election indicate that pre-marking the ballot was quite acceptable. This leads to the supposition that the practice was more widespread than is indicated by the evidence. But evidence

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43) November 10, 1906, Election Folder, Bursum Papers.

with the intention of preventing the commission of the frauds mentioned in the quoted letters. The governor stated:

> While it may be difficult to secure convictions, we never can be certain of the extent of efforts in Socorro County unless vigorous measures are taken immediately after the election . . . to prevent the substitution of less methods that have prevailed in elections in Socorro County in the past.

Though the Governor was anxious concerning the outcome of the prosecution if instituted, he certainly did not approve the contents of the letter that prompted his action. From this we may surmise that Hagerman desired for reports prompted him to utilize any evidence to institute legal proceedings against corrupt politics. To this extent from this supposition, however, while confirmed the well-known fact that the Governor was particularly anxious to bring action against the officers of the Territorial Party. This may indicate that the corrupt law enforcement was justified by a fervid wish to destroy a dangerous rival, but, whatever the case, the omnipresent invasion by alien was considered within the realm of possibility.

The two instances mentioned immediately above certainly indicate that pre-marking was quite widespread. This leads to the supposition that the practice was widespread than is indicated by the evidence. Not without

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43) November 10, 1900, Hagerman to Taft, Hagerman Papers.

does show that at least to the peoples of Dawson and San Antonio joint statehood did not excite them sufficiently to question the pre-marked ballots presented to them on election day. Although two examples are not an adequate cross-section to determine the true temper of the vote, perhaps Otero was correct in stating that the people of New Mexico did not consider jointure much of an issue.[44]

The biggest post-election difficulty resulted from the narrow margin of victory given to W. H. Andrews. This stimulated some controversy concerning the count from the various counties and from Taos County in particular.[45] The action of Taos County in giving 362 votes to Andrews, prompted A. A. Jones, Territorial Democratic Party Chairman, to protest the election. Jones felt that Taos County had acted contrary to pre-election prognostication in voting Republican, thus raising the suspicion in Democratic minds that the count was inaccurate.[46]

Mr. Jones' bid to contest the election brought accusations from Roy, New Mexico, that the Democrats had improperly influenced elections in Mora County. By this accusation

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44) Las Vegas Daily Optic, November 8, 1906, p. 1.

45) Mr. Andrew carried Bernalillo, Colfax, Dona Ana, Lincoln, McKinley, Sandoval, Santa Fe, Taos, Socorro, Torrance and Valencia Counties. Mr. Larrazola carried Chaves, Eddy, Grant, Guadalupe, Luna, Mora, Otero, Quay, Roosevelt, San Miguel, San Juan, Sierra, Union and Rio Arriba Counties. Las Vegas Daily Optic, November 13, 1906, p. 1.

46) Ibid.

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46) Ibid.

the writer, M. A. Bushkevitz, hoped to demonstrate that the Republicans could likewise protest the election with the justifiable intent of reviewing the count in Mora County. As to the specific action of exuberant Democrats in Roy, Bushkevitz stated that the local Party officials had hired three toughs, Jose Archuleta, Leandro Archuleta and Nazario Flores, to prevent Republican voters access to the polls. These men, according to the writer, were conspicuously armed and, on occasion, discharged firearms in the streets. Eventually the authorities arrested the three men and criminal charges were brought against them. In closing, the writer urged that the letter be used as a news item so that it would come to the attention of the legally constituted authorities of the Territory.[47] Frost, seeing the value of this letter, seriously urged Bursum to allow the use of it to countermand Mr. Jones' attempts to contest the election. This advice was not followed by Bursum, probably because Democratic protests faded quickly regarding the election in Taos County.

With the settlement of the election dispute, the public duties of the Chairman were complete. The remaining problems of party business, however, occupied the attention of

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47) Mr. Bushkevitz, in partnership with H. A. Hanson, was the owner of the Mora County Publishing Company, publishers of El Hispano Americano. Bushkevitz to Frost, November 7, 1906, Bursum Papers.

the writer, M. A. Buskovitz, hoped to persuade Lamar the Republicans could likewise profit by the election with an justifiable intent of removing the duplicity Mary Jones. As to the specific action of election, remarks in May, Buskovitz stated that the local Jews hatched an idea three tongue, José Aranguren, leading a Mexican faction Flores, to prevent Republican votes ever to the polls. These men, according to the writer, were particularly armed and, on occasion, discharged firearms in the streets. Eventually the authorities arrested the three men and criminal charges were brought against them. In closing, the writer urged that the letter be used in a news item so that it would come to the attention of the legal, executive authorities of the Territory.[47] Frost, noting the value of this letter, seriously urged Curran to allow his use of it to counteract Mr. Jones' attempts to contest the election. This advice was not followed by Curran, obviously because Democratic protests faded quickly regarding the election in Taos County.

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[47] Mr. Buskovitz, in partnership with M. A. Lamar, was the owner of the Taos County Mining Company, publishers of El Hispano Americano. Buskovitz to Frost, November 7, 1906, Bureau Papers.

Bursum and serve to cast light upon his view of election results. In a letter to Judge Waldo, Bursum stated, "The majority for Delegate was very small although we should be thankful that results were not worse."[48] The election results concerning the Territorial offices were much more satisfying to the Chairman. By skillful politics the Republicans received two-thirds of the legislative seats. In the Council they received 10 seats while the opposition gained only 2, and in the House the Republicans held an 18 to 6 majority.[49] In spite of this majority, the Chairman thought that a bigger percentage could have been gathered had not "overconfidence" prompted "the great slump in Rio Arriba and San Miguel and Colfax Counties."[50]

Although Bursum attributed part of the failure to overconfidence, some Party members were not convinced that the failure resulted from any natural cause. The McKinley County Committee spokesman wrote:

> This committee feels satisfied that there must have been a great deal of treachery to the party in several of the counties throughout the Territory. We feel compelled to call

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48) Judge H. L. Waldo was, at that time, residing in Kansas City, Missouri. November 20, 1906, Bursum Papers.

49) Bursum to George W. Bowen, November 20, 1906, Bursum Papers. In this letter Bursum stated that the small majority received by Andrews was "owing to the disturbing conditions within the party."

50) Bursum to I. C. Barnes, November 20, 1906, Bursum Papers. Mr. Barnes was the editor of the Tucumcari News.

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> your attention to the fact; as regards McKinley County. Mr. Stephen Canavan a member of the Ter[ritorial] Central. [sic] Com[mittee] , and a man who has been signally [sic] honored by the Republincan[sic] Party of the County; bolted the party and worked as hard for the defeat of the county ticket and that of Hon. W. H. Andrews, our Candidate for Congress, as did any Democrat in the territory, useing [sic] Larazolla [sic] stickers, making false affidavits for non voters [sic], buying votes for Larazolla [sic], and in every way possible contributing to the defeat of Mr. Andrews. We have the most positive evidence of Mr. Canavan's treachery. Some of this evidence being in the shape of affidavits attached to Independent tickets with Larazolla [sic] stickers. We would respectfully ask you to see to it that Mr. Canavan is not recognized by the Republican organization of this Territory nor else where [sic]. We take this stand in justice to the Republican party, as we feel that treachery must be punished or the distruction [sic] of our Party will be the consequence.[51]

Mr. Bursum's reply was one of agreement with the tone of the letter and he noted that Canavan's treachery would "not be rewarded by recognition from the Territorial Committee."[52] This example of treachery was the only one reported by the various county committees, but the attitude of the McKinley County group shows that treachery was considered by them to be the chief cause for Andrews'

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51) Harry Coddington to Bursum, November 10, 1906, Bursum Papers. Mr. Coddington was the Secretary of the McKinley County Republican Committee.

52) Bursum to Coddington, November 20, 1906, Bursum Papers.

your attention to the [illegible] McKinley County. [illegible] a member of the [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] Committee, [illegible] been already [illegible] publicans [illegible] [illegible] polled the party and [illegible] the defeat of the [illegible] of Hon. R. E. Andrews, [illegible] Congress, as did any [illegible] territory, making [illegible] [illegible] non voters [illegible] [illegible] [illegible], and in every way possible contributing to the defeat of Mr. Andrews. We have the most positive evidence of Mr. Canavan's treachery. Some of this evidence being in the [illegible] [illegible] attached by [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] respectfully ask you to see to it that Mr. Canavan is not recognized by the Republican organization of this Territory nor elsewhere [illegible]. We take this stand in justice to the Republican party, as we feel that treachery must be punished or the distruction [illegible] of our party will be the consequence.[31]

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31) Harry Coddington to Burnum, November 10, 1900, Burnum Papers. Mr. Coddington was the secretary of the McKinley County Republican Committee.

32) Burnum to Coddington, November 21, 1900, Burnum Papers.

poor showing against Larrazola. Although this opinion did not seem to be fully shared by the Chairman, it is noteworthy that he gives some credit to the "disturbing influences within the party" for the small majority given to the Republican Delegate.[53] Exactly what is meant by this statement is doubtful since a multiplicity of disturbing influences have been noted; however, it is assumed that the Party leader was referring to the attitude of the Governor and other New Mexicans in disputing the leadership of the Party. This factor may have accounted for the narrow margin given to Andrews, but it is more likely that the reason was more complex than either argument admits.

After giving his views on the results of the campaign and dispensing Party discipline, Bursum had but one more task to accomplish before the campaign passed into the realm of completed and forgotten tasks. This particular duty was one of fattening the Party larder to pay the expenses incurred in the heat of the campaign. One fund raising missive emanating from the Central Committee office divulged that the request for a contribution from the Phelps-Dodge Company had yielded a $3,000 check to the campaign fund. Bursum did not state exactly why this money was forthcoming;[54] perhaps

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53) Bursum to Bowen, November 20, 1906, Bursum Papers.

54) Bursum to Waldo, November 20, 1906, Bursum Papers.

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35) Bursum to Sowell, November 20, 1920, [illegible]

36) Bursum to Hall, November 27, 1920, [illegible]

this large gift was resultant from the argument for jointure that the Chairman stated to Spies on October 15, 1906.[55] If such were the case it would serve as another example of the skill of the Chairman in adjusting arguments to suit the recipient and doing it in such a manner as to convince and not dupe the receiver.

Thus ended the joint statehood campaign of 1906. Oklahoma and Indian Territory, after drafting a suitable constitution, received statehood, but for Arizona and New Mexico there remained more years of hard work before they would be admitted into the Union.

In New Mexico Territory the definite accomplishments of this campaign were those incidental to the statehood issue, that is, the successful election of loyal Republicans to fill the office of Territorial Delegate to Congress and the local legislative seats. From this fact it may be surmised that no real benefit was derived from championing the statehood cause, but before such a blanket statement is given it would be well to determine the goals entertained by those who were instrumental in securing support for the joint statehood movement.

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55) Bursum Papers.

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55) Bureau Papers.

CONCLUSION

In dealing with the joint statehood campaign it early becomes evident that the plan followed by its advocates was of a fluctuating nature. The fluidity of the arguments confounds any attempt to fix rigidly the theory behind the campaign, but it is possible to assume that a general framework was followed.

At the outset of negotiations for jointure the citizens of both New Mexico and Arizona were generally opposed to any plan of union. The Foraker amendment, sponsored in part by Arizona lobbyists, attracted some interest in the Territories and, with the passage of this amendment, came New Mexico's unofficial acceptance of joint statehood.

This action started the development of the general framework of the statehood movement. From existing evidence it is possible to surmise that within the framework of support for jointure two general categories of argumentation developed. The first was the acceptance of consolidation as the quickest and only available means to statehood. The second general category was more devious than the first but just as practical, that is, to support jointure in the hopes that Arizona would defeat the measure. This support, though in

the end unsuccessful, would display the Party loyalty of the Territorial citizens and create a favorable impression upon the Roosevelt Administration. This favorable impression incurred by dogged loyalty to the policies of the President would be an asset when the opportunity for single statehood came, and in the interim the largess of the Federal Government might well be proffered to develop the economic and social life of the Territory.

With these tools at hand the Party leaders gradually established control over their reluctant followers. Party pressure and skillful propaganda gradually produced a workable solidarity within Republican ranks. Although some politicos were never reconciled to jointure, the power of organized effort drowned out the discordant voices of the disorganized protesters. With solidarity accomplished, joint statehood became an officially endorsed program and propagandists began working to gather enough votes to secure a majority in the coming election.

As it became more and more evident that Arizona would defeat jointure greater emphasis was given to the fact that loyalty to the measure would evoke a grateful response from the Administration. In fact, the slim chance that Arizona would accept jointure had, from the first, made this contention the most favored. It should be noted, however, that in few instances were there pure examples of either of the two general categories, so that in the end neither of the

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two were mutually exclusive. In reality, the two categories are abstractions existing only as a general framework for the purpose of classifying the various arguments used in the campaign.

The triumph of joint statehood in New Mexico was almost a personal victory for the Chairman and his immediate associates. The victory of the Roosevelt supported measure produced no noticeable accolades from the President, but such a hollow victory could hardly be held as deserving too much praise. It seemed as if the effort given to jointure was both futile and empty, but in the complexity of partisan politics it obviously possessed a value that need not be depreciated and in truth was not depreciated by those personally involved in the effort.

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