



**Voices, Votes and Violence:  
Essays on Select Dynamics of Electoral Authoritarian Regimes**

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Thèse présentée en vue de l'obtention du grade de Philosophiæ doctor (PhD)

en sciences politiques

Deposé le 21 juillet, 2016

Soutenu le 27 septembre 2016

## Résumé

« Voix, vote et violence : Essais sur les dynamiques des régimes autoritaires électoraux » porte sur l'expression des voix généralement exclues sous des régimes autoritaires électoraux (« AE »), depuis les défis des processus institutionnalisés (en particulier les élections et la démocratie) jusqu'aux rationalisations des comportements extra-institutionnels (notamment la violence politique).

Les essais sont présentés en deux parties. Les deux essais de la partie I ont trait aux cadres analytiques d'étude des comportements des partis au pouvoir et des oppositions dans les régimes semi-autoritaires. Les trois essais de la partie II examinent un sous-domaine spécifique de ces régimes : la participation politique des femmes. Chaque chapitre propose des découvertes comme résumé ci-dessous.

Le chapitre 1 explore les défis méthodologiques dans l'étude des régimes semi-autoritaires (comme AE) en analysant de manière critique un cadre d'analyse important dans le domaine. Une réplique indépendante du modèle de classification de l'autoritarisme compétitif (« AC ») de Levitsky et Way (2010) révèle des anomalies de codification dans la sélection des cas qui influent sur la théorie générale des régimes AC et qui ont des implications méthodologiques pour l'étude comparative des régimes hybrides en général.

Le chapitre 2 examine le comportement des partis de l'opposition sous des régimes AE. Je fais l'hypothèse que les objectifs électoraux et les objectifs de régime des oppositions dans les EA (les « jeux parallèles ») s'alignent dans des conditions où il existe une certitude relative concernant les résultats, mais divergent lorsque l'incertitude des résultats de régime ou des élections est plus importante, ce qui entraîne quatre types de comportement identifiables. Je teste mes hypothèses sur 55 élections dans 29 États d'Afrique subsaharienne et je démontre que les quatre types de comportement dépendent du degré de répression de l'État et du niveau de capacité organisationnelle des oppositions.

Le chapitre 3 révèle et définit la nature sexuée de la violence électorale (une caractéristique commune des régimes AE). Une base de données originale de plus de 2 000 incidents de violence électorale dans six pays, ainsi qu'un travail de terrain dans plus de cinquante pays

révèlent l'existence d'importantes distinctions dans la manifestation de la violence électorale, ainsi que la présence d'un phénomène auparavant non reconnu, la violence électorale basée sur le genre (« VEBG »). Le chapitre présente les définitions, une taxonomie et la typologie des deux formes de violence.

Le chapitre 4 se penche en profondeur sur le sujet, en examinant la relation complexe entre les technologies de l'information et de la communication (TIC) et la VEBG. Les notions de la violence électorale différenciée selon le genre ainsi que la VEBG sont étendues à la violence politique en général. Je démontre que les TIC facilitent les formes sexuées de la violence politique, mais qu'elles contribuent également à résister et atténuer ces violences, grâce à certaines qualités spécifiques aux TIC.

Le dernier chapitre fournit la solution à une énigme de longue date dans l'exclusion politique dans les régimes AE (et autres) en démontrant la complémentarité des formes spécifiques de mesures temporaires spéciales (MTS) dans les systèmes électoraux fondés sur des circonscriptions uninominales (CU). Le chapitre présente une classification en cinq parties des options MTS dans les CU, y compris une interprétation originale des « seuils parallèles ». L'analyse des cinq types de MTS à travers des études de cas de pays illustre que les divergences dans l'adoption de quotas entre les systèmes électoraux sont le résultat d'un manque de connaissances plutôt que des traits intrinsèques des systèmes électoraux, comme supposé précédemment.

**Mots clés:** autoritarisme électoral, comportements d'opposition, théorie des jeux imbriqués, violence électorale, genre et politique, technologies de l'information et de la communication (TIC), mesures temporaires spéciales, quotas.

## Summary

“Voices, Votes and Violence: Essays on Select Dynamics of Electoral Authoritarian Regimes” concerns the expression of commonly excluded voices under electoral authoritarian (EA) regimes, from the challenges of institutionalized processes (specifically, elections and voting) to rationalizations for extra-institutional behaviors (notably political violence).

The essays are presented in two parts. The first two essays in Part I concern frameworks for studying incumbent and opposition behaviors in semi-authoritarian states. The three essays in Part II examine a specific sub-field of EA regime dynamics: political participation of women. Each chapter provides findings as summarized below.

Chapter 1 explores methodological challenges in studying semi-authoritarian regimes (such as EA) by critically engaging with a leading framework of analysis in the field. An independent replication of Levistky and Way’s 2010 classification model of competitive authoritarianism (CA) reveals coding discrepancies in the authors’ case selection which impact the broader theory of CA regimes and have methodological implications for the comparative study of hybrid regimes in general.

Chapter 2 examines opposition party behavior under EA regimes. I hypothesize that EA oppositions’ electoral and regime objectives (“dual games”) align under conditions where there is relative certainty of outcomes but diverge where either regime or electoral uncertainty is greater, resulting in four identifiable behavior types. Testing the theory on 55 elections in 29 sub-Saharan African states, I demonstrate that the four behavior types are functions of the degree of state repression and the level of organizational capacity of the opposition.

Chapter 3 reveals and defines the gendered nature of electoral violence (a common feature of EA regimes). An original database of over 2000 incidents of election violence in six countries as well as fieldwork from over fifty countries reveal the existence of significant gender-differentiation in the manifestation of election violence as well as the presence of a previously unrecognized phenomenon, *gender-based election violence (GBEV)*. The chapter introduces definitions, a taxonomy and typology of both forms of violence.

Chapter 4 delves deeper into the topic by examining the complex relationship between information and communication technologies and gendered election violence. The notions of gender-differentiated and gender-motivated violence are extended to political violence in this chapter. Information and communication technologies are found to both facilitate gendered forms of political violence as well as empower resistance and violence mitigation. The final chapter provides the solution to a longstanding puzzle of political exclusion in EA (and other) regimes by demonstrating the complementarity of specific forms of temporary special measures (TSMs) in electoral systems based on single-member districts (SMDs). The chapter presents a five-part classification of TSM options in SMDs, including an original interpretation of “Alternate Thresholds”. Analyzing the five TSM types through country case studies, Chapter 5 illustrated that discrepancies in the adoption of quotas between electoral systems are the result a knowledge gap rather than intrinsic traits of electoral systems, as previously assumed.

**Keywords:** electoral authoritarianism, opposition behavior, dual game theory, election violence, gender, information and communication technologies (ICT), temporary special measures (TSMs)

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## List of Acronyms and Abbreviations

|              |   |
|--------------|---|
| CA           | Competitive authoritarianism  |
| CEDAW        | Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women                                |
| EA           | Electoral authoritarianism  |
| EMB          | Electoral Management Body   |
| EV           | Electoral violence (election violence)  |
| EVER         | Election Violence Education and Resolution Program  |
| FA           | Full Authoritarian  |
| FPTP         | First Past the Post   |
| GBEV (VEBG)  | Gender-based electoral violence ( <i>violence électorale basée sur le genre</i> )                         |
| GBPV (VPBG)  | Gender-based political violence ( <i>violence politique basée sur le genre</i> )                          |
| GBV          | Gender-based violence   |
| GD-EV/PV     | Gender differentiated electoral violence/Political violence   |
| HA           | Hegemonic Authoritarian   |
| HRW          | Human Rights Watch  |
| ICG          | International Crisis Group  |
| IDEA         | International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance  |
| IDP          | Internally displaced person   |
| (I)EOM       | (International) Electoral Observation Mission   |
| IFES         | International Foundation for Electoral Systems  |
| IPU          | Inter-Parliamentary Union   |
| ICT          | Information and Communication Technology  |
| MMD          | Multi-Member District   |
| NDI          | National Democratic Institute   |
| OSCE-ODHIR   | Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe - Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights |
| PR           | Proportional Representation   |
| PV           | Political violence  |
| SMD          | Single-Member District  |
| SNTV         | Single Non-Transferable Vote  |
| TSM          | Temporary Special Measures  |
| UNDP         | United Nations Development Program  |
| UNGA         | United Nations General Assembly   |
| UNHCHR       | United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights   |
| UNHCR        | United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees   |
| UNOCHA       | UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs  |
| UNW          | UN Women  |
| UPF          | Uneven playing field  |
| USAID        | United States Agency for International Development  |
| VAW          | Violence Against Women  |
| VAWE         | Violence Against Women in Elections   |
| VAWIP (VAWP) | Violence Against Women in Politics  |



*Every citizen shall have the right and the opportunity  
...[t]o take part in the conduct of public affairs,  
...[t]o vote and to be elected at genuine periodic elections  
which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret ballot,  
guaranteeing the free expression of the will of the electors.*

— **Article 25, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966**

*...[W]e are determined to foment a rebellion,  
and will not hold ourselves bound by any laws in which we have no voice or representation.*

— **A. Adams. March 31, 1776**



To my family





## Avant Propos & Acknowledgements

I count myself as a happy and fortunate woman because I have truly (yes, truly) enjoyed (almost) every moment of the PhD process and because I am able to work in a field that holds meaning and inspiration for me as well as visible impact. Undertaking the PhD was the opportunity to step away from nearly a decade of intense work in democracy promotion in post-conflict elections and to think about what we were doing, how we were doing it, and why. In a field of work driven by political deadlines, adrenaline, idealism and sleep-deprivation, taking the time to read, write and reflect seemed like an impossible boon. And too, after years of witnessing multiple setbacks in the countries where I worked, the PhD proved to be a cure for impending cynicism. The community of researchers studying democratization around the world draws on history, rigorous study and a diverse collegial network to better understand the challenges and struggles practitioners face in the field each day. It is a daily motivation and an honor to be a part of this community.

This work would never have been possible without the invaluable support of many individuals and institutions.

I extend my gratitude to my co-directors, Professors Mamoudou Gazibo, Marie-Joelle Zahar and Andre Blais for their insightful comments on my writing and constructive guidance in helping me realize my dream of bridging academia and practice. To the Pierre Elliott Trudeau Foundation for providing the primary financial support for this PhD, as well as the entrée into an exuberantly dynamic and brilliant community.

Thank you to the co-author of Chapter 5, Skye Christensen, as well as the research team that supported Chapters 1 and 2, Anais Auvray, H el ene Tr ehin and Yanick Touchette. For taking the time to comment, discuss and review various materials over the course of recent years, I am indebted to Steven Levistky, Scott Mainwaring, Andreas Schedler, Matthijs Bogaards, Sebastian Eischler, Theodore McLauchlin, Jennifer Piscopo and Inken von Borzyskowski. During my PhD, I had the outstanding opportunity to be hosted by the Department of Peace and Conflict Studies at Uppsala University for a semester. To Peter and Lena Wallenstein, whose generosity will stay with me always. *Tack s  mycket* to

Kristine Höglund for participating on my committee, to Elin Bjarnegård and Mimmi Söderberg Kovacs and all the colleagues at the department for the learning opportunities you provided. I extend my thanks to Pippa Norris and the Electoral Integrity Project for ongoing encouragement since 2012. I am grateful to Jean-François Godbout, Eléonore Lépinard, the Centre d'études sur la paix et la sécurité international (CEPSI) for the attention and opportunities they have provided.

Portions of this work were presented at the annual meetings of the American Political Science Association, the International Studies Association, the International Political Studies Association, the European Consortium for Political Research, the Australian Political Science Association, the Women in International Security - Canada (WIIS) as well as a number of working groups and specialist meetings. The valuable feedback received in these venues contributed to improving my work, I appreciate the discussants' and participants' contributions as well as the financial support provided in several cases to attend these events by the American and Australian Political Science Associations, the CEPSI and WIIS-C. Thank you Maya Eichler and WIIS-Canada for your recognition of my work, which appears here in Chapter 3.

Several other institutions provided support for this work, including the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council, which supported some of the initial development and specification of some of the variables in Chapter 2 under the auspices of the project "Beyond democratic symbolism: Elections as a tool of conflict-management in war-to-peace transitions". The International Foundation for Electoral Studies (IFES) provided the initial opportunity to work with some of their EVER data on a White Paper and ultimately contribute to this body of work.

My greatest professional fulfillment lies in building the mutual bond between practice and academic knowledge. I am deeply grateful to have worked with such extraordinary colleagues in many extraordinary places. Thank you to Julie Ballington, for being a mentor, friend and one of the most talented people I could ever hope to admire. Lourdes Gonzalez, for patience, perseverance and a Primus (some fine day). Samia Mahgoub, Connie Moon-Sehat, Frank McLaughlin, Stéphanie Plante, and "boombox" team Victoria Florinder, Franck Balme & Leandro Nagore, working with you is charmed. To my mentors, Jean-Pierre

Kingsley, Denise Bombardier, Fulgence Ndagijimana - merci pour l'attention et l'inspiration que vous m'avez apportées ces dernières années. Thank you to Micheline Begin, Gisèle Poirier, Sean Dunne, Abigail Wilson, Richard Chambers, Hermann Thiel, Marta Val, Alessandra Rossi, Sandra Pepera and Rakesh Sharma. To those who helped to pave the way but departed before their time: l'Abbé Apollinaire Malu Malu Muholangu, Ernest Manirumva, Richard Ferland, Alison Des Forges.

The PhD would not have been possible without the constant and unwavering encouragement of family and friends.

Ann Conley-Bardall, Ken Bardall and Morgan Bardall, you are my bedrock, my runway, allowing me to fly and shepherding me home again safely. You have moved my furniture; airlifted my cat; allowed me to gut your house; floated on my leaky boats; weeded, hoed, chopped and pickled through my homesteading endeavors; endured my nerve-wrecking travels and offered unconditional love through my heartbreaks and losses, with unflagging support, optimism and high-spirits. Morgan, I look up to you each day for all you do and who you are. I am who I am because of you all and no one has ever been more blessed with a family.

Nancy Jean, Chantal Lepire, Sacha Marie-Levay, Alex Martin et les amis du Ze Groupe, vous avez révolutionné ma vie – votre amitié, communauté, générosité, vos sourires furent pour moi ces dernières années aussi essentiels qu'un gilet de sauvetage jeté d'un vieux canot (bleu), aussi beau qu'un jardin abondant (de zucchini), aussi réconfortant qu'un repas chaud (de KD) lors d'une nuit froide sur le fleuve, aussi inspirant que les envolés d'oies que nous avons admirés ensemble. Je vous aime, cette thèse n'existerait pas sans vous.

To friends that have taken me in along the way, Jon Tracy, Alexandra Hovelaque, Nicholas Matatu, Adriana Malheiro, Marie-Claude Dupont, Greg and Kyla Dixon, Sue Kutulak, and so many more. Estelle Grandbois-Bernard, chère amie de toute une vie, petite maman, je regarde grandir Rose et Valier avec un coeur plein d'amour. Dan Puga, for suggesting I go to Africa in the first place and ever since, grounding me in what's real and what is most important. Cristina Campisi and Naomi Bramhall, Alexis Arieff; Oneil Bouchard pour l'amitié, poésie et beauté que tu apportes dans nos vies, Marc Legaré - patience, persistance,

positivisme = succès! To my early mentors who imparted vision and values, inspired courage and trusted me to make a start: Lance Fialkoff, Felix Molzer, Tom Mahedy. Debbie & Donald Jacoby and the Children's Peace Fair crew.

André Bizoza pour votre courage au quotidien et élan inépuisable. KW, DL, AT, I am stronger for having known you. Drew Bush, for starting this journey together.

I don't know if you can be indebted to a place, but I am. Cap Tourmente, place of beauty, source of peace, misnomer of a fair haven. The PhD would not have existed without my spirit's home and I'm grateful doctorates take as long as they do, permitting me these happy years in my favorite place in the world.

*That was fun.*

— Steven T. Colbert, December 18, 2014

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Cap Tourmente, Québec

July 2016



## Introduction

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Some years ago, following a turbulent election in a repressive tropical state, an electoral official observed to me:

“The [opposition party] stuffed the ballot boxes, there’s no doubt about it. But who will prosecute them? They only helped the [ruling party] win even bigger.”

*Why, sir, might this be?*

“Because the opposition filled the boxes with ballots for the ruling party, of course.”<sup>1</sup>

This was not a case of a co-opted or controlled opposition, but a very deliberate tactic. My interlocutor went on to explain that, in the face of almost certain defeat, the opposition leaders in several districts had given this instruction to their partisans with the intent to subsequently present claims of fraud and ballot stuffing against the incumbent in court and in front of the high-profile international observation missions that would sway the popular

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<sup>1</sup> Conversation with author, March 2011. Port-au-Prince, Haiti. Author’s translation from original French.

perception of the incumbent, if not the incumbent's actual hold on power. They knew that, under the repressive electoral environment, they could not win the votes, but they still had a chance to win some voice.

This kind of logical illogic is commonplace in the elections of authoritarian states. Working on elections in some three-dozen semi-authoritarian states over the course of a decade, I found regularly emerging an array of seeming paradoxes that confound logic and sometimes confound the aid agencies that seek to accompany democratic transitions. The following chapters tell the story of some of these political enigmas.

The series of essays contained in this volume examine the dynamics of electoral competition in semi-authoritarian regimes. The research helps explain apparent paradoxes, such as the uses and misuses of new technologies for election violence, and the use of violent electoral strategies by pro-democracy groups. Composed of five essays, the volume focuses on two oft-ignored areas of this puzzle: opposition party behavior and women's political participation in hybrid states. I hypothesize that electoral disruption (violent and non-violent) is a rational strategy, both predictable and classifiable. Opposition group tactics reflect the degree of repression of the state as well as the organizational capacity of the opposition. Disruptive tactics against women in elections reflect specific patterns of violence and may be gender-specific. These disruptions, in turn, influence the speed and nature of political outcomes. They affect interpretations of violence and measurement of democratic progress.

The essays presented here are organized in two parts. The first two essays in Part I consider how to study the dynamics of electoral authoritarian (EA) regimes. Chapter 1 explores methodological challenges in studying semi-authoritarian regimes by critically engaging with a prominent framework of analysis in the field. Chapter 2 proposes and tests an original classification system for understanding opposition party behavior in EA regimes.

The three essays in Part II examine a specific sub-field of EA regime dynamics: women's political participation. The first essay in this group reveals and defines the gendered nature of electoral violence (a common feature of EA regimes) and the existence of gender-specific

electoral violence through a large-n empirical study and field research. The second delves deeper into the topic by examining the complex relationship between information and communication technologies and gender-specific election violence. The final essay explores solutions to protecting and promoting women's political participation by addressing a hitherto intractable challenge between gender quotas and common electoral systems.

Coming close on the heels of short-lived, post-Cold War democratic euphoria, the study of hybrid regimes has steadily grown over the past two decades. We have come to recognize that transitions to democracy are not linear, that entrenched semi-authoritarianism is enduring, and that the institutional trimmings of democracy can fall far short of realizing civil and political rights – indeed, they may hide some of the worst abuses of these basic rights of democratic society. Yet, our knowledge is deeply one-sided in more than one way. While the field of comparative politics seeks to understand multiparty democracy, its literature places excessive emphasis on a single party-actor – regime incumbents – to the exclusion of the opposition groups that constitute the other half of the political equation. Likewise, what we know about electoral violence (a common occurrence in semi-authoritarian elections) overemphasizes the violence experienced (and perpetrated) by men, ignoring the existence of the distinct forms and nature of violence experienced by the other half of the global population. How can we hope to build a full picture of the dynamics of EA regimes – which, for over a decade, have constituted the most pervasive form of governance in the world – without looking to the other side of the coin of political participation? This is the gap these articles seek to help fill and the common theme that unites the research endeavor.

## **Electoral Authoritarian Regimes**

Hybrid regimes, or “pseudo-democracy” (Diamond 2002), is a generic term that includes all regimes that simultaneously demonstrate characteristics of both authoritarianism and democracy. The study of these hybrid regimes over the past decade and a half has developed rich descriptive analysis reflecting the political realities of many countries caught between authoritarianism and democracy (Collier and Levitsky 1997; Diamond 2002; Levitsky and Way 2002, 2010; Schedler 2002, 2006; Ottaway 2003; Karl 2005;



Howard and Roessler 2006). The most significant conceptual contributions of this literature are the shift away from “democracy with adjectives” (Collier and Levitsky 1997) and towards ‘authoritarianism with adjectives’, i.e., the recognition that ‘transitional’ states are not nascent democracies on a linear path of democratization but are authoritarian regimes with some outward traits of democracies (Schedler 2006, Wigell 2008). Although they are less stable than full authoritarian or full democratic states (Ekman 2009), hybrid regimes are an enduring regime type in their own right (Diamond 2002).

Vast amounts of ink have been spilled and a great number of hairs have been split in the identification of “diminished subtypes” of hybrid regimes (Collier and Levitsky 1997). Matthijs Bogaards (2012, 2009) identifies no fewer than 38 different ways in which Freedom House and Polity scores have been used to distinguish between democracies and non-democracies, varying between dichotomous and continuous measurement scales.<sup>2</sup> This study intentionally casts a wide net in regime classification, focusing on a broadly inclusive sub-set of hybrid regimes described by Andreas Schedler (2006: 2):

Electoral authoritarian regimes play the game of multiparty elections by holding regular elections for the chief executive and a national legislative assembly. Yet they violate the liberal-democratic principles of freedom and fairness so profoundly and systematically as to render elections instruments of authoritarian rule rather than ‘instruments of democracy’ (Powell 2000).

Schedler elaborates that “under electoral authoritarian rule, elections are broadly inclusive (they are held under universal suffrage), as well as minimally pluralistic (opposition parties are allowed to run), minimally competitive (opposition parties, while denied victory, are allowed to win votes and seats), and minimally open (opposition parties are not subject to massive repression, although they may experience repressive treatment in selective and intermittent ways)” (2006: 3). However, EA elections are subject to severe, widespread and systematic state manipulation that makes fair competition impossible and renders the elections undemocratic.

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<sup>2</sup> Notably Bollen and Jackman 1989, Coppedge AND Reinicke 1990, Howard and Roessler 2006, Diamond 2002, Diamond 1999, Hadenis and Reorell 2007, Van de walle 2002, Wigell 2008

The choice of a broadly-encompassing regime category in the following chapters reflects my interpretation of a defining variable of mixed regimes: the uncertainty of outcomes. A key distinction between more hardline regimes (such as hegemonic authoritarian (Diamond 1999)) and midrange regimes (such as competitive authoritarian (Levitsky and Way 2002) or illiberal democracy (Emmerson 1994)) is frequently associated with the existence of uncertainty of electoral outcomes (Levitsky and Way 2010; Schedler 2001, 2013). Specifically, closed/hegemonic authoritarian elections take place in contexts where electoral outcomes are a forgone conclusion, whereas less repressive hybrid regimes (illiberal democratic, competitive authoritarian, etc.) (Emerson 1994; Levitsky and Way 2010) have some degree of reasonable uncertainty in electoral outcomes, despite competitive environments that heavily favor the incumbent. This distinction is rooted in a Schumpeterian notion of democracy, wherein electoral votes cast are the determining factor of democratic quality. I argue that uncertainty exists in hegemonic authoritarian states as well as in less repressive subtypes, because of the nature of political competition in these regimes. In all forms of EA regimes, political parties compete in elections to amass votes, while they also seek to influence broader regime outcomes by competing for popular legitimacy/attacking the legitimacy of their opponents, sometimes at the cost of electoral gain. Although there may not be uncertainty in the electoral outcomes, there is substantial uncertainty in the regime game. Thus, competition of one form or another exists in virtually all elections where an independent opposition is in place and diminished subtypes do not provide value-added.

My pragmatic agnosticism regarding regime classification takes its lead from Collier and Adcock (1999) who reject the idea of a single, “best” meaning and instead argue that regime classifications should respond to the question being asked. Instead of entering the empirical debate between classifying democracy according to a dichotomous or graded scale, “it is more productive to establish an interpretation that is justified at least in part by its suitability to their immediate research goals and to the specific research tradition within which they are working” (1999: 546). In this case, diminished subtypes do not serve their purpose in increasing differentiation and avoiding conceptual stretching (Collier and Levitsky 1997) because the regime itself is not object of the inquiry. Rather, actors outside

regime power structures are under consideration, i.e., opposition groups and women voters and candidates. Although the repressive nature of the regimes directly impacts actors' outcomes, as demonstrated in Chapter 1, over-restrictive regime typologies are notoriously difficult to quantify and prone to inaccuracy when applied in empirical study. I leave it to future researchers to concern themselves whether opposition parties respond differently in limited- versus diminished- or defective- democracies and to explore the subtleties of gender-specific election violence in competitive vs. classic or closed autocracies. For my purposes, assuming the broad classification of electoral authoritarianism (or semi-authoritarianism, terms I use interchangeably) is sufficient to the purposes of these studies.

## **Authoritarian Elections & Incumbent Behavior**

Why do authoritarian regimes trouble with the effort of holding expensive and contentious elections if they are, at best, marginally effective in achieving democratic representation? Are there other reasons for holding elections apart from the advancement of popular democracy? A variety of pressures arise during tumultuous post-conflict or authoritarian transitional periods that generate demand for elections in suboptimal conditions. Elections are often a key component to post-civil war peace treaties and political transitions and the reasons political actors in these circumstances choose to engage in elections reflect this link. In the context of conflict negotiations, political actors may choose to support elections because conflicting parties have reached a “mutually hurting stalemate” (Zartman 2001) where continued civil war or authoritarian repression appears too costly or inefficient (Stedman 1996, Kecskemeti 1970). They may view elections as a solution to a security dilemma posed in conflict relations (Walter 2004, Stedman 1996). Actors may have made public or semi-public commitments to elections and democracy in the forms of peace treaties and declarations or elite pacts, and therefore be forced to participate in elections to maintain their perceived credibility.

There are strategic reasons for authoritarians to hold elections. Elections enable regimes to identify disloyal geographic pockets, to punish or keep tabs on opposition military strength

and loyal regions, to reward with patronage (Brownlee 2007, Magaloni 2008, Cox 2009). More broadly, autocrats seek to continue ruling and do so through whatever means appear best suited to achieving their end, which, in some cases, is democracy. Slater and Wong thus argue that exceptionally strong autocrats can be incentivized to concede democratization from a position of exceptional strength as well as extreme weakness (2010).

Through learning, coercion, and other forms of diffusion, external pressures also encourage elections to be held where they may otherwise not take place. Governance conditionality may link elections and democracy to lucrative trade and investment deals and aid packages (Santiso 2001). The evolution of accepted international norms and practices may place sufficient pressure on leadership to hold elections, whether or not they are committed to democratic values in practice. The decision may also be strategic, as in conflict contexts where Walter (2004) and Stedman (1996) recognize the importance of external mediators in acting upon “ripe moments” in conflict to initiate the negotiations that result in election deals. Although many of these pressures arise during post-conflict or authoritarian transitional periods, they often persist for multiple election cycles. Political actors thus engage in elections of questionable quality or utility by publicly committing to democratic principles and by making apparent good faith efforts to engage in the process. These efforts include running candidates, staging campaigns, accepting international electoral assistance and allowing international and domestic observer groups.

There is an extensive ‘menu of manipulation’ (Schedler 2002) for incumbents to manipulate the electoral arena and consolidate (semi-)authoritarian regimes. Electoral fraud and malpractice target various areas, including manipulation of the rules governing elections, manipulation of voter preference formation and expression and of the voting process (Lehoucq 2003, Birch 2011). Strategies include the restriction of civil liberties, reserving key positions and domains of influence from voter influence, seeking to exclude or fragment opposition parties, disenfranchising opposition supporters, direct fraud and vote buying, intimidation and violence (Case in Schedler, 2006). Incumbents use unfair advantage to skew the playing field, including abuse of state resources, media, bureaucratic harassment and legal harassment (Levitsky and Way, 2010). Authoritarian strategies are

ever morphing to adapt to modern contexts, frequently technologically sophisticated and replacing direct brutality to subtle coercion. They engage in manipulation when the stakes are high, either because of a close race or because losing power can dramatically threaten the economic fortunes or life-chances of an incumbent dictator (Birch 2011). Manipulation is also more common in countries with higher levels of economic inequality, larger rural populations, weaker civil society and restrictions on press freedom (Birch 2011). Incumbent manipulation occurs at all phases of the electoral cycle, including before, during and after Election Day. Outcomes of incumbent strategies may reflect the strength of the governing party and state institutions, as well as linkage to the West (Levitsky and Way, 2010).

Both Eckman and Levitsky & Way agree that the incumbent's organizational abilities are key in maintaining stable authoritarian outcomes, which includes their ability to play to the weaknesses and biases of international observation missions (Carothers 1997, Kelley 2009) and marshal state resources for their re-election campaigns. Ellen Lust's theory of "structures of contestation" ("SoCs", 2005) provides another useful framework for classifying and understanding political behavior in these regimes. Lust argues that, in semi-authoritarian states, incumbent elites can create three different ideal types of SoCs as strategies of rule: inclusive, unified SoCs are those in which incumbent elites permit all political opponents to participate in the formal political system; exclusive, unified SoCs are those in which incumbents allow no political opponents to participate in the formal sphere; and divided SoCs are those in which incumbents allow selected political opponents to participate in the political system, while excluding others (40).

There are a plethora of reasons – other than democratic intention – for authoritarian incumbents to hold elections. The undemocratic nature of these contests is reflected in the well-documented strategies incumbents employ to undermine competition and maintain their control. My research contributes to this narrative by critically engaging with a prominent framework of analysis for the dynamics of semi-authoritarian regimes and by looking at the other side of the coin: the behaviors of opposition groups in the context of authoritarian elections. These hybrid-state elections are the stage upon which the

subsequent chapters unfold, and the incumbent structures of manipulation and contestation are the foils that highlight the behaviors of interest.

## **Feminist Politics and the study of Electoral Authoritarian Regimes**

The conspicuous absence of adequate research on political oppositions in the recent literature on EA regimes justifies the attention paid to the topic in this dissertation. The significance of a similar absence of feminist political theory in comparative democratization may require further justification. Why talk about women's political participation in this framework? Why focus on election violence in particular?

Gender-considerations are altogether lacking in academic writing on democratic transitions and authoritarian behavior. And yet, the rise in women's political participation is perhaps the single greatest political change taking place in these regimes worldwide, with more than half of the countries in the world adopting gender quotas largely in the past 20 years, and women's average share of parliamentary membership nearly doubling between 1995 and 2015, worldwide (Inter-Parliamentary Union 2015). This is consistently true across the semi-authoritarian regimes of the world. Such a dramatic, global trend in these states merits study in its own right.

Addressing EA regime dynamics from a feminist political perspective has theoretical implications for the study of hybrid regimes as a whole. Gender equality in politics is commonly presumed to be intrinsically correlated with democratic consolidation, but the relationship is far more complex. Experience from hybrid regimes suggest that ostensible advances in political gender equality can sometimes facilitate authoritarian consolidation, while democratization processes may undermine political gender equality under specific conditions (Bardall 2014). Both academic literature and practitioner advocacy for women's political participation have avoided addressing this complexity. The field of potential for this study is vast indeed, calling into question some of the most basic assumptions about the normative implications of women's political participation and the impacts of political transitions on inclusiveness in general.

One of the greatest challenges in feminist theory is the empirical demonstration of

hypotheses, especially in comparative research. For this reason, feminist political theory has remained outside the study of comparative democratization and its hyper-emphasis on quantifiable diminished subtypes. Gender studies have not yet encountered the literature on hybrid regimes, although they are on a collision course to meet sooner rather than later. This study does not attempt such an ambitious course, but opts to examine the question from a narrowly defined subfield – gender issues as reflected in election violence. In doing so, I make an implicit argument for more broadly revisiting democratization literature from a feminist perspective. By empirically demonstrating that election violence (a common feature of elections in authoritarian states, as elsewhere) has a significant gender differentiation in conceptualization and in its manifestations, these articles encourage future research to consider other aspects of democratization from a feminist perspective, to achieve a more complete perspective on the dynamics of authoritarian regimes today.

Why electoral violence? Electoral violence is a common characteristic in the contentious elections of semi-authoritarian states. Just as the quality of democracy is measured by characteristics such as respect for civil liberties and political rights, a determinant factor in the quality of elections is the presence of electoral violence. Electoral violence is traditionally presumed to be a universal and gender-neutral concept. This is a misleading and harmful assumption. Elected political institutions have been overwhelmingly dominated by men worldwide for most of modern history, as have been national electorates and political parties until recent years. The definitions and conceptualizations of political competition that have emerged around these realities have, necessarily, grown to reflect a masculine experience. Without exception, academic evaluations of electoral violence – and connected assessments of the quality of democracy – have reflected this gender-bias. By assuming a ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach in our core concepts of political contest, the study of comparative democratization is hobbled and incomplete. Indeed, the oversight is harmful: by failing to recognize the distinct nature and types of election violence experienced by women, we fail to offer practitioners a basis for prevention and mitigation.

I choose to study election violence through this lens because the presence of violence is a basic determinant in the measurement of regime type and quality of democracy -- one of

the consistent themes throughout these texts. Studying election violence also provides a gateway for the empirical study of gender perspectives in hybrid regimes, because electoral violence has readily operable conceptual framework, alternately classified by the timing of violent acts, actors involved, intensity and motives (Hoglund 2009; Straus and Taylor 2009; Reif 2005, Hafner-Burton et al 2014, Kehailia 2014). Unlike other variables in the measurement of democracy and regime type, election violence can be measured through gender-distinguishable quantitative data. One of the key contributions of this work is the disaggregation of this data for the first time.

In the two articles addressing the issue of electoral violence and women's participation, I progressively deepen the examination of the gender dimensions of electoral violence. Chapter 3 presents the concept and demonstrates the existence of gender-differentiations in electoral violence as well as the existence of gender-specific electoral violence. Chapter 4 takes the narrative further, by exploring a sub-type of electoral violence.

Finally, taking a step away from the issue of violence, the concluding article of the collection turns to an electoral systems question concerning women's participation, with implications for the policy world.

Gender quotas (also known as Temporary Special Measures (TSMs)) are emerging at lightening speed in the semi-autocracies of the world. Almost 70 percent of legislated gender quotas today exist in "Partly Free" or "Not Free" states.<sup>3</sup> Indeed, "Partly Free" states are almost twice as likely to have a gender quota than are "Free" states, quotas appear in "Not Free" regimes at almost the same frequencies.<sup>4</sup> Although they exist in all types of political systems, the question of gender quotas is very much a hybrid regime issue.

Quotas are a proven means of furthering gender equality in elected bodies – a goal that is ostensibly shared by the 189 states signatory to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW, article 7). Yet, of nearly fourscore countries with legislated gender quotas in nationally-elected bodies, only ten actively apply quotas in single member district (SMD) systems (13 percent). As a result, women's

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<sup>3</sup> Author's calculation, data from Freedom House FIW 2016 scores & Quotaproject.org

<sup>4</sup> 27% of "Free" states have legislated gender quotas, compared to 51% of "Partly Free" states



representation in countries with majority/plurality systems (i.e., those that use SMDs) is notably lower than in countries that use proportional or mixed systems and continues to fall behind. In chapter 5, co-author Skye Christensen and I argue that this discrepancy in the adoption of quotas according to electoral system is the result of a practical concern rather than any intrinsic trait of SMD-based systems. Specifically, a widespread misperception of incompatibility of quota application in single-member systems has prevented their widespread adoption at the same rates as in multi-member systems.

Not only does this offer insight into a key policy area in the examination of semi-authoritarian regimes, it encourages us to take an important precaution across the field of study. Specifically, we must remain vigilant in distinguishing those dynamics that are driven by the inherent political nature of a given regime type from those dynamics that simply reflect a policy discrepancy. This is an important caveat: measures to support women's political participation in semi-authoritarian regimes, such as the adoption of quotas, have been criticized by some as a strategic tactic that does more to enhance the international reputation of a regime than to advance democracy (Bush 2015; David and Nanes 2011). Elsewhere, I have argued that impacts of measures promoting women's political participation in semi-authoritarian regimes vary between incumbent and opposition actors (Bardall 2014). Any such analysis of women's political participation in hybrid regimes should be grounded in the distinction between political theory and practical reality. This is a further reminder of the importance of mixed research methods (see below), as this type of distinction is unlikely to be recognized in a large-n quantitative analysis.

Broadly speaking, the chapter furthers the case for examining presumably gender-neutral structures, such as electoral systems in hybrid states, from a feminist perspective.

### **A few words on methodology**

My approach to research of hybrid regime dynamics is rooted in mixed methods. In each of these chapters, quantitative analysis provides a starting point in identifying patterns and trends, rather than an outcome. Each chapter begins with a quantitative perspective that is

progressively supplemented with qualitative evaluation based on case research, fieldwork, and reviews of historical literature. The approach facilitates triangulation of findings, identification and exploration of variation, and generally enhances the accuracy, precision and breadth (Becker 1996) of the topics studies. Reflecting an epistemological view that one cannot entirely remove a phenomenon from its context, the mixed-methods approach enables a large enough N sample to provide useful comparative findings without excessive reduction of the complex realities of the cases. This design is intentionally positioned in contrast to quantitative research on hybrid regimes. The choice is based on observation of the interconnectedness of processes present in these regimes. It seeks to avoid the pitfalls of over-quantification of hybrid types (Bogaards 2012, Armony and Schamis 2005) and dynamics (see Chapter 1) and allows for greater responsiveness and agility in studying dynamics of these regimes.

Mixed method approaches have the disadvantage of increasing time and resources required and limiting sample size (Driscoll 2007). In turn, some argue that this limits the generalizability of data (Lieber 2009). Despite these shortcomings, mixed methods approaches overcome the greater risks inherent in the alternatives of single-stream approaches (see chapter 2). The mixed approach recognizes an intrinsic mutuality in research design, namely, that all quantitative data is based on qualitative judgment and, in turn, virtually all qualitative data can be coded quantitatively.

The two articles in the first section draw on the same methodological approach: double-blind coding of a defined set of cases (both in sub-Saharan Africa) to provide a general quantitative orientation to the findings, followed by in-depth, literature-rich analysis of the threads set forth by the statistical results. Chapter 1 undertakes a replication exercise of an important study of a hybrid regime type (competitive authoritarianism). In Chapter 2, the double-blind coding enables the identification of consistent types in opposition party behaviors, which are subsequently explored in analysis.

Similarly, the introductory article on gender and election violence starts from a quantitative approach, comparing over 2000 incidents of violence in 6 countries. Through this analysis I find a basic and significant difference in the nature and manifestations of electoral violence. The subsequent analysis draws on a qualitative approach that looks

more closely at the statistical findings: only through qualitative analysis can we determine the gender-specific nature of these (and other) acts of violence. As I will argue, understanding gender-specificity is key in distinguishing two divergent forms of election violence, namely, to differentiate between electoral violence grounded in misogyny, and general (non-gender-specific) electoral violence that occurs differently depending on the sex of the victim. Chapter 4 continues the analysis where Chapter 3 leaves off, pursuing the investigation of a specific sub-type of electoral violence through fieldwork and historical research.

The policy article on quotas is the exception to the mixed-methodological approach, as it draws entirely on interviews, desk research and historical literature.

The research design and content is further informed by personal experience. I draw on formal interviews, informal meetings, conversations and participant-observations made in over a decade spent working in the field of international electoral assistance and on projects supporting women's political participation and leadership in some three dozen countries worldwide.

## Presentation of the Research

In Part I, I argue that our methodological tools for studying electoral authoritarianism are underdeveloped: I offer one new tool and critique another. The tool introduced in Part I has theoretical implications for the broadened study of electoral authoritarian dynamics. Part II introduces the notion that gender issues interact in distinct and significant ways with EA dynamics, affecting outcomes, defining political strategies and shaping participation.

In **Chapter 1**, I open with an examination of a leading framework in the study of semi-authoritarian regimes. One of the most ambitious studies of the nature and behavior of hybrids in the past decade is Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way's 2010 book, *Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes After the Cold War* (Cambridge University Press). In this "era of unprecedented abundance of cross-national political data" (Mudde and Schedler 2010, p. 410), the Levitsky and Way framework both organizes data into a uniquely operable model and contributes to it by generating new information on regime type. Yet

those who look to build and expand upon it must be aware of the “structural problems of information about data supply and data quality” (Mudde and Schedler 2010, p. 410) inherent in current political quantitative data and models. The competitive authoritarian (CA) model is no exception to these problems. In order to reproduce it and to use the regime model and theory for further research, it is necessary to address a number of conceptual, methodological and empirical deficiencies present in the work.

This chapter assesses Levitsky and Way’s CA regime classification model by independently reproducing it in the 14 Sub-Saharan African countries in the original analysis as well as in a limited number of additional cases in Sub-Saharan Africa. The chapter opens with a presentation of the core concepts of competitive authoritarianism, an argument for the purpose of the present study, and an overview of the CA model. The replication exercise is described and the findings are reviewed in detail. The paper closes with a systematic analysis of the work, drawing on Munck and Verkuilen’s framework (2002) for assessing quality of democracy data. I describe the most significant empirical indeterminacies that arise from the methodological indeterminacies identified in the replication exercise. I conclude that the inability to replicate the case selection undermines the usefulness of the proposed model to systematically identify CA. I consider how the broader conclusions of the original work are impacted by these findings, specifically how the persistence of competitive authoritarianism in this region is impacted by variations in case selection. The chapter offers recommendations on how to address shortcomings in the model in order to strengthen it and adapt it to the study of other non-CA hybrid regimes.

Having established a conceptual basis for the further study of electoral authoritarian regime dynamics generally (rather than specific subtypes, such as CA) and justified the mixed-methods approach, **Chapter 2** turns to the dynamics of competition within EA regimes. Political competition in EA regimes is characterized by a dual game (Schedler 2002, Mainwaring and Scully 2003, Levitsky and Way 2010). While both opposition groups and incumbents compete to win votes during elections (Electoral Game), they may also seek to undermine elections or democratic principles in favor of broader political objectives (Regime Game). Far from irrational, this behavior is a strategic response to the specific dynamics of electoral authoritarian (EA) regimes.

Opposition party behavior in electoral authoritarian regimes has received little attention in a literature dominated by theories reflecting incumbent behavior. In order to determine the effectiveness of these unique strategies and their impact on political processes as a whole, it is necessary to establish a theoretical framework to classify and assess them. The objective of Chapter 2 is to provide such a framework and offer an initial test of its application.

I contend that opposition in EA states reflects both the regime objectives of the opposition and the behaviors engaged by opposition groups. Four opposition behaviors are consistent during authoritarian elections: democratic transition, preservation, delegitimation and breakdown. These behaviors reflect both the degree of repression of the state as well as the organizational capacity of the opposition. Engaging comparative opposition literature in the context of semi-authoritarian regimes, the chapter tests a conceptual framework of opposition behavior. The framework inventories and classifies the complex and diverse behaviors most commonly engaged by opposition groups in EA states, ranging from electoral boycotts, election-related violence, popular protest, uneven compromise and symbolic politics. The framework is tested through a double-blind, pilot application on 55 EA elections in 29 sub-Saharan Africa between 2003-2010.

The elaboration of a framework for studying opposition behavior in this common contemporary political context is a first step in filling a significant research gap. It offers a critical tool in analyzing regime outcomes in EA states, from democratization to authoritarian consolidation to political breakdown.

In Part II, I turn to women's political participation in electoral authoritarian regimes. **Chapter 3** reveals and defines the gendered nature of electoral violence through the analysis of over 2,000 documented incidents of election violence collected in six countries between 2006 and 2010 and argues for the existence of specific, gender-based electoral violence. Women's experience with electoral violence is profoundly different from that of men. While men and women both experience (and perpetrate) violence as candidates, representatives, voters, party supporters and in other public roles, the forms of electoral violence that women experience are substantially different, including socio-psychological and sexual violence. The perpetrators of electoral violence against women are distinct as

are the locations in which violence occurs and the ways in which it is reported. Because women's experience of violence is different than that of men, its impact on their participation is also distinct. Some acts of election violence are gender-specific (targeted against women because they are women), which we call gender-based election violence (GBEV).

**Chapter 4** continues this inquiry and examines the subfield of election violence that takes place across new information and communication technologies (ICTs). The rising influence of new information and communication technologies (ICTs) has paralleled the rapid development of women's political participation worldwide. I argue that, for women entering political life as voters, candidates or holding public positions, new ICTs are frequently used as tools of gender-specific electoral and political violence. There is evidence of ICTs being used to perpetrate a broad range of violent acts against women during elections, especially acts inflicting fear and psychological harm. Specific characteristics of ICTs are particularly adapted to misuse in this manner. Despite these significant challenges, ICTs also offer groundbreaking solutions for preventing and mitigating violence against women in elections (VAWE). Notably, ICTs combat VAWE through monitoring and documenting violence, via education and awareness-raising platforms and through empowerment and advocacy initiatives.

Finally, **Chapter 5** concludes the collection with the examination of temporary special measures in single-member district electoral systems. In this chapter, Skye Christensen and I argue that conventional knowledge on the effectiveness of gender quotas for enhancing women's political participation has, to date, been unanimous on the superiority of quotas in proportional representation (PR) systems. Yet this view overlooks the many possible alternatives to implementing gender quotas in single-member district (SMD) systems. This paper studies gender quotas (or temporary special measures, TSMs) in SMD electoral systems. Drawing on case examples from Uganda, France, India and elsewhere, we refute the myth of the incompatibility of quotas in SMDs. Our research investigates and presents multiple ways in which quotas can be successfully implemented in SMDs.

Chapters 1, 4 and 5 have appeared as articles in separate publications (Bardall 2013, 2015, Christensen and Bardall 2015). An earlier iteration of the content of Chapter 3, on violence against women in elections first appeared as a White Paper (Bardall 2011).

## Part I :

# Approaches to the Comparative Study of Electoral Authoritarian Dynamics

*Part I considers frameworks for studying incumbent and opposition behaviors in semi-authoritarian states. Chapter 1 explores methodological challenges in studying semi-authoritarian regimes (such as EA) by critically engaging with a leading framework of analysis in the field. An independent replication of Levitsky and Way's 2010 classification model of competitive authoritarianism (CA) reveals coding discrepancies in the authors' case selection which impact the broader theory of CA regimes and have methodological implications for the comparative study of hybrid regimes in general.*

*Chapter 2 examines opposition party behavior under EA regimes. I hypothesize that EA oppositions' electoral and regime objectives ("dual games") align under conditions where there is relative certainty of outcomes but diverge where either regime or electoral uncertainty is greater, resulting in four identifiable behavior types. Testing the theory on 55 elections in 29 sub-Saharan African states, I demonstrate that the four behavior types are functions of the degree of state repression and the level of organizational capacity of the opposition.*





# Chapter 1.

## Coding Competitive Authoritarianism<sup>5</sup>

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Hybrid regimes are a persistent and unique regime form. Brownlee notes that “the ‘half way house’ has become a fortress”—an enduring blend of liberalization and repression indicating the durability of authoritarianism in an age of purported global democracy (Brownlee 2007, p. 16). Since the emergence of the concept and the recognition of its enduring nature, over a dozen authors have offered a similar number of distinct typologies for hybrid regimes (Bogaards 2009).

The intense debate over the identification and classification of hybrid regimes has often taken precedence over the operationalization of frameworks to predict their behavior. One of the most significant exceptions to this is Stephen Levitsky and Lucan Way’s work on competitive authoritarian regimes. A distinct sub-type within the field of hybrid regimes, CA regimes are defined as “civilian regimes in which formal democratic institutions exist but ... they are not democratic because the playing field is heavily skewed in favor of

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<sup>5</sup> Chapter 1 appeared in the *Journal of Comparative Governance and Politics*, 10(1) 1–28 [ONLINE] Available at: [doi:10.1007/s12286-015-0259-4](https://doi.org/10.1007/s12286-015-0259-4)

incumbents” (Levitsky and Way 2010, p. 5). On a conceptual spectrum, CA regimes fall between minimalist democracies (where competitive elections are held but may coexist with human and civil rights violations and weak rule of law) and hegemonic authoritarian regimes (where non-competitive elections are held).

One of the most critical innovations of Levitsky and Way—that which most concerns us here—is their organization of dozens of the traits of hybrid behavior into an empirically operable framework for measuring regime type and, ultimately, regime change. Their original model is designed to distinguish competitive authoritarianism from full authoritarian (FA) regimes, on the one hand, and from democracies on the other.

## **Objectives and pertinence of the replication study**

Mudde and Schedler note that “the academic rewards for systematic, in-depth assessments of data quality are scant ... and the required efforts substantial” (2010, p. 411). So why undertake this study?

The original intent of the exercise was to reproduce and extend the important findings on competitive authoritarian regimes, however the Levitsky and Way publication failed to meet the replication standard, which holds when “sufficient information exists with which to understand, evaluate and build upon a prior work if a third party could replicate the results without any additional information from the author” (King 1995, p. 444). Ultimately I was only able to achieve commensurate results in just over a third of the cases. Of those cases where I found corresponding outcomes, we came to the same conclusion via different paths. Additionally, using the same methodology on a limited external sample, I identified an additional three cases of competitive authoritarianism excluded from the original study.

King asks, “if the empirical basis for an article or book cannot be reproduced, of what use to the discipline are the conclusions?” (King 1995, p. 445). In this case, the inability to reproduce the case selection choices undermines the usefulness of the proposed CA model. If we cannot consistently agree on if, or why a regime is CA, we cannot measure the behavior of the regime type with consistency. “Without complete information about where

data come from and how we measured the real world and abstracted from it, we cannot truly understand a set of empirical results” (King 1995, p. 445).

Some may argue that revising the case selection may not impact the predictive ability of the broader theory in light of the exceptionally high rate of success of the overall conclusions of the book (Levitsky and Way achieved a 93 percent rate of agreement for their theory in the Sub-Saharan region).<sup>6</sup> It is vital to settle this question, given the vast amount of time and energy that can be wasted on extending, expanding and building on bodies of work that lack firm empirical foundations (King 1995, p. 445). Indeed, in the short time since its publication, the work has been cited over 350 times in the literature and has been recognized as a seminal work. I argue in my conclusion that the case selection does impact the theory’s predictive ability and that the empirical inconsistency of the case selection model is reflected in the work’s other proposed models, rendering it impossible to falsify.

Beyond the empirical critique, this exercise seeks to serve other researchers interested in using the Levitsky and Way model. Regime classifications are not an end in themselves, but serve only as heuristic devices designed to shed light on some part of a given phenomenon. Levitsky and Way examine only a fraction of the hybrid regimes in existence during the period of their study.<sup>7</sup> Yet the three central variables (unfair elections, violation of civil liberties and uneven playing field) apply to virtually all forms of hybrid regimes, in varying degrees. While these regimes are excluded from Levitsky and Way’s analysis, the prospect of adapting this tool to operationalize them holds promise.

A second reason to invest in further applications of the framework is because of its innovative description of the third “defining attribute” of democracy that has hitherto been elusive in empirical studies: the uneven playing field. As the “menu of manipulation” (Schedler 2002) grows increasingly sophisticated, electoral wrongdoing and human and civil rights abuses are replaced by more subtle manipulation of institutional machinery and

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<sup>6</sup> Calculated by the author from the results in the reference publication

<sup>6</sup> In Africa alone, Levittsky and Way’s study only recognizes 14 CA cases, although Freedom House identified almost twice the number of “Partly Free” states during the baseline period (1990 – 1995)

<sup>7</sup> Such as the UN Declaration of Human Rights and the Declaration of Principles for International Election Observation

state resources. While electoral abuse and human and civil rights violations can be measured against firm, internationally-recognized standard<sup>8</sup> no such codification of political and institutional manipulation exists. Thus, the “uneven playing field” variable merits deeper examination. What does it add to what we know? Is it truly independent of the other variables? Does the uneven playing field manifest itself through the same indicators in other hybrid states?

### Challenges in modeling competitive authoritarianism

The replication exercise seeks to address a number of specific deficiencies presented by the CA model. First, a brief recap of the CA model itself: The framework for coding CA regimes established by Levitsky and Way operates from the bottom up—if states do not meet one of the two criteria for full authoritarianism,<sup>9</sup> they are run through a gamut of conditions that would classify them as CA. Should they clear these many demanding indicators, they must meet two additional criteria to qualify as democracies.<sup>10</sup> Beyond three basic measures,<sup>11</sup> the detailed criteria for competitive authoritarianism are categorized according to the “three defining attributes of democracy” (Levitsky and Way 2010, p. 7): election fairness, defense of civil liberties and the existence of an even playing field. Each group is determined by three or four variables with differing degrees of specification (between zero and seven indicators per variable). The presence of any one of these indicators is sufficient to classify the case as CA. All told, over three-dozen indicators of competitive authoritarian

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
<sup>8</sup> The criteria for full authoritarian elections are that there are no national –level elections or that national-level elections are essentially non-competitive (Levitsky and Way 2010, p. 365) or that Calculated by the author from the results in the reference publication

<sup>9</sup> Democracy is measured according to five criteria, three of which refer to previously coded elements. The Two new conditions are 1) “the existence of near –universal suffrage” (compared to “broad adult suffrage” under CA – a negligible distinction in practice) and 2) “basic level liberties (speech, press, association) are systematically protected” (Levitsky and Way 2010, p. 368)

<sup>10</sup> CA regimes must meet three basic conditions 1) not meet the conditions of full authoritarianism, 2) respect broad adult suffrage and 3) unelected “tutelary” powers cannot restrict the authority of elected governments (Levitsky and Way 2010 p. 365).

behavior are identified and classified according to these three families, thereby operationalizing a notoriously complex concept and making the study unique in its depth and detail.

**Figure 1. Overview of Levitsky and Way's Model of Competitive Authoritarianism**



*Source: author's overview of Levitsky and Way model (2010)*

The work claims to test all competitive authoritarian regimes in the world between 1990 and 1995. This implies that all or most regimes worldwide were tested according to the CA model to narrow the set down to the final 35 cases. While the criteria for inclusion of these 35 cases is provided in the work,<sup>12</sup> the empirical basis for the exclusion of the other 150+ cases is not. The authors kept no record of the cases that were excluded (Levitsky 2013). Were they too authoritarian? Too democratic? A different kind of hybrid? In order to test a regime change model, it is essential to comprehend the basis of case exclusion. Pepinsky (2007, p. 18) notes, "In addition to making clear statements about social facts that are requisites for variable coding decisions, coders should make data available for non-

<sup>11</sup> Appendix 1, Regime Scores 1990 – 1995 pp. 369-370

<sup>12</sup> Anecdotal information on the basis for exclusion is provided in an ad hoc manner for a number of individual cases, however no data is systematically document the basis for exclusion has been made publically available to date. This is most likely attributable to the "least common denominator" approach to coding the cases, as explained in the concluding section.

included cases as well as included cases ... In principle, this should be relatively costless.” By rejecting existing indices of regime type, the authors assume the onus of providing information not only about why they chose some cases, but also about why they didn’t chose the others.<sup>13</sup>

The absence of documentation on case exclusion is pertinent because the cases identified as competitive authoritarian vary significantly from corresponding indices. As discussed above, although multiple indices classify intermediate regime forms, Levitsky and Way eschew pre-existing datasets that were not designed to specifically measure CA regimes or that rely on proxy variables, in favor of a specifically developed model (Levitsky and Way 2010, p. 35). Given the nature of competitive authoritarianism as a specific sub-set within the hybrid spectrum, this approach is consistent. Yet, based on this construction, one could reasonably expect to find substantial overlap between CA regimes identified by Levitsky and Way and intermediate regimes as identified in other major indices. Simply stated, if CA is a sub-set of hybrid regimes, one would expect the case selection to generally reflect this when compared to other major indices, particularly in the absence of documentation on case exclusion. It is surprising to find that this is not the case.

Figure 1 illustrates this for the 14 African cases identified by the authors compared to their corresponding classifications on the Freedom House and Polity IV scales (grey-shaded areas in Figure 1 indicate intermediate regime form classification). Freedom House classifies regimes based on aggregate scores of political rights and civil liberties indexes ranging from 1 (“Free”) to 7 (“Not Free”)<sup>14</sup>; Polity subtracts each country’s authority score (0-10) from their democracy score (0-10) to classify regimes as autocracies (-10 to -6), anocracies (-5 to +5) and democracies (+6 to +10). In contemporary research, the empirical study of hybrid regimes and the definition of diminished subtypes to autocracy and democracy have primarily been operationalized with the help Freedom House or Polity scores (Bogaards 2009, 2010). While the Freedom House and Polity scores are broadly consistent in Figure 1, the discrepancies between these dominant indexes and the Levitsky and Way classification would appear to be more than a few “borderline” cases (Levitsky

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and Way 2010, p. 34) and bears further investigation.

**Figure 2 Hybrid Regime Indices Compared**

| Country    | Year | Levitsky & Way | Freedom House |    |          | Polity IV      |           |
|------------|------|----------------|---------------|----|----------|----------------|-----------|
|            |      |                | PR            | CL | FH Score | Combined Score | Category  |
| Benin      | 1991 | CA             | 2             | 3  | F        | 6              | Democracy |
| Botswana   | 1994 | CA             | 2             | 3  | F        | 7              | Democracy |
| Cameroon   | 1992 | CA             | 6             | 5  | NF       | -4             | Anocracy  |
| Gabon      | 1990 | CA             | 4             | 4  | PF       | -88 (-6*)      | Anocracy  |
| Ghana      | 1992 | CA             | 5             | 5  | PF       | -1             | Anocracy  |
| Kenya      | 1992 | CA             | 4             | 5  | PF       | -5             | Anocracy  |
| Madagascar | 1993 | CA             | 2             | 4  | PF       | 9              | Democracy |
| Malawi     | 1994 | CA             | 2             | 3  | F        | 6              | Democracy |
| Mali       | 1992 | CA             | 2             | 3  | F        | 7              | Democracy |
| Mozambique | 1994 | CA             | 3             | 5  | PF       | 5              | Anocracy  |
| Senegal    | 1994 | CA             | 4             | 5  | PF       | -1             | Anocracy  |
| Tanzania   | 1990 | CA             | 6             | 5  | NF       | -6             | Autocracy |
| Zambia     | 1991 | CA             | 2             | 3  | F        | 6              | Democracy |
| Zimbabwe   | 1990 | CA             | 6             | 4  | PF       | -6             | Autocracy |

\* Revised Combined Polity Score for Gabon 1990, -6

*Source: Levitsky and Way 2010; Freedom House Freedom in The World – Individual country ratings and status, 1973-2014; Polity IV Individual Country Regime Trends, 1946-2013.*

### The replication exercise

This study tests Levitsky and Way's model of competitive authoritarianism for reproducibility and consistency. The objective of the study was to determine whether independent researchers could a) agree on which cases should be classified as CA and b)



why these cases are CA. Such an exercise offered the opportunity to analyze the CA model's strengths and potential shortcomings, and to consider its potential for future adaptation and further extensions. It also provides the opportunity for further investigation into the nature of electoral authoritarianism in several Sub-Saharan states.

Seeking to independently reproduce the exercise, the study applied the CA coding model to the 14 Sub-Saharan cases identified as CA by Levitsky and Way, as well as to the eight additional "Partly Free" cases that were not classified as CA. These additional eight cases are countries that held multi-party legislative/parliamentary elections between 1990 and 1995 (NELDA) and were ranked as "Partly Free" in the year of the election during that timeframe (Freedom House). Cases were chosen based on the existence of legislative/parliamentary elections although in several cases, executive elections were also held as part of the same electoral process.<sup>15</sup> This was taken into consideration in the coding. For those countries that held multiple elections during this period or where election results were annulled due to massive fraud or violence, the first competitive, multi-party election was selected as the baseline year.

Based on the selection process described above, four types of cases emerged:

**Figure 3. Compared Freedom House and CA Classifications in sub-Saharan Africa**

| GROUP I<br><i>Competitive<br/>Authoritarian</i><br>&<br><i>"Partly Free"</i><br>(7)   | GROUP II<br><i>Competitive<br/>Authoritarian</i><br>&<br><i>"Free"</i><br>(5)   | GROUP III<br><i>Competitive<br/>Authoritarian</i><br>&<br><i>"Not Free"</i><br>(2) | GROUP IV<br><i>Not Competitive<br/>Authoritarian</i><br>&<br><i>"Partly Free"</i><br>(8)   |
|---|---|--|--|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>Gabon</b></li> <li>• <b>Ghana</b></li> <li>• <b>Kenya</b></li> <li>• <b>Madagascar</b></li> <li>• <b>Mozambique</b></li> <li>• <b>Senegal</b></li> <li>• <b>Zimbabwe</b></li> </ul> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Benin</li> <li>• Botswana</li> <li>• Malawi</li> <li>• Mali</li> <li>• Zambia</li> </ul> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Cameroon</li> <li>• Tanzania</li> </ul>   | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Burkina Faso</li> <li>• Central African Republic</li> <li>• Congo (Brazzaville)</li> <li>• Côte d'Ivoire</li> <li>• Guinea-Bissau</li> <li>• Lesotho</li> <li>• Niger</li> <li>• Nigeria</li> </ul> |

Source: Levitsky and Way 2010; Freedom House Freedom in The World - Individual country ratings and status, 1973-2014

<sup>14</sup> Uganda, 1994, was excluded because the elections were for a constituent assembly only.

A few caveats: Competitive authoritarianism reflects the quality of a regime, not of a single election, thus identifying cases according to a single moment in time is sub-optimal. However, elections are the most important variable in CA classification and thus, for the purposes of this sample study, the electoral process was used as the pivotal point for examining the nature of the broader regime. I chose to work with the Freedom House index because its simplicity and broad lines favor inclusion of cases, allowing for a representative sample. Freedom House is one of the most widely used measures of democratization by scholars of hybrid regimes (Munck and Verkuilen 2002), making it both accessible and a legitimate reference. Freedom House's definition of democracy reflects the definition adopted by Levitsky and Way in that it is essentially based on Dahl's procedural minimum definition but includes the presence of "significant public access of major political parties to the electorate through the media and through generally open political campaigning" (Freedom House). This is somewhat reflective of Levitsky and Way's level playing field criteria. Finally, Freedom House data is highly correlated with the other widely used dataset, Polity IV (Casper and Tufis 2002, p. 2), making it a representative option.

All 22 cases were independently coded through a double-blind process. The research team consisted of myself and three research assistants.<sup>16</sup> Several months before launching the coding, the group reviewed the literature and discussed the coding model extensively. Three preliminary trial runs were conducted to train the team and establish reliability. The results of the trials were recorded and addressed during group discussion.

To complete the exercise, we found it necessary to introduce additional clarifications to some of the coding rules. The most notable clarification regards the behavior classified as the "uneven playing field" (UPF). We established that UPF behavior refers to the incumbents' use/abuse of the state's resources and institutions, not to incumbent behavior towards opposition parties, which is documented under "unfair elections" and "civil liberties" variables. Steven Levitsky confirmed this distinction in an interview before the launch of the exercise.

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<sup>16</sup> Anaïs Auvray, France, B.Sc. International Studies (Université de Montréal); Hélène Trehin, France, B.A. International Studies (Université de Montréal); Yanick L. Touchette, Canada, B.A. Honors, International Development Studies (McGill University), M.Sc. Political Science (current, Université de Montréal).

An additional guideline was introduced relating to the CA model's emphasis on incumbent behavior to determine regime type. While the incumbent-opposition power dynamic was clear in many cases, in others it was more ambiguous, with opposition groups driving the undemocratic dynamics in the country equally or more than the incumbent. I chose to apply the model in strictest adherence to its original design and exclude opposition behaviors from consideration while recognizing the potential this had in affecting outcomes.

I set a number of rules in approaching the documentation for each case. The original model is highly demanding in its criteria for inclusion as a CA regime – the presence of any one of the 30+ indicators is sufficient to classify a regime as CA. This minimal threshold is problematic, as it could conceivably lower the bar for coding. We cannot know if this was the case, as indicator-level data from the original study is not available. To overcome this, throughout the approximately 160 sources used for the coding exercise, I sought to ensure that the material covered all areas of the classification model and drew upon both academic analysis (where available) and policy analysis (election observation reports, human rights reports, etc.), supported by national legal documents and contemporaneous media articles, reflective of the described approach in the original text. I could not replicate the identical reference material, as the 100+ pge bibliography in the original text is not case-specific, however we used as much as possible and, for supplemental documentation, exclusively used reference sources that were available to the original authors (i.e., published by 2010).<sup>17</sup>

I also introduced a number of additional guidelines regarding the temporal parameters of the CA variables. As described above, each case required an identified election in order to be coded for “electoral fairness”. Since the elections in question were not specified in the

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<sup>16</sup>Three of the 160+ resources were published after 2010, however these were used to clarify information and did not affect the overall coding decisions.

<sup>17</sup> The baseline year is defined as the year between 1990 and 1995 in which multi-party elections were held for legislative/parliamentary office. In some cases, executive elections were also held during the same electoral cycle. The “Party Free” classification is the closes corresponding classification to CA.

<sup>18</sup> Funding for the double-coding was provided through the author's 2012 Pierre Elliott Trudeau Scholarship.

<sup>19</sup> “Unanimous” cases were those where both coders were in agreement with Levitsky and Way; “borderline” cases were those where only one coder identified the case as CA

original work, I made the decision to use the first competitive, multi-party election in the identified timeframe as the baseline year.<sup>18</sup> Finally, additional specifications for the timeframes covered by each variable were determined (please see below, *Aggregation and Theory Implications* for further detail).

Before launching the full coding exercise, I met with Dr. Steven Levitsky to discuss some of the challenges I faced and to clarify some technical questions. A debriefing session was held with the research group following the coding exercise to review the experience, identify common problems and provide feedback on the exercise and the model. I extend sincere thanks to this committed team of researchers as well as to the Trudeau Foundation for providing the funding for the double-coding,<sup>19</sup> to Dr. Marie-Joelle Zahar for her generous contribution of time, expertise and professional collaboration, and to Dr. Steven Levitsky for his advice and encouragement in pursuing this exercise.

## **Empirical findings**

Of the 14 original CA cases in the Levitsky and Way study, I ultimately achieved commensurate findings in only five (Ghana, Malawi, Mozambique Senegal and Zambia). I was unable to reproduce the authors' results in over 60 percent of the cases. Six of the fourteen appeared as borderline cases, with coders in disagreement over their classification as CA (Benin, Botswana, Gabon, Madagascar, Tanzania and Zimbabwe). I found an additional three cases of competitive authoritarianism from among the Group IV series (Central African Republic, Congo-Brazzaville and Lesotho).<sup>20</sup> Figure 4 illustrates the number of cases of agreement between the original study and the replication exercise.

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<sup>20</sup> "Unanimous" cases were those where both coders were in agreement with Levitsky and Way; "borderline" cases were those where only one coder identified the case as CA.

**Figure 4. CA Replication Study Outcomes**

|         |                               | Levitsky & Way            |                               |
|---------|-------------------------------|---------------------------|-------------------------------|
|         |                               | Competitive Authoritarian | Not Competitive Authoritarian |
| Bardall | Competitive Authoritarian     | 5                         | 3                             |
|         | Not Competitive Authoritarian | 9                         | 5                             |

*Source: Author's own compilation based on research findings*

To interpret the findings, numerical values were attributed to each of the three regime options and averaged between coders for each case. Values of “1” were most democratic and values of “3” most authoritarian. An attribution of “2” designates competitive authoritarian; these appear in boldface in Figure 4. In Groups I – III, this signals agreement with the Levitsky and Way classification. The cases in Group IV were not included in the original study. The boldface cases in Group IV are CA regimes not identified in the original work.

**Figure 5. Detailed outcomes of CA replication study**

| <b>GROUP I</b>                |          | <b>GROUP II</b>        |          | <b>GROUP III</b>           |     | <b>GROUP IV</b>                   |          |
|-------------------------------|----------|------------------------|----------|----------------------------|-----|-----------------------------------|----------|
| <i>CA &amp; "Partly Free"</i> |          | <i>CA &amp; "Free"</i> |          | <i>CA &amp; "Not Free"</i> |     | <i>Not CA &amp; "Partly Free"</i> |          |
| Gabon                         | 2.5      | Benin                  | 1.5      | Tanzania                   | 2.5 | Burkina Faso                      | 2.5      |
| <b>Ghana</b>                  | <b>2</b> | Botswana               | 1.5      | Cameroon                   | 3   | <b>Central African Republic</b>   | <b>2</b> |
| Kenya                         | 3        | <b>Malawi</b>          | <b>2</b> |                            |     | <b>Congo (Brazzaville)</b>        | <b>2</b> |
| Madagascar                    | 1.5      | Mali                   | 1        |                            |     | Côte d'Ivoire                     | 2.5      |
| <b>Mozambique</b>             | <b>2</b> | <b>Zambia</b>          | <b>2</b> |                            |     | Guinea-Bissau                     | 3        |
| <b>Senegal</b>                | <b>2</b> |                        |          |                            |     | <b>Lesotho</b>                    | <b>2</b> |
| Zimbabwe                      | 2.5      |                        |          |                            |     | Niger                             | 1.5      |
|                               |          |                        |          |                            |     | Nigeria                           | 3        |

Source: Author's own compilation based on research findings

**Group I** (CA and “Partly Free”) was expected to achieve the highest level of agreement between the original authors’ coding and our test group, however the results demonstrate the significant challenges faced in engaging with the model. Of the seven cases in this group, I found only three (Ghana, Mozambique and Senegal) that fell clearly into the CA classification. Three others were found to be at or below the standard of CA (Gabon, Kenya and Zimbabwe) while one (Madagascar) was deemed at or above CA status.

Although I arrived at the same outcome as the authors for Ghana, Mozambique and Senegal, we did not agree on the variables leading to the classification. In the case of Ghana in 1992, electoral fraud and the existence of an uneven playing field were unquestionably documented, which, in itself, was sufficient for CA classification. However, Jerry Rawlings used his authority as head of state to establish extensive impediments to the electoral process beyond the fraudulent electoral practices cited in the original work. Opposition groups were routinely refused applications for police permits for rallies (HRW 1991; Oquaye 1995) and reports of significant violence and intimidation against political opponents was recorded, including physical violence by state security forces against campaigning opposition members, threatening chiefs with destoolment and making death threats against rural voters for failing to vote for Rawlings (Oquaye 1995, p. 263; Jeffries and Thomas, 1993). Likewise, our analysis recorded widespread civil liberties violations in all areas of the assessment. The offices of several dissenting private media were closed down, vandalized or burnt and in one instance, the proprietor and editor of an independent paper were arrested, detained and tortured—one later died of his injuries (Oquaye, 1995). Free speech and assembly were tightly circumscribed (HRW) and several repressive laws were withdrawn the month before the election only to be replaced by the Public Order Law, which gave the regime other powers of detention (HRW). In sum, our assessment of the Ghanaian case is more critical than the original evaluation, noting twice the amount of violations of fair electoral practices and respect of civil liberties.

Mozambique reflects a similarly pronounced discrepancy in the justification for the CA classification. Although multiparty elections were officially introduced in 1994, the ruling

Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO) party swept the general elections. Its success in the 1994 (and subsequent) elections is largely attributable to its extensive control of state resources. A pattern of FRELIMO harassment of opposition parties throughout the country involved heckling and stoning opposition candidates, and systematic defacing of opposition campaign material (USDoS 1994). Although freedom of speech and association were constitutionally protected and permission for public gatherings was generally granted, security forces used excessive force to control unauthorized demonstrations, killing and wounding several persons on several occasions (USDoS 1994). Again, I identified twice the number of variables justifying the CA classification than the original study. This result was consistent in the case of Senegal.

I anticipated a high rate of agreement for cases in **Group II** (CA and “Free”) based on the understanding of CA as a more demanding and broader reaching classification than the FH standard for “Free”. This bore out in practice. I only differed substantially in the case of Mali, which I classified as a “Democracy” according to the CA model. The Malian case illustrates our difficulty with the question of timing in the application of this model. Although military coup leader Amadou Toumani Touré had the capacity to wield state resources in his favor during the 1992 elections, he chose instead not to participate. The elections were widely viewed as free and fair and resulted in the peaceful transfer of executive power and turnover in parliament. Based on our application of the model, this qualified the case as a democracy. The CA nature of the regime only took shape under the newly elected president, Alpha Oumar Konaré. While Mali unquestionably met CA criteria by the time of the 1997 elections (beyond the period of analysis), determining exactly when the shift took place prior to that is highly debatable. Indeed, the authors classified the case as CA based on the presence of a single variable that was only present during events of 1996-1997—frequent harassment of media under the Konaré government (Myers 1998, p. 205). Leaving aside the contentiousness of determining the precise moment of a shift in regime nature, the Mali case suggests potential conflicts in applying the model to cases where the CA regime—the “incumbent of interest”—did not preside over an election (i.e., assessing the authoritarian behavior of a democratically elected opposition group outside of an electoral period). This issue is also present in the classification of Madagascar.



The two cases in **Group III** (CA and “Not Free”) were the most problematic conceptually; predictably, they demonstrated the lowest level of empirical consistency. Our coding team unanimously classified Cameroon as “Full Authoritarian” and Tanzania the lowest possible borderline. There was no agreement with the Levitsky and Way coding of cases in this group. The study of these two cases revealed some insight into the classification of full authoritarian regimes under this model.

Tanzania held its first multiparty elections at the tail end of the analysis period (October 28, 1995). Despite the official legalization of pluralism, the 1995 elections were so deeply flawed that observers determined that the officially announced results of the contest did not reflect the choice of voters at the polls (Reeves and Klein, 1995; USDoS 1996). In Cameroon, the repression of political and civil groups in the lead-up to the 1992 legislative and presidential elections<sup>21</sup> was severe. In the year preceding the elections, the government banned at least six independent organizations associated with the Opposition Coordinating Group and five independent newspapers. The period was characterized by intense violence, widespread imprisonment and torture of protesters and political opposition (HRW 1994, Agendia 2013, ICG 2010, NDI 1992). The main opposition party boycotted the legislative elections after the government failed to meet its demand for the establishment of an independent electoral commission (Ngoh 2004, p. 440). Although the opposition fiercely contested the presidential elections later in the year, the actions taken by the government to ensure Biya’s reelection were deemed “unusually extreme and illegitimate” (NDI 1992) to the extent that the legitimacy and validity of the elections were undermined.

Both of these cases fall into a “phantom” regime category excluded from this model: They are hegemonic authoritarian states where non-competitive multiparty elections take place. The authors recognize the existence of this regime type (Levitsky and Way 2010, p. 16) but do not make a provision for it within the coding model. As a result, I was left to interpret

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<sup>20</sup> We assessed Cameroon based on both the presidential and legislative elections that took place in 1992, although they were separated by eight months.

the limited specifications of “Full Authoritarian” and relied heavily on the criteria defining large-scale falsification of electoral results rendering voting effectively meaningless.

**Group IV** (not CA but “Partly Free”) results were largely consistent with our expectation that these cases would be a mix between “Full Authoritarian” and “CA”. Indeed, of the eight cases, four were Full Authoritarian cases or almost FA (Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau and Nigeria) and three were Competitive Authoritarian (CAR, Congo-Brazzaville and Lesotho). Niger appears as an outlier, falling between CA and Democratic.

The authors suggest that competitive authoritarianism in Congo-Brazzaville (RoC) may have existed after 1995, however the brutal tug-of-war between authoritarian leadership and multi-party politics defined the entire period between the completion of the transition in 1990 and the descent into civil war in 1997. Indeed, RoC crossed the line between CA and full authoritarianism/conflict several times between 1990-1995, but is best described as a CA regime during this turbulent period. Although the president dissolved the National Assembly in 1992, new elections were held the following year under CA conditions. Two major episodes of violence in reaction to the elections in 1994 were resolved with a ceasefire agreement by December of that year, and the country maintained a precarious multi-party status until civil war erupted during the lead-up to the abortive 1997 elections.

In the Central African Republic (CAR), general elections were held in 1993 following the Supreme Court’s decision to annul the results of the 1992 elections due to irregularities. The elections marked the end of 12 years of military rule and the beginning of a well-defined CA regime under Ange-Felix Patassé. While a competitive multi-party contest was permitted by the military during the 1993 elections, the electoral environment was characterized by electoral impediments and civil liberty violations described by CA conditions. Violence and political detention were commonly employed against opposition actors and the right of assembly was restricted by regulations and discretionary use of permits by government ministries (HRW 1993). The government controlled the media and restricted publication of dissenting views. Despite the political turnover, the CA nature of the state persisted under the new regime of Patassé, an “incredible demagogue” (ICG 2008). The CA regime ultimately survived another round of elections in 1999 and several

military mutinies and coup attempts until finally being overthrown in 2003 when rebel leader François Bozizé seized Bangui.

On the other end of the spectrum, the cases of Lesotho and Niger were much closer to democracy during the 1990-1995 period. In Lesotho, the opposition Basutoland Congress Party (BCP) swept the largely free and fair March 1993 elections, and the military handed over power to the civilian government after almost 30 years in power (Southall 1994). The constitutionally-elected government was briefly interrupted by a coup and suspension of parliament, but was restored within a month and saw out its term under CA conditions. In Niger, a transitional government established by national conference organized the November 1991 elections under free, fair and nonviolent conditions. The elected government of Mahamane Ousmane improved some political and civil rights in the country but was regularly condemned by international human rights monitors for the detention without charge or trial of dozens of members of the Tuareg minority, some of whom had been beaten and tortured (AFR 43/02/93). Ousmane's CA regime lasted for almost the entire period of the analysis (1991-1995) before collapsing and returning to military rule in 1996.

Niger (and presumably also Lesotho) were excluded from the original study because their CA regimes collapsed before the full completion of a presidential term (Levitsky and Way 2010, p. 32, footnote 169). The choice to exclude these two is problematic, however. The Ousmane and BCP regimes were more clearly-defined and longer-lived CA regimes than several others included in the case selection. The decision to exclude these cases based on this criterion is not fully justified in our opinion. Further, Niger's appearance as an outlier in our exercise (between CA and Democracy) demonstrates the model's failure to adequately define the baseline time period of relevance. Identical to the Malian case, competitive authoritarianism in Niger began *after* the elections. However, the model requires the inclusion of at least one defining election during the baseline period and precludes simultaneously coding multiple regimes.

## Evaluation

I was unable to replicate the results of the CA case selection model through my exercise. The final section of the paper discusses the impacts of these findings on the theoretical robustness of the work. I discuss the causes of the dissimilarities and provide tips for researchers seeking to develop further work on this material. In this final section, I draw on Munck and Verkuilen's framework (2002) for the analysis of data to develop a systematic review of the LW model.

## Conceptualization

Munck and Verkuilen define the first task in the construction of a dataset as its conceptualization, or "the identification of attributes that are constitutive of the concept under consideration" (Munck and Verkuilen 2002, p. 7). The specification of the concept consists of identifying its attributes (avoiding either maximalist or minimalist definitions) and vertically organizing the attributes within a conceptual logic so as to avoid redundancy and conflation (Munck and Verkuilen 2002, p. 8). In the CA model, the identification of regime attributes according to three groups (elections, civil liberties and playing field) was comprehensive, however the maximalist approach results in the pitfalls of redundancy and conflation suggested by Munck and Verkuilen. This pertained both to variables within a group (for example, between the different electoral variables) and between the groups (electoral variables vs. UPF, for example).

A number of the variables within each of the three groups are so close as to be extremely difficult to differentiate. For example, Civil Liberties variables 1 and 2 distinguish between limitations on media and threats to media that are often linked or nearly indistinguishable in practice. Similarly, the difference between "legal harassment" (Civil Liberties 1) and "legal actions" (Civil Liberties 2) are so close that the empirical distinction is blurred. Limiting the opposition's ability to meet and to campaign (Elections 3) is also a violation of right to free speech (Civil Liberties 3) and free assembly (Civil Liberties 4). The effect is either to inflate the value of a single incident by coding it under more than one category, or to risk inter-coder consistency by choosing between effectively identical variables.

Most significant are the conceptual overlaps between the three variable groups. The conceptual distinction between the elements of the level playing field and electoral variable 4 (“uneven *electoral* playing field”) and civil liberty variables 1 and 3 (harassment of media and restricted freedom of speech and association) posed a particular challenge. I sought to address the issue by distinguishing clear time references for each variable. Additionally, I developed an enhanced description of the variables to specify between electoral variables, which refer to opposition access to the process, and UPF variables, which refer to the degree of fusion between the incumbent part and the state. Nonetheless, the presence of an uneven electoral playing field systematically corresponded with the presence of the other uneven playing field variables. This was the case in the original study as well, where the correspondence appeared in 13 of the 14 cases (Kenya excepted).

The same issue emerged with the two civil liberties variables, both in the replication exercise and, to a greater degree, in the original study. The indicators of these variables reflected actions that can only be undertaken where the incumbent and the state are closely bound. The definition of media harassment includes censorship, legal harassment by central government and discretionary use of licenses, while the restriction of civil freedoms is described by enforcement of repressive laws inhibiting speech, frequent use of the legal or tax system to harass critics, and state or paramilitary repression of protests and public meetings. These actions reflect a widespread influence of political interests across different areas of state administration—the defining characteristic of the uneven playing field. The corresponding presence of these variables and the UPF variables indicates a potential overlap in the conceptual definition of the two civil liberties variables.

While some variables had a tendency to be “overcoded” due to conceptual overlap, others were underutilized. In our exercise, the Elections 1 variable where “at least one candidate or political party is barred for political reasons” was never used. Levitsky and Way only recorded it once, for Kenya. This may be attributable to the similarity to the indicator for Full Authoritarianism (where parties and candidates are *routinely* excluded).

In sum, the model fails to meet Munck and Verkuilen’s standard for vertical organization of attributes in the conceptualization of the data framework. This conceptual approach of

working from the “bottom up”, along with the heavy emphasis on the CA variables (almost 75 percent of the model assesses CA characteristics, compared to less than 10 percent each for FA and Democracy), affects the neutrality of the model. The model presumes cases “guilty” (authoritarian) until proven “innocent” (democracy). Lack of clarity between the variables amplifies this effect and potentially distorts the outcomes.

## Measurement

“A second challenge in the generation of data is the formation of measures, which link the conceptual attributes identified and logically organized during the prior step with observations” (Munck and Verkuilen 2002). Three tasks are involved in the measurement of the concept: 1) the selection of indicators, 2) the selection of the measurement level, and 3) the recording and publicizing of the coding rules, process and disaggregate data.

The CA model establishes the basis for cross-system equivalence by selecting a multitude of indicators to specify each variable. By doing so, the model overcomes any focus on identical measures and establishes a “ ... *similarity of the structure of indicators ... Equivalence is a matter of inference, not of direct observation*” (Przeworski and Teune 1970, pp. 117-118, emphasis in original). In theory, this should minimize measurement error and allow for cross-checking (Munck and Verkuilen 2002).

The selection of the measurement level is more challenging. To establish measurement validity, Munck and Verkuilen advise to “maximize homogeneity within measurement classes with the minimum number of necessary distinctions ... [in] an attempt to avoid the excesses of introducing distinctions that are either too fine-grained, which would result in statements about measurement that are simply not plausible in light of the available information and the extent to which measurement error can be minimized, or too coarse-grained, which would result in cases that we are quite certain are different being placed together.” In the CA model, the onus of this came down to distinguishing the original variable (“Uneven Playing Field”) from the other two groups. The difficulty of this became apparent in one of the principle methodological difficulties I experienced, specifically, maintaining inter-coder reliability throughout the exercise, both for the overall regime

classification as well as for the individual variables that defined why CA regimes were classified as such.<sup>22</sup>

The broad reasons for this may be attributed to two structural factors. First, I found the time periods covered by the coders both over-specified in some regards and under-specified in others.<sup>23</sup> Two of the four civil liberties variables specified the inclusion of acts that took place “within a one-year period that can reasonably be expected to have a ‘chilling effect’” (Levitsky and Way 2010, p. 367). I interpreted this to refer to acts within a one-year period *preceding the elections*<sup>24</sup> that could have a chilling effect *on political participation in the elections*. The timeframe served as a useful parameter, but strictly respecting the one-year date limit was over-restrictive in some instances. The remaining two civil liberties variables and the UPF variables did not specify time frames and therefore proved to be the area of broadest leeway in coder interpretation. I found it necessary to consider the elections as the end-point reference: virtually the litmus test of UPF infrastructure. Under this model it was extremely difficult to identify CA regimes in the absence of an electoral contest, as in the cases of Mali and Niger.

Regimes in consideration that did not hold elections during this period were, by default, newly elected to office (i.e., a democratic contest resulted in the election of a party that subsequently transformed the state into a CA regime). This implied the need to assess the behavior of the previous opposition actors who had recently acceded to power. The

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<sup>22</sup>

**Intercoder Reliability Test Results**

**Percent Agreement**

|                    |        |             |       |              |       |
|--------------------|--------|-------------|-------|--------------|-------|
| <b>Elections_1</b> | 100.0% | <b>CL_1</b> | 68.2% | <b>UPL_1</b> | 63.6% |
| <b>Elections_2</b> | 63.6%  | <b>CL_2</b> | 77.3% | <b>UPF_2</b> | 72.7% |
| <b>Elections_3</b> | 59.1%  | <b>CL_3</b> | 72.7% | <b>UPF_3</b> | 68.2% |
| <b>Elections_4</b> | 59.1%  | <b>CL_4</b> | 45.5% |              |       |

22 cases double-coded by Bardall team

<sup>22</sup> This did not affect the electoral variables. Electoral variables were coded for pertinent issues present during the electoral process defined as starting from the official announcement of elections and/or opening of official campaign period, ending with the investiture of the new offices.

<sup>23</sup> In cases of post-conflict and transitional elections, the period starts with the signature of peace accord or the transfer of power to a transitional body following a national conference

variables specified in the model were insufficient to fully determine this. The UPF variables generally reflect characteristics of long-held and deeply entrenched regimes, which are difficult to achieve within the first term of office. Likewise, it was problematic to consider these groups “twice” in the given period: once as potential victims of oppression under the previous regime and a second time as newly elected incumbents. Although in most CA regimes the power dynamic between an oppressive incumbent and a besieged opposition was clear, in others the opposition was equally or even more violent and aggressive than the regime. Indeed, many opposition groups engaged in dual game behavior<sup>25</sup> during elections, however only some successfully acceded to power. In order to maintain conceptual coherence in the model, it is necessary to either entirely exclude opposition behavior from consideration (as we have done) or recognize the complex relationship between successful dual game behavior and the nature of the ensuing regimes.

The second structural issue also relates to the baseline timing. Very broadly speaking, elections in Sub-Saharan Africa between 1990 and 1995 were either “first” or (almost) “last” elections. First elections following peace agreements<sup>26</sup> or national conferences<sup>27</sup> were moments of sweeping transition, often characterized by rapid liberalization of the political and civil spheres, the creation of independent electoral bodies and the elimination or stern restriction of hyper-presidential powers. The last (or “almost last”) elections were authoritarian holdouts that in most cases terminated sometime in the following decade. In some cases, such as Malawi, this effect was so dramatic that Freedom House ratings shifted from “Not Free” to “Free” in the course of a single year (1993-1994). This issue compounds the timing problem described above and creates a highly unstable baseline period from which to judge the persistence of an uneven playing field. Furthermore, although we did not code regime status in the outcome year, we are concerned that this issue could create

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<sup>24</sup> Dual game behavior refers to opposition groups that seek to win power by existing rules while simultaneously trying to change them (Levitsky and Way 2010, p. 32), often through manipulative and violent tactics.

<sup>25</sup> Mozambique, Mali

<sup>26</sup> Benin, Gabon, Congo- Brazzaville, Mali, Niger, Madagascar .

<sup>26</sup> Mozambique, Mali

<sup>27</sup> Benin, Gabon, Congo-Brazzaville, Mali, Niger, Madagascar



an unequal basis for comparison between the baseline year and the outcome year. Regime outcomes in the original study were based on three consecutive election cycles in most cases, whereas the baseline was determined during a short and highly volatile period. This may be an area for further examination.

In sum, although one of the great attractions of the Levitsky and Way model is the move away from excessive electoralism in regime classification, we found it necessary to anchor our evaluation in relation to at least one electoral event. Without the presence of a pertinent election, the model was insufficient to determine and describe a regime type. The lack of specification of applicable time frames for several variables resulted in conceptual confusion in the replication process. On the other hand, the clear specification of pertinent timeframes for other variables was highly effective in determining the presence of determinative behaviors. The question of timing is problematic both within the cases and in the overall selection of cases in this time period starting in the early 1990s.

### **Aggregation and implications for CA theory**

The selection of the level of aggregation and the rules of the aggregation process are clearly set forward. Yet, as I have demonstrated, the CA model fails the final aggregation test of replicability. The failure to meet this standard has implications for the theories of organizational power, linkage and leverage presented in the original work.

“The numbers we choose are likely to affect the world we see” (Mudde and Schedler 2010, p. 412). Despite the high rate of agreement of the original theory, case selection still matters. Levitsky and Way conclude that their theory explained the persistence of stable or unstable authoritarianism in 11 of the 14 original Sub-Saharan cases. It explained instability in Mali and Benin, but failed to account for democratization in these two states or in Ghana. Yet, if the sample is restricted to the five cases where we agreed on the classification (see Figure 5), the theory would predict a greater probability of authoritarian stability in the two cases of medium linkage (Ghana and Senegal) and greater instability/opportunity for democratization in the other three states with lower linkage and organizational power levels. However, Ghana and (disputably) Senegal both

democratized by 2008 while (according to Levitsky and Way's measurements) authoritarian abuse tightened in Malawi and Mozambique.

Further to this, to explore the implications of case selection on the broader CA theory, I initiated an additional line of study to code the other three cases of competitive authoritarianism (Central African Republic, Congo-Brazzaville and Lesotho) according to the criteria for organizational strength, linkage and leverage provided in the original text. Here again, for reasons too numerous to list in the space of this article, I found I was unable to do so.

In sum, this preliminary inquiry suggests that altering the case selection reduces the robustness of the theoretical findings. In the final section of this article, I review the findings to provide practical suggestions on how to overcome some of the challenges in the CA model to apply it in future studies.

### **Further applications**

Despite the challenges I found in reproducing the case selection, the Levitsky and Way model is a useful tool for studying the nature of CA regimes and has potential to be expanded to evaluate other forms of hybrid regimes.

The strengths of the model are in its broad lines of conceptualization. The literature to date has identified several dozen indicators of hybrid behavior, and Levitsky and Way performed a vital service to researchers by organizing many of them into an approachable model. The model makes a further contribution by distinguishing between electoral incidents and the many significant issues that take place between electoral events that create a fundamentally unfair playing field during electoral competition. The inclusion of the UPF variables is vital to the concept, although its specification and operationalization need further refinement.

Notwithstanding the empirical shortcomings identified in the preceding pages, the basic components of the CA model are largely compatible as a basis for the study of other hybrid regime forms. Clearly, the conceptual definitions and specification on timing must be

addressed. In order to expand the study to other hybrid forms, the most significant nuances to be specified are the level of competitiveness, the degree of repression and the inter-election period behavior. Scholars engaging with this coding framework in the future should consider the following:

- The nature of election violence is a complex phenomenon, especially in CA regimes, and merits clarification. The presence of ongoing civil conflict, regional conflict, attempted coup d'état and orchestrated post-election violence are features of many hybrid electoral environments in Sub-Saharan Africa and elsewhere, and should be considered for their impact on competitiveness. The intensity of violence varies substantially between cases, as do the actors involved. Cases where intense violence between opposition and incumbents exists vary significantly from cases of minor violence or non-violent state-only repression.
- The presence of an uneven playing field extends beyond the areas of “media” and “finance” writ-large. In specifying this variable, it may be worthwhile to consider state capture of other pertinent sectors (justice, security, humanitarian aid, education and health access).
- The “Full Authoritarian” category subsumes hegemonic authoritarian regimes as well as closed regimes. While this is a legitimate grouping, further specification would benefit its operationalization, particularly to clarify between “large scale falsification of results that makes voting effectively meaningless” (Full Authoritarian 2) and the indicators of Elections 2, including “falsification of results” and other forms of electoral malpractice. Indeed, the fundamental distinction between the two is to distinguish between competitiveness and the absence of competition. It should therefore be recognized in the model that voting can be meaningless for reasons other than falsification of results. Severe intensity of violence and intimidation, judicial court rigging, and many other options are available to render an election meaningless. Specifying the distinction between (un)competitiveness would enhance the explanation of the variable.
- The UPF does not apply to a number of political contexts in Sub-Saharan Africa. Specifically, in cases of post-conflict, revolution, death or exile of head-of-state or other cases where an incumbent is not clearly identifiable to benefit from state capture, the

UPF is not applicable. Likewise, UPF variables reflect a long-term relationship of state capture whereas today, many states have experienced political turnover and the creation of a new CA relationship. Indicators of “young” CA regimes might be envisioned.

- The model relies on the availability of highly nuanced and cross-case consistent data from countries over 20 years ago. This was challenging especially for states such as the Central Africa Republic and Guinea Bissau, which were not the object of significant international assistance or academic study. This is a practical challenge to be considered when extending the model to other cases.
- The requirement of “broad adult suffrage” often does not reflect the reality of women’s political participation in our cases. In Mozambique, for example, there are no legal restrictions on women’s participation, yet targeted government tactics coupled with cultural practices in the country severely limited women’s suffrage. While I did not apply a gender analysis to the assessment, the growing influence of gender as a basis of political exclusion especially in the Sub-Saharan region must be taken into account. Alternately, the use of empty pro-women policies as a way for CA regimes to “gender wash” their behavior and enhance their credibility should also be noted as a tactic for maintaining CA stability (Bardall 2014).
- The model does not account for opposition behavior. While this is appropriate, in some cases it is problematic. Specifically, in cases of major opposition boycotts the model will achieve false positives for electoral fairness (i.e. where there is no opposition, there is no need to commit electoral fraud). In most cases, the regime will still qualify as CA due to the existence of the UPF (the cause of most boycotts), however this undermines the use of the model as a quantitative tool.

This last point brings the discussion to a close on a broad note. Despite its implied scope, the Levitsky and Way model was not designed as the foundation for a database or even for more limited use beyond the purposes of the book (Levitsky 2013). It was solely intended a tool to narrow case selection based on a least common denominator. As Steven Levitsky explained, “we had a low tripwire ... you just had to cross off one of the violations for a regime to be competitive authoritarian.” Naturally, the study went well beyond this and

recorded the basis for case selection according to the individually specified variables that I have examined in the pages above. However, the original conceptualization was developed for a strictly utilitarian purpose. In the preceding analysis, I have considered the reliability of the model as the basis of case selection for this subset of electoral authoritarian regimes. The impact of the case selection on the authors' theoretical findings is a future path to explore. While the replication exercise reminds us to proceed carefully where regime classification is concerned, the rich detail and insightful categorization of the traits of these complex states offers a promising basis for further study of the many forms of electoral authoritarianism in Africa and elsewhere.



## Chapter 2.

# Opposition Parties & Hybrid Regime Elections: Classifying and Interpreting Strategy

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Elections that take place in the context of authoritarian regimes do not follow traditional 'rules of the game'. While both opposition groups and incumbents compete to win votes during elections, they may also seek to undermine elections or democratic principles in favor of broader political objectives. Far from irrational, this behavior is a strategic response to the specific dynamics of electoral authoritarian (EA) regimes.

One of the key functions of democracy is to channel political competition through institutions, not violence. Elections are the most important of these. However, in EA regimes, elections are hollow rituals. Although they are held regularly and legally recognized as the official channel to gain office, electoral contests and civil liberties are violated so severely that elections largely lose their meaning as instruments to determine legitimate representation. Political actors operating in these conditions are faced with a

basic paradox: elections are both essential and impossible; they are both the formal means to accessing power and the instrument preventing access to power. Under EA virtually all political actors have officially accepted elections and democracy as the only legitimate means of acceding to power, but the circumstances in which the elections take place are so distorted that they lack popular legitimacy. Thus, to gain office and/or to sustain their political clout, political contestants often face a situation where they must publicly support an ostensibly democratic election while privately seeking to distort it, in pursuit of broader regime objectives. This raises the question: how do opposition parties compete in uncompetitive elections?

Opposition parties provide political contestation and electoral competition, without them democracy cannot exist (Dahl 1973; Kotzé and García-Rivero 2008). Opposition party behavior in electoral authoritarian regimes has received little attention in a literature dominated by theories of incumbency. Despite the resurgence of political opposition since the 1990s, “there were [are] few cases in which one could [can] plausibly identify stable patterns of competition between governing and opposition parties within a broadly accepted political framework” (Clapham 1997: 556). This article sets out to revisit Clapham’s challenge by identifying consistent patterns of opposition contestation within the framework of these semi-authoritarian regimes.

I argue that opposition behavior in EA states reflects both regime objectives and electoral goals. During authoritarian elections, oppositions engage in one of four types of behaviors: democratic transition, preservation, delegitimation and breakdown (adapted from Mainwaring, in Mainwaring and Scully, 2003). These behaviors are affected by both the degree of state repression as well as the organizational capacity of the opposition. The study locates the complex and diverse actions most commonly engaged in by opposition groups in EA states, in this behavioral framework, ranging from boycotts, violence, popular protest, and strategic compromise. The framework is tested through a double-blind, pilot application on 55 EA elections in 29 sub-Saharan African states between 2004-2010.

The elaboration of a framework for studying opposition behavior in this common contemporary political context is a first step in filling a research gap. It offers an analytical



tool in classifying regime outcomes in EA states, from democratization to authoritarian consolidation to political breakdown.

The present research seeks to develop a model for comparative analysis of opposition behaviors in EA elections. The model is based on a theoretical conceptualization of opposition party behavior and is tested on a cross-national sample. By identifying and classifying common patterns of behavior, the model provides a basis for understanding how these behaviors impact broader regime outcomes over time.

## **Classifying Political Oppositions**

The behavior of incumbent parties in electoral authoritarian contexts is well documented. Indeed, incumbent behavior has virtually become synonymous with overall regime type in many analyses (Schedler 2002, Lehoucq 2003, Birch 2011, Levitsky and Way, 2010, Dobson 2012, Carothers 1997, Kelley 2009, Oskar-Lust 2005,). Opposition groups' "struggle to institutionalize democratic uncertainty" (Schedler 2002) in hope of impacting autocratic regimes is a less commonly understood phenomenon.

A substantial body of literature was developed in the decades following decolonization; however, the subject has not been widely revisited since that time. The typologies from that period provide insight into current contexts. Opposition types range from anti-system to pro-system (Kirchheimer 1957, Dahl 1965, Linz 1973, Sartori 1976, Stepan 1990, 1993; Capoccia 2002). The principal distinction in classification is based upon whether opposition type is defined by the means they employ or the ends they seek to achieve (i.e., what they stand in opposition to – the current administration or the structural basis of the political system).

Authors adhering to the "ends" approach offer an array of subtypes for political oppositions (Dahl 1966 and Smith 1987 in Gel'man 2005; Barghoorn 1973; Skilling 1968, 1973; Uhlin and Kalm 2015). Key among these for current analysis is Kirchheimer's (1957) typology. Stated simply, there exist three forms of opposition: classical opposition (loyal opposition,

offers alternative policies that do not question regime legitimacy); principled opposition (oppose the legitimacy of the whole system of governance not just specific policy/incumbent administration); and waning opposition (opposition not based on principle, but on neo-corporatist/cartel relations) (see Kubát 2010).

Other opposition typologies reflect the means by which opposition groups pursue their goals. Loyal opposition (alternately named semi- or quasi-opposition in authoritarian regimes, Linz 1973) seeks to join the government through constitutional means, without significant changes in the political regimes and/or its policies. Disloyal opposition is one that makes “blanket attacks on the government and system rather than on particular parties or actors” and attacks on the government and system parties with “disruptive purposes”. A semi-loyal opposition may work with disloyal parties and manipulate the political system, but has no “intent to overthrow the system or change it radically” (Linz 1978, 29 – 32). Where the state is repressive, disloyal opposition emerges as “outright resistance to the state; resistance to the power of the state when that power is exerted oppressively; resistance to the group, faction, or dynasty controlling the state,” (Barker 1971, 4-6).

Both approaches to classification are somewhat problematic when applied to modern electoral authoritarian regimes. Objective-based classification is not viable in contemporary contexts where virtually all oppositions unanimously adopt pro-democracy discourses – such classification efforts quickly become exercises in assigning interpretive motives to nearly identical political discourses. Pursuing a behavioral typology yields better results, though it still struggles with ambiguity between intermediate forms as Linz recognized over 35 years ago.

In modern literature, Scott Mainwaring offers one of the few conceptual frameworks for opposition in autocracy and fragile states. In authoritarian regimes, Mainwaring suggests that opposition parties that “behave well” and do not threaten entrenched military and elite interests may increase the likelihood of a transition to a competitive political regime (“democratic transition game”, 2003: 9). Where this does not appear possible, opposition parties may pull out of elections to delegitimize the incumbent and hope to open the door

for democratic transition in the future. In democracies and semi-democracies, opposition groups may try to polarize their message to destabilize the regime, even at the cost of losing the votes of political moderates (“breakdown game”). Alternately, fearing such a breakdown, opposition parties may choose to pursue moderate positions that preserve (semi-) democracy at the expense of their own electoral interests (“preservation behavior”).

Although it does not offer a clear, operative framework, this heritage of comparative theory provides the conceptual basis for the study of modern opposition. Cold War regime ideological polemics have been replaced by a struggle to control the meaning – and the associated material and political benefits – of democratic state control. The field has narrowed, and anti-system opposition today is largely confined to the struggle against the semi-authoritarian state, but without a necessary ideological alternative. Intermediate opposition forms continue to exist within semi-authoritarian states, so long as oppositions continue to engage simultaneously in both regime and electoral games, as described in the following pages.

### **The Inverted Logic of Opposition Parties in Authoritarian Elections**

Reflecting Kirchheimer, today’s semi-authoritarian oppositions are largely principled or waning. Despite public displays of good faith in electoral politics, both opposition and incumbent parties often simultaneously employ tactics to undermine electoral processes during semi-authoritarian elections. Fearing loss in a free and fair competition, incumbents seek to manipulate elections (Levitsky and Way 2010, Birth 2011, Lehoucq 2003, Schedler 2002, 2006) in their own favor through unfair or illegal electoral practices, attacks on civil liberties and the tilting of the political playing field to the extent where fair competition can no longer exist. Expecting to lose or hedging their bets, opposition parties seek to influence local and international perceptions of the electoral process in order to cast doubt on its legitimacy. Common tactics may include boycott and also public protest, violence, organized crime, corruption, pre-emptive victory announcements and/or strategic declarations of fraud.

Far from irrational, this behavior reflects the “nested game” (Tsebelis 1991) of institutional design, or political “games” that involve not only winning the game but also defining the rules of the game itself (see Schedler 2002). As Tsebelis suggests, when actors take what appear to be suboptimal decisions (in this case, political parties undermining elections in which they are seeking office), the observer must look beyond the immediate context to understand the broader framework shaping their decisions.

Under the unconventional circumstances of EA regimes, political opposition is confronted with a participation dilemma.<sup>28</sup> On one hand, political opening exists and beckons political groups to try their luck in electoral competition. After all, elections in EA regimes feature universal suffrage, opposition parties are legally permitted to compete and win seats and they do not face overwhelming repression or violence. These opportunities are enticing for experienced and novice parties alike, whether because of the democratic idealism they inspire, because of fatigue from drawn out armed or non-violent struggles under authoritarian rule, or simply because the elections are viewed as the internationally recognized path to legitimate power and, therefore, control of lucrative resources.

However, promising as these opportunities may appear on the surface, opposition parties may be justifiably wary of the true reach of political freedom. They expect, and often find, that the incumbent party abuses state resources during campaigns, denies adequate media coverage to the opposition, and harasses opposition candidates and supporters as well as journalists, social leaders and intellectuals with violence, unfair legal statutes and the abuse of security and judicial structures (Levitsky and Way 2010, 2002; Case 2006, Birch 2011). Thus, opposition political parties enter into the electoral cycle with the conviction that the electoral process is fundamentally unfair. They are confronted with the troubling puzzle: how to compete in a non-competitive environment? It is under these circumstances that they must “weigh the uncertain pros and cons of different strategic options both within and outside the electoral arena” (Schedler 2009).

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<sup>27</sup> See Dahl, 1973, on participation dilemmas faced by incumbents.

This is a serious quandary for opposition parties – one that has a major impact on the outcome of the election and, more importantly, the overall state regime. Except in cases where the opposition seeks the breakdown of democracy and/or return to conflict, they share a common interest in improving their electoral interests by enhancing the quality of democracy overall. In the case of EA regimes, democracy is not necessarily being enhanced by the democratic institutions of ballots, laws and state office. Therefore, in order to achieve their goal, opposition groups must engage with the intangibles of democracy: popular opinion and legitimacy.

These intangibles are at the heart of the issue of democracy and central to decision-making in EA electoral contests. In his study of the Balkan states, Ivan Krastev (2002) emphasizes the importance of citizens' perceptions and confidence in democracy, asserting that it is necessary to “adapt a perspective that focuses on citizens and treats their experiences as key to understanding politics” (45). In healthy democracy, perceptions of democracy are assumed to be equivalent to actual processes (i.e., ballots cast, civil liberties, freedom of competition, etc. (see Elklit and Reynolds 2005; Pottie 2015). However, in EA regimes this is not the case. Political actors in EA states compete fiercely to win both popular votes and perceptions – often opting for one or the other, if winning both is not an option. Indeed, given a trade-off between the two, the perception of legitimacy yields greater political returns than actual legitimacy.

Thus, in EA regimes, popular perceptions of democracy are a fundamental prize sought by opposition and incumbent alike. Where democracy is “the only game in town” (Stepan and Linz 1996), the perceptions and opinions of the people count, no matter how deeply distorted some aspects of the democratic process may be. Although, in democratic states, “no one can imagine acting outside the democratic institutions” (Przeworski, 1991: 26), what goes on inside those institutions is still up for grabs (O'Donnell 1996) and one of the most valuable prizes is public opinion. Bratton asserts that elections are contested in symbolic as well as empirical terms, explaining that “in new democracies, where elections are not yet fully institutionalized, contenders vie to win votes and seats but they also struggle to control the interpretation of outcomes” (Bratton in Diamond and Plattner 2010:

21). Therefore in EA regimes, election struggles are fought out on two fronts: the on-the-ground fight for votes and seats on one hand, and on the other the normative control over popular perception, with its deep ties to the nature of the regime itself.

The competitive nature of these seemingly uncompetitive elections is characterized by “dual” or “nested” games (Tseblis 1991, Schedler 2002, Mainwaring 2003). Political actors seek to maximize votes and seats (the electoral game) because elections are the primary institution of political legitimacy. However, opposition groups may also “refuse to bind themselves to electoral rules that fall below minimum thresholds of democratic quality” (Schedler 2002) and use tactics outside the electoral rules to attack the system. Thus, simultaneous to their participation in an electoral process, they may also engage in a regime game where they seek to influence broader regime outcomes. In other words, while actors seek to win elections according to common democratic practices, they simultaneously seek to use elections to strategically alter the system at a more fundamental level. In some cases, these goals conflict with each other, with actors simultaneously participating in an electoral process and working to undermine it – thus, embodying the inverted logic of opposition behavior in authoritarian elections.

### **Rationalizing opposition behavior**

Academic writing, practitioner observations and simple logic largely converge around the notion that actions taken to undermine electoral processes are detrimental to the emergence of democracy. However these actions only undermine democracy where democracy exists. When taken in the context of regimes that are fundamentally authoritarian, the interpretation of these actions is more complex. As demonstrated in the following pages, opposition parties that pursue ostensibly suboptimal decisions during authoritarian elections have a rational purpose in doing so.

Opposition parties play dual games during authoritarian elections, pursuing both regime and electoral objectives or “games”. These games may align with each other or differ during any given electoral context. Electoral games may either engage or reject an electoral process.

Regime games may either actively champion democratic regime reform or they may maintain or exacerbate an authoritarian status quo. The possible relationships between electoral and regime games are summarized in Figure 6:

**Figure 6. Electoral and Regime Game Configurations**

|                | A                              | B                               | C                         | D                               |
|----------------|--------------------------------|---------------------------------|---------------------------|---------------------------------|
| Electoral Game | Engages with electoral process | Engages with electoral process  | Rejects electoral process | Rejects electoral process       |
| Regime Game    | Seeks democratic reform        | Maintains/exacerbates autocracy | Seeks democratic reform   | Maintains/exacerbates autocracy |

I hypothesize that these games align under conditions where there is relative certainty of outcomes but diverge where either regime or electoral uncertainty is greater. Specifically, where oppositions can confidently either expect space for political opening or no space at all, they will adopt consistent regime and electoral games (A & D). Where the opportunity for reform is uncertain, opposition games will diverge (B & C). This divergence is determined by contextual conditions relating to the organizational capacity of the opposition and the level of state repression (described below).

Hypothesizing the “games” binary according to related behaviors reflects a distinct epistemological approach to the study of opposition. We cannot hope to accurately know the nature of an opposition by interpreting their stated goals or intended ends, but only by examining their concrete actions. For this reason, the following analysis focuses on opposition behaviors. There are four possible types of opposition behavior, as defined according to the possible configurations of game behavior presented in Figure 6. To facilitate the examination of these four alternatives, I opt to borrow Mainwaring’s (2003) nomenclature to describe each of these behaviors, as follows:

**Figure 7. Opposition Behaviors in Electoral Authoritarian Regimes**

|                       | <b>Democratic Transition Behavior</b> | <b>Preservation Behavior</b> | <b>Delegitimation Behavior</b> | <b>Breakdown Behavior</b> |
|-----------------------|---------------------------------------|------------------------------|--------------------------------|---------------------------|
| <b>Electoral Game</b> | 1                                     | 1                            | 0                              | 0                         |
| <b>Regime Game</b>    | 1                                     | 0                            | 1                              | 0                         |

At opposite ends of the scale, Democratic Transition and Breakdown behaviors reflect aligned electoral and regime games (either consistently pro- or anti-democracy, designated by the numbers 1 or 0). According to my hypotheses, they exist where opposition groups are most certain of outcomes. In the center of the table, Preservation and Delegitimation behaviors are characterized by divergent game strategies. Existing where outcomes are less certain, they are determined by contextual factors.

The determination of an electoral game reflects whether or not the opposition accepts to participate in elections and/or accepts the outcome of the elections. Under Transition and Preservation behaviors, results are accepted (“1”), under Delegitimation and Breakdown behaviors the results are not accepted or elections are boycotted or otherwise substantially disrupted by unrest or violence (“0”).

The regime game variable determines whether opposition groups prioritize anti-authoritarian regime outcomes over electoral participation. In Transition and Delegitimation behaviors, opposition parties actively confront the authoritarian nature of the regime in the name of greater political opening (“1”). In Preservation and Breakdown behaviors, opposition groups’ behavior does not challenge authoritarianism – either by maintaining the current regime status quo or by furthering even deeper political breakdown (“0”).

Specifically:

- **Democratic Transition Behavior** is characterized by active participation in the formal and informal aspects of the electoral process as well as meaningful actions to compel



liberalizing reform to the underlying regime. These actions may include political dialogue, power-sharing, mutual concession and compromise between incumbent and opposition. Transition strategies pursue their ends exclusively through peaceful and institutional means.

- **Preservation Behavior** occurs when opposition participates in un-free and unfair electoral processes without making meaningful protest against the authoritarian incumbent, thereby maintaining the authoritarian status quo.
- **Delegitimization Behavior** occurs where opposition groups have little or no engagement in the electoral process and use extra-institutional tactics, such as boycotts, mass mobilization, coordinated international lobbying, and electoral violence, to discredit the regime. In these cases, oppositions place regime objectives before their electoral gain, sacrificing potential votes in favor of destabilizing the regime by attacking the basis of its democratic legitimacy.
- **Breakdown Behavior** is an extreme condition where parties forgo their potential electoral gains and engage in regime games that maintain or deepen political repression and conflict. Breakdown behaviors may include extensive electoral violence or boycott, resulting in the cancellation of polling or election results; coup d'état or takeover by other non-elected power; re-emergence of secessionist movements; radical rhetoric inciting or credibly threatening violence, state dissolution and/or a re-arming of warring factions.

The four behaviors reflect Linz's continuum between loyal opposition (which uses legal means for political struggle and rejects political violence (1978: 29) and disloyal opposition (which uses purely illegal or violent means (or the threat thereof)). Both Transition and Preservation behaviors are non-violent and non-disruptive, taking place within the institutional arrangements of the authoritarian state. Extra-institutional tactics and violence emerge under Delegitimation and Breakdown behaviors.

As alluded to above, I hypothesize that divergent game behavior (i.e., Preservation and Delegitimation behavior) emerges where uncertainty of outcomes is greatest. Specifically,


opposition behaviors are hypothesized to be functions of a) degree of regime repression and b) opposition party institutional strength (summarized in Figure 8).

Where regimes are relatively open, I expect to see opposition groups with adequate organizational capacity to pressure government reform through transitional behavior. Where repression is greater, opposition behavior should depend on the degree of organizational strength of the opposition.

Effective delegitimation strategies require strong organizational capacity. Building support and consensus for a crippling boycott, mobilizing thousands of protesters, persuasively lobbying international bodies – all of these actions require a certain degree of sophistication and unity. Where repression is high but organizational capacity is weak, I expect to find parties that revert to outright violence and breakdown, which (although this requires mobilizing capacity as well) is a regression to brute force rather than political organization.

Where repression is lesser, organizational capacity should determine whether the opposition is able to effectively engage the regime into persuasive reform (transition). Opposition parties are expected to preserve the status quo where they lack organizational capacity to engage effectively in either constructive (transition) behavior or organized disruptive behavior (delegitimation). In such cases, repression has not reached such a degree that opposition groups abandon democratic institutions, hollow though they may be.

**Figure 8. Opposition Behaviors as Functions of State Repression and Organizational Capacity**



Before proceeding to the empirical findings, a few comments regarding the distinction between my conception of these behaviors and that of Scott Mainwaring, who originally baptized them. The inheritance is primarily semantic. I suggest a conceptual distinction, in that opposition behaviors reflect a simultaneous configuration of both electoral *and* regime games. My model makes no assumptions about “good behavior” of opposition groups in Transition behavior (i.e., regime compatible/non-threatening to the regime); in my model, they may or may not align with incumbent elite interests. We agree on the concept of Delegitimation behavior. However, I find that Mainwaring’s distinction between delegitimation and breakdown cannot be reliably operationalized because it depends too closely on interpretations of intent and discourse (i.e. how to distinguish between “seeking to delegitimize the authoritarian regimes” v. “conspiring against democracy” writ large?). Thus, my conceptualization of Breakdown behavior is based on a more hardline, radical specification. We differ most significantly on Preservation behavior. Mainwaring suggests

that parties may forego electoral gains in the interest of preserving democracy, in the face of a threat to the system. I do not share this view that parties will act on anything other than their own interests, which are to obtain power, influence and resources as best they are able. Thus, organizational capacity is hypothesized to be the determining factor for preservation behavior, not commitment to democratic values – i.e., the only reason opposition groups do not disrupt the regime is because they are unable to - if they could, they would. Mainwaring’s conceptualization is restricted to the vertical axis of Figure 8 (degree of state repression). In contrast to my formulation, he expects Delegitimation and Transition behaviors in authoritarian states and Breakdown and Preservation behaviors to appear in less repressive, fragile democracies.

### **Empirical test**

I test my model of EA opposition party behaviors in order to determine if the classification structure may be successfully applied cross-nationally. Criteria for inclusion in the set is the full population of Sub-Saharan African states that held national elections (parliamentary, presidential or general, no referenda) between 2004 – 2010 (NELDA) that are classified as Partly Free or Not Free (Freedom House).<sup>29</sup> Each electoral cycle is an individual case. Subsequent elections were coded, whether or not their Freedom Status changed. In all, 55 election cycles<sup>30</sup> in 29 countries were coded for this exercise (see Appendix B).

Coders classified opposition party participation in electoral and regime games according to the coding rules in Appendix A. Opposition behavior was classified by pairing these outcomes according to the configurations presented in Figure 7. I draw on combined

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<sup>28</sup> All the countries held elections under “Party “Free or “Not Free” status, however the degree of intensity of state repression as determined by Freedom House varied between the countries from almost “free” to deep repression.

<sup>29</sup> I chose to code election cycles in cases where general elections were organized on a single day or within a short time period, or cases of two-round presidential votes. This choice was made because in a preliminary test, I found that political parties tended not to differentiate their game behavior by ballot race in these contexts. Coding them individually would have resulted in a skew of the findings. In all, 80 polling days were coded.

Freedom House scores to measure the degree of repression (y-axis of Figure 8). The degree of opposition party organizational capacity (x-axis of Figure 8) is drawn from a qualitative analysis of the narrative research collected to support the classification of the behavior.

Case selection for the test was based on a number of considerations. The time frame for inclusion in the test sample reflects recent elections, between 2004–2010. This time period was targeted because better data are available in the historical record, particularly with the increased scrutiny of international observation, electoral assistance and national and local media. Likewise, a relatively recent time frame was chosen to reflect the presumed learning curve in transitional electoral processes since the onset of the “third wave”, including the increased sophistication of electoral manipulation strategies. Starting roughly from this time, new information and communication technologies opened new opportunities for political actors to seek influence and popular legitimacy, which are critical elements of the posited model. The recent time frame was chosen in contrast to other dominant, cross-national studies of electoral authoritarianism which have reflected elections in the 1990s or earlier (Levitsky and Way 2010, Mansfield and Synder 2005, Lindberg 2009).

Significant disagreement on classification of hybrid regime type exists in the literature and case selection choices have profound impact on findings in this area (Bardall 2015). To limit errors based on case selection, I cast a wide net and adopt a highly inclusive classification. Electoral authoritarian regimes include both Competitive Authoritarian (CA) and Hegemonic Authoritarian (HA) subtypes. A close approximation of these classifications is Freedom House’s Partly Free and Not Free ratings. To identify cases for the study, I selected all legislative and presidential elections (NELDA) organized in Partly Free or Not Free states between 2004 and 2010.

The sub-Saharan Africa region was chosen as a limited sample for the pilot test. While there is some research on opposition party behaviors in other regions, there are few recent studies on African political party behavior, despite the fact that Africa is home to a greater proportion of semi-authoritarian regimes than any other region in the world (Freedom House 2015).

Political opposition encompasses “one or more political parties or other organized groups that are opposed to the government party or group in political control of a city, region, state or country” (Blondel 1997). In framing the parameters for this study, I adopt a more substantive definition, based on Brack and Weinblum (2009):

Any organized actor (the parliament; represented political parties; non-represented political forces; trade unions; social movements) expressing its stance in the public sphere (in the government; in the parliament; in the media; in the street etc.), that permanently or punctually checks, informs and criticizes the current state of affairs through different ... modalities (legislative processes; parliamentary questions; press releases; mobilization of the media; public protests, demonstrations etc.) the targets of its critiques being the government and/or its policies and/or the political elite and/or the political regime as a whole.<sup>31</sup>

I do not differentiate between typologies (loyal, disloyal, etc.). In practical terms, this exercise seeks to classify the behavior of the predominant political opposition during a given electoral process (presidential & national legislature). This may concern a single party or several leading parties. Minor parties that ally with leading parties or whose behavior reflects the dominant opposition are considered as part of general opposition movements. Fringe groups and small, radical extremist cells that are not aligned with dominant opposition and have negligible constituencies are not considered. Recognized pseudo-opposition parties are excluded. In most cases, opposition behavior will be considered as a single unit. In some cases, up to two distinct strands of opposition behavior will be distinguished. In these cases, the variables defined below are to be completed separately for each group.

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<sup>30</sup> This definition reflects one notable difference from Brack and Weinblum’s original version. Specifically, the authors state that modalities of action must be non-violent. Their version reflects standards of highly developed democracies and is unrealistic in reflecting the reality of political opposition groups in EA stats. Thus, this condition is dropped in the definition employed in the current study.

## Findings

To ensure internal measurement validity, the cases were subject to a double blind coding exercise. Analysis was conducted by two independent coders: the author coded all the cases and two trained undergraduate students shared the double-coding.<sup>32</sup> Results of the double-blind coding exercise are presented in Figure 9, with agreement between coders presented on the diagonal.

**Figure 9. Results of Double-Coding of Opposition Games**

| RESULTS |                | Coder B    |              |                |           |       |
|---------|----------------|------------|--------------|----------------|-----------|-------|
|         |                | Transition | Preservation | Delegitimation | Breakdown | Other |
| Coder A | Transition     | 9          |              |                |           |       |
|         | Preservation   | 1          | 11           | 5              |           | 2     |
|         | Delegitimation |            | 3            | 18             |           | 2     |
|         | Breakdown      |            | 1            | 3              | 0         |       |

Overall, coders agreed on 38 of the 55 cases, or 69 percent. Of the 17 cases where there was disagreement between coders, 12 cases were ‘close calls’, 1 case was an outlier and 4 cases were not compared due to other considerations (described below).

The sample contained three types of election: Presidential, Legislative and General elections (combined presidential and legislative). There was a notably higher degree of agreement in assessing party behavior during legislative elections compared to presidential contests (Figure 10).

<sup>31</sup> Double – coding was generously supported by the Pierre Elliott Trudeau Foundation.

**Figure 10. Coder Agreement According to Type of Contest**

| Types of elections |                 | # of agreements | % agreement |
|--------------------|-----------------|-----------------|-------------|
| General            | <i>16 cases</i> | 10              | 63%         |
| Legislative        | <i>18 cases</i> | 16              | 89%         |
| Presidential       | <i>21 cases</i> | 12              | 57%         |

Eighteen countries held more than one election in the period of study (between 2-4 elections per country). Coders agreed consistently on multiple elections in ten of the eighteen countries (31 of 44 elections).<sup>33</sup> Intercoder agreement was lower among countries that only held one national election during the period of study (50 percent agreement between coders on countries that held only one election).<sup>34</sup>

## Opposition Behaviors

This section considers first the coherence of the coding framework as a tool for classifying regime behavior. Secondly, the analysis considers the implications for each form of regime game. Finally, I explore future paths suggested in each area.

### *Transition Behaviors*

Coders agreed upon nine elections in seven countries as cases of transition behavior among opposition parties: Comoros 2006; Guinea-Bissau 2004, 2008; Liberia 2005; Mauritania 2006, 2007; Niger 2004; Sierra Leone 2007; and Tanzania 2010. Guinea-Bissau 2007 was a close call with coders differing on preservation and transitional behavior. In general, cases of transition were the most consistent and easily identifiable.

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<sup>32</sup> Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Comoros, Djibouti, Madagascar, Mauritania, Mozambique, Niger, Togo.

<sup>33</sup> Angola, CAR, Chad, DRC, Gambia, Guinea, Kenya, Liberia, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Uganda



The transition behavior cases were most commonly characterized by active participation in official (legal requirements, etc) and unofficial electoral activities (debates, codes of conduct, etc) (100 percent); respect for standards and principles including human rights, non-violence (78 percent); and peaceful, constructive dialogue and cooperation with incumbent (mutual concessions and negotiated compromise between opposition and incumbent groups regarding electoral issues) (78 percent). Roughly half of transition cases recorded firm commitments to pro-democratic reform or a firm stance against authoritarian practices of the incumbent (56 percent).

Opposition groups practiced transition strategies in less restrictive states. This is consistent with the hypothesis and other academic findings that suggest that protest is likely to occur in more democratic African countries, whereas violent rebellion is more likely to occur in more autocratic countries (Scarritt et al 2001; Minorities at Risk (MAR) project; Bratton and van de Walle 1997). Transitional behavior was associated with more open competitive environments and higher levels of uncertainty in electoral outcomes. Transitional behavior was frequently recorded in “first” elections following military coups (Mauritania 2006, 2007), power-sharing situations (Tanzania 2010), or civil war (Liberia 2005, Sierra Leone (2007). Generally, opposition groups pursued transition behavior where incumbents indicated willingness to leave office, because they had reached the end of their mandate (Comoros 2006) or because elections were organized under a transitional authority (Guinea-Bissau 2004; Liberia 2005; Mauritania 2006 & 2007). Opposition groups maintained their participation despite concerns about the free-ness and fairness of the upcoming contests (Guinea-Bissau 2008; Niger 2004; Sierra Leone 2007).

The key determining factor for the presence of the “Transition Behavior” is incumbent behavior. Did opposition groups have a basis to anticipate fair play from the incumbents based on past experience? Did the incumbent power play fairly in the election at hand? Transition behavior is consistently apparent where the answer to these questions is “yes, the incumbent played fair”. In other words, there is evidence of reciprocal behavior; i.e., opposition strategy is conditioned by incumbent behavior (both expectations and actual).

Government harassment of opposition during the elections was infrequent or nil (NELDA15) and there was very little or no violence around the elections.

Cases of transition behavior all had international monitors present during their elections (NELDA45). This last point is significant as it reflects a contrasting trend to that identified by Beaulieu and Hyde (2009), who found that the presence of international monitors was associated with an increased probability of electoral boycotts (i.e., delegitimation behavior). The consistent association of transition behavior with international election observers suggests that the presence of international observers may not be the determining incentive for opposition behavior. Instead, the nature of electoral contest itself appears to be more predictive of opposition behavior. Better elections were associated with “better” opposition behavior (where international electoral observation missions (IEOMS) reported free and fair elections, opposition groups were less likely to boycott, where IEOMS reported less-free and fair elections, opposition groups were more likely to boycott).

It is also telling to note that, whether or not the opposition won the election, in nearly all cases where opposition groups engaged in transitional behavior, they achieved gains in the vote count (NELDA27).

Does the analysis of the transition behavior states suggest any political outcomes? Five of the seven states that displayed transitional opposition behavior held multiple elections in the time period studied.<sup>35</sup> Of these, transitional behavior was recorded in the earlier elections in four of the five cases (excepting Tanzania). What outcomes were associated with transitional behavior in these cases? Did countries where opposition groups engaged in collaborative behavior maintain this into subsequent elections? Within this limited sample, most opposition groups that engaged in transition strategies subsequently hardened their positions in favor of delegitimation tactics in later elections.

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<sup>34</sup> Comoros, Guinea – Bissau, Mauritania, Niger and Tanzania. Note coders disagree over behavior in Tanzania 2005, therefore it is not considered in this section.

In Mauritania, opposition parties practiced transitional behavior in two consecutive elections following the coup of 2005 (2006 & 2007) before shifting to delegitimizing practices in the elections following the 2008 coup. Similarly, Niger's opposition hardened their position significantly between the 2004 and 2009 elections (transition to delegitimation), following the constitutional referendum that allowed President Tandja to remain in office. In Comoros, during the four elections held during the period of study, opposition behavior initially reflected a tendency towards opening (from preservation to transition between 2004 and 2006) followed by a hardening of anti-regime position (delegitimation behavior in 2009 and 2010). Coders did not agree fully on Guinea-Bissau's four elections, but generally noted consistent collaborative transitional behavior in 2004, 2008 and 2009, with an exceptional downturn in 2005.

This suggests a reciprocity in strategy between incumbent and opposition behaviors rather than a constant orientation of opposition groups. Likewise, no historic pattern or institutional learning is discernable. Even where opposition groups succeeded in increasing their vote count through transition behaviors, there is no evidence of a commitment to collaborative politics in subsequent elections.

### *Breakdown Behaviors*

The identification of breakdown strategies was unexpectedly inconsistent, with no cases of agreement between the coders. I hypothesized that breakdown behavior would be clearly identifiable due to the dramatic and trenchant nature of associated acts, such as extensive violence resulting in cancelled election results, a coup d'état, secessionist movement and/or radical rhetoric aimed at state dissolution, re-arming of war factions, etc. While the author coded four cases of breakdown behavior, the undergraduate student coders did not identify any cases as breakdown. Three cases (Chad 2006; DRC 2006 and Kenya 2007) constituted 'close calls' between the proximate categories of breakdown and delegitimation behavior, while one case (Burundi 2005) was an outlier. The outlier case will be examined separately. Let us here consider why it was difficult to discern between delegitimation and breakdown behavior.

All elections considered in this category took place in environments of general repression and electoral fraud. In all cases, the incumbent was widely expected to win. Chad and the DRC were rated “Not Free” regimes by Freedom House in the year of their election. Kenya was considered “Partly Free” in 2007, but the elections were widely viewed as rigged. In all cases, opposition parties responded by engaging in extreme behaviors. However, coders failed to agree on a classification for these behaviors due to insufficient specification of the coding structure.

The Chadian elections of 2006 took place in a hostile competitive environment. Presidential term limits were abolished via constitutional amendment the previous year, allowing incumbent Idriss Déby to run for an additional term. Multiple attempted coup d'états and rebel attacks took place between the Constitutional revision and the election. Opposition parties refused to collaborate with the process and ultimately boycotted the election. International observers largely declared the election credible, despite the very low (10 percent) turnout rate and absence of the opposition. Despite these dramatic conditions, opposition parties clung to political reform (rather than conflict) and ultimately engaged the government in a negotiated process the year after the election.

To the south of Chad, the DRC also organized contentious elections in 2006. The elections were the first in forty years and followed one of the bloodiest wars of the century. International investment in the organizing the electoral process was unprecedented, and regional and international observations groups deemed that, despite irregularities, the contest was credible. Significant fighting broke out several times in Kinshasa, once following the announcement of the results of the 1<sup>st</sup> round of presidential elections and again shortly after the inauguration, when demobilization agreement broke down along political lines. The Supreme Court building was burned down amongst gunfire during a hearing on an electoral fraud complaint. A rebel movement emerged in the eastern part of the country, under dissident army general Laurent Nkunda. The violence resulted in hundreds of deaths but did not bring the country back to a state of civil war.

One of the two principal opposition parties, the UPDS (associated with Etienne Tshisekedi's human and civil rights advocacy) boycotted the election from an early date, effectively

refusing to participate in the process before it had been substantively launched. The second principal opposition party, the MLC (associated with Jean-Pierre Bemba's wartime rebel group) played a more determinative role in the process, combatively participating in the elections until the violent rejection of results (after round 1 voting) and burning the Supreme Court (after round 2). Bemba later accepted the results, was elected to Senate and stated willingness to lead a "strong republican opposition in the interests of the nation". (BBC 28.11.2006). Yet, a few months later, Bemba's partisans engaged in heavy shelling and gun battle with government troops in Kinshasa, killing hundreds. Bemba himself went into exile before being arrested by the ICC for alleged crimes against humanity.

Previously a regional bastion of stability, Kenya entered into one of the most severe crises of its history after the main opposition party, the ODM, rejected the results of the second-round presidential contest. Post-electoral violence spread across the country, killing over 1000 people. Ultimately, a brokered power-sharing agreement between the two front runners, Mwai Kibaki (PNU) and Raila Odinga (ODM), ended the violence. Prior to the violence, the ODM had engaged in a number of delegitimation behaviors, including lobbying international observers to discredit the incumbent and promote perceptions in incumbent-organized fraud, demanding international intervention.

What does this tell us about (near) breakdown behavior? For one, extreme behavior does not occur from the outset of a process but is the result of cumulative failures over the course of an electoral process. In all cases of borderline breakdown behavior, opposition parties initially engaged in hardline delegitimation behaviors before crossing the line into breakdown levels of regime rejection.

In sum, further specification will permit the model to better classify breakdown behavior. Specifically, the issues of timing and of intent vs. outcome require revisions to the model. Boycotts that take place before an electoral process is officially launched suggest breakdown behavior. The model is expected to perform better if a clear limit on time is provided. In the DRC, the MLC opposition party engaged in substantial violence after the first round, burnt down the Supreme Court after the second round but later agreed to accept the results and participate in the government as official opposition. Three months

later, MLC partisans engaged in violence against the government resulting in hundreds of deaths. The drawn out nature of the post-electoral contestation clouded the classification of the behavior.

In the Kenyan case, the question of interpreting motives resulted in disagreement. Was the ODM's objective to cause the breakdown of the electoral process from the outset, to achieve a power-sharing outcome, or was the post-electoral violence simply a snowball effect?

In all cases of borderline breakdown, opposition groups began engagement in the electoral processes with at least minimal degrees of participation but eventually hardened their positions.

Finally, I hypothesized that breakdown behaviors would be found in contexts of high repression and relatively lower organizational capacity. Although there were not full-agreements between my coders for Breakdown behaviors, this held true for the cases that were closest to the Breakdown classification. Near-breakdowns that resulted in widespread violence reflected low political organizational capacity, although military capacity was relatively high. Mobilizing breakdown-style violence at the grassroots was achieved by falling back into patterns established during armed conflict or (in Kenya) mobilizing low-cost new information technologies (SMS in particular), rather than mature political organization.

### *Preservation Behaviors*

Opposition behaviors in eleven elections in nine countries were unanimously coded as cases of "preservation behaviors": Burkina Faso 2005 & 2007; Cameroon 2004 & 2007; Central African Republic 2005; Comoros 2004; Gabon 2006; Gambia 2006; Madagascar 2007; Rwanda 2008 and Togo 2007. In these states, elections took place under repressive conditions imposed by a semi-authoritarian incumbent. Despite the unfair conditions, opposition groups chose to participate in the elections with minimal resistance to the underlying regime. In doing so, they opted to preserve the status quo through electoral participation, despite the disadvantageous competitive environment.

Preservation behavior was most commonly characterized by acceptance of the status quo (weak or no demands for change) (10 cases) and acceptance of electoral results with minimal or no contestation (11 cases). In nearly half of the cases (5 cases), opposition groups demonstrated active participation in official and unofficial electoral activities and/or respect for principles of human rights and non-violence.

Elections where opposition parties opted for preservation behavior took place in “Not Free” or restrictive “Partly Free” regimes.<sup>36</sup> The status quo being preserved in these cases was often situations of entrenched incumbents/incumbent parties (Bongo was head of state of Gabon for the preceding 39 years prior to 2006 elections; Campoaré was in power for 18 years prior to 2005 Burkinabé election; Biya led Cameroon for the 22 years prior to 2004 election; Jammeh gained his third term in the Gambia in 2006; Kagame had held de facto power in Rwanda since the genocide 15 years prior to the 2008 elections; Gnassingbé succeeded his father after nearly 40 years as head of Togo).

Although opposition parties were allowed to compete,<sup>37</sup> it was widely anticipated that the incumbent party would maintain power and, indeed, incumbent leaders or parties won their seats back in all cases.<sup>38</sup> Despite this, opposition parties refrained from boycotting (NELDA14) and did not protest the results (NELDA 29, except Gabon 2006).

Almost all of the elections were part of ongoing series of electoral contests, rather than post-conflict, post-coup or negotiated political transitions.<sup>39</sup> International and/or regional election observers were present in all cases, but did not report significant voter fraud in any of the elections (except Cameroon 2007). All countries were large recipients of outside

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<sup>35</sup> 10 of the 11 cases had combined Freedom House scores of 4 or greater (more restrictive “Partly Free” classifications). Only Madagascar 2007 scored slightly better (Partly Free rating of 3.5)

<sup>36</sup> except in Rwanda 2008

<sup>37</sup> except in Comoros, 2004 where an opposition coalition took advantage of new constitution decentralizing power to upset the ruling Convention of the Renewal of the Comoros

<sup>38</sup> except CAR, where the restrictive 2005 election was organized after a coup.

economic aid (NELDA19) and the elections did not affect their good relation status with the US (NELDA50).

Preservation behavior was generally distinguished by two factors across the empirical analysis: 1) a weak or passive recognition of the authoritarian nature of the competition and 2) opposition party willingness to participate in the electoral process notwithstanding incumbent abuses. Although the manifestations of preservation behavior were consistently identifiable, the motivations for this course of action were diverse. There are three clusters of causes for preservation behavior: strategic intentionality, organizational weakness/failure, and co-optation (private gain/façade opposition). All nine cases of preservation behavior were based on one or a combination of these three factors.

Some cases confirmed Mainwaring's supposition that opposition groups would **intentionally, strategically** engage in preservation behavior despite the disadvantageous electoral environment and authoritarian nature of the regime. True to the hypothesis, these cases indicated support for an incremental approach to democratic opening. In these cases, some form of progress had been recently achieved which appeased demands for further reform. In 2005 in the Central African Republic, former rebel coup leader François Bozizé was elected in a contest that was organized under a negotiated agreement with opposition groups, mediated by Gabonese President Bongo. The Libreville Accords allowed all candidates to contest the elections except for deposed, exiled former President Patassé. In Togo, the 2007 elections went forward with minimal opposition resistance to irregularities and electoral abuses, largely thanks to the fact that the leading opposition party, the UFC, was partaking in parliamentary elections for the first time since the start of multiparty elections in the early 1990s. These cases are distinguished from transitional behavior because of the nature of the reforms involved: whereas transition behaviors are associated with mutually beneficial reforms, reforms agreed in preservation contexts are neutral or objectively negative for opposition parties. In Comoros, a previous constitutional revision decentralized power and favored opposition groups in the 2004 elections. Hence, opposition groups "preserved" the status quo based on this earlier gain.



In most cases however, preservation behavior was the result of a **failure of strategy** rather than an intentional course of action. Organizational weakness, fracturing and lack of resources commonly resulted in opposition groups competing in authoritarian elections that they were fated to lose. In these cases, preservation behavior resulted from opposition inability to mobilize either towards a more constructive position (transition behavior) or stronger regime resistance.

Former Gambian coup leader, Yahya Jemmeh won a third term as president in the 2006 elections, where opposition groups proceeded to the polls despite a campaign environment tilted strongly in the incumbent's favor. No substantive demands for reform or proposals for any meaningful alternatives were advanced by opposition groups. Across the continent, Malgasy opposition parties failed to fulfill their 2007 agreement to nominate a single viable candidate in each constituency, ultimately losing the election to the incumbent.

In Burkina Faso, a divided and corrupt opposition movement was unable to mobilize substantial support for civil disobedience. Ultimately, the leading opposition party was co-opted to support incumbent Compaoré. Legislative elections held two years later were characterized by greater fraud and greater resistance by opposition groups, including calls for electoral reform, poll reruns/cancellations. However, ultimately, parties failed to engage in meaningful protest against Compaoré's clientelist political machine, the option to boycott the election was rejected by opposition groups and complaints reflected relatively minor material concerns.

A third cluster of cases of preservation behavior reflects a factor that was unaccounted for in the hypothesized model. The model limits political party behaviors to political interests (regime or electoral), however in several of the cases of preservation behavior it is clear that opposition groups were motivated by interests other than political power. In these cases, **private gain** trumped either the regime or electoral games – opposition parties preserved the status quo in return for kickbacks.

Intensely beneficial patronage network resulted in effective cooptation of the opposition elite in Gabon 2006, while energetic behavior maintained popular support/tolerance for the authoritarian status quo. Indeed, opposition parties in tightly controlled Gabon had to

be persuaded to participate in the 2006 legislative elections after the state offered a number of limited reforms. The opposition parties made weak demands, such as demanding re-runs in a few districts and engaging in limited post-electoral protests. In cases such as Gabon and Burkina Faso 2005/2007, weak, disorganized political parties were more vulnerable to bribery and corruption. In general, preservation behaviors appeared especially frequently where patronage networks were strongest and opposition groups could reap the benefits of clientelism.

Preservation behavior in closed authoritarian regimes, such as Rwanda in 2008 and Cameroon 2004 and 2007, often reflected a controlled opposition. In Cameroon 2004/2007, a divided and co-opted opposition succumbed to bribery, coercion and patronage. Opposition groups accepted significant concessions, including legislative and municipal redistricting favoring ruling party interests, and the creation of the weak National Electoral Observatory instead of an independent EMB. Interestingly, Cameroonian opposition parties remained relatively passive during campaigns in which the Biya regime was pioneering the world of manufactured legitimacy through such innovative techniques as financing its own electoral observation missions – composed of no less than six US congressmen hired through a DC-based consulting firm.

Despite the varying motivations, preservation behaviors were consistently identifiable where opposition groups ultimately acquiesced to the structural authoritarian nature of the electoral contest without meaningfully seeking to change it. Of all the hypothesized games, preservation behavior was associated with the weakest party institutional capacity.

### *Delegitimation Behaviors*

Opposition behaviors in seventeen elections in thirteen countries were unanimously coded as cases of “delegitimation behaviors”: Burkina Faso 2010; Burundi 2010; Comoros 2009 & 2010; Republic of Congo 2007; Djibouti 2005 & 2008; Madagascar 2006; Malawi 2009; Mauritania 2009; Mozambique 2004 & 2009; Niger 2009; Nigeria 2007; Togo 2005 & 2010; Uganda 2006.

The distinguishing characteristic of delegitimation behaviors is the willingness of opposition groups to forego potential electoral gains in favor of strategies to attack the underlying regime. This is characterized by several tactics, targeted at undermining regime legitimacy (100 percent of cases), popular protest (82 percent), electoral violence (76 percent), and electoral boycott (35 percent). When engaging in delegitimation behavior, opposition groups' actions reflected both competing in elections/engaging in pro-democratic discourse and employing tactics to undermine the electoral process and/or the legitimacy of the incumbency. Opposition groups pursued strategies to enhance a popular perception of their legitimacy that appeared separate from their efforts to win votes, reflecting a shift to symbolic politics.

Opposition parties engaged in delegitimation behaviors irrespective of the degree of authoritarian repression imposed by the regime – parties were equally likely to engage in delegitimation actions under high scoring “partly free” regimes such as Madagascar, Malawi or Comoros, as they were in the most repressive “not free” regimes that held multiparty elections, such as the Republic of Congo, Mauritania and Togo. This conflicts with my expectation that delegitimation would be most frequent in highly repressive regimes. Instead, the results suggest that delegitimation behavior is more strongly tied to organizational strength and political opportunity, rather than regime repression. Where parties were able to attack the regime foundation, they did so, whether or not the regime was relatively more or less open – even at the cost of their own electoral gain.

While the presence of delegitimation behaviors was not affected by the degree of regime repression, the types of tactics employed correlate with level of repression.

**Non-violent manipulation tactics** were present in all of the cases. In less repressive regimes, opposition delegitimation strategies concentrated entirely on these tactics. Although they did not always undertake a full boycott, the credible threat of a widespread opposition boycott and/or a targeted non-electoral boycott (of negotiations, sessions of parliament, official events, etc.) resulted in concessions in some cases (Mauritania 2009, Nigeria 2007). Opposition groups frequently rejected the results before the election or before counting was complete. Coalitions coordinated advocacy campaigns to international

groups with the objective of denouncing the legitimacy of the incumbent regime and the electoral process, sending letters to UN bodies, international diplomats and public figures, international newspapers and creating websites. “Creative” tactics such as distributing propaganda describing newly elected officials – who, in fact, had not won; holding parallel elections; submitting requests for the presence of international observation missions, submitting court appeals “for posterity”.

Non-violent manipulation tactics such as these target gatekeepers of popular legitimacy. While rhetoric and manipulative shenanigans abound in all cases, some forms reflect sophisticated coordination with meaningful impact. International organizations (IOs) and international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) that provide electoral and governance support were common such gatekeepers. In some cases, these actors explicitly judge these states on overall regime type (Freedom House – “Free/Partly Free/Not Free”) or on electoral performance (international election observation groups including the EU, Carter Center, OSCE and others). Other gatekeepers influence perceptions of regimes in more subtle ways, especially technical electoral assistance providers that work closely with national electoral commissions to strengthen electoral activities (UNDP, IFES and others). While these organizations do not make explicit judgments on regime types, their technical analysis of electoral processes is nonetheless influential in reviewing regime performance, which subsequently influences trade and diplomatic relations with the state.

The presence of these international organizations and actors represent a second constituency for opposition groups engaged delegitimation behavior, beyond domestic voters. Opposition parties engaged with these IO/INGOs in various ways in order to shape their assessment of the electoral process and/or the regime writ large, generally by denouncing the electoral processes. For example, in Burundi 2010, twelve major opposition parties formed a coalition, the ADC-Ikibiri, and lobbied the UN Secretary General and multiple foreign heads of state, denouncing electoral malpractices during the communal elections. Their appeal was intended to modify the discourse surrounding and interpreting the election, rather than an appeal to any body that had jurisdiction over the dispute litigation – effectively, a symbolic political gesture. They later went on to fully

boycott legislative and presidential elections. These types of pressure tactics were aimed either at short-term goals connected to the electoral process (reforms, re-balloting, etc) or longer term objectives to potentially influence diplomatic or trade relations and compel regime liberalization. In these cases, opposition groups sacrificed electoral gains in favor of a delegitimation strategy, placing the goal of normative legitimacy over institutional legitimacy.

**Hardline tactics (boycott, protest, violence)** were more frequent in more repressive regimes. When confronted with the inverted logic of authoritarian elections, opposition parties were more likely to forego potential electoral gain by disrupting electoral processes through violence, public protest or boycott. In doing so, they seek to withhold legitimacy from the incumbent and to pursue regime change. This is consistent with the literature that identifies real or perceived unfair electoral conditions as one of the most significant domestic conditions increasing the chances of boycott (Beaulieu 2006, Bratton 1998, Lindberg 2006). These hardline tactics appear as responses to deeply flawed electoral processes where the opposition feels they have no chance of winning despite their (assumed) popularity. They also appear in cases where parties with weaker institutional capacity that are otherwise unable to garner sufficient popular support choose disruptive tactics as a means of bolstering their visibility (possible examples include UDPS in DRC 2006, FNL in Burundi 2005).

Disrupting or voluntarily abstaining from participating in an election is an act of protest that requires an important calculus on the part of the protesting party. They must determine that the benefits of the act of protest (media attention, perception of fairness, etc.) are worth the sacrifice of voluntarily renouncing a place at the legislative table in favor of a volatile course of seeking influence, power and institutional reform outside of formal channels. This type of extra-institutional disruption effectively shapes the information the domestic and international audiences receive about an electoral process, ultimately affecting the interpretation of legitimacy.

Building on Beaulieu (2006), who found that major boycotts reflected strong organizational capacity, my research suggests that other forms of substantive

delegitimation behavior (election violence, protest, targeted international campaigns) share this in common. These acts are used as tools of electoral manipulation in order to challenge the meaning assigned to the elections, and thus weaken the incumbent party outside of the electoral arena.

Limited electoral violence also appeared as a strategy of delegitimation in EA regimes. Because it is so strongly condemned, the perpetrators of election violence usually immediately lose democratic credibility and, to some degree, domestic and international popular support. Therefore, parties may seek to associate their opponents with acts of violence by provoking conflict, fueling a climate of instability and intimidation, or even by directly (but anonymously) perpetrating violence and laying the blame at the feet of their opponents (Bardall 2010). Whether these tactics are used to denounce unfair elections or condemn fair elections to discredit the incumbent, in both cases the parties are foregoing electoral gains in favor of influencing the underlying regime.

Overall, the identification of delegitimation behavior failed to justify the hypothesis that assigned this kind of behavior to highly repressive regimes. The failure is attributable to the coding rules, not to the hypothesis itself. To correct for this in the future, the model may be re-specified. By redefining delegitimation behavior to include only the harder-line behaviors of boycott, violence and popular protest, the model is more likely to predict this kind of behavior. Actions speak louder than words: delegitimation behavior can be consistently associated with well-organized opposition groups in highly repressive regimes based on an assessment of the meaningful actions they engage in to sacrifice electoral gain for regime goals.

A final note: while delegitimation tactics were often present early on in deeply troubled elections, in at least one case the behavior arose after a fruitful and constructive electoral period. Ethiopia's May 2005 parliamentary elections were the most competitive in their history to date, with unprecedented participation by opposition parties, meaningful political debate coverage in the media, political parties agreeing to comply with a code of conduct, and constructive negotiation with opposition parties in the early phases of the process. However, during the post-election period, malpractice during the counting phase

and the inability of the court system to resolve the issue resulted in a collapse of the peaceful process. Opposition parties organized massive public protest, taxi strikes, and student demonstrations at the University of Addis Ababa, in the face of a government ban on public demonstrations. From June through November, nearly 200 protesters were killed and over 750 injured, about 30,000 people were detained during the post-election period.<sup>40</sup> Both coders noted the strong nature of the initial transition behavior and the later collapse into delegitimation.

### Improving the model: Close calls, Exceptions and an Outlier

Of the seventeen cases where coders did not agree, 12 cases were “close calls” – i.e., **disagreement between proximate category types**. Eight of the twelve cases were due to disagreement between preservation and delegitimation behavior.<sup>41</sup> There was no apparent bias between the coders. For the most part, these differences of classification relate to the model specification issues described above, where difference in interpretation occurred between rhetoric and action. In the cases of preservation behavior, opposition groups recognized and protested against authoritarian regimes, but did not take substantive action. In a revision of this model, delegitimizing rhetoric – no matter how firm – may be classified as preservation behavior. Only hardline actions such as boycott, electoral violence, popular protest and coalition-based lobbying actions describe delegitimation behaviors.

A progression from collaborative to hardline behavior can be observed in many cases. Where transition negotiations fail, opposition groups tended to either accept the loss (preservation) or shift to hardline tactics. In some cases, threats of hardline tactics were sufficient to produce compromise and collaboration from the incumbent. To produce more

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<sup>39</sup> <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/6064638.stm>

<sup>40</sup> Angola 2008; Congo 2009, Cabon 2005, 2009; Guinea-Bissau 2005; Malawi 2004, Zambia 2006, 2008

consistent results, cases should be classified according to a lowest common denominator, i.e., according to the most hardline behavior.

Four cases of disagreement occurred (Ethiopia 2010, Guinea 2010, Rwanda 2010, Tanzania 2005) for distinct reasons. The model does not apply in cases of **controlled opposition** (Rwanda 2005) and is difficult to apply in cases with **no clear incumbent** (Guinea 2010). While an evolution of tactics over time is noted in many cases, in others, the change of strategy between two phases of a single electoral cycle (i.e., 1<sup>st</sup> and 2<sup>nd</sup> round presidential elections) was so dramatic as to render it impossible to regard them as a unified process. In Guinea 2010, this may have reflected the absence of an incumbent: while there was no incumbent ahead of the 1<sup>st</sup> round, parties engaged in preservation tactics, but ahead of the 2<sup>nd</sup> round, the leading candidate Alpha Condé became the target of the delegitimizing tactics of the trailing candidate, Cellou Diallo.

Two countries resulted in coder disagreement because of **divergent tactics within and between opposition parties**. In Ethiopia, some smaller parties engaged in a boycott while major parties complained about the process but maintained their participation. In Tanzania 2005, mainland opposition parties followed a preservation strategy while Zanzibari parties took a harder line, delegitimation position. The fact that so few countries were subject to within-opposition discrepancies is notable in itself. During the pilot phase, we tested whether diverse opposition parties could, in fact, be viewed as a single front. We anticipated a much higher degree of divergence in this regard.

There was one important **outlier** case: the Burundian elections in 2005. Coders differed significantly over the classification of the Burundian general elections in 2005, with one coder identifying opposition behavior as a case of preservation strategy and another viewing it as breakdown, with some traits of transition behavior. The considerable discrepancy offers insight on the model and on post-conflict cases in general.

The 2005 Burundian elections were the first to be organized since 1993 when the post-election assassination of democratically elected Burundian president Melchior Ndayaye set off a civil war that killed as many as 300,000. Following a lengthy peace process, several delays and with the participation of all but one of the country's major political/rebel



formations (the PALIPEHUTU-FNL) general elections were held in 2005 under the leadership of a transitional government.<sup>42</sup> Ahead of the elections, one of the leading opposition parties, the CNDD-FDD placed heavy pressure on the transitional government to hold the elections, accusing them of drawing out the process in order to stay in power, demanding respect for the electoral calendar set by the Arusha Accords and pressuring the government into opening a debate and holding a referendum on the post-transition Constitution (ostensibly reflecting Transition behavior). The electoral period was marked by intense interparty violence and intimidation (CNDD-FDD, Frodebu, CNDD Kaze, CNDD, Parena) targeting party supporters, civilians, candidates and local administrators, killing dozens and causing tens of thousands to flee the country. Although my hypothesized classification precludes violent tactics from preservation behavior, in this case, the violence most closely reflected a preservation strategy. The violence was used as a mechanism of competition for electoral power within the existing governing structure, rather than to change the institutional structure of the regime – preserving a status quo of rule through violence. Although they denied it, the CNDD-FDD, which ultimately won the elections, was widely recognized to have conducted a clandestine grassroots campaign of terror, explicitly threatening individual retribution and a return to civil war and ethnic cleansing should they lose the election. For this reason, the dominant opposition behavior may also be considered one of breakdown, according to my criteria wherein “Radical campaign rhetoric incites violence, division, state dissolution, re-arming of warring factions.” In other words, simply put: the Burundian 2005 case shatters the model.

This case is an outlier because the competing opposition groups’ behavior systematically transgressed the hypothesized classification structure, encompassing aspects of all categories and conforming to none. The Burundian case is one where all political parties, but especially the dominant opposition (CNDD-FDD) employed war tactics to compete in an electoral process. The election was not a transition away from war, but an effectively new strategy of war, consolidating and institutionalizing patterns of violence, retribution

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<sup>41</sup> As this was case of a transitional government, the lack of a clear incumbent affected coding to some extent (we designated the transitional government party, the FRODEBU, as the incumbent for our coding purposes).

and capture of resources by warlords. The Burundian outlier, along with the borderline-breakdown DRC and Chadian cases, speaks to the nature of breakdown behavior in post-conflict states in general. In all of these cases, opposition groups viewed the elections – quite literally – as battlegrounds in states of perpetual war. The dual game model is grounded in a logic of political control involving some degree of democratic order and institutionalism. Thus, the model is unable to capture conflict-state dynamics.

## Conclusion

Opposition party behavior in authoritarian elections has been overlooked, especially in the most recent generation of studies of semi-authoritarian regimes. It often appears secondary to incumbent behavior, confused and chaotic, its extra-institutional tactics viewed as anti-democratic and self-destructive. None of these attributes should be assumed.

There exists a distinct rationale of authoritarian elections. Parties compete both for votes and seats and also to control the underlying structure of the regime during these elections. They compete for ballots and also for popular perceptions, in and outside the electoral arena.

Seemingly paradoxical behavior and suboptimal decisions taken by opposition groups can be interpreted and rational through this filter. Indeed, these apparently chaotic behaviors tend to follow set behavioral paths that can be consistently identified and studied.

The choices opposition parties make reflect their circumstances, especially their organizational capacity and the degree of state repression, but also client list networks and opportunities for patronage. Parties virtually always seek to maximize their power, regardless of democratic rules of the game. In the cases studied here, no true democrats emerge. The parties make rational calculations in their choice of strategy, taking advantage of the unstable political dynamic as they are able. Where they can avoid costly and disruptive strategies, such as violence, boycotts and mass mobilization, they do so and instead pursue their ends through negotiated transition or non-violent delegitimation

tactics. They respect electoral rules at the cost of their own gains only where they are incapable of doing otherwise because of weak and fractured organizational capacity. They do not voluntarily sacrifice power (or the possibility of power) strictly on behalf of democratic principle.

We should not view repressive incumbents as the only obstacles to democratization. Opposition groups seek political opening to further their own interests, and frequently revert to authoritarian structures after they have acceded to power. To understand the persistence and dynamics of semi-authoritarian states, we must look to agents inside and outside the incumbent regime.

The identification of patterns of opposition behavior in authoritarian elections suggests lines of future research. How do these behaviors interact with formal electoral dispute mechanisms? Taking a lead from Gel'man (2005) and Kotzé and García-Rivero (2008), does the basis of party support impact the choices opposition groups make? What is the impact of other factors commonly associated with the stability of authoritarian control, such as (1) the degree of mass participation, (2) the extent of regime legitimacy, and (3) the power capacity of the political system (Blondel, 1969; Huntington and Moore, 1970; Almond and Powell, 1978, see Krane 1983). Most importantly, what can this understanding of opposition strategy tell us about the course of regime trajectories over time? Do destabilizing and disruptive tactics succeed in democratic opening or are they merely symptoms of an authoritarian opposition?

“The stronger the opposition, the brighter democracy’s future appears” (Van de Walle 2002). This study suggests that, in some contexts, Van de Walle’s statement is true even where opposition uses extra-institutional measures to attack authoritarian democratic institutions.

## PART II:

# Women and Political Participation in Electoral Authoritarian Regimes

*Part II probes the dynamics of women's political exclusion in EA regimes. Chapter 3 reveals and defines the gendered nature of electoral violence (a common feature of EA regimes). An original database of over 2000 incidents of election violence in six countries as well as fieldwork from over fifty countries reveal the existence of significant gender-differentiation in the manifestation of election violence as well as the presence of a previously unrecognized phenomenon, gender-based election violence (GBEV). The chapter introduces definitions, a taxonomy and typology of both forms of violence.*

*Chapter 4 delves deeper into the topic by examining the complex relationship between information and communication technologies and gendered election violence. The notions of gender-differentiated and gender-motivated violence are extended to political violence in this chapter. Information and communication technologies are found to both facilitate gendered forms of political violence as well as empower resistance and violence mitigation.*

*The final chapter provides the solution to a longstanding puzzle of political exclusion in EA (and other) regimes by demonstrating the complementarity of specific forms of temporary special measures (TSMs) in electoral systems based on single-member districts (SMDs). The chapter presents a five-part classification of TSM options in SMDs, including an original interpretation of "Alternate Thresholds". Analyzing the five TSM types through country case studies, Chapter 5 illustrated that discrepancies in the adoption of quotas between electoral systems are the result a knowledge gap rather than intrinsic traits of electoral systems, as previously assumed.*



# Chapter 3.

## Gender and Election Violence: Gender-Based Distinctions and Motivations in Political Conflict<sup>43</sup>

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### Introduction and Overview

Politics has been almost exclusively a male domain for most of history. Consequently, political violence as we recognize it today overwhelmingly reflects a masculine experience. Headlines shriek of political assassinations, explosions, street confrontations and physical assaults around troubled elections. These forms of violence have become the standard bearer for our interpretation of political and electoral violence. Yet these are the types of violence experienced and perpetrated by men. The reality of violence for women is

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<sup>43</sup> An earlier version of some of the findings of Chapter 3 appeared in Bardall, G. (2011) *Breaking the Mold: Understanding Gender and Election Violence*. Washington DC: IFES and are used here with the generous permission of the International Foundation for Electoral Systems.

profoundly different. Until we recognize the distinct, gendered nature of political violence and the existence of gender-based political violence, women will continue to face these scourges in silence and without recourse as they engage in political processes as candidates, elected officials, voters and in other related roles.

This article reveals and explores the gendered-nature of political violence and introduces the concept of gender-based political violence. I argue that, while men and women both experience (and perpetrate) violence as candidates, representatives, voters, party supporters and in other roles, the forms of violence that men and women experience are profoundly different, including experiences with socio-psychological, domestic and sexual violence. Women and men face different types of violence at different frequencies, times and places. Patterns and trends among perpetrators of electoral violence vary according to the sex of the victim. Furthermore, just as political violence has gendered manifestations and consequences, some forms of gender-based violence have political dimensions. Some acts of political violence are also acts of gender-based violence, targeted against women because they are women. In light of this, it is necessary to 1) employ inclusive and gender-sensitive definitions in the study of political violence and 2) recognize the existence of gender-motivated political violence as a unique form of violence. To this end, the paper is organized in three parts.

The first part of the study empirically demonstrates the existence of gender differentiation in political violence. Drawing on over 2,000 documented incidents of election violence (a key form of political violence) in six countries between 2006 and 2010 (Bangladesh, Burundi, Guinea, Guyana, Nepal, Timor-Leste), I demonstrate that electoral violence varies materially according to the sex of the actors involved.

The second part of the study takes the quantitative analysis as a starting point to construct an inclusive picture of political violence as it concerns both sexes. I offer a definition, typology and taxonomy of political violence that encompasses the forms of violence experienced by women as well as by men, accounting for variety in victim, perpetrator, type and location of acts of violence. The typology is enriched through data from case

examples, field observation and conversations, expanding it beyond the minimalist perspective presented in Part I.

In the final section of the paper, I assert that some acts of political violence are committed with the direct intent of impeding a person’s right to political participation on the basis of their gender identity. These acts constitute a distinct form of violence: gender-based political violence (GBPV). Section three draws on discourse analysis of perpetrator intent to identify GBPV.

Within these two principal areas (GD-PV and GBPV), two derivative distinctions emerge. The first reflects violence occurring specifically within the electoral timeframe, which I refer to as gender differentiated and gender-based electoral violence (GD-EV and GBEV). Whereas gender-based violence may target a person of any gender (e.g., transsexual, gender non-conforming, etc.), the second distinct subtype (and the present focus of attention) is specific to violence against women in all areas of political and public life (VAWP and VAWE). Table 1 summarizes the conceptual relationships between these terms.

**Table 1. Overview of Terminology**

| <b>POLITICAL VIOLENCE</b>                               | <b>GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE</b>                  |  |
|---|---|--|
| <b>Gender Differentiated Political Violence (GD-PV)</b> | <b>Gender-Based Political Violence (GBPV)</b> | Violence Against Women in Politics (VAWP)  |
| Gender Differentiated Electoral Violence (GD-EV)        | Gender-Based Electoral Violence (GBEV)        | Violence Against Women in Elections (VAWE) |

The article makes several theoretical contributions. I define and classify the gendered impacts of a unique form of political violence by identifying differences in the ways men and women experience and engage in political violence. Further, the article recognizes the



political impacts of a form of gender-based violence, where violent means are employed to prevent political participation on the basis of gender-identity. An overview of the conceptual framework is presented in Table 2. Although this study focuses on women in developing states, these forms of violence are not limited to any region or level of socio-economic development, opening an further agenda of study.

Empirically, the research contributes a gender-sensitive definition of political violence and a typology to operationalize it, which allows for a more balanced and exhaustive understanding of the issue. I also contribute an original dataset of some 2000 incidents of election violence that can be analyzed from a gender perspective. By identifying the links between feminist political theory and key issues in the study of comparative democratization, I set the stage for future research connecting these two vitally entwined fields of study.

Finally, a word of recognition. Since the initial version of this research was presented as a White Paper in 2011 (Bardall 2011), the topic has gained substantial traction and become the focus of international advocacy efforts. Women in dozens of countries have identified with the concern and have come forward to share their stories privately with the author as well as in a number of public forums that have begun to emerge. Policy publications, training and sensitization campaigns by UN Women and the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) as well as the National Democratic Institute's (NDI) #NotTheCost campaign have contributed to great strides in refining the debate and bringing the issue to the forefront in the field of practice, including raising awareness of the issue among electoral management bodies in over four dozen countries to date. In Bolivia and Mexico, laws have been passed to address the issue of political harassment and violence against women in politics. To all those engaged today in mitigating, preventing and bringing to justice the perpetrators this egregious violation of human rights: ¡Fuerza! I am humbled to contribute in some small way to the impressive movement now underway. I extend my gratitude to the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) for offering the original opportunity to pursue work in this area in 2010 and for sharing some of their EVER data with me. I particularly wish to acknowledge the contributions of Julie Ballington,

one of the earliest advocates to introduce the issue, for her expertise, mentorship and longstanding support in championing research and action around this topic.

Here, for the first time, the findings of the White Paper are updated and expanded in an scientific publication along with a sample of the wealth personal testimonies that have been shared over the past fives years since my original publication.

**Table 2. Taxonomy of Gender-Differentiated and Gender-Based Political Violence**

| <b>POLITICAL VIOLENCE</b>  | <b>GENDER-BASED POLITICAL VIOLENCE</b>   |
|--|--|
| <p><b>Objective</b><br/>To impact a political process or outcome through the use of coercive force</p>                             | <p><b>Objective</b><br/>To impede a person’s political participation on the basis of his/her gender identity</p> |
| <p><i>Political violence is gender-differentiated in nature</i></p>  | <p><i>Gender-based political violence is gender-specific in its intent</i></p>                                   |
| <p><b>Impact</b><br/>Violates victim’s civil and political rights to participate in political processes</p>                        |  |
| <p><b>Types</b><br/>Physical (bodily harm &amp; sexual)<br/>Non Physical (socio-psychological &amp; economic)</p>                  |  |
| <p><b>Perpetrators</b><br/>Institutional actors<br/>Non-state political actors<br/>Societal actors</p>                             |  |
| <p><b>Victims</b><br/>Political<br/>Institutional<br/>Professional non-state/non-political<br/>Private non-state/non-political</p> |  |
| <p><b>Locations</b><br/>Public<br/>Private<br/>Virtual<br/>Domestic</p>  |  |

## **Part I. Gender Distinction in Electoral Violence**

### **Approach and Method**

In setting out to empirically demonstrate the existence of a gender dimension in political violence, the objective is not to elaborate an exhaustive catalog or encompassing theory at this initial stage. This first section limits its goal to crossing a minimum threshold regarding the presence of gender differentiation in critical, but restricted field of political violence (electoral violence, GD-EV). To this end, I confine the test in Part I to a rigorous standard within a framework closely delimited in time and space, and applied to a limited sample size (n = 2005 cases, 6 countries). By proving that gender differences exist even where data made no intentional effort to capture them, I set the stage for the theory and typology presented in Part II.

In the following analysis of Part I, I restrict my test to the field of electoral violence, rather than the supra-category of political violence, for conceptual, methodological and strategic reasons. Participation in representative government without fear or discrimination is a universal human right and a key indicator of the quality of democracy, making the study of elections relevant and representative. Methodologically, although there is no commonly agreed upon definition, the topic of election violence benefits from greater conceptual specification than the broader category of political violence, allowing more accurate measurement and greater reliability. In particular, the delimitation of time and space employed in the determination of incidents of electoral violence promotes data validity. From a strategic perspective, studying election violence provides a gateway for the empirical study of other dimensions of gender in democratic transitions and in semi-authoritarian regimes. While my empirical proof only tests election-related violence, it implies the existence of gender-differentiated and gender-based political violence (GBPV) more broadly, as developed in subsequent sections. Unlike other variables in the measurement of democracy and regime type, election violence can be measured through gender-distinguishable quantitative data, enabling an empirical body of proof of the gender difference inherent in political processes, especially in elections in semi-authoritarian states.

To demonstrate the existence of gender-differentiation in election violence, I take my point of departure from a set of cross-national, micro-level data recording incidents of election violence. The following analysis tests 2,005 individual incidents of electoral violence collected in six countries between 2006 and 2010. The data was collected through the Election Violence Education and Resolution (EVER) project under the auspices of the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES), a US-based non-profit organization. The EVER methodology draws on trained civil society investigators to collect verified incident-level data on election violence. The dataset is unique in its use of a consistent, cross-national methodology for micro-level election violence data. The author was engaged in the methodological design and implementation of two of the six country cases (Nepal and Burundi).

The tests comprise data from three countries in South-East Asia (Timor-Leste, Nepal and Bangladesh) and two sub-Saharan African states (Burundi, Guinea) as well as a small dataset from Guyana, in South America (Table 3).<sup>44</sup> All countries were considered “Partly Free” at the time the monitoring took place (Freedom House) except for Guinea, which was “Not Free” following a coup-d’état. All countries had a gender quota in place at the time of the election. On average, the countries counted 21% women elected to lower houses of national parliament (IPU), slightly higher than the global average for women in parliament during the period of study (apx. 18.5 percent (IPU)). Women’s representation in parliament did not experience significant gains or losses during the elections studied, with the exception of Nepal, which introduced its quota for the first time during the 2007 elections covered in this study. No data is available for women’s turnout or unsuccessful candidacies.

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<sup>44</sup> Although 15 EVER monitoring projects had been conducted in 13 countries at the outset of the current investigation in the autumn of 2010, less than half of the projects disaggregated their perpetrator and victim data by sex at that time, thereby limiting the number of usable cases. Following the publication of the White Paper (Bardall 2011), gender disaggregation became a standard feature of EVER data, however no election violence data beyond 2010 was released by IFES for the purposes of this study. Nonetheless, the available sample is broadly diverse.

**Table 3. Overview of Country Cases**

| <b>Country</b>     | <b>Dates</b>                           | <b>Reporting Duration</b> | <b>Type of Election</b>  | <b># Incidents</b> |
|--------------------|--|---------------------------|--|--------------------|
| <b>Timor-Leste</b> | May-September 2007                     | 5 months                  | Parliamentary  | 162                |
| <b>Nepal</b>       | November 2007 – April 2008             | 6 months                  | Constituent Assembly<br>(originally scheduled for November 2007, held in April 2008)   | 403                |
| <b>Bangladesh</b>  | Oct 2006 – January 2007, December 2008 | 5 months                  | General Election<br>(originally scheduled Jan 2007 date was boycotted and cancelled, election held Dec 2008)   | 290 +<br>110       |
| <b>Burundi</b>     | April – September 2010                 | 6 months                  | Series of 5 elections covering Presidential, parliamentary, communal and local offices. A boycott resulted in uncontested executive and legislative races. | 519                |
| <b>Guinea</b>      | May – November 2010                    | 7 months                  | General elections  | 499                |
| <b>Guyana</b>      | April – August 2006                    | 5 months                  | General and Regional Elections   | 22                 |

The EVER dataset<sup>45</sup> was selected because it is unique in providing cross-national, sex-disaggregated micro-level data on election violence. It also has the advantage of a comparatively more gender-sensitive approach to data collection than other options involving publically available sources (media, police reports, etc.) in that it favored reports of firsthand witnesses and included testimony of community members as a source of

<sup>45</sup> The dataset used in this study is an original compilation of the individual project data provided by IFES to the author. Data was standardized and cleaned by the author to enable cross-national comparative analysis.

verification, as well as the public record. However, violence against women (in elections as in general) is underreported in the public record and frequently discovered through community sources. Thus, although the EVER data was not explicitly gender-sensitive (discussed below), it inadvertently diminished this form of gender-bias in its methodology.

The EVER data uses a gender-neutral definition of electoral violence:

[A]ny random or organized act that seeks to determine, delay, or otherwise influence an electoral process through threat, verbal intimidation, hate speech, disinformation, physical assault, forced “protection,” blackmail, destruction of property, or assassination. (Fischer 2002)

Although it extends to non-physical acts of violence (threats, intimidation, etc.) the definition falls short of expressing electoral violence as a violation of personal or human rights. The definition therefore belongs to the family of minimalist interpretations focused on acts of excessive force (Honderich 2003). At this stage, this confined definition serves the purposes of the study: such a definition is expected to minimize and restrict the findings, rather than magnify them, as would a broader definition. In sum, the EVER database sets a high bar for this exercise: the EVER data did not explicitly seek to record gender-specific election violence, men generally outnumbered women among data collection monitors, no specific training, instruction or tools were provided to encourage or guide the monitors towards collecting information on gendered-election violence. The findings were therefore expected to determine a lowest-common denominator regarding the existence of gender-differentiation in election violence.


### **Empirical Findings**

Women were victims on average in 36 percent of cases where the gender of the victim could be identified (n = 1528). Of these, women were the exclusive victims on average in 7 percent of cases (76 individual cases) and were victims together with men in 29 percent of cases (511 individual cases). This varied between regions, with the Southeast Asian countries reporting no or nearly no cases of violence with uniquely female victims in contrast to the African states where women were victims of violence (singly or together

with men) in more than half of all incidents of violence.

The predominance of men was anticipated. However, it is noteworthy that women were involved in 36 percent of cases of election violence, although they held only an average of 20 percent of elected legislative seats. While election violence is a largely male phenomenon, women are also affected by it to an extent disproportionate with their representation in elected bodies.


**Table 4. Women as victims of election violence (n = 1528 cases with identifiable victims)**



Women were perpetrators in similar proportions as they were victims (n = 1681 cases with identifiable perpetrators), with regional distributions similarly reflecting that of victims. Women acting alone perpetrated precisely the same number of incidents as where they were the sole victims (76 individual cases). In Guyana and Guinea, women acting alone or together with men perpetrated half or more than half of all identifiable acts of violence. On average, women perpetrated less violence than they fell victim to.




**Table 5. Women as perpetrators of election violence (n = 1681 cases with identifiable perpetrators)**




In the countries studied, men held nearly 80 percent of elected seats in parliament (IPU). Just as the political realm was dominated by men, so was electoral violence, with over two thirds of attacks taking place between men. Mixed sex groups constituted the next most significant group of victims, with over 20 percent of cases taking place during group clashes. Outside group conflicts, women were primarily victims of men (30 individual cases or 40 percent of all acts against women were committed by men) or by other women (13 cases, 17 percent of all acts against women). In contrast, men were victimized by women in just 13 cases, or 1 percent of all acts against men.

**Table 6. Sex of victims according to sex of perpetrators (n = 1178 identifiable victims and perpetrators)**



A relative comparison of the types of violence most frequently experienced by women in contrast to those experienced by men reveals a marked difference. The proportion of intimidation and psychological acts of violence experienced by women was nearly three times the same proportion among men (ratio of 28:10 percent) while men experienced more than three times the levels of physical violence as did women (39:11 percent). Gender-based discrepancies were also visible in other areas. Women had proportionally higher frequencies of jail/arbitrary detention (8:3 percent), threats of physical harm (8:5 percent), four times the frequency of theft (4:1 percent). Men were proportionally more likely to be kidnapped (ratio of 3:0 percent) or murdered (ratio of 5:1 percent). Violence against women was much more frequently described as “other” or “unable to be determined” by the monitors (12:4 percent). Table 6 presents the within-category distributions, i.e., the proportional breakdown of types within each sex group.


**Table 7. Within-category distribution of types of violence by sex of victim (n unique female victims = 92, n unique male victims = 1233)<sup>46</sup>**



Political party supporters were the most frequent group of victims for both men and women. The proportion of female voters victim of violence were nearly four times the same proportion for men voters (22:6) as was for female journalists or members of media (4:1). Women in rural settings were particularly vulnerable, with over half of recorded incidents against women taking place outside of urban and suburban areas. Interestingly, female party leaders/candidates as well as female state agents/police were victims at almost the same proportional rates as their male counterparts despite the fact that the total population of men in both of these areas in all the cases significantly outweighs women. Women candidates/party leaders were victims of violence in almost a quarter of all cases against candidates/party leaders where the victim's sex was identified (27 cases with mixed male/female victims, 7 cases against women-only). There was no correlation between degree of violence against female candidates and the amount of women in parliament and/or increases or decreases in women elected.


<sup>46</sup> NB: the N sample in Table 4 exceeds 100% of cases overall because incidents could receive up to three classifications according to their type (i.e., a single incident could be coded as a case of verbal harassment, destruction of materials and physical harm). Figures are calculated proportionally by victim's sex (i.e., as the relative number of incidents of a given type calculated according to the full number of incidents experienced by that sex-group).

**Table 8. Within-category distribution of victim types (n unique male victims = 1068, n unique female victims = 81)**




As perpetrators of electoral violence, women and men were both most frequently involved in the context of their membership with a political party or their support for a party or candidate. The monitors had greater difficulty classifying women perpetrators, using the “other” or “unable to determine” categories twice as often for cases with a woman as unique perpetrator compared to cases perpetrated exclusively by men or by mixed groups. Women police officers or state agents were twice as commonly involved as perpetrators of violence as opposed to the proportional frequency among male police/party agents.

**Table 9. Within-group distribution of Perpetrators of violence according to sex (n = 76 unique female perpetrators, 1193 unique male perpetrators, 407 mixed group perpetrators)**




Just as they experience violence differently, men and women perpetrate different forms of electoral violence. Only 6 percent of acts of violence committed by women acting alone were acts of direct, physical harm (harm, murder/attempted murder), compared to 37 percent of acts committed by men. Women were by far more likely to engage in acts of intimidation/psychological abuse (28 percent of women’s acts), verbal harassment (18 percent) or destruction of property (10 percent). Men were almost ten times as likely to perpetrate physical harm or torture as were women (3:29 percent ratio). As in other areas, monitors had more difficulty classifying women’s violence compared to men, recording nearly three times the rate of “other” or “unable to determine” for women acting alone compared to men acting alone (14:5).

**Table 10. Within-group distribution of Types of violence by perpetrator sex (n = 89 unique female perpetrators, 1659 unique male perpetrators , 482 mixed group perpetrators)**



Finally, the means of documenting violence varied significantly between incidents perpetrated against women and incidents perpetrated against men. Incidents involving only male victims were more likely to be verified through official records including police reports (12:9 male victim ratio to female ratio), hospital records (7:1) and the media (10:1). Meanwhile, incidents involving only female victims were most often traced through information from election observers (12:3 ratio between female and male victims), electoral agents (6:3) and community sources (26:9). Here again, the rate of unclassified sources was higher for incidents perpetrated against women than those against men (12:8).

**Table 11. Within-group distribution of Source of incident verification according to sex of victim (n = 1388 unique male victims, 102 unique female victims)<sup>47</sup>**



In sum, we may assert that election violence is not a gender-neutral phenomenon. It occurs according to gender-specific patterns. The types of violence experienced by men and women differ in form and frequency, as do the distinct types of violence they engage in as perpetrators. Virtually all areas of analysis in this area indicate a marked distinction according to the sex of the actors involved. Election violence is, indeed, gendered in nature.

## Part II. Classifying the gendered nature of political violence

The findings of Part I establish the existence of the gendered nature of electoral violence (GD-EV). However, as asserted at the outset, it also only establishes a minimum threshold in identifying gender-differentiation in political violence and fails to identify gender motivated violence. Indeed, while it elucidates the phenomenon, Part I also illustrates deep limitations in our understanding of this area.

For one, it is clear that minimalist definitions that assume the gender-neutrality of electoral violence are inadequate and misrepresentative. The same restrictiveness that makes the

<sup>47</sup> NB the N size exceeds 100% of cases because it was possible to include several sources of verification for a given incident.

Fischer definition helpful in establishing validity in the quantitative analysis of Part I is its greatest weakness in understanding the true complexity of the phenomenon. The comparatively high rate of unclassifiable variables for incidents relating to violence and women is one indicator of this.

Another indicator of the shortcomings of the traditional definition is the relatively vague specification of the most prominent form of violence experienced and perpetrated by women: intimidation/psychological violence. Similarly, the literature on gender-based violence (GBV)/violence against women (VAW) tells us that most violence against women occurs in private spaces (especially domestic spaces), however the application of Fischer's definition in the EVER data makes no provision for this, leaving it open-ended. Finally, the existence of such significant gender-differentiation within this highly restricted sample strongly suggests that a gender-sensitive definition of political violence may reveal greater depth and diversity of findings in this area. In short, Part I's quantitative findings based on the gender-neutral definition are the beginning, not the end of the story.

Section II offers an inclusive definition of political violence and explores the gendered-nature of political through a typology of its forms.

### *Defining and Classifying Political & Electoral Violence*

From the earliest writings of Hobbes and Weber, political violence is understood to be pervasive, affecting rich and poor states, established democracies and all others (Weinberg and Rapoport, 2001; Bates, 2001, Bufacchi 2005). Yet there is no consensus on the basic definition of political violence. Minimalist definitions focus on acts of excessive force (Honderich 2003) while comprehensive approaches consider violence as a violation of personal or human rights (Steger 2003, Riga 1969 and Wade 1971 in Bufacchi 2005).

A subset of political violence (Hoglund 2009), electoral violence (EV) likewise has no consistent definition in the social sciences. To study the complex phenomena, the concept of election violence has been disaggregated into classifications according to the timing, actors, intensity of violence and motives (Hoglund 2009; Straus and Taylor 2009; Reif 2005, Hafner-Burton et al 2014, Kehailia 2014). In order to study its causes and



consequences, authors have operationalized the concept broadly to include civil war to riots, political strikes and assassinations (Collier 2009), armed conflict (Synder 2000). Others have sought to refine it more closely to the electoral process, notably Straus and Taylor (2009) who define it as “physical violence and coercive intimidation directly tied to an impending electoral contest or to an announced electoral result.” Linebarger and Salehyan (2012) use violent social conflict incidents to measure social unrest around elections.

In light of measurement challenges, political analysts and international relation theorists (as well as practitioners such as Fischer and the EVER project) have tended to draw upon minimalist definitions. However even these often fail to fall into neat classifications and may overlap regarding the meaning and purpose of the act of violence, the level or scope of organization of the violent actors, or the nature of the violence itself (Krause 2009). Krause argues that the narrow concept of ‘violence as physical harm’ omits some forms of violence related to armed conflict and common-sense understandings (2009: 340).

Chief among these omissions, I argue that the minimalist definition overlooks key forms of violence experienced by women and thus limits and distorts our understanding of the nature of the phenomenon. Ad hoc efforts to date to address this are inadequate. A handful of authors have broadened the interpretation of election violence to include other acts such as political imprisonment and harassment (Haftner-Burton 2014), blackmail and ‘abuse’ (Fischer 2002, Reif 2009) and verbal abuse and psychological manipulation (Reif 2009). In a laudable effort to counter-male dominated perspectives on election violence, Hafner-Burton et al use the feminine pronoun throughout their article in referring to the incumbent perpetrators of election violence, however this is symbolic only – incumbent sex was not one of the independent variables tested and, indeed, none of the case studies had a female incumbent. Specific definitions related to the gendered-nature of political/election violence are otherwise absent in the literature.

To address this gap and in order to fully understand the diverse forms, outcomes and actors involved in GDPV, the following rights-based definition of political violence may be employed (adapted in part from Reif 2009 and the United Nations Office for the

Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA)):

Political violence is a means of controlling and/or oppressing an individual or group's right to participation in political processes and institutions through the use of emotional, social or economic force, coercion or pressure, as well as physical and sexual harm. It may take place in public or in private, including in the family, the general community, online and via media, or be perpetrated or condoned by the state.

Electoral violence is a subtype occurring within a given timeframe, specifically from the date of voter registration to the date of inauguration of a new government.


This definition avoids the omissions common to minimalist approaches, thereby allowing a more precise understanding of the nature of this form of violence. It belongs to the family of classifications most used in international relations and political science (Krause 2009), in that it focuses on the meaning and the purpose of the act of violence (i.e., to control/oppress electoral participation) but recognizes the relevance of other demonstrated facets of violence, including its scope (i.e., interpersonal/collective) and its nature (physical/psychological/sexual/economic).

Based on this definition and on the empirical findings of Part I, a distinguishing feature of political violence is determined to exist between direct and indirect harm (physical/non-physical). Using this distinction, a typology of violence may be constructed<sup>48</sup> (Table 12). As we shall see in Part III, the classification structure also applies to gender-based political violence.

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<sup>48</sup> NB: earlier formulations of this typology (Bardall 2011) disaggregated the non-physical types of violence.

**Table 12. Typology of Political and Gender-Based Violence**



While recognizing that all forms of physical harm also have the secondary impact of generating fear and intimidation within the victim and the broader community, this classification identifies mutually-exclusive types of violence necessary for comparative study.<sup>49</sup>

Each form of violence has multiple possible victims, defined in four categories:

- 1) Political: candidates, elected officials, political aspirants (i.e. seeking nomination), party members and supporters.
- 2) Institutional: electoral management body (EMB) permanent staff and poll workers, police and security forces, state administrators and civil servants.

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<sup>49</sup> Krook & Restrepo Sanín (2016) reprise Bardall’s 2011 classification, adding “symbolic violence” to a typology of violence against women in politics. Comprised of acts which “delegitimize female politicians through gendered tropes denying them competence in the political sphere,” they assert that symbolic violence “operates at the level of portrayal and representation, seeking to erase or nullify women’s presence in political office” (2016:144). While recognizing the validity of the concept in the broad context of gender inequality and oppression, symbolic violence falls outside the sphere of direct political violence in terms of scope, intent and measurability. The harassment, sexual objectification in media and social representations, “fundamental disrespect for human dignity,” diminishing and “invisibilization” (145) of women in politics that constitute manifestations of symbolic violence contribute to a general context of oppression, but exceed the boundaries of explicit harm or threat of harm, resulting in conceptual “creep”. Symbolic violence against women in political contexts is culturally-embedded, rendering it impossible to ascertain explicit and direct intentionality of action on the part of the perpetrator(s). Likewise, political violence is only one of many ways in which actors may symbolically “deny competence” to women in politics. In terms of measurement, although violence can take place in non-material locations (e.g., cyberspace), assessing cultural representations of women engages interpretive, theoretical dimensions which limit the concept’s measurability as either a form of interpersonal or collective violence, thereby diminishing its empirical usefulness and legal applications as a human rights violation. Thus, rather than viewing symbolic violence as a subtype of political violence against in politics, I suggest it is more usefully understood as both a possible cause of political violence (as Krook and Restrepo Sanín suggest) as well as a supra-category inscribed in the dynamics of gender inequality on the whole, both of which are outside the scope of this article.

- 3) Professional non-state/non-political: journalists, civic educators, civil activists, community leaders.
- 4) Private non-state/non-political: private citizens and voters.

Perpetrators are likewise diverse and may be identified in three groups:

- 1) Institutional actors (state security, police, armed forces), government institutions (executive, judicial and legislative actors), electoral agents (poll workers, EMB staff, electoral security agents), and state proxies (militia, gangs, insurgents, mercenaries, private security);
- 2) Non-state political actors (candidates, party leaders, inter-party and intra-party members, paramilitary, party militia, non-state armed actors); and
- 3) Societal actors (journalists/media, voters, community members or groups, religious leaders, traditional leaders, employers, criminal actors, intimate partners/spouses, family members, electoral observers, youth groups)<sup>50</sup>.

Finally, political and gender-based violence occur across the categories in distinct locations. As widely recognized in the literature, violence may occur in public spaces (streets, political party headquarters, churches, etc.) and in private space (private homes, offices, etc). In addition, election violence also occurs in virtual and domestic locations. Non-material virtual spaces are comprised of public online spaces such as television, blogs, internet media, chatrooms, YouTube, Facebook, Instagram, etc. They also consist of private virtual spaces, such as personal email, Short Message Service (SMS) texting, cellular and landline telephone connections, etc (Bardall 2013).

The domestic sphere is the space between intimate partners, wherever they may be physically located. Domestic violence is considered to be political violence when committed with the intent of controlling electoral participation or disenfranchising one's intimate partner. It includes physical, as well as emotional, economic or sexual violence committed by an intimate partner in the home or in public. Domestic violence has many forms,

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<sup>50</sup> Adapted from exchanges with Julie Ballington, 2013.

including physical aggression or threats thereof; sexual abuse; emotional abuse; controlling or domineering behavior; intimidation and stalking (Shipway 2004). Each form of violence in the typology may be located in the public, private, virtual or domestic spheres.

## Exploring the typology

Beyond what we have gleaned from the EVER data insights, a meaningful discussion of the gendered nature of political violence requires a qualitative investigation into the subject matter. Indeed, the EVER data tells us that community sources and other interpersonal contacts are the primary way to learn about women and election violence. So this is where I now turn in exploring the typology, broadening to look at violence occurring both during and outside the electoral period.

The following discussion of the components of the typology are drawn from field observations, classroom straw polls and exchanges, and conversations with male and female candidates, party representatives and elected officials; civil society members; electoral management body (EMB) members and general citizens by the author in the course of multiple missions as an advisor on women's political participation with United Nations and international non-profits between 2009 and 2016. The few specific, individual cases cited here were presented on public record before this researcher contacted the individuals. Verbal agreement for inclusion here. Despite the public nature of these few cases in their local jurisdictions, given the sensitive nature of the experiences of violence, the names of individual victims are withheld from publication. General feedback from the field includes 10 informal classroom polls and dialogues conducted by the author between 2012-2015, with roughly 250 adult participants from electoral management bodies, government agencies and civil society organizations from 45 countries.<sup>51</sup> Desk research was conducted to supplement the study.

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<sup>51</sup> Workshop participants in activities discussing gender and election violence and individual, topical conversations were with individuals from: Antigua, Benin, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso,

### *Bodily Harm*

The first form of violence is that which causes direct bodily harm to a person in relation to their involvement in a political process, and/or bodily harm to a proxy (child, family member, etc). Forms include beating and assault; assassination, murder/attempted murder; kidnapping/attempted kidnapping; grenade attacks; shooting, stabbing, armed or unarmed battery and assault; violent dispersion of protests and public gatherings; destruction or appropriation of property; political/arbitrary arrest/detention/imprisonment, excessive use of force, torture and mistreatment of prisoners by police and intelligence agencies; domestic violence and child abuse, and all other action resulting in bodily injury.

According to the EVER data, women experience and perpetrate significantly lower degrees of bodily harm than men. While true for gender-blind constructions of election violence, the amount of bodily harm experienced by women is considered to be significantly underreported because traditional frameworks, such as EVER, fail to consider domestic violence as a form of political violence. Given the pandemic nature of domestic violence worldwide (UN Women), it is reasonable to suspect that such a link may exist: UN Women estimates that one in three women worldwide will experience physical or sexual abuse, usually by an intimate partner and that 95 percent of all acts of domestic violence are perpetrated against women.

Through the fieldwork and desk review, numerous stories emerged to corroborate the theorized link between domestic and political violence. Women experienced bodily harm at the hands of their domestic partners in retaliation for differing political choices, as a deterrent to voting against family wishes and to dissuade female family members from running for office and/or compelling female candidates to drop their bid, elected women to turn over their seat to a male family member. Child abuse also emerged as a form of bodily

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Burundi, Cape Verde, Canada, Democratic Republic of Congo, Egypt, El Salvador, France, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Japan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kosovo, Liberia, Lesotho, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Romania, South Africa, Sierra Leone, Suriname, Swaziland, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, USA, Zambia, Zimbabwe.

harm used to coerce women's political choices or participation. In such cases, children were harmed or abused by domestic partners or close family members (parents and in-laws) to compel the behavior or the mother.<sup>52</sup>

A victim testimony illustrates these under-recognized physical forms of political violence and their relation to gender-based violence. Marie-Thèrese<sup>4</sup>, a Congolese woman in her mid-forties described her experience when she decided to run for national office in the 2010 elections in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). When she declared her intent to run for office, she attested to being beaten by her husband and threatened with rape if she didn't abandon the campaign to stay home with her children, whipped by her in-laws, and hit and stoned by her village priest for the same reasons. Her husband terrorized their children by blaming their mother for targeted acts of electoral violence the family had experienced since she launched her candidacy, causing them to believe she was intentionally trying to harm them and that she was of low moral character. Marie-Thèrese recounted being subject to further attacks by rival political parties, including being shot three times in the legs; having her home broken into and searched repeatedly; being kidnapped, beaten, burned and abandoned in a ditch; and receiving multiple threats against her children. Ultimately the children were sent away to school for the remainder of the campaign.<sup>53</sup>

Marie-Thèrese's case offers a glimpse into the complexity of political violence against women. Perpetrators range from intimate partners, to family and community figures, to political opponents not personally acquainted with the victim. Children were used as a proxy by both the husband and the political rivals to coerce the victim's behavior, but they also became victims in their own right. Multiple forms of violence coexist in any given case. Acts of violence were motivated by both political rivalry and by misogyny (as discussed in the final section of this chapter). Some acts were committed by her family and community

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<sup>52</sup> NB: Domestic violence and child abuse can also take sexual, economic or psychological forms and are discussed separately as such under the related rubrics.

<sup>53</sup> Reported during public event and privately discussed with author, October 13, 2012. Gaborone, Botswana. Names changed to protect the victim. The victim brought a newspaper clipping to the meeting documenting the most serious act of violence, and displayed the leg bullet wounds, however no other verification exists for the other incidents.

members protesting her candidacy on the basis of her sex. Other aspects of the violence were committed on presumably gender-neutral grounds (electoral rivalry) but used gender-specific methods, such as threatening the candidate's children (while effective against both sexes, women candidates may be particularly vulnerable to such attacks).

Other cases suggest that vulnerability to bodily harm may increase as women's political visibility rises, through candidacies and increased public prominence in electoral involvement. This risk may be amplified by anger against their rejection of women's traditional roles and mores. For example, in Afghanistan, the Free and Fair Election Foundation for Afghanistan (FEFA) reported that 9 out of 10 threats against candidates in the 2010 election campaign were against women (FEFA 2010). In one particularly noteworthy case, ten campaign volunteers working for female candidate Fauzia Gilani were kidnapped while working on her campaign; five of them were killed when she refused to quit the campaign. Gilani told the Guardian newspaper that, "Society is run by men, they are in charge and they don't want a woman to be over them" (Boone 2011).

In another anecdote recounted to the author by an international electoral advisor close to the case, a young Afghan woman faced severe resistance from her family when she sought work as a poll worker in Afghanistan's 2010 elections, due to objections to exposing herself in public in an unwomanly role. One night, after being required to work late, the young woman missed the provided women-only transport and took a public taxi to return home. In anger against riding with a male taxi driver after dark and for unwomanly conduct as a poll worker, the women's mother-in-law purportedly doused her daughter-in-law with petrol and lit her on fire. The poll worker later died of the injury.<sup>54</sup>

### *Sexual Violence*

The World Health Organization defines sexual violence as "any sexual act, attempt to obtain a sexual act, unwanted sexual comments or advances, or acts to traffic, or otherwise directed, against a person's sexuality using coercion, by any person regardless of their relationship to the victim, in any setting, including but not limited to home and work". In

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<sup>54</sup> Author conversation with international electoral assistance provider, September 2012. New York City. Interlocutor requested not to be named.



the field of election violence we will disaggregate sexual violence comprised of physical violations from sexualized threats and intimidation (as discussed under the relevant subsection). Sexual violence is distinct from other forms of bodily harm because of its intimate and degrading nature specific to the victim's gender identity and its potential impact on reproductive health.

Sexual violence for electoral motives includes politically-motivated rape as a tool of terror and intimidation, marital rape as a tool of repression, assault and abuse with the objective of controlling, intimidating, humiliating and disenfranchising the victim (including poll workers sexually assaulting voters, male MPs sexually assaulting women MPs, etc.), virginity tests and sexual exploitation of female political prisoners and detainees.

Sexual forms of election violence may be perpetrated by a stranger, sometimes in a public position (police, military, co-MPs, etc.) and also by domestic partners and members of the victims' community known to the victim. Physical sexual violence has a profound psychological impact on its victims and on the community of the victims. Although we give precedence to its physical nature in this field of the typology, in some cases, the perpetrator's principle objective may be the associated the humiliation or degradation of the victim and their family. Other non-physical violence of a sexual nature is discussed in the following subsection.

Women become victims of political violence in various forms as public citizens. Documented cases of wartime rape in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Uganda, Burma and Bosnia have demonstrated that rape can be a tool of political violence that not only represses political action, but also represses, dishonors and humiliates the political actor. Rape as an agent of political violence in non-conflict states, like in Guinea and Côte d'Ivoire in 2010 (Human Rights Watch, 2011), has the same effect. Rape as political intimidation and dissuasion has amplified effects during an electoral process, making gender-specific violence a high impact tool of political coercion.

Sexual abuse by public actors is estimated to be seriously under-reported, while private abuse for political or electoral purposes remains almost entirely outside of formal research approaches to date. Some gross violations make headlines, as in the case of the brutal army

dispersion on a pro-election rally in Conakry, Guinea in 2008, when scores of women were raped or in Zimbabwe where the “government is systematically deploying the most brutal forms of sexual violence to deter women ... from participating in opposition activities” (Democracy Digest 2011). More intimate examples are harder to document but equally damning. A female Nigerian MP described being regularly groped, propositioned and sexually harassed on the floor of parliament by fellow, male MPs.<sup>55</sup> A Haitian MP reported a similar experience.<sup>56</sup>

Although barriers to systematic documentation are high, sexual violence for political and electoral purposes is believed to be consequential. Committed in the home by domestic partners, this remains the most difficult form of violence to document. Sexual violence for electoral purposes also takes place in public settings by actors as diverse as police and military to interparty and extra-party sexual assault and harassment.

### *Socio-psychological*

Social-psychological violence causes harm by inflicting fear on its subject as punishment for their behavior or to coerce their behavior. It can include psychological intimidation, social sanctions and punishment, family pressure and character assassination. It may be sexual in nature, including harassment (unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal harassment of a sexual nature).

It may be perpetrated on its own, or in connection with another form of violence (for example, child abuse is a physical violence against the child as proxy, and a psychological violence against the proxied target, as in the case of Marie-Thèrese above). Psychological violence is the single most prevalent form of election violence experienced by women, accounting for one third of all incidents of violence against women recorded in the EVER data. The difference is striking: in the sample, the proportional frequency of intimidation against women was almost three times greater than for men, while the proportional

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<sup>55</sup> Reported in public event & confirmed in conversation with author, January 2013, Abuja, Nigeria.

<sup>56</sup> Reported in public event & confirmed in conversation with author, April 2013, Port-au-Prince, Haiti.

frequency of physical violence was three times greater among men than women. This powerful contrast illustrates the fundamental difference in the experience of political violence between men and women.

A widespread tool of political manipulation, intimidation is also often associated with situations of power imbalance and control in household settings. Psychological/emotional abuse includes rejecting, degrading, terrorizing, isolating, corrupting/exploiting in a sustained or repetitive manner. Some forms are most prevalent in the domestic context and may be sub-sets of domestic violence while others (such as terrorizing or degrading) may take place publically by public political actors.

Social sanctions and punishment are social mechanisms to regulate individual behaviors that can include informal means of control (systematic ridicule, ostracism, shame, criticism, exclusion, discrimination) and formal means of control (laws, statutes, regulations against deviant behavior). This disproportionately affects women. Political violence in traditional societies often takes the form of social censure. That is, a community may turn against publically, politically active women who are perceived to break with traditional roles, not only through limits on movement and speech that may be imposed by husbands and male community or religious leaders, but also marginalization, isolation and rejection imposed by older female relatives as well as by other community leaders.

Family pressure is a specific form of intimidation, control or forced disenfranchisement. It may include spousal or parental pressure on whom to support in an election, refusal of permission to leave house to vote or run for office, refusal of relatives to watch children for women to vote, family sanction or rejection for a woman candidate, aspirant or elected official. This disproportionately affects women due to traditional roles. Perpetrators of social and family related violence are most often close to the victim, in the community of the domestic sphere.

Evidence from different countries suggests that women can become victims of violence and threats of violence by their kin when they seek to pursue political office, to publically voice their political opinions or even when they disagree or fail to vote according to the wishes of their husband, parents or clan. Schaffer's (2011) study of controlled voting (dictating

women and younger men's vote choices by senior male household members) and split voting (deliberate allocation of a family's vote across two or more candidates) highlights the coercive nature and provides examples as far-ranging as Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Gabon, Guatemala, India, Israeli Bedouins, Macedonia, Niger, Pakistan, South Africa, South Korea, and Uganda. He notes that in these cases, "the ballot cast is not an expression of the controlled voter's opinion. In fact, vote control is often accompanied by violence or threats of violence. Women from various parts of the world, for instance, have been beaten or killed for disobeying their husbands' electoral orders" (p 13).

During the Egyptian elections of 2011-12, women in some rural regions were threatened with divorce for failing to vote according to their clan's electoral choices.<sup>57</sup> The threats were backed by references to marriage vows to obey the husband, and a belief in the non-secrecy of the ballot due to public voting and result counting in small communities. In these cases, the threat of divorce was devastating as it implied exile from children and family, social ostracism, loss of financial assets and income and the real possibility of homelessness.

In India, human rights activist Savitri Goonsekere explain that "character assassination, kidnapping of their children, rape and even murder of winner women politicians by opposition party members after losing elections, social boycott for being involved in politics, breakage of relationships, ill treatment by husbands...there are a whole lot of reasons which discourage women from entering the field" (IANS 2009). In Nigeria in 2015, an electoral monitoring program recognized "consistently elevated levels of gender-based hate speech toward women candidates and their supporters" in two regions, above the national average (NDI 2015) while in Zimbabwe, ISADA and UN Women noted that women faced especially high levels of violence and intimidation during primaries, when challenged by men in their own parties (2011). In other countries, the legal framework does not protect women from domestic pressure and violence; in some there are legal stipulations of male dominance and such clauses may be invoked to impede women's political

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<sup>57</sup> Carter Center Election Witness Mission in Egypt 2011-12.

participation a voters, activists or candidates. For example, in Algeria, Article 39 of the family code stipulates that “The duty of the wife is to obey her husband”. Although the constitution allows freedom of movement to all citizens, “policemen and court officials in Algeria, and in many other countries in the region, consider it an acceptable practice for a husband to forbid his wife to travel without his permission” (Freedom House 2006).

Psychological violence is the single most prevalent form of election violence experienced by women in the sample study. The most frequent reported threat to women is intimidation, which accounted for over one-third of all cases of violence against women, and nearly 90% of cases against women party leaders or supporters or women candidates. In addition to family and community, intimidation is perpetrated by inter-party and intra-party actors. In Peru, intraparty violence appears in cases where women candidates were "forced to resign or sign agreements before notaries agreeing to resign], even to leave office after two and a half years” (La Razón 2015). This practice has also been documented in Bolivia (Carrillo 2009), Mexico (Analco 2015).

International Alert reports a striking example of the challenges of intimidation faced by women candidates, in this case from Sierra Leone:

In December 2009, Elizabeth Torto stood as a candidate in the Paramount Chieftaincy election in Kono District. Directly descended from a former chief, she had received the full support of traditional leaders in her community and was confident of victory. However, the all-male ‘poro’ society viewed her candidacy as a contradiction of traditional practices and vowed to block her from standing. When she appeared in public she was confronted by extreme intimidation from men in her community. ‘They accused me of starting a revolution,’ she recalls. She received death threats warning her never to return to the area and her supporters were attacked and beaten. Under a hail of stones she was eventually flown to safety in Freetown in a UN helicopter.

In her absence, a loophole in a recently passed law was used to bar her from the resultant election, which was won by a man. The 2009 Chieftaincy Act

stipulates that women have equal rights to contest chieftaincy elections, but only 'where tradition so specifies'. (Kellow 2010)

Social-psychological attacks are particularly potent instruments of violence where women are concerned. Attacks against women's morality or ethical character often carry greater social costs for women than for men because of the implications they may have on the victim's children or because of the existence of double standards as far as what constitutes 'moral behavior' for male and female politicians (Bardall 2013). This makes psychological-violence a particularly effective weapon against women in general and specifically in political contexts.

Finally, one of the most salient locations for of socio-psychological violence is in the virtual sphere. Internet and other social media and information and communication technologies (ICTs) have proven to be uniquely dangerous instruments in perpetrating election violence against women because of the relative importance of psychological violence in women's political experience. ICTs may be used directly as a tool of intimidation by threatening or inciting physical violence against women candidates, voters or representatives (Bardall 2013). The extent of this unique area of electoral violence is so vast that Chapter 4 is dedicated to exploring it in depth.

### *Economic*

Economic harm, coercion, or abuse comes in institutional as well as personal forms. It includes harm or threats to harm a business, termination or threat of termination of employment, or other threats or theft related to one's livelihood. In families or between spouses, it may include situations where one member or spouse partner intentionally denies access to financial resources to another to enforce dependency and coerce her or his electoral decisions and/or participation. It may include theft, preventing a spouse from acquiring resources, forcibly limiting spouse's expenditure on essential goods, creating debts or spending a spouse's resources without her or his consent, preventing a spouse from seeking employment/education/assets, etc. Spousal economic harm disproportionately affects women.

Examples include situations in which one partner intentionally denies access to financial resources to another partner to enforce dependency and coerce their electoral decisions and/or participation. This may include theft, preventing a spouse from acquiring resources, forcibly limiting their expenditure on essential goods, spending a spouse's resources without their consent/creating debt, preventing a spouse from seeking employment/education/assets, etc. In traditional, patriarchal households, women's political participation or even the expression of divergent political views may be punished by increasing labor burdens, withholding of financial allowances, diminished bride-dowries or even reduction of food rations within a household (Adams et al 2008, Saunders 2006). These acts, when done to influence voting or political behavior are just as intimidating and coercive as those done in the more public spheres of commerce and employer/employee relationships. These acts happen in the home, and they disproportionately affect women, not only in traditional or explicitly patriarchal societies, but in all societies where men predominantly control household financial resources. In such societies, women may also participate in this form of violence against other women through encouragement and/or support of male actions, or by direct actions against younger women in their households.

Data on economic harm or financial loss was collected in 3 of the 7 cases available in the EVER data (Burundi, Guinea and Bangladesh-2008). Yet, 45 percent of cases that identified financial losses as the impact of violence were against women or women and men together, and 62 percent of cases that recorded disruption of economic life (businesses/roads closed). Financial loss and disruption of economic life constitute fully 22 percent of impacts of the cases in the countries where it was recorded, and the reality is likely much higher. The widespread nature of the issue coupled with what we know both of tactics of political disruption and gender-based violence on the whole confirm that conscious acts of economic abuse intended to disrupt, delay or suspend an electoral process constitute distinct forms of violence in their own right.

While further documentation will provide more insight, there are indications that deliberately coercive and explicitly political acts of theft, economic damages and other forms of financial coercion may exist equally in the private sphere as in the public sphere.

Economic harm/coercion is a regularly recognized form of domestic violence (Mouradian 2004, NCADV 2011, Wettersen et al 2004, De Benedictus 2004) and must be recognized equally as electoral violence when its intent is clearly to interfere with the choices and participation of legal voters. For example, the EVER data records that women-only victims constitute 12.9% of targets of election-related thefts, and an additional 19.4% are directed at both men and women together. If theft is considered a form of election violence in the public sphere, it must also have the same status when it takes place in the home with the same intent to disrupt freedom of choice and participation in electoral processes.

Another form of economic political violence relates to the exploitation of internally displaced peoples (IDP) and refugees. The “forced displacement of civilians for electoral ends” (Dunning) is a unique form of violence and may include prolonging IDP status, artificially conferring status, forcing movement, preventing refugee return or forcing refugee return to influence voter geography and registration, misuse/misdirection of aid resources, extortion are characteristics of what Klopp calls “gerrymandering by moving people” (Klopp 2001; see Kasara 2009). While it takes a physical and emotional toll as well, the role of financial coercion is predominant. The tactic has been documented in Columbia (Acemoglu, Robinson, and Santos-Villagran (2009), Steele) and in Kenya (Kasara 2009). In these two cases, as consistent with worldwide global statistics, 80 percent of refugees and IDPs are composed of women, children and the elderly. Thus, although this form of EV is not gender-specific in its intent, its impact is disproportionately assumed by women (GD-EV). The physical and emotional toll cannot be underestimated either: for example, over 100,000 Burundian refugees fled to Rwanda, Tanzania and the DRC during the pre-electoral violence in 2015. During the first weeks of the outflow, UNHCR spokesman Adrian Edwards stated that “In all these cases women and children, including a large number of unaccompanied children, are in the majority.” Women refugees reported threats of rape from armed men, having to bribe their way through roadblocks and walking for hours through the bush at night with their children (UNHCR 2015).



### Part III. Gender Motivations in Political Violence

The preceding sections have established that political violence is gender differentiated in its forms, frequencies, actors and locations. By providing a gender-sensitive definition of political violence and a structured typology, we are better able to recognize and interpret the complexity of the issue. Before closing this discussion, one final, vital distinction must be made regarding intent of violence. We shift our attention in this final section to the political dimension of violence against women (VAWP/VAWE).

To this point in the preceding sections, most of the cases of violence presented were perpetrated with a political intent, i.e., to disrupt or coerce an electoral process, pressure elected officials, etc. Although these acts affect men and women differently, the gender of the victim or perpetrator was arbitrary to the purpose of the act itself. While it is important to understand the gender-differentiated nature of political violence, especially in order to mitigate and prevent it, we must maintain an important distinction between politically-motivated and gender-based political violence (GBPV).

Politically-motivated violence has gender-differentiated manifestations in terms of the patterns, actors and types of associated violence. In contrast, gender-based political violence is a distinct form of gender-based violence characterized by the (often misogynistic) intent of its perpetrators. The distinction is in the purpose of the violence – all other aspects, including the possible types, victims, perpetrators and locations occur in both forms of violence. Table 2, presented at the outset of this paper, presents this conceptual relationship.

Gender-based violence (GBV) is the “general term used to capture violence that occurs as a result of the normative role expectations associated with each gender, along with the unequal power relationships between the two genders, within the context of a specific society.” (Bloom 2008: 14). According to the UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), GBV is defined as “*violence that is directed against a woman because she is a woman or that affects women disproportionately*”. This includes acts that inflict physical, mental or sexual harm or suffering, the threat of such acts, coercion and other deprivations of liberty (CEDAW, General Recommendation

No. 19 on VAW (GR 19)). Violence against women (VAW) is defined as “any act of gender-based violence that results in, or is likely to result in, physical, sexual or psychological harm or suffering to women, including threats of such acts, coercion or arbitrary deprivation of liberty, whether occurring in public or in private life” (DEVAW 1993). VAW may occur in public or in private, including in the family, in the general community or violence perpetrated and condoned by the state.

Gender-based political violence (GBPV) exists where harm is committed that violates an individual or groups’ political rights on the basis of their gender-identity. While this study has emphasized women’s concerns (VAWP/VAWE), gender-based political violence is not limited to women and may affect any person subject to political violence on the basis of their gender-identity. Where GBPV specifically targets women in order to enforce patriarchal control of democratic institutions, it may be described as VAWP. VAWP affects women in all political and public positions, including voters, civic activists, elected officials, civil servants, candidates, journalists, electoral officials, etc.<sup>58</sup> VAWP occurring within the electoral period timeframe is referred to as VAWE.

While identifying motives for violence is often challenging, and although overlap may exist in cases where violence is motivated by both political and gender-specific concerns, there is substantive documentation of the existence of GBPV. Motive in these cases is identified through analysis perpetrators’ discourse regarding the nature of their acts.

In Zimbabwe, a witness describes genital mutilation against politically-active women, stating “a very good example is when we had so many houses being burned in 2008, we had women who were forced to sit on hot plates - in fire - by men who asked them to

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<sup>58</sup> NB: the definition of GBPV and the subtypes of VAWP/VAWE presented here are distinguished from similar notions in the academic and practitioner literature (British Group-IPU 2015, Krook, 2015; Krook and Restrepo Sanín, 2014, Bardall 2011, 2013; Piscopo 2016; IDEA 2008, SAP 2006, 2010; NDI 2016). In particular, based on the empirical findings of Part I, I define the subtype VAWP to reflect a broader scope than definitions which limit it to candidates and elected women (British Group-IPU 2015, Krook, 2015; Krook and Restrepo Sanín, 2014) and their families (IDEA 2008, SAP 2006, 2010), and I do not limit the definition by assigning further intent or objectives to perpetrators’ acts beyond a general misogynistic motivation (i.e., existence of a backlash, use of violence to force women out of office, force their decisions, etc.). For further discussion of conflicting definitions in this area, see Bardall in Segrave & Vitis, forthcoming from Routledge 2017).

undress and make them sit on the hot plates and say ‘We want to burn your private parts, because that is making you do what you are doing’” (Glanis 2015).

In Pakistan, cases of GBEV are documented both against individual women and women as a collective group. Najma Hanif was a secular female politician from Northwest Pakistan and a senior member of the Awami National Party (ANP) known for its outspoken views against the Taliban. Hanif was killed by gunmen in her home in 2013. While the ANP was heavily targeted by the Taliban in general, the attack on Hanif is considered gender-specific “because of her bold outlook and her political affiliation which was seen as a deviation from the norms of that place. She was killed so that other [women] with similar intentions may refrain from all such activities.”<sup>59</sup> Hanif's husband and son along with their bodyguard were killed by a Taliban suicide bomber two years earlier. In a similar event, Pakistani politician and women's rights activist Zil-e-Huma Usman was shot and killed in 2007, while serving as provincial Minister for Social Welfare in Punjab. Her assassin was a religious extremist who allegedly killed her because of her refusal to abide by the Islamic dress code and because of his aversion to women in politics. He had previously been held in connection with the killing and mutilation of four other women and told a local television channel that Islam did not allow women to hold positions of leadership, stating “I will kill all those women who do not follow the right path, if I am freed again.”<sup>60</sup>

Other evidence from Pakistan documents political attacks on women as a collective group in society. Numerous examples of formal agreements between political parties and community leaders to bar women from voting or for running for office have been documented over the past decade.<sup>61</sup> These pacts have disenfranchised tens of thousands of women and resulted in physical and psychological harm, with as many as 564 polling stations barring women from voting in 2008.<sup>62</sup> According to the European Union observation mission during the 2008 Pakistani elections, “in Khyber agency, the local

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<sup>59</sup> Phone conversation with Pakistani activist familiar with the case. Requested anonymity. January 2016

<sup>60</sup> <http://www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/news/world/asia/article2606894.ece>

<sup>61</sup> UNDP 2011, See also Tariq, Bardall 2016.

<sup>62</sup> FAFEN <http://www.upi.com/UPI-Next/2013/03/26/Women-Face-Bars-to-Voting-in-Landmark-Pakistan-Poll/81363307951483/> Cited in Tariq, Bardall, 2016.

Lashkar-e-Islami leader Mangal Bagh was seen driving around the district in a convoy of 50 or 60 trucks with armed men, warning women not to vote over a loudspeaker, and announcing a shoot-to-kill policy for those who did. Similar agreements were also reported in Bajaur, Kurram and Mohmand agencies, and in Dir and Peshawar districts. At constituency results centres in three districts of Peshawar EU observers noted 87 polling stations where no women at all had voted.” Where women defy such bans, they may be subject to physical and non-physical violence by their families, communities and political leaders, even as their families’ may become targets for retaliatory attacks. In one example, a Pakistani woman who defied a pact described being rejected and threatened by her family and community: “My brothers and sisters are receiving calls from members of our own family, saying that I have done a very bad thing, and that I have humiliated them.” She further explained in interview with National Public Radio, that her husband had supported her desire to vote, but that his family was now living in fear for their lives and that the abuse was so significant that she was forced to temporarily leave her home to seek refuge elsewhere.<sup>63</sup>

Violence against women in elections and in politics (VAWE/VAWP) derives from a misogynistic intent to maintain male dominance in the political sphere. Documenting the extent of its occurrence and the depth of its impact on women’s political participation is a critical future step in the research agenda in this area. Likewise, exploring the causes, prevalence and incidence of this violence over time will indicate to what extent GBPV/VAWP exists in backlash to the increasing presence of women and/or non-traditional genders in political life (as suggested by Krook & Restrepo-Sanin 2016), as a stable, culturally-embedded form of violence (“policing the patriarchy”, Piscopo 2016) or as a strategic calculation (Bjarnegård 2016).

## Conclusion

The exceptionally high cost of political conflict, especially in post-war or transitional

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<sup>63</sup> <http://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2015/11/21/456797947/will-the-first-pakistani-woman-to-vote-in-her-village-also-be-the-last> Cited in Tariq, Bardall, 2016.

societies, make the study of political violence critical for citizens around the world. Yet, study of the topic has frequently excluded half of the population – women of developing states who become victims of this distinct form of violence and (though not explored here) those women that support or employ violent means to express and enforce their political aspirations.

Our knowledge of political violence relies on definitions that are overwhelmingly reflective of the masculine experience of this violence. In order to capture its full nature, we must adapt definitions that reflect the reality for all actors in the political process. Political violence is perpetrated by actors ranging from state to community to family. It is perpetrated by men, women and, at times, both sexes acting in conjunction. Likewise, different forms of political violence vary in impact on different groups and classes of women. Gender-based political violence can target women or others on the basis of their gender identity.

The discussion in the preceding pages demonstrates that a gendered understanding of political violence expands the forms and areas of violence from those traditionally associated with this field, and offers a framework for further study. Through this exercise, the necessity of re-thinking the definitions used to address political violence becomes apparent. In addition to understanding the diversity of victims and perpetrators of political violence, an enriched understanding of violence reveals distinct forms, tactics and strategies employed in violence as well as its distinct geography (including non-physical locations such as social media) and timing across the electoral cycle and political sphere.

Women's political participation continues to grow in leaps and bounds today, whether through changing social norms and international standards, through women's engagement in leadership roles in conflict, post-conflict and/or social uprising contexts, as civic leaders and human rights defenders, or through the exponential growth of gender-quotas in recent years that have brought an unparalleled number of women to political prominence. For one, the rapid changes in the roles of women in many countries mean that normal risks of political activity are augmented with the risk of rejecting traditional roles and values. Familial or social intimidation or pressures that play out in private spaces are not captured

by quantitative studies, nor are they included in traditional responses to political violence – we must adapt research tools according to the nature of the violence. So long as research continues to limit the definitions of political violence to the forms of violence primarily experienced by men, we will overlook the distinct yet pervasive issue of human rights.



## Chapter 4.

# The Role of Information and Communication Technologies in Facilitating and Resisting Gendered Forms of Political Violence<sup>64</sup>

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### Introduction

Substantial gains have been made worldwide in enhancing women's participation in public life in the past two decades. In 1995, women comprised at least 30 per cent of parliamentarians in only five countries (2 per cent of the total), while today forty-six nation states have reached that threshold (IPU 2016).<sup>65</sup> Constitutional revisions and electoral reform globally has enfranchised women and facilitated their political participation by entrenching their rights, offering incentives and/or imposing sanctions on political parties

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<sup>64</sup> Versions of this chapter appear in *Stability: International Journal of Security and Development*. 2013. X(X), pp 1-11. DOI. <http://www.stabilityjournal.org/article/view/sta.cs/161> and as a chapter of an edited volume *Gender, Technology and Violence*, edited by Marie Segrave, Monash University & Laura Vitis, University of Liverpool. Forthcoming: Routledge, 2017.

<sup>65</sup> Reflects single and lower houses. In 1995, women comprised more than 30 per cent of seats in only Sweden, Norway, Finland, Denmark and the Netherlands. As of June 2016, forty-six states have met or surpassed 30 per cent women in single or lower house seats.



and other public bodies to protect against gender-specific threats. Nonetheless, women generally remain acutely under-represented in parliaments (only 22.7 per cent of parliamentarians worldwide are women (IPU 2016)) and face deep-rooted obstacles to participation as voters and in other civil and public roles. Barriers range from inadequate or nonexistent legal protections, traditional cultural stereotypes and gender roles, lack of access to resources and civic education and generally lower levels of self-confidence in pursuing public office and actively participating in civic life in other roles. Of all of these barriers, political violence is perhaps the most insidious and affecting.

Focusing on the nexus of gender, violence and technology, this chapter chronicles the parallel rise in new information and communication technologies (ICTs) and women's increased political participation in developed and developing states. I argue that socio-psychological violence (such as acts of intimidation and moralistic shaming) is the most widespread and damaging form of violence against women in politics, and that this specific type of violence intensifies in online and other ICT spaces due to ICTs' unique ability to rapidly amplify the reach, impact and harmfulness of socio-psychological attacks. The chapter challenges and builds on the growing literature regarding political violence and women in both academic (Bardall 2013, 2016; Krook 2015; Krook and Restrepo Sanín 2016) and practitioner literature (Bardall 2011; NDI 2016; iKnowPolitics 2007; Inter-Parliamentary Union 2014, South Asia Partnership International 2006; USAID 2013). The discussion focuses in particular upon the ways in which ICTs are being utilized to inhibit women's political participation via gendered violence in a range of ways in different jurisdictions. For women entering political life or holding public positions, new ICTs are frequently used as tools of gender-specific electoral and political violence. There is evidence of ICTs being used to perpetrate a broad range of violent acts against women during elections and in public life, especially acts inflicting fear and psychological harm. Specific characteristics of ICTs are particularly adapted to misuse in this manner. Despite these significant challenges, ICTs also offer groundbreaking solutions to respond to the gendered dimensions of electoral and general political violence. Notably, ICTs combat these forms of violence through monitoring and documentation, via education and awareness-raising platforms and through empowerment and advocacy initiatives. The intersection of

gender, violence and technology creates new risks for harmfully suppressing women's public voices, just as it opens new opportunities for their empowerment and expression.

## Political Violence and Gender

Political violence is defined as “violence aimed at achieving or resisting regime change in established power hierarchies and orders; asserting or resisting supremacy of one form of national identity over another or others; seizing and controlling economic, political or other resources in the form of mineral, key routes; or resistance to any of these forms of violence” (Breen-Smyth 2016: 569). Political violence violates an individual or group's civil and political rights to participate in and contribute to the process of governing their society through the use or threat of coercive force. It is defined as political rather than interpersonal or other violence by the nature of the objectives; the targets of attacks; the organizational structure of groups responsible and the repertoire of actions (ECPR). Within the dominant literature on political violence, gender has been the subject of limited analysis. Before outlining how the key concept of gendered political violence is used in this chapter to explore technology's role in spreading or resisting violence, I outline the three key concepts that are often utilized in relation to this broad area of research and offer an overview of their strengths, limits and points of intersection or overlap.

First, traditional political violence is *gender-differentiated* (GD-PV) in its manifestations. Both women and men are victims (and perpetrators) of these types of violence, however the types of acts committed, their frequencies and the actors involved in them are patterned according to the sex of the victim (Bardall 2011). Likewise, the micro-geography of political violence (i.e. where violence occurs) is frequently correlated with the gender of the victim (Bardall 2011) and, like other forms of violence (such as intimate partner violence) it can take both physical and non-physical forms (see Bardall 2011, Krook 2015; Krook and Restrepo Sanín 2016).

As the previous chapter has shown, while gendered political violence may comprise physical, sexual or economic acts of aggression, psychological attacks are by far the most pervasive form experienced by women

and the most pertinent to the study of ICTs. Indeed, the proportion of intimidation and psychological acts of violence experienced by women was nearly three times the same proportion among men (ratio of 28:10 percent) while men experienced more than three times the levels of physical violence as did women (39:11 percent) (Bardall 2011, previous chapter). Psychological violence is an “informal means of control [and] includes systematic ridicule, ostracism, shame, sarcasm, criticism, disapproval, exclusion and discrimination” (ibid: 8). Coupled with threats of physical and sexual violence, these forms of violence degrade, demoralize and shame their victims. Devastating to their victims, psychological forms of violence are frequently orchestrated through the instruments of social media, as discussed below.

In contrast, the second concept, *gender-based* political violence (GBPV)<sup>66</sup> exists where harm is committed that violates an individual or groups’ political rights on the basis of their gender-identity. GBPV comprises all violent infringements of civil and political rights that are directed against an individual or group because of their gender-identity or that disproportionately affect a given gender.<sup>67</sup>

Political violence and gender-based violence are distinguished by the motivations of the perpetrators. The objective of political violence is to impact a political process or outcome through the use of coercive force. For example, the assassinations of Swedish Minister for Foreign Affairs Anna Lindh in 2003, former Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto in 2007 and of British MP Helen Joanne “Jo” Cox in 2016 may be considered as cases of non-gender-specific political violence, because in each case the perpetrators attributed their motivation to political rather than misogynistic objectives (referendums on European politics in the Lindh and Cox cases, ongoing political violence between al-Qaeda and Pakistani political parties in the Bhutto case). Although its motives are non-gender-specific, political violence is characterized by gender differentiations in its types, forms, locations, etc, as described above.

In contrast, while GBPV (and GBEV) also violate civil and political rights, they are forms of gender-based violence (GBV). As such, they are the result of “normative role expectations associated with each gender, along with the unequal power relationships between the two genders, within the context of a specific society” (Bloom 2008: 14). Acts of GBPV target the victim on the basis of their gender and occur within the political and civil sphere, in public, private or virtual locations. A high-profile example of GBPV is the attack on Pakistani women and youth activist Malala Yousafzai in 2012, who was targeted by the Taliban for her promotion of women’s right to education. Although not entirely mutually-exclusive, political violence is

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<sup>66</sup> Also referred to as gender-motivated political violence.

<sup>67</sup> Adapted from CEDAW General Recommendation No. 19 on VAW (GR 19)

broadly classified as a form of collective violence, while GBPV is primarily interpersonal insofar as it is not intended to “further the aims of any formally defined group or cause” (Waters et al 2004: 304).<sup>68</sup>

The third concept is a subset of GB-PV: where GBPV specifically targets cisgender women in order to enforce patriarchal control of democratic institutions, it may be described as Violence Against Women in Politics (VAWP). This chapter focuses on female victims of violence, both in gender-specific and gender-nonspecific acts of political violence. The use of the term “Violence Against Women in Politics” (VAWP) in this chapter differs substantially from the use of this term elsewhere in the literature (commonly abbreviated as VAWIP). The concept of “VAWIP” in the literature is conflicted and both overly broad and excessively narrow. VAWIP has been used in conflicting manners, with confusion over the objects of violence,<sup>69</sup> the relationship of the concept to other related concepts,<sup>70</sup> and its motives.<sup>71</sup> In recent writing, VAWIP has emerged as an excessively narrow notion, focusing exclusively on candidates and elected officials<sup>72</sup> and women as victims.<sup>73</sup> Narrow interpretations also inaccurately restrict perpetrators’ objectives<sup>74</sup> and context<sup>75</sup> of the

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<sup>68</sup> Political violence has interpersonal dimensions, insofar as discrete incidents have identifiable victims and perpetrators. Likewise, gender-violence is arguably inscribed in structural or symbolic power dynamics that are part of broader social repression characterized by collective violence.

<sup>69</sup> The idea of “women in politics” is sometimes interpreted broadly to include many categories of women stakeholders, including voters and party/candidate supporters (UNW 2014, ParlAmericas 2014, Tariq-Bardall 2016, NDI 2016) while other authors intentionally use “in politics” to limit the pool to female candidates and elected or appointed officials (British Group-IPU 2015, Krook, 2015; Krook and Restrepo Sanín, 2014). Others describe the objects of VAWIP to include the male and female family members of female candidates/office holders, but exclude female voters, party supporters, etc. (IDEA 2008, SAP 2006, 2010).

<sup>70</sup> Some view VAWIP exclusively as a form of VAW (Krook 2015, Krook and Restrepo-Sanin 2014, 2016), others view it as a subset of election violence (IDEA 2008), still others view it as both (SAP 2006, 2010; NDI 2015). Similar concepts face identical debates: for example, ParlAmericas views ‘political harassment and violence against women’ as a form of VAW while USAID suggests that ‘political violence against women in elections’ is a form of election violence.

<sup>71</sup> Some authors suggest that motives are exclusively gender-based (Krook 2015, Krook and Restrepo-Sanin 2015, 2016 (“with some ambiguity”)); while others suggest that VAWIP may be driven by both gender-specific and political motives (NDI 2015, Hubbard 2015, Piscopo 2016, SAP 2006, 2010).

<sup>72</sup> Empirical research suggests that candidates are one of the least frequent targets – more than 90 percent of recorded incidents against women in elections were against women in roles other than candidates (Bardall 2011, 2016). The same research suggests that political supporters are the largest category of victims and that female voters face a proportionally much greater risk than male counterparts.

<sup>73</sup> Men were victims in over 90% of cases in the Bardall 2011, 2016 studies, and women were involved as perpetrators at the same rate as they were victims. Political violence and GBPV also occurs against other gender-identities.

<sup>74</sup> The objective of VAWIP is variously described as to compel women to “step down as candidates or resign a particular political office”(Krook and Restrepo-Sanin 2016), to “prevent and discourage”(IDEA 2008), “breach,

violence. Although VAWP is theoretically limited to gender-motivated violence, in practice, the concept is often employed indiscriminately in referencing any act of political violence where a cisgender woman is victim. The over-extension and misuse of the concept of VAWIP diminish its usefulness, while its focus on female candidates and elected officials misdirect us from the other, key victims at the intersection of politics, violence and gender (men (Bardall 2011, 2016)). In light of this, this chapter grounds its theoretical framework in the core distinction between the types of violence (GD-PV and GBPV) based on the motivation or objective of the act. VAWP is used to describe those acts of gender-motivated political violence perpetrated against women *as women* to maintain patriarchal control of the political or electoral sphere. GD-PV and GBPV (and their subtypes) share potential categories of victims (e.g., voters, candidates, elected officials, political journalists, election workers, civil servants, etc), perpetrators (e.g., political opponents or co-party members, family and intimate partners, community actors, rebel groups, hackers, etc), as well as the locations (private, public, domestic, virtual) and types (physical and non-physical) described above.

Each of these three concepts are critical to understanding political violence perpetrated through the medium of ICTs.. Violence that takes place in virtual locations is, by definition, non-physical and is composed of various forms of threats, intimidation, character attacks, hacking, theft of personal information and personification. As discussed below, many of these attacks are gender-specific (VAWP), attacking female party supporters, voters, candidates, elected officials and others by employing sexualized or gender-specific messaging and with the objective of diminishing or coercing women's political voice. This chapter finds that VAWP that occurs in the form of cyber-attacks uses sexually demeaning and threatening messaging to violate the civil and political rights of its victims.

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obstruct or curtail" (SAP 2010), "prevent or control" (NDI 2015) women's participation. This is inconsistent: under some definitions the goal is to reduce or eliminate women's voices. In other cases, where women's participation can be controlled (by violence, family voting, etc.) increasing women in office can be valuable strategy (Bardall 2014).

<sup>75</sup> A debate exists as to whether this form of violence has arisen as a backlash to women's increasing participation (Krook 2015) or is a long-standing issue that has been overlooked to-date (Bardall 2016).

In other cases, women and men are indiscriminately victims of virtual acts of violence within the context of broader political pursuits (GD-PV). A gender-differential may exist according to country-specific contextual factors regarding gender-gaps in knowledge, access and usage of ICTs. For example, in countries where the digital fluency gap is large, women are more vulnerable than men to digital attacks. While the scope of this research does not extend to quantify this differential, it recognizes its existence and describes some of the channels it takes, setting a course for further research.

Finally, these forms of violence are not exclusively directed at cisgender women. As non-traditional gender identities gain public awareness and political participation and leadership among non-gender conforming individuals increases, the presence of GBPV/GBEV targeting transgender men and women and other genderqueer individuals, is, regrettably, likely to become more visible. These forms of political and election-related “genderbashing” (Namaste 1996) compel the use of inclusive terminology (“gender-based” and “gender-differentiated” political violence). Indeed, they will merit study in their own right, as they add further dimensions to gender- and politically-motivated violence as well as issues of sexuality and homophobia in politics. While recognizing this, based on available data and on the preponderance of evidence at this time, the present study focuses on the incidence of political and electoral violence affecting cisgender women.

This chapter is specifically interested in VAWP and the gender differential in non-gender-specific acts of political violence, and how recognizing the intersection of this form of gendered violence with ICTS offers new ways to understand political violence, its gendered nature and the extent to which ways to harness technology to combat this violence can achieve their stated aim. It begins first by outlining the empirical research that informs the discussion and then presents the roles of information and communication technologies in facilitating and resisting gendered forms of political violence.

## **Methodology**

My argument for the existence and typology of gender differentiation and gender-specificity in political violence is derived from a cross-national empirical analysis (Bardall

2011, see previous chapter). Drawing on over 2000 individual incidents of electoral violence collected by community monitors in six countries<sup>76</sup> between 2006 and 2010, I find that election violence has distinct gender dimensions in terms of the types of violence (physical or non-physical), the perpetrators involved (institutional, non-state, societal), the victims targeted (political affiliated, institutional, profession or private non-state or non-political actors) (Bardall 2011, 2016). Most importantly for this chapter, the empirical analysis indicates the existence of variation in the location of political violence, including violence that takes place in public, private, domestic and virtual locations. Although these 2000+ data points suggested the existence of gendered political violence in virtual spaces, the incident-based data was insufficient to explore the breadth and variety of this intersection between technology, gender and violence. This chapter takes the typology identified through the empirical analysis and applies it to technology-based violence. I consider the range of victims, perpetrators and types of violence that are engaged when technology is employed as a means of perpetrating violence against women in political contexts. In the final section of the chapter, I also look at how ICTs are used to resist and prevent political violence.

This chapter's empirical examples draw on field experience from the author's work with various international and non-governmental organizations in some three-dozen countries in sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East/North Africa, Central Asia, the Caribbean and Southeast Asia, as well as interviews with social media and gender entrepreneurs from 2011 to 2016 and supplemental desk research.

## **ICTs and Social Media as Implements of Gendered Violence**

As women's participation in politics internationally grows despite ongoing legal barriers and cultural resistance, women's vulnerability to political violence increases, including in online spaces and via ICTs. The UN estimates that 95 per cent of aggressive behavior, harassment, abusive language and denigrating images in online spaces are aimed at

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<sup>76</sup> The tests comprise data from three countries in South-East Asia (Timor-Leste, Nepal and Bangladesh) and two sub-Saharan African states (Burundi, Guinea) as well as a small dataset from Guyana, in South America.

women, most often by a current or former partner (UNGA 2006). Karen Banks noted over ten years ago that '[t]he internet is not creating new forms of crimes against women [...], but it is creating new ways and means for crimes to be perpetrated' (Banks 2001: 147-173). The focus of this discussion is to examine this claim, whilst considering the implications of these new ways and means of enacting violence in response to or to prevent women's political participation. In particular, the Internet and other social media and ICTs have proven to be uniquely dangerous instruments in perpetrating political violence against women because of the relative importance of psychological violence in women's political experience. In one cross-national study of election violence in six countries, the proportion of intimidation and psychological acts of violence experienced by women (threats, harassment, aggressively abusive or denigrating language) was nearly three times the same proportion among men (ratio of 28:10 percent) while men experienced more than three times the levels of physical violence as did women (39:11 percent) (Bardall 2011, 2016). Given such disproportionate impacts of psychological violence on women, violence perpetrated through ICTs (which is, by definition, non-physical and psychological in nature) has an acute effect in both GD-PV and VAWP.

ICTs may be used directly as a tool of intimidation by threatening or inciting physical violence against women candidates, voters or representatives. Such cyber-harassment or intimidation may include sending abusive, threatening or obscene emails explicit threats of physical and/or sexual violence and or encouraging strangers to physically harm the victim, which, in some cases result in actual physical assault (Citron 2014). Citron notes that, unlike cyber attacks against men, cyber-harassment of women is particularly "...sexually demeaning, [...] sexually threatening, [...] reduces the victims to basically their sexual organs, and sends the message that all [the victims are] there for is to be sexually abused, used and thrown away, that they offer nothing" (Citron 2014).

These acts of VAWP may involve spreading reputation-harming lies, electronic sabotage in the form of extensive spam and damaging viruses, impersonating the victim online and sending abusive emails or fraudulent spams, blog-posts, Tweets and other online communications in the victim's name or subscribing victims to unwanted email lists



resulting in hundreds of unwanted messages daily (Ellison and Akdeniz 1998, Citron 2014). The attacks are perpetrated by both strangers and individuals known to the victim, as well as by proxy-stalkers and “cyber-mobs” (Citron 2014:5). They may be perpetrated either as a form of VAWP or have a distinct impact on female victims due to sexualized nature of content, despite being perpetrated for purely political objectives (GD-PV).

Cyber-harassment can result in serious harm to the victim, as in one of the earliest cases recorded of Cynthia Armistead, an American woman who received thousands of offensive messages and threats in 1996 after her stalker published false online advertisements offering her services as a prostitute and providing her home address and personal telephone number (Bocij 2004). More innovative and sophisticated forms of ICT-based attacks on women have been documented and include the use of ‘spy software’ (spyware enables abusers to have access to all keystrokes made on the computer, including all email correspondence, web surfing and internet communication); the use of wireless technology to monitor private conversations; hacking; saved ‘cookies’ and browser histories; email tampering and interception; visual surveillance and geographic tracking via Global Positioning System (GPS) software (Southworth et al. 2007). These ICT-based attacks have an overwhelming impact on women’s private and professional lives. Indeed, some surveys estimate that over 80 per cent of victims in cyber-stalking incidents are women<sup>77</sup>. Likewise, women are often more vulnerable to these attacks: in the developing world, women have lower access to internet and ICTs than men (25 percent less likely in the developing women, 45 percent in sub-Saharan Africa (Intel/Dalberg)) and where they do have access, they tend to have lower degrees of experience and education in working with ICTs, making them less able to prevent and respond to cyber-attack, including hacks and leaks.

The use of these and other forms of ICT-based violence has been documented in cases of violence against women in politics. During the post-election violence in Kenya in 2008-09, tribal-based political partisans sent SMS messages to women in opposing tribal-based

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<sup>77</sup> WHO@ is a volunteer organization founded in 1997 to fight online harassment. Statistics are based on incidents reported primarily from the United States in 2012, as well as a limited number of cases in Europe. <http://www.haltabuse.org/about/about.shtml>

political groups, threatening bodily harm, rape and even death (Wanyeki 2010). Graphically violent Tweets were used to make rape and murder threats against British Member of Parliament Stella Creasy and other prominent British women at a rate of up to 50 threats per hour, over the course of 12 hours following their support of a feminist issue (Döing 2013). During her 2008 electoral bid, Hillary Clinton was the object of a video game where players slapped her each time she speaks.

Beyond these evident exploitative uses of the medium, a number of the specific qualities of social media make them peculiarly suited to inflicting psychological violence on women in civic life. Their disproportionate impact on women stems in large part from women's unique vulnerability to attacks on the basis of gender-specific cultural expectations of propriety and morality. By breaking into a traditionally masculine field that is frequently associated with rough behavior and corruption, women are exposed to sexualized and/or morally degrading criticism that may carry additional weight due to social expectations of women's roles and moral character. Derogatory accusations of being a prostitute, a lesbian or otherwise sinful and/or sexually deviant are commonly leveled against women running for or holding office in many countries (Bardall 2011, 2016; NDI 2015). These 'morality-based' attacks often carry much greater social costs for women than for men because of the implications they may have on the victim's because of the existence of double standards as far as what constitutes 'moral behavior' for male and female politicians. The specific nature of social media plays to these imbalances and exacerbates attacks on women in public life in several ways.

Firstly, the nature of messaging in social media facilitates ridicule, shaming and other psychological forms of violence against women in elections and in politics (both non-gender-specific and GBPV). The most effective social media messages are generally short (in the case of Twitter, limited to 140 characters), written in simple language and often humorous. A study of media coverage of Hillary Clinton and Sarah Palin's 2008 political campaigns in the US found that the crudest attacks were found online, including over 500 YouTube videos under the search 'Hillary' and 'bitch' and multiple Facebook groups with obscene or sexist names, including the most popular (41,025 followers in March 2008)

'Hillary Clinton: Stop running for president and make me a sandwich' (Jamieson and Dunn 2008). Crude and sensational messages circulate widely without the legal or professional ethical requirements of traditional media to ensure accuracy, check sources and rectify errors. With extremely low barriers to entry, social media users may engage in character assassination at virtually no cost and with little personal consequence.

Social media also facilitates attacks on women's ethics and morality through the ubiquitous presence of images. The use of stereotypical or demeaning images and photos to sexualize, emotionalize and trivialize women poses a strong disincentive for women considering running for office, and may even pose a direct threat to their personal safety (Blackman-Woods 2013). Women MPs in many countries report feeling compelled to be hyper-conscious about their appearance and physical posture in public, due to the ubiquity of cell phone cameras.<sup>78</sup> Candid shots taken at unguarded moments and immediately posted and disseminated online to mock and ridicule have a degrading and intimidating impact on women candidates and MPs (e.g., awkward or unattractive poses (eating, coughing, yawning, etc.), minor wardrobe malfunctions or accidental exposure of skin/cleavage). Exacerbating the issue, the ease of programs such as Photoshop allows perpetrators to modify snapshots or create entirely new images designed to denigrate, compromise or shame their victim, for example, through numerous such images of Hillary Clinton distributed on Twitter and Facebook during the 2016 campaign.<sup>79</sup> In the case of female politicians, this is commonly manifested through sexually suggestive or demeaning images. With YouTube, videography is often matched with music and can be used to promote violence towards women in politics, for example in a YouTube music video during the 2008 US campaign that flashed photos of Hillary Clinton during debates as the lyric 'I'll beat that bitch with a hit' was repeated (Jamieson and Dunn 2008) or widespread pornography spin-

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<sup>78</sup> Author's conversations with women MPs and candidates, including Tunisia, July 2013; Haiti, April 2013; Nigeria, January 2013; Egypt, November – January 2011-12.

<sup>79</sup> Inversely, sexualized and/or pornographic 'Photoshopped' images of political candidates, short animations distributed online and YouTube promotional videos have also been used to depict virility of male candidates/officials, such as US presidential candidate, Donald Trump (2016) and Vladimir Putin ("Strip for Putin/Virgins for Putin" (2012)) or use sex and violence to encourage electoral participation (e.g. Danish "Voteman" (2014)).

offs regarding former Vice-Presidential candidate, Sarah Palin. This form of violence, known as malicious distribution, uses technology as a tool to manipulate and distribute defamatory and/or illegal material related to the victim (Baker et al. 2013). Women who accede to public positions are often in the line of fire for this type of attack.

The speed with which information travels through social media networks and the scope of its diffusion magnify impact of acts of GD-PV and VAWP. Re-Tweets, shares and 'Likes' spread degrading, humiliating or threatening attacks on women in politics, civil activists and political supporters with almost uncontrollable rapidity. The scope of online stalking and harassment are likewise amplified (Arya 2013). In a recent case, in a single night British Labour MP, Jess Phillips reported receiving over 600 rape threats and was subjected to some 5,000 Twitter notifications of people discussing whether or not they would sexually assault her (Hughes 2016). While the speed of internet attacks affects both men and women, the specifically sexualized nature of attacks involving women amplifies and distorts their gendered messages.

Available redress for this type of attack, including community censure, website moderating and legal intervention, frequently take effect only after the damage to the victim has been done. Self-policing functions of websites such as Facebook and Twitter are often weak and/or vulnerable to gender bias.<sup>80</sup> Interventions may interrupt or halt a behavior but less frequently correct false accusations or degrading projections. Indeed, given tight electoral deadlines, harm to a victim's public image may be difficult or impossible to correct before ballots are cast. The reach of any given message on social media is dependent on the voluntary diffusion of the message by social media users. Therefore, efforts to rectify degrading depictions cannot be consistently broadcast to consumers of the original message. Finally, the speed and scope of social media attacks have a chilling effect on political aspirants, especially women entering politics for the first time. In my research, I

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<sup>80</sup> See Al Jazeera, "Does Facebook have a 'violence against women' problem?" <http://stream.aljazeera.com/story/201305222040-0022771> and Helen Davidson. The Guardian. "Facebook locks out campaigner against images of violence against women" <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/may/31/facebook-locks-out-campaigner-women>

found that women frequently cite the threat of widespread, rapid public attacks on personal dignity as a factor deterring women from entering politics.

In contrast to many forms of ICT-based VAWP that target a woman's public image, ICTs may also cause harm by their ability to silence and bury women who otherwise seek to build a public presence for political aims (described as "symbolic violence" by Krook and Restrepo-Sanin 2016). Some recent cases demonstrate explicit attacks on women's access to and visibility via ICTs. Between 2010 and 2013, Indian villages in Bihar and Uttar Pradesh states and the Priyadarshni Indira Gandhi Government College for Women in Haryana banned single (or undergraduate) women from using cell phones (single/undergraduate men were not affected). In 2004, the Saudi Arabian Ministry of Education banned women from carrying camera phones. Polls in Nigeria have registered support for banning women's use of mobile phones (APC 2013). Control over women's access to ICTs is also reported extensively as a tool of domestic violence including privacy invasion through SMS stalking, monitoring use and/or withholding permission from female family members who want to use cell phones (Madanda et al. 2009). In these cases, gender-motivated control of the use of ICTs intersects with VAWP where the forcible restriction on access to ICTs impedes the civic or political participation of the women, by limiting their access to information, privacy of choice or, for candidates or aspirants, limiting their ability to be politically visible.

Finally, violence perpetrated through social media benefits from a significant degree of legal and moral impunity. Legally, there is often a fine line between actionable harassment and abuse that cannot be regulated (including online "trolling") (Citron 2014). Non-criminal offenders may feel a certain moral impunity as a result of being distanced from the victim. In social media, the perpetrator may never meet his/her victim in person and never see the impact of his/her acts, thereby dehumanizing the victim. Public figures in particular may be seen as "fair game" for harassing and abusive behavior because of this effect. Likewise, attacks on public figures gather more popular feedback online than private individuals and offenders may develop a sense of moral approbation for their acts based on "likes" and re-shares in the cyber-sphere. Should he/she fear censure, the perpetrator may

choose to remain anonymous, either to his/her immediate community or to general society. A cyber-stalker or other online perpetrators can conceal his/her identity to a degree otherwise impossible in traditional violence, by using different ISPs and/or by adopting different screen names. More sophisticated perpetrators can use anonymous remailers to virtually erase their association as the source of an email or other online communication (Munyua et al. 2010). Since attacks on public figures tend to attract particular scrutiny by law enforcement and media, the ability to perpetrate acts of violence anonymously has strategic value and a particular cost-value for perpetrators of political violence.

The sense of impunity related to social media-based harassment and aggression may also be amplified because these acts lack identifiable leadership. An 'incident' of VAWP on social media is different in nature from a traditional act where the perpetrator is clearly identifiable. Instead, an incident of online violence is a collective phenomenon and may involve dozens or even thousands of 'perpetrators'. Terrifying for the victim, this is also empowering for the authors of violence. Perpetrators may gain confidence and feel social approbation when their messages are shared, re-Tweeted or 'Liked' on the Internet. Without a clear sense of direction or identification, social media users may feel diminished accountability when they promote hurtful messages through their networks.

Women in politics is the difficulty of regulating and punishing attacks. The realm of social media is one of relative legal impunity for the authors of electoral violence against women. Legal protections defining gender-based violence and sexual crimes are lacking or entirely absent in many countries. This gap is compounded by the even greater gap existing in the realm of cybercrime in many states (Madanda et al. 2009). Common protections against ICT-based violence against women may be limited to defending against stalking and harassment through telephone calls and electronic mail (Essof 2009). Only two countries, Mexico and Bolivia, have specific legislation addressing violence against women in elections.<sup>81</sup> Access to justice for women is similarly challenging and, for women who do

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<sup>81</sup> Bolivia's Law against Harassment and Political Violence against Women was passed May 12, 2012. In 2013, the Mexican Senate established a definition of acts that constitute political gender violence.

successfully bring their cases to court, favorable rulings and enforcement of criminal sentences or penalties may prove elusive. Electoral violence perpetrated through social media channels is thus virtually impossible to limit or prosecute.

### **Resisting VAWP through Information and Communication Technologies**

Information and communication technologies are also tools of empowerment for women entering politics and combatting all forms of VAWP, especially social media-based acts of VAWP. In 1995, at the Fourth World Conference on Women, the Beijing Plan of Action called on states as well as media systems and associations and NGOs to increase the participation and access of women to expression and decision-making in and through the media and new technologies of communication. Almost twenty years after Beijing, social media is being used to combat VAWP through three main areas: 1) monitoring and documenting VAWP, 2) educating and awareness-raising and 3) empowerment and advocacy initiatives.

Monitoring and documenting gender-based violence (GBV) is notoriously challenging due to the intimate and often humiliating nature of the violence and fear of retribution. In the case of election-related GBV, these factors are compounded by the lack of awareness of the link between election violence and GBV and the perceived need of women candidates to publically 'save face' by hiding their experience of violence. Yet baseline data on the presence of VAWP is vital to raising the profile of the problem, aiding its victims and identifying appropriate solutions to mitigate and prevent it in the future. ICTs are making major contributions toward overcoming some of these challenges and establishing critical documentation of the problem. Traditional sources of documentation for election monitoring and observation missions (EOMs) have expanded and are now able to more effectively monitor social media traffic thanks to the introduction of low-cost or public-domain software services such as Hootsuite, TweetReach, Klout, Social Mention and many others. As the issue of VAWP becomes more widely recognized and mainstreamed in election observation, these tools will enable EOMs to document incidents of social media-based violence and analyze their trends.

ICTs also facilitate the collection of data on acts of VAWP perpetrated 'offline' (i.e., acts of

physical, psychological and sexual election violence occurring in physical locations). Open-source platforms such as the Carter Center's Election Monitoring platform (ELMO) and the Kenyan-based Ushahidi facilitate monitoring of violence, transmission, analysis and mapping of incidents to enable the identification of patterns, trends, frequencies and hotspots of violence. Crowdsourcing tools collect incidents from the public via SMS, Twitter, Facebook, YouTube, phone calls and email, transmitting to web platforms and visually mapping data using publically-accessible maps such as GoogleMaps. Numerous initiatives exist to geographically map experiences with sexism, crime and violence such as HollaBack, Everyday Sexism, HarassMap. These can be effectively engaged to document VAWP at the community level, during rallies, protests, polling and other collective events.

Most critical of all, victims of violence are increasingly able to report acts of VAWP without fear of physical retribution or public shame, thanks to the anonymity of ICTs (Chaio 2011). As demonstrated in Ushahidi deployments in Egypt and in Syria, where the Ushahidi platform has been used to specifically document GBV (Harassmap), women feel empowered to speak out safely about their experience of violence when they are able to do so quickly (through their cell phones) and anonymously. Users have testified to the sense of empowerment provided by being able to securely yet publically denounce assaults on their dignity (Chaio 2011). For example, Chaio relates various examples during the Tahrir Square protests in Cairo, 2011, where women (and at least one man) were able to send a text message from a private location (such as bathrooms) to report sexually abusive incidents during the protests, away from the view of family members who might otherwise have prevented or sanctioned them, or perpetrators who may have threatened them further. The empowerment effect was noted in at least one case, where the victim identified herself voluntarily to Harassmap and stated she would not have otherwise reported the incident through traditional means, for fear of being shamed.

These empowering aspects of ICTs, combined with the growing recognition the human rights dimension of these forms of violence (Ballington 2016) enable local and international actors to reliably document and denounce gender-differentiated and gender-based political violence to international human rights treaty bodies and other UN



structures. The Commission on the Status of Women (2013) and the UN Working Group on Discrimination Against Women in Law and Public Life (2013) have begun recognizing technology-related forms of VAW. As data becomes more available on the political dimensions of VAW, further action can be taken. One example of this is the Carter Center and the Center for Civil and Political Rights' joint program in Burundi which uses the ELMO platform to collect data on GBV/GBPV and to disaggregate general political violence and human rights data for submission to the CEDAW review process.

Rapid response to mitigate VAWP and early warning to prevent it are both enabled through individual ICTs and powerful mash-ups such as Ushahidi. Social media monitoring software for 'crisis management and prevention' permits rapid identification of abusive posts and Twitter 'trends,' enabling actors to respond quickly to limit the damage. The use of SMS messaging and mobile apps for documenting GBV have improved the accuracy of data, such as USAID's CommCare program and InformaCam. In some cases, these mobile tools also assist victims, by providing referral services via SMS, as with HarassMap. In some countries, Ushahidi has been used to establish an early warning system for election violence. In 2010 in Burundi, a coalition of non-governmental organizations, Amatora Mu Mahoro, analyzed election violence trends reported via Ushahidi for early warning purposes (Bardall 2010b). Likewise, the Women's Situation Room initiative deployed in several sub-Saharan African states in recent years (UN Women) has used incident reports collected via SMS, cell phones and other ICTs to provide rapid response to victims (Bardall 2010a). The use of ICTs in the Situation Rooms empower women to act as stewards of the peace. Through mobilization, mediation and multi-sector coordination, these programs reinforce this key civic role performed by women in many countries.

A final component of research and documentation is the development of online platforms to store and share knowledge on the issue of ICTs and gender violence. GenderIT.org has been the leader in this area and provides an information resource and knowledge-sharing site for gender and ICT advocates, civil society organizations and policy makers, focused on Africa, Asia-Pacific, Central Eastern Europe and Latin America. Associated with the Association for Progressive Communications (Women's Networking Support Programme),

the website promotes issues papers and research exploring the intersection between the internet and violence against women, women's rights, sexuality and sexual rights.<sup>82</sup>

ICTs also promote the prevention and mitigation of VAWP in a second area: awareness-raising. The connection between election violence and gender-based violence is poorly understood. Training for women candidates and aspirants help identify the links and empower women to protect and prepare themselves from attacks by using social media tools to respond effectively. Training programs offered by non-profit organizations like the National Democratic Institute (Borovsky et al. 2010) as well as public resources to orient women aspirants help women to use social media to their advantage, fight against attacks, establish a credible online image to decrease their vulnerability to attacks and enable them to quickly respond and defend themselves in case of attack.

ICTs are being used to educate women about other ICT-based risks in ways that can be adapted to responding to VAWP. The International Knowledge Network of Women in Politics (iKNOW Politics) uses a technology-based forum to offer an interactive and multi-lingual tool that allows members and users to access resources, share expertise and create knowledge through mediated discussion forums and consolidated expert responses to queries. Today, iKnow Politics offers the most publically accessible and extensive collection of resources on the issue of VAWP, including country case studies, news, interviews, academic articles and policy papers. Apart from iKNOW Politics, other examples include specific online courses exist to promote victim safety from ICT-related violence against women (see, for example, Safety Net Canada (SNC)) or offer service providers, anti-violence workers, law enforcement, and members of civil and criminal justice systems information about the use of technology to stalk and harass victims.<sup>83</sup> Awareness-raising also extends to the media itself, where much of the violence is perpetrated. Awareness-raising and professional standards trainings for journalists and media professionals are common

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<sup>82</sup> See [www.genderit.org](http://www.genderit.org)

<sup>83</sup> See: Western Education Learning Network, Center for Research & Education on Violence Against Women & Children. "Online Training to Promote Safety for ICT-Related VAW." [http://www.vawlearningnetwork.ca/sites/learningtoendabuse.ca.vawlearningnetwork/files/Online\\_Training\\_Promote\\_Safety.pdf](http://www.vawlearningnetwork.ca/sites/learningtoendabuse.ca.vawlearningnetwork/files/Online_Training_Promote_Safety.pdf)

features of international electoral assistance programs and could offer opportunities to integrate information about VAWP. Finally, ICTs offer creative opportunities to respond to VAWP, for example through the use of digital storytelling which, by bearing witness to experiences of violence, provides a voice to victims and promotes awareness and action. Digital storytelling has been used to support victims of gender-based violence and to promote awareness worldwide in the past decade, through the work of diverse initiatives<sup>84</sup> as well as through short-form storytelling micro-blogging.<sup>85</sup>

Finally, ICT offer new platforms for advocacy to respond to specific events or in support of individual activists or candidates. ICT advocacy campaigns are especially effective in addressing the cross-cutting issue of VAWP. In particular, non-governmental organizations have been shown to effectively use ICTs to further initiatives, raise awareness, forge networks and exchange information on broad issues of VAW (Hamm 2001). In 2016, NDI launched the #NotTheCost campaign, mobilizing digital advocacy to raise awareness and prevent VAWP. Working in the context of the 16 Days of Activism Against Gender Violence Campaign, the 'Take Back the Tech' campaign seeks to train ICT users in employing activism against violence against women. The campaign draws on an extensive array of ICT and social media tools to empower women at both the personal and broader public levels. These tools include using internet platforms for advocacy, mapping attacks (hacking, blocking, deletion) of the websites of women's rights organizations, sexual rights advocates, feminist activists and bloggers, and user-friendly games to promote safety in social networks. The campaign is active in over 25 countries worldwide. Although the political dimension of VAW is not fully integrated into the campaign, Take Back the Tech is a model for ICT-based advocacy against VAW.

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<sup>84</sup> Silence Speaks, the Saartjie Baartman Centre for Women and Children (South Africa), Sonke Gender Justice Network (South Africa)

<sup>85</sup> see for example #RedMyLips, #YesAllWomen, #OrangeUrHood, and #CarryThatWeight or the #notokay/@KellyOxford Twitter activity in October 2016 around

Just as they are uniquely able to amplify VAWP, ICTs also empower voice and advocacy around VAWP to help resist it. Speaking together with a united voice empowers victims to affirm themselves, overcome shame and fear and resist the damaging impacts of these acts that seek to silence or coerce their political expression. Awareness and documentary evidence, coupled with personal empowerment are essential to raising the profile of VAWP and reducing it by confronting patriarchal norms and pushing cultural barriers that allow it to occur. Nonetheless, notable limits exist to ICTs ability to respond to VAWP. Monitoring and mapping all forms of VAW is notoriously challenging and measuring the impact of online attacks requires innovations in research methodology. Awareness raising and empowerment are only possible where ICT penetration and culture is sufficiently deep. ICT-based solutions to resisting VAWP are only complements to legal and institutional measures to prevent and punish VAWP.

## **Conclusion**

Information and communication technologies have had a profound impact on the reach and shape of violence against women in elections and politics, creating new threats and obstacles to achieving gender equality in political life. One of the greatest advantages to date has been the use of ICTs to collect and document incidents of GBEV/GBPv, thereby recognizing the existence of the problem and establishing baselines for progress. These innovations must come a long way yet to catch up to the threats posed by social media-based violence against women in elections. To do so, it is necessary to address the underlying dangers presented by social media – specifically, psychological forms of violence designed to attack women’s dignity, morality and self-worth. Both gender and political-rights advocates and practitioners seeking to prevent and mitigate this unique form of violence will gain by integrating the best practices from their mutual fields.

## Chapter 5.

# Temporary Special Measures in Single-Member District Electoral Systems<sup>86</sup>

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*Gender quotas in electoral systems that use single member districts are “less clear” (Krook and Norris, 2011), frequently “non-favourable” (Larserud and Taphorn, 2007), “more challenging” (Hoodfar and Tajali, 2011), or generally complicated or ineffective. This conventional wisdom on gender quotas in single-member districts (SMDs)<sup>87</sup> has influenced*

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<sup>86</sup> Co-authored with Skye Christensen (UNDP-Pakistan). Chapter 5 appeared in Christensen, Skye. and Bardall, G. (2015) Gender quotas in single-member district electoral systems *Politics, Groups, and Identities* 4(2) 246-267.

<sup>87</sup> District magnitude refers to the number of representatives elected from a given district to the same legislative body. SMD systems are composed of electoral districts or constituencies that elect a single representative to a legislative body rather than two or more. Multi-member districts (MMDs) systems are composed of electoral districts that send two or more members to a legislative chamber. SMDs are associated with majority/plurality voting systems while MMDs are generally associated with proportional

thought and policy for over a decade. Fortunately, this well-established assumption is incorrect. There are several effective ways to apply quotas in single-member district systems, as demonstrated by a growing number of experiences from countries around the world.

Given the importance of achieving gender balance in politics and the international commitments which 188 countries have made,<sup>88</sup> the option of “fast tracking” gender equality via quotas (also known as temporary special measures, TSMs) is of pertinence as a policy solution in many countries. Lawmakers and advocates must consider what type of quota package should be adopted and what the target representation should be (33 percent? 50 percent?). Despite the relative ease of implementing gender quotas in proportional representation (PR) systems, changes of electoral systems between PR and SMD are highly infrequent. Academic evidence about the benefits of PR is of little help when faced with the political reality of immutable electoral systems. To meet gender equality goals in this area, countries with SMD-based electoral systems must find viable ways of increasing women’s participation within the parameters of existing systems.

The challenge of SMDs is no peripheral matter; over four-billion people live in countries employing SMDs to elect national parliaments. This includes 64 countries (53 percent of people living in countries with elected national parliaments) that use single-member districts as the means to elect their parliaments. The SMD tally includes large populous countries such as the US, India, as well as much of the commonwealth. An additional 39 countries use a combination of SMDs and MMDs (21 percent of global voters.) By comparison, multi-member district systems such as PR cover 83 countries but only 26 percent of the relevant population.

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representation based systems. The Authors note that constituency is a more specific term than district since district is often a territorial administrative unit rather than an electoral area, but we will use district in this paper for consistency with previous work..

<sup>88</sup> At time of writing, 188 states have acceded to or ratified the UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW). Article 4.1 of CEDAW provides the international normative framework for the temporary use of special measures such as quotas to achieve de facto gender equality.

**Figure 11: Extent of single-member districts to elect national parliaments<sup>89</sup>**

| District Type             | Population     |             | Countries  |             |
|---------------------------|----------------|-------------|------------|-------------|
| <b>Single Member</b>      | 3,044 m        | 53.28%      | 64         | 34.41%      |
| <b>Multi-Member</b>       | 1,493 m        | 26.14%      | 83         | 44.62%      |
| <b>Both SMD &amp; MMD</b> | 1,175 m        | 20.57%      | 39         | 20.97%      |
| <b>Total</b>              | <b>5,714 m</b> | <b>100%</b> | <b>186</b> | <b>100%</b> |

The academic and practitioner communities alike remain constrained by stereotypes on this issue. Building on research suggesting that PR systems are more favorable for women and minority representation, international expert advisors frequently assert that PR systems are more compatible with quotas.<sup>90</sup> That narrative, coupled with the prejudice that single member districts are unfit for quotas, is regularly repeated in contemporary research. “In general,” the most current EU Report on gender quotas argues, “it is much more complicated to construct gender quotas that are appropriate for single-member constituency electoral systems” (Dahlerup and Freidenvall, 2011). Observer organizations have weighed in with similar advice on the matter. The Carter Center explained the dramatically declining participation of women in Sierra Leone’s elections as a result of the difficulty of applying a gender quota to Sierra Leone’s single member district system. “The Center noted that women’s quotas are found most often in proportional representation systems and are harder to implement in ‘first-past-the-post’ systems” (Carter Center, 2012).

Despite these arguments, successful examples of quotas in SMDs continue to proliferate around the world, including the nomination quotas used in France and Uzbekistan, the rotating districts applied to local government in India, the women’s ‘super-districts’ used in Uganda and emerging approaches to alternate thresholds or “best loser” systems. Each of these systems has its advantages and drawbacks, as do the quotas used in PR Systems. A

<sup>89</sup> Original dataset

<sup>90</sup> Based on authors’ experience.

review of these cases reveals that quotas in SMDs are no more complicated or less effective than quotas used in PR.

The concern that quota systems in SMDs are ‘complicated’ fails to reflect the reality that electoral systems in general tend to be complicated. Many countries opt for hybrid mixes of proportional and plurality systems, include special tiers and reservations for minorities, preferential voting, thresholds, or numerous other ‘complications.’ The German system of mixed member proportional and the preferential systems used in Ireland and Australia are both complicated for many voters to understand (for example, see OSCE/ODIHR 2007 and OSCE/ODIHR 2013). Simplicity is a valuable normative criterion but it probably not the most important one. Though quotas add complexity to any electoral system, the cases in this paper illustrate that quota designs in SMDs need not be excessively burdensome.

The present paper does not contest the advantages of list-based PR systems that have indeed tended to favor representation of women and minorities (Reynolds 2008, Norris 2003, Norris and Krook 2006). Instead, we investigate how TSMs can be effectively implemented under SMD-based systems without compromising the efficiency or benefits of the system.

Our research examines and presents multiple ways in which quotas can be successfully implemented in SMDs. We review nomination quotas and four types of reserved seats: rotating districts, super-districts, PR Tiers and alternate thresholds (“best losers”). Drawing on examples from Asia, Europe, and Africa, we refute the myth of the incompatibility of quotas and SMDs. We argue that it is essential to look for solutions in these contexts, given the widespread use of majority-based electoral systems.

By providing research and analysis on quotas in SMDs, we also seek to contribute to enhanced policy options. The failure of the current literature to adequately consider quotas in SMDs often results in policy recommendations that are exclusively relevant to proportional list systems (in some cases, without categorizing them as such).<sup>91</sup>

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<sup>91</sup> See for example [quotaproject.org](http://quotaproject.org) a comprehensive resource on quotas around the world. On the issue of nominations, the site underlines that rank order rules are the critical issue, even though such rules



Recommendations that are inappropriate to the systems in use can be misleading and counterproductive for practitioners and advocates working in this area.

Lastly, the established explanations for the advantage of PR systems also merit re-visiting in light of the evolving body of practice in enhancing women's representation in SMDs. We hope that this paper contributes to that evaluation.

### **Origins of the SMD –Quota Incompatibility Myth**

Misperceptions regarding the application of TSMs in SMDs are based on three factors. The first two reasons reflect the comparative performance of proportional systems, on one hand, and a handful of highly visible cases where TSMs have been poorly applied in SMDs, on the other. The third reason is based on the experience with the first two: namely, that the activists driving quota legislation forward have focused heavily on multi-member district (MMD) solutions because of a failure in the literature to provide a basis of understanding for other options.

#### ***Benefits of Multi-Member Districts***


Structural elements of electoral systems, such as “whether the system is proportional or majoritarian, how many members are elected from each district, whether there is an imposed threshold for representation, whether voters can choose between candidates as well as parties” (Reynolds 2006, p 3), have been recognized as influential factors affecting women's representation in the literature for over three decades. The most significant factor affecting levels of women's representation is generally considered to be the difference between party-list proportional systems and systems employing single-member districts (Duverger 1955; Lakeman 1970; Castles 1981; Rule 1981; 1987; Norris 1985; 1987). The gap has been documented statistically over time and across regions. Using a within-case analysis, Lancaster and Davis (Matland in Studlar, 1992) documented the difference in Germany's mixed system where multi-member district lists resulted in twice the number of women elected than in the SMDs. In 1993, western democracies with List PR systems

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are only relevant to list PR and are irrelevant in most electoral systems, including all single member district systems.

averaged 20 percent women elected to parliament while countries with SMDs achieved less than half this success, with only 9 percent women (Matland and Studlar 1996). Twenty years later the gap has shrunk significantly in developed countries, with proportional systems in electing almost 30 percent women to parliament and majority-based systems electing almost 24 percent.<sup>92</sup> However single member districts continue to lag behind MMDs and mixed systems in global statistics. Outside of the developed countries, PR systems still elect almost twice the number of women as majority systems.<sup>93</sup>

**Figure 12. Women in Parliament by Region and Electoral System<sup>94</sup>**



The distinction between the systems is attributed to the effect of PR systems on party nomination procedures. There are several factors in play here. Where only one seat is contested, party nominations often converge around the candidates perceived to be most broadly acceptable to their constituency, often resulting in slates of male-only candidates. As the number of seats per district (district magnitude) increases, these pressures ease. Each additional seat available represents an opportunity for parties to attract votes from constituencies beyond their core; hence they are more likely to seek out a more diverse slate of candidates, including women. Likewise, within-party competition for nominations is lessened and women face a lower threshold to cross in seeking their party's nomination (Engstrom 1987; Rule 1987; Matland 1993). Party list systems also tend to have more

<sup>92</sup> Calculated from Parline.

<sup>93</sup> Women currently represent 13% of MPs in non-developed countries with majority systems and 23% in countries with PR systems. This number includes both countries with and without quotas. (IPU - Parline)

<sup>94</sup> *ibid*

centralized nomination procedures (Castles 1981; Gallagher and Marsh 1988), which, it is argued, better enable them to respond to political pressures to increase women's representation (Norris 1993).

The list of benefits of PR systems continues beyond these party nomination considerations. By voting for lists rather than individuals, PR systems shift emphasis away from individual candidates in favor of parties. If individual male candidates are better-established than women, a focus on party rather than candidate can benefit women. Furthermore, the higher levels of MP turnover associated with PR systems offer more opportunity for newcomers, such as women (Matland and Studlar 1995). Inter-party contagion is also considered to be more probable in multi-member districts such that parties compete to be more representative in their lists (Matland and Studlar 1995).

### **Early Setbacks with TSMs in SMDs: The Case of PR-Tier Quotas**

To date, 20 countries that use either SMD-based electoral systems or mixed electoral systems employ a TSM to improve women's representation in their national elected bodies. Sixteen of them use TSMs in exclusively SMD-based systems. Despite the fact that the quota levels are generally set at lower levels than in MMDs, current data indicates that the impact (women in parliament) is similar (24.7 percent SMDs to 24.5 percent MMDs).<sup>95</sup> The assured impact of reserved seats with SMDs largely explains the better performance in terms of impact as a function of quota stipulation.

Yet this success often recedes in the shadow of highly publicized disappointments with quotas in SMD systems. Two cases, Pakistan and Tanzania were early adopters of a PR-Tier approach to quotas in their SMD systems. Under a PR-Tier approach, a tier of reserved seats is simply grafted to the existing FPTP system and filled through indirect elections. In this model, elections for general seats are held under FPTP, and each party submits a women-only candidate list for the reserved seats. Once the FPTP seats are allocated, the

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<sup>95</sup> Based on original dataset. Average excludes countries who have not yet held elections under their legal TSM systems (Eritrea, Samoa, South Sudan) or who do not have implementation mechanisms for their TSMs (Panama, Republic of Congo, Democratic Republic of Congo, Haiti).

party or seat-shares from the FPTP election determine how many of the reserved women seats each party will then occupy.

In Pakistan's first five decades, the law reserved a small number of seats for women which fluctuated, but never exceeded 10 percent. These reserved seats were filled initially by indirect votes, and then subsequently through a partly list as described above. This era of quotas ended in 1998 when the quotas expired and the numbers of elected women subsequently collapsed. Following the expiration of these temporary measures, women's rights leaders advocated a quota to be set at one-third of all seats from local government to parliament. The advocates preferred that the reserved seats be directly-elected using either a rotation system (similar to the Indian Panchayat, see below), or via super-districts (discussed in the Uganda case). Despite these demands, the system ultimately adopted (still in place today) reserves 19 percent of parliamentary seats to be indirectly elected from women's lists in accordance with party seat share in the national polls. Few women stand or are elected in unreserved seats. At the local level, reserved seats for women are directly elected in all but one province and the proportions vary dramatically by province and type of local body.<sup>96</sup>

The quota applied in Tanzania uses almost the same system. A 1995 law reserved fifteen percent of seats in parliament for women allocated through a similar formula as that used in Pakistan (where women are elected according to the proportion of total seats the party receives). Subsequent reforms to the constitution prior to the 2005 elections increased the percentage to 30 percent and changed the allocation so that it is based on the number of votes a party receives.

Although Pakistan and Tanzania have seen statistical progress in women's representation since the introduction of these systems (21 percent and 36 percent respectively), the approaches have been rightly criticized for making the reserved seats accountable only to party leaders, not to voters. The systems have diminished the political efficacy of the women elected and resulted in a "ghetto-ization" of women candidates. The criticisms are

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<sup>96</sup> As per draft legal frameworks (UNDP Pakistan 2013)

fair: without the legitimacy of winning an election or the political capital of a constituency base, the women occupying these seats may be at a disadvantage against directly-elected members.

This approach has also been criticized in terms of party-political representation. As the distribution of the quota seats is based on seats won rather than votes garnered, the quota may exaggerate disproportionate results of first-past-the-post by allocating additional seats to the larger parties at the expense of small parties and independents. In the most recent general elections in Pakistan, the quota accounted for about 9 percent of the total disproportionality.<sup>97</sup>

These cases have been extensively documented and contribute to a less-favorable analysis of TSMs in SMDs, especially in contrast to simultaneous innovations in closed-list proportional districts.

### **Knowledge Diffusion and International Norms**

The advantages of SMDs and the opportunities for implementing TSMs in SMD-based systems have been largely overlooked because of the way in which quota reform movements come about. Krook (2006) identifies four basic causal theories explaining quota adoption in the literature, namely that “[w]omen mobilize for quotas to increase women’s representation, political elites recognize strategic advantages for supporting quotas, quotas are consistent with existing or emerging notions of equality and representation, and quotas are supported by international norms and spread through transnational sharing.” In each of these approaches, the inadequate knowledge of solutions for SMDs systematically contributes to reinforcing the gap.

In cases where the introduction of quotas is driven by activist mobilization, the effectiveness of advocacy is at least partially based on the ability of advocates to clearly articulate how the quotas would work and point to examples where they have done so in the past. A mobilization effort without a clear understanding of the roadmap is unlikely to

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<sup>97</sup> Computed using Loosemore and Hanby index of disproportionality. (1971: 467-77)

succeed. Regrettably, this is too often the case in the field where advocates and lawmakers have been let down by a literature which does acknowledge the reality of immutable electoral systems and fails to offer practical solutions to TSMs in SMDs.

The same can be said for Krook's three other factors. Conventional wisdom that quotas are inappropriate for SMDs system could affect the calculus of political elites attempting to promote quotas for political benefits. Even where "quotas are consistent with existing or emerging notions of equality and representation", the perception that quotas are inferior in SMDs can block this method of reform. The emergence of quotas through international norms and transnational sharing is likewise vulnerable when the very international organizations that promote quotas and facilitate international exchanges themselves have little "best practice" to rely on in single member district systems.

In sum, these factors – the effectiveness of closed PR lists and the shortcomings of some of the earliest national-level quotas in SMDs - form the basis for the diverging assessment between multi and single member districts systems in terms of women's representation, and help to explain the strong preference for PR in the gender equality literature. Due to this literature, the benefits of SMDs to women's participation have often been overlooked by national and international actors who most commonly advocate reform, largely due to a lack of information on options and solutions for TSMs in SMDs. We seek to fill this gap in the following pages by exploring methods for applying TSMs in SMDs.

### **Windows of Opportunity in SMDs**

The apparent superiority of PR systems and early setbacks of TSMs in SMDs such as Pakistan and Tanzania have given rise to a focus on electoral system solutions for women's political participation. The emphasis on electoral system solutions to women's representation arose because electoral systems are frequently viewed as a window of opportunity in contexts characterized by other, steeper entry barriers for women's political participation such as the cultural status of women in society or a country's development levels. In light of the challenge of such obstacles, electoral systems often seem more readily accessible policy entry points.

In reality, electoral system reform is not a policy option in most countries considering introducing a TSM. While electoral systems are more approachable entry points than long-standing cultural norms, political reality renders electoral systems 'sticky' and wholesale change is infrequent. Boix (1999) finds that electoral systems only change when there is a deep political challenge due to new votes or a dramatic change in voter preferences. There are often deeply vested interests in any given electoral system, and when change does occur, it is frequently driven by party interest and ideational change rather than by motives of increased gender equality in representation (Pilet 2007; Blais 2008).<sup>98</sup>

Electoral system solutions for women's representation also tend to overlook the fact that electoral systems reflect a number of socio-political trade-offs of which gender equality is only one objective among many (albeit a critically important one). For example, while PR (specifically closed-list PR) has many advantages, there is also value in the voter-choice aspects of open-lists, the comprehensive geographical representation ensured by single member districts, or the effective accommodation of localized political power in single non-transferable vote (SNTV).<sup>99</sup> These other factors are regularly considered in decisions about electoral system choice and may understandably trump gender considerations. Furthermore, advocating change based on a single-issue, such as gender, may increase the probability of contestation and backlash (see Nanivadekar 2006, Tamale 2004, Dahlerup 2006 on backlash to quotas).

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<sup>98</sup> The exception to this rule is the post-conflict environment. The Sudan Comprehensive Peace Agreement, for instance, saw the division of South Sudan from Sudan and the electoral systems in both states change from First Past the Post to triple-tier parallel systems with significant reservations for women. In such cases the process of political change is quite different from the stable systems that Boix studied and gender-equality advocates, the international community, and civil society actors can encourage consideration of gender issues in electoral system design.

(<http://repositori.upf.edu/bitstream/handle/10230/506/812.pdf?sequence=1>) The United Nations for instance has published policy highlighting the potential for PR to fast-track gender equality in political representation.

([http://www.un.org/wcm/webdav/site/undpa/shared/undpa/pdf/women\\_electoral\\_guidelines.pdf](http://www.un.org/wcm/webdav/site/undpa/shared/undpa/pdf/women_electoral_guidelines.pdf)) it should be noted that the UN does not promote any electoral system see for instance [http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view\\_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/68/164](http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/68/164)

<sup>99</sup> "Under SNTV, each voter casts one vote for a candidate but (unlike FPTP) there is more than one seat to be filled in each electoral district. Those candidates with the highest vote totals fill these positions." ACEproject.

It is important to recognize that SMD systems have specific, structural benefits in given contexts that may outweigh the structural benefits that PR systems offer to enhance women's political participation. These are commonly overlooked. Firstly, SMD-based systems are, in general, amongst the easiest systems to understand and implement. Though complexity is not necessarily a disadvantage, ease of understanding and the ability to produce results quickly with minimum calculation is an important factor in some contexts. This is doubly true in countries where there is a history of using these systems.

Also, plurality systems have long been associated with certain positive political incentives such as favoring centrist 'big tent' parties at the expense of extreme parties (Norris, 2004). This is not only politically desirable in many contexts, but may also impact women's empowerment by reducing the seat-share of parties on the political-right, which are more prone to promote patriarchal social agendas. In Canada, for example, this characteristic of SMD system "bridge[s] the regional, linguistic, and racial gaps with policies, leaders, and candidates that appeal to as wide a cross-section of voters as possible..." allowing the country to "accommodate social difference through FPTP" (Elections Canada). Recent evidence suggests that, contrary to previous assumption, non-PR systems allow the same level of congruence between citizens and governments as in PR systems (see Blais and Bodet 2006; Golder and Stramski 2010).

A third and equally important benefit of SMD-based systems for women's representation is the reduced need for coalitions. Disproportionality in SMD-based systems helps to create manufactured majorities and reduces the need for coalition governments in parliamentary systems (Norris, 2004). In coalitions, women are frequently passed-up for electable list-positions and key ministerial posts as male party leaders jostle for position, thus fewer coalitions may actually be better for women, especially at the highest levels of politics (Reynolds, 1999).

In addition to these three primary areas, SMD systems possess other structural benefits to enhancing women's political participation. SMDs tend to be more stable and representatives may have longer terms of office. Although higher turnover can imply more opportunities for newcomer women, it may also be argued that greater stability allows



representatives more time to gain political experience and build their legislative record among constituents. The clear geographical lines of accountability in SMD systems connect the voter to their representative much more strongly than PR systems. This favors candidates with strong connections to their local communities and therefore benefits women who often begin their political career in local offices.

Thus we argue that it is important to study TSMs in SMDs because electoral systems are often immutable – legislators, women’s advocates and policy advisors must work with what they have. Although PR systems offer benefits, SMD systems also have many advantages, some of which positively contribute to enhancing women’s political participation.

### **Implementing Quotas in SMDs**

Based on this overview of the structural benefits of SMDs, we now turn to examine the practical options for implementing quotas in SMDs. The world of quotas are generally broken in nomination quotas (or input quotas) and reserved seats (output quotas). Nomination quotas set limits on who can be nominated for certain seats (for instance by setting a specific threshold for women or minority candidates), while reserved seats specify certain mandates for these categories of candidates. At present, there are six main families of approaches to introducing TSMs in SMDs (see Figure 24), based on both nomination quotas and reserved seats. Almost all the options perform at or near the same levels as averages in PR-List systems, when used in countries where they are effectively applied.

Among the nomination quotas, systems may either require a minimum percent of each sex among candidates for SMD races or they may create a separate ballot based on a proportional system. The first option is applied in pure SMD systems and the second creates a mixed system with both SMD seats and PR seats. Approaches that employ mixed systems by creating one or several separate PR constituencies to meet quota requirements are popular but not addressed here because they employ PR to fill their quotas.

Options for reserved seats are more varied. As discussed above, PR-Tier systems indirectly elect women candidates based on results in direct elections held under SMD races. While effective in raising the numbers of women in office, the PR-Tier system is criticized for marginalizing and undermining the legitimacy of the women elected under the system. A handful of other models fill quota seats through indirect or non-electoral means, violating the principle that citizens shall directly elect the representatives in a legislature, and are not addressed here for that reason. Specifically, these include filling reserved seat quotas through indirect elections, either through a PR-Tier system or party voting (for example, Bangladesh).

Outside of these marginal or controversial approaches, three other options emerge as viable options: super districts, rotating districts and alternate thresholds/best losers. The following pages explore the four primary options for implementing TSMs in pure SMD systems: nomination quotas in SMDs, super districts, rotating districts and alternate thresholds.

**Figure 13. Quotas in Systems with Single-Member Districts**

(country - % women in parliament)

| <i>Reserved Seat Quotas</i>                              |     |                  |     |                            |     |                           |     | <i>Nomination Quotas (SMDs)   </i>  |     |
|--|-----|------------------|-----|----------------------------|-----|---------------------------|-----|-------------------------------------|-----|
| <b>Super Districts</b>                                   |     | <b>PR – Tier</b> |     | <b>Alternate Threshold</b> |     | <b>Rotating Districts</b> |     |                                     |     |
| Eritrea*   | 22% | Bangladesh       | 20% | Jordan                     | 12% | India §                   | N/A | France                              | 26% |
| Kenya  | 19% | Mauritania¶      | 25% | Samoa*                     | 4%  |                           |     | Uzbekistan                          | 22% |
| Uganda   | 35% | Pakistan         | 21% |                            |     |                           |     | <b>...as part of a mixed system</b> |     |
|  |     | Swaziland †      | 6%  |                            |     |                           |     | Bolivia                             | 25% |
|  |     | Tanzania         | 36% |                            |     |                           |     | Mexico                              | 37% |
|  |     | Zimbabwe         | 31% |                            |     |                           |     | Mongolia                            | 15% |
|  |     |                  |     |                            |     |                           |     | Nepal                               | 30% |
|  |     |                  |     |                            |     |                           |     | Panama!‡                            | 8%  |
|  |     |                  |     |                            |     |                           |     | Republic of Korea                   | 16% |
|  |     |                  |     |                            |     |                           |     | Senegal                             | 43% |
| <b>Average Women in Parliament (applied quotas only)</b> |     |                  |     |                            |     |                           |     |                                     |     |
| 25%  |     | 23%              |     | 8%                         |     | n/a                       |     | 25%                                 |     |

\* These quotas have not yet been applied: in Eritrea parliamentary elections have been postponed since 2001; the Samoa quota will be applied for the first time in 2016.

† Quotas in Swaziland have not been fully implemented.

‡ In Panama, the nomination applies only to internal party elections, not candidate slates.

§ India's quota applies only to local government and is not included in national averages here.

|| Includes countries that only use SMDs (France, Uzbekistan) as well as mixed systems that apply quotas in their SMDs races (in addition to their PR races)

¶ Mauritania uses two quotas; a PR-tier which applies nationally and a nomination quota which applies to a sub-set of constituencies

## Nomination to SMDs

Nomination quotas are the most common form of TSM in majority systems, however they are most frequently employed in systems that use both PR and majority. France and Uzbekistan are the only two countries in the world to use nomination quotas in purely SMD systems. Six other countries use nomination quotas in the SMD component of their mixed system.<sup>100</sup> SMD nomination quotas have the broadest geographic representation (two Latin American/Caribbean countries, two each from the East and Southeast Asia (ESEA) region and sub-Saharan Africa, and one each from southern Asia and the Central and Eastern Europe-Central Asia (CEECA) region). As of December 2013, the average percent of women elected to parliament under systems using nomination quotas in SMDs was 25 percent.

**Figure 14. Performance of Nomination Quotas in SMDs**

|                       | Quota Stipulation | Sanction for Non-Compliance <sup>101</sup> | Women in Parliament |
|-----------------------|-------------------|--|---------------------|
| France*               | 50 percent        | Financial                                  | 26%                 |
| Uzbekistan            | 33%               | None                                       | 22%                 |
| <b>Mixed Systems*</b> |                   |  |                     |
| Bolivia               | 50%               | List rejection                             | 25%                 |
| Mexico                | 40%               | List rejection                             | 37%                 |
| Mongolia              | 20%               | List rejection                             | 15%                 |
| Nepal                 | 33%               | List rejection                             | 30%                 |
| Republic of Korea     | 30%               | List rejection                             | 16%                 |
| Senegal               | 50%               | List rejection                             | 43%                 |

\* *mixed systems that apply quotas to their SMDs. Note, the PR quota in Korea is 50%.*

Nomination quotas regulate the gender balance of nominated candidates representing a certain group, or party. In most cases the quota is a minimum threshold with sanctions for non-compliant groups or an unenforced target.

The objective of nomination quotas is to ensure that female candidates are on the ballot and “nominated in an electoral district in such a way as to give them equal—or close to equal—opportunities to be elected to the legislative body” (Larsrud and Taphorn, 2007, p

<sup>100</sup> Numerous other countries that use mixed electoral systems also employ nomination quotas, but only use them in their PR component. For this reason, these cases are not covered in this text.

<sup>101</sup> As per [quotaproject.org](http://quotaproject.org)

8). The quotas themselves create legal necessity or incentive structures that induce those who control ballot access (party leaders) to seek-out women candidates to stand for their parties. Nomination quotas normally do not ensure that women are elected, only that they are on the ballot.

The case of the French National Assembly is the sole instance of a nomination quota system with a sanction for noncompliance in a pure SMD system on a national scale. Progress towards gender equality in French political participation has been halting at best. It wasn't until 1944 that French women received the right to vote, nearly a century after their male compatriots. By the mid-1990s women represented just 6 percent of the seats in the National Assembly, lagging well behind the United States and most of Europe (IPU).

Candidate nomination quotas, implemented without wide-scale change to the electoral system, and the shift in power towards the Socialists in the last general election, have increased the number of women to nearly 27 percent. France has now become a notable example of the effectiveness of nomination quotas in single member district systems.


The National Assembly is elected from some 557 single-member constituencies, using a SMD two-round system. If no candidate wins an outright majority, then a second round of election is held with all candidates that achieved at least the 12.5 percent threshold of registered voters. The candidate with the most votes in the second round wins the mandate regardless of whether s/he takes the majority (50 percent plus).

This system has historically underperformed dramatically in terms of gender representation. Parties tended to nominate men with the exception of some marginal small parties. The Socialist party, the only significant large party with internal quotas, often flaunted its own target of 30 percent (increased to 50 percent in 2007) (Opello, 2006).

The 2000 parity law was a simple innovation to incentivize parties to nominate equal numbers of men and women. Today, parties which do not present 50 percent of their candidates from each sex are sanctioned through a proportional deduction. According to French Law *n° 88-227 du 11 mars 1988 relative à la transparence financière de la vie politique*, as modified by *article 9-1 of LOI n°2009-526 du 12 mai 2009 - art. 80*, this

deduction is three-quarters of the difference between the sexes in their public funding allotment. In 2014, the financial penalty was raised again to 150 percent of the gender gap. Corresponding quotas have also been adopted at the sub-national level, including nomination quotas for PR-elected bodies. The electoral system for district councillors was changed to a two-round party-block vote with the stipulation that candidates are to be nominated in gender-balanced pairs. The system will be applied for the first time in 2015. The impact of the parity law on nomination was significant, but the number of women elected has increased more gradually. The percentage of women candidates, which was less than a quarter in 1997 before the law, reached 38.9 percent in 2002, 41.6 percent in 2007, and dipped to 40 percent in 2012 (OSCE EOM 2012). The percentage of women among elected deputies was 10.9 percent in 1997, stagnated at 12.3 percent in 2002, reaching 18.5 percent in 2007, and finally 26.9 percent in 2012 (IPU Women in Parliament).

**Figure 15. Gender Balance in French National Assembly**



Maintaining this rate of convergence going forward is not certain, since the number of women elected depends significantly on party positions. The centre-right has tended to nominate fewer women and in less winnable positions than does the centre-left (Sineau 2008). The 2012 elections marked a strong performance of the centre-left, which had the effect of increasing the number of women elected.


Party compliance with the law has been mixed, improving with time. In early elections some of the largest parties opted to forgo public financing rather than field a gender-balanced slate of candidates. In 2002 the sanctions were 4m Euros for the UMP, and 1.3m for the Socialist Party (Sineau 2008). One of the main reasons for non-compliance has been incumbency - the largest parties have the greatest number of male incumbents who would have to be unseated and replaced by relative novices to comply with the quota, potentially leaving the party vulnerable in those seats (Sineau 2008). In subsequent elections the parties have increased the number of women nominated. The decade between 1997 and 2007 for instance, saw the centre-right UMP/RPR party increase its percentage of female candidates from 7.7 to 26.6 (more than a 300 percent increase). Parties on the left are approaching parity in their nominations, which represents a 100 percent increase over the same period.

There remain two notable gaps in the French quota system. The first is the gap between the nomination target (50 percent) and the actual nomination (40 percent in the most recent general elections). It remains to be seen to what extent this gap will be reduced over time, but generally, the quota has been quite successful in increasing the number of women elected. As the law continues to be examined and refined, larger sanctions or advocacy from within the parties may close this gap further.

The second gap is the electoral success of nominated women. The quota's initial impact was to increase the number of women nominated but not significantly increase the number of women elected. This drove down the average success of women candidates (many stood, few were elected). This is less the fault of the French voter than the fault of the parties and the structural reality of incumbency. What is most impressive about this case, and why it may stand as a model for others, has been the longer-term increase in women elected. Over time, the dynamics have changed and the success rate of women candidates (computed here as the percentage nominated over the percentage elected) is improving with each post-quota election. In the past, French parties may have systematically nominated women in less winnable constituencies than male candidates, but over time more and more women are being elected. This implies that parties have become better at recruiting and nominating women candidates, and/or that women aspirants have become

better at securing nomination in winnable constituencies. By ensuring that women are on the ballot and in the campaign through effective incentive structures this quota system is on track to achieving gender parity.

**Figure 16. Success of Women Candidates (France)** <sup>102</sup>



Does the French case illustrate a successful model of nomination quotas in SMDs? The delayed impact of the quota meant that the initial literature has tended to cast the law as at least a partial, if not complete failure (Murray 2012). Criticisms focused on the design of the law and some have recommended a replacement of the electoral system with proportional representation (Dahlerup, and Freidenvall 2006). Our analysis of the convergence over time between the targets set for nomination, and the success of female candidates leads us to believe that history will look more kindly on the French model. The quota has significantly increased the number of women nominated and elected without significant change to the electoral system or without the ‘undemocratic’ elements of other potential quota options. While it hasn’t seen the dramatic increases in representation to Rwanda-style levels, the increases have been gradual and consistent.

Uzbekistan was the first country in Central Asia to adopt a gender quota in the post-Soviet era and, with France, is the only other country in the world to adopt a candidate quota in a

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<sup>102</sup> Chart Data compiled from OSCE and Sineau (2008)



purely single-member district system. Uzbekistan has a bi-cameral parliament, comprised of a 100-member Senate and a 150-member lower chamber, both with five-year terms. 135 members of the lower chamber are directly elected from single-member, majoritarian constituencies and an additional 15 seats are reserved for representatives of the Ecological Movement of Uzbekistan (EMU). The upper chamber is indirectly elected by regional councils (84 seats) and by presidential appointment (16 seats).


Like many other post-Soviet states, women's representation in the Uzbek parliament was low (7 percent in 1999 and 17 percent in 2005) in the electoral cycles following the transition from communism. To address the under-representation, Uzbekistan introduced a minimum 30 percent candidate quota for the Oliy Majlis (upper and lower houses of parliament) and to kengashes (councils) of people's deputies in 2003.<sup>103</sup> The law was passed following the signature of CEDAW (1995) and lobbying pressure from Uzbek women's organizations (Saidazimova 2004). Thus, the electoral system includes a reserved seat quota for the EMU seats and a candidate quota for women.

The number of women in political parties increased since the quota system was adopted (women represented 37-50 percent of political party members according to 2010 data), however there does not appear to be a correlation between women as party members and the number of female members elected to Parliament (ADB 2014). Although the year the quota was introduced saw a notable gain in women elected to parliament (22 percent elected), numbers fell below pre-quota levels in the most recent elections (16 percent in 2013-14). In real terms, because the size of the lower house of parliament was reduced from 250 to 120 (subsequently increased to 150) in 2002, there has been little change in the number of women elected before and after the quota.

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<sup>103</sup> The Law "On elections to the Oliy Majlis of the Republic of Uzbekistan" as amended up to 2014

**Figure 17. Gender Balance in Oliy Majlis (Uzbekistan)**



Unlike France, there has never been a gap between the nomination target and the actual nomination levels under the Uzbek gender quota. Indeed, nomination rates have met or exceeded the 30 percent quota since the law was introduced, despite the absence of enforcement measures. This may be attributed to the tightly controlled political space and atypical nature of Uzbek political parties. Uzbekistan is pursuing a ‘step-by-step’ incremental transition to democracy. Rather than representing policy opposition to the government, the four recognized political parties were created to represent segments of society and are complimentary, not competitive (OSCE 2009). All of the parties have women’s wings to prepare women candidates, recruit new female supporters and to reach out to female voters, however none of the major political parties’ platforms advocate gender equality or take a position on women’s rights (OSCE-ODHIR 2009, 2014; ADB 2014). Candidates must be nominated by one of the four recognized political parties in order to run; independent candidates cannot contest parliamentary elections.

Assessment of Uzbekistan’s candidate quota is qualified by the closed political context. One cannot evaluate the effectiveness of the quota in transforming political parties by providing them with incentives to increase women’s participation because political parties are essentially non-competitive and aligned with government policy. However, the quota holds promise for three principle reasons.

Firstly, the quota protects against downward trends in women's participation in post-communist Central Asian countries. This trend is attributed to various causes including the phasing-out of the politically active generation of Communist-era women and a resurgence of state-promoted traditional values (Rakhimova 2015). In such a case, the gradual impact of the Uzbek quota may be partially linked to the political context: while France's quota was implemented in the dynamics of rapidly liberalizing European gender-equality norms, Uzbekistan's law is combatting downward trends in this area.

Secondly, as the French example demonstrates, candidate quotas may be slower to achieve results than other quota options. Uzbekistan's quota is relatively recent and only three elections have been held with the quota law in place. Like France, Uzbekistan is experiencing periods of dips and stagnation in representation. Indeed, Uzbekistan is outperforming France in some ways: after three elections under the quota system, France was still at 18 percent women elected out of a 50 percent quota whereas, even despite the 2014 lapse, Uzbekistan is at 16 percent elected under a 30 percent quota.

This last observation is connected to a final reflection on the Uzbek system: the quota target level. Because they only encourage representation rather than guarantee it, candidate quotas under all electoral systems (MMD or SMD) tend to fall short of their targets. None of the countries that establish parity at the candidate level (either with PR or with SMD systems) achieve parity in parliament, although they do elect a substantially larger proportion of women than the world average (29.8 percent). Likewise, candidate quotas under both SMD and MMD systems set at 30-33 percent achieve on average 23.5 percent of women elected to office (SG report on RES/66/130). The comparative success of the French quota may be related to the longer amount of time it has existed, the cultural context and the higher target level of the quota itself.

Over time, a fourth element – enforcement measures – may also impact the Uzbek quota. One of the keys to the success of legislated candidate quotas are the provisions for enforcing the legal targets (SG report on RES/66/130). The absence of any enforcement measures in the Uzbek case leaves this open to manipulation. An additional possible loophole to women's representation in the Uzbekistan electoral law allows political parties to annul the nomination of their candidates until five days before elections, while

candidates can withdraw from the race at any time (OSCE-ODHIR 2014). These factors may affect future effectiveness of the Uzbek quota in years to come.

So what are the challenges of nomination quotas in SMDs and how are they being overcome? Firstly, there is significant cross-national evidence of women candidates being nominated in areas where the party they are standing for is unlikely to win, while male candidates (often with the advantage of incumbency) are nominated in safer constituencies where their party is in an advantageous position (see Murray 2004). By running women candidates in less advantageous constituencies than their male counterparts, parties respect the letter of the law while denying the spirit of the law. Parties may exhibit bias in the allocation of constituencies because women candidates are not as successful in the internal competition for nominations or in the primary contests where they exist. Women may be seen as weaker candidates less deserving of a competitive or safe constituency. Where incumbents are more likely to be male, as is the case in most political systems, the natural reluctance to remove an incumbent may mean that newcomers brought into the race by the quota will automatically be placed in less secure constituencies.

Quota design has not yet come up with solid mechanisms to overcome this issue of women candidates being nominated in disadvantageous constituencies. In 1993, the British Labour Party passed a measure to introduce all-women shortlists in 50 per cent of all vacant and winnable seats, implementing the policy so that by January 1996 thirty-five women had been selected under its auspice. However the measure was ruled illegal according to sexual discrimination law the following year (Squires 2005).

Another attempt in Sierra Leone was one of the recent efforts to legislate advantageous constituencies for women candidates. A 2011 draft bill stipulated that women candidates should be nominated by parties in “safe seats”; those won by the party in the previous election (Dumbuya and Yukstas 2011, and Dalerup 2010). The draft never made it into law, in part because of resistance from incumbent male MPs. The ‘safe’ or ‘winnable’ seats criterion is problematic because it requires male incumbents to stand aside for female aspirants.

Beyond these gendered and structural nomination disadvantages, the impact of a nomination quota on the makeup of the elected body will ultimately be determined by the voters. Conventional wisdom has often had it that voters will prefer male candidates (Huddy and Terkildsen 1993), but evidence to support this common assumption is thin. Indeed, many studies have found evidence of the contrary (see Darcy and Schramm, 1977; Darcy Welsh and Clark, 1985; Burrell, 1996; Seltzer, Newman, and Leighton, 1997; Smith and Fox, 2001). Early studies in Norway showed voter bias against women (Matland 2005), but subsequent studies in the UK, US, Australia, Canada, Poland, Peru, and France have found that voters do not systematically favor male candidates (Matland and King, 2006; Norris, Vallance, and Lovenduski, 1992; Murray, Krook, and Opello 2006). In some cases women seem to have the advantage and in general the evidence is clear that parties tend to discriminate against women more than the voters themselves (Matland 2005). Recent adoptions of nomination quotas are encouraging; for example in Senegal, where a 2012 amendment of the electoral law introduced parity to nomination quotas for both PR and majority seats, bringing women's representation in parliament to a historic 42 percent (Electoral Law 92-16 of 1992, as amended by law 2012-01 of 2012, Article L.145).

The geographical gaps in the research underline the need for greater study of the gendered preferences of voters in other, less-developed parts of the world to determine the potential function of nomination quotas in these policies. Despite the significant geographical gaps in the literature on voter bias, the findings of existing studies support a fresh look at nomination quotas as a good way to improve political gender equality.

The benefits of this solution to introducing TSMs in SMDs are considerable. Nomination quotas may be less-disruptive to existing political systems than reserved-seats quotas, as they do not affect the delimitation of districts or the size of parliament. Likewise most electoral systems will have existing restrictions on nomination (nationality, age, criminal background, residency, education, etcetera) on which the gender balance criterion may be added.

Nomination quotas in SMDs may also be more politically acceptable than reserved seats quotas because the power remains in the realm of the voters. If elite bias against women candidates in party leadership structures is effectively removing them from the ballot, the

quota can be seen as improving the range of choice on the ballot (and thus improving the ability of the voter to make a free choice given a range of options). While the issue of nominating women to winnable districts remains, the case of France suggest that this barrier can be overcome gradually in time. Additionally, nomination quotas do not saddle women with a legitimacy gap which is a positive factor for political efficacy of women representatives in the short-term and long-term acceptance of women in politics. In sum, nomination quotas in SMDs present a viable, effective and generally politically acceptable option.

## Super Districts

A second approach consists in creating an additional tier of women representatives elected on a separate ballot, but joining the same elected body. Uganda is the only case of this type of quota being applied at the national level.

Uganda first adopted a quota for Parliament in 1998; one reserved seat was allocated to each district (consisting of several seats). These female MPs were indirectly elected through an electoral college consisting of local council members rather than by universal suffrage. This system, (in place from 1998 to 2005), was effective in ensuring that women were elected, but has been found lacking in terms of the women's impact on policymaking and their legitimacy as representatives of constituents (Goetz, 2002).

At the local level, Uganda applied a different system. One third of local council seats were to be reserved for women. The local councils were expanded to accommodate the new reserved seats and super-wards were created out of several existing wards. The voting to fill these seats also took place on a separate day, and polling was done by voters queuing up publicly behind the candidates of their choice. The unusual nature of voting, the separate day for polling (which suppressed turnout), and the add-on nature of the seats themselves did little to convey legitimacy on the women elected in the local councils. (The queuing was replaced with secret ballots in 2002).

In 2005 the national system was reformed – essentially by moving the local system of directly elected reserved seats in super-constituencies – up to the national level. The

reserved seats are now directly elected on a separate ballot, and the balloting takes place on the same day. While the new system enhances the legitimacy of the elected representatives, the larger constituencies of the reserved seats make campaigning difficult. Having a presence in such a large constituency is comparatively more resource intense and the women are not allocated additional state or party resources to compensate for this. Some have criticized the model for putting women elected in the reserved seats at a disadvantage because of this larger constituency.

Challenges faced in Uganda are partially due to the single party dominance of Ugandan. In the 2011 elections, four of the reserved seats were elected unopposed – because opposition didn't find the candidates or resources to contest these elections (EU 2011).

The Ugandan model has notable advantages of legitimacy and voter involvement over reserved seats models such as Tanzania and Pakistan, where reserved seats are filled indirectly, but it also has significant drawbacks – particularly the practical issues of campaigning in a larger constituency.

## **Rotating Seats**

A third approach is to introduce a rotational system. This approach is not reliant on new districts or tiers, instead a proportion of the regular single-member constituencies are reserved for women candidates one term out of three. Different constituencies fall under the reservation for each electoral cycle - through a rotation system - so that a portion of seats are reserved for any elections, and over subsequent cycles the impact is spread geographically.

The rotation system has only ever been used on a wide-scale in India, and never for national office. India had very low representation of women both at the national and local levels before the adoption of the rotation quota. Before the reforms in 1992, women's representation was just 5 percent lower councils (panchayats) (Chattopadhyay and Duflo 2004). Constitutional changes formalized a three-tier local government system consisting of village (Gram Panchayat), block (Panchayat Samiti) and district-level councils (Zilla

Parishad). The reservation system was introduced as part of these broader decentralization reforms.

The reservation covers one-third of both chairperson positions and members in each village council (Constitution of India, Art 243C). In each election, roughly one third of seats are reserved for women. In the following election, a different third of seats is reserved, and in the third election the remaining third of seats is reserved. States have the power to change the way in which these seats are selected and to increase the threshold of the quota beyond one-third. In law, the reservations for women are permanent, while the similar reservations for scheduled casts and tribes are temporary (expiring after 70 years).

The reservation also applies to chairpersons, such that each Panchayat will have a reserved chairperson every third election. There are similar reservations for scheduled casts and scheduled tribes so that women of scheduled casts and tribes are also represented.

The reservations have resulted in dramatic increases in the percentage of women in local government which grew off of a baseline of 5 percent in 1992 to 40 percent in 2000. Many of India's states have increased the reservation to either forty or fifty percent (Chattopadhyay and Duflo, 2004).

India's system is unique but could theoretically be applied in other contexts both at the local and national level. Its benefits and challenges merit consideration in this light. Firstly, the rotation quota is a type of reserved seat, which has the advantage of a defined impact - in a perfect compliance situation, there is little chance that thresholds defined in law will not be reflected in the makeup of the elected body(ies). This is an important aspect differentiating it from nomination quotas.

A second characteristic of the rotation system is the inherent mechanism for gradual - or 'natural' - increase in women's representation beyond the threshold. The mechanism is the reallocation of incumbency benefits in favor of female candidates. Incumbency has been established as one of the most important independent variables in determining a candidate's success. Incumbency benefits are structural inhibitors to political change. Newman and Leighton show that incumbency can be one of the most significant inhibitors of women's political participation (1997).



Rotation systems ensure that male incumbents face a defined term limit (in the case of India this has been two terms.) The reservations also result in female incumbents who may benefit from the incumbency advantage in subsequent non-reserved electoral cycles, a dynamic which probably gradually increases the number of women standing for and being elected in non-reserved seats. India has seen increasing numbers of women standing and winning in non-reserved seats. Beaman et al. (2009) found that the number of women running increased by 3.3 percent following two rounds of reservations while the percentage winning unreserved seats more than doubled.

Finally, the rotational system has the benefit of maintaining the institutional structure of the parliament and balloting system in place. Other TSM options such as super-districts and tier systems require expanding the size of parliament and/or creating a separate ballot. Rotational quotas require neither of these options, resulting in potential cost savings and simplifying the voting experience for the elector (the complexities of the system are borne by its administrators).

The most notable drawback of the rotational system is related to the effective term-limit it places on male incumbents. For popular incumbent candidates, the term-limit may be experienced as a restrictive limitation. In systems considering adopting a similar model, this effect could be overcome by introducing gender-neutral term-limit regulations for all seats.

### **Alternate Thresholds**

A final option for introducing TSMs in single member district-based systems is the use of what we term an “alternate threshold”, also known as the “best loser” system. This option establishes two thresholds for being elected: one based on greatest absolute number of votes, the other based on greatest percentage of votes within a subset of candidates (in this case, women). Alternate threshold systems fill reserved seats in parliament with the unsuccessful candidates of a certain group (women, for example) that garnered the highest number of votes. Under this approach, all candidates (male and female) compete together in a single race and the candidate with the greatest number of votes wins the seat.

Subsequently, an additional number of reserved seats are filled by those women candidates who received the highest number of votes without winning a majority/plurality in their district.

Few examples of this approach exist to date and the current average results (Figure 24) do not reflect the potential performance of this system. One of the key examples, Jordan, has a parallel system with 108 seats elected using first-past-the-post (FPTP, 17 seats) and Single-Non-Transferable in 45 electoral districts, and 27 seats elected using national list PR. An additional 15 seats are allocated to the “best losing” women candidates competing for the FPTP/SNTV seats in the 45 electoral districts, one seat for each of the 12 governorates and the three Bedouin districts. The losing woman candidate with the highest percentage of votes in her district wins the seat for that governorate (Thiel 2014). The quota has shown incremental progress over time and has been progressively increased. In 2007, when the system was exclusively FPTP/SNTV, all women elected to parliament were elected via the quota mechanism (6 women). Under the same system in 2010, the quota was increased to 12, and one woman was directly elected. In 2013, three women were directly elected (two for SNTV seats and one for a list on the list-PR seats), and the quota was increased to 15 seats (Thiel 2014). The Jordanian case is unique, however, in that political parties are insignificant in the political system – for the 108 FPTP/SNTV seats, all the candidates ran as independents and for the list PR, the lists were ad-hoc creations for the elections and largely unrepresentative of registered political parties; less than .1 percent of MPs have declared party affiliation (Thiel 2014). Alternate thresholds are also used for women in Afghanistan where at least two seats per district are reserved for women in the lower house (68 out of 249) and at least 20 percent of seats in the provincial councils are allocated to women with the most votes (quotaproject.org).

The most famous example of alternate thresholds is in Mauritius, where some form of this quota has been used since the pre-independence elections of 1959 to ensure ethnic proportionality in parliament. The system is used in multi-member districts and uses a complex formula where an initial group of candidates is chosen irrespective of political party, and a second group is allocated according to the size of the parties they belong to (EISA). Analyses of the quota reflect its impact on institutionalizing ethnic divisions in the

country and are therefore not helpful in assessing it for gender purposes. Singapore and Ecuador also use alternate thresholds, but not for gender, racial or ethnic representation.

Because the alternate threshold system has not been used extensively in multi-party elections, empirical examples and case-based analyses are limited. However the conceptual design of the quota holds great promise. Although alternate thresholds appear similar to mixed PR-list systems, insofar as a distinct group of reserved seats is set aside for women, the approaches are fundamentally different in the way in which those seats are chosen. Whereas mixed system PR lists establish a separate sphere of competition between women and require voters to intentionally choose a female candidate, in alternate thresholds there is a single competitive arena for both men and women. Long-term effects of this cannot yet be measured, but the system holds the promise of integrating women into political competition rather than ghetto-izing them in competitive field of their own, as other quota designs may do. Likewise, it minimizes the effect of creating a ceiling for representation by opening the field of competition.

Drawbacks of the system reflect the way in which it is implemented. Unless the system is designed so that it adds the reserved seats to parliament (increasing parliament size), it effectively results in casting out elected men in favor of unelected women. This may increase the likelihood of resistance and rejection of the quota and decrease the perceived legitimacy of the women parliamentarians to govern. In the case where additional seats are added to parliament, the alternate threshold system fails to overcome the issue of decreased geographic representation for women as compared to their male counterparts. Seats added to parliament have much greater district magnitudes than regular seats (i.e., women elected under the quota may represent multiple regular districts). This poses a disadvantage to the candidate/MP because of the increased ratio to the voter and associated greater costs in necessary financial resources, travel time, availability to respond to constituent needs, etc. Under this system, women (and men) compete for regular districts – the larger districts connected to the reserved seats never appear on a ballot for popular choice. Thus voters are represented by two MPs – one they chose based on campaign appeal and another assigned to them, who may never have campaigned in their districts at all. This may also reduce the legitimacy of the quota MPs and their

effectiveness to govern. Finally, a major drawback of this system is in its interaction with party politics. Unless designed in such a way as to reflect broader political party outcomes, alternate thresholds may skew political outcomes by attributing seats to women from political parties that did not win a majority in the district.

## Conclusion

These five systems – nomination quotas to SMDs, supra-districts, rotating districts, PR-tier systems and alternate thresholds – constitute the primary forms of TSMs used in single-member district based electoral systems. Single member districts have unique structural benefits which multi-member and particularly proportional-list systems do not have. They ensure geographical representation, they are simple for voters and candidates to understand, they promote a link between constituents and their representatives, and they allow voters to choose candidates directly and hold them accountable rather than having to go through parties. Furthermore, they are the political reality for most of the world's democracies and, as such, must be studied in light of making them as responsive as possible.

SMDs have long been considered to be less favorable for women's representation and largely incompatible with quotas. Through the analysis and cases outlined in this paper, we argue that SMDs are fully compatible with gender quotas. Indeed, the evidence supports a conclusion that innovations (and overlooked successes) in SMDs offer sensible options to ensure gender equality in political participation. Well-designed quota systems in SMDs ensure that elected women face open electoral competition, have the legitimacy of having campaigned and been directly elected, and develop links with constituents. In most of the cases, the systems have facilitated a gradual increase in the proportion of women elected towards parity. Time will tell if this growth continues or tapers off, but our analysis is that while the exact proportions may vary by election, the numbers of elected women in India and France is likely to increase over time. The systems both allow and facilitate growth.

In many contexts, these quota systems may be considered equally effective as those options available in MMDs. Indeed, all of the reserved seat options (with the exception of rotating

districts and alternate thresholds with no added parliamentary seats) result in de facto multi-member districts. In practical terms, it may be more expedient in most contexts to implement a quota within an existing SMD system, rather than implementing wholesale systemic change.

There are several other points that have emerged across the case studies and indicate paths for future research. First, innovations in quotas may happen at the local level, as demonstrated in the cases of India and Uganda. More research is required to establish this, but one reason may be that local government electoral rules don't face the same competitive dynamics as national level elections. The legislative body which sets the rules (the national or provincial legislature) is not the one who will be impacted by them – and thus it may promote rules which are less protective of incumbents.

The case studies also establish that the incompatibility of SMDs and quotas is a myth. Quotas in SMDs overcome the shared mandate conundrum by either reducing the bias in candidate nomination, sharing the mandate temporally (rotating districts) or overlapping the mandate (super districts). Further research may reveal other approaches yet to be identified.

Third, from the experience of the case studies we discern two principles to be considered in the development of quotas in SMDs. First, quotas need not saddle elected women with a legitimacy gap. This means that women elected by quota should have competed in an election, at minimum against a restricted field of women-only candidates, but preferably in a field open to both sexes. To maximize the political efficacy of women elected via quotas, they should have been directly elected and should have a tangible constituency to which they are accountable. A final principle is pragmatic in nature; in general, quotas that don't impact parliament size are preferable to those that increase the size of the elected body. It is politically very difficult to change the number of districts or the size of parliament, so systems like the Indian and French systems – which don't impact size of the elected body are particularly advantageous in this regard.

These findings have potential implications for people and politics across most of the world's democracies. The models identified are a potential roadmap for reforms, laying out

some sensible ways to overcome long-intractable issues of gender equality in politics, and offering real-world cases of where that has been done. Adoption of similar reforms in some of the larger and influential democracies such as the UK or US could see unprecedented rises the percentages of women elected to office, women political leadership, and the influence of women on policy.



## Conclusion

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Entrenched and enduring, electoral authoritarianism is the dominant regime type in the world today. This work contributes to the body of knowledge by broadening the study of electoral authoritarian regimes beyond the focus on incumbent behavior, to extend to the dynamics of political oppositions and of women's political participation in the semi-authoritarian context. Taking a step back from the "babel in democratization studies" (Armony and Schamis 2005), this work returns to some of the basics of democracy by looking at aspects of political competition and participation. Electoral authoritarian regimes distort the dynamics of both of these. Thus, to understand electoral authoritarian regimes, we must understand the dynamics of exclusion and violence.

The preceding pages have considered the exclusion of political voices through institutional rules and processes and extra-institutional behavior ("votes and violence" of the title). Whether politically dissident or culturally repressed, there are unique barriers to the expression and representation of diverse voices in EA regimes. I examine how popular concerns, needs, and priorities are expressed where the democratic institutions fail to translate them into representative government. How do oppositions compete in uncompetitive elections? Do women face distinct



barriers in public participation, effectively limiting their voice? These are some of the key dynamics of political exclusion in contemporary EA states.

Elections in semi-authoritarian regimes distort and undermine free competition to such a degree that they often effectively use the vote to silence unwanted voices. Opposition actors are compelled to look outside institutional channels to make their voices heard, engaging in parallel regime and electoral games. In light of the dynamics, in some cases, oppositions forego potential electoral games in hopes of provoking deeper structural change to the regime itself. Elections also regularly fail to represent women's voices in these states, both through distinct forms of repression or policy failure to implement quotas.

Where votes fail, voice is often expressed through violence in EA states. Violence is a factor both in retaliating against EA regimes and an integral aspect within these regimes, used by both incumbent and opposition parties to silence parts of the population, either for political or social-order purposes.

The preceding chapters further our knowledge of these dynamics through a number of contributions. In brief, I have developed and tested a theory of opposition party behavior in semi-authoritarian regimes, thereby enabling rational interpretation of these behaviors, many of which have previously been considered irrational.

Broadly speaking, the dissertation's contributions in the area of women's political participation are twofold. I prove the existence of unique forms of electoral and gender-based violence through a cross-national empirical study and offer analytical taxonomy and typology for their study. Secondly, I identify and analyze a number of solutions to the hitherto intractable problem of reconciling single-member district electoral systems with temporary special measures for women's representation. While these issues are global in scope, they have particular pertinence for women's participation in EA states.

The dissertation makes a methodological contribution by demonstrating the limitations of both qualitative and quantitative research used separately as tools of comparative research on hybrid regimes and making the case for mixed-methods approaches in this field. The concluding chapter examines the further implications of these findings and their pertinence to future research in the field of comparative democratization.

### *What have we learned? Methodological and Empirical Lessons in the Study of EA regimes*

The first contribution of this dissertation is a methodological caveat. Chapter 1 explored methodological challenges in studying semi-authoritarian regimes (such as EA) by critically engaging with a leading framework of analysis in the field. An independent replication of Levitsky and Way's 2010 classification model of competitive authoritarianism (CA) revealed coding discrepancies in the authors' case selection, demonstrating the vulnerability of quantitative comparative regime studies to methodological inconsistency. The discrepancies impact the broader theory of CA regimes and have methodological implications for the comparative study of hybrid regimes in general.

In this chapter, I reproduced the classification model through a double-blind coding to reproduce Levitsky and Way's model in the fourteen Sub-Saharan African countries in the original analysis as well as in a limited number of additional cases in Sub-Saharan Africa. The model organizes dozens of the traits of hybrid behavior into an empirically operable framework for measuring regime type and, ultimately, regime change.

I consider the challenges of producing consistent classifications of hybrid regimes based on quantified indicators, and the subsequent impact of inconsistent case selection on broader theory elaboration. The research was conducted to reflect the original research process as closely as possible, including returning to original case-study sources and excluding new research published after Levitsky and Way's publication. I worked with a team of two trained undergraduate researchers for the double-blind coding and consulted with original author, Steven Levitsky during the research design phase.

The study revealed that the model for coding competitive authoritarian regimes could not be independently reproduced. Of the 14 original CA cases in the Levitsky and Way study, I ultimately achieved commensurate findings in only five (Ghana, Malawi, Mozambique Senegal and Zambia). I was unable to reproduce the authors' results in over 60 percent of the cases. The discrepancies arose from shortcomings in concept conceptualization, measurement specifications, and ultimately, aggregation.

The inability to reproduce the initial case selection has broader implications for the usefulness of the model. Specifically, if we cannot consistently agree on if, or why a regime is competitive authoritarian, we cannot measure the behavior of the regime type with consistency. These case selection choices affect the predictive ability of Levitsky and Way's broader argument.

In addition to directly challenging a dominant theory in the field of comparative democratization, Chapter 1 confronts a number of other pre-existing views in this field. The failure of the CA replication exercise has implications for one of the dominant approaches to the study of hybrid regime dynamics, namely, the emphasis on diminished subtypes. Putting aside the ontological critiques of 'over-classification', there are equally important methodological reasons to steer the study of hybrid regimes away from the fixation on subtypes. As this chapter demonstrates, even the most-rigorous quantitative analyses of diminished subtypes are susceptible to data error in this field of study. Hybrid regimes are masquerades at heart, embodied by the game of smoke and mirrors. The very existence of such faux democracies is predicated on the ability to create deceptive illusions and distract the observer from the true nature of the regime – i.e., to distort information. This creates a minefield for data coding. Coupling these inherent traits of hybrid states with highly restrictive subtype measurement frameworks is a risky business for the cautious academic. The excessively high risks associated with reliance on quantitative approaches in this field coupled with the diminishing marginal theoretical utility of further subtypes suggest two things.

Firstly, we need to look at the comparative study of hybrid regimes differently. By recognizing the benefits and the limits of quantitative approaches, researchers can draw the benefits of both. Quantitative comparisons offer broad indicators and identification of common patterns. They offer clues but not definitive conclusions. Research on the complex and often paradoxical nature of hybrid regimes requires qualitative confirmation of preliminary quantitative findings.

This is ever more important as comparative studies of hybrid regimes delve into the "softer", more complex aspects of hybrid regime dynamics, such as Levitsky and Way's "unlevel playing field" or my own typologies of gender-specific electoral violence and opposition party strategy. Levitsky and Way engaged with the increasingly sophisticated realm of electoral manipulation in semi-authoritarian regimes through the development of a model that classified the components of electoral malpractice. While my findings were in discord with their case selection methodology,

I share their objective in finding new ways to model the complex qualities of semi-authoritarian regimes. With awareness of the limitations of quantitative comparison of hybrid regimes and adapted, mixed-methods approaches, such a course of future research is attainable.

The second lesson to retain from the findings of Chapter 1 is that not only do we need to look differently, we also need to look elsewhere. It has been over a decade since Armony and Schamis described the “babel in democratization studies” (2005). It is time for era of the hybrid regime subtype to draw to its natural close. For one, the emphasis on subtypes reflects stativity in the research agenda. Beyond classifying regime types, research must move towards understanding the dynamics of these regimes, to assessing their relationships to regime change, whether towards democratization, authoritarian consolidation or conflict. While Levitsky and Way pursued this they were ultimately constrained by the weight of the literature’s emphasis on diminished subtypes.

In addition to shifting from the study of regime classification towards the study of regime transformation, the findings of Chapter 1 suggest that the field of comparative democratization should look outside of the incumbency box. It is time to reconnect with some of the basics of democracy: political competition and participation. Electoral authoritarian regimes distort the dynamics of both competition and participation, with profound consequences for ultimate regime trajectories. Electoral authoritarian regimes are facades because they violate participation and competition so deeply. Thus, to understand electoral authoritarian regimes, we must understand the dynamics of exclusion, from the perspective of those excluded. It is this rationale that establishes the basis for the further contributions of the dissertation.

## **Opposition Behaviors in EA States**

In Chapter 2, I propose and test a theory of opposition behavior under electoral authoritarian regimes. Drawing on theories of dual game behavior (Schedler 2002 Tsebelis 1990) and a regional study from Latin America (Mainwaring and Scully 2003), I hypothesize that EA oppositions’ electoral and regime objectives (“dual games”) align under conditions where there is relative certainty of outcomes but diverge where either regime or electoral uncertainty is greater, resulting in four identifiable behavior types. Testing the hypotheses a cross-nationally, I

demonstrate that the four behavior types are functions of the degree of state repression and the level of organizational capacity of the opposition.

The chapter explores the pressures faced by opposition groups engaged in electoral competition under authoritarian regimes. I identify how these often conflicting incentives and pressures impact the strategies engaged by these parties, asking the question: *how do parties compete in uncompetitive elections?*

The model was tested on a set of 55 elections in 29 sub-Saharan countries between 2004 and 2010. Reflecting the caveats of case selection identified in Chapter 1, the case selection for Chapter 2 was intentionally broad and included a range of electoral authoritarian subtypes with different degrees of political freedoms. Double-blind coding results were subsequently analyzed qualitatively. Despite the diffusing effects of broad case selection, the model achieved inter-coder agreement levels as high as 89 percent for legislative elections and an average of 69 percent for general, legislative and presidential elections.

Chapter 2 contributes to the theoretical understanding of a core dimension of competition in electoral authoritarian regimes. Seemingly suboptimal choices taken by opposition groups during EA elections are, in fact, based on rational calculations. Furthermore, they adhere to consistent and identifiable patterns that operate according to two contextual conditions (degree of state repression and opposition organizational capacity).

There are two principal theoretical findings in Chapter 2. The first theoretical finding indicates that regime and electoral games played by oppositions during EA elections will align where there is relative certainty of electoral outcomes. In other words, where oppositions feel confident of either relative political freedom or no freedom, their regime and electoral behaviors tend to be consistent (transition or breakdown behaviors). Where there is greater uncertainty over electoral or regime outcomes, oppositions are more likely to exhibit divergent game behavior, i.e., sacrificing either regime or electoral ambitions for the other (preservation and delegitimation behaviors).

The second theoretical finding further specifies this distinction. I find that in less repressive regimes, the organizational capacity of the opposition will determine whether opposition groups constructively engage to promote further regime opening during an EA election, or whether they accept a semi-authoritarian status quo. Where repression is greater, oppositions with stronger

organizational capacity are more likely to strategically manipulate an EA election to seek regime change, even if it involves short-term electoral sacrifice. The greatest risk of political breakdown or return to armed conflict exists in elections where repression is greatest and oppositions are institutionally weak and fragmented. These findings are expected to enhance predictive ability in the analysis of EA electoral dynamics and the interpretation of democratic transition trajectories.

The chapter offers a further contribution in providing an empirical framework enabling the comparative study of opposition behaviors in EA contexts. The classification model presents and operationalizes the four opposition behavior types – transition, preservation, delegitimation and breakdown – according to configurations of dual game objectives. In so doing, it fills a gap in the literature regarding non-incumbent engagement in semi-authoritarian electoral processes and provides a tool for comparative analysis.

The empirical research offers a number of insights into the dynamics of the different behavioral approaches. We see that transitional and preservation behaviors appeared more frequently in “first” elections and evolved over time, in the limited cases tested. However there did not appear to be any linear relation or historic or institutional learning between the behaviors engaged by oppositions over the course of multiple elections. For example, even where opposition groups succeeded in increasing their vote count through transition behaviors, there was no evidence of a commitment to collaborative politics in subsequent elections. Extreme behavior by opposition groups during electoral processes did not occur from the outset of a process but was the result of cumulative failures over the course of an electoral process.

The model suggests that these behaviors are consistent only where a true opposition movement exists to counter a clearly identifiable incumbent. It excludes cases where opposition is co-opted or controlled by the incumbent regime (waning opposition) and cases of oppositions that have failed to assimilate basic democratic processes. In the latter, opposition behavior is more likely to respond to a logic of wartime engagement rather than reflect even minimal acceptance of democratic institutionalism.

Chapter 2 constitutes a departure from dominant literature associating regime outcomes exclusively with incumbent behavior or socio-economic factors. By establishing rational and consistent behavior of opposition groups in these contexts, it assigns great agency to non-incumbent actors. In so doing, this suggests several future directions in research, including

testing the theory outside of sub-Saharan Africa and pursuing deeper analysis of the relationship between opposition behavior and regime outcomes.

## **Women's Political Participation in EA Regimes**

Part II of this dissertation reflects a second dimension of competition in EA regime: women's political participation in EA processes and institutions. Chapters 3 and 4 examine the gender dimensions of election-related violence. These chapters contribute to both literatures on political and electoral violence and on gender-based violence by revealing and classifying the gendered-nature of political violence and introducing the concepts of gender-based political and electoral violence.

Chapter 3 reveals and defines the gendered nature of electoral violence (a common feature of EA regimes). An original database of over 2000 incidents of election violence in six countries as well as fieldwork and feedback from over fifty countries reveal the existence of significant gender-differentiation in the manifestation of election violence as well as the presence of a previously unrecognized phenomenon, *gender-based election violence (GBEV)*. The chapter introduces definitions, a taxonomy and typology of both forms of violence.

Chapter 4 delves deeper into the topic by examining the complex relationship between information and communication technologies and gendered electoral violence. The notions of gender-differentiated and gender-motivated violence are extended to political violence in this chapter. Information and communication technologies are found to both facilitate gendered forms of political violence as well as empower resistance and violence mitigation.

I defend a typology of electoral violence including both physical (including sexual harm) and non-physical (including socio-psychological and economic violence) and offer a taxonomy framing the categories of impact, perpetrators, victims, types, locations of election-related violence according to the empirical findings.

The research approached the topic from two angles, identifying gender differentiations within politically-motivated election violence on one hand, and on the other, revealing gender issues as the primary motivator of other acts of violence occurring within the political realm. The first part of the study empirically demonstrates the existence of gender differentiation in election violence

by analyzing over 2,000 documented incidents of election violence in six countries between 2006 and 2010 and through qualitative analysis, including fieldwork. The discussion of gender-based election violence draws on discourse analysis to assess perpetrators motives in committing acts of violence against women during electoral periods.

There are several implications of this research both for the study of EA regime dynamics in particular and for women's political participation more broadly. Feminist political theory is rarely applied within the field of comparative democratization. Through this exploratory study of this specific sub-field of democratization dynamics, I illustrate the significant impact such analysis can bring to core accepted notions, such as the nature of election and political violence. This makes a strong case for future analysis of other dimensions of comparative democracy and authoritarian dynamics from a gendered lens.

In recognizing the gendered nature of election violence, we gain a deeper understanding of a critical barrier to women's political participation as well as a richer and more nuanced perspective of a fundamental concept of political theory, e.g., election violence. We find that political transitions and the tactics of political actors are not gender neutral. Chapter 3's EV-GBEV taxonomy and typology presents the complexities of violence according to a conceptual schema for comparative study.

Likewise, the research in these chapters enriches our knowledge of political competition in other regime forms, including in established democracies. Political violence occurs more frequently where state institutions are weaker and where there is greater uncertainty over regime outcomes (see Chapter 2). However, this research reveals that gendered violence may exist at unexpectedly higher rates in both established and partial democracies. The strong presence of socio-psychological violence is a universal concern, although it manifests differently between cultures and regime-types. Likewise, Chapter 4's investigation of violence in the virtual realm revealed numerous examples from established democracies as well as from hybrid states. As access to technology grows in developing states, the incidence of violence in the virtual realm may increase. As Chapter 4 demonstrates, it exists currently in states with high levels of internet penetration, including established democracies. Thus, gendered election violence appears to be a function of gender roles across societies as well as function of regime type.



Just as the research has implications beyond hybrid regimes, it also contributes tools for the study of other at-risk groups in political processes. For one, although the two chapters focus largely on the challenges to women's political participation, the terminology of GBEV and GBPV may be adopted to examine electoral and political violence perpetrated on the basis of other gender-identities. Likewise, by extending definitions and typology of violence outside of the traditionally male-dominated status quo, there is potential to explore violence experiences by other groups that do not conform to mainstream, male-dominated political currents, for example political violence experienced by indigenous peoples, ethnic minorities, the elderly and by youth.

The final chapter of the dissertation continues the examination of exclusion in EA states by engaging to solve a longstanding puzzle regarding the use of quotas in majority/plurality electoral systems. Like the preceding chapters, the question is of global import, although it of specific pertinence to hybrid regimes where the majority of quotas are implemented today and where (as partially discussed in chapters 3 and 4), women face significant barriers to entry into political life. The chapter demonstrates that discrepancies in the adoption of quotas between electoral systems are the result of a knowledge gap rather than intrinsic traits of electoral systems, as previously assumed.

Quotas have been the single most effective means of increasing women's representation in parliaments, however countries with single member district electoral systems are much less likely to employ quotas. As a result, countries with SMD systems have lower levels of women in parliament. Skye Christensen and I argue that this is the result of misperceptions and a lack of knowledge regarding the relationship between temporary special measures (TSMs) and electoral systems.

Responding to this knowledge gap, Chapter 5 identifies and assesses approaches to implementing TSMs in SMDs, based on both nomination and reserved seat approaches.

The chapter inventories existing quotas worldwide according to the electoral system in which they are embedded and introduces a five-part classification of quota options for SMDs. The types are subsequently analyzed through case study research including in France, India, Pakistan, Uganda and Uzbekistan.

We found that the TSM-SMD puzzle may be addressed through nomination quotas to SMDs, supra-districts, rotating districts, PR-tier systems and alternate thresholds (as well as mixed-

system approaches). As a result, quotas may be effectively applied in a variety of majority/plurality systems, including at the input level (nomination quota options) and at the output level (reserved seat options). Evidence to date indicates that these options perform at or near the same levels as averages in PR-List systems, when used in countries where they are effectively applied. Beyond meeting quantitative targets, the research demonstrates that at least four of the five quota-types also have the potential to contribute to substantive goals for enhancing women's political participation, including establishing links with constituencies, achieving perceived legitimacy and supporting long-term growth.

The chapter's structured classification of TSMs in SMDs contributes a scientific framework for the study of quota systems. Within this framework, the introduction of the "Alternate Threshold" quota-type makes an original contribution by objectively analyzing the properties of hitherto marginalized concept to identify its viability. By taking the approach out of its troubled real-world context and examining it from a theoretical perspective, the chapter identifies the potential for Alternate Threshold quotas to solve the TSM-SMD puzzle, according to specific implementation guidelines. The chapter discredits the long-held prevailing view on the incompatibility of SMDs and quotas. It debunks the myth that TSMs are a sum-zero game between the sexes in majority/plurality states, and opens the door to constructive policy solutions towards enhancing gender equality in elected bodies.

Its findings are highly pertinent for EA regimes where TSMs are being most rapidly (and unevenly) implemented today, primarily in PR systems. The chapter's insight is expected to contribute to addressing issue of women's political participation in EA states in particular, as women face distinct barriers to political participation, including significant GBEV. The findings are equally pertinent outside of EA regimes, in established democracies that seek to improve political gender equality through quotas, as demonstrated by the case of France. Likewise, although the Chapter focuses on women's representation, these quota solutions are not exclusive to women's representation and may be applied to address ethnic and racial inequalities, multicultural representativity or historic injustice (such as the inclusion of indigenous groups).

## In conclusion

*“...[W]e are determined to foment a rebellion, and will not hold ourselves bound by any laws in which we have no voice or representation.”*

-- A. Adams. March 31, 1776

While Abigail Adams did not intend to take up actual arms in the face of women’s disenfranchisement in 1776, a universal truth underlies her lighthearted words. Where ostensible democracies fail to represent the voices of their people, disempowerment leads to profound discontent. Confronted with the failures of representation, excluded groups cease to recognize the legitimacy of the state and express their voice through a pursuit of systemic change, either violently or non-violently. Where exclusion is maintained through embedded violence, representation cannot be achieved without deconstructing the structures of repression.

## Annex A. Opposition behaviors - CODEBOOK

### 1.1. Electoral game

### OPPGME1

Code positively (1) if the opposition broadly participates in the electoral process, from start (candidate/party registration) to finish (acceptance of results).

- ⇒ This concerns official participation in electoral processes (parties register, submit candidates, organize campaigns, etc)

### 1.2. Regime game

### OPPGME2

Code positively (1) if the opposition's regime strategies openly seek to overturn the current political system in favor of more democratic reform.

- ⇒ Note: define according to dominant behavior.

|                | Transition                           | Preservation                        | Delegitimation                       | Breakdown                           |
|----------------|--------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|--------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|
| Electoral Game | 1                                    | 1                                   | 0                                    | 0                                   |
| Regime Game    | 1<br><i>(vers la<br/>democratie)</i> | 0<br><i>(accepte statu<br/>quo)</i> | 1<br><i>(vers la<br/>democratie)</i> | 0<br><i>(statu quo ou<br/>pire)</i> |

### 1.3. Transition behavior classification

### OPPGME3

Code positively (1) if opposition behavior can be characterized as a Transition Game, based on the matrix. Choose the indicators that justify this choice:

- 1) Active participation in official (legal requirements, etc) and unofficial electoral activities (debates, codes of conduct, etc).
- 2) Respect for standards and principles including human rights, non-violence
- 3) Firm commitment to pro-democratic reform/firm stance against EA practices of incumbent.
- 4) Peaceful, constructive dialogue and cooperation with incumbent. Mutual concessions and negotiated compromise between opposition and incumbent groups regarding electoral issues.

### 1.4. Preservation behavior classification

### OPPGME4

Code positively (1) if opposition behavior can be characterized as a Preservation Game, based on the matrix. Choose the indicators that justify this choice:

- 1) Active participation in official (legal requirements, etc) and unofficial electoral activities (debates, codes of conduct, etc)
- 2) Respect for standards and principles including human rights, non-violence.
- 3) Acceptance of status quo political regime (weak or no demands for change)
- 4) Acceptance of electoral results (minimal/no contestation)

### 1.5. Delegitimation behavior classification

### OPPGME5

Code positively (1) if opposition behavior can be characterized as a Delegitimation Game, based on the matrix. Choose the indicators that justify this choice:

- 1) Minimal or no participation in official and unofficial electoral activities – electoral boycott.
- 2) Employs strategic manipulation tactics (lobbying international actors, direct manipulation tactics, campaign rhetoric targets regime legitimacy) to undermine incumbent claim to democratic legitimacy.
- 3) Supports massive anti-regime protest and demonstration to undermine incumbent claim to democratic legitimacy.
- 4) Presence of significant electoral violence, including pre-electoral violence (anonymous acts, parties blame each other for violence, etc.) and post-electoral violence (rejection of results) to undermine incumbent claim to democratic legitimacy.

## **1.6 Breakdown behavior classification      OPPGME6**

Code positively (1) if opposition behavior can be characterized as a Breakdown Game, based on the matrix. Choose the indicators that justify this choice:

- 1) Extensive opposition group violence and/or boycott results in cancellation of election.
- 2) Coup d'état or other, non-elected power takes control.
- 3) Secessionist movement emerges/re-emerge during per-electoral period in association with opposition political party.
- 4) Radical campaign rhetoric incites violence, division, state dissolution, re-arming of warring factions.

## Annex B. Opposition Games & Behaviors – Double-Blind Coding Results

| Country                      | Year | Contest      | Behavior - Coder 1 | Behavior - Coder 2 |
|------------------------------|------|--------------|--------------------|--------------------|
| Angola                       | 2008 | Legislative  | Preservation       | Delegitimation     |
| Burkina Faso                 | 2005 | Presidential | Preservation       | Preservation       |
| Burkina Faso                 | 2007 | Legislative  | Preservation       | Preservation       |
| Burkina Faso                 | 2010 | Presidential | Delegitimation     | Delegitimation     |
| Burundi                      | 2005 | Combined     | Breakdown          | Preservation       |
| Burundi                      | 2010 | Combined     | Delegitimation     | Delegitimation     |
| Cameroon                     | 2004 | Presidential | Preservation       | Preservation       |
| Cameroon                     | 2007 | Legislative  | Preservation       | Preservation       |
| Central African Republic     | 2005 | Legislative  | Preservation       | Preservation       |
| Chad                         | 2006 | Presidential | Breakdown          | Delegitimation     |
| Comoros                      | 2004 | Legislative  | Preservation       | Preservation       |
| Comoros                      | 2006 | Presidential | Transition         | Transition         |
| Comoros                      | 2009 | Legislative  | Delegitimation     | Delegitimation     |
| Comoros                      | 2010 | Presidential | Delegitimation     | Delegitimation     |
| Congo                        | 2007 | Legislative  | Delegitimation     | Delegitimation     |
| Congo                        | 2009 | Presidential | Delegitimation     | Preservation       |
| Democratic Republic of Congo | 2006 | Combined     | Breakdown          | Delegitimation     |
| Djibouti                     | 2005 | Presidential | Delegitimation     | Delegitimation     |
| Djibouti                     | 2008 | Legislative  | Delegitimation     | Delegitimation     |
| Ethiopia                     | 2005 | Legislative  | Delegitimation     | Delegitimation     |
| Ethiopia                     | 2010 | Legislative  | Preservation       | <i>2 different</i> |
| Gabon                        | 2005 | Presidential | Preservation       | Delegitimation     |
| Gabon                        | 2006 | Legislative  | Preservation       | Preservation       |
| Gabon                        | 2009 | Presidential | Preservation       | Delegitimation     |
| Gambia                       | 2006 | Combined     | Preservation       | Preservation       |
| Guinea                       | 2010 | Presidential | Delegitimation     | <i>2 different</i> |
| Guinea-Bissau                | 2004 | Legislative  | Transition         | Transition         |
| Guinea-Bissau                | 2005 | Presidential | Delegitimation     | Preservation       |
| Guinea-Bissau                | 2008 | Legislative  | Transition         | Transition         |
| Guinea-Bissau                | 2009 | Presidential | Preservation       | Transition         |
| Kenya                        | 2007 | Combined     | Breakdown          | Delegitimation     |
| Liberia                      | 2005 | Combined     | Transition         | Transition         |
| Madagascar                   | 2006 | Presidential | Delegitimation     | Delegitimation     |
| Madagascar                   | 2007 | Legislative  | Preservation       | Preservation       |
| Malawi                       | 2004 | Combined     | Preservation       | Delegitimation     |
| Malawi                       | 2009 | Combined     | Delegitimation     | Delegitimation     |
| Mauritania                   | 2006 | Legislative  | Transition         | Transition         |
| Mauritania                   | 2007 | Presidential | Transition         | Transition         |

|              |      |              |                |                    |
|--------------|------|--------------|----------------|--------------------|
| Mauritania   | 2009 | Presidential | Delegitimation | Delegitimation     |
| Mozambique   | 2004 | Combined     | Delegitimation | Delegitimation     |
| Mozambique   | 2009 | Combined     | Delegitimation | Delegitimation     |
| Niger        | 2004 | Presidential | Transition     | Transition         |
| Niger        | 2009 | Legislative  | Delegitimation | Delegitimation     |
| Nigeria      | 2007 | Combined     | Delegitimation | Delegitimation     |
| Rwanda       | 2008 | Legislative  | Preservation   | Preservation       |
| Rwanda       | 2010 | Presidential | Delegitimation | NA                 |
| Sierra Leone | 2007 | Combined     | Transition     | Transition         |
| Tanzania     | 2005 | Combined     | Preservation   | <i>2 different</i> |
| Tanzania     | 2010 | Combined     | Transition     | Transition         |
| Togo         | 2005 | Presidential | Delegitimation | Delegitimation     |
| Togo         | 2007 | Legislative  | Preservation   | Preservation       |
| Togo         | 2010 | Presidential | Delegitimation | Delegitimation     |
| Uganda       | 2006 | Combined     | Delegitimation | Delegitimation     |
| Zambia       | 2006 | Combined     | Delegitimation | Preservation       |
| Zambia       | 2008 | Presidential | Preservation   | Delegitimation     |

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