

***Mobilizing in borderline citizenship regimes.
A comparative analysis of undocumented migrants' collective actions¹***

This article seeks to explain how and why groups and networks of undocumented migrants mobilizing in Berlin, Montreal and Paris since the beginning of the 2000s construct different types of claims. We explore the relationship between undocumented migrants and state authorities at the local level through the concept of the citizenship regime and its specific application to undocumented migrants (which we describe as the “borderline citizenship regime”). Despite their common formal exclusion from citizenship, non-status migrants experience different degrees and forms of exclusion in their daily lives, in terms of access to certain rights and services, recognition and belonging within the state (whether through formally or non-formally recognized means). As a result, they have an opportunity to create different, specific forms of leeway in the society in which they live. The concurrence of these different degrees of exclusion and different forms of leeway defines specific conditions of mobilization. We demonstrate how *the content of their claims are influenced by these conditions of mobilization.*

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The absence of residence papers for migrants living in a territory is a unique situation that denies these persons the right to be there, and places them in an highly precarious situation of legal, social and economic exclusion. Undocumented migrants are the “excluded among the excluded.”ⁱ They have collectively mobilized against this legal exclusion, generally in alliance with other social groups. For example, in Paris, Berlin and Montreal (and in many other locations),ⁱⁱ networks of undocumented migrants regularly organize public collective protest actions, such as demonstrations, marches and occupations. The type of actions these networks engage in are diverse: sometimes they launch extreme forms of protests such as hunger strikes; other times they use moderate styles of claims-making, such as lobbying campaigns or consciousness-raising campaigns through the media.

This article focuses on such mobilizations in a comparative perspective. We analyze the collective actions of undocumented migrants in three different cities: Berlin, Montreal and Paris. The comparison reveals their diversity with respect to the networks mobilized, the nature of their claims and the manner in which their arguments are constructed. For instance, movements of non-status persons in Berlin, Paris and Montreal attach different meanings to their causes: while in Paris and Montreal, the cause is presented as a multi-faceted one (labor conditions, housing conditions, risk of arrest and deportation, etc.), in Berlin, it is presented as a single issue (the confinement of non-status persons). Similarly, while the cause of undocumented migrants is often linked to other causes in Paris, thereby providing an opportunity to establish connections with other movements (and thus change the type of networks mobilized), it is a more isolated movement in Berlin and in Montreal.

The main objective of the paper is to tackle the following empirical puzzle: despite the fact that they are constructed around the same central claim - access to a legal residence status - the mobilizations of undocumented migrants take different forms and have different content in the three locations that we studied. How and why do they differ according to place?

We argue that undocumented migrants define their mobilizations differently in these three contexts because the conditions of mobilization are different: that is, they have different concrete possibilities for building alliances and networks, for accessing the media and other social actors and for using material and symbolic resources. These conditions are the result of a dual process.

First, the conditions of mobilization are influenced by the degrees and forms of exclusion that undocumented people experience on a daily basis. Like other excluded populations (homeless, poor people or unemployed for example), undocumented migrants face a series of conditions negatively affecting their ability to mobilize: they have few resources,ⁱⁱⁱ they have difficulties in establishing a collective identity,^{iv} and they face specific challenges, some of them directly linked to their

situation of illegality in the eyes of state authorities (for example, the simple fact of participating in public collective action exposes them to the risk of being arrested and deported).^v State legislation and public servants' practices^{vi} thus have a structuring effect on the conditions of mobilization of undocumented migrants.

Conditions of mobilization are also influenced by undocumented migrants own social practices. Especially, their "residence strategies"^{vii} create some leeway in their daily life and help them manage - or adapt to - their situation of exclusion. Non-status persons are not passive subjects: they live in societies, work, marry, pay taxes, consume goods and services and send their children to school. By engaging in these day-to-day activities, they create certain spaces of inclusion for themselves and for their relatives. In the course of their daily interactions (with employers, neighbors, controlling forces, allied activists, etc.), they define strategies that allow them to *deal* with the exclusionary mechanisms they face. In doing so, they are able to move the boundaries defined by public authorities, and so to improve the conditions of mobilization that they face.

Referring to the concept of "citizenship regime"^{viii}, we define the interaction between these two aspects of their experience as the process through which a "borderline citizenship regime" is built. We argue that the features of this citizenship regime define specific conditions of mobilization that will influence the content of their collective actions. The three borderline citizenship regimes that we consider (in Berlin, Montreal and Paris) represent three different sets of conditions of mobilization for undocumented migrants. They explain a large part of the variation in the content of the mobilizations we observed.

Our argument is both similar to and distinct from the current literature on mobilizations of excluded or marginalized populations. As in most of these studies, we consider undocumented migrants mobilizations as "unlikely"^{ix} because these populations face structuring conditions of exclusion that limit their access to material resources and constrain their actions.^x We agree that material conditions of mobilization have an influence on their content.^{xi} We also consider that the variations among the groups we are analyzing are not the main reason why we find differences in the content of their mobilizations. We argue that the characteristics of the networks involved in defending the cause of undocumented migrants are also linked to the *conditions* of mobilization that they face. Of course, this is not the only factor accounting for variation but we argue that it plays a major role in explaining who is mobilized in each location. The originality of our argument lies in that our focus is less on the structural constraints than on the creative practices and strategies that undocumented migrants develop to deal with these structuring forces.

We first present the concept of a borderline citizenship regime, and show how it can be used to analyze undocumented migrants' mobilizations in a comparative perspective. We then present the empirical results of our three cases and conclude with a comparative synthesis.

Beyond exclusion from citizenship: the borderline citizenship regime and the conditions of mobilization

In modern western states, citizenship defines who we are by granting us a nationality. It also defines what we are entitled to in political, social and economic terms. For this reason, citizenship plays a decisive role in determining our relationship to the state. Aside from citizenship, there exist a multitude of other statuses defined by the state which delineate legal and administrative categories, attributing some of the rights normally granted to citizens. These statuses concern permanent or temporary immigration (permanent resident status, migrant worker status, foreign student status, refugee status, etc.). The non-recognition of certain rights gives immigrants a limited status of citizenship: unlike citizens, they are “denizens”^{xii} (non-nationals whose right of residence is unlimited) and “foreigners” (non-national whose right of residence or stay is limited).^{xiii} Aside from these statuses, which are recognized and regulated by the state (full-fledged citizens and the various immigration statuses), a fringe of the population lives, works and studies in the absence of any legal recognition.^{xiv} In the eyes of the authorities, they are not citizens, or denizens, or even foreigners (all of which imply a legal status); they are “non-status immigrants”.^{xv} As Coutin underscores, in legal terms they occupy a “space of non-existence” for state authorities.^{xvi} Thus, in the eyes of the authorities, they are “non-persons”.^{xvii} Paradoxically, this situation of legal exclusion is also a situation of great dependence on the state: the state alone has the power to legalize their situation and integrate them into the territory’s political community or, conversely, to deport them. The question of citizenship is thus at the heart of the undocumented migrant’s life.

Scholars who have analyzed the exclusion of migrants and/or minorities^{xviii} have examined the citizenship issue through two dimensions. The first dimension is defined by the individual’s “access to the nation”.^{xix} nation-states determine which individuals have access to citizenship and to civil, social and political rights. This has led scholars to distinguish civic states from ethnic states or to compare and contrast the French and German notions of citizenship.^{xx} The second dimension defines citizenship from the perspective of minorities’ access to collective and cultural rights. Scholars have compared assimilationist states (France in particular) and multicultural states (such as Great Britain, Canada and the United States)^{xxi} based on their degree of tolerance toward particular identities. Moreover, scholars have shown further that formal access to citizenship is not to be

confused with the actual recognition of these rights: citizens with immigrant backgrounds have formal access to civil, social and political rights; however, they often face discrimination.

In discussions concerning undocumented migrants, attention is generally focused on the first dimension. The status of undocumented migrants is by definition a “non-status” for the nation-state; it is defined by a denial of individuals’ access to civil, social and political rights. Their living conditions are determined first and foremost by their exclusion from these rights, rather than by access to collective rights and the actual recognition of these rights. This being said, the situation of undocumented migrants in democratic countries is never one of total exclusion from civil, social and political rights: they find themselves at the “borders” as well as at the “boundaries” of citizenship.^{xxii} Here, the issue of geographic borders is closely related to the limits of belonging to the community. Undocumented migrants have crossed the borders. Their exclusion from the boundaries of citizenship cannot be total: certain minimal rights (such as the right to be admitted to a hospital in the event of an emergency) are often guaranteed to any person living within the territory (even if this person is considered by authorities to be “illegal”). The exclusion of undocumented migrants can exist to different degrees and take on different forms depending on the state in which they live.

The concept of citizenship regime^{xxiii} provides us with a better understanding of the types of leeway created by non-status persons in their interactions with their environments and offers a very useful tool for comparison of our three cases. The concept of citizenship regime “denotes the institutional arrangements, rules and understandings that guide and shape concurrent policy decisions and expenditures of states, problem definitions by states and citizens and claims-making by citizens.”^{xxiv} Citizenship regimes are defined by three dimensions. The first dimension—access—refers to formal access to rights that distinguish the various citizenship statuses and that define non-citizens by default. The second dimension—recognition—refers to the conditions of access to political representation, whether in terms of institutional arrangements or the legitimacy of actors and claims. The third dimension—belonging—refers to the most symbolic aspect of society in terms of belonging to a political community (national belonging and/or nationality). Non-status migrants are, in the words of Benedict Anderson, at the boundaries of “imagined communities.”^{xxv}

The conditions of mobilization of undocumented migrants are determined by their status of exclusion from the citizenship regime and the way in which they deal with it. Because it is possible to define different types of citizenship regimes,^{xxvi} it is also possible to distinguish different types of exclusion from this regime and different forms of leeway created by undocumented persons to deal

with their exclusion. This dual process defines what we refer to as a “borderline citizenship regime” in which undocumented persons live and become mobilized. This notion entails that the condition of undocumented migrants is determined by their situation at the border of the citizenship regime. On the one side, it implies that they are neither included, nor fully excluded from it: they live in an in-between situation which structures their existence. On the other side, it implies that undocumented migrants have the possibility (whether through formal or informal means) to deal concretely (on the basis of their day-to-day social practices and strategies) with this border and therefore to move it. In that sense, borders are not only physical barriers delimitating states’ territories, separating the domestic from the foreign. They consist also in more immaterial and changing limits that create social spaces of inclusion and exclusion within the *polis*. In other words, “they demarcate belonging and non-belonging and authorize a distinction between norms and exception”.^{xxvii} This distinction does not necessarily coincide with states’ territorial limits. In this regard, the border can be conceptualized as a zone (constructed by laws, practices and discourses),^{xxviii} or a “process”.^{xxix} Thus, following Nyers, the border’s zone “merges places such as health care clinics, social housing cooperatives, schools, food banks, welfare offices and police stations within a ubiquitous elsewhere”.^{xxx}

Jenson and Papillon^{xxxii} have shown that access to the rights defined by the citizenship regime (and their actual recognition) influences the construction of the identities and interests of collective and political actors and thus influences the process of political representation. We argue that the same is true regarding the borderline citizenship regime. In particular, we demonstrate that the citizenship regime influences the type of access to political representation that undocumented migrants have or do not have, because the opportunities for—and variety of—interactions between networks of undocumented migrants and others social groups will also vary in each case. The concept of a borderline citizenship regime encompasses the structuring context in which undocumented migrants build their identities and interests in each of the cases considered.^{xxxiii}

As in the case of the citizenship regime, the borderline citizenship regime can be characterized in terms of access, recognition and belonging.

1) Access: we have focused on four types of access, that is, to the labor market, to housing, to healthcare services and to education (for children of undocumented migrants). States provide undocumented migrants with legal access to some of these rights.^{xxxiii} However, in cases where they do not have legal access to these rights, they sometimes have access to certain services in an informal (or not formally recognized) manner. We have taken this possibility into account in comparing our three cases. As we discuss in the second part of our article, informal access depends

on the practices of police control in the public space. Indirectly, it depends very much on state-defined deportation policies.

2) Recognition: theoretically, there is no room for recognition of undocumented migrants by the state; they remain on the territory illegally, and in order to survive they should not, as individuals or as a group, seek any recognition. Nevertheless, undocumented migrants can be recognized by the state as part of the community when they gain access to the citizenship regime through a regularization procedure. States can launch regularization programs from time to time, or they can define a right to regularization that depends on specific criteria (for example, the length of the stay in the territory). The criteria for regularization vary over time and space, and the possibility of regularization is the main indicator for comparing the degrees of recognition of undocumented person in Berlin, Montreal and Paris. Apart from this binary dimension (i.e., only two solutions exist: you are either inside the political community and recognized by the state or you are on the outside and not recognized), partial collective recognition does occur, especially when undocumented migrants have the concrete opportunity to exist as collective actors. This opportunity relies on several factors, but one appears particularly crucial: the existence of alliances with other (already recognized) actors. These two criteria (the possibility of regularization and the existence of alliances) form the basis for analyzing the recognition dimension in each case.

3) Belonging: undocumented migrants represent a political problem for all governments and are usually presented as such in political discourse. However, the intensity of this public exposure can vary over time and place and different forms of symbolic exclusion may be observed. As shown by Baudino^{xxxiv} in her analysis of debates concerning gender equality in Belgium, the identity of persons who have access to the regime (the rights-holders) and the identity of the excluded are also defined by the manner in which public problems are constructed and debated in the public sphere. From this perspective, aside from the issue of denial of access to civil, social and political rights, and aside from the absence of recognition, the exclusion of undocumented migrants from the citizenship regime has a symbolic aspect as well: the designation of illegal migrations in the public sphere as a public problem by public authorities. In order to address this issue, we have focused on one indicator: the politicization of illegal migration (in other words, the extent to which public authorities prioritize the handling of this issue in their public discourses). The greater the politicization of the illegal migration issue, the greater the symbolic exclusion of undocumented migrants from the citizenship regime. As we will demonstrate, strong politicization of the issue is often associated with rapid reinforcement of the legal exclusion of undocumented migrants. In other words, politicization serves to justify new restrictive policies and practices.^{xxxv}

Depending on the manner in which these three dimensions are articulated, undocumented migrants are able to create different forms of leeway, defining specific citizenship regimes for

themselves. Different citizenship regimes at the border offer different conditions of mobilization that affect the way collective actors build their own cause and express their identities and interests through their discourses. After presenting our methodology and case selection, we will demonstrate how these elements interact in the cases of three cities: Paris, Berlin and Montreal.

Methodology

Our research is based on a comparison of networks of undocumented migrants at the local level. Decisions regarding the conditions of exclusion of undocumented migrants are generally taken at the national level, and sometimes internationally, but they are always applied at the local level.^{xxxvi} Furthermore, undocumented migrants construct their mobilizations primarily at the local level.^{xxxvii} Finally, the size of our unit of analysis, i.e. the city, allows us to build a virtually comprehensive sample: in Montreal, we have considered all important groups and networks mobilizing for the regularization of undocumented migrants from 2000 to 2009; in Berlin and in Paris, we have considered almost all of them for the same period.

These three cities are comparable in terms of the populations of undocumented migrants living on their respective territories but differ substantially with regard to the type of exclusion from the citizenship regime they offer. While they differ in size and status (two are capitals and the other is not), they are major economical urban centers in which undocumented migrants can establish themselves and have an opportunity to work, more often than not in the secondary and tertiary sectors. However, the immigration policies that are applied in each case are very different (in terms of detention procedures, possibility of regularization, politicization of the issue, etc.). These comparable yet contrasting cases offer an excellent framework for analyzing the connections between the citizenship regimes as experienced by non-status persons (the citizenship regimes at the border) and the contents of their mobilizations.

In each case, we analyze these connections by examining the discourses of the main groups and networks that mobilize around the cause of non-status persons.^{xxxviii} As several authors have underscored, discourses are the result of the daily experiences of the actors within social movements, rather than a strategic tool used independently from their own experiences and the events they face.^{xxxix} In this respect, the discourses of social movements are an expression of the identities and interests they have constructed in the course of their mobilizations, the result of the interaction among their intentionality, their environment and their strategies. Following this line of

query, we rely on the various types of discourses produced by networks of undocumented migrants in Montreal, Paris and Berlin.

We have selected 16 groups and networks (seven in Paris, four in Montreal and five in Berlin) mobilizing for the inclusion of undocumented migrants in recent years and that are representative of the most important mobilizations defending their cause in these three cities during the 2000s. We focus on two types of collective actors: groups or networks of undocumented migrants only (such as the *9e Collectif des Sans-Papiers* (9th Collective of Undocumented Persons in Paris), the Coalition against the Deportation of Palestinian Refugees in Montreal and the Voice Refugee Forum in Berlin); networks of undocumented migrants and individual or collective actors, such as trade unions, which considered themselves as allies (e.g., *Réseau Education Sans Frontières* (Education Without Borders Network) in Paris, *Solidarity Across Borders* in Montreal or *No Lager* in Berlin). These groups and networks vary in terms of size, history and organization. As we will develop, many of these variations are linked to the different conditions of mobilizations faced by undocumented migrants in these three cities. We will show in particular that, because of these differences, the groups mobilizing in Paris are generally bigger in size, have a longer history, and have more diversified allies than in Montreal and Berlin. We will also show that undocumented migrants' groups are more often organized on the basis of the countries of origin in Montreal than in Berlin and Paris. Beyond these variations, these groups and networks have however some common traits: they are non-professionalized grass-roots organizations; they have few material resources (much of these are provided by the networks of allies); they are rather small and act mainly at the local level; and they are recent (most of them were created during the 2000s). We collected approximately 250 public documents published by these groups and networks from 2000 to 2009.^{xl} These documents (e.g., communiqués, calls for demonstrations, petitions) were produced in the course—and for the purpose—of their mobilizations. They organize and publicly justify the collective actions they construct, such as demonstrations, marches, public meetings, lobbying campaigns, occupations and hunger-strikes. We performed a comparative analysis of these documents through discourse categories developed by frame analysis,^{xli} focusing on the distinction of various diagnostics (the definition of a problematic situation), prognostics (the presentation of the means to solve a problem situation) and motivations (the presentation of a rationale for mobilization). We also examined how the cause of undocumented migrants is connected (or is not connected) to other causes.

We begin our discussion of the cases of Berlin, Paris and Montreal by presenting the details of the borderline citizenship regime in each case, as well as their impact on the concrete conditions

of mobilization of non-status persons. Then, we demonstrate how these elements are connected with the discourses of groups and networks mobilizing for the defense of undocumented migrants through three dimensions: the degree of diversification of the diagnostics on which they rely; the various lines of differentiation within the cause of undocumented migrants; and the connection of their cause with other related causes.

Berlin: Isolation as a primary condition of mobilization and the definition of specific issue-oriented mobilizations to denounce organized segregation

Germany has long been considered a “reticent immigration country”,^{xlii} since the middle of the 1970s, immigration control policies have become increasingly restrictive, and access to civil, social and political rights has become increasingly difficult for migrants living in the German territory.^{xliii} This still holds true today.^{xliv} For undocumented migrants, the result is a system of strong marginalization. This system is characterized by both a formal and an informal exclusion from the citizenship regime resulting in restricted mobility at the local level. This is, however, counter-balanced by certain opportunities for regularization and by a relatively low level of symbolic exclusion from the citizenship regime (the illegal migration issue is politicized at selected times only and rarely receives front-page coverage in the media). These elements orient the content of mobilizations, which focus more on living conditions (as opposed to a demand for regularization or access to certain rights) and fight first and foremost against social isolation.

In Germany, undocumented migrants are excluded from most of the rights attached to the citizenship regime: they have no access to the labor market, to health services (except in case of emergency), to housing or to education.^{xlv} Since Germany is the European state that deports the largest number of migrants,^{xlvi} police controls are very frequent in the public space. Moreover, in Berlin particularly, a specific police agency (*Arbeitsgebiet Ausländer*) has been responsible for immigration issues since 1971. One of its tasks is to control undocumented migrants with a view to possible deportations.^{xlvii} In this context, informal access to rights related to the citizenship regime is challenging. For example, the illegal labor market (even if it is expanding) remains limited and is difficult for undocumented migrants to access because controls are frequent.^{xlviii} In addition, most of the undocumented migrants who work illegally do so in non-public spaces where they are more shielded from controls (e.g., domestic work, small garment factories and restaurants).^{xlix} With regards to access to other rights, the German law on foreigners (*Ausländergesetz*) requires providers of public services (schools, hospitals, employment agencies) to inform immigration services of any

infractions regarding immigration legislation. Public service providers work as a part of the migration controls policy.¹

In Berlin, formal exclusion from the citizenship regime is associated with a powerful system of control, which is extended to most sectors of social life. In this context, the mobility of undocumented migrants at the local level is very limited: the fear of police controls is permanent, and the interactions of undocumented migrants with social groups outside the immigrant community are difficult. Furthermore, some of the undocumented migrants living in the German territory (those who cannot be regularized but who cannot be deported either)^{li} face a process of detention or “obligation of residence” (*Residenzpflicht*): they must live in reception centers and cannot leave the district in which they have been placed. The undocumented migrants living in these centers are indeed facing a situation of total isolation. They are often situated in isolated areas (in the region of Berlin, there are four centers), and their interaction with social groups outside of these centers is very limited. For example, because they do not have the right to work, they have a minimum living allowance paid by the state, which is given in the form of vouchers and which can only be used in a limited number of shops. The undocumented migrants living in these reception centers have limited movement outside the centers and develop a feeling of total dependence vis-à-vis public authority. Like most of the undocumented migrants living in Germany, these undocumented migrants live in closed-quarters; at the local level, they face a process of marginalization that limits their interactions with social groups included in the citizenship regime. This situation is particularly difficult for undocumented migrants from African countries: because of the color of their skin, the risk of control by the police in public places is high.^{lii} The border separating undocumented migrants from the rest of the population living in Germany is not only a legal border; it is also a border defined in terms of skin color.

Furthermore, the possibility of escaping from these conditions and obtaining recognition from the state are very rare. German law does provide some opportunities for regularization: between 1996 and 2007, approximately 120,000 undocumented migrants were regularized.^{liii} These opportunities are, however, limited: they apply solely to persons with the status of “tolerance” (*Duldung*) and, most of the time, lead to a residence permit of only one or two years (after which time the possibility of deportation is re-evaluated depending on the situation in the country of origin).

Finally, we find an intermediate level of symbolic exclusion with respect to the dimension of belonging. The issue of illegal immigration has rarely been strongly politicized in Germany since

the beginning of the 2000s.^{liv} In the early 1990s, the high politicization of asylum policies led to dramatic events: an aggressive anti-immigrant press campaign was launched and several asylum-seekers were killed by neo-Nazi groups.^{lv} Since that time, the moderate political class has agreed to avoid framing the immigration policy issue as primarily a “public problem” (separate from the issue of the integration of foreigners). Specific episodes (such as the Visa Affair in the early 2000s^{lvi}) have raised the importance of this issue in public debates. The politicization of the illegal immigration issue, however, remains low in comparison with other European countries.^{lvii}

In Berlin, undocumented migrants face conditions of isolation from the rest of the population living on the German territory. Their mobility at the local level is limited, and they live in closed quarters at the margins of society. This is particularly true for migrants who are affected by the *Residenzpflicht* law and who are assigned to reception centers. The borderline citizenship regime is therefore characterized by isolation, or at least a marked separation between non-status migrants and German citizens. How are these conditions of mobilization related to the discourses of groups and networks that mobilize on behalf of undocumented migrants?

As one would expect, the discourse of undocumented migrants organizing as collective actors focuses mainly on conditions of isolation and their consequences on living conditions. The most important object of the mobilizations in Berlin is the *Residenzpflicht* law. For example, the Voice Refugee Forum (mobilizing in the north-east of Germany) presents itself as follows:

Germany is the only country in Europe where refugees are criminalized by the law of the movement restriction (*Residenzpflicht*). This law shows that refugees in Germany are meant to be socially isolated, not only being kept in far away camps in the middle of forests, also the restriction of movement by the “*Residenzpflicht*” law excludes refugees from the mainstream societies by not allowing them to mix with the general populace, fellow refugees and migrants who may be living in other cities.

The movement restriction law keeps refugees from seeing their doctors, their lawyers, their friends and relatives and for some of them worst of all from continuing the political activities that made them flee their country in the first instance. The government law is gagging us in a way.^{lviii}

The mobilizations focus on the most extreme form of isolation and demand an end to the detention measures. As mentioned above, the *Residenzpflicht* law applies only to some of the

undocumented migrants living in Germany (those who cannot be regularized but who cannot be deported either). Paradoxically, collective demands concern those undocumented migrants who are most protected from deportation measures. This line of differentiation (between those who are affected by the *Residenzpflicht* and those who are not) is hard to overcome, and the definition of more general claims that would apply to all undocumented migrants living in Germany is difficult to develop. For instance, we find fewer claims demanding the end of deportation measures or better working conditions than in the cases of Montreal and Paris.

Lastly, given the minimal politicization of the illegal immigration issue in Germany, mobilizations of undocumented migrants in Berlin have had a low level of visibility, and they have experienced less diversified forms of support. Our documentary analysis reveals that the communiqués and calls launched in Berlin have limited and homogeneous lists of co-signatories: most of them are groups and networks from autonomous movements. Comprehensive associations mobilizing for the defense of human rights, associations mobilizing around other causes, trade unions and political parties are rarely involved in these mobilizations. Their process of frame bridging remains limited; the cause of undocumented migrants is rarely linked with other causes. Undocumented migrants mobilizing in Berlin must take their cause into the public sphere: being less politicized, their situation is generally ignored by public opinion and they have difficulty finding allies during their mobilizations. Their discourse focuses on the awareness of potential allies. The cause of undocumented migrants is often presented through a humanitarian frame; it focuses on individual cases and on their daily living conditions in order to sensitize the public to what it means to be undocumented in Berlin. For example, in a call launched in 2008, the group Initiative Togo Action Plus illustrated the consequences of the *Residenzpflicht* law through one particular case:

This is to prevent refugees from integration, to isolate them from the world around them. This law punishes a lot of refugees who do not know which way to follow. This is the case with the political refugee Kodjo D'Almelda of the Initiative "TOGO ACTION PLUS". Actually, Kodjo has been many times a victim of this racist law. He travelled many times without permission because it would have meant that he pays 10 Euro each time he asked for permission: for 1, 2, 3 days or 1 week. In the region of Sachsen Anhalt (Halle Saalkreis), it is an obligation to pay 10 Euro, if not you are refused permission. He has been controlled 6 times. The first time he had to pay 65 Euro to the alien office, the second time 65 Euro and the third time also 65 Euro. The fourth time he

was summoned to court and was threatened with imprisonment if he failed to appear in court on the day of the court process.^{lix}

As we can see, the situation of total isolation that some undocumented migrants experience on a daily basis tends to shape the kind of claims that collective actors can make and to limit the scope of their mobilizations; it is challenging to present claims defined in general terms that would apply to the situation of all undocumented migrants living in Germany. This goes hand in hand with a very low level of alliances with other collective actors: in Berlin (as in Montreal, as we will see below), networks of undocumented migrants are operating very much alone. Their first obstacle is to be recognized as a political issue in the public space.

Paris: A more encompassing borderline citizenship regime, with changing mobilizations focused on improving living conditions for inclusion as full citizens

In Paris, the exclusion of undocumented migrants from the citizenship regime is less extensive than in Berlin. However, this situation has been changing since the beginning of the 2000s. In the context of high politicization of the illegal immigration issue, both the formal and informal access of undocumented migrants to the rights attached to citizenship is increasingly restricted and their mobility at the local level is more and more limited. Furthermore, fewer opportunities for regularization exist today than in the past. Nevertheless, compared to the case of Berlin, mobilizations are quite different and rely on strong alliances with recognized collective actors included in society.

In contrast with Germany, undocumented migrants living in France have more formal rights. They have access to public health care, and children are allowed to attend school.^{lx} In addition, illegal occupation of land and the illegal labor markets are more prevalent in France (as in most southern European countries) than in Germany,^{lxi} and undocumented migrants can access jobs and housing more readily through informal means. Regularization procedures are more open as well, and they lead to a more stable status (long-term residence permits). From 1998 to 2006, undocumented migrants were regularized if they could prove that they had resided in France for over 10 years, in the case of an illness that could not be treated in the country of origin, or if they had children born in France. Approximately 25,000 individuals have benefited from this regularization procedure in each of these years.

The situation is rapidly changing, however. Since the mid-2000s, the frequent legislative and administrative reforms have limited the rights of undocumented migrants significantly. In 2006, the option of regularization after 10 years of residence in the French territory was repealed. Since 2006 as well, employers have been required to verify that their employees (or future employees) have a work permit. Informal access to the labor market is thus considerably restricted. Above all, the explosion of the number of deportation procedures^{lxii} has had harmful consequences. Police controls have increased significantly and intensified the exclusion of undocumented migrants. With the multiplication of police controls, undocumented migrants have more difficulty accessing providers of public services. For example, the right to education is limited by the mushrooming of controls in the school environment. Also, informal access to housing and employment is increasingly limited due to the multiplication of police controls in these sectors. All in all, the mobility of undocumented migrants at the local level is becoming considerably reduced because the risks of controls in the public space are increasing. In Paris, police controls are conducted in areas with dense populations of foreigners, and control practices reveal that the exclusion of undocumented migrants from the citizenship regime is higher for people of color. As in Berlin, individuals from African countries are subject to more controls than other people and are forced to limit their mobility.^{lxiii} Another consequence of the explosion of deportations is the rise in detention procedures: from 2000 to 2007, the number of undocumented migrants placed in detention centers increased from 17,000 to 35,000, and the maximum length of detention increased from 12 to 32 days.^{lxiv}

In contrast with the situation in Berlin, the issue of illegal migration has been defined by public authorities as a major “public problem” since the beginning of the 2000s.^{lxv} The high politicization of this issue has served to justify frequent legislative and administrative changes: from 2000 to 2008, no less than five legislative reforms have involved immigration controls.^{lxvi} Since 2002 and the strong performance in the presidential elections of the Front National (FN), an extreme-right party, French governments have politicized the issue in order to attract the FN electorate.^{lxvii} This has resulted in the transformation of public discourses related to illegal immigration into a “securitarian discourse,”^{lxviii} fostering a high symbolic exclusion of undocumented migrants.^{lxix}

In Paris, the borderline citizenship regime is characterized on the whole by partial access to rights, certain opportunities for recognition and a very high degree of politicization. How do these conditions of mobilization interfere with the content of the discourses presented by undocumented migrants?

Undocumented migrants mobilizing in Paris (and in Montreal as we will see below), unlike their counterparts in Berlin, present their condition from a variety of angles. For example, while the undocumented migrants mobilizing in Berlin emphasize their exclusion from the labor market, those mobilizing in Paris emphasize their concrete (informal) inclusion when denouncing their working conditions. This is evident from a call launched by the *9e Collectif des Sans-Papiers* in Paris:

Hundreds of thousands of undocumented persons work in the construction industry, public works, food services and the hotel industry. (...) They work at difficult and essential jobs. Because of them, roads are extended, houses are built, hot meals are prepared, the laundry is done. (...)

They participate in the economy, and each day they are hunted in a most inhumane fashion and are described as taking advantage of aid and welfare. (...) This is a lie perpetuated for political and economic reasons: to divide the weakest members of society, blaming foreigners, and undocumented persons in particular, for their problems; and to create a docile, cheap labor force, at the mercy of employers and police, who are subject to exploitation and who can be fired at a moment's notice, and whose only right is to obey and be quiet.^{lxx} (Author's translation)

Undocumented migrants are required to use diverse arguments in their discourses when presenting the various aspects of their lives. Therefore, a description of their situation on the labor market goes hand-in-hand with the fight against economic exploitation. This issue is also often linked with the defense of fundamental rights or the fight against racism. Our analysis reveals, however, that the situation is changing. Since the mid-2000s, the restriction of rights has oriented the public discourses formulated by groups and networks of undocumented migrants on issues of repression and persecution, and on issues of isolation. However, in comparison with Berlin, the discourses of the movements mobilizing in Paris remain more diversified.

The specific demands formulated by networks of undocumented migrants in Paris define several lines of differentiation within their movements. Undocumented migrants have put forward demands, directly linked with the changes in immigration policies, for specific categories. In 2003, they insisted on the regularization of individuals facing deportation. In 2004, they began to demand the regularization of families with children attending school (in particular, with the network *Réseau éducation sans frontières* (Education without Borders Network), which includes the main education

unions). More recently, they demanded the regularization of undocumented migrants on the basis of their participation in the French economy (the campaign for the regularization of all migrant workers). In recent years as well, they have demanded the release of all undocumented migrants held in detention. All of these fights were led by groups of undocumented migrants and by central collective actors, such as the main trade unions and several left-wing parties.

Each of these specific claims is based on a particular line of cleavage within the general cause of the undocumented migrants (for example, between migrant workers and migrants who do not work). These lines of cleavage emerge (or deepen) when changes to immigration policy suddenly affect one aspect of their daily experiences. For example, the demand for the regularization of families with children attending school emerged when new police practices allowing for the identification of undocumented migrants' children in schools came into force.

Lastly, in Paris, in contrast with Berlin (and Montreal as we will see below), undocumented migrants often relate their claims with claims put forward by other social movements: they follow an extensive process of frame bridging. Due to the high level of politicization of the illegal immigration issue, undocumented migrants have had the opportunity to find diverse allies. Indeed, the high politicization of this issue has led diverse actors (political parties and leaders, trade unions, journalists, social movements, etc.) to take a position. The cause of the undocumented migrants has become visible in the public sphere and has allowed various opponents of the French government to support it. This has led undocumented migrants to relate their mobilization with other social movements, as they have found many allies at the local level during the course of their collective actions. This frame-bridging dynamic is visible in their discourse. Thus, many of the communiqués or calls for demonstration launched by groups of undocumented migrants are co-signed by associations and networks mobilizing around other issues (such as *Droit au Logement* (Right to Housing),^{lxxi} Act Up^{lxxii} and the *Coordination des Intermittents et Précaires d'Ile de France* (Coordination of Intermittent Workers and Precarious Persons of the Ile de France),^{lxxiii} or by generalist associations mobilizing for the defense of human rights (such as the *Ligue des Droits de l'Homme* (League for the Defense of Human Rights) and Amnesty International. Many of them have also been co-signed by trade unions and political parties from the opposition. The cause of undocumented migrants is often related with the causes of precarious workers, the unemployed, victims of racism, persons living in poor-quality housing, etc. In a call to demonstration symptomatically entitled “Etudiants, sans-papiers, salariés, intermittents, chômeurs, retraités, tous précaires, tous solidaires” (Students, undocumented persons, workers, laborers, intermittent workers, retired persons, all precarious, all solidary) the *9e Collectif des sans-*

papiers (supported by several associations and networks) denounced all governmental policies that create “social insecurity”:

Elected in 2002 against a backdrop of an extensive political consensus to bring about the failure of the Front National, the current government has since been applying safe and ultra-liberal policies that the FN would not have failed to drive ahead; provisions promoting an individualistic, utilitarian and slave-like vision of humans. These “fear politics” rest on one predicate: equality opportunity for each person and the individualization of risks.

In other words, a job has to be earned, and being deprived of one is a sign that the individual is dysfunctional, left to wallow in his own shame. Social insecurity.^{lxxiv} (Author’s translation)

The dynamics of the convergence of movements is rooted in history. In the mid-1990s, the mobilizations of undocumented persons benefited from a cycle of protest in France, beginning in December 1995 with the general strike against pension reform. This cycle of protest was characterized by a convergence of social movements around a general cause: *la cause des “sans”* (the cause of the have-nots), which was the term used to describe the situations of persons without jobs, without decent housing conditions or without residence documents.^{lxxv} In this context, undocumented migrants built diversified support networks and managed to place their mobilizations at the core of this cycle of protest.

As we can see, the nature of the claims is different in Paris and in Berlin. Because undocumented migrants in Paris are living in a citizenship regime that offers more leeway in their daily lives, they have more opportunities to do what full citizens do (they work, they go to school, they consume goods and services). When these conditions are threatened, they mobilize to preserve them. The rationalization of their claims centers on the argument that they are *de facto* members of the political community and contribute to the society and its development. These particular conditions of mobilization facilitate the building of alliances with other actors (such as unions) included in the citizenship regime and also sustain public sympathy for their cause. The tightening of their citizenship regime during the last five years due to changes in public policy has been followed by strong popular support of their cause and the denunciation of state repression.

Montreal: Paradoxical borderline citizenship regime leading to limited mobilizations

In Montreal, the borderline citizenship regime is characterized by a paradox: undocumented migrants face formal exclusion from most of the rights attached to citizenship but at the same time have informal access to some of the services provided by the province of Quebec. Their mobility at the local level is less restricted than it is in Berlin or even in Paris. Moreover, they do not face symbolic exclusion because the issue of illegal immigration is not politicized.

In Quebec, as in Canada as a whole, the formal rights of undocumented migrants are limited. The only public services to which they have access are hospitals (in case of emergency)^{lxxvi} and schools. However, many of the undocumented migrants living in Canada have an intermediate status that allows access to specific services guaranteed by the citizenship regime. For example, persons whose claim for asylum has been refused, but who cannot be deported because their country of origin is affected by a moratorium, are entitled to work subject to certain conditions.

The possibilities for full recognition by a regularization procedure are nonetheless much more limited than in France and Germany. The only undocumented migrants who can be regularized are those whose country of origin is affected by a moratorium (through a regularization for humanitarian considerations).^{lxxvii} For the rest of the undocumented migrants living in Canada, no regularization procedure exists. In 2002, over 900 undocumented Algerian migrants living in Quebec were regularized following a protest movement against the cancellation of the Algerian moratorium. This measure, however, has been employed rarely in Canada since the mid-1990s.

The number of deportations from Canada has risen since the beginning of the 2000s: in 2002–2003, approximately 7,000 undocumented migrants were deported, and approximately 10,700 were deported in 2006–2007.^{lxxviii} However, undocumented migrants who are deported are not arrested through police controls in public spaces (even if this practice has been increasing in recent years).^{lxxix} Almost all of the undocumented migrants who are deported are asylum-seekers whose claim for asylum was refused and who were detained while their case was being considered. The increase in deportation procedures coincides with an increase in the detention procedures of asylum-seekers (on the grounds of lack of cooperation regarding their identification).^{lxxx}

In comparison with the French and (above all) German cases, the lower risk of control by the police in public spaces has several consequences: undocumented migrants have some access to social services and housing (especially through community medical centers);^{lxxxii} they have some access to the illegal labor market and they work in diverse economic sectors;^{lxxxii} and their mobility at the local level is much less limited. It is easier for them to live as full citizens and they are not as

limited in the type of interactions they can have with the rest of the population. They have greater individual leeway on a daily basis than in the other two cases.

Furthermore, in comparison with both France and Germany, the symbolic exclusion of undocumented migrants is rather limited in Quebec, as it is in Canada as a whole. In 2001, the Canadian government, in conjunction with the United States government, adopted a “smart border action plan,” which constitutes a major change in migration controls for Canada.^{lxxxiii} This issue was not, however, debated publicly by the political class when the plan was adopted. More generally, the issue of undocumented migrants is not presented as a priority by the public authorities in Canada and Quebec; it is not even presented as a problem.^{lxxxiv}

On the whole, exclusion from the citizenship regime is quite restrictive, but the daily living conditions of undocumented migrants in Montreal are more similar to those of full citizens, compared with the situations in Paris and Berlin, due to the less repressive policies, informal access to some services and to paid work, and a lower degree of politicization. The effects of these conditions of mobilization on the content of their collective actions are complex.

In Montreal, as in Paris, we observe a tendency to emphasize the *de facto* contribution to Canadian society of undocumented migrants. For example, the network Solidarity Across Borders, which is active in Montreal, argues:

Since 2001, the new Immigration and Refugee Protection Act has exacerbated the systematic racism, discriminatory criteria and arbitrary decision-making of Immigration Canada, creating more obstacles for people to qualify as refugees and permanent residents. Additionally, the asylum procedure for refugees lacks an appeal process, and bureaucracy has created an enormous backlog. Yet, day by day, this growing underclass of exploited clandestine workers, deprived of all rights, fuels the Canadian economy.^{lxxxv}

Nevertheless, in a context of decreased politicization of the illegal immigration issue in Canada (as in Germany), the mobilizations of undocumented migrants in Montreal have been less visible, and they have enjoyed less diversified support than in Paris. Our analysis reveals that, as in Berlin, the lists of co-signatories for communiqués and calls launched in Montreal have been more limited and homogeneous. The process of frame bridging is limited (in comparison with Paris), and the cause of undocumented migrants is rarely linked with other causes. This leads to the definition

of a humanitarian discourse focusing on individual cases and on the daily living conditions of undocumented migrants in order to gain the support of potential allies in public opinion. For instance, in a call launched in November 2004 in Montreal, the Coalition against the Deportation of Palestinian Refugees used a humanitarian vocabulary (it denounced the “inhumane detention system”) in order to “expose” the situation of undocumented migrants “to the media and the public”:

The Immigration and Refugee Board refused to release Ahmad following a detention review hearing held today. (...) According to lawyers, Ahmad faces a very high likelihood of indefinite detention there simply because he is young, Palestinian and male. (...) It is therefore a crucial time to show solidarity with Ahmad and expose Immigration Canada's inhumane detention system to the media and the public.^{lxxxvi}

In Montreal, when demands are not formulated in general terms, they concern the nationality of undocumented migrants in particular. This is connected to Canadian legislation in terms of protection against deportation measures and regularization procedures. Often, undocumented migrants construct a mobilization to protest against the cancellation of a moratorium (this was the case of the Algerian mobilization of 2002) and to demand their regularization for humanitarian reasons on the basis of the situation in their country of origin (as is the case of the Coalition Against the Deportation of Palestinian Refugees). These groups do not demand the regularization of all undocumented migrants: they demand the regularization of those originating from a specific country. Thus, lines of differentiation are created between undocumented migrants of different origins.

In each case we observe a strong link between the borderline citizenship regime and the forms of mobilizations they build. This conclusion might appear trivial. However, in the last part of this article, we propose a comparative synthesis of our results to demonstrate more precisely how the particular conditions of mobilization that undocumented migrants face in the citizenship regime in which they live affect the content of their public demands when they organize as collective actors.

Synthesis: Citizenship regimes at the border, conditions of mobilizations and forms of protest

Our comparative analysis of Berlin, Montreal and Paris reveals different forms and degrees of exclusion that undocumented migrants face in these three cities. The results of this analysis are summarized in Table 1.

Table 1: The exclusion of undocumented migrants in Berlin, Montreal and Paris

	Berlin	Paris	Montreal
Exclusion from access to the services guaranteed to citizens	High	Intermediate	Intermediate
Level of recognition	Low	Intermediate	Low
Exclusion from belonging	Intermediate	High	Low

As we have shown at the very beginning of the article, all undocumented migrants experience radical exclusion from citizenship in each of the cases considered, because they are not considered as legal subjects of the state. Nevertheless, our analysis of the degree of exclusion from the three dimensions of the citizenship regimes reveals that the conditions of mobilization differ significantly from one place to another. To be an undocumented migrant in a reception center in Berlin, to live in a highly controlled environment in Paris, and to live for all intents and purposes as a nameless reality in Montreal does not mean the same thing in terms of concrete possibilities of mobilization. In Berlin, the access that undocumented migrants have to certain services guaranteed by the citizenship regime is very limited, while in Paris and Montreal, they do have access, either formally or informally, to some of these basic services.

In Berlin, Paris and Montreal, undocumented migrants do not experience the same levels of recognition. In Paris, undocumented migrants have more opportunities to be regularized than they do in Berlin or in Montreal (where these opportunities are very limited). In addition, groups and networks of undocumented migrants have more allies among citizens in Paris than in Berlin or Montreal.

Lastly, from a symbolic perspective, the issue of undocumented migrants is not defined in the exact same way in each society considered. In Quebec, the issue is very rarely a public problem, while in France, undocumented migration has been at the top of the political agenda since the mid-1990s. Germany occupies a middle ground: undocumented migration is defined as a problem, but it is hidden from the public sphere as much as possible.

Undocumented migrants also experience different degrees of exclusion with regard to the belonging dimension. In Paris, because of the high politicization of the issue, undocumented migrants are clearly considered by the state as being “on the outside” of the imagined community and treated as such by police forces. In Montreal, because undocumented migrants are not identified as a public problem, they are not considered to be “on the outside” and have more opportunities to act as full citizens. In Berlin, the situation is less clear-cut: because undocumented migrants are considered to be “on the outside” of society, they are not an accepted public problem. Undocumented migrants are, thus, suffering from public invisibility as well as from repressive treatment.

An analysis of the discourses of collective actors demonstrates the existence of similarities among networks of undocumented migrants in Berlin, Montreal and Paris. In particular, the common condition of formal exclusion from the citizenship regime obliges them to use the injustice argument in their discourse. However, as expected, profound differences exist among our three cases. An analysis of the materials produced by the movements of undocumented migrants in each case since the beginning of the 2000s clearly illustrates three principal dissimilarities. In these three cities, undocumented migrants use different types of diagnostics (more or less diversified) to express their claims; they define different lines of differentiation within their movement; and they relate their causes differently to other causes. These dissimilarities are connected to: different degrees and types of difficulty impeding formal and informal access to the services normally guaranteed by the citizenship regime; different degrees of difficulty in the recognition of undocumented migrants; different degrees of difficulty impeding their belonging. All of these dimensions have an influence on the experiences and interactions of undocumented migrants in the course of their mobilization and on the definition of their own cause.

First, differences involving access to the services guaranteed by the citizenship regime are connected to the different types of diagnostics that groups of undocumented migrants and networks create in each place. In Berlin, undocumented migrants face especially strong exclusion from the access dimension, and their conditions of mobilization are characterized by isolation from the rest of society. The movements mobilizing in Berlin focus their claims around this particular problematic situation. In contrast, in Paris and Montreal, undocumented migrants have less difficulty accessing some of the services normally guaranteed by the citizenship regime. They are able to create more leeway for themselves in their situation of exclusion, and their conditions of mobilization are characterized by the possibility of having more diversified interactions on a daily

basis. In the discourses presented by their mobilizations, they tend to define a variety of problematic situations (for example, jobs, housing and health care).

Second, our comparison illustrates that the cases of Berlin, Paris and Montreal can be distinguished in terms of the fragmentation (or differentiation) of the claims. General claims (such as the regularization of all undocumented migrants or the end of all deportation measures) can be found in the three cases. These demands concern the overall condition of undocumented migrants, whatever the degree or mode of exclusion. However, beyond these common claims, it is interesting to note that demands are often formulated with different variations. When demands are more specific (that is, when they do not concern all documented migrants), they define different categories of undocumented migrants in Berlin, Montreal and Paris. In other words, the lines of differentiation between different categories of undocumented migrants are not constructed in the same manner. In our three cases, the cause of undocumented migrants is plural, but for different reasons: the lines of differentiation distinguishing them correspond to different logics and are connected to the most restrictive aspect of legal exclusion from the citizenship regime in each case. In Germany, it reflects the condition of isolation; in France, the frequent restrictive immigration policy changes; and in Canada, the very limited opportunity for regularization.

Third, we note a difference in terms of the extensiveness of the frame-bridging process. In Paris, the cause of the undocumented migrants is often linked to other related causes: movements of undocumented migrants are often encompassed by broader social movements related to the fight against precarious conditions of life or against racism, for example. In Montreal and Berlin, the cause of the undocumented migrants is rarely linked with other related causes, and the movement of undocumented migrants appears more isolated. These differences are connected to the degree of politicization of the issue in each case. In France, the issue of undocumented migrants is treated as an illegal immigration issue and is highly politicized. Strongly excluded from the symbolic dimension of the citizenship regime and considered by the state as being “outside” of the national community, undocumented migrants, as collective actors, are nevertheless able to build alliances with opponents of the French government and to include their mobilizations within wider causes. Their symbolic exclusion as an administrative category (illegal immigrants) creates facilitating conditions in terms of collective action and protest. In contrast, in Germany and Canada, the lower level of politicization of the illegal immigration issue makes it more difficult for undocumented migrants to find allies to their cause, and connections with other causes are less frequent than in Paris. In Montreal and Berlin, the public invisibility of undocumented migrants greatly restricts their collective actions and the possibility of convergence with other allies.

This difference in the symbolic dimension of the citizenship regime is crucial for collective actors. In Paris, the specific situation of undocumented migrants being “outside” the national community facilitates their ability to present calls for mobilization through what they describe as a process of enlargement and intensification of their movement:

In Rennes, Bordeaux, Paris and throughout France and Europe, recent months have witnessed strong mobilizations against retention centers. The revolt against Mesnil Amelot won Vincennes, and strikers demanded the extension of the movement to all retention centers. Let us give more breadth to this movement. Let us support the revolt of undocumented persons.^{lxxxvii} (Author’s translation)

In Berlin and Montreal, however, before common claims can be established and protests expanded, they must emerge as a public “problem.” The idea is not to participate in collective action in order to “join” a movement but rather in order to organize the emergence of this movement. Constituents and potential supporters are called to mobilize and provide visibility to the cause of undocumented migrants:

To fight against the fear and paranoia generated by the government, we provide mutual support within a spirit of solidarity and mutual aid. Today we march so that all of our friends and allies who have been deported, detained and forced to live clandestinely or in refuge because of their religious beliefs, or who have been victimized by security certificates. (...) We refuse to be invisible, and we refuse to live in fear. We demand status for everyone. Join our efforts, and we will win.^{lxxxviii} (Author’s translation)

While the impact on collective actions of the low level of politicization of undocumented migrant issues is similar in Berlin and Montreal, it has different effects at the individual level. In Montreal, the low level of politicization is coupled with a low level of repression and control from the police forces, facilitating local mobility and a concrete opportunity to participate in collective life by working, attending school, consuming products and services, and establishing social relationships. In Berlin, the low level of politicization is coupled with repressive policies, limiting the local mobility of undocumented migrants and their participation in society.

Conclusion

It is evident that the relationship between the degrees and forms of exclusion from the citizenship regime and the content of the mobilizations of undocumented migrants is very complex. The links are not mechanical. Other elements must be taken into account to explain why a specific network developed as it did in a specific place. Nevertheless, we propose that in the case of undocumented migrants, who occupy a very specific position in our societies (at the border of citizenship regimes), their concrete conditions of mobilization must be examined to gain an understanding of the variations in mobilizations around their cause in the three cities considered. We show that the analysis of the links between the concrete conditions of mobilization and the content of the mobilizations in each city reveals some of the major social and political transformations that are occurring at the heart of these societies.

In particular, we demonstrate that changes in terms of policing and control of populations have an effect on the content and forms of mobilizations of undocumented migrants because they influence the opportunities of individuals to circulate locally and to have contact with people outside their circles in the course of their mobilizations. In our case, however, more control does not automatically mean fewer opportunities for collective mobilization: in the case of Paris, more police control combined with a strong public debate have contributed to enlarging the scope of mobilizations and the building of bridges with other social movements, even if the mobilizations are very precarious, due to repressive policies. Moreover, claims are not only made by non-status migrants but also by allies who demand a redefinition of the citizenship regime in all of its dimensions (access, recognition and belonging) in order to integrate individuals who play a concrete role in national collective life. In Montreal, the lack of public recognition prevents a movement from existing fully, and mobilizations of undocumented migrants work more as public awareness campaigns, even if individual dimensions of daily life are less restricted than in Paris and Berlin. Here, the citizenship regime is sufficiently elastic to allow some leeway at the individual scale. In this context, collective action demands changes in collective political representation: undocumented migrants search for public recognition. In Berlin, the same kind of process occurs: collective action is limited by the strictly confined public place the issue occupies, and the lives of individuals are restricted by very limited access to the citizenship regime. Groups and networks search for public recognition as well as for more integration into collective life. In all three places, through their individual and collective actions, undocumented migrants participate in the definition and redefinition of citizenship regimes.

ⁱ Etienne Balibar, *Droit de cité* (Paris: PUF, 2002).

ⁱⁱ See below for a justification of our three cases. For other empirical cases, see in the United States: Claudio Lomnitz, “2006 Immigrant Mobilizations in the United States,” in Michel Feher, Gaëlle Krikorian and Yates McKee, eds., *Nongovernmental Politics* (New York : Zone Books, 2007) : 434-445 ; in Australia : Prem Kumar Rajaram and Carl Grundy-Warr, “The Irregular Migrant as Homo Sacer: Migration and Detention in Australia, Malaysia, and Thailand,” *International Migration* 42, no. 1 (2004): 33–64; in Switzerland: Elodie Antony, *La mobilisation des sans-papiers : une revendication de l’invisible ? Etude du Collectif des Travailleurs et Travailleuses Sans Statut Légal à Genève* (Geneva: Université de Genève, 2010).

ⁱⁱⁱ Frances Fox Piven and Richard Cloward, *Poor People’s Movements: Why They Succeed, How They Fail* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1977); Bob Edwards and John McCarthy, “Resources and Social Movement Mobilization” in David Snow, Sarah Soule and Hanspeter Kriesi, eds., *The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements* (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2004), 116-152; David Snow, Sarah Soule and Daniel Cress “Identifying the Precipitants of Homeless Protest Across 17 U.S. Cities, 1980 to 1990,” *Social Forces* 83, no. 3 (2005): 1183–1210.

^{iv} Sophie Maurer, *Les chômeurs en action (décembre 1997–mars 1998): Mobilisation collective et ressources compensatoires* (Paris: L’Harmattan, 2001).

^v Frédéric Royall, “The Problems of Collective Action for Associations of the Unemployed in France and Ireland”, in Ricca Edmondson, ed., *The Political Context of Collective Action: Argumentation, Power and Democracy* (London: Routledge, 1997), 146–162; Jean Faniel, “Belgian Unemployed and Obstacles to Collective Action,” Paper presented at the European Consortium for Political Research Conference, Marburg (Germany), September 2003.

^{vi} As developed below, exclusion of undocumented migrants is primarily of a formal nature (exclusion from citizenship and the basic rights associated with it, including the right to be there). Because of that, civil servants and police forces in situations of social interaction with undocumented migrants have the power to deport them or to denounce them to state authorities.

^{vii} Godfried Engbersen, “The Unanticipated Consequences of Panopticon Europe: Residence Strategies of Illegal Immigrants,” in Virginie Guiraudon and Christian Joppke, eds., *Controlling a New Immigration World* (New York: Routledge, 2001): 222-246.

^{viii} Jane Jenson and Susan D. Phillips, “Regime Shift: New Citizenship Practices in Canada,” *International Journal of Canadian Studies* 14, no. 1 (1996): 111-136; Jane Jenson and Martin Papillon, “The Changing Boundaries of Citizenship: A Review and a Research Agenda” in *Modernizing Governance: A Preliminary Exploration* (Ottawa: Canadian Centre for Management Development 2000); Jane Jenson and Susan D. Phillips, “Redefining the Canadian citizenship regime: Remaking the institutions of representations” in Colin Crouch, Klaus Eder and Damian Tambini, eds., *Citizenship, Markets and the State* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001): 69-89

^{ix} Lilian Mathieu, “Une mobilisation improbable : l’occupation de l’église Saint-Nizier par les prostituées lyonnaises,” *Revue française de science politique* 40, no. 3 (1999): 475-499.

^x Simone Baglioni, Britta Baumgarten, Didier Chabanet, and Christian Lahusen, “Transcending Marginalization: The Mobilization of the Unemployed in France, Germany and Italy in Comparative Perspective”, *Mobilization* 13, no. 3 (2008): 323-335; Didier Chabanet and Frédéric Royall, eds., *Mobilizing Against Marginalization in Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2010); Frances F. Piven, and Richard A. Cloward, *Poor People’s Movements*, (New York: Pantheon, 1977).

^{xi} Donatella Della Porta, “Protest on unemployment: forms and opportunities”, *Mobilization* 23, no. 3 (2008): 277-295; Olivier Fillieule, ed., *Le désengagement militant* (Paris: Belin, 2005); Andrew Richards, *Mobilizing the Powerless: Collective Protest Action of the Unemployed in the Interwar Period*, *Working Paper 175*, (Madrid: *Juan March Institute*, 2002); Johanna Siméant, *La cause des sans-papiers* (Paris, Presses de Sciences Po : 1998) ; David Snow, Sarah Soule and Daniel Cress (2005), op. cit.

^{xii} Thomas Hammar, ed., *European Immigration Policy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985)

^{xiii} Thomas Hammar (1985), op. cit. ; Andrea Réa, “Les immigrés et la citoyenneté de l’Union Européenne,” in Marie Telo and Paul Magnette, eds., *Repenser l’Europe* (Bruxelles: Editions de l’ULB, 1994): 85-101.

^{xiv} Although it is impossible to calculate the exact number of undocumented migrants living in a territory, several estimates provide a good idea of the figure. Different studies have shown that non-status migrants represent two to three percent of the total population of large cities in western states (Jörg Alt, “Illegalität im Städtevergleich: Leipzig, München, Berlin,” *IMIS Beiträge* 27 (2005) 71-80). Estimates regarding the three cases that we analyze in this article (Berlin, Montreal and Paris) are available at the national level: between 50,000 and 100,000 undocumented migrants are living in Canada (Erika Khandor, Jean McDonald, Peter Nyers and Cynthia Wright, *The Regularization of Non-Status Immigrants in Canada 1960–2004. Past Policies, Current Perspectives, Active Campaigns* (2004), www.ceris.metropolis.net (accessed June 3, 2009); between 200,000 and

400,000 lived in France (Henri Courau, *Undocumented Migration Counting the Uncountable. Data and Trends across Europe, Country report France* (2008) www.clandestino.eliamep.gr (accessed June 3, 2009); and between 100,000 and one million live in Germany (Norbert Cyrus, *Undocumented Migration Counting the Uncountable. Data and Trends across Europe, Country report Germany for the research project Clandestino* (2008) www.clandestino.eliamep.gr (accessed: June 3, 2009).

^{xv} Peter Nyers, “No One Is Illegal. Between City and Nation” in Egin Isin and Greg Nielsen, eds., *Acts of Citizenship* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008): 160-181.

^{xvi} Susan Coutin, *Legalizing Moves: Salvadoran Immigrants’ Struggle for US Residency* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2000): 28.

^{xvii} Alessandro dal Lago, *Non-Persone. L’Esclusione dei Migranti in una Societa Globale* (Milano: SAGGI, 2004)

^{xviii} Virginie Guiraudon, *Les politiques d’immigration en Europe. Allemagne, France, Pays-Bas* (Paris: L’Harmattan, 2000); Thomas Hammar (1985), op. cit.; Ruud Koopmans, Paul Statham, Marco Giugni and Florence Passy, *Contested Citizenship: Immigration and Cultural Diversity in Europe* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2005); Andréa Réa, “Accès à la citoyenneté des immigrés et absence de reconnaissance,” in Jane Jenson, Bérengère Marques Pereira and Eric Remacle, eds., *L’Etat des citoyennetés en Europe et dans les Amériques*, (Montréal: Presses de l’Université de Montréal, 2007), 125-149.

^{xix} Rogers Brubaker, *Citizenship and Nationhood in France and in Germany* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992).

^{xx} Dominique Schnapper, *L’Europe des immigrés. Essai sur les politiques d’immigration* (Paris: François Bourin, 1992).

^{xxi} Will Kymlicka, *Multicultural Citizenship. A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995).

^{xxii} Jane Jenson, “Des Frontières aux lisières de la citoyenneté” in Jane Jenson, Bérengère Marques Pereira and Eric Remacle, eds., *L’Etat des citoyennetés en Europe et dans les Amériques* (Montréal: Presses de l’Université de Montréal 2007): 23-30.

^{xxiii} Jane Jenson and Susan D. Phillips (1996; 2001), op. cit.

^{xxiv} Jane Jenson, “Rethinking Equality and Equity. Canadian Children and the Social Union,” in Edward Broadbent, ed., *Democratic Equality, What Went Wrong?* (Toronto: University of Toronto, 2001): 114.

^{xxv} Benedict Anderson, *Imagined communities* (London: Verso, 2000).

^{xxvi} Jane Jenson and Susan Phillips (1996, 2001), op. cit.; Koopmans and al. (2005), op. cit.

^{xxvii} Prem Kumar Rajaram and Carl Grundy-Warr, eds., *Borderscapes. Hidden Geographies and Politics and Territory's Edge* (Minneapolis : The University of Minnesota Press, 2007) : 9.

^{xxviii} Prem Kumar Rajaram and Carl Grundy-Warr (2007), op. cit. : 10. In this perspective, see also Sandro Mezzadra, *I confini della libertà. Per una lettura politica delle migrazioni contemporanee*, (Rome : DeriveApprodi, 2004) ; Didier Bigo and Elspeth Guild, eds., *Controlling Frontiers. Free Movement Into and Within Europe* (London : Ashgate, 2005).

^{xxix} Katja Franko Aas, "Borders and the Changing Notions of Territoriality," in Elia Zureik and Mark Salte, eds., *Global Surveillance and Policing. Borders, Security, Identity* (Devon : Willam Publishing : 2005).

^{xxx} Peter Nyers (2008), op. cit. : 167.

^{xxxi} Jane Jenson and Martin Papillon (2000), op. cit.

^{xxxii} Our research is based on a comparison of movements of undocumented migrants at the local level, using major cities as a criterion for comparison. Although decisions regarding the conditions of exclusion of undocumented migrants are taken at the national level, they are applied at the local level (Alexis Spire, *Etrangers à la carte. L'administration de l'immigration en France, 1945-1975* (Paris: Grasset, 2005). Furthermore, it is primarily at the local level that undocumented migrants construct their mobilizations (Siméant, 1998, op. cit.). Lastly, the size of our unit of analysis, i.e. the city, allows us to build a virtually comprehensive sample: in Montreal, we have considered all important groups mobilizing for the regularization of undocumented migrants; in Berlin and in Paris, we have considered the most important groups mobilizing for the regularization of undocumented migrants from 2000 to 2009 (see below).

^{xxxiii} In most situations, legal access has been guaranteed through appeals to international law (Soysal, Yasemin, *Limits of Citizenship: Migrants and Postnational Membership in Europe* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994).

^{xxxiv} Claudie Baudino, "Citoyenneté et parité en Belgique. Figures et projets dans le débat paritaire" in Jane Jenson, Bérengère Marques Pereira and Eric Remacle, eds., *L'Etat des citoyennetés en Europe et dans les Amériques* (Montréal: Presses de l'Université de Montréal, 2007): 101-124.

^{xxxv} This is in line with historical studies that have analyzed the evolution of discourses and public policies related to the immigration issue since the nineteenth century (Guiraudon, op. cit.; Ulrich Herbert, *Geschichte der Ausländerpolitik in Deutschland. Saisonarbeiter, Zwangsarbeiter, Gastarbeiter, Flüchtlinge* (Munich: Beck, 2000); Gérard Noiriel, *Immigration, antisémitisme et racisme en France, 19^e-20^e siècle. Discours publics, humiliations privées* (Paris: Fayard, 2007).

^{xxxvi} International standards can have an influence on migrants' rights in general (Soysal, 1994, op. cit.). States, however, are the main actors that shape the conditions of exclusion of undocumented migrants, through the implementation of their immigration policy at the local level (Alexis Spire,

Etrangers à la carte. L'administration de l'immigration en France, 1945-1975 (Paris: Grasset, 2005). The focus of our analysis is at the city level, with the national level as a background, and we set aside the influence of the international level on the conditions of exclusion of undocumented migrants.

^{xxxvii} Siméant (1998), op. cit.

^{xxxviii} While the dynamics internal to the networks and the organizations themselves play a crucial role in the understanding of mobilizations, this aspect is beyond the scope of our article and could constitute the subject of another study.

^{xxxix} Elizabeth Armstrong, *Forging Gay Identities: Organizing Sexuality in San Francisco, 1950–1994* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2002); Jane Jenson, “Social Movements Naming Practices and the Political Opportunity Structure,” Paper presented at the Juan March Institute, Madrid, April 1998; Della Porta, Donatella and Gianni Piazza, *Voices of the Valley, Voices of the Straits: How Protest Creates Communities* (Berghahn Books, 2008); Daniel Cefaï and Danny Trom, eds., *Les Formes de l’Action Collective* (Paris: Editions de l’EHESS, 2001); Lilian Mathieu, “Rapport au politique, dimensions cognitives et perspectives pragmatiques dans l’analyse des mouvements sociaux,” *Revue française de science politique* 52, no. 1 (2002): 75-100.

^{xl} For instance, in 2006, 41 documents were produced by these groups and networks: 13 in Berlin, 9 in Montreal and 19 in Paris.

^{xli} David Snow, Burke Rochford, Steven Worden, Robert Benford, “Frame Alignment Processes, Micromobilization, and Movement Participation,” *American Sociological Review* 51, no. 1 (1986): 464-481; David Snow and Robert Benford, “Framing Processes and Social Movements: An Overview and Assessment”, *Annual Review of Sociology* 26, no. 1 (2000): 611-639.

^{xlii} Dietrich Thränhardt, “Germany - An Undeclared Immigration Country,” *New Community* 21, no. 1: 19-35.

^{xliii} Dietrich Thränhardt (1995), op. cit.; Virginie Guiraudon (2000), op. cit.

^{xliv} Norbert Cyrus (2008), op. cit.

^{xlv} Norbert Cyrus (2008), op. cit.

^{xlvi} Holk Stobbe, *Undokumentierte Migration in Deutschland und den Vereinigten Staaten* (Göttingen, Universitätsverlag, 2004). Recent studies place the number of deportations in 2002 and 2003 at 40,000 and 36,000, respectively. In 2002 and 2003 as well, 47,000 and 44,000 people, respectively, were deported immediately upon their arrival at the border (Sénat, Service des études juridiques, *L’expulsion des étrangers en situation irrégulière*, Étude de législation comparée n° 162, Paris, 2006).

^{xlvii} Jérémie Gauthier, “A Berlin, le contrôle par la prevention,” *Plein Droit*, no. 81 (2009): 25-29.

^{xlviii} The same can be said for the illegal housing market (Stobbe, 2004).

^{xlix} Stobbe (2004), op. cit.

^l Stobbe (2004), op. cit.

^{li} These migrants have a status of “tolerance” (*Duldung*). It is not a legal status; it is a provisional annulment of the deportation procedure. Individuals with the *Duldung* status have certain rights that other undocumented migrants do not have. For example, they have a minimum living allowance provided by the state, and their children may attend school. In 2006, approximately 200,000 migrants had this status (Philipp Riecken, *Die Duldung als Verfassungsproblem* (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2006).

^{lii} Jörg Alt and Ralf Fodor, *Rechtlos? Menschen Ohne Papiere: Anregungen für eine Positionsbestimmung* (Karlsruhe: Von Loeper, 2001).

^{liii} Martin Baldwin-Edwards and Albert Kraler, *Regularisations in Europe, Study on practices in the area of regularisation of illegally staying third-country nationals in the Member States of the EU*, Research project for the International Centre for Migration Policy Development, 2009, <http://research.icmpd.org/1184.html> (accessed: June 3, 2009).

^{liv} Norbert Cyrus (2008), op. cit.

^{lv} Ulrich Herbert (2000), op. cit.

^{lvi} This expression refers to the media’s discovery that several German diplomats awarded a very high number of visas to Ukrainian migrants.

^{lvii} Andrew Geddes, *Immigration and European Integration. Towards Fortress Europe?* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2000); Didier Bigo and Elspeth Guild, eds., *Controlling Frontiers: Free Movement Into and Within Europe* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005).

^{lviii} The Voice Refugee Forum, “Information about The Voice Refugee Forum Germany,” www.thevoiceforum.org (accessed: April 4, 2010).

^{lix} Initiative Togo Action Plus, “The Residenzpflicht law is a racist law,” August 15, 2008.

^{lx} François Brun, “Social and Economic Aspects of Living Conditions of Undocumented Migrants in France” in PICUM, *Book of Solidarity, Providing Assistance to Undocumented Migrants in France, Spain and Italy*, 2003: 16-34.

^{lxi} In France, the sectors of construction, catering and domestic work depend in large part on the employment of undocumented migrants (Brun, 2003, op. cit.).

^{lxii} In 2008, French authorities carried out 29,000 deportations. From 2002 to 2007, the number of deportations rose by 140% (Henri Courau, *Undocumented Migration Counting the Uncountable. Data and Trends across Europe, Country report France for the research project Clandestino*, 2008, www.clandestino.eliamep.gr (accessed: June 3, 2009).

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- ^{lxiii} The vast majority of undocumented migrants detained in retention centers are from North-African or sub-Saharan countries (Coureau, 2008, op. cit.).
- ^{lxiv} Cimade, *Rapport 2007 sur les centres et locaux de rétention administrative*, 2008, www.cimade.org (accessed: June 3, 2009).
- ^{lxv} Jérôme Valluy, “Quelles sont les origines du ministère de l’Identité nationale et de l’Immigration ?” *Cultures et Conflits* 69, no. 1 (2008): 7-18.
- ^{lxvi} Karin Sohler, *Regularisations in Europe, Study on practices in the area of regularisation of illegally staying third-country nationals in the Member States of the EU, Country report France*, Research project for the International Centre for Migration Policy Development, 2009, <http://research.icmpd.org/1184.html> (accessed: June 3, 2009).
- ^{lxvii} Olivier Le Cour Grandmaison, “Colonisés-immigrés et ‘périls migratoires’ : origines et permanence du racisme et d’une xénophobie d’Etat (1924-2007),” *Cultures et Conflits* 69, no. 1 (2008): 19-32; Gérard Noiriel (2007), op. cit.
- ^{lxviii} Didier Bigo, *Polices en Réseaux: L’Expérience Européenne* (Paris : Presses de la Fondation nationale des sciences politiques, 1996).
- ^{lxix} This process is not new but has become more visible since the early 2000s (Noiriel, 2007, op. cit.; Bigo and Guild, 2005, op. cit.).
- ^{lxx} 9^e Collectif des sans-papiers, “1er Mai 2009 Manifestation contre la précarisation, la criminalisation et pour la convergence des lutes” (Demonstration against precariousness, criminalization and for the convergence of fights, May 2009).
- ^{lxxi} Mobilizing around housing conditions.
- ^{lxxii} Mobilizing around the HIV issue.
- ^{lxxiii} Mobilizing around the precarious working conditions in the cultural field.
- ^{lxxiv} 9^e Collectif des sans-papiers, Etudiants, sans-papiers, salariés, intermittents, chômeurs, retraités, tous précaires, tous solidaires, April 7, 2006.
- ^{lxxv} Xavier Crettiez and Isabelle Sommier, eds., *La France rebelle: tous les mouvements et acteurs de la contestation* (Paris: Michalon, 2006).
- ^{lxxvi} However, they will be required to pay for it (François Crépeau and Cécile Rousseau, “Health Care Access for Refugees and Immigrants with Precarious Status: Public Health and Human Rights Challenges,” *Revue Canadienne de Santé Publique* 99, no. 4 (1999): 7-21.).
- ^{lxxvii} Studies estimate that approximately 5% of all undocumented migrants living in Canada can be regularized through this procedure (Erika Khandor, Jean McDonald, Peter Nyers and Cynthia Wright (2009), op. cit.).

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- ^{lxxxviii} Canadian Border Services Agency, Efficient and effective border management that contributes to the security and prosperity of Canada, 2008. www.cbsa-asfc.gc.ca (accessed: June 3, 2009).
- ^{lxxxix} Eugénie Depatie-Pelletier, *Le Québec et le Canada refusent de reconnaître aux travailleurs migrants les droits protégés par la Convention de l'O.N.U.*, Working paper presented for the Canada Research Chair on International Migratory Law, 2007.
- ^{lxxx} François Crépeau and Delphine Nakache, "Controlling irregular migration in Canada, Reconciling Security Concerns with Human Rights Protection," *Immigration and Refugee Policy* 12, no. 1 (2006): 5-23.
- ^{lxxx} François Crépeau and Cécile Rousseau, "Health Care Access for Refugees and Immigrants with Precarious Status: Public Health and Human Rights Challenges," *Revue Canadienne de Santé Publique* 99, no. 4 (2009): 7-21.
- ^{lxxxii} Erika Khandor, Jean McDonald, Peter Nyers and Cynthia Wright, 2004, op. cit.
- ^{lxxxiii} Idil Atak, François Crépeau and Delphine Nakache, "Sécurité et droits de la personne au Canada et en Europe : un déséquilibre à corriger," *Options politiques* 1, 2006: 30-35.
- ^{lxxxiv} François Crépeau, interview in Renaud Goyer, *Créer l'illégalité*, documentary film produced for the *Centre de recherches sur les Politiques et le Développement Social*, Montreal, 2008
- ^{lxxxv} Solidarity Across Borders, "The four demands of Solidarity Across Borders," <http://www.solidarityacrossborders.org> (accessed April 4, 2010).
- ^{lxxxvi} Coalition against the Deportation of Palestinian Refugees, visit to Laval detention center in support of Ahmad Nafaa, November 2004.
- ^{lxxxvii} 9^e Collectif des sans-papiers, Marche sur le CRA de Vincennes (March on the Vincennes detention center), January 2008.
- ^{lxxxviii} Solidarité Sans Frontières, Pourquoi nous marchons... (Why we are marching...), May 2006.