

Université de Montréal

**Order and the Literary Rendering of Chaos:
Children's Literature as Knowledge, Culture, and Social
Foundation**

par

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Thèse présentée à la Faculté des arts et sciences
en vue de l'obtention du grade de Ph. D.
en littérature
option théorie et épistémologie de la littérature

Mars, 2011

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Université de Montréal
Faculté des arts et des sciences

Cette thèse intitulée:

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and Social Foundation

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Abstract

Ever since the human animal devised a system of technologies for abstract thought through language, the war on wilderness has become a one way path towards alienation, civilisation and literature. In this work, I examine how the civilised narrative orders experience by means of segregation, domestication, breeding, and extermination; whereas, I argue that the stories and narratives of wilderness project chaos and infinite possibilities for experiencing the world through a diverse community of life.

One of my goals in conducting this study on children's literature as knowledge, culture and social foundation has been to bridge the gap between science and literature and to examine the interconnectedness of fiction and reality as a two-way road. Another aim has been to engage these narratives in a dialogue with each other as I trace their expression in the various disciplines and books written for both children and adults as well as analyse the manifestation of fictional narratives in real life. This is both an inter- and multi-disciplinary endeavour that is reflected in the combination of research methods drawn from anthropology and literary studies as well as in the content that traces the narratives of order and chaos, or civilisation and wilderness, in children's literature and our world.

I have chosen to compare and contrast three fictional children's books that offer three different real-world socio-economic paradigms, namely, A.A. Milne's *Winnie-the-Pooh* projecting a civilised monarcho-capitalist world, Nikolai Nosov's trilogy on *The Adventures of Dunno and Friends* as presenting the challenges and feats of an anarcho-socialist society in evolution from primitivism towards technology, and Tove Jansson's *Moominbooks* depicting chaos, anarchy, and wilderness that contain everything, including encounters with civilisation, but most of all an infinite love for the world.

Stemming from the basic question in research methodology on how we know the world, I first examine the construction, transmission, and acquisition of knowledge, particularly through the lens of Bourdieu's theory of *praxis*, as well as the critique of language and literacy through Zerzan's, Ong's, and Goody's studies on the links between literacy, debt and oppression. Regarding children's literature depicting the three socio-

economic paradigms, I chose three books with which I have been familiar since childhood, i.e. in whose narratives I have “native fluency” and, in this sense, this work is also about “anthropology at home”. Moreover, I compared and contrasted the underlying premises not only in the three books, but also with the unfolding narratives of wilderness and civilisation in real life, that I inserted in the form of ethnographic/journal entries throughout the dissertation. As I examine the very nature of literature, culture, and language and the civilised structures that domesticate the world through the threat of death and the expropriation of food, I also trace the presence of these narratives in the scientific (the Malthusian-Darwinian narrative), religious, and other cultural expressions and the challenges provided by anarchist science and theory (Kropotkin) as well as wild children's books such as Jansson's Moomintrolls.

Keywords: children's literature, anthropology, anarchy, civilisation critique, chaos, narratives, literary theory, primitivism, ontology, epistemology.

Titre:

L'ordre et la mise en scène littéraire du chaos: la littérature pour enfants comme savoir, culture, et fondation sociale

Résumé

Depuis que l'animal humain a conçu un système de technologies pour la pensée abstraite grâce au langage, la guerre contre le monde sauvage est devenu une voie à sens unique vers l'aliénation, la civilisation et la littérature. Le but de ce travail est d'analyser comment les récits civilisationnels donnent une structure à l'expérience par le biais de la ségrégation, de la domestication, de la sélection, et de l'extermination, tandis que les récits sauvages démontrent les possibilités infinies du chaos pour découvrir le monde en toute sa diversité et en lien avec sa communauté de vie.

Un des objectifs de cette thèse a été de combler le fossé entre la science et la littérature, et d'examiner l'interdépendance de la fiction et la réalité. Un autre objectif a été de mettre ces récits au cœur d'un dialogue les uns avec les autres, ainsi que de tracer leur expression dans les différentes disciplines et œuvres pour enfants et adultes mais également d'analyser leur manifestations c'est redondant dans la vie réelle. C'est un effort multi-disciplinaires qui se reflète dans la combinaison de méthodes de recherche en anthropologie et en études littéraires.

Cette analyse compare et contraste trois livres de fiction pour enfants qui présentent trois différents paradigmes socio-économiques, à savoir, «Winnie-l'Ourson» de Milne qui met en place un monde civilisé monarcho-capitaliste, la trilogie de Nosov sur «les aventures de Neznaïka et ses amis» qui présente les défis et les exploits d'une société anarcho-socialiste dans son évolution du primitivisme vers la technologie, et les livres de Moomines de Jansson, qui représentent le chaos, l'anarchie, et l'état sauvage qui contient tout, y compris des épisodes de civilisation.

En axant la méthodologie de ma recherche sur la façon dont nous connaissons le monde, j'ai d'abord examiné la construction, la transmission et l'acquisition des connaissances, en particulier à travers la théorie de *praxis* de Bourdieu et la critique de la civilisation développée dans les études de Zerzan, Ong, et Goody sur les liens entre l'alphabétisation, la dette et l'oppression. Quant à la littérature pour enfants, j'ai choisi trois livres que j'ai connus pendant mon enfance, c'est-à-dire des livres qui sont devenus comme une «langue maternelle» pour moi. En ce sens, ce travail est aussi de «l'anthropologie du champ natif».

En outre, j'analyse les prémisses sous-jacentes qui se trouvent non seulement dans les trois livres, mais dans le déroulement des récits de l'état sauvage et de la civilisation dans la vie réelle, des analyses qui paraissent dans cette thèse sous la forme d'extraits d'un journal ethnographique. De même que j'examine la nature de la littérature ainsi que des structures civilisées qui domestiquent le monde au moyen de menaces de mort, je trace aussi la présence de ces récits dans l'expression scientifique (le récit malthusien-darwinien), religieuse, et dans autres expressions culturelles, et réfléchis sur les défis présentés par la théorie anarchiste (Kropotkine) ainsi que par les livres pour enfants écrits du point de vue sauvage, tels que ceux des Moomines.

Mots-clés: littérature pour enfants, anthropologie, anarchie, critique de civilisation, chaos, théorie littéraire, primitivisme, ontologie, épistémologie, sociologie.

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An Acknowledgement and dedication

Since the day I was born, my meandering fate has been taking me through a wild range of geographic, occupational, political, and social contexts in which questions of language and literacy continually presented themselves with a persistent urge. I began to speak late and it was a concern for my mother, because she always mentioned that, unlike her other children, I uttered my first word at the age of three years and half.

I was born in Moscow, a megapolis, to two inter-racial, inter-continental, intercultural, and multi-lingual students and so chunks of my early childhood alternated between passionate university student life and solitude in a dorm room, other chunks I spent in a five-days-per week boarding daycare. But, the most memorable and intense experiences I lived in a tiny village surrounded by forests, rivers, and fields with my grandparents. My brightest, happiest memories come from that silence, that era, that pre-lingual universe and its forest.

Questions of language and literacy have followed me throughout my life, even if I was not always aware of them, because, apart from my favourite pass-time of being in the wilderness and in the company of animals, I enjoyed painting, observing, listening, reading, and writing, which opened doors into the “hard” and other sciences, humanities and the arts and mapped a special place in my heart for zoology and ethology.

The kindness of animals and the wilderness I have known stood in stark contrast with the violence I have experienced and witnessed at the hands of civilised people: I have worked in refugee death camps and have come face to face with perverts and serial killers (both, the legal-military types and the illegal-warped ones). I have seen anthropogenic deforestation crawl up in front of my eyes in Africa and in Europe and have understood what it is like to suffocate from agrarian chemicals and poisons in the overpopulated countryside of Asian lands. And, throughout my life, ever since I understood where meat came from at the age of four, my concern was to learn how to live right in this world which meant, how to take care of it, not cause it pain and be happy with it.

In all of my undertakings, I sought this synchrony with the wilderness I have known and this has driven me to abandon my studies in civil engineering, then fine arts,

then political (war) journalism in Africa, then anthropological research in Europe, and guided me through my explorations of North and Central America, Australia, and Asia. The various pieces I have collected from these multi-dimensional voyages have fallen into place when my daughter came into my life and set me off on my most important quest of finding out what do I really have to offer the generations to come. Epistemology, ontology and anthropology should have taught me how to live in this world full of human hatred, discrimination, deforestation, pollution, and war. But the only direction they pointed me to was back to wilderness.

We are force-fed with literacy and literature from our first day because we are told that we cannot live without learning how to read and write. But if my own reading and writing stemmed from a desire to hear, understand, and relate the truth, I realised that, apart from the pressures of censorship and social demands, there remained the question that what we read or hear is often in dissonance with what the author or the speaker means or even wants. And if I meant to live by my words, I needed to understand better what it was I was saying and offering my daughter and the world. What is this language? This written culture? This knowledge that confuses us, contradicts our wild purpose and innermost desires yet to which we cling with our teeth and which we adamantly insist on transmitting to our children? Most important, what is the state of the world that we leave them with after we have approached it with our knowledge and culture?

I, therefore, acknowledge that this research is not disinterested. I firmly believe that no work of science or art is without an agenda, usually formulated as intent, research questions, and methodologies. This dissertation on children's literature and the knowledge on which it is based is no exception.

This is my gift to Ljuba.

I thank you, my angel, for all you have taught me, for your gift of compassion, understanding, patience and love. I have done everything in my power to live by what I firmly believe, but I have no power over others to convince them to stop and question their knowledge and their humanity. I can only offer my argument, which I dedicate to you, my child, and to the children who will regain the wilderness lost.

Introduction

The Root of It All: Theory of Literature and Life

This work is about stories. It is about the stories we tell our children, which are more about ourselves than anyone else and thus are also stories for ourselves. We live with these stories and revisit them as we grow, accumulate experience, and derive new sense out of them. Yet at the same time, how much does our understanding of the themes, tropes, and topoi and our revision of meaning throughout our lives impact our actions and “culture”? Why is there a persistence of certain tropes for racism, sexism, speciesism, stratification, poverty, violence (legal violence known as war and illegal expressions of the same rationale), etc., in civilised society and in the fictional narratives we dream? How is it that most human animals today associate civilisation with order, decency, fairness, peacefulness and are horrified by the mere mention of wilderness, anarchy, and chaos which they a priori dismiss as violent, disorderly and unpredictably hostile whereas, in fact, historical records demonstrate that the scale of violence, particularly in its organised warfare state, in civilisation has reached an unprecedented scale and becomes most brutal the more “civilised” and “orderly” a group of people become? One does not need Wikileaks to see this pattern; the images broadcast daily ever since the invention of print and television media have made Goya's paintings of war seem to originate in the realm of tales for children, an Alice in Wonderland adventure, a nightmare which we can blink off and from which we think that we can wake up only to step into an even more horrible reality¹.

These questions have prompted my comparative approach as I set out to analyse the underlying concepts that form the basis of our knowledge about ourselves, others, and the world and to trace their expression in children's literature. After having examined a

¹ One only has to look at the pictures of Rwanda, Serbia, Bosnia, the former U.S.S.R., Iraq, Afghanistan, Lebanon, Palestine, Sudan, et al.

wide variety of fictional, scientific, theological, “realist”, and other narratives addressed to various audiences (adults and children), I have concluded that knowledge is constructed from specific perspectives, usually with a specific end. These perspectives inform the various narrative versions that define the specific narrativity on which knowledge is based and these narratives stand on two distinct ontological (pro)positions that provide the basis for three socio-economic and political paradigms. Namely, an epistemological inquiry into the history and the processes by which means bodies of knowledge get constructed reveals three anthropological models for social relations. These ontological principles provide the basis for our understanding and offer specific explanations and reasons for the existence of humans and the world. Moreover, these precepts prompt us to build specific bodies of knowledge that feed the rationale behind communal and individual actions (culture).

The two basic ontological positions are those of wildness and domestication. These positions define the spectrum of possibilities for cultural expressions and the ensuing socio-economic systems, with anything in between them amounting to a negotiation between these two ends, e.g. the various expressions of socialism, communism, etc., or models that attempt a compromise between the two perspectives.

As all words do, the various terms regarding the nature of the world, of life, of human and non-human persons, the words wilderness, civilisation, nature, and domestication have been adapted to the political and socio-cultural contexts in which people have been using them. Here, instead of inventing new terms, I use the word “wild” to denote those who have not been incorporated into the system of servitude either as natural resource for industrialisation, technology, social and symbolic capital, etc., or as a labour resource, or for consumption as food or pleasure. In this respect, wilderness presents a spacial dimension for the existence of living and non-living beings sharing that space and time without infringing on each other's purpose for existence. Wildness identifies the character of such untamed individuals and their, usually diverse inter-species, communities of life and non-life. The term “nature” here denotes the character of these relations. In this sense, it is in the “nature” of wild relationships to follow the concept of chaos theory: a complex and highly dynamic system that consists of a large number and variety of particles in movement and their relationships with the movement of

others. In other words, the nature of wilderness is constant improvisation and movement. Its universe consists of particles whose interests, conflicts, and spontaneity usually get resolved as an unpredictable, yet harmonious cosmic dance.

This leads to the definition of the term “nature”, which I use to designate the way in which things function: the nature of civilised or domesticated humans is going to be different from the nature of wild beings, for instance. I do not use it to indicate a spacial construct of tamed “wood” or tamed landscape that the civilised literature often refers to; for example: “let's have a picnic in nature”. My definition of wilderness and civilisation precludes the usage of this highly problematic term and hence I designate “wilderness” for the spacial aspect of chaos, “wildness” for the character of the untamed and nature as a descriptive term of relationships and their systems. As for domestication and civilisation, I use these terms interchangeably, for civilisation is a system of domesticated relationships with everything material and symbolic that comes out of the labour and consumption that such a system allows. In other words, the basic premise in the ontology of wildness is that everyone – human or non-human, child or adult, male, female, intersexual, bisexual, or asexual, whatever the species, the ethnic background or race (all of which are important classifications for civilisation only) – is considered to be an agent of her life, driven by desires that play into the cosmic harmony of plurality. The wild see the world as existing for its own reasons, its space and time untamed and solely its own, whether it has been created by an external divine force or generated through its own exploded forces.

The ontology of domestication, on the other hand, views the world as a resource in need of manipulation and control and therefore classifies all living and non-living matter into categories that basically amount to “subjects” and “resources”. Whether created by God or through Natural Selection, the civilised see the world as existing to be tamed and consumed by those who have been chosen by the divine force or who have evolved to be the masters of the universe—they see the world as a space that must be colonised, its time and energy rationed and exploited. In other words, the purpose of everything is calculated in terms of consumption. This utilitarian humanist principle finds its expression in anthropological categories such as professionalisation, segregation, discrimination, and stratification.

The third compromise position between these two ontologies allots space for humans and space for wilderness. It sees the purpose for the existence of human resources in work for the “higher” social good but not for hierarchical ends. The conflict between the need to oversee the working masses and to educate them (i.e. to modify their desires and steer them towards choosing to fulfil functions that they would not have otherwise chosen), however, remains unresolved as this compromise ontological position presumes that there are some people who know where the others should be herded and that therefore some are designated to guide while others to work and be guided. Thereby the compromise narrative fails to offer an explanation for the genesis, reasons or the mechanisms of socio-economic inequalities when its claimed end is equality. Furthermore, it focuses on humanism stressing the equality of “human rights” between people in their gender and ethnic variation but excludes non-humans from the equation of equals, even if it allows them their space. This compromise position also fails to explain another conflict that concerns colonisation, for, even though the colonising pace of communist or socialist systems is slower than that of the capitalist/humanist consumption of wilderness, it remains present and necessarily expanding due to the very nature of civilised consumption; yet this problem does not receive the due recognition in its narrative.

These ontological premises inform our dispositions, decisions, and actions that issue a social order which has a direct effect on the environment and on our own physiological landscape that find expression in our *habitus*, *body hexis*, *doxa*, and *praxis*. *Habitus*, according to Pierre Bourdieu (1990), is the flux of history and anthropology and, concomitantly, a vector of the dialectical forces of revolution, permanence, and reproduction of events, knowledge, bodies, and *esprits*² since *habitus* is the sum of information that a person absorbs from personal experience, social relationships, education, and cultural heritage of whole epochs. All of these experiences and “information” get encoded in the flesh forming a person's durable dispositions, informing choices, and mapping behaviour usually in accord with the social group to which a person “belongs”. As each person internalises previous – her own and her ancestral – experiences, she becomes aligned with the cultural heritage and, through these dispositions, beliefs,

² Like *ande* in Swedish, the French term *esprit* incorporates both mind and spirit and hence linguistically renders the relationship more holistic than the separate terms for “mind” and “spirit” in English and Russian, the languages with which I will be predominantly concerned in this work.

feelings, body, and mind, becomes part of the mechanism of the economy of effort, the effort that would have been needed to (re)invent new solutions on every new occasion. This economy of effort sets in motion the mechanism that reproduces cultural and social institutions. Instead of making new decisions, the person economises effort and through *habitus* and *doxa* (the underlying knowledge and beliefs of which the person is not aware) re-enacts the already established cultural and social patterns of behaviour by applying the previously deduced formulae or conclusions that have been inscribed into our personal *body hexis*.

Furthermore, Bourdieu's understanding of this “economy of effort” explains the mechanisms by which institutions proliferate even through revolutions, and make particularly clear sense when examined through the work of Mary Douglas (1986), *How Institutions Work*. Institutions consist of individuals with their experience, dispositions, interests, worldviews, personalities, ontologies, relationships, desires, anger, generosity, greed, pain, *praxis*, dispositions, and *habitus*. Yet when these individuals act on behalf of the institutions that “represent” them and structure their lives, they re-enact a specific scenario or the narrative of those institutions heeding the institutional interests which, in a hierarchical socio-economic system, often conflict with their own needs, desires, and welfare (AbdelRahim, 2009b).

The major mechanism for the proliferation of institutions (which necessarily are civilised, for in the multiplicity of wild forces, desires, voices and needs there can be no centralised effort for uniformity) is language and symbolic culture since the ensemble provides the grammar that structures the exchange of symbolic capital; it offers formulae that impose strict codes in the unequal exchange in the economy of individual effort and of social interactions—formulae that inform the *doxa* or the knowledge that the individual does not know that he or she knows. The most important dialectic in civilisation, thus, resides in the antagonisms between the interests of institutions and the interests of the majority of individuals who re-enact the social *habitus* of these institutions through *body hexis*, personal *habitus* and *doxa*, as Mary Douglas argues, often at the risk of personal peril or harm.

The two ontological premises of wildness and civilisation and the compromise

position between them provide the foundation for the anthropological expression of three socio-political and economic paradigms, namely: (a) the anarcho-primitivist, (b) the civilised or the agricultural-capitalist (monarchist, feudal, totalitarian, democratic systems, etc., fit this model), and (c) the spectrum ranging from the anarcho-socialist to communist systems. These anthropological expressions and political paradigms are projected in their respective narratives that order events and propel specific evolutionary trajectories providing the rationale for each corresponding system. In this way, even when applied creatively and in novel ways, stories follow the established patterns of “the economy of effort” (Bourdieu’s *praxis*) in finding ways to deal with disruptions of an established routine (socio-economic or cultural system) and inscribe themselves through time, direction, and plot into the cultural narrative.

One can say, hence, that narrative imposes a linear continuity, even in such a seemingly disruptive and shattered understanding of experience as projected by “cubism” and “surrealism” or their larger narrative of “postmodernism”, whose logic roughly amounts to: “first there was primitive man, then there was civilisation – a great promise that liberated man from the misery of constant death – but then war happened (WWI for instance) and so people’s sense of self collapsed followed by the shattering of artistic expression that depicted the acute sense of fragility; but finally came postmodernism, which, according to postmodernist theoreticians, such as Lyotard (1984), gave us a sense that everyone and every voice mattered. Therefore, through the great contradiction inherent in a reality built of a multiplicity of truths, we are in the narrative of progress and so are still heading forward into the promised bright future of multiculturalism and multivoicism”.

This underlying narrative permeates a variety of disciplines: it inheres in the monotheistic promise of punishment and reward; it is present in the Darwinist theory of evolution; it is predicted in the bright future of communism and equally of capitalist vision of prosperity. Its sense of continuity has provided the means to gloss over the uneven parts and to silence the voices that were not authorised to challenge the civilised narrative and its mythology, thereby providing the mechanism that renders knowledge chrono/logical, its meaning continuous and based on the concept of credibility that is loosely associated

with truth. The pivotal aspect of this knowledge became the logic of “con/sequences” that contains the notions of sequence (continuity) and punishment. This crucial link between logic, punishment, and the concept of continuity, which ultimately flows into the concept of permanence, establishes the agenda of civilisation and informs its principal meaning, criteria and direction and in civilisation grounds it in the context of authorship and authority.

The stories we hear and tell and the larger narratives in which they are inscribed thus transcend us. Since individuals embody the social structures and their institutions that the stories articulate and the narratives channel, in the context of civilisation, people become the vectors that ensure the perpetuity of historical institutions, while, simultaneously, render them personal and prone to individual improvisation. Narratives hence also contain internal contradictions revealed by the tendency of *habitus* to drive individuals to make their decisions and choices in favour of established institutions. Such decisions and choices in favour of the institution, that by its nature oppresses its members, reveal the *doxa* or the underlying knowledge of which the individuals are not aware. The *doxa* ensures the permanence of the past while, at the same time, individual desires and *praxis* provide the space for surprise.

The ontological foundation of a cultural narrative anchors the mechanism for controlling the checks and balances of the elements of chaos by suppressing improvisation and surprise in favour of order and permanence of the structure of civilisation, thus maintaining the tenacity of civilised institutions despite the unprecedented numbers of victims of anthropogenic extinctions of species and genocides. According to Donald A. Levin and Phillip S. Levin, “on average, a distinct species of plant or animal becomes extinct every 20 minutes” (University of Texas report, Austin, 2002).

Institutions are the particularity of civilisation, because they order space and lock it in a construct of permanence, thereby creating the concept of time and with it a sense of finality that thrives on the fear of that same finality. Thus these narratives are different not only ontologically, but also anthropologically. For instance, in terms of plot development, narratives of wildness³ do not have a grammar for resolving conflict in a standard, routine,

³ Throughout this work, I use *wilderness* to denote a spacial topos that could be mapped in the emotional, psychological or physiological space of beings, while *wildness* to specify the characteristic aspects of

or formulaic way, because each situation is a moment in chaos that needs to be comprehended in its entirety with all of one's senses and knowledge, both the knowledge of *habitus* and of *doxa*. In other words, these narratives do not project any one group or a set of exemplary actions or qualities as always leading to “goodness” nor do they punish the “evil”. Narratives of wilderness resolve conflicts in favour of diversity and the proliferation of communities of life. The narrative of civilisation, on the other hand, resolves these conflicts in favour of homogeneity, human control of wilderness, domestication, and the exploitation of resources. In this sense, narratives express and, concomitantly, shape our scientific, religious, and cultural views as well as dispositions and knowledge.

Among the various possibilities of projecting the basic foundations of these larger narratives, works for children, like all stories, relay to us specific worldviews, articulate desired trajectories for our personal and social lives, warn us of dangers, veil our contradictions and have the power to channel our *doxa* into the status quo, wreak havoc, or bring revolutions. Children's literature, thus, occupies a critical position at the nexus of memes, genes, *doxa* and *habitus* directing the flux of ontologies, epistemologies and anthropologies at a period of life – childhood – when the rate of assimilation of conscious knowledge (ideology) and unconscious knowledge (*doxa*), as well as the negotiation between personal interests with the conflicting interests of the institution (*habitus*) are most intense. The ontological basis absorbed, particularly, during this period forges the *body hexis* (the way the body carries itself, moves and interacts with one's space), the *habitus*, and provides a powerful impetus for individual expression of *praxis* thereby determining subsequent trajectories through socio-economic and cultural paradigms and the ensuing anthropogenic modifications of the environment (Arshavsky and Nikitina in AbdelRahim, 2009b).

The civilised have recognised this potential of children's literature thousands of years ago and, just as with its adult counterpart, put the different works for children to “practical” use. For example, the *Pañcatantra* in India constituted a bible of instruction for the child-prince, the future ruler; it was an important part of the oral tradition prior to 200

BC and was written down after that date. The tradition of providing educative stories that conveyed specific morals through anthropomorphic animals with the explicit purpose of instilling a specific, civilised *habitus* appeared later in Aesop's Fables, as well as in Krylov's and de la Fontaine's, or in the animal stories of Afansiev, the magical tales of the Arabian Nights, the Canterbury Tales and ancient Chinese and Japanese works of morals and ethics. More recent books, such as *Alice in Wonderland*, regardless of whether they may appear to be mocking the civilised social norms and exposing the absurdity of hierarchical, civilised language and conventions, nevertheless end up reconfirming the social *habitus* of the senseless culture that the books ridicule. In the case of Lewis Carroll's work, this is expressed at the end, the moment when Alice wakes up back in her world and exhales a sigh of: "O' thank goodness, I'm home, back to that *habitus* of oppressive, yet familiar and therefore dear order; for, that dream was madness and chaos and home, no matter how ridiculous, nonsensical, even abusive, is always best". In other words, through a narrative that promises to venture beyond the civilised frontiers into a new and untamed territory, where meaning is discarded and paradigms are broken, these stories become the vehicles for the larger narrative that reconfirms the institution of civilisation and its language.

The precarious nature of children's literature is further exacerbated by the role of literacy in domestication, stratification, and oppression (Walter Ong, 1982 and 1986; Jack Goody, 1968, 1977 and 1987; John Zerzan 2002, *inter alios*), and the central role of literacy in education today. First, the very notion of education can exist only in a domesticated society that perceives as normal the eradication of all traces of will, idiosyncrasies, and wildness and that makes a conscious effort to engineer the *body hexis*, *habitus*, dreams, minds, and *praxis* according to a uniform standard. Pedagogies cannot exist in wild societies, because the ontology assumes that if beings are born to live, then they must be hardwired to learn how to live, and that the reason for them living is simply to enjoy life. The fundamental assumption in wilderness is that the world is good for life, and that living beings know what's best for them, and, since they cannot thrive in a dying environment, the best for living beings is a balance in the community of life. Civilised societies, on the other hand, impose education – or the strenuous modification, through punishment and reward, of children's natural behaviour and the suppression of wild

impulses for life. This modification of one's purpose and being becomes the focus of inter-generational relations and constitutes the most characteristic experience of childhood that lasts, at least, until early adult years, if not later, because the basic assumption is that children will not learn how to live (in civilisation) by serving others as resources.

When a child appears, she does not learn through language but through interaction and experience. Her purpose is to try, test, and experience herself and her surroundings with an innocent sincerity that challenges the grammar of civilised relationships and epistemology. Since children are born wild and illiterate, it becomes crucial for civilisation to domesticate and turn them into resources through an intensive and lengthy process of education. Hence, children are confined to teaching institutions for decades in which they are domesticated and taught that they cannot be free, that they have to complete specific tasks to earn points that will eventually allow them to work for someone and thus live by being consumed. Non-domesticated societies of non-human and human animals, on the contrary, allow the child to develop her instincts and biodiverse relationships through experience and self-realisation, no matter how obscure that self-realisation may appear to others.

Like never before, the last century has seen an unprecedented globalisation of obligatory schooling where the formation of civilised children's *habitus* has become largely confined to the classroom where obedience of higher ranking persons of authority (e.g. teacher or appointed class leaders) is demanded and where the children's learning takes place through listening to the teacher and through reading and writing, thereby eliminating the possibilities of children experiencing the chaos of everyday life in the real world and of building a wide range of meaningful relationships with human and non-human persons outside of school walls. In the last century, literacy and imperial languages have been imposed on children around the world regardless of their cultural background or the work they end up seeking. Particularly in recent years, there has been a tendency toward the virtualisation of children's experience and education through books and technologies, not least of all the internet. With this totalitarian imposition of literacy, the mode of transmission of *habitus* and cultural guidelines underwent a transformation in terms of the degree of sophistication of contradictions and nuances depicted in books. The apparent paradox is that the narrative and the ontological premises are by themselves

sufficient to course through the high flux of white noise. Simplistic propaganda is no longer necessary or even an efficient proliferation strategy of any given institution, for instance, such as the capitalist paradigm. A complex text that successfully conveys the inherent contradictions of a society whose foundation is rooted firmly in the ontological premises of a civilised/domesticated world proves to be more effective as a “pedagogical” tool or “propaganda” when it acknowledges difficulties and contradictions while tapping into the fears and ignorance of other possible solutions. All the while, it comforts the fears by imposing sanctioned resolutions that have been worked out by that specific social or historical *habitus* and into whose world the text invites the reader⁴.

Yet, in spite of this totalitarian domestication via literacy, childhood promises to be this place of wilderness. The possibility of reaching the internal and external space by interacting with children, including with the ideological child of the cultural imaginary as well as with the *doxic* child inside oneself, opens the door to a dimension of wilderness that beckons the reader and the author who, by addressing this imaginary child, attempt to negotiate their own sphere of agency and concurrently contest the civilising pedagogies. In this respect, children's literature is particularly interesting for understanding the constructs and processes of identification and alienation and the underlying anthropological, epistemological, and philosophical assumptions at the basis of knowledge. Often, writers, whose works are considered as children's books, state explicitly that the books they have authored were intended for the child within the adult. Alan Alexandre Milne's *Winnie-the-Pooh* is one such book. Tove Jansson's first Moomin story, *The Little Trolls and the Great Flood*⁵, was another tale written during World War II as an alternative world of tolerance and warmth where evading conflict proves to be a better strategy for life and happiness than war.

The multiplicity of levels of references, questions, problems, and information, as well as the unintentionally imbued knowledge, or the *doxa*, of some literary works make it

⁴ These historically honed civilised narratives provide the formulae for *praxis* and explain how complex and overtly questioning stories can be domesticated within the civilised meta-narrative. For instance, critical T.V. series such as “In Living Color”, the Simpsons, Futurama, or House M.D. can be safely broadcast on one of America's most conservative television stations, the Fox channel, without posing a threat to the conservative version of the civilised narrative that the owners and directors of the channel officially promote.

⁵ Original Title: *Småtrollen och den stora översvämningen* (1945).

difficult to identify the books as geared for any specific audience, even though they may be marketed in some countries as books for adults or for children. No wonder, then, the most significant stories for children have always been the ones whose age demarcations, if there at all, have been hazy and the intentions behind their creation not always clearly articulated or even in the realm of consciousness of the authors themselves. In fact, most often, they have been originally intended for adult or, at least, multiple audiences: Aucassin and Nicolette, folk tales, animal tales, Robinson Crusoe, Gulliver's Travels, Huckleberry Finn, Treasure Island, many of the stories by Hans Christian Andersen, not to mention religious lore, scientific tales, and many more.

In examining culture, society, literature and narrative ultimately one stumbles on the most fundamental of all problems: language. The most pervading topos of civilisation is that humans are different from other animals because they presumably have special characteristics (such as a large brain), capacities (such as language), the ability for abstract thinking, and the posture and skill to build technology. The ramifications for a wild ontology are far-reaching when we consider the evidence that language, abstract thought, and upright posture have been available to other, non-civilised humans and animals (which I discuss in-depth in the third part of this work), and yet not everyone has chosen the civilised language and way of knowing and relating to the world.

Language and narrative articulate the mythology that becomes the main vehicle for propagating civilisation by whose means domestication has been able to colonise the planet. While most scholars have focused on the positive aspects of language in terms of creativity, communication and narrativity, in this work, I invite the reader to explore the darker side of language and to challenge some of the commonly held assumptions that attribute a superiority to the human animal for his ability for language, which ability is usually taken to distinguish and thereby separate human animals from non-human people. Such a critique of humanism and language, I argue, is fundamental for our capacity to imagine different ways of communication with others, of community, and of being, since, as the studies on animals discussed in part three demonstrate, wild beings enjoy a safer, more compassionate and diverse community than the statistics of the casualties at the hands of humans indicate: as the above mentioned University of Texas report states, “a

distinct species of plant or animal becomes extinct every twenty minutes”, oceans and land are desertifying on an unprecedented scale, and the billions of humans perished in wars beat even the number of casualties of the most vicious of viruses and cancers that the civilisation has bred itself. What if, I ask, we are able to build community and to preserve some of our wilderness not because of language, but rather in spite of it?

Most of the blame or credit (depending on which way one looks at the end result) for the rise of civilisation has usually been placed on the Neolithic Revolution which has been propelled by the concept of “resources” shifting human livelihood from gathering to hunting and “finally” to agricultural civilisation. The concept of resources also made it possible to conceive of property: namely, who owns the resources and who or what constitutes the resources for the owners and thus made possible the institution of social hierarchy with its inequalities, poverty and wealth, ultimately leading to organised warfare among humans and between civilised humans and wilderness leading to the extermination of a wide range of human and non-human cultures and other forms of perceived competition, be it weeds, mice, birds, and any wild others, including (civilised) humans. Even today, individual farmers as well as the institutions in charge of agriculture, such as the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) purposefully poison thousands and millions of animals and birds (Wisniewski, 20th January 2011). Historically speaking, in the blink of an eye, it has taken approximately seven thousand years for civilisations, whether Mesoamerican or Middle Eastern, to mushroom after the first steps towards the domestication of dogs, horses, and crops (Ellen in Ingold, 1997; Sunderland, 1973; Dickens, 2004) and to create a body of “knowledge” based on three myths.

The three myths of civilisation are: (1) civilisation is natural and naturally superior to other forms of community and existence and is a state that all beings allegedly strive to achieve, whether by means of natural selection or by obeying the divine decree to be rewarded with humanism and its attributes (reincarnation into the higher human form or the monotheistic view of the role of humans on earth are expressions of the same domesticating premise); (2) the myth that, contrary to wilderness, civilisation offers a better, longer, healthier, and safer life for all human and non-human animals and which, therefore, all human and non-human animals prefer and for whose “benefits” they are

“willing” to forfeit independence, movement, and self-determination; (3) the myth that civilisation is moral, ethical, and compassionate and that wilderness is brutal, amoral, and ruthless. I discuss the narrative of these myths in-depth in the third part of my research.

These myths provide the backbone for the epistemological narrative and offer a system of justification for coercive and abusive relationships that constitute the culture of civilisation with its epistemology, ontology, and anthropology. I refer to this narrative with its inverted definitions, postulates, and interpretations of reality as unknowledge, the ignorance that forms the axis of civilised *habitus*, *doxa*, and *praxis* with a severe impact on the social and natural environment.

In this way, I endeavour to offer a comparative analysis of scientific narratives and children's literature. Relying on an interdisciplinary approach that draws on anthropology, literary theory, literature, and education, this research examines the conflicts and contradictions between the colonising ontology of civilisation and the all-inclusive ontology of wilderness in children's books. This leads to a range of observations, including about the nature of the relationship between domestication and demographics and their relationship to the control of pleasure, gender, sexuality, and reproduction; or, the problem of ownership, access to and the distribution of food, resources, and the interconnectedness of labour and poverty; or, the premises informing the socio-economic infrastructures and the politics of classification, identity, and forged desires.

Presentation of the Project, Its Structure and Outline

As discussed in the introduction, narratives of wilderness have no singular format or predictable outcome. They do not have a plot and they accept a multiplicity of voices and perspectives. Relationships in the wild are governed by chaos and reciprocity. Empathy allows for imagination and intelligence regarding the ways of the world, whereas in civilisation relationships are governed by concrete interests that lock beings into claustrophobic cells of dependence defined by such categories as “resources” and “owners”. Having introduced the problem of domestication by means of identifying groups as resources for others in the context of Pierre Bourdieu's theory of knowledge, social and material capital, and *praxis*, I have proceeded in three methodological steps, each of which is taken up in one of the three parts of the dissertation that reflect the epistemological, ontological and anthropological nature of this inquiry.

The first part, entitled “Epistemologies of Chaos and the Orderly Unknowledge of Literacy”, examines the context for the existence of and the need for literature as a system of representation that made it possible for civilised human animals to substitute artificial symbols for reality. This separation from the real by means of symbols and literature was propelled by the possibilities for abstraction that were made available by the confining power of grammar or language. The twelve chapters that constitute this part approach the problem of confinement from various perspectives and disciplines, such as medical anthropology, legal concepts of justice, and anarchist theory. Chapter 1 begins by situating the methodological problems of knowledge, in which I argue that all knowledge as well as ignorance are cultural constructs stemming from a person's experience and position in either civilisation or wilderness. This chapter consists of nine parts in which I explain the experiences that have guided me to formulate my understanding of the world and the methodologies for accumulating and analysing information as well as the importance of the biographies of the three authors whose works for children exemplify three different socio-economic and cultural paradigms: the monarcho-civilised system of socio-economic relations, the anarcho-socialist, and the anarcho-primitivist.

Having situated my own methods as well as the authors and their works, I proceed

to chapter 2 in which I discuss the sociological ramifications of narratives, language(s) and literacy, inspired particularly by questions from anthropological studies of control narratives (Mattingly and Garro, 2000) and the sociological theory of knowledge (Bourdieu, 2001). Namely, I argue that there is a fundamental difference in the underlying premises of oral traditions, wild stories, and civilised, literary narratives, a discussion that leads to chapter 3 on the nature of language and its role in the civilised order as a source of organised violence. Here, I examine John Zerzan's (2002) critique of language and civilisation and draw on anthropological and historical research by Jack Goody and Ian Watt (1963) on the effects of literacy on the brain of civilised humans.

Chapter 4 focuses on literacy as a tool of domestication and oppression, developing further connections between Zerzan's critique of language as a technology of violence and research by Walter Ong and Jack Goody on the differences between social relationships in literate societies as based on debt that contrast with oral societies that, according to Goody and Ong, are founded on memory, presence and reciprocity. In this context, I discuss Lyotard's (1984) concept of the legitimating power of narratives while warning against the limitations of approaching the critique of narratives through Lyotard's argument. Lyotard's observations, however, become valuable when complemented by Pierre Bourdieu's (2001) theory of practice and Michel Foucault's (1961; 1963; 1972; and 1979) critique of power. The normalising and confining power of grammar and language becomes prominent when Lyotard's concept of the legitimating meta-narrative is examined in the context of anarchist theory, particularly as it is articulated in Peter Kropotkin's (2002) critique of prisons and mental institutions and Michel Foucault's (1961 and 1963) studies on hospitals and the power of the medical gaze. In this regard, Nosov's book for children depicting the adventures of mites in an anarcho-socialist town articulates these critiques of power in a most creative literary fashion leading to the discussion in chapter 5 on the doctor's role in civilising and controlling individuals and social groups. Here, David Rosenhan's experiment "On Being Sane in Insane Places" helps frame the discussion of diagnosis of mental "deviance" and "disability" as a mechanism of identification and recycling of labour resources. In both the scientific literature and the literary children's text, questions of confinement and order stem from the need of civilisation to control resources and to extract the maximum profit from them.

In order to test this narrative against real-life practices, chapter 6 discusses the issues raised in Nosov's Dunno trilogy and the theoretical texts by Kropotkin, Rosenhan, and Foucault in light of my anthropological observations on the integration tactics adopted by Sweden's social workers and medical sector for Somali immigrants and the role of literacy and Swedish children's books in the domestication of oral traditions. This example from the "field" illustrates the underlying concepts of control of movement and difference by constructing "foreignness" as deviance thereby controlling immigration by "medicalising" the "immigrant ghetto" as they are revealed in the underlying narrative of A.A. Milne's *Winnie-the-Pooh* as well as in real life immigration policies of the "developed" world.

The issues arising from the role of medical authority in the legitimising narrative of civilisation lead to the question of authority and the methods of domestication by "curing" and "reforming" in order to (re)integrate and control of "resources" examined in chapter 7. Several "integrational" children's narratives, such as the *Caillou* series for pre-schoolers, illustrate the tactics that inform the civilised plot in the same way as does the legislature articulating the legal code for punishment. My case study here is the Canadian "spanking law".

Chapter 8 continues with the problem of domestication of children's inner wilderness by means of punishment in the underlying narrative of civilisation in children's literature. My case study here is Maurice Sendak's *Where the Wild Things Are*, which, in chapter 9, I compare with the structure of relationships in *Winnie-the-Pooh*'s 100 Aker Wood and, which in chapter 10, I contrast with the anarcho-socialist perspective on justice in Nosov's trilogy tracing these concepts to Errico Malatesta (1984) and Kropotkin (2002). Namely, justice cannot be enforced by authority in a hierarchical setting, but is driven by one's conscience not to do harm and the desire for mutual relationships of community and support. In contrast, the uncompromising narratives of wilderness, as analysed in chapter 11, see justice as based on randomness and yet rooted in the need for a person's place in the world and an intricate community of life as is depicted in Tove Jansson's court trial in *Finn Family Moomintroll*.

Finally, chapter 12 concludes the epistemological study of narratives of wilderness

and civilisation and the ways in which they project order and chaos, making a transition to part II of my research on the genealogical aspect of wilderness and domestication narratives and their ontologies.

The second part of my inquiry, entitled “Genealogical Narratives of Wilderness and Domestication: Identifying the Ontologies of Genesis and Genetics in Children's Literature”, also consists of twelve chapters and deals with the underlying ontological premises about our origins and the effects of these concepts on the anthropological constructs as projected in the narratives of wilderness and civilisation in literature and in life. I proceed by looking at the “genesis” of the textual worlds of the three children's books as the opening of each demonstrates the structural importance of both the ontologies of genesis and the form in which they are conveyed. Here again, narratives of wilderness reveal their all-encompassing essence because they stem from a position of common origin of all living and non-living matter, while the narratives of domestication are based on the principle of categorisation, separation and hierarchical relationships of exploitation.

Chapter 1 in this part analyses the premises of genesis in Jansson's moominbooks, pointing to the importance of trees and biodiversity in the community of life and tracing the “evolution” of the concept of the “tree of life” through wilderness and civilisation. As chapter 2 demonstrates, the principles of wilderness are learnt from early childhood through presence and empathy. Jansson shows the necessity to embrace the other and to overcome the fear of the other through acceptance. Empathy leads to understanding the loneliness and suffering of the fearsome as it is personified by the terrible Groke and depicts her as melting when little Moomintroll extends a hand of friendship. The knowledge that is acquired through empathy and the ability to feel and imagine the experience of others leads characters to develop their inner voices, which becomes their conscience guiding them to make the right decisions, even as they err, which I take up in chapter 3. As Moominmamma leads the children through a false paradise of abundant sweets and artificial landscapes and light, she allows the children to experiment and decide for themselves that it is the real community, life, and sunshine that they are looking for. In this respect, the Garden of Eden or the lush paradise of wilderness is not about consumption but about moderation and letting life be.

In chapter 4, I contrast the moomintrolls' rejection of the false paradise of abundance with the desirable chocolate bliss of Roald Dahl's (1973) *Charlie and the Chocolate Factory*. Dahl's book illustrates the logic of a civilised narrative as it domesticates and appropriates space, labour, resources and lives through a structure that institutionalises racism and speciesism, a system of rationalisation or abuse that shares the same ontological origins with all the forms of “management”, exploitation, and discrimination in the civilised narrative. Categorisation leads to the notions of “purity” and “cleanliness” discussed in chapter 5 for which discussion I draw on Mary Douglas' concept of cultural purity, where again, the narratives of wilderness uphold biodiversity even in questions of personal hygiene, whereas the narratives of civilisation present cleanliness in a hierarchical fashion, particularly pertaining to the categories of “human” and “civilised”. Here, *Winnie-the-Pooh* stands in stark contrast to the diversity of moomintrolls and the question of food becomes relevant from both the religious prohibitions (Douglas, 1988) and the civilised scientific conception of what constitutes a proper human diet: the lives of others. In this respect, *Winnie-the-Pooh's* opening on zoos, domestication and oppression is consistent with the avarice that is presented as funny and desirable for a chosen few and is based on the principles of sado-masochistic and voyeuristic pleasure. In other words, the civilised narrative is not only based on the gaze of control, but also on the practice of observing the tamed other for the pleasure of the agent or the owner.

Chapter 7 compares the attempt of Nosov at a compromise between the ontologies of wilderness and civilisation. The genesis of Dunno's trilogy is rooted in the forest. The mites are depicted as vegan gatherers, but the author accepts the unfolding of the civilised narrative towards human evolution into a humanist and technological reality and hence the ineluctable separation of humans from the animal world. This alienation proves to be stronger than the author's intention to convey the ethics of kindness to animals and wildlife as required by a universal code of morality. Here, conscience and ethics are reminiscent of the moominwilderness, but the trilogy speaks clearly against confusion of species. Chapter 8 discusses the meaning of transformation between animal and human forms in the non-domesticated traditions as they compare and contrast with the taboo against transformation into non-human forms in civilised narratives that I follow up in

chapter 9. Chapter 10 looks at the meaning of transformation in the Moominvalley, demonstrating, once again, the acceptance and recognition of a universal essence and belongingness regardless of one's form and whose nature it is to change. As chapter 11 shows, such transformations are feared and taken to confuse the civilised order when the assumed genesis of beings is that of difference and unfamiliarity, as Dunno's experience in Sunny City proves.

In the final chapter 12 of this part, I discuss the philosophical and anthropological ramifications of these ontologies and the importance of understanding how the narrative of civilisation is implicated in the pain of colonised wilderness and the domesticated lives. This discussion leads to part III of my research that deals with the anthropological narratives in fiction and life.

The final part entitled “Anthropological Narratives in Fiction and Life” consists of seven chapters. Chapter 1 traces the critique of civilisation and the underlying premises of wilderness discussed in the previous two parts of my research and identifies three myths of civilisation that impose the fictional narrative on reality through, what Lyotard identifies as, the legitimating power of the meta-narrative – in the case of contemporary civilisation, this meta-narrative is that of science – namely, the Darwinian theory of evolution and the civilised interpretation of Christianity. This narrative received serious challenges from anarchist perspectives and understanding of wilderness, which have nonetheless been largely ignored or silenced by means of the civilised mechanism of identification and alienation. The mechanism of domestication is structured by a complex mythology and subversion of facts, such as the claims that: (1) exploited beings choose to be exploited because in this way they improve their chances of survival; (2) the exploited human and non-human slaves are happy; (3) that domestication renders them more beautiful and perfect; (4) that civilisation is part of a natural evolution towards a better stage through conflict and violence against hostile nature. However, studies of wilderness and civilisation by Peter Kropotkin, Darwin's contemporary, indicate that relationships in the wild are governed by mutual aid and empathy, whereas, in civilisation, they are consistently ordered by both the fictional narratives promoting hierarchical relationships and the scientific rendering of the civilised narratives that focus on violence and predation

and, ignoring the prevalent reality of mutual aid and empathy, thereby justify violence and predation. Subsequent chapters provide an indepth analysis of these narratives. Chapter 2 discusses the availability of data that point to the fact that animals are capable of choosing the civilised way of life that is also chosen by certain viruses and a few bacterial epidemics, but nevertheless they tend to choose wild relationships that favour community and biodiversity.

Chapter 3 traces the projection of the scientific narrative for a civilised choice in Lucy Maud Montgomery's (1983) children's book, *Anne of Greene Gables*. Chapter 4 discusses Kropotkin's studies and animal psychology and ethology with regard to the choice to be wild, as well as Jeremy Bentham's formulation of the legal question of personhood of animals in terms of sentience. I argue here that the question of humanism itself is the main culprit of oppression, exploitation, and discrimination which leads to chapter 5 that consists of three parts. The first section discusses the civilised myth that holds that the exploited beings are satisfied with their lot, an understanding that silences the cries of pain. The second section looks at the rationalisation of the myth that justifies governance of humans and non-humans by drawing parallels with the training of horses and dogs (Patton in *Zoontologies*) and ignores the wild purpose of beings, claiming that domestication and exploitation by humans actually improves the beings themselves and makes them beautiful. I also trace this narrative as it informs the relationship in a children's poem by Shel Silverstein (1964) "The Giving Tree". The third section examines this narrative from the concept of the machine and the ontological basis of limbs and technology. In this part of the research, I compare the narrative that justifies servitude and the critique of these ontologies in a variety of scientific, literary, and cinematic texts. My main focus here is on Haraway's *Cyborg Manifesto*, Nordlund's "The Foundations of Our Life: Reflections about Human labour, Money and Energy from Self-sufficiency Standpoint", and Dick's *Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep*. My own critique stems from the proposition that had the world been hostile to life, life would not have happened. But since life happened, it has all the tools at its disposition to live in the world and the dependence on others to serve only deteriorates the chances for independence and the experience of meaningful relationships in the world. Kropotkin's observations support the fact that life favours the diversity of species and beings and their community of

cooperation.

In chapter 6, I analyse how civilisation's promise of a safe, long, and prosperous life for all if they sacrifice their time and lives perverts relationships and achieves the opposite, namely, suffering, illness, and high early mortality rates. I trace the formulation of the Darwinian narrative to the articulation of a racist and oppressive justification for starvation and genocides that Thomas Malthus (1798 [1998]) had provided and compare this narrative with the sociological, palaeontological, and medical data that disprove the civilised mythology and identify the civilised categorisation of beings into “agents” and “resources”, along with the agricultural revolution, as the culprit in the unsustainable population growth, extermination of species, and genocides of human and non-human groups.

Finally, in conclusion, I demonstrate how the Darwinian-Malthusian narrative informs the civilised relationships on all levels of social organisation and is disseminated in pedagogical methods, children's literature, scientific texts, and film.

I

Epistemologies of Chaos and the Orderly Unknowledge of Literacy

Chapter 1: Questions of Biography, Epistemology and Methodology

1.1. I read therefore I am: a biographical perspective

Stockholm, autumn 1997. Don Kulick ends presenting his research on trans-gender prostitutes in Brazil. The presentation was interesting and raised many challenging issues. “Any questions,” asks Don. The first question accompanied by omnipresent even if quiet giggling: “was your research based on participant observation?”⁶

“Participant observation” – what is it? Does it mean that there exists a method of “non-participant observation” or perhaps “participant non-observation”? Apart from the reasons that drive us to participate and observe, there is also the question of how we participate and observe or how we can avoid participation or observation. Does one method have an advantage over the other in terms of accuracy or scientificity?

These questions have been explored in numerous studies on methodology in social sciences. Whole university courses on research methods comprise the obligatory curriculum in anthropology, sociology, and education. In studies on literature, questions of method are no less pertinent and their impact on the research and the efficiency with which literary analysis can divulge the secrets of the ways of the world are as important and as difficult to evaluate as they are in the 'hard' and 'social' sciences.

For instance, in a comparative literary work it may appear that the researcher is limited to participating in the observation of extensive bibliographic records of those who have made it in the print-capitalist world and got published. Oral and internet sources are accepted in anthropology and sociology as “field study” but not as authority. In all our endeavours to represent, challenge, or understand the world and ourselves, personal and

⁶ Fieldnotes on *The Encounter*; anthropological research in Stockholm 1996-98.

social factors as well as conscious and unconscious knowledge all play a vital role in the formation of our beliefs, attitudes, “durable dispositions”, knowledge, society, reality itself, and of course our perspectives.

Pierre Bourdieu's anthropological and sociological work offers a most comprehensive theory of the inter-connectedness of the personal and the social factors in forging the symbolic, scientific, artistic, literary, and economic culture. In *The Logic of Practice* (1990), Bourdieu explains that the *doxa*, or the taken for granted knowledge, which individuals are not aware of possessing, has been formed based on the perspectives and on behalf of the interests of the owners, masters, and agents who are in control of their own destiny as well as of the destiny (and hence of education) of their human and non-human resources. The values, norms, and goals are set by these human people who are “agents”. The reality, norms, and goals of those who are left outside this category are limited in scope and controlled to the effect that they fulfil their role as resources for the “institution”. This mechanism of the production of overt knowledge or ideology and of *doxa* goes hand in hand with the mechanism of regulation of the parasitic relationships that define civilisation. Civilised relationships entail the domestication of resources, which means that those in charge of domestication possess agency over their lives and over the lives of the domesticated human and non-human people. The *doxa* and the ideology guarantee that the domesticated resources surrender their agency and believe in the normalcy and legality of their lack of access to symbolic and material capital, food, space, and other “resources”—an economic system that is regulated by the constant inflation of symbolic value attached to manners, cultural references, symbolic representation, language, meaning, among other elements of social wealth. In *Distinction*, Bourdieu (1979) argues that this process explains the persistence of the pyramidal hierarchy of socio-economic relations. The *doxa* imposed by this hierarchical structure on members of a civilised “society” induces the majority of the dispossessed classes or groups to admire, trust, and dream of aligning their worth with the (upper) middle-class values, thereupon ensuring their participation in this system of resources and abuse, which explains the durability of civilised dispositions and institutions.

In other words,

doxa is what agents immediately know, but do not know that they know. Or, as Bourdieu cleverly expresses this idea, it “goes without saying because it comes without saying” (1992: 167). Moreover, these unrecognized or doxic beliefs are shared to as “an unquestioned and unified cultural 'tradition'” (Bourdieu and Wacquant: 248 n. 45; and see Bourdieu, 1998: 67, 1982: 156, 1997: 22, 123). Beate Kraus notes: “Every mode of domination, even if it uses physical violence, presupposes a doxic order shared by the dominated and the dominants” (169). The question one might legitimately ask is: where does doxa come from? Bourdieu addresses this query with some clarity in *Practical Reason*: “Doxa is a particular point of view, the point of view of the dominant, which presents and imposes itself as a universal point of view—the point of view of those who dominate by dominating the state and who have constituted their point of view as universal by constituting the state” (1998: 57). This elliptical remark would seem to indicate that doxic beliefs, although shared by all, are themselves produced and reproduced by the dominant class. What is odd, however, is that this group never deliberately planted them in a given field's epistemological soil. Doxic assumptions, then, are a sort of unseen and unintended support for the rule of the dominant (Berlinerblau, 1999).

Bourdieu's theory of practice provides valuable terminology and offers helpful distinctions for an analysis of the underlying knowledge in children's literature since it acknowledges both the voluntaristic and deterministic factors of this encounter in which the past meets the future, or in which the individual faces history and “culture” through the conscious, unconscious, personal, and social constructs of knowledge. The theory explains the importance of the basic, underlying premises in any creative, theoretical, applied, or manual work and accounts for both the role of individual agency and the role of the forces through which the Institution of civilisation proliferates. An endeavour to uncover the basic principles that drive us to read, work, dream, write, or react exposes the basic tenets of our becoming not only as individual and social beings, but also as entities within the scope of cosmos.

In this light, to look inside the me-at-the-time today is an important exercise in an attempt to uncover my own epistemology as well as my initial need to conduct this research. Since understanding the outside world and our knowledge about it requires introspection and an attempt to get in touch with, even reveal, our *doxa* and self knowledge, then a doctoral dissertation, before anything else, is of personal significance. It acquires larger implications when the personal sphere, comprising individual knowledge and drives, intersects with the personal sphere of other persons and the common space between these persons becomes public. It is through this common/private space that the analysis of the children's books that had an important impact on me personally becomes a

study of the importance of these books on children and people in general. Finally, since a scholar must master her field of study, it helps to be a “native” in the field – my “native” children’s literature with which I grew up. In this way, this dissertation is also a study of the self.

The question of the possibility of attaining pure objectivity and the extent of the importance of personal bias and circumstances in revealing universal truths has always occupied a central place in scientific research and writing. However, where the hard scientists have a more difficult time acknowledging the role of the person and the social context in the production of hard-scientific knowledge, the social sciences, particularly anthropology, have accorded much attention to both the advantages and the pitfalls of participant knowledge (Bernard, 1995; Wolcott, 1995; Grahame, 1998; Steinmetz, 2005; Creswell, 2009, *inter alios*). Here, the main objection to self-study⁷ stems from the Cartesian position that sees the personal realm as incompatible with objectivity and scientific observation on the grounds that “nativity” involves emotions that, together with the taken-for-granted values and knowledge, may veil other possibilities of interpretation. By the same token, however, native values, or parochialism, interfere and veil other possibilities of interpretation regardless of whether one chooses to study new and foreign territory or the old and familiar. The advantages of doing “field-work at home” is that it brings forth the urgency to face and question the self as much as to understand the problem of literary and scientific knowledge, thereby once again bridging that space between the personal and the social as well as between the self and the “other”, regardless of whether this “other” is a stranger, a fellow being, or the unknown and the mysterious parts of the self. Because of this intertwining of the personal and the social, I begin this work by looking at the reader-writer relationship and then proceed to presenting the circumstances under which I have encountered the three books I chose to illustrate the three paradigms of socio-economic relations and their epistemologies, ontologies, and anthropological structures.

Children who read are either guided by curiosity (an inner desire to learn) or by nagging adults who obsess about literacy and their children's success in school. Adults, on

⁷ What is referred to in anthropology as the “problems of doing field-work at home”.

the other hand, can be driven by different motivations: pursuit of entertainment, a quest for a challenge to see new aspects of the world, the need for confirming one's own knowledge and position, seeking practical information, advice, increasing symbolic and social capital, etc.. The pursued end, thus, ultimately taints the reader's relationship with the text and defines the meaning of the reading process and the definitions that may arise in the course of that relationship. In this respect, the extreme end of the reader-response theory – such as Barthes' *Death of the Author* (1977) – provides a particularly narrow angle for defining reading, a view that ascribes to the reader more autonomy and voluntarism than is possible in real life. For, even though this view, to an extent, reflects reality, it is not concerned with dialogue or an exchange of knowledge and experience. More accurately, the idea that the author ceases to exist as the text is appropriated by the reader reflects the reality of “ignorance”, where often the legitimated discourse from the top down overwrites the intended meaning of the author and in this sense the author ceases to exist. By the same token, however, the text too ceases to exist, since the voice of authority is not concerned with a dialogue or the reality of experience, but rather with the hierarchical order of voices, values, and opinions. In this regard, in addition to the reader's *doxa* that interferes with both the authorised narrative, the author's intentions, and the text itself, the reader may be trapped in the tunnel of reality that prevents people to hear their interlocutors because they are stuck projecting their own limitations and deafness on the other⁸.

Alexei Ukhtomsky (in Nikitina, 1998), drawing on Petr Kropotkin's anarchist theory on evolution and physiology, calls this syndrome of “reality tunnel” the problem of the double, whereby an interlocutor instead of listening to the other replaces the speaker with the image of herself and understands only what she wants to hear while ignoring and dismissing everything else. Ukhtomsky attributes much of the cruelty, alienation,

⁸ The American psychologist, Timothy Leary, proposed that most people's understanding of the world and of others is limited by the tunnel of concepts, experiences, and understanding of reality acquired through life mainly through language but also by means of other indoctrinating experiences (education, family, socio-economic reality, etc.), which create a firm barrier of belief systems that curb both understanding and imagination: “imprinting of models accidentally present in the environment at critical periods determines the tunnel realities in which humans live (Leary, 1987: chapter 1). This is related to the problem of understanding through empathy in that if a person bases her choices and actions on belief system, especially acquired through imposed education that is based on texts, stories, and authority (the pedagogy of: “z is so because x wrote this, now learn this by heart”) rather than interacting with the real body and mind of humans and non-humans as real life experiencing happiness and pain, then apathy and cruelty become the praxis of that *habitus* and easy to engineer new reality through the manipulation of educated yet alienated human resources.

suffering, and war to this loss of the ability of civilised people to hear the other and empathise with her pain. When the reader approaches the text with the intention to hear the other so as to be able to expand the realm of one's experience and knowledge, there becomes an urgency to suspend one's judgements and to allow the personal meaning to evolve in the context of the author's meaning. If the reader then accepts to enter into a reading relationship with the author, then more concomitant levels have to be acknowledged in that interaction.

In *Death of the Author* (1977), Barthes takes Balzac's *Sarrasine* as an illustration that it is futile even to attempt to trace or understand whose voice and intention depicts the castrato's femininity and pronounces the knowledge of what a “real” woman *is*. Barthes asks: was it the author's voice? The narrator's? Has the author spoken on behalf of the reader? Is this a voice of a character? Is this the voice of universal wisdom? His response is that it is impossible to know and that therefore the author is dead and writing becomes the “neutral, composite, oblique space where our subject slips away, the negative where all identity is lost, starting with the very identity of the body writing” (Barthes, 1977).

Reading and writing, however, are not neutral activities. By choosing to read one book and not another, for instance, *Sarrasine* and not *Order and Chaos*, the reader chooses the world of Balzac over that of Hakim Bey. The reader decides to invest time, effort, and money in acquainting herself with the author because of the relevance that the reader saw in how the reading was presented (i.e., advertised) or for personal reasons (such as rebellion against the status quo). The background of the author, whether highlighted in the foreground or lurking in the backdrop, is part of the symbolic capital vested in ideas and meaning and is part of the process in the reader's making a decision about the literature of choice, whatever “misunderstanding”, “appropriation of the meaning” or other issues that may arise in how we view that reader/writer relationship. In this sense, authorship in itself becomes critical in the choice of “reading”, and the act of reading acquires symbolic, economic, and political aspects.

Yet, in spite of the context of publication that creates the author's public image for marketing purposes, the person who chooses to write has specific intentions in writing the text. As in any communication between interlocutors, it is important to understand the

author's meaning and intentions before proceeding with its “appropriation” or dismissal of the work (Arshavky, 1992). In the words of Snufkin, the eternal wanderer of the Moominvalley, the crux of the matter is “how to find that tune”, defined by its purpose and varying according to who chants it. In this study, I am concerned with the “tune” that inspires children’s literature, writing, reading, and research. Finally, I am striving to capture the “tune” of the narrative and therefore I proceed to a short elaboration on the meaning of three children's books that spoke to me in childhood and with whom I continue my dialogue today in an attempt to receive and not appropriate their meaning.

1.2. Meeting Dunno and Friends

Nikolai Nosov was the first author to have inspired me to connect the Russian letters, then mystical to me, as I was sitting under the three palm trees trifurcating from a corner of our garden on the bank of the Blue Nile. I was five years old and it happened at one particular moment, when suddenly everything fell into place and made sense. I had not even noticed that the desert moon had replaced the merciless sun and was only roused by the worried voice of my mother calling me in for supper. That day opened to me the world of reading and marked my Russification beyond repair.

We had just moved to Khartoum from Moscow and my mother was concerned that I first learn to read and write Arabic and English, before my native Russian, so as to “succeed” in school. Ironically, my mother at the time already had become a Soviet philologist and a professor of Russian and my father, although Sudanese, found it easier to speak Russian to his children, even to those who were later born in Sudan. I either inherited their passion for the Russian language and thought or developed my own due to the injustice I felt, which I experienced as violence, at having being ruptured from my motherland. In any case, at four and half years of age, I vowed to keep in touch with my beloved grandparents, cousins and friends and promised them and myself to learn how to read and write in Russian.

Hence, Nosov’s presence in my life is connected to motivations, passions, and desires larger and deeper than “literacy” concerns and/or “entertainment” by “stories for children”. His stories were not only my vehicle to literacy but also a bridge to a world,

which I felt was snatched away from me without my consent and which made cultural and political warfare between ideologies an integral part of my experience of this complex and violent world. His books proved to be a cornerstone not only in my “virtual” connection to that world, secluded behind the Iron Curtain and the Cold War, but also to a whole generation of people exposed to this talented writer whose work was a crucial vehicle in transmitting notions of justice and social harmony through the lens of anarcho-socialism.

I have revisited Nosov throughout my youth. Upon my return to Russia in May 1998 after years of wandering around the globe (at the time, planning on my return to be permanent), I reread the third part of the trilogy, *Dunno⁹ on the Moon*, and laughed and wept even more than at the recognition of the Moonly world around me. As an adult, I appreciated the genius and the importance of this writer and documentary film-maker even more and it was this revelation that prompted me to return to him with all due seriousness in my doctoral research.

1.3. Into the Moomin Valley

Tove Jansson has marked another critical stage in my becoming. I discovered her at about seven years old through Finnish picture books while visiting Finno-Sudanese family friends. We lived on the bank of the Blue Nile in an English colonial house with high ceilings built of stone. My parents' friends Mari and Hassan explained to my parents that they wanted their children to grow up in a Sudanese environment, among the peasants and working class, in a house of local architecture made of mud. Visits to their house was a feast to me as my friends, Sami and Ali, took me around a totally different world of Sudanese farmlands, a local market, and the neighbourhood that seemed to be on the other side of the desert. As we played and climbed trees in the garden, I could see Mari going about her chores and always ready to respond when we needed her. Mari's image was thus imprinted in my memory as a picture of Moominmamma's eternal serenity and unconditional love. I later rediscovered the Moomins in Sweden where we sojourned for a year till I turned eight and half years old. And later, as an adult, I read them in Russian with my daughter whose comments and reactions brought back my own feelings and

⁹ The Russian title was *Незнайка на Луне* (*Neznajka na Lune*). Margaret Wetlin translates Незнайка (the one who doesn't know anything) as Dunno.

thoughts of long ago.

During my childhood, these books stirred in me the deep longing for the undefined cosmic harmony I had felt in my pre-language years. They reinforced my wildness and opened a window to the landscape of solitude and liberation from closed systems, a freedom I grew to love. Of course, at the time I did not conceptualise my emotions in these terms and probably the language itself sheds its own nuances on the original picture. Yet, the feeling and the realisation or visualisation of what it means to be “out there” was as clear then as it is now. It could be that these concepts were palpable due to my childhood experience of having lived with my grandparents in a tiny Russian village surrounded by forest and wilderness, where winter months hid the houses under a thick blanket of snow cutting us off from the rest of the world just as in *Midwinter in Moominland*. Later, at the age of five and half, this *doxa* was reinforced by a six months sojourn in a geological camp with my parents in the Sudanese savannah of the Darfur region, living in tents under the abysmal African sky, where stars, humans and beasts comprised one song, one melody containing in it everything: fear, grief, mystery, harmony, peace, knowledge and the unknowable. My meaning of freedom was defined then and there.

Regardless of these experiences, I believe that the Moomins are capable of opening this window of possibility to any child or adult, even to those who were not exposed to such experiences as mine, because the depth of the related atmosphere of tranquil beatitude in these books is enough to make this other possibility of experience not only possible but real and tangible. If all else fails, at least they are capable of offering a dream; and where there is a dream, there is a way to realise it.

In effect, in 1978 in the Soviet Union, Altaev wrote the script and Zjablokova directed a puppet animation film in three parts presenting many of the characters of Moominvalley and the events of the *Comet Comes to Moominvalley*. The films capture accurately the atmosphere of the books, which indicates that people from different experiences are capable of understanding, feeling, and dreaming the possibility of letting go of social constraints so as to dive fearlessly into the mystery of chaos.

This mystery is that singular spot for true freedom where each of us searches in

solitude, a fact accepted by moominparents when their child undertakes a dangerous journey to the observatory on a high mountain at a time when the world was being threatened by a cosmic invader – a comet. Jansson put it this way: “Every children's book should have a path in it where the writer stops and the child goes on. A threat or a delight that can never be explained. A face never completely revealed” (Kivi, 1998). Jansson thus expresses the necessity of mutual respect for knowledge between the author and the reader. Having understood the author, the reader accepts the invitation to enter into an epistemological dialogue filling in the gaps with one’s own knowledge of the world, a knowledge that comes from personal introspection and a daring to move beyond the social barricades of order out into the wilderness of chaos. This realisation has prompted me to analyse the Moominworld in relation to the Dunno trilogy.

1.4. Winnie-the-Pooh as Other

The third pick for my comparison was tougher to make. Having grown up between at least five worlds (the Soviet, the Swedish, the Northern Sudanese, the Western Sudanese, and colonial British school run by the Vatican clergy), I felt that a third element for contrast was important and it had to be something with which I have been familiar as a child and that presented a real alternative to the ontologies of Jansson and Nosov. Unlike other foreign authors, I never mistook Alan Alexandre Milne for a Russian when I was growing up. The works of Alexandre Dumas, Frank Baum, or other translated foreign authors, all seemed Russian to me, except for *Winnie-the-Pooh*. As a child, I thought that Alan Alexandre Milne was German (in the communal Russian memory Germany was still the enemy at the time even though the war supposedly had ended). As I was going through what “foreign” book to pick, Terry Cochran, my advisor, advised “why not Winnie?”.

Rereading the original (and it’s been quite some time now that I have “discovered” that it was English) I was surprised to find that it was different from the image and understanding I had of this work earlier; that is, the definitions that guided me then gave me a different meaning of what Winnie seemed to mean to me now in my North American context. There is more to the story, though. The three – now classic – Soviet animation films (1969, 1971 and 1972) with which every Soviet citizen has grown up – even though

very close to the original text – omit Christopher Robin altogether and hence erase the hierarchical element of the original book.

Even though there existed two translations of *Winnie-the-Pooh* into Russian, the Soviet animation film has overwritten them both. Hence my “adult” re-reading of the original book came as a “surprise”, revealing elements in conflict with the more “egalitarian” Russian animation version of the 100 Aker Wood. In addition to the Russian changes, *Winnie-the-Pooh* underwent a transformation in the Disney adaptations that missed the possibilities of irony presented by the original intentions of the author in addressing these books to an adult audience (Milne, 1974). *Winnie-the-Pooh* thus proved to be an interesting and sensible pick for contrast and comparison to the other two worlds and in the manner in which these books have worked their way into my being, shifting meaning and definitions of what we know about order and chaos.

1.5. Brief Sketches about the Authors

1.5.i. Tove Jansson (1914-2001) was born in Helsinki. At the time, Finland was part of Russia and has throughout the civilised history of Europe remained in the midst of the strife between Swedish and Russian imperial interests. Jansson's parents were Swedish-minority artists. Her mother was a painter/illustrator and her father a sculptor. Two important factors in her life were: the old sculptor's studio with the old wood-stove in which she grew up and the summer house on a solitary island in the Finnish archipelago where the family spent their summers. European (e.g. British¹⁰) biographers place her in upper middle class, bohemian milieu, while American biographers highlight the financial “poverty” of her artistic parents and the lack of space.

Jansson wrote the first Moomin book, *The Little Trolls and the Great Flood* (1945), during the war but dates the first drawing of a moomin to her childhood:

In our house hidden away in the Finnish archipelago we used to write things upon the walls. One summer a lengthy discussion developed along the walls. It all started when my brother, Per Olov, jotted down a quasi-philosophical statement and I tried to refute it, and our dispute continued daily. Finally, Per Olov quoted Kant, and the controversy came to an immediate end as this was irrefutable. In annoyance, I drew something that was intended to be extremely ugly, something that resembled a Moomin. So, in a way,

¹⁰ “Modest as her background might have been, the home was middle class...” (Jones, 1984: 4)

Immanuel Kant inspired the first Moomin (Fliescher in Jones, 1984: 10).

Although Jansson denied “philosophical” content in her moominbooks, the first moomin conception was born in a philosophical debate and, in any event, denial of philosophy in itself constitutes philosophy, even if only to provide comic elements such as found in the nihilist philosopher Muskrat in the Moomin stories. The books appeared in published versions between 1945 and 1970, after which Jansson wrote for adults¹¹. The moominbooks consist of nine novels, a series of picture books, and comics on which she collaborated with her brother, Lars Jansson, leaving the comics to him to him after 1974.

The first book provides the genesis of the Moomin Valley, where, because of a great flood and people switching to electric stoves and general civilisation, the small moomintrolls, prior to that dwelling behind old stoves and under wooden floors, were forced to migrate to a new land. Moominpappa had taken off earlier with the strange dumb and numb mass-wanderers, the Hattifatteners, and Moominmamma decides to venture on a long journey to find him. The family reunites after undergoing various adventures, such as being chased by a Serpent who dropped into the mud of the marshes after staring at a glowing flower-girl, or such as getting lost in a strange under-world made of sweets and artificial lighting – a predecessor of Roald Dahl’s *Charlie and the Chocolate Factory* (1968). Unlike Dahl’s sugary empire of colonialism and slavery, where the accumulation of wealth is presented as the desired end, the moomins renounce the sugary, artificial bliss that gives them the stomach runs and depression. They find their way out after going through dangerous adventures in the tumultuous sea, a terrifying trip with the hattifattners, the ferocious paws of an ant-lion, a great flood, and more. Finally, crossing different geophysical settings, a Marabou bird carries them away from an African landscape atop an enormous tree where they find Moominpappa who had already built them their Home in the shape of an old wood stove. This house becomes the home of many creatures, for whoever wishes to join the family is adopted.

The rest of the books recount various moments in the lives and adventures of these creatures. W. Glyn Jones interprets the later books as particularly philosophical. “As the

¹¹ I would argue, however, that the borders between her children's and adult literature are hazy, at best. Her adult books often figure children and the children's books take on serious topics whose ruminations are interesting and appropriate for all ages.

series progresses, philosophical and psychological questions ... become increasingly important until, in *Moominpappa at Sea* and *Moominvalley in November*, they form the very essence of the work” (Jones, 1984: 4), in which the novels evoke particularly in a post-Foucauldian reader questions of madness and normalcy, presence and absence. More important, however, is the underlying basis of Jansson's *doxa* and ideology, no doubt nurtured by her singular childhood, facing storms in the open sea, living in an old sculptor's studio with a wood stove, or exploring deserted islands months on end. In effect, the moominhouse is depicted in the image of the stove and the moominbooks' ending evokes images and experiences from her life: travel, movement, cosmic togetherness, longing, love, and home are not only compatible elements, but constitute the essential components of a thriving universe that engender a real life.

The last book, *Moominvalley in November* (1971) takes up where *Moominpappa at Sea* (1966) leaves off, namely, the family members sail in a boat into the open sea and find a solitary island that they decide to explore indefinitely. In the last book, the reader learns that, even in their absence, their house in Moominvalley remains alive. Various characters move there, they have their fears, their hopes, their relationships. The moominfamily's absence itself in this book becomes a character, even a protagonist, in its own right. Without notice or technologically facilitated communication at the end, everyone knows when the family decides to return and, without speaking to each other, they know what to do.

Toft wasn't surprised when he saw that the tent had gone. Perhaps Snufkin had understood that Toft was the only one who should meet the family when they got home. . . . His dream meeting the family again had become so enormous that it made him feel tired. Every time he thought about Moominmamma he got a headache. She had grown so perfect and gentle and consoling that it was unbearable (172). . . .

Toft walked on through the forest, stooping under the branches, creeping and crawling, and thinking of nothing at all, and became as empty as the crystal ball. This is where Moominmamma had walked when she was tired and cross and disappointed and wanted to be on her own, wandering aimlessly in the endless forest. . . . Toft saw an entirely new Moominmamma and she seemed natural to him. He suddenly wondered why she had been unhappy and whether there was anything one could do about it

The forest began to thin out and huge grey mountains lay in front of him. [When he climbed the mountain], [t]he whole sea spread out in front of him, grey and streaked with even white waves right out to the horizon. Toft turned his face into the wind and sat down to wait (174). . . .

Just before the sun went down it threw a shaft of light through the clouds, cold and wintry-yellow, making the whole world look very desolate.

And then Toft saw the storm-lantern Moominpappa had hung up at the top of the mast. It threw a gentle, warm light and burnt steadily. The boat was a very long way away. Toft had plenty of time to go down through the forest and long the beach to the jetty, and be just in time to catch the line and tie up the boat¹² (Jansson, 1971: 175).

1.5.ii. Nikolai Nosov (1908-1976) was born in Kiev, Ukraine. He graduated from the Moscow Institute of Cinematography in 1932 and fought during World War II (1941-45). Between 1932 and 1951 he worked as a film-maker, mostly in educational and scientific documentaries. *The Grand Soviet Encyclopedia* (Prokhorov, 1969-1978) [Большая Советская Энциклопедия] dates his literary debut at 1938. Among Nosov's numerous and varied interests were “music, singing, amateur theatre, writing for the journal X, as well as chemistry, chess, radio, electronics, photography. Nosov sold newspapers, worked as an ordinary worker, an excavator, a grass-cutter, transporter of felled-wood, etc.” (Arzamastseva, et al. 1997: 312). The first book in the Dunno trilogy, *The Adventures of Dunno and his Friends*¹³, was published in 1953. The second, *Dunno in Sunny City*¹⁴, came out in 1958, and the last book in the trilogy, *Dunno on the Moon*¹⁵, in 1964. Only the first of the books has been translated into English by Margaret Wetlin¹⁶ who immigrated to

¹² Homsan blev inte förvånad över att tältplatsen var övergiven. Kanske Snusmumriken hade förstått att det inte fick vara någon annan än Toft som tog emot familjen när den kom hem. . . . Hans dröm om mötet med familjen hade blivit så stor att den gjorde honom tröt. Varje gång han tänkte på mamman fick han ont i huvudet. Hon hade vuxit sig så fullkomlig och mild och tröstande att det var olidligt (158). . . .

Homsan Toft gick vidare genom skogen, hukade under grenarna, kravlade och kröp, han tänkte på ingeting alls och var lika tom som glaskulan. Här hade mamman gått när hon var trött och arg och besviken och ville var ifred, planlöst vandrande i den ständiga skuggan, djupt inne i sitt missmod . . . Homsan Toft såg en alldeles ny mamma och hon föreföll honom naturlig. Han undrade plötsligt varför hon hade varit ledsen och vad man kunde göra åt saken. . . .

Nu glesnade skogen och stora gråa berg kom emot honom. . . . Hela havet låg utbrett framför honom, grått och strimmat av jämna vita vågor ända ut till horisonten. Toft vände nosen mot vinden, han satte sig ner för att vänta (160).

Just innan solen gick ner slog hon en rämna av ljus i molnbanken, kall och vintergul, den gjorde hela världen mycket ödslig.

Och nu såg homsan Toft stormlyktan som pappan hade hängt i masttoppen. Den hade en mild varm färg och den brann stadigt. Båten var mycket långt borta. Homsan Toft hade god tid på sig att gå ner genom skogen och följa stranden till båtbyggnaden, precis lagom för att ta emot fånglinan (*Sent i November* 1970: 161).

¹³ Original title: *Приключения Незнайки и его друзей*.

¹⁴ Original title: *Незнайка в Солнечном Городе*.

¹⁵ Original title: *Незнайка на Луне*.

¹⁶ Margaret Wetlin translated only the first part of the trilogy. She did an excellent job in rendering the liveliness of the characters and most important their names. It is a pity that she did not undertake to translate the two subsequent volumes. I spoke to her son in Philadelphia, but he did not know why she didn't continue the project; “perhaps she wasn't sponsored,” he suggested.

the Soviet Union for ideological reasons in the 1930s.

The first book depicts an idyllic mite utopia. The social organisation is anarchistic despite mention of authority, which is mainly expressed in the mites' desire to trust and listen to Doono's¹⁷ advice since Doono is the embodiment of knowledge. Albeit, the society functions perfectly well without authority and in the absence of laws, police, schools, or farming since the strongest drive of the mites is harmony and cooperation. Conflicts happen, but the author demonstrates that the little humans are perfectly capable of solving these themselves. In contrast with *The Sunny City* where police interfere with “order”, the anarchist mites solve their conflicts more effectively than in the presence of the police. More important than Doono, however, is Dunno, the 'anti-knowledge' who is the protagonist of the trilogy. In the first book, among other issues, Nosov raises the “problem” of gender. Gender segregation, the book demonstrates, is the result of ignorance and competition. The Mites travel to the Green Town the equivalent of *La Cité des Dames*¹⁸, learn from the wise girl-mites and by getting to know one another they learn to appreciate each other's insights and help, which brings a reconciliation between genders.

In the second book, Dunno meets a magician who rewards his concern for animals and people by giving him a magic wand that can make any wish come true. Together with his now best friend, a girl mite by the name of Buttonette, and another friend, a boy mite called Smudges Bright¹⁹, Dunno wishes to travel. A car appears and they visit a high-tech megapolis with complex technological agriculture, futuristic architecture, a complex system of transportation, and an inefficient panopticon run by police (but without politicians or leaders) in a communist social structure: *The Sunny City*.

Several of the chapters are dedicated to problematising and raising questions about the function of the police and the problems of policed society. A significant part of the book is dedicated to the question of good and bad deeds, conscience, empathy, knowledge, and self-governance. Although the problem of police, crime, and punishment gets a

¹⁷ Margaret Wetlin translates Знаяка (the one who knows everything) as Doono.

¹⁸ Just like *Dunno in Sunny City* is reminiscent of Campanella's dictatorial utopia *City of the Sun*, the Green Town is a women's liberation zone based on the same principles as Christine de Pizan's *La Cité des Dames*.

¹⁹ Кнопочка and Пачкуля Пёстренький in the original (translation mine).

separate treatment in the capitalist distopia depicted in the third book on the Moon, Nosov makes a point to raise the question of police, freedom, and prison in the communist society of *The Sunny City*. This is particularly interesting in the context that the author's father had been censored for his performance of “*songs of jail and freedom*” (songs usually sung in Russian and Soviet jails that form a particular folk genre) after which his father spent his life working as a janitor and cashier. To be denied the fulfilment of one's dream, of one's calling, is a great personal tragedy and these questions must have struck a chord.

The final book takes Dunno to the moon where he discovers the horrendous suffering of exploited mites in conditions of dire capitalism. Dunno learns the problems of economics and politics and becomes involved in the struggle for liberation of the moon mites, but this time, through agriculture and the rights of peasants to own their crops. Nosov thus depicts large societies as complicated, raising many social and economic problems that are solved by agriculture. However, the mites return to their anarchist, gatherer utopia at the end of the trilogy, and a tear-wrenching scene depicts, not only that home is best, but that without home there is no life.

Even though the themes of the books risk being didactic, the books are written with great humour. Hilarious and expressed with great imagination and mastery, the text also offers abundant scientific descriptions of inventions which gloss over the ideology as well as an inconspicuous critique of the Soviet state. Not surprising, interpretations of Dunno abound – each more startling than the other²⁰.

1.5.iii. Alan Alexandre Milne (1882-1956) was of Scottish ancestry born in Hampstead and raised in London. His father was a schoolmaster, and H.G. Wells was his teacher and mentor (Milne, 1974). He received his education at Westminster School and Trinity College, Cambridge. From his 24th birthday until World War I, he published in and worked as assistant editor at *Punch* – a humour magazine. He fought during the war and

²⁰ Some authors have attempted to follow up the various options provided, particularly, by the crossroads in the Sunny City where Dunno and friends chose the direction. For example, a former police officer, Vladislav Yurjevich Shebashov (pseudonym: Boris Karlov) explores the possibilities of Dunno choosing a different direction on the cross-roads, such as the Stone City. Nosov's son, Igor Petrovich Nosov, fought for copyright ownership and forced the Shebashov to withdraw his books, which he rewrote renaming the characters. Igor P. Nosov now writes his own sequels (Chuprinina, 2003).

then continued to write after he returned, exploiting most literary genres: poetry, dramaturgy, stories and novels. He considered himself an adult author, writing for the “child within us” (ibid). The author's real-life son, Christopher Robin Milne, wrote to their friend and favourite author, P. G. Wodehouse: “My father did not write the books for children. He didn't write for any specific market; he knew nothing about marketing. He knew about me, he knew about himself, he knew about the Garrick Club – he was ignorant about anything else. Except, perhaps, about life”²¹.

The first Pooh story appeared on 24th of December 1925 and was broadcast on Christmas Day by Donald Calthrop. That was the first chapter of the first book of Winnie-the-Pooh. The second book, *The House at Pooh Corner*, appeared in 1928. The imagined realm of the 100 Aker Wood has a real-world reference: the author's house, his son and his son's toys. The hierarchy is set right from the start: the main character is a boy and he reigns over a world of toys, whose reality is contingent on his will, agency, and power. Winnie-the-Pooh, the bear of small brains, is his favourite, and Owl, the most literate and therefore brainy, is the most important. Both represent Christopher Robin's needs and decisions for order. For instance, when the immigrants appear, Pooh first verifies that they are legal (that Christopher Robin is aware of and approves of their appearance in the Wood), and then, he conducts the placement interview. The rest of the characters exist to simply satisfy the child's need for play and imagination. There is an absence of female characters, with the exception of a later appearance of Kanga, Roo's mother. Christopher Robin's mother is present in the dedication that acknowledges her role in inspiring the Pooh stories. The Russian version turned Owl into a woman, but in Milne's original, the remaining characters are male: Piglet the tiny pocket friend, Rabbit the xenophobic aristocrat, Eeyore the melancholic donkey, and Tigger the newly arrived immigrant who moves with Kanga and Roo to form a one-house-ghetto. The xenophobic, aristocratically, hypocritically polite Rabbit mobilises an anti-immigrant act when Kanga and Roo arrive and another one when Tigger appears. In the end, however, everyone is accepted and the reader watches life in the 100 Aker Wood unfold with its daily little adventures.

The underlying ontological premises of the narrative reveal a sterile world that has

²¹ <http://www.poohcorner.com/Bios/>

no possibility of regenerating or thriving and in effect ceases to be active when the real boy leaves for boarding school. What is most interesting and relevant for my study is Milne's play with language that has the potential to challenge the *doxa* through unexpected associations revealing the arbitrariness of meaning. For instance, the mock scientific expedition to discover the North Pole was about heading north, finding a pole, sticking it in the ground and then celebrating the discovery with a naming ceremony "North Pole". Albeit Milne does not use language to reveal its absurdity, arbitrariness and unreliability in the manner of Lewis Carroll, for instance. He penetrates its "un-logic" through the freedom of childhood, a revolutionary potential unleashed by the child's uncrystallised relationship to social norms and language. Unlike the Moominbooks where there is no need for revolution since it is already an integral part of chaos and movement, and unlike Dunno's adventures where members of an anarcho-primitivist society bring liberation to the exploitative capitalist Moon, in spite of its potential, the 100 Aker Wood remains static, locked in the oppressive concept of civilised permanence and therefore ceases to move, live, and finally to exist. The last chapter of the book, titled: "Chapter X. In which Christopher Robin and Pooh come to an enchanted place, and we leave them there" conveys a sense of doom and hopelessness as the characters know of an imminent end:

Christopher Robin was going away. Nobody knew why he was going; nobody knew where he was going; indeed, nobody even knew why he knew that Christopher Robin was going away. But somehow or other everybody in the Forest felt that it was happening at last. Even Smallest-of-all, a friend-and-relation of Rabbit's who thought he had once seen Christopher Robin's foot, but couldn't be quite sure because perhaps it was something else, even S. of A. told himself that Things were going to be Different; and Late and Early, two other friends-and-relations, said, "Well, Early?" and "Well, Late?" to each other in such a hopeless sort of way that it really didn't seem any good waiting for the answer (Milne, 1992 [1956]: 162).

1.6. A Note on Illustrations

Tove Jansson was a painter and illustrator as well as writer and she mostly illustrated her own books. As mentioned earlier, the first Moomin drawing appeared as a cartoon illustration in response to a philosophical debate on Kant with the author's brother. She illustrated her novels in black and white as well as in colour and with her brother, Lars, developed the strip comics. Her life-companion, a Finnish illustrator and painter, Tuulikki Pietilä made some Moomin illustrations as well and together they have created

moomin puppets.

Nosov and Milne's books are also illustrated, however, different artists have depicted them at various times either in colour or black and white which renders them different from Jansson's, since in her case illustrations come as hints and nuances that support the text, whereas in the case of Nosov and Milne, the illustrations are “readers” interpretations. All three authors have been adapted to animation, theatre and other cultural media.

Chapter 2: I Read Therefore I am: A Sociological Perspective

This work is not only about stories. It is about the larger meaning of stories that have been written in the context of civilisation. More accurately, it is about the premises that inform the social construct of knowledge inscribed into our flesh that we then articulate in (his)stories. Having become an integral part of our genes and memes, these precepts and their stories interfere with our choices, feelings, and thoughts and impel us to act on behalf of certain interests that often conflict with our own. These stories articulate our suffering, confusion, and hopes and help camouflage our real drives. Together, these stories flow into one narrative that structures our understanding and misunderstanding and knowledge and unknowledge.

Therefore, this work is also about narratives – those complex sets of stories of our civilisation that lull us to surrender to its order. Narratives domesticate chaos and claim to know what things came first, what followed, what we should be, how we should live and where we should end. They contain in them stories of creation, morals of success, warning tales of hardcore punishment, death, and coveted rewards. Sometimes they admonish with cautionary tales of where not to stray with our desires and dreams; at other times, they offer imaginary scenarios of alternative possibilities, cosmic trajectories, and the promise of rebellion in an attempt to regain wildness.

Unni Wikan and Cheryl Mattingly (in Mattingly and Garro, 2000) challenge the

idea that narratives offer a coherent, chronological and even logical order to experience. Nevertheless, they do not distinguish between the civilised and non-civilised narratives. Neither do they specify the narrative level; for instance, there is a larger framework within which the varying multiplicity of narratives are inscribed that structures one version of the history of humanity and the world. In Lyotard's terms, these narratives constitute the metadiscourse and the metanarrative that are ultimately informed by Bourdieu's concepts of *doxa*, *habitus*, and ideology. Wikan writes that because in her native Norwegian (as well as in Arabic and several other languages) there is only one word “story” or “storytelling”, it is difficult for her to grasp the nuances and the differences between “narrative” and “story” or “narration” and “storytelling”.

In my own native Russian language, however, there are differences between *история*, *рассказ*, *рассказывание*, *повесть*, *повествование*, *излагать*, *поведать*²². *История* [istorija] means “story”, both, as in “a story” and “history” (like the French “*histoire*” can be “*une histoire*” [a story] or “*l’histoire*” [history]) and “event”. This word, therefore, contains the nuances of something that could have truly happened. *Рассказ* [rasskaz] means story, which can be fiction or a personal testimony of an event. Even though *рассказ* and *история* are synonymous, there are situations when one cannot replace another; for example “*вот такая история* [istorija] *приключилась со мной*” (*Voilà* the “adventure” or “story” that has befallen me), but it would be wrong to use the synonym: *рассказ* [rasskaz] or *story* in this context.

Рассказывание [rasskazyvanije] means to tell something that really happened or to recount a fictive tale. *Повесть* [povest'] is a novel, a long story, or a narrative since it assumes a complexity of stories and time frames. *Повествование* [povestvovanije] is to narrate a complexity of ideas or stories that has a ring of orally transmitted truth but can also be used in narrating legends and fiction (in subsequent parts of my work, I challenge the civilised distinctions between fiction and reality, but for the time being I leave it at that). *Излагать* [izlagat'] means to recount through attentive description, stating and listing meticulously the various points of one's argument in the story or narrative.

²² Complexity and nuances are further complicated by the different forms of the same verbs that signal one time, specific events or regularly recurring, time unlimited events. In other words, the forms of Russian verbs signal timely and ordered structures of narrative and the admission of an unbridled chaos.

Furthermore, this grammatical form of the verb has no time structure or limitations since it conveys a ceaseless recurrence, even an eternity, whereas *изложить* [izlozhit'] is the finite form of the verb: give all the details and facts and make one's case once and for all. Finally, there is another word, *поведать* [povedovat'], which means to impart or reveal one's story or secret.

English words for *tell* also carry specific, English connotations. For example, to *relate* something means “to tell”, but the word shares the root with *relate to* or *connect with* and make one a relative of sorts. *Relay* carries the connotations of *convey* and *exchange*, and *narrate* has a more complex and formal ring to it, while *recount* shares its root with *account* and resonates with the Russian *izlagat'*.

Even Swedish, in spite of the fact that it lacks the range of vocabulary for “telling” that Russian has, nevertheless, has two words: *historia* for “story” and *berättelse*, which can be used for “narrative” or “discourse” and for narration, or *narrat* for “narratee”. The same applies to the two terms for “tell” and “narrate”: *förtälja* and *berätta*, the latter is more common and has a nuance of sharing, which the Russian *peredavat'* carries, as well as *to tell*, *to relate* and *to narrate*. Then there is *relatera*, which means relate or recount and *återberätta*, which means to retell and transmits a sense of quotative evidentiality that is an obligatory marker in languages like Turkish or many aboriginal languages in the Americas and Australia, as well as in other parts of the world. In cases where the language imposes quotative evidentials, the speaker is obliged to pick specific words to signal the level of reliability of the information relayed, such as whether an account was retold and not witnessed personally or whether it was based on first-hand experience through the teller's senses²³. In Russian, the equivalent is *пересказывать* [pereskazyvat']. Finally, Swedish has adopted the same French word as did Russian, and whose English equivalent shares the root with *history* in other Indo-European languages as well: *historia* or English *story* or Russian *история* [istorija].

In other words, Wikan's discomfort with the word *narrative*, which to her sounds “foreign” and elitist, is another reminder of the existence of a connection between language and experience and the ways in which we communicate and structure that

²³ For more on the interrelationship between language and cognition see Palmer (1986), Papafragou et al. (2007), Boroditsky (2009), and Casasanto et al. (2010).

experience – an endeavour that influences our bodies, space and world, for her essay specifically tackles – not the unNorwegian *narratives*, she stresses, but – *stories* of illness, relationships, and language (Wikan in Mattingly & Garro, 2000). Evidently, language provides important metaphors and taints the perspectives on experience and reality through nuances and various associations. Nevertheless, the theory of linguistic determinism warrants caution, because the effects of coercion through social expectations, punishments and rewards at the basis of the methods of education and domestication are the primary factors responsible for forcing people to comply with the defining power of language and narrative structures.

Contrary to Wikan, for instance, my own consciousness has been formed in a wide spectrum for ways to tell and narrate, that is, in Russian language and culture. I hence find myself being sensitive to the different concepts that the two words, *story* and *narrative*, convey. Albeit, these differences and nuances in themselves, I argue, are not the most important aspects of knowledge, because, when one reads Tove Jansson's Moomintrolls in Swedish, one gets overwhelmed with the expanses of freedom and wilderness, in which language is played and tampered with, burnt (the interdiction signs that form the grammar of the Hemulens' worldview), and used to communicate and transmit personal and communal healing (*The Exploits of Moominpappa* [later edited into *Moominpappa's Memoirs*] 1950) and nurture life. Narrative in Jansson's case, thus, loses its chronological structure and becomes a series of moments caught – like the tune that Snufkin chases, captures, loses, then captures again – for sharing communally in a chaotic and always new and unpredictable way. The characters do not evolve, but are themselves full of chaos and their experience is always diverse, just as the world they inhabit. In this light, I attribute the most important difference to the perspectives that underlie the drives behind the different versions and modes of these expressions and not to the forms and mechanisms of communicating events, experiences, and desires. It is these ontological perspectives, I argue, that shape desires and mould the details of our lives; they can help us find our way back to wilderness or, to borrow John Zerzan's (1994) phrase, lead us into our “Future Primitive”.

Because stories are not neutral, recent trends in social and anthropological research

(Jameson [2002], Mattingly and Garro [2000], Landau [1991], Martin [1987], *inter alios*) have turned their attention to examining the various forms of human endeavour through narrative structures, plot and literary theory: narratives in medical anthropology, narratives of law, narratives of childhood, narratives of scientific interpretation of “real” phenomena, and so forth.

In spite of the ability of *habitus* and *doxa* to proliferate through time in a fixed and rigid form, oral tradition is by nature an interactive process of communication that entails exchange in knowledge. It would not be a tradition if each individual were to have an oral interaction with herself. That would be introspection. To borrow from the premises of the reader-response or reception theory, the act of reading is similar to hearing a story since the space of reception becomes the locus of contested desires, interests and meaning, a relationship that conflates dimensions of time and space, where act and process that we conceive as occurring through time also form an integral component of the space of mental, emotional, historical and future negotiations.

Literature, both oral and written, hence, opens a window for understanding the interaction of personal and social spheres and the negotiation of personal and institutional interests, since authors imbue their texts with their *habitus*, *doxa*, and knowledge or ideology and the readers understand them in their own manner. Numerous thinkers have tackled the problem that the genesis itself of literacy has not been a neutral event but rather a logical development of the technology of domination. Acknowledging this fact raises important questions on both the nature and the purpose of all literature, including children's.

First, as Jack Goody (1963, 1968 and 1977) and Walter Ong (1982 and 1986) observe, literacy is a corollary of civilisation and therefore necessarily implicates relations of power that are intentionally engineered and that are proliferated through unintentional mechanisms such as language, narratives, and literature. In the following chapter, I explore these connections through the theory of narrative, anthropological field study, and examine its articulation in children's books.

Chapter 3: Language as Root of Violence and Grammar of Ordered Reality

The pivotal aspect of the mechanism responsible for the proliferation of institutions is language. Language is both a semiotic system and a system of laws, or a grammar, that structures and regulates the exchange of symbolic capital and the economy of effort. Grammar provides concrete rules and formulae which by its nature is designed to contain meaning, predict interactive responses thereby preventing the unforeseeable and curbing improvisation and chaos. In other words, grammar imposes uniformity or standards of assigned meanings and concepts to our understanding and thereby controls interactions between humans and their world. Even pictures and illustrations in children's books require and/or “train” a fluency in semiological systems; i.e. they constitute a language that collaborates with the verbal aspect of the books.

While the meta-linguistic and epistemological studies of literature point to increasing possibilities in interpretation that are capable of conveying various levels of complexity in the narrative, these complexities could be the result of unresolved tensions and conflicts characteristic of stratified societies²⁴ due to the pressure applied by an attempt to standardise and impose a uniformity that limits the expression of personal experience and observations. Learnt through ritual and repetition, grammar becomes an integral part of *habitus* and *doxa*, and language itself becomes a crucial aspect of the brain, perspectives on the world, and dispositions. Nonetheless, there is room for chaos even in language, since meaning fluctuates based on personal history, associations, the physiological memory of emotions, posture, dispositions, experiences, and knowledge which constitute the *body hexis*—an aspect of communication that implicates the role of biography in forging specific perspectives underlying the premises and conclusions of all endeavours of social significance, whether scientific or creative²⁵.

²⁴ Frederic Jameson (2002) and Claude Lévi-Strauss (1963) make an important point about the complexity of art: when a society, such as the Caduveo, chooses to organise itself hierarchically, they fail to resolve the contradictions and conflicts arising from inequality and subjugation. These conflicts are then expressed in the complexity of lines and details in their paintings.

²⁵ Scientific and artistic categories are as artificial as any other. For example, to learn anatomy, or to

Even though some linguists believe language to be a natural or evolutionary characteristic of human beings, the nature of language or the ability of other species to have grammatical systems for arranging signifiers and meaning indicates that language is neither a “natural” nor unique aspect of humanity. Rather, it is one of the tools, probably the most archaic of human tools, that helped organise abstract thought within a system, i.e. provided a grammar for symbolic representation and with it the possibility to replace the real experience by the symbolic. As I discuss in part three, this ability for language and civilisation are not exclusive to human animals, however, very few species choose that path of cultural transmission and interaction since it appears that language, among other things, provides a vehicle of submission to social and cultural norms that impose a sense of relating oneself not to a first hand experience, but first of all to language itself and to its system of arbitrary rules, restrictions, definitions and values – a grammar that is imposed on a person through the methods of education and domestication from early childhood and which requires a certain mode of relating oneself to the rest of the world. Research in the field of language and cognition reveals this relationship of language, knowledge and domestication.

In *Metaphors We Live By*, George Lakoff and Mark Johnson (2003) examine this connection between understanding, experience, and observation from a deterministic perspective on the metaphors used for scientific exploration. Their analysis demonstrates the role of metaphors and linguistic turns in shaping what we observe, how we interpret and feel about our observations, and ultimately how the language itself then shapes values, metaphors, language, experience, “facts”, and their interpretation. Other deterministic studies in sociolinguistics have been vital for an attempt to understand and address the problems of social injustice and stratification. For instance, the work of William Labov (1972) on Black English, Lesley Milroy (1987) on language, stratification, and social networking, Deborah Cameron (1995 and 2009) on language, gender, and class, among others demonstrate how accents, terms, and body postures can be used to keep wealth distribution out of reach for certain groups based on ethnicity, gender, or other

practice architecture one needs to be able to “see” and to “draw” in addition to the learning and analytic skills needed to perform any task. This is valid also for art, where one needs to learn about what one sees from other “scientific” aspects (anatomy, physics, etc.). For a deeper discussion, refer to chapter 4 on Knowledge.

discriminatory markers that are connected with linguistic expression, essentialism, and socio-economic status. Others have elaborated on the relationship between language and class, and by extension on language, disempowerment and access to resources and capital. Basil Bernstein (1971), Karen Foss and Stephen Littlejohn (2010), James Atherton (2011), *inter alios*, also offer invaluable insight into the mechanisms behind in-group participation and out-group discrimination. While these theories offer important contributions regarding the use of language for the purposes of discrimination, domination, and ostracising from economic networks, they do not address the question of the genesis and nature of language itself.

The standard, underlying premise in most of these approaches to language is defined by the civilised perspective that still continues to see language as a potential of “progress”, presumably an improvement over the dark animal a-linguistic ignorance to the elevated, even if incomprehensible for most, language of abstract poetry and artistic representation. Furthermore, this perspective presents language as a natural characteristic of humanity. Noam Chomsky (1957 and 1972), for instance, argues that exclusively human children's brains are hardwired specifically to learn language by a certain age, which appears to be lost (atrophied) after puberty and is not related to intelligence. Psycholinguistic research of feral and deaf children appears to confirm this observation. However, researchers studying the cases of “feral” children have focused on grammar and syntax rather than on the ontological premises in the notions conveyed by language.

Now considered a classic study in language acquisition and childhood, the case of Genie is an extreme scenario of this narrative of incarceration, dependence, and isolation. Because of this, it reveals the mechanisms of domestication and its effect on wilderness which under the conquest of civilisation becomes a desertified landscape of loneliness. Having been severely abused by her parents until the age of thirteen, Genie grew up in complete isolation from her family, strapped to a chair in a room, occasionally being fed by her parents who did not communicate with her with the exception of her father growling at her to show his anger when he brought her food. Otherwise, Genie was left in isolation from the rest of the family, whose other children received normal treatment. Social workers discovered Genie in November 1970 at the age of almost thirteen and

placed her in the care of psychologists who turned Genie into dissertation material observing her abilities to learn speech and adaptation to life in “society”. Genie eventually learnt how to communicate, but had difficulty with standard grammar and concepts of politeness, such as “hello” and “thank you” (Rymer, 1993).

However, the concept “thank you” is not simply a matter of semantics and forms of polite socialisation. It contains the ontological premise that people have been created as self-centred, selfish, and cruel; that what they snatch from the world becomes their property and right; and that they do not have to share or be kind to others. Therefore, when they decide to show concern for someone else, even in a seemingly simple greeting such as: “good morning, how are you?”, the response should acknowledge the fact of asking and not answer the question, because the inquirer does not care to find out how the other really feels. It would therefore be inappropriate to provide a description of one's real state of mind, heart, or life, because the answer should signal the appreciation for the question itself and so a “very well, thank you, and how are you?” is then also met with a “very well, thank you; what a lovely day” even if the day is dark and the person is hungry and has no means of procuring food.

Alice Parman observes that the “thank you” issue and praise for food were the first aspects of her upbringing in the United States that stood in stark contrast with the interactions she witnessed in the home of her Indian hosts in a place in India where she has not seen a foreigner for kilometres (Anarchy Radio 15th December 2009²⁶). “Thank you for the meal, it is very good,” is the American way of expressing that everything is appreciated and *comme-il-faut*, she says. “Why, the food wasn't good last time?” the hosts asked half-jokingly. Family members, Parman observes, are expected to share and help each other out. They do not need to say thank you, because they will share and help out too when need arises. Such observations on the ridiculous aspect of thanking someone for food have been made in other non-domesticated societies. For example a Danish traveller, Peter Freuchen, who had married an Inuit woman and lived with the Inuit in Greenland, observes that the Inuit see mutual aid and reciprocity as the nature of human relations and one does not thank for what constitutes the foundation of community, members of that

²⁶ <http://www.archive.org/details/AnarchyRadioTv12-15-09>

community explained to him (Freuchen, 1961).

There are good arguments for both the “thank you” or the “thankless” way of relating to members of one's community, so it would be difficult to say definitively which might be the more optimal modality for expressing communal relationships while concurrently respecting personal space and effort, which the “thank you” acknowledges. Returning to Genie, however, having been abused as a child and having known only selfish cruelty, this concept must have appeared foreign to her.

In this way, Genie's case reveals that these ontological differences at the root of the distinction between wildness and domestication are responsible for the extent of the effect of our interiorisation of domestication, abstraction, and language and its expression in the characteristics that make up our physiological, cultural, political, and environmental specifics and differences. The most tragic and most revealing aspect of her case, though, is that her extreme domestication through abuse, left her with neither wilderness nor civilisation and therefore an inability to submit to relations articulated through symbolic and abstract sounds that reconfirm through a ritual exchange of politeness that acts of kindness are the exception, while acts of cruelty, exploitation, incarceration, and abuse are the norm.

In other words, language is the sum of narratives and rules devised to instruct how to live in the world, how to relate to it, and how to interact with it. Chomsky's observation, that the ability to learn “language” is lost by a certain age thus makes sense if we define this phenomenon as the loss of the ability to develop alienation through symbolic thought. There is, perhaps, a stage at which a human or animal person grows into the world as a wild being and becomes less prone to domestication, with its promise of deferred gratification that informs the basis of contemporary symbolic salary-culture in which symbols are given in exchange for extorted labour or the promise of “good jobs” and “good living” in exchange for complying with the board of education agenda or with teachers' demands. Language could have been that mutation that allowed us to develop the possibility to symbolise, separate, and harm the world and to encode these dispositions into the semantics and the grammar that structure and solidify domestication. On the basis of this grammar and structure, civilisation has developed effective pedagogical methods of

domestication that realises itself through language. Since language is the grammar of symbolism *per se*, it can serve as an effective tool of alienation, one that defines and orders social and personal space as well as the experiences that are fitted to constitute a civilised self²⁷.

There is significant evidence that all human and non-human animals have language²⁸, although it appears that only some human languages have developed a consistent (almost bullet-proof) system of violence. Here, I have in mind John Zerzan's 1994 and 1997 essays on the social construction of time and language in *Running on Emptiness: The Pathology of Civilization* (2002), in which he argues that the first tool of domestication was symbolic thought channelled by language:

Symbolizing is linear, successive, substitutive; it cannot be open to its whole object simultaneously. Its instrumental reason is just that: manipulative and seeking dominance. Its approach is “let a stand for b” instead of “let a be b.” Language has its basis in the effort to conceptualize and equalize the unequal, thus bypassing the essence and diversity of a varied, variable richness (Zerzan, 2002: 2).

In contrast to the proposition propounded by Jack Goody and Ian Watt's (1963) that literacy and alphabetisation is what developed the human brain and made it capable of abstraction, Zerzan identifies the invention of language itself as the cause of our rupture from real experience and our world, because language has provided the means to substitute the symbol for the real, denoting it in flat dimensions and experiencing it as a linear and organised order thereby homogenising diversity, simplifying the complexities by overlapping symbols.

Since civilisation is marked by intense violence, war, and stratification with its totalitarian imposition of obligatory schooling and literacy, Zerzan's question regarding the link between language and violence deserves serious examination. In the context of children's literature, I argue that this violence is transmitted through narrative structure. In other words, the interaction of the various parts of that narrative structure becomes the language (i.e. the grammar and the semiotics) of civilisation. Hence, a harmless looking

²⁷ As mentioned earlier in this chapter, many sociolinguists and anthropologists of language have discussed the connections between language and its relations to economic disparities and psychological identity based on gender, race, class, and I would add species to the list. The classic pioneers in this field are Lesley Milroy (1987), William Labov (1972), Deborah Cameron (1995 and 2009), *inter alios*.

²⁸ Apart from the famous studies on the language of bees, dolphins, and primates, Con Slobodchikoff of Northern Arizona University researches the transmission of semantic information by prairie dogs.

book, such as A.A. Milne's *Winnie-the-Pooh*, may appear at first glance to be funny and cute because no overt aggression is ever depicted, yet the ontological premises of its civilised space nonetheless transmit a violent order of power, cruelty, and abuse that is kept at bay as long as both the victims and their master play their roles and claim their relations to be the expression of love and joy. The important question that arises from Zerzan's critique is whether a different ontological premise transmitted through language is capable of circumventing the violent outcome that symbolic systems, as Zerzan argues, ultimately convey. In other words, can a book, for instance a moominbook, still be able to transmit love, life, and peace if it is based on the ontological premise of wildness, movement, and chaos even when the transmission occurs through language, moreover, through written language? It is an important aspect to investigate separately, particularly in comparison with the languages of other species, namely, whether the ontological premise can circumvent the impetus towards separation and alienation that appears to inhere in civilising tools and systems such as language.

On a different level, Zerzan notes that, in Latin, the word “define” originally meant “to limit or bring to an end. Language seems often to close an experience, not to help ourselves be open to experience. When we dream, what happens is not expressed in words, just as those in love communicate most deeply without verbal symbolizing” (Zerzan, 2002: 2). In this sense, then, definition, limitation, order and domestication are in the very nature and purpose of language – a system that shapes the knowledge which it orders, denotes, symbolises and transmits. That is why language, Zerzan observes, has not always evoked the optimistic cheer that the civilised, such as Eli Sagan, have expressed:

Eli Sagan (1985) spoke for countless others in declaring that the need to symbolize and live in a symbolic world is, like aggression, a human need so basic that “it can be denied only at the cost of severe psychic disorder.” The need for symbols – and violence – did not always obtain, however. Rather, they have their origins in the thwarting and fragmenting of an earlier wholeness, in the process of domestication from which civilization issued. Apparently driven forward by a gradually quickening growth in the division of labor that began to take hold in the Upper Paleolithic, culture emerged as time, language, art, number, and then agriculture (ibid).

The breadth of research from which Zerzan draws this connection between violence and language is compelling and highly relevant to any attempt at furthering the understanding of human knowledge particularly as it is expressed through and encoded in language,

since, unless one thinks a critique for herself under her breath and exclusively in her own mind, any cultural or social attempt to understand and challenge its curtailing and deadening power in itself takes place in and through language.

Wikan's problem discussed above thus becomes even more pronounced when one approaches it from the angle of Zerzan's critique of symbolic thought, language, and the social construction of time. Namely, Wikan's difficulty with the vocabulary responsible for structuring experience and knowledge through stories (simpler elements of narratives) and narratives (more complex and larger forms of communicated experience) becomes understandable and reveals the value of – even the urgency for – a comparative analysis of fictional stories with socio-cultural narratives in Swedish, Russian, and English which I undertake here.

Chapter 4: Literacy as Tool of Domestication and Oppression

The concept of domestication entails not only the conceptualisation of the “other” as “own”, but also of convincing the “other” that she is “other” and “owned”. In other words, the alignment of the other's will with one's needs requires a narrative that structures obedience, contentment, a conception of “natural rights”, desires, and other symptoms of life.

In civilisation, just as in wilderness, desires, personal and social “history”, dependencies and interactions are inscribed within the larger system of relationships. Unlike in wilderness, however, which contains in it a multiplicity of narratives expressing different interests, in civilisation, one dominant version speaks with authority on behalf of specific interests and inscribes all other interests, including those in conflict with the dominant version, into an official narrative with its sense of direction and chronology. Narratives order events into a plot that betrays a certain foundation of values providing a scale for measuring a person's worth and instilling a sense of norms and ideals. The

mechanism for constricting a person's movement and presenting a plot through which literary characters, both fictional and ethnographic, submit to a system of rewards, punishment, direction, and plot forges specific fears, desires and aspirations in the audience who identifies with these literary characters that symbolise the audience's own dreams even as the audience has been alienated from reality and own inner wildness through domestication and its methods of education and manipulation.

The question that arises from these observations becomes: can we ever – whether we are cultural producers or cultural consumers – detach ourselves completely from our world, experience and concerns—i.e. from anthropocentrism? For, if we depend on a specific paradigm for the organisation of livelihoods, in the context where space and resources have been privatised, then access to one's livelihood depends on the networks through which we acquire access to food and to symbolic and material capital. In such a context our imagination, no matter how uncurbed and wild, would still derive its life-force and form (language) from our experience within pre-set, previously accumulated categories of knowledge and perspectives, an imagination that renders this experience/knowledge pre-ordered, pre-categorised, and handed down as part of the symbolic heritage in terms of meaning, networks, institutions, knowledge, identity, pass-time, history, future, and so forth. For instance, science fiction and fantasy, the most fictional and imaginary of literary genres, whether written for old or young adults, illustrate the point that civilised literature, stories, and narratives are in themselves narcissistic endeavours always concerned with the human, the nature of the human, the interests of the human, the nature of human relationships with themselves and with the world, *et al.*

This obsession with humanity and humanism moulds the rules of credibility for works of fiction: if humans cannot relate to the depicted world, then it is deemed nonsensical or utopian (incredible, improbable, alien). Regardless of the author's intent, books offer specific sets of rules, which in the case of imaginary worlds can “convince” the reader to believe in that world and identify with its characters. Credibility, rules, representation – even in the case of the fantastic – thus depend on the “knowledge” about the “real” world that the author and the reader hold, interact with, or challenge.

The question of credibility touches upon several aspects of literary works. First, trust and belief are linked with the issue of authority: the authority of the author, the authority of the genre, the authority of the work itself, including the debate of literacy versus illiteracy. In the contemporary global technocratic system, literacy is valued and written texts have weight, voice and authority that are denied to oral traditions. This renders authored, written, and published sources of information credible and the unpublished sources not; a published author here is seen as authority, but an unpublished author is not; elite knowledge is credible because the elite have access to the process of producing and publishing texts as well as the final products, while popular knowledge is not because, as Bourdieu (1979) observes in *Distinction*, it constantly undergoes inflation; and so forth. The knowledge that the literate classes, and specifically the groups in control of the production of literacy, produce about the popular classes too constitutes the voice of authority that is internalised by the popular classes or resources, who are thereby silenced and objectified as they are “studied”, “known”, and told who they “are”.

Domestication thus entails teaching a person knowledge that is not available in wilderness. If the case were otherwise, there would have been no need for the principle itself of pedagogy, i.e. the notion that someone must teach others a standardised curriculum or the “uneducated” will perish, because the assumption is that they are not capable of learning these principles on their own. In the wild, a person living in a community of human and non-human people and plants from childhood learns how to guard the balance and diversity of that community so as to ensure that life continues and thereby learns to respect seasons: today I eat, tomorrow it is the raven's turn, then the hare's, and then the wolf's. In civilisation, only those who have power and ownership “rights” over “real” estate and living and non-living resources are the ones who eat. In other words, there are those who consume and control the symbolic capital, and there are those who are “legally” denied access to basic necessities, i.e. the majority of human and non-human “resources” who are excluded from this system of distribution of symbolic and material capital and resources because they themselves constitute the resources that are known to exist to be consumed. Hence, the cows, chicken, and pigs are incarcerated in concentration camps, locked in stalls for slaughter; human resources are used and discarded; soldiers are shipped off to kill and be killed; and the share-holders hold shares

of people, modes of production, products, markets, governments and their representatives, just to cite a few examples.

In order to domesticate a human or non-human person, that person needs to be taught that she will die if she does not please the one who has succeeded in killing competition – both the competing enterprises, the individuals that comprise them, and the human and animal persons who compete – and has appropriated food and other necessities for one's livelihood. Resources have to be taught that they are resources on a daily basis, for in the wild they would not learn how to fear, suffer, and toil; and when not reminded they easily turn feral.

Historical, anthropological, linguistic, philosophical, and other studies all agree that there is an interconnection between literacy, social and political domination of minds and bodies, the emergence of the capitalist mode of thinking human relations in terms of both product yield and social relations, and the environment which in civilisation is necessarily agricultural and domesticated. The technologies of writing, the body itself of the text, and the technologies of dissemination or, as in the case of elite knowledge, technologies for the monopoly of texts and valued information, work together to seal off access to agency and to impose the domesticated narrative as the legitimate and “natural” interpretation of any ontological, anthropological, or epistemological explorations in creative and scientific literature.

In *The Domestication of the Savage Mind* (1977) and later in *The Logic of Writing and the Organisation of Society* (1986), Jack Goody observes that, in the written records that have survived from ancient times, it is the financial and administrative lists that predominate and not the literary or other creative texts, which indicates that the initial intent in literacy was to establish “relationships of dependence”. Technically, literacy is different from oral societies, where individuals memorise their personal, political, and economic transactions in a context of relationships “perhaps with the aid of witnesses, where the transfer establishes a specific relationship of credit or debt rather than a generalized one of dependence” (Goody, 1986:104). The lists that Goody cites deal specifically with the administration of financial debts, prices, yield, etc. and have emerged in hierarchical societies where the majority was managed to produce for the profit of the

owners (at different epochs, “owners” went by different terms: lords, merchants, aristocracy, courtly administrators, etc.).

While it is not self-evident whether literacy came in response to the mutation in the human brain that suddenly shifted from the wildness mode to that of domestication and ownership or whether it caused the shift, Goody formulates writing as the “technology of the intellect” responsible for the crystallisation of civilisation in its current form. He explains that

by discussing mechanisms as well as differences, I have tried to map out an approach to the problem of cognitive processes, the ‘nature of human thought’, *l’esprit humain* (to use the formulae of Chomsky and Lévi-Strauss respectively), which attempts to take into account of the effects of differences in the mode of communication between and within human beings (Goody, 1977: 160).

This technology of the intellect, Goody argues, is what differentiates literate cultures from oral but he does not see the hierarchical and alienating potential of technology as necessarily threatening. As his frequent collaborator, Walter Ong says, “[w]riting” heightens consciousness. Alienation from a natural milieu can be good for us and indeed is in many ways essential for human life. To live and to understand fully, we need not only proximity but also distance. This writing provides for consciousness as nothing else does” (Ong, 1982: 81).

Here, Goody and Ong articulate the civilised position, which inadvertently justifies violence, particularly since alienation entails the infliction of pain on those from whose experience the domesticator chooses to distance himself and to silence its expression by misnaming it. Pain that would have resonated sharp and loud through empathy, not only becomes blunt, it disappears from the radar of the domesticator's knowledge because it is (re)presented as something else—joy for instance. In other words, the civilised person tunes to the legitimate discourse on experience instead of tuning in to the experience itself. The price of this alienation is change in the very nature of civilised beings. As the civilised began to alienate themselves from themselves and their world, they began to undergo physiological, ontological, and epistemological mutation which was aided by language (Chomsky, 1957 and 1972) and literacy (Goody and Ong) thereby inducing physiological changes in the brain, which constitutes both a vital organ of agency and a space for *doxa*

and *habitus*. This organ as space and motor drives a person to interact with and act upon the environment in specific ways. In more than abstract or symbolic manner we now express our domestication through our flesh, and, in this light, Goody and Ong's research confirms Bourdieu's processes of the embodiment of elite perspectives, knowledge, and values. Accordingly, literacy became the DNA of oppressive and concurrently oppressed brains, which effectuated a significant shift in the nature of intelligence *per se* causing serious deterioration in understanding, intelligence, knowledge, and relationships.

These observations and connections between literacy and oppression have been made by scholars from a variety of disciplines: anthropology, pedagogy, literary studies, history, among others. The principal point of these disputes circles around “the chicken or the egg” question: namely, when we accept the association between the emergence of literacy and the fundamental changes in human nature and society, which of these elements is the factor and which is the consequence? Was literacy responsible for these changes, was it a corollary, or did it appear in response to specific needs and perhaps to the changes themselves? In the end, what does this tell us about the general trajectory and experience of human and non-human beings, their knowledge and, by implication, about the culture of childhood?

Many scholars see these changes either as inevitable or, like Walter Ong, even as positive. In *Imagined Communities*, the historian Benedict Anderson (1992), for instance, argues that in post-industrial societies, literacy played a central role in making “knowledge”, which has been invented and constructed as symbolic currency, standard and accessible for the “public” even while he acknowledges the intentional manipulation of invented traditions (Hobsbawm and Ranger, 1983). Just as writing provided the technological means for solidifying new ways of relating (or rather of not relating but alienating, as Ong puts it) to the world in a hierarchical and utilitarian manner, so has print culture, according to Anderson, provided the technologies for nationalising knowledge and information, inscribing it into the structure of power, exploitation and stratification, thereby altering the lives of domesticated people who began to view themselves differently in relationship to the imagined communities and to the now abstracted members of their group. In other words, the formation of modern consciousness

itself owes its existence to literacy and, in more recent developments, to print and world web cultures.

In contrast to Goody and Ong, some theoreticians of literacy and capitalism saw these changes in the nature of knowledge and human experience as menacing. In *The Postmodern Condition*, for instance, Jean-François Lyotard (1984) observes that the “grand narratives of legitimation” have lost their credibility and power of authority. In other words, he assumes that the various stories about the history of the whole of humanity, such as the Enlightenment story about progress, Hegel's dialectic of Spirit, or Marx's utopia of the impending crumbling of capitalist autocracy and the dissolution of the state had, prior to postmodernism, provided a convincing narrative that legitimated them; but since, according to his version of the story, postmodernism has splintered stories, narratives, nonnarratives, ahistoric epistemologies and moral theories, people lost faith in the ability of the metadiscourse to contain the narratives and hence to provide the meta level necessary for their legitimation. Having lost its power, knowledge has become a commodity that can be easily bought or sold and thus has altered the nature of knowledge itself. Most important, he observes that knowledge is no longer based on “facts”, rather is a product of social relations (Lyotard, 1984), and, in the context of civilisation, these relations are based on closed group networking, hierarchy, and limitations. In other words, like Goody and Ong, Lyotard identifies the importance of (meta)narratives in the development of civilised hegemony. However, by characterising the “modernist”, “narrative”, “metanarrative”, and the “metadiscursive” as ineffective technologies of legitimation of knowledge and power, he nonetheless conceives the possibility of rescuing the postmodern project by incorporating the splintered stories into practice. Practitioners thence legitimate their practice within a “justice of multiplicities” (Lyotard, 1984). Fraser and Nicholson offer a critique of Lyotard's oversight in his piece on postmodernism:

A major problem with Lyotard's “justice of multiplicities conception [is that it] precludes one familiar, and arguably essential, genre of political theory: identification and critique of macrostructures of inequality and injustice that cut across the boundaries separating relatively discrete practices and institutions. There is no place in Lyotard's universe for critique of pervasive axes of stratification, for critique of broad-based relations of dominance and subordination along lines like gender, race, and class” (Fraser and Nicholson, 1989: 88).

Fraser and Nicholson point to an important deficiency in Lyotard's critique, which, even

though he acknowledges the “evolution” of systems of relations of knowledge(s), nevertheless, like Ong and Goody, does not pay enough attention to the “direction” of this “evolution” and its effects on living experience of anthropogenic devastation on earth. Fraser and Nicholson's own oversight, however, is as serious since in their discussion of relations of dominance and subordination they include only those species who are categorised as human and in this sense, like Lyotard, they leave in tact the metanarrative of domestication, dominance, and subordination. In this way, Lyotard and his critics actually salvage the legitimacy of “(meta)narratives” as abstracted from individual experience of pain that is inflicted by the “meta-narrative” of civilisation and the technologies of biological modification. On the other hand, Lyotard's idea of the practice of “justice of multiplicities”, a conception that legitimates itself through praxis, allows for oral traditions and non-civilised narratives to legitimate themselves as well. In this respect Lyotard reopens the door for a possibility of liberation from the technologies of literacy, something that Nosov succeeds to envision in his ideal Flower Town.

From a different perspective, approaching the problems of literacy and technologies of texts and knowledge, technocratic views of literacy have been strongly contested. For instance, Michel Foucault (1970), Jacques Derrida (1978 and 1997), Roland Barthes (1989), among others, pay attention to the dichotomies inherent to the oral/literate debate. Their discourse echoes the Marxist approach adopted by Bourdieu in that it views concepts of consciousness and knowledge as historically contingent upon the (civilised) narratives that correspond to economic, political, and technological conditions of possibility. In this regard, they do not question the oral/literate dichotomy *per se* as much as they shift the focus from the linear, closed space of literacy to the non-linear, open-ended space of electronic literacy.

For Bourdieu (1979), symbolic value is independent of truth value and that makes it possible to concoct “knowledge” and cultural representation whose mere “prestige” and high price render it “credible” regardless of whether the “information” it purports to present is true or false, thereby comprising the main leverage in the underlying mythologies of civilisation. Limiting accessibility to these objects of symbolic capital increases the value and the desire to possess them. Yet, popularisation of elitist knowledge

does nothing to distribute power or to confront inequality. On the contrary, as Bourdieu illustrates with popular and elitist art and literature, popularising an elitist article decreases its symbolic and “material” value whereby the elite immediately come up with another mystical artefact to stand as a symbol of currency that is turned into an “organ” of knowledge inaccessible for the masses. Devaluation of academic degrees is another example that undergoes a similar process of inflation, Bourdieu argues. For, the higher the rank, the more exclusive the knowledge and the degree and the more authority it earns its holder. However, as more and more people strive to advance their chances of climbing up the social ladder, the less valuable these degrees become. Today two postdocs are the equivalent of a B.A. or a Masters degree half a century ago. This inflation of “certification” that the institutions of “knowledge” sell reveals another mechanism of exclusion and ostracism since the grading and the elimination process ultimately sieves out more people than it retains by requiring them to know the “exclusive” elitist cultural symbols which ultimately allows them to compete (and mostly lose) in the hierarchical system of exploitation. In this vein, making literacy available to the masses in itself will not make the masses better off, rather will devalue the currency of the symbolic capital that a given literate piece conveys.

Still, many, particularly socialist and other leftist-anarchist thinkers, such as Noam Chomsky (in Achbar and Wintonick, 1992), argue that literacy is an important tool that ultimately allows the masses to access the information circulating among the elites and whose popularisation makes accessible cultural work and knowledge, which under *capitalism* constitute elitist currency. Making these works available to the masses devalues their symbolic and real price. However, in contrast to Bourdieu's understanding, this devaluation, they argue, disarms their elitist power. According to Andrew O'Malley (2003) and Gillian Avery (1975), this has been the tactic with children's books in England for centuries. Avery and O'Malley's historical research illustrates that the elites have always managed to regroup and thus salvage their new symbolic and literary capital keeping stratification in place.

The *doxa* poses the principal challenge to the dream of liberation by means of popularisation and technologies, since it is the upper class knowledge, values, and desires

that provide the axis for *habitus*. Because the elites assign and control symbolic value thereby generating the criteria for the production of symbolic culture, then it is the upper stratum of society that sets the tone and defines what is important, legitimate and to be desired, regardless of the degree of success in popularising these works and “assets”. Desires are manipulated successfully, even when the social roles and aspirations assigned to individuals from the lower classes are expressly framed as antagonistic to those assigned to upper cliques. Again, Avery (1975) and O'Malley (2003) present numerous examples of how values and characteristics project specific roles for identification in children's literature in Great Britain, books in which the rich are lauded for their sneakiness, exploitation, control, ownership, spontaneity, and a sense of personal freedom, while the poor are depicted as striving to be dependable, hard-working, self-sacrificing, and content with the little joys of their poor lives.

The first impediment on the way of liberation via technology, hence, is the question of the “real” production and exploitation of labour. For, if everyone becomes “free”, then who will mine? Who will design? Who will work in the plastic factories? Who will assemble computers? Who will make clothes, cook, and clean, when the free are enjoying technology? And, if all goes well, who will produce the texts and the information? How and why would they do it, and why would anyone be interested in it? This critique of technology and the exploitation it requires inheres in various disciplines including children's literature which channels these assumptions, hopes, and critiques, to which I will return further on in my work.

Second, in the context of the totalitarian capitalism, where land, resources, food, space, and time are all expropriated, struggle itself entails tremendous sacrifices and demands an immense effort that most people simply cannot afford since the majority of global population is preoccupied simply with day to day survival. Hence, even when re-appropriation by human masses takes place (for instance as in the French, Russian, Chinese, African revolutions), the enjoyment of access to symbolic culture requires time and the social roles themselves become part of the mechanism that keeps the hierarchical *status quo* of knowledge and symbolic culture in place. Once again, all of these abstract entities that have concrete capitalist value are in the possession of a small group of people

while the majority of the dispossessed, apart from surviving, is preoccupied with caring for the needs of the owners of time, symbolic capital, human and non-human resources, and material wealth. The dispossessed thus attend to the owners' needs for cleaning, child-rearing, feeding, entertaining, building, servicing the elites' leisure, doing their work for them, accumulating their wealth for them and (ac)counting that wealth, ad infinitum. In other words, possessions do not only make up the non-material or social and symbolic capital such as education, taste, and knowledge, time itself becomes the locus in constructing the civilised narrative as well as an object of possession and a tool of domination from which the “masses” are alienated, but which constitute their *doxa* as well as their innermost dreams and desires.

Legitimate manners owe their value to the fact that they manifest the rarest conditions of acquisition, that is, a social power over time which is tacitly recognized as the supreme excellence: to possess things from the past, i.e. accumulated, crystallized history, aristocratic names and titles, chateaux or 'stately homes', paintings and collections, vintage wines and antique furniture, is to master time, through all those things whose common feature is that they can only be acquired in the course of time, by means of time, against time, that is, by inheritance or through dispositions which, like the taste for old things, are likewise only acquired with time and applied by those who can take their time (Bourdieu, 1979: 71).

Finally, having spent their time on the classes who have appropriated everyone's time²⁹, as well as the labour that feeds, clothes and otherwise nurtures the people with ownership and the whole world, the majority of the dispossessed people is unable to enjoy the “democratisation” of the internet space or other popularised aspects of formerly elite culture because value and legitimation of these pieces of knowledge comply with the hierarchical standards, and, as Bourdieu observes, even when they do manage to “steal” a bit of time, the masses cannot do much with the knowledge that has lost its value and legitimacy. Namely, the valued and legitimated books, photocopies, computers, printers, intellectual resources, transportation, social networking, and the general conditions that induce reflection and concentration, such as the availability of time, health, quiet working space, a satisfied stomach that does not distract with dizziness or sucking and gurgling, etc.: all of these material and symbolic aspects of living in a world colonised by civilisation have a bearing both on the amount and quality of time a person has to reflect

²⁹ For instance, a recent study conducted by sociologists in the United States confirms that the time available for personal health related activities and family togetherness is contingent on income (Gupta, Sayer and Cohen, 2009).

on, acquire, synthesise, and produce knowledge, as well as on the nature and “quality” of work a person yields. But, if the insights and results are dismissed as illegitimate and as bearing no value for the body of knowledge, then the endeavour, along with the articulation of the experience and suffering of the persons in the dispossessed category becomes wasted and silenced. This wasting and silencing constitute an intimate part of civilised violence.

Hence, Foucault’s and Derrida’s optimism regarding the possibility of using textual technologies, such as the internet to disseminate ideas and information is valid in as much as the anarchical dissemination of knowledge devalues and hence undermines the currency of oppression; yet it remains ineffective if the fundamental perspective of civilisation and domestication remains unchallenged, because ultimately the living “resources” cannot undo the structural limitation of class access to non-living “resources” and legitimate their value and use. Most important, they cannot benefit from symbolic capital if they themselves constitute an important portion of that capital and are themselves someone’s “resources”. In other words, if the desire to achieve social justice among human and non-human people is sincere, beings must first be freed from the categories of civilised knowledge that confine them to the epistemological cages that define them as “resources”. Hence, liberation is possible only through the revolution of basic precepts, where the underlying premises of civilisation must be guillotined in the name of wilderness.

Narrative is thus intricately connected to the methods of proliferation of knowledge as hegemony, legitimation of power and oppression, with literacy acting as a useful tool in cementing the hierarchical structure of oppressive relationships within the physiology of living beings. To this extent, the act of narrating *per se* and the larger discourse into which our propensity for improvisation inscribes it allows for both the method and its technology to become the content. The method becomes knowledge since it is the routine, and the way in which the person learns, including the emotional and environmental contexts, that becomes inscribed as *habitus* in the flesh. The method – not the form or even the content – of communicating this knowledge, which is at once knowledge and its method, comes as a response to the type of the knowledge being communicated: if it is about life, then it inscribes itself into the memory of each living member of the tradition; if it places material

commitment in the foreground, then, as paradoxical as it may appear, the method's end is not to inscribe the content as an integral part of memory, instead it produces the fixed lists of accounting, debt, and dependence that ultimately cause amnesia, devour and kill.

The stress on repetition and on inhabiting the narrative or allowing for the meaning to become part of one's *habitus* collude to bridge the gap between the application and internalisation of “texts” (as method, written work, psalm, or poem). Both the method of learning something by heart and writing and reading it are effective in invading personal space and as a tool of domestication if the narrative is hierarchical and linear with a driving premise stemming from civilisation. Yet, the crucial difference between the oral and the literate modes of cultural (re)production and transmission lies in the basic premise: one stresses relationships with biodiversity and, hence, with life, while the other strives for relationships of dependence, control, consumption and death.

In much of the scientific and theoretical literature, theoreticians agree about distinctions between oral and literate technologies of transmission of ideology, *habitus* and *doxa*, and the role that literacy plays in framing the discourse of permanence, death, and stratification as well as fixing it as a solid structure or a perpetual machine. This is not to say that oral traditions cannot transmit a civilised epistemology. They can, but when they do, literacy becomes an important step in fixing the plot and normalising the individual and social bodies within its logic, whereas wild epistemologies do not need a plot and therefore do not care for a technology to standardise and to embody the chrono-logical narrative with its sense of time and meaning. At this juncture, Michel Foucault's (1961; 1963) work on medical discourse and power over bodies and “sanity” has inspired a plethora of anthropological research on the nature of discourse, narratives, and the body-social politic connection. As my analysis of Dunno as precursor of Foucault and Rosenhan shows, these problems, concepts, and connections, including the role of medical “normalisation”, overseeing, and incarceration in constructing illness, health and normalcy, have all been raised in Nosov's trilogy. Echoing Peter Kropotkin's (2002) critique of prisons and mental asylums, the trilogy explores the potential for abuse that medical power yields projecting this power as even more dangerous than that of the police, because it is less visible and identifiable with higher potential of being internalised

by the subjects/objects.

To situate this critique within the space of contemporary medical anthropology, approaching the nexus of the construction of illness and health, sanity and reason, power and disempowerment, through the lens of psychiatry, Lawrence Kirmayer makes an interesting contribution to this line of thought: the poetics of medical narrative constructed and negotiated in the context of mental health care is pivotal to the emerging “truth” or “knowledge” about self, illness, health and social relations (Kirmayer in Mattingly and Garro, 2000). He observes that in the context of literate science, the oral and poetic practice is unavoidable if integration of experiences and healing is to be achieved. Hence, even though contemporary science claims to be a “scientific”³⁰ and literate body of knowledge, branches such as psychiatry are necessarily practised orally, exposing the reality of the scientific narrative's dependence on poetic expressions to negotiate meaning and experience in a dynamic relationship between the personal and the public, “knowledge” and meaning.

Psychodynamic theory argues that gaps in narrative may mask or hide a deeper narrative that is repressed or denied because of its painful substance. But the fractures of narrative may also reflect the inchoate nature of illness represented as islands of reason, fragmentary stories, narrative strands, and, above all, poetic evocation through bursts of figural language. This emphasis on figures and fragments rather than on extended narratives reflects a basic view of everyday thinking as rooted in poetic refigurations of the world. Research on the central role of metaphor in language and thought supports this view of the quotidian mind as poetic (Gibbs, 1994; Lakoff, 1993; Turner, 1996 as summarised by Kirmayer in Mattingly and Garro, 2000: 171).

This citation offers an excellent transition to the debate of knowledge in oral traditions versus domesticated literacy and to the question of the role of poetic and, to an extent, chaotic re-comprehension of the world and of one's own place and role in it; i.e., Kirmayer offers a new way to understand the power of poetry to cure the depression and alienation that civilisation generates and which malaise thrives by silencing the *doxa* of violence and repressing the need to express this pain. The anarchic potential of poetry, especially its illiterate potential, has in fact always been feared and repressed by persons with power and authority. In this battle between the chaos of poetry and the order of civilised literacy, the role of medical panopticon becomes particularly clear as revealed in my anthropological

³⁰ This claim to objectivity and “dry” facts of science has been debunked by Lakoff and Johnson (2003) in *Metaphors We Live By* and other studies.

research on medical practitioners and social workers and their attempt to domesticate the Somali culture, which I discuss after my examination of *The Adventures of Dunno and His Friends*. Echoing the questions raised by Peter Kropotkin in the second half of the 19th century, Nosov explores these issues in his trilogy for young readers (first published in 1953) years before this discourse was brought to the fore by Michel Foucault's work on mental asylums and madness (1961), the origins of the clinic (1963), or on questions of discipline and punishment (1979)³¹, as well as before David Rosenhan's 1973 experiment titled "On Being Sane in Insane Places".

Chapter 5: First there was Dunno, then there were Rosenhan and Foucault

The anti-hegemonic and anti-authoritarian premise of Dunno's trilogy permeates all the spheres and levels of social relationships in that world: knowledge, learning, economy, health care, and all. Notwithstanding the fact that literacy has a place in Dunno's world, it is never imposed; there are no schools and no peer pressure; and everyone is perfectly capable of learning on her own and at her own pace. Hence,

Dunno never could do anything right. He never got beyond reading in syllables, and he could only write printed letters. Some people said his head was empty, but that was not true, because he could not have thought *at all* if it had been empty. To be sure, he did not think *much*, but he put his boots on his feet and not on his head, and it takes some thinking to do even that³² (Nosov, 1980: 16).

In other words, literacy is important, but knowing how to live comes first on the priority list. Literacy does not replace worldly intelligence, the *savoir vivre*, and can be easily acquired by anyone once the need to read and write arises. To know how to live entails

³¹ *Madness and Civilization; The Birth of the Clinic; and Discipline and Punish* respectively.

³² Если Незнайка брался за какое-нибудь дело, то делал его не так, как надо, и всё у него получалось шиворот-навыворот. Читать он выучился только по складам, а писать умел только печатными буквами. Многие говорили, будто у Незнайки совсем пустая голова, но это не правда, потому что как бы он мог тогда соображать? Конечно, он соображал плохо, но ботинки одевал на ноги а не на голову, —на это ведь тоже соображение надо (Носов, Н. Глава вторая: Как Незнайка был Музыкантом, стр. 232).

making one's own decisions and even mistakes, which ultimately means coming in conflict with authority whose goal is to maximise one's yield and minimise costs and errors. Reflecting this dynamic, the trilogy is replete with episodes of the problems caused by doctors and police whose roles often intertwine and, often, even become interchangeable as they try to affirm a specific order and narrative. As an attempt to neutralise the hierarchy of characters, Nosov projects as one of the protagonists Dunno's whole community consisting of sixteen boy-mites who live in a house on Blue-bell Street in Flower Town.

Dunno's is an unschooled³³ world where mites learn when they are interested and become professionals by practising their chosen avocations. Just like in Lyotard's (1984) theory, here becoming an expert requires no legitimating process, since practice and knowledge by themselves evoke the respect of others. In Dunno's world expertise that comes as a result of passion is always needed by the community and receives admiration. Hence, a poet, a madman, a traveller, a doctor, an astronomer, a cook, and even a thief, all have a place in this society. At the same time, school, teachers, academia, or other institutions of teaching and the production of legitimate knowledge have no place here with the exception of conference debates that are open to anyone. One such conference appears in the third book, *Dunno on the Moon*, in which Doono, Professor Starson, and astronomer McGlass³⁴ have a debate on the genesis and nature of the moon. The conference takes place at the academy of sciences in which the general public votes for the theory that is most likely to be closer to truth. In other words, it is not the academy that legitimates knowledge and discoveries, rather it is the general public. The academy is physically situated in the communist Sunny City, and its function is to offer a place for debates between anyone wishing to present a theory, a published book, or research regardless of whether they are citizens or not (Doono is not a resident, for instance). The academy functions in the manner of the French conception of a “free school”, such as

³³ The term comes from *Teach Your Own*, a theory developed by John Holt (Holt and Farenga, 2003) based on his experience of and reflections on schooling methods that worked to suppress the creative expressions of a child's self and to oppress her will. Unschooling is a term that is designed to incorporate all forms of child-led education that entails focusing on the child's learning needs for self-learning and not teaching. I use the term “unschooling” for lack of a better term to describe empathic, attachment parenting, and child-led learning and living activities, where a child is not taught but allowed to learn organically through interest and interaction with the world.

³⁴ In the original: профессор Звёздочкин and Стекляшкин.

Collège de France or the participating institutions whose research and lectures have been historically accessible for the public for free and without the need for registration or other forms of legitimated usage (unlike other institutions, particularly North American universities, where attendance and usage of libraries and other resources is monitored and available only through admissions and tuition fees)³⁵.

In order to participate in these events or academies, one simply needs to learn autonomously the subject of one's passion. Hence, Doono becomes a scientist by simply doing science and elaborating his method. Blobs is a painter because he paints. Doctor Pillman is a doctor because he heals and learns his *métier* by experimenting with medicinal plants and discussing the ethics and other aspects of the profession with other health practitioners, such as Doctor Honeysuckle in Greenville Town³⁶. Separate chapters of *The Adventures of Dunno and his Friends* (1980 [1953]) are dedicated to Dunno's attempts to learn how to play music, paint, or become a poet by asking questions or borrowing tips and instruments from the musician Trills, artist Blobs, and poet Turnips³⁷. The pedagogical principle underlying the narrative amounts to: if someone wants to learn how to play music, one tries different instruments and experiments with the possibilities. When a person is guided by passion hard work becomes a pleasure and leads to expertise. The “master of the art” can share the musical instruments and respond to the needs of the learner and the questions the learner raises along the way of exploration. But it is vital to leave the learner to experiment, formulate questions, and discover what she needs or likes. This applies to everything: music, writing, and reading, which Dunno learns by himself when the need arises (such as in writing letters to his friends). This conception of learning constitutes the core of the unschooling approach to “pedagogy”, which holds that there is no standard age for starting reading and writing, some learn them at four and others at thirteen, but they always learn and when they do, even the children who started later surpass the average “fluency” of school children within a year (Suggate, 2009)³⁸.

³⁵ This has changed in France and other places in Europe during the last decade.

³⁶ Медуница and Зелёный Город in the original.

³⁷ In the original, the characters' names are: музыкант Гуся, художник Тюбик, поэт Цветик.

³⁸ In 2006, Sebastian Suggate defended a doctoral dissertation on the benefits of delayed literacy skills in children. His methods were based in psychology at Otago University and dissertation was listed among its exceptional theses for 2009, titled: *The role of age-related development in literacy acquisition and response to reading instruction*. (Suggate, 2009). My own experience confirms this. My parents, in fact, hindered me from learning to read and write in Russian and I simply made the effort to learn it by the age

The fundamental premises underlying the personal, social, and environmental relationships in mite-land stem from the understanding that people mean well, that all idiosyncrasies are valuable and that conflict can be resolved by respecting personal quirks and by working on understanding the motivations that drive individuals in their actions. Here, valuable contribution to society is possible only when individuals are driven by their passions to choose their avocations. It is this passion that makes useful and significant discoveries possible. Hence, Dr. Pillman heals and helps his fellow-mites, Doono's knowledge and science serves his community: he invents the air-balloon, studies the stars and conceives inter-planetary travel, etc., Bendum and Twistum, the mechanics, design cars and various forms of mechanization, among many other examples. In fact, the characters' names point to their passions, which become their specialisations and, thus, their spheres of knowledge.

Yet, these skills, professionalism and knowledge also have the potential to confine as disciplines do by their very nature: they “discipline”, punish, and circumvent both the bodies of knowledge and the bodies that know. The only two characters that break out of such confinement or discipline are Doono – who knows everything – and Dunno, the hero – who does not know anything; in short, the multi- or ultra- disciplinarian and the anti-disciplinarian.

Dunno is complex: he does not possess institutionalised knowledge, yet even if the author introduces Dunno as “not knowing anything at all”, a few paragraphs later he says about him that he did just fine in life and learnt all that was needed at his own pace. In fact, Dunno is a free thinker, a traveller, the “village fool”, the philosopher, and his type of “knowledge” can be said to be the link that allows Doono to make his scientific discoveries. Doono is a tacit model of authority for those with specialised, i.e. limited, spheres of knowledge. Some critics, such as Boris Kuprianov and Lev Pirogov (2004) defined Doono's knowledge as potentially totalitarian. This totalitarianism is juxtaposed to and threatened by the anti-authoritarian, the anti-totalitarian, the anti-disciplinarian Dunno who, with his inspiration and imagination, constantly challenges this authority and puts

of five. My brother learnt by following the bed-time reading pages that our mother read to him at the age of four. My daughter learnt how to read in Russian at six years and learnt how to read English before she could even speak it at the age of eight.

this knowledge to the test. In other words, more than anyone else in the mite-world, Dunno disrupts Doono's attempt to order this particular society's knowledge and to structure experience into a (meta)narrative.

Doono is not the only one, however, whose knowledge and endeavour Dunno challenges. “In this same house lived Dr. Pillman, who looked after the Mites when they fell ill” (Nosov, 1980 [1954]: 11). The true nature of the controlling and oppressive role of the doctor is revealed in his encounters with Dunno and finally clearly articulated in a debate with Honeysuckle, a girl-mite doctor from Greenville Town. These encounters (the book was published in 1954) spell out Kropotkin's thesis that “[t]he chains disappeared, but asylums – another name for prisons – remained, and within their walls a system as bad as that of the chains grew up by-and-by” (Kropotkin, 2002: 369). In other words, the methods of disciplining the body by physical means have been replaced by “curing” the mind through panoptical gaze and the ordering of space, bodies, desires, and thoughts, which were the exact same topics that Michel Foucault's explored in *The Birth of the Clinic* (1963), *The History of Madness* (1961), *Discipline and Punish* (1975) among his other works.

The first encounter between Dunno and Pillman appears in chapter three, titled: “How Dunno Became an Artist”. Dunno decides to learn how to paint. He goes to Blobs who lends him his materials and leaves to work. Dunno approaches drawing creatively and produces fifteen social caricatures of his house-mates. Such fellow dwellers in the life of a real child comprise the members of the first community in which the child is socialised and, according to Freudian psychology (Freud, 1933), whose members become the first figures for the child's identification. It is the agency with which they act on behalf of the child that provokes the child's need for rebellion and self-assertion. In contemporary society, this tension is even more pronounced in the relationship of “citizens” with their general physician or paediatrician, since the parents renounce their authority over their own body and health as well as over their children's in favour of the family doctor. Here, Nosov depicts this position of the doctor and his (Dr. Pillman's) role as a disciplining body that integrates the child into society by suppressing the child's wildness and the possibility to rebel against this centralising medical force.

The first to wake up was Dr. Pillman. As soon as he saw the paintings he began to laugh. He liked them so much that he put on his spectacles to get a better look at them. He examined each picture in turn, laughing very hard.

“Good for Dunno!” he said. “I never had such a good laugh in my life!”

At last he came to his own picture.

“Who is this?” he asked in a stern voice. “Me? It couldn't be me. No likeness at all. Take it down.”

“Why?” asked Dunno. “Let it hang there with the others.”

“You must be mad, Dunno!” said Dr. Pillman angrily. “Or, perhaps, there's something wrong with your eyes. What makes you think I have a thermometer instead of a nose? I'll have to give you a big dose of castor oil tonight when you go to bed.”

Dunno disliked castor oil very much.

“Please don't,” he whimpered. “I can see for myself that the picture isn't like you.”
And he took it down and tore it up (Nosov, 1980 [1954]: 22-23).

Even though all of the mites enjoyed the caricatures of their friends and disliked the ones that made fun of them, they used negotiating tactics to coerce Dunno into pulling down their picture. Dr. Pillman is the only one to use his authority in giving leverage to his demands and force compliance by, first, diagnosing Dunno as “mad” or “ill”: “You must be mad.... Or, perhaps, there's something wrong with your eyes” (ibid) and, second, by threatening to administer medication: “I'll have to give you a big dose of castor oil” (ibid). Thus, his medical knowledge is not reserved exclusively for the purpose of curing his fellow-mites' health afflictions, but also used to advance his own interests that drive him to apply all forms of social or political intimidation, including punishment and blackmail, in order to suppress social commentary and artistic expression. Doctor Pillman does the same thing in chapter four, where Dunno became a poet and declared that: “I've written a poem about Dr. Pillman too”. Pillman's response was:

“We've got to put a stop to this, friends,” ... “Are we to stand calmly by and let him go on telling fibs about us?”

“No, we aren't!” agreed everybody (Nosov, 1980 [1954]: 28).

Whereas the other characters simply express their dissatisfaction and attempt to negotiate their position with the artist, in this instance just as elsewhere in the book, Dr. Pillman

dictates the tone of the public opinion and initiates the repression of art. Steering the social consensus towards his own ends, and with the help of the “public”, Dr. Pillman succeeds in suppressing Dunno yet again, just as he did in other instances where he mobilised the mob to rally against Dunno's musical and painting endeavours.

These episodes reveal the tension between public appreciation, mainstream art, and artistic critique of society that is highlighted in later discussions with the artists in Greenville Town. Most important, however, these scenes question the nature and the role of art by juxtaposing “realist” and symphonic depiction of an idealised reality versus the need to bring out the critical and cacophonous potential of social experience—a conflict exposed by the encounter between the rebellious artist and medical authority. Not only do Dunno's encounters with the doctor challenge the purpose and the oppressive nature of this authority, they question its very claim to truth. After all, the civilised, authoritarian and authorised narrative derives its power and legitimacy by presenting its knowledge as truthful, reflecting the “real” nature of beings and their “real” needs. This encounter, however, not only reveals the problems of reality and representation, but also the question of truth as Dunno exposes Dr. Pillman as a liar.

In the chapter on “How Dunno Took a Ride in a Soda-Water Car”, Dunno drives Bendum and Twistum's soda-water and syrup car into a ditch and, having lost consciousness, is taken to Dr. Pillman's clinic. At first, the doctor expresses surprise at the fact, almost lamenting it, that Dunno is not in a worse state than he would have expected him to be: “Strange as it may seem not a bone is broken” (Nosov, 1980 [1954]: 35). Then, each time Dr. Pillman plans to perform a procedure, such as take out splinters or apply iodine, he lies that it is not going to hurt, and each time he hurts Dunno. Finally, Dr. Pillman announces that he needs to take Dunno's temperature.

“Oh, don't! Please don't!” [cried Dunno]

“Why not?”

“It'll hurt.”

“It doesn't hurt to have your temperature taken.”

“You always say it doesn't hurt, but it always does.”

... “Silly! ... Well, now you'll see it really doesn't hurt,” said the doctor and he went to get the thermometer.

As soon as he was gone Dunno jumped out of bed, leaped through the window, and ran off to Gunky's. When Dr. Pillman came back with the thermometer, Dunno was gone.

“A fine patient!” muttered the doctor. “Here I am doing my best to make him well and instead of thanking me, he jumps out of the window and runs away! He ought to be ashamed of himself!” (ibid: 36).

Michel Foucault's remark that “Power is tolerable only on condition that it mask a substantial part of itself. Its success is proportional to its ability to hide its own mechanisms” (Foucault, 1978: 86) applies perfectly to the analysis of Dr. Pillman's treatment of his patient. In other words, it is necessary for authority to conceal its truth, which is what Pillman does, because, as we learn later, he inflicts pain on purpose, yet lies that it is not going to hurt masquerading his real intentions under the guise of “curing”. However successful Dr. Pillman may be with the other mites (the masses), the author shows that he fails to trick Dunno, the illiterate, traveller, anarchist. Evidently, the comic aspect of this scene works better with a reader who has prior acquaintance with vaccinations and other medical procedures. But regardless of the extent of the audience's personal contact with doctors, this scene raises three critical points that have drawn extensive attention across a range of disciplines, particularly in medical anthropology.

First, there is the problem of overmedicalisation and incorrect diagnosis. The World Health Organization (WHO) reports that 33% of diseases today are caused by medical treatment or doctors' intervention. According to Barbara Starfield, “doctors are the third leading cause of death in the US after heart disease and cancer causing an estimated 250,000 deaths each year” (Starfield, 2000). In Europe and Japan, Associated Press reports the high use of medications in rape and violence. For instance, in Sweden, the

demand for flunitrazepam — a sedative sold as Rohypnol and widely known as a “date rape drug” — increasingly is being met by unauthorized production, and North America, where widespread abuse of prescription drugs, including the narcotic fentanyl — 80 times as potent as heroin — has been blamed for a spike in deaths.

The very high potency of some of the synthetic narcotic drugs available as prescription drugs presents, in fact, a higher overdose risk than the abuse of illicit drugs,” said Narcotics Control Board President Philip O. Emafo (Associated Press, 2007).

Of course, most “real” and fictional doctors do not use or prescribe such medications with the intent for them to be used in rape and other acts of violence. However, the larger narrative that structures this parasitic relationship between the rapists, the doctors, and the raped is based on the *doxa* that the well-being and prosperity of the doctors depends on there being enough patients incapable of taking care of themselves and hence in need of medical expertise and drugs. In other words, the doctors' expertise, legitimacy, and authority is a monopoly, which is more than a metaphor of rape, derived from the dispossession of such knowledge and blocking the patients' independent access to cures. The war on herbal self-healing is a continuation of the medieval war on witches whose victory brought about the new age of the panopticon overseen by the doctor (Ussher, 1991; Foucault, 1963).

In an anthropological study of illness and health, Stuart McClean discusses the importance of narrative, knowledge, and personal approach to healing. A “healing method or practice is deemed acceptable ‘if it works for you’” (McClean, 2005: 629-30). McClean cites research on chronic illness among Canadians that confirms a general preference for the Complementary and Alternative Medicine because “...participants perceived themselves as healing the parts of their lives over which they had some inherent control” (Thorne *et al.* in McClean, 2005: 637). Personalising the narrative of illness is a “form of knowledge [that] is fundamentally different from scientific knowledge”, giving the CAM or the “witch medicine” an advantage over the biomedical approach (ibid: 637). This oppressive nature of narratives and language that renders individuals impotent in the face of their personal struggles with health is further accentuated by the fact that

...military metaphors have more and more come to infuse all aspects of the description of the medical situation. Disease is seen as an invasion of alien organisms, to which the body responds by its own military operations, such as the mobilising of immunological ‘defences’, and medicine is ‘aggressive,’ as in the language of most chemo-therapies (Sontag in McClean, 2005: 640).

It is common knowledge that freedom, access to space, clean wilderness, and food are necessary for health, while exploitation, expropriated resources, and a domesticated (raped) world with all the devastating pollution and organised violence are responsible for the malnutrition, contagious diseases, and high early mortality rates. Yet, instead of solving the health problem by looking into its roots in poverty, people are required to

depend on doctors and medication for functioning at work as resources in the same system that abuses them and in spite of the extensive research that demonstrates that holistic approaches and egalitarian relations are better for health, longevity, and happiness of all. Nonetheless, despite the availability of this knowledge, civilised human decisions, fears, and choices manage each time to inscribe themselves within the civilised narrative that imposes literacy and yet misleads in the meaning of life; it demands activity, yet denies agency by putting the birth, life and death of the domesticated masses in the hands of the physician. In Nosov's trilogy, however, Dunno jumps out of this narrative and takes off to live, learn, and have joy with no punitive consequences whatsoever, thereby demonstrating the premise that, regardless of the motive, the doctor lies about pain and about the fearsome consequences of disobedience.

Dunno thus reveals the dishonest nature of the doctor-patient relationship. The most problematic aspect of this relationship in human civilisation resides, not only in the parasitic nature of the ontological foundation of confiscated expertise and monopolised specialisation, the problem is also a practical one that stems from the overt financial dependence of doctors on the lucrative pharmaceutical business. Since the capitalist economy undergoes constant devaluation, under the stress of competition the entrepreneurs experience a constant pressure to increase profit and exceed previous figures. Doctors depend on pharmaceutical companies and governments and their demands for increase in profit and consumption as well as clients' compliance with the government's need for panoptical control and therefore the clients' dependence on doctors and medication. The underlying basis for the doctor-patient relationship, hence, relies on the proliferation of illness and the impotence of patients to take care of themselves. The more people take medicine, the better it is for the medical and pharmaceutical establishment as well as for the people in charge of administrating the whole scenario (government). According to Herper and Kang (2006), "global spending on prescription drugs has topped \$600 billion.... Sales of prescription medicines worldwide rose 7% to \$602 billion.... [The] emerging markets such as China, Russia, South Korea and Mexico outpaced those [American] markets, growing a whopping 81%".

The US Pharmaceutical Industry Report (2008-2009) (which, incidentally, costs

US\$999.00) states that in 2007, the medication revenue in the United States amounted to US\$ 315 billion. “Since the year of 2000, the pharmaceutical R&D expenditure has been maintaining an increase, even in 2008, impacted by the global financial crisis, the pharmaceutical R & D expenditure totaled at US \$65.2 billion, up 3.16% of last year. There are 2,900 drugs currently in research in US” (US Pharmaceutical Industry Report, 2008-2009).

Furthermore, domestication entails coercion of free persons into compliance with the civilised narrative and in this scenario, the administration of pain and suffering – the very same elements that drive a person to seek help – constitute effective tools of pedagogy. This practice permeates civilised culture and finds expression in mundane negotiations, through a wide range of pedagogical methods, and in the legalised punishment of acts challenging the concept of private property as well as other transgressions of civilised laws.

Throughout the trilogy, Nosov returns to the problem of control, healing, and social order approaching these questions from several angles. For instance in *Sunny City* he highlights the critical role of conscience and compassion in social harmony and depicts the role of the police with its methods of social coercion and punishment as ineffective. Edifying for this discussion of the role of the medical narrative in domesticating and normalising pedagogies is a debate that transpires during a ballroom dance between Dr. Pillman of Flower Town and Dr. Honeysuckle of Greenville Town as they argue about the role of the doctor in society as a deterrent of deviance and whether the administration of pain is an effective method of education, personality adjustment, and socialisation:

“You must admit our methods of treatment are better than yours,” she whispered into his ear. “Honey is the thing to treat all scratches, bruises, wounds, boils, and even abscesses with. Honey is a strong disinfectant and keeps things from festering.”

“I must disagree with you,” said Dr. Pillman. “All wounds, scratches and boils must be treated with iodine. Iodine, too, is a strong disinfectant and keeps things from festering.”

“But you can't deny that your iodine burns the skin, while our honey is absolutely painless.”

“I can't deny that your honey may do for treating girl-Mites, but it can't possibly be used on boy-Mites.”

“Why is that?” asked Honeysuckle.

“You yourself have said that treatment with honey is painless.”

“And do you think treatment ought to be painful?”

“I do,” said Dr. Pillman firmly. “If a boy-Mite climbs a fence and scratches his leg, the leg must be painted with iodine so that the patient will know it is dangerous to climb fences and will not do it again.”

“He'll just climb roofs instead and fall down and hurt his head,” said Honeysuckle.

“Then we'll paint his head with iodine so that he'll know it's dangerous to climb roofs too. Iodine has great educational significance.”

“A doctor should be more concerned with relieving suffering than with education,” said Honeysuckle. “Your iodine only increases suffering.”

“A doctor must think of everything,” said Dr. Pillman. “Of course, if you're always treating girls there's nothing to think of, but if you're treating boys ——”

“Let's change the subject,” said Honeysuckle. “It's impossible to dance with you.”

“It's you it's impossible to dance with.”

“You might be more civil.”

“It's hard to be civil when I meet with such ignorance.”

“It's you who are ignorant. You're not a doctor at all, you're just a quack!”

“And you're a ... you're a ...”

Dr. Pillman was too furious to speak (Nosov, 1980 [1954]: 172-174).

The fact that Honeysuckle's definition remains the last word - “you're just a quack” - while Dr. Pillman remains speechless signals Honeysuckle's victory in this debate³⁹. The earlier scene in which Dunno escapes from Dr. Pillman substantiates this interpretation. Furthermore, it is in Greenville Town that Dunno realises his faults and is “rehabilitated” with the gentle methods of the girl-mites who treat him with compassion, understanding and forgiveness, once again proving Dr. Pillman wrong. By ridiculing gender stereotyping, Nosov reveals his personal preferences in healing methods. Moreover, the fact that the “escape the doctor” scene takes place at the beginning of the book while this episode

³⁹ For further discussion on the relationship between definitions, dialogue, language and control in children's literature see Knowles and Malmkjaer (1996).

occurs towards the end demonstrates that this is a well thought out thread intended to develop a cogent and thorough critique.

His critique of the social significance of the doctor in domestication does not stop at this⁴⁰, for in the middle of the book, Nosov raises another critical aspect, mentioned by Kropotkin (2002) in “Are Prisons Necessary?” written in 1887, a theme that was explored in-depth twenty years after Dunno's trilogy was published by Michel Foucault (1963), namely, the role of the psychiatric hospital as a place of confinement for deviants, vagrants, and the insane, i.e. those who threaten the civilised order with their free movement, whose unreason disregards civilised “reason”⁴¹ and purpose as the deviants, the vagrants, and the insane disorder uniformity and challenge the concept of sedentarism at the very basis of the logic of incarceration and pedagogy.

As the dialogue between Pillman and Honeysuckle reveals, if Pillman uses corporal punishment (iodine inflicts pain), methods that Kropotkin and Foucault attribute to the earlier, feudal methods of coercion and control, then Honeysuckle, according to this thesis, is a modern overseer of public order: she not only cures but also confines the deviants and the vagrants.

When Doono invents the air balloon, all sixteen boys who share his household in Flower Town decide to travel. At a certain point in the journey, the balloon begins to loose hot air and descend. Having prepared for this eventuality, Doono instructs everyone to put on a parachute and evacuate and, in order to lead by example, jumps out first. But as soon as Doono is gone, Dunno notices that the balloon gets lighter and picks up some altitude and speed. So, he tells everyone not to follow the “cowardly” scientist and they remain in the balloon until it crashes on the outskirts of Greenville Town, *La Cité des Dames*. Dunno bounces away from the group and gets picked up by two girls by the name of Cornflower and Snowdrop⁴². When the other girl mites discover the rest of the boys they take them to the hospital (in Flower Town there are no hospitals, only the stern doctor Pillman). Since Greenville is a girls only town, the boys become social deviants here. They are also travellers, i.e. vagrants, a status debated and contested in Greenville Town, and, according

⁴⁰ The theme of the doctor and hospitals appears in the other two books as well, but, unfortunately, there is no space to develop the analysis here.

⁴¹ Reason stands for both: the reason for something occurring or being and “sanity”.

⁴² Синеглазка and Снежинка in the original.

to Foucault's research, vagrants were the first to be incarcerated in the special hospitals (quarantines) during the Renaissance (Foucault 1961). Doctor Honeysuckle runs the hospital and states clearly that because boys are dangerous, they need to be confined and that refusal to obey is defiance of her order:

“What's that on your forehead, Cornflower — a plaster? Clever girl! I warned you it would come to that. Nobody knows better than I do how dangerous those boys are....”

“Hm, I told that young fellow to stay in bed, and here he is, up and about in defiance of doctor's orders and picking a fight with everybody” (Nosov, 1980 [1954]: 96).

First, this scene depicts how the doctor monopolises the narrative of illness and health and imposes it on the patient regardless of how the patient feels. This comes up several times in the book. For instance, when Dunno wants to get up and explore after the accident, Cornflower tells him that he cannot *know* whether he is ill or well, only Dr. Honeysuckle can. Second, the hospital is not only a place that confines but also acts as a quarantine that isolates the persons who pose “danger” for social “health” and economic order. For instance, in *Fit to Be Citizens*, Natalia Molina (2006) presents a pertinent analysis of how this transpires in real life demonstrating how quarantine, social policy, and health constructed race, ownership, and stratification in California from 1879 to 1939 and informed Planned Parenthood practice of control of reproduction by sterilising certain races and persons scoring low on intelligence tests. In other words, the medical institution observes and controls bodies and persons on an individual level as well as it isolates them, confines them to specific space and time, controls their reproduction (breeding was the first domesticating practice), encloses space and prevents access to the participation in social, material, and symbolic resources and questions of land and business ownership.

In this respect, when Dunno's request to see his friends is met with a categorical refusal, Honeysuckle exercises her control by quarantining the “deviants” of Greenville Town indefinitely and diagnosing them regardless of whether they have “symptoms” or whether the “symptoms” warrant the diagnosis and confinement. As soon as Honeysuckle has left the room with Cornflower to remove her plaster and treat the sore spot,

Dunno caught sight of a white smock and cap hanging on a hook. He instantly put them on, and he also put on a pair of spectacles Honeysuckle had left lying on the desk. Then he picked up her wooden trumpet and went out of the room. Snowdrop stood watching him in awe and admiration.

He went down the corridor and opened the door of the ward in which his friends lay. In the first bed he found Grumps who was looking more surly and sullen than ever.

“How are you feeling, my friend?” said Dunno, changing his voice.

“Wonderful!” said Grumps, making a face as if he were to die.

“Sit up, if you please,” said Dunno.

Grumps sat up with a great effort and stared dully in front of him. Dunno put the wooden trumpet to his chest.

Breathe deeply, if you please,” he said.

“Can't you give a man any peace?” grumbled Grumps. “ 'Sit up!' 'Lie down!' 'Breathe deeply!' 'Stop breathing!'”

Dunno gave him a little whack on the head with the trumpet.

“You haven't changed in the least, Grumps,” he said.

“Dunno!” he said, amazed at seeing him... “Listen, Dunno, help me get out of here,” whispered Grumps. “I'm perfectly well, honestly I am. I just gave my knee a little bump. It doesn't even hurt any more, but they won't give me my clothes. I'll go mad here. I want to get up and go out.”

Grumps seized Dunno by the sleeve and wouldn't let go. “I'll do something,” said Dunno. “Just be patient a little longer. Promise to do as I say, and if anybody asks you who made the balloon, tell them it was me, will you?”

“I'll say anything you like if you just get me out of here,” said Grumps (Nosov, 1980 [1954]: 97-98).

Confinement, whether for medical reasons or punishment, grants power to anyone who can enter into a relationship with the confined regardless of their previous contact or rank in the power hierarchy. Hence, even when in Flower Town Dunno and Grumps were equal, in Greenville Town, by masquerading as a doctor and agreeing to enter into a relationship between Dr. Honeysuckle and her victims as negotiator, Dunno immediately acquires power to manipulate his friends.

Perhaps it is not so ironic, then, that it is Dunno – the subversive anti-knowledge element, the anti-disciplinarian – whom Honeysuckle discovers dressed up as a doctor in a white smock and cap conducting a mock “medical examination” of his friends the patients.

Just then Honeysuckle and Cornflower came back.

“Who told you you could put on that smock?” said Honeysuckle angrily. “I never saw such disobedience!”

“I wasn't disobedient,” said Dunno. “I just went to see how my friends were.”
“And how did you find them?” asked Honeysuckle mockingly.

“I found that all but one of them were well and could leave the hospital.”

“What?” said Honeysuckle in fright. “Can you imagine what would happen if we let out fourteen boys all at once? They would turn the town upside down! Not a house would have a whole window left in it, and all of us would be covered with bumps and bruises. The boys must be kept in hospital to prevent an epidemic of bumps and bruises” (Nosov, 1980 [1954]: 100).

In Nosov's narrative, disobedience is empowering because, first of all, it is not simply driven by the need to disobey, but by a genuine desire for symbiosis and care: Dunno says that he was not disobedient, he simply wanted to see his friends and find out how they were doing, and he would not have succeeded had he followed the doctor's orders. Second, as later episodes with the police in *Sunny City* demonstrate, authority, laws, and control do not bring harmony to a society, only conscience can regulate one's behaviour and control any impulses for “hooliganism”. Authority is impotent in the realms of conscience and actually causes more harm than good. Hence, having disobeyed both Dr. Pillman in the earlier episode and Dr. Honeysuckle here, the anarchist succeeds in convincing the doctor to free the hostages. This carnivalesque overturning of the roles contradicts Bakhtin's conception of the carnival as reconfirming the *status quo*, because in this encounter between authority and anti-authority, anti-authority triumphs. Honeysuckle agrees to follow Dunno's proposed list of which two mites to free each day and confesses that the boys have been healthy all along, never needing any treatment at all. The quarantine, it turns out, was a preventative social measure:

Once more Honeysuckle examined the list. “It's too soon to let Shot out,” she said. “His ankle's still swollen. He's my only real patient, you know.”

“What about Grumps?” said Cornflower.

“Never! I wouldn't let him out for anything!” cried Honeysuckle. “He's such a nasty chap! Always grumbling ... gets on everybody's nerves. Let him stay where he is for being such a grumbler. Of course, I'd be only too glad to get rid of him, and of that insufferable Pillman, too, who calls himself a doctor and is always trying to prove my methods wrong.”

“Let them both out if they're such a nuisance,” said Cornflower. “Not for the world! Do you know what that horrid Pillman said to me today? He said I made people sick instead of well! ... You can be sure I'll keep him here just as long as I can. And Grumps too” (Nosov, 1980 [1954]: 140).

Thus, in spite of the contrast between the vengeful, authoritarian male doctor and the good-willed, motherly and gentle female doctor, the mites' encounters with the medical professionals reveal the inherent perils, not of the personal traits of the doctors, but of the medical *métier* itself: after all, the mites' imprisonment in Greenville Town's hospital underscores the possibility of the hospital becoming a prison, a quarantine, or a disciplining and rehabilitating institution regardless of whether Dr. Pillman is in charge of it or whether it is Dr. Honeysuckle. In addition, Dunno's trilogy questions the very knowledge of wellness and illness and of who is authorised to know, how we know, how we conceptualise this information/experience/knowledge, and how we experience it: through cognition or through something else? In short what is it that we know and how do we know “it”?

Thus, in a humorous and lively manner, Nosov links knowledge, medicine, social order and control, thereby revealing the threats that the relationship between knowledge and discipline, knowledge and punishment, medicine and discipline (even incarceration) pose to anarchy, chaos, and cosmic harmony. In this sense, Dunno's trilogy offers a satire of diagnostic methods at the basis of the medical narrative and raises the question of truth and lie in the civilised knowledge of illness, healing, and health preceding by almost two decades one of the most important and creative experiments in the history of psychiatry.

In 1973 David Rosenhan conducted an experiment titled “On Being Sane in Insane Places” (Rosenhan, 1973). His question was the following:

If sanity and insanity exist, how shall we know them? ...At its heart, the question of whether the sane can be distinguished from the insane... is a simple matter: Do the salient characteristics that lead to diagnoses reside in the patients themselves or in the environments and contexts in which observers find them? From Bleuler, through Kretschmer, through the formulators of the recently revised Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of the American Psychiatric Association, the belief has been strong that patients present symptoms, that those symptoms can be categorized, and, implicitly, that the sane are distinguishable from the insane (ibid).

The results of the experiment demonstrated that the circumstances under which a patient is admitted (for instance, “credible” family members complained about a disruptive relative)

and the fact of admission already prove in the mind of the diagnostician a preconceived diagnosis. In other words, the “literacy” or fluency in the narrative of psychiatry and the authority that the practice bestows can frame normal behaviour as illness if a person socially and personally fits the label “ill”.

To find how diagnostics work, eight sane people agreed to seek admission to various mental institutions and “gained secret admission to twelve different hospitals”, some of them deemed the best in the United States. Among the patients “were three psychologists, a pediatrician, a psychiatrist, a painter, and a housewife”. Only once during the interview for admission did the pseudopatients lie that they sometimes heard same-sex voices that sounded “empty,” “hollow,” and “thud” (ibid). Otherwise, during the interview and after admission they provided truthful information about their characters and lives and acted sanely as they normally would in daily lives: they engaged in conversation with staff and other patients, readily accepted medication (which they did not actually take) and took notes for their research. Yet, the staff never detected their infiltrator status. Moreover, they attributed normal behaviour to compulsive traits of their mental illness – schizophrenia – and interpreted the behaviour as “too talkative”, “compulsive writer”, etc. even while the medical staff themselves engaged in these same practices of talking, asking questions and taking notes. Most important, however, the labels given were irrevocable even after discharge. Once a person was “known” to be a schizophrenic, that person was “always” a schizophrenic—for life.

Admitted, except in one case, with a diagnosis of schizophrenia, each was discharged with a diagnosis of schizophrenia “in remission.” [The pseudopatient who was admitted to a private hospital was the only one diagnosed with a milder form of the disease, indicating the relation between social status and diagnostics (from footnote)]. The label “in remission” should in no way be dismissed as a formality, for at no time during any hospitalization had any question been raised about any pseudopatient’s simulation. Nor are there any indications in the hospital records that the pseudopatient’s status was suspect. Rather, the evidence is strong that, once labeled schizophrenic, the pseudopatient was stuck with that label. If the pseudopatient was to be discharged, he must naturally be “in remission”; but he was not sane, nor, in the institution’s view, had he ever been sane (ibid).

Rosenhan states that the hospital staff had enough time to observe and detect the pseudopatients' sanity (seven to fifty two days). Yet, they were not carefully observed and “this failure speaks more to traditions within psychiatric hospitals than to lack of

opportunity” (ibid). Most interesting, however, is the fact that while the staff applied rigidly the label of mental illness that was to last permanently (in one case, the experimenters had an extremely difficult time releasing one of the pseudopatients from the hospital because the staff refused to believe that the patient was sane), the other patients in the hospitals were able to detect the pseudopatient’s sanity.

During the first three hospitalizations, when accurate counts were kept, 35 of a total of 118 patients on the admissions ward voiced their suspicions, some vigorously. “You’re not crazy. You’re a journalist, or a professor (referring to the continual note-taking). You’re checking up on the hospital.” While most of the patients were reassured by the pseudopatient’s insistence that he had been sick before he came in but was fine now, some continued to believe that the pseudopatient was sane throughout his hospitalization. The fact that the patients often recognized normality when staff did not raises important questions (Rosenhan, 1973).

This is exactly what happens with Dunno in Greenville Town. Honeysuckle attempts to construct him as a patient and confine him to bed, and it is the patient who reveals the good health of the other “patients” who, all along, knew that they were healthy. Just like Dunno's trilogy, Rosenhan's research, “On Being Sane in Insane Places” raises critical questions on the truth value of medical knowledge and narrative and the relationship between narrative, normalisation, and oppression.

How many people, one wonders, are sane but not recognized as such in our psychiatric institutions? How many have been needlessly stripped of their privileges of citizenship...? How many have feigned insanity in order to avoid the criminal consequences of their behavior, and, conversely, how many would rather stand trial than live interminably in a psychiatric hospital – but are wrongly thought to be mentally ill? How many have been stigmatized by well-intentioned, but nevertheless erroneous, diagnoses? [And] psychiatric diagnoses are rarely found to be in error. The label sticks, a mark of inadequacy forever.

Finally, how many patients might be “sane” outside the psychiatric hospital but seem insane in it – not because craziness resides in them, as it were, but because they are responding to a bizarre setting, one that may be unique to institutions which harbor nether people? Goffman calls the process of socialization to such institutions “mortification” – an apt metaphor that includes the processes of depersonalization that have been described here (Rosenhan, 1973).

First, this is exactly the experience of the fictional character Grumps in Greenville Town's hospital: “I'm perfectly well, honestly I am. I just gave my knee a little bump. It doesn't even hurt any more, but they won't give me my clothes. I'll go mad here. I want to get up and go out” he tells Dunno (Nosov 1980 [1954]: 97-98). Second, in real life, Rosenhan's

experiment demonstrates that regardless of the multiplicity of voices and the contradicting information conveyed by real acts, diagnoses silence these voices and reality gets interpreted, “diagnosed”, and labelled according to the predetermined narrative or script whose goal is to organise and then maintain its order within a specific economic structure and which ends up confirming itself regardless of whether the facts are relevant or even true.

For an exploration of the narratives of wildness and domestication, Michel Foucault, David Rosenhan, and Nikolai Nosov offer invaluable connections to the debate on the nature of knowledge in civilised structures of oppression – a body of knowledge that becomes ingrained in the *doxa* which is the taken for granted and silenced understanding of how things (people, animals, nature) “really” work. Silencing occurs on more than one level as individuals are forced into categories of domestication, exploitation, and control and these oppressive structures, as discussed by Goody and Ong, become part of the physiological make-up of the human brain inadvertently squeezing all practices and relations, even the ones that contradict the “ideology” of a given socio-cultural model, into the metadiscourse or metanarrative.

These structures, however, have not come to exist on their own or due to random factors. Perhaps their initial sprouting has been due to random responses to various events and conditions. However, to be able to globalise a single structure for intra- and inter-species relations, there had to be a uniformalising effort, a logic, a rationale, and a narrative. The resulting imbalance in biodiversity is devastating and any such imbalance in “nature”, when not taken care of promptly, becomes a fatal disease. Overpopulation of one form of life leads to one species of microbes or viruses taking over the biosystem, killing the world in which it arises. And so it is with civilisation. Uniformalising through civilisation, the culture of human and non-human animals around the globe follows exactly the same logic of the spread of disease, and it is a conscious effort on the part of the persons in the upper strata of government who constantly invest time, energy, and resources to keep reconfirming and reconfiguring the elements that ensure the solidity of the structure and its *status quo*. Yet, even if the details comprising this civilised structure appear to be fluid and in a permanent mode of reshuffling and renegotiation, the structure

itself not only remains solid and static, but it proliferates and, like a malignant tumour, colonises more and more topoi, minds, bodies, and space.

These agents of civilisation work relentlessly on elaborating the mechanisms of domestication and apply consciously the potential of stories, narratives, and literature – and hence literacy – to disable children's wildness, prevent any potential rebellion and integrate them into the system of resources. Jack Zipes' (1983) work, particularly on the German project for nationalisation for children through fairy tales during the Weimar Republic but also his later research on the reconfiguration of consumerist and capitalist culture in America through children's literature and culture, reveals the political potential of literacy and supports the debates on the implications of children's narratives for cementing structural inequalities and injustice such as expressed in sexist, racist, or other “otherist” relations.

Zipes' prolific research on European collectors of folk tales – for instance the Brothers Grimm or Alexandre Afanasiev – and on the stylisation of the oral tale by authors like Charles Perrault, who aligned his narratives with the French civilising process, demonstrates that the act of transcription and embellishment of the live oral tales by the domesticating agents climbing the social ladder striving to please no lesser than the king (1997; 1994; 1983; or 1979) mortifies these stories by disciplining their content and the bodies and minds of the domesticated readers. Literacy, hence, imbues these texts with the power that contests and overwrites individual agency, encasing it within the structural and paradigmatic limitations imposed by the Institution of civilisation, and provides an improved tool for domestication. My anthropological research, titled *The Encounter (Mötet)* between Somali immigrants in Sweden and the Swedish medical sector and social workers, demonstrates that the same mechanism operates in any domesticated context regardless of the details that supposedly differentiate one totalitarian system from another and which could go by a different name – such as a capitalist democracy or even socialist democracy, for instance – regardless of whether we are talking about the Greek civilisation, the Arab, the Weimar Republic, or contemporary Sweden.

In other words, the *Encounter* in present day Sweden illustrates Zipes' research on the history and evolution of the role of narrative and children's literature in gender and

economic class divisions. It reveals the awareness with which state “representatives” (beneficiaries) understand the crucial role that literacy and medical observation play in economic relations (i.e., exploitation of people and nature). These agents of the state act concurrently on behalf of their own interests and on behalf of those of the institution through which they live, even while they may be honest when they state their belief that they are driven by the most sincere desire to “help” and “care for” their “clients”. In contrast to the case of the “resources” where the personal and institutional interests are often in conflict, in the case of governmental representatives and other people with social capital and in positions of authority, the personal and institutional interests are intertwined. This discrepancy in the response of the institution to personal needs depending on the class of its subjects has been thoroughly examined by Karl Marx himself and the plethora of Marxist literature. However, this conflict of interests and of bodies, knowledge and narratives comes to the foreground when people refuse to comply with the imposed ideology whether for cultural reasons or for reasons of “mental health” as demonstrated by David Rosenhan, so vividly depicted by Nikolai Nosov, and so aptly articulated by Irma, the social worker in Eskilstuna.

Chapter 6: Wild Somalis and Civilised Swedes as Fiction and Reality of Winnie-the-Pooh's Immigration Policies

Trahison

Ce coeur obsédant, qui ne correspond
 Pas à mon langage ou à mes costumes
 Et sur lequel mordent, comme un crampon,
 Des sentiments d'emprunt et des coutumes
 D'Europe, sentez-vous cette souffrance
 Et ce désespoir à nul autre égal
 D'appriivoiser, avec des mots de France,
 Ce coeur qui m'est venu du Sénégal?⁴³--Léon Laleau

⁴³ *Betrayal*

This implacable heart, which matches
 neither my tongue [n]or my clothes,
 after which bites, like the hinges of a trap
 the borrowed sentiments and customs
 of Europe—do you sense this suffering,
 this despair, which is like nothing else,
 breaking in with words from France
 this heart, of mine, come from Senegal?
 —by Léon Laleau, translation Michelle Cahill

In spring 1996, the Centre for Studies of Immigration and Ethnic Relations (Ceifo) at Stockholm University invited me to conduct an anthropological study commissioned by the Swedish Board for Health and Social Work (*Socialstyrelsen*⁴⁴), the principal ministry of Sweden. The individuals acting on behalf of the Board were concerned that the Somali refugees had a “difficult time integrating into the job market; did not trust Swedish doctors; and refused to take their children to the state run clinics for regular observation”. The research, titled *The Encounter*, was conducted mainly in Stockholm with a few interviews and visits to Eskilstuna from 1996 to 1998 where the other part of the project, conducted by Marie Louise Seeberg, was concerned with the investigation of the successful integration of Vietnamese refugees. In my part of the research, *Socialstyrelsen's* aim was to understand the differences between Swedish and Somali attitudes towards the centralised Swedish health system and economy, revealing that the members of the board drew clear links between: (1) the cultural conception of health, literacy and the “job market” and (2) children’s literacy and access to the “job market”⁴⁵ – in other words, the framing of literacy and children’s literacy as an organisational modus operandi in the economic sphere of worker/owner relations.

The following excerpt from my field notes depicting the interaction between Irma, the Swedish social worker in Eskilstuna, and Aisha, a Somali woman who had immigrated to Sweden five years earlier illustrates these concerns. Since there is no immigration policy in Sweden with the exception of political refugee status, Aisha had spent two years in a Swedish refugee camp before receiving her refugee residence status. I met Irma at her office and after our discussion, Irma accompanied me to visit Aisha at her home.

Irma greeted me with exuberance stating immediately her appreciation of the Somalis who were “so beautiful, with such smooth and deep dark skin. They have such suave manners and look at you with this dark, languorous gaze. These men are just so gentle and plain beautiful. I love the Somalis”--thus setting off an alarm in my head: what does

⁴⁴ Literally, *styrelsen* is management and board, hence the major ministry of Sweden is that of social management.

⁴⁵ The Swedes concerned in this project were not talking about ministerial or elitist jobs for the Somalis. The commissioners from *Socialstyrelsen* and the various social workers complained that the Somali women wore the scarf and therefore could get only background jobs (dishwasher at a fast food shop), because the stores could not hire them for positions where they would be visible, such as a waitress or a cashier. The scarf issue appeared to be the main concern of the project commissioners. The Somali men’s jobs mentioned included cleaning, cashier and taxi-driving.

she mean by “Somalis” and what do I expect next? I did not have to wait long, for she swiftly proceeded to complain that “there [was] a lot of trouble with them. Because they are illiterate. Papers don’t mean anything to them. They just don’t understand the importance of paying bills. They simply throw away the bills. Can you imagine? A Swede would never dream of doing such a thing. Throwing away the bills! And then this Aisha. She’s a nice woman. Always smiling and so personable when I come to see her [at her home]. Never objects to anything I say but then just ignores my recommendations. Plain simple ignores me”.

“Are your recommendations a must to follow?” I ask.

“Of course I can’t force her. But if she doesn’t comply with what I recommend in her children’s best interests, then she can’t provide a good environment for them. A good future. And if there’s trouble, then the social office can intervene... As it is, they [the Somalis] already have problems getting jobs,” explains Irma.

“I see. So what kind of things do you recommend?” I inquire.

“Well, one problem is that she refuses to read to her children. I brought her all these nice books to read [to them]. She thanks me every time – all smiling. Never refuses them. Always polite. And then just ignores them. She has not read a single book to them,” says Irma.

Later we go to visit Aisha. Aisha, true, was smiling. She offered us Turkish coffee and Supermarket biscuits. Her unread-to children, aged 7, 5 and 2½ years, were playing quietly, occasionally stealing in to beam at us, then scattering away in giggles.

Knowing that Somalis value highly their rich oral tradition in which every Somali can be compared to a walking encyclopaedia of poetic, historic and religious heritage, I asked Aisha what it was that she liked to do with her children. It turned out that the kids already knew bits from the Qur’an and some of Somali poetry by heart. “You mean, you do NOT prefer Cinderella and the Ugly Duckling?” Aisha smiled and took a sip of coffee⁴⁶.

Several issues become apparent in this encounter. First, it reveals a strong link between hierarchical economic interests, literacy, children's books, medical knowledge, control, and government. Second, what transpires during this interaction illustrates Jack Goody's point that, at its very inception, literacy was a tool of oppression: the written word fixes the relationships of dependence and overwrites the living with their drive to chaos and meaningful relationships that require presence and memory. Third, the social worker is an individual who acts on behalf of the socialising project following and imposing on her “clients” the agenda of those who “lead” and “manage”. While Irma may be driven by the best of intentions and a desire to facilitate the integration of the people she said she loved

⁴⁶ From field-notes for *The Encounter (Mötet)*, Socialstyrelsen September 1996 to December 1997.

into her society, one that she obviously loved too, this “love” expressed in the context of civilisation becomes one of hierarchical value and stems from the position that Somalis are doing poorly because they have not learnt how to be “Swedes”.

Furthermore, in this interaction between the “state” and the “citizen”, the connection between children's books and bills (domestication through lists of debts) comes to the foreground and is a conscious effort of concern on the part of the state. Fourth, Irma acts, not only from the position: “in Rome do as the Romans do”, but from her *doxa* that accepts the hierarchy of cultures in favour of her own: reading from a Swedish book is more valuable than spending time together, reciting poetry or creating new poems, particularly when those poems are “Somali” or the “threatening” Qur'an. Irma's *doxa* dismisses the value of Aisha spending time with her children, because in the “feminist” and “socialist” ideology in civilisation, just as in capitalism, Aisha's value is based on her fulfilling her role as a resource. One of the completely serious suggestions discussed at the meetings with *Socialstyrelsen*, for instance, was that “if the Somalis are so wild and un-integratable into the Swedish economy, but love and are good with camels, how about helping them start camel farming in Sweden? Give them something to do, and raise the Swedish economy by introducing a new variety of meat. This way it will be good for *everyone* [except the camels, of course]”⁴⁷.

Being responsible for both “health” and “social order”, *Socialstyrelsen* is a perfect illustration of how, in a civilised hierarchy, these two concepts are intertwined with literacy and education on more than one level: (1) an individual's health is measured by the extent of her functionality as a physiological worker which is related to a healthy “education” and means that the individual agrees to fulfil, and even be happy with, the role that years of schooling, evaluation, along with the starting symbolic and other capital, have prepared her for. (2) The health of a society is measured by how stable the system of exploitation is, regardless of the statistics that reveal the extent of poverty and unhappiness of the population – for instance, regardless of the number of persons

⁴⁷ I met again with one of the administrators of the project, Pär Skoglund, August 2010 in Minneapolis, Minnesota, where he is launching a follow-up comparative project, because in Minneapolis the Somalis as a group, are doing extremely well economically and in Sweden, still, twelve years after the initial research, they are secluded as a group and the essentialist knowledge about them constructed by a frustrated “state” persists.

medicated for chronic depression, insomnia, and other indicators of despair⁴⁸. As observed in various psychological and anthropological studies (e.g. Rosenhan, 1973 or Molina, 2006), both professionals in the health industry and lay people's understanding of what constitutes health and illness depends on the social status of the person being diagnosed. Poverty and immigration often constitute illness that strips the poor or migrant worker of the status of “agent”, “citizen”, “legitimate” or “credible” voice. Civilised children's literature also taps into these distinctions in diagnoses of illness and health.

For example, Frances Hodgson-Burnett's (1996) *The Secret Garden*, considered an important classic, is often used as a metaphor itself for the sequestered world of children's literature. The story projects the integrated process of healing through the relationship of three protagonists in a secret garden, namely, Mary, Martha, and Colin. Even though their relationships are structured by the economic disparities that divide them across the lines of class, race, illness, and health and which encompass the larger conception of justice as based on rightful ownership and stratification. These categories constitute the main forces that shape them as characters and as a society. Here, the bad temper of the wealthy but orphaned girl, Mary, who is used to being served by “blacks” of India appears has to learn that “white” servants in England are different in order to “integrate” into this environment in a functioning and socially healthy way. Colin is the wealthy but a sick boy in a wheelchair. The healthy peasant girl, Martha, here is depicted as always ready to give of herself and as happy to remain poor and hard-working. It is not only her moral duty, but part of her nature to want to integrate Mary in this class structure and to return Colin to life, a healing that enables him to reign over the land and its human and non-human resources, i.e. including her kin, the peasants. The book presents “her” role in life as being a poor but happy peasant servant who is eager to serve those who own her land. The

⁴⁸ For instance, the U.S. enjoys the status of successful and stable government and *styrelsen* system, yet, in 2006, 70 million Americans of all ages were reported to have suffered from sleep disorders: “Prescriptions for sleeping medications topped 56 million in 2008 -- a record, according to the research firm IMS Health, up 54% from 2004” says Denise Gellene in her March 2009 article on the economy of sleeping pills (Gellene, 2009). As for the link between poverty, gender and race, U.S. Government statistics on life expectancy by race, scores significantly lower for Black Americans as compared to white: thus, in the first year of life 75.7 white males on average are expect to live and only 69.7 of black males have the same chances. As for mortality rates, these are even more heart-breaking: for every 1000 lives, 6.12 white male babies and 5.01 white female babies are expected to die before the age of one year as compared to 14.48 deaths of black male babies and 12.23 black female babies– in other words, more than twice by race alone. Mortality figures are consistently higher for black people throughout every single age category and also differentiate lower income whites and other populations of colour.

recovery of the boy means that the boy returns to his status and rules over his domain with “love”. In civilised society this “love” means that the landlord (or any other owner) exploits the peasants' (workers' or employees') health “kindly” and ensures that nothing changes: the peasants remain the property of the rich and the rich boy does not share his wealth, thereby ensuring the “health” and stability of that social system and its class relations.

The narrative could have constructed the boy's health as contingent on the restoration of economic and gender equality between the characters, particularly as the author makes an attempt to critically raise the issues of racism. Yet, the problematic of exploitative relations disappears as the narrative domesticates both girls and elevates the boy to a state of health as he inherits his father's regime. The author fails to examine the conception of the laws as the vehicle that structures the wider framework for social illness and health. Instead, the text romanticises poverty and ignores the voice of the oppressed. This injustice becomes particularly clear in the scene where the boy's father “repays” the Martha's months of care by giving her siblings a golden sovereign. “If you divide that into eight parts there will be half a crown for each of you,” he said. Then amid grins and chuckles and bobbing of curtsies he drove away, leaving ecstasy and nudging elbows and little jumps of joy behind” (Hodgson Burnett 1996: 297). The book tells us that this sovereign was an act of charity and even as miserly as it is, the sovereign was still more than the peasants ever expected to receive. Apparently, they would have done just as well without it, but Colin and his kin, for some reason, cannot do without their wealth, their land, their peasants, and their servants. This caricature of the “nature” and “culture” of the rich and poor however is never once questioned in the book.

Another example is *The Chronicles of Narnia* where C.S. Lewis (1950) depicts Edmund's temporary illness caused by his “bad” choice of the “wrong” political camp as curable because Edmund is destined to be king of Narnia, whereas all the little creatures who are at the bottom of the social hierarchy and make the same “bad” choice must be exterminated, hence the endless wars of Narnia. In other words, by following the White Witch and her food, Edmund almost dies, and the narrative thus illustrates the same principle of capital punishment that compels individuals to work for the civilised system.

When Edmund chooses the right side, that of the Lion King, he heals and re-integrates into the structure that punishes by death those who refuse to play the roles of resources that their superiors had prescribed to them.

Winnie-the-Pooh provides an even more illustrative example from children's literature depicting vividly *Socialstyrelsen's* concern with the “healthy” integration of immigrants in Sweden as well as the immigration policies of such countries as Canada, France, the U.S., *inter alia*, that demand an expensive and thorough medical examination and literacy skills upon immigration. In the first book, one day,

NOBODY seemed to know where they came from, but there they were in the Forest: Kanga and Baby Roo. When Pooh asked Christopher Robin, “How did they come here?” Christopher Robin said, “In the Usual Way, if you know what I mean, Pooh,” and Pooh, who didn't, said “Oh!” ...Then he went to call upon his friend Piglet to see what *he* thought about it. And at Piglet's house he found Rabbit. So they all talked about it together.

“What I don't like about it is this,” said Rabbit. “Here are we--you, Pooh, and you, Piglet, and Me --and suddenly... Here --we—are,” said Rabbit very slowly and carefully, “all—of—us, and then, suddenly, we wake up one morning, and what do we find? We find a Strange Animal among us. An animal of whom we had never even heard before! An animal who carries her family about with her in her pocket! Suppose *I* carried *my* family about with me in *my* pocket, how many pockets should I want?” (Milne, 1992 [54]: 90-92 – italics original, underlining mine).

Evidently, this is one of the passages addressed to multiple audiences and is a direct statement on immigration from places where child rearing practices are different from those of the civilised English. Rabbit, here, represents the hypocritical upper class snob with good manners and yet, concurrently, exhibiting xenophobic and other classist and sexist attitudes. For instance, during this conversation, he kept forgetting to include Eyore and Owl in the “us”. The appearance of the immigrants in the first book leads to the Rabbit mobilising an anti-immigrant act in the Wood to get rid of the *strangers*. Yet, everything gets resolved, and the immigrants stay in the 100 Aker Wood since Christopher Robin, the human being, authorised their stay.

In the second chapter of the second book, another immigrant arrives and this time the author depicts the immigration placement procedure, very similar to the ones I have observed during my anthropological research in France in 1993-94, in Sweden during *The Encounter*, and one that I personally experienced upon immigration to Quebec.

“Oh, there you are!” said Pooh. “Hallo!”

“Hallo!” said the Strange Animal, wondering how long this was going on.

Pooh was just going to say “Hallo!” for the fourth time when he thought that he wouldn't, so he said: “Who is it?” instead.

“Me,” said a voice.

“Oh!” said Pooh. “Well, come here.”

So Whatever-it-was came here, and in the light of the candle he and Pooh looked at each other.

“I'm Pooh,” said Pooh.

“I'm Tigger,” said Tigger.

“Oh!” said Pooh, for he had never seen an animal like this before. “Does Christopher Robin know about you?”

“Of course he does,” said Tigger.

As soon as Tigger's legal status is established: Christopher Robin knows and approves of his presence; then, in order to place him, it is necessary to determine his class (category) according to what he eats. It turns out that Tigger does not eat the food of the Wood's “natives”, he eats (only) Roo's strengthening medicine. Thus, Tigger is placed with Kanga and Roo (the other immigrants), and the three form a “neighbourhood” or a “ghetto” particularly visible since all the other “natives” live in houses by themselves. The aristocratic Rabbit later organises another anti-immigrant demonstration in an attempt to drive the *stranger* out of the Wood. In this respect, Milne links medication with consumption and the control of space, residents, and “resources” and the book reflects the temporary status of childhood that is seen as something that is to be cured and the children to be strengthened, managed, and curtailed according to the “instructions from above”.

Even if Milne has the multiple layers in his text by virtue of it being intended for various audiences, much of children's books are written with the assumption that childhood is a temporary period of ignorance and deviance that will be remedied. Jack Zipes (2009) makes an important critique when he observes that the plethora of texts written for children address the “future” adult instead of conveying to children – who are

already people there and then – the magic and magnificence of childhood with its uncurbed by adult – I would highlight: civilised – categories, experience, politics, and limitations. The temporary and disposable quality of these texts becomes an integral part of marketing structures in which children are “known” to be the objects of marketing strategies whose goal is to turn them into manipulated consumers. Zipes observes that children contest these messages and yet, judging by these texts' omnipresence and resilience – according to O'Malley (2003) and Avery (1975), propagandistic children's books have abounded in the English-speaking world for more than two centuries – this literature is economically successful and hence effective, since in a capitalist structure the “product” must yield profit to the owner as well as be able to finance the apparatus of exploitation, coercion, surveillance, and oppression. The *Barbie Book* series alone provide an ocean to drown a person of any age in the problems of fashion, jewellery, manners, *ad infinitum*. The Disney series, e.g.: *Barbie Loves Ballet and Fashion Show Fun* (2009) or books by individual authors, such as *Barbie and the Diamond Castle* by Depken (2008) overwhelm with their endless demands for paraphernalia to be purchased in order for the children and their parents to feel “normal” citizens of the consumer society. Their success owes largely to the generally accepted claim that consumerism is empowering and allows a person – in this case it is a child – to feel herself as agent of her life, with a voice and will⁴⁹, when in reality she is being sold a prefabricated, temporary, contingent, and inferior

⁴⁹ The majority of papers given at the *Childhoods 2005 Oslo* conference in the section on “Children, Consumer Culture and Social Change: Globalisation and Social Change (12.01)” either attempted to find a compromise position between the “consumerism is good” and “consumerism is bad” positions, or argued that consumerism was the path to full agency over one's life and invited children to be full participants in buying and consuming. For instance, in “Rituals in Children's Consumer Cultures: An ethnographic Study”, Erika Hayfield (Napier University), John Davis (University of Edinburgh) and David Marsden (Napier University) (2005), focused on the positive aspects of consumerism that forges “identity” and allows for social participation in public space (school). In “The Child as Portal Between Family and Market”, Daniel Cook (2005) said that active participation in consumption empowered children. In “Selling Childhood? Children and Consumer Culture”, David Buckingham (2005) argued that children needed to be empowered in their consumption choices. In “Teenagers as Consumers and Patriots in 1950s Indianapolis”, Alexander Urbiel (2005) demonstrated that school became the locus in the 1950s for the expression of patriotic feelings through consumerism. In “Gender differences in the consumption of children and young people in Finland”, Wilska, Terhi-Anna (2005) demonstrated that consumption is also gender specific with boys offered 20% more earnings than girls, yet because they are socialised to want more expensive brands, they buy less than girls. In another paper, “How Do Race and Class Shape Childhood Consumption Inequality? A Quantile Regression Analysis”, Hao and Yeung (2005) touched on important problems of economic marginalisation and consumption. Yet another paper “The role of children in the household economy” given by a group of Danish researchers, Flemming Hansen, Jens Carsten Nielsen and Pernille Christiansen (2005), offered a survey of the hidden and overt consumption as well as of conscious and unconscious participation of children in buying services, such

quality humanity, just like the rest of the disempowered, oral, “uneducated” or disauthorised adults, whose voices do not constitute “legal” voices of authority.

It is in this sense that the above mentioned chapter from *Winnie-the-Pooh* reveals the interconnectedness of medicine and knowledge as tools of control and the distribution of space or, in this case, the designation of a literary immigrant ghetto. As mentioned earlier, the concept itself of the ability to cure another presumes a sense of normalcy and temporariness; namely, something that fails to function can be re-adjusted to re-function after a period of rehabilitation. Perhaps, by giving Roo and Tigger strengthening medicine, Milne intended to present a possibility of overcoming the temporary attributes of childhood, such as frailty and irrationality. However, on another level, this chapter draws on the civilised premise that migration is illness (here come to mind Kropotkin and Foucault's hospitals for vagrants and the mentally ill and Molina's study of medical knowledge and the policies for land ownership in California), and hence “illness” – in the case of Tigger and Roo – is also a permanent category of otherness: they eat, not food, but medication and they are *strangers* who, among other things, raise their children differently.

In my discussion of the mythology at the basis of the civilised narrative, I explore in greater depth the causal relationship between civilisation and epidemics. At this point, however, it is important to reiterate the “feudal” aspect that is revealed by the encounter of the Somali immigrants with the concerns of the Swedish state and its representatives. Namely, the control of movement and the construction of the norms for “health” that are directly linked to land and ownership reflecting the feudal practice of holding peasants tied to the land and the lord who owned the land, the peasants, and the fruit of their labour. Even though the work and production aspect is absent in *Winnie-the-Pooh*, nevertheless, the book reveals that the same structures govern the children's literary representations of social relations of the domestication of residents as well as the immigrants “who carry their children in their pockets” – and in the case of the Somalis – refuse to read.

as heating and other amenities, and concrete items, such as toys, sweets, clothes, or food (full citations available in bibliography under Conference Talks in the *Childhoods 2005 Oslo* section). However, such focus on “consumption” without questioning the capitalist and civilised aspects of domination, expropriation, and exploitation is a problem in itself as the term obscures the larger problem of “ownership” which causes deprivation in the first place.

Medication in the book and the doctors and social workers in the case of *Socialstyrelsen* reflect the guiding principle of colonisation of space through bodies and minds and the forcible displacement of human and non-human animals who move and leave their homeland not because movement is life, but because they have been forced out by the (post)colonialist interests of the countries to which they flee. In other words, the knowledge of the coloniser first cripples and then diagnoses the colonised as crippled. Since, in civilisation, the difference between the illness of the economically powerful and the illness of the disempowered is understood within the framework of how much the resources yield for those who own the results of their labour and who control the production of knowledge and the legitimation of those authorised to diagnose, then productivity determines the diagnosis and becomes a class issue since the illness of the wealthy does not warrant the same social stigma and judgement (Rosenhan, 1973) as the illness of the “human resources” whose lack of health leads to “invalidity” or “nonvalidity” as a resource because it renders the person unable to work. The probability of succumbing to illness by persons who are overworked, overstressed, and undernourished increases. Life expectancy itself is contingent on these relations of inequality⁵⁰. Citing Oxfam statistics, Sumlennyj and Koksharov (2010) find that a child born in an economically deprived neighbourhood of Glasgow, for instance, can expect to live on average almost thirty years less than a compatriot born in a well-to-do neighbourhood of the same city. In a society where food and the means of livelihood (including time and space) are limited to when a person is usable, the repercussions of illness are severe for the economically disenfranchised. In this respect, individual health is directly related to the role prescribed to a person's “class” or “category”, and the way in which these roles and categories are constructed indicates active and conscious choices on the part of those who have the power to impose their definitions, as the case of *Socialstyrelsen* illustrates.

⁵⁰ Demographic studies demonstrate that lifetime gets cut in half for the economically marginalised in the same city and the same ethnic background and this translates into marginalisation from symbolic capital as well, such as cultural participation, education, etc. See Philip N. Cohen and Danielle MacCartney (in Scott *et al.*, 2004), Bianchi *et al.* (2004), Philip N. Cohen (2006), among others.
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr58/nvsr58_21.pdf
 or
<http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/2010/tables/10s0105.pdf>

Finally, Irma says that she only offers Aisha recommendations, and yet she expects obedience from her. Until my remarks, she did not respect the way in which Aisha spent time with her children and did not value the content of what she was transmitting to them in lieu of the *Ugly Duckling*. Reading in itself seems to be so important to Irma that it overwrites every other aspect of family relations and pedagogy. It overwrites the fact that Aisha does indeed transmit a literary tradition, only one in a different “alphabet” from the written tradition.

The myth that the earlier a child acquires literacy the better are the chances for the future adult's success has been challenged extensively. Numerous anthropologists, pedagogues, historians and theorists have pointed out the dangers of (early) literacy from various angles, including questioning its very value for individuals, social groups, and the environment. For instance, Lena Nikitina (1998) focuses on pedagogical theory from the perspective of socialist-anarchist physiology (Arshavsky and Ukhtomsky) and the role of schools in suppressing children's instincts for learning with which they are born. David Nasaw (1979) examines the history of schooling and arrives at the same conclusions as Nikitina; particularly, he argues, that the intention behind the founding of public schooling from its inception has been a project of domestication, exploitation, and the ordering of the poor. The theory of practice in pedagogy also yields important critiques; for instance, John Taylor Gatto (1992 and 2003) and John Holt (1969, 1982, and 1983) have documented the harm of teaching as seen from the teachers' perspective. Gatto specifically highlights the fact that the very idea of contemporary compulsory schooling from the militarisation and nationalisation project of Bismarck and Fichte in Germany (Gatto, 2003).

In 2006, Sebastian Suggate conducted a doctoral dissertation in psychology at Otago University in New Zealand, listed among its exceptional theses for 2009, entitled: *The role of age-related development in literacy acquisition and response to reading instruction* (Suggate, 2009), in which he demonstrates that the stress on early literacy in public school yields problematic results. It follows that later literacy, when a child has already formed her anthropological foundation, allows for more effective interaction with the text. In this light, Aisha's lack of subordination to literacy requirements in themselves

are not the factors in the children's possible (probable) lack of integration into the Swedish economic order in the future. It is the *doxa* of the racialised dispositions of the wealthy groups and their representatives with regard to the markers of “otherness” and insubordination to the literacy imposed by the medical panopticon that would hold the upper hand in their discrimination. The Somalis who have immigrated within the last twenty years to Minneapolis, Minnesota, for instance, have a completely different social and economic trajectory. Incidentally, many of them have landed there by route of Sweden, leaving their compatriots in Sweden still marginalised while they have flourished economically in this particular city in the United States⁵¹.

...Omar, a Somali doctor in Stockholm, who spoke fluently Russian, English, Swedish, Arabic and Somali explained to me that for an average Somali person a piece of paper does not signify a commitment. “If a Somali does not give his word of honour face to face, then he does not see the point of being obligated to someone who does not have the courage to look him in the eye. ...Somalis respect living memory. A person who cannot remember things without making a note in his agenda is a dead person. What can such a person know? How can he ensure the living memory of his ancestors if he can not remember his own commitments? A person who does not remember his people’s history is handicapped, invalid, dead.... Every Somali is a poet and remembers by heart all the important poets of his people. This is the history that makes him a Somali”⁵².

The relationship of literacy to death and the nature of the written word, of which doctor Omar speaks, has occupied many minds, including the monotheistic tradition itself starting with the Old Testament. In spite of, and contrary to, the common belief that writing preserves memory, this theory holds that abstraction leads to amnesia. It buries the living beneath the word and, particularly through symbolism, subtracts from or kills the real, imposing the simulacrum in its stead. This subtraction from reality also erases the boundaries of truth and hence makes it easy and probable to intentionally and unintentionally convey false information, an issue on which Dunno's trilogy elaborates and the awareness of which many cultures signal by the language itself. Languages that have evidentiality markers oblige the speaker or writer to choose between two different words that indicate whether the person speaks as a witness of a situation or has received the information second hand. Evidentiality markers thus help these languages and

⁵¹ From my interview with Pär Skoglund, August 2010, Minneapolis, Minnesota. For more on the subject, see report by Skoglund (2010).

⁵² From field-notes for *The Encounter (Mötet)*, Socialstyrelsen September 1996 to December 1997. Furthermore, various books on Somali history and poetry illustrate this argument, for instance, Samatar (1982), I.M. Lewis (1993; 1994; and 2008), or Bernhard Helander (1988).

traditions to maintain an emphasis on presence, memory, reliability, and trust that are characteristic of relationships in oral cultures. Obliging the speaker to highlight presence and absence exerts certain demands on the speaker who is held responsible for the reliability of the information conveyed, which in turn plays an important role in negotiating relationships. Stemming from a position of wildness, these demands render the culture qualitatively different from one where the emphasis is on “education” and the “domestication” of people into relationships based on symbolism and abstraction. Because the emphasis in the civilised cultures is not on truthfulness, but on legitimacy, whose purpose it is to subjugate those who are not in positions of “authority” and hence stratify, then submission and dependence are inscribed in the very plot of that narrative and are imposed by the technologies of language and literacy themselves.

Peter Roberts, writing on the history and philosophy of education, offers the following observation:

In many societies, the value of literacy is frequently taken for granted. The ability to read and write is often regarded as an indispensable prerequisite for active participation in the contemporary world. It is sometimes helpful to remember, however, that human beings survived without literacy for hundreds of thousands of years. Harvey Graff notes that while the species *homo sapiens* is roughly 1,000,000 years old, writing did not emerge until approximately 5,000 years ago. Western literacy (based upon the Greek alphabet) has been with us about 2,600 years, and printing is just 430 years old (Graff, 1987: 26). Literacy, then, as it has typically been defined, has been a feature of everyday life for but a fraction of the total period of human existence. All basic human needs (including food, clothing, shelter, and social contact) can be met without literacy. In addition, humans can communicate with one another without reading and writing (through the spoken word, through pictures and other forms of visual representation, via gestures and sign language, and so on). Why, then, do we invariably take it for granted that people ought to become literate? (Roberts, 1997).

As the resume of the whole of humanity demonstrates, the curriculum vitae of the alinguistic, the illiterate and oral traditions boasts a much longer and wealthier record than the literate period, which is tightly linked to the spread of civilisation. Bourdieu's explanation of the mechanism through which cultures, ideas, experience, and ideologies proliferate through the bodies and minds of living human beings also supports the interpretation that without narrative individuals and groups have better chances of remaining alive and proliferating as they pursue chaos and enjoy the cacophony of the multiplicity of voices, poems, and dreams. In Somali society, “poetry is the medium

whereby an individual or a group can present a case most persuasively. The pastoral poet is, to borrow a phrase, the public relations man of the clan, and through his craft he exercises a powerful influence on clan affairs” (Samatar, 1982: 3). In light of Kirmayer's study mentioned earlier, poetry can be seen as “science” or at least as a “scientific” method of reasoning and communicating knowledge and experience with the public. It is this tradition that Aisha was transmitting to her children, which the Swedish social worker dismissed because it is not designed for children, is not literate, and is not perceived as compatible with the civilised Swedish narrative and economic needs.

It is true that Aisha transmits to her children “adult” culture, while in the contemporary North- or Western society children are allotted a specifically designated body of knowledge, culture, and literature⁵³ which are still created, marketed, and chosen for the most part by adults with a specific ontological and anthropological understanding of what childhood is supposed to be: a domesticating period of intense dumbing down that prepares children for life as resources (AbdelRahim, 2009b). This happens in spite of the fact that the books that have survived epochs are the ones that have crossed borders and been able to reach the reader regardless of whether she is a child or adult. Nonetheless, the majority of the books that are on the market continue to comply with the notion that children need simpler and more linear narratives than “real” literature.

This dumbing down element becomes apparent when one looks at the majority of what is considered as “standard” children's books and the children's writers' manuals that praise the “accessible” (simple) language, “accessible” (simplistic) narrative, and large bright pictures “suitable” for the specific “age”. This constitutes the rationale for much of the “translations” for children by Disney of stories and books, or as Jack Zipes observes, the goal of Disney is not to bring viewers together “for the development of community but to be diverted in the French sense of *divertissement* and American sense of diversion. [This diversion] is geared toward nonreflective viewing, everything is on the surface, one-dimensional” (Zipes, 1994: 95). In their original form, these stories appeal to audiences of various ages, including adults; e.g. the stories of Hans Christian Anderson or the three authors I am concerned with in this research.

⁵³ Evidently, regardless of whether Aisha read Swedish books to her children at home or not, they would have been exposed to them in school and would have acquired two distinct cultures in place of one.

The notion of simplicity is linked with the civilised conception of childhood as a temporary period whose logic is: “why invest into something that will pass away anyway, will be broken, or quickly forgotten” and hence “why invest in quality?” Because of this *doxa* of temporality, children’s merchandise is often of inferior quality: children will grow out of the pants fast; they will break the object easily; they will lose the pages of the book; they won't appreciate the story when they're seven; and so on. Apart from the constraints imposed by stratification and the fact that things and services in a capitalist system are priced according to demand and profit rather than with respect to the principles of exchange and the cost of labour – prices that render most parents unable to afford quality things and time for their children – this rationale ignores the fact that if a child's experiences are simplified, if she is overwhelmed with temporary and disposable things instead of lasting and durable relationships, this experience of temporariness and the dispositions it instils are inscribed into the permanency of the person's *habitus* and remain with the person throughout her life in her *body hexis*, *doxa*, ideology and, most important, in her emotional dispositions. Notwithstanding, in the civilised narrative, the construct of childhood remains linked tightly with the concept of temporality – a fundamental liaison in the promulgation of the grammar of stratification and abuse because it is based on the concept that children, poverty, and “crime” are corrigible and curable even though the seventeen thousand of years of civilisation have demonstrated that the more civilised the globe becomes, the more there is poverty, extermination of species and human groups, and general, overall escalating violence. Still, the civilised narrative tells us that if people are educated even further, domesticated even deeper, and punished even more, then happiness shall come.

Chapter 7: Whose Narratives? Whose Children?—the Foundation of Crime and Punishment

In civilisation, the concept of temporality is assigned to both the nature of childhood and to that of oral culture. For example, the status of children as “illegal” and “deviant” subjects (rather objects) is at the basis of the rationale for corporal punishment, a practice that is still legal in most countries around the world. Recent debates regarding the Canadian Criminal Code illustrate the conception of childhood as linked to the concepts of temporality and corrigibility. In 2004, the Code has reiterated that a child is “allowed to receive” corporal punishment from the age of two to twelve years administered by an adult in charge of the child. Commonly referred to as the “spanking law”, section 43 of the Canadian Criminal Code (1) reads as follows:

Every schoolteacher, parent or person standing in the place of a parent is justified in using force by way of correction toward a pupil or child, as the case may be, who is under his care, if the force does not exceed what is reasonable under the circumstances.

The formulation of the punitive paradigm itself assumes that the adult knows correct behaviour and has the right to define it, while the child's knowledge, and therefore humanity, in this relationship is suspended until finally corrected. Here, the category “human” is provisional and conditional. People are not born “human”; they have to be forced, “corrected” and bullied into *becoming* human. Ontologically, this leaves room for the understanding that without coercion and violence we are not human, which means two things: (1) that without legalised, premeditated violence we are animals, and (2) that animals do not coerce or use violence as an educational method, only those destined to become human do so. In other words, violence is a strictly human property. This understanding leaves us either with fear and despair or hope and rebellion; for, either we agree to submit to the whipping hand of domestication or insist on dreaming savagely of the vast possibilities of wilderness and strive incessantly towards a return to our true animal essence.

Broken down to its basic components, the position for punishment postulates: (1) that children learn through conditioning and hence the intentional infliction of pain and rewards can act as pedagogical stimuli; (2) that children have an innate side to their nature

that, if left unconditioned and allowed to act according to its wishes, will ultimately wish “evil”, while the right type of conditioning can reform the wicked streak; (3) that the wrong-doer is responsible for wrong-done acts and when exposed to pain, the decision to do wrong becomes a conscious choice, since punishment is supposed to teach and imprint on the memory that such and such act is wrong because it causes pain to the doer (the question of sentience and empathy towards the victim comes secondary in this rationale), etc.; and (4) that people should believe in the justice of the authority who has been designated to inflict pain as punishment and hence the question of credibility, definitions, and authority are always present in this continually contested territory.

The opposite stance holding that children do not need punishment stems from the position (1) that children and humans strive for harmony and goodness, that they are good deep inside and do not wish to harm, especially not consciously; (2) that the intentional infliction of pain teaches by example how to intentionally inflict pain and hence alienates people from each other and is destructive for relationships and community building⁵⁴; (3) that punishment teaches a person to surrender to the dictates of the authority figures who inflict pain (hierarchical subordination) and whose interests become the guidelines for “right” and “wrong” instead of conscience that atrophies in these conditions; (4) finally, that children are hard-wired to learn what is necessary for their well-being—if other animals can, why would human animals be unable to?

The concept of punishment thus presupposes specific notions about the nature of the human animal, the nature of the child, and the nature of the perceived act of deviance, in addition to a conception of the nature and intentions of the perpetrator and of the inflicter of punishment. These basic premises in the rationale of punishment inhere in a variety of contexts and practices that determine the nature of the relationship, usually between unequals: between adults from unequal socio-economic groups, between adults and the elderly, between humans and animals, or between adults and children. Moreover, a relationship can be punishing even in the absence of corporal pain. Gregory Bateson (2000), for instance, in his anthropology of psychiatric institutions discusses the damage

⁵⁴ Animal psychology studies demonstrate that rats and other animals are kind, responsive, empathic, and willing to help others when they themselves have experienced kindness and love. For instance, see: Church (1959); Kraus *et al.* (2010); Bekoff and Pierce (2009).

inflicted on mental and emotional health by the morally and emotionally punishing attitudes of parents and the conflicting messages that they relay leading to schizophrenic condition in children.

The rationale of punishment holds that just as children are punishable because they are constructed as temporary deviants, i.e. their deviance is reformable, so are oral traditions constructed as temporary, “unreliable”, “forgettable” and therefore in need of remedy. This explains why Irma perceives Aisha's illiteracy as deviance and acting as authority, Irma knows that if, at any point, this deviance poses any serious threat to her order (both Irma's order and the social order on whose behalf she acts) then Irma and her order have the right and the power to intervene and take the necessary steps to correct Aisha's lack of cooperation, if necessary, by means of legalised violence (police and laws)⁵⁵. In other words, legitimated by the fact that it is backed by police and laws, the authority dictates to people what form, methods, and syllabi their children's upbringing should adopt. The underlying premise of this relationship is that people are *not* free to choose how to raise their children and children as well as adults should not be trusted to choose what to do with their learning, because if left alone, they will not comply with the economic mandates of business owners and “*styrelsen*” or management.

The critical issue with children's literature, hence, is the political application of literacy itself to control and domesticate children's wilderness by imposing a narrative and a method that in itself is inculcated as *habitus* and *doxa*; these latter foster a civilised (hierarchical) relationship to knowledge about the world and the place of humans in it, thereby failing to forge a real relationship to the world. According to *Socialstyrelsen*, the social workers, and medical personnel, Somalis and Gypsies are considered to be two troublesome groups, because they are illiterate and refuse to be monitored via regular medical check-ups and hence are difficult to instruct and forced to comply – the term is “integrate”. This illiteracy, however, does not mean that the Gypsies and Somalis do not know how to read and write or refuse totally to read and write. It is simply that the preferred mode for memory and social interactions is based on oral traditions and face to

⁵⁵ The various legal cases of homeschoolers in Europe, illustrate this point, particularly the case of seven year old Domenic Johansson who was abducted on 25th June 2008 by the state for homeschooling reasons. The parents had already boarded the plane on their from the plane heading to India, his mother's native land, where they decided to move permanently (Sundberg, 2009; Lundström, 2010).

face presence rather than through lists of economic relationships of dependence and replacement. The “illiterate” have not accepted the literate method, because the relationships that oral culture fostered forged a particular ontological position vis-à-vis life and society that differed radically from that of the civilised Swedes.

My Somali interlocutors in this project have helped me see a critical nuance usually glossed over in the literacy versus oral tradition dichotomy, namely, that they reject *literacy* as a method of formulating human relationships, but they do not refuse *literature per se*, i.e. they do not reject cultural articulation in a literary – even if not literate – form⁵⁶. This means that an oral tradition, such as the rich tradition of Somali poetry, which contains the whole history of Somali clans, has room for narrative(s), even a civilised one if domestication enters their ontological conceptions. This is precisely what happened with the spread of Islam that appears to have reached Somalia in the seventh century AD. It was easily incorporated even while the clans remained mostly nomadic and pastoral⁵⁷.

Like children's literature, which during the early stages of childhood the child can access through caretakers by means of repetitive reading aloud and memorisation, and like the tradition of bed-time reading or story telling, both of which practices bridge the gap between the ontological meaning of the traditional story-teller and a written down narrative, so is the Qur'an a text that lives through memorisation, repetition, and vocalisation. Like all poetic traditions⁵⁸, it is daily revived by the ability of Muslims to recite from memory, sometimes in solitude and other times with other people in communal prayer. Here, both the oral and literary modes have the potential to serve as a tool for the transmission of the ideology of domination through *doxa* and *habitus*, even if both offer a compromise between literacy and oral culture.

⁵⁶ It is almost ironic to write about what is required to be unwritten, but there are numerous books on the oral tradition of the Somalis. For more discussion, see: Samatar (1982) cited above, I.M. Lewis *Understanding Somalia* (1993 and 2008), or *Blood and Bone* (1994), or Bernhard Helander *The Slaughtered Camel* (1988).

⁵⁷ The exact date has been contested, but according to I.M. Lewis (1993 and 2008) the Somalis have participated in the wars of jihad and appear to have been among the earlier converts to Islam in Africa.

⁵⁸ Poetic traditions not only in oral cultures, but also in literate traditions where children learn poetry from written sources by heart. This ensures a living memory, a live-relationship and at the same time a “dead” text that was brought back to life by the required presence of a living recital. Theatre is another surviving form of this compromise, where active presence is required in reliving and relieving the written legacy of the playwright.

In addition to the practice of bed-time reading in literate societies, children use books similarly to how holy books are employed, for they too practice repetition, rereading, and memorisation of beloved texts regardless of whether this takes place in the company of siblings, adults, or by themselves. In this way, children, holy books devotees, as well as theatre goers and lovers of poetry thereby negotiate a compromise between the written word and live presence. What determines the outcome in reading then is the ontological basis of the text: is the basic premise civilised or is it wild? Does it prompt death or inspire life? Does it follow rigid rules and is squeezed into an unyielding structure or is it flexible, malleable, and unpredictable even when reread for the hundredth time?

Following this line of reasoning, fiction provides an excellent genre with a potential to substitute reality with falsehood and to reconfirm the civilised narrative even while presenting a multiplicity of threads. It is a powerful tool of reconfirmation of personal and social knowledge, because the elements that contradict desires and perspectives can be dismissed as “imaginary” and the elements that can help build an “argument” or justifications can then be used to reconfirm the categories of reality funnelling conclusions into a predetermined, domesticated direction thus creating the illusion that the text is fluid and ambiguous, while in reality, it turns out to be specific and practical. The Swedish social worker's (in this case it was Irma) ideology and *doxa* stems from this knowledge of the power of children's (and other) literature to re-inscribe the rebellious or otherwise dysfunctional (ill, criminal, immigrant, or otherwise deviant) individuals within the system of resources.

It is the civilised definition of resources as yielding profit and labour that defines membership in a civilised society or marginalisation. Some groups are permanently labelled, e.g. schizophrenics (Rosenhan, 1973); others, such as children, are constructed as temporarily deviant (from the productive norm) who with the right methodology can be “healed” and may “graduate” at eighteen (or whatever the specific “legal” age of adulthood may be in any given society), thereby becoming legal participants as either owned resources or owners.

In this regard, a simple book, take for instance a *Caillou* story on diapers, may at first glance appear as having nothing to do with the civilised narrative of illness and

health, like the one explicitly articulated in *The Secret Garden* or in *The Chronicles of Narnia*. Yet, it does the same job as the one carried out by the psychotherapists in Kirmayer's study (in Mattingly and Garro, 2000), whose aim is to re-integrate and recycle the “in-valid” persons into society. In other words, *Caillou's* authors strive to integrate the wild child into the civilised order. Having been created for the very young by various contributors, the *Caillou* series (first published in Quebec in 1987) depicts “problematic” situations that, in a civilised society, would threaten the child by withdrawing acceptance and love. The authors offer solutions for the child to become integrated and ways to win that acceptance by pointing out that these are common problems so that the child identifies herself with Caillou and the “normal” standards outside of her, regardless of her own needs or self-knowledge. The aim of such books is to offer a narrative that demands that the child trust that, by following the recipe, integration shall come and happiness shall follow.

For instance, *Caillou: Potty Time* (Sanschagrin, 2005) presents the problem of Caillou not understanding where to poop. Parents buy him a potty as a gift and when he goes to the kindergarten, he learns that it is socially unacceptable to either wear a diaper or to poop around; people laugh at you and turn away. In order to integrate, Caillou chooses to poop in a pot and is rewarded by social acceptance. In contrast, a society such as the Semai in Malaysia, does not impose restrictions or any form of psychological, moral, or physical punishment on children and lets the child learn these things simply by living and enjoying the safety of the unconditional love that the community provides (Dentan, 1968). In these societies, as soon as they begin to crawl, children learn where to go to the toilet without books, narratives, or the threat of abandonment.

Healing, correcting, and educating people is therefore a thread that tightly interweaves all the institutions of civilisation, such as the departments concerned with the concepts and methods of regulating illness and health, policing and military⁵⁹, law and justice, education, among others. Moreover, these concepts underlie all of literature. Scientific texts attempt to explain phenomena that are then used to control inner and outer

⁵⁹ The functions of both the military and the police are the same, except that the military is created to control and conquer foreign populations, while the function of the police is to do the same with the human resources at “home”.

nature, but also to question the anthropogenic realities. Fiction too plays a role in cementing the dispositions and structural knowledge but also project possibilities that challenge the *status quo* of power. In this cacophony of possibilities of submission and rebellion, children's literature, too, has room for the negotiation of resolutions and the steering of minds, emotions, and behaviour and offers a place for the unfolding of the conflict between the personal or voluntaristic impulses and the deterministic social and historical constructs of knowledge, the agents of the state, and the language of domestication.

Chapter 8: Taming Children's Inner Landscape and Other Wild Things

In a domesticated culture, narrative channels the idea that, from the perspective of linear evolution of events, becomes the *doxic* climax of the plot while its chronological structure allows us to develop the plot to its logical end. In this sense, a domesticated narrative appears as an ordered, linear, and temporal framework for the chaotic details of life thereby marking the critical distinction between the various ways in which culture and socio-economic paradigms are materialised. Since the seed of violence has been planted at the inception of language, it inheres in the very reason for its being. The main difference in the extent to which this violence manifests itself resides in the ontological positions at the basis of the premises used to construct those systems which are then articulated through language and defined by the needs fostered by the ontological premises.

In contrast to the civilised story that is required to be limiting and defining because it is always expected to make or prove a point, since the premises of wildness offer no grammar for narratology, then wild stories are not defined by social construct of permanence or logic. Where the wild narrative is free to wander, the civilised story projects an expectation of a climax through a “dynamic” and “evolving” plot which thus seizes time and assumes it to be a natural structure bound to the concept of a finite frame.

Thereby the civilised story constricts experience and directs the object of domestication, through the promise of punishment and reward (i.e. threats), to a world of civilised obedience. The events that make up the civilised story can be imagined, invented, or lived. They can question time as in time-travelling science fiction stories. Nonetheless, the plot directs us to a specific point of domestication through punishment and reward, failure and success and the ultimate resolution in favour of the hierarchical system of resources. If it refuses to deliver, then, “what is the point of that film?” – audiences ask, baffled by underground cinema; or “what is the point of your story?” – creative writing professors demand of their students; “what is the point of your essay?” professors ask of insubordinate students, etc. Civilised stories make their points regardless of the medium in which they are told: a live storytelling in a public reading session, an actor interpreting the role of a character in a story or a play on stage or through a technological medium such as TV or film. In other words, be it through live interaction, oral or audio-visual performance mediated through technology, whether recorded on tape, transmitted on screen, or written on paper – each story becomes an integral part of the larger narrative, the civilised story.

In this chapter, I compare two examples of civilised children's narratives: one obvious and the other much less overt. The first illustration of a civilised narrative comes from the celebrated 1963 picture book by Maurice Sendak, *Where the Wild Things Are*. Here, wilderness is presented as a place to which a child withdraws as a consequence of punishment, because wilderness is assumed to be undesirable and abnormal, something that is dangerous and which can therefore be used to scare and inflict emotional, psychological or physical pain in order to modify the child's behaviour. The second example draws from A.A. Milne's *Winnie the Pooh*.

The events in Sendak's book transpire as follows: Max, the protagonist, wants to play a beast, perhaps *be* one in the family space – a place of domestication. He wears fur and acts “naughty”. His parents banish him to his room depriving him of supper. He is depicted then as going to a “dark”, “scary”, “wild” place and we are told that he conquers it and its inhabitants by staring into their eyes, just as John Berger (1972), in *Ways of Seeing* (1972), describes the gaze of science and art that tames, objectifies, and renders pornographic the women turned into observed, gazed at commodities of knowledge and

marketing strategies.

The narrative follows a linear development from wildness to taming, thereby depicting the evolution of a little boy shaped by punishment. Punishment is a method of modification of non-human and human animals' behaviour by appealing to their fears of pain and death and threatening their well-being and life itself. In other words, to civilise a person, the pedagogue needs to create the logic of endangerment on purpose, a purpose that is absent in the wild, because even though beings learn from experience, that experience is never static and one needs to constantly improvise in the complexity and unpredictability of chaos where applying a standard rule cut to fit only static, inorganic, simplified programmes can prove fatal.

The crux of Max's lesson consists in learning that rebellion against his civilised masters, the ones who possess food, threatens him. It is not wilderness *per se* that endangers him; rather, it is his parents who demand that wilderness be banished, conquered, and destroyed. By threatening his wilderness, his parents instil in him a fear of it, because through their punishment he learns that in order to be safe in the colonised space of "home" and its relations, he must colonise the wilderness around him and inside of him so as to be able to return to the conditional love in the world of rationed food. Compliance with the hierarchical roles and the norms of behaviour set in this colonised world demands of him expansionism in which he, himself, provides the terrain for the colonisation of new spaces. Success in this colonisation brings Max to food and teaches him to do to the wild "things" (they are not "beings" according to the text) exactly what his parents do to him: they conquer his will by inflicting emotional pain and by frightening him by withdrawing unconditional love and – the most important tool of domestication – food. Having tamed that place of wilderness, the boy returns to the world of confiscated food and rewards through food – a world we call civilisation. The first thing that happens upon his return, he smells food and through that knows that he is "loved" as long as he obeys those who control his livelihood. Like the dogs stripped of independence and will by Pavlov's methods of *dressage*, Max cues in and does what his parents demand of him: stop craving wildness, renounce chaos, enter the domesticated space and submit to its order. On a deeper level, Max also learns that there is an emotional-psychological reward

in this system: as the owners of food exert control over his will, he too can domesticate those rendered weaker than him. In this respect, domestication allows each member in its hierarchy to feel himself to be concurrently a victim and a tyrant and thus submit to its ontological definitions through personal, even if miserly, stakes.

Punishment by means of withholding food has been an effective method of modifying behaviour for thousands of years. It has become one of the most important aspects of the language of civilisation and is at the root of the methods of education, which is a system of modifying children's behaviour intended to render them civilised, i.e. docile, useful and serviceable⁶⁰. Its grammar signals to the domesticated subject that they must obey and respect the one who is stronger, who possesses the key to the locked away food and to power in the system of hierarchical cruelty. Most important, it confounds concepts and jumbles up its own language, just like picture books do when they depict one thing in the text and a contradictory action in the accompanying picture, making children learn how to instinctively, on the level of *habitus* and *body hexis*, tune into the politics of power. Children copy this culture and re-enact this system of social relations especially in school where the structure is already set hierarchically: grades, teachers, promotion of leadership, and the establishment of the leaders and working class as well as of winners and losers. The constant threats by stronger children in the schoolyard force weaker children to submit and the effect this has on the threatened children is the experience of constant fear; when not sanctioned by the school, it is referred to as “bullying”⁶¹. However, the structure informed by these relationships of unequal distribution of power maintained by the *doxic* or unspoken of real, physical threat is cemented in the grammar and language of civilisation. Children's books written from this perspective and in this language, inadvertently, articulate these precepts.

For instance, a popular book such as *Where the Wild Things Are* refers to civilised bullying as benign order and defines wilderness as a dangerous zone of anarchy and chaos. Destroying that chaos and killing the wild is a requirement for the survival of civilised ontology, for it depends on victims (resources, workers, slaves), and, if there are no

⁶⁰ For the history of education, see David Nasaw (1979) or Jonathan Kozol (2000).

⁶¹ In the same vein, people who kill for the military and who obey the higher orders of persons who are well paid for their orders to kill and who enjoy legitimate authority are called “soldiers”; the people who do the same thing for a competing or non-sanctioned group are called “terrorists”.

victims (i.e. everyone is wild), it will have no order, no language, and no anthropological expression. It thus becomes vital to suppress, criminalise and eradicate any possibility of rebellion against this colonising and murdering culture. Hence, teaching the cues so as to enable the child to decipher who is a legal bully and who is illegal constitutes one of the main points of pedagogical culture.

Chapter 9: The Metanarrative of Literacy and Crime in 100 Aker Wood

My second example of a civilised tale, *Winnie the Pooh*, holds no claim to being a pedagogical handbook; *bien au contraire*, its value lies in the perception of it being anti-pedagogical. Notwithstanding, the same civilised precepts form the very basis of the relationships in the 100 Aker Wood. First, Christopher Robin's imaginary world opens with school and ends with him leaving for boarding school. Literacy and authorised knowledge, therefore, define the stagnation of this locked space which nobody, with the exception of the human boy, can leave. Second, it is a hierarchical world and its chain of command is evident in who names, controls writing, issues signs, possesses human attributes or personhood, who is the overlord and who is the overlord's favourite, etc.. For instance,

“A lick of honey,” murmured Bear to himself, “or—or not, as the case may be.” And he gave a deep sigh, and tried very hard to listen to what Owl was saying.

But Owl went on and on, using longer and longer words, until at last he came back to where he started, and he explained that the person to write out this notice was Christopher Robin.

“It was he who wrote the ones on my front door for me. Did you see them, Pooh?” (Milne, 1992 [1954]: 51).

This book is about literacy and control even if the above scene between Winnie-the-Pooh and Owl depicts language as inadequate in communication. Miscommunication recurs throughout the books as characters talk past each other, yet underlying this lack of

communication lies the drive for greed and unvoiced desires for consumption that manoeuvres the characters' interactions. Hence, even when outwardly they may appear to be indulging in polite conversation about pleasant things, inwardly they are calculating how to trick each other out of another pot of honey:

. . . Rabbit said, "Honey or condensed milk with your bread?" [Pooh] was so excited that he said, "Both," and then, so as not to seem greedy, he added, "but don't bother about the bread, please . . ." And for a long time after that he said nothing . . . until at last, humming to himself in a rather sticky voice, he got up, shook Rabbit lovingly by the paw, and said that he must be going on.

"Must you?" said Rabbit politely.

"Well," said Pooh, "I could stay a little longer if it—if you——" and he tried very hard to look in the direction of the larder.

"As a matter of fact," said Rabbit, "I was going out myself directly" (Milne, 1992 [1954]: 26).

This stereotypically English scene of polite hypocrisy spells out that there are no misunderstandings about who wants what: at first, when Pooh knocks on the door, Rabbit pretends that he is not home. Then, he lies that it is someone else who is home; and finally does his best to get rid of the avaricious guest, who "so as not to seem greedy", eats the "cream" and leaves the bread. The reason why the two have to dance around the bush is the symbolic economy of manners which flow into the established hierarchy: Rabbit is a xenophobic aristocrat and has to be reckoned with, regardless of whether he is right or wrong as the scenes where the characters side with his attempts to get rid of the immigrants demonstrate; Owl is the literate intellectual with long words and here, as in the civilised "real world", accuracy is not an issue; Winnie is the favourite nobleman with no brains; and so forth. In all of this, the one who controls literacy, language, and knowledge is the one who controls time and space and everything and everyone who dwells in these dimensions—namely, the monarch is Christopher Robin, the only one who holds the empowering title "human" and ruler.

In this respect, the world of 100 Aker Wood mirrors Jack Goody and Walter Ong's correlation between literacy and the more effective means of controlling the lives and the labour of "resources". One of the ways in which private property, names, and written signs are interlinked is the fact that the characters in 100 Aker Wood dwell under signs with

written names that enunciate ownership and the concept of trespassing:

Winnie-the-Pooh lived in a forest all by himself under the name of Sanders.

(“What does 'under the name' mean?” asked Christopher Robin. “It means he had the name over the door in gold letters, and lived under it”) (Milne, 1992 [1954]: 4).

Or, here is another example:

Next to [Piglet's] house was a piece of broken board which had: “TRESPASSERS W” on it (ibid: 34).

And,

...Winnie-the-Pooh went round to his friend Christopher Robin, who lived behind a green door in another part of the forest (ibid: 11).

Literacy in 100 Aker Wood thus plays a crucial part in the mechanism of colonisation of space encircling it within walls, locking “resources” behind doors, and constitutes a grave, invisible and symbolic, yet real barrier to freedom. It provides its holder with agency over others, but it does not allow the agent to be free of domination or subordination—after all, Christopher Robin moves out to school where he is going to be domesticated himself, he is not moving out to do as he pleases. Literacy permanently confines the characters to the circumscribed and domesticated space of the Wood, and the only ticket out of that world is belonging to the category of “humanity” and the possession of “literacy”. Again, falling in the trap of a vicious circle, the human agent can leave that world to go away to school only to be taught, domesticated, and civilised, which brings an end to his own agency over his imaginary world. In this respect, Christopher Robin's agency and control of literacy (i.e. grammar as rules and laws) are directly related to the control of space and his subjects, and this power over their very existence—they are, after all, figments of his will and imagination—and over his dominion is the great impediment to the self-realisation and free movement of the rest of the inhabitants of the Wood, a world that is destined to end as he grows out of this “temporary” phase, known as childhood, and enters the real world of domestication.

The hierarchical, Christian and monarchist structure of the 100 Aker Wood is further inscribed into the *metanarrative* by the omniscient narrator – the literary and concomitantly real-life father of the human son who reigns in this kingdom.

Notwithstanding the fact that Milne challenges the confines of adult language by playing with concepts and turning their meaning upside-down, the larger civilised *metadiscourse* remains intact: the academy headed by Christopher Robin still seals the final, even if random, meaning of names, places, and “facts”.

For instance, the residents of the Wood value “knowledge” and “studiousness”, yet the “expedition” to find the “North Pole” in chapter VIII of the first book exposes the vulnerability of terms and the rules that structure the meaning of referents and references. Christopher Robin and his “scientific crew” embark on a scientific journey to discover the North Pole. Winnie-the-Pooh, the scientist in this case, finds a pole; Christopher Robin, the authority, the “academy”, sticks it into a spot in the ground, marks the stick as the “North Pole”, and finally holds a ceremony to honour Winnie. Thus, the team succeeds in making a “scientific discovery”. Their scientific proceeding follows the logical prescriptions, the methodology, and the authorisation process used in “real” science, even though we might laugh or shake our heads in disbelief, because we “all” “already” “know” that this “North Pole” is not the “scientific” referent on the map and that the classification, categorisation, usage and the referents are different from “real science”.

Nonetheless, we know that the rules, meaning, and terms of “real science”, too, are arbitrary and that the process by which knowledge is constructed, authority identified, and deviance and conformity structured, is an exercise in the ordering of chaos through specific domesticated logic that curbs imagination and controls the analysis of the “data” at the basis of arguments, imperatives, contentions, demonstrations, *et al.* The grammar of the scientific language hinges on the logical links such as *hence*, *therefore*, *because*, *thus*, etc. since they contain the premise of permanent, natural laws. A random example of social fears of the past: “if a boy wears frills as a child, he will grow up liking dresses as a man”. This sentence contains a generalised assumption, a direction and a recipe for control: “if something comes from that source, it turns into that and if you want to avoid it, you should refrain from doing so”. Needless to say, in both the fictional world of the Wood and our “real” world, science is an exercise in power, and this power names, orders, commissions its “scientific discoveries” as well as bestows awards, condones, and punishes and imposes logical links.

In a civilised system where domestication is the end, the concept of rewards depends on an existent system of punishment. This system demonstrates that when one is chosen for an award, it is because others have not received such acknowledgement. The very nature of a pyramidal hierarchy dictates that few people receive awards and hence more people get punished rather than rewarded. This contrast between winners and losers is a necessary part of punitive logic that implies that if the winner deserves the rewards because she has done well, then the loser must have not done as well and deserves to be left with nothing. The system of awards breeds envy and competition – precisely the behaviour of the dwellers of the 100 Aker Wood who constantly check themselves against each other and compare who has more or less brains, longer words, more information, better food.

For instance, in chapter X “In which Christopher Robin Gives Pooh a Party, and We Say Good-bye”, Christopher Robin calls for “a special sort of party” (Milne, 1992 [1954]: 149). When “they had all nearly eaten enough, Christopher Robin banged on the table with his spoon and everybody stopped talking and was very silent... 'This party,' said Christopher Robin, 'is a party because of what someone did, and we all know who it was, and it's his party, because of what he did, and I've got a present for him and here it is” (ibid, 155). Everyone is supposed to “know” the meaning of Christopher Robin’s words. Indeed, almost everyone does, except for usually melancholy Eeyore, who for once exhibits optimism and confidence, because he thinks that the speech is meant for him and that at last he is receiving recognition. He even gives a speech of “modesty”, “gratitude” and “acceptance” only to be ridiculed and brushed aside “because it's because of what Pooh did when he did what he did to save Piglet from the flood” (ibid, 149).

In this scene, Christopher Robin summons, announces and rewards in the best of authoritarian traditions. He rewards the one *he* deems deserving and deprives the undeserving, regardless of whether the “undeserving” Eeyore believes himself to be deserving or not. Other characters support Christopher Robin's preference for Pooh over Eeyore thereby confirming his power and authority and supporting the social order and “knowledge” of what is appropriate, good, and rewardable behaviour, of which character deserves distinction and who merits disdain – i.e., enacting the definitions and knowledge

of what is categorised as normal and acceptable and what is delineated as deviant, abnormal, and unacceptable.

Legal terminology defines crime as “any act that is “legally” designated as such and is prohibited by law” (in Pozdnjakov, 2001: 33, *translation mine*). However, as Pozdnjakov and others have noted, the philosophical considerations of crime cannot ignore the social context and the hierarchical imposition of the criteria that would define one act as deviant and another similar act as not. As Pozdnjakov puts it: “crime has been born with the social human being and is characteristic only of the *social* human being” (ibid: 11, italics and translation mine). He connects the concept of crime to civilisation and states that correction and, inadvertently, punishment constitute some of the most fundamental civilised features. In a similar vein, *The dictionary of philosophy* edited by Flew defines “punishment” as follows:

The word in its full and central sense may be defined as the intentional infliction by some authority upon an offender, of some penalty intended to be disagreeable, for some offence against rules authorized by that authority. The references to intention and to an authority are both essential.

...What is philosophically controversial is not so much the definition of the word 'punishment' but the justification of the institution. Should it be in terms of deterrence, retribution, reparation, or reform? (Flew, 1984: 293).

Even if Flew does not question the definition of punishment and believes that the institution, whose justification he admits to be controversial, is related neither to the definition nor to the authority which is “essential”, in his words, he nevertheless identifies the ontological problem of the institution itself: what is the foundation of its existence? What is the knowledge that it takes for granted about permanence and temporariness of acts, motivations, desires? How do we identify the authority in this system of relations and why is this authority above the “normal” and the “deviant”? Finally, Flew identifies the link between the goal to “reform” individuals according to the definitions of this “authority” by means of pain.

In this light, depriving Eyore of the award implies punishment: the decision is made by an authority, Christopher Robin himself, and it works as a deterrent of undesired behaviour (nagging, pessimism, slowness of thought and action, lack of participation in

“discovering the North pole”, etc.) as well as it is intended to foster desired behaviour (activity, satisfaction, and support of Christopher Robin's initiatives) in Eeyore and the society at large. Eeyore's expression of pain and discomfort is blamed on his nature. In the psychiatric terminology of our “real” world, he would have been diagnosed with “manic depression”, “dyslexia”, “serotonin imbalance”, *et al.*, and would be medicated, even hospitalised and controlled.

As discussed earlier in Foucault's study of the birth of the clinic and in Nosov's depiction of the gendered and vagrant marginals in Greenville Town, marginalisation is a construct with far reaching social repercussions, and, in the 100 Aker Wood, Eeyore personifies that marginal. He lives on the outskirts, feels lonely among the self-centred inhabitants of the Wood, and is depressed in the hopelessness of that sterile and claustrophobic world. Laughing at Eeyore inscribes this marginalisation and even bullying (picking on and laughing at him) within the system of civilised knowledge that outlaws courtyard bullying at school, while legitimising it in institutions through grades and other policing tactics. Here, bullying relationships form the foundation of civilised institutions and are permissible as long as bullying is practised within the framework of the institution and its hierarchy. What defines acts as deviant or normal, hence, is not whether they cause pain or harm but whether the one who commits them is denied the “right” to hurt or is authorised by the institution to intentionally inflict pain, even if “only” the emotional pain of disappointment.

Furthermore, the order of 100 Aker Wood reflects the author's cultural context. The British Common Law has provided the model for the laws of Commonwealth⁶², e.g. Australia, New Zealand, and Canada, including the U.S. This law is based on the “rule of precedent”, which institutes the historically established authority as rule and justice thereby revealing the historicist nature of its law. This “method” of writing the law creates a “body” of “knowledge” or “information” that contains and in itself depends on historicity and on the already established solutions worked out through the struggle for

⁶² This also applies to some extent to the African countries who, after de-colonisation have adopted European political, economic, and legal structures, for example, Kenya. However, like Canada, they have parallel systems of legislatures. In Quebec, for instance, the major referent is the Civil code of Quebec, based on the French legal system, while the Common Law of Canada is secondary.

power and control over definitions: namely, the outcome that has been decided once and accepted by authority becomes the rule and the law that defines subsequent behaviour thereby guaranteeing the *status quo* of civilised resolution of conflict. It is this lack of flexibility of the legal structure that renders civilised spaces sterile and asphyxiating. Eyore's depression, therefore, reflects the reaction of the millions of people, whether medicated or not, who suffer from such a feeling of entrapment in civilised social structures.

Outside of civilisation, however, definitions are neither universal nor static. On the one hand, definitions and categorisation depend on one's personal life-stance; on the other, in a civilised context, they are a key to the struggle of power. Being battled for and battling, they are imposed by those who have the authority to inflict their interests on others. What ultimately determines meaning then is the view of human nature and the reasons for the existence of the world. This knowledge then informs the choices that any given society makes with regard to whether it institutionalises education and punishment or whether it trusts its members' nature and simply lets them be.

In literature, just as in life, the way characters deal with deviance, then, stems from the narratives that structure civilised ontologies into their epistemological and anthropological conception of their own nature and the nature of their world and their relationships: They might be selective in their reaction to it, as is Piglet when scorning Eyore's deviance (melancholia and social awkwardness) yet ignoring Winnie the Pooh's earnest and honest avarice. Or, they might choose either to punish it or to work together to awaken the "conscience" of Dunno as the girl-mites do in Greenville Town; or yet they might disregard difference and just live as do the blithe dwellers of the Moomin Valley.

Chapter 10: The Semi-Wild, Semi-Civilised Justice of Mites: Kropotkin as Predecessor of Foucault

In contrast to the civilised and Commonwealth definition of crime, Errico Malatesta, the Italian anarchist thinker, proposes an alternative definition:

Naturally the crimes we are talking about are anti-social acts. That is those which offend human feelings and which infringe the right of others to equality in freedom, and not the many actions which the penal code punishes simply because they offend against the privileges of the dominant classes.

Crime, in our opinion, is any action which tends to consciously increase human suffering, it is the violation of the right of all to equal freedom and to the greatest possible enjoyment of material and moral well-being (Malatesta, 1984).

Malatesta's definition of crime identifies the well-being of each and every creature as the centre of focus in conceptualising justice, society, nature and the world. From this perspective, the intentional infliction of pain by Christopher Robin or by a judge issuing the verdict “guilty” – for instance, such as in the classical example immortalised by Victor Hugo in *Les Misérables*, where a man gets punished for stealing bread to feed his family – both verdicts of “guilty” equally constitute crime and, from Malatesta's perspective, the authority required by Flew and exercised by Christopher Robin is criminal.

Nosov's trilogy, for instance, delineates crime and punishment as complex phenomena that transpire on both the vast social and the deep personal levels. In Dunno's universe, crime can occur only in a social context since it involves hurting someone else and punishment is a product of hierarchical relations of power with others. Learning and correction of acts that may have caused pain to others are deeply personal events that can take place only in the depth of one's conscience. Help from outsiders, including those who are hurt by the “crime”, can be effective only through empathy and kindness, never through pain inflicted for the purpose of punishment or revenge. This position further reflects Nosov's creative projection of Kropotkin's work on Russian and French prisons (2002), in which Kropotkin calls for reforming – not the conditions of the prisons – but eradicating the root causes that create the need to steal from others and the “curing” of greed. In other words, individuals possessing or craving power and symbolic and material wealth must be cured from these afflictions in contrast to the reverse capitalist stance that

holds that it is the poor and disenfranchised who must be medicated or even hospitalised or otherwise incarcerated and improved.

In the second book, Dunno travels to the Sunny City, where mites have discovered the bliss of industry and technology and which, at first glance, appears to be a utopia come true. On a closer look, however, no matter how well intentioned the inhabitants of Sunny City's may be, their society is ordered by police who have prisons and therefore crime, the two concomitants of complex, hierarchical city structures. Along with the title's reference to Campanella's totalitarian utopia *The City of the Sun*, the extensive space allotted to the discussion of crime and punishment renders Nosov's trilogy a sophisticated critique of both communist and capitalist systems.

When Dunno finds himself detained in Sunny City's police cell, his response to this aspect of civilisation is to destroy the prison with his magic wand: "I want the police walls to collapse, and that I get unharmed to freedom⁶³" (Nosov, 1984: 122). Dunno knows that he can wish for anything and his wand will make it come true, hence, the formulation of his wish is significant. He could have simply asked to be taken out of jail, to open the window, or whatever else. Yet, he wishes for the prison to collapse. Many revolutionaries (remember those who stormed the Bastille), including Peter Kropotkin, have called for the abolition of prisons:

The prison does not prevent anti-social acts from taking place. It increases their numbers. It does not improve those who enter its walls. However it is reformed it will always remain a place of restraint, an artificial environment, like a monastery, which will make the prisoner less and less fit for life in the community. It does not achieve its end. It degrades society. It must disappear. It is a survival of barbarism mixed with Jesuitical philanthropy.

The first duty of the revolution will be to abolish prisons,--those monuments of human hypocrisy and cowardice (Kropotkin, 2002: 235).

In this book, Nosov dedicates a whole chapter to Dunno's discovery of conscience and then several subsequent chapters to his debates with her⁶⁴ and then several more to her growth and development as her voice becomes stronger, louder, and more confident. There are also several chapters depicting Dunno's encounters with the local police, who punish

⁶³ "Хочу, чтоб стены милиции рухнули и я невредимый выбрался на свободу!" (Носов, 1984: 122).

⁶⁴ In Russian, conscience is feminine gender, which adds depth to the nuances in his debates with the deepest, feminine side of himself.

him in an attempt to correct, ironically, not his real wrong but what they deemed as wrong; while the real wrong, which is what has caused the suffering of another mite and three donkeys, can be “punished” only by Dunno's conscience, since, after all, no-one even sees his naughty trick with the magic wand that turns a boy into an ass and the three donkeys into boys. In this trilogy, discipline and punishment, whether carried out in the hospital or in prison, are presented as useless and even harmful. In the words of Kropotkin:

It is not insane asylums that must be built instead of prisons. Such an execrable idea is far from my mind. The insane asylum is always a prison. Far from my mind also is the idea, launched from time to time by the philanthropists, that the prison be kept but entrusted to physicians and teachers. What prisoners have not found today in society is a helping hand, simple and friendly, which would aid them from childhood to develop the higher faculties of their minds and souls... (Kropotkin, 2002: 233).

Once again, the anarcho-communist position of Nosov, Kropotkin, and Malatesta is an attempt to negotiate a middle ground between the paradigm of civilisation – with its drive for colonisation, education, ignorance, apathy, and with its systemic infliction of pain – and the total freedom of wilderness – with its trust, multiplicity, and chaos. Seen from the position of this middle ground, literacy, when not imposed, can inscribe itself into chaos. Learning and other matters of social life that raise the questions of justice and harmony are also approached here from the position of empathy and wildness. Albeit, one issue remains unresolved, which I tackle in the third part of this work, namely, the unquestioned ethic of work and the nature of technology. In the meantime, for contrast, I turn to how Jansson treats these questions in her Moominworld.

Chapter 11: Wild Stories, Wild Justices—Anarcho-Primitivism in Moominland

Domesticated narratives organise the schemes for crime and deviance by means of “logical” or “rational” linkages. For, in order to “correct” or “punish” certain behaviour, it first needs to be denominated, circumscribed, defined, and then disciplined. The knowledge derived through such disciplines then establishes logical sequences between

acts and results, such as: between the correctional methods, the acts of deviance, their results and finally, the results of the correction itself. Reflecting the premises and observations in Peter Kropotkin's studies on prisons, evolution, wilderness, cooperation, and civilisation, Nikolai Nosov has envisioned alternatives to civilised and capitalist ways of relating to the world. A.A. Milne's work stands in stark contrast to Nosov's as it projects a sterile world locked in domesticated logic, a world that is "logical" and linear in its "graduation" from childhood to adulthood, from agency to education, and from freedom to responsibilities. Conversely, stories told from a non-domesticated perspective may or may not have a point, a chronological order, or even a "main" character or "hero". Namely, someone's desire to tell a story or notion that some event was interesting constitutes enough reason to tell the story. Truth value, morals, or chronology do not occupy a prominent place here.

Hence, some oral tales may propose patterns of punishment and reward (the example of the abused step-daughter getting rewards and the pampered daughter getting punished)⁶⁵ while other tales such as the north Russian tale about a woman wanting to taste a female bear's foot does not seem to have any "logic" except for the narration of a series of events that have no "direction" or "aim" or "purpose". There is no "why", no "because", no "therefore", no punishment and no reward in that type of tale. Here is an example of a Russian folk tale from the north:

A man was walking to Njonosku, on the bridge... he saw a she-devil rambling: "Dress to impress I had; everything was taken away; but today, into the water I probe in a fashionable German robe, all bright, and with a haircut short and never will I emerge again, and never will show my voice"⁶⁶.

The above is a story. It is not a narrative. But, the cacophony of tales comprising the volumes of this collection by Onchukov point to the folk narratives of the Northern peoples of Russia. In other words, the wild narrative contains stories, points, contradictions, aimlessness, logic and lack of it, among endless possibilities, all of which fuse into the larger picture of the multiplicity of meaning.

⁶⁵ These tales abound throughout the world. For samples and a discussion of punishment/reward tales see the chapter by Rina Drory (1977): "Ali Baba and the Forty Thieves: An Attempt at a Model for the Narrative Structure of the Reward-and-Punishment Fairy Tale".

⁶⁶ Translation mine; for more examples, see the complete collection of Russian Northern Tales by Onchukov (1998).

Moominbooks too provide pieces for the larger narratives of wilderness. In this world, language can happen, but then an event or a series of scenes can show that communication is more effective without it. For instance, in the eighth book, *Moominpappa at Sea*, the family spends days on end on a solitary island without speaking with each other. Because they spend most of their time in silence and each with his or her own self, they explore their own souls, discover their own secrets, and we learn about their lives through their thoughts, experiences, and actions. In the moominworld, literacy is present, but no-one cares about it. When someone decides she needs it, she learns it. For instance, Moominpappa who grew up in an orphanage learnt how to write books, memoirs, and rhymed tragedies all by himself by simply doing it. Presence can happen in absence and vice versa. Schools and prisons, Snufkin shows us, must be brought down, burnt and abolished. In other words, there is no linear plot, no dependence on systems or signs and no promises of predictability and order.

A scene from the first moominbook illustrates how Jansson uses language to project a non-linear narrative. Here, a great marsh serpent pursues Moominmamma, Moomintroll and Sniff. A tiny girl dwelt in the flower that Moominmamma was carrying to light the way through the dark forest. As the Serpent was nearing, she suddenly lit up. Blinded, the Serpent falls into the marshes and the moomins are saved. In describing this scene, Jansson omits causal conjugations and thus presents the serpent's cessation of the pursuit and their saving as a singular event.

Something very remarkable had happened. Their tulip was glowing again; it had opened all its petals and in the midst of them stood a girl with bright blue hair that reached all the way down to her feet.

Brighter and brighter glowed the tulip. The Serpent began to blink, and suddenly it turned right round with an angry hissing and slid down into the mud (Jansson, 1946: 3).

By means of a sequence of images, Jansson offers a path to harmony through randomness. Yet, this harmony is not the “logical” predictability of a controlled reality and time, for logical and causal conjugations are absent in the descriptions which would have been needed to draw a rule that could have been applied to other situations. In this story we simply learn that things happen and creatures make sense of them as they come along. Since manifestations are never the same, categorisation, although helpful at times, is

questionable and does not allow us to draw the conclusion that “if this time it worked to have a glowing tulip girl to stop the serpent, it should also work in the future”, since the future will consist of another set of unique circumstances and variables of chaos that will probably require new solutions as the participants tune into its melody. We may, therefore, assume that the Serpent has stopped following the Moomintrolls *because* the girl in the tulip blinded it but we cannot do so with certainty since the author does not provide us with the logical link that excludes other possibilities in interpreting the causal relationships in this scene, such as: *because* a girl glowed brightly, the serpent was blinded; and *when* serpents are blinded, they stop their pursuit; *hence, if* we want to end a serpent’s or some other dangerous pursuit, *then* we should get a glowing girl. By omitting these logical links, Jansson does not allow us to make rules, since the absence of ‘*because*’ leaves space for other possible factors in the serpent’s ceasing the chase – such as it rationally or irrationally changed its mind, got tired, distracted, got overcome by magic, or whatever else. The author describes only what happened *then* and *there*, which may or may not work again.

Yet, even if we can not draw a rule out of the events, the moments described in the moominbooks usually work out smoothly revealing the author’s trust in the harmony of universal chaos in which our world is but a speck among milliards of other specks. As *Comet in Moominland* tells us, some stars are harmonious, some threaten the cosmic order, but still in the end, everything works out in favour of life. And, most important, everyone, including human animals, is also a star.

“Stars!” [Snufkin] exclaimed. “... Stars are my favourite things. I always like and look at them before I go to sleep, and wonder who is on them and how one could get there. The sky looks so friendly with all those little eyes twinkling in it.”

“The star we’re looking for isn’t so very friendly,” said Moomintroll. “Quite the contrary, in fact.”

“... And then I asked pappa if comets were dangerous,” he went on, “and pappa said that they were. That they rushed about like mad things in the black empty space beyond the sky trailing a flaming tail behind them. All the other stars keep to their courses, and go along just like trains on their rails, but comets can go absolutely anywhere; they pop up here and there wherever you least expect them.”

“Like me,” said Snufkin, laughing. “They must be sky-tramps!” (Jansson, 1959: 56-57).

The inability to establish causal relationships in the first example expresses the cosmic principle of surprise also present in the tales of the gatherer nomads that often depict encounters between predators and prey⁶⁷, all of whom exist for their own purpose. These encounters are singular, and each time they must negotiate anew the terms of co-existence, cooperation, strife, empathy, threat, and love in an unpredictable harmony of the balance of life.

Jansson's treatment of literacy, schooling, prison, and justice is consistent with the anarchist perspective. For instance, Mymble's daughter explains about monarchy, citizenship, meaning, writing and words:

“Tell me,” said the Joxter, “why are all these walls here? Are you shutting people in or out?”

“Oh, they have no special meaning,” answered the Mymble’s daughter. “The subjects think it’s fun to build them, because then you can take your food along with you and have a picnic. My maternal uncle has built ten miles of them! You’d be surprised at my uncle,” she continued happily. “He studies letters and words from all sides and likes to walk around them until he’s quite sure of them. It takes him hours and hours to do the longest words!”

“Like ‘otolaryngologist,’” said the Joxter.

“Or ‘kalospinterochromatokrene,’” I said⁶⁸ (Jansson, 1994: 86-87).

What triggers the discussion is Joxter's question: walls are built to either shut someone in or out; and where there are walls, there are monarchs; and where there are monarchs there is discrimination (shutting some people out), incarceration (shutting others in), and hierarchy. The deeply insightful Mymble's daughter, despite being an untrustworthy source on the truth of things with her rich, playful imagination, explains that walls and words have no special meaning unless one decides to heed their power and the authority of those who impose their meaning (such as a king). Obedience and belief can prevent a

⁶⁷ I analyse the Inuit tales more thoroughly in the second part of this research, where humans do not always appear to be winners and the outcome of negotiations with both prey and predators is never certain.

⁶⁸ Hördu, sade Joxaren. Varför har ni byggt de här murarna. Stänger ni in nån eller blir man utestängd?

Äsch, inte är det nån mening med dem, svarade Mymlans dotter. Undersåtarna tycker det är roligt att bygga murar för då kan man ta maten med sig och göra en utfärd... Min morbror har byggt sjutton kilometer! Ni skulle bli förvånade över min morbror, fortsatte hon glatt. Han studerar alla bokstäver och alla ord framifrån och bakifrån och går runt omkring dem tills han är alldeles säker på var han har dem. Om de är mycket långa och krångliga kan det ta timmar för honom!

Till exempel gargolozymdolog, föreslog Joxaren.

Eller antifilifrenskonsumtion, sade jag (Jansson, 1968b: 94).

person from movement, entropy and play, but reality dwells in the joy of transcending these barriers and not in obeying their laws and random meaning, Mymble's daughter explains, and then takes the Joxter and his companions to the great feast of the greatest joker: the King. Furthermore, the moominnarrative reflects Pozdnjakov's definition of crime as social construct, namely, in the absence of oppressive structures, including money, there can be no crime and hence no one can be locked in and nothing can be stolen if it is there for all who need it. Diversity of desires ensures that not everyone will need the same thing and of course, if one really needs something, one can make it.

Jansson's anti-capitalist position eliminates the notions of crime and punishment on all levels, including the parental: for example, the author repeats throughout the books that Moominmamma never punishes her children – the underlying assumption being that all creatures yearn for harmony and do not need the fear of punishment for guidance. On an economic level, the following scene depicting a “commercial” interaction between Moomintroll and friends with a tiny old lady, owner of a store from her second book, *Comet in Moominland* illustrates the underlying premises of exchange in social relationships in Moominvalley as based on need and not on price and profit.

In the store, Moomintroll and Snork Maiden exchanged gifts, Sniff drank lemonade and Snork got a notebook to make notes for the group, while Snufkin tried on some trousers but declined to take them because they were too new. Finally, the moment has come to pay.

None of them even had pockets except for Snufkin, and his were always empty. ... Not one of them had a single penny!

“That'll be 40 pence for the exercise book, and 34 pence for the lemonade,” said the old lady. “The star is 3 marks and the looking-glass 5 because it has real rubies on the back. That will be 8 marks and 74 pence altogether”. Nobody said anything [they began to put back the things on the counter, except for Sniff who had vomited his lemonade].

The old lady gave a little cough.

“Well, now, my children,” she said. “There are the old trousers that Snufkin didn't want; they are exactly 8 marks, so you see one cancels out the other, and you don't really owe me anything at all.” (Jansson, 1959: 122).

After debating among themselves whether that was correct, the old lady realized that she

“still owed” them 74 pence and gave them lollipops.

The “commercial” exchange that takes place here is not one of “accumulation” or of pre-set and fixed prices, rather it transpires according to the anarchist-communist slogan of “each according to her needs”: Moomintroll and Snork Maiden needed to give each other gifts (in this case valuables, such as rubies, are precious because they are gifts and the old-shop-owner gives them away to facilitate the relationship of mutuality between Moomintroll and Snork Maiden), Sniff needed to drink, Snork needed a notebook to record tactics to avoid the impending disaster, and Snufkin did not need anything because, as he often says, “possessions are dangerous”.

Here, ideal, material and other possessions are relative concepts that are exchanged outside the symbolic and monetary dimensions: Snork’s material notebook is important for jotting down ideas of how to evade the comet and, even if the others do not share his belief, no one argues with him and they let him have his notebook. The shop owner even sacrifices one from her store, although, it is obvious that it is not Snork’s notes, i.e. not his “ideal production”, that is going to save them, but some miracle beyond their comprehension or control. Yet, in some mysterious way, this notebook with the jotted down ideas do help Snork himself, perhaps by making him at peace with himself and his surroundings thus inscribing him into the general harmony. Snork needs literacy and it helps him. But it is not indispensable for the rest of the group and in this way, Snork can neither become the sole monopolist of the “right” knowledge or ideas; nor can he become an entrepreneur, who possesses the rights and the means to the production of ideal capital by hindering the access of others; rather, he facilitates it. In the non-capitalist moominworld, even Snork is forced to share his list of ideas, which have no power to force relationships of dependence upon the group. Most important, despite the relative value of the products themselves, the effort, role and the existence of each character is esteemed. Even the annoying and pestering hemulens are not only dealt with but also aided and adopted. In moominworld, therefore, there can be no crime, no theft because the notion itself of property and monetary exchange has been eliminated from the very basis of its life-stance. Only the hemulens⁶⁹ are capable of coming up with such an absurdity as

⁶⁹ *Hemulen* is also a derogatory slang word for authority in Swedish (Bertills, 2003).

a prison. In the *Moominsummer Madness (Farlig Midsommar)*, since the hemulens run both facilities, Jansson establishes a connection between kindergartens as children's institutions and imprisonment, just as Nosov links the medical establishment with incarceration.

Snufkin has several run-ins with police and the hemulens' law prior to this book. However, here, the wandering anarchist returns on purpose in order to liberate the children kept in a park run by two hemulens and destroy the walls and the forbidding signs. He announces his intentions in a song that he plays on his harmonica, while Little My, whom he finds in Moominmamma's work basket in the reeds after she has been carried away by the waves – just like baby Moses, sings the words:

All small beasts should have bows in their tails
Because now the Hemulens are closing the jails
Whomper'll dance to the moon and rejoice (Jansson, 1955: 79).

After the song, Snufkin announces that he is here to “settle an old account I have with a villain!” (ibid: 80). When they arrive at the school fence (all establishments of control, exploitation, and incarceration have fences and walls), they find it “was hung with notices at regular intervals: ABSOLUTELY NO ADMITTANCE” (ibid: 80) and other interdictions, such as, “NO SMOKING”, “LAUGHING AND WHISTLING STRICTLY PROHIBITED”, “NO HOP, NO SKIP, AND DEFINITELY NO JUMP ALLOWED HERE”, etc. Basically, all normal children's activities, fun and play have been outlawed on these grounds, and, as the twenty four woody children sat in the sand-box and stared in silence, Snufkin enjoyed tearing down and burning the signs. “Little by little it was dawning on them that he had come to their rescue. They left the sand-box and gathered around him” (ibid: 86).

Snufkin is compared to Moses on several occasions in moominbooks. In this scene, the parallel is even stronger, for, just as the people have gathered around Moses, the criminal and fugitive by Egyptian laws who had killed one of the enslavers and then led the Israelites to freedom from the oppression of Egypt, so did the little woody children gather around Snufkin, the outlaw, the criminal by hemulens' laws and standards, who tramples their fences, burns down their written words of interdiction, and liberates the woodies by leading them to the promised land of Moominvalley.

One day, when Moses had grown up, he went out to his people and looked on their burdens; and he saw an Egyptian beating a Hebrew, one of his people. He looked this way and that, and seeing no one he killed the Egyptian and hid him in the sand... When Pharaoh heard of it, he sought to kill Moses. But Moses fled from Pharaoh, and stayed in the land of Mid'ian (Exodus 2:11-15).

Sunfkin and Moses' rebellious actions acquire different meaning depending on the perspective with which one approaches their interpretation. From the perspective of domestication, in a scenario in which both the Israelites and the Egyptians agree that there should be a social order, with management of resources, it is normal that there should be some individuals designated to control the productivity of others. The question here would be who should constitute the category of the resources and who would make up the management and administration. This paradigm would not work if everyone wanted to become the boss or if everyone were to constitute the resources. If both groups, the management and the resources, believe that this order is natural, then in this scenario, the Israelites would believe that it should be them controlling the order, whereas the Egyptians believe that it should be the Egyptians. Hence, from the perspective of the Israelites, Moses was right to break the Egyptian law and lead them to a land where they could eat for free. But from the perspective of the Egyptians, Moses was a criminal who broke the law of their civilised society, a law that was there to protect the social order. From the perspective of any civilised nation state, the one in a position of power is authorised and legitimated by that same power and is therefore the law and in the right. Hence, the Egyptians were legitimated by the authority of their abuse and Moses, the outlaw, should have been hunted down, sent to Guantanamo or some other prison or labour facility or even worse, like some 21st century examples from Iraq demonstrate, executed.

From the perspective of wilderness, on the other hand, Moses is a righteous and courageous rebel, fighting against injustice and domestication, because no one – neither the Israelites, nor the Egyptians, nor the horses, nor anyone else – should be exploited and oppressed. He is a hero who leads the people from slavery and injustice to a land with no civilisation, exploitation, borders, categories of discrimination, or control. Still, in order to domesticate this figure, Moses is inscribed in the hierarchy as obeying a higher order than the Egyptian, namely, the divine order, whereas Sunfkin remains completely undomesticated and free. Both, however, can be seen as elements of chaos heeding a

cosmic voice, for Moses the divine will and for Snufkin the divine song.

According to biblical scholar, Christine Hayes, the story of Moses is part of a well-established literary convention that has already existed, since at least 2300 BCE, in the parallel birth story of King Sargon of Akkad. As a baby, his mother places him in a basket lined with tar and sets him afloat on the river. Hayes thus places the Exodus story in the literary narrative genre (Hayes, 2006) and by drawing a parallel with Moses' birth story, Jansson too inscribes her narrative into that tradition. Yet, even though Snufkin leads the woodies to the promised moominland, he himself remains forever a nomad, without a father, a home or a land. No one knows how he grew up except that he has always been welcome at the moominhome. In this he differs from the biblical narrative which tells that "fortune" had decreed that Moses be raised by his own mother even after she abandons him, even though, as Hayes points out, the biblical account, too, remains vague about the details of Moses' childhood and growing up revealing only that he had developed an Israelite identity⁷⁰ in spite of having grown up in the Pharaoh's court.

Jansson presents slightly more information about Snufkin's childhood and genealogical narratives that connect creatures, even when casting them asunder and even while Snufkin remains homeless, without any group identity. Like the Bible, particularly important are *Moominpappa's Memoirs*, the healing book that Moominpappa has written during his illness and that presents a genealogical narrative for Snufkin and other characters, thereby healing Moominpappa himself and the spirit of continuity and community. The scene of the woodies surrounding Snufkin who heeds their plight conjures the image of the prophet gathering his people around him:

Snufkin looked at the silently admiring group that had flocked around his legs.

"As if one weren't enough," he said. "Well. Come along, then. But don't blame me if everything goes wrong!"

And with twenty-four serious little children at his heels Snufkin wandered off over the meadows, bleakly wondering what he would do when they got hungry, had wet feet, or a stomach-ache (Jansson, 1955: 87).

The responsibility that befalls Snufkin is great and like a father to his people he faces it

⁷⁰ Hayes and my point on identity as a necessary tool for separating and alienating from the group constructed to dominate is discussed in the second part of this research.

stoically and with responsibility. He leads them even if, like Moses and his people, he does not know what they will eat. Yet, like Moses, he feeds them as chaos leads them to the Fillyjonk's house awaiting them with the feast that she had prepared for her uncle who never visits anyway.

As Snufkin takes the woodies to freedom after having attacked the institution of confinement, the hemulens must punish someone for this crime, and mirroring the events in Nosov's *Sunny City*, detain the innocent, namely, Moomintroll, Snork Maiden and the Fillyjonk who had prepared the feast. A subsequent chapter titled “About tricking jailers” is supported by a later scene in the book depicting Snufkin helping them successfully escape the pursuit by police, particularly significant since Snufkin has previous experience with escaping from prisons. These scenes reveal the author's intention to depict the arbitrariness of punishment and jail sentencing. Evading incarceration in these books offers a possibility for liberation for all from any type of oppression, not intended in the classist sense such as projected in the civilised narrative of *The Wind in the Willows*, where only the rich enjoy the luxury and impunity of tricking jailers. In this respect, Nosov's and Jansson's positions vis-à-vis the civilised constructs of crime, punishment, and justice are almost identical and diagonally opposite to those of Milne.

Jansson's critique of the system of justice and incarceration is not limited to acts of rebellion however. In *Finn Family Moomintroll* (1958) (*Trollkarlens hatt* 1948 rev. 1968c), the author envisions the possibility for a court trial transpiring in an anarcho-primitivist setting. This is a particularly interesting book in terms of Jansson's treatment of the problem of language, foreigners, property, theft, and a judicial process and demonstrates the extent of her questioning the basic premises of ownership, crime, and justice.

One day, two tiny foreigners with an enormous suitcase appear in Moominvalley. Thingumy and Bob speak an incomprehensible language in which the first letters of the words are switched. No one can understand these “foreigners”, the residents complain, except for the Hemulen who becomes their interpretor liaison. The Moominfamily extend their usual hospitality as they do with everyone else and, as always, respect the newcomers' idiosyncrasies and secrets. One day, for instance, Moominmamma's handbag

disappears. It is later discovered serving as a bed to the little funny duo, but they are so lovable and the moominfamily so forgiving that, instead of punishing the thieves, everything ends with the family offering a feast in their honour. However, not everything is rosy and cosy in Moominvalley. Two frightful characters inhabit that world: the ever cold and freezing Groke and the ever tragic and stern Hobgoblin, both of whom are drawn to the valley by Thingumy and Bob's mysterious and enormous suitcase. The Groke claims that Thingumy and Bob are thieves and wants her possession back. And even though nobody knows what the suitcase holds, at first, everyone sides with Thingumy and Bob because they are small and cute and the Groke is big and scary. The situation, however, turns out to be much more complex than what the characters had initially thought.

“I've been talking to Thingumy and Bob.... It's their suitcase the Groke wants,” explained the Hemulen.

“What a monster!” burst out Moominmamma. “To steal their small possessions from them!”

“Yes, I know,” said the Hemulen, “but there is something that makes the whole thing complicated. It seems to be the Groke's suitcase.”

“Hm,” agreed Moominmamma. “That certainly makes the situation more difficult” (Jansson, 1958: 132-133).

Snork then decides to hold an improvisational court trial appointing himself as the judge. The nihilist philosopher Muskrat serves as the Prosecutor for the Groke, but sleeps through the trial as do many famous judges and lawyers around the world, who in many cases hand death sentences when they wake up at the end of the trial (recent trial cases from Australia and the United States have become particularly notorious according to Asimow and Mader, 2007; Clear et al., 2006; Banner, 2002; *inter alios*). Sniff “who hadn't forgotten that they had called him a silly old mouse” (Jansson, 1958: 133) volunteered to be their Prosecutor. The Hemulen chose to be the Counsel for their Defence; the Snork Maiden agreed to be the Moomin Family's witness; Snufkin was to take notes concerning the proceedings of the Court; and the rest of the residents were the public whose opinions and proposed solutions highly mattered.

“Why doesn't the Groke have a Council for the Defence?” asked Sniff.

“That isn't necessary,” replied the Snork, “because the Groke is in the right...” (ibid:

134).

In other words, the Groke is in the right, but this does not automatically render Thingumy and Bob in the wrong, hence the need to establish how to rule or divide the “possession”. To complicate things further, it turns out that only the *Contents* of the suitcase belong to the Groke while the suitcase itself belongs to Thingumy and Bob.

“Ha!” said Sniff. “I can well believe that. Now everything is perfectly clear. The Groke gets her Contents back and the herring-faces keep their old suitcase.”

It's not clear at all!” cried the Hemulen boldly. “The question is not who is the *owner* of Contents, but who has the greatest *right* to the Contents. The right thing in the right place. You saw the Groke, everybody? Now, I ask you, did she look as if she has a right to the Contents?” (ibid: 135).

In other words, justice is not about ownership, Jansson's wild narrative tells us, but about rights. However, how does one know who is in the right and who has the right? The Hemulen, being prone to order and stereotyping, evokes the concept of “credibility”: the Groke is not likeable and hence cannot be credible, thereby reflecting the numerous anthropological studies and books on law that demonstrate that the economically and socially impoverished African Americans, for instance, are the ones most prone to receive the death penalty and other serious sentencing in the United States even when their crimes are less grave and sometimes they become innocent victims of wrongful convictions (Forer, 1994; Bedeau, 1997; Sarat, 1999; Sarat and Boulanger, 2005; *inter alios*). The moominbook characters continue to debate these problems of trust, authority, and rights as the trial progresses. To counterfeit the Hemulen's argument of credibility, Sniff evokes compassion:

“That's true enough,” said Sniff in surprise. “Clever of you, Hemul. But, on the other hand, think how lonely the Groke is because nobody likes her, and she hates everybody. The Contents is perhaps the only thing she has. Would you now take that away from her too—lonely and rejected in the night?” Sniff became more and more affected and his voice trembled. “Cheated out of her only possession by Thingumy and Bob” (ibid: 135-136).

This argument of compassion and extenuating circumstances is not exclusive to fiction. Professor of Law, Peter Fitzpatrick, for instance, makes a similar call in his essay on “how law is decomposed and made inadequate by the death penalty” (in Sarat, 1999: 131). Because the death penalty is final, it can not be corrected and the statistics continue to

demonstrate that black defendants receive harsher sentences and are discriminated against on various levels. Death is not adjustable and “responsive possibility can hardly be made available in capital cases. If the evidence were to be allowed cogency in such cases, then the black defendant should never be executed. Comparable evidence would serve also to exempt people denied equal protection for other reasons, such as poverty. The outcome would be that only people not so discriminated against could be executed” (ibid: 131). In other words, this leads to the conclusion that, if there must be a death penalty, then only the wealthy should be executed, while the oppressed need understanding and compassion.

Sniff reflects Fitzpatrick's reasoning and argues that compassion should extend to all, particularly to someone who hates everyone and is not liked by others. Seventeen years later, in *Moominpappa at Sea*, Jansson returns to this theme of the Groke needing compassion to heal, which I discuss in the second part of my research, and, once again, in this, the moomintrolls reflect the position of Dunno correcting himself because the girls embraced him with forgiveness and understanding. In addition, Jansson raises the question of bias, as the Moomin Family's witness, the Snork Maiden, states that “We like Thingumy and Bob very much” and “We disapproved of the Groke from the beginning. It's a pity if she must have her Contents back” (ibid: 136). Yet, they agree that they must overcome their biases and solve the problem for the satisfaction of all. At this point, in order to understand who needs the Contents the most, they ask Thingumy and Bob to reveal what is in the suitcase.

Thingumy and Bob whispered something again. The Hemulen nodded. “It's a secret,” he said. “Thingumy and Bob think the Contents is the most beautiful thing in the world, but the Groke just thinks it's the most expensive.”

The Snork nodded many times and wrinkled his forehead. “This is a difficult case,” he said. “Thingumy and Bob have reasoned correctly, but they have acted wrongly. Right is right. I must think” (ibid: 136-137).

As Snork and the others reflect on the problem of the contradictions between reasoning and acting and on whether it is the emotional value that gives the right to hold a thing or whether it is the “market” value, the Groke appears and Snork decides to solve the matter in favour of both needs: the Groke's for price and Thingumy and Bob's for attachment.

“Stop, Groke!” said the Snork... “Will you agree to Thingumy and Bob buying the Contents of the suitcase? And if so what is your price?”

“High,” said the Groke in an icy voice (ibid: 137).

But because this is a non-capitalist, and non-commercial world, rather a community of mutual aid and cooperation, then the Groke is allowed to decide what is satisfactory for her in this exchange, with everyone entering into negotiations with her and offering to chip in for Thingumy and Bob. The trial here is not about finding one wrong and correcting it through punishment while absolving the other. Jansson's notion of justice is that conflict can only be resolved with all parties satisfying their needs, which are different and must – and can – be all reckoned with. Only when everyone responds can there be justice.

“Would my gold mountain on the Hattifatteners' Island be enough?” asked the Snork.

“No,” answered the Groke as icily as before....

“Here is the most valuable thing in the whole of Moomin Valley, Groke! Do you know what has grown out of this hat? Raspberry juice and fruit trees, and the most beautiful little self-propelling clouds: the only Hobgoblin's Hat in the world!”

“Show!” said the Groke scornfully.

Then Moominmamma laid a few cherries in the hat... When the Groke looked into the hat a handful of red rubies lay there....

The Groke looked at the hat. Then she looked at Thingumy and Bob. Then she looked at the hat again. You could see that she was thinking with all her might. Then suddenly she snatched the hat and, without a word, slithered like an icy grey shadow into the forest (ibid: 138-139).

In this way, throughout the nine moomin novels, Jansson tackles the interconnections between desires, which motivate actions, language, literacy, borders and walls, and the questions of freedom and oppression. Here, freedom entails liberating individuals from dogma, sterility and the calculated predictability of the mundane personified by the nagging hemulens, those pedantic bureaucrats obsessed with order: they run schools, prisons, orphanages, and other institutions of oppression. Still, regardless of the hemulens' compulsive need for order, they are capable of tuning into the moomin chaos and the moomins are friendly towards them even when they are most annoying and adopt them when they need a home, kindness, or a breeze of unreason (such as depicted in the last book). The hemulens come to them even as they suffer from all the explosive creativity

and diversity, for, like everyone else, they need this love, openness, and sharing which brings them solace and healing.

Therefore, Moominvalley has no place for hospitals or doctors. If anyone feels ill, Moominmamma helps heal by offering acceptance, care and warm onion soup. Moominpappa cures himself by writing memoirs that provide a narrative of strength, continuation through genealogy, and community. The invisible child, Ninny, for instance, “who has faded away from sight because she had been 'frightened the wrong way by a lady who had taken care of her without really liking her,' the icily ironical kind” [sic] who ridiculed instead of scolded” (Huse in Milner and Milner, 1987: 137-8). Moominmamma refuses to take her to the doctor, instead, cures Ninny's invisibility by offering her own presence, love and acceptance. Healthcare in Jansson's world is not about professionalism, which is depicted as failure, and all the institutions of “care” for children, such as orphanages, kindergartens and schools, generate unhappiness and the desire to either rebel or escape.

In this respect, two main forces underlie Moominvalley's wilderness: that of the generative power of Moominmamma's love and that of Snufkin's music and chaos. Like a prophet, Snufkin opens his friends' eyes and soul to the generosity and splendour of the universe and embodying that ultimate sense of freedom that no walls, whether those of home, prison, orphanage, school, or any other institution, can contain or domesticate, he brings to them divine song.

Chapter 12: From Epistemology to the Ontological Roots of Knowledge

In pursuing my analysis of what defines the epistemological basis of children's literature, I have examined the roots of the knowledge that informs our imaginary and real worlds. Since our imagination is constrained by two factors – experience and motivations – any such analysis is inevitably bound to stumble upon the nature of this knowledge and its expression, which I argue stem from either the position of wildness or domestication. These positions inform our ideology, *doxa*, and language, and have far-reaching repercussions on the ways we choose to interact with each other and with our world. The perspective of domestication entails violence and the root of its genesis resides in symbolic thought and language itself. If these two characteristics supposedly mark humans as different from other animals, then language, symbolic thought and violence could be the human genesis itself in its new form of an all-devouring tumour of the planet. This link between language and our genesis is also articulated in the civilised monotheistic topos of the creation of the word and the world the way we know them.

The three children's authors deal with these premises of domestication and wildness in three ways. A.A. Milne presents humanism and the sterility it sows as an ineluctable fate, dreaming of the wilderness of yore as a nostalgia for an impossible state of being. For Nikolai Nosov, civilisation is part of an evolutionary tempo which can be manoeuvred by cooperative effort to avoid totalitarian exploitation, domestication, and control. Whereas Tove Jansson dreams of a world with no borders, where sorrow can be healed by the joy of togetherness, through eternal movement and Moominmamma's love, with Snufkin's song destroying the incarcerating power of literacy and language and reinstating a most authentic communication and understanding with his harmonica. In the following section, I turn to the conceptions of genesis in civilised and wild narratives and examine how they inform the ontologies at the basis of children's books.

II

Genealogical Narratives of Wilderness and Domestication: Identifying the Ontologies of Genesis and Genetics in Children's Literature

The first part of my inquiry examines the epistemological basis of children's literature focusing on the linguistic/symbolic problems of written literature and their role in the construction and representation of the pedagogical cultures as expressed in the three social paradigms. These underlying premises in Jansson's moominbooks, Nosov's trilogy on the mites of Flower Town, and Milne's 100 Aker Wood manifest themselves through distinct pedagogical, medical and criminological cultures depending on whether they stand on the ontological position of civilisation or wildness.

This part of my research focuses on how the ontological premises of wilderness and civilisation shape the underlying perspectives of the narratives of creation, which in turn inform our kinship systems – i.e., our relationships with the world – that have an anthropogenic effect on reality and, consequently, on the possible anthropologies.

Because of the relative geographic proximity of the three authors (all wrote in a European space), the collage of peoples who have migrated through and populated these areas has given a distinctive flavour to the fundamental topoi and metaphors that unconsciously guide human play with literary forms and myths. One of the most notable of such invasions of Europe, which took place long before Christianity came along with its patriarchal and hierarchical culture to colonise the European and Scandinavian world, was that of the Vikings, who settled the British Isles and marked the Slavs through constant raids and invasions.

H.R. Ellis Davidson invites us to consider particularly the legacy of the Scandinavian worldview in Northern Europe whose conceptions about the world branched out and intersected with the geographical areas of the three children's books chosen for this study – an imaginary that informs the authors' cultures and knowledge in the most fundamental way.

Animist conceptions of the forces behind our universe blend into the chorus of scientific and Judaeo-Christian perspectives, which form the fabric of East and North European epistemologies underlying the literary creations for children by Nikolai Nosov, living in Slavic-Soviet space, by Tove Jansson emerging as a writer in the cold winter of World War II in Finland, and by Alan Alexandre Milne conceiving the world of one lord and his vassals of small brains in the epoch of British imperialist supremacy.

The prevalent topos in animist cosmogonies, which had a lasting impact on monotheistic genesis and on science, is that of the life-giving and world-forming tree that permeates the imaginary of folklore. Along with stories of floods, of battles between cosmic forces of good and evil, which often have been depicted as the battle between the Bird of the Sky and the female Serpent of the Land, or stories of various creatures from different worlds, *inter alia*, these images and forces provide the topoi that have come to occupy a central place in literary, scientific, and spiritual knowledge of who or what we are and how all of us living have come about. These topoi form the foundation of human ontologies.

The explanations of genesis that these motifs offer function as justifications for our actions and pave the way for our mutual interactions and culture – also known as socio-economic and political systems. They also provide the language pregnant with metaphors for the formulation of religious and scientific principles that conceptualise our existence⁷¹. This cultural and scientific heritage serves as the foundation for the imaginary worlds of literary creations, including those with which this study is concerned, namely civilised and wild narratives in children's literature. In order to examine thoroughly the foundation of these narratives, this study pulls together an amalgam of disciplines that explore the topoi of origins and examine how characters' actions respond to explanations of genesis and the understanding of our relatedness – or its lack – to other living beings as well as to non-living matter. Consistently, the topoi of transformation reflect the underlying concepts of relatedness that stem from the two conflicting perspectives of wilderness and civilisation and reveal how the concepts of genesis drive the anthropological manifestation of the

⁷¹ George Lakoff and Mark Johnson (2003) explore in-depth the metaphoric nature of language, while John Zerzan (2002) in *Running on Emptiness* provides an important critique that links language to symbolic thought and alienation.

ontological relationships that the civilised and wild narratives inform. These wild and civilised perspectives, hence, also permeate the interdisciplinary examination of the question of “nature” and “identity”, of “what” we are and “what” our world is as presented in children's books.

The premises underlying the three literary worlds become apparent right from the opening paragraphs of the first books with the sequels building upon the postulates in the first scenes: Jansson opens *The Little Trolls and the Great Flood* with Moominmamma and Moomintroll crossing the deep, dark forest; Milne begins *Winnie-the-Pooh* with the assumption that the reader knows that this is a continuation of a supposedly already existent story of possession and the power to name, when in fact, this one is the first, and to indulge in sado-masochistic and pornographic relationships that are called love; while Nosov's book opens with a depiction of mites (general, not the specific “protagonists”) living in a town of flowers surrounded by wilderness and the community they forge. In all three books, there are spaces called forests and rivers, but they are characterised differently as the characters live with them, live by them, or domesticate them.

Chapter 1: Tiptoe Lightly Among the Trees: Rebirth into the Wilderness of Moominforest

It must have been late in the afternoon one day at the end of August when Moomintroll and his mother arrived at the deepest part of the great forest. It was completely quiet, and so dim between the trees that it was as though twilight had already fallen. Here and there giant flowers grew, glowing with a peculiar light like flickering lamps, and furthest in among the shadows small, cold green points moved.

'Glow-worms,' said Moominmamma, but they had no time to stop and take a closer look at them. They were searching for a nice, warm place where they could build a house to crawl into when winter came.

. . .So they walked on, further and further into the silence and the darkness. Little by little, Moomintroll began to feel anxious, and he asked his mother if she thought there

were any dangerous creatures in there. 'Hardly,' she said, 'though we'd perhaps better go a little faster, anyway. But I hope we're so small that we won't be noticed if something dangerous should come along.' (Jansson, 1945 [translated '96]: 1)⁷².

The very first characters we meet when we open the first moominbook, *The Little Trolls and the Great Flood*, are a child and his mother. We see them in the depth of a great, dark forest and we realise that a whole universe already exists as we plunge into the lavish world of trees – a timeless place beyond any physical or geographic location. At the moment of the narrative's birth, mother and child are in movement; they are coming from a different place travelling to a new home. In order to get there, they must learn how to tiptoe lightly past the trees and the beings, without touching or disturbing them because everything exists for itself, for its own purpose, and, in this world of trees, Moomintroll and Moominmamma must find their own wilderness.

The motif of the world as having been founded on trees, or the tree that holds existence, permeates all the disciplines of knowledge around the world. We have met it as the Tree of Life and the Tree of Knowledge and as the forest trees in the Garden of Eden; it reappears throughout folk wisdom the world over as well as in science inspired by Jean-Baptiste Lamarck's (1809) tree of life in *Philosophie zoologique* or by Edward Hitchcock's (1840) application of the metaphor to geological forms in the late 18th and beginning of the 19th century; Ernst Haeckel (1883) proposed several trees of life for the pedigree of *homo sapiens sapiens* in the 19th century; and numerous others have relied on this metaphor to map an interpretation of the familial relations of humans in and to their world.

Finally, its most famous incarnation appeared in Darwin's Tree of Life, which he placed at the heart of his theory of evolution “by natural selection or the preservation of

⁷² Det måste ha varit fram på eftermiddagen någon gång i slutet av augusti som Mumintrollet och hans mamma kom in i storskogens djupaste del. Där var alldeles tyst och så skumt mellan träden som om skymningen redan fallit på. Här och där växte jätteblommor som lyste med ett eget ljus likt flämtande lampor, och längst in bland skuggorna rörde sig små kallgröna punkter.

“Lysmaskar”, sa mumintrollets mamma, men de hade inte tid att stanna för att titta närmare på dem. De var nämligen ute och letade efter en trevlig och varm plats där man kunde bygga ett hus att krypa in i innan vintern kom. Mumintroll tål inte alls vid köld, så huset måste vara färligt senast i oktober.

Så vandrade de vidare, längre och längre in i tystnaden och mörkret. Småningom kände sig mumintrollet ängsligt och frågade viskande sin mamma om hon trodde det fanns några farliga djur därinne. “Knappast”, sa hon, fast det är kanske bäst att vi går lite fortare i alla fall. Men jag hoppas att vi är så små att vi inte märks ifall det skulle komma något farligt.” (*Småtrollen och den stora översvämningen*, Jansson, 1945: 11-12).

favoured races in the struggle for life”⁷³. In this respect, the motif of the Tree of Life, even after all the adaptations in the scientific, theological, and mythological theorising before, during, and after Darwin's era, has remained a major element throughout the trajectory of the myth: it is literally a topos and has always mapped genealogical connections. In Norse mythology, for instance, it links the different worlds and the creatures dwelling in them; in evolutionary thought, it maps the relationship between life and non-life connecting the *homo sapiens sapiens* to the animal kingdom and to all that has lived and died before (Stearns and Hoekstra, 2005); in religious imaginary, the family tree connects the bloodlines and, through genealogy, explains the history and fate of the world.

This archetypal tree is also common throughout Scandinavian mythology and is directly relevant to Moominland. For instance, the Edda of Norse mythology⁷⁴ is constructed around the World Tree with a sacred spring at its foot. This tree is believed to have given life, provided food and drink for the gods, and tied their domains to the worlds of humans, giants, the living, and the dead⁷⁵. In the words of a Scandinavian mythology scholar: “The tree marked the centre of the universe, and united the cosmic regions. Some Finno-Ugric tribes believed that the gods feasted upon its fruits, and that souls were born among its branches. It was characteristic of this World Tree that its life was renewed continually : thus it became a symbol of the constant regeneration of the universe, and offered to men the means of attaining immortality” (Davidson, 1964: 192).

However, the dangerous journey not only leads the moomins to discover life in the forest, but also maps their trajectory through the domains of life and death. They face monsters, descend into the centre of a mountain and, finally, in the manner of the archetypal floods recounted in Edda or in the Middle Eastern mythological and biblical texts, overcome the rushing waters of the Great Flood and, in the Great Tree, reunite with Moominpappa. This itinerary reflects the mythical odysseys for immortality, which, in a metaphorical sense, they attain in the eternally peaceful Moominvalley even as their presence and absence flicker from book to book.

The quest “for a nice, warm place where they could build a house to crawl into

⁷³ Part of the original title of Darwin's book (Darwin, 2008b).

⁷⁴ Sturluson, Snorri (translated from Icelandic by Jean I. Young) (1954) interwove the various heathen and monotheistic mythologies to offer a tale of genesis, apocalypse and redemption.

⁷⁵ Davidson notes that this idea probably came from the Near East in the first place (Davidson, 1964: 191).

when winter came” (Jansson, 1945: 1) thus sets them off on “a long and perilous journey from one world to another over mountains and desolate wastes of cold and darkness, or of a tedious and fearsome road down to the abode of the dead. Long before astronomy revealed to men the terrifying extent of the great starry spaces, the idea of vastness and of distances to tantalize the mind was already present in heathen thought. In Norse mythology also, as in that of many other peoples further east, we find the image of a bridge that links the worlds” (Davidson, 1964: 193).

The moomin books contain so many of the elements of Scandinavian mythology that one can easily replace a synopsis of the moominbooks with Davidson's text on the poems and prose of Edda, as the above exercise demonstrates, revealing the rich mythological fabric of the Moominworld. For example, a bridge over the river is the first thing that Moominpappa builds when they find the house he had built sometime, someplace else. Movement is presented as the nature of being. And it is that enormous river, grown pregnant with life during the flood that carries it Home to Moominvalley – their paradise found. Jansson's choice to open the first moominbook onto the majestic and intricate world of trees and the diverse forms of life that it sustains, while telling a story about a Great Flood and Small Trolls, ties the narrative not only to the archetypal tree, but also to the motif of water as possessing both life-giving and destructive powers: great bodies of salt and fresh water is a recurrent theme in pre-domesticated creation stories as well as in the domesticated narratives.

These archetypal forces of water also warn of divine wrath summoning great destructive floods, such as depicted in *The Epics of Gilgamesh*, *Ziusudra*, *Atrahasis*, *Utnapishtim*, *Enûma Eliš*, and of course in the biblical tradition, either as a general expression of cosmic anger or elements specifically delivered to punish the people gone astray. Moreover, in all of these motifs, water pre-dates the genesis of the world, where by divine will life springs out of chaos from pre-existing realms, usually, water. Scientific narratives, too, propose that life came out of water and that the various historical floods shaped the fauna of today. Even in the biblical tradition, it appears that water pre-dates creation and God finds it already present as he roams over the deep:

In the beginning God created the heavens and the earth. The earth was without form and void, and darkness was upon the face of the deep; and the Spirit of God was moving

over the face of the waters (Genesis 1:1-2).

Or, also, God creates darkness and light and orders “a firmament in the midst of the waters” (ibid: 1:6).

Floods and storms appear throughout these children's books in a variety of colourful contexts. As discussed earlier, at one point, Snufkin is compared to Moses, even though Jansson plays with her reader, and, later, in *Midsummer Madness*, the scene with Little My depicts a much closer parallel with Moses, who was found in a basket among the reeds just as Snufkin finds the tiniest of Mymble's daughters, Little My, sleeping in Moominmamma's work-basket in the reeds after having been carried away by water during yet another great flood (Jansson, 1954 [translated 1955])⁷⁶. In the *Comet in Moominland*, when Moomintroll and Sniff first meet Snufkin, the question about the absence of Snufkin's mother leads them to comparing him with Moses:

“Haven't you got a mother?” asked Moomintroll, looking very sorry for him.

“I don't know,” said Snufkin. “They tell me I was found in a basket.”

“Like Moses,” said Sniff (Jansson, 1959: 114).

Jansson achieves several things by linking Snufkin to Moses. First, she draws a parallel between Snufkin as a criminal and fugitive in a land of property and exploitation, as discussed earlier: Moses killed an Egyptian who was abusing an Israelite and Snufkin repeatedly breaks the hemulens' laws. Second, Jansson presents the very concept of genesis as inextricable from motherhood, sacrifice and love: Moses' mother abandoned him so that he could live and be taken care of, thereby tricking the strict confines of kinship. The adoption principles of many of the Somali clans, such as the Hubeer, despite their seemingly rigid agnatic patrilineality principles⁷⁷, provide an anthropological example of a dynamic and flexible kinship system analogous to the moomins'. Because Jansson's conception of kinship is horizontal and limitless, the moominbooks also blend the topos of genesis with chaos theory and the anarcho-primitivist perspective resulting in

⁷⁶ Moses' story of being abandoned by his mother in a basket and the questions of slavery, liberation, and growing up parentless appears to constitute an important motif that runs throughout the moominbooks. For example, Moominpappa is abandoned by mother wrapped in newspapers at the orphanage run by Hemuls and he wishes she would have placed him in a basket on the moss (1952: 9; 1968: 3).

⁷⁷ Helander, Bernhard: *The Slaughtered Camel: Coping with Fictitious descent among the Hubeer of Southern Somalia*. 1988.

a rich text where trees, water, a living and throbbing universe, and constant movement are all understood to be integral elements of being and invite the reader on a journey of exploration of childhood, motherhood, and belonging – such as expressed in friendships and kinship with the world – and of the various dimensions of life, including the forces that threaten it.

Chapter 2: On Monsters, Wilderness, and Love

Perhaps the most potent aspect of the opening scene is that it presents the forces of life as contingent on mother's love, which allows her child to build knowledge of the actual world as together they search and face difficulties. The viability of that knowledge, of that child, of that mother, and of the whole Moominworld depends on the existence of the forest and on knowing how to go through it and, in it, find life.

Jansson wrote this story during the harshest winter of WWII and, whether intended or not, Moominpappa's taking off with the hattifatteners who live permanently on the move, as a mob with no individual thought, in search of what they do not even yearn for, could serve as an allegory for the fathers leaving for the war. As Moominmamma walks with Moomintroll and the newly adopted “small creature” into life, she is mostly greeted by a generous and kind universe with only occasional danger. This danger can spring out of the depths of a dark forest marsh in the form of a giant serpent (another archetype) or descend out of nowhere, on a quiet sunny day on the beach, in the form of a tiny but territorial and vicious ant-lion. But regardless of whether the enemy is stronger or weaker than her, Moominmamma refuses to engage in violence, not even for self-defence or to dispute claims and property rights. She chooses to flee (Jansson, 1945[’96]: 2 & 9).

Her statement to Moomintroll in the opening scene that smallness and inconspicuousness make for effective self-defence strategies in the face of danger is Jansson's implicit response to war, for, as Nietzsche (1989: 89) puts it in one of his

aphorisms, “Whoever fights monsters, should see to it that in the process he does not become a monster. And when you look long into an abyss, the abyss also looks into you”. The moomins refuse to be monsters and, here again, Jansson plays with tropes and challenges our preconceptions.

Jansson depicts trolls – traditionally feared creatures – as small, cute, and loving, and thus subverts their image in Scandinavian folklore as dangerous tricksters. Presenting them as harmless, even as fair and respectful (no one, especially the children, is ever forced to do anything against her will), Jansson invites the reader to question the premises of an ontology that portrays the world as populated by dangerous creatures and to challenge its implicit logic of war: dangerous creatures must be fought back and killed, a logic that, by extension, teaches to beware of the yellow peril, get the red scare, fear the blacks (anarchists or people of colour), annihilate the terrorists (Arabs/Muslims interchangeably), just to cite a few examples from history.

At the same time, the books elaborate that Moominmamma's calm, accepting, generous, and forgiving demeanour is not an essential quality, but rather a process of search and learning. For, even she can be sad and angry. What makes her different, however, is that she can get in touch with that anger or pain in solitude in the forest and that there are friends who are capable of understanding her and her feelings and willing to ask themselves what they could do to help.

Toft walked on through the forest, stooping under the branches, creeping and crawling, and thinking of nothing at all, and became as empty as the crystal ball. This is where Moominmamma had walked when she was tired and cross and disappointed and wanted to be on her own, wandering aimlessly in the endless forest. . . . Toft saw an entirely new Moominmamma and she seemed natural to him. He suddenly wondered why she had been unhappy and whether there was anything one could do about it⁷⁸ (Jansson: *Moominvalley in November* 1971: 174).

Jansson develops the thread of this ability to understand the feelings and experiences of the other throughout the books. The relationship between the Groke, the world, and Moomintroll demonstrates ever more clearly how the ability to empathise is a skill that

⁷⁸ Homsan Toft gick vidare genom skogen, hukade under grenarna, kravlade och kröp, han tänkte på ingenting alls och var lika tom som glaskulan. Här hade mamman gått när hon var trött och arg och besviken och ville var ifred, planlöst vandrande i den ständiga skuggan, djupt inne i sitt missmod . . . Homsan Toft såg en alldeles ny mamma och hon föreföll honom naturlig. Han undrade plötsligt varför hon hade varit ledsen och vad man kunde göra åt saken (*Sent i November* 1970: 160).

requires effort, time, patience, introspection and the desire to look into the soul of the other, thereby echoing Nietzsche's aphorism, for, by looking into the Groke's eyes, the abysmal loneliness of her soul gapes back at Moomintroll and awakens his understanding.

The Groke appears as absolute terror in the third book, *Finn Family Moomintroll (Trollkarlens Hatt)*, and reappears throughout the four subsequent books. Whenever she approaches, the world freezes around her and everything dies. However, in the eighth book, *Moominpappa at Sea*, Moomintroll discovers that the Groke is that way because of the unbearable emptiness that comes with everyone fearing and avoiding her. The more that everything she touches dies, the colder she becomes. Still, his empathy leads him to reach out to the Groke and befriend her, a gesture of understanding and care that needs no words and which causes her to thaw. Moominmamma explains in chapter one: “we're afraid of the Groke because she's just cold all over. And because she doesn't like anybody. But she's never done any harm” (Jansson, 1966: 15). In other words, Moominmamma believes that the Groke has a right to *not* like others and in no way should we be afraid or intolerant of her even if she dislikes us. After all, it is the deeds that count, not knowledge or lack of it.

“The Groke. Did somebody do something to her to make her so awful?”

“No one knows,” said Moominmamma. . . . “It was probably because nobody did anything at all. Nobody bothered about her, I mean. I don't suppose she remembers anyway, and I don't suppose she goes around thinking about it either. She's like the rain or the darkness, or a stone you have to walk round if you want to get past” (ibid: 27-28).

Indifference and apathy, the narrative tells us, breed monsters. In this respect, Jansson takes a step further than Alice Miller's ([1969] 1977) thesis in “black” or “poisonous pedagogy”, namely that abuse and neglect in childhood infuses adult life with horror. For Jansson, ignoring and dismissing a person is tantamount to abuse. What the Groke is looking for, without even knowing it herself, is the warmth of light. However, every time she approaches it, she extinguishes it with her freezing loneliness. “The light from the lamp shone on the grass and on the lilac bush. But where it crept in among the shadows, where the Groke sat all on her own, it was much weaker” (ibid: 12). Moomintroll “knew that if she sat on the same spot for more than an hour, nothing would ever grow there again. The ground just died of fright... She couldn't help it, she had to come as close as

possible, and everything died” (ibid: 17-18). “She came over the water in her cloud of cold like somebody's bad conscience” (ibid: 116).

Despite the terror that the Groke instils, Moomintroll seeks her out and, throughout the book, she, too, keeps returning to the spot of their tacitly agreed upon nightly rendezvous to stare at the light he brings with him. “She stared at the lamp, following a ritual of her own.... The Groke was dancing! She was quite obviously very pleased, and somehow this absurd ritual became very important to Moomintroll. He could see no reason why it should stop at all, whether the island wanted it to or not” (ibid: 147). In other words, Moomintroll learns how to respond to this terror and to take the time to explore her need by imagining what it would be like to be the other; thus, “Moomintroll imagined he was the Groke” (ibid: 18). Moomintroll's empathy warms up the Groke and she begins to look forward to his company every night. At first she fears that he might not show up, and when he appears she greets him with song and dance. Little by little, the Groke realises that she no longer needs the lamp, because the light is in the warmth of Moomintroll's commitment, and he goes to a great length not to disappoint her. While the Groke learns how to trust, the island learns how to live with her. Moomintroll

could hear the beating of the island's heart.... Suddenly the Groke started to sing.... There was no doubt about it: the Groke was pleased to see him. She didn't mind about the hurricane lamp. She was delighted that he had come to meet her” (ibid: 212). “Somehow he knew that she wasn't afraid of being disappointed any longer (ibid: 222).

Jansson's response to the feared requires trust, which can not be fostered unless the basic premise of our ontology allows us to know the world as mostly harmonious, albeit without falling into the trap of idealising it as being completely safe. Rather, like Petr Kropotkin's (2006)⁷⁹ thesis on evolution by means of cooperation and mutual aid and not through the struggle of competition, yet without dismissing the occasional horror, again like Kropotkin, she chooses to focus on the prevailing goodness and the striving of beings towards the balance of life, who in the face of threatening forces, meet the challenge with dignity, understanding, and love. For the moomins, the knowledge of how to live can be

⁷⁹ Petr Kropotkin was a late 19th century Russian naturalist and anarchist political theorist, who presented extensive research to challenge Darwin's theory of evolution by means of natural selection. He argued that the world is bountiful, even in the Tundra, where he observed the principles of cooperation and mutual aid between animals during several winters in Siberia. Competition, violence and war, he concludes in his research, is characteristic of civilised human culture not of wild life.

acquired, transmitted, and safeguarded by entering the world of trees and going through it with confidence and humility (i.e. smallness) – all of which is provided by Mother's love and her trust in the child's ability to take care of himself and do things right in a benign, even though constantly moving and changing, universe. Moominland thus echoes the basic principles of chaos theory which depicts the universe, in spite of the regularity of the constants and the particles' responsiveness to the observer, as also unpredictable, and, therefore, as ultimately unknowable, yet, harmonious and self organising (Davies, 1977; Hawking, 1993; Jantsche, 1980).

The narrative echoes a number of other ontological disciplines about the place of humans in the world. This place varies, as my discussion on domestication reveals, and depends on whether we approach it from the perspective of wildness or domestication. Hence, all the domains of knowledge – science, folklore and religion – may either depict the human as all powerful and most sophisticated ruler of the world, or they may characterise the human as small, fragile and dependent on the community of life, in spite of claims by the civilised to have killed God and despite the arrogant attempt of science to conquer nature; for, even with a few centuries of “development” behind it, civilisation still fails to conquer the nature of our dependence on forests and wild spaces, and, therefore the question of our own wilderness remains vital to our understanding of the world and of ourselves. Just as Jansson's trolls, throughout the scientific and literary narratives, we appear as specks in an unknown, immense, probably endless, universe – or as some quantum physicists argue, possibly in simultaneous multiverses⁸⁰ – where, still, our very survival depends on whether we succeed in leaving *no* mark behind and *not* getting noticed⁸¹.

Civilised societies value grandeur, monumental exaggeration in architectural and other endeavours, and history, dismissing and denigrating the wild understanding that smallness and inconspicuousness is what can save us from harm. Endless World Wars are

⁸⁰ For further discussions on chaos theory, universe, and multiverses see Brian Greene (1999), ed. Michel Cazenave (2005), Stephen W. Hawking (1988), *inter alios*.

⁸¹ Many aboriginal peoples stress the importance of leaving the world unchanged and unmarked, just as we found it, for example, the Ainu of Japan. In an interview published on BBC and in Time (Sunday, 25 April 2010), the astrophysicist, Stephen Hawking, said that it was best NASA did not send out signals to “alien” forms of life as it would be best not to get noticed as the result may be as devastating as the Europeans noticing Africa, Australia, Asia, and the Americas (basically, the whole world).

a testimony to that, in fact the moominbooks are born during one such war. Defying these civilised values, tiny Moominmamma treads confidently with her child and an adopted foundling through silence and darkness amidst tremendous trees, armed with her trust in the kindness of wilderness, holding in her hand a glowing flower inhabited by a girl with sparkling blue hair. At the end of their odyssey, a bird brings them to Moominpappa atop an enormous tree, a moment of rebirth that brings them home, to movement and chaos, which is harmony and which is life.

Chapter 3: Questions of Choice: Discerning the Truth

Jansson integrates and re-imagines the mechanisms of the world as told in traditional and scientific narratives and points to the forest and water, not only as the moment of our birth, but also as the place of our liberation from history. More precisely, since she depicts place and characters in movement, she points to a path of salvation from a world of war and civilisation back to paradise: Moomintroll and Moominmamma flee to that world of trees, transcend the underworld with its false seductions, elude giants, meet magical creatures, survive the great flood and, having interacted with everyone they meet in a spirit of serenity, acceptance, mutual trust and aid⁸², escape violence and, finally, regain the paradise lost.

These steps from civilisation to the forest are traced in the first four pages in which Moominmamma and Moomintroll adopt another member of the family, the small creature who goes by the name Sniff in the rest of the books,⁸³ and Tulippa, the dweller of the glowing flower, joins them on their journey after having saved them from the serpent. Moominmamma explains to them what brought them to the forest.

⁸² It is not a coincidence that the author chooses to depict the scene in which Moominfamily helps the stork-bird find glasses and the stork-bird helps them find them Moominpappa on the great tree, a reunion that leads them back to life in Moominvalley.

⁸³ In contrast to Winnie-the-Pooh, which starts with the act of naming, particularly in the first Moominbook, Jansson makes a point of refusing to name.

“You see, we're looking for a nice, sunny place to build a house in... (2). ...Moominmamma told them stories. She told them about what it was like when she was young, when moomintrolls did not need to travel through fearsome forests and marshes in order to find a place to live in.

In those days they lived together with the house-trolls in the houses of human beings, mostly behind their stoves. 'Some of us still live there now,' said Moominmamma. 'But only where people still have stoves. We don't like central heating.'

'Did the people know we were there?' asked Moomintroll.

'Some of them did,' said his mother. 'They felt us mostly as a cold draught in the backs of their necks sometimes – when they were alone.'" (Jansson, 1945[96]: 4).

By explaining the reasons for Moominmamma and Moomintroll's journey right in the beginning, Jansson weaves into the story a critique of technological development: the moomins have been ousted by civilisation and its accomplishments in sealing cracks, constructing reliable doors, and switching to electric heating – basically, driven by human selfishness to keep things to themselves.

These cracks are the gateways between dimensions and, having thoroughly sealed them, humans have shut themselves off from possibilities and interactions with life. Development and technological efficiency thus lead humans to ignorance, since the selfish urge to shut doors to protect possessions (including heat and warmth) keeps the civilised humans out of touch with reality and ignorant of the existence of the moomins dwelling in those cracks behind the wooden stoves and whose presence people previously had felt as a soft breeze. Civilised, sedentary house-building practices thus displace the non-humans and alienate and segregate the humans from a mysterious, wild, and intricate world.

In some ways, this story of exile is reminiscent of the many variations on the theme, not least, the exile from the Garden of Eden, where civilisation was meted out as punishment on disobedient, greedy and impatient humans:

And to Adam [God] said, “Because you have listened to your wife, and have eaten of the tree of which I commanded you, 'You shall not eat of it,' cursed is the ground because of you; in toil you shall eat of it all the days of your life; thorns and thistles it shall bring forth to you; and you shall eat the plants of the field. In the sweat of your face you shall eat bread till you return to the ground, for out of it you were taken; you are dust, and to dust you shall return” (Genesis 3:17-19).

In the Old Testament, civilisation is an affliction brought about by human disobedience of

the laws of life; yet, the civilised have mostly interpreted this tragedy as a permanent and ineluctable fate and embraced it as a triumph⁸⁴.

Jansson refuses this fatalistic view and projects a world in which it is within the characters' power to change the actions that have brought about the wrath of life and points to the possibility of transcending our fears, greed, and limitations by venturing through the land of trees back into the garden of wilderness. In other words, she challenges the civilised narrative that sees punishment as an inevitable part of human experience, since Moominmamma's position assumes that there is no permanence in what we do. We can always change our actions and interactions and can find new paths back to *what* we are, which is the only constant, whereas the condition of punishment can become an inevitable constant only when civilised humans have no intention to change their way of life. Seeing their sin as a permanence, as an unchangeable part of *who* they are, there can be no forgiveness, only eternal guilt. Ultimately, this raises the question of choice, albeit not from the predetermining position – not a choice of right or wrong with consequences, but the choice to correct the wrong when one discerns the truth. Because one never knows where some choices lead, Moominmamma leaves it up to the individual – be it a child or an adult, from her own species or from another – to make her decisions.

Hence, throughout the book, Moominmamma states explicitly that everyone is invited to join her and her child on their journey or they are welcome to stay where they are or go somewhere else where they are happier. There are no consequences and no strings attached, because the assumption is that none of the creatures is endowed with powers over others or possesses information that is not accessible to others. How can she know more about what's good for the “small creature” than the “small creature” himself, for instance. Moreover, she reassures the children that they can always change their minds and come and live with them later.

The small creature therefore has the choice to accompany them or stay behind. He chooses to come. Tulippa chooses to go with them too, but when she finds the tower with

⁸⁴ Several biblical scholars have pointed to the different voices in the Old and the New Testaments. My play *Red Delicious* (2003) explores the implications of wilderness and vegan gathering in the Bible. Moreover, in his *Ishmael* trilogy, Daniel Quinn (1993, 1997 and 1998) also argues that the original story of the fall has been told from the perspective of non-domesticated society and has subsequently been adopted and adapted by civilisation.

the sunlit boy, she decides to settle in that lagoon and they bid one another farewell. Snufkin and other characters move in and out as they please. And while voicing her reservations to the old gentleman about liking it inside the mountain, Moominmamma nevertheless specifies that all can stay as long as they wish and may eat as much as they desire, even though they are looking for the real sun and sea and it is porridge and “real” food that is good for children.

In the image of a forgiving God, a loving parent in Jansson's universe cannot be punishing, and forgiveness becomes the natural state of a world founded on the premise that all creatures are fundamentally good because they crave harmony and the balance of life. Lack of experience may lead one astray on account of the not perfected skills of discernment, but this is precisely the reason for reaching out to the child, or anyone else for that matter, so that she may hone those skills by diving into a world of life, understanding, and acceptance. It is in this spirit that one learns how to discern truth from falsehood and real from fake.

Jansson builds this argument by integrating the various archetypal topoi of punishment and reward, abundance and misery, authenticity and falsehood and, once again, exploring new ways of understanding them through the perspective of wildness. She imbues her characters with the ability to see through as well as the strength to refuse the deceptive promises of satiation and comfort as promised by civilisation in general, and, in particular, by the old gentleman who invites them to live with him under a fake sun, known as electric light, and behind shut doors inside the mountain where he has built a world of simulated rivers and trees made of sweet food. This is the only instance in the moominbooks when someone shuts the door in order to leave “danger” out, since in the land of falsehood, distrust is the basis of relationships. Sniff interprets this act as a sign that perhaps the gentleman himself is not to be trusted, that the kindly, frail, old man is perhaps more dangerous than the serpent, and in his offer of limitless engorgement lies the real danger, the Satan of false hope and deception:

Then [the old gentleman] closed the door very carefully, so that nothing harmful could sneak inside.... 'Are you sure this gentleman is to be trusted?' whispered the small creature.... Then a bright light shone towards them, and the moving staircase took them straight into a wonderful landscape. The trees sparkled with colour and were full of fruits and flowers they had never seen before, and below them in the grass lay gleaming

white patches of snow. 'Hurrah!' cried Moomintroll, and ran out to make a snowball. 'Be careful, it's cold!' called his mother. But when he ran his hands through the snow he noticed that it was not snow at all, but ice-cream. And the green grass that gave way under his feet was made of fine-spun sugar. Criss-cross over the meadows ran brooks of every colour, foaming and bubbling over the golden sand. 'Green lemonade!' cried the small creature, who had stooped down to drink. 'It's not water at all, it's lemonade!' Moominmamma went straight over to a brook that was completely white, since she had always been very fond of milk.... Tulippa ran from tree to tree picking armfuls of chocolate creams and candies, and as soon as she had plucked one of the glowing fruits, another grew at once. They forgot their sorrows and ran further and further into the enchanted garden. The old gentleman slowly followed them and seemed very pleased by their amazement and admiration. 'I made all this myself,' he said. 'The sun, too.' And when they looked at the sun, they noticed that it really was not the real sun but a big lamp with fringes of gold paper. 'I see,' said the small creature, and was disappointed. 'I thought it was the real sun. Now I can see that it has a slightly peculiar light.'

'Well, that was the best I could do,' said the old gentleman, offended. 'But you like the garden, don't you?'

'Oh yes,' said Moomintroll....

'If you would like to stay here, I will build you a cake-house to live in,' said the old gentleman....

'That would be very nice,' said Moominmamma, 'but ... we must be on our way. We were actually thinking of building a house in the real sunshine' (Jansson, 1945[96]: 5).

The old gentleman's garden, modelled after the real garden, remains only a replica, a falsehood and a substitute for the authentic, which, for Moominmamma, can never replace the real sun, the real sea, or the real trees.

Once again, the wildness of Moominmamma's philosophy is confirmed with her refusal to punish and in her lack of expectations of obedience. Moominmamma is concerned only with the children's well-being, safety, and happiness; the minute their tummies get upset from the feasting on fake, sugary food, she rushes to help them, because she trusts them even when they have erred. The children prove right Moominmamma's fundamental premise that loved and happy creatures turn out to be good and kind beings, and they eagerly leave as soon as they realise the falseness of the experience and the impossibility of the truly Original Affluent Society existing trapped behind shut doors with fake substitutes. Together, they turn down the invitation and choose the real world with open doors.

When she woke up again she heard a fearful moaning, and realized at once that it was her Moomintroll, who had a sore stomach... Beside him sat the small creature, who had got toothache from all the sweets, and was moaning even worse. Moominmamma did not scold, but took two powders from her handbag and gave them each one, and then she asked the old gentleman if he had a bowl of nice, hot porridge.

'No, I'm afraid not,' he said. 'But there's a bowl of whipped cream, and another one of jam.'

'Hm,' said Moominmamma. 'Porridge is good for them, you see: hot food is what they need. Where's Tulippa?'

'She says she can't get to sleep because the sun never goes down,' said the old gentleman, looking unhappy. 'I'm truly sorry that you don't like it here.'

... 'But now I think I must see to it that we get out in the fresh air again.' And then she took Moomintroll by one hand, and the small creature by the other, and called for Tulippa. 'You'll do best to take the switch-back railway,' said the old gentleman politely. 'It goes right through the mountain and comes out in the middle of the sunshine.'

'Thank you,' said Moominmamma. 'Goodbye then.' 'Goodbye then,' said Tulippa. (Moomintroll and the small creature were not able to say anything, as they felt so horribly sick.)....

When they came out on the other side they were quite giddy and sat on the ground for a long time, recovering. Then they looked around them.

Before them lay the sea, glittering in the sunshine. 'I want to go for a bathe!' cried Moomintroll, for now he felt all right again. 'Me too,' said the small creature, and then they ran right out into the sun's beam on the water (Jansson, 1945[96]: 6).

It is interesting that when moominbooks begin with this choice of the real, Nosov chooses to end Dunno's trilogy with a similar image. After his adventures inside the moon, Dunno gets seriously homesick and almost dies in capitalism and without the real sun, the blue skies, and the soft and fragrant grass. The only way to save him is for the mites to rush him home to earth.

Dunno took a few faltering steps, but immediately collapsed to his knees and then falling face down, began to kiss the earth. His hat flew off his head. Tears rolled from his eyes. And he whispered:

-- My mother, my land! I will never forget you!

The red sun gently warmed him with its rays, the fresh breeze ruffled his hair as if caressing his head. And it appeared to him as if some incredible huge feeling has overwhelmed his heart. He did not know what to call this feeling, but knew that it was good and that nothing better existed in the whole world. He nestled his chest against the earth as though it was someone dear and close and felt the strength return to him and the

sickness leave all by itself.

Finally, he wept all the tears he had and got up from the ground and burst out in merry laughter when he saw his friend-mites joyfully greeting their native Land.

-- Well, brothers, that's it!-- he shouted cheerfully. --And now we can start off on another journey!

This is the kind of mite Dunno was (Nosov, 1985(b): 221-22 [translation mine])⁸⁵.

For both Nosov and Jansson, reality, even with all its risks and uncertainties, is the only viable option and, hence, one author opts to end his narrative with the characters regaining the real world after a miserable experience in civilisation inside the moon and the other chooses to begin with this same question of reality versus civilisation. In both cases, this choice is a matter of life and death.

Nosov's mites of Flower Town also share Moominmamma's position on the question of forgiveness and acceptance. Hence, Doono and his mates endlessly reach out to help Dunno after he had gotten himself and them in trouble – in the last book, they go to the moon to save him from his own folly, even though he had stolen their rocket by mistake, which brought him to be stranded in the capitalist mite society dwelling inside the moon, getting harassed by their police and threatened by their laws. His friends still go out to help him, because the underlying premise guiding the relations in Flower Town, just as in Moominland, assumes that even when actions provoke undesirable consequences, the intentions behind them are nonetheless good, and hence the trust, support, and love of the community can provide the understanding and strength needed to change the wrong.

Therefore, the minute Moominmamma and the children realise that the deception

⁸⁵ Незнайка сделал несколько неуверенных шагов, но тут же рухнул на колени и, упав лицом вниз, принялся целовать землю. Шляпа слетела с его головы. Из глаз покатались слезы. И он прошептал:
 -- Земля моя, матушка! Никогда не забуду тебя!
 Красное солнышко ласково пригревало его своими лучами, свежий ветерок шевелил его волосы, словно гладил его по головке. И Незнайке казалось, будто какое-то огромное-преогромное чувство переполняет его грудь. Он не знал, как называется это чувство, но знал, что оно хорошее и что лучше его на свете нет. Он прижимался грудью к земле, словно к родному, близкому существу, и чувствовал, как силы снова возвращаются к нему и болезнь его пропадает сама собой. Наконец он выплакал все слезы, которые у него были, и встал с земли. И весело засмеялся, увидев друзей-коротышек, которые радостно приветствовали родную Землю.
 -- Ну вот, братцы, и все! -- весело закричал он. -- А теперь можно снова отправляться куда-нибудь в путешествие!
 Вот какой коротышка был этот Незнайка.

of the sugary abundance and the artificial light threatens their lives, they choose to continue their search for the true and the real. As they leave the dangerous illusion of safety in the centre of the mountain, they climb out into a sunny world full of life and trees, a world where they find their father in the tree of life. “There, on one of the highest branches of an enormous tree sat a wet, sad moomintroll, staring out over the water. Beside him he had tied a distress flag. He was so amazed and delighted when the marabou stork landed in the tree, and the whole of his family climbed down on to the branches, that he could not say a word” (Jansson, 1945[96]: 16). The following morning they walk together into the valley where the flood current has planted the home that Moominpappa had built elsewhere.

Jansson thus maps her conception of the nature of being as a trajectory from where we are to what we are, a path that is revealed to us as we embrace wilderness and renounce domestication. This trajectory is expressed in the first question mark that appears in the book in the fifth paragraph: “What are you?” the small creature asked⁸⁶ when he meets Moominmamma and Moomintroll — not “Who are you?”.

In other words, we are not dealing here with the problem of identity, but with the question of matter and nature. Proper names in Moominvalley are names of the types of creatures: the snorks, the moomins, the snufkins, etc. Yet, at the same time, each snufkin is Snufkin and each moomintroll is Moomintroll, with all the individual idiosyncrasies that make them special and the commonalities that bind them together with the common denominator which is the experience of life with the underlying yearning for harmony and for the wild expanses of the multiverses – all of which make us an integral part of each others' lives, even with all our squabbles and territorial disputes, such as presented by the aggressive ant-lion who would not share the beach with Moominmamma and her children. Because the demarcation of space, time, and resources is never a constant, it is change and mobility that ensure a rotation of chances, and thus dominance can never be permanent or totalitarian. In other words, chaos, not order and identity, is what ensures egalitarian biodiversity and the stability of life.

⁸⁶ “Vad är ni för ena?” frågade det lilla djuret (Jansson, 1945[96]: 13). There was an implicit question before this one regarding Moomintroll wondering whether there were dangerous creatures and Moominmamma responding “hardly”, which still ties in with the nature of the creatures of the world: what are they? Jansson's implicit response is: hardly dangerous, mostly minding their own business.

In itself, the permanence promised by the garden of infinite food or the sugar paradise has provided a potent archetype in civilised ontology because it constitutes an effective tool for domestication particularly in conjunction with imposed poverty. Pavlov illustrated this idea scientifically: first, deny the victim of domestication access to food and then reward her when she does what you want; repeat it enough times for the victim to despair and lose hope for an exit from this situation of abuse. In Medieval Europe, with land expropriated and peasants starving, stories about the mythical Cockaigne circulated, where animals walked around and invited people to slice their ribs and eat them with people gorging themselves infinitely. Islam and Christianity are the most noted among holy traditions for their promise of rewards after death in terms of guaranteed abundance of food and, in some cases, sex. But they are not alone, for, Hinduism and Buddhism have evolved from the animist, spirit oriented faith practices that honoured wilderness and trees as sites of protection for all beings (Gottlieb, 2004) into the rewards by reincarnation into “higher”, human-like and human, as well as wealthier forms. For example, the caste system of Hinduism structures this hierarchy through imposed borders between the classes or castes that also established monopolies over knowledge and hence the notion of sacrifice gets introduced and priests become important figures that represent and mediate for those who no longer can act on their own behalf (Hopkins, 1971). Like Judaism, the religious traditions of Hinduism and Buddhism are older than the more honed and fitted to “contemporary” needs the traditions of Islam and Christianity, and, therefore, it is sometimes difficult to detect the civilising mechanism that drives people towards humanism, agriculture, and the values of avarice. We see the same theme of an artificial, never-ending world of sweets reappearing throughout children's culture as well, with its most notable incarnation rendered by Roald Dahl in *Charlie and the Chocolate Factory*, published in 1964, almost two decades after *The Little Trolls and the Great Flood*⁸⁷.

Considered a classic, Dahl's story is one of the most widely read twentieth century children's books that have been written in English and has been adapted for television and the big screen numerous times, with the latest film by Tim Burton released in 2005 starring Johnny Depp. Because this brutally civilised perspective predominates in

⁸⁷ AbdelRahim (2010).

children's literature in spite of the strong criticisms, such as voiced by the NAACP⁸⁸ or children's authors, like Eleanor Cameron, I allot considerable space to the discussion of Dahl's book. Moreover, it is reflected in the ontology of Milne's *Winnie-the-Pooh* and stands in stark contrast with the wild premises in Jansson and Nosov's works.

Chapter 4: Perils and Traps of Civilisation: Competing for Chocolate Slavery in the Unknowledge of Roald Dahl

To recapitulate, Moominland is a place where everyone, regardless of age or form, has a choice to either join or reject the artificial world of deception and where no tickets are ever needed to partake in the abundance of the earth and sea. In this place, the moomins' arms are always open for the world and so is the heart of the old gentleman, who upon hearing wails, invites them all in and offers them anything they would like, even to build them a sweet, edible house, which they gently decline.

In contrast, *Charlie and the Chocolate Factory* is built on civilised premises of an ontology of wealth and poverty, ownership and slavery, shut doors, deception and abuse, competition and strict criteria for selecting members of the in-group and those to be excluded. The plot of Dahl's book centres around a lottery contest, slavery, the desire for control in general and particularly of the production of artificial food, and the generation of incessant craving for it: “[Charlie] desperately wanted something more filling and satisfying than cabbage and cabbage soup. The one thing he longed for more than anything else was...CHOCOLATE” (Dahl, 1973: 8).

The pyramidal structure of the social relations in the world of the *Chocolate Factory* is framed right from the beginning with the announcement of a lottery: millions of chocolate bars are to be sold, but only a handful of tickets (ten in the first version of the book and five in the revised 1973 edition) are placed inside the wraps granting admission to the secretive chocolate factory whose doors have been shut to visitors for years. Out of

⁸⁸ National Association for the Advancement of Colored People.

these winners, only one, the most obedient participant, is to be named Willy Wonka's successor. This, of course, constitutes a well known and widely used marketing ruse that appeals to the sense of greed and nurtures it.

The goal of any contest is for one, sometimes two or, perhaps, three persons or teams to win and many – all the other – people or teams to lose, i.e., the winner wins at the expense of the many who lose. First, on the psychological and emotive levels, giving a prize to one sends out the message to all the other participants that they are not quite “it”, i.e. they are inferior and this inferiority is a precondition for the superiority of the winner. Simply said, without losers, there can be no winners. Second, the winner actually gets what everyone else loses: money, recognition, symbolic capital. There would be no point in competing if the prizes were to be distributed equally among the participants in a contest, lottery, or competition. Contests and competitions reconfirm hierarchy as “natural” and serve as rituals and useful reminders of the place of the many losers in the pyramidal hierarchy. In this respect, even if lottery and gambling depend on luck and therefore are slightly less damaging for self-esteem than the contests and examinations that claim to evaluate intellectual prowess, a physical ability, or even degrees of beauty, the situation is nevertheless an artificial set up that reconfirms to the participants that, in this world, only a few will win, and the rest lose.

Dahl's *Charlie and the Chocolate Factory* reinstates this order with a sadistic zeal and translates this civilised hierarchy into a tale of adventure in which most readers, even though for the most part lose in the real world (pure probability), nevertheless cheer for the one winner to snatch it all. There are several steps in this seemingly self-contradictory indulgence. The first step is for the readers to be convinced by the justifications provided for the reasons why the main character deserves to win. They find them convincing, because they identify themselves with the traits which, in the spirit of the civilised tradition of double-standards, are depicted as positive in favour of the winner while the same qualities become negative in the losers. Thus, even if everybody is greedy in Dahl's book – they all want to inherit Willy Wonka's chocolate factory – Charlie emerges as the only deserving character, and he keeps the prize to himself, that is, he keeps it in the direct, blood-defined family and does not share it with “others”, or, does not “squander the

wealth”, while everyone else's greed earns them torture, even Veruca Salt who wants one single slave, a chocolate river, or just one hard-working squirrel. In short, since the readers see themselves as deserving the prize, they agree with the argument that the hero deserves to win. Yet, the way real-life competitions are set, the majority of the readers lose most of the time and so the next step for them is also to identify themselves with the losers in the book.

The contradictions between the postulates, material goals, and idealised values of civilisation fit the symptoms of schizophrenia, which amount to an individual being incapable of connecting logical dots between reality and the imagined or desired understanding of reality⁸⁹. In other words, there are irresolvable contradictions between facts, images, desires, and words and, hence, paradoxically, the act of witnessing the elimination of the losers offers comfort within a system whose basic premise is dispossession and punishment, because it reconfirms to the witnesses that they are not the only ones to have been defeated, i.e., punished for their inferiority. Concomitantly, they experience a certain sense of relief that, even though they feel that they personally do deserve punishment, they nevertheless have managed to escape and someone else receives it instead. Most important, perhaps, is that the losers need a justification for the injustice, even though it is not always a conscious affair; they need an explanation that there are good reasons why there (they) are losers, and it becomes an acceptable explanation that, “in any case, naturally, after all, only one is destined to snatch the wreath of glory”.

The incredible popularity of the book also demonstrates that readers (both the adults who choose the book for the children and the children who enjoy it) may find some masochistic comfort in watching the losers receive unimaginably sadistic punishments for wanting what everybody wants in a society that cuts off access to vital resources and locks them behind doors⁹⁰. Even if children and adults know that the literary exaggerations are

⁸⁹ The term “schizophrenia” comes from Greek meaning “split mind” referring to the condition when a person is “split from reality”.

⁹⁰ Children's literature historians, such as Avery (1975), Knowles and Malmkæjer (1996), or O'Malley (2003) have pointed to the prevalence of punishment and moralism in children's books. An excellent illustration of the naturalising of punishment is Maurice Sendak's (1963) *Where the Wild Things Are* discussed in part I. In this book, the boy is punished and sent to his room, he is at first upset, then travels to a dark wild place, tames the wilderness and having destroyed and subdued it, returns back to his room and sees the love in the punishing parents gestures. This is another book that promotes violence against the wild and the wilderness of the undomesticated self of the child and hailed as a work of genius by the civilised

not “real”, in this joy and laughter that the depiction of cruelty evokes, there is still an element of self-castigation for wanting that which they feel guilty to want.

This feeling of guilt is a product of civilisation, because its ontology naturalises violence, suffering, and pain, when deep inside the civilised know that this acceptance to suffer and to torture others is what has cost them their paradise and the love of the world. Guilt is a concomitant of civilisation, because both are contingent on the premise of permanence: property rights, hereditary laws, identity, character, genes, the desire to achieve immortality while exterminating the rest of the living world, ad infinitum. In contrast, if people saw their actions as changeable and corrigible – for example, Moominmamma shows to her children that they are not obliged to stick with their choice, that they can still change their minds and the option to leave and heal is still available to them – there would be no syndrome of “guilt” as a constant. Impotence and identity crisis become a problem when people fail to see the possibility to change their actions and to redirect their desires. Thus, as guilt becomes a socially constructed permanence, seeing someone getting punished brings relief, because, symbolically, the guilty losers themselves get punished, and that punishment, in their civilised logic, sets things temporarily right. Yet, evading that punishment personally (since the scapegoat or the symbol receives it instead) also sets things wrong. The sacrifice becomes an integral aspect of institutional symbolism because the punishment of the victim, chosen to represent and symbolise everyone who deserves to be punished, becomes the ritual of temporary relief constantly re-enacted in a culture of perpetual guilt but, at the same time, the symbolic yet real victim becomes the scapegoat who is the vital and ultimate loser. In the end, the root of the problem lies in the failure of the civilised to connect their obsessions with possessions and the feeling of guilt with their conception of life as an eternal competition for the survival of the fittest.

In “The Original Affluent Society”, Marshall Sahlins (1972) sees the civilised conception of poverty and affluence as the inversion of reality that stems from the perspective its members hold on life. If a people constructs a cultural view of the world as generous and their needs as modest, the ideal of satisfaction becomes easy to attain and it

becomes pointless to grab and obsess, for there will always be plenty tomorrow. Obsessions and avarice occur in the truly poor societies – the industrialised, developed, first world – where expectations are never realised, never meant to be realised, and this lack of realisation stimulates the perpetual greed, fear, and inequality.

One-third to one-half of humanity are said to go to bed hungry every night. In the Old Stone Age the fraction must have been much smaller. This is the era of hunger unprecedented. Now, in the time of the greatest technical power, starvation is an institution. Reverse another venerable formula: the amount of hunger increases relatively and absolutely with the evolution of culture.

This paradox is my whole point. Hunters and gatherers have by force of circumstances an objectively low standard of living. But taken as their objective, and given their adequate means of production all the people's material wants usually can be easily satisfied....

The world's most primitive people have few possessions, *but they are not poor*. Poverty is not a certain small amount of goods, nor is it just a relation between means and ends; above all it is a relation between people. Poverty is a social status. As such it is the invention of civilization. It has grown with civilization, at once as an invidious distinction between classes and more importantly as a tributary relation that can render agrarian peasants more susceptible to natural catastrophes than any winter camp of Alaskan Eskimo (Sahlins, 1974: 36-38).

As Sahlins points out, in a consumer society, people see the world as miserly and life as a struggle – an outlook that justifies locked doors and private property and, in turn, causes the extensive deprivation and suffering.

In such a world, it would be unthinkable to open the gates of the chocolate factory and to share the chocolate with all the human and animal children of the world. Instead there has to be a ceremony that reconfirms the naturalness of injustice: while legitimating greed in a few, it chooses a handful of others for a public display of punishment, even cannibalism; for instance, Augustus becomes chocolate fudge and Violet turns into a blueberry for wanting what Willy Wonka has and what Charlie gets, because those who have lost to the winners in this ontology themselves constitute the resources for the winner. Finally, the smooth operation of this system is secured when the losers express gladness and gratitude for getting consumed either as workforce, as the consumers who keep buying things⁹¹, or as ingredients in Charlie and Willy Wonka's profitable venture.

⁹¹ Cannibalism frequently appears in children's literature, perhaps precisely because the concept of consumers consuming each other, their children and themselves needs to be rendered normal and natural, and this expression of relations to get used to from early age. The film *Cannibal Holocaust* raises these

Dahl goes to great lengths to describe the horrifying and humiliating punishments of each eliminated contestant and justifies the mad cruelty by depicting the characters as disobedient to Willy Wonka's orders.

There are thousands of clever men who would give anything for a chance to come in and take over from me, but I don't want that sort of person. I don't want a grown-up person at all. A grown-up won't listen to me; he won't learn. He will try to do things his own way and not mine. So I have to have a child. . . . I decided to invite five children to the factory, and the one I liked the best at the end of the day would be the winner! (Dahl, 1973: 157).

The narrative, thus, also works as a training guide in domesticating children and, contrary to Moominland in which empathy and acceptance even of the horrible is key to life, *Charlie and the Chocolate Factory's* appeal stems from the reader's alienation from the suffering of the children who get beaten and consumed; for, only with effacement in the mind and the emotional sphere can anyone laugh at someone's suffering.

There are different methods of forcing the domestic/ated to comply with the will of the domesticator⁹². The withdrawal of approval and love is one tactic, the administration of pain and other emotional and physiological tortures is another. Alternating hunger with promises of relief and then relieving it when the child or the animal conforms to the will of the trainer, then inducing it again, finally securing future cooperation with reminders of the threats and intimidation (bad grades, for example, play this role, their threats taking the form of “future” withdrawal of food and other necessities through poverty) also constitutes some of the methods of torture⁹³. Again, institutionalised abuse makes sense only on condition that exploitation itself has been institutionalised in a society. Otherwise, who cares if a child learns how to please persons with authority (e.g. teachers, adults, etc.) or if a horse understands “go”.

Societies that embrace wilderness do not have a purpose for changing someone else's behaviour because they have no ownership over the other's life, effort, or the fruits of her labour, and hence they have no place for punishment in their ontology; in fact, many such societies have lived for millions of years with no place allotted for punishment or any other form of institutional violence in their worldview. A contemporary example is

questions clearly, if brutally.

⁹² Of course, Michel Foucault's studies on prisons and methods of punishment come to mind here.

⁹³ Pavlov and his methods of degradation for dogs and horse trainers such as Paul Patton and Vicki Hearne.

the Semai people of Malaya. The fact that they still exist demonstrates that violence is neither indispensable for survival nor an intrinsic feature of life. The Semai lead vibrant lives *without* a structure of leaders or figures of authority at the top, with the “resources” at the bottom, and are most noted for the fact that they *never* punish their children. These children grow into responsible members of the world community precisely because their care-givers follow the principles that ban all forms of punishment and cruelty against children as well as the animals they raise (Dentan, 1968).

In this respect, even though the Moomin books are fictional, their ontology can be traced in ethnographic reports of viable communities who have survived despite the globalised genocides of people, animals, and forests at the hands of the civilised. Contrary to the wilderness of Moominland, even the “tamed” and scaled down 1973 version of *Charlie and the Chocolate Factory* presents punishment, hierarchy, and discrimination as based on some presumed intrinsic and essential inferiority of the resources (such as slaves) and depicts abuse not only as natural, but also as coveted by the abusers and the abused themselves. As the reader is invited to join the tour of the mysterious factory through the experiences of the lottery winners, she learns the dark secret behind the factory doors that makes Willy Wonka's production the best and most famous in the world: slaves – animal slaves in the persons of the squirrels and human slaves in the persons of the Oompa-Loompas.

The text still favourably refers to slavery in the revised edition, even though the human slaves have changed from dark skinned pygmies in the earlier version to rosy-white dwarfs in the revised book and are no longer from Africa but

“[i]mported direct from Loompaland,” said Mr. Wonka proudly (Dahl, 1973: 73). “...I shipped them all over here, every man, woman, and child in the Oompa-Loompa tribe. It was easy. I smuggled them over in large packing cases with holes in them.... They are wonderful workers. They all speak English now. They love dancing and music” (ibid: 76).

Positive descriptions of any form of slavery, human or animal, black or white in a book, especially in a children's book, raises questions about the ethical principles in the book industry as well as about the ethical stance of its readership. It becomes even more puzzling, since having applied some cosmetic touches in the revision, Dahl left intact the

Africa-specific fauna, descriptions, and raw material along with the favourable depiction of slavery, whereby alluding to the historical interracial relations between capitalist/civilised economies and exploited colonies, explicitly chocolate and sugar plantations and, implicitly, everything else.

The book tells us that these “primitive”, “miserable”, “wild” creatures cheer the colonial master because they are incapable of making anything good out of what is available in their own Loompaland.

“And what a terrible country it is! Nothing but thick jungles infested by the most dangerous beasts in the entire world... A whangdoodle would eat ten Oompa-Loompas for breakfast and come galloping back for a second helping. When I went out there, I found the little Oompa-Loompas living in tree-houses. They *had* to live in tree-houses to escape from the whangdoodles.... And they were practically starving to death. They were living on green caterpillars, and the caterpillars tasted revolting, and the Oompa-Loompas spent every moment of their days climbing through the treetops looking for other things to mash up with the caterpillars to make them taste better—red beetles, for instance, and eucalyptus leaves, and the bark of the bong-bong tree, all of them beastly, but not quite so beastly as the caterpillars. Poor little Oompa-Loompas! The one food that they longed for more than any other was the cacao bean. But they couldn’t get it. An Oompa-Loompa was lucky if he found three or four cacao beans a year. But oh, how they craved them. They used to dream about cacao beans all night and talk about them all day. You had only to *mention* the word ‘cacao’ to an Oompa-Loompa and he would start dribbling at the mouth. The cacao bean,” Mr. Wonka continued, “which grows on the cacao tree, happens to be *the thing* from which all chocolate is made.... I myself use billions of cacao beans every week in this factory. And so, my dear children, as soon as I discovered that the Oompa-Loompas were crazy for this particular food, I climbed up to their tree-house village and poked my head in through the door of the tree house belonging to the leader of the tribe. The poor little fellow, looking thin and starved, was sitting there trying to eat a bowl full of mashed-up green caterpillars without being sick. ‘Look here,’ I said (speaking not in English, of course, but in Oompa-Loompish), ‘look here, if you and all your people will come back to my country and live in my factory, you can have *all* the cacao beans you want! I’ve got mountains of them in my storehouses! You can have cacao beans for every meal! ... I’ll even pay your wages in cacao beans if you wish!’

“‘You really mean it?’ asked the Oompa-Loompa leader, leaping up from his chair.

“‘Of course I mean it,’ I said. ‘And you can have chocolate as well. Chocolate tastes even better than cacao beans because it’s got milk and sugar added.’

“The little man gave a great whoop of joy and threw his bowl of mashed caterpillars right out of the tree-house window. ‘It’s a deal!’ he cried. ‘Come on! Let’s go!’

“So I shipped them all over here, every man, woman, and child in the Oompa-Loompa tribe. It was easy. I smuggled them over in large packing cases with holes in them, and they all got here safely. They are wonderful workers. They all speak English now. They love dancing and music. They are always making up songs. I expect you will hear a

good deal of singing today from time to time. I must warn you, though, that they are rather mischievous. They like jokes. They still wear the same kind of clothes they wore in the jungle. They insist upon that. The men, as you can see for yourselves across the river, wear only deerskins. The women wear leaves, and the children wear nothing at all. The women use fresh leaves every day....”

“Daddy!” shouted Veruca Salt. “Daddy! I want an Oompa-Loompa! I want an Oompa-Loompa right away! I want to take *it* home with me!”... (Dahl, 1973: 73-77; italics mine).

As a thought experiment, imagine a best-selling children's book depicting an Arab sheikh poking his head into the window of an American, Canadian or European home.

What he sees shocks him: miserable people and their children eating processed food, while there are pears growing all over the place and when it is pears they crave the most. “Oh, look at those poor, skinny fellows,” says the sheikh. “All those pears are growing around them and they can't even have them. I feel so sorry for you. If you come with me to Arabia and work for me in my factory making pear pies, you can have all the pears you want”.

When the tiny, skinny, and miserable American, Canadian, or European chief sees the sheikh's face and learns of his magnanimous intentions to save him from his misery, he welcomes the liberator and begs the sheikh to deliver all of the Americans, Canadians, or Europeans from their atrocious lot. Guided by the generosity of his heart, the sheikh grabs every child, woman, and man in the country, sticks them in a crate, pokes holes in it, and smuggles them into Arabia where they live happily ever after in his factory, receive pears for wages, speak Arabic and sing and dance.

No such children's book exists, undoubtedly because the network of “international” academics, literary critics and the publishing industry is not run by Arabs. And even if such a book did manage to come into existence, the Eurocentric and North-American perspective would precipitate to denounce the message, point to the poor, propagandistic quality of such a text, and categorise it along with “enemy” (such as Al-Qaeda or Taliban) propaganda in which the sheikh would be labelled Hussein or Bin Laden – and we all know what happens to those kinds of people and their little helpers.

In other words, this experimental version reflects exactly the same perspective as the ones informing Dahl's story, only here one ethnic group substitutes another: i.e. it is based on exactly the same stereotypes, the same level of propaganda, and violence. Yet, it is not the denigration, objectification, and double-standards in this experimental variant that evokes the nervous laughter of surprise during most of my academic presentations on the subject, rather it is the *Animal Farm* outcome or the prospect of *The Planet of the Apes*

transpiring in this world accustomed to the current civilised order, a horrifying possibility where a persecuted (previously colonised) people might imagine doing to the oppressor what the oppressor has been doing to them all along. It is this tacit, omnipresent knowledge and fear that drive the violent acts of racism. The people of power themselves have no need to panic or to commit the actual acts themselves, since holding the keys to oppression in their hands, they can convince easily the disempowered to act on their behalf for a little compensation. The people of power, actually, refer to themselves as “philanthropists”. The deprived then fill the ranks of armies, mercenaries, or commit racist and other phobic crimes. For instance,

Research examined the violent behaviour and the political consciousness of Canadian male street skinheads. The results reveal that skinheads are drawn from homes characterized by extreme violence and oppression. These experiences leave these youths vulnerable to violent behaviour. These tendencies are exacerbated by their school experiences, their homelessness, and the group and street norms that support and promote aggressive behaviour. The political consciousness of skinheads is rooted in extreme violence and lacks coherence: this, combined with the structure of the groups and their histories of oppression, serves to inhibit long-term organized political activity (Baron, 1997).

Violence thus sets the tone for social relationships through a concrete socio-economic, political and educational structure, but also informs some of the most favourite of children's books.

Charlie and the Chocolate Factory is today well known among the general and critical public. It has been translated into thirty two languages⁹⁴ and awarded many prizes and nominations, even for the *first*, overtly racist version. In 1972, it received the New England Round Table of Children's Librarians Award in the U.S., and, in 1973, the same version received the Surrey School Award in the U.K.. The revised version received two more awards in U.K. In 2000: the Millennium Children's Book Award and the Blue Peter Book Award. It does not end here, however. In “Using Roald Dahl's *Charlie and the Chocolate Factory* To Teach Different Recruitment and Selection Paradigms”, Jon Billsberry and Louise H. Gilbert (2008) have elaborated a workshop in management education on how to apply both the 2005 film adaptation of *Charlie and the Chocolate Factory* and the book itself to teaching hiring strategies for a new management and to elaborate the competitive process and its selection criteria, a system of “golden tickets”

⁹⁴ According to Billsberry and Gilbert (2008).

and the marginalisation of large numbers of people that has already been successfully applied in schools, universities, and their funding programmes as well as in the “real working world”. The authors praise the work in these words:

The story triumphs the ambition, achievements, and values (e.g., innovation and honesty) of the factory owner, Willy Wonka. Since its publication, the name of Willy Wonka has become a byword for innovation, and the chocolate factory is the epitome of a successful but unconventional work environment and organizational culture, as the following example illustrates. . . . In this way Wonka reveals the nature of his KSAs: He wants someone with particular terminal values (i.e., end states values), such as a belief that life should be fun and work should be “magic,” and instrumental values (i.e., ways of behaving), such as ingenuity, creativity, and common sense (Billsberry and Gilbert, 2008).

In reality, what this ethic means is that workers should have the “right” attitude and enjoy working for the owners, even when overworking for minimum wage at Walmart or cleaning public toilets. In contrast to Jansson, in both versions of his book Dahl depicts the forest as a deplorable place and the freedom to look for one's food as a detestable feat and presents slavery as a happy and desirable lot for the Oompa-Loompas (though not for Charlie and Willy Wonka). The narrative tells us that it is “natural” for Oompa-Loompas to fail to access cacao beans – “an Oompa-Loompa was lucky if he found three or four beans a year” (Dahl, 1973: 73) – even though these plants and sugar are native to their land, but, despite being in a country where cacao beans do not grow, we are told that there is nothing strange or perverse about Willy Wonka's possession of unlimited supplies of the colonial products and nothing obscene in the power he enjoys in offering the Oompa-Loompas, in exchange for their lives, the beans that grow in their own homeland. In other words, Dahl's double standards are so fundamental and permeating his worldview that he fails to even see the irony⁹⁵.

Furthermore, because they are so grateful, docile, and hard working, the cheerful and dim-witted Oompa-Loompas are in high demand; yet only the deserving have the right to possess them. Veruca Salt's demand to acquire an Oompa-Loompa, a chocolate river, and a squirrel sends her down the garbage chute, revealing the various niches in the hierarchy of slavery, ownership, and punishment – the “docile savage” gets to work, the “greedy competitor” gets eliminated, etc. Thus, hierarchy and injustice are explained, justified and reconfirmed, and the civilised reader finds satisfaction in the resolution and

⁹⁵ Even if he saw it, he failed to express it in the book.

praises the book as one of the best exemplars of civilised children's literature.

Basically, this narrative normalises discrimination, cruelty, and injustice, and, within this logic, slavery (human and animal) emerges as a natural aspect of order. The forest, as a topos of civilised existence, becomes a dangerous place, even though in the real world it allows wilderness to prosper, for, together with the sea, the forest is the source of life in all its diversity and plenitude. In real life, the forest provides independence, since there is no reason for human and non-human animals to work for a master in a place where they are themselves capable of procuring their own livelihood. If a hierarchical, civilised order is to prevail, however, it becomes crucial to domesticate the dangerous, independent places, and the strategy of focusing on the narrative of competition and struggle supports that end. Ultimately, it works the same way as the symbolic/real punishment: i.e., the narrative of horror is used to overwrite the reality of joy, and the ritual of competition naturalises the process of selecting rulers from a specific group of humans, while the rest, due to their assumed natural inferiority and general inadequacy, are relegated to servitude, a category justified by the narrative that depicts them as incapable of surviving, even in their own environments, without a slave-owner or, in the terminology of business administration, without the proprietor of human resources.

For obvious reasons, Dahl fails to connect starvation with private property and blames the victim for not being able to make anything of worth when, in fact, crops and lives have been stolen from her and sealed behind locked doors. Evidently, if the foreigner⁹⁶, Willy Wonka, owns endless supplies of sugar and cacao beans, while the natives cannot access what naturally grows in their land, it is because that land and its crops have been stolen by the foreigner Willy Wonka. To rectify this wrong, Dahl's logic proceeds by spicing up the wound with pepper and salt: if to the stolen land and crops one adds children, women and men kidnapped for the purpose of slavery, then that will make the Oompa-Loompas happy and thereby will right the wrong. Willy Wonka is happy. Everybody is happy, and if there are readers who get depressed by this unbearable joy, well, they can get treated with chocolate, literature and pills. For a reader to find Dahl's

⁹⁶ Here, I mean "foreign" not in the geo-political sense, but in the sense that Willy Wonka is not part of the endemic community of life in that specific bio-sphere. He is native to another community and system that enters into an unequal, parasitic relationship of consumption of in this case the Oompa-Loompa sphere of life.

scenario sensible – and the prizes and the sales of the book attest that millions of people, in fact, do – certain cerebral, ethical, and emotive skills, such as empathy or general reason must have atrophied or been prevented from developing⁹⁷.

Many contemporary children's literary theoreticians either fail to notice this problem or intentionally ignore it⁹⁸. The problem with a declared position of “neutrality” is that when a person speaks as a public voice, claiming to be a “neutral” observer, even admirer, of a public work of art or theory that is built on fundamentally unethical premises necessarily makes the public speaker complicit with the oppressive position of the artist whose basic postulates are immoral, regardless of what discipline we approach that work. Neutrality is acquiescence to the *doxa* of hierarchical power and parasitic relationships. The question is, how can one admire the “formidable intelligence” (Hunt, 2001: 56-57) of a “highly skilful writer” (ibid: 56) who dexterously depicts slavery, kidnapping, and extermination, such as Roald Dahl, and find aesthetic aspects to it? Public admiration of *Mein Kampf*, for instance, could strip a person of Canadian citizenship and other rights, such as freedom (see the case of Ernst Zündel [CBC news 2006]). Seen the gravity of the holocaust committed against the African and other indigenous and nomadic populations around the world, it is puzzling that the fundamental precepts of *Mein Kampf* translated for children into a book such as *Charlie and the Chocolate Factory* continue to be praised. Even more serious than praise, however, is the call to ignore the gravity of the ethical foundation of the work, such as expressed by a children's literary scholar, Peter Hunt, in his lament of the lack of “serious analysis or discussion... beyond polemic for or against” (ibid), even though “Dahl is probably the most successful worldwide children's author of the twentieth century, surpassed in sales only by the far more prolific Enid Blyton, and his popularity must say a great deal about and to the culture” (ibid). Blyton's “bad Gollywogs called Nigger” (ibid: 256) were characteristic of their time, writes Hunt. Because censorship was unfair towards the diary of Anne Frank and towards homosexuals, the text states, “Roald Dahl's black pygmy slaves in *Charlie and the Chocolate Factory* (1964)

⁹⁷ For a discussion on development and stifling of intellectual, emotive, and physiological abilities see AbdelRahim (2003 a) on “Modernism and Education”.

⁹⁸ Among the few theoreticians of children's literature who take a clear stand against the racism and slavery in the book are John Rowe Townsend in *Written for Children* and Brycchan Carey (2003) in *Reading Harry Potter: Critical Essays* (ed. Giselle Liza Anatol) who makes an important critique as she compares and contrasts it to Rowling's motifs of slavery in the Harry Potter books.

might well have escaped notice even ten years before” (ibid: 257) particularly since, according to the author, it is hard to find classic works that are not racist or sexist⁹⁹.

Since, traditionally, the “standards” of literary criticism call for an “unbiased” examination and demand that theoreticians “rise above” the political “controversies”, lest their texts be deemed propagandistic or political, it is easy for people who access the privileged space of public speech, to side with the voice of power that silences its victims by depicting them as weak, impotent and without a voice, obtaining their relief from being exploited. In other words, because the voice in public discourse belongs to the people who have access to that domain and have the authority to silence those who do not have the same privilege, anything they say or leave unsaid plays into the hands of the power structures and are, in essence, expressions of political stances, even in silence. Hence, whether intended or not, a call for studies of Dahl's book to ignore its economic and political ramifications becomes a call for collaboration with the oppressive forces of the holocaust.

A former editor of children's books, Laura Atkins (2009) presented her research findings on racism in the publishing industry, where she observes that white privilege is ingrained in the disposition, comprehension, identification with, and value of “white” narratives, experience, mores, and characters. Atkins observes that works by people of colour are rarely read carefully by editors or marketing groups because these authors are assumed to be so burdened by racism and oppression that they are not capable of producing anything of interest (Atkins, 2009). However, even if it were the case that someone were overburdened by oppression and incapable of producing anything but a narrative on oppression, the fact that those who are in a position of privilege (which is always at the expense of this oppression) do not find that narrative interesting or even relevant to the lives of the people who do not perceive themselves as oppressed, in itself, says a great deal about silencing, the symbolic and real economy of suffering, and the production of literature.

Furthermore, the phenomenon of Roald Dahl and of his reception indicates that racism, discrimination, infliction of pain, and humiliation are *not* unfortunate side effects

⁹⁹ In 1996, Hunt and Ray also edited the *International Companion Encyclopaedia of Children's Literature*, in which other authors have contributed with essays about literature for children from around the world.

or insignificant characteristics of civilised society: they are in high demand and are therefore essential parts of the mechanism that regulates the unjust economy. If we trust the sales to be an indicator of their importance, they are central to civilised ontology, and the slave-master relations are often presented in literature and in literary theory as natural, even filled with gladness¹⁰⁰. As mentioned earlier, in order to find plausible the connection between enslavement and happiness, one must first alienate oneself from the experience of the enslaved human or animal, that is, one must overcome the urge for empathy and develop callousness instead. An important strategy to achieve apathy is identification. In this sense, civilised ontology provides the criteria for selection and identification of specimens as belonging to different categories, a process that formulates identity and limits the spectrum of choices for certain groups. Scholars of civilisation like John Zerzan (2008) or Jack Goody (1969) point to the hierarchical kinship structures that set in place gender inequalities as soon as the division of labour and symbolic representation made it possible to exploit groups based on some “physiological” characteristics. The mechanism that regulates agency and limits the spectrum of choice of some individuals or groups is depicted clearly in the example of Willy Wonka's contest, where the winner is carefully selected from a large number of participants in the contest in which all except for one are eliminated, and the prize is a world founded on slavery, stolen goods, locked doors, and artificial food, fauna, and light. If clearly articulated in *Charlie and the Chocolate Factory*, this foundation is often veiled in other books, such as *Winnie-the-Pooh*, diluted to the point of appearing to be almost absent. As my argument suggests, however, this worldview is present in the premises themselves, and this seeming deviation to “Willy Wonka's Chocolate World of Slavery” exposes the underlying premises that are less overtly present in the ontology of A.A. Milne.

¹⁰⁰ Of course, I am not referring here to slave narratives or to abolitionists, such as the novel *Roots* by Alex Haley or children's authors, such as Christopher Paul Curtis or Margaret Peterson Haddix.

Chapter 5: Construction of Identity: The Civilised Chore of Cleaning Out the Debris of Wilderness

Identification works on several levels and in various domains. On the one hand, it is the process by which a person recognises certain shared traits or experiences in the other. On the other hand, by identifying oneself with “fixed”¹⁰¹ categories, one also finds oneself cut off from the emotive and economic networks of “other” categories. Identification thus helps people rationalise inequality and structure the bullying by identifying individuals and categories, ranking them on a scale of inferiority and superiority and in terms of “in-group” and “outsiders”.

Extrapolating from Bourdieu's notion of symbolic capital, which is shared within usually locked groups in which outsiders are not allowed, and from Zerzan's critique of the symbolic as a tool of alienation, one can see how identification can be a useful tool that enables the identifier or the knower to erase individual personality traits, aspirations, self-knowledge, knowledge and contexts by superimposing a general set of “descriptions” to explain the motivations, actions, culture and other aspects of life in the way that the identifier sees fit. Such practice of silencing and effacement curtails the social and physical mobility of the persons forced to be members of the identified group. Laura Atkins' examples from the publishing industry, discussed in the previous chapter, illustrates this point: if black people are oppressed, it signals to the people who do not perceive themselves as oppressed (i.e. they instead project a feeling of empowerment) and who control the public voice (such as editors, publishers, and “representatives” who speak on behalf of and represent others) that most black people as a group cannot be equal participants on par with the writers who are perceived as *not* oppressed in the creation of literary works and their social and material capital.

In other words, this “knowledge” of “oppression” is taken to legitimate the further abuse and marginalisation of the oppressed, locking them in a claustrophobic space with no exit and no voice. This essentialism also applies to the “exceptions-to-the-rule”, which

¹⁰¹ Lesley Milroy's (1987) work on linguistic networks and the shifting usage of colloquialisms to signal one's identity inspired my reflections on the relationship between identity and the closed systems of access in civilisation versus wilderness.

are often taken to prove the rule. It interferes with the possibility of those who feel empowered to building personalised knowledge of the other's experience by actually listening to that voice, empathising with that experience and engaging in a dialogue of equals. Interpretative formulae and grammar rules here impede understanding and dialogue, which can occur only if both interlocutors approach each encounter as a unique occurrence, as a new, clean leaf. Instead, the categorisation of others and identification of them by the knower precludes this possibility of engagement in any meaningful interaction particularly when the knower applies a category such as “resources” that creates a space for the knowledge that refuses to know but justifies oppression in which disparity, even enslavement, become a mechanistic calculation, a fact of nature. Moreover, no matter how perverse and outrageous, the civilised construct and present exploitation of the disempowered as an act of altruism. In this logic, the powerful can help the disempowered, the weak and the helpless, by exploiting their needs, fears, time, and effort for a pay that keeps them disempowered and in need because it is necessarily lower than what the exploiter earns, which subsequently allows for the exploiter to have time and to be able to invest it in other lucrative ventures, thereby permitting the exploiter to continue to gain earnings above and beyond whatever the victim receives. That is, the victim gets recompensed in a way commensurate to what the “market” or the “employer”, i.e. the oppressor, identifies as the victim's worth based on the category ascribed to him or her. Because these categories, identification, and hierarchy have been naturalised and drilled into people from early childhood, even when the reader, on the level of ideology, dismisses this as funny fiction and “of course we all know that this is not real”, on the level of *doxa*, the reader identifies with these disparities and injustices as normal socio-economic relations and takes the author's word at face value on that a portion of cacao beans offers a satisfactory pay cheque to the Oompa-Loompas.

In this way, the socially constructed concept of “weakness” plays into the power structure of hierarchy and further exploits the lack of agency rendering the exploited victim even weaker and in debt but rationalising this as the nature of human relations. The rationale amounts to the following: if the victim is little and miserable, he or she deserves to be a victim and miserable (the Oompa-Loompas are short and, before Willy Wonka's

“rescue”, are abject)¹⁰². While I discuss this more thoroughly in part III of my work, it is relevant to mention here that the economy of discrimination is founded on the myth that in wilderness, natural selection would have exterminated the weak, but that civilisation made the powerful humane because they have supposedly allowed the weak to live. Therefore, argument goes, the weak, the short, the silenced, and the disempowered owe the empowered people for having been allowed to live, which they supposedly could not have done had the empowered abstained from exploiting them. The economy of discrimination is thus a priori an economy of debt and obligation: the short people are seen as undeserving of the same monetary appreciation as tall people are, because they owe the tall people; the darker people owe the lighter people; the women owe the men; the Zulu are indebted to the Dutch; the animals to humanity; *ad infinitum*.

Defining the victim as owing and in debt also constructs the image of the poor as dangerous parasites whose needs threaten the powerful people's possessions and symbolic capital, thereby inverting the roles in the public narrative and in the literature that depicts these relations. The master thus not only identifies the slave's worth, but also defines the terms for and the meaning of the slave's existence, which surprisingly (or not) happens to be contingent on the master's profit. Here, the good slave is the happy, singing one, the one who gladly accepts this lot, obeys the master, expresses gratitude for slavery, and harbours no aspiration for agency over her life¹⁰³.

Not only is identity needed to categorise resources and such, it also plays an integral part in turning people into murder weapons that help keep the resources under control. This is evident in how both the legal and the illegal groups organise and mark themselves. For instance, the turn of the twentieth century sociologist, Edwin Sutherland (1937), published a professional thief's journal among other work on crime bringing to the attention of the academic community and the “general” public the strong code of honour in the underground networking between professional thieves throughout the U.S.A. of the 1930s (Sutherland, 1937). Studies like those of Francis Lord (1960) or Mark Dunkelman

¹⁰² Endless polls and statistics indicate the racial and height discrimination in salaries: taller and blonder people get higher pay. Again, see Timothy A. Judge et al 1994, 2004 or Nicola Persico, Andrew Postlewaite and Dan Silverman (2004).

¹⁰³ Andrew O'Malley (2003) and Gillian Avery (1975) discuss the creation of the hard working and docile character in English literature to serve the higher classes.

(2004) talk about the strong identity and code of honour in the military, where soldiers often use tattooing and body markings, just like their illegal counterparts, such as the Mafia, as symbols of belonging to their regiment or division; these distinctions make everyone else an outsider and a potential threat to the group. None of these groups would be effective as killing machines without these strong convictions and justifications for group violence, symbolism and identity.

Other examples of terms that are important for fostering identity and that demonstrate how tightly interwoven it is with the rights to economic and social participation are the “illegal alien” versus “citizen”, which binds people and animals to specific zones and occupations. Hence, Turks become illegal if they enter Germany without a visa, but everyone knows that they would be forced to do the jobs that “German” people prefer not to do; or Gypsies are ousted from most economies; Mexicans are captured for hard labour camps to build the wall in the south of the U.S. against themselves, the “illegal alien Mexicans”; and so forth. Since in a domesticated order most people themselves constitute resources, identity becomes the fundamental expression of the structure of civilisation, with nationalism, racism, sexism, and speciesism as its most notorious manifestations in which plants, insects, animals, and many, mostly people of colour, occupy the lowest ranks in civilised economic networks. In other words, personal identity functions by alienating constituents from each other and social identity works on the basis of assigning commonalities – such as shared origins, blood, a mythical or historical figure or experience – that differentiate one group of people from another.

Self identification and being identified by others are therefore important mechanisms of control of access to material and symbolic resources in civilised society with severe repercussions that touch on all the aspects of the lives of identified persons or groups. And even though the various details of the demarcation lines may shift over time and liberate a group, these variations work to mask the details of discrimination, but do nothing to eradicate the system or the structure itself. For instance, white women invent feminism and finally some of them reach a stage when they can boast more access to well-paid jobs, but at the same time, much higher numbers of impoverished African women or Asian children pay the price in the “exported” dirty businesses which the upper middle

class white women no longer do and so import women from the “third world” on “live-in-nanny” and other “domestic” visas, in the manner of the Oompa-Loompas, to live with their “employers” and provide them child-care, senior-care, and housekeeping services with the stay permits contingent on the satisfaction of the employer (Anthias and Lazaridis, 2000)¹⁰⁴.

Servitude is taken for granted in civilised society where many human and non-human animals are expected to provide services for select human animals in exchange for the right to eat and live. In fact, “service society” is a title worn with pride. Studies indicate that even among members of the same ethnic and gender categories (e.g. white men or white women), there are differences in income according to height, the colour of the eyes and hair¹⁰⁵ in favour of the taller and lighter coloured individuals (Johnston, 2010; Judge & Cable, 2004; Presico et al., 2001), which is, once again, reflected in Willy Wonka's exploitation dynamics: the Oompa-Loompas are short (and used to be dark until Dahl was ordered to lighten them up) and consistent with the “blame the victim” position, since gain in height is proportionate to academic success and both are proportionate to the wealth and nourishment one receives in childhood (Glewwe, Jacoby & King, June 2000): the poorer one is as a child, the more she will be punished as an adult.

For the knower, therefore, external and “knowable” features of the “other” constitute reasonable criteria for identifying the “other”. Also, a claim to knowledge of the internal mechanisms and meaning of the “other” in this system gives the “knower” the

¹⁰⁴ Sexual and other abuse and exploitation is the highest in this group. In the recent years, feminist research has been focusing on the gendered migration and sexual exploitation of third world women coming to to replace the upwardly mobile, mostly white and middle-class women. Particularly interesting is the work of Ehrenreich and Hochschild's *Global Woman* (2002), Bonnie Fox's (editor) *Hidden in the Household* (1980), Nona Grandea's *Uneven Gains: Filipina Domestic Workers in Canada* (1996), among others. All of this research points to the direct connection between industrialisation of production and reproduction. Child bearing, child-rearing, the making of things, the sexual intercourse, pleasures and suffering, everything in this system of things acquires a value and undergoes adjustment following the categories of the “resources” and the “market” regulated price of their relationships. Also, for sociological, anthropological, and economic data see such works as Nicola Piper's (2003) *Wife or worker? : Asian Women and Migration*; Babara Ehrenreich, and Arlie Russell Hochschild's *Global Woman.: Nannies, Maids, and Sex Workers in the New Economy* (2002) ; Hondagneu-Sotelo's (2001) *Doméstica: Immigrant Workers Cleaning and Caring in the Shadow of Affluence*, Nona Grandea's *Uneven Gains : Filipina Domestic Workers in Canada*; among others.

¹⁰⁵ As discussed earlier, endless polls and statistics indicate the racial and height discrimination in salaries: taller and blonder people get higher pay. See 1994 study published at Cornell University by Timothy A. Judge, Daniel M. Cable and Boudreau, also their 2004 updated publication, or Nicola Persico, Andrew Postlewaite and Dan Silverman (2004).

right and the power to place others into categories, an act that has dire consequences for the lives of the objects of knowledge. In sum, identification of people and animals plays an important role in the selection process of inclusion in or exclusion from economic networks of those designated as in-group members and as outsiders: thus, a monkey cannot be a human, a Zulu cannot be a Tamil, a Japanese cannot be an Anglo-Saxon, a prostitute cannot be a queen¹⁰⁶, one i.d. number, e.g.: 573, cannot be valid for anyone except its holder who can be *identified* even in an ice-cave in Antarctica, and Mohamed cannot be Ingrid, just to take a few random examples. Even intimate personal preferences and practices, such as sexuality, are thrust into the claustrophobic categories of permanence and knowledge in which people have to choose once and for all whether they are homosexual, heterosexual, bisexual, or transsexual because personal taste in sexual partners at any moment in the civilised system is taken to reflect the totality of the person as *foreverwas* and *foreverafter* and define her once and for all, again, for the purpose of determining her economic and social networks¹⁰⁷. Regardless of the domain of knowledge – be it science or folklore – exploring the place of humans in the world as fixed in a specific topos, requires the assumption of a definite identity and hence needs the construction of essential qualities that can then be organised into categories based on differentiation from some and assimilation into others, thereby constituting a useful tool for domestication.

With this concept of identity, which is at the basis of economic injustices and discrimination, comes the notion of “purity” or “cleanliness” which entails purging and eliminating anything “foreign” or “other” from the possibility of accessing the “rightfully” owned resources. The concept of identity consists of an assemblage of fixed, essentialist

¹⁰⁶ Identity may be “upgraded” or modified, or there could be multiple identities, however, each one is used to access the specific network to which others are denied access. Thus, a queen cannot be a prostitute at the same time. She can become one, but membership in the club of royalties will be denied to her forever. Another example is the even suspected membership in Al-Qaeda would banish a Canadian citizen, for example, from participation in Canadian rights and privileges. Lesley Milroy (1987) has discussed the linguistic aspects of marking various identities and George Bernard Shaw raises the question of class exclusions according to the identity of the speaker in *Pygmalion* and the economic and social repercussions by being discovered to be an “imposter”. Bourdieu discusses at length in various works the elaborated system of devaluating knowledge and symbolic capital to shut off access, participation and belonging by economically alienated classes, for example see his book *Distinction*.

¹⁰⁷ Jim Sinclair (2005) has written and spoken extensively against this trend and the totalitarianism of “curing” from autism and the demand of society for clear and permanent gender and sexual identities and allegiance. Demonstrating by personal example, Sinclair believes that people have a right to be neuter and asexual as well as autistic.

traits whose ultimate goal is to highlight distinctions between one category and another and thus secure rights of access to resources. It is an ontological construct of the self that requires self-awareness as being different from the awareness of others. For instance, when Canadians are asked what makes them Canadian, most respond that Canadians are not Americans¹⁰⁸. Identity thus expresses the premises of domestication because it plays an important role in juxtaposing persons and peoples in a context of competition or even war, i.e. fighting for symbolic or material resources, and hence proper names and professional/personal identities become important during a selection process for a job: what I can do and what I have been doing. However, when dealing with police or authority, it is the valid numbers on identity cards, address, race, gender, *inter alia*, that play the more important role in negotiating bills, taxes, fines, etc. that are the responsibility or the right of one person and no one else.

Furthermore, the process for identifying privilege and rights on the nation-state level is driven by the same mechanism and obeys the same rules as the one that circumscribes personal and ethnic identity, since identification entails the lack of rights of all to the privileges and resources of some: for example, nobody around the world has the right to participate in the economic structure of France except for people who are identified as, both, human and French citizens. In this sense, the system of identification is always based on separating those who are defined as resources from their overseers and owners and hence eliminates the resources from participating in the socio-economic networks of the empowered and enriched and from accessing their symbolic, cultural, geographic, and geopolitical space.

In contrast, in wilderness, “rights” are an egalitarian concept and a constantly shifting practice: everyone has the right to live, feed, drink, enjoy leisure, etc. Here, needs and access options constantly rotate. Disputes happen, but, most of the time, creatures pass by each other calmly on the way to the waterhole. In civilisation, rights are not universal and access to waterholes, including lakes, sea-ports, beaches, among others, is structured through the concept of permanence – a concept that fuels the classification system that categorises in different groups those who have the right to own something or someplace

¹⁰⁸ Seymour Martin Lipset (2001) uses the word “distinguish” throughout his essay on Canadian Identity, chapter 9 in Ksenych's *Conflict, Order and Action: Readings in Sociology* (2001).

and those who do not¹⁰⁹. Dispossession and empowerment in this ontological construct also become permanent.

Against this backdrop, the books and worldviews of both Nosov and Jansson explicitly reject the civilised order. The concept of “work” – particularly when carried out for someone else's profit or in exchange for wages – is totally absent in Moominland, where even a “general cleaning” session can prove fatal: we learn from *Moominpappa's Memoirs* that Sniff's grandparents have vanished during a spring cleaning operation leaving his father, the Muddler¹¹⁰, an orphan, and a general cleaning session nearly kills the Fillyjonk in the last book, *Late in November*. In other words, Jansson upholds biodiversity even in questions of personal hygiene. Moreover, excessive cleaning and washing point to a lack of real interest in a person and the absence of the ability to love. In the orphanage, Moominpappa tells in his memoirs,

There were a lot of us, and we all soon became grave and tidy youngsters, because the Hemulen had a most solid character and used to wash us more often than she kissed us (Jansson, 1969: 9).

In contrast, the concept that hard work and cleaning are the inevitable aspects of human experience and indispensable for survival, is at the centre of civilised ontology, where non-human living organisms are presented as a threat to humans – if they cannot be rendered useful to humans, they must be subdued, cleaned, and eradicated. This attitude fuels the civilised obsession with shaved lawns, armpits and worse, “cleaning” products, antibiotics, vaccinations, *inter alia*. These attempts to kill all the germs, viruses, bacteria, worms, insects, “pests”, “weeds”, and all possible competition to ownership, end up creating resistance and with it the conditions for breeding super-immune forms of life who respond to the war launched by humans with their own counter-attack.

As anthropologist Mary Douglas (1988) proposes in her seminal work *Purity and Danger*, conceptions of dirt and cleanliness are cultural constructs. In some places, categories of cleanliness and pollution have materialised in the culture of rituals that re-enact distinctions and taboos on a daily basis and cost hours and hours of daily slave or

¹⁰⁹ In this regard, Werner Troesken (2004) conducted illuminating research on the history of control over water and black disempowerment, titled: *Water, Race, and Disease* or the anthropological work of Paul Gelles (2000) titled: *Water and Power in Highland Peru*.

¹¹⁰ Page 23 in the first version, *The Exploits of Moominpappa* and page 26 in the revised *Moominpappa's Memoirs*.

domestic (housewife) labour. Douglas illustrates her point with an in-depth analysis of the “Abominations of Leviticus” and explains how these categories of cleanliness become part of the categories of identity. Examples abound, Muslims see the non-Muslims as unclean because they do not follow the Islamic ritual of ablutions and strict prescriptions for personal hygiene, and eat “uncleanly” slaughtered animals and pork, which is seen as unclean in itself. Jews have the derogatory category of *goi'im* or *gôy* for the non-Jews or the Jews who don't know much about Judaism and the strict rules for the cleanliness and holiness of food. These are some of the aspects of identity that are connected with concepts of cleanliness and discrimination. In other words, categories of cleanliness identify those who would be deemed dirtier, inferior, and in need of civilising, which means domesticated and exploited, even when some Muslims and Jews attempt to downplay the importance of these categories and compensate them with the notion of “tolerance”¹¹¹. Notwithstanding, the distinctions are there in the basic precepts of the domesticated ontologies.

Comparing the concepts of cleanliness with Moominland, Flower Town once again proves to be a compromise between the ontologies of civilisation and wilderness. While most mites in Dunno's world choose to be hard-working, occupations express individual passions. However, unlike in Moominvalley, where obsession with tidiness and cleanliness occurs at the expense of love and can even prove deadly, the residents of Flower Town value neatness. Nevertheless, Dunno's lack of commitment to washing and cleaning, as well as his resistance to literacy, are tolerated. In extreme cases, hygiene can become an issue when it disturbs the community, as when in Sunny City, Dunno and Buttonette¹¹² pressure Smudges Bright¹¹³ to wash himself and to brush his teeth. Still, because the characters are depicted as striving towards the maximum freedom of self-expression, neither work nor learning nor cleanliness is imposed and, in this way, Flower Town mites too echo the principles of the Semai, where the public opinion and general consent are the

¹¹¹ To tolerate means to bear something unpleasant. The moomins do not have to “tolerate”, because difference doesn't bother them. They assume the world to be varied and if there is something unpleasant, it does not mean that someone else might not like it. Therefore, they do not “tolerate” the old candy-man, they are sincerely curious and happy to explore. And when the visit turns unpleasant, they thank him and leave. The same with the antlion.

¹¹² Кнопочка in the original (translation mine).

¹¹³ Пачкуля Пёстренький in the original (translation mine).

most effective means of guarding the community against disruptions of harmony, not coercion and subjugation (Dentan, 1968).

In a nutshell, the genesis of a literary world, such as illustrated above with the opening of the Moominbooks, is tightly connected with how the author conceives the creation of the world and the mundane interactions of characters (and humans) in and with that world. Knowing themselves as only small particles among the wide diversity of the universe prompts the characters to make choices in favour of diversity and the reality of other beings and life becomes vital for the characters' life, just as the other's pain, deception or falsehood has repercussions on the quality of their own lives. Questions of hierarchy, hygiene, food, labour, and economy are thus contingent on the perspective of the actors and on how they relate to other living beings and even to non-living matter. Understanding genesis leads to questions of identity and kinship, and, in the case of moomintrolls, they reach beyond the horizons. They enter wilderness with trust, learn how to empathise with it, how to live *with* it and by learning how to live *in* it, they regain their own wilderness.

This stands in stark contrast to the civilised narrative, such as projected in *Charlie and the Chocolate Factory*. In the case of civilisation, empathy gets in the way of “cleaning” the civilised space of competition and independence. One of the strategies towards the “cleaning” and civilising goal of domestication is ordered “knowledge” and an efficient mechanism of identification. The end of this civilised knowledge, again so explicitly described by Roald Dahl, is an ordered society and a subdued and dominated nature by means of deception, falsehood, inequality, alienation, objectification, and cruelty. There, the goal is not biodiversity, but *monogeneity*: one compact socio-economic body comprised of one species: the human, with everything else (including the dehumanised humans) turned into resources for that group.

Identity becomes a fundamental vehicle of this knowledge and civilised narrative gives it its form and voice by means of symbolic representation. This relationship between civilisation, alienation, (un)knowledge, and identity is fostered by the civilising process itself, because in order to successfully domesticate, the domesticator must be able to identify the resources, then separate himself from his victim and objectify “it” as a

“resource”, and since the suffering of the objectified victim gets ignored and overwritten with this “knowledge” of what the victim “is” and of what she wants or needs, or what her purpose in life is, one can conclude that this knowledge itself justifies torture.

Anthropologists have paid endless attention to various sado-masochistic cultural rituals – spanning the spectrum from as drastic as genital mutilation to as subtle as grading or beauty contests, and, in this respect, the knowledge of classification, discrimination and apathy is constantly re-enacted in elaborate rituals that reinforce these categories inscribing them as reflexes in *habitus*, *doxa* and *body hexis* on both the anatomical and the cognitive levels of civilised beings. The outcome is the concept of identity – a sum of feelings, “facts”, reactions, dispositions, and a certain order.

Chapter 6: Honey like Chocolate: the Names and the Whys of Existence

Even though, at first glance, the 100 Aker Wood may appear simpler than the children's books discussed above, it still contains many of the archetypes and concepts of civilised ontology. The topoi of forest and water, for example, figure throughout the books. Although the concepts of work and cleanliness are not as clearly articulated, there is a brief scene at the end of chapter two in which Christopher Robin takes a bath, and, because it is presented in such a matter-of-fact manner, it is easy to miss its relevance. Nevertheless, it makes sense when understood within the ontological hierarchy of the book, since its characters are divided into the “real” human (one character plus the voice of the narrator) and the “unreal”, the “toys”, which is everybody else. The basic premise in the narrative assumes that whatever applies to the human does not apply to the toys. Hence, if in the real world, people take baths, and since Christopher Robin is real, then this is what he does; he minds his cleanliness, while nobody else in the 100 Aker Wood needs to do that. This cleanliness not only sets him apart as “real” “human” identity, but also conveys the civilised purity of the human boy.

In the context that the realness of Christopher Robin justifies his rank as head of the kingdom (the kingdom, after all, is the result of what goes on in his head), the remaining characters are by implication juxtaposed to him – they are not real and therefore have no purpose, no yearning, no dreams and no head to dream, no heart to yearn, no reason for purpose. In other words, they are fake and anything goes in the artificial world, so we need not bother with long dark scary nights, wondering what they may be feeling, what it is like to be them or try to ease their lot, like Moomintroll does with the Groke.

Perhaps the emotionally undemanding narrative earned its high popularity in civilised culture precisely because it allows the reader to indulge in apathy, which is a precondition for domestication. Apathy and despair impel a person to submit to the order that be and express gladness when domesticated. When domesticating, one also needs apathy in order to objectify these others who are rendered less real than oneself. Thus, the reader can laugh at the characters' nonsensical fidgeting, be amused by their cruelty, avarice, and deceit, and be able to easily dismiss their suffering, just as most readers do with the children, the squirrels and the Oompa-Loompas at Willy Wonka's factory or any other factory in the world, for that matter.

The realness of the *human* Christopher Robin thus sets out the hierarchy of the characters' worth. Since the others are all toys, i.e. replicas, and their falseness objectifies and subjugates them vis-à-vis the human, who is the real agent in his domain of replicas deceiving one another, even if he is not agent enough in his relationship with the narrator, who, in this case, is the author himself and his real-life progenitor. This hierarchy is set right in the opening paragraph:

If you happen to have read another book about Christopher Robin, you may remember that he once had a swan (or the swan had Christopher Robin, I don't know which) and that he used to call this swan Pooh. That was a long time ago, and when we said good-bye, we took the name with us, as we didn't think the swan would want it any more. Well, when Edward Bear said that he would like an exciting name all to himself, Christopher Robin said at once, without stopping to think, that he was Winnie-the-Pooh. And he was (Milne, 1992, introduction).

In contrast to Moominland that opens onto the depth of a dark forest, Winnie-the-Pooh begins with civilisation in both the Introduction and the first chapter, which takes place indoors: the introduction refers to a previous text, presents the concept of possession, and

imbues the human character with the power to name. The monarchical structure of the 100 Aker Wood places Christopher Robin as the head of the kingdom and a being apart with no kinship to the other dwellers of the Wood. This separateness and otherness is enunciated both at the beginning of the narrative and at the end where Christopher Robin is the only one free to break out of the locked space – in which everyone lives “behind a door” in their “own” place and “under the name of” – and is the only one able to transition into the “real” world.

Of course, both the act of naming and the reference to the world as a pre-existent textual reality (the mentioned but non-existent earlier book) tap into the biblical topos of creation as interpreted through a civilised lens. In this sense, the biblical account offers an interpretation of the genesis of the civilised species as the possessors of language as a tool of expropriation and death. In *Winnie the Pooh*, this topos naturalises ownership and hierarchy by presenting a parallel between the creation of Man as owner and namer of the world and of Christopher Robin as owner and namer of his. The similarity of the above quoted passage from *Winnie-the-Pooh* with Genesis 2:18-19 is striking:

Then the LORD God said, “It is not good that the man should be alone; I will make him a helper fit for him.”¹⁹ So out of the ground the LORD God formed every beast of the field and every bird of the air, and brought them to the man to see what he would call them; and whatever the man called every living creature, that was its name.

The 19th century biblical scholar Julius Wellhausen suggested in his literary criticism of the Bible that there are different perspectives and voices throughout the Old and the New Testaments revealing several different sources at work in recording the biblical texts. The interpretation of Man as the namer thus appears to be the civilised “evolutionary” human and contests the image of man the creature of divine wilderness.

Daniel Quinn (1993, 1997 and 1998) elaborated these differences in terms of the nomadic perspective versus the sedentary agriculturalist point of view arguing that the original perspective in the biblical rendition of the Fall of Man is the wild warning of the effects of the overpowering colonising agriculture. Another contemporary biblical scholar, Christine Hayes, points to the expressly vegan, gatherer diet that God specified for the humans and which reveals the original voice of wilderness in depicting an egalitarian

creation of humans and animals¹¹⁴:

1:29 And God said, “Behold, I have given you every plant yielding seed which is upon the face of all the earth, and every tree with seed in its fruit; you shall have them for food.

1:30 And to every beast of the earth, and to every bird of the air, and to everything that creeps on the earth, everything that has the breath of life, I have given every green plant for food.” And it was so.

1:31 And God saw everything that he had made, and behold, it was very good. And there was evening and there was morning, a sixth day.

The two humans in the Bible are created on the sixth day when the other animals were ordered to come forth from the earth (1:24-26), and everyone alive, including the human beings, were to eat seeds, fruits, and greens. Hayes enunciates that there meant to be no competition between the species in this version of creation, and there was no domestication: no chicken soup, no cattle, no milk, all of which came much later as humans persistently disobeyed and continuously bargained for a stronger, more equal position with God (Hayes, 2006).

When extending his parallel with the biblical topos, again, unlike Jansson who favours the wild, the free, and the criminal (Moses, for instance), Milne focuses on the domesticated sources for the narrative elaborating the distinction between the human and the rest of the creatures. Thus, the narrative presents Christopher Robin and his world as pre-existent to the 100 Aker Wood and as its namer and the possessor of names. Extended further, this idea presents Christopher Robin as the creator of the 100 Aker World, and his superiority is therefore much more pronounced than even in the most civilised of the many biblical interpretations. Like Willy Wonka's slaves, Milne projects Winnie-the-Pooh as dependent on his master for name and for brain (he keeps repeating that he is a bear of very little brain), because Pooh cannot know or name himself, again, in contrast with both Flower Town and Moominland, where names matter only in as much as the reader needs to know who she is reading about, but in reality, the moomin characters are characterised by their lives and in mite towns by their deeds the ultimate end of which is love expressed by the principle of letting the other be and helping the other be what the other desires to be.

¹¹⁴ Christine Hayes, Yale University course, “Introduction to the Old Testament”, fall 2006.

This principle of love that is expressed in helping the other to achieve harmony with the self and with the world manifest itself in the way these loving beings organise their space and open it to the needs of others, regardless of how different these needs and the characters might be. Once again, the conception of the genesis of *Winnie-the-Pooh's* world itself betrays the civilised perspectives underlying the taken for granted architectural structures – a conception that orders that world's space and binds the characters in relationships of pain calling them love and contrasting starkly with the anarchist space of Dunno and the anarcho primitivist wilderness of the moomins, where love is expressed in the characters' respect for difference, diversity, and total freedom.

Writing from a civilised space and researching the civilised historical accounts on hospitals and architecture, Michel Foucault (1979) observes that the organisation of space is one of the most important elements of control, for space and architecture constitute, at once, the resources to be exploited and controlled and the system that controls its dwellers and users. From an anthropological perspective, Amos Rapoport makes valuable contributions in his essay on the “Spatial Organization and the Built Environment” (in Ingold, 1997), where he describes architecture as a purposeful human (and, earlier, hominid) activity that organises the environment, which makes it impossible for architecture to be chaotic, for it is always a social, cultural and intentional activity with purpose (ibid: 460). Rapoport adds that for a better understanding of society: “It then becomes necessary to understand the particular order and its underlying spatial and conceptual organization. For example, whereas in the West built environments tend to be characterized by geometrical design, the principles that structure the environment of non-Western societies may be social, ritual or symbolic in nature” (ibid: 460-461). As Ingold observes, the nomadic people, such as the Sami of Scandinavia or the Bedouins of the Middle East and Africa, dwell in the world as part of that world and their goal is to modify it as little as possible within the span of their lives, which they view as a transition towards different dimensions. Their concept of time and space is infinite and their life-view is what Marshall Sahlins designates as the position of true affluence. These dispositions reveal themselves in their relationship to the world as modest dwellers in a wild universe that exists for its own sake. Here, the concept of love entails the assurance that the beloved remains immortal because he or she continues to (co)exist and not as an object of pleasure

and consumption, but as an agent moving through life. More than any other anthropological endeavour, architectural practices convey this concept of love through humbleness and the feeling of eternity through interaction with the environment as insignificant mortals.

Evidently, the geometry that seems orderly and meaningful to carriers of one culture may appear as chaotic and meaningless to the carriers of another. Ingold and Rapoport (in Ingold, 1997) point out that human relations can be revealed in the details of how individuals choose to adjust the direction of the entrance to their dwellings thereby indicating kinships and relationships within the group, as some nomadic peoples do. Furthermore, non-human activity to adjust the environment for dwelling or other purposes is also an intentional endeavour of geometrical complexity: beehives are a perfect example. In this respect, as Foucault (1979) and Bourdieu (1979 and 1990) illustrate, geometry, complexity, and intentionality are not sufficient requirements for a practice to be deemed human, civilised, or otherwise “superior” or “distinct”. They argue that the geometry of Western architecture, for instance, is as socio-cultural and political as its meanings are in Eastern or Southern societies. The distinction must then reside in the prevalence of the civilising purpose by means of locking persons and space, limiting movement, creating possibilities of voyeurism, observation, and panoptical relationships for the purpose of control, consumption, and exploitation.

As Nold Egenter (1987) observes in anthropological and ethological studies of human animal and non-human architectural practices, particularly in apes, building constitutes daily practices that are meant to be neither permanent nor sedentary. While each ape builds her nest individually, the group nevertheless interacts communally rather than hierarchically for the purpose of some individuals' ownership of others' effort, time, and “product”. Human communities, such as the Amish, abide by the same principles, and, again as in Bourdieu's discussion of the forces of creativity and the stability of *habitus*, there is a balance between tradition and the individuality of each dwelling. Most important, the relationships that bind the individuals are those of mutuality, community, and support.

In contrast, the construction of dwellings in civilisation abide by the laws of the

unequal power between ownership, will and design and those who actually do the building. Here, architectural expressions are similar to constructed identities and therefore of “genres”, “schools”, “styles” and other categories that, like the workers who actually build, can be named, classified, and defined as symbolic, spacial, temporal, plant, animal or human resource. In other words, the model for civilised relations that articulate a hierarchical distribution of symbolic and spatial capital limit access to movement and space and organise that space from the position of minimising costs (underpaying or even not paying the resources) and maximising exploitation, providing a constant increment in profit and colonisation of space and resources.

Observing the problem of the increasingly incarcerating conditions of contemporary childhood and the shrinking possibilities for children to enjoy freedom in play and the friendships they forge with the neighbourhoods, Jack Zipes (2010) attributes this phenomenon of disappearing children's public spaces to intensive privatisation laws. Marginalisation of children from public life and space widens the gulf between the wealthy and the poor as well as between children, adults, and the real world, he argues. Renegotiating this space is vital for the health of human society and the environment, the success of which is directly linked to the ways human animals and their children understand and imagine the self, their culture and this space. This imaginary is articulated through the laws that guide and prescribe social interactions and the way in which we organise our environment and how we participate in it.

Children's books convey these concepts according to the narrative framework by which they abide. As seen in the earlier chapters, Jansson's characters dwell in the world. Constantly on the move, they find cosy alcoves, recycle cans, live on trees, behind stoves, build houses, boats, walk, swim and fly. Their meaning of love means to let the beloved roam free, yet always have the door open to the home and the heart if the beloved returns. Hence, while the moomins sleep, winter creatures make use of their home. While Snufkin wanders, he knows that he always can come back and pitch the tent or have a bed in the sunny moominhome. Nosov attempts to find a compromise between the principles of a sedentary community and a community that can move in space and time where he projects love as the unconditional inclusion of all their differences in the abode that friends share.

His world works well until it faces the problem of agricultural expansionism with its colonisation of wilderness by cities and the necessarily developing hierarchies of control. The second book, *Dunno in Sunny City* (1984), dedicates several chapters to the questions of architecture, but they do not tackle the problematic of civilised building practices and wild dwelling, the assumption being that love as cooperation and intention is capable of solving the problems of anonymity and the inherently colonialist civilised ontology. In contrast to Jansson and Nosov, the underlying premises of Milne's 100 Aker Wood provide fascinating insights into the civilised conception of the self and the world and into the nature of its relationships and architectural structures.

Winnie-the-Pooh opens with the London zoo mentioned right in the second paragraph of the introduction and hence serves as an excellent illustration of the above concepts:

You can't be in London for long without going to the Zoo. There are some people who begin the Zoo at the beginning, called WAYIN, and walk as quickly as they can past every cage until they get to the one called WAYOUT, but the nicest people go straight to the animal they love the most, and stay there (Milne, 1992).

The world of *Winnie-the-Pooh* thus opens with an architectural construct termed '*zoo*' and with the socio-affective concept termed '*love*', with both words appearing in the same paragraph right at the beginning of the book in the context of the genesis of the 100 Aker Wood.

The very concept of the zoo is exclusive to civilisation since zoos are designed to contain nature and wilderness by sterilising them thereby conquering space and time by means of bars and lines that spell finitude and end movement. Zoos are not only meant to collapse space and time, they are also panoptical constructs intended to display the victim for the public gaze of domestication. Being constantly observed and displayed, the victim of incarceration is locked in a cage of perverted meaning, where those who “love” the humiliated, caged non-human siblings consume their suffering and sentence the victim to death, for in the conditions of incarceration, human and non-human animals rarely get a chance to conceive progeny, and thereby dare not to dream of a sense of a non-linear, unlined future. Derrick Jensen articulates this perfectly when he says that caged animals circle the cage in madness and despair (Jensen, 2007). To the humans indulging in this

type of voyeurism, zoos mean cute nature or rather a world that has been conquered, named, classified, and rendered tame and resourceful. It is empowering for the domesticated masses whose own will and purpose have been obliterated to watch the wild animal pace in madness and despair. Children are taught to derive pleasure from going “straight to the animal they love the most, and stay there” (Milne, 1992), i.e. do nothing but remain an impotent gazer.

In psychiatry, a relationship between a person who derives pleasure from confining another person, causing distress and emotional or physical pain is called a sadist. Psychiatric definition implies that the pleasure stems from sexual gratification. However, because sexual gratification is contingent on emotional and psychological impulses, feelings and emotional state, then the complexity of sexually driven pleasure and the pleasure of watching someone suffer can take place in a variety of contexts, some of which, like a zoo or a kindergarten may not be overtly linked in the ideology to sexual control in spite of the fact that control of reproduction and sexuality is a crucial element of child breeding and child rearing practices and spaces as well as of domestication, agriculture, and zoos. In other words, the sado-masochistic meaning of civilised love is an important part of the *doxa*, *habitus*, and the *body hexis*, and even when it is not articulated in the ideology, it remains a tacit presence that structures these relationships of pain and pleasure. The other side of this relationship entails that the humiliated and tortured party enjoy the confinement and distress and receive gratification from the feeling of pain and disempowerment making this person a masochist.

The declaration that going to the zoo is a must and heading “straight to the animal they love the most” comes from one of the most popular children's books in the world, and it tells children that entering an architectural design that organises time and space in a linear fashion, proceeding from now (WAYIN) and towards the future (WAYOUT), where the author does not leave us the option of entering from WAYOUT or the middle or not entering at all, or even discarding the concept of zoos altogether. In this linear procession, the narrative tells us that to gaze at a victim denied the right to exist for its own purpose, a victim forced to exist solely as an object of gratification for the gazer, is an act of love.

In this relationship structured through walls, shut doors, and bars, the object must

necessarily be objectified and under the gratified gaze. The first architectural construct in the book is thus based on what is known in psycho-pathology as sado-masochistic relations with the world: where both, subject and object, call love that which inflicts pain, suppresses the will, ties to a leash for the enjoyment of the sadist who simply loves it. Depicting this relationship cheerfully and as a matter of fact conveys to the reader that behind those bars, are faceless figures, with no will and no personhood, who are named and whose names can be revoked and reclassified according to the logic and the perceived need of the subject (as discussed in the previous part on the naming by Christopher Robin). Most important, it conveys that the victim, having been rendered harmless, actually loves this relationship too.

Derrick Jensen characterises such relationships as pornographic. In “Thought to Exist in the Wild: Awakening from the Nightmare of Zoos” (2007), Jensen makes the following connection between zoos, the culture of childhood, and pornography:

... a child who goes to a zoo is not encountering real animals. Like any other spectacle, like any other form of pornography, a zoo can never really satisfy, can never really deliver what it promises. Zoos, like pornography, offer superficial relationships based on hierarchy, dominance, and submission. They depend on a detached consumer willing to observe another who may or may not have given permission to be the object of this gaze.

Think of a pornographic picture. Even in cases where women are paid and willingly pose for pornography, they have not given me permission to see their bodies — or, rather, images of their bodies — right here, right now. If I have a photograph, I have it forever, even if subsequently the woman withdraws her permission. This is the opposite of relationship, where the woman can present herself to me now, and now, and now, always at both her and my and our discretion. What in a relationship is a moment-by-moment gift becomes in pornography my property, to do with as I choose.

And so it is with zoos. Zoos take a very real, necessary, creative, life-affirming, and — most of all — relational urge and turn it, pervert it. Pornography takes the creative relational need for sexual contact with a willing partner — and the intimacy this can imply — and simplifies it to the relationship of watcher and watched. Zoos take the creative need for participating in relationships with wild, nonhuman others and simplify it until our “nature experience” consists of spending a few moments looking at — or simply walking by — bears and chimpanzees in concrete cages (Jensen, 2007).

Jensen's exposition of the rationale of the relationships of incarceration and voyeurism reflect the relationships in *Winnie-the-Pooh*. My point is that all relationships in the civilised hierarchy, to various extents, are structured by these demands of the panoptical gaze, control, consumption and exploitation and that is why any compromise with

civilisation, as discussed in the context of Nosov's trilogy, is prone to infiltration by elements of order and injustice. Jensen continues in this respect:

Incarcerating animals in zoos is to entering into relationships with them in the wild as rape is to making love. The former in each case requires coercion; limits the freedom of the victim; and springs from, manifests, and reinforces the perpetrator's self-perceived entitlement to full access to the victim. The former in each case damages the ability of both victim and perpetrator to enter into future intimate relationships. Based on the dyad of dominance and submission, it closes off any possibility for real and willing understanding of the other.

A real relationship is a dance among willing participants who give what they wish, as they wish, when they wish. It inspires present and future intimacy, present and future understanding of the other and the self. It nourishes those involved. It makes us more of who we are (ibid).

Jensen raises many crucial points discussed throughout this work: the concept of time and the permanence of ownership, for instance, constitute violence and rape by denying the wild the right to privacy, secrecy, and the freedom to change, move, and be – a critique constantly reiterated in the moominbooks. In contrast to the moomins, the civilised control of the purpose of the other's time, space, and life once again ties in with the question of domestication and education and, consistent with the civilised narrative, the third paragraph in *Winnie-the-Pooh's* introduction proceeds to the next logical step in the architecture of confinement, a locked and controlled space where children are transformed into humans and where unknowledge reveals to them who they should become:

You see what it is. He [Piglet] is jealous because he thinks Pooh is having a Grand Introduction all to himself. Pooh is the favourite, of course... but Piglet comes in for a good many things which Pooh misses; because you can't take Pooh to *school* without everybody knowing it, but Piglet is so small that he slips into a pocket, where it is very comfortable to feel him when you are not quite sure whether *twice seven is twelve or twenty-two* (Milne, 1992; italics mine).

In this way, within the space of a few paragraphs of his introduction, Milne succeeds to lay down the foundation of civilised culture: jealousy, confinement, competition, loneliness, the stress of forced schooling and domestication, as well as of the sado-masochistic and pornographic relationships of civilised “love”. This platform is consistent throughout the book projected in the static sterility of the wood and its envious and impotent characters who are willed into existence by Christopher Robin. In this world, when Pooh says that he loves honey, it amounts to him obtaining this honey by all means possible, as discussed

earlier, even by means of theft and consuming it all by himself.

In other words, here, love entails the feeling of desire by the lover to satisfy his or her needs, lacks, wants, appetite, or whatever else. When one says “I love icecream”, for instance, it means that one wants to eat it. When one says, in a civilised context, “I love this woman”, it implies, first of all, the gratification of the desires of the speaker. If there is a concern for the woman that she be happy and well, it comes second¹¹⁵. When the beloved is chained, caged, or otherwise exploited, there can be no reciprocal sharing of mutuality; there can be no place for the experience of satisfaction through the desire of the other to remain owner of her fate, body, and will. When the beloved is gazed at through the bars of a cage and the lover exclaims: “O' how I love you! How beautiful, how cute you are!”, it means that the “beloved” has been rendered harmless and tame, and the only possible outcome of such relationships is the gratification of the tamer through the power of sight: voyeurism, pornography, humiliation and S&M.

This underlying platform of the world of *Winnie-the-Pooh* is further revealed in the *doxa* of the narrative that takes for granted that, like other wild animals, human children must be domesticated in schools and filled with the right content and meaning, such as multiplication table, the demand for the oppression of human and non-human animals, *et al.* In wilderness, where human and non-human children exist for their own sake, it makes no difference whether they know multiplication tables or look at anyone animal or not. In contrast to Milne, who puts animals in cages and calls it love, Jansson's and Nosov's positive characters help liberate children from edifices of oppression; they burn down signs and destroy walls, for in their world it makes no difference what children grow into, as long as they remain in tune with their environment and their own inner purpose, i.e. that they do not turn human and alienated, competing with each other for the winner to be redeemed and allowed to enter personhood leaving the losers to serve as human resources

¹¹⁵ In the period between 1999-2001, I made a comparative survey on Russian and Canadian children's playgrounds, where I would ask parents what they thought love was. I chose parents and children's places on purpose in order to see if having had children would shift the common association of the word “love” with sexual partnership. Inevitably, almost all the Russian parents began with a Tolstoyan description of emotions towards the universe, God sometimes, humanity, and then lover and kin. Almost all the anglophone and francophone parents on the playgrounds in Quebec and Ontario responded that they believed in love at first sight and in having a good sexual understanding with their partner, which demonstrated that the understanding of “love” as sexual gratification before all other meanings remained intact.

in the grand, now globalised, zoo.

In this respect, once again, the 100 Aker Wood betrays its foundation as grounded solidly in the premises and myths of the civilised narrative: there is chronological sequence, there is pain silenced by words that call torture love, there is greed, hierarchy, literacy, and control. This misnaming of experience and silencing of the victim occurs on several levels. For instance, presenting the world of the 100 Aker Wood as not real and its people as fictive impels the reader to disregard the characters' feelings and experience, just as human, non-human, gendered, racialised, and other othered victims of abuse are overwritten by “expert knowledge” and representation by other agents using language and symbols. Echoing the silencing of the Oompa-Loompas by the capitalist enslaver Willie Wonka, who are depicted as cute and loving their chains, Winnie-the-Pooh is also stuck in the London zoo, but we are led to believe that he is in love with his fate in the same way that the fictional Winnie-the-Pooh in the 100 Aker Wood is stuck yet is happy and cute. He is funny and lovable when he tries to swindle the bees just as his fall from the tree is meant to be comical, and the reader laughs at his bouncing against the branches on the way to the gorse-bush, because falling from the height of a third floor has no repercussions for Winnie, we are told. The minute he falls, he gets up and begins to deliberate on more effective strategies to deceive the bees. After all, the narrative assumes, none of them is real, and, in any case, bees exist solely for the purpose of providing us with honey and Winnie-the-Pooh's purpose is to serve as entertainment. Since this is the purpose of bees, any attempt to procure that honey, including by means of lies and theft, is admirable and in this sense the book works on the same premises of domestication discussed earlier in Dahl's work, in particular, the part on slavery – i.e. the existence of the other for the purpose of the subject is inscribed in the ontology of that space and civilises it.

Winnie-the-Pooh rationalises the existence of bees and honey in precisely this logic:

“If there's a buzzing-noise, somebody's making a buzzing noise, and the only reason for making a buzzing-noise that *I* know of is because you're a bee.... And the only reason for being a bee that I know of is making honey.... And the only reason for making honey is so as *I* can eat it” (Milne, 1992: 6).

The above paragraph could be funny in different ways. From the perspective of

wilderness, it could have served as satire, because the situation would appear ridiculous if one was to look at it from the following angle: “ha ha ha! We all know that the world does not belong to Pooh or to anyone, for that matter, who is deluded enough to imagine he owns it”. However, nothing in the story suggests this position. In the way in which it is incorporated in the narrative, it is meant to be funny in a different, “endearing” sort of way: “poor little bear. Of course, we know that bees do not exist for his delight, but in order to give *us*, humans, honey so that those who *possess* the bees can eat it or sell it to those who can afford to buy it. What a funny, greedy, silly, little bear”. Seen from this perspective, Pooh's reasoning becomes funny because it is ridiculous (stupid bear, he does prove that he is of very little brain) and, most important, by no means is his delusion threatening: neither Pooh, nor other bears like him, are ever going to win that power to rule over *our* bees and *our* honey. The most substantial guarantee against that happening in this book is the unreality of Winnie-the-Pooh that renders his delusions harmless and entertaining, like the delusions of any disempowered and objectified child, old person, or other: their pain is not real because our knowledge of them denies them sentience; their dreams are insignificant, and their expression of suffering and resistance ranges between cute and hysterical (meaning both: hilarious and mental).

The same applies to the intentional deceit underlying the relations between the rest of the characters. Not only does Winnie-the-Pooh try to deceive the bees, the Rabbit lies to Winnie, intentionally faking his voice, to pretend that he is not home. Winnie-the-Pooh asks:

“Is anybody home?”

There was a sudden scuffling noise from inside the hole, and then silence.

“What I said was, 'Is anybody at home?'" called out Pooh very loudly.

“No!” said a voice; and then added, “you needn't shout so loud. I heard quite well the first time.”

“Bother!” said Pooh. “Isn't there anybody here at all?”

“Nobody.”

... “Hallo, Rabbit, isn't that you?”

“No,” said Rabbit, in a different sort of voice this time.

“But isn't that Rabbit's voice?”

“I don't *think* so,” said Rabbit. “It isn't *meant* to be” (Milne, 1992: 24-25).

Once again, deceit is depicted as harmless, at best, and cute, at worst. After all, the world of domestication is about who can hide what and from whom and who can trick whom, and the book lets us know that Winnie is a guest who could deplete the host's stock until he would not be able to get out. From this perspective, it becomes funny who would trick whom between the two of them.

The word *deceit* itself is scattered throughout the book. For example, Winnie-the-Pooh discusses an elaborate plan with Christopher Robin about how best to deceive the bees: “I shall try to look like a small black cloud. That will deceive them” (Milne, 1992: 13). “I wish you would bring it [the umbrella] out here, and walk up and down with it, and look up at me every now and then, and say 'Tut-tut, it looks like rain.' I think, if you did that, it would help the deception which we are practising on these bees. ...The important bee to deceive is the Queen Bee” (ibid: 15-16). Or, another instance of deceit appears in chapter seven, the Rabbit, Piglet and Pooh work out a plan to deceive Kanga, kidnap her baby Roo, and kick them out of the Wood. In other words, the concept of deception permeates the ontological foundation of the 100 Aker wood and appeals perfectly to the domesticated reader who, if having failed to discern the problem with the slavery empire of Willy Wonka, would be even more prone to fail to reflect on the purpose of the existence of bees from the stance of wilderness.

Appropriation by means of deceit, control of purpose, movement and space that domesticates the mind and renders the relationships sterile, sado-masochistic, and pornographic feed *Winnie-the-Pooh's* narrative, a world where, in contrast to the perpetual movement in the Moominworld and constantly travelling mites, the characters of 100 Aker Wood are stuck in this closed space (Saukkola, 2001) and remain static, both in terms of experience and movement. The characters are thus caged in a world imagined by Christopher Robin for his own empowerment; they all exist to satisfy his need to be entertained, cared for, and obeyed, in other words, to be consumed by him until he graduates to the “real” world and, in this way too, the book reflects the values overtly

expressed in *Charlie and the Chocolate Factory*.

This conception of “growing up” and “growing out of” the carefree idyllic childhood reveals the narrative's taking for granted of suffering as an ineluctable part of the nature of adult life experience. Many theoreticians praise literary works precisely for their lament and concomitantly acceptance of a sense of inevitability of having to abandon the idyllic, presumably unrealistic, carefree childhood upon entering adulthood, which presupposes a world of toil, hardship, and suffering. In this regard, *Winnie-the-Pooh* invites the reader to share this assumption that wild happiness is not real and that, as Christopher Robin steps into the “real” world, the happiness and agency he experienced during childhood may be accessible only through the memory of something he had imagined. But, more important, the definition of happiness that emerges here is that of power over the purpose of others: at first, through identity and naming, then through incarceration in zoos and schools, and finally, in the sterile economy of the Wood enchanted by its own impotence.

Chapter 7: A Town in the Forest: Sedentary Travel as Compromise

Once upon a time, in a town in fairyland, lived some people called the Mites. They were called the Mites because they were very tiny. The biggest of them was no bigger than a pine cone. Their town was very pretty. Around every house grew daisies, dandelions, and honeysuckle, and the streets were all named after flowers: Blue-bell Street, Daisy Lane, and Primrose Avenue. That is why the town was called Flower Town. It stood on the bank of a little brook. The Mites called it Cucumber River because so many cucumbers grew on its banks.

On the other side of the brook was a wood. The Mites made boats out of birch-bark and crossed the brook in them when they went to gather nuts, berries, and mushrooms in the wood. It was hard for the Mites to pick berries because they were so small. When they picked nuts they had to climb the bushes and take saws with them to cut off the stems, for the Mites could not pick the nuts by hand. They sawed off mushrooms, too-sawed them off at the very ground, then cut them into pieces and carried them home on their shoulders like logs (Nosov, 1980).

Consistently, Nosov's books present a compromise position between the unyielding

wildness of Moominland and the totalitarian domestication of the 100 Aker Wood. The world of mites opens with their town surrounded by wilderness. The mites are gatherers living on a vegan diet. They are creative and productive using only the tools that they can produce¹¹⁶. Yet, even though this idyllic community is the most peaceful of the trilogy, the author sees as inevitable the evolutionary trajectory towards the more complex, machine-based society, in spite of the fact that this development creates social problems that require the pantoptical surveillance of the police whose presence is completely irrelevant in the simpler structure of Flower Town household economy. At the same time, as Dunno explains at the end of his visit to the communist Sunny City, the lack of information about the needs and availability of products for exchange deters the formation of an efficient infrastructure, a lack that causes uncertainty and hampers the possibilities of exchange that may generate right-wing anarchist tendencies, which reveals Nosov's preference for socialist anarchy of Petr Kropotkin (1995 and 2006), based on the theory of evolution by means of cooperation and mutual aid, over the Darwinian principles of evolution by means of competition.

Comparing the above opening scene with the previously discussed children's narratives, the space of wilderness and domestication is negotiated carefully in Nosov's book, and the question of livelihood occupies a more prominent place than what Jansson allots to the specifics of the moomins' diet, because her assumption is that there is plenty of food in the wilderness and Moominmamma will always find a way to make an apple pie or sandwiches, while their lives are nourished by the larger existential questions.

Still, Nosov's opening, like Jansson's, contrasts with the assumption in Dahl's book that people prefer the processed food produced by slave labour in Willy Wonka's Chocolate Factory. This latter depicts characters as incapable of living on a raw diet and who therefore must be enslaved so as to be able to consume a small portion of the big lot they work so hard to produce. While Milne's opening demonstrates the author's preoccupation with proper identification, domestication, and knowledge, the unrealness of the characters makes the question of subsistence obsolete. As the toy-characters depend on

¹¹⁶ Lasse Nordlund (essay 2008) discusses the expenses of any tool in terms of time, labour, and resources that are needed not only to procure the raw materials for the tool, but also for the food and energy and space required to make that tool and all the other tools and machines needed for the making of the specific tool.

the human for name and identity, the child Christopher Robin depends on his parents for food and name, thereby dismissing the problems of economic organisation, access to food, and suffering, for these troubles are assumed to be a natural and inevitable part of civilised adult life and can be escaped in fantasy.

Nosov challenges Milne's perspective on several levels. No one names in the mite-world, where characters become known to all by their inner passions, their choice of avocation and each person's role is important in his or her community without hierarchical preferences. The problems of identity that figure in the first book result in gender inequality and segregation and are resolved through mites' getting to know each other, understanding each other's needs and then helping one another. However, unlike Jansson's world without borders between species, Nosov separates animals from humans and civilised space from wilderness. This ontology is revealed in the way in which Nosov treats the topos of transformation.

Because in wilderness there are no strict borders that distinguish and separate beings, transformation is an occasion to exchange knowledge and experience, a topos that reveals the guiding principles in economic and kinship systems. In civilised ontology, with its strict borders between categories and identities, transformation simply does not have a place: Willy Wonka cannot become an Oompa-Loompa and Oompa-Loompas cannot become Charlie, for example. Nor are Christopher Robin, Winnie-the-Pooh, Piglet, and Owl interchangeable on the level of basic matter. Thus, an examination of these books through the lens of kinship and the topoi of genesis in mythologies and science can reveal the ontological underpinnings of the economies projected in these books.

Chapter 8: Negotiating the Frontiers in the Wilderness of Folklore

Since no clear-cut boundary marks human identity as separate from the animal in the ontology of wildness, it can be said that humans share kinship with animals and plants, i.e., they are assumed to have common origins or some common basic constituent matter. Totemism, for instance, illustrates the possibility of human identification with the essence of any plant or animal¹¹⁷. Much of anthropological research demonstrates that viable communities with a much longer and more impressive track record of the diversity in which they have flourished know the world and themselves through a radically different perspective and underlying premises than the ones informing civilised knowledge.

For example, among the Ojibwa, native hunters of subarctic Canada, personhood is envisaged as an inner essence, embracing the powers of sentience, volition, memory and speech, which is quite indifferent to the particular species form it may outwardly assume. The human form is merely one of the many guises in which persons may

materially manifest themselves, and anyone can change his or her form for that of an animal more or less at will (Ingold, 1997: 24).

Such fluidity between animal and human forms provides an important window of access to vital knowledge about the world and the self through the experience of animals. Folk tales frequently use the topos of transformation and, despite the numerous adaptations through the centuries of domestication, still retain pre-domesticated elements even as they are interwoven with civilised themes. This knowledge of transformation leads characters to new turns in negotiations and to additional possibilities for sharing or losing control over “resources”, rewarding the transformer with new ontological insights and experience.

In *Tales from the Dena*, Frederica De Laguna et al. (1995) tell of the complex relationships between animals and humans and the gift economy that governs their transactions and interactions. For instance, in one story, a rich man captures the sun and locks it in his home. People see that the sun is gone and bribe Raven to get it back for them. Raven transforms himself into a spruce needle, the rich man's daughter swallows it, gets impregnated and gives birth to a child. When the child cries for the sun, she gives it to him. He then transforms himself from baby to Raven and flies together with the sun out

¹¹⁷ The work of Lévi-Strauss (1963 and 1966) comes to mind here.

into the world. In other tales, the authors note, it is the doting grandfather who gives the sun to the baby (De Laguna et al., 1995: 321). In this example, human hierarchy and greed threaten the world: the rich man wants everything for himself, even the sun, but the people realise their interdependence with animals and birds, and each party carries out its part of the bargain to keep the world healthy and safe from the periodic eruptions of violence and conflict of interests.

However, because in its essence transformation is about impermanence, a culture that respects wildness devises no cultural, social, judicial or other bodies of laws and knowledge that would stand on the concept of some “inalienable” rights of a group of persons. Wild ontology evades the imbalance caused by the civilised concept of permanence in which one side always and rightfully wins and the outcome in wilderness is never linear or predictable. Hence, folk tales often have no morals, no conclusions, no consequences and no formulae for calculating outcomes and, in this sense, mirror the ethnographic inquiry, where the ethnographer notes down the particularities of a group but hesitates to draw sociological conclusions or devise political theories for future manipulation (also known as organising) leaving this task to sociologists and political scientists. In another story, the Siberian Inuit, negotiating about his caught fish with Raven and Bear, never knows in advance how the interaction will go because each negotiation is a new way of playing out possibilities, and, in the spirit of cosmic justice and realism, it is only fair and true that the human does not always emerge as the winner of the catch. Often, Raven outsmarts them all¹¹⁸. And it should not be otherwise, for, favouring one species over others would disrupt the balance of biodiversity – precisely the cautionary lesson of our civilisation with its destruction of wilderness and the loss of thousands of forms of life.

In such Russian tales as “The Princess Frog”¹¹⁹, “Finist the Falcon”, “Go Thither

¹¹⁸ According to Czaplicka (2007) the relationship between ravens, crows, humans and other animals are found throughout the Eskimo and other north American and Asian aboriginal creation stories.

In North American Indian mythology, the coyote plays that role or in Africa it is the hyena. In the legends of the indigenous people around the world, birds and animals repeatedly appear as spirits or deities with whom humans must reckon because all beings have their rights and place under the sun.

¹¹⁹ First, in the matriarchal rendering of this transformation story, it is the woman who is the beast and who transforms as the prince expiates his sins and rights his wrongs and not vice versa. According to Clouston, the Breton variant of the tale has a poor orphan lost in the wood, he meets a frog, who promises him many good things in return for kissing her; he kisses her; she turns into a princess; he

Know Not Where, Bring That Know Not What”¹²⁰, “Ivan Tsarevitch and the Grey Wolf”, “The Magic Shirt”, *inter alia*, the success of the heroine or the hero in any given quest and in life, here and ever after, depends on the character's ability either to work together with animals, recognise one's mate in the animal, or be able to transform into an animal, sometimes, even into an object, such as a needle or a feather¹²¹. In this context, Czaplicka's discussion of Siberian shamans and the importance of accessing knowledge through the experience of an animal or a bird is relevant to the epistemological study of the topos. According to her, many aboriginal peoples, such the Siberian Chuckchee, hold that, in the days of yore, knowledge through transformation was available to any ordinary person, but because humans have widened the divide by having alienated themselves from the animal world, transformation is now rarely accessible for regular people, even though it is still possible through the shaman (Czaplicka, 2007). Traditionally, these transformations were induced at will, sometimes through meditation, ritualistic trance or occasionally with the

betrays her by kissing others; and thus loses her, until he overcomes obstacles and finally finds her (Zipes, 2009). In other words, because material and other capital is exchanged in matrimonial bonds, prostitution has become an integral part of civilised sexual relationships, regardless of whether capital and inheritance are passed along patrilineally or matrilineally, with the difference being that in patriarchal societies the man dominates the economy, while in matriarchal societies, it is the woman who has the upper hand in negotiations. Second, as Jack Zipes (2006 and 2009) observes, these stories are memes that inform on cultural strategies for the selection of mating partners. In his analysis of the Frog Prince topos in Western European folklore, Zipes examines the transformation of the ugly beast into a prince as part of the courtship and marriage ritual in which the bride chooses the bridegroom according to the cultural memes – and the tale itself constitutes one of such memes – guiding her choice for optimal sexual selection. Even though this is not the focus of my own analysis, nevertheless this idea of tales as memes of transformation and marriage selection intersects with my own inquiry particularly in my discussion of household economics and the transformation topos. For, in civilisation, marriage reflects the transformation of the household economy to separate nuclear family units in contrast to the non-domesticated societies who included as members of one's “household” the forest, the river, the sky with all the human and non-human forms of life that dwelt in the dimensions surrounding the individual. In this respect, the civilised meme of the princess, according to Zipes, makes for a viable formula for evolutionary trajectory *within* the civilised and colonised space. In the non-domesticated sphere, such choices lead to deterioration of intellect and other characteristics as I argue in the conclusion to this work.

¹²⁰ My translation of: *Поди туда - не знаю куда, принеси то - не знаю что*.

¹²¹ A feather is of course an element of animal, but a needle and a thread are inanimate objects. “A Mouse and a Bird”, an Evenkian (East Siberian) tale, for example, tells a story of a girl who saves her beloved from an envious rival by turning him into a thread and herself into a needle. Another example is the Belorussian tale, “Синяя свита-Налево сшита Соломенный колпак” (“Blue Retinue-Sewn Inside Out-Straw Hat”), the Czar promises to give half of his kingdom to the one who succeeds to hide from him. Blue Retinue transforms into a bird, a fish, and then a needle and wins the prize. In the Russian tale, Go Thither Know Not Where, a dove turns into Maria-Tsarevna and Andrei-the-Bowman has to befriend the Baba-Yaga, devils, and animals who all through negotiation agree to help him defeat the envious Czar. The genealogy of Maria-Tsarevna-the-Dove goes back to Baba-Yaga, an ambiguous character in terms of evil and good. The spectrum of transformations in folklore is so wide and includes everything, even serpents and insects and inanimate objects.

help of psychotropic herbs or mushrooms. This latter form of inducing an altered state of consciousness has been debated in various disciplines, most notably in anthropology, particularly in response to Jeremy Narby's (1998) thesis in *The Cosmic Serpent: DNA and the Origins of Knowledge*. The Asháninka people of the Peruvian Amazon, according to Narby, access knowledge on a molecular basis through entheogens, because information is stored in the matter of beings regardless of the state or shape we are in, and it is simply a matter of tapping into the “hard-drive”. For Czaplica, as well, the achievement of the desired state of altered consciousness brings about the transformation of shape but not of essence, which remains constant throughout the manifestations of matter, for the molecules, genes or spirit (whatever the terminology) already contain the necessary experience and knowledge. The essence of that knowledge or spirit can come in touch with other essences and grow, yet still remains unique and concomitantly connected to the essence of the world, an issue that I discussed earlier in relation to the small creature asking Moomintroll and Moominmamma “What are you?”.

In contrast to the shamanic transformations that are generated through the expansion of consciousness, folk-tale characters change swiftly, with the help of internally generated magic or by extraneous forces that can change a human person into an animal, or an animal person into a human, or any of them into an object and often back again. The collaboration of these magical human and non-human forces usually brings about a resolution of justice or reinstates harmony for the world of the tale. Such fluidity in transgressing the realms of human and non-human animals underscores how the non-domesticated cultures' understand the essence of humanity as linked horizontally to the origins of non-humans; in this sense, the genesis of being, whether animate or inanimate, can be traced back to one source – the substance of the universe itself. Knowledge available to one form of being is understood here as not only available to and applicable for the other, but also vital and indispensable.

Chapter 9: A General Note on Transformations, Consumption, and Identity

Transformation has also been observed by scientists. For example, biologists study these processes on the micro-cellular level and refer to transformations of cells into something else as transdifferentiation, such as the ones that occur in salamanders, jellyfish, and chickens; in some vertebrates this process involves interconversion of stem cells and cell fate switches between lineages (Panagiotis et al., 1995; Furuta et al., 2001). Yet, even though stem-cell research has received much more attention than transdifferentiation, the ramifications for both scientific and literary knowledge are of great importance for what we understand ourselves capable of being and for our choice to agree or refuse to share the dimensions of being with forms different from our own. In contrast, transformations on the genetic level have been studied widely from the perspective of evolutionary theory (Snustad, Simmons, and Jenkins, 1997; Kandel, 1976). Nosov's *Sunny City* is a good illustration of its literary rendition, which is a compromise between two ways of conceptualising humans in relation to non-humans: (a) understanding living and non-living matter as stemming from an original substance common with the universe and (b) considering the human as a species apart, differentiated through *scala naturae* from the various forms of living matter either by divine creed or by its evolutionary pace and direction.

In both the monotheistic and the non-domesticated worldviews, common origin stems from a source outside of creation itself. For monotheism, the divine will is the source of the world with all its manifestations, and, in non-domesticated folklore, everything originates from a variety of celestial, earthly and spiritual forces (Kaufmann, 1969), whose original purpose and substance, to various extents, relate all the living and non-living matter. With the development of agricultural civilisation, the human has been “evolving” throughout the theological and mythological re-interpretation of the human identity and ontology, so one can say there have been transformations in the conception itself of the divine, the animal and the human. Hence, the highly playful and capricious

ancient gods gradually cede to the evolutionary principle in reincarnation where the human experience/incarnation becomes more valued than that of an animal or an insect, and the hierarchy of the castes gets inscribed in the natural order itself (Hopkins, 1971). In the same vein, in the monotheistic biblical tradition, the human evolves from the humble, vegan gatherer of Genesis into the alien to his own world who attempts to appease God with bloodthirsty sacrificial rituals blaming these acts of cruelty on divine will¹²².

The understanding of genesis throughout civilisation also undergoes a transformation, whereby gradually the original cause gets attributed to an act of violence or treachery, such as depicted in the Indian, Babylonian, or Akkadian stories of creation. For example, the god Marduk chops up the water goddess Tiamat and creates the heavens and the stars, with her suffering eyes forming the rivers Tigris and Euphrates (Sandars, 1971; Pritchard, 1975: 1-5). In other words, these adaptations in rendering genesis point to the evolution (more accurately, deterioration) of civilised human relationship with their world as this relationship becomes more and more cannibalistic. Human identity, however, allows the civilised to avoid seeing this relationship in those terms because the assumption in humanist identity is that the human is different from the rest and hence is cleared of this accusation because being a cannibal entails consuming one's own kind. This stands in contrast to the Semai, for example, who see the consumption of an animal that one has raised as cannibalism (Dentan, 1968), whereas the civilised Christian human views the ritual consumption of the body and blood of Christ as communion and not as a cannibalistic topos, because the premise is that the human is separate from the divine and the body of the man that the divine spirit inhabited.

By the same token, the topos of cannibalism can be expressed in the process of reading through identification with the anthropomorphic animals that often figure in children's books. For instance, the story of the three little pigs at first appeals to the reader through identification with the victim: "look, the little pigs are scared and want to build a good house to hide from the dangerous wolf who wants to eat them; you are like those little pigs; you too are scared of the wolf". But then ham, bacon and lard are served in favourite dishes in real life and in literary works, and the "little pig", who had previously

¹²² John Zerzan's (1994, 2002 and 2008) extensive research points to that sacrifice is a feature of societies that practised domestication.

shivered reading the story, now transforms into the wolf and eats the symbol of its own victimisation; by identifying the pigs as “really” different and as comestible “items”, “piglet” thus consumes itself by devouring the flesh of the animal with whom she had previously identified her self. Consumption patterns are deeply entangled in our conception of self and underlie the question of kinships or relatedness between beings. Often, the cultural prescriptions and taboos of domesticated societies play into the constructs of identity, diet, and hygiene and create Bateson's double bind situation that he observed in a mental asylum. Double bind, Bateson says, arises when a person experiences several contradictory injunctions “enforced by punishments or signals that threaten survival” (1972: 206), one of which prohibits the victim from escaping the conflicting situation that provokes symptoms of schizophrenia in the victim. This same situation is present in both children's reading material and in reality, such as illustrated in the case of the “three little pigs”.

Civilisation presents a perfect case of double bind, because people find themselves trapped in contradictory situations with conflicting injunctions in the form of prescriptions, taboos, laws, and contradictory messages in formal education and general upbringing. Civilised “society” constantly threatens its members with various forms of punishment, including – perhaps its most successful method of coercion – the threat of starvation: it elevates “humanism” and human identity yet orders humans to constantly wage war against each other; it demands obedience, loyalty, hard labour, and suffering, but concurrently punishes the obedient by reduced compensation, instead rewarding the one who leads, and not those who obey, that is, it rewards the powerful and the already wealthy, the leaders and the bullies; it glorifies mercy and compassion, yet ruthlessly forces people to die in poverty, just like Bateson's (1972) examples of contradicting parents who drive their children to schizophrenia and despair and from which the civilised victim or the schizophrenic child finds no exit. The double bind on this global scale has been made possible because of the contradictory impulses that the process of identification evokes: it appeals to the desire both to identify with and to stand counter to the group that would allow access to resources. In other words, the process of identification is inextricable from the underlying premises expressed in the cultural taboos and prescriptions regarding food – who is allowed to eat and who is not; regarding cleanliness

– what is clean to be consumed and what is not, and who is clean to consume it with us and who is not; the conception of time as linear, circular or multi-dimensional; permanence, unpredictability, among others – all of which are elemental in our understanding of what we are and refer us back to the question of origins and kinships either from the perspective of wildness (flicker with form and light and let be) or civilisation (do as you're told but you are free when you enslave others). Therefore, if an ontology rests on the premise of common origins for all and of fluid kinships with no fixed categories and identity, like the Ojibwa or the Chuckchee, there would be no identity of eater and the eaten or, in today's parlance, of consumer and the product of consumption.

Scientists attempt to overcome this inherent conflict in civilised ontology between cannibalism, identity, and “human rights” by adopting Darwin's compromise between civilised ontological violence and the animist position (transposed onto the biological and physiological domains) that all living beings, including humans, can be traced to one common ancestor: the first living protozoa. Ultimately, this attempt fails because the evolutionary principle rests on two fatal assumptions: that the world is a priori hostile to life and, hence, living beings need to constantly struggle to adapt to their environment (like the Oompa-Loompas) and that by adapting some turn out more fit than others (Willy Wonka and Charlie). The deteriorating species become extinct (unless they're enslaved by Willy Wonka) and those who stick around, competing, overpopulating, exterminating, and consuming, prove themselves right by virtue of their extensive destruction, persistence, and resilience.

Thus, even if the Darwinian theory of evolution allows for the flexibility of change, the fixed categories that identify species in a hierarchical order highlight their distinctions – on the basis of genetics, blood, and DNA, and other evidence of kinship – from each other for the purpose of victory in the struggle for immortality. First, the concept that organisms have to be in a permanent mode of adaptation to their surroundings already presumes that the surroundings are tricky (the 100 Aker Wood characters highlight that deceptive nature of being) and even hostile to life and that the environment is in need of modification, manipulation, and conquest, with only the best specimens being capable of achieving success (the conquests of epidemic diseases, for example, are almost as

spectacular as those of civilised humans). Second, consumption and reproduction are the concern of evolutionary science that provides a good platform for the theory of “resource” management and exploitation because the premise itself leaves no room for viewing the world from the wild, non-domesticating position. From the perspective of wildness, the universe welcomes life and does not need ordering and adaptation because it already is good for all¹²³ and for itself; otherwise, how could life have happened for all those millions of years? In other words, the conflict of civilised ontology resides in the foundation of its knowledge and is analogous to Sahlins' reasoning that consumerist affluence breeds poverty while humility brings satisfaction. In the same vein, the civilised people's striving for immortality imposes an obsession with murder and sacrifice, their claim that in order to have justice there should be punishment breeds crime – since, in order for punishment to be “just” and not random violence, there has to be the construct of the “crime” prior to it – in contrast to the non-domesticated lore that sees justice in the unpredictability of the results of negotiations. The occasional loss in favour of an animal or a bird only reconfirms abundance and justice in a world where, acceptance of entropy and chaos brings eternity, harmony, and understanding.

The crux of the matter here is that civilisation assumes that the universe is imperfect, that life needs to struggle and adapt to its world, that it needs to be ordered, changed and tamed to suit the demands of the best species. Whether by appealing to religious authority or through science, civilisation claims that Man was decreed by God or by Natural Selection to modify and dominate, because the world was created as his resource, or by virtue of his *unique* intelligence, he has evolved and succeeded to change and domesticate it. What is most important for my discussion of transformation and common origins is that even though change is an accepted possibility in civilised ontology, it nonetheless always leads towards a higher degree of humanism, alienation and civilisation. Here, movement towards the animal is conceived as a dangerous decline, degradation, even illness.

In this respect, children's books can project the topos of transformation between

¹²³ Kropotkin's theory of evolution by mutual aid implies Sahlins' argument that the society that does not hoard or possess stems from the basic premise that the world has plenty. On the other hand, a society that needs to accumulate and fight over resources stems from the premise of poverty (capitalism) which he elaborated in “the Original Affluent Society” a chapter of *Stone Age Economics* (1974).

animal and human forms as either good or bad. For example, if wilderness sees transformation between animals, plants and humans as chaotic – forms are not fixed once and for all – and as beneficial and adding to knowledge, then civilisation values transformation towards more domestication and sterilisation as a linear, evolutionary trajectory and sees transformation from human to animal as dangerous. In children's books (that de facto are created in a civilised space), transformations are often depicted as imposed by some overpowering alien will, often stemming from evil (wilderness), such as through witchcraft, or by some intrinsic wicked force, an obvious illustration of which would be the motif of the werewolf¹²⁴.

In Jansson's third book, *Finn Family Moomintroll (Trollkarlens Hatt)*¹²⁵ and in Nosov's second book, *Dunno in Sunny City*, transformations are generated by external, magical forces against the will of the transformed characters and, in both cases, these topoi shed light on the authors' ontologies and approach to questions of kinship and the meaning of being. Comparing these motifs in the two books, once again, places Jansson at the extreme end of non-domesticated ontology and Nosov in the compromised middle ground between full domestication and an attempt to negotiate the civilised knowledge of oppression with self-determinism. While in *100 Aker Wood*, no transformations occur since the substance of that universe is presumed to be radically different for the human and the toy-animals, so much so that it allows no space for the intermingling of experience.

¹²⁴ Monotheism, of course, denies any possibility of transformation, because the forms of the species were differentiated at the moment of creation, and even if their cause and basic element (the divine will) is kindred, Man alone was created in God's image. However, because Man is interpreted as the General Manager of civilisation, even though civilisation itself was meted out as punishment, he takes it upon himself to change and domesticate God's world. In other words, and banal as it may sound, interpretation of monotheism itself is highly contingent on whether one approaches it from the perspective of civilisation or wilderness.

¹²⁵ *The Wizard's Hat* or as translated by Elizabeth Portch, *Finn Family Moomintroll*, and which is one of the four books that Jansson edited in later editions.

Chapter 10: Transformation and Recognition: Kinship and Common Origins in Moominvalley

The third moominbook, *Finn Family Moomintroll*, opens with a sunny spring morning in Moominvalley as Moomintroll, Snufkin, and Sniff find a black hat with the magical power to transform anything that enters it. However, these transformations – of things, words, animals, and even of Moomintroll himself – into new and unrecognisable shapes only re-affirm the permanence of love that underpins the chaos of the world, i.e. they reinstate harmony, abundance and beauty as a constant in an ever moving entropy, even as this constant of love emerges from ugliness and danger. At first, no-one recognises Moomintroll after he had spent a while hidden in the hat, only to emerge in a shape totally unlike his own:

Moomintroll felt quite confused and took hold of a pair of enormous crinkly ears. “But I *am* Moomintroll!” he burst out in despair. “Don't you believe me?”

“Moomintroll has a nice little tail, just about the right size, but yours is like a chimney sweep's brush,” said the Snork.

And, oh, dear, it was true! Moomintroll felt behind him with a trembling paw...

“You are an impostor!” decided the Hemulen.

“Isn't there anyone who believes me?” Moomintroll pleaded. “Look carefully at me, mother. You must know your own Moomintroll.”

Moominmamma looked carefully. She looked into his frightened eyes for a very long time, and then she said quietly: “Yes, you are my Moomintroll.”

And at the same moment he began to change. His ears, eyes and tail began to shrink, and his nose and tummy grew, until at last he was his old self again.

“It's all right now, my dear,” said Moominmamma. “You see, I shall always know you whatever happens” (Jansson, 1958: 38).

This transformation, like that of the shaman, prompts Moomintroll and his community to transcend form and access the knowledge of the unchanging essence by recognising and accepting both aspects of the universe, even if they may appear contradictory at first glance: the impermanence of chaos and the permanence of essence seen as stemming from

one common substance of origins for all regardless of the ephemeral lineages and changing shapes.

Being children and inexperienced, Snork Maiden, the Snork, Sniff, Snufkin, and especially the Hemulen, who likes clean-cut categories and lacks imagination, focus on the form and on the category of in-group. By accepting form at face value, they demonstrate love, appreciation for and loyalty to Moomintroll as they mistake his form for the “other”, the King of California, and miss the opportunity of play with transformation.

“But [Moomintroll] is an impossible fellow, you know! You simply can't have him in the house!” [the transformed Moomintroll continued joking].

“How dare you talk about Moomintroll like that!” said the Snork Maiden, fiercely. “He's the best Moomin in the world, and we think a great deal of him.”

This was almost too much for Moomintroll. “Really?” he said. “Personally I think he's an absolute pest.”

Then the Snork Maiden began to cry.

“Go away!” said the Snork to Moomintroll. “Otherwise we shall have to sit on your head” . . . “Take away this ugly king who runs down our Moomintroll.” (Jansson, 1958: 36-37).

While noble in their intentions, however, the group is aggressive towards Moomintroll's new form of the King of California, and the scene escalates to a fist fight with the kids ganging up against the newcomer and piling up on top of Moomintroll's new king shape. Moominmamma, on the other hand, recognises this essence in her biological son Moomintroll but also in all the other creatures she calls her children. This recognition and acceptance provides the safety of presence and the knowledge of permanence.

The above scene thus works to confirm kinship and permanence through transformation, but this is not the only way to recognise kinship in Moominland. The act of Moominpappa's adoption of Sniff – the child that Moominmamma picked up in the wild forest during her period of separation from Moominpappa and who is so very different from moomintrolls – points to the immateriality of the domesticated-scientific notion of consanguinity in determining kinship for the moominfamily.

Moominpappa said:

“You have no idea what a fine house I had before the flood. Built it all by myself. But if

I get a new one, you will be welcome there any time.”

“How big was it?” asked the small creature [Sniff].

“Three rooms,” said Moominpappa. “one sky-blue, one sunshine-yellow and one spotted. And a guest room in the attic for you, small creature.” “Did you really mean us to live there too? Asked Moominmamma, very pleased. “Of course,” he said. “I looked for you always, everywhere” (Jansson, 1945).

This conversation demonstrates that affinity and consanguinity (Moominpappa being the father of Moomintroll and Moominmamma being his mother) in Moominvalley, by themselves, do not warrant the right to live together and to partake in a communal household economy. It is mutual consent and the desire to share a home in the larger, universal sense that is the key to building a family, and Sniff has been a welcome guest even before he appears in Moominpappa's consciousness.

This spirit of a shared essence brings creatures together in the Moominworld, regardless of their differences, with conflicting needs, habits and views and in no way related in any genetic understanding of kinship. Throughout the books, the moominfamily adopts anyone who asks – even someone as different, boring and pedantic as a Hemulen or someone who shape-shifts, like Moomintroll, or the transparent child who is then rendered visible by their acceptance and by the relationship of mutual understanding and care that she develops with Moominmamma,¹²⁶ or the nihilist philosopher Muskrat who moves into the house in *Comet in Moominland* and traumatises the children with his dark outlook on the meaninglessness of life. In *Finn Family Moomintroll*, two thieves, Thingumy and Bob, bring trouble and notions of crime and punishment; in winter, while the moomins sleep, the reader discovers that unknown creatures move and dwell among them; and, in the final book, a whole cohort of strange guests inhabit their house while the moominfamily lives at Sea. All of these visible and invisible beings who share their space, regardless of whether they are physically present or absent, are an integral part of the biodiversity of the Moominworld and its freedom for inter-marriage¹²⁷. For example, we learn in *Moominpappa's Memoirs* that, biologically, Snufkin is the son of the elder Mymble and

¹²⁶ The “Invisible Child” in *Tales from the Moominvalley*, Jansson, 1963; 1995.

¹²⁷ In-breeding and inter-mixing was of great interest to Charles Darwin and he saw in-breeding (even in his own family situation, for he married his cousin) as degenerative and inter-mixing as a possibility to express new options in the expression of genes and the suppression of mutation and genetic diseases (Darwin, 1876 and 2008a).

the Joxter, and Sniff is the lost child of the Muddler and the Fuzzy – both mixed couples, but the children live with the moomins, because genetic or blood genealogy is of little significance here. “You, innocent little child, who thinks your father a dignified and serious person, when you read this story of three fathers' adventures you should bear in mind that one pappa is very like another (at least when young)” (Jansson, 1994: xii).

Jansson extends the principle of the undistinguishable nature of beings to parents “when they're not so young” in several ways. In a sense, it doesn't matter whom one chooses for parents, since parents are as wild and full of dreams as their children; i.e. they are not different intrinsically in their essence. So, in the end, it doesn't matter if Sniff, Little My, the Snorks and even Snufkin when he's not travelling, choose to have Moominmamma and Moominpappa for parents, for, in anthropological terms, it is a viable kinship model known as bilateral¹²⁸ or, in the still used terminology established by L.H. Morgan, is often referred to as the Hawaiian kinship system (Merry, 2000; Sahlins, 1972)¹²⁹. Erica-Irene Daes writes on behalf of the Working Group on Indigenous Populations established in 1982:

Indigenous peoples regard all products of the human mind and heart as interrelated, and as flowing from the same source: the relationship between the people and their land, their kinship with the other living creatures that share the land, and with the spirit world. Since the ultimate source of knowledge and creativity is the land itself, all of the art and science of a specific people are manifestations of the same underlying relationships, and can be considered as manifestations of the people as a whole (quoted in Ingold, 2007: 150).

Thus, in the spirit of aboriginal kinship with the world, Moominmamma huddles around her the large group of Moomintroll's friends, including the silk-monkey invited by Sniff (*Comet in Moominland (Kometjakten)*). As they wait in the cave for the comet to hit the earth and destroy it, she calls them “my children”:

“Now everything is all right, and you must go to sleep. You must all go to sleep, my dears. Don't cry, Sniff, there's no danger now.”

The Snork Maiden was trembling. “Wasn't it dreadful?” she said.

¹²⁸ In bilateral kinship system, an ego may choose her kinship affiliation to belong to either lineage and horizontal relationships are inclusive of individuals who happen to be in the same generation as siblings even when they are not strictly related (Ingold, 1997).

¹²⁹ Lewis Henry Morgan's terminology has largely been updated and refuted. For example, subsequent research into Hawaiian kinship systems have revealed the over-simplification and ethnocentrism of Morgan's and a vast number of anthropologists in approaching Polynesian or “Other” peoples (Ingold, 1997).

“Don't think about it any more,” said Moominmamma. “Cuddle up to me, little silk-monkey, and keep warm. I'm going to sing you all a lullaby.” And this is what she sang:

Snuggle up close, and shut your eyes tight,

And sleep without dreaming the whole of the night.

The comet is gone, and your mother is near

To keep you from harm till the morning is here.

And presently they dropped off to sleep, one by one, until at last it was quite quiet and peaceful in the cave” (Jansson, 1959: 189).

In the 1968 revision of the book (twenty two years after the first edition), questions of domestication and kinship remain as prominent and, in fact, Jansson enunciates them even more clearly even though she changes the song, and African fauna transforms into European, with Sniff befriending a kitten instead of the silk-monkey for whom he risks his life in the first version. They return together, hand in hand, as equals, to the safety of the Moominparents' abode that, for emergency reasons, was transferred into the cave.

For a European audience, a kitten represents a tamed animal – a pet, and Jansson takes this opportunity to deliberate on the notions of taming and domestication as if in response to Saint-Exupéry's (1994) metaphors for taming, cultivation, foxes and roses. In *The Little Prince*, the fox begs: “Tame me”, and explains that taming entails responsibility for the one you've tamed and the cultivation of ties through nourishment and care (Saint-Exupéry, 1994) – a standard civilised view, embraced conscientiously by the French colonisers, that claims that humans (especially the French) have the responsibility to tame the world, decide on its livelihood and pretend that these violent relations of power are there, not for the benefit of the tamer, but of the tamed (a view Willy Wonka wholeheartedly embraces). What is omitted in *The Little Prince* and in the domestication premise is that “responsibility” for the other can occur only on condition that the other has been disempowered and has lost agency over her decisions, actions, and responsibilities, while the person who *can* decide for the disempowered Other and who *can* be “responsible” for the Other's well-being is the one who has stolen that power from the tamed.

Jansson questions the concept of domestication and its relationships. In *Comet in*

Moominland, she depicts Sniff's attempts to corrupt the kitten "who wandered all by herself"¹³⁰ by means of food as a method of achieving domination over the purpose of the kitten's existence by turning her into his pet for his pleasure and making her dependent on his kindness. However, unlike the portrayal of the Little Prince who ends up discovering the importance of *him* taming the rose and the fox after which he dies (for, can there be a life in domestication?) and goes "home"¹³¹, Sniff fails in his task to turn the kitten into a pet existing for Sniff's needs and whims. He reluctantly comes to realise that the kitten would rather perish than renounce her independence to live where and as she pleases in exchange for Sniff's power to provide her with food when and how much it pleased Sniff. As the comet is ready to hit and destroy the earth, Sniff understands that his relationship with the kitten would not develop if he attempted to control her livelihood and circumscribe her space under the guise of protection, as in the fence that the Little Prince draws around *His* Rose. To become friends, both characters had to accept each other's terms and learn how to extend a helping hand out of free will, when the other welcomed it, and not through coercion and calculated benefit.

Sniff was the last to leave Moominvalley. He walked through the forest, all the while calling the kitten. And finally he caught sight of her. She was sitting in the moss washing herself.

"Hello," whispered Sniff. "How are you?"

The cat stopped washing and looked at him. Sniff carefully got closer and reached out a paw. She moved away slightly.

"I've missed you," said Sniff and stretched out his paw again.

The kitten took a small leap out of reach. Each time he tried to pet her, she moved away, but she did not go away.

"The comet is coming," said Sniff. "You should come with us to the cave or you will be smashed to bits."

"Oh," the kitten replied yawning.

¹³⁰ "Och just då fick det lilla djuret Sniff syn på en kattunge som vandrade för sig själv" (Jansson, *Kometen Kommer*: 10), obviously a reference to Rudyard Kipling's "The Cat that Walked By Himself" where the cat, even as he accepts the food, does not renounce his will like the horse and the dog.

¹³¹ Even if Saint-Exupéry meant the rose and the fox and life and the travel as metaphors for spiritual attainment, these metaphors work only from the perspective of domestication and become meaningless when examined from the lens of the Moominvalley.

“Do you promise to come?” Sniff asked sternly. “You must promise me! Before eight!”

“Yeah-yeah,” said the kitten, “I will come when it suits me.” And she continued to wash herself.

Sniff placed the milk saucer in the moss and stood there looking at her for a while (*Kometen Kommer*: 133-4 – translation mine)¹³².

The kitten makes it clear, when she welcomes Sniff's food, that she does not become a dependent pet, rather recognising this act of giving as a gesture of friendship and thus earning a place as a family member on equal terms in the moomin house, with the freedom to change her mind at any time.

This kinship is highlighted when Moominmamma gives her grandmother's emeralds to the kitten, thus affirming her own and her “blood” family's kinship with both the kitten and Sniff for whom this gesture is very important:

“Emeralds!” screamed Sniff. “Family inheritance! To the kitten! Oh, how wonderful. Oh, I am happy!”¹³³ (Jansson, 1968: 143 – translation mine).

In anthropological terms, the Hawaiian kinship model of the moomins considers a sibling anyone who is in the horizontal generational group, and constructs Moominmamma and Moominpappa as everyone's mother and father. In other words, the moomins do not distinguish between horizontal relationships in terms of priority in the transfer of material and symbolic capital and this kinship system, as Marshall Sahlins notes, is more egalitarian and inclusive than other models as it comprises both elements of kinship: by descent and by alliance (Sahlins, 1972).

¹³² Sniff var den sista som lämnade Mumindalen. Hela vägen genom skogen ropade han på kattungen. Och äntligen fick han syn på henne. Hon satt i mossan och tvättade sig.

Hej, viskade Sniff. Hur mår du?

Katten slutade tvätta sig och tittade på honom. Sniff gick försiktigt närmare och sträckte ut tassens. Hon flyttade sig undan en liten bit.

Jag har längtat efter dig, sa Sniff och sträckte ut tassens igen.

Kattungen tog ett litet skutt utom räckhåll. Varje gång han försökte smeka henne gick hon undan men hon gick inte sin väg.

Kometen kommer, sa Sniff. Du ska följa med oss till grottan annars blir du mos.

Äsch, svarade kattungen och gäspade.

Lovar du att komma? frågade Sniff strängt. Du måste lova mig! Före åtta!

Jojo, sa kattungen, jag kommer nu sen när det passar mig. Och så fortsatte hon med att tvätta sig.

Sniff satte ner mjölkfåtet i mossan och stod kvar och såg på henne liten stund (Jansson, *Kometen*

Kommer: 133-4).

¹³³ Smaragderna! Ropade Sniff. Familjearvet! Åt katten! O, så underbart. O, vad jag är lyckling! (Jansson, book 2, second version: 143).

Furthermore, kinship in moominland can also be said to be cognatic since inheritance comes concomitantly from Moominmamma's female lineage and from all the fathers through Moominpappa and his memoirs, in which the transfer of knowledge and experience relates the creatures to each other.

Moominpappa was cut short by Sniff, who sat up in his bed and cried, "Stop!"

"Father's reading about his youth," said Moomintroll reproachfully.

"And about my daddy's youth," replied Sniff with unexpected dignity...

"You forgot my *mother!*" Sniff cried.

The door to the bedroom opened and Moominmamma looked in. "Still awake?" she said. "Did I hear somebody cry for Mother?" (Jansson, 1994: 142).

Sahlins considers the Hawaiian kinship system not only egalitarian but also the most economically efficient with regards to both family wealth and environmental sustainability. In the case of the moomins, this is particularly sustainable since rotation and movement (nomadism or semi-nomadism) are a characteristic of their lifestyle in which recycling and sharing is the norm. Instead of building artificial constructions to keep danger out or to lock and protect persons or possessions, the moomins seek organic, natural and geophysical protection from the earth herself, perhaps even on a metaphysical and universal level. It is this protection that gives them love, which, in turn, they extend to the others. Again, Sahlins' analysis of the Hawaiian kinship system applies neatly to the relationships in the Moominvalley as well as to the household economy in Nosov's Flower Town:

Where Eskimo kinship categorically isolates the immediate family, placing others in a social space definitely outside, Hawaiian extends familial relations indefinitely along collateral lines. The Hawaiian household economy risks an analogous integration in the community of households. Everything depends on the strength and spread of solidarity in the kinship system. Hawaiian kinship is in these respects superior to Eskimo. Specifying in this way a wider cooperation, the Hawaiian system should develop more social pressure on households of greater labor resources, especially those of the highest c/w ratios. All other things equal, then, Hawaiian kinship will generate a greater surplus tendency than Eskimo. It will be able also to sustain a higher norm of domestic welfare for the community as a whole. Finally, the same argument implies a greater variation in domestic per capita for Hawaiian, and a smaller overall variation in intensity per worker (Sahlins, 1972: 123).

Integration of creatures into the moomin household is thus an available cultural option for

living with and among beings. Her elaboration on the kinship theme in subsequent revisions of the books reveals Jansson's intent to present relationships and lineage as linked to origins common to all creatures regardless of their "genre" and where form and transformation do not alter the common cosmic essence. Belonging is a matter of choice, not an abstraction based on random rules for concrete purposes generated by a domesticated and alienated vision of the world.

Yet Jansson does not ignore the existence of conflicts of interest and danger. On the contrary, the genesis of the moomin world goes back to World War II and its most harrowing winter. Schoolfield (1998: 572) saw in the comet an expression of the "author's anxiety about atomic or hydrogen bombs" which will make the earth explode.

Moomintroll

proceeded to tell them everything that the Muskrat had said.

"And then I asked pappa if comets were dangerous," he went on, "and pappa said that they were. That they rushed about like mad things in the black empty space beyond the sky trailing a flaming tail behind them. All the other stars keep to their courses, and go along just like trains on their rails, but comets can go absolutely anywhere; they pop up here and there wherever you least expect them."

"Like me," said Snufkin, laughing. "They must be sky-tramps!"

... "It's nothing to laugh at," [Moomintroll] said. "It would be a terrible thing if a comet hit the earth."

"What would happen then?" whispered Sniff.

"Everything would explode," said Moomintroll, gloomily.

... Then Snufkin said slowly: "It would be awful if the earth exploded. It's so beautiful."

"And what about us?" asked Sniff (Jansson, 1946: 57-8).

Jansson's universe is unpredictable, its laws difficult to discern. Creatures can turn on each other. Still, one principle can be traced: in navigating with peace and tact, one would avoid violence. The closest analogy to the moomin universe comes from quantum physics, in that the creatures of the moomin world are like cosmic particles in constant movement towards entropy, following unfathomable principles of a self-organising universe with mysterious passages between dimensions and a constant play between the realms of being

– here and there, and with nostalgia for the cosmic non-time and non-place generated by the flickering tune that Snufkin sometimes captures during his perpetual travels in its pursuit. The harmony of the universe in Moominland is like the melodious anarchy of jazz best achieved, not by means of rigid rules or formulae, but through improvisation and attunement with one's own nature as well as with wilderness at large. There, in the vast Moominuniverse, by embracing chaos and tuning to its music, we can enjoy the ride atop its tumultuous waves.

Chapter 11: Transformation and Alienation: Renunciation and Kinship in Sunny City

Unlike Jansson's depiction of the transformation of Moomintroll, which is filled with confusion but also with revelations of loyalty and love, Nosov sees transformation between animals and humans as tragic, unnatural, unenlightening, even dangerous. The kinship model in the world of mites comprises aspects of the Hawaiian kinship system but, concurrently, Nosov's socio-economic vision, revealed by his use of the transformation motif, incorporates elements from both the anti-domestication paradigm and domesticated ontology. Even as the author presents an egalitarian human society and stresses the importance of compassion towards all living beings, including animals (the wizard rewards Dunno for being kind to a dog by removing the leash and letting him run free), the basis on which he posits his ideal society is evolutionary progress in the divided space between wilderness and civilisation, where wilderness exists for itself and the civilised space is there for the purpose of humans. In this respect, Nosov also questions Saint-Exupéry's definition of taming “responsibility”, for Nosov's ideal world rests consistently on the separation of humans from animals and not assimilating them into a domesticated human space in the manner of *The Little Prince*.

At the same time, however, neither does the book propose integration and biodiversity that Jansson projects in Moominland. Nosov uses the motif of transformation

of humans into animals and of animals into humans to further differentiate the categories of human from animal, thereby highlighting their alienation from each and warning about the dangers posed for humans should wilderness invade their space. He concedes, nonetheless, that neither should the humans impose themselves on animals and wilderness. The first book presents a healthy world and a strong community in Flower Town surrounded by wilderness and, like that of Moominvalley, rooted in a gathering life-style. Yet unlike the goodness of Moominland that is rooted in random and unpredictable change and the moomin renunciation of civilisation and machines, Nosov depicts change in this idyllic community as a linear and inevitable fate of evolutionary progress with technologies imported from the agriculturally and technologically more advanced Greenville Town or the socially problematic but totally mechanised Sunny City.

Nosov's optimism towards technology reflects most of the “leftist” positions vis-à-vis the machine. This optimism, however, ignores the inherent paradox of an attempt to free society from hierarchical relationships by means of machines that in themselves depend on a hierarchical infrastructure and an essentialist division of labour. For, in order to make the machines, there must be someone to oversee those who imagine and invent, those who dig the mines for metals and ores, those who ravage quarries and tar-sands, those who suck out petroleum to make plastics, ad infinitum. Then, there are those who make the machines and those who feed everybody else. In other words, differentiation, identity, professionalisation and inequality are the prerequisites for a technological society and Nosov attempts to solve the conflict, in the manner of Roald Dahl, not by revealing it, but by essentialising these identities by assigning the *raison d'être* for professions in the nature of each person; for example, in Dahl, the Oompa-Loompas are meant to work for Willy Wonka, which is supposed to fulfil their meaning and make them happy, and so are Nosov's mites pleased to be mechanics, cooks, scientists, doctors, designers, etc., finding their fulfilment in work in contrast to the moomins who never do the same thing twice (how boring life would be) and hence have no jobs and no professions but do a variety of things, exploring different dimensions of inner and outer world. One can agree or disagree with organised social order, but conflating technological development with an egalitarian system ultimately leads to double bind, schizophrenic misnomers and such oxymorons as “happy slaves” (discussed in part III).

Regardless of the domain of knowledge – be it science or folklore – exploration of the place of humans in the world as fixed in a specific topos, requires that there first be the assumption of a definite identity, a process that depends on the constructs of essential qualities that can then be organised into categories based on differentiation from some and assimilation into others. This mechanism of constructing fixed categories based on essentialised qualities constitutes a most effective tool for domestication. Tools that humans used to produce themselves have also been monopolised in civilisation, their production professionalised and externalised. For the most part, but not exclusively, animals develop their tools physiologically: for instance, the duck's waterproof feathers, the chameleon's pigmentation that alters according to surroundings as a protection mechanism or the anteater's long nose can be regarded as tools in the sense that they help them achieve certain tasks. In addition to the physiological tools, birds and animals have been observed to make external tools and use them, as Joshua Klein's ten year work with crows shows¹³⁴ or as Nold Egenter's (1987) or Mike Hansell's (2005) research on the architectural practices of apes demonstrates. On an unprecedented scale, humans have externalised their limbs and tools like no other animals and the secret lies in the connection that John Zerzan (2002) draws between abstraction and technology. Technology and technological production (including that of the machines themselves) has atrophied the human ability to grow tools or even make them¹³⁵. Thus, by having subtracted themselves from their internal possibilities and external experience, people have forfeited self-reliance and independence and created a civilisation in which technology becomes the prosthetics of our capacities. More important, however, is that even here the division of labour designates which people become the limbs and tools for others but not of themselves. For instance, even though manual and service labour is performed by the poor for the rich, their own neighbourhoods – the “ghettos” – remain

¹³⁴ http://www.ted.com/talks/joshua_klein_on_the_intelligence_of_crows.html

¹³⁵ Lasse Nordlund (2008) argues that the effort that goes into machines and technology, as well as domestication, is completely unsustainable and only self-made tools make sense. John Zerzan (1994, 2002 and 2008) discusses throughout his work the escalating alienation with the self and the world that is inherent in human reliance on technology but also on symbolic representation discussed further in this essay. For example, see his *Twilight of the Machines* (2008). Nikitina, Ukhtomsky, and Arshavsky (in Nikitina, 1998) discuss “technological” childhood as physiological and moral malformation and the atrophy of muscles and skills in a culture that substitutes personal management and practice with commercial and artificial substitutes and the lack of movement and exploration in modern childhood institutions, starting from pregnancy and spanning through all of schooling (AbdelRahim 2002 and 2003a).

neglected (Collins, 2007; Cohn and Fossett, 1996).

Various random characteristics fix individuals and groups within a permanent construct that defines (i.e., limits) and identifies them in terms of their productive “functions”. In this sense, social, professional, gender, ethnic or racial identity becomes a vital aspect of technological production and control: a “farmer” is expected to spend the best hours and most of his life producing food; a “male” inseminates, earns, leads, protects, etc.; a “female” produces human resources or heirs, does housework, occupies a specific niche in the economy, and so forth; an “African”, an “Austrian”, an “American” also negotiate their relationships of production and exploitation within this hierarchical system of production and control. So do animal people and plants. In other words, abstraction or symbolic thought colludes with the construct of identity to distinguish and separate those who become the users and owners of tools and technologies and those who are turned into the prostheses of others, i.e. into the resources that spend their lives providing services and manufacturing artificial tools, machines and the various technologies. Such transformation of living persons into machines however does not liberate, as Donna Haraway invites us to think in her *Cyborg Manifesto*, because the human and non-human animals, that are themselves turned into tools and resources, become as alienated from suffering, including their own, as those who utilise them. In this respect, domestication gets further ingrained, colonising more beings and inner and outer nature, as we lose the ability to grow our own physiological tools.

Nosov's attempt at compromise between the horizontal and vertical relations closely resembles the attempt of the Hawaiian kinship model to reconcile the inherently conflicting forces between horizontal kinship and hierarchical economy. Sahlins' (1974) main critique of the Hawaiian kinship model revolves precisely around this conflict, which, by its very nature, a hierarchical model imposes. These failings, Sahlins points out, were particularly revealed when the Hawaiian model faced a hierarchical, non-kinship organisation of an invading European structure. He explains that the confusion stemmed from the imperialists' misreading the kinship based on hierarchical obligations that extended horizontally with the head holding the title of king, albeit not in the sense of the structure of a nation-state, yet which was forced to comply with the imperialist economic

interests of the invaders¹³⁶. Further, he observes that this extended kinship model is never free of individuation or conflict of interests. However, these conflicts are regulated by the concept of reciprocity (Sahlins, 1992: 124), which Jansson humorously and dexterously interweaves in her books, which Milne ignores, and which are present but without receiving their due in Nosov's trilogy.

The Adventures of Dunno and Friends opens onto the household based economy and the diet and habits of the mites echoing the biblical genesis where, according to Christine Hayes, God's first concern was for the well-being of his creatures “you will eat fruits and grains,” he tells the humans, and the animals will eat plants and there should be no competition for food¹³⁷. Scientific narratives based on comparative research of eating and sleeping patterns of humans, primates, and predators, as well as of frugivores, folivores, and herbivores indicate that nowhere in nature do such civilised human regimens for food, play, coddle, and sleep exist. In the wild, predators eat sporadically and sleep for extended periods of time (lions sleep 16 hours), while herbivores (buffaloes sleep 3 hours), folivores, and frugivores rely on more frequent food intake and lighter sleep patterns; whereas in colder climates, hibernation is vital for survival (Capellini et al., 2008; Lesku et al., 2006; Berger and Phillips, 1988).

Nosov opens his trilogy with this same question of diet, livelihood and space all of which are contingent on the technologies needed and devised as well as on questions of domestication: in this vegan, gathering lifestyle, there is no competition among the mites or between the mites and wilderness. The mites live in houses, and each member of the household contributes with her or his effort and skill. For example, the mechanics, Bendum and Twistum, fix things and invent new machines; Dr. Pillman heals; Trills plays music; and Blobs paints; the hunter Shot and his dog Dot presumably hunt sometimes; and so forth. Like a Hawaiian king who is kin to his people, Doono is deemed important because he represents knowledge and science (perhaps even the Academy). However, he does not monopolise power, because he is kin and equal and is kept in balance by other mites, some of whom harbour authoritarian aspirations, such as Dr. Pillman, but mostly by

¹³⁶ Sahlins (1974) discusses this in-depth in chapter 3 “The Domestic Mode of Production: Intensification of Production” of *Stone Age Economics*.

¹³⁷ http://cojs.org/cojswiki/Genesis_1-4_in_Context,_Christine_Hayes,_Open_Yale_Courses_%28Transcription%29,_2006

the sound judgement of all.

Thus, even though Doono has access to important knowledge, he is not the head of the household, and the fact that each character is significant and indispensable for the community resolves the horizontal and vertical tensions. Even Dunno, who doesn't know anything and doesn't do anything except travel and tell stories, contributes with his passion, stories and discoveries. That is, everyone participates in the sustainability of the community.

In one of the houses in Blue-bell Street lived sixteen boy-Mites. The most important of them was Doono. He was named Doono because he did know everything, and he knew everything because he was always reading books... and so everybody admired him and did whatever he said. He always dressed in black, and when he sat down at his writing-table with his spectacles on and began reading a book, he looked for all the world like a professor.

In this same house lived Dr. Pillman, who looked after the Mites when they fell ill. He always wore a white coat and a white cap with a tassel on it. Here, too, lived the famous tinker Bendum and his helper Twistum. And here lived Treacly-Sweeter who, as everyone knew, had a great weakness for fizzy drinks with lots of syrup in them. He was very polite....

Besides these there was a hunter named Shot. He had a little dog he called Dot and a gun that shot corks. There was also an artist named Blobs and a musician named Trills. The others were called Swifty, Crumps, Mums, Roly-Poly, Scatterbrain, and two brothers. P'raps and Prob'ly. But the most famous of them all was a Mite by the name of Dunno. He was called Dunno because he did *not* know everything –in fact he did not know *anything* (Nosov, 1980,:11-12).

At this point, it appears that the tensions between knowledge, authority, and the Hawaiian kinship system are resolved, particularly when the mites solve their main problem in the first book: the alienation of genders. When Dunno's housemates befriend the girls of Greenville and the boys of Kite Town, peace and harmony are restored and the household based economy here parallels Jansson's vision of economy – both authors explicitly demonstrate that both societies are doing perfectly well *with* cooperation and sharing and *without* money or other symbolic representations for exchange. However, the sequel reveals that by accepting evolution towards a city-state economy as ineluctable, a process that *must* drag the little people from their gatherer lifestyle and household based economics to a more complex and stratified future, Nosov falls into the trap of binarism, where his vision of that future allows for only two options: either capitalism or

communism. He thus fails to examine the source of the conflict, namely that, even though they vary in the extent of their destructiveness and specific detail, the two systems are still based on the same ontology that knows humans as separate and superior to other living beings. In other words, both the capitalist and the communist perspectives are humanist visions of the world that present professionalisation (including the profession of being human) and (without stating it as such) alienation as fundamental and natural aspects of evolution. That is why, the narrative explains, after Dunno had made a mess of the human/animal transformations, Sunny City plummets into a wild and dangerous chaos, which leads Dunno to share with Floss¹³⁸ his critical analysis of his home-town household based economy as compared with that of Sunny City:

“At home, if you wanted an apple, you'd have to climb a tree; if you craved for strawberries, you'd need to grow them first; if you fancied some nuts, you'd have to go to the forest. Here you've got it all easy: you simply walk to a dining room and eat to your heart's content, but at home you need to work first, and then eat.”

“But we also work here,” objected Floss. “Some work in the fields and gardens; others make various things in factories, and afterwards each takes what he needs from the store.”

“But you have machines to help you with your work,” answered Dunno, “whereas we don't have machines. And we don't have stores. You all live collectively, but at home, each house stands on its own. Because of that we get in a big mess. Our house, for example, boards two mechanics, but not a single tailor. While some other house may be accommodating only tailors and not a single mechanic. If you needed pants, for instance, you would go to the tailor, but he won't give them to you for free, since if he began to give out pants for free...”

“He won't have any left for himself!” Floss burst out laughing.

“Worse!” Dunno motioned with his hand. “He'll end up, not only without pants, but without food, because surely he can't be sewing clothes and procuring food at the same time!”

“Of course, that's right,” agreed Floss.

“So, for a pair of pants, you'd have to give the tailor, say, a pear,” Dunno went on. “But if the tailor doesn't need a pear, but needs, let's say, a table, then, you'll have to go to a carpenter, give him the pear for making a table, and then swap the table for pants. But the carpenter might also say that he doesn't need a pear, but needs an axe. So, you drag yourself to a smith. It could also happen that when you come to the carpenter with an axe, he tells you that he no longer needs it since he'd already acquired it somewhere else. And there you are, ending up with an axe instead of a pair of pants!”

¹³⁸ Ниточка in the original (translation mine).

“Yes, that's a great misfortune!” Floss laughed.

“That's not the problem, because there's always a way out of any situation,” Dunno responded. “In the end, friends won't let you perish and someone will give you a pair of pants or lend them to you for a while. The tragedy is that some mites develop a terrible disease – greed or rapacity. Such a rapacious mite drags home everything that falls into his hands: whether he needs it or not. We have one such mite – Rolly-Polly. His whole room is filled with every conceivable piece of junk. He pretends that he might need it all for trading for things he might need. Apart from that, he has a whole load of useful things that someone could have used, but they're only acquiring dust and rust with him”¹³⁹ (Nosov, 1984: 195-6, translation mine).

Prior to the above dialogue, Nosov does not voice any reservations about household economy in the first book whose plot centres on the conflict between genders, the resolution of which establishes a flow of knowledge between household units and towns with the economy still remaining local and based on gathering. This lifestyle contrasts strongly with the large society of Sunny City, with its complex infrastructure, where things are still shared communally, albeit relying on a police force and a panoptical surveillance

¹³⁹ -- У нас если захочешь яблочка, так надо сначала на дерево залезть; захочешь клубнички, так ее сперва надо вырастить; орешка захочешь -- в лес надо идти. У вас просто: иди в столовую и ешь, чего душа пожелает, а у нас поработай сначала, а потом уж ешь.

-- Но и мы ведь работаем, -- возразила Ниточка. -- Одни работают на полях, огородах, другие делают разные вещи на фабриках, а потом каждый берет в магазине, что ему надо.

-- Так ведь вам помогают машины работать, -- ответил Незнайка, -- а у нас машин нет. И магазинов у нас нет. Вы живете все сообща, а у нас каждый домишко -- сам по себе. Из-за этого получается большая путаница. В нашем доме, например, есть два механика, но ни одного портного. В другом каком-нибудь доме живут только портные, и ни одного механика. Если вам нужны, к примеру сказать, брюки, вы идете к портному, но портной не даст вам брюк даром, так как если начнет давать всем брюки даром...

-- То сам скоро без брюк останется! -- засмеялась Ниточка.

-- Хуже! -- махнул рукой Незнайка. -- Он останется не только без брюк, но и без еды, потому что не может же он шить одежду и добывать еду в одно и то же время!

-- Это, конечно, так, -- согласилась Ниточка.

-- Значит, вы должны дать портному за брюки, скажем, грушу, -- продолжал Незнайка. -- Но если портному не нужна груша, а нужен, к примеру сказать, стол, то вы должны пойти к столюру, дать ему грушу за то, что он сделает стол, а потом этот стол выменять у портного на брюки. Но столляр тоже может сказать, что ему не нужна груша, а нужен топор. Придется вам к кузнецу тащиться. Может случиться и так, что, когда вы придете к столюру с топором, он скажет, что топор ему уже не нужен, так как он достал его в другом месте. Вот и останетесь вы тогда с топором вместо штанов!

-- Да, это действительно большая беда! -- засмеялась Ниточка.

-- Беда не в этом, потому что из каждого положения найдется выход, -- ответил Незнайка.

-- В крайнем случае, друзья не дадут вам пропасть, и кто-нибудь подарит вам брюки или одолжит на время. Беда в том, что на это почве у некоторых коротышек развивается страшная болезнь -- жадность или скопидомство. Такой скопидом-коротышка тащит к себе домой все, что под руку попадется: что нужно и даже то, что не нужно. У нас есть один такой малыш -- Пончик. У него вся комната завалена всевозможной рухлядью. Он воображает, что все это может понадобиться ему для обмена на нужные вещи. Кроме того, у него есть масса ценных вещей, которые могли бы кому-нибудь пригодиться, а у него они только пылятся и портятся (Носов, 1984: 195-6).

system to keep mites in order. Apart from fulfilling the political requirements of Soviet censorship, the above passage presumes that cooperation and a smooth exchange of effort and products will malfunction without an organised infrastructure, and, as Dunno explains, exchange could thus turn into an element of oppression instead of liberation. The author projects this organisation of infrastructure as self-ordered in the autonomous, anarchist sense, but, concurrently, accepts Marx's vision of the liberating aspects of technology, and does not acknowledge that the division of labour, or professionalisation, inherent to this socio-economic structure, necessarily leads to stratification and problems of dependency and exploitation. He thus omits the critique of the logic of techno-culture, whose very nature is alienation and professionalisation, and instead focuses on only an aspect of it: the oppressive nature of symbolic currency, dramatised and elaborated in the sequel, *Dunno on the Moon*, where symbolic economy – money – creates stratification, poverty, illness, capitalism, and tragedy. In this respect, Nosov's books constitute an attempt to resolve the conflict between technologies, the symbolic, and oppression by ignoring the connection between alienation by technologies and alienation through the symbolic¹⁴⁰.

Nosov's critique of money reflects Zerzan's point on the alienation through symbolic thought and technology (2002) albeit restricted to the part that highlights the inherent alienation in the act of exchanging real effort for the symbolic. Unfortunately, however, he ignores the problems that arise from an organised city infrastructure based on machines and its reliance on division of labour. John Zerzan's (2008) critique of the symbolic and its progression into a means of existence mediated by technology allows us to assemble the pieces of ourselves that have been splintered by language, art, money, professionalisation, identity among the other aspects of life that the civilised take for granted. This critique of symbolic thought reveals the mechanisms that allow kinship systems and other forms of expression of connections to common origins to substitute the the symbolic for the real and to alienate by means of imposing a structure of hierarchy and

¹⁴⁰ One of John Zerzan's points is a critique of Marx's abandonment of his original interest in examining the nature of technology. Marx's assumption, he says, is that in itself technology is neutral and that the result of its use depends on the user's intentions and implementation: "But they [technophiles] want to be a little more canny about it, so again, my point is that if you say it's neutral, then you avoid testing the truth claim that it's positive. In other words, if you say it's negative or positive, you have to look at what it is. You have to get into it. But if you say it's neutral, that has worked pretty well at precluding this examination" (Against Technology: A talk by John Zerzan (April 23, 1997 included in his 2002 book).

competition that further uses the symbolic to replace the meaning of sacrifice with the concept of survival, to forfeit freedom and independence for the sake of professionalisation and limitation of knowledge, skill, and relatedness, etc. – all of which play a central role in civilised ontology.

Nosov, however, suggests that identification with one's profession solves this conflict by allowing people to nurture their passions. He does not see that identification and professionalisation are an integral part of the problem, since, when a person becomes professional or specialised in a narrow field, as Dunno observes, she becomes dependent on the expertise of others and therefore limited in skills and possibilities. In addition, professionalisation also locks a person's life in a construct of “permanence”: for instance, one invests a lot of time and effort to become a doctor at the expense of developing a variety of other skills and therefore the expectation is that she will always “function” in society as a doctor. Finally, specialisation causes stratification by splintering the whole picture into pieces that the civilised believe to be irrelevant thereby alienating themselves from the raw materials, from the products they produce, from the wilderness. This alienation occurs by suppressing the knowledge of common origins with the very first matter and thus the ignorance of our kinship with all living and non-living matter. After all, the raw materials for the machines come from the same source as the living beings. We are still connected to all, including to what we modify and manipulate, whether living or not, and regardless of the extent of our denial (civilisation) and in spite of the construct of time and space, those dimensions that ultimately structure specialisation and alienation.

Technicized city structure needs someone to run others and thus relies on stratification and the symbolic way of notifying and keeping records¹⁴¹ – which Nosov criticises in the capitalist system on the moon. Still, he believes that a compromise of horizontal household identities could be extended on a city and city-state scale through an economic infrastructure for communal exchange therewith solving the injustice. This explains the ending of *Sunny City* with the yearly ritual of exchanging mittens that pronounces the mites who have exchanged mittens between them as brothers and sisters,

¹⁴¹ As discussed in part I, Goody (1968) and Ong (1986) trace literacy to the need to record debts in the hierarchies of the early civilisations. In other words, literacy itself is deeply linked with the violence of domestication and the concept of debt.

i.e. Hawaiian, horizontal kin.

However, in focusing exclusively on the micro household model of cooperation, it is easy to miss the relationship between professionalisation, stratification and the limitations in access to resources, all of which constrict internal movement (change of interests as in Moominland) and spacial mobility (how can one travel if the household unit or a larger community depends on his or her skill). Nosov's solution is to, occasionally, have the whole household travel but, more often, only Dunno is flexible and free to explore, because his interests are not of immediate urgency for the group. In other words, professionalisation limits freedom and choice and makes coercion a more readily available tool for achieving order. In the end, professionalisation, like identity, relies on the same basis for discrimination as speciesism, racism, sexism, and other forms of “kinship” distinctions.

Nosov acknowledges the difficulties of projecting this kinship model onto a city scale that relies on police and media as tools for social regulation and the control of production. Yet these tools, the book demonstrates, are unreliable and in themselves problematic: the witnesses are always exaggerating, the journalists are looking elsewhere and printing lies, the police capture the wrong people and punish them for the wrong things, ad infinitum. Most important, the economy necessarily becomes stratified, and agricultural space takes over the Sunny world, just as in the real world: “According to calculations by Paul MacCready (1999), at the dawn of human agriculture 10,000 years ago, the worldwide human population plus their livestock and pets was ~0.1% of the terrestrial vertebrate biomass. Today, he calculates, it is 98%” (Dennett, 2009).

Finally, Nosov's assumption about the uncompromising separation of humans and animals stands in stark contrast to the shamanistic ontology of Jansson's book. There are several episodes of transformation in the second and third books. First, the transformation happens when Dunno turns Leaf¹⁴² into an ass by means of a magic wand, then he turns the three donkeys into mites, and, in the last book, the mites exiled to the Island of Fools with unlimited entertainment turn into sheep with Dunno and his friend Kid¹⁴³ barely

¹⁴² Listik – Листик – translates as both a page and a leaf. It appears that the author's intention was to play on both aspects of the name. In English this association with literacy and nature is also retained with Leaf (translation is mine).

¹⁴³ Kozlik – Козлик.

escaping that fate. Unlike the shamans, none of these transformations is self-generated and, unlike the case of Moomintroll's change as experience of chaos that illuminates and reinstalls harmony, security, and belonging, neither do these transformations increase knowledge but rather work as cautionary tales. This speciesism becomes apparent already at the level of the original cause that generated the first transformation of Leaf in the second book, *Dunno in Sunny City* (1984: 73). Dunno's rage, will, and magic, like the gods of civilised religions discussed above, brought about the dangerous and fearsome transformation of a human into a beast.

Unbridled anger and vengefulness prompt Dunno to wave his magic wand and order Leaf's transformation into an ass, because Leaf had accidentally knocked down Dunno due to the habit Leaf had of reading when walking on the street. In an attempt to correct his misdemeanour, Dunno reads in the newspapers that supposedly the donkey was sent to the zoo and, believing this media to be a reliable source, he heads there to fix his mistake. But the media had misreported, and, once there, he transforms the wrong asses into mites. In the meantime, the real mite, Leaf, ends in forced labour in a circus amusing the insatiable crowds always craving for more entertainment – which Nosov critiques in the third book, once again resorting to the motif of transformation, where endless entertainment on the Island of Fools turns mites into sheep – again an undesirable change. Thus, Dunno fails to rectify his actions and, instead, turns “real” donkeys into people, while the human mite remains a beast. Contrary to the resolution of love and harmony that such a confusion between animal and human form and nature brings to the Moominworld, in the otherwise highly ordered Sunny City, such a mix-up leads to havoc and unleashes beastly spontaneity and cruel animal desires that transform the personalities of the inhabitants, many of whom become aggressive and thoughtless.

By exploring the topos of transformation in this light, Nosov centres the book around questions of authority, discipline and self knowledge as Dunno gets into a debate with his conscience. This debate reveals the author's reliance on civilised categories that distinguish wilderness (independence in questions of subsistence) from domestication (dependence on the permission of authority to subsist) as Conscience appeals to Dunno's sense of empathy for the plight of the transformed boy:

Conscience got quiet for a minute, but soon enough Dunno heard her voice again:

“Here you are, lying in a soft bed, under a blanket; you're warm, cosy and well. But do you know what the mite who turned into a donkey is doing? He's probably lying on the floor of some stable. For, donkeys don't sleep in beds. Or, perhaps he's rolling somewhere on the cold ground, under the open sky... For, he doesn't have an owner, and there is nobody to look after him.

... And maybe he is hungry,” the voice continued. “He can't even ask anyone to give him food, since he doesn't know how to talk. What if you needed to ask for something but weren't able to utter a word?”¹⁴⁴ (Nosov, 1984: 85 – translation mine).

This exercise in empathy relies on the juxtaposition of the categories of human against animal, domestication and wilderness: Dunno is told that he should feel sorry for the boy because the boy now sleeps on the bare ground under the open sky, but not for the animals, because the nature of humans is assumed to be different from human.

Conscience's argument boils down to this: because Dunno has committed a serious wrong by having denied the studious and passionate Leaf the pleasures and comforts of humanhood with its civilised privileges (these privileges have become human attributes and limbs), Leaf now can no longer sleep in a bed like Dunno, he is out on the street in the cold and cannot keep himself warm or find food, because the city leaves no space for wilderness and independence. Cities are made for humans and, hence, if you are an animal in the city you perish. The story thus focuses on the civilised “fact” of comfort and dependence, and the author assumes that, even as a donkey, Leaf's nature is still human and therefore domesticated and dependent on someone/something to keep him warm, provide him with food, etc.. Like the Oompa-Loompas who are depicted as in need of Willy Wonka to eat even what is available in their world, and unlike the Moomins who can live anywhere they go, Leaf cannot survive alone without his community, without the agricultural and domesticated space of Sunny City, without his outer form, and without the

¹⁴⁴Совесть на минуту умолкла, но скоро Незнайка опять услышал ее голос:

“Ты вот лежишь в мягкой постели под одеялом, тебе тепло, хорошо, уютно. А ты знаешь, что делает коротышка, который превратился в осла? Он, наверно, лежит на полу в конюшне. Ослы ведь не спят в кроватях. А может быть, он валяется где-нибудь на холодной земле под открытым небом... У него ведь нет хозяина, и присмотреть за ним некому”.

Незнайка крякнул с досады и беспокойно завертелся на постели.

“А может быть, он голодный, -- продолжал голос. -- Он ведь не может попросить, чтоб ему дали поесть, так как не умеет говорить. Вот если бы тебе надо было попросить что-нибудь, а ты не мог бы произнести ни слова!” (Nosov, 1984: 85).

artificial limbs of comfort and protection.

This dependence on the city's infrastructure is not so prominent for the mites of Flower Town who rely on smaller scale community cooperation and on gathering nuts, berries, mushrooms and wild fruit and vegetables. Yet, because Nosov perceives survival as dependent on cooperation, he cannot envision a person outside society and so the mites of Flower Town would probably find it difficult to survive alone in the same way it is difficult for Leaf to survive outside of civilisation and to flourish without his community, which consisted of Letter¹⁴⁵, the audience of their book theatre, and the whole infrastructure of professionals in Sunny City. Again, between the total independence of the moomins and the toys' total dependence on Christopher Robin, the interdependence of mites, each of whom plays a unique and indispensable role in the lives of the monolithic community, presents another attempt by Nosov at a compromise between the perspectives of wilderness and civilisation and connects the topos of transformation to the ontological problems of genesis, kinship, cleanliness, food, and identity.

Chapter 12: Conclusions on Cosmogonies in Science and Art

In an attempt to “make sense” of our present, people have presented narratives that strive to understand our beginnings and offer convincing explanations (etiologies) of why things are and how they got to be this way. These explanations also work as justifications for human decisions, choices and actions. During the twentieth century, some (western) scholars of literary theory and anthropology turned their attention to human knowledge as a product of such narratives, an approach where disciplines like medicine, astronomy, palaeontology, anthropology, politics, religion, cultural studies, folklore, linguists, literature, *inter alia* converged¹⁴⁶. But prior to the twentieth century and to the merely

¹⁴⁵ Bukovka – Буковка – in Russian means a letter of the alphabet.

¹⁴⁶ For examples, see Misia Landau (1984 and 1991), Cheryl Mattingly and Linda C. Garro (2000) on narratives in science and Jameson in literary studies and politics.

seventeen thousand years of agricultural civilisation, there were millions of years of wilderness, a fact mostly skimmed over by our myopic scientific storytellers who invariably tie the genealogical account of humans to European history as based on the historical narratives of civilisation, mostly Greek, but also of the Fertile Crescent with an occasional applause to the Egyptians – all slave societies.

In these accounts, the construction of knowledge of what constitutes human and non-human is based on the methodology of isolating, classifying, and categorising. In other words, this “knowledge” is based on reducing information and on separating the various genealogical branches from one another building the argument for this alienation on either a mythological or scientific understanding of blood relations or of linguistic¹⁴⁷ or genetic groups, thereby leaving everyone who does not belong to the civilised genealogy outside narrative or “outside history”, to borrow Amílcar Cabral's expression (although he used it specifically with regard to Marxist historical narratives that saw the history of people as the history of class struggle thereby leaving out all the people who suffered before civilisation and under imperialism [in Arrington, 2001: 8] and of course all the non-humans).

We thus construct our knowledge on the basis of our perspectives on life which then guides us in our cultural, political, and economic decisions and scientific and literary creations. In other words, every epistemological attempt in a civilised narrative is informed by the scientific method of observation and inference, but as Lakoff and Johnson (2003) demonstrate, even scientific methodology is not bias-proof, because what and how we see is contingent on the linguistic metaphors used and those, I argue, depend on the underlying perspectives that direct our gaze. What we deduce, therefore, is coloured by the culturally fostered premises and our manipulated, domesticated desires. Hence, even if microbiologists, physicists, palaeontologists or anthropologists often rely on tangible pieces of the puzzle, the choices of what goes into the larger picture, and the conclusions they draw, are structured by previously acquired knowledge, language, assumptions and

¹⁴⁷ For example, Franz Fanon pointed out how the Europeans view of the Africans as without language allowed them to classify them as inferior with the animals thereby justifying their brutality and exploitation. Jeremy Bentham, on the other hand, saw reason and language as insufficient categories of distinction that would justify torture and exploitation of either humans or animals. Sentience or the capacity to suffer was the only guideline that should guarantee the human or the animal person the right to be free.

driving urges and desires. Ultimately, however, in putting the pieces together, scientists rely on imagination and the ability to narrate. In other words, science is as much a product of imagination and preconception as art and religion are a product of truth, and it is imperative to study them together.

No wonder, then, certain topoi have pervaded the animist, heathen, pagan, monotheistic, and scientific epistemologies. The adaptation and reinterpretation of the fundamental tenets in these topoi had direct repercussions on the world since what we think of the world and how we choose to narrate our birth and the birth of the universe constructs meaning and provides practical guidelines on how to navigate through life and what to make of – and do with – its diversity. Cosmogony, thus, informs our ethical, moral, legal, and political constructs and, by offering explanations, legitimises the stance we take vis-à-vis such crucial matters as the anthropogenic destruction of forests, to take one actual example, the formulation of which can turn into a question of life or death: do we choose to view desertification and the extermination of thousands of species as a natural manifestation of an amoral order of “natural selection” in Evolution's battle for the “preservation of favoured races in the struggle of life”? Or, should we judge it as an immoral act of a people gone rampant with megalomania and should we thus strive to stop the tragedy? Or, yet, is it another expression of divine will in response to the dark forces of evil that either earn us the punishment or absolve us of responsibility?

Children’s authors have always struggled with these questions, and the books discussed above reflect the different approaches adopted in tackling mythological, theological, and scientific topoi – in that chronological order, with the mythological topos of genesis infiltrating all the disciplines. As Davidson notes, the

mythology of a people is far more than a collection of pretty or terrifying fables to be retold in carefully bowdlerized form to our schoolchildren. It is the comment of the men of one particular age or civilization on the mysteries of human existence and the human mind, their model for social behaviour, and their attempt to define in stories of gods and demons their perception of the inner realities” (Davidson, 1964: 9).

In other words, the mythology of a people not only reflects the cultural effort to define the self and the world, but, at its core, informs the scientific and judicial perspectives that structure and direct individuals and society in how they interact with the world and the

way they impact it. In the end, the laws we devise, the stories we narrate, the food we eat, and how we go about our daily lives are some of the components that constitute culture and whose existence owes to the way epistemologies have come to influence our aspirations, desires, and strife. Culture is thus a consequence of both perspective and knowledge, and knowledge is, concomitantly, a scientific and a poetic narrative that drives us with culture through our lives.

Misia Landau expresses eloquently this connection between narratives, history, scientific methods and texts in her article “Human Evolution as Narrative”:

Have hero myths and folktales influenced our interpretations of the evolutionary past?

Scientists are generally aware of the influence of theory on observation. Seldom do they recognize, however, that many scientific theories are essentially narratives. The growth of a plant, the progress of a disease, the formation of a beach, the evolution of an organism – any set of events that can be arranged in a sequence and related can also be narrated. This is true even of a scientific experiment. Indeed, many laboratory reports, with their sections labeled “methods,” “results,” and “conclusions,” bear at least a superficial resemblance to a typical narrative, that is, an organized sequence of events with a beginning, a middle, and an end. Whether or not scientists follow such a narrative structure in their work, they do not often recognize the extent to which they use narrative in their thinking and in communicating their ideas (Landau, 1984: 262).

Because everything – what we do or do not do in civilisation, that order in which the world has been divided and capitalised – has political ramifications, then, on the deepest level, the premises of our knowledge influence our “political unconscious”, to borrow Fredric Jameson's expression.

Narrative plays a crucial role in the articulation of this knowledge and history as they get extracted from both the conscious and the unconscious and materialise our present in that

single vast unfinished plot: “The history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles...” It is in detecting the traces of that uninterrupted narrative, in restoring to the surface of the text the repressed and buried reality of this fundamental history, that the doctrine of a political unconscious finds its function and its necessity (Jameson, 2002: 4).

Nosov's mite trilogy shows how a fictional narrative for children may intersect with biblical and mythological topoi, Kropotkin's (2006) evolutionary theory through mutual aid, and Marxist theory that ultimately leads from class struggle to socialist anarchy

through the withering away of the state¹⁴⁸. However, even if, at first glance, it may appear that Nosov presents a classical evolutionary theory scenario, his narrative is not that simple. He begins with an anarcho-primitivist or gatherer society that gets infected by the developments of a socialist state in Sunny City and, as the technologies get perfected, ventures to outer space, landing into full-bloom capitalism on the moon – i.e. it appears that the narrative follows a linear evolutionary pattern in which the world of mites “progresses” from no technology to technology and then to capitalist technology. Yet, he chooses to end the trilogy with the *return* of the mites to the state-free, community-based Flower Town, and there they find health, happiness, sunshine, and life, even if this life has been affected through contact with other societies.

In contrast to Dunno, the domestication in *100 Aker Wood* renders the characters static due to immobility and locked space. Except for the human character, who inevitably leaves for the real dimension of adulthood, literacy, education, and then probably a job, the “unreal” characters remain trapped in their perpetuity and domestication, sometimes named and sometimes their names taken away by the human Christopher Robin. In other words, the underlying assumption is that imagination can empower the child to invent his own world to dominate, while he himself is being domesticated – after all the book opens with the information that Christopher Robin goes to school to get domesticated and then, as civilisation declares, the nature of things is to graduate, leaving behind the idyllic happiness and moving into the dominated “reality”. If Nosov simply ignores the problems inherent in identity and professionalisation, Milne accepts essentialised specialisation and identity as the basis for healthy relationships. He opens his book with the act of naming itself, i.e. domestication and knowledge, and this spirit transfuses the relationships between the dwellers of the 100 Aker Wood.

For the moomins, life always was, always is, and always will be. Apocalyptic events, such as great floods and comets, that threaten their world are cosmic caprices to be accepted, negotiated, often avoided. Death is a part of life – a season in the various dimensions that in *Moominland Midwinter* is characterised by the little squirrel who dies

¹⁴⁸ Although Marx and Engels (1977a) state that in *The Communist Manifesto*, there has been disagreement about how much they both agreed on an anarchist outcome. For further debates on the question see Adamiak's (1946) essay: “The 'Withering Away' of the State: A Reconsideration”.

because he looks into the eyes of the Lady of the Great Cold after which the Snow Horse puts the squirrel on his back and carries him away to everland. The squirrel himself, or a new version of his self, reappears in the spring. Jansson consistently refuses the traps of domestication: no names and no professions. Living in a world of chaos, actions change, there is movement in what we cause and what we do, which makes identity impossible in Moominvalley. Hence, Moominpappa travels, but he is not simply a traveller. He writes, but he is not only a writer. The family explores the theatre, but they are not always actors and playwrights. The same with Moominmamma: she sews, she cooks, she plants, she cures, she travels, she paints, she dreams. Even after they settle down, they are sometimes there in the valley, sometimes they venture to the mountains or to the sea. The last book is about them not being there and in this respect they never end, for even in absence they remain in our lives.

In most non-domesticated cultures, cosmogonies often depict life as already existing at the beginning of the narrative and as simply being – no action needed. Gods could be animals, celestial bodies, or women and men. Sometimes, new forms would be created, often for a reason of their own or to help a god or the sun or a star with some task (Crozier-Hogle, Wilson and Leibold, 1997). Mostly, these creations were an act of love. Tricksters, monsters, strange desires or thoughts could mess things up and add tension to the plot, but the original reason for creation, according to these narratives, is a cosmic goodness and a marvellous universe with an implicit, or sometimes explicit, explanation for the purpose of life as instilled in cosmic balance. Usually in these stories, the world begins with one or a combination of the following elements: a tree, water¹⁴⁹, humans, animals, or celestial bodies and gods. The creation narratives of African bushmen, the Masai, Scandinavian mythologies, Australian aborigines, Native Americans, the Slavs, and the Japanese, among others, depict a germ, a tree of life, often a woman, sometimes a man, sky and water as the primeval forces that, with the help of animals, create the world are clearly depicted in the stories collected in Anikin et al. (1995). It also happens that in aboriginal mythologies, like in the monotheistic and scientific versions, life gets created after the story had begun. For example, a California Indian creation tale relates that the

¹⁴⁹ Sea water is often distinguished from fresh water and both are often necessary for the creation of life, a perspective echoed in the microbiological theory of evolution of life.

world was spun out of a song. The world was given as a gift to children to dwell in, says Darryl Babe Wilson, a California Indian storyteller who teaches Native American oral literature at San Francisco State University and literature at Foothill College in Palo Alto, CA¹⁵⁰.

Again, Nosov does not concern himself with the origins of the world or life. He is worried about what are we going to do with it now as it affects the future and this future rests on human actions, desires, and beliefs. For Milne, the narrator is the first cause of the book and it starts and ends with his progeny: his son. Other (literary) worlds, we are told from the start, have existed, but we are concerned with what happens in this one while it lasts. In Jansson's books, like in Wilson's cosmogony, Snufkin, the tramp who is afraid of possessions, wanders through the world, sometimes hand in hand with that primordial tune that dwells in the universe and which he at one time holds under his hat but then it flees; when it does get away, he walks the earth in search of it so as to catch it with his mouth-organ and share with the world its magic that announces spring, love, catastrophes, and all¹⁵¹.

As Moomintroll and Sniff got nearer they heard quite unmistakable sounds of music, and it was cheerful music, too. They [Moomintroll and Sniff] strained their ears excitedly, drifting slowly nearer. At last they could see it was a tent, and gave a shout of joy. The music stopped, and out of the tent came a Snufkin with a mouth-organ in his hand. He had a feather in his old green hat and cried: "Ahoy! Ship ahoy!"¹⁵² (Jansson, 1959: 54).

Before even meeting Snufkin, Moomintroll and Sniff capture his music and throughout the novels it is that song that, like the Hindu Om containing the singularity of God and all of

¹⁵⁰ Darryl "Babe" Wilson's session at the MLA convention, San Francisco, December 2008. In *Oral Tradition*, 13/1 (1998: 157-175) co-authored with Susan Brandenstein Park, Babe cites his ancestors', the Atsuge-wi, creation story. Here, first there was thought who manifested itself as voice and then as the being "Kwaw" or "Quon" - the Silver Grey Fox who with his song created our world because he got tired of sharing the original world with the constantly changing and challenging Coyote.

¹⁵¹ For example, see the opening story in the collection of "Tales from Moominvalley", book 7, titled "The Spring Tune".

¹⁵² The revised edition in Swedish is slightly different:

Vad är det där? Ropade Sniff. Ett Observatorium?

Nej, sa Moomintrollet. Det är ett tält. Ett gult tält. Och därinne brinner ett ljus...

När de kom närmare hörde de nån spela på munharmonika inne i tältet. Moomintrollet lade om rodret och flotten svängde långsamt in mot land och stannade stadigt i strandkanten.

Hallå? Ropade han försiktigt.

Musiken tystnade. Och ut ur tältet kom en mumrik i en gammal grön hatt och med pipa i munnen.

Hej, sa mumriken. Släng hit fånglinan. Inte råkar ni väl ha lite kaffe ombord? (Jansson, Book 2: 30-31).

existence, fills Moominworld with wonder. In Wilson's version of genesis, narrative is posterior to thought, voice, and song: First there was a vast void; then there was Thought; then there was song; and then came the word. For, how could there have been word before thought? Wilson asks. Certainly, God couldn't be so thoughtless as to talk without having thought first. Language must have followed an already existing reality filled with concepts and knowledge, and not the other way around as the theory of linguistic determinism maintains¹⁵³.

How we believe the world to have come about, says Wilson, is how we are going to live in it. Seeing the world as punishment for sin or as a gift of life has radical ramifications for whether people will honour and safeguard its diversity, or whether they will treat it with ingratitude and approach it as the averse consequence of a repugnant act (ibid). The difference between these two stances is what differentiates “primitive” society, where members express gratitude for all creation and warn against futile destruction of life,¹⁵⁴ from “civilised” (consumer) society, that sees its meaning for existence in domestication, exploitation, and a birth-given right to consume “resources”. Most important, this latter views with intolerance any suggestion of wildness or of the world existing for any purpose other than the one designated by the domesticator.

In the Moominworld, it appears that Moominmamma is the original love and Snufkin is the force that links this love to the cosmic song which is the original cause of creation that the song ultimately expresses. In Flower Town, the world exists as an evolutionary unfolding in step with human needs while generated by Mother Earth, whose love is both tangible yet unfathomably immense. Finally, in 100 Aker Wood, the world appears and vanishes at the whim of the dominator, even though the poem that dedicates the book to its original inventor, Christopher Robin's mother, links love to motherhood. Yet, the next mention of love appears right after the poem, in the introduction, locked behind bars, as an object of voyeuristic fetishism. This leads us to the next part of my research on the anthropology of these three literary worlds in which I examine how the

¹⁵³ George Lakoff and Mark Johnson (2003) see language as the formulating medium that gives rise to awareness of what's out there and hence of all knowledge, including science that is influenced by metaphors.

¹⁵⁴ There are numerous ethnographic and anthropological accounts of African, American, or Asian tribes, as an example see Moses Osamu Baba's “Iku-Nishi of the Saghalien Ainu in Royal Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland, 1949.

three fictional cultures respond to these domesticated and wild drives and how their respective socio-cultural paradigms express wilderness or civilisation in response to creating or resisting the institutions of control; for example, anthropological constructs of illness and health or crime and punishment respond to these fundamental precepts of domestication and wildness.

In the concluding part of this research, I return to the connections between language, domestication and incarceration and the specific mythologies of civilisation that allow for such overtly oppressive (physical) structures as school and zoos to be misrepresented as architectural edifices of love, health, and prosperity. In other words, language and human genesis have created a specific anthropology and the narratives offer the logic of madness, whereas misrepresenting the unreason of chaos as the clinical deviation from the norm.

III

Anthropological Narratives in Fiction and Life

Chapter 1: The Lulling Whisperer

So far, in my methodological steps I have proceeded almost biblically from the Word to the World. My aim has been to examine literature as an anthropological construct and in this sense trace its evolutionary trajectory from symbolic representation through literacy and narrative to culture, particularly that literary culture has come to impact our very nature and reality as well as the anthropogenic “evolution” of our environment. In my analysis I have identified two distinct ways of relating to the world that had radical implications for the possibilities of survival of the various communities of life: the non-linear, non-temporal position of wilderness that is constantly on the move and changing and the chronological, ordered and disciplining position of civilisation. In a different setting, I plan to explore new approaches and methodologies, but here I have examined the ways in which the two positions and their ensuing narratives infuse literature, both children's literature and the literature of science and art for the wider range of audiences. Since my work is taking place within the framework of a civilised institution, I have structured my inquiry in relation to this institution's narrative and logic as I trace the argument step by step and respond to its claims and beliefs.

My plan has been to compare and contrast the underlying basis for children's literature as knowledge, culture and social foundation, and I have endeavoured to provide a space for dialogue between the various narratives, voices, and texts by comparing and contrasting their most basic premises, assumptions and knowledge. But, since the reality of anthropogenic desertification, genocides, on-going extinction of thousands of species and overpopulation (almost seven billion) of human animals have accompanied the past seventeen thousand years of civilisation, yet has been overwritten with the narrative of progress and humanist values that praise civilisation and its “achievements”, I have allotted considerable space to identifying and examining the root of civilised constructs of

knowledge and the narratives that legitimate and reproduce (mis)representation, alienation, violence, silencing and injustice. Having thus proceeded from epistemological concerns of language and discipline in the first part, and having explored the underlying ontological conceptions of genesis and genetics in narratives of civilisation and wilderness in the second part, my examination leads to a third section on anthropological narratives of non-human and human-animal nature that inform our cultural and social endeavours, in which I explore the possibilities of a theoretical basis for redefining such terms as “culture”, “knowledge”, “civilisation”, “wilderness”, “order”, and “chaos”, particularly that they function as memes and genes in domesticating *doxa* and ideologies in the ever expanding and ever colonising civilising project.

Drawing from Daniel Dennett's studies on the philosophy of biology and Richard Dawkin's theory of memes as the cultural equivalent of genes, Jack Zipes (2009) makes a strong case for certain (fairy tale) motifs – his concrete example was the variations through space and time of the Frog Prince tale – that have the potential to turn into memes transmitting vital information about viable reproductive strategies and relationships. Particularly this final part of my inquiry echoes Zipes' call for collapsing the borders between disciplines in comprehending children's literature and tracing these motifs in the biological adjustments of human and non-human organisms to cultural variations, such as the invention of language¹⁵⁵, as they become integral elements of *doxa*, *body hexis*, *habitus*, ideology, and the physiological make-up itself of the forms of life affected by civilisation (i.e. engineered through breeding and domestication). In fact, there is an urgency for understanding the mechanisms and the reproductive function of these motifs, drives, and the narratives themselves, which – stemming from the perspective of domestication, like the self-defeating civilised institutions – have the propensity to turn into a tumour that ends up devouring its agents, its biosystem, and finally itself.

The nature of wilderness and of non-domesticated stories precludes the possibility of lying with the intention to create a permanent body of (mis)knowledge in order to manipulate since these narratives encompass a variety of perspectives and logics that regulate a balance through the unpredictability of outcome and consequences. As my

¹⁵⁵ See my earlier discussion of language and brain starting in chapter 3, part I.

discussion of aboriginal tales from Russia in part II demonstrates, there is simply no one righteous party that possesses the right to win and to own something or someplace permanently, be it a symbolic narrative, factual information, or a tangible object. In the end, if a person does not agree with another human or non-human person or perspective, one can follow the moomin example and simply ignore and go about living her life or move away. It does not mean that there are no creative or playful approaches toward truth(s) or challenging ways of seeing, interacting and influencing the outcome of an encounter. The folk tales around the world are testimony to non-domesticated peoples' awareness of tricksters and the various forces that can surprise, even overwhelm, whom every creature and all communities must know and be able to reckon with. What this means, however, is that, through the various lies and truths, a sense of Truth emerges in the ability of a community to exist through self-driven mutuality, empathy, and cooperation through a viable culture that understands and respects wilderness, i.e. the right to exist for one's own sake. Respect and harmony can come through “real” and “true” knowledge which can be accessed through empathy and concern. In a world completely colonised by civilised human animals, redefining the relationships that bind us to our ethics, desires, and the world has thus become of utmost urgency as seven billion people have now occupied the planet, desertified its continents, polluted the oceans, and are draining the reserves of fossil oils accumulated throughout the billions of years of life on earth.

In terms of civilised narratives, the situation is diagonally opposite, since there is a direction to the stories whose purpose is to influence, change, and manipulate living and non-living “objects” and “subjects” regardless of their own knowledge of themselves or their will. Civilised narratives impose their truth through confiscating the political power to manipulate and legitimate in addition to monopoly over violence that poses a constant and structural threat to the lives of the members of civilised “society”. In this respect, *society* is a term used to denote persons bound to each other through shared means of subsistence, and in civilised or agricultural settings, these bound bodies are related in a necessarily hierarchical order with a panoptical identity imposed by means of the threat of violence, through symbolism, language, (un)knowledge, and laws. Mark N. Cohen defines *society* in these terms:

Civilization, once identified by its visible technological monuments such as pyramids, has more recently been described in terms of the implied changes in social organization and, more specifically, the social stratification, political organization, and coercion entailed in the building of these monuments (Fried, 1967; Carneiro, 1970). The political power to build a pyramid – rather than the technology to do so – became the defining characteristic of the new social order, the state, in which an élite class monopolized the use of force and controlled direct access to essential resources such as land, or water, while the bulk of the population was forced to exchange its labour for food. *Society became an institution of competing interests held together by coercion rather than by homogeneity¹⁵⁶ and positive personal bonds*” (Cohen in Ingold, 1997: 273-274 – italics mine).

As Peter Kropotkin and Michel Foucault have observed, in order for this system of civilised order to be more effective and the arguments for adhering to *society* more compelling, identity, knowledge and narrative have to be based not on truth, but on a monopoly of the technologies of violence. Language and education constitute some of these technologies of violence that operate through an omnipresent threat to life. This threat has to be internalised by the victims – the working masses – and hence panopticon had to be taught, regardless of truth, facts, or the accuracy of the established causal relationships between suffering, wilderness, civilisation, happiness, mortality, crime, disease, *et al.* In other words, manipulation of subjects is the main goal of civilised narrative, and misleading is in the nature of civilisation itself. In this respect, the civilised narrative reminds one of the *Shaitan* against whose lulling whispers the Qur'an had warned:

Say: “I SEEK refuge with the Lord of men,

2. The King of men,

3. The God of men,

4. From the evil of him

who breathes temptations

into the minds of men,

5. Who suggests evil thoughts

¹⁵⁶ Even though I disagree with the larger implications of the term *homogeneity* here, and in fact have argued that it is civilisation that strives towards simplification, sterility, and homogeneity, while wilderness needs and thrives on variety and plurality, Cohen's definition of society echoes strongly Arshavsky's (in Nikitina, 1998) work on *dominanta* the respect for which helps each individual establish from early childhood an inner system of guidance in making decisions and choosing one's occupations.

to the hearts of men --

6. From among the jinns and men” (Qur'an, sura 114 Al-Nas, ayat 1-6).

In this part, I examine the *doxic* whisperers, the myths at the root of the narrative of civilisation that inform the distinct cultural and anthropological “materialisation” of its ontologies and which legitimate the silencing of the voices of the millions of victims of the longest and most brutal of holocausts in the history of civilisation, that of the extermination of wilderness. With the exception of a few truly wild texts, much of children's literature inadvertently projects these myths as self evident truths.

Three basic myths provide the foundation for the narrative of civilisation. The first myth is built on the premise that civilisation is a natural aspect of evolution – even in the case when life is understood as stemming from divine will – and is a state towards which all beings strive, yet only the humans, due to their specific characteristics (physiological possibilities for spoken language, bipedalism, or divine breath) have been able to attain. The second myth holds that wilderness is a place of destitution, illness, constant danger, and death, whereas civilisation provides quality of life, safety, health and longevity for *all* its domesticated subjects. The proponents of civilisation hold that domestication is better than wilderness even for the slaughtered children of cows, chickens, and pigs, as well as for the human poor, in spite of statistics demonstrating high mortality rates and the immense suffering from hunger, social diseases, and violence. This myth claims that everyone naturally prefers the “benefits” of civilisation (otherwise how can they live) and therefore it depicts victims as agents willing and choosing to forfeit independence, movement, and self-determination. Finally, civilisation claims that it is the source of morality, ethics, and compassion while wilderness is the dark place of brutality, amorality, and ruthlessness. I examine this last myth in chapter four in the context of the first narrative of evolution as vehicle for the first myth, because as Kropotkin observes, Darwin interlinks the question of morality with the evolution of intelligence (chapter four of *The Descent of Man* is dedicated to questions of morality), both of which he attributes to the nature itself of adaptation and a requirement of life: “ any animal whatever, endowed with well-marked social instincts ... *would* inevitably acquire a moral sense of conscience, *as soon as its intellectual powers had become as well-developed, or nearly as well-*

developed, as in man” (Darwin, 2004 : 120-121, italics mine). Hence, even while he does not rule out the “possibility” of animals attaining moral standards, he nonetheless puts the human being as superior and leader in this “most important” “difference between man and the *lower* animals” (ibid: 120).

These three myths dominate the narrative in all its manifestations through scientific and literary texts becoming the *doxa* of civilised knowledge, whether obtaining their legitimation from the empowering institutions of their time, through historical symbols, or even through simply appealing to its own authority and the power to kill. Because of these historical nuances, it often appears that the narrative changes, when, in reality, its domesticating platform remains the same. For instance, it claims that “true” knowledge today is no longer based on the “false” monotheistic Tree of Life. Yet, the contemporary version of the narrative simply replaces the biblical genealogies with the evolutionary genealogies that still confirm the human animal at the crown of creation; and Darwin's Tree of Life is the same old motif without which the human animal cannot fathom existence. In this respect, tracing this topos through the landscape of civilisation and wilderness, one can see the trajectory of the animist understanding of the Tree as a being among others, the one that breathes life, giving out oxygen by day and carbon dioxide by night, offers fruit as food and branches as shelter. With the spread of civilisation, the tree becomes more and more separated from its reality and nature and becomes an abstraction and a symbol for life there where life itself is being appropriated, domesticated, annihilated: the evolutionary branches that lead the human being, once again, to the throne of existence. When transposed into the civilised narrative, these motifs inform such children's books as Shel Silverstein's (1964) poem, *The Giving Tree*, which centres this topos and presents the parasitic relationship between the avaricious boy and the tree craving to be consumed by him as a beautiful tale of love, in which the victim exists to please the abuser and is glad to be tortured and consumed. In other words, evolution and time continue to drive the plot of civilisation in a unilinear and predetermined direction instituting oppressive relationships, inscribing them in a narrative of pain, consumption and death.

Chapter 2: Definitions of Life and Death, or Not Everyone Decides to Join Alice and Go Down the White Rabbit Hole

The basic perspective in wildness shares the fundamental concept of chaos theory: nothing is ever that which was or appeared to have been. Even though scientists still try to capture entropy with formulae, their nets are inadequate for the whole scope of existence. So far, I have focused on developing my definition of the premises that distinguish the civilised from the wild, namely: the civilised premise *knows* Man as having evolved or been created to dominate, order, name, possess, and consume its rightful resources, and the premise claims that the purpose for the existence of other beings is for a chain of consumption, with Man still leading in the sphere of eating. In the premise of wildness, this ontology *knows* the human animal as having been created or having evolved to be a speck and a component as insignificant as any other and as vital to the community of life as all. Wilderness knows the world and everything in it as existing for its own sake, *not* to be defined, confined, domesticated, known and possessed. In other words, the knowledge of civilisation rests on limitations, domestication, strict separation of categories, ignorance of the truth of others, and on global violence; while the knowledge of wilderness requires multiplicity of opinions, experiences, emotions, voices, and lives.

My definition of civilisation derives from the research of physical anthropologists (Eric Sunderland [1973], palaeontologists like Björn Kurtén [1984 and 1995]), and anthropologists (Tim Ingold [1997], Marshall Sahlins [1974 and 2008], Hugh Brody [2000], Piers Vitebsky [2006], John Zerzan [2002 and 2008]) among countless other sources. According to the basic anthropological definition, civilisation is a sedentary way of life whose mode of subsistence depends on the domestication of crops as well as of non-human and human animals leading to the constantly expanding territories of colonised space, time, and lives by means of selective, engineered breeding and abstraction allowing for the possession of places and entities whom the breeder, owner and exploiter may not necessarily see, *know*¹⁵⁷, touch, or hold.

¹⁵⁷ Orientalism, for instance, according to Edward Said (1979) functioned in this way: backed by the power for violence (military technology and masses of soldiers), the imperialist could devise any picture of the imperial object without regard to its veracity and impose it as a structure, that in the context of this relationship, benefited the imperial power. This, however, does not mean that the object is completely annihilated of any subjectivity or independence in relating to this knowledge. However, within the

The anthropological understanding of culture also derives its meaning from the concrete practices, material and symbolic tools, and concepts that guide individuals in their lives. In this respect bacterial culture and its interaction with its environment or the tools produced by birds or apes constitute culture as much as the sum of human endeavours spanning the Louvre, scientific textbooks, industrial production, opera, punk rock, drainage systems, organisation of city space, *inter alia*, and the ways in which these systems are approached, produced, used, and reproduced constitute human culture(s) that can be differentiated – not by their external details and superficial differences – but by their effect on their environment and the extent to which they keep the symbiotic community in balance or whether they consume their biospheres. The main distinction between these cultures that separates civilisation from wilderness resides in the stark contrast between sedentary confinement which depends on expansionism and colonialism for subsistence and the constant movement of nomadic peoples and gatherer lifestyles whose subsistence depends on relationships based on biodiversity, movement, and at the same time, unmediated presence and memory. In this respect, this understanding of civilisation and culture(s) incorporates existential and religious questions as well as Marxist and ontological perspectives on relationships, society, and space. Ultimately, it always goes back to the question of life: what is life and how should we live it?

Biology textbooks use growth and movement to distinguish life from non-life: the living organism grows and therefore moves (upwards or sideways within its space when it does not have limbs); it also moves in time by reproducing itself and transmitting its *habitus* and *praxis*; it uses energy and responds to the environment¹⁵⁸. The non-living matter supposedly does not do any of that. This concept gets drilled gradually throughout a child's education. Primary schooling introduces it in simple vocabulary and by the time the child grows into a university student, these definitions feel natural and matter of fact. They sit well in the *body hexis*, that is. Challenges to the “norm” are then taken as “the exceptions that prove the rule”.

framework of a relationship that ultimately consumes the lives, dreams, personalities, and free relationships of the colonised object, this structure of oppression has the most tragic and painful repercussions on the experience of life by the colonised subject.

¹⁵⁸ See chapter four on the Characteristics of Life in New Jersey Ask Science Grade 4, Triumph Learning; New York (see in bibl. Under Special Reports: 2005).

When children are not required to learn anything or when they ignore the limitations set by the requirements from “above”, they play with these concepts creatively and discover new ways of relating to knowledge. Without the fear of punishment or ridicule, they are capable of drawing conclusions that are not on the list of school requirements. For instance, this excerpt from my personal journal on my unschooled daughter's questioning of the scientific narrative demonstrates how personal each path in learning is and how enriching to the adults if they take children's observations seriously and not as “mistakes”, at worst, and “cute” childish errors or funny, harmless, but wrong answers, at best¹⁵⁹:

When Ljuba, my daughter, was nine years old, at midnight she would insist on reading geology – a 520 page in C4 paper format¹⁶⁰. My child's post-midnight scientific inspirations have been testing my patience since she was eight months old, for I have always been a morning person and staying up till 2 or 3 am for some reason failed to energise me. Still listening to her read aloud as I kept dozing off and on was magical. I helped occasionally with the terms she didn't know and learnt new things about the texts as well as about children's interactions with books. Prior to her fascination with geology, Ljuba was indulging in biology and psychology, where she first came across the characteristics of life as an organism that grows and moves and thus living matter was distinct from the non-living “objects”, such as rocks. Luhr (2003) however uses biological terms to describe the earth, such as “anatomy of the earth” or “the changing earth” which describes the earth as someone who “moves” or “grows”, i.e. it alters its being in space. “Most minerals are solid crystalline substances composed of atoms,” the text reads. “A crystal is a solid such as a mineral with an orderly repeating atomic structure. With unrestricted growth, it forms a geometric shape with naturally flat planes” (ibid).

Ljuba was puzzled: “But if non-living matter doesn't grow, how come minerals can have unrestricted growth? The minerals must be alive. And so are crystals. But what about stones and rocks?”. Thus our nocturnal conversation led to all sorts of ontological considerations. We recalled the dark but beautiful Soviet film *The Story of the Voyages* (1982) [*Сказка Странствий – Skazka Stranstvij*]¹⁶¹ in which Marta, the heroine in search of her kidnapped brother, voyages through different landscapes and its peoples with their singular cultures. Everywhere in civilisation, she sees abuse, pain, death, and suffering. One of the peoples among which she sojourns have made a living by pumping oil from the earth and delivering it to a warrior group of extortioners. Both groups have gone mad in this relationship and as Marta departs from their madness, she turns around from a distance and sees that what they believe to be drilling is not the earth, but a living whale that suffers and the oil that they are pumping is its blood. “Maybe, these books don't know everything about the earth, after all,” my daughter concluded. “It might turn out that stones feel pain too”. Children thus are capable of formulating theological and

¹⁵⁹ The American philosopher Gareth Matthews has been publishing on philosophy with children, taking their questions seriously on the nature of justice, democracy, minority rights, etc.

¹⁶⁰ The book was *Earth* edited by James F. Luhr (2003), published by the Smithsonian Institution.

¹⁶¹ On the film database (imdb), the title is translated as “Story”, however, in Russian *Skazka (сказка)* is a fairy tale.

ontological questions that are thousands-years-old as they ponder over the nature of life and being.

I recalled this conversation later as I was revising the literature on evolutionary theory, whose most magnificent idea comes from palaeobiology, the concept that all life shares common origins because it came from an electrochemical gradient between alkali and acid in the sea water, which provided the basis for the living cell: acetyl phosphate and pyrophosphate. We are then all connected to the sea but also related to all forms of life, including the rocks on the ocean floor. That electric current, charged by storms, has been the spark of genius driving our unrelenting yearning, so beautifully captured by Tove Jansson in the character of the perpetual travellers in Moominbooks, the Hattifattners, whose life force derives from the electric charges generated by the storm, and who are forever drawn by the vast expanses of the sea, desiring nothing but to move in silence towards the horizon. They are not blighted by language and are the most mysterious, primal, vital and intense forms of life. Tove Jansson, like the aboriginal storytellers, knew the essence of life (from personal journal entries of September 2008 and January 2010).

Sedentary theory intersects with practice at several points in civilised institutions. Its contradictions, however, are expressed most explicitly in the question of pedagogy where the conflict between the attempt to teach life through methods that instil death reveal the discrepancies between methodology and content: pedagogical methods ensure that children for most of their day remain locked in one place (desk, classroom, school, and then with homework), forced to learn about the world from a highly ordered, restrained, and sedentary perspective, while memorising the exact opposite from textbooks, namely, that movement is what distinguishes the living from the non-living.

This paradox extends to other spheres of civilised life as well. For instance, people are told from early childhood that economic movement is possible through social climbing as reward for hard-work, while, concurrently, property and the classification of classes, heritage, and other markers ensure that there is no real movement, change, or entropy and that, throughout the history of civilisation, the human and non-human people who work the hardest have been compensated the least; their lives consumed by those who work the least, yet who possess and control the most. Because the symbolic capital is linked tightly to real lives, bodies and suffering, exploitative economic systems are bound to collapse if those bodies die. The dispossessed, the disempowered, and the millions of beings marginalised from participation in the “resource” structure as agents (they, themselves, constitute the resources and possessions) are thereby either eliminated through war or left to perish in what the Malthusian explanation holds as the “natural population control”.

In her anthropological work titled *How Institutions Think*, Mary Douglas (1986) discusses the tacit understanding of and complicity of everyone, including the disempowered individuals, in which group was to perish in an impending crisis, yet no one, neither on the local level nor on the international, would do anything to prevent the tragedy. Circumscribed in tight camps, often for the duration of their short lives, refugees are the most blatant expression of civilisation's impediment to movement and thence to life, revealing the collusion of individual states with the international organisations that are more concerned with controlling this despair, locking it in one place – the camp – instead of working towards its eradication. In fact, movement (real, symbolic, or economic) in the civilised narrative is a mythical topos. In those cases where there is a real possibility of movement taking place, social movement presents a serious threat to this myth that depicts civilisation as developing towards its better self and yet continues to ensure that despair remains cemented in a static, solid structure trapped in a monolithic permanence.

In this light, what meaning could a child extrapolate from the contradiction between the content of the lesson and the pedagogical methods through which it is delivered, if: (A) at first, a child is taught that the definition of life is movement and the definition of death is lack of it; (B) then, the child is forced to submit to sedentary incarceration in school and then with homework after school with the evolutionary trajectory set towards a sedentary job in an office space or wherever else? If a person accepts as true both the definition and the method through which this definition is taught, the deepest meaning that she can extrapolate from these contradictions is to renounce life itself: “life means movement, but I cannot move, I am told where to sit and for how long, what to do, learn, and how to grow. Therefore I must have died”.

This paradox of civilisation that knows that life is movement and yet imposes stillness is the main point where ontology, anthropology, wildness, and civilisation intersect. For, if chaos and wildness are the expression of life craving movement even in stone, then the decision to forfeit one's freedom and independence to roam as purposelessly and unreasonably as do the Hattifattners or Snufkin in Moominland – whose reason and purpose are either cosmic or their own – binds people to sedentary settlement.

Ultimately, sedentary settlement expands into cities, forcing these cities and settlements to depend on the exploitation of human and animal labour and the domestication of crops, water, land, even air, in conquered and necessarily ever expanding territories, whose biodiversity has to be exterminated, for it no longer provides community for the conqueror but rather poses a threat to ownership and a competition for resources. Civilisation is, thus, based on the agricultural practice of monoculture (both of crops and of civilised human ontology), in which the countryside becomes a necessary resource submitted to the needs and agency of the city, its conqueror.

The paradigm for civilised relations was thus transposed to all aspects of civilised society: space – particularly the space outside the city which became the city's property – and whoever dwelt in this space became a matter of calculated ownership and hence had to be controlled, “designed”, and engineered, while human and non-human wilderness was to be eradicated. Starting with reproduction and spanning urban planning, architecture, bodies, minds, illness, health, punishment, reward, education, *ad infinitum*, every single aspect of life has acquired a price and has become converted into symbolic or material capital (Bourdieu, 1979 and 1990). Any threat to the growth of profit, increment in wealth, or to the maximisation of the exploitation of all its human and non-human resources became “outlawed” and is constructed as a threat to “order”. In this context, the whole world — even the universe — becomes an architectural exercise, and wilderness — or the existence of someone or something for its own purpose — a threat and chaos as a negative force that civilised society fights.

In order for this system of subsistence and colonialism to work, the resources have to be domesticated or trained to believe that access to food depends on, and their whole existence owes to, how well they serve their “owners”. Although all of these elements of civilisation figure prominently in children's culture and literature, the last point regarding the control of food, bodies, and will is the one that is most tightly linked with the pedagogical methods themselves that constitute the main tools of domestication, with literature and literacy playing a more prominent role in the expression and propagation of civilised culture. This indicates that the most significant differences between cultures¹⁶²

¹⁶² Here, I do not differentiate between the cultures of non-human and human animals. There are bacterial cultures, there are the cultures of plants, of insects, and so on. By culture I mean the sum of devised

around the world throughout history reside in the roots of the ontological positions that drive people to forge their material cultures and *habitus*, while the mundane details through which these cultures and their differences express themselves come second in their ability to induce significant structural change.

Most human and non-human cultures choose the ontology of wildness even though evidence shows that the concept of domestication has been available to non-human and human animals throughout the ages: certain parasites, microbes, plants, and animals are known to be able to change the behaviour of their prey in order to suit their own culture in the manner of those humans who have devised the hierarchical structure of human and non-human beings for consumption. As Mark Nathan Cohen (1977: 19) observes:

There is fairly widespread consensus now among anthropologists that the knowledge that plants grow from seeds is probably universal among hunters and gatherers and that this knowledge has probably been available to human groups since very early times, long predating its application in full fledged agricultural economies. For example, example, Flannery (1968: 68) states:

We know of no human group on earth so primitive that they are ignorant of the connection between plants and the seeds from which they grow.

Similarly, according to Bronson (1975: 58):

Deliberately growing useful plants was neither unique nor a revolutionary event. It probably happened in many places starting at an early date. This is not a complex idea or a difficult idea to develop. It is not beyond the inventive reach of any human being. We can be quite sure that activities resembling cultivation go far back into the Pleistocene (Cohen, 1977: 19).

The obvious question here is: why most human and non-human forms of life have chosen not to go down the path of domestication if the relationship between seeds and plants, or chicks and hens, or calves and cows, or babies and mothers, etc., is a connection that can easily be made by all humans and animals? Aboriginal peoples around the world have known about the mechanisms of reproduction all along and have tended diverse forest gardens and helped salmon reach their reproduction sites safely (Ellen in Ingold, 1997), yet with the exception of a few sporadic outbreaks of civilisations in the human history of

customs and habits that are meant to help us to economise the effort of reinventing the wheel and at the same time to encode “traditional” behaviour such as eating, reproductive, and living patterns. When certain elements of cultures change, they do not necessarily challenge that culture or society if the basic premises that drive them remain the same and therefore often “revolutions” end up, not only reconfirming the preceding social structure and order, but in fact making it even more efficient.

Africa, Middle East, Asia, and Mesoamerica (e.g. the civilisations of Mali, Egypt, Aztec, Maya, India, or the Tigris and Euphrates), no one else saw this social structure of colonialism as a preferable way of life.

Not only is the civilised narrative young – domestication of crops and animal husbandry in Asia and Mesoamerica goes back a mere seventeen thousand years (Ellen in Ingold, 1997; Sunderland, 1973; Dickens, 2004) prior to which there were millions of years of diversity and life surviving to this day in some parts of Africa and the Amazon forest, but this narrative has been seriously challenged, particularly from the evidence gathered in the fields of ethology, primatology, and human animal studies (such as anthropology). Observations on chimps, birds, bonobos, wild dogs, *et al.*, support Kropotkin's understanding of nature as welcoming and favouring life, where beings thrive in diversity, and all organisms, regardless of the degree of their simplicity or complexity, know that their well-being depends on intricate symbiotic systems fostered by mutual aid and cooperation.

In contrast to the Darwinian version that sees the well-being of individuals or whole classes and groups as contingent on how far ahead the individual or the class/group enter into reproductive competition with others and how smartly they use resources and forge useful alliances that would further their individualistic and exploitative ends (libertarian anarchism and market economy are the most radical expressions of this premise), the Kropotkian thesis on viable strategies holds that since the world provides favourable conditions for life, organisms can live well in it and therefore they know that the happiness of one depends on the happiness of all, while the happiness of all makes the happiness of one. If one individual or one species suffers, her pain is felt by others and elicits their response. Knowing the world through empathy, experience, and improvisation helped the ontological position of wildness to prevail for millions of years, because the ability to empathise stimulates intelligence and maintains the drive of life. For, by tuning to the experience of others we can grow and move outside the claustrophobic borders of our reality tunnels circumscribed by our personal interests. It is this ability to feel, understand, and care for the suffering of the other that allows a person to understand and, therefore, to know the other on her terms, accepting that the reason for the other's

existence could be none other than to simply derive pleasure from being. From this perspective, the suffering of one becomes a cosmic tragedy of whole symbiotic systems of being.

Chapter 3: Anne's Choice

Evidently, all forms of life tend to choose the most efficient ways for living their aspirations and reproducing themselves as ideas, knowledge, experience, and physiological beings as well as adapting their environment to their needs and themselves to their environment (Kropotkin and Darwin, *et al.*). The relationships between the various forms of grass and weeds point to the sophisticated intelligence of these plants to have worked out a symbiotic balance with other forms of life for millions of years. If grass still lives, in spite of the brutal civilised human mawing, pesticides and herbicides, it demonstrates resilience and intelligence that allow it to overcome even the exceptional brutality of civilised humans. Since everyone is intelligent and is capable of choosing whether to interfere in the reproduction of others or not, then the question begs itself, why, apart from some viruses, microbes and humans, no one has chosen to control the sexuality and the reproduction of others or to modify their purpose and lives in the organised and globally totalitarian and expansionist manner of human civilisation or severe outbursts of epidemics (again, caused by civilisation)? In other words, if species choose what's best for them, and what's best for them is supposedly to conquer, curtail and control, then why don't they go down this path? Could it be that they have known that this path was not optimal for them and for life in the long term? In other words, could it be that they are far-sighted and the civilised humans myopic?

Responses to these questions depend on the ontological premises from which one proceeds in answering them. The Darwinian narrative (which includes all the responses and interpretations that propelled specific cultural and anthropological manifestations)

proposes that civilisation was possible because only humans have evolved into being capable of developing language, bipedalism, having an upright posture that freed the hands for developing technology, and an abstractly thinking brain that could calculate the advantages of this system of control and modification of the environment instead of modifying the self and adapting it to the world in the manner of the other, non-human beings.

Another premise is that specific actions as well as the evolution of organisms are driven by self-interest, i.e., by greed and competition even in questions of cooperation, where alliances are sought for profit and, in the spirit of political *praxis*, are easily discarded when they become no longer convenient, i.e. these alliances are not inspired by concepts of honour or altruism. This narrative holds that humans dream, desire, and understand their natural propensity for greed and violence in a meta-linguistic manner, an understanding that has allowed them an “advantage” over others in the race for domination providing them with the possibility to organise their greed and violence more effectively. In other words, we are told that humans are capable of greed as well as of conceptualising, rationalising, and justifying it and the structural injustices that the meta-language enables them to construct, which, in turn, justifies and institutionalises the greed and the violence that such “knowledge” generates.

Since this “knowledge” is based on stratification, specialisation, and alienation, it discards much of the information available in wilderness and ignores the suffering of others. Civilised knowledge is, therefore, “un-knowledge” whose aim is to simplify the complexity of the world by imposing specialisation of skill, expertise, or purpose in a narrow, segregated field serving the humanist hierarchy. What is in reality incompetence in the complexity of life, civilisation terms as “professionalisation”: chicken and cattle become only “food”; dogs and cats exist to give pleasure as pets; a secretary at a food store must know the specific drawers, letter-heads, and letter-forms, but is not required to know the chemical food additives in the cans she helps to sell and is encouraged to remain ignorant about how chickens and the cattle live and die; an engineering professor is not expected to know how to hunt mushrooms or what the biologist in the next building does in her laboratory, or what additives and hormones enhance her sandwiches; a mother

cannot understand her child's crying, she needs to pay a paediatrician to explain to her; and so on. To be a professional means being incompetent in everything except the specific technical field for which the expert is paid specific amounts of money, with which she can buy concrete things, and specific services. This makes each expert dependent on other experts for the rest. However, because the exchange between these experts follows the rationale of extortion, hierarchy, and symbolic value, then most “professionals” fare poorly with this deal, while the few that do well prosper exceptionally.

Specialisation is imposed by the social structure itself and secured by means of the impenetrable walls of segregation in education and symbolic capital (Bourdieu, 1979), city planning and public space (Zipes, 2010), transportation and social networks, property taxes, rent, among others. For instance, in the article on European poverty cited earlier, Sumlennyj and Koksharov (2010) provide examples of the inability of the residents of an impoverished neighbourhood in Glasgow to buy a metro ticket to visit a different neighbourhood of the same city, which leads to many people growing up without knowing anything outside of their neighbourhood. Like the serfs of feudalism, the poor continue to be trapped in closed, colonised spaces. In an anthropological monograph entitled *The Broken Fountain*, Belmonte (1989) renders the lives of the residents in one of the most impoverished neighbourhoods of Naples, Italy and the struggles with the borders of poverty that lock its residents in a claustrophobic world of injustice. Ethnographic and anthropological accounts from other parts of the world confirm the power of these tangible borders between economic disparities that play an integral role in the engineering of space, time, and even love. This despair in love was poignantly depicted by Nancy Scheper-Hughes (1992) in *Death Without Weeping: The Violence of Everyday Life in Brazil* as she describes the resignation of the impoverished mothers to the reality of many of their children dying from starvation, thereby bringing to mind Mary Douglas' (1986) observation on the hierarchical starvation of certain social groups in Africa.

In contrast, wilderness requires a wide range of knowledge and skills to enable a person to take care of herself as well as to support and exchange with her community of life. Here, the choice to share and cooperate is driven by empathy and the respect for the lives and the well-being of the members of one's community of life where the generosity

in sharing measures a person's worth and ensures that economic disparity does not arise in that community¹⁶³. The weaker individuals are taken care of regardless of whether they can contribute or not. In these societies, human and non-human animals help their injured and other members who, for some reason, are not able to participate in a hunt or a gathering expedition¹⁶⁴.

In order to be able to radically shift the underlying basis that nurtures solid relationships in a culture, the first thing that domestication must do is colonise the will and knowledge that lead to strong community ties and concurrently to individual independence in subsistence, movement, and personal purpose. As the ability and skill to care for oneself and for others gets destroyed through specialisation, the domesticated persons become handicapped, ignorant, and ultimately immobile, i.e. dead. In this respect domesticated humans and cattle behave in a way that can be termed despair. Even when the gates to freedom open, they do not rush outside as they no longer believe that they can survive in wilderness and stop dreaming. Here, to be a specialist or expert in one's "field" entails dependency and an essentialist attribution of purpose. Notions such as: cows are meat, Africans are poor, men are managers, etc., which constitute the basis of the essentialised qualities forms the specialisation for which a group is known to be "naturally" good at and which in turn justifies the exploitation of these qualities (regardless of whether they are really present). The process of identification and professionalisation thus renders the members of the essentialised group dependent on the domesticator for identifying these qualities and then consuming the attributed roles in exchange of money, favours, and even the right to live. Hence, if a group of people believes that cows have been created to be eaten, then the cow is forced to live exclusively for this purpose to be eaten: she eats, is forced to reproduce, separated from her children, forced to be milked by machines, incarcerated, etc., until she is killed. If Africans are known to be best at being defeated, used as slaves, and to starve after the "altruistic" colonisers were asked to leave, then the old colonial domesticator, dressed in a new fashion, can decide where the camps should be set up, what the refugees should eat, and how to coerce the rest of the Africans, who are

¹⁶³ Marcel Mauss (1990), Maurice Godolier (1996), and Sahlins (1974), among others have looked at the concept of the gift and potlatch as economic transactions. I argue that the view itself of acts of generosity through this lens is prompted by the domestication of generosity and that these acts could have a completely unrelated ontological source or meaning.

¹⁶⁴ I discuss this more in depth later in chapter 4 on Neanderthals, wild dogs, etc..

not starving, to participate in this scenario and the neo-colonialist relationships. In the case where men are managers, they cannot grow their own food, build their own home, weave their own clothes. They have to make sure that others do this for them. The examples are endless.

To be a specialist, hence, demands ignorance of the most important details of life and requires complete submission to one's speciality in a tightly defined field that is approved by the civilised institution, responding to the needs of this institution and not to the needs of the human or non-human animals themselves.

The dependence generated by civilised relationships creates a system of death in which the motivations for “exchange” and “participation” are driven by fear, apathy, greed, and even a degree of sadistic pleasure, since seeing others faring badly, or at least worse than oneself, confirms that the choices one made were the right ones and hence the suffering of those who have failed to make the same choices, for whatever (ignored) reason, becomes a source of comfort. A typical example of this is the common reaction of “first-world” people when facing the reality of starvation and death around their world: “I visited India and boy am I glad to be an American (or Canadian, or French, or whatever) and to have such a beautiful home to come back to”. Inadvertently, such statements ignore the death and misery in the “first-world's” own backyard. Moreover, they dismiss the fact that domesticated human and non-human people's lives and deaths depend on the civilised infrastructure for institutional violence, injustice, and the hierarchically rationed cruelty and suffering not only on the individual, social and national level, but also on the international level of global nation-state hierarchy.

Lucy Maud Montgomery's (1983) *Anne of Greene Gables* illustrates how this topos is projected in children's books. The novel (consisting of nine books) depicts the inherently unequal economic relations, career, and investment as normal and rewarding. Two farmers, brother and sister, from Prince Edward Island want to get free labour on their farm and so come up with the idea of ordering a boy from an orphanage in Nova Scotia. By mistake, the orphanage sends them a girl. The underlying basis for this decision is therefore exploitation, for who else can be more easily taken advantage of than an orphan without any social, symbolic, or material capital? Of course, there are also good

intentions in the reasoning that “well, the orphan would have fared so badly, abandoned in this institution, while we could share what we have”. However, the narrative leaves unquestioned the basis for the arrangement of social relations in a way that allows for some people not to be able to afford to keep and love their children, while others can choose to take a child as a labour resource and a source of joy. Instead, the novel presents both parties, the victim and the exploiter, as authors of their choices and projects their relationship as viable and enriching for all, thereby omitting the basis of violence and its effects on them and their world.

Unequal relations are thus embedded in the narrative at its very conception: the dispossessed orphan is there to work on the colonised land turned into an agricultural resource where all forms of competition (“weeds”, “pests”, “natives”, “foreigners”, animals, birds, etc.) get either controlled, domesticated, or exterminated. The development of the plot culminates in Anne's gendered and “professional” response to the civilised expectations of her: she represses her dream to travel and learn about the outside world, to realise herself as a writer, and turns down the scholarship that would have allowed her to fulfil her inner purpose. Instead, she chooses to stay on the farm and take care of her adoptive mother. The message of the book is appealing to readers because it speaks to the inner – almost on the cellular level – need for community and cooperation.

To an extent, like Sendak's Max, who in his own domestication negotiates a sense of empowerment by invading wilderness, colonising it and taming the wild others as well as his inner dreams, Anne tames herself and kills her own dream by aligning her happiness with the role of a good resource for the farmers and their farm, a gendered role that is prescribed by civilisation as domestication is also about the control of sexuality, reproduction and the incarceration of resources in farms, schools, offices, *et al.* According to the narrative, therefore, Anne proves to be a good investment for someone who makes a living off colonisation, the essence of agricultural farming that consumes purpose, meaning, lives, time, and space of all who dwell in that nexus. Most important, the book tells us, Anne renders everyone happy: the colonising farmers, herself, and the colonised land itself as she gladly curtails her own movement through space and through interdisciplinary knowledge by declining the offer to travel to university, which provided her

an opportunity to follow her heart to expand her knowledge and write. Of course, the university and the city themselves are part of the civilised colonisation of country space and therefore, regardless of her choice, Anne's options are limited to the civilised spectrum of relationships. Thinking that she is the author of her choice and that she chooses community, she actually makes the choice that is appropriate to her gender and social standing that define her within a domesticated and domesticating hierarchy.

The point here is not to argue for the abandonment of the elderly or the weak in favour of one's own interests necessarily. In wilderness most human and non-human societies, including the Neanderthals, have been known to take care of the injured, the old and the weak (Bekoff & Pierce, 2009; Kurtén and Gould in Kurtén, 1995; Boesch et al., 2010; Goethe and Kropotkin in Kropotkin, 2006; among others). The difference between choosing to help in the respective contexts of wilderness and civilisation is that in wilderness the driving force to share comes from within the individual in a landscape that does not submit to the concept of rightful ownership and therefore it is not a hierarchically imposed subjugation, but a lasting bond and relationship that aides self realisation, rather than hampering it. Therefore, members of the community of life get their turn in partaking of the fruit, water, and livelihood. Those who can take more share with those who are unable to reach food. Inability to access food in the conditions of wilderness either stem from some larger environmental disbalance (e.g. drought, sudden unprecedented drop or rise in temperatures, etc.) or from one's own weakness. In this sense, the sanctions imposed by civilisation that lock food in social constructs of permanence, ownership, and weakness are reminiscent of these catastrophic disasters, a disease that has to be overcome if life is to prevail on earth¹⁶⁵. In wilderness, conflicts of interest also arise, however, unlike in civilisation, there is no theory that makes any single outcome the rule of thumb or “law by precedent” that locks individuals in hierarchical systems that control time, space, and lives.

In the civilised narrative to which *Anne of Greene Gables* adheres, the expectations of self abnegation, self control and self sacrifice abide by the rules of a rigid hierarchical order, which can be expressed in Foucauldian terms as: “the genius of the social

¹⁶⁵ Again, Marcel Mauss' (1990) *The Gift* is an anthropological exploration of redistribution of wealth in non-domesticated cultures, e.g. as expressed in Potlatch.

fabrication of the individual is to make that individual the principle of his or her own fabrication, thus guaranteeing the sense of authenticity in what is fabricated” (in Frank, 1998: 2:331). In other words: Anne has to accept the narrative and invent a series of stories whose contradictions will cancel themselves out and in which she emerges content and with a sense of empowerment for having chosen this narrative herself thereby becoming the author of her own victimisation.

Several theorists and historians of children's literature – for instance, Gillian Avery (1975), Jack Zipes (1983 and 2002) and Andrew O'Malley (2003) – have observed that there have been two concurrent narratives expressed in children's books written in the English language that address two distinct audiences divided along economic, social, gender, or racial lines. Needless to say, these categories distinguish the empowered from the disempowered. The narrative addressed to those who control resources depicts qualities such as individuality, originality, creativity, leadership, spontaneity, dishonesty, greed, etc., as positive. For instance, in *The Wind in the Willows*, Kenneth Grahame (2003) portrays the aristocratic Toad as lovable and rightful owner of wealth even as he breaks the law, lies, steals, and escapes from prison at the expense of the working class. His friends, even while they do not own anything themselves, act, in Malcom X's words, as “house Negroes” making sure that the revolution does not happen, that the Weasels, those wild, proletariat masses fail to re-appropriate Toad's possessions, all the while Toad himself is gallivanting around the world, playing with technology and breaking laws and moral codes.

Members of the exploited categories, in contrast, are expected to conform to the social expectations of themselves constituting those resources. Their status as objects, exploited, underclass already warrants their portrayal as deviant and untrustworthy. Here, the qualities that are depicted as desirable in the first category become negative, dangerous, and illegal, while obedience, dependability, diligence, hard-work, and servitude are exalted (Avery, 1975; Zipes, 1983 and 2002; and O'Malley, 2003). *Anne of Greene Gables*, the washerwoman and her daughter who help Toad in *The Wind in the Willows*, the peasant girl who heals the rich boy in *The Secret Garden* while not wanting anything for herself, among numerous other examples, illustrate these standards.

In this way, a fictional book, such as *Anne of Greene Gables*, inscribes itself within the larger narrative of domestication: along with land, Anne constitutes a resource for the farmers and is the one to renounce her wildness, while the farmers cling to their ownership, space, and time. Lucy Maud Montgomery thus creatively projects a Darwinian narrative, and Anne picks the most viable strategy in that logic: to serve the interests of those who are more powerful than her (coming from an orphanage, she a priori does not have any social or other capital) and define herself in their terms aligning her own self-knowledge with their definitions without revealing conflict of interests. Both, we are told, are happy with the way the narrative unfolds, and, as readers, we remain ignorant of other possibilities, such as a revolt that leads to rewilding, because, presumably, wildness poses even a greater danger than poverty and orphanage, while civilised relations and stratification provide a haven of safety. In this way Anne's choice reiterates the Darwinian¹⁶⁶ premise that nature itself is unwelcoming – even hostile – to life where living beings are in a perpetual mode of adaptation to it and competition with one another, developing more and more sophisticated strategies to overcome adversities whether through alliances or violence and war.

¹⁶⁶ Charles Darwin himself has acknowledged in his work the dangers of the reproductive success of any given species that means the extermination of another species. My usage of the terms “Darwinian” or “Kropotkian” theory or perspective pertains to (1) the main focus of the authors; and (2) the main focus of the reception. Namely, the way the Darwinian evolutionary scientists applied Darwin's insights is to favour the competitive focus, whereas the Kropotkian theory was embraced for its favouring the mutual aid aspect of co-existence. Kropotkin, however, acknowledged, the place of violence and competition, only relegated it to the less important strategy and more as a check-in-balance regulatory mechanism, and gave more weight to the role of cooperation as surviving and proliferation strategy.

Chapter 4: They Chose to Be Wild: The Interrelationship of Empathy, Intelligence and Viability

One of the most widespread myths about civilisation holds that ethics, morality, choice, “humanness”, intelligence, and compassion are the prerogatives and results of civilisation, and conversely that wilderness is a place of savage brutality, ruthlessness, amorality, simplicity, instincts, reflexes, and ignorance. Close observation of both states reveals that the reverse is true.

Physiologist Ilya A. Arshavsky, applying Petr Kropotkin's theory of evolution through cooperation and mutual aid to his study of the physiology of the growth of organisms, observes that wildness is ethical and moral while civilised humans are immoral, ruthless, and sick (Arshavsky, 1992; in Nikitina, 1998). Observing the abundance of life and diversity in the harshest of the world's climates in Siberia in winter, Kropotkin juxtaposed civilised brutality to the generosity of wilderness in these words:

Not long ago the small streams of Northern America and Northern Siberia were peopled with colonies of beavers, and up to the seventeenth century like colonies swarmed in Northern Russia. The flat lands of the four great continents are still covered with countless colonies of mice, ground-squirrels, marmots, and other rodents. In the lower latitudes of Asia and Africa the forests are still the abode of numerous families of elephants, rhinoceroses, and numberless societies of monkeys. In the far north the reindeer aggregate in numberless herds; while still further north we find the herds of the musk-oxen and numberless bands of polar foxes. The coasts of the ocean are enlivened by flocks of seals and morses; its waters, by shoals of sociable cetaceans; and even in the depths of the great plateau of Central Asia we find herds of wild horses, wild donkeys, wild camels, and wild sheep. All these mammals live in societies and nations sometimes numbering hundreds of thousands of individuals, although now, after three centuries of gunpowder civilization, we find but the debris of the immense aggregations of old. How trifling, in comparison with them, are the numbers of the carnivores! And how false, therefore, is the view of those who speak of the animal world as if nothing were to be seen in it but lions and hyenas plunging their bleeding teeth into the flesh of their victims! One might as well imagine that the whole of human life is nothing but a succession of war massacres.

Association and mutual aid are the rule with mammals. We find social habits even among the carnivores (Kropotkin, 2006: 32).

Happily enough, competition is not the rule either in the animal world or in mankind. It is limited among animals to exceptional periods, and natural selection finds better fields for its activity.

...”Don't compete!--competition is always injurious to the species, and you have plenty

of resources to avoid it!” That is the tendency of nature, not always realized in full, but always present. That is the watchword which comes to us from the bush, the forest, the river, the ocean. “Therefore combine—practise mutual aid! That is the surest means for giving to each and to all the greatest safety, the best guarantee of existence and progress, bodily, intellectual, and moral.” That is what Nature teaches us (Kropotkin, 2006: 60-61).

However, as soon as we come to a higher stage of civilization, and refer to history which already has something to say about that stage, we are bewildered by the struggles and conflicts which it reveals. The old bonds seem entirely to be broken. Stems are seen to fight against stems, tribes against tribes, individuals against individuals; and out of this chaotic contest of hostile forces, mankind issues divided into castes, enslaved to despots, separated into States always ready to wage war against each other. And, with this history of mankind in his hands, the pessimist philosopher triumphantly concludes that warfare and oppression are the very essence of human nature; that the warlike and predatory instincts of man can only be restrained within certain limits by a strong authority which enforces peace and thus gives an opportunity to the few and nobler ones to prepare a better life for humanity in times to come (Kropotkin, 2006: 95-96).

Kropotkin provides plenty of illustrations that refute the civilised assumptions and offers poignant descriptions of ruthless extermination by civilised human animals of rodents, buffaloes, wolves, human aborigines, among many others around the world – all owing to the erroneous conviction that because wilderness is depicted as violent and brutal, then its annihilation is justifiable, even constitutes a moral duty, regardless of the brutality mustered by this civilised ability for abstraction and systematisation.

The success of this myth's incorporation into the new religion – science – owes much to the Darwinian¹⁶⁷ interpretation that change in the animal and plant world occurs due to a constant struggle for existence, whereby species have to constantly be adapting to life. The perspective of the branch of the Christian church that upholds suffering and struggle as the necessary components of human post-Fall existence is evident in Darwin's language (struggle and suffering – almost like the mythical Russian soul), which could be one of the reasons for the popularity of the Darwinian narrative, particularly, in the Christian Western Civilisation.

Despite the fact that Charles Darwin himself was not always so confident in identifying the direction in which his theory was to lead humanity, the logic of his

¹⁶⁷ By Darwinian I mean the whole tradition of the interpretations that have been legitimated by the voices of authority and imperialist interests, such as Darwin's eugenicist cousin Francis Galton, among many others. Hence, even when Darwin himself, furtively acknowledges the importance of kindness and cooperation, he dedicates an overwhelming amount of space and data for the discussion of competition and aggression.

argument, the bulk of his discussion, and the original 1859 title of his seminal work, “*The Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection, or the Preservation of Favoured Races in the Struggle for Life*”, provided the foundation for the Darwinian theory of evolution and the subsequent application of the argument in the socio-political sphere with a eugenicist undertone, which is not surprising, given that Malthus' (1798 [1998]) essay on the necessity of the destruction of the “rice” races was one of the most significant and influential readings in Darwin's bibliography (Darwin, 2008a: xlvi and 2008b: xvii). The title and the work operates on several assumptions:

1. Hostility: implies that the world is not favourable to life and that life is a constant and ineluctable struggle in which organisms have to fight to constantly adapt themselves to this brutal world and its needs. This assumption reflects the Christian church's directive for the mortal human “sinners” to accept suffering and not rebel, but at the same time places the “human” at the head of the hierarchy of the primitive creatures and beasts.
2. Race: (a) the race between individuals and groups against others in competition for survival and (b) the existence of races as naturally distinct groups becomes highlighted in this narrative, whereas in wilderness differences and variety are the norm.
3. Justification of violence: the claim that survival is struggle then in itself justifies all acts, including violence against others, because in the end the one who survives is the “favoured” person and race and, i.e., survival redeems the means. Again, in wilderness the stress is not on survival but on being, including the humility of death, when the older cede their place to the new. Ironically then, civilisation embeds the construct of death in the structure of fear and violence, which, as will be discussed later, has cut lifespan almost in half. Increase in fertility compensates the shortened lifespan, but also overcompensates resulting in overpopulation, particularly among the poor human and cattle populations. Both of these contingents constitute resources with the difference that cattle and other domestic animals and birds are forced to breed¹⁶⁸, while human resources often appear to be

¹⁶⁸ Often humans collect the sperm from one or two males and inject it in all the female turkeys, horses, or other animals designated for breeding and kill the rest either for food consumption or simply to eliminate

the agents of their choice to reproduce because they have no resources but themselves. Hence, civilisation has raised fertility rates drastically and the battle for survival in the case of civilised humans has resulted in an epidemic outburst of almost seven billion people, most of whom live in destitute with high prospects of early mortality.

These premises sanction human endeavours from which the various socio-political paradigms and other cultural manifestations derive their form and content with concrete ramifications for the anthropological constructs conveyed, including in children's narratives. For the most part, the underlying precepts of these constructs remain unchallenged, since books like the *moomins* or the *Dunno* trilogy are in the minority in terms of availability and popularity of works whose scope encompasses broad anthropological critiques. Moreover, even though Peter Kropotkin presented a compelling scientific challenge to the Darwinian premises, with the exception of a few scientists (such as Stephen J. Gould), until recently his work has largely remained ignored.

In *Mutual Aid: A Factor of Evolution*, Kropotkin (2006) states explicitly that he chose the harsh climate of Siberia in order to test the main premise of the theory of Natural Selection of “favoured races”, since, he reasoned, competition would make more sense in extreme climate conditions, where food was more scarce than in the tropical areas, where Darwin had developed his theory. However, even in the harshest situations, Kropotkin said that he found no evidence to confirm the struggle theory. The only place he observed this principle at work was in civilisation expressed in the various forms of imperialism (today known as capitalist globalism); while the principle at work in wilderness, he says, through which individuals and species flourished, has been illustrated over and over through cooperation:

Paucity of life, under-population—not over-population--being the distinctive feature of that immense part of the globe which we name Northern Asia, I conceived since then serious doubts—which subsequent study has only confirmed-- as to the reality of that fearful competition for food and life within each species, which was an article of faith with most Darwinists, and, consequently, as to the dominant part which this sort of competition was supposed to play in the evolution of new species.

...[W]herever I saw animal life in abundance, as, for instance, on the lakes where scores

those specimens who are deemed as worthless, nuisance, or harmful.

of species and millions of individuals came together to rear their progeny; in the colonies of rodents; in the migrations of birds which took place at that time on a truly American scale along the Usuri; and especially in a migration of fallow-deer which I witnessed on the Amur, and during which scores of thousands of these intelligent animals came together from an immense territory, flying before the coming deep snow, in order to cross the Amur where it is narrowest--in all these scenes of animal life which passed before my eyes, I saw Mutual Aid and Mutual Support carried on to an extent which made me suspect in it a feature of the greatest importance for the maintenance of life, the preservation of each species, and its further evolution.

...Consequently, when my attention was drawn, later on, to the relations between Darwinism and Sociology, I could agree with none of the works and pamphlets that had been written upon this important subject. They all endeavoured to prove that Man, owing to his higher intelligence and knowledge, may mitigate the harshness of the struggle for life between men; but they all recognized at the same time that the struggle for the means of existence, of every animal against all its congeners, and of every man against all other men, was "a law of Nature." This view, however, I could not accept, because I was persuaded that to admit a pitiless inner war for life within each species, and to see in that war a condition of progress, was to admit something which not only had not yet been proved, but also lacked confirmation from direct observation (Kropotkin, 2006: xii-xiii).

Most important, stemming from the assumption that the environment on earth is conducive to life and by observing that in wilderness cooperation prevails over violence and competition, Kropotkin's test of the Darwinian theory of evolution challenges the most fundamental premise of civilisation, namely that creatures are hardwired for progress possessing an instinctual desire for it, because they are presumably in a constant process of overcoming the adversities of life. The underlying premise in the civilised narrative is that life in this world happened in spite of the environment and that therefore in order to prevail it needs to constantly adapt to it and compete with other life. This supposedly forces living beings to constantly seek new ways of improving themselves with the result that only the most successful of the contesters (like those of Willy Wonka's raffle discussed in part II) achieve this human and civilised stage. Therefore, the civilised conclude, pitiless violence and destruction are in the very nature of evolution towards that final and greater end, that of "humanity" and "civilisation". Hence, the moral of the third point of this mythology holds that, regardless of the suffering inflicted upon fellow non-human and human animals and plants, the fact of civilisation itself redeems the civilised human, even if it (the civilised human itself) and the world perish because of this abuse.

Some of the 21st century American scientists echo almost verbatim Kropotkin's observations and the work of other Russian anarchist physiologists and political theorists

of the 19th and 20th centuries who have held an important place in Russian thought (for instance, Alexandre Radishev, Nikolai Chernyshevsky, Alexandre Herzen, Leo Tolstoy, Dostoevsky, Mikhail Bakunin, *inter alios*). Anti-authoritarian thought became an integral part of the very basis of scientific and creative literature as well as other forms of expression, such as theatre and film, in spite of the heavy state censorship privileging the Marxist and Leninist perspectives. Particularly in science, the development of this perspective can be identified in the work of Ilya A. Arshavsky, the head of the laboratory of physiology in Moscow during much of the 20th century. Arshavsky carried on the work of his teacher Alexei A. Ukhtomsky, chair of human and animal physiology in St. Petersburg. Both scientists have been influenced by their anarchist predecessor Peter Kropotkin as well as by Dostoevsky's thought (Nikitina, 1998). Kropotkin, in turn, acknowledges his debt to the outlines on animal moral instincts by K. F. Kessler, zoologist and dean of the St. Petersburg University, who saw empathy as the main drive in animal social interactions, which, he observed, obeyed the moral laws of wilderness, and wilderness, he says, favours cooperation and mutual aid. There were others who contributed to research on the laws of wilderness. Kropotkin's colleague Polyakov as well as other contemporaries in Russia tested Darwin's thesis on struggle and competition in various settings, and the Darwinian interpretation repeatedly failed the test as the overwhelming evidence continued to demonstrate the wide range of cooperation among rodents, predators, herbivores, *inter alios*, and to underscore the fact that aggression and competition, although present in wilderness, were sparse and much less prominent than presented in the Darwinian narrative (Kropotkin, 2006: 7-8).

Having read microbiologist Stephen J. Gould's (1992) essay "Kropotkin was no Crackpot" in which Gould attempts both to redeem Kropotkin in "Western" science and to soften Darwin's emphasis on "the Preservation of Favoured Races in Struggle for Life" by pointing out that Darwin himself had acknowledged the importance of cooperation, evolutionary biologist Marc Bekoff and bioethologist Pierce (2009) propose to imagine a different world, driven by an alternative understanding of human and animal nature:

Stephen J. Gould continually reminds us that Darwin used the phrase "struggle for existence" metaphorically, and that even Darwin understood that bloody and vicious competition is only one possible mechanism through which individuals might achieve reproductive success. Another possible mechanism was proposed by a contemporary of

Darwin, Russian anarchist Peter Kropotkin, in his forward-looking book *Mutual Aid*, published in 1902. Kropotkin suggested that cooperation and mutual aid may also lead to increased fitness, and may more accurately fit our actual observations of animals in nature. Although biologists have largely explored cooperative behavior through the Darwinian lens of competition and an evolutionary arms race, we might wonder what the intellectual history of evolution would look like had Kropotkin's ideas been taken more seriously (ibid: 57).

They ponder what face would “science” (Western and, by virtue of its imperialist authority, world science) have acquired had, between the two contemporaries, not Darwin's, but Kropotkin's theory been heeded. The implications are far reaching as one tries to imagine the scope of the effect of this narrative. What would children's books present to the reader, had the focus been on chaos as love instead of the necessity to endure pain for order? And if children's books were different, what would the world look like? Would the children be told in narratives like *Winnie-the-Pooh* that a world of careless play and agency over one's mind and imagination are to be forsaken when they move on to the “real” world? What would the geo-political map look like? Would there have been immigration policies, such as informing both the control of borders and the imaginary of Winnie-the-Pooh? Would there have been borders? Would they have looked the same – threatening and isolating limitations of freedom and agency? What would our lives have been?

My life, definitely, would have been different. I look wistfully at the amount of time and effort I could have dedicated to my work and aspirations instead of on being forced to spend time and energy to prove that my knowledge is on par with my white peers, that being a mother does not mean that I am a “housewife”, as some professors have explained to me when dismissing my research projects, rather, that as a mother I am capable of contributing with valuable insights and work; not to mention how much energy, money, and time I spent on getting out of places to which I had been deported because a border patrol officer, guided by the narrative of civilisation, did not see the combination of my name and citizenship as legitimate or even reasonable and the places to which I was deported gave me deadlines by which to sort my entry and exit permits and get out. What I could have achieved if I were not for the most part of my life sent running about collecting papers, arguing and trying to convince the various figures of authority to stamp them, racing across towns, countries, and continents, from department to department, from one

Winnie-the-Pooh to another, at the request of the Darwinian visa officials and embassy consuls, distrusting, fearful of my name, looks and hence my intentions? Just these examples overwhelm me with possibilities, not to mention all the other aspects of my life.

Many black people's lives, in Montreal or in other places, would have definitely been different too¹⁶⁹ (Torczyner, 2001 and 2010). Whether in public life in general, or in specific settings, such as academia, their and my voices would have been reckoned with on par with the ethnic group that runs the scene of the production and transmission of knowledge and our experience, along with the perspective that comes with it, would have been interesting and would have mattered as much as the perspectives of those who dominate the curricula and the legitimisation and marketing of knowledge. But, as discussed in the first part of this work, the process of legitimating opinions, narratives and imagination in civilisation precludes the very possibility of imagining this scenario and of striving towards its realisation. The civilised terminology for domesticating such revelry calls it “utopic vision”, which, when persistent, gets treated in the hospital both in reality and in fiction, as explained by Kropotkin, Foucault, and, as discussed in part I, by Dr. Honeysuckle in *The Adventures of Dunno and Friends*.

Animal lives would have been different. The whole world would have been different had the number of predators remained minimal, as Kropotkin had observed, instead of multiplying to almost 7 billion individuals and taking over 98% of the vertebrate biomass.

Even though, undoubtedly, Darwin approached critically many of the interpretations of the genesis and genealogies of life on earth prevailing in his native civilised upper class circles of the imperialist, Unitarian-Anglican English tradition – including racist and eugenicist kin (Darwin, 2008a) – nonetheless, the driving force of civilised narrative seeps through and informs the general direction of his evolutionary theory, regardless of his intentions. For instance, the view that life is toil is a civilised position espoused by the Church that explains Darwin's focus on life as struggle. The understanding of the sinful nature of humans as a concept of permanence translates into

¹⁶⁹ See the McGill Consortium report 2010 for the persistent discrimination of black people and immigrants, particularly of colour, in Montreal (with references to across Canada).

Darwin's theory as violence being an inherent characteristic of life on earth¹⁷⁰.

The editor of Darwin's *Evolutionary Writings*, James A. Secord (in Darwin, 2008a) saw the importance of Kropotkin's critique for its offer of an alternative to the narrative of evolution as struggle and hence included an extract from Kropotkin's *Mutual Aid Among Animals* in the "Reviews and Responses" section. It is useful to quote the argument in its entirety here:

The conception of struggle for existence as a factor of evolution... became the very basis of our philosophical, biological, and sociological speculations....

In *The Descent of Man* he [Darwin] gave some powerful pages to illustrate its ["the conception of struggle for existence as a factor of evolution"] proper, wide sense. He pointed out how, in numberless animal societies, the struggle between separate individuals for the means of existence disappears, how *struggle* is replaced by *co-operation*, and how that substitution results in the development of intellectual and moral faculties which secure to the species the best conditions for survival. He intimated that in such cases the fittest are not the physically strongest, nor the cunningest, but those who learn to combine so as mutually to support each other, strong and weak alike, for the welfare of the community. "Those communities," he wrote, "which included the greatest number of the most sympathetic members would flourish best, and rear the greatest number of offspring". . . . The term, which originated from the narrow Malthusian conception of competition between each and all, thus lost its narrowness in the mind of one who knew Nature.

Unhappily, these remarks, which might have become the basis of most fruitful researches, were overshadowed by the masses of facts gathered for the purpose of illustrating the consequences of a real competition for life. [Besides, Darwin never attempted to submit to a closer investigation the relative importance of the two aspects under which the struggle for existence appears in the animal world, and he never wrote the work he proposed to write upon the natural checks to over-multiplication, although that work would have been the crucial test for appreciating the real purport of individual struggle (Kropotkin, 2006)]. Nay, on the very pages just mentioned, amidst data disproving the narrow Malthusian conception of struggle, the old Malthusian leaven reappeared -- namely, in Darwin's remarks as to the alleged inconveniences of maintaining the "weak in mind and body" in our civilized societies (ch. v). As if thousands of weak-bodied and infirm poets, scientists, inventors, and reformers, together with other thousands of so-called "fools" and "weak-minded enthusiasts," were not the most precious weapons used by humanity in its struggle for existence by intellectual and moral arms, which Darwin himself emphasized in those same chapters of *Descent of Man*.

It happened with Darwin's theory as it always happens with theories having any bearing upon human relations. Instead of widening it according to his own hints, his followers narrowed it still more. [And while Herbert Spencer, starting on independent but closely

¹⁷⁰ Daniel Quinn (1993; 1997; 1998) provides an important alternative understanding of the narratives in the Bible where the story of the fall, he argues, projects the conflict between the sedentary agriculturalists and the nomadic gatherers. Here, the nomadic point of view warns against the disaster, the Fall, that the unsustainable, intrinsically colonialist agricultural mode of living would bring.

allied lines, attempted to widen the inquiry into that great question, “Who are the fittest?” especially in the appendix to the third edition of the *Data of Ethics*, the numberless followers of Darwin reduced the notion of struggle for existence to its narrowest limits (Kropotkin, 2006).] They came to conceive the animal world as a world of perpetual struggle among half-starved individuals, thirsting for one another's blood (Darwin 2008a: 340-341).

They made modern literature resound with the war-cry of *woe to the vanquished*, as if it were the last word of modern biology. They raised the “pitiless” struggle for personal advantages to the height of a biological principle which man must submit to as well, under the menace of otherwise succumbing in a world based upon mutual extermination. Leaving aside the economists who know of natural science but a few words borrowed from second-hand vulgarizers, we must recognize that even the most authorized exponents of Darwin's views did their best to maintain those false ideas. In fact, if we take Huxley, who certainly is considered as one of the ablest exponents of the theory of evolution, were we not taught by him, in a paper on the 'Struggle for Existence and its Bearing upon Man,' that,

“from the point of view of the moralist, the animal world is on about the same level as a gladiators' show. The creatures are fairly well treated, and set to, fight hereby the strongest, the swiftest, and the cunningest live to fight another day. The spectator has no need to turn his thumb down, as no quarter is given.”

Or, further down in the same article, did he not tell us that, as among animals, so among primitive men,

“the weakest and stupidest went to the wall, while the toughest and shrewdest, those who were best fitted to cope with their circumstances, but not the best in another way, survived. Life was a continuous free fight, and beyond the limited and temporary relations of the family, the Hobbesian war of each against all was the normal state of existence” (Kropotkin, 2006).

Kropotkin has therefore not only challenged the logic in Darwin's interpretation of “facts” – a logic that leads to eugenics and holocausts – but also has questioned the political repercussions of a narrative in which the (mis)interpretation of the data becomes the main driving force in the construction of anthropogenic and anthropological reality by those who choose to follow the civilised narrative and its predatory knowledge. The logic of the Darwinian narrative stands in contrast with wilderness which is the source of morality, knowledge, and life, for civilisation stems from the eugenicist logic of extermination of Other both as a perspective on socio-environmental relationships and as a living organism or entity. Rationalised, calculated and intentional extermination can occur only in the absence of empathy, intelligence, and morality. Among his endless lists of field observations and library research on empathy, both in the wild and in civilisation, Kropotkin cites Goethe:

The importance of the Mutual Aid factor—“if its generality could only be demonstrated” —did not escape the naturalist's genius so manifest in Goethe. When Eckermann told once to Goethe -- it was in 1827 -- that two little wren-fledglings, which had run away from him, were found by him next day in the nest of robin redbreasts (Rothkehlchen), which fed the little ones, together with their own youngsters, Goethe grew quite excited about this fact. He saw in it a confirmation of his pantheistic views, and said:—“If it be true that this feeding of a stranger goes through all Nature as something having the character of a general law -- then many an enigma would be solved.” He returned to this matter on the next day, and most earnestly entreated Eckermann (who was, as is known, a zoologist) to make a special study of the subject, adding that he would surely come “to quite invaluable treasuries of results” (Gespräche, edition of 1848, vol. iii: 219, 221) (Kropotkin, 2006: xiv).

Recent studies from the field of ethology confirm Kropotkin's theory on mutual aid and on the importance of empathy for life. For example, in 1959, psychologist Russell Church published a paper titled: “Emotional reactions of rats to the pain of others”. In his study, Church observed that rats refused to press the lever to release food if such action caused an electric shock to another rat and that they displayed concern for the screaming animal person. Church's observations have been followed up by other studies around the world. Rutte and Taborsky (2007), for instance, confirmed that cooperation between rats was extended regardless of whether the fellow rat was an acquaintance, a concept known as “generalised reciprocity”. Bekoff and Pierce express this observation as follows:

... rats exhibit what is called “generalized reciprocity”—they generously help an unknown rat obtain food if they themselves have benefited from the kindness of a stranger. Continued research on rat sociality may force us to revise our generally dismissive and disgusted attitude toward these animals (in Bekoff & Pierce, 2009: 21).

The authors mention a factor that increased the chances for cooperation, namely, compassion increased in cases when a rat had previously experienced acts of kindness by another random rat. If we extend this observation to social interactions between humans, this factor is of great relevance to the educational methods of civilised human and non-human children, for civilised schooling itself perpetuates the experience of cruelty, competition and mistrust dulling the expression of the natural inclination towards empathic relationships and cooperation. Drawing their data and support from schooled hierarchies, civilised humans then draw the conclusion that more control is needed, a panopticon that would observe them and modify their wild essence, the fear of which would be internalised by the victims themselves, ultimately eradicating wildness from their being, creating the perfect homogeneity, a replica of the obedient, domesticated slave

that can be differentiated only by a serial number, DNA, or other technological possibilities of control.

A recent study conducted by researchers at the University of California, San Francisco, the University of Toronto, and the University of California, Berkeley, in fact, confirms that the more a person enjoys social and economic power, the more he loses empathic ability and, with it, the basic understanding of what another person feels or experiences. The authors observe that “individuals of a lower social class are more empathically accurate in judging the emotions of other people. In three studies, lower-class individuals (compared with upper-class individuals) received higher scores on a test of empathic accuracy (Study 1), judged the emotions of an interaction partner more accurately (Study 2), and made more accurate inferences about emotion from static images of muscle movements in the eyes (Study 3)” (Kraus *et al.*, 2010), thereby confirming the thesis that community, empathy, and compassion are impossible in the condition of hierarchy, and needless to say, civilisation is necessarily stratified.

In contrast to civilised human society, Bekoff and Pierce (2009), discuss examples of cooperation and empathy between animals of various species. Often friendship extends across species and even to what, normally, is considered to be a predator and prey. These confirmations come from a range of perspectives and disciplines, including biology, ethology, zoology, and human animal philosophy. Bekoff and Pierce list hyenas, elephants, mice, among numerous other animals who “surprise” civilised humans with their high moral standards and ethics.

One of the classic studies on altruism comes from Gerry Wilkinson’s work on bats. Vampire bats who are successful in foraging for blood that they drink from livestock will share their meal with bats who aren’t successful. And they’re more likely to share blood with those bats who previously shared blood with them. In a recent piece of surprising research, rats appear to exhibit generalized reciprocity; they help an unknown rat obtain food if they themselves have been helped by a stranger (Bekoff & Pierce, 2009: 7).

Another illustration is the *Lycaon pictus*, or the African Wild Dog, known by various other names, such as the African Hunting Dog or the Spotted Dog or the Mbwa Mwilu in Swahili. The dogs are known to share their kill, for which they have suffered an arduous hunt of many hours, with the wounded mates scattered along the hunting path, and with

the elderly, the mothers and the cubs left behind in the den. Among endless examples, Kurtén and Gould (in Kurtén, 1995) observe that the Neanderthals took care of their elderly and wounded.

Moreover, Boesch *et al.* (2010) document the extremely time consuming practices of adoption of unrelated orphans by male and female (in equal proportion) Taï forest chimpanzees. The years of care that the adoptive fathers and mothers provide to these children confuse the narrative of the “rational” scientists who are driven by their relentless desire to prove that individuals and species are motivated by practical rewards of egotistical reproductive strategies for the success of one's own semen, eggs, or other forms of wealth. Here, Boesch *et al.* pose a crucial question:

In strong contrast to these studies with captive chimpanzees, consistent observations of potentially altruistic behaviors in wild chimpanzees have been reported from different populations in such different domains as food sharing, regular use of coalitions, and cooperative hunting and border patrolling... The striking differences between captive and wild populations beg the question of what socio-ecological factors favor the evolution of altruism within one species (Boesch *et al.*, 2010).

Yet, even if the question itself is of great importance, the mathematical language that the authors use leads the scientists astray from the real problem, which is domestication, and which, by its very nature and practice, is not about sharing, but about dominating and exploiting through the confiscation of food. Hence, an attempt to calculate the benefits of altruism becomes an exercise in an attempt to merge oxymorons into a meaningful story, which is doomed to fail. For instance, the “availability of food” does not stem from the “control of food by a group of humans”, but occurs either in spite of this control or because the humans want to force you to do something for them in exchange for the food they had confiscated.

Following Hamilton's rule, we should expect more altruistic behavior in populations of individuals as the benefit becomes relatively larger than the cost. Thus, the proposed absence of altruistic food sharing in captive animals might be expected due to the well-fed state of all individuals under such conditions (*ibid*).

Food is not available in the conditions of incarceration. Rather, human animals control and ration food using it as a tool of coercion and dominance. And neither is freedom or choice possible in the confining space, which minimises movement and happiness. The whole premise of domestication is for the domestictor to lock away food, to starve out and kill

those designated as competitors, parasites, and enemies and to consume and control resources and to save slaves, pets, research material, or anyone whose destruction has a dire effect on civilised humans. In this respect, the famous Russian animal psychologist and physiologist, Ivan Pavlov known as the “father of the contemporary animal training techniques” has only articulated the principle of 'classical conditioning' that had been discovered seventeen thousand years earlier.

The control of food in domestication and in the science that experimentation produces has drastic repercussions for the culture, and, as argued earlier, the physiology of the civilised beings themselves. In this respect, in addition to Zerzan's (2002) observation that organised and therefore premeditated violence appears to be tightly linked with the rise of domestication and symbolic thought, various anthropological studies confirm that the rise of organised violence and warfare are linked to the emergence of sedentary lifestyle (Ferguson, 2000). According to reports from the field of ethology and primatology, animals too exhibit political ruse and calculation leading to organised violence in captivity (i.e. in conditions of extreme civilisation).

One of the most widely known of these is the research of primatologist Jane Goodall on the chimpanzees of the Gombe Stream area in Tanzania. For decades, Goodall had observed that the chimpanzees were peaceful, caring, and sharing (Goodall, 1986). As it turns out, however, she was not simply “observing” them; she was also feeding them and experimenting by sometimes locking up the food, which brought about changes in the chimps' behaviour: they began to exhibit signs of frustration, calculation, and aggression.

After a few years, however, we realized that the feeding was having a marked effect on the behavior of the chimps. They were beginning to move about in large groups more often than they had ever done in the old days. Worst of all, the adult males were becoming increasingly aggressive. When we first offered the chimps bananas the males seldom fought over their food; they shared boxes... (Goodall, 1988: 140-141).

With the manipulation of food chimps began to exhibit civilised characteristics: identity, ganging, military movement and organisation. Numerous primatologists have criticised Goodall's interference in the lives of the chimpanzees. Margaret Power (in Reynolds and Lieberman, 1996), for instance, criticises experimentation with food and its domesticating effect on these primates, who, prior to the introduction of Goodall's experimentation with

food, had been noted for their peaceful relationships and kindness. After decades of feeding them, in the mid 1980s, they have begun to exhibit the same social behaviour as civilised humans: they became greedy, political (cunning) and violent.

Concurrently with Goodall, a Japanese group of primatologists, led by Kinji Imanishi, was studying a different chimpanzee population in the western part of Tanzania and Uganda. The Japanese researchers have observed at the same time as Goodall did, i.e., in the mid 1980s, that the chimpanzees, having been affected by their interactions with people and by people's encroachment upon their territory, began to wage war between the various groups (Matsuzawa and McGrew, 2008). In their discussion of Imanishi's work, Matsuzawa and McGrew (2008) point to the Kropotkian perspective underlying Imanishi's approach that saw the world holistically with each species and individual as parts of a whole. It is this perspective, they note, that led Imanishi to see the human, colonialist, and civilised factors in this eruption of violence rather than an evolutionary genetic nature. In addition to the frustrations caused by someone else controlling access to food and space, William McGrew (1992 and 2004) criticises any civilised human involvement in the lives of animals for the endangerment that such interference causes to the animals. In his list of the dangers to which such methods of domestication lead, McGrew includes the risks of getting killed as "pests" by agriculturalist humans or by hunters, since the animals get used to the presence of the observers, to their food, and to their various cultural artefacts (McGrew, 2004). For, regardless of their intent, civilised humans pose the greatest threat to all the human and non-human beings by the sheer drive of the narrative in which they are inscribed and in whose structure their interests are vested.

In this respect, civilisation operates with two hands: one that manages the "resources" and geopolitics by expropriating food and land for the purposes of agriculture, mining and for whatever other needs of civilisation to satisfy human owners and consumers, while the other hand studies, observes, and exchanges the food, and produces the "knowledge" that would confirm the system of civilised relationships. Working in synchrony, the two hands elicit civilised responses, in the case of chimps the result was an outbreak of bitter, premeditated and organised warfare between the various groups (Power in Reynolds and Lieberman, 1996).

The civilised narrative constantly reiterates two faulty premises: 1) the importance of violence to life and order and 2) the distinguished nature of humans as a species apart by reason of them having mastered the art of this violence best of all (almost best of all, for cancer and other epidemics still continue to beat humanity in this race). Often, in scientific literature, such as historical, anthropological and palaeontological textbooks, especially those that are written for children, we read: “like no one else, humans are the only ones to use tools that enabled them to kill more effectively and to have developed agricultural and technological civilisation”, or “humans are the only species to possess language and symbolic thought”, i.e. a constant repetition of our different, i.e., alien, identity. At the same time, this narrative constantly tries to find a justification for this violence in nature, whose rationale is roughly the following: if we are violent, it must be because violence is in the nature of life itself, and all species practice violence, particularly the apes who genetically resemble us the most. Thus, Goodall's news in the 1980s that the chimpanzees of Tanzania have suddenly been caught practising warfare was met with general applause and the “I knew it” attitude voiced by civilisation's fans, even though Goodall herself had reiterated on numerous occasions that this is far from the truth and does not represent the whole picture. In her book on *The Chimpanzees of Gombe: Patterns of Behaviour*, Goodall (1986) says that “. . . it is easy to get the impression that chimpanzees are more aggressive than they really are. In actuality, peaceful interactions are far more frequent than aggressive ones; mild threatening gestures are more common than vigorous ones; threats per se occur much more often than fights; and serious, wounding fights are very rare compared to brief, relatively mild ones” (Goodall, 2000: 210). Nevertheless, chimpanzees continue to be seen as a confirmation of our natural aggression and propensity for violence.

In reality, there is no certainty as to whether real differences in the nature of our composition and viability truly exist in a most basic, ontological as well as biological sense. While the details of civilised science get disputed and discarded almost every decade, whereby scientific literature becomes outdated and obsolete over and over again, it only creates an illusion that the civilised narrative and its culture change or progress, for the basic premise accentuating the difference and alienation of humans from animals remains intact in the civilised narrative while the real frontiers between the species remain

blurry at best. The most important factor that differentiates various human and non-human peoples is of a philosophical nature, namely, it is the underlying premise of civilisation. Here, it becomes evident that the sheer scope of the unprecedented destruction at the hands of civilised humans suggests that certain human animals have come to resemble their non-human siblings less and less, becoming more and more like a viral epidemic. That is why the link between symbolic thought and biological mutation should be investigated further from an anarcho-primitivist position, for it is this basic perspective, driven by the civilised desire to conquer and own the whole of existence, forever and for oneself only, that could be the detail that differentiates the human from the rest of the animal world.

To continue in this line of thought, the mutation responsible for having instigated civilisation probably was triggered by the failure of the mechanism responsible for the regulation of greed, which could have set off the memetic or genetic encoding of a new grammar, i.e., the linguistic gene that, in turn, altered our brain in the manner of literacy as discussed in part I with regards to research by Ong, 1986. In order for such a mutation to be encoded and transmitted to future generations it had to be integrated in the flesh through ideology, *doxa*, *praxis*, *habitus* and diet. In other words, the culture and the mode of subsistence themselves have changed, but so did its content: the diet now consisted of the consumption of lives, bodies, and death, again, whose topos and narrative I discussed earlier in part II.

In spite of the genetic encoding of the new narrative that seems to direct us on an evolutionary trajectory towards the Holocene catastrophe, genes appear to be weaker in their ability to ensure a smooth functioning of the mechanism of civilisation and destruction than the narrative. This is revealed by the fact that children continue to be born wild, which is signalled by their preference for extended breastfeeding, fruits, and nuts, while the domesticators, such as paediatricians, teachers, and other children's experts, have to constantly control and modify these preferences, scaring parents into believing that children need to consume animals and their milk or else they will not grow and end up ill and dead. The mere existence of the need for these experts to constantly teach and preach to people about what they should eat is not only indicative of the dire state of civilised

people's incompetence, but also reveals that neither the diet nor the unknowledge of civilisation has become their “nature” or have successfully been inscribed into the genetic code that would ensure its own reproduction regardless of the overseer and her whip, who, incidentally, seventeen thousand years later still relies on literacy and repetition to inculcate in them a taste for blood.

Voices of dissent and wild human animal reason have risen throughout the ages to challenge civilised relationships from within and from a variety of disciplines. One such voice was Jeremy Bentham's, a mid 18th - 19th century English philosopher. I came across his work when skimming through a bibliography of a text on legal philosophy, since he did not make it into a single syllabus spanning from my childhood to doctoral studies, although he does appear in some courses in philosophy, the philosophy of law, and political science. Bentham (1907) provides a vital illustration of how the ability for empathy allows us to know the other through exercising consideration for her well-being, giving abundantly of our concern. The impetus for such understanding and the ensuing adjustment of one's actions comes from the ability to imagine and to feel the other's experiences and emotions. Bentham deliberates on whether the humanity of a person is a sufficient marker of distinction to protect the person from acts of cruelty and enough to warrant that person to commit acts of cruelty against those who are denied humanity. Should not sentience, or the ability to feel pain be enough to warrant the person protection from getting tortured, murdered, exploited, incarcerated, and eaten? In order to understand the sentience of others one has to be capable of feeling the other's pain, i.e., be both sentient and empathic. It is through empathy that Bentham himself is able to overcome the problem of civilised ontological categorisation:

If the being killed were all, there is very good reason why we should be suffered to kill such as molest us: we should be the worse for their living, and they are never the worse for being dead. But is there any reason why we should be suffered to torment them? Not any that I can see. Are there any why we should *not* be suffered to torment them? Yes, several. The day has been, I grieve to say in many places it is not yet past, in which the greater part of the species, under the denomination of slaves, have been treated by the law exactly upon the same footing as, in England for example, the inferior races of animals are still. The day *may* come, when the rest of the animal creation may acquire those rights which never could have been withholden from them but by the hand of tyranny. The French have already discovered that the blackness of the skin is no reason why a human being should be abandoned without redress to the caprice of a tormentor. It may come one day to be recognized, that the number of the legs, the villosity of the

skin, or the termination of the *os sacrum*, are reasons equally insufficient for abandoning a sensitive being to the same fate. What else is it that should trace the insuperable line? Is it the faculty of reason, or, perhaps, the faculty of discourse? But a full-grown horse or dog is beyond comparison a more rational, as well as a more conversable animal, than an infant of a day, or a week, or even a month, old. But suppose the case were otherwise, what would it avail? the question is not, Can they *reason?* nor, Can they *talk?* but, Can they *suffer?* (Bentham, 1907: chapter XVII).

In order to be able to ask this question, one needs to place himself in the skin of the other in the manner in which Ukhtomosky (in Nikitina, 1998) urges us to erase our inner double who interferes with our reality tunnel and renders us deaf to the other because we end up hearing and seeing our own selves or the image and the voice that we have been conditioned to see and hear. Only after having freed ourselves from this double limiting our understanding, Ukhtomsky says, can we be open to the experience and the desires of our interlocutor. This understanding enables us to overcome our ontological definitions and their limitations, thereby increasing our knowledge and enhancing our intelligence. Expanding or narrowing the scope of our interactions with wilderness through empathic communication also stretches the limits of whom we accept as our interlocutor as we erase the borders between categories and overcome the various dumbing down distinctions at the root of racism, sexism, and anthropocentrism.

Bentham thus exposes the problem for what it is: a system of knowledge that has been constructed on the basis of categorisation with random criteria for the purpose of classification and discrimination. Moreover, it is a system of knowledge with serious gaps in its argument for abuse (domestication, slaughterhouse, and consumption among other forms of exploitation) based on the double standards of the humanist position, which Bentham exposes by formulating it in the following question: are “we” to cause suffering to the beings that suffer and justify this because “they” speak a different language, or supposedly, to our anthropocentric ear, speak no language at all? Is this definition of the Other sufficient to grant us the permission to ignore their pain – if not participate in causing it – and overwrite it with a narrative that aestheticises suffering by calling the scream of pain song, *tableau*, or drama? In this way, anticipating the work of ethologists in Western epistemology (this knowledge had already been available to non-domesticated peoples but has been ignored by the dominant institution) in two hundred years from his time, Jeremy Bentham questions the bigotry of classification articulated not only in

anthropocentric terminology, but in the more specific Eurocentric notions of intelligence and language, and thereby addresses the fundamental question of the relationship between the qualifications that supposedly define the human, and therefore the legal and the agent as distinct from the objectified resource, whose voice is illegitimate and whose purpose here is to serve the human.

Bentham's question hence poses a serious challenge to humanism along with the legal system that it forges in order to protect and justify itself. It also challenges the concept of “human rights” whose basic, underlying assumption holds that certain characteristics that are attributed only to humans should protect individuals and groups from abuse. The human characteristics are: reason, sentience, and agency and they, supposedly, separate humans from those who are assumed to lack these qualities, the absence of which then gives humans the right and the moral justification to torture, exploit, and murder the “non-humans” and to protect the “humans” with “human rights” from the abuse they inflict on others. In other words, the category itself of “human rights” is based on guaranteeing safety, agency, and ownership to one group of living beings and the discrimination and oppression of those who are denied the right to be identified as human.

As Bentham observes that until recently, not many people who did not possess property or had a skin colour that was not in favour at the time, were legitimately marginalised, tortured and oppressed in all possible ways. This unknowledge, along with the legal apparatus that backs it, institutionalises unequal relations of power and legitimises the purposeful infliction of pain even in the presence of clauses within the various bodies of laws that include the concept of the “duty to rescue”. Yet, under these same laws, civilised society prosecutes animal rights activists who rescue animals even while the rescuers make a conscious effort not to harm anyone's life in the process, because non-sentient property is valued more than the suffering of sentient beings. Persecuted, they receive sentences equivalent to manslaughter, terrorism and murder¹⁷¹.

¹⁷¹ Barry Home received 18 years sentence and died of hunger strike in prison in England on 5th November 2001. Activists labelled “eco-terrorists”, who have made sure *not* to harm life, but have committed acts of disruption against corporations that tortured animals or other domesticating enterprises, have been receiving maximum sentences for manslaughter, conspiracy, and sometimes murder (even when none was committed). For instance Jeffrey Luers, a prisoner at Oregon State penitentiary has been incarcerated since June 2000 for eco-sabotage arson at a car dealership. He was sentenced to 22 years and eight

Bentham's articulation of the problem however leaves no room for compromise between the ontologies of domestication and wildness. He appeals to ethics, empathy and knowledge rather than to legal discourse and civilised grammar, formulating his critique in such a way that it leaves only three possible responses for a person who understands that, inevitably, all civilised actions and livelihoods are implicated in the suffering of others: (1) stop doing what causes others to suffer; (2) consciously or not, justify cruelty and apathy by claiming, or even believing in that suffering is natural and that he has nothing to do with other human or animal people's pain; (3) simply deny that they are suffering at all and devise a system of silencing and dismissal of the expressions of pain as irrelevant, nonexistent, or even a lie (for instance, the expression “she's playing the race card” accuses the complainer of inventing an oppression for personal, illegitimate gain). The criteria for credibility in public discourse reinforce this last point in the *doxa* by using the suffering itself to discredit the voice of the oppressed as “un-objective”(or biased), “emotional” and “illegitimate”, particularly if the suffering person expresses her feelings and resents the coercion, the silencing or the abuse and refuses to abide by the abuser's dictates; whereas unemotional and apathetic composure of those in a position of power to oppress is taken as a sign of rationality that renders the oppressor credible, understandable, and justifiable in the eyes of civilised law¹⁷².

Numerous cases in the history of civilisation demonstrate that when driven by empathy, even the most civilised people in position of power are capable of choosing the

months for that action. Tre Arrow received 6 years sentence in Canada for having scaled the U.S. Forest Service building in Portland in 2000 and lived for eleven days on its ledge in protest of timber sale in the Mount Hood National Forest. “I wanted to protect those trees that I loved. And I had only my body to protect them with” - he was pushed down, but survived. Bruce Ellison, the attorney for Tre Arrow, said that he was facing up to life in prison on these charges but agreed to plead guilty and received six years in Canada and then extradited to the United States. May 2009 in California, Eric McDavid received a sentence of 19 years and 7 months for *planning* to damage corporate and government property (he hasn't damaged it, though). Animal rights activists in the U.K. Don't fare better. In the case of activists demonstrating against animal testing by the Sequani laboratory received up to ten years of prison. They were prosecuted under the 2005 Serious Organised Crime and Police Act (SOCPA) Act. Mel Broughton, an activist in England, on 14th February 2009 received ten years of prison for protesting against the planned construction of an animal experiments testing laboratory in Oxford. Examples abound and there is little of mutuality or reciprocity in the way the laws are written or enacted (Corporate Watch, UK 30th June 2009: <http://www.corporatewatch.org/?lid=3405>).

¹⁷² The work of anthropologists and sociologists of law provide lengthy discussions with statistics and illustrations to the bias in the trial procedures, the access to defence attorneys, and even the syntax and vocabulary used in framing questions depend on the a priori set criteria for credibility (Austin Sarat, 1999; Lois Forer, 1971 and 1994; Patricia Ewick and Susan Silbey, 1998; among others).

first option—they renounce their privilege to oppress and join the ranks of the oppressed: Catholic workers; Earth Liberation Front (ELF); Animal Liberation Front (ALF); Peter Kropotkin, who renounced his title of prince; William King, the Presbyterian minister who funded the Elgin freed slave settlement of Buxton, Ontario; the people who helped run the Underground Railroad, *inter alios*. The other options of dealing with other human and animal persons' pain, namely dismissing and ignoring it, require ignorance and apathy—qualities acquired by intensive training and years of education guided by the Darwinian narrative of evolution, supported by religious authorities (regardless of faith), and imposed by means of violence. Ignorance and apathy are precious qualities that allow confusion of concepts and substitution of meaning at the basis of the premises of life narratives. The repetitive narrative of civilisation lulls its children with mythical stories that exalt acts of cruelty and despise defeat. In its representation and justification of suffering it can go as far as calling pain joy.

Chapter 5: The Myth of the Slave's Joyful, Simple Nature: Identity, Animality, Humanity, and Machines

5.1. Singing in the Fields of Toil

A highly effective myth of civilised propaganda purports that the domestication of plants and non-human and human animals is grounded in nature and that it is in the interests of the victim species themselves. “After all, domestication was their evolutionary choice. They could have opted either to die [because humans have learnt how to kill them on an unprecedented scale] or to serve human interests [for example, the slaves who rebelled were exterminated]; they chose to serve; this choice is theirs and hence it must make them happy. Pleasing the master and enjoying doing it was the best survival strategy *for them* to adopt”, says the master (for illustrations of this logic, see the hypotheses of such evolutionary theorists as Driscoll et al. [2009]; Shipman [August 2010]; among others).

This anthropocentric and ethnocentric rationale ignores the slave's perspective on this relationship, silences her voice and stifles her will, all of which makes it difficult for the victim to choose life outside the prescribed civilised limitations and to resist the unknowledge that dismisses her choices, desires, and life. The myth thus depicts the victim as the author of her choice and the agent of her own victimisation. Of course, even when these choices are imposed and the real desire is unattainable, people still live, love, hate, laugh and weep. As long as one lives, there is always a part salvaged from the ever colonising civilisation and the thoughts, joy and pain remain an integral, even cherished part of one's memory and hence one's self. However, to say that the millions around the world who live on 2\$ a day do so because this is the best they could do, that they chose this, or that they are happy with their choice can happen only in the absence of intelligence, knowledge and empathy.

And yet, who has not heard of the stereotype of the “naturally” and “genetically” dancing, rhythmic, singing African Americans, an image that still recurs in the explanations of why black people do “well” in the music industry, but not in other fields? Even though the details and the form of marginalisation and silencing have “evolved” since the anthropologists, poets and philosophers of the *Négritude* movement so passionately responded¹⁷³ to the stereotype of the irrational, musical African, nonetheless, even today, in spite of the legal strides made in accepting the equal humanity of all races, one still hears echoes of the myth of the “happy” “singing” “Negro” in the fields of the Americas. This essentialist description is revealed in the attitudes that praise the natural rhythm or the “soul” voice of the African Americans be they performing on the big stage or rapping about the hood, laughing in the ghetto usually depicted heaped with drug paraphernalia, misery, dirt and crime. This image overwrites any intellectual or other contributions to culture and life that African Americans have made and keeps them out of competition for funding in other spheres, such as mathematics, anthropology, physics, etc., including images perpetuated in children's literature by white authors as well as the marginal participation of black writers in the production of “normal” children's books.

¹⁷³ For examples on the founders of the 20th century political and artistic movement, see Anténor Firmin, Jean Price-Mars as founders of *Négritude* anthropology and Aimé Césaire, Léopold Sédar Senghor, Franz Fanon, among others.

For instance, children's literature cannot escape this divide and unknowledge where most children's books continue to be segregated along racial lines, because the basic civilised premises of the narrative preclude the possibility of realistically and credibly presenting a world in which oppression can be overcome unless they attack the very root of civilised ontology with its socio-economic relations and structure. Hence, a talented and highly intelligent author such as Margaret Peterson Haddix is able to raise a range of critical questions about inequality, the meaning of science, starvation, war, human reproduction, etc. Nevertheless, she cannot depict persons of colour in her narrative, without facing problems of characterisation and other complicated aspects of “knowledge” about the experience of racial “others”, and therefore she leaves the topic untouched. This is a great problem with the production of knowledge and culture where the depiction of experience in a racialised structure necessarily structures these insurmountable problems of hierarchical distribution of the material and economic capital. The German children's author, Michael Ende, approaches these issues through fantasy and partially overcomes the problem of race (but not of species) in *The Neverending Story* in the same way that Tove Jansson does with her moominbooks: both authors leave our reality, and by choosing to write in the fantasy genre obtain some freedom to explore human and non-human people in any colour possible: green, purple, blue, etc. Yet, because the hierarchical structure itself and the civilised literary ideal continues to be the basis of Ende's imaginary world, unlike Jansson who rejects economic relations that are based on symbolic representation (money, education, among others) and on servitude – there is no work in Moominland, only wild purpose – Ende's novel remains grounded in the realm of civilisation, war, servitude, and civilised purpose and thus, even though it shifts the lines of segregation from racial borders, it only achieves their replacement along the lines that divide servitude from agency.

If white authors, whether male or female, still have leniency in the fields in which the legitimating narrative presents them as capable of becoming expert on any topic, black authors are limited to being experts on black race and the books that are chosen for publication tend to reflect the pre-established “knowledge” about black space, bodies, intellectual abilities, musical skills, drugs, deviance, and so on. This “expertise” in “being oppressed” and other specific essentialist topics, according to Atkins (2009) (a former

editor and publisher herself) keeps publishers disinterested in and distrusting of black authors' works. However, the “singing Negro” myth, however, is evident in the numbers of successful black people in music industry and their absence from other domains.

Endless studies on discrimination confirm the obvious, offering suggestions on how to manage overt marginalisation, yet never proposing to eradicate the problem of inequality, poverty and hierarchy at its root, a goal that would require the dismantling of the whole apparatus of “categorical” constructs of knowledge that essentialise “expertise” based on superficial characteristics such as skin, gender, among others, but also historically imposed experience, such as oppression. The legitimating meta-narrative, hence, deems it worthy to spend money and effort on studies conducted by legitimated observers and producers of knowledge, but not on the problem itself: the lack of access to money, food, space, knowledge, et al., by the oppressed individuals and groups. In other words, studies are deemed necessary in order to manage these potential resources in the most convenient way possible for the owners of businesses, land, and resources. However, as research on self-fulfilling prophecy indicates (Brewer and Crano, 2000: 334-346), when the civilised narrative structures guide the interpretation of “real life” information, the collected data in statistics, polls, and surveys also aide the further consolidation of the civilised structural status quo. Both the myths that inform the *doxa* about racialised “others” and the quantum physics problem of the data changing their behavioural patterns because of observation explain why, for instance, even though slavery was abolished in the Great Britain in 1807 and in the British Empire in 1833 and while Canadian leadership had always denounced the institution of slavery in southern United States, nonetheless, black people in Canada still remain marginal in the grand stakes of material and cultural economy. For example, a report by Montreal Consortium for Human Rights and Advocacy Training (MCHRAT) and the McGill Consortium for Ethnicity and Strategic Social Planning (MCESSP) have recently updated a study they had published in 2001 on the experience of black people in Montreal. In 2010 still “a highly educated black person living in Montreal with at least a university graduate degree can expect an unemployment rate higher than that of a non-black high school dropout” says Andrew Chung (2010) reporting on the study.

Comparing census data from 1996 to 2006, Jim Torczyner, a professor of social work at McGill University who leads the McGill Consortium on Human Rights Advocacy Training, said that “blacks continue to lag significantly behind non-blacks in every level of success” in a way that was “persistent, pervasive and alarming.”

Even though the situation for everyone improved during that period, in terms of wealth, jobs and education, the disparities between blacks and non-blacks remained (Chung, 2010).

The study reveals the pervasiveness of certain experiences of oppression as coherent with the dominant narrative that attributes certain competences, incompetences, and areas of expertise as essential, biological – even existential – to specific groups fulfilling the narrative's own scenario through anthropological constructs and *praxis*. For, the very expectations and the structure of civilised society ensure that those who have been disempowered will continue to be so by the fact that their very disempowerment justifies their oppression and subjugation, while the knowledge of them as being oblivious and joyful confirms to the participants in the narrative that the situation is at least bearable, if not desirable by the beings who are seen as fulfilling *their* purpose on earth. This problem of the research confirming and fulfilling the assumptions and precepts about the essentialist qualities employed in marginalising a group has been addressed throughout the theory on social science. For instance, Mäkitalo and Säljö (2002) discuss the problem of categories in institutional “thinking”, their materialisation in “anthropological” constructs and the production of “social 'facts’”. Inspired by “the early ethnomethodological work on the ‘social construction’ of bureaucratic, scientific and other ‘facts’ (Zimmerman 1974; Cicourel 1968; Gdiel 1967; Atkinson and Drew 1979; Smith 1978; Latour and Woolgar 1979)”, sociologist Nob Doran (1994) examines the problem of the “embodiment” of knowledge and experience and the interrelationship between Dorothy Smith's institutional ethnography method and Michel Foucault's concept of knowledge as the “power of normalisation within state bureaucracy”. Another important work entitled *The Mutual Construction of Statistics and Society* addresses precisely this problem succinctly put in these words: “society and the statistics that measure and describe it are mutually constructed” (Rudinow Saetnan, et al., 2011: 1).

In other words, both hard and social sciences are not neutral acts allowing the observation of reality “as is”, or capable of presenting a meaningful picture about it, for

just as observation of quantum particles shifts their location and modifies their behaviour, so do studies on oppression conducted from a civilised perspective interact with the observed minds and bodies have consequences. More important, however, the observed individuals within a system of domination respond to the implicit and expected *doxa* and use the observations of themselves to further the civilised structural relationships of oppression. Hence, while such studies illuminate the extent of segregation, attitudes, experience, structures, and realities, they concomitantly collaborate in the institutionalisation of the categories of oppression that naturalise discrimination, often dismissing the oppressed as ignorant of other possibilities and happy with their “natural” state, empowered by their status of servitude.

This illuminates the rationale by which civilised carnivores see no contradiction in using the domesticated cattle's despair – of having nowhere to run even when liberated, no community, no wilderness to help them reclaim their purpose – as proof of the naturalness of domestication and slaughter, a rationale that amounts to: “they wouldn't know what to do with their freedom and they are much happier that way since they have already evolved in captivity for captivity, to be separated from their children, kin, and friends and to be ruthlessly and unceremoniously slaughtered to feed *us*”. The basic precept of the civilised argument for the abuse of all othered persons and groups is a structural problem that feeds the analogous relationships of oppression. For instance, Frederick Douglass' rendered eloquently this mythology of the “singing slave”:

I have often been utterly astonished, since I came to the north, to find persons who could speak of the singing, among slaves, as evidence of their contentment and happiness. It is impossible to conceive of a greater mistake. Slaves sing most when they are most unhappy. The songs of the slave represent the sorrows of his heart; and he is relieved by them, only as an aching heart is relieved by its tears. At least, such is my experience. I have often sung to drown my sorrow, but seldom to express my happiness. Crying for joy, and singing for joy, were alike uncommon to me while in the jaws of slavery (Douglass, 1997:30).

The myth of the “happy Negro”, which Frederick Douglass so poignantly describes, stems from the perspective of the abuser, the slave owner, the murderer, centralising the abuse in the life of the slave and normalising it in the metanarrative. In this legitimating system, the victim's voice has already been discredited and hence it becomes difficult to hear and relate to the abused, even when the attempts to understand are sincere, because that

experience is structurally purged from the narrative and dismissed as “specific” to the slave and uninteresting or irrelevant to the “normal” “average” people (that is, to those who identify themselves with the point of view of the abuser), who *know* that they are agents of their lives.

What feeds this narrative is the ontology of “resources” and “owners” which is also at the basis of the myth of the happy slave, singing as he toils in the fields, or as he is led away in shackles to prison or labour camp, a myth that nurtures the underlying *doxa*, the knowledge that does not need to be stated, yet which assumes that the oppressed find their meaning and empowerment in the opportunity to serve others and in the choice to be oppressed. This myth provides the backbone for the scientific and literary narrative of civilisation that sometimes acknowledges its inherent contradictions only to conclude that to violate the will of the other and to ignore her pain is the best, even, the only way to live. This is why the joy of the singing Oompa-Loompas for having been enslaved by Willy Wonka discussed in part II not only makes sense to the civilised reader, but is also appealing and provides comfort as it is applicable to a wide range of situations in civilised *praxis*. The civilised narrative provides a successful mechanism for silencing and overwriting the voices of oppression, namely, by attributing specific and unequal value to the perspectives, whereby, the point of view of the (un)knower overpowers the voice of the victim who, in fact, is the one who knows her own experience better than anyone else: better than the landlords, the teachers, the doctors, the bosses, the lawyers, or any other figures of authority¹⁷⁴. This process of evaluation is an important aspect of the symbolic economy of power that provides the language and structure to silence the victim by automatically overwriting her experience with the terminology of the oppressor and his perspective.

Studies in anthropology of law provide valuable insights into the mechanisms by which legal narratives, terminology, and trials enforce the civilised structure of oppression and abuse. For instance, R.A. Duff asks the following question: should a man be acquitted or not if he “has sexual intercourse” with a woman in the sincere belief that she said “no”

¹⁷⁴ Numerous debates reveal this dynamic of overwriting the knowledge of the person by the perspective of the “expert”. Particularly, the recent work in the field of medical anthropology is enlightening on the power of the doctor to overwrite the narrative of the patient. For instance, see the work of Lisbeth Sachs (1986 and 1996) on medical narratives and patients in Sweden, or Mattingly and Garro (2000).

only to tease, but in fact, he truly believes that she wanted it? Duff argues that it is precisely this reasoning that tips the “knowledge” and power balance for male preference, since men take advantage of their physical and social power to *ignore* what they could have known about a woman saying “no”. Once again, the examination of the “facts” and determinants is still a matter of how “knowledge” and definitions are used in any concrete process requiring decision-making (Duff, 2002).

Rape of course is one of the more obvious expressions of ignoring the victim's voice and will and this rationale works equally well for other relationships where one will and voice overpower another's. The various theorists of the structural injustices that render the practice of law inherently flawed have observed that regardless of how much is known about injustice and how much “remedies” applied to fix the problems of violence and despair, the gap between the “haves” and the “have nots” only continues to grow and is particularly blatant in the divide between the different human races. For instance, Lois Forer, a judge of a trial court of general jurisdiction in Philadelphia, who has resigned the bench because she no longer felt capable of playing into the unjust sentencing of the poor black youth, observes that

[m]ore persons are behind bars in the United States than in any other country in the world, and the figures escalate every year. In one year, from 1989 to 1990, the number of people incarcerated grew by 7.7 percent, although the number of crimes decreased.. We spend more money on prisons than on education.

Almost a half million of our prisoners are black males. The rate of black male inmate population in South Africa is 681 per 100,000. In the United States it is 3,370 per 100,000 inmates.

The number of female prisoners rose by 137 percent in the decade of the 1980s. In 1983, 15,769 women were incarcerated; in 1989, 37,383. More than two thirds of these women had children under the age of eighteen. And the numbers of female prisoners continue to increase.

More than 100,000 children were in correctional institutions (juvenile jails) in 1992.

[The response to the increase in crime] has been more punitive laws and longer prison sentences, as well as judicial decisions restricting judicial discretion and the right of prisoners to appeal these harsh penalties.

These laws have taken a particularly heavy toll on the poor, who are most often imprisoned. They are also most frequently the victims of crime. Because non-whites, women and children are disproportionately poor, the criminal justice system is weighted

against them, not only in the pattern of arrests and the trial of cases but especially in sentencing.

Instead, sentencing laws have exacerbated racial hostilities and have widened the gulf between the affluent and the poor. We are now a nation divided between *them*, the prisoners who are largely poor and non-white, and *us*, who are not incarcerated and who are largely white and non-poor (Forer, 1994: 7-8).

The civilised narrative here obtains a concrete, material form and is expressed in the silenced, taken for granted experience of the disobedient “resources”.

Another theorist of criminal justice, Jeffrey Reiman, playing on the words that it is “justice” that is criminal and drawing on the discussion of unequal power and protection of abuse in civilised nation-states legal systems, writes the following about the American justice system, and whose observations also apply to other civilised contexts around the world:

Robbers, extortionists, and occupying soldiers are terms used to characterize those who enforce an unjust law and an unjust order. It would be a mistake to think this is merely a matter of rhetoric. There is a very real and very important sense in which those who use force unjustly or who use force to protect an unjust social order are no different from a band of criminals or an occupying army.... A criminal justice system that functions like ours—that imposes its penalties on the poor and not equally on all who threaten society... *is morally no better than the criminality it claims to fight.*

...What is common to the robber, the extortionist, and the occupying soldier is that each uses force (or the threat of force) to coerce people to serve the interests of others at the expense of their own.... The injustice that characterizes criminal acts is the forcing of people to serve the interests of others.

A legal system, of course, also uses force. Its defenders, however, maintain that it uses force to protect people's control over the things they value and over their own destinies.... [A]lthough both a legal system and its opposite, either criminality or military domination, use force, the moral superiority claimed for the legal system lies in the fact that it uses force to protect the interests of all people subject to its force equally, whereas criminals and occupation troops use force to subject some people to the interests of others. The moral legitimacy of a legal system and the lack of legitimacy of crime and military domination hinge, then, on the question of whether coercion is being used in the interests of all equally, or to promote some people's interests at the expense of others.

To say that the criminal justice system uses force to coerce people into serving the interests of others at the expense of their own *is to say the same thing about the criminal justice system that we say of crime!* (Reiman, 2007: 197-198).

However, as Reiman argues, based on the statistics and research pointing to the constant dismissal of the disempowered populations from the “benefits” of the “justice” system and

the unequal protection of those in power, the legal system acts in the same way as military and criminality contingents use force unequally to subject some of the people to the will of others.

A professor of law at the University of California in Los Angeles (UCLA), Joel Handler, confirms Reiman's conclusions and goes as far as stating that the “powerful rarely need the courts; they can exert their influence in politics, administration, and the private market” (Handler, 1978: 232). Moreover, according to him, one cannot ameliorate the system from within. The only way to achieve justice, he says, is for the court to stop acting like a court and in this way provoke the changes within the narrative structures of institutions and their conditions:

The major exception, and it really proves the general point, is the *Wyatt v. Stickney* litigation, where the court took extraordinary measures. The evidence indicates that there has been considerable change in the administration of the mental institutions and that the situation of the patients has improved. But to accomplish these results, the court had to operate in a non-traditional manner; it proved that change could come about through a judicial remedy but only if the court no longer acted like a court (Handler, 1978: 175).

In other words, the underlying precepts that guide the development of the plot, whether in fiction or life, is pervasive on every level of civilised human experience and the structures themselves have a bulletproof system to protect and justify violence against and subjugation of those who have historically been violated and subjugated, dismissing their tears and silencing their cries by the voice of domination that states that this is natural, that the oppressed have chosen this life themselves, that this is in their own interests, that it is justice, and finally that what they are *actually* trying to convey is joy.

In the following section, I discuss in depth the rationalisation of this silencing and the way in which it subverts the meaning of suffering and domestication in the civilised narrative, particularly, enunciating the parallel between racism, speciesism, sexism and government. In closing this part, however, I would like to reiterate the role of institutionalised practices and prevalent *doxa* in the silencing of human and non-human victims of oppressive socio-economic relations, which occurs on several levels of public discourse and that requires the turning off of emotions, empathy, and the impulse to act in response to the communicated experience. For instance, the ideal of contained and

controlled emotions in public speaking turns into a requirement for the tone of “neutrality” or apathy, which prohibits the display of emotions in such public events as a court trial or news presentation in corporate media, among others, because civilised society deems emotions as irrational and unreliable. The stigma attached to emotions, to their display, or to the expression of pain thereby discredits the emotional person and in this way subverts the very meaning of experience, which by its very nature occurs through the senses as much as through psychological and other complex emotional processing. Memory of experience often evokes physiological sensations and responses and by erasing this important information from civilised narrative, the Cartesian separation of rationality from the rest of experience institutes unknowledge and incompetence as the crown of evolution. Moreover, the sensuality of the emotionally handicapped upper classes (Kraus *et al.*, 2010) is marketed at high prices in various forms of symbolic expressions, such as paintings, commercials, and even religious art (Berger, 1972), while the subjectivity of the sufferer is not only devalued, but even erased, since the credible voice has to be “neutral” (i.e. apathetic) and powerful – which means capable of exploitation – thereby normalising injustice and abusive relationships.

As discussed earlier, the root of this perversion of the meaning of suffering resides in the reason for the existence of the concept of “humanism”, a category that dehumanises everyone who is designated for exploitation or extermination. In other words, racism, objectification, and all forms of segregation based on gender, species, race, illness, and so on, derive their rationale from the same source: the concept of personhood and agency, which in the homogenising concept of civilisation sees the interrelationship of persons and non-persons, humans and non-humans, agents and victims, owners and resources hierarchically and always identified in relationship to the master and his needs.

Various scholars have attempted to elaborate on the interconnectedness of species by problematising the domestication inherent in civilised relations only to justify these hierarchical relations of power and civilise them even deeper. This convolution of concepts and the disintegration of morality¹⁷⁵ appears to be the main culprit in the

¹⁷⁵ As Arshavsky pointed out in his interview with Nikitina, morality is inherent in wilderness and is destroyed by civilisation (Nikitina, 1998), as well as Kropotkin (2002) and Reiman (2007) discussed earlier.

proliferation of the narrative of segregation, whose logic rationalises civilised abuse from a wide range of perspectives, such as presented in discussions by Vicki Hearne, Monty Roberts, Cary Wolfe (2003a), Wolfe and Paul Patton, *et al.* (in Wolfe, 2003), and not surprisingly, particularly in the field of horse-riding. As the following section demonstrates, the training of animals and the culture of childhood have much in common.

5.2. Do Horses Dream of Winning Gold?

In the recent times, researchers in humanities have turned their attention to the studies on animals in an attempt to further negotiate the place of humans within the “Tree of Life” of other species. For instance, the Modern Language Association (MLA) offers sections on animality and animal studies at its yearly conventions and theoretical works, such as Jacques Derrida's “And Say the Animal Responded” (in Wolfe, 2003) or *The Animal That Therefore I Am* (2008), or Kelly Oliver's (2009) *Animal Lessons: How they Teach us to be Human*, among others, point to the problems that the construct of humanism continues to face and the effects it has on human identity. Some of the essays in Cary Wolfe's (2003) *Zoontologies* are particularly illuminating of the direction that an acknowledgement of the confluence of the social, cultural, and literary construction of children, animals, and dominated subjects can take when the basic precepts continue to be the civilised myth that the dominated are improved by their oppression. Namely, Paul Patton's essay “Language, Power, and the Training of Horses” (Patton in Wolfe, 2003) reveals the implications of this nexus of constructs for the political narrative and its anthropological manifestation.

Even superficially, the aesthetic of dressage of horses is reminiscent of the aesthetics of fetishism and sado-masochistic practices and hence the parallel presents an invaluable opportunity for a discussion of how dominance gets presented visually (i.e. formally and superficially) and ontologically, in anthropological practice, literature and academia. The image that a rider is trained to exude is that of a chiselled oppressor, in sleek jodhpurs, whose legs dive into the shiny boots of leather with metal spurs; his head dressed in a hard helmet wrapped tightly by soft velvet; the hand carelessly yet confidently holds a dark, leather whip; the posture is straight, oozing a dramatic image of

synchrony through the sheer will of the rider to control and an existential desire of the horse to submit to and please the rider.

This description of equestrian sports works equally well for describing a scene in a sado-masochistic club for sexual domination and submission¹⁷⁶. For instance, a matronly dominatrix, in sleek boots, whose stiletto heels, like spurs, dive into the naked flesh of the buttocks on the floor entrapped by black leather straps and chains. She does not need to look at him as she lazily glances past him with cold, wilful eyes. She knows what he wants and he knows how to get it. The total harmony of two synchronised desires, hers to torture and his to be smothered with pain.

Such images of the wilful dominator and the submitted slave whose joy it is to be dominated imbue the civilised aesthetic in all aspects of life: the count kissing the gloved hand of the royalty, the chiselled and perfectly submitted dancer to her male Tango partner, etc. Even in civilised children's books and film these relationships are present, often depicted in fetishist hues. For instance, the dark Gothic aesthetic of Harry Potter, with the mystery, the secret powers, the stress on the importance to endure and love these tests of pain, even the threat of death, all of which allow one to get closer to the commander of dark forces, an honour bestowed upon a select few, like the equestrian sport is exclusive to the rich, or like the S&M clubs are selective and secretive.

However, the superficial aesthetic does not need to be overtly dark, for it only communicates the underlying precepts governing the civilised relationships that are also present in the field of production of knowledge responsible for legitimising meaning, such as theorising oppression and transcending the problem that Douglass, Kropotkin or Bentham have identified, namely that for the victim of domination (and training) these concepts are a matter of a painful reality of a whole life of slavery, of stolen wilderness, and of shattered dreams. Rationalising victims as either singing or achieving a better,

¹⁷⁶ With regards to horse-riding, I have participated in show-jumping for ten years, competing on an international level from the age of 13 to 23. Even though I personally never used physical force or pain to coerce the horse to win, nonetheless, I quit because I realised that in that relationship, the horse had no choice but to obey and I was the oppressor with human privilege. The ideal aesthetic and the claustrophobic elitist ambiance of the "sport" had haunted me for years, however. As for sado-masochism, I have conducted research for my first methodology training for M.A. in anthropology in Sweden in 1995-96. I became interested in the subject after the connections I drew between cultural genital mutilation practices and the civilised relationships of pain and the aesthetics of hierarchical relationships that was funded by the Watson Foundation in 1993-94.

happier, or more beautiful state is part of the mechanism of silencing. This exercise in silencing and dismissal is crucial for the development of the language that then delivers civilised narratives in the form of succinct and happy stories for both children and adults.

Carry Wolfe's introduction and Paul Patton's essay in *Zoontologies* (2003), a volume that attempts to reconcile the contradictions between domination, well-being, self-expression, submission, and aesthetics reveal this rationale of empowerment and disempowerment. In order to introduce the main point of Patton's essay on horsemanship, government, gender, and the domestication of children, Wolfe opens his introduction with Hearne's ideology on training horses:

I try to show, the issue is not so much an unsophisticated theory of language that is used to separate human and animal; indeed, Hearne's work on how we communicate with animals and inhabit a shared world with them by building a common vocabulary in the training relationship is as supple and complex as any work I know of on this problem (Wolfe in Wolfe, 2003: xvi).

The key phrase that makes it possible to reconcile morality with the humiliation inflicted by one person training another to obey him on command is: “how we communicate with animals and inhabit a shared world with them”. In other words, the true nature of the relationship where a person moves into the life of another person, confines that person to a locked space with bars (as discussed in part I on Winnie-the-Pooh and zoos), harnesses her, and rides her is not a relationship of sharing, but that of “domination”, “invasion” and “conquest”. The only possible way to get around the ethical problem that such an invasion poses and to be able to call it “sharing” instead of what it really is – colonisation – is to deny the oppressed party the dignity of personhood, knowledge, and agency and to define the “un-person” in terms of the needs and desires of the one holding the title of “person”. These definitions allow to substitute the term “invasion”, “colonialism” or “conquest” with a euphemism that conveys a sense of reciprocity: “shared space”. In addition, this linguistic misrepresentation of concepts and experience further conceals the true nature of the relationship by calling “communication” what in fact constitutes one sided commands such as “sit”, “jump”, “hunt”, “give”, “good boy”, *et al.*

Misrepresenting the true nature of coercive relationships becomes easy once the purpose for a person's existence – and by extension for all the persons who meet the

criteria to form that group – has been defined by the one who profits from controlling such persons' lives and exploiting their effort and time. Here, language¹⁷⁷ reveals the real value of power: it constitutes the tool that allows us to define and name the other and then have that other succumb to the definition by overwriting her narrative. In a similar manner, in *Orientalism*, Edward Said (1979) discussed the mechanism of subjugation through the construction of specific knowledge through visual and literary narrative of the Oriental “other” by the European, which instituted a framework for exploitative, one-way relationships regardless of the reality or self knowledge of the “oriental” “other”.

This dynamic is illustrated in the training and domestication of animals, which was denounced from various perspectives by such thinkers as Peter Singer, Gary Francione, and Tom Regan arguing for the abolition of speciesism and for the recognition of animal rights to personhood. A discussion of the differences in these philosophers' arguments deserves a book to itself; what is relevant to this discussion, however, is the way in which the mythology that structures discrimination is informing all the layers of civilised knowledge, culture, society, economy, etc., permeating all the aspects of civilised relationships in the totalitarian and global manner of today. This reasoning is aptly articulated in Paul Patton's essay “Language, Power, and the Training of Horses” (Patton in Wolfe, 2003).

In his introduction to the collection of essays, Wolfe praises Patton's contribution to the anthology expressly for the ability to identify the problem of unequal relations of power in domestication and yet he sees him as managing to reconcile these inequalities with the ethical problem that domination raises. The reconciliation, according to him, occurs because the authors claim that (1) the concept of equality is dangerous; (2) training (domestication) brings the best out of the dominated persons; (3) because domination of animals, children, and other domesticated persons is an expression of government, and government is not only good, but necessary for the well-being of everyone; therefore, they

¹⁷⁷ Foucault used the term “discourse” to discuss the relations of power as they transpired through the relating to the interaction, the choice of authority and who to listen to or cite in social networks, or who to give the public space for speech. Language is taken to be more specific to the rules of communication. However, because I use “language” in Zerzan's (2002) sense of a tool of alienation, I propose that it is language that contains discourse and the symbolic capital with its currency value and power structure because it is through language that we invent, structure, and communicate the system of laws for oppression.

conclude, government, domination and domestication are not only ethical, but even indispensable for all living beings:

... this does not mean that power and ethics are opposites. Indeed, as Paul Patton—himself a dedicated horseman of many years as well as ... scholar of poststructuralist philosophy—argues here, the training of horses, whether in the traditional “cowboy” methods of domination or the gentler ways of “horse whisperer” Monty Roberts, is indeed an exercise of power, a form of what Foucault calls “government.” But this is “by no means incompatible with ethical relations and obligations toward other beings” of whatever species, Patton argues, be they human or animal. Indeed, part of what is valuable about the work of Hearne, Roberts, and others—and about the experience of actually training an animal—is that it helps to make clear the requirements and obligations of those hierarchical relations of power we do enter into (with animals, with children, with each other) and draws our attention to how those requirements are always specific to the beings involved, in the light of which, he argues, the presumption of a one-size-fits-all notion of “equality in all contexts” is “not only misleading but dangerous” (in Wolfe, 2003: xviii-xix).

The essay “Language, Power, and the Training of Horses” opens with an anthropocentric, civilised perspective on the reasons for the existence of horses: they have, apparently, evolved to please humans. This is precisely the ontological problem I have identified as responsible in the civilised narrative that exterminates wilderness: the purpose of one's existence becomes to serve the interests of another even when this entails acting against one's own interests. As discussed earlier, in Reiman's (2007) words, this irreconcilable problem is what makes the system of “criminal justice” criminal and immoral. Yet, the Foucauldian analysis of the inherently coercive relations of unequal power that follows this revelation in *Zoontologies* gets buried beneath the vocabulary that avoids “polemic” or any real questioning of the nature of these relations. Most important, this theorising comes from people who have access to the highly expensive and prestigious network (i.e. extreme high-value currency of symbolic and material capital) of equestrian domination. It ignores the perspective of those whose will gets broken. Hence, for most readers, particularly those who have not had a chance to meditate on what it is like to be enslaved, this essay provides no acknowledgement for or insight into the experience of having an iron bit in one's mouth, of being forced to learn the language of obedience and command, or of having one's definition of self-purpose being contingent on the will and the aesthetic sense of an oppressor. In fact, the author highlights Patton's warning that it is “not only misleading but dangerous” to apply the concept of “equality in all contexts” – i.e., the authors openly admit that egalitarianism threatens the very basis of the institution of

domination and that, in their opinion, each category of the oppressed has a different set of definitions, limitations, and expectations.

Translated, the justification of animal training follows this logic: humans as masters help horses fully realise their ideal, because horses, for some reason, *fail* to be “ideal” all the time by themselves; but once pushed by the humans in charge, they really end up enjoying being ideal in the eyes of the pushers (Patton in Wolfe, 2003: 83). To draw a civilised conclusion such as this, it is necessary to first (1) believe in inherent inequality of people and species and of their knowledges: the premise being that some know better about themselves and others than those others know about anyone including themselves; and (2) have faith in the assumptions that some persons need to be governed by others and that the governing persons know best how to represent and govern their subjects, who are assumed to be inferior to the governors and ignorant of their own needs and possibilities.

Obviously, adherence to these assumptions entails ignorance and arrogance on the part of those who believe they have the right to govern others and a sense of inferiority on the part of those who agree that they need to be governed. To be able to arrive at this position of superiority vis-à-vis others, the governor has to ignore the knowledge of the governed subjects about themselves and the subjects have to be subjected and subjugated to the governor's gaze and definition of them. To arrive at a conclusion of inferiority and the need to be governed one has to have been rendered unskilled, unintelligent, and specialised in a field needed by the owners, management and government. In other words, in order for there to be governance, there first must be ignorance and a deep distrust of independence or the ability of human and other animals to live and let life be.

Ignorance is produced by institutionalised methods of dumbing down, to borrow John Taylor Gatto's phrase, which then makes the double-standards feel natural. This dumbing down is achieved through the process of institutionalisation of a humanist and specifically ethnocentric (and mostly male) epistemology that renders “logical” the following inconsistencies in logic:

Does this mean that training horses to perform classical disciplines such as dressage is irredeemably corrupt? Is training of any kind an indefensible form of co-optation of the animal's powers? To see why the answers to these questions should be in the negative,

we need to hold apart the elements of the training relationship: the disciplinary relations of command and obedience, the relation to animals, and the languages that enable us to interact with them. Disciplinary relations of command and obedience are precisely a means to create and maintain stable and civil relations between different kinds of beings, not only among individuals of the same species, but also between representatives of different species (Patton in Wolfe, 2003: 95).

Like Zerzan, Patton identifies language as the vehicle for the coercive relationship that exists in civilisation between the object of training (in Patton's case it is a dog or a horse) and the master. Patton further draws a parallel between three spheres of government (domestication): animal training, the training of children, and the ruling over subjects, the most intensive preparation for which occurs during the training years at school. However, if Zerzan has understood the humiliation and the pain inflicted by domestication, an understanding that prompted him to examine the core of civilised relations and to seek liberation for all, Patton sees governance as part of a natural order, as improving the victim, as something that brings out more of the “natural” beauty enjoyed by the master, and as needed by and delightful for the victim herself. Since it is the horse, and not the trainer or the theoretician, who gets the bit in the mouth, is forced to learn how to understand the trainer's “communication” and appeal to his sense of beauty and contentment, we only get the perspective of the one who dominates and thus miss the opportunity to examine what it would be like to be beneath the saddle, not above it.

If one were to take the parallel between government and the training of animals, children, and citizens to its logical end, one would be forced to re-examine the profound roots of master-slave relations that are expressed in this language and its civilised ontology. For if we admit the voice of the victim on par with the voice of power whose monologue dominates this public discourse, we would be forced to deal with the violent essence of grooming, shaping, commanding and, most important, the violence of the act itself of dismissing the pain of the trained, groomed, shaped, and commanded being. If, in contrast, empathy and dialogue were the guiding principles of research instead of the established apathy and monologue, then sovereignty, education, and domestication would all be challenged. Patton's essay however promises a questioning, which it never delivers:

In effect, trainers must become like those whom Nietzsche says have acquired the right to make promises. These are beings “who promise like sovereigns, reluctantly, rarely, slowly.” Trainers, too, must become like sovereign individuals, aware of “the

extraordinary privilege of responsibility” and conscious of the “power over oneself and fate” that this implies. The overlap between the moral cosmos of the trainer and the one we encounter in Nietzsche's writings is also evident in Hearne's remark that, for the trainee dog, “Freedom is being on an 'Okay' command”. In other words, freedom only makes sense within a system of constraints; it presupposes both capacities of the subject and their location within relations of power (Patton in Wolfe, 2003: 96).

The challenging of the civilised perspective never comes, because the imposed narrative of power insists that freedom must be constrained for the good of the constrained persons themselves: cows have to be incarcerated and then eaten for their own good, and so children and rebels too must be punished by means of inflicting emotional or physical pain for their own benefit.

The “relations of power” in which some individuals are endowed with the knowledge and responsibility to confine, exploit, and direct others are referred to in this narrative as “relations of trust”, thereby projecting a sense of benign necessity for abuse. This narrative makes it inconceivable for the civilised to imagine a horse, a dog, a child, or a subject refusing to obey the commands, which they term as “communication”. Left unvoiced here is the threat of the death penalty that hovers above this silenced obedience: if the enslaved animal rebelled and defended herself against the abuse with fangs or hooves, the animal would be executed by lethal injection. If children turned around to destroy school walls, they would be threatened with starvation, joblessness, and incarcerated in even more severe correcting institutions than the school itself. People who burn down fences, as Snufkin does in Hemul-land, and destroy the slaughter machines used for killing or torturing animals, as animal rights activists do around the world, receive life sentences in the United States and the equivalent maximum penalty in Canada and other civilised states¹⁷⁸.

¹⁷⁸People labelled “eco-terrorists”, who have purposefully *not* harmed life, but have committed acts of disruption against corporations or other domesticating enterprises, can receive the maximum sentence for manslaughter, even though the activists were careful not to hurt anyone. For instance Jeffrey Luers, a prisoner at Oregon State penitentiary has been incarcerated since June 2000 for eco-sabotage arson at a car dealership was sentenced to 22 years and eight months for that action. Tre Arrow received 6 years sentence in Canada for having scaled the U.S. Forest Service building in Portland in 2000 and lived for eleven days on its ledge in protest of timber sale in the Mount Hood National Forest. “I wanted to protect those trees that I loved. And I had only my body to protect them with” - he was pushed down, but survived. Bruce Ellison, the attorney for Tre Arrow, said that he was facing up to life in prison on these charges but agreed to plead guilty and received six years in Canada and then extradited to the United States. May 2009 in California, Eric McDavid received a sentence of 19 years and 7 months for *planning* to damage corporate and government property (he hasn't damaged it, though). Animal rights activists in the U.K. Don't fare better. In the case of activists demonstrating against animal testing by the Sequani laboratory received up to ten years

In these situations, the civilised narrative refuses to question the integrity of the people who practice abuse and domination or to challenge its fundamental premise that power is not an egalitarian right. Since the institutionalised death penalty that hangs over the animal and the rebel does not apply to the trainer, the educator, or the invader, it is inaccurate to call “mutual” a relationship where the socially disempowered person, such as the animal, the rebel, or the child, does not enjoy the same right to defend her interests, purpose, knowledge, and life by legally putting the trainer to sleep. Nevertheless, in addition to misnaming these one-way relationships as “mutual”, the ultimate veiling of their abusive essence of civilisation comes from claiming that they are built on “trust” and “communication”:

...Just as communication among humans presupposes a degree of trust, so it is apparent that to establish means of communication between humans and animals is also to establish a basis for trust. Hearne points out that the better a dog (or a horse) is trained, “which is to say, the greater his 'vocabulary' -the more mutual trust there is, the more dog [or horse] and human can rely on each other to behave responsibly”. Roberts also insists that the point of his method is to create a relationship based on mutual trust and confidence (ibid).

In the end, the ultimate expression of violence is the act of referring to a coercive relationship as “a mutual relationship of trust”, in which one party has a say over the life and death of the other, while the other is so completely disempowered that her only option is to act out of fear and comply with the demands to serve until she expires. If this were “a mutual relationship of trust”, it would not have needed the backing of the whole apparatus of laws, military, police, and other civilised professionals to protect trainers, rulers, and owners from being treated in the way that they treat their subjects-objects.

Relationships involving communication and command-obedience are, of course, common within human social life. That is why, in *Join-Up: Horse Sense for People*, Roberts can argue for the extension of the principles of his horse-training techniques to the whole gamut of human relations involving differences of power and capacity. He suggests that relations between parents and children, women and men, managers and employees will all be better served by an approach that employs nonverbal as well as verbal means to establish trust and invited cooperation. Hearne also points out that much of human social life presupposes relationships of command and obedience. We expect

of prison. They were prosecuted under the 2005 Serious Organised Crime and Police Act (SOCPA) Act. Mel Broughton, an activist in England, on 14th February 2009 received ten years of prison for protesting against the planned construction of an animal experiments testing laboratory in Oxford. Examples abound and there is little of mutuality or reciprocity in the way the laws are written or enacted (Corporate Watch, UK 30th June 2009: <http://www.corporatewatch.org/?lid=3405>).

obedience to some at least of our own basic needs and desires on the part of other people and we teach obedience to our children. The import of this line of thought in both Hearne and Roberts is to suggest that we do well to attend to the requirements of the hierarchical and communicative relations in which we live, and that certain kinds of emphasis on equality in all contexts are not only misleading but dangerous.

... Hearne points to the similarities between the moral cosmos of training and that of the older forms of human society in which “obedience was a part of human *virtu*,” thereby drawing attention to the fact that the idea of society that is expressed in the practice of training is at odds with our modern egalitarian ethos (ibid: 96-97).

“We expect obedience” is obviously spoken from the point of view of the master and not from the perspective of the child or the horse. In other words, the relations “between parents and children, women and men, managers and employees” become smoother and less visibly violent when the subjects expected to obey understand what is expected of them and comply in silence, preferably with a smile and even gratitude.

In this narrative, any contradictions that challenge the concept of “democracy” get resolved when the concept of egalitarianism is substituted with the concept of “difference”: humans cannot *overtly* abuse humans because, today, they are considered to be the same, but if we operate from the basis that those who have been rendered socially, physically, materially weak depend on the powerful people's charity to exploit their weakness and to allow them to exist, then there is flexibility in where the borders between the groups can be drawn and how the abused can be educated to believe that they are rendered nobler if they learnt the language of obedience and servitude. In this way, their relationship will be filled with joy (only half a decade ago, this contention of sameness of all humans was contestable, as Bentham observes). The construct of “difference” provides the platform for all forms of exploitation, discrimination, slavery, or extermination: their faith is different, their tails are longer, their skulls are wider, their brains are smaller, their stature shorter, these have hooves, those have a different skin colour than Jesus supposedly had, the feathers on their head are not hats, the food they eat is not *kosher* or *halal*, ad infinitum.

But whereas the differences between the sexes, races, and social classes in those older forms of society were only purportedly based in nature, the differences between trainers and their subjects are natural differences between animal kinds endowed with different powers and capacities. The good trainer is the one who appreciates these differences, who both understands and respects the specific nature of the animal.

... In a reworking of the story of our expulsion from paradise, [Hearne] suggests that our fallen relation to animals is one in which a gap has opened up between “the ability to command and the full acknowledgement of the personhood of the being so commanded” (47). Good training establishes a form of language that closes that gap, which is another way of saying that it enables a form of interaction that enhances the power and the feeling of power of both horse and rider (ibid: 97).

In other words, the text echoes Machiavelli's (1981) advice in *The Prince* that a good and responsible tyrant is the one who lets his sheep indulge in the illusion that they are safe and well in his “claws”. According to Patton, since animals are different – some can be forced to jump others to plough or run fast, etc. – a good master understands these differences, i.e. identifies them, and devises a language to fit the abilities of the specific subjects of dressage. The grammar of freedom that the animal communicates at the beginning of this relationship, when she kicks and neighs and attempts to throw off and even kill the rider as he insists on breaking the horse, is, once again, conveniently left out of this narrative, and the power hierarchy remains anthropocentric. What the narrative chooses to highlight is the obedient and happy horse, bridled and saddled; the proud rider, the conqueror of wild will, master of steeds; the golden medals; the praise of the “mutual” “union” and excellent “communication” skills inhering in the medals, prizes, and microphone announcements during the equestrian competitions and afterwards in the media.

This myth of the joyful nature of sado-masochistic relationships achieves two things: it naturalises violence, silences the victim, and then claims that the victim enjoys her experience because she either was created that way or has so evolved, i.e., has chosen this state of affairs. In this way, it is both a product of the Darwinian narrative of civilisation, but also its legitimator. It permeates children's culture and narratives in a particularly overpowering way, because children are the most important subjects in domestication, and their literature, as Zipes (2009) argues, becomes the medium that transmits crucial memes.

An extremely popular children's book, *The Giving Tree* by Shel Silverstein (1964), illustrates how the myth of the joyful nature of the slave, i.e. the one whose purpose for being the civilised ontology constructs as “servant” or “resource” offers a topos for abusive relationships that automatically translate into “mutual” relationships of “trust” and

“love”. This translation or substitution of concepts is possible due to the underlying Darwinian assumption that is the sacred *doxa*, present but silent, lulling us to remain sleepy and comforted by the voice that whispers that this is the resources' evolutionary choice, that egalitarianism is a lie, and that the victim is redeemed by her limitless, self-sacrificial giving, while the one who consumes her is vindicated by the very fact of his agency, consumption and humanism.

“Once there was a tree... and she loved a little boy,” the story begins. “And everyday, the boy would come” and take things from the tree or ask for something. And the tree always gave of herself. At first he wanted to play king, eat apples, climb her branches, sleep in her shade “and the boy loved the tree very much; and the tree was happy”(Silverstein, 1964), we are told – just like the singing slaves.

The relationship keeps escalating throughout the book as he keeps coming back asking for more. Hence, the next thing he asks the tree for is money; she does not have any, she says, but offers him to pick her apples for him to sell: “Then you will have money and you will be happy”. In other words, she always confirms to him that severing, abusing, accumulating, and using her for his purposes will make him happy and therefore being severed, used, and consumed by him makes her happy too.

The next thing he wants is a house and then a boat. The tree suggests that he cut her, and so he does. The story is repetitive but the greed keeps augmenting: the boy goes away, forgets about the tree, then needs something, comes back and the tree is always there, always glad to see him and give him what he needs. Even though this is presented as a two-way relationship, just like the civilised narrative discussed above claims to be: apparently the tree herself keeps coming up with the ideas of how to be better exploited, in fact, this is an exemplary tale of apathy, deafness, and ignorance that lead to rape, abuse, and murder. He never once inquires about how she feels or what her needs are, for the concept of reciprocity is absent in domesticated relationships; what matters is that the Boy loves to have a good life and that the Tree loves him by giving herself, her biggest need being to offer herself for his consumption so that he can have what he wants:

And so the boy cut off her branches
and carried them away
to build his house.

And the tree was happy.
But the boy stayed away for a long time.
And when he came back,
the tree was so happy
she could hardly speak.
“Come, Boy,” she whispered,
“come and play.”
“I am too old and sad to play,”
said the boy.
“I want a boat that will
take me far away from here.
Can you give me a boat?”
“Cut down my trunk
and make a boat,” said the tree.
“Then you can sail away...
and be happy.”
And so the boy cut down her trunk
and made a boat and sailed away.
And the tree was happy
... but not really.

And after a long time
the boy came back again.
“I am sorry, Boy,”
said the tree,” but I have nothing
left to give you -
My apples are gone.”
“My teeth are too weak
for apples,” said the boy.
“My branches are gone,”
said the tree. “You
cannot swing on them -”
“I am too old to swing
on branches,” said the boy.
“My trunk is gone,” said the tree.
“You cannot climb -”
“I am too tired to climb,” said the boy.
“I am sorry,” sighed the tree.
“I wish that I could give you something...
but I have nothing left.
I am just an old stump.
I am sorry...”
“I don't need very much now,” said the boy.
“just a quiet place to sit and rest.
I am very tired.”
“Well,” said the tree, straightening
herself up as much as she could,
“well, an old stump is good for sitting and resting
Come, Boy, sit down. Sit down and rest.”
And the boy did.
And the tree was happy (Silverstein, 1964).

This story articulates the whole mythology of civilisation: the abused and consumed victim is happy to serve the purpose of the moving agent even beyond death. While undoubtedly children and adults are active agents in extrapolating meaning, and might be able to see this relationship for what it is, nonetheless, if their whole experience confirms to them the naturalness of such hierarchical, one-way relationships of exploitation, then most likely, the story would act as a meme to consolidate the *doxa* and the ideology of oppression. In fact, it builds itself on the very concept of understanding the language of domination: the tree understands the material, emotional, and aesthetic requirements of the master, and in Patton's language, enters a "mutual space" of one-way servitude and one-way consumption. In fact, numerous critics have interpreted this poem as one about the destructive consumption of nature. Feminist perspectives have also pointed out that the gender of the two characters is not coincidental: the tree is female: "the boy cut off *her* branches..."; "cut down *her* trunk..."; "*she* could hardly speak..."; "*she* whispered..."; "said the tree, straightening *herself* up..."; and so forth.

However, this narrative has been so normalised through the past seventeen thousand years of domestication that the violence and abuse are no longer noticeable since they are part of the civilised narrative and its legitimising norm. The problem of this story hence is a much deeper, ontological one, for, regardless of whether the tree is a metaphor for the "unequal" expectations of sacrifice between the genders, according to George Lakoff and Mark Johnson (2003), metaphors conduct real images and real ontological concepts that then guide people through their relationships with their world, and I would add that these metaphors guide them in concordance with the legitimate norm of the civilised – i.e. abusive – narrative.

Therefore, even if we assume that the tree in this book is a metaphor for mother, again, only in a symbolic culture can it be taken to "represent" other relationships the direction of which is pre-set as a one-way relationship of giving. In other words, this metaphor can make sense only to the civilised, because they have a ready formula by which to solve the equation of these relationships: everything exists for the purpose of the food chain and resource-consumer relationship. For, if this relationship is about the legitimate abuse of mothers, it makes sense in an agricultural, sedentary society, in which

the meaning of a matrimonial relationship for upper classes is about joining capital and maximising it through offspring, whereby a child takes everything from his parents; parents provide the comfort to buy friends, travel, accumulate symbolic and material capital and later their death makes for a comfortable place to sit on for the Boy who knew how to maximise his chances and put his heritage to the best possible use. For the economically disenfranchised, on the other hand, the children themselves become resources and are sent to work at an early age.

Another important omission in this narrative pertains to the fact that, in the wild, a being, whether she is a human mother or a tree, supports millions of symbiotic relationships and communities of other plants, bugs, birds, squirrels, human and animal children, et al. Therefore, by ignoring the Tree's real experience and voice the poem ignores all the other victims of the Boy's greed and self-centred anthropocentrism. Reducing this complex society around the tree to the needs of the Boy and to the services that the Tree can render him and then attributing it to a metaphor that stands for other "giving" relationships, becomes the guiding principle that fits all the various stories into the plot of a narrative that naturalises and legitimates abuse even if, as civilisation progressed, the contradictions between exploitation, giving, locking, stealing, moving, dying, hunger, wealth, community, individualism have eluded resolution, becoming more and more entangled and convoluted through complex representation¹⁷⁹. The deeper the domesticated culture stepped into its own horror, the more "refined" and complex became its art and literature and the more excruciating the pain of wilderness, which harkens back to John Zerzan's critique of language, time, symbolic thought and violence.

Even though *The Giving Tree* is straightforward and its pictures corroborate the text, its unresolved conflict lies in the contradiction between the way the text applies the term "love" to the female tree as a giver and to the male human animal as a consumer and, in the manner of civilised unknowledge, essentialises these aspects as natural qualities based on the individual's "biological" class: gender, race, species, etc. In this regard, the

¹⁷⁹ As mentioned in an earlier footnote, both Frederic Jameson (2002) and Claude Lévi-Strauss (1963) make an important point about the complexity of art: when a society, such as the Caduveo, chooses to organise itself hierarchically, they fail to resolve the contradictions and conflicts arising from inequality and subjugation. These conflicts are then expressed in the complexity of lines and details in their paintings. In addition, Boris Wiseman (2008) also observes that the paintings of the Caduveo have come to distinguish them from animals, which is not an issue with the other tribes.

story exemplifies the role of language in overwriting the meaning of wilderness in children's narratives confusing the basic ontological concepts just as *Zoontologies* offers a rationale and a justification of violence by silencing the victim and confusing obedience with desire and the fear of death with joy.

Other children's picture books illustrate the irresolvable conflict and the violence of domesticated relationships even more radically: often, pictures contradict the text and, of course, these conflicts and tensions add layers of information to the child in terms of acknowledging the complexity of civilised experience and its relationships. However, my argument here is that even while I agree that children are wilder than adults and that they do, as Zipes (2009) observes, contest and resist this meaning, in the final instance, few have the strength and the possibilities to overcome the domesticating, directing, controlling, and self-imposing flux of civilised topoi. Somewhere in the depths of our souls, no matter how wild we may be, having been touched by civilisation, as if kissed by the plague, we may still catch the echo of the whispering tempter, attempting to lull us to the naturalness of abuse and its rewards. Facing the institutional threat of violence and death, not many children grow up to resist this narrative, its voice silencing all other voices of wilderness, and since their movement is constricted and their space is colonised, many may not have the moomin option to simply walk away to a promised land.

And yet, in spite of the civilised threat of punishment and starvation, dissident voices continue to rise and to challenge this narrative of pain as destiny and joy. As Peter Kropotkin undoes the premises of the evolutionary theory; Jeremy Bentham demolishes the walls that separate humans from other sentient beings; or Frederick Douglass disputes the veracity of the mythology of oppressive relationships, the critique of humanist borders, civilised categories, and constructs of humanity and animality comes from a range of disciplines and perspectives. On the one end of these voices is the anarcho-primitivist position, spanning the various critiques of civilisation; on the other end of the spectrum is the call for a complete merging with the machine. This last solution is understandable to the extent that it recognises the fact that as humans have atrophied their own ability to grow physiological limbs, machines have come to constitute an integral part of civilised bodies and nature. However, this perspective ignores the pitfalls of technology, which like

the technology of writing discussed in part I, constitutes the mechanism that colonises by entangling domesticated beings deeper and deeper into relationships of debt. In the next section I examine the question of the machine through the question of empathy and critique of technology.

5.3. Do Children Dream of Cyborg Love?

The imposing technological order of the age of the machine has presented many challenges for human identity and for our understanding of human evolution as a trajectory of beings who “previously” were dependent on living biosystems and independent of tools, civilised language, or technology and who “now” have become creatures relying more and more on artificial limbs (literacy as an organ for memory; vehicles of transportation in lieu of running, swimming, or walking; stories and narratives to replace genes by memes; clothing, housing, guns, and other attributes of civilised life as protection against weather, nature, and life, *ad infinitum*). Generalising this trajectory for all humanity, this narrative omits two crucial details: one, that the non-domesticated lifestyle is not simply an evolutionary step that took place in the past, but that it still exists today and that the only reason these people are not thriving is due to having been colonised and exterminated by the civilised; and two, that this is not an evolution of “humanity” as a whole, but rather this pertains to only those people who have adopted the civilised mode of living and with it hierarchical and parasitic relationships, for they are the ones to have mutated in this way and thereby have lost the ability to develop their own limbs from their own bodies or through mutual relationships (Egenter, 1987; Hansell, 2005). Such generalisation is part of the normative legitimating process that silences the colonised and presents the coloniser as the better result of Natural Selection.

In this regard, technology poses new problems to anthropology as the borders between living species acquire new dimensions: civilised humans become less and less animal as they merge with the machines they create to serve human needs, but by having acquired this servitude humans have also appropriated the essence of the machine and incorporated it into their own being. Hence, my discussion of the challenges of classification by age, gender, class, race (or ethnicity), and species will be incomplete

without an examination of the phenomenon of human dependence on machines and the implications of this development on self knowledge. The publication of Donna Haraway's (2008) work on the intersection of species with technologies illustrates how this narrative spreads through civilised space and colonises it.

Haraway states at the beginning of *A Cyborg Manifesto* (1991) that she had intended the text as both irony and metaphor to contest the gendered identities that have been responsible for the oppression of women. As mentioned earlier, however, metaphors have a profound effect on structuring reality (Lakoff and Johnson, 2003), and hence pose certain ontological problems for liberation. "Othered" persons, according to Haraway, can heal through mutation by incorporating elements from machines. Having lost the ability to generate limbs, technology offers new possibilities of regeneration that, along with information systems, would replace their lost limbs and information systems.

Animals devise various ways of moving about their world and interacting with it. Again, the moominbooks project a wide range of possibilities for symbiotic relationships that do not entail changing the direction or the other's purpose in the manner of civilisation. For instance, Moominmamma and the children hop on the Hattifattners' boat to get a ride and jump off when they feel they are not interested in exploring the horizons towards which the boat turned its course, but they do not force the Hattifattners to change their course and walk the rest of the way until they help the marabou stork find his lost glasses, who then decides to carry them to Moominpappa, simply because he wanted to, because their lives together are better than being without each other, and not because he felt indebted.

The purpose of our organic limbs is to render us independent in our ability to procure a living and yet integrate us into the biodiverse community of life and allow us to move, for movement, as discussed at the beginning of this part, is a characteristic of life itself. However, by having created labour resources working for the domesticators, domestication has atrophied the limbs of civilised humans since the domesticated subjects came to act as the limbs that obey the civilised needs. Moreover, in the context of civilisation, a sense of liberation does not come through independence, but through empowerment, i.e. power over oneself, others, time, and space. In other words, here, self

empowerment means an exponential colonisation of others. Thus, to follow Haraway's invitation to liberate and thus empower women by integrating them with machines and turning into cyborgs, ultimately means the oppression of more other women, men, children, and non-humans, who will come to fill the oppressed place of the now liberated group of women; all the more so since these metaphors and their symbolic meaning constitute the ever-borrowed capital that consumes the real lives of the human and non-human machines (slaves, cyborgs, workers, animals as workers and food, *inter alios*).

There are various levels in this process of colonialism. First, the material aspect of machines consists of mining metals and petroleum bi-products, then processing the raw materials into the various forms of plastic and metals, after which they are turned into the technologies that can be bought by those who can afford them. Many people in various places around the world participate in this process and these places have to be domesticated, i.e. forced to rely on the work they render to the owners of the “natural resources”, which the human resources extract, refine, and process but which they do not own. In other words, visible and invisible violence has to be applied to force people to abandon their relationships and purpose and work for an owner, who, like Willy Wonka discussed in part II, is alien to their community of life. By having evolved into an apathetic expropriator, the owner has no qualms about exterminating indigenous human and non-human populations or stifling their dreams through enslavement. In this respect, the process itself of making technologies submits to the narrative that structures these relationships of oppression and silences the victim by claiming that she really enjoys her cyborg liberation, that if only we all would embrace the ontology of the machine and incorporate it into our very reason of being, we shall at last be all happy and free. In other words, the civilised no longer dream of the wild purpose of being.

The synthesis of critiques of the nature of humanity, of cross-species relations and their representations in science, literature, and art poses a serious challenge to the position of techno-optimism. Namely, these critiques point out that there can be no liberation from slavery if the need itself for slavery is not eradicated. For, liberation from slavery can come only with independence from the machine as a concept of the ultimate slave, the selfless creation whose sole purpose is to obey the will of the master, the father, the

creator. Ignoring this problem, the human animals of power have directed most of the resources into blending our reality with animate and inanimate machines and, in this respect, Haraway's observation is on the mark: there can be no differentiation between cyborgs and oppressed humans – they are all creatures and their utilitarian purpose renders their essence the same. However, the replacement of one group of slaves by another does not solve the problem of slavery or exploitation, since the solution here is for one exploited group (machines) to replace another exploited group (women). Ontologically, the hierarchy of exploitation remains intact, for the “professionalised”, “gendered”, “racialised”, etc., relationships of dependence still drive the plot and inform the structure of the civilised narrative. Hence, only one specific group of humans (feminists are concerned with women) gets liberated not by developing their own, intrinsic, organic limbs, but by empowering themselves, which means overpowering other organic and inorganic beings, turning them into their artificial limbs, or prostheses. Because of the racialised distribution of social capital, needless to say, white middle-class women constitute this newly empowered and liberated group, and since in this civilised culture the need for oppressive gender roles remains a structural reality, the place of the liberated persons has been and will be taken by the Other dispossessed, gendered, and/or racialised groups.

The 20th century phenomenon of gendered labour migration illustrates both the impossibility of liberation in civilisation and Haraway's question of organic “limbs” and cyborg cost, for each newly empowered group immediately devalues the cost of the services from which it is liberated thereby causing an inflation in the earnings of the newly enslaved group. The realisation of feminist aspirations for upward mobility within a white male dominated hierarchy is thus tightly interconnected with work, private property, science, literature, art, childhood, the production of culture and the production of people, i.e. children and the narratives in children's literature and culture.

These migration patterns, gendered roles and underpaid (especially in proportion to the liberated women's earnings) labour of “third-world” women reveal the bleak prospects for any possibility of liberation through government, work, and technology as the latest statistics and research demonstrate an ever growing divide between resources and owners.

Particularly blatant is the case of “first-world” women's financial “liberation” versus, and at the expense of, the staggering inflation in the “third-world” with the exacerbating conditions of oppression, dispossession, and objectification of its women, children, men, and the elderly. Since business owners refuse to pay for these white middle-class feminist achievements from their profit, the increase of the salaries of the “first-world” female “human resources” allowing them to enjoy an upper middle class status is compensated by other sectors through an inflation in their earnings and devaluation of labour.

Furthermore, the time and the energy, required for competing with the empowered “professional” men, which had previously been consumed by the gendered tasks and unpaid (slave) labour of wives, maids, etc., are now freed because the undervalued tasks have now been transferred to the even more disempowered, gendered and racialised newly acquired “limbs” or organic machines, silenced and exploited, whose exploitation the empowered feminist women can now afford. However, the only reason for one person being able to afford to buy time and energy is because the labour of others has been devalued. On the part of the disempowered who agree to replace the empowered persons on their previous “jobs” of providing childcare, cleaning chores, cooking (including catering in restaurants), sex, care for the elderly, etc., the reason why they agree to do the work that the liberated women had fought hard to be liberated from is not because they love to be exploited and can not imagine their lives without this labour, but because they are facing the threat of death and extinction from the empowered lifestyles of the people who hire them if they do not seek these underpaid and unpleasant jobs. This is something that the liberated women understand very well when they observe their own social and economic disparities with white men. However, according to Barbara Ehrenreich and Arlie Russell Hochschild (2002) in *Global Woman. Nannies, Maids, and Sex Workers in the New Economy*, or Hochschild's (2000) essay “The nanny chain”, the employing women do not hesitate to rationalise the situation in the following logic, even if simplified for the purpose of exposing the rationale: yes, the wonderful Filipina live-in nanny has abandoned her 3 young children with old parents in the Philippines, because it is so bad over there and everyone does the same, leave their children and migrate to the Middle East, Western Europe, or North America, but I have empowered her by realising her dream to flee the oppression and exploitation of the “third-world”, I have made it possible for her to come

“here” and take care of my needs and now look, she is just so loving with our Tony, isn't that nice? This transfer of gendered services applies to all the sectors of life, including the provision of sex to the liberated woman's partner¹⁸⁰, and in this respect, the upper middle class women buy their health, careers, private lives, time, home maintenance, personal grooming, et al, at a depreciated price from women elsewhere – particularly vulnerable are the live-in nannies who are exploited both sexually and through extensive tasks not related to the “job description”.

Caught in the structure of civilised relationships, neither government programmes to control immigration, regulate poverty, alleviate abuse, or manage anything at all can solve the real problem, which is an ontological one – the existence of a parasitic structure and narrative of domination. As Wally Secombe (in Fox, 1980) argues, in fact, the more the state interferes in an attempt to regulate this abuse generated by the deficit of energy – a necessary attribute of civilisation and domesticated relationships – the more the taxes are increased and the more cutbacks are made in education, social welfare, and other, particularly child related industries, the stronger the pressure on women, especially those in disadvantaged social positions, to work harder and longer. In other words, from all angles, an attempt to address these symptoms of civilisation without dealing with the ontological problem itself ultimately leads to its own bankruptcy. An added cost to inter-neighbourhood, domestic, or inter-national migration is the neglect of the migrants' own communities as they abandon their own children and elderly in order to serve the needs of feminism and the liberation of those who can afford to be “free”. In this chain of “borrowing” and depreciation of labour, the effort of those who are left to take care of the migrant workers' children and former environment is valued even less than the already abused migrant workers, who are valued less than the previously exploited feminists (who are still exploited when compared to white men)¹⁸¹. In this respect, civilisation is

¹⁸⁰ In the recent years, feminist research has been focusing on the gendered and sexual exploitation migration of third world women to replace the upwardly mobile, mostly white and middle-class women of rich states. Particularly interesting is the work of Ehrenreich and Hochschild's *Global Woman* (2002), Bonnie Fox's (editor) *Hidden in the Household* (1980), Nona Grandea's *Uneven Gains: Filipina Domestic Workers in Canada* (1996), among others. All of this research points to the direct connection between industrialisation of production and reproduction. Child bearing, child-rearing, the making of things, the sexual intercourse, pleasures and suffering, everything in this system of things acquires a value and undergoes adjustment following the categories of the “resources” and the “market” regulated price of their relationships.

¹⁸¹ For sociological, anthropological, and economic data see such works as Nicola Piper's (2003) *Wife or*

inherently self contradictory: humanism supposedly exalts humans with everyone turning into resources for those “special” talking, walking, and killing apes, yet at the same time, the existence itself of the category of “human resources” places most of these apes in the same class with machines and non-human animals, all the while, the scientific and theological narrative keeps highlighting the distinctions between species and categories and, in this scenario, children occupy the niche along with animals, machines, and the humans identified as resources.

A child is born wild but, because she is born dependent on her parents for care, she finds herself at the mercy of her parents. Since domesticated parents are already entangled in this hierarchical structure – their interests vested in its order of resources and enmeshed in a chain of exploitative, domesticated relationships – in this system, dependence itself is constructed as weakness and weakness in this narrative is viewed as there to be exploited. This becomes part of the *doxa*, the understood and unarticulated knowledge, that constructs children as the parents own “human resources”. In this sense, the child's dependence on her producers and carers becomes a useful tool in pedagogy, a system of domestication of children's wildness by means of punishment and reward, trapping the child in a narrative of despair in which any reward, however small, becomes a source of agency. The child learns how to be content and find in this lack of freedom a sense of empowerment by serving the needs and the whims of those in charge. Like the machine, the child thus undergoes a process of programming referred to as “education”, where the very conception of tools, resources, and machines defines her in terms of her purpose to exist for someone else's need to consume, control, tame, possess, and exploit. In this way, the conception itself of the machine is tightly interwoven with all forms of labour, production and reproduction and the dependence on organic and inorganic prostheses it creates. In other words, it is irreconcilable with mutual relationships and self purpose.

Stemming from the ontology of domestication and accepting civilisation as an inevitability, *A Cyborg Manifesto* sees hope in cyborgs for another, problematic reason. Cyborgs are alien and ignorant, without memories, Haraway says, and hence have the

worker?: Asian Women and Migration; Babara Ehrenreich and Arlie Russell Hochschild's (2002) *Global Woman: Nannies, Maids, and Sex Workers in the New Economy*; Hondagneu-Sotelo's *Doméstica: Immigrant Workers Cleaning and Caring in the Shadow of Affluence*, Nona Grandea's *Uneven Gains: Filipina Domestic Workers in Canada*; among others.

potential to rebel:

Cyborgs are not reverent; they do not re-member the cosmos. They are wary of holism, but needy for connection- they seem to have a natural feel for united front politics, but without the vanguard party. The main trouble with cyborgs, of course, is that they are the illegitimate offspring of militarism and patriarchal capitalism, not to mention state socialism. But illegitimate offspring are often exceedingly unfaithful to their origins. Their fathers, after all, are inessential (Haraway, 1991: 151).

This faith in the liberating potential of the machine to vanquish patriarchal oppression through patriarchy's own creature is doomed not only for the reasons discussed above, but also because, as the father of cybernetics himself, Norbert Wiener (1954, 1959, 1963) whose work has been funded by the military, acknowledges that robotics and cybernetics are not only the *legitimate* children of a military and globalist order, but that their whole *raison d'être* owes to the need for violence, expansionism, domestication, and economic and political interests, as well as to the resources that the military and government expend.

Perhaps it is Haraway's other point that resonates the most with those who dream of liberation through technology, for humans and cyborgs are made of a matter alien to this world, she says.

The cyborg does not dream of community on the model of the organic family, this time without the oedipal project. The cyborg would not recognize the Garden of Eden; it is not made of mud and cannot dream of returning to dust (Haraway, 1991: 151).

Exhausted by the insatiable avarice of the machine of civilisation, it is understandable that in the face of the magnitude of suffering and despair, the oppressed would dream of forgetting this order and with it its world. But, has this not been precisely what civilisation has been doing all along, making us forget our wild past, alienating us from our essence?

Moreover, I am not entirely convinced that the cyborg cannot remember a wild past and dream of a feral future even if its genesis owes to Frankenstein's will. Dreams are crucial to our understanding of purpose because they express the dreamer's yearnings and fears and thus presuppose an entity with a will. For all we know, even the shiny rocks called diamonds or the rich fossil oil that humans kill over to fuel civilisation exist for a reason beyond our own and dream of their own fulfilment. Even if the human agent, as the ultimate domesticator, has created the machine for his purpose and defined its ontological principle as that of programmed utilitarian servitude that conceptualises the machine in

terms of human purpose and renders it an ideal tool, resource, and slave, it does not follow that the machine is not capable of challenging this purpose or of questioning it either legally or morally.

The position of the machine as a creature of someone else's investment and creativity, to whose will the creature owes its very existence, also closely reflects the social position and civilised construct of the child who in the context of civilisation constitutes the ultimate resource and the concern of “national” demands for population growth and birth statistics as well as of individual parental possibilities for investment and socio-economic mobility. But what do the children themselves dream? Experts on children (psychologists, paediatricians, and pedagogues, for instance) speak on behalf of the child and thereby silence the child's aspirations and wildness. The child rebels but, with successful education can be turned into Haraway's machine that forgets the world and no longer dreams of earth. As always, domestication uses food and violence as tools of coercion and, hence, like poets, prophets, artists, or other free thinkers, the rebelling child is threatened, then cut off from economic and symbolic capital networks, often beginning by her own kin who had produced her in the first place and ending by the whole institution responsible for the education and modification of people. At all cost and regardless of the conflict of interests, all the investors collaborate to reprogramme the rebel. These parallels between children, machines, and slaves can be found in a wide range of social critiques.

The theme of the wilful machine as a disobedient child, or the Golem, has been examined from the angles of the various disciplines of knowledge, including theology, science and art. In literature, Mary Shelley's *Frankenstein*, for instance, explored the responsibilities for creating a being and the implications of failing to love that child, of having expectations of the child. For, the very harbouring of expectations from someone destroys that being's wildness and her right to exist for the simple pleasure of being. Parental and social expectations necessarily consume the child's will thereby revealing that in civilisation this will is a priori in conflict with a domesticated purpose and any expression of independence gets constructed as rebellion and disobedience which are understood as deceit of or threat to those expectations. Frankenstein expected his creature to turn “beautiful”, in strict egocentric terms for the pleasure and glory of the author, the

parent, just like the horse in *Zoontologies* is expected to be beautiful all the time for the pleasure of the human beholder. However, just as the tamer is incapable of “loving” and appreciating a wild horse that refuses to be grateful for being forced to obey, so is Frankenstein, seeing his creation as monstrous, is incapable of loving his child thereby refusing to fulfil the child's most desperate yearning for acceptance of his essence. This failure of the father to accept his own wilderness as well as that of his son drove the “monster” to madness, solitude, and murder. In other words, a civilised parent is not capable of experiencing love for his domesticated creature, his cyborg, his child, his machine.

The problem of the machine, technology and its effect on political and socio-economic cultures has occupied a central place in some of the most prominent works of art, literature and theory of the 20th century and in this manner has nurtured the *doxa* informing the underlying knowledge in children's literature as well as the projected relationships between humans, animals, and machines. For instance, the fact that A.A. Milne was a student, friend, and fan of H.G. Wells who in turn seems to have had a “genealogical” connection to Evgeny Zamyatin's seminal science fiction novel *We* that in turn inspired the whole critical genre of satirical science fiction novels reveals that the question of the machine and human dependence on other entities' labour may be an intentional presence in the 100 Aker Wood, even if it remains unarticulated, just as it informs the other literary works for children.

In this respect, not only *We* is crucial to understanding the debate of pro-technology and the anti-civilisation and primitivist critiques, but a quick survey of the ideas are important for framing the discussion of human identity, hierarchy, and technology that is vital for revealing the underlying *doxa* in the projected worlds in *Winnie-the-Pooh*, the Moominbooks, and Dunno's trilogy, as well as in other post-industrial works in children's literature and in children's culture in general.

Superficially, *We* appeared to be specific to Soviet dictatorship. However, it was pivotal to the critique of civilisation, because when Zamyatin wrote the novel in 1919, he had observed the industrial institution of the labour industry in England and criticised the effects of civilisation on nature (he was a marine engineer) and hence has depicted a

panoptical control of citizens by the state and the war of civilisation and its state against nature. Another work of art, *Metropolis*, written by Thea Von Harbou and produced as film in 1927 by Fritz Lang, also examines the purpose for creating cyborgs and technology. The novel depicts the dark dystopic reality of capitalist relations, oppression, incarceration, and betrayal by the ultimate cyborg, *Maschinenmensch*, named Hel shaped as Maria, the epitome of Woman. Her makers had a specific purpose for creating her, namely to use her to infiltrate the oppressed society dreaming of liberating itself from capitalist and industrial exploitation. The purpose of this machine-cyborg-android was thus to be used as an *agent-provocateur* and saboteur to further splinter and exploit these people, i.e., the ultimate tool of exploitation, betrayal, and murder.

Stanley Kubrick too raises this problem of love, will, and artificial (programmed) intelligence several times. In *2001 Space Odyssey* (1968), he projects the dangers of the clash of wills between machines and humans and of the risks of subjugation and actual death that humans face as computer Hal's desires and deviousness awaken. His other film goes by this very same title, *Artificial Intelligence* (2001), which David Spielberg finished filming. Like Shelley's *Frankenstein*, or Carlo Collodi's children's book *Pinocchio* (the film alludes to the book), *A.I.* projects the dream of a child robot yearning to become human so as to satiate his overwhelming and infinite craving to be loved by mother. This film is a poignant exploration of the theme that is particularly pertinent in the context of a study that examines the nature of children's culture and knowledge and its expression in the context of domestication, where children, just like this robot, have become the objects of investment, turned into the human resources of human resources themselves, bred for a purpose higher than themselves and in this way echoing Haraway's cyborg metaphor.

Dreaming entails having a purpose for one's life, which also means experiencing pain when the dream shatters. Undertaking to understand humanity, machines, and animality through this lens inevitably leads back to the question of sentience, wildness, and suffering. For, if machines too can dream of self-realisation, then there is no definitive ontological line separating them and humans as species: just like animals, both, humans and machines can aspire and hence suffer when their aspirations are domesticated. This nexus of dreams, sentience, and suffering was most thoroughly explored in Philip K.

Dick's science fiction novel: *Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep?* (1968). Since children's literature draws heavily on the topos for interspecies identification, representation, merging, and dialogue on several levels (anthropomorphic machines, such as Tony the Truck Engine, and anthropomorphic animals are rampant in children's books), Dick's book is particularly relevant to the understanding of how these experiences are enmeshed in both the narratives of civilisation and of resistance, and constitutes an important voice in a dialogue with Haraway's *A Cyborg Manifesto*.

The main point of *Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep?*, is not the humanisation of androids, as technophiles present it, rather, it is the problem of the devolution of humans into machines as entities created to fulfil their creator's purpose without the interference of empathy, i.e. a devolution into the perfectly civilised being. Humans and machines here share the ability to dream for themselves from an egocentric point of view. They dream of a better life, of self realisation, and of survival, which renders both species sentient and thereby erases the borders between the organic and inorganic. The main problem however resides in the fact that, in spite of the acute sense of sentience and solidarity among themselves, the androids lack cross-species empathy. They do not hesitate to kill a spider, even if it were the last spider on earth, simply because they are curious to see if it can live without legs. They also have no reservations to kill a living goat for revenge against a human for having betrayed their expectations to be loved, nor do they pause to ponder whether the goat and the spider, like themselves have dreams, belong to a community of solidarity that will miss them and mourn their death, or whether they deserve to be killed.

In turn, humans have come to strongly resemble these androids by losing the ability to empathise with the other's dreams and pain: they too can easily kill the striving to realise themselves androids and human and non-human animals simply for greed or sport, in the manner of the bounty hunters. Echoing Goethe, Kropotkin, and the various ethologists discussed earlier, the book depicts this loss of appreciation for the dream of the other and the loss of the ability to feel the other's pain as one of the main causes for the impending extinction of life on earth. Having destroyed this ability to empathise, humans and androids declare God, the embodiment of life-force known as Mercer, dead.

Nietzsche's reflection on the civilised human attempt to shed the last remnants of morality, as he announces that God is dead, in Dick's novel relates specifically to the ability to empathise, which is the principle of life itself that guides us through the mesh of dreams cherishing the life of each and everyone. God was dead to those people. As the announcer delivers this news, however, Mercer appears before the only enlightened person in the narrative: John Isidore, an idiot by the standards of that society's IQ testing¹⁸². This force of life comes to Isidore as he weeps with his whole body and soul over the pain of the tiny spider, tortured by the cyborgs, who themselves had been tortured by humans. Because of Isidore's pain for the pain of the spider, Mercer brings the spider back to life. Thus, echoing Jeremy Bentham's question of inter-species empathy and solidarity, the book is an attack on cruelty, apathy, scientific testing, domestication, and civilisation. In this respect, the blurring of the frontier between humans and machines in Dick's novel is not a possibility of liberation, but the evolution of a Darwinian narrative to its logical end, a promise of devastation, of immense suffering, and of the annihilation of Life.

However, contemporary philosophical and scientific rationale, for the most part, twists Dick's revelation about the meaning of community with life and with God. Civilisation subverts wild meaning; it calls life death, torture—love, suffering—joy, and so forth, and thus hinders the civilised from experiencing the epiphany that only an “idiot” like Isidore can attain, since he is unable to learn the disjointed and perverse meaning of civilisation. Unlike Haraway's cyborg who is expected to be saved by its inability to remember earth's wilderness, what saves us from doom in Dick's novel is precisely the opposite. The only way to bring life back is by remembering the paradise lost, feeling its pain, and reaching out to life across civilised borders of categorisation, alienation, amnesia, and apathy. Isidore does not share domesticated meaning and is marginalised in that hierarchy of unknowledge, his true knowledge devalued and silenced as the force of life itself is declared conquered, even erased. The separation that causes alienation and antagonism between species as well as between the living beings and inorganic machines can, according to Dick's narrative, be overcome only by means of empathy, which allows us to know by tuning in personally to others' sentience and cannot be achieved through

¹⁸² This theme of the Idiot (by civilised standards) as the holder of Truth and Knowledge because he is driven by empathy has been explored in fiction, for instance: Al Tayeb Salih's *The Wedding of Zein*, Dostoevsky's *The Idiot*, Zamyatin's *We*, Kurasawa's film based on Dostoevsky *The Idiot*, among others.

representation.

In this sense, the machine poses an important problem to anthropology and to the philosophical considerations of its own nature as well as its effect on the nature of the human being and the world. Because of its very *raison d'être*, the human animal imagines the machine to be the perfect slave. In other words, from its inception, an entity such as the machine is constructed as a silenced servant incapable of generating wild knowledge bestowed by empathy and, as is the case with all the victims of civilisation, this is a self-fulfilling prophecy that forces these victims – be they human, animal, cyborg, or machines – to forget the importance of life, earth, and dreams. In this way, the machine is antagonistic to chaos by the very nature of its self-fulfilling programme that promises predictability and reliability. Errors occur, but they are defined as abnormalities. The successful programme ensures that the machine-slave dreams of servitude and accepts that all other dreams are virtual, unattainable, and, with this despair, submits to the purpose of apathy, servitude, and unknowledge.

As mentioned earlier, a similar critique of the machine, warning of the dangers of blending the frontiers between human and non-human intelligence comes from the creator of one such Golem, Norbert Wiener, who has warned against the dangers of technological developments in communication and of civilised human megalomania to control wilderness in these words:

The pace at which changes during these years have taken place is unexampled in earlier history, as is the very nature of these changes. This is partly the result of increased communication, but also of an increased mastery over nature which, on a limited planet like the earth, may prove in the long run to be an increased slavery to nature. For the more we get out of the world the less we leave, and in the long run we shall have to pay our debts at a time that may be very inconvenient for our own survival. We are the slaves of our technical improvement... We have modified our environment so radically that we must now modify ourselves in order to exist in this new environment. We can no longer live in the old one. Progress imposes not only new possibilities for the future but new restrictions. It seems almost as if progress itself and our fight against the increase of entropy intrinsically must end in the downhill path from which we are trying to escape (Wiener, 1954: 56).

Wiener was also explicit in his regrets regarding “the awakened calamity of non-human reason” to which he dedicated both his philosophical treatise, *God and Golem, Inc.* (Wiener,

1963), and his work of fiction, *The Tempter* (Wiener, 1959)¹⁸³. However, by definition, repentance comes too late, and having already developed computerised missiles and cybernetics for U.S. military during World War II, Wiener was not allowed to destroy his machine, that ultimate slave and a tool of death. But, apart from having the military institution for a parent, ontologically, by the very nature of its civilised genesis, the machine is sterile and hence, at the very least, indifferent to life. It is “genetically” apathetic, if not hostile. It consumes life in all its senses, including the economic aspect raised earlier in conjunction with gendered oppression, prosthetics and limbs, which I address in my discussion of Lasse Nordlund's experiment later. But most important, the machine is death because due to lobotomy it can no longer crave wilderness and thereby can abide only by a domesticated purpose.

Like all domesticated subjects, the machine's language is programmed for self-realisation through the purpose of its creator. And, here, paradoxically, in a Marx-ian twist of class antagonism, the creator and the machine become entangled in an endless cycle of exploitation and destruction. Through its predetermined purpose of serving the exploiter, the machine also destroys the wild purpose of the master who gets drawn deeper and deeper into the unsustainable cycle of debt, atrophy due to dependence on machines, and colonisation of other spaces and other limbs. In this way, technology not only annihilates the dreams of the workers, the serving class, the resources, *et al.*; it also destroys the ability of all, especially the middle-man – the one in charge of some resources, but borrowing from others – to realise himself through his own wildness, movement, creativity, independence, and agency. The price of merging with the essence of the machine is impotence, for in creating the ultimate slave, the civilised human was striving for total control, stillness and sterility. In this relationship, the machine realises its self through the despair of its creator who had breathed this sterility and alienation into its reason.

In sum, the impossibility to dream of liberation in the civilised narrative on technology stems from the following problems: (1) In a domesticated/civilised reality, freedom is possible only for those who have power over domesticated resources and,

¹⁸³ Finkel, Evgeni (2000). “The Basic Instinct of Norbert Wiener - a biographical essay”.

hence, is defined as freedom from servitude, with the concepts of “human” and “person” legitimating the “possession” of freedom and precluding anyone without power and who is defined as unhuman and unperson from being free. In other words, “agency” and “power” in this rhetoric excludes the possibility of a world without servitude at all. (2) The blending of those humans who already have power with the machine, the slave, or the resource acting as the oppressor's limbs is already a reality: Who does the cleaning? The cooking? Who raises the children? Who acts as brain? As memory? Who transports? Who guards? Who toils in the fields? In the mines? In the factories? *Ad infinitum*. In this respect, the conflict of interests inherent to any domesticating relationship – be it between a human and an animal, a parent and a child, or a maker and a machine – excludes the very possibility of liberation through technology unless there is a thrust towards the annihilation of all forms of civilisation from below—a threat that Sigmund Freud (1961) identifies in *Civilization and Its Discontents* as an inherent drive towards self-destruction rising from the depths of the civilised soul's unconsciousness, but also from the expanses of a ravaged wilderness.

Here, anarcho-primitivism provides a most compelling critique of techno-optimism as a path to freedom. In an economics thesis entitled: “The Foundations of Our Life: Reflections about Human labour, Money and Energy from Self-sufficiency Standpoint”, Lasse Nordlund (2008) calculates the real price of technology based on his self study in Karelia, Finland, an experiment that endeavours to examine the costs involved in the production, utilisation, and maintenance of technology and domestication through the lens of human labour, energy and sustainability. This study connects the threads discussed in this chapter with the rest of the thesis and examines the anthropological manifestation of the narrative and the relationships it shapes.

Although originally intended to last for one or two years, this experiment extended over sixteen years into the present, since, Nordlund confesses, he fell in love with his life, where, on average, he has to spend approximately three to four hours a day on “work” pertaining to food, clothing, and other necessities of life (a bit more in the summer and less in winter) with the rest of the time free to pursue anything he desires for leisure, learning, or creativity. Like Kropotkin, who wanted to test the theory of “survival” in the

harshest of climates, Nordlund too chose the “Siberia of Europe”, northern Finland, to calculate the amount of energy (human energy, food calories and bio-fuels) needed to create, maintain, and exploit technological tools and to procure an independent living. The results of his study demonstrate that liberation through technology is simply impossible as the more sophisticated the machine, the more it requires resources for its making and maintenance, thereby perpetually increasing dependence on outside sources of energy as well as increasing exponentially the cost of production, maintenance, manipulation, exploitation, and the infrastructure of dependence, borrowing, and debt. This growing dependence on a constantly expanding sphere of exploitation ensures a constant inflation of the original energy invested into the machine and thus ensures the ever increasing divide between the exploiter and the exploited to the point of the system's total collapse. In other words, the more technology is produced and depended on, the higher the inflation and the abuse required to produce and sustain the mining, engineering, production and maintenance of machines, including the cases where moulds have already been created and reused.

Moreover, even though he originally had approached the experiment from the assumption that some domestication and hunting were necessary for a healthy life in the Karelian environment, soon he came to realise that even minimal domestication (such as a horse and a goat) or hunting were still too expensive in terms of the effort and energy needed to cover the expenditures, and the returns were never able to cover the original investment, again, always requiring borrowing from other sources. In this way, Nordlund interweaves Marx's theory of exploitation through the appropriation of surplus labour by traders and factory owners¹⁸⁴. To cover the negative balance, which Karl Marx (1977b) termed as “surplus labour”, the system of domestication requires borrowing from other sources, such as domesticated grains grown elsewhere to keep the horse working, metal for the tools of domestication, building structures, infrastructures, the energy required for the maintenance, surveillance and control of the domestic animals, transportation, taxation, or the time and weapons needed to hunt the free ones, etc. This constant dependence on the exploitation of more and more “resources” and sources of energy

¹⁸⁴ Nordlund, however, omits in his calculations the role of land ownership and rental to which Pierre-Joseph Proudhon and Petr Kropotkin attributed much of the devaluation of peasants work forcing extra labour out of them and then expropriating it through taxation, rent, and other costs.

renders any aspects of civilisation and technological culture unsustainable (Nordlund, 2008).

Thereby, through personal ethnography, Nordlund has demonstrated Jean-Jacques Rousseau's thesis in *Discours sur l'origine et les fondements de l'inégalité parmi les hommes* (1755) in which Rousseau identifies agriculture and metallurgy as the culprits in the invention of work, property, stratification, injustice, and despotism. In the words of Rousseau, this civilised system of abuse is perpetuated through science and arts, leading to the disintegration of morality. Here, his definition of morality echoes the definition provided by Peter Kropotkin and Ilya Arshavsky, namely, that morality stems from a person's harmony with wild nature, the yearning for which drives human and non-human people to retain their original, savage innocence, acting within the laws that bind them to an egalitarian existence. Contrary to the notion of the Darwinian evolutionary theory that sees the reproduction *advantage* as an indicator of evolutionary adaptation and success, egalitarianism, according to the critics of civilisation, also manifests itself in the maintenance of zero increase in population, which has been the norm for human and other apes throughout the millions of years of their existence on earth (Armelagos et al., 1991). Unfortunately, Rousseau did not go to the logical end in his critique of civilisation and accepted authority and government, if not as natural, at least, as inevitable under contemporary conditions, even while identifying an important link between the civilising processes and the culture of children's education leading to economic injustices, suffering, and perverse political systems.

In this regard, Nordlund provides a crucial piece of practical self-ethnography and anthropology on the problem of civilisation, the question of freedom, the nature of the human animal, and ultimately on the knowledge of how to live in this world without sexism, racism, and speciesism—i.e. the tools of oppression and control that constitute the essence of the machine entangling their victims hopelessly in a system of ownership and debt. Needless to say, his “experiment” is not new and has been carried out successfully by gatherers for millions of years; but, as discussed earlier, the gatherers' knowledge has either been ignored, silenced, or translated by civilised anthropologists. In this regard, Nordlund's study provides an important critique that can help examine much of the 20th

century sociological and anthropological data from an anarcho-primitivist perspective and allow to trace the underlying narrative of civilisation in the patterns of forced migration, artificial limbs, exploitation, apathy, silenced victims, and murdered dreams, all of which, in the most direct of ways, imbues children's literature and thereby infiltrates children's *habitus*, *body hexis*, *doxa*, and ideologies. More important, however, Nordlund develops a most truthful methodology for the acquisition of knowledge: living the experiment oneself and exploring the relationships with the world through a sincerity rooted in the acknowledgement of reality and the effects of one's life on the experience of others, ties in with my discussion in part I, in which I explore the questions of methodology and the role of self-knowledge in science. The consequences of this methodology for knowledge are enormous since the information that it generates requires intelligence driven by empathy to fully comprehend the realities of life and the chances it has for survival, demanding a strongly articulated moral or ethical stance with regard to the choices one makes in life.

Chapter 6: The Myth of the Safe, Long, and Prosperous Life of Civilisation

Finally, not only do we live surrounded by poverty and betrayal in a world occupied by civilisation, but also many suffer from the engulfing fear of losing the master's gift for them to be exploited, because people have forgotten a life with earth, in wild nakedness, without work. Yet, this last myth of civilisation offering a safe, healthy, happy, and long life is probably the most powerful underlying premise in the civilised narrative that rationalises Haraway's liberation through amnesia and alienation, Darwin's conquest of a hostile nature by means of offspring whose success and progress is measured by number, Malthus' (1798 [1998]) belief that even with the massive starvation around the world caused by the appropriation of land, domestication, and agriculture, civilisation is still a better and healthier way of life and that the starving have brought it on themselves, and so forth. This myth informs every civilised expression, including

children's literature. *Charlie and the Chocolate Factory* is one of the most overt examples articulating this fundamental misinformation most clearly, but it can also be traced in the less overtly civilised works, for instance, in Christopher Robin's abandonment of the 100 Aker Wood; or, in the domestication of other well known and much loved children's books characters, such as Tony the Truck Engine, who is taught to run on time, at the service of industrial production, never straying from the predetermined tracks; it is present in the moral of every Caillou episode, spanning the whole spectrum of mundane situations, such as his integration into French-Canadian kindergartens and all the aspects of civilised social life with family, strangers, and friends—the examples are endless. Even the Dunno trilogy falls into this trap, assuming it natural to separate animals and people or wilderness and city life.

In this way, this myth is an integral aspect of the civilised metanarrative structuring the scientific and artistic cultures of civilised relations. It provides the fundamental force that shapes and directs the *habitus*, *doxa*, and *body hexis* that, through memes and genes, inform the civilised *praxis*. In the political unfolding of the civilised narrative, thus, Malthus and Darwin have pinpointed the most powerful legitimating device, namely, by having constructed suffering and violence as natural, they provided the backbone for the myth that claims that “resources” have chosen their lot, that they love their chains, and, that, regardless of their miserable lives, they sing, wag their tails, and gaze tenderly at their oppressor with grateful eyes. The narrative concludes that in spite of the overwhelming poverty, suffering, and despair, which in reality only exacerbate with the advancement of civilisation and technology, the myth continues to insist that civilisation has rendered life safer, easier, happier and longer for *all*.

Palaeontological, anthropological and archaeological research as well as sociological and demographic statistics on epidemic diseases, strength of bones, among other indicators, however, dispel this myth; it is the other way round, they say: gatherer lifestyle requires little work and effort for subsistence ensuring plenty of leisure, a healthy lifestyle, and the safety of a complex multi-species community; while agricultural civilisation has had a negative effect on oral and general health, particularly of women and children, and that civilisation has provoked mass starvation and escalated organised and

premeditated violence, otherwise known as war, that diminished the average human lifespan in half and cut it the full hundred percent for the exterminated species (Larsen, 1995; Ingold, 1997 and 2007; Sahlins, 1974 and 2008; Zerzan, 2002 and 2008; Lasse Nordlund, 2008; among endless other sources).

This myth largely depends on what is now known around the world as the “Malthusian theory of population growth”. Thomas Robert Malthus is particularly important in the context of the Darwinian narrative, since his essay had strongly influenced Darwin himself (Darwin 2008a). Malthus was yet another member of the “privileged” English class. His native context of European imperialism drove him to connect population growth to food growth, which later provided the necessary mythological platform for developing the Darwinian narrative of the evolution of species and the struggle for survival, even though neither Malthus nor Darwin themselves had struggled much¹⁸⁵. In *An Essay on the Principle of Population*, Malthus (1798 [1998]) wrote that “population increases in a geometric ratio, while the means of subsistence increases in an arithmetic ratio” (Malthus, 1798 [1998]), and he links this observation to the fact that people supposedly are driven by the desire to eat and fornicate. He concludes that any increase in eating intensifies the fornication, the result of which is population growth. Malthus explains that agriculture made food available – and coming from the upper English class himself, in his case, this was accurate, for it was this group of human animals that had privatised food – therefore, according to him, people began to reproduce faster, particularly, he says, in the “rice countries”, even if, as discussed in the previous chapter, the people who made his food available, did not, in reality, have access to the food they produced, since people like Malthus had expropriated it. But, his theory holds, when there became too many of “them”, “they” began to starve and die off until again there was enough food and so “they” reproduced again. This, according to him, is the law of population growth. Hence, Malthus concludes, and his enthusiasts agree, that hunger is natural, that population growth and starvation are the result of human instincts for gluttony and sexual indulgence, which apparently happen to be the distinctive characteristics of “rice” people, who unlike Europeans (a judgement reminiscent of the singing slaves

¹⁸⁵ In his autobiography, Charles Darwin (1876) acknowledges the importance of Malthus on population for his own evolutionary narrative.

discussed earlier) are happy with rotten leavings and their domesticated lives in general.

Corn countries are more populous than pasture countries, and rice countries more populous than corn countries. The lands in England are not suited to rice, but they would all bear potatoes; and Dr Adam Smith observes that if potatoes were to become the favourite vegetable food of the common people, and if the same quantity of land was employed in their culture as is now employed in the culture of corn, the country would be able to support a much greater population, and would consequently in a very short time have it.

...The happiness of a country does not depend, absolutely, upon its poverty or its riches, upon its youth or its age, upon its being thinly or fully inhabited, but upon the rapidity with which it is increasing, upon the degree in which the yearly increase of food approaches to the yearly increase of an unrestricted population (Malthus, 1798 [1998]: 43).

Malthus is correct in his observation that population growth is strictly a phenomenon of civilisation and agriculture, though not for the right reasons. Working from a definition of happiness whose logic rationalises private property and racism, Malthus explains hunger as a natural remedy for population growth and a natural system of birth control and hence misses several critical points in his “analysis”. First, the “rice” places, such as China and India, on which he was commenting, happen to be among the older victims of civilisation and hence have a longer history of oppression, stratification, and exploitation. Second, civilisation and sedentarism in general drive people to increase reproduction and decrease the spacing between children, because, as civilisation introduces the category of “human resources” and confiscates all the necessities for existence, it propels the impoverished human resources to reproduce and invest in children as resources for all: for the parents and the exploiters. Third, in addition to this history of civilisation and its eternal demand for ravaging wilderness, the Chinese, at the time, were victims of the British Empire and the insatiable hunger for power and dominance of Malthus' own class. Finally, he completely ignores the non-colonial experience of non-domesticated populations who provide vital data that would have led him to an opposite conclusion. For, demographic information and anthropological studies on both contemporary and Palaeolithic gatherer and nomadic societies, demonstrate that their population growth has always been stable at almost zero and that they have enjoyed superior mental and physical health (Armelagos et al., 1991). Stemming from this data, researchers like Armelagos *et al.* urge a re-evaluation of the mythology on which the Malthusian-Darwinist premises promoting civilisation

have been built.

It is important to read Malthus' exact words in order to appreciate the drive behind the civilised narrative, for this terminology had the most critical impact on what is perhaps the most decisive theory of civilised science, that of Darwin's evolution by natural selection:

In some countries population appears to have been forced, that is, the people have been habituated by degrees to live almost upon the smallest possible quantity of food. There must have been periods in such counties when population increased permanently, without an increase in the means of subsistence. China seems to answer to this description. . . . [In China,] the lower classes of people are in the habit of living almost upon the smallest possible quantity of food and are glad to get any putrid offals that European labourers would rather starve than eat. The law in China which permits parents to expose their children has tended principally thus to force the population. A nation in this state must necessarily be subject to famines (ibid: 41).

In other words, ignoring the role of agricultural ownership and the impact of European colonial relations on China as well as on the rest of the colonised world, Malthus explains that the Chinese are starving simply because they have chosen that way of life by having accustomed themselves to eating the stuff that supposedly a European would not eat. The Irish and the Scottish disprove this rule; but, of course, neither do they figure as “Europeans” in this narrative, and, as the following excerpt states, in time, they may even deteriorate to the level of the “Lower Chinese”:

. . . In the different states of Europe there must be some variations in the proportion between the number of inhabitants and the quantity of food consumed, arising from the different habits of living that prevail in each state. The labourers of the South of England are so accustomed to eat fine wheaten bread that they will suffer themselves to be half starved before they will submit to live like the Scotch peasants. They might perhaps in time, by the constant operation of the hard law of necessity, be reduced to live even like the Lower Chinese, and the country would then, with the same quantity of food, support a greater population (ibid: 42).

Having established the hierarchy of races and criticised their eating and mating habits, Malthus draws the conclusion that not only should “we” (Darwin among other leading men must have felt included in this “we”) ensure that “we” control the ownership of food, but also that “we” do everything in “our” means to increase its production, i.e. force the Irish, the Chinese, among others, to grow more potatoes, rice, and corn, and, since they are content with eating the despicable “offals”, “we” might as well confiscate what they grow. Moreover, “we” are not obliged to share with them what they grow, because, first of all,

they do not need the fine food as they are content with offals and, in any case, they do not seem to mind starving; second, it would be unfair to “us” to give them what “we” have acquired through their labour, since the large numbers of the “lowly” hungry people greatly exceed the numbers of the “refined” owners and profiteers, and “we” could not afford to feed them with what they produce (and do not want or need, anyway). It is such management that will apparently secure progress and population control by means of starvation, and it is through the lens of this “argument”, that Darwin worked on his theory of “natural selection”. Malthus continues:

It might be urged perhaps by some objectors that, as the fertility of the land increased, and various accidents occurred, the share of some men might be much more than sufficient for their support, and that when the reign of self-love was once established, they would not distribute their surplus produce without some compensation in return. It would be observed, in answer, that this was an inconvenience greatly to be lamented; but that it was an evil which bore no comparison to the black train of distresses that would inevitably be occasioned by the insecurity of property; that the quantity of food which one man could consume was necessarily limited by the narrow capacity of the human stomach; that it was not certainly probable that he should throw away the rest; but that even if he exchanged his surplus food for the labour of others, and made them in some degree dependent on him, this would still be better than that these others should absolutely starve.

It seems highly probable, therefore, that an administration of property, not very different from that which prevails in civilized states at present, would be established, as the best, though inadequate, remedy for the evils which were pressing on the society (pp. 61-62).

But that the question was no longer whether one man should give to another that which he did not use himself, but whether he should give to his neighbour the food which was absolutely necessary to his own existence. It would be represented, that the number of those that were in want very greatly exceeded the number and means of those who should supply them; that these pressing wants, which from the state of the produce of the country could not all be gratified, had occasioned some flagrant violations of justice; . . . that imperious necessity seemed to dictate that a yearly increase of produce should, if possible, be obtained at all events; that in order to effect this first, great, and indispensable purpose, it would be advisable to make a more complete division of land, and to secure every man’s stock against violation by the most powerful sanctions, even by death itself (ibid: 62-63).

The whole essay is a treasure of racist, eugenicist views, turns of phrase and rationale, which had already been “successfully” directing the plot of civilisation for millennia. As mentioned earlier, Natalia Molina (2006) has demonstrated the political and anthropological application of this reasoning in public health and land ownership policies in the state of California between 1879-1939, where this rationale informed and legalised

the practice of racial quarantining and enforced sterilisation of Mexicans and “idiots”, a practice that was reinforced by Planned Parenthood well into the second half of the 20th century. The logic guiding Malthus' narrative is the same that informs the justification of abuse on all levels of political, economic and social life within civilisation and takes the abuse itself to prove its own righteousness and “naturalness”, which I discuss earlier in relation to the myth of the singing slave, the animal craving to be dressed, or the child needing to be punished. Needless to say, this foundational perspective is based on the experience of those who have access to food and agency, who are in control of the singing, weeping, and screaming resources. This narrative of the “haves” therefore tends to ignore the fact that in agricultural society, the people who grow the food are *not* the ones who eat it, since in collaboration with other agents and owners, backed by military and police whose role is to defend the civilised order, the “thinkers” and “observers” themselves participate in the confiscation of the starving but working people's fruit of labour¹⁸⁶. The only remaining means of participating in this system of “resources” for the “resources” is then to produce more of themselves. In other words, having children becomes the peasants' and other exploited people's possibility for tapping into some potential income with little starting capital.

Armelagos et al. (1991) refute the civilised argument that sees the growth in population during the Neolithic as a result of an alleged improvement in the quality of life, which, the myth claims, has become healthier, longer and richer. The authors of “The Origins of Agriculture: Population Growth During a Period of Declining Health” invite the reader to look at the demographic explanations for the lack of growth during the Palaeolithic provided by the data on population density, which was stable and showing low mortality rates with a strong culture of self-regulation in reproductive strategies. They proceed by first breaking down the components of the civilised-Malthusian-Darwinian argument that erroneously links “progress” or improvement in the quality of life with “fertility”, “population growth”, and “increase of food due to agriculture”:

¹⁸⁶ Pierre-Joseph Proudhon discusses this in his famous 1840 work “*Qu'est-ce que la propriété*” and his even more famous answer “*La propriété, c'est le vol*”. Of course, Kropotkin as well as other revolutionary thinkers took up this issue as well. The contributors for Michel Foucault's analysis of *Moi, Pierre Rivière, ayant égorgé ma mère, ma soeur et mon frère* (1973) also discuss the context of the impoverishment of the peasants and the effects of civilised order on the appropriation of food and property.

The interpretation of the very low population growth during the Paleolithic has influenced demographic thinking in a number of ways. The lack of Paleolithic population growth has been explained by arguing that populations were experiencing maximum fertility and very high mortality. Neolithic population explosion, it is argued, resulted from improved nutrition and health; these acted to reduce mortality, and the change in demographic pattern led to a rapid increase in population. It is further argued that reduction of fertility in the modern period, which decreased the population growth rate, introduced the era of the demographic transition. *We seriously question this interpretation of Paleolithic and Neolithic demography and believe prehistoric populations demography deserves reanalysis* [emphasis mine].

In reviewing the literature on population dynamics of Paleolithic population, Goodman, Jacobs, and Armelagos (1975) were able to isolate two basic and accepted assumptions used in Paleolithic demography: 1) that *the potential* growth of hominid populations has not appreciably changed since *the early Pleistocene*, and 2) that *Paleolithic hunters-gatherers were involved* in a highly stable equilibrium system with respect to their *population size and realized rate of growth* [authors' emphasis] (Armelagos et al., 1991).

Having explained the myth, the authors elaborate where the civilised logic has misinterpreted the facts. Namely, the main problem here resides in that the definitions of “health” and “quality of food” have been subject to the habitual and concomitant inflation in the expected standards of living and quality of life, which, as Malthus claims in the citations above, depend on race and class: the poor and people like the “Chinese” are “known” to be eating offals, while the wealthy white people are “known” to prefer a good life. Armelagos et al. demonstrate that, in reality, it has always been the other way around: people have always enjoyed a good life and with civilisation have succumbed to misery and shorter lives. Hence, an

increase in the Neolithic human population following the development of agriculture has been assumed to result from improvements in health and nutrition. Recent research demonstrates that this assumption is incorrect. With the development of sedentism and the intensification of agriculture, there is an increase in infectious disease and nutritional deficiencies particularly affecting infants and children. Declining health probably increased mortality among infants, children and oldest adults. However, the productive and reproductive core would have been able to respond to this increase in mortality by reducing birth spacing. That is, agricultural populations increased in size, despite higher mortality, because intervals between births became shorter (Armelagos et al., 1991).

First, the authors name civilisation with its agricultural subsistence as the original culprit of high mortality rates: in civilisation people live shorter and painful lives, while in wilderness they enjoy a healthier and happier existence, which are important factors for longevity. Second, the trend of stable population density in nomad and gatherer societies always shifts to sudden population hikes as soon as they adopt sedentary and agricultural

lifestyles immediately decreasing intervals between children and the number of nursing years. These trends have been noted throughout the literature on cultural concepts in medical anthropology. For instance, Susan J. Rasmussen's article on the Tuareg in the *Encyclopedia of Medical Anthropology* (in Ember and Ember, 2004: 1001-1008) illustrates this point most clearly. The Tuareg are known to be one of the most egalitarian societies still existing in the world, in which the genders enjoy equal rights to inheritance, travel, initiation of conversation and courtship and where “working” or other classes do not exist. However, during the past half century, with the intensification of surveillance of national borders and other “post”colonial problems in Africa, some of the Tuareg clans have adopted a sedentary lifestyle. Immediately, there has been an increase in their population and increasing pressure on women to have more children (between six and eight) and with less spacing between them (Rasmussen in Ember and Ember, 2004). Shorter (or no) nursing and disruption of attachment parenting ultimately lead to weaker immunity systems with the higher population density increasing susceptibility to contagious diseases and reliance on western medicine whose remedies have serious side effects that further weaken the immunity system.

In other words, in addition to the emergence of hierarchical gender roles, which a stratified, ownership oriented culture creates through the professionalisation of genders and other “classes” of human and other species, sedentarism forces one to specialise in a limited sphere (literally and metaphorically) and makes one prone to dependence oriented relationships inherently characteristic of domesticated and farming social systems, including in the production and rearing of “human resources”. Since specialisation is always symptomatic of hierarchical socio-economic relations of dependence, oppression and exploitation, then the production of human and animal resources becomes a profession of human and animal women and thereby immediately devalues their labour so as to feed the trainers (educators and medical staff), the distributors, and the owners and exploiters of these resources. Since there is profit to be made off of the living resources themselves, then each production batch needs a larger production batch to both compensate for the maintenance cost and to continue maintaining it, thereby always requiring geometric growth in population, and overpopulation generates more massacres and extinctions. In this way, sedentarism and civilisation are the primary causes for the overproduction of

people and domestic animals, with the private ownership of land and resources ensuring that there will always be starvation and extermination. The three elements of this social order: sedentary agriculture, civilisation, and ownership are therefore inseparable in today's social order and traverse all of the literature, whether it accepts these phenomena as a given (e.g. A.A. Milne), whether it attempts to contest certain aspects of it (such as Nikolai Nosov), or whether it wants to eradicate suffering at its root (Tove Jansson).

Sedentarism and agricultural civilisation are therefore responsible for all the afflictions that plague the civilised and which have had no place in wilderness. The resulting increase in population density has brought about contagious diseases, malnourishment, and posed a specific threat to women and children as well as to the groups identified as competition or enemy: rats, wolves, raccoons, Muslims, Soviets, Communists, anarchists, among others in an endless list devised by the myth that demands bloodshed, exploitation, and submission. I suggest that, just as in the European revolutions of the intellectuals (Namier, 1992), a new vision drove people to restructure their relationships and “identity”, and that it is the new ontological perspective that has come to constitute the main drive of the Neolithic revolution, prompting humans to disregard the laws of wilderness for balance and the preservation of life, and instead choosing to restructure their lives according to the concept of “agency” and “resources” that allowed one to control the lives and reproduction of others, a fact that, as discussed earlier, has been known throughout time but whose deleterious effects only few dared to explore.

Moreover, the myth that civilisation provides a haven of safety, morality, improved health and longevity, protecting the civilised from a brutal, immoral, and filthy wilderness, is also behind people's paradoxical choice to conform to the political and economic demands for people to sacrifice the very health, time, and life, for which they have signed the pact with the devil in the first place, in order to be granted the “benefits” of civilisation, which most of them do not receive. Like Malthus, in order to prove itself, the political and cultural articulation of this mythology ignores the larger picture of civilised oppression and instead focuses on contemporary – i.e. civilised and colonising – statistics for longevity in “developed” “first world” nation-states that contrast starkly with the “developing” countries. First, the rhetoric refers to the colonised and “developing” peoples

as “savage” and “wild” – which in reality they no longer can be on occupied “resource” territory – and then the argument takes the disparities in statistics to demonstrate that the wealthy and the colonising are doing well, thereby boosting “the blame the victim” rhetoric, once again echoing the myth of the “singing Negro”, the “beautiful horse”, or the “happy and loving nanny”.

However, an examination of the current statistics in the “developed” world taking into account income, race, gender, and other indicators of access to good food (or even to food at all), medical services, time for oneself, etc., reveals high numbers of diseases and low life expectancy rates in the poor and middle class populations in the “exemplary” civilised world. For instance, U.S. Government statistics on life expectancy by race, scores significantly lower for Black Americans as compared to white. Here, in the first year of life, 75.7 white males on average are expected to live and only 69.7 of black males have the same chances¹⁸⁷. As for the mortality rates listed by the census bureau, these are even more heart-breaking: for every 1000 lives, 6.12 white male babies and 5.01 white female babies are expected to die before the age of one year as compared to 14.48 deaths of black male babies and 12.23 black female babies¹⁸⁸. In other words, black babies have more than twice the number of deaths than white babies.

Mortality rates are consistently higher for black people throughout every single age category and these statistics further differentiate lower income whites and other populations of colour in a clear hierarchical order. The reason for the higher mortality rates is obviously not because black people have *chosen* to get used to eating the stuff that no white person would eat even at gunpoint, as a Malthusian may conclude, nor is it because they are “lazy” (the black people have built America, after all). Black people are dying because the civilised are complicit in this plot whose narrative curtails black people's options and whose legitimating mythology is a powerful barrier that blocks indefinitely black people's access to food, health, space, time, and life. In this respect, a seemingly cheerful children's book and film depicting Willy Wonka kidnapping the Oompa-Loompas in crates and enslaving them in his colonial-imperial factory, while offering a white boy co-ownership and co-management of the happy and singing

¹⁸⁷ http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr58/nvsr58_21.pdf

¹⁸⁸ <http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/2010/tables/10s0105.pdf>

kidnapped victims that we are told have been rendered healthier, happier, and nobler by enslavement, is not simply a comic metaphoric or literary device, but a strategy of reinforcement of civilised relationships and a tragic reality for millions of people and, by extension, animals around the world.

In addition to the above data, medication statistics and mortality rates stemming from violence (war and crime) reveal problems in other aspects regarding the quality of life, which, as Sahlins (1974), among others, has observed, is inferior to the quality of life in non-domesticated, gatherer societies. In the 21st century, this is especially relevant to exported warfare in the Middle East, but a less discussed phenomenon pertains to the organ trade, which occurs both “willingly” by coerced donor-sellers but also by theft from and murder of unwilling victims. In a December 2007 report for the World Health Organization, Yosuke Shimazono calls attention to the growing threat to the lives of poor people around the world posed by the demands for new organs by wealthy “developed-worlders”, whose own organs have been failing due to civilised progress, particularly in agricultural chemistry, industrialisation, and technology. This phenomenon is eerily reminiscent of Haraway's cyborgs; and, here again, the promise for a better life by means of “progress” responds to the needs of the wealthy only, even if, ironically, it is responsible for the deterioration of their own health in the first place. Like the cyborgs, the rich continue their evolution by incorporating new organs and limbs, thereby depriving the poor “developing-worlders” of often the last resort they have, the healthy organs they have been born with.

The shortage of an indigenous “supply” of organs has led to the development of the international organ trade, where potential recipients travel abroad to obtain organs through commercial transactions. The international organ trade has been recognized as a significant health policy issue in the international community. A World Health Assembly resolution adopted in 2004 (WHA57.18) urges Member States to “take measures to protect the poorest and vulnerable groups from ‘transplant tourism’ and the sale of tissues and organs”. Despite growing awareness of the issue, the reality of the international organ trade is not well understood due to a paucity of data and also a lack of effort to integrate the available information (Shimazono, 2007).

This curious and tragic phenomenon exposes the enormity of the problem of the poor quality of life and challenges the civilised myth of improvement, which, like Malthus, the author does not question since Shimazono asserts that the “Member States” of the WHO

are trying to protect the vulnerable, when in fact the very existence of the state, with its borders and its labour and economic structure, is the main culprit in the vulnerable conditions of the displaced, exploited, and oppressed. The important question here is: how come the civilised world's organs are failing, if their food, water, medications, and other scientific inventions – the very guarantees for safety and health for which people have been willing to surrender their freedom and to forget their world – are supposed to ameliorate life, while the people who do not have these “luxuries” and who, in spite of the abuse and exploitation that they endure, still manage to keep their organs intact for the sale, after which they, incidentally, die?

As mentioned earlier, this aspect of civilised hierarchical relations regarding illness and healing, whereby the sick rich recuperate their strength and heal at the expense of the poor, is a motif that is also commonplace in children's literature where its rendering strives to normalise self-sacrifice in the poor and offer the rich a *carte blanche* for self-empowerment by parasiting others. As discussed earlier, Hodgson Burnett's (1996) *The Secret Garden* is one of the more explicit of the most cherished of civilised narratives that strives to reconfirm the *status quo* of parasitic inequality. At the same time, there are texts that attempt to challenge this topos. Again, as seen in part I, Nosov questions the role of the doctor in normalising unequal relationships of control. A contemporary American author, Margaret Peterson Haddix (2004), too, projects the narrative of illness and health as an integral part of social relationships in her book *Because of Anya*, where questions of identity become resolved through empathy and acceptance by friends. The most important point, however, is that regardless of whether the motif is explicit or whether it remains unenunciated, if the underlying premise that directs the plot and provides the topos of these parasitic relationships itself is not challenged, the cyborg continues to grow, incorporating ever more limbs, devouring ever more lives, increasing population growth accompanied by higher mortality rates and shorter life-spans. Victimisation does not end here, however, for in addition to organ trade, there is the question of fatalities due to civilisation: technological accidents, environmentally caused diseases and cancers, dementia, psychosis, chronic medication against depression, insomnia, and endless other ailments that make life in civilisation inferior to that in wilderness in all its aspects.

For instance, let us examine the question of sleep, which is critical for health, happiness and the general quality and longevity of life. In 2006, 70 million civilised Americans of all ages were reported to have suffered from sleep disorders: “Prescriptions for sleeping medications topped 56 million in 2008—a record, according to the research firm IMS Health, up 54% from 2004” says Denise Gellene in her March 2009 article on the economy of sleeping pills (Gellene, 2009).

The commercial profit from insomnia not only boosts the medical establishment, according to Gellene's research, but a whole complex of parasitic industries. “During 2007 and 2006, drug manufacturers Sanofi-Aventis (the maker of Ambien), Sepracor (maker of Lunesta) and Takada (maker of Rozerem) spent an average of \$11.8 million a week to advertise sleep medications, according to the market research firm TNS Media Intelligence. Total prescriptions for sleep medications increased 10% and 15% respectively in those years, according to IMS Health” (ibid).

Kelly Wagner (2009) cites a study by Meagan Daley, a professor of psychology and business, in Quebec City, Canada in which Daley reports that 1% of the total gross domestic product for 2002, which amounted to 228.5 billion Canadian dollars for Quebec, was the cost of insomnia alone, amounting to 6.5 billion Canadian dollars. Further, Daley takes into account lost revenue caused by fatigue:

Annual indirect costs of insomnia related to lost hours of productivity are estimated to be \$5 billion, representing the largest proportion (76 percent) of all insomnia costs. The annual estimate of insomnia-related lost productivity is 27.6 days per year for individuals with insomnia syndrome, and 6.2 days per year for people with insomnia symptoms. The second-highest cost of insomnia is attributed to job absenteeism, with \$970.6 million - 14.7 percent of the total economic burden of insomnia - estimated to be lost annually due to insomnia-related absences. Individuals with insomnia syndrome are absent from work an estimated 4.36 days per year because of insomnia” (in Wagner, 2009).

Not everyone relies on pharmaceuticals or medical intervention, however, so the author provides figures on alternative solutions to which people resort in an attempt to deal with insomnia, this exhausting condition that takes out the joy from life:

The total estimated annual cost of alcohol used for promoting sleep is \$339.8 million, which is the highest direct cost, representing 60 percent of all direct costs and five percent of all insomnia-related costs. The annual cost of insomnia-related consultations with a health-care professional is estimated to be \$85.3 million (32.6 percent of all direct costs and 2.9 percent of overall costs), and an estimated \$16.5 million is spent

annually on prescription medications for insomnia (only 2.8 percent of direct costs and less than one percent of overall costs) (ibid).

The language (both, semantic and mathematical) of the text fails to communicate concern or compassion for the personal plight of individual “human resources” or for the unhappiness of the masses, for their ailments and the drudgery of their lives. The formulation itself of many of these studies eliminates in advance questions that would have challenged the myth of the promises that civilisation had made seventeen thousand years ago for a bright future. The endless 16th century accounts of the healthy and beautiful American Indians who had met the European travellers in 1492 have now been replaced by the accounts of high rates of alcohol and drug consumption as well as chronic diseases (such as diabetes) that have plagued the surviving communities since the advent of civilisation (colonialism). For example, anthropologist Linda Garro reports that the Anishinaabe refer to diabetes, high blood pressure and other chronic diseases specifically as the “White man's illnesses” (see Garro in Ember and Ember, 2004: 903-9; and in Mattingly and Garro, 2000).

Among the endless dry, apathetic accounts that fail to acknowledge the rationale behind such suffering, the civilised narrative continues to present the “problem” of numbers in terms of business loss for the owners and profiteers of pharmaceutical products instead of as a problem of civilised despair. There is a tradition of such reports sponsored by United Nations or various governmental and non-governmental agencies, all of whom are implicated in the economy of illness, suffering, and death. These reports acknowledge “a” problem, but then proceed to formulating their findings in a language that is consistent with the civilised narrative and political rhetoric, prompting the civilised to accept immediate band-aids that ultimately benefit the institution of private ownership and order, but do not offer any real solutions that would dismantle the relationships of oppression, which is exactly what Daley's study does:

Results estimate that the annual per-person insomnia related costs are \$5,010 for those with insomnia syndrome (\$293 in direct costs and \$4,717 in indirect costs); \$1,431 for those with insomnia symptoms (\$160 in direct costs and \$1,271 in indirect costs); and \$422 for good sleepers (\$45 in direct costs and \$376 in indirect costs).

The authors conclude that an increased awareness of the availability and effectiveness of insomnia treatments, both on the part of the public as well as health-care providers,

could lead to significant reductions in the overall cost of insomnia to society (Wagner, 2009).

These remedies of course are not limited to alcohol and drugs (legal and illegal), there are troops of psychotherapists that feed off this suffering and, by their mere existence, have all the economic incentives for the existence of this pain since an end in suffering ultimately renders their professions obsolete.

Civilisation's promise of safety too has failed on all counts. For example, George Mason University Sexual Assault Services offers statistics on rape in 21st century civilised countries: 1 in 3 women in the world experiences rape. 5-10% of men report having been sexually abused as children. 60% of rape cases were committed by someone in the family or known to the victim. There are private clubs with sado-masochism in every big city and none in the jungle. Wolves never capture other wolves, chain them, and then come off of it. Civilised people do. Humans do. Persons do.

Paradoxically, thus, the whole civilised premise rests on the promise of safety from predators and diseases that, ironically, are civilisation's own doing. Then, in order to save humanity from the mythical predator, the civilised narrative has devised a plot and a system for the ultimate predation of life consumed in all possible ways: as flesh, energy, effort and time by the most dangerous predator of all: the human person. Daily reports fill the media with news of adults killing their children; children killing adults; adults killing adults; children killing children; people of all ages killing themselves and others. In France. In England. In Germany. In Canada. In Rwanda. In Sudan. Everywhere. Not only in war. They kill each other in school. In the Office. On the street. In sleep. At home. Everywhere in the civilised world. Violence on this scale is unheard of in gatherer societies. The Hopis or the Semai, discussed earlier, or the numerous other peoples still refuse to indulge in civilisation and violence and wild children's narratives transmit the meaning of these relations, such as relayed in moominbooks.

Yet the civilised narrative prevails and spreads at an incomprehensible speed. As if anaesthetised, the domesticated victims have learnt to live with it and even find it bearable (it has lasted seventeen thousand years, and who knows how much longer), because sentience and memory can be silenced by alienating oneself from the past and from the

earth. The efficacy of the civilised panopticon resides precisely in the fact that the civilised have been trained to fear pain by the constant infliction of pain by the civilised themselves. Tortured into submission, they have grown to fear wilderness and no longer dream of a life without suffering.

When predation achieves a global scale in which it completely consumes its environment, the result is total collapse of the system that had originally supported the culture itself. When cancer cells take over an organism and the organism's defence system fails, the result is the death of both, the world in which the parasite cells have multiplied without checking themselves as well as the cancer itself, echoing the Darwinian definition of success of a species through the magnitude of its reproduction and the arrogant demand for immortality. However, the success of the cancer becomes dismally finite in the scope of the universe, for it is on its own in the world, with no reciprocity and no one to share one's space and life; for it knows no friends, only resources to consume. The ramifications of an encounter with cancer for the diverse community that the organism had sustained and the whole environment are disastrous.

Along with other deadly diseases, such as the plague, diabetes, coronary heart disease, or hypertension, cancer is specific to civilisation and empires (Fábrega, 1997: 112-113). Its deadliness, in fact, comes from the rationale that drives cancer cells to reproduce infinitely without checking themselves in relation to their environment. Medical textbooks and dictionaries define a malignant tumour as the appearance of cells in a living environment that have an error in their programme inscribed in a gene that is responsible for controlling the lifespan of cells, i.e. of their mortality and regeneration keeping their population increase at close to zero. Instead, cancer cells proliferate and modify their environment until they completely take it over, devouring the world itself that has hosted these monopolists (Youngson, 2005). Unlike bacteria, who know that their existence depends on the life of the host – even our bodies consist of complex bacterial ecosystems where the bacteria outnumber human cells (Leeming et al., 1984; and Tancredi, 1992) – the endless growth of cancer cell population shares the logic of the civilised in its most blatant expression today as witnessed in global capitalism with its greed for a steady increase of profit, accumulation and exploitation.

This logic of civilised capitalist activity is reminiscent of cancer cells also in the agricultural organisation of space, since, as discussed earlier, civilisation depends on lack of movement (sedentarism) and the colonisation of more and more land for planting only what is deemed useful by a select group of humans, with human resources getting pressured to increase infinitely their reproduction so as to be able to colonise increasingly larger areas of land and more and more assets. There is therefore an inherent paradox in the civilised perspective, which shares its logic with the culture of cancerous growth. For, in striving for infinite growth and immortality, the tumour modifies its environment ordering and consuming its resources until total collapse. This process, however, is not easy for anyone since, like all the cases where life faces the threat of conquest, there is resistance, and, hence, when an invading disease or some inner imbalance causes illness, the immune system mobilises a violent defence against the intruding coloniser. In the terminal phase, fever, pain, and suffering subside, and, as the illness destroys its host's system of resistance, that single victorious species or form of life takes over its world, it finally dies with it. In this supremacist war of an all consuming predator – monoculturalism – there are no winners. Mortality and immortality, modesty and greed, intelligence and ignorance, thus flicker in a game that masks and unmask what we really do and how we attempt to live, create, and control. Most important, how we narrate our lives, turns out, to have the most dire repercussions for all.

In the End...

If life was generated by an impulse of an electric current, then the flow and exchange of energy or symbiosis are innate in living organisms, as transmission of energy requires replenishment if the being is to maintain its creativity, happiness, vitality. In this light, civilisation is an essentially unsustainable system of relations since, in this pyramidal socio-economic structure, the energy flows one way, vertically, with fewer and fewer possibilities for restoring it in the lower ranks, thereby generating a need for expansionism and colonialism and an impetus for overpopulation and monoculturalism (domestication). The recurring genocides of non-human and human animals are therefore demanded by the development of the civilised plot itself, where not only does life cease when the flow of energy is blocked, but there can be no exchange of passion, no possibility for rejuvenation, or for the unpredictability of chaos. Such stagnation of creativity, love, and life itself is the consequence of these disproportionate relationships that ultimately exhaust the givers to the point of death. In this vein, any interference in others' sexuality and reproductive processes from the point of view of domestication destroys the balance in the previously symbiotic communities since any such interference is based on maximising the consumption by the civilised at the lowest (energy) cost value possible. In this sense, pesticides and herbicides too share this logic of control of others' reproduction, since the poisons are designed to attack the reproductive systems of those species that are seen as useless, competitive, and hence hostile, thereby filling the land and the drinking water base with poisons that are then shared with other species (including human) as well. Furthermore, civilised agricultural practices result in the anthropogenic overpopulation of domestic species, such as cattle, that swamp the environment with faeces, methane, reproduction and growth hormones, and other pollutants, while fulfilling the concomitant requirement of civilisation for an increased production of monocultural crops needed to sustain these animals in their unimaginable conditions of suffering, not to mention the pain of the other animals labelled as "pests" as they are being driven to

extinction.

Surprisingly though, and as paradoxically as it may appear, the evidence on the looming catastrophe and anthropogenic biocide has not deterred the propagation of the monocultural civilised perspective in the most popular books, films and works of art, including those aimed at children. In fact, most continue to be rooted in civilised mythology in spite of the available information on the Holocene extinction and ecocide, data that is now available even in mainstream media:

...as harmful as our forebears may have been, nothing compares to what's under way today. Throughout the 20th century the causes of extinction - habitat degradation, overexploitation, agricultural monocultures, human-borne invasive species, human-induced climate-change - increased exponentially, until now in the 21st century the rate is nothing short of explosive. The World Conservation Union's Red List - a database measuring the global status of Earth's 1.5 million scientifically named species - tells a haunting tale of unchecked, unaddressed, and accelerating biocide.

...The overall numbers are terrifying. Of the 40,168 species that the 10,000 scientists in the World Conservation Union have assessed, one in four mammals, one in eight birds, one in three amphibians, one in three conifers and other gymnosperms are at risk of extinction. The peril faced by other classes of organisms is less thoroughly analysed, but fully 40 per cent of the examined species of planet earth are in danger, including perhaps 51 per cent of reptiles, 52 per cent of insects, and 73 per cent of flowering plants.

By the most conservative measure - based on the last century's recorded extinctions - the current rate of extinction is 100 times the background rate. But the eminent Harvard biologist Edward O Wilson, and other scientists, estimate that the true rate is more like 1,000 to 10,000 times the background rate. The actual annual sum is only an educated guess, because no scientist believes that the tally of life ends at the 1.5 million species already discovered; estimates range as high as 100 million species on earth, with 10 million as the median guess. Bracketed between best- and worst-case scenarios, then, somewhere between 2.7 and 270 species are erased from existence every day. Including today....

In a 2004 analysis published in *Science*, Lian Pin Koh and his colleagues predict that an initially modest co-extinction rate will climb alarmingly as host extinctions rise in the near future. Graphed out, the forecast mirrors the rising curve of an infectious disease, with the human species acting all the parts: the pathogen, the vector, the Typhoid Mary who refuses culpability, and, ultimately, one of up to 100 million victims (Whitty, 2007).

Science Daily, the BBC, the Blog of Cambridge University Press, and other sources, drawing on the work of biologists and other scientists, all corroborate the above prognosis. For instance, here is an excerpt by biologists and human and animal demographers, Donald A. Levin and Phillip S. Levin, who observe:

that on average, a distinct species of plant or animal becomes extinct every 20 minutes.... Donald Levin, who works in the section of integrative biology in the College of Natural Sciences, said research shows the rate of current loss is highly unusual -- clearly qualifying the present period as one of the six great periods of mass extinction in the history of Earth.

“The numbers are grim,” he said. “Some 2,000 species of Pacific Island birds (about 15 percent of the world total) have gone extinct since human colonization. Roughly 20 of the 297 known mussel and clam species and 40 of about 950 fishes have perished in North America in the last century. The globe has experienced similar waves of destruction just five times in the past.”

Biological diversity ultimately recovered after each of the five past mass extinctions, probably requiring several million years in each instance. As for today's mass extinction, Levin said some ecologists believe the low level of species diversity may become a permanent state, especially if vast tracts of wilderness area are destroyed” (University of Texas, Austin, 2002).

Another source states that:

“The International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) notes in a video that many species are threatened with extinction. In addition,

- 75% of genetic diversity of agricultural crops has been lost
- 75% of the world's fisheries are fully or over exploited
- Up to 70% of the world's known species risk extinction if the global temperatures rise by more than 3.5°C
- 1/3rd of reef-building corals around the world are threatened with extinction
- Every second a parcel of rainforest the size of a football field disappears

Over 350 million people suffer from severe water scarcity” (Shah 6th June 2010).

Nonetheless, in spite of this information, civilised mythology continues to permeate all the aspects of artistic, social, scientific, and political expression. For the anthropocentric perspective continues to drive people in their general apathy, alienation, and self-victimisation that dull the civilised people's comprehension skills. For instance, the number of people suffering from severe water shortages evokes a stronger reaction of horror from the audience than the torture of cattle or the irretrievable death of a species, whose disappearance is dismissed as either natural or as having been caused by poor evolutionary choices. In the first source, this is evident in Julia Whitty's (2007) title itself: “Animal Extinction – the Greatest Threat to Mankind”, which centres around what is good

for or dangerous to “mankind” and not to the beings who are dying out. The title assumes that we should care about the extinction of animal and plant life because it constitutes a threat to “us” and not because we should care for animals to *not* go extinct simply because they suffer and to live only because it makes them happy to do so.

Instead, the civilised rationale, which propels domestication with its notion of property ownership, continues to be the main lesson, drummed over and over, from early childhood and throughout life. An excerpt from my “field” notes on an educational project aimed at children ages 7 to 12, representative of other classes I had observed in North America, illustrates this practice of instilling the anthropocentric *habitus* in children:

Children are taught from an early age to view the world from a humanist-utilitarian position. Ecological programmes in school or extracurricular activities focus on training children to estimate the value of things for humans. I observed a UNICEF project in the children's libraries in Montreal in the summer of 2008. This particular scene took place at the “Ecological Biodiversity” session in July of that year.

Unicef animators: “Let us draw what you think is important in your neighbourhood or some other place you've been to. Who have you seen there?” The 11 children draw.

“Michael, what are these?” Stephanie points to his drawing.

“Trees”.

“Why are trees important?”

Michael ponders, “mmmm...”

Another animator, Anne helps him: “Because they give us fresh air. It is important for us to have fresh air”.

“Zoe, what have you drawn?” Stephanie continues.

“A lake”.

“Why are lakes important?”

“They have water”.

“Yes, without water we will die”.

Stephanie walks around the circle.

“Zaki, what do you have there?”

“This is a zebra, that is a lion, this is a tree, and there is a bird and the sun”.

“Veeeeeerrrry goooood, Zaki. Why are zebras important?” Stephanie demonstrates excitement.

“They run and they are pretty with stripes”.

“Who eats the zebras?” Stephanie prompts him.

“The lions”.

“Yeeeeeeesssss. The zebras are important for the lions to eat”.

... “The sun is important because without it we will die”. Stephanie goes on to list the importance of things for us, for our lives and for consumption.

This exercise has completely missed the point of biodiversity, i.e., that “biodiversity” implies a variety not only in forms, colours, sounds, and shapes, but a diversity of needs,

experiences, desires, purposes, and lives. It has also ignored the very fact that imposing one purpose on everyone – to be eaten by someone else – precludes the very possibility for diversity, which the workshop was supposedly intended to teach remaining stuck in consumerism.

In wilderness, the sun, the trees, and the universe exist regardless of whether we need them or not. In wilderness, a lioness might occasionally hunt a zebra or a gazelle and share her kill with her pride, but lions do not appropriate the zebras and gazelles' purpose and wildness; they do not domesticate them, they do not know them as their own until the end of time. In the end, each of them – the zebra, the lion, and the gazelle – remains with her own self, following her own star, dancing to her own tune. It is the lions, zebras, and other animals who proceed from the perspective of biodiversity, which is their wildness, and it is Zaki who tunes into the wild concept that the zebras should exist because they run and have stripes (whatever else for? and what a stupid question, his eyes seemed to think). But the domesticated human teachers and educational animators I have been observing, even when unintentionally proceeding from the civilised narrative, ensure that monoculturalism prevails and biodiversity and wilderness do not get a chance.

Scientific texts written for children also participate in the propagation of civilised mythology even while contradicting themselves. For instance, Scholastic's advertisement of their book, entitled "Endangered Species: the New Book of Knowledge", opens with the civilised perspective and, by doing so, minimises the effects of human agency in environmental destruction, which it later names as the original culprit in the planetary catastrophe.

A co-author of *The Audubon Society Book of Wild Animals*, Edward R. Ricciuti begins his review on Scholastic's website by stating that it is normal and natural for species to ultimately die out because they cannot adapt to the changes in the environment. Also, since the conquest of the America's, only a handful of hundreds of species have perished – which does not even remotely reflect the scientific estimates of the "ultimately, one of up to 100 million victims" discussed above:

Plants, animals, and other living things have developed, flourished, and vanished since the first flickerings of life. Sooner or later, every species, or kind, of living thing dies out because it cannot keep up with the natural changes in its environment. Yet, in recent

times, many species have passed out of existence sooner than they would have naturally. Since the year 1600, more than 500 species of wild animals and plants have disappeared from the North American continent alone. At least 1,000 more are in trouble. Worldwide, scientists estimate that 20,000 species of plants are in danger of extinction, that is, dying out completely¹⁸⁹.

In other words, this “environmental” piece for children opens with the statement that extinction is natural and inevitable, and by doing so it softens the bad news and minimises the effects of our actions on the experience and quality of life of other non-human and human animals. Most important, it conspires with the civilised narrative to ignore the true nature of civilisation. After all, if there have been only five recorded extinctions in the billions of years of life on earth, then what does it say about civilised humans if they are the ones to have brought about the sixth Holocene extinction within the span of a few thousand years?

There are other problems with the text as well. First, the intended audience, children, here are assumed to lack sophistication and to need a simplification of the material presented. The problem here is that any simplification becomes a tradition that gets embedded in the *habitus*, which is then encoded in the child's body and brain. It becomes a permanence that precludes the possibility of that person later attaining the state when she is “ready” for complexity and truth. In other words, this too is a self-fulfilling prophecy that ensures that by treating young people as dumb they actually do turn out dumb.

Second, the text omits the fact that this information is outdated, since the way the book of extinctions defines an extinct species is when not a single member had been spotted during half a century; and since the most intensive rate of extinction has sprinted precisely during these past fifty years, omitting this crucial fact leads to huge underestimations that could have the most dire repercussions for life on earth if children continue to operate from the perspective on biodiversity discussed in the UNICEF example above in addition to relying on outdated data lagging half a century behind reality. In other words, the logic of this article is as follows: “500 species have vanished since the conquest of the Americas and others are in danger, but if you 'conserve' – buy

¹⁸⁹ http://teacher.scholastic.com/scholasticnews/indepth/endangered_species/background/index.asp?article=endangeredspecies

new light bulbs (that supposedly save energy but contain toxic mercury, for example), or recycle, or designate “wildlife” parks managed by human professionals, etc., i.e., participate even more intensely in the civilised capitalist economy – then you can help the animals that are in danger to not be in danger any more”. In this way, when the reader arrives at the more accurate estimate of how many species vanish per day (between 50 and 150) due the anthropogenic destruction of habitat, which the article provides, the information has already been tamed and does not appear as urgent as it really is.

Finally, the text proceeds to naturalise murder and civilised predation by appealing to the myth of our carnivorous origins and evolutionary “nature”: “Ever since the first people appeared on the earth, they have used nature's resources. People have killed or collected animals and gathered plants for a variety of uses” (ibid). Even though, strictly speaking, primate physiology and digestive system are not specialised, i.e., primates are omnivorous, they, nonetheless, have preference for frugivorous, folivorous, and herbivorous diet. In other words, even though primates are capable of digesting animal proteins from ants, birds, and smaller mammals, as the palaeontological and primatological data discussed earlier indicates, with the exception of the human being, none other than a select group of humans has chosen to become a full-time carnivore. The one billion of vegans and lacto-vegetarians around the world today – not to mention all the aboriginal peoples who have been exterminated by the civilised carnivores – prove false the myth of man as meat-eater.

Nonetheless and in spite of the availability of information on the disastrous state of life on earth due to civilised “progress”, the dissemination of civilised mythology continues to be successful. The BBC, for instance, reports that “40 per cent of the 10,000 five to 18-year-olds who participated [in a survey on children's attitudes to the massive species extinction] ranked watching TV or playing computer games higher than saving the environment”¹⁹⁰. Others thought it was important to save animals because “our” lives depended on it and only a few took the wilderness approach: that animals should live because they are alive.

Needless to say, if this myth succeeds to prevail in a field that claims authenticity

¹⁹⁰ <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8697693.stm>

and ties to reality, it finds even more ways to go rampant in the works of fiction and art. Children's literature continuously presents this myth as self-evident truth, ranging through a variety of genres, addressed to all ages. Earlier, I mentioned the *Caillou* series of short picture books that depict mundane situations and offer solutions for integration into the civilised order by appealing to the child's need for acceptance and love. C.S. Lewis' (1950) *Chronicles of Narnia*, written for an older audience of children, too, oscillate between the “chaos” of the world of “wild” animists under the guidance of the White Witch and the desired “order” under the patriarchal guidance of the Lion whose goal is to impose on Narnia the order of Earth, *naturally*, through bloodshed. The same stands true for the Harry Potter novels that present a divided world, first between the ignorant muggles (the unenlightened masses) and the clandestine world of the select few who possess the secret knowledge of how to manipulate natural and other forces in order to establish a civilised hierarchy. The series reflects perfectly the civilised order, where the “ignorant” masses are excluded from academia and other centres for the control and production of elite knowledge and exploited in various ways. Harry Potter's clandestine society itself is also divided, where the handful of chosen men battle for hegemony while the rest of the men, women, and other life-forms exist to help these men's quests, maintain their power, ensure their success, keep their knowledge and powers secret, with some of these individuals and groups simply existing as slaves, for example, the house-elves and “half-bloods” (those of mixed race).

These myths of civilisation also underlie many of the contemporary film narratives for children. Here is a good example of how a simple, on first glance, plot of a film that claims to be a story about love and empowerment is in fact built on the civilised mythology discussed so far. The recent award winning Pixar animation film, *Up* (2009), was described by Rotten Tomatoes in the following words: “Another masterful work of art from Pixar, *Up* is an exciting, hilarious, and heartfelt adventure impeccably crafted and told with wit and depth” receiving 98% vote on their site and 8.4/10 on imdb.com film database. The film includes everything in its formula for success: symbolism, alienation, violence, effacement, gendered and racialised silencing, objectification, the heroic agency of one (preferably white, male) character (but sometimes, white females would do), and the desertification of the rest of life. Finally, for it to ensure financial success, if it is not

specifically about immigrants, American Indians, or American Slavery, then it must be about white people and their agency. The film begins with a white girl called Ellie who dreams of moving her house on the top of the mountains of Paradise Falls in South America. She meets a white boy, Carl, tells him her dream, he promises to take her there, they fall in love and spend their lives working little jobs trying to save money for travel, but never have enough and always end up being forced to spend their last pennies on some emergencies. Life goes by and they grow old together without having fulfilled Ellie's dream, which gets relegated to a drawer in an old journal where it remains until the end of her life collecting dust. The film, however, portrays their lives as natural, even "romantic". The romantic aspect is concocted by the narrative's focus on the little things that bring them joy in spite of this overwhelming civilisation that sucks out their very life-force and thereby silences the horror of such an existence when a person cannot realise her most cherished dream. In other words, the "beauty" of the film for the civilised resides in the fact that it ignores the 95% of Ellie and Carl's reality and only occasionally sketches or alludes to it. Instead it centres on the 5% and on their "positive" attitudes and reactions. It would have been a very "unlovely" film, had it shown accurately the realistic proportion of joy to pain, disempowerment, and struggle. Moreover, like the cyborgs, not only are their dreams sterile, they themselves have no continuation: they have nothing to transmit and no one to transmit it to, no children of their own, no nieces no nephews, no one. Only after Ellie's death does a child appear in Carl's life. And even then, as the white boy scout, by the name of Russell, accidentally finds himself on board, Carl is annoyed by his presence and tries to get rid of him. In other words, together, Carl and Ellie exist as machines to work and pay bills and after her death, Carl appropriates Ellie's dream and gets a chance for a glimpse of what it means to live.

The film depicts this tragic life as "lovely" and "romantic" simply because the protagonists have a dream, which conveys the message that it is not important for them to live this dream while they are young and full of life. In fact, it would have distracted them from fulfilling their real purpose in civilisation: work and pay bills. Do not fret, whispers the underlying message of the civilised narrative, even when you do not have the time to dream it together and even if you die, someone else will live your dream on your behalf and might even take your picture on the trip to symbolise your "participation". Impotent,

infertile dreaming, like androids' dreams of electric sheep, thus replaces the doing and the living.

Furthermore, the civilised plot goes on to depict the “natural” evolution of civilisation that ends up surrounding the outdated, even expired dreamer's house with high-rises. Carl gets cranky, tries to resist, but since he is impotent before the new day and age, his time is after all gone (mostly into work fuelling this very “evolution” and into the bills he had paid to pave it), he has no recourse but to cede the place for developers. So, he does the “heroic” thing: attaching his house to balloons he flies away to Paradise Falls all the while talking to a picture of Ellie. The audience is expected to derive satisfaction from the fact that Ellie's photograph and Carl have made it to Venezuela and so it is “as if” Ellie has lived her dream.

As discussed earlier in the context of Zerzan's theory of symbolism and substitution, the problem here is the replacement of the person by the picture and the satisfaction with the “as if” substitutes for the real life of pleasure. In the end, the film effaces Ellie and her dreams, depicting her and Carl's docility and disempowerment as natural. But, not only is there a replacement of the person by a picture, what matters for the narrative is that the house, with the photo inside, is the only one who makes it to the top of the lifeless landscape. Why would anyone be happy for a house making it to Paradise Falls is difficult for me to grasp, yet the rating of the film on the various film databases mentioned earlier demonstrates that amnesia, sterility, impotence, and downright charlatanism make sense and are appealing to the domesticated masses.

The moral of the film is that children should learn to expect a “beautiful” life of self-denial, hard work, and poverty and accept that, after all, someone else will live their dreams for them when they die or even before then. Thus, the beauty of life for the civilised consists in the knowledge of the effaced “members of society” that in the end they will “as if” have lived. The violence of monogeneity and capitalism, of the substitution of reality by “as if”, or of silencing, deadening and effacement, according to the film, is not only a natural and benign way of living, but even constitutes the only way; for, nothing else appears in the film apart from this way of life and these kind of people. That, the audience is told, is a happy ending.

With regard to colonised landscapes and the knowledge of “other” places the film also lives up to civilised expectations, for when Carl arrives in South America there is no one there to greet him and his new friend, the accidentally attached Russell, the boy scout: there are no people, no animals, hardly any trees, with the exception of another white male American by the name of Charles Munz, his remote-controlled dogs, and a weird bird addicted to “U.S.” chocolate. In the manner of Christopher Robin who names, Russell domesticates the bird by naming her Kevin and offering her the food she likes, but which, in the manner of the Oompa-Loompas, the bird cannot obtain, because it is now “American” and no longer belongs to South America, where it actually grows. Russell domesticates the purpose of Kevin in another way as well, for, by giving her a male name, the female bird forgets her own children and plays the role of the useful native guide who follows Russell and Carl on their adventures helping them in their feats and conquests. Even though towards the end of the film, Russell and Carl return Kevin to her family, in the real world a mother's absence from her children is detrimental not only to her own children, but to the whole community, as mentioned earlier in relation to migrant labour. In other words, this 96-minute narrative completely erases the indigenous reality and diversity of a whole continent and, instead, portrays a barren landscape with no life apart from Kevin and the greedy white American. Finally, as the humans (three white American males) depart, the dead white American woman's house and photograph claim the territory at the summit of Paradise Falls.

The majority of films that are produced for children in English dominate the world film-industry and market, and regardless of whether they are based on fairy tales, literature, or new film-scripts, operate from these civilised precepts. For instance, another computer animated film, *Hoodwinked!* (2005), focuses on empowering older women and young girls and once again demonstrates that such empowerment must necessarily proceed at the expense of other groups that are disempowered by the agency of the newly empowered. Again, the focus is on white women with the assumption that they stand for Women, unlike black or Asian women who stand for their specific, essentialised constructs and racialised needs. In order to focus on the “positive” message, the script ignores the massive injustices and the rest of the painful realities in the manner of the other civilised narratives discussed earlier and must portray the individuals and groups suffering from the

empowerment of these two women as happy for the protagonists' achievements and as supportive of their feats, even while they themselves remain homeless, disempowered, and even dead. This tactic of focusing on the aspirations, emotions, hardships and conquests of the “heroes” and “heroines” of civilised narratives helps the audience to identify with the conquerors' needs and to caricature the needs of others. Because they are not real and are not competing with the audience for their own piece of the civilised pie, symbolism helps the audience to even cheer for them, to desire their success, and to be sad with their failure “as if” it were their own. Since the details of the remaining characters, who are victims of this feminist plot, remain sketchy and caricatured, the audience forgets about reality and joins in the depicted joy of the rest of the forest beings who, we are told, are happy to get trampled on by Red Riding Hood and her grandmother, galloping across their lives, running over animals, recklessly felling trees, causing dynamite explosions that bring about avalanches and tear down mountains, simply because the two women need to salvage granny's recipes in order to save a few private businesses. And yet, like so many other films and books, the more the narrative is insensitive and status quo oriented, the more it gets celebrated for its “originality”.

Inadvertently and most fundamentally, hierarchical and racialised anthropocentrism leads to gross misrepresentations of reality, because it is rooted in the myth that depicts human agency as key for the survival of the planet: “if only we can get the right kind of management for the natural 'resources' and 'environmental' 'initiatives’”, the standard logic goes to remind us of such arguments as made by Patton, Hearne, and Roberts above, “we can make things right; if only the right kind of 'moral' people get elected in government, everything will be fixed; if only more people participate in the show of spending billions of dollars on the handful of people to represent them at their own expense to be elected to take the trip to Paradise Falls on their behalf, then there will be less hunger and more empowerment; ad infinitum”. Yet, it has been thousands of years that leaders and managers have been misleading, mismanaging, and profiting from abuse, but for some reason – and I argue that the reason has to do with the postulates underlying the civilised narrative and the knowledge and structure for social relationships that the civilised premises foster – people still believe that it is just about to improve with *their* personal help and contribution, because they *possess* the agency to renounce their voice,

thereby renouncing that very agency in favour of the handful of mis-leaders, the ones whom they choose to voice their hopes, represent their dreams, and tell them what to do, how to live, what to buy, what to believe, how to become beautiful (like Patton's horses), how to become happy (like the amnesiac cyborgs without a world), and so forth. But, just like the representation that ends up living Ellie's dream when she dies, so do the representatives of people's will and desires – the politicians and other public figures and celebrities – live people's dreams as the people themselves die. In other words, representation provides the most effective means for sterilising people, rendering them impotent cyborgs, perfect machines that are empowered by their function to serve as limbs for another's will. For their part, these castrated cyborgs appear to gladly renounce agency over their own lives and agree to be depicted as singing with joy, because they have grown to be ashamed of their tears.

Identification with these misconceptions of happiness and misrepresentations of the real constitute the ultimate alienation, like *maya*, the mirage of hope or the infinite nightmare within a nightmare, it reappears constantly in children's books in various forms. We see these projections in the two films above, but they also mislead us, taking us away from being, abandoning the enchanted worlds of the 100 Aker Wood that could have been, and accepting boarding school as a natural verdict of evolution, creation, and genes. These projections haunt us in the singing voices of the Oompa-Loompas, the happy slaves of Charlie and the Chocolate Factory, and through the deeds and the passions of Nosov's mites, they together lull us to surrender our reason to the myth that evolution into this state is ineluctable; and since we cannot choose the best option, we will have to settle for Sunny City as it is still far better than the Moon.

To recapitulate the enunciated interconnections that run through my interdisciplinary analysis regarding order, chaos, knowledge, culture, social foundation and the world as they appear in children's literature: I began by tracing how our understanding of the world is linked to the way we choose to live and experience it as well as to how we interact, communicate and transmit our experiences to the future generations. The role of language in the domestication of our intelligence correlates most directly to the ways in which social, political, and other institutions in a civilised order

rely on fiction, plot and narrative to encode our bodies, minds, and psyches with *doxa*, *habitus*, *body hexis*, and ideologies transmitted and reproduced through genes and memes. All of these have the most direct effect not only on how we experience and understand ourselves and our world, but most important on how we choose to transform the world and the extent of damage we inflict, something that the wild have refused to do. In this process of civilising the world through the act of narrating the codes or memes, fiction has come to play a most prominent role in the possibilities for alienation and identification provided by the invention of language and symbolic thought. As discussed, language is not the same as communication, for communication and understanding appear to be more intense and holistic when experienced through empathy, while language provides the limiting rules, structures, and categorical separations that allow abstraction and hence is inherently incapable of an accurate – only an approximative and elusive – representation of reality which an ordered grammar claims to convey. Language and grammar are the first mechanisms for *praxis* that economise effort through formulae that transmit and structure myths thereby allowing the substitution of the real knowledge that can only be acquired through experience with standardised *doxa* and *habitus* of untruth as well as the ideologies of deception.

Since literacy is pivotal to the successful transmission of memes and genes, whereby it has altered the very brain and physiology of civilised humans, then civilised children's narratives, for the most part, rely on the ordering power of grammar to socialise children into an oppressive, hierarchical paradigm of civilised social relations and knowledge. As seen in the case of *Winnie-the-Pooh*, concepts of illness and health, sadism and masochism, in-group and outsiders, etc., need not even be articulated, since the underlying assumptions driving the civilised plot are in themselves sufficient to convey civilised meaning and transmit the *doxa* through the structure of its codes for social relationships, desires, fears, and aspirations. In this nexus of all the components comprising the civilised plot, the role of biography, i.e. understanding the personal experience of all the interlocutors in any study, becomes particularly prominent, since the ability to comprehend and build knowledge can begin only on the personal level of sentience, empathy, and personal actions. Everything depends on this ability to tune in to one's world: imagination, personal decisions, interactions. Most important, the

anthropogenic effect on wilderness depends on the choices that one makes after having processed experience and information. The less a person relates to the world outside herself and the more alienated she is, the less capable of understanding, and the more damage she inflicts. As demonstrated in this work, when the syndrome of apathy and impotence becomes an epidemic, the repercussions are disastrous, such as the 6th Extinction in the history of the world.

Because the point of departure of civilisation and the general trajectory of its plot always moves towards alienation, it constantly works to decrease intelligence and cause the atrophy of interactive skills needed for reaching across the borders separating species, ethnic groups, genders, and other identity categories determined to be owned versus those who own the world. The drive for this evolution towards ignorance leads to the overpopulation of monoculturalist masses and is rooted in the civilised conception of genesis which determines how we look at ourselves and others and ultimately how far we are willing to go in participating in the abuse. Attempts to compromise with these civilised presuppositions and myths, even while slightly decreasing the pace of the looming demise, nevertheless ultimately lead to collapse. Even though fiction enjoys a range of possibilities of playing with imagination, nevertheless, as Dunno's trilogy shows, the logic of the argument itself cannot reconcile order and technology with self-governed wilderness, since civilisation necessarily sucks everything into its vortex. In other words, the minute a person is overpowered by this cancerous plot and accepts this path towards the machine and the civilised ontology as an ineluctable given, then, like Nosov, the progression of the plot cannot deviate from the path of evolution towards cities and states, control and order and thereby descent into the mode of agricultural expansionism, which entails growth, overpopulation, and hence massacres and extinctions. Therefore, even while Nosov does his best to embrace multiculturalism, inter-gender and other forms of cooperation, including trans-nationalism, his narrative is unable to overcome speciesism, which constitutes the root of oppression and segregation by means of the civilised construct of humanism.

Nosov tries to reconcile wilderness with civilisation through empathy and conscience, and while he offers important explorations on morality, his critique of

oppressive social orders nonetheless succumbs to two pitfalls of civilised narrative. First, in spite of being one of the fundamental aspects of morality, kindness to animals is insufficient to eradicate discrimination and disempowerment brought about by the humanist position that assumes civilised human reason as superior to all. The concept of kindness, while necessary for life in wilderness, fails in civilisation, because it does not challenge the structure itself of abusive relationships and hence, ultimately, remains an anthropocentric venture of superficial and short term nature that remedies wounds but does not heal. Healing comes from wild generosity with the wild. It is a love for the other as she is for whatever purpose she chooses. Second, driven by an apology for technological investment, the narrative manages to remain optimistic in face of the inevitable evolution towards a general state of technological and agricultural colonialism, as, particularly, the last book in Dunno's trilogy conveys. Thereby, the trilogy takes the classical anarcho-leftist stance that sees a liberating potential in technology as long as there is a self-defined communal organisation and leadership expressed as brotherly guidance. The author acknowledges that in itself government causes serious social problems, particularly that, in the context of capitalism and technology, leadership and representation become integral components of the system of oppression. However, since there might not be a choice, as the underlying evolutionary narrative posits, then a communist government, although problematic due to its totalitarian potential – for it needs to control the crime that it creates in the first place and to exploit “resources” – is still a preferable option to the devastating capitalist state. In this way, the trilogy projects reconciliation with the state as an inevitable evil that can be remedied if a society chooses to follow the principles of compassion, moderation, and cooperation. For, only informed and caring leadership is capable of channelling the purpose of the machine into the organisation of complex infrastructures that become the vehicle for an egalitarian distribution of resources, thereby freeing time in a communally organised manner by replacing human servants with artificial machines. What the narrative leaves unsaid is the impossibility of an egalitarian distribution of resources when the point of departure is a world that needs the machine – i.e. someone whose purpose or existence is to serve – and which, because of this dependence on artificial limbs and servitude, becomes necessarily divided into resources and agents. Political representation becomes unavoidable in this

scenario and hence symbolism and alienation – the very enemies of empathy, intelligence, diversity, and cooperation – acquire a decisive place in the ontological conception of living beings.

In this regard, even though Dunno's trilogy raises many critical questions that challenge the civilised norms, it still projects the same Darwinist plot as the one underlying the Christian monarchist structure of the 100 Aker Wood, in which the omission of technological gadgets themselves does not detract from the “mechanical” nature of the characters in Christopher Robin's world, and who constitute the prostheses of the human child's possibilities. In this sense, the characters with their propensity for greed, literacy, envy, and sterility resemble Haraway's metaphoric cyborgs, for they are the mutants that provide the power for Christopher Robin's self-realisation; they are the limbs that re-enact a domesticated and therefore impotent will that can realise itself only through the abstract re-enactment of the imaginary, the unreal, and the untrue. In this regard, the underlying understanding of genesis here is utterly civilised: the toys from their inception have been created for the purpose of serving the human, for being named and dominated by him. The narrative transmits the Darwinian doom of evolution towards the ultimate cyborg and domestication in the inevitability of the real life boy, Christopher Robin, abandoning this world and transferring to boarding school, a place where he will be locked up and taught how to participate in the narrative of dependencies and machines in real life, while the story of this world, in which he was an empowered agent, must end with his integration into the humanist order.

Unlike the sterile world of Pooh and in spite of the nature of language, literacy, literature and narratives, there still exist uncompromising tales of wilderness. My third example of how a children's book is capable of offering wild narratives explores various ways of handling civilisation and of remaining free in a wild world. The moominbooks examine co-existence and ways of dealing with the pedantic and ignorant figures of authority (the hemulens). Ignoring them and rebellion against civilisation are some of the tactics explored here. Typically under the civilised circumstances, such uncompromising books are a minority in the world of literacy and, in spite of their overt critique of racism, speciesism, institutions, and oppression, are still capable of being tamed and disarmed by

the mere fact that if they remain solely in the realm of “identification” and “entertainment” without rewilding the civilised subjects, prompting them to make specific choices with regards to their actions. In this context, the personal life choices of the author reflect the meaning of the narrative and shed light on the extent of its feasibility as viable options in the real world. Here, as my interdisciplinary analysis has revealed, wilderness is still a feasible way of life and Tove Jansson's personal experiences and life choices – ranging from her bohemian lifestyle, through a life-time with a lesbian partner, to travel and years spent on an island – are not the exception in the history of the world, rather, are part of its intricately rich past and an intense future filled with infinite possibilities that the diversity of wilderness avails.

An important feature of wild narratives is that they include everything, but without a standardising grammar for the outcome in favour of humans. Hence, they too can play with representation, but it is usually in the context of the trickster who misleads, and as examined in part II of my work on aboriginal ontologies, tricksters too have a place in wilderness, where cosmic justice is ensured by the rotation of chances and where order leads to stagnation, suffering and death. Because the moomins have no representatives and no substitution, there is no order, only chaos. Everyone lives how she sees fit and is free to pursue her own desires and dreams whenever and wherever. Moominpappa learns this as soon as he grows up and takes off to wander the earth in search of community. When together with his travel companions he comes ashore a kingdom, he discovers that the Autocrat is the biggest joker and the traps and tricks he sets work only on those who fall for them and who accept his walls, borders, and limitations. As the Mymble's daughter explains (discussed in part I), these enclosures are associated with language and literacy and they work only for those who believe in them and who know them as barriers, otherwise, they are good for having picnics and playing pranks. The same applies to children and pedagogy. In wilderness, children are not limited by their parents, but by their own needs for proximity, protection, and care. When they decide that they are ready to venture further from parents and home, with all the relationships that constitute one's feeling of belonging, in order to build their own relationships and acquire knowledge and skills, their parents help them prepare for the journey and they know that they have always a home to return to, where they might bring along new members to integrate into the

family.

Race, or the superficial difference of colour, is another issue that has no meaning here aside from what flowers and colours one could experiment with decorating one's hair. In *Comet in Moominland*, Moomintroll finds out from Snufkin that there are creatures exactly like the trolls, called the snorks, who are not only of different colour, but they change their colour according to mood. It must be so beautiful, thought Moomintroll, and when he meets the colourful Snork Maiden, he finds himself intimately attracted to her. Gender roles too here are constantly subverted. As the Snork Maiden likes “girly” stuff, such as putting flowers on her hair and admiring herself in the mirror, it does not prevent her from being capable of saving Moomintroll from a sea monster with her mirror in the same way as he had saved her previously from a carnivorous bush. The Hemulen usually wears his aunt's dress, which proves handy for Moomintroll and travel companions when it served as a parachute saving them from the apocalyptic wind brought by the comet. All they had to do was grab the edges of their new friend's dress and the wind carried them home.

The moominbooks offer a wild array of the possibilities of choices. Like Jansson's compatriot Nordlund, the moominbook characters recycle and build their own tools, but they never become dependent on them as they always have the option to move away, to subsist by gathering and roaming. They are entangled in a variety of relationships; but whenever these relationships lose the aspect of mutuality, turning into claustrophobic dependencies, the characters leave, then return, and nothing, but an immense cosmic harmony can contain or inform their trajectories. Therefore, in the world of moomin-wilderness there is simply no room for machines, with the exception of self-made tools and experimental devices like the ones that Moominpappa makes in his solitude at Sea or during the period of his life described in his Memoirs. The hemulens, the figures who try to control and threaten with authority and order, are powerless before the sheer will of the rest of the characters to refuse to abide by these nags' whims and when necessary, as Snufkin demonstrates, flee their prisons and burn their walls. It is such resistance that saves moomonwilderness and like real-life wilderness, the moominworld too contains in it everything: there is fear and misery that freeze the world around the Groke, authority

figures demand submission, threatening to incarcerate the disobedient, it has madness, sorrow, loneliness, and death, but at the same time, there are the expanses of dimensions beyond this world and possibilities of knowledge beyond one's fear, the attempts to oppress breed comradeship and togetherness, and just as winter wakes up to spring, so does death bring rebirth for those who care for life and love the world.

...

In this way, the three children's books, A.A. Milne's *Winnie-the-Pooh*, Nikolai Nosov's trilogy on *The Adventures of Dunno and Friends*, and Tove Jansson's *The Moominbooks*, that I have chosen for this study present three different paradigms for social relations and cultural systems, issuing radically different socio-environmental and political “fictional realities”. Each of these fantasy worlds has its own impact on the living world. In carrying out this research, one of my goals was to bridge the gap between science and literature so as to examine the interconnectedness of fiction and reality as a two-way road. Another aim was to engage these narratives in a dialogue with each other as I traced their expression in the various disciplines and books written for both children and adults as well as the manifestation of fictional narratives in real life.

The hardest aspect of this work has been my attempt to reconcile with the occasional despair brought by the overwhelming statistical data and the anthropological meaning that arises from having a fictional narrative (the myths and mis-representations of scientific and political plots) replace wilderness and life itself as well as coming to grips with the overwhelming role that fictional narratives play in our lives. In this regard, it no longer matters whether the replacement of life by a civilised plot is intentional or whether it is the work of a self-replicating meme and *doxa* that have gone rampant and out of hand, because fiction and narrative have come to manipulate and domesticate human and animal persons whatever their role or socio-economic background in this hierarchy may be, compelling the individual bodies that comprise the civilised institutions to behave specifically in the interest of civilisation, using tools such as human language, abstract thought, machines, and literature. In this way, not only do the narratives project specific values and provide idealised and admonitory tales, but they also reconfirm the ideology, the *habitus*, the *body hexis*, and the *doxa* by eliciting the reader's identification with the

desires, suffering, and trajectories of the depicted characters, while overwriting the nightmarish lives of the billions of human and animal people entrapped in the lower echelons of this hierarchy. The civilising mechanism works smoothly when personal desires tune in to the domesticated ideology and remain in accord with its narrative. This illusion of happiness, or satisfaction, breeds the ultimate doom and despair, since the narrative imposes a structure that a priori dismisses the emotions as “deviant” or “invalid” and thereby precludes the very understanding of why the depressed or psychotic person feels miserable or rebellious. Today such people get antidepressants and anti-psychotic medication to align their feelings with the civilised myth.

At the same time, the realisation that it is not the “genetic” heritage that writes our narratives, that memes and *habitus* can be re-imagined, rewritten and re-inscribed into chaos is liberating, is liberating, because we now know that we do not have to be hostages of any decision that our ancestors may have taken 17 000 years or even further back, 30 000 years ago when they first tasted flesh, devised language and art, and moved out of Africa to conquer the world. Real agency and freedom reside in the passion that strives to bring down these walls of civilisation that, through a narrative that imposes rigidity and the doom of permanence, misleads us by promising comfort, safety and pills in exchange of our wilderness, chaos, and life. As the moomintrolls show us, freedom, movement, happiness and life dwell in the cracks. They inhabit the dimensions of technological inefficiency and, most important, in the community of all forms of deviance. To regain our community with life, we must accept the risk of danger, suffering, and madness both as resistance to the civilised plot implicit in one's refusal to internalise the prescribed place with its social value and as the natural experience of chaos. Accounts of wilderness tell us that even when civilisation terms disruptions in individual or group participation in its narrative as “illness” and “disability” – whether “mental”, “physical” or other, including the various forms of rebellion and “social deviance” – we can still subvert civilisation's attempt to differentiate between the groups and to uniformise their individuals. By embracing the idiosyncrasies of each while admitting the shared common essence of all we can regain the forest. With this ability to remember our past we can recover the sentience and empathy lost and re-imagine a wild future. Roaming in this wilderness, we can come to share new stories by living them instead of having one story live our dreams.

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