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Article

***151 Regulatory History Material** as an Extrinsic Aid to Interpretation: An Empirical Study on the Use of RIAS by the Federal Court of Canada [\[FNd1\]](#)

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*Since 1986, the Canadian Public Administration is required to analyze the socio-economic impact of new **regulatory** requirements or **regulatory** changes. To report on its analysis, a **Regulatory Impact Analysis Statement (RIAS)** is produced and published in the *Canada Gazette* with the proposed regulation to which it pertains for notice to, and comments by, interested parties. After the allocated time for comments has elapsed, the regulation is adopted with a final version of the RIAS. Both documents are again published in the *Canada Gazette*. As a result, the RIAS acquires the status of an official public document of the Government of Canada and its content can be argued in courts as an extrinsic aid to the interpretation of a regulation. In this paper, an analysis of empirical findings on the uses of this interpretative tool by the Federal Court of Canada is made. A sample of decisions classified as unorthodox show that judges are making determinations on the basis of two distinct sets of arguments built from the information found in a RIAS and which the author calls "technocratic" and "democratic". The author argues that these uses raise the general question of "What makes law possible in our contemporary legal systems"? for they underline enduring legal problems pertaining to the knowledge and the acceptance of the law by the governed. She concludes that this new interpretive trend of making technocratic and democratic uses of a RIAS in case law should be monitored closely as it may signal a greater change than foreseen, and perhaps an unwanted one, regarding the relationship between the government and the judiciary.*

***152 1. INTRODUCTION**

In 1986, the Canadian Federal Government approved a **regulatory** policy requiring departments and agencies to analyze the socio-economic impact of any new **regulatory** requirements or **regulatory** changes. [\[FN1\]](#) From then to now, a **Regulatory Impact Analysis Statement (RIAS)** accompanies a draft regulation and both documents are published in Part I of the *Canada Gazette* for notice to, and comments by, interested parties. After the allocated time for comments has elapsed, the regulation is adopted with a final version of the RIAS. Both documents are then published in Part II of the *Canada Gazette*. As a result, the RIAS acquires the status of an official public document of the Government of Canada and its ***153** content can be argued in courts as an extrinsic aid to the interpretation of a regulation.

In this paper, I propose an analysis of empirical findings on the uses of this interpretative tool by the Federal Court of Canada. It is important to report on this new legal phenomenon for two reasons. First, common law judges (as opposed to civil law judges) have shown restraint in using this type of **material** as an extrinsic aid to interpretation of statutes and regulations. Stringent limits on the weight given to legislative **history material** (in this instance, **regulatory history material**) in the interpretive process are imposed on judges. Indeed, if they were to grant decisive authority to this type of **material**, it would interfere with their exclusive constitutional function as final legitimate interpreters of the law. However, an analysis of Federal Court cases in which a RIAS is used as an extrinsic aid to interpretation shows greater deference to the views expressed by the **regulatory** authority in a RIAS than to any other type of legislative **history material**. This unorthodox use of a RIAS brings me to the second reason for writing this paper.

A sample of decisions classified as unorthodox show that judges are making determinations on the basis of two distinct sets of arguments built from the information found in a RIAS and which I call "technocratic" and "democratic". These uses raise the general question of "What makes law possible in our contemporary legal system"? for they underline enduring legal problems pertaining to the knowledge and the acceptance of the law by the governed. These issues will be succinctly addressed in the second part of this paper. But first, I will provide general background information on the RIAS and its rationale in the age of **regulatory** reforms.

2. THE RULE-MAKING PROCESS IN THE AGE OF REGULATORY REFORMS

The obligation to measure the impact of a proposed regulation was one of the important tools created to address the economic crisis perceived to be directly linked to the **regulatory** state. During the decade of the 1980s, the Government of Canada, following the United States, reaffirmed the superiority of the market economy to efficiently allocate resources. The government was committed to ensure that its **regulatory** powers would be used only when they would result in a socio-economic benefit to the population.

The content of a RIAS derives mainly from a functional perspective as well as a utilitarian analytical framework. It requires a **regulatory** authority to demonstrate that a problem exists which can be best addressed **154* through the implementation of a new regulation. Before making a final determination on the choice of the instrument, the **regulatory** authority must provide a socio-economic analysis of the impact of adding a new **regulatory** requirement or changing an existing one. Finally, it must examine the impact of the new measures and balance its benefits against its costs. It is only when the **regulatory** authority can convince the government that the proposed regulation will result in the greatest net benefit to Canadian society that it will be approved by the Governor-in-Council. But before this final approval, the **regulatory** authority must submit its analysis to public scrutiny. This is when the requirement for a **regulatory** authority to seek comments from the public comes into play.

From this account, two distinct purposes of a RIAS emerge. It is first and foremost a justificatory tool; second, a consultative tool. This choice of ends is coherent with two important tenets of the new **regulatory** model which aims to produce "better", [FN2] "quality" [FN3] or "smart" [FN4] regulations implemented in OECD and APEC countries. It is also coherent with the content of a RIAS.

(a) Two Tenets of the New Regulatory Model

Although many criticisms were identified on the negative impact that **regulatory** programs had on the economy (in particular, their high costs and their inefficiency), the necessity of regulation as an instrument **155* of state intervention was not at issue for long in Canada. [FN5] Indeed, the deregulation project was quickly replaced by a questioning of the quality of **regulatory** programs and **regulatory** management. As

Milhar writes, "deregulation concentrates on the *quantity* of regulation, **regulatory** reform emphasizes the *quality* of regulation. **Regulatory** management is said to take a long-run view of regulation as a policy tool within the state". [\[FN6\]](#)

However, despite these early government attempts to reform **regulatory** programs, they were still criticized for being poorly designed. One of the causes often cited to support this criticism was the internal operations of the bureaucracy itself. For example, the public administration would copy one **regulatory** system on top of another, without addressing the particular needs of the social and economic systems which the regulations would be applied. The perception was that it was acting only for reasons of administrative efficiency while the interests of the public were secondary. [\[FN7\]](#)

These criticisms, among others, had profound impacts on political science and management of the public administration theories. Lately in Canada, the goal of reforming the **regulatory** state crystallized with the implementation of the concept of "smart regulation". The general goal is to ensure that Canada uses its **regulatory** system to "generate greater environmental and social benefits while enhancing the conditions for a competitive and innovative economy" to ensure a "comparative advantage *156 in attracting investments and skilled workers." [\[FN8\]](#) For the success of this new **regulatory** model, "accountability" and "transparency" represent leading principles and they buttress the integration of the RIAS into the rule-making process. [\[FN9\]](#)

(i) Accountability

Enhancing accountability of **regulatory** authorities was viewed as central for successful **regulatory** reforms. In particular, **regulatory** authorities needed to broaden their views on the complexity of the problems they encountered. Indeed, they could no longer reduce problems to their simplest expression in order to be able to apply their own rules and procedures or to inform themselves by exclusively resorting to formal exigencies of administrative law. For example, the public administration was criticized for taking decisions to regulate solely on the basis of statutory powers granted by Parliament and for relying too heavily on case law to determine the wording of a regulation. To address these perceived shortcomings, it was proposed that the bureaucracy take into account parameters other than those which would either serve to maximize their budgets or adhere to their specific competencies when devising **regulatory** programs. [\[FN10\]](#)

These bureaucratic failures were understood as a direct consequence of the lack of constraints placed on departments and agencies to justify **regulatory** initiatives from a social and economic perspective. This lack of accountability of **regulatory** authorities was notably addressed through the obligation to produce a RIAS: **regulatory** authorities had to justify their decision to regulate by showing that a problem exists and that the best solution to solve it is to adopt a regulation because the net benefits for the population are greater than their inconvenience. [\[FN11\]](#)

**157 (ii) Transparency*

Promoting transparency was another key issue in the betterment of regulations. Consultation with the stakeholders and the general public aims at achieving two goals. The first goal is to ensure that the **regulatory** authority did not misunderstand the problem; the second is to ensure greater voluntary compliance with the new **regulatory** requirement. It is believed that by submitting its **regulatory** policies to economic and social actors the regulator enriched, not impoverished, its process. Since a **regulatory** authority is expected to know the cause of a problem and the best cure, why not submit its views for scrutiny to those who are affected by its proposed regulations? On the one hand, if affected parties disagree with the government, perhaps their comments may bring the **regulatory** authority to partially or entirely rethink its approach. Even if such comments are not accepted, their existence will give a clear signal to the **regulatory** authority that further persuasion is needed before it can adopt its regulation and achieve a measure of voluntary compliance. On the other hand, if affected parties agree with a

proposed regulation, chances are that voluntary compliance with the new requirement will be high. The theory behind these assumptions is that the binding force of the law comes from the acceptance of the rule by those who are subjected to it. [\[FN12\]](#)

The consultation mechanism put into place by the Canadian Government is a two-step process. First, the **regulatory** authority consults its stakeholders at the stage of elaborating its **regulatory** policy. This is an informal procedure and the only record available is the short summary that one finds in the first version of the RIAS. Once the Government decides to go ahead with a regulation, a second round of consultations occurs. It is at this stage that a RIAS is pre-published with the proposed regulation in Part 1 of the *Canada Gazette*. During this formal consultation process, the stakeholders and the general public are invited to submit their comments. At the end of the consultation period (which varies but does not appear to be less than 30 days), comments are analyzed and may be used to modify the draft regulation. After the regulations are approved by the Governor-in-Council, they are published in Part II of *Canada Gazette* with a final version of the RIAS integrating a summary of this second round of consultations. But what precisely is the content of a RIAS?

***158 (b) The Regulatory Impact Analysis Statement (RIAS)**

In Canada, the obligation to produce impact studies on regulations began to arise at the end of the 1970s. [\[FN13\]](#) It was after the first oil shock and the subsequent inflationary crisis that the Canadian Government took a decision to re-examine the role of the State in the Canadian economy. In 1976, the Federal Government announced its intention to profoundly revise the role it played in Canadian economic development, specifically with regard to micro-economic management. During this period, it declared its intention to halt the growth of government spending and to curtail growth in the public service. Projects to establish this new political orientation were announced such as, amongst others, the Federal Cabinet according a mandate to the Ministry of Consumer and Corporate Affairs and the Treasury Board for a study on the feasibility of the use of cost-benefit analyses and related methods to scrutinize the socio-economic benefits of **regulatory** changes.

In 1977, the Ministry and the Treasury Board tabled their Report. They recommended that the Government should start to “evaluate in the proper manner proposed regulation” to better guarantee that the cost, in terms of market efficiency, was on a net basis inferior “in relation to the practical advantages” of the regulation in question. This recommendation was followed up by Cabinet. In 1978, it adopted the first policy requiring the public administration to produce a **regulatory** impact statement with proposed regulations. [\[FN14\]](#) Although this policy has changed over time, the content of a RIAS has remained largely the same.

(i) Development of the RIAS policy

On the 14th of April, 1977, the President of the Treasury Board and the Minister of Consumer and Corporate Affairs announced the adoption of a pilot project in a policy relating to the production of a socioeconomic analysis of the impacts of a regulation. On the 1st of August, 1978, this policy came into force. However, its effects were limited to 13 departments and the socio-economic impact analysis had to be conducted for any new and important regulations affecting health, safety and environmental ***159** protection. [\[FN15\]](#) In 1986, the *1978 Policy* was replaced by a more formal policy concerning Government regulation making it mandatory to provide a socio-economic impact analysis with every draft regulation produced by all Government departments, as well as including a summary of that analysis. This summary became an annex with every draft regulation which was presented to Cabinet for approval. In this 1986 **Regulatory** Policy, the summary took on an actual name: **Regulatory** Impact Analysis Summary (RIAS).

Subsequent modifications to the **Regulatory** Policy (1992, 1995 and 1999) have been implemented to tighten up the details regarding the production of the RIAS by the

creation of diverse mechanisms of surveillance and control. The most important of these mechanisms is set out in *Regulatory Process Management Standards* which can be found in Appendix B of the **Regulatory** Policy.

These administrative norms require all Federal **regulatory** authorities “to develop and maintain a system to manage the **regulatory** process that meets the standards”, and to “document clearly how they are met” for each proposal to create or amend regulations. [FN16] As a result, it became clearly mandatory for **regulatory** authorities to show, when proposing new **regulatory** requirements or **regulatory** changes, “that a problem has arisen, that government intervention is required and that new **regulatory** requirements are necessary”. [FN17] It also became clear that consultation [FN18] at the stage of the pre-publication of the draft regulations were now part of the rule-making process: “Notice of proposed regulations and *160 amendments must be given so that there is time to make changes and to take comments from consultees (*sic*) into account.” [FN19]

From a pilot project launched in 1978, the RIAS today is completely integrated into the **regulatory** process. Any **regulatory** authority has to produce this document in relation to any draft regulation. Without the RIAS, the draft will simply not be presented to Cabinet for approval.

(ii) Information contained in a RIAS

Since its first appearance on the Canadian Federal **regulatory** scene, the basic content of the impact analysis statement has not changed significantly. [FN20] However, the Privy Office Council issued a guideline in 1992 describing the content of a RIAS. The *RIAS Writer's Guide* [FN21] was *161 central to the achievement of greater uniformity in the drafting of impact analysis statements throughout the Federal Public Administration.

The *RIAS Writer's Guide* states that a RIAS must be divided into six sections. The first section is called “Description”. It must include a definition of the problem, how the regulation will solve the problem, an account of how the regulation impinges on the persons affected by it and an explanation as to why it was necessary to take such action.

Section 2 is called “Alternatives”. Here, the **regulatory** authority must show that it explored other means of fixing the problem, rather than simply taking for granted that a regulation is the only adequate instrument at hand. Other possible instruments are, for example, voluntary standards, tax credits, insurance, user fees and marketable property rights. [FN22]

Section 3 is called “Benefits and Costs”. The **regulatory** authority must design regulation in such a way that it will maximize the gains to beneficiaries in relation to the cost to Canadian Governments, businesses and individuals. [FN23] More precisely, the **regulatory** authority must take steps to minimize the **regulatory** burden on the population and to ensure that **regulatory** programs impede as little as possible Canada's ability to compete internationally. To achieve this goal, a **regulatory** authority estimates qualitative as well as quantitative impacts (when possible) of the proposed regulation on inflation, employment, distribution of income, international trade and operating costs on the government. [FN24]

Section 4 is called “Consultation”. The **regulatory** authority must describe who was consulted and the mechanisms that were used to conduct consultations. It must also include a discussion on the results of the *162 consultation and the name of any group still opposed to the regulation. This section of the RIAS is revised after the notice and comment procedure is completed. The **regulatory** authority must state if comments received have led to a modification of the proposed regulation and, if not, the authority must explain the reasons why it chose not to change it. [FN25]

Section 5 is called “Compliance and Enforcement”. When relevant to a particular regulation, this section articulates the compliance and enforcement tools created, describes the means to detect, and the penalties for, non-compliance. [FN26]

Finally, Section 6 is called "Contact Person" and provides the name, address and telephone number of the person who can answer requests for information after the publication of the RIAS.

In support of the argument made in this article, it is important to remember the following points about the types of information found contained in a RIAS. This information intends:

1. to persuade potential readers that the regulation conforms to government policy;
2. to provide to those who might like to participate in the rule-making process relevant background information to evaluate by **163* themselves whether the regulation will achieve its intended goals and;
3. to inform the public of the results of the consultations.

In sum, these justificatory and consultative functions of a RIAS were designed to meet the principles of accountability and transparency which have been required by government since the second half of the last century. Although the RIAS was crafted to enhance the integration of these two principles into the daily operations of the bureaucracy, it quickly lost its original administrative vocation and has become an official public document of the Canadian Government. Since then, it assumed added legal value and lawyers started to argue its content in the Federal Court when an interpretative issue regarding a regulation was at stake. Today, there is growing use of this document in Federal Court decisions: Judges use RIAS as an extrinsic aid to interpretation.

3. THE USE OF RIAS BY THE FEDERAL COURT OF CANADA

From 1988 to 2005, 128 decisions of the Federal Court (Trial and Appeal Divisions) referred to a RIAS. [\[FN27\]](#) Although at first glance these numbers may appear low, they are not when compared to the use of other types of legislative **history material** during the same period. Indeed, the RIAS is now used by the Federal Court as often as *Hansard* (in existence for over 100 years) which provides a transcription of the House of Common Debates. [\[FN28\]](#) It is even more interesting to note that when the period is narrowed to 1998-2005, [\[FN29\]](#) the RIAS is cited almost twice as much (85 decisions) as *Hansard* (49 decisions). Of course, numbers are only one of the variables for consideration in relation to complex phenomena such as the construction of statutes and regulations. However, these numbers indicate, at the very least, a rapid adoption rate of a relatively new source of information. Judges now rely on RIAS to interpret a regulation because they perceive a RIAS as persuasive and legitimate.

For a better understanding of this phenomenon, it is necessary to classify the cases. In order to distinguish between relevant and irrelevant **164* decisions, cases were first divided into two categories: descriptive and normative. A descriptive use of a RIAS means that the information does not influence judges in their interpretative tasks. Very often, a RIAS is cited at the beginning of a judgment to provide background information to either explain the functioning and the effect of a legal scheme or to simply give some contextual information regarding the regulation that is about to be analyzed. [\[FN30\]](#) The descriptive use of a RIAS is found in 36 **165* decisions representing 28% of cases. [\[FN31\]](#) A descriptive use of a RIAS in a **166* judgment is not contentious in legal theory regarding the construction of statutes and regulations. For this reason, these 36 decisions were considered irrelevant and set aside.

The remaining 92 decisions (representing 72 percent of cases) display a normative use of a RIAS. A normative use means that the information contained in a RIAS implicitly or explicitly influenced the judge in her interpretative task. The influence is implicit when, for example, the information contained in a RIAS was argued by one party, but was not referred to by the judge in her reasoning. [\[FN32\]](#) This implicit category, also called "normative in a weak sense", comprises 16 decisions (13% of cases). [\[FN33\]](#) They are also excluded from the sample of decisions which will **167* be used for the analysis in the following section because it is not possible to determine if any weight was given to the RIAS by the judge. This reduces the total number of cases used in this sample to 76 out of 128 (60% of cases). This sample forms a category that I call "normative in a

strong sense”, because the influence of the RIAS is explicit on the interpretative reasoning of judges. They clearly use a RIAS as an extrinsic aid to construct their interpretation of a regulation.

(a) Using RIAS as an Extrinsic Aid to Interpretation

The term “extrinsic aid” refers to all **materials** which form part of the context of legislation or a regulation. This kind of **material** is distinguished from “intrinsic aid” to interpretation of a legal text, such as case law. As Sullivan states in the third edition of *Driedger on the Construction of Statutes*: “in modern interpretive practice, courts have become accustomed to considering legislation in a broad context.” [FN34] However, until recently, the official judicial discourse held that not all extrinsic ***168 materials** could be utilized as legitimate aids to interpretation. Only foreign case law, international conventions, commission reports and scholarly publications could be used. Legislative **history material**, in which a RIAS belongs, was not admissible to assist interpretation [FN35] but Sullivan wrote in 1994 that “the exclusionary rule has been eroding at a rapid rate”, notably in the field of constitutional interpretation. [FN36] She also noted that the exclusionary rule was relaxed in statutory interpretation cases, “but in a haphazard manner and to an uncertain degree” and concluded that the case law on the use of legislative **history material** was unsatisfactory. [FN37]

Since the publication of the third edition of *Driedger on the Construction of Statutes*, the Supreme Court has solved this issue in a series of four cases decided between 1997 and 1999. [FN38] In these decisions, ***169** the Supreme Court showed that it had resolutely embarked on the path of authorizing legislative **history material** as an extrinsic aid to statutory interpretation. The Court stated that this type of **material** is admissible to interpret statutes and regulations without any restrictions as long as the information contained in it was clear. However, the Court added that judges have to use this **material** with caution, which means that the **material** can only be used as a complement to interpretation. Therefore, judges can use the information included in a RIAS to confirm an interpretation already reached through the usual methods of interpretation, calling for an analysis of information provided by sources intrinsic to the legal system (analysis of the text of the regulation taking into consideration the context of the **regulatory** and statutory scheme as well as case law). Subsequently, extrinsic information, such as a RIAS, can be used to provide an additional argument to support an interpretation, but it should not be understood as indispensable to the task of interpretation. In sum, a RIAS has to be viewed as a useful source of information, not as an authoritative one. It cannot be the only source of information upon which a judge constructs the meaning of a regulation. [FN39]

Based on the application of these principles, it was possible to come to a more refined analysis of the decisions forming the “normative in a strong sense” (NSS) category of cases. I further divided the cases into two additional categories: orthodox and unorthodox. Of the 76 decisions, there are 45 (59% NSS; 35% of all cases) in which judges make an orthodox (correct) use of a RIAS. It is only after a judge had reached an interpretation through the intrinsic methods of interpretation that she reinforced it with the information contained in a RIAS. [FN40] In these decisions, ***170** a RIAS is treated as only one relevant source of information that is ***171** helpful--but not decisive - to resolve the interpretative issue.

***172** The remaining 31 decisions (40% NSS; 24% of all cases) do not fit squarely within the parameters set by the Supreme Court on the use of legislative **history material** as an extrinsic aid to interpretation. In this ***173** sense, these decisions constitute an unorthodox use of a RIAS. This category is further sub-divided into two categories: technocratic and democratic.

(i) Technocratic use

Twenty-two decisions (32% NSS; 19% of all cases) fall into the category of a “technocratic” use of a RIAS. It is called technocratic because judges rely on the expertise of the Public Administration to provide them with reliable information to resolve the interpretative issue put before them. The information referred to in these cases can be found in either Section 1 (Description), Section 2 (alternatives), or Section 3 (Benefits and Costs) of the RIAS.

Here is an example of a RIAS produced to accompany the new live-in caregivers provisions in the *Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations*. [\[FN41\]](#) Despite its length, it gives a good idea of the kind of information found in these three sections of a RIAS.

Description

The Live-in Caregiver Program brings qualified caregivers to Canada to respond to employer needs in situations where there are no Canadians or Canadian permanent residents to fill the available positions. Live-in caregivers who qualify for the program are allowed to apply for permanent residence in Canada after completion of a minimum of two years employment, within a three-year period, as a live-in employee in a private household providing child care, senior home support or care of the disabled.

Purpose of these provisions

(...) The intent of the new provisions is to get the fairest working arrangement possible for both the employer and the caregiver while ensuring that both parties understand what is expected of them.

What the regulations do

The regulations relating to live-in caregivers prescribe the criteria for eligibility to apply under the Live-in Caregiver Program; these requirements are held over from the Immigration Regulations, 1978.

The Regulations specify:

- the criteria which must be met by person applying under the Program;
- what is expected of the employee and employer;
- what is required of the employee to change employers; and
- *174** - the process by which the live-in caregiver might apply for permanent residence.

What has changed

New **regulatory** provisions specify that live-in caregivers:

- must enter into a contract with their employer which sets out the terms and conditions of the employment; and
- may change employers after they have presented their validated jobs offer to an officer and have received a work permit naming the new employer.

Alternatives

The objective of setting out the relationship in a contract is to get the fairest working arrangement possible for both the employer and the caregiver while ensuring that both parties understand what is expected of them. Leaving this exercise to the discretion of the employee and employer is likely to result in the inconsistent application of this important process. Incorporating the provision that live-in caregivers can change employers in regulation, rather than applied as an administrative policy, reinforces this right of caregivers.

Benefits and Costs

Benefits

A contract indicates what the employer expects of the caregiver and will reinforce the employer's legal responsibilities to the caregiver. As well, such a contract can help the

employer to easily bring to the attention of the employee his or her employment responsibilities.

The live-in caregiver regulations take into consideration the unique circumstances and potential vulnerability of live-in caregivers, the majority of whom are women. Requiring that there be a written contract between the employee and employer, will give the employee a readily available reference should there be a need to use this in support of defining the parameters of the job duties, hours of employment, salary, benefits or other terms of the employment.

Costs

There will continue to be a processing fee incurred by the employee when changing employers.

In this category of cases, judges go beyond what is permitted by case law for they have used a RIAS as the only source of information to either determine the purpose [FN42] or the meaning of a regulation [FN43] - including *175 if a regulation is *ultra vires* of its parent law [FN44]- or if it meets the conditions in interlocutory proceedings. [FN45] For example in *176 *Jiang v. Canada (Minister *176 of Citizenship & Immigration)*), [FN46] McKeown J. had to determine whether an immigrant needed to "delay" or "actively delay" the execution of an exclusion or deportation order before he could be excluded from a particular immigration program (the Deferred Removals Order Class program also known as DROC). The wording of the regulation simply referred to an immigrant who had not "hindered or delayed" the execution of the order. The text of the regulation was silent on the question whether proof of "active delaying" was necessary. McKeown J. did not proceed with an intrinsic legal analysis based on the text and the whole **regulatory** and statutory context of the DROC program nor did he refer to case law or make any comment regarding relevant or irrelevant case law. Instead, McKeown J. relied exclusively on the information contained in the RIAS to find that immigrants had to actively delay the execution of an exclusion or deportation order before they could be excluded from the program. Even if McKeown J. clearly stated that he was not bound by the information found in the RIAS, he treated this evidence as determinative of the interpretative issue.

Of course, one may argue that judges will use such extrinsic **material** to resolve an ambiguity because there is no way of resolving it within the regular interpretive framework. While this argument is acceptable on its face, it is my contention that judges should explicitly demonstrate in their reasons that neither the legislative and **regulatory** legal frameworks, nor case law (because decisions are either non-existent or irrelevant), can help to resolve the issue. Indeed, it is important that judges make this statement clearly for in its absence, the legality of the decision would be highly questionable if indeed the issue could have been resolved with a reasonable effort to construct the statute and regulations as a whole or with case law addressing the interpretative issue.

In *Yu v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration)*, the Court stated that the RIAS expressed a Departmental policy. [FN47] Yu was a citizen of Taiwan. In 1990, his father applied for permanent residency under the entrepreneur class and included Yu in his application. His father's application was approved and the family was given landed immigrant status. However, Yu, who was 16-years-old at the time, was unable to obtain a Taiwanese passport due to the government's policy not to issue passports to people 16-years of age or over who had not yet undergone mandatory military service and so, he remained in Taiwan. By *177 the time his military service was completed, his visa had expired and he then re-applied, requesting that his application be considered on humanitarian grounds. His application was denied. The visa officer found that the application did not show humanitarian and compassionate grounds. The interesting point in this decision is that Richard J. was of the opinion that the RIAS dated in 1992 stated the Immigration Department's policy permitting a finding of dependency where a minor had to undertake military service prior to joining his family in Canada and presumed that it was indeed a policy of the Department because the statement in the RIAS "was repeated in an immigration policy dated February 1st, 1994."

Finally, in two other decisions, the question at stake was not about a substantive interpretation of a regulation, but procedural. The question concerned when the regulation was made public and the information contained in a RIAS was used to determine this question. [FN48] Although this type of case is interesting, it will not be discussed because it raises fairness issues rather than interpretive questions.

**178 (ii) Democratic use*

Nine decisions (12% NSS; 7% of all cases) fall into the category of a “democratic use” of a RIAS. For a better understanding of the argument raised by these cases, it is important to remember that a key reason a Department or Agency is required to produce a RIAS is for consultation with the public. As has been said, a RIAS is pre-published in Part I of the *Canada Gazette* with the proposed regulations for a minimum period of 30 days. During this time, stakeholders and members of the general public can forward their comments to the **Regulatory** authority. Once the consultation period is closed, the comments are then analyzed by the relevant authority who can then decide to modify (or not) the proposed regulations in accordance with the comments received. The decisions taken are thereafter summarized in the final RIAS which is published with the approved regulation in Part II of the *Canada Gazette*.

Here is a very brief example, pertaining to the detention and release of persons in the *Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations*, [FN49] of what one may read in a RIAS as published in Part II of the *Gazette*:

Consultation

(...) Consultations were held in July of 2000 and In August, and September of 2001. Informal consultations on detention issues have taken place throughout the legislative process. (...)

Pre-publication

Following pre-publication, comments were received from a number of organizations including: the Canadian Bar Association, the Canadian Council for Refugees and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. The Standing Committee on Citizenship and Immigration also made recommendations.

The main issues raised centred on the mandatory release; factors to consider when assessing if a person is a danger to the public; concerns relating to vulnerable groups, mainly minors, persons seeking protection and persons who have psychological and medical problems.

In response to comments made, the following changes have been made:

- The factors to consider when assessing if a person is a danger to the public have been changed to replace the expression ‘involved with an organized human smuggling or trafficking operation’ with ‘engagement in people smuggling or trafficking in persons’. This modification clarifies that the **179* intent of the Regulations is to include only people responsible for smuggling or trafficking of persons; (...)

Interested stakeholders were contacted and informed of the changes in the detention regulations. Respondents supported the changes made to the detention regulations.

In some decisions, the fact that consultation occurred in the rule-making process was used by judges as an argument to support their view on the proper interpretation of regulation, and in particular, its validity in relation to its parent law. As a result of the consultations or a lack thereof, judges assumed in these cases, although implicitly, that Canadians agreed or did not agree either to a particular interpretation of a regulation or to the general acceptability of the regulations which were adopted. [FN50]

For example, in *Abel v. Canada (Minister of Agriculture)*, the plaintiff asked for a declaration that s. 4 of the *Maximum Amounts for Destroyed Animals Regulations* made under the authority of the *Health of Animals Act* was *ultra vires* of the *Act*. Abel owned a herd of elks in Alberta that were destroyed pursuant to s. 48 of the *Act*, as it was suspected they had tuberculosis. In 1990, the *Act* required compensation to be at market

value and Abel received \$13,500 for each female and \$15,000 for each male destroyed. Throughout the early 1990s, tuberculosis continued to be a problem in elk herds in Alberta. However, when the *Act* was amended in 1991, s. 4 of the Regulations placed a cap on the amount of compensation payable, and as a consequence, Abel received only \$3,500 for each male and \$7,000 for each female elk destroyed after March 18, 1991. Abel argued that the amounts in the Regulations were to have some relationship to market value and since they did not, the quantum decided was not authorized and the section was *ultra vires*.

Campbell J. dismissed the action. He held first that a "plain reading of the words used in s. 51(2) and (3) do not admit to the interpretation placed upon them by the Plaintiffs. I find that the term "value mentioned" in s. 51(3) means only the outcome of the process of valuation exercised under s. 52(2)(a), and, thus, s. 51(3) cannot be read to import a statutory requirement to have regard to the market value of elk when determining the cap to be placed on compensation to be made available by operation of s. 4 of the Regulations." [FN51]

**180* However, the "plain meaning" interpretation of Campbell J. is not convincing because s. 52(2)(a)--(to which s. 51(3) refers explicitly)--clearly states that "the amount of compensation shall be (a) the market value, as determined by the Minister, (...)". [FN52] Therefore, it is difficult to understand Campbell J.'s interpretive finding. Perhaps Campbell J. was aware his interpretation was inconclusive and, as a result, added an additional paragraph to his reasons:

Nevertheless, on the evidence, I find that the Minister did have significant regard for the market value of elk in making the compensation determination contested in the present action. It is also clear that political and economic considerations were nevertheless properly in play in the exercise of the Minister's discretion. *These conclusions are based on the extensive description of the process, including consultation with elk owners, used to reach the compensation decision, as described in the 'Regulatory Impact Analysis Statement appended to the Regulations under consideration'* (emphasis added). [FN53]

Therefore, it is quite clear in this case that consultation had a significant impact on Campbell J.'s decision, and this is presumably for the reason that he did not want to find the regulations invalid because of the financial effect that this decision could have on the viability of the government compensation program. [FN54]

**181* In another case, *Teal Cedar Products (1977) Ltd. v. R.*, a different argument was presented to Muldoon J. to support the view that the regulation was *ultra vires*. In an injunction case, Plaintiff asked the Court for a stay to the application of a regulation in his case, while waiting for a final resolution of the issue. On the first criteria to be granted an injunction, the existence of a serious issue to be tried, he argued that contrary to s. 3(a.1) of the statute--which aims to preserve employment in Canada on which the impugned regulation is based-- the adoption of the Order C.P. 1988-288, was *ultra vires* because it had a devastating impact on employment in his business. His main argument was that the Governor-in-Council adopted this Order on the basis of misleading information concerning the object and effect of the proposed regulation as shown in the RIAS. Muldoon J. accepted the argument and further added that this misleading information was obtained as a result of a badly conducted consultation process. [FN55]

Finally, in the remaining cases, counsel argued that their clients had legitimate expectations to be consulted during the rule-making process and the failure to do so affected the validity of the regulations. [FN56] **182* However, these cases do not relate to a substantive interpretation of a regulation and will not be analyzed further in this article.

Technocratic and democratic uses of a RIAS as an extrinsic aid to interpretation raise several interesting topics for further research which will briefly be touched upon in the next section.

(b) Making Law Possible

In 1994, Sullivan stated that case law was unsatisfactory on the use of extrinsic evidence. The first reason was the “recurring discrepancy between the rules that courts purport to follow and what they actually do. Second, with some exceptions, little effort has been made by courts to address the theoretical and practical assumptions underlying these rules or to analyze the appropriate uses of extrinsic aids.” [FN57] As was shown earlier, the first problem was solved by the Supreme Court in the late 1990s. But the second issue is still largely uncharted by Canadian Courts including the Supreme Court. This section is an attempt to draw attention to some theoretical and practical issues and to explore possible avenues to resolve them.

In this vein, it is useful to note that the vast majority of cases displaying a technocratic use of a RIAS involve a problem concerning the purpose or the meaning of a regulation, while those showing a democratic use concern the validity of a regulation in relation to its parent law. It is important to keep this distinction in mind as it affects the application of two distinct legal presumptions. Searching for the meaning of the law has to do with the presumption of the “knowledge” of the law by the governed. Indeed, citizens must understand the rules and this understanding has to be stable and predictable. However, looking at the validity of a regulation in relation to its parent law is connected to the presumption of the “acceptance” of the law by the governed. In the realm of regulation, the application of this presumption raises particular problems since there is very little public participation in the rule-making process compared to the legislation-making process. Although the Government is undoubtedly trying to address this issue with the pre-publication of proposed regulation with a RIAS in Part I of the *Canada Gazette*, the content of regulations is still tightly controlled by the bureaucracy.

**183 (i) Knowledge of the law*

The presumption of knowledge of the law can be applied in multiple legal contexts, including the choice of the method of interpretation. Since “societies operate on the basis that citizens are presumed to know the law”, it follows that individuals falling within the ambit of a given legal rule “should be able to ascertain the limits of permissible conduct under it” [FN58] after a simple reading of the rule. This is one of the reasons why, up until the turn of the last century, judges preferred a literal approach to interpretation of legal rules. [FN59] This method was coherent with judges' representations of a “free and democratic society” since they were abiding by the words chosen by the freely elected representatives of the people. However, until the emergence of the Welfare State, it was understood that the main function of judges was to give effective protection to individuals' rights and freedoms. The contextual background against which a judge ascertained the meaning of a rule was relatively one-dimensional.

The implementation of the Welfare State resulted in the creation of legal schemes requiring judges to balance competing interests. The complexity of goals sought through the enactment of these new statutes rapidly showed the analytical limits of the literal method of interpretation. This method needed to be relaxed to permit judges to also consider social and economic objectives underlying modern legal schemes. At first, judges resorted to intrinsic methods of interpretation (analysis of the whole legal scheme including relevant case law) to find the intention of Parliament. However, since Parliament rarely stated its goals explicitly in a statute, judges' findings were fragile from a legal perspective as well as open to criticism from a legitimacy perspective. In order to justify a judge's reasoning, they were thereafter permitted to use extrinsic aids to support their interpretation. As a result, a balancing of the interpretation between reliance on the “text” and the “intrinsic/extrinsic contexts” became the new interpretative current.

In 1998, the Supreme Court officially adopted this “modern method to interpretation” in *Rizzo Shoes*. [FN60] Later, in **184 Bristol-Myers Squibb *184 Co. v. Canada (Attorney General)*, [FN61] majority and minority judges of the Supreme Court proposed different frameworks of analysis for the modern method of interpretation: the “successive circles of context” and the “step-by-step” approaches. Binnie J., for the majority, speaks

of an interpretation made in “successive circles of context” during which the examination of the text and the intrinsic and extrinsic context do not follow a particular order. Contrary to Binnie J., Bastarache J. followed a step-by-step analysis. This is a more structured approach since an analysis of the text of the rule is made first; second, an analysis of its intrinsic context and; third, the interpreter makes an analysis of the extrinsic context. Although more structured, Bastarache J. says that it should not be viewed as an interpretation made in a “formulaic manner”. [FN62] In both cases, a RIAS was consulted for the examination of the purpose of the regulation which was under scrutiny in the case at bar.

Understanding the rationale of using a RIAS to support an interpretation is one thing; using it as an authoritative source is quite another. At the beginning of the last century, it was generally recognized that a trial judge could not abdicate responsibility for the interpretation of legislation to a civil servant. [FN63] This tenet of non-abdication remains a principle of contemporary application in a legal system based on the doctrine of the separation of powers between the government and the judiciary. This has notably been canvassed in the principles of independence and impartiality of judges. [FN64] For this reason, reconciling the use of extrinsic aids to interpretation with the doctrine of separation of powers can be achieved by recognition of the usefulness of a RIAS, not its authoritativeness, as reflected in the sample of decisions labelled “technocratic” in this paper. [FN65]

However, the sample of Federal Court decisions noted herein show that judges give greater weight to this type of information than legal **185* principles would officially authorize. Although this result may be partly due to unclear guidelines from the Supreme Court regarding this issue, [FN66] it may also be the result of the evolution of our legal system. It is possible judges see the examination of this **material** as one central condition for correctly assessing the ambit of polycentric questions at stake in given **regulatory** programs. As a consequence, they would more readily respect governmental views in order to reach a correct interpretation: an interpretation which would properly balance competing interests. [FN67]

This discussion highlights three issues related to the general question “what makes law knowable”. The first issue is: Is the information found in a RIAS reliable? Recall that Muldoon J. questioned its accuracy in *Teal Cedar*. [FN68] It is also worth noting that a reading of 33 RIAS' that were produced by the Citizenship and Immigration Department with the new *Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations* (IRPR), show that, for the most part, the section called “description” is often vague and it is doubtful that this information could be found conclusive to resolve any interpretive issue. As far as the sections “alternatives” and “cost and benefits”, they rarely propose a meaningful analysis of these questions. In addition, after conducting interviews with civil servants in charge of drafting the RIAS for the IRPR, it is clear that they are very aware of the use of RIAS by courts and draft them keeping this reality in mind. Therefore, judges have to be cautious: arguments that are elaborated and approved by the government very much resemble self-serving evidence.

The second issue is related to the question of ranking. What is the most reliable source to find the meaning of the law: Is it the text of the rule or its context, or even perhaps the values underpinning rules? Given the answer to this question, what would be the ideal framework of analysis to apply to the modern method of interpretation? In my view, the **186* step-by-step framework of analysis directs judges toward an orthodox use of a RIAS, while the “successive circles of context” framework gives far more discretion to a judge choosing to defer to the expertise of civil servants. Therefore, the choice of analytical framework is a crucial question to be resolved in this regard.

The third issue is related to the second concerning the choice of an analytical framework. If the Supreme Court were to prefer the “successive circles of context” framework, it will effect the understanding of the doctrine of separation of powers, notably if it leads judges to a greater technocratic use of the RIAS. Indeed, one may question whether the Federal Court and the Supreme Court (Binnie J.), are not implicitly relying on a type of “dialogue metaphor” when they rely too heavily on a RIAS to resolve

an interpretive issue. In this regard, further research could focus on the underpinnings of the "dialogue metaphor" referred to by courts when they examine if a legal scheme can be saved by the limiting clause of the *Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms*. As the Supreme Court pointed out, the dialogue metaphor requires courts to be open to arguments and to show co-operation and mutual respect for the various actors in the constitutional order. It is in this sense that the interaction between the various branches of government are described as a dialogue by the Supreme Court, with the result that "each of the branches is made somewhat accountable to the other". For this Court, the dialogue between, and accountability of, each of the branches has the effect of "enhancing the democratic process, not denying it". [FN69] Even if someone were to accept the validity of this last argument in a *Charter* context when legislations are challenged, its application in the **regulatory** context raises serious difficulty, notably when put in relation to the discussion in the next question.

(ii) *Acceptance of the law*

With respect to the role of a RIAS in the application of the concept of "acceptance of the law by the governed", it is interesting to note that the Privy Council of the Government of Canada states in the *RIAS Writer's Guide* that a "RIAS is very much a social contract" between the Government and the governed. Although this claim is contentious, it encompasses a democratic ideal of "rules made by the people". However, how far can this argument be carried?

***187** The two decisions above, classified under "democratic use of a RIAS" and which were subsequently summarized, raise two sides of the argument-- tautological and logical - based on the fact that consultations were conducted during the rule-making process. However, both arguments are presumably aimed at protecting the financial stability of public programs and private enterprise.

In my view, *Abel* represents the decision in which the argument becomes a tautology. On the one hand, Campbell J. rejected Abel's argument that the price for destroying elk should be fixed by taking the market value of elk into consideration. Yet, on the other hand, Campbell J. stated that the Minister did exercise his discretion not only by taking the market value of elk into consideration, but also the broader political and economic considerations. Indeed, as Campbell J. continues this line of argument, he stated that the content of the RIAS confirms that these factors can be used to reach the compensation decision. At this point, Campbell J. adds that consultations were conducted with elk owners when a decision to use these factors was reached. By saying this, he implies that elk owners, including Abel, agreed to such factors being used in the compensation decision. As a consequence, he also implies that the Minister's discretionary decision was fair and reasonable.

As I said earlier, presumably Campbell J. did not want to find the regulations invalid because of the financial implications his decision would have had. In sum, it is possible that the argument was aimed at protecting the financial stability of a government program. [FN70]

Contrary to *Abel*, *Teal Cedar* represents a case in which a logical argument was carried by Muldoon J. Even if his argument was quashed on appeal, [FN71] it is nevertheless interesting to discuss the issue that he raised. Indeed, as the evidence shows, the Governor-in-Council approved a regulation which was based on misleading information. This information was obtained as a result of consultations which were badly conducted since it did not include an important stakeholder (*Teal Cedar*), who would be seriously affected by the regulation. As a result of this regulation, the wood trade of this company became too costly and the owner had to shut it down. As a result, 150 workers lost their jobs. This case reveals the importance of governments to not only integrate stakeholders into the rule-making process but also to plan and organize consultations seriously and thoroughly. On this issue, further research would be needed to inquire into possible legal consequences of government's failure in this regard.

***188 4. CONCLUSION**

The application of presumptions such as “knowledge of the law” and “acceptance of the law” appears to have acquired a particular scope in the **regulatory** realm. Through technocratic and democratic uses of the RIAS, Judges of the Federal Court are more inclined to show deference to the government's view on the purpose and the meaning of a regulation, as well as to give more significance to the fact that consultations occurred with stakeholders during the rule-making process. As noted earlier, these uses of a RIAS open interesting avenues for future research. In addition, the emerging trend in using RIAS' to construct regulations is a phenomenon which may have very important impacts on at least two fields of administrative law: rule-making procedure and judicial review of regulations.

If a duty on the part of the government to consult during the rule-making process were to become reality, it would undoubtedly be welcomed by non-governmental actors. Regulation is a phenomenon which is not likely to disappear in the near future and, in order to address the democratic deficit inherent to the actual statutory rule-making process, it would be desirable that Parliament decides, at last, to redesign the *Statutory Instrument Act* to incorporate a legal obligation to consult minimally with stakeholders representing competing interests.

The hope that Parliament would take this step is not high. Indeed, this question has been debated for over 25 years. However, since 1986, the Canadian Government has chosen to impose on itself an administrative duty to consult (through pre-publication of proposed regulations) and this administrative duty may provide room for courts to intervene more robustly in this debate. Indeed, it is useful to recall that judges played a central role in requiring the Parliament to adopt a statute providing for the general publication of regulations at the beginning of last century. [FN72] Second, it is important to mention that one Judge of the Federal Court of Appeal made a significant contribution to this debate, but, unfortunately, his dissenting opinion was largely unnoticed.

In the *Apotex* case, [FN73] Evans J.A. proposed an interesting development to the doctrine of legitimate expectations. This doctrine, as explained by the Supreme Court, “is part of the rules of procedural fairness *189 which can govern administrative bodies. Where it is applicable, it can only create a right to make representations or to be consulted”. [FN74] As Evans J.A. rightly pointed out in *Apotex*, the Supreme Court specifically said “that the doctrine has no application to the exercise of legislative powers as it would place a fetter on an essential feature of democracy”. In the exercise of delegated legislative powers, however, Evans J.A. stated that similar considerations do not apply because these powers are not subject to the “same level of scrutiny as primary legislation that must pass through the full legislative process”. He concluded that “in the absence of binding authority to the contrary, the doctrine of legitimate expectations applies in principle to delegated legislative powers so as to create participatory rights when none would otherwise arise, provided that honouring the expectation would not breach some other legal duty, or unduly delay the enactment of regulations for which there was a demonstrably urgent need.” [FN75] The Supreme Court denied leave to appeal this case, but this refusal to hear the case leaves the door open for later consideration of this very issue.

With respect to judicial review of regulations, a sustained increase in cases in which judges make a technocratic use of a RIAS will undoubtedly affect the degree of deference accorded to civil servants. Although it is too soon to make a judgment on whether this trend is desirable or not, this issue may take a different turn if the full implementation of the “smart regulation” project were to become a reality. Indeed, this project implies that the government will move toward results-based **regulatory** programs. It will therefore leave the determination of the appropriate means to reach these objectives in the hands of stakeholders. In this type of **regulatory** system, if too much weight is given to the expert views of the government as to the purpose of the regulation as well as to the fact that stakeholders agreed with the objectives because they were consulted, it may

become illusory to challenge the validity of regulations in relation to its parent law, outside of constitutional parameters. For this reason, this new interpretive trend should be monitored closely as it may signal a greater change than foreseen, and perhaps an unwanted one, regarding the relationship between the government and the judiciary.

[FNd1].

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[FN1]. The latest version of the **Regulatory** Policy is published on the Web site of the Privy Council Office of the Canadian Federal Government at: www.pco-bcp.gc.ca. **Regulatory** reform has now become a major field of study in many countries, notably within the OECD and APEC. For a view on regulation and its reform around the world, see *inter alia* the OECD site: (www.oecd.org); and AEI-Brookings Joint Center for **Regulatory** Analysis (www.aei.brookings.org). In 2000, Robert W. Hahn, Director of the Center wrote a book in which a chapter is dedicated to **regulatory** reform around the world: *Reviving Regulatory Reform. A Global Perspective*, (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2000) at 6-31.

[FN2]. In England, the terminology "better regulations" is used and the British Government created a Better Regulation Task Force in September 1997. This Task Force is an independent body that advises Government on action to ensure that regulation and its enforcement accord with the five "Principles of Good Regulation" which are: proportionality, accountability, consistency, transparency and targeting. For more information, see the publications on the Web site of the Task Force at: <http://www.brta.gov.uk/publications>.

[FN3]. Within the OECD, the terminology "quality regulations" is used in the documentation. See for example, OECD, *Government Capacity to Assure High Quality Regulation*, (Paris: Éditions de l'OCDE, 1999). The OECD has published many publications on **regulatory** reforms in OECD countries. See: [http:// www.oecd.org/topic](http://www.oecd.org/topic).

[FN4]. In Canada, the expression "smart regulation" is used in the recent documentation. Each letter of the word "smart" refers to a concept: **s**ound, **m** odern, **a**ccountable, **r**esults-based and **t**ransparent. The Canadian government created in May 2003, the External Advisory Committee on Smart Regulation which issued its first Report in September 2004. See Canada, External Advisory Committee on Smart Regulation, *Smart Regulation. A Regulatory Strategy for Canada*, (Ottawa: Communication Group, 2004) [*Smart Regulation*]. This Report is available on the Web site of the Committee: <http://www.pco-bcp.gc.ca/smartreg-regint/>.

[FN5]. Some industries were deregulated, such as airlines, trucking, telecommunications, services. On deregulation, see *inter alia*: Walter Block & Lerner George, eds., *Breaking the Shackles: Deregulating Canadian Industry*, (Vancouver: The Fraser Institute, 1991).

[FN6]. Fazil Mihlar, "Federal **Regulatory** Reform, Rhetoric or Reality", (1997) 6 Public Policy Sources 1 at 9 [Mihlar, "Federal Reform"]. Mihlar further explains **regulatory** management in saying: "Its primary concerns include the impact of regulation on

Canadians, co-ordinating mechanisms between different **regulatory** systems, ranking regulation and finding alternatives to command and control regulation so as to meet policy goals." He quotes the work of Prof. Margaret Hill, "Managing the **Regulatory** State: From up, to In and Down, to Out and Across" in G. Bruce Doern et al. (eds.), *Changing the Rules: Canadian **Regulatory** Regimes and Institutions*, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999) at 259-76.

[FN7]. Many monographs were written on the failure of **regulatory** programs especially in United States. See, *inter alia*, the legal analysis of S. Breyer, who is now a Judge at the United States Supreme Court. S. Breyer, *Regulation and its Reform*, (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1982) [Breyer, *Regulation and Reform*].

[FN8]. *Smart Regulation*, *supra* note 4 at 13.

[FN9]. Canada, Treasury Board Secretariat, Audit and Review Group, *Number 14: **Regulatory** Reform Through **Regulatory** Impact Analysis: The Canadian Experience*, (Ottawa: Public Affairs Branch, Treasury Board, 1997). See also *Smart Regulation*, *ibid.* at 126.

[FN10]. Breyer, *Regulation and Reform*, *supra* note 7.

[FN11]. *Smart Regulation*, *supra* note 4 at 136 : Annex 3- "A Proposal for a New **Regulatory** Policy for Canada", clearly points out the need for a RIAS under the heading accountability of this proposal:

The government is committed to explaining to Canadians how a new **regulatory** intervention is in the public interest and specifying the results expected from **regulatory** intervention. The government is committed to monitoring its **regulatory** performance, providing meaningful reports to Canadians and ensuring accountability for the results generated through **regulatory** action.

[FN12]. *Smart Regulation*, *ibid.* at 131. The Committee is proposing a new analytical framework in Annex II: A Public Interest Accountability Framework (PIAF).

[FN13]. For a general article on the RIAS, see Fazil Mihlar, "The Federal Government and the 'RIAS' Process: Origins, Need, and Non-Compliance", in G. Bruce Doern et al. (eds.), *Changing the Rules: Canadian **Regulatory** Regimes and Institutions*, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999) at 277.

[FN14]. Canada, Economic Council of Canada, *Responsible Regulation*, (Ottawa: Canadian Government Publishing Centre, 1979).

[FN15]. For a brief summary of the development of the Federal Government **Regulatory** Policy, see Mihlar, "Federal Reform," *supra* note 6 at 8.

[FN16]. Canada, Privy Council Office, *Regulatory Policy. Appendix B: **Regulatory** Process Management Standards [**Regulatory** Standards]*. These standards are available on the Web site of the Privy Council, *supra* note 1:

Regulatory authorities must document their **regulatory** policy and processes, including the responsibilities, authorities and interrelationships of personnel who manage, carry out and review **regulatory** programs. The process followed to develop each new or changed regulation must be documented. The documentation should include, but not be limited to, a description of the problem, alternative solutions, the risks involved, the reasons for regulating, the consultation process used and the benefit-cost analysis.

[FN17].

Ibid.

[FN18]. It is important to note that the Federal Government makes a distinction between "consultation" and "pre-publication" (which also involves consultation) in a RIAS. The so-called "consultation" procedure normally begins as soon as possible during the stage of the elaboration of the **regulatory** policy "in order to get stakeholder input on the definition of the problem, as well as on proposed solutions." In the *Regulatory Standards* it is written:

Regulatory authorities must clearly set out the processes they use to allow interested parties to express their opinions and provide input. In particular, authorities must be able to identify and contact interested stakeholders, including, where appropriate, representatives from public interest, labour and consumer groups. If stakeholder groups indicate a preference for a particular consultation mechanism, they should be accommodated, time and resources permitting. Consultation efforts should be coordinated between authorities to reduce duplication and burden on stakeholders. **Regulatory** authorities should consider using an iterative system to obtain feedback on the problem, on alternative solutions and, later, on the preferred solution.

The so-called "pre-publication" is a form of consultation which occurs after the regulation is drafted and pre-published for notice to stakeholders and the public in general in order to provide to them a last chance to make their views known on the proposed regulation before it is approved by the government.

[FN19]. *Regulatory Standards, supra* note 16.

[FN20]. The RIAS is supposed to be a summary of the strategic analysis (including the cost-benefit analysis) made before the decision to regulate is made. However, it is far from clear that such strategic analyses are conducted beforehand (or are as detailed as they should be), contrary to United States where this process is closely monitored by an independent research centre (AEI-Brookings Joint Center for **Regulatory** Studies). The Center published several studies criticizing the government in that regard. For example, see Robert W. Hahn, et al., "Assessing **Regulatory** Impact Analyses: The Failure of Agencies to Comply With [Executive Order 12,866](#)", (2000) 23:3 Harv. J.L.& Pub. Pol'y 859. It is also interesting to note that in the U.S., scholars are asking their government to provide a summary of the **regulatory** impact statement, Robert W. Hahn, "An Assessment of OMB's Draft of Guidelines to Help Agencies Estimate the Benefits and Costs of Federal Regulation", AEI-Brookings Joint Center for **Regulatory** Analysis, 6. This paper is available on the Web site of this research centre: www.aei.brookings.org.

[FN21]. This guideline is also published on the Privy Council Office Web site. See note 1.

[FN22]. Canada, Privy Council Office, "**Regulatory** Affairs and Orders in Council Secretariat, Assessing **Regulatory** Alternatives", (Ottawa: Privy Council Office, 1994). This guide is available on the Privy Council Web site. See note 1.

[FN23]. Canada, Consulting Audit, "Benefit-Cost Analysis Guide for **Regulatory** Programs", (Ottawa: Consulting Audit Canada, August 1995). This guide is available on the Privy Council Web site. See note 1.

[FN24]. There are different analytical approaches to assess social regulation. See Lester Lave, "The Strategy of Social Regulation" (1981) AEI-Brookings Joint Center for **Regulatory** Analysis 3. The two major ones appear to be "benefit-cost analysis" and "cost-effectiveness". The main distinction between the two is that the "benefit-cost analysis says something directly about the economic efficiency of a policy. Cost effectiveness analysis typically takes the goal of a policy as a "given", and thus provides information that will help achieve that goal at the lowest social cost." See Robert W. Hahn & Robert E. Litan, "A Review of the Office of Management and Budget's Draft Guidelines for Conducting **Regulatory** Analyses", AEI-Brookings Joint Center for **Regulatory** Analysis 2003 at 3. This paper is available on the Web site of this research centre:

www.aei.brookings.org.

[FN25]. Canada, Privy Council Office, *Consultation Guidelines for Managers in the Federal Public Service*, (Ottawa: Privy Council Office, 1992). These guidelines are available on the Privy Council Web site. See *supra* note 1. There is a growing concern of the issue of conducting meaningful consultation. On this topic, there is interesting documentation produced by the European Commission. See for example: Commission des communautés européennes, *Communication de la Commission, Vers une culture renforcée de consultation et de dialogue--Principes généraux et normes minimales applicables aux consultations engagées par la Commission avec les parties intéressées*, Bruxelles, 11.12.2002; *Gouvernance européenne, un livre blanc*, Bruxelles, 25.7.2001, at14ff.; *Rapport de la Commission sur la gouvernance européenne*, (Luxembourg : Office des publications officielles des Communautés européennes, 2003). These documents are available on the Web site of the European Community at: www.europa.eu.int. In France, the Minister in charge of the Délégation aux usagers et aux simplifications administratives (DUSA), appointed Mr. Dieudonné Mandelkern as the rapporteur général of a working group studying the quality of regulation. The *Rapport du Groupe de travail interministériel sur la qualité de la réglementation* (particularly 20ff.) is available on the DUSA Web site at: www.dusa.gouv.fr.

[FN26]. There is also a growth regarding compliance and enforcement measures in the OECD countries. See OECD, *Reducing the Risk of Policy Failure: Challenge for Regulatory Compliance*, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2000, available on the OECD Web site at: www.oecd.org.

[FN27]. The research was made from the QuickLaw Data Bank, available online.

[FN28]. A summary of research in the QuickLaw Data Bank shows that during the same period (1988-2005), there were 126 decisions in which *Hansard* was referred to by Federal Court Judges.

[FN29]. 1998 marks the year when the Supreme Court delivered a very important judgment regarding the adoption of the modern method of interpretation to construct statutes and regulations: *Rizzo & Rizzo Shoes Ltd. (Re)*, [1998] 1 R.C.S. 27 [*Rizzo Shoes*].

[FN30]. See [*Canadian Wildlife Federation Inc. v. Canada \(Minister of the Environment\)*, \[1989\] 3 F.C. 309, 1989 CarswellNat 129, 37 Admin. L.R. 39, 3 C.E.L.R. \(N.S.\) 287, 26 F.T.R. 245 \(Fed. T.D.\)](#), at para. 16 [F.C.]; [*Arias v. Canada \(Minister of Citizenship & Immigration\)* \(1994\), 1994 CarswellNat 804, 89 F.T.R. 183, \[1994\] F.C.J. No. 1948 \(Fed. T.D.\)](#), at para. 47 [F.C.J.]; [*Abdi-Egeh v. Canada \(Minister of Citizenship & Immigration\)* \(1995\), 1995 CarswellNat 355, 29 Imm. L.R. \(2d\) 254, 99 F.T.R. 279, \[1995\] F.C.J. No. 1007 \(Fed. T.D.\)](#), at para. 5 [F.C.J.]; [*Dass v. Canada \(Minister of Employment & Immigration\)*, \[1996\] 2 F.C. 410, 1996 CarswellNat 154, 32 Imm. L.R. \(2d\) 209, 107 F.T.R. 320 \(note\) \(Fed. C.A.\)](#), at para. 25 [F.C.]; [*Mitov v. Canada \(Minister of Citizenship & Immigration\)* \(1996\), 1996 CarswellNat 207, 33 Imm. L.R. \(2d\) 70, 107 F.T.R. 228, \[1996\] F.C.J. No. 222 \(Fed. T.D.\)](#), at para. 7 [F.C.J.]; [*Dubé v. Lepage* \(1997\), 1997 CarswellNat 1439, \(sub nom. *Dubé v. Direction des Pensions de Retraite \(Canada\)*\) 131 F.T.R. 201, 3 Admin. L.R. \(3d\) 99, \[1997\] A.C.F. No. 616 \(Fed. T.D.\)](#), at para. 3 [A.C.F.]; [*Eli Lilly & Co. v. Novopharm Ltd.* \(1997\), 1997 CarswellNat 178, 137 F.T.R. 32, \[1997\] A.C.F. No. 1344 \(Fed. T.D.\)](#), at para. 13 [A.C.F.]; (Dubé J.); [*Adam v. Canada \(Minister of Citizenship & Immigration\)* \(1998\), 1998 CarswellNat 2714, 161 F.T.R. 42, \[1998\] F.C.J. No. 1901 \(Fed. T.D.\)](#), at para. 16, [F.C.J.], affirmed (2000), 2000 CarswellNat 1983, 8 Imm. L.R. (3d) 1, [2001] 1 F.C. 373, 186 F.T.R. 159 (note), [2000] F.C.J. No. 1375 (Fed. C.A.); [*Nouranidoust v. Canada \(Minister of Citizenship & Immigration\)* \(1999\), \[2000\] 1 F.C. 123, 1999 CarswellNat 1369, 172 F.T.R. 115, \[1999\] F.C.J. No. 1100 \(Fed. T.D.\)](#), at

para. 2 [F.C.]; *Merck & Co. v. Canada (Attorney General)* (2000), 2000 CarswellNat 566, (sub nom. *Merck & Co. v. Nu-Pharm Inc.*) 179 F.T.R. 278 (note), [2000] F.C.J. No. 380 (Fed. C.A.), at para. 9 [F.C.J.], leave to appeal refused 2000 CarswellNat 1153, 5 C.P.R. (4th) vii, [2000] 1 S.C.R. xvii, [2000] S.C.C.A. No. 185 (S.C.C.); *Glaxo Group Ltd. v. Canada (Minister of National Health & Welfare)* (2000), 2000 CarswellNat 841, 6 C.P.R. (4th) 73, 188 F.T.R. 1, [2000] F.C.J. No. 585 (Fed. T.D.), at para. 12 [F.C.J.], affirmed 2001 CarswellNat 683, 2001 FCA 96, 203 F.T.R. 148 (note) (Fed. C.A.); *Farzad v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration)*, 2001 CarswellNat 1143, 2001 FCT 74, 14 Imm. L.R. (3d) 241, 200 F.T.R. 298, [2001] F.C.J. No. 607 (Fed. T.D.), at para. 10 [F.C.J.]; *Nu-Pharm Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General)*, 2001 CarswellNat 1895, 2001 FCT 973, 14 C.P.R. (4th) 280, 211 F.T.R. 181, [2001] F.C.J. No. 1352 (Fed. T.D.), at para. 15 [F.C.T.], affirmed 2002 CarswellNat 350, 2002 FCA 54, (sub nom. *Nu-Pharm Inc. v. Merck & Co.*) 17 C.P.R. (4th) 288 (Fed. C.A.); *Borisova v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration)*, [2003] 4 F.C. 408, 2003 CarswellNat 4607, 29 Imm. L.R. (3d) 163, 237 F.T.R. 87, 2003 FC 859, [2003] F.C.J. No. 1114 (F.C.), at para. 7 [F.C.]; *Akram v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration)*, 2004 FC 826, 2004 CarswellNat 5454, 254 F.T.R. 137, 2004 CF 826 (F.C.), at para. 5 [F.C.]; *Englander v. Telus Communications Inc.* (2004), 2004 FCA 387, 2004 CarswellNat 4119, [2005] 2 F.C.R. 572, 247 D.L.R. (4th) 275, 2004 CAF 38, [2004] F.C.J. No. 1935 (F.C.A.), at para. 34 [FCA]; *Say v. Canada (Solicitor General)*, 2005 FC 739, 2005 CarswellNat 1510, 46 Imm. L.R. (3d) 255, 2005 CF 739, [2005] F.C.J. No. 931 (F.C.), at para. 23 [F.C.], affirmed 2005 CarswellNat 427, 2005 FCA 422, 2005 CAF 422 (F.C.A.), leave to appeal refused (2006), 2006 CarswellNat 1060 (S.C.C.); *Rana v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration)*, 2005 FC 974, 2005 CarswellNat 1945, 2005 CF 974 (F.C.), at paras. 1-3 [F.C.]; *Jose Pereira E Hijos S.A. v. Canada (Attorney General)*, 2005 F.C. 1011, 2005 CarswellNat 2116, 17 C.E.L.R. (3d) 1 (F.C.), at para. 195 [F.C.]; *Glaxosmithkline Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General)*, 2004 FC 1302, 2004 CarswellNat 5181, 2004 CF 1302, 38 C.P.R. (4th) 27, (sub nom. *GlaxoSmithKline Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General)*) 264 F.T.R. 162, [2004] F.C.J. No. 1578 (F.C.), at para. 11 [FC]; *Begg v. Canada (Minister of Agriculture)*, 2004 FC 659, 2004 CarswellNat 3298, 252 F.T.R. 66, 2004 CF 659 (F.C.), at para. 15 [FC], affirmed 2005 CarswellNat 3560, 2005 FCA 362, 261 D.L.R. (4th) 36, 2005 CAF 362, [2005] F.C.J. No. 1819 (F.C.A.); *Singh v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration)* (1996), 1996 CarswellNat 1918, 36 Imm. L.R. (2d) 248, 122 F.T.R. 59, [1996] F.C.J. No. 1473 (Fed. T.D.), at para. 12 [F.C.J.]; *Nguyen v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration)* (1996), 1996 CarswellNat 1919, 122 F.T.R. 282, [1996] F.C.J. No. 1478 (Fed. T.D.), at para. 8 [F.C.J.]; *Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Canada (Minister of National Health & Welfare)* (1999), 1999 CarswellNat 143, 162 F.T.R. 186, [1999] F.C.J. No. 99 (Fed. T.D.), at para. 5 [F.C.J.]; *P.S.A.C. v. Canada (Attorney General)*, [1992] 2 F.C. 181, 1992 CarswellNat 89, (sub nom. *PSAC v. Canada (Public Service Commission)*) 52 F.T.R. 278 (Fed. T.D.), at para. 5 [F.C.].

[FN31]. I sub-divided this category into four subgroups. For the references to cases in Group 1, see note 7. Group 2: A case is cited in the reasons in which a reference to a RIAS appears. See *Begg v. Canada (Minister of Agriculture)*, 2005 FCA 362, 2005 CarswellNat 3560, 261 D.L.R. (4th) 36, 2005 CAF 362, [2005] F.C.J. No. 1819 (F.C.A.), at para. 363 [FCA]; *Bear v. Canada (Attorney General)*, 2003 FCA 40, 2003 CarswellNat 124, (sub nom. *R. v. Bear*) 105 C.R.R. (2d) 1, [2003] 3 F.C. 456, 2003 CAF, 238 F.T.R. 184 (note), [2003] 2 C.T.C. 221, [2003] 2 C.N.L.R. 21, [2003] F.C.J. No. 96 (Fed. C.A.), at para. 14 [FCA], leave to appeal refused 2003 CarswellNat 2778, [2003] 4 C.N.L.R. iv (note), [2003] S.C.C.A. No. 115 (S.C.C.); *Esquimalt Anglers' Assn. v. R.* (1988), 21 F.T.R. 304, 1988 CarswellNat 188 (Fed. T.D.); *Hu v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration)* (1996), 1996 CarswellNat 1921, [1996] F.C.J. No. 1476 (Fed. T.D.), at para. 7 [F.C.J.]; *GlaxoSmithKline Inc. v. Apotex Inc.*, 2003 FC 1055, 2003 CarswellNat 4638, 239 F.T.R. 32, [2003] F.C.J. No. 1334 (F.C.), at para. 81 [FC]; *Revich c. Canada (Ministre de la Citoyenneté & de l'Immigration)*, 2005 CF 852, 2005 CarswellNat 1691 (F.C.), at para. 14 [CF]. Group 3: A RIAS is argued by one party, but the judge declares

it totally irrelevant to the case at bar. See [Ontario Hydro v. R. \(1996\)](#), 1996 CarswellNat 779, (sub nom. [Ontario Hydro v. National Energy Board](#)) 112 F.T.R. 225, [1996] A.C.F. No. 708 (Fed. T.D.), at para. 29 [A.C.F.], reversed [1997 CarswellNat 1002](#), (sub nom. [Ontario Hydro v. National Energy Board](#)) 215 N.R. 175, 130 F.T.R. 320 (note), [1997] 3 F.C. 565, 50 Admin. L.R. (2d) 297 (Fed. C.A.). Group 4: A RIAS is used to explain the rule-making process. [Antonsen v. Canada \(Attorney General\)](#), [1995] 2 F.C. 272, 1995 CarswellNat 661F, 32 Admin. L.R. (2d) 237, 91 F.T.R. 1 (Fed. T.D.), at para. 31 [F.C.]; [Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Canada \(Minister of National Health & Welfare\) \(1996\)](#), 1996 CarswellNat 369, 109 F.T.R. 216, [1996] F.C.J. No. 348 (Fed. T.D.), at para. 11 [F.C.J.]; [International Assn. of Immigration Practitioners v. R.](#), 2004 CarswellNat 1249, 2004 FC 630 (F.C.), at paras. 6-10 [FC].

[FN32]. 2 See [Canada Eighty-Eight Fund Ltd. v. Canada \(Minister of Employment & Immigration\) \(1991\)](#), 48 F.T.R. 196, 1991 CarswellNat 274 (Fed. T.D.); [Apotex Inc. v. R.](#), 2003 FCT 414, 2003 CarswellNat 3397, 2003 CFPI 414, [2003] F.C.J. No. 593 (Fed. T.D.), at paras. 15 & 19 FCT], affirmed [2004 CarswellNat 249](#), 2004 FCA 43, (sub nom. [Apotex Inc. v. Canada](#)) 2004 CAF 43, [2004] F.C.J. No. 164 (F.C.A.); [Imperial Tobacco Canada Ltd. v. Canada \(Minister of Health\)](#), 247 F.T.R. 210, 2004 CarswellNat 3830, 2004 CF 236, 2004 FC 236 (F.C.), at para. 28 [F.T.R.]; [Van Vlymen v. Canada \(Solicitor General\) \(2004\)](#), [2005] 1 F.C.R. 617, 2004 CarswellNat 6083, 189 C.C.C. (3d) 538, 258 F.T.R. 1 (Eng.), 2004 FC 1054 (F.C.), at para. 64 [F.C.R.]; [Canada \(Minister of Citizenship & Immigration\) v. Vong](#), 2005 FC 855, 2005 CarswellNat 1701, 47 Imm. L.R. (3d) 213, 2005 CF 855 (F.C.), at para. 21 [FC]; [Abbott Laboratories Ltd. v. Canada \(Minister of Health\)](#), 2005 FC 989, 2005 CarswellNat 2202, 41 C.P.R. (4th) 289, 2005 CF 989 (F.C.), at para. 35 [FC]; [Tihomirovs v. Canada \(Minister of Citizenship & Immigration\)](#), 2005 FCA 308, 2005 CarswellNat 2989, 31 Admin. L.R. (4th) 257, 259 D.L.R. (4th) 534, 2005 CAF 308, 49 Imm. L.R. (3d) 163, [2005] F.C.J. No. 1597 (F.C.A.), at para. 8 [FCA].

[FN33]. Group 2: Other uses. In this category, there are five decisions in which a RIAS is argued by one party and judges address the argument. However, they dismiss it. In two cases, the Federal Court of Appeal found that whether the information contained in a RIAS is right or wrong is not a relevant issue to determine if a serious question is to be tried (in this case the validity of a regulation): [Teal Cedar Products \(1977\) Ltd. v. R. \(1988\)](#), [1989] 2 F.C. 158, 1988 CarswellNat 158, 25 F.T.R. 160 (note), 2 T.C.T. 4158 (Fed. C.A.), at para. 16 [F.C.], leave to appeal refused (1989), 100 N.R. 320n (S.C.C.); [Parker Cedar Products Ltd. v. R. \(1988\)](#), 92 N.R. 318, 1988 CarswellNat 1020, 18 C.E.R. 226 (Fed. C.A.); in two cases, the judge determines that the portion of the RIAS cited by one party is not relevant, but only after reviewing the argument: [Newman v. Canada \(Minister of Agriculture\) \(1993\)](#), 1993 CarswellNat 517, 68 F.T.R. 100, [1993] F.C.J. No. 864 (Fed. T.D.), at para. 14 [F.C.J.]; [Collier v. Canada \(Minister of Citizenship & Immigration\)](#), 2004 FC 1209, 2004 CarswellNat 5094, 2004 CF 1209, 43 Imm. L.R. (3d) 53, 260 F.T.R. 266 (Eng.), [2004] F.C.J. No. 1445 (F.C.), at paras. 24-26 [FC]; in another case, the judge states that a RIAS is simply a comment by the Department: [Chen v. Canada \(Minister of Citizenship & Immigration\) \(1997\)](#), 43 Imm. L.R. (2d) 83, 1997 CarswellNat 1198, [1997] F.C.J. No. 871 (Fed. T.D.), at paras. 20-21 [Imm. L.R.]. In this category, I also classified three other cases. In the first one, the judge distinguishes a press release from a RIAS: [National Anti-Poverty Organization v. Canada \(Attorney General\) \(1988\)](#), [1989] 1 F.C. 208, 1988 CarswellNat 725, 32 Admin. L.R. 1, 21 F.T.R. 33 (Fed. T.D.), at paras. 24-25, [F.C.], reversed [1989 CarswellNat 581](#), 36 Admin. L.R. 197, 60 D.L.R. (4th) 712, [1989] 3 F.C. 684, 28 F.T.R. 160 (note) (Fed. C.A.), leave to appeal refused (1989), 1989 CarswellNat 1290 (S.C.C.); in the second case, the judge acknowledges that the RIAS may be the source of the ambiguity of the regulation: [Gonzales v. Canada \(Minister of Citizenship & Immigration\) \(1994\)](#), 1994 CarswellNat 765, 87 F.T.R. 150, [1994] F.C.J. No. 1844 (Fed. T.D.), at paras. 7 & 9 [F.C.J.]; in the third case, the judge used the RIAS as a statement of fact, to provide

evidence that the minister acted in a cavalier attitude: [Popal v. Canada \(Minister of Citizenship & Immigration\)](#), [2000] 3 F.C. 532, 2000 CarswellNat 459, 184 F.T.R. 161, [2000] F.C.J. No. 352 (Fed. T.D.), at paras. 23-25 [F.C.].

[FN34]. Ruth Sullivan, *Driedger on the Construction of Statutes*, 3rd ed., (Toronto: Butterworths, 1994) at 426 [Sullivan, *Construction of Statutes*].

[FN35]. With the exception of Commission Reports.

[FN36]. Sullivan, *Construction of Statutes*, *supra* note 34 at 440. Sullivan writes that the erosion of the exclusionary rule started in "a series of cases arising under the *Constitution Act, 1867*, the Supreme Court of Canada held that extrinsic **materials**, including the legislative **history** of an enactment, should not automatically be excluded in constitutional cases." She cites: [Reference re Anti-Inflation Act, 1975 \(Canada\)](#), 68 D.L.R. (3d) 452, 1976 CarswellOnt 405, [1976] 2 S.C.R. 373 (S.C.C.), at 468 [D.L.R.]; [Reference re Residential Tenancies Act \(Ontario\)](#), 123 D.L.R. (3d) 554, 1981 CarswellOnt 623, [1981] 1 S.C.R. 714 (S.C.C.) at 562 [D.L.R.]; [Upper Churchill Water Rights Reversion Act, 1980, Re](#), [1984] 1 S.C.R. 297, 1984 CarswellNfld 40, 8 D.L.R. (4th) 1, (sub nom. *Churchill Falls (Labrador) Corp. v. Newfoundland (Attorney General)*) 47 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 125 (S.C.C.) at 318 [S.C.R.]. Thereafter the rule was also relaxed in *Charter* cases. See for example: [Reference re ss. 193 & 195.1\(1\)\(c\) of the Criminal Code \(Canada\)](#), [1990] 4 W.W.R. 481, EYB 1990-67183, 1990 CarswellMan 206, 77 C.R. (3d) 1, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1123, 56 C.C.C. (3d) 65 (S.C.C.) at 539-40 [W.W.R.]; [Reference re s. 94\(2\) of the Motor Vehicle Act \(British Columbia\)](#) (1985), [1985] 2 S.C.R. 486, 1985 CarswellBC 398, [1985] S.C.J. No. 73, 24 D.L.R. (4th) 536, 23 C.C.C. (3d) 289, 18 C.R.R. 30, 48 C.R. (3d) 289, [1986] D.L.Q. 90 (S.C.C.) at 508-09 [S.C.R.].

[FN37]. In Great Britain, legislative **history material** was not clearly permitted to be used until the decision in [Pepper \(Inspector of Taxes\) v. Hart](#) (1992), [1992] 3 W.L.R. 1032, [1993] All E.R. 41 (U.K. H.L.).

[FN38]. [Construction Gilles Paquette Ltée c. Entreprises Végo Ltée](#), [1997] 2 S.C.R. 299, 1997 CarswellQue 154, (sub nom. *Construction Gilles Paquette Ltée v. Entreprises Végo Ltée*) 146 D.L.R. (4th) 193, (S.C.C.); [Doré c. Verdun \(Municipalité\)](#), (sub nom. *Doré v. Verdun (City)*), [1997] 2 S.C.R. 862, 1997 CarswellQue 159, (sub nom. *Doré v. Verdun (Ville)*) 150 D.L.R. (4th) 385, [1997] S.C.J. No. 69 (S.C.C.); [Rizzo & Rizzo Shoes Ltd., Re](#), [1998] 1 S.C.R. 27, 1998 CarswellOnt 1, 154 D.L.R. (4th) 193, 36 O.R. (3d) 418 (headnote only), (sub nom. *Rizzo & Rizzo Shoes Ltd. (Bankrupt), Re*) 221 N.R. 241, (sub nom. *Adrien v. Ontario Ministry of Labour*) 50 C.B.R. (3d) 163, 106 O.A.C. 1, [1998] S.C.J. No. 2 (S.C.C.); [R. v. Gladue](#), [1999] 1 S.C.R. 688, 1999 CarswellBC 778, 133 C.C.C. (3d) 385, 171 D.L.R. (4th) 385, [1999] 2 C.N.L.R. 252, 23 C.R. (5th) 197, [1999] S.C.J. No. 19 (S.C.C.).

[FN39]. Two decisions of the Federal Court are particularly interesting on the issue of the weight to be given to a RIAS: [Eli Lilly Canada Inc. v. \(Minister of Health\)](#), 2003 FCA 24, 2003 CarswellNat 90, [2003] F.C. 140 (Fed. C.A.) at paras. 67-75 [FCA]; [Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Canada \(Minister of Health\)](#), [2004] FC 1547, 2004 CarswellNat 3943, [2004] F.C.J. No. 1880 (F.C.) at paras. 20-21 [FC].

[FN40]. [Comeau's Sea Foods Ltd. v. Canada \(Minister of Fisheries & Oceans\)](#), [1992] 3 F.C. 54, 1992 CarswellNat 169, 54 F.T.R. 20 (Fed. T.D.), at para. 17 [F.C.], reversed 1995 CarswellNat 692, 29 Admin. L.R. (2d) 264, 123 D.L.R. (4th) 180, [1995] 2 F.C. 467 (Fed. C.A.), leave to appeal refused (1995), 127 D.L.R. (4th) vii (note) (S.C.C.), affirmed 1997 CarswellNat 10, 142 D.L.R. (4th) 193, 43 Admin. L.R. (2d) 1, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 12 (S.C.C.); [Tri-Seeds Ltd. v. Canada \(Minister of Agriculture\)](#) (1993), 1993 CarswellNat 477, [1993] F.C.J. No. 834 (Fed. T.D.), at para. 18 [F.C.J.]; [Eli Lilly & Co. v. Novopharm](#)

Ltd. (1995), [1995] F.C.J. No. 174 (Fed. T.D.), at paras. 16-17 [F.C.J.]; [Bochnakov v. Canada \(Minister of Citizenship & Immigration\) \(1995\)](#), 1995 CarswellNat 62, 26 Imm. L.R. (2d) 242, [1995] F.C.J. No. 271 (Fed. T.D.), at para. 11 [F.C.J.]; *Pharmacia Inc. v. Canada (Minister of National Health & Welfare)* (1995), 1995 CarswellNat 1001, [1995] F.C.J. No. 450 (Fed. T.D.), at para. 11 [F.C.J.]; *Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Canada (Minister of National Health & Welfare)* (1995), 1995 CarswellNat 156, [1995] F.C.J. No. 985 (Fed. T.D.), at para. 39 [F.C.J.], affirmed (1995), 1995 CarswellNat 1166, 107 F.T.R. 79 (note) (Fed. C.A.), leave to appeal refused 1996 CarswellNat 3161, [1996] 3 S.C.R. xi (note), [1996] S.C.C.A. No. 65 (S.C.C.); [Bayer Inc. v. Canada \(Attorney General\) \(1998\)](#), [1999] 1 F.C. 553, 1998 CarswellNat 2173 (Fed. T.D.), at paras. 36-37 [F.C.], affirmed (1999), 1999 CarswellNat 1047, 166 F.T.R. 160 (note), [1999] F.C.J. No. 826 (Fed. C.A.), leave to appeal refused (2000), 2000 CarswellNat 1052, [1999] S.C.C.A. No. 386 (S.C.C.); [Murphy v. Canada \(Attorney General\) \(1998\)](#), [1999] 2 F.C. 326, 1998 CarswellNat 2516, [1998] F.C.J. No. 1843 (Fed. T.D.), at paras. 30-31 [F.C.]; [Diaz v. Canada \(Minister of Citizenship & Immigration\)](#), [1999] 2 F.C. 496, 1999 CarswellNat 279, 46 Imm. L.R. (2d) 202 (Fed. T.D.), at para. 9 [F.C.]; *Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Canada (Minister of National Health & Welfare)* (1999), 1999 CarswellNat 430, [1999] F.C.J. No. 348 (Fed. T.D.), at paras. 18-21 [F.C.J.]; [Bayer Inc. v. Canada \(Attorney General\) \(1999\)](#), 1999 CarswellNat 1047, 87 C.P.R. (3d) 293 (Fed. C.A.) at 296-97 [C.P.R.], leave to appeal refused (2000), 2000 CarswellNat 1053, [1999] S.C.C.A. No. 386 (S.C.C.); *Jain v. Canada (Attorney General)* (1999), 1999 CarswellNat 1471, [1999] F.C.J. No. 1201 (Fed. T.D.), at para. 8 [F.C.J.]; *Mohamed v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration)* (1999), 1999 CarswellNat 1514, [1999] F.C.J. No. 1230 (Fed. T.D.), at paras. 15-16 [F.C.J.]; [Merck Frosst Canada & Co. v. Canada \(Minister of Health\) \(2000\)](#), 2000 CarswellNat 846, 189, [2000] F.C.J. No. 559 (Fed. T.D.), at paras. 19-22 [F.C.J.]; [Apotex Inc. v. Canada \(Attorney General\)](#), [2000] 4 F.C. 264, 2000 CarswellNat 889, 188 D.L.R. (4th) 145, 24 Admin. L.R. (3d) 279, [2000] F.C.J. No. 634 (Fed. C.A.), at para. 73 [F.C.], leave to appeal refused 2001 CarswellNat 281, [2001] 1 S.C.R. v (S.C.C.); *Novartis Pharmaceuticals Canada Inc. v. Abbott Laboratories Ltd.* (2000), 2000 CarswellNat 1302, [2000] F.C.J. No. 941 (Fed. C.A.), at paras. 10-1 [F.C.J.]; [Warner-Lambert Canada Inc. v. Canada \(Minister of Health\)](#), 2001 FCT 514, 2001 CarswellNat 1076, [2001] F.C.J. No. 801 (Fed. T.D.), at para. 17 [FCT]; [Parke-Davis Division, Warner-Lambert Canada Inc. v. Canada \(Minister of Health\) \(2001\)](#), [2002] 1 F.C. 517, 2001 CarswellNat 1942, 2001 FCT 931, (sub nom. *Warner-Lambert Canada Inc. v. Canada (Minister of Health)*) (sub nom. *Warner-Lambert Canada Inc., Parke-Davis Division v. Canada (Minister of Health)*) [2001] F.C.J. No. 1335 (Fed. T.D.), at paras. 40-45 [F.C.], reversed (2002), 2002 CarswellNat 3282, 2002 FCA 454, 2003 CAF 454, [2003] 2 F.C. 514 (Fed. C.A.), leave to appeal refused (2003), 2003 CarswellNat 1369, [2003] S.C.C.A. No. 66 (S.C.C.); [Kwan v. Canada \(Minister of Citizenship & Immigration\) \(2001\)](#), [2002] 2 F.C. 99, 2001 CarswellNat 1933, 2001 FCT 971, 17 Imm. L.R. (3d) 167, [2001] F.C.J. No. 1333 (Fed. T.D.), at para. 40 [F.C.]; [Eli Lilly Canada Inc. v. Canada \(Minister of Health\)](#), 2002 FCT 28, 2002 CarswellNat 47 (Fed. T.D.), at paras. 15-16 [FCT], reversed 2003 CarswellNat 90, 2003 FCA 24, 2003 CAF 24, [2003] 3 F.C. 140, [2003] F.C.J. No. 75 (Fed. C.A.); [Wyeth-Ayerst Canada Inc. v. Faulding \(Canada\) Inc.](#), 2002 CarswellNat 2422, 2002 FCT 969, 2002 CFPI 969 (Fed. T.D.), at paras. 27-29 [F.T.R.]; [Parke-Davis Division, Warner-Lambert Canada Inc. v. Canada \(Minister of Health\) \(2002\)](#), [2003] 2 F.C. 514, 2002 CarswellNat 3282, 2002 FCA 454, 2003 CAF 454 (Fed. C.A.), at paras. 30-33 [F.C.]; [Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Canada \(Attorney General\)](#), 2002 FCT 1205, 2002 CarswellNat 3331 (Fed. T.D.), at para. 53 [FCT], affirmed 2003 CarswellNat 926, 2003 FCA 180, (sub nom. *Biolysse Pharma Corp. v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co.*) [2003] 4 F.C. 505, 226 D.L.R. (4th) 138, [2003] F.C.J. No. 566 (Fed. C.A.), leave to appeal allowed (2003), 2003 CarswellNat 3618 (S.C.C.), reversed EYB 2005-90541, 2005 CarswellNat 1261, 2005 SCC 26, [2005] 1 S.C.R. 533, [2005] S.C.J. No. 26 (S.C.C.); [Ferring Inc. v. Canada \(Attorney General\)](#), 2003 CFPI 293, 2003 CarswellNat 602, 2003 FCT 293, [2003] F.C.J. No. 409 (Fed. T.D.), at paras. 33-34 [CFPI], reversed 2003 CarswellNat 1879, 2003 FCA 274, 2003 CAF 274, [2003] F.C.J. No. 982 (Fed. C.A.),

leave to appeal refused (2004), 2004 CarswellNat 495, [2003] S.C.C.A. No. 396 (S.C.C.); *Pfizer Canada Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General)*, 2003 CAF 138, 2003 CarswellNat 613, [2003] 4 F.C. 95, 2003 FCA 138, 224 D.L.R. (4th) 178 (Fed. C.A.), leave to appeal refused (2003), 2003 CarswellNat 3684 (S.C.C.); *Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Canada (Attorney General)*, 2003 FCA 180, 2003 CarswellNat 926, (sub nom. *Biolyse Pharma Corp. v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co.*) [2003] 4 F.C. 505, [2003] F.C.J. No. 566 (Fed. C.A.), at paras. 21, 32 [FCA], leave to appeal allowed (2003), 2003 CarswellNat 3618 (S.C.C.), reversed EYB 2005-90541, 2005 CarswellNat 1261, 2005 SCC 26, [2005] 1 S.C.R. 533, [2005] S.C.J. No. 26 (S.C.C.); *Sunshine Village Corp. v. Parks Canada*, [2003] 4 F.C. 459, 2003 CarswellNat 1185, 3 Admin. L.R. (4th) 138, 2003 FCT 546 (Fed. T.D.), at paras. 45-46, 57-58 [F.C.], reversed 2004 CarswellNat 5582, [2004] 3 F.C.R. 600, 16 Admin. L.R. (4th) 242, 2004 FCA 166, [2004] F.C.J. No. 756 (F.C.A.); *Englander v. Telus Communications Inc.*, 2003 FCT 705, 2003 CarswellNat 3424, 2003 CFPI 705, [2003] F.C.J. No. 975 (Fed. T.D.), at paras. 44-48 [FCT], reversed in part (2004), 2004 CarswellNat 4119, [2005] 2 F.C.R. 572, 2004 CAF 387, 2004 FCA 387, [2004] F.C.J. No. 1935 (F.C.A.); *Genpharm Inc. v. Canada (Minister of Health)* (2003), [2004] 1 F.C.R. 375, 2003 CarswellNat 3258, 2003 FC 1148, 2003 CF 1148 (F.C.), at para. 58 [F.C.R.]; *Biovail Corp. v. Canada (Minister of National Health & Welfare)*, 2003 FCA 406, 2003 CarswellNat 3355, 2003 CAF 406, 29 (F.C.A.), at para. 31 [FCA]; *Adviento v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration)*, 2003 FC 1430, 2003 CarswellNat 3955, 2003 CF 1430, 9 Admin. L.R. (4th) 314, [2003] F.C.J. No. 1837 (F.C.), at para. 52 [FC]; *Townsend v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration)*, 2004 FC 293, 2004 CarswellNat 3271, 2004 CF 293 (F.C.), at para. 18 [FC], affirmed 2004 CarswellNat 5639, 2004 CarswellNat 4723, 41 Imm. L.R. (3d) 1, 2004 CAF 436, 2004 FCA 436 (F.C.A.); *Apotex Inc. v. Merck & Co.*, 2004 FC 314, 2004 CarswellNat 1707, 2004 CF 314, [2004] F.C.J. No. 387 (F.C.), at paras. 30-35 [FC], affirmed 2004 CarswellNat 3311, 2004 FCA 298, 2004 CAF 298 (F.C.A.); *Astrazeneca Canada Inc. v. Apotex Inc.*, 2004 FC 647, 2004 CarswellNat 6155, 2004 CF 647, [2004] F.C.J. No. 1078 (F.C.), at paras. 47-49 [FC], additional reasons at 2004 CarswellNat 5762, 2004 CF 1075, 2004 FC 1075 (F.C.), affirmed 2005 CarswellNat 1673, 2005 FCA 216, 2005 CAF 216 (F.C.A.), leave to appeal refused (2005), 2005 CarswellNat 4248 (S.C.C.); *Astrazeneca Canada Inc. v. Canada (Minister of Health)*, 2004 FC 736, 2004 CarswellNat 2715, 2004 CF 736, [2004] F.C.J. No. 883 (F.C.), at paras. 24-26 [FC], affirmed 2005 CarswellNat 1298, 2005 FCA 175, 2005 CAF 175, [2005] F.C.J. No. 856 (F.C.A.); *Apotex Inc. v. Bayer AG*, 2004 FCA 242, 2004 CarswellNat 3447, (sub nom. *Bayer AG v. Apotex Inc.*) 2004 CAF 242, (sub nom. *Bayer AG v. Apotex Inc.*) 32 C.P.R. (4th) 449 (F.C.A.), at paras. 13-14 [FCA], leave to appeal refused (2005), 2005 CarswellNat 37 (S.C.C.); *Lee v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration)* (2004), 2004 FC 1012, 2004 CarswellNat 2213, [2005], 2004 CF 1012, 38 Imm. L.R. (3d) 220, [2004] F.C.J. No. 1232 (F.C.), at para. 22 [FC]; *Astrazeneca Canada Inc. v. Canada (Minister of Health)*, 2005 FCA 189, 2005 CarswellNat 1399, 254 D.L.R. (4th) 690, 2005 CAF 189 (F.C.A.), at para. 54 [FCA], leave to appeal allowed (2005), 2005 CarswellNat 3346, [2005] S.C.C.A. No. 280 (S.C.C.); *Janssen-Ortho Inc. v. Canada (Minister of Health)*, 2005 FC 765, 2005 CarswellNat 1506 (F.C.), at paras. 15, 38-39 [FC], reversed 2006 CarswellNat 29, 2006 FCA 9 (F.C.A.); *Ontario Harness Horse Assn. v. Canadian Pari-Mutuel Agency*, 2005 FC 1320, 2005 CarswellNat 3010 (F.C.), at para. 40 [FC]; *Sinnappu v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration)*, [1997] 2 F.C. 791, 1997 CarswellNat 2034, [1997] F.C.J. No. 173 (Fed. T.D.), at paras. 44, 59 [F.C.], affirmed (1999), 1999 CarswellNat 2891, 179 F.T.R. 320 (note) (Fed. C.A.); *Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration) v. Dular* (1997), [1998] 2 F.C. 81, 1997 CarswellNat 1993, (sub nom. *Dular v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration)*) 48 C.R.R. (2d) 262 (Fed. T.D.), at para. 20 [F.C.], affirmed (October 22, 1998), Décar, Létourneau, Noël J.J.A. (Fed. C.A.), leave to appeal refused (1999), 245 N.R. 200 (note) (S.C.C.); *Bell Canada v. C.T.E.A.*, (sub nom. *Bell Canada v. Canadian Telephone Employees Assn.*) [1998] 3 F.C. 244, REJB 1998-05878, 1998 CarswellNat 423, 143 F.T.R. 241, (sub nom. *Bell Canada v. C.E.P.U. (No. 6)*) 10 Admin. L.R. (3d) 116, [1998] F.C.J. No. 313 (Fed. T.D.), at para. 64 [F.C.]; *Roy v. R.*, (sub nom. *Roy v. Canada*)

[\[2002\] 4 F.C. 451](#), [2002 CarswellNat 4708](#), [2002 FCT 233 \(Fed. T.D.\)](#), at paras. 46-47, 72 [F.C.], affirmed [\(2003\)](#), [2003 CarswellNat 3244](#), [231 D.L.R. \(4th\) 531](#), (sub nom. *Ballantyne v. Canada*) [\[2004\] 1 F.C.R. 243](#), [2003 FCA 320](#), [2003 CAF 320 \(Fed. C.A.\)](#); [Eli Lilly Canada Inc. v. Canada \(Minister of Health\)](#), [2003 FCA 24](#), [2003 CarswellNat 90](#), [2003 CAF 24](#), [\[2003\] 3 F.C. 140](#), [\[2003\] F.C.J. No. 75 \(Fed. C.A.\)](#), at para. 73 [FCA]; *Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Canada (Minister of Health)*, [2004 FC 1547](#), [2004 CarswellNat 3943](#), [\[2004\] F.C.J. No. 1880 \(F.C.\)](#), at paras. 20-21 [FC], affirmed [\(2005\)](#), [2005 CarswellNat 1299](#), [253 D.L.R. \(4th\) 644](#), [2005 FCA 140](#), [2005 CAF 140](#), [\[2006\] 1 F.C.R. 141](#), [\[2005\] F.C.J. No. 855 \(F.C.A.\)](#).

[FN41]. [SOR/DORS/2002-227](#) at 246-47.

[FN42]. [C.W.C. v. Canada \(Attorney General\) \(1988\)](#), [\[1989\] 1 F.C. 643](#), [1988 CarswellNat 677](#), [34 Admin. L.R. 8](#), (sub nom. *C.W.C. v. Canada (A.G.) (No. 2)*) [21 F.T.R. 56 \(Fed. T.D.\)](#), at paras. 32-33 [F.C.]; [Kaisersingh v. Canada \(Minister of Citizenship & Immigration\) \(1994\)](#), [\[1995\] 2 F.C. 20](#), [1994 CarswellNat 1457 \(Fed. T.D.\)](#), at para. 10 [F.C.]; [Darmantchev v. Canada \(Minister of Citizenship & Immigration\) \(1995\)](#), [1995 CarswellNat 1480](#), [32 Imm. L.R. \(2d\) 65](#), [\[1995\] F.C.J. No. 1445 \(Fed. T.D.\)](#), at para. 5 [F.C.J.]; [Say v. Canada \(Minister of Citizenship & Immigration\) \(1997\)](#), [1997 CarswellNat 2085](#), [\[1997\] F.C.J. No. 1478 \(Fed. T.D.\)](#), at para. 5 [F.C.J.]; [SmithKline Beecham Pharma Inc. v. Apotex Inc. \(1999\)](#), [1999 CarswellNat 2356](#), [\[1999\] F.C.J. No. 1775 \(Fed. T.D.\)](#), at para. 18 [F.C.J.]; [Merck & Co. v. Canada \(Attorney General\) \(1999\)](#), [1999 CarswellNat 2461](#), [\[1999\] F.C.J. No. 1825 \(Fed. T.D.\)](#), at para. 51 [F.C.J.], affirmed [\(2000\)](#), [2000 CarswellNat 566](#), (sub nom. *Merck & Co. v. Nu-Pharm Inc.*), [\[2000\] F.C.J. No. 380 \(Fed. C.A.\)](#), leave to appeal refused [2000 CarswellNat 1153](#), [\[2000\] 1 S.C.R. xvii](#), [\[2000\] S.C.C.A. No. 185 \(S.C.C.\)](#); [Bristol-Myers Squibb Canada Inc. v. Canada \(Attorney General\) \(2001\)](#), [2001 CarswellNat 85](#), [\[2001\] F.C.J. No. 51 \(Fed. T.D.\)](#), at paras. 17-21 [F.C.J.], affirmed [2002 CarswellNat 197](#), [2002 FCA 32](#), (Fed. C.A.); [Pfizer Canada Inc. v. Apotex Inc.](#), [2002 FCT 805](#), [2002 CarswellNat 1843](#), [\[2002\] F.C.J. No. 1078 \(Fed. T.D.\)](#), at paras. 62-66 [FCT]; [Shephard v. Fortin](#), [2003 FC 1296](#), [2003 CarswellNat 3459](#), [9 Admin. L.R. \(4th\) 19](#), [2003 CF 1296](#), (sub nom. *Shephard v. Canada (Royal Canadian Mounted Police)*) [\[2003\] F.C.J. No. 1638 \(F.C.\)](#), at paras. 22-26 [FC], reversed [2004 CarswellNat 3976](#), [19 Admin. L.R. \(4th\) 315](#), [2004 FCA 254 \(F.C.A.\)](#).

[FN43]. [Jiang v. Canada \(Minister of Citizenship & Immigration\) \(1998\)](#), [1998 CarswellNat 878](#), [46 Imm. L.R. \(2d\) 125](#), [\[1998\] F.C.J. No. 631 \(Fed. T.D.\)](#), at para. 7 [F.C.J.]; [Procter & Gamble Pharmaceuticals Canada Inc. v. Canada \(Minister of Health\)](#), [\[2003\] 4 F.C. 44](#), [2003 CarswellNat 1222](#), [2003 FCT 583 5](#), [\[2003\] F.C.J. No. 750 \(Fed. T.D.\)](#), at paras. 21-25 [F.C.], affirmed [\(2003\)](#), [2003 CarswellNat 3843](#), [2003 FCA 467](#), [\[2004\] 2 F.C.R. 85](#), [\[2003\] F.C.J. No. 1805 \(F.C.A.\)](#); [Adorable Junior Garments Inc. v. Minister of National Revenue \(1995\)](#), [1995 CarswellNat 2693](#), [\[1995\] F.C.J. No. 1722 \(Fed. T.D.\)](#), at paras. 17-20 [F.C.J.]; [Johnson & Johnson Inc. v. Boston Scientific Ltd./Boston Scientifique Ltée](#), [2004 FC 1672](#), [2004 CarswellNat 5905](#), [\[2005\] 4 F.C.R. 110](#), [\[2004\] F.C.J. No. 2040 \(F.C.\)](#), at para. 104 [FC].

[FN44]. [Bandali v. Canada \(Minister of Employment & Immigration\) \(1994\)](#), [1994 CarswellNat 220](#), [27 Imm. L.R. \(2d\) 142](#), [\[1994\] F.C.J. No. 922 \(Fed. T.D.\)](#), at para. 8 [F.C.J.]; [Smith v. Canada \(Attorney General\) \(1999\)](#), [1999 CarswellNat 2438](#), [\[1999\] F.C.J. No. 1751 \(Fed. T.D.\)](#), at paras. 19-21, 36-37 [F.C.J.], varied on reconsideration [\(2000\)](#), [2000 CarswellNat 249 \(Fed. T.D.\)](#); [Animal Alliance of Canada v. Canada \(Attorney General\)](#), [\[1999\] 4 F.C. 72](#), [1999 CarswellNat 846](#), (Fed. T.D.), at paras. 42-43 [F.C.].

[FN45]. [Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Canada \(Attorney General\)](#), [2002 FCT 1319](#), [2002 CarswellNat 3788](#), [\[2002\] F.C.J. No. 1799 \(Fed. T.D.\)](#), at paras. 9-10 [F.C.T.]; [Chen v. Canada \(Minister of Citizenship & Immigration\)](#), [2004 CarswellNat 2875](#), [35 Imm. L.R.](#)

[\(3d\) 122, 2004 FC 464, \[2004\] F.C.J. No. 567 \(F.C.\)](#), at para. 17 [F.T.R.]; [Figurado v. Canada \(Solicitor General\)](#), 2005 FC 347, 2005 CarswellNat 791, 28 Admin. L.R. (4th) 82, [2005] 4 F.C.R. 387, [2005] F.C.J. No. 458 (F.C.), at para. 40 [FC].

[FN46]. (1998), 1998 CarswellNat 878, [1998] F.C.J. No. 631 at para. 7 (Fed. T.D.).

[FN47]. (1999), 178 F.T.R. 84, 1999 CarswellNat 2231 (Fed. T.D.) at paras. 26-27 [F.T.R.].

[FN48]. [Kazi v. Canada \(Minister of Citizenship & Immigration\) \(2003\)](#), 2003 CarswellNat 4427, [2004] 1 F.C.R. 161, 34 Imm. L.R. (3d) 38, 238 F.T.R. 99, 2003 CF 948, [2003] F.C.J. No. 1212 (F.C.), at para. 33 [CF]. In *Kazi*, the decision to reject his application as a qualified worker was challenged. A new point system came into force on June 28, 2002, requiring 75 points instead of 70 to pass as a qualified worker. Kazi made his application on January 3, 2002. On July 28, 2002 he was evaluated and he obtained 73 points. As a result of the new point system his application was rejected. In Court, he argued that he was not aware of the new point system and was not given a chance to make his case. Counsel for the Minister argued that Kazi should have known that the point system changed: the presumption of knowledge of the law applies here and ignorance of the law is not an excuse. Although Martineau J. agreed that the presumption would normally apply, he found that such was not the case at bar because the department could not expect the applicant, at the moment he made his application, to observe a regulation that was not yet in force. To support his argument, Martineau J. referred to the RIAS which was pre-published on June 14, 2002 and which made the announcement that a new point system would likely be put in place. Martineau J. used this statement to find that the earliest possible time at which the applicant could have known about the new point system was June 14, 2002. Consequently, between this date and the time his application was processed, the applicant would not have had sufficient time to become cognizant of the new rules and subsequently change his application accordingly. See also *9101-9380 Québec Inc. c. Canada (Agence des Douanes & du Revenu)*, 2005 CF 309, 2005 FC 309, 2005 CarswellNat 584, [2005] A.C.F. No. 389 (F.C.) at paras. 10-11 [CF].

[FN49]. SOR/DORS/2002-227 at 307-08.

[FN50]. [Rogers Communications Inc. v. Canada \(Attorney General\)](#) (1998), 1998 CarswellNat 419, [1998] F.C.J. No. 368 at para. 13 [F.C.J.].

[FN51]. [Abel v. Canada \(Minister of Agriculture\)](#), 2001 FCT 1378, 2001 CarswellNat 2933 (Fed. T.D.) at para. 13 [*Abel* cited too FCT].

[FN52]. In 1994, Sullivan, *Construction of Statutes*, *supra* note 34 at 427, wrote that one of the reasons why she found the case law unsatisfactory is because "in responding to these **materials** the courts often rely on the rhetoric of the plain meaning rule, even though the substance of this rule no longer commands respect."

[FN53]. *Abel*, *supra* note 51 at para 14.

[FN54]. There were two other decisions in which the judges referred to consultation. However, it is more difficult to evaluate the weight the argument had with the judge's reasoning. As a consequence, these two cases are weaker examples, but they are nevertheless interesting because they show that judges refer to what is written in the 'consultation' section of the RIAS to make determinations. In *Cousins v. Canada (Minister of Agriculture)* (1993), 1993 CarswellNat 462, [1993] F.C.J. No. 581 (Fed. T.D.) [*Cousins* cited to F.C.J.], Rothstein J. said at para. 24:

The **regulatory** impact analysis statement confirms Mr. Paynter's evidence that the Regulations came about as a result of negotiations. It appears however that table stock

growers were not involved in the negotiations. What impact their presence would have had on the Regulations is of course only speculative. However, it is clear that the plight of the table stock growers, although affected, albeit indirectly, by the PV Yn Virus and restrictions on the sale of seed potatoes, has not been recognized under the Regulations. [para. 25]:

I am bound by the law. Mr. Cousins does not qualify for compensation under the Regulations. I regret that I am unable to make an order for compensation in his favour. *Rogers Communications Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General)* (1998), 1998 CarswellNat 419, [1998] F.C.J. No. 368 (Fed. T.D.) at para. 13 [F.C.J.].

[FN55]. (sub nom. *Teal Cedar Products Ltd. v. Canada* [1989], 2 F.C. 135, 1988 CarswellNat 157, 19 F.T.R. 35 (Fed. T.D.) at paras. 10-11, 24-26 [*Teal Cedar* cited to F.C.]. This decision, and this line of argument particularly, was quashed by the Federal Court of Appeal: (1988), [1989] 2 F.C. 158, 1988 CarswellNat 158F (Fed. C.A.) at paras. 10-16, leave to appeal refused (1989), 100 N.R. 320n (S.C.C.).

[FN56]. *Apotex Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General)* (1996), [1997] 1 F.C. 518, 1996 CarswellNat 2132, 123 F.T.R. 161, 48 Admin. L.R. (2d) 109, [1996] F.C.J. No. 1535 (Fed. T.D.), at para. 78 [F.C.], affirmed 2000 CarswellNat 889, 188 D.L.R. (4th) 145, 24 Admin. L.R. (3d) 279, [2000] 4 F.C. 264, 180 F.T.R. 278, [2000] F.C.J. No. 634 (Fed. C.A.), leave to appeal refused 2001 CarswellNat 281, [2001] 1 S.C.R. v, [2000] S.C.C.A. No. 379 (S.C.C.) [*Apotex A.G.* cited to F.C.]; *Bowen v. Canada (Attorney General)* (1997), [1998] 2 F.C. 395, 1997 CarswellNat 2078, 139 F.T.R. 1, 6 Admin. L.R. (3d) 263, [1997] F.C.J. No. 1526 (Fed. T.D.), at paras. 34, 49-50, 84-86 [F.C.]; *Animal Alliance of Canada v. Canada (Attorney General)*, [1999] 4 F.C. 72, 1999 CarswellNat 846, 168 F.T.R. 114 (Fed. T.D.), at paras. 51-52, 57-58 [F.C.]; *Assoc. des Pilotes de Lignes Internationales v. Urbino*, 2004 FC 1387, 2004 CarswellNat 4273, 263 F.T.R. 41, 21 Admin. L.R. (4th) 93 (F.C.), at paras. 10-13, 19-22 [FC]; *Apotex Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General)*, [2000] 4 F.C. 264, 266, 2000 CarswellNat 889, 188 D.L.R. (4th) 145, 24 Admin. L.R. (3d) 279, 180 F.T.R. 278, [2000] F.C.J. No. 634 (Fed. C.A.) at 268-69 [F.C.], leave to appeal refused 2001 CarswellNat 281, [2001] 1 S.C.R. v (S.C.C.).

[FN57]. Sullivan, *Construction of Statutes, supra* note 34. She also states another problem which will not be addressed in this article. She writes: "Third, in responding to these **materials** the courts often rely on the rhetoric of the plain meaning rule, even though the substance of this rule no longer commands respect."

[FN58]. *R. v. Butcher*, 2001 NFCA 33, 2001 CarswellNfld 182, [2001] N.J. No. 186 (Nfld. C.A.) at para. 83 [*Butcher* cited to NFCA].

[FN59]. P.-A. Côté, *The Interpretation of Legislation in Canada*, 2nd ed., (Cowansville, Québec: É d. Yvon Blais) at 398.

[FN60]. See *Rizzo Shoes, supra* note 29 at para. 21.

[FN61]. [2005] 1 S.C.R. 533, 2005 CarswellNat 1261, 253 D.L.R. (4th) 1, [2005] S.C.J. No. 26 (S.C.C.) [*Bristol-Myers* cited to S.C.R.].

[FN62]. *Ibid.*, at paras. 44, 96 and 104ff.

[FN63]. *Marquis of Camden v. Inland Revenue Commissioners* (1913), (1914) 1 K.B. 641 (Eng. C.A.).

[FN64]. *Peel (Regional Municipality) v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Co. of Canada* (1991), 78 D.L.R. (4th) 333, 1991 CarswellOnt 489 (Ont. C.A.), leave to appeal allowed 85 D.L.R. (4th) viii (note) (sub nom. *Oshawa Group Ltd. v. Ontario (Attorney General)*) [1991] 3

[FN65]. See also *Boutcher*, *supra* note 58 at para. 76, where Marshall J.A. stated: "such Statements have rapidly come to be recognized as authoritative sources of purpose and intent in construing federal legislation".

[FN66]. See *RJR-MacDonald Inc. v. Canada (Attorney-General)*, [1994] 1 S.C.R. 311, 1994 CarswellQue 120F, 111 D.L.R. (4th) 385, [1994] S.C.J. No. 17 (S.C.C.); *Friesen v. R.*, [1995] 3 S.C.R. 103, 1995 CarswellNat 988, 102 F.T.R. 238 (note) (S.C.C.).

[FN67]. The polycentric objectives sought by the government in its **regulatory** programs has been used by the Supreme Court as an argument to show deference to administrative decisions. See for example: *Barrie Public Utilities v. Canadian Cable Television Assn.*, [2003] 1 S.C.R. 476, 2003 CarswellNat 1226, 225 D.L.R. (4th) 206, 49 Admin. L.R. (3d) 161, [2003] S.C.J. No. 27 (S.C.C.) at para. 95 [S.C.R.]; *Baker v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration)*, [1999] 2 S.C.R. 817, 1999 CarswellNat 1124, 14 Admin. L.R. (3d) 173, [1999] S.C.J. No. 39 (S.C.C.) at para. 55 [S.C.R.].

[FN68]. *Teal Cedar*, *supra* note 55.

[FN69]. *Vriend v. Alberta*, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 493, 1998 CarswellAlta 210, 156 D.L.R. (4th) 385, [1998] S.C.J. No. 29 (S.C.C.) at para. 139 [S.C.R.].

[FN70]. Presumably, this would also be the case in the *Cousins* decision, *supra* note 54.

[FN71]. *Teal Cedar*, *supra* note 55.

[FN72]. *Duncan v. Knill* (1907), 96 (XCVI) The Law Times, 911 (Lord Alverstone, C.J., Darling and Phillimore, JJ.); *Johnson v. Sargant & Sons*, (1917), 87 K.B. Div. 122 (U.K.).

[FN73]. *Apotex A.G.*, *supra* note 56.

[FN74]. *Reference re Canada Assistance Plan (Canada.)*, (sub nom. *Reference re Canada Assistance Plan (British Columbia)*) [1991] 2 S.C.R. 525, 1991 CarswellBC 168, 1 Admin. L.R. (2d) 1, 83 D.L.R. (4th) 297 (S.C.C.) at 528 [S.C.R.].

[FN75]. *Apotex A.G.*, *supra* note 56 at 268.

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