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Pakistan: Teetering on the Brink of Islamic Revolution?

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Pakistan:

Teetering on the brink of Islamic Revolution?

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Masters of Arts in Corporate and Public Communications.
Seton Hall University

May 2005

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Chapter I

Introduction

The belt of borderland between Afghanistan and Pakistan, which runs from Peshawar in Pakistan's Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP) to Quetta in Baluchistan, is home to approximately 1.5 million Afghan refugees (UNHCR, 2000). Some 300, "woefully inadequate, refugee camps dot the landscape on the Pakistani side of the Pak-Afghan border"(Gall, 1988, p. 219). While the number of asylum seekers ensconced in these shelters may have fallen from its 1990 peak of 3.5 million, the distant rumble of artillery fire from Afghanistan floats across the border unabated (UNHCR, 2000).

Since Soviet tanks rolled into Afghanistan in 1979, Pakistan has been at the forefront of attempts to resolve conflicts between and at times manipulate the various factions within the borders of its western neighbor. The refugee problem is but one aspect of the multidimensional impact the crisis in Afghanistan has had on Pakistan. The most disquieting ramification, one not often noted by regional experts, has been the rampant intensification of domestic strife in Pakistan – both political and sectarian. There exists a nascent connection between Pakistan's continued involvement in the crisis and recent socio-political trends within its own borders.

Background

On the 30th of September 1947, a fledgling state, the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, petitioned the United Nations (UN) for admission to the organization. The only state to oppose this application was Afghanistan (UN Records, 1947). With that, Afghanistan fired the first salvo in a diplomatic war that continued intermittently until the Soviet

invasion in December 1979. At the heart of this animosity lay the issue of the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan – the Durand Line – delineated by an 1893 treaty between the British and the Afghans. Since Afghan independence in 1919, the government had rejected the border, claiming it has separated the Pashtun population – Afghanistan's largest ethnic group. The Afghan government laid claim to Pakistan's North West Frontier Province (NWFP) on the grounds that the Durand line separated the Pashtuns – the ethnic majority of Afghanistan – from their brethren in Afghanistan. Several times, in the years between 1948 and 1965, Afghanistan raised the specter of Pashtunistan – an independent Pashtun province (Dar, 1986). The ensuing failed political tete-a-tete culminated in escalation to limited fighting in 1960 and an eventual break in relations in 1961. The Tehran Agreement of 1963 reopened the border and relations were restored.

A fluid domestic political situation in Afghanistan and the Indo-Pak war of 1965 meant that both sides were preoccupied with other concerns in the years immediately following the Tehran Agreement. This unintentional normalcy continued until the fall of the Afghan monarchy in 1973.

With the coming to power of Muhammad Douod's leftist political party, hopes of a continued detente were shattered. From 1973 to 1975, each side engaged in a parry-and-thrust strategy of destabilization. Dauod repeatedly brought up the Pashtunistan issue, and allowed Baluch and Pashtun separatists to use the Afghan borderlands as sanctuaries. For its part, Pakistan hosted the likes of Gulbudin Hekmatyar and Barhanuddin Rabbani – radical Islamists avowed to bring the Dauod regime down. It also trained some 5,000

dissidents in secret Pakistani camps. These very same camps were later to play an indispensable role in the development of the Taliban. After several failed local insurrections in Afghanistan, practical measures at normalization of inter-state relationships were attempted.

Both Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, Pakistani Prime Minister at the time, and Dauod saw the benefits of fostering normal relations with each other. Iran, whose policies leaning were similar to those of Pakistan, offered \$3 billion in aid to Afghanistan – an offer that most certainly greased the cogs of the reconciliation machinery. State visits were exchanged but by the end of the decade both Bhutto and Dauod had been overthrown. In their respective places, General Zia ul Haq – an avowed Islamist – and President Muhammad Taraki – a communist – came to power. Resistance to the pro-Soviet regime in Kabul erupted almost immediately after the military coup in 1978, which brought it to power. In December 1979, the drone of approaching Soviet forces drowned out the anti-Communist slogans of the Afghan resistance.

The arrival of the Soviets changed Pakistan's relationship with Afghanistan, permanently. It had already been supporting the factions opposed to the communist regime of Muhammad Taraki. With Soviet forces in Afghanistan, Pakistan championed the mujahedin resistance and kept it alive. Mujahedin, plural of mujahid, which means fighter of holy war to defend or spread Islam. It did so, however, in a calculated manner. Pakistan gave "recognition" to the seven largest resistance groups – *Hezb-I-Islami (Hekmatyar)*, *Jamiat-I-Islami*, *Hezb-I-Islami (Khalis)*, *Ittehad-I-Islami*, *the Afghan National Liberation Front*, *Harkat-I-Inqilab-I-Islami*, and *the Mahaz-I-Milli-Islami-*

necessitating that the other, more minor, factions either disband themselves or ally with ones that were recognized (Marsden, 1998).

A myriad of factors converged to embroil Pakistan in the effort to resist Soviet occupation: the fear that the Soviets would ultimately try to push, through Pakistan, to the Arabian Sea, Pakistan's desire to return Afghan refugees before their socio-economic impact became too strong, and Zia's dedication to the defense of Islam from an atheistic communism. Perhaps the most over-riding factor was that by helping the Afghans undermine the Soviets, Pakistan would win the loyalty of a grateful nation, thereby quelling the demon of a renewed Pashtun nationalism for perpetuity. In such a context, the overriding role of implementation assigned to Pakistan's military intelligence establishment, the Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI), was understandable. However, the leading role it came to adopt in designing Pakistan's Afghan policy was less foreseeable (Weinbaum, 1994). The ISI's involvement in Afghanistan grew steadily to the extent of often undermining the diplomatic efforts of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The opinion in Pakistan was that it should be at the vanguard of directing the activities of the Afghan resistance. Leaders such as Zia saw the situation in Afghanistan as the ultimate defense of battered Muslims from atheistic elements. It was just such an emotional image that was played up in domestic discussions of Pakistan's obligations to their brothers across the border. This particularly suited Zia's Islamization policies. "General Zia found an irreconcilable contradiction between democracy and Islam, and went on to assert that if, in the pursuit of Islamization, democratic values had to be

abandoned the people of Pakistan had a duty to offer this sacrifice” (Rehman, 1988, p. 55). Despite such lofty, publicly declared, ideals the national security concerns of Pakistan were never subordinated to Zia’s personal agenda for an Islamic Utopia. Pakistan took a deliberate stance in eliciting both aid and support for the Afghan cause and in distributing it.

Need for the Study

Pakistan is the only country in the world to have been established solely as a homeland for Muslims. The relationship between the majority Sunni Muslims and the minority followers of Shi’ism has steadily deteriorated. The majority of Muslims, the world over, are adherents to the Sunni branch of Islam. Sunnism recognizes the first four Caliphs as the rightful successors of Muhammad. In contrast the Shi’ or Shia branch of Islam – the branch of a minority of Muslims – asserts the legitimate authority of Ali’s descendants.

Daily reports of sectarian and religious violence committed by various religious groups have increased in both frequency and severity. A report by Human Rights Watch concludes that since 1990 each year 1,000 people died in Pakistan as a result of ethnic or religious violence (World Report, 2001). Incidents of sectarian violence have tripled between 1989 and 1999, in Lahore, my hometown and the capital of the most populous province of Pakistan – Punjab – from 67 occurrences to 188. The death toll grew exponentially as well from 19 to nearly 200 (Sectarian Killings, 2004). Statistics rarely evoke emotion. It might, therefore, be better to place these numbers in context. There are typically 19 students in the average college seminar and a Boeing 727 can seat up to 200

passengers. In the last ten years, then, sectarian violence, typically perpetuated by religious groups such as the Lashkar-e-Tayba and the Sipah-e-Sahaba, went from consuming the lives of a seminar-room full of students to the lives of an entire planeload each year.

Religious parties have taken to challenge the legitimacy of the state by targeting events that Pakistani government has overlooked as acceptable digressions by the “Muslim” elite. New Year’s Eve celebrations at the Punjab Club in Lahore are just such a case in point. The Club has long been the site for liberal Lahoris to engage in New York style revelry— parties replete with the finest imported alcohol money can buy. There had always been an implicit understanding that the authorities would turn a blind eye on the drinking and dancing inside the Club’s whitewashed compound.

In 1993, the *Mullahs* of the city had issued a *Fatwa* that there would be repercussions if the Punjab Club continued with its typical festivities and they proved true to their word. A *Mullah* is a traditional leader of prayer at a local mosque. A *Fatwa* is a legal ruling / religious edict issued by Islamic scholars. The security instilled by the unspoken agreement was shattered along with countless windshields and rear-view mirrors. Three busloads of students from both Punjab University and Government College, all members of one religious party or another, stormed the Club and its parking lot with batons and *lathis*, sending the partygoers fleeing to their homes. A *lathi* is a large number of staff.

Less violent and, perhaps therefore, less noticed is the increasing number of mosques throughout the country’s cities. Lahore has been a rapid increase in mosque

construction. My own neighborhood is flanked on all sides by four different Sunni mosques. At most each is a five-minute walk from the other. At its most innocent, this is a sign of a heightened sense of one's prescribed duty as a Muslim to pray in congregation. At its most sinister level, it signals the growing influence and financial well being of fundamentalist religious groups.

Research Statement:

The study explores Pakistan's role in the ever changing Afghan situation. It focuses on the role of leadership of the Pakistani government and examines the costs of Pakistan's support and recognition of the Taliban in the context of the Pakistani nation-state. This discussion can be extracted from an examination of the various policy-phases of the United States toward both Afghanistan and Pakistan. It analyzes how this tripartite relationship has affected nationalism within the county and where it has brought Islam as a political entity in Pakistan. Some have gone as far as to conclude that Pakistan is teetering on the brink of a popular Islamic Revolution. I will argue, with counter evidence, such a revolution has no potential to take hold in Pakistan.

Relatively, it is the purpose of this study to know the history behind the religious violence in Pakistan, the connection of it to the emergence of the Taliban. To know the development of the sectarian violence will enable to critically analyze the cause of such violence and find solution to it. I believe that the one of the major factors that causes the violence is the unconscious decisions of its leaders throughout the decade. The study will assimilate facts and literature about the leadership in Pakistan and provide a connection

between leadership and violence. It is a common notion that a good leadership will outwit all differences in a country.

Rationale:

Factions in a nation maybe unified if there is a good leader who would lead the people to unity despite the differences in religion. The task of this thesis is to understand the mode of leadership in Pakistan and how it affected the nation-state. It is common knowledge that Pakistan is a country of Muslims. History dictates that religion is a very powerful weapon to manipulate the mind of the followers. It is important to note that religious leaders owe responsibilities in the staging violence in Pakistan. By scrutinizing the movements and conflicts of each sectarian faction, there could be a conclusion as to what kind of leadership Pakistan has had. The question is who is to blame? Many Pakistani blame the tremor in Pakistan to the foreigners who came into the country and make everything blur. But the gruesome reality is that the foreigners could not have entered the country if the leaders of Pakistan did not allow them. There is a missing link or crack in the leadership in Pakistan. And this paper will unleash that crack and analyze, scrutinize and discover the transparent fault in its system that made Pakistan one of the most dangerous countries to visit. Leadership has a very big factor in the stability and unity of a country and will prove that it is not the fault of the foreigners but the fault of the Pakistani leaders why the said country is flooded with political and sectarian violence.

Definition of Terms

1. *Sunnism* – This is the first sect of Islam and includes the majority of Muslims in the world. Majority of the Muslims in Pakistan / Afghanistan are of the Sunni branch.
2. *Shiaism* – the branch of a minority of Muslims that are mostly from Iran / Iraq area. There is a clash between Sunni and Shia Muslims.
3. *Mullah* – A traditional leader of prayer at a local mosque. He has a lot of influence with the local community.
4. *Fatwa* – legal ruling / religious edict issued by Islamic scholars. This is the calling of the local community to unite and work together. When a Fatwa is giving, the people are told to obey the Fatwa or else the people are going against their religion.
5. *Taliban* – the plural of the word Talib, means students. The majority of the Taliban are from Afghanistan that were educated at madrasas operating in Pakistan.
6. *Madrasas* – Religious educational institutions operating in Pakistan. This is where the Taliban learned to become religious and become freedom fighters.
7. *Mujahedin* – plural of mujahid, which means fighter of holy war to defend or spread Islam. These people include the Taliban who came over from Afghanistan to Pakistan to defend or spread Islam.

Limitations

The primary limitation of this study is that the data included in this study is primarily gathered from publications. Data on this topic is not readily available in standard reference materials. Therefore the author relied on primary data and utilized secondary data to supplement his findings. The boundaries of the study are of the borderland between Afghanistan and Pakistan, which runs from Peshawar in Pakistan's North West Frontier Province (NWFP) to Quetta in Baluchistan. The timeframe is from 1994 to 1999 – a period that marked the emergence and rise to power of the Taliban in Afghanistan.

CHAPTER II

Review of Literature:

Pakistan leadership is directly connected to the reign of Allah as an article comments that: "There is only one way for Pakistan's life, survival, and progress: trust in and reliance on Allah and peoples' waking up, so that the reign could come in the hands of the real representatives and well-wishers of people and Ummah instead of being with opportunist cheats, so that the people could commit themselves to the duty of working for their future" (Ahmed, 2000, p. 189). The leaders in Pakistan are also religious leaders and they inculcate in the administration of the Government, the doctrine of Islam. Verily, the country's goal is dependent on its religious beliefs and aspirations.

Relatively, Pakistan has had exactly one type of leadership: Dictatorship. The thing about dictators -of any stripe- is that they operate on the whole cult of personality philosophy (Chapati Mystery, 2005). The disgust with dictators begins and ends with the simple observation that they epitomize that particular view of the "politics of the masses". Pakistanis are forever stuck in the "not yet" time - lacking education or training or a civil society to elect governments to represent themselves. The masses are uncouth and uncivilized. "mature" democracies such as the United States do not have mass rallies and tire burning after a child is killed in a road accident. Verily, the lack of leadership on the national stage in Pakistan is inherently a representation of the lack of electoral politics and the dominance of the dictator. Leadership has a big weight in contributing to the maturity of the country. When dictatorship exist, it is inevitable that discrimination to certain classes of masses will arise and consequently insurgencies will follow. Factions

will multiply and there will be turmoil in the country, just like what happened in Pakistan.

Accordingly, one lesson learned from the Kargil War defeat of Pakistan over India is the lack of good leadership in Pakistan as the commentators suggest that "And as the operation incrementally moved up on the escalation ladder, Pakistan's decision-making system betrayed signs of confusion and dysfunction. In fact, the shortcomings of Pakistan's national security decision-making were revealed by the Kargil Conflict were not episodic but systemic" (Kapila, 1999, p. 38).

It shall be noted that Pakistan defeat was due to some internal dysfunction in its military undertaking. It seems that there is a conflict between military leaders in Pakistan; to make a simple decision would be impossible to efficiently execute. If there is an internal commotion in the military the simple and logical conclusion is that there is lack of leadership in the military. The military is one of the most obedient bodies in the government; its function is only to follow orders and if there is confusion and dysfunction in the military there is an awful leadership in the country. If the military cannot be disciplined and lead well, how much more the civilians, which have broader rights than the military.

Verily, it shows that Pakistan has a poor leadership and a country that has a poor leadership is a weak country because it is believed by the researcher that leadership is the quintessence of a strong nation.

The Unholy Alliance

Any discussions of Pakistan's association with the Afghan mujahedin must proceed in tandem with duly crediting the part played by the United States of America, its

Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and the awesome military arsenal from which it gave freely to the anti-Soviet Afghan cause. (Anatomy of a Victory, 1992). As early as 1980, the US had plunged itself into Afghanistan at least indirectly. President Carter's National Security Advisor, Zbigniew Brzezinski, posed for photographers at a Pakistani border outpost near the Khyber Pass in February 1980 brandishing a submachine gun symbolically at the Afghan border (Cordovez, 1995). Figurative posturing was but an iota of the support the US gave to the mujahedin in the course of the 1980s.

The Reagan administration provided \$3.2 billion dollars in military and economic assistance to Pakistan as appreciation for the country's hard-line stance against the Soviet forces. Upon the expiration of this initial package, in 1987, military sales were made to Pakistan of \$1.74 billion and \$2.28 billion in economic grant aid was also provided. Such American largesse was closely matched by infusions of aid capital by both development financial institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) as well as by other Western donor countries.

The Rise of Religious Political Parties

Under Zia's martial law regime, all political parties had been banned. None was allowed to address public gatherings or to even publish its party literature. None that is except that *Jamaat-I-Islami* (JI) – a party that had championed the Afghan cause and had built inroads into the Afghan *Hezb-I-Islami*, the primary recipient of Pak-US support. One of the main elements of the *Ji* is that it is a Sunni Muslim party that is bitterly opposed to the Shia minority in Pakistan. It was the only party allowed access to the refugee camps in the Pakistan. The leader of the *Jamaat-I-Islami*, Sheikh Abdullah Khan,

fostered a planned purge of political leftists and moderate Islamists from the growing number of refugee camps in Pakistan. This set the stage for the *Ji* to dominate political and religious indoctrination of the displaced masses in the camps.

More Guns, More Deaths

Existing socio-political strife in Pakistan coupled with ardent religious fervor made for a heady mixture that sent many reeling to the madrasas of the *Ji*. Inadequate education and limited economic opportunities combined to create an environment that allowed parties like the *Jamaat-I-Islami* to assimilate in its ranks thousands of disillusioned teens (Weinbaum, 1994). To further complicate matters was the large number of weapons that were continually being siphoned off from the supply pipelines – both by the Pakistani military establishment and also by the Afghan resistance (Wirsing, 1991). Such guns from the US-provided arms caches allowed Pakistan's religious parties to arm impressionable individuals not only with Egyptian-made Kalashnikovs but also with narrow minded hard line interpretations of an otherwise tolerant religion – Islam. With this arsenal, the *Jamaat-I-Islamis* of Pakistan began to develop their own role in the prolonged saga of the Pakistani-backed Mujahedin.

Ungodly Trade

It has often been alleged that certain elements within the Pakistani establishment were cooperating with mujahedin commanders in the drug trade. The national Logistics Cell – the army unit handling the delivery of arms shipments to the resistance groups, reportedly facilitated the transport of the narcotics across the border (Anatomy of a Victory, 1992). The very trucks that took weapons to the mujahedin brought drugs back.

It is likely that the illicit trade was seen as an acceptable loss in the battle against the Soviets. A US government estimated that the heroin from the Pak-Afghan border accounted for 51% of the US supply in 1984 (The National Narcotics, 1984).

In 1988, the Geneva Accords were signed and marked the beginning of the end of Soviet presence in Afghanistan. As with other initiatives for Afghanistan, the UN-brokered peace deal was far from being a smoothly executed operation. Accusations and counter-accusations of violating the terms of the Accords were leveled all around between Afghanistan, Pakistan, the Soviet Union and the United States. Neither the American nor the Soviet camps had stopped the flow of arms to their respective satellites in Afghanistan. Each side walked a diplomatic tightrope as it sought to disentangle itself from Afghanistan.

The Mujahedin were opposed to the Najibullah government that was being left in charge in the wake of the Geneva Accords. In 1992, Najibullah's regime was overthrown and the Mujahedin took over Kabul. More inflammatory than the fall of the city itself was the fact that it had fallen to the Tajik and Uzbek forces of Masud and Dostum. With the fall of Kabul, 300 years of Pashtun occupation of the capital city came to an end. War did not. A civil war for the control of Kabul erupted almost immediately after the ouster of Najibullah.

From the leadership model of Pakistan it can be concluded that a country with good leadership will grow, and a country with poor leadership will easily wither away. This theory the researcher arrived is not only based on Pakistan's History but also the history of the World. It shows that those countries that have good and mature leader

grows and become a very powerful and wealthy country. And those countries that have poor leaders are likely to become a poor country. The significance of leadership in trying to evaluate the strengths and opportunities of a country is material. A country's direction is dependent on its leader and therefore if the leader of a country lacks foresight and skill to make a good decision, ultimately, the country will suffer.

Leadership is significant in a country's development. In order for a country to go in a right direction there must be a good leader who will not only think for his own benefit but the benefit of a nation as a whole in order to minimize prejudice and discrimination. A leader who is unprejudiced will unite a nation because his/her decisions are rational and just and there are no special class of individuals he/she prioritizes. One of the reasons why factions in a government are formed is it is because of a loss of trust and confidence of a certain class of individuals to the leader of a nation. A leader must show respect to the ideals and sentiments of its people and will make judgment according to light of the Nation. In making decisions that benefit of the Nation as a whole, should be given due course.

Another theory the researcher had observed and formulated is that there must be a separation of powers between state and religion. It is observed that the benevolent factor of the factions in Pakistan is that it is because of Religion. In Pakistan, religion plays a vital role in running the government and one thing bad about religion is that it has a lot of prejudices and discriminations. If religion and government will be one, verily, a nation will be filled of religious militant and factions who will fight for the right of their religion because a religion had been imposed to the entire country and therefore others who are not member of the said religion recognized by the country will be prejudice. We all

know that religion is a very powerful weapon, it can surpass any weapon, and could make an individual do the unthinkable. Therefore, there must be a separation between state and religion. And this had been inculcated in the constitution of the United States and many peaceful nations.

Relatively, the state will not favor any religion in order to avoid prejudice and in order not to offend other religious sects. We know that Pakistan is a very religious country and if you are going to prejudice one sectarian, that sectarian might be the biggest enemy of a country. That is what exactly happened in Pakistan that is why there is confusion and dysfunction of its government. The dictator in Pakistan only recognizes his religion, thus, such act will offend other religion and would definitely cause the brink of religious militant against his reign. Therefore it is important to separate religious beliefs and aspirations from political endeavors, for if not separate, it would cause internal chaos.

Taliban: Soldiers of Peace?

In the summer of 1994, a new player appeared on the Afghan battlefields – the Taliban. Lore has it that a local commander in Kandahar kidnapped and raped two girls. The girls' parents went to a local madras and appealed to the teacher, Mullah Mohammad Omar, for help. Incensed at the continuing abuse of power and torture of the populace, the teacher took 30 of his students and stormed the commander's base, freed the girls and hung the commander (Davis, 1995). This ragtag group of students then purportedly rose to power, under Mullah Omar, on a wave of mass support and approval. The group that attacked the commander's base was the Taliban.

The group claimed that its purpose was to free Afghanistan from the yoke of a corrupt leadership and to create a peaceful society that met the dictates of Islam. They claimed to be fighting to bring peace to a country that had known war for far too long. However, before such idealistic goals could be met, they had to establish themselves against the Mujahedin factions who had been armed by the US and Pakistan since 1979, the Taliban needed support – both political and military. Their first step in gaining political support came when an associate of Mullah Mohammad Omar, Mullah Mohammad Rabbani, traveled to Kabul to gain the endorsement of President Rabbani.

At about the same time as the Taliban were trying to rally other Afghan groups to support them, the newly elected government of Benazir Bhutto in Pakistan was seeking to open up a trade route to Central Asia. Naseerullah Babur, the country's Interior Minister at the time, assumed a leading role in trying to assure that such routes would indeed be reopened. Fighting in Afghanistan continued to be an insurmountable hurdle in this context, as it was not safe for trade convoys to pass through the country. After visiting Afghanistan in September to survey the roads, he announced that an experimental convoy would pass from Quetta to Kandahar and on to Asykhabad, Turkmenistan (Dawn, 2000).

It is inconceivable that such a step could have been taken without intelligence support from the ISI. The ISI, which runs an extensive intelligence network in and around Kandahar, must almost certainly have known of the emergence of the Taliban at this time. Pakistan had, till then, primarily been supporting Gulbudin Hekmatyar as its primary vassal in Afghanistan. Hekmatyar had proven useless by 1994 having lost ground militarily and having divided the Pashtuns with his extremism. The Taliban were

in need of support and promised to be more pliable and viable entity. Evidence suggests that the makers of Pakistan's Afghan policy reassessed their strategy and decided to aid the Taliban.

Beginner's Luck

On the 12th of October 1994, a band of 200 Taliban from both Kandahar and Madrasas on Pakistani territory converged on the small border town of Spin Baldak – a garrison of Gulbudin Kekmatyar (Davis, 1995). A short battle and a handful of casualties later, Spin Baldak fell. Just outside the town was an arms dump, which the Taliban were also able to capture. Here the Taliban acquired some 18,000 Kalashnikovs, dozens of artillery pieces, immense quantities of ammunition and many vehicles. There were reports that the Taliban raid was aided by covering fire from Pakistani artillery on the other side of the border. If these reports are indeed then the Pakistani establishment had facilitated the capture of Spin Baldak yet again - the first time it had provided similar assistance to Mujahedin forces in 1988. To Further compound international consternation over Pakistani involvement in the incident, Spin Baldak had apparently been looted over the years and reportedly did not contain the quantities of weapons that the Taliban claimed to have come into.

The Baldak incident helps provide the perfect screen behind which Pakistan could support the Taliban without revealing its direct involvement. This theory is further compounded by the fact that on the 29th of October – barely 3 weeks after Baldak – Naseerullah Babur took a 30 truck convoy laden with medicines, consumer goods, and food stuffs from Quetta on the “experimental“ journey through Afghanistan to

Turkmenistan. He took along an entourage of 6 ambassadors to Pakistan in an effort to give them first hand evidence of the safety of the route and to drum investment for reconstruction and roadwork enhancement. The six ambassadors were from United States, United Kingdom, China, Italy, Spain and South Korea to the Islamic Republic of Pakistan

It is hard to believe that an Interior Minister could instigate such a massive trade operation through a foreign land in such a short time without the complicity of more informed divisions of the government apparatus. Babur's long standing relationship with the Bhutto family and the military leadership is a matter of public knowledge. What is not yet public is how closely the military and its intelligence branch helped coordinate such a foreign relation's coup.

Warlords within Afghanistan were infuriated by the Taliban's conquest at Spin Baldak. They detained the Babur-led convoy at Takht-e-Pul, just outside Kandahar on the 2nd of November. Taliban reinforcements from Pakistan freed the political hostages the next day. From here they swept on into Kanadahar where one of the strongest commanders capitulated to the Taliban and those that opposed the students onslaught were swept away in two days (Davis, 1998). The capitulation of this commander did not come cheaply – one estimate puts the amount spent to “win” his allegiance at \$1.5 million.

In November, the Taliban continued to steam ahead, galvanized by support from Madrasas in Pakistan if (as Pakistan claims) by nothing else (Davis, 1998). The reinforced numbers of the Taliban moved into the Uruzgan and Zabul provinces where

their willingness to buy submission proved instrumental in the surrender of forces in those provinces. December and January saw the battle for Helmand unfold and end with the Taliban claiming yet another victory. Their enemy Gulbuddin Hekmatyar – alienated the leadership of Ghazni by attacking them, thus helping them on their way. Ghazni, which had earlier rejected Taliban calls to disarm, now aligned itself with the religious students against Hekmatyar.

Such alignment against non-government forces prompted reports that the Taliban were on the side of the Rabbani government. The Taliban, for its part, dispelled any such notion, saying, “We are neutral in the power struggle between Hekmatyar and Rabbani” (Marsden, 1998, p. 128). As news of successive Taliban victories spread some 12,000 Afghani and Pakistani Madrasas students had begun enlisting in the Taliban ranks. Meanwhile, Pakistan was coming under mounting world pressure to explain its position on the Taliban to the world. In February 1995, at the time, Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto formally denied backing the Taliban. “We have no favorites in Afghanistan and we do not interfere in Afghanistan.. If Afghans want to cross the border, I do not stop them. I can stop them from re-entering but most of them have families here” (Report on Afghanistan, 1995, p. 168). While Bhutto tried to assuage the world’s concerns, the Taliban were busy over-running the Charasayab headquarters of Hekmatyar.

Heart, however, remained a key prize in the designs of not only the Taliban but also of the Pashtun transport mafia that backed them. There exists in Pakistan an extensive smuggling network that is known locally as the bara system. The Quetta based arm of this pan Baluchistan – NWFP truck transport smuggling Mafia saw Heart as essential for the

expansion of their operation to Iran and Central Asia. Ahmed Shah Masud, the Mujahedin military commander who continues to be the single biggest enemy of the Taliban, inflicted numerous attacks and even more casualties on the advancing Taliban through March and April.

Using the summer of 1995 to regroup and coordinate their efforts, the Taliban reportedly received technical help through their Pakistani and Saudi backers. The leader of Heart launched an offensive against the Taliban in August 1995. What he encountered was a Taliban that had rearmed and reinforced not only its stockpile of munitions and vehicles but also the size of its rank – all courtesy of the ISI and its advisers (Rashid, 2000). The counter offensive of the Taliban saw Heart come under their control. As a direct retaliation to its involvement, the Pakistani Embassy in Kabul was sacked and pillaged by the student group.

Friends Indeed:

The following year – 1996 – saw a series of attempts at alignment and realignment by the now fast – diminishing number of factions in Afghanistan. The Rabbani government tried to ally itself with General Rahid Dostum against the Taliban. Islamabad attempted to intervene with the same commanders in favor of the Taliban, but failed. This further mobilized the Rabbani government, which sent a delegation to Iran, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan to garner support for the anti-Taliban forces in Afghanistan. Iran's concerns over an overtly anti-Shia power in Afghanistan backed by traditional rivals Pakistan and Saudi Arabia manifested themselves in the pledge of support to the Rabbani delegation.

In the face of growing opposition to the Taliban, both Saudi Arabia and Pakistan stepped up their aid to the Taliban. Pakistan went as far as to put Kandahar on the national telephone network, providing it with the same prefix as the Baluch capital – Quetta – 081. This increased incidence of support was also directly implicated in the surrender of Jalalabad (Rubin, 1996). The Taliban rode this new wave of support thorough Nangarhar, Laghman, Kunar and Sarobi provinces. They continued to pursue the fleeing government supporters northwards even as Ahmed Shah Masud ordered that Kabul be evacuated in September 1996. Not content to capture the capital and solidify their position, the Taliban forces chased pell-mell after the fleeing forces of Masud.

Masud, ever the tactician, took advantage of the unruly charge and retaliated causing the onrushing Taliban to turn face and retreat to Kabul. Masud's push back towards Kabul brought him the Bagram air base and within striking distance from Kabul. The ensuing shelling of Kabul both from Bagram and from Dostum resulted in rising casualties for the Taliban. Pakistan's clergy, particular those of the *Jamaat-I-Islami* proved invaluable to the Taliban movement yet again. *Ji* shut down its Madrasas thereby forcing their students to enlist in the ranks of the Taliban. The state apparatus also lent a hand by abolishing visa and passport requirements for Taliban volunteers. These students an exact account of whom is not available helped turn the tide of the battle against Masud. By the time Christmas rolled by, the Taliban had regained what Masud had wrested from them.

Chapter III

Methodology:

The data included in this study is primarily gathered from publications. Data on this topic is not readily available in standard reference materials and experts are not easy to contact for interviews and personal opinions. Therefore the author relied on primary data and utilized secondary data to supplement his findings. The study is designed from a research standpoint accessing studies, reports, and opinions from organization. The Internet has been an invaluable research tool as it provides information from organizations across the United States, as well as internationally. The web is a very suitable form of finding information / published papers regarding this study. It also facilitates global access to information despite any distance.

The boundaries of the study are of the borderland between Afghanistan and Pakistan, which runs from Peshawar in Pakistan's NorthWest Frontier Province (NWFP) to Quetta in Baluchistan. The timeframe is from 1994 to 1999 – a period that marked the emergence and rise to power of the Taliban in Afghanistan.

Chapter IV

Results: A Model of Leadership

I believe the theory that Pakistan leaders are poor in leadership skills causing faction within the government. Its leaders lack the skill to unite the sects in Pakistan, that is why there are terrorism and anti-government militants. It is important to consider leadership because the nation's direction is dependent on the decision of a leader. More so, the system of government Pakistan is adopting right now is dictatorship in which I believe is not feasible. Dictatorship will give rise to prejudices and discriminations to religious groups in which Pakistan is rich of. The Pakistanis take religion seriously and if their religious beliefs are offended, these people who belong to the group will defend their religion. Furthermore, dictatorship will also cripple the voice of the majority and would cause internal combustion in the country and might lead to civil war.

The researcher believes that the insurrections and rebellions in Pakistan are caused by poor leadership and that is why until now Pakistan is not at peace to itself. Religion is a good undertaking but it could also be harmful if it will be made to govern a country, like Pakistan. If religion and state are not be separated, an extremist form of government will be established and it is inevitable that a lot of people will be prejudice and discriminated. The people who will be discriminated and prejudiced will be motivated to react or fight against the government and will make their fight a very meaningful one. This is a very dangerous situation and that is why there are a lot of bombing and religious violence in Pakistan until today. If you are going to have a very religious leader, such leader will be very prejudiced and his/her decisions will be

impaired by reason of his/her belief. Belief is one thing and leader is other thing. If these two will be combined, chaos will arise.

The concluding theory is that a country needs a good leader who is unprejudiced and just and who knows what he/she is doing. For if the decisions will be based on religious beliefs and aspirations, definitely, the decision will be tainted with bias and prejudice. The decision will cause faction and the leader will lose his/her ability to unite his/her nation under one roof.

Massacre at Mazar-e-Sharif

Mazar-e-Sharif was to the next Taliban goal. Internal disputes and blood feuds between the leadership of Mazar led to the betrayal of the city's commander, General Rashid Dostum, and a Taliban victory. This, however, was not to be the only betrayal in the struggle to win Mazar. The Taliban refused to share power with Dostum. Instead, they set about disarming this man and the rest of the city, which is comprised of the Uzbek and Hazara ethnic group. One group of Hazaras refused to have their weapons taken from them and revolted. Taliban ineptitude proved to be their undoing as the entire city rose up against them. Trapped in the veritable maze of the city's alleyways – the Taliban fell by the hundreds.

While the Taliban were trying to free themselves from the bear pit into which they had hurled themselves, Pakistan was busy compounding its intractability by issuing a statement of formal recognition to the Taliban. Pakistan's Foreign Minister Gohar Ayub Khan, issued a statement on May 25th 1997 stating, "The Taliban is not in effective control of most of the territory of Afghanistan and is representative of all ethnic groups in

that country” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1997, p. 98). Within hours, the Taliban’s “effective control” was weakening.

Masud’s forces joined in and the ensuing all-front battle left 3000 dead and 3600 were taken prisoners (Rashid, 2000) Perhaps indicative of Pakistan’s complicity is the fact that 250 Pakistani citizens were killed and 500 captured. Once more, the call to Pakistan’s madrasa students went out – the response 5,000 eager and fresh recruits (550 Pakistani Students, 1997). It was these recruits that allowed the Taliban to weather the defeat and the bitter winter that soon slowed down fighting between the various factions for the rest of the year.

Perhaps the connivance of Pakistan’s military and intelligence establishments was highlighted by its acquiescence to yet another offensive to the northern enclave of Bamiyan in the late summer of 1998 (550 Pakistani Students, 1997). Bamiyan – to the northwest of Kabul – is a city of Hazaras – an ethnic minority in Afghanistan. The Taliban had blocked all routes in and out of the city and the people within the city were starving. It appears that neither international criticism of the inexcusable blockade of Bamiyan nor the cold brutality of the siege made any impression on Pakistan’s decision-makers. The government of Pakistan saw fit to allocate 600,000 tons of wheat to the Taliban as well as 2 billion Rupees to support this new push north (Rashid, 2000). ISI officers, to help prepare the attack strategy, followed the usual infusion of Pakistani and Afghan Madrasa students this time.

The Taliban swarmed Mazar as Dostum deserted and Uzbek commanders took bribes to allow uncontested access for the Taliban to the forces arrayed for Mazar-e-

Sharif's defense. The Taliban targeted the Hazara population for its ethnicity and then went on to kill 11 Iranian diplomats for their Shia faith (Winchester, 1991). The ensuing diplomatic and political ire left the world united against Afghanistan. In December 1998 the UN tabled a very tough sanction proposal against the Taliban and Afghanistan. Just as there had been only one dissenting voice against Pakistan's inclusion in the UN in 1947, there was a solitary whimper of opposition to the sanctions against Afghanistan – that of Pakistan.

A country that has already received international admonishment for conducting nuclear tests, Pakistan could have done much better for its own international position by not aligning itself against the UN sanctions. How can one be expected to believe that there is “nothing but diplomatic support“ for the Taliban from Pakistan in the face of such self-destructive behavior? There is undoubtedly more than a diplomatic relationship at stake – why else would the Pakistani government try to alienate itself even more in the international community of states for a group like the Taliban whose atrocities have been well documented.

The preceding section is meant to highlight Pakistan's inextricable and inexplicable loyal stance vis-à-vis the Taliban. The next sections look at what this loyalty had meant for Pakistan. It must be remembered that Pakistan's policy toward Afghanistan was heavily influenced by the US during Soviet occupation. The change in the US stance subsequent to the Soviet pullout was equally important to how Pakistan's Afghan policy developed. All these effects taken together inform the following discussions.

However, a number of caveats are necessary at this point. The word “effect” is somewhat misleading. It implies a simple causal relationship – one that is not quite as simple to establish. Before the effects of Pakistan’s commitment to the Taliban can be fully appreciated, one must establish a sense of the state of Pakistan – both from an internal perspective and from the point of view of the nation-state in the international system.

Pakistan: The Unwitting Victim

Most of today’s Taliban’s are the off springs of the Jihad against the Soviet Union. Many carry Pakistani identification cards as they were born in the refugee camps in Pakistan - country in which many of their families still reside. They grew up being educated in Madrasas run by the *Jamiat-i-Ulema-i-Islam (JUI)* – educated for free, studying the Holy Quran and Islamic law. It was in Pakistan that they received international refugee assistance and it was here that they leased land to grow fodder and herd animals. Their most ardent linkages are thus with Pakistan. But just what have these linkages brought Pakistan.

In 1950, Pakistan gave Afghanistan permission to import duty-free goods through what was called the Afghan Transit Trade agreement. Smuggling under this agreement began soon afterwards, when goods trucks would enter Afghanistan, sell a fraction of their cargo, turn around and sell the goods in Pakistan. While the smuggling has gone on since, never before has the mafia known such political clout (Rashid, 2000).

The Quetta faction of the smuggling mafia in Pakistan has had strong ties with the Taliban since their early days. It was instrumental to pushing through the Taliban's initial military campaigns. It wants to expand its operation and is willing to finance any cause that will allow it to do so. The loss to the Pakistan economy has risen from \$80 million in 1992 to \$600 million in 1997 – an astronomical increase to say the least (Rashid, 2000). This is a significant portion of the country's imports – 30% in 1998.

Coupled with this has been the increased corruption in the border regions – if the jostling within the lower-echelons of the bureaucratic wing for posts in NWFP or Baluchistan is any indication – to officials. Posts such as those with the Customs Department and Border Security Forces allow for lucrative bribes to exchange hands. This situation has been exacerbated by the mafia's involvement in car-jacking operations throughout the country – 6500 were stolen in Karachi alone from 1992-1998 (Rashid, 2000).

Attempts to reign in the bara system in the last few years have only highlighted the state's inability to control the trade and its vulnerability to criminal interest groups in the country. The measurable economic effects aside, there is growing resentment in the industrial zones in Pakistan for the Afghans that perpetuate the smuggling and hence cripple domestic industry. According to one Vice-chairman of the Central Board of Revenue, goods worth about \$200 million a year are smuggled by Afghans under the Transit Trade agreement, depriving Pakistan of customs revenues in excess of \$100 million. The transit trade is growing fast. In 1995, the number of televisions sets imported by Afghanistan was ten times greater than the number imported by Pakistan – on paper,

at least. The government believes most of the goods never reach Afghanistan. They are delivered to tribal areas bordering Afghanistan and then distributed throughout Pakistan, where they are sold for less than legally imported goods.

Another dimension that of religion must also be mentioned. The *Jamiat-i-Ulema-i-Islam* had not played a significant role in aiding the Mujahedin during the course of the war against the Soviets. That role, as has been noted earlier, was carried out by the *Jamaat-i-Islami* – an ideological rival. The Jamiat, however, built up a more covert support base among the Taliban through the numerous free Madrasas that it ran in the tribal belt of Baluchistan.

The Jamiat are *Deobandi Muslims* – a fundamental reformist sect that propagates a narrow interpretation of Islam. It inculcates an Islam that is stringently against women exercising a role in politics and one that denounces Shia Muslims as non-believers. (Islamic Reformism) The loyalty the Jamiat has generated among the Taliban, not only for the education of their children but also for other relief initiatives, has allowed the *JUI* to gain access to military training camps that were once the domain of arch rival, the *Jamaat-i-Islami (JI)*. From these camps, some say the Jamiat and its allies train recruits for the conflicts in Chechnya, Yugoslavia, and Kashmir.

But this was just one aspect of this relationship. The Taliban gave sanctuary to the most militant of Pakistan's Sunni extremist groups. These groups killed Pakistani Shias, and agitated for the declaration of Pakistan as a Sunni state. In fact the support was leading to a 'Talibanization' of Pakistan. " [A]lready small fundamentalist tribal emirates are appearing on Pakistani soil. Afghanistan will accentuate centrifugal

tendencies within Pakistan” (Dar, 1986, p. 32). The Taliban also appealed to a spectrum of militant Islamist groups across the region from the Abu Sayyaf rebels in the Philippines to the Chechen Muslim resistance. The most notorious of these was al Qaeda (the Base)— the group led by Osama Bin Laden. On the FBI’s ten-most wanted list, this individual has become synonymous with any mention of Islamic fundamentalism (US vs Osama Bin Laden, 1994).

The Taliban’s associations with such avowedly anti - American groups in conjunction with several other factors played into the US policy towards post - 1994 Afghanistan. This has in turn affected US attitudes towards Pakistan.

Taliban and the United States: Making do

The subtitle of this section takes its name from the words of Robert Gates, former Director of the CIA, in a 1993 interview, ”...you had to make do with the strategic situation in Afghanistan” (Davis, 1998, p. 93). He was referring to the US attitude towards the anti-Soviet Afghan Jihad. It was exactly such an approach that resulted in the drastic change in the US stance towards Afghanistan after 1992. By this time America’s greatest concern – the Soviet Union – had disintegrated. Without a direct threat to motivate it, the US saw its Afghan policy become as directionless as the rapidly changing political situation in Afghanistan.

When the Taliban emerged in 1994, the US, like Pakistan denied any knowledge of or complicity with the group. The former, if not the latter, seems unbelievable at best. The US had strong reasons to bolster the Taliban in the context of Cold War. Given their

proclaimed objectives, the Taliban promised to be important to US interests in the region. A largely Sunni group wanting to restore Islam to Afghanistan, if successful, would be invaluable against Iranian and Russian interests in the country. A group wanting to bring peace to a war-infested state would likely try to abolish the terrorist training camps within its borders and return order to the country as a whole. Furthermore, Pakistan, its long-time ally, would be able to gain a better strategic position in the region by establishing an overland trade route to central Asia.

Perhaps the most directly important fact in coaxing the US along in Afghanistan was the Taliban's interest in allowing the construction of oil and gas pipelines through the country from Central Asia to Pakistan. The main contender for the pipeline was a US - led coalition of Unocal and Delta Oil companies (Rashid, 2000). The projection for oil output that the Central Asia-Afghanistan-Pakistan pipeline would be much-needed alternative to the Middle East's global monopoly on oil supplies. The pipeline could start pumping a million barrels of oil per day. Once it was linked to other Central Asian oil fields, it could pump 5 million barrels a day. (Davis, 1998) With such tremendous production capacities being touted, it is no wonder that the US looked on avidly from the sidelines as events unfolded in Afghanistan. Unocal tried to cement its ties with the Taliban to rally support for the pipeline. Its team of consultants drew heavily from the pool of Americans that had been involved in US operations during the Afghan Jihad. It also funded an institution that established vocational education programs in Afghanistan. These attempts at fostering goodwill were self-serving, however, as 9 of the 14 skills these programs were designed to impart were peculiar to building pipelines (Davis, 1998).

While visions of fields of black gold continued to blur the sight of many in the US, the progress of the Taliban did not. They did not seem to be making as easy a progress had been envisioned. Neither were they wooing the outside world by not stopping the burgeoning production of opium within their territories. On the contrary, they were, in fact, profiting from it. By 1997, 7.5% of the estimated 2,500 tons produced by Afghanistan was reportedly coming from the Taliban's base area - Kandahar. Most of this crop was channeled to processing units in Pakistan and its port in Karachi.

The Taliban earned increasing ire from the Western world by continuing to provide safe haven to Osama Bin Laden. Osama had maintained his links with Afghanistan since the early 1980's – a time when the Mujahedin cause had galvanized Islamist militia the world over. His claims to notoriety have grown at the cost of more than 3000 American lives. The FBI indictment lists a whole slew of charges against Osama, of which the bombing of the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania and the World Trade Centers were perhaps the most deadly. Bin Laden holds extremist interpretations of Islam, which call for Muslims to wage war on the West, its decadence and the Zionist plot on all fronts. Such views make his support and training for Kashmiri militants for Jihad against India all the easier to fathom.

The US reaction to Bin Laden's activities was to launch seventy cruise missiles at campsites in Afghanistan. Several of these missiles hit unintended targets in Baluchistan. Coupled with Osama's rhetoric against the "infidel west," the bombing campaign only riled Bin Laden and his fundamentalist associates even more. While the US pressured Pakistan to help it snatch Osama from Afghanistan, Pakistan squirmed, as it did not want

to cut Kashmiri militants off from the training, funding, and equipment that Bid Laden provided.

 The US labeled Pakistan a state that supports terrorism in 1998. This was because al-Qaeda the faction led by Osama Bid Laden not only had an office in Peshawar, Pakistan but also because the Pakistani government was not able to stem the flow of militants back and forth across the border to Afghanistan. The hijackers of Indian Airlines Flight XYZ were able to “slip” through the border undetected, indicating an inability, if not unwillingness, of the state to pit itself against such groups. Such a label has meant greater isolation from the international community especially in the wake of the May 1998 nuclear tests.

Despite this, people actually like the Taliban. Some even try to emulate them. As early as 1995, a group called the *Tanzim Nifaz Shariat-i-Mohammadi* led an uprising to demand Sharia law. Hundreds of Afghan and Pakistani Taliban joined their ranks till the army sent them fleeing to Afghanistan for refuge. Why would the people of Pakistan, no matter how small a number, wish to identify with a group such as the Taliban?

What does Pakistan stand for?

Just what is it that makes a nation or an ethnic group? How do people identify with a nation? Why identify at all? A nation is a group of people that share the same culture, where a culture means a system of ideas, of association and of communication. An ethnic group is a nation that either constitutes a minority within a state or is not large enough to be the majority. The nation, held together by such common consciousness,

seeks to attain the highest form of organized activity – a sovereign state. An ethnic group is a nation that either constitutes a minority within a state or is not large enough to be the majority. The nation, state, as Max Weber sees it, is the only agency in society that can legitimately engage in violence. The state, then, is that institution or set of institutions specifically concerned with the enforcement of law and order. How has the modern-day nation-state dynamic developed?

As time has progressed nomadic agricultural civilizations have settled down to construct large cities, industrialization has occurred, empires established and later vanquished. States were created and altered both in terms of population and composition and territorial holding. Over this time, society evolved – a modern society – one where power is centralized, one that regards the states as the guarantor of its freedoms, its rights, its comforts and its security. The maintenance of social order is the responsibility of the state. The world outside and the people within accept no excuses for a disheveled social order. In some respects the state is truly the only legitimate source of violence in today's world – since it is the only institution that is “expected” to meet out force to gain its ends.

It is just within such a framework that Pakistan was developed – with one very important distinction. In Pakistan's case, the nation built the state. Furthermore, the “system of association” for the Pakistani nation was religion based not ethnicity-based. This is because the Punjabi, Sindhi, Pathan and Baluch populations of the country each possess distinct ethno-linguistic characteristics. The population is a complex mixture of racial types introduced by successive waves of migration through time. Aryan, Persian, Greek, Pathan (Pashtun), Mughal and Arab ancestry all abounds in the ethnic fabric of

Pakistan. Perhaps the most significant difference among the four groups is that of cultural practice. The Baluch and Pathan are tribal people. Even within the tribal structure the code of conduct is quite different. The Sindhi and the Punjabi while not organized around tribal affiliations are also equally disparate (Ahmed, 2000).

But this inter-ethnic differentiation does not concern us here. Suffice it to say that the social fabric of Pakistan is quite complex and that religion is the overarching identification trait for a Pakistani. What is of concern here is the relationship between the nation and the state. Just what of this symbiotic entity called the nation-state? It stands to reason that a decline in one necessarily affects the other.

Since 1947, the Pakistani state has experienced a noticeable decline. Pakistan is ranked 4th in the list of the world's most corrupt countries. The state and its administrative apparatus is thus considered both unable to and apathetic towards guaranteeing society's freedoms, its rights, its comforts and its security. Such notions are compounded by low indices of development: 38% literacy, Rs. 1.25 per capita on health care per annum, Rs. 0.85 per capita on education annually and the financial nightmare that the state's exchequer remains in - \$40 billion outstanding debt.

Pakistanis also have caused to be disillusioned with their state's political longevity. In the course of the past 50 years, the leadership of the country has changed hands spasmodically. The democratic process has been interrupted by the Martial Law regimes of Yahya Khan, Ayub Khan, Zia-ul-Haq and, most recently, by Pervaiz Musharraf. 1971 was a bitter year for the country – a year when its entire eastern wing seceded – bringing the country to a harsh realization that attempts at national unity were

sorely needed. In the intervening years between Zia and Musharraf, democratically elected governments were dissolved four times. Benazir Bhutto's Prime Ministership was terminated before she could finish her term on two occasions. Nawaz Sharif suffered a similar fate. Furthermore, while Benazir still evades prosecution for charges of corruption, Nawaz Sharif is in exile in Saudi Arabia – the result of a deal for clemency brokered by the Saudi Arabian government with the Musharraf regime – after having been convicted of hijacking, corruption and abuse of power.

CHAPTER V

Conclusion

It is therefore concluded that in order for a nation to grow and succeed its goals, it must choose a just and unprejudiced leader. In Pakistan all the leaders who ruled and failed have only one thing in common, and that thing is that they are all religious and they all based their decision on their religious beliefs. That is clear evidence that the principle of separation between the church and the state is a very important principle in order for a nation to be free from tyranny and bloodshed. These leaders who based there decisions on their religious beliefs and aspirations no matter how good and charismatic they are, they all fail because of the simple reason that their decisions are prejudiced because they tend to overlook matters that are important to other religious sects. That is why there are many religious militant in Pakistan and also terrorist who wants to air their side. Hence, the tyranny and bloodshed will go on if Pakistan will not separate the church from the government. No matter how good the leader is if the decisions he/she made are biased by religion, decision is dysfunctional. The nations, in which he leads, will be confused and dysfunctional. Therefore, the separation between the church and the state in Pakistan should be adopted in order for it to have a good leadership. For good leadership is essential to a nation-state.

Furthermore, the economic and social “de-development“ Pakistan has undergone since its creation raises the question of what direction the nation-state paradigm will take in the years to come.

One school of thought contends that the “threat of an Islamic Revolution in Pakistan has never been greater” (Rashid, 2000, p. 89). Ahmed Rashid, the Far Eastern Economic Review’s leading journalist on Afghanistan and Pakistan, refers to a number of isolated incidents in Pakistan’s tribal belt as portents of what lies in the future. In 1998, for instance, in the Orazkai Agency in the North West Frontier Province a very Taliban-esque situation unfolded. A group called the *Tehrik-e-Tuleba*, the Movement of the Taliban, publicly executed a murderer – extra judicially. This group also vowed to implement a Taliban-style system of justice in the Pashtun tribal lands. He sees, therefore, a country on the brink of a mass Islamic uprising.

It is, however, a very difficult to accept such a dire scenario. To borrow from Anthony Davis (1998), “[p]olitical Islam is no longer a geo strategic factor; it is at most a societal phenomenon. It is fitting that one of the leading thinkers on Islam as political system was the founder of Pakistan’s *Jamaat-i-Islami*, Abul-Ala Maududi. The Jamaat is at the forefront of religious parties. The ideology that he propounded can be easily applied to the country in which he formulated it. The type of Islamism that Rashid is afraid of is the kind that is concerned only with the establishment political success of sharia. It is obsessed with this without paying attention to the need for political forms relevant to Islam’s political success.

The basis premise of Islamist thought is that the existence of an Islamic political society is a necessary condition for the believer to achieve total virtue. However, such a society only functions if its members and especially its leaders are truly virtuous.

Thus even if Pakistan were to become a country with an Islamist political society, it would only succeed as such based on the virtuosity of its leaders and of its masses.

Islam has been associated with very militant fundamentalist groups. These have been associated with line upon line of bearded men prostrating in unison in mosques as cries of Allah-o-Akbar resound through the building. While the projection of such images has certainly made fundamentalist Islam highly visible, it has overstated its virulence. Images such as those of a bleary-eyed Osama Bin Laden with his flowing white beard or a veiled Afghan woman scuttling across the streets of Kandahar have overshadowed the far more common clean-shaven, suit wearing Pakistani bureaucrat or the streak-blond, sleeveless shirt sporting Pakistani woman driving through the city on the way to her co-educational college. It is just such hype that has overshadowed the fact that despite Islamic contestation, leaders have experienced political longevity.

[In the 1980s, from Morocco to Pakistan (with the exception of Lebanon, Sudan, and Afghanistan), the only heads of state who disappeared did so as a result of illness or death (Bourguiba, Khomeini, Zia ul-Haq); all the others (Hasan II, Chadi Benjedid, Mubarak, Husayn of Jordan, Asad of Syria, Fahd of Saudi Arabia, Jabir al-Sabah of Kuwait, Qabus of Oman, Abdallah Salih of North Yemen) remained in place the entire decade. (Davis, 1998, p.26)

They have been the leaders of political movements that have run almost counter to the Islamists. The leader of the Islamists, the *Amir*, is both the political and religious leader of the community. As described above, little other than his virtues qualify him for the position. Maududi sees the *Amir* as healthy, adult Muslim male, who is a *Haji*, fearful of Allah, trustworthy and as someone who does not aspire to the position (Marsden, 1998).

Within such a framework, the more radical the party, the more central is the *Amir* (Dar, 1986). This hypothesis is supported by empirical evidence from the Taliban. In 1996, in order to legitimize his leadership, Mullah Omar, the Taliban leader, took out the cloak of the Prophet Muhammad from a shrine in Kandahar and showed it to a large crowd of Taliban. They appointed him *Amir-ul-Mominin*—Leader of the Faithful. Omar's blatant allusions to the Prophet were made even more so when he appeared in public audience wrapped in the sacred cloak (Rashid, 2000). Pakistan, however, is devoid of such an enigmatic figure. There is no leader in the country that any significant portion of the populace would point to as the unerring *Amir*.

The state in Pakistan has consistently maneuvered to disarm any overt Islamist challenge to it. In the 1980s, under Zia, while the government was quite conservative, the attempt at Islamization was collaboration between the military and a minority religious part, the *Jamaat-i-Islami*. This cooperation was an appeasement to neutralize the larger Muslim parties like the *Jamiat-i-Islami*. More recently, in 1998, despite the Jamiat's inroads with the Taliban and any heightened legitimacy that came with it - the attempt to impose Sharia failed. Control of Islam is at the heart of Islamism. To have it is to have undeniable legitimacy.


If Islamism were to appear on the political map of Pakistan it would do so in one of two ways: as a call to fundamentalism (ostensibly a call to sharia and "old Islam") or as a call against colonialism and imperialism (protest against the West). Each of these is less an attack on an external entity than it is against one's inner desires. It is these that are seen as the root of one's decadence not a Western or foreign culture.

The anti-Western sentiment is not likely to gain much momentum in the present day and age. Too many facets of Pakistani society are inextricably linked to the West: especially social and economic. The West has already ingrained itself into Pakistan – from the satellite televisions to cell-phones and to e-commerce business. In all reality, the Islamist state, let us take Saudi Arabia for an example. Is not a “fun place”. It is in fact quite restrictive. There are only teahouses and restaurants – no cinemas or dance clubs (Rashid, 2000). Women cannot drive, let alone show their face in public. In Pakistan, any movement that would make life, in the newest of millennia, “drab: is not going to garner support with in the youth of the country. In a country where women such as Benazir Bhutto have become Prime Minister, where Asma Jehanguir, a human rights lawyer, has been appointed Special Rapporteur to the Secretary General of the UN, where Maleeha Lodhi and Syeda Abida Hussain have each been the Pakistani ambassadors to the United States – the kind of society that the world fears as the “Islamic threat” is not going to be a viable entity.

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