Identity Politics in Local Markets: Comparing Immigrant Integration Outcomes in the ‘New’ Europe

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Boston College

The Graduate School of Arts and Sciences

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IDENTITY POLITICS IN LOCAL MARKETS:

COMPARING IMMIGRANT INTEGRATION OUTCOMES IN THE 'NEW' EUROPE

a dissertation

by

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ABSTRACT

Identity Politics in Local Markets:
Comparing Immigrant Integration Outcomes in the 'New' Europe
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This dissertation explores the factors that influence immigrant reception and integration in new immigration spaces like Dublin and Madrid. Through the case studies of Poles and Nigerians in Dublin and Ecuadorians and Bulgarians in Madrid, the thesis provides a response to three research questions: 1) How do Western European receiving societies construct inclusion and exclusion of the immigrant?; 2) Why do immigrants belong or fail to fit in?; 3) How do inclusion-exclusion dynamics and immigrants' perceptions affect incorporation outcomes? The project contributes to migration scholarship by emphasizing the understudied cultural and local aspects of incorporation and bringing immigrant agency back into the integration equation.

The central argument is that culture and identity matter. While acknowledging the significance of material self-interest, social contact, or national policy regimes, the dissertation finds that identity characteristics, both those of the newcomers and their host societies, are primary in determining the welcome or rejection of different ethnic communities in receiving cities. Further, the study shows that migrants are agents who form their own perceptions of belonging or isolation on the basis of cultural identity. These perceptions determine the foreigners' stake in the host context and what they do with the openings and closures they face. The thesis concludes that political, economic, and social incorporation outcomes are ultimately conditioned on the interplay between

the inclusion-exclusion dynamics in the receiving context and the immigrants' perceptions of welcome or rejection.

Analysis of in-depth interviews, survey data, and relevant documents and legislation for all four case studies confirms the main argument. The comparison among European and non-European immigrants in Dublin and Madrid attests to the significance of culture and identity for integration outcomes and contributes to the broader understanding of immigrant incorporation in Europe and beyond.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION: FOLLOWING THE "EUROPEAN DREAM"

I.1. Puzzle, Research Questions, and Significance

Migration is in Europe to stay. Immigrants from European countries' former colonies are joined by workers from farther away in the global South, refugees escaping conflicts in Syria and beyond, and post-communist migrants seeking their fortunes in the West after European Union expansion. A variety of foreign populations are changing European societies' labor markets, political dynamics, way of life, and very self-definition (Messina, 2014). They are influencing profoundly not only traditional countries of immigration, such as Germany or France, but also countries like Ireland and Spain that have little experience of managing diversity or accommodating ethnic minorities.

Along with migration, xenophobia is on the rise throughout the Continent. Just as receiving countries, and especially new migration locations, are hard pressed to accommodate their *de facto* multicultural societies, the impulse is to engage in ethnic stereotyping instead. Right-wing parties and movements campaigning on immigrant exclusion and freedom from EU prerogatives are gaining ground among European publics and elites (Brändlin, 2013; Karnitschnig, Troianovski, & Gross, 2015). Occurrences like the threat to remove East Europeans cheating on the German social welfare system, the deportation of a French Roma girl off a school bus, or the description of Muslim migration to Italy as "an attempted military and cultural occupation" are common to all immigrant receiving countries in Europe (Dahl, 2014; Karnitschnig et al., 2015; Rubin, 2013). Even the migrant workers so necessary to close labor and demographic gaps are politicized, racialized, and scapegoated.

Despite the burning significance of the migration issue, however, current scholarship leaves the question of what contributes to the integration and inclusion of foreigners unanswered. Preoccupation with the economic costs and benefits of migration (Castles & Kosack, 1985; Miles, 1986, 1987) or the preferences of national interest groups (Freeman, 1995) results in little attention to the issues of culture and ethnicity that increasingly determine how Europeans talk about and deal with the migration question. Emphasis on citizenship laws (Brubaker, 1992; Howard, 2006) or the structure of domestic institutions (Ireland, 2000) obscures the implications of immigrant agency for shaping immigrant integration outcomes. Discussion of the power or decline of the nation-state, especially among traditional host countries, detracts from scholarship explaining the trajectories of new immigration localities (Joppke, 1998; Jacobson, 1996).

The migration literature does not account for the significant variations in immigrant reception and integration that persist in Europe's cities and neighborhoods. For instance, while Nigerians have come to settle in Dublin, they experience rejection in the social sphere and are displaced by the Polish from the city's lower-skilled labor market (Central Statistical Office [CSO], 2006-2011; Immigrants Council of Ireland [ICI], 2008). They fail to acquire or exercise the full array of social, economic, and political rights in the host city. While the Polish were welcomed by their Irish hosts in the mid-2000s as part of the "new" Europe, they are still exploited in the economic sphere and do not fully belong in Ireland (Kelbie, 2006; Krings, 2010). Yet, they are on their way to successful incorporation into the receiving society. Bulgarians travelled to Madrid due to a shared European identity and citizenship with the Spanish, but were received with suspicion by their hosts and remain far from integrated. While somewhat

disadvantaged economically and despite their legal status as third-country nationals, Ecuadorian immigrants are included in their new home in Madrid.[1]

What explains these patterns? Why do reception and integration outcomes vary in similar new Western European immigration spaces? This dissertation addresses these questions by studying the experiences of Poles and Nigerians in Dublin and Ecuadorians and Bulgarians in Madrid. Three empirical sets of questions shape the project: First, how do Western European receiving societies construct inclusion and exclusion of the immigrant? On what basis are Nigerians rejected by their Irish hosts? Why are Poles and Ecuadorians included? Why are Bulgarians received with indifference and suspicion? Second, why do immigrants belong or fail to fit in? Why do Poles and Nigerians consider themselves strangers in Dublin, while Ecuadorians and Bulgarians perceive themselves as part of Madrid? Third, how do inclusion-exclusion dynamics and immigrants' perceptions affect incorporation outcomes? Why are Ecuadorians and Poles enjoying relatively ample political, economic, and social rights, while Nigerians, and to a lesser extent Bulgarians, claim few entitlements?

The central argument is that identity and culture matter. The thesis asserts that the identity characteristics, both those of the newcomers and their host societies, are primary in determining the welcome or rejection of different ethnic communities in receiving cities. What is more, immigrants are considered agents who form their own perceptions of belonging or isolation on the basis of cultural identity. These perceptions determine the foreigners' stake in the host context and what they do with the openings and closures they face. Political, economic, and social incorporation outcomes are ultimately conditioned

[1] Confidential respondents, personal interviews, February – May, 2011, Madrid.

on the interplay between the inclusion-exclusion dynamics in the receiving context and the immigrants' perceptions of welcome or rejection.

The project does not claim to assess or downplay the explanatory power of material self-interest, social contact, or national policy regimes. However, it suggests that considerations of identity are highly significant in determining immigrant welcome or rejection. The dissertation thus departs from the literature by highlighting the understudied role of culture in comparing immigrant reception patterns. The thesis acknowledges the significance of citizenship laws and national institutions. However, it enhances existing migration scholarship by considering how these are themselves shaped by identity. It also looks at the ways in which immigrants as conscious actors form perceptions, navigate institutions, and choose whether to integrate in the receiving context. The project does not deny that national and supranational legislation and policy matter. Still, it contributes to understanding of incorporation patterns by turning to the local level, where policy is implemented in practice. It also focuses on new immigrant receiving locations, which could still avoid the mistakes of traditional immigration countries when dealing with their foreign populations.

While focused on the cases of Dublin and Madrid, the dissertation aims to provide insight into a larger puzzle about the future of the "new" Europe. Immigration is tearing at a Continent already in crisis. Refugees create fears of cultural disharmony and the overwhelming of public resources, but also of the loss of national autonomy with European dictates of burden-sharing (Fichtner, Popp, Schult, & Smoltczyk, 2015). Rioting in Sweden and France calls into focus the perceived deficiencies of immigrant integration, especially among Europe's Muslims (Higgins, 2013; Roy, 2005). Worker

mobility from the developing world is interpreted as a danger to receiving societies' sense of community and as a threat to Europe's already fragile labor market with economic troubles in Greece, Spain, and Italy (Dimou, 2015). Post-communist migration with European Union enlargement is producing renewed debates on "poverty migration" from the East and rising resentment of the limits on national policy and identity brought about by EU expansion ("EU-Richter," 2014; Pohl, 2014; Simons & Volkery, 2013). The specter of the Roma, seen as incompatible with host communities' way of life yet empowered by the ideals of European citizenship, is reinforcing Euroscepticism and enlargement fatigue ("Ich kann," 2014; Penketh, 2014). As immigrant receiving localities on the Continent are plagued by these multiple crises in common, albeit in their own particular ways, studying identity and immigrant integration in Dublin and Madrid can provide valuable insight into the viability of the very idea of Europe.

This chapter introduces the framework underpinning the dissertation through: a) a review of the immigrant reception literature; b) a review of the literature on immigrant integration; c) an elaboration of the main argument and concepts; and d) a discussion of the research design and methodology.

I.2. Immigrant Reception in the Literature

Why do reception outcomes vary in Western European immigration spaces? The literature only addresses the question indirectly when explaining variations in immigration patterns, policy and group conflict. Nonetheless, immigrant inclusion and exclusion are attributed to an economic-rational, a social network, and a political-institutional rationale.

Representatives of the economic-rational approach argue that immigrant reception is determined by the cost-benefit calculations of the state and its actors. Migration patterns reflect differences in labor demand and supply in a globalized marketplace (Todaro, 1976; Sassen, 1998). Immigrants are accepted when they provide Western European countries with cheap labor in economic sectors undesirable to native workers (Piore, 1979) and serve the economic interests of the receiving state or its capitalist class (Wallerstein, 1974; Freeman, 1995). Immigrants are excluded in times of recession or periods of high unemployment (Sides & Citrin, 2007). Foreign laborers are also rejected when they compete with nationals for scarce resources like jobs, wages, or welfare benefits (Fetzer, 2000; Sniderman, Hougendoorn, & Prior, 2004). Lesser educated or economically disadvantaged natives are particularly prone to express anti-immigrant sentiment (Scheve & Slaughter, 2001).

According to the social network approach, migration occurs when "webs of connectivity" between sending and receiving countries, as well as migrant-supporting institutions in the receiving state, facilitate mobility (Faist, 2000; Massey, Alacron, Durand, & Gonzalez, 1987). Longer-established immigrant groups in possession of high levels of "ethnic capital" are better received by their host societies, since they have opportunities to engage in meaningful social contact with natives, debunk harmful stereotypes, and build intergroup trust (Allport, 1954; Zhou & Logan, 1989). However, if contact is casual and fails to establish meaningful relationships with the autochthonous population, large ethnic enclave generate hostility and exclusion instead (Fetzer, 2000; Quillian, 1995).

Finally, the political-institutional approach attributes exclusion and inclusion dynamics to the national institutional context and principal stakeholders of the receiving state (Ireland, 2000). Immigration policy creation, as well as immigrant rejection or acceptance, is contingent upon the preferences and power of national administrators (Guiraudon, 1998), courts (Joppke, 1999), employers (Freeman, 1995; Money, 1997, 1999), ethnic organizations (Koopmans & Statham, 2000), and trade unions (Meyers, 2000). Migrants are rejected with the break-up of traditional state structures and the rise of anti-immigrant parties (Betz, 1991; Messina, 1989; Schain, 1988; Thränhardt, 1995) and are generally included in states with left-wing governments (Lenski, 1966). Immigrant reception can also reflect the contending interests of specific state institutions (for ex., Calavita, 1992) or the foreign policy prerogatives of the receiving country (Miller, 1992; Weiner, 1985).

All three approaches contribute to understanding of immigrant reception in Europe and beyond. The economic and demographic benefits of migration are often cited as a justification for liberalizing immigration policy or as an explanation of pro-immigrant public opinion. Networks of family and friends attract migrants to specific destinations, as they reduce the risk and cost of mobility (Massey et al., 1993). Populist parties radicalize the reception climate in host countries.

Despite these contributions, the literature leaves some gaps as well. Most significantly, all three paradigms tend to omit non-material variables and the issues of cultural distance and identity politics, which define immigration discourse and politics today (Hainmüeller & Hiscox, 2007; Hayes & Dowds, 2006). For instance, economic-rational theorists suggest that states would "import" immigrants to fill labor shortages

regardless of the workers' ethnic origin, while in reality racial and ethnic discrimination influence labor migration policy (Meyers, 2000). A number of studies find that the threat of socio-cultural disharmony with migration is much more prominent in public opinion than the danger of economic competition (Sides & Citrin, 2007; Manevska & Achterberg, 2011).

Moreover, the preferred level of analysis for all three approaches is the national or the supranational level, with less attention to the local level, where exclusion and inclusion patterns shape up in reality (Money, 1999). The emphasis is on the creation of policy, rather than its actual outcomes, or on the determinants of group conflict, rather than its contours on the ground. Finally, while reception patterns are a significant predictor of immigrant incorporation, the connection is overlooked in the literature.

This project aims to enhance existing scholarship by focusing on the understudied cultural aspects of inclusion and exclusion, turning to the local level of analysis, considering discourses along with policies, and exploring how reception influences integration.

I.3 Immigrant Integration in the Literature

Why do integration outcomes vary in Western European immigration spaces? Only recently has the migration literature begun to answer this question, due to practical pressures with the rise of right-wing parties across the Continent, terrorist attacks in the United States and Europe, and doubts about the incorporation of Europe's Muslims (Givens, 2007). Nonetheless, three main perspectives have emerged to explain immigrant integration in Europe. The national identity approach, most famously elaborated by

Rogers Brubaker (1992), focuses on the identification of ideal-type integration models. Integration is interpreted as a set of national policies falling on the continuum between assimilation, or immigrants' becoming like natives through the acquisition of distinct national values (Joppke & Morwaska, 2003), and multiculturalism, or immigrants' empowerment through group rights and the retention of particular ethnic identities (Kymlicka, 2012; Scholten, 2011). Through a comparison of France's territorial-based and Germany's blood-based nationality laws, Brubaker (1992) argues that integration depends on the contours of formal citizenship regimes, which are in turn conditioned by processes of nation-building. Koopmans and Statham (1999) build upon Brubaker's argument to suggest that ethnic and civic citizenship regimes interact with distinct integration models to produce certain political opportunity structures for immigrant incorporation (Koopmans, Statham, Guigni, & Passy, 2005; Statham, 1999). Favell (2001) finds that differences in immigration patterns and nation-building prerogatives between France and Britain dictate an emphasis on assimilation and citizenship acquisition in the former and on race relations and multiculturalism in the latter.

The liberal institutionalist approach, developed by Mark Miller (1981) and James Hollifield (1992), challenges the power of the nation-state and the primacy of national citizenship rules extended by the national identity paradigm. According to Miller (1981)'s "European Dilemma," liberal democratic states cannot detract from the rights of even temporary, short-term workers. Hollifield (1992) picks up Miller's argument to suggest that thickening economic interdependence forces liberal states to grant rights to all of their residents regardless of their nationality. Increasingly porous national borders and stronger liberal international regimes have led to the decline of national citizenship

and the rise of "postnational" personhood (Soysal, 1994). Therefore, the state's ability to dictate the conditions under which immigrant communities are incorporated has been severely undermined (Jacobson, 1996). This is especially the case in Europe, where European Union integration imposes added limitations on individual member states (Bauböck, 2006; Guiraudon, 1998).

Finally, the domestic politics approach looks within the nation-state to suggest that integration depends on the structure of key national institutions and the power of the state's main political actors. Integration is defined not as a policy characterized as either assimilationist or multiculturalist, but as the access immigrants have to the host society's distinct spheres, like education or the labor market (Boswell & Geddes, 2011; Faist, 1994; Ireland, 2000). Some representatives of this paradigm focus on the structure of the welfare state (Dörr & Faist, 1997) or the educational system (Crul & Vermeulen, 2003), while others disaggregate the state into different institutional domains and survey integration in all of these areas (Etzinger, 2000). Furthermore, political parties are hypothesized to enhance or undermine opportunities for incorporation. For instance, Messina (2006) suggests that left-leaning parties encourage immigrants' political mobilization. On the other hand, radical right parties impede integration through influencing governmental policy and citizenship legislation directly, or through shifting the agendas of mainstream elites to the right (Schain, 2006).

The three approaches provide valuable insight into immigrant incorporation patterns in Europe and partially inform this dissertation. This project espouses the concern with historically-grounded values and identities reflected in the work of Brubaker and other representatives of the national identity paradigm. It shares in liberal

institutionalists' skepticism of the nation-state's ability to determine the contours of belonging or citizenship single-handedly. The thesis adopts the definition of integration extended by domestic politics scholars as migrants' access to rights in the domains of state, market, culture, and welfare (Freeman, 2004).

Nonetheless, this project is cognizant of the gaps left by the integration literature. Most significantly, all three perspectives are concerned with the power, institutions, and main actors of the nation-state (Castles & Miller, 2003; Hammar, 1985). Conspicuously missing is discussion of the characteristics, perceptions, and choices of the immigrant. Sociology has a lot to offer here. For instance, neo-classical assimilation theory contends that integration is only possible as immigrants become indistinguishable from natives in a process that spans generations (Alba & Nee, 2003). The segmented assimilation model suggests that immigrants' language, education, or work experience determine occupational and socioeconomic mobility and dictate the sector of the receiving society to which migrants are assimilated (Portes, 2007; Portes & Zhou, 1993). Yet, even in the work of Alba and Nee (2003) or Portes and Zhou (1993), the emphasis falls on immutable characteristics rather than on the immigrant as a conscious actor (Berger, Galonska, & Koopmans, 2004; Fennema & Tillie, 1999). Immigrant agency is missing from the integration equation.

What is more, the three paradigms focus on the creation and effects of incorporation rules and regimes. Formal integration policies clearly create opportunities for Europe's immigrants in practice. Nonetheless, policy often does not achieve its intended goals and its implementation is uneven across and within countries. In this context, comparing actual integration outcomes sheds more light on the situation of the

foreign worker in Europe. Focusing just on formal rules eclipses discussion of informal discourses and "cultural opportunity structures" that might explain variation in incorporation outcomes regardless of similar policies (Guigni & Passy, 2004). As Carmel and Cerami (2011) put it, surprisingly little attention is given to "emotions" and how they drive preference formation and circumscribe decision-making. Identity politics are largely absent from the discussion of immigrant integration.

While the national identity approach does consider the role of culture and the liberal institutional perspective challenges the primacy of the nation-state, both pay no heed to the local. In the former paradigm, preoccupation with large structural processes occurring on the national level obscures the significance of dynamic local identities that might challenge the national narrative. In the latter approach, discussion of supranational pressures says little about sub-national variations in reception and integration patterns, often occurring as a direct result of European policy standardization. Moreover, in all three perspectives, attention is directed to traditional immigration countries that serve as ideal types of the ethnic, civic, or multicultural state (Brubaker, 1992; for Germany, for ex., see Euwals, Dagevos, & Roodenburg, 2010; Kahanec & Tosum, 2009; for France, consult Bleich, 2005; Weil & Crowley, 1994; for the United Kingdom, examples include Boswell, 2011, 2012; Favell, 1998; Koopmans & Statham, 1999). Fewer scholars focus on the experiences of new immigration spaces on the Continent. The elaboration of the main argument that follows suggests how this project seeks to extend the explanatory reach of the immigrant integration literature.

I.4. Argument, Definitions, and Contributions

This dissertation aims to address the limitations of current migration scholarship by combining a political science literature concerned with the nation-state with insights from sociology and social psychology that emphasize perceptions, boundaries, and group relationships. The thesis makes four principal contributions. First, while not discounting the insights in the migration literature, the dissertation concentrates on its least developed aspects by stressing culture, identity, and "emotion" as drivers of immigrant inclusion-exclusion and incorporation. Second, the thesis brings immigrants' agency back into the discussion of integration. The immigrant is considered a conscious actor who interprets surroundings and forms preferences. Unlike in previous studies, the interaction between immigrants' perceptions, ambitions, and strategies on the one hand, and the host communities' discourses and preferences on the other constitutes a central piece of the argument. Third, the dissertation turns to newer migration spaces, which have received less scholarly attention than traditional immigration countries, and to the local level of analysis, where integration actually takes place. Finally, it considers the connection between reception, and how we decide who to admit, and integration, or how we accommodate the ones admitted.

The thesis also offers some practical implications. By identifying entrenched cultural identities and immigrant perceptions as obstacles to immigrant accommodation in Western European cities, it also hints at the ways in which to overcome these challenges. By highlighting the significance of local dynamics, it weighs in on the effectiveness of national frameworks and supranational directives.

Why do reception and integration outcomes vary in similar new Western European immigration spaces? The argument centers on identity politics, culture, and emotions. But what is meant by these three concepts? The dissertation turns to the work of theorists of symbolic boundaries to provide a definition (for ex., Durkheim, 1965; Jenkins, 1997; Lamont & Molnar, 2002; Taifel, 1982; Weber, 1978). Culture is conceptualized as "the beliefs, behaviors, objects, and other characteristics common to the members of a particular group or society." The focus is on non-material culture or symbols, rituals, "knowledge and beliefs that influence people's behavior" (Livesey & Lawson, 2008). Culture is employed by groups and individuals for self-definition and for distinction from other groups. However, culture is dynamic and changeable, as are the boundaries between groups that it is often used to erect. This definition diverges fundamentally from essentialist paradigms that interpret the concept as an immutable marker of personal and group identification. Unlike Huntington's understanding of culture as a rigid objective category that produces conflict between individuals, groups, and civilizations, this project considers culture subjective and fluid (Huntington, 2005). Consequently, group boundaries can be reconstructed, clashes between ethnic populations are not inevitable, and integration deficiencies can be remedied.

Identity is defined as the counterpart to culture. Identity is understood as a means of self-definition for a person or a social group, which is relational, or possible only through distinction from another person or social group (Jenkins, 1997; Somers, 1994; Taifel, 1982). Individuals' and groups' identity formation, or the answering of both the question "who am I (are we)?" and the query "who are you (they)?", is based on cultural ideas and beliefs (Livesey & Lawson, 2008). "Assumption of dissimilarity of beliefs

between oneself and the members of the out group", as well as similarity of beliefs among the members of the in-group is one element of group identity (Tajfel, 1981, 1982: 25; Weber, 1978). Identity is thus a feeling of communality, as well as opposition to the perceived identity of other racial and ethnic groups (Barth, 1969). Therefore, the interpretation of identity is often used by members of the in-group to "maintain and achieve superiority over an out-group on some dimension" (Lamont & Molnar, 2002; Tajfel & Turner, 1985). As culture and identity are intimately interrelated, with culture constituting one element of identity and identification of both "us" and "them" based on cultural beliefs, the two concepts are used in conjunction throughout the dissertation.

Emotions are found to be "socially constructed" and "interactionist." Emotions, therefore, are taken to denote feelings that are "culturally patterned, experienced, acquired, transformed, managed in daily life, and legitimated" and in turn affect interactions and cultures. Emotions are the cultural meaning given to certain feelings and as such are experienced differently by different groups and societies. They necessarily stem from the interaction between the person/group and their environment (Marshall, 1998). Emotions are intimately related with culture, since they are defined by culture and in turn contribute to its development. They also interact with identity, as the interpretation of feelings derived from identity and emotions lead to different attributions of identity not based on objective characteristics.

How do Western European receiving societies construct inclusion and exclusion of the immigrant? Both elites and publics in host societies form preferences for certain immigrant cohorts over others based on emotions (or feelings of social and cultural anxiety), culture (or beliefs and ideas held in common within the group but considered

fundamentally different for out-groups), and identity (or perceived characteristics which place a foreign population either in an insider or an outsider status) (Taifel, 1982; Weber, 1978). Local identity variations, or the definition of "who we are", affect how different migrant groups are identified, or the answer to the question "who they are" (Livesey & Lawson, 2008). Identity and local cultural understandings have a role to play in which immigrant characteristics are considered "similar" and welcomed and which ones are deemed "different" and undesirable (Triandafyllidou, 2001). Immigrant populations are included when commonalities are perceived in cultural categories like race, religion, shared past, language, common lifestyle and disposition, as well as "work ethic" – a non-material, fluid characteristic that could be re-ascribed to any immigrant group (Barth, 1969; Smith, 1991). On the other hand, groups considered fundamentally different in terms of the same cultural attributes are excluded, to maintain the cohesion of the host community. Connections are invented both to justify the welcome of a certain foreign cohort and to emphasize the most desirable attributes of the receiving society. Commonalities are also undermined or ignored in order to solidify the placement of an immigrant population in an outsider status.

Immigrant reception is conceptualized as the discourses and attitudes prevalent among the receiving society's elites and public rather than as the formal legal rules or administrative policies of the host community. Legislature and policies are of interest to this project, yet are interpreted as the outcome of attitudes and discourses rather than their cause. Particularly, the project adopts Giddens' (2001, p. 323ff) definition of exclusion as "ways in which individuals may become cut off from full involvement in the wider society." Inclusion and exclusion patterns are thus found to reflect the setting of symbolic

boundaries between natives and immigrants. Welcome or rejection dynamics are understood as "the fundamental construction of in-groups and out-groups in various public spaces, structurally and discursively, as the basis for, and with varying impact on, conflicts, integration, negotiation, decision-making and the genesis of racism and anti-Semitism" (Giddens, 2001, p. 61).

Why do immigrants belong or fail to fit in? Identity politics are important from the perspective of the immigrant as well. Foreign populations' perceptions of difference or similarity from receiving communities, often framed through the same cultural categories identified above, influence the migrants' stakes in the host context. If immigrant populations consider themselves similar to their hosts and believe they belong in their new home, they are more likely to actively seek and exercise political, economic, and socio-cultural rights. Perceptions of difference and isolation on the part of the newcomers lead to the reverse – little engagement in the host society's everyday life. How are belonging and isolation conceptualized and operationalized here? By definition subjective and relational, the dyad is expressed through subjective feelings of being different or similar and belonging to an integrated or isolated diasporic community; future migration plans; satisfaction and primary identification as either an "alien" or an insider; and comparative levels of interaction with the host society and one's own ethnic group.

Finally, how do inclusion-exclusion dynamics and immigrants' perceptions affect incorporation outcomes? Identity politics have a role to play here as well. The host society's identity-based reception patterns correlate with open or closed opportunities for integration and the endowment or denial of rights and resources. Immigrants' identity-

Figure I.1. Local Identity, Immigrant Perceptions, and Integration (Model)

Local identity characteristics and discourses ↔ Immigrant identity characteristics

Inclusion-exclusion patterns ↔ Immigrant belonging-isolation

Integration outcomes

based perceptions of belonging or isolation translate into different preferences for the active pursuit and enjoyment of these resources. Ultimately, therefore, integration outcomes depend on the interaction between the immigrants' agency and the prevailing discourses in the receiving society (**Figure I.1**).

This dissertation is concerned not with integration models but with actual incorporation outcomes. Therefore, the project adopts Freeman (2004)'s definition of incorporation as access to rights and resources in the domains of the state, the market, culture, and welfare over the focus on ideal policy types preferred by national identity theorists. Incorporation in the "state" is divided into "passive political incorporation" contingent on legal status and pertinent legislature and policy, and "active political incorporation," or running and voting in elections, membership in trade unions and political parties, voluntary activism, and naturalization. When surveying integration in the "market,' the focus is on recruitment, occupational mobility, employment and unemployment rates, as well as conditions and relationships at work. Incorporation to

"welfare" is operationalized through access to disposable income, fair housing, social welfare benefits, education and health resources, as well as other state institutions like the police or the local trade unions. Finally, "culture" is studied in conjunction with social integration, through a discussion of experiences of discrimination. The project departs from traditional studies, which find that socio-economic rights depend on political membership, in that it considers cultural access a prerequisite for socio-economic and political inclusion instead (Brubaker, 1992; Howard, 2006). Further, the definition of incorporation considers not only whether immigrants have access to material and cultural resources on the ground, but also what foreign populations do with such resources.

Table I.1. Integration Outcomes (Model)

<table>
<tr><td rowspan="4">Immigrant Group</td><td rowspan="3">Belong</td><td colspan="2">Host Society</td></tr>
<tr><td>Accept</td><td>Reject</td></tr>
<tr><td>Organic Integration (Best Outcome)</td><td>Conflicted Integration (Third Best Outcome)</td></tr>
<tr><td>Don't Belong</td><td>Reluctant Integration (Second Best Outcome)</td><td>Blocked Integration (Worst Outcome)</td></tr>
</table>

Based on the central argument, integration patterns can be represented in a two-by-two matrix, with four possible outcomes (**Table I.1**). Incorporation is most successful when the immigrant group perceives itself to be similar and belong and when the receiving society shares in this discourse of inclusion. In what this project calls *organic integration*, immigrants both enjoy open opportunities and utilize them to fit into their new homes. Integration outcomes are least favorable when the immigrant group considers itself isolated or different and the receiving community reproduces this discourse of exclusion. In this instance of *blocked integration*, immigrant populations fail to combat the closures they face in the receiving context and remain strangers in their cities of residence. The other two outcomes are intermediary. *Reluctant integration*, or the second best outcome according to this dissertation, results when reluctant immigrant populations who do not consider themselves to belong are nonetheless drawn into the receiving context's life by welcoming local stakeholders. The third best outcome, or *conflicted integration*, occurs when foreign groups who perceive themselves to fit in are still forced to combat rejection in the host city.

One final pair of terms needs clarification. The dissertation employs *immigrant*, *immigrant worker*, and *foreign worker* interchangeably to signify this thesis' assumption that regardless of their initial route of entry, the foreign nationals discussed here are economic migrants who compete for jobs and other resources in the host countries' labor markets. Nonetheless, the project dubs these same populations *immigrant "Others*," *ethnic groups* or *foreign populations*. Some might disagree with this classification. The Polish, for instance, are not an ethnic minority in Ireland, but rather share the ethnicity of their hosts. However, this dissertation argues that ascribing ethnicity is often a conscious

instrument of closure and that “ethnicity” stands for racial, national, or cultural characteristics. This nomenclature also stresses the thesis’ assumption that the immigrant as an economic commodity cannot be separated from the immigrant as a socio-cultural being. As Overbeek (1995, p. 15) explains, “it is nearly impossible to distinguish between ‘political’ and ‘economic’ migrants.” Economics and politics are intertwined as push factors for migration, and all foreign groups are subject to “xenophobic nationalism” regardless of their legal status. The immigrant worker is also an “Other” who falls on a continuum of ethno-cultural similarity and difference from the receiving society.

I.5. Research Design, Case Selection, and Methodology

The main argument and concepts are developed in a “small-n” comparison between two receiving localities each hosting two distinct immigrant populations. I compare Ireland and Spain, and more specifically Dublin and Madrid, where I survey Polish and Nigerian, and Bulgarian and Ecuadorian immigrants respectively.[2] I review four possible integration outcomes, one roughly fitting in each cell of **Table I.1**.

Spain and Ireland provide for a fruitful comparison. Former emigration countries, both became immigration countries in the mid-1990s, as they moved from the European periphery to the forefront of economic growth with booms in the service and construction sectors (Brücker, 2007). Both are coming to terms with the immigrant workers in their

[2] Throughout the dissertation, Bulgarian and Polish immigrants are described *as East Europeans* and Dublin and Madrid are dubbed *Western European cities*. Those are not meant to be precise geographic classifications. Instead, they emphasize the contrast between established members of the European Union and new ones aspiring to fully belong to the Continent, as well as between desirable migrant destinations and countries that primarily export migrant labor. The categories are necessarily fluid, yet call to the persistent hierarchy among European countries regardless of the myth of a unified Europe. The terminology also highlights the contrast with non-European immigrants, who do not share a common European past and destiny with their hosts.

midst for the first time in the context of European integration, sweeping economic change, and fragmented national identity. Both states are experiencing severe economic contraction since the late 2000s, while struggling with continued immigration and pressure to integrate their foreign populations. Neither, however, is subject to the overt racialization of politics or the influence of a right-wing political party. Despite similarities, Ireland remains the only EU country where European immigrants are more numerous than third-country nationals and relatively large groups of Nigerians or Chinese migrants are nonetheless dwarfed by white Christian workers (European Commission [EC], 2008; CSO, 2012a). In contrast, Spain's foreign labor force is multicultural, with Ecuadorians, Moroccans, Romanians and Bulgarians representing some of the largest groups (Instituto Nacional de Estadística [INE], 2010; Papademetriou, Sumpton, & Terazzas, 2010).

The focus is on Polish and Nigerian immigrants in Ireland and Bulgarians and Ecuadorians in Spain (**Table I.2**). For each country, a "new" European and a non-European immigrant collective is selected. The intent is to determine if European Union citizenship confers added rights and protections to immigrant workers in an enlarged Continent or whether European membership has little effect on reception and incorporation patterns in practice.

The four cohorts are among the most prominent in the receiving localities (**Table I.2**). The first non-Irish immigrants to arrive to Ireland, Nigerians grew from only 10 in 1996 to 19,780 in 2011. They represent the largest third-country national group in the receiving context (CSO, 2012a; Kómoláfé, 2008). Nigerians are dwarfed by Polish

Table I.2. Case Selection Criteria

Characteristics	*Polish*	*Nigerian*	*Ecuadorian*	*Bulgarian*
EU citizen	✓	×	×	✓
Third-country national	×	✓	✓	×
Large group	✓	✓	✓	✓
Economic migrant	✓	✓	✓	✓
Low-skilled worker	✓	✓	✓	✓
Muslim	×	×	×	×
Historical resentment	×	×	×	×
Recent colonial relationship	×	×	×	×
First generation	✓	✓	✓	✓
Urban concentration	✓	✓	✓	✓

workers, however, who account for 8% of the Irish labor force (Barrett, 2009). Attracted to a rapidly growing and liberal economy and the ease of migration with EU enlargement, Polish nationals are the most numerous foreign group in Ireland with 122,585 persons in 2011 (CSO, 2012a). With a booming construction and service sectors in the host state, Ecuadorian labor mobility to Spain rose sharply in the early 2000s, rivaling traditional migration from Africa (Pérez, 2003). Ecuadorians are the third largest national group in Spain, with 440,304 persons residing in the receiving state as of 2009 (INE, 2010). Spain is also the home of the largest Bulgarian diaspora in Europe. Bulgarians were among the fastest growing foreign groups in Spain in the late 2000s (INE, 2009, 2010).[3]

While a large number of Nigerians entered Ireland as asylum seekers, all four groups are currently economic migrants concentrated in the same market segments of the host states. Apart from some medical personnel, Nigerian nationals in Ireland are

[3] The Bulgarian population in Spain grew by 112% between 2006 and 2007, from 60,174 to 127,058 persons. This is the largest relative migration growth for any national group excluding Romania with 185% (INE, 2010). It also represents a shift in European migration to Spain from retirement-based migration from Western European older EU member states to economic migration for low-skilled and informal employment from among the new Eastern European EU members (Papademetriou et al., 2010).

employed in lower skilled services, such as social work, security, retail, manufacturing, and the taxi industry (CSO, 2008). It is in these sectors that they compete with Polish workers who arrived to Ireland to fill labor shortages in construction, manufacturing, retail, hotels, and restaurants (CSO, 2006-2011; Quinn, 2010). Bulgarian and Ecuadorian men vie for employment in construction, low-skilled services, and manufacturing, while women take work primarily as domestics or in tourism (Papademetriou et al., 2010; INE, 2007). The analysis focuses on these lower skilled occupations, including construction, retail, hotels, restaurants, and domestic care. These economic sectors have the highest concentrations of the immigrants in this study. They are home to the most severe competition among the relevant foreign groups facing conditions of economic recession. They also tend to fall within the informal economy and to offer little if any safety net.[4]

The four cohorts are also selected for this dissertation, since they offer a realistic view into immigrant reception and integration, relatively unburdened by history, international relations, or excessive media attention (**Table I.2**). None of the four immigrant populations are of predominantly Muslim faith, and therefore their experiences have not been scrutinized and skewed by a hyper vigilant media or heated public debate. While Ecuador was a Spanish colony, the relationship falls in the distant

[4]Some might suggest that Polish and Ecuadorian workers were officially "invited" into Dublin's and Madrid's labor markets through recruitment fairs and bilateral agreements respectively (Pérez, 2003). On the other hand, Nigerians were forced upon the Irish state as involuntary asylum seekers, and no official invitation was extended to Bulgarians by the Spanish authorities (Kómoláfé, 2008; Confidential interviews, September 2010 – May 2010, Dublin and Madrid). This distinction is exaggerated. The four groups are faced with comparably conflicted "official invitations," which do not neatly correspond to informal dynamics of reception on the ground. Poles' and Ecuadorians' official invitations into Ireland and Spain were withdrawn with economic downturn in Europe in 2007-2008. That has not significantly changed migration or inclusion-exclusion patterns for the two populations (Arango, 2012). While a majority of Nigerians entered Ireland as asylum seekers in the late 1990s, some members of this group were recruited as medical personnel and students (Kómoláfé, 2008). A majority today are workers entering Ireland through employment permits (ICI, 2008). Bulgarians were recruited to Spain as fruit pickers, for instance, yet their invitation has also been rescinded with downturn (Confidential interviews, February – May 2010, Madrid). The informal discursive variations in welcome or rejection on the local level are not considered problematic in the case selection process, as they are in fact one of the main queries of this dissertation.

past, unlike in the case of Morocco, which was actively managed by Spain until the 1950s (Flesler, 2008; Lange, Mahoney, & Von Hau, 2006). Consequently, the dissertation does not discuss Moroccan immigration to Spain, even though Moroccans are the largest third-country national group in the receiving state (INE 2010; Papademetriou et al., 2010). Recent colonial ties, deeply rooted resentment of the "Moor," and fears of the Moroccan Muslim are powerful lenses through which Moroccan identity is inevitable interpreted (Calavita, 2005; Flesler, 2008; INE 2010; Mendoza, 2001; Papademetriou et al., 2010). Such historical resentments or prejudices are not present in the case of Poles, Nigerians, Ecuadorians, and Bulgarians. In fact, Bulgarians in Spain are studied instead of the larger Romanian group, since despite a similar legal-political status and migration patterns, the former are not immediately racialized through the stereotype of the "Roma."

The majority of the four immigrant groups represent the first generation. While there is ample literature on the integration patterns of the children of immigrants, less is known about their parents. Nonetheless, whether the first generation is able to "catch up" with natives is a significant issue affecting immigrants' opportunities for generations to come (Barban & White, 2011; DeVoretz, 2006).

Despite these multiple commonalities, there are significant variations in the four groups' identity and ethnic characteristics, with some defined as profoundly "different" and others described as presumably "similar" to their hosts. Therefore, the experiences of Poles, Nigerians, Ecuadorians and Bulgarians provide for a fruitful comparison in a dissertation concerned with identity politics.

While the four collectives migrated to multiple localities within Ireland and Spain, a majority concentrate in these countries' capital cities. Therefore, the analysis moves

beyond the national level to focus on the urban spaces of Dublin and Madrid (Sassen, 1998; Money, 1999). Dublin and Madrid both attract about one-fifth of all immigrants in their respective countries (CSO, 2008; INE, 2010). Dublin is the home of forty percent of all Nigerians residing in Ireland and about one third of all the Polish workers in Ireland in 2011 (CSO, 2012a; Ministerstwo Spraw Zagranicznych [MSZ], 2009). Madrid hosts the largest Ecuadorian community in Spain (30% of the total) and the most Bulgarians in the receiving state (18% of the total) (INE, 2010). The two cities are also the center of the economic sectors in which the immigrant groups of interest focus, or construction and lower-skilled services (CSO, 2006-2011; INE, 2007, 2009). Madrid and Dublin have been profoundly transformed by Bulgarian, Ecuadorian, Polish, and Nigerian immigrants, whose churches, restaurants, shops, and associations have enhanced the cities' identities. On the one hand, the cities are representative of the four populations' experiences in the host countries more broadly, as they contain a cross section of these communities in terms of socioeconomic profiles and cultural backgrounds. On the other hand, they are unique spaces for the study of immigrant integration, as it is there that immigration and integration policies are implemented in reality and the immigrant groups interact among each other and with local labor market and socio-political actors.

The study applies mixed methods, with emphasis on qualitative analysis. Data collection is based on the ethnographic approach (Geertz, 1983). During a year-long fieldwork in Madrid and Dublin, I engaged in participant observation of the relevant migrant groups in their social, economic, and organizational environments. I took residence in heavily immigrant localities of the cities. I visited the communities' associations, and participated in the cultural, social, and political events they organized. I

also collected short surveys with one-hundred randomly selected native consumers of foreign labor in each city.

More significantly, I conducted semi-structured interviews with three types of relevant actors in each location. I interviewed anywhere between ten and forty representatives of each of the foreign populations of interest. I supplemented the less numerous interviews conducted with Nigerian and Ecuadorian workers through surveys of these communities by other researchers and research organizations.[5] Questions follow the same script, but are open-ended in order to elicit what the immigrants themselves consider most significant about their immigration and integration. I also conducted interviews with the immigrants' representatives in ethnic organizations. Finally, I interviewed thirty local labor and political actors in each context. These include local elected politicians and administrators, representatives of the relevant ministries and trade unions, members of the police and the media, as well as employers of foreign labor. The questions are comparable, yet I ensured that the participants were enabled to identify the issues in local integration of most importance to them and to outline their organization's specific role in reception and incorporation. While interviews with the immigrants are not representative, they are essential in understanding how perceptions and attitudes form among the foreign populations (Maxwell, 2008). Together with reports and secondary sources, they provide a crucial level of detail and richness to the findings and reinforce the patterns identified by community leaders and native stakeholders.

Sampling differs across actor type. The snowball approach is employed to identify immigrant participants. However, the approach was modified where subsequent

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[5] For instance, the project employs surveys of Nigerian integration by the Immigrant Council of Ireland (ICI, 2008) and the Economic Social and Research Institute (McGinnity, Quinn, O'Connell, & Donnelly, 2011), concerned with similar issues as this work.

interviewees were selected on the basis of their difference from the previous "seed" in terms of demographic characteristics (Atkinson & Hammersley, 2004). I also picked respondents at random from immigrant-heavy areas and ethnic events. Sampling for immigrant representatives and local labor market actors is purposive. I identified in advance the local organizations that take part in shaping exclusion, inclusion and integration policy, and I met with at least one representative from each relevant institution. In the case of elected councilors and the media, I approached more than one representative in order to take full account of the left-right political spectrum.

Interview and survey data are the primary source of establishing variations in reception and belonging across immigrant groups and localities. I analyze interviews and observations recorded during fieldwork through discourse analysis. I interpret the survey data through statistical analysis. I tabulate all responses pertaining to a certain question and identify repeating trends. I supplement interview data by expert respondents through analysis of legislation and other pertinent documents in order to determine integration outcomes and how they relate to reception and belonging,.

I.6. Dissertation Plan and Sources

The dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter Two provides an overview of contemporary migration to Western Europe and serves as context for the cases of Dublin and Madrid. The chapter focuses on the changing patterns and logics of European migration since the 1950s in order to demonstrate the growing significance of identity in the European migration process. It also documents the transition of Spain and Ireland from sending to receiving countries of migration in order to answer the question whether

new immigration spaces in Southern Europe provide continuity or divergence from traditional immigrant receiving countries on the Continent.

Chapters Three through Seven focus on the specific case studies of this dissertation. By studying two receiving locations and two immigrant populations in each host community, I obtain four cases of immigrant reception and assimilation. The chapters are organized by theme, with all four immigrant populations and both cities discussed in each section. Chapters Three and Four present the immigration discourse prevalent in Spain and Ireland, from both the receiving society's and the immigrants' perspective. The two chapters address the first and second empirical questions of this dissertation by outlining the scope and determinants of immigrant inclusion-exclusion and belonging-isolation in Dublin and Madrid. Chapter Three employs expert interviews with local labor market actors and a survey of local consumers of the immigrants' labor in order to demonstrate which foreign populations are accepted and which rejected and to suggest what accounts for these inclusion-exclusion patterns. Chapter Four utilizes interview data with the four immigrant groups and their representatives to determine whether these populations consider themselves to be part of their receiving communities or whether they still identify as outsiders in their new homes.

Chapters Five through Seven analyze immigrant incorporation in the political, economic, and socio-cultural spheres respectively. They assess the dependent variable of this dissertation, or integration, and answer the third research question of this dissertation. These three chapters are based primarily on legislation and policy documents, statistical data, governmental and non-governmental reports, as well as original interview data. By discussing a large array of issues, such as voting and running in elections, access to the

educational or health systems, or working conditions and relationships, the chapters outline how the intersection of immigrant belonging and isolation on the one hand and exclusion and inclusion discourses on the other produce specific incorporation outcomes for the four populations of interest.

Chapter Eight concludes the dissertation.

CHAPTER II

URBAN LABORATORIES OF EXCLUSION AND INCLUSION: DUBLIN AND MADRID IN THE HISTORICAL EUROPEAN CONTEXT

II.1. Introduction

Migration is not new to Europe. People traveled from villages to cities to take advantage of economic opportunity with industrialization or moved across countries to escape religious persecution at home as early as the 1800s (Sassen, 2000, pp. 7-31). What is new, however, is the rising significance of identity for contemporary immigration patterns, policies, and discourses on the Continent.

European migration became a qualitatively different phenomenon after the end of the Second World War, as labor mobility flows intensified and transformed from a legal/practical issue into a highly politicized item on the agendas of an increasing number of states. It was with the onset of the new millennium, however, that an emphasis on identity politics turned immigration into one of the most contentious issues before European elites and publics. Who are the ones admitted is a highly significant question, where even workers necessary to fill demographic and labor gaps are racialized and met with suspicion across Europe. Whether foreign populations conform to cultural values and narratives of national identity increasingly determines patterns of reception and integration, especially with the resurgence of xenophobic sentiments and actors in most host communities on the Continent. With European Union enlargement, identity politics affect not only non-European, but also Eastern European immigrants seeking their fortunes in the West. Identity is particularly prominent on the sub-national level, to which inclusion-exclusion dynamics shift with pressures of European harmonization and

national standardization. As all immigrant receiving communities on the Continent are plagued by the migration dilemma and the effects of identity politics in common, albeit in their own particular ways, the idea of a multicultural Europe unified in peace and democracy becomes highly questionable.

The goal of this chapter is two-fold. First, an exposé of historical migration trends documents the rising significance of identity for migration processes and dynamics on the Continent. Second, a description of the migration experiences of Ireland and Spain serves to situate the two cases within the European context. While reflecting larger European trends, Ireland and Spain are still constructing their migration systems and are yet to be ravaged by overt xenophobic pressure or the influence of a right-wing party. The remainder of this dissertation surveys the effects of identity politics in the two receiving communities, in order to determine whether these new migration localities will be able to effectively accommodate their foreign populations.

II.2. European Migration Patterns and the Rising Significance of Identity

II.2.1. Intensification and Politicization in the Post-WWII Era

Immigration has occurred to and within Europe for centuries (Soysal, 1994). However, the phenomenon underwent a qualitative transformation in the aftermath of the Second World War, when migratory flows intensified, diversified, and reached a rising number of European countries (Castles & Miller, 2003). Most significantly, the migration question transitioned from an economic issue to a political and security dilemma (Geddes, 2003, p. 17). A brief exposé of three historical migration waves documents the changing logic of migration leading to the rise of identity politics on the Continent.

In the immediate aftermath of WWII, elites in a select number of Western European states framed immigration as an practical economic issue (Messina, 2007). Governments and private firms actively recruited low-skilled, cheap, flexible foreign workers to rebuild Europe after the War and to fill economic and demographic gaps on a rapidly growing Continent. Migration was considered a temporary phenomenon that conformed to simple dynamics of supply and demand (Messina, 2002, p. 212). Therefore, immigration policy was constructed behind closed doors with no public debate or consideration of political and social implications (McLaren, 2001).

Identity had little role to play in immigration politics, since the sources of migration were perceived as relatively unproblematic. Most European migrants originated from the stagnant high-unemployment economies of Southern Europe and Ireland, especially after the establishment of the European Economic Community in 1957 (Castles, 1984; Garson & Loizillon, 2003, pp. 3-4). Bilateral treaties further allowed for the mobility of familiar Mediterranean neighbors from Turkey and the former Yugoslavia and former colonial subjects from Asia and Africa (Baldwin-Edwards & Schain, 1994, pp. 7-9; Joppke, 2005). In the rare occasions when the migration question made European headlines in 1950-1970, it was framed as “vital for Europe” (Sulzberger, 1950).

Economic crisis in the mid-1970s transformed migration into a political and social issue, considered increasingly contentious by European elites and publics. With deepening economic recession and rising unemployment, Western European states terminated recruitment, initiated immigrant repatriation programs, and closed their doors to new immigrant workers (Trindafyllidou, Gropas, & Vogel 2007, p. 2). As British Prime Minister Edward Heath put it, “there is to be no more permanent large-scale

immigration into this country" ("British conservatives," 1970). "Black" immigrants from outside the European Common Market were particularly marginalized (Kandell, 1978). However, few foreigners left, since they were worried about future employment opportunities and even tighter migration controls (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development [OECD], 2003, p. 4). The closing of traditional labor migration routes in fact led a rising number of workers from Asia and Africa to utilize special colonial ties to bring along their families and settle permanently in Western Europe (Lahav, 2004, pp. 29-30; Messina, 2007; Trindafyllidou et al., 2007, p. 2).

The combination of economic stagnation and a growing number of ethnically and racially different immigrants on the Continent led to the politicization of the immigration issue and the birth of identity politics. Publics were no longer apathetic to immigration, but came to resent economic competition from "unfamiliar" foreigners. Feeling "swamped by immigrants of a different culture," Western Europeans experienced xenophobia for the first time since the end of WWII (Swaine, 2009). In France, numerous Algerians were killed in racial conflicts in 1975-1979 and Arab immigrants were expelled as a "threat to public order." The Swiss complained of the "overforeignization" of their country, especially as Roman Catholic workers from Latin America disrupted the homogeneity of Protestant cantons. Welcome to Turkish workers in Germany was replaced by worry about these immigrants' refusal to leave ("Europe rejects," 1979).

This increasingly hostile climate became fertile ground for the advent of right-wing parties and movements on the Continent. The 1970s marked the ascent of the Freedom Party in Austria, the British National Party in Britain, the Progress Party in Denmark, the National Front in France, Pim Fortuyn in the Netherlands, the National

Socialist Front in Sweden, the People's Party in Switzerland, and a variety of extremist political movements in Germany (Schain, 2006). Politicians like Enoch Powell in Britain rose to prominence by demanding that immigrants be sent back home (Kilborn, 1977). Questions of immigrant integration and ethnic conflict rose rapidly on the agendas of Western European states (Baldwin-Edwards & Schain, 1994, pp. 12-13; Lahav, 2004).

Considerations of security and order came to the fore of the migration debate in the 1980s, as receiving and sending countries diversified and the flow of asylum seekers, illegal immigrants, and ethnic minorities intensified (Geddes, 2003; OECD, 2003). After the closure of immigration policy in the 1970s, many economic migrants entered the Continent without authorization (Messina, 2007).[6] With the rising incidence of regional conflicts and the collapse of the Iron Curtain in Eastern Europe, the number of asylum seekers and refugees to Western Europe increased substantially.[7] As political revolution convulsed East Central Europe, both East-West migration and the mobility of ethnic minorities intensified (Salt, 2006). Civil conflicts and globalization led to higher levels of immigration from countries in Sub-Saharan Africa and Asia with no colonial ties to Western Europe (Messina, 2007).

As an ever larger spectrum of immigrants left for Europe for a larger set of motivations, immigration became securitized. Refugees and asylum seekers brought along issues of war, ethnic difference and perceptions of rising crime rates. Non-white "poor, hungry, and persecuted" immigrants were blamed for all "big-city problems like

[6] While the illegal immigrant population in the European Community was estimated to be 600,000 in the early 1970s, it stood between one and two million in 1976 and was put anywhere between 2.6 million and 4 million in 1991 (Messina, 2007, pp. 39-41).

[7] The total number of asylum claims to Western Europe in 1955-1979 was estimated to be 629,185. In 1983, Western states reported 700,000 applications. Despite a drop in applications due to constitutional reform in Germany in the mid-1990s, 388,000 applications were received by Western states in 2001 alone and a total of 3 million applications were submitted in the 1990s (OECD, 2003; Paspalanova, 2006).

drug addiction, crime and … AIDS" (Markham, 1987). Irregular migrants confronted Western societies with concerns of human trafficking and organized crime. As immigrants from far away places introduced different lifestyles to European host societies, fears of the incompatibility of Islam with democratic values galvanized Western publics and politicians for the first time (Lahav, 2004; Markham, 1987).

These new tensions were replicated in new locations, moreover, as traditional immigrant sending countries like Spain, Greece, or Ireland turned into receiving states after joining the European Economic Community. These localities had to deal with the migration dilemma with little experience and few political and social institutions or policies (Ruspini, 2008, pp. 11-28).

Notably, identity politics influenced migration patterns, immigration control, and integration policies in Europe even before the advent of the new century. Common history and a shared colonial past led workers from the Commonwealth and Ireland to settle in the United Kingdom, while Moroccans, Tunisians and Algerians chose France as their destination. Turkish and Serbian migrants went to Germany and Austria (Fassman & Münz, 1994). Germany, a self-defined "ethnic state," granted citizenship rights to ethnic Germans "returning" from Eastern Europe after the collapse of Communism (Brubaker, 1992). On the other hand, Turkish immigrants residing in the receiving state for decades were denied economic, social and political rights, as they were not considered part of the German nation (Angenendt, 1999). Identification as a "civic state" and an emphasis on the values of secularism and equality produced a focus on

"assimilationist republicanism"[8] in France (Brubaker, 1992). Ample integration efforts and high naturalization rates were paired with insistence on immigrants' unqualified adoption of French democratic political values (Angenendt & Pfaffenroth, 1999; Schuerkens, 2007).[9] Considerations of identity defined the particular ways in which European states experienced common migration trends on the Continent.

European migration was fundamentally transformed in the aftermath of the Second World War. The immigration issue transitioned from an unproblematic economic consideration to a socio-political dilemma and a security concern. Ever more numerous European states were confronted with new ethnic and social cleavages, as the sources and types of migrants diversified. Identity rose to prominence in defining European mobility, and influenced where people went, how they were received, and what policies were constructed to accommodate them. Nonetheless, it was not until the new millennium that identity became paramount in defining European migratory processes and dynamics. It is to this development that the chapter turns next.

II.2.2. The Rise of Identity Politics in the New Millennium

While immigration has preoccupied European states for decades, the new millennium transformed migration into one of the most contentious issues before European elites and publics. Five interrelated developments characterize this transformation. First, governments on the Continent are torn between the need to fill

[8] This term was coined by Virginie Guiraudon (2006) to reflect the expectation that foreign workers will become French through the institutions of the Republic (to which they had equal access), and through their inclusion in the labor market and other economic and social institutions.

[9] In 1996 117,500 foreigners acquired French nationality. The annual number of naturalizations averaged 100,000 in 1992-1996 and 150,000 in the late 1990s. To compare, naturalization numbers stood at an average of 50,000 applications per annum in the UK and 85,000 in Germany (OECD, 2008).

demographic and labor gaps and the impulse to control their borders against a persistent flow of highly diverse immigrants, especially with economic downturn. Second, even mainstream politicians are swayed to the right with the entrenchment of populist forces deep into the European political process and with the rising discontent of publics fearful of the immigrant "Other." Third, the quickening pace of European Union enlargement creates new migration cleavages on the Continent, as poor post-Communist workers join post-colonial migrants in the West. Fourth, the supranationalization of immigration policy with European Union integration produces resentment of external pressures on an issue most intimate to national sovereignty and shifts immigration policies and discourses to the local level. Finally, with the diversion of immigrant flows from traditional host states to new immigration destinations, countries like Ireland and Spain are at the center of these dynamics, yet remain ill-equipped to deal with the migration pressures common to all of Europe. Identity politics underpin these multiple tensions, with "who are we" and "who are they" serving as two of the most significant questions before Europe's immigrants, natives, and governments.

A graying Continent needs immigrants. Declining fertility and increasing life expectancy produce a shrinking native work force, empty tax coffers, and an unraveling safety net for Europe's elderly (Münz, 2011). Only substantial immigration can remedy these demographic gaps or the persistent labor shortages on the Continent. European governments responded to these challenges by reinstituting worker recruitment programs in the early 2000s. Northern and Western European states invited highly-skilled immigrants to address booms in information and technology (EC, 2008). The 2000 German Green Card program for IT specialists and the British Highly Skilled Migrant

Programme (2002) are two examples (Castles, 2006, pp. 749-753). Simultaneously, Germany and the Southern European states implemented temporary programs to alleviate low-skilled labor shortages and channel illegal immigrants into legal employment in agriculture, construction, tourism, and catering (EC, 2008, p. 97; Garson & Loizillon, 2003, p. 5; Kraler & Iglicka, 2002).

However, especially with economic downturn, economic calculations are counteracted by the impulse to control European borders against a persistent flow of highly diverse immigrants. The workers recruited to the Continent in the 2000s are increasingly selected by Western governments on the basis of their socioeconomic, national, ethnic, and cultural characteristics (Castles, 2006, p. 747; Triandafyllidou et al., 2007).[10] There is an emphasis on the immigrants' future potential for integration (Castles, 2006).

The focus on control and exclusion is more pronounced when it comes to "less desirable" migrants in Europe, like undocumented workers or refugees from the Middle East, Asia and Africa. To point out a few examples, the Austrian government restricted asylum seekers' access to Austrian procedural guarantees,[11] clamped down on illegal immigration,[12] and introduced rigorous "integration agreements" for third country nationals in the early 2000s (Kraler & Sohler, 2007, pp. 20-22).[13] During the same period, the Dutch government introduced a strict asylum regime and compulsory courses

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[10] For example, the British Highly Skilled Migrant Programme (2002) was followed by the introduction of the White Paper (2006), which overhauled the immigration regime by introducing a point-based system of migration in the UK (Castles, 2006, pp. 749-753).
[11] For example, the right to appeal was limited by excusing new evidence during appeal procedures.
[12] For instance, by giving more power to the state to investigate sham marriages, transferring resident permit powers to provincial authorities, or extending the maximum duration of detention pending deportation.
[13] Integration agreements as per the 1998 law required immigrants from third countries who immigrated to Austria after 1998 to enroll in mandatory language classes. Language proficiency requirements were raised in 2005, making it increasingly difficult for immigrants to fulfill the requirements (Kraler & Sohler, 2007).

of civic integration for non-European laborers (Ter Wal, 2007, pp. 250-251). With economic crisis, the Italian government criminalized the irregular immigrants it had tolerated for years. Italian police expelled hundreds of immigrants on suspicion of immigration violations in 2008 and authorized citizen patrols to control illegal immigration in 2009 (Rosenthal, 2008). In early 2009, the French government followed suit and expelled a number of illegal laborers to create jobs for unemployed legal workers (Fix et al., 2009). Issues of control, integration, and identity came to be intimately interrelated in Western European states' treatment of the migration question.

Indeed, even mainstream politicians are swayed to the right by publics threatened by the immigrant "Other" and populist actors entrenched in European politics. Especially in traditional immigration countries like France, the Netherlands, Britain, or Germany, elites racialize and marginalize the "different" immigrants in their midst. Labour Party British immigration minister Phil Woolas "pandered to the right" when he proposed to ease racial tensions in the UK by "stabilizing" the British population through a cap on non-EU foreigners (Rothschild, 2008). Ministerial candidate David Cameron omitted non-white Tory candidates from campaign leaflets. After becoming Prime Minister, Cameron quipped, "We hate immigrants more than Labour" and introduced a twenty-million-dollar plan to assure "white enclaves" they have nothing to fear from non-white immigration (Gohir, 2010; "UK immigration," 2013).

Mainstream politicians often respond to the rising xenophobia and fear of the immigrant among European publics. Worker mobility from the global South is perceived as a danger to receiving societies' sense of community and as a threat to Europe's already fragile labor market after economic downturn (Dimou, 2015). Refugees from Syria and

beyond stoke fears of cultural disharmony and the overwhelming of public resources (Fichtner, Popp, Schult, & Smoltczyk, 2015). Terrorist attacks in the United States, Madrid, and London, and events like the *Charlie Hebdo* massacre, serve to frame immigrants as a threat to Western societies' security and well-being in the minds of Europeans (Laurence, 2015; Triandafyllidou et al., 2007). Ethnic riots in Belgium, France, and Sweden bring the failure of immigrant integration and Islam's incompatibility with Western culture to the forefront of public debate on the Continent (Guiraudon, 2006; Higgins, 2013; Riding, 1991; Roy, 2005). Since the 2005 French riots in particular, a "crisis of meaning and identity" marks French and European society (Schuerkens, 2007, p. 116).

Such fears of the immigrant are sharpened by right-wing parties and movements, which are not only reinvigorated but are deeply entrenched in European politics since the 2000s. The National Front in France, the Freedom Party in the Netherlands, and the Italian Northern League participate in their governments' political process and infuse mainstream politics with exhortations to "get rid of, deport or send home foreigners and 'the others'" (Azikiwe, 2010). While such urgings have been justified primarily as a solution to economic ills, they are increasingly cast in identity terms. For instance, the Swiss People's Party, the most popular party in Switzerland in the 2007 election, introduced election campaign posters depicting a black sheep kicked off a Swiss flag by three white sheep and images of black, brown and yellow hands grabbing for Swiss passports ("On becoming Swiss," 2008). The UK Independence Party or the Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamisation of the West (PEGIDA) in Germany are making

significant political gains by campaigning for the exclusion of Europe's immigrants (Brändlin, 2013; Karnitschnig, Troianovski, & Gross, 2015).

The quickening pace of European Union integration feeds into the racialization of the foreigner and the success of populist parties on the Continent. After the unprecedented addition of twelve new members from East Central Europe to the Union in 2004 and 2007, Western European receiving societies increasingly question the principles of free movement and European citizenship (EC, 2008). They initially welcomed their eastern neighbors as an alternative to third-country workers, but are now rethinking opening their doors to the poor post-Communist immigrants (EC, 2008, pp. 111-114; Thränhardt, 2009).[14] With the impending removal of transitional agreements to Bulgarian and Romanian labor, for instance, debate on welfare tourism and unsustainable "poverty

[14] Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Slovenia joined the European Union in 2004 and Bulgaria and Romania followed suit in 2007 (EC, 2013). As a result, the number of Eastern Central Europeans working in Western Europe rose by over a million between 2003 and 2007, with Balkan immigrants contributing to the swelling of the East European migrant pool even further (Brücker, 2007, p. 7; EC, 2008, pp. 15-16, 114; Fix et al., 2009). In order to address Western European states' concerns over labor market dislocation with these rising numbers, European states reached a compromise that allowed older members of the EU to temporarily abrogate European Community principles of free movement of people by imposing Transitional Agreements (TAs) on new member states. These arrangements could limit the free movement of East Central European workers (but not other Eastern immigrants) for as many as seven years based on a "two plus three plus two" rule (Commission of the European Communities [CEC], 2006). During the first two years, older member states were allowed to apply national measures or discretionary bilateral formulas to regulate access to their labor markets. Labor mobility from new member states could be further limited for three years as a sovereign decision (Brücker, 2007). Restrictions past the first five years could only be maintained if free labor mobility would result in severe disturbances in hosts' labor markets (CEC, 2006; EC, 2008, pp. 111, 113). Western European countries used transitional agreements very differently, resulting in uneven patterns of East-West labor mobility. As Sweden and Ireland decided not to impose any restrictions on the movement of the first EU joiners, and the United Kingdom applied no restrictions but maintained its Worker Registration Scheme, for instance, the Anglo-Saxon countries attracted a large numbers of Polish workers in the mid-2000s (Fix et al., 2009). As Southern European countries only limited the movement of workers from both Eastern Europe and the Balkans for two years, they welcomed a large number of Romanian, Bulgarian, and to a lesser extent Polish immigrants (EC, 2008; INE, 2009). Nonetheless, transitional arrangements and immigration patterns on the Continent do not correspond neatly. While Austria and Germany maintained limitations on Eastern labor for the maximum period of seven years, for instance, they continued to receive large number of Eastern European workers throughout the 2000s. Open Sweden welcomed few migrants from the East. Polish workers inundated the markets of the UK and Ireland, but were less predominant in Sweden, Spain or Portugal (EC, 2008, pp. 55, 117; Eurostat, 2009). Bulgarians and Romanians concentrated in Southern Europe, and less so in the Nordic countries (EC, 2008, pp. 117-120).

migration" shook German cities in 2014 ("EU-Richter," 2014). Similar fears were politicized by British Prime Minister David Cameron who threatened to abandon the idea of Europe if he was not allowed to severely curb welfare benefits for Eastern Europeans and deport unemployed Eastern workers (Onyanga-Omara, 2014). Even in Spain, politicians from the right-leaning People's Party emphasize the stress Balkan immigrants put on the welfare system and low-skilled native workers lament the fact that Spain is not "kicking out all their immigrants" like Italy or France (Burnett, 2008).

The Roma, considered incompatible with host communities' way of life yet empowered by European citizenship, create even more powerful cleavages in the "new" enlarged Europe ("Ich kann," 2014; Penketh, 2014). French President Nicholas Sarkozy, for instance, ordered a Roma girl to be deported while on her way to school due to a belief that "only a minority" of Roma can integrate in France (Rubin, 2013). Hundreds of Romanian gypsies were evacuated from their homes in Belfast after Ulster youth attacked them on the basis of their race and their perceived abuse of Northern Ireland's social and economic resources ("NI racists," 2009). A rumor that a Gypsy girl stole a baby was used as a justification to evict the residents of a Roma encampment in Naples (Ghosh, 2008; Rosenthal, 2008). The systematic discrimination of these ethnically-different European nationals chips away at the very idea of a Europe "unified in peace and democracy" (European Economic Community [EEC], 1957).

Tensions surrounding East-West labor mobility, often framed in economic terms, are nonetheless firmly embedded in larger debates about national autonomy and identity in the face of an ever more overreaching Europe. Especially with economic slowdown, individual European governments protest the harmonization of immigration policy or the

requirement for burden-sharing under the European umbrella. Enlargement fatigue and resentment of supranational limitations on national identity and policy fuel Euroskepticism and the success of political parties advocating departure from Europe (Messina, 2014). They also lead to the "shifting down" of migration politics to the local level, where the rights of all migrants can be restricted and where identity politics can thrive (Guiraudon & Lahav, 2000). For instance, the limitation of welfare benefits on the state level in Germany has led to de facto exclusion of Bulgarian and Romanian immigrants from some German provinces but not from others (Pohl, 2014). Uneven granting of benefits at the municipal level in Ireland precludes Polish migrants from settling in certain Irish cities and limits their freedom of movement regardless of their European citizenship.[15] Electoral success of the National Front in some French cantons and town halls has led to restrictions for foreigners, by requiring foreigner registration or added inspection of marriage certificates between foreigners and nationals (Guiraudon & Lahav, 2000). Local rather than national identity variations are increasingly prominent in influencing these patterns of inclusion and exclusion of the immigrant.

Finally, all of these dynamics play out in new immigration spaces on the Continent. Ireland and the Southern European countries not only became the leaders in immigration figures in the 2000s, but diverted migration flows from traditional receivers of foreign labor (Triandafyllidou et al., 2007). They attracted European and non-European immigrants due to their high demand for low-skilled labor, their underdeveloped and relatively open migration regimes, as well as their comparatively tolerant attitudes to migration (Laczko, 2002). The foreign populations in Ireland and Spain, for instance, swelled from 1% of the total in the 1990s to more than 10% in the

[15] Confidential respondents, personal interviews, September – December, 2010, Dublin.

new millennium (Triandafyllidou et al., 2007). Increasingly important as centers of European migration, the new immigration localities are also uniquely unprepared to accommodate their foreign workers. Insufficient migration experience leaves the new host states ill-prepared to deal with the interrelated challenges of massive immigrant inflows, economic stagnation, and fragmented national identity. However, the lack of discursive, institutional or policy baggage allows the new host communities to avoid the mistake of traditional immigration countries.

To summarize, immigration, intimately interrelated with identity politics, is one of the thorniest issues plaguing European states since the new millennium. Mobility is high on the agendas of European states both as an economic and demographic necessity and something to control and protect against. Migration threatens European publics and leads to their support for populist parties and anti-immigrant measures. The immigration issue feeds into doubts about the very idea of a powerful, overarching Europe that would limit national identity and sovereignty. With rising Euroskepticism, the tensions surrounding migration on the Continent come to affect both non-European and European foreign workers, and increasingly play themselves out on the local level. The migration debate is centered in new receiving destinations like Ireland and Spain that are uniquely unprepared to deal with the contentious issue. Nonetheless, as they had few policies in place before the arrival of numerous foreigners in their midst, these new migration spaces offer a relatively unadulterated glimpse into migration patterns and experiences on the Continent. The chapter turns to the cases of Ireland and Spain next in order to situate them in the larger European context.

II.3. The Case of Ireland

The case of Ireland reflects the general European trends described above, as this new host state is dealing with the same challenges that have plagued traditional immigration countries on the Continent for decades. As this thesis will demonstrate, cultural dynamics and local identity politics affect immigrant reception and integration and complicate the management of foreign cohorts there, much like in the rest of Europe. However, the project is not concerned with a comparison between Ireland and older host states like France or Germany. In fact, the Irish case was selected since it offers a glimpse into migration, reception, and incorporation patterns that is relatively unburdened by media hyper attention, intense public debate, or association with the polarizing Muslim or Roma questions. A factual exposition on the developing trajectory of migration flows to Ireland in this chapter is followed by a discussion of the connection between identity on the one hand and immigration discourse and integration on the other in subsequent sections of the dissertation.

II.3.1. From Emigration to Immigration

Ireland has long been an emigration country. In response to crises like the Irish potato famine or in simple search of a better life, the Irish immigrated in large numbers to countries with stronger economic development, like USA, Australia, or the United Kingdom. In spite of sixty years of independence from the UK and EU membership, as late as the 1980s massive numbers of Irish left their home country.[16]

[16] As many as 70,000 left in 1989 (O'Connell & Joyce, 2009, p. 4).

However, as the Irish economy experienced unprecedented growth in the 1990s, Ireland reached its turning point and finally followed the rest of Europe by transforming into an immigration country. Attracted by rapid growth in a variety of economic sectors and significantly lower unemployment rates, returning Irish nationals were the first massive immigration wave to Ireland during the 1990s. They were succeeded by non-EU nationals, who dominated flows between 2001 and 2004 and came to constitute more than half of all non-Irish immigration to the country. Nigerian immigrants, mostly arriving in the country as asylum seekers in the late 1990s and early 2000s, are still among the most numerous foreign groups in Ireland (O'Connell & Joyce, 2009).

However, it was European Union enlargement that led to a marked rise in migration to Ireland. As Ireland, together with Sweden and the UK, was one of three countries to immediately open its doors to new EU members, workers from the ten countries that acceded to the Union in 2004 elevated Irish migration to new heights. From a country with negative migration, Ireland suddenly transformed into the European Union's member with the third highest immigration rate.[17] Foreigners came to account for 10% of the Irish population in 2007 and this proportion has remained steady into 2011, regardless of the economic downturn. The migration surge reflects rising mobility by citizens from the new EU member states, who constituted half of all new migration flows into Ireland in 2005-2009 and account for more than a quarter of immigrant stocks in 2011.[18] The country is the only EU member state with a predominantly white and

[17] Ireland had the highest proportion of immigrants among EU member states in 2009, following only Malta and Spain. There were 14.5 migrants per 1,000 native inhabitants in 2009 (Ruhs, 2009).

[18] To be precise, they accounted for 44% of all migration flows in 2005-2008 and for 54% of all non-Irish immigration flows for the same time period (Ruhs, 2009). The migration from new member states to Ireland grew from 31,000 in 2003 to 203,000 in 2007. In 2011, there were 196,896 citizens of the new EU member states in Ireland, compared to a total foreign population of 766,770 persons (CSO, 2008, 2012a).

European foreign population (CSO, 2012a).[19] In spite of rapid decrease in flows in 2008-2009 and return migration with the full onset of economic crisis, Eastern Europeans have renewed their migration to Ireland in 2010-2011 and continue to play an important role in the country's labor market and socio-cultural life. Together with more established non-European immigrant groups, East European workers are the primary subject of exclusion and inclusion dynamics, as well as integration efforts, in the country.

II.3.2. Nigerian Migrants in Ireland

The first large group of non-Irish nationals to arrive in Ireland was that of Nigerian immigrants. As Kómoláfé (2008) puts it, "Ireland may well be considered a new haven for Nigerian migrants." Nigerian migration to Ireland began in the 1980s and mostly consisted of medical students or trainees who often returned to their home country upon completion of their studies. Nigerians started settling in Ireland in the late 1990s and early 2000s, taking advantage of relatively liberal immigration and asylum laws and the accelerating economy. The number of Nigerians officially residing in Ireland increased substantially from only 10 in 1996 to 19,780 in 2011.[20] While the absolute number of Nigerian citizens in Ireland might not be large, Nigerians are the largest non-EU national group in the country. The Africans have contributed to significant changes in Ireland's and Dublin's economic, political, and sociocultural landscape (CSO, 2012a; Kómoláfé, 2008).

[19] In most European countries, the migration flows and stocks of third country nationals far exceed these of European Union nationals. The numbers in the Irish case are as follows: In 2007, 3.7% of the population consisted of non-EU migrants, 3.9% of EU-15 nationals, and 5.8% of EU10 nationals (EC, 2008).
[20] The actual figure is estimated to be much higher, as it includes a number of undocumented migrants.

Kómoláfé (2008) identifies a number of motivations for Nigerian citizens to migrate to Ireland, including regularization of status conveyed by another Western European country, persecution, or professional and economic migration. The connection between the sending and receiving countries, with many Irish missionaries developing education, building churches and villages, and improving the quality of life in Nigeria, serves as an additional incentive for Nigerian nationals to select Ireland (ICI, 2008; Ugba, 2009). Regardless of their true motives, many Nigerians in the late 1990s and early 2000s chose to apply for Irish asylum as a fast track to regularization in the country. Nigeria was the top country in terms of asylum applications to Ireland until 2011, providing for one third of all application in 2001-2005, one fourth of all applications in 2006-2008, and one fifth of applications in 2009-2010 (Office of the Refugee Applications Commissioner [ORAC], 2002-2012).

Regardless of their route of entry, however, most Nigerians in Ireland are economic migrants today. Apart from a number of medical professionals recruited to fill gaps in Ireland's health sector, most Nigerian nationals in the country are employed in lower skilled occupations, such as social work, security, retail, manufacturing, or the taxi industry.[21] These occupations rarely match the educational qualifications of Nigerians in Ireland, 38.3% of whom held a third-level degree in 2006 (CSO, 2008). The Africans often work in these occupations illegally, after their documentation expired or while they are still part of the asylum system. As few are returning home with economic downturn,

[21] Between 1996 and 2001, there was an open policy that allowed Nigerian medical doctors and nurses to apply for employment permits to Ireland from Lagos and Abuja. These working permits were usually for a period of two years, renewable thirty days before expiration. After 2001, the system changed, where hospitals went to Nigeria to directly recruit medical doctors and nurses. Once the doctors and nurses arrived in Ireland, they only needed to undergo a six-week induction course to begin work (Kómoláfé, 2008; also confidential interviews, September-December, 2010, Dublin).

Nigerian workers are becoming a permanent presence in Ireland's low-skilled economic sectors.[22] These are the sectors where Nigerian immigrants compete for jobs and labor market inclusion with other foreign nationals, such as the numerous Polish workers inundating Ireland since the mid-2000s.

II.3.3. The Polish in Ireland

Among Eastern European nationals migrating to Ireland, Poland provided for the largest inflows. Attracted to the high wages, liberal economic system, and widely spoken English language in the host country, the proverbial "Polish plumber" arrived in every Irish town and city after 2004. The Polish quickly inundated the Irish labor market and are the largest foreign-born group in Ireland today (CSO, 2012a).[23] Some estimates place the Polish community in Ireland at close to a quarter of a million persons at its peak (Krings, 2010). The proliferation of Polish services, shops, and restaurants, and the founding of several Polish-language newspapers in Ireland, such as *Polska Gazeta* or *Polski Herald*, testify to the rising significance of Polish nationals in Irish society.

This significance is most clearly identifiable in the Irish labor market, as the majority of Polish migrants to Ireland are economic migrants. Most arrivals are male,

[22] Indeed, many occupations were closed to permit holders as response to the crisis. Nigerian immigrants were given few new permits – in fact, the rate of refusal of permits increased substantially. Also, deportation efforts for Nigerians immigrants have substantially intensified since 2010, leading to even smaller numbers for the Nigerian group residing in Ireland. However, a large number of Nigerian migrants has actually naturalized and acquired citizenship in Ireland and thus cannot be forced to leave. The drive to citizenship is related to the referendum changing citizenship laws in Ireland in 2004. Before *jus soli* was replaced by a mixed system with *jus soli* and *jus sanguinis* as guiding principles, Nigerian nationals with children born in Ireland and thus Irish citizens were permitted to regularize their status and apply for citizenship themselves. At the time of the Supreme Court decision overturning the right to a leave to remain for Irish-born children, there were 11,500 applications for residence by parents with Irish citizen children (Mullally, 2007, p. 28).

[23] The Polish were the largest foreign group in Ireland in 2011 with 122,585 persons compared to 112,259 UK nationals as the second largest group and 36,683 Lithuanians as the third largest group (CSO, 2012a).

young, and single.[24] All Polish interviewees in this project are in Ireland for economic reasons, even if some also quoted desire for adventure, better knowledge of the English language, and the experience of a new country as additional motivations for migration. As Barrett (2009) points out, while Eastern European immigrants from the new EU member states accounted for 4.5% of the total population in Ireland in 2008, they represented 8% of the labor force, an overrepresentation attesting to Poles' primarily economic motives.[25]

Not only have Polish nationals come to Ireland to work, but they have come armed with high qualifications and educational levels. The Polish labor force in Ireland is considered one of the most educated foreign labor forces in the European Union. As high as 27.2% of the Polish community in Ireland hold a postsecondary educational degree and 19.2% completed postgraduate education (CSO, 2008). According to Barrett and Duffy (2008), Eastern European immigrants "compare favorably with the domestic labour force in terms of skill levels," and have higher educational levels than the overall population of Poland.

Nonetheless, the "highly skilled inflow" of Polish workers Barrett (2009) describes is concentrated in low-skilled industries and is absent from highly-skilled occupations, which are reserved for the Irish themselves and for nationals from the older European Union members (Quinn, 2010, xiii). They also earn much less than natives in

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[24] According to the 2006 Census, male arrivals were almost double the number of female ones. The numbers stood at 56,200 compared to 23,000 respectively. What is more, of the 63,000 that reported their marital status, 39,000 self-identified as single. Finally, over half of the Polish population in 2006 was 25 to 40 years of age (CSO, 2008). However, as part of the natural process of family reunification, more numerous female Polish nationals arrived in Ireland more recently (Bushin, 2009; Krings, 2010).

[25] Barrett (2009) also points out that while the employment rate for Irish nationals was only 59% in 2008, EU12 nationals exhibited an employment rate of 80%.

comparable occupations (Barrett & McCarthy, 2007).[26] The majority of Poles arriving in 2004 concentrated in the booming construction industry, with hotels, restaurants, and retail attracting a large number of the East Europeans as well (CSO, 2008). [27]

With economic downturn, this sectoral distribution changed. The crash of the construction industry pushed many Polish nationals into alternative employment or led them to return to their home country and migrate to other EU member states. The number of Poles employed in construction shrank significantly after 2008. While at its peak in 2007 more than one quarter were employed in construction, only 5.6% reported activity in the construction sector in the last quarter of 2011. This shift has led to larger numbers of Polish nationals to transition to manufacturing jobs (23%). An additional 21% kept shops or served as clerks in Irish supermarkets and the rest worked in restaurants and hotels as servers, dishwashers, cleaners, and security guards (CSO, 2012b).[28] Encouragingly, some Polish nationals, and especially younger English speakers, transitioned to higher-skilled employment in secretarial and administrative support positions (CSO, 2012b).[29]

Polish workers did not “displace” but rather “replaced” Irish workers from jobs they were no longer willing to perform (Foras Áiseanna Saothair [FÁS], 2009). Migration

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[26] Barrett and Kelly (2010) argue that the income disadvantage for immigrants from new member states is 45% compared to the earnings of Irish nationals for comparable jobs.

[27] The Quarterly National Household Survey (QNHS) is a document produced by the Irish Central Statistical Office that reflects on a number of economic indicators concerning households in Ireland. Unfortunately, the QNHS has only produced an annex documenting foreign workers' economic activity since 2006. Furthermore, the survey deals with broad national groupings, such as *Irish*, *UK*, *EU15*, *EU15 to EU27* and *Other*. Therefore, it is impossible to state the precise number of Polish nationals engaged in a particular industry in Ireland, but as the Polish group accounts for more than half of the *EU15 to EU27* group, it is safe to conclude that the data for this category reflect the experiences of Polish nationals in Ireland (CSO, 2006-2011).

[28] Figures are for the fourth quarter of 2011 and refer to all immigrants from the *EU15 to EU27* countries (including Bulgaria and Romania). As Poles are by far the largest group and in fact account for 54% of the *EU15 to EU27* group in 2011, the data are considered representative (CSO, 2012b).

[29] There is an increase even between 2010 and 2011 by as high as three percentage points (CSO, 2012b).

from the new member states fit neatly within Ireland's larger migration strategy to fill all labor needs through nationals from the enlarged European Economic Area (Quinn, 2010). Government officials and large company representatives even travelled to Eastern European countries in the early 2000s to actively recruit labor at the low skill spectrum (Wickham, Moriarty, Bobek, & Salamonska, 2008).[30]

The massive influx of Polish workers, however, led to the displacement of third-country workers in Ireland. The Department of the Taoiseach mandated that labor market shortages be addressed almost exclusively through the pool of immigrants coming from within the European Union (Department of the Taoiseach, 2000). A new Work Visa/Work Authorization scheme came into place in 2000 to facilitate high skilled migration from outside the EU, while simultaneously closing a rising number of lower skilled occupations to non-European citizens through the introduction of market tests (Quinn, 2010). The displacement of third-county nationals is apparent in the receding number of work permits granted to non-EU citizens in the 2000s (Barrett & Duffy, 2008; Krings, 2010). These changes affected Nigerian immigrants most severely. All African interviewees in this project reported a sense of displacement by Eastern Europeans, who now occupy the jobs previously available to Nigerians.[31]

Competition is particularly prominent with economic downturn, and occurs among Poles, third-country nationals, other Eastern European workers, and Irish workers returning to the jobs they refused to perform during economic boom. It is most fierce in the lower skilled occupations reserved for foreigners in Ireland.[32] Therefore, the focus here is on Polish workers employed in construction, manufacturing, and low-skilled

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[30] Also, confidential interviews, September – December, 2010, Dublin.
[31] Confidential interviews, September – December, 2010, Dublin.
[32] Confidential interviews, September – December, 2010, Dublin.

services. These occupations not only attract the majority of Poles arriving to Ireland, but also contain the most dynamic and problematic relationships between Polish nationals on the one hand and other immigrant workers, Irish employers, and public officials on the other.

II.3.4. Dublin as an Urban Laboratory of Immigrant Exclusion and Inclusion

The trends described above are even starker on the city level, particularly in Ireland's capital – Dublin. Dublin hosts the highest percentage of non-nationals generally (with 21%). It is home to the majority of Poles in Ireland and to forty percent of all Nigerian immigrants. While Polish immigrants went to every town and city in Ireland, they have concentrated primarily in and around Dublin City. According to the 2006 census, of the total of 73,033 so-called new accession countries' nationals, almost twenty-two thousand could be found in Dublin compared to only 8,572 in the next largest center of residence (CSO, 2008). The Polish Embassy reported that as many as one hundred thousand Poles resided in Dublin in 2009 (MSZ, 2009). Dublin's identity today has been permanently enhanced by the Polish hair salons, restaurants, and bakeries in Capel Street, the impressive building of the Polish Chaplaincy in the city's center, or the numerous Eastern European shops in Parnell and Dorset Street. The Nigerian community, in its turn, has transformed the southwest of the city, where Nigerian immigrants have opened shops and restaurants and are an indelible part of the neighborhood (CSO, 2008).

Therefore, this research focuses on the city of Dublin. Dublin is the urban space where the majority of immigrant workers of the two groups of interest are concentrated. It is also the setting where Poles' and Nigerians' inclusion and exclusion take place and where

integration discourses and outcomes unfold. Dublin hosts most of the lower skill professions where the two immigrant communities tend to focus and in which they compete among each other and with the native population. The city is representative of Poles' and Nigerians' experiences in Ireland more broadly, as it contains a cross-section of these communities in terms of socioeconomic profiles and cultural backgrounds. Dublin is also a unique urban laboratory for the study of immigrant integration, inclusion and exclusion, as it is where the interaction between the two groups, their relationships with local labor market and socio-political actors, as well as their own experiences of belonging or isolation shape up. Dublin provides for a fruitful comparison with the other new migration space discussed in this project – Madrid. It is to the latter that the chapter turns next, in order to provide a background for the migration trajectories and experiences of Ecuadorians and Bulgarians.

II.4. The Case of Spain

The case of Spain, like that of Ireland, reflects general European migration trends and dilemmas. Cultural dynamics affect immigrant reception and integration in this second case study as well. Distinct historical and identity characteristics determine how Spanish publics and elites accommodate the different migrants populations in their midst, with local and community identity variations defining the unique inclusion, exclusion, and incorporation patterns facing the newcomers. These unique identity variations also produce a disparate immigration dynamic in Spain from that of Ireland. Migrant cohorts in the former are numerous and diverse, while they are largely white and European in the latter context (CSO, 2012a; EC, 2008; INE, 2010). A factual exposition of the developing

trajectory of migration flows to Spain establishes grounds for comparison with the Irish case and introduces the second case study of this dissertation.

II.4.1. From Emigration to Transit Migration to Immigration

Much like Ireland, Spain is a traditional emigration country. Large numbers of Spanish citizens left for North Africa and Latin America in the 19th and early 20th centuries. Due to high unemployment and retarded economic modernization in the country, temporary Spanish workers also migrated to more affluent countries in Northern Europe in 1950-1970.[33] Despite significant development and growth since the oil shocks of the 1970s, numerous Spaniards reacted to pan-European economic slowdown by renewing their migration to countries like Mexico, Chile, or Brazil as late as 2012 (Flannery, 2013).[34]

As traditional immigrant receivers closed their doors to foreign workers in the 1970s and Spain joined the European Community in 1986, Spain transitioned from an emigration to a transit country, serving as a gateway for Maghrebi migrants heading further north and west. Intense economic growth and substantial reduction in unemployment finally rendered Spain an immigration country in the late 1980s (Hazán, 2014, p. 376). The first large wave of migrants in Spain were in fact well-to-do retirees from the rest of Europe, moving to Spain to enjoy the favorable climate and way of life.

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[33] In 1850-1950, 3.5 million Spanish workers migrated to the Americas concentrating primarily in Argentina, which received almost half of the flows, but also in Uruguay, Brazil, and Cuba. In the 1930s-1950s, 80% of all Spanish migrants chose the Americas, whereas in the 1960s and 1970s 75% left for the rest of Europe (Pérez, 2003).

[34] While only 3,700 Spaniards moved to Latin America in 2005, as many as 30,000 left in 2011 ("¡Ya me voy!," 2012). Renewed emigration from Spain to Latin America simultaneously reasserts Spain's active role in the Iberian community and produces tensions between Spain and Latin American countries. Mistreatment of Latin Americans migrants in Spain has led to retaliatory measures towards Spaniards in Latin America with Brazil, for instance, requiring "a letter of invitation" of all Spanish visitors since April 2012 (Flannery, 2013).

With economic boom, the Northern Europeans were joined by non-European workers from Northern Africa, and especially Morocco, who were attracted to the large underground economy, the ample opportunities in the agricultural sector, and the historical, cultural, and geographic proximity of Spain (Pérez, 2003).

It was Latin Americans immigrants, however, who led to the explosion of the foreign population in the receiving country in the late 1990s and early 2000s. Traditional migrants from Argentina, Venezuela or Chile came to be complemented by ever rising numbers of Ecuadorian, Peruvian and Dominican workers. Taken together, South Americans quickly surpassed Moroccans as the primary source of non-European migration to Spain (Hazán, 2014, p. 377). Drawn to ample economic opportunities in services, construction and agriculture, preferential and lax immigration policies, tolerant attitudes, as well as similar economic, social, and cultural structures in home and host countries, Ecuadorians became the second largest foreign group in Spain after Moroccans in 2001 (Arango, 2012; Pérez, 2003; Rodríguez-Planas & Nollenberger, 2014).

Latin American workers were joined by a steady flow of Eastern European laborers, especially after Spain removed all limitations to the movement and employment of citizens from the new EU member states in 2006 and 2009. After Bulgaria and Romania joined the Union in 2007, the influx of East Europeans into Spain peaked. Balkan migrants grew from 7% to 20% of all European foreigners in Spain between 2000 and 2011 and continue to arrive in the host country despite high unemployment, economic contraction, souring public attitudes, and the renewed emigration of Spanish nationals (Rodríguez-Planas & Nollenberger, 2014, p. 3). Romanians and Bulgarians are

among the ten largest foreign nationalities in Spain, with Bulgarians as the fastest growing European immigrant group in the receiving country (OECD, 2013b).

As a result of these numerous migration waves, Spain's migrant stocks grew from 1.5 million people in 2000 to 5.4 million in 2012 (OECD, 2011, 2013b). Much like Ireland, Spain contains some of the highest concentrations of foreigners among developed countries and in fact only trails the United States in terms of relative migration figures (Arango, 2012; OECD, 2013b). Unlike Ireland, however, Spain contains a diverse foreign population comprised of large numbers of Northern Europeans, Africans, Balkan immigrants, and Latin Americans. This intricate and varied migration landscape produces complex patterns of immigrant inclusion, exclusion and incorporation in the receiving state, especially as Spain continues to experience economic contraction and high levels of unemployment. The interaction among natives, Latin American workers, and Bulgarian laborers is particularly dynamic.

II.4.2. Ecuadorian Migrants in Spain

The fastest growing group of non-Spanish nationals in Spain is that of Latin American immigrants, and since 2000, Ecuadorians in particular. While Spaniards have migrated to South America since the 19th century, Latin Americans started to arrive in steady numbers in Spain in the 1970s for the first time. Political refugees and highly-educated workers from Chile, Venezuela or Argentina, these foreign cohorts were considered unproblematic in terms of integration and remained largely unnoticed by native publics (Peixoto, 2012). With hyperinflation and economic stagnation at home, tighter immigration controls in alternative destinations like the United States, and

preferential policy arrangements, Ecuadorians began to arrive in Spain in large numbers since the late 1990s. Together with Peruvians, they came to dominate South American migration to Spain in the 2000s. The number of Ecuadorians in Spain increased from 76,000 in 2001 to 457,000 persons in 2006, a figure that is close to 300,000 persons in 2013 (Bertoli, Moraga, & Ortega, 2010; INE, 2014). Ecuadorians remain the largest Latin American, the second largest non-European, and the fourth largest immigrant group in Spain despite return migration (INE, 2014; Rodriguez-Planas & Nollenberger, 2014). As they are active in the receiving country's economic, political, and sociocultural life, Ecuadorians are highly significant to Spain's and Madrid's migration landscape and constitute one of the four case studies in this dissertation.

The motivations for Ecuadorians to migrate to Spain are largely economic, even though institutional and cultural openness have a large role to play a well. The Spanish economy entered a period of rapid growth from 1994 to 2007, corresponding almost exactly with massive migration of Latin Americans into the receiving country. Since the growth was fueled by investment in real estate and tourism, the tourism and construction industries expanded disproportionately and generated strong demand for low-skilled foreign workers. The seven million jobs created in Spain in these sectors between 1998 and 2007 were filled mostly by Latin American workers (Hazán, 2014, pp. 378-379).

A number of bilateral agreements between sending and receiving countries opened ample employment opportunities for the Latin Americans and granted them generous rights in Spain. Bilateral arrangements in the 2000s, for instance, defined Ecuadorians' access to the Spanish labor market, facilitated seasonal employment or the assessment of professional qualifications, and ensured labor and social rights. Quota

systems instituted in 1993-1995, 1997-1999 and in 2002 to respond to short- and long-term shortages in the Spanish labor market were largely filled through South American workers, especially these already in the country (Pérez, 2003). Latin Americans accounted for one third of all work permits granted in the 2000s. Further, a 1960 bilateral arrangement guaranteed that Ecuadorian pension benefits were fully transferable from home to host country. A 1963 agreement allowed Ecuadorians to be admitted in Spain for a period of three months without a visa, provided they had "approximately $2,000 ('la bolsa'), a credit card, tourist plan, hotel reservations, confirmed return flight, and justification for being in Spain" (Jokisch & Pribilsky, 2002). The stay was extendable beyond the initial three-month allowance. While the visa waiver was removed in 2003 so that Spain conforms to European directives, Ecuadorians who used the arrangement in prior to 2003 could remain in the receiving state without authorization. Periodic amnesties, occurring in 1985, 1991, 1996, 2000, and 2001, and 2005 and targeting Latin Americans in particular, channeled these irregular migrants into legal employment in the country (Bertoli et al., 2010).

Cultural proximity and a shared language complemented economic and institutional openness and made Spain an even more attractive destination for the Latin American immigrants (Hall, 2008). To provide an illustration, Bertoli et al. (2010) argue that between 1999 and 2005, Ecuadorians were almost three times more likely to seek employment in Spain than in the United States, their traditional destination.

Ecuadorians are firmly embedded in the Spanish labor market despite crisis and return migration. Most arrivals are relatively young and single, with women likely to migrate to Spain as frequently as men. A majority hold a high school or primary school

diploma only, with few college graduates (Bertoli et al., 2010; Rodríguez-Planas & Vegas, 2012).[35] Regardless of education, Ecuadorians in Spain are likely to be employed in low-skilled services and construction, much like their Nigerian and Polish counterparts in Dublin and Bulgarian ones in Madrid (Bernardi, Garrido, & Miyar, 2011). Employment is most likely in domestic and elderly care for women and construction for men, even though both groups are transitioning to other low-skilled services with economic downturn (Dudley, 2013; Jokisch & Pribilsky, 2002). While Ecuadorians usually arrive in Spain legally, moreover, they are likely to lose authorization and fall into the intricate Spanish underground economy at least at one time of their stay in Spain (Rodríguez-Planas & Vegas, 2012). It is in this gray economy and the low-skilled sectors identified above that Ecuadorians compete for labor market inclusion with other foreign workers, such as the numerous Balkan laborers entering Spain since the mid-2000s.

II.4.3. Bulgarian Workers in Spain

Eastern and Central European nationals have migrated to Spain since the collapse of the Iron Curtain. However, Romanians and Bulgarians became the fastest growing groups after the latest European Union enlargement in 2007 and Spain's decision to remove barriers to their labor after two years. The Balkan workers have also been attracted to the familiar and flexible market structure in the receiving country, the favorable climate, and their hosts' similar disposition and culture (Slavkova, 2012). As a result, there are over 170,000 Bulgarians residing in Spain in 2014, making Spain the home of the largest Bulgarian diaspora abroad. The Bulgarian cohort in Spain grew by 112% between 2006 and 2007, making it one of the ten largest nationalities in the host

[35] Only 7%-12% of Rodríguez-Planas and Vegas' (2012) Ecuadorian interviewees held a university degree.

state (INE, 2009, 2010, 2014).[36] A number of ethnic associations and foundations and a Bulgarian newspaper, *Nova Duma*, testify to Bulgarians' embeddedness in Spanish society.

Much like Ecuadorians, Bulgarians migrate to Spain to work. As the Bulgarian government's transition to a market economy resulted in high inflation and unemployment rates, many Bulgarians left in search of better opportunities, particularly to Southern Europe (Slavkova, 2008). For instance, a 2005 study of 202 Bulgarians found that even before entry in the European community, a substantial number of Bulgarians went to Spain to improve their economic situation (Markova, 2005). According to another survey, three quarters of Balkan immigrants in Spain were employed within a short period from arrival, a figure comparable to that for Ecuadorians (Rodríguez-Planas & Vegas, 2012).

Bulgarians in Spain are young and single (Markova, 2005).[37] They are relatively low-skilled and have fewer qualifications than both the Polish and Nigerian groups in Ireland, but are better educated than Ecuadorians.[38] However, like their Ecuadorian counterparts, Bulgarians take low-skilled jobs in the host country (Rodríguez-Planas & Nollenberger, 2014). Female migrants compete with their Ecuadorian counterparts for jobs in the elderly and domestic services. Most serve as *internas* (live-in domestic

[36] Bulgarians are selected rather than Romanians, since Bulgarians are still among the most prominent foreign populations in Spain and are rising in numbers during economic downturn. Bulgarians also have similar legal-political status and motivations for migration to those of Romanians. However, they are not immediately racialized through the stereotype of the "Roma" as their Romanian counterparts. Therefore, they provide a more realistic picture of immigrant experiences in the receiving context.

[37] For example, Markova (2005)'s respondents were mostly in the 25-34 age group (37%).

[38] Markova (2005) finds that 69% of Bulgarians in Spain completed high school education, usually with a technical specialization. Another 27% held a university or a postgraduate degree. Only around 10% of Ecuadorians held a college degree or better according to Rodríguez-Planas and Vegas (2012). To compare, 46% of Poles in Ireland held a college degree or better (Barrett, 2009).

workers engaged in house work, baby-sitting, or elderly care). Some *internas* transition to employment in small businesses printing or distributing leaflets (*careteras*), cleaning offices and shops, or supporting the tourism sector. Bulgarian males are employed in low-skilled services and in unqualified construction jobs (Markova, 2005). Since Bulgaria only joined the European Union in 2007 and restrictions to the Balkan migrants' labor were only removed in 2009, many Bulgarians residing in Spain have been in unauthorized status at one point of their stay and have interacted with Latin American workers in the Spanish underground economy. In this gray space, they are exploited by other foreigners, their settled or naturalized compatriots, and Spanish employers.[39]

The four immigrant groups discussed in this dissertation are highly comparable. They offer a realistic view into immigrant reception and integration in the cities, since they are relatively unburdened by history, international relations, or excessive media attention. None of the four immigrant populations are of predominantly Muslim faith and therefore their experiences have not been scrutinized and skewed by a hyper vigilant media. While Ecuador was a Spanish colony, the relationship falls in the distant past, and escapes considerations of recent colonial hierarchies, resentments, or fears (Flesler, 2008; Lange, Mahoney, & Von Hau, 2006; Mendoza, 2001). The specter of the Roma does not automatically skew perceptions of the Bulgarian in Madrid, as it would in the case of the Romanian.

The four groups occupy a similar labor market position despite their qualifications, legal status, or point of entry. All four cohorts have been employed in the construction and low-skilled service sectors and have worked in the host countries

[39] 56% of Markova (2005)'s interviewees were irregular in 2005. Many entered prior to 2007 using the same visa waiver as Ecuadorian migrants and overstayed their authorization. Some took part of the amnesties organized by the Spanish governments or acquired legal status through an employment offer.

without authorization at some point of their migration. Interestingly, unlike Polish immigrants in Ireland, Bulgarians in Spain did not displace older non-European migrants from these occupations, even with economic crisis. The Latin Americans' identity characteristics and language skills make them desirable employees preferred to Bulgarians regardless of the EU citizenship of the latter. All four populations concentrate in the receiving countries' capital cities, where they interact with employers, politicians, and native populations and negotiate opportunities, status, and identities.

II.4.4. Madrid as an Urban Laboratory of Immigrant Exclusion and Inclusion

The trends described above are more pronounced on the city level, where East European and Latin American immigrants interact and compete with each other, get welcomed or excluded, and strive to integrate in practice. While foreign populations concentrate in a number of agricultural and urban locations in Spain, and are numerous in the autonomous communities of Andalucía, Valencia, and Madrid, the Bulgarian and Ecuadorian cohorts focus mostly in Spain's capital – Madrid. While the foreign population in Spain stood at 14% of the total, it represented 16% of the total, or more than one million people, in Madrid in 2012. The second largest foreign group in Madrid in 2012 was the Ecuadorian, with almost 100,000 people or 10% of all foreign nationals in the autonomous community (Comunidad de Madrid, 2012a). One third of all Ecuadorian immigrants work and live in Madrid. Madrid's identity is largely defined by South American shops, businesses, restaurants and neighborhoods, especially in the districts of Ciudad Lineal, Latina, and Carabanchel (Dirección General de Estadística, 2007; Lucko, 2007). Madrid is also the home of a substantial Balkan community, with

Bulgarians among the top ten nationalities in the city with 32,000 people (Comunidad de Madrid, 2012a). Since one quarter of all Bulgarians in Spain cluster in the capital city, the Balkan newcomers have radically transformed their new home with a multitude of foundations and ethnic associations, hair salons, restaurants, and supermarkets. Since Bulgarians also tend to select the neighborhoods of Ciudad Lineal, Latina, and Carabanchel, it is in these localities that the East Europeans coexist and compete with their Latin American counterparts (Dirección General de Estadística, 2007).

Consequently, this thesis focuses on the city of Madrid. Madrid hosts the majority of Ecuadorian and Bulgarian immigrants of interest to this project and places them together in tightly knit migration and living spaces. It is in this urban setting that the immigrants' inclusion and exclusion take place and integration dynamics unfold. Madrid also contains most of the lower skill professions where the two immigrant communities focus and in which they compete among each other, with other foreign cohorts, and with the native population. The city provides for a fruitful comparison with the case of Dublin, where the experiences of Polish and Nigerian workers develop. Madrid is representative of Bulgarians' and Ecuadorians' experiences in Spain more broadly, as it contains a cross section of these communities in terms of socioeconomic profiles and cultural backgrounds. However, it is also a unique, as it is where the interaction between the two groups, their relationships with local stakeholders, and their own experiences of belonging or isolation shape up. It is to these experiences that the dissertation turns in the next two chapters, by first outlining the discourse of welcome and rejection the four immigrants groups face and then turning to the newcomers' own perceptions and motivations.

CHAPTER III

BUT THEY ARE NOT "JUST THE SAME AS US":

INCLUSION AND EXCLUSION IN DUBLIN AND MADRID

III.1. Introduction

How are Polish and Nigerian workers received in Dublin? Are Ecuadorians and Bulgarians welcomed or rejected in Madrid? What explains the reception patterns of the four immigrant groups? This chapter responds to these empirical questions in order to address the general question: How do Western European receiving societies construct inclusion and exclusion of the immigrant? The main finding is that identity politics affect immigrant reception in Dublin, Madrid and beyond. Local stakeholders include or exclude foreign workers not on the basis of economic utility, but in view of how well the newcomers fit into the host communities' ideal identity.[40] Immigrants are welcomed if they are perceived as similar to natives in terms of race/ethnicity, religion, history, language, culture, and "work ethic." Foreign populations are excluded if they are framed as different on the basis of the same characteristics. Commonalities between desirable immigrant populations and natives are invented while connections with undesirable groups are downplayed in order to reassert the receiving city's favorable identity variations while discounting unfavorable traits.

The six markers of similarity and difference are not objective, but are subjective, flexible, and strategic. Their interpretation and prominence vary significantly across

[40] The chapter and the thesis are not concerned with assessing the relative explanatory power of economic and cultural determinants of immigrant reception and integration in Europe. The causal connection between economic factors and immigrant reception is beyond the scope of the project. This dissertation is only concerned with establishing how identity politics figure in discourses of exclusion and inclusion in new immigration receiving spaces on the Continent.

different receiving contexts. These categories are firmly embedded in the city, with relevant stakeholders adamantly placing their self-identification in the local level, often in opposition to national or supranational projects of identity-building.

Table III.1. Immigrant Inclusion and Exclusion in Dublin and Madrid

		Host Society	
		Accept	*Reject*
Immigrant Group	*Belong*	Ecuadorians in Madrid	Bulgarians in Madrid
	Don't Belong	Poles in Dublin	Nigerians in Dublin

The experiences of Poles and Nigerians in Dublin and Ecuadorians and Bulgarians in Madrid attest to the significance of local identity for immigrant inclusion and exclusion. Chapter III establishes that Polish immigrants are included in Dublin's landscape, since they are constructed to be "just the same as us." [41] Shared strong work ethic, white European ethnicity, Catholicism, history of emigration and independent spirit, as well as an accepting and friendly disposition establish strong kinship between the Irish and the Polish, while also reasserting these positive qualities in Dubliners' own self-identification. Language skills inadequacies are overlooked in order to maintain this discourse of inclusion intact. Poles place in the left-hand column of **Table III.1**.

[41] Chapter III and this dissertation define immigration reception patterns, or inclusion-excluion dynamics, as discourse constructed by elites interlocutors, as well as the general public. Reception is not understood as policies or laws. It is assumed that discourse underlies policy creation and implementation. However, establishing a causal connection between discourses and policies is beyond the scope of this dissertation.

Nigerians in Dublin are narrated as "different" regardless of actual historical and cultural connections with the host country. Their racial and cultural dissimilarity, bogus asylum claims and subservient status in the British Empire, as well as poor work ethic, are employed to exclude them from the receiving city. Suspect religious belonging, different intonation, and inadequate language capabilities are further invented to relegate the Africans to the right-hand column of **Table III.1**.

Ecuadorians' work ethic and educational levels are questioned by Spaniards. The South Americans are framed as similar and are included in Madrid regardless of these shortcomings. Madrilenians focus on the Latin Americans' shared religion, language, and history, as well as jovial and friendly disposition, in order to reassert their own Iberian-American self-identification. Ecuadorians' dissimilar racial characteristics are narrated as an advantage, and stress Madrilenians' commitment to multiculturalism and equality.[42] The South American population locates in the left-hand column of **Table III.1**.

Bulgarians in Madrid are perceived to share a European identity, proclivity to "work hard," and belonging to similar political norms with the Spanish. Limited acceptance of the Balkan migrants reinforces Spaniards' own identity as European, which was questioned in the 1980s while Spain was finding its space within the European Union. However, Bulgarians' connection to the Roma ethnicity, their criminal proclivities, their different religion and inability or unwillingness to speak Spanish, as well as their dissimilar social disposition are also emphasized, in order to construct an image of this group that is neutral at best and negative at worst. Bulgarians fall in the right-hand column of **Table III.1**.

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[42] Race here is not an objective hard category, but a fluid characteristic that can be framed to include or exclude any immigrant group.

The local identity particularities of Dublin and Madrid shape the interpretation and prominence of the subjective categories through which immigrant reception is constructed. For instance, "language nationalism" and painful memories of a dictatorial past, combined with emphasis on democracy and multiculturalism, define local stakeholders' understanding of what Madrid should stand for. Conflict between an Iberian-American and a European identity determines reception for different foreign cohorts in the Spanish receiving space. On the other hand, Catholicism, ethnic homogeneity and opposition to historical domination by a powerful British Empire influence the contours of immigrant inclusion and exclusion in Dublin. Ties with white, European, and spirited Polish newcomers are invented, while historical connections with Nigerian migrants within the British sphere of influence are undermined.

These findings are grounded in analysis of semi-structured interviews with thirty to forty local stakeholders in each context, as these are the actors that are influenced by the city's identity, (re)interpret this identity, and determine who is accepted or not in the city.[43] These local officials define both the discourse of immigrant reception and the construction and implementation of immigration policy.[44] A survey of one hundred randomly selected Spanish- and Irish-born natives introduces a quantitative element to

[43] These include city hall and governmental administrators, mayoral officers, local political representatives from across the political spectrum, trade union leaders, local representatives of national, regional and European political institutions, journalists and researchers, as well as employers of immigrants. Their selection is purposive, as there are a finite number of such leaders in immigration politics and reception. Only immigrant employers, who are numerous in Dublin and Madrid, were selected through referrals by other participants and randomly, after observation of different areas in the city and walk-in requests for an interview. See Appendix A for details.

[44] The interviews are analyzed through simple tabulation. The sample is too small to warrant statistical analysis and too homogenous in terms of socio-cultural and demographic characteristics to warrant discourse analysis. Nonetheless, there are clear repeating trends that emerge from the responses and hold regardless of the participants' identity or characteristics.

the analysis in Chapter III and reinforces the significance of identity for immigrant reception in Dublin and Madrid.[45]

The chapter proceeds as follows. A summary of reception patterns for the four groups is followed by discussion of these patterns' limited material bases. The bulk of the chapter is dedicated to the non-material sources of inclusion and inclusion, with ethnicity, religion, language, history, work ethic, and culture discussed in turn.

III.2. The Contours of Immigrant Reception in Dublin and Madrid

Polish and Nigerian immigrants in Dublin and Bulgarian and Ecuadorian laborers in Madrid are a permanent part of the receiving cities and have enriched the host societies in which they are embedded. Nonetheless, the four groups have engendered dissimilar sentiments in their new communities. They have also been evaluated quite differently by local officials, employers, and the general public, even as economic downturn produces a more negative attitude towards all immigrant populations in the cities.[46] The outlook of the reception of each group is detailed below, on the basis of interview and survey data.[47] **Table III.2** summarizes the main indicators underlying these reception patterns.

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[45] This author conducted a survey with one-hundred randomly selected local residents who are the "consumers" of the immigrant groups' labor and interact with them in the socio-cultural spheres of Dublin and Madrid. Surveys in Dublin were carried on in December 2010 and in Madrid – in April-May 2011. One hundred valid samples were produced in Ireland and ninety in Spain. The participants were solicited in different neighborhoods of the two cities, both in city centers and immigrant-heavy communities, in order to account for variation in opinion based on social contact or economic class reflected in these geographic differences. Participants were approached at shopping malls, bus or train stops, or on the street. Surveys were analyzed through simple regression and correlation analysis, using the SPSS software. See Appendix B for survey instrument and descriptive statistics.

[46] Local labor market actors and the general public present a consistent narrative of Polish and Nigerian immigrants in Dublin and Ecuadorian and Bulgarian workers in Madrid, with all expert respondents highlighting similar themes regarding the four groups. However, some of the officials attribute the narrative to something they have heard among the public or to other local administrators and actors.

[47] Several questions in the interviews with local stakeholders are employed as indicators of general reception patterns. Particularly, relevant actors were asked if the immigrant groups of interest are necessary

Table III.2. Indicators of Inclusion and Exclusion in Dublin and Madrid

	Polish	*Nigerian*	*Ecuadorian*	*Bulgarian*
Swamping/unease		✓		✓
Empathy	✓		✓	
Accepted by others in the city	✓		✓	✓
Rejected by others in the city		✓		✓
Positive consequences	✓		✓	
Negative consequences		✓	✓	
Direct evaluation	Very good	N/A	Very good	Good
Efforts to fit in	✓		✓	✓
No efforts to fit in		✓		✓
RECEPTION	**Included**	**Excluded**	**Included**	**Conflicted**

III.2.1. The Reception of Polish Immigrants in Dublin

Polish immigrants are received into the Irish labor market and sociocultural landscape in almost unexpectedly positive terms by politicians, the media, and the general public (**Table III.2**). Public officials were surprised that the massive Polish migration into Ireland, which constituted the first large economic migration wave Ireland ever experienced, did not engender fears of "swamping" or "inundation" of Dublin's labor market and society (D5-ADMIN). The Polish were instead received with "novelty and curiosity", a sense of kinship and empathy, and consternation at stories of exploitation of Polish workers. Attempts by political party Fine Gael to "play the race card" against Polish immigrants largely backfired (D1-J). Despite "a certain amount of racism" in Dublin, Polish immigrants in the city are "largely accepted" (D2-TU).

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to the receiving city or are seen as too many. They were asked how other elite and rank-and-file members of the city have received the immigrants. Stakeholders were asked whether the consequences of the immigrants' mobility are mostly positive or negative. They were also queried about the immigrants' perceived efforts to fit in the cities' life through actions like learning the language or buying property. Both public officials and the respondents of the survey conducted by this author were also asked to directly rate their experiences with the four immigrant groups of interest to this dissertation through categories ranging from "poor" to "excellent." **Table III.2** reflects the answers given by a majority of relevant actors or the general public.

Positive public discourse is reflected in public opinion as well. In a survey this author conducted with one hundred randomly-selected Dubliners in December 2010, 90.6% rated their interactions with Polish immigrants as "excellent," "very good" or "good," with a majority of persons giving the East Europeans a "very good" evaluation and only 3.1% rating Poles as "poor" or "very poor."[48] This highly positive evaluation occurred regardless of the fact that Poles were considered the most visible group in the city by 88.8% of survey participants. Large population size does not translate into a negative evaluation in the case of the Polish in Dublin.[49]

This positive reception correlates with officials' and the public's evaluation of the East Europeans' ability to "fit in" into Dublin's landscape. Undoubtedly, Poles are becoming an indelible part of the city. However, as the next chapter will demonstrate, they also tend to remain embedded in their ethnic community and communicate, work, and live mostly with their conationals. Yet objective indicators have little space in public discourse, which declares Polish immigrants' success in "fitting in." Officials argue that "without exception" the Polish in Dublin "have integrated," "settled" and "have at least one Irish friend" (D8-ADMIN; D15-E). They are reported to "have integrated easier" than other immigrant populations in Dublin, moreover, and to "have settled, have settled ties here, have children here … have bought property here" (D6-TU). Assimilating into the city's life is invariably associated with learning the English language, where the

[48] The remaining 6.3% evaluated Poles as "adequate."

[49] According to Sides and Citrin (2007), native populations that overestimate the numbers of an immigrant cohort also overestimate its negative consequences for the receiving society. This hypothesis does not hold in the case Poles in Dublin. I argue that this is the case, since the general public construct their acceptance of the Polish not based on "the pocketbook," or the immigrants' effects on the Irish economy, but based on "the flag," or similar Poles' contribution to the city's identity (Aksoy, 2012). As non-material factors matter more for inclusion and exclusion, the foreign group's similarity to locals does not present a threat to socio-cultural cohesion. Political and media discourse trickles into public opinion. The general public are somewhat conflicted in their evaluation of the Polish, but follow closely the official narrative.

language barrier in the case of Polish immigrants is downplayed and even ignored. The proliferation of Polish shops, organizations and publications is not only a sign of Poles' embeddedness in Dublin, but also an indication of the positive effects of Polish migration on the city's life and culture:

> *But the other sign of how the Polish have adapted is the way they have set up shops and retail outlets for their own products. They attend church services in quite large numbers. And they mix with the Irish community by and large. I think they mix quite well with the Irish community and they also have their own networks and their own communities in Ireland* (D2-TU)

> *I'd say maybe five-ten years ago we didn't have a Polish food section in the shops. We didn't have Polish documents in the newspapers. We have that now* (D4-P)

> *The Polish people seemed to fit in to Ireland whether it was the shared religion, that shared experience, I am not too sure, but certainly they seemed to fit really well in the Irish way of life, they seemed to be a little bit Irish in the sense that they know how to enjoy themselves, they are very sociable, they were very quick to settle their own communities, their own chaplain in the church, and their own shops, and there as a certain level of entrepreneurship in providing things like translation services, and groceries and stuff like that that you would get in those communities* (D7-TU)

III.2.2. The Reception of Nigerian Immigrants in Dublin

Unlike their Polish counterparts, Nigerian immigrants are excluded from Dublin (**Table III.2**). Nigerians comprised the first migratory wave into Ireland after it became an immigration receiver and despite their relatively meager numbers, they were reported to have caused "a shock to the system" (D25-J). In a country with "no history of black people," Nigerians immigrants arriving in Ireland engendered an attitude of "we have nothing in common here" among the native population (D1-J). As the majority arrived through the asylum system, Nigerians were received with fears that they will overwhelm and abuse social resources in Ireland. When they were dispersed into Irish communities, native residents expressed "concern" with their perceived illegality and criminality, as

well as “irrational fears” that they will “take over” and corrupt local communities (D1-J; D25-J). The Irish “closed their doors to the Africans” (D28-P).

This negative reception is paralleled by a negative evaluation of Nigerians’ ability to integrate in Dublin, at least compared to Poles. Indeed, the Polish are reported to have “integrated much better than the Nigerians,” who continue to experience problems with incorporation (D25-J). Some expert interviewees discuss the “community energy” of Nigerian immigrants and their knack for founding shops, bars or restaurants as a positive indicator of integration (D3-P). Since many Nigerian immigrants have children, contact in the Irish school system is found particularly helpful in facilitating African migrants’ transition to Ireland and mitigating the negative reactions towards them.

Nonetheless, it is predominantly organizations that serve the Nigerian community that hold these positive views. Irish political, economic, and social actors instead emphasize the challenges with Nigerians’ integration. Those arriving through the asylum system are often considered severely obstructed in their assimilation efforts. While blame is not directly placed on asylum seekers, but is recognized to lie in the asylum system or even the Irish government, Nigerian migrants are still deemed as reluctant to establish connections with their host country and “set down their roots here” (D13-P). Nigerians are perceived to “stick together” in less desirable areas of the city and live a “parallel life” in Ireland (D6-TU; D9-P; D11-L; D12-E; D41-NO).

Interestingly, while the level of multiculturalism Polish immigrants bring to the city is portrayed as positive in official discourse, the multiculturalism that comes with the “Nigerialization” of Parnell street is either overlooked or admitted to “make people nervous” (D25-J; D42-NO). According to one participant, sharing a geographic space

does not create multiculturalism and the idea of the "New Irish" remains a myth (D28-P).[50] The more diverse the immigrant populations in Dublin, the more difficult it is considered accommodating them and the stronger the anti-immigrant sentiments of the local population grow.

III.2.3. The Reception of Ecuadorian Immigrants in Madrid

Like the Polish in Dublin, Ecuadorians in Madrid are received warmly in the city (**Table III.2**). After Moroccan immigrants "did not adapt very well," Ecuadorians who "have a language like ours, a culture that is similar and so on" were eagerly invited to the receiving context to fill positions in domestic care, construction or agriculture (M23-TU; Pérez, 2003).[51] The economic crisis has admittedly caused some Spaniards "to be against migrants, because they think that they are trying to take something from them" and has introduced a "competitive aspect" in the otherwise tolerant city (M20-ADMIN; M28-EU). However, the strong socio-cultural bonds between Madrilenians and the South Americans have resulted in continued "good feelings" for the immigrant cohort and efforts in including what are conceived of as "European Latinos" (M16-P; M31-R). A survey by the European Union's Center for Sociological Investigation (CIS) similarly found that only 0.8% of Spanish respondents had no sympathy for Ecuadorians (compared to 15.4% in the case of Romanians), where 14.1% of participants found Latin Americans most acceptable or "easiest to sympathize with" in Spain, the largest

[50] The "New Irish" was a series by the Irish Times that covered various immigrant communities residing in Dublin. Much like the *One City, One People* program by the Dublin City Hall, this series proponed the idea that ethnic communities residing in the city could maintain their cultural identity while adopting Irish culture and nationality. The series also promoted inclusion of immigrant populations in the country (D1-J).
[51] Author's translation from original quote in Spanish: "Los marroquís no se adaptan muy bien, vamos a probar con los países de Sudamérica, que tienen un lenguaje como el nuestro, una cultura parecida y tal…"

percentage among all foreign nationalities or regional groups (Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas [CIS], 2012, pp. 11-12). In the survey with Madrilenians conducted by this author, a majority of respondents identified Ecuadorians as the largest group in the city, yet this estimation did not translate into a negative evaluation of the group.

Welcome for the cohort correlates with the perception that Ecuadorians "come to set down roots and stay" in Madrid (M13-E).[52] The Latin Americans are perceived to "have fewer problems [fitting in] than, for example, Bulgarians" and to be able to make it much easier than Moroccans who are yet to belong after twenty or more years in the receiving context (M11-E).[53] As the South Americans "present few problems"[54] with integration and there is no perception that "they should be changing something [or] need to make a bigger effort to integrate, to accept our values," Ecuadorians are deemed to "have the best…integration [in the city]" (M19-ADMIN; M27-L; M33-ADMIN).

As Ecuadorians are beneficiaries of fast-track naturalization procedures, but more so as "they speak the language" and have similar culture, they are narrated to "want ot live the rest of their lives here, even if they are unemployed" (M16-P). They are reported to have "settled permanently" and to "bring their kids or have kids" in the host city (M16-P; M19-ADMIN). Ecuadorians' embeddedness in the receiving context is indicated by their proclivity to naturalize in large numbers, buy apartments in Madrid, place their children in the Spanish educational system, and exhibit "feelings of belonging, some degree of attachment" (M31-R). One respondent shares a telling anecdote:

[52]Author's translation from original quote in Spanish: "Sudamericanos por general es gente que todo lo contrario al gente del Este, vienen para echar raíces y quedarse."
[53]Author's translation from original quote in Spanish: "Yo creo que Sudamérica tiene menos problemas como, por ejemplo, búlgaros."
[54]Author's translation from original quote in Spanish: "Los latinoamericanos plantean pocos problemas" (M27-L).

There was the question, "Are you planning to return, to go back?" They said, "Yes, for the holidays." That is, they feel Spanish (M31-R)

Some expert interviewees admit that South Americans in Madrid engage in segmented assimilation, where they incorporate to unfavorable niches of society in Madrid, "do not go to school…and are on the streets," and engage in "Latino gangs with their fights and rivalries" (M18-ADMIN).[55] However, even such patterns are taken to signify Ecuadorians' permanence in the city and their transformation from Latin Americans into "European Latinos," much like in the US (M16-P).

III.2.4. The Reception of Bulgarian Immigrants in Madrid

Finally, while Bulgarians in Madrid are not rejected like Nigerians in Dublin, they face a neutral treatment at best (**Table III.2**). As Spain itself was perceived to suffer from second-class citizenship in the European Union upon joining in 1986, a certain expectation existed among administrators that the new Balkan members of the EU will be met with empathy by Spaniards. However, as two expert respondents stated, while "being part of the European Union should [translate into] the same rights, you cannot tell [with Bulgarians]" (M17-P; M31-P).[56] Especially as the removal of all barriers to Bulgarian migration to Spain coincided with economic crisis, the East Europeans are instead suggested to have produced "unease … discomfort. No risk, no clashes in the streets, but a certain uneasiness [among Madrilenians]" (M27-L).[57]

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[55]Author's translation from original quote in Spanish: "Chicos que tienen que ir al colegio y no van... Y bueno, pues que están en la calle…Bueno, hay bandas latinas de jóvenes que tienen sus peleas y sus rivalidades."

[56] Author's translation from original quote in Spanish: "Además de ser de la Unión Europea, tener los mismos derechos, pero no se les nota."

[57] Author's translation from original quote in Spanish: "Crea cierta… nosotros decimos desazón. Incomodidad visual. No hay peligro, no hay choques en las calles, pero sí que se percibe cierto desazón."

These sentiments are further reflected in public opinion. Only 0.1% of Spanish respondents in a survey by CIS (2012, p. 11) reported to have the most sympathy for Bulgarians in particular and 1.0% for East Europeans in general, figures that compare to 1.4% for Ecuadorians in particular and 14.1% for Latin Americans in general. At best, the Balkan workers met with indifference and lack of interest. As one official put it, "I don't think there is neither good nor bad perception [of Bulgarians]…I think Bulgaria is still a very unknown country… People don't know anything at all about it" (M16-P). In this author's survey of Madrilenians, 38.5% of respondents were unsure how to rate the Balkan migrants. Bulgarians were considered "very good" or "good" by 49.8% of participants and "adequate" to "very poor" by 12.5%. While positive, this evaluation is less favorable than that of Poles in Dublin or other foreign workers in Madrid.[58]

This relatively negative reception of Bulgarians in Madrid correlates with a conflicted but somewhat adverse evaluation of the migrants' ability to "fit in" into Madrid's life. Some respondents suggest that the simple tendency not to see Bulgarians physically speaks to their integration in the city. Some experts hold that a European status render Bulgarians "well integrated, no problem" (M-16). Two political stakeholders go as far as to argue that East Europeans' integration has been the easiest among all immigrant cohorts, since "the population is more skilled … the culture is similar, there is a different level of education, the lifestyle is common" (M18-ADMIN; M32-ADMIN).[59]

Nonetheless, the more common opinion is that "while the South American relates [to Madrilenians] fast, the East European is slower to do so" and "has it more

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[58] In the survey conducted by this author, 65.9% of respondents eexpressed preference for other foreign workers like Ecuadorians to Bulgarians residing in Madrid. See Appendix for detailed results.

[59] Author's translation from original quote in Spanish: "Es una población que está más formada… la cultura es mucho más similar, tiene otra educación, el estilo de vida es muy común. Entonces la integración ha sido fácil."

complicated" than a Latin American worker does (M11-E; M13-E).[60] Bulgarians are reported to "stick to themselves and do not mix with the Spanish" (M15-E).[61] The perception of Bulgarians as isolated is exemplified in the Balkan migrants' tendency to concentrate in labor market niches populated by their compatriots and to work only with other Bulgarians. Further, Bulgarians live together in large numbers and focus in immigrant neighborhoods in the outer belt of Madrid. They "group up together and develop relationships amongst each other above all" (M27-L).[62] The tendency not to "open themselves" is attributed to a certain feeling of superiority Bulgarians have over both other immigrant communities and the Spanish, which prevents them from fully inserting themselves into Madrid's life (M16-P).

III.3. The Limited Material Bases of Inclusion and Exclusion

What explains these reception patterns? Why are Poles in Dublin and Ecuadorians in Madrid welcomed to their host cities despite economic downturn and their large numbers? Why are Nigerians excluded from Dublin? Why do Bulgarians meet with indifference and lack of interest in Madrid? Why do public officials and employers portray Poles in Dublin and Ecuadorians in Madrid as "embedded" and their Nigerian and Bulgarian counterparts as experiencing problems with integration? The material interests of receiving localities have something to do with it, but are not primary in the immigrants' inclusion and exclusion.

[60] Author's translation from original quote in Spanish: "Pero así como el sudamericano se relaja rápido, el del Este tarda más en relajarse. Y el africano se relaja un poquito menos" (M13-E); "Ellos lo tienen más complicado" (M11-E).
[61] Author's translation from original quote in Spanish: "Son más con ellos, no se juntan tanto con españoles."
[62] Author's translation from original quote in Spanish: "Se agrupan entre ellos y desarrollan sus relaciones entre ellos sobre todo."

At least initially, Polish workers were perceived to fill large gaps in undesirable occupations that Irish nationals no longer wanted to take. Irish employers and even the public were thankful for the influx of flexible, cheap Polish workers who dampened the rising costs of labor. Most interviewees went as far as to suggest that Polish workers were the drivers of the economic boom in Ireland, where they not only fueled the construction sector but also occupied "the apartments that were built" (D13-P). As one employer shared, "EU enlargement was a godsend, because we seem to have run out of local employees and resources and when these people came in, it was fantastic" (D10-E).

However, material factors cannot explain the persistent welcome for the Polish after economic downturn. Economic considerations are largely absent from elite discourse of Poles' inclusion. They are also the least significant factor in Poles' evaluation by the general public. "Hard work" was the East Europeans' most important characteristic according to the Dubliners surveyed by this author and served as the basis of the opinions of 59.6% of respondents. However, hard work signifies non-material qualities rather than economic utility for the city's residents. In fact, 45.3% of Dubliners agreed that "The Polish take away jobs from the Irish," almost forty percent disagreed with the statement "The Polish are necessary in Dublin because there are no Irish to fill some jobs," and only 12.6% agreed that Poles are a source of cheap labor in the city.[63] The East Europeans' positive public image is based on Poles' non-material attributes.

In contrast to the Polish case, the arrival of Nigerian immigrants was considered not an economic asset but the cause of significant public cost. Nigerian asylum seekers arrived in Ireland in the late 1990s when the Celtic Tiger was only beginning to roar, governmental subsidies were fueling the rising economy, and returning Irish nationals

[63] Consults the Appendix for more detailed survey results.

provided for labor shortages in the country (Dorgan, 2006). As asylum seekers are not allowed to work while their claims are being processed, many Nigerians were not only losing valuable economic capital, but were also never considered a potential economic resource by the native population and public officials. In fact, in public discourse, admitting asylums seekers into Ireland is interpreted to be "costing a fortune" to Irish taxpayers and to be putting a strain on public finances and social resources (D25-J). As many were placed in the direct provision system and assigned housing, Nigerians were also not considered valuable tenants in new housing tenements, unlike the Polish.[64]

Nonetheless, a majority of the original Nigerian asylum seekers are currently economic migrants filling the low-skilled jobs the Irish do not want. Many Nigerians arrive as students and employ their high educational levels to enrich the receiving context. Many have superior education and professional qualifications. However, such material considerations are not acknowledged by respondents. Discussion of Nigerians' economic value is secondary to reports of the Africans' cultural characteristics and difference from the Irish.

The connection between economic benefit and reception patterns is even less clear in Madrid than in Dublin. Ecuadorians were indeed recruited to Spain through a number of bilateral agreements in the 1990s to fill shortages in jobs left vacant by an ever more educated and skilled Spanish middle class (Pérez, 2003). As Masterson-Algar (2011) argues, many Spanish companies invested in or relocated to the emerging markets of Latin America, with those enterprises that could not outsource their operations importing South American workers to fuel their growth locally instead. Ecuadorians'

[64] Direct provision signifies placing asylum seekers in state-mandated residences, where the state provides each adult individual with full-board accommodation, including two meals per day and a personal allowance of €19.10 a week (Reception and Integration Agency [RIA], 2010).

fitting human capital made them a particularly attractive source of a flexible cheap labor in the booming Spanish economy of the early 2000s (CIS, 2012, p. 6).

However, Ecuadorians' economic utility is not discussed by Madrilenian respondents in this project. While Ecuadorians are considered "good workers" by some employers, stereotypes suggest that Latin Americans "do not work well" but "drink and party a lot" (M23-TU).[65] Ecuadorians are reported to be "less organized" or hard-working than East Europeans, for instance, and to lack "seriousness, respect, and long-term plans" in the work place (M11-E; M18-ADMIN).[66] Therefore, the South Americans are accepted despite of, rather than due to, their material value to the receiving context.

Finally, most Madrilenian expert respondents consider Bulgarians educated, skilled, and good workers. Bulgarians' arrival to Spain in the 2000s is seen as the result of "the size and vigor of the construction sector, of the tourist industry, of the domestic service, care industry, and to some extent, agriculture," where the Balkan workers have complemented the work of Latin Americans and Moroccans (M31-R). However, as Bulgaria's accession to the EU in 2007 and the removal of limitations to Bulgarians' employment in Spain in 2009 coincided with economic downturn, evaluation of the economic effects of the East Europeans' labor are ambiguous. The advantages of Bulgarian work are disputed, as the Balkan workers not only compete for jobs with other immigrants, but also undercut employment opportunities for Spaniards returning to the dirty, dangerous, and demeaning jobs they had vacated in the 1980s-1990s. According to one respondent, such material costs have resulted in the "public opinion that they need to

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[65] Author's translation from original quote in Spanish: "Los latinoamericanos no trabajan bien beben mucho, fiesta y not trabajan."

[66] Author's translation from original quote in Spanish: "menos organizado" (M11-E); "esa falta de seriedad, de respeto, de tener una proyección a largo plazo…" (M18-ADMIN).

leave" (M26-TU).[67] Moreover, Bulgarians reinforce the growing underground economy in which they are embedded. While participation in the informal economy is common to all foreign populations in Spain, Bulgarian's European status renders such participation particularly costly, since "even if they work illegally, they cannot be expelled" (M31-R).

The connection between economic self-interest and inclusion is even more tenuous in public opinion of Bulgarians in Madrid. Bulgarians receive a neutral reception regardless of the fact that they are considered "hard-working" in 42.9% of the responses given by the Madrilenians surveyed by this author. Most respondents are unsure of Bulgarians' usefulness to the city, with 49.5% persons agreeing and 39.3% disagreeing with the statement that Bulgarians are necessary to fill the jobs natives do not want, and 52.8% of participants considering the East Europeans a source of cheap labor, while 47.2% finding them expensive. Interestingly, the Balkan workers ae viewed less positively than Poles in Dublin despite the opinion that that they make a larger contribution to the Spanish labor market. To illustrate, Bulgarians in Madrid are welcomed by less than 50% of participants and Poles in Dublin – by 90% of respondents. Yet, 26.1% of Madrilenians believe that Bulgarians take away Spanish jobs. The figure is 37.9% in the Irish case.[68]

In sum, immigrant inclusion and exclusion in Dublin and Madrid occur despite of, rather than on the basis, economic considerations. Local elites and publics evaluate the newcomers in their midst in relation to "the flag" and not "the pocketbook" and are more concerned with the immigrants' socio-cultural characteristics than their economic profile.

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[67] Author's translation from the original quote in Spanish: "Es esa, tú le estás diciendo a la opinión pública, que tienen que marchar."

[68] Consult Appendix for more detailed survey results.

III.4. The Non-Economic Bases of Inclusion and Exclusion

Table III.3. Markers of Inclusion and Exclusion in Dublin and Madrid[69]

	Race/ ethnicity	Religion	Language	History	Work ethic	Culture
Polish	✓	✓	[×]	✓	✓	✓
Nigerian	×	×	[✓]	×	×	×
Ecuadorian	[×]	✓	✓	✓	[×]	✓
Bulgarian	[✓]	×	×	×	[✓]	[×]

The narrative of exclusion and inclusion in Dublin and Madrid is framed not through material interests but through non-economic categories. Welcome and rejection are understood in terms of ethnic, historical, and cultural affinities between immigrants and natives, rooted in Dubliners' and Madrilenians' own self-identification.

Reception patterns are based on six characteristics, five of which closely follow Smith's (1991) definition of national identity. However, these attributes are rooted firmly in the local context, and are often interpreted in opposition to a national identity-building project. The juxtaposition of the immigrant communities in each city renders the categories particularly meaningful. Public discourse places Polish and Ecuadorian workers in the "us" group on the basis of shared ethnicity, religion, history, language, as well as a common culture and disposition between the newcomers and their hosts. Nigerian and Bulgarian immigrants are relegated to the "them" group by reference to

[69] A "✓" indicates that local stakeholders consider the respective immigrant group similar according to this identity characteristic, while a "×" mark shows that local actors narrate the immigrant population as different according to the particular attribute. Parentheses "[]" indicate that while relevant local actors acknowledge a similarity or difference with an immigrant group according to the particular characteristic, they explain it out. These classifications are highly subjective and are not based on the author's judgment. Instead, they present a summary of the interview data underpinning this chapter and reflect the perceptions of the relevant stakeholders defining immigrant inclusion and exclusion in Dublin and Madrid.

differences according to these same characteristics. Similarity is also established though the category of "work ethic," a non-economic entity that subsumes all the rest, especially in the case of Dublin. "Culture" further serves as an all-encompassing attribute that underlies all other key traits, particularly in the case of Madrid. **Table III.3** summarizes how the six categories frame immigrant reception in Dublin and Madrid.

III.4.1. Ethnicity

Local stakeholders justify immigrant inclusion and exclusion on the basis of the migrants' perceived racial and ethnic similarities and differences with natives. Racial and ethnic characteristics render the Polish "just the same as us," while they permanently relegate Nigerian migrants to a space of cultural marginalization in Dublin (D18-P). Ecuadorians' racial distinctiveness contributes to an image of Madrid as tolerant and multicultural.[70] Bulgarians' European identity contribute to the foreigners' inclusion in Madrid, but the East Europeans' connection to Roma gypsies is strategically employed to undermine connections to the Spanish. Race and ethnicity are not hard objective characteristics that permanently locate an immigrant group in an outsider or insider status, but are reinterpreted by social and political actors to strategically include and exclude. Any immigrant group can be "racialized."

III.4.1.1. Ethnicity and Poles in Dublin

Polish workers in Dublin are included on the basis of the racial and ethnic characteristics they share with the Irish (**Table III.3**). Race, ethnicity, and culture are

[70] However, the ethnicity of less desirable foreign populations, like Moroccans or the Roma, is considered a problem for social cohesion in Madrid, unlike in the case of the culturally-similar Ecuadorians.

often used interchangeably by the respondents. White ethnicity and European origin mitigate racism or discrimination against the Polish in Ireland according to Irish interviewees. Since the Polish are "hard to distinguish" from the Irish group phenotypically, they rarely "invite trouble" and have an easier time assimilating into Dublin's landscape (D13-P). Because "they look like us," Polish immigrants are perceived to face less prejudice and more open access to socioeconomic and cultural resources in the city than their Nigerian counterparts (D11-L). Furthermore, being "white" creates a feeling of empathy towards the Polish in a "homogenous" country like Ireland (D25-J). Irish national identity has long been defined by a tension between its European origins and British ties, with a conflicted attitude towards the idea of Europe. The arrival of the white, European Polish at a time of acceptance of the idea of the unified Europe has contributed to the strengthening of Irish identity as deservedly European. Ethnically similar Poles are also considered best suited to "mix with" the native Irish group (D4-P). Especially through intermarriage, these similar migrants contribute to a comfortable level of multiculturalism in Dublin without undermining the city's ethnic integrity. While Polish workers have introduced some racial diversity in the previously insular Ireland and are perceived to have enhanced Irish ethnicity and culture, they do not threaten to change the city fundamentally. In the words of the respondents:

> *There are also a lot of young Polish people in Dublin in general and they mix very well with the Irish. They intermarry; they really fit in, while the Indians and Filipinos stick together more. The young Pole and the young Irish, these really mix well. They go out, they marry, and we really need that here in Ireland* (D20-ADMIN)

> *They do tend to be a better blend or a better mix, and I find lots of them even having Irish boyfriends, etc…and some of them even marry… I think that certainly it does wonders for our gene pool because we've tended to be very insular and not exposed to other cultures* (D4-P)

Elite discourse is mirrored in public opinion. Similarity to the Irish is the second most significant characteristic that renders Poles welcome in Dublin and is cited in 28% of responses. The city's residents find Poles highly likeable, as 64% consider this group "most similar to the Irish" in ethnic and cultural terms.[71]

III.4.1.2. Ethnicity and Nigerians in Dublin

While shared racial and ethnic characteristics place the Polish in the "insider" group, Nigerian immigrants are relegated to the "outsider" group on the basis of their skin color (**Table III.3**). "Those who are a different color of skin" "stand out" in Caucasian Ireland (D13-P; D28-P). Immigrants who are racially different are the most apparent targets for "blatant prejudice" and the usual victims of racist attacks (Pettigrew & Meertens, 1995). According to respondents, visual differences present Nigerian immigrants with numerous barriers to integration, such as subtle prejudice and institutional discrimination. "Black Africans" are immediately identified as "not Irish" and not full citizens in the host country (D14-R; D41-NO). Deportations on the basis of racial identity are becoming more common in Ireland.

Most significantly, "the racial issue" establishes a barrier between Nigerian immigrants and the native population. As they have different skin color, Nigerians are perceived to "have nothing in common" with the Irish (D1-J; D11-L; D18-P; D25-J). Race is conflated with culture and a number of negative stereotypes that further distinguish the Nigerian group from the host society. Specifically, black skin color is associated with asylum seeker status and abuse of social resources, inferior education, as well as lack of ambition or enterprise. Race, an immutable identity characteristic, often

[71] Consult the Appendix for detailed survey results.

trumps other changeable identity components like religion or language, thus perpetually precluding Nigerians from fitting in. As Dubliners' own self-identification is rooted in their white European ethnicity, there is a strong feeling of unfamiliarity between the receiving society and the black Nigerian community.

III.4.1.3. Ethnicity and Ecuadorians in Madrid

Ecuadorians' distinct racial and ethnic characteristics are either rarely discussed by expert respondents or are framed as a positive feature (**Table III.3**). Acceptance of the ethnically-different Ecuadorian institutionalizes Madrilenians' commitment to multiculturalism and difference from isolationist Barcelona or nationalist Spain. While the darker Ecuadorians fit it easily despite ethnic dissimilarities and contribute to Spaniards' pride in tolerance for all races, however, ethnically distinct Moroccan and Roma migrants are perceived as a problem for social cohesion.

Employers in Madrid argued that nationality or race had little to do with the selection or treatment of their foreign workers. One respondent suggested that he purposefully strove to make his enterprise "a United Colors of Benetton, as racial intermixing enhances humanity" (M14-E).[72] In a survey by CIS, "skin color" is significant for respondents' treatment of the immigrant only in one tenth of the cases, while "cultural enrichment" is paramount in immigrant reception in Madrid (CIS, 2012).

Similarly, public officials suggest that the services they provide or the policies they create "don't distinguish, but focus on everybody" regardless of nationality, race or ethnicity (M20-ADMIN; M33-ADMIN). Spain is characterized as "a young country of

[72] Author's translation from the original quote in Spanish: "Yo siempre digo una frase que es United Color of Benetton, que es la mezcla racial yo creo que potencia la humanidad."

immigration" "with very homogenous constituency that has not had immigrants traditionally"[73] and especially has not had "people of color, black people" (M19-ADMIN; M27-L; M34-TU). Respondents argue that the arrival of multiple immigrants from South America and Eastern Europe in the 1990s has served to transform Spain from a country with little tradition in the area of migration into a tolerant, receptive, de facto multicultural society "characterized by peaceful coexistence" among ethnicities and races (M26-TU).[74] Ecuadorians in particular "have different ethnic characteristics, that they're proud with them and, of course, they maintain," which only contribute to Madrid's identity as a multicultural city (M16-P). Precisely because of the inclusion of the ethnically different Latin Americans, Madrid is compared to tolerant New York City and contrasted with Barcelona, with its "circumscribing Catalan identity," and with Spain, which continues to be tied to a "nationalist-Catholic" project (M35-P).[75]

Nonetheless, such inclusion applies to the ethnically different Ecuadorians only because they are not considered fundamentally different from the Spanish. Only one respondent talks of Ecuadorians' physical difference and their "swarthy complexion, dirty eyes" (M12-E).[76] However, multiple interviewees speak of their families' migration to South America and their personal identification with the Ibero-American community, which the presence of culturally similar Ecuadorians only serves to enhance. On the other hand, despite the fact that they have been present in Spain for more than twenty years, Moroccans are perceived as "not clean," "dirty" and "problematic" based on their

[73] Author's translation from original quote in Spanish: "Nosotros somos un país con bastante homogénea como consecuencia de que no ha habido tradicionalmente inmigración" (M27-L); "En España no había gente de color, no había gente negra." (M34-TU).
[74] Author's translation from original quote in Spanish: "Nos caracteriza una convivencia."
[75] Author's translation derived from orginal quote in Spanish: "Nosotros somos de una generación del nacional-catolicismo"; "He vivido mi identidad catalana que es más identitaria."
[76] Author's translation from original quote in Spanish: "…si ves a un moreno con los ojos medio limpios."

physical appearance, which includes both their skin color and the religious symbols they wear (M28-EU). Similarly, "the Roma ethnicity" is considered "contaminated" and is admitted to face multiple "problems of xenophobia" (M28-EU; M31-R). These two ethnic populations are directly contrasted with Ecuadorians to relegate the latter cohort to insider status in the receiving context.

III.4.1.4. Ethnicity and Bulgarians in Madrid

Some Madrilenian experts acknowledge that Bulgarians' phenotypical similarity to the Spanish makes their transition to life in Madrid relatively smooth (**Table III.3**). Furthermore, the Balkan migrants' European ethnicity renders them similar to the Spanish, where their inclusion actually reasserts Madrilenians' own European self-identification. According to some participants, European ethnicity correlates with high educational levels, elevated rights, subscription to political and cultural values of democracy and human rights, and easier integration. As one respondent summarizes:

> *Being Europeans and belonging to the same political and cultural space, makes things much easier. I mean, even ethnically, no? It still is those things… still it's easier to integrate if you are European, no? And because there are still people who are racist, who are xenophobic* (M16-P)

Nonetheless, the majority of local stakeholders in Madrid focus on Bulgarians' connection to the Roma to undermine the group's ethnic similarity to the Spanish. Expert interviewees assert that "there has been a certain confusion and an element of stigmatization where the people fix their attention on concrete ethnicities" and reject Bulgarians based on their perceived location within a gypsy ethnos (M35-P).[77] As the "gypsy is always viewed to be worse than any other foreigner," the image of the Balkan

[77] Author's translation from original quote in Spanish: "Ha podido haber una cierta confusión o un elemento de estigmatización general cuando la gente fijaba su atención en etnias concretas…"

workers is “contaminated” and “the scales of sympathy” swing away from Bulgarian immigrants in Madrid (M31-R). Identification with Roma ethnicity leads Bulgarians to be viewed as “dirty” and to be associated with homelessness, crime, begging on the streets and numerous problems for social cohesion in the receiving society (M19-ADMIN).

“Nationality” is the most significant characteristic defining public opinion towards the immigrant in Spain. In a survey by CIS (2012), Romanians were the least liked group based on that trait, followed by “Moors” and “Arabs,” with “people from Eastern Europe” a close fourth. Few of the respondents to the survey conducted by this author in Madrid found Bulgarians to be similar to the Spanish. The receiving city’s residents are in fact as ambiguous about Bulgarians’ ethnic ties to Spaniards as public officials with 38.2% finding some similarity, 32.6% focusing on the differences between the two group, and four in ten respondents conflicted of Bulgarians’ ethnic belonging.[78]

III.4.2. Religion

Religion reinforces race and ethnicity to place Poles and Ecuadorians in the “insider” group and to cast Nigerians and Bulgarians as “outsiders.” Even though respondents in Madrid identify are less religious than Dubliners, religious belonging in both cities signifies cultural and social rituals and values that make some foreign groups less similar to natives than others.[79] In both cities, fear of Islam is the backdrop against which the inclusion and exclusion of non-Muslim migrants are constructed.

[78] Consult the Appendix for detailed survey results.

[79] In the surveys this author conducted with Dubliners and Madrilenians, there is little difference in religious patterns among respondents. For instance, 62.3% of Dubliners and 63.3% of Madrilenians identified as Catholic. 20.4% of the Irish and 28.9% reported not being religious. While religiosity is highly comparable, there are few subtle differences, with Spaniards actually being more Catholic than the Irish or than betrayed in public discourse. Yet, Madrilenians also tended to be non-religious more frequently than Dubliners, who identified as Protestant or Episcopal in relatively high numbers. Religious belonging in

III.4.2.1. Religion and Poles in Dublin

Religion reinforces ethnicity to explain Poles' welcome in Dublin (**Table III.3**). The strong Catholic tradition shared by Poland and Ireland is narrated as one of the factors attracting Polish workers to Dublin in the first place. Ireland's Catholic values are believed to have been "publicized strongly in Poland" as to convince many potential migrants to select this country over other destinations (D9-P). Shared religion is also constructed as one of the key factors that rendered the Polish "very much welcomed" in the host country (D9-P). Religious affinity interacts with common ethnicity to enhance the positive opinion of Polish immigrants in Ireland and to institutionalize "positive stereotypes" about them (D11-L). For instance, religious values correlate with being "good" or "trustworthy" according to respondents. Common religion leads Irish participants to argue that the Polish are a "good mix" with the Irish, as the two groups' social activities can coincide around the church (D4-P). The arrival of Polish immigrants to Ireland serves to reassert Irish identity as devoutly Catholic in a time of declining church attendance among Irish youth. In fact, the Polish influx into Dublin is perceived as beneficial to Irish Catholicism by some, with the demand for Polish Catholic mass rejuvenating emptying churches and lackluster chaplaincies.

III.4.2.2. Religion and Nigerians in Dublin

While shared religious values are found to be central to the interaction between Polish immigrants and their Irish hosts, religious kinship is downplayed in the narrative about Nigerian immigrants (**Table III.3**). A majority of Nigerians in Dublin are

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Madrid, therefore, is split between Catholicism and atheism, while cleavages between Catholicism and Protestantism are more prominent in Dublin. Consult Appendix for detailed survey results.

Christian. In 2011, more than one quarter of all Nigerians in Ireland reported to be Roman Catholic, 22% identified as Pentecostal, and 30% as belonging to another Christian denomination. Only 12% reported being Muslim and less than 1% identified as not religious. In comparison, while nine in ten Polish respondents identified as Roman Catholic, 5% reported being atheist (CSO, 2012a). Clearly, the Nigerian community in Ireland is highly religious, even more so than its Polish counterpart, where the majority of Nigerians share the Christian faith of the Irish. However, religious kinship does not figure into the discourse of Nigerian migrants in Ireland. Only one local labor market actor spoke of the religiosity of Nigerians in Dublin, of their active participation in Pentecostal churches in Ireland, and of their construction of support networks through church structures. Other public officials were in fact surprised to find out that a large proportion of Nigerians in Ireland were Roman Catholic or of other Christian denominations. The assumption was that Nigerian immigrants in Dublin are "not Christians" and therefore remain profoundly dissimilar from their Irish hosts (D26-ADMIN).

III.4.2.3. Religion and Ecuadorians in Madrid

Religious commonality places Ecuadorians firmly in the "insider" group in Madrid (**Table III.3**). Expert respondents argue that Spain is hardly an ardently religious country and identify it is "neither Catholic not anti-Catholic" (M21-ADMIN).[80] Nonetheless, in a report conducted in Spain in 2012 by the European Union's Center for Sociological Investigations (CIS, 2012), 74% of respondents identified as Catholic, 23% as "non-religious" or "atheist", and only 2% as belonging to another religious denomination. More than six in ten of Madrilenians surveyed by this author self-

[80] Author's translation from original quote in Spanish: "O sea, España no es católica o anti-católica."

identified as Catholic, with 28% considering themselves not religious. While there is a cleavage between religiosity and being non-religious, belief systems like Islam or Orthodoxy have lesser space in Madrilenian society.

All expert respondents admit that "culture in its religious facet creates a common identity" between Madrilenians and Ecuadorians (M27-L).[81] The South Americans are perceived to have chosen Madrid based on the Catholic values of the receiving context. Their religiosity places them in the common space of the church where they interact regularly with their Spanish hosts. Being religious also creates trust and positive stereotypes of the Latin Americans and reinforces historic ties between South America and Spain. Most significantly, belonging to a Catholic cultural community sets Ecuadorians apart from undesirable religious minorities in Madrid, like Muslim Moroccans. Religious belonging correlates with certain cultural mores and values. Muslim religion is interpreted to connote "deceitfulness, thievery," mistreatment of women, "rebelliousness," "disrespect of our values", ties to global terrorism, and lack of integration (M21-ADMIN; M31-R; M19-ADMIN).[82] In contrast, Catholic Ecuadorians are honest, focused on the family, and respectful of women, much like Madrilenians.

III.4.2.4. Religion and Bulgarians in Madrid

While Bulgarians' religious belonging is rarely discussed by respondents, some experts admit that the East Europeans' atheism and Orthodox faith is a barrier to their

[81] Author's translation from original quote in Spanish: "El idioma y la cultura en su trasfondo religioso crea una identidad común."
[82] Author's translation derived from original quote in Spanish: "Los marroquíes son todos unos ladrones, son musulmanes, son mentirosos, y tal" (M21-ADMIN).

inclusion in Spain (**Table III.3**).[83] It is not the particular belonging to Catholicism, the migrants' religiosity, or their church attendance that is at stake here. Rather, the cultural and social values attached to religious belonging matter. As they are not perceived as religious, Bulgarians are considered suspect in terms of their trustworthiness, loyalty or goodness. Because they are Orthodox, the Balkan immigrants' "customs are [framed as] different," and so are their patterns and spaces of social interaction (M35-P).[84] Religion stands for culture and is employed to reinforce the differences between post-Communist Balkan Bulgarians and European Catholic Spaniards.

III.4.3. Language

Linguistic affinity institutionalizes the other desirable characteristics of accepted immigrant groups while setting apart dissimilar foreign populations, especially in the Spanish case. Ecuadorians' Spanish language skills allow them to procure jobs, interact with their hosts, and easily integrate. They also reinforce pride in a global Spanish cultural reach. Bulgarians' inadequate knowledge of the language signifies their cultural dissimilarity from the native population. Linguistic ties are invented or undermined to keep intact reception narratives in the Irish case. While Poles rarely speak English upon arrival in Dublin, their efforts to learn the language are praised as the ultimate sign of their integration. Nigerians' distinct intonation is emphasized to highlight their difference from the Irish. Language is not an objective category, but a fluid characteristic interpreted strategically by local actors to justify the differential reception of the foreign cohorts.

[83] As one respondent argued, "La barrera de la religión en ciertas zonas tiene mucha importancia…."
[84] Author's translation from original quote in Spanish: "Es de las pocas cosas en las que se nota y dices, sus costumbres son diferentes."

III.4.3.1. Language and Poles in Dublin

The category of language is employed by Irish labor market actors to construct similarity with the Polish, while setting apart Nigerian immigrants (**Table III.3**). As English is not the first language in Poland, and Russian and German used to be the foreign languages taught at Polish schools, many Polish workers arrived to Dublin with deficient language skills. One quarter of Irish labor market actors acknowledge "the language barrier" as the singular issue of Polish immigration into Ireland, especially among "middle-aged men" (D8-ADMIN; D15-E; D24-E; D31-E). Language deficiencies are recognized not only to affect the integration prospects of Polish workers and diminish the quality of interaction between the immigrants and their hosts, but also to render the Polish vulnerable to exploitation in the socio-economic sphere. The language barrier is also the most commonly cited negative attribute of Polish migrants in public opinion. Of the thirty respondents surveyed by this author who wrote in a negative attribute for the East Europeans, more than one third cited Poles' deficient language skills. Some respondents were frustrated about how hard it was to communicate and understand each other and others proposed a language requirement for all immigrants in Ireland.

However, even local labor market actors who admit to the language deficiencies of Polish immigrants in Dublin qualify their statements and construct away language as a marker of difference in the case of the Polish. A distinction is made between older Polish workers and younger Polish nationals "with good English" who easily fit into Dublin's life (D22-TU). The implication is that while many belonging to the former group have left after economic downturn, the latter group continues arriving in Dublin. Any language barriers are thus erased. Furthermore, interviewees tout the the efforts of the Polish

community to “learn the language” (D10-E). Through English language courses and communication with the native population, the Polish are perceived to have “learned English quite quickly,” especially compared to “other people from other countries,” and even to have “taken on some Irish-isms” (D15-E). As a result of these efforts, one third of local labor market actors never found any issues with Polish workers’ language. Public discourse is not far removed from reality, in fact, whereas 70% of Polish participants in the 2011 Census report speaking English “well” or “very well” and only 5% suggest that they do not speak English “at all” (CSO, 2012a). Similarly, despite complaints about Poles’ deficient language skills, 60.7% of Dubliners surveyed by this author at least somewhat agreed that “Poles speak English,” in direct contradiction to their previous statements.[85] Therefore, language differences were explained away by elites and the public to maintain the construction of Poles’ cultural similarity to their hosts.

III.4.3.2. Language and Nigerians in Dublin

On the other hand, language is employed by Irish respondents to assert the difference of Nigerian immigrants (**Table III.3**). More than nine in ten Nigerians reported speaking English “well” or “very well” in 2011 (CSO, 2012a). Nigerian organizations quoted knowledge of the English language as the one significant advantage of Nigerians over Polish workers in Dublin, and as the characteristic that facilitates Nigerian integration in Ireland. However, local stakeholders focus on disparities in accent or “intonation” instead (D28-P). For instance, one organization suggested that while Nigerian immigrants speak English readily, their written skills are poor (D39-PO). Speaking English with a Nigerian accent is considered a barrier in the work environment,

[85] Consult Appendix for detailed survey results.

an obstacle to developing professionally, and the source of complaints by customers or colleagues. The Nigerian community's "pronunciation" or "bad English" is a source of irritation among the native population and another marker of Nigerians' difference from the Irish (D11-L; D13-P; D28-P; D29-ADMIN). Rather than an objective category, language here is a cultural and social construct employed by Dubliners to exclude the Nigerian group.

III.4.3.3. Language and Ecuadorians in Madrid

For self-admitted "language nationalists" like Spaniards, common language with their hosts is the single most important advantage Ecuadorians have over other immigrants populations in Madrid (M21-ADMIN) (**Table III.3**).[86] Ecuadorians' excellent command of the Spanish language permits for the Latin Americans' smooth insertion into the Spanish labor market and their domination of certain economic sectors, according to interviewees. As "Spaniards do not learn foreign languages," the South American migrants' knowledge of Spanish creates the opportunity for a "common identity" and increased interactions with the native population (M27-L).[87] Due to their language skills, Ecuadorians can be "extroverted, can integrate better … and share in [Spaniards'] public spaces, parks and parties" (M25-TU; M33-TU).[88] Linguistic commonality is further perceived to reinforce a broader "cultural affinity" between Madrilenians and Latin Americans and reinforce historical, cultural, and ethnic ties

[86] Author's translation from original phrase in Spanish: "nacionalistas idiomáticos."
[87] Author's translation from original quote in Spanish: "Y es que los españoles no aprendemos lenguas extranjeras," "identidad común."
[88] Author's translation derived from original quote in Spanish: "Son más extrovertidos , que se integran mejor porque hablan nuestro idioma y comen nuestra comida, y que comparten los espacios públicos, porque se los ven en parques, en fiestas, y tal."

(M12-E; M20-ADMIN; M33-ADMIN). “Speaking the language” nullifies any “ethnic difference” between Ecuadorians and Spaniards and explains the ease of the South Americans’ integration in the receiving context (M16-P). Ecuadorians’ command of Spanish, finally, reinforces Madrilenians’ “national pride that many people in the world speak Spanish” and institutionalizes the image of a powerful Spain with a global cultural reach (M27-L).[89]

III.4.3.4. Language and Bulgarians in Madrid

On the other hand, Bulgarians’ inability to speak Spanish is perceived as the most significant obstacle to the Balkan migrants’ inclusion and integration in Madrid (**Table III.3**). Some local labor market actors acknowledge the fact that the East Europeans have made an effort to learn the local language and have thus been successful economically and socially in their new environment. However, the majority suggest that the language barrier severely cripples Bulgarians’ economic opportunities in a city where the service industry is the most prominent employer of foreign laborers. Their “language challenge” contributes to Bulgarians’ “labor problems, which accompany familial problems, problems with housing, health” (M19-ADMIN; M25-TU).[90] A survey of Madrilenians by the Autonomous Community of Madrid confirms this sentiment, with one quarter of Spanish respondents dubbing “difficulties with the language” the “largest obstacle on foreigners’ road to integration” (Comunidad de Madrid, 2014a).[91]

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[89] Author’s translation from original quote in Spanish: “Es una de las razones para sentirse orgulloso de que hay tanta gente en el mundo que habla español.”

[90] Author‘s translation from original quote in Spanish: “Son gente que además de arrastrar problemas laborales, le acompañan problemas familiares, desestructura familiar, de vivienda, de sanidad.”

[91] Author‘s translation from original text in Spanish: “Dificultades con el idioma,” “obstáculos que se han encontrado los extranjeros en su camino hacia la integración.”

The "language barrier" also contributes to a perception of difference and unease caused by the numerous Balkan migrants who "are a lot" and "tend to speak … the same kind of strange language" (M16-P). Interestingly, as many as 67.5% of Madrilenians surveyed by the author at least somewhat agreed that Bulgarians speak Spanish. However, the language barrier presented the most important negative aspect of Balkan migration to the city (among 17.4% of responses), according to the write-in answers of survey respondents. Correlation analysis suggested that language skills were the most significant predictor of a positive evaluation of the foreign cohort (Pearson's R = .403**). Linguistic differences, therefore, serve to institutionalize and reinforce broader cultural, social, religious, ethnic, and historical dissimilarity and place Bulgarians in the outsider group in Madrid.

III.4.4. History

The historical and colonial bonds existing between receiving and sending societies are a further marker of similarity and difference and justification for the newcomers' inclusion or exclusion. Historical parallels are invented between the Polish and the Irish in order to institutionalize Dublin's spirit as European, independent and entrepreneurial, while connections with Nigerians are omitted as to forget painful memories of Irish subservience within the British Empire. Independent Poles are consequently constructed as insiders, while "bogus" Nigerian migrants are relegated to outsider status. Connections between Madrid and Ecuador are emphasized in order to reinforce the image of Spain as a leader of a forward-looking Iberian-American transnational community. Ecuadorians fit in the receiving city not as second-class former colonial subjects but as a cohort sharing

in a socio-cultural and migration space with their hosts and able to extend a similar sentiment of welcome to Spaniards in South America. While Bulgarians' path within the European Union creates certain empathy for the Balkan migrants, Bulgarians' historical trajectory brings about unwanted memories of Spain's own authoritarian past and former second-class citizenship in Europe. Such parallels are undermined in the democratic pluralistic space of Madrid.

Before proceeding with the four case studies, an important clarification is in order. While Ireland was never a colonial power, Spain constructed the first global empire in Europe, extending over parts of Europe, the Americas, and Africa (Lange et al., 2006). Spain's colonial holdings, adeptly manipulated from the city of Madrid, could be argued to distinguish between the two case studies in this dissertation and render Spain closer to traditional immigration receivers like Franc than to new migration countries like Ireland.

Nonetheless, the project maintains that Ireland and Spain are comparable for two reasons. First, unlike the colonial holdings of Northern European states, which only achieved independence in the mid-1900s and thus have recent and profound political, social, economic and cultural ties to the center, Spain's empire in the Americas disintegrated in the early 1800s. Many territories achieved independence during the Bolivar Revolution and before nationalist movements or the birth of modern Venezuela, Colombia, Peru, Bolivia, and Ecuador (Lange et al., 2006).[92] The temporal distance weakens the historical bonds of subservience between Spain and the South American countries. On the other hand, Spain participated in the management of parts of Morocco until 1956. Thus, a hierarchical relationship and strong historical precedent exists

[92] For instance, Ecuador gained its independence from Spain in 1822. On the other hand, India and Pakistan gained independence from the British Empire in 1947 and Nigeria – not until 1960 (Lange et al., 2006).

between the two localities (Flesler, 2008; Mendoza, 2001). The Moroccan group is not studied here to steer clear of the burdens of such historical precedent. Notably, Moroccans' colonial ties to Spaniards have not produced more favorable policies or discourses towards the North Africans (Mendoza, 2001, pp. 47-48). What is more, the strong cultural and historical bonds between Ecuador and Spain stem from a more recent relationship based on the migration of Spanish nationals to Latin America, especially during dictatorship and economic industrialization, and occurring within the bounds of a developing economic, political, social, and cultural Iberian-American community (Calavita, 2005; Masterson-Algar, 2011).[93] Considerations of reciprocity and the welfare of the Spanish diaspora in South America, as well as understanding of the need for cooperation within the Latin American transnational space render the relationship between Ecuadorians and Spaniards highly significant yet fluid and untainted by notions of superiority or inferiority. In fact, the connection here is closer to the relationship between Spain and the original members of the European Union, to which Spanish nationals migrated for economic opportunity in the 1950s and 1960s. The connection is forward-looking rather than focused on the past, with Spain angling to head the Ibero-American community in its future political and socio-economic development. On the other hand, South American countries aim to institutionalize the Hispanic roots of Madrid, a locality torn between its American origins and European aspirations, in order to deepen interdependence with the "motherland" (Masterson-Algar, 2011).

[93] The Iberian-American community refers to the community of countries and people sharing a cultural and linguistic Hispanic heritage. Spain serves as the center, with a number of Latin American nations, including Ecuador, participating in this transnational entity (Masterson-Algar, 2011). The formal institution of the Iberian-American community is a recent venture, existing since 1991 as an alternative center of power to the European Union. It assumes economic, political, social, and migration commitments and agreements among the twenty-two participating states. Yet, the structures are based on the historical presence and influence of Southern European descendants in Latin American countries (Peixoto, 2012).

Second, while Ireland had no colonial holdings of its own, its special status within the British Empire made it a complicit ally of the British imperial project. Irish missionaries and settlers in fact employed rays of British colonial influence in order to transplant Catholicism, spread political, social, and educational institutions and values, and create a certain desirable image of the center in British holdings in Africa (Lentin & McVeigh, 2002). Thus, the relationships between Nigeria and Ireland and Ecuador and Spain could be considered quite similar in their "quasi-colonial" nature. These similar connections are interpreted and utilized very differently in the two receiving cities.

III.4.4.1. History and Poles in Dublin

Shared historical myths complement language in cementing Polish belonging in Dublin (**Table III.3**). Polish immigrants are welcomed, since they fought for independence from a larger neighbor like the Irish, and share in their hosts' experience of emigration. Poland and Ireland are considered akin as both were part of "big bad empires," the British Empire and the Soviet bloc respectively, where they were "overrun" as smaller and more vulnerable members of these structures (D9-P). Shared historical experiences and the fight for independence against this neighbor are also employed as to construct an image of the Polish worker as patriotic, brave, and principled. Through this historical parallel, Dublin's stakeholders reassert their own spirit of independence. In reality, however, Ireland was a much more willing participant in the British Empire than Poland was in the Soviet bloc, as it was part of Britain's colonization project and maintains strong socio-economic ties with the United Kingdom today (Lentin &

McVeigh, 2002). Still, Irish interviewees reinforce the myth of "having fought against a bigger country" through connection with independent Poles (D18-P).

What is more, Dubliners construct kinship with Polish workers as both groups come from a "country of emigration" (D1-J). The experience of being an "emigrant nation" renders the Irish more welcoming towards all immigrant groups in the country, according to labor market actors. As one respondent put it, "We don't really have the right … to be looking at immigrants as something negative" (D7-TU). As "there isn't an Irish family that doesn't have an emigrant in their midst," Irish public discourse casts Dubliners as guided by the maxim of "treat people like you would ask your family to be treated in other countries" (D8-ADMIN; D11-L). Nonetheless, this feeling of empathy extends only to Polish immigrants, who are compared to Irish workers travelling to America or England. A majority of public officials recreate the myth of kinship between the two groups on the basis of their enterprising spirit and desire to improve their family's life, as well as the common sacrifices and negative treatment the two groups faced abroad. As they have themselves experienced discrimination in Great Britain, Irish respondents empathize with the negative reception the Polish received in Germany, for instance.[94] By constructing migration as part of the "tradition" and "psyche" of both the Polish and Irish, Irish labor market actors reestablish Poles' and their own spirit of "entrepreneurship" (D5-ADMIN; D18-P).

III.4.4.2. History and Nigerians in Dublin

In turn, Nigerians' national struggles are downplayed or ignored (**Table III.3**). African migration for self-development and economic improvement is considered not

[94] Respondents referred to the slogans of "No blacks, no Irish" in 1960's London, for instance (D25-J).

enterprising but "bogus" (D13-P; D25-J). Despite actual historical connections and shared experiences within the sphere of influence of the British Empire, none of the Irish respondents in this project referred to historical kinship between Nigerian migrants and the host society. African authors discuss Nigeria's colonial history in terms much similar to those of Ireland's history as part of the British Empire, where military, cultural and religious pressure were "used to cultivate British hegemony" (Fafunwa, 1974; Ihuegbu, 2002). While Nigerian immigrants arrived in Dublin partially in view of colonial kinship, and their perception of Ireland as a beacon of equality, upon arrival they found that such historical ties are not part of the local mythology. Neither do Nigerian immigrants in Dublin meet with the same empathy as Polish labor migrants, even though many have migrated in search of a better life. This lack of affinity stems mostly from the perception that the Nigerian community in Dublin is comprised only of asylum seekers rather than enterprising economic migrants. Rather than economic ambition, Nigerians are associated with the burden they are placing on the Irish social state. In the words of one respondent, when considering Nigerian immigrants in Dublin, natives think "why do we have to pay them" (D35-PO). A belief that most of these refugees are in fact economic migrants does not establish a connection with the Irish either, as Nigerian migrants in Ireland are considered to have suspect motives. They are perceived as "spongers" there to defraud the system rather than enhance it (D1-J). Nigerians are considered "in the wrong foot with everybody" from the start, and "totally separate" from Polish economic migrants in entry route, history, and goals (D17-ADMIN; D18-P). Nigerians receive no sympathy or kinship from Dublin's elites and public.

III.4.4.3. History and Ecuadorians in Madrid

Ecuadorians' inclusion in Madrid is cemented through their historical connections to their hosts (**Table III.3**). Much like the Polish in Ireland, the Latin Americans are welcomed as they share historical memory of belonging to an emigration country with the Spanish. A majority of expert respondents characterize Madrid as "also an immigrant society" "that has been sending immigrants abroad for centuries" and acknowledge that Spaniards are struggling to assimilate in the Americas like their Ecuadorian counterparts in Europe (M16-P). The fact that Spanish nationals were pushed out of their own country "after the Civil War and during the Second World War to Europe or Latin America" renders Madrid a "receptive" (*receptiva*), "flexible" migration space, where immigration is not "a risk to our culture, our entity," but a process to be emphasized with instead (M16-P; M23-TU). Especially as Spaniards "went a lot to South America," "remembering our history" means according Ecuadorians in Spain "certain solidarity" and favorable treatment (M26-TU; M32-ADMIN).[95] Vague feelings of solidarity translate into particular benefits Latin Americans in Madrid, unlike in the case of Poles in Ireland, however, since recent emigration from Spain to South America creates concrete ethnic, cultural, and familial ties across the two countries. For instance, the influence of Spanish descendants in Southern Europe and considerations of reciprocity translate into advantageous naturalization rules for Ecuadorians in Spain. More significantly, the historical ties between Spanish and Ecuadorians contribute to a broader feeling of cultural communality and lead Madrilenians to "hardly perceive Latin Americans… as 'foreigners'" (Cornelius, 2004, p. 410).

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[95]Author's translation from original quote in Spanish: "Intentamos siempre que se recuerde nuestra historia. Quiero decir que nosotros nos fuimos tanto a Sudamérica…" (M26-TU), "Hay una cierta solidaridad que está ahí latent (M32-ADMIN).

Notably, historical connections are not cast in colonial undertones that assume a hierarchical relationship between first-class Spaniards and second-class Ecuadorians. In the words of local stakeholders, "it is not in the Spanish character to have a superior status as a British person might have towards the members of their colonies. The Spanish immigrant used to be of lower middle class and would situate himself at a level close [to that of former colonial subjects]" (M18-ADMIN).[96] Respondents declare themselves "proud of a historical past of the empire where the sun never set" (M25-TU).[97] Yet, the more significant historical relationship is that of Spanish cultural and artistic dominance in the Ibero-American transnational space and the open-mindedness of Madrilenians to South Americans intertwined with their hosts through descent and common cultural, historical and linguistic self-identification.

III.4.4.4. History and Bulgarians in Madrid

While ties to Ecuador invite memories of a glorious past and a bright future, historical parallels with Bulgarians only bring about painful memories of domination, dictatorship, and second-class European citizenship among local stakeholders. Therefore, these parallels are discounted and Bulgarians' difference from their hosts is institutionalized through the category of history (**Table III.3**). Some Madrilenian respondents talk about the connections between Bulgaria's and Spain's political and historical trajectories, as well as the two countries common participation in the European project. As one expert suggested, 2010 Bulgarian Prime Minister Simeon Saxe-Coburg-

[96] Author's translation from original quote in Spanish: "Dentro del carácter español no tenemos ese sentimiento quizás de estatus superior que igual puede tener el inglés frente a los miembros de sus colonias."
[97] Author's translation from original quote in Spanish: "Yo me siento muy orgullosa de ser española y he tenido un pasado histórico que no se ponía el sol en nuestro imperio."

Gotha "is in reality Spanish and that has drawn the two countries closer together in a palpable manner" (M27-L).[98] As another interviewee argues, "in ten or twenty years" Bulgaria "will follow a pattern similar to that of the Spanish in Europe" and will develop correspondingly within the European Union (M16-P).

Nonetheless, local stakeholders downplay historical parallels between Spain and Bulgaria, since these call forth the undesirable aspects of Madrid's own past. Experts argue that, "Spain has never ever had an intense [historical] relation with Eastern Europe" (M16-P). While Spaniards went to many European and American countries and intertwined their destinies with ethnicities on multiple continents, Bulgarians were complacently tucked behind an Iron Curtain (M16-P). The domination of Bulgaria by the Turkish Empire does not invite empathy by Spaniards themselves subjugated by the infamous "Moor" (Flesler, 2008). Instead, "cultural and religious subjugation" drives a wedge between a Spain that allegedly overcame such domination and a Bulgaria that is still "tainted by Turkish ethnicity" (M12-E).[99] Further, historical parallels of Communism in Bulgaria and dictatorship in Spain are painful for Spaniards who want to forget "the Francoist epoch" and "the disgrace of political dictatorship" (M14-E; M27-L). Historical connections between the two countries are undermined in order to underestimate Spain's own complicity in allying with despotic Russia or imposing a repressive nationalist project on its citizens. "Modern, advanced, republican" and "internationalist" Madrid is different from authoritarian Bulgaria (M35-P).[100]

[98] Author's translation from original quote in Spanish: "Es que el rey de Bulgaria había un primer ministro que queda al español realmente. Y esto ha cercado los dos países de una manera muy sensible."
[99] Author's translation from original quote in Spanish: "Ha estado como sometida durante mucho tiempo tanto como por cultura, como por religión al imperio turco… tiene la lacra de la etnia turca."
[100] Author's translation from original quote in Spanish: "Moderno, avanzado y republican… apelamos a nuestro patrimonio internacionalista."

Finally, Spain's own second-class status in the European Union in the 1980s and its perceived inferiority to Northern developed states like Germany or the United Kingdom did not engender empathy for Bulgarian migrants in Madrid. Spain still imposed limits to Bulgarian mobility for two years, forgetting how such discriminatory arrangements affected its own national self-pride in 1986. As one respondent put it, such political decisions speak of a "very selective memory" of Bulgaria's and Spain's status within the European community and a desire to forget the host country's inferior position as "Europeans second-class."[101] Instead, there is a desire to emphasize the transformation of Spaniards into "new rich, new Europeans" with equal claims to the "club of rich countries with reserved admission rights" (Flesler, 2008, p. 31; M12-E; M19-ADMIN). Therefore, despite existing historical parallels, connections between Spain and Bulgaria are downplayed to undermine the receiving context's own undesirable characteristics.

III.4.5. Work Ethic

Along with relatively immutable characteristics of identity, Irish and Spanish officials justify immigrant inclusion and exclusion through the category of "work ethic." Being "hard-working" is an attribute that is particularly significant in the case of Dublin. The quality of "hard work" implies the economic benefits that cheap and highly skilled Polish workers provide to the expanding Irish economy, at least before economic downturn. However, "hard work" does not refer simply to material benefit. It is a catchall characteristic that implies the good education, skills, reliability, honesty, and flexibility of Polish workers, as well as the pride they take in their work. It suggests affinity with Dubliners, who have also left home and "worked hard" in search of a better life. Work

[101] Author's translation from original quote in Spanish: "Que somos europeos de segunda" (M12-E).

ethic is also the category that establishes the starkest contrast between the insider Polish group and the outsider Nigerian group. Nigerians' characterization as "not good workers" is multilayered and evokes this ethnic community's economic and social cost to the receiving society. "Work ethic" asserts the fundamental difference of African migrants from entrepreneurial Dubliners without employing problematic categories, such as race.

"Working hard" is less significant in Madrid, where discourse concentrates on immigrant integration and multiculturalism rather than on the cost-benefit analysis of migrants' entry (Arango, 2012). Culture, instead of hard work, is emphasized as an all-encompassing, non-problematic attribute that evokes all other characteristics essential in local political discourse, and which can relegate specific immigrant populations to the "us" or "them" group. In fact, Ecuadorians are accepted in Madrilenian society regardless of perceptions of their lower quality of work, as Spaniards self-define as jovial people for whom work is not primary. In the case of Bulgarians, the category of "work ethic" is adeptly manipulated to justify the lack of acceptance for this ethnic population. While local stakeholder's emphasize Bulgarians' skills and education, much as in the case of the Polish in Dublin, they also juxtapose these characteristics with Bulgarians' perceived criminality and aggressiveness, like in the case of Nigerians in Dublin.

III.4.5.1. Work Ethic and Poles in Dublin

More than two-thirds of all the Irish officials interviewed defined Polish immigrants as "very hard workers" who are "willing to go the extra mile" (D12-E; D18-P). The strong work ethic of Polish immigrants is perceived as the reason the Polish are preferred to workers from other national groups, including the Irish (**Table III.3**).

Because "they are more hard-working than some of the other nationalities," Polish immigrants place higher on the labor market hierarchy in Dublin (D15-E). "Working hard" correlates with superior skills and education, efficiency and punctuality in the work place, and flexibility essential in a competitive labor market. However, strong work ethic is also interpreted in non-economic terms. It implies that the Polish Polish immigrant in Dublin is "reliable" and "punctual," "honest" and "trustworthy," as well as enthusiastic, "diligent", and proud of one's work (D3-E; D10-E; D12-E; D13-P; D15-E; D24-E). Work ethic and the positive stereotypes attached to this characteristic do not simply serve as the reason for Irish "employers [to] just love [the Polish]" and "keep recruiting them in the recession" (D8-ADMIN; D9-P). "Working hard" creates a strong perception of kinship for the Polish. Since the "Polish here are doing the same thing that the Irish did in America and in Britain, "Irish people recognize that similarity" (D17-ADMIN; D29-ADMIN). Polish immigrants' construction as hard-working, yet sociable, hard-playing, and "good" reasserts Irish nationals' own ability to "make a contribution" (D10-E; D23-E; D26-ADMIN).[102]

Similar connections are established in the survey with Dubliners conducted by this author. The East Europeans' "hard work" is the reason for their overwhelmingly positive evaluation according to 57% of respondents, with being "hard-working" as the most quoted positive characteristic of the Polish in write-in responses. One participant even went as far as to suggest that the Polish "kept the country going." More than 60% of respondents considered Poles the most skilled and highly qualified foreign cohort in Dublin and 67.4% dubbed them "the most reliable and hard-working." The work ethic of

[102] Work ethic is a flexible category that justifies the inclusion of Polish immigrants in Dublin without referring to immutable national identity characteristics.It allows Irish public officials to change their mind and relegate Polish nationals to the "out" group in the future.

Poles was related less to their cheap labor or ability to fill the jobs the Irish do not want, however, and more so to their being "reliable," "honest," "polite," "genuine," "efficient," and simply "good people."[103] Therefore, a socio-cultural connection was established between Dubliners and the East Europeans.

III.4.5.2. Work Ethic and Nigerians in Dublin

Work ethic institutes the starkest contrast between the "in" and the "out" groups in Dublin. It hints at African immigrants' complex legal status, suspect migration motives, and "perceived distance" from the Irish without referring to characteristics like race (**Table III.3**). Even though there is a substantial Nigerian population in Ireland, these African immigrants are not considered a potential labor resource by Irish respondents. Employers either omit Nigerians altogether or suggest that Nigerian workers are less prominent in the Irish labor market due to legal restrictions or the availability of an alternative European labor force with EU enlargement. In public discourse, the lack of prominence of Nigerian immigrants in Dublin's labor market is also justified through their poor work ethic. In direct contrast to their Polish counterparts, Nigerians are perceived to be "not good workers" and "lazy because of the social and cultural system" in Africa (D11-L; D12-E; D28-P). Poor work ethic implies other shortcomings like unreliability, lack of education, and dishonesty. Even employed Nigerians are associated not with contributing to the system but rather with abusing it through fraudulent taxi licenses, for instance. Mostly, however, Nigerians are narrated to "not [be] working at all" and to be "getting money for nothing from the community" (D11-L).

[103] Consult Appendix for detailed survey results.

While Polish workers are making an honest living in Ireland, much like the Irish, Nigerian immigrants are perceived as asylum seekers in the country to "defraud" the social welfare system (D28-P). Nigerians are narrated as "bogus" and prone to engage in illegal activities (D25-J). Even when recognized as economic migrants, the Africans are framed as "spongers" "[relying] on the state and not contributing to the economy" (D1-J; D25-J). Irish respondents convey unfamiliarity towards Nigerian immigrants who are in Ireland "for a quick buck" and out of suspect motivations (D4-P). Work ethic is thus used to cement a connection among race, nationality, legal status, and perceived distance from the Irish in the case of Nigerian workers in Dublin.

III.4.5.3. Work Ethic and Ecuadorians in Madrid

Conversely to Nigerians in Dublin, Ecuadorians in Madrid are accepted in Spain despite the fact that they are not considered "hard-working" (**Table III.3**). Having "economic qualifications that Spain needs" is among the most important considerations in including migrants in Madrid, according to a survey by CIS (2012, p. 4). Still, Ecuadorians are not rejected despite of their inferior economic performance or qualifications. Most employers surveyed here have South Americans workers. Few of them, however, talked about the work ethic of Ecuadorians. Among the ones who did, some suggested that the Latin American migrants are not as "seriously hard-working" or "well-organized" as other nationalities, even though they are still useful sources of cheap labor (M11-E; M13-E).[104] Ecuadorians are also considered much less educated than Bulgarians, for instance. As one expert interviewee put it, even if Bulgarian workers

[104] Author's translation from original quote in Spanish: "Lo veo menos organizado que los países del Este" (ME-11), "No son tan serios trabajando como la gente del Este (M13-E).

"have more qualifications, they do not get the better of an Ecuadorian woman," however (M26-TU).[105] Historical connections and cultural proximity assure the continuous employment of Ecuadorian workers in Madrid. The lack of emphasis on "hard work" both renders "culture" the most significant category underlying the acceptance of immigrants in the receiving city and institutionalizes the following relationship between being Spanish and "work":

> *The way people get along with each other, social contact. You build up friendships and you have your social life…I'm more proud of the fact that work is important but not the essential thing. We work to earn the living and don't live for work* (M19-ADMIN)

III.4.5.4. Work Ethic and Bulgarians in Madrid

Manipulation of the attribute of "hard work" justifies the conflicted reception of Bulgarians in Madrid (**Table III.3**). On the one hand, the group is characterized as very "hard-working" and "well-prepared," much like the Polish in Dublin (M13-E).[106] Indeed, more than two-thirds of local stakeholders talk about Bulgarians' elevated educational and skills levels, efficiency, and labor market experience that renders them good professionals. Among Madrilenian survey respondents, hard work was cited a positive feature of Bulgarians in 47.3% of responses and 32.7% of write-in answers.[107]

While they are responsible, "high achievers" and "good as workers," Bulgarians fail to connect with Spanish employers on a socio-cultural level (M12-E; M13-E; M15-E; M23-TU).[108] Being "too serious" precludes the Balkan laborers from "improvisation in

[105] Author's translation from original quote in Spanish:" Tienen más cualificación, pero no es que tengan a lo mejor que una mujer ecuatoriana."
[106] Author's translation from original quote in Spanish: "Son bastante trabajadores… En términos generales la gente del Este está bastante mejor preparada."
[107] Consult the Appendix for detailed survey results.
[108] Author's translation derived from original quote in Spanish: "Lo que te he dicho, son serios, bastante serios. … Son bastante responsables en general. Cumplen sus compromisos, son bastante trabajadores…

the organization," and isolates them from other collectives (M11-E).[109] Since "culture" is more significant as a predictor of public opinion that economic position and Spaniards are most concerned that foreigners "adopt the way of life" (*esté dispuesto/a a adoptar el modo de vida del país*) in the receiving country, Bulgarians' seriousness sets them apart from relaxed Madrilenians (CIS, 2012).[110] Such considerations lead the same Madrilenian survey respondents who touted Bulgarians' hard work to be conflicted in their evaluation of the Balkan migrants' work ethic and reliability, with 56.7% providing a somewhat positive rating and 43.3% a somewhat negative one.[111]

Bulgarians' hard work is counterbalanced with stereotypes of the group's criminality, much like in the case of Nigerians in Dublin. The perception of Bulgarians as connected to crime and "violence" is as widespread as that of their high qualifications (M17-P; M35-P).[112] The East Europeans are reported to have a "tendency to work underground," a trend that undermines governmental efforts to eradicate the growing informal economy in Madrid (M19-ADMIN). Coming from "a more corrupt country" attaches security considerations to Bulgarian migration, as the East Europeans' mobility is perceived to corrupt the receiving space (M23-TU).[113] Connections to "organized mafia" and "criminal organizations" taint the image of the respectful, educated Balkan

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Por su nivel de fomación más elevada que el resto, que es clarísimo que tiene una formación más elevada (M13-E), "Pero como trabajadores bien" (M15-E).

[109] Author's translation derived from original quote in Spanish: "En los países del Este como Bulgaria, tienen…no es ser serios, sino tienen más organización, las cosas se hacen así, así y así. Hacen menos improvisación en la organización."

[110] Among CIS respondents, 26.4% based their opinion about immigrants on the newcomers' culture, and 19.6% on their economic position. Other predictors included nationality (24.6%), skin color (10.6%), and other factors (6.9%). 12.6% of respondents did not provide an answer to this question (CIS, 2012, p. 6) (author's translation from original text in Spanish).

[111] Consult the Appendix for detailed survey results.

[112] Author's translation derived from original quote in Spanish: "Pero el principal problema con respecto a la delincuencia, y sobre todo búlgara, es la violencia."

[113] Author's translation derived from original quote in Spanish: "Luego también vienen de países más corruptos, donde hay una corrupción más generalizada, donde todo el mundo entiende que la corrupción es un hábito, una costumbre."

worker (M16-P; M20-ADMIN; M27-L).[114] The frame of the Bulgarians "who … dedicate themselves only to drugs and stealing" further detracts from perceptions of Bulgarians' hard work and suggests that perhaps the East European migrants "don't come in to work but only to steal" (M15-E).[115] The stereotypes of having "a number of crimes higher than the median," of being "former military, Mafioso," and of engaging in "physical violence" "collide with Spanish society," according to respondents (M17-P; M24-TU; M27-L).[116] Bulgarians' aggressiveness, crime, begging, dirtiness, or proneness to alcoholism are cited as significant negatives by Madrilenian survey respondents as well. Such images are particularly damaging in a host community where immigrants who "come to rob" are much less likely to be perceived as sympathetic than the ones who have different customs and way of life (CIS, 2012).[117] In contrast, few Ecuadorians are viewed as criminal, and any issues with the Latin American group are dubbed "internal affairs" (M27-L).[118] Bulgarians' perceived criminality sets the collective apart from Spaniards and South Americans in Madrid.

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[114] Author's translation derived from original quote in Spanish: "La percepción que se tienen del delito organizo de los extranjeros es del este. Mafia organizada…" (M27-L).

[115] Author's translation from original quote in Spanish: "Yo conozco a búlgaros que tienen su plan y se dedican solamente a la droga y a robar … Que se vienen a trabajar y no entran a trabajar sino a robarte."

[116] Author's translation derived from original quote in Spanish: "En ciertas ocasiones ha habido cierto recelo, en términos sociológicos, se registra que hay un número de delitos producidos por los ciudadanos bulgaros superior a la media…." (M27-L), "Los hombres del este es igual un poco a ex militar, mafioso, por toda la historia contemporánea, la relación de Yugoslavia de Romania de…" (M24-TU), "Lo que ocurre es que cuando han participado en ciertos delitos, como que chocan mucho con la sociedad Española…Es decir, ya no es que entren a una casa a robar estando los habitantes dentro, sino que encima hay una violencia física muy exagerada" (M17-P).

[117] Indeed, in a survey by CIS (2012, p. 13), immigrants are "perceived worse" or endanger "less sympathy by Spaniards" (*le caen peor o tiene menos simpatía por*) mostly if they "come to rob" (*vienen a robar*) (20.4%), are "bad persons" (*son malas personas*) (9.8%), "do not integrate, form ghettos"(*no se integran, forman guetos*) (9.6%), have different "customs, way of life, cultural difference" (*sus costumbres, formas de vida, diferencias culturales*) (8.8%), "are violent, aggressive, conflictual, problematic" (*son violentos, agresivos, conflictivos, problemáticos*) (8.4%). Other reasons like attitudes towards women (5.6%) or religious extremism or Islamism (4.3%) are important but less significant than criminality, violence, and cultural dissimilarity (author's translation from original text in Spanish).

[118] Author's translation derived from original quote in Spanish: "Cuando se asocia la delincuencia con los latinoamericanos fundamentalmente, eso es un asunto interno."

III.4.6. Culture

Finally, the category of culture subsumes all the other markers of difference and similarity employed by local stakeholders, as to firmly place certain ethnic cohorts in the "us" group, while relegating others to a "them" status, especially in the case of Madrid.[119] Cultural similarity between the South Americans and their Spanish hosts produces a common identity and undermines any differences in educational levels, political development, or ethnic belonging. While Bulgarians might share European roots, higher qualifications, or historical trends with Madrilenians, the Balkan migrants' cultural attributes, including a dissimilar disposition, linguistic differences, and a distinct way of life, render their reception conflicted. In the case of Dublin, "work ethic" is instead employed by stakeholders as a non-problematic rubric to summarize perceived ethnic, linguistic, historical, and social connections or differences. Nonetheless, culture is also highly significant. It contributes to Poles and Dubliners' connection due to their similar disposition and mores. More importantly, "culture" sets apart Dubliners and Nigerians, as the latter are reported to have distinct traditions and social interaction patterns from natives. In reality, even when Irish respondents speak of Nigerians' different intonation or work ethic, they highlight cultural differences of social relations and perceptions of what is socially appropriate or desirable. Thus, in both case studies of this dissertation, "culture" is paramount in including and excluding desirable and undesirable foreign cohorts.

[119] For the definition of culture, refer to Chapter I of this dissertation. The project's definition diverges fundamentally from essentialist paradigms that interpret the concept as an immutable marker of personal and group identification. Unlike Huntington's understanding of culture as a rigid objective category that produces conflict between individuals, groups, states, and civilizations, this project considers culture subjective and fluid (Huntington, 2005). Consequently, group boundaries can be reconstructed, clashes between ethnic populations are not inevitable, and exclusion or integration deficiencies can be remedied.

III.4.6.1. Culture and Poles in Dublin

Polish immigrants are cast as insiders because of their culture (**Table III.3**). The "cultural connection" is reported to be one of the motives attracting Polish workers to Ireland in the first place (D18-P). Cultural similarity is also perceived to render the Polish so well liked among the native population. Cultural kinship is understood in terms of a common friendly attitude and openness to others. It is further defined as the ability "to get on socially," as well as an "easy-going temperament" and a penchant for "enjoyment" (D1-J; D13-P). Reference to cultural similarity with the Polish reconstructs their Irish hosts as possessing a "gregarious," "friendly," and accepting disposition themselves (D1-J; D16-ADMIN). It also calls forth Poles' other desirable attributes, such as hard work, historical connections to the Irish, or shared ethnic belonging.

The perceived cultural similarity between Poles and their Irish hosts is highly significant for public opinion in Dublin as well. Similarity to the Irish, understood both in ethno-national terms and as a common attitude or disposition, is the second most prominent positive feature of the East Europeans, according to the city's residents. Polish workers' friendliness and easy-going, open-minded, and fun attitude accounts for the respondents' advantageous evaluation of the Polish in numerous write-in responses. Multiple participants characterize Poles as "nice" or "good" people, who are "polite," "courteous," "helpful" to others, "neat" and "attractive", much like the Irish.[120]

III.4.6.2. Culture and Nigerians in Dublin

On the other hand, Nigerians are narrated as "unfamiliar" because of their culture (**Table III.3**). Their arrival in the 1990s is cast as a threat to the relatively homogenous

[120] Consult the Appendix for detailed survey results.

fabric of Irish culture. Nigerians are considered less integrated and the subject of more resentment than their Polish counterparts in view of how "different" they are. As one respondent put it, "visual and cultural differences present a barrier for Nigerians" (D41-NO). Nigerians are described as a "different category people." A "feeling of difference between us and them" is based on the Africans' aggressiveness and "loud," "rude" manner of communication (D1-J; D9-P; D28-P). The "cultural gap" with the Irish is considered evident even in the different ways of African and Irish nationals in celebrating Christmas or carrying out other social traditions (D1-J). "Because their culture is a very different thing to us," Nigerian immigrants are even described through the term "unacceptable migrants" (D1-J; D18-P). Cultural incompatibility is what the respondents refer to when they reference Nigerians' loud voices or when they describe the Africans' tendency not to work hard but to take advantage of the social system. While interpreted as habits and disposition by Irish local actors, therefore, "culture" is a much broader category that underlies all other determinants of inclusion and exclusion in Dublin.

III.4.6.3. Culture and Ecuadorians in Madrid

The category of culture, interpreted as common customs and way of life, but further assuming similar language, history, religion, and disposition, is the most significant marker of similarity and difference between the native population and immigrant collectives in the city of Madrid. While Madrid is constructed as a "plural democratic society… where there are multiple faiths that need to be respected," cultural distance is not tolerated by the host population (M27-L).[121] To demonstrate, respondents

[121] Author's translation from original quote in Spanish: "Puedan vivir en una sociedad democrática y plural…Es un país realmente donde hay muchas creencias y hay que respetar."

in the survey by CIS (2012, p. 4) found immigrants' willingness "to adapt to the way of life in the country" (*que esté dispuesto/a a adoptar el modo de vida del país*) by far the most significant factor for allowing them to remain in Spain. "Culture" (*cultura*) was also considered the best predictor of foreigners' treatment in the receiving context. 40% of respondents found "cultural enrichment" (*enriquecimiento cultural*) to be the most significant positive effect of immigration and "cultural clashes" (*choques culturales*) the most problematic aspect of mobility (CIS, 2012, pp. 6, 8). More than half of CIS' participants agreed that "immigrants should be allowed to maintain only these aspects of their culture that do not bother the rest of the Spanish" (*Los inmigrantes deberían poder mantener sólo aquellos aspectos de su cultura y costumbres que no molesten al resto de los españoles*) (CIS, 2012, p. 9).[122] Respondents surveyed by this author similarly argued that foreigners have to "function like Spaniards and change their culture" (M21-ADMIN).[123] Therefore, culturally proximate Ecuadorians are in a particularly favorable position to enrich the sense of multiculturalism in the receiving city without introducing fundamentally different or disruptive customs or patterns of interaction (**Table III.3**).

A majority of local stakeholders talk about the fact that "culture brings us closer to the South Americans" (M12-E).[124] Workers from Ecuador "who do not have a very different culture" are reported to choose Madrid as a destination based on their proximity with their hosts and to "adapt very well" in the receiving context (M25-TU; M34-TU).[125] Respondents interpret culture as "common language," which allows for the Latin

[122] Author's translation from original text in Spanish.
[123] Author's translation from original quote in Spanish: "Y que por tanto tienen que funcionar como españoles y cambian la cultura."
[124] Author's translation from original quote in Spanish: "Quizás la cultura nos acerca más a los americanos, por el idioma, por la historia."
[125] Author's translation derived from original quote in Spanish: "Ha sido la oleada migratoria potente en España ha sido la de América Latina: Perú, Ecuador, Bolivia, Argentina, que son trabajadores que hablan español, que no tienen una cultura muy diferente y que han encontrado más fácil el estar en España."

Americans' easier transition to the host city (M23-TU).[126] "Cultural similarities" and a "common language" contribute to Ecuadorians' superior integration levels in the city (M16-P; M18-ADMIN; M20-ADMIN; M26-TU; M32-ADMIN; M33-ADMIN). "Cultural closeness" in terms of shared religion and history create a "common identity" between Ecuadorians and Madrilenians and contribute to the immigrants' warm welcome (M27-L).[127] Common culture is also framed "proximity, proximity of customs, links to Latin America and the language" (M35-P).[128] Finally, culture is interpreted as a shared "form of communication" between hosts and newcomers (M33-TU).[129] As Ecuadorian workers are more "loose" and "communicative," much like the Spanish, they perform better in the service industry where they compete with Bulgarians (M10-E).[130] Since the "Latin Americans are more extroverted … speak our language and eat our food, share in our public spaces," this ethnic cohort has multiple opportunities for communication with the native population and exists in a shared socio-cultural space with Madrilenians (M25-TU; M34-TU).[131] Common culture, interpreted as similar language, history, religion and an extroverted disposition, cements Ecuadorians' acceptance and belonging in the city of Madrid, while confirming Spaniards' own friendliness and favorable way of life.

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[126] Author's translation derived from original quote in Spanish: "Vamos a probar con los países de Sudamérica, que tienen un lenguaje como el nuestro, una cultura parecida y tal…"
[127] Author's translation derived from original quote in Spanish: "Hay una cercanía cultural que hace… el idioma y la cultura en su trasfondo religioso crea una identidad común."
[128] Author's translation from original quote in Spanish: "Por cercanía, por cercanía de costumbres y por vinculación a Latinoamérica y por idioma."
[129] Author's translation from original quote in Spanish: "forma de comunicación."
[130] Author's translation derived from original quote in Spanish: "Se nota, las chicas de Europa del Este son más serias. Las sudamericanas son un poquito más dejadas, pero también son más alegres con respecto al trabajo, son más comunicativas con la gente."
[131] Author's translation from original quote in Spanish: "Los latinonamericanos son más extrovertidos… hablan nuestro idioma y comen nuestra comida, y que comparten los espacios públicos, porque se los ven en parques, en fiestas, y tal."

III.4.6.4. Culture and Bulgarians in Madrid

The conception of Bulgarians' cultural characteristics is highly conflicted (**Table III.3**). On the one hand, one third of expert respondents suggest that Bulgarians "stem from a culture very similar to ours" (M17-P).[132] The category of culture here is interpreted less as partaking in common language, disposition, history, ethnie, or way of life, an "organic" conception participants apply to Latin Americans (Gellner, 1983). It is instead framed as participating in shared high educational levels, a common economic and political reality within Europe, and certain political mores and values like obeying the law. Culture here is understood as socially and politically engineered (Weber, 1976). Thus, while shared cultural identity with Ecuadorians refers to Spaniards' innate Ibero-American roots, shared culture with Bulgarians is elected and confirms Madrilenians' determination to be European. The two connections highlight the desirable characteristics of the receiving space without necessarily being contradictory and despite two distinct conceptions of culture and identity.

On the other hand, the same expert respondents speak of Bulgarians' cultural distance from Madrilenians and the Balkan migrants' different customs. As the East Europeans are "introverted, in the sense of 'I don't interact with others'," Madrilenians find it hard to establish deep connections and share in relationships with the newcomers (M25-TU; M34-TU).[133] Bulgarians' "different customs" set them apart from both the festive Madrilenian and the lively Ecuadorian, who "parties, dances" (*fiestas, bailes*) and

[132] Author's translation from original quote in Spanish: "Parten de culturas muy parecida a la nuestra."
[133] Author's translation derived from original quote in Spanish: "Un poco quizás introvertidos, en el sentido de 'no me interactúo con otros'. … La gente de los países del Este son como más introvertidas, de relacionarse más entre ellos,."

enjoys life (M23-TU).[134] As Bulgarians are "people who do not speak your language… people who come from a different reality," they create problems of cohesion and integration in the receiving context (M25-TU; M34-TU).[135] Their different way of life, for instance their tendencies for aggression and public drunkenness, presents a barrier to their inclusion in Madrid and an issue for coexistence with that collective. These elite sentiments are reflected in public opinion as well, with 21.7% of write-in responses pointing to Bulgarians' seriousness, closed mindset, and lack for trust for outsiders. Respondents also suggest they simply cannot understand the culturally-different Balkan migrants.[136] Therefore, while the East Europeans might share certain civic and political values with Spaniards as Europeans, they are different from their hosts and the culturally proximate South American group in terms of fundamental characteristics like their "way of being" (*forma de ser*). Bulgarians are thus excluded in Madrid.

III.5. Conclusion

Through analysis of elite and public discourse, Chapter III finds that the four immigrant groups of interest to this thesis are positioned very differently in Dublin and Madrid. Despite a general souring of public attitudes toward all immigrant groups with economic downturn, Polish and Ecuadorian workers continue to be narrated as insiders who fit into the host contexts' lives and integrate in the receiving societies. Both engender empathy and a sense of kinship from their hosts. On the other hand, Nigerian immigrants are excluded in public discourse despite the length of their stay and the actual

[134] Author's translation from original Spanish.
[135] Author's translation from original quote in Spanish: "Son gente que no habla tu idioma, son gente que viene de una realidad diferente."
[136] Consult the Appendix for detailed survey results.

ties they share with their receiving community. They are perceived as outsiders who are too different from the native population to integrate. Bulgarians' reception in Madrid is conflicted. While not as negative as that of Nigerians in Dublin, the evaluation of Bulgarians' ability and willingness to fit in is ambiguous.

This differential reception might have something to do with the groups' perceived economic utility. The Polish are considered economic migrants contributing to Dublin's labor market and Nigerians are seen as asylum seekers who only place a burden on Irish social resources. Ecuadorians were recruited by the Spanish state to fill labor shortages in low-skilled services, and Bulgarians, while highly educated and hard-working, are tied to organized criminal organizations and the begging Roma.

However, in both official discourse and the public's eye, economic utility has less to do with inclusion and exclusion than do perceived distance and familiarity constructed in cultural, non-economic terms. Shared strong work ethic, white European ethnicity, Catholicism, English language, history of emigration and independent spirit, as well as an accepting and friendly disposition, frame kinship between the Irish and the Polish, while also reasserting these positive qualities among Dubliners. Nigerian immigrants are in turn narrated as fundamentally different on the basis of the same categories, where the coexistence of the two immigrant groups makes these categories even more meaningful. Ecuadorians are admitted in Madrid in view of their common existence with Spaniards in an Ibero-American transnational space. They share with their hosts the Castellan language; historical parallels of emigration and a spirit of reciprocity between Spain and South America; Catholic religion; as well as social interaction patterns, an extroverted disposition and common culture. Despite Bulgarians' white European ethnicity and

similar historical trajectories, the Balkan migrants are constructed as different from Madrilenians. They are farmed as serious, criminal, authoritarian, Orthodox, ethnically suspect, and participants in different customs and interaction patterns. Commonalities between desirable immigrant populations and natives are emphasized or invented while any connections with undesirable collectives are downplayed.

Surprisingly, European belonging or privileged legal status does not automatically translate into positive reception in new immigration spaces on the Continent, with non-European Ecuadorians faring better than EU Bulgarians in Spain. Instead, inclusion and inclusion are based in local stakeholders' interpretation of the subjective identity-based categories of ethnicity, history, religion, language, work ethic, and culture. Two of these attributes stand out. "Hard work" is a non-material category that underlies and assumes all other desirable characteristics of insider immigrants, especially in the case of Dublin. "Culture," while understood as common mores and a shared disposition, is an all-encompassing classification that serves as the basis of other commonalities. For instance, Poles' hard work implies shared cultural mores with ambitious Dubliners. Nigerians' distinct intonation suggests cultural distance from the Irish. Ecuadorians' shared language with Madrilenians allows for common traditions and cultural patterns. Bulgarians' Orthodox faith correlates with dissimilar customs and a cultural barrier.

Furthermore, cultural markers of similarity and difference are not essentialist or objective, but are mutable, fluid, and reinterpretable. They are employed strategically by local stakeholders to institutionalize patterns of welcome or rejection, and carry different meanings and weight according to context and local identity variations. For instance, authoritarian past engenders not empathy but suspicion for Bulgarians in Madrid, as local

identity is focused on modernism, republicanism, and democracy. It creates kinship between Poles and Dubliners who have both overcome such historical obstacles. Language skills are paramount in Spain, but are downplayed and explained out in Ireland.

This chapter showed how local political and economic elites and the general public interpret and reinterpret flexible identity characteristics in order to include or exclude the immigrants in their midst. However, public discourse is only factor in determining immigrant integration outcomes in Dublin and Madid. Ethnic communities' own perceptions of welcome or rejection have a large role to play for incorporation patterns. It is to the way in which foreign cohorts utilize the same fluid identity attributes employed by elites and native public to construct their own belonging or isolation in Dublin and Madrid that Chapter IV turns next.

CHAPTER IV

TO STAY OR NOT TO STAY:

BELONGING AND ISOLATION IN DUBLIN AND MADRID

IV.1. Introduction

Poles and Nigerians in Dublin and Ecuadorians and Bulgarians in Madrid are received very differently by employers, politicians, and the general public. The four populations also form different perceptions of their own belonging or isolation in the two cities, often in opposition to the public discourses they face. Polish workers are accepted by Dubliners and satisfied with life in Ireland, but are still to make Dublin their home. Nigerians feel isolated in the hostile receiving city. Ecuadorians are at home in welcoming Madrid. Bulgarians build a future in the host community despite attachment to the motherland or Madrilenians' lukewarm reception. What explains these patterns? Why do the immigrants belong or fail to fit in?

Cultural proximity and distance play a role in all four cases. Rigid cultural self-identification and embeddedness in national networks preclude commitment to integration in the case of Polish workers. Ethnoracial differences and their effects undermine the ability to belong among Nigerian migrants. Linguistic and historical commonalities render Madrid an extension of Ecuador for the South American immigrants. Strong national self-identification and intense nostalgia for the homeland are counteracted by a common European destiny with the Spanish in the case of Bulgarians. While these findings concern four particular foreign cohorts in two specific European locations, they also provide insight into the experiences of the first generation of

immigrants on the Continent more broadly. Immigrant agency and rigid culturally-grounded conceptions of welcome or rejection obstruct incorporation efforts as much as local discourses of exclusion.

Table IV.1. Indicators of Immigrant Perceptions of Belonging and Isolation[137]

Indicator	*Polish (Score)*	*Nigerian (Score)*	*Ecuadorian (Score)*	*Bulgarian (Score)*
Migration trajectory	Low (2)	High (4)	High (4)	High (4)
Group status	Intermediate (3)	Low (2)	High (5)	High (4)
Individual status	Intermediate (3)	Low (2)	High (5)	Intermediate (3)
BELONGING	***Intermediate-low (8)***	***Intermediate-low (8)***	***High (14)***	***Intermediate-high (11)***

This chapter traces patterns of belonging and isolation for Poles and Nigerians in Dublin and Ecuadorians and Bulgarians in Madrid through the discussion of migration trajectories; perceptions of group status; interactions with natives; and conceptions of individual satisfaction, integration, and self-identification (**Table IV.1**). Polish workers

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[137] Each category is assigned a number between 1 and 5. Answers that reflect lack of belonging are assigned a value of 1. Answers that reflect high levels of belonging constructed in cultural terms are given a value of 5. Answers that fall in the middle are assigned a 3. The numbers 2 and 4 reflect intermediary levels of belonging falling between the three categories. The values from each row are added to produce an average level of belonging for each group. Values between 3 and 6 reflect low levels of belonging, values of 7-11 show intermediate levels of belonging, and values of 12-15 reflect high levels of belonging. "Migration trajectory" is a composite indicator defined in terms of motivations for migration, length of stay, and future migration plans. Each sub-category is given a number of 1-5, and the sum is divided by three. Migration on the basis of cultural ties, long-term settlement, and no return plans warrant high values, while economic motives, short-term migration and plans to return home warrant a low value. "Group status" focuses on individuals' perceptions of how well their national group fits in into the receiving context. Group welcome and perceptions of the group's integration are assigned a value of 1-5 and the sum is divided by two. "Individual status" is composed of four sub-categories. The immigrants' interactions are evaluated and given a high value if relationships are with natives and other nationalities and low value if they occur only with compatriots. Self-reported satisfaction and integration in the receiving city are the second and third components. Self-identification is the fourth sub-category, given a low value if the immigrants identify predominantly with the home country and a high one if they also identify with the host community. Each of the four sub-components is assigned a value of 1-5 and the sum is divided by four.

are satisfied with opportunity in Dublin and feel relatively welcomed by their Irish hosts. However, as their self-identification is exclusively Polish, the East European immigrants do not invest adequate efforts in integration. They perceive their larger ethnic community as isolated, confined to the Polish diaspora and lacking in meaningful interactions with the local society. Even individual respondents fail to establish deeper connections with Dubliners and define themselves exclusively through the home country. According to **Table IV.1**, Poles do not belong in Dublin.

Nigerians' ethnoracial differences from the Irish and the constant reminder of their unfamiliarity undermine their sense of belonging in the host city. Unlike Polish workers, Nigerian immigrants were actually attracted to Ireland due to the cultural and historical ties they share with this country and have come to Dublin to settle. However, much like their Polish counterparts, they still feel isolated and rejected. The Nigerian community is considered to be excluded on an everyday basis and therefore remains self-contained and separate from the local population. While individual migrants are satisfied with life in Dublin and interact with the native population, they still identify as Nigerian and different from their Irish hosts. The Nigerian community has more at stake in Ireland than the Polish community, but shares in its feelings of isolation (**Table IV.1**).

On the other hand, Ecuadorians belong in Madrid as they are similar to their hosts. While they are economic migrants in Spain arriving with a relatively short-term migration plans, the intimate interrelation between home and host countries leads the South Americans to choose Spain as their destination, remain in the receiving city indefinitely, and build their future in both Ecuador and Spain. Cultural affinity, as well as historic and linguistic connections, underlies the Latin Americans' perceptions of

welcome by the Spanish and integration of their larger ethnic community. Individual respondents' "Spanish blood" explains their ease in navigating Madrid's landscape, building relationships with the Spanish, and ultimately reuniting the family unit in the receiving space. According to **Table IV.1**, and as they perceive both Ecuador and Spain as part of a larger Ibero-American transnational community, Ecuadorians experience high levels of belonging in Madrid (and the highest among the four ethnic populations).

Despite conflicted feelings about life in Madrid, Bulgarians belong in the host city (**Table IV.1**). The East Europeans identify exclusively as Bulgarian and suffer from intense nostalgia for the motherland. They arrived in Spain with short-term plans, continue to form their strongest relationships with other Bulgarians, and see their national community as isolated. However, as they are joined by family and friends, find the Spanish a warm society with a similar temperament, and want to provide the next generation with stability and opportunity, the immigrants extend their stay in Madrid. Disappointment with a corrupt homeland and a superior standard of life in the receiving context lead them to set roots in Spain and look for connections with the Spanish. High levels of satisfaction in Spain, especially with language acquisition and the consolidation of the family unit, lead Bulgarians to call Madrid their new home.[138]

Based on their perceptions, Polish workers place in the lower left corner of **Table IV.2**. The myth of inclusion and similarity established in Irish public discourse is undermined by Polish immigrants' relatively weak sense of belonging in Dublin. The

[138]Group identification and experiences are always established in opposition to those of other ethnic cohorts. Both Ecuadorians and Bulgarians in Spain, for example, cite the other collective's dissimilarity with the Spanish to cement their own belonging in Madrid. Nigerians' disagreement with the myth of Poles' belonging in Dublin intensifies their own indignation with an exclusionary receiving environment and disassociation with the host city.

Nigerian community falls in the lower right quadrant of **Table IV.2.** Nigerians' isolation reinforces the discourse of difference of Irish elites and the public. Ecuadorians occupy the upper left quadrant of **Table IV.2**. Perceptions of belonging are consistent with the image of inclusion and affinity extended by the Spanish. Bulgarians fit into the upper right quadrant of **Table IV.2**. Their conflicted yet growing sense of identification with Madrid occurs in contrast with a certain perception of difference by Madrilenians.

Table IV.2. Immigrant Belonging and Isolation in Dublin and Madrid

<table>
<tr><td rowspan="4">Immigrant Group</td><td rowspan="3">Belong</td><td colspan="2">Host Society</td></tr>
<tr><td>Accept</td><td>Reject</td></tr>
<tr><td>Ecuadorians In Madrid</td><td>Bulgarians In Madrid</td></tr>
<tr><td>Don't Belong</td><td>Poles in Dublin</td><td>Nigerians in Dublin</td></tr>
</table>

These findings are based on analysis of in-depth interviews with thirty to forty members of the Eastern European cohorts and ten members of the non-European groups, as well as all four groups' representatives in ethnic organizations. In the case of Nigerians in Dublin, interview data are further supplemented through studies conducted by the Economic and Social Research Institute and the Immigrant Council of Ireland. In the case of Ecuadorians in Madrid, periodic surveys by the Autonomous Community of Madrid, as well as works by Masterson-Algar (2009) and Dudley (2013), complete the sources.

Interviews with the individual migrants are not representative, but they are not meant to be. Instead, they introduce a crucial level of thickness and nuance to the findings and bring the human experience into theoretical discussion of identity, belonging, or integration. They reinforce the conclusions of the groups' elite interlocutors. Combined with secondary sources and reports, the interview data provide invaluable insight into how attitudes and perceptions form among foreign populations (Maxwell, 2008).

This chapter turns to the narrative for each immigrant group, starting with Poles and Nigerians in Dublin and moving on to Ecuadorians and Bulgarians in Madrid.

IV.2. "A Contented Proletariat": Polish Perceptions of Belonging and Isolation in Dublin

The Polish immigrants studied here are not a homogenous group. In fact, members of this ethnic community themselves point to the existence of several separate categories of Polish immigrants in Ireland. The clearest cleavage is between older, lesser-educated migrants in Ireland for a specific purpose and thus connected exclusively to Poland and younger, better-educated workers ready to experience Irish culture and society. Some also identify a third group, composed of migrants who still feel connected to the home country, but are thankful for the opportunities they have found in Ireland and constantly reconsider the length of their stay in the receiving country. With return migration from the first group after the collapse of the Irish construction industry, yet an uninterrupted flow of people into Ireland, the third group is growing in numbers in Dublin. Therefore, most of the members of the Polish community in Ireland today share similar sentiments about their migration to Dublin. Those sentiments are highly conflicted, and betray a feeling of being "in between", temporary, and not truly invested

in the host society. Polish immigrants' own perceptions and inspirations diverge from the discourse of welcome and inclusion extended by Irish local administrators and the general public. As a result, Poles place in the bottom row of **Table IV.2**. Polish immigrants' narrative of belonging is detailed below.

IV.2.1. Polish Workers' Migration Trajectories

Poles' migration trajectories indicate conflicted sense of belonging in Dublin. In contrast to the perceptions of Dubliners, Polish workers migrated to Ireland not due to shared identity characteristics and a perception of common future with their hosts, but rather for a complex set of motives combining economic opportunity, desire for adventure, the wish to learn English and experience a different culture, and the prerogatives of family life. Political openness with European Union enlargement, the promise of support by family and friends, the ease of travel, and the positive image of Ireland in the Polish media serve as additional factors for choosing Ireland.

Table IV.3. Poles' Motivation to Migrate to Ireland

Motive	% of all responses	Number	% of all respondents
Economic opportunity	27.4%	29	69%
Open borders (EU)	17.9%	19	45.2%
Adventure/experience	15.1%	16	38.1%
Social networks	14.1%	15	35.7%
Family prerogatives	10.4%	11	26.2%
Kinship and friendliness	8.5%	9	21.4%
Ease of travel	3.8%	4	9.5%
Media image	2.8%	3	7%
Total	***100%***	***106***	***Of 42 persons***

Source: Author.

Regardless of the myth of kinship in Irish public discourse, few Polish immigrants and representatives asserted that the Polish community migrated to Ireland in view of cultural affinity with the Irish. Three Polish respondents cited the shared history between the receiving and sending societies as one of the factors behind their decision, and a single Polish worker provided Ireland's Catholic tradition as his main motive for choosing this destination. Seven among the forty-two participants quoted Irish people's "similar" and friendly disposition and the small country's comfortable way of life as reasons to choose Ireland over other potential host states. Because it is "the most friendly place in Europe for Polish people" and "Ireland is more like at home," 16% of all participants "booked a one-way ticket" to Ireland instead of Sweden, which also removed political and economic borders for new EU members joining in 2004 (**Table IV.3**).[139]

However, most chose Dublin for economic reasons. More than a quarter of all responses deem Dublin-bound migration the result of financial or economic factors and seven in ten of my Polish participants admit they are in Ireland because of the "taste of money" (Jennifer, 29) (**Table IV.3**). Lack of economic opportunity at home, even for college graduates, has pushed many Polish workers to seek alternative destinations of employment. Undesirable positions, "little money," and high unemployment rates at home led many Polish immigrants to leave their country (Mary, 41). On the other hand, the booming and flexible economy and relatively high wages attracted Polish workers to Ireland in particular. The availability of work, especially in the building industry, the

[139] Most participants gave multiple responses to the question "Why did you leave Poland and migrate to Ireland?" Therefore, while there are forty-two respondents who discussed this question, there are in fact one hundred and six recorded answers among them. The rest of the chapter takes account of the incidence of the responses both as percentage of all 42 respondents and all 106 responses given. While rates for each answer are radically different based on these two different modes of calculation, results are the same regardless of method.

"good money" and the active recruitment of Polish workers by Irish companies and government agencies led Polish workers to swell up Dublin's population (Devon, 33). A majority of respondents arrived for the money to supplement low pensions in Poland or to save up for a new business, a new house, or a wedding in the home country.

While financial troubles and lack of opportunity at home were the main motivations to leave Poland, economic prerogatives were often combined with desire for change from a routine reality, thirst for getting to know different societies, as well as aspirations for professional experience and sharper language skills. Almost four in ten of all participants referred to their migration as an "adventure" or "risky," where in 15% of all responses the need for change, experience, and excitement served as the primary drive behind labor mobility (Amy, 28; Kevin, 27; Ted, 28) (**Table IV.3**). The second largest group of participants, therefore, left Poland to look for a better and more interesting life. This inevitably entailed gaining practical experience from the entrepreneurial Irish, meeting "a different culture," as well as learning the English language (Rick, 45). The implication is that experience and skills acquired in Ireland would eventually be applied back in the home country.

Finally, a large group of Polish respondents left the sending country with the prerogative of maintaining their family unit. Family interest was the fifth most common motivation for migration, in 10% of all responses. More than one fourth of the forty-two participants who responded to this question suggested that they migrated to Dublin to preserve a relationship with their Polish partner or to develop a new one after meeting Irish partners in Poland (**Table IV.3**). Other interviewees relocated to Dublin to help out children, improve the educational opportunities of their children or start a family

Several other factors led Polish respondents to choose Ireland as a migration destination in particular. The enlargement of the European Union played a major role in Polish migration to Ireland. Almost half of my interviewees suggested their migration to Dublin was greatly influenced by the removal of political boundaries for Polish citizens there (**Table IV.3**). According to 18%, the freedom of movement with EU widening allowed the Polish to take advantage of opportunities in Ireland with "no border, no passports, no visas" or any other obstacles (George, 58). The "open door policy after EU enlargement" that Ireland espoused contributed to this country looking "like paradise" for many Poles (Thomas, 37). As one respondent shared, "enlargement definitely helped most of the Eastern European countries to go to the West and try to find a better place to live" (Zara, 30). EU enlargement helped regularize Polish workers already in Ireland and therefore improved the quality of their economic and social life. As one participant put it:

> *I live in Ireland for almost five years because there was big opportunity for us, Polish citizens, to come here in 2004 with European Union extension. So I decided to not go elsewhere because I couldn't build my existence on illegal work* (Rick, 45)

The ease of travel with open borders and an ever proliferating number of flights between Poland and Ireland was also quoted as a catalyst for Polish workers' decision to migrate to Dublin. While not a leading factor, almost 10% of all respondents talked about Aer Lingus and Ryan Air, which "connect Ireland with almost every city in Poland" and make commuting between the two countries "very easy" (George, 58; Hailey, 60). A rising number of bus connections and improved Internet communications between receiving and sending states further facilitated Polish migration to Dublin.

A slew of information and a positive image of Ireland by friends, family or the Polish media, as well as the security of support upon arrival, also served to attract Polish workers to Dublin. Social and human networks made Ireland a preferred destination of

Polish migration, as Poles already residing and working there presented the country as "paradise" (Lara, 32). The image of Ireland as "green," "nice," and "good economically" led 7% of all interviewees to conclude that they will like this particular destination. A place where a lot of their fellow citizens were already residing appeared like a safer and better bet for many Polish immigrants. The promise of support on the ground, in terms of accommodation, information, and even a job offer upon arrival, facilitated Poles' decision to migrate to Ireland among more than one third of all participants. In 14% of all responses, Polish workers followed relatives or responded to professional opportunities offered to them by friends and family (**Table IV.3**).

One respondent summarizes well the complicated motives behind Polish workers' decision to migrate to Ireland: "Polish people came to Ireland because they wanted a better life. Second, it was very easy. Economic was very high. Of course also if all your friends are here, you are going to come here ... Of course there was a boom and many people came with the EU" (Thomas, 37). Economic motivation and a booming economy in Ireland combined with social networks, desire for adventure, and open borders to attract hundreds of thousands of Poles to Ireland. While a certain coziness and familiarity between Poland and Ireland exists, this feeling of kinship rarely led the decision of Polish workers to migrate to Dublin. Therefore, this sub-component of migration trajectories is assigned a low value of 2 (**Table IV.1**).

Not only are Polish migrants in Dublin rarely led by feelings of perceived familiarity, but also they are recent arrivals who do not plan to settle in Ireland. In 2002, there were only 2,000 Polish residents officially in Ireland, a figure that soared to more than 62,000 in 2006 and more than 115,000 in 2011 (CSO, 2004, 2008, 2012a). While

these numbers could simply reflect the illegality of Polish immigrants in Ireland prior to EU enlargement, they more likely suggest that Dublin-bound Polish migration occurred primarily after 2002. Among this project's respondents, only 19% arrived prior to 2004. The majority (62%) migrated to Dublin immediately after Poland was admitted to the European Union, with another 19% arriving after 2007. At the time of their interviews in 2010, therefore, Polish participants have been in Ireland for an average of five year, insufficient time to set roots in the receiving city.

Polish workers also arrived with short-terms or unclear migration plans. Most interviewees planned a short trip to Dublin for a specific goal like raising money to purchase an accommodation in Poland or finance a wedding, obtain a larger pension, or take advantage of a specific program in Ireland. Six in ten Polish participants arrived in Dublin for several months and no more than several years. Another third were unsure of the length of their stay in Ireland. Only one in ten relocated either with the intention to settle in Dublin or to remain in the host state long-term.

However, the respondents have remained in Ireland beyond their original plans and have reluctantly put down roots in Dublin. Some remain in the country, because they have not reached their migration goals. However, other Polish workers admit they have stayed longer, because they are in good employment, "met nice people," feel satisfied in Ireland, or have children who are now part of the Irish educational system (Michaela, 24). As one respondent put it, "the holiday [I initially planned] turned into six years" (Kevin, 27). Therefore, the Polish are neither here nor there, as they participate in life in Ireland, yet still consider their migration short-term and deny they have in fact settled. The group is assigned a 2 for his sub-component of migration trajectories (**Table IV.1**).

The feeling of being in-between is reflected in respondents' plans for the future. Almost half of all participants would like to return to Poland and do not foresee living in Ireland indefinitely. As they have "left friends and family behind" and identify as "foreign" in Ireland, these respondents envision "having a proper life" in Poland (Nadine, 27; Peter, 32; Zara, 30). On the other hand, one third of all interviewees plan to remain in Dublin, since they "love Ireland," made many friends, purchased property, or have a family in the city (Elizabeth, 36). One in five are unclear about their plans or unwilling to commit to specific arrangements. Among those planning to return, most remain unsure of the exact date and continue extending their stay in Ireland.[140]

As they remain in Ireland longer and longer, respondents begin to admit their ties to their receiving society and the difficulty of returning home. As one Polish migrant shared, "I am very nationalist, so my mind was set on coming back. But lately I am realizing I might stay here for much longer than I thought. I started to be involved in more community things here. We are trying to get more connected to the Irish society and get more involved in Irish life" (Steven, 34). Another Polish worker suggests how hard it is to return as her son grows up in Ireland. According to a final respondent, if "something changes and I have a good job and I am happy, maybe I will stay" (Kevin, 27). In view of their conflicted migration plan, Polish workers are assigned an intermediate 3 for this subcomponent of migration trajectories (**Table IV.1**).

In sum, Polish immigrants choose Ireland for mostly economic motives, consider their stay temporary, and plan to return to their home country. They feel more connected to Poland and continue to identify as "immigrants" in Dublin, in contrast to the

[140] Only 8% of respondents had a specific date in mind to leave Ireland, whereas 65% reported being "unsure" of their future migration plans.

perceptions of their Irish hosts. Nonetheless, as they remain in Dublin longer, they inevitably settle and become part of the city, thus extending their stay indefinitely. However, while they reluctantly participate in Irish society, they invest less in their host community and continue to plan their future lives in Poland. Poles' migration trajectories, therefore, indicate a relatively low level of belonging in the host city (**Table IV.1**).

IV.2.2. Perceptions of the Polish Community's Group Status

Conceptions of the Polish community's position in Irish society further complicate Polish workers' feelings of belonging in Dublin. The Polish community in Dublin is perceived as welcomed by their Irish hosts. At least in boom economic times, Polish workers considered Dublin "the most friendly place in Europe for Polish people" and found the Polish to be preferred in the work place to other immigrant groups and even Irish nationals (Thomas, 37). Polish workers and their representatives report that the Polish community in Dublin has enjoyed a "very positive image" and was well liked by their hosts, at least in the past (D36-PO; D37-PO). Irish people are considered "very friendly" in their reception of Polish immigrants and Ireland is dubbed the "the most open country in Europe for Polish people" (D37-PO).

Some respondents reiterate the myth of belonging established by their Irish hosts by suggesting that Polish immigrants are welcomed in Dublin due to historical and cultural affinity between the receiving and sending societies. Three in ten respondents believe that similar history and religion, shared mentality and a common race are what render the Polish well-liked in Ireland. Polish workers argue that they were able to fit in well in Dublin because "the Polish and the Irish are very, very similar. They match very

well. They understand each other very well" (George, 58). "Similar experience" in terms "history of immigration and fighting," "shared Catholicism," common humor and "style of enjoyment," as well as "fighting spirit" are perceived to account for Polish workers' elevated status in Dublin (D33-PO; D34-PO; Iris, 32; Jake, 31; Rick, 45). However, the majority of respondents do not ascribe the native population's positive reception of the Polish to perceived familiarity. One quarter of all participants find their kinship with Dubliners to be only relative and suggest that "in many ways [the Polish and Irish] are completely different" (Ashley, 29). Almost half of all Polish interviewees actually emphasize the distinctions between the receiving and sending communities.

Indeed, most Polish respondents suggest that they felt welcomed in Ireland, at least upon their arrival, not due to a deep sense of belonging or similarity, but rather in view of their high qualifications and willingness to work. Almost nine in ten participants agree that their economic utility was what rendered them so well liked in Dublin, regardless of how their reception is framed by their hosts. As one respondent put it, "if somebody knows something about economics, work, or Poland, they are fine with us" (Jane, 30). The Irish were perceived to open their doors to Polish migration because "there was a need for us" to occupy the jobs that the native population found undesirable (Amy, 28). Polish interviewees felt welcomed because they are "doing the job well" and are "better educated, better experienced, better motivated" than other workers in Dublin (Nadine, 27; Rick, 45). Interestingly the category of "hard work" is interpreted differently by the Polish community than it is among the native population. For Polish immigrants, being a "dedicated worker" does entail high qualifications, efficiency, reliability, and honesty (D36-PO). However, this characteristic does not imply other positive qualities or

affinities with the Irish. Rather, it is an economic category, where a "good work ethic" is equated with "not [being] afraid of anything and [liking] to work," and agreeing to exploitation and underpayment in the Dublin labor market (Richard, 34).

Reportedly, Polish workers' economic utility is also the qualification that sets the Polish apart from other workers in Dublin. Among the interviewees, 22.5% argue that Polish immigrants are preferred even to local workers, since they would take any job and work "much harder [and better] than the Irish" for lower wages (Annie, 30). Six in ten of Polish participants suggest they are preferred both in the workplace and the social sphere to all immigrant groups.[141] Comparing themselves specifically with African immigrants in Ireland, six in ten Polish participants believe they are better suited to life in the receiving country. The justification echoes Irish interviewees' connection between race, immigration status, cultural difference and tendency to abuse the system. However, it is Nigerian immigrants' diminished economic utility and unwillingness to work that renders them particularly undesirable guests, according to Polish respondents.

As emphasis is placed on Polish immigrants' economic commodity, welcome and satisfaction with Polish workers does not translate into deeper relationships or a true sense of inclusion in the work place. As one respondent puts it, "the Irish people like you only as a colleague" or employee, but "after that, that's it" (Ted, 28). Inadequate knowledge of the English language compounds the barriers that remain between Polish workers and their Irish hosts. Due to inadequate language skills, the connection between Polish and Irish in Dublin's landscape remains strictly economic in nature. When economic self-interest is no longer strong, therefore, the Polish are no longer "included."

[141] Only 7% believe there is no preference for Polish immigrants in Dublin. The rest either did not provide an answer to this question (23%) or were undecided in their answer (7%).

With economic downturn, the economic utility of Polish workers in Ireland has diminished along with their welcome. In the words of one interviewee, "We were very welcome in 2004-2005 when there was a need for us, when there were lots of jobs for us, which the Irish didn't want. Whereas now discrimination has increased hugely and it is frustrating for some people that 'the foreigners are here and they are getting our jobs'" (Amy, 28). Only about 12.5% Polish respondents found no change in their Irish hosts' positive attitude towards them, whereas 72.5% reported a worsening climate and less than warm welcome in Dublin.[142] Due to the perception that they are too many, abuse the welfare system, and "take jobs" away from Irish workers, Polish immigrants report cool treatment in Ireland since 2008. More than half of all Polish interviewees believe that the native population now considers them a drain rather than an asset to the Irish economy, and resents that unemployed Irish workers have to emigrate while "those immigrants are staying here" (D35-PO). The Polish group is assigned a relative high, but not the highest, value of 4 for this sub-component of group status (**Table IV.1).**

On the other hand, Polish immigrants and their elite interlocutors find their national community far from integrated in Dublin. Seventy percent of all Polish respondents believe that Poles in Ireland are not integrated, twenty-four percent consider the picture mixed, and only six percent find Polish workers incorporated in Irish life. This lack of assimilation is expressed through a set of identifiable symptoms. The Polish community is considered prone to "stick together" within their own "homogenous" group and less inclined to "mix" with their Irish hosts beyond the necessities of an economic relationship (D33-PO). Polish immigrants are reported to live together, frequent Polish bars, restaurants or shops, watch Polish television, and use the Polish language in their

[142] The remaining 15% of all respondents provided no answer to this question.

everyday interactions.[143] Therefore, intergroup relationships rarely evolve "beyond [conversations about the] weather and small talk" (D35-PO). As they rely for their everyday lives on Polish networks, Polish workers live [in Dublin] "without knowing a word of English," further obstructing the assimilation process (D33-PO).

Nonetheless, the Polish community is perceived as fragmented by its members, with certain parts isolated "in the Polish bubble," yet others ready to make Dublin their home (Rick, 45). In the words of the interviewees, there are those who "mentally … are in Poland" (D37-PO). However, there are also "some people who are very much assimilated without losing their own identity and very happy to integrate with the Irish people and other nationalities here" (Janet, 67). Language is by far "the main problem" for the isolation of some parts of the Polish community (Kevin, 27). Eight in ten participants believe that inadequate language skills substantially affect Polish workers' ability "to talk, to be here," as well as to "meet Irish people" (D38-PO; Jane, 30). Limited language capabilities create a vicious cycle, as lack of English often forces Polish workers to "live together with Polish people, work with Polish people and [only] watch Polish TV"; thus further isolating them from their Irish hosts (Mary, 41).

Other barriers to the integration of the Polish community in Ireland are found to exist, however, including the lack of effort by Irish organizations to make Polish immigrants more welcome. The preoccupation with one's own economic goals is perceived by my respondents to cause rifts even within the Polish community itself, with competition for jobs and "envy" precluding the solidification of this group as a

[143] It is possible not to speak English and still leave a productive life in Ireland, as the sheer number of Polish immigrants has led to the creation not only of a number of Polish-based services and offices, but has also necessitated the employment of Polish workers who could serve as interpreters in all major Irish companies and institutions.

permanent and powerful player in Dublin's landscape (Sarah, 33). In the words of one expert, "people who came just to work are not interested in integration but they are interested just in money" (D37-PO). Difference in mentality or culture from the Irish is also considered a significant barrier to Polish integration in Ireland. Because the "mentally is a hundred percent different" and Polish immigrants' lifestyle is differently structured, Poles are found to fail to truly fit in (Thomas, 37). A demanding work life and emphasis on saving, as well as social interaction in the home rather than the pub leads to even little communication between guests and hosts. Finally, dedication to family is actually believed to facilitate incorporation among the Polish in Dublin. Raising a Polish family in Ireland necessitates "settling" as to ensure continuity and stability for children, where Ireland is considered "safer" than Poland and the Irish educational system "better" than the Polish one (D38-PO; Richard, 34; Steven, 34). In view of the barriers identified by Polish interviewees, the East Europeans are assigned a low value of 2 for this sub-component of group status (**Table IV.1**).

In sum, the position of the Polish collective in Dublin's life is conflicted and merits an intermediary evaluation (**Table IV.1**). Polish immigrants feel welcome in Dublin and argue that they place high on the hierarchy among immigrant groups than Nigerians, for instance. However, Irish elites and publics' welcome, perceived to be economically motivated, is seen as tenuous with economic downturn. Group status is further complicated by the Polish community's inward-looking character and embeddedness in strong ethnic networks. Despite local discourses, therefore, Polish respondents believe their group to be far from integrated in life in Dublin. Belonging and investment in life in the city are tenuous.

IV.2.3. Poles' Perceptions of Individual Status

Perceptions of personal status further complicate the narrative of Polish belonging in Dublin. Individual participants are quick to disassociate themselves from the larger Polish community in Ireland, which they consider ridden by jealousy, preoccupied with material goals, and isolated. Polish interviewees' personal experience is characterized by contentment with life in the receiving country, more frequent and meaningful interaction with the native population, and a deeper level of self-reported integration. Regardless of these accounts, respondents still consider themselves different from their hosts and continue to identify as outsiders. For most Polish interviewees comfort and belonging in Ireland are in tension with national pride and an exclusively Polish identity (**Table IV.1**).

Turner, D'Art, & Cross (2009) deem the Polish in Ireland "a contented proletariat," a community that is satisfied with their economic and social conditions in the receiving state.[144] This project's respondents confirm the authors' proposal. Seven in ten suggest that they are at least satisfied with life in Dublin, with more than a quarter of them stating they are "welcomed," "like being" in Ireland, and feel "quite happy" "to live here" (Emily, 35; Jake, 31; Jane, 30). On the other hand, 15% of participants are not content with their migration to Dublin and the same percentage are conflicted about the host state, "sometimes [feeling] happy and sometimes feeling depressed" (Sarah, 33). Respondents also lend credence to the hypothesis of self-selected migration and consider themselves the best suited for migration from among their compatriots.[145]

[144] The levels of satisfaction of the Polish community in Ireland are discussed in the following section, which explores the objective indicators of integration for the Polish in Dublin.
[145] As contrasted to the majority of Polish nationals, who have not chosen to immigrate.

Table IV.4. Poles' Motivation for Satisfaction in Ireland

Motive	% of all responses	Number
Economic opportunity	17.5%	7
Ease/quality of life	17.5%	7
Love city/people	15%	6
Connections with Irish	12.5%	5
Better family life/schooling	10%	4
Not satisfied	15%	6
No response	12.5%	5
Total	***100%***	***40***

Source: Author.

The economic and financial opportunities Ireland provides are the main reason for Polish immigrants' personal satisfaction with their lives in Dublin (**Table IV.4**). The ease and quality of life in Ireland outstrip sacrifices like hard lowly work and separation from family. Love for the city of Dublin, its cultural identity, and its people renders 15% of respondents contented with their life abroad. The welcome provided them by the local population and the positive relationship with Irish friends contributes to the sense of satisfaction of 12.5% of Polish participants. The benefits of the Irish educational system and the better structured family life in Dublin are not lost on the interviewees. This sub-component of individual status merits a high rating of 4 (**Table IV.1**).

Not only are Polish participants relatively satisfied with life in Dublin, but they also have some relationships with the Irish and feel somewhat integrated in the host city. More than one third share that they have Irish friends and another 18% report Irish acquaintances, mostly in a professional sphere. While interactions at work remain the more common, several interviewees have gained close friends and even partners from among the native population. Furthermore, 21% consider themselves integrated in

Dublin's landscape and another 26% identify as at least somewhat assimilated to life in their new home. Participants even consider the receiving society their "second home" (Michaela, 24). In the words of one Polish immigrant:

> *I do feel part of Dublin. I do feel welcomed. I am happy with what I have received here. I do feel Ireland as home now and Dublin as the place where I belong too* (Amy, 28)

Despite relative satisfaction, some connection with the Irish and some belonging in Dublin, Polish workers continue to relate most closely to their compatriots, remain embedded in Polish networks in Dublin, and identify as Polish. While interaction with the native population is not absent and is generally positive, one in four participants have no friendships with Irish nationals and find communication with their hosts difficult.[146] As they "do not have much to do with the Irish" in terms of temperament and interests, cannot communicate well in English, or "did not come to be social," these interviewees consider it "very difficult to make close connections with Irish people" (Hailey, 60; Jane, 26; Mary, 41). Even those who report having some Irish friends, consider the relationships limited. Indeed, even if they communicate with other immigrants and enjoy the higher degree of "multiculturalism" Ireland offers them, most respondents hold their "closest relationships … with the Polish" (Amy, 28). While 16% suggest they steer clear of the Polish community, as it is ridden by competition and jealousy, the remaining 84% report that the majority of their friends are Polish. Interaction with other Polish immigrants is frequent at home, at work, during religious services, and in the social sphere. Participants see their "friendship with [other] Polish people as fuller and complete because [they] share much more than with Irish people" (Ted, 28):

[146] As discussed previously, 39% of Polish respondents have no Irish friends, 37% report having close relationships with the native population, and 18% have some Irish friends, but those are few and usually work-based. The remaining 6% did not provide an answer to this question.

Polish people are more close to me, it's a different way that they are speaking or something but we are connecting better (Nadine, 27)

As their interactions are embedded primarily within the "Polish bubble," a large percentage of Polish interviewees in Dublin remain isolated from the host society (Rick, 45). Almost half of all respondents report not feeling integrated in the receiving city.[147] These participants rarely interact with the native population and rely on Polish networks for their everyday lives. Going to "the Polish shops," attending Polish mass, and communicating with their compatriots at work or in the social sphere prevents them from truly belonging in their new environment (Lilly, 36). Due to inadequate language skills, different cultural and social traditions and rituals, as well as subjective feelings of foreignness, Polish immigrants in Dublin remain confined to the Polish diaspora. The group is given intermediate ratings for the second and third components of perceptions of individual status (**Table IV.1**).

Finally, most Polish respondents maintain a strong Polish cultural identity. Two thirds of the interviewees suggest that they will "always feel Polish," irrespective of the ties they build in the host society (Ted, 28). Only one in ten state they feel "more Irish than Polish" and consider Dublin their home (George, 58).[148] Because of the barrier "to talk, to be here," most Polish immigrants in Dublin still consider the host city "not the same as home," not their "place" (Howard, 28; Jane, 30). Even when their language skills are adequate, most respondents prioritize their connections to family and friends in the home country and identify their future as embedded in Poland. As they are "very

[147] 45% of respondents do not consider themselves integrated, 26% believe they are somewhat integrated, and 21% believe they are integrated in Dublin. 8% did not provide an answer to this question.

[148] Another 16% consider themselves "in between," cannot identify their center of belonging or consider themselves uprooted from national boundaries or loyalties. The remaining 8% did not provide an answer to this question.

nationalist" or consider themselves fundamentally "different" from the gregarious Irish, participants continue to deem themselves "foreigners" who are "outside" of life in Dublin (Ashley, 29; Nadine, 27; Steven, 34). Indeed, even when feeling satisfied in Ireland, Polish workers still "feel as an immigrant," "think in Polish, read in Polish … write in Polish" and identify as Polish (Peter, 32). Even when they have nothing to hold them connected to Poland after years of migration and have reached a reasonable level of integration in their new environment, 16% of Polish interviewees remain uprooted and still fall short of feeling truly included in Dublin. Therefore, the group is assigned a low 2 for this sub-category and an intermediate value for the composite indicator of individual status (**Table IV.1**).

In contrast with the perceptions of their Irish hosts, Polish workers in Dublin do not truly belong in their new environment. Respondents perceive the Polish community at large as isolated, reliant on Polish networks and not engaged with the native population. As their migration plans are short-term and based in predominantly economic motives, Polish immigrants in Ireland are considered embedded in the Polish diaspora and lacking in meaningful interaction with the local society. Individual participants are more satisfied with their life in Dublin, more integrated in the receiving city, and better suited to communicate with their Irish hosts. However, they still fail to establish deeper connections with Dubliners, hold on to relationships in their home country, and define their cultural identity as exclusively Polish. The Polish community in Dublin remains at best "in between," torn between a certain level of belonging in the host city and continually strong ties and identification with Poland (**Table IV.1**).

IV.3. "The Worst Received Among All Foreign Groups": Nigerian Perceptions of Belonging and Isolation in Dublin[149]

Much like their Polish counterparts, Nigerian immigrants do not consider themselves to belong in Dublin, thus reinforcing the discourse of exclusion established by their Irish hosts. Unlike Polish workers, Nigerians in Dublin consider their migration long-term and have arrived in the host city to seek asylum or a better life. Like the Polish, Nigerian migrants deem their larger ethic group far from integrated in Irish life and their interactions with the local population less than perfect. Intense exclusion from their hosts and irreconcilable differences in cultural and social structures are found to blame. Therefore, despite for different reasons than the Polish community, the Nigerian community is similarly "in between." Nigerian migrants are torn between the desire to settle in Dublin and an acute sense of isolation from life in the city and thus they experience feelings of frustration and even depression rather than belonging. They place into the bottom row of **Table IV.2**.

IV.3.1. Nigerians' Migration Trajectories

Nigerians' migration trajectories speak of relative high but nonetheless conflicted levels of belonging in Dublin. The Africans' ability to fit in the receiving city is further complicated by perceptions of group status and individual insertion into Dublin's life. Like the Polish, Nigerian immigrants have arrived in Ireland for a variety of reasons, including the historical and cultural connections between the sending and receiving

[149] As there are fewer respondents of Nigerian origin than of Polish nationality, interviews conducted directly by this researcher are supplemented with a comprehensive survey conducted by the Economic and Social Research Institute with 1109 non-EU adults, of which 142 Nigerian, as well as a study conducted by the Immigrant Council of Ireland, which includes twenty Nigerian nationals (ICI, 2008; McGinnity, O'Connell, Quinn, & Williams, 2006).

countries. Regardless of stereotypes, persecution at home is no longer the primary motivation behind Nigerian migration to Ireland. In 2011, 12.8% of all asylum applications were filed by Nigerian nationals, where Nigeria dropped from first to third sending country in terms of the number of asylum applications to Ireland. As in 2011 only 3% of applications were approved by the Irish Office of the Refugee Applications Commissioner, Nigerians no longer rely on the Irish asylum system (ORAC, 2012). Among this dissertation's interviewees, only twenty percent reported persecution in the sending country as their primary reason to leave for Dublin (**Table IV.5**).

Table IV.5. Nigerians' Motivation to Migrate to Ireland

Motive	% of all responses	Number	% of all respondents
Better life/education	36.4%	8	88.9%
Economic opportunity	18.2%	4	44.4%
Cultural connection	18.2%	4	44.4%
Positive image	9.1%	2	22.2%
Persecution	9.1%	2	22.2%
Adventure	4.5%	1	11.1%
Networks	4.5%	1	11.1%
Total	***100%***	***22***	***Of 9 persons***

Source: Author.

In fact, all Nigerian respondents came to Ireland in search of "greener pastures" (Zach, 32). Nine in ten interviewees suggest that their main motive to migrate to Dublin was the quest for a "better life" and self-development (Stephen, 36).[150] "Better life" is understood as economic resources by some interviewees. Much like their Polish counterparts, four in ten Nigerians suggest that "job opportunities" and "money" for a "better life for [their] children" propelled them to leave their home country (Harry, 35;

[150] More than one third of all responses given indicate the same reply.

Stephen, 36). Nonetheless, for nine in ten participants the phrase “greener pastures” signifies educational opportunity and the possibility for self-improvement in the receiving country. The main motive for Nigerian migration to Dublin is the quest for “better education,” the aspiration to “perfect oneself,” as well as the desire for a stable life and “peace of mind” (Alexis, 21; Ethan, 46; Taylor, 30) (**Table IV.5**).

Unlike their Polish counterparts, however, Nigerian immigrants have also chosen Ireland as a destination due to historical and cultural affinities between the two countries and the positive image of Ireland proliferated by Irish missionaries in Nigeria. More than four in ten respondents cited the connections between home and host states as drivers of their mobility to Ireland, where more than two in ten spoke of the perception of Ireland as “paradise.” The common English language, the shared Catholic religion, the similar history as part of the British sphere of influence, as well as the embeddedness of Irish missionaries in Nigerian culture were much more significant to Nigerian than to Polish immigrants in Dublin.[151] In the words of one interviewee:

> *An Irish missionary took in my father and trained him as a priest called Patrick in Nigeria. And my dad went to college in an Irish-built college. So I always felt good about the Irish because they built a lot of things in Nigeria and Africa. When you talk about Catholicism, you talk about the Irish missionary. I am Catholic. And it is an English-speaking country, so that had really helped me* (Zach, 32)

Consistent with the cultural and historical affinity they perceive between Ireland and Nigeria, Nigerians travel to Dublin to settle. While Polish nationals have lived in Dublin for an average of five years, the majority of Nigerian immigrants arrived in the late 1990s in view of the upturn of the Irish economy and the open migration system. According to the Irish Census, there were 4,867 Africans in Ireland in 1996, compared to

[151] As they arrive in Ireland, Nigerian immigrants tend to be disappointed with the reality in the host country. While they imagined inclusion and a “better life” prior to migration, they often meet with exclusion and lack of recognition of the connections that motivated them to go to Ireland in the first place.

8,650 Nigerians in 2002, 16,327 in 2006, and 17,642 in 2011. These numbers indicate that few Nigerians have migrated to Ireland after 2006, and that most Nigerian migrants in Ireland have resided in the host country since the late 1990s (CSO, 1996, 2002, 2008, 2012a). Among this project's respondents, the average length of stay is eight years or more. Six in ten had resided in Ireland for ten years or more at the time of their interviews, one third have lived in Dublin for more than five years, and only 8% were in Ireland for less than five years in 2010.

Furthermore, Nigerian immigrants arrived to Dublin with long-term plans. The Africans are aware that getting through the asylum process, legalizing their status, or completing educational degrees in Ireland would be anything but a short-term process. As one Nigerian migrant suggested, Nigerian nationals require "seven to eight years" to "get residency … and an Irish passport" and are thus "stuck" in Ireland for a relatively long period (Ethan, 46). Nigerians are also more "settled" in the receiving country that Polish workers, since they have "their whole family here, wife and kids" (Ethan, 46). Half of all interviewees reported having a Nigerian partner in Dublin and, in some cases, extended family. Another 50% shared that they have children who were born in Ireland. Therefore, a large percentage of respondents considered themselves "there" in Dublin, "paying taxes" and looking to buy property (Stephen, 36).

A majority (50%) of Nigerian interviewees extended their stay in Ireland. Some remain stuck in the asylum system, yet others are taking advantage of the educational system, have satisfactory employment, are enjoying the experience of new cultures and people in Ireland, or are raising a family in Dublin. Children who are to a large degree "Irish" and are indistinguishable from the local population save for the color of their skin

are often the main reason to remain in Ireland. As their children are inured to the Irish educational system, “feel good” in Dublin, and “don’t know any country apart from Ireland,” life in the receiving state is considered preferable (D44-NO; Harry, 35). Consequently, the African group is assigned high values of 4 for the first two sub-components of the migration trajectory indicator (**Table IV.1**).

Despite their long-term stay in the receiving country, however, Nigerian migrants do not plan to remain in Ireland indefinitely. In a study by McGinnity et al. (2006), 53.3% of Nigerian respondents expressed the intention to “stay in Ireland for good,” 22% were planning to return home, and 24.7% remained unsure of their plans. Research by the ICI conducted in 2007 shows similar results, where almost half of all Nigerian participants intend to remain in the host country permanently, one third plan to leave, and the remaining one fifth are unclear about their plans (ICI, 2008). Among this project’s respondents, the figures are reversed where a majority share that their “intention was never to spend [their] life [in Dublin]” and “going back would be one of [their] long-term plans” (Charles, 56; Taylor, 30). Only one third want to stay in Ireland for the foreseeable future, as they have worked too hard to legalize their status and establish their family. This figure is comparable to the percentage of Polish immigrants who would like to stay in Ireland. On the other hand, half of the participants would like to leave Ireland, as they do not feel at home there and find life in Dublin “not great” (Tatiana, 27). At least in the long run, almost six in ten Nigerian interviewees want to return home. Some educate their children about their home country or have even initiated the family’s relocation back to Nigeria. This discrepancy in results might be due to sampling methods, but it most probably reflects the changing economic and social climate in Dublin and the increasing

hostility against "different" Nigerian immigrants. Regardless, the sub-category of migration plans is assigned an intermediate rating of 3 (**Table IV.1**).

In sum, Nigerian migrants arrived in Ireland in view of connections to Irish culture and history and consider themselves long-term migrants who would raise a family in Dublin. They find return migration difficult as their children are embedded in the city's life. Nonetheless, most continue to plan their return to Nigeria. While return might never be possible due to political persecution, economic reasons, or family dynamics, the interviewees still talk of their "mission" in Nigeria and keep connected to their home country (Zach, 32). Conflicted migration trajectories detract from Nigerians' expectations of belonging in Dublin (**Table IV.1**).

IV.3.2. Perceptions of the Nigerian Community's Group Status

Belonging is undermined by perceptions of the unfavorable status of the Nigerian community in Dublin. Nigerians face rejection and hostility in Ireland. According to the Immigrant Council of Ireland (ICI), only about 30% of Nigerians agree or strongly agree with the statement "Irish people make me feel welcome," whereas 35% disagree or strongly disagree. Furthermore, around 70% disagree or strongly disagree with the statement "Irish people accept diverse cultures and communities as part of Irish society" and only one in ten feel personally "accepted by Irish society" (ICI, 2008, pp. 158-160).

This dissertation's interviewees agree that the Nigerian community is "the worst received among all foreign groups" in Dublin (Taylor, 30). Nigerian respondents consider their ethnic community excluded from economic and social life in Dublin. Eight in ten perceive Nigerian nationals not to be welcome in the receiving society, whereas 14%

argue that Nigerians are included in Ireland and 7% suggest that the situation is mixed. These numbers contrast sharply with feelings of welcome among Polish immigrants, all but one of whom found Dublin friendly. Everyday discrimination in all spheres of life is the clearest indicator of exclusion. Nigerian immigrants report racism and discriminatory treatment as the single black student in their educational institution, or at the hands of public officials and landlords. Abuse occurs at work, "on the bus stop" and on the street, where such experiences are considered not personal but systematic and common to all Nigerians in Dublin. Being "put down," "abused" and even "spat" at are considered signs of deliberate isolation by the native population (Stephen, 36; Zach, 32). In the words of one respondent, "They don't want you and they show it" (Zach, 32). While the Polish community no longer feels welcomed with economic downturn either, the difference in reception is considerable.

Respondents are surprised by the negative treatment they have received in Ireland, famed to be one of the most friendly and receptive nations. Eight in ten expected the native population to be friendly, but in reality found them "mean, especially when you are black" (Harry, 35). They were puzzled that their compatriots would be discriminated against by "the people who suffered some of the greatest stereotyping and discrimination in the whole world" (Ethan, 46). One respondent even felt disappointed that the Irish, who are so "well-travelled" and should have empathy for fellow immigrants, were in reality so hostile to the Nigerian community (Zach, 32).

When prompted about the reasons for this hostility and lack of welcome towards the Nigerian community in Dublin, interviewees are painfully aware of the discourse of exclusion constructed by local stakeholders in Dublin. One in four interviewees argue

that they are rejected in Dublin due to the "unfair" image of Nigerian migrants as asylum seekers who "don't obey the laws" and abuse the system, "spongers" who do not contribute to the system, or simply "too many" to accommodate (Frank, 34; Stephen, 36; Taylor, 30) (**Table IV.6**). The local population is believed to "have hatred for Nigerians," as these guests are "into vices," steal, and constitute a burden on local resources (Isaac, 36; Stephen, 36). As the perception is that "Africans are uneducated and nothing good can come out of them," Nigerian migrants are considered an onus rather than an asset to the receiving country (Zach, 32). The incorrect perception that all Nigerians are asylum seekers who are "sponges on the economy," are "lazy," and "here to defraud you" is found responsible for the exclusion Nigerians face (D44-NO). Natives' view of Africans is exacerbated as "half of the African population in Ireland" is Nigerian and as the supposedly short-term asylum seekers are staying longer than expected in Dublin (Ethan, 46). Negative treatment, therefore, is perceived to be based in a complex set of stereotypes, tying legal status, economic cost, criminality, nationality, and race.

Table IV.6. Perceived Motives for Rejection of Nigerian Migrants

Motive	% of all responses	Number	% of all respondents
Asylum seekers/abusing system	24.5%	12	85.7%
Racial/cultural difference	22.4%	11	78.6%
Economic crisis	18.4%	9	64.3%
Influx of Polish	18.4%	9	41.7%
Economic onus	10.2%	5	41.7%
Large numbers	6.1%	3	21.4%
Total	***100%***	***49***	***Of 14 persons***

Source: Author.

Rejection is considered closely related to the racial and cultural differences between Nigerian immigrants and their Irish hosts as well. More than one in five interviewees suggested that simple "visual differences" create hostility among natives (D41-NO) (**Table IV.6**). Skin color sets Nigerians apart from Dubliners more so than any other foreign group. The color of Nigerians' skin is also reported to the perception is that "every black person in Ireland is Nigerian. Every black person is an asylum seeker. Every asylum seeker is Nigerian. Every Nigerian is a fraudster who is cheating the system and is not hard-working" (D42-NO). Racial differences are compounded by differences in family and sociocultural structures, which are perceived to place a further wall of unfamiliarity and isolation between Nigerian guests and their Irish hosts.

Exclusion and the stereotypes surrounding the Nigerian community in Dublin as "too many," criminals, or uneducated "spongers," have intensified with economic crisis, as Nigerian workers now compete for jobs with the Irish and other immigrants. Two in ten of my respondents argue that as the Celtic Tiger is no longer roaring and the "bubble burst," the Irish "feel threatened by us immigrants and their hostility is increasing … Things they didn't care about before, they care about now. They care now that we are populating their schools, putting stress on their hospitals. It's bothering them now, but they didn't care about it when it was all good" (Ethan, 46). Nigerian workers believe that the economic situation had further exacerbated the negative attitudes they have experienced in Dublin, where the Irish "want to get all the immigrants out" and "don't want them spoiling the country or taking social welfare" (D44-NO).

Finally, a large number of Nigerian interviewees found that their welcome has particularly worn after the influx of Polish workers into Dublin. Respondents believe that

Nigerians were tolerated in Ireland in the early 2000s, as they were the single source of cheap labor in the receiving country. They suggest, however, that the white Polish workers arriving in the mid-2000s have become a preferred pool of labor in Dublin. While they recognize that every immigrant community in Ireland experiences some discrimination, including the Polish, close to 80% of Nigerian participants argue that Polish workers are nonetheless preferred due to their racial and cultural similarity to the Irish. As one person put it, it is much harder to "fit in if you are black" (Harry, 35). It was recognized among Nigerian immigrants that Polish nationals have the "right to be in Dublin" as they are "European Union people" (Zach, 32). However, African respondents also realize that "the policy of European first and then others" has "disadvantaged Nigerian seriously" and comparison with the Polish has spurred even more "negative tendencies towards Africans" (Ethan, 46; Taylor, 30; Zach, 32). Due to perceptions of exclusion and hostility, the Nigerian group is assigned the lowest value for this component of the group status indicator (**Table IV.1**).

As a result of the exclusion they face, but also due to unfavorable governmental policies and their own self-identification as different from the Irish, Nigerian respondents do not consider their community truly integrated in Ireland, like the Polish. Three quarters of Nigerian respondents argue that Nigerian immigrants are not integrated in life in Dublin.[152] While engaging with the host society to a larger degree than when they first arrived, participants suggest that Nigerians are "not reaching out" and taking advantage of the "opportunities of integration" (Taylor, 30). As they are "oriented just toward their

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[152] 75% state the community is not integrated, 12.5% find the community integrated and another 12.5% believe some Nigerians are integrated, while others fails to assimilate. These numbers are somewhat comparable to percentages among Polish respondents, where 70% find the Polish community not to be integrated, 24% consider the picture mixed, and only 6% find the Polish fully incorporated in Ireland.

own community and live a parallel life," Nigerians become increasingly unfamiliar to the local population (D41-P). Many prefer to be residentially segregated from their hosts and to live in predominantly Nigerian neighborhoods to "protect themselves," to secure support with raising children, as well as to shield their children from the stigma of being "different" (Ethan, 46). The "Nigerialization" of certain neighborhoods like Parnell Street, however, is considered to lead to retarded integration, devaluation of skills, and diminished multiculturalism (D42-NO).

Both the Irish government's limited efforts and Nigerians' racial and "cultural differences" from the Irish are believed to be to blame for this lack of integration (Frank, 34). Two thirds of Nigerian interviewees argue that the local government "makes it quite hard to integrate" (Isaac, 36). Nigerian asylum seekers in particular are physically removed from the Irish and are deprived of the opportunity to interact with the host society.[153] Being "stuck" for years without the permission to work or study leads to devaluation and loss of skills, depression and isolation, as well as the creation of a permanent underclass with a disadvantaged second generation. Local policy of promoting integration without actually engaging representatives of the immigrant groups involved or giving them enough say in the process is also discussed as an obstacle to Nigerians' assimilation. The racism and negative stereotyping of Nigerians are further obstacles.

More importantly, six in ten Nigerian respondents find that "visual and cultural differences present a barrier" to the integration of their ethnic community (D41-NO). The color of their skin makes "Africans stand out" and marks them as "different" from

[153] Asylum seekers are placed in direct provision while awaiting a decision. Direct provision signifies placing asylum seekers in state-mandated residences, where the state provides each adult individual with full-board accommodation, including two meals per day, as well as a personal allowance of €19.10 per week (Reception and Integration Agency [RIA], 2010).

the native population regardless of their actual level of assimilation (D42-NO). As "people are peeking at [them]" due to their phenotypical differences, Nigerian migrants consider it difficult to ever fit in, as they cannot alter their appearance (D44-NO).

In a 2007 survey, 70% of Nigerian respondents suggested they do not share common values with Irish culture (ICI, 2008, p. 142).[154] Two thirds of participants in this project agree that "culturally a lot of things are different" between the Irish and the Nigerians (Frank, 34). The dissimilar "social and cultural system" of Nigeria is believed to account for differences in work ethic and for lack of inclusion in the Irish economic system (D44-PO). Differences in family structure contribute to the overuse of social resources by Nigerian mothers and isolation from the host society while taking care of children in the home. Unique family and social relationships and modes of interaction are reported to prevent Nigerian immigrants from "mingling with the Irish" (Frank, 34). According to the ICI (2008), for instance, as few Nigerians frequent pubs and other social spaces the Irish favor, the two communities rarely intersect in sports, cultural, food-based and even religious activities.[155] Respondents were in fact surprised at how divergent their sociocultural practices were from those of the local population, since they assumed that a shared Catholic religion and English language would guarantee easy integration.

Command of the English language is considered to aid Nigerians in assimilating in Irish life by two thirds of respondents and to present an advantage for this ethnic group. Since "the communication barrier is not there," in theory there are few obstacles to interaction with the receiving population (Frank, 34). Being able to "express yourself

[154] Only 7% of Nigerian respondents argued that Nigerians "share many values in common with Irish people."

[155] Catholic Nigerians find church activities particularly important to their lives and feel respected by the Irish attending the same services, yet rarely associate with them and meet a different attitude outside of church.

from day one" is believed to facilitate adaptation to "the system" in the host city (Zach, 32). As one Nigerian immigrant puts it, "if you can't communicate, you can't integrate" (Taylor, 30). Nonetheless, Nigerians' distinct accent is perceived as a marker of difference from the Irish and therefore as a barrier to incorporation. Communication between Nigerian workers and the receiving society remains imperfect due to a difference in the immigrants' "speaking and listening pattern," which identifies them as foreigners and outsiders (D42-NO). The African cohort is assigned a low value of 2 for this sub-component of group status (**Table IV.1**).

Despite the promise of Ireland as a "land of equality and opportunity," Nigerians find that their community is the worst received foreign group in Dublin (Ugba, 2009). Welcome for the group is tenuous, since Nigerians are considered racially different, uneducated, criminal, "too many," and less desirable than Polish immigrants. The Nigerian community is also far from integrated in Dublin's economic and social life. Nigerian immigrants continue to communicate and live among their compatriots as to protect their families and shield their children from being deemed "different." While English language skills ease Nigerians' ability to communicate with their hosts and render them better suited to fit in than their Polish counterparts, their accents and way of speech still mark them as dissimilar from the Irish. Africans' racial and cultural differences from the Irish, however, tip the scales in Polish workers' favor when it comes to economic and social integration in Dublin. Nigerians' perceptions of the rejection of their larger ethnic community and its inability to fir in into Dublin's life create feelings of isolation among individual Nigerian immigrants (**Table IV.1**).

IV.3.3. Nigerians' Perceptions of Individual Status

Like in the case of the Polish, individual respondents disassociate themselves from the larger Nigerian community in Ireland and report higher levels of integration, satisfaction, and communication with the Irish. However, a majority of Nigerian immigrants continue to identify exclusively with their home country and to rely on other Africans for support from the sacrifices and disappointments that fill life in Ireland. Perceptions of individual ability to fit in detract from Nigerians' belonging in Dublin.

While a majority found the Nigerian community at large isolated in the host country, individual Nigerian interviewees tend to consider themselves relatively integrated in their new home. Indeed, 37% shared that they have assimilated to life in Dublin, whereas 27% stated they "still need to make this place [their] second home" (Zach, 32). More than one third find the receiving society to be their home, as their life and family are now embedded in Dublin. Taking advantage of the Irish educational system is considered the quickest way to learn about Irish culture, remove social and economic barriers, and "adapt" (Frank, 34). Connections between Ireland and Nigeria are once again cited as a catalyst to assimilation.

Interaction with the local population is deemed a significant sign of integration in the host country. Indeed, three quarters of the interviewees interact with the Irish and report having "a lot of Irish friends," especially as they can communicate with them in English (Isaac, 36). A majority of Nigerian participants describe the natives as "very nice people", since "they themselves know what it is to be living in a foreign land" (Frank, 34; Isaac, 36). These statements are confirmed in other studies with Nigerian immigrants in Dublin. According to McGinnity et al. (2006), 58% of Nigerian respondents considered it

"very easy" or "quite easy" to make Irish friends in 2005, a figure that compared to 64% among Eastern Europeans. The ICI reports somewhat less encouraging results, with only one third of respondents finding communication with the Irish easy and one quarter agreeing that "Irish people want to get to know me" (ICI, 2008).

Individual Nigerian interviewees believe that they are not given the chance to make Ireland their second home. While generally "friendly," the native population is considered to be hostile against Nigerian immigrants in particular and 27% of all respondents have negative interactions with the Irish. In 2005, as high as 42.3% of Black African respondents found it difficult to make friends with the Irish (McGinnity et al., 2006). In 2008, more than one third of Nigerian immigrants suggested that "Irish people are difficult to get to know" (ICI, 2008). Consequently, Nigerians in Dublin interact mostly within their ethnic community, much like their Polish counterparts. Eight in one of this project's respondents have close connections within their national group and interact with their compatriots in the home, at church, and at social and cultural events. Nigerian interviewees deliberately surround themselves with other African immigrants for safety and cultural solidarity. The group merits an intermediate rating of 3 for the first two components of the individual status indicator (**Table IV.1**).

Furthermore, Nigerian immigrants in Ireland are not fully satisfied in the receiving country. While three quarters of Polish immigrants are contented with life in Dublin, only one third of Nigerian workers feel "welcome" and "happy" in Ireland, and almost one half are "not happy at all" and even "depressed" (D42-NO; Stephen, 36; Tatiana, 27). While economic opportunity and the superior educational system make Dublin attractive, Nigerian immigrants continue to feel "different" and "not at home" in

Ireland (Ethan, 46; Harry, 35). The financial onus of providing for children and family in Ireland and Nigeria is discussed by the interviewees. Downward job mobility takes a financial and psychological toll on the highly educated Nigerian respondents. Being "tucked away" in the asylum system not only leads to loss of skills, but also produces social isolation from the Irish, psychological distress and a sense of powerlessness (Isaac, 36). Not being given the chance to integrate and feeling uprooted due to skin color and prejudice is perceived as the largest sacrifice of choosing to live in Ireland. Refusal to be accepted even when "doing everything right" leads to resentment among African participants (Stephen, 36). High quality of life in terms of material benefits is matched by low quality of life in terms of socio-cultural interactions. Nigerians are assigned a low value of 2 for the satisfaction indicator of belonging (**Table IV.1**).

Nigerian workers in Dublin deal with depression and frustration by holding on to a strong Nigerian cultural identity. Much like their Polish counterparts, almost three quarters of Nigerian interviewees identify exclusively as Nigerian and none describe themselves as Irish. While one fifth would like to feel Irish after spending more than five years in Dublin, they continue to feel excluded, "different" and far from the ideal of the "New Irish."[156] As one person put it, while making their life in Dublin in practice, Nigerian immigrants in Ireland have "left [their] soul in Nigeria" (Zach, 32). The group is given the lowest value for the indicator of self-identification and a similarly low rating for their self-conception of their individual status (**Table IV.1**).

While Nigerian immigrants were actually attracted to Ireland due to the cultural and historical ties they share with this country and have come to Dublin to settle, they feel isolated in Dublin. Unfavorable group status interacts with individual inability to fit

[156] For a description of the "New Irish," refer to Chapter III.

in, form meaningful relationships with the Irish, or feel happy and at home in Dublin. Respondents identify with Nigeria and perceive themselves as culturally different from their Irish hosts, thus perpetuating the discourse of rejection they face in Dublin. The Nigerian community has more at stake in the city than the Polish community, but shares in its feelings of isolation (**Table IV.1**).

IV.4. Transnational "Hispanidad":[157] Ecuadorian Perceptions of Belonging and Isolation in Madrid[158]

Unlike their counterparts in Dublin, Ecuadorians consider themselves to fit in well in. They confirm Spaniards' discourse of inclusion. Ecuadorians see their migration to Madrid as relatively long-term and plans of return do not contradict desire to settle in Spain, as the home and host countries are located within a transnational Ibero-American community. Certain perceptions of discrimination in the receiving context are counteracted by feelings of welcome due to the Ecuadorians' shared cultural and linguistic heritage with Madrilenians and the immigrants' hard-working nature. Cultural proximity further ensures the group's and individuals' integration in Madrid and the ease of interaction with the local population. Despite deeper connections with compatriots and separation from family, therefore, Spain is deemed an extension of the homeland and satisfaction and belonging in the host city are high among the South Americans (**Table IV.1**). Ecuadorians therefore fit in the upper row of **Table IV.2**.

[157]*Hispanidad* refers to the community of countries and people sharing a cultural and linguistic Hispanic heritage. Spain serves as "the motherland," with a number of Latin American nations, including Ecuador, participating in this Ibero-American community (Masterson-Algar, 2011).

[158] As there are fewer respondents of Ecuadorian origin than of Bulgarian nationality in the case of Madrid, the interviews are supplemented through periodic surveys of immigrant integration by the Comunidad de Madrid (2010a, 2010c, 2014) and ethnographic studies by Dudley (2013) and Masterson-Algar (2011). The former include anywhere between 363 and 445 face-to-face interviews with Ecuadorian respondents. The latter comprise twenty-four and forty interviews respectively.

IV.4.1. Ecuadorians' Migration Trajectories

Table IV.7. Ecuadorians' Motivation to Migrate to Spain[159]

Motive	% of all responses	Number	% of all respondents
Economic opportunity	31.5%	6	66.7%
Social networks	26.2%	5	55.6%
Shared language, culture	21.1%	4	44.4%
Liberal migration regime	5.3%	1	11.1%
Opportunity for development	5.3%	1	11.1%
Adventure	5.3%	1	11.1%
Family prerogatives	5.3%	1	11.1%
Total	***100%***	***19***	***Of 9 persons***

Source: Author.

Ecuadorians' migration trajectories contribute to the immigrants' belonging in Madrid. The Latin Americans move to the city for a complex set of motives, yet economic considerations are intricately intertwined with perceptions of cultural kinship. Undeniably, Ecuadorians in Madrid are "economic migrants" (M9-EO). Two thirds of my respondents cited "lots of idleness, high unemployment, meager economic means that weren't enough for anything" at home combined with "good money" in Madrid as the reason to leave Ecuador and migrate to Spain (Dudley, 2013, p. 38; Ethan, 39; Lina, 30; Lincoln, 32).[160] Economic motives explained one in three cases (**Table IV.7**). As Masterson-Algar (2011) explains, however, such material incentives have a cultural basis. Ecuador's debt and banking crises in the 1980s-1990s resulted in the push of

[159] Most participants gave multiple responses to the question "Why did you leave Ecuador and migrate to Spain?" Here the incidence of a certain response is reported as a percentage of all responses given and as a percentage of all respondents. Personal interviews are supplemented with works by Dudley (2013), who surveys female Ecuadorians' motivation for migration Spain and thus complements this project's mostly male cohort, and Masterson-Algar (2011).

[160] Author's translation derived from original quote in Spanish: "No había mucho trabajo allí, mucha desocupación, mucho desempleo. Muy pocos los medios económicos, no nos alcanzaban para nada, entonces buscando a un porvenir mejor" (Ethan, 39); "Que ganaba buena pasta" (Lina, 30).

Ecuadorian immigrants out of the country with painful structural adjustment programs and tumultuous economic and political situations. There was also a pull towards Spain in particular, however, as the Ecuadorian government was only willing to accept offers for adjustment from the Spanish government. This served as an opening for Spain to reassert its global economic status by “recolonizing” the Latin American country through targeted investment and the acceptance of immigrants from Ecuador into its booming services and construction sectors. The exportation of Spanish industries to Ecuador and the simultaneous importation of Ecuadorian workers into Madrid were framed through a discourse of *Hispanidad* and Spanish responsibility for the Ibero-American community. Moreover, the South Americans’ decision to choose Madrid as a destination was officially presented as a bid for the “re-latinoamericanization” of a Spain that was drifting further towards the European Union (Dudley, 2013; Masterson-Algar, 2011).

Shared Ibero-American identity, common language, and a similar cultural and social pattern motivate almost half of this project’s interviewees to choose Madrid. Culture and language are significant in more than one fifth of all responses (**Table IV.7**). Language skills render the host country easier to navigate and job opportunities quicker to encounter (Hall, 2008). Language also makes Spain preferable to traditional migration destinations like the United States. Similar cultural and social patterns ensure that the transition to life and work in Spain is smooth, as the newcomers already have experience with a similar context and way of organization. The migration of Spaniards into Latin American provided for connections and social networks when migration started occurring in the reverse direction. One participant talks about the colonization of Latin America by Spain, a factor that brings Ecuadorians to Madrid today in a reverse colonization process:

They implanted their religion in South America, they brought us the Christin religion. The culture they have, that the Spanish have here, we carry as well, the same culture and the same traditions and customs. Because they came to Latin America (Ethan, 39)[161]

The social networks that have proliferated between Spain and Ecuador with mobility between the two countries going in both directions further explain the South Americans' relocation to Madrid. Parents, brothers, cousins, in-laws or friends facilitated the arrival of half of the participants, as they offered information, housing, or jobs (**Table IV.7**). Additional factors that mattered for the interviewees were the liberal migration regime in Spain, with ample opportunity to migrate without papers and eventually get regularized and even naturalized, the reintegration of the family unit, as well as the desire for adventure or personal development in a foreign but familiar country. Notably, a study of Ecuadorians women in Madrid emphases the latter motive by suggesting that mobility is a "coming-of-age" ritual for young single women and an opportunity for older married women to escape traditional family structures and acquire a new identity as professionals in the host society (Dudley, 2013, pp. 46-52).

Consistently with the cultural and historical affinity they perceive between Ecuador and Spain, moreover, Ecuadorian workers consider their stay in Madrid relatively long-term. Their plans for the future are conflicted, however, with a majority of respondents viewing return to Ecuador and settlement in Spain as not mutually exclusive. Indeed, Ecuadorian migration to Spain intensified significantly from 1999 onward, with 384,000 individuals arriving between 1999 and 2005 (Bertoli et al., 2011, p. 7). According to a survey by the Madrid Autonomous Community, 46% of Ecuadorians

[161] Author's translation from original quote in Spanish: "Desde luego yo le veo la cultura como ellos nos implantaron la religión en Sudamérica, nos llevaron la religión cristiana, nos hicieron conocer el catolicismo, esa misma cultura que tienen, que acá tienen los españoles, nosotros también llevamos la misma cultura y las mismas tradiciones, costumbres. Se fueron a Latinoamérica."

arrived in Spain at the start of the new millennium, and another 42% - between 2001 and 2005, with only a minority migrating since 2006 (Comunidad de Madrid, 2014b, p. 5). Only one in five of this project's respondents spent less than five years in the country at the time of their interviews in 2011. One third lived in Spain for more than ten years.

While Ecuadorians came with unclear or short-term plans, these plans have been subsequently extended or modified. A majority of participants migrated to Madrid alone to seek work temporarily, "for three-four years" (*por tres-quatro años*) (Kris, 39).[162] However, they have subsequently been joined by wives and children, reared children in Spain, or initiated the process of naturalization in the receiving country. Thus, short-term employment arrangements turned into twelve years for one participant who shared how "time passes quickly, flies" in his new home (Lincoln, 32).[163] Masterson-Algar (2011) confirms that the Ecuadorian population in Madrid is the "oldest," at least in Spain, with the city as a space of "long-term settlement," "obtaining Spanish citizenship, and completing family reunification."

Despite their long-term stay in the receiving country, the Latin American migrants do not necessarily plan to remain in Spain. One in five of the interviewees want to return home, as they feel constrained in the "limited" urban space of Madrid and yearn for the "open grounds" of Ecuador (Ethan, 39; Lincoln, 32).[164] However, one third are resolved to settle in Spain at all costs because they like it there. Indicative of this trend are the large number of Ecuadorians children born in Madrid or enrolled in the Spanish

[162] Author's translation from Spanish.
[163] Author's translation derived from original quote in Spanish: "Aquí llevo ya 12 años. Bueno, aunque no parezca, pero el tiempo pasa rápido, volando. Muy rápido pasa."
[164] Author's translation derived from original quote in Spanish: "Tu chalet, al aire libre… Entonces nosotros estamos acostumbrados a tener un espacio más amplio, aquí es muy reducido, es un poco más privado."

educational system, the high naturalization rates for Ecuadorians in Spain, and the visibility of Ecuadorian youth in Spanish public spaces (Comunidad de Madrid, 2014b; Masterson-Algar, 2011).[165] Interestingly, the majority (44%) of South American participants plan the future in both the host and home countries. They have acquired Spanish nationality or are waiting to do so, have invested in properties in both Madrid and Quito and plan living in both the sending and receiving spaces (Masterson-Algar, 2012). According to a survey by the Madrid Autonomous Community Data, 23% of South American respondents plan to return to Ecuador, 35% aim to settle in Spain, and 25% construct their future life in a transnational space including both the host and home countries (Comunidad de Madrid, 2014a). In view of Ecuadorians' multilayered migration motives and plans, the three sub-categories and the composite indicator of migration trajectory are assigned a high value of 4 (**Table IV.1**).

In sum, Ecuadorians in Madrid are economic migrants like the other three cohorts in this study. However, linguistic, historical, and cultural similarities have a significant role to play as well, with Ecuadorians engaging in a process of reverse colonization of the Spanish receiving space. Unsurprisingly, Ecuadorian workers are long-term immigrants who settle in the host city, invest in property there and establish their families and children in the receiving context. While some plan to return home, these arrangements do not exclude a future life in Madrid, as Madrid is perceived largely as an extension of the motherland. The Latin Americans' past and future migration trajectories serve to a explain Ecuadorians' high levels of belonging in their new home (**Table IV.1**).

[165] Ecuadorians are among the foreign populations in the Madrid Autonomous Community with the most children in the local educational system. Two thirds of respondents in a survey by the Autonomous Community reporting having at least two children in Spain compared to one third of Bulgarian respondents, for instance. Further, among foreigners acquiring Spanish nationality in Madrid in 2001-2007, 70% were Latin Americans and 40% Ecuadorians (Comunidad de Madrid, 2014a; Masterson-Algar, 2011).

IV.4.2. Perceptions of the Ecuadorian Community's Group Status

Ecuadorians' feelings of affinity with Madrid correlate with the South Americans' conception of the position of their larger ethnic community in the receiving city. Ecuadorians feel welcome in Madrid. While these arriving in the late 1990s suggest that initially Spaniards "were not used to dealing with Latin Americans" and "doubted" their economic performance or legal status, all respondents concede that this changed within a couple short years (Patrick, 32).[166] Some discrimination and negative stereotypes of the Ecuadorian who "likes to drink, creates disorder" are discounted by the interviewees (Lincoln, 32).[167] Instead, the migrant workers emphasize the rarity of negative stories about them and the fact that "the Spanish are not racist" (Kris, 39).[168] The Spanish are described as "cordial, inclusive," "understanding of foreigners" and "open to others," and "much less [discriminating] than in other places" (Lina, 30).[169] Inclusive attitudes toward Ecuadorians in Madrid are also reflected in surveys by the Madrid Autonomous Community (Comunidad de Madrid, 2010a).[170] In her study of Ecuadorian women, Dudley (2013) reports an image of her participants as "caring, patient, cheerful, respectful and very integrated" (Dudley, 2013, p. 38).

Not only are Ecuadorians welcome in Spain, but the hard-working Southern Americans are preferred to other foreigners. It is not their economic utility but rather their cultural similarity that is paramount according to the participants, however. One third of

[166] Author's translation form original quote in Spanish: "Los latinoamericanos éramos nuevos aquí hace diez años, once años. Los españoles no trataban con latinoamericanos y al principio dudaban. "
[167] Author's translation from original quote in Spanish: "Hay gente que le gusta beber, que hace el desorden, todo esto."
[168] Author's translation from original quote in Spanish: "Los españoles no son racistas."
[169] Author's translation derived from original quote in Spanish: "En general son bastantes cordiales. Yo creo que inclusive, son muy comprensivos con la gente extranjero, porque no sufrimos tanta discriminación como en otros países."
[170] 14.8% of Spanish respondents answered that their first foreign friend was from Ecuador. The next largest nationality of foreign friends was Peru with 10.2% (Comunidad de Madrid, 2010a).

the respondents suggest that Latin Americans are included in the receiving context because they "work, work, work" and are "hard-working and responsible", but economic utility and skill in the labor market are not found to distinguish them from the diligent East Europeans (Patrick, 32; Yana, 20).[171] On the other hand, all participants argue that language skills set them apart from both the Bulgarian and Moroccan communities in Madrid. Two thirds of the interviewees identify speaking Castellan as an advantage in finding employment and establishing connections with Spanish employers and friends. Welcome is also based in common religion, implanted in South America by Spanish colonizers, a shared past, as well as Spaniards' experience with migration to Latin America. Shared ethnicity and "Spanish blood" are further cited as reasons for inclusion (Travis, 42). [172] Mostly, common culture and common customs, as well as a connection "as people" (*como gente*) contribute to the warm welcome Ecuadorians enjoy in Madrid (Ethan, 39).[173] This inclusion and perceived cultural proximity are established in contrast to other ethnic populations like Bulgarians who are "closed, not like the Spanish, the Latinos," but especially like Moroccans who are "Arabs… with different mentality, hostile blood" (Kris, 39; Lincoln, 32).[174]

While the economic crisis is perceived to limit economic opportunities for Ecuadorians in Spain, it has not altered the natives' welcome, according to my respondents. All report that their compatriots have returned home to seek their luck there and that jobs are scarce and worse paid than in boom economic times. A few participants

[171] Author's translation from original quote in Spanish: "Trabajadores que estamos trabajando, trabajando, trabajando (Patrick, 32), "Si eres trabajador y responsible" (Yana, 20).
[172] Author's translation derived from original quote in Spanish: "Al final nosotros somos sangre española."
[173] Author's translation from original quote in Spanish.
[174] Author's translation from original quote in Spanish: "Los búlgaros, es que no son tan abiertos. Muy cerrados. No como el español, los latinos…" (Lincoln, 32), "Tú sabes que el árabe...Son otra mentalidad, una sangre guerrera…" (Kris, 39).

even suggest that the Spanish are more likely to take advantage of foreign workers,. However, as the welcome for the ethnic cohort is conditioned on immutable shared characteristics rather than on cost-benefit analysis, none of the interviewees report rising intolerance, discrimination or exclusion. Despite some competition with Spanish workers and "undercutting Romanians" in the labor market, relationships with Madrilenians are considered "normal" regardless of the economic situation of the receiving context (Travis, 42).[175] The group merits a high rating of 5 for this component of te group status indicator (**Table IV.1**).

Cultural familiarity also leads Ecuadorians in Madrid to view their larger ethnic community as integrated. Three quarters of respondents suggest that South Americans in Madrid are satisfied, because people in Spain are "very friendly, very understanding" and "the culture… it is very similar to that of Latinos… it is easy to coexist [with the Spanish]" (Kris, 39; Lina, 30).[176] Nine in ten argue that Ecuadorians are not only welcomed and contented, but also integrated into the receiving city's life, because "the Spanish understand us well" (Ethan, 39).[177] Surveys by the Autonomous Community of Madrid confirm this sentiment. In one report, the Latin Americans respondents were the most likely to feel Madrilenian. To illustrate, 46% of the South American participants suggested that they identify themselves as part of Madrid, compared to only 28% among East Europeans and 33% among Africans (Comunidad de Madrid, 2010a, p. 78). According to another study, more than half of the Spanish participants commended the

[175] Author's translation derived from original quote in Spanish: "Después, el resto, normal … Bueno, la competencia ahora está con los rumanos. Porque ellos están cobrando demasiado bajo. Este es el problema."

[176] Author's translation from original quote in Spanish: "Son bastantes cordiales … son muy comprensivos" (Lina, 30), "La cultura. Si casi se parece mucho a los latinos, me gusta, es muy parecida. La puede convivir, claro." (Kris, 39)

[177] Author's translation from original quote in Spanish: "Nos entienden muy bien ellos."

immediate integration of Ecuadorians, while only 16.5% were impressed by Moroccans' incorporation, for instance (Comunidad de Madrid, 2010c). The Spanish and South Americans' shared knack for "acting as jokesters," Ecuadorians' residence in areas where "there are people from everywhere," and the Latin Americans' propensity to buy apartments, start companies, and "buy trucks" for construction in Madrid are cited as signs of embeddedness into the host community (Kris, 39; Patrick, 32; Travis, 42).[178]

The collective's integration is based in cultural characteristics that make life in Spain easier for the newcomers. Half of all participants emphasize language when they describe the facility of their transition into the host context. Similarly, in a survey by the Autonomous Community of Madrid, 94% of Latin American respondents found that their language skills had significantly facilitated their integration in Spain, compared to 69% among Eastern Europeans and 62% among Africans (Comunidad de Madrid 2010a, pp. 77-78). The other half of respondents in this project focus on shared culture. The Spanish are considered "wonderful people who help you" to fit in, especially in view of "what happened between Spain and Latin America, the colonization and all that" (Patrick, 32; Travis, 42).[179] Shared past and customs render daily life in home and host contexts similar.

Interestingly, when asked about integration, the Ecuadorian interviewees did not focus on their own ethnic community and its fragmentation, like the other three foreign cohorts. They understood the query as intended by this author and talked about their relationships with the Spanish. Regardless, the South American immigrants did feel that

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[178] Author's translation derived from original quote in Spanish: "En sentido de que son bromistas, con buen sentido de humor, son graciosos" (Kris, 39), "En el bloque donde yo vivo, hay de todo" (Travis, 42), "He escuchado amigos que tenían alguna empresa, que había comprado camiones aquí…" (Patrick, 32).
[179] Author's translation from original quote in Spanish: "Que hay buenísima gente, que te apoya" (Travis, 42), "Por la raíz, por lo que ha pasado de España y Latinoamérica y toda la conquista y tal" (Patrick, 32).

Latin Americans tend to support each other and help their compatriots, at least relatively to other collectives. Finally, European Union enlargement was not perceived to have altered Ecuadorians' position in the city by the majority of respondents, as "Southern American people are established here" (Lina, 30).[180] The sub-category is given the high value (**Table IV.1**).

In sum, Ecuadorians find their ethnic community to be profoundly welcomed and highly integrated in Madrid. The favorable position of the immigrant group is constructed through linguistic and cultural similarities and reference to Ecuadorians' "Spanish blood" (*sangre española*), much as in official discourse. Therefore, economic downturn or competition with Bulgarians is not seen to contribute to deteriorating relationships or exclusion. The experiences of the larger community contribute to individual Ecuadorians' sense of belonging in Madrid (**Table IV.1**).

IV.4.3. Ecuadorians' Perceptions of Individual Status

Unlike other immigrant populations in this study, finally, individual Ecuadorian respondents are representative of the larger ethnic group and report high levels of satisfaction and belonging in Madrid. Ecuadorian workers suggest that there is some discrimination in the city, even though they have never experienced any personally, and miss their families back home. However, they feel happy with the similar yet more modern and organized way of life in Madrid and their welcoming hosts. The Latin Americans communicate not just with compatriots but also with the Spanish and other immigrant populations alike. They have acquired Spanish nationality and feel as much Spanish as Ecuadorian.

[180] Author's translation from original quote in Spanish: "Ya la gente sudamericana estaba establecida aquí."

Life in Madrid is not perfect for the South American participants but it comes close. All of the respondents mention that they have heard of some discrimination by the Spanish towards Latin Americans, similarly to Nigerians in Dublin. The Autonomous Community of Madrid reports that 19% of Latin Americans perceive discrimination in the neighborhood compared to 16% of East Europeans, and that 32.5% feel discriminated against at work, for instance (Comunidad de Madrid 2010b, p. 74). However, only one of participant in this project experienced discrimination personally. All agree that "99% [of the Spanish] are very good" people (Kris, 39).[181] As one Ecuadorian interviewee put it, "They are not racists, no, no, no. The Spanish are more tolerant [than other host societies]" (Patrick, 32).[182] Minor experiences of exclusion still combine with nostalgia for family left behind to mar the otherwise happy life Ecuadorians lead in Madrid.

Especially as they are rejoined by their spouses, children, and parents, at least three quarters of the Latin Americans are very content with their existence and are "in love with Spain" (Patrick, 32).[183] The "social development level, the class of life" in Spain; the opportunities to study and work; and the free and modern social system impress the South American immigrants (Patrick, 32).[184] The similarity of socio-economic and cultural structures in the host context and multiple Latin American stores and goods lead the interviewees to feel like they are in Ecuador, but an Ecuador with "everything modern, the transport, the cleanliness, the health system" (Lina, 30).[185] The

[181] Author's translation derived from original quote in Spanish: "Creo que los 99 %será muy buenos, el resto 1%, 2% excepciones."
[182] Author's translation from original quote in Spanish: "No es que sean racistas, no, no, no. Con los españoles están más tolerantes, eso sí."
[183] Author's translation from original quote in Spanish: "Yo en España estaba enamorado."
[184] Author's translation from original quote in Spanish: "Me gusta el nivel social, la clase de vida que hay."
[185] Author's translation derived from original quote in Spanish: "Lo moderno que es todo, el transporte público, la sanidad. Que vas al hospital y que te atienden. Las cosas más bien funcionan mejor en sentido

"happy, open towards the world" Spaniards who "understand us well" are the final reason for the Latin Americans' contentment (Lincoln, 32; Ethan, 39).[186] The group is assigned the highest value for this subcomponent of belonging (**Table IV.1**).

As they perceive their hosts as tolerant and interested, Ecuadorians form relationships not just with their compatriots but also with Madrilenians and other immigrants. Unlike the Polish in Dublin or Bulgarians in Madrid, fewer participants talk of the jealousy and disunity that rids their own diaspora. They even share that their consulate includes them in cultural events and that they still join their conationals for "parties and folklore celebrations," if more infrequently over time (Kris, 39).[187] Ecuadorians go dancing, play soccer and cook together with other Latin Americans. However, the South Americans also communicate with other immigrant communities, including Bulgarians, and prefer a mix of friends from different nationalities and cultures. Seven in ten respondents form deeper connections with the Spanish as well, since "we share a lot of things, we talk, we discuss. They [the Spanish] like to seek out friends" (Ethan, 39).[188] Spaniards and Ecuadorians intersect and form friendships over shared love of food and music and since they structure their leisure similarly. Madrilenians' inclusiveness leads the interviews to view at least some Spanish friends "almost like a family here" (Patrick, 32). [189] A high value of 4 is assigned to the group for the indicator of social interaction (**Table IV.1**).

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administrativo. Por ejemplo, si tienes que quedarte sin trabajo, tienes el paro. Cosas, que en mi país no funcionan así."

[186] Author's translation from original quote in Spanish: "Son alegres, son abiertos al mundo" (Lincoln, 32); "Nos entienden muy bien ellos" (Ethan, 39).

[187] Author's translation from original quote in Spanish: "Hay fiestas, cosas culturales, folclóricas."

[188] Author's translation from original quote in Spanish: "Compartimos con ellos muchas cosas, conversamos, dialogamos. A mí lo que me gusta es que ellos buscan amigos."

[189] Author's translation from original quote in Spanish: "Son casi como mi familia aquí."

In view of high satisfaction and strong relationships with their hosts, Ecuadorians in Madrid "feel like a part of Spain" (Travis, 42).[190] The few respondents who answer that question suggest that while they are Ecuadorian, they are adopting a Spanish cultural identity and consider themselves "almost Spanish" (Patrick, 32).[191] Latin Americans were indeed the most likely to feel Madrilenian among all collectives in a study by the city of Madrid, with almost half giving that response (Ayuntamiento de Madrid, 2010). All of the respondents are waiting for Spanish nationality. More than half were joined by family or reared children in Madrid. One fourth engaged in studies in the city after their arrival. Some acquired property in Madrid and delved into the city's rich civic associational tradition. All of these developments lead one respondent to summarize the sentiment of the majority, "I am integrated … [I] mix into Spanish life. I am here, in the middle of it all" (Travis, 42).[192] The group merits the highest rating for this sub-category and for the indicator of individual status (**Table IV.1**).

Consistent with the perceptions of their Spanish hosts, therefore, Ecuadorians belong in Madrid (**Table IV.1**). The Latin Americans experience some discrimination in the city and miss family they have left behind. They are mostly economic migrants, some of whom plan to return home. Nonetheless, linguistic and cultural similarities with the Spanish, and perceptions of shared past and future, lead Ecuadorians to choose Spain as their destination and to invest in life in both the home and host countries. Cultural proximity factors into the South Americans' feelings of welcome by the Spanish and their perception of the integration of the larger Ecuadorian community in Madrid. Their

[190] Author's translation from original quote in Spanish: "Yo me siento… come una parte de España."
[191] Author's translation from original quote in Spanish: "Yo soy casi español, soy español."
[192] Author's translation from original quote in Spanish: "Y ya soy integrado; Integrado seria estar metido a la vida española. Estar allí, metido en eso."

"Spanish blood" (*sangre española*) leads individual respondents to form connections with the native population and feel satisfied with life in their new home, which they consider a modern, organized version of their motherland. Since Ecuadorians feel "almost Spanish" (*casi español*), the South American immigrants reunite their families, acquire Spanish nationality, invest in property, and embed themselves in the receiving context. High levels of belonging do not exclude pride for the sending state, which exists within the same transnational Ibero-American community as the host city.

IV.5. "An Adaptive Tribe": Bulgarian Perceptions of Belonging and Isolation in Madrid

Like their Polish and Nigerian counterparts in Dublin, Bulgarian immigrants in Madrid are not a homogenous group. The largest difference occur among the three waves identified by Bulgarian organizations in the receiving city, or the groups arriving in the early 1990s, the mid to late 1990s, and after 2007. While the first wave was meager and comprised mostly of adventurous types looking for opportunity and personal development in a new world, the second group consisted of elites from the Bulgarian intelligentsia but also of workers seeking economic opportunity. The third wave includes lesser-educated workers looking for financial gain, but also taking advantage of institutional openness, increased familiarity, and social networks. As this dissertation is concerned with lower-skilled migrant workers and focuses mostly on the period since the mid-1990s, it retells the experiences of the second and third cohorts.

Bulgarians' conceptions of belonging and isolation in Madrid are conflicted, as in the case of Dublin's immigrants, and develop in opposition to a somewhat exclusionary public discourse in the host city. Bulgarians often continue to identify with their

homeland, communicate with other Bulgarians and want to return to Bulgaria. However, their stay in Spain gets continuously extended and their plans of return are increasingly unclear, especially as profound disappointment and even disgust with the motherland is widespread within the group. As they feel "kicked out" (*изритани*) and betrayed by Bulgaria, the Balkan migrants learn to appreciate the orderly and calm way of life, the higher standard of living, and the tolerant and warm people in Madrid (for ex., Dothy, 60; Shay, 56; Sylvester, 29). They bring in their families and friends, bear children, and set roots in the host community. As they consider themselves welcome and satisfied, they reluctantly shed the image of the receiving context as unfamiliar and begin to stress the similarities they share with the native population (**Table IV.1**). While Bulgarians could be considered similar to Poles in Dublin for instance and linger between the bottom and top rows of **Table IV.2**, therefore, they are actually closer to Ecuadorians in Madrid. They are ultimately placed in the top row, as discourses and actions of belonging outstrip perceptions of isolation and apathy.

IV.5.1. Bulgarians' Migration Trajectories

Bulgarians' migration trajectories point to relatively high levels of belonging in Madrid. Much like their Ecuadorian counterparts, Bulgarians migrate to the city for a complex set of motives, combining economic, social, institutional, and cultural elements. They are undoubtedly "economic migrants" (M6-BO).[193] More than half of the respondents in this project cite economic reasons for their decision to leave Bulgaria (**Table IV.8**). Pull and push factors matter even though the latter are more significant. "Opportunity for business, export, import" or the abundance of work in Spain pulled

[193] Author's translation from original quote in Bulgarian: "Българите са икономически емигранти."

many Bulgarian workers to Madrid to see "what [they] can accomplish [there] even without the language" (Devin, 55; Rita, 43).[194] However, the lack of prospects in Bulgaria and the bankrupt situation in the home country are what truly contributes to Bulgarian migration to Madrid. A majority of respondents "saw no light in Bulgaria" with extended periods of joblessness, combined with debt with the purchase of property or increased educational or medical expenses for immediate family (Chris, 34).[195] Even without a family crisis, salaries are reported to be so meager that they are insufficient for satisfying even basic needs. Many left as they perceived that "there was nothing in Bulgaria" for them financially, where even stable economic situations were thwarted by political upheaval (Redford, 36).[196] Therefore, while a major motive for labor mobility, economic opportunity is more complex than a simple financial cost-benefit calculation. It is combined with acute sense of betrayal by the motherland, and desperation with the financial and political situation at home. As one respondent put it:

> *I don't care about Bulgaria, because Bulgaria does not care about me. They kicked us out from Bulgaria to go abroad without any concern. Educated people, experts, the majority in Bulgaria, were kicked out abroad. Why should I care about Bulgaria?* (Shay, 56)[197]

Financial troubles and lack of opportunity at home reinforce family prerogatives in the Bulgarian case (**Table IV.8**). Almost half of all respondents (or one in five replies) cited the need to follow a loved one abroad as a motivator for their decision to go to Spain, as they "could not make it alone" and the family unit had to be kept intact (Nina,

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[194] Author's translation from original quote in Bulgarian: "възможности за някакъв по- сериозен бизнес, експорт- импорт" (Devin, 55); "Заради стандарта, за да видя какво точно мога да постигна в тази страна и без език" (Rita, 43).
[195] Author's translation from original quote in Bulgarian: "Защото в България вече не виждах изход."
[196] Author's translation from original quote in Bulgarian: "Видях, че в България няма нищо..."
[197] Author's translation from original quote in Bulgarian: "Но от гледна точка на други неща не ме интересува, защото и България не се интересува за мене. От България ни натириха в чужбина без да се интересува за нас. Подготвени хора, с образование, масата на българската нация, специалистите ни изгониха в чужбина. За какво аз да се интересувам за България?"

57).[198] Sick relatives, the need to send money to children in university or help children working in Spain were all reasons that led Bulgarians to go to Madrid. The theme "we migrated for the kids" resonates in the replies of a number of the Balkan participants (Pam, 39).[199] Disruptions in the family are another incentive to relocate, where divorce left interviewees no reason to stay in the sending county and created the "need for change" (*нужда от промяна*) (Devin, 55; Redford, 36).[200]

Table IV.8. Bulgarians' Motivation to Migrate to Spain[201]

Motive	% of all responses	Number	% of all respondents
Economic opportunity	22%	22	56.4%
Social networks	21%	21	53.8%
Family prerogatives	18%	18	46.1%
Ease of travel/settlement	14%	14	35.9%
Opportunity for development	14%	14	35.9%
Adventure	7%	7	17.9%
Kinship, culture, and friendliness	4%	4	10.3%
Total	***100%***	***100 responses***	***Of 39 persons***

Source: Author.

Desire for personal growth and development, for more opportunity, and for experience and adventure are the final reason for Bulgarians to leave home (**Table IV.8**). One third of all respondents purported migrating for Spain for non-material "development" (*развитие*) and "opportunity" (*перспектива*), such as the possibility for

198 Author's translation from original quote in Bulgarian: "И аз казах, че ще дойда, не мога да го оставя сам той да се справя тука."
199 Author's translation from original quote in Bulgarian: "Емигрирахме заради децата."
200 Author's translation from original quote in Bulgarian.
201 Most participants gave multiple responses to the question "Why did you leave Bulgaria and migrate to Spain?" Therefore, while there are thirty-nine respondents who discussed this question, there are in fact one hundred recorded answers among them. In the rest of this chapter, I take account of the incidence of the responses both as percentage of all thirty-nine respondents and all one hundred responses given. While rates for each answer are radically different based on these two different modes of calculation, results are the same regardless of method.

personal growth and self-realization in terms of professional development, language acquisition, and expanding one's horizons (Xander, 20). Once again, the "scary" (*страшна*) situation in Bulgaria leaving little space for personal growth serves as a backdrop to the decision to migrate (Gina, 33). It is the self-described "curious" "dreamers" who discounted the risk and took the spontaneous decision to relocate and "get to learn another side of things" (Devin, 55; Nora, 26; Pam, 39).[202]

Several other factors motivate the respondents to choose Madrid as their particular destination. The proliferation of social networks between home and host societies is most significant, as the few risk-takers going to Madrid in the early 1990s reduce the risk for subsequent arrivals. In what one organizational representative dubbed the "calling effect" (*efecto llamada*) immigrants on the ground are providing information, housing, and, less frequently, jobs to family and friends (M1-BO).[203] More than half of all interviewees (and one in five responses) identify the personal connections they had in Madrid as the reason they were drawn to the city in particular (**Table IV.8**). As one respondent shares, "We had friends here who could help us start all over again" (Yana, 50).[204] Therefore, social factors come to rival economic considerations in Bulgarians' decision to move to Spain. Notably, the four cases in this thesis do not share a single motivation for migration, regardless of their current status as economic migrants. Social, economic, and cultural factors interplay, yet carry different weight for each of the four groups.

[202] Paragraph contains author's translation from original quote in Bulgarian, including: "Аз съм един мечтател" (Pam, 39);" И пристигнах чисто от любопитство" (Devin, 55); "Не само приключение, да професионално и може би да опознаеш още една страна на нещата" (Nora, 26).
[203] Author's translation from original phrase in Spanish.
[204] Author's translation from original quote in Spanish: "Той дойде тука, защото имахме познати, приятели, които да ни помогнат малко или много да започнем съвсем отначало."

Two other factors point to Spain as the right choice of destination for Bulgarians – the liberal migration regime and the tolerant and friendly Spaniards who share a certain kinship or mentality with the newcomers. Immigrant respondents and their elite interlocutors cite the ease of traveling to Spain, the ability to "fix documents" and "get legal," and the general social and integration policies in the country as important factors for selecting Madrid (M6-BO).[205] The fear of deportation made unauthorized Bulgarians forego traditional migration destinations like Germany and Austria. The ease of entry without documents through a tourist visa attracted a large number of the East Europeans to Spain in particular and served as the motivator of one third of this project's interviewees (**Table IV.8**). While considered beneficial, Bulgaria's accession to the European Union did not change the situation of the majority of Bulgarians in Madrid or cause a massive wave of new immigrants to the country. Rather, repeated amnesties and a laissez-faire attitude towards the undocumented are more significant. Relatedly, the Spanish government's open social policies of free medical coverage or ample local integration funds inspired many respondents to select Madrid as their destination.

Finally, perceptions of tolerance, welcome, kinship, and shared mentality lead some of the Balkan migrants to Madrid. Most interviewees find the Spanish to be warm Southern people, much like Bulgarians themselves, in contrast to the "robots in Germany" (Tanner, 64).[206] While only one in ten interviewees (or 4% of all responses) cited cultural ties as the main reason for migration, many of the respondents talked about the Spanish as "warmer, emotional, amiable, closer to our mentality" and told stories where busy Spanish passersby would guide lost Bulgarians to their destinations (Rosa,

[205] Author's translation from original quote in Spanish: "После Испания имаше политика да приема емигранти, да ги легализира, да им оправя документите."
[206] Author's translation from original quote in Bulgarian: "Германия за мене е държава- робот."

44).[207] Half of all ethnic representatives identified southern mentality similar to that of Bulgarians, warmth, and tolerance to foreigners as reasons for Bulgarians to choose Spain. Tolerance and opportunity, together with a perception of Spain as a better, more "cultured" (културно място) version of Bulgaria, leads respondents to call Spain a "paradise" (рай) (Idris, 30; Xander, 20). One respondent puts it most eloquently:[208]

> *I saw a Spain that I want Bulgaria to be like. A multinational Spain, with many cultures, many religions, no one bothered by that, everyone learning from each other and cohabiting with tolerance and empathy among ethnicities… Spaniards are used to this sea of nationalities and migrants… they are so polite, so tolerant. I saw a Spain that was so socially accepting and welcoming* (Devin, 55)[209]

The East Europeans are assigned an intermediate value of 3 for this sub-category of the migration trajectory indicator (**Table IV.1**).

Bulgarians' migration plans are conflicted, much like the group's motives for mobility, yet indicate an increasing level of affinity and belonging in Madrid. Bulgarian migration to Spain intensified in the early 2000s, with a peak in 2006 (INE, 2008). There were only about 3,000 Bulgarians in the receiving country in 1998, a number that grew to around 10,000 in the early 2000s and 150,000 in 2011 (INE, 2014; Kolev, 2005). Like the Polish in Dublin, Bulgarians appear to be short-term immigrants in the host context with an average length of stay of around five years. However, a closer inspection reveals that Bulgarians have actually been setting roots in Spain since the late 1990s and therefore average at least ten in the receiving context, more like Nigerians in Ireland or

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[207] Author's translation from original quote in Bulgarian: "Тези хора са много топли и сърдечни и са по-близки до нашия манталитет."

[208] Author's translation from original quote in Bulgarian.

[209] Author's translation from original quote in Bulgarian: "Видях една Испания, която е какъвто искам да видя света и каквато искам да видя България. Ами мултинационална Испания, много култури, много религии, никой нищо не го интересува, т.е. всеки може де попие от другия и една съвместимост и толерантност и търпимост по отношение на религии и по отношение на всичко. Между самите етноси. От друга страна самите испанци сякаш са привикнали от това масово море, масов наплив на чужденци…И самите испанци са изключително толерантни, изключително вежливи и не на последно място видях една социално осигурена Испания."

Ecuadorians in Madrid. Bulgarians did not immigrate to Spain in reaction to European Union enlargement in 2007, but have already chosen the Southern European context before the major institutional change. Fewer than one third of respondents in this project have been in Madrid for less than five years, with one third residing in the receiving community for more than ten years. Consequently, they have been able to create social networks in the city, start or bring in families, and begin to assimilate into Spanish life.

Bulgarians arrived in Spain with unclear or short-term plans, leaving partners and children behind, like Poles and Ecuadorians. Few had a clear goal in mind, with seven in ten respondents arriving with the idea to secure a job, acquire financial stability, visit friends, or simply "see how things are" (Tara, 50).[210] However, plans have changed for a majority of the Balkan immigrants. Most have stayed well beyond their original plans. As one interview put it, "We just came to see for 5-6 months but we are here for eleven years now" (Anna, 36).[211] One in six participants who gave a response to this question reported being joined by family and having children in Spain after a short period to settle and get legalized in the receiving society. Even if they still dream to return to Bulgaria and have even acquired property there, the immigrants' prerogatives have changed. As one interviewee summarized, "this is the plan but you know how plans change. Our boy is growing here, adapting, and loses his desire to go back with each day" (Gina, 33).[212] The cohort is assigned a value of 4 for this sub-component of belonging (**Table IV.1**).

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[210] Author's translation from original quote in Bulgarian: "Да видим как стоят нещата."

[211] Author's translation from original quote in Bulgarian: "По принцип дойдохме за 5- 6 месеца, колкото можем нещо да заработим и да се върнем. Но тези 6 месеца станаха вече 11 години."

[212] Author's translation from original quote in Bulgarian: "Това ни е планът, обаче то нали знаеш, едно планираш, друго става. Като се замисля детето ако расте тука и свикне с тази среда, с тези хора и вече то няма да има желание да се приберем."

As a result, Bulgarian respondents are conflicted about their migration plans, but as time passes, they "have negotiated in [their] heads that [they are] staying [in Spain]" (Idris, 30).[213] A majority of the Balkan immigrants report missing their homeland. Four in ten want to go back to Bulgaria one day, but have no clear arrangements or date for the return trip. A report by the Madrid Autonomous Community confirms Bulgarian's desire to stay, with 57% Balkan respondents intending to settle in Spain and only 18% planning to return to Bulgaria (Comunidad de Madrid, 2014a). One interviewee summarizes the common sentiment best, "I will go back eventually, maybe in fifteen-twenty years when it's better in Bulgaria" (Xavier, 20).[214] Six in ten have decided to stay in the host country, however. Feelings of disappointment, betrayal and even disgust with the motherland are a major reason to decide to remain in Madrid indefinitely:

> *How can you go back to Bulgaria? When I worked there the money was enough only for rent, cigarettes, food. You couldn't afford anything else* (Van, 30)[215]

> *There is no life in Bulgaria. When I go back, I start crying from the airport. The problems start. Everyone is looking for money from you* (Dothy, 60)[216]

Setting roots in the host city and the well-being of the family are equally important. A majority of Bulgarian participants suggest that their future depends on the family unit. Even if they miss their home state, older Balkan migrants concede to stay in order to provide an organized, easy, lawful, and calm lifestyle for their children. Having worked to secure a bright future for their progeny, few foreign workers want to go back

[213] Author's translation from original quote in Bulgarian: "Да де, сега се преустроих, в смисъл мисловно да оставам тука."
[214] Author's translation from original quote in Bulgarian: "Ще се прибера евентуално, след 15- 20 години мисля, като се оправи България."
[215] Author's translation from original quote in Bulgarian: "Как да се прибираме в България, като аз като бях в България каквото съм работил ти стига за квартира, за цигари, за храна. Не можеш да си позволиш нищо да си купиш."
[216] Author's translation from original quote in Bulgarian: "няма живот в България? Аз като си отида със слизането на аерогарата започвам да плача, започват ти проблемите. И всеки те гледа в ръцете и мисли, че идваш с много пари."

and start the process anew. In the meantime, they often get used to the manageable and stable way of life in Spain themselves. As the second generation adapts to the receiving community, gets engulfed into the Spanish education system, speaks Spanish more often than Bulgarian, and only occasionally visits relatives in Bulgaria, family prerogatives make staying the only possible choice for first-generation Bulgarian migrants. The significance of the family unit, therefore, is paramount both in constructing initial migration arrangements and in changing migration plans:

> *My home is where my family is. My family is here. My brother in Bulgaria is sick and doesn't even know me. My parents passed. So I don't want to go back (*Nina, 57)[217]

The cohort is assigned a value of 4 for this indicator of belonging (**Table IV.1**).

In sum, Bulgarians migrate to Madrid for a complex set of reasons, in which economic, social, political, and cultural elements are hard to separate. Desperation with the economic situation at home pushes Bulgarians to leave their home country. An open Spain offering economic and social stability, liberal migration policies and generous social welfare system, as well as a warm and similar society, draws the Balkan immigrants to Madrid. Social networks enhance perceptions of safety and familiarity for the newcomers. Stability and growing kinship with Madrid serve to transform short-term plans into long-term settlement among the East Europeans. As they are disappointed with a corrupt Bulgaria, want to provide a bright future for their progeny, and get used to the superior way of life in Spain, Bulgarians concede that Madrid is their de facto new home. Bulgarians' migration trajectory indicates a rising level of affinity with the city (**Table IV.1**).

[217] Author's translation from original quote in Bulgarian: "Където ми е семейството там ми е домът, там ми е родината. Семейството ми е тука, в България нямам, родителие ми, сестра ми са починали. Брат ми е болен и не ме познава даже вече. Затова и не ми се ходи в България."

IV.5.2. Perceptions of the Bulgarian Community's Group Status

The changing migration trajectories of Bulgarians correlate with the East Europeans' perceptions of the relatively privileged status of their ethnic community in Madrid. Bulgarian workers arriving in Madrid feel welcome and consider their new home "paradise" (*рай*), regardless of the city's economic situation (Dothy, 60). While these arriving in the 1990s suggest that initially Spaniards knew less about Bulgarians and even viewed them negatively as they equated them with the Roma ethnic community, all concede that this has changed. Even though Bulgarians have the "bad reputation of being car thieves," Madrid's population continues to welcome the Balkan newcomers and is even amazed by their superior skills in stealing cars (Kevin, 33).[218] Madrilenians are found to be "positive," eager to help, and "welcoming towards us" (Xander, 20).[219]As they are "charmed by [Bulgarians]," the Spanish are deemed to be "interested" and to "know our traditions" (Caleb, 33; Tanner, 64).[220]

The Bulgarian cohort is split in its understanding of the basis of welcome by the Spanish, with the same person prioritizing economic utility and cultural similarity in the same interview and not considering the two factors mutually exclusive. Much like their Polish counterparts in Dublin, Bulgarians believe that Madrilenians prefer them to other nationalities, since they are hard workers with good education and high qualifications.[221] More than half of all Balkan respondents and all Bulgarian representatives in ethnic

[218] Author's translation from original quote in Bulgarian: "Българите, които идват в Испания имат слава на крадци на коли."
[219]Author's translation from original quote in Bulgarian: "Положително отношение. Дружелюбни са. Приемат ни."
[220] Author's translation from original quote in Bulgarian: "Очаровани са от нас, очаровани" (Tanner, 64), "Ами да, знаят и за традициите, за празниците и се интересуват" (Caleb, 33).
[221] Among the Bulgarian respondents, eight in ten (thirty out of thirty-seven) suggest that they are preferred to other immigrant nationalities, with only two respondents unsure and one convinced that other immigrants groups are better liked than Bulgarians.

organizations who gave a response to this question hold that the Spanish like the East Europeans, because "they know their job" and "are not afraid of work" (Jack, 28; M2-BO).[222] Fifty-five percent of Bulgarians self-identify as the "most hard-working of all" (*най- работните от всички*), with few respondents also implying that Bulgarians are easier to exploit by their hosts than other foreign workers (Sasha, 33).[223]

The category of hard work is hardly a material one, however. Hard work is conflated with conscientiousness, politeness, honesty, discipline, as well as high qualifications and good education. As one respondent put it, "We work both with our hands and our heads. We are educated" (Nina, 57).[224] Bulgarian representatives also emphasize the home country's educational system that gives an edge to the Balkan cohort in the Spanish labor market. In the minds of the interviewees, Bulgarians' intelligence, preparedness, and cultured nature is what sets them apart from Latin Americans, who are "illiterate" and don't have education or manners (Chris, 34).[225] Bulgarians also claim to differ from South Americans, who are "two-faced" (*двулични*) (Pam, 39), impolite, and very "slow and lazy" (*бавни и мързеливи*) (Rita, 43).

Bulgarians, much like Ecuadorians, believe that they are welcomed by the Spanish due to their common cultural attributes, with economic and cultural factors not mutually exclusive.[226] Perceived similarity is constructed by the Balkan cohort through the same categories employed in public discourse and by Latin American immigrants.

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[222]Author's translation from original quote in Bulgarian: "Знаят си работата" (jack, 28), "По принцип мнението на испанците /може с времето да се е променило/ е, че хората от Източна Европа са работливи, че не ги е страх от работа" (M2-BO).
[223] Author's translation from original quote in Bulgarian.
[224] Author's translation from original quote in Bulgarian: "И начинът на работа, работи с главата си освен с ръцете си… Образовани сме."
[225] Author's translation from original quote in Bulgarian: "Ами защото латиноамериканците не знаят да четат, не знаят да пишат, те са неграмотни."
[226] Four in ten of the respondents, as well as three quarters of the community's representatives emphasized cultural similarity when explaining Bulgarians' warm welcome in Madrid.

That is, Bulgarians feel welcomed in Madrid as they are racially and ethnically similar to their hosts and "indistinguishable from the Spanish physically," rendering them less likely to be discriminated against (M1-BO).[227] As Bulgarians are "part of Europe," there is a perception of shared past and future between the newcomers and the native society (Sylvester, 29).[228] Common history and a vivid historical memory of Spanish emigration constitute additional reasons for Bulgarians to fit in, according to the respondents. Being under Turkish and Moor slavery, and sharing in religious rituals or national folklore are pointed out by one respondent. As another interviewee put it, "I tell Spaniards, you were emigrants too, you were exploited too… I feel the empathy - they understand" (Connor, 44).[229] While Bulgarians do not speak Spanish like Latin Americans, they emphasize their multilingual abilities and correct pronunciation of Castellan Spanish as opposed to the South Americans' different jargon. Finally, Bulgarians "habits, character" (and "mentality… the way of fiestas" are found to be closer to those of the Spanish, even if the latter "are a bit louder" (Grady, 54; Kevin, 33).[230] The commonalities between Spaniards and Bulgarians are once again emphasized through a reference to Latin Americans:

> *There is a myth that Spaniards and Latin Americans share a linguistic and cultural similarity. In terms of language, the similarity is 80% as Latin Americans speak gypsy Spanish. In terms of culture, there is actually no correspondence whatsoever. A Peruvian or another South American comes from a much lower educational base than the average Spaniard creating tensions and issues with integration… Maybe it is not so bad for Bulgarians, as we are educated and part of Europe* (Sylvester, 29)[231]

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[227] Author's translation from original quote in Bulgarian: "Ние не се отличаваме от испанците и от това сме облагодетелствани."

[228] Author's translation from original quote in Bulgarian: "Ние сме част от Европа."

[229] Author's translation from original quote in Bulgarian: "Да, и за им казвам на испанците 'Вие също сте били емигранти, използвани.' Чувствам симпатия, знаят го това нещо.

[230] Author's translation from original quote in Bulgarian: "По- топли като характер. И много им са близки навиците. (Grady, 54), "Защото българският манталитет е много близък до испанския начин на живот, начина на фиеста … но те са по-грамогласни." Only one respondent suggested that Spanish and Bulgarian cultures are incompatible and hence Bulgarians' status in Madrid will always be inferior to that of South Americans (Shay, 56).

[231] Author's translation from original quote in Bulgarian: "По принцип общоприето е, че Испания има много сериозна връзка с латиноамериканците на базата на езика и на базата на културата. Въпросът

According to the Balkan immigrants, moreover, economic crisis has not affected the tolerance and welcome of their Spanish hosts. While a few Bulgarians find that Madrilenians started prioritizing their compatriots, while before the crisis they preferred the cheaper, educated, and fast foreign workers, all concede that they continue to be "always respected anywhere [they] go" (Chris, 34).[232] Only one respondent shared the opinion that "Spaniards started losing their jobs and blamed us, all foreigners, that we are taking their bread" (Pam, 39).[233] The downturn was also perceived to affect the internal dynamics of the Bulgarian community, with many people leaving, losing their jobs or becoming resentful and isolated from the larger Bulgarian diaspora. However, the respondents did not face a deteriorating relationship with their hosts. The situation was considered different for South Americans, however. Several East Europeans suggested that the non-European workers create tensions and issues of integration by sending remittances outside of Europe and staying with crisis. The confident Bulgarian cohort is assigned the highest value for this sub-component of belonging (**Table IV.1**).

Despite the welcome they perceive from their Spanish hosts, Bulgarians are conflicted in their conception of their community's integration. On the one hand, elite interlocutors tout the ability of the Balkan workers to adapt to Madrilenian society. Six out of the eight ethnic representatives interviewed suggest that Bulgarians integrate well.

е, че базата на езика е донякъде, до известна степен вярна 80 %, тъй като те говорят много по-цигански от испанците. В културно отношение няма никакво припокриване. Това означава, че един латиноамериканец, дошъл тук от базата на образованието, което е получил в Перу или която и да е латиноамериканска държава не кореспондира на средния испански кадър, който е живял в неговите среди. Това означава, че ще има някакви много сериозни базови разминавания в културно отношение, които ще доведат до конфликти и ще направят много трудна асимилацията на дадения латиноамериканец…. При българите може би е по- различно, тъй като сме образовани и сме част от Европа."

[232] Author's translation from original quote in Bulgarian: "Винаги ме уважават където и да ида."

[233] Author's translation from original quote in Bulgarian: "Дефакто испанцит започнаха да остават без работа и ни обвиняваха нас, че сме дошли да им вземем хляба."

The remaining two do not deny that their compatriots can fit in, but simply see the group as more heterogeneous. Since they are not criminal and "do not cause trouble for Spanish authorities," are Orthodox Christians rather than Muslims, and are educated and cultured, Bulgarians are considered among the most successful groups in their integration in the host country (M4-BO).[234] Reports by the Madrid Autonomous Community confirm the ethnic representatives' assertions by documenting the rising rates of intermarriages and friendships between Bulgarians and Spaniards.[235]

The agency of both Bulgarian organizations and the Spanish government is considered decisive. The numerous associations (more numerous that these for larger immigrant communities in Madrid) not only aid the Balkan migrants in language acquisition and getting used to life in Madrid, but also create a positive image of Bulgarians among the Spanish and spark the hosts' interest in Bulgarian culture. In their turn, the Spanish and Madrilenian governments' integration plans and funds are deemed "pointed," "holistic," and truly beneficial to the newcomers (M6-BO).[236] Association leaders even go as far as to suggest that the East Europeans are "an adaptive tribe" that blends in better with Spaniards than with their own compatriots (M1-BO).[237]

On the other hand, individual respondents find their larger community far from integrated, much like in the case of Poles in Dublin. Three quarters of the ones who discussed the issue find that Bulgarians do not easily fit into Madrid's life. As one person described the trend, "They don't speak the language. Bulgarians, they live together six

[234] Author's translation from original quote in Bulgarian: "Българската емиграция е добре интегрирана и не създава проблеми на испанските власти."

[235] For instance, 11% of Bulgarians had a Spanish partner in 2013, as opposed to 6% in 2012. This compares with 6% among Romanians and 1% among the Chinese. The highest rate of intermarriages occurs between the Spanish and Dominicans, with 23% (Comunidad de Madrid, 2014b).

[236] Author's translation from original quote in Bulgarian: И те са цялостни, целенасочени, разбира се с помощта на ЕС.

[237] Author's translation from original quote in Bulgarian: "Суперадаптивно племе сме."

people at a time and only watch Bulgarian TV. No one leaves this narrow circle of Bulgarian friends. They buy Bulgarian stuff, go to a Bulgarian hairdresser. Everything is happening in this narrow circle …I believe at least 60-70% of Bulgarians here continue to live in this Bulgarian commune" (Anna, 36).[238] The remaining interviewees suggested that it is hard to settle on a group trend with younger people and families more likely to belong in the host city:

> *There are two types of Bulgarians. One type comes to work and study. They decide to integrate. Others simply don't want to. They are racist towards the Spanish. They say, 'they are stupid, they are unqualified.' How can you go to another county and speak like that [about your hosts]?* (Jasmine, 56)[239]

The language barrier and the reliance on Bulgarian social networks, at least in the initial phases of migration, are the main reasons for Bulgarians' isolation in Madrid. Bulgarians' disadvantage of arriving in the host city with no language skills is the primary focus of ethnic associations, who race to organize multitudes of courses to help their compatriots. Four out of ten respondents argue that not knowing "a word of Spanish" (*дума испански*) upon arrival limits the group's opportunities for employment and interaction with natives and forces it to rely on ethnic networks exclusively (Shay, 56). Still, it is indicative that most Balkan migrants speak of the language barrier in the past tense and realize that "[they] have no future in Spain without the language" (Grady, 54).

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[238] Author's translation from original quote in Bulgarian: "Друго нещо, което е много обичайно и срещано е, че българите, които неговрятезика, живеят по 6 човека да речем единственото, което гледат е българска телевизия. Никой не излиза от този кръг български приятели и ходят пазаруват български работи, ходят на българската фризьорка. …Обаче смятам, че поне 60-70% от хората тук продължават да си живеят така, в този тип комуна българска."

[239] Author's translation from original quote in Bulgarian: "Има два вида българи, има едни, които просто идват за работа и идват хора да учат. Зависи, има хора, които решават да се интегрират и хора, които просто не желаят. От страна на българите към испанците има расисъм също. Пооне от типа на „те нищо не разбират, те са тъпи", нещо, което не ми е ясно защо. От каква позиция отиваш в някаква държава и да кажеш, че тези хора са тъпи?"

Additionally, the Bulgarian community is considered isolated due to the tendency to live together and be stuck together in immigrant neighborhoods. As one person explains, "everyone comes to their friends and family and the group gets bigger, they stick together, live together" (Hunter, 29).[240] As Bulgarians have to rely on each other initially to find housing or secure a job, especially if they have deficient language skills, they might get stuck within the "Bulgarian commune" (*комуна българска*) and even exploited by settled compatriots (Anna, 36). Notably, only one respondent blamed cultural incompatibility for Bulgarians' isolation in the city.

Interestingly, when prompted about the integration of the Bulgarian community, the immigrants and their representatives talk mostly about the fragmentation existing within the Bulgarian collective. Leaders from the community decry the inability of ethnic associations to cooperate on the advancement of the Balkan population, with envy and competition for funding as the main issues. One third of the immigrants also spoke of Bulgarians' tendency not to support each other and shared that they have "suffered from other Bulgarians" before (Xavier, 20). The East European community is described as "not united," with individual families fending for themselves (M6-BO). While this trend is considered a significant obstacle to ethnic mobilization and the success of the group in the receiving context, it unwittingly pushes Bulgarians outside of the diaspora and forces them to rely on the larger Madrilenian society.[241] Still, the group is assigned an intermediate value of 3 for this component of the group status indicator (**Table IV.1**).

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[240] Author's translation from original quote in Bulgarian: "Ами те всички нови българи идват при техните роднини и те живеят тука и то така става. И се натрупва по малко. Всеки идва при познати. Той там отива и там си остава."

[241] Paragraph contains author's translation from original quote in Bulgarian: "Има много хора, които са си изпатили от българи (Xavier, 20), "Българското общество абсолютно никъде не е задружно" (M6-BO).

To conclude, Bulgarians find their larger group to be relatively well positioned in Madrid. Individual respondents report that deficient language skills and embeddedness in rigid ethnic networks preclude Bulgarians from integrating in the receiving city. However, elite representatives suggest that ample integration efforts and funds by a multitude of actors and divisiveness among Bulgarians themselves push the Eastern Europeans out in the larger society. The group is further empowered by the welcome it receives by Spaniards, even during economic downturn. Bulgarians consider themselves better positioned in the city than n Latin American workers, in view of hard work and superior education, but also due to the ethnicity, European nationality, common history, and mentality they share with Madrilenians. The Bulgarian community's favorable status in the receiving city correlates with relatively high levels of belonging for individual Balkan respondents (**Table IV.1**).

IV.5.3. Bulgarians' Perceptions of Individual Status

As they are stay longer, bring in or create families, and enjoy life in Madrid, Bulgarians are slowly coming to identify with the receiving context and "forget Bulgaria" (M8-BO).[242] Since the Balkan immigrants consider the diaspora as a whole disunited, ridden by jealousy, and generally isolated, they form relationships with the friendlier and warmer Spaniards, as to escape envy and negativism. The Balkan immigrants miss Bulgaria intensely and continue to identify with the home country primarily, yet are starting to integrate into Madrid's life, especially as they focus on the next generation (**Table IV.1**).

[242] Author's translation from original quote in Bulgarian: "Почти съм забравил България."

Table IV.9. Bulgarians' Motivation for Satisfaction in Spain

Motive	**% of all responses**	**Number**
Ease/quality/orderliness of life	32.7%	18
Tolerant/open people	21.8%	12
Financial stability/money/jobs	21.8%	12
Opportunity for children	5.6%	3
Social rights, liberal politics	3.6%	2
Clear rights	3.6%	6
Conflicted	10.9%	5
Total	***100%***	***55***

Source: Author**.**

Much like their Polish and Ecuadorian counterparts, individual participants in Madrid are highly satisfied with life in the receiving context. None of the Bulgarians interviewed for this project is unhappy in Madrid. Eight in ten immigrants are content with their new home, with the remainder somewhat conflicted due to either nostalgia or deteriorating economic circumstance.

While the reasons for this high level of satisfaction are complex, quality of life in the host society stands out as the main motive (**Table IV.9**). Each respondent provides multiple explanations for their contentment, but in one third of the cases the Bulgarian migrants emphasize how "calm, easier" (*спокоен, по-лесен*), "comfortable" (*удобно*), "better organized and settled" (*по-добре организирано и уредено*) their existence is in the receiving context (Caleb, 33; Tangra, 36; Tonya, 45). Law and order, superior transportation, and even street lights and pothole-free streets lead a majority of Bulgarians to pronounce themselves "charmed with Spain" (*очарована от Испания*) (Dothy, 60). Spanish peoples' tolerant nature and openness toward Bulgarians counteract intense nostalgia for the motherland in more than one fifth of all responses. Being

surrounded by the "patient" (*търпеливи*), "intelligent" (*интелигентни*), "carefree" (*освободени*) natives who are always ready to help makes the respondents forget about the multiple sacrifices with migration and the family they have behind (Anna, 36; Dothy, 60; Idris, 30). Ample economic opportunity, even with crisis, a stable financial situation, and the ability to satisfy one's basic needs render the East Europeans better able to share in the "unburdened life" of Spaniards (Yana, 50).[243] Liberal politics, a generous and well-organized social system, the ability to claim one's personal rights, and the opportunity to provide a better life for future generations, are additional incentives for Bulgarians to like their existence in the host country. The advantageous image of Madrid is constructed in contrast with a lawless, corrupt, poor, desperate Bulgaria, leading one respondent to quip, "I can be a cleaning lady in Bulgaria too, but I will be a sad cleaning lady" (Rosa, 44).[244] Satisfaction levels merit the highest rating (**Table IV.1**).

This unfavorable image of the motherland, despite the interviewees' unconditional love for it, is transposed to the Bulgarian diaspora in Spain. The East Europeans feel most comfortable with their compatriots and form their closest relationships with them, yet find other Bulgarians to be jealous, backhanded and unsupportive of the larger national community. Thus, the Balkan immigrants begin to disassociate from their fellow citizens and to form relationships with the tolerant, helpful Spanish instead. The foreign workers are highly conflicted in their opinion about other Bulgarians.[245] One third of the respondents report "doing everything through Bulgarians"

[243] Paragraph contains author's translation from original quote in Bulgarian including: "Живот без стресови ситуации, без натоварване" (Yana, 50).

[244] Author's translation from original quote in Bulgarian: "И когато имаш стабилна работа, защото аз можех да бъда чистачка и в България, но да бъда нещастна чистачка."

[245] 28% of all respondents suggested their relationships in Madrid were with other Bulgarians almost exclusively (eleven out of thirty-nine), with the same number and percentage suggesting the diametrically opposed option – that they avoid communicating with Bulgarians entirely. 15% suggested that they have

(Tangra, 33).[246] They remain within "the Bulgarian commune," since it is "always easier to communicate with your own blood" (Anna, 36; Tonya, 45).[247] They find it hard to form a connection with Madrilenians beyond that of a mere acquaintance. However, an equal number of participants steer clear of their compatriots. As people are "overburdened with problems" or are in Madrid "for the money and not for their dreams," the communication within the ethnic population is breaking down (Pam, 39; Tonya, 45).[248] The collective also includes a small percentage of Bulgarians who purposefully abuse newcomers by charging a commission for housing, for instance. The latter group leads one respondent to conclude, "A Bulgarian schemer is a Bulgarian schemer, no matter in what country" (Yana, 50).[249]

Since mistrust rather than unity characterizes the Balkan collective, Bulgarian workers "have no choice" but to become "friends with the Spanish" (Jasmine, 56).[250] Indeed, while one fifth of respondents find it difficult to create and maintain friendships with Madrilenians, six in ten report having at least some Spanish friends and communicating with all people, including the native population. As Spaniards are interested in Bulgarians, seeking out Spanish friends quickly results in deeper relationships. Some respondents even have Spanish partners or go out with Spanish groups exclusively. Few report "getting along better with Spaniards than with

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many Bulgarian friends but that they also have friends and acquaintances from other nationalities and do not seek Bulgarians exclusively. Another 13% reported having mostly Bulgarians friends but keeping the circle tight and only communicating with immediate relatives and a few friendly families. The remaining 15% did not provide a response to this question.

[246] Author's translation from original quote in Bulgarian: "Аз всичко чрез българи."

[247] Author's translation from original quote in Bulgarian: "Как да ти кажа, с една кръвна група хората се усещат без значение от коя нация са" (Tonya, 45).

[248] Author's translation from original quote in Bulgarian: " Всеки с проблемите си, всеки с грижите си " (Tonya, 45); "Тук са за парите, а не да следват мечтите си" (Pam, 39).

[249] Author's translation from original quote in Bulgarian: "Аз общувам с малко българи и винаги съм чувала от българи, от наши сънародници оплаквания, че Бай Ганьо си е Бай Ганьо, където и да го сложиш той си е ..."

[250] Author's translation from original quote in Bulgarian: "Ами то няма как- с испанци и румънци."

Bulgarians" (Tamara, 43).[251] This component of the individual status indicator is given a high value of 4 (**Table IV.1**).

Regardless of these budding relationships, the Balkan migrants maintain a strong Bulgarian cultural identity and categorize missing the motherland as one of the largest sacrifices with migration to Madrid. Eight in ten participants share that they consider themselves Bulgarian, even if their children were born in Spain.[252] They suggest that they are "never going to feel Spanish," even if the next generation makes Madrid its home (Tanner, 64).[253] As one interviewee puts it:

> *When you go back to Bulgaria, to the seaside, to the Rila Monastery, you get recharged. Bulgaria will always be our homeland* (Tamara, 43)[254]

This strong national identification correlates with intense nostalgia for the motherland. While the interviewees suggest that leaving family behind or living in squalid conditions in Madrid were significant obstacles in their experience abroad initially, most continue to suffer in Spain primarily because they "really miss Bulgaria" (Xavier, 20).[255] As one interviewee vividly explains, "there is not a night I don't look at pictures from Bulgaria. I want to scream from pain for the homeland but …" (Grady,

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[251] Author's translation from original quote in Bulgarian: "Аз се разбирам –подобре с испанци отколкото с българи."
[252] One two in ten share feeling like "citizens of the world" (*жител на света*) and "not [feeling] proud to be Bulgarians" (*не се гордея, че съм българка*) (Devon, 55; Jasmine, 56) (Author's translation from original quote in Bulgarian).
[253] Author's translation from original quote in Bulgarian: "Ще се почувствам като свободен човек, но не и като част от Испания."
[254] Author's translation from original quote in Bulgarian: "Аз бих казала, че тази година той беше с мене в България. И просто друго си е като обиколиш на Рилския манастир, Варна, морето, София и се зареждаш с енергия. И аз мисля, че България винаги ще си е нашата Родина."
[255] 27.6% of the respondents identify missing Bulgaria as the biggest sacrifice they face daily with life in Madrid, with an additional 10.3% suggesting that Spain is not their home. 27.6% share that leaving behind family and friends has been the hardest part of immigrating. 24.1% point to miserable conditions of living and employment, life in fear without documents, and inability to communicate in Spanish as the issues that made their existence in Madrid difficult initially. 10.4% believe they made no sacrifices when they left Bulgaria. Author's translation from original quote in Bulgarian: "По принцип на мене много ми липсва България."

54).[256] Feelings of loss make some of the foreign workers feel like “trees without a root here” and believe that they “always will be immigrants” in Madrid (Connor, 44; Trini, 31).[257] It is encouraging, however, that one in ten respondents do not believe they made sacrifices by migrating to Madrid and a majority find that their situation has improved over time. Still, this sub-indicator of belonging merits the lowest value (**Table IV.1**).

Despite a strong national identification and feelings of loss for the motherland, Balkan immigrants to consider themselves relatively integrated. Almost half of the participants who provided a response to this question considered themselves “part of Spanish society,” with an additional 15% unsure yet leaning towards belonging in Madrid and another 8% having initiated the process of settlement (Sylvester, 29).[258] Fewer than one quarter of the interviewees suggested that “even if life is good here,” they “will never feel at home” in Madrid (Gina, 33).[259] The remainder shared how “with time things change and [they] almost don’t feel any difference between [the Spanish] and us” (Rita, 43). They learned the language, acquired a house or a car, and are even being mistaken for natives on the street. As children are immersed into the Spanish educational system and family and friends relocate to Madrid, Bulgarians report that “now everything is here … not in Bulgaria” and they even “feel a little weird” returning to Bulgaria for a short visit (Chris, 34; Izzy, 40).[260] This last sub-category of the individual status indicator receives a relatively high value of 4 (**Table IV.1**).

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[256] Author’s translation from original quote in Bulgarian: “Не минава вечер без да гледам снимки от България. И да плача е малко, иде ми да вия от болка за България.”
[257] Author’s translation from original quote in Bulgarian: “Емигранти, винаги сме си емигранти” (Connor, 44), “Като дърво без корен си” (Trini, 31).
[258] Author’s translation from original quote in Bulgarian: “Аз съм част от испанското общество.”
[259] Author’s translation from original quote in Bulgarian: “Дори животът тука да е добре … не мога да се почувствам като у дома си, колкото и да се опитвам, трудно ми е.”
[260] Author’s translation from original quote in Bulgarian: “Всичко е тука. В България- не” (Izzy, 40), “Като се прибера в България ми е малко странно” (Chris, 34).

To conclude, despite conflicted feelings about life in Madrid and in contrast with the perceptions of their Spanish hosts, Bulgarians belong in the host city. The East Europeans identify exclusively as Bulgarian and suffer from intense nostalgia for the motherland. They arrived in Spain with short-term plans and continue to form their strongest relationships with other Bulgarians. The larger national community is viewed as isolated and fragmented. However, as they are joined by their family and friends, consider the Spanish a warm society with a similar temperament, and want to provide the next generation with stability and opportunity, the immigrants continuously extend their stay in Madrid. Disappointment with a corrupt and impoverished homeland and a superior standard of life in the receiving context lead them to set down roots in Spain. Disgust with compatriots abroad who abuse the larger ethnic community combined with perceptions of warm welcome by the native population forces Bulgarians to look for connections beyond the Bulgarian diaspora in Madrid. Perceptions of personal integration, relative favorable evaluations of group status evaluation, and positive migration trajectories lead Bulgarians to call Madrid their home (**Table IV.1**).

IV.6. Conclusion

Poles and Nigerians in Dublin and Ecuadorians and Bulgarians in Madrid are received very differently by employers, politicians, and the general public in their new homes. They also exhibit very different and often conflicted perceptions of belonging or isolation in the two receiving cities. A discussion of migration trajectories, perceptions of community welcome and integration, and evaluation of individual ability to fit in traces levels of belonging and isolation for the four populations.

While they consider themselves relatively welcome in the city, Polish workers in Dublin find themselves profoundly different from their hosts, deem their stay in Dublin temporary, communicate mostly with their compatriots, and plan to return to their true home – Poland. Nigerian immigrants came to Ireland in view of historical, linguistic, and cultural connections with the intention to settle. However, they do not consider their larger community in Dublin welcome or integrated and feel "stuck" in a hostile city in which they have nothing in common with the local population. Ecuadorians came to Madrid due to the ease of the socio-cultural transition with migration and the similar economic structure in Spain. As they consider Madrid an extension of the motherland, they plan a better future for their family in the host city. Even return migration to Ecuador is not permanent but often turns cyclical with individual and group investment in both the home and receiving contexts. Bulgarians arrived in Spain in view of social networks, economic opportunity, and their common temperament with Spaniards. While the majority of respondents desire to return to Bulgaria in the long-term, the East Europeans are settling in Spain in practice. As Bulgarians are disappointed in their homeland, they embrace the organized and happy lifestyle in the receiving city, set down roots and create families, and accept Madrid as their second home (**Table IV.1**).

The cultural categories established in Dublin's and Madrid's public discourse underlie the immigrants' perceptions of belonging as well. Poles' national pride and embeddedness in inward-looking ethnic networks prevent the East Europeans from investing in life in Dublin. Racial and cultural differences detract from Nigerians' ability and willingness to belong in Ireland. Socio-cultural and linguistic ties draw in Ecuadorians into Madrid's landscape. Ethnic and historical affinity with Madrilenians

undermine strong national belonging to produce rising levels of belonging among Bulgarians in Madrid. Satisfaction with life in Dublin due to economic opportunity is secondary to the effects of racial discrimination or immutable cultural identity. Perceived welcome in Madrid is partly based on work ethic, yet characteristics like language, history, culture, or similar disposition emerge are paramount in constructing understanding of welcome or rejection. Significantly, group identification and experiences are always established in opposition to those of other ethnic cohorts in the two receiving spaces. Both Ecuadorians and Bulgarians in Spain, for example, cite the other collective's dissimilarity with the Spanish to cement their own belonging in Madrid. Nigerians' disagreement with the myth of Poles' belonging in Dublin intensifies their own indignation with an exclusionary receiving environment.

The immigrants' perceptions of welcome or rejection intersect with the dynamics of inclusion and exclusion shaped by the host society to produce distinct political, economic, and socio-cultural integration outcomes. As Ecuadorians are welcomed and belong, they are positioned to settle and enjoy a number of rights in Madrid. They are hypothesized to represent what his dissertation calls *organic integration* and occupy the upper left quadrant of **Table IV.10**. Since they are both isolated and rejected from Dublin, Nigerians are least likely to be incorporated in the host context. They experience *blocked integration* in the city and fall in the lower right quadrant of **Table IV.10**. Because their own perceptions of isolation are counteracted by a discourse of inclusion in the receiving locality, Poles are drawn into life in the receiving context. They undergo *reluctant integration* in Dublin and place in the lower left corner of **Table IV.10**. Bulgarians represent the third best integration outcome, or *conflicted integration*, and fit

in the upper right quadrant of **Table IV.10.** Their affinity with Madrid undermines a discourse of exclusion in the host city.

Table IV.10. Integration Outcomes in New Western European Immigration Cities

		Host Society	
		Accept	*Reject*
Immigrant Group	*Belong*	***Organic Integration*** (Ecuadorians in Madrid)	***Conflicted Integration*** (Bulgarians in Madrid)
	Don't Belong	***Reluctant Integration*** (Poles in Dublin)	***Blocked Integration*** (Nigerians in Dublin)

This dissertation turns to an elaboration of the immigrants' incorporation outcomes next. In particular, Chapter V outlines the acquisition and exercise of political rights for the four immigrant groups. Chapter VI traces the economic situation and incorporation results for the foreign collectives. Chapter VII details the social integration of the four populations. The aim is to survey how the intersection of discourses of inclusion and exclusion on the one hand and belonging-isolation on the other translate into actual outcomes of incorporation in reality.

CHAPTER V

"COUNT US IN"[261]:

POLITICAL INCORPORATION IN DUBLIN AND MADRID

V.1. Introduction

Why do integration outcomes vary in similar new Western European immigration spaces? The argument is that incorporation outcomes are contingent on both political and discursive openness in the receiving context and foreign populations' willingness to employ opportunities and combat closures. Reception and integration patterns, moreover, are firmly grounded in identity politics and cultural dynamics. Immigrants considered similar to local stakeholders in socio-cultural terms benefit from favorable policies, integration funds, or the attention of benevolent political actors. Foreign populations perceived as different from natives are targeted by harsh actors of control and see their political rights undermined rather than enhanced. What is more, immigrant cohorts who perceive themselves to belong in their host cities are more likely to fight for political inclusion. They naturalize in high numbers, vote and run in elections, and participate in native and ethnic organizations. On the other hand, foreign workers who do not fit it have little stake in the receiving community. They are apathetic subjects who do little to protest unfavorable policies or exclusion from the political process.

Chapter V develops the argument by surveying the political incorporation of Poles and Nigerians in Dublin and Ecuadorians and Bulgarians in Madrid. Chapters VI and VII turn to the four groups' economic and social integration patterns respectively.

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[261] *Count Us In* is a program instituted by the Immigrant Council of Ireland in 2011 to raise awareness among naturalized citizens of their right to vote in general elections (ICI, 2011; Mutwarasibo, 2011).

The discussion of incorporation begins with political integration, since it underlies, delimits, and defines the economic and social rights of immigrants in the receiving context. Political incorporation is conceived as a bi-furcated concept including two elements. On the one hand, political integration is defined as a set of legal, administrative, and policy principles by the receiving city. These are employed to assign immigrant groups and individuals to particular legal statuses, each affected by specific immigration, employment and social policies and carrying a set of political, economic, and social rights. Consequently, the political integration of the relevant populations is operationalized through the legal status held by members of the four cohorts, as well as through legal and policy developments and the direction they have taken over time.

Political integration is also dependent on the immigrants' active exercise of the entitlements outlined in legal and policy instruments. This dualistic approach of considering how the reception framework interacts with what immigrants do with it echoes the general approach of the dissertation. There are several components to immigrants' active political participation. Naturalization is the quickest route to a fuller set of rights for the newcomers. Running for office is the activity that confers most power to ethnic candidates, yet also is the hardest to achieve and might not produce clear benefits for the candidates' national group. Voting, especially in local elections, influences access to social, cultural, economic, and political resources for foreign communities. Participating in labor unions enhances knowledge and exercise of economic rights and is open to all immigrants residing in Dublin and Madrid. The establishment of and participation in ethnic organizations is a final aspect of active political participation. All of these components of political participation not only enhance

resources for ethnic societies but also signal these societies' intent to settle in the host country. According to one report, "inclusive politics" are these that "the willingness of immigrants and members of ethnic minorities to actively get involved in local and national politics" (Fanning, Mutwarasibo, & Chadamoyo, 2003).

Table V.1. Immigrant Political Incorporation in Dublin and Madrid

		Host Society	
		Accept	*Reject*
Immigrant Group	*Belong*	Ecuadorians in Madrid ***(Organic Integration)***	Bulgarians in Madrid ***(Conflicted Integration)***
	Don't Belong	Poles in Dublin ***(Reluctant Integration)***	Nigerians in Dublin ***(Blocked Integration)***

The four case studies of this dissertation conform to the main argument, despite Nigerians' higher than predicted levels of political mobilization. Since Ecuadorians in Madrid are both included and perceive themselves to belong in their new home, they enjoy a number of local political opportunities and take advantage of them. They experience *organic integration* in Madrid's political sphere (**Table V.1**). Ecuadorians are not disadvantaged despite their non-EU citizenship. As legal status is fluid in the Spanish case, even the Latin Americans who had at one time been temporary or irregular workers easily transition to the favorable categories of long-term resident and Spanish national.

Moreover, the South American workers are privileged by national and local policy initiatives and campaigns. They are the beneficiaries of an expedited naturalization process, as well as bilateral agreements that assure their ability to vote in local elections, their access to the municipal labor market, and a fast-track path to stable legal status. Ecuadorians are the targets of regularization and information campaigns by the major trade unions, and secure the lions' share of local and national integration funds. Unsurprisingly, Ecuadorians naturalize in large numbers, have some of the highest rates of electoral participation and trade unionism, and found the largest number of civic associations in Madrid (**Table V.2**).

Table V.2. Political Incorporation Index[262]

Indicator	*Polish (Score)*	*Nigerian (Score)*	*Ecuadorian (Score)*	*Bulgarian (Score)*
Legal status	High (5)	Low (2)	High (4)	High (4)
Laws and policies	High (4)	Low (1)	High (4)	Intermediate (3)
Naturalization/long-term residency	Intermediate (3)	Intermediate (3)	High (5)	Low (2)
Local electoral participation	Intermediate (3)	Intermediate (3)	Intermediate (3)	Low (2)
Extrapolitical activities	Intermediate (3)	High (4)	High (4)	Low (2)
Civic activism	High (4)	High (4)	High (4)	High (5)
POLTIICAL INCORPORATION	***Intermediate/high (22)***	***Intermediate (17)***	***High (24)***	***Intermediate (18)***

[262] Each category is assigned a number between 1 and 5. Outcomes that reflect lack of political access are assigned a value of 1. High levels of incorporation are given a value of 5. Outcomes that fall in the middle are assigned a 3. The values from every column are added to produce an index of political incorporation levels for each immigrant group. Many indicators are complex or composite. "Laws and policies" reviews all relevant laws and policies concerning each group and the direction of policy over time. "Local electoral participation" includes both voting and running in local elections. "Extrapolitical activities" references trade unionism and instances of political mobilization outside the regular political process. "Civic activism" refers to participation in ethnic and local associations. The Index ranges from 6 to 30. Values between 6 and 13 reflect low levels of incorporation, 14-22 show intermediate political access and 23-30 correspond to a multitude of political rights.

Poles in Dublin represent what this dissertation calls *reluctant integration*. They are drawn into Dublin's political process by eager local stakeholders, despite their conflicted belonging in the host city (**Table V.1**). Polish political integration in Ireland is, therefore, imperfect but improving. Most Polish immigrants entered Ireland as EU citizens, or have regularized their status since 2004, thus acquiring a privileged legal status. Developments like the opening of the Irish labor market to new member states in 2004, the conscious policy to fill labor shortages through migration from within the European Economic Area (EEA), and the focusing of integration resources on EU immigrants since 2008, further enhanced the legal-political position of this community. Polish political participation and unionization are on the rise due to direct recruitment by local parties and trade unions. Poles set up ethnic organizations in the receiving context, which hold potential for mobilization despite their inward-facing nature (**Table V.2**).

Bulgarians find themselves to belong in Madrid, yet are met with indifference and suspicion by local stakeholders. They experience *conflicted integration* in the city (**Table V.1**). The legal status of EU national curiously does not translate into added protections or integration funds for Bulgarians in Spain. Bulgarians are allowed to vote in local elections, as EU directives dictate. However, Spain imposed transitional agreements on Bulgarians in 2007 and reinstated them with crisis in 2010. Moreover, the East Europeans are subject to restrictive naturalization requirements, and are rarely the targets of employment drives or integration campaigns. The Balkan migrants exhibit limited active political participation as well, with low naturalization, voting, and trade unionism rates. Nonetheless, Bulgarians are civically active and engage in a disproportionately large

number of ethnic associations in Madrid focused on both their national community and its insertion into the larger society (**Table V.2**).

Finally, Nigerians experience *blocked integration*, since their own discourse of isolation reinforces exclusion by local stakeholders (**Table V.1**). Nigerians are highly disadvantaged in terms of passive political participation. Their legal status as asylum seekers, foreign students, or undocumented migrants warrants few rights and entitlements. Recent policy developments, such as the 2004 Referendum amending the *jus soli* principle of citizenship, the 2009 closure of certain professions to work permits, and the 2010 Immigration Bill's summary deportation procedures, further disadvantage this group. Surprisingly, Nigerians are relatively politically active. They naturalize and vote in higher numbers than their Polish counterparts. The African migrants have set up some ethnic organizations and are led by a strong if small cadre of activists focused primarily on the specific problems of the community (**Table V.2**).

The chapter proceeds as follows. The first section traces the constellation of legal categories in Ireland and Spain and places the four cohorts within it. The following section discusses relevant legislation and policy. Next, the chapter summarizes active political participation patterns. Naturalization rates, running and voting in local elections, trade union membership and other political activism, as well as community mobilization are considered. Each section discusses Poles, Nigerians, Ecuadorians, and Bulgarians in turn. The findings are based on analysis of policies and laws, governmental and non-governmental reports, statistical data, secondary studies, as well as interviews with relevant ethnic representatives and local stakeholders.[263]

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[263] To survey the active political participation of Poles and Nigerians in Ireland, the thesis focused on the 2004 and 2009 local elections in Dublin. Data sources include Irish immigration and asylum legislation; a

V.2. Legal Status

V.2.1. Legal Status in Ireland

Like most Western European countries, Ireland assigns foreigners to different legal categories. Foreign nationals can arrive as European Union citizens, foreign workers, or their spouses. They can also be classified as students, asylum seekers, tourists, or undocumented migrants. These official labels influence the reception of each group within the receiving society. Legal status determines which laws and policies affect the immigrants and what social, economic and political resources are available to them. However, reception and incorporation patterns also occur in spite of the immigrants' official status. As this and the following section demonstrate, local stakeholders interpret legal classifications creatively in order to justify foreign populations' welcome or rejection. The local implementation of laws and policies follows the logic of identity politics to exclude even foreign cohorts holding a privileged legal status, while including immigrant workers disadvantaged by their legal classification. The very construction of legal categories includes considerations of cultural proximity and distance.

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series of reports by the Economic and Social Research Institute (McGinnity et al., 2011; O'Connell & Joyce, 2009; Quinn, 2010); a survey by the Immigrant Council of Ireland (ICI, 2008); data and reports by the Department of Enterprise, Trade and Innovation (DETI) and the Department of Justice, Equality and Law Reform; figures by the Reception and Integration Agency (RIA) and the Office of the Refugee Applications Commissioner (ORAC); a study of ethnic candidates by Fanning and O'Boyle (2010); volumes by Fanning (2011) and Lentin and Moreo (2012); reports by the Africa Centre; a 2009 editorial series by the ethnic newspaper *Metro Eireann*; data by the Irish statistical office; as well as this researcher's interviews with immigrant representatives in ethnic associations and local political and administrative actors. In the case of Ecuadorians and Bulgarians in Madrid, the focus is on the local elections of 2007 and 2011. Data sources comprise Spanish migration legislation; a series of reports by the Ministry of Labor and Migration (MTIN) and the Madrid Autonomous Community; exposes on legal status in Spain by the European Migration Network [EMN] (2011) and Rodríguez-Ferrand (2013); scholarly reports on immigrant political rights by Bertoli et al. (2010), Juberías and Alonso (2008), Mateos and Durand (2012), Muñoz (2009), Pérez-Nievas, Vintila, Morales, and Paradés (2014), and Zapata-Barrero and Zaragoza (2009); studies on integration campaigns by Arango (2012), the European Commission (Bertozi, 2010), and Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX); information on immigrant unionism and civic activism by Meardi, Martín and Riera (2012) and Gómez and Cubillo (2010); and as well as relevant interviews with ethnic representatives and local stakeholders.

Table V.3. Certificates of Registration Types, Ireland

Stamp	Category
1	Non-EU nationals with employment or business permit
1A	Non-EU nationals in full time training (no other employment permitted)
2	Non-EU national students (limitations to work permission)
2A	Non-EU national students (not permitted to work)
3	Non-EU nationals not permitted to work
4	People permitted to work without a permit, incl. non-EU nationals, spouses of Irish/EU nationals, parents to Irish-born child (ICB), leave to remain, refugees, non-EU intra-company transfers, temporary doctors, non-EU nationals with work visas
4 EU FAM	Non-EU national family member to EU citizen (no permit required to work)
5	Non-EU nationals in Ireland for eight years and permitted to remain without time conditions (no permit required to work)
6	Irish national with dual citizenship

Source: Department of Justice, Equality and Law Reform (amended from O'Connell & Joyce, 2009, p. 10).

There are several migrant classifications in Ireland.[264] EU immigrants benefit from the most entitlements and are guided by European Union directives rather than national or local policy. They can reside in Ireland freely if they are self-sufficient, employed, or self-employed. On the other hand, non-EU nationals must register with the Garda National Immigration Bureau (GNIB) and receive an immigration stamp denoting their status (O'Connell & Joyce, 2009) (**Table V.3**).

Labor migrants possess the strongest entitlements apart from EU citizens. After an overhaul of the system in 2007, high-skilled workers are issued a green card entitling them to enter Ireland without a market test, change employers and occupations, reunite with families immediately, and renew their permit indefinitely only after two years. This legal category is the closest proxy for long-term residency in Ireland (Employment Permit Act, 2006; ICI, 2008, pp. 68-69; McGinnity et al., 2011, p. 19). On the other hand, low-skilled workers, given work permits or work visas, are entitled to fewer rights. They

[264] For a detailed description of legal categories in Ireland, consult Appendix C.

depend on specific employers for stable legal status. Their job offer is contingent on a market test and the impossibility to fill the position with workers from Ireland or the EU. Family reunification rights are limited or delayed and permit renewals are short-term. With economic downturn in 2007, multiple occupations were in fact closed to work permits (Department of Enterprise, Trade and Innovation [DETI], 2010) (**Table V.3**).

Foreign students receive a Stamp 2 certification in Ireland and have fewer rights than immigrant workers (**Table V.3**). They must be enrolled in full-time study to maintain their status, have limited work permission, carry no family reunification privileges, and cannot apply the time spent in Ireland toward naturalization requirements. A two-tier system introduced in 2009 excludes students engaged in language study from immigration entitlements (McGinnity et al., 2011, p.10; Quinn, 2010, p. 30).

While recognized refugees have similar rights to those of Irish and European citizens, asylum seekers are entitled to few protections (ICI, 2008; McGinnity et al., 2011, p. 12; RIA, 2010). If their application is refused by the Office of the Refugee Applications Commissioner (ORAC) or the Refugee Appeals Tribunal (RAT), they depend on the discretion of the Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform to grant them subsidiary protection or Leave to Remain (McGinnity et al., 2011, p. 12). While awaiting determination, asylum seekers fall outside the scope of integration policy. They are dispersed to lower-income or small homogenous communities. Applicants are not allowed to work and are housed in direct provision facilities, where they are provided meals and a weekly allowance of €19.10 per adult and €9.52 per child (McGinnity et al., 2011, p. 12). Relatedly, parents of children born in Ireland prior to 2005 are given

discretionary permission to stay similar to the Leave to Remain and live in Ireland with few and unstable rights (ICI, 2008, pp. 70-71) (**Table V.3**).

Finally, undocumented migrants are not entitled to social or political resources and are subject to deportation. Still, a temporary scheme introduced in 2009 grants those who became undocumented through no fault of their own four months to secure an employment permit. Unfortunately, the scheme is not permanent, leaving undocumented immigrants in a precarious situation (ICI, 2008, pp. 70-71; McGinnity et al., 2011, pp. 11-12).

Table V.4. Poles' and Nigerians' Current and Arrival Migration Status

Status at arrival	Nigerian (%)	East European (%)	Current status	Nigerian (%)	East European (%)
EU citizen	1	67	EU citizen	2	94
Work permit	5	15	Work permit/visa	6	1
Work visa	0	0	Spouse of work visa/permit holder	3	1
Spouse of work visa/permit	2	3	Leave to remain	34	0
Student visa	7	3	Family reunification	1	0
Asylum seeker	72	2	Student visa	5	0
Tourist visa	1	4	Asylum seeker	15	0
Undocumented	4	1	Undocumented	1	0
Unanswered	8	4	Other/Unanswered	33	4

Source: Table modified from Tables 2.7 and 2.8 by the ICI (2008, pp. 67-68).

These legal designations are accompanied by different entitlements and are guided by different legal and administrative measures. Since most Polish immigrants arrived in Ireland as European Union citizens or work permit holders, they enjoy a

multitude of legal-political rights in the receiving country. In a 2008 study by the Immigrant Council of Ireland, two thirds of Eastern European participants arrived in Ireland as EU nationals, and another 15% were work permit holders. At the time of the report, 94% self-identified as EU citizens (**Table V.4**). The ICI respondents are thus entitled to unrestricted access to living and working in Ireland and cannot be deported (ICI, 2008, pp. 67-68). The situation of this project's interviewees is similar, with only 15% requiring authorization. Of those 15%, 5% entered Ireland on the basis of a work permit, 5% arrived on a tourist visa and acquired a work permit, and the remaining 5% came as spouses of Irish nationals or work permit holders. The remaining 85% arrived as EU nationals in the first place. All regularized their status after 2004. As one participant shares, "before 2004, there were some people here but they were illegal and were afraid of the Garda as they could be deported. And employers were even worse. So the EU helped because we could work and be legal" (Kevin, 27). Native stakeholders' perception of Poles' legality is even more significant. According to one respondent, "[the Polish] had the right to be here … to work, to access the Irish system, be it employment or education … and were able to enforce those rights" (D26-ADMIN).

On the other hand, a majority of Nigerian immigrants entered Ireland as asylum seekers, students or undocumented workers, thus occupying the least privileged legal categories. Nigeria was the top country in terms of asylum applications to Ireland until 2011, providing for one third of all application in 2001-2005, one fourth of all applications in 2006-2008, and one fifth of applications in 2009-2010 (ORAC, 2002-2012) (**Table V.5**). According to the Reception and Integration Authority, there were 6,725 persons living in direct provision in Ireland in 2004. Of those, almost 2,000 were of

Nigerian nationality, and so were the majority of the 1,280 Irish-born children included in this number (RIA, 2005). The ICI confirms these numbers, even though many of the ICI's respondents have been granted leave to remain since they first came to Dublin (**Table V.4**). More than seven in ten of the ICI's participants arrived in Ireland as asylum seekers. However, only 15% remain in the asylum system.

Table V.5. Asylum Applications by Nigerian Nationals in Ireland, 2001-2011

Year	Total Asylum Applications (N)	Nigerian Applications (N)	Nigerian Applications (% of total)
2001	10,325	3,461	33.5%
2002	11,634	4,050	34.8%
2003	7,900	3,110	39.4%
2004	4,766	1,776	37.3%
2005	4,323	1,278	29.6%
2006	4,314	1,038	24.1%
2007	3,985	1,028	25.8%
2008	3,866	1,009	26.1%
2009	2,689	569	21.2%
2010	1,939	387	20.0%
2011	1,290	182	14.1%

Source: ORAC, 2002-2012.

Fewer of the Nigerian interviewees in this dissertation passed through the Irish asylum system. A majority of the respondents (40%) entered the receiving country as students. One fifth came through the asylum system and another 20% arrived as labor migrants. An additional 10% came as undocumented migrants. Currently, half of the participants have permission to reside and work in Ireland, 10% are "stuck" in the asylum system, 20% are in Ireland as dependents, and 10% remain undocumented.

To conclude, most Polish immigrants in Dublin hold a legal status that endows them with political entitlements similar to those of Irish citizens. As EU citizens, the Polish are subject to liberal European directives rather than restrictive national policy. In

comparison to their Polish counterparts, Nigerian immigrants appear disadvantaged, since at one time they occupied the migrant designations associated with the fewest rights. A closer inspection reveals that differences in legal status between the two groups are exaggerated. On the one hand, Polish nationals arriving in Ireland prior to 2004 were often undocumented, like their Nigerian counterparts. On the other hand, Nigerians in Dublin today should have rights similar to these of Polish EU citizens, since they are most commonly recognized refugees or long-term work permit holders.

However, subjective interpretation of legal categories serves to widen the gap between Poles and Nigerians in Dublin once again. Irish political actors argue that Nigerians are mostly asylum seekers and thus have "the greatest difficulty" in integrating (D2-TU). There is a clear hierarchy among ethnic groups according to expert respondents, with Polish citizens placing towards the top as settled EU nationals with a multitude of entitlements and Nigerian citizens placing towards the bottom as undocumented migrants or asylum seekers who are vulnerable in all spheres of life in Dublin (D27-TU). While the Polish are recognized to have "the right to work," Nigerians are believed to have a very different entry route (D26-ADMIN). In view of the subjective interpretation of legal status, Poles are assigned the highest value for this indicator of political incorporation, while the Nigerian group is given a lower value of 2 (**Table V.2**).

The very creation of legal categories is driven by identity politics, moreover. The status of a parent of an Irish-born child was created specifically with Nigerians in mind and was endowed with limited and unstable rights. Exclusion and inclusion often occur regardless of legal status or through the reinterpretation of legal categories to fit perceived identity characteristics.

V.2.2. Legal Status in Spain

Considerations of identity are written into the Spanish system of immigrant legal status. Spain grants entry and assigns rights to foreigners on the basis of a visa and permit system, like Ireland. European citizens, such as Bulgarians, should constitute the only category exempt from the limitations of national and local policies, according to EU directives. However, citizens from countries with ties to Spain, such as Ecuador, are also granted beneficial treatment by Spanish authorities (Rodríguez-Ferrand, 2013). The complexity and fluidity of the system allow non-EU immigrants to transition among designations and acquire a favorable legal status. They also allow national and local authorities to interpret legal status and justify the inclusion of third-country nationals considered similar to Spaniards or the exclusion of EU migrants found to be different.

Despite the complexity of classifying immigrants in Spain, foreigners are placed in an array of legal categories, associated with graduated rights, much like in Ireland.[265] EU immigrants are supposed to benefit from the most entitlements and be guided by European Union directives rather than national or local policy. They can live in work in the host country without a visa or a permit. However, unlike in Ireland, EU nationals need to register on the *padrón*, a list of all the people living in a city or town, and obtain a residence certificate, which requires proof of financial means and valid health insurance. Much like other foreigners in Spain, EU citizens are entered in the Central Register of Foreign Nationals and receive a Foreigner's Identity Number (NIE) which they must carry at all times. EU citizens are also encouraged to register with the General Social Security Fund in exchange for tax benefits. These measures effectively move control of EU nationals from the supranational to the municipal level (EMN, 2011; Expatica, 2014).

[265] For a detailed description of legal status in Spain, consult Appendix C.

One more category of persons did not require a visa to Spain, at least until 2003, unlike in the case of Ireland. Nationals of countries who have concluded bilateral agreements with Spain, such as Ecuador, did not need to obtain a visa to Spain if they resided and worked in the country for no longer than three months within a six-month period. This visa-free entry permitted Latin Americans' unregulated admission into the fluid Spanish migration system (Jokisch, 2007).

All other immigrants to Spain need to obtain a visa prior to their entry, in a bid to prevent irregular migration. Labor migrants, both low- and high-skilled ones, are at the center of the permit regime. They can enter Spain through the general worker regime or via the yearly contingents. Immigrants are further attracted to fill jobs for which Spaniards are unavailable based on a hard-to-fill occupations catalog within he general regime. Occupations on the catalog are mostly medium or low-skilled. They are not regulated by market tests on the basis of recommendation by benevolent trade unions assessing local economic needs (Ministerio de Trabajo e Inmigración [MTIN], 2009).

While most European countries afford highly skilled workers a number of privileges, Spanish authorities grant rights to foreign workers on the basis of length of residence instead (**Table V.6**).[266] Standard work permits (Type B) limit the professions or geographic area available to their third-country holders. However, after renewal of the permit, all foreign employees are granted more flexibility, culminating in freedom of residence and employment in Spain. In effect, all immigrants require a job offer from a specific employer prior to their arrival in Spain, yet are entitled to rights similar to these

[266] As there are perpetual shortages in the agricultural and service sectors, for instance, low- and middle-skilled workers enjoy privileged entry and status in the country, unlike in other European migration countries (MTIN, 2009).

of natives and EU citizens after working in the country for five years (Iabogado, 2015; MTIN, 2009). There are few differences between the rights of high- and low-skilled workers. The only special privilege is afforded to holders of the special jobseeker visa, who are allowed to enter Spain without a job offer and move freely about the country while seeking employment. Ministerial Order reserves a number of such visas for the sons, daughters and grandchildren of Spaniards in Latin America (EMN, 2011).

Table V.6. Work Permit Types, Spain

Type	Category
A	Seasonal worker (9-month time limit)
B	Initial permit for 1 year and 2-year renewal (geographical, sectorial, job limitations)
C	After Type B renewal (valid for any job across Spain)
D	Self-employed initial permit (1-year and renewal for 2 additional year)
E	Long-term (3-year) permit for self-employed, after Type D renewal
F	Shuttle workers (daily return to home country) (for 5 years, renewable)
Permanent	Any professional activity in Spain (renewed every 5 years, after Type C or Type E)
Extraordinary	Non-EU nationals who have helped Spanish economic and cultural progress (renewed every 5 years)

Source: Author from EMN, 2011 and Iabogado, 2015.

These coming to Spain for family reunification can join their relatives after one year and are assigned the same status as their partners (**Table V.6**). They are treated as potential workers and are granted permanent residence after a shorter period than their worker spouses or parents (EMN, 2011). Family members in Spain, therefore, enjoy more rights that relatives arriving to other EU immigration states, including Ireland.

Foreign students are granted fewer rights than EU citizens, labor migrants or foreign family members. While EU students do not need a visa for Spain, they still need

to register with local authorities. Third-country nationals require proof of their course of study and have limited work and family reunification rights (Expatica, 2014).[267]

Asylum seekers occupy little space in Spanish public discourse, unlike in Ireland, and are guided by European directives. The asylum procedure is expedited, with the application decision process supposed to occur with one year. Unsuccessful applicants are immediately deported. These awaiting a decision are not subject to direct provision or dispersal, but are entitled to work after six months in Spain. Those recognized as refugees by the Ministry of the Interior are granted rights similar to the rights of natives and enjoy privileged access to Spanish nationality (Ministerio del Interior, 2010). Unlike in the Irish case, the category of asylum seekers is treated as a potential worker pool.

Finally, while combatting irregular migration is an explicit aim of Spanish immigration policy, the fluidity of the Spanish permit system confers more privileges upon undocumented migrants than does the Irish system (MTIN, 2009). Even the undocumented have access to universal healthcare or educational resources locally (Hazán, 2014). They are continuously channeled into legal employment through large-scale regularization drives. Irregular migrants who have been in the country for a two-year period and have worked for at least six months; these who have ties to Spanish residents and have engaged in cultural and social integration programs; as well as the parents of Spanish children or children of parents who are Spanish by origin are brought into legality based on their integration potential and efforts (Rodríguez-Ferrand, 2013).

Based on this system, Ecuadorians are afforded multiple rights and additional benefits than other immigrants in Spain. A majority of Ecuadorians came to Spain

[267] While family members can visit foreign students during their academic career in Spain, they are not entitled to long-term family reunification, work, or residence permits and must be financially self-sufficient (Expatica, 2014).

through legal channels, with an advance job offer. Even if arriving without employment, unlike Bulgarians for instance, the South Americans were entitled to visa-free entry in Spain, a period providing ample time to acquire a work contract. In a study by Rodríguez-Planas and Vegas (2012), 90.2% of male and 89.3% of Ecuadorian respondents were working in Spain legally in 2007. One tenth arrived in the country with a job offer. The remainder employed the visa-free regime for Latin American migrants, where 60% became legal work permit holders within a month of their migration. In comparison, only 60% of Romanians in the same report were in Spain legally. Among Latin American respondents in this study, almost seventy percent migrated to Madrid on the basis of a work contract, and are long-term residents or nationality applicants (**Table V.7**). Consequently, Ecuadorians have rights similar to these of the native population and EU citizens, where they can initiate family reunification, occupy a multitude of economic positions, travel freely, and even vote in local elections. Even the minority of Ecuadorians who were at one time irregular in Madrid have quick access to legality, as they can apply for residence based on cultural and social ties to the receiving context, a privilege fewer Eastern European possess (Rodríguez-Ferrand, 2013). While they are not EU citizens, therefore, Ecuadorians in Spain are not disadvantaged by their legal status.

Surprisingly, Bulgarians do not occupy an especially privileged legal status in Madrid, despite their EU citizenship. All Bulgarians in Spain are currently categorized as EU nationals and enjoy rights of free movement, employment, and family reunification. However, these privileges are on par with the rights of other long-term residents in the country, like Ecuadorians. What is more, Bulgarians coming to Spain in the 1990s held an irregular or temporary worker status in Madrid. According to a 2005 study with 202

Bulgarians, 56% of participants resided in Madrid illegally, 7% were working while on a tourist visa, and 37% regularized their status through a job offer or the amnesty programs of 2001 and 2002 (Markova, 2005). Trends are similar among the interviewees in this project. Only one fifth moved to Spain after the removal of all barriers to East European labor in 2009. Almost half came to Spain without a contract and worked in the underground economy until they could regularize their status. Only 17.5% came through formal channels, on the basis of bilateral agreements in anticipation of EU enlargement. One respondent arrived as a foreign student, yet subsequently acquired residency status as a foreign laborer. The remaining 12.5% gained entry to Spain as family members of established Bulgarian migrants, yet also became work permit holders (**Table V.7**).

Table V.7. Ecuadorians' and Bulgarians' Current and Arrival Migration Status

Status at arrival	**Ecuadorian (%)**	**Bulgarian (%)**	**Current status**	**Ecuadorian (%)**	**Bulgarian (%)**
EU citizen	0	20	EU citizen	0	100
Work permit	67	17.5	Work permit	0	0
	-	-	Long-term resident	89	0
Family member	11	12.5	Family member	0	0
Student	0	2.5	Student	0	0
Asylum seeker	0	0	Asylum seeker	0	0
Irregular/visa overstayer	22	47.5	Irregular/ visa overstayer	11	0

Source: Author.

To conclude, much like in the case of Dublin, local stakeholders in Madrid construct and interpret legal status on the basis of identity politics in order to include familiar groups and exclude unfamiliar ones. In theory, Bulgarians should occupy the most privileged legal category as EU citizens and should enjoy a multitude of unlimited

rights. Despite their EU citizenship, however, Bulgarians hold legal standing similar to that of third-country Ecuadorians. While they are currently entitled to freedom of work, residence, and travel, Bulgarians were much more likely than Ecuadorians to be working and residing in the country undocumented prior to 2009. European Union nationality does not protect against local measures of control and might actually render the Balkan migrants ineligible for incorporation resources. The East Europeans are thus assigned a lower value of 4 for this component of political incorporation (**Table V.2**).

Since foreign workers are the centerpiece of the Spanish permit and residency system, Ecuadorians in Spain are privileged by their legal entry as laborers, and share in the rights of European citizens after the acquisition of long-term residence. Even irregular entrants have quick access to legality through claims of social and cultural ties to the host city. Non-EU status is not a disadvantage but might even serve as a privilege for the South Americans, as it entitles them to numerous integration and employment programs and benefits. European harmonization does not serve to undermine the Latin Americans' rights in Spain, since there is a similarly strong pull for continued reciprocal privileges between Spain and the Iberian-American community. Ecuadorians are also assigned a 4 for this indicator of political integration (**Table V.2**).

V.3. Law and Policy

V.3.1. Law and Policy in Ireland

Legal status, but more importantly local stakeholders' interpretation of it, translates into different immigration, asylum, and integration laws and policies for Poles and Nigerians in Ireland (**Table V.8**). As Ireland only recently became an immigration

country, until the late 1990s and early 2000s, the *Aliens Act of 1935* and *Aliens Order 1946*, as amended, determined the management of foreign nationals. Ireland also adopted European directives on the right of residence after joining the EU in 1973. With increased asylum and immigration flows since the 1990s, the legal framework was updated by the *Refugee Act of 1996* and the *Immigration Acts of 1999, 2003 and 2004*. Most measures prior to EU enlargement in 2004 were aimed at asylum seekers, refugees, and undocumented migrants, and implicitly tied to Nigerian immigrants. Provisions since 2003 mostly address EU nationals and the Polish group.

Table V.8. Immigration, Asylum and Integration Legislature in Ireland

Aliens Act, 1935
Irish Nationality and Citizenship Acts 1956, 1986, 1994, 2001 and 2004
The Prohibition of Incitement to Hatred Act, 1989
Refugee Act (As Amended), 1996
Employment Equality Act, 1998
Equal Status Act, 2000
Employment Permits Act, 2003, 2006
Equality Act, 2004
Immigration Act, 1999
Illegal Immigrants (Trafficking) Act, 2000
Immigration Act, 2003
Immigration Act, 2004
EU Accession Treaty, 2004
Criminal Law (Human Trafficking) Act, 2008
(Immigration, Residence and Protection Bill, 2010) (Still under Debate)

Source: Reproduced from McGinnity et al., 2011.

Current laws and policies only moved the immigration framework forward in an ad hoc and reactive approach by responding to specific problems after they arose. The system is yet to be modernized and codified. Therefore, policy is administrative and discretionary rather than based in legislature. It is less influenced by European Union prerogatives than by principles of the Common Travel Area with the UK (McGinnity et al., 2011).

V.3.1.1. Laws, Policies, and the Polish Worker

The Polish in Dublin are guided primarily by European Commission directives. Those in Ireland prior to 2004 were initially subject to Irish labor laws and required work permits, yet currently enjoy relatively unrestricted rights of residence, work, and movement. As a result, policy, rather than legislature, affects Polish migrants in Ireland. Irish policies, including the implementation of EU enlargement, the filling of labor shortages, or the construction of integration programs, benefit the Polish, with only a few exceptions. Polish immigrants in Dublin, moreover, interact with benevolent national and local institutions, like the Office for the Minister of Integration, rather than the harsh agents of control faced by Nigerians. The focus in managing the East Europeans is placed on language acquisition, social rights, and integration.

There are several turning points concerning Polish immigrants in Dublin (**Figure V.1**). Ireland, together only with the UK and Sweden, opened its doors to citizens of the EU acceding member states in 2004 (Fanning, 2011, p. 16). It codified into national law the *European Convention on Human Rights Act* in 2003 to allow for the arrival of Eastern European immigrants (O'Connell & Joyce, 2009, p. 16). Consequently, nationals of the EU10 countries are admitted "without restriction" to reside and work in Ireland (Quinn, 2010, p. 12). Polish workers are regulated by the EU's *Statement on Principles of Integration* and *Equality Principles*, much like British citizens in Ireland (D29-ADMIN). They are no longer constrained by harsh domestic regulations and are guaranteed strong political, economic, and social rights. Irish politicians, Polish individuals, and ethnic organizations consider the removal of all boundaries, which was not replicated in the case of Bulgarian and Romanian workers, a major advantage (D26-ADMIN; D29-ADMIN;

D34-PO; D35-P; D38-PO).[268] Irish stakeholders interpret the open access as a "conscious policy" to welcome a highly-qualified pool of European labor to fill low- and high-skilled labor shortages in the country. The policy choice is also deemed a political calculation. By supporting the widening of the European Union, the Irish could act as "good Europeans" and overcome the "embarrassment" of rejecting the Nice Treaty (D16-ADMIN; D26-ADMIN; D29-ADMIN). Welcoming the Polish is therefore a step to reassert Ireland's European identity.

Figure V.1. Turning Points in Irish Immigration Policy



[268] After unprecedented levels of immigration, as well as with economic contraction, Ireland chose to impose a work permit on citizens from Bulgaria and Romania after 2007, and thus maintain agreement with UK policy and the coherence of the Common Travel Area (McGinnity et al., 2011, p. 9; Quinn, 2010, p. 14).

A second major turning point, and one intimately related to the implementation of EU enlargement in Ireland, is to frame Ireland as a country of controlled labor migration (**Figure V.1**). This framing is interpreted to warrant "reducing asylum and refugee claims," while encouraging economic migration from the new European member states (D26-ADMIN). Dublin's administrative actors admit refusing asylum claims at a higher rate than in the past, while diverting immigration and integration resources to labor migrants (D29-ADMIN). Certain professions have been closed to third-country nationals and employers "[have been] mandated by the government through the employment test to select Irish first, EU next, Romanian and Bulgarian workers next, and only after third-country nationals" (D21-ADMIN). Thus, Polish and other EU10 nationals are consciously chosen to provide for labor shortages in Ireland and are actively recruited through job fairs in their home countries.

Several legislative and policy developments underlie the emphasis on controllable labor mobility from within the enlarged Europe. The *Employment Permits Act 2003* placed work permits on a statutory basis for the first time, and introduced penalties for non-compliance for employers and employees. The Act ensured that labor shortages are filled through migrants from the new member states who no longer require authorization by increasing the opportunity costs of hiring third-country nationals (O'Connell & Joyce, 2009, p. 45; Quinn, 2010, p.17). What is more, Ireland did not institute any measures of cooperation on labor migration with third countries or guidelines for the recognition of the qualifications of third-country nationals. However, the International Employment Unit of the Irish Training and Employment Agency (Foras Áiseanna Saothair or FÁS), together with large private employers like Intel, organized a number of job fairs for

lower-skilled services in Eastern Europe (D29-ADMIN; Quinn, 2010, pp. 61-62). Agencies and employers looked for workers for the construction, hospitality, and IT industries in Poland, Latvia, and Lithuania in particular (D17-ADMIN). Government-led initiatives trickled down to local employers who conducted their own recruitment fairs fashioned after the national ones (D27-TU).

Policy reports by the Irish National and Economic and Social Council (NESC) and the Expert Group on Future Skills Needs (EGFSN) to the Department of Trade, Enterprise, and Innovation underpin Ireland's labor strategy. In *Managing Migration in Ireland: A Social and Economic Perspective* (2006), the NESC argued that with foreign investment, a better domestic situation and expansion of the labor force, managed immigration was necessary to sustain economic growth and boost the competitiveness of the Irish economy. Single East European laborers would increase flexibility in service sectors like hotels or catering and reduce prices for Irish consumers (Fanning, 2011, pp. 25-26; National Economic and Social Council [NESC], 2006). However, the complementary report *Skills Needs in the Irish Economy: The Role of Migration* (2005) posited that the focus should be on educating the native population and attracting Irish returnees. Filling labor shortages through third-country nationals was rejected as it would lead to a spiral of mobility. The 2007 *National Skills Strategy* suggested that migration had a limited role in rendering Ireland a modern, knowledge-based economy. However, the report identified managed mobility from Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Slovakia, the Czech Republic, and the UK as a source of educated labor to fill high- and low-skilled shortages. On the other hand, third-country nationals would account only for highly qualified positions still unfilled by European migrants. Their migration would be curbed

through the limiting of work permits to specific economic sectors and professions (Expert Group on Future Skills Needs [EGFSN], 2005, 2007). These recommendations were codified in the *Employment Permits Act 2006* and the *National Reform Program 2008-2010* (Department of the Taoiseach, 2009).

A third turning point is the development of integration efforts to address the mass migration of Eastern Europeans to Ireland (**Figure V.1**). There were few integration initiatives in Ireland prior to European Union enlargement in 2004. After the arrival of a large number of Eastern European citizens with expansion, however, the Office of the Minister for Integration (OMI) was established in 2007 to develop integration policy for all legally-resident immigrants in Ireland. Irish administrators and Office representatives recognize the OMI as a direct response to the large-scale influx of Polish workers. As the Ministry transformed from a unit under the Department of Justice to its own institution in 2008, Irish representatives suggest a conscious move from control towards inclusion. The current Ministry is considered much "kinder" than its predecessor (D29-ADMIN).

The OMI's activities focus largely on the Polish community and overlook other immigrant groups in Dublin. In fact, protection applicants fall outside the scope of integration policy. The OMI's first report *Migration Nation* (2008) calls for partnership between government and non-government organizations; linkage between integration policy and social inclusion; public policy to avoid the ghettoization of immigrant communities; as well as local delivery (Fanning, 2011, p. 38; Office of Minister for Integration [OMI], 2008). The document argues for cooperation among all actors, including immigrant communities and the receiving society (D29-ADMIN; McGinnity et al., 2011, pp. 13-14; Quinn, 2010, p. 37). The OMI also encouraged different

governmental departments to develop their own integration strategies, resulting for instance in the *Intercultural Education Strategy* (Department of Education and Skills, 2010) and the *National Intercultural Health Strategy 2007-2012* (Health Services Executive [HSE], 2007). The Ministry focuses on combating work exploitation among immigrants, and thus targets economic migrants from within the enlarged EU in particular (D29-ADMIN; McGinnity et al., 2011, pp. 13-14). The Office also stresses intercultural education, and especially English language provision. Polish immigrants take advantage of vocational and language training most frequently (D29-ADMIN; Quinn, 2010, pp. 37-38).

In 2010, the Office set up a Ministerial Council on Integration to establish a direct connection between the Minister and immigrant communities, as well as a consultative process of policy-making. The Council meets in four regional fora, each including fifteen to twenty members from key immigrant populations. It provides for local involvement in debating and building integration policy (McGinnity et al., 2011, p. 14). The Office argues that the Councils were "conceived with the specific immigration make-up of Ireland in mind", namely the predominance of Polish nationals in the country. Therefore, meetings focus on English language instruction rather than citizenship or legal status, issues significant to the Nigerian community (D29-ADMIN). The large number of Polish members at the Dublin regional board gives voice to the Polish community (D33-PO).

Despite these favorable developments, there have been reversals in Poles' rights in Dublin. Most notably, while Ireland opened its borders to nationals from the new EU members, it did introduce some restrictions to their migration in fear of labor market inundation. Particularly, the *Social Welfare Act 2004* created the Habitual Residency

Condition (HRC) that restricts EU and non-EU migrants' access to social assistance and child benefits (O'Connell & Joyce, 2009, p. 45). Benefits are withheld for the first two years of residence in Ireland or if the applicant has no significant ties to the receiving country (McGinnity et al., 2011, p. 9). Polish organizations deemed the law a legal way of circumventing European "soft law" and the rights inherent in European citizenship (D35-PO). Since assessing eligibility for social assistance is discretionary, changing attitudes and economic climate can impair social welfare decisions and undermine Poles' social inclusion in Dublin. Still, redress mechanisms exist, where organizations like Crosscare are recognized as legitimate actors to appeal negative decisions on behalf of their Polish clients (D36-PO).

In sum, political, legislative, and administrative changes have enhanced the political rights of the Polish community in Dublin, even after economic downturn. Ireland was one of only three countries to open its doors to citizens from the new EU member states. National and local policy directives designated Polish economic migrants as the main source of filling skilled and unskilled labor shortages in Ireland, provided for the active recruitment of Polish workers to Dublin, and created institutions to solidify their employment rights. Polish immigrants in Dublin are the primary beneficiaries of the recent emphasis on integration in Dublin, as they avail of the OMI's language and educational resources and dominate the Ministerial Councils. The Polish community interacts mostly with actors dedicated to their incorporation in Irish society, namely the OMI, FÁS, and a slew of Polish advocacy and service organizations, rather than the harsh agents of control in charge of the Nigerian community. Therefore, Polish workers are assigned a high value for this indicator of political integration (**Table V.2**).

V.3.1.2. Laws, Policies, and the Nigerian Immigrant

On the other hand, Nigerians' rights are undermined by legislative and policy changes in Ireland, often to the benefit of Polish immigrants. Asylum law in Ireland is arbitrary and discretionary, putting many Nigerian immigrants in a precarious position. The change in citizenship laws in 2004 not only deprived Irish-born Nigerian children of Irish nationality but also undermined the rights of their parents. Reforms in immigration law restrict the entry and entitlements of the African group. Changes in Ireland's labor policy closed multiple professions to third-country nationals, in order to encourage migration only from within the European Union. Integration policy fails to address the specific needs of Nigerian immigrants in Ireland. The Africans fall under the jurisdiction of harsh Irish institutions focused on undermining their rights (D42-NO; Taylor, 30).

Several legal and policy developments circumscribe the political rights of Nigerians in Dublin (**Figure V.1**). The very construction of asylum legislature and policy aims at restricting Nigerians' entitlements. As unfamiliar asylum seekers were the first immigrant population to enter homogenous Ireland in the 1990s, they engendered public, media and political discourses emphasizing the "bogus refugee" coming to swindle the Irish welfare system.[269] The *1996 Refugee Act* consequently codified asylum application procedures with a focus on exclusion and placed relevant asylum institutions like the Office of the Refugee Applications Commissioner (ORAC) under the aegis of the control-oriented Department of Justice, Equality, and Law Reform (Fanning, 2011, p. 44; Lentin & Moreo, 2010; O'Connell & Joyce, 2009, pp. 19, 44). The Act's implementation

[269] To quote one example, Ivor Callely, Member of Parliament for Fianna Fail, reflected the general sentiment when he publicly asserted in 1997 that "rogue" asylum seekers were "carrying on a culture that is not akin to Irish culture" and "should be kicked out." Such widespread populist media and political discourse created moral panic in the receiving society with emphasis on "refugee crises," "swamping," or "flooding" by "a new army of poor" "sponger refugees" (Loyal, 2011, p. 84).

in 1997 was particularly heavy-handed, with immigration officers granted expansive powers to deny entry and deport asylum-seeking "aliens." Treatment of asylum seekers deteriorated even further in 1999, when prominent politicians declared the asylum issue an "administrative crisis" regardless of the low absolute numbers of refugees in Ireland.[270] The Department of Justice instituted a system of dispersal, where asylum seekers were settled away from Dublin into small, homogenous, and unwelcoming communities. Such dispersal caused intense racist reactions among the hosts, such as the arson of a refugee hostel in Clogheen, County Tipperary, the blocking off of a hotel in County Wexford to prevent the relocation of asylum seekers there, or calls to institute mandatory AIDS screening for the new arrivals (D1-J; Fanning, 2002, p.105). Direct provision complements dispersal, where asylum seekers are provided with full room and "a residual income maintenance payment to cover personal requisites" of €19.10 per adult and €9.60 per child per week (Moreo, 2012a, pp. 162-163). Direct provision does not have a statutory basis and falls beyond the purview of equality legislation (Loyal, 2011, p. 102).

The Irish asylum system is even more restrictive since the new millennium. The *1999 Immigration Act*, *Illegal Immigrant Trafficking Bill 1999*, and the *Immigration Act 2003*, for instance, normalized the deportation of unsuccessful asylum seekers, co-opted transportation companies in surveilling Irish asylum seekers, and instituted sending applicants back to "safe countries of origin" despite persistent danger (Loyal, 2011, p. 83; O'Connell & Joyce, 2009, pp. 19, 44-45). The government signed bilateral readmission agreements with Nigeria, and imposed much narrower definitions of what actually

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[270] Ireland received the lowest absolute number of asylum applications within the European Union in 2000, with only 2.4% of the total (Loyal, 2011, pp. 84-85).

constitutes “refugee status” (Loyal, 2011, p. 83). There are regular “deportation flights” where unsuccessful Nigerian asylum seekers are transported back to the home country without deliberation (D25-J). The acceptance rate for African asylum applicants is considered “practically zero” and a “systematic way of rejecting people” by the interviewees (D2-NO; D44-NO). While in 1995 the recognition rate for asylum applications was as high as 57%, it fell to only 1% in 2010 (the lowest rate within the EU). The acceptance rate is particularly low for Nigerian immigrants, with only 0.6% granted status in 2004, compared to a 7.3% average cited by the UNHCR (Loyal, 2011, pp. 87-88). Since all attempts to codify the asylum system have so far failed, finally, the asylum system is arbitrary, particularly in the case of African immigrants (D42-NO; D44-NO). With administrative discretion, processing times are lengthy, leading to deskilling and psychological distress for applicants stuck in the system (D42-NO; Isaac, 36). While applications should take no longer than six months to process, many asylum seekers have awaited a decision for at least eighteen months with one interviewee awaiting decision for seven years (Isaac, 36; Lentin & Moreo, 2010; McGinnity et al., 2011; Smyth, 2010). Being placed in direct provision for such extended periods is recognized to lead to loss of human capital, growing dependence on social welfare, and deteriorating community relations between Nigerians and natives (D1-J; Isaac, 36).

Second, changing citizenship rules in Ireland impaired the political rights of Nigerians in Dublin (**Figure V.1**). Article 2 of the 1937 Irish Constitution guaranteed a *jus soli* principle of citizenship where any person born on Irish soil was conferred citizenship automatically, as were persons born to Irish parents (Loyal, 2011, p. 143). The 1987 court decision of *Fajujonu v. Minister of Justice*, moreover, established the

entitlement of Irish-born children to live in Ireland with the companionship of their non-citizen parents (Fanning, 2009, p. 82). However, in 2003, the Department of Justice, Equality, and Law Reform announced that the immigrant parents of Irish-born children could no longer obtain residency based on their children's citizenship. The argument was that non-EU asylum seekers traveled to Ireland in large numbers to give birth and obtain citizenship for their children and residency for themselves. This policy decision, aimed directly at Nigerians, resulted in a series of High Court decisions. Ultimately, the Irish Supreme Court ruled in favor of executive discretion in deporting the parents of Irish-born children denied asylum and even the Irish national children (Fanning, 2011, p. 44).

The loss of entitlements was consolidated after a Referendum held in 2004 amended the Constitution to eliminate automatic Irish citizenship by virtue of birth. The referendum passed by a staggering 80% to amend citizenship rules to *jus sanguinis*, where children receive Irish citizenship on the basis of their parents' nationality. The referendum was accompanied by a surge of populist politics and an emphasis on the distinction between "nationals" and "non-nationals" in public discourse. Most commentators suggest that the Amendment was particularly aimed at preventing African asylum seekers from acquiring citizenship in Ireland (Fanning, 2011, p. 16). The Referendum culminated in the *Irish Nationality and Citizenship Act 2004* which legally changed citizenship rules to grant Irish nationality only to Irish-born children whose parents are Irish citizens or who have been lawfully present in the country for three of the four years preceding the child's birth (O'Connell & Joyce, 2009, p. 20).[271] The Department of Justice instituted a special administrative scheme (IBC/05) for the parents of Irish-born children who have applied for residency prior to the constitutional change, a

[271] Temporary residence statuses like student or asylum-seeker status are excluded from that provision.

majority of whom Nigerian. While granted a leave to remain in the country, holders of the special IBC status were under review in 2010 and had to prove self-sufficiency to remain in Ireland (O'Connell & Joyce, 2009, pp. 20-21). The 2004 Act and Referendum further eliminated the expansive definition of social membership contained in Article 45.1 of the Irish Constitution by placing emphasis on formal citizenship rather than denizenship when conferring protection. The Act enabled wider discretion in granting citizenship, where a large number of naturalization applications today are refused for minor offenses (D42-NO).

The above changes in asylum and citizenship policy are accompanied by administrative and legal immigration proposals that have restricted the rights of third-country nationals in Ireland through both what they mandated and what they failed to accomplish (**Figure V.1**). Specifically, the *1999 Immigration Act* institutionalized the practice of deporting undocumented immigrants, most of whom African citizens. The 2003 and 2004 *Immigration Acts* created liability for carriers of undocumented migrants and granted wider powers to immigration officers to deny entry to all third-country nationals (O'Connell & Joyce, 2009, pp. 19, 44-45). With steady immigration flows to Ireland from both within the EU and from the rest of the world, the Irish Government conceived of the *Immigration, Residence and Protection Bill 2007* to codify administrative practices into a coherent legislative system. The Bill, and its 2008 and 2010 successors, has still not passed. Regardless, it undermines Nigerians' and other non-EU citizens' rights. On the one hand, the *2010 Act* creates the category of "non-national" for the first time in Irish legislature, thus de-normalizing a number of Nigerian immigrants in public discourse. As one activist put it, "Before I used to be regarded as a

non-immigrant. Now because of this Act I can go into this situation of being undocumented" (D44-NO; O'Connell & Joyce, 2009, pp. 1, 47-48; McGinnity et al., 2011, p. 9; Quinn, 2010). On the other hand, failure in passing the Bill perpetuates an arbitrary administrative migration system, processing delays, and the absence of a secure long-term residency status for Nigerians in Dublin (D21-ADMIN; Isaac, 36).

The rights of Nigerian and other third-country workers were also undermined as a direct consequence of EU enlargement and the strengthening of the rights of Polish workers in Ireland (**Figure V.1**). Specifically, the *Employment Permits Act 2006* carried some positive consequences for third-country nationals, including Nigerian immigrants, by creating a green card category, allowing both employers and employees to apply for employment permits, or granting visas directly to employees. However, the Act restricted the list of occupations eligible for work permits earning less than €30,000 and therefore effectively closed a number of occupations to non-EU nationals. As the employment scheme laid in the *2006 Permits Act* was introduced as an administrative measure, significant discretion mars the system, where the Minister for Enterprise, Trade and Innovation can set arbitrary limits to the number of permits within a certain sector (O'Connell & Joyce, 2009, pp. 45-46; Quinn, 2010, pp. 18, 28-30). Policy instruments reinforce the Act, with the report *Migration in Ireland: a Social and Economic Perspective*, for instance, suggesting that with economic downturn, the immigration of third-country nationals, including Nigerians, will be controlled through the further restriction of visa and permit numbers (Fanning, 2011, p. 25). This is what happened when more lower-skilled occupations were closed to work permits in 2009, market tests for new permits were extended, processing fees soared and spouses of work permit

holders were made ineligible for work permits. Occupations earning between €30,000 and €59,999, including in healthcare where Nigerians predominate, were also restricted for green cards (McGinnity et al., 2011, pp. 10, 19-20; Quinn, 2010). As a result, new work permits issued to third-country nationals declined by 60% between 2007 and 2009, and green cards declined by 77% for the same period (DETI, 2010; EGFSN, 2010).

A final issue with the legal-political rights of Nigerians in Ireland concerns integration and anti-discrimination policy (**Figure V.1**). Ireland is touted as a model country in terms of its anti-discrimination legislation. The government codified strong anti-discrimination directives in the *Employment Equality Acts* 1998, 2008 and the *Equal Status Acts* 2000, 2008. It reports periodically to the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination and instituted the *National Plan against Racism 2005-2008* (McGinnity et al., 2011, pp. 14-15). However, anti-racism institutions deteriorated with economic downturn. The *National Action Plan* lapsed without replacement in 2009 (D41-NO). Economic constraints led to the demise of the National Consultative Committee for Racism and Interculturalism (NCCRI), where reporting on racism today is fragmented (McGinnity et al., 2011, pp. 14-15). Local anti-discrimination initiatives are in danger of collapse as well, with non-profit organizations "cut out of the picture" through the termination of governmental funds (D41-NO; D43-NO).

Integration programs also do not fully address the needs of the Nigerian community in Dublin, and target European immigrants instead. While the creation of the Office of the Minister of Integration was considered a positive step by this project's interviewees, it is also seen as a "work in development" (D42-NO). One NGO representatives even called the office "useless" as it does not engage key immigrant

groups (D41-NO). The Office of Integration is found to be unsuited to combat racism and xenophobic sentiments in Ireland and even fraudulent in its overly optimistic reporting on racism. A top-down organization, regardless of the Ministerial Councils, this institution did not engage immigrant communities in its initial stages and subsequently only gave ethnic representatives limited say in creating integration policy (Taylor, 30). The power of the OMI is viewed as particularly limited and its accomplishments "in name only" with economic downturn (Isaac, 36). Unfortunately, other integration funds like the European Refugee Fund and the European Fund for the Integration of Third-Country Nationals have also contracted by 15% since 2010 (McGinnity et al., 2011, pp. 14-15). As the Ministerial Councils focus largely on language acquisition and economic incorporation, they often overlook issues of political and legal entitlements and racism that are most significant to Nigerians in Dublin. Therefore, both integration and anti-discrimination efforts remain insufficient when it comes to African immigrants in Ireland.

In all fairness, there have been some positive developments for the political-legal rights of the Nigerian community in Ireland. According to representatives of the Department of Enterprise, Trade and Innovation, the *Employment Permits Act of 2006* was "meant to help [all] immigrants" in Dublin (D21-ADMIN). For instance, the Act grants permits directly to employees in order to protect them from exploitative employers (D21-ADMIN; Quinn, 2010, p. 16). However, non-EU immigrant workers remain limited as changing employment is costly and can only occur within specific economic sectors (D14-R; D21-ADMIN; D27-TU). Moreover, the *Third Level Graduate Scheme* (2007) allows non-EU third-level students, including Nigerians, to remain in Ireland for six months after graduation and find employment. Other changes lead in the opposite

direction, however. For instance, the Department of Justice, Equality and Law Reform announced that the children of non-EU students will not be permitted to access state-funded education. Non-EU nationals entering third-level education in Ireland are denied immigration clearance unless they confirm they are not accompanied by their children "nor do they intend to have their children join them later" (O'Connell & Joyce, 2009, pp. 45-46; Quinn, 2010, pp. 15, 29). The Nigerians in the Irish educational system are particularly disadvantaged.

To conclude, unlike in the case of Poles, policy changes have resulted mostly in limitations for Nigerians in Dublin. The asylum system is arbitrary and ever more restrictive since the late 1990s. New citizenship laws undermine the rights of Nigerian parents of Irish-born children and preclude even those with a simple traffic offense from acquiring citizenship. Changes in immigration law restrict the entitlements of Nigerians by toughening visa and entry requirements and providing for deportation and summary removal of irregular migrants. New labor policy significantly limits the professions available to African workers in Dublin. Integration efforts and anti-discrimination legislation fall short of addressing the specific needs of Nigerian immigrants in Ireland. Third-country students, mostly Africans, are effectively denied family reunification. Finally, while Polish workers in Dublin are mostly addressed by benevolent state agencies like the Office of the Minister of Integration, the Nigerian community interacts with institutions like the Garda or the Department of Justice, Equality and Law Reform. Therefore, there is a harsh and even xenophobic security approach to Nigerians' migration to Dublin (D21-ADMIN; Fanning, 2011, p. 38). The African group is assigned the lowest value for this indicator of political integration (**Table V.2**).

V.3.2. Law and Policy in Spain

Unlike in the Irish case, migration policy varies according to time period rather than foreign collective in Spain (**Table V.9**). Much like its Irish counterpart, Spain became an immigration country only in the 1980s. Since it was under dictatorial rule until 1975, its first legal migration framework was the *1985 Foreigner's Law (Ley de Extranjería)* enacted predominantly to satisfy EU accession requirements.[272] The law was unduly restrictive having in mind the relatively low number of migrants in Spain. It plunged many newcomers into irregular status and deprived the local labor market of much needed human capital, thus necessitating a number of corrective administrative measures and regularization programs. As Spain turned into a multicultural country, the direction of policy shifted to incorporation and recognition of migration as a structural phenomenon in the host context that is necessary to address labor and demographic challenges (Hazán, 2014). The legal framework was updated by the *1996 Amendment to the Foreigner's Law*, the *2000 Organic Law (Ley Organica 4/2000)* and its *8/2000 Amendment*, as well as the 2000 Plan GRECO. With increasing migration due to EU enlargement, considerations of security and public safety with terrorist threats and criminal activity, as well as with economic slowdown, legal developments shifted back to the rhetoric of control. Several royal decrees were instituted to reflect that shift, including the restrictive *Real Decreto 557/2011* (M28-E).

Most of these legal instruments pertain to Ecuadorian immigrants, as Bulgarians are subject to EU directives since 2007. Still, the Balkan immigrants were guided by the

[272] Spain joined the EU in 1986 and passed the 1985 Law to conform to European standards. The law was therefore unduly restrictive and focused on control regardless of the relatively low number of immigrants in the host country and the continued predominance of Spanish emigration to the rest of Europe and Latin America (Pérez, 2003).

same policies as Ecuadorians prior to 2007. They are constrained by Spanish policy today, as *Real Decreto 2010* reversed the freedom of circulation for the newest EU joiners in Spain temporarily or as integration and public safety rules apply to all foreigners. Regardless of the proliferation of legal instruments in Spain and the compliance with EU-wide directives, moreover, local initiatives, administrative decrees, and sub-national integration programs fragment the Spanish migration system, much like in the Irish case, and detract from supranational prerogatives by focusing on local tools of migration management.

Table V.9. Immigration, Asylum and Integration Legislature in Spain

Foreigner's Law, 1985 and 1996 Amendment
Law on the Rights of Asylum and Refugee Status, 1984, modified by 1994 Law, Royal Decrees 1995, 2001, 2003 and 2004, and Law 12/2009
Law on the Rights and Freedoms of Foreigners in Spain and their Integration (Organic Law 4/2000), amended by Organic Law 8/2000, Organic Law 11/2003, 14/2003, Organic Law 2/2009, and Organic Law 10/2011
Organic Law 1/1992 on the Protecting of Public Safety, amended in 1997, 1999, 2006
Royal Decree 2007 on the Free Circulation of EU Citizens in Spain, amended 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012
Royal Decree 557/2011 on the implementation of Organic Law 4/2000 on the Rights and Freedoms of Foreigners in Spain and Their Integration
Spanish Civil Code, 1889, as Amended

Source: Derived from Hazán, 2014; Ministerio del Interior, 2015.

V.3.2.1. Laws, Policies, and the Ecuadorian Worker

As workers travelling to Spain mostly through legal channels and possessing cultural, social and familial ties to the host context, Ecuadorians in Madrid are privileged by legal, policy, and administrative measures. Despite some negative developments, policies and law grant the Latin Americans preferential access to entry and employment

opportunities, naturalization and local political participation, as well as integration resources. Even when irregular, Ecuadorians enjoy an easier access into stable legal status, on the basis of economic, social and cultural ties to the receiving context. The focus with this group is on incorporation through provision of economic and social resources, as well as access to active political participation. Despite European harmonization and severe economic contraction, changes in the legal framework have not severely undermined the rights of the South Americans, rendering Spain "exceptional in Europe" (Arango, 2012). In fact, since 2008 the cohort interacts with more benevolent national and local political actors focused on integration, such as the Ministry of Labor and Immigrants, as opposed to the control- and crime-focused Ministry of the Interior or Ministry of Justice (MTIN, 2009).

There are several key policies that advance the legal-political incorporation of Ecuadorian workers in Madrid (**Figure V.2**). The Latin Americans enjoy relatively unrestricted and even preferential entry into Spain's labor market and society, much like their Polish counterparts in Ireland. As this open access is based in bilateral agreements rather than legal instruments, it persists despite economic downturn and the pressures of European supranationalization. A 1963 agreement between Spain and Ecuador allowed the South American workers to arrive in the host country without a visa as tourists for an easily extendable three-month period, provided they had proof of financial means and a tourist plan. Effectively, the visa waiver enabled Ecuadorians, but not African or East European workers for example, to gain entry into Spain and then regularize their status through an employment offer or one of the frequent amnesties occurring in the host context (Bertoli et al., 2010).

Figure V.2. Spanish Migration Policies Concerning Ecuadorians



While the agreement expired in 2003, as the European Union added Ecuador to its common visa list, the host government creatively made up for the closure (EC 453/2003). For instance, a 2001 bilateral agreement between Spain and Ecuador channeled 25,000 irregular Ecuadorians into legal employment (Jokisch, 2007). Spain signed a bilateral

agreement with Ecuador in 2000 to actively recruit Latin American workers for low- and medium- skilled jobs and to expedite the transfer of their professional qualifications (MTIN, 2009). In 2004, the Socialist government reformed the 2000 *Organic Law* to introduce the catalog of hard-to-fill occupations in the general labor regime, which enables employers to contract non-EU workers without a market test or considerations of the availability of native or EU workers (M19-ADMIN).[273] Latin Americans are the main beneficiaries of the reform (Arango, 2012). Ecuadorians are also the primary participants in the labor quotas of 1993-1995, 1997-1999 and 2002 and the yearly contingents that succeeded the quota system to fill persistent labor gaps through seasonal employment (Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores i Cooperación [MAEC], 2008; MTIN, 2009). While seasonal contracts are conceived as temporary, in practice they provide an avenue to long-term residency, if the terms of the agreement are observed (MTIN, 2009). Finally, while all legal workers entering Spain require an established job offer and permits are granted to employers, *Organic Law* 14/2003 grants Ecuadorians among others the benefit of a three-month visa to search for employment in the host country, if they have familial ties to Spanish natives (Ley Orgánica 14/2003, 2003).

Ecuadorians in Spain are also advantaged by citizenship and political participation legislation and policy (**Figure V.2**). Unlike third-country nationals in Ireland, Latin Americans in Spain benefit from privileged access to Spanish nationality. Spanish citizenship, regulated by the Civil Code since 1889, advances a pronouncedly ethnic

[273] The catalog of hard-to-fill occupations is a list of occupations for which few native or EU workers are available. It is published by the government every three months based on information from local employment offices and the major trade unions. It allows employers to hire workers for the occupations listed without having to prove that there are no native or EU workers available for the job (Ley Orgánica 4/2000, 2000; MTIN, 2009; Real Decreto 2393/2004, 2004). It moves policy away from national agencies to local authorities that take into account sub-national economic trends.

conception of the nation (Brubaker, 1992; Mateos & Durand, 2012). It is awarded by origin (on the basis of familial and ethnic ties or the *jus sanguinis* principle) and through naturalization. The children or grandchildren of these fleeing political repression during the Spanish Civil War in 1936-1956, mostly to Latin America, can "recover" their Spanish nationality "by origin" after the passage of the *Law of Historical Memory* in 2007. Naturalization requires a ten-year legal continuous residency for all other applicants, including EU citizens, but is granted only after a two-year period to Hispano-Americans, including Ecuadorians (Martín-Pérez & Moreno-Fuentes, 2012; Mateos & Durand, 2012). Naturalization requirements include "good character" and "integration into Spanish society", interpreted as knowledge of the Spanish language and culture (Rodríguez-Ferrand, 2013). Granting citizenship status to Ecuadorians through naturalization is consequently a particularly unproblematic process, as "Spaniards always remember their history" (M26-TU).[274] Finally, dual nationality is only extended through reciprocity to countries that recognize the citizenship of Spaniards abroad, and particularly Andorra, the Philippines, Equatorial Guinea and Ibero-American nations like Ecuador (Martín-Pérez & Moreno-Fuentes, 2012). These provisions lead Zapata-Barrero and Zaragoza (2009) to deem Spanish citizenship "selection by origin" and an instance of positive institutional discrimination towards South Americans.

EU migration policy harmonization did not result in a move away from the ethnic conception of citizenship in Spain. In fact, migrants with cultural, social and familial ties to the receiving context were granted additional political rights to match these of EU citizens residing in Spain. Thus, while foreign collectives are generally excluded from

[274] Author translation from original quote in Spanish: "Intentamos siempre que se recuerde nuestra historia."

municipal voting rights in Spain, local political participation was allowed for European Union nationals in the 1990s and for Ibero-Americans in anticipation of the 2011 elections (Arango, 2012; Zapata-Barerro & Zaragoza, 2009).

Legal and policy instruments further grant Ecuadorians in Spain multiple social rights and privileged access to integration funds and programs (**Figure V.2**). The integration of third-country nationals has been the cornerstone of Spanish migration legislation, political institutions, and local programs since the 1990s. The *Foreigner's Law of 1985* focused on controlling temporary migrants rather than on granting rights to the newcomers, and pushed many foreigners into illegality through strict visa and permit limits. Since the Law's 1996 amendment, however, Spanish migration legislation has stressed the social integration of third-country nationals, regardless of the political make-up of government. In the words of local administrators, "Now we have a completely different scenario. Now what we have to implement are policies regarding equality of treatment, integration and the reception phase" (M19-ADMIN). For instance, the 1996 Law recognized immigrants' rights to education, equality, legal counsel, family reunification, and long-term residency (Pérez, 2003). *Organic Law 4/2000* and *Law 8/2000*, which served as the basis for the extensive Plan GRECO, granted access to education, public health and social assistance to all third-country nationals, including irregular migrants (Bertozzi, 2010). Since 2000, being registered on the municipal population register (*padrón*) entitles unauthorized migrants to full access to healthcare and local educational rights. While the conservative *Partido Popular* government amended the law in 2012 to predicate healthcare access on legal status, individual municipalities and local providers have not obeyed the decree and leftist political parties

aim to reverse the policy (Arango, 2012; OECD, 2013). Even after renewed emphasis on control since the late 2000s, the incorporation of third-country nationals in Spain remains a foundation of immigration policy (Hazán, 2014; Real Decreto 557/2011, 2011).

The emphasis on incorporation in legal and policy frameworks resulted in the shifting of responsibility for migration from harsh ministries to benevolent agencies focused on rights (M31-R). For instance, Ecuadorians in Spain initially dealt with the Ministry of the Interior, also tasked with combatting crime and illegal migration, thus setting public debate in negative terms of control (MTIN, 2009). In 2008, third-country migration policy shifted to the Ministry of Labor and Immigration to signal the explicit link between migration and the needs of the Spanish national and local labor market (M19-ADMIN; M20-ADMIN; M26-TU; M33-ADMIN). The post of the Secretary of State for Emigration and Immigration was created in 2000 to coordinate migration and integration policy and the cooperation among national, regional, and local authorities in ensuring immigrant rights (Bertozzi, 2010; Pérez, 2003). The Spanish Observatory on Racism and Xenophobia (OBERAXE), tasked with reporting on migrant rights, human rights plan development, and coordination with local authorities, was born in the same year (M20-ADMIN; M33-ADMIN). After the adoption of a national integration plan by the government in 1994, the Forum for the Social Integration of Immigrants was set up to bring together migrants' associations, non-governmental organizations, trade unions, and central, regional and local administrators (Hazán, 2014; M22-ADMIN). The Forum gives migrants voice in crafting policy, cements the commitment of the host context to incorporation and rights, and transfers responsibility for immigrant welfare to city halls (Bertozzi, 2010). In both 2006-2010 and 2010-2013, Ecuadorian immigrant organizations

held two of the nine seats dedicated to ethnic associations in the Forum, with Latin American organizations representing the majority (M22-ADMIN). Further, the Immigration Fund was created in 2005 to ground the incorporation initiatives of autonomous communities and municipalities (M19-ADMIN).

These institutional developments resulted in multiple incorporation plans and initiatives, serving to benefit non-EU migrants in particular. The 2007-2010 Strategic Plan for Citizenship and Integration, accompanied by the Madrid City Council Plan on Social and Intercultural Coexistence, aimed at "establishing a social context conducive to greater inclusion and closer integration," expanding access to public and private services, instituting respect for cultural diversity, combatting xenophobia, and amending educational or health institutions to fit immigrants' particular needs (Bertozzi, 2010; M18-ADMIN; M32-ADMIN). Its successor, the 2011-2014 Strategic Plan of Citizenship and Integration, aims to produce "feeling of common belonging among all the citizens" and participation for immigrants stakeholders (Rodríguez-Ferrand, 2013). The focus is on ever more rights and transfer of powers to the local level (M18-ADMIN; M32-ADMIN). As European Union citizens, Eastern European nationals are rarely the center of these initiatives (M20-ADMIN; M33-AMDIN). Concerns with local access to employment, social services, education and legal status trump concerns with language training in integration organizations and campaigns (M18-ADMIN; M20-ADMIN; M22-ADMIN; M32-ADMIN; M33-ADMIN). Despite severe economic contraction, moreover, the budget for non-EU immigrant integration persists, if at a reduced level (Arango, 2012; M20-ADMIN; M33-ADMIN). Accordingly, MIPEX maintains its top ranking of Spain in

terms of equality, integration, and rights for third-country workers (Huddleston & Niessen, 2011).

Finally, Ecuadorians are unlikely to be affected by the recent focus on combatting irregular migration, as they enjoy privileged access into stable legal status (**Figure V.2**). Even if the Latin American workers found themselves in a precarious legal position after the harsh 1985 Foreigner's Law or with the removal of the tourist visa waiver in 2003, a number of ad hoc regularization programs were instituted to correct the situation. Amnesties in in 1986, 1994, 1996, 2000, and 2001, and 2005 served to regularize a large number of South American migrants who might have lost their legal status or entered the country surreptitiously in the first place. The 2001 program focused on Ecuadorians in particular (Finotelli & Arango, 2011). The massive 2005 drive not only granted irregular Ecuadorians access to health care and education by introducing the *padrón*, but conferred legal status on as many as 200,000 Ecuadorians, more than one third of the 578,375 successful applications (Finotelli & Arango, 2011; M16-P). Normalization of status for is achieved on the basis of economic ties to Spain (*arráigo laboral*), and thus through proof of employment in the country, a scheme that benefits all foreign workers in the host context. However, other grounds for regularization include social and cultural ties (*arráigo social*), particularly salient in the case of Ecuadorian and other Southern American migrants with Spanish language skills, and historical and cultural ties to the receiving locality. In fact, despite tightening of migration policies and limiting labor recruitment from non-EU countries with economic downturn, the Zapatero government introduced the possibility to regularize one's status by discretion through family ties

(*arráigo familial*) in 2010, effectively granting stable status to Latin American and other third-country parents of Spanish-born children (Hazán, 2014).

To conclude, political, legal, and administrative changes have enhanced the political rights of the Ecuadorian community in Madrid, even after economic downturn or EU enlargement. Ecuadorians are granted relatively open entry into the Spanish "motherland," as well as preferential access to the Spanish labor market, on the basis of bilateral agreements, special familial ties, and bargaining by local actors. The South Americans are the prime beneficiaries of an ethnic conception of membership. They receive nationality automatically on the basis of direct descent or summarily through socio-cultural ties, and are granted preferential local political participation rights as to maintain intact the Iberian-American community. Ecuadorians are the key participants in local integration forums, regularization programs, and other incorporation campaigns, due to their knowledge of the Spanish language and connections to the host society. Negative changes, like the removal of the 2003 visa waiver, have not severely undermined the South Americans' rights. Neither has competition from Bulgarians with EU enlargement, with the latter surprisingly facing restrictive or at least neutral legal and administrative provisions despite their European membership. The Latin Americans are assigned a high value of 4 for this component of political incorporation (**Table V.2**).

V.3.2.2. Laws, Policies, and the Bulgarian Worker

Even though Bulgarians in Madrid are European Union citizens, policy and law have not served to amplify their political rights, as in the case of Poles in Ireland. While the legal framework does not directly disadvantage this foreign cohort, the attainment of

"communitarian" status obstructs the group indirectly, by depriving it of integration funds or the attention of benevolent local authorities. Bulgarians continue to be subject to stricter naturalization rules and there are no campaigns for their political inclusion. Bulgarians' free circulation was limited for only two years, yet limitations were reinstituted in a rare reversal of free movement principles. Being able to travel to Spain freely, yet not take up employment, created distinct problems with social integration for the East Europeans. The Balkan migrants were much more likely to be irregular than their Ecuadorian counterparts prior to their home country's accession to the EU. Even though they are currently residing in Spain legally, they still tend to take unauthorized employment, creating avenues for exploitation and de facto loss of rights. While European directives grant rights to Bulgarians on the national level in Spain, the transfer of authority to the local level leads to disregard for the concerns and rights of the East Europeans. A final unanticipated consequence of European Union status is that Bulgarians workers in Spain, no longer considered "foreigners," deal not with the pronouncedly pro-immigrant Ministry of Labor and Immigration, but with local authorities without a standard approach to the management of distinct ethnic collectives.

Several policy and legislative issues affect the political incorporation of Bulgarians in Spain, often in direct opposition to the situation of Ecuadorians (**Figure V.3**). While Ireland opened its doors to Polish migration in 2004, for example, Spain imposed barriers to the movement of the 2007 EU joiners. The receiving country did not place transitional agreements on the newcomers, but it limited their access to the national and local labor market in practice, as the government "didn't know if they wanted the [Bulgarian] people to be coming here" (M20-ADMIN; M33-ADMIN). Bulgarians were

free to enter the host country, yet *Royal Decree 240/2007* predicated their ability to work on proof of two years of residence in Spain. Effectively, Bulgarians were subjected to the same requirements as non-EU nationals, including a visa, valid passport, no criminal record, private health insurance, justification of their trip, financial means, and a return ticket (Real Decreto 240/2007, 2007; Rodríguez-Planas & Farré, 2014).

Figure V.3. Spanish Migration Policies Concerning Bulgarians



A study by Rodríguez-Planas and Vegas (2012) finds that while Ecuadorians tend to come to Spain legally or quickly regularize their status in view of a clear migration regime, Balkan migrants are in fact much more likely to hold irregular status in the host

context, regardless of their EU membership. Some local actors argue that "members of the European Union [not having] free circulation" "was completely discriminatory… and make it very difficult to tell what the situation of Bulgarians and Romanians was" (M17-P; M35-P).[275] Other stakeholders suggest that this legal limbo "on the one hand, has augmented the difficulties of these persons in Spain, and on the other hand, is an issue the local population is preoccupied with, because [the East Europeans] don't work… they are in the streets. If they are in the streets, they are visible" (M27-L).[276] Even though barriers to the work of the Balkan migrants were officially removed in 2009, they were reinstated in 2010 in view of severe unemployment (Castle & Dempsey, 2011). The additional restrictions renewed the requirement for visas for citizens of the 2007 EU joiners until 2013, rendering the legal situation of Bulgarians in Spain more unstable than that of third-country nationals (OECD, 2013; Rodríguez-Planas & Farré, 2014).

Not only is Bulgarians' free circulation into Spain limited despite their European Union membership, but legal recognition of the Balkan migrants as "communitarians" actually deprives them of rights, protections, integration funds, and attention by benevolent local actors (**Figure V.3**). As one trade union representative put it, "in many cases, free movement entails certain loss of rights" (M23-TU).[277] Since third-country nationals are guided by clear migration rules, their labor rights are publicized and any breaches of these rights by employers are easy to identify and correct.

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[275] Author's translation from original quote in Spanish: "La única diferencia que ha habido es el tema de que durante dos años, siendo ya miembros de la Unión Europea, no tenían libre circulación. Era completamente discriminatorio… Entonces, a partir de la ampliación, hoy es muy difícil poder decir cuál es la situación de los búlgaros o rumanos."

[276] Author's translation from original quote in Spanish: "Por un lado, eso ha aumentado las dificultades de estas personas en España, y por otro lado es un tema de preocupación por la población de aquí. Porque la gente no trabaja, y eso siempre presenta una incomodidad porque si no trabajan, están en las calles. Si están en las calles, son visibles."

[277] Author's translation from original quote in Spanish: "Entonces en algunos casos se han perdido algunos derechos…"

On the other hand, EU workers free to move about the Continent are harder to control or track by national authorities, thus opening opportunities for Spanish employers to exploit these workers and deny them accommodation, health provisions, or travel expenses. In the words of one Spanish stakeholder, "while free movement facilitated bureaucracy, red tape, in some cases it undermines rights' guarantees [in the form of] the contract granted to these workers" (M23-TU).[278] This is particularly true for Bulgarians, who continue to suffer from unstable work permission despite free entry.

The conception of Bulgarians as EU nationals, and thus no longer foreigners, places the Balkan workers outside the scope of many incorporation campaigns. A majority of Spanish local actors suggest that "the issue with Eastern European immigrants is that for all those who are members of the European Union or are European Union citizens, the legal process has been different" (M16-P; M19-AMIDN; M20-ADMIN; M36-ADMIN). While trade unions uphold the rights of all workers resident in Spain, their representatives admit that integration funds or regularization programs focus almost exclusively on "non-communitarians" and particularly Latin American workers like Ecuadorians, since Europeans are perceived to enjoy multiple rights and stable legal status (M23-TU; M24-TU; M26-TU; M33-TU). However, the opposite is true as freedom of entry is undermined by lack of predictable contract or employment rights for the Balkan workers. Since Bulgarians "are not foreigners," they are not covered by anti-discrimination laws designed to protect immigrants in Madrid or regular reporting by bodies like OBERAXE (M19-ADMIN). As "now the Eastern Europeans don't fit very nicely into any of this …. they are not eligible for" certain national and local integration

[278] Author's translation from original quote in Spanish:" Entonces que la libre circulación ha facilitado los trámites burocráticos, los trámites administrativos, pero en algunos casos ha mermado las garantías, o el contrato que había sobre estos trabajadores."

funds (M20-ADMIN; M36-ADMIN). Bulgarians do participate in the Forum for the Social Integration of Immigrants, yet issues like language training are rarely the focus of the organization (M22-ADMIN).

Relatedly, Bulgarians in Madrid are mostly managed by local agencies and administrators that might further chip away at the supposedly privileged status of the Europeans (**Figure V.3**). With migration policy supranationalization, and as national actors are obliged to implement EU directives into law, Spain witnessed a transfer of authority to the local and regional levels, to counteract external pressures. "The State" maintains its power in "making the laws," yet city halls and regional governments are the focal points of "physical resources, centers of participation, programs of employment, of reception" (M17-P; M35-P). Since EU citizens are encouraged to register with the local Social Security Administration and are obliged to enter the *padrón*, there is a measure of local control over their movement, employment, and incorporation (EMN, 2011). As municipal administrators and politicians admit, "in the Madrid Autonomous Community, integration is very easy provided that [the immigrants] share a culture similar to ours" (M17-P; M35-P). Is the case with Bulgarians, problems might occur on the local level, where "fights derived from immigration take place" (M16-P). Since education and healthcare should be granted universally in Spanish cities, large migrant communities, especially these with unclear entitlements and rights, often produce institutional and personal discrimination and unease (M16-P). Even though they are EU nationals, Bulgarians who do not speak Spanish "produce a shock, a barrier for the immigrant" and possibly exclusion (M17-P; M35-P).[279] Devolution of authority to the local level in the

[279] Paragaph contains author's translation from same original quote in Spanish: "El Estado hace las leyes y tiene todas las competencias en Interior y en Seguridad. Los planes corresponden a los gobiernos

2000s led to obstacles in the incorporation of immigrants granted multiple legal rights on the national and supranational level, like European Bulgarians.

Finally, unlike Ecuadorians, Bulgarians are subject to strict naturalization rules. There are few campaigns for their political inclusion (**Figure V.3**). Bulgarians do not share ethnic ties or descent with Spaniards and therefore never have to option to naturalize "by origin," like Ecuadorians in Madrid. More significantly, these who aspire to Spanish citizenship by acquisition are subject to a ten-year waiting period as opposed to the two-year waiting period for Latin Americans. Dual nationality is not permitted, as it is only based in bilateral agreements, reciprocity, and historical affinity. Debates on citizenship reform exclude the East Europeans, since they are already the holders of EU membership (Zapata-Barerro & Zaragoza, 2009). Bulgarians are eligible to vote in municipal and EU parliamentary elections in Spain, as are other Europeans in Spain (Muñoz, 2009). However, EU status correlates with the assumption that actual participation merits little encouragement. Despite the relatively high number of Bulgarians in Spain, for instance, there were only two polling stations for Bulgarians in the country that would allow the East Europeans to participate in the 2009 elections in their home country. As a comparison, there were more than fifty polling stations located in Turkey (Dobreva, 2013). There were also few drives for the active political engagement of the Balkan workers by political parties or trade unions (Muñoz, 2009).

In sum, while Bulgarians in Spain are European Union citizens and should enjoy a multitude of rights, they might have even lost privileges and entitlements after 2007. Visa

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regionales, y los ayuntamientos son los que en primer término tienen que tener los servicios. Por ejemplo, en Madrid hay recursos físicos, regionales, centros de participación, programas de empleo de acogida de no sé qué, en el nivel regional, y luego lo hay en el nivel municipal… Es decir, en la Comunidad de Madrid la integración es muy sencilla en la medida en que parten de culturas muy parecida a la nuestra. Producen un choque, una barrera por la integración…" (M17-P; M35-P).

requirements remained for the East Europeans despite Bulgaria's accession to the EU, and limitations to free movement were reinstituted in 2010. Free entry yet limited work permission placed Bulgarians into legal limbo and forced a large number of the East Europeans into irregular employment. Bulgarians have in fact lost labor rights, attention by benevolent trade unions, anti-discrimination monitoring, or integration help with EU membership. Yet, they are ever more in need of language training, economic assistance, or social incorporation funding. With the transfer of authority away from the national and supranational levels, local administrators undermine the immigrants' freedoms or resources. Finally, limited access to Spanish citizenship and political participation leaves Bulgarians few avenues to correct other rights deficiencies. Therefore, while few policy changes have undermined the Balkan workers' rights directly, institutional neglect have indirectly deprived them of clear rules, stable status, and political, economic and social privileges. The East Europeans are assigned an intermediate value for this indicator of political incorporation (**Table V.2**).

V.4. Active Political Integration

After the above exposé on legal status and relevant changes in laws and policies, the chapter turns to the four cohorts' exercise of political rights. In particular, the thesis discusses naturalization, voting and running in local elections, trade unionism rates, and tendencies to engage in civic activism. For each indicator, a survey of the situation in Ireland, and the political participation of Poles and Nigerians, is followed by a discussion of political rights in Spain, and the activities of Ecuadorians and Bulgarians.

V.4.1. Naturalization and Long-Term Residency

V.4.1.1. Naturalization and Long-Term Residency in Ireland

Naturalization numbers are rising in Ireland. Between January 2005 and December 2009, 20,000 non-EU individuals acquired Irish citizenship. The figures exclude EU citizens, who according to McGinnity et al. (2011) rarely naturalize, due to high levels of mobility and lack of incentives to acquire Irish nationality.

In fact, there are multiple obstacles to naturalization for both EU and third-country nationals in Ireland. Naturalization data are misleading, since there is a significant lag in the system. Current immigrants are unlikely to be eligible for naturalization, with applications effective only after several years. According to the ICI, while most naturalization applications were processed in six months in the UK, ninety days in Australia, and eleven months in Canada, it took twenty-three months on average to process applications in Ireland (ICI, 2008; McGinnity et al., 2011). Therefore, Eastern European nationals are unable to naturalize regardless of their intent, as they only arrived in large numbers in 2004. Nigerians' access to Irish citizenship is severely undermined after constitutional changes in the mid-2000s.[280]

Especially with a worsening economic climate, Ireland maintains a high naturalization application refusal, with 47% refusal in 2009, compared to 9% in the UK or Australia, and less than 3% in Canada (Fanning, 2011, pp. 166-167). From the 25,500 naturalization applications processed in 2009, 12,242 were rejected on technicalities, 6,011 were deemed ineligible, and 1,461 were refused, and only 5,868 were granted (23% of the original number filed). The cost of application at €950.00 is found prohibitive by some migrants (McGinnity et al., 2011, pp. 36-37).

[280] See **Figure V.1** and previous section of this chapter.

According to the 1956 Irish Nationality and Citizenship Act as amended, the Minister for Justice and Law Reform has 'absolute discretion' in granting nationality, where citizenship through naturalization is considered a privilege rather than an entitlement (McGinnity et al., 2011, p. 36). Therefore, subjective and vague criteria like "good character" might be employed to exclude deserving foreign candidates. "Good character" is not maintained, for instance, if the applicant has come to the "adverse attention" of the Garda Síochána even in a minor traffic offense or through the use of social welfare.[281] There is no mechanism to appeal refusal of citizenship or legal obligation to reveal the reasons for refusal, where the Minister of Justice might even revoke a certificate of naturalization if the grantee fails in their loyalty to Ireland (Fanning, 2011, pp. 166-168; McGinnity et al., 2011, p. 36). There are no active programs to promote naturalization in Ireland (Fanning, 2011, p. 168).

Naturalization is also precluded by a narrow definition of "reckonable residence," or the period of time a migrant must live in Ireland prior to applying for citizenship (Fanning, 2011, p. 167). The 2004 Citizenship Act specifies a necessary one year of continuous "reckonable residence" in the state immediately before applying for nationality, as well as another four years during the previous eight years (McGinnity et al., 2011, p. 36). Student, undocumented and asylum statuses do not apply when calculating "reckonable residence." These exclusions particularly and unduly disadvantage the children of foreign residents, who are enrolled in education since their arrival in Ireland and set roots in the receiving state. These obstacles lead Fanning (2011)

[281] For instance, in 2009 the Irish Times featured a story about a 23-old Zimbabwe national who had resided in Ireland for eight years. He entered the country as an asylum seeker, yet was granted refugee status within several months. He was stopped for drunk driving, but was never charged or convicted in a court of law. Still, the Minister of Justice, Equality and Law reform refused his naturalization application on a discretionary basis based in his lack of "good character" ("Zimbabwean challenges," 2009).

to characterize the system as an “anti-integrationist security-governance perspective,” especially when it comes to African nationals.

Structural and personal discrimination play a role in diminishing naturalization opportunities as well, especially in the case of Nigerian immigrants. In one recent example, thousands of Nigerian nationals who participated in the latest naturalization ceremony and were granted naturalization certificates by Minister of Justice Alan Shatter were refused Irish passports by the Passport Office. A representative of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade suggested that documents submitted with the applications, such as marriage certificates, did not appear genuine and had to be further investigated even though they were accepted by the Ministry of Justice. The incident also prompted widespread xenophobic commentary, with Irish nationals suggesting that Nigerians who have Nigerian passports should not be entitled to Irish ones and that “80% of Nigerians in Ireland are not who they claim to be” (“Thousands of Nigerians,” 2012).

An alternative to naturalization for third-country nationals is long-term residence. Such legal status does not yet exist in Ireland, as the Immigration, Residence and Protection Bills 2007, 2008 and 2010 that proposed it never passed into law. Legal long-term residence would entitle non-EU residents to travel, work, welfare and healthcare. In the absence of a legal framework, Ireland grants administrative long-term residence to employment permit holders and their spouses. However, even fewer such grants were made between 2005 and 2009 than naturalization grants. Like naturalization, long-term residence is discretionary and grounded in subjective and unclear criteria. For instance, travel outside of Ireland might undermine claims on long-term residence. Other criteria are good character; knowledge of English or Irish; as well as adequate efforts to integrate,

all of which are highly subjective. Significantly, together with the UK and Denmark, Ireland opted out of the *EC Directive 2009/103*, which provides rights to education or employment for third-country long-term residents equal to those of citizens. The Irish long-term residency status does not include the EC's automatic renewal after five years, includes broad provisions for revocation of the status, and makes residence security dependent on job security. These limitations lead MIPEX to rate Irish long-term residency provision as 28th of 31 countries (Huddleston & Niessen, 2011).

To conclude, Nigerian nationals in Dublin are naturalizing in higher numbers than their Polish counterparts, even if data disaggregated by nationality are unavailable. Polish workers do not see a need to naturalize as they are European Union citizens with a slew of rights. However, low naturalization rates among East Europeans are also the result of these immigrants' recent arrival in Ireland and the significant backlog of the Irish citizenship application system. Further, Nigerian nationals face an increasing number of obstacles to naturalizing in Ireland, such as high costs, a slow and discretionary process, and structural and individual racism. Therefore, their naturalization rates are likely to drop or plateau in the future, equalizing this component of political participation for the two immigrant cohorts. Both groups are assigned an intermediary value of 3 for this indicator (**Table V.2**).

V.4.1.2. Naturalization and Long-Term Residency in Spain

Naturalization and long-term residency rules in Ireland disadvantage all immigrants but are particularly harsh for African foreign workers. On the other hand, naturalization provisions are extremely generous for Latin Americans in Spain yet

severely restrict entry into the national community for Bulgarians, despite their EU citizenship. Because of its discriminatory citizenship legislation, MIPEX III grants Spain only 39% for its naturalization rules (Huddleston & Niessen, 2011)

Having an expedited access into Spanish citizenship has led multiple Ecuadorian migrants to acquire the nationality of the host country. To demonstrate, 81% of the 523,106 individuals who naturalized in Spain between 1980 and 2008 came from Latin America (Mateos & Durand, 2012). In 2010, 103,971 of the 123,721 naturalized citizens were from Latin America and 43,091 from Ecuador – the largest national group to acquire Spanish nationality that year (Martín-Pérez & Moreno-Fuentes, 2012). Naturalization rates are particularly high for the South Americans in the Autonomous Community of Madrid. According to a 2012 report, all but one of the top nationalities of these naturalizing in the city belonged to Latin America (with Morocco as the only exception). Ecuadorians were the most numerous recipients of Spanish nationality, with 11,398 persons in the Madrid Autonomous Community (Comunidad de Madrid, 2012a).

Latin Americans take advantage of favorable naturalization procedures. According to a comparative study by Huddleston and Tjaden (2012), immigrants in Madrid had to wait for an average of 9.8 years to apply for citizenship, compared to 11.7 years in Paris or 13 years in Lyon. Yet, South Americans only waited for six years. After residing in the city for twenty years, 91% of migrants with historical ties to the receiving locality were Spanish citizens compared to 63% of these without cultural ties, 56% of foreigners in France, and only 29% of immigrants in Italy. Only 12% of Latin Americans reported problems with their application for citizenship in Madrid, compared to 25% of other migrants and 53% of foreigners in Paris, for instance.

What is more, these Latin Americans who have not naturalized in Spain hold long-term residency permits, which entitle them to multiple rights. Indeed, 80% of foreigners in Madrid aspire for long-term residence or citizenship according to Huddleston and Tjaden (2012), compared to 70% of immigrants in France and less than 30% in Germany and Belgium. After residing and working in Spain for only five years, Ecuadorians have freedom of movement, opportunities to change employers, and entitlements to reunite with their families similar to these of EU citizens and Spanish nationals. The application process is deemed "short and simple" and the status – secure. Consequently, MIPEX III assigns Spain the second best ranking in terms of long-term residency with a rating of 78% and the third-best grade for access to family reunification for third-country nationals among all thirty-one MIPEX countries. Ireland is last in terms of the latter, with only 34% (Huddleston & Niessen, 2011).

On the other hand, few Bulgarians naturalize in the receiving context. Only 2,086 of the 114,599 naturalized citizens in Spain in 2011 came from the EU (Martín-Pérez & Moreno-Fuentes, 2012). In 2001-2009, 850 Bulgarians naturalized in Spain (or 0.2% of the total) (Pérez-Nievas, Vintila, Morales, & Paradés, 2014). While national law does not mandate cultural tests for citizenship acquisition, municipal civil registries ask increasingly difficult language, geographical, and historical questions of the applicants, which serve as an additional barrier for non-Hispanic East Europeans, compared to the Latino Ecuadorians (García, 2014). Bulgarians are also not eligible for long-term residency in Spain, as they are EU nationals who should enjoy rights to free movement, employment, and family reunifications similar to these of Spaniards. However, as the receiving state's government continues to limit labor market access for the East

Europeans through Royal Decrees, EU membership privileges are incomplete. Counterintuitively, the status of Bulgarians is less stable than that of long-term Ecuadorian residents in Madrid.

In sum, EU Bulgarians are less likely to enjoy access to Spanish nationality than non-EU Ecuadorians, who naturalize in large numbers, especially in Madrid, or hold secure long-term residency permits. The Balkan migrants, occupying a complicated legal status, are only beneficiaries of EU membership rights in name, but might be denied some of the entitlements of long-term residents in reality. Strict naturalization rules based in an ethnic conception of citizenship denies them access to Spanish citizenship as well. Ecuadorians thus merit the highest value for this indicator of political incorporation, while Bulgarians are assigned a low value of 2 (**Table V.2**).

V.4.2. Local Electoral Participation

V.4.2.1.Running for Office and Voting in Dublin

A second component of active political integration is the ability to stand and vote in local elections. Only Irish nationals can vote for the Dail Eireann (or the House of Representatives), in presidential elections, or participate in referendums. Third-country nationals are also barred from European elections, unlike their EU counterparts. However, all residents of Ireland can participate in local elections (Huseini & Yao, 2010; McGinnity et al., 2011, pp. 38-39; Mutwarasibo, 2011). The Irish Electorate Act (1992) is a particularly permissive document that allows non-nationals over 18 years of age to vote and stand in local elections after residing in the country for six months (Electoral Act, 1992; O'Boyle, 2012). This legal framework prompted Dobbs (2009, p. 5) to

describe Ireland as "a critical case for understanding immigrant political integration," as "it has one of the most open electoral systems in the world for non-citizens."

Regardless of political opportunity and a growing foreign population, there were few ethnic candidates in Irish elections in the early 2000s. A 2003 report by the Africa Centre found that party platforms and candidacies did not reflect the increasing diversity of Irish society and thus exemplified institutional racism. None of the major political parties had specific policies to encourage the membership of immigrant candidates or canvassed immigrant communities (Fanning et al., 2003). As Ugba (2005) argues, Irish authorities did not create a "legal and institutional" foundation for immigrant political participation, as they were unwilling to "promote [Ireland] as a migration destination." Since most immigrants are non-citizens, and therefore ineligible to vote in general elections, they were met with "pragmatic indifference" by politicians (Fanning 2011, p.156; McGinnity et al., 2011, p. 38). Therefore, the lack of participation of both the Nigerian and Polish communities prior to 2004 is easily attributable to the exclusive character of the political process.[282]

None of the major political parties advanced immigrant candidates in the 2004 local elections either. However, six candidates ran as independents and two Africans were elected city councilors (Fanning & O'Boyle, 2010; Mutwarasibo, 2011; O'Boyle, 2012). Dr. Taiwo Matthews and Rotimi Adebari were both former asylum seekers, whose inability to secure employment despite high qualifications led them to political activism (Fanning, 2011, p. 156; Fanning & O'Boyle, 2010). A more striking example of desire for political participation came when asylum seekers in the Mosney reception

[282] In the case of Polish immigrants, there was not yet a critical mass that would ensure the interest of political parties in this national group in 2004. Such a critical mass existed prior to the 2009 local elections, however, which included Polish candidates and voter registration efforts aimed at this ethnic group.

center organized to set up a local branch of Fianna Fail. After one sixth of the camp's residents met with Fianna Fail members of parliament, their petition was rejected on a national level, further precluding political participation (Fanning, 2011, pp. 156-157). Such political activity remained the exception rather than the rule, however, with all ethnic communities practically excluded from the political process until the late 2000s.

With dramatic increases in migration rates and diversity in the country, all political parties committed to including foreign candidates on their ballots and to reaching to ethnic communities during electoral campaigning in the mid-2000s (Mac Cormaic, 2009). After Adebari was elected as the first black mayor in Ireland in 2007, Speaker of the House John O'Donoghue emphasized the political significance of the "New Irish" in all future elections. Minister of State for Integration Policy Conor Lenihan stressed the role of political parties in the integration of immigrant communities and several voter registration programs were placed under way by the Dublin City Council and the Office for the Minister for Integration (Fanning, 2011, p. 157). Fianna Fail and Fine Gael recruited integration officers from among the Polish community in 2007-2008 and participated in efforts by Forum Polonia to aid Polish candidates in the election (McGinnity et al., 2011, p. 38). Especially in Fine Gael, Polish candidates were clearly favored over other ethnic politicians. Poles' Catholicism contributed to an institutionalization of the party as religious in character and a connection was drawn between Fine Gael and Poland's Civic Forum. However, Fine Gael recruited only two Polish and four Nigerian candidates. Fianna Fail practiced "racialized politics," as it selected seven European and only two African candidates (Fanning, 2011, p. 159).

Forty-four non-national candidates ran for all the major parties in contest for 114 County, City, Borough and Town Councils in 2009 (Huseini & Yao, 2010; O'Boyle, 2012).[283] Irish stakeholders and African and Eastern European communities consider the effort "quite positive and much better than previous elections" (D14-R; Ethan, 46). The rising participation rates are particularly significant, as they are motivated by desire to improve the local community, as well as the integration of the candidates' ethnic group (Fanning & O'Boyle, 2010; O'Boyle, 2012). For instance, one Nigerian candidate interviewed by this researcher chose to run for Fine Gael due to the party's underlying message of racial equality and its commitment to the idea of the "New Irish," or immigrants' adopting Irish cultural norms while maintaining their own (D44-NO).

A stronger ethnic candidacy in 2009 did not translate into electoral successes, however. Only four foreign candidates were elected out of the forty-four and none in Dublin or from the two groups of interest here (McGinnity et al., 2011, p. 38).[284] Narrow campaigns relying only on the immigrant vote based in identity hurt ethnic politicians, having in mind the limited numbers of voting non-nationals in 2009, as well as the unwillingness of foreign voters to be associated with a particular ethnicity. Voting along

[283] Fianna Fail had ten foreign candidates, Fine Gael and the Green Party listed eight each, the Labour Party ran four non-nationals, and fourteen others ran as independents. Those candidates came from Nigeria (sixteen), Poland (nine), India and Pakistan, Latvia, Lithuania, and Russia, as well as Moldova, the Netherlands, USA, Colombia, Zimbabwe, Congo DRC, and South Africa. Immigrant candidates stood in 60% of city councils' elections, 38% of county councils' elections, and one fifth of town and borough elections (Huseini & Yao, 2010). Polish candidates ran in Limerick, Kilkenny, Mullingar, Shannon, Tullamore, Templemore, with Mr. Bartlomiej Bruzewick running for Fine Gael in the Dublin North Inner City and Lech Szczecinski running for in the South West Inner City (Mutwarasibo, 2011).

[284] Mr. Adebari was elected to the Laois County Council and the Portlaoise Town Council. Dutch former aid worker Jan Rotte won a seat for the Labour Party in Lismore, Co Waterford. There were two successes in Co. Monaghan, where Lithuanian school teacher Kristina Jankaitiene took a seat for the Green Party and Russian-born Anna Rooney was elected to Clones' town council under the auspices of Fianna Fail. Several candidates, like Fine Gael's Adeola Ogunsina in Mulhuddart, Anna Michalska of Fianna Fáil in Kilkenny, the Green Party's Tendai Madondo in Tallaght, and Labour's Elena Secas, performed well without taking a seat (Mac Cormaic, 2009).

identity lines pitted ethnic candidates against one another. This was the case for Fine Gael's Adeola Ogunsuna, Fianna Fáil's Idowu Olafimihan, and Independent Ignatius Okafor who ran in Mulhuddart, where voting occurred along tribal and class lines. Lack of financial resources or knowledge of the Irish political system, as well as low voting rates in the immigrant-heavy communities also disadvantaged the newcomers (D43-NO; "The failure of Mulhuddart's," 2009; O'Boyle, 2012; Reilly, 2009). Racial discrimination played a large role with African candidates. Visual differences detracted from the much needed Irish vote in the process of door-to-door canvassing (Okorie, 2009). For instance, South African Patrick Maphoso was verbally abused while canvassing in Dublin City and there were rumors that Tendai Madondo had AIDS in Tallaght. Institutional discrimination and the lack of support for ethnic candidates by the party with which they were running exacerbated the situation further (Mac Cormaic, 2009; Reilly, 2009). As one African candidate suggested, parties like Fianna Fail were "merely shopping for immigrant faces," and their enthusiastic courting of ethnic candidates did not translate into granting them the necessary resources to win (Fanning, 2011, p. 154). Rather, running as part of established political parties exposed ethnic candidates to rigid party agendas and limited their creativity and reliance on ethnic networks (D43-NO).

The 2009 local election saw not only a higher count of ethnic candidates, but also a drive to involve immigrant voters in the political process. The Africa Centre engaged in the creation and development of migrant networks as to enhance civil and political rights. Together with the New Communities Partnership (NCP), the Centre engaged in voter mobilization across immigrant communities and registered 10,000 immigrants to vote in 2009 (Huseini & Yao, 2010; McGinnity et al., 2011, p. 38). The NCP also worked with

the Dublin City Council, which launched its own voter registration campaign among non-nationals. Fianna Fail and Fine Gael, in their turn, engaged in active recruitment of Polish organizers, or "integration officers," and translated election materials into various languages. Integration officers encouraged Polish immigrants to run and vote in local elections. Finally, the Immigrant Council of Ireland launched the *Count Us In* program in 2011 that raised awareness among naturalized citizens of their right to vote in general elections (ICI, 2011; Mutwarasibo, 2011). Political party efforts focused mostly on the untapped pool of culturally and ethnically similar Polish immigrants (Fanning, 2011).

Despite these efforts, voting rates among immigrant communities are low. The ICI conducted a study with Nigerian and Eastern European voters prior to the 2009 election. It reported that the Nigerian community registered in large numbers, with about half of the Nigerians interviewed registered to vote in the local 2009 elections. On the other hand, only 15% of all East European respondents reported being registered to vote. The lack of information on the eligibility to vote and the complexities of the process precluded 35% of East Europeans from actually registering, but six in ten did not plan to engage in the Irish political process due to sheer disinterest. On the other hand, one third of Nigerian potential voters were disinterested and 45% were unaware of the political process or their political rights (ICI, 2008, pp. 79-80).

The stronger intent to participate in the Irish political process and the lower levels of political apathy among Nigerian immigrants should be interpreted with caution. The more recent arrival of the Eastern European population might account for its lower participation rates. Short residence might correlate with lack of time to develop political power and stake in Dublin. What is more, despite voter registration figures, actual voting

numbers for both groups are relatively low, with East Europeans showing the more significant gains. According to the Dublin City Council, in 2009 there were only 15,150 people on the register who did not have the right to vote in general elections, and were thus assumed to be non-nationals (Mac Cormaic, 2009). This number is placed at 15,681 by the New Communities Partnership and is considered a success as it marks a 44% increase in immigrant voting from 2004. There were an extra 542 votes for Dublin City Council, or a 6% increase, and 1,184 for South Dublin County Council, or a 24% increase. Increases were more prominent among EU citizens, who registered a 30% overall increase in votes in Dublin County, and as high as a 50% increase in votes for Dublin City Council. On the other hand, voting rates among third country nationals plateaued (Huseini & Yao, 2010). Thus, European Union citizens in Dublin reflect a bigger promise of political involvement in future elections.

According to a 2006 report with 41 African immigrants by the Africa Centre, while Africans participate in religious and ethnic communal activities, they are not interested in Dublin's local political life (Ejohr, 2006). One third of the African respondents surveyed could not even define "civic participation" and two thirds were not involved in the receiving city's life. Only 12% reported being involved in political activity in Dublin. When discussing particular political activities, only 2% were involved in Irish political parties or associations and less than one third voted in the 2004 local elections. While racism and exclusion by local political parties had a lot to do with it, lack of information, time, and interest was also to blame (Ejohr, 2006, pp. 22-23). The apathy of Africans residing in Dublin and their preoccupation with their own economic

and immigration problems are considered the persistent causes of diminished political rights and power through the 2009 election (Okorie, 2009).

In sum, both Polish and Nigerian immigrants have low levels of political participation in Dublin. More Nigerian candidates than Polish candidates participated in local elections in the early 2000s, partly because there were few Polish workers in Ireland at the time. However, Polish candidates are growing in number and had a strong showing in the 2009 elections, as a direct result of active recruitment by Irish political parties. Both ethnic groups reaped few political successes, however, with limited resources or a split ethnic vote. More significantly, Nigerian candidates experienced both institutional and individual racism. Consequently, "similar" Polish workers are much more likely to succeed as foreign candidates in the future than their Nigerian counterparts. This conclusion is also evident in the increasing rates of voting by Polish citizens in Dublin. While both Nigerians and Poles rarely vote in local elections due to apathy or lack of information, the East Europeans are registering larger increases at the voting booth since the late 2000s. They are more likely than their Nigerian counterparts to exercise their political rights, as they settle in Dublin's local life. Both groups assigned an intermediate value of 3 for this component of political incorporation (**Table V.2**).

V.4.2.2. Running for Office and Voting in Madrid

Local participatory rights are more restrictive in the case of Madrid than in the case of Dublin. Much like in Ireland, only Spanish citizens can vote and run in national and regional elections. Spain's implementation of the Maastricht Treaty led to the permission for EU nationals to run and vote in local elections in 1999. Bulgarians and

Romanians acquired suffrage rights after 2007, rendering them legitimate participants in the 2011 municipal vote (Zapata-Barrero & Zaragoza, 2009). Other foreign nationals were originally excluded from the local political process, yet a Constitutional amendment in 1992 permitted foreigners to become both voters and candidates in municipal elections. The amendment maintained the condition of reciprocal rights for Spanish citizens abroad, however, thus barring most immigrants from participating in practice. In 2008, the Socialist government used bilateral agreements to extend voting rights to the citizens of Argentina, Ecuador, Peru, and Colombia, similar to these of EU nationals and Spaniards (Juberías & Alonso, 2011). Latin American long-term residents cannot serve as candidates in city elections, however, unless they have acquired Spanish nationality (Pérez-Nievas et al., 2014). As the naturalization process is expedited for numerous South American migrants in Madrid, despite restrictions, Ecuadorians and Bulgarians in Madrid are awarded similar rights of political participation.

Ecuadorians are not entitled to stand in local elections, unless they are Spanish nationals. Bulgarians' long naturalization requirement and permission to participate in the municipal political process only since 2007 has precluded the Balkan collective from running in city elections. Another reason for the scarcity of immigrant candidates in local elections is the very nature of the electoral system in Spain, which emphasizes not individual candidates and their ability to capture the ethnic vote, but rather affinities with the ideologies of national political parties (Pérez-Nievas et al., 2014).[285] Due to the local

[285] In Dublin, all candidates run in a first-past-the-post system, where individual candidates, be they affiliated with a political parry or running as independents, are elected if they receive the most votes in a particular electoral district (Fanning et al., 2003). On the other hand, in Madrid the emphasis is on closed and blocked party lists. That is, each political party presents voters with a list of candidates equal to the number of open seats, ordered according to the party machinery's preferences. Voters can elect a list in its entirety and cannot reorder candidates. Therefore, competition is among national political parties with

political context, parties in Spain have little incentive to include immigrant-origin candidates in their lists, where immigrant candidates cannot run as independents, as is the case in Dublin. Institutional barriers lead to the underrepresentation of all foreign populations as candidates in local elections or their low-priority ordering on party lists, which precludes them from winning a seat in practice. According to Pérez-Nievas et al. (2014), while most party lists for Spanish electoral districts should include at least three immigrants candidates, a majority included none in 2011. The gap is found to be largest in the capital of Madrid, where only one party included one immigrant candidate, yet twelve foreign-born candidates should have been nominated on the basis of the size of the immigrant population. Across the various electoral districts in the Madrid Autonomous Community, only 106 nominees for the 2011 election (or 2.9% of the 3650 total nominees) were of immigrant origin despite an average immigrant population of 15% in each district. Furthermore, even fewer ethnic candidates get elected, with an average of 0.9% of councilors holding non-Spanish nationality.

Still, Latin Americans are better represented politically than Bulgarians. In a small sample of Spanish electoral districts selected by Pérez-Nievas et al. (2014), despite the growing size of the Bulgarian population, no Bulgarian candidates were nominated on the municipal level in 2003, 2007 or 2011. That compares to one Moroccan candidate, as well as fifteen Romanian, twenty-two Latin American, and forty-nine other immigrant nominees for the 2011 elections. What is more, even when included in party lists, East European migrants are unlikely to reap electoral successes. In fact, none of the Balkan migrants in the authors' sample of 709 candidates obtained a councilor seat in 2011. On

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differing ideologies and positions on the right-left continuum, rather than among particular personalities or ethnic collectives.

the other hand, three Latin American candidates secured a post, together with two "other" immigrant nominees. While all foreign-born candidates are severely disadvantaged by the local electoral process, therefore, Bulgarians, along with Moroccans, are particularly deprived of electoral successes, with Latin Americans the only, if very moderately, successful immigrant political candidates. This contrast leads Pérez-Nievas et al. (2014, p. 43) to conclude that an "ethnic penalty" is clearly in operation for the Bulgarian and Moroccan collectives, yet is less damning for South Americans in view of their "greater cultural and linguistic proximity."[286]

Not only are Bulgarians much less likely to stand as candidates in local elections than are Ecuadorians, but they are also less likely to vote. Foreign workers have an increasingly large voting potential in Spain as the migrants eligible to vote have grown from 2.9% in 1999 to 7% of all potential voters in 2011. Notably, Ecuadorians take a small part of this potential (with Latin Americans accounting for 14% of eligible voters), due to the requirement for long-term residency in Spain prior to voting. Bulgarians and Romanians account for almost four in ten potential voters (Pérez-Nievas et al., 2014). However, all foreign collectives register and vote in much lower numbers than in a perfect world. In 2007, only 16.9% of eligible foreign voters actually entered in the Electoral Census for Foreign Residents (CERE). The numbers were particularly low for East Central Europeans whose registration rates were close to 1% in some cases (Juberías & Alonso, 2011). According to Muňoz (2009), only 10% of Bulgarians registered for the

[286] Author's translation from the following quote in Spanish, "En concreto, la sanción étnica parece operar en mayor medida entre los inmigrantes procedentes de Europa del Este (especialmente los búlgaros y, por lo que se refiere a la probabilidad de resultar electos, también los rumanos) y entre los inmigrantes de origen marroquí. En sentido contrario, y como quizás cabría esperar dada su mayor proximidad cultural y lingüística, la sanción étnica opera en menor medida entre latinoamericanos. (Pérez-Nievas et al., 2014, p. 43).

2007 local elections, a rate lower than the 17% average and Ecuadorians' 30% registration rate. In 2001, 20% of foreigners registered to vote in Spain's local elections, with 14% of all new member state citizens and 15% of all third-country nationals expressing desire to participate (Pérez-Nievas et al., 2014). While the gap between the two groups has been closing according to some researchers, Ecuadorians are still more likely to participate locally. According to Bulgarian representatives, 2011 participation rates for the Balkan migrants stood only at 8%, with 34,000 Bulgarians eligible to vote in Madrid, yet only 2,810 registered. Only ten persons attended the information campaigns by the NGO. The lack of inclusion campaigns by the local, regional, and national governments in Spain, combined with Bulgarian's disenchantment with the political process in general are found to blame (M2-BO).

What is more, Ecuadorians are granted multiple accommodations for political participation in the home country, through the so-called "external vote." However, as they settle into the receiving context, they are losing interest in the politics of the sending state. To demonstrate, in both 2006 and 2009 a majority of Ecuadorian residents in Spain were entitled to vote in elections back home. However, while the participation rate stood at 61% among registered voters and 16% among all potential voters in 2006, participation rates dropped to 40% among registered voters and only 11% among all potential Ecuadorian voters in 2009 (Echeverria, 2015). Simultaneously, three quarters of Ecuadorians expressed interest in voting in Spanish elections if entitled to do so (Morales & San Martín, 2011). The South Americans are also the beneficiaries of activist trade unions and other social actors, who engage in multiple political campaigns to extend the right to vote to third-country nationals in Spain without conditions of reciprocity or long-

term residency (Zapata-Barerro & Zaragoza, 2009). On the other hand, Bulgarians' right to the external vote is far from accommodated by Spanish national and local authorities. To provide one example, despite the relatively high number of Bulgarians residing in Spain, there were only two polling stations Bulgarians could use to vote in the 2009 elections in the home country, compared to over fifty in Turkey (Dobreva, 2013).

In sum, much like their counterparts in Dublin, both Ecuadorians and Bulgarians rarely participate in Madrid's political process. The Spanish political system is mostly to blame, as electoral rules in Madrid exclude a number of immigrants from voting and standing in municipal elections and make the inclusion of ethnic candidates on party lists unattractive to political parties. Nonetheless, non-EU Ecuadorians are more involved than European Bulgarians. While European harmonization dictates that Bulgarians be granted local political participation, few of the East Europeans are nominated by the major parties and rarely win if they are, due to an "ethnic penalty." The Balkan workers also register to vote in relatively low numbers and are precluded from participating politically in the home country. On the other hand, policy changes enable Ecuadorians to vote in municipal contests, where naturalization rules effectively open an avenue for the South Americans' running in Madrid's electoral contests as well. While also severely underrepresented in party lists, Ecuadorian candidates tend to win seats on the basis of their cultural and linguistic proximity to Spanish voters. Voting rates are relatively low yet higher than these of East Europeans. While the Latin Americans are accommodated to participate in politics at home, their interest in the external vote is decreasing, signaling a shift to belonging in the host context. Ecuadorians are assigned a 3 and Bulgarians a 2 for this component of political integration (**Table V.2**).

V.4.3. Extrapolitical Participation

V.4.3.1. Extrapolitical Participation in Dublin

Extrapolitical activities among the four cohorts, like participation in trade unions or independent political mobilization, signal trends similar to these in local political engagement. Trade unionization and political activism rates are relatively low for all immigrants in Dublin, but are rising among Polish workers. According to the ICI, political activism is extremely low for Nigerian, Chinese, Indian, and East European immigrants. While the Council's East European participants were somewhat more likely to engage in such activities, with 2.5% of all of the ICI's interviewees, only 1% of Nigerians engaged in political activism. Trade unionization was higher for both groups. One quarter of all Nigerian participants were unionized compared to one tenth of East Europeans (CSO, 2006-2011; ICI, 2008, pp. 80-81).

These low unionization rates reflect the sectors in which the immigrants of interest are employed, their length of stay in Ireland, as well as structural factors from their home countries. Trade union density among immigrants varies across economic sectors. For instance, Nigerian women in the health industry have much higher trade unionization rates, while the cleaning industry where Polish women are employed exhibits one of the lower union density rates in the country (D27-TU). There are differences even within economic sectors, with 45% of cleaners in public transportation unionized and only 3% of cleaners in private offices belonging to a union (D2-TU; D27-TU). Long working hours and high membership fees account for the low unionization rates of both Nigerians and Poles. Union organizing is also low among Polish workers due to distrust in the labor movement at home (D27-TU). On the other hand, precarious

legal status precludes Nigerian immigrants from union activity (ICI, 2008, p. 80). Since Nigerian immigrants have been in Ireland longer, they have come to need the unions' help in resolving labor disputes, while Polish workers are only now discovering the power of the Services Industrial Professional and Technical Union (SIPTU). As SIPTU and other trade unions engage in active recruitment of Polish workers, differences in unionization rates are disappearing (D27-TU; ICI, 2008, p. 80; Mutwarasibo, 2011).

Despite "issues of perception" with the labor movement, union density is on the rise amidst Polish workers due to the active efforts of SIPTU. Union representatives report a conscious policy to welcome workers from new EU member states "one hundred percent", both to secure non-Irish workers' rights and entitlements and "to prevent employers from undermining labor laws and standards" for specific economic sectors (D2-TU; D27-TU). For instance, in 2009 the Joint Labor Committee of SIPTU made a decision to target the contract cleaning industry for a strategic organizing campaign. An administrative group interacts with industrial organizers within the Union to bring on board immigrants in cleaning, most of whom Polish. SIPTU also works with the Migrants Rights Centre of Ireland to inform on worker rights and promote economic integration for immigrant workers in Dublin (D27-TU). These developments led one union representative to suggest that the "Polish actually were the strongest group" in SIPTU, where there was even a Polish section of the Union's website (D2-TU).

Political activity is also increasing for both groups, yet differs in target and mechanism. African immigrants engage in political activity as part of their everyday life as asylum seekers in Ireland and aim to change the system. On the other hand, Polish immigrants involve themselves in Irish governmental initiatives, as to avail themselves of

the system. To illustrate, in 2010 residents of the family-friendly Mosney asylum camp were told to relocate to ghettoized urban hostels in Dublin. The decision came without consultation with the immigrants. It would effectively separate family and friendship networks developed in Mosney and crowd Nigerians with other asylum seekers of fundamentally different cultures (D43-NO; Isaac, 36; Moreo, 2012a, p. 165). As one asylum seeker shared, after fathering a child to a fellow Nigerian in Mosney, he would be deprived of the chance to see his son by moving to Dublin city (Isaac, 36). The relocation produced months of demonstrations, meetings with members of Parliament and Dublin City Hall, and the coming together of existing immigrant support organizations. It also spawned new immigrant organizations like the Anti-Racism Network Ireland. While the protests did not prevent removal from Mosney, they are a prime example of political mobilization by asylum seekers (D43-NO; Isaac, 36).

On the other hand, Polish community leaders rarely engage in protests. Instead, they are involved in initiatives like the Ministerial Council by the Office for the Minister of Integration. As one Polish immigrant in the Council shared, ethnic representatives meet with the Minister and other key institutions, such as the Garda, to discuss key issues for the ethnic groups involved like schooling, problematic interactions with the police, or political participation (Kevin, 27).

In sum, rates of political and trade activism are low for both Nigerian and Polish workers, yet are rising for the latter. This is the case due to the costs of engagement in terms of wages lost or membership fees, as well as disenchantment with the labor movement in one's home country among Polish workers. Once again, the Polish are overtaking their Nigerian counterparts in terms of unionization, however, as they learn of

the power of SIPTU and as they are actively recruited by the Union. The Polish are also more likely to avail themselves of the Irish political machine than to protest against it than are Nigerian immigrants in Dublin. The East Europeans are assigned an intermediary 3 for this indicator of political integration, while Nigerians are given a higher value of 4 (**Table V.2**).

V.4.3.2. Extrapolitical Participation in Madrid

Trade unionizing and political mobilization are also relatively low among Ecuadorians and Bulgarians in Madrid, yet are significantly higher for the Latin Americans. The latter unionize in rates higher than these for Spaniards and are the primary beneficiaries of Spanish trade unions' political and legal campaigns and activities. Ecuadorians also tend to engage in political mobilization, mostly using the Spanish system and resources to target the home state. The Balkan migrants, much like their Polish counterparts, are wary of political activism or union activity in view of a repressive Communist past and disenchantment with the labor movement or the political process. However, unlike in the Irish case, Spanish actors rarely seek to engage the East Europeans, who are supposed to enjoy sufficient rights as EU citizens and whose level of civic distrust is hard to overcome.

Much like in the case of Ireland, trade unions in Spain do not collect information on unionization disaggregated by nationality, with one representative placing the unionization of all foreign-born workers in Spain at a modest 15% (M23-TU). Nonetheless, a study by Meardi, Martín and Riera (2012) of the construction sector, a space where Bulgarians and Ecuadorians interact, finds that unionization rates differ

significantly between the two groups. Unionization in construction is generally low, with 8.7% for Spaniards and 3.6% for immigrants. However, campaigns by the UGT (*Unión General de Trabajadores*) and CCOO (*Confederación Sindical de Comisiones Obreras*) resulted in success only among Latin Americans, who might even exhibit unionization rates higher than these of natives, but achieved no results among East European or Moroccan workers. The authors attribute union success to Ecuadorians' and other South Americans' language and cultural proximity, as well as general potential for political mobilization. On the other hand, the scholars blame Bulgarians' and other East European workers' lack of union involvement on their individualism and temporary outlook, distrust in organized labor activity, and "sense of distance" from Spanish unions.

Notably, Spanish trade unionism is less about participation than about unions' political activism and active protection of workers' rights (Meardi, Martín & Riera, 2012). Unions are the primary force behind regularization campaigns of undocumented workers (M23-TU; M25-TU; M26-TU; M34-TU). They set up e Information Centers for Migrant Workers to inform regular and irregular foreign laborers of their rights, promote "dignified work" (*trabajo digno*), and help with permit renewals, regularization, family reunification, or health care access (M23-TU; M25-TU; M34-TU).[287] The UGT reports being active in social dialogue with employers and the government in order to render migration and labor legislation more beneficial to foreign workers, shape the catalog of hard-to-find occupations and open more avenues of entry for third-county workers in Spain (M23-TU; M25-TU; M26-TU; M34-TU). The Union's migration secretariats work together with the Ministry of Labor and Immigration to set up incorporation programs, put forward "diversity programs," open centers that aid with foreign laborers' socio-

[287] Author's translation from original phrase in Spanish.

economic integration, and provide education on interviewing or looking for work in Madrid (M23-TU; M25-TU; M34-TU). Finally, immigrants are included as syndicate delegates and officials more often than as political party candidates (M23-TU). Ecuadorian and other third-country nationals, who require permits to enter the Spanish labor market, might find themselves in an irregular situation, and are eager to participate politically, are the primary beneficiaries of all these efforts (M23-TU; M25-TU; M34-TU). On the other hand, EU Bulgarians who are hostile towards institutionalized trade unions tend not to avail themselves of the organizations' political clout (M26-TU).

Bulgarians also rarely engage in political mobilization in Spain due to political socialization, cynicism, and low levels of involvement with politically active social actors in Spain, such as UGT and CCOO (M2-BO). On the other hand, transnationally-oriented Ecuadorians often employ the resources of the host context to influence politics in the home country. In one instance, Ecuadorians associations and their members in Madrid mobilized to prevent Ecuadorians national banks from recovering mortgage debt acquired in Spain in 2011 (De Sandoval, 2011).

In sum, distrustful Bulgarians are unlikely to be drawn in by eager trade unions in Spain. Unions also rarely target the East Europeans, since they are uninterested in political and social activities, or are perceived to enjoy sufficient rights and resources as EU citizens. On the other hand, Ecuadorians are the primary beneficiaries of trade union activities in Madrid. They unionize in relatively high rates, partake in UGT and CCOO regularization drives, employ the services of Information Centers for Migrant Workers, and are interested in the unions' legal sway, integration programs and educational services. Ecuadorians also engage in political mobilization, mostly to change the home

country. Ecuadorians' cultural and linguistic proximity and conception of Ecuador and Spain as existing in one transnational space underpins higher extra-political participation rates. Bulgarians are thus given a low 2 for their Extrapolitical activity in Madrid, while Ecuadorians merit a higher value of 4 (**Table V.2**).

V.4.4. Civic Activism

V.4.4.1. Civic Activism in Dublin

Finally, both Nigerian and Polish immigrants engage in community activism in Dublin, as do Bulgarians and Ecuadorians in Madrid. Migrants in Dublin have established organizations to serve their national populations, larger ethnic groups, or the local community in the receiving city. Migrant activism falls in two types, however, with differences between European and non-European immigrants. Third country nationals established organizations and engaged in immigrant activism mostly between 2000 and 2004, as a direct continuation of the political activities of individuals in their countries of origin. On the other hand, EU migrants engage in organizational activity since the EU enlargement in 2004, concentrating their efforts on practical issues like employment, social welfare, language acquisition, and cultural socialization (Lentin, 2012).

Africans are well involved in community activity due to previous activism in their country of origin, the length of their stay in Ireland, and their urgent legal and migration situation in Dublin. A strong yet small cadre of Nigerian activists works across networks to advance the interests of the ethnic group. Nigerians participate in the Africa Centre, an umbrella organization concerned with the advancement of all Africans in Ireland, but also have their own national voluntary and civic organizations like the Nigerian Association

of Ireland and the Igbo Association of Ireland (ICI, 2008, p. 84). These associations tend to emphasize political and social empowerment rather than the economic and cultural integration stressed by Polish organizations (Fanning, Shaw, & Boyle, 2009).[288] They focus almost exclusively on remedying the asylum process and securing the political and legal rights of the Africans.

Religious activities are a popular venue of empowerment for the community. African immigrants are particularly engaged in Pentecostal churches, which provide them with "spiritual guidance and comfort, practical advice and help, and an interpretive frame to make sense of migration trajectories." Pentecostal churches also serve as a forum for African immigrants to devise and engage in activities for socio-economic and political empowerment (Moreo, 2012b, pp. 86-87). Churches spawn other migrant organizations dedicated to community support and service provision. While promoting integration, churches represent a unique space where members of the ethnic group can preserve and reenact their home culture and social rituals (Passarelli, 2012, pp. 143, 149-150).

The media is another mechanism for Nigerian activists to advance the interests of their community and to secure its political integration. For example, one activist started a radio program at Dublin Community Radio to discuss issues pertinent to African immigrants, "their social concerns, political concerns, policies that are unfavorable to them" (Taylor, 30). Another established the most prominent ethnic newspaper in Dublin in 2000 – *Metro Eireann* – a publication with predominantly Nigerian contributors. The

[288] A few established Nigerian immigrants do focus on building the economic and social capital of their community. For instance, Nigerians participate in Emerge, where ethnic entrepreneurs are trained to conduct business according to the Irish standard and are thus provided with skills to ensure their economic integration in Ireland (D42-NO). One Nigerian organized a fashion show with ethnic models as to empower African women (Tatiana, 27).

newspaper looks at “issues in the community, it could be immigration issues, political issues or policies” (Charles, 56).

The civic activities of Nigerian immigrants in Dublin are rich and empowering. However, while asylum seekers are particularly active, once they emerge from the asylum process and receive more secure status or gainful employment, they focus on their own well-being rather than on their community’s. A desire to disassociate with the asylum experience, as well as one’s race or particular nationality, becomes significant. Consequently, communal interests lose priority (ICI, 2008, p. 84). There is also high turnover and cessation of activities by non-paid volunteers whose time and resources are limited (D43-NO). Few Nigerians beyond the core of Nigerian “career activists,” therefore, are involved in civic and political activities in Dublin.

Polish workers are much better integrated in the labor market than their Nigerian counterparts. Further, they are rarely the subject of racism in Dublin. Therefore, socio-cultural marginalization is not a predictor of Poles’ political and civic activity. Discrimination in employment did create some political aspirations, and many Polish organizations in Dublin focus on issues of economic and social service provision. Nonetheless, Polish community energy is concentrated mostly on the Polish diaspora in Ireland rather than on Irish institutions. For instance, the drive to create Polish schools in Dublin was directed at the Polish consulate and not the Irish government (Fanning & O’Boyle, 2010, p. 422). Still, the Polish Social and Cultural Association (POSK Dublin), the Irish-Polish Business Society, or Forum Polonia have provided for cross-cultural events in Dublin, business networking and entrepreneurship opportunities between the two countries, service provision and information, as well as ethnic and cultural solidarity.

Polish weekend schools educate Polish children in language skills and Polish history and geography and serve to promote "resistance against …linguistic and cultural assimilation," but also to establish a new cultural identity for a community whose life occurs in the home and host country (Moreo, 2012b, pp. 88-90).

There are two types of Polish organizations, both run by a loyal cadre of Polish activists engaged across networks to strengthen the ethnic group while promoting interaction with the host society. The first type of organization focuses on serving the practical needs of Polish immigrants in Dublin. The Social and Legal Advice Centre, for instance, provides legal services and information about employment and social welfare entitlements (D38-PO; D39-PO). Polish employees at Irish service providers like Crosscare, CARE, or My Mind, give specialized information to their Polish clients on housing, healthcare, and psychological issues respectively (D35-PO; D36-PO; D40-PO). Organizations like Cultur or the Polish Chaplaincy are venues for the professional development of well-educated Poles (Kevin, 27; Lilly, 36; Michael, 56).

The second type of Polish organization in Dublin aims to enhance the cultural integrity of the ethnic group, while also presenting Polish culture to the Irish. The Polish-speaking Polish Social and Cultural Association and the English-speaking Irish-Polish Society are the overarching umbrellas in setting up a wealth of cultural events in the host city (D35-PO). The Polish Social and Cultural Association has a "concentration on Polish culture" and organizes activities like meet-and-greets with visiting Polish politicians, thus increasing cultural density within the Polish diaspora in Ireland (George, 58). The Irish-Polish society, on the other hand, is focused on establishing connections with the host society and setting up intercultural interactions. Recently, the focus is placed on

"[getting] more connected to the Irish society and [getting] more involved in Irish life" (Steven, 34). The Irish-Polish society works with the Irish Peace Corps Localise, where a group of Polish volunteers not only teach English to their compatriots but also aid the native communities in which they are based, with Irish nationals as the primary beneficiaries (Kevin, 27). The Polish House is the physical seat of the cultural associations. It serves as a forum for the strengthening of the Polish diaspora in Dublin, a platform for artistic expression and exchange, and formerly a seat of the Polish (George, 58; Janet, 67; Richard, 34). The wealth of Polish bars, restaurants and shops in Dublin are considered another venue for interaction within the community and between the community and its Irish hosts (D41-NO).

The religious and media activities of the Polish group combine the two aspects of community involvement described above, as they both serve to enhance the spiritual and cultural identity of Polish immigrants in Dublin and provide them with practical information and services. The Polish Chaplaincy provides a number of religious activities that serve as a glue and expression platform to the Polish community in Dublin, but also a forum for this community to interact with Irish citizens (D35-PO; D37-PO). The Church is recognized as a seat of political power for the Polish community in Ireland (George, 58; Hailey, 60). The Chaplaincy's activities reach beyond spiritual services. For instance, the Polish Chaplaincy works with the Social and Legal Advice Center to address economic concerns, such as welfare benefits, and organizes Polish Sunday school for immigrant children (D39-PO; Janet, 67). It also collaborates with the Polish Commissioner for People's Rights and the Ombudsman for Human Rights to ensure equal rights for Polish citizens in Ireland (D35-PO; D37-PO).

Ethnic publications like the newspapers *Gazeta*, *Polska Gazeta*, and the Polish *Sunday Herald* are invaluable sources of information for the Polish community, but also a way to announce the community's identity to the host society. Even information portals like www.nadjemy.ie are helpful to thickening Polish ethnic networks and enhancing the community's potential for civic activism (D41-NO). Most media outlets for the Polish community thrive under the umbrella of Forum Polonia, a diasporic network of Polish immigrants around the world, active in Ireland since the mid-2000s (Kevin, 27).

In sum, both Nigerian and Polish immigrants in Dublin participle in civic and voluntary associations on a daily basis. Nigerian immigrants focus their efforts on aiding the political and social integration of their ethnic group. Polish immigrants are instead concerned with economic and service provision, as well as the cultural enhancement and entrenchment of their cohort in the host city. Both populations are active in religious and media organizations. Unfortunately, only a small number of "career activists" from both nationalities are civically engaged in Ireland. The number is limited in the case of Nigerian immigrants to only those with previous political experience from the home country. On the other hand, as a number of "ordinary" Poles participate in activities to strengthen their cultural community in Dublin, the East Europeans are more likely to interact with their Irish hosts. Regardless, both populations are assigned a high 4 for this indicator of political integration (**Table V.2**).

V.4.4.2. Civic Activism in Madrid

Civic engagement as an expression of belonging in the host context is strong among Ecuadorians and Bulgarians in Madrid as well. Despite the scarcity of research on

the subject, Ecuadorians' associational activity in Madrid is significant (Morales & Pilati, 2014). Of the 488 immigrant associations in Spain, 150 pertain to Latin Americans, and 58 to Eastern Europeans. Ecuadorians have the largest number of organizations in Spain among all nationalities (89) compared to 49 for Romanians, for instance. While organizational density is intermediate (with 26.5 organizations per 100,000 persons), it is still higher than that for Eastern Europeans.[289] As Morales and Pilati (2014) argue, many of these organizations are focused on the home country. Of the thirteen organizations surveyed by Gómez and Cubillo (2010), for instance, ten reported cooperating with the country of origin and working to maintain the immigrants' own culture. Nonetheless, as ten of the thirteen were dedicated to political activities, Ecuadorians' civic activism in Madrid is a significant predictor of Ecuadorians' tendency for political mobilization and of the immigrants' capacity to engage politically in Spain (Gómez & Cubillo, 2010).

Bulgarians exhibit disproportionately high rates of civic participation in Madrid as an alternative rather than a supplement to political engagement. In 2006, for instance, five of the fifty-two ethnic associations in Madrid were Bulgarian (Gómez & Cubillo, 2010). This researcher met with the representatives of seven ethnic organizations in the city of Madrid, all founded since 2003. Much like the activities of Polish organizations in Dublin, Bulgarian associations can be divided into two types, one focused on service provision and the other – on cultural enhancement and integration. On the one hand, associations like Balcan, the CEPI Hispano-Bulgaro, ABE Cirilo y Metodio, and even the Office for Labor and Social Affairs to the Bulgarian Embassy in Madrid address the labor and legal needs of the Bulgarian community in Madrid (M1-BO; M2-BO; M4-BO; M5-

[289] For example, organizational density among Romanians is 15 organizations per 100,000 people. That number compares to 63 organizations for Dominicans (Góomez & Cubillo, 2010).

BO). Prior to 2007, they dealt with permit acquisition and renewal, family reunification or access to social services (M2-BO). With entry into the EU, yet imposition of transitional arrangements, the organizations dedicated their energies to disseminating information on Bulgarians' legal status in Spain and setting up self-employment and other contracts as to ensure entry in Madrid (M2-BO; M5-BO). The latest activities of these associations involve services like resume writing courses, voter registration drives, social security and pension consultations, and language classes (M1-BO; M2-BO; M4-BO; M5-BO). Unlike their Polish counterparts, however, the ethnic associations are intricately involved with the local government (M1-BO). They do not serve the Bulgarian community exclusively. While 60% of clients are Bulgarian, Spaniards form another 20% and other migrants like Ecuadorians are the third type of beneficiary (M2-BO; M5-BO).

A second set of East European associations in Madrid promote the cultural integrity and expression of the Bulgarian diaspora, yet also aim to incorporate Bulgarians into the cultural outlook of the receiving context. For instance, Balcan organizes an increasingly popular Bulgarian Sunday school teaching children Bulgarian language and history (M1-BO; M7-BO). Associations like TANGRA, Kubrat, ABE Ciril I Metodio, and Asociación Hispano-Bulgara para la Integración y el Desarrollo develop the artistic expression of the Bulgarian community in Spain by organizing Bulgarian folk music or dance troupes or inviting performers from the home country (M5-BO; M6-BO; M7-BO). However, they also publicize Bulgarian cultural expression to Spaniards by organizing events for the general public in Madrid (M6-BO). They are engaged in Bulgarians' socio-cultural incorporation in the host city through language courses or campaigns of sensitization of Spaniards to the cultural diversity brought about by Bulgarians (M6-BO).

Media and religious expression are other venues for Bulgarian civic engagement in Madrid (M3-BO; M8-BO). The Bulgarian newspaper *Nova Duma*, based in the capital yet disseminated throughout Spain, was started in 2003 as a communication forum for the Bulgarian diaspora. It incorporates news about Bulgaria, information about inspiring Bulgarians in Spain, news on Spanish developments concerning Bulgarians, as well as a practical question-and-answer section (M2-BO; M3-BO). The magazine "BgStyl" is a cultural platform for Bulgarians in Madrid, yet also contains useful information concerning the Balkan migrants (M6-BO). The Orthodox church "Sveto Bogojavlenie" provides the community with spiritual guidance and social expression.

In sum, both Ecuadorians and Bulgarians are engaged civically in Madrid. Ecuadorians hold the largest number of associations in the city among all immigrant collectives and employ these platforms to connect to the home country and to change the receiving context. Civic membership is a good predictor of political activity for the cohort, which is assigned a high 4 for this indicator of political integration (**Table V.2**). Bulgarians, engage in ethnic associations as an alternative to political involvement. Bulgarian associations in Madrid are dedicated to service provision, but also to cultural development and immersion in the host city. Bulgarians' civic activism is the easiest way for the community to signal its desire to incorporate in the socio-political life of Madrid and merits the highest value of 5 (**Table V.2**).

V.5. Conclusion

Political participation patterns support the broader argument of this dissertation. While the incorporation of all four groups of interest here is somewhat imperfect, there

are significant differences among the collectives based on the exclusion-inclusion they face in the receiving context and their own conception of belonging or isolation. These dynamics concern both passive political incorporation, and the entitlements conferred upon the newcomers through policy, legislation, or differing legal status classifications, and active participation, or the foreign workers' use of these rights.

Ecuadorians, who are both included and perceive themselves to belong in Madrid, experience *organic integration* (**Table V.1**). They are privileged by national and local policies and laws and take ample advantage of their entitlements. Their arrival in Spain as workers puts them at the center of a migration system dedicated to serving the receiving country's economic and demographic needs. The South Americans are the beneficiaries of relatively open entry and labor market access in Spain based in bilateral agreements, the hard-to-fill occupations catalog, the labor contingents, and the jobseekers visa. They are granted fast-track admission to Spanish citizenship, local political rights close to these of natives and EU nationals, and ample incorporation resources. Even if irregular, Ecuadorians can easily avail themselves of targeted regularizations made easier by their socio-cultural connections to the host context. Unsurprisingly, the Latin American immigrants naturalize in the largest numbers among any foreign group in Spain, vote in local elections and might even be elected into office despite obstacles, participate in trade unions, and set the most civic associations in the receiving city. Even when continuing to focus on the motherland through their political activism, Ecuadorians signal their belonging in host and home contexts, which exist in one transnational space (**Table V.2**).

Polish workers, who are welcomed in the receiving context, yet do not consider themselves to fit into Ireland's life, represent *reluctant integration* (**Table V.1**). Most

Polish immigrants entered Ireland as EU citizens, or have regularized their status since 2004. Developments like the opening of the Irish labor market to new member states in 2004, the conscious policy to fill labor shortages through migration from within the EEA, and the focusing of integration resources on EU immigrants since 2008, further enhance the legal-political position of this community in Dublin. Regardless, Poles, who conceive of themselves as different from their Irish hosts, are reluctant to utilize the plethora of rights they are granted. They naturalize, unionize, and vote in relatively low numbers. However, Polish political participation is on the rise with efforts by local parties and trade unions. The Polish also tend to avail of the Irish political system more efficiently than their Nigerian counterparts as to advance their political and social integration in the host country. As they settle in Ireland, they overcome Nigerian immigrants in terms of political integration in Dublin (**Table V.2**).

Bulgarians belong in their new home in Madrid, yet are met with disinterest if not hostility by local stakeholders. They represent the *conflicted integration* outcome (**Table V.1**) and intermediary levels of political incorporation (**Table V.2**). There are few legal or policy provisions that privilege the East Europeans. Legal status as EU nationals combined with barriers to working in Spain actually deprive them of clarity, labor protections, or incorporation funds. Naturalization rules or local political accommodations disadvantage the Balkan newcomers. As a consequence of these barriers, Bulgarians rarely naturalize or participate in Madrid's elections. Prior political socialization and distrust precludes them from unionization or political mobilization. As they aspire to signal belonging in the host context, however, Bulgarians set a

disproportionately large number of ethnic associations in the host city, which serve to both preserve the community and immerse it into the receiving context's life.

Nigerian immigrants experience *blocked integration* (**Table V.1**). They are disadvantaged in terms of passive political integration. Their legal status as asylum seekers, foreign students, or undocumented migrants holds few rights and entitlements. Recent policy and legal developments concerning third-country nationals, such as the 2004 Referendum amending the *jus soli* principle of citizenship, the 2009 closure of certain professions to work permits, or the 2010 Immigration Bill's summary deportation procedures, further disadvantage this group. While Nigerian immigrants exhibit relatively high rates of active political participation, moreover, participation rates are still low and have plateaued over time. It cannot be denied that Nigerian immigrants naturalize and participate in local elections and Irish trade unions in larger numbers than Polish nationals in Dublin. However, Nigerian political participation is precluded by immutable barriers of structural and personal discrimination and a precarious legal status. Therefore, political integration levels are intermediate at best (**Table V.2**).

Discussion of political integration also brings to light the differences between the two receiving contexts. With a focus on homogeneity and European-ness, Dublin's stakeholders privilege Eastern European migrants. However, political participation rules are generally open to all foreigners in the city providing some opportunity even for different Nigerians. On the other hand, Madrid's political landscape is conservative and closed regardless of a discourse of tolerance and democracy. An exclusively ethnic conception of the political community corresponds to entitlements for culturally and linguistically proximate Latin Americans at the expense of EU immigrants. EU

membership does not guarantee local rights and inclusion despite national commitment to EU harmonization. Contextual identity variations affect integration patterns.

While context matters, what the newcomers do with it is important too. Poles' cynicism and lack of belonging in Dublin render the East Europeans unwilling to avail themselves of the multiple entitlements and political access points they are granted. Interestingly, despite exclusion and lack of belonging, Nigerians in Ireland still exhibit relatively high active political participation levels, making the group the only outlier in this discussion. In this case, exclusion and racial discrimination do not connect with passivity but with the mobilization of ethnic group consciousness and resources. Unfortunately, incorporation outcomes are severely impaired in the economic and social spheres, the topics to which this dissertation turns next.

CHAPTER VI

"PH.D.'s DRIVING BUSES":

ECONOMIC INCORPORATION IN DUBLIN AND MADRID

VI.1. Introduction

Why do Poles have access to the Dublin labor market, while highly-educated Nigerians are not considered a valuable worker pool by the Irish? Why do Bulgarians experience downward occupational mobility in Madrid, while Ecuadorians enjoy improved economic circumstances? Identity and perceptions of cultural proximity affect these patterns. Not the migrants who carry the largest economic benefit, but rather the foreign cohorts that are considered "similar" in socio-cultural terms inspire the highest levels of trust and empathy among local labor market actors. They benefit from better access to jobs, less exploitation and more favorable relationships in the work place. Furthermore, immigrant collectives that consider themselves to "belong," in subjective identity terms, are more likely to invest in economic access in the host city. They transfer qualifications and engage in jobs fitting their education, seek their economic rights and are satisfied with their economic situation in the receiving context.

This chapter traces the economic integration of Poles and Nigerians in Dublin and Ecuadorians and Bulgarians in Madrid through the discussion of access to employment; occupational mobility; working conditions; treatment at work; and satisfaction.[290] A

[290] Access is determined through the ability of a qualified immigrant candidate to receive an interview or a job offer regardless of nationality or race, as well as employment and unemployment rates. The indicator "occupational mobility" compares type and sector of current employment to education and work history at home and over time. Discussion of "working conditions" includes considerations of contract type, wages, work schedule, harsh working environment, or undue termination. Treatment at work is defined as

detailed discussion of these indicators suggests that Ecuadorians experience *organic integration* in Madrid. These similar migrants continue to have relatively open access to the Spanish labor market despite economic downturn and restrictive policy changes. Their socio-cultural proximity inspires trust in Spanish employers and results in little discrimination in recruitment, as well as higher participation rates and lower rates of inactivity than other immigrant groups like Moroccans or Eastern Europeans. Ecuadorians consider Madrid an extension of their homeland and their work life abroad a logical continuation of employment trajectories at home. They experience smaller penalties than Bulgarians, for instance, in terms of occupational mobility or working conditions upon migration. Identification with natives leads to less discrimination at work and higher levels of self-reported satisfaction (**Table VI.1**).

Polish workers undergo *reluctant integration* in Dublin. Local labor market actors perceive Poles as similar to the hard-working, white, European Irish. The East Europeans rarely experience discrimination in recruitment, even with economic downturn, and have high employment rates and relatively low unemployment ones. Polish workers can be mistreated at work by managers or colleagues, yet bullying is much less frequent among the Polish than among Nigerian workers, for instance. Polish immigrants are satisfied with their employment in Dublin. Poles' own lack of belonging and identification with their hosts, however, leads to certain deficiencies in incorporation. Access is paired with downward occupational mobility and subpar conditions at work. As economic opportunities are ample, however, even if working below their educational level, Polish workers in Dublin are in full control of their economic destiny (**Table VI.1**).

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relationships with native managers, native and immigrant coworkers, as well as local clients and customers. Satisfaction is self-defined.

Table VI.1. Economic Incorporation Index[291]

Indicator	*Polish (Score)*	*Nigerian (Score)*	*Ecuadorian (Score)*	*Bulgarian (Score)*
Access	High (4)	Low (1)	High (5)	Intermediate (3)
Mobility	Intermediate (3)	Low (1)	High (4)	Low (2)
Conditions	Intermediate (3)	Low (1)	Intermediate (3)	Low (2)
Relationships	High (4)	Low (1)	High (5)	Low (2)
Satisfaction	High (4)	Low (1)	High (4)	High (4)
ECONOMIC INCORPORATION	***Intermediate/high (18)***	***Low (5)***	***High (21)***	***Intermediate (13)***

Bulgarians face *conflicted integration* in Madrid. Despite their European Union citizenship and high qualifications, the Balkan migrants are perceived as different and suspect by their Spanish hosts. Access to employment is impaired, employment status does not correspond to qualifications and exploitation at work is common. Regardless, as Bulgarian workers perceive themselves as similar to Spaniards in terms of history, temperament, and common European roots, the foreign workers seek their rights and are somewhat satisfied with the receiving city's labor market (**Table VI.1**).

Finally, Nigerians experience *blocked integration* in Dublin. The African immigrants face intense discrimination in the Irish workplace. The recruitment process is

[291] Each category is assigned a number between 1 and 5. Outcomes that reflect lack of economic access or incorporation are assigned a value of 1. High levels of incorporation and economic rights are given a value of 5. Outcomes that fall in the middle are assigned a 3. The values from every column are added to produce an index of economic incorporation levels for each immigrant group. Indicators are composite. "Access/(un)employment" includes the sub-categories of discrimination in recruitment/initial access to the labor market, current employment levels, as well as current unemployment levels for the group as a whole. Each of the three is given a value between 1 and 5 and the total is divided by three to come up with an average. Similarly, "conditions" comprise contract type, wages, hours, hard/menial work, as well as undue termination, with each sub-category assigned value from 1-5 and "conditions" as the average. "Relationships" includes treatment by native employers/managers, treatment by native and other coworkers, as well as treatment by native clients/customers, with each category assigned a value from 1 to 5 and an average calculated. The Index ranges from 5 to 25. Values between 5 and 11 reflect low levels of incorporation, 12-18 show intermediate economic access and 19-25 correspond to a multitude of economic rights.

highly disadvantaging for this physically different foreign population. There is a large gap between education and skills and actual employment opportunities, with medical doctors working as street cleaners. Occupational mobility is slow or nonexistent, unemployment rates are high, and activity levels are the lowest for any immigrant group in Ireland. Conditions and treatment at work are substandard, with bullying and xenophobia as an everyday experience (**Table VI.1**).

The remainder of this chapter discusses each indicator of economic integration for Poles and Nigerians in Dublin and Ecuadorians and Bulgarians in Madrid in turn. The findings are based on analysis of governmental and non-governmental reports, statistical information, secondary sources, and interviews with all relevant stakeholders. Interviews with the immigrants and their elite interlocutors add nuance to the discussion and complete the sources.[292]

VI.2. Labor Market Access

VI.2.1. Labor Market Access in Dublin

Polish workers, considered similar to the white, European, Catholic, hard-working Irish, have relatively open access to Dublin's local labor market. On the other hand,

[292] In Dublin, additional sources include the study by the Immigrant Council of Ireland of the integration levels of Nigerians and Eastern Europeans in Ireland (ICI, 2008); two Economic and Social Research Institute (ESRI) studies on immigrant integration in Ireland (McGinnity et al., 2006, 2011); an ESRI piece on discrimination in recruitment among immigrants in Ireland (McGinnity, Nelson, Lunn, & Quinn, 2009); a report by O'Connell and McGinnity (2008) on foreign workers in the Irish labor market; as well as data from the Irish census (CSO, 2008, 2012a) and Quarterly National Household Survey (CSO, 2006-2011). In the case of Madrid, primary and secondary data are derived from the National Immigrant Survey (ENI) and its regional counterpart, the Regional Immigrant Survey (ERI); a report on immigrant integration in select European cities by the Migration Policy Institute (Huddleston & Tjaden, 2012); as well as several studies on the distinct aspects of immigranteconomic incorporation (Bernardi et al. 2010; Fernandez & Ortega, 2008; Rodríguez-Planas & Nollenberger, 2014; Rodríguez-Planas & Vegas, 2012; Sanromá, Ramos, & Simón, 2009, among others).

Nigerians' entry and continued access to Dublin's workplace is severely impaired. The Polish rarely experience discrimination in recruitment, despite deficient language skills, as opposed to their English-speaking yet racially different African counterparts.[293] Even with the collapse of the construction industry, the East Europeans' activity rates remain high, while labor market participation is particularly low for Nigerians in Dublin.

Table VI.2. Length of Job Search among Polish Workers in Dublin

Length of job search	**Arrival with job offer**			**< 1 week**	**1 wk – 1 month**	**> 1 month**	**Total**
	Polish/Irish agency	**Internet application**	**Friends/ family**				
Number	4	7	3	7	10	3	**34**
%	12%	20.5%	9%	20.5%	29%	9%	**100%**

Source: Author.

Desirable Polish workers easily secure employment in Dublin and are actively recruited by eager Irish local labor market actors. For instance, a 2006 study by the Economic and Social Research Institute found that Eastern Europeans were the least likely immigrant group to have limited access to employment in Ireland, with 85.6% never experiencing problems in recruitment compared to 65.5% among Black Africans (McGinnity et al., 2006). Polish interviewees in this project attest to the ease of finding a job in Ireland, especially before the economic crisis. All those looking for a job before 2008 talk of the availability of work, be it in lower-skilled occupations than their qualifications. Four in ten of the respondents came to Ireland with a job offer. Similarly, almost half of the Eastern Europeans in the study by the Immigrant Council of Ireland

[293] Indicative is the fact that no representative of Polish organizations spoke of impaired access to jobs for the Polish, while a majority talked about other issues with Poles' economic integration in their new country of residence.

arrived in Ireland with secure employment compared to one sixth of Nigerian respondents (ICI, 2008, p. 88). Few of the East European participants in this dissertation required longer than one month to secure a job in Dublin (**Table VI.2**). Polish workers' open access to work in Dublin is the result of active recruitment by Irish companies and governmental agencies, Polish agencies which provided for job placement and language courses in Dublin, and family and friends already in Ireland (D16-ADMIN; D41-NO).

Table VI.3. Job-Seeking Strategies among Polish Workers in Dublin

Strategies	Number of responses	%
Recruited in Poland	2	4.5%
Agency in Poland	2	4.5%
Agency/FÁS in Dublin	7	16%
News ad in Dublin	3	7%
Internet	7	16%
Family/friends	11	26%
Personal contact	11	26%
Total	***43***	***100%***

Source: Author.

The Polish interviewees employed different strategies when looking for work and sometimes changed course to ensure success. Apart from those recruited by Irish actors, a minority worked with an employment agency while in the home country and 16% enlisted the help of agencies in Ireland. Upon arrival in Dublin, a small number searched for jobs through newspaper ads, with little success. A more successful strategy was the use of the Internet, where 16% posted resumes to websites like the native irishjobs.ie or the Polish gazeta.ie. One quarter relied on recommendations by friends or family, or filled the vacancy after these friends or family returned home. A majority of participants

simply walked into businesses like restaurants, factories, casinos, shops, or hotels and handed out their resumes to potential employers. This final strategy is considered the most effective, where personal contact increased the chance of "similar" Polish workers to secure a job in Dublin (**Table VI.3**). Phenotypical characteristics affect access to employment in the receiving city.

Few Polish workers were rejected from jobs outright. Most commonly, they were told they would be contacted later and were never called back. The participants who did receive a negative response were either told that there is a high volume of applications by better qualified candidates or that they were overqualified for the job (Howard, 28; Jane, 26; Sarah, 33). Only two respondents felt discriminated against on the basis of their nationality. Both were looking for positions in high-skilled fields like photography and law. When prompted to elaborate, both conceded that lack of trust in their English language abilities cost them the job (Gillian, 25; Thomas, 37).

Indeed, language deficiencies are the largest barrier to Poles' recruitment in Dublin. Poor English is a justification for both not looking for qualified jobs and for not securing a specific desirable position. Economic downturn further affects the chances of Polish respondents in securing employment. Interviewees suggested that while "work was lying on the streets" prior to 2008, finding a job is difficult today (Jane, 27; Michael, 56; Richard, 34). With the onset of crisis, governmental and local policy goals shifted from the up-skilling of the Irish population to the provision of jobs for the Irish (EGFSN, 2010; Quinn, 2010). Employers followed suit and came to be concerned with a "quest for authenticity" in the service jobs previously occupied by the Polish (D16-ADMIN). Nonetheless, interviewees still believe that eagerness and desire to work will help them

secure a position regardless of economic circumstances (for instance, Kevin, 27; Ted, 28). Irish employers agree and continue to employ the East Europeans both in view of their hard-working nature and their ability to "fit in."

While similarity accounts for non-English speaking Poles' relatively open entry into the Dublin labor market, phenotypical and socio-cultural differences severely impair Nigerians' access to jobs in Ireland. In a study with 480 job applicants in Ireland, the Economic and Social Research Institute found that discrimination in recruitment is particularly severe among Africans in Dublin. Job candidates with identifiable non-Irish names were over two times less likely to be invited for an interview than candidates with Irish names, despite comparable qualifications. African candidates were three times less likely to be invited for an interview as compared to applicants with European names. This is especially the case in lower-skilled positions (McGinnity et al., 2009). African organizations in Dublin agree that "it [is] hard for a black person to get a job in Ireland," where a Nigerian person would apply to a multitude of jobs, and even if they were invited for an interview, "for one reason or another [they] will [still] be rejected" (D44-NO). Discrimination in accessing employment is the most severe area of work discrimination for Black immigrants in Ireland (Russell, Quinn, O'Riain, & McGinnity, 2008).

Nigerian participants in this project confirm the difficulty of finding a job in Dublin and speak of the many rejections they faced in the recruitment process. They believe that "in-group favoritism" is strong with economic crisis, where employers "think about their people first" and "give preference to Irish people" (Isaac, 36; Zach, 32). Employing "Irish first" and "looking after their own kind" is a common theme that resounds with all of the interviewees (Harry, 35; Isaac, 36; Tatiana, 27; Zach, 32). In-

group favoritism often occurs in the subtle forms described by the ESRI experiment. Most employers would take the Nigerian candidates' resume and suggest they would contact them later with a decision, but they would never call back (Stephen, 36). The need for "Irish experience" serves as the most common justification to not hire African candidates (Taylor, 30). Bias is not always subtle, however. One Nigerian interviewee was turned away from a KFC restaurant and was directly told they are "looking for Irish people only" (Tatiana, 27). Another witnessed his resume being thrown "in the bin" immediately after he submitted it (Stephen, 36).

Skin color affects discrimination in recruitment among Nigerians. African organization members suggest that African immigrants are rarely employed in public positions or service jobs, even low-skilled. Instead, white immigrants like the Polish take the jobs where "the face of labor" is important (D42-NO; D44-NO). According to the ICI (2008), while personal contact resulted in building trust and securing a job for Eastern European migrants in Ireland, it severely disadvantaged Nigerian workers. Race and phenotypical characteristics, or as one respondent put it, "the sight of me", affect Nigerians' ability to find a job, where all suggest they need to be more qualified than white candidates in order to be hired (Tatiana, 27). In occupations where skills are not necessary, ethnicity and national origin significantly disadvantage African candidates. Therefore, securing a job is only possible through friend networks and recommendations to avoid racialization (Ethan, 46; Tatiana, 27; Taylor, 30).

"Similar" Poles in Dublin not only secure jobs in the first place but are also able to retain them, despite economic downturn or the collapse of the construction industry. The East Europeans' employment rates remain high in bust economic times, even if

unemployment levels are on the rise. On the other hand, Nigerians' activity rates are the lowest in Dublin and among the four cohorts in this dissertation. At the height of the economic boom in 2006, 84% of Polish workers in Ireland were employed and fewer than one in ten were unemployed. For the same period, fewer than four in ten Nigerians were employed and one third were unemployed (CSO, 2008). These activity rates are stable over time. In 2010, for instance, 65.6% of Polish workers in Ireland were in employment compared to 60.1% among the Irish and 52.8% among third-country nationals. Activity rates stood at 80% for EU12 citizens, 68.8% for Irish nationals and 62.4% for non-EU immigrants (**Table VI.4**). Low activity rates among third-country migrants speak to the limited access they have to the Irish labor market (CSO, 2010; McGinnity et al., 2011).

Table VI.4. Employment, Unemployment, and Activity Rates in Dublin (in %)

Population	2006		2010		
	Employment	Unemployment	Employment	Unemployment	Activity
Polish	84	9	65.6	18	80
Nigerians	38	31	52.8*	15.4*	62.4*
Irish	60	-	60.1	12.7	68.8

* These numbers pertain to all third-country nationals rather than only to Nigerian immigrants.
Sources: CSO, 2008, 2010.

It is undeniable that Eastern European nationals are severely affected by the economic crisis, since they concentrated in the economic sectors that experienced the largest downturn (D5-ADMIN; D16-ADMIN; Mühlau, 2010). In 2010, the group was plagued by high unemployment of 18%, compared to 12.7% among the Irish and 15.4% among non-EU workers (CSO, 2010). Still, when one adjusts for the persons who are in education or care for the home, is it in fact 21% of all Poles who are in the job market but do not have a job compared to 22.5% among non-EU citizens. The high unemployment

rate for Polish nationals, moreover, reflects the continuous inflow of Polish migrants into Ireland even after economic downturn. New arrivals have greater difficulty in securing a job in Ireland, while these arriving prior to 2008 enjoy a secure economic status. In fact, Russell et al. (2008) found that Black Africans were most severely affected by unemployment in Ireland. They were more than nine times more likely to be unemployed than Irish nationals when age, sex, and education were controlled for. Similarly, the ICI (2008) reports that only about half of the Nigerian workers they interviewed were employed. 13% of Nigerian men and 16% of Nigerian women were looking for work, percentages much higher than these for Chinese, Indian and Eastern European participants (ICI, 2008).

This dissertation's interviewees confirm these trends. Only 6% of Polish respondents were not working at the time of their interview compared to 60% of Nigerians. One third of Polish participants had been unemployed at one time, most often with the onset of recession, but had managed to find another job within five months. Only one in ten had been unemployed for longer than one year, but during that time they partook in government-sponsored education and volunteered in ethnic organizations to significantly augment their economic capital. Almost two thirds of Poles had never been unemployed during their stay in Ireland and a large number had never sought social welfare in Dublin. On the other hand, all Nigerian participants reported being unemployed at least at one time during their migration in Ireland. As one African representative suggested, since the employment opportunities available to Nigerians are so unsatisfactory, many to either become self-employed or rely on the generous Irish social security system (D44-NO).

To conclude, Polish immigrants have relatively open access to the Dublin labor market, and merit a rating of 4 for this indicator of economic incorporation (**Table VI.1**). The culturally and physically proximate East Europeans rarely experience discrimination when seeking employment in Ireland, despite poor English language skills. Even with economic downturn, they believe that lesser qualified jobs are available to the eager to work. While plagued by high unemployment rates in Dublin since 2008, Polish workers continue to exhibit very high activity rates, and enjoy better access to employment than African immigrants and even Irish workers. On the other hand, Nigerians are blocked from the Dublin labor market and are assigned a composite value of 1 for this indicator of economic incorporation (**Table VI.1**). Third-country legal status disadvantages the Africans in looking for work. However, it is Nigerians' phenotypical difference from the Irish that truly precludes them from securing occupations in which "the face of labor" is important. Activity rates for the excluded migrants who not consider themselves to belong in hostile Dublin are among the lowest for any group in Ireland. Discrimination in the economic sphere explains Africans' limited access to work in Dublin.

VI.2.2. Labor Market Access in Madrid

Like their Polish counterparts, culturally and linguistically similar Ecuadorians rarely experience discrimination in recruitment in Madrid. Despite severe economic contraction, the Latin Americans are still as likely or even more likely than native or East European workers to be employed and less likely to be unemployed. On the other hand, despite higher qualifications and more flexibility than South Americans, dissimilar Bulgarians do not enjoy open access to Madrid's labor market. The Europeans' activity

rates are not low like these of racially different Nigerians in Dublin. Yet, unemployment is higher among the Balkan workers than among the Spanish-speaking Ecuadorians.

While all of the Spanish employers interviewed by this author argue that they do not consider national origin when hiring, the labor market recruitment of Latin Americans is relatively unproblematic as compared to that of Bulgarians. In a study with 3,636 Moroccans, Ecuadorians, and East Europeans in Madrid,[294] Rodríguez-Planas and Vegas (2012) find that 61% of female Ecuadorian workers and 54% of male Ecuadorian migrants are working in the receiving context within thirty days of their arrival. This is true for only 46% of Moroccans and 51% of Eastern European laborers. Among this project's interviewees, almost six in ten Ecuadorian respondents arrived in Spain with a contract and an additional one third were able to secure employment within one month. Only one in ten had difficulty in finding work, due to their irregular legal status. Nine in ten were never rejected during the application process, a percentage that compares to 57% of all immigrant respondents in a study by the Migration Policy Group (Huddleston & Tjaden, 2012). Like the Polish in Dublin, Ecuadorians are even recruited by Spanish private employers, in view of their favorable linguistic, socio-cultural, and economic characteristics (M23-TU).

Table VI.5. Length of Job Search among Bulgarian Workers in Madrid

Length of job search	**Contract**	**<1 week**	**1 wk – 1 month**	**>1 month**	**Total**
Number	2	8	9	9	**28**
%	7%	29%	32%	32%	**100%**

Source: Author.

[294] 1,125 of the respondents in the study are Ecuadorian.

While not as disadvantaged as Nigerians in Dublin, Bulgarians have more difficulty entering employment in Madrid than Ecuadorians or Poles. Only 7% of this project's interviewees arrived in the receiving context with a contract obtained through the Bulgarian National Employment Agency rather than through direct contact with Spanish employers. While 61% secured a job within a month, one third had difficulty finding employment in the long-term, compared to only 10% of both Ecuadorian and Polish respondents (**Table VI.5**).

Table VI.6. Job-Seeking Strategies among Bulgarian Workers in Madrid

Strategies	**Number of responses**	**%**
Labor office Bulgaria	2	5.4%
Labor office Madrid	2	5.4%
BG assn/officials in Madrid	3	8.1%
Spanish newspaper in Madrid	5	13.5%
Internet	1	2.7%
Family/friends	22	59.5%
Personal contact	2	5.4%
Total	***37***	***100%***

Source: Author.

Job search strategies further reflect the differences in access to employment between the Latin American and the Balkan workers. Ecuadorians are either recruited by Spanish companies from the home country or employ personal contact with potential employers to secure a job. On the other hand, Bulgarians rely almost exclusively on family and friend networks (60%) or the help of Bulgarian officials in Madrid (8%) (**Table VI.6**). The East Europeans share that they are usually hired only upon recommendation by a previous employer or by a worker leaving their post and responsible to find a replacement.

Table VI.7. Obstacles to Employment among Bulgarian Workers in Madrid

Obstacles	Language	Mistrust/preference for Latin Americans	Age	Legal status/ employment conditions	Total
Number of responses	11	6	4	4	**25**
%	44%	24%	16%	16%	**100%**

Source: Author.

Few Bulgarian workers were rejected from positions outright, but a majority identified the language barrier as a significant obstacle. Much like in the case of the Polish in Ireland, poor language skills serve both as a justification to confine oneself to lower-skilled positions and as a reason for rejection from specific posts. Age, lack of papers or disagreement on work conditions are other hurdles to Bulgarians' employment in Madrid. However, lack of trust or connection between Balkan Bulgarians and Iberian Spaniards, as well as preference for culturally proximate Latin Americans, is the second most significant barrier to employment quoted by the participants (**Table VI.7**). Interviewees share that after responding to newspaper ads about employment in domestic care, they were told that the job is only available to South American women (Rosa, 44, for instance). As the Bulgarian workers themselves put it, "No one trusts you enough to let you in their house," since Spaniards "are used to their Latinos" (Pam, 39; Tonya, 45).[295] The European workers get better access to jobs over time, as they build trust and language skills.

Culturally similar Latin Americans, seen largely as an extension of the Spanish labor force, are able to retain relatively high levels of employment despite economic collapse in Spain. While Bulgarians are not severely disadvantaged in terms of

[295] Author's translation from original quote in Bulgarian: "Те са си свикнали с техните латинци" (Pam, 39), "Никой не може да ти има доверие да те пусне в къщата си" (Yana, 50).

employment and unemployment rates, like Nigerians in Dublin, they exhibit larger gaps from the native population than their South American counterparts. The Balkan laborers' conflicted access into the Spanish labor market reflects equally conflicted self-conceptions of belonging and perceptions of Bulgarians' identity among local stakeholders.

Both Latin Americans and East Europeans came to Spain to work and thus have higher activity rates than other immigrant cohorts, such as Africans, and even the native labor force. Still, Ecuadorians are employed in higher numbers than Bulgarians. To illustrate, during boom times, almost nine in ten Latin Americans were employed compared to eight in ten East Europeans and seven in ten Spaniards (Fernandez & Ortega, 2008). At the height of economic growth in Spain, 82.7% of Ecuadorian participants in Bernardi et al. (2010)'s study were employed, compared to 75.3% of East Europeans, 70% of Spaniards and only 54% of Moroccans (**Table VI.8**). While immigrant cohorts have been severely disadvantaged with economic downturn in Spain in comparison to natives, the two groups of interest here fared better than other ethnic communities. While 59.8% of natives were employed in 2012, 53% of Ecuadorians were in employment compared to 52% of Bulgarians and only 34% of Moroccans, for instance (INE, 2012). Among this project's interviewees, 89% of the Latin Americans were employed at the time of their interview and in the height of crisis, compared to 77% of the Bulgarian participants. While differences between the two ethnic communities are subtle, they are still significant and surprising, given the East Europeans' EU citizenship status.

Table VI.8. Labor Market Participation in Madrid (in %)

Work status	Latin Americans	East Europeans	Africans	Spanish
Active (1996-2006)*	88.32	86.5	73.43	77.22
Unemployed (1996-2006)*	10.26	9.17	14.58	11.29
Inactive (2006-2007)**	9.2	14.6	34	24.5
Unemployed (2006-2007)**	8.1	10.1	12	5.5
Employed (2006-2007)**	82.7	75.3	54	70
Out of work (2010-2011)*	37	44	66	39
Out of work if arrived 2008-2011 (2010-2011)*	41	50	76	-

*Numbers concern broad nationality groups.
**Numbers concern Ecuadorians, East Europeans other than Romanians (many of whom Bulgarian), and Moroccans in particular.
Sources: Bernardi et al., 2010; Fernandez & Ortega, 2008; Rodríguez-Planas & Nolleberger, 2014.

As both the Balkan workers and their South American counterparts are employed in the economic sectors that experienced the largest downturn after 2008, the immigrants' unemployment rates rose substantially. A regional study found that 39.5% of Ecuadorians in Madrid were unemployed in 2012 compared to 40.6% of Bulgarians and 27% of Spaniards (INE, 2012). A report by Rodríguez-Planas and Nolleberger (2014), however, suggests that Latin Americans are not nearly as disadvantaged and are similar to natives in terms of their economic inactivity rates. In the authors' sample, while 39% of natives were out of work in 2010-2011, 37% of South Americans were unemployed when time of arrival was not considered, a number that compared to 44% of all East Europeans and 66% of African migrants in Spain. When accounting for arrival time, half of the newest entrants from the East European cohorts are out of work – a number much higher than that for Latin Americans (**Table VI.8**).

The interviewees in this project confirm these trends. Only 11% of Ecuadorians were not working at the time of their interview compared to 23% of Bulgarians. Four in

ten of the South Americans had been unemployed at one time, yet had managed to find another job within three months. Only one in ten had been unemployed for longer than one year, like the Polish respondents in Dublin. On the other hand, half of the Bulgarian participants reported being unemployed at least at one time in Spain. A majority failed to secure employment for longer than six months, with more than one quarter unemployed for longer than one year.

To conclude, Ecuadorians have relatively open access to Madrid's labor market and merit a high value of 4 for this indicator of economic incorporation (**Table VI.1**). The culturally proximate Ibero-Americans do not face discrimination in securing employment in Spain and rely on their language skills and socio-cultural similarities when looking for jobs in the receiving context. While activity rates have collapsed and unemployment is high among the South Americans since 2009, differences with natives are not unsurmountable. Bulgarians' access to work in Madrid is not as impaired as that of Nigerians in Dublin, but is less favorable than that of Ecuadorians. The Balkan collective is given an intermediate value of 3 for this indicator of economic incorporation (**Table VI.1**). While European Bulgarians break into Madrid's labor market over time, their entry into employment is hindered by deficient language skills, mistrust, perceptions of difference, and preference for familiar Latin Americans. Activity rates approximate these of Ecuadorians, yet Bulgarians experience a larger penalty in terms of employment and unemployment than South Americans. The conflicted reception Bulgarians receive is thus paralleled by the Balkan laborers' conflicted access to Madrid's economy.

VI.3. Occupational Mobility

VI.3.1. Occupational Mobility in Dublin

The correlation between open labor market access on the one hand and downward occupational mobility on the other hand is well-documented by the literature (for instance, Fernandez & Ortega, 2008; Venturini & Villosio, 2008). The Polish in Dublin are no exception, and are often employed below their educational level and skills. However, gaps between qualifications and employment are less glaring than these for the Nigerian population in Ireland. Polish workers are in control of their economic status and often choose to perform jobs below their qualifications. A majority experienced job shortages or downward occupational mobility prior to migration and thus do not suffer from severe deskilling upon migration, like their African counterparts. On the other hand, Nigerians completed tertiary education and occupied managerial and government positions at home, but are forced into undesirable, dead-end jobs in Ireland. They suffer from frustration and psychological distress due to their economic failure.

Table VI.9. Educational Attainment among Polish Participants in Dublin

Highest educational level	**Number of responses**	**%**
High school or lower	5	12%
College	14	32%
Master's or Ph.D.	18	42%
Vocational	2	5%
In higher education	4	9%
Total	***43***	***100%***

Source: Author.

Polish immigrants in Ireland are highly educated. In 2006, 27% of the Polish population in Ireland held a university degree and 19% – a post-graduate degree in

engineering, manufacturing, construction, social sciences, business, or law (Barrett, 2009; CSO, 2008). Researchers at the Trinity College Dublin Migrant Initiative found that while the Polish have migrated to all of Europe, the Irish cohort holds higher educational qualifications compared to the group residing in the South of Europe (Krings et al., 2010). In fact, more recent arrivals are even better qualified than their predecessors. In 2009, 41% of Eastern European migrants in Ireland aged 23-34 completed tertiary education compared to 47% of the Irish and 59% among non-European immigrants (McGinnity et al., 2011, p. 22). Among this project's participants, only 12% did not complete some form of higher education and almost half held a Master's degree in fields as diverse as psychology, philology, geography, biology, geology, computer science, engineering, economics, marketing, chemistry, and theology (**Table VI.9**).

Despite substantial educational achievements, Polish workers had few job opportunities at home and experienced severe downward occupational mobility prior to migration. According to the ICI (2008), while only 4% of Nigerians migrating to Dublin were not employed at home, 10% of East Europeans were unemployed prior to their arrival in Ireland. The same survey reports that Polish workers held a variety of occupations in the sending country, including lower-skilled jobs in construction or sales (ICI, 2008, pp. 87-88). Among this dissertation's interviewees, 40% were never employed in the home country and the rest participated in sectors as diverse as government, education, and sales. Elite representatives characterize the Polish group in Dublin as diverse in terms of work experiences and skills, yet divided between young, highly educated workers and middle-aged, retired, lesser educated immigrants (D1-J; D22-TU).

The Polish in Ireland work below their qualifications. Male migrants concentrate in construction (22%) or manufacturing (22%), while female workers find work primarily in retail (17%) or hotels and restaurants (16%). The most common occupations are sales assistants (7%), building laborers (6%), cleaners and domestics (5%), as well carpenters and joiners (4%). Only 9% work as managers or professionals (CSO, 2008). While there has been some change with the collapse of the construction sector in Ireland, Polish workers continue to be focused in low-skilled occupations like shop keepers, clerks, servers, dishwashers, cleaners, security guards, or taxi drivers (CSO, 2006-2011).

Nonetheless, the occupational gap is not nearly as severe for the Polish as it is for Nigerian workers in Dublin. 64% of Eastern European migrants in Ireland are overqualified for their position compared to a staggering 73% among African immigrants (McGinnity et al., 2011, p. 49). It is not uncommon to find "Polish ex surgeons working in a production line in a meat factory" and feeling powerless with their economic situation (D22-TU). However, Polish workers are generally "in control" and consider economic sacrifices an inevitable step towards a better life (D14-R; ICI, 2008, pp. 91-93). They also move up the employment ladder. Most of this project's interviewees took low-skilled service jobs upon their arrival in Ireland. However, Bachelor's and Master's degree holders eventually came to be employed in banking, office administration, management, or the non-governmental sector. Polish service centers and organizations provide a particularly attractive venue for professional advancement.

Not only are the occupational gap and downward occupational mobility less pronounced in the case of the Polish than in the case of Nigerians in Dublin, but they also have different causes. Unlike in the case of Nigerian migrants, the recognition of

education or experience abroad does not affect Polish workers. Unless the field is country-specific, such as law, medicine, or academia, qualifications are recognized and a Master's degree or other tertiary education is considered in the job recruitment process (D1-J; D27-TU). Discrimination is much less pronounced. While with economic crisis Irish employers are "looking after their own" and promoting only Irish employees, "similar" Polish workers at least retain their positions. This is not the case for Nigerian workers (D40-PO).

The mismatch between skills and occupation is the result of objective factors. The structure of the Dublin labor market and local labor policies limit the range of professions available to any foreign worker. As labor shortages in lower-end occupations like construction or personal services coincided with EU enlargement, such lower-skilled professions tended to attract Polish workers migrating to Ireland in the first place (D5-PO; D33-PO). It was also deliberate governmental policy to employ nationals from the acceding European states as "labor at the lower end of the skills continuum" (D26-ADMIN; D34-PO; EGFSN, 2005; Quinn, 2010). Polish immigrants are also welcomed to fill technical positions in engineering or IT, however (D26-ADMIN).

More importantly, the language barrier prevents the Polish from working according to qualifications (D8-ADMIN; D34-PO; D36-PO; D39-PO). Confidence issues rather than actual lack of language skills often affect the jobs Polish immigrants themselves choose (D22-TU; D27-TU; D37-PO). However, as they acquire language skills, Polish workers advance professionally in Ireland. One third of the respondents received a raise or promotion after arriving in Ireland, especially as they honed their language skills. As on expert interviewee put it, "These people don't want to stay in the

same job for ten years. They want to improve their language, they want to go to an Irish college or university, and acquire some more skills to find a different job" (D34-PO). What is more, newer arrivals hold a better command of the English language and more confidence (D32-PO). Professional organizations like the Polish Business Club in Dublin further diminish the occupational gap by training Polish professionals in language, organizational and business skills (ICI, 2008).

Polish immigrants remain in control of their occupational status. They choose to work in low-skilled professions in order to accumulate country-specific capital or earn enough to return home (D14-R; D17-ADMIN; D26-ADMIN). Downward or insufficient occupational mobility is not the result of factors beyond Polish immigrants' control, like lack of recognition of educational attainment, legal status, or racism.

On the other hand, Nigerian immigrants experience severe deskilling upon their migration to Ireland. Nigerians are better educated than Polish immigrants in Dublin. According to the 2006 Census, 38% of Nigerians in Ireland hold a tertiary degree, a number an ESRI study from the same year puts at 47.7% (CSO, 2008; McGinnity et al., 2006, p. 24). Furthermore, unlike the disparate Polish group, most Nigerian immigrants were gainfully employed according to their qualifications before their migration to Ireland. Among the ICI's respondents, a majority worked as managers and executives, in business and commerce, in the local and central government, or as medical doctors in their country of origin (ICI, 2008).

Once they arrive in Ireland, Nigerian workers can rarely use their education or previous professional experience. In 2006, only six percent were employed as doctors. The majority are employed in unskilled occupations, such as health care attendants,

security guards, sales assistants, taxi drivers, waiters, or cleaners (CSO, 2008; ICI, 2008). The Immigrant Council of Ireland suggests that among the four nationalities they study, Nigerians experience the most dramatic mismatch between skills and employment. Most of their Nigerian subjects express negative feelings at the occupational gaps they suffer in Ireland and the extreme length of their road to job security. Most are extremely frustrated at the menial jobs they are forced to accept in spite of high educational achievement (ICI, 2008). In 2010, 73% of African employees in Ireland were overqualified for their jobs compared to 55% of Irish employees and 64% of Eastern European immigrants (McGinnity et al., 2011, p. 49).

As one NGO representative aptly put it, "many [Nigerians] have Master's or PhDs and they are driving buses" (D42-PO). All of the interviewees in this thesis are severely overqualified for their occupations in Dublin. One African writer and labor organizer only worked as a waiter, a cleaner, a security guard, and a supermarket clerk in Dublin (Zach, 32). Another respondent pursuing degrees in web technology and fashion was employed as a waitress and a housekeeper (Tatiana, 27). A teacher, business owner, and law student was unable to find any steady job in Ireland (Isaac, 36). A Nigerian engineer drives a taxi in Ireland (Harry, 35).

While the structure of the Irish economy and Dublin's labor market influences this mismatch, as in the case of Polish immigrants, other factors severely limit the professional opportunities of African workers in Ireland. Unlike their Polish counterparts, Nigerians workers in Ireland are disadvantaged due to the lack of recognition of their education achievements and the racism they face daily. According to immigrant organization representatives in Dublin, unless they were recruited directly from Nigeria,

Nigerian job seekers experienced difficulties in getting their qualifications recognized.[296] Only 40% of Nigerian men in the ICI study had their qualifications recognized upon arrival in Dublin (ICI, 2008). The difficulty often lies in the complexity of the process, with no single department responsible for qualification recognition. Decisions are discretionary and lack transparency, allowing for personal and institutional discrimination against the immigrants (D13-P; Frank, 34). Furthermore, most Irish employers believe that degrees from Ireland and Nigeria are simply not equivalent (Ethan, 46). Therefore, Nigerian workers have to pursue education in Ireland if they want to advance professionally in Dublin. The prohibitive cost and the frustration with having to start "from square one" stunt third-country nationals' economic development (D42-NO).

The stigma and restrictions of asylum status further affect Nigerians' occupational mobility and exacerbate the loss of human capital among African workers. Immigrants and their representatives in Dublin lament the inept treatment of the asylum issue by the Irish government and the Dublin-based Office of Integration. Most asylum seekers are highly educated, yet are not allowed to work until their case is decided, a process that could take years. Asylum seekers experience severe deskilling and loss of human capital, while the government foregoes "a readily accessible supply of multilingual and multicultural employees" (D41-NO; Isaac, 36).

Downward occupational mobility and gaps between education and jobs are mostly the result of discrimination against the racially different Nigerians. Stereotyping in the private sector, where asylum status, African nationality, and low educational achievement are linked together, prevents Nigerian workers from securing better jobs and forces them

[296] As was the practice in the 1990s, when Ireland experienced a severe shortage of medical personnel and the government recruited a number of Nigerian medical doctors and nurses (Kómoláfé, 2008).

into low-skilled employment (D41-NO). Even once employed, Nigerians find the upward mobility of "an ethnic person" much slower than that of an Irish or a European national. As one respondent put it, "you got the job, but there was no promotion or projection curve for you. You were just moving from one hospital to the other. … Most people found themselves just stuck into jobs" (D44-NO).

In sum, both Polish and African immigrants take jobs below their educational and professional attainment and are slow or unable to progress up the economic ladder in Dublin. Majorities of both foreign populations completed higher secondary or tertiary education and were employed in higher-skilled occupations in management, government, education, or health at home. Both cluster in lower-skilled jobs in Ireland and rarely move up to white-collar employment. However, deskilling is severe among Nigerian workers. Numerous Polish immigrants were unemployed or confined to lower-skilled services even before they came to Ireland. They choose to remain in such occupations in Dublin as they find the acquisition of professional and language skills undesirable having in mind their temporary sojourn in Ireland. The cohort is assigned a 3 for this component of economic integration (**Table VI.1**). On the other hand, Nigerians experience extreme psychological distress as they are stuck in jobs that do not correspond to their skills. While they would like to advance professionally, they are obstructed by structural factors like non-recognition of qualifications, precarious and stigmatizing legal status, and everyday discrimination. Since immutable ethnic characteristics are likely to remain an obstacle to Nigerians in Dublin, the African migrants are assigned the lowest value for this component of economic incorporation (**Table VI.1**).

VI.3.2. Occupational Mobility in Madrid

Ecuadorian immigrants in Spain are employed in the lower-skilled occupations abundant in the receiving context. However, most work according to qualifications and even improve their economic circumstances upon migration. Mobility to the familiar Iberian labor market in fact serves as a prerequisite to professional development for a number of female Ecuadorian migrants whose familial and social roles had excluded them from labor participation in the home country altogether. While Bulgarians are not experiencing a severe mismatch between qualifications and employment in Madrid, they are regarded as an educated worker pool nonetheless employed in unskilled occupations in Spain, much like their Polish counterparts. The mismatch causes some psychological distress and loss of confidence among the proud East Europeans.

Table VI.10. Educational Attainment among Ecuadorians in Madrid (in %)

Highest educational level	Primary	Lower secondary	High school (upper secondary)	Vocational	Tertiary	Total
2007 ENI	35	14.4	40.1	-	10.5	**100**
2006-2007 LFS	29.9	23.3	36.6	4.5	5.7	**100**
2011 (Author)	-	11	78	-	11	**100**

Sources: Author; Bernardi et al., 2010; Rodríguez-Planas & Vegas, 2012.

Ecuadorians in Spain are not as highly educated as the other three groups of interest here. Among Latin American participants in the 2007 National Immigration Survey, only one in ten held a tertiary degree, while more than one third only completed primary education. Four in ten had high school diplomas (Rodríguez-Planas & Vegas, 2012).[297] Using the Spanish Labor Force Survey for 2006-2007, Bernardi et al. (2010) come up with similar numbers. About one third of Ecuadorians recorded in the survey

[297] There are 1,125 Latin Americans in the authors' sample.

only completed primary education and only 6% held college degrees or higher. Among this project's interviewees, the majority arrived in Spain with secondary education, completing upper secondary or high school degrees (**Table VI.10**).

Consequently, the gap between qualifications and previous professional experiences on the one hand and current employment on the other is smaller for the Latin Americans than for the other three cohorts. Ecuadorians in Spain work below their qualifications and do not necessarily catch up with comparable natives over time (Bernardi et al., 2010). Like their counterparts, male Latin American migrants in Madrid concentrate in construction and manufacturing, while female laborers find work mostly as domestic workers, in restaurants, or in retail (M16-P; M17-P; M18-ADMIN; M19-ADMIN; M25-TU; M32-ADMIN; M34-TU; M35-P). About two-thirds of Ecuadorians in Spain worked in unskilled positions, and one third were employed in skilled manual labor in 2006-2007. Only a negligible proportion held high-skilled white-collar jobs (Bernardi et al., 2010).

The lower-skilled positions Ecuadorians occupy in the receiving context are not so dissimilar from employment at home, however. Among the project's participants, only one in ten experienced significant downward mobility with migration to Madrid, with a university professor serving as a bike messenger, for instance (Ethan, 39). The remaining participants transitioned to construction or domestic care from relatively comparable jobs in retail, restaurants, construction, and other low-skilled services. Several respondents were never employed in Ecuador and instead embarked on a professional career in Spain for the first time. In the case of female migrants in particular, migration to Spain served as a rite of passage into professionalization and an impetus for the transformation of

gender, familial, and social roles. Women confined to the domestic sphere in Ecuador are able to employ their skills in the domestic care economic sector in Spain and gain human capital and an entrance into the labor market in the process (Dudley, 2013, pp. 51-53). Consequently, Bernardi et al. (2010) deem Latin American women's economic incorporation in Spain the most unproblematic among different nationality and gender cohorts. In 2007, the number of Latin Americans who were overqualified for their position in Spain stood at 39.1%, the lowest value among all four immigrant groups of interest here (Fernandez & Ortega, 2008).[298] In 2007, 34% of South Americans in Spain worked in the same occupation as in the home country and 27% – in the same economic sector – proportions higher than these for East Europeans (INE, 2009, p. 38).

Ecuadorians concentrate in lesser qualified occupations in Madrid because of the structure of the local labor market. The "most valuable jobs" in Spain are reported to be low-skilled due to the "size and vigor of the construction sector, of the tourist industry, of the domestic service, the care industry" (M31-R). The South American workers are contracted from the home country precisely due to their relatively suited qualifications and experiences in filling vacancies in Spain's unskilled labor market. In the words of one trade union representative, "There is no need for qualified workers in the fields" (M23-TU).[299] Therefore, fewer Ecuadorian workers, than for instance Bulgarian ones, have moved down the occupation ladder upon their migration to Spain. Linguistic and socio-cultural proximity ensure quick entry into comparable employment, the transfer of educational certificates, and the portability of work experience from home. Latin

[298] This compares to 17.2% for Spanish natives, 51.2% for Eastern Europeans in Spain, 65.5% for East Europeans in Ireland, and 73% among Africans in Dublin. The mismatch is likely to be even smaller for Ecuadorians in particular, since the Latin American group in Spain includes highly-educated and qualified nationalities like Argentinians for instance (Fernandez & Ortega, 2008; McGinnity et al., 2011).

[299] Author's translation from original quote in Spanish: "El campo no demanda trabajador cualificado."

Americans are the only foreign cohort in Spain where higher educational attainment and relevant professional experience from the origin country actually produce improved economic circumstances in Madrid. Similarity also undermines discrimination as a barrier to occupational mobility (Sanromá et al., 2009).

On the other hand, Bulgarians have limited access to favorable or comparable employment in Madrid. While the Balkan workers are not as highly educated as the immigrant cohorts in Dublin, they still experience a larger penalty in terms of occupational attainment than Ecuadorians. Dissimilarity and lack of language skills impair prospects of transferring qualifications, applying home country human capital effectively, or quickly progressing up the career ladder in the host city.

Table VI.11. Educational Attainment among Bulgarians in Madrid

Highest educational level	**Primary**	**Lower secondary**	**High school (upper secondary)**	**Vocational**	**Tertiary**	**Other**	**Total**
2006-2007 LFS	13.2%	12.3%	23.8%	23.2%	26.9%	0.6%	**100%**
*Number of responses**	1	1	12	12	13	-	**39**
*%**	2.6%	2.6%	30.75%	30.75%	33.3%	-	**100%**

*Numbers as per interviews conducted by author.
Sources: Author; Bernardi et al, 2010.

Bulgarians' qualifications are relatively similar to yet somewhat lower than these of Poles in Dublin. However, Eastern Europeans in Spain are better educated than Latin Americans and Spaniards alike. More than one quarter of the East Europeans in Spain in 2006-2007 completed a university degree, as compared to one third of the participants in this thesis (Bernardi et al., 2010). Less than one fifth of natives held a tertiary degree in the same time period. Relatively few of the Balkan workers did not advance past primary

education.[300] Curiously, Bulgarians are more likely to engage in technical professional training than other immigrant groups of interest here, with anywhere between 23% and 31% of Bernardi et al. (2010)'s and this project's participants completing vocational education (**Table VI.11**) Among the interviewees here, two thirds completed vocational or higher educational degrees in fields as diverse as transportation, electro technology, mechanical engineering, welding, education, economics, or theater.

A large number of Bulgarian immigrants were actually employed in construction or transportation in the origin country, an occupation that they retain in Madrid. However, the majority worked according to qualifications at home. Therefore, deskilling upon migration is relatively larger for Bulgarians in Spain than for Poles in Dublin, with the latter sacrificing skills for secure employment in their home country. Among the interviewees, one quarter were never employed in Bulgaria and were students or served in the army. Limited economic prospects upon graduation pushed them to try their luck in Spain. The remainder were employed as accountants, teachers, construction workers, engineers, and business owners, among other professions. Expert respondents confirm that Bulgarians in Madrid are a relatively homogenous group, bringing with them intermediate educational and professional achievements (M23-TU).

Nonetheless, Spanish and Bulgarian stakeholders agree that "in 90% of the cases" Bulgarians work below their qualifications in Madrid (M5-BO).[301] Especially before 2000 and after economic downturn, Bulgarians could not "expect to work in anything

[300] 13.2% of Bernardi et al. (2010)'s participants only completed primary education compared to 24.9% for Spaniards and 24.6% for all relevant cohorts.
[301] Author's translation from original quote in Bulgarian: "В 90% от случаите."

related to their skills" with migration (M1-BO).[302] Regardless of education, the Balkan workers are employed in domestic service, elderly care and cleaning among women, construction, agriculture or transportation among men, and hotels and restaurants for both sexes.[303] Like Ecuadorians, two-thirds were in unskilled and one-third in skilled manual occupations in Spain in 2006-2007, with the proportion of East Europeans working in the lowest-qualified positions in the receiving context in 2010-2011 even higher than that of Latin Americans (Bernardi et al, 2010; Rodríguez-Planas & Nollenberger, 2014). In 2007, 32% of East Europeans in Spain worked in the same occupation as in the home country and less than one quarter – in the same economic sector – proportions lower than these for Latin Americans (INE, 2009, p. 38). According to Rodríguez-Planas and Farré (2014), East Europeans migrants are overqualified for their jobs more often than natives or other migrants in Spain.

According to one trade union representative, deskilling can be severe, with "lawyers or people with a degree who serve coffees at a bar or clean the street" (M24-TU; M33-TU).[304] The mismatch between skills and employment is usually not as pronounced, but is endemic among the East Europeans. According to one ethnic representative, "I personally don't know anyone who came here from Bulgaria to work according to qualifications" (M8-BO).[305] Even if they have completed related vocational training at home and are employed in construction in Spain, the Balkan laborers work as

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[302] Author's translation from original quote in Bulgarian: "Идвайки тук не можеше да претендираш да работиш нещо, свързано с ценза ти, на практика идваш с нагласа, че ще падне статусът ти като дойдеш."
[303] All relevant actors enumerate the same sectors of employment (for example, M1-BO; M2-BO; M3-BO; M4-BO; M5-BO; M16-P; M17-P; M18-ADMIN; M19-ADMIN; M26-TU; M32-ADMIN; M35-P).
[304] Author's translation from original quote in Spanish: "Aquí también hay abogados y gente con titulo que están sirviendo cafes en un bar o limpiando la calle."
[305] Author's translation from original quote in Bulgarian: Поне аз лично нямам информация, но не знам някой да е дошъл от България и да работи по специалността си. Няма, не познавам такъв.

peones, the lowest unskilled category in the sector, rather than according to specialized skills (M25-TU; M34-TU). Unsurprisingly, Fernandez and Ortega (2008) find that 51.2% of Eastern Europeans in Spain were overeducated for their current position, a gap higher than that for any other immigrant cohort in the receiving country. It is encouraging, however, that just like the Polish in Dublin, Bulgarians in Madrid "use low-skilled services as a trampoline to move forward" (M1-BO).[306] Some Bulgarians engage in higher-qualified positions in Madrid as lab technicians, dentists or nurses (M3-BO; M5-BO). Therefore, the occupational gap is relatively smaller than that for Nigerians in Dublin and comparable to that of the Polish in Ireland, if larger than the mismatch experienced by Ecuadorians.

While Bulgarian organizational leaders are hopeful that with time Bulgarians will acquire language skills and confidence and move up the professional ladder in Spain, a deeper look into the causes of deskilling might suggest otherwise (M1-BO; M4-BO). Labor market structure produces a persistent demand for low- and medium-skilled labor in Madrid, where higher educational achievement or the accumulation of human capital, including language skills, are not rewarded (M23-TU; M31-R; Rodríguez-Planas & Nollenberger, 2014; Sanromá et al., 2009). Unfamiliarity between Balkan Bulgarians and Iberian Spaniards, despite a common European framework, is the paramount obstacle to the occupational mobility of the East Europeans, however. On the one hand, the lack of parallels between Bulgarians and their Spanish hosts produces institutional barriers for the former, such as the non-transferability of educational qualifications. Bulgarian representatives talk of the difficulties in translating diplomas from the home to the host

[306] Author's translation from original quote in Bulgarian: го наричат феномен на страните от Източна Европа, че използват сферата на услугите като трамплин, за да продължат нататък.

country, especially in the medical or other higher-skilled economic sectors (M1-BO; M2-BO; M7-BO; M8-BO). Non-transferability of education and professional experience carries an element of nationalism as well, with Spanish officials argued to insist on immigrants' adopting "their education, their information" (M7-BO).[307] There are no such difficulties for familiar Ecuadorians coming from a similar socio-economic and cultural reality. On the other hand, while language deficiencies as human capital might not lead to lower occupational status among immigrants, the lack of language skills creates mistrust among Spanish employers and officials (M7-BO; Sanromá et al., 2009). Individual perceptions of difference disadvantage Bulgarians in Madrid.

Nonetheless, as they aspire to belong in the host context, the East Europeans attempt to learn Spanish and progress with their. Ethnic representatives are amazed at the ambition of "45-year old women, who read, study, go to courses, so they can requalify themselves and go forward" (M2-BO).[308] Some of the in this dissertation interviewees managed to transition from unskilled construction positions or domestic servants to medium-skilled occupations like loading dock clerks, electricians, or dental assistants. When structural factors preclude upward mobility despite personal aspirations, however, the proud East Europeans experience psychological distress (M1-BO; M5-BO).

In sum, both Ecuadorians and Bulgarians work below their qualifications in Madrid, much Poles and Nigerians in Dublin. However, the gap is much smaller for the Latin Americans than for any of the other cohorts. Ecuadorians have lower educational achievement than the other three groups and tend to work in lesser-skilled occupations in

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[307] Author's translation from original quote in Bulgarian: "Испанците държат да имаш тяхното образование, тяхната информация."

[308] Author's translation from original quote in Bulgarian: "Аз винаги се изненадвам на капацитета, на желанието на жени от 45, почти към 50 годишни, които четат, учат, ходат на курсове, явяват се на изпити, за да могат да се преквалифицират и да продължат."

the origin country. Therefore, migration to Spain serves as a continuation of professional trajectories rather than a step back on the career ladder. Socio-cultural familiarity between the migrants and their Spanish hosts leads to the transferability of qualifications and human capital and better access to professional growth in Madrid. Consequently, the South Americans are assigned a 4 for this indicator of economic incorporation (**Table VI.1**). On the other hand, Bulgarians experience the largest human capital and educational penalty among any immigrant group in Spain.[309] Despite personal ambition and some professional success after migration, the unfamiliar Balkan workers are obstructed by a labor market that does not reward skills or education, non-transferability of qualifications, linguistic deficiencies, and perceptions of difference by natives. The East Europeans merit a rating of 2 for this indicator of incorporation (**Table VI.1**).

VI.4. Employment Conditions

VI.4.1. Employment Conditions in Dublin

The occupational gap translates into unfavorable conditions of employment for both Poles and Nigerians in Dublin. These include a lack of contract, lesser pay than natives, unsocial or long hours, menial work, and unlawful termination (ICI, 2008, pp. 95-97). However, the East Europeans are treated better at the job than their African counterparts, especially during economic boom (D14-R; McGinnity et al., 2006). Among ICI participants, for instance, less than half reported issues at work, compared to more than three quarters of Nigerian respondents (ICI, 2008, pp. 95-97). Only one of the Nigerian participants here found their working conditions favorable, compared to one

[309] If similar to that of Poles in Dublin and lesser than the mismatch experienced by Nigerians in Ireland.

third of Polish interviewees. African immigrants are particularly vulnerable to job exploitation due to legal status and perceived difference from the Irish.

Polish workers in Dublin experience worse working conditions than natives. With economic downturn, the most significant issue for this population is unlawful termination or placement on the lay-off position. The Social and Legal Advice Center (SLAC) in Dublin, which processes one thousand service requests annually, reports that one fourth of these complaints concern "disputes with employers." Among such disputes, "employers denying the entitlement to redundancy payment," "extended periods of lay-off" and "unfair dismissal" constitute the major complaints (Social and Legal Advice Center [SLAC], 2010). "Lay-off" is a forced unpaid leave that could be used by employers for no longer than four weeks at a time to reduce costs during unfavorable economic times. However, Irish employers habitually place Polish workers in this position for longer periods to avoid paying redundancy, which could be as high as €6,000 for an employee in service for more than two years (Citizens Information, 2013a; D36-PO; D38-PO). Further, employers purposefully dismiss Polish and other foreign workers for gross misconduct, in order to avoid paying redundancy (D36-PO). Still, only two of the respondents here were terminated from their jobs. Only one was placed on the lay-off position in a particularly severe case.[310] A majority actually quit their jobs voluntarily in search of better opportunities.

Being unlawfully terminated correlates with a lack of a contract or a short-term contract. According to SLAC, "not being provided with written terms of employment"

[310] This person was placed on lay-off for three years for 3-6 months at a time. Lay-off was used as a "punishment" for pointing out safety concerns and failure to pay the lawful rates for normal and overtime wages. The employee was never fired to avoid redundancy payments or legal recourse against the company. After referring his case to the Equality Tribunal, this employee is still owed back wages and fines (Steven, 34).

ranks high on Polish workers' list of concerns (SLAC, 2010). This condition is especially problematic when the lack of legal employment is unknown to the Polish employee until they are terminated (D7-TU). Obtaining social welfare benefits in this situation is extremely difficult, as that requires proof of employment (D39-PO). As one trade union representative shared, "it's much more difficult to vindicate people's rights 'if it's all verbal'" (D27-TU). Among Polish interviewees in this project, one third did not have a contract at one time of their employment in Ireland. Half of these employees, however, received pay slips and were thus entitled to social welfare benefits. All moved to contract employment eventually. In 2010, only 18% of East Europeans were employed on a temporary or casual contract compared to 13% of natives (**Table VI.12**).

The issue is not nearly as pronounced among Polish workers as it is among other immigrant groups in Dublin who are not part of the European Union. All Nigerian respondents n this dissertation worked without a contract at least at one time of their employment in Ireland. They were paid "under the table," allowing employers to change job conditions, reduce or withhold pay, and terminate employment without justification (Ethan, 46; Isaac, 36; Stephen, 35; Tatiana, 27; Taylor, 30; Zach, 32). Almost one third of African workers in Dublin did not have a long-term or any contract in 2010 (McGinnity et al., 2011). Working without a contract or on a casual contract is the only possibility among asylum seekers, not legally allowed to work in Ireland (for ex., Ethan, 46, Isaac, 36). The lack of contract is the norm in low-skilled occupations or in the "black market" where Nigerians concentrate. Therefore, African immigrants have no claim to redundancy payments or recourse upon termination (D9-P).

Table VI.12. Work Hours and Type of Work in Dublin (in %)

Work hours/Type of work	Polish	African	Irish
Work week of >45 hrs	18	14	14
Work week of 30-44 hrs	68	57	60
Work week of <30 hrs	14	29	25
Temporary/casual contract	18	31	13
Shift work	17	26*	12
Part-time work	14	33	29
Night/evening work	25	36*	20
Weekend work	35	54*	27

*These numbers refer to all non-EU workers rather than just African workers and therefore have to be considered with reservation. Still, as they are significantly different than percentages for EU12 and Irish workers, it is safe to deduce that Nigerian workers are more likely to be employed during weekends, nights or in shifts than the other populations of interest.
Source: Adapted from McGinnity et al., 2011, pp. 18, 44-45.

Even if granted a contract, both Polish and Nigerian workers have to agree to temporary and unstable employment. Almost half of East European interviewees with contractual employment were employed on a short-term contract of one year or less at one time of their migration to Ireland. Nonetheless, more than one-third of Polish respondents began their employment in Dublin on a long-term or full-time contract, a figure much higher than that among Nigerian workers. Nigerian immigrants are more likely to be employed temporarily. In 2010, almost one third had a temporary contract compared to two in ten East Europeans and one in ten natives (**Table VI.12**).

In view of their temporary employment in the grey economy, all foreign workers in Ireland are paid less than native employees. Expert respondents identified underpayment as the main issue for Polish workers in Ireland, even during the economic boom (D7-TU; D32-PO; D33-PO; D34-PO; D36-PO). Barrett, McGuinness and O'Brien (2008), for instance, found an earning disadvantage of 18% for East European workers compared to the native labor force. More than a fifth of the interviewees in this

dissertation believe that they receive lower wages than their Irish colleagues regardless of similar qualifications or job title. In fact, Irish companies habitually hire cheaper Polish workers to undercut payment rates in direct violation of industry-specific wage regulations (D1-J; D6-TU; D7-TU; D36-PO; D39-PO). The Irish Ferries Dispute of 2005 was one gross example of underpayment. The construction industry is another locus of multiple violations of wage regulations (D2-TU; D7-TU; "Irish ferries dispute," 2005). The lack of payment for holiday or medical leave, as well as illegal wage deductions, compounds the payment gap between Polish and Irish workers (D1-J; D33-PO; D39-PO).

Regardless of underpayment, Polish workers in Dublin are satisfied with their wages as they still provide for a better lifestyle than the one in the home country (D5-ADMIN; D6-TU; D36-PO). A study by Turner et al. (2009) with 136 Polish workers in Ireland in a range of professions found that Polish workers earned at the low end of the spectrum with 27% earning at or below the national minimum wage, 43% earning in the next wage bracket, and 30% earning at twice the national minimum wage. As 97% of respondents were paid at least the national Irish minimum wage, however, they were earning double the average industrial wage in Poland.[311] Therefore, a majority of Polish workers reported being "very definitely" or "definitely" satisfied with their pay, and only 6% were "not at all" satisfied (Turner et al., 2009). Two-thirds of interviewees here are satisfied with their wages and expressly called their pay "fair."

On the other hand, Nigerian workers are profoundly unhappy with the minimum or below wages they receive in Dublin. Salary and benefit reductions are endemic among African workers, especially with the economic crisis. Like the participants in the ICI

[311] In 2006-2007, when the study was completed, the national minimum wage in Ireland was €7.65 compared to an average industrial wage in Poland of €4 (Turner et al., 2009).

study (2008), most interviewees here share being paid “very low, lower than other people” (Stephen, 36). Benefits are withheld or reduced. A negotiation to receive a raise or promotion might result in termination (Taylor, 30). Irregular or immigrant status, lack of a formal agreement with the employer, the unfavorable judicial system if higher pay was sought, and discrimination are found to blame for underpayment (Ethan, 46; Isaac, 36; Stephen, 36). As one respondent shares, “They take advantage of you. A job that is supposed to be minimum wage, 8.65 euro, they would give you four euro an hour for. You have no choice but to take it” (Isaac, 36).

Both Nigerian and Polish workers in Dublin work long or unsocial hours in larger proportion than Irish nationals. Polish representatives in Dublin identified the length of the work day as problematic for Polish workers in Ireland, where lengthening working hours was used by employers to reduce fixed daily rates among foreign workers (D22-TU; D32-PO; D34-PO; D38-PO). Four in ten of this project’s respondents work for sixty, eighty or even hundred hours a week, and are primarily employed during night shifts or on the weekend. Still, only a fifth of respondents in Turner et al.’s study reported working longer hours upon migration, with one third actually working less in Ireland than in their home country (Turner et al., 2009, p. 119).

Eastern Europeans are better off than African immigrants. Nigerian workers in Dublin often work fewer hours than their Polish and Irish counterparts but those are part-time, shift-based, and during unsocial times. Specifically, 18% of East Europeans in 2010 reported working longer than forty-five hours each week compared to 14% among Irish and African workers. However, Polish workers were also much more likely to have a normal work week of thirty to forty-four hours of length, while Africans were more likely

to work less than thirty hours each week. While 17% of East European workers performed shift work, as high as 26% of third-country nationals worked shifts. Africans are also employed part-time, during evenings or nights, or on the weekend in higher proportions than Polish and Irish nationals (**Table VI.12**).

Finally, both foreign populations are more likely than natives to perform jobs which are menial, physically demanding, and sometimes hazardous. Almost four in ten of Polish respondents reported that at least one of their jobs in Ireland has been "hard", "heavy" or "physical." 14% complained about the menial, "boring" and "not challenging enough" nature of their jobs. Only two, however, considered their jobs unsafe, as they were working in a bad area or were performing tasks without training or the proper equipment. In fact, according to Turner et al. (2009), almost half of Polish workers do not experience any change in how hard they after migrating to Ireland.

All African respondents consider their job in Dublin "lowly" or "hard." Being asked to travel far and then being sent away or being asked to work during Christmas without heat are just two examples of unfavorable working conditions. According to one respondent, due to the harsh conditions at their job, all Irish employees quit and "only the immigrants were left" (Taylor, 30). As a result, some Nigerian workers resort to self-employment. However, they suggest that finding business is increasingly hard with economic downturn, especially for different African nationals (Harry, 35; Taylor, 30).

In sum, Polish and Nigerian workers in Ireland experience worse working conditions than the native labor force. They are exposed to less secure jobs, unwarranted termination, lower pay, and lengthier and more physically demanding work. The situation is easier to remedy in the case of Polish workers, however. Inferior working conditions

for this ethnic group are attributable to unawareness of labor regulations and entitlements (D32-PO; D36-PO; D39-PO). The language barrier prevents the Polish in Dublin from enforcing their labor rights, especially as few documents or regulations are translated from English (D22-TU). As Polish immigrants settle in Dublin, learn English and join trade unions, they are more likely to seek fair labor conditions for their work. Since structural or individual discrimination does not play a role in the inferior labor conditions Poles face, Poles are assigned a composite value of 3 for this component of economic incorporation (**Table VI.1**). African workers not only experience much worse working conditions but have fewer avenues for redress than their Polish counterparts. They are employed in the economic sectors with the worst levels of union density or regulation compliance and face daily discrimination in terms of contract, hours, or termination. This ethnic group is less likely to witness substantive improvement in job conditions over time. Nigerians receive the lowest value a for this indicator of economic integration (**Table VI.1**).

VI.4.2. Employment Conditions in Madrid

Ecuadorians and Bulgarians in Madrid are disadvantaged in terms of their conditions of employment compared to Spaniards, much like their counterparts in Dublin. As all four cohorts are employed in low-skilled precarious occupations, it is inevitable that they experience some degree of "exploitation" and "abuse of labor rights" by cost-calculating employers (M25-TU; M34-TU).[312] However, there are at least subtle differences between the two groups that attest to the importance of culture in affecting

[312] Author's translation from original quote in Spanish: "El caso típico de un trabajador extranjero que se aproxima al sindicato es un trabajador que ha visto vulnerados sus derechos… un trabajador explotado."

economic outcomes. Similar Ecuadorians enjoy comparable or somewhat more favorable conditions of employment than different, if European, Bulgarians in Madrid. The Spanish-speaking South Americans, who are familiar with local socio-economic structures and often arrive in Madrid with a labor contract, are closer in employment conditions to natives than the Balkan workers.

Table VI.13. Working Conditions in Madrid (in % unless otherwise stated)

Type of work	**Latin American**	**Eastern European**	**African**	**Spanish**
Permanent contract (2000-2011)*	35	31	23	40.5
Indefinite contract (2007)	52.9	51.3	45.1	-
Temporary contract (2007)	47.1	48.7	54.9	-
Temporary contract (2008)	55.75	60.74	70.34	33.58
Monthly wage (in Euro)	963.3	957.9	954.5	1017.4
**Normal work week ** **	62.5	31	-	-
Work week of >45 or <30 hours **	37.5	69	-	-
**Manual job ** **	42.9	85.7	-	-

* Values here refer to the New Member States joining the EU in the 2000s.
** Values for the last three columns refer to Bulgarian and Ecuadorian immigrants surveyed by this author specifically. The remainder of the figures refers to the broader national categories in the table.
Sources: Author; Fernandez & Ortega, 2008; INE, 2009; Rodríguez-Planas & Farré, 2014; Sanromá et al., 2009.

Immigrants, their ethnic representatives and Spanish trade unionists agree that the most significant issue for all foreign laborers in Madrid is being employed on a temporary, rather than a permanent or indefinite, contract or not having a contract altogether (M17-P; M24-TU; M26-TU; M33-TU; M35-P). Without a contract stating the precise conditions of employment, native companies can easily exploit their foreign workers by not paying social security contributions, mandating longer hours, granting lesser than agreed-upon pay, or terminating employment unlawfully. The promise of a contract or extending temporary employment into permanent one can keep vulnerable

immigrants working in "despicable labor conditions" (M26-TU).[313] Peculiarly, both before and after Bulgaria's accession to the European Union, Bulgarian migrants have been more likely than their Ecuadorian counterparts to work without a contract in the underground economy or to only have part-time or temporary employment. Even with EU enlargement, Iberian Ecuadorians, contracted from the home country under specific conditions, are less likely to be abused by employers than Balkan Bulgarians who are at the mercy of native labor market actors for their subsistence (M23-TU).

South American workers are in temporary employment more often than comparable natives but hold permanent employment more regularly than Bulgarian laborers. For instance, Fernandez and Ortega (2008) find that among their sample population, extracted from the Spanish Labor Force Survey, one third of native workers had a temporary contract compared to a little more than half of all Latin American employees. The latter were better off than Eastern European workers, however, six in ten of whom were employed on a temporary contract, and African workers, seven in ten of whom only had a short-term contract. Results from the National Immigrant Survey are different in value but indicate the same trends, with 47% of South Americans in Spain on a temporary contract and 53% on an indefinite one, compared to 49% of East Europeans in temporary employment and 51% - in indefinite one (INE, 2009). Rodríguez-Planas and Farre (2014) sample the Spanish Labor Force Survey for 2000-2011 to find that four in ten Spaniards had a permanent contract for that time period compared to 3.5 in ten Latin Americans, three in ten Eastern Europeans and only two in ten African workers (**Table VI.13**)

[313] Author's translation from original quote in Spanish: "Los regulares que están sometidos a unas condiciones laborales indignas."

Most of the Ecuadorian respondents in this project arrived in Madrid with a contract or were legalized shortly on the basis of their social ties to the receiving context. They transitioned from a temporary contract to an indefinite one.[314] On the other hand, Bulgarian respondents are more likely to be stuck in a precarious job without contract, guarantees, or social security payments. Nine in ten have worked in Spain without a written agreement at some point of their migration, but even more significantly, almost half are still employed "under the table" (*под масата*) regardless of their EU status (Kevin, 33).[315] Lack of contract and having to work "by project" (*на парче*) or "by the hour" (*на час*) results in unstable employment and living conditions, the separation of families, and the ineligibility for social security during periods of unemployment (for instance, Connor, 44; Jasmine, 53; Shay, 56; Tonya, 45). As one Bulgarian migrant put it, "when you get sick, they don't pay you. No contract - no social security payments" (Idris, 30).[316] In fact, Bulgarians find that Spanish employers purposefully delay the process of granting a contract or extending temporary employment into permanent one, and even deliberately make mistakes when filing the necessary documents, in order to avoid social security contributions on the East European workers' behalf. Employers also refuse permanent employment, since they lack trust for the different Balkan migrants, prompting one Bulgarian domestic worker to conclude, "We don't have humane conditions, from an economic standpoint, we don't have contracts" (Trini, 31).[317]

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[314] Refer to Chapter V and Appendix C for a classification of permit types, durations, and conditions.
[315] 28 persons arrived in Madrid with no contract and only 3 had one upon arrivals. Currently, 14 still have no contract, 13 have secured contract, and 4 are self-employed. Author's translation from Bulgarian.
[316] Paragraph contains author's translation from original quote in Bulgarian, including: Специално при мен- не, защото аз тогава съм бил без договори. И като се разболееш не ти плащат просто. но без осигуровки, без нищо (Idris, 30).
[317] Author's translation from original quote in Bulgarian: "Нямаме човешки условия, откъм икономическата страна, нямаме договори, нямаме осигуровки."

The lack of stable contract often translates into unlawful termination, especially for Bulgarians in Madrid. One third of Ecuadorian participants were let go from their positions in Madrid in the past. However, only in two in ten cases termination had something to do with personal disagreement or individual discrimination. One third of Bulgarian interviewees were released from jobs in Madrid as well. However, only few lost their jobs legitimately or quit themselves to take care of family and look for better opportunities. Two-thirds report being terminated when they brought up the legalization of their employment, after complaining about unsafe working conditions, or before a contract had officially ended. As one respondent recounts, his Spanish employer would habitually hire him for one year and then place his employment "on pause" (*на пауза*) for six months so that he was not mandated to grant the Balkan worker permanent employment and a hefty severance payment (Sylvester, 29).[318]

Due to their temporary employment in the grey economy, all foreign workers in Spain are underpaid compared to natives. Underpayment is even more widespread in Spain than it is in Ireland, as employers prefer cutting wages and hours or placing workers "on pause" instead of letting them go, to retain a flexible and plentiful labor pool (M23-TU). South Americans, who arrive in Spain with a contract, knowledge of the local language and labor market conditions, and readiness to access trade union representatives when undercut in their wages, are better off than Eastern Europeans. The latter are disadvantaged by their freedom of circulation in Spain and therefore tendency to work without contract or specific conditions of employment, their deficient language skills, and their unfamiliarity with the Spanish labor market (M23-TU). While differences in wages might seem negligible, they are still significant, with all immigrants receiving €50 less

[318] Author's translation from original quote in Bulgarian.

than Spaniards for similar employment and East Europeans earning €6 less than South Americans for the same job (Sanromá et al., 2009) (**Table VI.13**). Employers' charging their workers high rent, not paying overtime or all the hours immigrants worked, or illegally deducting from wages "for a series of things no one explained beforehand" compounds the gap between natives' and immigrants' wages (M23-TU).[319]

Among this project's interviewees, two in ten Ecuadorians complained of being underpaid or earning little with economic crisis. Half were paid overtime when working weekends or evenings. On the other hand, seven in ten Bulgarians reported being underpaid in Madrid, some severely. For instance, one domestic worker was paid only €300/month and wages were deducted if she did not stay in the employer's house overnight (Tangra, 36). Another worker received only €20/hour for a job in construction, while the normal rate is €50-60 (Redford, 36). Even if not severe, underpayment is endemic, where the East Europeans are aware that they receive less than both lesser qualified Spanish workers and other immigrants laborers. In one example, a Bulgarian barkeep received €600/month, while her South American predecessor earned €800 because of "the language" (*заради езика*) (Tonya, 45). Another skilled Bulgarian construction worker was paid €36/hour, while his unskilled Ecuadorians colleagues were granted €50/hour (Tanner, 64). A majority are not paid overtime wages. The attitude that "there is worse" makes Bulgarian unwilling to seek redress (Yana, 50).[320] Severe and widespread underpayment is pushing many of the Balkan workers into self-employment (M8-BO).

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[319] Author's translation from original quote in Spanish: "Si a eso le sumas que yo te cobro un alquiler abusivo, y que te descuento una serie de cosas que nadie las ha explicado en su país."
[320] Paragraph contains author's translation from original quote in Bulgarian: "Има и по-зле" (Yana, 50).

Finally, both Ecuadorians and Bulgarians in Madrid work long, unsocial, or insufficient hours and perform jobs that are physically-demanding, hard and even dangerous in larger proportion than Spanish nationals. Nonetheless, South Americans experience less exploitation than Bulgarians. While a little over one third of Latin American participants suggest that they work long hours during the night or on the weekend, almost two thirds report a "normal work week," and rest on Sunday. The figures are reversed in the case of Bulgarians, with less than one third enjoying a normal work week and the rest either working long shifts with few breaks or not being able to secure enough hours of employment (**Table VI.13**). In one example, a Bulgarian working as a dishwasher in a restaurant worked for fifteen hours each day and was given no break to recuperate (Tonya, 45). In another, a Balkan flyer distributor worked only nights, standing for hours on end in the freezing cold (Idris, 30). In a particularly severe case, a Bulgarian restaurants employee worked every day from 11 am to 4 am and was forced to walk five kilometers to get home after his shift (Sylvester, 29). Looking at the other extreme, many Bulgarian domestic workers are only able to secure ten hours of employment each week, since they are mistrusted by Spanish homemakers (for example, Izzy, 40; Pam, 31). The unfavorable hours of employment lead one Bulgarian ethnic representative to conclude that the mandated European work day of eight regular hours and one overtime hour is a myth in Spain (M8-BO).

Both foreign populations are more likely to perform jobs which are manual and sometimes hazardous than natives. Four in ten of Ecuadorian respondents found that at least one of their jobs in Spain was hard or unsafe, numbers comparable to these for Poles in Dublin. Much like Nigerians in Ireland, almost all Bulgarian participants found their

employment in Madrid "heavy" (*тежка*), "hard" (*трудна*), or "isolating" (*изолираща*) (**Table VI.13**). One Bulgarian domestic worker spoke of the "killer conditions" (*убийствени условия*) to which Balkan immigrants are exposed in Spain (Tonya, 45). Being cooped up in a home with unfriendly native elderly employers when serving as an *interna*, taking care of numerous "wild" (*луди*) children without command of the Spanish language, living away from the city in remote areas, lifting heavy luggage despite muscle trauma, or being asked to clean external window panes in a high-rise are some of the examples of the "thankless jobs" (*неблагодарни работи*) Bulgarian women perform in Spain (Trini, 31).[321] Bulgarian men are also prone to work in menial or dangerous positions, with one employee getting electrocuted on the job, another receiving a hernia from lifting heavy trays at a restaurant, and a third asked to serve tables with a broken arm (Hunter, 29; Redford, 36; Sylvester, 29). One respondent summarizes the unfavorable working conditions all Bulgarians face in Madrid well, "you can be king in Bulgaria, but here you start from absolute zero" (Caleb, 33).[322]

In sum, like their counterparts in Dublin, Ecuadorian and Bulgarian immigrants experience worse working conditions than the Spanish labor force. They rarely have formal or long-term contracts, are terminated unlawfully, receive lower pay and work longer hours, and perform more physically-demanding jobs than natives. However, South Americans are somewhat closer in their working conditions to native laborers regardless of their third-country legal status. Language skills, contract from the home country, use of local trade unions, and familiarity with socio-economic conditions and work culture

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[321] An *interna* is a live-in domestic worker who receives a low salary and resides in the house where she works.
[322] Paragraph contains author's translation from original quote in Bulgarian, including: "В България можеш да си цар, тука като дойдеш почваш от начало, за първи път почваш" (Caleb, 33).

renders the Latin Americans better able to secure decent employment and stick to previously agreed-upon terms. Ecuadorians are assigned a value of 3 for this component of economic incorporation (**Table VI.1**). Dissimilar Bulgarians, arriving in Spain without a contract, command of the Spanish language, knowledge of the local labor market, or trust by Spanish employers, experience worse exploitation than their South American counterparts. Regardless of their EU citizenship, a majority of the Balkan workers put up with informal employment and dismal working conditions, since "there is worse" (*има и по-зле*) (Yana, 50). Thus, Bulgarians compare better to African workers in Dublin than to European Polish immigrants. The ethnic group merits a value of 2 for this indicator of economic integration (**Table VI.1**).

VI.5. Work Relationships

VI.5.1. Work Relationships in Dublin

Polish workers in Dublin are less likely to be discriminated against at work than Nigerian immigrants. The Immigrant Council of Ireland reports that more than half of their East European participants never experienced discrimination at work, compared to only 14% of Nigerian interviewees. East Europeans were also the least likely to be bullied by managers and coworkers, while Nigerians were the most likely (**Table VI.14**) (ICI, 2008, p. 95). In fact, Polish workers in Turner et al. (2009, p. 120)'s study were extremely positive about their workplace relationships. A majority reported being treated well by Irish employers (68%), supervisors (73%), and colleagues (69%), leading 64% to rate their work well-being as "good" or "very good."

Table VI.14. Bullying and Harassment at Work in Dublin (in %)

Work Relationships	**Polish**	**Nigerian**	**Chinese**	**Irish**
No problems at work	55	14	31	-
Bullying by managers	6	34	28	-
Bullying by coworkers	4	29	9	-
Discrimination at work (O'Connell & McGinnity, 2008)	11*	12.4**	-	4.6
Discrimination at work (CSO, 2005)	-	15.4**	-	4.9

*The number refers to white non-English speaking immigrants, a majority of whom Polish.
** These numbers refer to Black immigrants, a majority of whom Nigerian workers.
Sources: CSO, 2005; ICI, 2008; O'Connell & McGinnity, 2008.

On the other hand, Africans are harassed at work not only by Irish supervisors or coworkers, but also by immigrant colleagues (ICI, 2008, p. 95). In a 2008 study, for instance, Black immigrants (most of whom Nigerians) were the most likely to experience discrimination at work, in percentages significantly higher than those for white non-English speaking immigrants and native workers. The Equality Module of the Quarterly National Household Survey points to similar results where 12.7% of non-Irish nationals and 15.4% of non-white persons experienced discrimination at work compared to 4.5% of Irish nationals and 4.9% of white persons. Almost one fifth experienced discrimination at work on the basis of their nationality or race (CSO, 2005) (**Table VI.14**).

Interview evidence points to similar results. Polish workers are sometimes bullied by Irish and Polish supervisors, yet are rarely discriminated against on an everyday basis. Expert respondents note a sense of entitlement among Irish supervisors and workers in relation to their Polish colleagues, where the mentality of "let the Polish guy do it" is common (D7-TU; D41-NO). As one trade union representative put it, "respect and dignity is a key issue" (D6-TU). Interestingly, trade union representatives report that

bullying, especially in the hospitality industry, most often occurs at the hands of Polish supervisors (D2-TU; D6-TU; D27-TU). Threats to let a Polish worker go and prevent them from finding another job in the industry, as well as the mentality that Polish workers should be thankful to have any job in Ireland and "shut up," persist through economic boom and bust (D22-TU).

The creation of employment agencies that act as intermediaries between employers and Polish employees facilitates discrimination against immigrant by reducing accountability for the perpetrator of harassment (D22-TU). Nonetheless, there have been few major incidents of bullying against the Polish recorded by officials (D26-ADMIN; D33-PO; D34-PO). Discrimination is more prevalent with economic downturn, yet as one Polish service provider put it, "it's not that I get such complaints every week. It is every few months" (D36-PO; D38-PO).

Less than one third of Polish participants felt discriminated against by their Irish employers or managers (**Table VI.15**). Discrimination is interpreted as being treated with less respect by their manager or the feeling of being pushed to work harder than Irish workers. Being told not to speak in Polish also occurred. In only one incident was harassment severe and the employee was threatened that he would never be able to find a job in the industry, as Ireland is a "small country." After bringing legitimate safety concerns to his manager, the immigrant was told to "shut up" and be thankful to have a job. However, he shared that labor rights violations also applied to Irish workers at the same company (Steven, 34). In only two instances did Polish employees believe that they experienced racism. Most interviewees either have little interaction with their Irish managers or have a very good relationship with them. Two-thirds suggest that they work

in a good atmosphere and feel that their hard work is appreciated. Some even share how their "amazing" Irish employer personally helped them set up a bank account and even buy groceries upon their arrival in Ireland, for instance.

Table VI.15. Bullying and Harassment at Work in Dublin, Interview Data (in %)

Population	By Irish manager	By Irish coworkers	By immigrant coworkers	By Irish customers
Polish	27	5	5	40
Nigerian	100	-	33	50

Source: Author.

Polish workers, unlike their Nigerian counterparts, rarely experience bullying by their coworkers. There is some resentment among Irish coworkers directed at Polish immigrants who are "taking Irish jobs" (D7-TU; D32-PO). However, only 10% of Polish participants reported a problem with their coworkers (**Table VI.15**). In one instance, an Irish employee undermined her Polish coworker in front of the manager, and in another a Polish immigrant was snubbed by a Pakistani colleague who didn't like her "because of [her] religion" (Kathryn, 27). In fact, more than half of respondents work with a large number of nationalities and enjoy the experience. They report no problems in labor relationships and believe the Irish to be "nice people" and "very kind" (Lilly, 36; Matthew, 32). Polish immigrants get along well with native workers and even socialize with them beyond the job. What is troubling is the large number of Polish nationals who work mostly with other Polish people, speaking to them in Polish (14%), and keeping closer relationship only within their national group (15%). Even more disheartening is the fact that Polish workers in Dublin dislike their African colleagues, because they were "lazy," "didn't work" or had a "different culture" (George, 58; Howard, 28; Kathryn, 27).

Finally, almost half of Polish interviewees report some discrimination by their Irish customers or clients (**Table VI.15**). Complaints focused on Polish workers' accent or limited command of English. Verbal abuse was most common and occurred among third of Polish respondents. They were addressed with a slur or told to "go home" and stop taking Irish jobs. However, such abuse was an isolated incident considered to be the exception rather than the rule. In fact, 55% of Polish subjects report having a very good relationship with their customer base. Several share that the Irish are genuinely interested in Poland and are quite patient with foreign accents and deficient language skills. A few Polish workers even consider their regular Irish customers "close friends" (Jennifer, 29; Michaela, 24; Nadine, 27; Rick, 45).

On the other hand, Nigerian employees in Dublin experience systematic discrimination at the hands of Irish managers or supervisors, native customers, as well as Irish and immigrant colleagues. According to expert interviewees, most Nigerian workers in Ireland believe that they were not being treated as equal employees by their managers and coworkers (D11-L; D44-NO). Referrals to the Equality Tribunal, a body that deals with cases of discrimination in the workplace, mostly concern this ethnic group (D41-NO). One official discussed the special case of the taxi industry, where race leads to severe hostility by Irish colleagues and clients (D25-J).

Bullying or harassment at work is widely reported by this project's African respondents. Discrimination is not only much more prevalent against Nigerian immigrants than it is among Polish workers, but also takes more severe forms. All Nigerian participants shared that their Irish managers were quick to accuse Nigerian workers of mistakes at work. They report hostile or inappropriate behavior, such as

objectifying female Nigerian employees, being made to feel as “a second-class citizen,” as well as verbal abuse (D44-NO; Tatiana, 27). One third of Nigerian workers also felt discrimination against by their foreign colleagues. Unfavorable treatment came in different forms ranging from undercutting the efforts of Nigerian workers or blaming them for mistakes to isolating them during work. Finally, half of respondents experienced discrimination by the customers at their job (**Table VI.15**). Most would complain about Nigerian workers’ accent and the inability to understand their English or would assume Nigerians hold the lowest position at the office. Some Irish clients would withhold their business on the basis of nationality and skin color. Many customers would cause trouble or steal during the shift of Nigerian clerks or security guards. Finally, aggressive customers verbally and even physically abused Nigerian immigrants at work and told them to “go back” (Harry, 35; Stephen, 36; Zach, 32).

Interestingly, Nigerian workers attributed their inadequate economic opportunities and status not just to discrimination from the Irish, but also to the influx of Polish workers into Ireland. As Polish workers are willing to work harder and for less, are white and similar to their Irish hosts, are already familiar with the work etiquette in Ireland as Europeans, and do not require work permits, they are perceived to take away the jobs that would otherwise be given to African immigrants.

In sum, Polish and Nigerian immigrants experience less than perfect relationships in the workplace. Polish workers often work with their compatriots and build rapport and friendships only within their national group. They face some resentment from Irish managers or colleagues, especially as they are perceived to “take Irish jobs” with economic downturn. Irish customers or clients are likely to verbally abuse Polish

employees or complain about their limited language skills. Nonetheless, it is Polish managers that are the worst perpetrators of bullying against Polish workers. A majority of Polish immigrants are in fact quite satisfied with their work environment and deem labor relations with the Irish "really good." Therefore, the Europeans are assigned a high value of 4 for this component of economic incorporation (**Table VI.1**). On the other hand, Nigerian employees in Dublin experience everyday work discrimination at the hands of Irish and immigrant supervisors, customers, and coworkers. They face not only verbal abuse, but also physical abuse at work. Bullying and racism are particularly pronounced with the arrival of a large number of Polish workers who provide for a contrast with "different" Nigerian immigrants. The Africans merit a rating of 1 for this indicator of economic integration (**Table VI.1**).

VI.5.2. Work Relationships in Madrid

Regardless of their subpar working conditions, few Ecuadorians experience discrimination or bullying by employers, managers, colleagues or customers in Madrid. While the workplace in Madrid is more tolerant than the place of employment in Dublin, Bulgarians are still likelier than their Southern American counterparts to be harassed by Spanish and Bulgarian bosses or native and immigrant coworkers and clients. The Spanish workplace is different from the Irish one. It is characterized by the blurring of public and private functions, the mixing between professional and personal relationships, and the framing of the exchanges between supervisor and employee as exchanges of personal favors rather than contractual interactions (Fiala, 2012; Martínez, 2009). Levels of tolerance for all foreign workers are relatively high. Eight in ten immigrants in the

Madrid Autonomous Community work with the native population, yet only 12% experience discrimination on the job (Comunidad de Madrid, 2014a). Eight in ten Spaniards openly accept their immigrant employees or colleagues, and only 2.5% reject them, even when immigrants hold superior positions at work (CIS, 2012).

In this informal, tolerant context, Ecuadorian workers are particularly well positioned for favorable treatment. As Fiala (2012) explains, the Catholic work ethic shared by Spaniards and Ecuadorians differs from the formality of the Protestant or Orthodox work ethic of Bulgarians. Since both the sending and receiving spaces have a tradition of intermixing personal and professional relationships in the workplace, it is easy for the Latin Americans to fit in the Spanish labor sphere. Ecuadorians are fast to integrate into what Fiala (2012) dubs patron-client relationships in Spain and accept special gifts and help in exchange for loyalty and gratitude for employers. The immigrants develop a personal bond towards employers and managers and even consider the latter "family."

Unsurprisingly, only one in ten of Ecuadorian workers in this project felt discriminated against or treated unfairly by Spanish employers. It is true that some reported being too busy to form a bond with their superiors in the first place and some suggested that Spanish managers exerted constant pressure on them "to produce" or "to hurry" (Ethan, 39; Kris, 39).[323] Some mistrust and "doubt" at the beginning of the work relationship was reported as well (Patrick, 32).[324] However, the vast majority concede both their Spanish and ethnic superiors to be "friendly," "very nice, very understanding,"

[323] Author's translation derived from original quote in Spanish: "Nos meten mucha prisa, ya y entonces tenemos que cumplir" (Ethan, 39), "Que tú le produzcas, productividad, producción" (Kris, 39).
[324] Author's translation derived from original quote in Spanish: "Los españoles no trataban con latinoamericanos y al principio dudaban."

and to "treat [them] very well" and appreciate their "development and hard work" (Kris, 39; Lina, 30; Patrick, 32; Travis, 42).[325] Relationships are considered "extremely cordial" (*muy cordial*) with Spanish customers (Lina, 30) (**Table VI.16**).

Table VI.16. Problematic Relationships at Work in Madrid (in %)

Population	Spanish employer/manager	Spanish coworkers	Immigrant coworkers	Spanish customers/clients
Ecuadorians	11	33	11	11
Bulgarians	38.5/60*	15.4/66.7*	12.8/62.5*	10.3/66.7*

*The higher number reflects the valid percentage when respondents who did not give an answer to the questions were excluded from the calculations.
Source: Author.

Good relations are the rule with immigrant colleagues as well, even though Ecuadorians prefer working with their co-ethnics. As one person put it, "it is easier to work with the same nationality. We understand each other a bit more" (Ethan, 39).[326] Another South American worker captured well the high level of informality and personal loyalty present in relationships with Ecuadorian and Spanish coworkers alike, "I have been working with them for four years. I am working for four years and the people stay with me. We are *paisanos* (countrymen). It is normal. We are together, whatever you need, be it food or … I'd give you one thing, you'd give me another" (Travis, 42).[327] Despite preference for their *paisanos* and a belief that other immigrants like Bulgarians are "very closed" (*muy cerrados*) and hard to communicate with, Ecuadorians report

[325]Author's translation derived from original quote in Spanish: "Mi jefe español sí. Yo lo he tenido amable al hombre" (Kris, 39), "Los jefes son muy buenas, muy atentas y muy comprensivas" (Lina, 30), "Pero luego él vio el desenvolvimiento mío, cómo trabajo y que soy una persona responsable y trabajadora y tal"(Patrick, 32), "Me trataba muy bien"(Travis, 42).
[326]Author's translation derived from original quote in Spanish: "Es muy fácil trabajar con la misma nacionalidad. Nos entendemos un poco más."
[327] Author's translation derived from original quote in Spanish: "Les conozco por estar trabajando conmigo estos cuatro años. Tres años está trabajando la gente y siguen conmigo. Todos somos paisanos...Eso es lo normal. Nos juntamos allí, cualquier cosa uno comida, te da una cosa, te da otra cosa."

getting along with all foreign coworkers in Spain "very well" (*muy bien*) (Lina, 30; Lincoln, 32). The only unfavorable work relationship is that with Spanish coworkers. None of the South American participants talk of direct confrontation or discrimination from native coworkers, unlike Nigerians in Dublin, for instance. However, much like in the case of the Polish in Ireland, one third sense "some vindictiveness, some pessimism, because you have a job and I don't." "Taking Spanish jobs" is at the root of worsening relationships between Spanish and Latin Americans coworkers, but only in bust economic times (Ethan, 39) (**Table VI.16**). [328]

On the other hand, Bulgarians are conflicted about their workplace relationships but fare worse than similar Iberian Ecuadorians in Madrid or white, European Poles in Dublin. Especially when it comes to Spanish employers, stern, proud, different Bulgarians do not know how to navigate the patron-client relationship Fiala (2012) describes, unlike their South American counterparts. Consequently, more than one third of the interviewees here experienced some problems in their relationships with their Spanish employers or managers. The proportion is much higher when only valid answers are taken into account **(Table VI.16**). Anecdotes of employers treating Bulgarian women in domestic services "like slaves" (*като роби*) abound (Izzy, 40; Tangra, 36). Some examples are extreme. One female cleaner was hung from the eleventh floor by her Spanish employer to clean the outside windows panes as a test of her work ethic (Gina, 33). Another refused to work during "disgusting" (*отвратителни*) parties her employer threw late at night and was threatened with police and deportation (Pam, 39). A third Balkan worker was made to eat at a separate table where her employers left trash, "like a

[328] Paragraph contains author's translation derived from original quote in Spanish, including: Hay un poco de revanchismo, de pesimismo, por qué tú tienes trabajo y yo no lo tengo. Porque quitas el trabajo de los españoles (Ethan, 39).

dog" (*като куче*) (Dothy, 60). Other examples are not as severe but reflect mistrust, unfamiliarity and the conception of Bulgarians as second-class citizens to be exploited. Pressure to work faster than other laborers despite lesser pay, being forbidden to speak Bulgarian, or having to "work seven days a week for two weeks" or "non-stop without a break" are common occurrences (Sylvester, 29; Tangra, 36).[329] Accusations of stealing and even throwing jewelry around a house to see if the Bulgarian domestic worker would take it occurred as well. Questioning an administrative worker's literacy or not inviting a Bulgarian cleaner to a hacienda-wide party are other indications of the East European's exclusion by their employers.

Still, Bulgarian workers concede that their experiences are not always been negative and "in some houses they treat you like a slave, but in the other, family people are more intelligent and there is no such treatment" (Yana, 50).[330] A large number call their Spanish bosses "good employers," (*добри работодатели*) and describe the "great relationship" (*прекрасни взаимоотношения*) they have in the Madrid workplace (Grady, 54; Shay, 56; Tara, 50). Spanish employers are "patient with language" (*търпеливи с езика*) and sometimes treat their foreign workers "as family" (*като семейство*) (Anna, 36; Trini, 31). As one interviewee recalls, her Spanish boss found her other places to clean, so she doesn't "lose her papers," legalized her documents, secured a job for her husband, and even found housing for her children (Nina, 57).[331]

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[329] Paragraph contains author's translation from original quote in Bulgarian, including: "И ме държа ужасно много време без почивка, 7 дена в седмицата работя, събраха ми се 2 седмици и аз казах „аз не мога повече" (Sylvester, 29), "Не много добро, защото се работи нон- стоп, няма почивка" (Tangra, 36).
[330]Author's translation from original quote in Bulgarian: "Едното семейство те третират едва ли не като слугиня, обаче в другото семейство пък хората са по- интелигентнии няма такова отношение."
[331] Paragraph contains author's translation from original quote in Bulgarian, including: "Ще изгуби правото си, ще изгуби тархетата" (Nina, 57).

Few Balkan workers have colleagues, since they are the sole caretakers of private households. Still, treatment by colleagues and customers is conflicted. On the one hand, a majority sense mistrust, condescension, and resentment. Between 10% and 15% of the participants faced problematic relationships with their coworkers or customers, proportions that grew exponentially to two-third of participants when only valid responses were considered (**Table VI.16**). Spanish coworkers are reported to look at Bulgarians "with contempt, with distrust, after all you don't speak well" (Dylan, 45).[332] They minimize Bulgarians' work efforts or lodge complains against them in front of managers. Both Spanish and Latin American colleagues, "envious" (*ревност*) of the East Europeans' work ethic or achievements, act with entitlement and boss the Balkan workers around regardless of their actual stature in the company, "create drama" to undermine the Bulgarians' efforts, or make comments about the foreigners' "taking jobs" that are not rightfully theirs (Chris, 34; Grady, 54).[333] Resentment is considered particularly strong when the Balkan laborers are in a position superior to that of native or South American workers. Disturbingly, like in the case of the Polish in Dublin, Bulgarians are prejudiced themselves and report that they simply "cannot deal with Moroccans," who are too different in religious and cultural terms (Sasha, 33).[334] On the other hand, language skill acquisition and acculturation "after years in Spain" (*след години в Испания*) are reported to result in more communication and "good

[332] Author's translation from original quote in Bulgarian: "И ходех, но хората ме гледаха малко с пренебрежение, с недоверие, все пак не им вдъхваш доверие, не говориш добре."
[333] Paragraph contains author's translation from original quote in Bulgarian, including: "Създават драма," "Взимаме им работата" (Grady, 54).
[334] Author's translation from original quote in Bulgarian: "Въпрос на разбиране, аз примерно не че са мароканци, но това, че са мюсюлмани това ме бърка и не ми е приятно."

relationships” (*добри взаимоотношения*) in the workplace, as well as “respect” (*уважение*) by native clients (Redford, 36).

To conclude, familiar Ecuadorians can navigate well the informal Spanish workplace. Despite pressure by Spanish employers, some resentment by Spanish coworkers who believe they are losing their jobs to the South Americans and preference for working among *paisanos*, extroverted Catholic Ecuadorians boast “very good” relationships on the job in Madrid. They form personal bonds with employers and colleagues and score high on this component of economic incorporation (**Table VI.1**) (Fiala, 2012). On the other hand, while not as disadvantaged as Nigerians in Dublin, Bulgarians experience worse treatment that their Latin American or Polish counterparts. The different Balkan workers are viewed with suspicion and contempt by managers, colleagues and clients and are regarded as second-class persons regardless of actual position in the workplace. Still, with time work relationships improve and some of the East European employees come to feel part of their manager’s “family,” much like Ecuadorians. Despite improvements with acculturation, Bulgarians rate relatively low on this facet of economic integration and receive a value of 2 (**Table VI.1**).

VI.6. Job Satisfaction

VI.6.1. Job Satisfaction in Dublin

As a result of their occupational status and working conditions and relationships, Polish workers are satisfied with their economic position in Dublin, while Nigerian immigrants are not. In fact, Polish immigrants downplay any instances of exploitation and describe their professional situation as their deliberate choice. On the other hand,

Nigerians emphasize their lack of control and extreme dissatisfaction with their economic status in Ireland.

The Polish Embassy's economic section reports that there are few gross instances of exploitation of Polish workers in Ireland and "Poles are treated more and more as part of Irish society" (D33-PO). Other Polish organizations suggest that "people are braver" and know their rights better and thus utilize institutions like the Equality Tribunal more frequently to dispute unfavorable conditions (D39-PO). Unsurprisingly, labor market satisfaction among the Polish is high leading Turner et al. (2009) to dub Polish workers in Ireland "contented proletariat." Only 2% of Turner et al.'s respondents were "not at all satisfied with their job conditions," while 59% were "very definitely" or "definitely" satisfied (Turner et al., 2009, p. 118). According to McGinnity et al. (2011), Eastern Europeans experience the lowest work pressure among all nationality groups in Dublin, including the Irish, and feel most secure at their jobs. More than half of Polish respondents here are at least somewhat satisfied with their experience in Ireland. The cohort merits a rating of 4 for this component of economic incorporation (**Table VI.1**).

On the other hand, Nigerian immigrants in Ireland report low levels of job security and job satisfaction. According to McGinnity et al. (2011), while 29% of Irish and Eastern European workers thought that their job was not secure, 34% of African employees did not feel stable at their job. Africans workers also report higher levels of work pressure than Eastern Europeans with a mean score of 2.62 compared to 2.52 (McGinnity et al., 2011, p. 46-47). Among this project's interviewees, less than one third is satisfied with their work in Ireland. This collective is assigned the lowest rating for this indicator of economic integration (**Table VI.1**).

VI.6.2. Job Satisfaction in Madrid

Like the Polish in Dublin, Ecuadorians are somewhat satisfied with their occupational position in Madrid. Surprisingly, so are Bulgarians, who consider the receiving context preferable to dismal conditions at home.

Foreign workers in Spain are less satisfied with their labor experiences than natives but the gap is not glaring. For instance, while 50.9% of natives are "very satisfied" or "satisfied" with "work in general," 42% of immigrants express high levels of satisfaction. Salary levels are the least favorable aspect for both groups, while the "physical workplace" and "health/safety" ae found more than adequate by a majority of all cohorts (Corral & Isusi, 2007; Ministerio de Trabajo e Asuntos Sociales [MTAS], 2004). Similar Ecuadorians whose workplace transition is relatively smooth, and who experience better access, conditions, and relationships in the Spanish labor market than other ethnic groups, are happy with their employment in Madrid. Two-thirds of Latin American respondents in this dissertation suggest they are at least somewhat satisfied with their economic situation in the receiving city. The better organization of labor and clearer rules, the higher remuneration, the access to professional activities for first-time South American female labor market entrants, and even the personal attachment and gratitude to individual employers contribute to feelings of security and happiness (Dudley, 2013; Fiala, 2012). Despite the fewer opportunities with economic crisis and the tendency of employers to "take advantage" of all foreign workers, one respondent sums up the general attitude that "clearly, it is a little bit better here than in my country"

(Patrick, 32; Travis, 42)[335]. As a result, Ecuadorians receive a value of 4 for this indicator of economic incorporation (**Table VI.1**).

Surprisingly, Bulgarians are also satisfied with their employment in Spain. A little more than half of this project's interviewees suggest that their migration produced better working circumstances for them. Better opportunities and "better money" (*по-добри пари*), especially in comparison to "horrible" (*ужасни*) conditions in the origin country, make up for sacrifices, deskilling, and humiliation (Tonya, 45). Bulgarian workers, who perceive themselves as similar to their European Spanish hosts, believe that as time passes and they acquire Spanish language and habits, their economic situation will improve further. Therefore, the Balkan migrants are starting to come forward with grievances against employers and to seek their economic rights. They also place more value on the work they do in Spain, and can reconcile being employed well below qualifications and still being satisfied. As one participants summarizes, "I can be a cleaning lady in Bulgaria too, but a sad cleaning lady" (Rosa, 44).[336] The East Europeans are assigned a 4 for this component of economic integration (**Table VI.1**).

VI.7. Conclusion

In conclusion, the economic incorporation of Poles and Nigerians in Dublin and Ecuadorians and Bulgarians in Madrid is imperfect, much like the four cohorts' access to political rights. However, there are significant differences among the four groups, which cannot be explained by legal status, human capital, or niche of employment. Culturally-

[335] Author's translation from original quote in Spanish: " Se approvechan" (Patrick, 32), "Claro que aca es un poquito mejor que en mi país" (Travis, 42).

[336] Paragraph contains author's translation from original quote in Bulgarian: "И когато имаш стабилна работа, защото аз можех да бъда чистачка и в България, но да бъда нещастна чистачка" (Rosa, 44).

grounded exclusion and inclusion amid local labor market actors, and identity-based perceptions of belonging or isolation among the immigrants playa fundamental role.

Ecuadorians experience *organic integration* into the Madrid labor market and rank relatively high on the economic index constructed by this author (**Table VI.1**). Even though they are exploited by cost-calculating employers during economic crunch and face worse working conditions and higher unemployment rates than natives, the South Americans still fare better than other immigrants in Spain. The Spanish-speaking foreigners have easy access to jobs and higher activity rates than East European workers. Ecuadorians, who come to Spain from a similar socio-economic reality, do not experience severe deskilling upon migration. In fact, female migrants often enter the professional sphere for the first time with mobility and educational attainment for both male and female cohorts translates into higher achievement in the host city. In view of the immigrants' Catholic work ethic and shared understanding of the informal relations of the Spanish labor market, working conditions for the Latin Americans are adequate and relationships in the workplace are favorable. Perceptions of welcome and improved economic circumstances lead to high levels of satisfaction among the South Americans.

Poles in Dublin, who are welcomed, yet hardly believe themselves to belong, undergo *reluctant integration* and merit a high/intermediate rating on the economic incorporation index constructed by this author (**Table VI.1**). In spite of the language barrier and the economic crisis, Polish immigrants are able to find employment in Ireland and face little discrimination in recruitment. While many lost jobs with economic downturn, their activity and employment rates remain among the highest in Ireland. There is a steady stream of new arrivals. Many Polish workers in Dublin are highly

qualified, yet are employed in lower-skilled professions. However, as they were under- or unemployed in Poland and worked below qualifications in the home country, Polish workers are not experiencing steep downward mobility upon migration. Poles can close the occupational gap with language acquisition. Like Ecuadorians in Madrid, the East European workers experience worse working conditions that Irish nationals. However, exploitation diminishes with increased knowledge of labor rights or the help of friendly Irish institutions. Working conditions are still better than these of Nigerians in Dublin, for instance, who are at the mercy of their employers. Working relationships are generally favorable, even during hard economic times. Unsurprisingly, the Polish are satisfied with their economic situation in Dublin, earning the moniker "contented proletariat."

Bulgarians, who view themselves to belong in Spain, yet face negative reception by their hosts, undergo *conflicted integration* in Madrid and merit an intermediate economic incorporation rating (**Table VI.1**). While not fully excluded from the labor market in the receiving context, the different Balkan workers have impaired access to employment in Spain and have to rely on ethnic networks for securing a job. Employment rates are lower and unemployment levels are higher than these of natives or South American migrants. While some members of the intermediately qualified Bulgarian labor pool might be employed according to qualifications, downward occupational mobility is endemic for the culturally-different cohort. Inadequate labor conditions and bullying by Spanish employers is much more common among the proud, stern East Europeans, who do not know how to navigate the Spanish labor market than among their Latin American counterparts. Surprisingly, satisfaction is relatively high

among Bulgarians, whose belief of their similarity to European Spaniards leads them to fight for their labor rights and hope for improved economic conditions over time.

Finally, Nigerian workers experience *blocked integration* in Dublin and rank low on the economic incorporation index constructed by this author (**Table VI.1**). The racially and culturally distinct Africans are often unable to even secure a job in view of preference for Polish workers and discrimination by Irish employers. Their activity rates are much lower than those of Polish immigrants. When they are employed, Nigerians experience greater occupational gaps than their Polish counterparts and transition from jobs in medicine, for instance, to employment in lower-skilled occupations. Relatedly, African immigrants in Dublin face substandard working conditions. Pay is low, contracts are casual and hours of employment are unsocial. Bullying and harassment by managers, colleagues, and customers are pervasive and repeated. Consequently, Africans are not satisfied with their employment in Ireland. Since Nigerians are thwarted by structural factors like prejudice, their economic exclusion is hard to overcome and severe gaps in economic integration are replicated in other areas, like the social sphere. It is to the social integration of the four ethnic groups that Chapter VII turns to next.

CHAPTER VII

"THE LOWEST RUNG IN SOCIETY":

SOCIAL INCORPORATION IN DUBLIN AND MADRID

VII.1. Introduction

Non-European and European immigrants in Dublin and Madrid are highly disadvantaged in their access to social resources. However, there are important differences among collectives and contexts that cannot be easily explained by the newcomers' legal status, socio-economic class and labor market position, or human capital. It is puzzling that English-speaking Nigerians perform worse in Irish schools than East European Poles. It is surprising that non-EU Ecuadorians have better access to Madrid's housing market, healthcare system, or social welfare administration than European Bulgarians. Why tolerant Madrid is often less adept at accommodating its foreign population than homogenous Dublin remains unanswered. The argument is that identity politics are an integral part of an explanation. Regardless of a relatively disadvantaged economic position, culturally-familiar foreign collectives benefit from better opportunities in the social sphere, as they inspire empathy among natives and engender little discrimination. They can navigate local educational or health institutions with ease and are rarely the victims of racism. Immigrant collectives that consider themselves to belong in their new home, moreover, are likely to seek their rights and combat obstacles to social incorporation. They enroll in local schools, attend regular medical check-ups, intermix with the autochthonous population in housing tenements and invest in their new environment.

Table VII.1. Social Incorporation Index[337]

Indicator	*Polish (Score)*	*Nigerian (Score)*	*Ecuadorian (Score)*	*Bulgarian (Score)*
Income	High (4)	Intermediate (3)	Intermediate (3)	Low (2)
Housing	Intermediate (3)	Low (2)	High (4)	Low (2)
Education	High (4)	High (4)	High (4)	Intermediate (3)
Health	Intermediate (3)	Intermediate (3)	High (5)	High (4)
Social Welfare	Low (2)	Low (1)	High (5)	High (4)
Other Institutions	High (5)	Low (1)	High (4)	Intermediate (3)
Racism	Intermediate (3)	Low (1)	High (4)	Intermediate (3)
SOCIAL INCORPORATION	***Intermediate (24)***	***Low (15)***	***High (29)***	***Intermediate (21)***

This chapter traces the social integration of Poles and Nigerians in Dublin and Ecuadorians and Bulgarians in Madrid through the discussion of disposable income; access to housing, education, healthcare, and social welfare; relationships with other key governmental institutions; as well as incidents of racism and discrimination. While all four groups are hardly integrated in the social domain of the receiving communities, Ecuadorians in Madrid have better access than the other three collectives. The similar

[337] Each category is assigned a number between 1 and 5. Outcomes that reflect lack of social access are assigned a value of 1. High levels of incorporation are given a value of 5. Outcomes that fall in the middle are assigned a 3. The values from every column are added to produce an index of social incorporation levels for each immigrant group. Many indicators are composite. "Disposable income" is surveyed through average wages and poverty rates. "Housing" includes homeownership, access to the rental market, segregation from the native community, and concentration in areas with lower socio-economic status. "Education" refers to access to all levels of schooling, concentration in immigrant-heavy or public and otherwise disadvantaged institutions, educational achievement, and treatment by teachers and other students. "Health" references self-reported health status, use of health services, and relationships with healthcare providers. "Social welfare" includes rates of welfare activity, legal provisions and barriers to receiving social welfare, as well as discrimination in the system. "Other institutions" includes treatment by and access to police, employment and training agencies, immigration offices, and trade unions. "Racism" includes bias encountered on the streets, in shops or in other public spaces, as well as by the media. The Index ranges from 7 to 35. Values between 7 and 16 reflect low levels of incorporation, 17-26 show intermediate social access and 27-35 correspond to a multitude of social rights.

South Americans deviate from the *organic integration* model extended in this dissertation, yet they are considered among the most sympathetic groups by Madrilenians and have relatively ample social entitlements in the city. Perceptions of Madrid as an extension of the homeland lead Ecuadorians to strategically employ local opportunities and invest in life in Spain. The Latin Americans own homes in the receiving context and intermix residentially with the native community. They utilize the generous healthcare and social security systems and can easily navigate other key institutions in the city. Despite some discrimination, cultural affinity and a similar social reality bode well for the South American's long-term incorporation prospects (**Table VII.1**).

Poles in Dublin are worse off than their Latin American counterparts. As they perceive themselves not to belong in the receiving context, the East Europeans resign themselves to low income, subpar accommodations, disadvantaged schools, and exclusion form the Irish social security system. However, the multiple opportunities Poles are granted by welcoming local actors force the newcomers to *reluctantly integrate* in their new home. Open access to the Dublin rental housing market, preferential treatment in educational institutions, decent medical coverage, and positive interactions with police or courts close the social gap for Polish immigrants in Ireland. As they are considered sympathetic by Irish stakeholders, Poles experience little discrimination and are likely to enjoy even more plentiful opportunities in the long-term (**Table VII.1**).

Bulgarians' *conflicted integration* extends beyond economic and political rights to Madrid's social sphere. The Eastern Europeans have low disposable income, inhabit crowded subpar accommodations in segregated neighborhoods, and have relatively low educational achievement. Use of the generous healthcare system is somewhat limited,

prejudiced treatment in immigration offices occurs, and stereotyping in the Spanish media is well-established. Nonetheless, as they perceive themselves to belong in the receiving context, Bulgarians avail themselves of the Madrilenian social security system and aspire to learn Spanish in order to excel in the educational sphere. The Balkan workers are satisfied with their access to the generous medical system and other institutions like the police and suggest that their European-ness shields them from overt racism in the host context (**Table VII.1**).

Despite relatively favorable access to some social institutions in Dublin, Nigerians in Ireland stand out as the most disadvantaged collective in terms of social incorporation. The dissimilar African migrants are *blocked in their integration* in the receiving city. Poverty rates are high, isolation from the rental market is pervasive, and residential and educational segregation are the norm among Nigerians. Bullying in primary and secondary education, higher costs for medical care, stereotypes in the social welfare system, and unfair treatment by police or immigration officers further detract from the Africans' social incorporation. Nigerian immigrants are the most likely victims of discrimination by Irish and foreign perpetrators. As exclusion is based on Nigerians' racial and cultural difference from the Irish, it is likely to persist (**Table VII.1**).

The remainder of this chapter discusses each indicator of social integration for Poles and Nigerians in Dublin and Ecuadorians and Bulgarians in Madrid in turn. The findings are grounded in statistical data, governmental and non-governmental reports, secondary sources, and interviews with the relevant stakeholders in each city. Interview

data with the immigrants and their ethnic representatives add richness and detail to the discussion.[338]

VII.2. Disposable Income

VII.2.1. Disposable Income in Dublin

While most immigrants in Ireland have lower wages than the native population, disposable income is lowest among citizens of the new member states. To illustrate, in 2008 the average gross income for an Irish household stood at €51,956 annually. This compares to only €39,095 among Eastern European nationals and €45,666 for non-EU nationals (McGinnity et al., 2011).

However, Polish immigrants fare better in terms of their income compared to Nigerian workers in Dublin. East Europeans earn monthly net income higher than that of Africans by more than twenty euro points (McGinnity et al., 2006). A majority of Polish respondents are able to cover their living expenses regardless of their low wages. On the other hand, only four in ten Nigerian respondents can provide for all household expenses, in view of large families and the tendency of Nigerian women to care for the home (ICI, 2008). Polish immigrants in Dublin are also less likely to be in poverty. The proportion of

[338] In Dublin, additional sources include a study by the Immigrant Council of Ireland (ICI, 2008); two Economic and Social Research Institute (ESRI) reports on immigrant integration (McGinnity et al., 2006, 2011); analyses of immigrants in the Irish educational system (Curry et al., 2010; Smyth, Darmody, McGinnity, & Byrne, 2009); relevant legislation; and data from the Irish census, the *National Consultative Committee on Racism and Interculturalism* (NCCRI), the Program for International Student Assessment (PISA), and the Dublin City Council. In the case of Madrid, primary and secondary data are derived, among other sources, from integration reports by national, regional and local institutions (Ayuntamiento de Madrid, 2010; Bertozzi, 2010, Comunidad de Madrid, 2012b; D'Ancona & Martíinez, 2009); various analyses of the Spanish National Health Survey (Carrasco-Garrido, De Miguel, Barrera, & Jiménez-García, 2007; Hernández-Quevedo & Jiménez-Rubio, 2009, 2012; Solé-Auro & Crimmins, 2008; Villarroel and Artazcoz 2015); as well as a number of scholarly papers on segregation in the Spanish educational system (Zinovyeva, Felgueroso, & Vazquez, 2013; Teese, Aasen, Field, & Pont, 2006) or housing market (Amuedo-Dorantes & Mundra, 2012; Blázquez, Llano, & Moral, 2010; Bosch, Carnero, & Farré, 2011; Vono-de-Vilhena & Bayona-Carrasco, 2012).

Eastern Europeans at risk of poverty is almost the same as that of the Irish and much lower than that for third-country nationals (McGinnity et al., 2011).[339]

While Eastern Europeans tend to earn less than Nigerian migrants in absolute numbers, they employ their income efficiently and are less likely than Nigerian immigrants to fall under the poverty line. In fact, most of the Polish respondents in this project are very satisfied with their quality of life in Ireland regardless of relatively low salaries. Nigerian interviewees, on the other hand, are deeply disappointed with their insufficient income. The East Europeans are assigned a 4 and Africans – a 3 – for this component of social integration (**Table VII.1**).

VII.2.2. Disposable Income in Madrid

Like their counterparts in Dublin, immigrants in Madrid have lesser disposable income than natives. Generally, gross monthly earnings are lower among immigrant and natives than in Ireland. While 18-19% Spaniards were at risk of poverty and 4% suffered from extreme poverty in 2003-2007, the comparable numbers for immigrants stood at 29-31% and 7-13% respectively. Even after socio-demographic characteristics and economic profile are accounted for, there remains a 20% "pay gap" between natives and foreigners (De Bustillo & Ánton, 2011, p. 673). In Madrid, the gap is even higher, standing at 24% (Bárcena-Martín & Pérez-Moreno, 2008).

Household and individual income is comparable between Ecuadorians and Bulgarians in Madrid. An average monthly wage of €995 is matched by €963 for Latin Americans and €958 for Eastern Europeans (Fernandez & Ortega, 2008). Another

[339] The percentage of individuals at risk of poverty is highest among non-EU nationals with almost 19% compared to 14.3% among Eastern European and 14.1% among the Irish (McGinnity et al., 2011).

estimate puts monthly wages for Latin Americans at €939 on average compared to only €927.5 for Eastern Europeans. As Ecuadorians live in somewhat larger households, with 4.15 persons on average as opposed to 3.96 among Balkan migrants, income is comparable. Nonetheless, the East Europeans do not earn higher wages if they have higher educational degrees, experience in the home country, or even work experience or training in Spain (Rodríguez-Planas & Vegas, 2012). On the other hand, home country work experience results in higher income for Latin Americans (Sanromá et al., 2009).

While all foreigners earn wages lower than these of natives or immigrants in other European countries, Eastern Europeans are more disadvantaged than Latin Americans. Monthly wage differentials are negligible. However, experience or education in the home or host country only results in income increases among Ecuadorians. In fact, most Ecuadorian participants ae satisfied with their wages, especially before the economic downturn, while Bulgarian interviewees speak of the artificially low income they receive in Spain. Based on relative deprivation, the South Americans are assigned a 3 and the East Europeans - a 2 for this component of social incorporation (**Table VII.1**).

VII.3. Access to Housing

VII.3.1. Access to Housing in Dublin

Access to housing appears less satisfactory among Polish immigrants than among Nigerian immigrants in Dublin. Few Poles own their accommodations and most live in undesirable neighborhoods predominantly with their compatriots or other immigrants. Nonetheless, Nigerians are highly disadvantaged in terms of rental accommodations due to their physical difference and cluster in neighborhoods populated mostly by other

Nigerian nationals. Both communities feel relatively safe in their surroundings, yet the East Europeans are more likely to be satisfied with their location and particular residence.

More than nine in ten Polish immigrants lived in rented accommodations in Ireland in 2006, with only 7% identifying as homeowners (CSO, 2008). In comparison, 23% of non-EU nationals owned their housing in Dublin in 2010 (McGinnity et al., 2011). Among respondents in this project, however, almost one fifth either owned or were looking to buy residence in Dublin. Still, Nigerian immigrants are much more likely to own their residence in Ireland than are Polish workers. Both the Central Statistical Institute and the Immigrants Council of Ireland find that 17% of Nigerians own their residences with five or six in ten living in rented tenements, and the remainder confined to public housing or asylum hostels (CSO, 2008; ICI, 2008). However, home ownership among all immigrants is diminishing. The desire to send remittances home is one reason for this trend. A more troubling explanation is that economic exclusion translates into social exclusion, where the requirement to demonstrate credit and employment history poses greater difficulty for immigrant mortgage applicants (National Consultative Committee on Racism and Interculturalism [NCCRI], 2008).

The higher rates of home ownership among Nigerian immigrants in Dublin often reflect not Nigerians' embeddedness in the community, but the biased access to rental accommodations the Africans face. According to the ICI, African immigrants are severely disadvantaged in securing accommodations from an Irish landlord. When identified as Nigerian, they are usually told that the advertised accommodation is no longer available, while in reality it remains unoccupied. Sometimes they are directly told that Nigerians are not welcome in the residence (ICI, 2008, p. 127). The same experience

is shared by this project's interviewees. Half report discrimination by landlords when looking for rental accommodations and all believe that many Irish landlords simply do not rent to Nigerians. For instance, after one Nigerian immigrant was told an accommodation is occupied, her Irish friend posed as a potential occupant and was encouraged to view the residence (Tatiana, 27). Even renting through a housing agency proved difficult after the owners realized the potential tenant was black (Ethan, 46). In some cases, bias is direct. Landlords would identify Nigerian renters by "their voice" and tell them they are unwanted or even address them with racial slurs (Ethan, 46; D25-J; Taylor, 30). Unfavorable treatment by landlords is common during tenancy as well, with lack of maintenance or unwarranted complaints against African occupants.

On the other hand, the Polish have unlimited access to rental accommodations. Only one in ten of interviewees in this project found securing rented housing difficult, not due to discrimination but in view of high prices and demand. In fact, Polish respondents believe that Irish landlords prefer and appreciate Polish tenants even to native lessees, since the East Europeans are "clean," quiet, and look after their apartments (Elizabeth, 36; Steven, 34). Issues with Irish landlords are rare. Problems stem from housing that is subpar to begin with, and constitute predominantly neglect to make repairs. Only in one case did a participant believe an Irish landlord treated foreign tenants worse than native ones and in one instance did a landlord unfairly withhold a tenant's deposit. Most respondents found Irish landlords to be "good," quick to repair the accommodation, and even "fantastic" (Elizabeth, 36).

Regardless of whether they rent or own their accommodations, both Polish and Nigerian immigrants cluster in Dublin's less desirable areas. Poles are not as isolated as

Nigerians. According to one expert respondent, Polish immigrants are “not really a minority,” and so “they blend in” and “are pretty spread out” throughout Dublin (D11-L). However, because they have limited finances and seek proximity to jobs, Poles remain focused mostly in neighborhoods that are immigrant-heavy and of relatively low socio-economic standing (D1-J; D16-ADMIN). A large proportion lives in new construction on the north of the City in communities like Fairview, Clonsilla, Clonliffe, Clondalkin, Tallaght, Finglas, Drumcondra, Blanchardstown, and Mulhuddart (D1-J; D18-P; D33-PO; D34-PO; D38-PO). Other Polish immigrants focus in Dublin’s center, where they are closer to jobs, entertainment, and Polish organizations (D5-ADMIN; D9-P; D18-P; D35-PO). For instance, Poles reside around St. Audeon’s church, which provides mass in Polish, around Polish restaurants in Capel and Moore Street, as well as close to Polish service organizations (D13-P; D35-PO; D36-PO; D40-PO).

Similarly, Nigerian immigrants are geographically clustered in Dublin’s less prestigious communities. According to expert participants, Nigerian workers live either in the inner city in low-cost residences around Parnell Street if they are single or in the North West of the city in communities like Balbriggan, Blanchardstown, Mulhuddard, and Tallaght if they are married (D11-L; D16-ADMIN; D41-NO; D44-NO). In fact, Polish and Nigerian immigrants intersect in Mulhuddart or Tallaght, as well as in the city center. In order to establish contrast between the housing situations of the two populations, the project focuses on Mulhuddart, Tallaght, Balbriggan, and Blanchardstown when discussing the living conditions of Nigerians. For the Polish group, the emphasis is on communities with a high concentration of Polish nationals and low concentrations of Nigerians nationals, and specifically City Center North (8.5% Polish as

opposed to the 1.5% average), Fairview (with 4.6% Polish), Cabra (2.4% Poles), and Drumcondra (2.2%) (CSO, 2012a; Rate My Area, 2012).

The communities in which Polish workers concentrate are immigrant-heavy, yet ethnically homogenous and predominantly "white." Polish immigrants are geographically integrated with the Irish and live in areas where the percentage of the Irish population is similar to, if a little below, the national average. However, the neighborhoods in which Polish workers focus tend to be more ethnically "similar" than those preferred by Nigerian immigrants in Dublin. The foreign populations in Cabra, Fairview, or Drumcondra, for instance, are larger than the average, but are mostly of white ethnicity and Lithuanian, British or another European Union nationality. Only the city center offers Poles a truly multicultural neighborhood, with foreign nationals making up almost half of all residents and non-EU nationals making up one quarter of the population (CSO 2012a; Rate My Area, 2012) (**Table VII.2**).

Table VII.2. National and Ethnic Composition of Poles' and Nigerians' Communities (in %)

Community	Polish	Other EU	Non-EU	Foreign	Irish	White Irish	Other white	Black
Average	*1.5*	*5.1*	*3.5*	*10.2*	*89.8*	*89.5*	*7.1*	*1.1*
City Center N	8.5	13.6	26.2	50.1	49.9	48.9	28.6	3.2
Fairview	4.6	10.1	8.2	22.9	77.1	77	16.1	2
Cabra	2.4	4.9	4.4	11.6	88.4	88.1	8.4	1
Drumcondra	2.2	5.9	5.5	13.7	86.3	86.1	9.7	1.2
Tallaght	2.3	3.9	5.7	11.8	88.2	87.2	7.1	2
Mulhuddart	4.3	8.2	16.3	28.8	71.2	62.6	16.3	13.4
Balbriggan	0.9	4.7	7.3	14.8	87.2	84.9	6.7	6
Blanchardstown	2	5.7	9.2	16.8	83.2	79.7	10.1	3.9

Sources: CSO, 2012a; Rate My Area, 2012.

On the other hand, the neighborhoods populated by Nigerian immigrants have a high percentage of immigrants who identify as black or non-EU. For instance, 16.8% of Blachardstown's population and as high as 28.8% of Mulhuddart's population is foreign-born compared to only 10.2% nationally. What is more, non-EU black immigrants make up 6% of Balbriggan's and 13.4% of Mulhuddart's population compared to 1.1% nationally (**Table VII.2**). This dissertation's interviewees suggest that they prefer such "ethnic" locations. After facing stigma and stereotyping, parents actively seek out estates where other African families live, because ethnic families "look out for each other" and provide protection for each other's children. One respondent suggests that before he rents any accommodation, he always asks "How many black people live here?" (Ethan, 46). However, "multiculturalism" is not always as positive as integration experts make it out to be, with the "multicultural" neighborhoods populated by Nigerians also the ones with the most racial tensions and highest crime rates. As one respondent put it, "Some parts of Dublin, like Dublin 15 where I live, would be multicultural. But is it really multicultural in terms of social facilities, in terms of equality of opportunity, or is it only called multicultural because people live there together?" (D44-NO).

The localities inhabited by Polish and Nigerian workers are also of lower socio-economic status than average regardless of high educational levels. This disparity is even more pronounced in the case of Nigerian immigrants. Despite the fact that a large number of residents in Mulhuddart or the city center, for instance, have completed tertiary degrees, they are employed in trade or other unidentified economic sectors rather than prestigious white-collar occupations. The percentages of people in these localities identifying as professional or managerial/technical is lower than the average, whereas the

percentage of those identifying as semi-skilled, unskilled or other is much higher. Polish workers are more likely to live in neighborhoods with residents that belong to the professional or managerial classes than Nigerians (**Tables VII.3a and VII.3b**).

Table VII.3a: Socio-Economic Status of Poles' and Nigerians' Communities (Education and Social Class) (in %)

Community	Education		Social class			
	Vocational	Tertiary	Managerial/ Profess'l	Semi-/ unskilled	Non-manual/ skilled-manual	Other
Average	*9*	*6.9*	*32.9*	*15.4*	*34.1*	*17.6*
City Center N	11	14	18.2	18.3	22.2	41.3
Fairview	11.1	11.9	30.6	14.4	37.8	17.1
Cabra	8.2	7.8	28.5	17.6	36.1	17.7
Drumcondra	7.4	13.4	40.6	12.1	27.8	19.5
Tallaght	11.2	3.5	19.3	17.9	42.4	20.4
Mulhuddart	11.4	8.8	19.1	16.6	33.3	31.1
Balbriggan	9.5	6.8	28.6	14.6	36.4	20.5
Blanchardstown	8.5	8.6	31	13.5	34.3	21.1

Sources: CSO, 2012a; Rate My Area, 2012.

Table VII.3b: Socio-Economic Status of Poles' and Nigerians' Communities (Education and Employment) (in %)

Community	Education		Employment		
	Vocational	Tertiary	Commerce /trade	Construction	Other
Average	*9*	*6.9*	*29.1*	*10.2*	*17.4*
City Center N	11	14	32.1	7.2	37.8
Fairview	11.1	11.9	37.2`	7.4	22.7
Cabra	8.2	7.8	33.6	7.1	19.4
Drumcondra	7.4	13.4	33.5	6.1	19.3
Tallaght	11.2	3.5	34	10.7	20.2
Mulhuddart	11.4	8.8	37	6.8	21.8
Balbriggan	9.5	6.8	34.2	9.5	18.1
Blanchardstown	8.5	8.6	35.1	8	16.7

Sources: CSO, 2012a; Rate My Area, 2012.

As one moves from to the level of analysis of the neighborhood to that of the individual household, Polish workers appear to be more isolated than Nigerian immigrants. In 2006, only 9% of Eastern Europeans lived with Irish citizens and another 9% resided with other immigrant nationalities (CSO, 2008). The remainder lived with their compatriots. More than half of Polish respondents here report cohabiting with other Polish people. However, these were most commonly their Polish partners and children, or other family members. What is more, interviews reported "mixing" with the Irish in terms of housing. Indeed, 15% live with an Irish or Western European partner or spouse and 27% suggest that they prefer living with roommates who are Irish or from other immigrant nationalities. Younger Poles with good English language skills are much more likely to live with other nationalities and the Irish.

Alternatively, Nigerians appear to live mostly in private households with Irish nationals, attesting to an assimilation rate much higher than that for Polish nationals. However, the majority of these Irish nationals are in fact the Irish-born children of Nigerian parents. If Irish-born children are discounted, the rate of residential segregation is similar for the two groups (CSO, 2008).

Furthermore, the specific accommodations of Nigerian immigrants in Dublin are low in quality and less safe than those of Polish nationals. Among ICI respondents, one in five Nigerians rated their residence as "poor" or "very poor," whereas 70% of Eastern European immigrants characterized their accommodation as "good." In fact, all East European respondents in the ICI study reported living in at least satisfactory accommodations (ICI, 2008, p. 127).

Among the four national groups studied by the ICI, East Europeans were also the community with the largest number of people who felt safe where they lived (ICI, 2008, p. 127). Because they actively seek a community with other Nigerian residents, a large number of Nigerian residents also felt safe in their neighborhoods and reported being able to raise their children there. Nonetheless, a majority of the ICI's Nigerian respondents also suggested they would never feel completely safe due to their racial difference from the Irish. Especially those living in the north inner city reported being pelted with eggs and stones by young Irish hooligans (ICI, 2008, pp. 129-130). Nigerians were two and a half times more likely to be harassed by their neighbors than Eastern Europeans according to a 2006 report (McGinnity et al., 2006).

In sum, Polish workers in Dublin have better access to housing than Nigerians immigrants. Few Polish nationals in Dublin own their accommodations, yet the rates of home ownership among the East Europeans are on the rise and access to rental accommodations is unlimited. On the other hand, Nigerians experience severe discrimination in terms of access to rental housing. Polish nationals also tend to live with their compatriots in higher rates than Nigerians. However, when Irish-born Nigerian children are discounted, intermixing with the Irish is comparable for both populations. Both foreign groups cluster in neighborhoods that are immigrant-heavy and of lower socio-economic class than the national average. However, the Polish are more spread out throughout Dublin. The multicultural neighborhoods preferred by Nigerians are also the ones with most racial tensions and high crime rates. Nigerians' communities are also more likely to be of unskilled or semi-skilled social class, while Poles' areas are more likely to have more numerous residents belonging to the professional or managerial social

classes. As a result, Nigerians feel somewhat unsafe in their neighborhoods, while Polish citizens are very satisfied with their residences. Consequently, the East Europeans are assigned a value of 3 and the African immigrants a 2 for this indicator of social incorporation (**Table VII.1**).

VII.3.2. Access to Housing in Madrid

Much like in the case of Dublin, immigrants have limited access to housing compared to natives in Madrid, leading one team of researchers to talk of the creation of "new ghettos" in Spain (Moraga, Ferrer, & Saiz, 2013). However, Ecuadorians' living conditions are more favorable than these of Bulgarians. The South Americans are more likely to own their residence, live in integrated or higher income neighborhoods, be closer to jobs, and have better access to the rental market than the East Europeans. Individual Balkan workers reside in cramped conditions and unmaintained housing tenements, due to economic isolation, lack of local knowledge, deficient language skills, and prejudice (García-Almirall & Valdivia, 2011).

Housing is relatively open to immigrants in Spain as compared to foreigners in other Western European receivers. Spain's metropolitan areas are considered less segregated than these in other major European cities (Bosch et al., 2011; García-Almirall & Valdivia, 2011). There is little governmental intervention in the housing market, with public housing in the country accounting for only 2% of the total. The private mortgage and housing economic sectors promote homeownership even among new arrivals (Vono-de-Vilhena & Bayona-Carrasco, 2012). As a result, more than one third of immigrants owned a home in Spain in 2007. With generous loans from a number of Spanish banks

granted regardless of nationality, foreigners borrowed extensively and purchased a large share of homes in 2007 (Amuedo-Dorantes & Mundra, 2012).

Differences between ethnic groups are still significant. Vono-de-Vilhena and Bayona-Carrasco (2012) find that Ecuadorians are the fastest group to transition to home ownership in Spain. Eastern Europeans are much slower to buy an accommodation in the receiving country. Almost half of this project's Ecuadorian interviewees own their accommodations or live with their homeowner family members. The rest transitioned from sharing apartments with acquaintances to living in smaller residences with partners or family. In comparison, only one in ten of Bulgarian participants own their accommodations in Madrid, with the rest living in rented tenements. Given the strong "'culture' of home ownership" in the receiving context, home ownership among immigrants signals not only socio-economic stability but also the ability to fit in with the native community (Vono-de-Vilhena & Bayona-Carrasco, 2012).[340]

The Spanish rental market also privileges similar and thus trustworthy Latin American immigrants. Ecuadorian respondents report unlimited access to rental accommodations. As one interviewee put it, "It is very easy [to find housing], when you speak the language, it is very easy" (Kris, 39).[341] As another shared, "It is not difficult [finding housing] but what happens is that you have to have the money" (Yana, 20).[342] Indeed, none of the South Americans believe they were denied an apartment on the basis of their nationality or ethnicity. The Latin Americans are also treated with trust by their

[340] As Vono-de-Vilhena and Bayona-Carrasco (2012) report, 85% of Spaniards own their accommodations due to the culture of homeownership promoted by the state in the 1950s and 1960s. Even younger natives strive to buy homes as a symbol of stability and a prerequisite for strong family relationships.
[341] Author's translation from original quote in Spanish: "Esto es muy fácil, como hablas el idioma, es muy fácil."
[342] Author's translation from original quote in Spanish: "No es difícil pero lo que pasa es que tienes que tener dinero."

Spanish landlords. Like in the case of the Polish in Dublin, the only issues with rental housing are subpar accommodations to begin with, rather than negligent treatment by owners. In fact, most find their landlords "very cordial" and ready to fix a broken washing machine without "messing" into the tenants' everyday existence (Lina, 30).[343]

On the other hand, Bulgarians are more likely to experience discrimination in the Spanish rental market. As Bosch et al. (2011) find, "property owners use the informational content of names to differentially treat immigrants," a bias that does not disappear when immigrants' socio-economic status is revealed (Bosch et al., 2011). As a trade union representative confirms, "immigrants have more difficulties in accessing a residence," since the local "population has been less receptive" and believes "an immigrant worker … will break or deteriorate [the apartment]" (M23-TU).[344]

Individual mistrust and prejudice, lack of culturally specific or linguistic knowledge, as well as poverty, severely limit access to rental housing among Balkan interviewees (García-Almirall & Valdivia, 2011). Madrilenian landlords remain suspicious of the different East Europeans. As one respondent suggested, apartments are rented to Bulgarians only upon a recommendation from a Spanish employer or acquaintance. As another summarized, "if you have no secured housing, you cannot find one. When they see you cannot speak the language, they don't trust you. That's why Latino Americans have no problems, because they are in their own land" (Yana, 50).[345]

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[343] Author's translation from original quote in Spanish: "La verdad es que la relación es muy cordial. No le veo nunca. Siempre que le llamo es porque se me ha estropeado la lavadora o porque… Nadie se metía con nadie."

[344] Author's translation from original quote in Spanish: "Tiene más dificultades para acceder a una vivienda… Hay muchos propietarios que son reacios a alquilar una vivienda a un trabajador inmigrante porque creen que su piso se lo van a estropear, o se lo van a deteriorar.

[345] Author's translation from original quote in Bulgarian: "Ако нямаш намерена квартира не можеш да си намериш. Но по принцип нямаш големи възможности сам да си търсиш квартира, заради езика,

Exclusion from rental accommodations pushed one tenth of respondents to homelessness, with one person sleeping in the foyer of a bank during cold times, for instance. Two in ten were forced to live in monastery hostels, like the Auberge San Juan, where conditions were similar to these in asylum seeker hostels in Dublin (Chris, 34). Limited access to Spanish-owned accommodations also forced the interviewees in the hands of predatory Bulgarian landlords who abuse their newly arrived conationals by overcharging them, placing them in inhumane living conditions, or expelling them without notice (Gina, 33).

"Cultural difference, in terms of mentality, in many things" also sours relationships between Bulgarians and their landlords, like in the case of Nigerians in Dublin (Kevin, 33). Six in ten of this project's interviewees consider their relationship with Spanish or Bulgarian landlords "bad." "Bad, dirty apartments" (*лоши мръсни апартаменти*), "unhygienic conditions" (*нехигиенични услония*) or refusal to fix broken amenities are some examples of unfavorable treatment (Tonya, 45, Trini, 31).[346]

While Ecuadorians have much better access to both homeownership and the Spanish rental market than Bulgarians, both cohorts cluster in Madrid's "new ghettos" (Moraga et al., 2013). However, the South Americans are less segregated from the native population than the Balkan workers and live closer to jobs and amenities. A majority of Ecuadorians inhabit Madrid City, with fewer spreading to nearby towns like Valdemoro, San Sebastian de los Reyes, Paracuellos, or Algete to the North of the city. Within Madrid, Ecuadorians predominate in numerous districts and neighborhoods, with a majority focusing in Villaverde, La Latina, Carabanchel, Puente de Vallecas, Moratalaz,

ако не го знаеш. Като те видят, че не можеш да говориш, не могат да ти имат доверие. Затова латиномериканците тука нямат проблеми, защото те са на собствена земя."

[346] Paragraph contains author's translation from original quote in Bulgarian, including: "Проблеми в смисъл, че има културна разлика, в мисленето разлика, в много неща." (Kevin, 33).

Chamberí, Tetuan, and Arganzuela (Bosch et al, 2011; Comunidad de Madrid, 2012a; M18-AMIN; M32-ADMIN). Among this dissertation's interviewees, one third live in Puente de Vallecas, one third in higher-value areas like Argüelles, and one third – outside of the city proper.

Bulgarians share some neighborhoods with their Latin American counterparts and also favor Puente de Vallecas, Carabanchel or La Latina to "chase after jobs" (*защото всичко е в зависимост от работата*) (M8-BO). They further cluster in the Barajas airport area and in the city center (Comunidad de Madrid, 2012a). Unlike the South Americans, however, the "reserved" and "individualistic" East Europeans are more "spread out" (*разпръснати*) as they try to avoid compatriots who have abused their trust in the past (M1-BO; M2-BO; M3-BO).[347] Many Bulgarians choose to live in the belt of Madrid and in farther away communities to the East or South, such as Getafe, Alcalá de Henares, Coslada, Móstoles, Parla or Villalba (Blázquez et al., 2010; M1-BO; M2-BO; M3-BO; M25-TU; M34-TU). Interestingly, there tends to be segregation among Bulagrians according to city of origin, with residents of Shumen focusing in Getafe and these from Pleven in Villalba (M5-BO; M6-BO). Among respondents, one quarter resided in Puente de Vallecas at the time of their interview, one in ten in the city center, and six in ten in the outer belts of the city in Getafe, Fuenlabrada, Móstoles or Parla.

There are no consistent ratings of these areas, as in the Irish case. Nonetheless, it is safe to conclude that the neighborhoods where Ecuadorians and Bulgarians live are characterized by high concentrations of immigrants. While both cohorts are somewhat segregated from natives, the South Americans fare slightly better. For instance, eight in

[347] Paragraph contains author's translation from original quote in Bulgarian, including: "Едното е, че ние сме резервирани, а другото е, че сме индивидуалисти" (M2-BO).

ten Ecuadorians live in Madrid proper, where 15.5% of the population is foreign-born (Blázquez et al., 2010). The towns of Valdemoro and San Sebastian de los Reyes preferred by the Latin Americans host even lower percentages of immigrants. On the other hand, the new suburbs where Bulgarians focus have among the highest concentrations of immigrants in the Madrid region (Comunidad de Madrid, 2012a). When one focuses on the particular neighborhoods and districts within the city where Ecuadorians concentrate, the average percentage of immigrant inhabitants stands at 21.4% compared to 22.2% for the areas favored by Bulgarians (Bosch et al., 2011) (**Table VII. 4**). Ballester and Vorsatz (2014) confirm Ecuadorians' relatively lower levels of residential segregation. According to the authors, while the South Americans are less than six times more likely to be surrounded by their compatriots than by Spaniards, Bulgarians are eight times more likely to live among their conationals.

While data on the socio-economic profiles of the neighborhoods preferred by Ecuadorians and Bulgarians is unavailable, a study by Blázquez (2010) suggests that residential patterns privilege the Latin Americans by locating them closer to jobs and amenities. All immigrants collectives spend a substantial amount of time commuting from their homes to their places of employment in the construction, hotels, restaurants, retail, or domestic care close to the Madrid city center. However, Eastern European nationals are more likely to experience higher commuting times than other foreign cohorts, with Ecuadorians' commute comparable to that of Spaniards. As longer commuting times for the Balkan workers are not suggested to correlate with better socio-economic profiles of preferred residential areas, they actually imply a worse quality of

life and a larger spatial mismatch for Bulgarians in Madrid.[348] Echazarra (2010) further finds that spatial dependence, or being "stuck" within certain often underprivileged residential areas, is higher among nationals of the New Member States (with 0.3) than for South American citizens in Madrid (with 0.2). Finally, Ecuadorians are the largest foreign nationality in the richest districts of Madrid that have the lowest percentages of immigrants, namely Retiro and Salamanca (Ayuntamiento de Madrid, 2010). Consequently, Bulgarians' residential patterns are more likely to limit job opportunities and quality of life than these of Ecuadorians.

Table VII.4. Foreign-born as a Percentage of the Population in Ecuadorians' and Bulgarians' Preferred Communities (in %)

Community	Ecuadorians	Bulgarians
Tetuán	25.4	-
Barajas	-	15.4
Chamberí	18.3	-
Centro	-	31.4
Moratalaz	13.2	
Latina	21.2	21.2
Carabanchel	25.2	-
Arganzuela	19.1	-
Puente da Vallecas	20.9	20.9
Vilaverde	25.3	-
Madrid City Average	21.4	22.2
Móstoles	-	14.3
Alcalá de Henares	-	21.5
Fuenlabrada	-	15.4
Getafe	-	16.5
Parla	-	26.5
Coslada	-	24.5
S. Sebastian de los Reyes	13.9	-
Valdemoro	14.8	-
Villalba	-	22.7
Average	19.9	20.9

Sources: Bosch et al., 2011; Comunidad de Madrid, 2012a.

[348] Spatial mismatch refers to the mismatch between areas of residence of low-income individuals and families and the location of suitable job opportunities. It implies limited economic opportunity, as high commuting costs might prevent potential workers from securing far-away employment (Blázquez et al., 2010).

South American individuals and households also enjoy better living conditions that Balkan workers in Madrid. Bulgarians and other East European migrants are cramped together in small living spaces and share residences with numerous other tenants, mostly their compatriots. While the average living space per person is 22.2 square meters according to the 2007 National Immigrant Survey, Eastern Europeans in Spain live only in 7.9 square meters on average (INE, 2009, p. 51). A majority of this project's Bulgarian respondents find their living quarters to be "bad" (*лоши*), "unhygienic" (*нехигиенични*), and even "horrible" (*ужасни*) (Tangra, 36; Trini, 31).[349] Many report being cramped with "15 other people" or having to share with numerous other families to defray costs (Connor, 44).

Latin Americans inhabit somewhat more favorable quarters than the Balkan migrants. Each person from South America was found to live on 18.9 square meters, a figure closer to the average and more than double that for Eastern Europeans. Apartment size among Ecuadorians also approximates the average figure and is 2.5 times larger than that for Bulgarians, despite a similar household size of around three persons (INE, 2009, p. 51). While many of the Ecuadorians respondents in this thesis used to live in cramped apartments with other male immigrants upon arrival in Spain, most are currently residing with immediate family in favorable quarters. Unsurprisingly, a majority are satisfied with their living conditions, unlike Bulgarians.

In sum, Ecuadorians have better access to housing than Bulgarians in Madrid. Housing in Spain is relatively favorable, with few low-quality public tenements, high incentives for home-ownership among immigrants, ample areas with affordable housing in the belt of Madrid, and lesser segregation between foreigners and natives. Nonetheless,

[349] Author's translation from original quote in Bulgarian.

Latin Americans are more likely than Eastern Europeans to own their homes. Their language skills and cultural proximity open up access to the Spanish rental market, and correlate with good relationships with landlords, more spacious and higher-quality living quarters, and higher levels of satisfaction. On the other hand, Bulgarians' lack of context-specific knowledge and difference from their hosts engenders mistrust and limits access to decent accommodations. The Balkan workers tend to be cramped in relatively run-down tenements with exploitative landlords, and even live on the streets or in monastery hostels until they can get the trust of Spanish owners. While both groups live in neighborhoods with high concentrations of migrants, Ecuadorians are more likely to intermix with their hosts and be located closer to jobs or resources. Bulgarians are "stuck" farther away from job opportunities or amenities, thus perpetuating perceptions of isolation among the native population. Consequently, Ecuadorians are assigned a 4 for this indicator of social incorporation, while Bulgarians only merit a 2 (**Table VII.1**).

VII.4. Access to Education

VII.4.1. Access to Education in Dublin

Fewer Poles than Nigerians are engaged in education in Ireland or have children in the Irish educational system. Still, enrollment is on the rise, as both Nigerians and Poles consider the system one of the least biased spheres of life in Ireland and an essential step toward integration. Polish adults experience few barriers in accessing third-level Irish education due to their EU status and physical similarity to the Irish, yet even Nigerian adults are satisfied with education in Dublin. Representatives of both groups often remain in the host country due to the contentment of their children with the Irish

primary and secondary educational system. Still, Polish and Nigerian children resemble other “newcomer” pupils and cluster in less desirable schools with other immigrant children. Budget cuts to language resources in the education system limit Polish students.

Fewer Polish nationals are in education in Ireland than are Nigerians. While one third of the ICI’s Nigerian respondents were enrolled in education, mostly in third-level colleges, only about one in ten Eastern Europeans were in the Irish educational system (ICI, 2008, p. 101). In 2006, only 2% of Polish workers in the Ireland reported being in education, compared to 16% of Nigerians (CSO, 2008). The number of Polish nationals in Irish higher education in fact dropped from 539 in 2006-2007 to 512 in 2009-2010. On the other hand, the number of Nigerian students increased from 482 to 618 in the same years (Education Ireland, 2010).

Most of this project’s Nigerian respondents attended an educational institution in Dublin in the past or were studying at the time of their interviews. Half pursued a college degree in Dublin in areas as diverse as psychology, political science and economics. Half are or were enrolled in Master’s programs or Ph.D. degrees in areas like globalization studies, media communications management, or sociology, mostly in Dublin City University. Such high enrollment rates reflect Nigerian immigrants’ recognition of the significance of educational achievement for integration in Ireland. As one respondent put it, “if you study within this environment, you adapt” (Frank, 34). The respondents in the ICI study shared a similar sentiment and suggested that only through education in Ireland can one “integrate into the system” (ICI, 2008, p.101).

Nonetheless, the number of Polish pupils in Ireland is rising. In fact, “Polish” is the twelfth most numerous nationality of foreign students in Ireland, just behind

“Nigerian” (Education Ireland, 2010). Further, Polish community representatives report a “baby boom” of Polish newborn children in Ireland. In 2010, there were 3,500 Polish children born in Ireland and 6,500 new passports issued to Polish infants and children from Dublin (Pás, 2010). Therefore, the Polish population to be involved in the Irish education system is growing rapidly. One quarter of this dissertation’s interviewees had been engaged in an educational program in Ireland at least at one time. More than one in ten had children participating in the Irish educational system.

Polish workers face fewer barriers in accessing higher education than Nigerian immigrants. Due to their European Union status, the Polish in Ireland qualify for free college education and significantly lower fees than those paid by third-country nationals. On the other hand, Nigerian nationals find their access to higher education in Dublin discriminatory in view of prohibitive costs. **Table VII.5** gives a glimpse of the difference in educational fees (Smyth et al., 2009). While Nigerian immigrants can qualify to pay the lower EU fees, the requirements of being employed and paying taxes for three of the last five years exclude many of the Africans (Citizens Information, 2012).

Table VII.5. Higher Education Fees for Selected Universities in Dublin, 2007-2008 (in €)

Degree type	**UCD**		**Trinity**		**UCC**	
	EU	**Non-EU**	**EU**	**Non-EU**	**EU**	**Non-EU**
Undergraduate arts degree	0	14,850	0	14,516	0	11,800
Undergraduate science degree	0	20,000	0	19,020	0	17,000
Undergraduate medicine degree	0	27,000	0	27,000	0	27,000
Master of Arts	4,800	9,600	4,244	10,844	4,340	11,620
Master of Science	6,930	13,860	5,038	12,911	4,340	11,620
Ph.D.	5,000	10,000	4,244	10,844	5,155	10,310

Source: Reproduced from ICI, 2008, p. 102.

Polish immigrants also rarely experience issues with the recognition of previous qualifications, unless they are in country-specific fields like law. In these cases, they can still obtain recognition more easily than non-EU immigrants after a short recertification process. On the other hand, degrees from third countries are rarely recognized due to the lack of national guidelines for educational institutions. Many Nigerians have to repeat certain educational degrees and incur even higher costs in order to practice their profession in Dublin (D13-P; ICI, 2008, pp. 102-103). African respondents cite cost as the biggest obstacle to attaining education and integration in Ireland.

Further, the Polish do not require a student visa when accessing tertiary education in Dublin, while Nigerians do. Nigerian migrants not only find the cost high, but are also plagued by the numerous limitations of student status, such as the permission to only work twenty hours a week (Citizens Information, 2012; Irish Naturalisation and Immigration Service [INIS], 2011). EU citizens also have full access to training and retraining courses by the Irish employment agency, FÁS, and the European employment agency, EPIC. While participation rates disaggregated by nationality are not available, FÁS representatives share that with economic recession, large numbers of Poles are taking advantage of retraining and language courses (D16-ADMIN; D17-ADMIN; OMI, 2011b). On the other hand, non-EU nationals like Nigerians require long-term residency to access training and educational resources and are thus limited in their vocational and educational opportunities (D8-ADMIN).

Finally, fewer Polish than Nigerian respondents experience discrimination in higher education in Ireland. In 2006, only 2% of East Europeans reported harassment based on national origin in schools or universities (McGinnity et al., 2006) (**Table VII.6**).

All of this project's Polish interviewees are satisfied with their academic careers in Dublin and report ample attention from Irish instructors and a "very positive" experience (Howard, 28). Education contributes to "self-confidence" and more opportunities for Poles who excel in their studies (Devon, 33; Elizabeth, 36; Jennifer, 29; Kevin, 27; Lara, 32; Miriam, 24). The opportunities for free higher education in Ireland far exceeded those in Poland and were dubbed "amazing" (Rick, 45).

Table VII.6. Harassment in School/University Based on Ethnic Origin, 2006 (in %)

	Black African	**White African**	**North African**	**Asian**	**East European**	**Total**
Never	47.6%	57.9%	67.3%	78.4%	75.9%	68.4%
1-2 times	5.9%	2.6%	0%	3.2%	1.6%	3.3%
3-4 times	1.9%	-	-	0.5%	-	0.7%
>5 times	4.5%	2.6%	1.8%	1.0%	0.4%	1.9%
N/A	40.1%	36.8%	30.9%	17.0%	22.1%	25.8%

Source: McGinnity et al., 2006.

On the other hand, discrimination in higher education is pronounced against physically-identifiable foreigners like Nigerians. Harassment based on ethnic origin occurred among 12.3% of Black Africans in 2006, a percentage much higher than that for any other national group in Ireland (**Table VII.6**). Discrimination is reported by all African interviewees in this thesis. Incidents range from less attention by instructors to stereotyping by classmates to administrative neglect. Still, most of respondents recognize the educational field as the least biased space in Dublin.

While both Polish and Nigerian adults are relatively satisfied with education in Dublin, all immigrant children are disadvantaged in their access to primary and secondary schooling. Both ethnic populations are clustered in less desirable schools in Dublin, mostly due to the residence patterns (D25-J). In a study with twelve primary and

secondary schools in Ireland, Smyth et al. (2009) found that immigrant children make up 6% of the total student population. According to the study, primary schools that are urban and designated as “disadvantaged” have a higher proportion of “newcomer children,” or the children of immigrants entering the school system by September 2007. Primary schools with a large percentage of immigrant children also tend to have greater difficulties in areas, such as behavioral problems, literacy, or learning disabilities. As these schools contain a higher percentage of disadvantaged Traveller children, the institutions have fewer resources to address cultural, ethnic or national diversity. Resource shortage affects both Polish and Nigerian pupils (Smyth et al., 2009).

Admission policies further limit immigrant children’s access to good educational institutions. In the most desirable and oversubscribed schools advantage is given to pupils whose family members have attended the school. Immigrant children whose parents are recent arrivals are less likely to be admitted. Polish children are better off than Nigerian children, however, as admissions policies in oversubscribed schools give priority to children with the same religious affiliation as the school’s patron. More Polish children are likely to match desirable schools’ religious affiliation, as 90% of Poles in Ireland identify as Roman Catholic, compared to 26% of Nigerians (CSO, 2012a; Smyth et al., 2009, p. 53).

Clustering does not translate into much lower educational achievement among immigrant children. Still, the lack of English proficiency affects reading and math scores. Therefore, Polish pupils with no English language skills perform worse than English-speaking Nigerian students on standard tests. While English-speaking migrant children fall only 2-6 points behind Irish children in reading and math scores, non-English

speaking pupils fall behind by as many as 59 and 34 points respectively (Perkins, Moran, Cosgrove, & Shie, 2011). Despite the language barrier, Polish pupils immigrant children are reported to be highly motivated and to outperform their Irish peers (D25-J). Curry et al. (2010) find that all immigrant children perform well in school as they tend to be more diligent and respectful of their teachers than their Irish peers.

Polish school children and their parents are satisfied with the Irish school system. According to Curry et al. (2010), Polish and other Eastern European pupils value highly the English language instruction they are provided and appreciate the kindness and attention of Irish teachers. All of this project's respondents with school children in Ireland report a very positive experience. In fact, parents find the system to be better than the one in Poland. They rate teachers' efforts to accommodate all foreign children as "excellent" and even suggest that they are willing to stay in Ireland because their children are immersed in their new superior schools (Pás, 2010). Satisfaction is also high among Nigerian respondents and their children.

Both immigrant groups are satisfied with the education their children receive in Ireland, because bullying is less common than in other social spheres. Polish students are especially capable of overcoming discriminatory treatment by their peers. Curry et al. (2010) find that Eastern European students make Irish friends at school quicker than African respondents. While they are equally confused and offended at the culture of "slagging" in Irish schools as their Nigerian peers, Eastern Europeans are less likely to clash with Irish students on issues like religious affiliation. As Irish officials put it, "Polish and the other nations from the European Union do not have nearly as many problems as somebody African" (D13-P).

However, some discrimination persists, as Irish students project their parents' prejudice onto their foreign peers (D7-TU). Discrimination and bullying are more common against African students. Most primary and second-level schools have an anti-bullying policy in place with a strong focus on respect for all students. However, such policies deal with racial harassment explicitly only in 56% of second-level schools and 40% of primary schools. As a result, racially-different children often interact only among each other in school to avoid bullying. As few would report bullying incidents, the relatively low incidence of bullying on the basis of race is misleading (Smyth et al., 2009, pp. 113-114). Indeed, in a survey conducted by the Teacher's Union of Ireland in 2010, 46% of teachers reported witnessing racism in the classroom (European Network against Racism Ireland [ENAR], 2011; Teachers' Union of Ireland [TUI], 2010).

In sum, both Polish and Nigerian immigrants in Dublin have relatively open access to the Irish educational system, but racial prejudice disadvantages African students. While Polish nationals rarely come to Dublin to study, the number of Polish students in all levels of the Irish educational system is on the rise. Poles and other EU nationals pay fees for higher education comparable to those for Irish citizens and rarely face bullying or harassment at school. They are eligible for multiple training and language resources and have an easier time transferring credits or recertifying degrees from abroad. On the other hand, Nigerians might have migrated to Ireland to study, yet face high educational fees, difficulties in degree recognition from the home country, and lack of eligibility for some educational programs. All immigrant children cluster in Dublin's less desirable primary and secondary schools, moreover. Polish pupils appears more disadvantaged than their Nigerian peers, as the language barrier results in lower

math and reading scores among them. However, as they are deferential to their teachers, Polish pupils are likely to make up for any differences in educational achievement. Further, they are more likely than Nigerian pupils to overcome prejudice and make friends with Irish students. Indeed, racial discrimination is the most significant issue affecting African students in all levels of the Irish educational system. Both groups are assigned a 4 for this component of social incorporation (**Table VII.1**).

VII.4.2. Access to Education in Madrid

Bulgarians are less likely to engage in the Spanish educational system than Ecuadorians, with few adults from either cohort returning to education in the host country. Still, Bulgarian adults experience larger barriers to entry in the system, in view of linguistic differences and the surprisingly difficult process of degree recognition. Bulgarians in Madrid are not satisfied with the Spanish educational system, which is difficult to adapt to for non-Spanish speaking children, is unambitious or isolating for immigrant families with little disposable income, and does not instill appreciation for the value of education. On the other hand, Latin American parents consider access to education in Spain open and quality satisfactory, yet their children underperform despite numerous special provisions and resources.

Education in Spain is mostly public and free and is compulsory between the ages of 6 and 16 (Zynovieva et al., 2014). The three main phases of education include basic schooling (including voluntary preschool, primary school and lower secondary education (ESO), upper secondary school, and tertiary education (Comunidad de Madrid, 2012b). Most students are assigned to publically-funded institutions based on residential criteria.

Few select private schools or the so-called *colegios concentrados* (private institutions with public funding). At age sixteen, and if they have successfully graduated from lower secondary school, students can elect to complete a two-year general baccalaureate or enroll in specific vocational training to prepare them for practical employment. Graduates of the baccalaureate are awarded a bachelor's diploma (*Titulo de Bachiller*) entitling them to continue with a tertiary degree (a Master's or a Ph.D.) or one- or two-year advanced technical training. University education is particularly hard to access and depends on a national entrance exam (Eurydice, 2015; Teese et al., 2006)

In view of administrative hurdles, few foreign adults engage in education in Spain. In fact, only 2.2% of immigrants nationally and 2.8% of the foreign-born in Madrid are enrolled in a program of study. Adult East Europeans are even less likely to pursue education than Latin Americans. These trends do not reflect lack of resources in the receiving context. Indeed, Madrid boasts a number of educational centers for adults (CEPAs), as well as three municipal schools, one state university, twenty-five institutions of secondary education, and twenty-five private institutions that cater to the needs of adult immigrants (Comunidad de Madrid, 2012b).

As most of the foreign-born are in Madrid to work, few are interested in acquiring extra qualifications through tertiary education. The ones enrolled either fill gaps in secondary schooling or engage in language study. Two in ten of this project's Ecuadorian respondents engaged in studies past the obligatory basic and lower secondary education in Spain. They focused on vocational training in floristry or hairdressing, for instance, to expand job opportunities and continue their educational trajectory from the home country. On the other hand, a majority of Bulgarian respondents, aspiring to fit in with

their Spanish hosts, concentrated on language courses (M1-BO; M5-BO; M7-BO). As an exception to the rule, one in ten of the East Europeans enrolled in other types of adult education in Madrid and look to attain tertiary degrees in law, math, or dentistry.

The two cohorts' distinct educational paths reflect higher aspirations but also more substantial barriers for the Balkan migrants. Latin American participants report "no problems" (*ningún problema*) with transferring qualifications, acquiring knowledge, or interacting with classmates and instructors in their course of study (Yana, 20). Bulgarian respondents find it hard to navigate the Spanish educational system. Linguistic differences are hard to surmount for the East Europeans, with no bilingual or translation resources offered to the non-Spanish speaking migrants. Even these who have undergone a substantial course of Spanish study at home find delving into advanced subjects in Spanish extremely difficult. One Bulgarian representative talked of the "aging tertiary educational system [in Spain] which definitely does not predispose to …integration … and thus represents a major hindrance" to adult immigrants (M5-BO). Lack of language resources made one Eastern European turn to technical employment in the medical field as opposed to the study of medicine (Nina, 57). Another respondent was admitted to Juan Carlos University in Madrid, yet shared that because he "did not know enough Spanish, [he] could not successfully maneuver the university environment" (Sylvester, 29).[350] This obstacle does not exist for similar South Americans.

Surprisingly, European Union status does not lead to an easy transfer of previous educational degrees for the Balkan newcomers, unlike in the case of the Polish in Dublin.

[350] Paragraph contains author's translation from original quote in Spanish and Bulgarian, including: "Тук е доста поостаряла образователната система във висшето образование и определено не предразполага или поне не толкова силно и не толкова изострено интеграцията и от тази гледна точка, това е едно спъване по пътя" (M5-BO), "Защото аз не знаех испански достатъчно, за да мога да устоя на маневрите, които се изискват в университетските среди" (Sylvester, 29).

The few Bulgarian respondents who attempted to translate high school courses from the country and pursue a college or a Master's degree in Spain all experienced difficulties. The procedure was lengthy and took close to twelve months. Significant retraining within the Spanish system renders the process costly and even impossible for these not fluent in Spanish. In one case, a high school diploma from Bulgaria was "thrown out after deliberation," as "the Bulgarian and Spanish systems do not correspond."[351] The Bulgarian participant had to abandon advanced knowledge of math from Bulgaria and regress back to the Spanish general educational system (Shay, 56). The transfer of degrees is easier for Ecuadorian migrants, whose educational system and linguistic skills make them better suited to participate in Spanish education (Sanromá et al., 2009).

Unlike in the Irish case, individual discrimination plays a lesser role in restricting access to adult education in Spain. A report by the Madrid municipal government suggests that while 16.1% of immigrants in the city experience discrimination in the school system, numbers higher than these even for different Nigerians in Dublin, a comparable 15.3% of natives report discrimination in education as well (Ayuntamiento de Madrid, 2010). While nationality is not necessarily the source of exclusion from education in the receiving city, some Bulgarian institutions suggest that Bulgarians'influx into the educational system has produced resentment among Spaniards (M2-BO).

As in the Dublin case, immigrant children in Madrid are disadvantaged in their access to compulsory education and their choice of upper secondary education, despite the efforts of Spanish administrators. They perform significantly worse on standardized

[351] Author's translation from original quote in Bulgarian:"Около 1000 евро хвърлихме да преведем всичко, занесохме ги в Министерството, разгледаха ги и ни казаха, че не отговаря нашата образователна система на тяхната и не може да продължи да учи изобщо по тази специалност."

tests, tend to cluster in public schools, and are more likely to take on vocational training rather than a baccalaureate. Non-Spanish speaking Bulgarian children with qualified parents yet fewer educational opportunities are more likely to feel deprived than their Ecuadorian peers.

The number of foreign-born children in the Spanish educational system is growing rapidly at all levels of schooling and in all types of educational institutions. Only 114,523 in 1997-1998, immigrant children counted 875,091 in 2006-2007. Most foreign pupils in the receiving context come from South America. Latin American children are more than 50% of Madrid's immigrant students, with Eastern European children - 16.2%. Ecuadorian pupils are the most numerous in the city with 31,258 children, compared to 2,782 of Bulgarian pupils in Madrid's schools. Still, both collectives are among the ten largest in the host community, with Bulgarian students growing rapidly since 2007 (Comunidad de Madrid, 2012b; Maiztegui-Oñate & Santibáñez-Gruber, 2010).

Local, regional, and national governments made the education of immigrant students a policy priority and have adopted multiple changes to accommodate the increasingly diverse student body in Spain (M20-ADMIN; M33-ADMIN; Ruiza, 2011). In 2005-2008, the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs allocated 120 million euros to immigrant integration, 40% of which was dedicated to education (Teese et al., 2006, p. 20). Madrid, Catalonia, and Andalusia developed temporary reception classrooms, where immigrant children receive additional linguistic, social, psychological and educational support before they can transition to regular school activities. Spanish schools also hold introductory information sessions for immigrant parents to explain the educational system. Additional teaching resources and special social support services are eligible

within mainstream classrooms (Comunidad de Madrid, 2012b; Eurydice, 2004; Teese et al., 2006). Further, professional development programs are offered to teachers so that they can better cater to their diverse pupils. The emphasis is on intercultural materials and curricula (Eurydice, 2004; Teese et al., 2006).

Regardless of these efforts, foreign students in Spain remain disadvantaged. Most are concentrated in primary education, with few continuing beyond compulsory schooling. To demonstrate, 45% of all foreign pupils were in primary education and 28.5% in secondary education. Immigrant children in the favorable baccalaureate upper educational track are only 0.4% of the total compared to 4.3% in the somewhat limiting vocational track. Only 23% of immigrant students express ambition to go to university or are confident they will be able to attend higher educational institutions (Maiztegui-Oñate & Santibáñez-Gruber, 2010). What is more, foreign pupils are almost exclusively concentrated in public schools, with few able to afford paid *colegios concetrados* or private institutions. Only one quarter of foreign students in Madrid were enrolled in private or semi-private primary schools in 2004-2007 (Comunidad de Madrid, 2012b). Eight in ten foreign students attended a public institution at any level of schooling in 2008 compared to only six in ten natives (Zynovieva et al., 2014). The tendency of Spaniards to place their children in private education lead some Spanish administrators to talk of the "ghettoization of public schools" (M19-ADMIN). As native students flee public schooling, resources are stretched thin to accommodate an increasingly intercultural, immigrant-heavy, and economically disadvantaged student body.

Concentration in less desirable schools translates into lower educational achievement among immigrant children. Foreign pupils score more than 50 points lower

than their Spanish counterparts on standardized tests in math, reading, and sciences. Socio-economic status has something to do with it, with the difference reduced to 36 points for the math component when parents' educational and economic background is taken into account. However, type of school, immigrants' concentration in school, parental involvement in education, and language matter too (Zynovieva et al., 2014).

While Ecuadoran and Bulgarian children hold the above obstacles in common, the East Europeans experience further challenges than the South Americans. It is telling that only 64.5% of Bulgarian children eligible for school are enrolled in education in Madrid, as opposed to 92% Ecuadorian pupils (Comunidad de Madrid, 2012b). Among East Europeans, 13.6% have access to the privileged, resource-rich charter and private schools compared to 24.2% of Latin Americans (Anghel & Cabrales, 2010).

Satisfaction levels differ between the two groups as well. One third of respondents from both collectives have children in the Spanish educational system. Ecuadorian parents are satisfied with schooling in Madrid, as it is not much different than the one in Ecuador, and in fact emphasize the professional and technical opportunities of Spanish education. It is not unreasonable to conclude that concentration of Ecuadorian children in vocation training has more to do with parental preferences than discrimination in the host context.

On the other hand, three-quarters of Bulgarian parents are dissatisfied with their children's educational experiences. While none report racism, all mention the language barrier as a significant obstacle to learning. One parent shared how having to learn 60-80 words every day heavily burdened her children (Izzy, 40). Despite efforts of enhancing multiculturalism in the classroom, indeed, Spain is among the few EU countries that does

not promote bilingual or mother tongue education or second language learning (Eurydice, 2004; Maiztegui-Oñate & Santibáñez-Gruber, 2010). The lack of rigor of the system or encouragement by teachers is another barrier for Bulgarian parents who value educational achievement. As one respondent put it, "our kids are limited because here they do not have subjects like art or music. … the Spanish system is not that rich of information, so children learn slower" (Yana, 50).[352] As another shared, there is "not much respect for education in school" with neither teachers nor Spanish or other immigrant parents "putting much effort" into educating (Gina 33; Matt, 42).[353] Bulgarian associations also speak of the lack of consistency in the system, teachers' insistence to hold immigrant pupils back, or the lack of stimulation by educators (M8-BO). Emphasis on work undermines any ambition for higher educational achievement. Spanish public schools are considered particularly ill-fitted in addressing the educational needs of Bulgarian students who are subject to a language barrier and difficulties in social adaptation, yet have higher aspirations than other immigrant pupils (Teese et al., 2006).

Despite the commendable efforts of Madrilenian officials, the Spanish educational system disadvantages both immigrant children and adults. Newcomer children perform worse than natives and are concentrated in public schools or vocational tracks. Adults rarely enter tertiary education and mostly focus on language acquisition rather than academic training. Still, Bulgarian migrants are more disadvantaged than Ecuadorian workers. Adults are precluded from university education due to linguistic differences,

[352] Author's translation from original quote in Bulgarian: "Отрицателното за мен остана това, че нашите деца са осакатени в едни такива сфери като изобразителното изкуство, като музиката, като танцовото изкуство… Испанската система не е толкова натоварена като обем на знания и постепенно и постепенно се обучават децата."
[353] Author's translation from original quote in Bulgarian: "Може би, защото самите деца много не си дават зор. Родителите не си дават зор" (Gina, 33); "Испанските деца не държат толкова на ученето" (Matt, 42).

obstacles in transferring qualifications despite a common European framework, as well as a dissimilar system. Children are rarely stimulated by indifferent teachers and their ambitions are undermined through emphasis on vocational training. Consequently, Bulgarian parents are discontented with education in Spain, even if none report discrimination in the system. The cohort merits a rating of 2 for this component of social integration. On the other hand, Ecuadorians are satisfied with schooling in Spain. Adults are happy to engage in vocational training as a continuation of their educational trajectories at home and agree with Spanish teachers about the merits of technical education for their children. Discrimination is not significant here. The South Americans are assigned a 3 for this indicator of social incorporation (**Table VII.1**).

VII.5. Access to Healthcare

VII.5.1. Access to Healthcare in Dublin

Like access to education, access to healthcare is also relatively satisfactory for Polish and Nigerian immigrants in Dublin. Both communities report being very healthy, yet Poles are even less likely to be chronically ill or disabled than Nigerians. The Polish also have more entitlements within the Irish healthcare system. However, they are unaware of their rights and prefer to use Polish health institutions instead of the Irish system, which is widely used by Nigerians. Conscious governmental policy rendered healthcare services open to any foreign group in Dublin. Yet, discrimination and incompetence persist among some Irish providers.

Polish immigrants in Ireland self-report as extremely healthy. When asked to assess their own health status in 2008, 97.8% identified as in "good" or in "very good"

health compared to 92.9% among non-EU nationals and 84% among the Irish (McGinnity et al., 2011; Nolan, 2012). Poles are also less likely to be disabled than African immigrants (CSO, 2008).[354] This project's interviewees confirm the "healthy immigrant" hypothesis, where it is the mentally and psychically stronger who migrate in the first place, hence they rarely need medical or psychological care (D40-PO).[355] Less than one third of Polish respondents discussed their medical history in the first place and all of them reported not having to use medical care in Ireland.

Since they are healthy, Polish workers rarely avail themselves of the Irish medical system. Moreover, one fifth of Polish participants report going to ethnic medical providers in Ireland when necessary, because "it is easier." According to the ICI, only 45% of East European immigrants use health services in Ireland compared to 94% among Nigerian respondents (ICI, 2008, p. 76). In 2006, 16.9% of East Europeans had never used the Irish medical system compared to only 4.4% among Black Africans. One expert interviewee argues that because of cultural norms, many Polish immigrants self-medicate and discount mental illness like depression or anxiety (D40-PO).

Non-use of the Irish healthcare system also correlates with ambivalence about its quality among Polish interviewees. Half of all respondents are not fully satisfied with their access to medical care, mostly based on the cost. As they did not qualify for a means-based medical card, they had to acquire a GP card and were responsible for copays. Insurance policies cover emergency care, yet the comparison with free care in Poland renders the Irish system less attractive. In certain cases, Polish immigrants

[354] 3.2% of Nigerians in Ireland are disabled compared to 11% among the Irish and almost none among Polish nationals (CSO, 2008).

[355] Nolan's "healthy immigrant" hypothesis is that immigrants are often healthier than the native population as the ones ready to migrate self-select on the basis of health status. Their health status is predicted to converge with that of the native population as they settle in the host country (Nolan, 2012).

uninformed of their rights were denied a medical card or were overcharged (D35-PO; D36-PO). Organizations like CARE are dedicated to helping Poles identify specific hospitals that ae not "user-friendly," especially to immigrants (D35-PO). Still, the other half of Polish immigrants is impressed with the quality of healthcare in Ireland. Polish participants are satisfied with the ease of acquiring a medical card, the short waiting times, and the positive bedside manner of Irish medical personnel.

African immigrants appear to have better access to, and knowledge of, health services in Dublin than the Polish. While they are relatively happy with medical services in Dublin, however, they also report severe abuses when receiving healthcare in Ireland. Indeed, recent local and national governmental initiatives ensure that comparable medical services are available to all foreign workers in Ireland. Health care is universal, even if charges apply. Medical cards are granted on a needs basis regardless of nationality and are also given to asylum seekers in direct provision. Medical cards provide for free inpatient and outpatient care, as well as GP, pharmacy, dental, eye, and maternal care (HSE, 2009; Smith & Nolan, 2012). GP Visit Cards are also granted on the basis of means and entitle holders to free GP services with patient co-pays (McGinnity et al., 2011). Further, in 2007 the Health Service Executive developed a National Intercultural Health Strategy 2007–2012 (NIHS). The Strategy seeks to create greater inclusion for ethnic communities, immigrants, and asylum seekers in the Irish health system. In practice, the plan calls for support to service providers in addressing the unique care needs of people from diverse cultural backgrounds (HSE, 2008).

Regardless of these positive developments, only residents are entitled to free medical services and the dependents of non-EU citizens might not enjoy full access to

free care in Dublin. Among short-term visitors, EU residents pay fees similar to those for the native population, while non-EU citizens have to pay full fees. EU citizens do not always have to satisfy the means test to receive a free medical card in Ireland, while third country citizens do (Citizens Information, 2013b). Therefore, while medical entitlements are the same for all nationalities in Ireland, EU nationals are entitled to lesser payments than non-EU nationals.

The quality of healthcare can be subpar, especially with economic downturn. Even before the crisis, Nigerian immigrants experienced discrimination much more often than the Irish or other immigrants. One fifth reported issues when receiving healthcare in 2006, compared to 15% of Eastern Europeans (McGinnity et al., 2006). Nigerian respondents shared witnessing severe abuses and neglect in the healthcare system. In one extreme example, a pregnant Nigerian woman died after she was sent home regardless of experiencing severe pains (Isaac, 36).

In sum, Polish immigrants are healthier than other nationalities in Ireland and are entitled to free medical care in Dublin. However, Poles are often unaware of their entitlements and avoid using the Irish healthcare system. On the other hand, Nigerians avail themselves of medical services in Ireland. Governmental initiatives to render service provision sensitive to diverse cultural needs, makes the Irish system attractive to "different" African immigrants. However, Nigerian patients are legally disadvantaged as third-country nationals and often pay higher fees for the same services than their Polish counterparts. They are also more likely to suffer abuses and discrimination in the Irish healthcare system, especially with economic downturn. Both groups are assigned a value of 3 for this indicator of social integration (**Table VII.1**).

VII.5.2. Access to Healthcare in Madrid

Access to healthcare is as open in Madrid as it is in Dublin and is satisfactory for both Ecuadorian and Bulgarian immigrants. Both the Latin Americans and the East Europeans self-report as healthy and both groups are entitled to free medical care and multiple rights within the Spanish healthcare system, regardless of legal status. However, similar Ecuadorians avail themselves more freely of Spanish health institutions than different Bulgarians. They are more likely to receive regular exams from their GP and less like to be hospitalized than comparable natives. On the other hand, Bulgarians discount illness or self-medicate. The Balkan migrants are disadvantaged by lack of context-specific knowledge and some discrimination.

The "healthy immigrant" hypothesis holds for the Spanish case, as it does in Dublin (Nolan, 2012). According to the 20011-2012 Spanish National Health Survey, foreign residents view themselves as healthier than their hosts. While 74.8% of native respondents assess their health as "very good" or "good," 78.6% of immigrants do so and a negligible 3.3% of the latter consider their health "poor" or "very poor." Almost all of the newcomers experience no problems with mobility, self-care or performing daily activities. Eight in ten immigrants have no psychological or chronic health issues compared to seven in ten natives (INE, 2013). Foreign-born respondents also lead healthier lifestyles and are less likely to smoke, drink or take medical drugs than Spaniards by as many as 20 percentage points (Hernández-Quevedo & Jiménez-Rubio, 2009; Carrasco-Garrido et al., 2007). In a comparative study of eleven European host countries, Spain emerged as the only country where immigrants perceive their health to be better than that of natives (Solé-Auró & Crimmins. 2008). Nine in ten of this project's

Ecuadorian respondents self-identify as healthy and suggest that their age and habits make it unnecessary for them to use the Spanish healthcare system. On the other hand, only half of the Bulgarian interviewees who discussed health issues reported to be healthy with the other half mostly suffering from work accidents.

In view of their good health, Ecuadorian respondents did not avail themselves of the Spanish medical system, while one sixth of Bulgarian participants did. Regardless, access is open to both collectives and the Spanish healthcare system is even more generous than the Irish one. Organic Law 4/2000 grants the right to public healthcare to immigrants registered on the local population register, the *padrón*, regardless of their legal or employment status (Bertozzi, 2010). Even unregistered individuals can utilize emergency and pregnancy care. Local and national integration plans further aim to eradicate inequalities in access to health services as a prerequisite for social cohesion (Hernández-Quevedo & Jiménez-Rubio, 2012). Care is free even for life-threatening diseases such as HIV and cancer (Burridge, 2012). A 2012 policy restriction, excluding illegal immigrants from free medical care in Spain, was not only unevenly implemented by local administrators, but was revered in 2015 (Gaffey, 2015).

Regardless of universally open access, there are important differences in the use of healthcare by Ecuadorians and Bulgarians in Madrid. The 2006 National Health Survey suggests that East Europeans are less likely to avail themselves of primary care, hospital services or emergency services than are South American migrants or natives. On the other hand, Ecuadorians appear to overuse hospital and emergency services.[356]

[356] While 27% of Spanish respondents used primary care in the last four weeks, 26% Ecuadorians and 17% East Europeans did. While 8% of the native participants were hospitalized in the last year, 11% of Ecuadorians and 7% of Balkan workers were. A 29% rate of use of emergency care by Spaniards, lastly,

However, after controlling for socio-economic characteristics, Villarroel and Artazcoz (2015) find that Ecuadorian migrants are in fact the most likely among all cohorts to visit their primary physicians and the least likely to be hospitalized. On the other hand, Eastern European workers have the most limited access to regular primary care among all collectives surveyed. Therefore, Ecuadorians have open access to regular healthcare services in Madrid, which might prevent them from developing chronic or serious illness or having to resort to unstable emergency services. On the other hand, East Europeans are somewhat restricted in their access to regular medical care in Spain, and tend to discount serious illnesses or self-medicate, a trend that could produce long-term unfavorable health effects. Villarroel and Artazcoz (2015) conclude that linguistic difference, unfamiliarity with the local context, as well as cultural dissimilarity, present significant barriers for the Balkan migrants. Spanish-speaking Ecuadorians aware of Spain's sociocultural reality face fewer hindrances in using healthcare.

Cultural distance renders this project's Bulgarian respondents ambivalent about the Spanish healthcare system. A majority are in awe of the generous provisions and positive bedside manner of Spanish doctors. One female migrant shared that she survived cancer due to the free chemotherapy she received in Spain. However, others complain of red tape, delays in processing results or scheduling treatments, as well as the improper use of expensive equipment. Some discrimination for the different Balkan workers who are perceived to burden free health services is reported by Bulgarian organizations (M6-BO). As the East Europeans "do not speak Spanish … [while] the people in the health

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corresponds to 35% rate among Ecuadorians and only 27% among Romanians, for instance (Villarroel & Artazcoz, 2015).

centers do not speak a language apart from Spanish," there is "a clash, a barrier," which prevents Bulgarians from receiving the necessary medical care (M17-P; M35-P).[357]

To conclude, both Ecuadorians and Bulgarians are healthier than their Spanish counterparts, much like the Polish in Dublin. Both nationalities have open access to universal free healthcare in Madrid. However, Spanish-speaking culturally-proximate Latin Americans utilize primary care in larger numbers and ensure long-term stable health and fewer serious illnesses or hospitalizations. On the other hand, Bulgarians are less likely to avail themselves of healthcare in Spain. While almost universally satisfied with professional Spanish doctors and generous services, the Balkan workers still report some discrimination and barriers to access. Ecuadorians are assigned a 5 and Bulgarians a 4 for this indicator of social incorporation (**Table VII.1**).

VII.6. Access to Social Welfare

VII.6.1. Access to Social Welfare in Dublin

Access to social welfare is the most problematic area of social integration for Polish immigrants in Ireland. While a large number of Polish workers in Ireland avail themselves of the relatively generous welfare system, they still face legal obstacles like the Habitual Residency Condition, longer waiting times than natives, and inconsistency of decision-making across offices. Nonetheless, Polish immigrants fare better than the Nigerian group. Nigerians' access to welfare is limited by legal provisions, institutional and individual prejudice, and widespread stereotypes about their abuse of the system.

[357] Author's translation from original quote in Spanish: "Porque hay muchos casos en que el inmigrante no habla, no sabe hablar español, y la gente que está en los centros sanitarios, los funcionarios que los reciben, no los médicos, no hablan más idioma que el español y se produce un choque, una barrera que para el inmigrante hay casos en los que desiste y se va, estando enfermo."

The percentage of Polish nationals claiming social welfare increased substantially over the years. In 2004, only 3% of those allowed to work in Ireland filed social welfare claims. The number rose to 33% in 2009 (CSO, 2011). Among this project's interviewees, almost half had used the social welfare system in Ireland, mainly claiming job seeker allowance or child benefits. Claims among Polish workers are only likely to increase with length of stay and the satisfaction of the Habitual Residence Requirement, as well as the rise of unemployment with economic downturn.

On the other hand, welfare claims by non-EU nationals registered a more moderate increase with 29% claiming welfare in 2009 compared to 19% in 2004 (CSO, 2011). While the number of accession state citizens who have access to job seeker's benefits or job-seekers allowance grew forty times between 2005 and 2012, the number of non-EU nationals receiving social welfare payments increased three-fold in the same period (CSO, 2012b).[358] While the discrepancy might indicate that Eastern Europeans are harder affected economically by the 2009 downturn, it also reflects the more limited access to the welfare system of non-EU nationals (D5-ADMIN).

Both Poles and Nigerians face obstacles when seeking social welfare in Dublin (D27-TU; D34-PO). There are legal obstacles to claiming welfare that affect all foreign nationals in Ireland. European immigrants are only at a slight advantage, despite EU directives on equal treatment, since national administrative practices trump European prerogatives.

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[358] The Irish Live Register is a monthly record indicating the number of people in Ireland who are employed part-time or who are entitled to job seeker's allowance or benefits. EU15 to EU27 nationals, the majority of whom are Polish, register a much higher activity on the Live Register than any other group. Whereas only 1,089 persons from this group were registered in January 2005, the number grew to 42,831 in January 2012. On the other hand, non-EU persons, the largest group of whom comprises Nigerian workers, have not witnessed such a sharp increase. 4,370 persons were registered in January 2005 compared to 13,845 in January 2012 (CSO, 2012b).

Social welfare is administered by the Department of Social Protection. Payments include social insurance payments like disability and maternity payment and job-seeker benefit; means-tested payments like job-seeker allowance or supplementary welfare allowance; as well as universal payments like child benefits. Receiving the first type depends on the contributions one made to the Irish social security system, while the second type is means-based and is granted even to those without sufficient social security contributions. An "aggregation principle" stipulates that contributions made in other countries of the European Union be recognized in Ireland and that Irish contributions carry over to the sending country upon return migration (also D2-TU). Non-EU nationals with legal residence in Ireland are also afforded rights of "aggregation" and "export" of social security payments (EC No 859/2003). However, the Habitual Residence Condition (HRC) was introduced in 2004 for both EU and non-EU nationals receiving social assistance and child benefits. It precludes Polish and Nigerian immigrants from obtaining benefits as it requires a minimum of two-year residency in Ireland before access to welfare. HRC renders the process of claiming benefits arbitrary, since grants are made on a case-by-case basis and depend on subjective factors like the applicant's "main center of interest" (Department of Social Protection, 2011; McGinnity et al., 2011, pp. 33-34). The fluidity of the Habitual Residence Condition leaves more room for discrimination, since decisions depend on the discretion of individual welfare officers (D38-PO).

While the HRC affects the access to social resources for all foreign populations in Ireland, it disadvantages Nigerian immigrants more severely than their Polish counterparts. For instance, illegal immigrants or asylum seekers, many of whom Nigerians, can never qualify for Habitual Residence and are thus actively precluded from

receiving social welfare in Ireland. Nigerians are also obstructed in claiming welfare in Ireland by the fear that "becoming a burden on the state" would invalidate their claims to residency and citizenship. The fluid requirements of the HRC disadvantage "different" Nigerian nationals more severely than their Polish counterparts, as they are stereotyped as asylum seekers looking for a quick payout and are discriminated against more often than white Eastern European immigrants (D9-P; D13-P).

Nonetheless, the HRC requirement is the largest impediment to the full social inclusion of Polish immigrants in Ireland as well. Polish workers who have spent a sufficient time working in Ireland rarely experience difficulties in obtaining job-seeker benefits. However, once these benefits expire or in the case of childbirth, the HRC applies and social welfare entitlements are more ambiguous (D36-PO; D38-PO; D39-PO; D41-NO). In fact, of all the cases filed with the Polish Social and Legal Advice Centre, 60% concerned social welfare issues, and particularly the refusal of Habitual Residence, delays in processing claims, the stoppage of child benefit payments without justification, as well as the non-recognition of social contributions made in Poland (SLAC, 2010).

The HRC affects waiting times or negative responses among this project's Polish interviewees. The waiting period for a social welfare decision is listed as three weeks on average. However, according to Polish service providers, Polish nationals wait for a decision for eight to nine weeks on average. As the Irish social security administration does not have specific guidelines on the times to process welfare applications, individual overburdened offices where many immigrants are required to file their applications take longer to respond (D36-PO). Child benefits are particularly problematic and could take up to three years to grant (D38-PO).

The sheer volume of applications is often found to blame (D16-ADMIN; D17-ADMIN; D21-ADMIN; D38-PO). As one interviewee put it, "the Irish welfare system is a total mess," where offices simply cannot handle the soaring unemployment claims in the country (Rick, 45). In the case of Polish workers, communications between the Polish and Irish governments in ascertaining employment and contribution records render the process even lengthier (D38-PO). While half of Polish participants were granted welfare within the three to four week period, for the other half waiting periods for all three types of benefits were extensive. They stretched anywhere between eight months and two years. While social security is granted retroactively, the uncertainty often leads to depression, inability to meet household expenses and the rethinking of migration choices.

What is more, with the introduction of the Habitual Residence Condition, Polish immigrants receive negative decisions from welfare offices more often and face the sudden termination of benefits without justification (D36-PO; D39-PO). Especially with economic downturn, written notices of decisions are rarely provided. Refusal of child benefits often have no basis, and as an explanation of the case's reasoning is not included, Polish service providers have a harder time appealing negative decisions (D36-PO; D39-PO). One third of Polish interviewees report that their benefits were either terminated "for no reason" or were denied without justification.

Even during the decision-making process, little information is given to Polish claimants. They are told to "wait" and that their application "is being processed' (Gillian, 25; Jane, 26). Polish applicants are rarely provided with advice and crucial pieces of information about their entitlements. For instance, they are rarely advised that contributions made in Poland transfer in Ireland. They are not told that they are entitled to

supplementary allowance while waiting for a decision on their applications. Polish immigrants are also no longer provided with translations or language help and the amount of documents they are asked to include is overwhelming. One claimant had to file six times before being successful (Mary, 41).

Further, since the introduction of the HRC calls for a discretionary, case-by-case decision-making process based on five individual factors, there is little consistency among Irish welfare offices (D36-PO; D39-PO). Polish service providers readily identify individual offices where staff is particularly unhelpful and decisions are often negative and unsubstantiated (D35-PO; D36-PO; D38-PO; D39-PO). Still, other offices are recognized as extremely helpful to Polish organizations and individuals (D36-PO).

Similar difficulties are described by Nigerian participants. Among them, 70% claimed social welfare benefits and 50% faced difficulties with obtaining them or were refused them altogether. Lack of residency prevented many from obtaining benefits in spite of the contributions they made to the Irish social welfare system. Even if they were legally entitled to social welfare, the complexity of the process and the numerous requirements obstructed a large number of Nigerian immigrants from receiving job seeker's allowance or job seeker benefits. Many quoted the numerous demands made by social welfare officers as an obstacle. As one respondent put it, "They may not say, 'No, we are not giving you it,' but they could make the conditions so hard that it would make you forget about it. They just discourage you from applying" (Zach, 32).

Both Polish and Nigerian workers have increasingly negative experiences and interactions at the welfare office. Since the economic downturn affected many of the industries where they were employed, the Polish are becoming the majority of clients in

the Irish Department of Social Protection (D36-PO). In turn, they are facing an increasingly negative attitude there. While in the mid-2000's social welfare officers accommodated immigrant claimants and took the time to translate documents or requirements, this is no longer the case. Polish welfare applicants report aggressive and rude welfare officers who refuse to explain benefits or tell Polish clients that "they should have spoken good English because they have been in Ireland so long" (D40-PO).

Aggressive or discriminatory treatment is even more common against Nigerian welfare claimants. One quarter of Black Africans reported unfavorable or discriminatory treatment by the Department of Social and Family Affairs or other Social Services in 2006, compared to 10% among Eastern Europeans. Among Nigerians studied in the same report, more than one third encountered problems when with social services (McGinnity et al., 2006, pp. 46, 51).

"An element of institutional discrimination" exists in Dublin's welfare office. As one NGO representative put it, the attitude among welfare officers is "Here comes a guy with an accent, so I have to ask him an extra question" (D41-NO). If not discrimination, there is "at least different treatment" for Polish claimants (D36-PO). Among interviewees in this project, 40% felt discriminated against by "rude" social welfare officers. Some were even told to go back to Poland instead of claiming benefits in Ireland (Kevin, 27; Mary, 41). Unaware of the rigorous HRC, Irish nationals believe that Polish immigrants practice "welfare tourism" and migrate to Ireland to only "rob" the Irish welfare system (D5-ADMIN; D7-TU; D13-P; D18-P). The Polish are believed to abuse the child benefit system in particular (D1-J; D13-P). While some of the stories are realistic, they are

exaggerated. The number of Irish nationals cheating the system is ignored altogether (D33-PO). Different nationality causes tensions in processing welfare claims (D38-PO).

Still, Polish interviewees share that compared to similar public administrators in Poland, Irish officers are “great” (Ashley, 29). The proliferation of Polish organizations dealing with welfare discrimination further cements Polish nationals’ social welfare rights and entitlements. Organizations like SLAC, Crosscare, Caidre, Culture, and My Mind serve as advocates in advancing social welfare and educate Polish immigrants about their rights (D36-PO; D38-PO; D39-PO).

On the other hand, discrimination and stereotyping among Nigerian welfare claimants is ubiquitous. According to Nigerian interviewees, African men rarely rely on “the dole” due to their cultural mentality and pride, as well as the limited amounts that could be granted (Ethan, 46; Isaac, 36). As one interviewee suggests, there is no welfare system in Nigeria and Africans immigrating to Ireland do not arrive with the goal of living off of the system (D44-NO). Participants admit that African women use social security in Ireland due to the large number of children they have. However, all agree that while the Irish are the most common abusers of social welfare, they tend to blame foreign nationals for the drain on social resources. There is high incidence of stereotyping among Nigerian immigrants in particular who are all perceived as asylum seekers in Dublin with the objective of abusing social welfare. This stereotype is believed to translate into unfavorable treatment by social welfare officers. As one interviewee shared, after applying for the dole, he heard a racial slur about him. He suggested that officers often treat foreigners with “abuse” and that stereotypes affect decisions (Stephen, 36). The discretionary nature of decisions is a permit to stereotype and discriminate.

In sum, access to social welfare is limited for both Polish and Nigerian nationals in Dublin. Waiting times are long, decisions are discretionary and arbitrary, benefits are denied or terminated without justification, and negative stereotyping is endemic. The introduction of the additional legal requirement of habitual residence exacerbates all these issues for both EU and non-EU nationals in Ireland. It is discrimination and the belief that all foreigners abuse the Irish social welfare system that most severely limits access to welfare in Dublin. While discrimination is being combatted by a slew of Polish service organizations, Nigerians continue to be subjected to stereotyping and racism when seeking social resources in Ireland. Consequently, Poles are assigned a 2 and Nigerians – the lowest value – for this indicator of social integration (**Table VII.1**).

VII.6.2. Access to Social Welfare in Madrid

Access to social welfare is not nearly as problematic in Madrid as it is in Dublin, since grants are made according to standard rules rather than an arbitrary decision-making process and there is a national and local emphasis on equality of social rights regardless of nationality. However, migrants in precarious or informal employment, whose employers did not contribute to social security schemes, are completely excluded from the system. This is more often the case for Bulgarian immigrants rather than their Ecuadorian counterparts who rarely claim welfare payments to begin with. While discrimination is not nearly as pronounced as in the Irish case, the dissimilar non-Spanish speaking Balkan workers are more likely to require extra effort in receiving social benefits than their South American peers.

The social welfare regime in Spain comprises contribution-based nationally-administered social insurance (unemployment benefits and pensions), regionally-managed universal programs (healthcare or education discussed elsewhere in this dissertation), as well as locally-developed need-based social services. While spending on social welfare is generally low compared to other developed countries, social security, the foundation of the Spanish welfare state, is better funded than similar programs in the majority of EU countries. The National Social Security Institute (INSS) manages contributions made by workers and employers to respond to unemployment, accidents in the workplace, disability and retirement. Receipt of benefits is contingent on and proportional to contributions, except in access to non-contributory pensions and disability programs. In Madrid, contributing to the system for one year results in four months of unemployment benefits (*paro*), with some limited protections after social security is used up. The waiting period is shorter than the two-year requirement in Ireland, with subsidies available even for the unemployed who have worked for less than 12 months. Foreign nationality does not preclude access to the system, yet employment in the informal economy with no contributions excludes immigrants from payments. Apart from social insurance, social services administered by the Department of Family and Social Affairs provide minimum care to populations excluded from the social security system in the form of home care, non-contributory pensions, minimum insertion income, or food banks. They are open to nationals and foreigners (Angloinfo, 2015; Comunidad de Madrid, 2012b; Moreno-Fuentes & Callejo, 2011).

Participation in the generous Spanish welfare system is growing for both collectives of interest here with economic downturn. The number of immigrant affiliates

with social security remained stable over time, with around 2 million foreign-born contributors (10% of the total) between 2007 and 2010 (Moreno-Fuentes & Callejo, 2011). However, the number of foreigners using the *paro* increased from 30,000 or 2.2% of all claimants in 2001 to 319,000 or 14.7% of all applicants in 2010 (MTIN, 2010). Immigrants also account for 12% of users of social services in the Madrid Autonomous Community. Six in ten Latin American and Eastern Europeans in the city of Madrid avail themselves of integration resources (Ayuntamiento de Madrid, 2010). According to local administrators, the growing numbers of social benefit claimants reflect "awareness of the system" and the inclusion of all immigrants in the city (M19-ADMIN).

Ethnic communities are satisfied with the social system in Spain. In Madrid, 68.1% of Latin Americans are content with the quality of social provisions, compared to 66.9% of Eastern Europeans (Ayuntamiento de Madrid, 2010). As one Bulgarian respondent put it, "Spain is paradise for the lazy. There are food banks, maybe thirty in Madrid, which offer plentiful free food. There are [free cafeterias that offer] social activities. You can play chess, tennis, bathe for free. Not only do they give you free food, but they serve it for you too… No wonder Bulgarians are not going back" (Devin, 55).[359]

Nonetheless, there are differences in access between Bulgarians and Ecuadorians. For instance, Ecuadorians are higher net contributors to the social insurance system with affiliates rising from 0.4% of the total in 2001 to 1.3% of the total in 2007. On the other hand, Eastern Europeans have comprised only 0.4% of all contributors in 2001-2007 despite rising numbers of new arrivals with EU enlargement, indicating a much higher

[359] Author's translation from original quote in Bulgarian: "Испания е рай за лентяите. Тука има хранилки, в Мадрид са може би 30, в които предлагат храна в изобилие. Социални дейности. В тях можеш да играеш шах, да играеш тенис, да се къпеш, има безплатна баня. Значи не само ти дават храната, но ти и сервират … И това беше първият отговор за мен, защо българите не искат да се връщат."

tendency to be employed underground with no eligibility for social insurance (Moreno-Fuentes & Callejo, 2011). Consequently, more vulnerable Balkan migrants are more likely to use food banks in Madrid but less likely to employ integration resources beyond basic subsistence needs (Comunidad de Madrid, 2012b).

Only one in ten of this project's Ecuadorian respondents used unemployment benefits, despite universal awareness and eligibility. One interviewee claimed the benefit for a year while resting in the home country upon being laid off in Spain. He shared, "You have a right to the *paro* because you are paying social security for four years and you have the obligation to collect it if you find yourself to be unemployed" (Patrick, 32).[360] None of the South Americans report issues with the receipt of the social benefit and all consider the process simple despite the long lines.

Four in ten of the Bulgarians who spoke about this aspect of their life in Spain used the host country's social security system, while six in ten never availed themselves of welfare.[361] One sixth of all participants are currently receiving some type of assistance, be it unemployment benefits or means-based subsidies if ineligible for the *paro*. Satisfaction is relatively high among the Balkan workers. More than one third express contentment with the service, since due to the standard requirements, if one is eligible for the *paro*, "they have to give it to you" (Kevin, 33).[362] Spanish social security personnel are considered "very polite, very nice" and unlikely to cause "issues" (Redford, 36).[363] One respondent was even amazed of local administrators' proactive efforts to inform her

[360] Author's translation from original quote in Spanish: "Tú tienes derecho al paro porque tú estas pagando la seguridad social cuatro años y tienes la obligación a cobrar si te quedas desempleado."
[361] One Bulgarian representative suggests that stereotypes form the home country that only "the poor and the gypsies" (*в социалните служби отиват бедни, цигани*) claim social security have resulted in lesser claims of the benefit by Bulgarian workers (M1-BO) (Author's translation from Bulgarian).
[362] Author's translation from original quote in Bulgarian: "Те са длъжни да ми ги дадат."
[363] Author's translation from original quote in Bulgarian: "Испанците са много вежливи хора, много топли… няма проблеми."

of her eligibility for a disability-based pension (Nina, 57). In fact, Bulgarian workers admit that the generosity of the system resulted in some abuse by their compatriots who would work illegally in the home country, yet travel periodically to Spain to maintain the appearance of unemployment and their access to payments (M2-BO).

While not nearly disadvantaged as immigrants in Dublin, however, Bulgarians still experience barriers to securing social protections. More than one third of the Balkan workers lament being excluded from the system on the basis of their precarious employment in Madrid's underground economy. As Spanish stakeholders put it, "they are illegal, they do not have the right to social security, to the majority of provisions, they don't collect *paro* and have no economic means of survival" (M18-ADMIN; M36-ADMIN).[364] Another third perceive discrimination in their receipt of benefits. Unlike in the Irish case, there is no politicization of the abuse of the unemployment system, since benefits are contingent on contributions. In fact, immigrants are proven to be net contributors to the system. However, there remain certain perceptions of the "excess stress [immigrants] put on social services" in view of "their precarious employment, lower salaries, [and] lack of family and social networks" (M16-P; Moreno-Fuentes & Callejo, 2011). There are concerns of social welfare tourism and welfare dependency that lead to resentment and exclusion among natives (Moreno-Fuentes & Callejo, 2011). For instance, when inquiring about social security contributions, one Balkan immigrant was told, "If you don't like the system here, go to your own country" (Pam, 39).[365] Another was purposefully misled about filing deadlines as to be unable to file for benefits (Hunter,

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[364] Author's translation from original quote in Spanish: "Son ilegales, no tienen derecho a la seguridad social, no tienen derecho a la mayoría de las prestaciones, no cobran el paro, no tienen medios económicos para subsistir."

[365] Author's translation from original quote in Bulgarian: "Аз ходих да питам социалния работник и тя ми отговори: „Ако не ти харесва, иди си в твоята държава".

29). Regardless, stereotypes of welfare abuse and institutional or individual discrimination in social welfare provision are much less widespread among foreigners in Spain than among both Poles and Nigerians in Dublin.

In sum, access to social welfare is relatively open to both Ecuadorians and Bulgarians in Madrid. Standard requirements, short waiting periods, multiple local resources, and little discrimination contribute to relatively plentiful social benefits and high level of satisfaction among immigrant claimants in Spain. Still, East Europeans are somewhat disadvantaged in claiming social welfare compared to Latin Americans, as their tendency to be employed in the underground economy effectively excludes them from social provisions. What is more, the different Balkan workers are more likely to experience subtle discrimination or be told to "go home" instead of abusing Spanish resources. Consequently, Bulgarians are assigned a 4 for this indicator of social incorporation, while Ecuadorians merit the highest value (**Table VII.1**).

VII.7. Access to Other Institutions

VII.7.1. Access to Other Institutions in Dublin

While their experience with the Irish social security administration is negative, Polish workers in Dublin fare well in their relations with other governmental institutions like the Irish employment agency, FÁS, or the police. Africans, on the other hand, are highly disadvantaged in their interactions with Irish immigration services or the Garda.

To illustrate, in 2006 only 7.8% of Eastern European respondents reported being treated poorly by the Irish police, the Garda, a figure that compared to 21.9% among Black Africans and 25% among Nigerians. East Europeans were also less likely than

African migrants to have poor interactions with the Department of Justice or other immigration services. Finally, East European did have relatively poor experiences with the Irish National Training and Employment Authority (FÁS), but they still fared better than Black African immigrants (McGinnity et al., 2006, pp. 47-49) (**Table VII.7**).

In fact, Polish organizational representatives suggest that public services and governmental institutions in Ireland are far superior to those in Poland. As one expert put it, "this country is more for the people … In Poland, the law is important. Here, the person is important and law exists to serve the person" (D37-PO). Still, ethnic representative criticize the fluidity of administrative structures in Ireland, as well as the reliance on discretion in the decision-making process (D35-PO). Due to the subjectivity of Irish governmental institutions, discrimination can occur in individual cases, especially in the employment agency and particularly after the economic downturn.

Most of this project's Polish respondents rate their interactions with Irish institutions as "very positive." Only 14% had negative experience with an administrative office in Ireland, while 62% report positive interactions and "friendly" public employees. Some of the interviewees are actually very satisfied with the access they have to high-ranking public officials in Dublin. One shared an anecdote of the Irish President attending Polish church services to encourage Polish immigrants to remain in Ireland with the crisis (Rick, 45). Another participant discussed her ability to set an appointment with the Minister for Integration to discuss her professional development in Ireland (Mary, 41). A third spoke of his access to his local representative and the Minister of Trade in a dispute with his employer (Richard, 34).

Table VII.7. Harassment in Other Irish Institutions Based on Ethnic Origin, 2006 (in %)[366]

	Never			1-2 times			3-4 times			>5 times		
	Garda	FÁS	INIS	Garda	FÁS	INIS	Garda	FÁS	INIS	Garda	FÁS	INIS
Black African	70	57.2	68.4	11.4	5.2	15.1	2.4	-	1.7	5.9	0.7	4.8
White African	71.1	59	60.5	10.5	12.8	15.8	-	2.6	10.5	-	-	2.6
North African	82.8	79.3	80	6.9	1.7	10	-	-	1.7	0	0	-
Asian	89	83.3	83.3	3.8	3.3	8.9	0.2	0.2	1.2	-	0.2	1.7
East European	76.5	67.2	73.8	5	7.3	10.8	0.8	-	2.3	0.8	0.8	3.5
Nigerian*				22	-	25						
Total	79.8	71.1	75.9	6.6	5.1	11.3	0.9	0.2	2	1.8	0.5	2.9

* Figures for Nigerians refer to those experiencing discrimination at least 1-2 times. INIS stands for Irish Naturalisation and Immigration Service.
Source: Reproduced from McGinnity et al., 2006.

On the other hand, Nigerian immigrants report widespread institutional discrimination. Half of this dissertation's interviewees experienced poor treatment by institutions in Dublin. One respondent, who migrated to Ireland as an EU dependent, talked about the aggressive employees at the immigration office. She suggests that immigration officers treat immigrants with disrespect and assume that all Nigerians in Ireland are asylum seekers and should be happy to be in the country (Tatiana, 27). Another was refused a new residency card even though he fulfilled all requirements (Stephen, 36). Some reported that permit applications would take longer to process in their case on the basis of skin color and nationality.

Male African respondents all encounter issues with the police. In some cases, the police would be too slow to provide Nigerians with assistance or would discount or

[366] The remaining participants in McGinnity et al. (2006)'s survey did not provide any information about harassment in Irish institutions based on ethnic origin.

minimize their call for help. For example, one Nigerian supermarket clerk rarely received police assistance in cases of theft in the store on account of his accent when he called to report the crime (Zach, 32). In other cases, police officers would racially profile Nigerian immigrants. One respondent, for instance, shared that after reacting to racial comments by an Irish proprietor of a car shop, he was the one "rough-handled" and arrested by the Garda for disorderly conduct (Taylor, 32).

Racial profiling is particularly severe in the relationship between the Garda and black Nigerian immigrants in Dublin (D11-L; ENAR, 2011). The Garda's Racial and Intercultural Office was created in 2000 to remedy issues of racial discrimination by Irish policemen. The main mission of the Unit is to provide sensitivity training and prepare police officers to better address the problems of ethnic communities, as well as to establish connections with such communities through ethnic liaison officers. It is also meant to remedy one of Nigerian's biggest concerns – that "they are not being listened to" (D11-L). Nonetheless, the Unit remains understaffed with 350 employees. Nigerians migrants and other ethnic persons continue to mistrust the police who can also act as immigration officers. As the Garda are not covered by Equality Legislation, their actions remain particularly suspect for Africans in Dublin (ENAR, 2011).

On the other hand, Polish immigrants have limited or positive experiences with the Irish police or court system. As one *Gardai* shares, while he has interactions with the Polish community, Polish immigrants in Dublin rarely commit crimes or experience racist crimes (D11-L). Few of this project's respondents had any interaction with Irish police, but the ones who did find the *Gardai* friendly and helpful. While they concede

that the courts deliberate for long periods of time and are "stressful," Polish interviewees also have trust in the Irish court system and its fairness (Devon, 33).

Polish workers also make extensive use of the Irish employment agency, FÁS. Most of their experiences are positive. More than one third (38%) of the subjects who discussed their interactions with Irish institutions stated they have used FÁS in search of employment or access to retraining courses in Ireland. The majority (63%) find this institution useful and the employees "helpful" and "positive." They obtained jobs through the agency or were accepted to courses in their field of desired employment. Only 10% report poor interactions with individual officers. Especially with economic crisis, they were put down when looking for employment. A FÁS employee tore up one respondent's carefully-crafted resume and told him "it was no good" (Rick, 45). Another participant was told by a FÁS employee that all Eastern European women come to Ireland to "live off Irish tax payers" (Sarah, 33). Still, such cases are the exception rather than the rule.

Exchanges with the main trade union, SIPTU, are extremely rewarding for Poles as well. In the case of disputes with employers or employment agencies, SIPTU representatives are reported to fight for workers' rights regardless of membership. As one person put it, SIPTU "works pretty hard to inform as many people as they could about their rights. And when you have some information about your rights and have SIPTU, you can … fight" (Kathryn, 27).

In sum, Polish immigrants have better access to immigration, economic, and security institutions in Dublin than their Nigerian counterparts. While some Polish workers are treated poorly by the Irish Training and Employment Agency, most Poles in Ireland have positive experiences when reporting a crime, looking for training, or

securing a permit. The East Europeans are assigned a 5 for this component of social incorporation. On the other hand, Nigerians are particularly likely to be stigmatized and abused by the Irish Immigration and Naturalisation Service or racially profiled by the Garda. They are only assigned a 1 for this indicator of social integration (**Table VII.1**).

VII.7.2. Access to Other Institutions in Madrid

Like their Polish counterparts in Dublin, Ecuadorians and Bulgarians in Madrid are generally satisfied with their interactions with public institutions, such as the police and courts, the Foreigner's offices, or the major trade unions. However, Bulgarians are "a passive collective" that is less likely to benefit from relatively benign local public servants and which is more likely to encounter negative treatment when dealing with immigration services (M5-BO).[367] While Ecuadorians are more likely to be targeted by the police than their East European peers, the South Americans are well attuned to Madrilenian administrative offices and take advantage of their inclusive attitude.

According to a survey by Madrid's municipal government, Latin Americans are more likely to experience discrimination than Eastern Europeans when dealing with local officials, even if both groups fare better than Africans. In general, immigrants' relationships with the police or public administrators are satisfactory and similar to these of natives. The percentages of natives and foreign-born experiencing negative treatment by law enforcement or city halls are low and differ by less than 2%. However, one fifth of Latin Americans report some discrimination by Madrilenian police forces compared to one tenth of East European workers. 13% the South Americans perceive unfavorable

[367] Author's translation from original quote in Bulgarian: "пасивен колектив."

treatment in public offices compared to 7.5% among Balkan immigrants (Ayuntamiento de Madrid, 2010).

While Ecuadorian respondents are indeed prone to question their relations with Madrilenian law enforcement, Bulgarians are much more likely to experience subpar treatment from other public officers or to find benevolent local administrators useless, overly bureaucratic, and extremely slow. The East Europeans shy away from Spanish institutions altogether (M5-BO).

This project's Ecuadorian participants find the Madrilenian police officer "cold" and "on edge" when dealing with Latin Americans (Lina, 30; Patrick, 32).[368] They agree that the police are effective and quick to intervene in accidents or confrontations, but a majority also suggest that police officers "are accustomed to catching Latinos" in their daily duties (Patrick, 32).[369] Individual interviewees have been stopped by police officers and asked for papers, yet are quickly released after showing the necessary documents. Still, there is a certain perception of racial profiling among Ecuadorians, who believe law enforcement officers to "generalize" and assume some wrongdoing when interacting with the "law-abiding" South American community (Lincoln, 32).[370] Nonetheless, ethnic representatives concede that it is African migrants who are most disadvantaged in their relations with the Spanish police (M9-EO).

While Eastern Europeans are less likely to experience discrimination at the hands of Spanish police forces or be stopped for a document check, Bulgarian respondents are

[368] Author's translation from original quote in Spanish: "Pero el trato es demasiado frio, es la policía" (Lina, 30), "Hay veces que algún policía es un poco borde" (Patrick, 32).
[369] Author's translation from original quote in Spanish: "Ellos ya están acostumbrados a coger latino."
[370] Author's translation from original quote in Spanish: "No, pero generalizan. Aprovechan que unos latinos son malos y a otros o a todos los generalizan. Yo también estoy en contra de la gente mala, que hace el desorden, pero lo generalizan todo."

conflicted about their relationship with law enforcement in Madrid as well. Some report no issue with the law (Xander, 20). One Balkan restaurant employee even recalls being driven home by police officers at 3 am after missing the last bus from work (Sylvester, 29). On the other hand, two-thirds of respondents who spoke of their interactions with Madrilenian law enforcement encountered some problems. They reporte being profiled and stopped for drug checks or for perceived traffic violations frequently. One respondent was shocked after witnessing police beat a disabled Eastern European man at a long line for documents. Bulgarians are also somewhat disenchanted with the court system. While proceedings are found to be relatively fair, courts and public lawyers are considered slow, "unprofessional," and disposed to treat their Bulgarian clients "as immigrants" (Sylvester, 29).[371] Public officials and ethnic representative concede that stereotypes of Bulgarians' criminality and a tendency to equate the Bulgarians with the Roma population produce tensions and discrimination by police officers, as well as lack of confidence and trust in the police among the immigrants (M7-BO; M27-L).

The Spanish-speaking and culturally-attuned Ecuadorians might have strained relationships with police officers in Spain, but they can easily navigate Foreigner's Offices and local ministry branches when looking to issue or renew permits or secure a tax identification card (Número de Identidád de Extranjero, or NIE). Local stakeholders admit that managing the informal, complex, and decentralized Spanish administrative system is best done through word of mouth information to identify immigrant-friendly offices and employees when seeking or renewing documents (M24-TU; M33-TU). Therefore, use of public offices "has been easier for people who speak Spanish, for

[371] Author's translation from original quote in Bulgarian: "Самата адвокатката беше непрофесионалист…. Тя е доловила нещо и с визията, че аз съм емигрант."

people from Latin America who come to ask and tell another compatriot" (M25-TU; M34-TU).[372] Indeed, while some Ecuadorian participants find immigrant offices "hectic" (*frenéticos*) or bad at explaining forms or instructions, they hold that administrators "serve [Latinos] very well" (*nos atienden muy bien ellos*) (Ethan, 39). Since foreigner's offices are "accustomed to dealing with Latinos" (*están acostumbrados ya a tratar con muchos latinos*), a majority of Ecuadorian respondents rate their interactions with them as "neutral" (*neutrales*) at worse and "perfect" (*perfectos*) at best (Lina, 30; Patrick, 32). Even the South American respondents who perceive some negativity when obtaining papers concede that administrators are "by no means racists" (*no es que sean racistas*) and are often "very friendly" (*muy amables*) (Kris, 39; Patrick, 32). All Ecuadorians find the bureaucracy in Spain "quick" (*rápido*) and generally effective (Yana, 20).[373]

On the other hand, non-Spanish speaking Bulgarians are lost in the confusing Spanish administrative system and are conflicted about their interactions with immigration officers. One fifth of the interviewees found Madrilenian administrators to be "polite" (*вежливи*), to "do their job" (*вършат си работата*), and to "treat everyone the same" (*държат се с всички еднакво*) (Jack, 28; Tanner, 64; Tonya, 45; Xander, 20). However, one sixth of the Balkan migrants perceived negative treatment when dealing with immigration authorities, with one person sharing that Madrilenian administrators "treat us like dogs" (*държат се с нас като с кучета*) (Sylvester, 29). The East Europeans would be denied benefits, put under more scrutiny and higher requirements, and accused of purposefully cheating the system. As one participant put it, "when you tell

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[372] Author's translation from original quote in Spanish: "Quizá la aproximación ha sido más fácil para la gente que hablaba español, para le gente de América Latina que se acerca a preguntar, que se lo cuenta a otro compañero."
[373] Paragraph contains author's translation from original quotes in Spanish.

them you know English but not Spanish, they immediately start to make faces and create drama. They are huge language nationalists. When they see a foreigner, they look at him with contempt" (Xavier, 20).[374]

Bulgarians also have a much harder time than their South American counterparts in navigating the highly bureaucratic and complex process. The confusing requirements for documents, the conflicting instructions given by decentralized offices, and ineffective employees "drinking their coffee" (*пият си кафето*) while lines are bulging render obtaining papers "a nightmare" (*кошмар*) (Pam, 39; Sylvester, 29). Interactions with immigrant services are excruciatingly slow. A majority of the Balkan participants describe "the insane lines" wrapping around the infamous Diego de Leon Street and "sleeping on the streets for days" in tents, on carton boxes, or bare mattresses to obtain documentation (Anna, 36).[375] While a NIE should take one month to issue and work permits 3-4 months to issue or renew, permit issuance or renovations prior to EU accession often took eight or more months on average (Angloinfo, 2015; M24-TU; M25-TU; M34-TU; M35-TU).

Finally, Madrid's trade unions advocate for foreign workers and provide training, juridical help and employment resources, regardless of nationality or membership (M23-TU; M24-TU; M25-TU; M26-TU; M34-TU; M35-TU). However, Eastern Europeans find syndicates foreign, "useless," and even "annoying" (Hunter, 29; Van, 30).[376] On the other hand, Ecuadorians use the benevolent actors frequently, leading SIPTU

[374] Paragraph contains author's translation from original quote in Bulgarian, including: "Точно, че и от езика са супер големи националисти. Като видят например някой чужденец и го гледат едва ли не с пренебрежение, че не знае техния език или нещо такова" (Xanvier, 20).
[375] Paragraph contains author's translation from original quote in Bulgarian, including: "Опашките за луди, където останаха в историята, километрични… Хората отиваха и спяха на улицата дни наредллл" (Anna, 36),
[376] Author's translation from original quote in Bulgarian: "Да, ходихме в Профсъюза и нищо не стана" (Hunter, 29), "Не мога да ги понасям, много са ми досадни" (Van, 30).

representatives to conclude that "Latin Americans are very unionist" (M24-TU; M33-TU).[377]

In sum, Ecuadorian migrants have better access to immigration, economic, or security institutions in Madrid than their Bulgarian counterparts. While the South Americans have somewhat strained relationships with law enforcement officers, the similar Spanish-speaking immigrants can easily navigate foreigner's officers and strategically employ the help of trade unions. They are assigned a 4 for this component of social incorporation. Balkan migrants are not as likely to be stopped by police and find public officials polite. However, the different East Europeans experience discrimination at the hands of immigration officers and are lost in the lengthy, complex, and inconsistent procedure of obtaining documentation. They find public offices ineffective and are unable to take advantage of benevolent local actors like SIPTU. Bulgarians are assigned an intermediary value for this indicator of social integration (**Table VII.1**).

VII.8. Racism and Discrimination

VII.8.1. Racism and Discrimination in Dublin

Finally, Polish immigrants in Ireland are much less likely than their Nigerian counterparts to experience racism or discriminatory treatment. Polish workers face discrimination in the economic sphere and in their access to some social resources. Nonetheless, they experience little discrimination in their interaction with the Irish public or individual administrators and are rarely the victims of racist crimes. On the other hand, Nigerians encounter racism in the cultural, social, and economic spheres in Dublin.

[377] Author's translation from original quote in Spanish: "La gente latinoamericana es muy sindicalista."

Discrimination takes the form of bullying and exploitation in the workplace or inadequate access to healthcare, for instance. However, Nigerians are also the casualty of verbal abuse and even physical assaults on Dublin's streets and are the primary target of scaremongering and stereotyping by the Irish media.

The system to report racism in Ireland is fragmented and inadequate (D25-J). The National Consultative Committee on Racism and Interculturalism (NCCRI), the main body responsible for reporting on racism in Ireland, was eliminated in 2007. The Garda collects statistics on racist crime, yet as a representative of the Racial, Intercultural, and Diversity Office shared, few immigrants report racially-motivated attacks to the police due to mistrust (D11-L). Furthermore, Garda figures do not show discrimination in access to resources. Other institutions, like the Central Statistical Office, the Dublin City Council, or the Equality Tribunal, only collect data on the number of incidents in a specific sphere and do not include any details about the victim or the perpetrator of racism, in fear of identification. Consequently, documentation, the first step of resolving instances of discrimination, is insufficient or nonexistent.

The responsibility of reporting on racism, moreover, shifted from the Justice Department to the Office of the Minister for Integration (OMI) that was created in 2007. While more sympathetic to the migrant than its predecessor, the OMI is severely underfunded and spread thin between service provision, documenting discrimination, and issuing broad statements on equality (D29-ADMIN). Monitoring and enforcement agencies, like the National Employment Rights Authority in the case of work exploitation, are understaffed and communicate with employers rather than with the immigrant worker. Thus, abuses remain unreported and workers – vulnerable (D27-TU).

Table VII.8. Poor Treatment Based on Ethnic Origin in Dublin's Public Spaces, 2006 (in %)

	Restaurant, pub or club			Shop			Street or public transport			Violent crime		
	EE	BA	Avg	EE	BA	Avg	EE	BA	Avg	EE	BA	Avg
Never	88.5	79.8	86.4	86.5	69.7	82.8	75	46.7	65	92.3	88.5	89.6
1-2 times	7.3	10.8	8.7	6.9	14.4	9.2	18.8	28.6	21.2	6.5	8.2	8.3
3-4 times	1.9	2.9	1.8	3.9	8.7	4.4	2.7	8.7	5.9	0.4	1.8	1
>5 times	2.3	6.5	3.1	2.7	7.2	3.6	3.5	16	7.9	0.8	1.4	1

EE stands for East European; BA denotes Black Africans; N - Nigerians and Avg is the average among all nationalities.
Source: Reproduced from McGinnity et al., 2006.

With these deficiencies in mind, it is still clear that Eastern Europeans experience less racism than African workers in Ireland (D5-ADMIN). For instance, in 2006, East Europeans were much less likely than Nigerians or other Black Africans to face discrimination in a shop, in a restaurant, in a bar or club, on the street, or in public transportation. Eastern Europeans were also less likely than Nigerians to be the victim of violent crime in Ireland (McGinnity et al. 2006) (**Table VII.8**).[378]

The interview data confirms that Polish workers are rarely the subject of xenophobia in Ireland, while Nigerian immigrants experience racism daily. As one expert put it, "There are not many racist incidents against the Polish because they look like us. They are not identifiable, so they don't have as many problems" (D11-L; D18-P). On the other hand, "discrimination" based on "the color of their skin" is the main issue for the Nigerian community in Dublin (D13-P; D42-NO). The African group is considered

[378] Nigerians in particular were much more likely to experience poor treatment based on their ethnic origin than any other national group. For example, 35% were discriminated against in shops in Dublin compared to 9% on average. More than half (53%) faced discrimination on the street or in public transportation, compared to 21% on average. 10% were the victims of violent racist crime, compared to 1% on average (McGinnity et al., 2006).

"worse off" than other immigrants as it is subjected to "racist attack, abuse, maltreatment from law enforcement agents, discrimination in work place, everything" (Taylor, 30). Racism is so pervasive among the community that one official suggested that Nigerians would perceive discrimination even where it does not exist (D44-NO).

When prompted about racism, Polish immigrants rarely report instances of racial discrimination, even if they have heard of others being abused (D39-PO). Among participants, 45% were the victim of some instance of discrimination in Ireland. However, they tend to refer to exploitation at work more frequently rather than to harassment based on national or ethnic origin. Indeed, half of all incidents occurred in the workplace, with few occurring on the street, in public institutions, or on public radio.[379]

Discrimination against the Polish manifests itself in subtle forms. High-profile crimes against the Polish community have occurred in Ireland. In fact, two Polish men were murdered viciously in 2008 and another Polish immigrant was killed in 2010. Nonetheless, police, Polish representatives, and Polish respondents deny that the murders were racially-motivated (D11-L; D25-J; D29-ADMIN; D37-PO; D38-PO). Intoxication or drug abuse, as well as lack of education are considered the culprits of crime against Polish nationals, rather than racial prejudice (D9-P).

It is not violent crime but verbal abuse or unfavorable remarks that are the most common form of discrimination against the Polish in Ireland. Especially with economic downturn, some Polish workers are told to "stop taking Irish jobs" and to "go home" (D13-P). Among respondents who were the victim of discrimination, three quarters experienced verbal abuse, with one case of refusal of service, one physical attack, and

[379] It is important to note that many Polish immigrants discount experiences of discrimination and explain them away as "normal." Therefore, the incidence of racism among the Polish might be higher (D39-PO).

one person perceiving being treated differently in shops and restaurants on the basis of his nationality.[380] In half of the cases, Polish participants were told to "go back" to their own country. In two cases, respondents were told to "f* off" or were addressed rudely on the basis of their nationality (Nadine, 27; Peter, 32).

On the other hand, all of this project's Nigerian respondents report racism or discrimination in Dublin, with biased treatment occurring in most aspects of their lives. All Nigerian participants experience discrimination in private and public institutions, including work, school, the police station, or the immigration office. In some cases, discrimination is subtle. For instance, in everyday transactions like parking in a public lot, Nigerians would hear quips about their being "always after money" (D44-NO). They also report that Irish would give them "looks" if they spoke too loudly in public or would spit on the ground when they saw Africans passing by (D44-NO' Zach, 32). The most common form of racism is verbal abuse for African and Polish interviewees alike (D11-L). For instance, two respondents were told to "F* off" because they drove too nice of a car for an "ethnic person" (D44-NO; Stephen, 36). Participants were addressed with profanity and racial slurs by clients calling on the phone in a bank or taking their taxi. Most were yelled at to "go back to [their] f*ing country" and were called "nigger" on the street, in public transportation, when looking for accommodations, or in private businesses. Systematic discrimination prompted one interviewee to conclude about Nigerians, "We are at the lowest rung in the society" (Zach, 32).

Racism against African immigrants in Dublin can also be direct and severe, however. One third of respondents were physically assaulted at work or on the street, as

[380] However, the respondent who was attacked does not believe his nationality provoked the attack. He was attacked by a group of aggressive teenagers who wanted to create tension regardless of the victim's nationality (Ted, 28).

strangers slapped them or threw ice balls at them. One respondent active in the public sphere reported being placed in "racially-motivated" "life-threatening" situations more than once in Ireland (D42-NO). A high-profile murder of a Nigerian youth in Tyrrelstown was perceived to be racially-motivated, unlike in the Polish case (D25-J).

Not only the forms but also the underlying causes of discrimination differ between the two populations. Most incidents against the Polish are based on the misconception that they are "taking Irish jobs" (D4-P; D7-TU; D9-P; D36-PO; D39-PO; D41-NO). Polish respondents agree that the Irish public harbors some resentment against the Polish, since with economic downturn Irish relatives and friends have lost their jobs, while Polish workers remain employed. The competition for scarce resources produces stereotypes about this group. For instance, the issue of fraudulent social security claims is used to justify biased treatment against Polish workers in Dublin (D18-P). As economic fortunes rise, stereotyping of the East Europeans is less common.

On the other hand, racial and cultural dissimilarity from the Irish is the main cause of discrimination against African immigrants. Visual differences render Nigerians an easy target of racism, especially in a homogenous and "white" country like Ireland (D11-L; D13-P; D18-P; D41-NO). Common misconceptions about Nigerian migration, such as their abuse of the asylum system, illegal status, criminality, or poor work ethic, further fuel racism towards this group (D44-NO). Even the name Nigeria invokes a number of negative stereotypes, such as "bogus" status (D9-P; D18-P; D25-J; D42-NO). Racism towards Nigerian migrants in Ireland is exacerbated because it is rarely addressed. When racism is subtle and occurs in the form of "bad attitude," it is hard to prove or resolve (D44-NO). On the other hand, overt racism is rarely reported due to

mistrust in the police, fear that the *Gardai* will act as immigration agents, and belief they will do nothing to remedy the situation (D11-L).

The Irish media reinforces and perpetuates the negative stereotypes of Nigerian migrants in Dublin. News publications are generally silent on migration to Ireland, in effect glossing over the fact that Dublin is a multicultural city (D41-NO, D42-NO). Nonetheless, media outlets are more vocal on the Nigerian community than on the Polish one and portray the former in a negative light (D1-J; D11-L; D25-J). Especially right-leaning publications like the *Irish Independent* adopt a tough stance on immigration and mimic the Department of Justice's language of control (D25-J). Public figures are particularly "irresponsible" in their discourse of Nigerians (D43-NO). As the media branded Nigerians "sponges" abusing the system, the African community in Dublin is prevented from "being taken as a serious, hard-working group of people" (D44-NO; Taylor, 30). It was the media that institutionalized the link between black skin color, Nigerian nationality, asylum seeker legal status, laziness, and fraud of the social welfare system (D1-J; D42-NO). As one interviewee put it, "the Western media doesn't consider Africa good just generally. Most of them are sitting down drinking coffee and writing about Africa and they haven't even been there. So they think Africa is all about war, disease, AIDS, and other negatives" (Zach, 32). Nigerian representatives are concerned that such irresponsible language and stereotyping might translate into a far-right political party in the new immigration country of Ireland (D41-NO; D43-NO). A case in point is the right-leaning Emmett Oliver using *the Irish Independent* as a platform to lament the severe impact of non-EU immigrants on Irish service jobs, a claim that guises cultural and racial concerns in economic terms (D11-L; D27-TU).

The Irish media also created some negative stereotypes about Polish immigrants in Dublin (D26-ADMIN). For instance, in 2004 news publications drummed up the issue of abuse of child benefits by Polish workers. Irish media outlets also report on the higher incidence of car accidents caused by reckless Polish drivers (D32-PO; D35-PO; D39-PO). Sensationalist stories, such as Polish immigrants hunting and eating Irish swans, were also reported (Kevin, 27; Richard, 34). Nonetheless, as politicians tried to capitalize on stereotypes of the East Europeans, they undermined their political position and in fact lost electoral votes. When the mayor of Limerick "played the race card" by arguing that unemployed East Europeans should be "sent home", news outlets published a passionate rebuttal by Polish groups (D41-NO). Some newspapers also publicized the plight of Polish workers trying to fulfill the Habitual Residence Condition (D1-J). As the Polish community has its own press in Ireland in newspapers like *Polska Gazeta*, *Gazeta*, or the Polish section of the *Irish Herald*, it has ample opportunity to rectify its image in the host country (D38-PO).

Indeed, the Irish media are generally silent or favorable towards on the subject of Polish immigrants in Dublin.[381] As the Polish community is perceived to fit into normal life in Ireland, the media only report on the Polish in the case of a "crisis," such as the murder of Pawel in 2010 (D32-PO; D37-PO). Irish newspapers address the issue of the Polish with empathy and fascination at their cultural similarity and strong work ethic (D1-J; D17-ADMIN). The media tout Polish immigrants who invigorate lackluster churches or bringa comfortable sense of cultural diversity to the city (D1-J; D32-PO). More than half of respondents agree that Irish newspapers are quite positive in their

[381] One third of the interviewees either do not consult the Irish media or suggest that Irish newspapers are no longer concerned with the Polish community, despite the initial fascination with this national group.

evaluation of the Polish community, described as hard-working, culturally similar, and interested in their new home.

In sum, Polish immigrants in Dublin are less likely to be the victims of racism or discrimination than their Nigerian counterparts. Polish workers experience some exploitation in employment and less than perfect access to social resources. With economic downturn, Polish immigrants are told to "go home" and stop taking Irish jobs. However, as economic fortunes in the receiving country improve, the East Europeans are mostly regarded with empathy in public and media discourse. The cohort is assigned a 3 for this component of social incorporation. On the other hand, Nigerians experience racism and racially-motivated crime in restaurants, bars, shops, public transportation, or on the streets of Dublin. They are not only verbally abused but sometimes physically assaulted on the basis of their skin color and nationality. The negative stereotypes perpetuated by the Irish media severally disadvantage this phenotypically different group. This collective is assigned a 1 for the final indicator of social integration (**Table VII.1**).

VII.8.2. Racism and Discrimination in Madrid

While Latin Americans in Madrid are more likely to perceive racism or discriminatory treatment than East Europeans, the South Americans are also rated as the most sympathetic and familiar group in the city. Balkan workers engender indifference among Spaniards. Both Ecuadorians and Bulgarians face some discrimination in the work place or in their access to social services. Ecuadorians are profiled by police and could be the target of verbal abuse or "looks" on the street or in other public spaces. Bulgarians also perceive different treatment in public spaces or economic and social institutions,

especially with economic downturn. However, neither collective is the subject of physical assaults or overt forms of racism. The Spanish media is more harmful in the case of the Balkan migrants, by tying the newcomers to organized and violent crime and rising crime rates in the receiving city.

The Spanish system of combatting racism and promoting equality is weak and hardly independent. Instances of discrimination are only recorded if they include prejudice on the basis of ethnicity, race, and religion. Hence, Latin American and Maghrebi migrants are more likely to benefit from the system than East Europeans, for instance. Bias on the basis of nationality is not officially deemed racism, therefore excluding numerous immigrant collectives, including Bulgarians. The Council for the Promotion of Equality of Treatment and Non-Discrimination of Persons by Racial or Ethnic Origin, the main body charged with combatting discrimination, was only created in 2009 without political debate or input from civil society. It is mainly suited to investigate instances of discrimination. However, it has no authority to help victims in concrete ways and fails to provide juridical assistance, local resources for reporting and support, or alternative mediation procedures for traumatized victims. Unsurprisingly, despite anti-discrimination legislation and governmental efforts at equality, Spain ranks as 21 out of 31 OECD countries and only receives 49 out of 100 points in the MIPEX III immigrant integration report (Huddleston & Niessen, 2011).

Regardless of institutional shortcomings, instances of racism are relatively rare in Spain. There were 381 racist crimes committed in 2013, compared to 109 in Ireland, an incidence per 1,000 of natives lower than in the Irish case (Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe [OSCE], 2015). Four in ten of all foreigners in Madrid have

never been the victims of racism, with only one quarter suffering prejudice more than two times. The majority of biased treatment occurs in the workplace, moreover, reflecting the perception of immigrants as an economic threat rather than an essentially different "Other" whose dissimilarity can never be reconciled with the Spanish way of life (Bertozzi, 2010, p. 28). Despite the downturn, Spaniards remain generally tolerant of newcomers in their midst with 70% viewing migration in very positive terms, and only 13% perceiving foreign cohorts as a negative (Comunidad de Madrid. 2012b). Acceptance in spheres as distinct as work and study, common living spaces, and even personal relationships is high and ranges between 74% and 90% in 2008. What is more, violence against the foreign-born is not more widespread than that against the native population (D'Ancona & Martínez, 2009, p. 314).

Table VII.9. Discrimination Based on Broad National Group in Madrid, 2008 (in %)

	Latin America	**Eastern Europe**	**Older EU**	**Asia**	**Africa**
Work	32.5	27.1	19.8	14.5	30.9
Neighborhood	19.3	15.8	10.3	17.1	22.5
Police	21.3	9.3	16	8.1	18.2
School	20.6	13.1	5.9	7.7	11.2
Administration	13.6	7.5	8	5.8	9.7
Public transport	16.1	5.7	4.6	5.5	7.1
Sport fields	6.8	3.3	2.8	2.8	1

Source: Reproduced from Ayuntamiento de Madrid, 2010.

When one turns to the two groups of interest to this dissertation, it appears that Latin Americans are much more likely to experience discrimination in all spheres of life in Madrid than are Eastern Europeans. In some cases almost twice as many South Americans than Balkan migrants perceive prejudiced treatment in areas as diverse as the

school, public transportation, or by the police (**Table VII.9**) (Ayuntamiento de Madrid, 2010). Interestingly, Ecuadorians are also among the best liked nationalities amidst Spaniards and engender much more sympathy and kinship by the native population than other immigrant collectives. To demonstrate, 11.8% of respondents in a 2008 report by OBERAXE were most sympathetic to Latin American immigrants, while only 1.4% found strong affinities with East Europeans. On the other hand, Moroccans, Romanians and East Europeans ranked among the least sympathetic groups in the country (D'Ancona & Martínez. 2009, p. 328). In Madrid, older EU migrants were considered the most sympathetic group (index of 6.8), but South Americans were a close second (index of 6.3), and Eastern Europeans ranked closer to the lower end of the spectrum with an index similar to that of Maghrebi and Sub-Saharan immigrants (Ayuntamiento de Madrid, 2010). Finally, good relations between Latin Americans and Spaniards prevail in Madrid's neighborhoods, public spaces and shops. In fact, South American migrants are the most likely cohort to experience positive or at least cordial interaction with their hosts on Madrilenian streets, in public parks and gardens, or on squares and plazas, where social interaction often occurs (**Table VII.10**).

Table VII.10. Relationships in Madrid's Public Spaces, 2008 (in %)

	Neighborhood			**Streets, parks, plazas**			**Shops**		
	Good	**Bad**	**Cordial/ indifferent**	**Good**	**Bad**	**Cordial/ indifferent**	**Good**	**Bad**	**Cordial/ Indifferent**
Latin America	71.4	1.7	26.9	64.1	0.7	35.2	58	0.3	41.7
Eastern Europe	75.5	0.5	24	61.7	0.3	38	60.4	0.3	39.3
Older EU	83	0.6	16.4	67.1	0.2	32.7	72.2	0.5	27.3
Africa	76.8	4.3	18.9	55.2	0	44.8	59.4	0.9	39.7
Asia	70	2.3	27.7	48.2	0.3	51.5	54.3	0.7	45

Source: Reproduced from Ayuntamiento de Madrid, 2010.

The interview data suggest that Ecuadorian migrants experience mostly positive relationships with the local population. The South Americans face some discrimination in their access to the economic and social spheres, or at the hands of Spanish police. However, they are rarely the target of violent crime and are more likely to hear about instances of racism than experience it first-hand. One third report subtle racism. “Lack of confidence” by employers, or “someone always saying something on the street” are the most common forms of discrimination (Lina, 30; Patrick, 32).[382] However, most respondents concede that they faced no personal injustices or “aggressive” (*agresivas*) treatment (Lina, 30). As Spaniards are “very friendly” (*muy amables*) and Ecuadorians “share many things with them” (*compartimos con ellos muchas cosas*), discriminatory treatment is the exception rather than the rule (Ethan, 39; Kris 39). Spanish stakeholders and ethnic representatives conclude that “there are no large problems of racism, of segregation” for the South Americans (M18-ADMIN; M32-ADMIN).[383]

Much like their Ecuadorian counterparts, Bulgarians in Madrid rarely experience overt discrimination or acts of aggression on the basis of their nationality. However, the Balkan migrants and their representatives are more aware of discrimination than the South American collective. Half of the participants who spoke on the issue, and a majority of ethnic representatives, perceived biased treatment, even if rare and mild. Most commonly, while people are “outwardly polite” (*уж възпитани*), they do have “an attitude” (*различно отношение*) to the Balkan migrants and “look at them differently”

[382] Paragraph contains author’s translation from original quote in Spanish, including: “Eso sí, alguien siempre dice algo en la calle… Pero luego cosas más agresivas, la verdad es que no tuve la oportunidad de pasar” (Lina, 30), “Me he sentido un poquito discriminado en la desconfianza que tenían mis jefes” (Patrick, 32).
[383] Author’s translation from original quote in Spanish: “No hay grandes problemas de racismo, de segregación.”

(*гледат ни накриво*) (Izzy, 40; Sasha, 33). Especially older and lesser educated Madrilenians might "make a face" at Bulgarians or "give them bad looks" on the street, in public transportation, or at work (Idris, 30; M3-BO).[384] Occasionally, verbal abuse is reported, with natives sending the East Europeans "back home" or swearing at the newcomers for "taking Spanish jobs" (Idris, 30; M2-BO).[385] Calling the newcomers "*búlgaro*" with disdain is the most common form of discrimination in Madrid's public spaces (Sylvester, 29). As negatively is mostly connected to the economic situation of the receiving country, some ethnic associations suggest that "there has not been an issue with human rights violations" and discrimination should be discounted (M2-BO).[386] However, community representatives also concede that "Spaniards will never accept us as 'Spanish'" and "as equals" (M7-BO; M8-BO). Thus, eventual economic boom might not reduce bias against the culturally-different Bulgarians. [387]

The Spanish media reinforces the stereotypes associated with the Balkan cohort, while it is neutral or positive when it comes to Latin Americans. The autochthonous public interprets the negatives of migration pervasively as "crime and insecurity" (*delincuencia e inseguridad*) (33%), followed by "problems of integration and cultural clashes" (*problemas de integración y choque cultural*) (11%), "competition for work" (*competividad en el mercado de trabajo*) (11%), and "too many people" (*exceso de*

[384] Paragraph contains author's translation from original quote in Bulgarian, including: "Ами ако те разберат, че си чужденец ти правят една физиономия" (Idris, 30), "Доста хора се чустват гледани с лошо око" (M3-BO).
[385] Author's translation derived from original quote in Bulgarian: "Ами ако те разберат, че си чужденец ти правят една физиономия, някои са по- некултурни и те пращат да си вървиш на майната си и да си вървиш в страната и да не им взимаш работата."
[386] Author's translation from original quote in Bulgarian: "Големи конфликти не сме срещали, не е имало проблеми с човешки права."
[387] Author's translation derived from original quote in Bulgarian: "Ние никога няма да станем испанци, те никога няма да ни приемат като испанци" (M7-BO), "Не сме равни, но гледат с малко по- друго око" (M8-BO).

inmigrantes) (10%).[388] Crime, moreover, is associated with the East of Europe, and less so with Colombia, Peru, Chile, or Morocco (D'Ancona & Martínez, 2009, p. 225).

Local media outlets capitalize on the connection between immigration, rising crime rates, and xenophobia (Álvarez, Gutiérrez, & González, 2012, p. 8; Fernández, Manavella, & Ortuño, 2009). While the Spanish press is somewhat indifferent to the Balkan migrants, credit card fraud, car robberies, mafia connections, and calls for natives to beware of suspicious Bulgarians are common frames in Spanish media discourse (M1-BO). Ethnic associations and Spanish stakeholders acknowledge the media's fundamental role in institutionalizing the link between Eastern Europeans and violent crime in the country, including severe beatings, rape, or murder (M3-BO; M20-ADMIN; M33-ADMIN). They speak of the "amplification" and "exaggeration" of Bulgarians' violence, aggression and tendency to participate in large criminal organizations (M17-P; M35-P).[389] Even when news stories are more benevolent, like a piece on Bulgarian males' scheming airport customers, they still impact the public's opinion of the East Europeans as "mafia" who should "go back to where they came from" (M3-BO).[390]

Media outlets could capitalize on the illegality of some Latin Americans in Madrid. However, the second line of interest in recent publications are instead sensationalist stories of boats full of irregular North African and Sub-Saharan immigrants

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[388] Other associations include competition for social resources (*competividad por las ventajas sociales*) (3%), poverty, marginality, begging (*pobreza, marginalidad, mendacidad*) (3%), lowering wages (*abaratamiento del mercado de trabajo*) (3%), imposing their culture on Spaniards (*imposición de su cultura*) (2%). 1% of the Spanish find "everything" (*todos*) wrong with migration and 3% consider nothing to be wrong with the phenomenon, with 21% giving no response (D'Ancona & Martínez, 2009, p. 240). (Author's translation from original text in Spanish).

[389] Author's translation derived from original quote in Spanish: "Cuando se habla de la criminalidad muchas veces no se sabe si son los medios de comunicación que suelen confundir a veces las cosas y se amplifican mucho más…Es decir, ya no es que entren a una casa a robar estando los habitantes dentro, sino que encima hay una violencia física muy exagerada."

[390] Author's translation from original quote in Bulgarian: "Много от коментиращите статията испанци бяха на мнение, че емигрантите трябва да си ходят там, откъдето са дошли."

trying to storm Spanish borders (Fernández et al., 2009; M9-EO). Thus, instead of negativity, "performances, parties… people representing their countries, their customs" fill the news about Ecuadorians in the receiving context (Ethan, 39).[391]

In sum, Ecuadorians appear more likely to experience discrimination in Madrid than their Bulgarians counterparts. However, they are also the best liked foreign collective in tolerant Spain. The South Americans boast positive or at least cordial interactions with the autochthonous community and only face subtle and rare instances of discrimination in the receiving city. They are assigned a 4 for this indicator of social integration. Bulgarians are also unlikely to be the victims of racist crime and mostly experience discrimination in the forms of looks, attitude or negative comments on the part of Spaniards. However, as the media perpetuates the image of the Bulgarian as violent, aggressive, and criminal, prejudice against the East Europeans is likely to persist beyond economic downturn. The Balkan cohort is assigned an intermediate value for this indicator of social incorporation (**Table VII.1**).

VII.9. Conclusion

In conclusion, Poles and Nigerians in Dublin and Ecuadorians and Bulgarians in Madrid are disadvantaged in their access to social rights and resources, with social incorporation for all four groups lagging behind integration in the political or economic domain. Differences among the four cohorts are more subtle than in other spheres, with contextual variations between Spain and Ireland minimizing the gap between the two Eastern European cohorts especially. Nonetheless, relative differences remain.

[391] Author's translation from original quote in Spanish: "Por ejemplo, cuando hay actuaciones, fiestas, por ejemplo el día de la hispanidad, salen también representaciones de los diferentes países, se logra ver como representa la gente a sus países, sus costumbres. En el periódico, en las noticias, van firmando."

Surprisingly, non-EU Ecuadorians enjoy more social rights than European Bulgarians in Madrid and white Catholic Poles fare better than more established quasi-colonial Nigerians in Dublin. Nigerians are pronouncedly worse off than the other three collectives, even though their access to education or medical care is actually open and comparable to that of the other immigrant groups. The South Americans are most attuned to opportunities and entitlements in the Spanish social sphere, despite low performance in education or discrimination. Once again, culture, identity and belonging play a fundamental role in determining social integration patterns.

Ecuadorian migrants in Madrid deviate from the *organic iintegration* model extended by the dissertation. They have relatively low disposable income, concentrate in public schools or vocational tracks in Madrid and perform poorly in school, and experience some discrimination by Spanish police forces, local administrators, or in the receiving city's streets. Nonetheless, the similar Latin Americans still rank the highest on the social incorporation index constructed by this author (**Table VII.1**). The familiar South Americans receive more sympathy from their hosts than any other immigrant community in the city and are rarely the subject of racist crime or negative framing by the media. Since they view Madrid as an extension of their home country, Ecuadorians invest in owned accommodations in the receiving context and intermix with natives in the neighborhood more often than other foreign collectives. They utilize the generous healthcare system in Spain regularly, make adept use of the social security system, and strategically employ other benevolent institutions in the city.

Poles in Dublin and Bulgarians in Madrid occupy an intermediary position in terms of social incorporation (**Table VII.1**). Welcomed Poles who nonetheless perceive

themselves as isolated in the receiving city do not strive to increase their disposable income, concede to subpar rented housing away from their Irish hosts or disadvantaged immigrant-heavy schools, and rarely combat discrimination in the arbitrary Irish social security system. However, the East Europeans still fare better than their Nigerian and Bulgarians counterparts and experience *reluctant integration i*n their new home with the help of ethnic and native organizations. Indeed, the Polish rarely fall beyond the poverty line. Open access to rental accommodations by eager Irish landlords ensures residence in desirable neighborhoods. Little bullying, language resources and preferential admission policies in semi-private religious institutions serve to close the educational gap with the local population. Access to the police, the courts, the employment agency, or the Irish trade unions makes up for discrimination in other social domains. The Eastern European immigrants are rarely the victims of racism in Ireland, as the press portrays them in a positive light.

Bulgarians, who meet with indifference in Madrid despite their aspirations to fit into their new home's life, follow the *conflicted integration* model extended in the thesis and score similarly to, if somewhat lower than, their Polish counterparts (**Table VII.1**). The different Eastern Europeans have low disposable income. They inhabit crowded subpar accommodations in segregated, immigrant-heavy neighborhoods and are less likely to own their residences than other collectives. Few language resources and lack of encouragement by native teachers lead to low educational achievement. Use of the generous healthcare system is somewhat limited, prejudiced treatment in immigration offices occurs, and stereotyping in the Spanish media is well-established. Nonetheless, as they perceive themselves to belong in the receiving context, Bulgarians avail themselves

of the Madrilenian social security system and aspire to learn Spanish as to excel in the educational sphere. The Balkan workers are satisfied with their access to the generous medical system and other institutions like the police or local administrators and suggest that their European-ness shields them from overt racism in the host context.

Finally, despite relatively favorable access to some social institutions in Dublin, such as health and education, Nigerians in Ireland stand out as the most disadvantaged collective in terms of social incorporation (**Table VII.1**). The African migrants experience *blocked integration* due to their racial and cultural difference from the Irish. While Nigerians' disposable income is high, home ownership is somewhat satisfactory, and access to medical services is decent, exclusion by local stakeholders severely limits social rights for the ethnic community. Poverty rates are high, isolation from the rental market is pervasive, and residential and educational segregation are the norm. Bullying in primary and secondary education, higher costs for medical care, stereotypes of abuse of the social welfare system, and unfair treatment by police or immigration officers all serve to compound deficiencies in the Africans' social incorporation. Nigerian immigrants are the most likely victims of discrimination and racism by Irish and other perpetrators, as the Irish media and political officials perpetuate this group's negative image.

Surprisingly, tolerant Spain, explicitly focused on the social incorporation of its immigrants, provides fewer resources for the social inclusion of its foreign-born than homogenous exclusionary Ireland. Educational and anti-discrimination provisions are weaker in Madrid than in Dublin, for instance. Local identity perceptions can partly explain the anomaly. Language nationalism precludes the introduction of key resources for non-Spanish speakers in Madrid's classroom and explains the low achievement of

Bulgarian immigrants, for instance. Focus on Madrid's Latin American population which can navigate the similar social system relatively easily obscures more substantial subjective obstacles in front of other foreign populations in the city. Self-image as a tolerant country with ample free resources for all residents obfuscates the need for extra protections for different non-Iberian immigrants. Immigrants' self-identification provides for the other piece of the puzzle. Even if Poles are granted innumerable resources for social integration in Dublin, they are unlikely to employ the generous healthcare system, for instance, if they perceive no stake in the receiving community. Awareness of cultural boundaries and ethnic communities' self-perceptions is paramount for local stakeholders trying to accommodate their multicultural societies.

CHAPTER VIII

CONCLUSION: CONTESTING THE "EUROPEAN DREAM"

Migrants are in Europe to stay. They travel to countries that previously sent workers abroad. They come from ever more diverse sources and include both post-colonial and post-communist newcomers. They are conscious actors who contest host communities' political, economic and socio-cultural space. Just as European receivers, and especially new migration locations, are hard pressed to accommodate their *de facto* multicultural societies, xenophobia is on the rise among previously tolerant publics and elites. Even the migrant workers so necessary to close labor and demographic gaps on the Continent are politicized and racialized to justify exclusion or differential treatment. Despite the urgency of the migration issue, however, the literature continues to struggle with pinpointing the determinants of immigrant reception and incorporation, especially among the first generation and in new immigrant receiving countries. Emphasis on economic costs and benefits, the structure of institutions in the receiving context, the electoral success of right-wing parties, the outlook and genesis of citizenship laws, or the decline of host state sovereignty leaves larger issues of what actually contributes to the integration and inclusion of foreigners unanswered.

This study set out to fill the gaps left by the literature. Using the cases of Poles and Nigerians in Dublin and Ecuadorians and Bulgarians in Madrid, it provides a response to three research questions: 1) How do Western European receiving societies construct inclusion and exclusion of the immigrant?; 2) Why do immigrants belong or fail to fit in?; 3) How do inclusion-exclusion dynamics and immigrants' perceptions affect incorporation outcomes? By synthesizing theory and methods from the fields of

political science and sociology, exploring innovative cases at the local level of analysis, bringing migrant agency back to considerations of integration, and turning to the understudied role of culture, the project demonstrates that identity politics influence both the reception and incorporation opportunities before immigrant communities.

VIII.1. Executive Summary

Just as immigration policy is shifting up to the supranational level, local identity characteristics are increasingly prominent for immigrant reception. Publics and elites in cities receiving immigrants justify the welcome or exclusion of the newcomers not so much on the basis of economic utility, as much as in view of how well foreign workers fit into the locality's ideal identity. As Chapter III establishes, strong work ethic, white European ethnicity, Catholicism, English language skills, historical affinities, and friendly disposition, are the characteristics that frame kinship between the Irish and the Polish, while also reasserting these positive qualities in Dubliners' own self-identification. Nigerian immigrants are in turn narrated as fundamentally different on the basis of the same traits, where the coexistence of the two immigrant groups makes these categories even more meaningful. In the case of Madrid, Ecuadorians are admitted in view of their common existence with Spaniards in an Ibero-American space. They share with their hosts the Castellan language, historical ties, be those colonial or more recent parallels of emigration and a spirit of reciprocity, Catholic religion, extroverted disposition and social interaction patterns, as well as cultural rituals. Despite Bulgarians' European white ethnicity and similar historical trajectories, the Balkan migrants are constructed as different or at least dubious by Madrilenians as they are serious, criminal,

authoritarian, Orthodox, ethnically suspect, and participants in different customs and interaction patterns. In all four cases, commonalities between desirable immigrant populations and natives are emphasized or invented while connections with undesirable collectives are downplayed. Even though race/ethnicity, religion, language, history, disposition/culture, and work ethic are crucial markers of similarity or difference across all groups, local context determines which identity variations matter more. "Hard work" and white European ethnicity are highly significant in the case of Dublin, for instance, while common language and cultural habits are essential in the case of Madrid.

While receiving societies create a climate of welcome or exclusion for foreign workers, based on perceptions of migrants' cultural distance or proximity to local identity, immigrant agency matters too. What the newcomers do with the opportunities presented to them depends on their own conception of belonging and isolation in host cities. The cultural categories established in public discourse underlie the foreigners' sentiments as well. According to Chapter IV, rigid cultural self-identification and embeddedness in ethnic networks, as well as temporary migration plans with an economic rationale, preclude commitment to life in Dublin among Polish workers. Ethnoracial differences and their effects undermine the ability or will to belong among Nigerian migrants in Ireland. Both groups place little stake in utilizing opportunities or combatting obstacles to incorporation in Dublin. Linguistic, historical, and cultural commonalities render Madrid an extension of the motherland for Ecuadorian workers. Consequently, the South Americans stay in the receiving city, interact with natives, and build their future in both Ecuador and Spain. Strong national self-identification and intense nostalgia for the homeland are counteracted by a common European destiny with

the Spanish and concern for presenting the family unit with more opportunities abroad in the case of Bulgarians. As they deem the receiving city the ideal image of their own currently corrupt homeland, the Balkan migrants aspire to fit into Madrid's life.

Table VIII.1. Immigrant Incorporation in Dublin and Madrid

		Host Society	
		Accept	*Reject*
Immigrant Group	*Belong*	***Organic Integration*** (Ecuadorians in Madrid)	***Conflicted Integration*** (Bulgarians in Madrid)
	Don't Belong	***Reluctant Integration*** (Polish in Dublin)	***Blocked Integration*** (Nigerian in Dublin)

Inclusion-exclusion dynamics shaped by the host society interact with immigrants' own perceptions of welcome-rejection and stake in receiving cities to lead to different integration outcomes in the political, economic, and social spheres. When foreign communities are welcomed and see themselves to belong in their new homes, they are likely to both have opportunities to fit in and actually employ these opportunities to adapt to life in the receiving context. On the other hand, when immigrants are excluded and do not consider themselves to belong, they face obstacles to incorporation, which they are unlikely to overcome. Culture and identity underlie these outcomes.

As Chapters V-VII demonstrate, Ecuadorians are better poised to adapt to life in Madrid than the other three cohorts of interest, as they are both welcomed and believe to fit in the host city (**Table VIII.1**). The South Americans experience what this dissertation

calls *organic integration* in all spheres of life in Spain. As Chapter V argued, similar Ecuadorians are the beneficiaries of open entry into the Spanish labor market, a fast-tracked naturalization process, periodic regularization programs, and ever more liberal political participation rules. They naturalize in large numbers, vote in local elections, unionize and found a number of civic associations to signal their belonging in the receiving city. According to Chapter VI, the Latin Americans might be exploited in the economic sphere, yet face little discrimination in recruitment or in their interactions with employers and coworkers. They work mostly according to qualifications and education, are employed even in crisis, have adequate workplace conditions, and are satisfied with their professional development in Madrid. Transition to Madrid's economic sphere is smooth for the Spanish-speaking, Iberian newcomers with knowledge of the informal work relationships which characterize Spain. Chapter VII shows that despite relatively low disposable income, concentration in disadvantaged educational institutions, and some discrimination by Spanish police or in Madrid's streets, Ecuadorians are rarely the subject of racist crime in Spain or negative treatment by the media. The South Americans are relatively integrated in the receiving city's residential sphere and own their accommodations. Since they are invested in life in the city and perceive Madrid as their second home, Ecuadorians utilize the generous healthcare system regularly, make adept use of the social security system, and strategically employ other institutions in the receiving community.

On the other hand, Nigerians are most disadvantaged in their incorporation outcomes among the four cases. They experience *blocked integration*, since their lack of belonging in Dublin reinforces the discourse of exclusion they face in the host city

(**Table VIII.1**). As Chapter V shows, the Africans might vote and run in Dublin's elections and set up ethnic associations, yet they rarely hold public positions of power. Political activity rates remain low, with interpretations of legal status and recent policy developments stripping this group of political entitlements. Chapter VII demonstrates that Nigerian immigrants have the lowest employment rates and highest unemployment rates among the four populations discussed in the dissertation. The racially different African migrants face profound economic obstacles, like severe deskilling, pervasive discrimination in recruitment, and highly inferior working conditions and workplace relationships, which they are unable and unwilling to combat. Thus, they exhibit very low levels of job satisfaction and even desperation with their economic status in Dublin. As Chapter VII details, exclusion extends to the social sphere. Nigerian immigrants might own their residences in Dublin, yet live mostly with other Nigerians in less desirable neighborhoods. They experience institutional and subjective barriers to accessing rental accommodations, educational institutions, social welfare offices, or other governmental institutions like the police. The Africans are subjected to overt and pervasive racism in the receiving context.

Poles in Ireland and Bulgarians in Spain occupy an intermediate position in terms of integration outcomes. The Polish in Dublin undergo *reluctant integration* and represent the second best outcome among the four groups, as their lack of belonging in the host city is counteracted by the eagerness of the Irish to include them (**Table VIII.1**). According to Chapter V, privileged legal status, a plethora of legal and policy entitlements, and a number of welcoming Irish political actors are pulling the similar East Europeans into Dublin's political life. Therefore, despite their own perceptions of

difference and low naturalization, voting or unionization rates, Poles are being drawn into Irish political parties and civic institutions. As Chapter VI shows, Polish workers rarely work according to qualifications in Ireland, even if downward occupational mobility tends to occur in the home country rather than upon migration. The East Europeans face exploitation and worse working conditions than natives, which they are unwilling to contest in view of their low stakes in the city. However, the welcomed Poles are recruited by Irish employers, are treated favorably by native managers, coworkers, and customers, and remain at work even during downturn. Unsurprisingly, they are very satisfied with their work in Ireland, earning the name "contented proletariat." According to Chapter VII, Poles in Dublin have low disposable income, rarely own their accommodations, concentrate in disadvantaged schools, and have limited access to social welfare. Nonetheless, the East Europeans have open entry into the Irish rental market and are granted resources to overcome the educational gap. They are rarely the victims of racism and have full access to the healthcare system, the police, the courts, the training and employment agency, or Irish trade unions.

Finally, Bulgarians, who view themselves to belong in Spain, yet face indifferent or negative reception by their hosts, undergo *conflicted integration* in Madrid (**Table VIII.1**). As Chapter V shows, despite European Union citizenship, Bulgarians are disadvantaged by local, regional and national legal and policy developments and are granted few resources for political incorporation. Thus, the Balkan workers rarely naturalize or participate in local elections or trade unions. However, they set up a disproportionately high number of ethnic associations in Madrid to express their belonging in the city. According to Chapter VI, natives' mistrust and the language barrier

limit access to the Spanish labor market for the Eastern Europeans and translate into downward occupational mobility, subpar working conditions, and some bullying by Spanish employers. However, Bulgarians workers eager to belong are satisfied with work in Madrid and fight for their labor rights. As Chapter VII demonstrates, the different Balkan workers are relatively segregated residentially from the Spanish and occupy crowded accommodations. They are granted few language or other educational resources, and have low disposable income. Still, a stake in their new home leads Bulgarians to avail themselves of the generous Madrilenian social security system and aspire to learn Spanish as to excel in the educational sphere. The Balkan workers are satisfied with their access to the medical system and other institutions or local administrators and suggest that their European-ness shields them from overt racism in the host context.

VIII.2. Theoretical and Methodological Implications

The findings carry several theoretical and methodological implications for migration and European scholarship. In particular: a) culture and identity should be brought back into migration studies; b) immigrants should be considered conscious actors whose decisions and perceptions matter for incorporation outcomes; c) the local level of analysis is increasingly important with policy supranationalization and the resurgence of nationalism in Europe, especially in new immigrant receivers; d) a cross-disciplinary theoretical and methodological approach can only benefit migration scholarship.

First, the cases of Dublin and Madrid attest to the role of culture and identity in determining reception and integration outcomes on the Continent and beyond. The findings show that culture and ethnicity increasingly determine how key European

stakeholders talk about and deal with the issue of migration, and what happens to diverse immigrant communities after they are admitted. This rising importance has not been fully reflected in current migration scholarship. Immigrant reception is rarely the focus of inquiry, with immigration policy and border control taking center stage instead (Guiraudon & Lahav, 2000). Inclusion and exclusion are discussed from the perspective of the economic costs and benefits of migration (Castles & Kosack, 1985; Miles 1986, 1987), the ethnic capital of immigrant communities in the form of social networks (Massey et al., 1987; Zhou & Logan, 1989), or the preferences of national interest groups (for ex., Freeman, 1995). Numerous studies continue to track the rise of Europe's right-wing parties and their effects on the mainstream political process (Golder, 2003; Kitschelt, 2007). While these perspectives offer rich contributions to understanding immigrant reception, they leave gaps as well. For instance, the economic approach cannot explain why cheaper yet different Bulgarians workers have a more limited access to Madrid's labor market than more expensive but familiar Ecuadorian laborers. Social networks cannot account for differences in reception among immigrant populations arriving in host societies in the same time frame or for the fact that the best established among the four groups, Nigerians in Dublin, is also the most disadvantaged. Studies of the lifecycle of extreme right parties omit considerations of the cultural underpinnings of the politics of resentment and have little to offer in countries with no nationalist parties. Explicit consideration of how perceptions of identity and cultural dynamics influence reception discourses and actual outcomes therefore can only enrich the existing literature.

Scholarship on immigrant incorporation can benefit from discussion of culture and identity as well. Currently, the focus falls on citizenship rules (Brubaker, 1992;

Howard, 2006), the structures of national institutions (Etzinger, 2000; Ireland, 2000), or the declining ability of the liberal state to exclude, include, or incorporate altogether (Hollifield, 1992; Soysal, 1994). The main questions are how specific integration policies affect immigrant political participation and ethnic conflict (Givens, 2007). However, policy often fails to achieve its intended goals and can be implemented very differently in different contexts. The deterioration of Bulgarians' rights in Madrid with European Union citizenship is a case in point. Incorporation in spheres other than the political matters too, with belonging demonstrated to actually be a prerequisite for political and other participation rather than its effect. Local institutions treat distinct immigrant communities in profoundly different ways despite standard rules. Declining sovereignty actually makes identity politics more significant, where perceptions and emotions matter as much as legal rules or institutional outlook. In fact, discussion of incorporation should inevitably be linked to study of reception and inclusion-exclusion as both are underlined by the same cultural dynamics. It is commonsensical that the climate in which an immigrant arrives would define long-term opportunities to fit in, yet the proposition is rarely empirically followed by the literature. This study is an attempt to do just that.

Second, the thesis makes a case for immigrant agency in determining incorporation outcomes. As shown above, current scholarship on immigrant integration focuses on the characteristics of receiving state and pays little heed to the immigrant as a subject who chooses to acquire citizenship, buy an apartment, or look for a job that better fits his or hers qualifications. The sociological and anthropological literature has a lot to contribute here by focusing on the individual integration process. However, even the neo-assimilation and segmented assimilation models emphasize newcomers' "human capital"

and objective characteristics (Alba & Nee, 2003; Portes and Zhou, 1993). Immigrants' ethnicity, culture, or self-identification are rarely analyzed, even though these attributes have a role to play in immigrants' preferences, motivations, and actions in the host state (Fennema & Tillie, 1999; Berger et al., 2004). Furthermore, few authors emphasize the intersection between migrants' strategies and perceptions and the institutional and discourse landscape of the receiving society (Diehl & Schnell, 2006). The interaction between immigrant claims-making and the host state's political opportunity structures eclipses the significance of "cultural" opportunities structures (Guigni & Passy, 2004). As Carmel and Cerami (2011) put it, surprisingly little attention is given to "emotions" and how they drive preference formation and limit policy. The thesis incorporates considerations of culture, identity, emotions, and immigrant belonging and perceptions as to address gaps left by the literature.

Third, the project demonstrates the rising significance of local-level analysis. Issues of immigrant reception and incorporation are usually studied at the national (for ex., Castles & Miller, 2009; Messina, 2007) and supranational levels (Geddes, 2001; Lavenex, 2006). They are mostly surveyed for European countries that have received large numbers of immigrants historically (for Germany, for ex., see Euwals, Dagevos & Roodenburg, 2010; Kahanec & Tosum, 2009; for France, consult Bleich, 2005; Weil & Crowley, 1994; for the UK, examples include Boswell, 2011, 2012; Favell, 1998). Less attention is dedicated to the local level (except for instance Jørgensen, 2012; Money, 1999) or to new immigrant receivers like Ireland (except for ex. Fanning, 2002, 2011 or Lentin & Moreo, 2012) or Spain (except for ex. Arango, 2009; Calavita, 2005). However, turning to the local level is paramount with rising resentment of Europeanization and

supranationalization among European publics and resurgent nationalism in European immigrant receivers (Brändlin, 2013). As the case of Madrid demonstrated, for instance, local perceptions and policy implementation can easily counteract the effect of nationally-crafted programs. It is also imperative to study new immigrant spaces like Dublin and Madrid that are yet to make the mistakes of traditional host contexts, yet have a lot to contribute to understanding of the dynamics and future of European institutions.

Fourth, the dissertation points to the benefits of a cross-disciplinary approach to the study of immigrant reception and integration. Sociological and anthropological refernces concerning individual characteristics, as well as issues of identity, context, and boundaries, enhance a political science literature focused on policy construction and the national state. For instance, while boundary work is commonly evoked to explain access to political membership in the nation-state (Zolberg, 1981), it is even more fruitful in elucidating local integration patterns. The focus on the immigrant embodied in the sociology literature might explain how individual agency thwarts exemplary institutional and policy arrangements. Most significantly, the ethnographic approach and qualitative discourse analysis so common in sociology and social anthropology bring depth and richness to a political science discipline largely dedicated to a quantitative, large-n method. Especially when surveying the local level, national and supranational public opinion polls offer a great starting point of analysis, yet fail to introduce nuance or even identify the attitudes and outcomes for specific migrant nationalities. Especially when combined with interviews of all key stakeholders and a sampling of the secondary literature, even a limited number of semi-structured interviews are crucial in providing

richness and insight into preference and perception formation and variation (Maxwell, 2008). In their turns, preferences and perceptions are what drive policies and outcomes.

Two additional contributions merit brief mention. The thesis is original, as it focuses on the first generation in its discussion of incorporation outcomes. While the integration process is a long-term endeavor that might only yield results for the children of immigrants, the perceptions and achievements of first-generation migrants are crucial, since they affect the incorporation trajectories of generations to come. As numerous studies have shown, if the first generation never "catches up" with natives, then the children of the foreign-born begin their journey to life in the receiving country from a disadvantaged position (Barban & White, 2011; DeVoretz, 2006). Moreover, the dissertation is unique as it juxtaposes Spain with Ireland rather than other Mediterranean countries. The comparison is fruitful since Dublin and Madrid have more in common than acknowledged by current scholarship. Looking at the two cities provides additional evidence for the relationship between culture and immigrant integration.

VIII.3. Practical Implications

Each of this dissertation's theoretical implications has practical consequences. First, if culture and identity matter for immigrant reception and incorporation outcomes, current integration programs in Europe and beyond might be misguided or simply ineffective. Even if national and supranational legal and policy rules present a fair way to treat ethnic and immigrant communities, their local implementation is likely to be characterized by individual and institutional discrimination, be it positive or negative. Chances are, however, that even national policies contain built-in inequalities among

immigrant communities based on cultural and identity perceptions. More importantly, discrimination often will occur regardless of rules or policies. Ensuring equal and open access to all spheres of life for immigrant collectives, therefore, might not simply be a matter of constructing equitable institutions or writing standard and liberal rules. Multiculturalism and tolerance might continue to be just a dream short of the redefinition of local (and national) identity and its internalization by native publics and elites. The European project, some argue, is one such chance of inculcating a more inclusive identity among Europeans. However, supranationalization often produces exactly the opposite result and leads to resentment of foreign impositions, the rise of right-wing parties and even more exclusion for foreign groups considered unable to fit in (Messina, 2014). States are ill-served by focusing solely on border control and specific admission rules when dealing with immigration. If reception is grounded in cultural dynamics and is intimately related to long-term integration outcomes, a holistic approach to the migration phenomenon will better resolve issues of exclusion and conflict in receiving societies.

Second, if immigrant agency and perceptions are crucial in the incorporation process, there might be little receiving states, cities, and neighborhoods can do to optimize integration outcomes. Indeed, even if there are plentiful resources for assimilation before immigrant communities, exclusion by publics or lack of belonging by immigrants committed to their home state or profoundly alienated in their new environment might thwart integration initiatives. Integration resources, therefore, are best directed not just at ensuring open access to institutions, but also at fostering kinship between hosts and newcomers.

Third and finally, while Europe is becoming an ever stronger and deeper Union, local dynamics might significantly counteract policy, discourse, and identity supranationalization and harmonization. The "shifting down" Guiraudon and Lahav (2000) describe as a mechanism to pursue national immigration prerogatives of control more effectively might not compliment the simultaneous "shifting up" to the European level but rather contradict it. Indeed, local identity is often defined as radically different from national image and historical tendencies and is constructed in opposition to external pressures from institutions like the EU. The continuous and even rising significance of the local level carries important implications for the future of Europe, therefore. If local identity variations define migration discourses and outcomes, then the dream of a Europe "unified in peace and democracy" might never materialize (EEC, 1957).

VIII.4. Limitations and Future Research Trajectories

While this project makes contributions to migration and European studies, it represents only the first step in establishing the significance of identity for immigrant incorporation and is not without its limitations. For one, the dissertation does not claim to discount alternative explanations of immigrant reception and incorporation. Neither does it claim to assess their relative significance compared to identity politics or their interaction with cultural factors. The thesis is only dedicated to showing that culture matters. How do economic cost-benefit calculations relate to perceptions of belonging? Does the nature of social networks alter opportunities for integration? What factors motivate radical right actors and how do these actors affect local identity perceptions? These are questions that need to be addressed by future research endeavors.

Moreover, the study does not claim to firmly establish a causal relationship between local identity on the one hand and reception, perceptions and incorporation on the other. The project demonstrates a correlation between culture and incorporation. To establish a more robust connection, future work will extend the argument to other case studies, comparing traditional and new immigrant receivers. It will also focus on following up with current interviewees, including migrants who chose to return to their home countries. Exploring how culture affects reception and integration in smaller cities other than state capitals is a productive future direction of research as well. Finally, turning to culturally-homogenous host spaces even further East that are only now their immigration regimes will provide a crucial test for the significance of identity politics in immigration studies.

Next, the thesis discusses reception discourses, attitudes, and climate. It does not purport to talk about policy formation, even though attitudes and perceptions are the starting point to the creation and implementation of policy. Further, it does not claim to discuss how local dynamics affect the national or supranational level. Looking for the mechanisms through which discourse and perceptions translate into specific rules and through which local discourses migrates "up" and "out" is a fruitful task that would enhance limited yet highly significant previous such efforts (for ex., Money, 1997).

The data underlying the dissertation are limited as well. The thesis employs a small number of semi-structured qualitative interviews with different local stakeholders. Interviews with immigrants are not representative of larger ethnic communities. However, they are not meant to be. Instead, they reinforce findings from the survey of community leaders, native administrators, and local publics. In combination with reports

and secondary sources, they provide a crucial level of nuance and richness to the findings and hint at how attitudes and perceptions form among foreign populations (Maxwell, 2008). Nonetheless, future work will employ larger-scale surveys and interviewee pools to better understand the mechanisms behind the formation of perceptions of belonging among immigrant populations abroad.

The thesis raises other important questions: Does European Union citizenship have any consequences for immigrant belonging or integration outcomes? Can it be counterproductive and how? Does exclusion lead to ethnic mobilization and under what conditions? Where is the European project headed? Future research will focus on addressing these and more.

APPENDIX A

INTERVIEW RESPONDENTS

Table A.1. Interview Respondents in Dublin: Elite Stakeholders

Group	Number
Employer	9
Trade union	5
Politician/city councilor	5
Employment/training agency	3
Migration, municipal	2
Migration, national	2
Journalist	2
Law enforcement	1
European Commission	1
Researcher	1
Polish organization	9
Nigerian organization	4
TOTAL	**44**

Table A.2. Immigrant Organizations in Dublin: Issue Areas

Orientation	Frequency
Social	9
Labor rights/economic	6
Anti-racism	2
Legal	2
Religious	1
Media	1
Political	1

Table A.3. Immigrant Respondents in Dublin

Group	Polish	Nigerian	Total
Male	12	10	22
Female	25	2	27
18-34 years old	24	5	29
35-44 years old	6	5	11
45 years old or older	7	2	9
Arrived before 2000	2	2	4
Arrived 2000-2004	26	7	33
Arrived 2005 or after	9	3	12
Admin/white-collar	7	5	12
Store/sales	7	1	8
Cleaner	6	1	7
Taxi/driver	3	1	4
Construction	3	0	3
Bar/restaurant	3	0	3
Nanny	2	0	2
Factory	2	0	2
Other low-skilled	2	1	3
Unemployed/N/A	2	3	5
TOTAL	**37**	**12**	**49**

Table A.4. Interview Respondents in Madrid: Elite Stakeholders

Group	Number
Employer	6
Trade union	6
Politician	3
Anti-discrimination	3
Migration, municipal	2
Migration, regional	1
Migration, national	1
Law enforcement	1
European Commission	1
Researcher	3
Bulgarian organization	9
Ecuadorian organization	1
TOTAL	**37**

Table A.5. Immigrant Organizations in Madrid: Issue Areas

Orientation	Frequency
Social	6
Economic	6
Legal	3
Cultural	3
Media	3
Political	1

Table A.6. Immigrant Respondents in Madrid

Group	Bulgarian	Ecuadorian	Total
Male	20	6	26
Female	19	4	23
18-34 years old	17	7	24
35-44 years old	9	3	12
45 years old or older	13	2	13
Arrived before 2000	2	2	4
Arrived 2000-2006	26	7	33
Arrived 2007 or after	11	1	12
Construction	12	3	16
Interna (domestic care)	9	0	9
Store/sales	2	2	4
Bar/restaurant	2	1	3
Security	3	0	3
Admin	1	2	3
Driver/taxi	0	2	2
Student	2	0	2
Other low-skilled	5	0	5
Unemployed/housewife	3	0	3
TOTAL	**39**	**10**	**49**

APPENDIX B

SURVEY INSTRUMENT AND RESULTS

B.1. Descriptive Statistics – Dublin Survey






Education
Frequency
50
40
30
20
10
0
Primary
Secondary
High school
Vocational
College
Higher
Education


Religion
Frequency
60
40
20
0
Catholic
Protestant
Presbyterian
Other Christian
Muslim
Not religious
Other
Religion


Identity
Frequency
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
Not sure
Neighborhood
City
Country
Europe
The world
Identity


Perceptions of largest immigrant group in Dublin
Frequency
80
60
40
20
0
Other
Polish
Perceptions of largest immigrant group in Dublin


Frequency of interaction with Polish workers
Frequency
40
30
20
10
0
Rarely
Occasionally
Often
Monthly
Daily
Frequency of interaction with Polish workers


Rating of services and interactions with Polish workers
Frequency
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
Don't know
Excellent
Very good
Good
Adequate
Poor
Very poor
Rating of services and interactions with Polish workers


Preference for Polish workers to other immigrants
40
30
20
10
0
Frequency
Prefer others
Prefer Polish
Preference for Polish workers to other immigrants


Preference for Polish workers to Irish workers
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
Frequency
Prefer Irish
Prefer Polish
Preference for Polish workers to Irish workers


Best qualities of Polish workers
Frequency
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
Cheap
Hard-working
Skilled
Know language
Easy to deal with and understand
Similar to Irish
Other
Best qualities of Polish workers


The Polish take away jobs from the Irish
Frequency
30
20
10
0
Don't know
Strongly agree
Agree
Somewhat agree
Somewhat disagree
Disagree
Strongly disagree
The Polish take away jobs from the Irish


The Polish are necessary in Dublin becasue there are no Irish to fill some jobs
Frequency
40
30
20
10
0
Don't know
Strongly agree
Agree
Somewhat agree
Somewhat disagree
Disagree
Strongly disagree
The Polish are necessary in Dublin becasue there are no Irish to fill some jobs


The Polish know English
Frequency
50
40
30
20
10
0
Don't know
Strongly agree
Agree
Somewhat agree
Somewhat disagree
Disagree
The Polish know English

The Polish are the immigrant group most similar to the Irish
Frequency
40
30
20
10
0
Don't know
Strongly agree
Agree
Somewhat agree
Somewhat disagree
Disagree
Strongly disagree
The Polish are the immigrant group most similar to the Irish


The Polish are the most skilled and highly qualified immigrant group in Dublin
Frequency
30
20
10
0
Don't know
Strongly agree
Agree
Somewhat agree
Somewhat disagree
Disagree
Strongly disagree
The Polish are the most skilled and highly qualified immigrant group in Dublin


The Polish are the most reliable and hard working immigrant group in Dublin
Frequency
40
30
20
10
0
Don't know
Strongly agree
Agree
Somewhat agree
Somewhat disagree
Disagree
Strongly disagree
The Polish are the most reliable and hard working immigrant group in Dublin


The Polish are the immigrant group the easiest to deal with in Dublin
Frequency
40
30
20
10
0
Don't know
Strongly agree
Agree
Somewhat agree
Somewhat disagree
Disagree
Strongly disagree
The Polish are the immigrant group the easiest to deal with in Dublin


The Polish provide the cheapest labor in Dubln
Frequency
40
30
20
10
0
Don't know
Strongly agree
Agree
Somewhat agree
Somewhat disagree
Disagree
Strongly disagree
The Polish provide the cheapest labor in Dubln


Polish workers cause problems
Frequency
50
40
30
20
10
0
Don't know
Agree
Somewhat agree
Somewhat disagree
Disagree
Strongly disagree
Polish workers cause problems

B.2. Descriptive Statistics – Madrid Survey






Education
Frequency
40
30
20
10
0
Primary
Secondary
High school
Vocational
College
Higher
Education


Religion
Frequency
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
Catholic
Protestant
Other Christian
Not religious
Other
Religion


Identity
Frequency
40
30
20
10
0
Not sure
Neighborhood
City
Country
Europe
The world
Identity


Perceptions of largest immigrant group in Madrid
Frequency
80
60
40
20
0
Other
Bulgarian
Perceptions of largest immigrant group in Madrid


Frequency of interaction with Bulgarian workers
Frequency
30
20
10
0
.00
Never
Rarely
Sometimes
Often
Frequency of interaction with Bulgarian workers


Rating of services and interactions with Bulgarian workers
Frequency
40
30
20
10
0
Don't know
Very good
Good
Adequate
Poor
Very poor
Rating of services and interactions with Bulgarian workers


Preference for Bulgarian workers to other imigrants
Frequency
30
20
10
0
Prefer others
Prefer Bulgarians
Preference for Bulgarian workers to other imigrants


Preference for Bulgarian workers to Spanish workers
Frequency
50
40
30
20
10
0
Prefer Spanish
Prefer Bulgarian
Preference for Bulgarian workers to Spanish workers


Best qualities of Bulgarian workers
Frequency
0
10
20
30
40
Cheap
Hard-working
Educated/Skilled
Easy to deal with and uderstand
Similar to Spanish
Other
Best qualities of Bulgarian workers


Bulgarians take away jobs from the Spanish
Frequency
0
10
20
30
40
Don't know
Strongly agree
Agree
Somewhat agree
Somewhat disagree
Disagree
Strongly disagree
Bulgarians take away jobs from the Spanish


Bulgarians are necessary in Madrid becasue there are no Spanish to fill some jobs
Frequency
25
20
15
10
5
0
Don't know
Strongly agree
Agree
Somewhat agree
Somewhat disagree
Disagree
Strongly disagree
Bulgarians are necessary in Madrid becasue there are no Spanish to fill some jobs


Bulgarians know Spanish
Frequency
40
30
20
10
0
Don't know
Strongly agree
Agree
Somewhat agree
Somewhat disagree
Disagree
Strongly disagree
Bulgarians know Spanish


Bulgarians are the immigrant group most similar to the Spanish
Frequency
30
20
10
0
Don't know
Strongly agree
Agree
Somewhat agree
Somewhat disagree
Disagree
Strongly disagree
Bulgarians are the immigrant group most similar to the Spanish


Bulgarians are the most skilled and highly qualified immigrant group in Madrid
Frequency
30
20
10
0
Don't know
Strongly agree
Agree
Somewhat agree
Somewhat disagree
Disagree
Strongly disagree
Bulgarians are the most skilled and highly qualified immigrant group in Madrid


Bulgarians are the most reliable and hard working immigrant group in Madrid
Frequency
30
20
10
0
Don't know
Strongly agree
Agree
Somewhat agree
Somewhat disagree
Disagree
Strongly disagree
Bulgarians are the most reliable and hard working immigrant group in Madrid


Bulgarians are the immigrant group that is easiest to deal with in Madrid
Frequency
25
20
15
10
5
0
Don't know
Strongly agree
Agree
Somewhat agree
Somewhat disagree
Disagree
Strongly disagree
Bulgarians are the immigrant group that is easiest to deal with in Madrid


Bulgarians provide the cheapest labor in Madrid
Frequency
40
30
20
10
0
Don't know
Strongly agree
Agree
Somewhat agree
Somewhat disagree
Disagree
Bulgarians provide the cheapest labor in Madrid


Bulgarian workers cause problems
Frequency
40
30
20
10
0
Don't know
Strongly agree
Agree
Somewhat agree
Somewhat disagree
Disagree
Strongly disagree
Bulgarian workers cause problems

APPENDIX C

LEGAL STATUS CLASSIFICATIONS IN IRELAND AND SPAIN

Table C.1. Certificates of Registration Types, Ireland

Stamp	Category
1	Non-EU nationals with employment or business permit
1A	Non-EU nationals in full time training (no other employment permitted)
2	Non-EU national students (limitations to work permission)
2A	Non-EU national students (not permitted to work)
3	Non-EU nationals not permitted to work
4	People permitted to work without a permit, incl. non-EU nationals, spouses of Irish/EU nationals, parents to Irish-born child (ICB), leave to remain, refugees, non-EU intra-company transfers, temporary doctors, non-EU nationals with work visas
4 EU FAM	Non-EU national family member to EU citizen (no permit required to work)
5	Non-EU nationals in Ireland for eight years and permitted to remain without time conditions (no permit required to work)
6	Irish national with dual citizenship

Source: Department of Justice, Equality and Law Reform (amended from Table 6, O'Connell & Joyce, 2009, p. 10).

There are several migrant legal classifications in Ireland. EU immigrants benefit from the most entitlements and are generally guided by European Union directives rather than national or local policy. They can reside in Ireland freely if they are self-sufficient, employed, or self-employed. On the other hand, all non-EU nationals in Ireland for more than three months must register with the Garda National Immigration Bureau (GNIB) and receive an immigration stamp denoting their category of entry (O'Connell & Joyce, 2009, pp. 9-10) (**Table E.1**).

Third country nationals have several mechanisms of migration to Ireland. Labor migrants, especially highly-skilled ones, possess the strongest entitlements after EU nationals. They are granted either a work permit or a work visa, codified in the *Employment Permits Acts of 2003* and *2006*. The 2006 Act also created a green card category for the highly skilled (McGinnity et al., 2011, p. 19). Work permits were issued for lower-skilled occupations, like services or agriculture, and were non-transferrable and tied to a specific job and employer. They still warrant a Stamp 1 certificate issued by the GNIB. The employer applied for the permit and had to demonstrate the impossibility to fill the position with workers from Ireland or the EU through a labor market test. Employees had to apply for a new permit if changing jobs and could only do so after 12 months of continuous employment. Work permit holders could apply for family reunification only after residing in the country for one year. After the 2007 overhaul, more occupations were closed to work permits, and only those earning €30,000 or more

could apply for such authorization.[392] Prior to the EU enlargement round of 2004, there were few foreign workers with employment permits in Ireland, and most of those came from non-European countries (ICI, 2008, pp. 68-69; McGinnity et al., 2011, pp. 9, 19). The number of work permits rose dramatically from less than 7,000 in 1999 to 47,551 in 2003, however, mostly due to East European migration in anticipation of EU enlargement (DETI, 2010).

The *Employment Permits Act 2003* codified a work visa scheme for specialists in the medical, information technology, and construction sectors. Under this permit type, foreign workers could change employers within their sector, renew after two years and bring along their dependents after only three months (ICI, 2008, pp. 68-69; McGinnity et al., 2011, p. 9). The 2006 *Employment Permits Act* replaced the work visa scheme with a green card system. Green cards are issued to those earning more than €60,000 or those earning €30,000-€59,999 in eligible occupations, and are granted directly to the employee. As it allows for immediately family reunification, requires no market test, and is renewed indefinitely after two years, the green card scheme is the closest proxy for long-term residency in Ireland (Employment Permit Act, 2006; ICI, 2008, pp. 68-69; McGinnity et al., 2011, p. 19; Quinn, 2010, p. 30).

Another legal designation in Ireland carrying fewer rights than EU citizenship or labor migration is that of a foreign student. Third-country nationals could apply for a student visa from their home country, pay for their courses in advance, often at fees triple those for Irish and EU students, and receive s Stamp 2 certification. Student visa holders must be enrolled in full-time recognized study, which includes English language courses, have limited work permission, carry no family reunification privileges, and cannot apply their time spent in Ireland toward naturalization requirements. Students' rights were improved in 2007 as the *Third Level Graduate Scheme* permitted students to remain in Ireland in search of employment for six months after completing third-level education. However, in 2009 positive developments were reversed as the time a student could remain in Ireland was capped and a two-tier system was introduced, with only those earning degrees eligible for immigration entitlements. A substantial number of students registered in Ireland in 2009, mostly in pursuit of English language studies. Still, more than one third of foreign students in Ireland come from within the European Union (ICI, 2008, p. 70; McGinnity et al., 2011, p.10; Quinn, 2010, p. 30).

Asylum seekers enjoy even fewer rights than student visa holders. Asylum seekers apply for refugee status with the Office of the Refugee Applications Commissioner (ORAC) and could appeal negative decisions at the Refugee Appeals Tribunal (RAT). If their appeal is rejected, they could apply for subsidiary protection (McGinnity et al., 2011, p. 12). In the case of refusal, the Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform makes a discretionary decision on whether the person will be deported or granted a Leave to Remain. While awaiting a determination, asylum seekers fall outside the scope of integration policy. They are dispersed to lower-income or small homogenous communities. Applicants are not allowed to work and are housed in direct provision facilities, where they are provided meals and a weekly allowance of €19.10 per adult and €9.52 per child. Direct provision centers raise concerns with asylum seekers' health, safety, and future inability to integrate in the larger society. The process is

[392] If earning a salary smaller than €30,000 per year, immigrants were only eligible for work permits in a very restricted list of occupations (McGinnity et al., 2011, p. 19).

disorienting as there is no single procedure when processing protection claims in Ireland and the one codified in the 2010 *Immigration, Residence and Protection Bill* has not yet been passed or enacted (McGinnity et al., 2011, p. 12). If successful, asylum seekers are granted refugee status, leave to remain or subsidiary protection. They receive a 12-month renewable residence permit. Refugees have similar rights to those of Irish and European citizens (ICI, 2008; McGinnity et al., 2011, p. 12; RIA, 2010).

A related status is that of a parent of an Irish-born child. No longer granted residency after the Citizenship Referendum of 2004, parents of children born in Ireland prior to 2005 were given permission to stay under a special scheme (IBC/05) with rights similar to those who were granted Leave to Remain. IBC immigrants are obliged to work and their status is renewed after two years, yet they remain in a precarious position with unsure rights, as their status is discretionary (ICI, 2008, pp. 70-71).

The least stable immigrant characterization in Ireland is that of undocumented migrant. The Migrant Rights Center estimated that there were around 30,000 undocumented migrants in Ireland in 2010, even if this number is hard to verify. Undocumented migrants do not hold social or political rights and are subject to deportation. Still, a temporary scheme was introduced in 2009 to deal "in a humanitarian way" with those who became undocumented through no fault of their own, granting them four months to seek employment or an employment permit. Unfortunately, the scheme is not permanent, leaving undocumented immigrants in an extremely precarious situation (ICI, 2008, pp. 70-71; McGinnity et al., 2011, pp. 11-12).

Similar legal classifications exist in Spain as well. EU immigrants are supposed to benefit from the most entitlements and are generally guided by European Union directives rather than national or local policy. They can live in work in the host country without a visa or a permit. However, even EU nationals need to register with local authorities and obtain a residence certificate, which requires proof of financial means and valid health insurance. EU citizens are entered in the Central Register of Foreign Nationals and receive a Foreigner's Identity Number (NIE) which they must carry at all times. EU citizens are also encouraged, if not required, to register with the General Social Security Fund in exchange for tax benefits (EMN, 2011; Expatica, 2014).

Prior to 2003, nationals of countries with bilateral agreements with Spain did not need to obtain a visa to Spain if they would reside and work in the country for no longer than three months within a six-month period (Jokisch, 2007). All other non-EU nationals require a visa to enter Spain, which has to be obtained prior to entry in the host country. There are several entry mechanisms, with labor migrants at the center of the permit regime. Labor migrants can enter Spain in two ways: through the general worker regime and or via the yearly contingents. Immigrants are attracted to fill jobs for which Spaniards are unavailable based on a hard-to-fill occupations catalog, where occupations mostly fall within medium and low-skilled economic sectors. Additional need for workers in seasonal occupations is satisfied through the yearly quotas, mostly fulfilled through bilateral agreements with specific sending countries (MTIN, 2009).

Foreign workers' rights depend on length of residence (**Table E.2**). Seasonal workers (Type A permit) are only entitled to work in the host country for nine months within a period of one year and must sign a pledge that they will return to their home country. Nonetheless, those who abide by this pledge and their legal obligations are likely to be recruited in subsequent years, where a worker hired in Spain for four years has an

expedited entry into permanent residence and work in the receiving context. Initially, standard work permits (Type B) entitle their third-country holders to only perform jobs in a specific profession, sector and geographic area for a limited time period, yet as the permit is continuously renewed, foreign employees are granted more flexibility, culminating in a permanent residence permit and freedom of residence and employment in Spain (Iabogado, 2015; MTIN, 2009). While all foreign workers in Spain tend to be recruited directly from origin countries to specific locations and jobs in Spain, the special jobseeker visa authorizes its holder to freely move about the country while seeking employment for three months. Ministerial Order reserves a number of such visas for the sons, daughters and grandchildren of Spaniards in Latin America (EMN, 2011).

Table C.2. Work Permit Types, Spain

Type	Category
A	Seasonal worker (9-month time limit)
B	Initial permit for 1 year and 2-year renewal (geographical, sectorial, job limitations)
C	After Type B renewal (valid for any job across Spain)
D	Self-employed initial permit (1-year and renewal for 2 additional year)
E	Long-term (3-year) permit for self-employed, after Type D renewal
F	Shuttle workers (daily return to home country) (for 5 years, renewable)
Permanent	Any professional activity in Spain (renewed every 5 years, after Type C or Type E)
Extraordinary	Non-EU nationals who have helped Spanish economic and cultural progress (renewed every 5 years)

Source: Author from EMN, 2011 and Iabogado, 2015.

These coming to Spain for family reunification can join their relatives, including a common law partner, after these relatives have resided in Spain for one year and have obtained authorization for a subsequent year (renewed Type B permit) (**Table E.2**). There is no waiting period for the family reunification of EU nationals. The beneficiaries of family reunification are classified in a way similar to the worker migrant already in Spain and can work in the country without obtaining a permit. Family members obtain a permanent residence card after only three years (EMN, 2011).

A subsequent legal designation in Spain carrying fewer rights than EU citizens, labor migrants or their families is that of foreign student. While EU students do not need a visa for Spain, they still require registration with local authorities. Third-country nationals could apply for a student visa from their home country, provided that they can

prove they have been accepted to a program at an officially recognized institution in Spain. Only these coming to study for more than six months are allowed to work in Spain, yet substantial limitations apply (Expatica, 2014).[393] The only special entitlements for foreign students in Spain are granted to these graduating in the medical profession, as their participation in Spanish residency is promoted. Additionally, researchers are allowed to enter Spain and work there temporarily. Researchers are treated as temporary work and residence permit holders and are allowed employment in Spain for no longer than three months (EMN, 2011).

Asylum seekers are dealt with according to European directives. The procedure is expedited, with claimants having one month to apply with the Oficina de Asilo y Refugio (OAR), entitled to be notified of a decision within six months, and allowed to appeal a negative decision with the Spanish courts. Unsuccessful applicants are immediately deported. These awaiting a decision are not subject to direct provision or dispersal, unlike in the Irish case, even though public assistance is available. They are, in fact, entitled to work after six months in Spain. These recognized as refugees by the Ministry of the Interior are granted rights similar to these of natives and EU citizens and enjoy privileged access to Spanish nationality (Ministerio del Interior, 2010).

Finally, irregular migrants hold more rights in Spain than in Ireland. They could potentially be granted residency rights, if they can demonstrate social, family, or labor ties to receiving localities. Irregular migrants who have been in the country for a two-year period and have worked for at least six months regardless of current position; these who have ties to Spanish residents and have engaged in cultural and social integration programs; as well as the parents of Spanish children or children of parents who are Spanish by origin are brought into legality based on their integration potential and efforts (Rodríguez-Ferrand, 2013).

[393] While family members can visit foreign students during their academic career in Spain, they are not entitled to long-term family reunification, work, or residence permits and must be financially self-sufficient (Expatica, 2014).

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