

Ever Vigilant: Chinese Perceptions of Adversarial Alliances

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EVER VIGILANT: CHINESE PERCEPTIONS OF ADVERSARIAL ALLIANCES

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Abstract: This dissertation presents a structured and focused comparison of how Chinese leaders and academics have perceived the security cooperation of states on China's periphery. This study examines three cases: the U.S.S.R.-Vietnam Alliance (1978-1989); the U.S.-Japan Alliance (1990-2016) and the U.S.-South Korea Alliance (1990-2016). They exemplify adversarial alliances in that they represent security cooperation that threatened or potentially threaten Chinese vital interests. Similarly, they all represent adversarial alliances of an asymmetric power relationship between a larger and smaller state. I gathered this data from Chinese journal articles and books related to the three cases, interviewed Chinese academics and think tank analysts, and compared the Chinese perceptions with non-Chinese primary and secondary sources. The research explores how well four concepts describe alliance behavior in the evidence. The first three concepts relate to how China views the alliances' intentions, capabilities, and cohesion. The fourth concept relates to China's self-perception as a rising state relative to the adversarial alliances. Knowledge of Chinese past and present perceptions of adversarial alliances should assist academics and policy makers in understanding the implications of security cooperation of states that are in close proximity to the Chinese mainland.

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TABLE OF ABBREVIATIONS

AMD	Anti-Missile Defense
ASAT	Anti-Satellite
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
AVLM	Armored Vehicle Launched Mine Clearing Line Charge
BMD	Ballistic Missile Defense
CCP	Chinese Communist Party
DPJ	Democratic Party of Japan
DPRK	Democratic People's Republic of Korea—North Korea
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
FOTA	Future of the Alliance Policy Initiative
GMD	Ground-based Mid-course Defense
HEU	Highly Enriched Uranium
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
ICBM	Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile
JSDF	Japan Self-Defense Force
LDP	Liberal Democratic Party (Japan)
MDA	Missile Defense Agency
MOKV	Multi-Object Kill Vehicle
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NMD	National Missile Defense
NPR	Nuclear Posture Review
NTWD	Navy Theater Wide Defense
PAC-3	Patriot Advanced Capability—3 rd Version
PLA	People's Liberation Army
PLAAF	People's Liberation Army Air Force
RIMPAC	Rim of the Pacific—Multi-State Naval Exercise
RMB	<i>Renminbi</i> , China's currency
SALT II	Strategic Arms Limitation Talks—2 nd Round
SBX	Sea-Based X-Band Radar
SEATO	Southeast Asia Treaty Organization
SPI	Security Policy Initiative
SM-3	Aegis Standard Missile—3 rd Version
SOFA	Status of Forces Agreement
THAAD	Theater High Altitude Area Defense
TMD	Theater Missile Defense
UHF	Ultra-High Frequency
USFK	United States Forces Korea
VWP	Vietnam Worker's Party

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1.0 CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

1.1 KEY QUESTIONS AND RELEVANCE

In broad terms, how do China's leaders and policy makers perceive security cooperation between states on China's periphery? How do they evaluate an adversarial alliance's cohesion or capabilities? Moreover, do alliance activities on China's periphery cause Chinese analysts to over-read or perceive conspiratorial motives? Consequently, do these varying perceptions of adversarial alliances have any bearing on the formation of Chinese foreign policy outcomes? These four questions build upon a number of significant International Relations debates concerning the ability to discern intentions, the role of capabilities, perceptions and misperceptions, and rising states.

Beyond the debates above, it is important to understand how China's leaders have perceived past and present adversarial alliances. First, little has been written on how target state leaders perceive adversarial alliances. The CIA has delved into the topic, as evidenced by a thought provoking study of how the Warsaw Pact officers viewed NATO in the early 1980s.¹ Besides Thomas Christensen's book,

¹ "Warsaw Pact Perceptions of NATO Strengths and Weaknesses," *CIA*, Intelligence Information Report (HR 70-14), 19 August 1982, Document No. 5166d4f999326091c6a60963, <http://www.foia.cia.gov/document/5166d4f999326091c6a60963> (Accessed 12 March 2015);

Worse Than a Monolith, and his article, “China, the U.S.-Japan Alliance, and the Security Dilemma in East Asia,” little attention has been paid specifically to China’s perceptions of foreign alliances.² In a different vein of scholarship, works by Timothy Crawford and Yasuhiro Izumikawa have focused on how target states have attempted to prevent or divide adversarial adversaries.³ In contrast to Zhang Biwu’s recent book, Chinese Perceptions of the U.S., I will focus on three great power alliances that threatened or currently threaten Chinese security interests.⁴

Second, from a practical angle it is important to trace how China’s leaders and policy makers have interpreted important or transformative alliance events such as revised guidelines and military capability enhancements. For example, from China’s viewpoint, are the adversarial alliances actions heightening the security dilemma? Alternatively, how do they perceive the cohesion and capabilities of adversarial alliances? Likewise, in the context of the rise of China, it is important to examine how the growth of China’s comprehensive national power has changed the way China’s leaders perceive the adversarial alliances. For instance, is there evidence that Chinese leaders have become increasingly dissatisfied with adversarial alliances on its periphery?

² Thomas Christensen, Worse Than a Monolith: Alliance Politics and Problems of Coercive Diplomacy in Asia (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011); and Thomas Christensen, “China, the U.S.-Japan Alliance, and the Security Dilemma in East Asia,” International Security, Vol. 23, No. 4 (Spring 1999), pp. 49-80.

³ Timothy W. Crawford, “How Wedge Strategies Shape Power Politics,” International Security, Vol. 35, No. 4, Spring 2011, pp. 155-189; and Timothy W. Crawford, “Wedge Strategy, Balancing, and the Deviant Case of Spain, 1940-41,” Security Studies, Vol. 17, No. 4, Spring 2011, pp. 155-189; and Yasuhiro Izumikawa, “To Coerce or Reward? Theorizing Wedge Strategies in Alliance Politics,” Security Studies, Vol. 22, No. 3, pp. 498-531.

⁴ Zhang Biwu, Chinese Perceptions of the U.S.: An Exploration of China’s Foreign Policy Motivations (New York: Lexington Books, 2012).

Third, it is important to understand how China's leaders view adversarial alliances in the context of peripheral issues such as North Korea, Taiwan, and maritime territorial disputes with Vietnam and the Philippines.

This dissertation investigates how Chinese perceptions of adversarial alliances exhibit variation in reading the alliance's intentions, capabilities, and cohesion. Additionally, this dissertation will investigate how China's rise in both economic and military power has changed its perception of the US-Japan Alliance and the US-ROK Alliance.

1.2 RESEARCH CONCEPTS

This research seeks to examine four significant alliance perception concepts, so I will begin with defining key terms and concepts. To define the term *alliance*, I will use Glenn Snyder's definition, "Alliances are formal associations of states for the use (or nonuse) of military force, in specified circumstances, against states outside their own membership (Italics removed)."⁵ From the vantage point of the third-party state or target state, its position is outside the membership of the alliance. Thus, an *adversarial alliance* is one that is targeted against one's own military capabilities or one's own existing alliances.⁶ I use the term adversarial to draw the distinction from alliances that China had formal membership during the Cold War:

⁵ Glenn H. Snyder, *Alliance Politics* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997), p. 4.

⁶ Christensen, *Worse Than a Monolith*. The term "adversarial alliance" is commonly used in business parlance to mean cooperation between two or more competing companies to accomplish a shared purpose; for example, Dell and Hewlett-Packard working together on laptop motherboard research and development to produce for their respective product lines.

the Sino-Soviet Alliance and the Sino-North Korean Alliance. Additionally, at present China's relations with Pakistan and Russia are often termed "quasi-alliances." Therefore, I am not studying Chinese perceptions of its past or present alliance or quasi-alliance relationships.

To accomplish greater understanding of Chinese perceptions of adversarial alliances, I will explore how well four concepts describe alliance behavior in the evidence. The conceptual frameworks in Chapter 3 will layout the questions that I will ask of the three case studies, but first I want to introduce the concepts in the context of how a third-party state could perceive an adversarial alliance in regards to intentions, capabilities, and cohesion.

First, *Adversarial Alliance Intentions*—this is a concept related to the judgement of motivations and goals of an actor. Analysts often characterize intentions as being benign or malign. Additionally, intentions can change and are not static. Therefore, I want to determine when Chinese analysts have perceived a change in alliance intentions, and what factors precipitated those judgements. Lastly, I want to see when the alliance's intentions have been judged as a conspiracy, and whether the judgements of conspiracy are countered by differing appraisals or corrected.

Second, *Adversarial Alliance Cohesion*—this concept is concerned with Chinese evaluations of the unity of the adversarial alliances to work towards shared goals. Often an analyst will judge whether an alliance possessed or lacked cohesion *after* a crisis tests the mettle of the alliance, which makes it difficult to judge the

present state of alliance cohesion. I want to see what variables or factors inform such an appraisal.

Third, *Adversarial Alliance Capabilities*—this concept focuses on the military capabilities possessed by the adversarial alliance. I want to see what types of capabilities such as conventional or nuclear capabilities draw the most attention and what perceptions are formed. Asymmetric alliances often do not aggregate capabilities as the small power has little military power to contribute, but the small power can aid the large power in projecting power over a great distance by allowing access to ports and bases.

The fourth concept under investigation is *Self-Perception of the Rising State in Relation to Adversarial Alliance*—this concept concerns how China's rise in comprehensive national power has influenced and changed its view of the adversarial alliances on its periphery. In particular, I want to see how China's relationship with the smaller alliance members, Japan and South Korea, changed as China has grown in economic and military power.

Undergirding this research project are some key concepts that need defining. The first is *Costly Action*—this concept relates to how states signal their intentions in to act ways that requires spending political or material resources. I will divide costly action into the tangible and intangible costly actions. For example, *tangible costly actions* involve material costs such as the deployment, reduction or complete withdrawal of military capabilities, the development, reduction or destruction of military capabilities, and outlay of monetary resources to base or relocate soldiers. In contrast, analysts cannot quantify *intangible costly actions* such as reputational

costs, the spending of political capital, and abandonment costs. Lastly, *Diplomatic Signaling* relates to how states signal their intentions to act in non-costly or costly ways. For example, a state, states, or states in an alliance can issue or sign joint declarations, joint statements, reports, treaties, and agreements.

1.3 RESEARCH PROJECT

This next section will detail how I used the three cases, how the case studies are similar to one another, and how they differ from other possible adversarial alliance cases since World War II. Next, I will describe how I went about gathering the sample of journal articles, interviews with Chinese scholars, and the use of non-Chinese sources to compare and contrast Chinese perceptions.

1.3.1 Case Selection

This research conducts a structured and focused comparison of three cases: the Soviet Union-Vietnam Alliance (1978-1989), the US-Japan Alliance (1990-2016), and the US-South Korea (ROK) Alliance (1990-2016). The case studies will allow me to examine junctures in which Chinese analysts perceive adversarial alliance intentions, capabilities, and cohesion. Thus, in each case study, I ask whether there is evidence supporting each of the three alliance perception concepts. The US-Japan Alliance and US-ROK Alliance case studies will allow me to examine the self-perception of a rising state in relation to two adversarial alliances.

In terms of case selection, I chose these three adversarial alliance cases because they represent the most serious security concerns for China in the past 40 years. In each case, China's smaller power neighbors were in alliance with a distant great power that possessed tactical and strategic nuclear weapons. These alliance relationships dramatically altered or presently alter the smaller powers' position relative to China, because the larger power's possession of strategic offensive weapons greatly enhances the ability of the alliance to deter and coerce China. Additionally, these alliance relationships allowed the greater power access to the smaller powers' territory; and thus, enhance the distant greater powers' ability to project power in close proximity to China.

Therefore, China as the target state perceived that the three adversarial alliances threatened or potentially threatens its vital interests. I am defining vital interests in a rather conservative manner where the adversarial alliance cases were threatening or presently threaten the existence of the Chinese state. This conservative treatment follows Timothy Crawford's logic that vital interests concern the state's self-preservation. Thus, situations that involve self-preservation will cause states to "assess the intensity of each other's interests similarly." It is analytically useful to control the cases in this way since it puts the perceived intensity of interests of all state actors on a common playing field. In an anarchic international environment, all states are threatened by alliances formed on their periphery that could potentially destroy them.

1.3.2 Sources and Interviews

As I worked through these three cases of adversarial alliances, I discovered how Chinese academics viewed the respective adversarial alliance developments. The Chinese government at present considers the first historical case, the Soviet Union-Vietnam Alliance, as a sensitive and potentially objectionable topic given that a portion of the case study coincides with the Chinese Cultural Revolution (1966 to 1976).⁷ Fortunately, Chinese scholars pointed me to a number of primary sources available on the Internet from the late 1970s regarding the Sino-Vietnam border war. Yet, I have largely depended on secondary sources to construct the case study. The period for the two current-day cases, the US-Japan Alliance and the US-ROK Alliance, is from the end of the Cold War to 2015. These cases are much too recent and government documents are not open to public viewing. Currently, Chinese government archives are rather restrictive, and information concerning current events are definitely not open to the public.⁸ This restrictive nature of the archive system is a reality that I must work with and will guide the formation of the research.

Therefore, I have treated three kinds of Chinese sources as representatives of Chinese perceptions: 1) official government statements, 2) journal scholars, and 3) academic interview subjects. First, when available, I have consulted official Chinese

⁷ Chen Bo [陈波], Personal Interview, 10 November 2015, East China Normal University—Center for Cold War International History Studies.

⁸ Maura Cunningham, "Denying Historians: China's Archives Increasingly Off-Bounds," *The Wall Street Journal* blog China Real Time, 19 August 2014, <http://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2014/08/19/denying-historians-chinas-archives-increasingly-off-bounds/> (Accessed 30 June 2015).

government statements published by the *People's Daily* and the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Given the nature of the subject matter and the seriousness of adversarial alliances, I did not have any opportunities to interview elite policy makers or government figures.

Second, I chose the five most highly regarded and well respected Chinese International Relations policy and academic journals from three think tanks and two universities in Beijing. The three leading policy journals were World Economics and Politics [世界经济与政治] from the Institute of World Politics and Economics of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences; China International Studies [国际问题研究] from the China Institute of International Studies; and Contemporary International Relations [现代国际关系] from the China Institute of Contemporary International Relations. The two academic journals selected for the research project were International Politics [国际政治研究] from the School of International Studies at Peking University, and Foreign Affairs Review [外交评论] from China Foreign Affairs University. The five journals are all readily available from the China Knowledge Resource Integrated Database (CNKI). After accumulating a sample of 64 articles, I found that the sample was lacking journal articles by Chinese scholars from the 1990s. Consequently, I decided to broaden the sample by supplementing with three articles from other respected Chinese scholars that appeared in a journal produced in the late 1990s entitled, International Strategic Studies [国际战略研究所].

Additionally, I added two articles by Chinese scholars from Stanford University's Asia-Pacific Research Center, a book chapter by Yuan Jingdong, and an article by Wu Xinbo from the The Washington Quarterly. Table 1.1 details the sample size and

sources for the respective alliances; granted, some articles offered details on both alliances if the author focused on U.S. alliances in East Asia.

<i>Sample Sources</i>	<i>Number of Articles</i>
China International Studies	15
Contemporary International Relations	25
Foreign Affairs Review	3
International Politics	9
International Strategic Studies	3
World Economics and Politics	12
Chinese author in Non-Chinese Publication	4
<i>Total</i>	71
<i>Sample Topics</i>	<i>Number of Articles</i>
US-Japan Alliance	31
US-ROK Alliance	12
Both US-Japan Alliance and US-ROK Alliance	25
USSR-Vietnam Alliance	3
<i>Total</i>	71

Table 1.1 Chinese Journal Articles Sample Size and Topics

Thirdly, I have used interviews with highly respected academics and policy analysts to collect their perceptions and those of high-level decision makers and policy makers. As a non-Chinese citizen, I have limited access to high-level government documents and archives that would give a broader and more systematic observation of Chinese perceptions of adversarial alliances. In this regard, I must depend on the interview subjects' knowledge of elite discussions and perceptions of adversarial alliances. During my field work in Beijing from September 2015 to January 2016, I interviewed highly respected Chinese academics and think tank analysts; some of whom possess access to Chinese policy makers. Each of the interview subjects gave me permission to quote them in this dissertation. After I completed the transcription and translation of the interviews, I presented the important quotes that I found most useful to my research to the

interview subjects to read over and approve. I am very grateful to the following interview subjects for their insights into Chinese perceptions of security cooperation on China's periphery:

Chen Bo [陈波] East China Normal University—Diplomatic Historian

Li Danhui [李丹慧] East China Normal University—Diplomatic Historian

Li Qingsi [李庆四] Renmin University—Political Scientist

Sun Xuefeng [孙学峰] Qinghua University—Political Scientist

Wang Dong [王栋] Peking University—Political Scientist

Wu Riqiang [吴日强] Renmin University—Political Scientist

Xin Qiang [信强] Fudan University—Political Scientist

Xing Guangcheng [型广程] Chinese Academy of Social Sciences—Director of the Institute of Chinese Borderland Studies

Yu Tiejun [于铁军] Peking University—Political Scientist

Zhu Feng [朱锋] Nanjing University—Executive Director of the China Center for Collaborative Studies of the South China Sea.

To round out my case study observations, I have used non-Chinese primary and secondary sources to compare and contrast the Chinese perceptions presented in the Chinese sources. In this way, I present both congruent and opposing viewpoints to support or challenge the varied Chinese perceptions.

1.4 DISSERTATION LAYOUT

In Chapter 2, I will introduce the current state of alliance and perceptions scholarship that relates to research concepts. Chapter 3 will build on the literature review and layout the conceptual framework that I used for the structured and focused comparison of the cases. Next, the three empirical chapters cover the most critical adversarial alliances China faced over the past 40 years. The three case studies highlight the different adversarial alliance developments that will be useful to validate the respective alliance perception concepts. Chapter 4 analyzes the background and formation of the USSR-Vietnam Alliance from 1978 to 1989. The chapter examines Soviet and North Vietnamese security cooperation in fighting the U.S in the Vietnam War and the formation of an alliance that threatened China. Next, I turn to the two post-Cold War adversarial alliances that will offer a comparison within the U.S. alliance system in East Asia from 1991 to present. Chapter 5 will examine the US-Japan Alliance, and Chapter 6 will analyze the US-ROK Alliance. Finally, Chapter 7 will display the results from the structured and focused comparison of Chinese perceptions towards the three adversarial alliances cases for each concept. I will conclude chapter 7 with policy implications and notes for further research.

2.0 CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 CHAPTER SUMMARY

The literature review introduces the current state of research on alliances and perceptions. Both of these areas contain important International Relations debates, explanations, and interpretations.

2.2 LITERATURE REVIEW ON ALLIANCES

The topic of adversarial alliances requires me to understand the crucial scholarship on security alliances; more specifically, how political scientists have developed and debated the concept. After examining the differing conceptual and theoretical views of alliance formation, I have divided the alliance literature review into two interlocking components: the functional and the relational. The functional component pertains to the purposes of alliances. The relational component pertains to both the power symmetry of the alliance members, and how the adversarial alliance relates to the target state or third-party state. Though I have delineated the functional and relational components they are not mutually exclusive.

2.2.1 Alliance Definition

Among International Relations scholarship the definition of what is and what is not an alliance is rather diverse. Melvin Small and David Singer offer a narrow conceptual definition that points towards three types of military alliances:¹

- 1) Defense pact,
- 2) Non-aggression or neutrality treaty, and
- 3) Entente.

In this regard, Small and Singer's conception is so narrow it would not include any unilateral or asymmetric security guarantees such as the 1951 Japanese-American security treaty. They argue that only one state in the agreement committed to protect the other state.² With this reasoning, David Lake termed the 1951 Japanese-American security treaty a "loose protectorate" instead of an alliance relationship.³

Douglas Gibler's definition depicts a much broader and all-inclusive interpretation, "An alliance is a formal contingent commitment by two or more states to some future action."⁴ As a result, Gibler's alliance definition could include the World Trade Organization as an example of an alliance. Commenting on the conceptual broadness of alliances, Edwin Fedder stated, "The concept of alliance in

¹ Melvin Small and J. David Singer, "Formal Alliances, 1816-1965: An Extension of the Basic Data," *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 6, No. 3 (1969), p. 261.

² Volker Krause and J. David Singer, "Minor Powers, Alliances, and Armed Conflict: Some Preliminary Patterns," from chapter in Erich Reiter and Heinz Gärtner, eds., *Small States and Alliances* (New York: Physica-Verlag, 2001), p. 17.

³ David A. Lake, *Entangling Relations: American Foreign Policy in Its Century* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999), p. 143.

⁴ Douglas M. Gibler, *International Military Alliances 1648-2008*, Vol. I (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 2009), p. xlix.

the literature of international relations is ambiguous and amorphous.”⁵ To rectify this conceptual ambiguity, Fedder offered nine necessary and sufficient conditions of an alliance:⁶

- 1) Is comprised of member states,
- 2) Has fixed territorial jurisdiction,
- 3) Has a limited duration,
- 4) Has either symmetric or asymmetric power distributions,
- 5) Has an active or passive orientation,
- 6) Is based upon unilateral or mutual commitments,
- 7) Possesses a guarantee or force-in-being security mechanisms,
- 8) Possesses a structured or unstructured organization, and
- 9) Produces collective goods or both collective and non-collective goods.

Stefan Bergsmann’s definition took Fedder’s insights and moved towards greater conceptual precision. He stated, “an alliance shall be defined as an explicit agreement among states in the realm of national security in which the partners promise mutual assistance in the form of a substantial contribution of resources in the case of a certain contingency the arising of which is uncertain.”⁷ For my research purposes, I will use Glenn Snyder’s definition because it points to the target of the alliance. He wrote, “Alliances are formal associations of states for the use (or nonuse) of military force, in specified circumstances, against states outside their

⁵ Edwin H. Fedder, “The Concept of Alliance,” *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 12, No. 1 (March 1968), p. 70.

⁶ Fedder, “The Concept of Alliance,” pp. 80-81.

⁷ Stefan Bergsmann, “The Concept of Military Alliance,” from chapter in Erich Reiter and Heinz Gärtner, eds., *Small States and Alliances* (New York: Physica-Verlag, 2001), p. 36.

own membership (*Italics removed*).”⁸ This definition is precise enough and does well to encapsulate the three adversarial alliance cases in the three empirical chapters because China remains the state outside of the alliance membership. Additionally, since Glenn Snyder’s definition does not include “mutual assistance in the form of a substantial contribution of resources,” his definition better suits the asymmetric nature of my three cases. The Soviet Union was not dependent on the military resources of Vietnam, and the United States is not dependent on the military resources of Japan or South Korea.

2.2.2 Alliance Formation and the Balance of Power

Alliances play an important role in balance of power theory, but as Glenn Snyder reminds us, “These two subjects are far from identical, however. The balance of power is a systemic tendency linked to anarchy; alliance formation is an instrument of statecraft.”⁹ Frederick the Great spoke of the balance of power as a guiding principle for foreign affairs in 1748, he stated, “when the policy and the prudence of the princes of Europe lose sight of the maintenance of a just balance among dominant powers, the constitution of the whole body politic resents it: violence is found on one side, weakness on the other.”¹⁰ Hans Morgenthau’s classical realist treatment of balance of power theory is put forward as a social

⁸ Glenn H. Snyder, *Alliance Politics* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997), p. 4.

⁹ Glenn H. Snyder, *Alliance Politics*, p. 156.

¹⁰ Hans Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, 5th Edition (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1973), p. 189. Quote from Frederick the Great, “Considerations on the present state of the political body of Europe,” *Oeuvres de Frédéric le Grand*, Vol. VIII (Berlin: Rudolph Decker, 1848), p. 24. Morgenthau supplied the translation himself from the French.

equilibrium found not in “isolated nations, but in the relations between one nation or alliance of nations and another alliance.”¹¹

In regards to the balance of power, it is important to recognize the impact of rising powers and declining powers. International Relations scholars often cite Thucydides as the first to notice the impact of a rising power on the relative declining power.¹² In the 20th century, A. F. K. Organski, noted the importance and quality of industrialization in the power transition process, and he was keenly aware of population and immigration as sources of power. In regards to future challengers, Organski noted in 1968, “If China is successful, control of the Communist order will pass to her, and the Western powers will find that the most serious threat to their supremacy comes from China.”¹³ Robert Gilpin argued, “The rising state or states in the system increasingly demand changes in the system that will reflect their newly gained power and their unmet interests.”¹⁴ Potentially the “incompatibility” between the “existing international system and the changing distribution of power” could result in a hegemonic war to alleviate the “disequilibrium.”¹⁵ In contrast, Yang Shih-yueh offered an alternative to hegemonic war. He wrote, “A power transition will be peaceful if the leading defender is willing

¹¹ Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations*, p. 181.

¹² Thucydides, *The Landmark Thucydides: A Comprehensive Guide to the Peloponnesian War*, Robert B. Strassler, ed. (New York: The Free Press, 1996), p. 65.

¹³ A. F. K. Organski, *World Politics*, 2nd Ed. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1968), p. 361.

¹⁴ Robert Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), p. 33.

¹⁵ Robert Gilpin, “The Theory of Hegemonic War,” *Journal of Interdisciplinary History*, Vol. 18, No. 4, The Origin and Prevention of Major Wars (Spring 1988), pp. 601-602.

to accommodate the challenger appropriately, offering the rising challenger a proportional share of benefits and status according to its rising share of power.”¹⁶

In relation to alliances, rising powers could gain allies that envision their state profiting from alignment. Randall Schweller wrote, “Alliance choices, however, are often motivated by opportunities for gain as well as danger, by appetite as well as fear.”¹⁷ China watchers have taken an interest in the rise of China as it has grown tremendously in comprehensive national power in comparison to the Maoist era. Scholars such as Robert Ross, Zhu Feng, and David Shambaugh have all noted China’s increase in power.¹⁸

Kenneth Waltz later introduced his structural ideas concerning how the international system shifted from multipolarity to bipolarity. Waltz argued that the balance of power in a bipolar system was more stable because the leading poles have greater clarity on “who will oppose whom.”¹⁹ Glenn Snyder and Paul Diesing in agreement with Waltz, argued that in a bipolar system the alliances “*register* the general interests of the members,” and the “interests are clear and relatively unchanging” because they are based on the power structure of the international system. In contrast, in a multipolar system the alliances “*create* interests that did not previously exist,” and “the interests are often ambiguous... and are imperfectly

¹⁶ Yang Shih-yueh, “Power Transition, Balance of Power, and the Rise of China: A Theoretical Reflection about Rising Great Powers,” *The China Review*, Vol. 13, No. 2 (Fall 2013), p. 37.

¹⁷ Randall L. Schweller, “Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In,” *International Security*, Vol. 19, No. 1 (Summer 1994), p. 79.

¹⁸ Robert Ross and Zhu Feng, eds., *China’s Ascent: Power, Security, and the Future of International Politics* (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 2008); and David Shambaugh, *Power Shift: China and Asia’s New Dynamics* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005).

¹⁹ Kenneth N. Waltz, “The Stability of a Bipolar World,” *Daedalus*, Vol. 93, No. 3 (Summer 1964), pp. 884.

shared among allies.”²⁰ In a later work by Waltz, he added that alliances, regardless of the polarity of the system, require constant intra-alliance maintenance and management.²¹

A significant criticism of Waltz’s neorealism rose from the neoclassical realist theorists that argued that Waltz had overemphasized the current distribution of power. Though the theory achieved parsimony, it neglected “the role of domestic distributional politics” and the role of assessing threats.²² Notable neoclassical scholars have delved into the domestic politics of states to understand how it can contribute to foreign policy outcomes. For example, William Wohlforth rejects balance of power frameworks as “flawed and ambiguous” formulations in comparison to the historic details of Soviet policy and the Cold War.²³ An additional neoclassical work by Randall Schweller confronts the balance of power theory of alliance formation. He concludes, “states are less concerned with power imbalances than they are about who holds power. Interests, not power, determine how states choose their friends and enemies.”²⁴ In another work, Schweller illustrates how domestic elite diffusion or concentration affects a state’s ability to balance against potential threats. He concludes, “The closer the policymaking process and actual

²⁰ Glenn H. Snyder, and Paul Diesing, Conflict Among Nations: Bargaining, Decision Making, and System Structure in International Crises (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977), p. 426, 428-429.

²¹ Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Long Grove, Ill.: Waveland Press, Inc., 1979), pp. 168-169.

²² Mark R. Brawley, “Neoclassical realism and strategic calculations: explaining divergent British, French, and Soviet Strategies toward Germany between the world wars (1919-1939),” from chapter 3 in Steven E. Lobell, Norrin M. Ripsman, and Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, eds., Neoclassical Realism, The State, and Foreign Policy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), p. 78.

²³ William C. Wohlforth, The Elusive Balance: Power and Perceptions During the Cold War (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993), p. 16.

²⁴ Randall L. Schweller, Deadly Imbalances: Tripolarity and Hitler’s Strategy of World Conquest (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998).

state-society relations approximate a unitary actor, the more accurate realism's predictions. Conversely, when states are divided at the elite and societal levels, they are less likely to behave in accordance with balance of power predictions."²⁵

Schweller and other neoclassical realists reject the structural determinism of neorealist scholars such as Christopher Layne, Arnold Wolfers, and John Mearsheimer that promote balance of power as a "law of nature;" instead, Schweller argued that balancing policy is a result of domestic political process and deliberation.²⁶ Therefore, neoclassical realists bring greater attention to how the internal politics of a state contribute to the formation of alliances.

2.2.3 The Functional Component

This section will explore why states choose to form alliances. George Liska's foundational work from late 1960s provides the first three alliance functions, Kenneth Boulding provides the fourth function, and James Fearon and James Morrow provide the fifth function:²⁷

1) Aggregation of power,

²⁵ Randall L. Schweller, "Unanswered Threats: A Neoclassical Realist Theory of Underbalancing," International Security, Vol. 29, No. 2 (Fall 2004), p. 161.

²⁶ Schweller, "Unanswered Threats," p. 163. For neorealist examples see Christopher Layne, "From Preponderance to Offshore Balancing: America's Future Grand Strategy," International Security, Vol. 22, No. 1 (Summer 1997), p. 117; Arnold Wolfers, Discord and Collaboration: Essays on International Politics (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1962), p. 15; and John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W.W. Norton, 2001), p. 21.

²⁷ George Liska, Alliances and the Third World (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1968), pp. 24-25; Kenneth E. Boulding, Conflict and Defense: A General Theory (New York: Harper and Row, 1962); James D. Fearon, "Signaling Foreign Policy Interests: Tying Hands versus Sinking Costs," The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 41, No. 1, New Games: Modeling Domestic-International Linkages (Feb., 1997), p. 70; James D. Morrow, "Alliances, Credibility, and Peacetime Costs," The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 38, No. 2, Arms, Alliances, and Cooperation: Formal Models and Empirical Tests (June, 1994), pp. 271-2; James D. Morrow, "Alliances: Why Write Them Down?" Annual Review of Political Science, Vol. 3 (2000), pp. 67-69.

- 2) Interallied control,
- 3) International order promotion,
- 4) Aid power projection across distance and geography, and
- 5) Strengthen the credibility of commitments.

A preponderance of international relations scholars spend most of their attention on the first function, aggregation of power, as it can be considered the most obvious function of alliances. As James Morrow wrote, "The dominant view sees alliances as tools for aggregating capabilities against a threat; nations form alliances to increase their security by massing their capabilities against a common enemy. The need for the alliance ends when the threat passes."²⁸ Thus, the aggregation of power would fall into the category of external balancing, as Morgenthau describes, a state's leadership makes the decision to improve their relative power position when they "add to their own power the power of other nations."²⁹ The aggregation of capabilities function relates to the balance of power studies concerning alliance formation seeking to answer two questions: when do states bandwagon with the greater power or balance against the greater power, and under what conditions? For example, Jack Snyder and Thomas Christensen argued that elite perception of the offense-defense balance will help predict how alliances formed and behaved before the First and Second World Wars.³⁰ Stephen Walt has

²⁸ James D. Morrow, "Alliances and Asymmetry: An Alternative to the Capability Aggregation Model of Alliances," *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 35, No. 4, November 1991, p. 904.

²⁹ Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations*, p. 181.

³⁰ Thomas J. Christensen, and Jack Snyder, "Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks: Predicting Alliance Patterns in Multipolarity," *International Organization*, Vol. 44, No. 2 (Spring 1990), pp. 137-168.

argued that instead of the balance of power, leaders consider the balance of threat faced by their state.³¹

However, the formation of alliances for aggregating capabilities does not make sense to Kenneth Waltz and Robert Jervis as they assess the value of allies in a bipolar system. Waltz wrote, “Because allies add relatively little to the superpower’s capabilities, they concentrate their attention on their own dispositions.”³² Jervis agreed with Waltz in writing, “Under bipolarity, superpowers do not need allies because they have sufficient resources so that they can rely on ‘internal balancing’ – the acquisition of arms through domestic building programs.”³³ From Waltz and Jervis’s deductive reasoning from a bipolar international system such as the Cold War, the alliance function of aggregating capabilities made little sense for the Soviet Union to form the Warsaw Pact and for the U.S. to form NATO. Both states would end up paying the majority of the military expenditures of their respective blocs.³⁴ To answer this counter-intuitive decision we will have to turn our attention to the two remaining functions of alliances.

Liska’s second alliance function, interallied control, is an often-overlooked function, but the purpose of one state allying with a weak power or even a potential rival is an important answer to Waltz’ question of why the Soviet Union and the United States would form alliances in a bipolar system. Paul Schroeder expanded on Liska’s earlier work and used the term “alliance management”; he provided

³¹ Stephen M. Walt, “Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power,” *International Security*, Vol. 9, No. 4 (Spring 1985), pp. 3-43; and Stephen M. Walt, *The Origins of Alliances* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987).

³² Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, p. 171.

³³ Robert Jervis, *System Effects: Complexity in Political and Social Life* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997), p. 112.

³⁴ Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, p. 169.

numerous examples from European politics, post-Napoleonic Wars to 1945, where the alliance function was the management of the ally in contrast to the aggregation of military capabilities function.³⁵ Schroeder agreed that the primary and most common function is capability aggregation, but he wants students of International Relations to understand the prevalence of alliance management. Schroeder listed three alliance management goals, “the desire to control one’s ally, the aim of managing an international problem, and even the hope of avoiding conflict by allying oneself with a rival.”³⁶ Thus, under certain conditions, great powers can use alliances for hegemonic domination.³⁷

In similar fashion, Glenn Snyder’s classic work on alliance theory explores how alliance management confronts the “alliance security dilemma.” He argued that the remedy to abandonment anxiety is to bolster your commitment to your ally; yet, you do not want your ally to be emboldened to draw you in to an unwanted war leading to entrapment so a state reduces its commitment.³⁸ Michael Beckley answers the above concern by illustrating how the U.S., even with its extensive alliance and allied involvement after World War II, has avoided entanglement.³⁹ Beckley concludes, “the empirical record shows that the risk of entanglement is real but manageable and that, for better or worse, U.S. security policy lies firmly in the hands of U.S. leaders and is shaped primarily by those leaders; perceptions of the

³⁵ Paul W. Schroeder, “Alliances, 1815-1945: Weapons of Power and Tools of Management,” in Klaus Knorr, ed., Historical Dimensions of National Security Problems (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1976), pp. 227-262.

³⁶ Schroeder, “Alliances, 1815-1945: Weapons of Power and Tools of Management,” p. 255.

³⁷ Liska, Alliances and the Third World, p. 32.

³⁸ Snyder, Alliance Politics, pp. 180-181.

³⁹ Michael Beckley, “The Myth of Entangling Alliances: Reassessing the Security Risks of U.S. Defense Pacts,” International Security, Vol. 39, No. 4 (Spring 2015), pp. 7-48.

nation's core interests."⁴⁰ Beckley calls it dual deterrence: "simultaneously deterring aggressors and restraining allies."⁴¹ Furthermore, Jeremy Pressman explored the entrapment theme on how weaker allies have the potential to undermine the powerful restrainer's attempts to avoid conflict.⁴² Finally, a recent work by Gene Gerzhoy illustrates how the U.S. used alliance coercion to stymy West Germany's determination to pursue its own nuclear deterrent.⁴³ President Kennedy offered Chancellor Konrad Adenauer an ultimatum in early 1963: cooperate with the French to acquire a nuclear weapon and you will lose U.S. ground troops, or remain subordinate to NATO and keep a U.S. troop presence and extended nuclear deterrence.⁴⁴

The third alliance function, promotion of international order, Liska closely relates to the second function in writing, "Promotion of international order comes close to being international government if an alliance institutionalizes a 'concert' among great powers and is used to deal with interstate conflict as well as well as more fundamental threats such as social revolution."⁴⁵ Ikenberry's work on international institution building after major wars points to the alliance system's function of producing order between states. For example, after the Napoleonic Wars, "the British were introducing an institutional innovation into the organization

⁴⁰ Beckley, "The Myth of Entangling Alliances," p. 47.

⁴¹ Beckley, "The Myth of Entangling Alliances," p. 21.

⁴² Jeremy Pressman, Warring Friends: Alliance Restraint in International Politics (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2008), p. 15-17.

⁴³ Gene Gerzhoy, "Alliance Coercion and Nuclear Restraint: How the United States Thwarted West Germany's Nuclear Ambitions," International Security, Vol. 39, No. 4 (Spring 2015), pp. 91-129.

⁴⁴ Gerzhoy, "Alliance Coercion and Nuclear Restraint," p. 115.

⁴⁵ Liska, Alliances and the Third World, p. 26.

of European order.”⁴⁶ Ikenberry’s thoughts on the third alliance function align well with Hedley Bull’s statement concerning international order, “NATO has fulfilled the role of providing a multilateral framework within which the inevitable recovery of West German power could take place while causing the minimum alarm to others.”⁴⁷ Another example of this ordering function comes from one of Timothy Crawford’s case studies detailing U.S. diplomatic efforts to manage a conflict between two allies within NATO; namely, Greece and Turkey, in their dispute over Cyprus in the mid-1960s.⁴⁸ In line with Crawford’s concern for the moral hazard problem is a recent work by Brett Benson. Benson looks at the question of how a state carefully lending credibility to defend an ally while not emboldening the ally to commit to war; for example, the U.S. promising to defend Taiwan from China, but not emboldening Jiang Jieshi [Chiang Kaishek] to attack the mainland.⁴⁹

The fourth alliance function aids in the projection of power across great distances. As noted by Waltz and Jervis an alliance between a superpower and a lesser power does not enhance the aggregated power of the alliance.⁵⁰ However, an alliance with a lesser power can offer strategic proximity. This represents the logic of the Brookings Institution analysts in suggesting that after World War II the U.S. should establish a forward base in Asia similar to the role that Britain played in Europe. Philippines would be an optimal place for the U.S. to establish a “bastion off

⁴⁶ G. John Ikenberry, After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), p. 100.

⁴⁷ Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics, 3rd Ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002), p. 219.

⁴⁸ Timothy W. Crawford, Pivotal Deterrence (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003), pp. 100-134.

⁴⁹ Brett V. Benson, Constructing International Security: Alliances, Deterrence, and Moral Hazard (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), pp. 10-12.

⁵⁰ Waltz, Theory of International Politics, p. 171; and Jervis, System Effects: Complexity in Political and Social Life, p. 112.

the continent of Asia” in the event of conflict.⁵¹ Geographic distance represents a large problem for great powers that want to project power and remain a presence in another region. Kenneth Boulding defined the loss-of-strength gradient as “The amount by which the competitive power of a party diminishes per mile movement away from home.”⁵² This idea is in line with Mearsheimer’s writings on the stopping power of water that “large bodies of water profoundly limit power-projection capabilities of land forces.”⁵³ Thus, great powers form alliances with small powers because an alliance “enables the powerful state to project power more effectively” by overcoming distance and geography.⁵⁴ Along the same lines, Gartzke and Braithwaite concluded, alliances “overcome distance by creating opportunities for security partners to share territory.”⁵⁵ Additionally, Edwin Fedder includes this strategic function in postulating, State A allies with State B “to gain use of B’s territory for strategic purposes such as military bases, refueling depots, ports, and forward deployment.”⁵⁶ The security benefits are not all one-sided; Morrow argued that the smaller state enters a security-autonomy trade-off. The smaller state makes

⁵¹ Frederick S. Dunn, Edward M. Earle, William T. R. Fox, Grayson L. Kirk, David N. Rowe, Harold Sprout, and Arnold Wolfers, “Joint Chiefs of Staff Memorandum for Information No. 382: A Security Policy for Post-War America,” 29 March 1945, *Naval Historical Center*, Strategic Plans Division, Series 14, Box 194, AI-2, pp. 13-14.

⁵² Boulding, *Conflict and Defense: A General Theory*, p. 79.

⁵³ Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, pp. 83-84, 114.

⁵⁴ Patrick R. Bentley, “Alliances, Arms Transfers and Military Aid: Major Power Security Cooperation with Applications and Extensions to the United States,” Ph.D. dissertation, *Vanderbilt University*, May 2013, p. 73, <http://etd.library.vanderbilt.edu/available/etd-03262013-141440/unrestricted/Bentley.pdf> (Accessed 17 June 2016); Bentley cites Harvey Starr, “Alliances: Tradition and Change in American Views of Foreign Military Entanglements,” chapter 2 from Ken Booth and Moorhead Wright, eds., *In American Thinking About Peace and War* (New York: Barnes & Noble, 1978); and Harvey Starr and Randolph M. Siverson, “Alliances and Geopolitics,” *Political Geography Quarterly*, Vol. 9, No. 3, 1990, p. 241.

⁵⁵ Erik Gartzke and Alex Braithwaite “Power, Parity and Proximity: How Distance and Uncertainty Condition the Balance of Power,” University of California, San Diego, 2011, p. 22, paper available from <http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.457.1921&rep=rep1&type=pdf> (Accessed 17 June 2016).

⁵⁶ Fedder, “The Concept of Alliance,” p. 67.

concessions to the large state to gain security, but the small state loses autonomy in its ability to determine its foreign policy or domestic policy without interference.⁵⁷ The large state is able to enhance its ability to project power by utilizing the smaller state's territory and prepare for the potential future conflicts.⁵⁸

The fifth function that an alliance can serve is to strengthen the credibility of a commitment. As Morrow wrote, "Alliances signal to parties outside the alliance the willingness of the allies to come to one another's aid if threatened by other nations. Such signals could enhance deterrence of threats by convincing threatening nations that intervention against them was likely."⁵⁹ Harvey Starr added that alliances "may be particularly useful in maintaining the credibility of a nation's threats and promises."⁶⁰ James Fearon pointed to the signaling of alliance commitments to shared interests being tied to domestic and international reputation. A states' leader can make a credible threat by "tying their hands" to a certain policy that they cannot back down from without a reaction from the domestic political audience. Additionally, a state could station a "trip-wire" force within an alliance partner's threatened territory to signal commitment.⁶¹ Glenn Snyder warns in this situation, an alliance partner that does not fulfill its commitment could face abandonment costs. He wrote, "The more explicit and

⁵⁷ Morrow, "Alliances and Asymmetry: An Alternative to the Capability Aggregation Model of Alliances," p. 930; Morrow, "Alliances: Why Write Them Down?" p. 79; and Chung Jaewook, "The Power Distribution between Allies, Alliance Politics and Alliance Duration," Ph.D. dissertation, *Rice University*, August 2014, p. 18, <https://scholarship.rice.edu/handle/1911/87736> (Accessed 17 June 2016).

⁵⁸ Bentley, "Alliances, Arms Transfers and Military Aid: Major Power Security Cooperation with Applications and Extensions to the United States," p. 95.

⁵⁹ Morrow, "Alliances, Credibility, and Peacetime Costs," p. 272.

⁶⁰ Starr, "Alliances: Tradition and Change in American Views of Foreign Military Entanglements," p. 39.

⁶¹ Fearon, "Signaling Foreign Policy Interests: Tying Hands versus Sinking Costs," p. 70.

precise the verbal commitment, the greater the cost in nonfulfillment and the lower the credibility of the threat of nonfulfillment.”⁶²

2.2.4 The Relational Component

This final section on alliance scholarship will look at power disparities between allies and the relationship of the target state to the adversarial alliance. The works of George Liska and James Morrow help describe the relational component of alliances, as these two scholars focused primarily on asymmetric alliances.⁶³ Additionally, I want to cover a third relational type developed by Thomas Christensen, adversarial alliances.⁶⁴

The first relational type, symmetric alliance, occurs when two powers of equal strength enter into a security agreement to fulfill one or multiple of the previous mentioned functions. Theoretically, James Morrow postulated that the two great powers should both receive security and autonomy benefits by entering into a security alliance, with autonomy being defined as a “state’s ability to determine its own policies.”⁶⁵ Morrow offered the Axis Alliance of World War II as an example where Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy, and Imperial Japan all had common interests in changing the status quo and increased autonomy to pursue that shared goal.⁶⁶ Waltz also stated how defection in an alliance of equals was most damaging. He

⁶² Snyder, *Alliance Politics*, p. 169

⁶³ Liska, *Alliances and the Third World*, pp. 26-43.

⁶⁴ Thomas Christensen, *Worse Than a Monolith: Alliance Politics and Problems of Coercive Diplomacy in Asia* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011).

⁶⁵ Morrow, “Alliances and Asymmetry,” p. 905 & 909.

⁶⁶ Morrow, “Alliances and Asymmetry,” p. 912.

stated, “In alliances among equals, the defection of one party threatens the security of the others.” The opposite will be true as we move to consider the relationship of asymmetric alliance members.

The second relational type, asymmetric alliances, occurs when a great power aligns itself with a weak or small power. Morrow’s writings are influential in understanding how weak powers make gains in security by forming an alliance with a great power, but at the cost of policy autonomy.⁶⁷ Works by four scholars have focused in particular on the roles and strategies of the small states in the international system: Annette Baker Fox, Michael Handel, Robert Rothstein and Glenn Snyder. Annette Baker Fox’s study illustrates two important details that analysts can miss if they overly focus on great powers. First, “Both great and small states can employ economic, ideological, and diplomatic methods as well as military measures.”⁶⁸ Second, “Another difference in perspectives between the great and the small powers was the acute sensitivity of the small to possible encroachments on their independence. Characteristically, small state leaders strive to compensate for their military inferiority by emphasizing respect for their dignity.”⁶⁹ Michael Handel’s work extended Annette Fox’s conclusions by showing numerous examples where “weak states” were far from impotent security “consumers.”⁷⁰ Handel wrote, “There are two major ways in which the weak states can recruit the support of other countries. They may either enter into a *formal* alliance with other states, or they

⁶⁷ Morrow, “Alliances and Asymmetry,” pp. 913-914.

⁶⁸ Annette Baker Fox, The Power of Small States: Diplomacy in World War II (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1959), p. 2

⁶⁹ Fox, The Power of Small States, p. 182.

⁷⁰ Michael I. Handel, Weak States in the International System (Portland: Frank Cass, 1990), p. 36.

may reach an *informal*, though not necessarily less helpful, understanding with a partner sharing common interests.[emphasis in original]” Morrow offered the U.S. and Israel as an example of an informal alliance. He wrote, “Their military interests have been sufficiently similar that an alliance has been unnecessary.”⁷¹ Next, Robert Rothstein focuses on the differences in capabilities and commitment towards confronting a threat; the small power brings little in military capabilities in comparison to the great power, but is very much committed to confronting the threat. Rothstein argued that the opposite is true for the great power; the great power contributes a lot in military capabilities, “but only a partial commitment,” and “not to the detriment of its other interests.”⁷² Finally, Glenn Snyder reminds us, “Paradoxically, a weak ally may lack influence because of its dependence but gain influence by reason of its vulnerability and essentiality.”⁷³

In relational terms, an adversarial alliance represents the vantage point of the target state or third-party state. As George Liska wrote, “Put negatively, an alliance is a means of reducing the impact of antagonistic power, perceived as pressure which threatens one’s independence.”⁷⁴ If we are to take the vantage point of State C, the activities of States A and B can be potentially threatening, divisive, or containing if we consider three different types of capability aggregating uses by States A and B. Edwin Fedder offered three potential functions that work against State C:

⁷¹ Morrow, “Alliances and Asymmetry,” pp. 906-907.

⁷² Robert L. Rothstein, *Alliance and Small Powers* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968), p. 57.

⁷³ Snyder, *Alliance Politics*, p. 170.

⁷⁴ George Liska, *Nations in Alliance: The Limits of Interdependence* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1968), p. 26.

- 1) Augmentive: A allies with B to add B's power relative to the outside enemy C.
 $A+B > C$;
- 2) Preemptive or Preclusive: A allies with B to prevent B's power from being added to enemy C. $A > C-B$; and
- 3) Strategic: A allies with B to gain use of B's territory for strategic purposes such as military bases, refueling depots, ports, and forward deployment.⁷⁵

On point three, Liska made an important point concerning three different types of alliance bases. *Integral bases* are used for local defense, strategic deterrence, and retaliation; *contingent bases* are used for the defense of the host country or adjacent ally; and *potential bases* are essential facilities for air, land, and sea operations minus the dominant ally's personnel and military assets.⁷⁶ An alliance target or third-party state could judge the alliance relationship founded on the type of base the host alliance partner has allowed their alliance partner to station on their territory.

The final relational area concerns the target or third-party state's relationship to the alliance. Christensen's book, Worse Than a Monolith, views the diplomatic struggle the U.S. faced during the Cold War dealing with a Sino-Soviet relationship that was fractured and not cohesive.⁷⁷ For example, Christensen notes how the Sino-Soviet split forced the Soviet Union and China to ramp up their revolutionary support of communist movements in Southeast Asia as the two states

⁷⁵ Fedder, "The Concept of Alliance," p. 67. Liska uses the term "preclusive" to describe the motive to "divert small-state power from alliance with an adversary," Liska, Alliances and the Third World, p. 31.

⁷⁶ Liska, Nations in Alliance, p. 145.

⁷⁷ Christensen, Worse Than a Monolith, p. 4.

competed for political influence; thus, making it more difficult for the U.S. to confront two active adversaries. Similar scholarship by Timothy Crawford and Yasuhiro Izumikawa has focused on the target state's ability to divide existing adversarial alliances or prevent the formation of an adversarial alliance by use of a "wedge" strategy.⁷⁸ A successful division or prevention of an adversarial alliance would overturn two of Edwin Fedder's alliance functions.⁷⁹ For instance, State C works to prevent or remove the alliance functions that work against it:

- 1) Disaggregate: State C removes A from allying with B to decrease B's power.
- 2) Remove Strategic Advantage: State C removes A's ability to use B's territory for strategic purposes such as military bases, refueling depots, ports, and forward deployment.

2.3 LITERATURE REVIEW ON PERCEPTIONS

This section covers the rather large concept of political perceptions. There are important debates and theoretical developments within the broad concept of perceptions that I was cognizant of when researching Chinese perceptions of adversarial alliances. The formation of a perception involves calculations, reasoning, and the accumulation of facts for analysts and political leaders to

⁷⁸ Timothy W. Crawford, "How Wedge Strategies Shape Power Politics," *International Security*, Vol. 35, No. 4, Spring 2011, pp. 155-189; and Timothy W. Crawford, "Wedge Strategy, Balancing, and the Deviant Case of Spain, 1940-41," *Security Studies*, Vol. 17, No. 4, Spring 2011, pp. 155-189; and Yasuhiro Izumikawa, "To Coerce or Reward? Theorizing Wedge Strategies in Alliance Politics," *Security Studies*, Vol. 22, No. 3, pp. 498-531.

⁷⁹ Fedder, "The Concept of Alliance," p. 67.

interpret and challenge. After covering political psychology and decision making the literature review will focus on three topics: intentions, capabilities and cohesion.

2.3.1 Political Psychology and Decision Making

Psychology's reach into the realm of political science began with Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman's work on cognitive biases in judgmental heuristics.⁸⁰ They pointed to three examples of how individuals regularly make poor decisions: misunderstandings of probability, conflating correlation with causation, and exhibiting inflexible thinking processes. A couple of years later, Robert Jervis further opened the way for psychological and cognitive research with his foundational work, Perceptions and Misperception in International Politics.⁸¹ Jervis made an important assertion concerning how a target state could interpret the formation and maintenance of an alliance that potentially threatened it. Jervis asserted that the target state's perception would display "overcentralization" or "over-Machiavellianism." The former regards events that might have happened for random reasons as events that an adversary planned against them; the latter refers to a target state or third-party state over-reading of malicious intent in every event as if it was conspiracy.⁸² Another book that provides an overview of political psychology remains Rose McDermott's Political Psychology in International

⁸⁰ Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, "Availability: A Heuristic for Judging Frequency and Probability," Cognitive Psychology, Vol. 5, No. 2 (September 1973), pp. 207-232; and Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman "Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases," Science, 1974, 185 (4157): pp. 1124-31

⁸¹ Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976).

⁸² Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics, p. 329.

Relations; her book serves as a compendium of various studies and experimental cases.⁸³

Jonathan Mercer's research makes a crucial break from the previous scholarship. He noted that much of the early political psychology works were explaining poor decision-making and irrational thinking.⁸⁴ Instead, Mercer sets out to describe how rational choice scholarship cannot separate rational political decision-making from emotions; Mercer wrote, "Because rationality depends on psychology, psychology must do more than explain mistakes."⁸⁵ Mercer gains backing from Stephen Rosen's work on U.S. presidential decision-making since Rosen sees the emotion as an integral part of decision making. Rosen wrote, "Human beings who cannot react and decide emotionally can easily become paralyzed with indecision in settings far less complex than those faced by the presidents..."⁸⁶

Rosen's work helps us bridge to a key component of political psychology: political decision making. Scholars such as Yaacov Vertzberger, and Richard Neustadt and Ernest May extended Jervis's research on understanding how political leaders make decisions. Vertzberger's expansive work on political decision making covers numerous issues ranging from information processing, decision maker personalities, social and cultural influences, to the "use and abuse" of history.⁸⁷

⁸³ Rose McDermott, Political Psychology in International Relations (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 2004).

⁸⁴ Jonathan Mercer, "Rationality and Psychology in International Politics," International Organization, Vol. 59, Is. 1 (January 2005), p. 78.

⁸⁵ Mercer, "Rationality and Psychology in International Politics," p. 89.

⁸⁶ Stephen Peter Rosen, War and Human Nature (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005), p. 69.

⁸⁷ Yaacov Vertzberger, The World in Their Minds: Information Processing, Cognition, and Perception in Foreign Policy Decisionmaking (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990).

Vertzberger also published a single case study on the Sino-Indian Conflict from 1959 to 1962.⁸⁸ Neustadt and May also paid particular attention to the use of history in the formulation of foreign and public policy; their book is a collection of valuable case studies that illustrate both good and bad uses of history.⁸⁹

In related fashion, Khong Yuen Foong's contribution to the political decision making in his exploration of analogical reasoning; and more importantly, how analogies direct policy makers to a prescribed policy.⁹⁰ On analogical reasoning Vertzberger wrote, "Decision makers who prefer little deliberation and swift, reflexive, intuitive decisions are particularly prone to use simplistic historical analogies to support the predicted outcomes of their decision-making process even when faced with complex problems."⁹¹ Additionally, Christopher Twomey focuses on how military doctrinal differences can cause misperceptions. He wrote, "States look at the world through the lens of their own military doctrine. At times, the lens blurs the view, complicating statecraft, signaling, interpreting the adversary's signals, and assessing the balance of power."⁹² Vertzberger points to this type of misunderstanding when U.S. intelligence misjudged Arab military initiatives in 1973, because from the American understanding of war "one fights a war to achieve

⁸⁸ Yaacov Vertzberger, Misperceptions in Foreign Policymaking: The Sino-Indian Conflict, 1959-1962 (Boulder: Westview Press, 1984).

⁸⁹ Richard E. Neustadt and Ernest R. May, Thinking in Time: The Uses of History for Decision-Makers (New York: The Free Press, 1986).

⁹⁰ Khong Yuen Foong, Analogies at War: Korea, Munich, Dien Bien Phu, and the Vietnam Decisions of 1965 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992). Also see Deborah Welch Larson, "Politics, Uncertainty, and Values: Good Judgement in Context," from chapter 12 in Stanley Allen Renshon and Deborah Welch Larson, eds., Good Judgement in Foreign Policy: Theory and Application (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003), pp. 318-319.

⁹¹ Vertzberger, The World in Their Minds, p. 321.

⁹² Christopher P. Twomey, Christopher P., The Military Lens: Doctrinal Difference and Deterrence Failure in Sino-American Relations (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2010), p. ix.

victory”; instead, the Arab’s goal was to “upset the status quo in the Middle East.”⁹³ A recent article by Jennifer Mitzen and Randall Schweller explores senior leaders’ “misplaced certainty.” Their findings go against the expectation that leaders would be indecisive or make small incremental decisions. Mitzen and Schweller wrote, “In security dilemma and spiral model cases, however, things go terribly wrong because leaders form very strong opinions and take bold and decidedly non-incremental actions.”⁹⁴

2.3.2 Interpreting Intentions

This section will highlight the neorealist and neoclassical realist debate on whether states have the ability to determine intentions and interpret capabilities. To begin, Robert Jervis’s work on images sought to show the limits and untrustworthiness of images. He wrote, “Few actions are unambiguous. They rarely provide anything like proof of how the state plans to act in the future. This is shown, first, by historical examples of successful attempts to project inaccurate, and even wildly inaccurate, images. Aggressive states have convinced others they were peaceful.”⁹⁵ Kenneth Waltz and John Mearsheimer represent the neorealist camp that is primarily concerned with capabilities since they argue that a state’s intentions are uncertain and can change rapidly.⁹⁶ Mearsheimer wrote, “intentions

⁹³ Vertzberger, *The World in Their Minds*, p. 326.

⁹⁴ Jennifer Mitzen and Randall L. Schweller, “Knowing the Unknown Unknowns: Misplaced Certainty and the Onset of War,” *Security Studies*, Vol. 20, 2011, pp. 2-35.

⁹⁵ Robert Jervis, *The Logic of Images in International Relations* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970), p. 9.

⁹⁶ Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, p. 105.

are ultimately unknowable, so states worried about their survival must make worst-case assumptions about their rivals' intentions."⁹⁷ CIA analysts, tasked with the responsibility of judging the intentions and capabilities of other states, have long recognized the difficulty of judging intentions and capabilities. Acting Director of Central Intelligence Charles Cabell stated, "In the future, we do not expect that military activity will provide conclusive evidence of intent to attack, except perhaps late in a crisis situation, since most indications will also be consistent with an intention to deter or to defend if attacked."⁹⁸

In contrast to the neorealists, Charles Glaser designed his rational theory around the ability of states to discern the offense-defense balance and state intentions based on an information variable based on malign or benign signaling.⁹⁹ Randall Schweller challenges Glaser's theory by arguing that states in the digital age are not concerned with the offense-defense balance, but are more concerned with creating environments of innovation and "generating dynamic growth."¹⁰⁰ A rather recent work by Keren Yarhi-Milo looks at how political leaders and the intelligence community judge intentions differently. The former assesses intentions on "their own theories, expectations, and needs" that are often informed by "vivid" personal

⁹⁷ Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, p. 45.

⁹⁸ "Current Status of Soviet and Satellite Military Forces and Indications of Military Intentions," CIA, Memorandum, from Acting DCI Cabell for General Taylor forwarding material for President Kennedy, 6 September 1961, Document No. 5166d4f999326091c6a607de, p. 7 [pdf p. 8] <http://www.foia.cia.gov/document/5166d4f999326091c6a607de> (Accessed 16 March 2015).

⁹⁹ Charles L. Glaser, *Rational Theory of International Politics*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010), chap. 3.

¹⁰⁰ Randall L. Schweller, "Rational Theory for a Bygone Era," *Security Studies*, Vol. 20, 2011, pp. 461 and 466.

and emotional information; in contrast, the intelligence organizations prioritize the collection and analysis of the adversaries military assets to evaluate intentions.¹⁰¹

2.3.3 Interpreting Capabilities

In regards to the capabilities debate, Andrew Marshall performed a study that discussed the difficulties of assessing military capabilities in 1966.¹⁰² This short 22 page paper outlined how force assessments are much more complex than simple tabulations of one state's military in contrast to another state's military.¹⁰³ Moreover, a political analyst must be careful when adding alliance members' military strength because the allied forces "are not entirely complementary," due to differences in training and logistical support. Similarly, Marshall argued that the alliance members might have different interests in how valuable the respective states view a certain conflict or contingency.¹⁰⁴ In a more recent study on capabilities, Ashley Tellis, Janice Bially, Christopher Layne, Melissa McPherson wrote a critical RAND study entitled, Measuring National Power in the Postindustrial Age. The chapter on military capability offers some important insights; they wrote, "A country may provide its military with generous budgets and large cadres of manpower, but if the military's doctrine is misguided, the training ineffective, the leadership unschooled, or the organization inappropriate, military

¹⁰¹ Keren Yarhi-Milo, "In the Eye of the Beholder: How Leaders and Intelligence Communities Assess the Intentions of Adversaries," International Security, Vol. 38, No. 1 (Summer 2013), p. 9.

¹⁰² Andrew W. Marshall, Problems of Estimating Military Power, P-3417 (Santa Monica: The RAND Corporation, 1966).

¹⁰³ Marshall, Problems of Estimating Military Power, p. 2.

¹⁰⁴ Marshall, Problems of Estimating Military Power, p. 5.

capability will suffer.”¹⁰⁵ For example, Italy and India have a very similar Gross Domestic Product (GDP), but the two states have very different military resources, doctrines, and interests in their respective security situations. Again, Mearsheimer gives primacy to capabilities as the determinate of threat in writing, “Capabilities, however, not only can be measured but also determine whether or not a rival state is a serious threat.”¹⁰⁶ In contrast to Mearsheimer, Bernard Finel provides more nuance to the focus on capabilities. Finel’s criticism of the offense-defense balance as a structural variable emphasized strategic interaction as a critical factor in war outcomes; he wrote, “Choices are only dominant vis-à-vis other states’ choices... The optimal choice depends on the opponent’s decisions.”¹⁰⁷ Retired U.S. Air Force General Glenn Kent echoes the necessity of thinking about strategic interactions. In his analytical memoir, Kent stated, “In military affairs, as in most fields of human endeavor, opponents react to each other’s moves. Although this seems obvious, it is surprisingly common for advocates of certain policies or programs to assume that the adversary does not react to our initiative.”¹⁰⁸ Thus, the task of assessing capabilities is much more complicated than counting troops and tanks, but it involves the strategic interaction and the military doctrine in how the state employs its capabilities.

¹⁰⁵ Ashely J. Tellis, Janice Bially, Christopher Layne, Melissa McPherson, Measuring National Power in the Postindustrial Age (Santa Monica: The RAND Corporation, 2000), p. 134.

¹⁰⁶ Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, p. 45.

¹⁰⁷ James W. Davis, Jr., Bernard I. Finel, Stacie E. Goddard, Stephen Van Evera, Charles L. Glaser, and Chaim Kaufmann, “Correspondence: Taking Offense at the Offense-Defense Theory,” International Security, Vol. 23, No. 3 (Winter 1998/99), pp. 183-184.

¹⁰⁸ Glenn A. Kent, with David Ochmanek, Michael Spirtas, Bruce R. Pirnie, Thinking about America’s Defense: An Analytical Memoir, OP233 (Santa Monica: The RAND Corporation, 2008), p. 158 [PDF p. 184].

2.3.4 Interpreting Cohesion

The concept of cohesion is a seldom defined term in International Relations literature. A work by Ole Holsti, Terrence Hopmann, and John Sullivan defined cohesion as “the ability of alliance partners to agree upon goals, strategy, and tactics, and to coordinate activities directed towards those ends.”¹⁰⁹ The term’s usage is equally ambiguous in reference to alliances possessing or lacking cohesion. Charles Kupchan’s analyzed intra-alliance cooperation and discord by measuring military assistance, policy compromise, and economic contributions. He tested four theories of cohesion that represent four functions:

1) External threat- alliance cohesion is a function of redressing “eroding security predicament through cooperation.”

2) Alliance security dilemma- “alliance cohesion is a function of the coercive potential of the alliance leader and its ability to exact cooperative behavior from its weaker partners.”

3) Collective action- alliance cohesion is a function of the “alliance leader’s willingness and ability to assume a large share of the costs of the collective good produced by the alliance.”

4) Domestic politics- alliance cohesion is a function of popular support for cooperating or political elites perceiving an “electoral advantage in tightening alliance relations or raising defense spending.”

¹⁰⁹ Ole R. Holsti, P. Terrence Hopmann, and John D. Sullivan, Unity and Disintegration in International Alliances: Comparative Studies (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1973), p. 16.

Kupchan admitted that the explanations are not mutually exclusive, and his findings on a non-war NATO case study showed a mixture of coercive bargaining by the U.S. and domestic politics at work.¹¹⁰ Along these lines, Patricia Weitsman's first contribution was making the often-overlooked conclusion that alliance cohesion and the resulting intra-alliance politics are very different between wartime and peacetime alliances.¹¹¹ Next, International Relations scholars have attempted to bring greater attention to alliance cohesion variables. For instance, Sarah Kreps focused on two variables that encourage alliance cooperation and solidarity: elite consensus and intra-alliance politics.¹¹² In comparison, Evan Resnick focused on a different set of variables in the context of war-fighting: threat of defeat, shared primary adversary, power symmetry between alliance partners, and regime type.¹¹³ Lastly, Weitsman's second contribution was the comparison of pre-existing alliances and impromptu coalitions in war-fighting conditions that included senior decision-maker relationships and institutional relationships.¹¹⁴ From the vantage point of a target state, the evaluation of an alliance's cohesion at various levels of analysis should point towards the question of whether an alliance is susceptible to "wedge"

¹¹⁰ Charles A. Kupchan, "NATO and the Persian Gulf: Examining Intra-Alliance Behavior," *International Organization*, Vol. 42, No. 2 (Spring, 1988), pp. 323-326 & 344-346.

¹¹¹ Patricia A. Weitsman, *Dangerous Alliances: Proponents of Peace, Weapons of War* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004), p. 31 & 37.

¹¹² Sarah Kreps, "Elite Consensus as a Determinant of Alliance Cohesion: Why Public Opinion Hardly Matters for NATO-led Operations in Afghanistan," *Foreign Policy Analysis*, Vol. 6, Is. 3, July 2010, pp. 209-211.

¹¹³ Evan N. Resnick, "Hang Together or Hang Separately? Evaluating Rival Theories of Wartime Alliance Cohesion," *Security Studies*, Vol. 22, No. 4, p. 673.

¹¹⁴ Patricia A. Weitsman, "Wartime Alliances versus Coalition Warfare: How Institutional Structure Matters in the Multilateral Prosecution of Wars," *Strategic Studies Quarterly*, Summer 2010 pp. 113-136. Available at DTIC, <http://www.dtic.mil/get-tr-doc/pdf?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA520747> (Accessed 20 June 2016).

strategies.¹¹⁵ Lastly, Jervis reminded his readers, “alliances usually appear more durable and binding from the outside than from the inside.”¹¹⁶ From the vantage point of the target state, it cannot see or discern the inner workings and arguments within an alliance, but the target state could surmise that the alliance is unified and coordinated in executing a plan. The problem is made more acute when a target state and the alliance members are in conflict since the target state will not have as much information on the alliance partners’ bureaucracies and internal conflicts.¹¹⁷

¹¹⁵ Crawford, “How Wedge Strategies Shape Power Politics,” pp. 155-189; and Crawford, “Wedge Strategy, Balancing, and the Deviant Case of Spain, 1940-41,” pp. 155-189; and Izumikawa, “To Coerce or Reward? Theorizing Wedge Strategies in Alliance Politics,” pp. 498-531.

¹¹⁶ Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics, p. 326.

¹¹⁷ Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics, p. 329.

3.0 CHAPTER 3: CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

3.1 CHAPTER SUMMARY

The conceptual framework will begin by laying out the logic of the structured and focused comparison of the three adversarial alliance cases. Next, each framework begins with a conceptual foundation offered by the literature review, moves to describe the purpose of the inquiry, and introduces specific questions evaluated in the three empirical case studies.

3.2 STRUCTURED AND FOCUSED COMPARISON

Provided the large amount of insights and debates from the literature review on alliances and perceptions, I have drawn out four concepts to form a conceptual framework. The conceptual framework will aid our understanding of how China perceives adversarial alliances by facilitating a structured and focused comparison of the three case studies. The four concepts abide by the same structure. Each concept will establish the concept's foundation from the literature review. Second, the purpose of the inquiry will point to what information I want to find. Next, I will introduce several questions that I will ask to evaluate the evidence within the case studies.

In constructing the conceptual framework, I have attempted to simplify the study and eliminate as many moving parts as possible. Granted, the concepts of intentions, cohesion, and capabilities overlap and are not mutually exclusive, but I have attempted to parse them in such a way to draw out a certain distinctive feature. For example, alliance cohesion and alliance capabilities are concepts that are not mutually exclusive. If an alliance cooperates (cohesion) on a new weapon system (capability) they have affected both conceptual realms. Therefore, when addressing cohesion, I will largely hold the capabilities constant and vice versa.

The conceptual framework seeks to offer a logical and consistent examination of how China perceives the respective adversarial alliances at different points in time. China's leaders, policy analysts, and academics are the observers of the security cooperation on their state's periphery. For simplicity of developing this conceptual framework, I have labeled this diverse group of observers with their various interests, "Chinese analysts." The senior leaders, journal scholars, and interview subjects do not display uniform views of the adversarial alliances, and the variance between the analysts makes the study thought-provoking. For instance, some Chinese International Relations scholars emphasize individual agency, others focus on history, and others focus on systemic and organizational structures. The three case studies will offer evidence to confirm or disconfirm the specific concept questions.

In regards to the perception of intentions, each case study will attempt to lay out a "baseline" intention that I will use to compare and contrast Chinese perceptions of conspiracy. The great power in the alliance relationship will largely

determine the baseline intention. The baseline intentions for the Soviet Union in the USSR-Vietnam case were ascertained by Soviet specialists Robert Gates, Odd Arne Westad, Kenneth Weiss, Sally Stoecker, and unnamed CIA analysts; the baseline intentions for the U.S. in the US-Japan case and the US-ROK case will be taken from official primary source documents, official pronouncements, and statements made by prominent policy makers such as Joseph Nye and Jeffrey Bader. In some instances, I am able to describe the smaller powers' intentions for pursuing certain policies within the case study.

A final consideration is whether the concept points to Chinese foreign policy outcome. In some instances, Chinese official statements or academic journal scholars will point to a certain concept influencing Chinese decision making. In other instances, particularly the USSR-Vietnam Alliance, certain concepts will point to a correlation of events as evidence of influence on foreign policy outcomes.

3.3 PERCEPTIONS OF ADVERSARIAL ALLIANCE INTENTIONS

The evaluation of an alliance's intentions will be broken into two categories: perceptions of a change in the adversarial alliance's intentions and perceptions that the adversarial alliance is engaged in a conspiracy against the target state.

3.3.1 Perceptions of Changed Intentions (1A)

Conceptual Foundation 1A: A basic principle of realism argues that a state's intentions are uncertain and can change rapidly, thus, states focus on a potential adversary's capabilities.¹ Yet, no matter the uncertainty and propensity to change, states dedicate numerous resources to their intelligence services to judge the intentions of rivals.²

Purpose of Inquiry 1A: To see what factors or variables inform perceptions of adversarial alliance intentions, and how the perceived intention changes.

Question 1Aa: Do Chinese analysts focus on adversarial alliance agreements, reports, speeches, statements, and treaties to perceive changes in intentions?

Question 1Ab: Do Chinese analysts perceive tangible costly actions that diminish the adversarial alliance's capabilities as a signal of benign intentions?

Question 1Ac: Do Chinese analysts perceive tangible costly actions that enhance the adversarial alliance's capabilities as a signal of malign intentions?

Question 1Ad: Do Chinese analysts' perceptions of changes in alliance intentions influence Chinese foreign policy outcomes?

¹ Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, p. 105; and John Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, p. 45.

² Yarhi-Milo, "In the Eye of the Beholder: How Leaders and Intelligence Communities Assess the Intentions of Adversaries," p. 9.

3.3.2 Perceptions of Conspiracy (1B)

Conceptual Foundation 1B: It is natural for a target state or third-party state to discern that adversarial alliance developments are aimed at it, but over-Machiavellianism refers to the tendency to perceive conspiracy and malicious intent behind every alliance event.³ Jervis reminded his readers: “the search for the devious plan believed to lurk behind even the most seemingly spontaneous behavior is neither uncommon nor totally unwarranted.”⁴

Purpose of Inquiry 1B: To see if perceptions of conspiracy cause foreign policy outcomes, and are these perceptions of conspiracy refuted or corrected to align with the baseline intentions.

Question 1Ba: Do Chinese analysts interpret adversarial alliance activities as well organized and planned moves against them?

Question 1Bb: Do Chinese analysts interpret adversarial alliance activities as a conspiracy aimed against them.

Question 1Bc: Are Chinese analysts able to correct perceptions of conspiracy?

Question 1Bd: Do Chinese analysts’ perceptions of conspiracy influence Chinese foreign policy outcomes?

³ Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics*, p. 329.

⁴ Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics*, p. 320.

3.4 PERCEPTIONS OF ADVERSARIAL ALLIANCE COHESION

Conceptual Foundation 2: International Relations scholars point to a host of variables that encourage alliance cooperation and solidarity such as threat, elite consensus, willingness of alliance leaders to coerce or provide common goods, power symmetry between alliance partners, and domestic politics.⁵

Purpose of Inquiry 2: To see how a target state or third-party state evaluates adversarial alliance cohesion.

Question 2a: Do Chinese analysts of adversarial alliance cohesion presume that it is a function of external political context?

Question 2b: Do Chinese analysts of adversarial alliance cohesion focus on the institutional solidarity between the alliance partners?

Question 2c: Do Chinese analysts of adversarial alliance cohesion focus on the interactions between the alliance partners' senior leadership?

Question 2d: Do Chinese analysts of adversarial alliance cohesion focus on the domestic politics of the alliance partners?

Question 2e: Do Chinese analysts' perceptions of adversarial alliance cohesion influence Chinese foreign policy outcomes?

⁵ Ole R. Holsti, P. Terrence Hopmann, and John D. Sullivan, Unity and Disintegration in International Alliances: Comparative Studies; Sarah Kreps, "Elite Consensus as a Determinant of Alliance Cohesion: Why Public Opinion Hardly Matters for NATO-led Operations in Afghanistan," Foreign Policy Analysis, Vol. 6, Is. 3, July 2010, pp. 209-211; Kupchan, "NATO and the Persian Gulf: Examining Intra-Alliance Behavior," International Organization, pp. 323-326 & 344-346; Resnick, "Hang Together or Hang Separately? Evaluating Rival Theories of Wartime Alliance Cohesion," p. 673; Weitsman, Dangerous Alliances: Proponents of Peace. Weapons of War, p. 31 & 37; and Weitsman, "Wartime Alliances versus Coalition Warfare: How Institutional Structure Matters in the Multilateral Prosecution of Wars," pp. 113-136.

3.5 PERCEPTIONS OF ADVERSARIAL ALLIANCE CAPABILITIES

Conceptual Foundation 3: Scholarship on alliance formation suggest that alliances are useful for aggregating capabilities against potential or real threats as a form of external balancing.⁶ Additionally, scholarship on asymmetrical alliances suggests that alliances are strategic uses of a smaller power's territory to enhance power projection capabilities.⁷

Purpose of Inquiry 3: To see how a target state or third-party state evaluates adversarial alliance nuclear and conventional capabilities and how great powers a use lesser power's territory to aid in power projection.

Question 3a: Do Chinese analysts focus on the geostrategic factors of the adversarial alliance capabilities; for example, forward deployments, and use of ports, airfields, and military bases?

Question 3b: Do Chinese analysts focus on the strategic nuclear capabilities of the adversarial alliances?

Question 3c: Do Chinese analysts focus on the conventional capabilities of the adversarial alliances?

⁶ Liska, *Alliances and the Third World*, pp. 24-25; Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, pp. 155-157; Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, 5th Edition, pp. 181-197; Morrow, "Alliances and Asymmetry: An Alternative to the Capability Aggregation Model of Alliances," p. 904; Schweller, *Deadly Imbalances*, pp. 60-61; Snyder, *Alliance Politics*, Chapter 2, pp. 43-78; Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, pp. 164-165.

⁷ Bentley, "Alliances, Arms Transfers and Military Aid: Major Power Security Cooperation with Applications and Extensions to the United States," p. 73; Boulding, *Conflict and Defense: A General Theory*, pp. 262-263; Chung, "The Power Distribution between Allies, Alliance Politics and Alliance Duration," p. 18; Fedder, "The Concept of Alliance," p. 67; Gartzke and Braithwaite "Power, Parity and Proximity: How Distance and Uncertainty Condition the Balance of Power," p. 22; Morrow, "Alliances and Asymmetry: An Alternative to the Capability Aggregation Model of Alliances," p. 930; Morrow, "Alliances: Why Write Them Down?" p. 79; Starr, "Alliances: Tradition and Change in American Views of Foreign Military Entanglements," chapter 2; and Starr and Siverson, "Alliances and Geopolitics," *Political Geography Quarterly*, Vol. 9, No. 3, 1990, p. 241.

Question 3d: Do Chinese analysts' perceptions of adversarial alliance capabilities and foreign basing influence its foreign policy outcomes?

3.6 SELF-PERCEPTIONS OF RISING STATE IN RELATION TO ADVERSARIAL ALLIANCE

Conceptual Foundation 4: Students of International Relations have long been concerned with rising states upsetting the balance of power and hegemonic transition.⁸

Purpose of Inquiry 4: To see how a rising power views adversarial alliance activity on its periphery as its economic and military power and influence expands.

Question 4a: Have Chinese analysts become increasingly dissatisfied with adversarial alliances on its periphery?

Question 4b: Do Chinese analysts tolerate the adversarial alliances and recognize the security benefits?

Question 4c: Has China's self-perception of its rise in power influenced its foreign policy outcomes?

⁸ Gilpin, "The Theory of Hegemonic War," pp. 601-602; Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics*, p. 33; Organski, *World Politics*, 2nd Ed., chapter 14, pp. 339-376; and Yang Shih-yueh, "Power Transition, Balance of Power, and the Rise of China: A Theoretical Reflection about Rising Great Powers," p. 37.

3.7 CONCEPTS AND CASE STUDIES

I will present the three adversarial alliance cases in a rough chronological fashion, and at different junctures, I will highlight a specific concept when it becomes most apparent or salient. Table 3.1 offers a summary of the different instances that provide evidence for the six different concepts.

<i>Concept</i>	<i>Adversarial Alliance Case Event</i>		
	<i>USSR-Vietnam</i>	<i>US-Japan</i>	<i>US-ROK</i>
INTENTIONS			
<i>Perceptions of Changed Intentions</i>	USSR invasion of Afghanistan & Gorbachev's Vladivostok speech	1996 joint declaration & 1997 defense guideline revisions	<i>No Evidence</i>
<i>Perceptions of Conspiracy</i>	USSR-Vietnam Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation	2010 & 2012 <i>Diaoyu</i> incidents	2006 and 2009 North Korean nuclear tests & 2010 <i>Cheonan</i> and <i>Yeonpyeong</i> Island crises
CAPABILITIES			
<i>Adversarial Alliance Capabilities</i>	USSR deployment of nuclear missiles & troops along border with China	Conventional arms purchases, Retention of nuclear fissile material stockpile & Research and development of TMD	2014-2015 exercises and forward deployment & TMD deployment debate
COHESION			
<i>Adversarial Alliance Cohesion</i>	Sino-Vietnam War	Hatoyama Government (2009-2010)	Roh Administration (2003-2007)
RISING STATE			
<i>Self-Perception of Rising State in Relation to Adversarial Alliance</i>	Not Applicable	China's rise in military power	China's rise in economic power

Table 3.1. Concepts and Case Study Events

4.0 CHAPTER 4: USSR-VIETNAM ALLIANCE

4.1 CHAPTER SUMMARY

From the Chinese standpoint, the USSR-Vietnam Alliance (1978 to 1989) will constitute one of China's most critical threats and transform into a complete non-threat. The alliance would also determine China's strategic interaction with both the USSR and the U.S. during its short history. This chapter will begin with background information on the USSR-Vietnam bilateral relationship; discuss China's political interactions with the USSR and Vietnam as alliance partners, and layout Soviet baseline intentions. Specific junctures will arise that will offer an opportunity to evaluate particular concepts. First, senior Chinese leadership will offer their perceptions of the formation of the USSR-Vietnam Alliance. Second, the USSR's deployment of nuclear missiles and troops along the border with China offers an evaluation of alliance capabilities. Third, China's interpretation of the treaty between the USSR and Vietnam will exhibit overcentralization but not conspiracy. Fourth, the USSR's lack of involvement in responding to the China's punitive war and subsequent border bombardments will display low alliance cohesion. Fifth, the USSR's invasion of Afghanistan and the ability of Gorbachev to walk back the tensions between the China and the USSR exhibits a change in perceived intentions. Accordingly, this chapter will cover three of the four alliance perception concepts by

highlighting five important events in the USSR-Vietnam Alliance's interaction with China.

4.2 CHINA'S RELATIONS WITH THE USSR AND NORTH VIETNAM

China's problematic relationship with the Soviet Union, and Soviet and Chinese military aid to North Vietnam during the Second Indochina War (1965-1975) shaped its perception of the USSR-Vietnam Alliance. Sino-Soviet relations started to show signs of fracturing in 1958 when disagreements concerning the development of a long-distance radio communication system and a joint naval submarine fleet caused a rift between the two states. At the time, Mao Zedong insisted that the Soviets "wanted to control China militarily."¹ The relationship between the two leading Communist states further deteriorated in the wake of four political disagreements: Chinese policy concerning the Great Leap Forward, the shelling of Taiwan's *Jinmen* Island, the Soviets withholding of atomic secrets, and the fracturing of Sino-Indian relations over Tibet.² The Chinese believed that the Soviet's position on these policies "undermined the strength and goals of the international communist movement by accommodating the West."³ Early on in the Cold War, the United States challenged China's security environment, but after the Sino-Soviet split transpired in the late 1950s and early 1960s, China faced two great

¹ Chen Jian, *Mao's China and the Cold War* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2001), pp. 73-75.

² Chen, *Mao's China and the Cold War*, pp. 77-83.

³ Edward O'Dowd, *Chinese Military Strategy in the Third Indochina War: The Last Maoist War* (London: Routledge, 2007), p. 40.

powers. By 1963-1964, Mao repeatedly stated his apprehensions that the Soviets were a threat to China's northern border.⁴ As Wang Dong stated, at this stage "China started thinking about 'fighting with two fists' in the mid-1960s; China viewed the Soviet Union as a revisionist and the United States was still the main enemy as an imperialist. China wanted to fight both at the same time."⁵ China and the Soviet Union maintained state to state relations during this period, but the states' party-to-party relations severed in 1964. Subsequently, China broke its alliance relationship with the Soviet Union and began branding itself as the leader of the international Communist movement's leftist forces.⁶

Despite the Sino-Soviet split, both China and the Soviet Union supported North Vietnam in its war against the United States. North Vietnam was greatly dependent on China for essential items ranging from food resources, uniforms, small arms, and soldiers. China sent roughly 300,000 soldiers to serve in North Vietnam over the course of the war. In 1967 alone, 170,000 Chinese troops were serving in North Vietnam building, maintaining, and defending North Vietnamese transportation lines and strategic assets north of the 21st parallel where Hanoi is situated.⁷ The aid from China fit Mao's conception of North Vietnam waging a "people's war" against the U.S. In August 1965, Lin Biao published a book entitled Long Live the People's War. As historian Douglas Pike writes, "In blunt terms Lin Biao implied that the Vietnamese now were breaking all the basic rules of people's war" when it shifted in early 1965 from "revolutionary guerilla war to what Hanoi

⁴ Chen, Mao's China and the Cold War, p. 84.

⁵ Wang Dong [王栋], Personal Interview, 28 December 2015, Peking University.

⁶ Wang Dong [王栋], Personal Interview, 28 December 2015, Peking University.

⁷ Chen, Mao's China and the Cold War, p. 229.

generals call regular force strategy war.”⁸ Maoist doctrine insisted on a people’s war strategy that avoided large and costly offensives such as the Tet Offensive in 1968 and Easter (*Nguyen Hue*) Offensive in 1972.⁹ For example, in the Easter Offensive alone North Vietnamese forces lost over 600 tanks.¹⁰ Despite China’s poor relations with North Vietnam and U.S. rapprochement, Beijing feared a unified Vietnam as a politically influential power in Indochina; and therefore, continued to provide large quantities of war material, aid, and weapons to the North Vietnamese until 1975.¹¹

Vietnam was equally dependent on the Soviet Union and sought aid that would help them confront a technologically advanced adversary. Only the Soviet Union could provide expensive technologically advanced weapon systems and resources that could compete against the United States. North Vietnam eagerly sought surface to air missiles, radars, and oil from the Soviets. Table 4.1 below illustrates Soviet and Chinese military aid to North Vietnam from 1970 to 1974.

Western historians argue that Vietnam manipulated the competition between the Soviet Union and the Chinese to gain resources from both states. Historian Steven Hood wrote, “Hanoi played the [Soviets and Chinese] against each other, giving outward praise to the superiority of protracted war as espoused by

⁸ Douglas Pike, *Vietnam and the Soviet Union: Anatomy of an Alliance* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1987), pp. 65-66.

⁹ Nguyen Lien-Hang T., “The Sino-Vietnamese split and the Indochina War, 1968-1975,” from Chapter 1 in Odd Arne Westad and Sophie Quinn-Judge, eds., *The Third Indochina War: Conflict between China, Vietnam and Cambodia, 1972-79* (London: Routledge, 2006), p. 14.

¹⁰ Spencer C. Tucker, ed., *The Encyclopedia of the Vietnam War: A Political, Social, & Military History* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), p. 113.

¹¹ Hood, *Dragons Entangled: Indochina and the China-Vietnam War*, pp. 23.; see Chen, *Mao’s China and the Cold War*, p. 228, See Table 1: China’s Military Aid to Vietnam- 1964-1975 for detailed numbers on the huge supply of Chinese rifles, bullets, artillery, shells, tanks, airplanes, telephones, radios, and uniforms sent to North Vietnam.

Chairman Mao, and claiming that sophisticated weapons supplied by the Russians would improve Hanoi’s position at the bargaining table.”¹² Indeed, it is possible that both China and the USSR were willing participants in the manipulation, as both vied for Vietnamese influence.

<i>Year</i>	<i>1970</i>	<i>1971</i>	<i>1972</i>	<i>1973</i>	<i>1974</i>	<i>1970-1974</i>
<i>USSR</i>						
Combat Materiel	60	145	360	140	90	795
Military Related Support	45	55	130	85	65	380
<i>China</i>						
Combat Materiel	75	90	200	85	180	630
Military Related Support	30	40	80	40	75	265
Total Soviet and Chinese Military Aid	210	330	770	350	410	2,070

Table 4.1. Communist Aid to North Vietnam 1970-1974 (millions of USD)¹³

4.3 BASELINE ALLIANCE INTENTIONS

The Soviet Union’s enthusiasm for intervention in the “Third World” gained new traction in 1968 after the Tet offensive. When the President Nixon promised in 1969 to withdrawal from South Vietnam, a key ally, Soviet activists within the Central Committee saw an opening to promote revolutions elsewhere in Asia, Africa, and Latin America.¹⁴ Victory in Vietnam demonstrated that the Soviet Union could

¹² Steven J. Hood, *Dragons Entangled: Indochina and the China-Vietnam War* (Armonk, New York: An East Gate Book, 1992), p. 22.

¹³ “Communist Military and Economic Aid to North Vietnam, 1970-1974,” CIA, 3 January 1975, Document No. 0001166499, <http://www.foia.cia.gov/document/0001166499> (Accessed 27 July 2015), p. 5 [pdf p. 6].

¹⁴ Odd Arne Westad, *The Global Cold War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), pp. 169-170.

assist a distant ally successfully. Moreover, Soviet collective leadership, with Brezhnev as a key member, viewed China as a “direct and major threat” in the wake of the 1969 border clashes.¹⁵ On a cross-country rail trip with Defense Minister Ustinov, on 3 April 1977 Brezhnev told officers of the Trans-Baikal Military District that China was “the primary enemy” and “the number-one enemy.”¹⁶ In 1977, the CIA concluded that the Soviets were “conscious of weaknesses on their own side, particularly those arising from economic and technological deficiencies and conflict with China.”¹⁷ The Soviets were concerned that China’s strategic capabilities were going to grow exponentially for several reasons: an economic shift would produce more resources for the military, newfound access to Western technologies to enhance its defense industrial base, and continued research and development of strategic weapons and signal intelligence satellites. Therefore, Soviet leaders chose to take advantage of the strategic opportunity in Vietnam as a way to counter both China and the United States. As Robert Gates summarized, “Soviet aggressiveness in the Third World—at least in the mid-1970s—was initially directed as much at China as at the West and the United States in particular.”¹⁸ By 1977, CIA Soviet analysts listed four foreign policy goals directed at China:

- 1) To combat and reduce Chinese influence both among nations and within the international Communist movement,

¹⁵ Westad, *The Global Cold War*, pp. 194-195.

¹⁶ Robert M. Gates, *From the Shadows: The Ultimate Insider’s Story of Five Presidents and How They Won the Cold War* (New York: Simon & Schuster Paperbacks, 2006), p. 82.

¹⁷ “Soviet Strategic Objectives,” *CIA*, National Intelligence Estimate, (NIE 11-4-77), 12 January 1977, Document No. 0000268137, p. 2 [pdf p. 8], <http://www.foia.cia.gov/document/0000268137> (Accessed 12 March 2015).

¹⁸ Gates, *From the Shadows: The Ultimate Insider’s Story of Five Presidents and How They Won the Cold War*, pp. 80-81 & 83.

- 2) To limit Sino-US rapprochement,
- 3) To exert military pressure designed to deter Chinese jabs along the border while impressing upon Chinese leaders the folly of making the Soviet Union their enemy, and
- 4) Meanwhile to maintain a public posture of readiness to normalize relations against the time when Mao's successors might unfreeze China's implacable hostility.¹⁹

Thus, at the time of the creation of the USSR-Vietnam Alliance we see that the Soviet Union was highly concerned about China's growth in strategic capabilities, but also open to normalization of relations. In sum, the USSR-Vietnam Alliance was a strategic contract for both parties: the Soviet Union gained access to strategic bases in Vietnam in return for much needed economic aid and military support for fighting the Khmer Rouge.

4.4 PERCEPTIONS FROM SENIOR CHINESE LEADERSHIP

Despite a dramatic shift in its strategic relationship with the United States and the Soviet Union, China's leadership remained wary of the threat posed by the Soviet Union and its influence in Southeast Asia. Chinese apprehension is evidenced by the following three quotes from 1973 and 1974, prior to North Vietnam's reunification. In January 1973, Vice Chairman Li Desheng assessed, "in the past, the U.S. established the SEATO to blockade us. Now the U.S. has failed, while Soviet

¹⁹ "Soviet Strategic Objectives," p. 8 [pdf p. 14].

revisionists are meddling by establishing the so-called 'Asian Collective Security System.' They will replace the U.S. in blockading us."²⁰ Two months later, during the US-Vietnamese Paris peace accords, Premier Zhou Enlai made an accurate prediction, stating, "the Soviet revisionists will intensify economic aid to the Vietnamese people after the Vietnamese war comes to an end to countervail our influence in Vietnam. The struggle afterwards will be complicated and acute."²¹ Upon the conclusion of the Paris Agreement in April 1973 and the subsequent removal of U.S. military forces from Vietnam and Cambodia, the Soviet threat Zhou Enlai imagined came to fruition.

A year later in May 1974, Chairman Mao in discussions with former British Prime Minister Edward Heath articulated China's awareness of the Soviet threat and his countries readiness to face it:

Edward Heath: But its military forces are growing incessantly. Although the Soviet Union has encountered problems in many parts of the world, but it is constantly strengthening its power. Therefore, we think this is the main threat. Does the chairman believe that the Soviet Union does not pose a threat to China?

Mao Zedong: We have prepared for the Soviet to come. Nevertheless, if it comes, it will be its downfall! It only has a few soldiers, you Europeans are so afraid!²²

To confront the Soviet Union-Vietnam Alliance, China pursued détente with the U.S. and Japan instead of forming new alliances. Wang and Wu wrote, "During

²⁰ Speech, "Li Desheng at the National Physical Education Work Conference," 22 January 1973, Shanghai Municipal Archive, B246-2-840-47, pp. 5-6, Huang Yuxing's translation.

²¹ Charles McGregor, *The Sino-Vietnamese Relationship and the Soviet Union*, *Adelphi Papers* 232, (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1988), p. 60.

²² Record of Conversation, People's Republic of China Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Selected Works of Mao Zedong's Foreign Diplomacy*, [*Mao Zedong waijiao wenxuan*] (Beijing: Central Literature Press [*Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe*], 1995), pp. 602-603.

the 1970s, although China advocated a united front against the Soviet Union it was reluctant to forge a formal alliance structure with the United States and Japan. What China wanted was ‘parallel actions based on common interests.’”²³ China, the US-Japan Alliance, and the US-ROK Alliance all shared a common interest towards constraining the Soviet Union’s expansion in East Asia.

4.5 VIETNAMESE REUNIFICATION BRINGS A NEW THREAT

From the Chinese vantage point, the USSR-Vietnam Alliance became a greater threat at the end of the 1970s. The fall of Saigon and the demise of the South Vietnamese government paved the way for North Vietnam to reunify the country. In examination of the Soviet Union-Vietnam Alliance, Yu Tiejun admits that the alliance relationship is rather complicated as both the Soviet Union and China supported North Vietnam in fighting the U.S. It was not until Vietnam’s reunification that Sino-Vietnamese relations deteriorated and Soviet-Vietnamese relations became closer.²⁴ A Rand analyst, Sally Stoecker, determined that the Soviet Union and Vietnam had separate goals in the burgeoning relationship. For Vietnam, it relied “almost exclusively” on Soviet economic and military aid as it was seeking to recover from decades of war. For the Soviet Union, it wanted access to *Cam Ranh* Bay and *Da Nang* military facilities “for its intelligence-gathering and power-projection

²³ Wang and Wu, *Against Us or With Us?*, p. 35.

²⁴ Yu Tiejun [于铁军], Personal Interview, 24 November 2015, Peking University.

capabilities.”²⁵ Thus, the Soviet Union was fulfilling strategic function of using Vietnam’s territory for military bases, refueling depots, and ports to extend its ability to confront China.

A “Beijing Review” article offers a summary of China’s viewpoint of Soviet developments in Southeast Asia:

After 1975 and the end of the Vietnam War, the Soviet Union altered its expansionist policies in Southeast Asia... The Soviet Union's ultimate objective is to create another Cuba in Southeast Asia. The Soviet Union is attempting to help Vietnam sell its “Indochina Federation” to the world.... The Soviet Union also supported Vietnam in 1977 when it forced Laos to sign “friendship and cooperation” and “border” treaties.²⁶

Similarly, Wang and Wu contend that in 1975, “China had concluded that the Soviet Union was more dangerous than the United States since the former was on the offensive while the latter was on the defensive.”²⁷ In September 1975, China warned Hanoi that its close ties with the “hegemonist” Soviet Union would hurt Sino-Vietnamese relations. Chinese Foreign Minister Qiao Guanhua speaking at the U.N. warned Vietnam to be careful not to “let the tiger in through the back door while repulsing the wolf through the front gate.”²⁸ However, much to China’s chagrin Vietnam disregarded its warning, and Le Duan went to Moscow in October 1975 to sign two large economic aid agreements.²⁹ Moreover, the exigencies of war recovery led the Vietnamese to seek aid from both the Soviet Union and the United

²⁵ Sally W. Stoecker, Clients and Commitments: Soviet-Vietnamese Relations, 1978-1988, A RAND Note, N-2737-A (Santa Monica: The RAND Corporation, 1989), p. v [pdf p. 7] <http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/notes/2009/N2737.pdf> (Accessed 10 June 2016).

²⁶ Pike, Vietnam and the Soviet Union: Anatomy of an Alliance, p. 201, quoted from Beijing Review, 1 March 1982.

²⁷ Wang and Wu, Against Us or With Us?, p. 16.

²⁸ King C. Chen, China’s War with Vietnam, 1979: Issues, Decisions, and Implications (Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 1987), p. 24.

²⁹ Hemen Ray, China’s Vietnam War (New Delhi: Radiant Publishers, 1983), p. 63.

States. Vietnam gained membership in the Soviet sponsored International Investment Bank, as well as COMECON's International Bank for Economic Cooperation.³⁰ Figure 4.1 below illustrates Soviet Aid to North Vietnam/Vietnam. Additionally, playing both ideological sides, Vietnam became a member of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in September 1976. Four months later, Vietnam drew \$36 million in credit from the IMF.³¹




Figure 4.1. Soviet Aid to North Vietnam/Vietnam in USD Source: Douglas Pike³²

The large source of economic aid led Chinese media commentators to argue that Vietnam had traded sovereignty for economic aid: “To get rubles from the Soviets, the Le Duan clique has acted against the dictates of conscience, despite its

³⁰ Robert S. Ross, *The Indochina Tangle: China's Vietnam Policy, 1975-1979* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988), pp. 121-122.

³¹ Nayan Chanda, *Brother Enemy: The War after the War* (San Diego: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Publishers, 1986), p. 182.

³² Douglas Pike, *Vietnam and the Soviet Union: Anatomy of an Alliance*, p. 139. Note: Douglas Pike compiled the chart's data from multiple sources; therefore, he provided the high and low ranges. 1975 represents the first year of aid to a unified Vietnam. Pike recognizes the inherent difficulty of “meaningfully converting cost/prices in a socialist economy into a capitalist currency figures.”

claim to the contrary. It calls for opposition to China, controls Laos, invades Kampuchea, has intruded into Thailand and threatens the other Southeast Asian countries. It has become a pawn for the Soviet's expansionist scheme..."³³ In addition to financial aid, Vietnam by the mid-1980s was heavily dependent on Soviet products; for example, 100% of its oil, 90% of its fertilizers, 90% of its cotton, and 80% of its metals came from the Soviet Union.³⁴

Two other developments display the growing influence of the Soviet Union in Vietnam by the end of 1976. First, the Vietnamese Communist Party's (formerly the Vietnam Worker's Party) 4th Party Congress purged pro-Beijing party members from high-level positions in December 1976.³⁵ Second, by the end of 1976, Vietnam granted the Soviets usage of *Cam Ranh* Bay port and airfield in exchange for military goods.³⁶ In 1977, the CIA surmised, "The Soviets are... continuing to improve their Far Eastern naval forces capable of operations against Chinese domestic and foreign sea lines of communication."³⁷ By the mid-1980s, *Cam Ranh* Bay would host a Soviet naval presence of 25 to 30 surface ships, including a 37,000 ton displacement *Kiev*

³³ Pike, *Vietnam and the Soviet Union: Anatomy of an Alliance*, p. 226, quoting "All-Around Cooperation or Thorough Sell-Out?" *Xinhua*, Radio Beijing Commentary, 19 September 1980.

³⁴ Liu Pu [刘朴], "Soviet-Vietnam Relations and Development Trends" [*Yuesu guanxi ji qi fazhan qushi*], *World Economics and Politics* [*Shejie jingji yu zhengzhi*], 1987, No. 5, p. 54.

³⁵ O'Dowd, *Chinese Military Strategy in the Third Indochina War: The Last Maoist War*, p. 41.

³⁶ Ross, *The Indochina Tangle: China's Vietnam Policy, 1975-1979*, pp. 92-93. King C. Chen in his book, *China's War with Vietnam, 1979: Issues, Decisions, and Implications*, pp. 27-28, p. 189 notes 69 and 74, stated that the Agence Française de Presse (AFP) on 16 August 1978 reported that Vietnam had already let the Soviet Union build a military base. The AFP would later record Hanoi's confirmation that Soviet warships were in *Cam Ranh* Bay on 27 March 1979.

³⁷ "Soviet Strategic Objectives," CIA, National Intelligence Estimate, (NIE 11-4-77), 12 January 1977, Document No. 0000268137, <http://www.foia.cia.gov/document/0000268137> (Accessed 12 March 2015), p. 13 [pdf p. 19].

class Vertical Short-Takeoff and Landing (V/STOL) aircraft carrier,³⁸ and four to six submarines.³⁹ The *Cam Ranh* Bay airfield would host numerous Soviet aircraft including Tu-95 Bear bombers, four Tu-142 Bear F/J anti-submarine warfare aircraft, and 14 Mig-23 Flogger fighters.⁴⁰ The USSR-Vietnam Alliance's operational capabilities were completely dependent upon the Soviet Union's heavy weaponry and conventional forces. Thus, Li Qingsi argues that the threat of the Soviet-Vietnam Alliance rested primarily on the Soviets, and the Soviet-Vietnam Alliance was rather limited and was more aptly a part of Soviet expansion.⁴¹

China's leadership took notice of Soviet activities in Indochina during the late 1970s. For instance, the 1977 publication of "Chairman Mao's Theory of the Differentiation of the Three Worlds Is a Major Contribution to Marxism-Leninism" illustrates China's perception of the above political and military developments in Indochina. The publication stated that the Soviet Union was "taking advantage of the reduced U.S. presence in Asia after defeat in the war of aggression against Vietnam" and "intensifying expansion in the region to fill the 'vacuum.'"⁴² Additionally, Zhou Enlai informed two U.S. Congressmen that U.S. military forces should remain in Asia to keep a stable balance of power.⁴³ The Soviet Union's

³⁸ Pike, *Vietnam and the Soviet Union: Anatomy of an Alliance*, p. 220, fn. 28, "Technically not an aircraft carrier, it has the capability of deploying 35 fixed-wing and 25 rotary-wing aircraft, primarily on anti-submarine missions."

³⁹ Robert C. Horn, *Alliance Politics Between Comrades: The Dynamic of Soviet-Vietnamese Relations* (Santa Monica: RAND/UCLA Center for the Study of Soviet International Behavior, 1987), p. 35.

⁴⁰ Horn, *Alliance Politics Between Comrades: The Dynamic of Soviet-Vietnamese*, p. 34.

⁴¹ Li Qingsi [李庆四], Personal Interview, Renmin University, 14 October 2015.

⁴² Wang and Wu, *Against Us or With Us?*, p. 16, quoting The Editorial Department of the "People's Daily" [*Renmin Ribao*], "Chairman Mao's Theory of the Differentiation of the Three Worlds Is a Major Contribution to Marxism-Leninism," *Peking Review*, 4 November 1977, p. 18.

⁴³ Wang and Wu, *Against Us or With Us?*, p. 35; Wang and Wu cite Harry Harding, *A Fragile Relationship: The United States and China since 1972* (Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1992), p. 45.

military activities on Japanese claimed Northern Territories (four islands: *Habomia*, *Shikotan*, *Kunashiri*, and *Etorofu*) were described often in the Chinese media as part of the Soviet Union's Far East and Pacific strategic system. The Northern Territories bases were linked with Soviet bases in Vladivostok and "other places in the Far East" to threaten the U.S. Seventh Fleet and Japan.⁴⁴

Two additional political conflicts affecting the Sino-Vietnamese relationship's downward trend concerned the territorial border disputes and the ethnic Chinese population in Vietnam. For instance, Vietnamese sources indicate that in 1976 and 1977 there were 812 and 873 border incidents, respectively. Normally the incidents involved an individual or a small group making a disruption, but on 4 May 1977, a large border clash between Chinese and Vietnamese troops represented an increase in "fierceness" and organization. Ross notes that the Chinese "may have initiated many of the clashes" to signal "China's intention to present Vietnam with a two-front war if it should invade Kampuchea."⁴⁵ Furthermore, in the midst of these border clashes came the controversial treatment of the ethnic Chinese population living in Vietnam. Le Duan speaking to the Soviet ambassador in October 1977 remarked that the communists were going to end the economic influence of the Chinese minority, termed *Hoa* in Vietnamese. In early 1977, the Hanoi government targeted the Saigon Chinese population when they launched the "Campaign against Comprador Bourgeoisie," and a year later, they launched the "Campaign to

⁴⁴ Wang and Wu, *Against Us or With Us?*, p. 17.

⁴⁵ O'Dowd, *Chinese Military Strategy in the Third Indochina War: The Last Maoist War*, pp. 41-42; and Ross, *The Indochina Tangle: China's Vietnam Policy, 1975-1979*, pp. 216-217. O'Dowd cites the Vietnamese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Memorandum on Chinese Provocations and Territorial Disputes," Vietnam News Agency, 16 March 1979, reported in Foreign Broadcast Information System (FBIS), Southeast Asia, 19 March 1979, p. K-19.

Transform Private Industry and Commerce.”⁴⁶ These ethnic policies encouraged a mass exodus of 105,000 ethnic Chinese by May 1978, and another 65,000 by the end of the year.⁴⁷ In July 1978, Vietnam closed the Chinese border, and the ethnic Chinese began leaving by boats to other states. China responded by cutting off all aid to Vietnam on 3 July 1978.⁴⁸ At the same time, Soviet arms shipments to Vietnam increased to help “ready Vietnamese forces for action.”⁴⁹ Additionally, China criticized the Vietnamese socialist transformation policies as unjust and focused on ethnic Chinese, but refugees in Hong Kong, Malaysia, and Thailand confirmed that the application of the policies was independent of ethnicity. The Vietnamese rebuttal pointed to the duplicity of the Chinese critique: China did not protest when the Cambodians killed ethnic Chinese because Cambodia is an ally of China.⁵⁰ More importantly, Vietnam’s “ingratitude” and “insolence” angered Deng Xiaoping and Vice Premier Li Xiannian because China had provided Vietnam with 4.26 billion RMB in aid from 1950 to 1974.⁵¹

⁴⁶ O’Dowd, *Chinese Military Strategy in the Third Indochina War: The Last Maoist War*, p. 42

⁴⁷ Ross, *The Indochina Tangle: China’s Vietnam Policy, 1975-1979*, p. 240.

⁴⁸ O’Dowd, *Chinese Military Strategy in the Third Indochina War: The Last Maoist War*, p. 43.

⁴⁹ Kenneth G. Weiss, “Power Grows Out of the Barrel of a Gunboat: The U.S. in Sino-Soviet Crises,” *Center for Naval Analyses*, Professional Paper 376, December 1982, p. 55 [pdf p. 59] <http://www.dtic.mil/get-tr-doc/pdf?AD=ADA130561> (Accessed 10 June 2016).

⁵⁰ Ray, *China’s Vietnam War*, pp. 80-81. In late 1977, the Chinese sought to attract hard currency and technical skill by establishing the Department of Overseas Chinese Affairs. The upgrading of Chinese policy towards overseas Chinese was an effort to overturn the Cultural Revolution policies of persecution, and exhibit that the Chinese state could take measures to protect overseas Chinese interests.

⁵¹ Gareth Porter, “Cambodia: Sihanouk’s Initiative,” *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 66, No. 4, The Defense Debate (Spring, 1988), p. 810; and Zhang Xiaoming, “Deng Xiaoping and China’s Decision to go to War with Vietnam,” *Journal of Cold War Studies*, Vol. 12, No. 3, Summer 2010, pp. 11-12, fn. 39. Zhang Xiaoming cites Li Ke and Hao Shengzhang, *The PLA in the Cultural Revolution* [*Wenhua dagemin zhong de jiefangjun*] (Beijing: Zhonggong dangshi ziliao chubanshe, 1989), p. 409. The official Chinese statistic is \$20 billion USD, but Zhang Xiaoming trusts the Chinese figure quoted by Li Ke and Hao Shengzhang.

The Vietnam problem was much more complicated than a simple border dispute or mistreatment of ethnic Chinese; rather, Deng Xiaoping saw Soviet influence at work. On 22 September 1978, Deng Xiaoping in reference to the Vietnam problem would say to the Malaysian foreign minister, "Speaking globally, you can see the Soviet Union's meddlesome hand at the root."⁵² Another area of particular concern to China was Vietnam's involvement with its ally, Cambodia. The dispute started much earlier in the 1970s. In March 1970 when the pro-U.S. coup d'état led by General Lon Nol removed Prince Norodom Sihanouk while he was on vacation. The Soviets recognized the Lon Nol regime, and the Chinese-backed Prince Sihanouk who took refuge in Beijing. The Chinese wanted to capitalize on the Soviet's backing of a pro-U.S. regime. Moreover, China was able to garner the support of the prince's former enemies, the Khmer Rouge, and the North Vietnamese in opposing the Lon Nol regime.⁵³ Yet, from 1971 to 1978 border clashes between the Khmer Rouge and the North Vietnamese hampered the bilateral relationship. After victory over Lon Nol in April 1975, the Khmer Rouge escalated their attacks against Vietnam. North Vietnam would wait to secure its own victory over South Vietnam before retaliating against Cambodian military bases in June 1975.⁵⁴

Throughout 1976, Vietnam negotiated with Pol Pot, the leader of the Khmer Rouge, to end the border conflicts, but the two revolutionary sides were at an

⁵² Record of Conversation, "Deng Xiaoping's meeting the Malaysian Foreign Minister Li Taoding [里陶丁]," 22 September 1978, <http://history.people.com.cn/GB/205396/13260831.html> (Accessed 27 July 2015).

⁵³ Chen, "China, the Vietnam War, and the Sino-American rapprochement, 1968-1973," pp. 48-49.

⁵⁴ O'Dowd, *Chinese Military Strategy in the Third Indochina War: The Last Maoist War*, p. 34; and Gordon, Bernard K., "The Third Indochina Conflict," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 65, No. 1 (Fall, 1986), p. 69.

impasse. Pol Pot mounted aggressive purges to remove Communist Party of Kampuchea members associated with Vietnam, often termed the “Hanoi Khmer.”⁵⁵ It is reported that by September 1976, the Cambodian communist movement had eliminated “opponents and those who were suspected of Vietnamese connections and orientation.”⁵⁶ Edward O’Dowd claimed: “Any person who was sympathetic to the Vietnamese revolution, who had trained in Vietnam, or who so much acknowledged that the Indochina Communist Party had once worked for the communist revolution in Cambodia was a target of Pol Pot and his faction.”⁵⁷ The Cambodian military matched the political purges by imprisonment or execution of 4,000 Vietnamese trained Cambodian soldiers serving in the Cambodian army.⁵⁸ Vietnam viewed the regime as an “ungrateful upstart,” and it took offense that the Cambodian leadership repeatedly called for all Vietnamese troops to leave Cambodia.⁵⁹ The Vietnamese argued that the Cambodians should treat them as “Big Brothers” since they helped liberate Cambodia from the Lon Nol regime.⁶⁰ In April and May of 1977, Cambodia launched several attacks along the Vietnamese border, and by December, the two states were regularly engaging each other with division-sized forces.⁶¹

In February 1978, the Vietnamese Central Committee of the Vietnamese Communist Party made its decision to oust the Pol Pot regime by the end of 1978. By the autumn of 1978, Vietnam attempted border negotiations with the

⁵⁵ Gordon, “The Third Indochina Conflict,” p. 69.

⁵⁶ Huynh Kim Khanh, “Into the Third Indochina War,” p. 332, fn. 5.

⁵⁷ O’Dowd, *Chinese Military Strategy in the Third Indochina War: The Last Maoist War*, p. 35.

⁵⁸ Chen, *China’s War with Vietnam, 1979: Issues, Decisions, and Implications*, p. 33.

⁵⁹ Gordon, “The Third Indochina Conflict,” p. 69.

⁶⁰ Chen, *China’s War with Vietnam, 1979: Issues, Decisions, and Implications*, pp. 32-33.

⁶¹ Huynh Kim Khanh, “Into the Third Indochina War,” *Southeast Asian Affairs*, (1980), p. 332.

Cambodians, mediation with the Chinese, and at least four coup attempts had all failed to solve the Cambodian problem—invasion was the final option to pursue. In September and October 1978, Vietnamese Prime Minister Pham van Dong visited all of the ASEAN states, promising that the Vietnamese would not interfere in the respective states' internal affairs or support insurgent movements.⁶² The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leadership learned of the Vietnamese invasion plans and began deliberation on how to respond to Vietnam. Negotiations between China and Vietnam still did not resolve the *Hoa* refugee issue in September and October 1978.⁶³ As the pending invasion neared, China issued a “stern warning” to Vietnam in October 1978, stating, “Our patience is not unlimited. Vietnam must pay the price and attack will be met with counter-attack.”⁶⁴ The warning did not alleviate the Sino-Vietnamese rift, but Le Duan and Pham Van Dong signed a 25-year Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation in Moscow on November 3, 1978. Even then, Le Duan criticized the Chinese for their “expansionist, chauvinist designs and great power hegemonism in South East Asia.”⁶⁵ By late November Vietnam began pounding Pol Pot's forces with “intense air and ground strikes” in Cambodia.⁶⁶

⁶² Chen, *China's War with Vietnam, 1979: Issues, Decisions, and Implications*, p. 35; and Huynh Kim Khanh, “Into the Third Indochina War,” p. 333.

⁶³ Chen, *China's War with Vietnam, 1979: Issues, Decisions, and Implications*, p. 85.

⁶⁴ Ray, *China's Vietnam War*, pp. 86-87. Quote taken from *Xinhua News*, October 21, 1978.

⁶⁵ Ray, *China's Vietnam War* (New Delhi: Radiant Publishers, 1983), p. 87.

⁶⁶ Weiss, “Power Grows Out of the Barrel of a Gunboat: The U.S. in Sino-Soviet Crises,” p. 55 [pdf p. 59].

4.6 PERCEPTIONS OF ALLIANCE CAPABILITIES

This juncture provides an opportunity to examine how China evaluated the capabilities of the USSR-Vietnam Alliance. The Soviet's nuclear capabilities alone posed an enormous threat without having to aggregate Vietnam's conventional capabilities. For example, the March 1969 Sino-Soviet border conflicts at *Zhenbao* Island (2 and 15 March) and in *Xinjiang* (13 August) dramatically altered China's calculation of its international security environment.⁶⁷ These border conflicts reinforced the existential threat posed by the Soviet Union's nuclear capabilities that could destroy China with a "surgical strike."⁶⁸ Soviet SS-20 ballistic missiles were "intended primarily to provide a decisive supplement to other Soviet firepower in compensating—and over-compensating—for the large and permanent Chinese manpower advantage."⁶⁹ The Sino-Soviet stand-off drove home the magnitude of the Soviet threat facing China. Additionally, Li Qingsi stated that the Soviet's deployment of 1,000,000 troops on China's northern border during the 1970s and 1980s made the Soviet Union an imminent threat.⁷⁰ The USSR represented a serious threat to China's security because the Soviet's Southeastern Theater of Military Operations contained 25 Soviet Army divisions that could be ready for combat within four days, and an additional complement of 31 Soviet Army divisions could

⁶⁷ Chen Jian, "China, the Vietnam War, and the Sino-American rapprochement, 1968-1973," from Chapter 2 in Odd Arne Westad and Sophie Quinn-Judge, eds., *The Third Indochina War: Conflict between China, Vietnam and Cambodia, 1972-79* (London: Routledge, 2006), pp. 44-55.

⁶⁸ Wang Jianwei and Wu Xinbo, *Against Us or With Us? The Chinese Perspective of America's Alliances with Japan and Korea* (Stanford: The Asia/Pacific Research Center, 1998), p. 11.

⁶⁹ Harry Gelman, "The Soviet Union, East Asia and the West," from chapter 9 in Robert O'Neill, ed., *East Asia, the West and International Security* (London: The MacMillan Press Ltd., 1987), p. 99.

⁷⁰ Li Qingsi [李庆四], Personal Interview, Renmin University, 14 October 2015.

be combat ready within eleven days of full alert.⁷¹ This comprehensive military capability represented a real military threat to China given the close proximity of the Soviet forces.⁷² China shared a roughly 6,800 mile (11,000 kilometer) border with the Soviet Union and Mongolia (a Soviet satellite state) since the old Soviet Union border contained modern day Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. The Soviet's manipulation of Mongolia put its troops only 350 miles (560 kilometers) from Beijing.⁷³

Though Vietnam had an estimated 2.6 million people “under arms,” the Soviet Union had little to gain in aggregating its capabilities with Vietnam.⁷⁴ However, the Soviets gained an advantage in its ability to project power in the western Pacific with access to Cam Ranh Bay airfield and port facilities, in addition to the *Haiphong* and *Da Nang* port facilities. By mid-April 1979, TU-95D Bears were flying missions over Cambodia and the Gulf of Tonkin. Moreover, the Soviet Navy operating in the western Pacific could rest and service its crews without traveling back to Vladivostok, and it extended the range of Soviet naval vessels into the Indian

⁷¹ “The Readiness of Soviet Ground Forces,” *CIA*, Interagency Intelligence Memorandum (NI IIM 82-10012), November 1982, Document No. 5166d4f999326091c6a60960, <http://www.foia.cia.gov/document/5166d4f999326091c6a60960> (Accessed 14 March 2015), p. 27 [pdf p. 35].

⁷² Xing Guangcheng [邢广程], Personal Interview, 25 November 2015, Chinese Academy of Social Science, Institute of Chinese Borderland Studies.

⁷³ Joseph V. Braddock, Douglas N. Beatty, William P. Schneider, Raymond J. Milesfsky, “Targeting the Soviet Army Along the Sino-Soviet Border,” 31 March 1978, Document No.: BDM/W-0643-78-S ... DNA001-77-C-0216 ... b310077464P99QAXDE502-10H2590D, Box No. 15, Number 437, *Nautilus FOIA Documents*, <http://nautilus.org/foia-document/targeting-the-soviet-army-along-the-sino-soviet-border-2/> (Accessed 10 March 2015), p. 71 [PDF p. 62].

⁷⁴ Bernard Weinraub, “Hanoi, in Economic Straits, Seeks to Move Toward Ties with U.S.,” *The New York Times*, 28 December 1981, p. A4, <http://www.nytimes.com/1981/12/28/world/hanoi-in-economic-straits-seeks-to-move-toward-ties-with-us.html> (Accessed 25 June 2016).

Ocean.⁷⁵ The distance between Vladivostok and *Cam Ranh* Bay is roughly 4,000 miles, so this greatly enhanced Soviet naval and air force capabilities. Potentially a Soviet Backfire bombers stationed north of Vladivostok could bomb Chinese military targets in southern China, and land in *Cam Ranh* Bay. In late 1982, U.S. Air Force Major General Burns estimated that the Soviets could move as many as 20 Backfire bombers to *Cam Ranh* Bay within eight hours “almost instantly tilting the balance of power in Southeast Asia.”⁷⁶

Perceptions of Alliance Capabilities:

Question 3a: Do Chinese analysts focus on the geostrategic factors of the adversarial alliance capabilities; for example, forward deployments, and use of ports, airfields, and military bases? Supported. Chinese analysts were acutely aware of the close proximity of Soviet forces on the extensive northern border with the USSR and Mongolia, and they recognized the strategic usefulness of *Cam Ranh* Bay port and airfield and *Da Nang* port.

Question 3b: Do Chinese analysts focus on the strategic nuclear capabilities of the adversarial alliances? Supported. Chinese analysts were well aware of Soviet SS-20 nuclear missiles deployed on their northern border.

Question 3c: Do Chinese analysts focus on the conventional capabilities of the adversarial alliances? Supported. Chinese analysts were well aware of the 56 Soviet divisions on their northern border.

⁷⁵ Nguyen Van Canh with Earle Cooper, *Vietnam Under Communism, 1975-1982* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1983), pp. 229-230.

⁷⁶ Ron Redmond, “Vietnam Legacy: Can Ranh Bay now is haven for Soviet fleet,” *United Press International*, 13 November 1982, <http://www.upi.com/Archives/1982/11/13/Vietnam-Legacy-Can-Ranh-Bay-now-is-haven-for-Soviet-fleet/2624406011600/> (Accessed 24 June 2016).

Question 3d: Do Chinese analysts' perceptions of adversarial alliance capabilities and foreign basing influence its foreign policy outcomes? Supported. Soviet capabilities alone were threatening to China and pushed China towards rapprochement with the U.S. and Japan. Subsequent sections will detail how China will balance against the Soviet threat.

4.7 PERCEPTIONS OF CONSPIRACY

The Chinese interpretation of the USSR-Vietnam Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation marks a juncture to see if Chinese analysts perceived a Soviet conspiracy against China. The Vietnamese leaders went to Moscow to secure an agreement that would protect Vietnam from Chinese military pressure.⁷⁷ The treaty agreement far from guaranteed military protection; yet, from the Chinese side, the USSR-Vietnam Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation was far more threatening. The language of Article Six of the USSR-Vietnam Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation provides a very ambiguous security guarantee: "In the event of an attack or the threat of an attack against one of the Parties, the High Contracting Parties shall immediately hold mutual consultations with a view to eliminating that threat and taking appropriate effective measures for the maintenance of peace and security of their countries."⁷⁸ Important terms that would add teeth and commitment to the

⁷⁷ Huynh Kim Khanh, "Into the Third Indochina War," p. 333.

⁷⁸ Douglas M. Gibler, "Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam," International Military Alliances 1648-2008, Vol. II (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 2009), pp. 465-467.

treaty such as “military” and “alliance” were clearly absent. Additionally, the treaty made no mention of extended nuclear deterrence or any specific security guarantees beyond consultation.

Indeed, the USSR-Vietnam treaty did not assure military aid to Vietnam if an aggressor attacked Vietnam. By contrast, such a commitment was explicit in the Soviet Union’s treaties with North Korea and East Germany.⁷⁹ The treaty language with North Korea (1961) states, “Should either of the Contracting Parties suffer armed attack by any State or coalition of States and thus find itself in a state of war, the other Contracting Party shall immediately extend military and other assistance with all the means at its disposal.”⁸⁰ The treaty language in the USSR-East Germany treaty (1967) stated, “In the event of an armed attack in Europe on either of the High Contracting Parties by any State or group of States, the other High Contracting Party shall afford it immediate assistance in accordance with the provisions of the Warsaw Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance.”⁸¹

The weaker treaty language between the USSR and Vietnam is very similar to the friendship treaties that the Soviets signed with Egypt (1971),⁸² Angola (1976),⁸³ Mozambique (1977),⁸⁴ and Ethiopia (1978),⁸⁵ Yemen (1979),⁸⁶ and Congo (1981).⁸⁷ Along with Vietnam, all of these states represent far-flung Soviet interests in the 1970s and early 1980s. The Soviets could only guarantee that in the case of

⁷⁹ Ray, *China’s Vietnam War* (New Delhi: Radiant Publishers, 1983), p. 87

⁸⁰ Gibler, *International Military Alliances 1648-2008, Vol. II*, p. 423.

⁸¹ Gibler, *International Military Alliances 1648-2008, Vol. II*, p. 430.

⁸² Gibler, *International Military Alliances 1648-2008, Vol. II*, pp. 452-453.

⁸³ Gibler, *International Military Alliances 1648-2008, Vol. II*, p. 462.

⁸⁴ Gibler, *International Military Alliances 1648-2008, Vol. II*, p. 464.

⁸⁵ Gibler, *International Military Alliances 1648-2008, Vol. II*, p. 468.

⁸⁶ Gibler, *International Military Alliances 1648-2008, Vol. II*, p. 473.

⁸⁷ Gibler, *International Military Alliances 1648-2008, Vol. II*, p. 484.

breaches of peace that they will “seek urgent and immediate contact,” or “immediately contact” one another.⁸⁸ Moreover, in response to the Chinese attack on Vietnam detailed below, the Soviets did not exceed the very cautious and ambiguous language in the USSR-Vietnam treaty. An anonymous senior Vietnamese officer argued, “[National Security Adviser] Zbigniew Brzezinski told Carter the USSR would not take action against China because it had no vital interest at stake. He was right, and we did not expect Soviet military assistance.”⁸⁹ Robert Gates’s account of November 1978 revealed that the CIA judged that the Soviets “would do as little as it could get away with and take little risk of a direct military clash with the Chinese.”⁹⁰

Chinese interpretation of the USSR-Vietnam Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation viewed it as an agreement that emboldened Vietnam to act aggressively and dominate Southeast Asia. Repeatedly, Chinese interpreters used the term “military alliance” to describe the treaty. For example, a Chinese media source saw the 1978 USSR-Vietnam Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation as a threat because it “explicitly provides for military cooperation and can be considered a military alliance that it (enables) Vietnam to escalate its aggression and expansion.”⁹¹

Another Chinese commentator wrote, “On 3 November 1978, Vietnam and the Soviet Union signed the ‘Soviet-Vietnam Friendship and Cooperation Treaty’ that

⁸⁸ Gibler, *International Military Alliances 1648-2008, Vol. II*, pp. 468 & 473.

⁸⁹ Henry J. Kenny, “Vietnamese Perceptions of the 1979 War with China,” from Chapter 10 in Mark A. Ryan, David M. Finkelstein, and Michael A. McDevitt, eds., *Chinese Warfighting: The PLA Experience Since 1949* (Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2003), p. 222, the interview was conducted in 1999.

⁹⁰ Gates, *From the Shadows: The Ultimate Insider’s Story of Five Presidents and How They Won the Cold War*, pp. 121-122.

⁹¹ Pike, *Vietnam and the Soviet Union: Anatomy of an Alliance*, p. 205, quoting Tang Shan, “Source of Southeast Asia Tension,” *Beijing Review*, No. 46 (November 1983).

possessed the characteristics of a military alliance. The Soviets and Vietnamese were striving to encourage Vietnamese regional hegemony. The treaty especially played an important role for the Vietnamese to launch a war to invade Cambodia.”⁹² Another Chinese commentator argued that the treaty was a Vietnamese diplomatic maneuver to ensure a superpower was on their side for the December 1978 invasion of Cambodia.⁹³

Indeed, Vietnam’s treaty with the Soviets was a diplomatic maneuver aimed at China. I argue that Vietnam was moving towards the Cambodian invasion far in advance of the treaty with the Soviets, and the treaty served as one component of Vietnam’s diplomatic efforts prior to full invasion. Vietnam’s planning stages had begun in February 1978, nine months in advance of the treaty. The treaty was an agreement with a superpower that had already provided more than ten years of economic and security assistance. Moreover, the Vietnamese had exhausted a number of other policies aimed at ending the border conflict with Cambodia. Vietnam tried bilateral negotiations with the Cambodians, it tried using the Chinese to mediate a solution, and Vietnam tried at least four coup attempts to bring about a solution to the border conflicts with Cambodia. The Cambodians and Vietnamese were already engaged in division-sized conflicts by December 1977, eleven months before its treaty with the Soviets. Vietnam’s last option was to launch a war to end the Khmer incursions with the dry-season offensive in 1978-1979. The treaty with the Soviets was just one part of Vietnam’s diplomatic strategy in preparation for its

⁹² Shen Zhihua [沈志华], ed., History of Sino-Soviet Relations: 1917-1991, revised edition [*Zhongsu guanxi shigang*] (Beijing: Social Sciences Academic Press (China), 2011), p. 458.

⁹³ Chen, China’s War with Vietnam, 1979: Issues, Decisions, and Implications, p. 36.

invasion of Cambodia.⁹⁴ Chinese leaders correctly interpreted that the treaty was aimed at them, and it caused them to prepare extra measures to signal a limited use of force. Even though the treaty did not explicitly promise military assistance to the Vietnamese in the event of a military threat, the Chinese assigned a higher level of cohesion to the nascent alliance. More importantly, Chinese evidence does not point to “over-Machiavellianism” on the part of the Soviets and the Vietnamese because there is no mention of conspiracy.⁹⁵ Therefore, China’s reaction to the treaty can be considered a reasonable over-reaction.

Three weeks after signing the treaty with the Soviets, the Vietnamese established a “puppet” Cambodian government on 25 November 1978.⁹⁶ Subsequently, a month later, on 25 December, Vietnam invaded Cambodia with 13 army divisions.⁹⁷ Kenneth Weiss asserted that Vietnam and the Soviet Union had separate “but compatible goals” in launching the invasion of Cambodia.⁹⁸ For Vietnam, to accomplish the goal of removing its bothersome neighbor it would need both military and economic political support to deter China’s reaction. The Soviets were willing to bear these costs because it matched its geopolitical policy to contain China.⁹⁹

On the day of the invasion, a “People’s Daily” article stated China’s position: “The Vietnamese authorities have gone far enough in pursuing their strong anti-

⁹⁴ Huynh Kim Khanh, “Into the Third Indochina War,” pp. 332-333.

⁹⁵ Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics*, pp. 326-329.

⁹⁶ Shen, ed., *History of Sino-Soviet Relations: 1917-1991*, p. 458.

⁹⁷ Nguyen Van Canh, *Vietnam Under Communism, 1975-1982*, p. 239.

⁹⁸ Kenneth G. Weiss, “Power Grows Out of the Barrel of a Gunboat: The U.S. in Sino-Soviet Crises,” *Center for Naval Analyses*, Professional Paper 376, December 1982, p. 55 [pdf p. 59] <http://www.dtic.mil/get-tr-doc/pdf?AD=ADA130561> (Accessed 10 June 2016).

⁹⁹ Weiss, “Power Grows Out of the Barrel of a Gunboat: The U.S. in Sino-Soviet Crises,” p. 56 [pdf. p. 60].

China course. There is a limit to the Chinese people's forbearance and restraint. China has never bullied and will never bully any other country; neither will it allow itself to be bullied by others. It will not attack unless it is attacked. But if it is attacked, it will certainly counterattack."¹⁰⁰ In terms of a tangible response, China suspended its oil exports to Vietnam.¹⁰¹

Less than two weeks into the invasion, by 7 January, Vietnamese forces attacked and occupied the Cambodian capital of Phnom Penh and inserted Heng Samrin as head of a pro-Hanoi government supported by 16 Vietnamese divisions (roughly 200,000 soldiers); Pol Pot's Khmer Rouge would escape to the refuge of the jungles of western Cambodia on the border of Thailand.¹⁰² Former Cambodian military purged by Pol Pot would form a segment of the new government's leadership.¹⁰³ Shen Zhihua wrote, "The mutual strategic interest between the Soviet Union and Vietnam clearly involved an intention to confront China, and it certainly gave rise to China's vigilance and opposition. China's security interests mandate that it cannot accept a militarily powerful adversarial state too close to its borders."¹⁰⁴ Chinese analysts differ on what was accomplished at the Chinese Central Work Conference held from 10 November to 15 December of 1978, prior to Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia. Zhang Xiaoming argues that the conference was most concerned with economic reform and "addressing the legacies of the Cultural

¹⁰⁰ "Sino-Vietnam Border," *CIA*, Memorandum, 5 January 1988, Document No. 0000789470, <http://www.foia.cia.gov/document/est-pub-date-sino-vietnam-border> (Accessed 12 March 2015).

¹⁰¹ Harlan W. Jencks, "China's 'Punitive' War on Vietnam: A Military Assessment," *Asian Survey*, Vol 19, No. 8, August 1979, p. 804.

¹⁰² Nguyen Van Canh, *Vietnam Under Communism, 1975-1982*, p. 239.

¹⁰³ Shen, ed., *History of Sino-Soviet Relations: 1917-1991*, p. 458; and Chen, *China's War with Vietnam, 1979: Issues, Decisions, and Implications*, p. 37; and Porter, "Cambodia: Sihanouk's Initiative," p. 810.

¹⁰⁴ Shen, ed., *History of Sino-Soviet Relations: 1917-1991*, p. 458.

Revolution.”¹⁰⁵ Yet, King C. Chen contends that Indochinese politics was a key discussion point, with Deng Xiaoping as the central figure since he was commanding both the Politburo and the Central Committee.¹⁰⁶ Deng argued that China should engage in a “punitive” war that would accomplish the following goals:

- 1) A limited counter-attack that would not provoke Soviet intervention;
- 2) Attack Vietnam for its invasion of Cambodia,
- 3) Show China’s determination to fight a costly war even if it diverted it from its modernization efforts,
- 4) Serve as a stimulus for military improvement, and
- 5) Demonstrate to the Soviet Union, that China could break through any encirclement device.¹⁰⁷

To accomplish the first goal, China deliberately kept the military operation against Vietnam limited to achieve Deng Xiaoping’s number one goal of not provoking the Soviet Union. The General Staff denied requests from Chinese commanders on the front for combat air support.¹⁰⁸ The Chinese Air Force (PLAAF) did not carry out any combat missions, but did fly reconnaissance and helicopter evacuations of wounded soldiers.¹⁰⁹ A Chinese source *Guangjiaojing* [Wide Angle] reported on 16 March 1979 that PLA forces were ordered not to advance more than 50 kilometers into Vietnam.¹¹⁰

¹⁰⁵ Zhang Xiaoming, “China’s 1979 War with Vietnam: A Reassessment,” *The China Quarterly*, No. 184 (Dec. 2005), p. 858.

¹⁰⁶ Chen, *China’s War with Vietnam, 1979: Issues, Decisions, and Implications*, p. 76.

¹⁰⁷ Chen, *China’s War with Vietnam, 1979: Issues, Decisions, and Implications*, p. 88.

¹⁰⁸ Zhang, “China’s 1979 War with Vietnam: A Reassessment,” p. 864.

¹⁰⁹ Allen, “The PLA Air Force: 1949-2002 Overview and Lessons Learned,” pp. 118-121.

¹¹⁰ Jencks, “China’s ‘Punitive’ War on Vietnam: A Military Assessment,” p. 809.

Deng Xiaoping admitted that during their deliberations over how to prosecute the war so as not to provoke the Soviet Union, the USSR and Vietnam had signed their treaty. In his view, “Vietnam relied on the USSR-Vietnam Friendship Treaty to launch a massive attack on Cambodia, cause trouble on the Sino-Vietnam border, and caused us to be disturbed.”¹¹¹ Shen Zhihua describes the predicament China faced after Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia:

There was a contradiction between the Sino-Vietnamese bilateral relationship at the regional level, especially Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia. This factor quickly aroused China because the Soviet Union was supporting Vietnam’s confrontation of China. The Chinese government finally decided to execute an attack against Vietnam as a punitive action, while at the same time preventing Soviet expansion, and encouraging other states to courageously resist Soviet policies of expansion.¹¹²

To encounter this predicament China moved to bolster its strategic standing. On the diplomatic front, in late 1978, China developed two “parallel strategic partnerships” with both the U.S. and Japan. China and the U.S. shared the common goal of defending their interests against Soviet advances. Thus, the Soviet-Vietnam alliance provided the prospect of normalization between China and the U.S.¹¹³ Chinese Premier Hua Guofeng, at the press conference after issuing the US-China communiqué on normalization said, “We think that the normalization of relations between China and the United States and the signing of the Treaty of Peace and Friendship between China and Japan are conducive to peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region and the world as a whole. Does this mean the formation of an

¹¹¹ Speech, “Deng Xiaoping at Sino-Vietnam Border War Situation Meeting” [*Deng Xiaoping zai Zhongyue bianjing zuozhan qingguang baogaohui shang de jianghua*] 16 March 1979, available at Xilu.com, http://junshi.xilu.com/2011/0315/news_346_146311.html (Accessed 26 April 2016).

¹¹² Shen, ed., *History of Sino-Soviet Relations: 1917-1991*, p. 458.

¹¹³ Li Qingsi [李庆四], Personal Interview, Renmin University, 14 October 2015.

axis or alliance of China, Japan, and the United States? We say that it is neither an alliance nor an axis.”¹¹⁴

Likewise, during Deng Xiaoping’s scheduled trips to Thailand, Malaysia, and Singapore in early November 1978, Deng was clearly signaling China’s intentions to use force against Vietnam if Vietnam attacked China’s ally, Cambodia.¹¹⁵ Finally, Deng Xiaoping went to the U.S in late January 1979 and met President Carter at the White House to discuss the Chinese plans. Deng said, “We consider it necessary to put a restraint on the wild ambitions of the Vietnamese and to give them an appropriate limited lesson.”¹¹⁶ Carter insisted that the new Sino-American relationship was supposed to bring peace and stability to Asia, but Deng reportedly said that China would have to respond to its arrogant neighbors and could not allow them to disturb the region without consequences.¹¹⁷ Moreover, Deng was attempting to form a “United Front” against the Soviet Threat. In an interview with American reporters Deng said, “in order to oppose hegemony and safeguard world peace, security, and stability, the United States, Europe, Japan, China, and other third-world countries should unite and earnestly deal with this challenge of the danger of war. We do not need any kind of pact or an alliance. What we need is a common understanding of the situation and common efforts.”¹¹⁸

Subsequently on Deng’s return to China on 9 February, Deng called an enlarged Politburo meeting to discuss the rationale for attacking Vietnam.¹¹⁹

¹¹⁴ Wang and Wu, *Against Us or With Us?*, p. 19.

¹¹⁵ Zhang, “China’s 1979 War with Vietnam: A Reassessment,” p. 856.

¹¹⁶ Chen, *China’s War with Vietnam, 1979: Issues, Decisions, and Implications*, p. 91.

¹¹⁷ Chen, *China’s War with Vietnam, 1979: Issues, Decisions, and Implications*, p. 91.

¹¹⁸ Wang and Wu, *Against Us or With Us?*, p. 19.

¹¹⁹ Zhang, “China’s 1979 War with Vietnam: A Reassessment,” p. 860.

Additionally, the Chinese Central Military Commission made their final deliberations in early February, and it decided that the PLA was to launch a punitive war against Vietnam.¹²⁰ The Chinese attack was limited in scope, but had a larger strategic purpose in confronting the Soviet Union as well. As Shen Zhihua writes, “The Chinese government openly declared that the military attack on Vietnam was to attack the expansion of the Soviet Union in southeast Asia, because ‘the hegemonic collusion between Vietnam and the Soviet Union to carry out invasion and expansion, this brought the destruction of peace to modern Indochina and is the root cause threatening peace and stability in southeast Asia.’”¹²¹ As the Chinese invasion approached in early February, Soviet leaders never commented on the treaty and even a *Pravda* article by I. Aleksandrov (pseudonym) did not refer to the treaty. The only mention of the treaty came from the *Radio Peace and Progress* broadcast.¹²² In terms of military signals prior to the Chinese invasion, the Soviets deployed approximately 15 naval vessels, cruisers and destroyers, off of the Chinese and Vietnamese coasts and increased Soviet military air patrols along *Xinjiang* (China’s northwestern border with the Soviet Union).¹²³

China for its part signaled to the Soviet Union that the invasion was in pursuant of limited goals and of limited duration. China did not demand that

¹²⁰ Andrew Scobell, *China’s Use of Military Force: Beyond the Great Wall and the Long March* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), p. 119.

¹²¹ Shen, ed., *History of Sino-Soviet Relations: 1917-1991*, p. 458, quote from People’s Daily Editor, “The Hegemonic Logic of the Vietnamese Authorities” [*Yuenan dangju de baquan zhuyi luoji*] *People’s Daily*, 7 May 1979.

¹²² Ross, *The Indochina Tangle: China’s Vietnam Policy, 1975-1979*, p. 227; Ross cites I. Aleksandrov, “On the Issue of Chinese Provocations Against the SRV,” *Pravda*, 10 February 1979, FBIS, Soviet Union, 12 February 1979, pp. C1-2; and “Commentary, Viktor Gradov, *Moscow Radio Peace and Progress*, 30 January 1979, FBIS, Soviet Union, 14 February 1979, pp. 4-5.

¹²³ Ross, *The Indochina Tangle: China’s Vietnam Policy, 1975-1979*, p. 227.

Vietnam should withdrawal from Cambodia as a condition of China's withdrawal from Vietnam. Deng Xiaoping told reporters, "The idea of a simultaneous withdrawal is very good. But we would not make the simultaneous Chinese and Vietnamese withdrawal a bargaining condition."¹²⁴ Therefore, Beijing was attempting to signal that the Soviet Union would not need to use force to protect Vietnam. Yet, China prepared for the worst. In *Xinjiang* and *Heilongjiang* (China's northeastern border) an estimated 300,000 civilians were evacuated and border forces were put on "maximum, first-order alert."¹²⁵ In terms of military preparations the Chinese assembled 31 divisions (roughly ten percent of total ground forces) and 1,200 tanks to the Sino-Vietnamese border. Additionally, the PLA Air Force (PLAAF) assembled between 800 and 1,100 aircraft deployed to 15 air bases in *Yunnan*, *Guangxi*, *Guangdong*, and *Hainan*. Kenneth Allen estimated that 20,000 PLAAF troops prepared temporary fuel lines and storage facilities, water lines, and housing in preparation for the invasion.¹²⁶ The Chinese deployed naval and air capabilities, but they did not use the assets in actual combat. Center for Naval Analyses analyst Kenneth Weiss noted, "Chinese restraint in the air and naval weaponry was mostly a political signal of the limited nature of the incursion that the Vietnamese recognized on their own or were told as much by their Soviet allies."¹²⁷

¹²⁴ Weiss, "Power Grows Out of the Barrel of a Gunboat: The U.S. in Sino-Soviet Crises," p. 117 [pdf p. 121], note 250.

¹²⁵ Ross, *The Indochina Tangle: China's Vietnam Policy, 1975-1979*, p. 227.

¹²⁶ Kenneth W. Allen, "The PLA Air Force: 1949-2002 Overview and Lessons Learned," from Chapter 4 in Laurie Burkitt, Andrew Scobell, and Larry M. Wortzel, eds., *The Lessons of History: The Chinese People's Liberation Army at 75* (Carlisle, Penn.: Strategic Studies Institute, 2003), pp. 118-120.

¹²⁷ Weiss, "Power Grows Out of the Barrel of a Gunboat: The U.S. in Sino-Soviet Crises," p. 63 [pdf p. 67], fn.

Perceptions of Conspiracy:

Question 1Ba: Do Chinese analysts interpret adversarial alliance activities as well organized and planned moves against them? Supported. Chinese analysts correctly interpreted that the Soviet Union and Vietnam aimed the USSR-Vietnam Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation against Chinese interests. This assessment aligns well with the baseline intentions of the alliance.

Question 1Bb: Do Chinese analysts interpret adversarial alliance activities as a conspiracy aimed against them? Not Supported. No evidence of Chinese analysts using conspiracy arguments to explain or describe USSR-Vietnam Alliance activities.

Question 1Bc: Are Chinese analysts able to correct perceptions of conspiracy?
Not Applicable. Yet, the Sino-Vietnam War revealed a lack of alliance cohesion between the USSR and Vietnam, and China corrected its perception that the Soviets would come to the aid of the Vietnamese.

Question 1Bd: Do Chinese analysts' perceptions of conspiracy influence Chinese foreign policy outcomes? Not Applicable. Chinese analysis did not show perceptions of conspiracy. It is possible that Chinese perception of enhanced security cooperation between the Soviet Union and Vietnam may have played a part in how the PLA executed its punitive war against Vietnam in such a way to not cause a Soviet reprisal; for example, Deng's planning not to incite a war with the Soviet Union, and limited use of air assets for reconnaissance and medical evacuations.

4.8 ADVERSARIAL ALLIANCE COHESION

The Sino-Vietnamese War offers an opportunity to analyze China's perception of alliance cohesion in how the alliance responded to the invasion and repeated incursions of an alliance partner. On 17 February 1979, no fewer than 30 Chinese divisions (roughly 320,000 soldiers) launched a multi-prong attack towards three Vietnamese provincial capitals: *Lao Cai*, *Cao Bang*, and *Lang Son*.¹²⁸ The Vietnamese defenders were much smaller in number, predominantly local militia forces estimated between 75,000 and 100,000 men.¹²⁹ In contrast to the Chinese forces, the Vietnamese were battle hardened from fighting the French and U.S. militaries for more than two and a half decades.¹³⁰ Gates's memoir of CIA intelligence at the time reported that the seasoned Vietnamese veterans "were giving a good account of themselves and that the Chinese were having problems maintaining command and control, that their equipment was outdated, and that Hanoi's troops were seasoned veterans compared to the Chinese."¹³¹ The Vietnamese did bring in reinforcements from Laos, southern Vietnam, and two divisions from Cambodia, but the punitive war failed to relieve pressure on the Khmer Rouge as fighting in Cambodia in April 1979 was more intense than in

¹²⁸ Zhang, "China's 1979 War with Vietnam: A Reassessment," p. 861.

¹²⁹ Kenny, "Vietnamese Perceptions of the 1979 War with China," p. 230.

¹³⁰ O'Dowd and Corbett, "The 1979 Chinese Campaign in Vietnam: Lessons Learned," p. 353; and O'Dowd, *Chinese Military Strategy in the Third Indochina War: The Last Maoist War*, p. 45.

¹³¹ Gates, *From the Shadows: The Ultimate Insider's Story of Five Presidents and How They Won the Cold War*, p. 121.

February.¹³² The Vietnamese did not commit its best divisions to fight, but kept at least five divisions in reserve to defend Hanoi.¹³³

The main brunt of combat took place in two stages. The first stage, from 17 to 26 February, saw slow moving progress towards *Lao Cai* and *Cao Bang*. The People's Liberation Army (PLA) took heavy losses, and the morale of the men was greatly diminished due to the lack of supplies, losses due to human wave tactics, and Vietnamese death traps and mines.¹³⁴ The second stage of the war, from 27 February to 4 March, concentrated on capturing the provincial capital of *Lang Son*, 20 kilometers from the Chinese border. Heavy fighting between Chinese tanks and Vietnamese artillery characterized this stage. The battle was a very destructive fight for the hills that surround *Lang Son*. At the same time, fighting was taking place in other border areas, including Vietnamese incursions into *Guangxi* Province.¹³⁵ The Chinese forces ultimately captured the three key provincial capitals, but the PLA suffered high losses. The most recent Chinese casualty estimates state that 6,900 PLA soldiers were killed in action, and 15,000 were wounded in action.¹³⁶ The Far East Economic Review reported that several Vietnamese army divisions were "badly mauled" in combat with Chinese forces: the 3rd at *Dong Dang*, the 345th and 316A at

¹³² Weiss, "Power Grows Out of the Barrel of a Gunboat: The U.S. in Sino-Soviet Crises," p. 61 [pdf. p. 65]; and Jencks, "China's 'Punitive' War on Vietnam: A Military Assessment," pp. 808 & 815.

¹³³ Jencks, "China's 'Punitive' War on Vietnam: A Military Assessment," p. 814.

¹³⁴ Chen, *China's War with Vietnam, 1979: Issues, Decisions, and Implications*, pp. 105-110; and O'Dowd, *Chinese Military Strategy in the Third Indochina War: The Last Maoist War*, pp. 70-71.

¹³⁵ Chen, *China's War with Vietnam, 1979: Issues, Decisions, and Implications*, pp. 110-112.

¹³⁶ Zhang, "China's 1979 War with Vietnam: A Reassessment," pp. 866-867.

Lau Cai, and possibly the 346th at *Lang Son*.¹³⁷ These are large amounts of casualties for only fighting 16 days in a time of modern warfare.¹³⁸

In response to China's border war with Vietnam, the Soviet Union kept to the ambiguous wording of the USSR-Vietnam treaty. There was no promise of Soviet military action to assist Vietnam, and the Soviet "airlift" was only ten flights.¹³⁹ However, the Soviet Union was active in signaling its displeasure to the Chinese. During the first stage of the war, 17 to 27 February, Soviet diplomatic leaders were making very strong statements that they were watching the progress of the war and hinted at involvement if the conflict did not remain limited.¹⁴⁰ On 18 February, the Soviets public reaction to the invasion was to state that it would "honor its commitments."¹⁴¹ Robert Gates summarized the Soviet response, "while Soviet political and propaganda support was strong, their practical efforts were modest and focused on helping Vietnam within its own borders."¹⁴² Ten days into the Chinese punitive war, a Japanese newspaper, *Mainichi Shimbun*, interviewed Deng Xiaoping. He stated:

In deciding to launch military action against Vietnam we were ready to take certain risks and made sufficient preparations. Because our objective is limited and fighting will not last long, most probably these risks will not materialize, although we cannot rule out the possibility of a Soviet attack on China... The Vietnamese expected help from those who pulled the string

¹³⁷ Jencks, "China's 'Punitive' War on Vietnam: A Military Assessment," p. 814.

¹³⁸ O'Dowd, *Chinese Military Strategy in the Third Indochina War: The Last Maoist War*, p. 72.

¹³⁹ Gates, *From the Shadows: The Ultimate Insider's Story of Five Presidents and How They Won the Cold War*, p. 122.

¹⁴⁰ Chen, *China's War with Vietnam, 1979: Issues, Decisions, and Implications*, p. 110.

¹⁴¹ Jencks, "China's 'Punitive' War on Vietnam: A Military Assessment," p. 806.

¹⁴² Gates, *From the Shadows: The Ultimate Insider's Story of Five Presidents and How They Won the Cold War*, p. 122.

behind them and depended on the [Sino-Soviet] treaty. But if we were afraid of that, other people would think we were soft.¹⁴³

Chinese commentators noted, “On the one hand the Soviet Union criticized China’s military attack on Vietnam, and on the other hand it increased the military activities on the China-Soviet Union border region such as holding military exercises, and clearly increased the adversarial atmosphere between China and the Soviet Union.”¹⁴⁴ Deng Xiaoping’s evaluation of the Soviet response was tied to his apprehension that a conflict with the Soviet Union from the north would impact China’s Four Modernization plans, but Deng judged that the “North’s reaction was small, and the impact was small.”¹⁴⁵ A year later, Deng Xiaoping would admit, “If someone should ask us if we were scared, frankly speaking, we were indeed scared.”¹⁴⁶

RAND analyst, Sally Stoecker provides three possible reasons the Soviets did not become physically involved in the conflict:

- 1) The proximity of Chinese forces on the Soviet’s Far East border and Vietnam’s border would create a dual front conflict for the Soviets,
- 2) The Soviets did not want to hurt relations with ASEAN states, and
- 3) The Soviets were engaged in SALT II negotiations with the U.S. and did not want to provoke the West.¹⁴⁷

¹⁴³ Weiss, “Power Grows Out of the Barrel of a Gunboat: The U.S. in Sino-Soviet Crises,” p. 118 [pdf p. 122], note 252.

¹⁴⁴ Shen, ed., History of Sino-Soviet Relations: 1917-1991, p. 458-459.

¹⁴⁵ Speech, “Deng Xiaoping at Sino-Vietnam Border War Situation Meeting” [*Deng Xiaoping zai Zhongyue bianjing zuozhan qingguang baogaohui shang de jianghua*] 16 March 1979.

¹⁴⁶ Weiss, “Power Grows Out of the Barrel of a Gunboat: The U.S. in Sino-Soviet Crises,” p. 115 [pdf p. 119], note 240, interview with *Yomiuri Shimbun*, 30 March 1980, p. 3.

¹⁴⁷ Stoecker, Clients and Commitments: Soviet-Vietnamese Relations, 1978-1988, p. v [pdf p. 7].

Additional reasons include the Vietnamese assessment that Vietnam was not a vital interest to the Soviets, and the Chinese leadership had successfully signaled that their punitive invasion was a limited action that would not threaten the Vietnamese regime. Also in the fall of 1978, the Soviet Union was preoccupied with deteriorating relations with Iran and Afghanistan, and by March 1979, the Soviets were discussing the utility of invading Afghanistan.¹⁴⁸ Though the Soviet Union did not physically intervene in the Sino-Vietnam War, the Soviet Union would remain a solid supporter of Vietnam and Vietnam's policy toward Cambodia. From 1979 to 1982, the Soviets provided Vietnam large amounts of materiel for operations including over 300 T-54, T-55 tanks, and armored personnel carriers, more than 4,000 military trucks, 300 heavy artillery weapons, and Mi-24 HIND gunship helicopters, and Mi-8 HIP transport helicopters. Estimates on Soviet aid to Vietnam varied widely. In 1981, Bernard Weinraub of "The New York Times" estimated that the Soviets were spending between three to six million dollars per day on military and civilian projects which included support for an estimated 200,000 Vietnamese soldiers in Cambodia.¹⁴⁹ Douglas Pike estimated that by 1986 "the war in Kampuchea was costing Vietnam about \$12 million a day, about 80 percent of which came directly or indirectly from the USSR."¹⁵⁰

On 21 March 1980, *Radio Beijing* registered China's opinion of Soviet activities in Vietnam:

¹⁴⁸ Westad, *The Global Cold War*, pp. 288-316.

¹⁴⁹ Weinraub, "Hanoi, in Economic Straits, Seeks to Move Toward Ties with U.S.," *The New York Times*, 28 December 1981, p. A4.

¹⁵⁰ Pike, *Vietnam and the Soviet Union: Anatomy of an Alliance*, pp. 198 & 210.

In Vietnam, Mr. Soviet Union has now replaced Mr. United States. From the Soviets in Vietnam you see the shadow of the Americans and smell the neocolonialism. On the highways near Hanoi you can see Soviet made command cars, trucks and tanks. The port of Haiphong is crowded with Soviet vessels. Soviet fighters are flying over Vietnamese skies... These facts show that the relationship between the Soviet Union and Vietnam is one between a master and a lackey, and that such a relationship is founded on mutual collusion and utilization.¹⁵¹

Nine days later, in an interview with *Yomiuri Shimbun*, Deng Xiaoping would express how China learned its own lesson from the punitive war against Vietnam. He stated, “China meted out punishment to Vietnam last year not just for China’s interests. The world was afraid of touching the tiger’s arse but we did it. As a result, we found that we can do it.” China learned that it could attack Vietnam in limited ways and not have to face military repercussions from the Soviet Union.

In the years following China’s “punitive” war against Vietnam, China’s military continued significant military operations on its southern border with Vietnam. The military operations were often in response to Vietnam’s dry season offensives (December to March) in Cambodia that took place in the early 1980s.¹⁵² For example, in April 1983 the PRC launched a “Symbolic Offensive”—characterized as small raids, psychological operations, occasional shelling, and destruction of property to punish Vietnam for its yearly dry-season offensives.¹⁵³ For example, Vietnam’s 1984-85 dry-season offensive eliminated a number of Khmer Rouge camps on the Thai border and severely disrupted its supply bases and logistical

¹⁵¹ Pike, *Vietnam and the Soviet Union: Anatomy of an Alliance*, p. 216.

¹⁵² Carlyle A. Thayer, “Security Issues in Southeast Asia: The Third Indochina War,” Conference Paper for “Security and Arms Control in the North Pacific,” 12-14 August 1987, pp. 8, 19, 20-21.

¹⁵³ Thayer, “Security Issues in Southeast Asia: The Third Indochina War,” pp. 11-17.

networks.¹⁵⁴ In retribution for the campaign, China launched its own operation from 27 May 1985 to 13 June 1985; the PLA hammered *Vi Xuyen* District of *Ha Tuyen* Province with 226,900 artillery shells.¹⁵⁵ In consideration of Chinese military activities and the concurrent Sino-Soviet negotiations on normalization, the lack of a Soviet response is telling of the USSR-Vietnam Alliance's cohesion. For example, after the 13-14 March 1988 clash between Vietnamese and Chinese sailors on Johnson South Reef in the Spratly Islands,¹⁵⁶ the Soviets "maintained near total silence."¹⁵⁷ The USSR was not going to allow the Sino-Vietnamese conflict to stymie the Sino-Soviet normalization process.

It is also important to see the punitive nature of the Chinese border war not as a single month long invasion in early 1979, but as the first movement of a long-term strategy to pressure Vietnam to exit Cambodia. The continued Chinese pressure on the border and the constant threat of "another lesson" forced Vietnam to maintain a large deployment of troops along its northern border with China, estimates range from 300,000 to 800,000 soldiers.¹⁵⁸ A former Vietnamese ambassador summarized China's "lesson" for Vietnam by stating, "We [China] can punish you at any time, even if you are allied with a big power. You cannot escape

¹⁵⁴ Porter, "Cambodia: Sihanouk's Initiative," p. 812. Before Vietnam's 1984-85 dry-season offensive, the Khmer Rouge was believed to have enough supplies for two years of fighting, but after the offensive it was credited to have only a couple of months of supplies to conduct operations.

¹⁵⁵ Thayer, "Security Issues in Southeast Asia: The Third Indochina War," pp. 20-22.

¹⁵⁶ Min Gyo Koo, Island Disputes and Maritime Regime Building in East Asia: Between a Rock and a Hard Place (New York: Springer, 2009), p. 154.

¹⁵⁷ Robert Ross, "China and the Cambodian Peace Process: The Value of Coercive Diplomacy," Asian Survey, Vol. 31, No. 12 (Dec. 1991), pp. 1174-1175.

¹⁵⁸ Kenny, "Vietnamese Perceptions of the 1979 War with China," p. 232; Ross, "China and the Cambodian Peace Process: The Value of Coercive Diplomacy," p. 1175.

your geopolitical status as a tributary state.”¹⁵⁹ Therefore, China was forcing Hanoi to sustain two fronts in a time when Vietnam had large economic difficulties.¹⁶⁰ China anticipated that the cumulative effect of being dependent on the Soviet Union for economic and military aid, the threat of another border attack, Chinese support for the Khmer Rouge, and the strain on the Vietnamese economy would force Vietnam to accede to Chinese demands.¹⁶¹

In the 1980s, She Defeng noted Soviet dissatisfaction with its alliance partner, Vietnam. He wrote, “The Soviet Union has actively provided military assistance such as arms and ammunition to Vietnam to support its invasion of Cambodia, oppose China, and dominate Southeast Asia, but to this day Vietnam does not allow Soviet military advisors to directly get involved with Vietnamese troops or command any Vietnamese troops, so much so that Soviet advisors are often excluded from Vietnamese operational information.”¹⁶² From this instance above, that the Soviets were providing plenty of capabilities, but the Vietnamese were resistant to cooperating with Soviet advisors. “The New York Times” reported in 1981 that Vietnam and the Soviet Union were experiencing tensions over Soviet influence in Cambodia, diplomats serving in Hanoi argued that, “the intensely

¹⁵⁹ Kenny, “Vietnamese Perceptions of the 1979 War with China,” p. 236.

¹⁶⁰ Zhang Xiaoming, “China’s 1979 War with Vietnam: A Reassessment,” *The China Quarterly*, No. 184 (Dec. 2005), p. 868.

¹⁶¹ Weiss, “Power Grows Out of the Barrel of a Gunboat: The U.S. in Sino-Soviet Crises,” p. 59 [pdf. p. 63]

¹⁶² She Defeng [社德峰], “New Changes in the Soviet Union and Eastern European Countries’ Relations with Vietnam” [*Sulian dongou guoia yu yuenan guanxi de xin bianhua*], *World Economics and Politics* [*Shejie jingji yu zhengzhi*], 1988, No. 7, p. 40.

nationalistic Vietnamese leaders, who fought the French and the Americans, will never fall under the total sway of the Russians.”¹⁶³

Perceptions of Adversarial Alliance Cohesion:

Question 2a: Do Chinese analysts of adversarial alliance cohesion presume that it is a function of external political context? Supported. The 1979 punitive invasion offers a good test of the USSR-Vietnam Alliance cohesion. In the face of a crisis, the Soviet Union was practically unresponsive.

Question 2b: Do Chinese analysts of adversarial alliance cohesion focus on the institutional solidarity between the alliance partners? Not Supported. One Chinese analyst noted that Soviet advisors and the Vietnamese Army did not cooperate. The Soviet’s supplied aid but were kept out of operational decision making.

Question 2c: Do Chinese analysts of adversarial alliance cohesion focus on the interactions between the alliance partners’ senior leadership? Supported. Chinese analysts paid attention to senior level meetings and subsequent economic aid packages flowing to Vietnam.

Question 2d: Do Chinese analysts of adversarial alliance cohesion focus on the domestic politics of the alliance partners? No Evidence.

Question 2e: Do Chinese analysts’ perceptions of adversarial alliance cohesion influence Chinese foreign policy outcomes? Supported. After the punitive war on Vietnam, Chinese analysts judged the USSR-Vietnam Alliance cohesion as weak; the Chinese were unrestricted by the Soviets to punish Vietnam for its dry season offensives in Cambodia year after year.

¹⁶³ Weinraub, “Hanoi, in Economic Straits, Seeks to Move Toward Ties with U.S.,” *The New York Times*, 28 December 1981, p. A4.

4.9 PERCEPTIONS OF CHANGED INTENTIONS

The behavior of the USSR-Vietnam Alliance in the 1980s provides an opportunity to examine Chinese perceptions of alliance intentions. China's security environment would worsen with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan on 24 December 1979. Deng Xiaoping's predictions of a dangerous decade were coming to fruition.¹⁶⁴ "On 31 [December], Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Hai Fengyao met Soviet Ambassador to China, Shcherbakov, to denounce the Soviet invasion and to postpone the vice foreign minister meeting. On 20 January 1980, the Chinese Foreign Ministry issued a formal declaration, the invasion of China's neighbor Afghanistan had installed an obstacle to the normalization process of China and the Soviet Union, and it was inappropriate to continue negotiations between the two states."¹⁶⁵ Wang and Wu contend that the Soviet threat of the late 1970s and early 1980s pushed China to form a "united front" against "Soviet expansion."¹⁶⁶ Shen Zihua wrote, "In January 1980 the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee held a staff meeting and Deng Xiaoping raised the point that there were three large tasks in the 1980s: opposing hegemony, national reunification, and speeding up economic construction. Concerning opposing hegemony was specifically opposing the Soviet Union."¹⁶⁷

Thus, China attempted to further balance against the Soviet threat by increasing intelligence and defense cooperation with the U.S. Concerning

¹⁶⁴ Wang and Wu, *Against Us or With Us?*, p. 19.

¹⁶⁵ Shen, ed., *History of Sino-Soviet Relations: 1917-1991*, p. 464-465.

¹⁶⁶ Wang and Wu, *Against Us or With Us?*, p. 19.

¹⁶⁷ Shen, ed., *History of Sino-Soviet Relations: 1917-1991*, p. 477.

intelligence cooperation, Director of Central Intelligence Stansfield Turner and Robert Gates traveled to Beijing at the end of December 1979 to discuss the establishment of collection facilities in western China. After the Iranian Revolution, the CIA needed to replace the former Iranian-based collection stations to gain intelligence on Soviet missiles.¹⁶⁸ In terms of defense cooperation, in January 1980 U.S. Secretary of Defense Harold Brown arrived in Beijing to discuss the potential for military cooperation. These key meetings signified what Wang and Wu have termed the “quasi-alliance” between the U.S. and China.¹⁶⁹ Two months later, in an interview with *Yomiuri Shimbun*, Deng Xiaoping described Soviet intentions:

As they counter mounting obstacles in Western Europe, the Soviets have advanced their schedule and increased their emphasis on the East. As a result, they utilize Vietnam in the East and, in combination of forming an Indochina federation, they try to build an Asian security system in a joint effort by big and small hegemonism. At the same time, the Soviet Union has strengthened its Pacific Fleet so that it now equals the U.S. Pacific Fleet in strength.¹⁷⁰

However, disagreements between the two states concerning arms sales to Taiwan in 1981 and 1982 crushed the momentum of the formation of this Sino-American “quasi-alliance.” Shen Zhihua wrote, “Reagan entered the White House in 1981 and issued the so-called dual track policy toward China: on one hand continuing to develop Sino-American relations; and on the other hand, in accordance with the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979, continuing to sell weapons to Taiwan such as the sale of the advanced FX fighter aircraft. This policy caused

¹⁶⁸ Gates, *From the Shadows: The Ultimate Insider’s Story of Five Presidents and How They Won the Cold War*, p. 123.

¹⁶⁹ Wang and Wu, *Against Us or With Us?*, p. 19.

¹⁷⁰ Weiss, “Power Grows Out of the Barrel of a Gunboat: The U.S. in Sino-Soviet Crises,” pp. 115-116 [pdf pp. 119-120], note 241.

serious fluctuations in Sino-American relations.”¹⁷¹ The Chinese press noted the low-point in Sino-American relations, and the Soviets were attentive to the news. Subsequently, on 24 March 1982, Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev proclaimed publicly in Tashkent that the USSR supported Chinese claims to Taiwan and was willing to improve Sino-Soviet relations.¹⁷² Brezhnev clearly played upon the Taiwan dispute by stating that the Soviet Union was opposed to the “concept of two Chinas.”¹⁷³

In October 1982, Deng Xiaoping made his “three obstacles” very clear to the Soviets to “stop supporting Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia, and urge the Vietnamese to withdraw from Cambodia,” withdrawal from Afghanistan, and resolve the Sino-Soviet border issues.¹⁷⁴ Six months after Brezhnev’s Tashkent speech, when the 12th CCP Congress met, CCP General Secretary Hu Yaobang pushed forward an “independent foreign policy” that would askew tilted relations toward the U.S. or the USSR and any bloc of countries; three years later, Hu Yaobang would reiterate that Chinese foreign policy would be free from strategic relations or alliances with any great power or bloc of powers.¹⁷⁵ This new “independent foreign policy” direction slowly moved China towards détente with the USSR, and the two states began holding high-level rounds of meetings.¹⁷⁶ Bilateral trade increases in

¹⁷¹ Shen, ed., *History of Sino-Soviet Relations: 1917-1991*, p. 479.

¹⁷² Jonathan D. Pollack, “China Between the Superpowers: In Search of a Security Strategy,” from Chapter 10 in Michael Y.M. Kua and Susan H. Marsh, eds., *China in the Era of Deng Xiaoping: A Decade of Reform* (London: An East Gate Book, 1993), p. 369.

¹⁷³ Wang and Wu, *Against Us or With Us?*, p. 23.

¹⁷⁴ Shen, ed., *History of Sino-Soviet Relations: 1917-1991*, p. 486; Pollack, “China Between the Superpowers: In Search of a Security Strategy,” p. 370; and Alexander Pantsov with Steven I. Levine, *Deng Xiaoping: A Revolutionary Life* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), p. 406.

¹⁷⁵ Wang and Wu, *Against Us or With Us?*, p. 23.

¹⁷⁶ Thayer, “Security Issues in Southeast Asia: The Third Indochina War,” p. 12.

the early 1980s provides evidence of these nascent steps to mend the Sino-Soviet relationship. Sino-Soviet trade in 1982 was \$300,000,000 USD; yet, by 1985 bilateral trade had increased to \$1,840,000,000 USD.¹⁷⁷ As a result, the CIA noticed that the Sino-Soviet negotiations were influencing the USSR-Vietnam Alliance in late 1983. A CIA analyst noted:

The Vietnamese clearly were worried about the reopening of the Sino-Soviet talks last year. Vietnam's second-ranking Politburo member hastily arranged a visit to Moscow, and Hanoi said publicly that Beijing intended to use the talks to isolate Vietnam.

The Soviets, hoping to ease Vietnamese concerns, now consult Hanoi after each round of talks with China. When Vietnamese Foreign Minister Nguyen Co Thach made his annual visit to Moscow last month, he saw Deputy Foreign Minister Kapitsa, presumably to discuss Kapitsa's talks in Beijing in September.

Moscow also seeks to reassure Hanoi by publicizing most of the authoritative Vietnamese attacks on the Chinese, despite its own ban on media criticism of China. General Secretary Andropov, in his meetings with Vietnamese leaders and in his public statements, has said there will be no Sino-Soviet rapprochement at Hanoi's expense. [Deputy Premier] Aliyev reiterated the message during his visit [in November 1982].¹⁷⁸

Despite high-level negotiations between them, Chinese rhetoric on the Soviet threat in Indochina remained high. Chinese media commentator, Tang Shan's writings in the "Beijing Review" in November 1983, illustrate the Soviet military threat: "Military aid for the invasion of Kampuchea was only the opener. The USSR had been granted use of *Cam Ranh Bay, Da Nang* and other military bases in Vietnam which effectively moves its Asian and Pacific outposts south by 2,000 miles and completes its naval web... menacing international sea lanes, especially the

¹⁷⁷ Shen, ed., *History of Sino-Soviet Relations: 1917-1991*, p. 502; "Switzerland/U.S. Foreign Exchange Rate," *U.S. Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis*, Economics Research, Last updated 7 March 2016, <https://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/data/EXSZUS.txt> (Accessed 12 March 2016).

¹⁷⁸ "USSR-VIETNAM: Impact of Sino-Soviet Dialogue," *CIA*, National Intelligence Daily, 9 November 1983, Document No. 0005630094, pp. 14-15 [pdf pp. 3-4], <http://www.foia.cia.gov/document/0005630094> (Accessed 11 March 2015).

Strait of Malacca linking the Indian and Pacific Oceans.”¹⁷⁹ Tang Shan also described how the enhancement of the Soviet threat emboldened Vietnam in writing, “Vietnam, powerfully backed by the USSR, can step up its acts of aggression along the Sino-Vietnamese border... which helps meet the strategic needs of the USSR... [Thus] Vietnam becomes a knife that the USSR holds to China’s throat.”¹⁸⁰ Shen Zhihua’s analysis of Soviet capabilities presents how threatening the Soviets were to the Chinese:

Until 1984, the Soviet Union was strengthening its military power in East Asia to unprecedented levels. The Soviet military deployed 140 SS-20 ballistic missiles to the region and more than 100 nuclear capable Backfire bombers. Of the four Soviet military aircraft carriers, the Soviets deployed two to the Pacific region; the Soviet Pacific fleet also added ballistic and nuclear powered submarines. The Soviet side repeatedly explained that it did not have intentions to threaten China, but this strengthening of Soviet military power did not help China not feel threatened.¹⁸¹

However, the threat environment in the Soviet Far East was going to change dramatically when Gorbachev came to power on 11 March 1985. The Gorbachev era signaled the death knell of the USSR-Vietnam Alliance as Gorbachev was trying to right a failing economy and rein in an overstretched empire. The next month, Deng Xiaoping met former British Prime Minister Edward Heath on 18 April. Deng told him, “For the Soviets it would be a relatively easy and costless to get the Vietnamese to withdraw from Cambodia.”¹⁸²

¹⁷⁹ Pike, *Vietnam and the Soviet Union: Anatomy of an Alliance*, p. 205, quoting Tang Shan, “Source of Southeast Asia Tension,” *Beijing Review*, No. 46 (November 1983).

¹⁸⁰ Pike, *Vietnam and the Soviet Union: Anatomy of an Alliance*, p. 205, quoting Tang Shan, “Source of Southeast Asia Tension,” *Beijing Review*, No. 46 (November 1983).

¹⁸¹ Shen, ed., *History of Sino-Soviet Relations: 1917-1991*, p. 488.

¹⁸² Shen, ed., *History of Sino-Soviet Relations: 1917-1991*, p. 505.

Subsequently, important Soviet-Vietnamese diplomatic activities signaled a shift in alliance intentions in June 1985 when Le Duan visited Moscow. During the high level meetings, the two sides hinted that towards the purpose of peace both the Soviet Union and Vietnam desired normalization with China. Additionally, the USSR and Vietnam issued a joint statement: “The two parties think that the Socialist Republics of the Soviet Union and Vietnam desire to normalize relations with the People’s Republic of China in accordance with the purpose of increasing peace in Asia and international security.”¹⁸³ The Soviets and the Vietnamese wanted to maintain the status quo instead of bowing to Chinese demands. Four months later, in October 1985, Deng Xiaoping asked Nicolae Ceaușescu to convey a message to Gorbachev. Deng was willing to travel to Moscow to hold a summit meeting with Gorbachev on the condition that Gorbachev must remove the “three obstacles.”¹⁸⁴ The Soviets took their time in responding to Deng’s offer, but in early 1986, the USSR and Vietnam made two important statements independently that affected China’s peripheral security situation. In February, at the convening of the 27th People’s Congress, Gorbachev announced that the Soviet Union would be withdrawing from Afghanistan. Next, on 4 March 1986, the Polish “Evening Bulletin” published the Vietnamese first vice minister of foreign affairs stating that the Vietnamese would be withdrawing from Cambodia before 1990.¹⁸⁵ However, Vietnam had not issued a formal diplomatic statement; its intention to withdraw

¹⁸³ Shen, ed., *History of Sino-Soviet Relations: 1917-1991*, p. 511.

¹⁸⁴ Wang and Wu, *Against Us or With Us?*, p. 24; and “Deng Xiaoping and China's relations with Japan, US and Soviet Union,” *People’s Daily*, 18 August 2004, http://en.people.cn/200408/17/eng20040817_153464.html (Accessed 6 June 2016).

¹⁸⁵ Shen, ed., *History of Sino-Soviet Relations: 1917-1991*, p. 513.

from Cambodia by the end of the decade was published in an Eastern European newspaper. Thus, the Chinese would wait for the Vietnamese withdraw to take place before they would move towards rapprochement with the Soviets or the Vietnamese.

Another event for the USSR-Vietnam Alliance came when Gorbachev, on 28 July 1986, made a speech in Vladivostok that signaled openness to rapprochement with China.¹⁸⁶ Gorbachev stated, “A noticeable improvement has occurred in our relations in recent years. I would like to affirm that the Soviet Union is prepared—any time, at any level—to discuss with China questions of additional measures for creating an atmosphere of good-neighborliness. We hope that the border dividing—I would prefer to say, linking—us will soon become a line of peace and friendship.”¹⁸⁷ This speech was a clear signal of receptivity to enhance the relationship between China and the USSR.¹⁸⁸ Moreover, the Vietnamese read Gorbachev’s signal clearly, and the newly appointed Vietnamese Communist Party Chief, Truong Chinh, was waiting to meet Gorbachev in Moscow upon Gorbachev’s return, and the two leaders met on 12 August 1986.¹⁸⁹ State media outlets publicly disclosed vague details about the two leaders discussing economic aid.¹⁹⁰

The normalization process between the Soviet Union and China and its connection to the USSR-Vietnam Alliance relationship was not lost on Chinese academics. Liu Pu wrote, “From the outset of the Sino-Soviet consultations on

¹⁸⁶ Wang and Wu, *Against Us or With Us?*, p. 24.

¹⁸⁷ “Excerpts From Gorbachev’s Speech,” *New York Times*, 29 July 1986, <http://www.nytimes.com/1986/07/29/world/excerpts-from-gorbachev-s-speech.html> (Accessed 8 February 2016).

¹⁸⁸ Wang and Wu, *Against Us or With Us?*, p. 24.

¹⁸⁹ Thayer, “Security Issues in Southeast Asia: The Third Indochina War,” p. 25.

¹⁹⁰ Leszek Buszynski, *Gorbachev and Southeast Asia* (New York: Routledge, 1992), pp. 95-97.

normalization of relations between the two countries, Vietnam has been very ill at ease worried that the Soviets would place relations with China above Vietnam.”¹⁹¹ This was as a key cohesion test for the USSR-Vietnam Alliance as the larger power was seeking to mend diplomatic relations with the key target of the alliance.

In response to Gorbachev’s Vladivostok speech, Deng told an American reporter on 2 September 1986 that if the Soviets are able to get Vietnamese to withdraw from Cambodia, it would be a “solid step” in solving the Cambodia obstacle, and Deng would be ready to meet Gorbachev in person.¹⁹² In November 1987 Deng would provide impetus to the normalization process; he told a Japanese delegation that in a couple of years he would be 85 years old and physically unfit to travel to Moscow. Moreover, he pointed specifically to the Vietnam issue as the key issue causing the “undue delay.”¹⁹³ Yet, by the summer of 1988, three important steps were showing signs that the Vietnamese were in-fact withdrawing from Cambodia and the Soviets were serious about making Vietnam’s departure a reality:

- 1) After the 1987-1988 dry season campaign, between ten and twelve thousand Vietnamese soldiers withdrew from Cambodia,
- 2) In June 1988, Hanoi removed its high command from Cambodia, and
- 3) Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Igor Rogachev went to Beijing to discuss Vietnam’s complete withdrawal from Cambodia.¹⁹⁴ These military and diplomatic moves continue to illustrate the deterioration of USSR-Vietnam Alliance cohesion

¹⁹¹ Liu Pu [刘朴], “Soviet-Vietnam Relations and Development Trends,” p. 56.

¹⁹² Shen, ed., History of Sino-Soviet Relations: 1917-1991, pp. 516-517.

¹⁹³ Chi Su, “The Strategic Triangle and China’s Soviet Policy,” in Chapter 3 from Robert S. Ross, ed., China, the United States, and the Soviet Union: Tripolarity and Policy (Armonk, New York: An East Gate Book, 1993), p. 55.

¹⁹⁴ Stoecker, Clients and Commitments: Soviet-Vietnamese Relations, 1978-1988, p. 25 [pdf p. 39].

since the USSR was working towards a policy end that was unfavorable to Vietnam's desire to control Cambodia.

The USSR had clearly placed normalization with China above its security cooperation with Vietnam. Between April and June of 1987, the Soviets withdrew a "motorized division and some other units from Mongolia"—a positive step towards the border obstacle.¹⁹⁵ Concerning the Afghanistan obstacle, Soviet troops started their withdrawal in the spring of 1988.¹⁹⁶ On 18 September 1988, Gorbachev made a speech in Krasnoyarsk that again sent signals to the Chinese that the Soviets were seeking normalization with China. He stated, "We are in favor of a full normalization of relations with the People's Republic of China and the development [of relations] commensurate with our mutual responsibility for a peaceful policy. We are ready to begin preparations immediately for a Soviet-Chinese summit meeting."¹⁹⁷ By the middle of February 1989, the Soviets had removed the Afghanistan obstacle by completing the withdrawal of 103,000 soldiers.¹⁹⁸

In fact, normalization of state and party relations between the USSR and China would occur nine months later in mid-May 1989 when Gorbachev traveled to Beijing to meet with Deng Xiaoping, Zhao Ziyang, and Li Peng.¹⁹⁹ Even though the Cambodia and border obstacles were not completely resolved, China was willing to hold the summit because it was observing increasingly positive interaction between the U.S. and the Soviet Union and the Soviets were proposing a 200,000 troop

¹⁹⁵ Chi Su, "The Strategic Triangle and China's Soviet Policy," p. 55.

¹⁹⁶ Bill Keller, "Last Soviet Soldiers Leave Afghanistan," *The New York Times*, 16 February 1989, <https://partners.nytimes.com/library/world/africa/021689afghan-laden.html> (Accessed 1 June 2016).

¹⁹⁷ Stoecker, *Clients and Commitments: Soviet-Vietnamese Relations, 1978-1988*, p. 23 [pdf p. 37].

¹⁹⁸ Keller, "Last Soviet Soldiers Leave Afghanistan."

¹⁹⁹ Carlyle A. Thayer, "Vietnam: Coping with China," *Southeast Asian Affairs*, (1994), pp. 353.

reduction. In anticipation of the May summit, CIA analysts deduced that China was attempting to maintain its leverage with both of the superpowers.²⁰⁰ Subsequently, Vietnamese forces would complete their withdrawal from Cambodia at the end of 1989.²⁰¹ China's peripheral environment changed dramatically when the USSR undertook costly actions to withdraw from *Cam Ranh* Bay all of its surface ships and submarines, and Soviet air assets: a Mig-23 Flogger squadron, eight Tu-16 Badger bombers, two Tu-95 Bear bombers, and two Tu-142 Bear F/J maritime reconnaissance and anti-submarine warfare planes.²⁰² The Soviet military's exit from Vietnam liquidated the alliance. September of the next year, China and Vietnam held a "secret summit" in Chengdu towards normalizing relations. The Vietnamese made a "major concession" by conceding to support a United Nations' settlement of the Cambodian problem.²⁰³

In conclusion, we see that Chinese analysts were able to discern the shifting intentions of the Soviet Union more than adequately. Soviet baseline intentions held forth deterrence of Chinese offensives and an openness to normalization of relations.

Perceptions of Changed Intentions:

Question 1Aa: Do Chinese analysts focus on adversarial alliance agreements, reports, speeches, statements, and treaties to perceive changes in intentions? Supported.

²⁰⁰ "Sino-Soviet Relations: The Summit and Beyond," *CIA*, Directorate of Intelligence, 9 May 1989, pp. 2 & 4, http://www.foia.cia.gov/sites/default/files/document_conversions/89801/DOC_0000444694.pdf (Accessed 4 June 2016)

²⁰¹ Shen, ed., *History of Sino-Soviet Relations: 1917-1991*, p. 521; Ross, "China and the Cambodian Peace Process: The Value of Coercive Diplomacy," p. 1177.

²⁰² Ramesh Thakur and Carlyle A. Thayer, *Soviet Relations with India and Vietnam* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992), p. 131.

²⁰³ Thayer, "Vietnam: Coping with China," p. 353.

Gorbachev's 1986 Vladivostok speech and 1988 Krasnoyarsk speech signaled détente towards China, but Deng Xiaoping held firm to the "three obstacles" before normalization would take place. This assessment shows that Chinese analysts' perceptions aligned well with the alliance's baseline intentions.

Question 1Ab: Do Chinese analysts perceive tangible costly actions that diminish the adversarial alliance's capabilities as a signal of benign intentions? Supported. The Chinese saw fulfillment of the speeches when the Soviets pulled out of Afghanistan, Vietnam started pulling out of Cambodia, and the reduction of Soviet troops on the Sino-Soviet border. The USSR's removal of air and naval assets from *Cam Ranh* Bay signaled the removal of threatening capabilities from China's southern flank.

Question 1Ac: Do Chinese analysts perceive tangible costly actions that enhance the adversarial alliance's capabilities as a signal of malign intentions? Supported. USSR naval and air capabilities in Vietnam aided Soviet projection of capabilities, and Soviet military aid to Vietnam facilitated Vietnam's multi-year occupation of Cambodia.

Question 1Ad: Do Chinese analysts' perceptions of changes in alliance intentions influence Chinese foreign policy outcomes? Supported. USSR signaled détente via speeches and large reductions of capabilities helped facilitate normalization between China and the USSR.

4.10 USSR-VIETNAM ALLIANCE SUMMARY

The USSR-Vietnam Alliance is an important case to understand because within the twenty year history of this alliance China and Vietnam would fight a limited war and a protracted border conflict. China's willingness to punish Vietnam for its invasion and subsequent occupation of Cambodia regardless of Vietnam's alliance with the Soviet Union demonstrates a high resolve on the part of the China's leadership. From China's vantage point, the Soviet Union comprised the main threat of the USSR-Vietnam Alliance. Vietnam was only a small part of the overall Soviet threat.²⁰⁴ Yet, China's bilateral relationship with the USSR dramatically recovered by the end of the 1980s. Thus, Yu Tiejun describes the Soviet-Vietnam Alliance as a bell curve: the alliance was a low threat in the early 1970s since Vietnam was fighting the U.S. and South Vietnam, but quickly ramped up in the late 1970s, and it slowly decreased towards the end of the 1980s.²⁰⁵

²⁰⁴ Li Qingsi [李庆四], Personal Interview, Renmin University, 14 October 2015.

²⁰⁵ Yu Tiejun [于铁军], Personal Interview, 24 November 2015, Peking University.

5.0 CHAPTER 5: US-JAPAN ALLIANCE

5.1 CHAPTER SUMMARY

This case study will trace through the political and military developments of the US-Japan Alliance from 1991 to 2015. After providing the baseline intention of the alliance and the context to the post-Cold War alliance activities, the chapter will progress in a chronological fashion to bring attention to four alliance perception concepts. Specific junctures within the chronology offer opportunities to assess the descriptive validity of the concepts in light of the case study evidence. First, the 1996 joint declaration and the 1997 revised guidelines will provide an opportunity to see a change in perceived intentions. Second, the Hatoyama administration will offer a point to evaluate alliance cohesion. Third, the recovery of alliance cooperation in 2010 will offer evidence of Chinese perceptions of over-Machiavellianism. Fourth, Japan's retention of a nuclear fissile material stockpile and the alliance's development of Theatre Missile Defense will display insights on alliance capabilities. Fifth, Sino-Japanese relations in the first fifteen years of the new millennium offer insight into China's perception of itself as a rising power in relation to the US-Japan Alliance. Each of these perception shaping concepts will have varying degrees of influence on Chinese foreign policy outcomes.

5.2 BASELINE ALLIANCE INTENTIONS

The Nye Initiative clearly lays out the objectives of U.S. engagement in the Asia-Pacific region in stating:

United States military presence in the region supports many of our broader objectives and those of our allies. It guarantees the security of sea lanes vital to the flow of Middle East oil, serves to deter armed conflict in the region, and promotes regional cooperation. It also denies political or economic control of the Asia-Pacific region by a rival, hostile power or coalition of powers, preventing any such group from having command over the vast resources, enormous wealth, and advanced technology of the Asia-Pacific region. The United States presence also allows developing countries to allocate resources to economic growth and expands markets for United States exports. By helping to preserve peace, expenditures on our continuing defense presence deter conflicts whose costs would be far greater.¹

The Nye Initiative advanced geopolitical understandings that the Brookings Institution introduced to the Joint Chiefs of Staff at the close of World War II. The Brookings Institution analysts clearly stated a fundamental understanding of Spykman's rimland geopolitics when they wrote, "In eastern Asia as in Europe, American security policy must be to oppose any aspirant for continental hegemony."² The U.S. and Japan have undertaken a "core strategic bargain" that is the basis of the bilateral security treaty: the U.S. is committed to defend Japan in return for U.S. "access to bases for forward deployments and operational capacity to

¹ Joseph S. Nye Jr., "United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region," *U.S. Department of Defense*, 28 February 1995, *Defense Technical Information Center*, p. 7. Text available at <http://nautilus.org/global-problem-solving/us-security-strategy-for-the-east-asia-pacific-region/> (Accessed 2 May 2016).

² Frederick S. Dunn, Edward M. Earle, William T. R. Fox, Grayson L. Kirk, David N. Rowe, Harold Sprout, and Arnold Wolfers, "Joint Chiefs of Staff Memorandum for Information No. 382: A Security Policy for Post-War America," 29 March 1945, *Naval Historical Center*, Strategic Plans Division, Series 14, Box 194, AI-2, p. 12.

maintain regional peace and security.”³ Furthermore, the Nye report called for a new benchmark to be set around 100,000 U.S. military personnel to be forward-deployed in the Western Pacific.⁴ This report would set the stage for a revitalization of the US-Japan Alliance and serves as a baseline intention to measure Chinese perceptions of alliance intentions.

5.3 PERCEPTIONS OF CHANGED INTENTIONS

The end of the Cold War offers a valuable opportunity to examine a shift in Chinese perceptions of the US-Japan Alliance intentions. The 1996 Clinton-Hashimoto Joint Declaration and the 1997 Revised Defense Guidelines issued by the US-Japan Alliance was a critical turning point in Chinese understanding as the event was heavily linked to the Taiwan issue.⁵ This section will include a discussion of the Taiwan issue as it relates to the shift in intentions. As Yu Tiejun concluded, “The Chinese perspective towards the [US-Japan] alliance changed in the mid-1990s because of Taiwan.”⁶ The shift in perceived adversarial alliance intentions pushed

³ Nicholas Szechenyi, “The U.S.-Japan Alliance: Prospects to Strengthen the Asia-Pacific Order,” chapter in Ashley J. Tellis, Abraham M. Denmark, and Greg Chaffin, eds, *Strategic Asia 2014-15: U.S. Alliances and Partnerships at the Center of Global Power* (Seattle: The National Bureau of Asian Research, 2014), pp. 35-36.

⁴ Wang Jianwei and Wu Xinbo, *Against Us or With Us? The Chinese Perspective of America’s Alliances with Japan and Korea* (Stanford: The Asia/Pacific Research Center, 1998), p. 29.

⁵ “Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security- Alliance for the 21st Century,” *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan*, 17 April 1996, <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/security.html> (Accessed 23 March 2016) from here on referred to as the 1996 joint declaration; and “The Guidelines For Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation (September 23, 1997),” *Japan Ministry of Defense*, http://www.mod.go.jp/e/d_act/anpo/19970923.html (Accessed 23 March 2016) from here on referred to as the 1997 revised guidelines.

⁶ Yu Tiejun [于铁军], Personal Interview, 24 November 2015, Peking University.

China towards two foreign policy outcomes: security dilemma avoidance and external balancing with Russia.

In February 1990, the US-Japan Alliance marked its 38th anniversary.⁷ At the time, U.S. Marine Corps General Henry Stackpole told a “Washington Post” correspondent that U.S. troops must remain in Japan until the beginning of the twenty-first century in large part because “no one wants a rearmed, resurgent Japan. So we are a cap in the bottle, if you will.”⁸ Soon after the conclusion of the Cold War, the preparations for the First Gulf War proved to be a cohesion test for the long-standing US-Japan Alliance. Japanese Prime Minister Kaifu Toshiki’s Government desired to support the U.S. led multinational coalition to oust Iraqi forces out of Kuwait; yet, the Japanese Diet in October of 1990 “failed to pass” the United Nations Peace Cooperation Bill to support noncombat activities.⁹ Therefore, Japan’s largest contribution to the war came in the form of “checkbook diplomacy”: a \$13 billion payment to cover an estimated 20% of the costs of prosecuting it.¹⁰ After the conclusion of combat, Japan was successful in sending six minesweeping ships to the Persian Gulf to aid the U.S.; the seven month deployment marked the first time the Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) operated outside of Japan.¹¹

⁷ “Japan-U.S. Security Treaty,” *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan*, last updated in 2014, <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/q&a/ref/1.html> (Accessed 22 March 2016).

⁸ Kenneth B. Pyle, “The U.S.-Japan Alliance in the 21st Century,” *The National Bureau of Asian Research*, 13 November 2012, endnote 1, <http://www.nbr.org/research/activity.aspx?id=296> (Accessed 25 June 2016).

⁹ “Special Feature 20th Anniversary of Japan’s Participation in the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations,” *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan*, 2012, http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/2013/html/chapter3/cp3_sf1.html (Accessed 22 March 2016).

¹⁰ Christopher Hughes, *Japan’s Security Agenda Military, Economic & Environmental* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2004), p. 160.

¹¹ “Two Decades of International Cooperation: A Look Back on 20 Years of SDF Activities Abroad,” *Ministry of Defense*, Japan Defense Focus, No. 24, December 2011,

Despite the mixed performance in security cooperation, the George H.W. Bush administration continued to emphasize the US-Japan Alliance with Secretary of State James Baker's 1991 article in *Foreign Affairs*, "America in Asia: Emerging Architecture for a Pacific Community." Additionally, the president's 1992 Tokyo Declaration promoted the global partnership.¹² Three years later, the Clinton administration released the "Nye Initiative" on 27 February 1995. Officially entitled, "United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region," this report, most notably, reaffirmed the importance of the US-Japan Alliance.¹³

During Clinton's first term in office, Beijing and Washington had numerous disagreements over China's human rights issues, nuclear tests, and most-favored-nation trade status. Moreover, tensions rose on the Korean Peninsula when North Korea withdrew from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty in March 1993, tested a mid-range missile two months later, and withdrew from the IAEA in June 1994.¹⁴ However, the most serious conflict between China and the U.S. concerned Taiwan President Lee Teng-hui's visit to Cornell University in 1995.¹⁵ China fired a total of six missiles (two per day on 21, 22, and 23 July 1995) and conducted a ten day joint

<http://www.mod.go.jp/e/jdf/no24/specialfeature01.html> (Accessed 22 March 2016); and Jin Linbo [晋林波], "Background, Process, and Impact of the US-Japan Redefinition" [*Meiri tongmeng zaidingyi de beijing, guocheng jiqi yingxiang*], *China International Studies* [*Guoji wenti yanjiu*], 2 November 1998, p. 36.

¹² Zhong Feiteng and Zhang Jie [钟飞腾与张洁], "Flying Geese Security Model and China's Strategic Choice in Neighbor Diplomacy" [*Yanxing anquan moshi yu Zhongguo zhoubian waijiao de zhanlue xuanze*], *World Economics and Politics* [*Shijie jingji yu zhengzhi*], 2011, No. 8, p. 49; and Liu Jiangyong, "International Partnerships Facing Challenges," *Contemporary International Relations (English Edition)*, No. 4 (1999), p. 2.

¹³ Nye, "United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region."

¹⁴ Shreeya Sinha and Susan C. Beachy, "Timeline on North Korea's Nuclear Program," *The New York Times*, Last updated 20 November 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2014/11/20/world/asia/northkorea-timeline.html?_r=0#/#time238_10529 (Accessed 26 February 2016).

¹⁵ Wang Jianwei and Wu Xinbo, *Against Us or With Us?*, p. 30.

PLA Navy and PLA Air Force live fire exercise off of the coast of Fujian Province.¹⁶ Four months later, President Clinton and Prime Minister Hashimoto were supposed to meet in Tokyo to issue a joint declaration to reaffirm the alliance, but due to the November 1995 sequestration, the Clinton administration had to postpone the summit.¹⁷ In March 1996, the PLA launched four missiles in to the Taiwan Strait and held a large joint military exercise with an estimated 150,000 personnel.¹⁸ Yoichi Funabashi pointed to the Taiwan Straits missile tests of 1995 and 1996 as a shock to the Japanese public. He wrote in 2000, “The incident has manifestly affected the Japanese security psyche, as it prompted Japan to join the West in criticizing China for its missile diplomacy and added to Japan’s motivation to formulate new Japan-U.S. defense guidelines.”¹⁹

When Clinton and Hashimoto held their long-awaited summit in April 1996 and signed a joint declaration affirming the alliance, Chinese analysts viewed it as a direct response to the PLA’s March 1996 military exercises. Mike Mochizuki summarized, “With the reaffirmation of the bilateral alliance coming so soon after the Taiwan Strait crisis, however, the Chinese not surprisingly feared that the U.S.-Japan security relationship was being directed against China and might even

¹⁶ Andrew Scobell, *China’s Use of Military Force: Beyond the Great Wall and the Long March* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), p. 176.

¹⁷ David Holley, “Japanese Say Clinton Takes Them Lightly: Asia: Cancellation of President’s trip to summit is seen as weakening U.S. influence. Tokyo puts best face on it, but many view decision as a snub,” *Los Angeles Times*, 17 November 1995, Article Collections, http://articles.latimes.com/print/1995-11-17/news/mn-4122_1_view-decision (Accessed 22 March 2016).

¹⁸ Scobell, *China’s Use of Military Force*, pp. 176-177.

¹⁹ Yoichi Funabashi, “Tokyo’s Temperance,” *The Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 23, No. 3, Summer 2000, p. 136.

encourage Taiwan to move toward independence.”²⁰ Wang and Wu concluded, “In a time that saw the growth of suspicion and distrust between China on the one hand and the United States and Japan on the other, it is no surprise that the Clinton-Hashimoto declaration on April 1996 aroused strong concern in China’s policy and academic circles.”²¹ Joseph Nye argues that the Clinton administration was taking an “integrate but hedge” strategy towards China. The U.S. achieved the integration piece by bringing China into the WTO. The U.S. performed the hedging piece when “the Clinton-Hashimoto Declaration of April 1996 affirmed that the U.S.-Japan security treaty, rather than being a Cold War relic, would provide the basis for a stable and prosperous East Asia.”²²

The 1996 joint declaration marked a clear transition in China’s view of the US-Japan Alliance. Approximately 14 months later, on 8 June 1997, the U.S. and Japan would jointly release the “Intermediate Report on the Revision of Guidelines for Defense Cooperation” to prepare the ground for the eventual revised guidelines.²³ Three months later, on 24 September, the U.S. and Japan would release the 1997 New Japan-US Defense Guidelines.²⁴ The revised guidelines officially paved the way for greater Japanese cooperation in regional contingencies; thus, the

²⁰ Mike M. Mochizuki, “Terms of Engagement: The U.S.-Japan Alliance and the Rise of China,” from chapter 4 in Ellis S. Krauss and T. J. Pempel, eds., Beyond Bilateralism: U.S.-Japan Relations in the New Asia-Pacific (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004), p. 104.

²¹ Wang Jianwei and Wu Xinbo, Against Us or With Us?, p. 30.

²² Joseph S. Nye, “Should China Be ‘Contained’?” *Harvard University*, Belfer Center, 4 July 2011, http://belfercenter.hks.harvard.edu/publication/21192/should_china_be_contained.html (Accessed 21 June 2016).

²³ Cao Zhangsheng [曹长盛], “Major Change and Its Impact on the Japan-US Security Partnership” [*Rimei anquan hezuo guanxi de zhongda bianhuan jiqi yingxiang*], International Politics [Guoji zhengzhi yanjiu], 1998, No. 2, p. 49.

²⁴ Yang Bojiang, “Why US-Japan Joint Declaration On Security Alliance?” Contemporary International Relations (English Edition), No. 5 (1996), p. 1; and Yang Bojiang, “Closer Alliance with Washington: Japan's Strategic Springboard for the 21st century?” Contemporary International Relations (English Edition) 1999, No. 6, p. 9.

alliance expanded from protection of Japan proper to potential hotspots on the Korean peninsula and the Taiwan Strait. To support the conclusion Yuan Jingdong wrote, “The new [1997] defense guidelines in effect give Japan the green light to go beyond the original exclusive self-defense to a collective defense function, therefore providing justification for Japan to intervene in regional security affairs.”²⁵

Therefore, the Chinese perception of the U.S.-Japan Alliance altered from a “constraint on Japan’s remilitarization” to a more active “partner.”²⁶ Many policy analysts were starting wonder if the new defense guidelines removed General Henry Stackpole’s “cap in the bottle.” According to National Security Advisor Anthony Lake, when Chinese Minister of National Defense Chi Haotian visited Washington around the time of the revisions, Chi Haotian repeatedly said, “It would not do to unleash Japan.”²⁷ The next section will detail how China’s perceptions of the defense revisions directly related Taiwan.

5.3.1 The Centrality of Taiwan

As a natural outworking of the 1996 and 1997 defense revisions between the U.S. and Japan, and much to China’s displeasure, the security relationships between the U.S. and Taiwan and Japan and Taiwan were both “remarkably enhanced.”²⁸ Sun Xuefeng argued that before 1996, when the US-Japan Alliance was not concerned

²⁵ Yuan Jingdong, “Chinese perspectives on the US-Japan alliance,” from chapter 4 in David Arase and Akaha Tsuneo, eds., *The US-Japan Alliance: Balancing Soft and Hard Power in East Asia* (New York: Routledge, 2010), p. 88.

²⁶ Wu Xinbo, “The End of the Silver Lining: A Chinese View of the U.S.-Japanese Alliance,” *The Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 29, No. 1 (Winter 2005-06), pp. 119-120.

²⁷ Funabashi, Yoichi, *Alliance Adrift* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1999), p. 436.

²⁸ Wu Xinbo, “The End of the Silver Lining: A Chinese View of the U.S.-Japanese Alliance,” p. 125.

with confronting China, the alliance was more focused on economic exchange. After Lee Teng-hui came to power in Taiwan, Chinese International Relations scholars noted the quick transformation in how the alliance dealt with China.²⁹

To illustrate this shift, Chinese policy makers quickly noted the difference of phrasing within the 1996 joint declaration, the intermediate report, and the 1997 Guideline Revisions regarding the geographic scope. First, the U.S. and Japan 1996 joint declaration contained new phrasing that shifted from “the Far East” to “Japan’s surrounding areas.”³⁰ Second, the intermediate report on 8 June 1997 did not clarify what geographic limits “Japan’s surrounding areas” were referencing. However, on 17 August 1997, Japanese Chief Cabinet Secretary Seiroku Kajiyama stated that “Japan’s surrounding areas” should “naturally include the Taiwan Straits.”³¹ Thus, if China used military force against Taiwan, the revised guidelines would provide a so-called “legal” basis for both Japan and the U.S. to intervene militarily.³² In response, two days later, the Chinese would demand that the Japanese government “issue a full clarification” of Kajiyama’s remarks.³³

Diplomats for the U.S. and Japan tried to assuage Chinese fears that the US-Japan Alliance was overly focused on China by claiming, “the scope of their defense

²⁹ Sun Xuefeng [孙学峰], Personal Interview, 5 November 2015, Tsinghua University.

³⁰ Zhang Taishan, “New Developments in the U.S.-Japan Military Relationship,” *International Strategic Studies*, Is. 4, 1997, p. 30.

³¹ Cao Zhangsheng [曹长盛], “Major Change and Its Impact on the Japan-US Security Partnership,” p. 49; and Zhang Taishan, “New Developments in the U.S.-Japan Military Relationship,” p. 30.

³² Xin Qiang [信强], Personal Interview, 13 November 2015, Fudan University—American Studies Center.

³³ Chu Shulong, “China and the US-Japan and US-Korea Alliances in a Changing Northeast Asia,” Stanford, California, *Asia/Pacific Research Center*, Stanford University, June 1999, downloaded from http://fsi.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/Chu_Shulong.pdf (Accessed on 6 August 2015), p. 17, quoted from Sun Wang, “Clarity in Japan-US Security Links Urged,” *China Daily*, 20 August 1997, p. 1.

cooperation is not geographically determined but scenario-specific.”³⁴ Yet, Chinese scholars remained unconvinced, as Wang and Wu concluded, “intentional ambiguity only deepens Beijing’s suspicion and aggravates its concern over the alliance.”³⁵ Additionally, Yang Bojiang raised the point that after signing the 1996 joint declaration, Japan repeatedly defended the purview of the US-Japan Alliance by asserting that the original 1960 interpretation of the Japan-US Security Treaty included Japan and the surrounding territories of the Korean Peninsula, Taiwan, and a large area north of the Philippines.³⁶

From the Chinese viewpoint, the 1997 revision did more than alter US-Japan accords, but seriously infringed on Sino-Japanese agreements going back to November 1972 when the Japanese Foreign Minister Masayoshi Ōhira recognized that the conflict between the People’s Republic of China and Taiwan was “China’s internal affairs.”³⁷ Moreover, Chinese analysts pointed to Japanese Foreign Minister Sunao Sonoda’s 1978 declaration that Taiwan was no longer covered by the security pact.³⁸ Therefore, the Chinese viewed the inclusion of military cooperation in the Taiwan Straits as a reversal of the normalization negotiations between the U.S and China, and Japan and China in the 1970s that insisted on a “one China policy.”³⁹ Finally, two days after the US-Japan Alliance guideline revisions were released, Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesman Shen Guofang stated, “The Chinese

³⁴ Wang Jianwei and Wu Xinbo, *Against Us or With Us?*, p. 32.

³⁵ Wang Jianwei and Wu Xinbo, *Against Us or With Us?*, p. 32.

³⁶ Yang Bojiang, “Why US-Japan Joint Declaration On Security Alliance?” p. 9.

³⁷ Yang Bojiang, “Closer Alliance with Washington: Japan’s Strategic Springboard for the 21st century?” p. 17.

³⁸ Wang Jianwei and Wu Xinbo, *Against Us or With Us?*, p. 32.

³⁹ Chu Shulong, “China and the US-Japan and US-Korea Alliances in a Changing Northeast Asia,” p. 17; and Zhang Taishan, “New Developments in the U.S.-Japan Military Relationship,” p. 30.

government and people will never accept violations of or interference in China's sovereignty by directly or indirectly including the Taiwan Strait in the scope of Japan-U.S. defense cooperation."⁴⁰ Thus, China's leaders viewed the 1997 revisions as a threat to one of China's preeminent national security objectives: national reunification.⁴¹ Wang and Wu argued that China is "extremely sensitive" to alliance maneuvers that affect China's sovereignty and territorial integrity; they concluded, "China may accept the expansion of the scope of the two security alliances beyond bilateral relations to cover other regional issues, but it is unlikely to tolerate their jurisdiction over the Taiwan Strait and to a lesser extent over the *Diaoyu* [*Senkaku*] islands and the South China Sea."⁴² Therefore, the 1997 guideline revisions greatly concerned China that Taiwan might fall into the "parameters" of the US-Japan Alliance.⁴³

China's perception of the US-Japan Alliance has historically been tied to Taiwan. For example, after Japan and Taiwan concluded a peace treaty in April 1952, Zhou Enlai asserted that the U.S. was using the peace treaty between the two states as a way to align allies against the PRC.⁴⁴ Another point of tension concerning Taiwan was in 1969 when Japanese Prime Minister Eisaku Sato's government included Taiwan inside Japan's "sphere of security."⁴⁵ Xin Qiang offers China's current-day calculus of its goals for Taiwan in stating, "Short-term, prevention of

⁴⁰ Chu Shulong, "China and the US-Japan and US-Korea Alliances in a Changing Northeast Asia," p. 16.

⁴¹ Wang Jianwei and Wu Xinbo, *Against Us or With Us?*, pp. 7, 14, 32, and 37.

⁴² Wang Jianwei and Wu Xinbo, *Against Us or With Us?*, p. 37. *Diaoyu* is the Chinese name, and *Senkaku* is the Japanese name for the small, uninhabited islands claimed by both states. For simplicity, for the remainder of the dissertation I will use the Chinese name.

⁴³ Wang Jianwei and Wu Xinbo, *Against Us or With Us?*, p. 33.

⁴⁴ Wang Jianwei and Wu Xinbo, *Against Us or With Us?*, p. 7.

⁴⁵ Wang Jianwei and Wu Xinbo, *Against Us or With Us?*, p. 37.

independence; mid-term, prevention of perpetual separation; and in the long-term, a desire for re-unification.”⁴⁶

Furthermore, Taiwan is of great concern to China because of Japan’s bilateral ties with Taiwan span multiple policy realms. Taiwan and Japan have significant “unofficial” cultural, economic, political, and academic ties, and China is concerned about Japan’s influence.⁴⁷ In terms of Taiwan-Japan military ties, in addition to intelligence sharing between the two states, Chinese analysts report interactions between the two militaries via retired military officers:

1) Taiwan and Japan both appointed retired officers to serve in the respective “quasi-official representative offices,”

2) Retired Japanese officers often engaged in bilateral security dialogues with Taiwanese military officers, and

3) Retired Japanese officers often served as advisors to Taiwanese military exercises.⁴⁸

In this regard, Chinese analysts feared that retired Japanese officers served as a conduit to transfer operational information that the JSDF gains from the alliance with the U.S. military. Thus, in the eyes of the Chinese, the 1996 joint declaration and the 1997 guideline revisions expanded the US-Japan Alliance from a bilateral security pact primarily concerned with protecting Japan proper to an expanding

⁴⁶ Xin Qiang [信强], Personal Interview, 13 November 2015, Fudan University—American Studies Center.

⁴⁷ Xin Qiang [信强], Personal Interview, 13 November 2015, Fudan University—American Studies Center.

⁴⁸ Yuan Jingdong, “Chinese perspectives on the US-Japan alliance,” p. 100.

agreement that threatens a key national interest.⁴⁹ To illustrate the gravity of the Taiwan issue to China, Yao Yunzhu wrote, "Taiwan is China's top security concern, and the only scenario for which China seriously considers the use of force."⁵⁰ Therefore, Chinese International Relations scholars have pointed to the 1996 joint declaration and the 1997 revised guidelines as a key turning point because it affected the US-Japan Alliance's ability to intervene in the Taiwan Strait.⁵¹ As Thomas Christensen wrote, the 1997 revised guidelines "only confirmed conspiracy theories among Beijing elites regarding the potential inclusion of Taiwan and the South China Sea in the alliance's scope. Following the issuance of the revised guidelines, Jiang Zemin announced that China is on 'high alert' about changes in the alliance."⁵²

Furthermore, Japan's implementation of the 1997 revised guidelines raised Chinese suspicions of the alliance's intentions when both houses of the Japanese Diet passed three related acts in April 1998 to fulfill the new guidelines. The laws required significant amendments to the Self-Defense Forces Act and the Cross-Serving Agreement between the U.S. and Japan.⁵³ Thus, the 1997 revised guidelines threatened China's reunification goals because they greatly expanded Japan's ability to support U.S. military operations in critical areas such as telecommunications,

⁴⁹ Yuan Jingdong, "Chinese perspectives on the US-Japan alliance," p. 101.

⁵⁰ Yao Yunzhu, "Chinese Nuclear Policy and the Future of Minimum Deterrence," from chapter 8 in Christopher P. Twomey, ed., Perspectives on Sino-American Strategic Nuclear Issues (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2008), p. 119. Yao Yunzhu was quoting from China's National Defense in 2004 from the Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, December 2004.

⁵¹ Yuan Jingdong, "Chinese perspectives on the US-Japan alliance," p. 89.

⁵² Thomas J. Christensen, "China, the U.S.-Japan Alliance, and the Security Dilemma in East Asia," International Security, Vol. 23, No. 4 (Spring 1999), p. 63.

⁵³ Yang Bojiang, "Closer Alliance with Washington: Japan's Strategic Springboard for the 21st century?" p. 9.

logistical support for frontline US troops, intelligence collection, surveillance, and mine sweeping. In total, the new guidelines laid out 40 specific items that expand the scope of cooperation between U.S. military forces and Japan's military and civilian facilities. Yang Bojiang argued that in the original Japan-US Security Treaty supported only six of the forty items.⁵⁴ The expansion of the new guidelines was so great, that one official of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs admitted, "the sixth article of the Japan-US Security Treaty should have been revised or a new treaty should have been signed. But the idea was dropped in fear of opposition of the Japanese citizens."⁵⁵ Subsequent Chinese commentators would note that the 1996 joint declaration and the 1997 revised guidelines brought about a qualitative change in the US-Japan Alliance to "play a role of 'NATO in the Far East' in Asia-Pacific Security."⁵⁶

However, some Chinese scholars drew very different conclusions on the 1996 joint declaration and the 1997 revised guidelines. For example, Liu Jianguo argued that the expansion of the relationship did "not signify any change in the unequal patron-client relationship between the two sides."⁵⁷ Liu points to the regional activities of the U.S. as separate from Japan's purpose towards "building a global military hegemony."⁵⁸ In support of Liu's argument, Wang Jianwei and Wu Xinbo contend that the U.S. part of the US-Japan Alliance serves as an oversight component that keeps Japan from being free to exercise full remilitarization. They

⁵⁴ Yang Bojiang, "Closer Alliance with Washington: Japan's Strategic Springboard for the 21st century?" pp. 11-13.

⁵⁵ Yang Bojiang, "Closer Alliance with Washington: Japan's Strategic Springboard for the 21st century?" p. 14.

⁵⁶ Liu Jianguo, "International Partnerships Facing Challenges," pp. 6-7.

⁵⁷ Liu Jianguo, "International Partnerships Facing Challenges," p. 2.

⁵⁸ Liu Jianguo, "International Partnerships Facing Challenges," p. 10.

concluded in 1998, “To some extent, what worries China more in this alliance structure is Japan rather than the United States.”⁵⁹ China desires to keep the U.S. as a restraint on Japanese militarism; yet, it is unclear how widespread this viewpoint is among Chinese analysts.

5.3.2 Chinese Foreign Policy Outcomes

The 1996 joint declaration and the 1997 revised guidelines changed Chinese perceptions of the US-Japan Alliance, and China responded in two ways. On one hand, China’s senior leaders issued statements that promoted avoiding the security dilemma; and on the other hand, we witness China strengthening its security cooperation with Russia. On the former response, Chinese scholars noted China’s experience from the early to mid-1990s informed its cautious approach. For instance, Yuan Jingdong argued that China’s foreign policies did not want to raise the suspicions of its neighbors and cause them to balance against China. He argued that China’s early 1990’s growth in “hard power capabilities” were actually unproductive when combined with strong “anti-hegemony rhetoric” and a “reluctance in endorsing and participating in regional security dialogues.”⁶⁰ Reflecting on the US-Japan Alliance’s reaction, Yuan reasoned that the 1995-96 Taiwan missile exercises made the “China threat” tangible and revitalized the US-Japan Alliance.⁶¹ China learned its lesson that its rise in power would have to pursue a more careful path of “soft balancing” against Washington’s attempts to

⁵⁹ Wang Jianwei and Wu Xinbo, *Against Us or With Us?*, p. 35.

⁶⁰ Yuan Jingdong, “Chinese perspectives on the US-Japan alliance,” p. 101.

⁶¹ Yuan Jingdong, “Chinese perspectives on the US-Japan alliance,” p. 101.

weaken, encircle, or contain China.⁶² Yuan asserted that China's new course, the so-called "New Security Concept," involves China's endorsement of multilateral security dialogues such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization as an alternative to military alliances.⁶³

China's official statements evidence this cautious approach. For example, a month after the U.S. and Japan issued the intermediate report, the "People's Daily" published an article regarding former Vice Premier Qian Qichen's position towards arms races. It stated, "Security cannot depend on the increase of armaments, nor cannot it depend on military alliances. Security ought to depend on mutual trust and shared security interests."⁶⁴ Two months later, on 12 September 1997, Chinese President Jiang Zemin addressed the 15th Party Congress with a message to avoid the security dilemma. He stated:

However, the Cold War mentality still exists, and hegemonism and power politics continue to be the main source of threat to world peace and stability. Expanding military blocs and strengthening military alliances will not be conducive to safeguarding peace and security. We should adhere to Deng Xiaoping's thinking on diplomatic work and firmly pursue an independent foreign policy of peace. In international affairs, we should determine our position and policies by proceeding from the fundamental interests of the people of China and other countries and judging each case on its own merits. We shall not yield to any outside pressure or enter into alliance with any big power or group of countries, nor shall we establish any military bloc, join in the arms race, or seek military expansion.⁶⁵

⁶² Yuan Jingdong, "Chinese perspectives on the US-Japan alliance," p. 102.

⁶³ Yuan Jingdong, "Chinese perspectives on the US-Japan alliance," p. 102.

⁶⁴ Cao Zhangsheng [曹长盛], "Major Change and Its Impact on the Japan-US Security Partnership," p. 49; and Xu Wansheng [徐万胜], "The Japan-US Alliance and the Post-Cold War Military Expansion of Japan," [*Rimei tongmeng yu lengzhanhou riben de junbei kuozhang*], *International Politics* [*Guoji zhengzhi yanjiu*], 2008, No. 1, p. 26, quoted from People's Daily [*Renmin ribao*], "Qian Qichen elaborates on his perspective and position on the Asia-Pacific situation" [*Qian Qichen jiu yatai xingshi chanshu wo guandian he lichang*], 28 July 1997.

⁶⁵ Chu Shulong, "China and the US-Japan and US-Korea Alliances in a Changing Northeast Asia," pp. 5-6, quoted from Jiang Zemin, "Hold High the Great Banner of Deng Xiaoping's Theory for an All-round

To reinforce this idea of avoiding a security dilemma, the day after the US-Japan Alliance issued its revised “Guidelines for Defense Cooperation” on 23 September 1997, China held to Deng Xiaoping’s prescribed policy. Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesman Shen Guofang reiterated, “We believe that the practice of strengthening military alliances and expanding military cooperation runs counter to the trends in the situation in the Asia-Pacific region, which is witnessing relative political stability, sustained economic growth, and an active security dialogue.”⁶⁶

Yet, instead of avoiding the alliance spiral and holding to Deng Xiaoping’s prescribed policy, China repeatedly moved towards Russia in the wake of the 1996 joint declaration and the 1997 revised guidelines. Liu Jianguo noted that in the late 1990s there was a “qualitative change” taking place in the US-Japan Alliance and the NATO alliance.⁶⁷ He concluded, “Regionalization of US-Japan alliance and globalization of NATO’s military functions have objectively spurred somewhat the advance of China-Russia cooperative strategic partnership.”⁶⁸ In April 1996, the same month as the US-Japan Joint Declaration, China and Russia signed the “Security Partnership for the 21st Century”⁶⁹ The next year, Jiang Zemin interrupted Boris Yeltsin’s vacation on the Black Sea to hold a summit in Moscow.⁷⁰ Subsequently, the

Advancement of the Cause of Building Socialism with Chinese Characteristics to the 21st Century,” *China Daily*, 23 September 1997, p. S-5.

⁶⁶ Chu Shulong, “China and the US-Japan and US-Korea Alliances in a Changing Northeast Asia,” p. 14, quoted from “Scope of Defense Pact Should be Restricted,” *Renmin Ribao [People’s Daily]*, 25 September 1997, p. 4.

⁶⁷ Liu Jianguo, “International Partnerships Facing Challenges,” p. 7.

⁶⁸ Liu Jianguo, “International Partnerships Facing Challenges,” p. 9.

⁶⁹ Song Dexing [宋德星], “Changes in the Post-Cold War Security Situation in Northeast Asia” [*Lengzhanhou dongbeiyu anquan xingshi de bianhua*] *Contemporary International Relations [Xiandai guoji guanxi]*, 1998, No. 9, p. 35.

⁷⁰ “Jiang Visit to Moscow Boosts Ties: Chinese, Russians Wary of U.S. Power,” *Chicago Tribune*, 23 April 1997, http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1997-04-23/news/9704230041_1_chinese-president-jiang-zemin-moscow-and-beijing-president-boris-yeltsin (Accessed 27 April 2016).

two leaders issued the “Joint Declaration Concerning Multipolarization and the Establishment of a New World Order.”⁷¹ The declaration euphemistically pointed at the United States in stating, “No country should seek hegemony, engage in power politics or monopolize international affairs,” and “The Parties express concern at attempts to enlarge and strengthen military blocs, since this trend can pose a threat to the security of individual countries and aggravate tension on a regional and global scale.”⁷² Jiang’s trip to Moscow in April 1997 also included meetings with leaders from Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan to reduce troop deployments on each other’s borders.⁷³ Concerning the 1996 and 1997 joint statements signed by China and Russia, Sun Xuefeng pointed to a convergence of both domestic and international policies. He offered a potential reason for the establishment of stronger relations with Russia would be China’s desire to develop stronger economic relations with Central Asia as part of China’s development plan to enhance the provincial economies of *Xinjiang*, *Gansu*, *Qianghai*, and the Tibetan Autonomous Region.⁷⁴

In summary, the 1996 joint declaration and the 1997 revised guidelines changed Chinese perceptions of the US-Japan Alliance from restraint to greater involvement in East Asian affairs—namely Taiwan. Sun Ru argued that the US-

⁷¹ Sun Cheng [孙承], “US Global Military Posture Realignment and the US - Japan Alliance,” [*Meiguo tiaozheng quanqiu junshi bushu yu meiri tongmeng*], *China International Studies* [*Guoji wenti yanjiu*], No. 5, 16 August 2004, p. 10.

⁷² “Russian-Chinese Joint Declaration on a Multipolar World and the Establishment of a New International Order,” United Nations, General Assembly, 52nd Session, 15 May 1997, <http://www.un.org/documents/ga/docs/52/plenary/a52-153.htm> (Accessed 22 March 2016).

⁷³ “Jiang Visit to Moscow Boosts Ties: Chinese, Russians Wary of U.S. Power,” *Chicago Tribune*, 23 April 1997, http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1997-04-23/news/9704230041_1_chinese-president-jiang-zemin-moscow-and-beijing-president-boris-yeltsin (Accessed 27 April 2016).

⁷⁴ Sun Xuefeng [孙学峰], Personal Interview, 5 November 2015, Tsinghua University.

Japan Alliance “is the primary prop for U.S. intervention into Asia-Pacific security affairs with region-wide influence.”⁷⁵ As a result, Yu Tiejun concluded that US-Japan Alliance security enhancements and the security dilemma pushed China towards Russia. He stated, “Strengthening of the alliance will always encourage the security dilemma. Military alliances can be useful in emergencies, but in a peaceful time, the strengthening of a military alliance will usually have negative consequences.”⁷⁶ China may continue to pursue its “quasi-alliance” or “special partnership” with Russia since both states feel that the alliance developments are encircling and containing them, and they have to respond.⁷⁷

Perceptions of Changed Intentions:

Question 1Aa: Do Chinese analysts focus on adversarial alliance agreements, reports, speeches, statements, and treaties to perceive changes in intentions? Supported.

Chinese analysts perceived that the 1996 joint declaration and the 1997 revised guidelines signaled a shift in alliance intentions.

Question 1Ab: Do Chinese analysts perceive tangible costly actions that diminish the adversarial alliance’s capabilities as a signal of benign intentions? No evidence in this instance, but the Adversarial Alliance Cohesion section will speak to this issue.

Question 1Ac: Do Chinese analysts perceive tangible costly actions that enhance the adversarial alliance’s capabilities as a signal of malign intentions? No evidence.

Question 1Ad: Do Chinese analysts’ perceptions of changes in alliance intentions influence Chinese foreign policy outcomes? Supported. Chinese senior leaders

⁷⁵ Sun Ru, trans. Ma Zongshi, “Toward A China-U.S.-ROK Cooperative Triangle,” p. 117.

⁷⁶ Yu Tiejun [于铁军], Personal Interview, 24 November 2015, Peking University.

⁷⁷ Yu Tiejun [于铁军], Personal Interview, 24 November 2015, Peking University.

signaled that they would keep with Deng Xiaoping's policy of avoiding alliance relations and arms races; however, in the wake of the 1996 Joint Declaration and the 1997 revised defense guidelines, Chinese diplomatic activity with Russia increased with yearly summits and regular agreements.

5.4 PERCEPTIONS OF ADVERSARIAL ALLIANCE COHESION

The US-Japan Alliance during the Hatoyama administration sheds light on alliance cohesion concept. Alliance cohesion is the mutual willingness of the alliance partners to cooperate towards a shared goal. An adversary's assessment of the cohesiveness of an adversarial alliance is important because cohesiveness indicates the willingness of the alliance partners to fight for each other which contributes to alliance credibility.

As background, in the late 2000s, North Korea's ballistic missile tests and the collapse of the Six-Party Talks in Beijing continued to spur U.S. and Japan security concerns in East Asia. For example, in October 2005, the two states would negotiate the relocation of the Marine Corps Air Station Futenma on Okinawa; and on 1 May 2006, the two sides would release the "Roadmap for Realignment Implementation"⁷⁸ The implementation of the plan to move a number of military

⁷⁸ "Chronology of U.S.-Japan Relations," *Embassy of the United States in Japan*, Last updated 30 September 2013, <http://aboutusa.japan.usembassy.gov/e/jusa-usj-chronology.html> (Accessed 26 January 2016); Christopher W. Hughes, *Japan's Remilitarisation* (London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2009), p. 156.; and "Joint Statement," United States-Japan Security Consultative Committee Document, *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan*, 1 May 2006, <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/scc/joint0605.html> (Accessed 25 February 2016).

installations to Guam would cost Japan \$6 billion.⁷⁹ The next year, the U.S. and Japan would successfully negotiate the replacement of the USS Kitty Hawk with the nuclear powered USS George Washington and the deployment of Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) missiles to bases on Japanese territory.⁸⁰

Yet, in September 2009, the newly installed Democratic Party of Japan's leadership under Prime Minister Hatoyama (16 September 2009 to 8 June 2010) would disrupt the cohesiveness of the US-Japan Alliance. The Hatoyama Government ushered in the lowest point in US-Japan Alliance history. Even though his government was in place for roughly nine months, it required the work of two more Japanese Prime Ministers to restore the military relationship to its prior state. Jin Linbo wrote, "The reshuffle of the Japanese foreign policy after the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) came to power led to cracks and even [an] unprecedented crisis of political confidence in the bilateral relations."⁸¹ Yuan Peng points to several problems during Japanese Prime Minister Hatoyama's administration that damaged U.S.-Japan Alliance cohesion:

- 1) Interruption of Japan's Indian Ocean oil and fresh water supply to U.S. and British naval vessels,
- 2) Marine Corps Air Station Futenma relocation was suspended,
- 3) Four secret US-Japan nuclear agreement were exposed, and

⁷⁹ Hughes, *Japan's Remilitarisation*, p. 94.

⁸⁰ "Chronology of U.S.-Japan Relations," *Embassy of the United States in Japan*.

⁸¹ Jin Linbo, "U.S.-Japan Relations under the DPJ Government," *China International Studies (English Edition)*, No. 5 (September/October 2012), p. 51.

4) Hatoyama's desire to construct an "East Asian Community" tilted him away from the American axis.⁸²

The Hatoyama government's decisions were damaging to the cohesion of the US-Japan Alliance because two previous agreements were broken, and the Japanese government revealed diplomatic secrets to the public. The first agreement broken was the suspension of fuel and water supplies to the U.S. and British fleets operating in the Indian Ocean conducting counter-terrorism operations in Afghanistan. The Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Forces provided roughly 30% of the allied warship's fuel. Previously Japan's legislature blocked the refueling mission in 2007, it was later renewed, but Hatoyama let the refueling bill expire in January 2010.⁸³ The second agreement broken was the 2006 Futenma relocation plan agreed to by the previous Liberal Democratic Party to move the Marine Corps Air Station Futenma to Camp Schwab in *Nago, Okinawa*.⁸⁴ The plan called for the construction of two 1,800 meter runways in a "V-shape" configuration built over reclaimed land adjacent to the sea.⁸⁵ The Futenma relocation agreement was a "hard-won" agreement between the U.S. and Japan, but Hatoyama wanted the airbase out of Okinawa.⁸⁶ Liu

⁸² Yuan Peng, trans. Hong Jianjun, "U.S. will Continue to Prioritize U.S.-Sino-Japan Balance," Contemporary International Relations (English Edition), Vol. 24, No. 2 (March/April 2014), p. 49; Jin Linbo, "U.S.-Japan Relations under the DPJ Government," pp. 52-53.

⁸³ Emma Chanlett-Avery, William H. Cooper, Mark E. Manyin, Weston S. Konishi, "Japan-U.S. Relations: Issues for Congress," *Congressional Research Service*, 25 November 2009, RL33436, <http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/134965.pdf> (Accessed 12 April 2016), p. 8 [pdf p. 12]; and Jin Linbo, "U.S.-Japan Relations under the DPJ Government," pp. 53-54.

⁸⁴ Jin Linbo, "U.S.-Japan Relations under the DPJ Government," pp. 54 and 56.

⁸⁵ Fan Xiaojun, "The Futenma Issue: Implications for U.S.-Japan Alliance," Contemporary International Relations (English Edition), Vol. 20, No. 3 (May/June 2010), p. 71.

⁸⁶ Jin Linbo, "U.S.-Japan Relations under the DPJ Government," p. 56.

Jiangyong wrote that these two issues brought serious contradictions between the two states.⁸⁷

The third problem area concerns US-Japan Alliance nuclear weapons policy. It is of note that Chinese analysts do not mention Japan's foreign minister, Okada Katsuya, publicly calling on the U.S. to renounce its policy of first use of nuclear weapons.⁸⁸ Jeffrey Bader, Obama's National Security Council specialist on East Asia, concluded that this idea would have reversed decades of U.S. nuclear doctrine—"a long-standing pillar of U.S. deterrence and defense of Japan."⁸⁹ Instead, Chinese analysts focused their attention on the Hatoyama's investigation of nuclear agreements made with the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) leaders. Hatoyama government broke the trust of the U.S. by divulging secret information when Hatoyama in the fall of 2009 ordered the Japanese Foreign Ministry and an independent committee to investigate a secret nuclear agreement between the U.S. and Japan. All previous LDP governments had denied the existence of a secret nuclear treaty, but in March 2010, the committee findings confirmed the existence of four secret agreements to the Japanese public:

1) Revision of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty in 1960 included a "broadly defined secret agreement" that US Navy ships could be carrying nuclear weapons.

⁸⁷ Liu Jiangyong, "US Would Face a Dilemma Should It Interfere Militarily in the Diaoyu Islands Dispute," *China International Studies (English Edition)*, No. 3 (May/June 2011), p. 54.

⁸⁸ Leon V. Sigal, "The Politics of a Korea-Japan NWFZ," *Nautilus Institute*, NAPSNet Special Reports, 17 April 2012, <http://nautilus.org/napsnet/napsnet-special-reports/the-politics-of-a-korea-japan-nwfz/> (Accessed 2 May 2016).

⁸⁹ Jeffery A. Bader, *Obama and China's Rise: An Insider's Account of America's Asia Strategy* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2012), p. 43.

2) Revision of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty in 1960 also included a “narrowly defined secret pact” that if hostilities broke out on the Korean Peninsula, Japan would promise use of bases.

3) The agreement to revert Okinawa to Japan included a “broadly defined secret pact” that the Japanese would cover all of the costs to restore plots of land used by the U.S. military to their original condition.⁹⁰

4) In November 1969, Nixon and Prime Minister Satō agreed that the U.S. could use the existing four nuclear storage facilities on Okinawa in case of emergency after the U.S. returned Okinawa to Japan in 1972.⁹¹

Though the agreement between Nixon and Satō did not technically violate Article 9 of Japan’s Peace Constitution; however, it constituted a violation of Japan’s “three non-nuclear principles” adopted by Prime Minister Satō two years previously when he stated, “My responsibility is to achieve and maintain safety in Japan under the Three Non-Nuclear Principles of not possessing, not producing and not permitting the introduction of nuclear weapons, in line with Japan's Peace Constitution.”⁹²

⁹⁰ Jin Linbo, “U.S.-Japan Relations under the DPJ Government,” p. 53; and Jeffrey Lewis, “More on the US-Japan ‘Secret Agreements’,” *Arms Control Wonk*, 11 March 2010, <http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/archive/202660/more-on-us-japan-secret-agreements/> (16 March 2016).

⁹¹ “Findings on the so-called ‘secret agreements’,” [Iwayuru `mitsuyaku' mondai ni kansuru chōsa kekka], *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan*, 10 March 2010, <http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/mitsuyaku/kekka.html> (Accessed 16 March 2016); and “Agreed Minute to Joint Communique of United States President Nixon and Japanese Prime Minister Sato Issued on November 21, 1969,” *University of Tokyo*, Institute for Advanced Studies on Asia, <http://www.ioc.u-tokyo.ac.jp/~worldjpn/documents/texts/IPUS/19691119.02E.html> (Accessed 16 March 2016).

⁹² Lee Chae-Jin, *Japan Faces China: Political and Economic Relations in the Postwar Era* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976), p. 54; and “Three Non-Nuclear Principles,” *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan*, Statement by Prime Minister Eisaku Sato at the Budget Committee in the

The fourth problem area the Hatoyama government raised was its Asian-centric focus. Instead of holding the policy of expressing that the U.S. was the primary axis of Japanese diplomacy and emphasizing the importance of the U.S. in the maintenance of Asian peace and stability, Hatoyama expressed a new direction. He emphasized equality with the U.S. and a desire to build an East Asian Community. As Liu Jianping asserted, "Japan's political strategic requirements of its East Asia Community foreign policy strove to serve as 'the diplomatic axis of East Asia' was a change from the position of a strategic tool in America's East Asia strategy."⁹³ Hatoyama pushed forward a diplomatic strategy that departed from U.S. leadership. Another Chinese scholar, Jin Linbo, wrote, "What [made] the White House more anxious and embarrassed was that the blueprint of the East Asian Community intended to exclude the United States from the community and even from Asia."⁹⁴ Bader reported that when Hatoyama revealed his plans towards an "East Asian Community" at the East Asia Summit meeting in October 2009, the president of Vietnam expressed his concern to a U.S. regional ally. Bader concluded, "The irony that Vietnam, of all countries, should have understood the strategic foolishness of such a proposal while America's strongest ally in the region did not was not lost on anyone. Friends in Australia, Singapore, South Korea, and Indonesia, among others, made clear they regarded this idea as unacceptable."⁹⁵

House of Representative(December 11th, 1967), <http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/un/disarmament/nnp/> (Accessed 17 March, 2016).

⁹³ Liu Jianping [刘建平], "China in East Asia: Experiences of Regional Politics and Regionalism," [*Dongya de Zhongguo: diqu zhengzhi jingyan yu diqu zhuyi sixiang*], World Economics and Politics [*Shijie jingji yu zhengzhi*], 2011, No. 6, p. 62.

⁹⁴ Jin Linbo, "U.S.-Japan Relations under the DPJ Government," p. 55.

⁹⁵ Bader, Obama and China's Rise: An Insider's Account of America's Asia Strategy, p. 44.

These four policy disruptions severely tested the US-Japan Alliance. President Obama personally pressured Prime Minister Hatoyama in November 2009 in Tokyo to settle the Futenma relocation plan by the end of the year, but Hatoyama promised a solution by May 2010.⁹⁶ In the same visit, Hatoyama left in the middle of Obama's visit to Tokyo, and the Obama administration was not pleased. President Obama reciprocated by holding a short ten minute "unofficial" conversation with Hatoyama when the prime minister came to Washington in April 2010.⁹⁷ The next month, Hatoyama was unable to fulfill his promise to find a solution to the Futenma relocation plan, and he handed in his resignation.⁹⁸ Liu Weidong offers a summary statement of the Hatoyama government's relationship with the U.S., "While Hatoyama Yukio was in office, he made the U.S. so furious to the degree that the U.S. would declare war against him."⁹⁹ The discord over Hatoyama's desire to build an "East Asian Community" did not align with Obama's goal for the United States to be the primary provider of Asia's security and prosperity.

The decrease in the cohesion of the US-Japan Alliance during the short nine month tenure of the Hatoyama government is well-documented by Chinese analysts. A key policy direction presented by Prime Minister Hatoyama was his call for the building of an "East Asian Community," and China's senior leadership read Tokyo's signals clearly and quickly. China welcomed this policy by echoing the call for the construction of community that was different from and exclusive of the U.S. call for

⁹⁶ Jin Linbo, "U.S.-Japan Relations under the DPJ Government," p. 57.

⁹⁷ Fan Xiaojun, "The Futenma Issue: Implications for U.S.-Japan Alliance," p. 80.

⁹⁸ Jin Linbo, "U.S.-Japan Relations under the DPJ Government," p. 57.

⁹⁹ Liu Weidong [刘卫东], "The U.S. Rebalancing between China and Japan in the Background of Its Rebalancing Strategy," [*Meiguo dui Zhongri liangguo de zai pingheng zhanlue lunxi*], World Economics and Politics [*Shijie jingji yu zhengzhi*], 2014, No. 10, p. 84.

greater “Asia-Pacific” relations. Sun Xuefeng asserted that China’s leadership moved on the opportunity to welcome Hatoyama’s desire for the building of an East Asian Community would enhance regional integration. Japan’s economy and military are both assets to be welcomed.¹⁰⁰

During the short nine month tenure of the Hatoyama government, Chinese officials encouraged the “East Asian Community” on six separate occasions. First, on 10 October 2009 Premier Wen Jiabao at the second meeting of Chinese, Japanese, and South Korean leadership expressed, “Support for ASEAN unification and East Asian integration as pushing forward multiple forms of regional and district level cooperation that promoted East Asian economic and societal development.”¹⁰¹ Second, fifteen days later Premier Wen Jiabao at the fourth East Asia summit meeting in Thailand emphasized, “forging ahead with the unremitting advancement of East Asian community was a long-term goal.”¹⁰² Third, while serving as the Chinese Vice Chairman, Xi Jinping visited Japan in December 2009. In a meeting with Japanese Prime Minister Hatoyama, Xi expressed support for Hatoyama’s thoughts on “East Asian Community” by expressing his hopes that China and Japan would “strengthen the course of Asian cooperation and especially the course of East Asian Community cooperation” and “the realization would be advantageous to both parties and mutually beneficial.”¹⁰³ Fourth, April 2010, President Hu Jintao emphasized to Hatoyama that, “Collaboration would impel the regions trade, financial, and infrastructure construction towards regional cooperation, and a

¹⁰⁰ Sun Xuefeng [孙学峰], Personal Interview, 5 November 2015, Tsinghua University.

¹⁰¹ Liu Jianping [刘建平], “China in East Asia: Experiences of Regional Politics and Regionalism,” p. 54.

¹⁰² Liu Jianping [刘建平], “China in East Asia: Experiences of Regional Politics and Regionalism,” p. 54.

¹⁰³ Liu Jianping [刘建平], “China in East Asia: Experiences of Regional Politics and Regionalism,” p. 54.

common push would be a constructive first step on a continuous path towards Asian integration.”¹⁰⁴ Fifth, the next month Premier Wen Jiabao at the third meeting of Chinese, Japanese, and South Korean leaders expressed the need for the construction of an East Asian Community as way to respond to the financial crisis at the time.¹⁰⁵ The sixth and final time came after the resignation of Hatoyama, in June 2010 President Hu Jintao met with newly installed Japanese Prime Minister Kan and raised the topic of East Asian Community by emphasizing, “the international financial crisis, climate change and other global challenges were advancing dialogue, negotiations, and cooperation.”¹⁰⁶ These six instances prove that China’s senior leadership were well aware of the decrease in alliance cohesion and did not miss the opportunity to press for increased engagement with Japan.

Zhu Feng stated that China’s reaction to the short-lived Hatoyama administration was not a squandered opportunity to reshape Sino-Japanese relations towards an “East Asian Community.” Hatoyama wanted to pursue a policy redirection that both Japan and China were not ready to undertake. Zhu concluded, “It is not a squandering of a historic opportunity, but an episode to illustrate that a policy readjustment is not able to create a systemic effect.”¹⁰⁷ Sun Xuefeng argued that the current alliance relationship was too important to Japanese leaders to be jeopardized; Hatoyama had to resign because of greater Japanese interests in

¹⁰⁴ Liu Jianping [刘建平], “China in East Asia: Experiences of Regional Politics and Regionalism,” p. 53.

¹⁰⁵ Liu Jianping [刘建平], “China in East Asia: Experiences of Regional Politics and Regionalism,” pp. 53-54.

¹⁰⁶ Liu Jianping [刘建平], “China in East Asia: Experiences of Regional Politics and Regionalism,” p. 53.

¹⁰⁷ Zhu Feng [朱锋], Personal Interview, 8 December 2015, Nanjing University.

preserving the alliance relationship with the U.S.¹⁰⁸ To illustrate Sun's point, Jeffrey Bader said Hatoyama's successor, Prime Minister Naoto Kan "immediately began to distance himself from the dalliances with neutralism that had undermined Hatoyama and to make clear that the alliance with the United States was the centerpiece of his cabinet's foreign policy."¹⁰⁹

Perceptions of Alliance Cohesion:

Question 2a: Do Chinese analysts of adversarial alliance cohesion presume that it is a function of external political context? Supported. The low point in adversarial alliance cohesion was in a time of relative calm between China and Japan.

Question 2b: Do Chinese analysts of adversarial alliance cohesion focus on the institutional solidarity between the alliance partners? Supported. Sun Xuefeng and Zhu Feng offer post-hoc assessments that the institutional solidarity of the alliance was at work behind the scenes. Sun offered that government elites pressured Hatoyama to resign because he jeopardized the alliance relationship.

Question 2c: Do Chinese analysts of adversarial alliance cohesion focus on the interactions between the alliance partners' senior leadership? Supported. A large amount of Chinese analysis is focused on the discord between President Obama and the Hatoyama government.

Question 2d: Do Chinese analysts of adversarial alliance cohesion focus on the domestic politics of the alliance partners? Supported. Numerous Chinese analysts described the Marine Corps Air Station *Futenma* issue as a domestic concern.

¹⁰⁸ Sun Xuefeng [孙学峰], Personal Interview, 5 November 2015, Tsinghua University.

¹⁰⁹ Bader, *Obama and China's Rise: An Insider's Account of America's Asia Strategy*, p. 44.

Question 2e: Do Chinese analysts' perceptions of adversarial alliance cohesion influence Chinese foreign policy outcomes? Supported. Six times senior China's leadership echoed Hatoyama's calls for the construction of an "East Asian Community."

5.5 PERCEPTIONS OF CONSPIRACY

The alliance developments in the early 2010s provide us an opportunity to examine two types of misperception. The September 2010 *Diaoyu/Senkaku* Island fishing boat captain arrest and threat of a rare earth embargo against Japan disrupted Sino-Japanese relations, and maritime disputes in the South China Sea and the Yellow Sea.¹¹⁰ The interpretation of the events went past overcentralization (alliance activities as well organized and planned moves against them) to perceptions of conspiracy, over-Machiavellianism. Over-Machiavellianism refers to a target state or third-party state's over-reading of malicious intent in every event as if it was conspiracy against it.¹¹¹

Some Chinese analysts perceived a U.S. conspiracy behind the disruption of bilateral relations between China and Japan in 2010. The examples will illustrate what Jervis posited: alliance activities can cause a third-party state to speculate that the alliance is targeting it. However, some Chinese scholars will offer different

¹¹⁰ Bader, *Obama and China's Rise: An Insider's Account of America's Asia Strategy*, pp. 79-82 and 106-108.

¹¹¹ Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), p. 329.

interpretations of what the U.S. is trying to accomplish in East Asia that fell in line with the baseline intentions of the alliance.

The year 2010, began with China's leaders echoing support for Hatoyama's calls for "East Asian Community," but it would end with the *Diaoyu* Island issue between China and Japan "coming off the shelf."¹¹² After a Chinese fishing boat captain on 8 September 2010 rammed two Japanese Coast Guard ships in close vicinity to the *Diaoyu* Islands, the issue remained a sensitive topic to the respective domestic audiences.¹¹³ Two years later, the *Diaoyu* Island issue would erupt as Japan "nationalized" the uninhabited islands. Throughout the Sino-Japan territorial disputes, U.S. leadership from Secretary of State Clinton to Secretary of Defense Gates continually promulgated support for Japanese "administration jurisdiction" over the *Diaoyu* Islands.¹¹⁴ In addition to verbal affirmations of the US-Japan Alliance, the U.S. military and JSDF held joint exercises to practice island defense operations to send signals of resolve.¹¹⁵

Liu Jianguyong asserted that the U.S. does not want to see good relations between China and Japan. Liu wrote, "the U.S. would chuckle to himself if China and Japan were in dispute over the *Diaoyu* Islands."¹¹⁶ Liu makes the presumption that

¹¹² Liu Jianping [刘建平], "China in East Asia: Experiences of Regional Politics and Regionalism," pp. 53-54.

¹¹³ Yuan Peng, trans. Hong Jianjun, "U.S. will Continue to Prioritize U.S.-Sino-Japan Balance," p. 49; and Liu Jianguyong, "US Would Face a Dilemma Should It Interfere Militarily in the Diaoyu Islands Dispute," p. 38; Martin Fackler and Ian Johnson, "Arrest in Disputed Seas Riles China and Japan," *The New York Times*, 19 September 2010, <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/20/world/asia/20chinajapan.html> (Accessed 31 May 2016).

¹¹⁴ Liu Jianguyong, "US Would Face a Dilemma Should It Interfere Militarily in the Diaoyu Islands Dispute," p. 61.

¹¹⁵ Liu Jianguyong, "US Would Face a Dilemma Should It Interfere Militarily in the Diaoyu Islands Dispute," pp. 45-46.

¹¹⁶ Liu Jianguyong, "US Would Face a Dilemma Should It Interfere Militarily in the Diaoyu Islands Dispute," p. 48.

this conspiracy helps the U.S. military accomplish two goals: “disturbing the Chinese navy’s action from penetrating the First Island Chain to the Second Island Chain, and also beneficial to the improvement of intervention capability of the US and Japan in the Taiwan Strait to prevent from the deadly threat to Taiwan in Easter Hualian posed by the Chinese mainland.”¹¹⁷ Thus, Liu draws the issue from containment of China to the unresolved national reunification problem of Taiwan. Liu later asserts that when tensions across the Taiwan straits are moving towards reconciliation, the U.S. steps in to use the *Diaoyu* issue to “stir the nerves of the Japanese citizens, estranging them from China while enhancing the US-Japan alliance.”¹¹⁸ This conspiracy makes the U.S. look like a puppet master that intentionally disrupts Sino-Japan and Sino-Taiwan bilateral relations.

The theme of presenting the U.S. as instigator of tensions and hotspots continued into 2012 as U.S. foreign policy pointed towards a return to the Asia-Pacific. In Wang Xiangsui’s article on the global shift in power, he repeatedly asserts that since the U.S. derives benefits from the enhanced cohesion of its respective security alliances when tensions arise, the U.S. must be the instigator. Wang’s argument begins by stating that U.S. bases its hegemony upon three pillars: finance, technology, and military. Of the three pillars, military power is the only one not waning. Therefore, the U.S. currently cannot attract Asian countries as it did in Europe with the Marshall Plan; instead, the U.S. must “stress the value of its military power through increasing tensions on the Korean Peninsula and by manipulating

¹¹⁷ Liu Jianguyong, “US Would Face a Dilemma Should It Interfere Militarily in the Diaoyu Islands Dispute,” p. 48.

¹¹⁸ Liu Jianguyong, “US Would Face a Dilemma Should It Interfere Militarily in the Diaoyu Islands Dispute,” p. 54.

'the South China Sea Dispute.'"¹¹⁹ Again, Wang portrays the U.S. as the hegemonic puppet master: "Its strategy is to cause trouble but at the same time to keep crises from spinning out of control. The U.S. wants to benefit from any conflict but it does not want the conflict to escalate into a crisis, especially one between large powers. So the U.S. will seek to maintain and control tensions in the region, in order to maximize its own interests."¹²⁰ Wang concluded that the U.S. pivot to Asia was an attempt to "lead the Asia-Pacific region by 'manipulating crises' and 'manufacturing issues.'"¹²¹ As Jeffrey Bader summarized, instead of China acknowledging the diplomatic failures of 2010, "[China's] foreign policy analysts confused cause and effect and blamed the United States for the deterioration in China's relations with its neighbors."¹²²

Qi and Zhang, likewise, concluded that the U.S. was scheming with China's neighbors. They wrote, "The United States is egging on Tokyo to collude with Manila and Hanoi in military collaboration, thus linking up the crises in the East and South China Seas. Meanwhile, Tokyo and New Delhi have been pushing security cooperation with China in mind, thus threatening a pincer attack on China in the future from both east and west fronts."¹²³ Again, Chinese analysis portrayed the U.S. as the strategic mastermind behind the plot to encircle China. The U.S. does hold policies of engagement with strategic partners as a core value for ensuring peace

¹¹⁹ Wang Xiangsui, trans. Li Lihong, "Shifts in Global Power Gravity," Contemporary International Relations (English Edition), Vol. 22, No. 1 (January/February 2012), p. 31.

¹²⁰ Wang Xiangsui, trans. Li Lihong, "Shifts in Global Power Gravity," p. 32.

¹²¹ Wang Xiangsui, trans. Li Lihong, "Shifts in Global Power Gravity," p. 33.

¹²² Bader, Obama and China's Rise: An Insider's Account of America's Asia Strategy, pp. 109-110.

¹²³ Qi Dapeng and Zhang Chi, trans. Ma Zongshi, "The Changing Asia-Pacific Strategic Picture," Contemporary International Relations (English Edition), Vol. 24, No. 6 (November/December 2014), pp. 30-31.

and stability in the region. U.S. Pacific Command notes the importance of India in its official strategy statement, “India is a particularly important partner in shaping the security environment, and we will continue to deepen our cooperation to address challenges in the Asia-Pacific.”¹²⁴

Writings of a conspiratorial nature are not limited to academic journals. Chinese officials can level accusations against the smaller alliance partner as well. The Chinese ambassador to the United Kingdom, Liu Xiaoming wrote an article in “The Daily Telegraph” in 2014. He stated, “Mr Abe has worked hard to portray China as a threat, aiming to sow discord among Asia-Pacific nations, raising regional tensions and so creating a convenient excuse for the resurrection of Japanese militarism.”¹²⁵

However, perceptions of conspiracy do not represent all Chinese scholarship on the increase in US-Japan Alliance cooperation. In contrast to the puppet master theme we can turn our attention to Sun Cheng; he quoted former U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense Joseph S. Nye’s opinion on the importance of stable relations between the three states: “American interests rest on regional stability and continued growth in trade and investment, hence the United States welcomes good relations between Japan and China; the East Asian balance of power rests on the triangle of China, Japan, and the United States though the U.S.-Japan alliance remains

¹²⁴ “USPACOM Strategy,” *U.S. Pacific Command*, Section on Partnerships, <http://www.pacom.mil/AboutUSPACOM/USPACOMStrategy.aspx> (Accessed 15 June 2016).

¹²⁵ “Liu Xiaoming: Japan's refusal to face up to its aggressive past is posing a serious threat to global peace,” *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China*, 2 January 2014, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/zwjg_665342/zwbd_665378/t1114136.shtml (Accessed 16 March 2016).

crucial to stability in East Asia.”¹²⁶ Sun Cheng is quoting the baseline intentions of the alliance. If the U.S. did not want Japan to engage China, but rather contain it, we would not expect to see such an abundant and growing economic bilateral relationship between China and Japan in the late 2000s and early 2010s. Instead, even with Japan’s increase in security cooperation with the US, Japan’s economic relationship with China prospered at the same time. Table 5.1 below illustrates the expansion of exports sent between the two states and the percentage of total exports sent to the partner state.

<i>Year</i>	<i>Japan Exports to China (billions USD)</i>	<i>Percent of Total Exports</i>	<i>China Exports to Japan (billions USD)</i>	<i>Percent of Total Exports</i>
2007	109.27	15.30%	102.06	8.37%
2008	124.90	15.98%	116.13	8.12%
2009	109.73	18.90%	97.91	8.15%
2010	149.45	19.41%	121.04	7.67%
2011	162.04	19.68%	148.27	7.81%
2012	144.21	18.06%	151.63	7.40%
2013	129.4	18.10%	150.13	6.80%
2014	124.99	18.28%	149.41	6.38%

Table 5.1. Japan’s Import and Export Record with China¹²⁷

The U.S. Alliance system in East Asia does not mandate that alliance partners avoid improving trade and finance relations with China. The empirical record shows much the opposite taking place. Since the end of the Cold War to present Japan has both increased its security cooperation with the U.S. and increased its economic cooperation with China. The two processes can occur concurrently and are not mutually exclusive.

¹²⁶ Sun Cheng, “The Regime Change from Koizumi to Abe and Japanese Nationalism,” *China International Studies (English Edition)*, No. 2, Summer 2007, p. 63.

¹²⁷ “World Integrated Trade Solution,” *World Bank*, <http://wits.worldbank.org/Default.aspx?lang=en> (Accessed 14 January 2016).

An additional non-conspiracy scholar, Yuan Peng, brought greater nuance to the understanding of events in East Asia. Yuan wrote, “the U.S. has not fundamentally changed its basic strategy to maintain the balance between itself, China and Japan, nor has it adopted a policy of clever checks and balances vis-à-vis the Asian giants.”¹²⁸ Yuan presents the case that Presidents Bill Clinton, George W. Bush, and Barack Obama all took steps to both enhance the military alliance with Japan, while also improving the political relationship with China. For example, during the Clinton administration the U.S. and Japan issued the 1997 revised guidelines, and the next year Clinton made a historic visit to Beijing and agreed to a “constructive strategic partnership oriented towards the 21st century.”¹²⁹ Yuan Peng concludes, “Currently, the U.S. is trying to strengthen its military alliance and political relationship with Japan. But at the same time it is also responding positively to China’s overtures of building a new type of big-power relationship between the two.”¹³⁰ Jeffrey Bader’s summary of the Obama administration’s policy towards both China and U.S. allies supports Yuan Peng’s concluding statement:

The administration endeavored to build a stable, predictable, and positive relationship with China, with substantial cooperation on political and security issues... This entailed frequent and respectful interaction between Obama and top Chinese leaders, extensive strategic dialogue on the administration’s perception of U.S. interests, the possible impact of unexpected developments, and firmness when the Chinese appeared to be overreaching, or allies needed to be reassured.¹³¹

Liu Weidong agrees that the U.S. is trying to walk a middle path between the two Asian powers. Liu Weidong of the American Research Branch of the Chinese

¹²⁸ Yuan Peng, trans. Hong Jianjun, “U.S. will Continue to Prioritize U.S.-Sino-Japan Balance,” pp. 47-48.

¹²⁹ Yuan Peng, trans. Hong Jianjun, “U.S. will Continue to Prioritize U.S.-Sino-Japan Balance,” p. 48.

¹³⁰ Yuan Peng, trans. Hong Jianjun, “U.S. will Continue to Prioritize U.S.-Sino-Japan Balance,” pp. 50-51.

¹³¹ Bader, *Obama and China’s Rise: An Insider’s Account of America’s Asia Strategy*, p. 143.

Academy of Social Sciences argued that the U.S. “pivot” to Asia was far from dangerous manipulation of Sino-Japanese relations. Liu wrote, “Under the circumstances both China and Japan both hope to avoid getting embroiled in a war, a relatively neutral outside power to help maintain the development of a peaceful and stable environment at least for a short period of time could help China and Japan to accept this phase. In actuality, the only outside power capable is the U.S. Therefore, the U.S. has the requirement of serving the purpose as the external balancer.”¹³² Similarly, Liu is realistic that serving this type of role is very difficult in light of the rising strength of China. He wrote, “This [balancing] strategy towards the U.S. has very high requirements: the U.S. must from beginning to end use its hard power to maintain its regional hegemonic position, while at the same time guaranteeing relations with China and Japan are foundationally sound in order to avoid one or both of the states feeling betrayed or the risk of being America’s enemy.”¹³³

Moreover, to those that would portray the U.S. as a “puppet master” that makes use of tension between China and Japan as a cunning strategy, Liu answers that China possesses agency. He wrote, “China cannot allow the U.S. to use the continual tension between China and Japan’s relationship, and possibly take initiative in the scope of possibilities to try one’s best to improve Sino-Japanese relations, and this could also lead to the weakening of the U.S. balancing of China

¹³² Liu Weidong [刘卫东], “The U.S. Rebalancing between China and Japan in the Background of Its Rebalancing Strategy,” p. 95.

¹³³ Liu Weidong [刘卫东], “The U.S. Rebalancing between China and Japan in the Background of Its Rebalancing Strategy,” p. 96.

and Japan.”¹³⁴ Thus, while assigning the U.S. the malign intention of using Sino-Japanese relations as a way for the U.S. to remain the regional hegemon of Asia, Liu is asserting that China has a role to play in its own affairs as well. China is not merely a marionette in the great game of power politics.

In respect to the US-Japan Alliance, Liu contends the U.S. has both enhanced the capabilities and cohesion of the alliance while also strengthening U.S. control over Japan. On the former, he lists the continual joint military exercises the two states hold, and the expansion of the scope and size of the military exercises. While on the latter, Liu contends that forcing or compelling Japan to purchase the F-35, increasing information sharing, and enhancing the interaction of the U.S. and Japanese military forces works toward increasing U.S. influence and Japanese dependence; thus, increasing U.S. ability to control Japan.¹³⁵ The logic might seem counter-intuitive, for example, if the Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) procures the F-35, Japan will enhance its air power capabilities; yet, Japan will be more reliant on the U.S to provide parts and maintenance training. Likewise, in intelligence collaboration, if the U.S. halts the flow of information, Japan will not have independent intelligence gathering resources to gather its own intelligence for supporting military operations. In conclusion, the U.S. can control what contingencies and types of operations the JSDF can plan to fight against China as a potential adversary.

¹³⁴ Liu Weidong [刘卫东], “The U.S. Rebalancing between China and Japan in the Background of Its Rebalancing Strategy,” p. 96.

¹³⁵ Liu Weidong [刘卫东], “The U.S. Rebalancing between China and Japan in the Background of Its Rebalancing Strategy,” p. 89.

To emphasize the balancing role that the U.S. plays in East Asia, Liu Weidong stated that even in the midst of strengthening the US-Japan Alliance, the U.S. is adamant that China and Japan must work out their territorial disputes peacefully. Again, we find alignment with the baseline intentions. Likewise, the Obama administration has been open to Xi Jinping's desire to increase the bilateral military relations between the U.S. and China. In 2013, the PLA received its first invitation to take part in joint military exercises on U.S. soil; in 2014, the PLA Navy received its first invitation to take part in the Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) joint naval exercise.¹³⁶ Yet, the ability of the U.S. to balance between China and Japan continues in this instance as well. The 2014 RIMPAC joint exercise also saw the first participation of Japanese Ground Self Defense Forces as well, a move that required Prime Minister Abe to sign a document "revising the government's interpretation" of Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution.¹³⁷

Finally, Liu Weidong illustrated how the Obama administration carefully balanced its messages to both China and Japan. In February 2012, Japanese Prime Minister Abe visited Washington hoping to gain support for his government to lift the ban on collective self-defense—a move towards Japan's "normalization." However, the Obama administration was very clear that it was "worried about stimulating China, and could lead to instability in the situation."¹³⁸ Two years later, during Obama's April 2014 visit to Japan, he accomplished an important first when

¹³⁶ Liu Weidong [刘卫东], "The U.S. Rebalancing between China and Japan in the Background of Its Rebalancing Strategy," p. 89.

¹³⁷ Yusuke Fukui, "GSDF joins U.S. Marines for first time in RIMPAC joint amphibious landing drill," *The Asahi Shimbun*, 1 July 2014, http://ajw.asahi.com/article/behind_news/politics/AJ201407010040 (Accessed 22 February 2016).

¹³⁸ Liu Weidong [刘卫东], "The U.S. Rebalancing between China and Japan in the Background of Its Rebalancing Strategy," p. 92.

he was the first U.S. President to say that the US-Japan Security Treaty covered the *Diaoyu* Islands. Chinese analysts took note of the single preceding sentence, but they often disregarded President Obama's three subsequent sentences that affirmed China. Liu included Obama's affirmations of China to provide a more balanced portrait of the strategic balancing act. President Obama stated, "The U.S. and China relationship is extremely close, the U.S. supports China's peaceful rise," "The U.S. has not set a red line," and "The inability of Japan and China to establish a conversation is a serious problem."¹³⁹ Jeffrey Bader's account of the Obama administration's policies toward Asia supports this fact. Bader stated concerning the prospect of improved Sino-Japanese ties, "Indeed, we welcomed such a change. Rising tensions between these historic rivals would have consequences for global and regional peace and make it difficult for the United States to maintain good relations with China while remaining true to its alliance with Japan."¹⁴⁰

Conspiracy theories could drive a state to react in very nervous and rash ways in reaction to adversarial alliance activities; however, another group of Chinese analysts point to China's senior leaders avoiding the security dilemma and acting cautiously. For example, in late 2013, Tang Yongsheng of the National Defense University noted that the U.S. strengthening of military alliance ties and deployment of soldiers was "a clear move against China."¹⁴¹ Tang asserted that the U.S. was targeting China because it was "the source of anti-access and area-denial

¹³⁹ Liu Weidong [刘卫东], "The U.S. Rebalancing between China and Japan in the Background of Its Rebalancing Strategy," p. 92.

¹⁴⁰ Bader, *Obama and China's Rise: An Insider's Account of America's Asia Strategy*, p. 43.

¹⁴¹ Tang Yongsheng, trans. Wang Hui, "Exploit Strategic Geopolitical Advantages and Positively Influence the Regional Order," *Contemporary International Relations (English Edition)*, Vol. 23, No. 6 (November/December 2013), p. 65.

challenges.”¹⁴² Yuan contends that China’s use of a “soft power approach” such as multilateralism as an alternative security structure “avoids the mistake of playing into the hands of proponents of the US-Japan alliance.”¹⁴³ Similarly, Yuan argued that Beijing’s response to the U.S. global strategy has been rather careful and pragmatic because, “China recognizes its own limitation and the need to avoid direct confrontation with the United States.”¹⁴⁴

However, in great contrast to Yuan Jingdong’s mention of Chinese decision making in the 2000s, China took a new direction in 2012 and 2013. China confronted the United States when it issued the Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) and repeatedly challenged the Japan’s administrative position over the *Diaoyu* Islands by repeatedly sending in Chinese government vessels into the islands contiguous and territorial waters. These methods do not resemble a “soft power approach” or a multilateral approach to conducting international relations. As Brookings Institution analyst, Jun Osawa wrote, “China unilaterally established its ADIZ over two-thirds of the East China Sea without any consultation [with its] neighbors.”¹⁴⁵ Concerning maritime incursions in the waters surrounding the *Diaoyu* Islands, Japan complained that Chinese government vessels were in the contiguous waters almost daily (weather permitting), and 83 vessels entered within 12 nautical miles of the islands on 25 separate occasions between 11 September 2012 and 6 February 2013. As a result, Japan almost daily lodged “strong protests”

¹⁴² Tang Yongsheng, trans. Wang Hui, “Exploit Strategic Geopolitical Advantages and Positively Influence the Regional Order,” p. 65.

¹⁴³ Yuan Jingdong, “Chinese perspectives on the US-Japan alliance,” p. 107.

¹⁴⁴ Yuan Jingdong, “Chinese perspectives on the US-Japan alliance,” p. 107.

¹⁴⁵ Jun Osawa, “China’s ADIZ over the East China Sea: A ‘Great Wall in the Sky’?” *Brookings Institution*, 17 December 2013, <http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2013/12/17-china-air-defense-identification-zone-osawa> (Accessed 16 June 2016).

with its Chinese diplomatic counterparts.¹⁴⁶ Two other provocative actions were the late January 2013 “radar lock” incidents.¹⁴⁷ Both incidents occurred in the East China Sea, the first on 19 January 2013 when PLA frigate *Wenzhou* [526] locked its fire-control radar on either the Japanese destroyer *Onami* [DD-111] or the helicopter attached to the destroyer. The second incident was on 30 January 2013 when PLA frigate *Lianyungang* [522] locked its fire-control radar on Japanese destroyer *Yuudachi* [DD-103]. On 5 February 2013, Japan lodged a formal complaint with Beijing concerning the incidents.¹⁴⁸

Perceptions of Conspiracy:

Question 1Ba: Do Chinese analysts interpret adversarial alliance activities as well organized and planned moves against them? Supported. Some Chinese analysts regularly view the US-Japan Alliance activities as promotion of “containment” policy. These assessments do not align well with the baseline intentions of the alliance.

Question 1Bb: Do Chinese analysts interpret adversarial alliance activities as a conspiracy aimed against them? Supported. Some Chinese analysts present

¹⁴⁶ “Trends in Chinese Government and Other Vessels in the Waters Surrounding the Senkaku Islands, and Japan's Response- Records of Intrusions of Chinese Government and Other Vessels into Japan's Territorial Sea,” *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan*, 16 June 2016, http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/page23e_000021.html (Accessed 17 June 2016).

¹⁴⁷ “Position Paper: Japan-China Relations Surrounding the Situation of the Senkaku Islands- In response to China's Weapons-guiding Radar Lock-on,” *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan*, 7 February 2013, http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/senkaku/position_paper3_en.html (Accessed 17 June 2016).

¹⁴⁸ “Japan protest over China ship's radar action,” *BBC News*, 5 February 2013, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-21337444> (Accessed 30 May 2013); “PLA generals admit Japanese frigates were targeted,” *Want China Times*, 21 March 2013, <http://www.wantchinatimes.com/news-subclass-cnt.aspx?id=20130321000002&cid=1101> (Accessed 30 May 2013); and “Chinese officials admit to MSDF radar lock allegations,” *Japan Times*, 18 March 2013, <http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2013/03/18/national/chinese-officials-admit-to-msdf-radar-lock-allegations/> (Accessed 30 May 2013).

conspiratorial logic that the U.S. benefited from the 2010 and 2012 *Diaoyu* Island crises, so the U.S. must have been the instigator.

Question 1Bc: Are Chinese analysts able to correct perceptions of conspiracy?

Potentially. Chinese analysts such as Sun Cheng, Yuan Peng, and Liu Weidong offered a different viewpoint of the U.S. acting as a mediator between China and Japan that aligned with the alliance's baseline intentions.

Question 1Bd: Do Chinese analysts' perceptions of conspiracy influence Chinese foreign policy outcomes? No evidence to suggest that perceptions of conspiracy influenced Chinese foreign policy outcomes. Potentially this finding is important because it could indicate that perceptions of conspiracy are not taking hold and rational thought processes are prevailing.

5.6 SELF-PERCEPTION OF RISING STATE IN RELATION TO ADVERSARIAL ALLIANCE

In the first 15 years of the new millennium, China's growth in comprehensive national power has been both dramatic in speed, scope, and size. In the year 2000, China's GDP was \$1.3 trillion USD, and it grew exponentially to \$5.3 trillion USD by 2014 (in constant 2005 USD). Moreover, China's GDP purchasing power parity rate in the same time span grew from \$3,678 to \$12,609 (in constant 2011 international dollars).¹⁴⁹ Economic latent power has directly influenced China's ability to spend

¹⁴⁹ "World Integrated Trade Solutions," *World Bank*, Last updated with 2014 economic data, <http://wits.worldbank.org/countrysnapshot/en/CHN> (Accessed 21 March 2016).

more on its military. Table 5.2 below details the estimated defense budgets of Japan and China with the year on year percent increase or decrease. The year 2004 marked the year when Chinese defense budget spending overtook Japanese defense spending. Granted, defense spending is just one of many measures that an analyst can use to evaluate the relative growth or decline of two states, but it is informative for our purposes to see how China’s rise in economic power has translated into

<i>Year</i>	<i>Japan (USD)</i>	<i>Percent Change</i>	<i>China (USD)</i>	<i>Percent Change</i>
2000	60,284	1.4%	36,995	7.7%
2001	60,249	-0.1%	45,367	22.6%
2002	60,954	1.2%	52,769	16.3%
2003	61,459	0.8%	57,325	8.6%
2004	61,200	-0.4%	63,503	10.8%
2005	61,288	0.1%	71,425	12.5%
2006	60,891	-0.6%	83,850	17.4%
2007	60,574	-0.5%	96,702	15.3%
2008	59,139	-2.4%	106,592	10.2%
2009	59,735	1.0%	128,701	20.7%
2010	59,003	-1.2%	136,220	5.8%
2011	60,452	2.5%	147,258	8.1%
2012	60,017	-0.7%	161,409	9.6%
2013	59,396	-1.0%	174,047	7.8%
2014	59,033	-0.6%	190,974	9.7%

Table 5.2. Japan and China Yearly Defense Budget Estimates (Constant 2011 USD in millions)¹⁵⁰

yearly spending increases to bolster its military power. Influential Chinese scholars are cognizant of China’s growth causing alarm in Japan, in particular. Yuan Jingdong observed how China in the late 2000s kept proclaiming its “peaceful rise” as a way to assuage the fears of its neighbors concerning China’s growth in economic and

¹⁵⁰ “SIPRI Military Expenditure Database,” *Stockholm International Peace Research Institute*, Last Updated 3 November 2015, http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/milex_database (Accessed 23 December 2015).

political influence.¹⁵¹ He notes that it is natural for the U.S. and Japan to enhance their security relationship as a way to hedge against China's growing economic and military power.¹⁵² For example, Yuan Jingdong noted in 2010 that the rise of China had brought about an "implicit competition for a regional leadership role if not hegemony or dominance."¹⁵³

Chinese scholars are cognizant of Japan's fears of a rising China. Yuan quotes a noted Japanese scholar, Funabashi Yōichi, "A rising China will induce critical, painful, and psychologically difficult strategic adjustments in Japan's foreign policy. Japan has not known a wealthy, powerful, confident, internationalist China since its modernization in the Meiji era [1868-1912]."¹⁵⁴ Furthermore, Yuan Jingdong wrote, senior Chinese leaders promoted a "peaceful rise" strategy in the 2000s because they discerned that a "strong rhetoric and military buildup of its own" would only provide "the very rationale for Washington and Tokyo to give new lease of life to the alliance."¹⁵⁵ For instance, Xin Qiang points out the China has not sought to maximize its power by increasing its nuclear weapons arsenal, but has consistently maintained its minimal deterrence doctrine. He concluded that arms racing the U.S. would not be in the best interest of China.¹⁵⁶

By the end of 2011, Chinese International Relations scholars were adamant that America's "pivot" to Asia expanded the capabilities of the US-Japan Alliance with the distinct purpose of containing China. One such scholar, Zhang Jingquan,

¹⁵¹ Yuan Jingdong, "Chinese perspectives on the US-Japan alliance," p. 106.

¹⁵² Yuan Jingdong, "Chinese perspectives on the US-Japan alliance," p. 107.

¹⁵³ Yuan Jingdong, "Chinese perspectives on the US-Japan alliance," p. 87.

¹⁵⁴ Yuan Jingdong, "Chinese perspectives on the US-Japan alliance," p. 85.

¹⁵⁵ Yuan Jingdong, "Chinese perspectives on the US-Japan alliance," p. 106.

¹⁵⁶ Xin Qiang [信强], Personal Interview, 13 November 2015, Fudan University—American Studies Center.

argued that the US-Japan Alliance formerly served a dual purpose in containing *both* China and Japan, but has now shifted to the single purpose of containing China.¹⁵⁷ Zhang draws this conclusion by deducing that the U.S. and Japan are both states declining in power relative to the increasing power of China. Zhang asserts, “With the passing of time, we will see the U.S. as a hegemonic state return to being an ordinary state, and we will also see the defeated Japan state return to being an ordinary country.”¹⁵⁸ Thus, the U.S. and Japan will seek to balance against power. Zhang wrote, “China’s rise has caused the greatest change in the Asia-Pacific power structure. America’s return to Asia is certainly at a higher level, and it is confronting the impact and challenge to the Asia-Pacific power structure brought about by China’s rise.”¹⁵⁹ Zhang also explained how the US-Japan Alliance intends to contain China, “With the background of America’s pivot to Asia, a trend is developing where the US-Japan Alliance’s purview extends to the East China Sea and the South China Sea, and this trend is a critical threat to China’s maritime strategy.”¹⁶⁰ Thus, for Zhang the strengthening of the US-Japan Alliance was to contain China’s rise in power. Zhang interprets the forward presence of the U.S. as containment, but the U.S. sees security benefits from remaining engaged in Asia. For example, Jeffrey Bader does not use the words contain or containment, but he does offer that one of the many “fundamental principles of the Obama administration’s Asia-Pacific

¹⁵⁷ Zhang Jingquan [张景全], “The Japan-US Alliance and the US Return to Asia Strategy,” [*Rimei tongmeng yu Meiguo chongfan yazhou zhanlue*], *China International Studies* [*Guoji wenti yanjiu*], No. 5, 4 August 2012, p. 51.

¹⁵⁸ Zhang Jingquan [张景全], “The Japan-US Alliance and the US Return to Asia Strategy,” p. 54.

¹⁵⁹ Zhang Jingquan [张景全], “The Japan-US Alliance and the US Return to Asia Strategy,” p. 50.

¹⁶⁰ Zhang Jingquan [张景全], “The Japan-US Alliance and the US Return to Asia Strategy,” p. 52.

strategy” was to “Expand the overall U.S. presence in the western Pacific and maintain its forward regional deployment.”¹⁶¹

Months after the “pivot” to Asia announcement, the 2012 *Diaoyu* Island dispute drastically soured Sino-Japanese relations. Approximately two years later, an official statement by China’s ambassador to Japan, Cheng Yonghua, stated, “that the China-Japan relations have been plunged into a severely difficult situation, with bilateral high-level exchanges being suspended and practical exchanges and cooperation suffering negative impact. This is not in line with the interests of both countries and peoples.”¹⁶² Figure 5.1 below shows evidence of high levels of Japanese foreign direct investment (FDI) flowing to China, and Japanese FDI to China declined from an all-time high of \$13.5 billion USD in 2012 to \$9.1 billion USD in 2013.¹⁶³

¹⁶¹ Bader, *Obama and China’s Rise: An Insider’s Account of America’s Asia Strategy*, p. 142.

¹⁶² “Ambassador to Japan Cheng Yonghua Attends Reception Commemorating 60th Anniversary of Establishment of Japanese Association for the Promotion of International Trade,” *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China*, 2 April 2014, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/zwjg_665342/zwbd_665378/t1165277.shtml (Accessed 22 March 2016).

¹⁶³ “OECD International direct investment database,” *Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development*, Last updated with 2013 data, http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DatasetCode=FDI_FLOW_PARTNER# (Accessed 25 December 2015).




Figure 5.1. Japan and China Bi-Lateral Foreign Direct Investment (millions USD)
Source: OECD¹⁶⁴

In contrast to Zhang Jingquan’s containment argument, China’s senior leaders and scholars recognize the interconnectedness of the international economy. China possesses the ability to signal good will as well as punish its neighbors economically. As Xin Qiang stated, “Enhancing economic development with the allies of the U.S., rather than competing sends the signal that China is not a threat. It also sends the signal to the U.S. alliance partner that they will need to maintain good relations with China, so that when they [Japan and South Korea] are tempted to do something that will challenge or harm China, it will think twice.”¹⁶⁵ Therefore, China possesses agency to operate in an international environment. Additionally, in March 2016, former Chinese State Councilor Dai Bingguo addressed the rise of China in relation to the United States. He stated:

¹⁶⁴ “OECD International direct investment database,” *Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development*.

¹⁶⁵ Xin Qiang [信强], Personal Interview, 13 November 2015, Fudan University—American Studies Center.

First, no country can take the place of the US as the super-power, and the US will not decline. Second, no country can obstruct the rise of developing countries including China, Russia, and India. China's development can both benefit the Chinese people and contribute to the development of the world and the mankind. If China succeeds in its development, the US will be the biggest beneficiary. On the contrary, if China does not develop and falls into poverty, turmoil or chaos, that would be the most terrible situation to the US.¹⁶⁶

This official statement shows that China's leaders recognize the state's limitations as a rising power in comparison to the United States, and they recognize the interconnectedness of the United States and China. As the great global recession proved, China had not "decoupled" from the world economy, and China is highly dependent on its export based economy. In conclusion, Zhu Feng summarized, "China should not be under the delusion that economic incentive can be turned into strategic assets, so Beijing should know where the limit is with regard to commercial diplomacy. In other words, don't have illusions that China's rise could undermine the U.S. strategic anchor in the region."¹⁶⁷ Therefore, Zhu Feng argued that China should learn how to coexist rather than challenge the U.S. He stated, "This type of nuance in understanding the strategic situation offers China an important chance for strategic recalibration instead of pursuing the traditional historic path of a rising power challenging the dominant power."¹⁶⁸

However, China's foreign policies in 2012 and 2013 did not match the peaceful rise rhetoric and nuanced statements from Zhu Feng and Xin Qiang. As

¹⁶⁶ "Issues on Building a New Model of China-US Major-Country Relationship: Dai Bingguo Discusses with Former US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger on How to Avoid 'Thucydides' Trap'," *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China*, 19 March 2016, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1349547.shtml (Accessed 22 March 2016).

¹⁶⁷ Zhu Feng [朱锋], Personal Interview, 8 December 2015, Nanjing University.

¹⁶⁸ Zhu Feng [朱锋], Personal Interview, 8 December 2015, Nanjing University.

Table 5.3 illustrates, China was displeased with Japan’s “nationalization” of the Diaoyu Islands and regularly sent ships from China’s Marine Surveillance (MS) and Fisheries Administration (FA) within the territorial waters of the islands. The repeated territorial incursions have challenged senior Japanese leaders. For instance, on 8 August 2013, in response to the incursion of the day, Foreign Minister Fumio Kishida stated, “Intrusion by Chinese government ships into Japanese territorial waters have been observed frequently, which is truly regrettable. And any attempts to change the status quo by use of coercion or intimidation shall not be condoned or tolerated by the international community.”¹⁶⁹

September 2012	October 2012	November 2012	December 2012	January 2013	February 2013	March 2013
14 th - 6 MS	2 nd - 4 MS	2 nd - 4 MS 2 FA	4 th - 1 MS	7/8 th -4 MS	4 th - 2 MS	6 th - 3 MS; 2 FA
18 th - 3 MS	3 rd - 3 MS	3 rd - 1 MS	7 th - 4 MS	19 th - 3 MS	15 th - 3 MS	12 th - 3 MS
24 th - 2 MS 2 FA	25 th - 4 MS	4 th - 4 MS	11 th - 2 MS	21 st - 3 MS	18 th - 3 MS	18 th - 3 MS
	28 th - 4 MS	20 th - 4 MS	12 th - 3 MS	30 th - 3 MS	21 st - 1 FA	? - ? MS ? FA
	30 th - 4 MS		13 th - 4 MS		23 rd - 1 FA	
			16 th - 1FA		24 th -3 MS 1 FA	
			21 st - ? MS ? FA		28 th - 3 MS	
			? - ? MS ? FA			
<i>3 Days</i>	<i>5 Days</i>	<i>4 Days</i>	<i>8 Days</i>	<i>4 Days</i>	<i>7 Days</i>	<i>4 Days</i>
11 MS 2 FA	19 MS 0 FA	13 MS 2 FA	14? MS 1? FA	13 MS 0 FA	16 MS 1 FA	9? MS 2? FA

Table 5.3. Chinese Territorial Incursions of *Diaoyu* Islands (<12 nautical miles)¹⁷⁰

¹⁶⁹ “Press Conference by Foreign Minister Fumio Kishida,” *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan*, 8 August 2013, http://www.mofa.go.jp/press/kaiken/kaiken24e_000021.html (Accessed 16 June 2016).

¹⁷⁰ “Due to fear of airspace violation by Chinese aircrafts, Japan sends helicopter equipped ships into Senkaku waters” [*Senkakushoto ni heri tosai-sen taio tsuyomeru Chugoku, ryoku shinpan no kenen*], *Asahi.com*, 3 March 2013, <http://www.asahi.com/shimen/articles/TKY201303020492.html>

Additionally, outside observers of China's Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) announcement on 23 November 2013 viewed it as a confrontational move by China to assert its administration over the *Diaoyu* Islands. The day of the announcement, Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel responded, "We view this development as a destabilizing attempt to alter the status quo in the region. This unilateral action increases the risk of misunderstanding and miscalculations."¹⁷¹ Five months later, Hagel stated, "China's ADIZ announcement was a provocative, unilateral action that raised tensions in one of the world's most geopolitically sensitive areas, including territory administered by Japan. It clearly increases the risk of a dangerous miscalculation or accident that could escalate quickly and dangerously."¹⁷² China's repeated territorial incursions and the ADIZ in the East China Sea from 2013 point to a more confident and powerful China that is realizing its rise in power.

(Accessed 8 June 2013); Michael Cucek, "Chinese Ship Incursions In and Around the Senkakus," *Shisaku Blog*, 20 December 2012, <http://shisaku.blogspot.com/2012/12/chinese-ship-incursions-around-senkakus.html> (Accessed 27 May 2013); "Senkaku encroachment, China's military efforts sending 'surveillance ships to region as well as unprecedented maneuvers,' will cause the Japanese Coast Guard to strengthen their vigilance" [*Senkaku shinpan, tsuyomeru Chugoku 'kanshi-sen, kore made ni nai ugoki*], *Sankei News*, 24 March 2013, <http://www.iza.ne.jp/news/newsarticle/event/crime/640761/> (Accessed 8 June 2013); and "Japan Coast Guard Region 11 is looking to prolong fulltime service for increased patrols" [*Kaiho ga Senkaku senju butai choki-ka nirami 11-kan ni junshi-sen zokyo*], *Sankei MSN News*, 24 December 2012, <http://sankei.jp.msn.com/politics/news/121224/plc12122410000005-n1.htm> (Accessed 8 June 2013).

¹⁷¹ "Statement by Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel on the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone," *U.S. Department of Defense*, 23 November 2013, <http://archive.defense.gov/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=16392> (Accessed 16 June 2016).

¹⁷² "Hagel Discusses U.S.-Japan Defense Relations in Interview," *U.S. Department of Defense*, American Forces Press Service, 5 April 2014, <http://archive.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=121990> (Accessed 16 June 2016).

Self-Perception of Rising State in Relation to Adversarial Alliance:

Question 4a: Have Chinese analysts become increasingly dissatisfied with adversarial alliances on its periphery? Supported. Chinese analysts such as Zhang Jingquan have argued that the U.S. uses the US-Japan Alliance to contain China.

Question 4b: Do Chinese analysts tolerate the adversarial alliances and recognize the security benefits? Supported. Xin Qiang and Yu Tiejun noted that the alliance benefited China's security by extending nuclear deterrence over Japan. Thus, Japan did not feel pressure to develop its own nuclear weapons.

Question 4c: Has China's self-perception of its rise in power influenced its foreign policy outcomes? Supported. Attempts to signal a "peaceful rise" and measures to avoid the security dilemma play a role in China's decision-making. However, China has also acted more assertively against Japan by continually sending ships into Diaoyu Island contiguous and territorial waters and formation of the East China Sea ADIZ.

5.7 PERCEPTIONS OF ADVERSARIAL ALLIANCE CAPABILITIES

This final section of the US-Japan Alliance case study will highlight Chinese perceptions of the alliance's capabilities. In relative terms, the conventional capabilities draw the least attention. In contrast, the alliance's strategic capabilities draw a preponderance of attention, namely Japan's retention of a nuclear fissile

material stockpile and the US-Japan Alliance’s research, development, and deployment of Theatre Missile Defense (TMD).

5.7.1 Japan's Conventional Capabilities

In terms of conventional capabilities, Xu Wansheng and Liu Jianguyong paid attention to the aviation assets possessed by the alliance. In 2008 by Xu Wansheng described in great detail the large numbers of U.S. manufactured weapon systems purchased by Japan since the end of the Cold War. Table 5.4 below displays the large amounts of aircraft Japan has purchased.

<i>Japanese Self-Defense Branch</i>	<i>Weapon System Type</i>	<i>Numbers of Aircraft Purchased</i>		
		<i>1991 to 1995</i>	<i>1996 to 2000</i>	<i>2001 to 2005</i>
<i>Land</i>	AH-1S- Anti-Tank Helicopter	18	3	-
	CH-47 J Transport Helicopter	12	9	7
<i>Sea</i>	P-3C Anti-Submarine Pursuit Aircraft	5	-	-
	SH-60J Anti-Submarine Helicopter	31	37	39
<i>Air</i>	F-15J Fighter Aircraft	29	4	12
	CH-47 J Transport Helicopter	2	4	12

Table 5.4. Japanese Purchases of U.S. Manufactured Aircraft from 1991 to 2005¹⁷³

¹⁷³ Xu Wansheng [徐万胜], “The Japan-US Alliance and the Post-Cold War Military Expansion of Japan” [*Rimei tongmeng yu lengzhanhou riben de junbei kuozhang*], *International Politics* [*Guoji zhengzhi yanjiu*], 2008, No. 1, p. 19.

Table 5.4 does not include Mitsubishi, Kawasaki, and Fuji's licensed production of the Japanese F-2 support fighter that is based on the General Dynamics F-16. Upgrades on the Japanese built fighter aircraft included advanced flight controls, improved land and maritime war-fighting capabilities, aerial refueling, and stealth materials for the 130 fighters that started production in the year 2000.¹⁷⁴ Liu Jianguo made mention of the US-Japan Alliance enhancing its aviation capabilities in 2010 when the US Marine Corps deployed two MV-22 Osprey squadrons to Marine Corp Air Station Futenma. The Osprey squadrons joined the existing 24 Sea Knight transport helicopters already based at Futenma. Liu noted that this addition of Osprey tiltrotors will "strengthen the operational capability of the US troops in the region."¹⁷⁵

In terms of conventional weapons transfers, Xu Wansheng provided numerous examples of how Japan regularly purchased equipment that would enhance the interoperability of the alliance. Japan's main battle tank, the Type 90, shares the same German 120mm cannon used by the Abrams M1A1. Japan's long-distance torpedoes are domestically produced, but share the same diameter as their U.S. Navy counterparts. Lastly, from the 1990s to present all of the aircraft GPS navigation, electronics, and radar systems are all U.S. products.¹⁷⁶ Indeed, the interoperability of a large amount of shared weapon systems and Japan's desire to acquire high quality military products points to enhanced capabilities and

¹⁷⁴ Xu Wansheng [徐万胜], "The Japan-US Alliance and the Post-Cold War Military Expansion of Japan," p. 19.

¹⁷⁵ Liu Jianguo, "US Would Face a Dilemma Should It Interfere Militarily in the Diaoyu Islands Dispute," p. 45.

¹⁷⁶ Xu Wansheng [徐万胜], "The Japan-US alliance and the Post-Cold War Military Expansion of Japan," pp. 24-25. For example, the F-15J uses advanced fire-control radars from the U.S.

effectiveness. Yet, Xu Wansheng fails to mention the alliance management angle of shared weapon systems and dependence on the alliance partner for weapon sales. For instance, if Japan seeks to prosecute a war it will need the full material support of the United States to provide spare parts, munitions, and technical assistance. This dependence on U.S. weapon systems can benefit the U.S. as the provider of such goods and can limit Japanese willingness to leave the alliance structure.

In consideration of alliance capabilities, discussion of alliance doctrine was absent from the journal articles in the sample. As noted before, the task of assessing capabilities is much more complicated than counting troops and tanks, but it involves the strategic interaction and the military doctrine in how the state employs its capabilities. To address the question of how Chinese analysts perceive alliance capabilities, I will need to find Chinese military journals that delve into doctrinal and warfighting analysis.

The key contribution that Japan serves the US-Japan Alliance is its shared territory that facilitates U.S. deployment. Zhang Jingquan recognized the fact that Japan sharing of its territory helped the U.S. overcome what Boulding termed the “loss-of-strength gradient” by allowing forward deployment and logistical support.¹⁷⁷ In 2013, an estimated 30,000 U.S. military personnel were forward deployed to Japan. Table 5.5 offers the details of the U.S. military presence in Japan for 2013. The forward presence of U.S. military personnel not only aids U.S. power projection capabilities in the western Pacific Ocean, but also signals U.S. commitment to defending Japan.

¹⁷⁷ Zhang Jingquan [张景全], “The Japan-US Alliance and the US Return to Asia Strategy,” p. 53.

<i>Service^a</i>	<i>Installation^b</i>	<i>Major Units</i>	<i>Personnel^b</i>
Air Force	<i>Kadena</i>	18 th Wing; 733 AMS; 82 nd Recon; Commander, Task Group 72.2	7,100
Air Force Navy	<i>Misawa</i>	Task Group 72.4; 35 th FW	3,500
Air Force	<i>Yokota</i>	374 th Airlift Wing; 730 th AMS	3,000
Army	<i>Camp Zama</i>	I Corps	800
Army	<i>Torii Station</i>	78 th Aviation Battalion	700
Marine Corps	<i>Camp Butler</i>	5 th Element of III MEF	5,600
Marine Corps	<i>Camp Courtney</i>	3 rd Marine Division	2,300
Marine Corps	<i>Camp Hansen</i>	31 st MEU HQ, 12 th Marine Regiment	-
Marine Corps	<i>Futenma</i>	36 th Marine Air Group, 18 th Marine Air Control Group	-
Marine Corps	<i>Iwakuni</i>	12 th Marine Air Group, 242 nd Marine Fighter Attack Squadron, 171 st Marine Wing Support Squadron	600
Navy	<i>Atsugi</i>	Carrier Air Wing 5	900
Navy	<i>Sasebo</i>	1 Amphibious transport dock, 1 amphibious assault ship, 2 landing ship docks, 4 Mine Countermeasure Ships	2,550
Navy	<i>Yokosuka</i>	7 th Fleet HQ, 6 destroyers, 1 amphibious command ship, 2 carrier groups, 1 carrier	3,000

Table 5.5. U.S. Military Posts, Units, and Personnel in Japan in 2013¹⁷⁸

5.7.2 Japan's Nuclear Material Stockpile

A key concern for China is Japan's nuclear material stockpile. Even though the U.S. has repeatedly provided statements to confirm the nuclear protective umbrella since President Johnson's January 1965 reassurance, Japan insists on

¹⁷⁸ "Marine Corp Base Camp Smedley D. Butler," *U.S. Marine Corps*, <http://www.mcbbutler.marines.mil/> (Accessed 18 March 2015).

Michael J. Lostumbo, Michael J. McNerney, Eric Peltz, Derek Eaton, David R. Frelinger, Victoria A. Greenfield, John Halliday, Patrick Mills, Bruce R. Nardulli, Stacie L. Pettyjohn, Jerry M. Sollinger, and Stephen M. Worman, *Overseas Basing of U.S. Military Forces: An Assessment of Relative Costs and Strategic Benefits* (Santa Monica, The RAND Corporation, 2013), p. 30. Note ^a: Multiple services are often serving at the same installation, but the services' major units are listed. Note ^b: The numbers are approximate and the installations aggregate the number of personnel that work at the multiple locations surrounding the installation.

possessing a nuclear fissile material stockpile.¹⁷⁹ This stockpile in conjunction with Japan's latent power when considering its industrial and technological advances makes it a threat to China, especially when considering that Japan could perform a "nuclear breakout" in a relatively short period.¹⁸⁰ Reportedly, in 2004, Japan held an accumulated surplus of 43 tons of plutonium which could be an adequate supply to produce 5,000 nuclear warheads. Also of concern to Yuan was the introduction of a new spent fuel reprocessing center in *Rokkasho-mura* and plans for fast-breeder reactors.¹⁸¹ Chinese analysts have complained that Japan has not honored its 1997 pledge to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to give up its surplus plutonium.¹⁸² Additionally, Liu Weidong noted in January 2014 that Japan had still not fulfilled a U.S. security condition to hand over plutonium and highly enriched uranium.¹⁸³ It is of consequence to note that Japan did handover 1,000 pounds of fissile material in March 2014, one month before President Obama's trip to Japan in April 2014.¹⁸⁴

From Wu Riqiang's viewpoint, Japan has cooperated with the IAEA and has placed the nearly 50 tons of nuclear fissile material under the management of the IAEA. Yet, he conceded that the large stores are a concern to China because Japan is

¹⁷⁹ Liu Xing [刘星], "Discussion on the Vitality of the US-Japan Alliance" [*Shilun Rimei tongnmeng de shengmingli*], *World Economics and Politics* [*Shejie jingji yu zhengzhi*], 2007, No. 6, p. 42, note 1.

¹⁸⁰ Yuan Jingdong, "Chinese perspectives on the US - Japan alliance," p. 88.

¹⁸¹ Yuan Jingdong, "Chinese perspectives on the US - Japan alliance," p. 92.

¹⁸² Yuan Jingdong, "Chinese perspectives on the US - Japan alliance," p. 92.

¹⁸³ Liu Weidong [刘卫东], "The U.S. Rebalancing between China and Japan in the Background of Its Rebalancing Strategy," p. 89.

¹⁸⁴ Dennis Lynch, "Senkaku Island Dispute: Japan Builds Controversial Radar Station On Yonaguni Island, 100 Miles From Disputed Islands," *International Business Times*, 19 April 2014, <http://www.ibtimes.com/senkaku-island-dispute-japan-builds-controversial-radar-station-yonaguni-island-100-miles-1573902> (Accessed 10 March 2015); and Wang Shan, trans. Wang Xiangyan, "An Analysis of Japan's 'Active Pacifism'," *Contemporary International Relations (English Edition)*, Vol. 24, No. 6 (November/December 2014), p. 106.

just under the nuclear threshold for producing a large amount of nuclear weapons very quickly. China continues to question: what does Japan want to do with 50 tons of nuclear fissile material? Wu Riqiang felt that the U.S. policy does not fully recognize the contradiction in stating, “On one hand, the U.S. does not want Japan to have large stores of Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) and plutonium that it can use to build nuclear weapons, but at the same time, the U.S. does not address or recognize Japan’s nuclear material problem. Moreover, the nuclear stockpile is only growing larger as Japan’s nuclear reactors for energy production contribute more materials each year.”¹⁸⁵ The 2015 report by China’s Arms Control and Disarmament Association [*Zhongguo junkong yu caijun xiehui*] entitled, “Study on Japan’s Nuclear Materials,” confirmed that of the 47.8 tons of separated plutonium owned by Japan, France and the United Kingdom hold 37 tons on its behalf. Moreover, the report calculated that Japan could use its domestically based 10.8 tons of separated plutonium to construct nearly 1350 nuclear warheads.¹⁸⁶

There is discussion within China over the ability to distinguish Japan’s purposes of maintaining such a large stockpile of fissile material. Professor Yu Tiejun argued that it is too difficult to distinguish the use. The Japanese could keep their nuclear stockpiles for future energy resources or making nuclear bombs.¹⁸⁷ From a different angle, Wang Dong views the nuclear material stockpile as Japan’s way to improve its de facto nuclear capability. Since Japan could produce a nuclear

¹⁸⁵ Wu Riqiang [吴日强], Personal Interview, 19 November 2015, Renmin University.

¹⁸⁶ “Study on Japan’s Nuclear Materials,” *China Arms Control and Disarmament Association and China Institute of Nuclear Information and Economics*, September 2015, p. 2 [pdf p. 8], available at: <http://fissilematerials.org/library/cacda15.pdf> (Accessed 28 April 2015). The warhead calculation references Frank von Hippel, “The large costs and small benefits of reprocessing,” *International Workshop on Spent Nuclear Fuel Management*, Beijing, 23 October 2014.

¹⁸⁷ Yu Tiejun [于铁军], Personal Interview, 24 November 2015, Peking University.

weapon quickly, it represents Japan's unique form of nuclear deterrence.¹⁸⁸ As Japanese Foreign Minister Muto Kabun said in 1993, "if North Korea develops nuclear weapons and that becomes a threat to Japan, first there is the nuclear umbrella of the United States upon which we can rely. But if it comes to a crunch, possessing the will that 'we can do it ourselves' is important."¹⁸⁹

Concerning China's ability to change Japan's nuclear stockpile policy Wang Dong stated, "China wants to pressure Japan to give up the nuclear material stockpile, but since the U.S. does not want to make an issue. China does not possess the mobilizing power to make Japan give it up."¹⁹⁰ Instead, China's Arms Control and Disarmament Association regularly publishes reports on Japan's nuclear stockpile problem as a type of "naming and shaming" tactic to keep Japan accountable to the IAEA; reportedly, these yearly reports were published even before Sino-Japanese relations started declining in 2006.¹⁹¹ For instance, the 2015 report cites lax security procedures and missing material. Of particular concern is unaccounted plutonium at the *Rokkasho-mura* and *Tokai* reprocessing plants, and the Mixed Oxide fuel fabrication plant—a sum of 5.1 kilograms in 2014.¹⁹² Due to the complexities of plutonium reprocessing, the Japanese have admitted that it is

¹⁸⁸ Wang Dong [王栋], Personal Interview, 28 December 2015, Peking University.

¹⁸⁹ Leon V. Sigal, "The Politics of a Korea-Japan NWFZ," *Nautilus Institute*, NAPSNet Special Reports, 17 April 2012, <http://nautilus.org/napsnet/napsnet-special-reports/the-politics-of-a-korea-japan-nwfz/> (Accessed 2 May 2016).

¹⁹⁰ Wang Dong [王栋], Personal Interview, 28 December 2015, Peking University.

¹⁹¹ Jeffrey A. Frieden, David A. Lake, and Kenneth A. Schultz, "Institutions: Do Rules Matter in World Politics?" section from, *World Politics: Interests, Interactions, Institutions*, 2nd Ed. (New York: W.W. Norton, 2010), pp. 62-72 & p. 444; and Wu Riqiang [吴日强], Personal Interview, 19 November 2015, Renmin University.

¹⁹² "Study on Japan's Nuclear Materials," pp. 9-10 & p.29 [pdf pp. 15-16 & p. 35].

impossible to insure with 100% accuracy because of “high-measurement uncertainty.”¹⁹³

5.7.3 Missile Defense and Strategic Stability

Ballistic Missile Defense and Missile Defense are blanket terms to describe the multiple levels of defense against a diverse range of missile threats. In this regard, these capabilities are often termed strategic defensive weapons. For example, Patriot Systems that have upgraded to the Patriot Advanced Capability (PAC-3) systems defend against short-range ballistic missile threats; Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) and Navy Theater Wide Defense (NTWD) are for defending against mid-range ballistic missile threats; the Aegis Standard Missile (SM-3) system and the Ground-based Mid-course Defense (GMD) are pointed at intercepting Inter-Continental Ballistic Missiles (ICBM) before the warheads re-enter the Earth’s atmosphere.¹⁹⁴ Different missile systems can *theoretically* target and intercept different phases of a missile attack such as the launch, boost, mid-course, or terminal phases.¹⁹⁵ For instance, the PAC-3 has a range of 22 miles high and the THAAD has a range of 93 miles high to defend against the terminal phase—

¹⁹³ Alan J. Kuperman, David Sokolow, Edwin S. Lyman, “Can the IAEA Safeguard Fuel-Cycle Facilities? The Historical Record,” from Chapter 6 in Henry D. Sokolski, ed., Nuclear Weapons Materials Gone Missing: What Does History Teach? (Carlisle, Penn.: Strategic Studies Institute and U.S. Army War College Press, 2014), p. 98. See pp. 94-99 for details on the Japan case study. Book available at: <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB1238.pdf> (Accessed 4 May 2016).

¹⁹⁴ Hughes, Japan’s Security Agenda, p. 183.

¹⁹⁵ “General Principles of Missile Defense,” Missilethreat.com, Claremont Institute and George C. Marshall Institute, <http://missilethreat.com/about/general-principles-of-missile-defense/> (Accessed 28 April 2016).

when the missile is coming back down to Earth. The SM-3 system has a range of 378 miles high to intercept missiles in the mid-course phase.¹⁹⁶

The actual ability to intercept incoming ballistic missiles or even negate the early launch phases of a potential adversary's Inter-Continental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) is highly complex and represents the highest level of military information technology. An effective TMD system requires full integration of satellite surveillance, missile trajectory tracking, target discrimination, communication relays, intercept capabilities, and an over-arching command and control structure. Thus, a state pursuing missile defense must overcome enormous technological challenges that are extremely challenging and expensive. Yet, the U.S. and Japan, as the world's two leading high-technology states have sought to combine their efforts in researching and developing missile defense system that is highly threatening to target states.

US-Japan Alliance Missile Defense Background

Advanced technological research and development has a long history in the US-Japan Alliance. For instance, in 1983, Japan formally participated in research work on the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative.¹⁹⁷ After the results of the First Gulf War, China fully recognized that advanced uses of information technology were driving a new revolution in military affairs. One such technology that received a lot of attention during the First Gulf War was the Patriot missile system that the U.S.

¹⁹⁶ Jeffrey Lewis, "Are You Scared About North Korea's Thermonuclear ICBM?" *Foreign Policy*, 19 February 2016, <http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/02/19/are-you-scared-about-north-koreas-thermonuclear-icbm/> (Accessed 13 May 2016); and Greg Freiherr, "Missiles Killing Missiles," *Air & Space*, February/March 2016, pp. 35-37.

¹⁹⁷ Wang Jianwei and Wu Xinbo, *Against Us or With Us?*, p. 28.

deployed to intercept Iraqi Scud missiles fired towards Saudi Arabia and Israel. The Patriot system displayed the burgeoning of a new technology developed jointly by American and Japanese researchers. Two years after the First Gulf War, U.S. Secretary of Defense Les Aspin and Japanese Director General Nakanishi agreed to set up a TMD Working Group.¹⁹⁸ Chinese estimates report that in 1995 the Japanese Self-Defense Agency spent 550 million yen (roughly \$5.4 million USD) conducting a covert study on the technical feasibility of TMD.¹⁹⁹ Furthermore, the US-Japan Alliance's strategic interaction with North Korea has played a role as well. North Korea's launch of the *Taepodong-1* missile in August 1998 that flew over Japan was a final catalyst that encouraged the U.S. and Japan to sign a memorandum of understanding on joint TMD research and development formally in September 1998.²⁰⁰ Chinese analysts Wang Jianwei and Wu Xinbo concluded in 1998 that a TMD system would "undermine the strategic stability in East Asia because it would possibly nullify China's limited strategic deterrence and place it in a disadvantageous strategic position."²⁰¹

The next year, Liu Jianguo attached great importance to a U.S. Department of Defense leak in February 1999 that the US was developing TMD to confront China as a "potential threat."²⁰² That very same month, Sha Zukang, serving as the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Department in the Chinese Ministry

¹⁹⁸ Hughes, *Japan's Security Agenda*, p. 184.

¹⁹⁹ Yuan Jingdong, "Chinese perspectives on the US-Japan alliance," p. 90.

²⁰⁰ Yuan Jingdong, "Chinese perspectives on the US-Japan alliance," p. 90; and QIN He [秦禾], "The Effect of the North Korea Issue on Japan's Nuclear Policy" [*Chaoxian wenti dui Riben he zhengce de yingxiang*], *International Politics* [*Guoji zhengzhi yanjiu*], 2009, No. 2, p. 163.

²⁰¹ Wang Jianwei and Wu Xinbo, *Against Us or With Us?*, p. 33.

²⁰² Liu Jianguo, "International Partnerships Facing Challenges," p. 8. Liu Jianguo quotes *Mainichi Shimbun*, Evening Edition, 3 February 1999.

of Foreign Affairs stated that China was not concerned with “what we call genuine TMD.”²⁰³ Sha Zukang said, “what China is opposed to is the development, deployment, and proliferation of antimissile systems with potential strategic defense capabilities in the name of TMD that violate the letter and spirit of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and go beyond the legitimate self-defense needs of relevant countries.”²⁰⁴ In 1999, Thomas Christensen noted that Chinese analysts believed “development of U.S.-Japan TMD is also designed to counter China's missile capabilities, which the PLA and civilian analysts recognize as China's most effective military asset, especially in relations with Taiwan.”²⁰⁵ As Yao Yunzhu wrote in 2008, “An upper-tier BMD system jointly deployed by the two countries [U.S. and Japan] in the name of protecting allies and overseas troops could be readily turned into a BMD system to offset a mainland missile attack against Taiwan.”²⁰⁶

Wei Min noted that U.S. behavior changed during the George W. Bush administration. He wrote, “After the 9/11 incident, the U.S. even more clearly pushed its unilateral policies. While the U.S. planned to deploy theater missile defense (TMD) to East Asia to pursue its own absolute security it also raised the risk for China’s strategic security.”²⁰⁷ The U.S. unilaterally abrogated its commitment to the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in December 2001, and its subsequent development of multiple levels of Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) has heightened the nuclear

²⁰³ Yuan Jingdong, “Chinese perspectives on the US-Japan alliance,” p. 89.

²⁰⁴ Yuan Jingdong, “Chinese perspectives on the US-Japan alliance,” p. 89.

²⁰⁵ Christensen, “China, the U.S.-Japan Alliance, and the Security Dilemma in East Asia,” p. 64.

²⁰⁶ Yao Yunzhu, “Chinese Nuclear Policy and the Future of Minimum Deterrence,” from chapter 8 in Christopher P. Twomey, ed., Perspectives on Sino-American Strategic Nuclear Issues (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2008), p. 120.

²⁰⁷ Wei Min [韦民], “Evolution of Mutual Recognition Bilateral Relations between Japan and ASEAN,” p. 33.

tensions with states that possessed secure second strike capabilities such as Russia and China.

Wu Xinbo asserted, "Military cooperation has been substantially deepened between U.S. and Japanese forces, with Japan deciding to join the United States in deploying a theater missile defense system, which will require the integration of U.S. and Japanese command, control, and communication systems."²⁰⁸ Effective TMD systems require advanced surveillance capabilities to detect and monitor missile launch sites or mobile launcher locations, and detect missile trajectories and up-to-date positioning. Japan's space program allows it to launch surveillance satellites that can aid in alliance intelligence capabilities. On 24 January 2006, Japan launched a rocket from the *Yoshinobu* Space Complex to put a Japanese Advanced Land Observation Satellite named "Earth" into orbit.²⁰⁹ Another important TMD development occurred at the RIMPAC joint naval exercise in June 2006 when the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force destroyer *Kirishima* used its Aegis radar system to successfully track a target missile.²¹⁰

The US-Japan Alliance's strategic interaction with North Korea continued to play a part in the alliance's rationale for TMD developments. For example, after North Korea's first nuclear test on 31 October 2006, U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice traveled to Japan to reassure the Japanese of the U.S. nuclear umbrella and to dissuade the Japanese from pursuing its own nuclear arsenal.²¹¹ Five months later, on 30 March 2007, the U.S. successfully deployed PAC-3 missiles

²⁰⁸ Wu Xinbo, "The End of the Silver Lining: A Chinese View of the U.S.-Japanese Alliance," p. 121.

²⁰⁹ Yuan Jingdong, "Chinese perspectives on the US-Japan alliance," pp. 95-96.

²¹⁰ Yuan Jingdong, "Chinese perspectives on the US-Japan alliance," p. 95.

²¹¹ Yuan Jingdong, "Chinese perspectives on the US-Japan alliance," p. 93.

at *Iruma* Air Base.²¹² By the end of 2007, the JSDF would successfully carry out a missile intercept test using the PAC-3.²¹³ The same year Sun Cheng noted, “Japan’s spending on missile defense system was reported to increase by 30.5% in 2007.”²¹⁴

In conclusion, Yuan Jingdong points to five strategic reasons why the U.S. is pursuing TMD:

- 1) Remain the dominant military in the region and be able to conduct military operations “with little inhibition,”
- 2) Take advantage of Japan’s technological development,
- 3) Increase its allies’ reliance on U.S. security guarantees “by integrating their defense systems into the US East Asian security architecture”,
- 4) “Further consolidate its lead in the Revolution in Military Affairs”; and
- 5) Force China to spend more money on defense expenditures with the goal of delaying its economic development.²¹⁵

By 2010, Zhang Jingquan’s research points to the fulfillment of points 2, 3, and 4. He argued that when Prime Minister Noda decided to lift Japan’s weapon export restrictions in late December 2011, Noda was pushing Japan towards further global development of TMD. Zhang argued that while US-Japan cooperation on TMD system was deepening, the U.S. was asking to Japan to accomplish two tasks: first, enhance its Asia-Pacific military containment capabilities, and second, contribute towards the European TMD system. To work towards the second task, the U.S.

²¹² “Successful PAC-3 Flight Test,” *Japan Ministry of Defense*, Japan Defense Forces, No. 11, October 2008, <http://www.mod.go.jp/e/jdf/no11/special.html> (Accessed 17 March 2015); and Yuan Jingdong, “Chinese perspectives on the US-Japan alliance,” p. 94.

²¹³ Xu Wansheng [徐万胜], “The Japan-US Alliance and the Post-Cold War Military Expansion of Japan,” p. 22.

²¹⁴ Sun Cheng, “The Regime Change from Koizumi to Abe and Japanese Nationalism,” p. 65.

²¹⁵ Yuan Jingdong, “Chinese perspectives on the US-Japan alliance,” p. 89.

Department of Defense urged Japan to make an exception to the three principal weapon export restrictions to help the U.S. fulfill its offer to construct a ballistic missile intercept system in Europe.²¹⁶ This linking of the European and Asian TMD systems could have substantial strategic consequences for both Russia and China.

Chinese Interpretation of Missile Defense and U.S. Responses

At present, Wu Riqiang, one of China's leading experts on US missile defense asserted that TMD is that it is technologically "effective," but NMD is currently "average."²¹⁷ He contended that the U.S. would need to launch three or four NMD interceptors to assure interception of one ICBM. He continued to express Chinese concerns over U.S. policy developments to deploy more X-band radars to enhance the NMD system's performance.²¹⁸ Another Chinese analyst, Xin Qiang, argued that the U.S. already has forward deployed X-band radars in Japan and Guam, but it is planning to deploy X-band radars in the Philippines, and another one in southern Japan. He stated, "Therefore, the additional THAAD deployment in South Korea is another challenge to China's security."²¹⁹ Australian defense expert, Rod Lyon, gives credence to this argument by stating that THAAD system X-band radar could transfer data to NMD assets protecting the continental United States.²²⁰

However, Bruce Bennett of Rand argues that China's position is disingenuous; he stated, "Chinese commentators raise concerns regarding the

²¹⁶ Zhang Jingquan [张景全], "The Japan-US Alliance and the US Return to Asia Strategy," p. 47.

²¹⁷ Wu Riqiang [吴日强], Personal Interview, 19 November 2015, Renmin University.

²¹⁸ Wu Riqiang [吴日强], Personal Interview, 19 November 2015, Renmin University.

²¹⁹ Xin Qiang [信强], Personal Interview, 13 November 2015, Fudan University—American Studies Center.

²²⁰ Rod Lyon, "THAAD, South Korea and China," Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 24 February 2016, <http://www.aspistrategist.org.au/thaad-south-korea-and-china/> (Accessed 13 May 2016).

THAAD radar's range, which reaches well into China, but this is a modest addition to other observational means already deployed on satellites, aircraft, and ships.”²²¹ For example, the Sea-Based X-band (SBX) radar based in the Pacific Ocean already provides “missile tracking, discrimination and hit assessment functions to the Ground-based Midcourse Defense.”²²² X-band radar (8-12 GHz) is a fire-control radar system used for tracking and killing missiles; it is qualitatively different from over-the-horizon radars such as L-band radar (1-2 GHz) and UHF radar (300 MHz-1 GHz) systems used for surveillance and searching functions.²²³ Thus, X-band radar provides both “advanced ballistic missile detection” and “discrimination” for distinguishing between warheads, decoys, and missile defense countermeasures.²²⁴

The current estimate is that the U.S. would employ multiple NMD interceptors to intercept a single ICBM. Therefore, from the Chinese side, the viability of the system in countering a state with a small to medium sized arsenal would require a counterforce first strike. In the case of China’s strategic posture, potentially a nuclear first counterforce strike on China could destroy most of China’s nuclear ballistic missiles, and the NMD system would be able to confront a smaller survivable nuclear arsenal launched to strike the United States. Thus, a pre-emptive

²²¹ Bruce W. Bennett, “THAAD’s Effect on South Korea’s Neighbors,” Rand Corporation, The Cipher Brief, 5 April 2016, <http://www.rand.org/blog/2016/04/the-effect-on-south-koreas-neighbors.html> (Accessed 18 April 2016).

²²² Ryan McGinley, Commander, “Sea-Based X-Band Radar Arrives in Pearl Harbor,” *U.S. Navy*, 10 January 2006, Story Number: NNS060110-11, http://www.navy.mil/submit/display.asp?story_id=21914 (Accessed 27 April 2016).

²²³ Lee O. Upton and Lewis A. Thurman, “Radars for the Detection and Tracking of Cruise Missiles,” *Lincoln Laboratory Journal*, Vol. 12, No. 2, 2000, p. 356. https://www.ll.mit.edu/publications/journal/pdf/vol12_no2/12_2detectcruisemissile.pdf (Accessed 24 February 2016); and Harold R. Raemer, *Radar System Principles* (New York: CRC Press, 1997), p. 5, see Table 1.1.

²²⁴ McGinley, “Sea-Based X-Band Radar Arrives in Pearl Harbor.”

or preventive counterforce attack of this nature would compromise China's secure second strike capability.²²⁵ This scenario requires two effective capabilities:

- 1) a counterforce strike that would be able to nullify both fixed and mobile targets, and
- 2) Effective capabilities to counter a limited nuclear response.

On the first capability, Austin Long and Brendan Green argue that space based radar, signal intelligence, ground sensors, and stealthy UAVs “the US military has harnessed a technological explosion to significantly improve intelligence capabilities” to find, track, and target mobile missiles.²²⁶ Second, anti-ballistic missile capabilities have progressed in sophistication from the Patriot missile systems of the First Iraq War to the latest tests of a new kill vehicle in June 2014. As of January 2016, the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) planned to deploy 44 Ground-based Interceptors in Alaska and California.²²⁷ Testimony from the director of the MDA, Vice Admiral J.D. Syring, indicates further testing and development of a complicated and expensive capabilities; the MDA conducted 25 field tests that “feature operationally realistic conditions” in a joint service environment to demonstrate BMD capabilities.²²⁸ These missile defense developments led to “many

²²⁵ Wu Riqiang [吴日强], Personal Interview, 19 November 2015, Renmin University.

²²⁶ Austin Long and Brendan Rittenhouse Green, “Stalking the Secure Second Strike: Intelligence, Counterforce, and Nuclear Strategy,” *Journal of Strategic Studies*, Vol. 38, Nos. 1-2, pp. 64-65. See pages 61 and 62 for discussion of stealth UAVS such as the RQ-170 and RQ-180.

²²⁷ Jen Judson, “Homeland Missile Defense System Successful in Non-Intercept Flight Test,” *Defense News*, 29 January 2016, <http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense/air-space/2016/01/28/homeland-missile-defense-system-successful-non-intercept-flight-test/79496944/> (Accessed 27 April 2016).

²²⁸ Vice Admiral J. D. Syring, “Fiscal Year 2017 Written Statement,” Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, Senate Armed Services Committee, 13 April 2016, p. 5, Available at: http://www.mda.mil/global/documents/pdf/FY17_Written_Statement_SASC_SFS_MDA_VADM_Syring_13042016.pdf (Accessed 27 April 2016).

Chinese assessments of the nascent U.S. missile defense deployments in East Asia anticipate the deployment of an integrated, multilayered system that enhances U.S. strategic deterrence at China's expense."²²⁹ Chinese assessments will certainly become more circumspect of U.S. strategic intentions as the U.S. MDA moves towards developing the Multi-Object Kill Vehicle (MOKV) program. In an effort to move the defense cost curve towards a more advantageous position, the MDA desires to add multiple kill vehicles to a single interceptor.²³⁰

This new estimation marks a shift in thinking from the 1990s when Thomas Christensen noted that Chinese scholars while noting the psychological and political aspect of a TMD system, "expressed serious doubts about the likely effectiveness of such a system, particularly given the proximity of Taiwan to the mainland in the ability of the PRC to launch a large number and wide variety of missiles."²³¹ Therefore, as Japan and the U.S. have invested in satellites, missile assets, and a command structure, TMD has moved from a theoretical threat to an actual threat. Moreover, the repeated mention of TMD in Chinese analysis points to the psychological pressure that a system of this kind brings to bear upon a potential adversary. It is similar to the effect that ballistic nuclear weapons possess in that the technical demands of such a system are extremely complex and unproven in real-life scenarios.²³²

²²⁹ Cunningham, Fiona and M. Taylor Fravel, "Assuring Assured Retaliation: China's Nuclear Posture and U.S.-China Strategic Stability," *International Security*, Vol. 40, No. 2, p. 17.

²³⁰ Syring, "Fiscal Year 2017 Written Statement," p. 6.

²³¹ Christensen, Thomas J., *Worse Than a Monolith: Alliance Politics and Problems of Coercive Diplomacy in Asia*, p. 241.

²³² Zachary J. Zwald, "Nuclear Weapons and U.S. Foreign Policy," 2013 ISSS-ISAC Annual Conference, Washington, D.C., 5 October 2013.

Zachary Zwald argued that the psychological effect of TMD and NMD on the adversary's choices is the greatest advantage of the defense systems. It could potentially cause an adversary to hesitate in launching a ballistic missile if they calculate that it could be intercepted.²³³ Yet, if the system causes other states to build larger arsenals to overwhelm the missile systems, the barrage could potentially inundate the limited arsenal of interceptors. Alternatively, a greater risk is that a missile system could cause an adversary to strike preemptively in the event of a crisis.

In consideration of the missile defense and its effect on the strategic stability, Wu Riqiang asserted that the U.S. has not properly considered the strategic consequences of the decision to pursue national missile defense.²³⁴ Li Bin and Nie Hongyi argued, "The reason is that given the large comparative advantage in numbers of U.S. missile compared to China's, the increase in the number of Chinese nuclear missiles would likely be used to absorb a U.S. first strike, and only the surviving few could be used to breakthrough missile defenses. So the United States does not need many interceptors to weaken the Chinese capability for nuclear retaliation."²³⁵ However, as Robert Pfaltzgraff argued, the missile defense systems currently deployed and planned by the U.S. are "not designed to be effective against larger and more sophisticated missile forces, such as those of Russia and China."

The U.S. has fielded a system that is focused on the problem presented by "rogue

²³³ Zachary J. Zwald, "Nuclear Weapons and U.S. Foreign Policy," 2013 ISSS-ISAC Annual Conference, Washington, D.C., 5 October 2013.

²³⁴ Wu Riqiang [吴日强], Personal Interview, 19 November 2015, Renmin University.

²³⁵ Li Bin, Nie Hongyi, trans. Gregory Kulacki, "An Investigation of China – U.S. Strategic Stability," Union of Concerned Scientists, *World Economics and Politics*, No. 2, 2008, p. 5, <http://www.ucsusa.org/sites/default/files/legacy/assets/documents/nwgs/Li-and-Nie-translation-final-5-22-09.pdf> (Accessed 22 March 2016).

states” and “terrorist launch.”²³⁶ Pfaltzgraff made this point as he was *actually* presenting an argument on why the U.S. should deploy space based missile defense systems to counter Russian and Chinese nuclear arsenals.

The U.S. has attempted to signal the defensive intentions of NMD to China and Russia via official publications such as the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), but the official proclamations are unlikely to convince China and Russia that NMD has only defensive purposes.²³⁷ The NPR stated, “We must continue to maintain stable strategic relationships with Russia and China and counter threats posed by any emerging nuclear-armed states, thereby protecting the United States and our allies and partners against nuclear threats or intimidation, and reducing any incentives our non-nuclear allies and partners might have to seek their own nuclear deterrents.”²³⁸ The same year, the U.S. State Department’s Bureau of Verification, Compliance and Implementation stated:

The United States missile defense systems would be employed to defend the United States against limited missile launches, and to defend its deployed forces, allies and partners against regional threats. The United States intends to continue improving and deploying its missile defense systems in order to defend itself against

²³⁶ Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., Independent Working Group Report on Missile Defense, the Space Relationship, & the Twenty-First Century, Report of the Independent Working Group on Missile Defense (Cambridge, MA: Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis for the Independent Working Group, revised edition, 2009), p. 101 [pdf p. 117]. <http://www.ifpa.org/pdf/IWG2009.pdf> (Accessed 22 March 2016).

²³⁷ Takashi Inoguchi, G. John Ikenberry, and Yoichiro Sato, “Conclusion: Active SDF, Coming End of Regional Ambiguity, and Comprehensive Political Alliance,” from chapter 15 in Takashi Inoguchi, G. John Ikenberry, and Yoichiro Sato, eds., *The U.S.-Japan Security Alliance: Regional Multilateralism* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), p. 275.

²³⁸ “Nuclear Posture Review,” *U.S. Department of Defense*, April 2010, p. 6 [pdf p. 28], http://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/features/defenseReviews/NPR/2010_Nuclear_Posture_Review_Report.pdf (Accessed 23 March 2016).

limited attack and as part of our collaborative approach to strengthening stability in key regions.²³⁹

The U.S. issued a statement to clarify its position found in the New START treaty with Russia, “that current strategic defensive arms do not undermine the viability and effectiveness of the strategic arms of the parties.”²⁴⁰

In 2015, the 2010 NPR was further backed by Assistant Secretary of State Frank Rose in the Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance. With a specific focus on China he stated, “The United States is committed to maintaining strategic stability in U.S.-China relations and supports initiation of a dialogue on strategic stability and nuclear postures aimed at fostering a more stable, resilient, and transparent security relationship with China” and “Ground-based Midcourse Defense System (GMD) is designed to protect the U.S. homeland only from limited ICBM attacks from states such as North Korea and Iran.”²⁴¹

The US-Japan Alliance’s research and development of TMD systems are a threatening capability that forces China to respond. With the threat of losing strategic stability, China has no choice but to oppose TMD since it has a small nuclear arsenal and maintains a minimal deterrence doctrine against the U.S.²⁴² As Yao Yunzhu argued, “A national missile defense system, no matter how limited it

²³⁹ “Statement by the United States of America Concerning Missile Defense,” *U.S. Department of State*, Bureau of Verification, Compliance and Implementation, Washington, DC, 7 April 2010, document available at <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/140406.pdf> (Accessed 22 April 2016).

²⁴⁰ “Treaty Between The United States of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms,” *U.S. Department of State*, Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance, p. 2, document available at <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/140035.pdf> (Accessed 22 April 2016).

²⁴¹ Speech, Frank A. Rose, “Ballistic Missile Defense and Strategic Stability in East Asia,” *U.S. Department of State*, 20 February 2015, <http://www.state.gov/t/avc/rls/2015/237746.htm> (Accessed 22 March 2016).

²⁴² Xin Qiang [信强], Personal Interview, 13 November 2015, Fudan University—American Studies Center.

might be, would no doubt reduce the effectiveness of China's deterrent against U.S. nuclear use."²⁴³ Naturally, China wants to avoid an arms race with the U.S., but TMD will neutralize a force posture built on the doctrine of minimal deterrence.

Therefore, China has a choice to accept the loss of strategic stability or build up its nuclear arsenal. As Yao Yunzhu argued, "China has to think about how to maintain a guaranteed, retaliatory, second strike capability in the face of a U.S. BMD system."²⁴⁴ Wu Riqiang argued that the choice for building up its nuclear weapons is inevitable, a decision that would break China's minimal deterrence doctrine and undoubtedly spur on the security dilemma between the U.S. and China. Wu Riqiang argued that for China, ICBMs are the most trustworthy way to deliver nuclear weapons and that in comparison to other delivery methods China's technological position is not in a place to develop strategic bombers or nuclear submarines. Therefore, the loss of strategic stability between the U.S. and China will force China to build more nuclear missiles and will lead to an arms race between the two states.²⁴⁵ Wang Dong agreed, "If China views the US-Japan Alliance as doing something hostile or targeted against China, China will respond in kind. Perceptions are an important factor because it deepens the security dilemma. For example, the TMD and THAAD developments contribute to a spiral in the security dilemma."²⁴⁶

Xin Qiang of Fudan University argued that TMD poses a security threat because of its close proximity to the Chinese mainland. He stated, "China must oppose it because it is a political and diplomatic issue with implications upon the

²⁴³ Yao Yunzhu, "Chinese Nuclear Policy and the Future of Minimum Deterrence," p. 120.

²⁴⁴ Yao Yunzhu, "Chinese Nuclear Policy and the Future of Minimum Deterrence," p. 120.

²⁴⁵ Wu Riqiang [吴日强], Personal Interview, 19 November 2015, Renmin University.

²⁴⁶ Wang Dong [王栋], Personal Interview, 28 December 2015, Peking University.

regional security. If China does not oppose it, it will allow the U.S. to do anything it wants in the region.”²⁴⁷

Chinese Foreign Policy Outcomes

The US-Japan Alliance’s development of NMD and TMD systems have pushed China to respond. One area that none of the Chinese scholars in the sample of journal articles or interview subjects mentioned was China’s development of Anti-Satellite (ASAT) missile systems and China’s own BMD systems. China’s evaluations of adversarial alliance capabilities in the area of missile defense may have pushed China to develop its own ballistic missile defense systems, and it has conducted eight known tests.²⁴⁸ After the ground-based intercept test in January 2013, a professor from the Second Artillery Force Engineering Institute claimed, “the success of this missile defense test means that China has already successfully resolved the issue of upper atmosphere target identification, tracking, and terminal guidance issues and that its mid-course missile defense technology is at the forefront of world technology.”²⁴⁹ Table 5.6 below offers details on the ASAT and BMD tests details. The BMD tests correlate to US-Japan BMD cooperation that accelerated after North Korea’s long-range rocket test on 5 April 2009.²⁵⁰

²⁴⁷ Xin Qiang [信强], Personal Interview, 13 November 2015, Fudan University—American Studies Center.

²⁴⁸ Rose, “Ballistic Missile Defense and Strategic Stability in East Asia;” and Brian Weeden, “Anti-satellite Tests in Space—The Case of China,” *Secure World Foundation*, Last updated 16 August 2013, Available at http://swfound.org/media/115643/china_asat_testing_fact_sheet_aug_2013.pdf (Accessed 28 April 2016); Adityanjee, “ASAT Weapons Program with Chinese Characteristics,” *The Council for Strategic Affairs* (India), 23 November 2015, http://councilforstrategicaffairs.blogspot.com/2015/11/asat-weapons-program-with-chinese_23.html (Accessed 29 April 2016).

²⁴⁹ Office of the Secretary of Defense, “Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2015,” Annual Report to Congress, *U.S. Department of Defense*, 2015, p. 71 [pdf p. 79].

²⁵⁰ Christopher W. Hughes, *Japan’s Remilitarisation* (New York: Routledge, 2009), p. 143.

<i>Test Date</i>	<i>Missile</i>	<i>Target</i>	<i>Test Type & Comment</i>
7 July 2005	SC-19	None known	ASAT—Modified DF-21 (NATO CSS-5) rocket test
6 February 2006	SC-19	Unknown satellite	ASAT—Possibly flyby of orbital target Unknown altitude reached
11 January 2007	SC-19	FY-1C satellite	ASAT—Destroyed orbital target, 3,000+ pieces of debris
11 January 2010	SC-19	CSS-X-11 ballistic missile	BMD—Destruction of target at altitude of 250 kilometers
20 January 2013	Possibly SC-19	Unknown ballistic missile	BMD—Destruction of target at unknown altitude
13 May 2013	Possibly DN-2	Unknown	BMD—Destruction of target 10,000 to 30,000 kilometers
23 July 2014	Unknown	Unknown	BMD—Non-destructive test at low orbit altitude
30 October 2015	DN-3	Unknown	BMD—Non-destructive test >30,000 kilometers

Table 5.6. Chinese ASAT and BMD Tests²⁵¹

Perceptions of Alliance Capabilities:

Question 3a: Do Chinese analysts focus on the geostrategic factors of the adversarial alliance capabilities; for example, forward deployments, and use of ports, airfields, and military bases? Supported. Chinese analysts do note the presence of U.S. military bases in Japan that aid the U.S. military’s ability to project power in East Asia.

Question 3b: Do Chinese analysts focus on the strategic nuclear capabilities of the adversarial alliances? Supported. Chinese analysts predominantly focus on strategic defensive weapons and Japan’s de facto nuclear capability.

Question 3c: Do Chinese analysts focus on the conventional capabilities of the adversarial alliances? Supported. Chinese analysts do pay attention to conventional

²⁵¹ Rose, “Ballistic Missile Defense and Strategic Stability in East Asia;” and Brian Weeden, “Anti-satellite Tests in Space—The Case of China,” (Accessed 28 April 2016); and Adityanjee, “ASAT Weapons Program with Chinese Characteristics,” *The Council for Strategic Affairs* (India), 23 November 2015.

capabilities. In particular, highly advanced U.S. manufactured aircraft such as 45 F-15Js fighter aircraft for air superiority missions, and 107 SH-60J anti-submarine helicopters and five P-3C anti-submarine pursuit aircraft. The selected journals did not make mention of the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force growth.

Question 3d: Do Chinese analysts' perceptions of adversarial alliance capabilities and foreign basing influence its foreign policy outcomes? Supported. Concerning Japan's nuclear fissile material stockpile, China has pursued a "naming and shaming" tactic. In response to alliance missile defense, China may have felt pressured to pursue its own ASAT and ballistic missile defense systems.

5.8 US-JAPAN ALLIANCE SUMMARY

All four alliance perception concepts shed light on Chinese perceptions of the US-Japan Alliance. Three of them pointed towards Chinese foreign policy outcomes. The 1996 joint declaration and 1997 revised guidelines led to change in perceived intentions, and China responded with both attempts to avoid the security dilemma and to promote stronger relations with Russia. Next, China's assessment of a decline in US-Japan Alliance cohesion during the Hatoyama administration pushed it to seek greater cooperation with Japan. Finally, Chinese estimates of US-Japan Alliance missile defense capabilities may have pushed China to develop its own ballistic missile systems and the deployment of nuclear missile submarines into the Pacific Ocean.

6.0 CHAPTER 6: US-ROK ALLIANCE

6.1 CHAPTER SUMMARY

After providing context to the post-Cold War alliance activities, this chapter will provide a chronological narrative of developments in the US-ROK Alliance, addressing the six alliance perception concepts at key points. After providing the baseline intention of the alliance and the context to the post-Cold War alliance activities, the chapter will progress in a chronological fashion to bring attention to four alliance perception concepts. First, the Roh administration will offer an examination of alliance cohesion. Second, Chinese perceptions of increased US-ROK Alliance cohesion after the *Cheonan* and *Yeonpyeong* Island crises will display over-Machiavellianism. Third, I will examine China's perception of itself as a rising economic and military power in relation to the smaller alliance partner, South Korea. Fourth, Chinese perception of the alliance's current THAAD consultations will reveal thoughts on alliance capabilities and the alliance's long-standing U.S. bases on the Korean Peninsula. Fifth, I will quickly detail the absence of a shift in the way that Chinese analysts have perceived the intentions of the US-ROK Alliance. Each of these perception shaping categories will have varying degrees of influence on Chinese foreign policy outcomes.

6.2 BASELINE ALLIANCE INTENTIONS

U.S. national strategy seeks to prevent the emergence of a regional power in Eurasia that would prevent the U.S. from having access to Eurasia's economic activity and resources.¹ Alliances play a large part of fulfilling this national security policy. In 1995 the Nye Initiative stated, "America clearly has a stake in maintaining the alliance structure in Asia as a foundation of regional stability and a means of promoting American influence on key Asian issues. Asian friends and allies are critical to the success of our global strategy in many respects."² Concerning alliances, the U.S. PACOM strategy states, U.S. territories "coupled with our treaty alliances with Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, Philippines, and Thailand are the cornerstone of U.S. engagement in the region."³ Therefore, from the Nye Initiative to the most up-to-date U.S. PACOM publications alliances affirm engagement in East Asian affairs as a central facet of U.S. national security strategy. As Ashley Tellis wrote, "Other U.S. compacts, such as the ones with South Korea and Japan, have proved more durable because the absence of the Soviet Union has, unfortunately, been substituted by newer dangers in Asia: North Korea for starters, but increasingly China over the longer term."⁴

¹ Ronald O'Rourke, "China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities—Background and Issues for Congress," *Congressional Research Service*, RL33153, 31 May 2016, p. 2 [pdf p. 7], <https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33153.pdf> (Accessed 10 June 2016).

² Joseph S. Nye, Jr., "United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region," U.S. Department of Defense, 28 February 1995, Defense Technical Information Center, p. 2 [pdf p. 8], text available at <http://nautilus.org/global-problem-solving/us-security-strategy-for-the-east-asia-pacific-region/> (Accessed 2 May 2016).

³ "USPACOM Strategy," *U.S. Pacific Command*, Sections on Alliances and Partnerships, <http://www.pacom.mil/AboutUSPACOM/USPACOMStrategy.aspx> (Accessed 15 June 2016).

⁴ Ashley J. Tellis, "Seeking Alliances and Partnerships: The Long Road to Confederationism in U.S. Grand Strategy," chapter in Ashley J. Tellis, Abraham M. Denmark, and Greg Chaffin, eds, *Strategic Asia*

6.3 POST-COLD WAR BACKGROUND

At the conclusion of the Cold War, the US sought to reduce its personnel deployed to the Korean Peninsula and remove all tactical nuclear weapons. The Nunn-Warner Amendment to the 1989 Defense Appropriation Bill mandated a reduction in U.S. troop strength in South Korea from 43,000 to 36,000 by the end of calendar year 1991.⁵ Similarly, President George H.W. Bush recommended further reductions of U.S. forces throughout the 1990s.⁶ The U.S. accomplished the latter policy decision on 27 September 1991 when President Bush called for the withdrawal of all U.S. tactical nuclear weapons from South Korea.⁷ Arms control experts estimate that the U.S. removed sixty B-61 nuclear bombs and forty W-33 artillery shells.⁸ In December 1991, South Korean President Roh Tae-woo announced a nuclear free South Korea, and he would sign both the “North-South Declaration on the De-nuclearization of the Korean Peninsula” and the “Agreement on Reconciliation.”⁹ A further development towards a nuclear free peninsula materialized in May 1992 when North Korea allowed IAEA inspectors to visit the

2014-15: *U.S. Alliances and Partnerships at the Center of Global Power* (Seattle: The National Bureau of Asian Research, 2014), pp. 17-18.

⁵ “History,” *U.S. Army*, 8th Army, <http://8tharmy.korea.army.mil/site/about/history.php> (Accessed 26 January 2016).

⁶ Wang Jianwei and Wu Xinbo, *Against Us or With Us? The Chinese Perspective of America’s Alliances with Japan and Korea* (Stanford: The Asia/Pacific Research Center, 1998), p. 29.

⁷ George Bush: “Address to the Nation on Reducing United States and Soviet Nuclear Weapons,” *The American Presidency Project*, September 27, 1991. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=20035>; and Dunbar Lockwood, “The Status of U.S., Russian, and Chinese Nuclear Forces in East Asia,” from chapter 16 in Young Whan Kihl and Peter Hays, eds., *Peace and Security in Northeast Asia: The Nuclear Issue and the Korean Peninsula* (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1997), p. 323.

⁸ Dunbar Lockwood, “The Status of U.S., Russian, and Chinese Nuclear Forces in East Asia,” pp. 318-358.

⁹ Dunbar Lockwood, “The Status of U.S., Russian, and Chinese Nuclear Forces in East Asia,” p. 323; and Li Zhijun [李治军], “The US-ROK Alliance at a Crossroads” [*Chuzai shizilukou de Meihan tongmeng*], *China International Studies* [*Guoji wentie yanjiu*], No. 4, 2005, p. 49.

Nyongbyon Nuclear Research Facility. As part of the negotiations, the U.S. cancelled the TEAM SPIRIT 1992 joint exercise.¹⁰ TEAM SPIRIT was a massive joint military exercise that regularly involved 200,000 military personnel annually since the 1980s.¹¹

In other political developments, at the end of August 1992, South Korea and China normalized relations.¹² The next year, however, North Korean and South Korean bilateral relations deteriorated in light of IAEA findings that North Korea had engaged in three separate reprocessing campaigns. Previously, in May 1992 the North Koreans admitted to a single reprocessing campaign.¹³ As a result, the U.S. military announced in January that the TEAM SPIRIT joint exercise would resume.¹⁴ Despite South Korean President Kim Young-sam's desire to promote a peaceful policy with his neighbor to the north, North Korea announced its withdrawal from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty on 12 March 1993, and successfully tested a mid-range missile by the end of May.¹⁵ Two months later, July 1993, Clinton visited Seoul and made a commitment that the U.S. would remain engaged in East Asia; and

¹⁰ Kenneth C. Quinones, "South Korea's Approaches to North Korea," from chapter 2 in PARK Kyung-ae and Kim Dalchoong, eds., *Korean Security Dynamics in Transition* (New York: Palgrave, 2001), p. 37.

¹¹ John F. Farrell, "Team Spirit: A Case Study on the Value of Military Exercises as a Show of Force in the Aftermath of Combat Operations," *Air & Space Power Journal*, Fall 2009, 1 September 2009, <http://www.airpower.au.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj09/fal09/farrell.html>

¹² Nicholas D. Kristof, "Chinese and South Koreans Formally Establish Relations," *The New York Times*, 24 August 1992, <http://www.nytimes.com/1992/08/24/world/chinese-and-south-koreans-formally-establish-relations.html> (Accessed 7 March 2016).

¹³ L.V. Sigal, "How to bring North Korea back into the NPT," from chapter 5 in Olav Njølstad, ed., *Nuclear Proliferation and International Order: Challenges to the Non-Proliferation Treaty* (London: Routledge, 2011), p. 67.

¹⁴ Farrell, "Team Spirit: A Case Study on the Value of Military Exercises as a Show of Force in the Aftermath of Combat Operations."

¹⁵ Li Zhijun [李治军], "The US-ROK Alliance at a Crossroads," p. 49; and Shreeya Sinha and Susan C. Beachy, "Timeline on North Korea's Nuclear Program," *New York Times*, 20 November 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2014/11/20/world/asia/northkorea-timeline.html?_r=0#/#time238_10529

by October, the Pentagon followed through with Clinton's commitment by holding the U.S. troop presence in East Asia at 100,000 personnel.¹⁶ In the midst of these policy commitments, the U.S. and North Korea held high level negotiations from June 1993 until October 1994.¹⁷ Yet the negotiations did not prevent North Korea from launching a *Nodong-1* cruise missile with a range of 100 miles on 31 May 1994, nor prevent it from announcing its intention to withdraw from the IAEA.¹⁸ As a response to these enhanced threats, the U.S., Japan, and South Korea held its first Trilateral Defense Consultation in Hawaii to discuss the North Korean military threat and relations between the U.S. and China.¹⁹ U.S.-North Korean negotiations reached a compromise in October 1994, and the two sides signed the Agreed Framework. The U.S. agreed to cancel the TEAM SPIRIT 1994 joint exercise as a part of the negotiations.²⁰

In terms of alliance relations, the U.S. and South Korea held negotiations concerning peacetime operational control. Since the inception of the US-ROK Alliance, the United States Forces Korea (USFK) maintained peacetime operational control of South Korea's military. After the successful negotiations, South Korea gained peacetime operational control, but the USFK retained wartime operational

¹⁶ Wu Xinbo [吴心伯], "Discussion on the Formation of the Clinton Administration's Asia-Pacific Security Strategy" [*Lun Kelindun zhengfu yatai anquan zhanlüe de xingcheng*], *International Politics* [*Guoji zhengzhi yanjiu*], 2003, No. 2, pp. 67, 71 & 73.

¹⁷ Quinones, C. Kenneth, "South Korea's Approaches to North Korea," p. 21.

¹⁸ Christopher W. Hughes, *Japan's Security Agenda: Military, Economic & Environmental* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2004), p. 166; and Sinha and Beachy, "Timeline on North Korea's Nuclear Program."

¹⁹ Jeongwon Yoon, "Alliance Activities: Meetings, Exercises, and the CFC's Roles," in *Recalibrating the U.S.-Republic of Korea Alliance*, ed. Donald W. Boose Jr. et al. (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, May 2003), p. 94 [PDF p. 102], <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdf/files/PUB53.pdf>.

²⁰ Farrell, "Team Spirit: A Case Study on the Value of Military Exercises as a Show of Force in the Aftermath of Combat Operations."

control.²¹ The following year, the U.S., Japan, and South Korea worked in concert to form the Korea Energy Development Organization to address North Korean energy issues.²² Moreover, the three states would continue to hold Trilateral Defense Consultations each year to discuss the North Korean situation and regional security issues.²³

The North Korean security issue remained an important issue into the late 1990s. For example, on 18 September 1996, South Korean forces encountered a North Korean submarine trying to infiltrate South Korea with heavily armed espionage agents.²⁴ Furthermore, on 31 August 1998, North Korea launched a *Taepodong-1* missile that flew over Japan and into the Pacific Ocean.²⁵ Nonetheless, despite North Korean missile tests and suspicious behavior, South Korean President Kim Dae-jung's administration (25 February 1998 to 25 February 2003) put forward and maintained the "Sunshine Policy" as a non-confrontational policy to engage North Korea. As a sign of improving North-South relations, two years later, North Korean and South Korean leaders held their first summit meeting.²⁶ Yet, the same year North Korean and South Korean forces engaged in their first skirmish since the end of the Korean War on 15 June 1999 at *Yeonpyeong* Island. Despite the

²¹ Guo Xiangang, "New Orientation for ROK-U.S. Alliance," China International Studies (English Edition), No. 2, Summer 2006, p. 141.

²² Yang Yunzhong [杨运忠], "US Government Moves One Step Toward Adjusting its Japan Policy" [*Meiguo zhengfu jinyibu tiaozheng dui ri zhengce*], World Economics and Politics [*Shijie jingji yu zhengzhi*], 1995, No. 7, p. 64.

²³ Yoon, "Alliance Activities: Meetings, Exercises, and the CFC's Roles," p. 94 [PDF p. 102].

²⁴ Quinones, "South Korea's Approaches to North Korea," p. 41.

²⁵ Hughes, Japan's Security Agenda: Military, Economic & Environmental, p. 166.

²⁶ Li Zhijun [李治军], "The US-ROK Alliance at a Crossroads," p. 49; and Guo Xiangang, "New Orientation for ROK-U.S. Alliance," p. 146.

skirmish, the South Koreans displayed a remarkable degree of patience and persevered with the “Sunshine Policy.”²⁷

In March 2001, President Kim Dae-jung and President George W. Bush held discussions on the U.S. returning to the negotiating table with North Korea.²⁸ According to Morton Abramowitz, “Bush told Kim that his ‘Sunshine Policy’ of engagement, attempting gradual change of the North Korean system, was naive.”²⁹ Yet, the two sides still negotiated important agreements that greatly benefitted South Korea: the Land Partnership Plan that sought to move U.S. personnel from the De-Militarized Zone (DMZ) to Camp Humphreys.³⁰

6.4 PERCEPTIONS OF ADVERSARIAL ALLIANCE COHESION

In 2003, South Korea’s new president, Roh Moo-hyun (25 February 2003 to 25 February 2008), ushered in a new chapter in alliance history. The Roh administration advanced a “balancer diplomacy” strategy that encouraged greater independence from the U.S. Li Zhijun described the conflict between the Roh Moo-hyun administration and the George W. Bush administration as the most difficult

²⁷ “Northern Limit Line (NLL) West Sea Naval Engagements,” *Global Security*, Last updated 11 August 2011, <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/nll.htm> (Accessed 26 January 2016).

²⁸ Zhu Feng [珠峰], “George W. Bush Administration’s Korean Policy: Adjustment and Prospects” [*Xiao Bushi zhengfu de chaoxian bandao zhengce: tiaozheng yu qianzhan*], *International Politics* [*Guoji zhengzhi yanjiu*], 2001, No. 3, p. 61.

²⁹ Morton Abramowitz, “Can a White House Visit Shore Up a Sagging US-South Korea Alliance?” *Yale Global Online*, 14 September 2006, <http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/can-white-house-visit-shore-sagging-us-south-korea-alliance> (Accessed 23 March 2016).

³⁰ “Memorandum on the US-ROK Agreement to Relocation of the USFK from Seoul,” *U.S. State Department*, 26 October 2004, PDF download available at <http://2001-2009.state.gov/documents/organization/95894.pdf> (Accessed 26 January 2016).

crisis in the alliance's 50 year history. President Roh not only continued Kim Dae-Jung's "Sunshine Policy," but he issued many direct challenges to U.S. strategic direction that sought to expand the scope of contingencies that South Korea could participate.³¹

In terms of context, in the summer of 2002, a U.S. Army M-60 tank variant, AVLM, crushed two middle school aged girls. As a result, the USFK witnessed anti-American demonstrations, attacks on U.S. military personnel, and fire bombings at Camp Page and Camp Grey.³² Subsequently, a U.S. military court martial acquitted both the tank driver and another driver in late November 2002.³³ Due to the extraterritoriality clause in the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), and to the disdain of the South Koreans, the South Korean court system did not have the authority to prosecute the two U.S. Army sergeants. The next month, the U.S. and South Korea agreed to alter the de facto extraterritoriality status of USFK soldiers in the SOFA.³⁴ Additionally, anti-American sentiment helped candidate Roh Moo-hyun's Millennium Democratic Party secure the presidential election.³⁵ In 2002, Victor Cha assessed that local South Korean politicians could take advantage of anti-American grievances that stemmed from the SOFA agreement and other key issues such as "basing and land-use, live-fire exercises; host nation support; and the

³¹ Li Zhijun [李治军], "The US-ROK Alliance at a Crossroads," p. 50.

³² U.S. Congress, House, Committee on International Relations, 109th Congress, 2nd Session, United States-Republic of Korea Alliance: An Alliance at Risk? (Washington, D.C.: Committee on International Relations, 2006), Serial No. 109-231, 27 September 2006, p. 75 [pdf p. 79]. <http://webharvest.gov/congress110th/20081217015258/http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/archives/109/30142.pdf> (Accessed 24 March 2016).

³³ Don Kirk, "2nd U.S. Sergeant Is Cleared In the Death of 2 Korean Girls," *The New York Times*, 23 November 2002, <http://www.nytimes.com/2002/11/23/world/2nd-us-sergeant-is-cleared-in-the-death-of-2-korean-girls.html> (Accessed 25 March 2016).

³⁴ Guo Xiangang, "New Orientation for ROK-U.S. Alliance," p. 142.

³⁵ U.S. Congress, United States-Republic of Korea Alliance: An Alliance at Risk? p. 66 [pdf p. 70].

combined forces command structures.”³⁶ Table 6.1 below displays the Pew Research numbers on how unpopular the United States was in the summer of 2002.

Question 9a: Please tell me if you have a very favorable, somewhat favorable, somewhat unfavorable, or very unfavorable opinion of the United States.					
Time	Very favorable	Somewhat favorable	Somewhat unfavorable	Very unfavorable	Don't know or Refused
Summer, 2002	4	48	37	7	3
May, 2003	3	43	39	11	4
Spring, 2007	3	55	33	5	5
Spring, 2008	4	66	25	3	2
Spring, 2009	4	74	17	2	3
Spring, 2010	9	70	16	2	4
Spring, 2013	8	70	18	2	2

Table 6.1. South Korean Public Opinion of the United States³⁷

When the Roh administration began in February 2003, the US-ROK Alliance leadership was already undergoing a strategic readjustment. The U.S. and ROK sides reached agreement after holding two separate lengthy negotiations: 1) Future of the Alliance Policy Initiative (FOTA), and 2) The Security Policy Initiative (SPI). The FOTA negotiations started in November 2002 and stretched until the end of

³⁶ Victor D. Cha, “Mistaken Attribution: The United States and Inter-Korean Relations,” *Asia-Pacific Review*, Vol. 9, No. 2 (2002), p. 53.

³⁷ “South Korea Topline Questionnaire and Survey Methods,” *Pew Research Center*, Last update 6 May 2013, <http://www.pewglobal.org/2013/05/06/south-korea-topline-questionnaire-and-survey-methods/> (Accessed 25 March 2016). Research Details: Sample design-random digit dial; Sample size- 809 adults aged 18 and older; Margin of error- ± 3.7 percentage points. Due to rounding, percentages may not total 100%.

2004. The US-ROK Alliance partners held nine conferences to finalize four important changes in the alliance:³⁸

- 1) The U.S. agreed to consolidate over 30 U.S. military bases from their northern border positions in to two large bases in southern positions,
- 2) Discussions on handing over the mission of containing North Korea to the South Korean partners,
- 3) A reduction of U.S. forces by 12,500 personnel, and
- 4) The *Yongsan* Relocation Plan moved the U.S. military headquarters out of Seoul's prime real estate market and sent it to *Pyeongtaek* [平泽地区] roughly 20 miles south of Seoul.³⁹

Even though the alliance partners complete FOTA agreement negotiations in 2004, the USFK at present is still in the lengthy process of moving from Seoul and U.S. Army camps north of Seoul close to the DMZ. The *Pyeongtaek* military base covers more than five square miles and contains more than 500 buildings; construction crews should complete their work by 2017. The USFK's 210th Field Artillery Brigade will remain just south of the DMZ until South Korean units can take over the task of countering North Korean artillery.⁴⁰

³⁸ Guo Xiangang, "New Orientation for ROK-U.S. Alliance," pp. 145-146.

³⁹ Yang Hongmei [杨红梅], "Power Adjustment of the US-ROK Alliance, Situation and Prospects" [*Meihan tongmeng tiaozheng de dongle, xianzhuang yu qianjing*], *Contemporary International Relations* [*Xiandai guoji guanxi*], 2005, No. 8, pp. 21-22; and "Memorandum on the US-ROK Agreement to Relocation of the USFK from Seoul," *U.S. State Department*; and Guo Xiangang, "New Orientation for ROK-U.S. Alliance," p. 143.

⁴⁰ "USFK relocation to Pyeongtaek pushed back to end of 2017," *Yonhap News Agency*, 13 December 2015, <http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/news/2015/12/13/0200000000AEN20151213002100315.html> (Accessed 6 June 2016).

Guo Xiangang notes how the USFK adopted policies that called for greater ownership of its own defenses.⁴¹ In part, these moves towards greater independence were due to the U.S. wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, which caused a drawdown of the USFK. Most importantly, the FOTA negotiations worked to resolve long-held problems with U.S. basing in South Korea. In 2006, testimony by Deputy Under Secretary of Defense Richard Lawless to the House Committee on International Relations revealed “legacy issues” as a source of anti-American sentiment that President Roh used to propel his election to presidency. Mr. Lawless stated:⁴²

For example, we reached an agreement with the Republic of Korea in, I believe, 1990, and again, I believe, in 1992, to remove Yongsan from the center of Seoul, a very tangible irritant in the center of their country and in the center of their capital. We had not executed on that agreement over that intervening 12-, 13-, 14-year period. So one of the things we set ourselves to do was resolve that issue, get out of Seoul, and return Yongsan to the control of the Republic of Korea, where it belongs.

There are other issues related to how our 2nd Infantry Division was organized and positioned north of the Han River. In many cases what we had were situations where just a growth of—economically had encroached upon those camps and created situations where we couldn’t even move our forces around. So we had no choice but to relocate.

The SPI meetings were ongoing at the time of Yang Hongmei’s writing, but Yang surmised the FOTA and SPI meetings displayed both progress and divergence of the alliance relationship. The U.S. was pushing South Korea to take on a greater burden of its own national security, and the South Koreans had to make some difficult strategic decisions to cooperate with or drift away from the American’s

⁴¹ Guo Xiangang, “New Orientation for ROK-U.S. Alliance,” p. 143.

⁴² U.S. Congress, United States-Republic of Korea Alliance: An Alliance at Risk?, p. 28 [pdf p. 32].

regional focus.⁴³ The U.S. military pressed its South Korean partners to expand the alliance from a Korean Peninsula focus to a “regional military” that would include Taiwan. The U.S. planned to rename the US-ROK Forces a “Northeast Asia Reserve Force.”⁴⁴ On this push for a new strategic direction, Li Zhijun’s interpretation is that the US-ROK Alliance was responding to two threats: 1) the North Korean military, and 2) the rising great power status of China. To confront these two threats, the alliance partners engaged in high level negotiations in October 2003. However, the suggested regional policy adjustments did not match up with the peace and stability goals set in motion by ROK President Kim Dae-jung and continued by Roh Moo-hyun.

On one hand, the FOTA and SPI negotiations actually aligned with the Roh administration’s desires to reduce South Korean dependence on the U.S. and make force adjustments that would lessen tensions with North Korea. In a speech on 15 August 2003, President Roh stated, “it’s not correct to be always dependent on U.S. military forces in ROK to safeguard our security. Independent national defense is not contradictory to the ROK-U.S. alliance. Their relations are mutually complemented. It’s already 55 years since the first government of ROK was established. It is in possession of strong economic strength that is 12th in the world. Now, it is the time for us to shoulder responsibilities of safeguarding our nation.”⁴⁵ This statement represented President Roh’s call for an independent national

⁴³ Yang Hongmei [杨红梅], “Power Adjustment of the US-ROK Alliance, Situation and Prospects,” p. 23.

⁴⁴ Li Zhijun [李治军], “The US-ROK Alliance at a Crossroads,” p. 51.

⁴⁵ Li Jun, “A Preliminary Analysis of Roh Moo-hyun’s ‘Balancer Diplomacy,’” Contemporary International Relations (English Edition), Vol. 15, No. 12 (December 2005), p. 34, LI Jun quoted from “President Roh Moo-hyun’s Celebrating Speech on August 15,” August 15, 2003, <http://news.naver.com/news/read.php?mode=LOD&office id=002&article id=0000005957>.

defense policy that included weapon modernization, and upgrading of information technology resources to increase combat capabilities.⁴⁶ Roh's comments about independent national defense did not fall on deaf ears in Washington, as Morton Abramowitz noted, "The US national-security establishment often expresses impatience with South Korea, questioning why the US should station troops there if the Koreans do not want them."⁴⁷ Likewise, Roh's advocacy of neutrality in South Korea's military alliance with America earned him criticism from the South Korean establishment.⁴⁸

Yet, on the Taiwan issue, the Roh administration was adamant that the South Koreans would not expand their scope towards Taiwan. On 8 March 2005, President Roh gave a speech at the South Korean Air and Land Officer School graduation that first diplomatically emphasized the importance of the U.S. military forces stationed in South Korea, but he also made a statement that went against the regional army direction desired by the U.S. military. President Roh stated, "I am here stating with extreme clarity. With exception to the circumstances we agreed to, the US military deployed to South Korea should not participate in any northeast Asian conflict. This is a firm principle that cannot be changed under any circumstances."⁴⁹ President Roh reiterated his position on regional affairs, "I clearly say that the USFK should not be involved in disputes in Northeast Asia without

⁴⁶ Guo Xiangang, "New Orientation for ROK-U.S. Alliance," pp. 145-146.

⁴⁷ Abramowitz, "Can a White House Visit Shore Up a Sagging US-South Korea Alliance?"

⁴⁸ "Roh wins, and looks to the North; South Korea's election; Roh wins," *Global Agenda*, 3 January 2003, *Academic OneFile*, (Accessed 24 March 2016).

⁴⁹ Li Zhijun [李治军], "The US-ROK Alliance at a Crossroads," p. 51.

Korea's agreement."⁵⁰ The above statements meant that the U.S. military's intentions of making the U.S. military stationed in South Korea able to respond to regional contingencies was conflicting with President Roh's strategic direction.

However, in September 2006, U.S. House Representative Tancredo inquired about South Korean resistance to U.S. deployment plans stationed on the Korean Peninsula to intervene in the Taiwan Straits in the event of an attack.⁵¹ Deputy Under Secretary of Defense Robert Lawless provided this answer: "Part of the process, and part of the discussions that we have had with the Republic of Korea in the past, has involved an issue called strategic flexibility. We just say that we are satisfied currently with the understanding that we have with the Republic of Korea with regard to the United States forces that are currently stationed in the Republic of Korea."⁵² Therefore, in rather vague terms, the Taiwan situation was resolved.

Guo Xiangang also noted that under President Roh, the ROK was attempting to change the US-ROK Alliance from a "protector-protégé" relationship into an alliance of equals.⁵³ In the 8 March graduation speech, President Roh asserted that in ten years South Korea would have complete military autonomy.⁵⁴ This statement echoed a speech a month previous that emphasized South Korean independence and "balancer diplomacy." Roh told the ROK National Assembly that South Korea "will fully take on all rights and responsibilities of a sovereign state. It will play the role of a balancer and promote peace and prosperity, not only on the Korean Peninsula,

⁵⁰ Guo Xiangang, "New Orientation for ROK-U.S. Alliance," p. 141.

⁵¹ U.S. Congress, United States-Republic of Korea Alliance: An Alliance at Risk?, p. 32 [pdf p. 36].

⁵² U.S. Congress, United States-Republic of Korea Alliance: An Alliance at Risk?, p. 32 [pdf p. 36].

⁵³ Guo Xiangang, "New Orientation for ROK-U.S. Alliance," p. 143.

⁵⁴ Guo Xiangang, "New Orientation for ROK-U.S. Alliance," p. 145; and Li Zhijun [李治军], "The US-ROK Alliance at a Crossroads," p. 50.

but also throughout Northeast Asia.”⁵⁵ President Roh repeatedly promoted South Korean “balancer diplomacy” as the ideal way of maintaining peace and stability between China and the U.S.⁵⁶ In fact, Roh’s “balancer diplomacy” produced controversy in 2005 when the South Korean Defense Ministry removed all references to North Korea as South Korea’s “main enemy” from its official white paper.⁵⁷ Yet, President Roh’s moves to soften tensions between the ROK and North Korea ran counter to Washington’s policy direction in the mid-2000s.

Guo pointed to the external political environment as a source of cohesion. He noted that during this period of decreased tensions between the two Korean states, the US-ROK relationship suffered because the George W. Bush administration took a hardline approach towards North Korea that included abandoning the 1994 Nuclear Framework Agreement.⁵⁸ Guo summarized Roh’s softer policies that sought to maintain the peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula naturally led to conflict within the alliance.⁵⁹ Li Jun contends that the U.S. and the ROK view the North Korean threat differently. Balbina Hwang, a senior policy analyst at the Heritage Foundation, testified to the House International Relations Committee in 2006, “Today, the majority of South Koreans no longer view North Korea as an invincible, evil enemy intent on conquering the South. Rather, the greatest threat posed by the North is the instability of the regime which could lead to a collapse (whether through implosion or explosion), thereby devastating the South’s economic, political

⁵⁵ Li Jun, “A Preliminary Analysis of Roh Moo-hyun’s ‘Balancer Diplomacy,’” p. 24.

⁵⁶ Li Jun, “A Preliminary Analysis of Roh Moo-hyun’s ‘Balancer Diplomacy,’” p. 25; and Yang Hongmei [杨红梅], “Power Adjustment of the US-ROK Alliance, Situation and Prospects,” pp. 20-25, and 45.

⁵⁷ Guo Xiangang, “New Orientation for ROK-U.S. Alliance,” p. 146.

⁵⁸ Guo Xiangang, “New Orientation for ROK-U.S. Alliance,” p. 147.

⁵⁹ Guo Xiangang, “New Orientation for ROK-U.S. Alliance,” p. 147.

and social systems.”⁶⁰ For South Korea, an abrupt DPRK collapse and initiation of “involuntary military conflicts” is the worst case scenario, but for the U.S., it views the DPRK as a nuclear threat and a source of nuclear weapon proliferation.⁶¹ As T. J. Pempel stated, the U.S. and South Korea under President Roh were “clearly pursuing differently calibrated moves toward the DPRK.”⁶² This divide caused Kurt Campbell to write in 2004, “The Alliance between the United States and South Korea is in bad shape, and it is unclear how it might be repaired. Indeed, the relationship may already have taken on less significance and become relegated to the ash heap of old alliance partnerships, given the difficulties in finding common ground for how to deal with North Korea.”⁶³

Another area of contention between the alliance partners pertains to the peacetime and wartime operational control of the alliance forces. In both April and September 2005, the ROK government announced its refusal to participate in a specific operation plan (OPLAN5029-05).⁶⁴ The plan mandated that in the event of an emergency in North Korea, the commander-in-chief of USFK would assume control over all of the US-ROK Alliance forces.⁶⁵ Li Jun argues that the Roh administration was attempting to establish an equal relationship with the U.S.; thus, attempting to recover military sovereignty and operational command were

⁶⁰ U.S. Congress, *United States-Republic of Korea Alliance: An Alliance at Risk?*, p. 44 [pdf p. 48].

⁶¹ Li Jun, “A Preliminary Analysis of Roh Moo-hyun’s ‘Balancer Diplomacy,’” p. 39.

⁶² T. J. Pempel, “Challenges to Bilateralism: Changing Foes, Capital Flows, and Complex Forums,” from chapter 1 in Ellis S. Krauss and T. J. Pempel, eds., *Beyond Bilateralism: U.S.-Japan Relations in the New Asia-Pacific* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004), p. 18.

⁶³ Kurt M. Campbell, “The End of Alliances? Not So Fast,” *The Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 27, No. 2 (Spring 2004), p. 159.

⁶⁴ Yang Hongmei [杨红梅], “Power Adjustment of the US-ROK Alliance, Situation and Prospects,” pp. 20-25, and 45; and Guo Xiangang, “New Orientation for ROK-U.S. Alliance,” p. 142.

⁶⁵ Guo Xiangang, “New Orientation for ROK-U.S. Alliance,” p. 141-142.

important goals for South Korea.⁶⁶ At that time, *The Economist* reported that the alliance was under strain, stating President Roh “treats two current wrangles between the allies—the intended relocation of America's huge military base, Yongsan, out of downtown Seoul, and a debate about whether America should concede operational control of allied forces in wartime—as issues of national sovereignty, as if the United States were an occupier.”⁶⁷ Subsequent negotiations on operational control did not produce a solution until June 2009 under the Obama administration when the U.S. promised to hand over full peacetime and wartime operational control in 2015.⁶⁸

Guo Xiangang from the China Institute of International Studies argued that the Bush administration pressured President Roh to concede that the U.S. was the ultimate balancer in Asia before his visit to the U.S. in June 2005. Six months later, on 17 November 2005, Bush and Roh issued a joint declaration, “proposing to deepen and develop a comprehensive, dynamic and mutually beneficial partnership.”⁶⁹ In January 2006, the alliance was continuing to show signs of recovery when the alliance partners marked an important first in holding the US-ROK Strategic Dialogue.⁷⁰ South Korea agreed to “respect the necessity for strategic flexibility of the U.S. Forces in the ROK” while the U.S. pledged, “not be involved in a

⁶⁶ Li Jun, “A Preliminary Analysis of Roh Moo-hyun’s ‘Balancer Diplomacy,’” p. 25.

⁶⁷ “Awkward bedfellows,” *The Economist*, 7 September 2006, <http://www.economist.com/node/7887978> (Accessed 23 March 2016).

⁶⁸ Speech, “A New Security Order in East Asia and the ROK-US Alliance,” *South Korea Ministry of Foreign Affairs*, 21 October 2011, http://www.mofa.go.kr/webmodule/htsboard/template/read/korboardread.jsp?typeID=12&boardid=304&seqno=312031&c=&t=&pagenum=1&tableName=TYPE_ENGLISH&pc=&dc=&wc=&lu=&vu=&iu=&du= (Accessed 8 March 2016)

⁶⁹ Guo Xiangang, “New Orientation for ROK-U.S. Alliance,” p. 149.

⁷⁰ Guo Xiangang, “New Orientation for ROK-U.S. Alliance,” p. 150.

regional conflict in Northeast Asia against the will of the Korean people.”⁷¹ Subsequently, the U.S. agreed to handover maritime operational control to South Korea.⁷² Further movement towards mending the alliance relationship came on 28 March 2006 when ROK President Roh said that he was not “anti-American,” re-emphasized the strategic and economic importance that the U.S. plays in South Korea, and desired to maintain a close relationship with the U.S.⁷³ President George W. Bush and President Roh again held a summit meeting in November 2006, and South Korea committed to build a “comprehensive and mutually beneficial partnership” with the United States.⁷⁴ Therefore, the US-ROK Alliance experienced a difficult time from the summer of 2002 to March 2006.

While some Chinese analysts point to President Roh’s time in office as a low point in alliance cohesion, Sun Xuefeng noted the immediate disappearance of the cohesion issues after Roh left office. Jeffrey Bader’s account chronicles the quick turnaround in senior level interaction. Roh’s successor Lee Myung-bak’s first meeting with Obama highlights the contrast between the two South Korean administrations. President Lee was one of the administration’s first head-of-state visitors to the White House, and the two presidents’ “public and private messages indicated solidarity against North Korea’s nuclear program and other provocations and the firmness of the U.S. security guarantee to South Korea.”⁷⁵ Sun’s stance is that the source of the problem was from within the ROK government and not related

⁷¹ Guo Xiangang, “New Orientation for ROK-U.S. Alliance,” pp. 140-141.

⁷² Guo Xiangang, “New Orientation for ROK-U.S. Alliance,” pp. 142, 149-150.

⁷³ Guo Xiangang, “New Orientation for ROK-U.S. Alliance,” p. 149.

⁷⁴ Guo Xiangang, “New Orientation for ROK-U.S. Alliance,” p. 144.

⁷⁵ Jeffrey A. Bader, Obama and China’s Rise: An Insider’s Account of America’s Asia Strategy (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2012), pp. 33-34.

to ROK's dependence on the U.S. Therefore, China had no way of disrupting the US-ROK Alliance with a wedge strategy to break apart the alliance, because such a strategy would be counter-productive. Sun argues that it was best for China to keep quiet and let the alliance run its course. To explain, Sun provides the example of a married couple arguing over a small matter, and if a third-party observer says something about the argument the married couple will quickly make amends over the small matter.⁷⁶ Under this logic, by China attempting to split the alliance, China would only make the alliance reconstitute itself in the face of an open challenge to divide it. Sun specifically mentioned that China would not try a "wedge" strategy like that suggested by Timothy Crawford.⁷⁷ However, President Roh's "balancer diplomacy" might have offered an opportunity for China to pursue the Sino-South Korean free trade agreement. In November of 2004, President Hu and President Roh agreed to launch an "unofficial feasibility study" that would move the two countries towards a final signed agreement on 2 June 2015.⁷⁸

On the institutional level, Yu Tiejun contends that while the leadership issues presented serious political disagreements at the senior level, the US-ROK Alliance remained secure and intact. The respective militaries and defense departments of both states remained in close coordination despite the issues between senior political leadership. As Yu Tiejun stated, "Most of the analysis concerning talk of US-Japan Alliance and US-ROK Alliance changes in cohesion concern the political

⁷⁶ Sun Xuefeng [孙学峰], Personal Interview, 5 November 2015, Tsinghua University.

⁷⁷ Timothy W. Crawford, "How Wedge Strategies Shape Power Politics," *International Security*, Vol. 35, No. 4, Spring 2011, pp. 155-189; and Timothy W. Crawford, "Wedge Strategy, Balancing, and the Deviant Case of Spain, 1940-41," *Security Studies*, Vol. 17, No. 4, Spring 2011, pp. 155-189.

⁷⁸ "China FTA Network," *Chinese Ministry of Commerce*, Last updated March 2016, <http://fta.mofcom.gov.cn/topic/enkorea.shtml> (Accessed 23 May 2016).

dealings of the two governments and do not really account for the depth of the security cooperation that is still present and very difficult to see from outside.”⁷⁹ This judgement by Yu Tiejun aligns well with non-Chinese sources that both the South Korean and the American national security establishments were displeased with the Roh administration’s policies.⁸⁰

Adversarial Alliance Cohesion:

Question 2a: Do Chinese analysts of adversarial alliance cohesion presume that it is a function of external political context? Supported. Chinese analysts viewed the reduced tensions between North and South Korea as a cause of Roh’s ambivalence towards the U.S., and the political crises in the next section will contrast this low point in adversarial alliance cohesion.

Question 2b: Do Chinese analysts of adversarial alliance cohesion focus on the institutional solidarity between the alliance partners? Supported. Chinese analysts noted that high level of security cooperation and successful negotiations were still evident throughout the low-point in adversarial alliance cohesion. Yet, in the sample of journal articles I did not find reference to either the South Korean or U.S. defense establishments being displeased by the disagreements.

Question 2c: Do Chinese analysts of adversarial alliance cohesion focus on the interactions between the alliance partners’ senior leadership? Supported. Numerous Chinese analysts pointed to the senior leadership disagreements between President George W. Bush and the Roh administration.

⁷⁹ Yu Tiejun [于铁军], Personal Interview, 24 November 2015, Peking University.

⁸⁰ Abramowitz, “Can a White House Visit Shore Up a Sagging US-South Korea Alliance?”; and “Roh wins, and looks to the North; South Korea’s election; Roh wins.”

Question 2d: Do Chinese analysts of adversarial alliance cohesion focus on the domestic politics of the alliance partners? Supported. Two Chinese analysts detailed South Korean domestic concerns over the FOTA issues and the low view of the U.S. in the summer of 2002 after the roadway accident killed two middle school girls.

Question 2e: Do Chinese analysts' perceptions of adversarial alliance cohesion influence Chinese foreign policy outcomes? No evidence points to Chinese foreign policy outcomes being influenced by the low-point in adversarial alliance cohesion. Potentially, President Roh's openness towards China presented an opportunity to pursue the Sino-South Korean free trade agreement in November of 2004.

6.5 PERCEPTIONS OF CONSPIRACY

After the US-ROK Alliance experienced an episode of low cohesion in the early and mid-2000s, the US-ROK Alliance would rebound as tensions with North Korea increased. The alliance partners responded by enhancing security cooperation to counter the North Korean threat. This increase in cohesiveness of the alliance did not escape the attention of Chinese analysts, and it caused some to speculate that the U.S. was manipulating the crises for its own benefit. This interpretation moved past overcentralization to over-Machiavellianism. To demonstrate this point, I have divided the incidents into two phases: the 2006 and 2009 North Korean nuclear tests and the 2010 *Cheonan* and *Yeonpyeong* Island crises.

6.5.1 Phase 1: 2006 and 2009 North Korean Nuclear Tests

The year 2006 saw an escalation in tensions between North Korea and the US-ROK Alliance. On 5 July 2006, North Korea launched seven missiles over the Sea of Japan, and on 6 October 2006, it conducted its first nuclear test—a clear violation of the Agreed Framework. Consequently, although the Six-Party Talks resumed on 31 October 2006, they eventually collapsed in December 2008. Five months later, on 25 and 26 May 2009, North Korea conducted its second nuclear test and fired three missiles into the sea near Japan.⁸¹ The next month, President Obama and South Korean President Lee issued the “Joint Vision Statement” that pointed towards the year 2015 as the year South Korea would take full operational command, both in peacetime and wartime.⁸²

Li Jun’s interpretation of the 2006 and 2009 North Korean nuclear tests points to the U.S. manipulating the North Korean security threat to its advantage. President Roh’s “balancer diplomacy” challenged U.S. strategic goals which were “to keep its troops deploying along the frontline in the Peninsula and maintain the ROK-U.S. alliance so as to consolidate its hegemony in the region.”⁸³ Li Jun argued that the U.S. conveniently uses the North Korean nuclear threat as a way to block the peaceful unification of the Korean Peninsula, because the existence of the US-ROK Alliance rests on the existence of the North Korean threat. If the North Korean threat did not exist, the U.S. military forward deployed on the peninsula would need

⁸¹ Sinha and Beachy, “Timeline on North Korea’s Nuclear Program.”

⁸² Kurt M. Campbell, “The Security Situation on the Korean Peninsula,” *U.S. State Department, Statement Before the Senate Armed Services Committee*, 16 September 2010, <http://www.state.gov/p/eap/rls/rm/2010/09/147210.htm> (Accessed 26 January 2016).

⁸³ Li Jun, “A Preliminary Analysis of Roh Moo-hyun’s ‘Balancer Diplomacy,’” p. 40.

to depart. Likewise, Li Zhijun noted that South Korea's trend towards "moving closer" to China and "being at odds with the leadership" has given the U.S. a deep sense of insecurity. Li concluded, "In order to maintain and strengthen the US-ROK Alliance, the U.S. thinks the best method is to exaggerate the North Korean nuclear threat, plot how to use force against North Korea, and bind South Korea on to the war chariot."⁸⁴ This evaluation of the US-ROK Alliance represents Chinese perception of conspiracy because it emphasizes a U.S. conspiracy to promote U.S. hegemony in northeast Asia.

Yet, the U.S. worked diligently to solve the North Korean nuclear issue by participating in the Six-Party Talks hosted by China, and it even offered North Korea a negative security assurance that the U.S. would not attack North Korea with nuclear weapons or conventional weapons. Victor Cha, a U.S. negotiator at the Six Party Talks, recounted the details of when the U.S. offered a negative security assurance to North Korea, the Russians called a special bilateral meeting to communicate to the North Koreans the importance of this type of assurance. In Victor Cha's words, this is what the Russian negotiators told him after the special bilateral meeting with the North Koreans:

We saw this language and we told the North Koreans that what this language basically constitutes is a negative security assurance: the United States will not attack North Korea with nuclear or conventional weapons. We consider this to be very significant language because we tried to get language like this from you during the Cold War and we could never get it. So the fact that you are now offering this language to us is very significant, and we told the North Koreans that.⁸⁵

⁸⁴ Li Zhijun [李治军], "The US-ROK Alliance at a Crossroads," p. 53.

⁸⁵ Victor D. Cha and Joanne J. Myers, "North Korea: What Next?" *Carnegie Council for Ethics in International Affairs*, 3 June 2009, Transcript available here: <http://www.cceia.org/resources/transcripts/0172.html>, Accessed 21 October 2009.

This quote above shows how serious the U.S. side was about negotiating towards a solution to the North Korean nuclear threat. Moreover, during the Six-Party Talks the U.S. was willing to remove North Korea off the U.S. State Department's international terrorism sponsor list. When the U.S. did this action in hopes of furthering the negotiation process on the North Korean nuclear program it cost political capital with Japan.⁸⁶ If the U.S. wanted to manipulate the North Korean threat to keep a strong US-ROK Alliance, the U.S. would not have taken an action that damaged alliance cohesion with the US-Japan Alliance at the negotiating table. In consideration of the increase of forces in the Asian-Pacific region in 2006 he mentions naval and marine capabilities, Kurt Campbell wrote:

The United States must maintain a forward deployed military presence in the region that is both reassuring to friends and a reminder to China that we remain the ultimate guarantor of regional peace and stability. Capital ships, stealthy submarines, expeditionary Marine forces, and overwhelming air power will likely offer the most effective military instruments for managing a range of Asian scenarios involving core U.S. interests.⁸⁷

U.S. national security strategy leans on Geoffrey Blainey's conclusion that "a clear preponderance of power tended to promote peace."⁸⁸ The U.S. displays a preponderance of power to convince states in the Asia-Pacific that a war would be very costly. Additionally, Blainey wrote, "It is not the actual distribution or balance of power which is vital: it is rather the way in which national leaders *think* that

⁸⁶ Fan Xiaojun, "The Futenma Issue: Implications for U.S.-Japan Alliance," Contemporary International Relations (English Edition), Vol. 20, No. 3 (May/June 2010), p. 76.

⁸⁷ Kurt M. Campbell and Michael E. O'Hanlon, Hard Power: The New Politics of National Security (New York: Basic Books, 2006), p. 208.

⁸⁸ Geoffrey Blainey, The Causes of War, 3rd ed. (New York: The Free Press, 1988), p. 113.

power is distributed [emphasis in original].”⁸⁹ The U.S. Department of Defense works to maintain this preponderance of power and is evidenced by U.S. PACOM’s statement on its “Readiness to Fight”: “USPACOM is first and foremost a war fighting command, committed to maintaining superiority across the range of military operations in all domains.”⁹⁰

However, this maintenance of a preponderance of power does not mean that the U.S. is seeking to contain China. As Jeffrey Bader explains, “Containment in the style of U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union after World War II was not a plausible option. China was now completely integrated into the global economy and indeed had been explicitly encouraged by the United States to move in this direction... U.S. policy toward a rising China could not rely solely on military muscle, economic blandishments and pressure...”⁹¹

6.5.2 Phase 2: 2010 Cheonan and Yeonpyeong Incidents

The year 2010 held two tests for the US-ROK Alliance. First, on 27 March, a North Korea torpedo sank the South Korean Navy ship *Cheonan* in a disputed maritime border area—46 sailors died. Second, on 23 November, the North Korean military shelled *Yeonpyeong* Island—2 ROK Marines and 2 ROK civilians died as a result. The US-ROK Alliance responded by holding large scale joint military

⁸⁹ Blainey, *The Causes of War*, p. 114.

⁹⁰ “USPACOM Strategy,” *U.S. Pacific Command*, Section Readiness to Fight, <http://www.pacom.mil/AboutUSPACOM/USPACOMStrategy.aspx> (Accessed 15 June 2016).

⁹¹ Bader, *Obama and China’s Rise: An Insider’s Account of America’s Asia Strategy*, p. 3.

exercises in the Yellow Sea and more than 27 districts. The U.S., Japan, and South Korea then met to coordinate their North Korean policies on 5 December 2010.⁹²

In stark contrast to the Roh administration, the security relationship between the U.S. and the ROK flourished under the presidency of Lee Myung-bak (25 February 2008 to 25 February 2013). The US-ROK Alliance moved towards a “comprehensive strategic alliance” as the U.S. put in writing for the first time its policy of extending nuclear deterrence over South Korea on 14 June 2012. This important deterrence distinction added South Korea into a special grouping of states (NATO, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand).⁹³ Moreover, the joint statement included the special term, “linchpin,” in describing the US-ROK Alliance as an integral part in securing the stability and prosperity of the Asia-Pacific region. Ordinarily, U.S. official reserved the “linchpin” term specifically for the US-Japan Alliance. Additionally, the ROK signaled greater involvement by resuming its deployment of troops to Afghanistan.⁹⁴ When an alliance partner is putting their own soldiers into dangerous environments, they are signaling alliance commitment.

Numerous Chinese scholars noted the increase in US-ROK Alliance cooperation. For example, Zhu Feng was quick to note how the US-ROK Alliance cohesion increased dramatically in the wake of the sinking of the *Cheonan*, and the shelling of *Yeonpyeong* Island.⁹⁵ He was also critical of what he termed a “trilateral alliance,” the combining of the US-ROK Alliance and the US-Japan Alliance on 5

⁹² Zhu Feng, trans. Yi Dong, “The Korean Peninsula after the Tian An Incident,” Contemporary International Relations (English Edition), Vol. 21, No. 6 (November/December 2011), pp. 55, 57 & 60.

⁹³ Sun Ru, trans. Ma Zongshi, “Toward A China-U.S.-ROK Cooperative Triangle,” Contemporary International Relations (English Edition), Vol. 24, No. 4 (July/August 2014), p. 106.

⁹⁴ Sun Ru, trans. Ma Zongshi, “Toward A China-U.S.-ROK Cooperative Triangle,” p. 106.

⁹⁵ Zhu Feng, trans. Yi Dong, “The Korean Peninsula after the Tian An Incident,” p. 55.

December 2010. Zhu Feng's article begins by noting that in 2010 tensions on the Korean Peninsula were high and the two incidents "pushed the region almost to the brink of war."⁹⁶ Yet, later in the article Zhu Feng writes, "Those two incidents in 2010 gave the U.S. a good excuse to consolidate the trilateral military alliance with South Korea and Japan, to build closer ties—both military and political—with South Korea at a time when South Korea seemed to be growing closer to China for economic reasons, to stop a rising China from replacing U.S. influence in the region and to keep hold of its other strategic resources in East Asia."⁹⁷ Zhu Feng interprets the "trilateral alliance" as a hedge against China's rise instead of a move against North Korea. Furthermore, Zhang and Wang cite the *Cheonan* sinking in 2010 as an excuse to bolster alliance ties. They are in complete agreement with Zhu Feng in writing,

The U.S. thinks, "The primary state in the midst of all the newly developing states, China possesses the largest possibility of developing a military competition with the U.S." As a result, after the *Cheonan* incident, the U.S. and the ROK used containment of North Korea as a pretext to continue to hold large-scale military exercises in the Yellow Sea, a serious threat to China's national security. The U.S. used all of its power to initiate the formation of a US-ROK-Japan security cooperation to contain China.⁹⁸

Qi Dapeng and Zhang Chi are in agreement with Zhu Feng's earlier assertion from 2010, they wrote, "Washington has used the DPRK Threat as an excuse for building up its military presence in the region so as to solidify its military/security

⁹⁶ Zhu Feng, trans. Yi Dong, "The Korean Peninsula after the Tian An Incident," p. 55.

⁹⁷ Zhu Feng, trans. Yi Dong, "The Korean Peninsula after the Tian An Incident," p. 59.

⁹⁸ Zhang and Wang [张慧智与王箫轲], "Twenty Years of China-ROK Relations: Achievements and Problems," p. 23. The quote concerning U.S. strategic thinking is from a Quadrennial Defense Review Report, 6 February 2006, p. 29.

alliance and therefore its preeminence in the region as a whole.”⁹⁹ Similarly, Liu Jianping asserted that the U.S. deliberately confronted Prime Minister Hatoyama’s “East Asian Community” policies by manipulating North and South Korean tensions and China’s territorial tensions. He writes, “The U.S. on one hand refused [Hatoyama’s policy direction], and on the other hand manipulated the ‘*Cheonan* Incident’ and Sino-Japanese and Sino-ASEAN maritime territorial disputes to engineer a joint military exercise. The situation once more exaggerated the ‘North Korean threat’ and the ‘China threat’.”¹⁰⁰

The conspiratorial nature of the Chinese interpretations rest on a faulty assumption: if an outcome benefitted the U.S., then the U.S. must have instigated the tensions. This assumption disregards the agency exercised by North Korea to sink the *Cheonan* and shell *Yeonpyeong* Island. Moreover, it presumes that the U.S. desires a conflict on the Korean Peninsula to aid its position in Northeast Asia. In contrast to the perceptions of conspiracy, one Chinese analyst in the sample of journal articles offered an explanation that rests on cohesion being a function of the external environment. Tang Yongsheng noted that alliance cohesion prospered when tension increased, “When inter-Korean relations were strained, the U.S. upgraded its South Korea-U.S. military alliance.”¹⁰¹

⁹⁹ Qi Dapeng and Zhang Chi, trans. Ma Zongshi, “The Changing Asia-Pacific Strategic Picture,” Contemporary International Relations (English Edition), Vol. 24, No. 6 (November/December 2014), p. 29.

¹⁰⁰ Liu Jianping [刘建平], “China in East Asia: Experiences of Regional Politics and Regionalism” [*Dongya de Zhongguo: diqu zhengzhi jingyan yu diqu zhuyi sixiang*], World Economics and Politics [Shijie jingji yu zhengzhi], 2011, No. 6, p. 53.

¹⁰¹ Tang Yongsheng, trans. Wang Hui, “The Impact of the U.S. Asia-Pacific Alliance on China’s Security,” Contemporary International Relations (English Edition), Vol. 23, No. 3 (May/June 2013), p. 31.

In regards to Chinese foreign policy outcomes, there is no direct evidence that points to Chinese perceptions of conspiracy pushing China towards certain policies. More likely, China recognized that the North Korean nuclear program was enhancing the US-ROK Alliance by heightening tension on the Korean Peninsula. In February 2013, China took a tough stance towards North Korea's nuclear bomb test preparations and issued "veiled threats" towards North Korea.¹⁰²

Perceptions of Conspiracy:

Question 1Ba: Do Chinese analysts interpret adversarial alliance activities as well organized and planned moves against them? Supported. Chinese analysts regularly view the US-ROK Alliance activities as promotion of "containment" policy. These assessments do not align well with the baseline intentions of the alliance.

Question 1Bb: Do Chinese analysts interpret adversarial alliance activities as a conspiracy aimed against them? Supported. Chinese analysts offered perceptions of conspiracy. Their logic was simple: since the U.S. alliance system became more robust in response to the North Korean nuclear program and the *Cheonan* and *Yeonpyeong* Island crises, then the U.S. must have manipulated the crises.

Question 1Bc: Are Chinese analysts able to correct perceptions of conspiracy? Potentially. One Chinese analyst offered a differing viewpoint that the alliance was responding to the external political environment. The differing viewpoint aligns well with the baseline intentions of the alliance.

Question 1Bd: Do Chinese analysts' perceptions of conspiracy influence Chinese foreign policy outcomes? Potentially. There is no evidence directly linking

¹⁰² Andrei Lankov, "North Korea Is a Nuclear Power," *Foreign Policy*, 12 February 2013, <http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/02/12/north-korea-is-a-nuclear-power/> (Accessed 31 May 2016).

perceptions of conspiracy to policy outcomes. Yet, China's recognition that North Korea's nuclear program was heightening the US-ROK Alliance caused China to issue "veiled threats" towards North Korea to cease testing nuclear weapons in 2013. This also could indicate that rational thought processes are prevailing over perceptions of conspiracy.

6.6 SELF-PERCEPTION OF RISING STATE IN RELATION TO ADVERSARIAL ALLIANCE

The rise of China's economic and military power and China's ever-expanding economic bilateral ties with South Korea represent two important and inter-related dynamics operating in the background of the US-ROK Alliance since the end of the Cold War. There are two distinct debates among Chinese analysts concerning China's rise and its relative position to the US-ROK Alliance. The first debate is China's prospering economic relationship holds lasting influence on the US-ROK Alliance. The second debate is how China should manage its rise in military power.

6.6.1 China's Rise in Economic Power

On the economic influence debate, it is undeniable that China's bilateral trade relationship is a great success. In 2011, the bilateral trade was valued at \$220.6

billion, 35 times the amount of bilateral trade in 1992.¹⁰³ In terms of bilateral trade between the two states, the numbers are staggering; bilateral trade has spiked from \$31.5 billion in 2001 to \$228.9 billion in 2013. For the same period, the ROK's percentage of total exports to China has risen from 12% to 26.1% while ROK percentage of total exports to the U.S. has dropped from 20.7% to 11.1%.¹⁰⁴ As evidenced by Table 6.2, the amount of bilateral trade between China and the ROK has increased exponentially.

<i>Year</i>	<i>ROK Exports to China (billions USD)</i>	<i>Percent of Total Exports</i>	<i>China Exports to ROK (billions USD)</i>	<i>Percent of Total Exports</i>
2000	18.45	10.71	11.29	4.53
2001	18.19	12.09	12.52	4.70
2002	23.75	14.62	15.53	4.77
2003	35.11	18.11	20.09	4.59
2004	49.76	19.60	27.81	4.69
2005	61.91	21.77	35.11	4.61
2006	69.46	21.34	44.52	4.60
2007	81.99	22.07	56.43	4.63
2008	91.39	21.66	73.93	5.17
2009	86.70	23.85	53.58	4.47
2010	116.84	25.05	68.77	4.36
2011	134.19	24.17	82.92	4.37
2012	134.32	24.52	87.67	4.28
2013	145.87	26.07	91.16	4.13

Table 6.2. South Korea's Import and Export Record with China¹⁰⁵

Moreover, South Korea has a sizable trade surplus with China and exports make up a sizeable portion of South Korea's GDP. For instance, in 2005, South Korea's exports to China were worth \$61.91 billion USD, and comprised 21.77% of total exports, which equated to 6.9% of South Korea's GDP. By comparison, in 2013

¹⁰³ Zhang and Wang [张慧智与王箫轲], "Twenty Years of China-ROK Relations: Achievements and Problems," p. 20.

¹⁰⁴ Sun Ru, trans. Ma Zongshi, "Toward A China-U.S.-ROK Cooperative Triangle," pp. 104-105.

¹⁰⁵ "World Integrated Trade Solution," *World Bank*, <http://wits.worldbank.org/Default.aspx?lang=en> (Accessed 14 January 2016).

South Korean exports to China equaled 12.2% of the state's GDP (in 2005 constant dollars).¹⁰⁶

One group of Chinese analysts argued that China's economic relationship was pushing South Korea away from the U.S. axis. Xin Qiang argued that rise of China's economic power and the alliance commitment held by South Korea is a precarious balance to manage.¹⁰⁷ China's free trade agreement with South Korea bolsters bilateral trade, and China's applications of serious pressure on North Korea are attempts to send benign signals to South Korea. Xin Qiang sees this change as a natural process, "when South Korea has higher stakes with China-South Korea relations it will show more hesitance toward cooperating with the U.S. if it will make China angry."¹⁰⁸ Xin Qiang argues that the economic rise of China has placed South Korea squarely between the interests of China and the United States. Xin Qiang argues that the economic rise of China has made it the largest trading partner of almost every neighboring state in East Asia and this naturally weakens the cohesion of the US-ROK Alliance. Additionally, China invites foreign investment and is an attractive market for exports. He stated, "If those countries want to fulfill their economic prosperity, they must have a good relationship with China. This will cause these states to think twice when the U.S. is calling them to challenge China."¹⁰⁹ For example, South Korea's current THAAD deployment issue "is a difficult decision for

¹⁰⁶ Republic of Korea Country Profile, "World Integrated Trade Solution," *World Bank*, <http://wits.worldbank.org/CountryProfile/en/Country/KOR/Year/2005/TradeFlow/Export> (Accessed 14 January 2016).

¹⁰⁷ Xin Qiang [信强], Personal Interview, 13 November 2015, Fudan University—American Studies Center.

¹⁰⁸ Xin Qiang [信强], Personal Interview, 13 November 2015, Fudan University—American Studies Center.

¹⁰⁹ Xin Qiang [信强], Personal Interview, 13 November 2015, Fudan University—American Studies Center.

President Park. China's economic boom provides a market for South Korean goods, so it is difficult for them to challenge China."¹¹⁰

Additionally, Li Zhijun, offered two reasons why South Korean leadership was not following the U.S. military's lead in expanding the scope of the US-ROK Alliance: 1) South Korea's economic dependence on exports to China, and 2) China's ability to influence North Korea's nuclear ambitions.¹¹¹ In the area of economic dependence, Guo Xiangang saw bilateral trade as an important indicator of the ROK strategic departure from the U.S. Guo reasons that ROK intervention or involvement in aiding U.S. military forces in the Taiwan Strait or in Northeast Asia would hold consequences for ROK's bilateral trade relationship with China.¹¹²

Finally, Sun Ru concluded that South Korea under President Park Geun-hye had already moved from "leaning" toward the U.S., to a new position of balance between the U.S. and China.¹¹³ Sun deduced that President Park's disrupted the usual order of state visits to signal "the importance she attached to relations with China."¹¹⁴ Normally, upon assumption of office, the ROK president would conduct state visits in the prescribed order: U.S., Japan, Russia, and China. President Park visited the U.S. in May 2013, but her second state visit was to China in June 2013.¹¹⁵

In contrast, other Chinese scholars see the limits of economics to divide the US-ROK Alliance. Yu Tiejun disagrees that China's rise is causing South Korea to lean towards China and contends that this viewpoint is superficial. Yu explained, "South

¹¹⁰ Xin Qiang [信强], Personal Interview, 13 November 2015, Fudan University—American Studies Center.

¹¹¹ Li Zhijun [李治军], "The US-ROK Alliance at a Crossroads," p. 52.

¹¹² Guo Xiangang, "New Orientation for ROK-U.S. Alliance," p. 141.

¹¹³ Sun Ru, trans. Ma Zongshi, "Toward A China-U.S.-ROK Cooperative Triangle," pp. 117-118

¹¹⁴ Sun Ru, trans. Ma Zongshi, "Toward A China-U.S.-ROK Cooperative Triangle," p. 108.

¹¹⁵ Sun Ru, trans. Ma Zongshi, "Toward A China-U.S.-ROK Cooperative Triangle," p. 108.

Korean public opinion polls suggest that more than 70% of South Koreans say that the U.S. is the most important state for South Korea. The two states are allies, and China is not an ally of South Korea. So while the China and South Korea economic relationship has prospered, the political and military relationship with the U.S. will be very difficult to change.”¹¹⁶ Zhu Feng agrees, while he noted that the loosening of US-ROK Alliance cohesion in recent years has provided China with some strategic space. Yet, Zhu Feng cautioned, “the U.S.-centric alliance system remains untouchable and unchangeable because the dynamics of economy and security are different.”¹¹⁷ Part of this unchangeable feature is South Korean elite consensus supports the U.S. axis. Yu Tiejun argued that the elite South Korean figures were all educated in the U.S. and lean heavily towards the U.S. They are not convinced that China represents the future and are not in favor of the China model. Thus, the bedrock of South Korea’s future lies in the US-ROK Alliance.¹¹⁸

Additionally, Wang Xiaoling of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences noted in 2012 pointed to ROK public opinion data that the consequences of China’s rise in economic power outweighed the positives because South Koreans feared that companies would move manufacturing jobs to China.¹¹⁹ Wang argues that this

¹¹⁶ Yu Tiejun [于铁军], Personal Interview, 24 November 2015, Peking University.

¹¹⁷ Zhu Feng [朱锋], Personal Interview, 8 December 2015, Nanjing University.

¹¹⁸ Yu Tiejun [于铁军], Personal Interview, 24 November 2015, Peking University.

¹¹⁹ Wang Xiaoling [王晓玲], “What Factors Influence the South Korean People’s Position on the China-US Relations” [*Shenme yinsu yingxiang hanguo minzhong zai Zhongmei zhijian de lichang*], World Economics and Politics [*Shijie jingji yu zhengzhi*], 2012, No. 8, p. 29

negative opinion towards China as an economic competitor increases favorable support towards the US-ROK Alliance.¹²⁰

6.6.2 China's Rise in Military Power

A substantial dichotomy exists between the level of security and economic relations between China and the ROK. Zhang Huizhi and Wang Xiaoke assessed that South Korea has a dual strategy of containment and cooperation towards China. On one hand, South Korea has a “comprehensive strategic alliance” with the United States that safeguards its security. On the other hand, South Korea has a “strategic partnership” with China that bolsters its economic relationship.¹²¹

China's defense budget since the 2000s clearly displays China's rise in military power. For instance, examination of the Chinese defense budget in 2011 constant dollars from 2004 at \$63.5 billion to 2014 at \$190.9 billion reveals tremendous growth over ten years—an increase of \$127.4 billion. By comparison, South Korea's defense budget was \$22.9 billion in 2004 and has grown to \$33.1 billion by 2014—an increase of \$10.2 billion.¹²² Chinese investments of monetary resources have gone into modernization and equipping all four elements of Chinese

¹²⁰ Wang Xiaoling [王晓玲], “What Factors Influence the South Korean People's Position on the China-US Relations,” p. 34.

¹²¹ Zhang Huizhi and Wang Xiaoke [张慧智与王箫轲], “Twenty Years of China-ROK Relations: Achievements and Problems” [*Zhonghan guanxi ershi nian: Chengjiu yu wenti*], Contemporary International Relations [*Xiandai guoji guanxi*], 2013, No. 1, p. 24.

¹²² “SIPRI Military Expenditure Database,” *Stockholm International Peace Research Institute*, Last Updated 3 November 2015, http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/milex_database (Accessed 23 December 2015).

defense: PLA Ground Forces, PLA Navy, PLA Air Force, and PLA Rocket Force.¹²³ As evidenced by Table 6.3 and Table 6.4, the Chinese military has grown in its power projection capabilities. The most notable additions are the military assets that were in development or absent from 2005 and 2005 reports that appear in the 2015 report. For instance, the PLA Ground Force’s development of an air wing and the growth of marine (amphibious) divisions and brigades enhance its abilities to assert itself on the battlefield.

<i>PLA Ground Forces</i>	<i>2005</i>	<i>2010</i>	<i>2015</i>
Group Armies	18	18	18
Infantry Divisions/Brigades (including airborne)	20/20	19/25	15/23
Armor Divisions/Brigades	10/10	9/8	1/17
Mechanized Infantry Divisions/Brigades	5/5	4/5	7/25
Artillery Divisions/Brigades	5/15	2/17	0/22
Army Aviation Brigades and Regiments	-	-	11
Marine (Amphibious) Divisions/Brigades	0/2	2/3	2/3
Tanks	6,500	7,000	6947
Artillery Pieces	11,000	8,000	7,953
<i>PLA Navy</i>	<i>2005</i>	<i>2010</i>	<i>2015</i>
Aircraft Carriers	-	-	1
Destroyers	21	25	21
Frigates	43	49	52
Corvettes	-	-	15
Tank Landing Ships/Amphibious Transport Docks	20	27	29
Medium Landing Ships	23	28	28
Diesel Attack Submarines	51	54	53
Nuclear Attack Submarines	6	6	5
Nuclear Ballistic Submarines	-	-	4

Table 6.3. PLA Ground and Naval Forces Growth and Modernization¹²⁴

¹²³ Office of the Secretary of Defense, “Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2016,” Annual Report to Congress, *U.S. Department of Defense*, 26 April 2016, <http://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2016%20China%20Military%20Power%20Report.pdf> (Accessed 15 June 2016), p. 1 [pdf p. 11]. As of 31 December 2015, the PLA Second Artillery Force was re-designated the PLA Rocket Force.

¹²⁴ Office of the Secretary of Defense, “The Military Power of the People’s Republic of China 2005,” Annual Report to Congress, *U.S. Department of Defense*, 19 July 2005, p. 44 [pdf p. 51], <http://archive.defense.gov/news/jul2005/d20050719china.pdf> (Accessed 3 June 2016); Office of the Secretary of Defense, “Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2010,” Annual Report to Congress, *U.S. Department of Defense*, 2010, p. 60 & 63 [pdf pp. 69 &

For the PLA Navy, its lone aircraft carrier garnered a lot of attention, but the addition of four nuclear ballistic submarines and 15 corvettes enhance China’s naval power.

<i>PLA Air Force</i>	<i>2005</i>	<i>2010</i>	<i>2015</i>
Fighters	1,500	1,680	1,700
Bombers	780	620	400
Transport	500	450	475
<i>PLA Rocket Force</i>	<i>2005</i>	<i>2010</i>	<i>2015</i>
<i>SRBMs</i>	<i>Launchers/Missiles</i>		
DF-15 (CSS-6)	70-80/230-270	90-110/350-400	90-110/350-400
DF-11 (CSS-7)	100-120/420-460	120-140/700-750	120-140/700-750
DF-16 (CSS-11)	-	-	Developmental
<i>IRBM & MRBMs</i>	<i>Launchers/Missiles</i>		
DF-21 (CSS-5 mod 1)	19-23/34-38	75-85/85-95	75-85/85-95
DF-21D (CSS-5 mod 5)	-	Developmental	Unknown
JL-1 SLBM	10-14	10-14	10-14
DF-26 (DF-21 Variant)	-	Developmental	Unknown
<i>ICBMs</i>	<i>Launchers/Missiles</i>		
DF-3 (CSS-2)	6-10/14-18	5-10/15-20	Retired?
DF-4 (CSS-3)	10-14/20-24	10-15/15-20	10/20
DF-5A (CSS-4 mod 1)	10/10	10/10	10/10
DF-5B (CSS-4 mod 2) MIRV	10/10	10/10	10/10
DF-31 (CSS-10 mod 1)	Developmental	<10/<10	8/8
DF-31A (CSS-10 mod 2) MIRV	Developmental	10-15/10-15	25/25
JL-2 SLBM (DF-31 Variant)	-	Developmental	Unknown
DF-41 (CSS-X-10)	-	-	Developmental

Table 6.4. PLA Air and Missile Forces Growth and Modernization¹²⁵

73], http://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2010_CMPR_Final.pdf (Accessed 3 June 2016); Office of the Secretary of Defense, “Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2015,” Annual Report to Congress, *U.S. Department of Defense*, 2015, p. 9, 78 & 79 [pdf pp. 17, 86 & 87],

http://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2015_China_Military_Power_Report.pdf (Accessed 3 June 2016).

¹²⁵ Office of the Secretary of Defense, “The Military Power of the People’s Republic of China 2005,” p. 44 [pdf p. 52]; Office of the Secretary of Defense, “Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2010,” p. 62 & 66 [pdf pp. 71 & 75]; Office of the Secretary of Defense, “Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2015,” p. 8 & 80 [pdf pp. 16 & 88]; Hans M. Kristensen, “Pentagon Report and Chinese Nuclear Forces,” *Federation of American Scientists*, 18 May 2016, <https://fas.org/blogs/security/2016/05/chinareport2016/> (Accessed 3

For the PLA Air Force, it is noticeable to see the overall increase in fighters as it develops the J-20 stealth fighter and the FC-31 multi-role fighter.¹²⁶ In terms of the PLA Rocket Force, China continues to research and develop missile systems aimed at deterring or attacking U.S. carrier and island based capabilities in the western Pacific Ocean. Most pointedly, the expansion of these military assets point to China's increased capability to threaten South Korea.

Zhang Huizhi and Wang Xiaoke noted in 2013 that China's growth in regional power is affecting Chinese-South Korean relations. They wrote, "China's rise is causing a marked change in the relative power of the region, China and states on its periphery have entered a new era... At present, in economic terms China is the world's number two great power, and in terms of military and soft power it has nearly reached regional great power status."¹²⁷

Tang Yongsheng of the National Defense University perceived that despite the enhanced cooperation and integration of the US-Japan Alliance and the US-ROK Alliance, the alliances would inevitably crumble in the face of China's anticipated development and "effective deterrence capability."¹²⁸ Tang predicted that instead of China's neighboring states balancing against China as a threat, China would draw in the surrounding states towards itself. Included in this prediction were current U.S.

June 2016); and Jordan Wilson, "China's Expanding Ability to Conduct Conventional Missile Strikes on Guam," Staff Report, *U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission*, 10 May 2016, report available at <http://www.uscc.gov/Research/china%E2%80%99s-expanding-ability-conduct-conventional-missile-strikes-guam> (Accessed 3 June 2016).

¹²⁶ Office of the Secretary of Defense, "Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China 2016," pp. 30-31 [pdf pp. 40-41].

¹²⁷ Zhang and Wang [张慧智与王箫轲], "Twenty Years of China-ROK Relations: Achievements and Problems," pp. 23-24.

¹²⁸ Tang Yongsheng, trans. Wang Hui, "The Impact of the U.S. Asia-Pacific Alliance on China's Security," pp. 30-32.

allies that would choose to side with China instead of the U.S. Later in Tang's article, he considered the policy implications of China's rise and concluded that the U.S. alliance system "cannot stop China from rising."¹²⁹ Moreover, China cannot force the U.S. out of the Western Pacific and challenge U.S. hegemony. Therefore, Tang prescribed patience instead of confrontation.

Tang Yongsheng, in another piece of scholarship, suggested that economic investment could accomplish two goals: 1) China could ease the concerns of neighboring states that its rise in comprehensive power was not a threat; and 2) counteract the strategic pressure brought about by the U.S. pivot to Asia.¹³⁰ Tang noted that as of 2013, "China is now the biggest trading partner of all of its neighbors and that gives it lasting economic and political clout."¹³¹ Similarly, Tang prescribed that China should improve relations with its traditional allies, specifically Pakistan, Thailand, Myanmar, and Laos. It is of interest that Tang does *not* mention North Korea as a "traditional ally"; but instead, argues that relations with other geo-strategic important countries as *South Korea*, Kazakhstan and Indonesia should also be improved. China did in fact improve its bilateral cooperation with Pakistan—a goal accomplished in April 2015 with an aid package worth \$46 billion.¹³²

¹²⁹ Tang Yongsheng, trans. Wang Hui, "The Impact of the U.S. Asia-Pacific Alliance on China's Security," p. 33.

¹³⁰ Tang Yongsheng, trans. Wang Hui, "Exploit Strategic Geopolitical Advantages and Positively Influence the Regional Order," *Contemporary International Relations (English Edition)*, Vol. 23, No. 6 (November/December 2013), p. 65.

¹³¹ Tang Yongsheng, trans. Wang Hui, "Exploit Strategic Geopolitical Advantages and Positively Influence the Regional Order," p. 64.

¹³² Tang Yongsheng, trans. Wang Hui, "Exploit Strategic Geopolitical Advantages and Positively Influence the Regional Order," p. 65; Andrew Stevens, "Pakistan lands \$46 billion investment from China," *CNN*, 20 April 2015, <http://money.cnn.com/2015/04/20/news/economy/pakistan-china-aid-infrastructure/> (Accessed 29 February 2016).

Self-Perception of Rising State in Relation to Adversarial Alliance:

Question 4a: Have Chinese analysts become increasingly dissatisfied with adversarial alliances on its periphery? Not Supported. Chinese analysts prescribe patience and further economic ties with South Korea and resist temptation to challenge U.S. hegemony.

Question 4b: Do Chinese analysts tolerate the adversarial alliances and recognize the security benefits? Supported. Chinese analysts, Xin Qiang and Yu Tiejun recognize the alliance benefit that South Korea has not developed its own nuclear weapons.

Question 4c: Has China's self-perception of its rise in power influenced its foreign policy outcomes? Possible. China may have used its free trade agreement with South Korea to enhance South Korea's economic dependence on China. Moreover, China has shown increases in its military capabilities over the past 15 years that enhance China's ability to project power on the Korean Peninsula.

6.7 PERCEPTIONS OF ADVERSARIAL ALLIANCE CAPABILITIES

The next Chinese perception of the US-ROK Alliance is how Chinese analysts evaluate changes in alliance capabilities. The analysis will continue with the rough chronology of alliance events before examination of the most recent key strategic issue—the proposed THAAD deployment on South Korean soil.

6.7.1 2014-2015 Exercises and Forward Deployment

The US-ROK Alliance over the next two years, 2014 and 2015, conducted some of the largest joint military exercises to date, and North Korea responded to the military exercises with its own missile exercises. For example, joint exercise SSANG YONG 2014 was the largest iteration of the exercise to date as U.S. Marine's 3rd Marine Expeditionary Force from Okinawa, ROK Marines, and units from the Australian Army conducted amphibious landings in March 2014.¹³³ Moreover, joint exercise MAX THUNDER in 2014 was also the largest iteration in its history as it practiced receiving and dispatching "follow on forces."¹³⁴ The next year, in protest to the KEY RESOLVE exercise and the FOAL EAGLE exercise, North Korea fired off seven surface to air missiles on 12 March 2015 and four missiles off its west coast on 3 April 2015.¹³⁵ The following month on 8 and 9 May, North Korea test fired a Sub-Launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM) and three KN-01 missiles, respectively.¹³⁶

Li Qingsi contended that the US-ROK Alliance has used North Korea's nuclear and rocket programs as an excuse to conduct military exercises. The result has pushed North Korea to pursue a "military first" policy and has dragged China into

¹³³ "Exercise Ssang Yong 14" *U.S. Marine Corps*, 7 April 2014, <http://www.marines.mil/News/MarinesTV.aspx?videoid=327892> (Accessed 26 January 2016).

¹³⁴ "Strategic Digest 2015," *U.S. Forces Korea*, 2015, p. 31 [pdf p. 32], PDF downloaded from http://www.usfk.mil/Portals/105/Documents/Strategic_Digest_2015_Eng.pdf (Accessed January 26 2016).

¹³⁵ "North Korea test fires seven surface-to-air missiles - South Korea," Reuters, 13 March 2015, <http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/03/13/us-northkorea-missiles-idUSKBN0M90EN20150313> (Accessed 26 January 2016) ; and "North Korea fires short-range missiles ahead of U.S. defense chief visit to Seoul," Reuters, 3 April 2015, <http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/04/03/us-northkorea-missiles-idUSKBN0MU0TG20150403> (Accessed 26 January 2016).

¹³⁶ Victor Cha, "North Korean SLBM Launch," *Center for Strategic and International Studies*, 11 May 2015, <https://csis.org/publication/north-korean-slbm-launch> (Accessed 26 January 2016).

the problem since the two states were alliance partners in the past. Likewise, he argued that it is difficult for China to protect North Korea.¹³⁷

Concerning the forward deployment of U.S. forces, Vice Secretary Liu Xige [刘惜戈], of the *Chinese International Strategic Research Foundation*, provided multiple reasons why the Korean Peninsula is important to American interests: “The Korean Peninsula holds important strategic value to the U.S., it not only served as an important strategic front to contain Soviet expansion, it also protects and suppresses Japan’s most advantageous flank; furthermore, because South Korea serves as a ‘forward position and assembly area’ for proceeding northward in land combat, and can also provide support for northwest Pacific maritime combat.”¹³⁸ Therefore, even if the Chinese consider the US-ROK Alliance a “relic” of the Cold War, it is promoting U.S. interests in East Asia.

<i>Service^a</i>	<i>Installation^b</i>	<i>Major Units</i>	<i>Personnel^b</i>
Air Force	<i>Kunsan</i>	8th FW	2,450
Air Force	<i>Osan</i>	51 st FW, 731 AMS	5,350
Army	Camp Casey	1 st BCT, 2 nd Infantry Division, Fires Brigade	5,200
Army	Camp Humphreys	Aviation Brigade, 210 th Air Defense Artillery	3,000
Army	Camp Red Cloud	2 nd Infantry Division HQ	1,550
Army	<i>Yongsan</i>	8 th Army HQ	4,100
Marine Corps	Camp <i>Mujuk</i>	Support Unit	-
Navy	<i>Chinhae</i>	Commander Fleet Activities	150

Table 6.5. U.S. Military Posts, Units, and Personnel in ROK in 2013¹³⁹

¹³⁷ Li Qingsi [李庆四], Personal Interview, Renmin University, 14 October 2015.

¹³⁸ Chen Xiangyang and Zhong Xin [陈向阳与种昕], “U.S.-ROK Alliance’ Seminar Summary,” p. 60.

¹³⁹ “Commander Fleet Activities, Korea, Republic of,” *U.S. Department of Defense*, 2 May 2014, http://www.militaryinstallations.dod.mil/pls/psgprod/f?p=132:CONTENT:0::NO::P4_INST_ID,P4_INST_TYPE:2850,INSTALLATION (Accessed 18 March 2015); “USFK relocation to Pyeongtaek pushed back to end of 2017,” *Yonhap News Agency*, 13 December 2015; and Michael J. Lostumbo, Michael J. Mc Nerney, Eric Peltz, Derek Eaton, David R. Frelinger, Victoria A. Greenfield, John Halliday, Patrick Mills, Bruce R. Nardulli, Stacie L. Pettyjohn, Jerry M. Sollinger, and

Table 6.5 points to the forward deployment of an estimated 22,000 U.S. military personnel deployed to South Korea. The forward presence of the troops not only aids power projection capabilities for the U.S., but also adds credibility to the U.S. commitment to defend South Korea.

6.7.2 2014-2016 ROK THAAD Issue

The cohesion test facing the US-ROK Alliance today is very different from the one the Roh administration caused. The U.S. has sought to deploy a THAAD system to South Korea which includes the missile interceptors and a forward based X-band radar. In October 2014, there was speculation that the U.S. subsequently delayed the hand-over of wartime operational control and tied it to the THAAD deployment as a negotiating point in late 2015.¹⁴⁰ To answer this speculation, U.S. Secretary of Defense Hagel issued a statement that the ROK was not ready to assume wartime operational control and was working towards a 2020 handover date.¹⁴¹

THAAD deployment incorporates China's strategic relations with South Korea and North Korea as well. Wang Dong summarized the current situation,

The U.S. has successfully deployed the TMD system to Japan, and the U.S. has been discussing the deployment of the THAAD system to South Korea. Of course, China cannot prevent the U.S. from deploying the system to Japan,

Stephen M. Worman, *Overseas Basing of U.S. Military Forces: An Assessment of Relative Costs and Strategic Benefits*, p. 28. Note ^a: Multiple services are often serving at the same installation, but the services' major units are listed. Note ^b: The numbers are approximate and the installations aggregate the number of personnel that work at the multiple locations surrounding the installation.

¹⁴⁰ "The Thaad conundrum," *Korea Joong Ang Daily*, 22 October 2014, <http://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/article/Article.aspx?aid=2996347> (Accessed 13 May 2016).

¹⁴¹ Nick Simeone, "Hagel Details U.S., South Korean Wartime Control Agreement," *Department of Defense News*, 23 October 2014, <http://www.defense.gov/News-Article-View/Article/603502/hagel-details-us-south-korean-wartime-control-agreement> (Accessed 13 May 2016).

but China is attempting to pressure South Korea from accepting the deployment. It is a sensitive topic as South Korea is torn between the two powers. Sometimes you will hear Korean people complain about this, and one option they have discussed is the development of Korea's own missile defense system that is separate from the U.S. That will to a great extent alleviate Chinese anxieties because China is most concerned about the forward deployed X-band radar that is potentially damaging to Chinese strategic missile deterrence.¹⁴²

For background information, the U.S. has deployed two different anti-ballistic missile systems: National Missile Defense (NMD) and Theatre Missile Defense (TMD). The U.S. has directed the NMD system towards protecting the U.S. mainland and directed the TMD system towards protecting Japan. A key contention raised by Wu Riqiang is that the two missile defense system's purposes can be linked together to enhance NMD performance. For example, the TMD system includes the Aegis missile system and the PAC-3 Patriot missile system are focused on protecting Japan, but Chinese analysts argue that the forward deployed X-band radar stations can be used for both TMD and NMD purposes.¹⁴³ Therefore, the Chinese argue that that the TMD assets are promoting the NMD system's protection of the U.S. mainland and breaking the strategic stability between the two states.¹⁴⁴ As noted in the US-Japan Alliance chapter above, X-band radar is a "fire-control" radar that is very different from L-band and UHF radar systems that have search and surveillance functions.¹⁴⁵

¹⁴² Wang Dong [王栋], Personal Interview, 28 December 2015, Peking University.

¹⁴³ Wu Riqiang [吴日强], Personal Interview, 19 November 2015, Renmin University.

¹⁴⁴ Wu Riqiang [吴日强], Personal Interview, 19 November 2015, Renmin University.

¹⁴⁵ Lee O. Upton and Lewis A. Thurman, "Radars for the Detection and Tracking of Cruise Missiles," *Lincoln Laboratory Journal*, Vol. 12, No. 2, 2000, p. 356. https://www.ll.mit.edu/publications/journal/pdf/vol12_no2/12_2detectcruisemissile.pdf (Accessed 24 February 2016); and Harold R. Raemer, *Radar System Principles* (New York: CRC Press, 1997), p. 5, see Table 1.1.

The U.S. government asserts that a THAAD system deployed to South Korea will counter the North Korean nuclear threat, but Chinese analysts reject this argument because at present North Korea does not possess any nuclear ballistic missiles. For instance, Wu Riqiang acknowledges that North Korea does possess nuclear weapons, but he adds that North Korea does not possess any ICBMs or the capability to arm a ballistic missile with a nuclear warhead. In 1998, U.S. experts were arguing that within five years North Korea would possess a nuclear ballistic missile, but as of early 2016, North Korea has still not developed a nuclear tipped ballistic missile. Even North Korea's most recent rocket launches in 2014 and 2016 have not fully demonstrated a weapon delivery capability. The U.S. reaction to the rocket launch in 2014 was to increase the number of Ground Based Interceptors (GBI), but what missiles are they going to intercept? Thus, at present, a THAAD system does not enhance South Korea's security because it has nothing to intercept from North Korea. Wu Riqiang posits that this policy represents a disconnection on the part of the U.S. in consideration of the non-existent North Korean nuclear missile threat.¹⁴⁶ Wang Dong agrees with Wu Riqiang's assessment, "The X-band radar's capabilities are much greater than what is necessary to confront the North Korean so-called 'nuclear threat.' If the U.S. goes forward with the THAAD deployment it serves as a prominent example of the U.S. trying to pursue absolute security at the expense of deepening the security dilemma with China."¹⁴⁷ Consequently, the U.S. argument that South Korea needs THAAD to protect South Korea and Japan from a North Korean nuclear attack is at present hard to justify. Wu Riqiang does not know

¹⁴⁶ Wu Riqiang [吴日强], Personal Interview, 19 November 2015, Renmin University.

¹⁴⁷ Wang Dong [王栋], Personal Interview, 28 December 2015, Peking University.

the intentions of the U.S., but the current reality causes him to speculate that the U.S. is pointing its TMD policy towards China's nuclear capabilities.¹⁴⁸ In response to Chinese fears that a THAAD deployment in South Korea is aimed at countering China's nuclear arsenal, Lt. Gen. David Mann recently stated, "It's very, very important that we clarify that the radar, that system, is not looking at China. That system is oriented, if the decision is made to deploy it, that system would be oriented on North Korea."¹⁴⁹ Yet, this response does not fully answer Chinese criticisms that the THAAD system's X-band radar could potentially enhance the precision of NMD defending the continental U.S.

U.S. extended deterrence over South Korea provides a different view of the problem. The US-ROK joint statement made on 14 June 2012 stated for the first time in writing that the U.S. has extended its nuclear umbrella over South Korea.¹⁵⁰ The ROK is already very secure without the addition of THAAD because North Korea would face nuclear devastation for launching a nuclear attack on South Korea. If the deployment of the THAAD system to South Korea truly enhanced the security of South Korea, it would be easy for the ROK leadership to go along with the U.S. as a trusted alliance partner. However, the Park administration has not been able to agree to the deployment.

The choice is not a simple one, because the bilateral relations between China and South Korea complicate the THAAD deployment decision. Since the summer of

¹⁴⁸ Wu Riqiang [吴日强], Personal Interview, 19 November 2015, Renmin University.

¹⁴⁹ Jen Judson, "Army Weighing THAAD Deployments in Europe, Middle East," *Defense News*, 22 March 2016, <http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense/land/army/2016/03/22/army-weighing-thaad-deployments-europe-middle-east/82127616/> (Accessed 23 March 2016).

¹⁵⁰ Sun Ru [孙茹], "Network and Outlook for the US Alliance System in the Asia-Pacific," [*Meiguo yatai tongmeng tixi de wangluohua ji qianjing*], *China International Studies* [*Guoji wenti yanjiu*], No. 4, 2 July 2012, p. 45; and Sun Ru, trans. Ma Zongshi, "Toward A China-U.S.-ROK Cooperative Triangle," p. 106.

2014, China's senior leadership has repeatedly voiced their disapproval of the proposed deployment of the THAAD system's capabilities being in such close proximity to China.¹⁵¹ For example, recently Xi Jinping told President Obama that China is "resolutely opposed" to the THAAD deployment.¹⁵² These veiled threats indicate the seriousness of the issue to China and attempts to test the cohesion of the US-ROK Alliance.

China has also focused attention on North Korea after its "hydrogen bomb" test on 6 January 2016 and the 7 February 2016 rocket launch. The day of the rocket launch, the Park administration signaled its intentions to hold "consultations" with the U.S. on the THAAD deployment, much to China's chagrin.¹⁵³ Subsequently, the Chinese Foreign Ministry summoned both the South Korean Ambassador to

¹⁵¹ Kim Oi-hyun, "Washington and Beijing's Conflict Growing over Missile Defense," *The Hankyoreh*, 9 June 2014, http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_international/641453.html (Accessed 13 May 2016); "China's Xi Asked Park to 'Tread Carefully' over U.S. Missile-Defense System," *Yonhap News*, 26 August 2014, <http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/national/2014/08/26/73/0301000000AEN20140826002100315F.html> (Accessed 13 May 2016); "Source: Xi Jinping Voiced Concerns About Missile Defense During Summit," *The Hankyoreh*, 27 August 2014, http://www.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_international/652992.html (Accessed 13 May 2016); Agence France-Press, "China Voices Concern About US Missile Defense in South Korea," *Defense News*, 4 February 2015, <http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense/international/asia-pacific/2015/02/04/china-voices-concern-us-missile-defense-south-korea/22869879/> (Accessed 13 May 2016); Chang Se-jeong and Ser Myo-ja, "Xi Pressed Park on Thaad System," *Korea JoongAng Daily*, 6 February 2015, <http://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/article/article.aspx?aid=3000595> (Accessed 13 May 2016); and "Seoul Must Stand Up to Chinese Pressure over THAAD," *The Chosun Ilbo*, 17 March 2015, http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2015/03/17/2015031701802.html (Accessed 13 May 2016).

¹⁵² Katsuji Nakazawa, "Xi warns Obama over THAAD missile system," *Nikkei News*, 8 April 2016, <http://asia.nikkei.com/Features/China-up-close/Xi-warns-Obama-over-THAAD-missile-system?page=1> (Accessed 13 May 2016).

¹⁵³ "China protests S. Korea's Decision on U.S. missile shield," *Yonhap News*, 8 February 2016, <http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/national/2016/02/08/52/0301000000AEN20160208000400315F.html> (Accessed 24 February 2016).

China, Kim Jang-soo, and the North Korean Ambassador to China, Ji Jae-ryong.¹⁵⁴

The Korean media outlet did not provide details on the message the Chinese Foreign Ministry delivered to the respective ambassadors. These recent developments highlight Chinese fears that a successful nuclear program in North Korea will create adverse effects for China such as South Korea and Japan requiring “more robust missile defense systems in Northeast Asia,” and provide incentives for independent nuclear weapons programs.¹⁵⁵

In late May 2016, Chinese military leaders were pointing to the potential THAAD deployment in South Korea and development of hypersonic glide missiles as rationale for China’s future deployment of its nuclear ballistic *Jin*-class (Type 094) submarines into the Pacific Ocean.¹⁵⁶ In late December 2013, China’s Ministry of Defense informed foreign military attaches that the missile-sub fleet would make its first voyage into the Indian Ocean. At the time, Chinese Admiral Wu Shengli stated in a Communist Party magazine, “This is a trump card that makes our motherland proud and our adversaries terrified... It is a strategic force symbolizing great-power status and supporting national security.”¹⁵⁷ However, Wu Riqiang argues against the effectiveness of the *Jin*-class submarines for deterrent purposes; he stated, “My

¹⁵⁴ “China protests S. Korea’s Decision on U.S. missile shield,” *Yonhap News*, 8 February 2016, <http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/national/2016/02/08/52/0301000000AEN20160208000400315F.html> (Accessed 24 February 2016).

¹⁵⁵ Yao Yunzhu, “Chinese Nuclear Policy and the Future of Minimum Deterrence,” from chapter 8 in Christopher P. Twomey, ed., *Perspectives on Sino-American Strategic Nuclear Issues* (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2008), p. 118.

¹⁵⁶ Julian Borger, “China to send nuclear-armed submarines into Pacific amid tensions with US,” *The Guardian*, 26 May 2016, <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/may/26/china-send-nuclear-armed-submarines-into-pacific-us> (Accessed 26 May 2016).

¹⁵⁷ Jeremy Page, “Deep Threat: China’s Submarines Add Nuclear-Strike Capability, Altering Strategic Balance,” *Wall Street Journal*, 24 October 2014, <http://www.wsj.com/articles/chinas-submarine-fleet-adds-nuclear-strike-capability-altering-strategic-balance-undersea-1414164738> (Accessed 27 May 2016).

argument is that because of the high noise level of the Type 094 and China's lack of experience of running a SSBN fleet, China cannot and should not put 094 in deterrent patrol in the near future."¹⁵⁸ Wu Riqiang argued that China's current ICBM forces are the most trustworthy way to deliver nuclear weapons since China is not technologically ready to develop strategic bombers or nuclear submarines.¹⁵⁹

Additionally, North Korea's provocative actions have pressed China to adopt tougher measures on North Korea as evidenced by its vote in favor of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2270 to apply pressure on North Korea for its most recent provocative behavior.¹⁶⁰ China also carried out its own sanctions to pressure North Korea such as the recent suspension of coal shipments from Dandong in Liaoning Province to North Korea that began in March.¹⁶¹

Adversarial Alliance Capabilities Concept:

Question 3a: Do Chinese analysts focus on the geostrategic factors of the adversarial alliance capabilities; for example, forward deployments, and use of ports, airfields, and military bases? Supported. Chinese analysts have commented on the proximity of U.S. military forces on the Korean peninsula in close proximity to the Chinese mainland.

¹⁵⁸ Julian Borger, "China to send nuclear-armed submarines into Pacific amid tensions with US," *The Guardian*, 26 May 2016, <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/may/26/china-send-nuclear-armed-submarines-into-pacific-us> (Accessed 26 May 2016).

¹⁵⁹ Wu Riqiang [吴日强], Personal Interview, 19 November 2015, Renmin University.

¹⁶⁰ "Resolution 2270 (2016)," United Nations Security Council, 2 March 2016, S/RES/2270 (2016), <https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N16/058/22/PDF/N1605822.pdf?OpenElement> (Accessed 4 March 2016).

¹⁶¹ "Chinese firm ordered to halt coal trade with N. Korea: state media," *Yonhap News*, 24 February 2016, <http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/national/2016/02/24/95/0301000000AEN20160224011500315F.html> (Accessed 24 February 2016).

Question 3b: Do Chinese analysts focus on the strategic nuclear capabilities of the adversarial alliances? Supported. Chinese analysts pay a lot of attention to the recent THAAD consultations between the US-ROK Alliance partners.

Question 3c: Do Chinese analysts focus on the conventional capabilities of the adversarial alliances? Supported. Chinese analysts have paid attention to the yearly joint US-ROK Alliance military exercises.

Question 3d: Do Chinese analysts' perceptions of adversarial alliance capabilities and foreign basing influence its foreign policy outcomes? Supported. Since the summer of 2014, Chinese leaders have used diplomatic channels to signal their disapproval of a potential THAAD deployment and veiled threats. Additionally, Chinese military leaders point to their future nuclear missile submarine deployment as a response to the THAAD system. Most recently, China has adopted a harder line on North Korea since the most recent North Korean nuclear and missile tests by agreeing to UN Security Council Resolution 2270.

6.8 PERCEPTIONS OF CHANGED INTENTIONS

An important result from the US-ROK Alliance case study is that scholars represented in the sample of Chinese journal articles and interview subjects did not talk about any notable shifts in how China perceives the US-ROK Alliance. Though there was mention in the alliance cohesion section and the perceptions of conspiracy section about the U.S. attempting towards confrontation with China, the

perceptions never fully took hold permanently. On the former point, the alliance partners agreed on the Future of the Alliance Policy Initiative and the Security Policy Initiative agreement and did not garner a large amount of attention. On the latter point, North Korea's provocative behavior in 2006, 2009, and 2010 served as a more viable explanation for why the alliance's cohesion rebounded from a historic low point. Chinese analysts are in general agreement that the US-ROK Alliance remains pointed towards North Korea. As Sun Ru summarized, "The influence of the ROK-U.S. alliance is confined predominantly to Northeast Asia, with its tensions with China both modest and local."¹⁶² The assessment aligns well with Yu Tiejun's ideas; he stated that despite the US-ROK Alliance, China has continued to develop stronger relations with South Korea as it does not consider the US-ROK Alliance as a major threat. Since China and South Korea's diplomatic normalization in August 1992, the Sino-South Korean relationship has prospered ever since as an important trading partner.¹⁶³

Perceptions of Changed Intentions:

Question 1Aa: Do Chinese analysts focus on adversarial alliance agreements, reports, speeches, statements, and treaties to perceive changes in intentions? Not Supported.

Even though the alliance has signed and issued various alliance documents and joint declarations reaffirming the alliance, Chinese analysts did not perceive a change in alliance intentions.

Question 1Ab: Do Chinese analysts perceive tangible costly actions that diminish the adversarial alliance's capabilities as a signal of benign intentions? No Evidence. I did

¹⁶² Sun Ru, trans. Ma Zongshi, "Toward A China-U.S.-ROK Cooperative Triangle," p. 117.

¹⁶³ Yu Tiejun [于铁军], Personal Interview, 24 November 2015, Peking University.

not find any articles in my sample that mentioned the removal of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons from the Korean Peninsula.

Question 1Ac: Do Chinese analysts perceive tangible costly actions that enhance the adversarial alliance's capabilities as a signal of malign intentions? No Evidence. The Adversarial Alliance Capabilities concept above focused on enhanced alliance capabilities, but Chinese analysts did not describe a change in the intentions of the alliance.

Question 1Ad: Do Chinese analysts' perceptions of changes in alliance intentions influence Chinese foreign policy outcomes? No Evidence.

6.9 US-ROK ALLIANCE SUMMARY

In conclusion, North Korea's nuclear and missile programs have greatly influenced the US-ROK Alliance since the end of the Cold War. This strategic interaction has heavily affected the way Chinese analysts have assessed and characterized the adversarial alliance. From their vantage point, the presence of the US-ROK alliance legitimizes the North Korean regime's fears. Li Qingsi provides the metaphor of a person trying to cool a boiling pot of water by blowing on it, instead of removing the heat source. If the US-ROK Alliance is acting as a heat source, any policy to reassure the North Koreans is useless as long as the US-ROK Alliance remains a serious threat to the North Korean regime. Li Qingsi admits that this dilemma has caused China to be perplexed because it has no method to dismantle

the US-ROK Alliance, and may have no other choice but to bring North Korea closer. Moreover, China's increasingly close economic relationship with South Korea further complicates the issue.¹⁶⁴ Notably, the North Korean threat heavily affected the state of US-ROK Alliance cohesion. This corollary made some Chinese analysts speculate that the U.S. was manipulating the tensions for its own benefit. Moreover, the rise of China's economic influence has directly influenced South Korea's ability to cooperate with the U.S. military, because activities that could potentially harm Chinese interests could create economic consequences for South Korea's economy.

¹⁶⁴ Li Qingsi [李庆四], Personal Interview, Renmin University, 14 October 2015.

7.0 CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION

7.1 CHAPTER SUMMARY

The findings from the three case studies reflect a structured and focused comparison. I have examined the same alliance perception concepts across all three cases. Although the three adversarial alliances vary in quality and experience, the method of inquiry has revealed some interesting observations. The comparisons below will focus on how Chinese scholars have viewed key developments within the cases. Each concept section will include a chart to compare the questions across the three cases; I have included an article count to show the relative amount of attention per question where applicable. Lastly, I will conclude with policy implications, and notes on areas for further research.

7.2 PERCEPTIONS OF ADVERSARIAL ALLIANCE INTENTIONS

7.2.1 Perceptions of Changed Intentions

Chinese analysts shifted their perceptions of alliance intentions in two cases—the USSR-Vietnam Alliance and the US-Japan Alliance. By contrast, Chinese analysts' perceptions of the intentions of the US-ROK Alliance did not markedly

change. First, we will address the changes perceived in USSR-Vietnam Alliance and the US-Japan Alliance, before turning to compare those two cases with the US-ROK Alliance.

The USSR-Vietnam Alliance took a dramatic turn in its short history. The role of the Soviet Union as the great power in the alliance relationship largely determined Chinese threat perceptions. The Soviet Union went from being a sizable threat in the 1970s and early 1980s to a non-threat by 1989 when China and the Soviet Union normalized relations. China called upon the Soviet Union to remove its support of Vietnam in Cambodia as a key requirement for normalization. Subsequently, the removal of Vietnamese forces from Cambodia was quickly followed by the exit of Soviet naval and air assets from *Cam Ranh Bay* and *Da Nang*. The tangible costly action of removing military assets pointed to a substantial decrease in alliance capabilities as well as Vietnamese interest in hosting Soviet forces.

From the Chinese standpoint, the US-Japan Alliance's intentions changed dramatically with the 1996 joint declaration and 1997 revised defense guidelines. Chinese analysts saw the alliance shift from a "restraining" alliance to a military alliance that allowed Japan to be more active in East Asian security matters. A key component of this activity is Japan's active role in Taiwan, and the US-Japan Alliance has been regarded a growing security challenge as the Sino-Japanese relationship has worsened since 2010. Likewise, the development of strategic defensive weapons signaled malign intentions towards China.

By contrast, Chinese perceptions of the US-ROK Alliance intentions have held constant. First, in comparison to the USSR-Vietnam Alliance, the US-ROK Alliance since the end of the Korean War to present has remained focused on North Korea and did not pose a large threat to the Chinese mainland since its tensions with China are “both modest and local.”¹ Second, in comparison to the US-Japan Alliance, the US-ROK Alliance did not present a large joint declaration or revised defense guidelines that signaled a shift or expansion in the scope of the alliance focus. The ROK military is operationally coordinated with U.S. military forces to contend with North Korea. While the Roh administration was adamant that South Korean forces were not going to support contingencies in Taiwan, U.S. Congressional testimony from Deputy Under Secretary of Defense Robert Lawless vaguely pointed to “strategic flexibility” of U.S. forces stationed in South Korea as an issue that had been resolved concerning a Taiwan contingency.² These two findings show that Chinese perceptions of intentions are rationally connected to observable behavior.

In conclusion, concerning changes in perceived intentions, Chinese analysts paid attention to a number of sources to determine intentions. Table 7.1 points to adversarial alliances signing agreements that expand their scope of activity and costly actions that notably enhance capabilities changing Chinese perceptions of intentions.

¹ Sun Ru, trans. Ma Zongshi, “Toward A China-U.S.-ROK Cooperative Triangle,” p. 117.

² Li Zhijun [李治军], “The US-ROK Alliance at a Crossroads” [*Chuzai shizilukou de Meihan tongmeng*], *China International Studies* [*Guoji wentie yanjiu*], No. 4, 2005, p. 51; and U.S. Congress, United States-Republic of Korea Alliance: An Alliance at Risk?, p. 32 [pdf p. 36].

<i>Change in Perceived Intentions Predictions</i>	<i>Adversarial Alliance Case</i>		
	<i>USSR-Vietnam</i>	<i>US-Japan</i>	<i>US-ROK</i>
<i>1Aa: Do Chinese analysts focus on adversarial alliance agreements, reports, speeches, statements, and treaties to perceive changes in intentions?</i>	Supported	Supported (12 articles)	No Change
<i>1Ab: Do Chinese analysts perceive tangible costly actions that diminish the adversarial alliance's capabilities as a signal of benign intentions?</i>	Supported	No Evidence	No Evidence
<i>1Ac: Do Chinese analysts perceive tangible costly actions that enhance the adversarial alliance's capabilities as a signal of malign intentions?</i> (See capabilities section)	Supported	Supported (15 articles)	No Evidence
<i>1Ad: Do Chinese analysts' perceptions of changes in alliance intentions influence Chinese foreign policy outcomes?</i>	Supported	Supported (8 articles)	No Evidence

Table 7.1. Structured Comparison of Change in Perceived Intentions

7.2.2 Perceptions of Conspiracy

This section will explore the evidence of Chinese analysts perceiving conspiracy against Chinese interests. With the USSR-Vietnam Alliance, I argue that Chinese interpreters over-read the significance of the USSR-Vietnam Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation. The Vietnamese aimed the treaty at China to gain diplomatic cover for Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia, but I argue that the Vietnamese would have invaded Cambodia without the treaty with the Soviets. The Vietnamese had exhausted previous attempts to end its border dispute with Cambodia via bilateral negotiations with Cambodia, the offer of Chinese mediation, and at least four coup attempts. Pre-existing levels of Soviet-Vietnamese security cooperation were present long before the Cambodian invasion.

Moreover, I argue that the Chinese over-read the treaty's significance. The language used in the treaty was very different from the military assistance promised to East Germany or North Korea in their respective agreements. The treaty between the USSR and Vietnam only promised "mutual consultation" not military force.³ The treaty served as a diplomatic signal that the Soviet Union was on Vietnam's side in the conflict and served to advance the Soviet-Vietnamese relationship. However, the Soviet leadership at the time of the signing must have been well aware of the tensions between China and Vietnam, and they were not going to allow Vietnam to entrap them in a war with China. The treaty may have forced the Chinese to plan response to a Vietnamese invasion at the Chinese Central Work Conference in November and December of 1978 that would not incite a Soviet response before the signing of the treaty.⁴ Potentially, the treaty agreement influenced China's diplomatic signaling that the upcoming attack on Vietnam would be limited and would not seek regime change.⁵ After the month long punitive strike on Vietnam in 1979, it is very possible that China re-evaluated its previous view of the USSR-Vietnam Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation as the Soviets did not respond forcefully to the month long invasion of Vietnam's northern border. Into the mid-1980s, the Chinese repeatedly bombarded Vietnam as a signal of their disapproval of Vietnam's continued occupation of Cambodia and "dry-season" offensives against the Khmer Rouge. While the treaty was against China's interests in Cambodia, there

³ Douglas M. Gibling, "Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam," International Military Alliances 1648-2008, Vol. II (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 2009), pp. 465-467.

⁴ Chen, China's War with Vietnam, 1979: Issues, Decisions, and Implications, p. 88.

⁵ Ross, The Indochina Tangle: China's Vietnam Policy, 1975-1979, p. 229

is no evidence that the treaty was part of a Soviet conspiracy against China. In summary, Chinese analysts were able to discern the intentions of the Soviets by reading the observable actions of the alliance.

In contrast to the USSR-Vietnam Alliance case, Chinese misperceptions of the US-Japan Alliance and the US-ROK Alliance moved beyond overcentralization and exhibiting over-Machiavellianism. In both the US-Japan Alliance and the US-ROK Alliance, the alliances entered respective crises that forced the U.S. to respond. Chinese analysts noticed as the alliances showed a dramatic reversal in alliance cohesion.

The first example of a perception of conspiracy comes from the US-Japan Alliance; numerous Chinese academics accused the U.S. of manipulating the 2010 and 2012 *Diaoyu* Island issues for its benefit. The conspiracy theories pointed to the U.S. as the instigator of the conflict as a means of improving its hegemonic position in East Asia. In the US-Japan Alliance case, moderate voices challenged the conspiracy theories to emphasize the positive balancing role that the U.S. plays between China and Japan. The second example comes from the US-ROK Alliance when it strengthened in the wake of the 2006 and 2009 North Korean nuclear tests and the *Cheonan* sinking and the shelling of *Yeonpyeong* Island in 2010. A number of Chinese academics speculated that the U.S. instigated the events without detailing how the U.S. accomplished the task. The logic of the conspiracy was simple: the U.S. benefitted the most from the crises; therefore, it is responsible for creating and stoking the crises. In contrast to the US-Japan Alliance, I did not find other Chinese analyses in the sample that refuted the US-ROK Alliance conspiracy theories.

In conclusion, it is natural for the target state or third-party state in an anarchic international system to be wary of security cooperation on its periphery, and this natural inclination to see connections and correlation can quickly lead to imagined planning and conspiracy. Table 7.2 details how perceptions of “overcentralization” and perceptions of conspiracy were present, but subsequent events corrected the misperception or other commentators offered differing viewpoints. Overall, Chinese analysts were able to rationally discern the baseline intentions of the alliances and offer differing viewpoints to counter perceptions of conspiracy.

<i>Perceptions of Conspiracy Questions</i>	<i>Adversarial Alliance Case</i>		
	<i>USSR-Vietnam</i>	<i>US-Japan</i>	<i>US-ROK</i>
<i>1Ba: Do Chinese analysts interpret adversarial alliance activities as well organized and planned moves against them?</i>	Supported	Supported (7 articles)	Supported (10 articles)
<i>1Bb: Do Chinese analysts interpret adversarial alliance activities as a conspiracy aimed against them?</i>	Not Supported	Supported (7 articles)	Supported (9 articles)
<i>1Bc: Are Chinese analysts able to correct perceptions of conspiracy?</i>	Not Applicable	Potentially (4 articles)	Potentially (1 article)
<i>1Bd: Do Chinese analysts’ perceptions of conspiracy influence Chinese foreign policy outcomes?</i>	Not Applicable	No Evidence	Potentially

Table 7.2. Structured Comparison of Perceptions of Conspiracy

7.3 ADVERSARIAL ALLIANCE COHESION

All three case studies revealed junctures of low cohesion. The Soviet Union displayed a lack of practical support for Vietnam while it faced China's 1979 punitive invasion and regular incursions. The US-Japan Alliance and US-ROK Alliance both suffered from senior-level disagreements over alliance direction and defense policy. In the former, Chinese leaders were wary of a strong reaction from the Soviets for attacking Vietnam, but the Soviet Union offered minimal "airlift" support of ten flights to Vietnam and held a naval exercise in the South China Sea on 17 March 1979 a full month after China's attack on Vietnam.⁶

In the latter cases, Chinese analysts focused on senior level speeches that pivoted away from the U.S. axis. For example, South Korean President Roh made some rather controversial speeches that promoted his ideas of "balancer diplomacy" and notions of independent security; Japanese Prime Minister Hatoyama also made speeches promoting an "East Asian Community." In both cases, both President George W. Bush and President Obama brought significant political pressure on their senior counterparts to bring realignment. In hindsight, scholars such as Sun Xuefeng and Zhu Feng noted how quickly the senior-level disagreements faded after the respective officials left office. This complete turnaround in cohesion made them look to the institutional solidarity of the U.S. alliance system as deep-rooted systemic variables.

⁶ Gates, *From the Shadows: The Ultimate Insider's Story of Five Presidents and How They Won the Cold War*, p. 122; and Sally W. Stoecker, *Clients and Commitments: Soviet-Vietnamese Relations, 1978-1988* (Santa Monica: RAND, 1989), p. 9 <http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/notes/2009/N2737.pdf> (Accessed 10 June 2016).

Concerning perceptions of adversarial alliance cohesion affecting Chinese foreign policy outcomes we can draw some conclusions via correlation of events. For example, the Soviets inattention to Vietnam displayed a lack of cohesion between the alliance, and China felt more freedom to launch further incursions against Vietnam. Additionally, Sino-Soviet high-level negotiations on normalization throughout the 1980s were completely unaffected by Sino-Vietnamese tensions such as the March 1988 clash over Johnson South Reef in the Spratly Islands,⁷ the Soviets “maintained near total silence.”⁸ For the US-Japan Alliance, even though the Hatoyama government was a short-lived departure from the American axis, senior Chinese leaders were very welcoming of Hatoyama’s calls for the creation of an “East Asian Community.” On six separate occasions, senior Chinese leaders such as Hu Jintao, Wen Jiabao, and Xi Jinping echoed calls for Japan to pivot towards the Asian mainland and away from the “Asia-Pacific.”⁹ In comparison, there is a possibility that Hu Jintao found the dip in cohesion of the US-ROK Alliance as a good point to pursue a free trade agreement with South Korea.¹⁰

In conclusion, cohesion is a quality often judged after the event. Moreover, there are multiple levels of analysis to consider within an alliance such as senior-level interaction, institutional level, degrees of dependence, threat environment, and shared versus individual national interests. Table 7.3 reveals that Chinese analysts

⁷ Min Gyo Koo, Island Disputes and Maritime Regime Building in East Asia: Between a Rock and a Hard Place (New York: Springer, 2009), p. 154.

⁸ Robert Ross, “China and the Cambodian Peace Process: The Value of Coercive Diplomacy,” Asian Survey, Vol. 31, No. 12 (Dec. 1991), pp. 1174-1175.

⁹ Liu Jianping [刘建平], “China in East Asia: Experiences of Regional Politics and Regionalism” [*Dongya de Zhongguo: diqu zhengzhi jingyan yu diqu zhuyi sixiang*], World Economics and Politics [Shijie jingji yu zhengzhi], 2011, No. 6, pp. 53-54.

¹⁰ “China FTA Network,” *Chinese Ministry of Commerce*, Last updated March 2016, <http://fta.mofcom.gov.cn/topic/enkorea.shtml> (Accessed 23 May 2016).

paid particular attention to the senior level interactions between adversarial alliance partners, but they were also aware of the deeper military-to-military nature of alliances.

<i>Adversarial Alliance Cohesion Questions</i>	<i>Adversarial Alliance Case</i>		
	<i>USSR-Vietnam</i>	<i>US-Japan</i>	<i>US-ROK</i>
<i>2a: Do Chinese analysts of adversarial alliance cohesion presume that it is a function of external political context?</i>	Supported	Supported	Supported
<i>2b: Do Chinese analysts of adversarial alliance cohesion focus on the institutional solidarity between the alliance partners?</i>	Supported (1 article)	Supported (2 articles)	Supported
<i>2c: Do Chinese analysts of adversarial alliance cohesion focus on the interactions between the alliance partners' senior leadership?</i>	Supported	Supported (6 articles)	Supported (4 articles)
<i>2d: Do Chinese analysts of adversarial alliance cohesion focus on the domestic politics of the alliance partners?</i>	No Evidence	Supported (3 articles)	Supported (2 articles)
<i>2e: Do Chinese analysts' perceptions of adversarial alliance cohesion influence Chinese foreign policy outcomes?</i>	Supported	Supported (1 article)	Potentially

Table 7.3. Structured Comparison of Adversarial Alliance Cohesion

7.4 ADVERSARIAL ALLIANCE CAPABILITIES

From the cases, it is possible to distinguish between what the Chinese perceived to be extremely versus moderately threatening capabilities. For Chinese analysts, the most worrisome part of the USSR-Vietnam Alliance was the USSR's large numbers of capabilities in close proximity to China. From 1969 until normalization in 1989, the Soviet Union presented SS-20 nuclear ballistic missile capabilities that could destroy China with a "surgical strike," and more than a 100

nuclear capable Backfire bombers.¹¹ Additionally, the Soviet's Southeastern Theater of Military Operations contained 25 Soviet Army divisions that could be ready for combat within four days, and an additional complement of 31 Soviet Army divisions with eleven days of full alert—representing a million Soviet troops on China's border.¹² Vietnam for its part of the alliance represented air and naval basing options for Soviet aircraft and naval vessels at *Cam Ranh* Bay and *Da Nang* as “fraternal facilities.”¹³

In comparison, the U.S. as the great power partner in both the US-Japan Alliance and the US-ROK Alliance does not represent the same threat to China as the Soviet Union. Since the post-Cold War troop decreases, the U.S. has held steady at 100,000 forward deployed personnel in the Asia-Pacific as mandated by the Nye Initiative.¹⁴ Even though the troop presence is much smaller than Soviet deployments, Zhang Jingquan and Liu Xige have recognized that U.S. military bases and ports in Japan and South Korea enhance U.S. power projection capabilities.¹⁵

¹¹ Wang Jianwei and Wu Xinbo, *Against Us or With Us? The Chinese Perspective of America's Alliances with Japan and Korea* (Stanford: The Asia/Pacific Research Center, 1998), p. 11; and Shen, ed., *History of Sino-Soviet Relations: 1917-1991*, p. 488.

¹² “The Readiness of Soviet Ground Forces,” *CIA*, Interagency Intelligence Memorandum (NI IIM 82-10012), November 1982, Document No. 5166d4f999326091c6a60960, <http://www.foia.cia.gov/document/5166d4f999326091c6a60960> (Accessed 14 March 2015), p. 27 [pdf p. 35]; and Xing Guangcheng [邢广程], Personal Interview, 25 November 2015, Chinese Academy of Social Science, Institute of Chinese Borderland Studies.

¹³ Douglas Pike, *Vietnam and the Soviet Union: Anatomy of an Alliance* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1987), p. 193 and p. 205.

¹⁴ Joseph S. Nye Jr., (1995) “United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region,” *U.S. Department of Defense*, 28 February 1995, *Defense Technical Information Center*, text available at <http://nautilus.org/global-problem-solving/us-security-strategy-for-the-east-asia-pacific-region/> (Accessed 2 May 2016), p. 32.

¹⁵ Zhang Jingquan [张景全], “The Japan-US Alliance and the US Return to Asia Strategy,” p. 53; and Chen Xiangyang and Zhong Xin [陈向阳与种昕], “U.S.-ROK Alliance’ Seminar Summary,” p. 60..

Moreover, the US-ROK Alliance for its small size has exhibited advanced joint operational capabilities.¹⁶

All three cases represent adversarial alliances where the small power is reliant on a great power with strategic nuclear weapons. The ability of the great power to extend nuclear deterrence holds important weight for an alliance relationship. The U.S. has repeatedly provided statements to confirm the fact that Japan is under the nuclear protective umbrella since President Johnson's January 1965 reassurance.¹⁷ For the South Koreans, the first time the U.S. stated in writing that South Korea is under the nuclear deterrence umbrella came in a US-ROK joint statement in 2012.¹⁸ The nuclear issue is of great concern to Chinese International Relations scholars since Japan possesses an extremely large stockpile of nuclear fissile materials that Japan could use to produce a large nuclear arsenal. Japan's fissile material is of great importance as China considers the strategic capabilities of the US-Japan Alliance and Japan's dependence on U.S. nuclear assets.¹⁹ The "Study on Japan's Nuclear Materials" cites a calculation from a nuclear security expert,

¹⁶ Yu Tiejun [于铁军], Personal Interview, 24 November 2015, Peking University.

¹⁷ Liu Xing [刘星], "Discussion on the Vitality of the US-Japan Alliance" [*Shilun Rimei tongnmeng de shengmingli*], *World Economics and Politics* [*Shejie jingji yu zhengzhi*], 2007, No. 6, p. 42, note 1.

¹⁸ Sun Ru [孙茹], "Network and Outlook for the US Alliance System in the Asia-Pacific," [*Meiguo yatai tongmeng tixi de wangluohua ji qianjing*], *China International Studies* [*Guoji wenti yanjiu*], No. 4, 2 July 2012, p. 45; and Sun Ru, trans. Ma Zongshi, "Toward A China-U.S.-ROK Cooperative Triangle," *Contemporary International Relations (English Edition)*, Vol. 24, No. 4 (July/August 2014), p. 106.

¹⁹ Liu Weidong [刘卫东], "The U.S. Rebalancing between China and Japan in the Background of Its Rebalancing Strategy," p. 89; Yuan Jingdong, "Chinese perspectives on the US - Japan alliance," pp. 88-92; "Study on Japan's Nuclear Materials," China Arms Control and Disarmament Association and China Institute of Nuclear Information and Economics, September 2015, pp. 27-28 [pdf pp. 33-34], available at: <http://fissilematerials.org/library/cacda15.pdf> (Accessed 28 April 2015).

Frank von Hippel, that Japan could use its domestically based 10.8 tons of separated plutonium to construct nearly 1350 nuclear warheads.²⁰

Finally, in consideration of missile defense as a strategic defensive weapon, the US and Japan have cooperated extensively on research and development of TMD capabilities. Chinese analysts have long taken note of this cooperation and judge that the missile defense capabilities upset the strategic stability between China and the U.S. Even though the U.S. repeatedly claims that missile defense is for countering “limited” nuclear attacks, the Chinese argue that missile defense endangers its secure second strike capability.²¹ Similarly, in recent months, moves to deploy THAAD in South Korea have garnered greater attention from Chinese leaders and analysts as the THAAD interceptor battery has X-band radar that could aid National Missile Defense with warhead discrimination and tracking.²² This discrimination capability would potentially hinder Chinese missile decoys and counter-measures. Table 7.4 below illustrates Chinese commentators are very much concerned with strategic capabilities in close proximity to the Chinese mainland.

²⁰ “Study on Japan’s Nuclear Materials,” p. 2 [pdf p. 8], The warhead calculation references Frank von Hippel, “The large costs and small benefits of reprocessing,” *International Workshop on Spent Nuclear Fuel Management*, Beijing, 23 October 2014.

²¹ “Statement by the United States of America Concerning Missile Defense,” *U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Verification, Compliance and Implementation*, Washington, DC, 7 April 2010, document available at <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/140406.pdf> (Accessed 22 April 2016); and Yao Yunzhu, “Chinese Nuclear Policy and the Future of Minimum Deterrence,” from chapter 8 in Christopher P. Twomey, ed., *Perspectives on Sino-American Strategic Nuclear Issues* (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2008), p. 120.

²² Wu Riqiang [吴日强], Personal Interview, 19 November 2015, Renmin University; and Ryan McGinley, Commander, “Sea-Based X-Band Radar Arrives in Pearl Harbor,” *U.S. Navy*, 10 January 2006, Story Number: NNS060110-11, http://www.navy.mil/submit/display.asp?story_id=21914 (Accessed 27 April 2016).

<i>Adversarial Alliance Capabilities Questions</i>	<i>Adversarial Alliance Case</i>		
	<i>USSR-Vietnam</i>	<i>US-Japan</i>	<i>US-ROK</i>
<i>3a: Do Chinese analysts focus on the geostrategic factors of the adversarial alliance capabilities; for example, forward deployments, and use of ports, airfields, and military bases?</i>	Supported	Supported (1 article)	Supported (1 article)
<i>3b: Do Chinese analysts focus on the strategic nuclear capabilities of the adversarial alliances?</i>	Supported	Supported (13 articles)	Supported (2 articles)
<i>3c: Do Chinese analysts focus on the conventional capabilities of the adversarial alliances?</i>	Supported	Supported (2 articles)	Supported (2 articles)
<i>3d: Do Chinese analysts' perceptions of adversarial alliance capabilities and foreign basing influence its foreign policy outcomes?</i>	Supported	Supported	Supported

Table 7.4. Structured Comparison of Adversarial Alliance Capabilities

7.5 SELF-PERCEPTIONS OF RISING STATE IN RELATION TO ADVERSARIAL ALLIANCE

China's self-perception as a rising power in relation to the US-Japan Alliance and the US-ROK Alliance elicits a variety of viewpoints: hedging, playing both sides, and a systemic viewpoint. First, there are perceptions that China's rise has enhanced the U.S. Alliance system as the U.S., Japan, and South Korea hedge against a potentially dangerous China. For instance, Yuan Jingdong noted that China's rise created an "implicit competition for a regional leadership role if not hegemony or dominance."²³ Another scholar, Zhang Jingquan, argued that China's rise shifted the United States' containment strategy. Instead of the US-Japan Alliance containing

²³ Yuan Jingdong, "Chinese perspectives on the US-Japan alliance," p. 87.

both China and Japan, the alliance has now shifted to the single purpose of containing China.²⁴ China is cognizant of the fact that its rise can cause other states to worry about China's future intentions and has learned to avoid inciting a security dilemma. As Xin Qiang pointed out, China has not sought to maximize its power by increasing its nuclear weapons arsenal, but has consistently maintained its minimal deterrence doctrine. He concluded that arms racing the U.S. would not be in the best interest of China.²⁵

Second, there is speculation from many analysts that China's economic rise is causing South Korea to lean towards China, but others contend that this is a superficial understanding. Yu Tiejun pointed to more than 70% of South Koreans stating that the U.S. is the most important state for South Korea. The bilateral economic relationship between China and South Korea has prospered, but the political and military relationship with the U.S. will be very difficult to change. Additionally, Yu Tiejun thinks that the U.S. educated South Korean elite lean heavily towards the U.S. and they are not in favor of the China model.²⁶ In summary, Zhang Huizhi and Wang Xiaoke assessed that South Korea has a dual strategy of containment and cooperation towards China. On one hand, South Korea has a "comprehensive strategic alliance" with the United States that safeguards its security. On the other hand, South Korea has a "strategic partnership" with China

²⁴ Zhang Jingquan [张景全], "The Japan-US Alliance and the US Return to Asia Strategy," [*Rimeitongmeng yu Meiguo chongfan yazhou zhanlue*], *China International Studies* [*Guoji wenti yanjiu*], No. 5, 4 August 2012, p. 51.

²⁵ Xin Qiang [信强], Personal Interview, 13 November 2015, Fudan University—American Studies Center.

²⁶ Yu Tiejun [于铁军], Personal Interview, 24 November 2015, Peking University.

that bolsters its economic relationship. Zhang Huizhi and Wang Xiaoke conclude that South Korea is using US-ROK relations to balance Sino-ROK relations.²⁷

Third, Zhu Feng offers a systemic vantage point. While he agrees that China’s rise has decreased the cohesion of the alliance and this provides China with a little more strategic space to maneuver, Zhu Feng also argues that the dynamics of economy and security are different and the U.S.-centric alliance system remains untouchable and unchangeable. He stated, “Don’t have illusions that China’s rise could undermine the U.S. strategic anchor in the region.”²⁸

<i>Self-Perception of Rising State in Relation to Adversarial Alliance Questions</i>	<i>Adversarial Alliance Case</i>		
	<i>USSR-Vietnam</i>	<i>US-Japan</i>	<i>US-ROK</i>
<i>4a: Have Chinese analysts become increasingly dissatisfied with adversarial alliances on its periphery?</i>	N/A	Supported (1 article)	Not Supported
<i>4b: Do Chinese analysts tolerate the adversarial alliances and recognize the security benefits?</i>	N/A	Supported	Supported
<i>4c: Has China’s self-perception of its rise in power influenced its foreign policy outcomes?</i>	N/A	Supported	Potentially

Table 7.5. Structured Comparison of Self Perception of Rising State in Relation to Adversarial Alliance

²⁷ Zhang Huizhi and Wang Xiaoke [张慧智与王箫轲], “Twenty Years of China-ROK Relations: Achievements and Problems” [*Zhonghan guanxi ershi nian: Chengjiu yu wenti*], *Contemporary International Relations* [*Xiandai guoji guanxi*], 2013, No. 1, p. 24.

²⁸ Zhu Feng [朱锋], Personal Interview, 8 December 2015, Nanjing University.

7.6 LESSONS LEARNED FOR INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

This dissertation research provides important lessons for International Relations, and this section will synthesize the case findings on four topics: the security dilemma, rational actor, rising power capabilities, and alliance politics. While the cases focus on Chinese perceptions of adversarial alliances, it is possible to draw greater analytical understanding of these International Relations issues.

First, this research points to the security dilemma as a political science concept that has real-world implications. International Relations is an anarchic environment where states compete and cooperate for security. It is only natural for states to prepare for worst-case scenarios by internally and externally balancing against other states. The cases illustrate how Chinese senior leaders saw first-hand how their actions could spur and initiate adverse reactions from the US-Japan Alliance. In turn, the US-Japan Alliance's 1996 joint declaration and 1997 revised guidelines continued to heighten security dilemma. In response, China enhanced its bilateral relations with Russia. While senior Chinese leaders publicly stated their desires to avoid arms racing and alliance politics, the empirical record shows quite the opposite. China has continued to enhance its offensive and defensive strategic arms; and without a doubt, the U.S. continues to advance its defensive strategic arms.

This continuous strategic competition between China and the U.S. illustrates the security dilemma at work. Both states are compelled to react to the other states' added capabilities. Since the end of the Cold War, the U.S. has retained its strategic alliances with Japan and South Korea to aid its power projection to hedge against

the rise of China. China's advancements in military capabilities cause other states to balance against its rise in power.

However, the USSR-Vietnam Alliance case shows how two states can circumvent the security dilemma by each state undertaking tangible costly actions. The Soviets achieved normalization with the Chinese by steadily removing the "three obstacles" that were threatening to the Chinese. First, physically removing Soviet troops from Mongolia and Afghanistan, and reducing troop numbers on the Sino-Soviet borders was a signal of benign intent. Second, removing support for the Vietnamese in Cambodia necessarily ended Soviet access to Cam Ranh Bay and Da Nang. These concrete policies helped to reduce the security dilemma.

Second, in relation to the security dilemma is the idea of the state behaving as a rational actor. As a state operating in an anarchic environment, it is natural to be cautious and wary of other powerful actors. For the three adversarial alliance cases, China was cognizant of great powers in security cooperation with lesser powers on its periphery. In each case the lesser power shared territory with the greater power; thus, aiding the greater power's ability to project power in East Asia. China, as a rational actor, is able to discern the benefits and drawbacks of the respective alliance relationships.

In the benefits column, numerous Chinese scholars have remarked that adversarial alliance partnerships have helped reduce the number of nuclear armed states on its periphery. The U.S. through its extended deterrence policy and alliance management practices kept Japan and South Korea from pursuing nuclear weapons. Second, the relationship with the large alliance partner can act potentially as an

institutional brake. In theory, if a great power manages its alliance relationship well, the small power and the large power will hold policy deliberations that can slow a small actor from behaving impetuously. The large power alliance partner can always inform the smaller alliance partner that certain under certain circumstances the large power alliance partner will abandon it. For instance, the distant large power alliance partner could have much smaller interest in advancing or protecting an issue or asset that is not a vital interest. Third, an adversarial alliance can potentially act as a restraint on the capabilities of the smaller power by causing the smaller power to be dependent on the great power. For example, Japan is heavily dependent on U.S. intelligence capabilities (a necessity in modern warfare), and the U.S. has limited the capabilities of Japan by not allowing it to have cruise missiles, ballistic missiles, nor aircraft carriers. For example, the U.S. decision to not to sell F-22 to Japan keeps the Japan Self-Defense Force from possessing the most advanced 5th generation fighter in the world. The F-22s that are in Okinawa are under the control of the U.S. Air Force's 94th Expeditionary Fighter Squadron.

In contrast, it is natural for China to see many of the drawbacks of security cooperation in close proximity to its borders. First, in the drawback column, an adversarial alliance decreases the distance between a great power and China's border. Quite simply, U.S. basing privileges on foreign soil make a North American great power an East Asian power. Second, the aggregated power of the adversarial alliance makes smaller neighbors much more powerful and potentially more dangerous if the small power is emboldened to challenge the resident power. This is the opposite situation of the benefit above; instead of alliance abandonment, this

type of situation could entrap the large power alliance partner in a conflict that it does not want to pursue. Third, a small power on China's periphery can greatly enhance its internal balancing capabilities by linking with a large power. In terms of internal balancing, a small power can gain technology transfers to its own domestic defense industries by way of production licenses, special equipment, and training.

China, additionally, as a rational actor in an anarchic environment is cautious of other states' intentions. While Chinese analysts are continually evaluating the intentions of the U.S. and its Asian allies, these intentions are apt to change and deemed undependable. Chinese analysts in this study evaluated the intentions of the alliances by looking for changes in intentions and at times saw conspiratorial intentions. It is perfectly natural for rational actors to doubt the intentions of other actors and be suspicious of their activities that pertain to its national interests. Other scholars offered differing perceptions that interpreted the same events without attributing conspiratorial intentions.

Third, Chinese analysts keep an eye to the future with an eye to potential threats and opportunities. As they anticipate a continued rise in comprehensive national power that will rival the U.S. In strategic terms, Chinese analysts recognize the potential dangers of a hegemonic war and the amount of resources that both states would dedicate towards an arms race. In economic terms, China's GDP has in constant 2011 US Dollars has grown dramatically in this new millennium; in 2000, China's GDP was \$1.3 trillion and by 2014, it was \$5.3 trillion. As an economic power, China benefits other countries as an export market. For example, South Korea's exports in 2005 comprised roughly 7% of South Korea's GDP, and it would

grow by 2014 to roughly 12% of its GDP (constant 2005 US Dollars). Additionally, China has demonstrated its rise in power by not only its yearly growth in GDP and trade surplus statistics, but also its yearly defense budget increases. In constant 2011 US Dollars, China defense budget surpassed Japan in 2004. Ten years later, China's defense budget would more than triple and Japan's defense budget would actually decrease by \$2 billion. China's military modernization has greatly benefited from the steadily growing defense budgets to pay for enhanced capabilities. For instance, China's research and development of ballistic missiles includes the full spectrum of ranges from intermediate to inter-continental. Additionally, the Chinese military has been active in researching ballistic missile defense systems.

In naval terms, China's rise in power capabilities has grown tremendously in the past 16 years. Chinese analysts are continually pointing to the fact that China is developing a blue water navy that will not be hemmed in by the first island chain, but will have greater abilities to operate in the Pacific Ocean. The most recent announcement came in May 2016 during the deliberations over the US-ROK Alliance's deployment of the THAAD system. Chinese military leaders point to the deployment of the Jin-class (Type 094) submarines as a way to insure retaliation with nuclear weapons, referring to the submarines as a strategic trump card. The addition of four Jin-class nuclear ballistic submarines enhances China's ability to project power. Each submarine is fitted with twelve JL-2 MIRV capable ballistic missiles that can carry two to three warheads. Likewise, while the Liaoning aircraft carrier has received a lot of media attention, the addition of 15 corvettes in the past five years merits attention.

With respect to the US-Japan Alliance, China's rise in power has allowed it to use government vessels since 2012 to sail the contiguous and territorial waters of the Diaoyu Islands on a regular, almost daily basis. In the summer of 2013, the Chinese government consolidated the activities of the Fisheries Administration, the Maritime Surveillance, the Customs Enforcement, and the Border Control under the China Coast Guard. The repeated use of Chinese government vessels in the Diaoyu Island waters forces Japan to use its maritime assets to monitor the Chinese government vessels. In April 1978, China resorted to sending a flotilla of fishing boats to the Diaoyu Island waters before Japan and China agreed to "shelve the issue" as part of the peace treaty negotiations.²⁹ Now in 2016, the Chinese government has much greater resources at its disposal to demonstrate its disapproval of Japanese policies over the disputed territory.

Fourth, this dissertation research points us to greater understanding of alliance politics from the vantage point of the target state or third-party state. From the perspective of a state outside the membership of an alliance, it is difficult to judge the actual intentions, capabilities, and cohesion of the alliance. The alliance can display joint declarations, agreements, treaties, revised guidelines, and proclamations in an effort to signal its intentions. The alliance can announce deployments, weapons sales and transfers, joint military exercises, and establish bases and ports to signal its capabilities. When alliance members undertake the

²⁹ M. Taylor Fravel, "China's Assertiveness in the Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands Dispute," MIT Political Science Department Research Paper No. 016-19, May 2016, p. 2, fn. 2, available at SSRN: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=2788165>. For more details on this event, see Daniel Tretiak, "The Sino-Japanese Treaty of 1978: The Senkaku incident prelude," *Asian Survey*, Vol. 18, No. 12, 1978, pp. 1235-1249.

actions above they are pointing to the alliance's cohesion, because all of these events require a degree of negotiations between the two alliance partners. These are the events that the target state or third-party state can perceive, but it is cognizant that so much more is going on behind closed doors.

Chinese analysts paid a lot of attention to the visible manifestations of low cohesion between the US-Japan Alliance and the US-ROK Alliance. The relationship between the respective senior leaders was strained by suspended agreements, revelation of secret agreements, independent and exclusionary rhetoric, and refusal to comply with operational planning. Chinese observations were validated by non-Chinese sources that indeed the alliances were in difficult shape. These analysts, Chinese and non-Chinese, were evaluating alliance cohesion by looking at the individual level of analysis. ROK President Roh and President George W. Bush had serious disagreements on North Korean policy; Japanese Prime Minister Hatoyama and President Obama had serious disagreements on the Futenma issue. These disagreements were public and evident for all to see. Strong and enduring alliances cannot be divided by a disagreement between senior actors alone. During this time, the inter-alliance workings behind the scenes represented by military to military dealings and the bureaucratic dealings between the respective defense departments were not public. It is thus, difficult to determine the level of alliance cohesion when a large part of the inter-alliance workings are behind closed doors.

7.7 POLICY IMPLICATIONS

Finding #1: Chinese analysts focus on the personal relationship between senior leaders when evaluating adversarial alliance cohesion.

First, the relationship between Indian Prime Minister Modi and President Obama has long garnered attention.³⁰ We should expect to see Chinese analysts on the lookout for strategic enhancements of the US-India relationship. For instance, in April 2016, Ash Carter made a logistics agreement with his Indian counterpart, Manohar Parrikar, that “will allow the Indian and American militaries to use each other’s bases to refuel and as staging areas during emergencies or natural disasters.”³¹

Second, President Obama’s presidency is quickly ending. Thus, looking forward to the 2016 presidential nominees, Hillary Clinton’s previous role as Secretary of State began during the Hatoyama low-point, but she was instrumental in pushing the U.S. “pivot” to Asia. In terms of the alliance, Hillary Clinton repeatedly voiced support for Japan’s administration over the *Diaoyu* Islands during the 2010 and 2012 crises, and she has a record of interacting positively with Prime Minister Abe. If Hillary Clinton is elected in November, Chinese analysts would expect the U.S. alliances in East Asia to remain cohesive. If the U.S. alliances in East

³⁰ Jeffrey Marcus, “After a Promise to Keep in Touch, Obama and Modi Get a Hotline,” *The New York Times*, 21 August 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/22/world/asia/after-a-promise-to-keep-in-touch-obama-and-modi-get-a-hotline.html?_r=0 (Accessed 16 June 2016); and Gardiner Harris, “President Obama and India’s Modi Forge an Unlikely Friendship,” *The New York Times*, 5 June 2016, <http://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/06/world/asia/india-narendra-modi-obama.html> (Accessed 16 June 2016);

³¹ Michael S. Schmidt, “U.S. and India Agree to Strengthen Military Ties,” *The New York Times*, 12 April 2016, <http://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/13/world/asia/us-and-india-with-eye-on-china-agree-to-strengthen-military-ties.html> (Accessed 28 June 2016).

Asia remain cohesive, South Korea and Japan have less incentive to pursue nuclear weapons to confront the nuclear threat from North Korea. However, Chinese analysts would not favor further moves by Clinton to check the rise of China or attempts to embolden Japan.

In contrast, Donald Trump has disparaged the U.S. alliances as a “bad deal” for the U.S., and he is opposed to the Trans-Pacific Partnership. If Donald Trump is elected in November, Chinese analysts would expect poor relations between Trump and Prime Minister Abe and President Park. Chinese analysts would expect the US-Japan Alliance and the US-ROK Alliance to enter a time of low cohesion. If the U.S. vacates the region or abrogates its extended deterrence policies with Japan and South Korea, it would be highly likely that the South Korea and Japan would independently develop nuclear weapons to match the present-day nuclear threat. This contingency is most-likely why Japan has retained domestically at least 10 tons of nuclear fissile material.

Finding #2: Chinese analysts focus on tangible costly actions in the realm of strategic capabilities.

First, we should expect to see China continue its attempts to dissuade South Korea from accepting a THAAD deployment while the alliance partners are holding consultations on the issue. South Korean media outlets have reported Chinese leaders issuing “veiled threats” toward the U.S. and South Korea if the alliance partners move forward with the THAAD deployment. In addition, China has shown greater willingness to punish North Korea for its provocative behavior that provides justification for a THAAD deployment.

Second, Theater Missile Defense (TMD) and National Missile Defense (NMD) have potentially compromised China's secure second strike capabilities. Assurances that the strategic defensive weapons are aimed at "rogue states" have not convinced the Chinese. Additionally, in response to further U.S. advances in Global Strike and the proposed Multi-Object Kill Vehicle (MOKV) we should expect to see China pursue development of a modern nuclear triad that would include hypersonic ballistic missiles, advanced ballistic missile submarines, and a strategic stealth bomber.

Finding #3: Chinese analysts are aware of the role South Korean and Japanese domestic politics plays in the cohesion of the alliance.

Chinese analysts pay attention to large protest events and polling numbers that gauge the respective domestic population's lack of support for U.S. bases. For example, the recent murder by a Marine veteran on Okinawa holds potential repercussions for the alliance relationship.³² This potentially affects U.S. basing options since Prime Minister Abe and the Governor of Okinawa, Takeshi Onaga, can discern the electorate's pressure.³³ We should expect China to welcome Japanese or South Korean leaders that lean away from the U.S. axis because they jeopardize the ability of the U.S. to retain basing privileges.

³² Jonathan Soble, "At Okinawa Protest, Thousands Call for Removal of U.S. Bases," *The New York Times*, 19 June 2016, <http://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/20/world/asia/japan-okinawa-protest-united-states-military.html> (Accessed 22 June 2016).

³³ Jonathan Soble, "Abe Voices Outrage After Former U.S. Marine Is Arrested in Okinawa Killing," *The New York Times*, 20 May 2016, <http://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/21/world/asia/okinawa-killing-marine.html>? (Accessed 22 June 2016).

Finding #4: Chinese analysts view the U.S. as a great power that has a moderating effect on the smaller alliance partner's behavior.

As China has carried out its “salami slicing” tactics in the South China Sea, the U.S. has undertaken a significant amount of security dealings with Vietnam and the Philippines.³⁴ We should also expect Chinese analysts to view the enhancement of U.S. security ties with the Philippines and Vietnam as a not entirely negative development.³⁵ Chinese leaders would be very reluctant to praise the development; yet, they can see the U.S. as a restraint on the smaller power's foreign policy. The U.S. can seek to maintain open sea lines of communication and act as an “honest broker” in the South China Sea territorial dispute.

Finding #5: Chinese analysts view the U.S. alliances with Japan and South Korea as a nuclear proliferation inhibitor.

U.S. extended nuclear deterrence over its alliance partners has, in this sense, had a positive effect on China's security. We should expect to see Chinese analysts encourage U.S. policies that will restrain Japanese remilitarization. For example, the 27 April 2015 defense guideline revisions have not elicited the large amount of attention as the 1997 guideline revisions.³⁶ In contrast to the 1997 revised guidelines that contained the phrasing “areas surrounding Japan” twenty times, the

³⁴ Ronald O'Rourke, “China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities—Background and Issues for Congress,” *Congressional Research Service*, RL33153, 31 May 2016, p. 4 [pdf p. 9], <https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33153.pdf> (Accessed 10 June 2016).

³⁵ Jane Perlez, “Why Might Vietnam Let U.S. Military Return? China,” *The New York Times*, 19 May 2016, <http://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/20/world/asia/access-to-bay-adds-enticement-as-us-weighs-lifting-vietnam-embargo.html> (Accessed 28 June 2016); and Floyd Whaley, “Eye on China, U.S. and Philippines Ramp Up Military Alliance,” *The New York Times*, 12 April 2016, <http://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/13/world/asia/philippines-south-china-sea-ash-carter.html> (Accessed 28 June 2016).

³⁶ “The Guidelines For Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation (April 27, 2015),” *Japan Ministry of Defense*, http://www.mod.go.jp/e/d_act/anpo/pdf/shishin_20150427e.pdf (Accessed 25 June 2015).

2015 revised guidelines only used the phrase “waters surrounding Japan” two times and two other mentions about defending airspace and maritime approaches. This emphasis on wording helps avoid the Taiwan issue and puts Japan’s focus on its own territory.

Finding #6: Chinese analysts’ perceptions are rationally connected to observable behavior.

Target states face a steep deficit of information on inter-alliance politics and bureaucratic policies. We should expect China to attach greater significance to observable behavior instead of statements and declarations. This finding should be particularly important for developments in the South China Sea as Freedom of Navigation Operations around the seven Chinese reclamation projects. Additionally, the ability to bolster Filipino naval and coast guard assets should indicate in an observable way that the U.S. serious about enhancing its relationship with the Philippines.

Finding #7: China’s rise in power relative to the U.S. alliances in East Asia is contradictory and suggests China has its own “integrate but hedge” strategy.

On one-hand Chinese diplomats and senior leaders have put forward the idea of a peaceful rise and avoidance of arms-racing and alliances, but at the same time China has developed a “quasi-alliance” with Russia as a way to purchase advanced weapon systems. We should expect to see China’s large and growing defense budgets to continue the development of blue water navy capabilities and advanced ballistic missiles that potentially threaten U.S. aircraft carriers ability to operate in close proximity to the Chinese mainland.

Finding #8: Chinese analysts understand that China's rise in economic and military power tests the economic and military resources of the U.S. to maintain its alliance network.

The U.S. does not possess the fiscal strength that it possessed in the Cold War and has fewer economic incentives to offer its allies. We should expect to see China test the cohesion of the U.S. alliances in East Asia by attempting to link economic policies with security issues. The U.S., South Korea, and Japan all seek economic gains by engaging in commerce with Chinese companies and would prefer not to cut economic ties with China.

Finding #9: The US-Japan Alliance has been unable to reverse China's announcement of the Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) and repeated sailings of government vessels in the contiguous and territorial waters surrounding the Diaoyu Islands.

We should expect to see China to continue its use of “salami tactics” to coerce smaller powers. Figure 7.1 displays China's use of government vessels in the contiguous and territorial waters surrounding the *Diaoyu* Islands from January 2012 to May 2016. China will use these assets to assert its territorial claims, and protect Chinese fishermen from arrest in disputed foreign Exclusive Economic Zones.




Figure 7.1. Chinese Government Vessels in Japanese Waters³⁷

7.8 NOTES FOR FURTHER RESEARCH

Concerning the USSR-Vietnam Alliance case, I would like to track down archival data on two critical cohesion events. First, I want to locate primary source evidence that would provide details on the November 1978 treaty negotiations between the USSR and Vietnam. Minutes or a memorandum from the meeting would confirm the testimony from the anonymous Vietnamese officer that said Vietnam did not expect the Soviets to come to the aid if the Chinese attacked as a

³⁷ "Trends in Chinese Government and Other Vessels in the Waters Surrounding the Senkaku Islands, and Japan's Response- Records of Intrusions of Chinese Government and Other Vessels into Japan's Territorial Sea," *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan*, 16 June 2016, http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/page23e_000021.html (Accessed 17 June 2016).

reprisal for invading Cambodia.³⁸ Second, after Gorbachev's Vladivostok speech in July 1986, the newly appointed Vietnamese Party Chief, Truong Chinh, was waiting for Gorbachev in Moscow. The two leaders met on 12 August 1986, and it would be highly instructive in the areas of alliance cohesion and power asymmetry to read the minutes of the meetings or memorandum between Gorbachev and Truong Chinh.

Concerning the US-ROK Alliance, I will conduct further research to trace the on-going THAAD deployment issues. This cohesion test places South Korea between the competing interests of its historic alliance partner, the U.S., and a rising economic power in the region, China. The THAAD issue continues to evolve as South Korean Defense Minister Han Min-koo recently stated at the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore on 5 June 2016, "If the THAAD is deployed to U.S. forces in Korea, our capability will be dramatically enhanced."³⁹

Concerning the US-Japan Alliance, I will need to keep an eye on the Abe administration's defense policies. Japan under the second Abe administration has displayed intentions of becoming a "normal country" and throwing off the restrictions imposed on it after World War II.⁴⁰ Furthermore, the Japanese Diet has

³⁸ Henry J. Kenny, "Vietnamese Perceptions of the 1979 War with China," from Chapter 10 in Mark A. Ryan, David M. Finkelstein, and Michael A. McDevitt, eds., *Chinese Warfighting: The PLA Experience Since 1949* (Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2003), p. 222, the interview was conducted in 1999.

³⁹ "THAAD to 'dramatically' enhance capacity to counter NK threat: defense chief," *Yonhap News Agency*, 6 June 2016, <http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/news/2016/06/06/0200000000AEN20160606006100315.html> (Accessed 6 June 2016).

⁴⁰ Wang Shan, trans. Wang Xiangyan, "An Analysis of Japan's 'Active Pacifism'," *Contemporary International Relations (English Edition)*, Vol. 24, No. 6 (November/December 2014), p. 105.

also displayed a legislative willingness to support Abe’s moves by passing legislation that provides the JSDF with greater legal latitude to act.⁴¹

Concerning the inter-connectedness of alliance cohesion and alliance capabilities, I would like to develop a typology of events where cohesion enhancing or degrading decisions interact with capability enhancing or degrading events.

Table 7.6 below illustrates the four possible outcomes that I would like to populate and examine.

		<i>CAPABILITY</i>	
		<i>Degrading</i>	<i>Enhancing</i>
<i>COHESION</i>	<i>Enhancing</i>	Cohesion Enhancement at the Cost of Capability Event	Dual Enhancement Event
	<i>Degrading</i>	Dual Degrading Event	Capability Enhancement at the Cost of Cohesion Event

Table 7.6. The Interaction of Alliance Cohesion and Capability Events 2x2

To fully address the question of how Chinese analysts perceive alliance capabilities, I will need to find Chinese military journals that delve into doctrinal and warfighting analysis. Five potential journals to explore include: Contemporary Military [现代军事] from the PLA Press; Contemporary Military Digest [当代军事文摘] from the China Defense Science and Technology Information Center; Military Operations Research and Systems Engineering [军事运筹与系统工程] from the Academy of Military Science’s Military Operation Research and Analysis Institute;

⁴¹ Jonathan Soble, “Japan’s Lower House Passes Bills to Give Military Freer Hand to Fight,” *The New York Times*, 16 July 2015.

and World Military Review [外国军事学术] and National Defense [国防] from the Academy of Military Science of the Chinese PLA.

Concerning the future of the U.S. Alliance system in East Asia, Zhu Feng contends, “East Asia security is a great laboratory for testing all of the assumptions. We need new theorizing of the security dynamics in East Asia. The alliance system will always come underneath the crux of economics and security. Otherwise, you will never know what is going on in the alliance system.”⁴² It will be worthwhile to keep tracing how China’s rise in economic and military power affects the respective alliances. Will China be able to use its growing economic influence to weaken alliance commitments that would hold economic repercussions, or will China’s growing military power continue to cause the alliance partners to hedge against China?

⁴² Zhu Feng [朱锋], Personal Interview, 8 December 2015, Nanjing University.

8.0 BIBLIOGRAPHY

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