

CHINA, THE UNITED NATIONS AND REGIME STABILITY

PROLOGUE

“Beware the person with a Buddha’ s mouth and a
snake’ s heart”

CHINESE PROVERB

I. INTERNATIONAL MATTERS: CHINA, THE UN AND AUSTRALIA

Dr Michael Fullilove argued in December 2010 that China has become a far more active and effective contributor to the United Nations. He emphasized, however, that increased engagement with the UN has its limits. China, in spite of its increased UN activity, has thus far refused to shoulder all of the responsibilities attached to its newly-gained great power status. At one end of what Fullilove calls a UN ‘stakeholder spectrum’ , China has enhanced its contribution to UN peacekeeping. At the other end of the ‘spectrum’ , China has refused to engage over human rights issues and has used its Security Council veto to shield pariah states from international pressure. Fullilove warns that China’ s intensification of its engagement in the UN and its

assumption of a more active role may not be compliant with Western expectations.¹

China's seat on the United Nations Security Council was originally held (from 1949 to 1971) by Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist Government, known as the 'Republic of China.' However, the Nationalists were forced to retreat to the island of Taiwan in 1949, during the Chinese Civil War. A Communist Government was left in control of mainland China, henceforth known as the 'People's Republic of China.' In 1971, Resolution 2758 recognized the PRC as the rightful representative of China in the UN and gave it the seat on the Security Council that had been held by the Republic of China, which was expelled from the UN altogether. Both Governments still claim one another's territory, although only a few small nations continue to officially recognize Taiwan's sovereignty.

2758 (XXVI). Restoration of the lawful rights of the People's Republic of China in the United Nations

The General Assembly,

Recalling the principles of the Charter of the United Nations,

Considering that the restoration of the lawful rights of the People's Republic of China is essential both for the protection of the Charter of the United Nations and for the cause that the United Nations must serve under the Charter,

Recognizing that the representatives of the Government of the People's Republic of China are the only lawful representatives of China to the United Nations and that the People's Republic of China is one of the five permanent members of the Security Council,

Decides to restore all its rights to the People's Republic of China and to recognize the representatives of its Government as the only legitimate representatives of China to the United Nations, and to expel forthwith the representatives of Chiang Kai-shek from the place which they unlawfully occupy at the United Nations and in all the organizations related to it.

*1976th plenary meeting,
25 October 1971.*

¹ Dr Michael Fullilove is a former Rhodes Scholar and Advisor to Australian Prime Minister Paul Keating and is currently Director of the Global Issues Programme at the Lowy Institute for International Policy and is a Nonresident Senior Fellow in Foreign Policy at the Brookings Institution.

China has become a highly engaged actor in the UN Security Council, which itself has taken a much more active role in collective security since the end of the Cold War. China's positions in Council deliberations are pragmatic and instrumental, not primarily ideological. It is especially motivated by two calculations: strategic interest and political reputation vis-a-vis the international community.²

China's path to engagement has extended over a lengthy period of some 41 years, stemming initially from its admission in 1971 in place of the defeated Nationalists. There are three identifiable 'phases': first that between 1971 and 1982 (where China was a passive learner, making frequent abstentions on peacekeeping votes and aligning itself with the Third World); second that between 1982 and 1992 (where China began to increase its engagement by taking the initiative); and third 1992 to the present (where China has adopted active engagement, has approved of most resolutions and participated in some PKOs).

China's strategic rationale has been, and in some cases, continues to be, to use its seat on the Security Council as a vehicle to check United States' unilateralism in international affairs. China's rationale is also to attempt to build up a credible

² See Joel Wuthnow, "China's Participation In The UN Security Council", Powerpoint Presentation, Hong Kong Political Science Association, 21 August 2009.

image of a ‘responsible great power’ that accepts pre-existing institutions and norms.

Since the Security Council’s inception up until August 2011, China (ROC/PRC) has used its veto six times;



France 18 times;

Russia/USSR 122 times; the United Kingdom 32 times; and the United States 81 times.³

The following Table illustrates how five of China’s Security Council vetoes came about:

³ See Professor C. L. Sanders, “History Of The United Nations Security Council”, 30 August 2011, as at URL <smileyandwest.ning.com/22profiles/blogs/history-of-the-united-nations-security-council> Accessed 8 August 2012.

TABLE OF CHINA' S VETOES
IN THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL
JANUARY 1997 TO FEBRUARY 2012

<u><i>DATE</i></u>	<u><i>ISSUE</i></u>	<u><i>EFFECT</i></u>	<u><i>REASON</i></u>
<u><i>10 January 1997</i></u>	<u><i>Guatemala peace keeping mission</i></u>	<u><i>Prevent military observer mission</i></u>	<u><i>Guatemala' s long-standing diplomatic recognition of Taiwan</i></u>
<u><i>25 February 1999</i></u>	<u><i>Macedonia peace keeping force</i></u>	<u><i>Discontinue UNPREDEP mission</i></u>	<u><i>Macedonian adoption of diplomatic relations with Taiwan</i></u>
<u><i>12 January 2007</i></u>	<u><i>Myanmar: censure over human rights abuses</i></u>	<u><i>Failure to condemn Myanmar regime</i></u>	<u><i>Sensitivity over human rights violations within own borders</i></u>
<u><i>11 July 2008</i></u>	<u><i>Zimbabwe: imposition of sanctions</i></u>	<u><i>Failure to approve sanctions against Mugabe regime</i></u>	<u><i>Negative effect on Chinese arms exporters to Zimbabwe</i></u>
<u><i>5 February 2012</i></u>	<u><i>Syria: sanctions against Assad regime</i></u>	<u><i>Failure to approve sanctions against violence inflicted on anti-Assad protestors</i></u>	<u><i>Negative impact of Chinese sales of weapons to Syrian regime.</i></u>

[**Sources:** See Wuthnow and Media Outlets BBC, CNN, Chicago Tribune, Guardian Newspapers.]

The changes in China have had a remarkable impact on Australia. In the 1970s, it was far from clear what the future world would hold for China and what that might mean for Australia. At the time, Australia' s economic focus was on Japan, which had already been Australia' s largest export market for almost a decade.

However, after four decades as Australia's foremost trading partner, Japan was overtaken (only in 2009 – three short years ago) when China became Australia's largest export market. China now holds the double distinction of being not only Australia's largest export market but also of being Australia's largest



trade partner.

The value of Australian resources exports to China has sky-rocketed. China now takes more than 23% of Australian exports. In 2009-2010, iron ore exports to China were worth \$25 billion and coal exports were worth \$5 billion. In 2009-2010, China supplied nearly 18% of Australian imports.



The same year, Chinese investment in Australia rose to \$16.3 billion

(75% of which being in the resources sector) – this figure being the third highest source of proposed foreign investment, after the United States and the United Kingdom, though more than that of Japan.⁴

The 10 Deals Signed by China and Australia on 21 June 2010 in Canberra	
No.	Description
1	USD 1.2 billion facility agreement between Karara Mining Ltd and China Development Bank Corporation (CDB)
2	MOU on cooperation on project development between South Australia and CDB in the sectors of resources, infrastructure and agriculture
3	MOU on cooperation on project development between Aquila Resources Ltd. and CDB
4	MOU between the Party School of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the Australian National University
5	Joint venture agreement between CNOOC and Arckaringa Energy
6	Strategic Partnership Agreement between Telstra and ZTE
7	Engineering and procurement contract cooperation agreement for China Gezhouba Group Company Ltd to provide procurement, engineering and design services to Fortescue Metals Group Ltd
8	Cooperation agreement of China First Coal Development between Resourcehouse Ltd., Export-Import Bank of China, Metallurgical Corporation of China and China Power Holdings
9	MOU between the Department of Resources, Energy and Tourism of Australia and the National Energy Administration of the People's Republic of China on enhancing cooperation in the field of energy
10	Protocol of phytosanitary requirements for the export of apples from Tasmania to China

Source: Sydney Morning Herald

In this period of great change, the question for Australia is ‘what policies do we need to maximize our national interest now and in the decades ahead?’

Hugh White argues that China’s rising power presents Australia with a fundamental dilemma. We want stability. We want to benefit from growing Chinese economic power; and we want to rely on the benefits derived from United States’ strategic power. White recommends that Australia urge the United States to seek a ‘concert of powers’ with China and other great powers so that conflict can be avoided.⁵

⁴ Scott Dewar, “Australia, China And The United States: Responding To Changing Great Power Dynamics”, *Australian Centre On China In The World*, Australian National University, circa 2011.

⁵ Ibid.

Arguing that White's proposal is too radical and asks the US to yield too many of its own strategic options, Dewar asserts that Australia should maintain our security links with the United States as well as our economic engagement with China. Dewar further adumbrates the view that Australia should foster and pursue a 'shared strategic approach' towards China with Singapore, Malaysia, the Republic of Korea and, of course, Japan.⁶

II. DOMESTIC FACTORS: EXIGENCIES THREATENING CCP CONTROL

China saw 180,000 protests, riots and mass demonstrations in 2010 alone – an average of about 500 every day – a number that has likely since increased. Villagers' complaints are common ones: local officials exploiting land sales and violently repressing dissent.⁷ Gary Locke, US Ambassador to China, has said *"...There is a growing frustration among the people over the operations of government, corruption, lack of transparency and issues that affect the Chinese people on a daily basis that [the people] feel are being neglected."*⁸

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Max Fisher, "How China Stays Stable Despite 500 Protests Every Day", *The Atlantic*, 5 January 2012.

⁸ See "US Ambassador: China's Political Stability Very Delicate, Rights Situation Worsened", *Tibetan Review*, 20 January 2012.

Given the lack of political freedoms, the Chinese government's legitimacy rests on its ability to deliver improved living standards and increased economic opportunity to the masses. So far, the masses have benefited to a certain degree with 200 million people having been lifted out of poverty, though that could change quite suddenly.⁹

There is the growing problem of unemployment and underemployment among university graduates. Since 1999, when the Chinese government began a drive to increase university education, the number of graduates has risen seven-fold, but the number of high-skilled, high paying jobs has not kept pace.¹⁰

According to risk Consultancy Company Maplecroft, China is categorized as 'extreme risk' across several areas including:

- ❖ civil and political rights
- ❖ judicial independence
- ❖ democratic governance
- ❖ labour rights
- ❖ human rights violations by security forces

Companies which are deemed in any way to be supporting a government or its agents in stifling democracy, liberty and human rights may suffer damage to their reputations.

⁹ Views of Barry Eichenberry, Professor of Economics and Political Science at Berkeley University.

¹⁰ Professor Eichenberry.

Blind Chinese activist, Chen Guangcheng, has accused Beijing of failing to uphold its own laws, saying its abusive treatment of dissidents – including members of his own family – threatens China’s political stability. As he remarked in May 2012, *“Indeed, China’s political stability may depend on its ability to develop the rule of law in a system where it barely exists.”*¹¹




Figure 1 : Extent and Frequency of Strikes Over Pay and Conditions by Chinese Transport Workers - February 2011 to April 2012

¹¹ See “China’s ‘Lawlessness’ Threatens Stability: Chen”, *The Times of India*, 30 May 2012.



Figure 2 : Heavy Police 'Crackdowns' on Protests over the State of the Chinese Environment



Figure 3 : Bravely Defiant Demonstrator at Shanghai Police Break Up of 'Jasmine Revolution' Protest¹²

¹² The term has meaning in two political contexts. The Tunisian Revolution which overthrew President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali by popular protests was called the 'Jasmine Revolution' by media outlets and heralded the beginning of the Arab Spring. The 2011 Chinese pro-democracy protests were inspired by the Tunisian Revolution and called a 'Jasmine Revolution' by some of the Chinese organizers.




Figure 4 : Collective Accused at Show Trial in Fujian Province in 2000 for Corruption - An Endemic and Widespread Crime in China¹³

Despite the use of violent and ruthless riot control force, the Politburo is concerned over a wide range of matters that are ‘eating away’ at the 63 year reign of the CCP. Below, I list some 24 such matters, extending across the four vital spheres of economics, environment, health and politics. Each issue is a potential catastrophe for the Chinese people and for the Communist ‘princelings’ who seek to manage the country without meaningful reform or sharing of power within a multi-party system.

¹³ A secret Report by the People’s Bank of China stated that more than 10,000 corrupt Chinese officials embezzled \$120 billion over 15 years (approximately between 1996 and 2011), many of whom fled to either Australia or the United States with the stolen money. See “Mistakenly-Released Report Reveals Embarrassing Extent Of Chinese Corruption”, *The Australian*, 17 June 2011.

DESCRIPTIVE TABLE: CHINA' S DESTABILIZING FACTORS

<i>Economic</i>	<i>Health</i>	<i>Environment</i>	<i>Political</i>
❖ <i>Increasing Inflation</i>	❖ <i>Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome [SARS]</i>	❖ <i>Widespread Pollution</i>	❖ <i>Leadership Worries over 'Jasmine Revolutions'</i>
❖ <i>Labour Shortages</i>	❖ <i>HIV/AIDS</i>	❖ <i>Eco-system destruction</i>	❖ <i>Communication Networks by internal and external Activists</i>
❖ <i>Rising Energy Costs</i>	❖ <i>Tuberculosis</i>	❖ <i>Undrinkability by Humans of 40% of river water</i>	❖ <i>CCP narrow base of Support</i>
❖ <i>Wealth Inequality (5% of people own 50% of Bank Assets)</i>	❖ <i>Malnutrition among rural children</i>	❖ <i>Desertification and Erosion of Top Soil</i>	❖ <i>Weak Channels for State-Society Conflict Resolution</i>
❖ <i>Unnecessary/Unprofitable buildings and factories</i>	❖ <i>Chronic Lung Cancer, Heart Disease and Stroke through heavy smoking</i>	❖ <i>Deforestation</i>	❖ <i>Weak Rule of Law</i>
❖ <i>Bad Investment in high-speed Railways not affordable by most Chinese</i>	❖ <i>Over-use of Anti-Biotics producing drug resistant bacteria</i>	❖ <i>Evaporation of Lakes and Rivers</i>	❖ <i>Embezzlement by absconding Managers of funds gained through illegal land transfers and stolen assets from shut down State Enterprises</i>

[Sources: Media Reports and Official Statements between 2010 and 2012 available in the public domain through Internet access.]

Given such a range of destabilizing factors, the question arises, how is it that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) manages to remain in absolute power?

To begin with, central party control is tightest in central government offices and in urban economic, industrial and cultural settings. It is considerably looser over government and party organizations in rural




Figure 5 : The Triangular Corporate One Party State Power Structure

The primary organs of power in the Communist Party include the General Secretary; the Politburo (22 full members); the Politburo Standing Committee (9 members at present); and the Central Military Commission.

The economy, however, the basis of China's rise to date, is now seriously unbalanced with excessive dependence on investment in property construction, infrastructure and exports. The forces of capital have been the largest beneficiaries of growth, not the workers. Migrant workers in the cities lack the right to education, health care or property purchases.¹⁴

¹⁴ Jonathan Fenley, "China Is Deeply Flawed. Its Dominance Is Not Inevitable", *The Guardian*, 5 April 2012.

The most powerful people in China are those that sit on the Standing Committee of the Politburo, which controls all aspects of China's political system. It currently is comprised of nine members, though has been as low as five. Most of the members control at least one of six key systems; these being (1) party affairs; (2) organizational affairs (involving all party positions);



(3) propaganda and education;

Figure 6 : Party Control Over External Media/Internet Sites

(4) political and legal affairs (involving the courts and the police and any 'crackdown' campaigns against dissidents or perceived 'enemies of the people' ;



Figure 7 : Special Police Squad For Demonstration Control

(5) finance and economics (led principally by the Prime Minister); and (6) military affairs (whereby the CCP

tries to maintain civilian control of the PLA which shares in operational decisions.)

Given that the armed force of the PLA is the ultimate factor maintaining CCP control across all of China, there are a number of means used by the party to keep the PLA reasonably responsive to party, not just military, wishes. The party is being cognizant of Mao's dictum "*The party must always control the gun; the gun must never control the party.*" CCP influence over the PLA consists of the Military Affairs Committee; budgetary allocations; the placing of political commissars in every military unit; and overlapping CCP and Politburo membership with the military.

Another important means of asserting and retaining control over China is the deliberate lack of a truly independent judiciary. China is dominated by personally based power, whereby 'rule of man' not 'rule of law' takes place. Officials perpetuate this situation as it enhances their authority. Local interests prevail in court decisions; plaintiffs from other external regions do not win their cases.¹⁵

Overall, then, the CCP controls all aspects of government in China. There are no other political parties outside the CCP; all government officials must be members of the CCP; and all officials of the Provincial and Central wings of the party are appointed.

¹⁵ Power Point Lecture, Power In China <teaching.ust.hk/~sosc152/ppt/Lecture 18.ppt> Accessed 4 August 2012.

There is no voting by the people, except in village-level elections where selected party members stand for low hierarchical positions. There is no independent judiciary, all judges being chosen by, and being accountable to, party members.

The party makes all local, national and foreign policies and very few external checks and balances – such as the separation of powers between the executive, the legislature and the judiciary – exist. CCP members are formally groomed, selected and trained from early childhood. Confucian traditions are used to rule China ‘scientifically’ as what David Shaumbaugh, a noted Sinologist, calls “*a meritocratic technocracy.*” Most high level party officials come from a science or engineering background.



Figure 8 : The 'Apostolic Succession' of Party Dictators from Mao to Hu

The average citizen, who may be permitted to join the party, cannot expect to rise within it. Susan Shirk, another prominent Sinologist, describes the most powerful government departments as “*the control cartel.*”¹⁶

Sadly, human rights in China are rigidly curtailed, over-ridden and violated. The flow of information to the people is controlled by the Propaganda Department. The right to gather and associate in groups is heavily restricted. All individual citizens are subject to arbitrary searches, arrests, torture and imprisonment. Citizens have few property rights and extensive land seizures are commonplace. Freedom of movement around, in and out of the country is strictly controlled by the government. Families throughout much of China are still limited to having one child only, as part of a population control measure.¹⁷

Given that 150,000 to 180,000 protest demonstrations occur each year in China against the harshness of the regime and the gross inequality of both income and wealth, the CCP has adopted a number of procedures to prevent future large scale demonstrations and social unrest. The party seeks to achieve unity within the ruling elite. The government makes it difficult for protest to spread from person to person and to the public at large (by jailing dissident leaders and

¹⁶ See “Modern China: The Promise And Challenge Of An Emerging Superpower”, *World Savvy Monitor*, Issue 2, June 2008, Sub-Section “The Chinese Communist Party”.

¹⁷ Ibid.

harassing/threatening their families). It addresses piecemeal some of the corruption issues that are at the centre of such protests. It has introduced some (flimsy) safety valve mechanisms in the form of direct elections of different party members at the local, though not at the provincial or the national levels.



Figure 9 : The 'Cuddly Side' To A Repressive One Party Dictatorship - A Panda

It desperately seeks to rebuild its damaged 'legitimacy' through continued economic prosperity. When on weak grounds, it uses declared external threats as a distraction (harnessing anti-American, anti-Taiwanese and anti-Japanese sentiments held by, and governmentally encouraged in, many Chinese citizens.)



Figure 10 : The CCP's Greatest Fear - Desertion Of The Party (50,000 To 70,000 A Day)

Finally, it ruthlessly uses force to contain erupting protests and to deter others.¹⁸

The ultimate sanction any government possesses is the taking of human life. Throughout the 20th century, civilian murders by dictatorial/authoritarian regimes amount to an estimated 153 million men, women and children. Such killings have extended from Africa, across continental Europe, to Southeast Asia, Northeast Asia and to Russia. The deaths, stemming from imposed starvation or direct violence, amount to six times the 2010 population of Scandinavia [25 million]; or, the combined 2010 populations of such European states as Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Hungary and Portugal [149 million].

DEATHS CAUSED BY REPRESSIVE LEADERS – 20TH CENTURY

<i>Dictator/ Ruler</i>	<i>Nation Afflicted</i>	<i>Deaths (Millions)</i>
<i>Yakubu Gowon</i>	<i>Nigeria</i>	<i>1.1</i>
<i>Mengistu Halie Mariam</i>	<i>Ethiopia</i>	<i>1.5</i>
<i>Kim Il Sung</i>	<i>North Korea</i>	<i>1.6</i>
<i>Pol Pot</i>	<i>Cambodia</i>	<i>1.7</i>
<i>Hideki Tojo</i>	<i>Imperial Japan</i>	<i>5.0</i>
<i>Leopold II (King of Belgium)</i>	<i>Congo</i>	<i>15.0</i>
<i>Adolph Hitler</i>	<i>Nazi Germany</i>	<i>17.0</i>
<i>Joseph Stalin</i>	<i>Soviet Russia</i>	<i>23.0</i>
<i>Mao Ze Dong</i>	<i>People' s Republic of China</i>	<i>78.0</i>

[**Source:** See Juan Carlos P.E. “Top Ten Most Evil Dictators Of All Time (In Order Of Kill Count)” URL <popten.net/2010/05/top-ten-most-evil-dictators-of-all-time-in-order-of-kill-count> Accessed 4 August 2012.]

¹⁸ Ibid.

EPILOGUE

“The administration of government lies in getting proper men. Such men are to be got by means of the ruler’ s own character. That character is to be cultivated by his treading in the ways of duty. And the treading [of] those ways of duty is to be cultivated by the cherishing of benevolence.”

CONFUCIUS [551BC -479BC]

“THE DOCTRINE OF THE MEAN.”

