

**Marketisation and Professionalisation of Campaigning
of Political Parties in the New Democracy:
An Investigation of the Structural Conditions and Factors That
Determined the Development of Marketization and
Professionalization of Campaigning of the Indonesian
Political Parties in the Post-Soeharto New Order**

Nyarwi Ahmad

A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements of Bournemouth
University for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

September 2017

Bournemouth University

Copyright Statement

“This copy of the thesis has been supplied on condition that anyone who consults it is understood to recognise that its copyright rests with its author and due acknowledgement must always be made of the use of any material contained in, or derived from, this thesis.”

Marketisation and Professionalisation of Campaigning of Political Parties in the New Democracy:

An Investigation of the Structural Conditions and Factors That Determined the Development of Marketisation and Professionalisation of Campaigning of the Indonesian Political Parties in the Post-Soeharto New Order

Abstract

This study explores the marketisation and professionalisation of campaigning of political parties. More specifically, it attempts to provide a systematic understanding of the structural conditions and factors that determine such developments in a new democracy. The following propositions commence this study. In new democracies that are indicated by a set of conditions postulated by Strömbäck (2007: 63), Strömbäck (2010: 28-29) and Strömbäck et al. (2012: 86), political parties are likely to adopt marketing principles, procedures and techniques to advance not only market-orientation, but also campaign structure and strategies. However, none of these parties is likely to turn into either market-oriented or the professional-electoral/sales-oriented parties. To evaluate such propositions, this study selected the new democracy of Indonesia as a case study, adopted critical realism as a research philosophy, formulated a holistic conceptual framework and applied a pure-mix of qualitative and the quantitative research methodology. Survey data were collected from marketers/campaigners of 10 Indonesian political parties during the 2014 parliamentary and presidential elections. The in-depth interview data were derived from these parties' leaders/secretaries, senior editors of the Indonesian media and political consultants and pollsters. These data were combined with reports released by these media and pollsters, the Indonesian research centres and the Indonesian General Election and Broadcasting Commissions.

This study reveals that there were 'structural conditions', which stimulated the Indonesian political parties Post-Soeharto New Order to develop such practices. In facing these elections, these parties realized the importance of political market arenas and political sub-markets and advanced such practices strategically. None of these parties however, turned into either market-oriented or the professional-electoral/sales-oriented parties. The main finding of this study is that in the emerging democratic countries, which have been ruled under the presidential government system and indicated by the candidate-centred system, such as Indonesia, the party orientations related to such practices seem to be matters of mode and degree rather than of type. The following factors determined such orientations. They include: a) perceptions of the party leaders, candidates and marketers/campaigners regarding the relative importance of the internal party, the media and electoral arenas; b) the party-specific factors, especially, party ideology, size, campaign resources and position in the government and experiences with internal and external shocks; c) the party's competitive chances to fulfil the minimum number of the presidential election threshold, assemble a political coalition and nominate a pair of presidential candidates; and d) the party presidential candidate-specific factors.

This study offers the following novelty theoretical and prescriptive models. The first theoretical model conceptualises the structural conditions and factors that determine developments of marketisation and professionalisation of campaigning of political parties in such countries within and across the parliamentary and presidential elections. The second theoretical model underpins formation of the party presidential candidate-specific factors and theorises its impacts on such developments systematically; while the third theoretical model provides a baseline framework to explore the effects of these aforementioned factors on such developments holistically. The second and the third theoretical models could be transformed into the prescriptive models to help these parties to achieve their goals in these elections effectively. The mainstream centre-right or centre-left parties in the Western democracy could adopt these models, as they want to tactically confront the rises of the radical-right wing populist parties and movements and strategically manage the sustainability of the liberal democratic system and society.

List of Contents

	Page
Copy Right Statement.....	i
Abstract.....	ii
List of Contents.....	iii
List of Figures in the Chapters.....	viii
List of Tables in the Chapters.....	xiv
List of Figures in the Appendices.....	xvi
List of Tables in the Appendices.....	xix
Acknowledgement.....	xx
Author’s Declaration.....	xxiii
Chapter 1: Introduction.....	1
1.1. Research Background.....	1
1.2. Political Marketing and Campaign Transformation.....	1
1.3. Research Question.....	7
1.4. Structure of Dissertation.....	8
Chapter 2: Political Marketing, Market-Orientation and Professionalization of Campaigning.....	10
Chapter Overview.....	10
2.1. Political Marketing as an Emanating Field Study.....	10
2.2. The Wide and Narrow Interpretations of Political Marketing.....	13
2.3. Political Marketing-Orientation and Market-Orientation.....	17
2.4. Professionalization of Political Communication and Campaigning.....	22
2.5. An Integrated Conceptual Framework.....	29
2.6. Summary.....	39
Chapter 3: Research Methodology, Method and Design.....	40
Chapter Overview.....	40
3.1. The Current Knowledge Gap.....	40
3.2. Research Aim and Objectives.....	42
3.3. Research Philosophy.....	44
3.4. ‘Pure Mixed’ Methodology.....	48
3.5. Sampling Procedures and Data Collections.....	52
3.6. The Qualitative and Quantitative Data analyses.....	55
3.7. Research Synthesis.....	69
3.8. Reliability and Validity.....	70
3.9. Research’s Strengths and Limitations.....	73
3.10. Research Ethics.....	74

3.11. Summary.....	75
--------------------	----

Chapter 4: Structural Conditions that Propelled Developments of Marketization and Professionalization of Campaigning of the Indonesian Political Parties Post-Soeharto New Order.....76

Chapter Overview.....	76
4.1. Democratization of Politics and Structural-Systemic Transformations Post-Soeharto New Order.....	76
4.2. The Indonesian Political Parties and Adaptations of Political Marketing and Market-Oriented and Professionalization of Political Campaigning.....	91
4.3. Conclusion.....	101
4.4. Summary.....	104

Chapter 5: Nomenclatures of Political Market Arenas and Political Sub-Markets and the Effects of Party-Specific Factors on Perceptions of the Indonesian Political Parties' Marketers/Campaigners Regarding the Importance of These Political Market Arenas and Political Sub-Markets.....105

Chapter Overview.....	105
5.1. Nomenclatures of Political Market Arenas Post-Soeharto New Order.....	105
5.2. The Effects of Party-Specific Factors on Perceptions of the Indonesian Political Parties' Marketers/Campaigners Regarding the Importance of Political Market Arenas during the 2014 Parliamentary and Presidential Elections.....	109
5.3. Nomenclatures of Political Sub-Markets Post-Soeharto New Order.....	119
5.4. The Effects of Party-Specific Factors on Perceptions of the Indonesian Political Parties' Marketers/Campaigners Regarding the Importance of Political Sub-Markets during the 2014 Parliamentary and Presidential Elections.....	123
5.5. Conclusions.....	134
5.6. Summary.....	138

Chapter 6: The Structural Elements that Constituted Practices of Marketization and Professionalization of Campaigning of the Indonesian Political Parties.....139

Chapter Overview.....	139
-----------------------	-----

6.1. Evaluations and Validations of the Measurements and Structural Components of the Baseline Structural Model.....	140
6.2. Preliminary Conclusions and Discussions.....	152
6.3. Formulation and Evaluation of the Alternative Structural Model.....	154
6.4. Final Conclusions.....	161
6.5. Summary.....	164

Chapter 7: Perceptions of the Indonesian Political Parties’ Marketers/Campaigners, Leaders and Candidates Regarding the Relative Importance of Political Market Arenas and their Effects on Marketization and Professionalization of Campaigning of These Parties.....165

Chapter Overview.....	165
7.1. Formulation and Evaluation of Dummy Models As An Analytical Framework.....	166
7.2. The Quantitative Findings.....	168
7.3. The Qualitative Findings.....	175
7.4. Conclusions and Discussions.....	195
7.5. Summary.....	197

Chapter 8: Party-Specific Factors and their Effects on Marketization and Professionalization of Campaigning of the Indonesian Political Parties.....198

Chapter Overview.....	198
8.1. Formulation and Evaluation of Dummy Models As An Analytical Framework.....	198
8.2. The Quantitative Findings.....	203
8.3. The Quantitative Findings.....	218
8.4. Conclusions and Discussions.....	233
8.5. Summary.....	236

Chapter 9: Party’ Presidential Candidate-Specific Factors and their Effects on Marketization and Professionalization of Campaigning of the Indonesian Political Parties.....238

Chapter Overview.....	238
9.1. Formulation and Evaluation of Dummy Models As An Analytical Framework.....	239
9.2. The Quantitative Findings.....	241
9.3. The Qualitative Findings.....	247

9.4. Discussions and Conclusions.....	290
9.5. Summary.....	293

Chapter 10: Research Conclusion and Knowledge Contributions...294

10.1. Democratization of Politics and Development of Marketization and Professionalization of Campaigning of the Indonesian Political Parties Post-Soeharto New Order.....	294
10.2. Nomenclatures of Political Market Arenas and Political Sub-Markets and the Effects of Party-Specific Factors on Perceptions of the Indonesian Political Parties' Marketers/Campaigners Regarding the Importance of These Political Market Arenas and Political Sub-Markets.....	296
10.3. The Structural Elements that Constituted Marketization and Professionalization of Campaigning of the Indonesian Political Parties.....	300
10.4. Influential Factors that Determined Modes of Marketization and Professionalization of Campaigning and Degrees of Market-Orientation and Campaign Professionalism of the Indonesian Political Parties Within and Across the 2014 Parliamentary and Presidential Elections.....	303
10.5. Conclusions.....	315

Chapter 11: Proposed Theoretical and Prescriptive Models and Their Knowledge and Practical Contributions.....320

11.1. The Structural Conditions and Factors that Determine Modes of Marketization and Professionalization of Campaigning and The Degree of Market-Orientation and Campaign Professionalism of Political Parties in the New Democratic Countries: The First Proposed Theoretical Model.....	320
11.2. The Party' Presidential Candidate-Specific Factors as an Exploratory Factor to Explore Modes of Marketization and Professionalization of Campaigning of Political Parties in the New Democratic Countries That Shared Similarities with the Indonesian Politics: The Second Proposed Theoretical Model.....	323
11.3. The Third Proposed Theoretical Model to Explore Modes of Marketization and Professionalization of Campaigning and the Degree of Market-Orientation and Campaign Professionalism of Political Parties.....	329
11.4. Theoretical and Practical Contributions of the Proposed Models...	331

11.5. Potential Contributions of the Second and Third Theoretical Models and the Prescriptive Models for Survivability of the Mainstream Centre-Left or Centre-Right Political Parties and Sustainability of the (Existing) Liberal Democratic System and Society in the Western Democratic Countries.....	340
Bibliography.....	348
Appendices.....	385
Appendix A: Interview and Personal Correspondence.....	385
Appendix B: Evaluations Results of the Measurements and Structural Elements that Construct the Baseline Structural Model.....	387
Appendix C: The Proposed Prescriptive Models with their Terms and Conditions.....	399
Appendix D: Interview Guides.....	406

List of Figures in the Chapters

Figure		Page
Figure 3.1	Research Philosophy, Methodology, Method and Design	50
Figure 3.2	A Proposed Baseline Structural Model	60
Figure 4.1	Levels of Party ID of the Indonesian Electorates in Between November 2003 and September 2013 (in %)	83
Figure 4.3	% of Total Votes Collected by the Main Indonesian Political Parties in the 2004 and 2009 Parliamentary Election and % of Loyal Voters of Those Remained Voted These Parties in the 2014 Parliamentary Election and Turned Into the Non-Voters.	84
Figure 4.3	Electorates' Assessments Regarding the Work Performances of and Conditions of National Economy Under SBY' Government and Approvals of the Democratic Party and SBY as a Presidential Candidate Once He Ran in the 2009 Presidential Election	86
Figure 4.4	Structural Conditions that Paved the Way for Developments of Marketization and Professionalization of Campaigning of the Indonesian Political Parties Post-Soeharto New Order	102
Figure 5.1	The Effects of Party Ideology on Perceptions of Marketers/Campaigners of the Indonesian Parties Regarding the Importance of Political Market Arenas during the 2014 Parliamentary Election	110
Figure 5.2	The Effects of Party Age Category on Perceptions of Marketers/Campaigners of the Indonesian Political Parties Regarding the Importance of Political Market Arenas during the 2014 Parliamentary Election	110
Figure 5.3	The Effects of Party Size on Perceptions of Marketers/Campaigners of the Indonesian Political Parties Regarding the Importance of Political Market Arenas during the 2014 Parliamentary Election	111
Figure 5.4	The Effects of Party Campaign Resources on Perceptions of Marketers/Campaigners of the Indonesian Political Parties Regarding the Importance of Political Market Arenas during the 2014 Parliamentary Election	111
Figure 5.5	The Effects of Party Experience with the Internal Shock/Leadership Change on Perceptions of Marketers/Campaigners of the Indonesian Political Parties Regarding the Importance of Political Market Arenas during the 2014 Parliamentary Election	112

Figure 5.6	The Effects of Party Positions in the Government on Perceptions of Marketers/Campaigners of the Indonesian Political Parties Regarding the Importance of Political Market Arenas during the 2014 Parliamentary Election	113
Figure 5.7	The Effects of Party Experience with the External Shock on Perceptions of Marketers/Campaigners of the Indonesian Political Parties Regarding the Importance of Political Market Arenas during the 2014 Parliamentary Election	113
Figure 5.8	The Effects of Party Size on Perceptions of Marketers/Campaigners of the Indonesian Political Parties Regarding the Importance of Political Market Arenas during the 2014 Presidential Election	114
Figure 5.9	The Effects of Party Age Category on Perceptions of Marketers/Campaigners of the Indonesian Political Parties Regarding the Importance of Political Market Arenas during the 2014 Presidential Election	115
Figure 5.10	The Effects of Party Experience with the Internal Shock/Leadership Change on Perceptions of Marketers/Campaigners of the Indonesian Political Parties Regarding the Importance of Political Market Arenas during the 2014 Presidential Election	115
Figure 5.11	The Effects of Party Position in the Government on Perceptions of Marketers/Campaigners of the Indonesian Political Parties Regarding the Importance of Political Market Arenas during the 2014 Presidential Election	116
Figure 5.12	The Effects of Party Ideology on Perceptions of Marketers/Campaigners of the Indonesian Political Parties Regarding the Importance of Political Market Arenas during the 2014 Presidential Election	117
Figure 5.13	The Effects of Party Campaign Resources on Perceptions of Marketers/Campaigners of the Indonesian Political Parties Regarding the Importance of Political Market Arenas during the 2014 Presidential Election	117
Figure 5.14	The Effects of Party Experience with the External Shock on Perceptions of Marketers/Campaigners of the Indonesian Political Parties Regarding the Importance of Political Market Arenas during the 2014 Presidential Election	118
Figure 5.15	The Effects of Type of the Election on Perceptions of	119

	the Marketers/Campaigners of the Indonesian Political Parties Regarding the Importance of Political Market Arenas	
Figure 5.16	The Effects of Party Age Category on Perceptions of Marketers/Campaigners of The Indonesian Political Parties Regarding the Importance of Political-Sub Markets during the 2014 Parliamentary Election	124
Figure 5.17	The Effects of Party Size on Perceptions of Marketers/Campaigners of the Indonesian Political Parties Regarding the Importance of Political-Sub Markets during the 2014 Parliamentary Election	124
Figure 5.18	The Effects of Party Experience with the External Shock on Perceptions of Marketers/Campaigners of the Indonesian Political Parties Regarding the Importance of Political-Sub Markets during the 2014 Parliamentary Election	125
Figure 5.19	The Effects of Party Position in the Government on Perceptions of Marketers/Campaigners of the Indonesian Political Parties Regarding the Importance of Political-Sub Markets during the 2014 Parliamentary Election	125
Figure 5.20	The Effects of Party Ideology on Perceptions of Marketers/Campaigners of the Indonesian Political Parties Regarding the Importance of Political-Sub Markets during the 2014 Parliamentary Election	127
Figure 5.21	The Effects of Party Campaign Resources on Perceptions of Marketers/Campaigners of the Indonesian Political Parties Regarding the Importance of Political-Sub Markets during the 2014 Parliamentary Election	127
Figure 5.22	The Effects of Party Experience with the Internal Shock/Leadership Change on Perceptions of Marketers/Campaigners of the Indonesian Political Parties Regarding the Importance of Political Sub-Markets during the 2014 Parliamentary Election	128
Figure 5.23	The Effects of Party Age Category on Perceptions of Marketers/Campaigners of the Indonesian Political Parties Regarding the Importance of Political-Sub Markets during the 2014 Presidential Election	129
Figure 5.24	The Effects of Party Size on Perceptions of Marketers/Campaigners of the Indonesian Political Parties Regarding the Importance of Political-Sub Markets during the 2014 Presidential Election	129

Figure 5.25	The Effects of Party Position in the Government on Perceptions of Marketers/Campaigners of the Indonesian Political Parties Regarding the Importance of Political-Sub Markets during the 2014 Presidential Election	130
Figure 5.26	The Effects of Party Ideology on Perceptions of Marketers/Campaigners of the Indonesian Political Parties Regarding the Importance of Political-Sub Markets during the 2014 Presidential Election	131
Figure 5.27	The Effects of Party Campaign Resources on Perceptions of Marketers/Campaigners of the Indonesian Political Parties Regarding the Importance of Political-Sub Markets during the 2014 Presidential Election	132
Figure 5.28	The Effects of Party Experience with the External Shock on Perceptions of Marketers/Campaigners of the Indonesian Political Parties Regarding the Importance of Political-Sub Markets during the 2014 Presidential Election	132
Figure 5.29	The Effects of Party Experience with the Internal Shock/Leadership Change on Perceptions of Marketers/Campaigners of the Indonesian Political Parties Regarding the Importance of Political-Sub Markets during the 2014 Presidential Election	133
Figure 5.30	The Effects of Type of the Election on Perceptions of Marketers/Campaigners of 10 Indonesian Political Parties Regarding the Importance of Political Sub-Markets	134
Figure 6.1	Evaluation Result that Visualizes The Baseline Structural Model with Path Coefficients (β) and R2 values	145
Figure 6.2	Evaluation Result that Visualizes the Alternative Structural Model with Path Coefficients Values (β) and Path Coefficient Determinations (R2 values)	156
Figure 9.1	Levels of Party ID of the Indonesian Electorates in Between May 2011 and September 2013	248
Figure 9.2	Total Incomes and Spending of the Indonesian Political Parties in the 2014 Parliamentary Election	250
Figure 9.3	Total Spot of Political Advertising Programs of the Indonesian Parties Broadcasted by 11 Indonesian Televisions Between 15 March and 5 April 2014	251
Figure 9.4	Proportion and Distribution of Parliamentary Seats of the Indonesian Political Parties in 33 Indonesian	253

	Provinces	
Figure 9.5	% of Popular Votes Collected by the Indonesian Political Parties in the 2009 and the 2014 Parliamentary Elections	254
Figure 9.6	Total Number of Parliamentary Seats Collected by the Indonesian Political Parties in the 2009 and the 2014 Parliamentary Elections	254
Figure 9.7	Levels of the Electorates' Approvals of Joko Widodo (Jokowi) and Prabowo Subijanto as Presidential Candidates in Between September 2013 and May 2014 (Head to Head)	266
Figure 9.8	Sources of Campaign Funds of Gerindra Party and Its Coalition and PDIP and Its Coalitions to Shore Up Marketing and Campaign Programs of their Pairs of Presidential Candidates during the 2014 Presidential Election	270
Figure 9.9	Total Spot of Political Advertising Programs of Prabowo Subijanto-Hatta Radjasa and Joko Widodo-Jusuf Kalla Broadcasted by 11 Indonesian TV Channels in Between 31 May and 5 July 2014	270
Figure 9.10	Modes of Spending of Campaign Funds Gerindra Party and Its Coalition and PDIP and Its Coalitions Used to Finance Marketing and Campaign Programs of their Pairs of Presidential Candidates Who Run in the 2014 Presidential Election	271
Figure 9.11	Levels of the Electorates' Approvals of Joko Widodo and Prabowo Subijanto as Presidential Candidates in Between May and the Last Week of June 2014 (Head to Head)	273
Figure 9.12	Total Numbers of Individual Campaign Donators Who Donated their Moneys to 3 Special Bank Accounts of Joko Widodo-Jusuf Kalla in Between the First Week of June and the First Week of July 2014	281
Figure 9.13	Total Number of Corporations Which Contributed their Moneys to 3 Special Bank Accounts of Joko Widodo-Jusuf Kalla In Between the First Week of June and the First Week of July 2014	281
Figure 9.14	Total Amount of Moneys Donated by Individual Campaign Donators and Corporations to 3 Special Bank Accounts of Joko Widodo-Jusuf Kalla (in Milliard IDR) in Between the First Week of June and the First Week of July 2014	282
Figure 9.15	Total Amount of Moneys Contributed by PDIP and its	282

	Coalition as an Organization (in Milliard IDR) in Between the Last Week of May and the First Week of July 2014	
Figure 9.16	Total Amount of Campaign Funds of Jokowi-Jusuf Kalla (in Milliard IDR) Collected in Between the Last Week of May and the First Week of July 2014	283
Figure 9.17	Total Budget Allocated to Finance Political Advertising Programs of Joko Widodo-Jusuf Kalla Broadcasted by the Indonesian Media in Between 01 May and 9 July 2014 (in Million IDR)	283
Figure 9.18	Development of the Electorates' Approvals of Joko Widodo and Prabowo Subijanto as Presidential Candidates (Head to Head) in Between May and the Last Week of June 2014	286
Figure 9.19	The 2014 Presidential Election Result	288
Figure 9.20	Total Numbers of Voters/Constituents of the Indonesian Political Parties (in %) Who Casted their Votes to Ones of These Pairs of Presidential Candidates in the 2014 Presidential Election Day	289
Figure 9.21	% of Total Popular Votes Collected by Prabowo Subijanto-Hatta Radjasa and Joko Widodo-Jusuf Kalla in the 2014 Presidential Election	289
Figure 11.1	The First Proposed Theoretical Model.	322
Figure 11.2	The Second Proposed Theoretical Model	326
Figure 11.3	The Third Proposed Theoretical Model	330

List of Tables in the Chapters

Table		Page
Table 3.1	Research Objectives and Research Methods and Designs Used to Evaluate These Research Objectives and Their Link with Data Collections and Analyses, Research Syntheses and Chapter Presentations	51
Table 3.2	Total Respondents Included in the Survey Data Set Collected Using the Panel-Survey Procedure During the 2014 Parliamentary and Presidential Elections, Respectively	54
Table 3.3	Proposed Indicators and Measurements to Evaluate RO 2	56
Table 3.4	Proposed Indicators and Measurements of Political Marketing-Orientation As A First-Order Formative Variable	61
Table 3.5	Proposed Indicators and Measurements of Political Market-Orientation As A Second/Higher-Order Formative Variable Constructed from 5 First/Lower-Order Reflective Variables	61
Table 3.6	Proposed Indicators and Measurements of Professional-Campaign Engagement As A First-Order Reflective Variable	62
Table 3.7	Proposed Indicators and Measurements of Professionalized-Campaign Structure As A First-Order Formative Variable	63
Table 3.8	Proposed Indicators and Measurements of Professionalized-Campaign Strategy As A Second/Higher-Order Formative Variable Composed from 4 First-Order Reflective Variables	63
Table 3.9	Party- and Party' Presidential Candidate-Specific Factors as Categorical Moderator-Groping Variables and Their Link with the Indonesian Political Parties	66
Table 3.10	Multilevel Modelling Approach and A Set of Formulas Used to Evaluate ROs 4, 5 and 6	68
Table 4.1	Changes in the Parliamentary Election Laws and Their Consequences on Indonesian Politics	79
Table 4.2	Changes in the Presidential Election Laws and Their Consequences on Indonesian Politics	80
Table 6.1	Acronyms of Variables that Construct the Baseline Structural Model	140
Table 6.2	Significance Testing Results of Structural Model Path Coefficients of the Baseline Structural Model	144
Table 6.3	The Importance-Performance Matrixes of Variables Underlying Political Market-Orientation as a First-Order Formative Variable Used as a Predictor for Elements	150

	Underlying Professionalization of Campaigning in the Baseline Structural Model	
Table 6.4	Acronyms of Variables that Construct the Alternative Structural Model	154
Table 6.5	Significance Testing Results of Structural Model Path Coefficients of the Variables of the Alternative Structural Model (Political Market-Orientation as a Second-Order Formative Variable)	155
Table 6.6	Total and Indirect Effects of Political Market-Orientation (as a Second-Order Formative Variable in the Alternative Structural Model) on the Lower-Level Variables Underlying Professionalization of Campaigning	158
Table 6.7	The Importance-Performance Matrixes of Political Market-Orientation as a Second-Order Formative Variable Used as a Predictor for Elements Underlying Professionalization of Campaigning in the Alternative Structural Model	160
Table 7.1	Total Samples Sizes of the Dummy Models 1a-9a and 1b-9b	167
Table 7.2	Standard Mean Root Square (SRMR) Common Factor Model and Composite Model of the Dummy Models 1a-9a and 1b-9b	167
Table 7.3	Acronyms of Variables that Construct the Baseline Model and Used in the PLS-SEM reports of the Dummy Models 1a-9a and 1b-9b	168
Table 7.4	PLS-MGA Results of Model 1a Vs. Model 2a, Model 1a Vs. Model 3a and Model 2a Vs. Model 3a	169
Table 7.5	PLS-MGA Results of Model 1b Vs. Model 2b, Model 1b Vs. Model 3b and Model 2b Vs. Model 3b	170
Table 7.6	PLS-MGA Results of Model 4a Vs. Model 5a, Model 4a Vs. Model 6a and Model 5a Vs. Model 6a	171
Table 7.7	PLS-MGA Results of Model 4b Vs. Model 5b, Model 4b Vs. Model 6b and Model 5b Vs. Model 6b	172
Table 7.8	PLS-MGA Results of Model 7a Vs. Model 8a, Model 7a Vs. Model 9a and Model 8a Vs. Model 9a	174
Table 7.9	PLS-MGA Results of Model 7b Vs. Model 8b, Model 7b Vs. Model 9b and Model 8b Vs. Model 9b	175
Table 8.1	Total Samples Sizes of the Dummy Models 10a-28a and 10b-28b	200
Table 8.2	Standard Mean Root Square (SRMR) Common Factor and Composite Values of the Dummy Models 10a-28a and 10b-28b	202
Table 8.3	Acronyms of Variables that Construct the Baseline Model	203

	and Used in the PLS-MGA reports of the Dummy Models 10a-28a and 10b-28b	
Table 8.4	PLS-MGA Results of Model 10a Vs. Model 11a, Model 10a Vs. Model 12a and Model 11a Vs. Model 12a	204
Table 8.5	PLS-MGA Results of Model 10b Vs. Model 11b, Model 10b Vs. Model 12b and Model 11b Vs. Model 12b	205
Table 8.5	PLS-MGA Results of Model 13a Vs. Model 14a and Model 13b Vs. Model 14b	206
Table 8.7	PLS-MGA Results of Model 15a Vs. Model 16a, Model 15a Vs. Model 17a and Model 16a Vs. Model 17a	207
Table 8.8	PLS-MGA Results of Model 15b Vs. Model 16b, Model 15b Vs. Model 17b and Model 16b Vs. Model 17b	208
Table 8.9	PLS-MGA Results of Model 18a Vs. Model 19a and Model 18 b Vs. Model 19b	209
Table 8.10	PLS-MGA Results of Model 20a Vs. Model 21a, Model 20a Vs. Model 22a, Model 20a Vs. Model 23a, Model 21a Vs. Model 22a, Model 21a Vs. Model 23a and Model 22a Vs. Model 23a	212
Table 8.11	PLS-MGA Results of Model 20b Vs. Model 21b, Model 20b Vs. Model 22b, Model 20b Vs. Model 23b, Model 21b Vs. Model 22b, Model 21b Vs. Model 23b and Model 22b Vs. Model 23b	213
Table 8.12	PLS-MGA Results of Model 24a Vs. Model 25a, Model 24a Vs. Model 26a and Model 25a Vs. Model 26a	216
Table 8.13	PLS-MGA Results of Model 24b Vs. Model 25b, Model 24b Vs. Model 26b and Model 25b Vs. Model 26b	216
Table 8.14	PLS-MGA Results of Model 27a Vs. Model 28a and Model 27b Vs. Model 28b	217
Table 9.1	Total of Samples Sizes of the Dummy Models 29a-34a and 29b-34b	239
Table 9.2	Standard Mean Root Square (SRMR) Common Factor Model and Composite Model of the Dummy Models 29a-34a and 29b-34b	240
Table 9.3	Acronyms of Variables that Construct the Baseline Model and Used in the PLS-MGA Reports of the Dummy Models 29a-34a and 29b-34b	241
Table 9.4	PLS-MGA Results of Model 29a Vs. Model 30a and Model 29b Vs. Model 30b	242
Table 9.5	PLS-MGA Results of Model 29a Vs. Model 29b and Model 30a Vs. Model 30b	243
Table 9.6	PLS-MGA Results of Model 31a Vs. Model 32a and Model 31b Vs. Model 32b	244
Table 9.7	PLS-MGA Results of Model 31a Vs. Model 31b and	244

	Model 32a Vs. Model 32b	
Table 9.8	PLS-MGA Results of Model 33a Vs. Model 34a and Model 33b Vs. Model 34b	245
Table 9.9	PLS-MGA Results of Model 33a Vs. Model 33b and Model 34a Vs. Model 34b	346
Table 9.10	Total Numbers of Voters/Constituents of the Indonesian Political Parties (in %) and Their Inclinations to Vote and Did Not Vote to One of Two Pairs of Presidential Candidates Who Run in the 2014 Presidential Election	287

List of Figures in the Appendices

Figure		Page
Figure C.1	The First Prescriptive Model	401
Figure C.2	The Second Prescriptive Model	402
Figure C.3	The Third Prescriptive Model	402
Figure C.4	The Fourth Prescriptive Model	403
Figure C.5	The Fifth Prescriptive Model	403
Figure C.6	The Sixth Prescriptive Model	404
Figure C.7	The Seventh Prescriptive Model	404
Figure C.8	The Eighth Prescriptive Model	405

List of Tables in the Appendices

Table		Page
Table B.1	Pattern Matrix of Indicators underlying 'Political Marketing-Orientation' (PMO) and Its Scree Plot	387
Table B.2	Pattern Matrix of Indicators of the Lower-Level Variables Underlying A High-Level Variable of 'Political Market-Orientation' and Its Scree Plot With the Exclusion of indicator of IO	388
Table B.3	Pattern Matrix of Indicators underlying 'Professional-Campaign Engagement' and Its Scree Plot	389
Table B.4	Pattern Matrix of Indicators underlying 'Professionalized-Campaign Structure and Its Scree Plot	390
Table B.5	Pattern Matrix of Indicators underlying 'Professionalized-Campaign Strategy (PATS 1-5, PNS 1-4, PNEMS 1-4 and PCPS 1-2) and Its Scree Plot	391
Table B.6	Fornell-Larcker Criterion	394
Table B.7	Results Summary for Reflective Measurement Models	394
Table B.8	Redundancy Analysis of Formative Variables	396
Table B.9	Variance Inflation Factor Results of Formative Variables	397
Table B.10	Assessment of Outer Weights Significance Testing Results of Indicators of Formative Variables	397
Table B.11	Collinearity Assessments of the Variables Used in the Baseline Structural Model	398
Table C.1	Acronyms of the Structural Elements that Construct the Prescriptive Models	400
Table C.2	Terms and Conditions for Political Parties and These Parties' Presidential Candidates, Leaders, Consultants, Strategists and Marketers Who Want to Adopt the Proposed Prescriptive Models	400

Acknowledgements

I am deeply indebted to the following people who supported me in entering, getting through and passing my PhD journey. First of all, I am really thankful to Associate Professor, Darren Lilleker, PhD and Dan Jackson, PhD, who have encouraged and endorsed me to join the Centre for Politics and Media Research, Faculty of Media and Communication, Bournemouth University (BU) and served as my supervisors and mentors. Within the past 5 years, they have enthusiastically guided me at every stage in developing and extracting my thoughts and experiences regarding the developments of political marketing and campaigning of the Indonesian political parties and these parties' candidates Post-Soeharto New Order and escorted me in completing this PhD dissertation, which really burdened me with debts that I can never repay. I would also express my remarkable gratitude to Chindu Sreedharan, PhD, who was very keen to serve as a chair of my viva examination and Prof, James Stanyer, PhD and Anastasia Veneti, PhD, who kindly served as the external and internal examiners and gave me invaluable insights and further suggestions to make my dissertation being much more readable.

I am also really grateful to Jan Lewis who has sent me a letter in May 2011 offering the opportunity to take PhD programme at BU and given me invaluable help since I joined in this programme. A special thanks also goes to the Chancellor and Vice Chancellor, Dean and Vice Dean, academic communities and staff of the Faculty of Media and Communication and Graduate School of BU who gave me wonderful times and academic and non-academic environments when I pursued MPhil/PhD programmes in BU. My great gratitude also goes to Alison J. Green who helped me to proofread the final draft of this dissertation, Associate Prof, An Duc Nguyen, PhD, and all (former) members of the BU PhD Student Club, especially Tauheed Ramjaun, PhD, and Kathryn McDonald, PhD, who really made me being much more familiar with the BU academic environment and the Bournemouth landscape, cultures and

life styles. I would also express my indebtedness to all members of the *Indo-Bournemouter*, especially Mas Fadnan, Mbak Ida, Kang Richard, Teh Rere, Cathy, Mbak Dina, Ian Clark, Mbak Tutik, Rizky, Aditya S., Adit Uban, Kupay, Dwi, Dewi, Defan, Gilang Hehanusa and Wanda and the *Indo-Southamptoner*, particularly Mas Dwi and his wife.

I fully realized that studying at the PhD programme and completing a PhD dissertation could never happen without remarkable endorsements offered by the following people and institutions. I want to take the opportunity to convey my great gratefulness to: 1) Prof. Nunung Prajarto, PhD, a former head of the department of communication sciences, the University of Gadjah Mada, Yogyakarta (UGM); 2) Kuskridho Ambardi, PhD, a current head of this department; 3) Rahayu, SIP, MA, a current secretary of this department; 4) Novi Kurnia, PhD, a current head of the graduate programme of this department; 5) Dr. Muhammad Sulhan, a former secretary of this department and now takes a role as a head of undergraduate programme of this department; 6) Prof. Pratikno, PhD, a former dean of faculty of social and political sciences of UGM and now serves as a Ministry of State Secretariat of the Republic Indonesia; 7) Hermin Indah Wahyuni, PhD, a former acting dean of this faculty and now is Director of the Centre for Social Southeast Asian Studies, UGM; and 8) Erwan Agus Purwanto, PhD, a current dean of this faculty. I would also like to express my deep and special gratitude to the Government of Republic of Indonesia for giving me a PhD Scholarship grant. I want also to thank all staff of the Directorate of Higher Education of Ministry of Research and Technology, Republic of Indonesia for helping me to obtain that grant. I am also really grateful to all staff of the Indonesian Embassy for the United Kingdom in London for all their support they provided within the last couple years of my study.

My remarkable gratitude goes to the leaders/secretaries of the Indonesian political parties, political pollsters/consultants and editor-in-chiefs and senior journalists of the Indonesian media who were happy to

share their invaluable knowledge and experiences when I organized my fieldwork. I am also really thankful to all activists and members of these parties and campaign staffs and volunteers of Joko Widodo-Jusuf Kalla and Prabowo Subiyanto-Hatta Radjasa who shared valuable information needed to complete this dissertation. Special thanks go to Dr. Eriyanto who gave me great support in organizing my fieldwork and also my friends and colleagues who effortlessly helped me in collecting the data to complete this dissertation.

I want to thank to my late grandfathers who gave me a very basic lesson that really help me in understanding the 'world' through diverse perspectives. They have given me 'a marvellous traditional village-schooling' equipped with living social, cultural and political laboratories when I was a little boy who enjoyed playing in the corn and rice fields and was still incapable to read any word and sentence. They have thought me, either directly or indirectly, to decipher invaluable Javanese cultures, mythologies and histories inherited from my ancestors and passionately guided me to make sense of the wonderful wisdom that underlay such mythologies and histories. These have driven me being always starving to read the social and political sciences literatures and constantly curious to know what had happened in the Indonesian politics since I was in the high school. These have really made me being fallen in love with history, politics and political communication studies since I started studying at the undergraduate program of communication science, the Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, the University of Gadjah Mada, Yogyakarta.

At last I would like to express my deep acknowledgement and regard to my dear partner, Dr. Khalilah, beloved son, Fathul Khabir Prayoga and daughter, Aisha Zuhairia Athena, mother, Siti Sundari, father, Simin Satiyo, mother-in law, Nur Laela and late father-in law, K.H. Khalil Ghazali. They have helped me in their own ways when I kept striving to resolve my personal problems, manage various distractions and achieve a qualified academic citizenship.

Author's Declaration

The work in this thesis was carried out in accordance with Research Ethics Code of Practice of Bournemouth University and approved by the University Research Ethic Committee (UREC). Except what has been indicated by special reference in the text, the work is original and no part of this work has been presented to any other University for examination either in the United Kingdom or overseas. This copy of the thesis has been supplied on condition that anyone who consults it is understood to recognise that its copyright rests with its author and due acknowledgement must always be made of the use of any material contained in, or derived from, this thesis.

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1. Research Background

The idea for this dissertation comes from following observations. Soon after the downfall of the New Order Soeharto regime, democratization of politics took place. It has resulted in a new political landscape in the Indonesian politics. The old political parties survived. However, political and electoral instability and extreme voter volatility led to some new political parties evolving as influential political players.

In addressing these developments, some authors explored constitutional changes, democratic transition and consolidation (Hara, 2001; Abdulbaki, 2008; Webber, 2005; Aspinall, 2010; Mietzner, 2012; Horowitz, 2013), the development of press freedom (Ispandriarno, 2008) and media policy (Wahyuni, 2006, 2008, 2014; Wiratraman, 2014) and performances (Gazali, 2004; Gazali, et al., 2009). The following authors also investigated transformations in party systems, competition and cartelization (Ambardi, 2008; Ufen, 2008a, 2008b, 2009; Tan, 2012; Mietzner, 2008; Slater, 2004, 2011, 2014) and executive-legislative relations (Hanan, 2012) and examined the increasing roles of political pollsters and consultants in the professionalization of campaigning of Indonesian political parties, especially during the elections (Mietzner, 2009; Qodari, 2010; Ufen, 2010a; Trihartono, 2013, 2014). However, whilst none of these authors investigated the dynamics that inform practices of political marketing and market-orientation and professionalization of campaigning of these parties comprehensively, the existing theoretical challenges needed to examine such practices, as detailed in the following points, remained unresolved properly.

1.2. Political Marketing and Campaign Transformations.

A series of changes in modes of political communication and campaigning of political parties and parties' candidates has been taking

shape both in the USA since the 1890s and in the UK since the 1930s (O' Shaugnessy, 1990; Kavanagh, 1995; Maarek, 1995; Scammell, 1995; Wring, 1996, 2001; Savigny, 2004, 2008). Modern political marketing however, took place in the Western democracy since the 1960s (Shama, 1976; Maarek, 1995; Savigny, 2004, 2008; Lilleker, et al., 2006). As non-profit organizations practised the marketing techniques extensively (Kotler, 1975; Kotler and Andreasen, 1991), political parties and politicians, especially in facing elections, adopted marketing principles, techniques and procedures and developed modern publicity, political public relations and packaging strategically (Sharma, 1976; Newman, 1994, 1999a, 1999b; Kavanagh, 1995; Franklin, 1994). Such practices evolved alongside the modernisation and professionalization of campaigning carried out by those who run in the elections (Newman, 1994; Maarek, 1995: 11-21; Farrell, 1996: 161) and were followed by the instalment of permanent campaigns advanced by those who ruled the government (Blumenthal, 1982; Nimmo, 1999).

The use of marketing principles, techniques and procedures has been widely seen as resulting in sizeable effects on the changing behaviours of political parties and parties' candidates in Western democracy (Scammell, 1998, 1999). In US politics, political parties' candidates use market intelligence research to analyse the whole process of creating and packaging political messages and deciding what tactics or tools can be utilized to develop and manage the campaign strategy, budget times and human resources and respond to the transformation of political markets and political environments (Newman, 1994; Friedenber, 1997; Farrell, 1996; Farrell and Webb, 2000; Dulio, 2004; Dullio and Garrett, 2005). Similarly, in UK politics, political parties and these parties' leaders also adopted modern principles, practices and techniques of marketing and campaigning advanced in the US politics. For example, since the media age of the 1960s, the Labour Party developed marketization strategies and adopted the American campaign techniques

and styles (Kavanagh, 1995; Wring, 1996: 92-103; Baines, 2001; Wring, 2001; Wring, 2005: 65-67). Thatcher—as leader of the Conservative Party—and Kinnock—as leader of the Labour Party—also used such strategies, techniques and styles when they faced the marketing age of the 1980s (Harrop, 1990; Harris, 2000; Wring, 2005; Butler and Harris, 2009). Since such principles, practices, techniques, procedures and styles have been adopted strategically, the logic of political party campaigning communication transformed from ‘party/propaganda logic’ to ‘media logic’ and then to ‘(political) marketing logic’ (Wring, 2005: 7; Lilleker, 2006: 153; Strömbäck, 2007: 52).

So far, significant attempts have been taken and plenty of concepts have been introduced to capture and understand such developments. For example, Shama (1976) postulated the concept of ‘political marketing-orientations’ to explain the adaptation processes and advancement of political marketing taken by Presidents Kennedy in the 1960s and Nixon in the 1970s when they ran in the presidential elections. In slight contrast, Blumenthal (1982) deployed the concept of the ‘permanent campaign’ to underpin a model of campaigning advanced by the Carter administration (1977-1981). For a couple of decades, this concept has been widely used to frame the ‘endless campaigning’ advanced by incumbent politicians who attempted to retain their popularity after they were elected and took power in government¹. However, its innate weaknesses were noticed, subsequent authors favoured introducing alternative concepts/models to underpin such practices. For example, Wring (2005: 7) introduced concepts of ‘propaganda-orientation’, ‘media-orientation’ and ‘marketing-orientation’ of political parties. Lilleker (2006: 153) formulated concepts of ‘production-orientation’, ‘sales-orientation’ and ‘market-orientation’ of political parties. Lees-Marshment (1999, 2001a, 2001b, 2001d, 2003a, 2004a, 2004b, 2008, 2009, 2010a) and Lilleker and Lees-Marshment

¹ Further information related to this issue, see Nimmo (1999), Steger (1999), Ornstein and Mann (2000), Needham (2005), Eshbaugh-Shoha and Nicholson-Crocty (2009), Doherty (2012), Larsson (2014) and Koliastasis (2014, 2016).

(2005a, 2005b) also theorised models of product-orientation, sales-orientation and market-orientation of political parties. However, whilst such concepts still left disputable debates, the following issues prevailed. The first one is how to explain and measure the complexity of 'political market orientation manifests', which take shape within the contexts of either policy development or internal parties' organizations or campaigning (Lilleker, 2006: 151; Lilleker, et al., 2006: 4). The second one is how to develop the more acceptable and applicable concepts to holistically examine practices of political marketing orientation and market orientation of political parties (Ormrod, 2006, 2007, 2009, 2011, 2012; Henneberg and O' Shaughnessy, 2007; Henneberg, 2008; Harris and Lock, 2010) and capture and explore the structural-systemic/country-related, party-specific and micro-individual factors that determine the ways of and the degrees to which these parties advanced such practices (Strömbäck, 2007: 62-63; Strömbäck, 2010: 28-29; Strömbäck, et al., 2012: 89; Ormrod, 2009: 90).

While such issues exist, some authors theorised and/or investigated stages of campaign transformations and changes in the modes of campaigning of political parties (Farrell, 1996: 170; Blumler and Kavanagh, 1999; Farrell and Webb, 2000: 104; Norris, 2000: 138; Gibson and Rommele, 2001: 34; Plasser and Plasser, 2002: 6) and introduced other concepts, such as 'Americanization' and 'professionalization campaign techniques' (Swanson and Mancini, 1996; Scammell, 1997, 1998; Plasser, 2000, and Plasser and Plasser 2002; Hallin and Mancini, 2004). For a couple of decades, 'Americanization of politics' and 'Americanization of campaign' have been widely deployed as conceptual umbrellas to reveal the 'Americanization campaigning techniques and styles', which have, presumably, been transmitted and transplanted across the UK since the 1970s and worldwide since 1980². These concepts

² These concepts are widely seen as being closely connected and sharing similarities with, but having differences from concepts of 'modernization', 'globalization' and 'hybridization' of campaigns (Kavanagh, 1996: 61-62; Plasser, 2000: 34; Baines, et al., 2001: 1100-1103; Holtz-Bacha, 2002: 27-28; Nord, 2006: 66; Uğur, 2012: 2-3). Further

however, have been seen as illusive in meaning (Negrine and Papathanassopoulos, 1996: 45-62) and being less workable to explain the campaign transformation and professionalization that took place within and across democratic countries (Gurevitch, 1999: 283; Xifra, 2011: 669-670).

As such issues were realised, subsequent authors introduced concepts of 'professionalization of politics' (Mancini, 1999) and 'professionalization of political communication and campaigning' (Gurevitch, 1999; Blummer and Gurevitch, 2001; Holtz-Bacha, 2002, 2007; Lilleker and Negrine, 2002; Negrine and Lilleker, 2002; Negrine, et al., 2007; Negrine, 2008). As it was considered that the first concept has too broad a sense and has not yet been theorised satisfactorily, some authors preferred using the second concept to explain the processes of adaptation and changes in the practices of communication and campaigning of political parties when they addressed the political system and media system and the relationships between these systems and the changing campaign-environments and communication technology (Gibson and Rommele, 2001, 2009; Holtz-Bacha, 2002, 2007; Negrine, et al., 2007; Negrine, 2008; Strömbäck, 2009). However, the second concept entails vague meaning and subjective interpretations (Negrine and Lilleker, 2002: 102; Lilleker and Negrine, 2002: 309-311). Since this issue has not been resolved properly, a workable conceptual framework to holistically capture, understand and measure the degrees of 'campaign professionalism' and modes of 'professionalization of political communication and campaigning' of political parties, either during the elections or in between the elections and, more importantly, diverse factors that determined such practices has not been developed comprehensively either (Strömbäck, 2007: 53; Strömbäck, 2009: 111;

discussion related to this issue, see Elebash (1984), Scammell (1997, 1998), Farrell, (1996), Farrell et al. (2001), Baines (2001), Baines and Egan (2001), Baines (et al., 2001), Plasser et al. (1999), Plasser (2000), Plasser and Plasser (2001), Plasser and Plasser, (2002), Sussman and Galizio (2003), Wring (2005), Nolan (2005), Nord (2006) and Doolan (2009).

Tenscher, et al., 2012:145; Tenscher and Mykkanen, 2013: 173; Tenscher, 2013: 243; Mykkanen and Tenscher, 2014: 23; Tenscher, et al., 2016: 4).

So far, such aforementioned issues remained unresolved. Plenty of observers however, simply assumed that the relationships between practices of political marketing and professionalization of political communication and campaigning really existed. For example, as derived within the specific context of US politics, Maarek (1995: 11-21) and Newman (1994) argued that modern political marketing is likely to take shape and/or co-exist within the evolution and modernization of presidential campaigning or leads to the professionalization of campaigning. Meanwhile, as stemming from the specific context of European politics, Strömbäck (2007: 62-64), Nord (2007: 88-92), Brants and Praag (2007: 107), Papathanassopoulos (2007: 129-132) and Maarek (2007: 146-52) argued that those already acquainted with modern political marketing would be more likely to consider professionalization of political communication and campaigning.

Similarly, Farrell (1996: 161) also voiced that modern political marketing first came to light in the campaign organizations of parties and parties' candidates when they developed modern campaigning in order to maximize electoral gains. Moreover, Scammell (1997: 8-9) and Scammell (1998: 255) argued that in order to understand political markets and to develop strategies and communication campaigns, campaigners seem strongly interested in deploying commercial marketing principles and procedures. Furthermore, Papathanassopoulos et al. (2007: 13), Negrine (2007: 36) and Mancini (2007: 122) posited that political parties are likely to establish a 'culture of marketing', as they are engaged in developing a more rational and streamlined organizational structure and appropriate set of practices of campaigning. In addition, Newman (1994, 1999a: x), Lees-Marshment (2001a: 22), Lees-Marshment (2008: 13), Lees-Marshment, (2010a: 1-2) and Strömbäck (2010: 18) highlighted that political parties

and their candidates who used the concepts, principles, techniques and procedures of marketing as “*an organizational philosophy*” would be much more professionalized in campaigning.

As seen, these authors indicated that political marketing and market-orientation take place alongside and determine professionalization of campaigning. However, whilst such developments were studied separately, most of them lacked a proposal of a workable conceptual lens to evaluate these developments holistically. In considering this issue, Strömbäck (2007: 57-59) posited a set of propositions that underpins the relationships between concepts and practices of political marketing, market-orientation and professionalization of campaigning. He also postulated a theory of strategic party goals regarding such practices within and across political market arenas (Strömbäck, 2007: 60-64) and a set of conditions that determines the ways and the degrees with which political parties within and across democratic countries advanced such practices within and across such arenas (Strömbäck, 2010: 28-29; Strömbäck, et al., 2012: 86). Unfortunately, he lacked offering an integrated conceptual framework that can be applied to holistically explore the structural conditions and factors that propelled marketization and professionalization of campaigning of political parties, especially in new democracies, such as Indonesia.

1.3. Research Question

Based on this background, I consider raising the following question: *How can we holistically understand and explain the structural conditions and factors that determined the development of marketization and professionalization of campaigning of the Indonesian political parties Post-Soeharto New Order up to the 2014 parliamentary and presidential elections?*

1.4. Structure of Dissertation

This dissertation consists of the following chapters. As informed by the existing literature, Chapter 2 develops an integrated conceptual framework to evaluate the question. Chapter 3 highlights the existing knowledge gap and delineates the research aim and objectives, spells out the research philosophy, methodology, methods and designs and displays the proposed baseline structural model to evaluate these research aim and objectives. Moreover, Chapter 4 spells out the structural conditions that paved the way for such development taking shape. Additionally, Chapter 5 discusses nomenclatures of political market arenas and political sub-markets that took place in the new democracy of Indonesia and the effects of the party-specific factors on perceptions of the Indonesian political parties' marketers/campaigners regarding the importance of these political market arenas and political sub-markets.

Chapter 6 evaluates the structural elements that constitute marketization and professionalization of campaigning of these parties. This chapter not only validates the proposed baseline structural model, but also posits an alternative structural model that would be used in subsequent chapters 7, 8 and 9 as an analytical framework to holistically examine the effects of the following factors on the ways and the degrees of which these parties carried out such practices within and across these elections. These factors consist of: a) the individual perceptions of the party leader, candidates and marketers/campaigners regarding the relative importance of internal party, the media and electoral arenas; b) party-specific factors that include party ideology, age category, campaign resources, size and position in the government and experiences with internal and external shocks; and c) party' presidential candidate-specific factors. These chapters also examine the underlying structures and mechanisms, which led to such factors and also some emerging factors taking shape.

Chapter 10 summarises the main findings reported in chapters 4-9. Using such extracted findings, Chapter 11 proposes three novelty theoretical models and spells out the way to transform the second model into the prescriptive models. This chapter points out the knowledge, practical and managerial contributions of these models. More importantly, this chapter highlights the functionalities of the second and third proposed models and usefulness of the prescriptive models to help the mainstream centre-right or centre-left parties in Western democracy, as dealt with the rises of the radical far-right populist parties and movements and secure the sustainability of liberal democracy and society.

CHAPTER 2

POLITICAL MARKETING, MARKET-ORIENTATION AND PROFESSIONALIZATION OF CAMPAIGNING

Chapter Overview

This chapter discusses and scrutinizes the existing literature on political marketing and campaigning to formulate an integrated theoretical framework, which is specifically directed to evaluate the research question. However, before going onto this point, this chapter will briefly discuss the development of political marketing as a field study and evaluate the existing perspectives and concepts introduced in the literature to develop that framework.

2.1. Political Marketing as an Emanating Field Study.

Soon after being introduced by Stanley Kelley in 1956, political marketing gradually emerged not only as a popular term, but also an influential approach (Scammell, 1999: 723; Savigny, 2004: 22; Wring, 2005: 2). Since the 1960s, political marketing has been widely used across the globe to analyse political campaigning (Wring, 1999: 45). As the word 'marketing' has been transferred and widely applied in politics (Moloney, 2004: 2-3), political marketing has been continuously recognized as alternative ways of thinking, speaking and practicing adopted by political party leaders and politicians in the political sphere (Moloney, 2008: 62). Since the 1990s, political marketing has been vigorously developed and considered not only as a strategic way to manage the internal party organization and its policy development and delivery strategy in government, but also as a new field study and perspective to explore such developments (Henneberg, 1996: 777; Henneberg, 2004a: 6-7; Henneberg, 2008: 154-155; Scammell, 1997, 1998; Lees-Marshment, 2001c, 2004a, 2004b, 2008).

So far, plenty of attempts have been made to define the essence of political marketing. *At first*, political marketing has been defined as 'a

process', which relates to the desire to comprehend dynamic political behaviours of political leaders in the political sphere (Scammell, 1999: 719) and includes all factors related to the political communication behaviour of non-profit organizations and political organizations (Shama, 1976: 766; Maarek, 1995: 2). *Secondly*, political marketing has been also considered as a set of practices which relates to the use of the logics, principles and procedures of marketing and the uses of opinion research and environmental analysis by political parties, parties' candidates, governments, lobbyists and interest groups, which want to strategically advance the management of campaigns, produce and promote a competitive offering, satisfy groups of electors in exchange for their votes, drive public opinion, win elections, develop organizational aims and ideological and policy orientations and pass the legislation and referenda, as demanded and expected by societies—in general and electorates—in particular (Kavanagh, 1995, 1996; O' Cass, 1996; Wring, 1997: 653).

Since the 1990s, many efforts have been undertaken to develop political marketing as a new field study. Political marketing has been continuously developed and used to capture and understand the adaptation of marketing principles and procedures by political organizations and actors to fulfil the needs, wants and expectations of selected-people and groups in societies (Newman, 1999: xiii); and the market intelligence, management, design of the political product by political organizations and actors as desired by their markets (Strömbäck, 2007: 56). Political marketing has been also robustly advanced to explore the ways of and the degrees to which political organizations adopted the business-marketing and commercial-marketing concepts and techniques as an organizational philosophy to help them achieve their goals (Lees-Marshment, 2001a: 22; 2008: 13); and the marketing tools, concepts and principles as an organizational philosophy and strategy to accomplish their political goals within the contexts of the policy development or internal

parties' organizations or campaigning (Lilleker, 2006: 151; Lilleker, et al., 2006: 4).

As an emanating field study, political marketing has been widely seen as offering new, better and workable perspectives and conceptual frameworks to holistically capture and understand following the phenomena. The first one relates to the complex processes of political exchanges and interactions between political entities/actors and organizations and their environment and among themselves in the political sphere within contexts of either parliamentary marketing or governmental marketing or electoral marketing (Henneberg, 1996: 777; Henneberg, 2002, 2009; Henneberg and Shaughnessy, 2007; Henneberg and Ormrod, 2013; Ormrod, et al., 2013). The second one is associated with transformations and modes of political attitudes and behaviours of political parties and party leaders and politicians when they dealt with various types of political markets and primary political actors in the political market arenas (Strömbäck, 2007: 59-60; Strömbäck, 2010: 18; Henneberg, 2008: 159-163; Henneberg and Ormrod, 2013: 98; Ormrod, et al., 2013: 18). The last one focuses on the ways of and the degree to which political parties and parties' politicians adopted and used the marketing concepts, principles and techniques as an organizational philosophy and strategy to address the electorates, competitors and the broad stakeholders that exist in the political system (Lock and Harris, 1996: 21; Lees-Marshment, 2001a, 2004a, 2004b, 2008; Lilleker and Lees-Marshment, 2005; Ormrod, 2005, 2007, 2009) within the contexts of either policy development or internal parties' organizations or campaigning (Lilleker, 2006: 151; Lilleker, et al., 2006: 4).

Having considered the ideas of these authors, this work posits the following proposition. Political marketing is actually a study and perspective form, which is needed to understand the following phenomena, which are:

- The nature and structure of political exchanges, interaction, collaboration and transaction processes between and among political actors and organisations that take place in democratic political spheres.
- The nomenclatures of political market arenas and political sub-markets that take shape and are being addressed by such actors and organizations.
- The structures, mechanisms and elements that underlie the structural conditions and factors that determined such processes and shaped up such nomenclatures.
- The consequences of such processes and formations of such nomenclatures on developments of marketization and professionalization of political communication and campaigning of these actors and organisations—in particular—and democracy and the political and government systems—in general.

2.2. The Wide and Narrow Interpretations of Political Marketing

Political marketing phenomena have been understood using wide and narrow interpretations (Henneberg, 2002, 2004a, 2008, Ormrod, 2012; Henneberg and O' Shaughnessy, 2007). As used in the wide interpretation, political marketing is deployed to understand the whole exchange and interaction processes, structures and political players and the existing systemic-political environments wherein political exchanges and interactions take place (Henneberg, 2004a: 16; Henneberg, 2008: 159-161). Those favoured following this interpretation advocated to adopt the existing theories of marketing and political sciences in order to holistically understand the complexity of such phenomena (Henneberg and O' Shaughnessy, 2007: 26) and consider the holistic approach and the meta-theoretical assumptions of political marketing in order to tackle its theoretical challenges and practical problems (Henneberg, 2002: 94-95; Henneberg, 2008; Ormrod, 2012: 12-13; Ormrod, et al., 2013: 13;

Savigny, 2007; Henneberg, 2008: 152). This interpretation is seen as being helpful since the existing theories and models of political marketing have been developed in various research paradigms spanning from the positivist and anti-positivist research traditions and formulated from the different assumptions and the contextual conditions (Savigny, 2004, 2007, 2008, Henneberg and O' Shaughnessy, 2007; Henneberg, 2004a, 2008).

Meanwhile, the narrow interpretation is specifically developed to explore political management activities, attitudes and organizational behaviours carried out by political actors and organizations when they deal with political markets and environments (Henneberg, 2004: 23; Henneberg and O'Shaughnessy, 2007: 12; Henneberg, 2008: 158; Ormrod, 2012: 6). As used in this interpretation, political marketing focuses on the ways of and the degrees to which such actors and organizations adopted and developed the marketing techniques, procedures and tools in the political spheres. These include the increasing sophistication of communication and 'spin', product and image management, candidate positioning and policy development, news management (i.e. the use of 'free' media), establishment of more coherent and planned political marketing and its strategy development and the intensified and integrated uses of political market researches and developments in political marketing organization and professionalization of political management (Henneberg, 2004a: 6-7; Henneberg, 2008: 154-155). Political marketing, in this sense, is seen as being closely related to the ways of and the degrees to which such actors and organizations understood, selected and used the marketing principles, procedures and tools from the marketing literature and adopted such principles, procedures and tools to develop workable marketing management strategies and activities in political spheres (Henneberg and O'Shaughnessy, 2007: 12-13; Ormrod, 2012: 6).

Since there is no consensus regarding the border and crosscutting lines between these wide and narrow interpretations, models of political marketing have been continuously formulated using diverse perspectives.

For example, Lees-Marshment (2001a, 2001d, 2003a, 2003b, 2004a, 2004b, 2008) proposed the '*comprehensive political marketing*' (CPM) perspective and claimed that this perspective would be invaluable in understanding the complete behaviour of political marketing of public organizations (such as interest groups, policy, the public sector, the media, parliament and local government as well as parties). Having explored the transformation of political attitudes and behaviours of political parties in UK politics, she proposed three models of political marketing of political parties, which are: the product-oriented party, the sales-oriented party and the market-oriented party (Lees-Marshment, 2001a: 16-35, 2001b: 696-702; 2001d: 1074-1081, 2003a: 16-26, 2004a: 17-20; 2008: 16-35; 2009: 207-208, 2010: 4-9). In a slightly dissimilar approach, O' Cass (2009: 195-197) formulated a resource-based view of the political marketing perspective and outlined a normative model of the triadic interaction processes of political marketing between the primary actors and political market place in competitive environments. Following this perspective, O' Cass and Voola (2011: 633-638) postulated three types of political marketing orientations, which are a proactive political market orientation (PPMO), a reactive political market orientation (RPMO), and a political brand orientation (PBO) and visualized the relationships between and among these orientations with political markets (voters and stakeholders) and political market-environments. Henneberg (2002, 2009) proposed a slightly different dyadic model of political marketing management (PMM), developed concepts of 'selling-orientated of PMM', 'instrumentally-oriented of PMM' and 'relational PMM' and claimed that these concepts would be useful to understand the political marketing management of political organisations. Since considering that this model lacks capture of the complex processes of the exchanges and interactions in the political sphere, Henneberg and Ormrod (2013: 93-94) and Ormrod et al. (2013: 18) posited a triadic, an interdependent-based view of political marketing, which underpins the whole political exchanges and interactions processes

between and among voters/citizens, political parties/parties' candidates and parliament/government.

Theoretically speaking, these authors offered invaluable theoretical models that allow us to explore diverse aspects and dimensions of political marketing phenomena. They also considered the multidimensional processes of political marketing and diverse aspects and contexts of marketization of political actors and organisations. However, while these formulated models are primarily based on Western established democratic countries that have been ruled primarily under the parliamentary government system as indicated by the party-centred system, these authors considered less variability of the structural-systemic conditions of the new/young democratic countries, which have been ruled under the presidential government system and are characterized by the candidate-centred system, such as Indonesia. Validities and applicability of their models in such countries therefore remained indefinite.

As regards to this condition, this work favours adopting both the wide and the narrow interpretations due to the following reasons. The first one entails multi-perspectives in understanding the essence of political marketing phenomena. However, it takes into account the positivist and anti-positive paradigms, as we want to systematically explore the diverse ontological dimensions of such phenomena (Savigny, 2007; Henneberg, 2008; Ormrod, 2012; Ormrod, et al., 2013). In considering such paradigms, it would be possible for us to explore the underlying structures, mechanisms and elements that determine not only the processes of political exchange, interaction and interaction between and among these actors and organizations, but also the natures and formations of models of the political marketing-orientations of political parties, which took place within and across democratic countries (Henneberg and O' Shaughnessy, 2007; Henneberg, 2008; Ormrod, 2012; Ormrod, et al., 2013).

Like the first one, the second one also has intrinsic weaknesses. Such weaknesses include: a) the inherent subjective views in theorising

practices of political marketing and market orientation of political parties; b) the unresolved criticisms related to the innate weakness of the existing theories and models that underpin such practices; and c) the continuing theoretical and empirical debates related to such practices³. However, the second one offers robust conceptual frameworks that can be deployed to systematically explore practices of political marketing-orientation and market-orientation carried out by political actors and organizations within and across democratic countries, regardless of the given structural and cultural conditions of these countries (Henneberg and O' Shaughnessy, 2007; Henneberg, 2008; Ormrod, 2012; Ormrod, et al., 2013).

This work argues that adopting wide and narrow interpretations allows us to adopt and develop the existing models of political marketing orientation and market-orientation of political parties introduced in the political marketing literature in a proper way. Such interpretations also give us more workable ways to evaluate the applicability and validity of these models. In considering these interpretations holistically, we could systematically examine the relationships between concepts and practices of political marketing orientation and market-orientation and explore diverse factors that constitute such concepts and practices and determine such relationships as well.

2.3. Political Marketing-Orientation and Market-Orientation

There have been disputable debates regarding the understanding of and the relationships between practices of 'political marketing-orientation' and 'market-orientation'. Such issues are spelled out as follows. Hennerberg (2002), Strömbäck (2010: 23-27), Strömbäck et al. (2012: 83-85), Ormrod (2005, 2007, 2009: 82) and O' Shaughnessy et al. (2012) suggested deploying concept 'market orientation', as we want to explain the use of marketing intelligence by political parties and explore

³ Further debates related to such issues, see Lees-Marshment (2006a, 2006b, 2008), Henneberg (2008), Ormrod (2006, 2007, 2009, 2011a, 2011b, 2012), Savigny (2004, 2008) and Ormrod and Savigny (2012).

the ways these parties identify latent wants and needs of targeted-groups of electorates, inform the market intelligence data of these parties' members, design political products in order to meet with later wants and needs of these groups and build a long term relationship with stakeholders and establish the relational exchange processes with political markets. Though hinting that these concepts and practices are ontologically dissimilar, O' Cass (1996, 2001a, 2001b), Henneberg (2002), Lees-Marshment (1999, 2001a, 2001b, 2004), Lilleker and Lees-Marshment (2005), Strömbäck (2007, 2010) and Strömbäck et al. (2012) explained the differentiations between these concepts and practices and validated the relationships between such concepts and practices less.

Lees-Marshment (2006a: 121, 2006b: 6; 2008: 37) intentionally made no attempt to differentiate these concepts and practices. From a slightly different stance, Ormrod (2005: 51; 2007: 70-72, 2009: 82-83, 2011: 5-7) and O' Shaughnessy et al. (2012: 355) shed light on the differentiations between these concepts and practices and delineated the relationships between these concepts and practices as well. In this respect, Ormrod (2005: 51; 2009: 82-83) considered '*political market orientation*' as the '*party organizational philosophy and behaviour*' and defined '*political marketing orientation*' as the '*party's marketing function*'. Moreover, as informed by the ideas of Kohli and Jaworski (1990), Narver and Slater (1990), Harrison-Walker (2001) and Lafferty and Hult (2001), Ormrod (2007, 2009) postulated that political market orientation (PMO) more likely exists when "*all members of a party are sensitive to internal and external stakeholders' attitudes, needs and wants and synthesize these within a framework of constraints imposed by all stakeholders to develop policies and programs with which to reach the party's objectives*".

Following this definition, Ormrod and his colleagues qualitatively examined political market-orientation and strategic postures of political parties in UK politics based on the three UK parties' manifestos (Ormrod and Henenberg, 2006, 2009; Ormrod, et al., 2007) and quantitatively

explored political market-orientation and strategic postures of political parties in Danish and UK politics based on the survey data derived from these parties' members (Ormrod, 2005, 2007, 2009; Henneberg and Ormrod, 2008; Ormrod and Henneberg, 2011). However, since the nature of the political sphere cannot be seen as being precisely similar to the nature of business and commercial spheres, this conceptual definition seems only suitable for capturing and describing a '*perfectly market oriented party*' that is too ideal and unlikely exist in real politics (Ormrod, 2009: 188). This definition is also less applicable within the specific context of the young democracies, such as Indonesia, wherein political parties' organizations have not yet been fully established (Ufen, 2008b; and memberships of these parties have been under-developed as well (Mujani and Liddle, 2007, 2010; Ufen, 2008a).

As regards to such conditions, this work formulates the following propositions. *At first*, this work, in considering ideas of Strömbäck (2007: 62-63), Ormrod (2005: 51; 2007: 82, 2009: 82-83, 2011: 5-7) and O' Shaughnessy et al. (2012: 355), favours placing 'political marketing-orientation' and 'political market-orientation' as two separate concepts and positioned them as equal concepts that are not superior to each other. This work also considered them as two different practices that more likely exist as sequential processes within the contexts of either during the elections or in between the elections. This proposition is slightly contrasted with the ideas of Ormrod (2006: 113, 2007: 82: 2009: 70) and O' Shaughnessy et al. (2012: 355, 362) that highlight '*political marketing orientation*' as *party*' *marketing function* and hint that '*political market orientation*' is much more *superior* rather than '*political marketing orientation*'. Unlike these authors, this work argues that since the nature of the political sphere is obviously dissimilar to the nature of business and commercial spheres, and as the nature of political parties' organizations is also clearly distinct from the nature of business and commercial

organizations, such propositions seem less workable within the specific context of the new democracies.

Secondly, this work favours using the concept of '(political) marketization' to capture and explore following phenomena, which are:

- a) Political exchange, interaction, collaboration and transaction processes between and among political organizations (such as parties, parliaments and government offices, presidential offices, state agencies), political actors (such as parties' leaders, candidates, politicians, officials, activists and members), and political markets (such as electorates/voters, party members and constituents, the media, competitors, political lobbyists and campaign donors) that existed in the 'democratic countries' and took shape within and across political market arenas (the media, electoral, internal party and the parliamentary/governmental arenas).
- b) Models of 'political marketing-orientation' and 'market-orientation' developed by political actors and organizations in the 'democratic spheres', when they have to deal with these political markets and political market arenas either during the elections or in between the elections.

The 'democratic countries' and 'democratic political sphere', in this sense, are seen as 'essential and principal conditions', that allow practices of 'marketization of these actors and organizations' to take shape. Such practices would not possibly take place in authoritarian political regimes and undemocratic political spheres. Instead, they are only likely to emerge in countries that have been ruled under democratic political regimes wherein the democratic media, election and political and government systems have been established, a group of people has freedom to freely set up a political party and more importantly, political parties' politicians and candidates have had the possibility of and are capable of running in the democratic/direct election system.

Thirdly, this work defines '*political marketing-orientation*' and '*market-orientation*' as follows.

- '*Political marketing-orientation*' refers to the attitudes and behaviour orientations of political organizations and actors regarding the adaptations and uses of business-marketing concepts, principles, procedures and techniques as 'an organizational philosophy' and/or 'organisational strategy' to form workable ways to strategically manage and address these political market arenas and deal with and prioritize these political sub-markets in order to accomplish their short-term or the long-term goals in elections and/or in between these elections.
- '*Market-orientation*' relates to the attitudinal and behavioural orientations performed by these actors and organisations when they responded, prioritized and dealt with these political sub-markets and attempted to meet and fulfil the latent and expressive needs, wants, desires and expectations of these political sub-markets in order to accomplish their short or long-term political objectives in elections and/or in between these elections.

Such definitions indicate that '*political marketing-orientation*' and '*market-orientation*' are actually two-fold concepts and sequential practices. As practices, '*political marketing-orientation*' and '*political market-orientation*' can be developed not only by political parties, parties' leaders, politicians, candidates, activists and members, but also by marketers/campaigners employed by these parties and these parties' leaders, politicians, candidates to achieve their goals in either one specific time/condition/election or more than specific times/conditions/elections. '*Political marketing-orientation*', in this sense, needs to be seen as a necessary condition for political parties when these parties want to develop '*market-orientation*'. The rationale is, it seems, unachievable for these parties to follow and develop '*market-orientation*' if they will not follow '*political marketing-orientation*'. Indeed, political parties, which already adopted '*political marketing-orientation*', would not automatically

be strongly interested in developing 'market-orientation' in strategic and effective ways. However, as they want to properly carry out 'market-orientation', they need to adopt 'political marketing-orientation' as an essential condition.

2.4. Professionalization of Political Communication and Campaigning.

Professionalization of political communication has been seen as being related to the Americanization, globalization and modernization of campaigning (Kavagh, 1995: 219; Sculz, 1998 in Holtz-Bacha, 2002: 24; Papathanassoulos, et al., 2007: 13). However, some argued that it could not be simply associated with the 'Americanization' of campaigning (Holtz-Bacha, 2002: 28-29; Lilleker, 2006: 30). While 'Americanization' has been widely criticized due to its inherent weaknesses (Negrine and Papathanassoulos, 1996: 45-62; Xifra, 2011: 669-670), 'professionalization' has been gradually acknowledged to explore campaign transformations (Holtz-Bacha, 2002, 2007; Negrine, et al., 2007; Negrine, 2008) and evaluate the increasing trend and changing form of campaign strategies and personalisation (Lilleker, 2006: 32) and political packaging (Lilleker, 2006: 139-141).

So far, 'professionalization' has been widely used in diverse contexts and scales and seen as a highly contested concept as well (Lilleker and Negrine, 2002: 308; Strömbäck, 2007: 53; Tenscher, et al., 2012: 145; Tenscher, 2013: 243). For example, Gurevitch (1999), Blummer and Gurevitch (2001), Holtz-Bacha (2002), Negrine and Lilleker (2002), Lilleker (2006), Holtz-Bacha (2007), Negrine et al. (2007) and Negrine (2008) deployed the concept of 'professionalization of political communication' to explain the adaptation processes and changes in practices of communication and campaigning and advancements in the packaging of political messages, policies and personalities taken by political actors and organizations when such actors and organizations

addressed transformations of political, government and media systems and changing communication technology and political environments. Mancini (1999) deployed a slightly different concept of 'professionalization of politics' to evaluate: a) phenomena of globalizations and homogenizations, which have also been closely associated with the highly contested concepts of Americanization and modernizations; and b) changes in the systems of attitudes and values of political organizations and parties toward politics and the very structure of the political system (Mancini 1999: 242). Moreover, he proposed following concepts of 'new political professionalism' and 'professionalization of politics' to analyse: a) transformation of party bureaucracy into the 'electoral-professional party'; and b) the increasing employment of 'political professionals' by political parties when these parties attempt to respond to the development of communication technology and transformations of electorates behaviours and political environments (Mancini, 1999: 231). Additionally, he also introduced the concept of 'professionalism in campaigning' to explain: a) the self-improvements in skills of campaign management in regard of changes in media environments and development of ICT; and b) the increasing roles of political consultants and pollsters in developing campaign organization of political parties and parties' politicians (Mancini, 1999: 237-240).

While lacking clarification of the differentiation between such concepts, Mancini (1999: 232) as well as Negrine, (2007: 35), as informed by idea of Panebianco (1982), suggested using the concept of the 'professional-electoral party' to capture transformation of party organization, communication and campaigning wherein the non-party professional strategists (such as pollsters, marketing specialists, media advisers) and 'political professionals' (such as professional consultants, media producers, buyers and press agents, spin doctors and media professionals) have presumably displaced the roles of party machines, leader, apparatuses, strategist and bureaucrats. Though the

nomenclatures and characteristics of the 'professional-electoral party' remained debatable, this concept, surprisingly, has been used by Jackson (2011) to explain the transformation of party organization of the Green Australian Party and adopted by Lamprinakou (2010: 4-5) to formulate a concept 'encompassing professionalization', which is defined as the latest stage of parties' evolution that has become the 'election campaign communicators'.

The other observers used slightly different concepts of 'campaign professional(s)' and 'campaign professionalism' to chronicle the increasing employment of political consultants hired either permanently or temporarily by political parties and party leaders and politicians, especially during campaigns and elections (Farrell, et al., 2001; Plasser, 2000, 2002; Abbe and Herrnson, 2003; Dulio and Garrett, 2005; Esser and Tenscher, 2005a, 2005b). Plasser et al. (1999: 101), as led by the idea of Althaus (1998), introduced the concept of 'professionalization of political consultants', while Weismel-Manor (2005, 2011) formulated concepts of 'professionalization of campaign consultancy' and 'campaign consultants' professionalization'. The first concept was specifically utilized to explore the essential criteria of political consultants as an independent profession, which had professional roles, a separate professional association, an academic career path and a codex of professional and ethical guidelines and offered special services to clients. In slightly contrast, the second and third concepts were used to investigate development and changes in the nature of work of political consultancies carried out by political consultants, which have been described of being evolved from an art to a science.

As seen, there have been divergent interpretations regarding the essence of professionalization that took shape in the fields of politics, political communication and campaigning. Having considered the ideas of Gurevitch (1999), Blummer and Gurevitch (2001), Holtz-Bacha (2002), Negrine and Lilleker (2002), Lilleker (2006: 32), Holtz-Bacha (2007), Negrine et al. (2007) and Negrine (2008), this work favours deploying the

concept of 'professionalization of political communication', rather than 'professionalization of politics' as posited by Mancini (1999). The main reason is this concept has been widely acknowledged and used by a number of authors to explain professionalization in the fields of political communication and campaigning (Negrine and Lilleker, 2002; Lilleker, 2006: 32; Negrine, et al., 2007; Negrine, 2008). The subsequent reason is this concept being slightly straightforward in capturing modes of professionalization of political communication and campaigning and the degrees of campaign professionalism of political parties.

Though being widely acceptable, this concept has been adopted to explore diverse forms and dimensions of professionalization. For example, Holtz-Bacha (2002: 23) deployed this concept to underpin 'a process by which the political actors adapt their strategies to changes in society and in the political system as well as to changes in the media system'. She also employed this concept to capture 'a process of adaptation to, and as such a necessary consequence of, changes in the political system on the one side, and the media system on the other, and in the relationship of the two systems' (Holtz-Bacha, 2007: 63). Slightly different, Lilleker (2006: 30) suggested using this concept to evaluate 'the way in which political communication has become better, or more strategic' and 'the way in which it has become more professional or been professionalized'. He also defined 'electoral professionalism' as 'the strategy developed by a party whose main aim is electoral success' and wherein 'all elements of the design of the parties' electoral offering are conducted to suit the electoral terrain, particularly voter opinion formation' (Lilleker, 2006: 84). He also voiced that professionalization related with: a) the ways in which politics is performed to the public in democratic societies, either directly or through the mass media; and b) a set of efforts carried out by political parties' leaders and politicians when they attempted presenting the right image, policies and personalities using the media and narrowcasting tools (Lilleker, 2006: 139-140).

Like these authors, Negrine (2007: 29) also advocated using this concept to capture and assess 'a process of change in the field of politics and communication that, either explicitly or implicitly, brings about better and more efficient – and more reflective—organizations of resources and skills in order to achieve desired objectives, whatever they might be'. More importantly, he also highlighted following phenomena that indicate professionalization of political communication of political parties (Negrine, 2007: 33). They include: a) a transition or even a transformation of the parties and other political bodies in the way they communicate with their particular constituencies; and b) a transformation of the nature and structure of the campaign organization and party communication activities which are undertaken by employing experts or 'professionals' to support or direct the communication, persuasion and mobilization. He also proposed following proposition: 'from the perspective of the political party, professionalization of political communication can be deemed to be the process of adaptation by which they change their structures and practices in order to meet new and continually changing circumstances and their use of experts in order to achieve their goals' (Negrine, 2007: 34).

Meanwhile, Papathanassopoulos et al. (2007: 10-11) formulated the following indicators of professionalization of political communication and campaigning. They include: a) a more 'rational' and more streamlined organizational structure or a more 'appropriate' set of practices; b) the growth of a plurality of sources of information in regard to modernization of societies; c) the reasons and goals of communications in changing practices of sets of appropriate skills and communication technology of political actors and political organizations in order to look better within the processes of persuasion and mobilization of electorates, get more media attention and influence the public agenda for government and interest groups; d) the self-improvement of performances and the ways of communication and media management of political actors and political organizations when dealing with the increased 'logic' of 'mediatisation of

politics'; and e) the advancement of sets of specialisms and special skills utilized to persuade and mobilize citizens, voters and consumers.

Despite that, Papathanassopoulos et al. (2007: 13) and Negrine (2007: 35) discussed the internal and external dimensions and the interplays between such dimensions that led to professionalization taking shape. The first author argued that the internal dimension relates to the following questions: a) what is happening from within; and b) how and the extent to which the changing roles, authority and responsibility to control and run the whole dimensions and processes of professionalization of campaigning have taken shape? Meanwhile, the external dimension is associated with the following questions: who is being employed to do what and how, in which way and to what extent they are hired? Such dimensions, according to the second author, are closely associated with processes and levels of '*specialization*', on one hand, and '*displacement*', on the other (Negrine, 2007: 35). '*Specialization*' refers to the changing management of campaigning by hiring expertise and adopting technology to respond to transformation of political environments and to accomplish particular goals, while '*displacement*' relates to the presence of non-party 'professional strategists' who had expertise and took over campaign management.

Theoretically speaking, these authors offered invaluable definitions that underpin the phenomena of professionalization of political communication advanced by political actors and organizations. Most of them however, defined these phenomena in a very abstract manner and lacked clarification of the differentiation between professionalization of campaigning and campaign professionalisms. More importantly, they lacked spelling out the universal measurable indicators that constitute such phenomena. Attempting to resolve such issues, Tenscher et al. (2012: 147-149), Tenscher (2013: 244) and Tenscher and Mykkanen, (2013: 174; 2014: 23) posited the concept of 'campaign professionalization'. This concept is specifically directed to explore what

they called 'processes of professionalization'. It refers to the long-term processes of changes in the structures and strategies of modern-related communication and campaigning that occur in between the elections and during the elections. Further, they also introduced the concept of 'campaign professionalism' to specifically describe and analyse how and the extent to which political parties develop sets of professional campaign structure and strategy within the specific context/time/election. More importantly, as they considered that the validity of these concepts has left disputable debates, Mykkanen and Tenscher (2014: 25-26) and Tenscher et al. (2015: 8-9) suggested evaluating the underlying indicators/variables of these concepts.

As accounted for in the ideas of these authors, this work ultimately highlights the following propositions. *Firstly*, this work voices that '*professionalization of political communication*' refers to the adaptation and evolution processes and modes of political communication—in general—and necessary consequences of changes in the practices, structures and strategies of political campaigning and packaging—in particular—(that have to be) advanced by political actors and organizations when they have to address and deal with transformations of political markets, arenas and environments. *Secondly*, this work also argues that in addressing *professionalization* that take place within the specific context of *campaigning*, the concept of '*professionalization of campaigning*' seems to be much more workable. It refers to strategic efforts taken by political actors and organizations when they attempt to accomplish their goals in campaigning in one specific time/condition/context or more than one specific time/condition/context. Such efforts include the engagement of having a professional-campaign and advancements of a 'professionalized-campaign'. In this respect, 'professional-campaign engagement' is associated with the degree to which political actors and organizations engaged in developing a professional-campaign. Meanwhile, 'professionalized-campaign' includes 'professionalized-campaign

structure' and 'professionalized-campaign strategy' and relates to a set or combination of material practices, techniques and strategies advanced by these actors and organisations, based on their resources and skills, to improve a better and more efficient campaign management, organization and tools in order to maximize their electoral goals and objectives.

Following these definitions, this work favours placing the concept of 'professional-campaign engagement' as the first essential element and 'professionalized-campaign' as the second element. The rationale is it seems impossible to see how political actors and organizations, which lacked engagement with having a professional-campaign, could develop a 'professionalized-campaign' properly. Following this argument, this work proposes the following propositions. *Firstly*, the ways political parties developed 'professional-campaign engagement', 'professionalized-campaign structure' and 'professionalized-campaign strategy' in a specific time or short-term or special condition that took shape during the elections or in between the elections indicate modes of 'professionalization of campaigning' of these parties. *Secondly*, the degrees to which these parties advanced 'professional-campaign engagement', 'professionalized-campaign structure' and 'professionalized-campaign strategy' within the long-term or more than one specific times/conditions constitute the levels of 'campaign professionalism' of these parties and indicates whether such parties run professionalization (that also lead them to be much more professionalized) or turned into de-professionalization (that make them less professionalized).

2.5. An Integrated Theoretical Framework

Points 2.2-2.4, respectively, already discussed the existing perspectives, models and concepts introduced in the political marketing and campaigning literature to capture and understand practices of political marketing and market-orientation and professionalization of political communications of political parties. Having considered such perspectives,

models and concepts, the subsequent point would formulate an integrated conceptual framework to evaluate the structural conditions and factors that determined marketization and professionalization of campaigning of the Indonesian political parties Post-Soeharto New Order. To this end, the ideas of the following authors would be scrutinized, adopted and refashioned as follows.

Firstly, Strömbäck (2007: 63), Strömbäck (2010: 28-29) and Strömbäck et al. (2012: 86) highlighted 'conditions' that stimulate political parties in democratic countries to use marketing techniques, follow market-orientation and run professionalization of campaigning. Such 'conditions' include the low level of party ID and party membership, little trust in political parties, high electorate volatility and commercial media system, the presence of candidate-centred over party-centred systems. The left-right ideological dimension and cleavage associations have been less important and only a few parties have competitive chances to win the elections. This work would adopt his proposition to identify and explore the structural conditions that propelled developments of marketization and professionalization of campaigning of political parties in the new democracy of Indonesia.

Secondly, Strömbäck (2007, 2009, 2010) and Strömbäck et al. (2012) proposed four types of political market arenas, which are the internal party, electoral, the media and parliamentary arenas. Slightly differently from this author, Johansen (2012: 139-168), delineated the nature, structures and characteristics of political markets that commonly took shape in the party-centred democracies, while Lock and Harris (1996: 14), Kotler and Kotler (1999: 5-6), Hughes and Dann (2009: 250, 2012: 1364) and Ormrod (2005, 2006, 2007, and 2009) identified various types of political markets which have been usually addressed by political parties and these parties' candidates. While they followed different perspectives, these authors posited nomenclatures of political market arenas and political sub-markets, which commonly took place in Western

democracies. However, they lacked exploration of political market arenas and political sub-markets that took shape and are considered and addressed by political parties in the new democracies, which have been ruled under the presidential government system, such as Indonesia. As focused on the new democracy of Indonesia, this work would adopt and reformulate the ideas of these authors to evaluate such issues.

Thirdly, Lees-Marshment (2001a: 16-35, 2001b: 696-702; 2001d: 1074-1081, 2003a: 16-26, 2004a: 17-20; 2008: 16-35; 2009: 207-208, 2010: 4-9) postulated three models of political marketing of party. As she considered the propaganda model, she outlined the 'product-oriented party' (POP). The main principle of this party is how to efficiently or effectively use political products to attract voters by ignoring the utilization of communication techniques and market intelligences. As followed in this model, the party tends to refuse to change political product and its design, even if it failed in the electoral arena. This party has to develop the following five steps, which are product design, communication, campaign, election, and delivery (Lees-Marshment, 2010: 9). Moreover, she also posited the 'sales-oriented party' (SOP). This party uses effective political marketing communication techniques and emphasizes the selling of the political product. What this party decides to sell is reliant on what is best for the voters. This party has to advance the following six steps, which are: product design, market intelligence, communication, campaign, election and delivery and formulate the best rational option using the marketing to present its most effective argument to the electorate segments that have been most open to persuasion (Lees-Marshment, 2010: 9). She also postulated the 'market-oriented party' (MOP) whereby a political party has to develop the following nine steps, which are market intelligence, product design, product adjustment, implementation, communication, campaign, election, delivery and maintaining⁴ and consider market-orientation as the

⁴ These steps are then transformed into eight steps, see Lilleker and Lees-Marshment (2005a: 8)—and being added to with the last step, which is keeping the market-

main party views and political judgments to design its behaviours and respond to and satisfy voter demands and meet the needs and wants of groups of citizens/electorates. In following this model, the party has to decide the best view and judgement in order to design and re-design its behaviour—as well as design and re-design its political products, which are directed to respond to and satisfy voters' demands—as informed by the market intelligences—in a way that meets voters' needs and wants, whereby it would be implemented and supported by the internal organization in order to be deliverable in government (Lees-Marshment, 2010: 4-5).

Savigny (2004, 2007b, 2008) argued that Lees-Marshment (2001a, 2001b, 2003a) clarified less whether these models should be placed as normative or prescriptive or predictive models of political marketing. Lees-Marshment (2006a: 121-124, 2006b: 3-6; 2008: 35-42) already addressed and discussed those issues. But, Savigny and Temple (2010) perceived that she did not yet fully weigh up the ideal positions and roles of media in a democratic system. Strömbäck (2010: 18) also argued that she accounted less for the characteristics and conditions that determine parties to follow one of those models. Ormrod (2006, 2007, 2011a, 2011b) also pointed out that she considered the marketing theories less and under-clarifies the differentiations between political marketing-orientation(s) and political market-orientation. Due to such issues, her models have been seen to account less for the ideal conditions of political realm and democracy (Savigny, 2008; Savigny and Wring, 2009). More specifically, the MOP model of Lees-Marshment has been widely criticized due to: a) its broad sense of the application of marketing principles and techniques in the political sphere; b) offering less of the conceptual clarity between marketing orientation and market orientation; c) mainly addressing the voters/electorates, but a lack of sufficiently addressing the

orientation, see Lilleker and Lees-Marshment (2005b: 225-226) and Lees-Marshment (2006a: 122).

competitors; and c) lack of properly exploring the internal activities of parties' organization in relation to the broader stakeholders and various political arenas. She also simply placed this model as a superior model over POP and SOP (Strömbäck, 2010: 17-18; Ormrod, 2006, 2007; Ormrod, 2009: 80; Ormrod, 2011a: 5-7; Ormrod, 2011b: 396-402).

Regardless of its inherent weaknesses, MOP has been seen as being useful. MOP considers the degree to which a political party used the marketing concepts, principles and tools as 'an organizational philosophy' within contexts of the long-term or the short-term as a crucial element in understanding the political marketing orientation of the party. MOP also accounts for the marketing attitudes, behaviours and activities of parties as a whole and includes the strategies, stages and processes of political marketing and market-orientation of party (Lees-Marshment, 2008: 41; Strömbäck, 2010: 16). More importantly, MOP has been widely accepted as being much more workable to evaluate political parties in the democratic countries that are indicated with: a) a low degree of party ID, high volatility of electorates; b) a high commercial media system; c) a low trust in these parties; d) the candidate-centred over the party-centred systems; e) the left-right ideological dimension is less important; and f) only a few political parties have competitive chances to win the elections (Strömbäck, 2010: 28-29; Lees-Marshment, 2008: 42).

Though offering invaluable theoretical frameworks, Lees-Marshment is, however, still left the following controversial debates. The first one is how can we really understand the ways of and the degrees to which political parties' leaders understood marketing concepts and philosophy and their real impacts on market orientation of these parties as an organization? The second one is how to properly define a set of indicators to measure and analyse market orientation of political parties? O' Cass (1996) and O' Cass (2001: 1010-1012) postulated 13 indicators to evaluate such issues and used them to run in-depth interviews with party executive managers, candidates, the branch chairman and electoral

campaign directors. Moreover, Maier et al. (2010: 34-51) proposed five indicators and measurements of the market orientation of a political party. Additionally, Ormrod (2005, 2006, 2007, and 2009) developed a set of variables, indicators and measurements of market orientation and generated these variables, indicators and measurements to formulate a baseline structural model that underpins political market orientation and the strategic posture of political party.

This work ultimately favours adopting and modifying the ideas of Lees-Marshment (2001a: 16-35, 2001b: 696-702; 2001d: 1074-1081, 2003a: 16-26, 2004a: 17-20; 2008: 16-35; 2009: 207-208, 2010: 4-9), O Cass (2001: 1010-1012) and Maier et al. (2010: 34-51) to evaluate 'political marketing-orientation'. However, 'political marketing-orientation', in this sense, is not deployed to achieve the perfect model of a market-oriented party, as Lees-Marshment (2001a, 2001b, 2001d, 2003a, 2004a, 2008, 2009, 2010) did. Instead, it is used a variable that constitutes an integrated model of marketization and professionalization of campaigning of a political party. In the following Chapter 3, point 3.6.3, table 3.3 would display a set of indicators and measurements of this variable.

Due to this, this work also prefers adopting the ideas of Hughes and Dann (2009: 250, 2012: 1364) and Ormrod (2005, 2006, 2007, and 2009) to develop variable 'market-orientation'. This variable would be placed as a second variable that constitutes this model. This variable is placed as a high-level variable to capture and evaluate the ways of and the degree to which the Indonesian political parties considered, addressed, prioritized and dealt with political sub-markets they targeted. In a slightly difference from Ormrod (2005, 2006, 2007, and 2009), this work operationalizes this variable using five lower-order variables/constructs, which are internal-orientation, voter-orientation, competitor-orientation, campaign contributor-orientation and media-orientation. The first variable is formulated as a single-item-construct, while the second, third, fourth and fifth variables are constructed as a multi-item-construct. The fourth and fifth variables are

developed from variable 'external/societal orientation', which was originally directed to capture and understand the attitudinal orientations of a political party to stakeholders that exist in the wider political system, which are not included as either voters or competitors (Ormrod, 2005: 60; Ormrod, 2009: 208). Ormrod (2009: 209) suggested that this variable could be divided into three components, which are the micro- (citizens), meso (lobby and interest groups) and macro-level stakeholders (media). The first component is theoretically different from voter-orientation, but it is likely to be seen as being similar to voter-orientation. Regarding this condition, this work excluded this component and replaced it with 'voter-orientation'⁵. Since the second and third components seem workable within the specific context of Indonesian politics, this work uses media-orientation as a variable of market-orientation and transforms the second component to formulate a new variable, which is campaign contributor-orientation⁶. In the following Chapter 3, point 3.6.3, table 3.4 would exhibit a set of indicators and measurements of these variables.

Meanwhile, Gibson and Rommele (2001: 39, 2009: 269) postulated a Campaign Professional Index approach. This approach was directed to evaluate campaign structures of political parties and incorporates campaign resources, staff, finances and infrastructure set up by this party.

⁵ This work fully considers that the Indonesian political parties probably use various forms of clientelistic transaction approach to address and mobilize electorates—in general—and constituents and voters—in particular. This approach is commonly framed as political clientelism, which refers to '*the individualized exchanges of goods or services for political supports*' (Withz-Shapiro, 2012: 568) *in which patrons and clients were tied to durable relationships by a powerful sense of obligation and duty*' (Hopkin, 2006: 2). This approach may appear as 'pork-barrelling transaction strategy' to secure the constituents, 'vote buying transaction strategy' to induce those inclined to vote and 'turnout buying transaction strategy' to persuade those inclined not to vote (undecided/voters) (Gans-Morse, et al., 2014: 418; Hidalgo and Nitcher, 2016: 437).

⁶ This work also conjectures that the Indonesian political parties and these parties' leaders and candidates might adopt a tactical populism strategy and style (Canovan, 1999: 5-6; Moffitt and Tormey, 2004: 386-394), strategically exploit on what Canovan (1999: 8-9) labelled as the 'politics of faith' and 'the politics of scepticism'. Some of them also probably select the main elements of Machiavellianism, such as manipulative and the unethical and pragmatic morality values (Hunt and Chonko, 1984: 32; John and Paulhus, 2009: 97) for addressing not only these electorates/voters and the media strategically, but also these campaign-contributors/donators effectively.

This index was slightly modified by Strömbäck (2009: 101-104). Slightly differently from these authors, Tenscher et al. (2012: 147), Tenscher (2013: 245-246), Tenscher and Mykkanen (2013: 173-176, 2014: 23-24) and Mykkanen and Tenscher (2014: 8-10) proposed a set of indicators and measurements of a professionalization-index and used these indicators and measurements to formulate two variables/constructs, which are: campaign structure and campaign strategy. The first one is also called as 'campaign hardware'. It relates to the development of the organizational dimension of political parties, such as sizes of the election campaign budget and campaign staff, degrees of centralization of campaign organization, degree of externalization, differentiation of internal communication structures and duration of the campaign. The second one is named as 'campaign software'. It includes a set of activities, such as the degree of audience targeting, event and news management, narrowcasting activities and personalization and the relevance of paid media, the free media and the relevance of talk shows.

This work would adopt and refashion the ideas of such authors as follows. Professionalization of campaigning would be placed as a high-level variable. This variable would be investigated through evaluating three following lower-level/order variables, which are 'professional-campaign engagement', 'professionalized-campaign structure' and 'professionalized-campaign strategy'. 'Professional-campaign engagement', in this sense, is interpreted as the extent to which a political party engaged in developing elements that constitute a 'professionalized-campaign'. 'Professionalized-campaign' relates to the presence of the strategies and structures, composed from a set or combination of material practices and techniques, which are directed to improve a better and more efficient organization of resources and skills and to maximize their electoral goals and objectives in a specific time or short-term or special condition. 'Professionalized-campaign' includes 'professionalized-campaign structure' and 'professionalized-campaign strategies'. The first one is formulated as a

formative variable, while the second one is used as a reflective variable. The second one consists of 4 lower-level/order reflective variables, which are professionalized-news and event management strategy, professionalized-audiences/electorates targeting strategy, professionalized-narrowcasting strategy and professionalized-campaign personalization strategy. In the following Chapter 3, point 3.6.3, tables 3.5-3.7 would display a set of indicators and measurements of these variables.

This work would use a set of variables displayed by tables 3.3-3.7 to formulate the baseline structural model. In Chapter 3, point 3.6.3, figure 3.2 would chart this model. This model would be specifically deployed to validate the relationships between the structural elements that constitute concepts and practices of political marketing orientation, market-orientation and professionalization of campaigning. The evaluation result of the structural components of this model would also be used to formulate the more parsimonious and workable structural model, which is called as the alternative structural model.

Finally, the following observations also proposed and uncovered diverse factors that determined such practices. Ormrod (2009: 102-105) revealed the impacts of the political activity levels of the elected politicians, party professionals, members with a position of responsibility, as well as rank-and-file party members on market orientation of the UK and Danish political parties. Slightly differently, Gibson and Rommele (2001, 2009) formulated party resources, internal structure, ideological outlook and electoral targets—as independent variables—and the presence of external shock and internal shock/leadership change—as the intervening variables—and suggested exploring the effects of these variables on the professionalization of campaigning of the political party. As a modified idea of Gibson and Rommelle (2001, 2007, 2009), Strömbäck (2009: 101-104) posited the degree of grassroots organization, types of ideological outlook, the electoral targets, the internal and external shocks and the changing leadership as intervening variables and discussed the effects of these

variables on the levels of professionalization of campaigning of Swedish political parties. Having considered the ideas of these authors, Tenscher et al (2012), Tenscher (2013) and Tenscher and Mykkanen (2013, 2014) and Tenscher et al. (2015) also deployed these factors to evaluate modes of professionalization of campaigning and the degrees of campaign professionalisms of political parties in some European countries.

From a slightly dissimilar stance, Strömbäck (2007: 59-60) presumed that the degree to which a political party accounted for the relative importance and relevance of political market arenas (the internal party, the electorates, the media and the parliamentary arenas) would determine a choice that has to be made by this party either to advance market-orientation or run professionalization of campaigning. Strömbäck (2010: 28-29) and Strömbäck et al. (2012: 86) also pointed out the country-specific and party-specific factors and suggested evaluating the effects of these factors on the ways in which political parties within and across democratic countries developed models of political marketing orientation and market-orientation. The party-specific factors encompass internal organizational culture of party, the electorates' support of the party and party' ideology, membership and position in the government and experience with electoral defeats in the elections.

Having adopted the ideas of these authors, this work formulates the following set of exploratory/categorical variables. *Firstly*, this work favours adopting and modifying the ideas of Strömbäck (2007: 60-62), Strömbäck (2010: 28-29) and Strömbäck et al. (2012: 86) to evaluate the individual perception of the Indonesian political parties' leaders, candidates and marketers/campaigners regarding the relative importance of the internal party, the media and the electoral arenas⁷. *Secondly*, this work also formulates *party-specific factors*. These variables consist of *party ideology*,

⁷ This work does not take into account political activity levels of the elected-politicians and party' professionals and members to explain market orientation of party, as Ormrod (2009) did. The main reason is party' memberships in the Indonesian politics has been in low level and under-developed (Uffen, 2010a, 2010b; Mujani, 2003; Mujani and Liddle, 2007).

age category, size, campaign resources and position in the government and experiences with *internal and external shocks*. These variables are modified regarding the given structural condition of the new democracy of Indonesia.

Finally, this work, in considering such given structural condition, also develops *party' presidential candidate-specific factors*. These factors refer to the degree of the success of a political party in nominating its top-leader as a presidential candidate, promoting its top-leader/public figure as a pair of presidential candidates and having an influential presidential candidate. The following Chapter 3, point 3.6.4, table 3.8 would detail formulations of these factors and use of such factors as exploratory variables to explore marketization and professionalization of campaigning of the Indonesian political parties within and across the 2014 parliamentary and presidential elections.

2.6. Summary

This chapter has scrutinized, adopted and refashioned the existing literature of political marketing and campaigning to formulate an integrated conceptual framework. This framework is directed to capture and explore the structural conditions and factors that determined developments of marketization and professionalization of campaigning of the Indonesian political parties Post-Soeharto New Order up to the 2014 parliamentary and presidential elections.

CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH PHILOSOPHY, METHODOLOGY, METHOD AND DESIGN

Chapter Overview

Chapter 2 hinted that those who followed either the positivist or the anti-positivist paradigms develop the perspectives, models and concepts used to formulate the integrated conceptual framework. The existing controversial debates regarding the uses of such paradigms in the field study of political marketing, however, have been unresolved properly (Savigny, 2007b; Henneberg and O'Shaughnessy, 2007; Henneberg, 2008). As regards this condition, I adopted the critical realism perspective of Bhaskar (1975, 1998, 2008) and deployed the pure-mix of methodological research approach, methods and designs. However, before going into such points, I would highlight the current knowledge gap.

3.1. The Current Knowledge Gap

Ufen (2010a: 11) argued that the following factors paved the way for the development of professionalization of campaigning of the Indonesian political parties Post-Soeharto New Order. These factors consist of: a) the instalment of new elections systems to directly vote for a pair of presidential candidates and the head and vice-head of the local government; b) changing technology; c) decline of political partisanship; and d) development of political pollsters and consultants. However, whilst he claimed that these parties have become increasingly market-oriented (Ufen, 2010a: 32), he failed to explore structural-systemic conditions and factors that stimulate political parties in the new democracy of Indonesia to develop such practices holistically.

While many things related to these points remain unknown, the following issues were unresolved. *Firstly*, Strömbäck (2007: 63), Strömbäck (2010: 28-29) and Strömbäck et al (2012: 86) proposed 'conditions' that stimulate political parties to use marketing techniques and

principles, follow market-orientation and run professionalization of campaigning. However, the validity and applicability of his proposition, within the specific context of the new democracies that have been ruled under a presidential government system and indicated by the candidate-centred system, such as Indonesia, have not yet been evaluated holistically.

Secondly, Strömbäck (2007: 63), Strömbäck (2010: 28-29) and Strömbäck et al. (2012: 86) also identified four types of political market arenas, while Lock and Harris (1996: 14), Johansen (2012: 139-168), Kotler and Kotler (1999: 5-6), Hughes and Dann (2009: 250, 2012: 1364) and Ormrod (2005, 2006, 2007, and 2009) delineated various types of political markets. These authors argued that political parties that run political marketing and market-orientation commonly addressed these political market arenas and political markets strategically. A holistic research that evaluates the applicability and validity of the ideas of these authors, within the specific context of the new democracy of Indonesia, remained under-developed however.

Thirdly, Lees-Marshment (2001a, 2001b, 2001d, 2003a, 2004a, 2008, 2009, 2010) proposed models of political marketing of political parties. Some observers also evaluated her models (Lilleker and Lees-Marshment, 2005a, 2005b; Lilleker, et al., 2006; Lees-Marshment, et al., 2012). However, as displayed previously in Chapter 2, point 2.5, the applicability and validity of her models, especially the *market-oriented party*, has still left controversial debates. Moreover, Ormrod (2005, 2007) formulated a baseline structural model that underpins the political market orientation of a political party and deployed this model to evaluate modes of market-orientation and strategic postures of political parties in UK and Danish politics (Ormrod and Henneberg, 2008, 2009, 2010a, 2010b, 2011; Ormrod, et al., 2015). The applicability and validity of variables that constitute this model, especially the attitudinal dimensions of market-orientation of political parties, within the specific context of the new

democratic countries, such as Indonesia, have been untested yet however. Additionally, the other authors posited a campaign professional index and the country and party-related factors that determine the professionalization of campaigning of political parties (Gibson and Rommele, 2001) and used them to evaluate the levels of campaign professionalism of political parties in German politics (Gibson and Rommele, 2009) and Swedish politics (Strömbäck, 2009). Subsequent authors also advanced indicators and measurements of a professionalization-index (Tenscher, 2007), applied such indicators and measurements to investigate the effects of these factors on the professionalization of campaigning of political parties in European countries (Tenscher, et al., 2012; Tenscher, 2013; Tenscher and Mykkanen, 2013, 2014; Mykkanen and Tenscher, 2014) and validated these indicators and measurements as well (Tenscher, et al., 2015). However, further evaluation regarding the applicability and validity of these indicators and measurements using the survey data collected from marketers/campaigners of political parties in the new democracies, such as Indonesia, have not yet been conducted.

Finally, Strömbäck (2007: 59-63) theorized the relationships between concepts and practices of political marketing and market-orientation and professionalization of campaigning. He also conceptualized diverse factors that determine the ways and the degree to which political parties advanced such practices (Strömbäck, 2007: 64, 2010: 28-29; Strömbäck, et al., 2012: 86). However, he lacked the proposal of an integrated conceptual framework needed to holistically evaluate such issues, more specifically within the specific context of the new democracy of Indonesia.

Based on this background, this work ultimately proposes the following research aim and objectives.

3.2. Research Aim and Objectives.

3.2.1. Research Aim

The main aim of this work is *'to holistically understand and explore the structural conditions and factors that determined the development of marketization and professionalization of campaigning of the Indonesian political parties Post-Soeharto New Order up to the 2014 parliamentary and presidential elections'*.

3.2.2. Research Objectives.

Based on that research aim, this work proposes the following research objectives (ROs).

1. To map out the structural conditions that propelled developments of marketization and professionalization of campaigning of the Indonesian political parties Post-Soeharto New Order (RO 1).
2. To investigate nomenclatures of political market arenas and political sub-markets in the new democracy of Indonesia and the effects of the party-specific factors on perceptions of marketers/campaigners of these parties regarding the importance of these political market arenas and political sub-markets (RO 2).
3. To validate structural elements which constitute practices of marketization and professionalization of campaigning of these parties (RO 3).
4. To evaluate the effects of perceptions of these parties' marketers/campaigners, leaders and candidates regarding the relative importance of the internal, the media and the electoral arenas on the ways and the extent to which these parties developed such practices within and across these elections (RO 4).
5. To examine the effects of the party-specific factors—party ideology, ages category, size, campaign resources, position in the government and experiences with internal and external shocks—on the ways and the degree to which these parties carried out such practices within and across these elections (RO 5).

6. To explore elements that constituted the party' presidential candidate-specific factors and the effects of these factors on the ways and the degrees to which these parties performed such practices within and across these elections (RO 6).

3.3. Research Philosophy

To evaluate such research objectives, this work adopted the critical realism perspective of Bhaskar (1975, 1998, 2008) as a philosophical standpoint⁸. This perspective is innovated based on an argument that sees that there have been '*two-sides of knowledge*', which are the '*structures and mechanisms that generate phenomena*', on the one hand, and the '*knowledge produced in the social activity of science*', on the other. These '*two-sides of knowledge*' cannot be simply captured and understood using either the naturalist or the anti-naturalist perspectives (Bhaskar, 1998: 16-18, 2008: 11-14). The main reason is each of these perspectives entailed inherent weaknesses in defining, approaching, interpreting and understanding these '*two-sides of knowledge*'.

As regards this condition, Bhaskar (1975, 1998, 2008) developed a critical realism perspective as an alternative point of view based on the following premises. *Firstly*, humans cannot directly observe and capture the reality to gain new knowledge. The main reason is that reality exists incessantly outside the human mind and is not dependable on either the human mind or the existing knowledge produced by the human mind. Humans, therefore, cannot simply see and define the existence of reality based on the existing knowledge they already have.

Secondly, the reality constantly exists with its own multi-layered dimensions. It is composed from what Bhaskar (1975, 1998, 2008) called the 'real', the 'actual' and the 'empirical'. The 'real' and the 'actual'

⁸ This perspective so far has been coined using various terms, such as 'transcendental realism' 'scientific realism', 'relational realism', and 'empirical realism' perspectives. Further discussion related to this issue, see Sayer (1992, 2000), Danermark et al. (1997) and Moses and Knutsen (2012).

continuously take shape outside the human mind and the ways they exist are also undependable on the human mind and knowledge. In order to sense the 'real', humans should delve deeper into the 'structures' and 'mechanisms' underlying the 'real'. The 'actual' takes shape as 'events', while the 'empirical' presents as the 'experiences' which have been produced by humans, individually or collectively, based on the ways they realized and discerned the existence the 'structures' and 'mechanisms' that generated the 'real'. Humans can sense the 'real', locate and reveal the 'actual' and recognize the 'empirical', but they would not be capable of directly capturing and understanding reality and the ways reality has been unceasingly existing in the world.

Thirdly, in order to produce the new knowledge, humans should consider not only 'existing knowledge' produced in the 'social activity of science', but also the 'structures and mechanisms that generate the 'real', the 'actual' (events) and the 'empirical' (experiences). The main reason is modes of production of the body of knowledge of science, in essence, are not merely being determined by the existing knowledge produced in the social activity of science. Rather, according to Bhaskar (2008: 15-16), *'it is the real structures, mechanisms and events that eternally exist and evolve independently outside our knowledge and experience, on the one hand, and how our minds address, define and comprehend these structures, mechanisms and events, on the other, which really generate the body knowledge of science'*. Based on such conditions, we could no longer be reliant on either the positivist or the anti-positivist paradigms in producing a new body knowledge of science (Bhaskar, 2008: 16).

Going beyond such paradigms, this perspective offers a new insight to understand multidimensional and multi-layered structures and mechanisms underlying social phenomena (Bhaskar, 1975, 1998, 2008; Bhaskar and Lawson, 1998: 6-8; Hartwig, 2008: xi-xv; Moses and Nutsen, 2012: 12-14). It ontologically and epistemologically accounts for the complexity of the relationships between these *'two-sides of knowledge'*.

For realists, such knowledge cannot be simply seen as either the reality of being separable from the human mind (following *empiricism*) nor the reality that is constructed by the human mind (following *idealism*). Rather, they have to be ontologically and epistemologically considered as being 'dialectically' existing and 'eternally' transformed within the whole processes of the '*social construction*' of the body knowledge of science (Hartwig, 2008: xi).

Using this perspective allows us to be much more capable of resolving a fundamental ontological mistake, which Bhaskar (1975, 1997: 40, 2008: 30) called as the '*epistemic fallacy*' and go further into what Bhaskar (1998: xii; 2008: 32) named as the '*trans-factuality (universality) of laws*', regardless of the complexity and differentiation of the world we recognized and encountered. Accomplishment is possible due to the existence of what Bhaskar (1998: xix) named as the '*ceteris paribus condition*'. It is '*a condition for moving from fact to fact in the open-systemic world to which the laws of nature trans-factually apply as much as it is to moving from fact to value in the practical social world of belief, judgment and action*' (Bhaskar, 1998: xix). Those who stand for philosophical orthodoxy, either the 'naturalist'/'positivist' or the 'anti-naturalist'/'anti-positivist', tend to understand the nature of '*trans-factuality of laws*', on the one hand, and the '*values in the practical social world of belief, judgment and action*', on the other, as '*radical dichotomies*'. Instead, the *realists* recognized them as the '*exact parallels*' (Bhaskar, 1998: xix).

This perspective is needed due to the following reason. The fact that sciences have been commonly created based on the '*imaginative*' and '*disciplined work*' of scientists, has been determined by *what theories and concepts are given to them*, on the one hand, and *the ways in which they understood the real, the actual and the empirical of levels and forms of reality*, on the other (Baskhar, 2008: 176-177). Pavitt (1999) suggested using this perspective as *the third way* to develop theories and concepts in

the field of communication science. Savigny (2007: 36-37) echoed that this perspective would be useful to develop theories, concepts and models of political marketing.

Since holistically accounting for social phenomena using methodological approaches of the natural science, on the one hand, and the interpretative and constructivist approaches, on the other (Sayer, 2000: 2-3), this perspective allows us to leverage a research paradigm that goes beyond the naturalism, interpretative and constructivism paradigms (Moses and Knutsen, 2012: 12) and explore complex processes and multi-layered dimensions of political marketing and campaigning phenomena, which cannot be simply understood using either the positivist or the interpretative paradigms (Henneberg, 2002, 2008; Henneberg and O' Shaughnessy, 2007, 2009; Butler, et al., 2007; Butler and Harris, 2009). This perspective seems to be useful to resolve the controversial debates between and among those following the positivist paradigm and those staying with the anti-positivist/constructivists/interpretative paradigms (Savigny, 2007: 36-37). This perspective is also of utmost importance when we want to scrutinize how far the existing political marketing, communication and campaigning theories and concepts can be employed and adopted to generate new knowledge (Henneberg, 2008: 161). Based on such arguments, I ultimately adopted the critical realism perspective of Bhaskar (1975, 1998, 2008) as a research philosophy.

The ways I applied this perspective are detailed as follows. I kept capturing and realizing the 'reality' of marketization and professionalization of campaigning of political parties Post-Soeharto New Order. I strived for exploring the 'structures' and 'mechanisms' that underlie this reality, evaluated the 'events' that constituted this reality, investigated the 'real' appearances of this reality and selected these elections as a 'primary event'. Within the last couple of years, I have been sensing these 'structures', 'mechanisms' and 'real' appearances and recognizing the

'empirical' dimensions of these 'events'. I then extracted my 'experiences' and deployed a set of 'knowledge' I learned from political marketing and campaigning literature and extracted and reflected on the data collected during the fieldwork to accomplish the research aim and objectives.

3.4. 'Pure Mixed' Methodology

As I followed critical realism as a research philosophy, I adopt the pure mix of qualitative and quantitative methods as a research methodology⁹. I employed this research methodology due to the following reasons. The measurement processes used in the quantitative method have spurious senses of precision and accuracy. The instruments and procedures offered by this method lack the capability to describe the connection between the research theme and everyday life. The complexity of human life cannot be understood using particular constructs/variables, which strongly indicate '*a static view of social life*' (Burn, 2000: 9-10; Bryman, 2008: 159-160). Meanwhile, the qualitative method entails the immanent problem in the whole processes of generalization. The nature of qualitative data is commonly derived from particular contexts and can sometimes be too subjective and difficult to be replicated (Burn, 2000: 14; Bryman, 2008: 391-392).

In adopting this methodology, we could complementarily and/or comparatively use both qualitative and quantitative data collections, procedures and analyses. We could also develop the appropriate scheme and sampling size, choose appropriate and adequate sampling procedures, tackle the intrinsic biases of each single-method, generate specific strengths and minimize the inherent weaknesses of the qualitative and quantitative methods. We could also discover more complementarily

⁹ It is a type of research methodology in which researchers could blend or unify both quantitative and qualitative research techniques into a single study (Denscombe, 2008) and holistically account for the following logic of inquiries, which are the deduction, the induction; and the abduction (Johnson and Onwuegbuzie, 2004: 17-18; Johnson, et al., 2007: 123). Further discussion related to the adaptation of critical realism as a research philosophy to inform the mixed-methods methodology, see Maxwell and Mittapalli (2010) and Shannon-Baker (2016).

types of data and sources of information, advance more comprehensive quantitative and qualitative data analyses and get a much more comprehensive finding (Denscombe, 2008: 272-273; Johnson, et al., 2007: 125).

This methodology can be operationalized using the following methods. The first one is the 'parallel use' of qualitative and quantitative methods in which both these methods have an equal status (the 'pure-mixed'). The second one is the 'mixed of qualitative methods'. The third one is the 'mixed of quantitative methods'. The fourth one is the 'qualitative dominant method'. The last one is the 'quantitative dominant method' (Johnson, et al., 2007: 123-124). Such methods have been widely seen as being useful to enhance the quality of instruments used for data collections and obtain much better, comprehensive and holistic quantitative and qualitative data findings and analyses (Mertens, 2010: 5; Tashakkori, 2009; Tashakkori and Creswell, 2007b; Creswell and Clark, 2007, 2011, Lunde, et al., 2013).

As I followed ideas of Neuman (2000) Denzin and Lincoln, (2005), Tashakkori and Creswell (2007) Johnson et al. (2007), Guest (2013: 144), Luyt (2012: 296), Creswell and Clark (2007, 2011) and Sandelowski et al. (2012), I operationalized this methodology using the following methods and designs to evaluate the research objectives (ROs 1-6). Pure-mixed of the qualitative and quantitative methods and convergence (triangulation) research design were deployed to evaluate RO 1, while pure-mixed of the quantitative methods and exploratory research design were conducted to assess RO 3. Pure-mixed of the qualitative and quantitative methods and sequential-exploratory research design were adopted to accomplish RO 2, while pure-mixed of the qualitative and quantitative methods and sequential-explanatory research design was undertaken to examine ROs 4-6. Figure 3.1 and table 3.2, respectively, chart the adaptations and applications of these methods and designs, and spell out the data collections and analyses, research syntheses and findings presentations.




Figure 3.1: Research Philosophy, Methodology, Method and Design¹⁰.

¹⁰ Formulated based on ideas of Bhaskar (1975, 1998, 2008), Neuman (2000) Denzin and Lincoln, (2005), Tashakkori and Creswell (2007) Creswell and Clark (2007, 2011), Johnson et al. (2007), Guest (2013), (Luyt, 2012) and Sandelowski et al. (2012).

ROs, RM & D	DC	DA	RS	CP
RO 1 evaluated using pure-mixed of the qualitative and quantitative methods and convergence research design	Quantitative Data Collections: Reports produced by the Indonesian political pollsters/consultants and research centres	Statistical descriptive analyses and Pearson correlation analyses using SPSS 23	The complementary uses of the top-down and the bottom up approaches	Chapter 4
	Qualitative Data Collection: Political, media and election laws and reports released by the general election commission, and the Indonesian media The in-depth interviews data ¹¹	The qualitative content and thematic content analyses		
	RO 2 evaluated using pure-mixed of the qualitative and quantitative methods and sequential-exploratory research design	Quantitative Data Collection: The primary survey data derived from marketers/campaigners of 10 Indonesian political parties collected using the face-to-face panel survey procedure during the 2014 Parliamentary and Presidential Elections	Statistical descriptive analyses, ANOVA, Pearson and Kendall-tau B correlations analyses using SPSS 23	The bottom-up approach followed by the top-down approach
RO 3 evaluated using pure-mixed of the quantitative methods and exploratory research design	Quantitative Data Collection: Reports released by the Indonesian political pollsters/consultants and research centres, the Indonesian General Election and Broadcasting Commissions	EFA and PCA of SPSS 23 and algorithm and bootstrapping techniques of PLS-SEM of Smart-PLS 3.0	The top-down approach	Chapter 6
ROs 4, 5 and 6 evaluated using pure-mixed of the qualitative and quantitative methods and sequential-explanatory research design		The multi level modelling approach using PLS-MGA of Smart-PLS 3.0	The bottom-up approach followed by the top-down approach	Chapters 7, 8 and 9

¹¹ These data were derived from 10 Indonesian political parties' leaders/secretaries and professionals, senior editors of the Indonesian media and political pollsters/consultants.

	Qualitative Data Collection: Political, media and election laws and the in-depth interviews data ¹²	The qualitative content and thematic content analyses		
--	--	---	--	--

Table 3.1: Research Objectives and Research Methods and Designs Used to Evaluate These Research Objectives and Their Link with Data Collections and Analyses, Research Syntheses and Chapter Presentations¹³

3.5. Sampling Procedures and Data Collections.

There were 12 national political parties and 3 local political parties that took part as political contestants during the 2014 parliamentary election. Two national political parties (PKPI and PBB) and three local political parties (The Aceh Peace Party, the Aceh National Party and the Aceh Party) were excluded since these parties failed to collect a substantial number of popular votes and the national parliamentary seats in this election. Moreover, 10 national political parties, which are Golkar Party, PDIP, Democratic Party, Gerindra Party, Nasdem Party, Hanura Party, PAN, PKB, PPP and PKS, obtained numbers of these seats in this election, which range from large, medium and small. Together with Golkar Party, Democratic Party, PAN, PPP and PKS, Gerindra Party set up the first political block. As supported by Nasdem party, PKB and Hanura Party, PDIP established the second political block. Each of these blocks nominates a pair of presidential candidates to run in the 2014 presidential election. I selected these parties as samples in the unit level.

¹² The extracted in-depth interview data collected from: a) 10 Indonesian political parties' leaders/secretaries, candidates and professionals, senior editors of the Indonesian media and political pollsters/consultants were used to fulfil RO 4; b) these parties' leaders/secretaries, candidates and professionals and pollsters/consultants and campaign-volunteers and members of campaign teams of the presidential candidates were deployed to evaluate RO 5; and c) these parties' leaders/secretaries, candidates and professionals and pollsters/consultants, senior editors of the Indonesian media and campaign-volunteers and members of campaign teams of and political lobbyists who worked for the presidential candidates were utilized to achieve RO 6.

¹³ ROs is an acronym of research objectives. RM & D is an acronym of research method and design. DC is an acronym of data collections. DA is an acronym of data analyses. RS is an acronym of research syntheses by aggregation and combination. CP is an acronym of chapter presentations.

I deployed purposive and cluster sampling procedures as follows. The first one was employed to collect information from four groups of the key-respondents. They include these parties' leaders/secretaries, senior editors/producers of the Indonesian media and political consultants/pollsters and also campaign-volunteers and political lobbyists who worked for each of two pairs of presidential candidates (Joko Widodo-M.Jusuf Kalla and Prabowo Subijanto-Hatta Radjasa). Appendix A will detail the list of these key-respondents, while Appendix D will exhibit the interview guides for interviewing these respondents. Most of these in-depth interviews were conducted within two months before the 2014 parliamentary and presidential elections and four months after these elections were being held. Further, survey data released by the Indonesian political pollsters/ consultants and research centres were used as the secondary data. Political, media and election laws, reports published by the Indonesian General Election and Broadcasting Commissions and news reports produced Indonesian media outlets were included as well as the secondary data.

Meanwhile, the second one was used to gather information from marketers/campaigners of these parties. The term 'marketers/campaigners' was intentionally used due to party membership in the Indonesian politics being still under-developed (Uffen, 2010a, 2010b). Marketers/campaigners, in this sense, refers to a group of individuals employed by these parties to shore up the marketization and professionalization of campaigning of these parties in facing these elections. This group not only include party members, staff and activists, but also consists of professionals who are not officially associated with each of these parties, but who were employed by each of these parties and /or these parties' candidates during these elections.

During these elections, there were thousands of marketers/campaigners employed by these parties and parties' candidates. I took them as a sample population of sample at the individual

level. As a population, they were structured and clustered based on groups of political parties and types of election contexts wherein they were employed. Since the exact total number of these marketers/campaigners was undetectable, I sampled them as follows. I clustered them based on the individual party that hired them during these elections. As I used the baseline structural model, which is constructed from 12 variables with 30 arrows directed to 7 endogenous variables (see figure 3.2), I attempted to collect more than 3000 respondents employed by these parties within and across these elections to evaluate this model. This procedure is imposed by the rule of thumb of PLS-SEM highlighted by Hair et al. (2014: 20). To this end, I proportionally sampled 300 marketers/campaigners who had been hired by each of these parties during the 2014 parliamentary and the 2014 presidential elections. A screening process was taken to make sure that each of these parties truly recruited them during these elections.

A series of surveys was taken using the face-to-face panel-survey procedure. The first survey was conducted within four months before and after the Parliamentary Election Day (9 April 2014). The second survey was undertaken in between the fourth and sixth month after the Presidential Election Day (9 July 2014). 5 researchers who had expertise and professional experiences were employed to conduct these surveys¹⁴.

Political Parties	Total respondents included in the first data set collected during the 2014 Parliamentary Election	Total cases/respondent included in the second data set gathered during the 2014 Presidential Election	Total
PDIP	75	75	150
Golkar Party	77	77	154
Democratic Party	81	81	162
Gerindra Party	83	83	186
Hanura Party	25	25	50
Nasdem Party	72	72	144
PAN	74	74	148
PKB	77	77	154
PPP	87	87	174
PKS	66	66	132
Total	717	717	1434

¹⁴ At the beginning, I actually attempted running the web-survey. But, since this effort completely failed, I finally turned to the face-to-face survey method.

Table 3.2: Total Respondents Included in the Survey Data Set Collected Using the Panel-Survey Procedure During the 2014 Parliamentary and Presidential Elections, Respectively

Since being constrained by the limitation of times and financial resources, I was only being capable of collecting the survey data derived from 765 respondents. 44 respondents with incomplete survey data were excluded from the survey data set. Those who answered more or less 95% of all items of the questioners totalled only 721 respondents. 4 of these respondents with the survey data with a lack of variability were removed from the survey data set. Table 3.2 displays the total respondents included in the survey data set.

3.6. The Qualitative and Quantitative Data Analyses and Chapters Presentations

3.6.1. Structural Conditions that Propelled Developments of Marketization and Professionalization of Campaigning of the Indonesian Political Parties Post-Soeharto New Order (RO 1).

In order to evaluate the first research objective, I complementarily ran the qualitative and thematic contents and the quantitative analyses. Political and election laws, the in-depth interviews data and reports released by the Indonesian media were analysed using the qualitative and thematic contents analyses. Meanwhile, the secondary survey reports published by the Indonesian political pollsters/consultants and research centres and general election commission were analysed using the statistical descriptive analysis and Pearson' correlation. Such analyses were directed to evaluate this research objective. Chapter 4 displays such analyses and findings.

3.6.2. Nomenclatures of Political Market Arenas and Political Sub-Markets in the New Democracy of Indonesia and the Effects of the Party-Specific Factors on Perceptions of the Indonesian Political Parties' Marketers/Campaigners Regarding the

Relative Importance of these Political Market Arenas and Political Sub-Markets (RO 2).

The following data analyses were carried out to evaluate the second research objective. *Firstly*, the in-depth interviews data derived from the Indonesian parties' leaders/secretaries and senior editors of the Indonesian media and political pollsters/consultants were extracted and examined using the qualitative content and thematic content analyses. Such analyses were directed to examine formations of political market arenas and political sub-markets in the new democracy of Indonesia.

No	Indicators and Measurements	Scales
I	Political Market Arenas	1 as not important at all - 5 as very important
1.	The Importance of the internal party organisation as a political market arena	
2	The Importance of the media as a political market arena	
3	The Importance of the electorates as a political market arena	
4	The Importance of the parliament as a political market arena	
5	The Importance of the government as a political market arena	
II	Political Sub-Markets	1 as not important at all - 5 as very important
1	The importance of party' members as a political sub-market	
2	The importance of the electorates/voters as a political sub-market	
3	The importance of the media as a political sub-market	
4	The importance of competitors as a political sub-market	
5	The importance of campaign-contributors as a political sub-market	

Table 3.3: Proposed Indicators and Measurements Used to Evaluate RO 2

Secondly, these parties' marketers/campaigners were surveyed using a set of indicators and measurements charted in table 3.3. This set of indicators and measurements were transformed into two sets of questionnaires, which were written in *Bahasa Indonesia* and utilized to interview these parties' marketers/campaigners during the 2014 parliamentary and the presidential elections, respectively. The survey data were imported in SPSS 23 and analysed using the statistic descriptive procedure and the following inferential statistical approaches, which are Pearson' and Kendall tau-B correlations and ANOVA. Such efforts were directed to evaluate the effects of the party-specific factors on perceptions of these parties' marketers/campaigners regarding the importance of these

political market arenas and political sub-markets. The following table 3.8 details formulations of these party-specific factors.

Chapter 5 displays these quantitative and qualitative analyses and findings.

3.6.3. Structural Elements that Constitute Practices of Marketization and Professionalization of Campaigning of the Indonesian Political Parties (RO 3).

As I imported the primary survey data in SPSS 23, this work deployed the following statistical analyses to evaluate the third research objective. *Firstly, Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA) and Principal Component Analysis (PCA)* were carried out to evaluate indicators of the variables, which compose the baseline structural model. *Secondly*, the second-generation of statistical analysis using Partial Least Squares-Structural Equation Modelling (PLS-SEM) of Smart-PLS 3.0 was used to validate these indicators and find the alternative and better solutions regarding the latent/unobserved variables that construct this model.

The reason for using PLS-SEM is spelled out as follows. PLS-SEM has been widely acknowledged as being useful to explore: a) the relationships between and among variables that constitute the structural model; and b) chains of the structural effects of the exogenous variables on the indigenous variables that construct this model (Hair et al., 2014: 14-18; Lowry and Gaskin, 2014: 213). PLS-SEM has been recognized as the most appropriate statistical approach to understand the patterns of correlation/covariance among a set of variables and explain as much of their variance as possible with the structural model, which has been specified in the study (Kline, 1998; Hair et al., 2012; Hair, et al., 2013; Hair et al., 2014; Lowry and Gaskin, 2014). PLS-SEM has also been seen to have a set of statistical analyses procedures, which are statistically robust to a relatively small sample size and non-normal data distribution and practically useful to handle the missing value, workable with metric, quasi-

metric and categorical scaled data and compatible with the complex structural model, as long as the minimum sample size used in the study met with the rule of thumb of PLS-SEM (Hair et al., 2013: 2-3; Hair, 2014: 23-24). Further, PLS-SEM has been claimed to be suitable to either evaluate the existing established theories and concepts or develop (new) theories and concepts (Hair et al., 2014: 4).

Taking into account that the existing theoretical challenges to define the connections and relationships between concepts and practices of political marketing, market-orientation and professionalization of campaigning has been unresolved properly (Strömbäck, 2007: 50), I favoured using PLS-SEM rather than employing the Covariance-Based Structural Equation Modelling (CB-SEM). The main reason was PLS-SEM generates a greater statistical power than CB-SEM. Hair et al. (2014: 15) stated that *'PLS-SEM is more likely to render a specific significant relationship when it is in fact significant in the population'*. This approach holistically considers the underlying factors that compose the concepts (the measurement models) and the concepts that constitute the model (the structural model) (Hair et al., 2014: 13-14) and allows us to take into account both the theory and the data driven within whole processes of the assessment and specification of the structural and measurement models (Hair et al., 2014: 32-35).

As I deployed PLS-SEM, I expected to be much more capable in developing an appropriate holistic framework that underpins the structural relationships between such concepts and practices and, more specifically, in evaluating the existences and the relationships between the structural elements that constituted such concepts and practices. In order to achieve these expectations, I ran a set of procedures of PLS-SEM suggested by Lowry and Gaskin (2014: 135-140) and Hair (et al., 2014: 25). These procedures include estimations and specifications of the structural and measurements models, data collection and examination, (re) estimations and (re) specifications of path model, tests for the moderation and

mediation effects and assessments of the predictive power of the baseline structural and alternative structural models and interpretations of the final statistical findings.

As informed by the existing literature charted previously by point 2.5 of Chapter 2, and also considering ideas of the following authors, I developed a baseline structural model as follows. This model includes both formative and reflective variables. A formative variable is a type of variable formulated based on theoretical and logical assumptions that see indicators of the variable cause the measurement of this variable. A slight differently, a reflective variable is a type of variable developed based on theoretical and logical assumptions, which see that the constructed variable causes the measurement of the indicator of this variable (Hair et al., 2014: 42-44). As I adopted the ideas of Hair et al. (2014: 45), this work favoured deploying 'political marketing-orientation' as 'a first-order formative variable' and 'market-orientation' as a 'second/higher-order formative variable'. The second one was evaluated using the following five 'lower-order reflective variables', which are: a) internal-orientation; b) voter-orientation; c) competitor-orientation; d) media-orientation; and e) campaign contributor/donator-orientation. Moreover, this work used 'professional-campaign engagement' as a first-order reflective variable, 'professionalized-campaign structure' as 'a first-order formative variable and 'professionalized-campaign strategy' as a second/higher-order formative variable. The last one was examined using the following lower-order reflective variables, which are: a) professionalized-audiences/electorates targeting strategy; b) professionalized-narrowcasting strategy; c) professionalized-news and event management strategy; and d) professionalized-campaign personalization strategy.

Figure 3.2 displays the ways this work deployed these variables to construct the baseline structural model. As seen from this figure, 'political marketing-orientation', 'internal-orientation', voter-orientation, competitor-orientation, media-orientation and campaign contributor/donator-

orientation are positioned as exogenous variables (ξ 1-6), while 'professional-campaign engagement', professionalized-campaign structure' and professionalized-campaign strategy ('professionalized-audiences/electorates targeting strategy', 'professionalized-narrowcasting strategy', 'professionalized-news and event management strategy' and 'professionalized-campaign personalization strategy') as endogenous variables (η 1-6).




Figure 3.2: A Proposed Baseline Structural Model

The following tables 3.4-3.8, respectively, detail a set of indicators and measurements of these variables. These indicators and measurements were transformed into two sets of questionnaires, which were written in *Bahasa Indonesia*. These questioners were used to

explore practices of ‘political marketing-orientation’, ‘market-orientation’ and ‘professionalization of campaigning’ carried out by 10 Indonesian political parties during the 2014 parliamentary and presidential elections, respectively.

No	Indicators and Measurements	Scales
1	The importance of understanding marketing concepts, principles and procedures	1 as not important at all -5 as very important
2	The importance of applying of marketing concepts, principles and procedures	
3	The importance of developing the market intelligences using surveys/polling and focus group discussion	
4	The importance of using the market intelligences data to develop strategies of positioning political products of political party and party' candidates	
5	The importance of using the market intelligences data to develop strategies of positioning political policies of political party and party' candidates	
6	The importance of using the market intelligences data to develop and deliver political policies and products and adjust these policies and products in order to accomplish political goals	
7	The importance of using the market intelligences data to develop communication and campaign programs and to shore up the delivering processes of these political policies and products in facing the elections	
8	The importance of implementing of these communication and campaign programs in facing the elections	

Table 3.4: Proposed Indicators and Measurements of Political Marketing-Orientation As A First-Order Formative Variable

No	Indicators and Measurements	Scales
I	Internal-Orientation	1 as not important at all -5 as very important
1	The importance of responding, prioritizing and satisfying party's members and/or activists as a political sub-market	
II	Voter-Orientation	
1	The importance of responding, prioritizing and satisfying the loyal voters as a political sub-market	
2	The importance of responding, prioritizing and satisfying the targeted-volatile voters as a political sub-market	
3	The importance of responding, prioritizing and satisfying the young voters/new electorates as a political sub-market	
III	Competitor-Orientation	
1	The importance of responding and prioritizing the primary competitors (those who have been seen of being much more potential to attack the party and or its candidates) as a political sub-market	
2	The importance of responding and prioritizing the secondary competitors (those who have been seen of being less potential to attack the party and or its candidates) as a political sub-market	
IV	Media-Orientation	
1	The importance of responding and prioritizing the commercial news TV channels, as a political sub-market	
2	The importance of responding and prioritizing the non-news	

	commercial TV channels as a political sub-market	
3	The importance of responding and prioritizing the commercial radio channels as a political sub-market	
4	The importance of responding and prioritizing the national newspaper as a political sub-market	
5	The importance of responding and prioritizing the local newspaper as a political sub-market	
6	The importance of responding and prioritizing the yellow newspaper as a political sub-market	
7	The importance of responding and prioritizing magazines as a political sub-market	
8	The importance of responding and prioritizing public radio channels as a political sub-market	
9	The importance of responding and prioritizing public TV channels as a political sub-market	
V	Campaign Contributor/Donator-Oriented	
1	The importance of addressing the internal party' members as a campaign-contributor	
2	The importance of addressing the non-party' members as a campaign-contributor	
3	The importance of addressing the domestic business owners as a campaign-contributor	
4	The importance of addressing the domestic corporations as a campaign-contributor	

Table 3.5: Proposed Indicators and Measurements of Political Market-Orientation As A Second-Order Formative Variable Constructed from 5 First-Order Reflective Variables

No	Indicators and Measurements	Scales
1	The importance of having professionalized-campaign structure	1 as not important at all -5 as very important
2	The importance of having professionalized-campaign strategy	
3	The importance of developing professionalized-campaign structure	
4	The importance of developing professionalized-campaign strategy	
5	The importance of advancing professionalized-campaign structure to persuade the targeted-audiences/voters	
6	The importance of advancing professionalized-campaign strategy to persuade the targeted-audiences/voters	
7	The importance of advancing professionalized-campaign structure to mobilize the targeted-audiences/voters	
8	The importance of advancing professionalized-campaign strategy to mobilize the targeted-audiences/voters	
9	The importance of developing professionalization of campaign's structure and strategy within the specific context of the ground war campaign	
10	The importance of developing professionalization of campaign's structure and strategy within the specific context of the air war campaign	
11	The importance of developing professionalization of campaign's structure and strategy within the specific context of the online war campaign	

Table 3.6: Proposed Indicators and Measurements of Professional-Campaign Engagement As A First-Order Reflective Variable

No	Indicators and Measurements	Scales
1	The importance of having a large number of campaign staffs	1 as not important at all -5 as very important
2	The importance of developing centralized-campaign organization (rather than decentralized-campaign organization)	
3	The importance of hiring professional political consultants/agencies	
4	The importance of setting up an appointed separated-campaign team	
5	The importance of using and developing the research to evaluate the competitors (the opposition research)	
6	The importance of developing the differentiation of internal communication campaign structure	
7	The importance of developing of an appointed-team to conduct survey and/or focus group to analyse the feedback from targeted-electorates	
8	The importance of having long-term campaign duration	
9	The importance of establishing and running research to evaluate the own party/candidate' campaigning	
10	The importance of creating "war room"	
11	The importance of using and developing rapid rebuttal-unit	

Table 3.7: Proposed Indicators and Measurements of Professionalized-Campaign Structure As A First-Order Formative Variable

No	Indicators and Measurements	Scales
I	The Professionalized-Audience/Electorates Targeting Strategy	1 as not important at all -5 as very important
1	The importance of targeting and mobilizing the loyal voters using professionalized strategy	
2	The importance of targeting and mobilizing the volatile voters using professionalized strategy	
3	The importance of targeting and mobilizing the young voters/new electorates using professionalized strategy	
II	The Professionalized-Narrowcasting Strategy	
1	The importance of developing narrowcasting strategy using e-mail and direct mail	
2	The importance of running narrowcasting strategy using the direct calling/mobile phone	
3	The importance of running narrowcasting strategy using SMS	
4	The importance of running narrowcasting strategy using Black Berry Messengers.	
5	The importance of running narrowcasting strategy using canvassing method	
III	The Professionalized-News and Events Management Strategy	
1	The importance of using paid media (billboard, TV, cinemas, radio, newspapers and magazines) to deliver and broadcast campaign messages	
2	The importance of using free media (national daily or weekly newspapers, regional/local print media, yellow press/tabloids radio, television and internet including Weblogs and forums) to deliver and broadcast campaign messages	
3	The importance of developing talk show and of reality show programs to deliver and broadcast campaign messages	
4	The importance of developing the news and events management strategy to get positive publication from the media	
IV	Professionalized-Campaign Personalization Strategy	
1	The importance of developing campaign-personalization strategy focusing on party' candidates	

2	The importance of developing campaign-personalization strategy focusing on party' leader	
---	--	--

Table 3.8: Proposed Indicators and Measurements of Professionalized-Campaign Strategy As A Second/Higher-Order Formative Variable Composed from 4 First-Order Reflective Variables

Chapter 6 details the applications of EFA, PCA and algorithm, bootstrapping and blindfolding procedures of PLS-SEM of Smart-PLS 3.0 to evaluate the measurement and structural components of the baseline structural model and formulate and examine the structural component of the alternative structural model, respectively. This chapter also chronicles the use of the Importance-Performance Matrix Analysis (IPMA) of PLS-SEM of Smart-PLS 3.0 to further explore the structural ingredients of these models. Based on reports resulting from such statistical approaches, this chapter will discuss the structural elements that constitute practices of marketization and professionalization of campaigning of these parties. This chapter will also assess the statistical powers and applicability of these models to evaluate subsequent research objectives (ROs 4, 5 and 6).

3.6.4. The Effects of: a) Perceptions of the Indonesian Political Parties' Marketers/Campaigners, Leader and Candidates Regarding the Relative Importance of Political Market Arenas; b) Party-Specific Factors; and c) Party' Presidential Candidate-specific factors on Marketization and Professionalization of Campaigning of these Parties Within and Across these Elections (ROs 4, 5 and 6).

Having validated the statistical power of the structural models, I then discuss ROs 4, 5 and 6, respectively. To this end, I ran the following procedures. I adopted a multilevel modelling approach to evaluate these research objectives. This approach was run using Partial Least Squares-Multi Group Analyses (PLS-MGA) of PLS-SEM of Smart-PLS 3.0. It is a non-parametric statistical approach, which was innovated by Henseler et

al. (2009) and developed by Sarstedt et al. (2011) based on the statistical logic used in a Mann-Whitney-U-test. This approach was deployed for the following reasons. The primary reason was that this approach is workable in handling the survey data set which was actually composed from the heterogenic and the clustered-data structure. The subsequent reason was that this approach is helpful to identify and analyse the observed and unobserved factors, which are not incorporated in the structural model.

This approach was organized through following steps. *Firstly*, the alternative structural model visualized in the following Chapter 6, figure 6.2, was used to evaluate the effects of the individual perceptions of party marketers/campaigners regarding the relative importance of the internal party, the media and the electoral arena on the ways of and the degree to which these parties advanced structural elements that constitute this model in facing these elections (RO 4). *Secondly*, this model was also deployed to explore the effects of *party-specific factors* on the ways of and the extent to which these parties carried out and selected such structural elements in facing these elections (RO 5). *Thirdly*, this model was also employed to explore the effects of *party' presidential candidate-specific factors* on the ways of and the degree to which these parties performed and prioritized such structural elements in facing these elections (RO 6). Table 3.9 summarises the connections between these variables and these parties. Chapter 7 details the way in which this range of perceptions, which are originally measured through Likert' scale 1-5, was transformed into categorical moderator/grouping variables, while Chapters 8 and 9 chart the ways in which these factors were operationalized as categorical moderators/grouping variables.

The following formulas were used to evaluate such effects. *Firstly*, formulae 1a-1a-1a and 1b-1b-1b were deployed to evaluate RO 4. The first formula exhibits the categorical moderator-grouping variables and a set of variables that compose this model were deployed in *the first-level* within the specific context of the *2014 parliamentary election*; while the

second formula indicates that the categorical moderator-grouping variables and a set of variables that compose this model were deployed in *the first-level* within the specific context of the *2014 presidential election*. Secondly, formulae 2a-1a-1a and 2b-1b-1b were employed in the second step to evaluate ROs 5 and 6, respectively. The first formula describes that the categorical moderator-grouping variables were placed in *the second-level*, while variables that compose this model were deployed in *the first-level* within the specific context of the *2014 parliamentary election*. The second formula illustrates that the categorical moderator-grouping variables were placed in *the second-level*, while variables that compose this model were deployed in *the first-level* within the specific context of the *2014 presidential election*. Table 3.10 summarizes such formulae and their link with the research objectives (ROs) and findings presentations.

Categorical Moderator/Grouping Variables			Political Parties									
			PDIP	Golkar Party	Democratic Party	Gerindra Party	Hanura Party	Nasdem Party	PAN	PKB	PPP	PKS
Party-Specific Factors	Party ideology/ Ideological orientation	Nationalist Parties	X	X	X	X	X	X	-	-	-	-
		Islamic Parties	-	-	-	-	-	-	X	X	-	-
		Islamist Parties	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	X	X
	Party age category	Political Parties Established during the New Order Soeharto	X	X	-	-	-	-	-	-	X	-
		Political Parties Established Post-Soeharto New Order	-	-	X	X	X	X	X	X	-	X
	Party size (based on total number of parliamentary seats collected in the 2009 parliamentary election)	The Big-Size Political Parties	X	X	X	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
		The Medium-Size Political Parties	-	-	-	-	-	-	X	X	X	X
		The Small-Size Political Parties	-	-	-	X	X	X	-	-	-	-
	Party experience with internal shock/leadership change before the 2014 parliamentary and presidential election	Political Parties experienced with internal shock	-	-	-	X	-	-	X	-	-	X
		Political Parties lacked of experiences with internal shock	X	X	X	-	X	X	-	-	X	-
	Party experience with external	Political Parties, which lost more than 5 % of the	-	X	-	-	-	-	-	X	-	-

	shock during the 2009/the last parliamentary election	votes in this election																				
		Political Parties, which lost in between 5 % and 1 % of the votes this election	X	-	-	-	-	-	X	-	X	-										
		Political Parties, which have not encountered external shock	-	-	X	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	X	
	Party position in the government during the second-term of SBY' government	New or Young Political Parties, which lacked of experience with external shock	-	-	-	X	X	X	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
		Political Parties, which took position as opposition parties	X	-	-	X	X	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
	Party campaign resource, as reported by the Indonesian General Election Commission	Political Parties, which ruled or shored up this government	-	X	X	-	-	-	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	
		Political Parties with a large amount of campaign budget	X	X	X	X	X	X	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
		Political Parties with a medium amount of campaign budget	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	X	X	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
	Party' Presidential Candidate-Specific Factors	The degrees of success of the party in nominating its top-leader as a presidential candidate	Political Parties with a small amount of campaign budget	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	X	X		
			Political Parties, which succeeded nominating their top-leaders as a presidential candidate	X	-	-	X	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
		The degrees of success of the party in nominating its top-leader/public figure as a pair of presidential candidate	Political Parties, which failed nominating their top-leaders as a presidential candidate	-	X	X	-	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
			Political Parties, which succeeded nominating their top-leaders/public figures as a pair of presidential candidates	X	-	-	X	-	-	X	-	-	X	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
The degrees of success of the party in having an influential presidential candidate		Political Parties, which failed nominating their top-leaders/public figures as a pair of presidential candidates	-	X	X	-	X	X	-	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	
		Political Parties, which had an influential presidential candidate	X	-	-	-	X	X	-	X	-	-	X	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
		Political Parties, which did not have an influential presidential candidate	-	X	X	X	-	-	X	-	-	X	-	-	-	-	-	X	X	X		

Table 3.9: Party- and Party' Presidential Candidate-Specific Factors as Categorical Moderator-Groping Variables and Their Link with the Indonesian Political Parties

ROs	Level of Analyses			Formulas	Findings Presentations
	Categorical Moderator/Grouping Variables	Exogenous and Endogenous Variables of the Alternative Structural Model and the Election Contexts			
		The 2014 Parliamentary Election	The 2014 Presidential Election		
RO 4	The Second-Level (Marketers/campaigners of political parties grouped based on their assessments regarding the relative importance of the internal party, the media and the electoral arenas)	The First-Level		2a-1a-1a and 2b-1b-1b	Chapter 7
RO 5 and 6	The First-Level (Political parties grouped based on indicators of the party-specific factors and party' presidential candidate-specific factors charted previously by table 3.9)			1a-1a-1a and 1b-1b-1b	Chapters 8 and 9

Table 3.10: Multilevel Modelling Approach and Proposed Formulae to Evaluate ROs 4, 5 and 6¹⁵

Secondly, having considered the PLS-MGA results, I then carried out subsequent analyses. The existing political, media and election laws and the in-depth interview data¹⁶ were extracted and analysed using the qualitative and thematic contents analyses. Such analyses were carried out to examine PLS-MGA results, explore the underlying structures, mechanisms and elements, which determined the structural conditions of political market arenas and political sub-markets and led to the party-specific and the party' presidential candidate-specific factors to take place

¹⁵ The first-number of the formulae belongs to the level analyses of categorical moderator-grouping variables; the second and the third-numbers of the formulae, respectively, refers to the level analyses of the exogenous and endogenous variables that constitute the model; letters 'a' and 'b', respectively, relates with the election contexts: the 2014 parliamentary and presidential elections.

¹⁶ The in-depth interviews data derived from the Indonesian political parties' leaders/secretaries were collected through a semi-structured in-depth interview procedure. A set of indicators charted previously by tables 3.3-3.7 was deployed to get these data. These data were extracted and triangulated with the in-depth interview data collected from senior editors of the Indonesian media, political pollsters/consultants to formulate the findings, as expected by ROs 4 and 5. These aforementioned in-depth interview data were also combined with the in-depth interview data gathered from campaign-volunteers and political lobbyists who worked for each of pairs of presidential candidates to get the findings as imposed by RO 6. Appendix D details the interview guides for interviewing these respondents.

and examine the ways of and the extent to which such conditions and factors influenced modes of marketization and professionalization of campaigning and the degrees of market-orientation and campaign professionalisms of these parties within and across these elections. Reports released by the Indonesian General Election and Broadcasting Commissions and the Indonesian political pollsters, consultants and research centres were also extracted to evaluate such issues.

The first parts of Chapters 7, 8 and 9, respectively, detail applications of these multilevel modelling approach and formulae as an analytical framework and PLS-MGA of Smart-PLS 3.0 as a statistical approach and displayed statistical reports resulted by this approach. Based on these reports, these chapters also spelled out variability and magnitudes of significant effects of these variables on the ways and the degree to which these parties in facing these elections advanced and prioritized structural elements that constitute this model. Subsequent parts of these chapters display the ways this work ran the qualitative and thematic contents analyses and reported the findings and conclusions.

3.7. Research Synthesis

As regards research syntheses, Sandelowski et al. (2012: 324-326) outlined the following points. *Firstly*, research synthesis by aggregation should take into account not only the objects of research, but also the research objectives. *Secondly*, research syntheses by configuration should be conducted by employing the bottom-up (following *the deductivism logic*) and top-down (following *the inductivism logic*) approaches.

Following her ideas, I ran the following research syntheses procedures, as charted previously by table 3.1. *Firstly*, the top-down and bottom-up approaches were complementarily used to accomplish RO 1. *Secondly*, the bottom-up approach, which was followed by the top-down approach, was conducted to evaluated RO 2. *Thirdly*, the top-down

approach was undertaken to assess RO 3. *Finally*, the top-down approach, which was followed by the bottom-up approach, was carried out to examine ROs 4, 5 and 6, respectively.

3.8. Reliability and Validity.

As I used the *critical realism perspective* of Bhaskar (1975, 1998, 2008) and pure-mixed of the quantitative and qualitative methodology, I realized that the reliability and validity issues were not only theoretical and methodological issues, but also epistemological and ontological issues. I strived for holistically managing such issues within the whole stages and processes of formulation, reformulation, finalisation and presentation of this dissertation. I also attempted to manage the validity issues, which are related to the application of the qualitative method and the reliability and validity issues that are associated with the use of quantitative methods. Such efforts are summarized as follows.

Firstly, as I adopted the idea of Tenscher et al. (2015), I took the following first-generation of statistical analyses. I deployed the *Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA) and Principal Component Analyses (PCA)* to determine whether and to what extent a set of indicators and measurements charted previously by tables 3.4-3.8 possessed sufficient *divergent* and *criterion validities* and appropriate *representative and internally reliabilities* to capture the latent variables of the baseline structural model. Moreover, as I used the second-generation of statistical technique using PLS-SEM in Smart-PLS 3.0, I deployed Fornell-Larker criterion and the cross factor loading and cross weight and the heterotrait-monotrait ratio of correlations (HTMT)—as a new criterion of discriminant validity suggested by Henseller et al. (2015: 128) to determine the discriminant validities of the reflective variables that constitute this model. Additionally, I also utilized the composite reliability of *Chronbach's Alpha* ($\alpha > 0.70$) to determine the internal validity of indicators that compose the reflective variables. Finally, I assessed the convergence validity,

collinearity issues and the significance and relevance of the indicators that constitute the formative variables. Appendix B details the ways I managed such efforts.

Secondly, as suggested by Torrence (2012), I verified the qualitative in-depth interview data derived from the Indonesian political parties' leaders/secretaries and triangulated them with the in-depth interview data collected from: a) senior editors/journalists of the Indonesian media and political consultants/pollsters for producing the findings as expected by ROs 1, 3, 4 and 5; and b) these editors/journalists and consultants/pollsters and campaign-volunteers who worked for each of pairs of presidential candidates for composing the findings as imposed by RO 6. I then systematically sorted out, rendered and saturated them to obtain the most trustable and relevant data to meet these research objectives.

As I followed the BU research ethics procedure (See point 3.7), I ran the data and respondent validations within the whole processes of the field research. As regards to the first and second research objectives, such validations were less difficult. However, as regards the subsequent research objectives (ROs 3, 4, 5 and 6), these validations encountered the following challenges. The first challenge was how to systematically capture the structural elements that constituted practices of marketization and professionalization of campaigning performed by these parties during these elections. The second challenge was how to appropriately measure (and differentiate between) what the Indonesian political parties really thought and planned and what these parties have actually run when they have carried out such practices during these elections. The third challenge was how to fairly evaluate the differentiations of the attitudes and behaviours they carried out when they advanced such practices in facing the 2014 parliamentary and presidential elections, respectively.

As regards to the first and second challenges, I undertook the following strategies. *Firstly*, I intentionally formulated the baseline

structural model that includes both formative and reflective variables. As I followed the fundamental principles of the nature and characteristics of the reflective and formative variables (Hair, et al., 2014: 42-45), I developed questionnaires that represent indicators of these variables and used them to systematically capture what these parties' marketers/campaigners thought and planned and what they carried out when they developed and prioritized these structural elements in facing these elections. Moreover, I also conducted two kinds of pre-tests, which were undertaken within two months before these questions were sent to these respondents. The first pre-test was conducted to evaluate the contents of these questionnaires. During this pre-test, 5 senior researchers/experts employed by prominent Indonesian political pollsters/consultants were asked to scrutinize the contents of these questionnaires. Having considered their suggestions, the questions, which were listed in these questionnaires and directed to evaluate the variables that constitute this model were refined to improve the reliability of indicators and measurements of these variables. The second pre-test was taken to evaluate the format and structure of the questions used in these questionnaires. 10 marketers/campaigners employed by the big and medium sized Indonesian political parties (PDIP, Golkar Party, Democratic Party, Gerindra Party, Nasdem Party, PKB, PAN and PPP) during these elections were asked to scrutinize the appropriateness of the format and structure of these questions. Having considered their advice, I then refined these questions to make them much more readable, discernible and answerable. These efforts were slightly helpful in dealing with the reliability and *content*, *criterion*, and *construct* validities issues.

With regard to the third challenge, I created two sets of questionnaires. The first one was directed to evaluate the ways and the extent to which these parties advanced and selected structural elements that constitute this model in facing the 2014 parliamentary election, while the second one was directed to explore the ways and the degrees of

which these parties upgraded and prioritized these structural elements in facing the 2014 presidential election. The format and structure of these questionnaires were tailored regarding the nature of these elections and the individual conditions of marketers/campaigners employed by these parties during these elections.

3.9. Research Strengths and Limitations

This work is the first study that holistically explores the structural conditions and factors that determined the developments of marketization and professionalization of campaigning of political parties in the new democratic countries, especially Indonesia. It offers not only an integrated conceptual framework and a nested workable baseline structural model, but also a new understanding of the applications of the critical realism perspective and mixed methodological approach and design to evaluate such developments within the specific context of the new democracy of Indonesia.

Regardless of its strengths, this work has the following inherent weaknesses. As I considered potential non-sampling and sampling and statistical errors, I undertook the following steps. *Firstly*, the basic assumptions of the first and the second-generations of the statistical approaches were considered not only to tackle the potential statistical errors (types of error I, II and III), but also to manage the validity and reliability issues and the model estimation, assessments and specification biases. *Secondly*, five professional researchers/surveyors who had expertise and professional experiences in conducting the face-to-face survey interviews were deployed to collect the survey data. Overall, such efforts were quite workable in handling such issues.

I also fully recognized the inherent weaknesses of the application of the in-depth elite interview data collection procedure. Lilleker (2003) highlighted that such weaknesses relate to following questions, which are: a) how to precisely seek, locate and make contact with elites as key

respondents in conducting in-depth interviews (Lilleker, 2003: 208-210; b) how to encourage respondents to answer openly, truthfully and naturally under fair conditions in order to obtain unbiased information (Lilleker, 2003: 210-211); c) how to properly fit the qualitative data analysis in regard to the research questions and objectives; d) how to come up with a general conclusion regarding the existing various perceptions and perspectives among respondents (Lilleker, 2003: 212-213); and e) how to make sure that the qualitative analysis was properly conducted and met with the standard of research ethics when respondents preferred to provide “off the record” data and keep their anonymities (Lilleker, 2003: 212-213).

With regards to the first and second issues, I maintained personal and professional relationships and personal trust with the key-respondents and strived to interview them as naturally as possible by seeking convenient places and times. As regards to the third issue, I ran the qualitative and thematic content analyses using the most relevant, credible and trustable data and information. With regard to the fourth issue, I systematically identified and evaluated divergent, subjective and inter-subjective views of these respondents when I conducted the field research and analysed these data and information. I also ran triangulation of the in-depth interview data and managed my subjective views when I formulated the findings and conclusions. Additionally, with regards to the research ethical issue, I carefully considered following research ethics.

3.10. Research Ethics

This study was guided by the Research Ethics Code of Practice of Bournemouth University and approved by the University Research Ethic Committee (UREC) in 2013. The key principles of the research ethics, as stated by point 3.1, sub section 8a of UREC (2013), were used as the guidance of this work. When I undertook the fieldwork, there were no vulnerable participants who were requested as (key) respondents of this

study. With respect to UREC (2013), all of the respondents were sufficiently informed of the entire research activities and objectives. The most essential aspect emerging during the fieldwork was related to the confidentiality and anonymity of the respondents (as stated by point 4.1 and 4.5 of UREC, 2013). Regarding this issue, the official letter was sent to these respondents and on-going consultations were held with these respondents to ensure that the research was being conducted based on the mutual agreement of ethical standards, as imposed by point 4.3 of UREC, 2013).

3.11. Summary

This chapter has adopted a critical realism perspective as a research philosophy and 'pure-mixed' of the qualitative and quantitative methods was considered as a research methodology. The pure-mixed of the qualitative and quantitative methods and the convergence (triangulation) research design was employed to evaluate RO 1 and the sequential-exploratory research designs were deployed to accomplish ROs 2, 4, 5 and 6. The pure-mixed of the quantitative methods and exploratory research design were conducted to assess RO 3. The uses of these research methods and designs and processes of the quantitative and qualitative data collections and analyses and research syntheses were spelled out. Reliability and validity issues related to this work were discussed and the strengths and limitations of this work were displayed as well.

CHAPTER 4 STRUCTURAL CONDITIONS THAT PROPELLED DEVELOPMENTS OF MARKETIZATION AND PROFESSIONALISATION OF CAMPAIGNING OF THE INDONESIAN POLITICAL PARTIES POST-SOEHARTO NEW ORDER

Chapter Overview

Strömbäck (2007: 63), Strömbäck (2010: 28-29) and Strömbäck et al. (2012: 86) proposed 'structural conditions' that stimulate political parties to use marketing techniques, follow market-orientation and run professionalization of campaigning. Such 'conditions' include the low level of party ID and party membership, little trust in political parties, highly electorate volatility and commercial media system, the presence of candidate-centred over the party-centred systems, the left-right ideological dimension; and cleavages associations have been less important and only few parties who have a competitive chance to win the elections. Using analysed reports released by the Indonesian general election commission, political pollsters, consultants and research centres and the media, the political and election laws and in-depth interviews data derived from the Indonesian political parties' leaders/secretaries and professionals, senior editors/producers of the media and political consultants/pollsters, this chapter discussed how and to what extent such 'conditions' took shape and paved the way for developments of marketization and professionalization of campaigning of the Indonesian Political Parties Post-Soeharto New Order (RO 1).

4.1. Democratization of Politics and Structural-Systemic Transformations Post-Soeharto New Order

During the New Order Soeharto regime (1966-1998), Indonesian politics had been ruled under an iron law. At that time, there had been undemocratic political spheres. Domination of the state/government propaganda and the presence of undemocratic political exchanges and

interactions had been much more prominent since this regime fully controlled the media, constrained ideological orientation of the existing political parties and restricted the freedom to express public and political opinion and establishment of new political parties. However, in the aftermath the downfall of this regime in May 21 1998, democratization of politics gradually took shape. Soon after this regime collapsed, B.J.Habibie replaced Soeharto in being appointed as an Indonesian president. He assigned Minister of the Home Affairs, Let. General (ret) Syarwan Hamid, to restore the structure and function of the People Consultative Assembly as a democratic political institution and set up democratic political and election laws.

As imposed by these laws, the first democratic general election was conducted on 7 June 1999. There were 48 Indonesian parties, which took part as political contestants during this election, but only 20 of these parties obtained parliamentary seats. As they were elected in this election, the elected-politicians of these parties took position as (new) members of the Indonesian House of Representative/the Indonesian Parliament (MPs), 1999-2004. The most fundamental political policy carried out by these MPs was the amendment of the Indonesian National Constitution 1945 (Liddle, 1999, 2000; Ambardi, 2008; Bunte and Ufen, 2010; Horowitz, 2013). New political, election and media regulations were redrafted in this constitution. The first one was the repositioning of the political authority and organizational structure of the Indonesian People Consultative Assembly. The resulting role of this institution as the Highest State Agency to select the Indonesian president and vice-president ceased since 2002. The second one was changing the authority of the Indonesian president-vice president and of the Indonesian House of Representative. The third one was changes in the election systems to vote for president and vice-president, members of the Indonesian House of Representative, the Indonesian Regional Representative Council, the Local Parliaments and the head and vice-head of the Indonesian Local Governments. The last

one was the establishment of press freedom and the instalment of a democratic media system.

Reformulations of the parliamentary and presidential election laws Post-Soeharto New Order gradually transformed mechanisms to vote for MPs and president and vice-president, restored the rights and roles of the Indonesian voters in casting their votes during these elections and changed the roles of political parties' leaders on nominating candidates and determining these parties' candidates who took position as MPs. Following article No. 39 point 3 of Law No. 3/1999, the 1999 general election was carried out based on the proportional election system (PR) with the close-list party candidates. Based on this system, a political party registered by the Indonesian General Election Commission as a political contestant would be granted parliamentary seats when this party gathered 2 % of popular votes during this election.

The 2004 parliamentary election was held based on Law No. 12/2003. The 2009 parliamentary election was conducted following Law No.10/2008. Slightly differently from the 1999 general election, the 2004 and the 2009 parliamentary elections were carried out using the proportional election system (PR) with the open-list party candidates. As imposed by Law No. 12/2003, the Indonesian parties' candidates who were listed in the 'top-list' ballot card would be appointed as MPs when these parties passed the minimum number of the parliamentary threshold, which was 2 % of total votes, in the 2004 parliamentary election. As imposed by Law No No.10/2008, however, there were only MP candidates of the Indonesian political parties who passed the minimum amount of the 'division of voters' in each of the parliamentary election districts and also obtained the higher numbers of popular votes in this district who would be granted parliamentary seats in the 2009 parliamentary election; even if they were being nominated by their parties in the 'lower-list' ballot card. The following table 4.1 charts transformations of the parliamentary election regulations and their consequences on Indonesian politics.

	The 1999 Parliamentary Election	The 2004 Parliamentary Election	The 2009 Parliamentary Election
The Election Laws	Law No. 3/1999	Law No 12/2003	Law No.10/2008
The election system model	PR system with the close-list party' candidates	PR system with the open-list party' candidates	
The parliamentary threshold (PT)	2 % of popular votes	2 % of popular votes	2.5 % of popular votes
The elected- party' candidates (as the party passed PT and got seats in the parliamentary election districts)	The elected- party' candidates were appointed by the party' leader	The elected- party' candidates were selected based on their ranks printed in the ballot card.	The elected-party' candidates were selected based on their abilities to collect popular votes in the parliamentary election district they nominated as MPs. Those who passed the minimum amount of the 'division of popular voters' in this district and obtained the higher number of votes would be appointed as MPs.
The right of voters during the elections	Voters were only allowed to vote names of political parties listed in the ballot card	Voters were allowed to chose names of political parties or these parties' candidates printed in the ballot card	
The roles and powers of political parties' leaders	Top party' leader has an absolute authority to nominate candidates who run in the parliamentary election, determine the elected- candidates and appointed them as MPs, as this party passed the minimum number of the parliamentary threshold (PT)	Top party' leader has an absolute authority to nominate candidates, but he or she has no longer an absolute authority to determine the elected- candidates and appoint them as MPs, as this party passed the minimum number of the parliamentary threshold (PT)	

Table 4.1: Changes in the Parliamentary Election Laws and Their Consequences on Indonesian Politics

Despite decreeing Law No. 12/2003, the Indonesian Parliament, as imposed by Article No.6A of the amended-National Constitution of 1945, also proposed a new Bill that regulates the presidential election. Soon after being approved by the Indonesian President, this parliament decreed this Bill as Law No. 23/2003. Implementation of this law instantly transformed the Indonesian presidential election system from 'the indirect election system' to 'the direct election system'. Following this law, a political party and its coalitions that gathered 5 % of popular votes in the

2004 parliamentary election were allowed to nominate a pair of presidential candidates to run in the 2004 presidential election (Article No. 5, point 5 of Law No. 23/2003) and the elected president and vice-president have to gather the highest number of popular votes in this election.

Meanwhile, the 2009 direct election of the president and vice-president was run one year after the Indonesian parliament decreed Law No.42/2008. Based on Article No.9 of Law No. 42/2008, only the Indonesian political party and its coalitions that obtained 20 % of parliamentary seats or 25 % of popular votes in the 2009 parliamentary election were allowed to nominate a pair of presidential candidates for running in the 2009 presidential election. Following this law, those gathering the highest numbers of popular votes, representing the diverse districts, were elected as the Indonesian president and vice president. Table 4.2 displays transformations of the presidential election regulations and their consequences on Indonesian politics.

	The 1999 and 2001 Presidential Elections	The 2004 Presidential Election	The 2009 Presidential Election
The election laws	Laws No. 3 and No.4/1999	Law No. 23/2003	Law No.42/2008
The election system	The indirect election system wherein members of the Indonesian People Consultative Assembly had exclusive privilege to elect a pair of presidential candidate	The direct election system to vote a pair of presidential candidate nominated by a coalition of political parties	
The presidential electoral threshold	There was no presidential electoral threshold.	5 % of popular votes (Article No. 5, point 5 of Law No. 23/2003)	20 % of parliament seats or 25 % of popular votes (Article No.9 of Law No. 42/2008)
The elected president and vice president	A pair of presidential candidate those who obtained the higher numbers of votes of members of the Indonesian People Assembly	A pair of presidential candidate those who gathered the higher numbers of popular votes, which represent the diverse districts of the Indonesian provinces	
The voter's right	Voters have no right to directly vote a pair of	Voters have an absolute right to directly cast their votes to a pair of	

	presidential candidate	presidential candidate
The roles of political parties' leaders	Leaders of political parties who assembled a political coalition in the parliament have an absolute authority to nominate president and vice president candidates and forcefully ask MPs as members of the Indonesian People Assembly to vote a particular pair of presidential candidate.	Leader of political parties who set up a political coalition still have an authority to nominate either a president or a vice president candidates. But, they have no longer absolute authority and powers in determining the elected-president and vice president. It was the Indonesian voters who absolutely determine the elected president-vice president in the presidential election.

Table 4.2: Changes in the Presidential Election Laws and Their Consequences on Indonesian Politics

Since these laws were implemented, political participation evolved and voters' turn-out gradually decreased¹⁷. In the 1999 parliamentary election, the total number of voters' turn-out was still 92.4 %. However, in the 2004 parliamentary election, it declined slightly to 84.10 %. It then dropped substantially since the 2009 parliamentary election was carried out, as imposed by Law No.10/2008 and the 2009 presidential election was conducted, as constituted by Law No. 42/2008. It dropped to 70.90 % in the 2009 parliamentary election. The total number of voters' turn-out in the presidential election also plummeted from 79.76 % in the first round of the 2004 presidential election to 77.44 % in the second-round of the 2004 presidential election and to 72.57 % in the 2009 presidential election.

Alongside this, alignment of the Indonesian electorate to the Indonesian political parties also changed dramatically due to the following conditions. Law No.42/2008 followed the open-list candidate, as a new mechanism to vote and select MPs. Based on this mechanism, those who passed the minimum amount of the 'division of voters' in the parliamentary election district and obtained the higher numbers of popular votes in this district would be granted parliamentary seats in the 2009 parliamentary election. This mechanism led to most of those who had backgrounds as


¹⁷ In the last decade of the New Order Soeharto regime, the total voters who turned out in the elections had been higher. Those who voted in these elections were more than 90 % of total registered-voters. The primary reason was this regime intensively mobilized the voters to cast their votes in the elections. Those who disfavoured casting their votes in these elections were labelled as the unfaithful citizens.

local leaders and rich persons nominated by political parties, who have been politically influential within and across parliamentary constituencies, successfully obtaining these seats in this election. Since most of the Indonesian voters were more interested in developing direct associations with such leaders and persons, substantial numbers of top leaders and prominent activists who controlled the central offices of these parties failed in winning seats in this election (Ufen, 2008a, 2008b, 2008c; Mietzner, 2008).

While the total number of the voter turn-out has been declining, the total number of the non-voters has been increasing. Yet the total number of voter turn-out in such elections has been still higher, as compared with the total number of voters that turned out during the parliamentary elections in Western democracies. However, it was obvious that those who cast their ballots in these elections declined substantially from 92.4 % in the 1999 general election to 70.90 % in the 2009 parliamentary election and 72.57 % in the 2009 presidential election. More importantly, as the total electorates that turned out in these elections declined, the total electorates, which turned into non-voters in these elections, increased substantially. Under the Indonesian (extreme) multiparty system, such conditions have been politically significant.

Whilst the total number of voters' turn-out dropped substantially, political partisanship of the Indonesian electorates, which is indicated by the level of party identification (Party ID), gradually diminished. Since the election system to vote for MPs was carried out based on the open-list candidates and the election system to vote for presidential candidates was conducted directly by the Indonesian electorates in 2004, the level of Party ID, as seen from figure 4.1, has been constantly shrinking. The level of political alignment was strongly and significantly associated with the total number of voters who turned out in the 2004 and the 2009 parliamentary elections reported by the Indonesian Election Commission (Spearman rho correlation is 0.990 and p value = 0.001, with the 2-tailed significant at the


level 0.01). Levels of Party ID seemed to be strongly and positively correlated with the total number of those who have decided to be the non-voters across these elections (Spearman rho correlation is 0.956 and p value = 0.001, with the 2-tailed significant at the level 0.05).



Source: The Indonesian Survey Institute (Lembaga Survey Indonesia) and Saiful Mujani Research and Consulting (SMRC). Survey has been taken using the multistage random sampling derived from 2.400 respondents represented all of the Indonesian populations.

A number of commentators pointed out structural-systemic factors, which propelled the decline of political participation and partisanship of the Indonesian electorates. Such factors include: a) shifting social and demographic of the Indonesian people; b) transformations of social and political cleavages that paved the way for an increasing number of volatile electorates; and c) the implementation of direct election systems of the Indonesian president and vice-president in 2004, the direct election systems of MPs using a PR system with the open-list candidates and the direct election system of the head and vice-head of the Indonesian Local Government in 2005 (Mujani, 2003; Mujani and Liddle, 2004: 122; Mujani and Liddle, 2007: 45; Uffen, 2008a, 2008b, 2008c). These factors have been seen to have further impacts not only on the inter-party competition

during the elections (Mietzner, 2008), but also on the inter-party interactions and collaborations within and across the electoral, parliamentary and governmental arenas (Ambardi, 2008).




Note: The data were being extracted from the exit poll data of Lembaga Penelitian, Pendidikan, dan Penerangan Ekonomi dan Sosial (LP3ES), 9 April 2009, as reported by Daniel Dhakidae (2009).

In line with such developments, there were also a substantial number of voters who turned into disloyal voters in the 2009 parliamentary election. In addressing this issue, one of the Indonesian research institutes, LP3ES, conducted the exit poll research soon after this election was held. This research was undertaken by interviewing 7.541 voters who cast their votes for 7 Indonesian political parties during the 2004 and 2009 parliamentary elections (Dhakidae, 2009). As visualized by figure 4.2, this pollster uncovered that the total number of loyal voters of the main Indonesian political parties was significantly small. This pollster also

revealed there were substantial numbers of disloyal voters and non-voters. Having evaluated the aggregate exit poll data of this pollster, this work confirmed that the total number of loyal voters was negatively correlated with the total number of disloyal voters. These relationships were visible and statistically significant (Spearman rho correlation is -0.857 and p value = 0.014, with the 2-tailed significant at the level 0.05).

Further to this, a ticket-splitting phenomenon has also gradually emerged in Indonesian politics since the direct election system to vote for the president and vice-president was implemented in 2004. These phenomena were much more obvious before the 2009 presidential election was held (Ali, 2006). In specifically addressing this issue, LP3ES conducted the exit poll research undertaken using the multistage stage random sampling and face-to-face interviews derived from 5,141 respondents representing all of the Indonesian electorate when the 2009 presidential election was being held in 8 July 2009. This pollster revealed the following reports. There were only 73.30 % of voters who voted PDIP in the 2009 parliamentary election and favoured casting their vote for Megawati Soekarnoputri-Prabowo Subiyanto. Meanwhile, there were 80.60 % of voters who voted Democratic Party in the 2009 parliamentary election and preferred casting their votes for SBY-Boediono. This pollster also uncovered that the Indonesian voters who cast their votes for the main Indonesian political parties, that took part as political contestants during the 2009 parliamentary election, likely favoured casting their votes to SBY-Boediono once they ran in the 2009 presidential election. Nonetheless, as recorded by the exit poll data reported by the Indonesian Circle Survey one week after the 2009 parliamentary election was run-off, most of those who cast their votes for these political parties in the 2009 parliamentary election strongly preferred voting SBY once the Democratic Party nominated him as a presidential candidate for running in the 2009 presidential election.

These trends took place alongside the increasing number of young voters. They are 17-22 or under 17 years old Indonesian voters who were already married. The total numbers of these voters/electorates is 27 million (18.5 % of the total Indonesian voters) in the 2004 parliamentary and presidential elections and 36 Million (21 % of the total Indonesian voters) in the 2009 parliamentary and presidential elections (KOMPAS, 8 April, 2014).



Source: The Survey Data of the Indonesian Circle Survey, December 2006-December 2008 collected using the multistage random sampling derived from 1.200 respondents represented all Indonesian population.

Alongside such developments, the rational voters and voting behaviour have been visibly taking shape in Indonesian politics¹⁸.

¹⁸ Following the idea of Downs (1957), it refers to how and the extent to which the electorates and voters considered the outcomes, incentive and social and private benefits as they favoured casting their votes to a particular political party during the elections (Downs, 1957: 138). Taking into account that the natures of the 'rationality' and the 'irrationality' of voters still became the most essential issue in the field of political

Regardless of the existing disputable debates regarding whether the rational voters already existed or had not yet fully taken shape, and to what extent they have taken place in the new democracy of Indonesia, most of the Indonesian pollsters pointed out that they gradually emerged in the new democracy of Indonesia. One of these pollsters is the Indonesian Circle Survey. This pollster ran parallel surveys in between December 2006 and December 2008 and revealed the findings, which are charted by figure 4.3.

Further to this, political consumerism and political activism also gradually took shape in Indonesian politics. Some observers outlined that the increasing 'new middle class' in the last decade of the New-Order Soeharto regime gradually appeared alongside the development of lifestyle images (Gerke, 2000: 146; Anshori, 2009: 91-94). Since the education levels and housing and lifestyle consumptions increased, the roles of the Indonesian middle class in Indonesian politics have been much more prevalent (Gerke, 2000: 152). During the last decade of this regime, most of them enjoyed less political power (Lev, 1990: 35) and strongly rebutted the undemocratic political and election systems established by this regime (Haryanto, 2006: 149). Some of them even took part in supporting the democratic political movement, which took shape in between 1994 and 1997 (see Uhlin, 1997: 85-127) and became the prominent actors who vociferously called for the instalment of new democratic political and election systems (Ishadi SK, 2002; Hill and Sen, 2005: 5).

Post-Soeharto New Order, various groups of the Indonesian middle class not only turned into heavy Internet and social media users, but also became the main consumers of the Indonesian mass media outlets. They strongly engaged in influencing political processes in the parliament and government and critically scrutinized wider social and cultural issues

marketing (see Savigny, 2004, 2008), this work favours defining the rational voters based on such indicators, as suggested by Downs (1957: 138).

related to the public interest and the quality, accountability and transparencies of public services (Nugroho, et al., 2012; Lim, 2013a; Ambardi, et al., 2014). As the use of the Internet among these middle classes increased significantly, political activism escalated substantially (Hill and Sen, 2005; Lim, 2003c, 2011, 2013; Nugroho and Syarief, 2012; Nugroho, et al., 2012; Ambardi, et al., 2014). ICT developments and the adaptations and uses of the Internet and social media transformed political engagement and activism of Indonesian non-government organizations (Nugroho, 2007), enlarged cyber–urban spaces (Lim, 2002, 2003a) and political resistances (Lim, 2003b) and led to cyber-urban activism (Lim, 2006) and social media activism (Parahita, 2012; Lim, 2013; Ambardi, et al., 2014).

Post-Soeharto New Order, the autonomy and self-rule of the Indonesian media also escalated substantially (Gazali, 2004, Gazali, et al., 2009; Ishadi, SK, 2002). Since the New Order Soeharto regime collapsed, most of the Indonesian media enjoyed press freedom and new democratic political environments much more (Gazali, 2004; Gazali, et al., 2009; Ispandriarno, 2008). Being ruled under the new press law (Law No.40/1999) and media broadcasting law (Law No.32/2002), the liberalization and commercialization of media industries rocketed rapidly (Armando, 2014) and a number of the groups and networks of the Indonesian media increased dramatically, followed by an increasing number of viewers, readers and users of the media (see Lim, 2011: 11; Lim, 2012: 12-17; Lim, 2013; Nugroho and Syarief, 2012: 32-36; Nugroho, et al., 2012b: 45-48; Ambardi, et al., 2014: 64-65).

These conditions comprised structural impacts on political journalism styles—in general—and modes of construction of political media agenda, packaging and dissemination of the contents of political news and programmes of the Indonesian media—in particular. A systemic change in management of the media organizations and the production of news programs took place after the highly commercialized media system

took shape in Indonesian politics. This change paved the way for the crucial roles of the spin-doctors/media strategists in Indonesian politics. AK, a former editor-in-chief of Antara (the Indonesian News Agency) described these phenomena as follows.

“Post-Soeharto New Order, the titles and headings of songs, names of the singers and the settings and stages on which these singers have to sing these songs have been much more easily crafted, packaged and delivered. The Indonesian media, especially the commercial media, seem to more easily direct the formation of agenda setting and constructions of political discourses. As the commercial and political interests of these media have been much more prevalent, there has been much room for spin-doctors and media strategists to intervene in the media agenda, package political agenda and determine the public agenda. Indeed these conditions would determine not only the most important political issues that have been released and mediated by these media, but also how political actors and organizations have to deal with this issue on the one hand and how people think about this issue and consider these actors and organizations on the other”¹⁹.

At the same time, the Indonesian pollsters and political consultants gradually took their place as important political actors in the new democracy of Indonesia. The infancy period took shape after the last decade of the New Order Soeharto regime (1991-1998). The domestic and internal research institution, the Indonesian media outlets, professional communities and the Indonesian social and political scientists, alongside the arrangement of the 1999 General Election and the 2004 presidential and parliamentary election, conducted polling programmes. Though polling programmes have mushroomed since 1999, political pollsters have, however, still been under-developed (Mietzner, 2009; Ufen, 2010; Qodari, 2010; Trihartono, 2012, 2013, 2014).

One year before the 2004 parliamentary and presidential elections were held, Indonesian pollsters began taking their place in Indonesian politics. It was Deny JA, with Saiful Mujani, and M.Qodari who founded the first Indonesian pollster in June 2003, which is called the Indonesian

¹⁹ Personal Interview with AK, 21 September 2013

Survey Institute (Lembaga Survey Indonesia) (Qodari, 2010: 123). The success story of Deny JA and his associates has been widely acknowledged since they succeeded in supervising the campaign management of SBY as a presidential candidate nominated by the Democratic Party (at that time it was a new and small party) to run in the 2004 presidential election. Soon after this election, Deny JA resigned from this institute and favoured establishing the Indonesian Circle Survey at the end of 2005 and set it up as a pollster and political consultancy firm. One year later, M.Qodari took a similar step and founded the Indo Barometer in 2006 as a new political pollster and consultancy firm. These pollsters and political consultants conducted various kinds of political polling (such as benchmark poll, brushfire poll, exploratory poll, tracking poll and panel survey) and offered these survey data to the Indonesian parties and these parties' candidates. The survey data released by these pollsters have been gradually recognized not only as the product of scientific research, but also as the crucial tool to achieve political power in parliament and government (Qodari, 2010: 125).

As the 'poll-fever' took place in 2005s (Mietzner, 2008), political pollsters/consultants, which offered market intelligence data and consultancy services, mushroomed dramatically (Trihartono, 2013: 923; Qodari, 2010: 125; Ufen, 2010a: 23). The total number of political pollsters/consultants has increased from 6 in 1998 to more than 60 at the end of 2013 (Trihartono, 2013: 931). This number does not include the local and new political pollsters/consultants, which have not been associated yet with these associations²⁰. Most of the Indonesian parties and candidates favoured employing these pollsters/consultants to obtain survey data and then publish the most positive aspects of these through

²⁰ Slightly different from the establishment of pollsters, the development of political consultants has been triggered by the soaring demand for political consultancies services from the Indonesian political parties and parties' candidates in order to tackle the weaknesses of their internal parties' machines and campaign organizations (Qodari, 2010: 125-132; Trihartono, 2014: 163-179).

various media outlets to attract more political support from political markets²¹.

These aforementioned conditions elicited changes in the attitudes and behaviours of Indonesian political parties and parties' leaders/politicians in the political sphere. The following points detail such changes.

4.2. The Indonesian Political Parties and Adaptations of Political Marketing and Market-Orientation and Professionalization of Political Campaigning

Soon after the new regulations of the 2004 and the 2009 parliamentary and presidential elections were being implemented, the level of political participation of the Indonesian electorate gradually declined. Political alignment of these electorates to the Indonesian political parties substantially diminished, while the ticket-splitting phenomenon consistently emerged. The total number of loyal voters of these parties also obviously shrunk, while the total number of disloyal voters of these parties and non-voters visibly increased.

Most of the Indonesian political parties considered such issues intensely. They gradually adopted modern principles of political marketing and engaged in developing professional communication and campaign methods. VYM, a leader of the National Mandatory Party (PAN) spelled out following testimonies.

“There were transformations of political and electoral regulations Post-Soeharto New Order. These regulations not only changed the inter-party competition in political (market) arenas during elections and post-elections, but also transformed political partisanship of the Indonesian electorates. We got some reports released by the Indonesian pollsters that Party ID has been in low level and most of the Indonesian electorates have been much more volatile and politically more rational. Since these regulations have been set up and the volatile electorates have been much more prominent, we indeed gradually accounted for the modern principle of marketing

²¹ Personal interview with AB, an executive director of the Nusantara Survey Institute/Lembaga Survey Nusantara/LSN, 11 May 2014.

as an organisation strategy and set up professional campaign. Selling political parties' ideology has been quite difficult during the elections. This party and party' candidates could no longer be reliant on the social and political cleavage they associated with. We have to keep improving the whole aspect of the party management and organizational strategy. We have to develop more appropriate communication methods and tools, especially in facing the elections”²².

The increasing number of volatile voters and the emergence and development of the rational voters and voting behaviours stimulated most of these parties and these parties' leaders to develop better organisational principles based on the marketing procedure and set up professional communication and campaign. In addressing such issues, SM, a leader of PPP and one of the former ministers of the second-term of SBY' government, stated as follows.

“The increasing levels of education of electorates, urbanization processes and the rise of the middle class Post-Soeharto New Order triggered the escalating numbers of rational voters and, more importantly, the rational voting behaviours. Since these voters are getting bigger in terms of numbers and much more critical in terms of political views they addressed to political parties and government, we need to adopt the marketing principle to holistically understand their attitudes and behaviours. We also need to develop some professional communication and campaign strategies and techniques to address them properly. We could no longer ignore them when we want to get elected during the elections or if we took a position in the parliament or run the government”²³.

Most of the political leaders recognized that such conditions carried consequences for the political parties they affiliated with. Some of them realized that it is still possible to adopt the marketing principles, techniques and procedures as an organizational strategy of party. However, it is quite hard to adopt such principles, techniques and procedures as an organizational philosophy of the party. In addressing such issues, YC, a leader of Hanura Party stated as follows.

²² Personal Interview, 25 July 2014

²³ Personal interview, 18 May 2014

“It is really difficult to fully adopt the marketing principles, techniques and procedures used in business and commercial organizations as an organizational philosophy of our political party. But, regardless of the limitation of resources of our party, it is still possible for us to generate them as an organizational strategy. We realized that such principles, techniques and procedures are helpful to identify the strength and the unique selling point of our party, party leaders and candidates (on the one hand) and to deal with the volatile and rational voters and, more importantly, to leverage the electorates’ support to our party (on the other) when we run in the elections. We realized that having had a party leader that strongly shored up the whole processes of adaptations and developments of such principles, techniques and procedures as an organizational strategy and developed professional campaigning is not enough. But, establishment of a collective enterprise of party leaders, politicians, members and activists in the national and local levels to carry out such efforts and develop a professional campaign is actually much more important”²⁴.

The decline of political partisanship of the Indonesian electorates and the increasing numbers of volatile and rational voters also transformed the ways the Indonesian political parties and these parties’ leaders and candidates (re) formulated political products and policies and delivered these products and policies to these voters. Some of them believed that the volatile and rational voters demanded the better political programmes and policies, which carried out the ‘real political and economic benefits’, much more. In addressing this issue, IJP, a leader of Golkar Party voiced as follows.

“Politicians who run in the elections could no longer be reliant on the electorates’ partisanship to the political party they affiliated with. The relationships between political parties and electorates changed substantially Post-Soeharto New Order. Voters are now much more volatile and rational. They are interested less in the ideological platforms of political parties. These platforms seem to be less workable. What they are mostly interested in is the ‘real political and economic benefit’ offered by the parties’ leaders and politicians during the elections and delivered by these parties’ leaders and politicians post-elections”²⁵.

²⁴ Personal interview, 10 May, 2014

²⁵ Personal interview, 28 October 2014

The Indonesian political parties and these parties' leaders and candidates who considered the low level of Party ID, the increasing numbers of non-voters and disloyal voters favoured developing the following strategies. The first one is leveraging both the brand image of the party and workability of the party as a political organisation. The second one is hunting the benevolent, rich, smart and professional politicians and national and local leaders who were potentially capable of capturing these voters during the parliamentary and presidential elections. In addressing these issues, PL, a leader of Gerindra Party stated as follows.

“We realized that having a high standard of organizational structure and influential party leaders are not enough for a political party to win the elections. (More than that) We have to ensure that the party’s organizational structure has been workable to connect with various groups of voters and to attract the non-voters and disloyal voters. We need to generate the ideology, values and policies advocated by the political party to develop an outstanding political party brand. We also need party ambassadors who can be expected to secure a political party brand and co-brand this party brand with his or her personal brand. Hunting and selecting ‘benevolent, ‘rich’, ‘smart’ and ‘professional’ politicians and local leaders who have been understood and are capable of accomplishing such efforts is much more crucial for the political party and party leader to win the elections”²⁶.

With slight differences, some of these parties and these parties' leaders and candidates much preferred developing the capacity of the party organisation and transforming its communication and campaign structure and strategies to keep securing loyal voters and capturing the volatile voters. Such efforts have been seen as being essential, especially for political parties, which have been, associated less with the social and political cleavages that exist in the Indonesian politics. Supported less by these cleavages, the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS), in facing the elections, favoured advancing the capacity and capability of its members to secure loyal voters and capture political support from the volatile voters. TR, a former secretary general of PKS spelled out such efforts as follows.

²⁶ Personal interview, 22 November 2014

“We realized that the success of the party, especially during the elections, is strongly determined by the capacity and capability of its members to keep securing the loyal voters and to get political support from the volatile voters. We conducted our own survey programmes and accounted for the survey reports released by the Indonesian pollsters as well. These reports are quite important and are helpful not only to identify the demands and expectations of these voters, but also to find a better strategy regarding how to deal with such demands and expectations of these voters. When we interacted with them, we asked our party candidates and activists to consider such demands and expectations of these voters. We also took into account the most important social and cultural aspects of these voters to develop the appropriate political communication and campaigning style in order to touch their hearts and minds properly”²⁷.

The older and more established Indonesian political parties and these parties’ leaders and candidates commonly perceived the low level of Party ID, the increasing numbers of non-voters and disloyal voters as a ‘real and hard political challenge’. However, the younger and less established political parties, such as Gerindra Party and Nasdem Party otherwise, accounted for such developments as a ‘lucrative political opportunity’ that allowed them to achieve a substantial number of parliamentary seats during the parliamentary election and to possibly run in the presidential election. Leaders and founding fathers of these parties carried out what they called ‘a scientific research’ and hired political pollsters to identify what factors really triggered the low level of Party ID and what values, policies and themes were really expected by the non-voters and disloyal voters. This research produced the market intelligence data, which were generated as a guidance to formulate these parties’ ideology and policies and decide the parties’ names, logos, and colours in order to attract these voters. In addressing these issues, AM, a general secretary of Gerindra Party stated as follows.

“Political pollsters we hired a couple of years ago assured us that there were large numbers of the Indonesian electorates who were still dissatisfied with the work performances of the existing political

²⁷ Personal interview, 18 May 2014

parties and told us that most of these electorates expected a new nationalist political party, which is non-identical to the existing nationalist political parties. A report produced by this pollster indicates that these electorates dreamed of having 'a great Indonesia'. As regards to such conditions, we established this party in 2008 and named it the 'great Indonesian-movement party', and developed its political positioning and branding to make it being dissimilar to the existing nationalist parties. We gradually set up its organizational structure and developed a set of marketing and campaigning strategies to connect with these electorates and also formulated policies and products, as expected by these electorates. This pollster informed us that these electorates were much more familiar with the 'head of eagle' and 'red' as a symbol of 'a great Indonesia'. We ultimately decided to select them as the main components of the party' logo and flag"²⁸.

In addressing such issues, WA, a deputy general secretary of Nasdem Party voiced the following.

"The low level of party ID and increasing numbers of non-voters and disloyal voters indicate that the existing political parties have not yet fully translated the people's voices into political policies and products and delivered these policies and products, as they expected. The founding father of this party realized such issues and then asked one of prominent Indonesian political pollsters to run survey researches to dig up various aspects underlying such issues. Based on this pollster's reports, we designed a new political party. This pollster data indicate that most of these voters need a 'change'. Thus, we highlighted the word 'change' as a main theme of this party. This pollster data told us that most of them favour having a democratic Indonesian society with more equal social, economic and political structures. We then named this party as 'National Democrat' and decided 'Nationalist-Social Democracy' as an ideology that comprised the name of this party. This pollster data also informed us that most of them are much more interested in 'blue' rather than on red, yellow or other colours. Thus, we decided using 'blue' as the main colour of this party's logo and flag"²⁹.

The Indonesian political parties, which have been strongly associated with the existing social and political cleavages, also engaged in developing some strategies to understand the characteristics of the Indonesian electorate. These parties and these parties' leaders and

²⁸ Personal interview, 5 November, 2014

²⁹ Personal interview, 29 October, 2014

politicians set up an appropriate political campaign style to address various groups of the electorate, which are grouped as a non-captive electoral market. One of these parties is the Nation Awakening Party (PKB). This party strongly accounted for the 'unexpressed need and expectations' of these electorates and developed what this party called '*an unordinary political campaign style*'. In addressing this issue, IN, a former general secretary of PKB has voiced the following.

"We can no longer rely on the core voters of the party. We need to address various types of voters. To do so, we need an unordinary political campaign style. We need to know precisely the characteristics of these voters. We have to know how to get closely connected to these voters. We have to use this campaigning style to keep them in touch with the party always. We have to address them properly not only as an individual electorate, but more importantly as an individual citizen. We have to treat them as friends, listen to what they voiced and serve them as citizens. We realized that most of the Indonesian people are now more likely to be treated personally as our fellow citizens and friends and more importantly as our family. Likewise, as to a member of our family, we have to be much more capable not only to understand what they implicitly and explicitly expected and wanted, but also to fulfil what they need and want during the elections and post-elections"³⁰.

The Indonesian political parties and these parties' leaders and politicians also considered the rise of political consumerism and political activism. They engaged in developing a more innovative and strategic political marketing management to manage such trends. SM, a leader of PPP has articulated his assessments regarding such issues as follows.

"The development of communication technology, especially social media, amplified political consumerism and political activism, organized primarily by the Indonesian middle class. They are only more or less 35 % of total population. They, however, are groups of the opinion leaders. What they voiced in the political sphere determined the patterns and degree of electorates' support for the ruling party and its coalition as well as the opposition parties. Since the ways they behaved in the political sphere could carry impacts on how people perceived a political party and its leaders and politicians, we have to develop more innovative and strategic

³⁰ Personal Interview, 14 May 2014

*political (marketing) management of party organization and its communication structure and strategy*³¹.

Such trends also gradually carried impacts on the formulations of political agenda setting of the Indonesian media³². Political issues advocated by political activists and amplified by the media determined the ways the parties' leaders and parties' politicians managed parties' organization, especially when they took position in the government. As regards to this issue, RP, a leader of Democratic Party that shored up SBY' government (2004-2014), voiced the following.

*“Those ruling in the government have been always in the public spotlight and scrutinized by the media and the Internet and social media users. It is not easy to handle such issues once we are in the government. We need to develop much more innovative party organization and offer better political policies and products not only to deal with various forms of political activism, but also advocate some policies and formulate political products demanded by diverse groups of political activists. For those who ruled in the government, it was really hard to handle the stream of public opinion they induced and its impacts on the peoples' perception to trust in the government”*³³.

Most of these parties and these parties' leaders and politicians also gradually developed management of media relations and advanced more appropriate professional skills to handle organizational changes in political journalism and political agenda setting carried out by the Indonesian media outlets³⁴. Since the private media, especially TV channels, have been seen to be much more influential in the new democracy of Indonesia, most of them considered the power of the commercial media logic. Gradually, they have become interested in hiring (former) senior editors/journalist as professional spin-doctors, regardless of their positions in government. This effort is directed to develop media and public relations

³¹ Personal interview, 18 May 2014

³² Personal interviews with RK, an Editor-in-Chief of Viva News.com, 23 September, 2014 and SR, an Editor-in-Chief of Okezone.com, 10 October 2014

³³ Personal interview, 13 May 2014

³⁴ Personal Interviews with UK, an Editor-in-Chief of Media Indonesia, 20 October 2014; VYM of PAN, 25 July, 2014; YC of Hanura Party, 22 May 2014

programmes, handle the increasing power of media logic, deal with an increasing personalization of political news and address the rolling news and horserace style of political news and programmes produced by the Indonesian commercial media, especially TV Channels³⁵.

Those who took positions in the government were much more engaged in hiring the spin-doctors and developing media relations and public relations programmes. For example, as they won the 2004 parliamentary and presidential elections, the Democratic Party particularly considered developing such programmes and employing political consultants, pollsters and spin-doctors. These efforts were directed to secure the political image and leadership style of SBY, as a top-leader of this party, and to attract and gather the electorates' support for this party. Such efforts were also carried out soon after this party won the 2009 parliamentary election and since SBY was re-elected for second time in the 2009 presidential election³⁶.

The development of political consultants and pollsters in the new democracy of Indonesia not only triggered professionalization of campaigning of political parties, but also transformed the ways these parties' leaders, politicians and candidates thought about politics and addressed political sub-markets (especially the electorates and the media). Market intelligence data offered by these consultants and pollsters have been commonly used to portray the actual conditions of political sub-markets and to formulate better strategies for these parties and parties' leaders, politicians and candidates. In addressing such issues, EK, a former director of the Indonesian Circle Survey (Lingkaran Survey

³⁵ Personal interviews with T, a political consultant and researcher of Saiful Mujani Research and Consulting/SMRC, 24 October 2014, PS, a senior producer of Trans TV Corporation, 10 Septembers, 2013 and ADG, a former senior producer of TV ONE and now is a senior journalist of CNN Indonesia, 15 September, 2013

³⁶ Personal interviews with RP of Democratic Party, 13 May 2014 and T, a former researcher and consultant of Fox Indonesia and now a researcher and consultant of SMRC who ever employed as political consultant of Democratic Party in between 2007 and 2013, 24 October 2014

Indonesia) and the Indonesian Voices Network (Jaringan Suara Indonesia) stated as follows.

“We run our jobs based on scientific research. We used various research methods. The strategies we developed to deal with the media and target and mobilize voters are run based on the actual data we collected using such methods. Most of the Indonesian political parties lacked such expertise and professional human resources to gather the market intelligence data related to the media and electoral markets scientifically. We support them with such data and expertise”³⁷.

The Indonesian political parties and parties' leaders, candidates and politicians gradually hired such consultants and pollsters and accounted for the professional skills and research they offered. However, the ways they carried out such practices varied. Most of them perceived that employing political consultants and pollsters whose good understanding of the diverse characteristics of voters existed within and across the Indonesian local districts, and political knowledge and experiences regarding the government and parliamentary affairs and who was being nominated as party candidates in the elections, was really helpful³⁸. Some of them asked these consultants and pollsters to merely evaluate the degree of the electorates' support they obtained during the last parliamentary and presidential elections and to find the best strategy to increase the electorates' support in facing the next parliamentary and presidential elections. However, the others hired these consultants and pollsters not only to develop proficient campaign structure and strategy to capture the volatile voters when they ran in these elections, but also to secure the electorates' support for political policies when they ruled in government³⁹.

³⁷ Personal interview, 13 October 2014

³⁸ Personal interviews with IJP of Golkar Party, 28 October 2014, AM, a General Secretary of Gerindra Party, 5 November 2014

³⁹ Personal interviews, with SC, a director of the Indonesian Circle Survey; 12 September 2014 and EK, a former director of the Indonesian Circle Survey and the Indonesian Voices Network/Jaringan Suara Indonesia, 13 October 2014

4.3. Conclusion.

As stated at the outset Strömbäck (2007: 63), Strömbäck (2010: 28-29) and Strömbäck et al. (2012: 86), posited structural conditions, which are likely to propel political parties in democratic countries to adopt political marketing-orientation, advance market-orientation and/or run professionalization of campaigning. This chapter has evaluated his proposition within the specific context of the new democracy of Indonesia. Points of 4.1 and 4.2 of this chapter have revealed the findings. The following points and subsequent figure 4.4 will summarize such findings.

The findings indicated that democratisation of politics, which emerged in the aftermath of the downfall of Soeharto regime, led to amendment of the National Constitution of 1945 taking place. This amendment, as exhibited previously by point 4.1, carried out structural-systemic changes that paved the way for the establishment of democratic-liberal media and political party and election systems. These systems determined the development of the candidate-centred electoral system and transformed mechanisms to vote for MPs, president and vice - president and the rights and roles of the Indonesian electorate, political parties' leaders and candidates. Soon after such systems were being installed, levels of political ID gradually declined. Total numbers of disloyal voters and the non-voters gradually increased. The ticket-splitting phenomenon and substantial number of the new electorates took shape in the 2004 and 2009 parliamentary and presidential elections. The rational voters who favoured scrutinizing work performances of the Indonesian political parties and parties' leaders and politicians, especially those took position in parliament and government, emerged robustly. Such circumstances, as displayed previously by point 4.2, stimulated most of these parties and parties' leaders and politicians and candidates to use marketing principles, techniques and procedures to address various groups of political markets.




Figure 4.4: Structural Conditions that Paved the Way for Developments of Marketization and Professionalization of Campaigning of the Indonesian Political Parties Post-Soeharto New Order

The findings also exhibited that establishment of such systems also led to organizational changes in political journalism taking shape. Such changes, as demonstrated previously by point 4.1, paved the way for the increasing influence of the media logic in productions of political news programmes and ascendancy of domination of the media agenda over the political agenda. Such changes also led to spin-doctors, media strategists, political consultants and pollsters having prominent roles in Indonesian politics. Such changes took place alongside ICT development, a soaring number of media consumers and the Internet and social media users who strongly engaged in political consumerism and activism and the emergence of rational voters and voting behaviours. As demonstrated previously by point 4.2, these developments stimulated the Indonesian political parties and parties' leaders, politicians and candidates to robustly develop proficient campaign structures and strategies when they attempted to manage, persuade and mobilize diverse political sub-markets, especially the electorates and the media. Those who had plenty of resources and/or ruled in government favoured hiring these spin-doctors, media strategists, political consultants and pollsters when they advanced such practices.

Overall, the findings meet with and substantiate the ideas of this author. Despite validating that the 'structural conditions' posited by this author really exist in the new democracy of Indonesia. The findings evidenced the structural-systemic changes that lead to diverse elements, which underlie such conditions. Such elements include items that have not been accounted for by this author, but were proposed by Lees-Marshment (2004: 5-7) and Lees-Marshment (2008: 6-9) and highlighted by Negrine (2008: 69) and Ufen (2010a: 32).

The findings also displayed new components, which have not yet been identified by these authors, such as a soaring number of non-voters and increasing use of the Internet and social media networks in the political spheres. The findings exhibited the ways these elements

systematically propelled developments of marketization and professionalization of campaigning of the Indonesian political parties Post-Soeharto New Order and shored up the existences of the democratic-liberal political exchanges, interactions and transactions in the new democracy of Indonesia. The findings hinted that formations of such elements likely determined characteristics of political market arenas and political sub-markets in the Indonesian politics Post-Soeharto New Order.

4.2. Summary

This chapter has evaluated 'structural conditions' that paved the way for developments of marketization and professionalization of political communication and campaigning of the Indonesian political parties Post-Soeharto New Order. Ideas of Strömbäck (2007: 63), Strömbäck (2010: 28-29) and Strömbäck et al. (2012: 86) were adopted to evaluate such conditions. The ways such conditions took shape and stimulated these parties to carry out such practices were displayed and discussed. The knowledge contributions of this chapter were highlighted as well.

CHAPTER 5

NOMENCLATURES OF POLITICAL MARKET ARENAS AND POLITICAL SUB-MARKETS AND THE EFFECTS OF PARTY-SPECIFIC FACTORS ON PERCEPTIONS OF THE INDONESIAN POLITICAL PARTIES' MARKETERS/CAMPAIGNERS REGARDING THE IMPORTANCE OF THESE POLITICAL MARKET ARENAS AND POLITICAL SUB-MARKETS

Chapter Overview

Strömbäck (2007: 63-64; 2010: 28-29) and Strömbäck et al. (2012: 86) proposed four types of political market arenas, while Johansen (2012: 160-163), Lock and Harris (1996: 14), Kotler and Kotler (1999: 5), Hughes and Dann (2009: 250, 2012: 1364) and Ormrod (2005, 2006, 2007, 2009) postulated diverse forms of political sub-markets. These authors argued that political parties in democratic countries commonly considered the relative importance of these political market arenas and political sub-markets. We, however, still lacked knowledge regarding the nomenclatures of political market arenas and political sub-markets that took place in the new democracy of Indonesia; and the effects of the party-specific factors on perceptions of the Indonesian political parties' marketers/campaigners regarding the importance of these political market arenas and political sub-markets (RO 2). In focusing on such issues, this chapter extracted the in-depth interview data derived from these parties' leaders and senior editors of the Indonesian media and pollsters and the survey data collected from these parties' marketers/campaigners during the 2014 parliamentary and presidential elections. This chapter reports the following findings.

5.1. Nomenclatures of Political Market Arenas Post-Soeharto New Order.

There have been five types of political market arenas, which took shape in Indonesian politics Post-Soeharto New Order. The first one is *the*

internal party arena wherein the Indonesian political parties' leaders, members, activities and politicians, as primary actors in this arena, carry out political exchanges, interactions and transactions during the elections and in between the elections. The second one is *the electoral arena* wherein the electorates, as primary actors in this arena, are addressed by these parties and parties' leaders, activists and politicians during the elections and in between the elections. The third one is *the media arena* wherein the media, journalists and the online and social media users, as primary actors in this arena, are engaged in taking part in such exchanges, interactions and transactions during the elections and in between the elections. The fourth one is *the governmental arena*, wherein those who rule in the executive body of government, as primary actors, run such exchanges, interactions and transactions with primary political actors and organizations of the internal party, the electoral, the media and parliamentary arenas during the elections and in between the elections. The last one is *the parliamentary arena* wherein those who took position in the legislative body of government/parliament, as primary actors, carry out such exchanges, interactions and transactions with primary actors and organizations of the internal party, the electoral, the media and governmental arenas during the elections and in between the elections.

Since Indonesia has been ruled under the presidential government system, the governmental arena has been widely seen as much more important than the parliamentary arena. The president, vice-president, ministers and senior officials take their places as primary actors in the governmental arena. They formulate regulations, political policies and products and attempt to deliver these political policies and products to the Indonesian electorates. Meanwhile, MPs, as primary actors in the parliamentary arena, propose, evaluate and scrutinize the political policies and products carried out by primary actors in the governmental arena. The parliamentary arena is widely seen as the secondary political market arena. Though concerned with what has been happening in this arena,

MPs as primary actors in this arena and political parties' leaders, members, activities and politicians, as primary political actors in the internal party arena, favoured evaluating the whole political processes in the governmental arena as well⁴⁰.

Due to the following conditions, such political actors also considered the media, especially TV channels, as an important political market arena as well. The total number of the Indonesian electorate who used the Internet and social media platforms in the political sphere increased substantially. However, the Internet and social media platforms have been seen as being less workable in persuading and mobilizing large numbers of these electorates, especially those who settled in the non-cosmopolitan areas. As regards such conditions, most of these actors have been reliant on the mainstream media. They needed these media to address and persuade the electorates, especially once they had limited capabilities, times and resources to directly address these electorates using communication and campaign method⁴¹.

The media organization and journalists who worked in these media also become important political actors. The ways they covered and framed each of the Indonesian political parties and these parties' leaders, MPs and presidential candidates likely determined modes of perceptions of the electorates to the attitudes and behaviours of these parties and parties' candidates. Such perceptions have been seen as having carried out visible effects on developments of levels of individual trust and support of these electorates of each of these parties and these parties' candidates⁴².

Those who ran in the 2014 parliamentary and presidential elections commonly considered the commercial TV channels as the primary

⁴⁰ The primary reason is most of these electorates much more favoured regarding the primary actors in the governmental arena rather than the primary actors in the parliamentary arena. Personal interviews with AT of PPP, 19 June 2014 and PL of Gerindra Party, 22 November 2014.

⁴¹ Personal interviews with WA of Nasdem Party, 29 October 2014, DS of PKS, 12 November 2014 and RP of Democratic Party, 13 May 2014

⁴² Personal interviews with WA of Nasdem Party, 29 October 2014, DS of PKS, 12 November 2014 and RP of Democratic Party, 13 May 2014

medium to communicate with the Indonesian electorates. In addressing this issue, SP, a former editor-in-chief of KOMPAS and Metro TV stated as follows.

“The socio-geographical condition of the Indonesian electorates/voters populated in 34 of the Indonesian provinces located in thousands of Islands led to the pivotal roles of the Indonesian media, especially News TV Channels, as the most strategic medium and significant intermediary actor. Most of the Indonesian political parties and these parties’ leaders, politicians and candidates need these TV Channels not only to communicate with these electorates/voters, but also to point out the main political products and policies they designed to address political actors in the internal party, the parliamentary and the governmental arenas”⁴³.

As compared to the media arena, the electoral arena has been widely seen as being much more important due to the following conditions. The total votes cast by the electorates inhabiting the parliamentary constituencies for the Indonesian political parties and these parties’ MPs candidates in the 2014 parliamentary election determined the chances of these parties in getting parliamentary seats in this election and fulfilling the minimum numbers of the presidential election threshold to nominate a pair of presidential candidates for running in the 2014 presidential election. The degree of support of these electorates for these parties’ MPs and presidential candidates and the inclination of these electorates to vote for each of these parties’ MPs and presidential candidates’ parties influenced the degree of success of these parties in achieving their goals in these elections⁴⁴.

Despite realizing the importance of such political market arenas, the Indonesian political parties and these parties’ leaders and politicians considered the internal party arena as an important arena as well. As primary actors in this arena, these parties’ activists, members and officials had been encouraged to improve the organisational capabilities of these

⁴³ Personal interview, 31 October 2014

⁴⁴ Personal interviews with IJP of Golkar Party, 28 October 2014, WA of Nasdem Party, 29 October 2014 and AM of Gerindra Party, 5 November 2014

parties in addressing, persuading and mobilizing the electorates, constituents and the targeted swing-voters. In addressing this issue, AM of Gerindra Party voiced the following.

“It seemed impossible for this party to achieve success in the 2014 parliamentary and presidential elections if its activists, members and officials have been politically fragmented. This party leader really needed them to improve the organizational capability of this party to effectively approach diverse groups of electorates and proficiently advance the campaign structure and strategies in order to persuade and mobilize the voters/electorates, especially the volatile electorates/swing voters”⁴⁵.


Within and across the 2014 parliamentary and presidential elections, marketers/campaigners of these parties realized the importance of these political market arenas. However, as detailed by following point, the degree to which they regarded the importance of these political market arenas were determined by the party-specific factors.

5.2. The Effects of Party-Specific Factors on Perceptions of the Indonesian Political Parties’ Marketers/Campaigners Regarding the Importance of Political Market Arenas during the 2014 Parliamentary and Presidential Elections.


The survey data indicated that, within the specific context of the 2014 parliamentary election, the Indonesian political parties’ marketers/campaigners perceived the importance of these political market arenas. Party-specific factors generate visible effects on such perceptions. However, only party position in the government and experiences with internal and external shocks, showed clear results regarding significant effects on such perceptions. As seen from figures 5.1-5.4, party ideology, age category, size and campaign resources generated visible effects on perceptions of the Indonesian political parties’ marketers/campaigners regarding the importance of political market arenas; but, the differences of

⁴⁵ Personal interview, 5 November 2014


magnitude of such effects between these parties are statistically insignificant.




ANOVA results: the electoral arena ($F = 1.660$; $\rho = 0.257$), the media arena ($F = 0.238$; $\rho = 0.794$), the internal party arena ($F = 1.809$; $\rho = 0.233$), the governmental arena ($F = 1.239$; $\rho = 0.346$) and the parliamentary arena ($F = 1.958$; $\rho = 0.211$).



ANOVA results: the electoral arena ($F = 1.994$; $\rho = 0.348$), the media arena ($F = 0.601$; $\rho = 0.461$), the internal party arena ($F = 0.103$; $\rho = 0.756$), the governmental arena ($F = 0.028$; $\rho = 0.872$) and the parliamentary arena ($F = 0.235$; $\rho = 0.640$).




ANOVA results: the electoral arena ($F= 1.349$; $\rho = 0.319$), the media arena ($F= 0.723$; $\rho = 0.514$), the internal party arena ($F= 0.821$; $\rho = 0.472$), the governmental arena ($F= 0.912$; $\rho = 0.445$) and the parliamentary arena ($F= 2.853$; $\rho = 0.124$).



ANOVA results: the electoral arena ($F= 1.660$; $\rho = 0.257$), the media arena ($F= 0.238$; $\rho = 0.794$), the internal party arena ($F= 1.809$; $\rho = 0.233$), the governmental arena ($F= 1.239$; $\rho = 0.346$) and the parliamentary arena ($F= 1.958$; $\rho = 0.211$).


Compared to these factors, the following factors generated much greater visible effects on perceptions of the Indonesian political parties' marketers/campaigners regarding the importance of these political market arenas. As seen from figure 5.5, party experience with internal shock

resulted in significant effects on perceptions of these parties' marketers/campaigners regarding the media arena ($F= 4.235$; $\rho = 0.04$). However, this factor produced insignificant effects on perceptions of these parties' marketers/campaigners regarding the importance of the electoral, internal party, governmental and parliamentary arenas. Party position in the government, as displayed by figure 5.6, created significant effects on perceptions of these parties' marketers/campaigners regarding the importance of the electoral ($F= 4.898$; $\rho = 0.04$), the governmental ($F= 4.713$; $\rho = 0.04$) and the parliamentary arenas ($F= 7.344$; $\rho = 0.03$). Party experience with external shock, as charted by figure 5.7, also lead to significant effects on the perceptions of these parties' marketers/campaigners regarding the importance of the governmental arena ($F= 4.245$; $\rho = 0.053$) and the parliamentary arena ($F= 4.575$; $\rho = 0.04$). These factors also produced visible effects on perceptions of these parties' marketers/campaigners regarding the importance of the internal party and the media arenas. The differences of magnitude of such effects between these parties, however, are statistically insignificant




ANOVA results: the electoral arena ($F= 0.898$; $\rho = 0.371$), the media arena ($F= 4.354$; $\rho = 0.04$), the internal party arena ($F= 0.170$; $\rho = 0.691$), the governmental arena ($F= 0.501$; $\rho = 0.499$) and the parliamentary arena ($F= 0.107$; $\rho = 0.752$).

Figure 5.6: The Effects of Party Position in the Government on Perceptions of Marketers/Campaigners of the Indonesian Political Parties Regarding the Importance of Political Market Arenas during the 2014 Parliamentary Election




ANOVA results: the electoral arena ($F= 4.898$; $\rho = 0.04$), the media arena ($F= 1.797$; $\rho = 0.217$), the internal party arena ($F= 2.356$; $\rho = 0.163$), the governmental arena ($F= 4.713$; $\rho = 0.04$) and the parliamentary arena ($F= 7.344$; $\rho = 0.03$).

Figure 5.7: The Effects of Party Experience with the External Shock on Perceptions of Marketers/Campaigners of the Indonesian Political Parties Regarding the Importance of Political Market Arenas during the 2014 Parliamentary Election




ANOVA results: the electoral arena ($F= 1.279$; $\rho = 0.364$), the media arena ($F= 3.015$; $\rho = 0.116$), the internal party arena ($F= 1.954$; $\rho = 0.222$), the governmental arena ($F= 4.245$; $\rho = 0.053$) and the parliamentary arena ($F= 4.575$; $\rho = 0.04$).

The survey data also demonstrated that, within the specific context of the 2014 presidential election, the Indonesian political parties' marketers/campaigners regarded the importance of these political market arenas. Party-specific factors generate visible effects on such perceptions but only party ideology, campaign resources and experience of external shock generated significant effects on such perceptions. As seen from figures 5.8-5.11, party size, age category, experience with internal shock and position in the government generated visible effects on perceptions of the Indonesian political parties' marketers/campaigners regarding the importance of political market arenas; but, the differences of magnitude of such effects between these parties are statistically insignificant.




ANOVA results: the electoral arena ($F = 2.062$; $\rho = 0.207$), the media arena ($F = 0.641$; $\rho = 0.616$), the internal party arena ($F = 0.662$; $\rho = 0.605$), the governmental arena ($F = 1.351$; $\rho = 0.344$) and the parliamentary arena ($F = 0.486$; $\rho = 0.704$).

Figure 5.9: The Effects of Party Age Category on Perceptions of Marketers/Campaigners of the Indonesian Political Parties Regarding the Importance of Political Market Arenas during the 2014 Presidential Election




ANOVA results: the electoral arena ($F = 1.128$; $\rho = 0.319$), the media arena ($F = 0.163$; $\rho = 0.697$), the internal party arena ($F = 0.021$; $\rho = 0.890$), the governmental arena ($F = 0.578$; $\rho = 0.469$) and the parliamentary arena ($F = 0.551$; $\rho = 0.479$).

Figure 5.10: The Effects of Party Experience with the Internal Shock/Leadership Change on Perceptions of Marketers/Campaigners of the Indonesian Political Parties Regarding the Importance of Political Market Arenas during the 2014 Presidential Election



ANOVA results: the electoral arena ($F = 2.612$; $\rho = 0.145$), the media arena ($F = 2.319$; $\rho = 0.166$), the internal party arena ($F = 0.372$; $\rho = 0.559$), the governmental arena ($F = 0.019$; $\rho = 0.893$) and the parliamentary arena ($F = 1.247$; $\rho = 0.297$).


Figure 5.11: The Effects of Party Position in the Government on Perceptions of Marketers/Campaigners of the Indonesian Political Parties Regarding the Importance of Political Market Arenas during the 2014 Presidential Election



ANOVA results: the electoral arena ($F = 0.731$; $\rho = 0.417$), the media arena ($F = 2.959$; $\rho = 0.124$), the internal party arena ($F = 1.357$; $\rho = 0.278$), the governmental arena ($F = 0.694$; $\rho = 0.429$) and the parliamentary arena ($F = 0.304$; $\rho = 0.597$).


As compared to these factors, the following factors generated much greater visible effects on perceptions of the Indonesian political parties' marketers/campaigners regarding the importance of these political market arenas. As seen from figure 5.12, party ideology produced significant effects on perceptions of these parties' marketers/campaigners regarding the importance of the parliamentary arena ($F = 3.676$; $\rho = 0.048$). Party campaign resources, as charted by figure 5.13, produced significant effects on perceptions of these parties' marketers/campaigners regarding the importance of this arena ($F = 3.676$; $\rho = 0.048$). These factors resulted in noticeable effects on perceptions of these parties' marketers/campaigners regarding the importance of the internal party, the media, the electoral and the governmental arenas. The differences of magnitude of such effects between these parties however, are statistically insignificant.

Figure 5.12: The Effects of Party Ideology on Perceptions of Marketers/Campaigners of the Indonesian Political Parties Regarding the Importance of Political Market Arenas during the 2014 Presidential Election




ANOVA results: the electoral arena ($F= 1.063$; $\rho = 0.395$), the media arena ($F= 1.022$; $\rho = 0.408$), the internal party arena ($F= 1.146$; $\rho = 0.371$), the governmental arena ($F= 1.213$; $\rho = 0.353$) and the parliamentary arena ($F= 3.676$; $\rho = 0.048$)

Figure 5.13: The Effects of Party Campaign Resources on Perceptions of Marketers/Campaigners of the Indonesian Political Parties Regarding the Importance of Political Market Arenas during the 2014 Presidential Election




ANOVA results: the electoral arena ($F= 1.063$; $\rho = 0.395$), the media arena ($F= 1.022$; $\rho = 0.408$), the internal party arena ($F= 1.146$; $\rho = 0.371$), the governmental arena ($F= 1.213$; $\rho = 0.353$) and the parliamentary arena ($F= 3.676$; $\rho = 0.048$).

In a slightly different mode, party experience with external shock, created significant effects on perceptions of these parties' marketers/campaigners regarding the importance of the governmental arena ($F= 7.521$; $\rho = 0.019$). As seen from figure 5.14, the magnitude of the differences of such effects is clearly obvious between political parties which lost more than 5 % of the popular votes and the new and young political parties, which lacked experience of external shock in the 2009 parliamentary election ($F= 8.867$; $\rho = 0.032$) and between political parties which lost more than 5 % of popular votes and political parties, which lost in between 5 % and 1 % of the vote in this election ($F= 11.183$; $\rho = 0.013$). The effects of this factor on perceptions of these parties' marketers/campaigners regarding the importance of the internal party, the media, the electoral and the parliamentary arenas are also visible. The differences of magnitude of such effects between these parties however, are statistically insignificant



ANOVA results: the electoral arena ($F= 0.964$; $\rho = 0.469$), the media arena ($F= 0.550$; $\rho = 0.667$), the internal party arena ($F= 1.985$; $\rho = 0.218$), the governmental arena ($F= 7.521$; $\rho = 0.019$) and the parliamentary arena ($F= 0.825$; $\rho = 0.626$).

Figure 5.15: The Effects of Type of the Election on Perceptions of the Marketers/Campaigners of the Indonesian Political Parties Regarding the Importance of Political Market Arenas



ANOVA results: the electoral arena ($F = 0.467$; $\rho = 0.503$), the media arena ($F = 2.081$; $\rho = 0.166$), the internal party arena ($F = 0.379$; $\rho = 0.546$), the governmental arena ($F = 0.222$; $\rho = 0.643$) and the parliamentary arena ($F = 0.484$; $\rho = 0.495$).

The survey data also confirmed that the differences of numbers of these parties' marketers/campaigners who considered the importance of these political market arenas across the 2014 parliamentary and presidential elections are visible. However, as seen from figure 5.15, the magnitude of such differences is statistically insignificant. The survey data also indicate that these parties' marketers/campaigners who perceived that the importance of these political market arenas during the 2014 parliamentary election also considered the importance of these political market arenas during the 2014 presidential election ($R = 0.915$, $\rho < 0.001$). Such perceptions were strongly correlated with the type of the election (Kendall's Tau-b=0.822, $\rho < 0.001$). Type of the election however, generated insignificant effect on such perceptions ($F = 2.323$, $df = 1,9$, $t = 1.524$, $\rho = 0.16$).

5.3. Nomenclatures of Political Sub-Markets Post-Soeharto New Order

The following political sub-markets took place in the new democracy of Indonesia. The first one is the *parliamentary* market. It is a

political market in which MPs, together with ministers and senior officials appointed by the Indonesian president and vice-president proposed, discussed, scrutinized and (re) designed political policies and products and legislation. The second one is the *governmental market*, which refers to a political market wherein those who manage the executive body of the government formulated, implemented and delivered such policies and products. The third one is *the internal party market*, which is created or facilitated by the internal organization of the Indonesian political parties and parties' leaders, politicians, candidates, members and activists and the association of organizations and stakeholders that are strongly affiliated with these parties. The fourth one is *the electoral market* wherein these parties, parties' leaders, parties' politicians and candidates, members and activists, in order to address the needs and expectations of the eligible voters and/or targeted-voters, carried out participatory services and/or parliamentary and governmental representations' functions. The fifth one is *the media market*, which is a political market that includes the Indonesian media outlets and the Internet and social media networks users. The last one is *the non-electoral market* that consists of the non-voters, political consultants, pollsters and commentators—as either a community or profession or an individual—and association of organisations and stakeholders that had not (yet) affiliated with any Indonesian political party and party' leaders and politicians.

The *governmental* and *parliamentary markets* strongly determine the flow and direction of the supply and demand sides of the *internal party*, *electoral*, *the media* and *non-electoral markets*. They are also widely considered as important strategic places wherein the state and government authorities are constantly shared, defined, regulated and generated, as demanded⁴⁶ by the public/electorates/voters. Along with the online and social media users, the media took shape as an influential

⁴⁶ Personal interviews with PL of Gerindra Party, 25 September 2015, SM of PPP, 18 May 2014, DS of PKS, 12 November 2014 and RP of Democratic Party, 13 May 2014

political market that shaped public discourses related to political and governmental affairs addressed by the Indonesian political' leaders and politicians, on the one hand, and the Indonesian citizens/electorates, on the other⁴⁷. The media are likely to frame such discourses, which have been seen as being politically important by *the internal party, electoral, non-electoral, governmental and parliamentary markets*. In addressing such issues, YAN, a senior editor of KOMPAS TV spelled out following opinions.

“The media create programmes and stories based on what the most interesting events and issues are considered by the Indonesian political parties’ leaders and politicians who ruled in either the executive or the legislative bodies of governments and accounted for by these parties’ members and activists and the people (electorates). We always expect to get good news related to these events and issues as good news. However, a common trend related to such events and issues, which comes up and raises public concern, is ‘the bad news is good news’. The media are likely to scrutinize the governmental and parliamentary markets, point out the opinions of parties’ leaders, politicians, members (the internal party market), highlight the perceptions of the people (the electoral market) and amplify political evaluations released by political commentators, consultants and pollsters (the non-electoral market)”⁴⁸.

The media not only pointed out what happened in *the internal party and the governmental and parliamentary markets*, but also amplified what *the electoral and non-electoral markets* voiced regarding what had been taking place in these political markets. In addressing such issues, DBS, a former editor-in-chief of Metro TV and now serving as an editor-in-chief of Berita Satu TV, voiced the following.

“We try to highlight the most important research reports released by the trustable political consultants and pollsters and critical issues voiced by credible political commentators and amplify the voices and demands of electorates related to the work performances of the Indonesian political parties’ leaders and politicians who ruled in the parliament and government. I believed that that most of those who

⁴⁷ Personal interviews with SP, a former editor-in-chief of KOMPAS and now as an editor-in-chief of Metro TV, 31 October 2014 and RB of KOMPAS, 12 November, 2014

⁴⁸ Personal interview, 6 November 2014

*took power in the government and parliament strongly considered these research reports, critical issues and voices and demands of electorates highlighted by the media, especially News TV Channels*⁴⁹.

Political consultants, pollsters and commentators, as *the non-electoral market* favoured taking part within the whole chain of the supply and demand sides of *the electoral, the governmental and parliamentary markets* and accounted for the supply and demand sides of *the media market* as well. In addressing this issue, T, a political consultant/pollster of Saiful Mujani Research and Consultants (SMRC) stated as follows.

*“Most of our clients need market intelligence data and consultancy services when they want to properly understand the electoral conditions and deal with the media agenda and their competitors. Some of them need our research and consultancy services to address the internal party and parliamentary and governmental issues. When we carried out our jobs, we commonly scrutinized not only the structural impacts of conditions of and current events that took place in the government and parliament on the electorates and the media, but also the structural impacts of the current agenda formulated by the media agenda and issues highlighted by the electorates on the government and parliament”*⁵⁰.

The Indonesian political parties' leaders, candidates and marketers/campaigners either during the elections or post-elections attempted to address following political sub-markets strategically⁵¹. They include the internal party members and activists, the media, campaign contributors, competitors and the electorates/voters. Within the specific context of the parliamentary and presidential elections, these parties' leaders, candidates and marketers/campaigners prioritized voters as the primary political sub-market and placed competitors, campaign contributors, the media outlets and internal party members/activists as the secondary political sub-markets. In addressing this issue, AT, an MP of

⁴⁹ Personal interview, 15 October 2014

⁵⁰ Personal Interview, 21 October 2014

⁵¹ Personal interviews with PL of Gerindra Party, 25 September 2015 and T, a political consultant/pollster of SMRC, 21 October 2014

the Indonesian Development Party (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan/PPP), stated as follows.

“During the parliamentary and presidential elections, voters are much more important. They need to be considered and addressed in a proper way in order for us to get elected during these elections. (In spite of addressing these voters) We also have to be aware to our competitors as well. During the parliamentary election, the others (political sub-markets) have been less crucial. But, during the presidential election, they are relatively important”⁵².


Within and across the 2014 parliamentary and the 2014 presidential elections, these parties’ marketers/campaigners realized the importance of these political sub-markets. However, as detailed by following point, the degree to which they regarded the importance of these political sub-markets were determined by party-specific factors.

5.4. The Effects of Party-Specific Factors on Perceptions of the Indonesian Political Parties’ Marketers/Campaigners Regarding the Importance of Political Sub-Markets during the 2014 Parliamentary and Presidential Elections

The survey data indicated that, within the specific context of the 2014 parliamentary election, the Indonesian political parties’ marketers/campaigners perceived the importance of these political sub-markets. Party-specific factors generated visible effects on such perceptions; but, there were only party ideology, campaign resources, experience of internal shock and position in the government that generated significant effects on such perceptions. As seen from figures 5.16-5.19, party size, age category, experience with external shock and position in the government generated visible effects on perceptions of the Indonesian political parties’ marketers/campaigners regarding the importance of political market arenas. The differences of magnitude of such effects between these parties are statistically insignificant.


⁵² Personal Interview, 26 May 2014.

Figure 5.16: The Effects of Party Age Category on Perceptions of Marketers/Campaigners of The Indonesian Political Parties Regarding the Importance of Political-Sub Markets during the 2014 Parliamentary Election




ANOVA results: the electorates ($F= 0.329$; $\rho = 0.582$), the media ($F= 0.013$; $\rho = 0.911$), competitors ($F= 0.626$; $\rho = 0.452$), campaign donators ($F= 0.698$; $\rho = 0.428$) and party' members ($F= 0.050$; $\rho = 0.828$).

Figure 5.17: The Effects of Party Size on Perceptions of Marketers/Campaigners of the Indonesian Political Parties Regarding the Importance of Political-Sub Markets during the 2014 Parliamentary Election




ANOVA results: the electorates ($F= 0.758$; $\rho = 0.503$), the media ($F= 0.771$; $\rho = 0.498$), competitors ($F= 0.321$; $\rho = 0.735$), campaign donators ($F= 0.433$; $\rho = 0.665$) and party' members ($F= 2.001$; $\rho = 0.205$).

Figure 5.18: The Effects of Party Experience with the External Shock/Leadership Change on Perceptions of Marketers/Campaigners of the Indonesian Political Parties Regarding the Importance of Political-Sub Markets during the 2014 Parliamentary Election



ANOVA results: the electorates ($F= 3.246$; $\rho = 0.101$), the media ($F= 1.873$; $\rho = 0.235$), competitors ($F= 0.772$; $\rho = 0.550$), campaign donators ($F= 0.848$; $\rho = 0.516$) and party' members ($F= 0.266$; $\rho = 0.848$).

Figure 5.19: The Effects of Party Position in the Government on Perceptions of Marketers/Campaigners of the Indonesian Political Parties Regarding the Importance of Political-Sub Markets during the 2014 Parliamentary Election




ANOVA results: the electorates ($F= 0.108$; $\rho = 0.750$), the media ($F= 0.896$; $\rho = 0.372$), competitors ($F= 0.088$; $\rho = 0.775$), campaign donators ($F= 0.157$; $\rho = 0.703$) and party' members ($F= 0.020$; $\rho = 0.892$).


Compared to such factors, the following factors resulted in much greater visible effects on the perceptions of the Indonesian political parties' marketers/campaigners regarding the importance of these political sub-markets. Party ideology generated significant effects on the perceptions of these parties' marketers/campaigners regarding the importance of campaign donors as a political sub-market ($F= 6.240$; $\rho = 0.028$). The differences of such effects, as seen from figure 5.20, are clearly perceivable between nationalist parties and Islamic parties ($F= 9.603$; $\rho = 0.025$) and between nationalist parties and Islamist parties ($F= 14.130$; $\rho = 0.011$). Likewise, this factor, party campaign resources, as displayed by figure 5.21, also determined perceptions of the Indonesian political parties' marketers/campaigners regarding the importance of campaign donors as a political sub-market ($F= 6.240$; $\rho = 0.028$). Such effects are clearly visible between political parties with a medium campaign budget and political parties with either a large campaign fund ($F= 9.603$; $\rho = 0.025$) and between political parties with a medium campaign budget and political parties with a small amount of campaign finance ($F= 14.130$; $\rho = 0.011$). These factors also created noticeable effects on the perceptions of these parties' marketers/campaigners regarding the importance of the electorates, the media, political competitors and party members as political sub-markets. However, the differences of magnitude of such effects between these parties are statistically insignificant.

Party experience with internal shock, as seen from figure 5.22, generated significant effects on perceptions of the Indonesian political parties marketers/campaigners regarding the importance of either the electorates as a political sub-market ($F= 6.520$; $\rho = 0.034$) or the party members as a political sub-market ($F= 4.963$; $\rho = 0.047$). The effects of this factor on perceptions of these parties' marketers/campaigners regarding the importance of the media, competitors and campaign donors as political sub-markets, however, are visible. The differences of

magnitude of such effects between these parties, however, are statistically insignificant.




ANOVA results: the electorates ($F= 0.642$; $\rho = 0.555$), the media ($F= 1.960$; $\rho = 0.211$), competitors ($F= 0.545$; $\rho = 0.603$), campaign donators ($F= 6.240$; $\rho = 0.028$) and party' members ($F= 2.274$; $\rho = 0.163$).



ANOVA results: the electorates ($F= 0.642$; $\rho = 0.555$), the media ($F= 1.960$; $\rho = 0.211$), competitors ($F= 0.545$; $\rho = 0.603$), campaign donators ($F= 6.240$; $\rho = 0.028$) and party' members ($F= 2.374$; $\rho = 0.163$).


Figure 5.22: The Effects of Party Experience with the Internal Shock/Leadership Change on Perceptions of Marketers/Campaigners of the Indonesian Political Parties Regarding the Importance of Political Sub-Markets during the 2014 Parliamentary Election



ANOVA results: the electorates ($F= 6.520$; $p = 0.034$), the media ($F= 0.077$; $p = 0.788$), competitors ($F= 0.016$; $p = 0.901$), campaign donators ($F= 1.197$; $p = 0.306$) and party' members ($F= 4.963$; $p = 0.047$).


The survey data also demonstrated that, within the specific context of the 2014 presidential election, the Indonesian political parties' marketers/campaigners also perceived the importance of these political sub-markets. Party-specific factors generated visible effects on such perceptions; but, there were only party ideology, campaign resources and experiences of internal and external shocks that generated significant effects on such perceptions. Such issues are detailed as follows. As seen from figures 5.23-5.25, party age category, size and position in the government generated visible effects on perceptions of the Indonesian political parties' marketers/campaigners regarding the importance of political market arenas. However, the differences of magnitude of such effects between these parties are statistically insignificant.

Figure 5.23: The Effects of Party Age Category on Perceptions of Marketers/Campaigners of the Indonesian Political Parties Regarding the Importance of Political-Sub Markets during the 2014 Presidential Election




ANOVA results: the electorates ($F= 0.945$; $\rho = 0.360$), the media ($F= 1.569$; $\rho = 0.246$), competitors ($F= 0.524$; $\rho = 0.490$), campaign donators ($F= 0.002$; $\rho = 0.969$) and party' members ($F= 0.509$; $\rho = 0.496$).

Figure 5.24: The Effects of Party Size on Perceptions of Marketers/Campaigners of the Indonesian Political Parties Regarding the Importance of Political-Sub Markets during the 2014 Presidential Election



Note: the electorates ($F= 0.278$; $\rho = 0.765$), the media ($F= 0.217$; $\rho = 0.810$), competitors ($F= 0.115$; $\rho = 0.893$), campaign donators ($F= 1.606$; $\rho = 0.267$) and party' members ($F= 0.668$; $\rho = 0.543$).


Figure 5.25: The Effects of Party Position in the Government on Perceptions of Marketers/Campaigners of the Indonesian Political Parties Regarding the Importance of Political-Sub Markets during the 2014 Presidential Election



ANOVA results: the electorates ($F= 0.412$; $\rho = 0.539$), the media ($F= 0.363$; $\rho = 0.563$), competitors ($F= 0.960$; $\rho = 0.356$), campaign donators ($F= 1.162$; $\rho = 0.312$) and party' members ($F= 0.429$; $\rho = 0.531$).


Compared to these factors, the following factors generated much greater visible effects on perceptions of the Indonesian political parties' marketers/campaigners regarding the importance of these political sub-markets. Party ideology resulted in significant effects on the perceptions of these parties' marketers/campaigners regarding the importance of competitors as a political sub-market ($F= 7.082$; $\rho = 0.021$). As seen from figure 5.26, significant differences of such effects are clearly noticeable between nationalist parties and Islamic parties ($F= 9.576$; $\rho = 0.03$) and between Islamic parties and Islamist parties ($F= 16.075$; $\rho = 0.007$). Similarly, party campaign resources, as charted by figure 5.27, generated significant effects on perceptions of the Indonesian political parties' marketers/campaigners regarding the importance of competitors as a political sub-market ($F= 7.082$; $\rho = 0.021$). The differences of such effects are much more perceivable between political parties with a medium amount of campaign resources and political parties with a small amount of

campaign resources. These factors also produced noticeable effects on perceptions of the Indonesian political parties' marketers/campaigners regarding the importance of the electorates, the media, campaign contributors and party members as political sub-markets, although the differences of magnitude of such effects between these parties are statistically insignificant. Slightly differently, party experience with external shock led to significant effects on the perceptions of these parties' marketers/campaigners regarding the importance of the media as a political sub-market ($F= 3.676$; $\rho = 0.048$). As displayed by figure 5.28, significant differences of such effects are clearly visible between political parties, which had no experience with external shock, and political parties, which lost in between 5 % or 1 % of votes during the last parliamentary election ($F= 17.673$; $\rho = 0.018$). This factor also resulted in quite noticeable effects on perceptions of the Indonesian political parties' marketers/campaigners regarding the importance of the electorates, competitors, campaign donors and party members as political sub-markets, although the differences of magnitude of such effects between these parties are statistically insignificant.




ANOVA results: the electorates ($F= 0.286$; $\rho = 0.760$), the media ($F= 1.159$; $\rho = 0.367$), competitors ($F= 7.082$; $\rho = 0.021$), campaign donators ($F= 2.790$; $\rho = 0.128$) and party members ($F= 2.229$; $\rho = 0.178$).

Figure 5.27: The Effects of Party Campaign Resources on Perceptions of Marketers/Campaigners of the Indonesian Political Parties Regarding the Importance of Political-Sub Markets during the 2014 Presidential Election




ANOVA results: the electorates ($F= 0.286$; $p = 0.760$), the media ($F= 1.159$; $p = 0.367$), competitors ($F= 7.082$; $p = 0.021$), campaign donators ($F= 2.790$; $p = 0.128$) and party' members ($F= 2.229$; $p = 0.178$).

Figure 5.28: The Effects of Party Experience with the External Shock on Perceptions of Marketers/Campaigners of the Indonesian Political Parties Regarding the Importance of Political-Sub Markets during the 2014 Presidential Election



ANOVA results: the electorates ($F= 1.747$; $p = 0.257$), the media ($F= 3.676$; $p = 0.048$), competitors ($F= 0.817$; $p = 0.530$), campaign donators ($F= 2.282$; $p = 0.179$) and party' members ($F= 0.098$; $p = 0.958$).


Party experience with internal shock generated visible effects on perceptions of these parties' marketers/campaigners regarding the importance of the electorates as a political sub-market ($F= 9.145$; $\rho = 0.016$). As seen from figure 5.29, this factor also produced perceivable effects on the perceptions of these parties' marketers/campaigners regarding the importance of the media, competitors, campaign donors and party members as political sub-markets. The differences of magnitude of such effects between these parties, however, are statistically insignificant.



ANOVA results: the electorates ($F= 9.145$; $\rho = 0.016$), the media ($F= 0.001$; $\rho = 0.975$), competitors ($F= 0.763$; $\rho = 0.408$), campaign donators ($F= 0.082$; $\rho = 0.782$) and party' members ($F= 2.119$; $\rho = 0.184$).

The survey data confirmed that the differences in numbers of Indonesian political parties' marketers/campaigners who considered the importance of these political sub-markets across the 2014 parliamentary and presidential elections, as seen from figure 5.30, are visible. However, only the magnitude of the differences of numbers of these parties' marketers/campaigners who recognized the importance of the media, competitors and campaign donators, respectively, are statistically

significant ($F= 12.938$; $\rho = 0.002$; $F= 33.965$; $\rho < 0.001$; $F= 36.825$; $\rho < 0.001$).



ANOVA results: the electorates ($F= 0.011$; $\rho = 0.917$), the media ($F= 12.938$; $\rho = 0.002$), competitors ($F= 33.965$; $\rho < 0.001$), campaign donators ($F= 36.825$; $\rho < 0.001$) and party members ($F= 0.698$; $\rho = 0.414$).

The survey data also revealed that these parties' marketers/campaigners who realized the importance of these political sub-markets within the specific context of the 2014 parliamentary election also perceived the importance of these political sub-markets within the specific context of the 2014 presidential election (Pearson correlation= 0.873 , $\rho < 0.001$). Such perceptions were strongly related to the type of the election (Kendall's Tau-b = 0.614 , $\rho = 0.015$). Type of election generated substantial effects on such perceptions ($t = 5.646$, $\rho < 0.001$) and the magnitude of such effects are statistically significant ($F = 31.877$, $df = 1, 9$, with partial eta squared = 0.78).

5.5. Conclusions.

Points 5.1 and 5.2, respectively, delineated nomenclatures of political market arenas that took shape in the new democracy of Indonesia and statistical findings regarding the effects of party-specific factors on the

degree to which the Indonesian political parties' marketers/campaigners perceived the importance of these political market arenas. The findings indicated that, within the specific context of the 2014 parliamentary election, perceptions of these parties' marketers/campaigners related to the importance of: a) the media arena is significantly determined by party experience of internal shock; b) the electoral arena is significantly influenced by party position in the government; and c) parliamentary and governmental arenas are significantly defined by party position in the government and experience of external shock. Meanwhile, within the specific context of the 2014 presidential election, perceptions of these parties' marketers/campaigners regarding the importance of: a) the parliamentary arena is significantly controlled by party ideology and campaign resources; and b) the governmental arena is significantly affected by party experience of external shock. These demonstrate that party-specific factors generate visible effects on the perceptions of these parties' marketers/campaigners regarding the importance of the electoral, the media and the parliamentary and governmental arenas. However, the magnitude of such effects is likely related with, but unlikely to be determined by type of the election.

The findings displayed by these points not only validate, but also substantiate the ideas of Strömbäck (2007: 63-64 2010: 28-29) and Strömbäck et al. (2012: 86). Such findings confirmed that the ideas of these authors seem quite workable in analysing such issues within the specific context of Indonesian politics. However, in a slightly different way from what these authors proposed, these findings validated the existence of a new type of political market arena, which is the governmental arena, in the new democracy of Indonesia. Such findings also exhibited that neither party-specific factors nor type of the election produce significant effects on perceptions of marketers/campaigners of these parties regarding the importance of the internal party arena. This evidences that

both party-specific factors and type of the election are unlikely to determine such perceptions.

Meanwhile, points 5.2 and 5.4, respectively, charted nomenclatures of political sub-markets that took place Post-Soeharto New Order and findings regarding the effects of party-specific factors on the degree to which the Indonesian political parties' marketers/campaigners perceived the importance of these political sub-markets. The findings demonstrated that, within the specific context of the 2014 parliamentary election, perceptions of these parties' marketers/campaigners regarding the importance of: a) campaign donors as a political sub-market is significantly determined by party ideology and campaign resources; b) the electorates and party members as political sub-markets are significantly influenced by party experience of internal shock. Meanwhile, within the specific context of the 2014 presidential election, perceptions of these parties' marketers/campaigners regarding the importance of: a) competitors as a political sub-market is significantly controlled by party ideology and campaign resources; b) the electorate as a political sub-market is significantly defined by party experience of internal shock; and c) the media as political sub-markets is significantly affected by party experience of external shock. These indicate that party-specific factors generate perceivable effects on perceptions of these parties' marketers/campaigners regarding the importance of these political sub-markets. But, the magnitude of such effects is likely to be determined by type of the election.

The findings chronicled by these points not only validate, but also substantiate the ideas of Johansen (2012: 160-163), Lock and Harris (1996: 14), Kotler and Kotler (1999: 5), Hughes and Dann (2009: 250, 2012: 1364) and Ormrod (2005, 2006, 2007, 2009). Though this evidenced that the ideas of these authors are quite applicable to analyse such issues within the specific context of Indonesian politics, these findings exhibited that nomenclatures of political sub-markets, which took

shape in the new democracy of Indonesia, and the degree to which these parties' marketers/campaigners considered the importance of these political sub-markets and prioritized these political sub-markets within and across these elections, are quite different from what these authors theorized. These findings revealed that these parties' marketers/campaigners strongly perceived the importance of the media and competitors as political sub-markets within the specific context of the 2014 parliamentary election, and recognized the importance of party members and campaign donors as political sub-markets within the specific context of the 2014 presidential election. Nonetheless, the degree to which they carried out such practices is unlikely to be determined by party-specific factors.

The findings reported by points 5.2 and 5.4 also confirmed that the degree to which these parties' marketers/campaigners perceived the importance of these political market arenas and political sub-markets are significantly related to type of the election. However, type of the election merely generates visible effects on the perceptions of these parties' marketers/campaigners regarding the importance of political sub-markets. These validate that type of the election only generates significant effects on the perceptions of these parties' marketers/campaigners related to the importance of these political sub-markets.

Based on such findings, this work argues that the following trends are likely to take shape in democratic countries that share similarities with Indonesian politics. *Firstly*, along with the electoral, internal party, the media and parliamentary arenas, the governmental arena is likely to exist in such countries. *Secondly*, characteristics of political sub-markets that existed in such countries are obviously different from nomenclatures of political sub-markets that took shape in the democratic countries that have been ruled under the parliamentary government system and indicated by the party-centred system. *Thirdly*, in such countries, perceptions of political parties' marketers/campaigners regarding the importance of the

electoral, the media and the parliamentary and governmental arenas are unlikely to be influenced by either party size or party age category. Conversely, such perceptions are likely to be determined by party ideology, campaign resources, position in the government and experiences with internal and external shocks. *Fourthly*, in such countries, perceptions of political parties' marketers/campaigners regarding the importance of these political sub-markets are unlikely to be affected by party size or age category. Such perceptions are otherwise likely to be defined by party position in the government, party ideology, campaign resources and experiences with internal and external shocks. *Finally*, in such countries, the degree to which these parties' marketers/campaigners perceived the importance of these political market arenas and political sub-markets are likely to be related to type of the elections. However, type of the election merely generates visible effects on the perceptions of these parties' marketers/campaigners regarding the importance of these political sub-markets.

5.6. Summary

This chapter chronicled nomenclatures of political market arenas and political sub-markets which took shape in the new democracy of Indonesia and displayed the effects of party-specific factors and the type of the election on perceptions of the Indonesian political parties' marketers/campaigners regarding the importance of these political market arenas and political sub-markets. The ideas of Strömbäck (2007, 2010) and Strömbäck et al. (2012), Johansen (2012), Lock and Harris (1996), Kotler and Kotler (1999), Hughes and Dann (2009, 2012) and Ormrod (2005, 2006, 2007, 2009) and Ormrod (2005, 2007, and 2009) were adopted to evaluate such issues. The findings were reported and discussed and their knowledge contributions were highlighted as well.

CHAPTER 6

THE STRUCTURAL ELEMENTS THAT CONSTITUTE PRACTICES OF MARKETIZATION AND PROFESSIONALIZATION OF CAMPAIGNING OF THE INDONESIAN POLITICAL PARTIES

Chapter Overview

It has been argued that parties and their candidates who strategically used the principles, techniques and procedures of marketing as 'an organizational philosophy' would be much more professionalized in campaigning (Newman, 1994, 1999a: x; Lees-Marshment, 2001a: 22; Lees-Marshment, 2008: 13; Lees-Marshment, 2010: 1-2). Having considered this proposition, the following authors formulated models of political marketing of political parties (Lees-Marshment, 2001a, 2001b, 2004, 2008; Lilleker and Lees-Marshment, 2005; Lilleker, et al., 2006; Lees-Marshment, et al., 2012), investigated market-orientation of political parties (Ormrod, 2004, 2006, 2007, 2009, 2011; Ormrod and Savigny, 2012) and market-orientation and strategic postures of political parties (Ormrod and Henneberg, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011a, 2011b; Ormrod, et al., 2015) and explored the degree and process of professionalization in campaigning (Gibson and Römmele, 2001, 2009; Strömbäck, 2009; Tenscher, 2013; Tenscher et al., 2012; Tenscher and Mykkänen, 2013, 2014). Indicators and measurements used to evaluate professionalization of campaigning of political parties have not yet been fully validated however (Mykkänen and Tenscher, 2014; Tenscher, et al., 2015). Similarly, the relationships between marketization and professionalization also remained hypothetical (Strömbäck, 2007). Regarding such issues, this chapter adopted the ideas of these authors to formulate an integrated baseline and alternative structural models. These models were evaluated using the survey data gathered during the 2014 parliamentary and presidential elections to holistically explore the structural elements that

constitute practices of marketization and professionalization of campaigning of the Indonesian political parties (RO 3).

6.1. Evaluations and Validations of the Measurements and Structural Components of the Baseline Structural Model.

The following efforts were undertaken to evaluate and validate the measurements and structural components of the baseline structural model. A statistical descriptive approach of SPSS 23 was used to assess the normality of the survey data that capture indicators of variables, which construct this model. EFA and PCA were conducted to evaluate the measurement elements of this model. The algorithm, bootstrapping and blindfolding techniques procedures of PLS-SEM of Smart-PLS 3.0 were organized to examine indicators and measurements of the reflective and formative variables that construct this model and the structural elements of this model as well. Table 6.1 charts acronyms of variables applied in the statistical reports resulting from such approaches. Operationalization of such approaches and the findings generated by such approaches are detailed by subsequent points.

Variables	Acronyms
Political Marketing-Orientation	PMO
Internal-Orientation	IO
Voter-Orientation	VO
Media-Orientation	MO
Competitor-Orientation	CO
Campaign Contributor-Orientation	CCO
Professional-Campaign Engagement	PCE
Professionalized-Campaign Structure	PCS
Professionalized-Audiences/Electorates Targeting Strategy	PATS
Professionalized-Narrowcasting Strategy	PNS
Professionalized-Campaign Personalization Strategy	PCPS
Professionalized-News and Event Management Strategy	PNEMS

Table 6.1: Acronyms of Variables that Construct the Baseline Structural Model⁵³

⁵³ In the Appendix B, Table B.1-B.5, Indicators that construct each of these variables are charted as cardinal numbers next to these acronyms following EFA and PCA results. For example MO1 is used to represent the first indicator of Media-Orientation, while PCS 2 is deployed to represent the second indicator of professionalized-campaign structure.

6.1.1. Evaluations and Validations of the Measurement Elements of the Baseline Structural Model.

These evaluations and validations were carried out through the following steps. *Firstly*, a statistical descriptive approach of SPSS 23 was deployed to assess the normality of the survey data that measure the indicators of variables, which construct this model. As I ran this, the work revealed that these data have Skewness values of no more than 1.5 and Kurtosis values no more than 2.0. This validates these data as sufficiently normal and statistically workable. Thus, they can be evaluated using following statistical approaches.

Secondly, EFA and PCA approaches of SPSS 23 were applied to evaluate indicators used to evaluate each of the variables that construct this model. In this respect, EFA was conducted using the Maximum Likelihood Extraction Method, while PCA was carried out using *Direct Oblimin Extraction Method with Kaiser Normalization* and suppressing coefficients value at 0.30⁵⁴. EFA and PCA results revealed that factors' components of each of these variables overall, have sufficient loadings values. IO, as a single-item variable, is statistically workable to evaluate this model. Each of the total variances of VO, MO, CO, CCO, PCE, PATS, PNS, PCPS and PNEMS, which are explained by their own indicators, is statistically sufficient to formulate a reflective variable, but statistically insufficient to construct a formative variable. In contrast, each of the total variances of PMO and PCS, which are explained by their own indicators, is statistically sufficient to form a reflective variable, but statistically insufficient to create a formative variable. These results indicate that VO, MO, CO, CCO, PCE, PATS, PNS, PCPS and PNEMS are likely to take shape as reflective variables, while PMO and PCS are likely to take place as formative variables. These results also confirm that these variables are statistically plausible and practically workable to holistically explain the

⁵⁴ This method is selected since this work assumed that each of indicators underlying these variables seem likely to be correlated with each other. EFA results are considered as initial estimations, while the PCA results as the final estimations.

structural elements that constitute practices of marketization and professionalization of campaigning of political parties. Point 2.1 of Appendix B details these results.

Thirdly, subsequent statistical methods of Smart-PLS 3.0 were deployed to evaluate the measurement elements of reflective variables that construct this model. Following the ideas of Hair et al. (2014: 101-107), this work used Fornell-Larcker criterion approach to evaluate the reflective variables that compose this model (VO, MO, CO, CCO, PCE, PATS, PNS, PCPS and PNEMS). The statistical finding resulted in by this approach indicates that each of these variables is statistically reliable and valid. This finding also evidences that each of these variables are sufficiently convergent. Moreover, as with the ideas of Hair, et al. (2014: 116-128), this work also employed the heterotrait-monotrait ratio of correlations (HTMT) approach to examine the internal consistency reliability, convergent validity and discriminant validity. The statistical finding generated by this approach confirms that each of these variables is internally and consistently reliable and convergent and has no substantial issue regarding the discriminant validity. This indicates that the set of indicators that construct each of these variables is statistically valid and convergent and practically reliable to measure and capture the ways political parties advanced market-orientation, engaged in having a professional-campaign and developing professionalized-campaign structure and audiences/electorates targeting, narrowcasting, campaign personalisation and news and event management strategies. Appendix B, point 2.2, details these statistical findings.

Fourthly, subsequent statistical methods of Smart-PLS 3.0 were also used to examine the measurement elements of formative variables that construct this model. Following the ideas of Hair et al. (2014: 121-122), this work deployed the redundancy analytical approach to examine the convergence validity of these variables. Moreover, as suggested by Hair et al. (2014: 125-127), this work employed the Variance Inflation

Factor (VIF) method to assess collinearity issues of indicators that constitute these variables. Additionally, based on the ideas of Hair et al. (2014: 128-132), this work applied the algorithm and bootstrapping methods to evaluate the outer weights significance of the indicators of these variables. The statistical results resulting from these methods revealed the following evidence. There were no substantial issues regarding collinearity and convergence validity of these variables. All indicators of PMO have outer weights, which are statistically significant. Most of the indicators of PCS have outer weights that are statistically significant as well. Such evidence indicates that both variables PMO and PCS did not suffer from collinearity and convergence validity issues. Indicators that construct PMO and components that constitute PCS are statistically plausible and practically workable to measure and capture the ways political parties developed practices of political marketing-orientation and professionalized-campaign structures. Appendix B, point 2.3, spells out these statistical results.

6.1.2. Evaluation and Validation of Structural Elements that Construct the Baseline Structural Model

Such evaluations and validations were conducted through the following steps. *Firstly*, this work, as suggested by Hair et al. (2014: 107-116) used the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) method of Smart-PLS 3.0 to assess collinearity issues of variables that construct this model. Statistical results of this method revealed that this model did not suffer from any collinearity issues. This indicates that these variables are statistically reasonable and practically workable to evaluate practices of marketization and professionalization of political parties. Appendix B, point 2.4 details the statistical results resulting from this method.

Secondly, this work used the algorithm and bootstrapping methods of Smart-PLS 3.0 to examine the structural model path coefficients values (β) of this model. Table 6.2 visualized by figure 6.1 details the statistical

results resulting from such methods. Such results indicate that variable 'political marketing-orientation' is positively correlated with most of the low-level variables that underlay practices of market-orientation and professionalization of campaigning. Most of the lower-level variables that construct variable 'market-orientation' are positively related with most of the low-level variables that constitute practices of professionalization of campaigning. Variables of 'professional-campaign engagement' and 'professionalized-campaign structure' are positively associated with almost all variables that form practices of professionalized-campaign strategies. Having evaluated such evidences and considered the ideas of Chin (1998) and Hair et al. (2014: 107-116), this work argues that this model is theoretically reasonable and practically workable to capture and explore practices of marketization and professionalization of campaigning of political parties.

Structural Relationships	Path Coefficients (β) Value	t value	SL	p value	90 % Confidence Intervals)
PMO→ IO	0.339	12.714	***	<0.001	(0.288, 0.391)
PMO→ VO	0.482	18.314	***	<0.001	(0.432, 0.529)
PMO→ CO	0.453	18.478	***	<0.001	(0.406, 0.498)
PMO→ MO	0.487	21.983	***	<0.001	(0.442, 0.528)
PMO→ CCO	0.162	6.222	***	<0.001	(0.109, 0.213)
PMO→ PCE	0.361	13.263	***	<0.001	(0.307, 0.413)
PMO→ PCS	0.113	4.414	***	<0.001	(0.068, 0.169)
PMO→ PATS	0.198	6.420	***	<0.001	(0.138, 0.253)
PMO→ PCPS	0.089	3.024	***	0.003	(0.029, 0.143)
PMO→ PNS	0.048	1.467	NS	0.143	(-0.018, 0.116)
PMO→ PNEMS	0.026	1.190	NS	0.235	(-0.020, 0.071)
IO→ PCE	-0.075	3.309	***	0.001	(-0.119, -0.030)
IO→ PCS	-0.028	1.238	NS	0.216	(-0.073, 0.015)
VO→ PCE	0.169	6.425	***	<0.001	(0.119, 0.221)
VO→ PCS	-0.006	0.325	NS	0.746	(-0.058, 0.040)
CO→ PCE	0.077	3.181	***	0.002	(0.031, 0.123)
CO→ PCS	0.074	3.501	***	0.001	(0.027, 0.113)
MO→ PCE	0.263	11.485	***	<0.001	(0.216, 0.307)
MO→ PCS	0.219	9.107	***	<0.001	(0.173, 0.268)
CCO→ PCE	0.023	1.088	NS	0.279	(-0.019, 0.066)
CCO→ PCS	0.208	10.840	***	<0.001	(0.169, 0.245)
PCE→ PCS	0.474	19.922	***	<0.001	(0.427, 0.520)
PCE→ PATS	0.339	8.657	***	<0.001	(0.264, 0.413)
PCE→ PNS	-0.013	0.214	NS	0.831	(-0.096, 0.055)
PCE→ PCPS	0.346	9.916	***	<0.001	(0.271, 0.418)

PCE→ PNEMS	0.277	7.654	***	<0.001	(0.206, 0.344)
PCS→ PATS	0.234	6.133	***	<0.001	(0.156, 0.305)
PCS→ PNS	0.378	9.630	***	<0.001	(0.311, 0.449)
PCS→ PCPS	0.351	9.427	***	<0.001	(0.280, 0.423)
PCS→ PNEMS	0.469	13.509	***	<0.001	(0.402, 0.536)

Table 6.2: Significance Testing Results of Structural Model Path Coefficients of the Baseline Structural Model⁵⁵




Figure 6.1: Evaluation Result that Visualizes The Baseline Structural Model with Path Coefficients (β) and R2 values

⁵⁵ SL = Significance Levels; NS= Not Significant

Thirdly, based on the ideas of Hair et al. (2014: 186), this work assessed the coefficients determination (R²) values of variables that construct this model. In running this, this work revealed the following statistical results. As a predictor for the lower-level variables that compose a higher-level variable 'market-orientation', which are IO, VO, CO, MO and CCO, variable PMO produced weak R² values. These values fall below the minimum threshold of R² value highlighted by Hulland (1999), which is 0.30; but, together with variables of IO, VO, CO, MO and CCO, these variables are actually good predictors for PCE and PCS. Moreover, as a predictor for PCE, these variables as a whole created R² of value 0.441. Magnitude of this value, according to Hair et al. (2014: 186) is statistically *moderate*. More importantly, as a predictor for PCS, these variables led to a substantial R² value, which is 0.626. These statistical results evidence that variables of 'political marketing-orientation' and 'market-orientation' are really relevant to assess 'professional-campaign engagement'. Together with variable 'professional-campaign engagement', these variables are also really suitable to evaluate 'professionalized-campaign structure'.

Meanwhile, as a predictor for PNS, variables PMO, IO, VO, CO, MO, CCO, PCE and PCS produced low R², which is 0.158. However, as predictors of PNEMS, PCPS and PATS, respectively, these variables yielded R² values of 0.503, 0.494 and 0.451. Such values, according to the ideas of Hair et al. (2014: 186), are statistically *moderate*. These indicate that variables of 'political marketing-orientation', 'market-orientation', 'professional-campaign engagement' and 'professionalized-campaign structure' are really relevant to evaluate professionalized-news and event management strategy', 'professionalized-campaign personalization strategy' and 'professionalized-audiences/electorates targeting strategy'. Nonetheless, these variables are little bit less feasible in explaining 'professionalized-narrowcasting strategy'.

Fourthly, having considered the ideas of Hair et al. (2014: 186), this work also evaluated the effect size (f^2) of variables that compose the baseline structural model and uncovered the following findings. As omitted from this model, PMO produced *substantial effect sizes* (f^2) for MO, VO and CO, as indicated by f^2 values of 0.31, 0.30 and 0.26, respectively. Moreover, exclusion of PMO from this model resulted in *medium effect sizes* (f^2) for PCE and IO, as evidenced by their f^2 values of 0.15 and 0.13, respectively. Furthermore, elimination of PMO from this model carried out *weak affect sizes* (f^2) for PCS, PATS, PCPS, PNS and PNEMS. These validate that variable 'political marketing-orientation' really took shape as an influential variable to explain the internal-orientation, media-orientation, voter-orientation and competitor-orientation and professional-campaign engagement. This variable however, seems being little bit less powerful to examine professionalized-campaign structure and professionalized-audiences/electorates targeting, campaign personalisation, narrowcasting and news and event management strategies.

Meanwhile, removal of MO from the structural path model resulted in *slightly medium effect sizes* (f^2) for PCS and PCE, which are 0.085 and 0.082, respectively. Moreover, as excluded from this model, CCO produced a *slightly medium effect size* (f^2) for PCS and PCE. Additionally, elimination of VO, IO and CO from this model generated a *quite weak effect sizes* (f^2) for PCE and PCS. This indicates that while variables of 'media-orientation' and 'campaign contributors-orientation' take shape as quite influential variables, variables of 'voters-orientation', 'internal-orientation' and 'competitor-orientation' take place as less powerful variables to evaluate professional-campaign engagement and campaign structures.

In the meantime, elimination of PCE from this model generated a *substantial effect size* (f^2) for PCS, as evidenced by its f^2 value of 0.34. Moreover, exclusion of PCS from this model carried out a *quite substantial*

effect size (f^2) for PNEMS, as validated by its f^2 value of 0.21. However, removal of PCE from this model entailed *quite weak effect sizes* (f^2) for PCPS, PATS, PNEMS and PNS and elimination of PCS from this model also entailed *weak effect sizes* for PCPS, PATS, PNEMS and PNS. These indicate that variable 'professional-campaign engagement' really takes place as a powerful variable to explain professionalized-campaign structure. Similarly, variable 'professionalized-campaign structure' is likely to take shape as an influential variable to explore professionalized-news and event management strategy. Variables of 'professional-campaign engagement' and 'professionalized-campaign structure' are a little bit less powerful in examining professionalized-audiences/electorates targeting, narrowcasting, and news and event management and campaign personalisation strategies.

Fifthly, this work also used a blindfolding technique of Smart-PLS 3.0 to determine the predictive relevancies of the exogenous variables used in the baseline structural model to a particular endogenous variable (q^2). The findings are summarized as follows. Predictive relevancies (q^2) values assessments indicated that PMO has a slightly medium q^2 for PATS and PCE. IO, VO, CO and CCO have slightly weak q^2 value for PCE, PCS, PATS, PNS, PCPS and PNEMS, while MO has a slightly medium q^2 for PCE and PCPS. PCE has a slightly medium q^2 value for PCS, PATS, PCPS and PNEMS, while PCS has slightly medium q^2 value for PATS, PNS and PCPS and PNEMS. Having evaluated such q^2 values using the ideas of Hair et al. (2014: 186), this work proposes the following propositions. Political marketing-orientation is fairly suitable to predict professional-campaign engagement and professionalized-audiences/electorates targeting strategy. Similarly, media-orientation is really relevant to predict professional-campaign engagement and campaign structure. However, internal-orientation, voter-orientation, competitor-orientation and campaign contributor-orientation are slightly less relevant to predict professionalized-campaign engagement and

campaign structure and professionalized-audiences/electorates targeting, narrowcasting, campaign personalization and news and event management strategies. Professionalized-campaign engagement is quite relevant to predict professionalized-campaign structure and professionalized-audiences/electorates targeting, narrowcasting, campaign personalization and news and event management strategies, while professionalized-campaign structure are reasonably relevant to predict such strategies.

Finally, this work also deployed that technique to evaluate the cross-validated redundancy measurements for each of endogenous variables that construct this model (Q2). These measurements resulted in Q2 values of more than 0. This evidences that each of these endogenous variables has predictive relevance for each of the endogenous variables of this model. This hints that the higher the likelihood of political parties to adopt political marketing-orientation, the much more likely these parties favoured advancing market-orientation. The higher the likelihood of these parties advanced market-orientation, the much more likely these parties preferred developing professionalization of campaigning. In other words, the greater the resources of political parties to adopt political marketing orientation and advance market-orientation, the much more likely these parties tend to be professionalized in campaigning.

Further to this, this work also conducted the Importance-Performance Matrix Analysis (IPMA) and revealed the subsequent findings. As seen from table 6.3, IO, VO, CO, MO and CCO resulted in weak total positive significant effects for PATS and PNS. Moreover, CCO, CO, IO and VO produced weak total positive significant effects on PCPS and created weak total positive significant effects for PCPS and PNEMS. Additionally, MO led to slightly moderate total positive significant effects on PCS and resulted in quite substantial total positive significant effects for PCPS and PNEMS. Overall, the lower-order variables that underlay 'market-orientation' (IO, VO, CO, MO and CCO) had moderate and

substantial performances and a range of importance, which is spreading from less important to quite important. This indicates that these variables in general, are theoretically important to evaluate the ways and the degree to which political parties advanced and prioritized the structural elements that constitute practices of professionalization of campaigning. This also hints that the more political parties succeed in advancing market-orientation, the much more likely these parties incline to be professionalized in campaigning.

Target Variables	Importance-Performances Matrixes
Professional-Campaign Engagement	
Professionalized-Campaign Structure	
Professionalized-Audiences/Electorates Targeting Strategy	
Professionalized-Narrowcasting Strategy	
Professionalized-Campaign Personalization Strategy	



Table 6.3: Importance-Performance Matrixes of Variables Underlying Political Market-Orientation as a First-Order Formative Variable Used as a Predictor for Elements Underlying Professionalization of Campaigning in the Baseline Structural Model

Nonetheless, this work also assessed Standardized Root Mean Square Residual (SRMR) Common Factor Model values Composite Model of the baseline structural model using Smart-PLS 3.0. The first one is SRMR value that does not contain the measurement error variance, while the second one is SRMR value with the measurement error variance. Henseler et al. (2014) voiced that SRMR values provide estimations regarding the ‘*average magnitude of the discrepancies between observed and expected correlations*’. Such estimations need to be undertaken in order to get an absolute measure of fit criterion value of the structural elements of the structural model and to determine a goodness of fit measure of this model. The rule of thumb is ‘*SRMR value less than 0.10 is considered a good fit*’ (Henseler et al., 2014). The work revealed that the baseline structural model has SRMR Common Factor Model value of 0.054 and t value 42.760 with p value < 0.001 and confidence interval of 90 % (0.052, 0.057). This model possesses SRMR Composite Model value of 0.043 and t value 31.968 with p value < 0.001 and confidence interval of 90 % (0.041, 0.046). These findings, according to the ideas of Henseler et al. (2014), indicate that this model has no substantial reliability validity and collinearity issues. These findings also validate that Indicators and measurements used to capture and evaluate variables that constitute this model seem to be reliable and valid and these variables are statistically plausible and relevant and have no crucial validity and collinearity issues as well. Such evidence indicates that this model is really

a good fit model and as a baseline theoretical model, this model has sufficient predictive power and statistical plausibility. We could, therefore, deploy this model as a workable and practical baseline conceptual model, as we want to holistically evaluate practices of marketization and professionalization of campaigning carried out by political parties in democratic countries, especially those sharing similarities with Indonesian politics.

6.2. Preliminary Conclusions and Discussions

Strömbäck (2007: 50) voiced that *'the distinction between political marketing, market-orientation, and marketing techniques is also often blurred, resulting in a conceptual lack of clarity'*. He also stated that *'political marketing and the professionalization of political campaigning should be viewed as two separate concepts, where both have implications for the planning and conduct of political campaigning, but where the concept of political marketing has much broader implications'* (Strömbäck, 2007: 63). This work, as seen from figure 6.1 and table 6.2, revealed findings that confirmed that political marketing orientation, market-orientation and professionalization of campaigning clearly took place as separate concepts and have multi-layered elements. Such findings also indicated that political marketing-orientation not only produced significant effects on all the variables that constitute market-orientation, but also generated significant effects on most of variables that underlay professionalization of campaigning. These findings not only clearly validated Strömbäck's (2007: 50) argument, but also obviously substantiated Strömbäck's (2007: 63) proposition.

Further to this, this work also uncovered that the relationships between concepts and practices of political marketing, market-orientation and professionalization of campaigning likely exist and solidly manifest. Such relationships, as summarised by the subsequent points, however, seem to be much more complex rather than what Strömbäck (2007: 50,

63) proposed. As showcased previously by table 6.2 and figure 6.1, the directions of path coefficient (β) values of structural relationships between political marketing-orientation and the elements that underlie market-orientation are positive and significant. Magnitudes of such values in general, are very substantial. However, the directions and magnitude of path coefficient (β) values of structural relationships between these elements and components that construct practices of professionalization of campaigning clearly vary⁵⁶. Moreover, as predictors for these components, variables of internal-orientation, voter-orientation, competitor-orientation and campaign contributors-orientation in general, had quite weak coefficients determination (R^2) values. However, these variables together with variable political marketing-orientation, as predictors for these components, had substantial R^2 value. Similarly, predictive relevancies values of these variables for these components are quite vary. Nonetheless, these variables in general, had moderate and substantial performances and a range of importance.

This evidence clearly indicated that such relationships, in essence, are quite complex. This complexity is particularly seen from the variability of direction and magnitude of the effects of the components that underlay market-orientation on the elements that constitute professionalization of campaigning. This complexity is also obviously perceived from the heterogeneity of statistical powers of these components to predict such elements as well. Regarding such conditions, this work formulated an

⁵⁶ As seen from table 6.2, three of such relationships (IO and PCE, IO and PCS and VO and PCE) have negative path coefficient (β) values. But, the rest of these relationships (VO and PCE, CO and PCE, CO and PCS, MO and PCE, MO and PCS, CCO and PCE and CCO and PCS) have positive path coefficient (β) values. Three of these relationships (IO and PCS, VO and PCS and CCO and PCS) have insignificant path coefficient (β) values. But, the rest of these relationships (IO and PCE, VO and PCE, CO and PCE, CO and PCS, MO and PCE, MO and PCS, and CCO and PCS) have significant path coefficient (β) values. Four of such relationships (IO and PCE, IO and PCS, PCE and PNS and VO and PCS) have weak negative path coefficients (β) values. But, the rest of such relationships (VO and PCE, CO and PCE, CO and PCS, MO and PCE, MO and PCS, CCO and PCE and CCO and PCS) have positive path coefficients (β) values.

alternative and more parsimonious structural model and carried out a following additional PLS-SEM analysis to evaluate this model.

6.3. Formulation and Evaluation of the Alternative Structural Model

This work deployed the lower-level reflective variables of IO, VO, CO, MO and CCO to formulate a higher-order formative variable of political market-orientation. Along with the other variables used in the baseline structural model, this variable was deployed to construct the alternative structural model. Table 6.4 displays a set of acronyms of these variables used in the PLS-SEM reports. Following points report the findings.

Variables	Acronyms
Political Marketing-Orientation	PMOa
Political Market-Orientation	PMOb
Professional-Campaign Engagement	PCE
Professionalized-Campaign Structure	PCS
Professionalized-Audiences/Electorates Targeting Strategy	PATS
Professionalized-Narrowcasting Strategy	PCS
Professionalized-Campaign Personalization Strategy	PCPS
Professionalized-News and Event Management Strategy	PNEMS

Table 6.4: Acronyms of the Variables that Construct the Alternative Structural Model

Firstly, evaluation results of measurement elements of this model indicate that this model has no crucial issues related with the internal consistency reliability, convergent validity and discriminant validity of reflective constructs and the convergence validity, collinearity issues and the significance and relevance of the indicators of formative constructs. Moreover, evaluation results of structural elements of this model demonstrate that this model has no significant collinearity issue. Additionally, evaluation results of path coefficient (β) values of such elements validate the existences of relationships between such elements. In this respect, PMOa is significantly correlated with and generates substantial effects on PMOb, PCE, PCS, PATS and PCPS. However, as displayed by table 6.5 and figure 6.2, PMOa is insignificantly associated with and produces less significant effects on PNS and PNEMS. PMOb is

significantly related with and carries out substantial effects on PCE and PCS. PCE is significantly related with and leads to substantial effects on PCS, PATS, PCPS and PNEMS, while PCS is significantly related with and produces strong significant effects on PATS, PNS, PCPS and PNEMS; but, PCE is insignificantly related with and generates insignificant effects on PNS. Such findings confirm that reflective variables that construct this model did not suffer from the internal consistency reliability, convergent validity and discriminant validity issues. Formative variables that form this model did not have substantial issues regarding the convergence validity, collinearity issues and the significance and relevance of their own indicators as well. More importantly, the relationships between these variables in general, are positive, strong and statistically significant. These validate that this model is theoretically reasonable and practically workable to capture and explore practices of marketization and professionalization of campaigning of political parties.

Structural Relationships	Path Coefficients (β) Value	t value	SL	p value	90 % Confidence Intervals)
PMOa→ PMOb	0.570	26.994	***	<0.001	(0.526, 0.607)
PMOa→ PCE	0.373	14.332	***	<0.001	(0.318, 0.419)
PMOa→ PCS	0.096	3.821	***	<0.001	(0.046, 0.149)
PMOa→ PATS	0.184	5.742	***	<0.001	(0.113, 0.243)
PMOa→ PCPS	0.092	3.193	***	0.001	(0.035, 0.144)
PMOa→ PNS	0.035	1.112	NS	0.262	(-0.023, 0.095)
PMOa→ PNEMS	0.024	0.887	NS	0.376	(-0.026, 0.073)
PMOb→PCE	0.373	14.332	***	<0.001	(0.324, 0.427)
PMOb→PCS	0.334	12.317	***	<0.001	(0.284, 0.385)
PCE→ PCS	0.466	17.399	***	<0.001	(0.410, 0.516)
PCE→ PATS	0.330	8.471	***	<0.001	(0.256, 0.408)
PCE→ PNS	0.011	0.366	NS	0.715	(-0.065, 0.087)
PCE→ PCPS	0.327	8.776	***	<0.001	(0.249, 0.404)
PCE→ PNEMS	0.304	8.964	***	<0.001	(0.235, 0.368)
PCS→ PATS	0.260	6.433	***	<0.001	(0.185, 0.337)
PCS→ PNS	0.355	8.706	***	<0.001	(0.279, 0.432)
PCS→ PCPS	0.372	9.952	***	<0.001	(0.296, 0.441)
PCS→ PNEMS	0.500	16.163	***	<0.001	(0.434, 0.556)

Table 6.5: Significance Testing Results of Structural Model Path Coefficients of the Variables of the Alternative Structural Model (Political Market-Orientation as a Second-Order Formative Variable)⁵⁷

⁵⁷ SL = Significance Levels NS= Not Significant




Figure 6.2: Evaluation Result that Visualizes the Alternative Structural Model with Path Coefficients Values (β) and Path Coefficient Determinations (R² values)

Secondly, this work revealed that the use of market-orientation, as a second-order variable, to predict the components that underlay professionalization of campaigning, led to moderate changes in the coefficients determination (R²) values. In this respect, all exogenous variables in this model, which predict variable PCS, resulted in R² value of 0.608. As compared to its R² value in the baseline structural model, its R²

value in the alternative structural model was little bit smaller. All exogenous variables in this model that predict PNS produced R2 value of 0.145. Similarly, this value was slightly smaller, as compared to R2 value of this variable in the baseline structural model; but, PCE, as an endogenous variable predicted by all exogenous variables in this model, had R2 value of 0.437. This value was slightly higher, as compared to R2 values of this variable in the baseline structural model. PNEMS, as an endogenous variable predicted by all exogenous variables in this model, had R2 value of 0.582. This value is quite bigger, as compared to R2 values of this variable in the baseline structural model. PCPS as an endogenous variable predicted by all exogenous variables in this model also had R2 value of 0.501. This value was slightly larger, as compared to R2 values of this variable in the baseline structural model. PATS, as an endogenous variable predicted by all exogenous variable in this model, had R2 value of 0.456. This value was larger, as compared to R2 value of this variable in the baseline structural model. These findings indicate that reformulation of market-orientation, as a second-order/higher-level formative variable, is likely to reduce the level of its relevancy to predict both professionalized-campaign structure and narrowcasting strategies. However, this reformulation is likely to elevate the level of its relevancy to predict professional-campaign engagement and professionalized-audiences/electorates targeting, campaign personalisation and news and event management strategies.

Thirdly, this work also uncovered that market-orientation (PMOb) as a set of practices resulted in visible total and indirect effects on the lower-level variables that construct practices of professionalization of campaigning (PCE, PCS, PATS, PNS, PCPS and PNEMS). As seen from table 6.6, PMOb generated visible total and indirect effects on these variables. Such effects stretch from moderate to very weak. PMOb also produced moderate total direct effects on PCE, PCS, PATS, PCPS and PNEMS, but weak total direct effects on PNS. PMOb led to moderate total

indirect effects on PCS, PATS, PCPS and PNEMS, but weak total indirect effects on PNS. These findings indicate that market-orientation, as a second-order/higher-level variable, is likely to generate moderate total direct and indirect effects on professional-campaign engagement, professionalized-campaign structure and developing professionalized-audiences/electorates targeting, campaign personalization and news and event management strategies. This validates the view that a high adaptation of market-orientation really propels political parties in tending to be much more professionalized, in terms of campaign structure and such campaign strategies.

	Path Coefficients (β) Value	t value	SL	p value	90 % Confidence Intervals)
Total Effects					
PMOb→ PCE	0.373	14.332	***	<0.001	(0.324, 0.427)
PMOb→PCS	0.508	19.460	***	<0.001	(0.458, 0.560)
PMOb→PATS	0.255	12.941	***	<0.001	(0.221, 0.295)
PMOb→PCPS	0.311	14.342	***	<0.001	(0.270, 0.356)
PMOb→PNS	0.185	9.558	***	<0.001	(0.151, 0.225)
PMOb→PNEMS	0.367	17.111	***	<0.001	(0.327, 0.408)
Indirect Effects					
PMOb→PCS	0.174	11.303	***	<0.001	(0.146, 0.204)
PMOb→PATS	0.255	19.941	***	<0.001	(0.221, 0.295)
PMOb→PCPS	0.311	14.342	***	<0.001	(0.270, 0.356)
PMOb→PNS	0.185	9.558	***	<0.001	(0.151, 0.225)
PMOb→PNEMS	0.367	17.111	***	<0.001	(0.327, 0.408)

Table 6.6: Total and Indirect Effects of Political Market-Orientation (as a Second-Order Formative Variable in the Alternative Structural Model) on The Low-Level Variables Underlying Professionalization of Campaigning⁵⁸

Finally, this work also found that all exogenous variables that construct this model, as predictors for each of endogenous variable that form this model, had Q2 value more than 0. This indicates that these endogenous variables have predictive relevance to predict each of these endogenous variables. This suggests that the bigger the resources of political parties to strategically adopt political marketing-orientation and advance market-orientation, the much more likely these parties incline to be professionalized in campaigning.

⁵⁸ SL = Significance Levels

This work also conducted the Importance-Performance Matrix Analysis (IPMA) and found the subsequent findings. *Firstly*, market-orientation, as a second-order/higher-level formative variable used to predict elements that constitute professionalization of campaigning, has a range of importance values, which stretch from less important to quite important. As seen from table 6.7, this variable leads to moderate total positive significant effects on professional-campaign engagement and professionalized-campaign structure, audiences/electorates targeting, campaign personalization and news and event management strategies. However, it generates weak total positive significant effects on professionalized-narrowcasting strategy. This demonstrates that political parties, which favoured advancing market-orientation, are likely to engage in having a professional-campaign and prefer developing professionalized-campaign structure and professionalized-audiences/electorates targeting, campaign personalization and news and event management strategies. This indicates that the higher the likeliness of political parties to strategically advance market-orientation, the much more likely these parties tend to be professionalized in terms of campaign structure and audiences/electorates targeting, campaign personalization and news and event management strategies.

Secondly, market-orientation, as a predictive variable for elements that underlay professionalization of campaigning, had slightly substantial performances. This point is summarized as follows. This variable is less powerful and applicable to predict professionalized-narrowcasting strategy. Nonetheless, this variable is really robust and relevant to assess professional-campaign engagement and campaign structure and professionalized-audiences/electorates targeting, campaign personalization and news and event management strategies. This validates variable market-orientation as quite less relevant and workable to evaluate the ways and the degree to which political parties advanced professionalized-campaign strategy. However, this variable is reasonably

and practically workable to examine the ways and the degree to which political parties engaged in having a professional-campaign and advanced and prioritized professionalized-campaign structure and professionalized-audiences/electorates targeting, campaign personalization and news and event management strategies.





Target Variables	The Importance-Performance Matrixes
Professional-Campaign Engagement	 <p>Professional Campaign Engagement</p> <p>Total Effects</p> <p>■ Political Market-Orientation ● Political Marketing-Orientation</p>
Professionalized-Campaign Structure	 <p>Professionalized-Campaign Structure</p> <p>Total Effects</p> <p>■ Political Market-Orientation ● Political Marketing-Orientation ▲ Professional Campaign Engagement</p>
Professionalized-Audiences/Electorates Targeting Strategy	 <p>Professionalized-Audiences/Electorates Targeting Strategy</p> <p>Total Effects</p> <p>■ Political Market-Orientation ● Political Marketing-Orientation ▲ Professional Campaign Engagement ◆ Professionalized-Campaign Structure</p>
Professionalized-Narrowcasting Strategy	 <p>Professionalized-Narrowcasting Strategy</p> <p>Total Effects</p> <p>■ Political Market-Orientation ● Political Marketing-Orientation ▲ Professional Campaign Engagement ◆ Professionalized-Campaign Structure</p>
Professionalized-Campaign Personalization Strategy	 <p>Professionalized-Campaign Personalization Strategy</p> <p>Total Effects</p> <p>■ Political Market-Orientation ● Political Marketing-Orientation ▲ Professional Campaign Engagement ◆ Professionalized-Campaign Structure</p>



Table 6.7: Importance-Performance Matrixes of Political Market-Orientation as a Second-Order Formative Variable Used as a Predictor for Elements Underlying Professionalization of Campaigning in the Alternative Structural Model

Nonetheless, this work also assessed Standardized Root Mean Square Residual (SRMR) Common Factor Model values Composite Model of this model and revealed the following findings. This model has SRMR Composite Model value of 0.057 with t value of 35.559 and $p > 0.001$ and Common Factor Model value of 0.041 with t value of 25.098 and $p > 0.001$. Having considered that these SRMR Composite Model and Common Factor values of this model are less than 0.10, this work confirmed that this model is a good fit model and has statistical plausibility. This validates this model as a really a workable model. This model is much more parsimonious, powerful and practical, as compared to the baseline structural model charted previously by figure 6.1. We could, therefore, use this model, as we want to systematically and holistically capture and explore practices of marketization and professionalization of campaigning advanced by political parties within and across democratic countries, particularly those that share similarities with Indonesian politics, within the specific contexts of the elections.

6.4. Final Conclusions.

Based on such findings, this work highlighted the following conclusions. Strömbäck (2007: 58) argued that *'under certain circumstances, being market oriented might facilitate the efforts of running more professionalized campaigns'*. The findings indicated that regardless of the party-specific factors, political parties in the new democracy of

Indonesia in general, favoured adopting the marketing concepts, procedures and techniques as an organisational strategy to address diverse political sub-markets and to advance practices of professionalization of campaigning in facing the parliamentary and presidential elections. Though lacking discussing of such 'certain circumstances', the findings, as showcased by figure 6.1 and table 6.2, clearly evidenced that the attitudinal orientations of these parties regarding these political sub-markets generated substantial structural effects on the ways and the degree to which these parties developed such practices strategically. The findings hinted that the more these parties considered voters-, competitor-, media- and campaign contributor-orientations, the more likely these parties engaged in having a professional-campaign and advancing a professionalized-campaign structure. The more these parties engaged on having a professional-campaign, the more likely these parties upgraded a professionalized-campaign structure. The more these parties preferred having a professional-campaign and developing a professionalized-campaign structure, the more likely these parties established professionalized-audiences/electorates targeting, campaign personalization and news and event management strategies. The more these parties favoured establishing a professionalized-campaign structure, the more likely these parties set up a professionalized-narrowcasting strategy.

The findings also confirmed that the relationships between concepts and practices of market-orientation and professionalization of campaigning were likely to exist. Table 6.2 visualized by figure 6.1 clearly indicated that adoption of a political marketing-orientation significantly influences adoption of the majority of the structural elements of a market-orientation and professional campaign. Two main components of market-orientation, a competitor-orientation and a media-orientation, significantly determine professional-campaign engagement and having a professionalized campaign structure. Voter-orientation shows significant

effects on adopting a professional-campaign, while a campaign contributors-orientation results in significant effects on professionalized-campaign structure. Similarly, figure 6.2 and table 6.5 also obviously exhibited that adaptation of a professional-campaign is correlated with advancements of professionalized-audiences/electorates targeting, campaign personalization and news and event management strategies. Correspondingly, adopting a professionalized-campaign structure is shown to be significant for adopting professionalized-audiences/electorates targeting, narrowcasting, campaign personalization and news and event management strategies. In other words, having successfully established a professionalized-campaign structure, political parties tend to be professionalized in terms of targeting electorates/voters, developing narrowcasting messages and a personalized campaign style and broadcasting such messages through various media outlets. Therefore, adopting a political marketing orientation leads directly to moving towards the adoption of a full market-orientation and having a professional campaign in terms of structure and strategy.

These findings evidence that a political marketing orientation really emerges as the most influential campaign paradigm (Strömbäck, 2007: 49) that determines the modes of marketization and professionalization, and the degrees of market-orientation and professionalized-campaign adopted by political parties (Strömbäck, 2007: 62-63). This demonstrates that the political marketing orientation, market-orientation and professionalization of campaigning are not, in reality, separate concepts and practices (Strömbäck, 2007: 50); rather that there are interdependent relationships between structural elements that constitute such concepts and practices, as displayed by the baseline structural and the alternative structural models. The data substantiates the arguments of Strömbäck (2007: 64), Mykkanen and Tenscher (2014: 25-26) and Tenscher et al. (2015: 113). More importantly, it validates the view that integrating these concepts and practices into a single model allows researchers to

systematically and holistically capture and understand how political parties develop such practices within and across the elections.

6.5. Summary

This chapter has evaluated the baseline and the alternative structural models using the survey data collected during the 2014 parliamentary and presidential elections. To evaluate the measurements and structural components of these models, this chapter evaluated the normality of the survey data and organized EFA and PCA of SPSS 23 and algorithm, bootstrapping and blindfolding procedures of PLS-SEM of Smart-PLS 3.0. Such efforts were taken to holistically evaluate the structural elements that constitute practices of marketization and professionalization of campaigning of the Indonesian political parties and explore the relationships between such elements. The research findings were displayed and discussed. The research conclusions were highlighted as well.

CHAPTER 7

PERCEPTIONS OF THE INDONESIAN POLITICAL PARTIES' MARKETERS/CAMPAIGNERS, LEADERS AND CANDIDATES REGARDING THE RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OF POLITICAL MARKET ARENAS AND THEIR EFFECTS ON MARKETIZATION AND PROFESSIONALIZATION OF CAMPAIGNING OF THESE PARTIES

Chapter Overview

Strömbäck (2007: 58-63, 2010: 21-27) and Strömbäck et al. (2012: 83-84) argued that the degree to which political parties realized the relative importance and relevance of political market arenas determines a choice (that has to be) made by such parties to advance market-orientation and/or professionalization of campaigning. However, since an appropriate analytical framework needed to evaluate this proposition has been under-developed (Strömbäck, 2007: 64-65), we lacked knowledge regarding the effects of perceptions of political parties in the emerging democracies regarding the relative importance of the internal party, the media and electoral arenas in the ways and the degree to which these parties advanced such practices within the specific context of the elections. Having regarded such conditions, I formulated this framework and deployed the survey data collected from these parties' marketers/campaigners during the 2014 parliamentary and the presidential elections and the in-depth interview data gathered from these parties' leaders/secretaries, candidates and professionals and political pollsters/consultants to capture and explore this issue within the specific context of Indonesian politics during these elections (RO 4). Point 7.1 spelled out the formulation and evaluation of this framework. Points 7.2-7.3 displayed operationalization of this framework and reported the quantitative and qualitative findings, respectively. Subsequently, point 7.4 discussed these findings and highlighted the research conclusions and its knowledge contributions.

7.1. Formulation and Evaluation of Dummy Models As An Analytical Framework

This analytical framework was developed as follows. *Firstly*, this work transformed the survey data collected during these elections, which measure perceptions of the Indonesian political parties' marketers/campaigners related to the relative importance of the internal party, the media and electoral arenas, into categorical moderator-grouping variables through the following procedures. Such perceptions were originally coded using Likerts' scales stretching from 1 (not important at all) to 5 (very important). Respondents who responded 1, 2 and 3 are grouped into group 1, while respondents who answered 4 and 5, respectively, are categorized into groups 2 and 3. These respondents were also classified based on the type of the election wherein they were being interviewed. Having run such procedures, this work finally generated 18 groups of samples. As charted by the following table 7.1, these groups were used to evaluate the following dummy models 1a-9a and 1b-9b. Each of these models incorporates more than 180 cases/samples. This condition meets the rule of thumb of the minimum sample size of PLS-SEM (Hair et al., 2013: 2-3; Hair, 2014: 23-24).

Perceptions of Marketers/Campaigners of Political Parties Regarding the Relative Importance of the Internal Party, the Media and Electoral Arenas as Categorical Moderator-Grouping variables	The 2014 Parliamentary Election		The 2014 Presidential Election	
	Dummy Models	Total Sample	Dummy Models	Total Sample
Internal party arena is not important at all - neither important nor unimportant	Model 1a	233	Model 1b	255
The internal party arena is important	Model 2a	264	Model 2b	234
The internal party arena is very important	Model 3a	220	Model 3c	228
The media arena is not important at all - neither important nor unimportant	Model 4a	235	Model 4b	192
The media arena is important	Model 5a	258	Model 5b	219
The media arena is very important	Model 6a	224	Model 6b	306
The electoral arena is not important at all - neither important nor unimportant	Model 7a	191	Model 7b	184

The electoral arena is important	Model 8a	254	Model 8b	230
The electoral arena is very important	Model 9a	270	Model 9b	303

Table 7.1: Total Samples Sizes of the Dummy Models 1a-9a and 1b-9b

Secondly, this work evaluated Standard Mean Root Square (SRMR) Common Factor Model and Composite Model values of these models to ensure that these dummy models have statistical power. Table 7.2 demonstrates that each of these dummy models, except for Model 3a and Model 3b, have SRMR Common Factor Model and SRMR Composite less than 0.10. Following Henseler et al.' (2014) idea, this work confirmed that each of these models is a good fit model and has sufficient statistical power.

Model	SRMR Common Factor Model	Confidence Interval of 95 %	SRMR Composite Model	Confidence Interval of 95 %
Model 1a	0.087	(0.079, 0.096)	0.073	(0.066, 0.082)
Model 1b	0.081	(0.074, 0.090)	0.068	(0.061, 0.076)
Model 2a	0.086	(0.078, 0.094)	0.070	(0.063, 0.078)
Model 2b	0.090	(0.080, 0.105)	0.075	(0.065, 0.087)
Model 3a	0.102	(0.093, 0.115)	0.064	(0.074, 0.095)
Model 3b	0.103	(0.092, 0.117)	0.083	(0.072, 0.098)
Model 4a	0.093	(0.084, 0.103)	0.077	(0.069, 0.086)
Model 4b	0.088	(0.080, 0.101)	0.076	(0.068, 0.087)
Model 5a	0.088	(0.081, 0.097)	0.072	(0.066, 0.081)
Model 5b	0.094	(0.084, 0.105)	0.079	(0.070, 0.088)
Model 6a	0.098	(0.089, 0.109)	0.081	(0.072, 0.091)
Model 6b	0.094	(0.086, 0.104)	0.075	(0.067, 0.084)
Model 7a	0.095	(0.085, 0.107)	0.082	(0.073, 0.093)
Model 7b	0.097	(0.086, 0.111)	0.083	(0.073, 0.096)
Model 8a	0.093	(0.085, 0.102)	0.075	(0.067, 0.084)
Model 8b	0.094	(0.084, 0.105)	0.078	(0.068, 0.089)
Model 9a	0.095	(0.087, 0.105)	0.077	(0.069, 0.087)
Model 9b	0.093	(0.085, 0.101)	0.075	(0.068, 0.084)

Table 7.2: Standard Mean Root Square (SRMR) Common Factor Model and Composite Model of the Dummy Models 1a-9a and 1b-9b

The following table 7.3 displays acronyms of variables that construct the baseline model and are used in PLS-MGA reports. In these reports, β (path coefficients) values differences with $p < 0.05$, and $p > 0.95$ indicate that such differences are statistically significant⁵⁹.

⁵⁹ The first one demonstrates that the structural path model (β path coefficients) value in the first dummy model is significantly smaller, as compared to the structural path model value in the second dummy model. In contrast, the second one shows that the structural

Variables	Acronyms
Political Marketing-Orientation	PMOa
Political Market-Orientation	PMOb
Professional-Campaign Engagement	PCE
Professionalized-Campaign Structure	PCS
Professionalized-Audiences/Electorates Targeting Strategy	PATS
Professionalized-Narrowcasting Strategy	PCS
Professionalized-Campaign Personalization Strategy	PCPS
Professionalized-News and Event Management Strategy	PNEMS

Table 7.3: Acronyms of Variables that Construct the Baseline Model and Used in the PLS-SEM reports of the Dummy Models 1a-9a and 1b-9b

7.2. The Quantitative Findings

Having evaluated these models using PLS-MGA, this work revealed the following findings.

7.2.1. The Effects of Perceptions of Party Marketers/Campaigners Regarding the Relative Importance of Internal Party Arena on Marketization and Professionalization of Campaigning of the Indonesian Political Parties Within the 2014 Parliamentary and Presidential Elections

These perceptions led to significant effects of professional-campaign engagement on professionalized-campaign structure in Models 2a and 3a. As seen from table 7.4, this effect in Model 2a is significantly smaller. Such perceptions also resulted in significant effects of professionalized-campaign structure on professionalized-news and event management strategy in Models 1a and 3a. This effect in Model 1a is significantly smaller. These findings indicate that within the specific context of the 2014 parliamentary election: political parties whose marketers/campaigners realized that this arena is important are much more professionalized, in term of campaign structure, compared to political parties whose marketers/campaigners who noticed that this arena is less, not and unimportant at all. However, as compared to the first one, political parties whose marketers/campaigners perceived that this arena is very

path model value in the first dummy model of is significantly larger as compared to the structural path model value in the second dummy model.

important are much more professionalized, in terms of campaign structure and news and event management strategy.

Path Models	Model 1a Vs. Model 2a		Model 1a Vs. Model 3a		Model 2a Vs. Model 3a	
	β Values Differences	ρ value	β Values Differences	ρ value	β Values Differences	ρ value
PMOa→PMOb	0.001	0.508	0.138	0.218	0.137	0.220
PMOa→PCE	0.002	0.508	0.077	0.218	0.079	0.220
PMOa→PATS	0.127	0.092	-	-	-	-
PMOb→PCE	0.129	0.069	0.083	0.177	0.046	0.700
PMOb→PCS	0.097	0.128	0.078	0.221	0.018	0.574
PCE→PCS	0.098	0.860	0.152	0.077	0.250	0.003
PCE→PATS	0.133	0.869	0.153	0.882	0.020	0.571
PCE→PCPS	0.145	0.905	0.075	0.741	0.070	0.263
PCE→PNEMS	0.110	0.873	0.105	0.842	0.006	0.482
PCS→PCPS	0.066	0.291	0.105	0.208	0.039	0.382
PCS→PNS	0.170	0.098	-	-	-	-
PCS→PNEMS	0.090	0.152	0.241	0.007	0.151	0.063

Table 7.4: PLS-MGA Results of Model 1a Vs. Model 2a, Model 1a Vs. Model 3a and Model 2a Vs. Model 3a

Such perceptions also generated significant effects of political market-orientation on professional-campaign engagement in Models 1b and 2b. As seen from table 7.5, this effect is significantly smaller for Model 1b. Such perceptions also resulted in significant effects of: a) political marketing-orientation on political market-orientation and professional-campaign engagement; and b) political market-orientation on professional-campaign engagement and professionalized-campaign structure in Models 1b and 3b. Such effects in Model 1b are significantly smaller. Such perceptions also created significant effects of: a) political marketing-orientation on political market-orientation and professional-campaign engagement; b) political market-orientation on professional-campaign engagement and professionalized-campaign structure; and c) professional-campaign engagement on professionalized-campaign structure in Models 2b and 3b. Such effects in Model 2b are significantly smaller. These findings indicate that within the specific contexts of the 2014 presidential election: political parties whose marketers/campaigners considered that this arena is important are much more market-orientated and professionalized, in terms of campaign structure and news and event

management strategy, as compared to political parties whose marketers/campaigners who realized that this arena is less, not and unimportant at all. However, as compared to these parties, political parties whose marketers/campaigners accounted for this arena as very important are much more market-orientated and professionalized, in terms of campaign structure and professionalized-news and event management and narrowcasting strategies.

Path Models	Model 1b Vs. Model 2b		Model 1b Vs. Model 3b		Model 2b Vs. Model 3b	
	β Values Differences	ρ value	β Values Differences	ρ value	β Differences	ρ value
PMOa→PMOb	0.009	0.552	0.136	0.043	0.145	0.033
PMOa→PCE	0.065	0.735	0.161	0.049	0.226	0.012
PMOa→PCS	-	-	-	-	0.143	0.918
PMOa→PATS	0.030	0.607	-	-	-	-
PMOb→PCE	0.212	0.017	0.087	0.175	0.125	0.912
PMOb→PCS	0.063	0.241	0.189	0.026	0.127	0.096
PCE→PCS	0.049	0.674	0.138	0.098	0.187	0.017
PCE→PATS	0.085	0.773	0.087	0.764	0.002	0.507
PCE→PCPS	0.077	0.738	0.041	0.643	0.036	0.359
PCE→PNS	-	-	-	-	-	-
PCE→PNEMS	0.014	0.457	0.023	0.585	0.037	0.650
PCS→PATS	0.122	0.145	0.071	0.281	0.051	0.674
PCS→PCPS	0.022	0.421	0.107	0.173	0.084	0.227
PCS→PNS	0.004	0.480	0.316	0.014	0.312	0.004
PCS→PNEMS	0.109	0.155	0.214	0.017	0.105	0.150

Table 7.5: PLS-MGA Results of Model 1b Vs. Model 2b, Model 1b Vs. Model 3b and Model 2b Vs. Model 3b

7.2.2. The Effects of Perceptions of Party Marketers/Campaigners Regarding the Relative Importance of the Media Arena on Marketization and Professionalization of Campaigning of the Indonesian Political Parties Within the 2014 Parliamentary and Presidential Elections

These perceptions led to significant effects of political market-orientation on professionalized-campaign engagement in Models 4a and 5a. As seen from table 7.6, this effect in Model 5a is significantly larger. They also generated significant effects of: a) political marketing-orientation on political market-orientation; b) professional-campaign engagement on professionalized-campaign structure and professionalized-news and event

management strategy; and c) professionalized-campaign structure on professionalized-narrowcasting strategy in Models 4a and 6a. Such effects in Model 4a are significantly smaller. They also produced significant effects of: a) political marketing-orientation on political market-orientation and professional-campaign engagement; b) professional-campaign engagement on professionalized-campaign structure; and c) professionalized-campaign structure on professionalized-narrowcasting strategy in Models 5a and 6a. Such effects in Model 5a are significantly smaller. They also resulted in significant effects of political market-orientation on professional-campaign engagement in these models. This effect in Model 5a is significantly larger. They also led to significant effects of: a) professional-campaign engagement on professionalized-campaign structure; and b) professionalized-campaign structure on professionalized-narrowcasting strategy and professionalized-news and event management strategy in Models 4b and 6b. As seen from table 7.7, such effects in Model 6b are significantly larger. They also created significant effects of political market-orientation on professional-campaign engagement in Models 4b and 5b. This effect in Model 5b is significantly larger. They also resulted in significant effects of professional-campaign engagement on professionalized-audiences/electorates targeting strategy in these Models; but, this effect in Model 5b is significantly smaller. They also generated significant effects of professionalized-campaign structure on professionalized-news and event management strategy in Models 5b and 6b. This effect in Model 6b is significantly larger.

Path Models	Model 4a Vs. Model 5a		Model 4a Vs. Model 6a		Model 5a Vs. Model 6a	
	β Differences	ρ value	β Differences	ρ value	β Differences	ρ value
PMOa→PMOb	0.018	0.603	0.134	0.047	0.152	0.033
PMOa→PCE	0.141	0.927	0.094	0.178	0.235	0.011
PMOa→PATS	0.079	0.781	-		-	
PMOb→PCE	0.237	0.006	0.000	0.498	0.237	0.996
PMOb→PCS	0.055	0.256	0.030	0.378	0.025	0.593
PCE→PCS	0.057	0.738	0.158	0.046	0.215	0.006
PCE→PATS	0.009	0.476	0.080	0.723	0.088	0.766
PCE→PCPS	0.071	0.732	0.005	0.522	0.065	0.253

PCE→PNS	-		-		-	
PCE→PNEMS	0.030	0.605	0.155	0.048	0.126	0.899
PCS→PATS	0.047	0.342	0.143	0.162	0.097	0.243
PCS→PCPS	0.083	0.232	0.056	0.673	0.140	0.895
PCS→PNS	0.094	0.767	0.396	0.003	0.490	0.000
PCS→PNEMS	0.028	0.389	0.076	0.219	0.048	0.308

Table 7.6: PLS-MGA Results of Model 4a Vs. Model 5a, Model 4a Vs. Model 6a and Model 5a Vs. Model 6a

Path Models	Model 4b Vs. Model 5b		Model 4b Vs. Model 6b		Model 5b Vs. Model 6b	
	β Differences	ρ value	β Differences	ρ value	β Differences	ρ value
PMOa→PMOb	0.018	0.403	0.094	0.129	0.076	0.187
PMOa→PCE	0.032	0.636	0.125	0.097	0.157	0.060
PMOa→PCS	0.017	0.571	0.129	0.878	0.112	0.837
PMOa→PATS	0.064	0.267	-		-	
PMOb→PCE	0.161	0.036	0.209	0.288	0.112	0.878
PMOb→PCS	0.037	0.668	0.049	0.318	0.085	0.219
PCE→PCS	0.085	0.189	0.048	0.025	0.124	0.124
PCE→PATS	0.187	0.960	0.072	0.727	0.115	0.155
PCE→PCPS	0.136	0.902	0.003	0.486	0.138	0.108
PCE→PNEMS	0.014	0.557	0.006	0.523	0.008	0.468
PCS→PATS	0.174	0.071	0.014	0.459	0.160	0.890
PCS→PCPS	0.045	0.340	0.002	0.513	0.048	0.654
PCS→PNS	0.138	0.156	0.296	0.012	0.158	0.126
PCS→PNEMS	0.041	0.323	0.296	0.027	0.166	0.049

Table 7.7: PLS-MGA Results of Model 4b Vs. Model 5b, Model 4b Vs. Model 6b and Model 5b Vs. Model 6b

These findings indicate that within the specific contexts of either the 2014 parliamentary or the 2014 presidential elections, such perceptions generated significant effects on the ways and the degree to which these parties advanced market-orientation and professionalization of campaigning. Within these elections, political parties whose marketers/campaigners realized that this arena is important are much more market-orientated and engaged in having a professional campaign, as compared to political parties whose marketers/campaigners perceived that this arena is less, not and unimportant at all. However, as compared to these parties, political parties whose marketers/campaigners noticed that this arena is very important are much more market-orientated and professionalized, in terms of campaign structure, news and event management and narrowcasting strategies.

7.2.3. The Effects of Perceptions of Party Marketers/Campaigners Regarding the Relative Importance of the Internal Party Arena on Marketization and Professionalization of Campaigning of the Indonesian Political Parties Within the 2014 Parliamentary and Presidential Elections

These perceptions led to significant effects of political market-orientation on professional-campaign engagement in Models 7a and 8a. As seen from table 7.8, this effect in Model 7a is significantly smaller. They also generated significant effects of: a) political marketing-orientation on political market-orientation; and b) professionalized-campaign structure on professionalized-campaign personalization strategy in Models 7a and 9a. These effects in Model 7a are significantly smaller. They also resulted in significant effects of professional-campaign engagement on professionalized-narrowcasting strategy in these models. This effect in Model 7a is significantly larger. They also produced significant effects of: a) political marketing-orientation on political market-orientation; b) professional-campaign engagement on professionalized-campaign structure; and c) professionalized-campaign structure on professionalized-news and event management strategy in Models 8a and 9a. Such effects in Model 8a are significantly smaller. They also created significant effects of professional-campaign engagement on professionalized-narrowcasting strategy in these Models. This effect in Model 8a is significantly larger. These findings indicate that, within the specific context of the 2014 parliamentary election, political parties whose marketers/campaigners noticed that this arena is important are much more market-orientated and engaged in having a professional campaign, as compared to political parties whose marketers/campaigners realized that this arena is less, not and unimportant at all. However, as compared to these parties, political parties whose marketers/campaigners perceived that this arena is very important are much more market-orientated and professionalized, in terms of campaign structure and campaign personalisation strategy.

Such perceptions also generated significant effects of: a) political market-orientation on professional-campaign engagement; b) professional-campaign engagement on professionalized-campaign structure; and c) professionalized-campaign structure on professionalized-narrowcasting and professionalized-news and event management strategies in Models 7b and 9b. As seen from table 7.9, such effects in Model 7b are significantly smaller. They also resulted in significant effects of: a) professional-campaign engagement on professionalized-campaign structure; and b) professionalized-campaign structure on professionalized-audiences/electorates targeting, professionalized-campaign personalization and professionalized-news and event management strategies in Models 8b and 9b. Such effects in Model 8b are significantly smaller. These findings demonstrate that, within the specific context of the 2014 presidential election, political parties whose marketers/campaigners recognized that this arena is important are much more market-orientated and professionalized in terms of campaign structure, narrowcasting and news and event management strategies, as compared to political parties whose marketers/campaigners accounted for this arena as less and unimportant at all. Nonetheless, as compared to these parties, political parties whose marketers/campaigners considered that this arena is very important are much market-oriented and professionalized in terms of campaign structure, audiences/electorates targeting, campaign personalization and news and event management strategies.

Path Models	Model 7a Vs. Model 8a		Model 7a Vs. Model 9a		Model 8a Vs. Model 9a	
	β Differences	ρ value	β Differences	ρ value	β Differences	ρ value
PMOa→PMOb	0.036	0.683	0.161	0.025	0.197	0.007
PMOa→PCE	0.079	0.768	0.008	0.528	0.071	0.241
PMOa→PATS	0.107	0.155	-	-	-	-
PMOb→PCE	0.219	0.016	0.124	0.096	0.095	0.845
PMOb→PCS	0.134	0.080	0.128	0.089	0.006	0.523
PCE→PCS	0.096	0.830	0.066	0.261	0.162	0.027
PCE→PATS	0.028	0.417	0.026	0.579	0.054	0.679
PCE→PCPS	-	-	-	-	0.059	0.700
PCE→PNS	0.100	0.795	0.420	0.999	0.320	0.997
PCE→PNEMS	0.082	0.238	0.135	0.882	0.167	0.938

PCS→PATS	0.057	0.653	-		-	
PCS→PCPS	0.145	0.115	0.276	0.013	0.131	0.129
PCS→PNS	0.029	0.395	-		-	
PCS→PNEMS	0.059	0.722	0.141	0.093	0.200	0.015

Table 7.8: PLS-MGA Results of Model 7a Vs. Model 8a, Model 7a Vs. Model 9a and Model 8a Vs. Model 9a

Path Models	Model 7b Vs. Model 8b		Model 7b Vs. Model 9b		Model 8b Vs. Model 9b	
	β Differences	ρ value	β Differences	ρ value	β Differences	ρ value
PMOa→PMOb	0.027	0.372	0.092	0.121	0.065	0.199
PMOa→PCE	0.051	0.674	0.003	0.486	0.055	0.307
PMOa→PCS	-		-		0.070	0.756
PMOb→PCE	0.147	0.078	0.213	0.018	0.066	0.233
PMOb→PCS	0.082	0.209	0.074	0.236	0.008	0.535
PCE→PCS	0.026	0.401	0.190	0.049	0.164	0.035
PCE→PATS	-		-		0.011	0.461
PCE→PCPS	0.007	0.529	0.038	0.623	0.031	0.611
PCE→PNS	-		-		-	
PCE→PNEMS	0.035	0.629	0.098	0.811	0.063	0.738
PCS→PATS	0.069	0.726	0.119	0.167	0.187	0.048
PCS→PCPS	0.081	0.758	0.095	0.215	0.176	0.047
PCS→PNS	0.130	0.167	0.298	0.017	0.167	0.087
PCS→PNEMS	0.008	0.461	0.212	0.021	0.203	0.015

Table 7.9: PLS-MGA Results of Model 7b Vs. Model 8b, Model 7b Vs. Model 9b and Model 8b Vs. Model 9b

7.3. The Quantitative Findings

7.3.1. Political, Media and Election Regulations as Determinant Factors

Enactments of Laws No.40/1999, No.32/2002, No.2/2011, No.15/2011, No.8/2012 and No.42/2008⁶⁰ gradually generated the underlying structures and mechanisms that systematically determined perceptions of the Indonesian political parties' marketers/campaigners, leaders and candidates regarding the importance of political market arenas and political sub-markets. This point is summarized as follows. Implementations of the first and second laws led to formation of the new democratic-liberal media system, decreasing roles of the Indonesian

⁶⁰ The first law was enacted alongside the process of the amendment of the Indonesian National Constitution of 1945. Soon after this constitution was amended, the second law was constituted. The subsequent laws were actually alterations of the existing democratic political, media and election regulations, which were constituted soon after this constitution was rewritten completely.

public/government media (TVRI and RRI) and increasing roles of the Indonesian commercial media taking place in the new democracy of Indonesia. The third law ruled the establishment and management of political parties in Indonesian politics. The fourth law constituted arrangement of the national and local elections. The fifth and sixth laws defined the organization of the 2014 parliamentary and presidential elections and paved the way for development of the candidate-centre electoral system. The fifth law regulated the open-list proportional representation system to vote for political parties' MPs candidates in the 2014 parliamentary election and constituted the minimum number of this election threshold, which is 3.5 % of popular votes collected by each of the political parties in this election. The sixth law set up a mechanism to vote for a pair of presidential candidates and defined the minimum number of the 2014 presidential election threshold that is 25 % of popular votes or 20 % of parliamentary seats gathered in the 2014 parliamentary election, which has to be fulfilled by those who want to nominate this pair of presidential candidates for running in this election.

Establishment of these laws directly and indirectly paved the way for development of the multi-party, liberal-democratic media and election systems. These systems not only contrived political polarization and competition between and among the Indonesian political parties, but also shaped the characteristics and structural conditions of political market arenas and political sub-markets⁶¹. As detailed by the following points, perceptions of these parties' leaders, politicians and candidates regarding the relative importance of these political market arenas determined the ways of and the degree to which these parties advanced market-orientation and managed professionalization of campaigning within and across the 2014 parliamentary and presidential elections.

⁶¹ Personal interviews with RCA of Golkar Party, 13 May, 2014, PL of Gerindra Party, 22 November 2014, VYM of PAN, 7 May 2014, SM of PPP, 18 May 2014 and IJP of Golkar Party, 28 October 2014

7.3.2. Perceptions of the Indonesian Political Parties' Leaders and Candidates Regarding the Relative Importance of the Internal Party, Electoral and the Media Arenas and Their Effects on Marketization and Professionalization of Campaigning of these Parties Within the Specific Context of the 2014 Parliamentary Election

Since such systems took place and the open-list proposition method to vote for the Indonesian political parties' MPs candidates were implemented, most of these parties' leaders and MPs candidates prioritized promoting himself or herself, and addressing primary actors in the electoral arenas as an individual politician rather than his or her party and organization, much more⁶². These parties' MPs candidates approached and targeted the electorates populated in his or her parliamentary constituency intensively as a primary political sub-market and exploited members, activists and officials of political parties to which they were affiliated to persuade and mobilize these electorates. Some of them tactically approached campaign donors to gain sufficient campaign funds to finance their own marketing and campaign programmes. Since the mainstream media took shape as a crucial political sub-market those who were nominated in the urban parliamentary constituencies strategically addressed these media to promote their own personal profiles to the targeted electorates⁶³.

Establishment of such systems and implementation of that method also transformed the ways these parties' MPs candidates perceived their competitors. Most of them commonly framed competitors based on types of: a) political parties that nominated such competitors as MPs candidates; and b) electorates inhabiting the parliamentary constituencies targeted by

⁶² Personal interviews with IJP of Golkar party, 28 October 2014, PL of Gerindra Party, 22 November 2014 and VYM of PAN, 7 May 2014.

⁶³ Personal interviews with AD, a professional employed by an MP candidate of Golkar Party, 15 July 2014, PSL of JSI, 12 October 2014.

such competitors⁶⁴. Within the specific context of this election, they classified their competitors into two camps, which are the internal- and the external-competitors. The first one refers to MPs candidates nominated by competitors of political parties they associated with. The second one relates to their colleagues who were being nominated by their own parties as MPs candidates who targeted exactly similar electorates in a parliamentary constituency that they approached and mobilized⁶⁵.

Having considered the characteristics of the electoral arena in parliamentary constituencies they represented, most of these parties' MPs candidates approached and exploited these parties' members, activists and officials who were not being nominated as MPs candidates intensively to market and promote their own personal profiles to the targeted electorates. In addressing this issue, SM, a leader of PPP voiced as follow.

“Since the total number of these candidates was significantly unequal with the total number of parliamentary seats allocated in each of 77 parliamentary constituencies, each of these MPs candidates favoured addressing his/her party activists, officials and members to manage the internal party and electoral arenas and deal with the targeted electorates to make sure that these electorates strongly recognize his/her personal profile and/or political policies and products he/she offered”⁶⁶.

The ways these parties and these parties' candidates targeted these electorates and addressed such competitors led to immense internal and external competition taking place within and across the internal party and electoral arenas. In describing such competitions, PL, an incumbent MP of Gerindra Party, presents his personal testimony as follows.

⁶⁴ Personal interviews with IJP of Golkar party, 28 October 2014, PL of Gerindra Party, 22 November 2014 and VYM of PAN, 7 May 2014.

⁶⁵ Most of the non-incumbent MPs candidates of the Indonesian political parties strongly reckoned with both the internal- and the external-competitors. But, most of incumbent MPs candidates of these parties were much more focused on the external-competitors. Some of them also intensively managed the internal-competitors under a 'condition' that the unmanageable internal-competitor could lead them to losing a chance to get a parliamentary seat in this election. Personal interviews with SM of PPP, 18 May 2014 and IN of PKB, 14 May 2014.

⁶⁶ Personal interview, 18 May 2014.

“Together with my fellows, I was trained by our party leaders and political consultants a few years before the 2014 parliamentary election was held. The main goal was to improve our skills to be outstanding politicians and professional marketers and campaigners as well. Our party top-leader expected that most of us would get elected in this election. But, since we shared a parliamentary constituency, each of us not only had to defeat our (external-) competitors, but also had to fight each other (the internal-competitor). Like most of the top-leaders of the other political parties did, our party top-leader also turned a blind eye to this condition. We were actually like gladiators, being trained together, but having to kill each other to capture the substantial number of voters that can be extracted as parliamentary seats”⁶⁷.

Generally speaking, the perceptions of these parties’ leaders and MPs candidates regarding the relative importance of the internal party, the media and electoral arenas, determined the ways and the degree to which these parties advanced market-orientation and professionalization of campaigning in facing this election. However, the following factors also influenced the ways of and the degree to which they advanced such practice. They include: a) geographical conditions of parliamentary constituencies they represent; and b) levels of campaign resources of these parties and these parties’ MPs candidates⁶⁸. In this respect, MPs candidates who had plenty or medium amounts of campaign resources, and were being nominated in the parliamentary election districts located in the urban areas, holistically considered these political market arenas and strategically addressed the electorates, the media and competitors as political sub-markets. They also strongly favoured hiring political consultants and professionals to set up proficient campaign structures and strategies. Most of them attempted to establish proficient electorate targeting and campaign personalization strategies to persuade and mobilize the targeted electorates. In order to run such strategies, they set up groups of marketers/campaigners who were labelled as *‘tim sukses’*

⁶⁷ Personal interview, 22 November 2014.

⁶⁸ Personal interview with VYM of PAN, 7 May 2014 and RCA of Golkar Party, 13 May 2014.

(the success team) or camouflaged as *'relawan'* (campaign-volunteers). Some of them combined these strategies with the narrowcasting and news and event management strategies. This effort was specifically directed to capture the 'swing voters', the 'undecided voters' and 'apathetic voters' inhabiting the parliamentary constituencies they represent⁶⁹.

Meanwhile, most of these parties' MPs candidates nominated to represent parliamentary constituencies located in rural and remote areas commonly had moderate or small amounts of campaign funds⁷⁰. They strongly accounted for the electoral and internal party arenas, but considered the media arena less. They approached the electorates and competitors robustly as political sub-markets, but engaged less in addressing the media as a political sub-market. They also strongly favoured investing their resources to run electorate targeting and campaign personalization strategies rather than the narrowcasting and news and event management strategies. Most of them recruited local leaders whose strong political patronages with and understanding of the socio-demographic, characteristics and political cultures of voters who populated the local districts, employed local leaders who were not officially affiliated with any political party and deployed a group of marketers/campaigners, which was also called as *'tim sukses'* (the success team)⁷¹.

⁶⁹ These voters are emic categories formulated, recognized and used by most of these Indonesian political candidates during the 2014 parliamentary and presidential elections. The first one was the biggest number of voters who occupied the middle ground, settled in either the urban or the rural areas and had sufficient knowledge and information, but had no preference to any political party and party candidate and have been associated less with political parties. The second one was a group of voters populated in both the urban and rural areas who had sufficient political knowledge and information, but did not yet have political preference to any political party and party candidate. The last one commonly came from the middle-class families who were reluctant to cast their votes for any political party or party candidates. Personal interviews with PL of Gerindra Party, 22 November 2014, VYM of PAN, 7 May 2014, SM of PPP, 18 May 2014, AT of PPP, 19 June 2014 and RCA of Golkar Party, 13 May, 2014

⁷⁰ The Indonesian general election commission validated that only some of them that had a substantial personal (official) campaign fund.

⁷¹ Personal interviews with PL of Gerindra Party, 22 November 2014, VYM of PAN, 7 May 2014, SM of PPP, 18 May 2014, AT of PPP, 19 June 2014, RCA of Golkar Party, 13 May,

Regardless of geographical conditions of parliamentary constituencies they represent, most of these parties' MPs candidates commonly organized a 'special-confidential team'. Those who had plenty of campaign resources employed professional consultants to train and supervise members of this team, strategically manage the internal party and the media arenas and target various groups of voters in the electoral arena. However, those who disfavoured employing such consultants or had limited campaign resources favoured managing this team personally much more. Instead of hiring such consultants, they greatly preferred developing the *clientelistic* and *vote-buying strategies*⁷². Members of this team commonly offered small sums of money and/or provided enjoyments to lure the '*clientelistic voters*' and '*cash and carry-oriented voters*'⁷³.

A few months before this election was held, most of the Indonesian political parties had to deal with the increasing magnitude of internal competition between and among their MPs candidates who targeted and approached groups of the electorates, media and competitors located in

2014, IN of PKB, 14 May 2014, WA of Nasdem Party 29 October 2014, AB, a Deputy General Secretary of PDIP, 11 June 2014 and DS, a leader of PKS, 12 November 2014

⁷² Law No.8/2012 actually prohibited the Indonesian political parties' MPs candidates from applying the vote-buying strategy. Nonetheless, these MPs candidates commonly deployed the 'special unofficial campaign team' to execute this strategy. In some cases, the election monitoring officials found unacceptable attitudes and behaviours of members of the 'unofficial confidential campaign team' of some of these MPs candidates who carried out this strategy in their parliamentary constituencies. However, these officials failed to prosecute these evidences due to the following reasons. *Firstly*, these officials lacked the capability to prove the existence of personal or professional connections between those who ran this strategy and MPs candidates who hired them. *Secondly*, this law did not regulate the punishment subjected to the electorates who benefitted from MPs candidates who ran this strategy. *Thirdly*, the electorates who benefitted from these MPs candidates disfavoured reporting evidences to these officials. This condition led to these officials losing a legal standing position to prosecute these evidences.

⁷³ These voters are also emic categories introduced and recognized and used by most of these Indonesian political candidates during the 2014 parliamentary and presidential elections. These clientelistic voters commonly populated the rural areas and have been strongly associated with the traditional, tribal, cultural and religious leaders. The 'cash and carry-oriented voters' commonly came from the uneducated lower and working-class families who favoured accepting some small cash money offered by the confidential campaign teams of the Indonesian political parties and these parties' candidates. The first one was strongly visible within and across these elections. But, the last one was much more obvious within the specific context of the 2014 parliamentary election. Personal interviews with PL of Gerindra Party, 22 November 2014, VYM of PAN, 7 May 2014, SM of PPP, 18 May 2014, AT of PPP, 19 June 2014 and RCA of Golkar Party, 13 May 2014.

similar parliamentary constituencies intensively. They organized special efforts to handle this issue. In this respect, Golkar Party, Gerindra Party, PDIP, Nasdem Party, PAN PKB and PKS established a set of internal party regulations to manage this issue tactically⁷⁴. Hanura Party and PPP did not develop such regulations. Instead, these parties merely expected each of their MPs candidates could deliberately manage this issue properly⁷⁵.

The following issues also determined the degree to which these parties considered the importance of the internal party, electoral and the media arenas, addressed political sub-markets and ran professionalization of campaigning in facing this election. *Firstly*, the top-leader or public figure of the party expected to get sufficient numbers of popular votes or parliamentary seats to secure a presidential ticket for running in the 2014 presidential election. *Secondly*, the internal consolidation of party members, activists and officials has been under-developed. *Thirdly*, the internal party arena has been heavily fragmented and less manageable. *Fourthly*, the mainstream media intensively reported crucial cases focusing on the party top-leader and public figure and the framing and tones of political news produced by these media regarding such cases strongly influenced the images of the party top-leader and public figure and destroyed the electorates' trust in and approval of the party. *Finally*, the electorates' trust and/or approval of the party not only declined substantially, but also undermined the party's chances to pass the minimum number of the 2014 parliamentary election threshold and gain a

⁷⁴ Marketers/campaigners and political consultants/experts hired by these parties' MPs candidates also have to comply with this regulation. Personal interviews with RCA of Golkar Party, 13 May 2014, PL of Gerindra Party, 22 November 2014, VYM of PAN, 7 May 2014, WA of Nasdem Party 29 October 2014, AB, a Deputy General Secretary of PDIP, 11 June 2014, DS, a leader of PKS, 12 November 2014 and IN of PKB, 14 May 2014.

⁷⁵ Personal interviews with YC of Hanura Party, 14 May 2014 and SM of PPP, 22 November 2014.

substantial number of parliamentary seats in this election⁷⁶. The subsequent points detail the consequences of such issues on the ways and the degree to which these parties advanced such practices.

Since dealing with the first issue, Golkar Party, PDIP and Gerindra Party called their MPs candidates intensively to collect substantial numbers of popular votes and parliamentary seats that met with the minimum number of the 2014 presidential election threshold⁷⁷, while Hanura Party prioritized the media and the electoral arenas over the internal party arena⁷⁸. PDIP, Gerindra Party, PAN and PKB encountered the second and third issues less, while Nasdem Party and Hanura Party faced the second issue. Like Golkar Party, PPP experienced the third issue⁷⁹. However, though they stumbled across these issues, this party addressed the media arena less. Although they suffered most from the fourth and fifth issues, Democratic Party and PKS intensively addressed not only the media arena, but also the electoral and internal party arenas. Following short stories delineated this point.

On 30 May 2011, the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) named MN, a general treasurer of the Democratic Party, as a suspect for receiving bribes from the construction projects of the homestead for athletes and Hambalang sport centre. As they ran a further investigation related to such cases, this commission also declared that AS, a deputy secretary of this party, had been implicated in the first case and AAU, a general chairman of this party and AAM, an influential leader of this party, had been involved in the second case. Soon after this commission exposed these cases, most of the Indonesian mainstream media were

⁷⁶ Extracted from personal interviews with YC of Hanura Party, 14 May 2014, WA, a Deputy General Secretary of Nasdem Party 29 October 2014 and RP of Democratic Party, 13 May 2014.

⁷⁷ Personal interviews with PL of Gerindra Party, 22 November 2014, RCA of Golkar Party, 13 May 2014 and AB of PDIP, 11 June 2014.

⁷⁸ Personal interview with YC of Hanura Party, 14 May 2014.

⁷⁹ Personal interviews with PL of Gerindra Party, 22 November 2014, VYM of PAN, 7 May 2014, SM of PPP, 18 May 2014, RCA of Golkar Party, 13 May 2014, YC of Hanura Party, 14 May 2014, WA of Nasdem Party 29 October 2014, AB of PDIP, 11 June 2014 and IN of PKB, 14 May 2014.

negatively framing these cases. At the same time, the electorates' approval of this party, as reported by some prominent Indonesian pollsters, declined substantially from more or less 20 % in 2011 to more or less 8 % in February 2013.

Such problems led this party as an organisation to lose its competitive chances in strategically managing the electorates, the media and campaign donor and tackling its competitors as well. This party and its MPs candidates actually spent plenty of resources in handling the media and the Internet and social media users to restore the image of this party and elevate the electorates' trust and approval of this party. MPs candidates of this party also effortlessly developed campaign structure and electorate targeting, campaign personalization and news and event management strategies to deal with the media and the internal- and the external-competitor and persuade and capture various groups of electorates populated in the parliamentary constituencies. However, such efforts were less workable in upgrading the level of electorate trust and support of this party and its MPs candidates⁸⁰.

PKS also faced such problems. Since KPK arrested LHI, a president of this party on 29 January 2013 for a bribery case, most of the Indonesian mainstream media reported this in negative tones. As the electorates' approval of this party gradually declined, this party made the following efforts. *Firstly*, this party constantly monitored the frames and contents of these media regarding this case and ran a tracking survey to systematically evaluate the structural effects of the media exposure on the electorates' perceptions, trust and approval of this party and its MPs candidates. *Secondly*, this party solidified its members, activists and officials and strived for developing media relations, organizing a tour of the offices of mainstream media and spinning the agenda setting of the mainstream media in reporting this case to manage the media arena; and harnessing the Internet and social media to respond to opinions of the

⁸⁰ Personal interview with RP of Democratic Party, 13 May 2014.

Internet and social media users regarding work performances and images of this party, its top-leader and its MPs candidates. *Thirdly*, this party set up a more centralised communication structure, established a war room and rapid rebuttal-unit, recruited and trained large numbers of campaign staff, organized special professional teams and advanced electorates/targeting and narrowcasting strategies to strategically manage the internal, electoral and the media arena and address its competitors, the internet and social media users, the electorates—in general—and targeted voters—in particular. Further to this, MPs candidates of this party also continuously upgraded their own campaign structure and campaign personalisation strategies and some of them, especially those who were nominated in the urban parliamentary constituencies, combined these strategies with the narrowcasting and news and event management strategies. In taking such efforts, this party succeeded in getting the popular voters needed to secure the parliamentary seats they targeted in this election⁸¹.

Further to the aforementioned factors, party ideology, campaign resources, position in the government and competitive chance to nominate its top-leader/public figure for running in the 2014 presidential election race also determined the ways of and the degree to which the Indonesian political parties advanced market-orientation and professionalization of campaigning within the specific context of the 2014 parliamentary election. This point is spelled out as follows. Neither secular-Islamic parties (PAN and PKB) nor Islamist parties (PKS and PPP) had large amounts of campaign resources and each of these parties lacked this chance. Conversely, being supported by a substantial amount of campaign resources, most of the secular-nationalist parties (Golkar Party, PDIP, Democratic Party, Gerindra Party and Hanura Party) had this chance. Compared to either of these secular-Islamic or these Islamist parties,

⁸¹ Personal interviews with TR, a former general secretary of PKS, 18 May 2014 and DS, a leader of PKS, 12 November 2014.

these secular-nationalist parties managed the electoral and the media arenas, targeted diverse groups of political sub-markets and placed substantial numbers of political advertising programmes in various Indonesian mainstream media, especially TV channels, to persuade and mobilize the electorates as the primary political sub-market much more intensively.

Being chaired by popular leaders and having this chance, two small-sized secular-nationalist opposition parties, which are Gerindra Party and Hanura Party, and a big-sized secular-nationalist non-opposition party, which is Golkar Party, robustly advanced such efforts. However, though led by non-populist leaders and lacking this opportunity, a new small-sized secular-nationalist political party, that is Nasdem Party, also developed such strategies as well⁸². Slightly differently, a big-sized secular-nationalist opposition party, which is PDIP, that had an influential top-leader and public figure, favoured prioritizing the internal and electoral arenas over the media arena more. This party also placed political advertising programmes on these TV channels to address the electorates as a primary actor in the electoral arena⁸³. However, compared to Golkar Party or Hanura Party or Gerindra Party or Nasdem Party, this party invested less of its resources in handling the media arena. Instead, this party much preferred allocating its resources to manage the internal party and the electoral arenas and encouraging its members, officials and activists in dealing with its competitors and developing professional campaign structures and strategies to persuade and capture the electorates and targeted voters⁸⁴.

Along with these factors, types of parliamentary constituencies, the degree of campaign resources and these parties' MPs candidates also took place as important factors. These factors determined the ways of and

⁸² Personal interviews with AM, General Secretary of Gerindra Party, 5 November 2014, RCA of Golkar Party, 13 May 2014, YC of Hanura Party, 14 May 2014 and WA, a Deputy General Secretary of Nasdem Party 29 October 2014

⁸³ See figure 9.3 of following chapter 9.

⁸⁴ Personal interview with AB, a Deputy General Secretary of PDIP, 11 June 2014

the degree to which these parties' MPs candidates addressed these political market arenas and advanced market-orientation and professionalization of campaigning within the specific context of the 2014 parliamentary election⁸⁵. MPs candidates nominated by these parties to represent the parliamentary constituencies located in rural areas favoured developing professionalized-electorates targeting and campaign personalization strategies much more rather than running professional narrowcasting and the news and event management strategies. In contrast, MPs candidates appointed by these parties to represent the parliamentary constituencies located in the urban area, and/or to target the marginal seats in either the urban or rural parliamentary constituencies, were much more interested in combining these strategies with the narrowcasting and news and event management strategies. For example, FZ of Gerindra party, who were being nominated in a parliamentary constituency of the Greater Jakarta, combined professionalized-electorates targeting and campaign personalization strategies with professionalized-news and event management strategy. Slightly differently, EM of Gerindra party who were nominated to target marginal seats that represent Gorontalo Province constituency favoured mixing such strategies with narrowcasting strategy⁸⁶. Furthermore, MPs candidates of these parties who had substantial campaign resources, such as ZH of PAN and PM of PDIP, much preferred hiring political consultants to supervise their campaign teams in selecting, formulating and advancing campaign strategies proficiently⁸⁷. In contrast, MPs candidates of these parties who lacked such resources, such as EMH of PKB and AHA of Nasdem party, were engaged less in taking up such efforts⁸⁸.

⁸⁵ Personal interviews with IJP of Golkar party, 28 October 2014, RCA of Golkar Party, 13 May 2014 and SM of PPP, 18 May 2014.

⁸⁶ Personal interviews with EM of Gerindra Party, 18 December 2014 and AM, a General Secretary of Gerindra Party, 5 November 2014.

⁸⁷ Personal interviews with PLG, a political consultant of JSI hired by PAN, 12 October 2014 and IB, a political consultant hired by PM of PDIP, 30 October 2014.

⁸⁸ Personal interviews with T, a political consultant of SMRC hired by PKB, 21 October 2014 and AHA of a non-incumbent MP candidate of Nasdem Party, 26 October 2014.

Nonetheless, the degree of support of the primary actors who had been politically powerful within and across the internal party and electoral arenas also took shape as an influential factor. In this respect, the Indonesian political parties' MPs candidates who successfully obtained and managed such support, much more easily addressed political sub-markets (especially the electorates, competitors and the media) and developed campaign structures and strategies to persuade and mobilize the electorates and targeted voters, as compared to the Indonesian political parties' MPs candidates who lacked success in managing such support. Above all, the quality of personal relationships between these parties' MPs candidates and such primary actors really took place as the most important factor. This factor determined the degree to which these parties and these parties' MPs candidates succeeded not only in running such efforts smoothly, but also in getting parliamentary seats in this election effectively⁸⁹.

7.3.3. Perceptions of the Indonesian Political Parties' Leaders and Candidates Regarding the Relative Importance of these Political Market Arenas and Their Effects on Marketization and Professionalization of Campaigning of these Parties Within the Specific Context of the 2014 Presidential Election.

Soon after the 2014 parliamentary election was conducted, the discordances of political interests of the Indonesian political parties' MPs candidates regarding the internal party arena gradually disappeared. Some of these parties, however, continued suffering from an internal fragmentation. This fragmentation was actually triggered by diverse

⁸⁹ Personal interviews with AM, General Secretary of Gerindra Party, 5 November 2014, AB, a Deputy General Secretary of PDIP, 11 June 2014, RCA of Golkar Party, 13 May 2014, YC of Hanura Party, 14 May 2014 and WA, a Deputy General Secretary of Nasdem Party 29 October 2014.

orientations of these parties' leaders in nominating and supporting a (pair of) presidential candidate(s)⁹⁰.

In the aftermath this election, the media arena also gradually polarized into three groups. The first one was a group of the media, which endorsed ARB, a potential presidential candidate of Golkar Party. The second one was a group of the media, which supported Jokowi, a potential presidential candidate of PDIP. The last one was a group of the media, which supported Prabowo Subijanto, a potential presidential candidate of Gerindra Party⁹¹.

In a similar vein, the electorates/voters as a primary actor in the electoral arena also gradually gravitated to support each of these parties and these parties' presidential candidates. In this respect, the electorates remained being seen as a primary political sub-market as they were in the 2014 parliamentary election. However, the ways these parties and these parties' presidential candidates addressed these electorates as a political sub-market were quite different. They grouped these electorates based on: a) socio-demographic conditions of the districts, municipalities and provinces which they populated; and b) these electorates' approval of each of these parties' presidential candidates⁹². These parties and these parties' presidential candidates also realized the importance of political activists and officials as political sub-markets. Nonetheless, they much favoured addressing the media, competitors and campaign donors as prominent political sub-markets⁹³.

Perceptions of these parties' leaders and presidential candidates regarding the relative importance of these political market-arenas took

⁹⁰ Personal interviews with IJP of Golkar Party, 28 October 2014, VYM of PAN, 7 May 2014 and SM of PPP, 18 May 2014.

⁹¹ Personal interviews with DBS of Berita Satu TV, 15 October 2014, YAN of KOMPAS TV, 6 November 2014 and RB of KOMPAS, 12 November 2014.

⁹² Personal interviews with USB of LSN, 14 May 2014, T of SMRC, 21 October 2014 and EK of JSI, 13 October 2014

⁹³ Personal interviews with IJP of Golkar Party, 28 October 2014, VYM of PAN, 7 May 2014, AB, a Deputy General Secretary of PDIP, 11 June 2014 and WA, a Deputy General Secretary of Nasdem Party, 29 October 2014.

place as a determinant factor that influenced marketization and professionalization of campaigning of these parties within the specific context of this election. Along with this factor, the following factors also determined the ways of and the degree to which these parties advanced such practices. This point is summarized as follows.

Soon after the 2014 parliamentary election was held, the Indonesian General Election Commission reported that none of these parties met the minimum number of this threshold (25 % of popular votes and 20 % of parliamentary seats). This election result hinted that Golkar Party, Democratic Party, Gerindra Party and PDIP actually had competitive chances to assemble a political coalition and nominate a pair of presidential candidates; but, as detailed by the subsequent points, only PDIP and Gerindra Party, finally succeeded in achieving such goals.

Having considered the degree to which the mainstream media and the electorates intensively supported Joko Widodo (being popularly called Jokowi) as a potential presidential candidate, PDIP arranged a coalition with PKB, Nasdem Party and Hanura Party and nominated Jokowi. He was then paired with Jusuf Kalla who ran as a vice-presidential candidate. Having successfully nominated them as a pair of presidential candidates, these parties encouraged their members, officials and activists to address the media, internal party and electoral arenas and develop workable models of market-orientation and professionalization of campaigning to get this pair of presidential candidate elected in this election. These parties' leaders hired media strategists and political consultants to develop professionalized-electorates targeting, campaign personalization, narrowcasting and news and event management strategies. They also approached some media barons to endorse Jokowi-Jusuf Kalla. The main reason was that it seemed impossible for this pair of presidential candidates to directly address 187.852.992 registered-voters who settled

in 33 Indonesian provinces and overseas⁹⁴. These parties successfully managed the media arena and gained substantial support from the influential Indonesian media and these media owners. In this respect, Media Indonesia and METRO TV owned by SP, a top-leader of Nasdem Party, Trans TV and Trans 7 owned by Chairul Tanjung, Berita Satu TV established and owned by LIPPO Group and KOMPAS TV owned by Jakob Oetama, intensively supported this pair of presidential candidates⁹⁵.

These parties and these parties' marketers/campaigners also got substantial support from campaign-volunteers who heavily harnessed the Internet and social media networks as campaign platforms⁹⁶. Most of them favoured highlighting his outstanding personal quality and professional performance and downgrading the personal quality and professional performance of his rival, which was Prabowo Subijanto of Gerindra Party (Hidayat, et al., 2014, *TEMPO*, 28 July-3 August, 2014; Paraqbueaq, 2014, *TEMPO*, 28 July-3 August, 2014). They were being trained to develop and protect his personal brand-identity and image and to undermine the personal brand-identity and image of his competitor as well⁹⁷.

Meanwhile, Gerindra Party persuaded PAN, Golkar Party, PKS, PAN and Democratic Party to form a subsequent political block and nominated Prabowo Subijanto-Hatta Rajasa as a pair of presidential candidates to run in this election. Having recognized that Prabowo Subijanto had been approved of less by the media and electorates, Gerindra Party took the following efforts. This party attempted maximising the integration of the internal party arena and strongly addressing the

⁹⁴ Personal interviews with AB, a Deputy General Secretary of PDIP, 11 June 2014, WA, a Deputy General Secretary of Nasdem Party, 29 October 2014 and IB, a social media strategist of PDIP, 30 October 2014.

⁹⁵ Within more or less a half and one month before the 2014 Presidential Election Day (9 July 2014), METRO TV, Trans TV and Trans 7 allocated substantial number of spot of political advertising programs of Jokowi. Further information related with this issue, see figure 9.9 of following chapter 9.

⁹⁶ Further information related with this issue would be detailed by point 9.4.3 of Chapter 9

⁹⁷ Personal interview with WA of a Deputy General Secretary of Nasdem Party, 29 October 2014

electoral arena. In addressing this issue, AM of Gerindra Party, stated as follows.

“We really believed that the degree of success in managing the internal party arena is likely to lead to our success in addressing the electoral arena”⁹⁸

This party also intensively deployed its activists, members and officials and its elected and unelected MPs to elevate levels of recognition and acceptability of this party and its presidential candidate in the electoral arenas. This party also robustly managed the media arena and spent plenty of financial resources to design and place political advertising programmes in various Indonesian mainstream media, especially TV channels⁹⁹. This party also deployed some overseas political consultants who have been closely associated with or were personally sympathetic to him (Hidayat, et al., *TEMPO*, 6 July, 2014).

Together with its coalition, this party robustly addressed various types of political sub-markets and advanced campaign structures and strategies to persuade and mobilize large number of electorates and voters populated in 33 Indonesian provinces. In addressing this issue, AM of Gerindra Party stated as follows.

“We developed a series of political consolidation and training to improve the expertise and skills of our party cadres, officials, activists and members in order to be good marketers and campaigners. They were deployed to shore up marketing and campaigning programmes carried out by our party within and across the Indonesian Provinces in order to get Prabowo Subijanto elected in the 2014 presidential election”¹⁰⁰.

This party itself actually ran such efforts a few years before this election was held¹⁰¹.

⁹⁸ Personal interview, 5 November 2014

⁹⁹ Personal interviews with AM of Gerindra Party, 5 November 2014 and PL of Gerindra Party, 22 November 2014

¹⁰⁰ Personal interview, 5 November 2014

¹⁰¹ Like this party, Golkar party also took similar efforts. Golkar Party expected getting success in nominating its top-leader, Aburizal Bakri (widely called as ARB), as a presidential candidate. But, this party lacked success in leveraging the electorates' approval to ARB. Since ARB did not see a chance to win this election, this party was

In terms of campaign recourses, those who supported Prabowo Subianto of Gerindra Party actually had considerably more resources, compared to those who endorsed Jokowi of PDIP. For example, Abu Rizalbakri (ARB), the chairman of Golkar Party, owned an influential TV news channel, which is TV One, and a new entertainment TV channel, which is ANTV. Since ARB supported Prabowo Subijanto-Hatta Radjasa as a pair of presidential candidates for running in this election, this TV news channel strongly endorsed and promoted them. Further, Hary Tanoesudibyo (HT), an owner of MNC Media Groups (RTCI, TPI and Global TV), and at that time one of the prominent leaders of Hanura Party¹⁰² also supported this pair of presidential candidates. It was undeniable that these TV channels placed substantial numbers of spots of political advertising programmes for this pair of presidential candidates¹⁰³.

As shored up by its coalition, Gerindra Party intensively organized the ground, air and online marketing wars and campaign programmes to manage the electoral arena strategically. This party also set up a special team composed from several units to handle the mainstream media and social media¹⁰⁴. One of these units was specifically deployed to upgrade the personal profile and brand-identity of Prabowo Subijanto and elevate the level of the electorates' approval of him as a presidential candidate¹⁰⁵. Moreover, this party also asked a top-leader of PKS to specifically set up a

finally inclined to team up with Gerindra party to support Prabowo Subijanto of Gerindra Party and Hatta Rajasa of PAN as a pair of presidential candidates (Hidayat, et al., 2014, *TEMPO*, 19-25 May 2014, pages 33-36).

¹⁰² Since Hanura Party lost a chance to assemble a political coalition and nominate a pair of presidential candidates, HT took a different political path with Wiranto, a founder of the top-leader of this party, who favoured endorsing Jokowi-Jusuf Kalla as a presidential candidate. Soon after the 2014 presidential election was held, he left this party and established a new political party, which is Perindo Party.

¹⁰³ Within more or less and a half months before the 2014 Presidential Election Day (9 July 2014), TV One, ANTV, MNC TV, RCTI and Global TV allocated a substantial number of spots of political advertising programmes for Prabowo Subijanto. For further information related with this issue, see figure 9.10 of following chapter 9.

¹⁰⁴ Further information related with this issue, see point 9.4.3 of chapter 9.

¹⁰⁵ Personal interview with BP, a media strategist of Prabowo Subijanto, 23 October, 2014

skilful group of buzzers who were familiar with harnessing online and social media platforms¹⁰⁶.

This party and its coalition were, to some degree, quite successful in managing the media and electoral arenas and upgrading the levels of the electorates' approval and support for Prabowo Subijanto¹⁰⁷. However, they did not fully succeed in harnessing their members and activists to mobilize their constituents to vote him and his running mate, Hatta Radjasa in this election¹⁰⁸. PLG, a political consultant of JSI, hired by this pair of presidential candidates reflected on this issue as follows.

“A coalition of political parties that endorsed Prabowo Subijanto-Hatta Radjasa seemed a little bit flimsy. These parties actually had much more organisational resources that can be generated as a powerful political machine to persuade and mobilize the electorates. But, each of these parties was, individually, quite fragile. Even the top-leaders of these parties could not manage internal fragmentation that took place in their parties. We knew some influential leaders and activists of these parties more likely favoured supporting Joko Widodo-Jusuf Kalla and expected this pair of presidential candidate get elected in this election”¹⁰⁹.

While this party and its coalition failed to resolve this issue properly, the degree of support of political sub-markets for Jokowi increased substantially. The total numbers of marketers/campaigners and fanatical supporters of Jokowi who had been widely camouflaged as *campaign-volunteers*, political lobbyists and campaign-donors who personally supported him and his running mate grew substantially¹¹⁰. Supported by these lobbyists and donors, these marketers/campaigners successfully managed the Indonesian mainstream media and Internet and social media users. As directed by professionals appointed by leaders of PDIP and its coalitions, they also robustly addressed not only a group of voters who

¹⁰⁶ Personal interview with DS of PKS, 12 November 2014.

¹⁰⁷ Further information related with this point, see figure 9.11 and 9.18 of following chapter 9.

¹⁰⁸ Further information related with this point, see table 9.10 and figure 9.20 of following chapter 9.

¹⁰⁹ Personal interview, 12 October 2014

¹¹⁰ Further information related with this issue, see figures 9.12, 9.13 and 9.14 of following chapter 9.

would potentially vote for his rival, but also various groups of voters who were unlikely to vote for either him or his rival (the non-voters/swing voters).

Regarding these developments, these parties strategically addressed the non-voters/swing voters and intensively upgraded campaign structures and strategies to persuade and capture them. They nearly succeeded in persuading and capturing these voters¹¹¹, but this pair of presidential candidates finally lost in this election. PDIP and its coalition, which were shored up by marketers/campaigners and fanatical supporters of Jokowi, successfully persuaded and captured large numbers of these voters and ultimately won this election¹¹².

7.4. Conclusions and Discussions.

As stated at the outset Strömbäck (2007: 58-63, 2010: 21-27) and Strömbäck et al. (2012: 83-84) argued that the degree to which the party accounted for the relative importance and relevance of political market arenas was likely to determine a choice that has to be made by the party to advance market-orientation and/or professionalization of campaigning. This work presented quantitative and the qualitative findings, which indicated that, within the specific context of the new democracy of Indonesia, this choice is less likely to be determined by the degree to which the party as an organization perceived the relative importance of the internal party, the media and electoral arenas. This choice is, instead, likely to be influenced by individual perceptions of marketers/campaigners, leaders and candidates of the party regarding the relative importance of these political market arenas. Such perceptions determined not only modes of marketization and professionalization of campaigning of these parties, but also the degree of market-orientation and campaign

¹¹¹ Further information related with this point, see figures 9.11 and 9.18 of following chapter 9.

¹¹² Further information related with this point, see figures 9.18 and 9.21 of following chapter 9.

professionalisms of these parties within and across the 2014 parliamentary and presidential elections. These clearly validate and substantiate the ideas of this author.

This author also voiced that *'even though parties have different strategic goals in multiple arenas, their relative importance might vary between different parties'* (Strömbäck, 2007: 60) and *'the degree of professionalized political campaigning, and the extent to which political parties and campaigns are becoming market oriented...neither can be dealt with as being independent from factors such as...the relative importance of the parliamentary arena, the media arena, the internal arena, and the electoral arena'* (Strömbäck, 2007: 62). Overall, the quantitative and the qualitative findings demonstrated that the effects of perceptions of the Indonesian political parties' marketers/campaigners, leaders and candidates regarding the importance of the internal arena on modes of marketization and professionalization of campaigning and degree of market-orientation and campaign professionalisms of these parties are less likely to be controlled by the type of the election. However, the effects of the perceptions of these parties' marketers/campaigners, leaders and candidates regarding the relative importance of the media and electoral arenas on processes of marketization and professionalization of campaigning and levels of market-orientation and campaign professionalisms of these parties are likely to be determined by the type of the elections. These findings indicated that the more these parties' marketers/campaigners, leaders and candidates perceived the importance of the media arena, the much more likely these parties tend to be market-oriented and professionalized, in terms of campaign structure, news and event management and narrowcasting strategies within the 2014 parliamentary and presidential elections. The more these parties' marketers/campaigners, leaders and candidates realized the importance of the electoral and media arenas, the much more likely these parties inclined to be market-oriented and professionalized, in terms of: a)

campaign structure, audiences/electorates targeting, news and event management and campaign personalisation strategies within the specific context of the 2014 parliamentary election; and b) campaign structure, audiences/electorates targeting, news and event management, campaign personalization and narrowcasting strategies within the specific context of the 2014 presidential election. These clearly validate and substantiate Strömbäck's (2007: 60, 62) propositions.

The qualitative findings also revealed that the following factors resulted in visible effects on the ways of and the degree to which these parties advanced such practices within and across these elections. They include: a) party-specific factors, which are party ideology, campaign resources and position in the government; b) party competitive chances to assemble a political coalition and nominate its top-leader/public figure as a presidential candidate to run in this election; and c) development of the political marketability level of the party's presidential candidate. The following chapters 8 and 9, respectively, will evaluate those factors thoroughly.

7.5. Summary

Having adopted the ideas of Strömbäck (2007: 58-63, 2010: 21-27) and Strömbäck et al. (2012: 83-84), this chapter formulated an analytical framework to evaluate the effects of perceptions of the Indonesian political parties' marketers/campaigner, leaders and candidates regarding the relative importance of the internal party, the media and electoral arenas on modes of marketization and professionalization of campaigning and degree of market-orientation and campaign professionalisms of these parties within the specific contexts of the 2014 parliamentary and the presidential elections. The survey and the in-depth interview data and the existing political, media and election regulations were extracted. The quantitative and qualitative findings were displayed and discussed. The research conclusions and recommendations were highlighted as well.

CHAPTER 8

PARTY-SPECIFIC FACTORS AND THEIR EFFECTS ON MARKETIZATION AND PROFESSIONALIZATION OF CAMPAIGNING OF THE INDONESIAN POLITICAL PARTIES

Chapter Overview

It has been argued that the party-specific factors determine modes of market-orientation and/or professionalization of campaigning of political parties (Strömbäck, 2007: 60-63; Strömbäck, 2010: 28-29; Strömbäck et al., 2012: 86; Gibson and Rommele, 2001, 2009; Strömbäck, 2009; Tenscher et al., 2012; Tenscher, 2013; Tenscher and Mykkanen, 2013, 2014; Tenscher et al., 2015). However, while a workable analytical framework needed to evaluate this issue has not been developed properly (Strömbäck, 2007: 64-65), a holistic research focusing on this issue within the specific context of new democratic countries, such as Indonesia, has not been conducted systematically. Having developed this framework, this work evaluated the effects of these factors on the ways of and the degree to which the Indonesian political parties advanced such practices within and across the 2014 parliamentary and presidential elections (RO 5). Based on the extracted survey data and in-depth interview data (derived from these parties' leaders, candidates and professionals and campaign-volunteers and teams of the presidential candidates), the existing political, media and election regulations, and the reports released by the Indonesian media, especially KOMPAS, GATRA and TEMPO, this work reported the quantitative and qualitative findings. Such efforts are detailed as follows.

8.1. Formulation and Evaluation of Dummy Models As An Analytical Framework

This work developed an analytical framework as follows. Based on type of party ideology (PI), this work, as seen from the following table 8.1, categorised the Indonesian political parties into three groups, which are

the secular-nationalist, secular-Islamic and Islamist parties¹¹³. Having accounted for the party age category (PAC), this work divided these parties into two camps, which are those established during the New Order Soeharto regime and those founded soon after this regime collapsed mid-1998. Regarding party experience of internal shock (IS)/leadership change, this work grouped these parties into two groups. In considering party experience of external shock (ES), this work categorized these parties into four categories¹¹⁴, while based on party size (PS) this work classified these parties as the big-size, medium-size and small-size political parties¹¹⁵. This work formulated such categorisations based on reports released by the Indonesian general elections and the regulations implemented in the 2009 parliamentary election¹¹⁶. In realizing party

¹¹³ The social and economic divisions existed in the Indonesian politics. But, the Left-Right ideological spectrums were not yet prominent since the class division did not fully emerge as a central political issue in the new democracy of Indonesia. Instead, it took place as a complementary issue alongside the social and religious sentiments (Ambardi, 2008: 54-58). Golkar Party, PDIP, Democratic Party, Gerindra Party, Nasdem Party and Hanura Party strongly upheld the secular ideological foundation of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia, which is the Five Principle (*Pancasila*). PKB and PAN accepted *Pancasila*, as its principle ideology and nationhood value, but strongly incorporates the moderate, and tolerant Islamic values as a basic principle. PKB has been seen as a secular-traditionalist Islamic party, PAN has been recognized as a secular-modernist Islamic party (Liddle and Mujani, 2004) and PPP and PKS have been widely considered as the Islamist parties. Categorizations of these secular-nationalist parties have been widely used to understand Indonesian politics. But, classifications of these Islamic and Islamist parties remained left controversial debates (Ambardi, 2008: 139-140; Sukmajati, 2011: 13-14; and Hamayotsu, 2011: 136).

¹¹⁴ The first one is the party that lost more than 5 % of popular votes in the last parliamentary election. The second one is a political party that lost in between 5 % and 1 % of popular votes in this election. The third one is a political party that lacked encountering external shock in this election. The last one is a new political party that never experienced with external shock.

¹¹⁵ The first one is a political party that obtained more than 12 % popular votes in the 2009 parliamentary election. The second one is a political party that obtained in between 6 and 12 % of popular votes in this election. The last one is a political party that obtained no more than 6 % popular votes in this election and a new small political party that run in this election as the first-time political contestant.

¹¹⁶ Law No.10/2008 constituted that only the Indonesian political parties that passed the minimum number of the parliamentary threshold (2.5 % of popular votes collected in the 2009 parliamentary election) would be granted parliamentary seats. Three big-size political parties, which are PDIP, Golkar Party and Democratic Party, respectively, got 14.03 %, 14.45 % and 20.85 % popular votes in this election. Most of the medium-size political parties gathered more or less 6.5 % of popular votes and small-size Indonesian political parties collated total popular votes in between 2.5 % and 4 % in this election.

campaign resources (PCR), this work, based on the report released by the Indonesian General Election Commission, classed these parties into three groups¹¹⁷. Having assessed party position in the government (PPG), this work pigeonholed these parties into two groups¹¹⁸. Having conducted such procedures and considered type of the elections wherein the survey data were collected; this work finally generated 38 groups, which were used to evaluate the following dummy models¹¹⁹.

Party-Specific Factors as Categorical Moderator-Grouping Variables		Samples in the Group/Unit Level	Dummy Models and Samples in the Individual Level	
			The 2014 Parliamentary Election	The 2014 Presidential Election
P	The nationalist parties	PDIP, Democratic Party, Golkar, Nasdem, Hanura and Gerindra	Model 10a (388)	Model 10b (388)
	The Islamic parties	PKB and PAN	Model 11a (177)	Model 11b (177)
	The Islamist parties	PPP and PKS	Model 12a (152)	Model 12b (152)
PAC	Political parties established during the New Order Soeharto	PDIP, Golkar and PPP	Model 13a (238)	Model 13b (238)
	Political parties established Post-Soeharto New Order	Democratic Party, Nasdem, Hanura and Gerindra, PKB, PAN and PKS	Model 14a (479)	Model 14b (479)
PS	The big-size parties	Democratic Party, PDIP and Golkar	Model 15a (232)	Model 15b (232)
	The medium-size parties	PKB, PAN, PPP and PKS	Model 16a (302)	Model 16b (302)
	The small-size parties	Hanura, Gerindra and Nasdem Parties	Model 17a (183)	Model 17b (183)
S	Political parties, which experienced with internal shock before	PAN, Gerindra and PKS	Model 18a (308)	Model 18b (308)

These conditions indicated that losing a number of popular votes in between 1 % and 5 % is politically important, especially for the medium- and the small-sizes political parties.

¹¹⁷ The first one is a political party that had a substantial campaign budget/more than 200 Billion IDR. The second one is a political party that had a medium campaign budget/between 150 and 200 Billion IDR. The last one is a political party that had a small campaign budget/less than 150 Billion IDR.

¹¹⁸ The first one is a political party and its coalition that took position as opposition parties during the second-term of SBY' government. The second one is a political party and its coalition that shored up this government.

¹¹⁹ This table charts that each of these models incorporates more than 180 cases, except for Models 12a, 12b, 20a, 20b, 25a, 25b, 26a and 26b. But, this condition, according to Hair et al. (2013: 2-3) and Hair (2014: 23-24) still meets the rule of thumb of the minimum sample size of PLS-SEM.

	the 2014 parliamentary and presidential elections were conducted			
	Political parties, which lacked of experience with internal shock before these elections were held	PDIP, Democratic Party, Golkar, Nasdem, Hanura, PPP and PKB	Model 19a (409)	Model 19b (409)
ES	Political parties, which lost more than 5 % of popular votes in the last parliamentary election	Golkar and PKB	Model 20a (153)	Model 20b (153)
	Political parties, which lost in between 5 % and 1 % of popular votes in this election	PDIP, PAN and PPP	Model 21a (236)	Model 21b (263)
	Political parties, which lacked of encountering the external shock in this election	Democratic Party and PKS	Model 22a (147)	Model 22b (147)
	Political parties, which never experienced with the external shock	Gerindra, Hanura and Nasdem	Model 23a (181)	Model 23b (181)
PCR	Political parties with a substantial amount of campaign budget	PDIP, Democratic Party, Golkar, Gerindra, Nasdem and Hanura	Model 24a (413)	Model 24b (413)
	Political parties with a moderate amount of campaign budget	PAN and PKB	Model 25a (152)	Model 25b (152)
	Political parties with a small amount of campaign budget	PPP and PKS	Model 26a (152)	Model 26b (152)
RPC	Opposition parties during the second-term of SBY' government	PDIP, Gerindra and Hanura	Model 27a (184)	Model 27b (184)
	Political parties, which shored up the second-term of SBY' government	Democratic Party, Golkar, PAN, PKB, PKS and PPP	Model 28a (461)	Model 28b (461)

Table 8.1: Total Samples Sizes of the Dummy Models 10a-28a and 10b-28b

This work also evaluated Standard Mean Root Square (SRMR) Common Factor and Composite values of these dummy models. According to Henseler et al. (2014), a structural model with SRMR Common Factor and Composite values less than 0.10 indicates that this

model is a good fit model and has statistical power. Table 8.2 shows that these Models are good fit models and have sufficient statistical powers.

	Dummy Models	SRMR Common Factor Model	Confidential Interval of 95 %	SRMR Composite Model	Confidential Interval of 95 %
PI	Model 10a	0.069	(0.063, 0.076)	0.055	(0.049, 0.062)
	Model 10b	0.069	(0.063, 0.076)	0.055	(0.049, 0.062)
	Model 11a	0.090	(0.080, 0.102)	0.077	(0.067, 0.088)
	Model 11b	0.090	(0.080, 0.102)	0.077	(0.067, 0.088)
	Model 12a	0.118	(0.101, 0.139)	0.102	(0.087, 0.120)
	Model 12b	0.118	(0.101, 0.139)	0.102	(0.087, 0.120)
PAC	Model 13a	0.091	(0.080, 0.103)	0.053	(0.048, 0.058)
	Model 13b	0.091	(0.080, 0.103)	0.053	(0.048, 0.058)
	Model 14a	0.066	(0.061, 0.071)	0.076	(0.066, 0.088)
	Model 14b	0.066	(0.061, 0.071)	0.076	(0.066, 0.088)
PS	Model 15a	0.081	(0.071, 0.093)	0.067	(0.057, 0.079)
	Model 15b	0.081	(0.071, 0.093)	0.067	(0.057, 0.079)
	Model 16a	0.081	(0.073, 0.090)	0.067	(0.059, 0.079)
	Model 16b	0.081	(0.073, 0.090)	0.067	(0.059, 0.076)
	Model 17a	0.091	(0.080, 0.105)	0.079	(0.068, 0.092)
	Model 17b	0.091	(0.080, 0.105)	0.079	(0.068, 0.092)
IS	Model 18a	0.073	(0.066, 0.081)	0.060	(0.054, 0.068)
	Model 18b	0.075	(0.068, 0.084)	0.062	(0.055, 0.071)
	Model 19a	0.072	(0.066, 0.080)	0.058	(0.052, 0.064)
	Model 19b	0.071	(0.065, 0.078)	0.056	(0.051, 0.063)
ES	Model 20a	0.095	(0.084, 0.109)	0.081	(0.071, 0.094)
	Model 20b	0.095	(0.095, 0.109)	0.081	(0.071, 0.094)
	Model 21a	0.089	(0.080, 0.101)	0.074	(0.065, 0.085)
	Model 21b	0.089	(0.080, 0.101)	0.074	(0.084, 0.115)
	Model 22a	0.097	(0.084, 0.115)	0.085	(0.072, 0.101)
	Model 22b	0.097	(0.081, 0.115)	0.085	(0.072, 0.101)
	Model 23a	0.091	(0.081, 0.104)	0.079	(0.069, 0.092)
	Model 23b	0.091	(0.081, 0.104)	0.079	(0.069, 0.092)
PCR	Model 24a	0.068	(0.062, 0.074)	0.054	(0.048, 0.060)
	Model 24b	0.068	(0.062, 0.074)	0.054	(0.048, 0.060)
	Model 25a	0.095	(0.084, 0.109)	0.082	(0.071, 0.094)
	Model 25b	0.095	(0.084, 0.109)	0.082	(0.071, 0.094)
	Model 26a	0.118	(0.101, 0.139)	0.102	(0.087, 0.120)
	Model 26b	0.118	(0.101, 0.139)	0.102	(0.087, 0.120)
PPG	Model 27a	0.094	(0.082, 0.110)	0.080	(0.069, 0.094)
	Model 27b	0.094	(0.082, 0.110)	0.080	(0.069, 0.094)
	Model 28a	0.052	(0.047, 0.058)	0.067	(0.062, 0.073)
	Model 28b	0.052	(0.047, 0.058)	0.067	(0.062, 0.073)

Table 8.2: Standard Mean Root Square (SRMR) Common Factor and Composite Values of the Dummy Models 10a-28a and 10b-28b

Table 8.3 displays a set of acronyms of variables that constitute the alternative structural model and are used in PLS-MGA reports of pairs of comparative dummy Models. In these reports, β (path coefficients) values

differences with $\rho < 0.05$, and $\rho > 0.95$ indicate that such differences are statistically significant¹²⁰.

Variables	Acronyms
Political Marketing-Orientation	PMOa
Political Market-Orientation	PMOb
Professional-Campaign Engagement	PCE
Professionalized-Campaign Structure	PCS
Professionalized-Audiences/Electorates Targeting Strategy	PATS
Professionalized-Narrowcasting Strategy	PCS
Professionalized-Campaign Personalization Strategy	PCPS
Professionalized-News and Event Management Strategy	PNEMS

Table 8.3: Acronyms of Variables that Construct the Baseline Model and Used in the PLS-MGA reports of the Dummy Models 10a-28a and 10b-28b

8.2. The Quantitative Findings.

Having evaluated these dummy models using PLS-MGA, this work revealed following findings.

8.2.1. Party Ideology

Party ideology generated significant effects of professionalized-campaign structure on professionalized-audiences/electorates targeting strategy in Models 10a and 11a. As seen from table 8.4, this effect in Model 11a is significantly larger. It also produced significant effects of professionalized-campaign structure on professionalized-campaign personalisation strategy in Models 10a and 12a and this effect in Model 12a is significantly larger. It also generated significant effects of professional-campaign engagement on professionalized-news and event management strategies in Models 11a and 12a. This effect in Model 11a is significantly larger. These demonstrate that within the specific context of the 2014 parliamentary election, the secular-nationalist parties were much more likely to advance a professionalized-campaign structure and audiences/electorates targeting strategy, as compared to the secular-

¹²⁰ The first one demonstrates that the structural path model (β path coefficients) value in the first dummy model is significantly smaller as compared to the structural path model value in the second dummy model. In contrast, the second one shows that the structural path model value in the first dummy model is significantly larger as compared to the structural path model value in the second dummy model.

Islamic parties. These parties were also much more likely to develop a professionalized-campaign structure and campaign personalization strategy, as compared to the Islamist parties. The secular-Islamic parties were much more likely to implement a professionalized-news and event management strategy, as compared to the Islamist parties.

Path Models	Model 10a Vs. Model 11a		Model 10a Vs. Model 12a		Model 11a Vs. Model 12a	
	β Differences	ρ value	β Differences	ρ value	β Differences	ρ value
PMOa→PMOb	0.020	0.385	0.134	0.082	0.114	0.142
PMOa→PCE	0.028	0.379	0.104	0.864	0.132	0.889
PMOa→PCS	0.105	0.889	0.117	0.887	0.012	0.544
PMOa→PATS	-	-	0.037	0.628	-	-
PMOa→PCPS	-	-	-	-	-	-
PMOa→PNS	-	-	-	-	-	-
PMOa→PNEMS	-	-	-	-	-	-
PMOb→PCE	0.031	0.638	-	-	-	-
PMOb→PCS	0.054	0.284	0.134	0.074	0.081	0.230
PCE→PCS	0.045	0.305	0.068	0.794	0.113	0.886
PCE→PATS	-	-	0.043	0.622	-	-
PCE→PNS	-	-	-	-	-	-
PCE→PCPS	0.031	0.394	0.173	0.069	0.142	0.123
PCE→PNEMS	0.155	0.931	0.072	0.267	0.227	0.031
PCS→PATS	0.287	0.985	-	-	-	-
PCS→PNS	0.048	0.646	0.051	0.424	0.099	0.327
PCS→PCPS	0.075	0.744	0.287	0.985	0.212	0.935
PCS→PNEMS	0.156	0.063	0.002	0.514	0.158	0.897

Table 8.4: PLS-MGA Results of Model 10a Vs. Model 11a, Model 10a Vs. Model 12a and Model 11a Vs. Model 12a

Party ideology also produced significant effects of professionalized-campaign structure on professionalized-news and event management strategy in Models 10b and 11b. As seen from table 8.5, this effect in Model 10b is significantly larger. It also led to significant effects of professionalized-campaign structure on professionalized-narrowcasting strategy in Model 10b and 12b. This effect in Model 10b is significantly larger. It also resulted in significant effects of political marketing-orientation on professional-campaign engagement in Models 11b and 12b. This effect in Model 11b is significantly smaller. It also produced significant effects of

professionalized-campaign structure on professionalized-audiences/electorates targeting strategy and professional-campaign engagement on professionalized-news and event management in these models. Such effects in Model 11b are significantly larger. These demonstrate that within the specific context of the 2014 presidential election: the secular-nationalist parties were much more likely to advance professionalized-campaign structure and news and event management strategy, as compared to the secular-Islamic parties; but, these parties were much less likely to advance a professionalized-narrowcasting strategy, as compared to the Islamist parties. The secular-Islamic parties were much more likely to develop professionalized-news and event management and audiences/electorates targeting strategies, as compared to the Islamist parties.

Path Models	Model 10b Vs. Model 11b		Model 10b Vs. Model 12b		Model 11b Vs. Model 12b	
	β Differences	ρ value	β Differences	ρ value	β Differences	ρ value
PMOa→PMOb	0.064	0.173	0.130	0.054	0.066	0.250
PMOa→PCE	0.056	0.275	0.123	0.917	0.179	0.955
PMOa→PCS	0.034	0.654	0.100	0.850	0.066	0.727
PMOa→PATS	-	-	-	-	-	-
PMOa→PCPS	-	-	-	-	-	-
PMOa→PNS	-	-	-	-	-	-
PMOa→PNEMS	-	-	-	-	-	-
PMOb→PCE	0.016	0.574	-	-	-	-
PMOb→PCS	0.011	0.543	0.025	0.616	0.014	0.548
PCE→PCS	0.068	0.254	0.062	0.259	0.006	0.521
PCE→PATS	-	-	0.106	0.203	-	-
PCE→PNS	-	-	-	-	-	-
PCE→PCPS	0.050	0.339	0.022	0.429	0.028	0.587
PCE→PNEMS	0.149	0.935	0.040	0.361	0.189	0.045
PCS→PATS	0.269	0.982	0.063	0.326	0.332	0.018
PCS→PNS	0.143	0.833	0.275	0.962	0.132	0.785
PCS→PCPS	0.022	0.580	0.003	0.516	0.019	0.452
PCS→PNEMS	0.209	0.013	0.052	0.336	0.157	0.889

Table 8.5: PLS-MGA Results of Model 10b Vs. Model 11b, Model 10b Vs. Model 12b and Model 11b Vs. Model 12b

8.2.2. Party Age Category

Party age category only resulted in significant effects of political marketing-orientation on political market-orientation in Models 13a and 14a. As seen from table 8.6, this effect in Model 13a is significantly larger. This finding demonstrates that, within the specific context of the 2014 parliamentary election, the older political parties were much more likely to advance market-orientation, as compared to the younger political parties.

Path Models	Model 13a Vs. Model 14a		Model 13b Vs. Model 14b	
	β Differences	ρ value	β Differences	ρ value
PMOa→PMOb	0.130	0.972	0.096	0.934
PMOa→PCE	0.041	0.686	0.071	0.803
PMOa→PCS	-	-	0.029	0.359
PMOa→PATS	0.016	0.423	0.117	0.114
PMOa→PCPS	-	-	-	-
PMOa→PNS	-	-	-	-
PMOa→PNEMS	-	-	-	-
PMOb→PCE	0.059	0.771	0.089	0.871
PMOb→PCS	0.095	0.883	0.045	0.734
PCE→PCS	0.081	0.165	0.047	0.272
PCE→PATS	0.039	0.626	0.111	0.849
PCE→PNS	-	-	-	-
PCE→PCPS	0.099	0.808	0.126	0.879
PCE→PNEMS	0.084	0.793	0.046	0.682
PCS→PATS	-	-	0.040	0.648
PCS→PNS	0.006	0.510	0.031	0.400
PCS→PCPS	0.009	0.463	0.081	0.223
PCS→PNEMS	0.097	0.147	0.084	0.169

Table 8.6: PLS-MGA Results of Model 13a Vs. Model 14a and Model 13b Vs. Model 14b

8.2.3. Party Size

Party size generated significant effects of: a) political market-orientation on professional-campaign engagement; and b) professionalized-campaign structure on professionalized-news and event management strategy in Models 15a, 16a, 15b and 16b. As seen from tables 8.7 and 8.8, respectively, such effects in Model 15a and 15b are significantly larger. It also resulted in significant effects of political market-orientation on professional-campaign engagement in Models 15a and 17a. This effect in Model 15a is significantly smaller. It also produced significant effects of political marketing-orientation on professional-campaign

engagement in these Models. This effect in Model 15a is significantly larger. It also created significant effects of political market-orientation on professional-campaign engagement in Models 15b and 17b. This effect in Model 15b is significantly larger. It also carried significant effects of political market-orientation on professional-campaign engagement in these Models. This effect in Model 15b is significantly smaller. It also caused significant effects of professionalized-campaign structure on professionalized-news and event management strategy in Models 16b and 17b. This effect in Model 17b is significantly larger. These, in general, demonstrate that, within the specific context of the 2014 parliamentary election, the big-size political parties were much more likely to advance market-orientation, establish a professional-campaign and upgrade professionalized-campaign structure and news and event management strategy, as compared to either the medium- or the small-sized political parties.

Path Models	Model 15a Vs. Model 16a		Model 15a Vs. Model 17a		Model 16a Vs. Model 17a	
	β Differences	ρ value	β Differences	ρ value	β Differences	ρ value
PMOa→PMOb	0.097	0.076	0.061	0.180	0.036	0.692
PMOa→PCE	0.113	0.905	0.194	0.970	0.081	0.803
PMOa→PCS	-		-		-	
PMOa→PATS	0.038	0.353	0.081	0.758	0.118	0.849
PMOa→PCPS	-		-		-	
PMOa→PNS	-		-		-	
PMOa→PNEMS	-		-		-	
PMOb→PCE	0.173	0.019	0.187	0.028	0.014	0.445
PMOb→PCS	0.041	0.313	0.041	0.649	0.081	0.791
PCE→PCS	0.049	0.708	0.028	0.397	0.078	0.201
PCE→PATS	0.075	0.300	0.219	0.064	0.143	0.128
PCE→PNS	-		-		-	
PCE→PCPS	0.000	0.505	0.125	0.185	0.125	0.139
PCE→PNEMS	0.120	0.864	0.052	0.669	0.068	0.253
PCS→PATS	-		-		0.151	0.869
PCS→PNS	0.026	0.570	0.014	0.466	0.039	0.396
PCS→PCPS	0.019	0.554	0.046	0.632	0.027	0.588
PCS→PNEMS	0.190	0.033	0.069	0.263	0.121	0.888

Table 8.7: PLS-MGA Results of Model 15a Vs. Model 16a, Model 15a Vs. Model 17a and Model 16a Vs. Model 17a

Path Models	Model 15b Vs. Model 16b		Model 15b Vs. Model 17b		Model 16b Vs. Model 17b	
	β Differences	ρ value	β Differences	ρ value	β Differences	ρ value
PMOa→PMOb	0.083	0.096	0.075	0.144	0.008	0.553
PMOa→PCE	0.107	0.887	0.159	0.955	0.052	0.717
PMOa→PCS	-	-	-	-	0.103	0.856
PMOa→PATS	-	-	0.054	0.698	-	-
PMOa→PCPS	-	-	-	-	-	-
PMOa→PNS	-	-	-	-	-	-
PMOa→PNEMS	-	-	-	-	-	-
PMOb→PCE	0.185	0.012	0.155	0.049	0.030	0.627
PMOb→PCS	0.042	0.704	0.091	0.837	0.049	0.703
PCE→PCS	0.015	0.421	0.160	0.069	0.145	0.059
PCE→PATS	0.126	0.185	0.158	0.118	0.032	0.378
PCE→PNS	-	-	-	-	-	-
PCE→PCPS	0.084	0.746	0.029	0.578	0.054	0.326
PCE→PNEMS	0.043	0.648	0.057	0.320	0.100	0.162
PCS→PATS	0.082	0.727	0.119	0.796	0.037	0.616
PCS→PNS	0.202	0.907	0.059	0.628	0.144	0.182
PCS→PCPS	0.144	0.107	0.086	0.241	0.058	0.696
PCS→PNEMS	0.170	0.043	0.008	0.466	0.163	0.957

Table 8.8: PLS-MGA Results of Model 15b Vs. Model 16b, Model 15b Vs. Model 17b and Model 16b Vs. Model 17b

8.2.4. Party Experience with Internal Shock

Party experience with internal shock generated significant effects of political marketing-orientation on political market-orientation, political market-orientation on professionalized-campaign structure, professional-campaign engagement on professionalized-audiences/electorates targeting and professionalized-campaign structure on professionalized-news and event management strategies in Models 18a and 19a. As seen from table 8.9, such effects in Model 18a are significantly larger. It also resulted in significant effects of political market-orientation on professional-campaign engagement, professional-campaign engagement on professionalized-audiences/electorates targeting and professionalized-campaign structure on professionalized-news and event management strategies in Models 18b and 19b. Such effects in Model 18b are significantly larger. These demonstrate that, within the specific contexts of

either the 2014 parliamentary or the 2014 presidential elections, political parties, which were experienced with internal shock, were much more likely to advance market-orientation and upgrade a professionalized-campaign structure and professionalized-audiences/electorates targeting and news and event management strategies, as compared to political parties, which lacked experience of internal shock.

Path Models	Model 18a Vs. Model 19a		Model 18b Vs. Model 19b	
	β Differences	ρ value	β Differences	ρ value
PMOa→PMOb	0.110	0.022	0.056	0.157
PMOa→PCE	0.050	0.744	0.090	0.876
PMOa→PCS	-	-	-	0.054
PMOa→PATS	0.033	0.648	0.055	0.727
PMOa→PCPS	-	-	-	-
PMOa→PNS	-	-	-	-
PMOa→PNEMS	-	-	-	-
PMOb→PCE	0.112	0.060	0.158	0.016
PMOb→PCS	0.125	0.047	0.086	0.105
PCE→PCS	0.128	0.962	0.102	0.910
PCE→PATS	0.235	0.021	0.192	0.034
PCE→PNS	-	-	-	-
PCE→PCPS	0.067	0.266	0.084	0.789
PCE→PNEMS	0.075	0.789	0.143	0.938
PCS→PATS	-	-	0.028	0.610
PCS→PNS	0.112	0.147	0.037	0.378
PCS→PCPS	0.044	0.647	0.018	0.426
PCS→PNEMS	0.162	0.027	0.175	0.017

Table 8.9: PLS-MGA Results of Model 18a Vs. Model 19a and Model 18 b Vs. Model 19b

8.2.5. Party Experience with External Shock

Party experience with external shock generated significant effects of: a) political marketing-orientation and market-orientation on professional-campaign engagement; and b) professional-campaign engagement and professionalized-campaign structure on professionalized-news and event management strategy in Models 20a and 21a. As seen from table 8.10, such effects in Model 20a are significantly larger. It also produced significant effects of: a) political marketing-orientation on professional-campaign engagement; and b) professional-campaign engagement on professionalized-campaign structure in Models 20a and 22a. Such effects in Model 22a are significantly larger. It also

created significant effects of political marketing-orientation on professional-campaign engagement in Models 20a and 23a. This effect in Model 23a is significantly smaller. It also resulted in significant effects of political market-orientation on professional-campaign engagement in these Models, but this effect in Model 20a is significantly larger. It also produced significant effects of: a) political marketing-orientation on political market-orientation; b) professional-campaign engagement on professionalized-audiences/electorates targeting strategy; and c) professionalized-campaign structure on professionalized-news and event management strategy in Models 21a and 22a. Such effects in Model 22a are significantly larger. It also led to significant effects of political engagement on professionalized-news and event management strategy in these Models, but this effect in Model 22a is significantly smaller. It also resulted in significant effects of professionalized-campaign structure on professionalized-news and event management strategy between Models 21a and 23a. This effect in Model 21a is significantly larger. It also generated significant effects of: a) political marketing-orientation on market-orientation; and b) professional-campaign engagement on professionalized-audiences/electorates targeting strategy in Models 22a and 23a. Such effects in Model 22a are significantly larger. Overall, these indicate that, though having no experience with external shock, political parties attempted to advance practices of market-orientation and professionalization of campaigning in facing the 2014 parliamentary election. However, political parties, which suffered from external shock moderately or extremely, favoured advancing such practices strategically much more. These parties were much more likely to upgrade market-orientation and develop a professionalized-campaign structure and professionalized-audiences/electorates targeting and news and event management strategies, as compared to political parties, which suffered less from internal shock.

Party experience with external shock also led to significant effects of professional-campaign engagement on professionalized-campaign personalization strategy in Models 20b and 21b. This effect in Model 20b is significantly larger. As seen from table 8.11, it also created significant effects of professionalized-campaign structure on professionalized-audiences/electorates targeting strategy in these Models, but this effect in Model 20b is significantly smaller. It resulted in significant effects of professional-campaign engagement and professionalized-campaign structure on professionalized-news and event management strategy in Models 21b and 22b. Such effects in Model 20b are significantly larger. It also produced significance effects of professional-campaign engagement on professionalized-campaign structure and professionalized-news and event management strategy in Models 20b and 23b. Such effects in Model 20b are significantly larger. It also resulted in significant effects of: a) political marketing-orientation on political market-orientation; and b) professionalized-campaign structure on professionalized-news and event management strategy in Models 21b and 22b. Such effects in Model 22b are significantly larger. It generated significant effects of professionalized-campaign structure on professionalized-audiences/electorates targeting strategy in these Models. This effect in Model 21b is significantly larger. It produced significant effects of: a) political market-orientation on professional-campaign engagement; and b) professionalized-campaign structure on professionalized-news and event management strategy in Models 21b and 23b. Such effects in Model 21b are significantly larger. It created significant effects of: a) political marketing-orientation on political market-orientation; and b) professional-campaign engagement on professionalized-audiences/electorates targeting strategy in Models 22b and 23b. Such effects in Model 22b are significantly larger. Overall, these indicate that, though having no experience with external shock, political parties attempt to advance practices of market-orientation and professionalization of campaigning in facing the 2014 presidential election.

However, political parties, which suffered from external shock moderately or extremely, they favoured advancing such practices strategically much more. In this respect, these parties are much more likely to develop market-orientation and upgrade professionalized-campaign structure and professionalized-audiences/electorates targeting, campaign personalisation and news and event management strategies, as compared to political parties, which suffered less from external shock.

Path Models	Model 20a Vs. Model 21a		Model 20a Vs. Model 22a		Model 20a Vs. Model 23a	
	β Differences	ρ value	β Differences	ρ value	β Differences	ρ value
PMOa→PMOb	0.117	0.102	0.110	0.922	0.013	0.430
PMOa→ PCE	0.252	0.992	0.225	0.964	0.293	0.995
PMOa→ PCS	-		-		-	
PMOa→ PATS	-		-		-	
PMOa→ PCPS	-		-		-	
PMOa→ PNS	-		-		-	
PMOa→ PNEMS	-		-		-	
PMOb→PCE	0.259	0.004	0.171	0.066	0.233	0.018
PMOb→PCS	0.040	0.330	0.019	0.568	0.057	0.698
PCE→ PCS	0.074	0.752	0.029	0.380	0.041	0.358
PCE→ PATS	0.022	0.573	0.319	0.962	0.019	0.472
PCE→ PNS	-		-		-	
PCE→ PCPS	0.019	0.472	0.102	0.735	0.066	0.355
PCE→ PNEMS	0.223	0.021	0.002	0.517	0.042	0.632
PCS→ PATS	-		-		0.100	0.281
PCS→ PNS	0.023	0.433	0.170	0.822	0.021	0.442
PCS→ PCPS	0.012	0.450	0.044	0.583	0.025	0.538
PCS→ PNEMS	0.301	0.010	0.033	0.388	0.080	0.249
Path Models	Model 21a Vs. Model 22a		Model 21a Vs. Model 23a		Model 22a Vs. Model 23a	
	β Differences	ρ value	β Differences	ρ value	β Differences	ρ value
PMOa→PMOb	0.227	0.997	0.103	0.890	0.123	0.040
PMOa→ PCE	0.027	0.408	0.041	0.660	0.067	0.714
PMOa→ PCS	-		0.064	0.734	-	
PMOa→ PATS	0.015	0.446	0.030	0.587	0.046	0.639
PMOa→ PCPS	-		0.024	0.594	-	
PMOa→ PNS	-		-		-	
PMOa→ PNEMS	-		-		-	
PMOb→PCE	0.088	0.800	0.026	0.602	0.062	0.300
PMOb→PCS	0.060	0.705	0.098	0.821	0.038	0.617

PCE→ PCS	0.103	0.118	0.114	0.123	0.011	0.459
PCE→ PATS	0.297	0.982	0.041	0.373	0.338	0.010
PCE→ PNS	-	-	-	-	-	-
PCE→ PCPS	0.121	0.823	0.047	0.348	0.168	0.116
PCE→ PNEMS	0.221	0.037	0.181	0.056	0.040	0.622
PCS→ PATS	-	-	-	-	-	-
PCS→ PNS	0.193	0.916	0.002	0.506	0.190	0.104
PCS→ PCPS	0.056	0.662	0.037	0.622	0.019	0.438
PCS→ PNEMS	0.268	0.990	0.220	0.977	0.047	0.325

Table 8.10: PLS-MGA Results of Model 20a Vs. Model 21a, Model 20a Vs. Model 22a, Model 20a Vs. Model 23a, Model 21a Vs. Model 22a, Model 21a Vs. Model 23a and Model 22a Vs. Model 23a

Path Models	Model 20b Vs. Model 21b		Model 20b Vs. Model 22b		Model 20b Vs. Model 23b	
	β Differences	ρ value	β Differences	ρ value	β Differences	ρ value
PMOa→PMOb	0.098	0.118	0.077	0.843	0.047	0.286
PMOa→ PCE	0.141	0.095	0.010	0.532	0.079	0.768
PMOa→ PCS	-	-	-	-	-	-
PMOa→ PATS	-	-	-	-	-	-
PMOa→ PCPS	-	-	-	-	-	-
PMOa→ PNS	-	-	-	-	-	-
PMOa→ PNEMS	-	-	-	-	-	-
PMOb→PCE	0.080	0.210	0.006	0.524	0.093	0.187
PMOb→PCS	0.013	0.452	0.054	0.685	0.072	0.730
PCE→ PCS	0.136	0.090	0.128	0.121	0.197	0.041
PCE→ PATS	-	-	0.214	0.925	0.139	0.144
PCE→ PNS	-	-	-	-	-	-
PCE→ PCPS	0.301	0.012	0.098	0.264	0.163	0.134
PCE→ PNEMS	0.102	0.202	0.229	0.040	0.208	0.049
PCS→ PATS	0.209	0.925	0.071	0.318	0.138	0.820
PCS→ PNS	0.037	0.411	0.027	0.441	0.054	0.392
PCS→ PCPS	0.152	0.869	0.037	0.597	0.019	0.438
PCS→ PNEMS	0.010	0.537	0.217	0.048	0.145	0.913
Path Models	Model 21b Vs. Model 22b		Model 21b Vs. Model 23b		Model 22b Vs. Model 23b	
	β Differences	ρ value	β Differences	ρ value	β Differences	ρ value
PMOa→PMOb	0.174	0.991	0.050	0.735	0.124	0.048
PMOa→ PCE	0.151	0.918	0.220	0.989	0.069	0.739
PMOa→ PCS	-	-	-	-	-	-
PMOa→ PATS	-	-	-	-	-	-
PMOa→ PCPS	-	-	-	-	-	-
PMOa→ PNS	-	-	-	-	-	-
PMOa→ PNEMS	-	-	-	-	-	-

PNEMS						
PMOb→PCE	0.087	0.801	0.013	0.447	0.100	0.179
PMOb→PCS	0.067	0.780	0.085	0.820	0.018	0.568
PCE→PCS	0.008	0.530	0.061	0.279	0.069	0.266
PCE→PATS	-		-		0.353	0.004
PCE→PNS	-		-		-	
PCE→PCPS	0.203	0.920	0.138	0.848	0.065	0.333
PCE→PNEMS	0.127	0.158	0.106	0.186	0.021	0.559
PCS→PATS	0.280	0.015	0.071	0.296	0.209	0.935
PCS→PNS	0.009	0.525	0.017	0.461	0.026	0.444
PCS→PCPS	0.118	0.182	0.108	0.195	0.009	0.531
PCS→PNEMS	0.207	0.965	0.185	0.958	0.072	0.246

Table 8.11: PLS-MGA Results of Model 20b Vs. Model 21b, Model 20b Vs. Model 22b, Model 20b Vs. Model 23b, Model 21b Vs. Model 22b, Model 21b Vs. Model 23b and Model 22b Vs. Model 23b

8.2.6. Party Campaign Resources

Party campaign resources led to significant effects of: a) political market-orientation on professionalized-campaign structure; and b) professionalized-campaign structure on professionalized-news and event management strategy in Models 24a and 25a. As seen from table 8.12, such effects in Model 24a are significantly larger. It generated significant effects of professionalized-campaign structure on professionalized-audiences/electorates targeting strategy in these Models, but this effect in Model 24a is significantly smaller. It also resulted in significant effects of professionalized-campaign structure on professionalized-campaign personalization strategy in Models 24a and 26a. This effect in Model 26a is significantly larger. It produced significant effects of: a) professional-campaign engagement on professionalized-campaign personalization and professionalized-news and event management strategies; and b) professionalized-campaign structure on professionalized-campaign personalization strategy in Models 25a and 26a. Such effects in Model 26a are significantly smaller. These demonstrate that political parties with a large amount of campaign funds were much more likely to advance market-orientation and develop a professionalized-campaign structure and news and event management strategy, as compared to political parties

with a medium amount of campaign funds. These parties were also much more likely to set up a professionalized-campaign structure and campaign personalisation strategy, as compared to political parties with a small amount of campaign funds. Political parties with a medium amount of campaign funds were much more likely to upgrade a professionalized-campaign structure and professionalized-campaign personalization and news and event management strategies, as compared to political parties with a small amount of campaign funds.

Party campaign resources also generated significant effects of professional-campaign engagement and professionalized-campaign structure on professionalized-news and event management strategy in Models 24b and 25b. As seen from table 8.13, such effects in Model 24b are significantly larger. It produced significant effects of political market-orientation and professional-campaign engagement in Models 24b and 26b. This effect in Model 24b is significantly larger. It resulted in significant effects of professionalized-campaign structure on professionalized-narrowcasting strategy in these Models. This effect in Model 24b is significantly smaller. It created significance effects of: a) political market-orientation on professional-campaign engagement; b) professional campaign engagement and professionalized-campaign structure on professionalized-news and event management; and c) professionalized-campaign structure on professionalized-audiences/electorates targeting strategy in Models 25b and 26b. Such effects in Model 25b are significantly larger. These indicate that, within the specific context of the 2014 presidential election, political parties with a large amount of campaign funds were much more likely to develop a professionalized-campaign structure and news and event management strategy, as compared to political parties with a medium amount of campaign funds. These parties were also much more likely to advance market-orientation, as compared to political parties with a small amount of campaign funds. Moreover, political parties with a medium amount of campaign funds were

much more likely to upgrade market-orientation and implement a professionalized-campaign structure and professionalized-audiences/electorates targeting and news and event management strategies, as compared to political parties with a small amount of campaign funds.

Path Models	Model 24a Vs. Model 25a		Model 24a Vs. Model 26a		Model 25a Vs. Model 26a	
	β Differences	ρ value	β Differences	ρ value	β Differences	ρ value
PMOa→PMOb	0.013	0.436	0.127	0.091	0.114	0.147
PMOa→PCE	0.045	0.316	0.096	0.838	0.140	0.893
PMOa→PCS	-		-			
PMOa→PATS	-		0.018	0.563	-	
PMOa→PCPS	-		-		-	
PMOa→PNS	-		-		-	
PMOa→PNEMS	-		-		-	
PMOb→PCE	0.061	0.756	-		-	
PMOb→PCS	0.186	0.016	0.130	0.080	0.056	0.695
PCE→PCS	0.099	0.890	0.091	0.863	0.008	0.467
PCE→PATS	0.153	0.157	0.026	0.577	0.179	0.840
PCE→PNS	-		-		-	
PCE→PCPS	0.117	0.856	0.173	0.062	0.290	0.009
PCE→PNEMS	0.187	0.016	0.035	0.386	0.222	0.048
PCS→PATS	0.262	0.957	-		-	
PCS→PNS	0.010	0.541	0.079	0.354	0.089	0.349
PCS→PCPS	0.079	0.247	0.275	0.985	0.353	0.033
PCS→PNEMS	0.232	0.016	0.051	0.330	0.181	0.907

Table 8.12: PLS-MGA Results of Model 24a Vs. Model 25a, Model 24a Vs. Model 26a and Model 25a Vs. Model 26a

Path Models	Model 24b Vs. Model 25b		Model 24b Vs. Model 26b		Model 25b Vs. Model 26b	
	β Differences	ρ value	β Differences	ρ value	β Differences	ρ value
PMOa→PMOb	0.000	0.507	0.108	0.090	0.108	0.123
PMOa→PCE	0.030	0.383	0.106	0.889	0.136	0.887
PMOa→PCS	0.026	0.615	0.128	0.909	0.102	0.819
PMOa→PATS	-		0.005	0.514	-	
PMOa→PCPS	-		-		-	
PMOa→PNS	-		-		-	
PMOa→PNEMS	-		-		-	
PMOb→PCE	0.010	0.540	0.288	0.001	0.297	0.004
PMOb→PCS	0.097	0.159	0.001	0.502	0.097	0.816

PCE→ PCS	0.066	0.747	0.066	0.248	0.131	0.133
PCE→ PATS	-		0.107	0.183	-	
PCE→ PNS	-		-		-	
PCE→ PCPS	0.019	0.561	0.047	0.343	0.067	0.307
PCE→ PNEMS	0.221	0.032	0.036	0.371	0.257	0.011
PCS→ PATS	0.221	0.931	0.070	0.296	0.292	0.049
PCS→ PNS	0.094	0.709	0.235	0.951	0.141	0.766
PCS→ PCPS	0.009	0.474	0.031	0.602	0.039	0.608
PCS→ PNEMS	0.286	0.002	0.056	0.314	0.230	0.026

Table 8.13: PLS-MGA Results of Model 24b Vs. Model 25b, Model 24b Vs. Model 26b and Model 25b Vs. Model 26b

8.2.7. Party Position in the Government

Party position in the government led to significant effects of: a) political marketing-orientation on professional-campaign engagement and professionalized-audiences/electorates targeting strategy; and b) political market-orientation on professional-campaign engagement in Models 27a and 28a. As seen from table 8.14, such effects in Model 27a are significantly larger. It also resulted significant effects of political marketing-orientation on professionalized-audiences/electorates targeting strategy in Models 27b and 28b. This effect in Model 27b is significantly larger. These indicate that, within the specific context of the 2014 parliamentary election, the opposition parties of the SBY government were much more likely to advance a market-orientation and professionalized-campaign structure and audiences/electorates targeting strategy, as compared to political parties that supported this government. Moreover, within the specific contexts of the 2014 presidential election, these parties were much more likely to advance a professionalized-campaign structure and audiences/electorates targeting strategy, as compared to political parties that endorsed this government.

Path Models	Model 27a Vs. Model 28a		Model 27b Vs. Model 28b	
	β Differences	ρ value	β Differences	ρ value
PMOa→PMOb	0.037	0.277	0.015	0.401
PMOa→ PCE	0.187	0.008	0.117	0.067
PMOa→ PCS	-		-	
PMOa→ PATS	0.240	0.017	0.213	0.029
PMOa→ PCPS	-		-	
PMOa→ PNS	-		-	

PMOa→ PNEMS	-		-	
PMOb→PCE	0.032	0.647	0.007	0.524
PMOb→PCS	0.167	0.049	0.137	0.065
PCE→ PCS	0.054	0.718	0.087	0.825
PCE→ PATS	0.165	0.914	0.006	0.475
PCE→ PNS	-		-	
PCE→ PCPS	0.044	0.639	0.050	0.374
PCE→ PNEMS	0.020	0.578	0.077	0.761
PCS→ PATS	-		0.131	0.878
PCS→ PNS	0.074	0.283	0.012	0.458
PCS→ PCPS	0.046	0.654	0.058	0.667
PCS→ PNEMS	0.090	0.169	0.108	0.121

Table 8.14: PLS-MGA Results of Model 27a Vs. Model 28a and Model 27b Vs. Model 28b

8.3. The Qualitative Findings

8.3.1. Political and Election Regulations as Influential Factors.

Articles No.1, Clauses No.1 and 2, No. 4, Clause 1 and No.10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16 and 17 of the Indonesian National Constitution of 1945 (amendment) constituted that Indonesia has to follow *Republican-Unitary States* and the *presidential government systems*. Being ruled under such systems, the elected-president took position as *heads of the States and the government*. Regarding this condition, most of these parties' top-leaders and public figures favoured running as a presidential candidate in the 2014 presidential election¹²¹. However, before they are allowed to step into this election race, legalities of political parties to which they are affiliated, as constituted by Law No.2/2011, have to be validated. These parties also have to comply with following regulations.

Since the election system to vote MPs candidates of these parties was run based on a proportional representation system with the open-list candidates (as imposed by Article no.5 of Law No.8/2012), each of these MP candidates would have had a chance to get a parliamentary seat once the political party that nominated him/her for running in this election passed the minimum number of the parliamentary election threshold, which is 3.5 % of total popular votes (Article No.209). Moreover, following

¹²¹ Personal interviews with IJP of Golkar Party, 28 October 2014, VYM of PAN, 7 May 2014, TR of a former General Secretary of PKS, 18 May 2014 and SM of PPP, 18 May 2014 and AM of Gerindra Party, 5 November 2014.

Articles No. 211 and 212 of this law, those who want to get elected in this election have to gain the minimum number of the 'division number of voters', which is equal with the total number of popular votes in a parliamentary constituency divided by the total number of parliamentary seats allocated in this parliamentary constituency (Article No.1, Clause 31 of Law No.8/2012). Furthermore, Article No. 215 of this law constituted that any candidate who got a higher number of such votes above that 'division number of voters' would automatically get a parliamentary seat. Additionally, the rest of the quota of parliamentary seats would be provided to the other MPs candidates based on a ranking of the total number of popular votes they collected in that parliamentary constituency¹²².

These regulations carried consequences for the competitive chances of these parties and these parties' MPs candidates in getting the parliamentary seats in the 2014 parliamentary election. Such chances are defined by the capabilities of these parties, as an organisation, and these parties' MPs candidates, as individual politicians, to gain popular votes in each of the parliamentary constituencies that not only pass the minimum number of the 2014 parliamentary threshold, but also turn into parliamentary seats as well. Most of the existing big-size political parties were commonly confident in developing such capabilities. In addressing this issue, AB of PDIP stated as follows.

*"We are quite sure of getting a large number of parliamentary seats in this election. (The main reason is) We have been supported by plenty of loyal and fanatical voters and activists and local leaders. (To accomplish this goal however) We indeed need to manage our resources strategically"*¹²³.

¹²² Article No.21 of this law stated that 560 parliamentary seats would be granted to the elected-MPs candidates that represented 77 parliamentary constituencies. Article No. 215 of this law also regulated that those who got the first-largest number of votes in each of these parliamentary constituencies would be prioritized in getting a parliamentary seat. The vacant parliamentary seat would be provided to an MP candidate who obtained the second-largest number of votes that represent the most diverse sub-districts and/or villages of the parliamentary constituency.

¹²³ Personal interview, 11 June 2014

Similarly, the existing medium-size political parties, which were less experienced with internal and external shocks, were also quite optimistic of establishing such capabilities. In addressing this issue, VYM of PAN stated as follows.

“This party’s leader and MPs candidates are quite sure that we could pass this threshold and obtain a larger number of parliamentary seats compared to the total number of such seats we achieved in the last parliamentary election”¹²⁴.

In contrast, the existing medium-size political parties, which suffered from internal fragmentation, were quite pessimistic in advancing such capabilities. In addressing this issue, SM, a senior leader of PPP denoted as follows.

“A few months before this election was held, some pollsters told me that this party would be likely to get more or less 3.5 % of popular votes in this parliamentary election. I personally believe that some of my fellows who run as MPs candidates could collect a substantial number of popular votes that can be turned into parliamentary seats. But, once this party failed in accomplishing the minimum number of the parliamentary threshold, they completely lost such seats. I therefore asked them to help this party to tackle this issue strategically”¹²⁵.

Despite developing such capabilities, political parties and these parties’ leaders who wanted to run as presidential candidates in the 2014 presidential election had to deal with following regulations. *Firstly*, Articles No.1, 9 and 10 of No.8/2008 constituted that a political party or a coalition of political parties that want to nominate a pair of presidential candidates have to pass the minimum number of the 2014 presidential election threshold. *Secondly*, Articles No.2 and 3 of No.8/2008 constituted that the president and vice-president candidates should be elected directly by the Indonesian people. Following these Articles, each of these parties could nominate its top-leader/public figure as a presidential candidate for running in the 2014 presidential election once they had fulfilled the

¹²⁴ Personal interview, 7 May 2014.

¹²⁵ Personal interview, 18 May 2014.

minimum number of this election threshold¹²⁶. When failing to accomplish this number, each of these parties has to assemble a political coalition¹²⁷.

Such regulations systematically restrained the organizational resources and capabilities of the Indonesian political parties in advancing practices of market-orientation and professionalization of campaigning. This condition led to the following party-specific and emerging factors determining the ways of and the degree to which these parties carried out such practices within and across these elections. This point is detailed as follows.

8.3.2. The Effects of Party-Specific Factors on Marketization and Professionalization of Campaigning of the Indonesian Political Parties Within and Across the 2014 Parliamentary and the 2014 Presidential Elections.

In facing the 2014 parliamentary election, most of these parties and these parties' MPs candidates noticed that the Indonesian electorates/voters had been commonly associated with the secular-nationalist or the secular-Islamic or the Islamist ideological orientations. PDIP, Golkar Party and Democratic Party and these parties' MPs candidates exploited the first one when they developed campaign messages and strategies to capture the electorates that populated parliamentary constituencies. MPs candidates of these parties, who targeted large numbers of traditionalist and modernist Muslim electorates, also advocated moderate and tolerant Islamic values when they advanced the electorates targeting and campaign personalization strategies to persuade and capture these electorates¹²⁸. Similarly, Gerindra Party, Hanura Party and Nasdem Party also undertook such efforts. However, while targeting these electorates, these parties and these parties' MPs

¹²⁶ As regulated by Article No.159 of Law No.8/2008, this number is equal with which is 20 % of 560 parliamentary seats or 25 % of popular votes collected in the 2014 parliamentary election

¹²⁷ Article No. 10 of Law No.8/2008 constitutes this condition.

¹²⁸ Personal interview with AB of PDIP, 11 June 2014.

candidates favoured offering populist political programmes and policies and advocating the importance of the establishment of a democratic social and economic system, which generated much more lucrative social and economic benefits to these electorates¹²⁹. Slightly differently, PKB and PAN and these parties' MPs candidates preferred advocating the second one to capture the electorates who believed strongly in moderate and tolerant Islamic values¹³⁰. Since PDIP, Golkar Party, Democratic Party, Gerindra Party, Hanura Party and Nasdem Party and these parties' MPs candidates also targeted those who accepted these values, they continuously advanced the electorate targeting, campaign personalization and news and event management strategies to approach and mobilize these electorates tactically¹³¹.

Meanwhile, PKS and PPP favoured approaching and persuading various groups of Moslem electorates who disapproved of or were dissatisfied with political policies and programmes advocated by those who followed secular-nationalist or secular-Islamic ideological orientations. As the targeted modern Muslim electorates inhabited the urban areas, PKS and its MPs candidates developed a campaign structure and ran the news and event management and campaign personalisation and electorates/targeting strategies using the media outlets and direct communication method. However, while they approached modern and traditional Muslim electorates settled in the rural areas, PPP and its MPs candidates advanced such strategies using the direct communication technique¹³².

¹²⁹ Personal interviews with WA of Nasdem Party, 29 October 2014, AM of Gerindra Party, 5 November 2014, PL of Gerindra Party, 22 November 2014.

¹³⁰ Personal interview with IN, a former General Secretary of PKB, 14 May 2014.

¹³¹ Personal interviews with IN a former General Secretary of PKB, 14 May 2014, HW, a Deputy General Secretary of PKB, 24 July 2015 and VYM of PAN, 7 May 2014.

¹³² Personal interviews with TR of a former General Secretary of PKS, 18 May 2014, DS of PKS, 12 November, SM of PPP, 18 May 2014, AT of PPP, 19 June 2014.

Soon after the 2014 presidential election began, most of these parties realized the irrelevance of such ideological orientations¹³³. Soon after they joined one of two political blocks set up by the secular-nationalist parties (Gerindra Party and PDIP), the secular-Islamic parties (PAN and PKB), surprisingly, moved into the left side political spectrum. These parties even offered populist policies and programmes to target large numbers of electorates of those occupying the middle ground, especially, since the social and economic gaps were visible political issues in this election (Ambardi, *TEMPO*, 13 July 2014).

Though the class-division remained in existence in Indonesian politics¹³⁴, none of these secular-nationalist, secular-Islamic and Islamist parties exploited this issue strategically within and across the 2014 parliamentary and presidential elections. Regardless of this condition, the discordances of personal profiles and backgrounds of presidential candidates nominated by these secular-nationalist parties led, however, to class-sentiments taking shape within and across these electorates. For example, Prabowo Subijanto, a presidential candidate nominated by Gerindra Party and its coalition, was widely seen and labelled by these electorates as a representation of extraordinary, wealthy, noble and well - educated and upper-class families. In contrast, Jokowi, a presidential candidate nominated by PDIP and its coalition, was widely recognized by these electorates as a representation of ordinary and lower middle-class

¹³³ The main reason was none of these parties fulfilled the minimum number of the presidential election threshold. Instead of considering the similarity of ideological platform, they set up this coalition primarily based on political transactions with a short-term purpose, which is to get a ticket for running as either president or a vice president candidates, and a long-term goal, which is to get a share of political positions in the executive branches of government (ministerial posts), once this coalition and its pair of presidential candidates won this election. Further information related with this issue would be discussed by point 9.3.3 of following chapter 9.

¹³⁴ Ambardi (2014) indicated that the social class sentiment was likely to exist during this election, but development of this sentiment was not actually triggered by the variability of the existing ideological orientations of and political policies and programmes offered by these parties and these parties' presidential candidates. Instead, this sentiment was primarily prompted by awareness of the Indonesian electorates regarding the real existences of the social and economic disparities in the new democracy of Indonesia. Further discussion related to this issue, see Ambardi, *TEMPO* 13 July 2014.

families¹³⁵. Even most of the marketers/campaigners and fanatical supporters of his rival disbelieved that he really came from a middle-class family and was not associated with the ruling elites/classes¹³⁶.

Such sentiments also took place alongside the following bigotry. Prabowo Subijanto was accused of having dual-citizenship, which has been considered illegal for Indonesian people (*KOMPAS*, 24 May 2014, *Koran Tempo*, 22 May 2014), while Jokowi was also negatively framed as a believer of Catholic principles, descended from a Singaporean-Chinese family (*GATRA*, 8 May, 2014, *GATRA*, 25 May 2014, *KOMPAS*, 28 May 2014). In addressing such bigotry, JJ, one of leaders of Pro-Jokowi (Projo) voiced as follows.

“Since Jokowi was accused of being Catholic and born from a Singaporean-Chinese family, some volatile Islamic electorates, especially inhabiting the urban West and East Java Provinces tended to be unlikely to cast their votes for him. Our team found this tendency. We got to work tactically and intensively to ensure these electorates that such accusations were totally invalid”¹³⁷.

Regardless of such developments, the Indonesian political parties, which were eager to nominate their top-leaders as a presidential candidate to run in the parliamentary election, were likely to invest their resources in addressing political sub-markets, especially the media competitors and electorates/voters and develop proficient campaign structure and strategies to persuade these electorates/voters. Such efforts were taken within more or less two years before the 2014 parliamentary and presidential elections. In facing these elections, Gerindra Party allocated a substantial amount of its funds and resources to hire political consultants, finance the survey research and develop and place political advertising programmes on the mainstream Indonesian TV Channels¹³⁸. In following the top-down organisational approach, this party strived for managing its

¹³⁵ Personal interview with BAS, a top-leader of Pro Jokowi (Projo), 10 November 2014

¹³⁶ Personal interview with SH, an unofficial campaign team of Prabowo Subijanto

¹³⁷ Personal interview with JJ, a leader of Pro Jokowi (Projo), 18 November 2014.

¹³⁸ See figure 9.3 of following chapter 9, point 9.4

funds and resources to upgrade campaign structure and strategies, more specifically, the electorate targeting and campaign personalisation strategies¹³⁹. Similarly, Golkar Party also deployed this approach and developed a mechanism to finance what this party and its candidates called 'an integrative marketing and campaigning programme'¹⁴⁰. However, although they followed this approach, Hanura Party and Nasdem Party lacked development this mechanism¹⁴¹.

Slightly differently, PDIP favoured adopting the top-down and bottom-up approaches and establishing a subsequent mechanism, which is termed as '*pendaan politik gotong royong*' (literally means '*mutual aid funding efforts*'). As regards this issue, AB, a vice-general secretary and an MP candidate of PDIP, voiced as follows.

*"This party favoured deploying both top-down and bottom-up approaches and intentionally using term 'pendaan politik gotong royong'. This term, to some degree, was quite workable to 'fire up' collective efforts of its activists, officials and members in gathering and managing such funds and spending such funds strategically. Such funds were really helpful to finance marketing and campaign programmes of this party, its MPs and presidential candidates in facing the 2014 parliamentary and presidential elections"*¹⁴².

Like this party, PKB, PAN, PKS and PPP also adopted these approaches to collect campaign funds¹⁴³. PKB and PAN allocated these funds to supporting the political advertising programmes of incumbent MPs candidates they nominated to target the safe seat and the non-incumbent

¹³⁹ Personal interviews with AM of Gerindra Party, 5 November 2014 and PL of Gerindra Party, 22 November 2014.

¹⁴⁰ Personal interview with IJP of Golkar Party, 28 October 2014.

¹⁴¹ Personal interviews with YC of Hanura Party, 14 May 2014 and WA of Nasdem Party, 29 October 2014.

¹⁴² Personal interview with AB of PDIP, 11 June 2014.

¹⁴³ Like the big-size nationalist parties (PDIP, Golkar Party, Democratic Party), the medium size secular-Islamic parties (PAN and PKB) also strongly favoured approaching political lobbyists and campaign donors as the secondary political sub-markets. Most of the top-leaders and senior politicians of these parties thrived on keeping stories related to this issue from junior politicians and ordinary MPs (candidates) of these parties, the media and electorates. It has been quite difficult to obtain and verify the validities of such stories. Regardless of this condition, point 9.4.3 of the following Chapter 9 will provide an example of how a secular-Islamic party, PKB, successfully persuaded campaign donors and professionals who had potential access to campaign donors.

MPs candidates they assigned to gain the marginal seats¹⁴⁴. Despite intensively managing their funds to finance their marketing and campaign programmes, PKS and PPP approached political lobbyists and campaign donors to fund their marketing and campaign programmes. However, they lacked success in organising this effort. They were therefore reliant on their own resources¹⁴⁵.

As compared to either PKS or PPP, PAN and PKB in facing the 2014 parliamentary and presidential elections were much more confident in advancing practices of market-orientation and professionalization of campaigning due to the following conditions. Not only large numbers of the Indonesian electorates, but also substantial numbers of political lobbyists and campaign donors were likely to favour accepting tolerant and moderate Islamic values advocated by these parties and their candidates¹⁴⁶. As they believed in such values, large numbers of leaders of social, religious and cultural organizations endorsed these parties and their MPs candidates as well. These conditions, to some degree, reduced the total amount of campaign funds they actually needed to finance their marketing and campaign programmes¹⁴⁷.

Like these parties, the Democratic Party and Hanura Party also developed such practices. However, as they were supported less by these political sub-markets, these parties lacked success in running such practices. In contrast, Gerindra Party, Golkar Party and Nasdem Party were much more assertive in advancing such practices due to the

¹⁴⁴ Personal interviews with HW, a Deputy General Secretary of PKB, 24 July, 2015 and VYM of PAN, 7 May 2014.

¹⁴⁵ Personal interviews with DS of PKS, 12 November 2014 and ZR of PPP, 22 September 2014.

¹⁴⁶ Having considered transformation of social and religious cleavages associated with the Indonesian political parties, Ambardi (2008: 313) positioned secular-Islamic parties (PKB and PAN) as a group of political parties, which have been ideologically located in between secular-nationalist and Islamist parties. Ideologically speaking, these parties had the second-largest number of the potential electoral market after the secular-nationalist parties and a larger number of the potential electoral market as compared to the Islamist parties.

¹⁴⁷ Personal interview with IN of PKB, 14 May 2014, HW, a Deputy General Secretary of PKB, 24 July, 2015 and VYM of PAN, 7 May 2014

following conditions. These parties have been strongly associated with various groups of political lobbyists and campaign donors. They also had various types and large numbers of officials and activists, who were experienced with the previous elections and developed a quite workable sharing mechanism to hire political consultants and finance marketing and campaign programmes to target substantial numbers of voters who settled in these constituencies¹⁴⁸.

Furthermore, the following factor also determined the ways of and the degree to which the Indonesian political parties and these parties' candidates advanced such practices within and across these elections. Article No.134, point 1 of Law No.8/2012 and Article No.227 of Law No.42/2008 constituted that these parties and these parties' candidates must report the total number of campaign funds they collected and spent during the elections to the Indonesian Election Commission. Regarding this regulation, most of these parties allocated 'unofficial campaign funds'. Since these funds were not constrained by this regulation, most of these parties and these parties' candidates robustly allocated such funds to finance 'unofficial campaign teams', which were commonly named as '*tim sukses*' (the success team) or camouflaged as '*relawan*' (campaign-volunteers). Having deployed such teams, they targeted various groups of electorates and established proficient campaign structure and professionalized-electorate targeting and campaign personalisation strategies to capture these electorates.

Regardless of sizes, age categories and ideological orientations of the political parties they affiliated, most of these parties' candidates favoured deploying the *clientelistic strategy* in order to get substantial numbers of voters in the 2014 parliamentary election that could be extracted as parliamentary seats¹⁴⁹. Those who had plenty of campaign

¹⁴⁸ Personal interviews with IJP of Golkar Party, 28 October 2014, WA of Nasdem Party, 29 October 2014 and AM of Gerindra Party, 5 November 2014

¹⁴⁹ The clientelistic strategy is widely recognized as a set of market-orientation and campaign strategies, which are specifically directed to persuade and capture a group of

resources employed professional consultants to target persuade and capture the *clientelistic-voters*. However, those who had moderate amounts of campaign resources least preferred hiring these consultants to mobilize these voters. Regardless of this issue, they commonly developed a marketing and campaign method of what they called ‘*a holistic personal-attachment/connection approach*’. This approach was actually a combination of competitor-orientation, voter-orientation and professionalized-campaign personalization and electorates targeting strategies directed to persuade and capture the individual local leaders and voters who had been strongly associated with these leaders¹⁵⁰. Those who were assigned by younger parties to target the marginal seats harnessed this approach. In addressing this issue, PL of Gerindra party provided his personal testimony as follows.

“Since 2009, this party has nominated me as an MP candidate to target a marginal parliamentary constituency. But, I faced the following problems. I am a Catholic. Also, I was not born in that constituency and did not have close relationships with voters and influential local leaders inhabiting that constituency who commonly followed either the Christian or the Islamic principles. Even though some of them were Catholic, their Catholic education system is really different with what I received. There were also influential incumbent MPs named by competitors of this party who strongly affiliated with such voters and leaders. Regarding such problems, my team and I strategically and intensively approached some of these voters and leaders who had been personally and emotionally disconnected from such MPs. I went to their houses and churches or mosques where they worship and chatted to each of them in person. I gave them my personal contact and address. I even often spent a few weeks in their towns or villages and immersed their

clientelistic-voters. Within the specific context of Indonesian politics, the clientelistic-voters are widely recognized as a type of voters who have been strongly associated with the tribal, cultural and religious leaders who have commonly inhabited rural or remote districts. Extracted from personal Interview with, with AD, an activist and professional campaigner employed by an incumbent MP of Golkar Party 21 October 2014.

¹⁵⁰ This approach was specifically used to raise personal-political trust and approval of these leaders and voters and elevate approval of these voters for these parties’ candidates. This approach has been widely recognized as a workable method to collect substantial votes and parliamentary seats. Personal interviews with VYM of PAN, 7 May 2014, SM of PPP, 18 May 2014, AT of PPP, 19 June 2014, DS of PKS, 12 November 2014, IN of PKB, 14 May 2014, AM of Gerindra Party, 5 Nov 2014 and YC of Hanura Party, 14 May 2014.

*conditions. I said to them that I am not a great politician; instead I am merely an ordinary person like them. However, I want to serve them and totally stand up for their interests regarding any public services they need once they cast their votes for me, or this party. This really helped me to get elected for both the first and second terms.*¹⁵¹

Further to taking such efforts, they also secretly advanced a *vote-buying strategy* and combined it with the *pork-barrelling strategy* to mobilize the ‘*undecided-voters* and ‘*reluctant-voters*’¹⁵².

These parties and these parties’ leaders and candidates also learned from these parties’ experiences regarding internal and external shocks. Within the specific contexts of either the 2014 parliamentary or the 2014 presidential elections, the secular-nationalist parties’ leaders and candidates with plenty of campaign resources perceived the unimportance of a leadership change. Most of them, instead, favoured developing a workable organisational management to manage campaign resources in order to accomplish their goals in these elections much more¹⁵³. Similarly, most of the secular-Islamic parties’ leaders and candidates realized that this change was not important since they were quite satisfied with the

¹⁵¹ Personal interview with PL of Gerindra Party, 22 November 2014.

¹⁵² Vote-buying strategy is a set of voter-orientation and campaign strategies in which parties’ candidates, as supported by marketers/campaigners of these parties, secretly carried out political exchanges and transactions with and offered some enjoyments to the targeted voters with expectations that these voters cast their votes for them in these elections. Pork-barrelling strategy refers to a marketing and campaign strategy carried out by incumbent MPs candidates of political parties whereby they delivered various forms of social and economic incentives to diverse groups of voters. Most of these incumbent MPs candidates carried out this strategy to capture the ‘*undecided- and reluctant-voters*’, especially once their constituents turned into disloyal voters. The ‘*undecided-voters*’ were widely recognized as a group of voters who had little trust in these parties and moderate trust in these parties’ candidates, but possibly cast their votes for these parties’ candidates during Election Day; while the ‘*reluctant-voters*’ were widely seen as a type of voters who remained uninterested in voting for these parties and these parties’ candidates. Personal interviews with VYM of PAN, 7 May 2014, SM of PPP, 18 May 2014, AT of PPP, 19 June 2014, DS of PKS, 12 November 2014, IN of PKB, 14 May 2014, AM of Gerindra Party, 5 Nov 2014 and YC of Hanura Party, 14 May 2014.

¹⁵³ Personal interviews with AB of PDIP, 11 June 2014, IJP of Golkar Party, 28 October 2014, AM of Gerindra Party, 5 November 2014, PL of Gerindra Party, 22 November 2014 and YC of Hanura Party, 14 May 2014.

ways their top-leaders managed their parties¹⁵⁴. Most of the Islamist parties' leaders and candidates, however, considered that this change is really important to enhance the organizational capabilities of their own parties in advancing market-orientation and implementing a proficient campaign structure and professionalized-audiences/electorates targeting, campaign personalization and news and event management strategies to achieve their goals in these elections¹⁵⁵.

Meanwhile, the ways these parties evaluated their experiences regarding the degree of external shock in the last parliamentary election quite varied. PDIP, Golkar Party, PKB and PAN were experienced with external shock. In contrast, the Democratic Party and PKS lacked any encounter with this external shock. Similarly, Gerindra Party Hanura Party and Nasdem Party lacked experience with external shock. Although they had diverse experiences regarding external shock, these parties in general, strongly considered the last parliamentary election result to develop such practices in facing the 2014 parliamentary election¹⁵⁶. Surprisingly, although experienced with external shock, PPP considered this election result less; even though some of its MPs candidates, especially its incumbent MPs candidates, favoured considering this result to develop such practices in facing this election¹⁵⁷.

In facing the 2014 presidential election, most of these parties perceived the irrelevance of the 2009 parliamentary and presidential election results. The primary reason was that the patterns and degrees of inclinations of the electorates, the media, the media owners, campaign donors, political lobbyists and activists in supporting either these parties or

¹⁵⁴ Personal interviews with IN of PKB, 14 May 2014, HW of PKB, 24 July 2015 and VYM of PAN, 7 May 2014.

¹⁵⁵ Personal interviews with SM of PPP, 18 May 2014, TR of PKS, 18 May 2014.

¹⁵⁶ Personal interviews with AB of PDIP, 11 June 2014, RCA of Golkar Party, 13 May 2014, HW, a Deputy General Secretary of PKB, 24 July 2015, VYM of PAN, 7 May 2014 AM of Gerindra Party, 5 November 2014, YC of Hanura Party, 14 May 2014, WA of Nasdem Party 29 October, 2014. TR of PKS, 18 May 2014 and RP of Democratic Party, 13 May 2014.

¹⁵⁷ Personal interview with SM of PPP, 18 May 2014.

these parties' presidential candidates during the 2014 presidential election, were different compared to what they were during the 2009 parliamentary and presidential elections. Most these political sub-markets considered public figures who potentially ran as presidential candidates as an individual person much more rather than political parties wherein such figures associated with as an organization¹⁵⁸.

Similarly, the ways these parties managed their positions in the government were also quite different. The ruling parties of this government (Democratic Party, Golkar Party, PKB, PAN, PPP and PKS) were likely to favour exploiting the budgetary and non-budgetary state funds. As they had direct access to manage these funds, these parties and these parties' candidates robustly exploited these funds to create and deliver populist political programmes and policies directed to various groups of electorates they targeted¹⁵⁹. While lacking such advantages, PDIP, Gerindra Party, Hanura Party and Nasdem Party had plenty of chances to evaluate and criticize the weaknesses of political policies and programmes carried out by this government. Most of the Indonesian media, political lobbyists and activists, campaign donors and the Internet and social media users were strongly aware of such weaknesses; but, most of the Indonesian electorates paid attention less to these weaknesses. Regarding such conditions, these parties exploited such weaknesses less when they addressed these electorates within and across these elections¹⁶⁰.

¹⁵⁸ Personal interview with AB of PDIP, 11 June 2014, AM of Gerindra Party, 5 November 2014 and PL of Gerindra Party, 22 November 2014

¹⁵⁹ Most of them developed the '*clientelistic*' and '*pork-barrelling*' strategies to capture these electorates. But, although they obtained such benefits, they still faced difficulties in fully addressing the dissatisfaction of substantial numbers of these electorates, especially the middle class and well-educated electorates, regarding political policies and programmes formulated and delivered by this government. This condition to some degree constrained their capabilities to strategically advance market-orientation and proficient campaign structures and strategies to persuade and mobilize the middle class electorates. Personal interviews with RP of Democratic Party, 13 May 2014, SM of PPP, 18 May 2014, TR of PKS, 18 May 2014 and VYM of PAN, 7 May 2014

¹⁶⁰ Personal interviews with PL of Gerindra Party, 22 November 2014 and YC of Hanura Party 14 May 2014.

8.3.3. The Emerging Factors

A few months before the 2014 parliamentary election was held, the survey data released by prominent pollsters revealed that the electorates' approval of PKB, PAN, PKS, Hanura Party and Nasdem Party and support of top-leaders/public figures of these parties who were running as a presidential candidate in the 2014 presidential election had been under-developed. Each of these parties attempted to develop market-orientation and upgrade campaign structure and strategies to manage this condition. The election result released by the Indonesian General Election Commissions indicated that none of these parties successfully tackled this condition. This commission reported that each of these parties failed in collecting more than 10 % of these electorates in this election. This commission also stated that although they obtained substantial numbers of popular votes and parliamentary seats, Democratic Party, Golkar Party, Gerindra Party and PDIP, individually, did not pass the minimum number of the 2014 presidential threshold (25 % of popular votes or 20 % of total parliamentary seats). Such developments forced them to assemble a political coalition and nominate a pair of presidential candidates to run in the 2014 presidential election. As spelled out by following points, only Gerindra Party and PDIP succeeded in organizing such efforts¹⁶¹.

Led by an influential top-leader, Prabowo Subijanto, Gerindra Party successfully persuaded the leaders of PKS, PAN and PPP to assemble a political coalition and nominate him as a presidential candidate for running in this election. Having selected Hatta Radjasa as a vice-presidential candidate, this party and its coalition intensively advanced market-orientation and proficient campaign structures and strategies. Since this party ran such efforts strategically, the electorates' approval of Prabowo

¹⁶¹ A full story related to the development of a political coalition established by either Gerindra Party or PDIP will be detailed by point 9.3.3 of following chapter 9

Subijanto within a few weeks before the 2014 presidential election was held, rocketed substantially¹⁶².

Meanwhile, having nominated a marketable presidential candidate, Jokowi, PDIP approached Nasdem, PKB, Hanura Party and PKPI to establish a political coalition. Having successfully assembled this coalition and selected Jusuf Kalla as a vice presidential-candidate, this party and its coalition intensively persuaded and mobilized the electorates, the media and campaign donors¹⁶³ and tactically allocated substantial amounts of such funds to finance political advertising programmes broadcast through the mainstream TV Channels¹⁶⁴. They also galvanised remarkable endorsements of campaign-volunteers, fanatical supporters, political lobbyists and campaign donors¹⁶⁵, encouraged their members and activists and hired professionals to develop the ground, air and online wars marketing and campaign programmes strategically. Having run such efforts, they successfully upgraded levels of electorates' support for Joko Widodo¹⁶⁶. More importantly, they ultimately succeeded in getting him and his running mate elected in this election¹⁶⁷.

8.4. Conclusions and Discussions

As stated at the outset, some authors proposed that party-specific factors influence a choice (that has to be) made by political parties to follow market-orientation and/or run professionalization of campaigning (Strömbäck, 2007: 60-63; Strömbäck, 2010: 28-29; Strömbäck, et al., 2012: 86; Gibson and Rommele, 2001, 2009; Strömbäck, 2009; Tenscher, et al., 2012; Tenscher, 2013; Tenscher and Mykkanen, 2013, 2014; Tenscher, et al., 2015). However, while they studied such issues

¹⁶² See figures 9.7 and 9.11. Further discussion about this issue will be displayed by point 9.4.4 of following chapter 9.

¹⁶³ Further information related with this issue would be detailed by point 9.3.4 of following chapter 9.

¹⁶⁴ See figure 9.17 of following chapter 9, point 9.3.4

¹⁶⁵ See figures 9.12, 9.13 and 9.14 of following chapter 9, point 9.3.4

¹⁶⁶ See figures 9.11 and 9.18 of following chapter 9, point 9.3.4

¹⁶⁷ See figure 9.21. Point 9.4.3 of following chapter 9 would detail such issues.

separately, these authors lacked offering a workable conceptual framework to evaluate such issues holistically. Having developed this framework and used it to evaluate such issues within the specific context of the new democracy of Indonesia, this chapter reported the quantitative and qualitative findings, which are summarized as follows.

The quantitative findings evidenced that the following trends take place in the new democracy of Indonesia. *Firstly*, the more secular the ideological orientation of political parties, the much more likely these parties tend to be professionalized, in terms of: a) campaign structure, audiences/electorates/targeting, campaign personalization and news and event management strategies within the specific context of the 2014 parliamentary election; and b) campaign structure and news and event management and audience/electorates targeting strategies within the specific context of the 2014 presidential election. *Secondly*, the older the ages of political parties, the much more likely these parties tend to be market-oriented within the specific context of the 2014 parliamentary election. *Thirdly*, the bigger the size of political parties, the much more likely these parties tend to be market-oriented and professionalized, in terms of campaign structure and news and event management strategy within the specific contexts of either the 2014 parliamentary or the presidential elections. *Fourthly*, political parties, which suffered from internal shock, incline to be much more market-oriented and professionalized, in terms of campaign structure, audiences/electorates targeting and news and event management strategies within these elections compared to political parties, which lacked suffering from this shock. *Fifthly*, as compared to political parties which suffered less from external shock, political parties which moderately or extremely suffered from external shock were much more likely to be market-oriented and professionalized, in terms of: campaign structure and audiences/electorates targeting and news and event management strategies within the specific context of the 2014 parliamentary election;

and b) campaign structure and audiences/electorates targeting, campaign personalisation and news and event management strategies within the specific context of the 2014 presidential election. *Sixthly*, the bigger the campaign resources of political parties, the much more likely these parties incline to be market-oriented and professionalized, in terms of: a) campaign structure and news and event management and campaign personalization strategies within the specific context of the 2014 parliamentary election; and b) campaign structure, audiences/electorates targeting and news and event management strategies within the specific context of the 2014 presidential election. *Finally*, having a role as an opposition block to those ruled in government clearly stimulates political parties to be much more market-oriented and professionalized, in terms of: a) audiences/electorates targeting strategy within the specific context of the 2014 parliamentary election; and b) campaign structure and audiences/electorates targeting strategy within the specific context of the 2014 presidential election. This indicates that magnitude and directions of the effects of party ideology, age category, campaign resources, position in the government and experience with external shock on marketization and professionalization of campaigning of these parties are likely to be determined by the type of the election. However, magnitude and direction of the effects of party size and experience with internal shock on marketization and professionalization of campaigning of these parties instead are unlikely to be influenced by the type of the election. These not only validate, but also substantiate the ideas of these authors.

Meanwhile, the qualitative findings indicated that the existing political and election laws systematically restrained the organisational capabilities of the Indonesian political parties and personal abilities of these parties' leaders and candidates in managing their own resources and conditions when they advanced market-orientation and professionalization of campaigning in facing the 2014 parliamentary and presidential elections. This condition led to party ideology, size, campaign

resources, position in the government and experience with internal shock resulting in much more visible effects on the ways of and the degree to which these parties advanced such practices within and across these elections, as compared to party age category and experience with internal shock. These findings demonstrated that the bigger the sizes and campaign resources of political parties and the more these parties suffered from external shock and preferred following secular ideological orientation and taking a role as opposition parties, the much more likely these parties tend to be market-oriented and professionalized, in terms of campaign structure and audiences/electorates targeting, campaign personalization and news and event management strategies within and across the parliamentary and presidential elections. These clearly substantiate ideas of these authors as well.

Further to this, these findings also revealed subsequent evidences that obviously go beyond these authors' propositions. *Firstly*, the attitudes and behaviours of these political parties' marketers/campaigners in considering the party-specific factors and running such practices, as displayed formerly by the quantitative findings, seem dissimilar to the attitudes and behaviours of these parties' elites (leaders and candidates) in managing such factors and developing such practices, as exhibited previously by the qualitative findings. *Secondly*, developments of political marketability levels of presidential candidates nominated by these parties, took place as an emerging influential factor. This factor, as evidenced previously by the qualitative findings, was likely to determine the ways of and the degree to which these parties advanced such practices, especially in the wake of the 2014 parliamentary election. Subsequently, Chapter 9 will discuss this issue thoroughly.

8.5. Summary

This chapter has evaluated the effects of party-specific factors on modes of marketization and professionalization of campaigning and the

degree of market-orientation and campaign professionalism of the Indonesian political parties within and across the 2014 parliamentary and presidential elections. An analytical framework was formulated and the survey and the in-depth interview data were extracted to explore this issue. The quantitative and qualitative findings were displayed, summarized and discussed. The party' presidential candidate-specific factor, as one of emerging influential factors, was highlighted as well.

CHAPTER 9

PARTY' PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE-SPECIFIC FACTORS AND THEIR EFFECTS ON MARKETIZATION AND PROFESSIONALIZATION OF CAMPAIGNING OF THE INDONESIAN POLITICAL PARTIES

Chapter Overview

Some authors have proposed diverse factors that determine processes of marketization and (de-) professionalization of campaigning and levels of market-orientation and/or campaign professionalism of political parties (Strömbäck, 2007: 60-63; Strömbäck, 2010: 28-29; Strömbäck, et al., 2012: 86; Gibson and Rommele, 2001, 2009; Strömbäck, 2009; Tenscher, et al., 2012; Tenscher, 2013; Tenscher and Mykkanen, 2013, 2014; Tenscher, et al., 2015). However, as they identified the party candidate-specific factors and components that construct these factors less, these authors lacked in proposing a workable conceptual framework needed to holistically evaluate formations of these factors and the effects of them on the ways of and the degree to which political parties in new democratic countries, those indicated by the candidate-centred system and ruled under the presidential government system, such as Indonesia, advanced such practices within and across the elections. Having regarded such issues, this work proposed this framework and deployed it to evaluate the effects of these factors on the ways of and the degree to which the Indonesian political parties developed such practices within and across the 2014 parliamentary and presidential elections (RO 6). Based on extracted survey data and in-depth interview data (derived from these parties' leaders, candidates and professionals, campaign-volunteers and teams of and political lobbyists who worked for the presidential candidates), the existing political, media and election regulations and reports released by the Indonesian General Election and Broadcasting Commissions, pollsters, research centres and the media, especially KOMPAS and TEMPO, this work evaluated and validated

component that underlie such factors and explored such effects as well. Such efforts are detailed as follows.

9.1. Formulation and Evaluation of Dummy Models As An Analytical Framework

This work developed an analytical framework as follows. *Firstly*, the Indonesian political parties, which successfully nominated their top-leaders as a presidential candidate, are coded as 1, while the Indonesian political parties, which failed in accomplishing this goal, are coded as 0. *Secondly*, the Indonesian political parties, which succeeded in nominating their top-leaders or public figures as a pair of presidential candidates, are coded as 1, while the Indonesian political parties, which failed in achieving this goal are coded as 0. *Finally*, the Indonesian political parties, which had an influential presidential candidate, are coded as 1, while the Indonesian political parties, which lacked this candidate, are coded as 0¹⁶⁸. Having undertaken such procedures and considered the type of the election wherein these data were collected; this work had 12 groups of samples. These groups are deployed to evaluate the following dummy models displayed by table 9.1¹⁶⁹.

The Party-Presidential Candidate-Specific Factors (PPSF) as Categorical Moderator-Grouping Variables		Samples in the Group/Unit Levels	Dummy Models and Samples in the Individual Level	
			The 2014 Parliamentary Election	The 2014 Presidential Election
PPCSF 1	Political party, which succeeded nominating its top leader as a presidential candidate	PDIP and Gerindra Party	Model 29a (159)	Model 29b (159)
	Political party, which	Golkar Party, Democratic	Model 30a	Model 30b

¹⁶⁸ An influential presidential candidate refers to a presidential candidate nominated by a political party, which has been highly approved of and supported by the Indonesian electorates within seven months before the 2014 presidential election was held. The survey data released by the Indonesian Circle Survey in December 2013 were used to determine this influential presidential candidate.

¹⁶⁹ This table displays that each of these dummy Models incorporates more than 180 cases/samples, except for Model 1a and Model 1b. This condition, according to Hair et al. (2013: 2-3) and Hair (2014: 23-24) still meets the rule of thumb of the minimum sample size of PLS-SEM.

	failed nominating its top leader as a presidential candidate	Party, Nasdem Party, Hanura Party, PAN, PKB, PPP and PKS	(558)	(558)
PPCSF 2	Political party, which succeeded nominating its top leader/public figure as a pair of presidential candidate	PDIP, Gerindra Party and PAN	Model 31a (232)	Model 31b (232)
	Political party, which failed nominating its top leader/public figure as a pair of presidential candidate	Golkar Party, Democratic Party, Nasdem Party, Hanura Party, PKB, PPP and PKS	Model 32a (485)	Model 32b (485)
PPCSF 3	Political party that had an influential presidential candidate	PDIP, Nasdem Party, PKB and Hanura Party	Model 33a (250)	Model 33b (250)
	Political party that lacked of having an influential presidential candidate	Golkar, Democratic, Gerindra Party, PAN, PPP and PKS	Model 34a (467)	Model 34b (467)

Table 9.1: Total of Samples Sizes of the Dummy Models 29a-34a and 29b-34b¹⁷⁰

This work evaluated Standard Mean Root Square (SRMR) Common Factor Model and Composite Model of these Models. As seen from table 9.2, such values of Model 30a, 30b, 31a, 31b, 32a, 32b, 33a, 33b, 34a and 34b are less than 0.10. Meanwhile, SRMR Common Factor Model values of Model 29a and Model 29b are slightly above 0.10 and SRMR Composite Model values of these models are less than 0.10. Based on ideas of Henseler et al. (2014), these values indicated that each of these models is a good fit model and has sufficient statistical power.

Dummy Models	SRMR Common Factor Model	Confidence Interval of 95 %	SRMR Composite Model	Confidence Interval of 95 %
Model 29a	0.102	(0.087, 0.120)	0.087	(0.074, 0.103)
Model 29b	0.105	(0.091, 0.123)	0.090	(0.077, 0.106)
Model 30a	0.063	(0.059, 0.068)	0.048	(0.044, 0.053)
Model 30b	0.067	(0.062, 0.071)	0.051	(0.047, 0.056)
Model 31a	0.091	(0.080, 0.104)	0.075	(0.065, 0.087)

¹⁷⁰ PPSF 1, PPSF 2 and PPSF 3, respectively, are acronyms of the first, the second and the third party' presidential candidate-specific factors.

Model 31b	0.092	(0.082, 0.104)	0.075	(0.066, 0.087)
Model 32a	0.066	(0.061, 0.072)	0.052	(0.047, 0.058)
Model 32b	0.069	(0.065, 0.075)	0.055	(0.050, 0.060)
Model 33a	0.078	(0.070, 0.087)	0.065	(0.058, 0.073)
Model 33b	0.087	(0.079, 0.097)	0.072	(0.065, 0.081)
Model 34a	0.069	(0.064, 0.076)	0.055	(0.049, 0.061)
Model 34b	0.069	(0.064, 0.075)	0.054	(0.049, 0.059)

Table 9.2: Standard Mean Root Square (SRMR) Common Factor Model and Composite Model of the Dummy Models 29a-34a and 29b-34b

Table 9.3 exhibits a set of acronyms of variables that construct the baseline model and are used in PLS-MGA reports. In these reports, β (path coefficients) values differences with $\rho < 0.05$, and $\rho > 0.95$ indicate that such differences are statistically significant¹⁷¹.

Variables	Acronyms
Political Marketing-Orientation	PMOa
Political Market-Orientation	PMOb
Professional-Campaign Engagement	PCE
Professionalized-Campaign Structure	PCS
Professionalized-Audiences/Electorates Targeting Strategy	PATS
Professionalized-Narrowcasting Strategy	PCS
Professionalized-Campaign Personalization Strategy	PCPS
Professionalized-News and Event Management Strategy	PNEMS

Table 9.3: Acronyms of Variables that Construct the Baseline Model and Used in the PLS-MGA reports of the Dummy Models 29a-34a and 29b-34b

9.2. The Quantitative Findings.

Having evaluated these dummy models using PLS-MGA, this work revealed following findings.

9.2.1. The First Party' Presidential Candidate-Specific Factor.

The first party presidential-candidate specific factor generated significant effects of political marketing-orientation on professional-campaign engagement and professionalized-audiences/electorates targeting strategy in Models 29a and 30a. As seen from table 9.4, such effects in Model 29a are significantly larger. This factor also led to

¹⁷¹ The first one demonstrates that the structural path model (β path coefficients) value in the first dummy model is significantly smaller as compared to the structural path model value in the second dummy model. In contrast, the second one shows that the structural path model value in the first dummy model is significantly larger, as compared to the structural path model value in the second dummy model.

significant effects of political marketing-orientation on professionalized-audiences/electorates targeting strategy in Models 29b and 30b. This effect in Model 29b is significantly larger. These demonstrate that within the specific contexts of either the 2014 parliamentary or the 2014 presidential election: political parties, which succeeded in nominating their top-leaders as a presidential candidate to run in the 2014 presidential election, favoured adopting political marketing-orientation and developing proficient audiences/electorates targeting strategy much more, as compared to political parties which failed in accomplishing this goal.

Path Models	Model 29a Vs. Model 30a		Model 29b Vs. Model 30b	
	β Differences	ρ value	β Differences	ρ value
PMOa→PMOb	0.029	0.322	0.062	0.182
PMOa→PCE	0.177	0.012	0.097	0.116
PMOa→PCS	-	-	-	-
PMOa→PATS	0.154	0.047	0.170	0.048
PMOa→PCPS	-	-	-	-
PMOa→PNS	-	-	-	-
PMOa→PNEMS	-	-	-	-
PMOb→PCE	0.007	0.464	0.014	0.435
PMOb→PCS	0.094	0.171	0.049	0.296
PCE→PCS	0.039	0.337	0.003	0.510
PCE→PATS	0.030	0.301	0.112	0.140
PCE→PNS	-	-	-	-
PCE→PCPS	0.004	0.487	0.063	0.367
PCE→PNEMS	0.007	0.470	0.057	0.686
PCS→PATS	-	-	-	-
PCS→PNS	0.027	0.422	0.034	0.579
PCS→PCPS	0.143	0.100	0.077	0.281
PCS→PNEMS	0.050	0.308	0.081	0.201

Table 9.4: PLS-MGA Results of Model 29a Vs. Model 30a and Model 29b Vs. Model 30b

This factor also produced significant effects of professionalized-campaign structure on professionalized-audiences/electorates targeting strategy in Models 30a and 30b. As displayed by table 9.5, this effect in Model 30a is significantly larger. This indicates that political parties, which lacked success in nominating their top-leaders as a presidential candidate to run in the 2014 presidential election, favoured advancing proficient campaign structure and audiences/electorates targeting strategy within the

specific context of the 2014 parliamentary election much more, as compared to within the specific context of the 2014 presidential election.

Path Models	Model 29a Vs. Model 29b		Model 30a Vs. Model 30b	
	β Differences	ρ value	β Differences	ρ value
PMOa→PMOb	0.019	0.589	0.014	0.385
PMOa→PCE	0.031	0.363	0.048	0.227
PMOa→PCS	-	-	0.039	0.244
PMOa→PATS	0.011	0.475	0.026	0.346
PMOa→PCPS	-	-	0.014	0.589
PMOa→PNS	-	-	-	-
PMOa→PNEMS	-	-	-	-
PMOb→PCE	0.005	0.522	0.002	0.486
PMOb→PCS	0.053	0.337	0.008	0.443
PCE→PCS	0.055	0.338	0.013	0.412
PCE→PATS	0.007	0.515	0.116	0.081
PCE→PNS	-	-	-	-
PCE→PCPS	0.018	0.530	0.007	0.467
PCE→PNEMS	0.076	0.622	0.011	0.440
PCS→PATS	-	-	0.153	0.046
PCS→PNS	0.084	0.665	0.024	0.388
PCS→PCPS	0.091	0.726	0.025	0.396
PCS→PNEMS	0.054	0.673	0.023	0.369

Table 9.5: PLS-MGA Results of Model 29a Vs. Model 29b and Model 30a Vs. Model 30b

9.2.2. The Second Party' Presidential Candidate-Specific Factor.

The second party' presidential candidate-specific factor generated significant effects of: a) political marketing-orientation on professional-campaign engagement; and b) professionalized-campaign structure on professionalized-campaign personalization and news and event management strategies in Models 31a and 32a. As seen from table 9.6, such effects in Model 31a are significantly larger. This factor also produced significant effects of professionalized-campaign structure on professionalized-narrowcasting, campaign personalization and news and event management strategies in Models 31b and 32b. Such effects in Model 31b are significantly larger. These demonstrate that compared to political parties, which lacked success in nominating their top-leaders or public figures as a pair of presidential candidates: political parties, which succeeded in achieving this goal, favoured advancing professionalized-campaign structure, audiences/electorates targeting and news and event

management strategies much more within the specific context of the 2014 parliamentary election, and robustly upgraded a professionalized-campaign structure, audiences/electorates targeting and news and event management and narrowcasting strategies much more within the specific context of the 2014 presidential election.

Path Models	Model 31a Vs. Model 32a		Model 31b Vs. Model 32b	
	β Differences	ρ value	β Differences	ρ value
PMOa→PMOb	0.007	0.449	0.075	0.108
PMOa→PCE	0.144	0.026	0.048	0.267
PMOa→PCS	-	-	0.017	0.421
PMOa→PATS	0.104	0.161	0.055	0.301
PMOa→PCPS	-	-	-	-
PMOa→PNS	-	-	-	-
PMOa→PNEMS	-	-	-	-
PMOb→PCE	0.024	0.371	0.026	0.365
PMOb→PCS	0.038	0.325	0.022	0.411
PCE→PCS	0.028	0.362	0.023	0.397
PCE→PATS	0.026	0.588	0.001	0.503
PCE→PNS	-	-	-	-
PCE→PCPS	0.097	0.362	0.053	0.342
PCE→PNEMS	0.055	0.343	0.076	0.238
PCS→PATS	-	-	0.101	0.078
PCS→PNS	0.037	0.616	0.135	0.031
PCS→PCPS	0.183	0.042	0.114	0.042
PCS→PNEMS	0.161	0.048	0.121	0.038

Table 9.6: PLS-MGA Results of Model 31a Vs. Model 32a and Model 31b Vs. Model 32b

This factor also generated significant effects of professionalized-campaign structure on professionalized-audiences/electorates targeting strategy in Models 32a and Model 32b. As displayed by table 9.7, this effect in Model 32b is significantly larger. This finding indicates that political parties, which lacked success in nominating their top-leaders or public figures as a pair of presidential candidates for running in the 2014 presidential election, favoured advancing a proficient campaign structure and audiences/electorates targeting strategy much more within the specific context of the 2014 presidential election, as compared to within the specific context of the 2014 parliamentary election

Path Models	Model 31a Vs. Model 31b		Model 32a Vs. Model 32b	
	β Differences	ρ value	β Differences	ρ value
PMOa→PMOb	0.037	0.695	0.031	0.269
PMOa→PCE	0.033	0.341	0.063	0.719

PMOa→ PCS	-		0.032	0.315
PMOa→ PATS	0.051	0.350	0.003	0.482
PMOa→ PCPS	-		-	
PMOa→ PNS	-		-	
PMOa→ PNEMS	-		-	
PMOb→ PCE	0.000	0.503	0.002	0.490
PMOb→ PCS	0.050	0.317	0.010	0.432
PCE→ PCS	0.073	0.241	0.022	0.362
PCE→ PATS	0.073	0.280	0.098	0.132
PCE→ PNS	-		-	
PCE→ PCPS	0.028	0.419	0.016	0.434
PCE→ PNEMS	0.069	0.284	0.009	0.452
PCS→ PATS	-		0.129	0.952
PCS→ PNS	0.103	0.746	0.005	0.475
PCS→ PCPS	0.072	0.730	0.003	0.487
PCS→ PNEMS	0.054	0.677	0.013	0.433

Table 9.7: PLS-MGA Results of Model 31a Vs. Model 31b and Model 32a Vs. Model 32b

9.2.3. The Third Party' Presidential Candidate-Specific Factor.

The third party' presidential candidate-specific factor generated significant effects of professional-campaign engagement on professionalized-audiences/electorates targeting strategy in Models 33a and 34b. As seen from table 9.8, this effect in model 34 is significantly larger. This factor produced significant effects of: a) political marketing-orientation on professional-campaign engagement and audiences/electorates targeting strategy; and b) professionalized-campaign structure on professionalized-campaign personalization strategy in Models 33b and 34b. Such effects in Model 33b are significantly larger. These demonstrate that as compared to political parties, which failed in having an influential presidential candidate: political parties, which had this candidate, were much less likely to advance professionalized-audiences/electorates targeting strategy within the specific context of the 2014 parliamentary election; but these parties are much more likely to advance and combine this strategy with a campaign personalisation strategy within the specific context of the 2014 presidential election.

Path Models	Model 33a Vs. Model 34a		Model 33b Vs. Model 34b	
	β Differences	ρ value	β Differences	ρ value
PMOa→PMOb	0.040	0.238	0.038	0.733
PMOa→ PCE	0.007	0.465	0.106	0.041

PMOa→ PCS	-	-	-	-
PMOa→ PATS	0.040	0.330	0.113	0.038
PMOa→ PCPS	0.041	0.315	-	-
PMOa→ PNS	-	-	-	-
PMOa→ PNEMS	-	-	-	-
PMOb→ PCE	0.024	0.380	0.011	0.561
PMOb→ PCS	0.001	0.497	0.007	0.538
PCE→ PCS	0.053	0.248	0.065	0.207
PCE→ PATS	0.153	0.960	0.038	0.646
PCE→ PNS	-	-	-	-
PCE→ PCPS	0.100	0.837	0.145	0.032
PCE→ PNEMS	0.100	0.858	0.014	0.660
PCS→ PATS	0.125	0.847	0.013	0.543
PCS→ PNS	0.082	0.787	0.019	0.572
PCS→ PCPS	0.032	0.395	0.010	0.462
PCS→ PNEMS	0.041	0.315	0.027	0.373

Table 9.8: PLS-MGA Results of Model 33a Vs. Model 34a and Model 33b Vs. Model 34b

This factor also produced significant effects of professional-campaign engagement on professionalized-campaign personalization strategy in Models 33a and 33b. As exhibited by table 9.9, this effect in Model 33b is significantly larger. This factor also resulted in significant effects of professional-campaign engagement and professionalized-campaign structure on professionalized-audiences/electorates targeting strategy in Models 34a and 34b. As charted by this table, such effects in Model 34b are significantly larger. These demonstrate that, across the 2014 parliamentary and presidential elections, both of the political parties, which succeeded in having an influential presidential candidate (1) and political parties which lacked of success in having this candidate (2), strongly engaged in establishing elements of professionalization of campaigning. However, the ways of, and the degree to which, these parties prioritized and advanced such elements across these elections were quite dissimilar. In this respect, the first one favoured advancing a professionalized-campaign personalization strategy much more, while the second one preferred developing a professionalized-campaign structure and audiences/electorates targeting strategy much more.

Path Models	Model 33a Vs. Model 33b		Model 34a Vs. Model 34b	
	β Differences	ρ value	β Differences	ρ value
PMOa→PMOb	0.059	0.179	0.004	0.529

PMOa→ PCE	0.092	0.838	0.003	0.518
PMOa→ PCS	-		0.061	0.834
PMOa→ PATS	0.015	0.560	0.063	0.190
PMOa→ PCPS	-		-	
PMOa→ PNS	-		0.045	0.711
PMOa→ PNEMS	0.053	0.256	-	
PMOb→ PCE	0.020	0.413	0.014	0.590
PMOb→ PCS	0.021	0.411	0.022	0.351
PCE→ PCS	0.026	0.386	0.015	0.406
PCE→ PATS	0.047	0.340	0.159	0.955
PCE→ PNS	-		-	
PCE→ PCPS	0.163	0.960	0.064	0.252
PCE→ PNEMS	0.039	0.661	0.036	0.341
PCS→ PATS	0.078	0.728	0.211	0.986
PCS→ PNS	0.001	0.503	0.067	0.742
PCS→ PCPS	0.027	0.399	0.039	0.349
PCS→ PNEMS	0.036	0.662	0.014	0.566


Table 9.9: PLS-MGA Results of Model 33a Vs. Model 33b and Model 34a Vs. Model 34b

9.3. The Qualitative Findings

9.3.1. Structural Conditions that Led to Formations of the Party' Presidential Candidate-Specific Factor.

As stated previously in Chapter 4, the direct election systems to vote for MPs and a pair of presidential candidates, respectively, had been implemented in Indonesian politics since 2004 and 2009. Implementations of such systems led to the following developments taking place within and across the primary and secondary political sub-markets of these parties. As indicated by transformation of party ID charted by following figure 9.1, political partisanship of the electorates, as a primary political sub-market of political parties, had been declining constantly. Further to this, political trust and support of the electorates for these parties also shrunk substantially (*KOMPAS*, 5 January 2014; *KOMPAS*, 9 February 2014). Instead of paying close attention to the work performances of these parties as an organization, most of these electorates had been much more attentive to personal qualities and work performances of these parties' prominent leaders, politicians and figures as individual politicians. These not only changed the roles of these parties in the Indonesian political

spheres¹⁷², but also transformed the relationships between and among the secondary political sub-markets of these parties (the media, the Internet and social media users, the media owners, political lobbyists, campaign donors, the affiliated and unaffiliated political leaders and activists and campaign-volunteers) and these parties' leaders, politicians and figures, especially those who were eager to be or (potentially) being nominated as presidential candidates to run in the 2014 presidential election¹⁷³.



Source: Survey Data collected by the *Indonesian Survey Institute* (Lembaga Survey Indonesia) and *Saiful Mujani Research and Consulting* (SMRC) in between May 2011 and September 2013.

These conditions led to the personal qualities and leadership styles of these parties' leaders, politicians and figures taking shape as an influential factor. This factor determined inclinations of these political sub-markets to either endorse or undermine of each of these parties' leaders, politicians and figures, especially those who stepped into the presidential election race¹⁷⁴. This factor paved the way for formations of *personal*

¹⁷² Personal interviews with AB of PDIP, 11 June 2014, RCA of Golkar Party, 13 May 2014, AM of Gerindra Party, 5 November 2014, YC of Hanura Party, 14 May 2014, SM of PPP, 18 May 2014, VYM of PAN, 7 May 2014 and WA of Nasdem Party 29 October, 2014.

¹⁷³ Personal interviews with PSL of JSI, 12 October 2014, DBS of Berita Satu TV, 15 October 2014, SP of METRO TV, 31 October 2014, MQ of Indo Barometer, 19 May 2014, AZ of TEMPO, 21 October 2014 and PS of Trans 7, 23 September 2014.

¹⁷⁴ Such predilections were quite predictable and assessable. The Indonesian political parties with plenty of robust organizational resources commonly hired political consultants and strategists to evaluate such predilections. Personal interviews with USB of LSN, 14 May 2014, T of SMRC, 21 October 2014, EK of JSI, 13 October 2014, RK of Viva News,

political gravitational and magnetism powers of each of these parties' leaders, politicians to attract and capture these political sub-markets¹⁷⁵. As detailed by following points, such powers constructed the political marketability level of each of these parties' leaders, politicians and figures and carried consequences for the ways of and the degree to which these parties advanced market-orientation and campaign professionalism within and across the 2014 parliamentary and presidential elections.

9.3.2. Formations of Political Marketability Levels of the Indonesian Political Parties' Presidential Candidates and Their Effects on Marketization and Professionalization of Campaigning of These Parties Within the Specific Context of the 2014 Parliamentary Election.

Two years before the 2014 parliamentary election was conducted, a top-leader of Golkar Party, Aburizal Bakrie (ARB), decided to run in the 2014 presidential election. This party organized a series of workshops to address the electorates/voters and the media and manage the competitors. This party intensively managed its members, activists and officials and approached political lobbyists and campaign donors as well¹⁷⁶. This party also hired some political pollsters and consultants to advance its campaign structure and strategies. Supported by these pollsters and consultants, this party continuously marketed and promoted ARB as a presidential candidate. Together with its MPs candidates, this party advanced a proficient campaign structure and professionalized-electorate targeting, campaign personalisation and news and event management strategies to


26 September 2014, RB of KOMPAS, 12 November, 2014, SR of Okezone.com, 10 October 2014

¹⁷⁵ Personal interviews with MQ of Indo Barometer, 19 May 2014, PSL of JSI, 12 October 2014, AZ of TEMPO, 21 October 2014, UK of Media Indonesia, 20 October 2014 and YAN of KOMPAS TV, 6 November 2014

¹⁷⁶ Personal interview with IJP of Golkar Party, 28 October 2014

persuade the electorates, mobilize political leaders and activists and manage the media¹⁷⁷.


Similarly, Gerindra Party also intensively addressed and managed these political sub-markets since its top-leader and founder, Prabowo Subijanto, to run as a presidential candidate in the 2014 presidential election¹⁷⁸. Further to hiring some political consultants, this party organized training and meetings in a special place near Prabowo Subijanto's house. Such efforts were directed to improve the political marketing management and campaigning knowledge and skills of its MPs candidates and local activists and officials (Hidayat and Widjaya, *TEMPO*, 20 April 2014). This party also advanced a set of direct communication strategies to persuade and mobilize leaders of Islamic leaders who had been politically influential among a large number of Moslem electorates inhabiting the rural and urban areas of the Indonesian Provinces, especially those located on Java Island (Agustina, et al., *TEMPO*, 13 April, 2014).



Source: The Indonesian General Election Commission, 2014.

¹⁷⁷ Personal interview with RCA, 16 December 2016

¹⁷⁸ Personal interview with AM of Gerindra Party, Personal interview, 5 November 2014



Source: The Indonesian Broadcasting Commission, 2014¹⁷⁹

Each of these parties, as seen from figures 9.2 and 9.3, respectively, collected and spent substantial amounts of official campaign funds and allocated substantial funds to finance political advertising programmes broadcast through the Indonesian TV channels. Gerindra Party, between 15 March 2014 and 5 April 2014, put out the larger number of political advertising programmes. Golkar Party conversely, favoured developing the ground war marketing and campaigning programmes much more to persuade and capture the electorates populating the parliamentary constituencies¹⁸⁰. As the political marketability levels of the presidential candidates of these parties remained under-developed, both of these parties succeeded less in accomplishing their goals in the 2014 parliamentary election¹⁸¹.

¹⁷⁹ 11 Indonesian televisions include RCTI, SCTV, MNC TV, INDOSIAR, ANTV, TRANS TV, METRO TV, TRANS 7, GLOBAL TV, TV One and TVRI

¹⁸⁰ Personal interview with RCA of Golkar Party, 13 May 2014.

¹⁸¹ While they targeted collecting 30 % of popular votes in this election (*KOMPAS*, 13 April 2014), Golkar party only obtained 14.75 % of popular votes and 91 parliamentary


In a slightly similar way, the Democratic Party exploited the positive personal image of its populist leader, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) to captive these political sub-markets. As validated by most of the Indonesian pollsters, he still had substantial *personal political gravitation and magnetism powers* to attract the electorates, non-affiliated political activists, campaign donors and the media. However, as imposed by Law No.48/2008, he was prohibited from running as a presidential candidate, for the third-time. While this party lacked an influential and marketable presidential candidate, the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK), as displayed previously by point 7.3.2 of Chapter 7, suddenly named its prominent public figures of being involved in some mega corruption cases. This condition substantially deteriorated the levels of trust and support of political sub-markets, especially the electorates, the mainstream media and the Internet and social media users, for this party and its MPs candidates¹⁸².

Regarding such conditions, between 22 September 2013 and the end of March 2014, this party had been organizing a *presidential primary election*. This party, as seen from figures 9.2 and 9.3, respectively, actually succeeded in collecting quite substantial amounts of campaign funds and allocated a considerable amount of these funds to finance political advertising programmes broadcast by Indonesian TV channels in between 15 March and 5 April 2014. Although they undertook such efforts, this party merely obtained 10.19 % of popular votes and 61 parliamentary seats in this election. These seats, as seen from figure 9.4, represented more than 60 % of parliamentary constituencies located in 33 Indonesian provinces. However, as charted by figures 9.5 and 9.6, such votes and seats are obviously smaller, as compared to the total number of popular votes and parliamentary seats this party gathered in the 2009

seats in this election. Similarly, whilst expected to get more than 20 % of popular votes and 100 parliamentary seats in this election (Personal interview with AM of Gerindra Party, 5 November 2014), Gerindra Party merely collected 11.81 % of popular votes and 73 parliamentary seats in this election.


¹⁸² Personal interview with RP of Democratic Party, 13 May 2014

parliamentary election. Having regarded such conditions, this party did not assemble a political coalition and nominate a presidential candidate to run in the 2014 presidential election¹⁸³.




Source: the Indonesian General Election Commission, 2014.

¹⁸³ In the wake of the 2014 parliamentary election, prominent figures of this party gradually fragmented into two groups. The first group endorsed Jokowi of PDIP, while the second group supported Prabowo Subianto of Gerindra Party (Candra, *TEMPO*, 20 April 2014). But, two weeks before the 2014 presidential election was conducted, this party officially joined a coalition established by Gerindra Party. Following point 9.4.2 will detail this issue.



Source: the Indonesian General Election Commission, 2009 and 2014.



Source: the Indonesian General Election Commission, 2009 and 2014.

Meanwhile, Hanura Party took the following efforts. Personally directed by its top-leader, Wiranto, this party addressed campaign donors and the mainstream media (owners). Ten months before the 2014 parliamentary election was being held, this party persuaded Harry Tanoesoedibyo (HT), a media baron who owned MNC Groups (RCTI, Global TV and MNC TV), to join this party. On 2 July 2014, this party officially nominated him as a vice-presidential candidate, paired with

Wiranto as a presidential candidate (*KOMPAS*, 3 July 2013). Supported by this media baron, this party intensively marketed Wiranto-Harry Tanoesoedibyo (Win-HT), as a pair of presidential candidates, and harnessed the mainstream media, especially MNC TV, RCTI and Global TV, a group of TV channels owned by HT to persuade and mobilize the electorates/voters. This party allocated substantial amounts of its campaign funds to finance political advertising programmes broadcast primarily by these TV channels. As showcased previously by figure 9.3, these TV channels, together with 8 Indonesian TV channels, had been placing substantial spots of political advertising programmes of this party in between 15 March and 5 April 2014.

This party expected that such efforts could elevate not only the *political marketability level* of this pair of presidential candidates, but also the electorates' approval of and support for this party and its MPs candidates¹⁸⁴. Unfortunately, since such efforts had been less workable, this party, as seen from figures 9.5 and 9.6, merely got 5.26 % of popular votes and obtained only 16 parliamentary seats in this election. This condition completely diminished the competitive chance of its top-leader, Wiranto, to get a presidential ticket. In the aftermath of this election, this party was approached by Golkar Party to assemble a coalition and nominate Aburizal Bakrie as a presidential candidate to run in the 2014 presidential election (Paraqbueq and Purnomo, *TEMPO*, 20 April 2014). However, this party ultimately joined a political block set up by PDIP.

PDIP was much more concerned with evaluating the development of *political marketability levels* of its top-leader, Megawati Soekarnoputri, and its prominent public figure, Joko Widodo (Jokowi). Since they considered that levels of endorsement of the electorates, campaign-volunteers, the mainstream media and the Internet and social media users, political lobbyists and campaign donors to this party had been strongly related to the degree of political marketability of Jokowi, most of

¹⁸⁴ Personal interview with YC of Hanura Party, 14 May 2014

the influential leaders of this party favoured nominating him as its presidential candidate. Nonetheless, they carefully considered the right time to announce his candidacy to make sure that his *personal political magnetism* could fully generate the '*spiralling electoral-effect*' that benefited this party and its MPs candidates who would run in the 2014 parliamentary election¹⁸⁵. As they noticed this '*Jokowi effect*' existed, this party officially announced his presidential candidacy on 14 March 2014, four weeks before this election was being held on 9 July 2014¹⁸⁶.

Three months before Jokowi ran in this election, some pollsters had been very curious to detect whether this effect was real or merely existed as a political illusion¹⁸⁷. A few weeks after he stepped into the presidential election race officially, two of these pollsters, *Charta Politika* and *Indikator Politik Indonesia*, validated that this effect was quite visible and likely to be elevating political support of the electorates for this party and its MPs candidates as well¹⁸⁸. However, slightly differently from these pollsters, *Saiful Mujani Research and Consulting (SMRC)* revealed that this effect was less visible and unlikely to be upgrading such support¹⁸⁹. While they

¹⁸⁵ Personal interview with AB of PDIP, 11 June 2014

¹⁸⁶ Personal interview with AB of PDIP, 11 June 2014

¹⁸⁷ One of them was Indo Barometer. As they carried out the multistage random sampling technique and ran the survey experimental procedure, this pollster had been collecting survey data in between 4 and 15 February 2014 drawn from 1200 respondents that represented electorates populated in 33 Indonesian Provinces. This pollster revealed that if this party did not name him as a presidential candidate before this election was held, this party was likely to get 28.8 % of popular votes. But, if this party nominated him as a presidential candidate, this party was likely to gather 25.8 % of popular votes (Indo Barometer, 2014).

¹⁸⁸ As they ran a survey using a multistage random sampling and a set of samples that represent the Indonesian electorates populated in 33 Indonesian Provinces, *Charta Politika* predicted that this effect was likely to elevate the levels of electorates' approval of this party up to more or less 30 % (Sutrisno, *DetikNews*, 3 March 2014). Meanwhile, as they took that sampling technique and carried out an experimental survey procedure, *Indikator Politik Indonesia (the Indonesian Political Indicator)* and *the Indonesian Institute* uncovered that if this party did not officially announce him as a presidential candidate, this party was likely to get 14 % popular votes. But, if this party publicly named him as a presidential candidate, this party was likely to obtain 27 % of popular votes (Muhtadi, *TEMPO*, 20 April 2014).

¹⁸⁹ This pollster found evidences that indicated that the levels of electorates' approval of this party slightly increased from 15 % in February 2014 to 21 % in the third week of March 2014 (*KOMPAS*, 3 April 2014). But, this pollster argued that it was not Jokowi' candidacy that propelled this development. Instead, it was the decreasing number of the

expected that the Jokowi' candidacy could upgrade such support, this party targeted collection of at least 27 % of popular votes in this election (Agustina, et al., *TEMPO*, 20 April 2014). Unfortunately, this party ultimately obtained 18.95 % of popular votes and 109 parliamentary seats in this election; such votes and seats, as seen from figures 9.5 and 9.6, were slightly larger, as compared to what this party obtained in the 2009 parliamentary election¹⁹⁰.

Nasdem Party addressed fewer campaign donors and political lobbyists as *secondary political sub-markets*. This party, otherwise, primarily addressed the electorates, as a *primary political sub-market* and the media, the Internet and social media users and political leaders and activists, as *secondary political sub-markets*. This party favoured taking such efforts since its top-leader, Surya Paloh, one of the influential media barons, personally favoured securing its campaign resources and supporting its political advertising programmes¹⁹¹. As charted by figure 9.3, this TV channel, together with 10 Indonesian TV channels, placed a considerable number of political advertising programmes for this party between 15 March and 5 April 2014. While lacking a marketable presidential candidate, this party continuously encouraged its members, activists and officials, managed the voters, the media and its competitors and advanced a professionalized-campaign structure and proficient news and event management and electorates targeting strategies as well. Whilst combining such strategies with campaign personalisation strategy, some of this party' MPs candidates, surprisingly, preferred exploiting the

non-voters and the increasing inclination of some of these voters to vote for this party and its MPs candidates that led this development to take place (*the Jakarta Post*, 4 April 2014).

¹⁹⁰ Some argued that the '*Jokowi effect*' actually took place in this election. But, its magnitude was quite small due to the following factors. *Firstly*, the implementation of the open list electoral system led to each of the MPs candidates of the Indonesian political parties, including this party, favouring developing their own campaign programmes and strategies rather than their parties' marketing programmes and strategies. *Secondly*, this party lacked success in capitalizing power of the personal quality and leadership style of Jokowi (Aspinall, *Newmandala*, 10 April 2014; Fatah, *KOMPAS*, 9 April 2014).

¹⁹¹ Personal interview with WA of Nasdem Party, 29 October 2014

personal political gravitational and magnetism powers of Jokowi to attract, persuade and capture voters of those occupying in the middle ground¹⁹². In undertaking such efforts, this party and its MPs candidates successfully obtained 6.72 % of popular votes in this election. Under the Indonesian (extreme) multi-party system, these votes are actually quite substantial for a new political party. However, since a large number of these votes, as imposed by this election regulation, cannot be extracted as parliamentary seats, this party merely got 36 parliamentary seats.

Meanwhile, PAN were much more engaged in targeting the electorates, especially the modern Moslem electorates who populated the urban areas, as a *primary political sub-market* and addressing the mainstream media and the Internet and social media users, political leaders and activists, campaign donors and lobbyists, as *secondary political sub-markets*. Since its top-leader, Hatta Radjasa expected to get a vice-presidential ticket this party hired professional consultants and pollsters to advance the campaign structure and strategies and called for its MPs candidates to strongly upgrade their own marketing and campaign programmes and strategies¹⁹³. Since political marketability of its leader as either a president or vice-presidential candidate, as reported by such pollsters, remained under-developed, this party only collected 7.59 % of popular votes and 48 parliamentary seats in this election. In the wake of this election, this party approached the secular-nationalist parties with highly marketable presidential candidates, which are PDIP and Gerindra Party. However, since PDIP were unlikely to nominate its top-leader as a vice-presidential candidate in the 2014 presidential election, this party finally joined a political coalition established by Gerindra Party, which offered its top-leader a vice-presidential ticket (Hidayat, et al., *TEMPO*, 25 May 2014).

¹⁹² Personal interview with WA of Nasdem Party, 29 October 2014

¹⁹³ This party expected that as they got substantial numbers of these seats, this party would had a good standing position to join the right coalition set up by the other political parties, which was pleased to nominate its top-leader, as a vice presidential-candidate. Personal interview with VYM of PAN, 7 May 2014

In the meantime, PKB preferred addressing the electorates much more, especially traditional Moslem electorates populating the rural areas that were strongly associated with *Nahdlatul Ulama* (NU), the biggest Islamic organization in Indonesia, as a *primary political sub-market*. To this end, this party exploited the *personal political magnetism power* of Abdurrahman Wahid (Gus Dur), a former Indonesian President (1999-2001), an influential leader of NU (1984-1999) and founder of this party, to persuade and capture these electorates¹⁹⁴. This party also hired political consultants to supervise marketing and campaign programmes carried out by its MPs candidates. This effort was taken to help its MPs candidates in grasping support of various groups of electorates, especially those who were strongly appreciative of the outstanding ideas and personal character of Abdurrahman Wahid¹⁹⁵.

Instead of approaching the mainstream media owners and the Internet and social media users, this party prioritized addressing political lobbyists, professionals and campaign donors much more. This party successfully persuaded some businessmen, such as Eko Putro Sandjojo, a former executive director of HUMPUSS, a corporation owned by Tommy Soeharto, a son of President Soeharto, to join this party, and Rusdi Kirana, an owner of Lion Air, the biggest low-cost Indonesian airlines corporation, to take a position as a deputy chairman of this party. The last one, as reported by Septian, et al. (2014), donated 40 Milliard IDR to finance political advertising programmes of this party broadcast by some prominent Indonesian TV Channels, and spent 30 Milliard IDR to shore up campaign programmes carried out by its outstanding MPs candidates who wanted to win the marginal seats. After these efforts, this party ultimately got 9.04 % of popular votes and 47 parliamentary seats in this election. When compared to what this party gathered in the 2009 parliamentary election, such numbers of votes and seats, as seen from figures 9.5 and

¹⁹⁴ Personal interview with IN of PKB, 14 May 2014

¹⁹⁵ Personal interviews with HW of PKB, 24 July, 2015 and T, a political consultant of SMRC hired by PKB, 21 October 2014

9.6, were substantially larger. Having realized that the *political marketability* level of Joko Widodo developed substantially, this party, in the wake of that election, joined a political coalition established by PDIP¹⁹⁶.

Unlike these parties, PPP addressed the media, campaign-volunteers, mainstream media owners, campaign donors and lobbyists less as *secondary political sub-markets*. This party instead, merely focused on persuading Moslem electorates populating either the rural or urban areas¹⁹⁷. A decision made by its top-leader, Surya Dharma Ali (SDA), to endorse Prabowo Subijanto of Gerindra Party as a presidential candidate led to an internal-fragmentation taking place within this party. This fragmentation was unmanageable, especially since the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) named SDA as a suspect of corruption in the case of the state funds allocated to the hajj pilgrimage programme covering the financial years 2010-2013 (Hidayat, et al., *TEMPO*, 8 June 2014).

Similarly, PKS prioritized addressing the Moslem electorates as well. However, in a slight contrast to PPP, this party focused on targeting the Moslem electorates populated in the urban areas much more, as a *primary political sub-market*. Further, this party also intensively approached the mainstream media and Internet and social media users, as *secondary political sub-markets*. This party robustly carried out such efforts, especially since KPK named its top-leader on 29 January 2013 as being involved in the bribery case¹⁹⁸.

Both PKS and PPP suffered badly from increasing numbers of negative publications regarding the personal profiles of their top-leaders

¹⁹⁶ This party expected PDIP to be pleased to nominate its top-leader, Muhaimin Iskandar, as a vice-presidential candidate, paired with Joko Widodo for running in the 2014 presidential election. Unfortunately, this party failed accomplishing this goal (Hidayat, et al., *TEMPO*, 27 April 2014).

¹⁹⁷ Personal interviews with SM of PPP, 18 May 2014 and ZR of PPP, 22 September 2014

¹⁹⁸ Personal interviews with TR, a former general secretary of PKS, 18 May 2014 and DS, a leader of PKS, 12 November 2014

who had been accused of being involved in these corruption cases. As this revealed that such cases undermined levels of the electorates' support of these parties, most of the prominent Indonesian pollsters predicted that each of these parties was unlikely pass the minimum number of the 2014 parliamentary election threshold (3.5 % of popular votes collected in this election). Regarding this condition, each of them attempted to advance their campaign structure and strategies. After such efforts, PKS finally collected 6.79 % of popular votes and 40 parliamentary seats, while PPP ultimately gathered 6.53 % of popular votes and 39 parliamentary seats. Having regarded the numbers of these votes and seats, both of them decided on taking a coalition set up by Gerindra Party¹⁹⁹.

9.3.3. Transformations of Political Marketability Levels of the Indonesian Political Parties' Presidential Candidates and Their Effects on Formation of Political Blocks and Nominations of Pairs of Presidential Candidates Who Ran in the 2014 Presidential Election.

In the wake of the 2014 parliamentary election, the Indonesian political parties gradually polarized into two political blocks: PDIP established the first one, while Gerindra Party organized the second one. Though they successfully assembled a political block, each of these parties encountered the following problems. The first one was how to develop a set of criteria to select the best vice-presidential candidate. The second one was how to define a mode of decision to fairly share a vice-presidential ticket with its coalitions²⁰⁰. The following stories detail the ways these parties attempted to manage such problems tactically.

As it was considered that the *political marketability* level of Prabowo Subijanto remained at a low level, Gerindra Party sought a marketable

¹⁹⁹ Each of these parties actually expected to get a vice-presidential ticket. But, none of these parties got this ticket

²⁰⁰ Personal interviews with PL of Gerindra Party, 22 November 2014, PLG, a political consultant of JSI hired by this party, 12 October 2014 and IB, a political strategist hired by PDIP, 30 October 2014

vice-presidential candidate. Leaders of this party took the following efforts to accomplish this goal. *Firstly*, Prabowo Subijanto, a top-leader and a presidential candidate of this party, really favoured nominating a prominent public figure of PDIP, Jokowi, as a vice-presidential candidate²⁰¹. However, soon after its primary rival, PDIP, named him as its presidential candidate on 14 March 2014 and started approaching Nasdem Party and PKB to form a political coalition, this party sought and selected several popular and influential public figures and continuously evaluated the degree of the electorates' approval and endorsement of these figures²⁰².

Secondly, Prabowo Subijanto also personally appointed Ahmad Muzani (AM) and Fadli Zon (FZ), a general secretary and deputy chairman of this party, respectively, to persuade top-leaders of the other political parties to formulate a political coalition and select and nominate a prospective vice-presidential candidate. They communicated intensively with Hatta Radjasa, Zulkifli Hasan and Taufik Kurniawan of PAN and strived to organize a special meeting with prominent leaders of PKS and PPP to make sure that these parties were pleased to join this coalition. Further, they also approached top-leaders of Golkar Party and the

²⁰¹ This expectation was formulated due to the following historical reasons. *Firstly*, in the 2009 presidential election, a top-leader of this party and a top-leader of PDIP signed the '*Batu Tulis Agreement*'. As imposed by this agreement, Prabowo Subijanto of Gerindra Party was pleased to run as a vice-presidential candidate, paired with Megawati Soekarnoputri of PDIP who ran as a presidential candidate in that election with the following '*condition*'. If these parties failed in that election, they would take a position as opposition parties of the second-term of SBY' government and assemble a political coalition to nominate him as a presidential candidate for running in the 2014 presidential election. *Secondly*, three years later, he, together with some influential public figures, also ensured that Megawati Soekarnoputri nominated Jokowi, at that time, a Mayor of Solo Regency, Central Java, as a candidate for governor to run in the 2012 Gubernatorial Election of Jakarta. He totally supported Jokowi to win this election. Since being elected in this election, Jokowi gradually become a new political rising-star and received huge positive publication from large numbers of the Indonesian mainstream media and favourable mentions and sentiments from substantial numbers of the Internet and social media users.

²⁰² Among of those who were considered by this party were Burhanuddin Abdullah, a senior politician of this party, Tri Rismaharini, a politician of PDIP who took position as a Mayor of Surabaya, East Java, Abraham Samad, a Chairman of the Indonesian Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK), Ahmad Heryawan, Hidayat Nur Wahid and Anis Matta, senior politicians and public figures of PKS and Said Aqil Siradj, a chairman of *Nahdlatul Ulama* (NU) (Agustina, et al., 2014, *TEMPO*, 13 April 2014).

Democratic Party to discuss a potential vice-presidential candidate (Chandra, et al., *TEMPO*, 27 April 2014).

Finally, Prabowo Subijanto also intensively persuaded top-leaders of Golkar Party and the Democratic Party to form a political coalition (Septian, et al., *TEMPO*, 18 May, 2014; Hidayat, et al., *TEMPO*, 25 May 2014). This party finally succeeded in persuading PAN, PKS, PPP, Golkar Party and the Democratic Party to join in and establish this coalition (*KOMPAS*, 30 June 2014; Sugiharto, et al., *TEMPO*, 13 July 2014). Having successfully managed this coalition, these parties selected him and Hatta Radjasa of PAN as a pair of presidential candidates²⁰³.

Meanwhile, a presidential candidate of PDIP, Jokowi, supported by the top-leader and leaders of this party, took the subsequent steps. *Firstly*, two days after the 2014 parliamentary election was conducted, he personally approached Surya Paloh, an owner of the Media Group (*METRO TV*, *Media Indonesia* and *Lampung Post*) and a top-leader of Nasdem Party²⁰⁴. He carried out this strategy due to the following issues. Since his party publicly announced him as a presidential candidate on 14 March 2014, the total number of political news stories that contained positive frames of his profile, activities and work performances produced and broadcast by the Indonesian TV Channels had been gradually declining. Some influential mainstream media, such as a News TV Channel owned by a top-leader of Golkar Party, not only intensively highlighted his poor performance as a governor of Jakarta, but also constantly undermined his personal character, capability and experiences

²⁰³ The most crucial issue, which had been intensively discussed by Gerindra Party and its coalition, was how to get a solid agreement regarding which one of the top-leaders or members of its coalition deserved a vice-presidential ticket. Golkar Party, PKS, PPP and Democratic Party were pleased not to ask for this ticket. Unlike these parties, PAN was very eager to get this ticket for its top-leader, Hatta Radjasa to running as a vice-presidential candidate in this election.

²⁰⁴ This effort was directed to accomplish the two following goals. The first one was to ensure that Nasdem Party preferred taking part in this coalition. The second one was to make sure that the mainstream media owned by Surya Paloh, especially *METRO TV*, the oldest and influential Indonesian news TV channel, totally promoted and endorsed him as a presidential candidate (Septian, et al., *TEMPO*, 13 April 2014).

in possibly taking a role as the next Indonesian president. Most of the Indonesian pollsters reported that he had a higher amount of electorates' approval as a presidential candidate. But, he was quite worried that such conditions would reduce the electorates' approval (Septian, et al., *TEMPO*, 13 April 2014).

Secondly, some influential leaders of this party organized meetings with leaders of the Democratic Party and Golkar Party. However, such meetings did not come up with a solid agreement regarding sharing the president and vice-presidential tickets (Septian, et al., *TEMPO*, 13 April 2014). They dealt intensively with the top-leaders of Nasdem Party, PKB and Hanura Party to get a marketable vice-presidential candidate²⁰⁵.

Finally, a top-leader of this party, Megawati Soekarnoputri, covertly organized two special teams named 'Team 9' and 'Team 11'. Supported by the first team, the second team formulated a set of criteria to select potential vice-presidential candidates²⁰⁶. These teams set up 19 criterions to select potential vice presidential candidates. Based on these criteria, they got the top five vice-presidential candidates²⁰⁷. They hired *Populi*

²⁰⁵ Nasdem Party named several potential presidential candidates. They were Jusuf Kalla, a former top-leader of Golkar Party and a close friend of a top-leader of this party, Barnabas Suebu, a former Governor of Papua Province and Admiral (ret) Tedjo Edhy Purdijatno, a former top-leader of the Indonesian Navy and an influential leader of this party. Meanwhile, PKB named its top-leader, Muhaimin Iskandar, as a vice-presidential candidate (Hidayat, et al., *TEMPO*, 27 April, 2014).

²⁰⁶ Members of this team consist of 2 senior politicians of PDIP, which are Prananda Prabowo, a son of a top-leader of this party and Hasto Kristiyanto, at that time, a vice general secretary of this party, and 9 professionals/experts, which are Dr. Cornelis Lay and Dr. Ari Dwipayana, political scientists of the University of Gadjah Mada, Hariadi, a political scientist of the Airlangga University, Muradi, a lecturer of Padjajaran University, Andi Widjayanto, a political scientist of the University of Indonesia, Jaleswari Pramodhawardhani, a political scientist of *the Indonesian Science Institute*, Alexander Retno Wulan and Sumaryo, marketing communication consultants and Teten Masdui, a senior activist of anti-corruption movement and a founder of the *Indonesian Corruption Watch*. They were recruited and directed personally by a top-leader of his party, Megawati Soekarno Putri (Septian, et al., *TEMPO*, 27 April 2014).

²⁰⁷ These top-five vice presidential candidates are Abraham Samad, Head of KPK, Mahfud, MD of PKB, Agus Martowardjojo, a governor of the Indonesian Central Bank, Kuntoro Mangkusubroto, a former senior official of SBY' Government, Darmin Nasution, a former governor of the Indonesian Central Bank. Some leaders of this party in the central office also selected following figures that as a potential vice presidential candidates as well. They are General (ret) Ryamizard Ryacudu and General (ret) Luhut B. Pandjaitan.

Centre, a pollster led by Nico Harjanto, PhD, a former researcher at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)²⁰⁸, to survey developments of the electorates' approval of these vice-presidential candidates. Having considered the survey data collected by this pollster between February and March 2014, this team finally named Jusuf Kalla as a vice-presidential candidate due to the following reasons (Hidayat, et al., *TEMPO*, 27 April 2014). The survey data revealed that Jusuf Kalla has been strongly supported by substantial numbers of electorates. He had also been widely seen as a senior and proficient politician and closely associated with influential businesspersons, such as Sofjan Wanandi, one of the founders of CSIS and chairman of the Association of the Indonesian Entrepreneurs (ASMINDO), and Jacob Oetama, an owner of KOMPAS Media Group, a holding company of the following influential mainstream media, which are *KOMPAS*, *the Jakarta Post* and *KOMPAS TV* and *Radio Sonora Networks*²⁰⁹.

9.3.4. Developments of Political Marketability Levels of the Indonesian Political Parties' Presidential Candidates and Their Effects on Marketization and Professionalization of Campaigning of These Parties Within the Specific Context of The 2014 Presidential Election.


A few months before this election was held, Gerindra Party and its coalition noticed that levels of the electorates' endorsement of Prabowo

These influential and public figures were delivered to Megawati Soekarnoputri as well (Hidayat, et al., *TEMPO*, 27 April 2014).

²⁰⁸ It is an influential think tank established by political activists, business owners and politicians in the first decade of New Order Soeharto regime. Among those were Sofjan Wanandi, Jusuf Wanandi, Harry Tjan Silalahi and Mayor General (ret) Ali Murtopo, one of loyal supporters of President Soeharto.

²⁰⁹ Jusuf Kalla and Sofjan Wanandi have been widely recognized as having personal and professional connections with various experts, professionals, lobbyists and conglomerates that have been institutionally or personally associated with founders of CSIS (Hidayat, et al., *TEMPO*, 27 April 2014). One of them was Jacob Soetojo, a member of CSIS Council and an owner of a House in South Jakarta wherein Jokowi on 21 April 2014 dined and promoted his ideas and political programmes with influential ambassadors, such as the ambassadors of USA, Vatikan, Burma, Turki, Peru, Norway and United Kingdom for Indonesia (Agustina, et al., 2014, *TEMPO*, 27 April 2014).

Subijanto had been under-developed, but they still believed that they could manage this problem tactically. They also conjectured that as they successfully elevated the degree of electorates' approval of Prabowo Subijanto, the electorates' support of his competitor, which was Jokowi, would gradually decline²¹⁰. As charted by figure 9.7, the survey data released by the Indonesian Circle Survey (Lingkaran Survey Indonesia) partially validated their assumptions.



Source: Survey Data Collected and Released by The Indonesian Circle Survey (Lingkaran Survey Indonesia) in Between September 2013 and May 2014.

Following this assumption, Gerindra Party and its coalitions took the following steps. *Firstly*, as they had successfully assembled a political block and nominated Prabowo Subijanto-Hatta Radjasa as a pair of presidential candidates, this party and its coalition appointed Mahfudz MD, a politician of PKB who personally endorsed Prabowo Subijanto, to lead 'Tim Pemenangan' (the Winner Team). Three of the former top-leaders of the Indonesian Arm Force, General (ret) George Toisuta and Lieutenant General (ret) Burhanuddin and Admiral (ret) Moekhlash Sidik were designated as second commanders of this team, while Fadli Zon, a deputy chairman of this party was appointed as a general secretary of this team.

²¹⁰ Personal interviews with AM of Gerindra party, 5 November 2014 and PL of Gerindra party, 22 November 2014

Leaders of this party and its coalition were also included in this team. This team also recruited some professionals, such as Budi Purnomo, a former media strategist hired by Jokowi during the 2012 gubernatorial election of Jakarta, and Arya Mahendra Sinulingga, a senior journalist of the MNC Group²¹¹.

Led by Admiral (ret) Moeklas Siddik, a central campaign organisation of this party managed the local campaign organization to upgrade the electorates' approval of Prabowo Subijanto²¹². This organization was structurally integrated with the *'Winner Team'*, but was detached from the central and local campaign organizations of this party and its MPs candidates who ran in the 2014 parliamentary election (Septian, et al., *TEMPO*, 4 May 2014). Further, this party also employed special confidential teams. These teams included: a) *'Bidakara Team'* located in the Nusantara Energy Group, a corporation set up by Prabowo Subijanto and Widjono Harjanto, a deputy chairman of this party (Septian, et al., *TEMPO*, 4 May 2014); b) *'Tunas Indonesia Raya'* (*The Genesis of the Great Indonesia*), a sub-organization of this party headed by Dirgayuza Setiawan, one of the best graduates of University of Melbourne, Australia; and c) *'Sentra Strategi Indonesia'* (Centre for the Indonesian Strategy), directed by Sugiono, a senior politician of this party, a former

²¹¹ Two years before Jokowi stepped into the 2014 presidential race this party actually established some professional campaign teams to upgrade the political marketability level of Prabowo Subijanto. One of these teams was a sophisticated team composed from 30 well-trained marketers/campaigners, which were qualified as a group of cyber armies. As supported by *Think Big*, this team harnessed social media platforms, especially Facebook and twitter to frame and market the personal quality and professional performance of Prabowo Subijanto and responded to various forms of negative campaign messages that undermined his personal quality and professional performance as well (Septian, et al., *TEMPO*, 4 May 2014; Hidayat, et al., *TEMPO*, 6 July 2014).

²¹² A local campaign coordinator managed each of these local campaign organizations. Those who ran these organizations were qualified as achieving a military rank as a general (ret) with at least one star. Most of them were fellows of or closely associated with Lieutenant General (ret) Glenny Kairupan, a senior politician of this party, former head of the Intelligence Strategic Unit of the Indonesian Arm Force and a close friend of Prabowo Subijanto. This coordinator continuously supervised the whole marketing and campaign programmes and activities carried out by marketers/campaigners of this party and its coalition in a group of parliamentary constituencies located in one of 33 Indonesian Provinces (Septian, et al., *TEMPO*, 4 May 2014).

middle-rank leader of the Indonesian Arm Force and qualified from Norwich University, USA²¹³.

This party also deployed 'clandestine campaign teams'. Being slightly different from these aforementioned teams, these teams deployed very confidential methods to persuade and mobilize the undecided-voters populating the prominent Indonesian provinces. The complete marketing and campaign activities carried out by members of these teams were nearly undetectable. Regardless of this, Hidayat (et al., 2014) reported that these teams consisted of former members of Prabowo Subijanto staff when he took position as a leader of Komando Pasukan Khusus (KOPASSUS), a 'Special Forces Command' of The Indonesian Arm Force. Col (ret) Chairawan Kadarsyah Nusyirwan, Lieutenant Col (ret) Fauka Noor Farid and Mayor (ret) Bambang Kristiono, were old friends of Prabowo Subijanto who joined this unit and intensively managed one of these teams (Hidayat, et al., *TEMPO*, 6 July 2014).

Secondly, this party and its coalition collected substantial amounts of campaign resources. This effort was carried out as follows. Hashim Djojohadikusumo, a younger brother of Prabowo Subijanto, has been widely acknowledged as a key person who managed various campaign funds needed by this party (Hidayat, et al., *TEMPO*, 6 July 2014). Such funds were divided into two types. The first is the 'official campaign fund',²¹⁴ while the second one is the 'unofficial campaign fund'²¹⁵. As reported by the Indonesian General Commission, this party and its coalition as charted by figure 9.8, collected and spent 101,7 Milliard IDR to

²¹³ These teams deployed proficient military methods in running the marketing and campaign programmes. They also shared outstanding military knowledge and skills with their members to advance their own marketing and campaign knowledge and skills (Septian, et al., *TEMPO*, 4 May 2014).

²¹⁴ Members of these teams and total amounts of campaign funds collected by this party and its coalition and spent by these teams must be reported to the Indonesian General Election Commission.

²¹⁵ The campaign fund was allocated to support the whole marketing and campaign programmes of the 'unofficial campaign teams' and to hire political consultants, pollsters and strategists. According to Law No.48/2008, these teams had no an obligation to report the total amount of this fund and the ways they used this fund to this commission.

finance marketing and campaign programmes of Prabowo Subijanto-Hatta Radjasa. Moreover, leaders and founders of this party and its coalition developed a mechanism to manage this fund²¹⁶ and intensively approached diverse campaign donors. However, they got smaller amounts of campaign funds from corporations and individual persons, as compared to their competitors²¹⁷.


Thirdly, this party and its coalition appointed the following public figures and professionals as spokespersons of Prabowo Subijanto and his running mate, Hatta Radjasa. They include Major General (ret) Sudrajat, Sandiaga Uno, a young successful entrepreneur, Marwah Daud Ibrahim, PhD, a political communication expert, Tantowi Yahya and Nurul Arifin, MPs of Golkar Party (2009-2014), Prof. Didik J.Rachbini, PhD, an economist, and Rizal Mallarangeng, PhD, a leader of Golkar Party who graduated from The Ohio State University. They supported this pair of presidential candidates manage their own performances in a series of president and vice-presidential debates²¹⁸.

²¹⁶ Hidayat (et al., 2014) reported that in the wake of the 2014 parliamentary election, this party discussed total campaign funds with its coalition to finance the whole marketing and campaign programmes to get Prabowo Subijanto-Hatta Radjasa elected in the 2014 presidential election. His report revealed that in order to proficiently run such programmes and successfully accomplish this goal, this party and its coalition needed at least 1.7 Trillion IDR. According to his report, this party set up a political agreement with members of its coalition. This agreement constituted that political parties, which joined a coalition this party had to share their campaign funds and organizational resources and, more specifically, a political party, which want to get a vice-presidential ticket in this coalition had to deposit at 40 % of 1.7 Trillion IDR. Some leaders of political parties, which joined this coalition, affirmed the existence and validity of this agreement. But most of leaders of this party and its coalition were not happy to verify the degree to which a sharing-fund mechanism enacted this agreement was being fully implemented (Hidayat, et al., *TEMPO*, 25 May, 2014).

²¹⁷ Campaign teams of this party and its coalition did not directly receive these funds. Instead, campaign-volunteers of Prabowo Subijanto directly accepted these funds. This party also let members of its coalition manage their own campaign funds to support their own marketing and campaigning programmes, which were running in 33 Indonesian Provinces (Sufa, *TEMPO*, 3 August 2014).


²¹⁸ The Indonesian General Election Commissions organized a series of these debates. Following these TV channels broadcast a series of these debates. SCTV, INDOSIAR and Berita Satu TV broadcasted the first presidential candidate debate in 9 June 2014. TV One and ANTV aired the second presidential candidate debate on 22 June 2014. Metro TV and Bloomberg TV televised the first vice-presidential candidate debate on 15 June 2014. RCTI, MNC TV and Global TV transmitted the second vice-presidential candidate

Figure 9.8: Sources of Campaign Funds of Gerindra Party and Its Coalition and PDIP and Its Coalitions to Shore Up Marketing and Campaign Programs of Their Pairs of Presidential Candidates during the 2014 Presidential Election



Sources: The Indonesian Election Commission, 2014


Figure 9.9: Total Spot of Political Advertising Programs of Prabowo Subijanto-Hatta Radjasa and Joko Widodo-Jusuf Kalla Broadcasted by 11 Indonesian TV Channels in Between 31 May and 5 July 2014



Source: The Indonesian Broadcasting Commission, 2014

debate on 29 June 2014. TVRI and KOMPAS TV reported the last president-vice-presidential candidates debates in 5 July 2014.

Figure 9.10: Modes of Spending of Campaign Funds
Gerindra Party and Its Coalition and PDIP and Its
Coalitions Used to Finance Marketing and Campaign
Programs of Their Pairs of Presidential Candidates Who
Run in the 2014 Presidential Election



Sources: The Indonesian Election Commission, 2014

PDIP and its coalition undertook the slightly different following efforts. *Firstly*, they robustly addressed both the primary and secondary political sub-markets and upgraded the campaign structure and strategies to persuade and capture these political sub-markets. Since the electorates took the shape of an influential primary political sub-market they approached them intensively. They realized that 9 months before this election was held, levels of these electorates' endorsement of Jokowi had been higher, compared to the degree of these electorates' support of his competitors. However, they noticed that the degree of these electorates'

support of him in between September 2013 and March 2014 had been declining slightly.


They suggested that such developments had taken shape since Golkar Party, PAN, PPP and PKS formed a coalition with Gerindra Party and endorsed Prabowo Subianto as a presidential candidate. They perceived that it would be quite difficult to address the electorates who had been strongly sympathetic to him or associated with (top-leaders of) these parties. Nonetheless, they believed that it would still be possible to persuade and mobilize swing/volatile voters and the undecided-voters (voters who were unlikely to vote for any of the presidential candidates and their running mates)²¹⁹. The total number of the undecided-voters, according to a series of reports released by the Indonesian Circle Survey, increased from 31.60 % in April 2014 to 41.83 % in May 2015. Supported by the political pollsters and consultants they hired, they evaluated the psychological and sociological dimensions that determined the political attitudes and behaviours of these voters, robustly approached these voters and vigorously advanced the campaign structure and electorate targeting and campaign personalisation strategies to persuade and mobilize these voters.

Secondly, this party and its coalition established the 'official campaign team'. Likely their rivals, they also named this team as '*Tim Pemenangan*' (the Winner Team). Tjahyo Kumolo, a senior politician of this party headed this team. Most of the influential leaders of political parties that joined a coalition with PDIP were teamed up in this team. Further, some professionals, political pollsters, consultants and media strategists were also included in this team²²⁰. This team recruited Saur

²¹⁹ Personal interviews with AB of PDIP, 11 June 2014 and WA of Nasdem Party, 29 October 2014

²²⁰ Among those was Andi Widjajanto, alumnus of SOAS University of London and LSE, UK and a lecturer at the University of Indonesia and an expert in the field of military and intelligence studies who was appointed as a secretary of this team. Sukardi Rinakit, PhD, alumni of NUS Singapore and an executive director of Sugeng Sarjadi Syndicate, a political pollster/consultant, Rizal Sukma, PhD, alumnus of LSE, UK and an executive director of the Centre for Strategies and International Studies (CSIS) and now the

Hutabarat, a senior journalist of METRO TV and Media Indonesia, and Romanus Surmayo and Triawan Munaf, digital strategists, to handle the mainstream media and the Internet and social media users. Members of this team were assigned not only to target potential Jokowi voters, but also to persuade various groups of the undecided-voters. As they considered that his personal quality and professional performance strongly attracted most of these voters, they highlighted his personal quality and professional performance as a core campaign message. As they also considered his *personal political gravitational and magnetism powers* to capture these voters, they strategically developed a proficient campaign personalisation strategy and combined this strategy with narrowcasting, electorates targeting and news and event management strategies to persuade and mobilize these voters.



Source: Survey Data Collected and Produced by The Indonesian Circle Survey (Lingkar Survey Indonesia) in Between May and the Last Week of June 2014.

In between May 2014 and the last week of June 2014, this party and its coalition had encountered plenty of smear-campaigns that attacked the personal quality and leadership style of Jokowi; but, they succeeded quite well in handling this problem. The survey data of the Indonesian

Indonesian Ambassador to the UK and Republic of Ireland, were designated as members of a board of experts who supervised marketers/campaigners of this team.

Circle Survey confirmed this evidence. As seen from figure 9.11, the levels of electorates' endorsement of Jokowi had been increasing moderately from 35.42 % in May 2014 to 45.00 % in the first week of June 2014. However, since there had been a large number of smear-campaigns in between the first week and the last week of June 2014, which had systematically denigrated the personal quality of Jokowi, the total number of those who endorsed his rival, Prabowo Subijanto, constantly increased.

Regarding this development, a top-leader and leaders of this party and its coalition and the campaign teams of the presidential candidate of this party advanced the subsequent efforts. *Firstly*, Megawati Soekarnoputri, a top-leader of this party, intensively managed the coordinators of central campaign organizations of this party and its coalition. She personally called for them to develop more sophisticated campaign teams (Widiarsi and Nurul, *TEMPO*, 20 July 2014). Such teams incorporated the following teams. The first team was formulated and deployed to track the sources and messengers of these messages and the medium and platforms used by these messengers to spread these messages and investigate groups of electorates targeted by these messengers and the effects of these messages on these electorates. The second team was established and employed to counter and attack the whole campaign strategies and activities of these messengers. The last team was set up and directed to secure potential voters for Jokowi and ensure that the undecided-voters favoured casting their votes for Jokowi in this election²²¹.

²²¹ This team recruited more or less 72.000 well-trained marketers/campaigners. These marketers/campaigners intensively ran door-to-door campaign activities. Such efforts were directed to accomplish the following goals. The first one was to make sure that potential voters of Jokowi remained favourites to cast their vote for him in this election. The second one was to persuade and mobilize these undecided-voters to be happy to cast their votes for Jokowi in this election (Chandra, *TEMPO*, 13 July 2014). Such efforts, to some degree, were quite effective. The total numbers of these voters in between May and the last week of June 2014 had been substantially declining. The total number of these voters, as reported by this pollster, in the last week of June 2014 was 13.50 % of total Indonesian electorates. But, since the levels of electorates' approval of these

Slightly differently from their rivals, this party and its coalition preferred using the term '*campaign-volunteers*' to camouflage and/or label the following groups of marketers/campaigners. The first one is a group of well-trained marketers/campaigners organized formerly by MPs candidates of this party and its coalition in the 2014 parliamentary election. The second one is a group of well-trained marketers/campaigners recruited by this party and its coalition in the wake of this election and deployed in 77 parliamentary constituencies located in 33 Indonesian provinces. The third one is a group of marketers/campaigners of Jokowi organized either by political consultants or strategists employed by this party and its coalition; or the third parties of volunteers established of groups of people who completely lacked political association with either PDIP or its coalition, but were personally sympathetic to either Jokowi or his running mate, Jusuf Kalla²²².

As compared to the first and second groups, the third group was much larger and varied in terms of its characteristics and marketing and campaign programmes and activities. This group consisted of three sub-groups of marketers/campaigners. The first one was those that used a name that related to Jokowi, such as Seknas Jokowi, Pro-Jokowi (Projo), *Jokowi advanced social media volunteers* (JASMEV) and Jokowi Mania. The second one was those that took a name, which is not associated with Jokowi²²³. The last one was unnamed and worked in a very confidential manner²²⁴.

presidential candidates gradually tied, these voters were a crucial factor that strongly determined the chance of Jokowi winning this election.

²²² Such as groups of campaign donors or close friends of Jokowi or his running mate, Jusuf Kalla.

²²³ For example, "*Relawan Gerak Cepat*" (Fast Movement Volunteer), which comprised 30.000 marketers/campaigners settled in all the Indonesian Districts/Municipalities and were managed by 30 well-trained marketers/campaigners. They used a house located in Jalan Brawijaya 30, Jakarta owned by a friend of Jusuf Kalla, as central headquarters. Chaerany Putri, an alumnus of Limkokwing University, Malaysia, organized them (Hidayat, et al., 2014, *TEMPO*, 3 August 2014).

²²⁴ For example, 9.000 marketers/campaigners managed by a business person, 32 years old, graduated from Ohio University, USA, were deployed to target potential voters of Prabowo Subianto settled in 10 selected Indonesian Districts located on Java Islands

A staff of communication consultants associated with the 'Winner Team' formulated by this party and its coalition also advanced the electorates targeting, personalisation and narrowcasting strategies to target young voters and undecided voters. For example, Faizal Reza Iskandar, a member of staff of *Narada Communication* owned by Sony Subrata, a friend of Romanus Surmaryo, designed a populist tagline, which was widely used by marketers/campaigners of Jokowi: "*I stand on the right side*"²²⁵. Supported by JASMEV, he designed Jokowi's avatar using this tagline and distributed it to wider campaign-volunteer networks through various platforms of social media (Paraqbueq, *TEMPO*, 3 Agustus 2014). Diverse groups of owners of the media production houses associated with one of these groups of campaign-volunteers developed innovative marketing and campaign programmes²²⁶, while professional media practitioners associated with the political advisers/strategists of Jokowi also organized creative marketing and campaign programmes to persuade and mobilize young voters and undecided voters²²⁷.

and thousands of those who were organized by Yusuf Qudori, a leader of Tegal Redjo Islamic Boarding School, Magelang, Central Java Province and an influential leader of PKB in this province (Hidayat, et al., 2014, *TEMPO*, 3 August 2014).

²²⁵ The word '*right*', in this sense, did not refer to *the right-wing ideological orientation*. This word instead, was tactically chosen due to the following reasons. The first one was the picture of Jokowi and his running mate, Jusuf Kalla printed in the '*right part*' of the *ballot card* next to Prabowo and his running mate, Hatta Radjasa. The second reason was this word was intentionally used to highlight that Jokowi is a '*good and right person*' for taking position as the next Indonesian president (Paraqbueq, *TEMPO*, 3 Agustus 2014).

²²⁶ For example, Shendy Abdi, an owner of *Simulakrum Media Works*, a production house and an activist of Pro-Jokowi, produced a video entitled "*Siapa Pahwalan Indonesia Sebenarnya*" (Who the Indonesian hero really is?). This video envisaged the condition of Indonesian people three years after Jokowi get elected as the Indonesian President. He also created the second video entitled "*Indonesian Kita*" (Our Indonesia). Together with some people such as, Syafiq Pontoh, a social media expert, Arief Widiassa, an expert in the development of creative games, Josephine Tanuwijaya and Beni Rahardian, well-known experts in developing creative comics, Shendy also joined in "*Gerakan Optimis*" (an Optimistic Movement), which as established by Marina Silvia Kusumawardhano who qualified from the Technical University of Vienna. The main purpose of this movement was to create a set of creative campaigns to elevate the trust of electorates, especially the young and undecided voters, in Jokowi (Paraqbueq, *TEMPO*, 3 August 2014).

²²⁷ For example, in May 2014, Edward Suhadi, a media practitioner and comrade of Anies Baswedan, produced 50 videos of testimonial campaign style to promote Jokowi to various groups of these voters. Edward asked some celebrities and influential figures in

From the first week of May 2014 until the fourth week of May 2014, the total number of marketing and campaign programmes advanced by organizations and communities of marketers/campaigners associated with the third group had been increasing substantially. The types of such programmes and characteristics and backgrounds of organizers of such programmes had been varying as well. Having considered such developments, Jokowi, as supported by professionals and media strategists employed by this party and its coalition, undertook the following efforts. On 3 June 2014, Jokowi and Romanus Surmaryo had a special meeting with leaders of the marketers/campaigners who harnessed the Internet and social media platforms. The total of those who attended this meeting was more or less 20 persons. Some of them were Sony Subrata, a digital communication strategist and a President Director of *Arwuda Communications*, and Yose Rizal, a digital strategist and founder of *Political Waves*²²⁸. These marketers/campaigners holistically evaluated the ways of and the degree to which the Indonesian mainstream media either positively or negatively framed the personal profile and leadership style of Jokowi; and how the Internet and social media users either positively or negatively mentioned his personal quality and performance (Hidayat, et al., 2014, *TEMPO*, 6 July 2014).

Further to this, Jokowi also deployed his personal liaison officers to support campaign strategies run by his marketers/campaigners and fanatical supporters. One of them was Eko Sulisty, a former journalist and head of the Election Commission of Surakarta Regency, 2003-2008.

the film, music and media industries to make a unique testimony and endorsement delivered to the young voters and undecided voters. He distributed these videos through *YouTube* to target the young voters and undecided-voters as well (Parabueq, *TEMPO*, 3 August 2014).

²²⁸ Sony Subrata and Yose Rizal have been widely acknowledged as a founder of JASMEV, a group of marketers/campaigners, which intensively harnessed the Internet and social media users to promote Jokowi during the 2012 Gubernatorial Election of Jakarta. Soon after Jokowi was named by PDIP as a presidential candidate, Jokowi also personally asked them to manage various groups of social media users who favoured endorsing him during the 2014 presidential election (Hidayat, et al., 2014, *TEMPO*, 6 July 2014).

He was personally entrusted by Jokowi to manage such marketers/campaigners and fanatical supporters. He robustly supported “*Aliansi Masyarakat Sipil untuk Indonesian Hebat*” (Association of Civil Society for a Great Indonesia). This is a group of marketers/campaigners for Jokowi set up by young activists of PDIP who had been associated with Repdem, a sub-organization of this party. He also intensively endorsed marketing and campaign programmes of Pro-Jokowi (Projo), which was organized by both the diehard activists of this party and fanatical supporters of Jokowi.

Anggit Noegroho, Muhammad Isnaini and David, three comrades of Jokowi were deployed as well. Jokowi himself named these people as a ‘*clandestine team*’²²⁹. This team discussed various issues he should address and supplied sufficient data he needed to be familiar with. This team also evaluated political issues, which were related to and carried negative consequences for his personal brand-image and identity. This team sent more or less 30 types of merchandise comprising campaigns, flags, banners, stickers, pins and posters to the Pro Jokowi (Projo) office and intensively communicated with some leaders of the other groups of marketers/campaigners of Jokowi, such as Seknas Jokowi (a National Secretariat of Jokowi) (Hidayat, et al., *TEMPO*, 6 July 2014).

Secondly, this party and its coalition also set up the Jokowi-JK Centre. This centre was established not only to manage various groups of people who voluntarily took part as marketers/campaigners for Jokowi-JK, but also to attract, persuade and mobilize groups of activists, artists, celebrities, lecturers and young voters who were likely to take part as influential supporters of Jokowi. This party and its coalition expected that they could exploit this centre by creating and sharing the creative and

²²⁹ Anggit Noegroho led this team. He was a journalist of Joglosemar, an influential local newspaper in Central Java Province. He together with Muhammad Isnaini and David supported Jokowi when he decided to run as a mayor candidate in the 2005 Mayor Election of the Solo Regency, Central Java (Hidayat, et al., *TEMPO*, 6 July 2014).

novelty ideas of marketing and campaign programmes to get Jokowi-JK elected in this election.

Thirdly, since they considered that campaign funds were a crucial element, this party and its coalition also approached political lobbyists to persuade and mobilize various groups of campaign donors strategically. To this end, they adopted some *Machiavellian* elements tactically. They even advanced a *Machiavellian market-orientation approach*²³⁰. This approach was carried out as follows. First at all, they exploited the ‘fears’ that had been lingering in the minds of campaign donors regarding the personal quality and leadership style of his rival, Prabowo Subijanto, and their consequences for formations of political and economic policies in Indonesia within the next five years once he won this election. In addressing this issue, A, a political lobbyist who has been associated with one of the influential campaign donors of Jokowi voiced as follows.

*“Most of the campaign donors, either individual persons or corporations, which directly or indirectly supported Jokowi, really worried about prospects for their businesses if Prabowo Subijanto won this election. They actually quite appreciated the political policies and programmes he proposed as a presidential candidate, but they were scared of his personal character and leadership style. They were much more confident with the personal quality, background and leadership style of Jokowi”*²³¹.

Most of these donors disfavoured directly supporting the campaign team of Jokowi in the central office. Instead, they preferred delivering their resources to marketers/campaigners and fanatical supporters of Jokowi

²³⁰ Following the ideas of Ormrod (2005: 56-60, 2007: 77-79, 2009: 209) and Hunt and Chonko (1984: 32) and John and Paulhus (2009: 97), this work, in this respect, defines this approach as a type of market-orientation approach in which the party and its candidates tactically and strategically addressed and exploited the ‘fears’ of the primary and the secondary political sub-markets regarding personal character and/or leadership style of a (presidential) candidate nominated by its competitors for running in the (presidential) election, especially once this candidate became elected in the election and ruled the government.

²³¹ Personal interview, 24 October 2014

who ran the online and the ground war marketing and campaigning in a confidential manner.²³²

Since they considered that the level of electorates' approval of Jokowi and his competitor in the last week of June 2014 had been closely tied, most of these campaign donors tactically used their liquid resources to intensively support the marketers/campaigners of Jokowi. In addressing this issue, A, a political lobbyist who has been associated with one of the influential campaign donors to Jokowi stated as follows.


“In the last week of June 2014, survey reports released by some prominent Indonesian pollsters revealed that the degree of electorates' approval of Prabowo Subijanto and Jokowi was very close. As they considered that this condition could lead to Jokowi losing in this election, some influential campaign donors spent their liquid resources to hire political pollsters and consultants to evaluate, target and persuade the undecided-voters and deal with and mobilize the mainstream media and the Internet and social media users. They intensively mobilized a larger number of potential campaign donors and produced campaign materials, which were delivered to campaign-volunteers (marketers/campaigners and fanatical supporters) of Jokowi.”²³³

Being driven by such fears, both individuals and owners of corporations who favoured taking part as campaign donors for Jokowi spent their money and resources to make sure that he and his running mate could win this election. As seen from figures 9.12 and 9.13, the total amounts of their donations between 6 June and 4 July 2014 had been escalating substantially. More importantly, the total amount of money they donated to 3 special bank accounts belonging to this pair of presidential candidates, as seen from figure 9.14, had also been rocketing substantially. Cumulative amounts of money collected by PDIP and its coalition between 30 May and 5 July 2014, as seen from figure 9.15, had been also increasing. The total amount of the 'official campaign fund'


²³² Personal interview with A, an activist and political lobbyist who has been personally associated with one of the influential campaign donors of Jokowi.

²³³ Personal interview, 24 October 2014

collected by this party and its coalition in between 30 May and 7 July 2014, as seen from figure 9.16, had been also increasing significantly.




Source: The Indonesian General Election Commission and Reports Released by the Winner Team of Jokowi-Jusuf Kalla




Source: The Indonesian General Election Commission and Reports Released by the Winner Team of Jokowi-Jusuf Kalla

Figure 9.14: Total Amount of Moneys Donated by Individual Campaign Donators and Corporations to 3 Special Bank Accounts of Joko Widodo-Jusuf Kalla (in Milliard IDR) in Between the First Week of June and the First Week of July 2014




Source: The Indonesian General Election Commission and Reports Released by the Winner Team of Jokowi-Jusuf Kalla


Figure 9.15: Total Amount of Moneys Contributed by PDIP and its Coalition as an Organization (in Milliard IDR) in Between the Last Week of May and the First Week of July 2014



Source: The Indonesian General Election Commission and Reports Released by the Winner Team of Joko Widodo-Jusuf Kalla



Source: The Indonesian General Election Commission and Reports Released by the Winner Team of Joko Widodo-Jusuf Kalla



Source: Yayasan Satu Dunia (the One World Foundation), 2014

This party and its coalition also spent such funds not only in shoring up the ground war and air war marketing and campaign programmes, but

also to finance political advertising programmes of Joko Widodo-Jusuf Kalla broadcast by the Indonesian media. As seen from figure 9.17, the total amount of such funds they allocated to pay for such programmes in between the last week of May and the last week of June 2014 had been increasing substantially. Being supervised by professionals and media strategists, they formulated an impressive populist-campaign with a personalisation tagline, which is '*Jokowi Adalah Kita*' (literary meaning *Jokowi is Us*). They highlighted this tagline as a primary campaign message to capture the Indonesian electorates who occupied the middle ground, but remained reluctant to vote for him in this election.

Finally, this party and its coalition also employed professionals and hired senior journalists as media strategists to supervise and improve the ways Jokowi and Jusuf Kalla articulated and delivered their campaign messages and managed their personal communication styles to the electorates and the media, especially within in a series of presidential and vice-presidential debates²³⁴. They also asked members of 'team 11' to recruit some media strategists and prominent celebrities and public figures in the Indonesian film and music industries as campaign-endorsers of Jokowi. A following sub-story details this issue.

Soon after being employed by this team, Romanus Sumaryono and Triawan Munaf developed campaign programmes, activities and events to attract the undecided voters. Teten Masduki, a member of this team also


²³⁴ Among those were Anies Baswedan, PhD, graduated from Northern Illinois University, USA and a Rector of Pamadina University, Andrinof Chaniago, a founder of Cirrus Network and a lecturer at the University of Indonesia and Sukardi Rinakit, PhD. Together with some members of Team 11, they prepared scripts of speeches of Jokowi delivered on public stages. They also upgraded the ways Jokowi handled press conferences and engaged in presidential debates (Teresia, *TEMPO*, 17 August, 2016). Eep Saifullah Fatah, a political consultant and an executive director of PolMark, Riza Primadi, a senior journalist and former anchor of RCTI, Sandrina Malakiano, a former news anchor/presenter of METRO TV and Rosiana Silalahi, a former editor-in-chief and news anchor of SCTV, and now an editor-in-chief of *KOMPAS TV* were also employed to help Jokowi and Jusuf Kalla during these debates. Akbar Faisal, an MP of Nasdem Party, Maruarar Sirait, an MP of PDIP and Arya Bima, an MP of this party who took position as a head of Media Team of Jokowi were also deployed to improve performances of this pair of presidential candidates during these debates (Hidayat, et al., *TEMPO* 6 July 2014; Chandra, *TEMPO*, 13 July 2014; Teresia, *TEMPO*, 17 August 2014).

asked Slank, a group of musicians that was popular among non-voters, and Wali, a group of musicians that was famous among the young voters to endorse Jokowi. Even Jokowi, himself, organized a meeting with Sony Subrata, Director of *Arwuda Communication*, to manage the online and ground war marketing and campaign programmes strategically. Together with Joko Anwar, an activist of '*Kawan Jokowi*' (Friend of Jokowi), Sony Subrata intensively approached some prominent Indonesian celebrities, film producers, celebrities, TV presenters, and comedians. They asked these public figures to harness their twitter accounts to exploit the most attractive personal profile and character of Jokowi to capture wider endorsements of the electorates and stimulate their followers to elevate such endorsements. They also designed a twitter Hashtag, which is #*AkhirnyaMilihJokowi*# (literarily meaning finally vote to Jokowi). They contacted some prominent public figures and celebrities to intensively share this Hashtag²³⁵. One of the groups of marketers/campaigners of Jokowi, the *Fast Movement*, also held a meeting on 4 July 2014, a day before the final stage of live music concerts organized by several groups of musicians such as Slank. This concert was named '*Konser Salam Dua Jari*' (Two Thumb Salute Concert)²³⁶. In this meeting, Anies Baswedan, a spokesperson for Jokowi, intensively trained them to be much more skilful in ensuring and persuading the middle class electorates to cast their votes for Jokowi (Hidayat, et al., *TEMPO*, 3 August 2014).

²³⁵ Most of the influential celebrities approached by Sonny Subrata and Joko Anwar favoured writing their personal testimonies using social media platforms regarding the outstanding personal quality and leadership style of Jokowi and explained a set of reasons that made them vote for Jokowi. Two of them were Ringgo whose 1.8 Million followers and Sherina Munaf, a daughter of Triawan Munaf whose 8 Million followers. Ringgo created a set of testimonies and comments that highlighted the personal quality of Jokowi, which were intensively discussed and shared by his followers. Like Ringgo, Sherina harnessed her twitter account to formulate a set of endorsements of Jokowi. Such endorsements were widely re-tweeted by not only by her followers, but also by thousands of influential Indonesian celebrities (Hidayat, et al., 2014, *TEMPO*, 20 July 2014).

²³⁶ The word 'two', in this sense refers to the 'official number' of Joko Widodo-Jusuf Kalla printed on the ballot card.

Since they carried out such efforts, the degree of electorates' approval of Jokowi in between the last week of June and the first week of July 2014 has been gradually rebounding. The survey data released by the Indonesian Circle Survey confirmed this development. As seen from figure the 9.18, total number of electorates who preferred to vote for him had been gradually increasing from 43.50 % in the first week of June 2014 to 47.80 % in the first week of July 2014.



Source: Survey Data Collected by The Indonesian Circle Survey (Lingkaran Survey Indonesia) in The Last Week of June and the First Week of July 2014.

Having considered such developments, Gerindra Party and its coalition organized the following efforts. *Firstly*, they managed their activists and members and officials to persuade and mobilize the Indonesian electorates who had already cast their votes for this party and its coalition and their MPs candidates in the 2014 parliamentary election (their constituents) strategically. As displayed by the following table 9.10, they succeeded quite well in persuading and mobilizing their own constituents.


	Times (Months)	Likely to Vote Prabowo Subijanto-Hatta Radjasa	Likely to Vote Joko Widodo- Jusuf Kalla	Being Stuck as the Undecided- Voters
PDIP	May 2014	10.64%	82.01%	7.35%
	The First Week of July 2014	11.10%	84.51%	4.39%
Nasdem Party	May 2014	20.48%	39.11%	40.41%
	The First Week of July 2014	38.80%	56.66%	4.54%
PKB	May 2014	19.11%	39.48%	41.41%
	The First Week of July 2014	37.80%	56.23%	5.97%
Hanura Party	May 2014	35.00%	25.48%	39.52%
	The First Week of July 2014	54.80%	34.46%	10.74%
Gerindra Party	May 2014	82.78%	12.18%	5.04%
	The First Week of July 2014	79.40%	17.82%	2.78%
Golkar Party	May 2014	24.15%	32.34%	43.51%
	The First Week of July 2014	57.30%	37.02%	5.68%
Democratic Party	May 2014	26.25%	34.02%	39.73%
	The First Week of July 2014	51.93%	46.00%	2.07%
PAN	May 2014	25.13%	41.30%	33.57%
	The First Week of July 2014	51.90%	45.45%	2.65%
PPP	May 2014	22.89%	30.03%	47.08%
	The First Week of July 2014	67.20%	23.90%	8.90%
PKS	May 2014	32.69%	32.69%	34.62%
	The First Week of July 2014	62.00%	27.74%	10.26%

Table 9.10: Total Numbers of Voters/Constituents of the Indonesian Political Parties (in %) and Their Inclinations to Vote and Did Not Vote to One of Two Pairs of Presidential Candidates Who Run in the 2014 Presidential Election.²³⁷

Secondly, they intensively upgraded their campaign structure and electorates targeting strategy and combined this strategy with the narrowcasting and news and event management strategies. Such efforts


²³⁷ Survey data of the Indonesian Circle Survey (Lingkaran Survey Indonesia) gathered in May and the first week of July 2014. The survey data were derived from 2,500 respondents who were selected using the multistage random sampling. These respondents proportionally represented the Indonesian electorates populated in 33 Indonesian Provinces.

were directed to capture more or less 8 % of the electorates who remained reluctant to cast their votes in this election. They identified both sociological and psychological characteristics of these voters, sought effective ways to address and deal with these voters and advanced the electorates targeting and campaign personalisation strategies to persuade and capture these voters²³⁸.




Source: The Indonesian General Election Commission, 2014.

²³⁸ Personal interview with PLG of JSI, 12 October 2014



Source: The exit poll data of KOMPAS released in 11 July 2014.



Source: The Indonesian General Election Commission, 2014

Having undertaken such efforts, this party and its coalition successfully captured more than 50 % of voters who populated South Sumatera, West Sumatera, Aceh, West Nusa Tenggara, South Kalimantan, Gorontalo and North Maluku Provinces. However, as seen from figure 9.19, they lacked success in persuading more than 50 % of voters who occupied 21 Indonesian Provinces to vote for this pair of presidential candidates. More particularly, they failed in mobilizing more than 50 % of voters who were settled in 4 Indonesian Provinces located in Java Islands, which are East Java, Central Java, Special Region of

Jakarta and Yogyakarta Provinces, to cast their votes for this pair of this pair of presidential candidates²³⁹.

As compared to this party and its coalition, PDIP and its coalition had much more success in mobilizing their constituents to vote for Jokowi and his running mate on this Election Day. The exit poll data of KOMPAS displayed by figure 9.20 affirmed this evidence²⁴⁰. Although it looked as if it would be a hung parliament, he and his running mate, as charted by figure 9.21, finally collected 53.15 % of popular votes and won this election.

9.4. Discussions and Conclusions

As stated at the outset, some authors proposed diverse factors that determine practices of market-orientation and/or professionalization of campaigning of political parties (Strömbäck, 2007: 60-63; Strömbäck, 2010: 28-29; Strömbäck, et al., 2012: 86; Gibson and Rommele, 2001, 2009; Strömbäck, 2009; Tenscher, et al., 2012; Tenscher, 2013; Tenscher and Mykkanen, 2013, 2014; Tenscher, et al., 2015). However, as they offered a less applicable framework to examine such practices holistically, these authors lacked investigating the effects of the party candidate-specific factors on how political parties in new democratic countries, that share characteristics with Indonesian politics, advance such practices strategically. In focusing on the new democracy of Indonesia, this work developed this framework, evaluated and explored such effects and reported the quantitative and the qualitative findings.

²³⁹ In this election, the West Java, Banten, East Java, Central Java, Special Region of Jakarta and Yogyakarta provinces took place as the main political battleground due to the following reasons. These provinces were populated by more or less 55 % of total Indonesian voters. As compared to voters inhabiting the other Indonesian provinces, voters populated in these provinces overall, had much better access to political information and were much more literate. These voters were much more volatile within the specific context of the 2014 presidential election as compared to how they were within the specific context of the 2014 parliamentary election.

²⁴⁰ The exit poll data collected from 1.762 respondents who cast their votes in 2.000 the Indonesian Polling Stations located in 33 Indonesian Provinces in 9 July 2014. These respondents were drawn using the multi stage random sampling.

The quantitative findings indicated that these factors refer to the degree of success of the Indonesian political parties in nominating their top-leaders as a presidential candidate (1), promoting their top-leaders/public figures for running as a pair of presidential candidates (2) and having an influential presidential candidate (3). These findings demonstrated that within the specific context of either the 2014 parliamentary or the 2014 presidential elections, political parties which succeeded in fulfilling both the first and second goals, were much more favoured in having a professional-campaign and advancing professionalized-campaign structures and audiences/electorates targeting, news and event management and narrowcasting strategies, as compared to political parties, which lacked achievement of such goals. Across these elections: political parties, which successfully achieved the first goal and/or did not accomplish the second goal, tended to be much more professionalized in terms of a campaign structure and audiences/electorates targeting strategy. Within the specific context of the 2014 parliamentary election, political parties, which lacked accomplishment of the third goal, preferred developing a professionalized-audiences/electorates targeting strategy much more. However, within the specific context of the 2014 presidential election, political parties, which succeeded in fulfilling the third goal, were much more attracted to upgrade professionalized-audiences/electorates targeting and campaign personalization strategies. These findings also hinted that the degree of success political parties gained in achieving the third goal significantly determined the ways of and the degree to which these parties prioritized and advanced elements of professionalization of campaigning across these elections. Across these elections: political parties which succeed in accomplishing the third goal, were much more interested in upgrading the professionalized-campaign personalization strategy, while political parties which did not succeed in achieving the third goal were much more engaged in improving the professionalized-campaign structure and

audiences/electorates targeting strategy. This evidence validates that, within the specific context of Indonesian politics, the degree of the success of the party in having an influential presidential candidate was likely to comprise the most important element of the party' presidential candidate-specific factors and strongly to determine modes of professionalization of campaigning and the degree of campaign professionalism of the Indonesian political parties within and across these elections.

Meanwhile, the qualitative findings visualized the elements that construct the party' presidential candidate-specific factors. Such elements consist of *personal political magnetism* and *gravitational powers* of the party' presidential candidate to attract and capture the primary and the secondary political sub-markets within and across the 2014 parliamentary and presidential elections. These elements shaped developments of the political marketability levels of top-leaders/public figures of the Indonesian political parties who wanted to run as presidential candidates in the 2014 presidential election and/or stepped into this election race. These developments determined not only modes of professionalization of campaigning and the degree of campaign professionalism of these parties within and across these elections, but also modes of marketization and levels of market-orientation of these parties within and across these elections. As seen from point 9.3, Both PDIP and Gerindra Party, as compared to their competitors, not only had much more marketable presidential candidates, but were also inclined to be more market-oriented and professionalized in campaigning. The ways of and the degree to which each of these parties and its coalition advanced market-orientation and prioritized elements of professionalization of campaigning in facing the 2014 parliamentary election, however, were quite dissimilar. The first block formulated by PDIP and its coalition succeeded quite well in capturing the primary and secondary political sub-markets. But, the second block established by Gerindra party failed a little in persuading these political sub-markets. The first block was likely to favour and gain success in

establishing campaign personalization, narrowcasting, electorates targeting and news event management strategies; while the second block preferred prioritizing electorates targeting and news and event management strategies, but succeeded less in combining such strategies with narrowcasting and campaign personalisation strategies.

These aforementioned findings not only substantiate the ideas of these authors, but also shed light on the following new knowledge contributions that go beyond what was posited by these authors. As seen from points 9.2 and 9.3, respectively, these findings hinted that these parties' marketers/campaigners strongly accounted for these factors when they selected and upgraded elements that constitute practices of professionalization of campaigning; while these parties' elites tactically exploited these factors when they prioritized and developed components that construct both practices of market-orientation and professionalization of campaigning. These indicate that political parties in democratic countries, which share similarities with the Indonesian politics, are likely to take shape as *'a multitude of actors rather than as monolithic entities'* (Ormrod and Savigny, 2012: 487).

9.5. Summary

This chapter explored the effects of party' presidential candidate-specific factors on developments of marketization and professionalization of campaigning of the Indonesian political parties within and across the 2014 parliamentary and presidential elections. A new analytical framework was formulated. The structural conditions that led to such factors taking place and elements that construct these factors were examined. The effects of such factors on such developments were explored. The quantitative and qualitative findings were displayed, summarized and discussed. The research findings and its conclusion were highlighted as well.

CHAPTER 10

RESEARCH CONCLUSION AND KNOWLEGDE CONTRIBUTIONS

This dissertation is purposely directed to understand and explain the structural conditions and factors that determined the development of marketization and professionalization of campaigning of Indonesian political parties Post-Soeharto New Order up to the 2014 parliamentary and presidential elections. This dissertation, as displayed previously from Chapters 2-9, respectively, has formulated an integrated conceptual framework, proposed the research philosophy, methodology, method and design, evaluated such issues and reported the research findings.

In this this chapter, I will recapitulate these findings. More particularly, I will highlight their potential knowledge contributions to the existing political marketing and campaign literatures.

10.1. Democratization of Politics and Development of Marketization and Professionalization of Campaigning of the Indonesian Political Parties Post-Soeharto New Order

Some authors have evaluated practices of political marketing of political parties in the Indonesian, Brazilian, Hungarian, Czech and Taiwan politics (Uffen, 2010a; Contrim-Macieira, 2005; Kiss and Mihalyffy, 2010; Matuskova, et.al, 2010; Fell and Cheng, 2010) and campaign professionalisms of political parties in the Portuguese, Czech, South Korean, Argentina, Chile and Uruguayan and Mexican politics (Lisi, 2013; Petrova, 2012; Lee, 2013; Espindola, 2002; Jimenez, 2012). However, while they studied such issues separately, these authors lacked exploration of the structural-systemic conditions that propelled political parties in the new democracies to take up such practices comprehensively. Chapter 5, alternatively, has adopted the ideas of Strömbäck (2007: 63), Strömbäck (2010: 28-29) and Strömbäck et al.

(2012: 86) to evaluate the structural conditions that paved the way for the developments of marketization and professionalization of campaigning of Indonesian political parties Post-Soeharto New Order.

This chapter offers the following knowledge contributions. *Firstly*, the democratization of politics led to establishments of the democratic political, media and election systems taking shape. Such systems resulted in 'structural conditions', which stimulated both the existing political parties established during the Soeharto regime (Golkar Party, PDIP and PPP) and the new/emerging political parties founded in the aftermath of the downfall of this regime (PAN, PKB, PKS, Democratic Party, Hanura Party, Gerindra Party and Hanura Party) to adopt the marketing principles, procedures and techniques to advance market-orientation and professionalization of campaigning, especially in facing the parliamentary and presidential elections. Each of these parties favoured adopting such practices strategically. However, none of these parties turned into either the market-oriented or the sales-oriented parties, as posited by Lees-Marshment (2001a: 16-35, 2001b: 696-702; 2001d: 1074-1081, 2003a: 16-26, 2004a: 17-20; 2008: 16-35; 2009: 207-208, 2010: 4-9, 2014: 28-33) and Lilleker and Lees-Marshment (2005a: 8, 2005b: 221-226).

Secondly, Lees-Marshment (2004a: 231, 2004b: 12) voiced that practices of political marketing and market-orientation of political parties and organisations in the UK politics transformed political system. This chapter, conversely, revealed that within the specific context of the new democracy of Indonesia, it was not the development of such practices that transformed the political system: it was the establishments of the democratic political party, government, media and election systems that generated the structural conditions, which propelled this development.

Based on such evidence, I formulate the following propositions. *Firstly*, in the Western-established democratic countries, such as the US and UK politics, development of such practices, as hinted by Lees-Marshment (2004a: 231; 2004b: 12), not only influences the attitudes and

behaviours of political actors and organisations in the political sphere, but also transforms the nature of political system. Moreover, in the new democratic countries, establishments of the democratic political party, government, media and election systems determine this development. Instead of transforming these systems, this development other wise, is likely to be determined by the establishment of such systems and triggered by the existences of the structural-systemic conditions that result from such systems. *Secondly*, political parties in the democratic countries that share similarity with the Indonesian politics are likely to favour advancing such practices strategically: but, none of these parties is likely to form an ideal profile of either the sales or the market-oriented parties, as posited by Lees-Marshment (2001a, 2001b, 201d, 2003a, 2004a, 2008, 2009, 2010) and Lilleker and Lees-Marshment (2005a, 2005b).

10.2. Nomenclatures of Political Market Arenas and Political Sub-Markets and the Effects of Party-Specific Factors on Perceptions of the Indonesian Political Parties' Marketers/Campaigners Regarding the Importance of These Political Market Arenas and Political Sub-Markets.

Chapter 5 has investigated the nomenclatures of political market arenas and political sub-markets that took shape in the new democracy of Indonesia and evaluated the effects of party-specific factors on perceptions of the Indonesian political parties' marketers/campaigners regarding the importance of these political market arenas and political sub-markets. Overall, this chapter offers the following knowledge contributions. *Firstly*, this chapter demonstrated that four types of political market arenas posited by Strömbäck (2007, 2010) and Strömbäck et al. (2012), which are *the internal party, media, electoral and the parliamentary arenas*, took shape in the new democracy of Indonesia. The Indonesian political parties' leaders, politicians and marketers/campaigners, not only considered the

relative importance of these political market arenas, but also recognised the relative importance of *the governmental arena*.

Secondly, Strömbäck (2007: 60-62, 2010: 28-29) and Strömbäck et al. (2012: 86) posited the party-specific factors, were likely to influence perceptions of the party regarding the relative importance of political market arenas. He also argued that *'there is a need for an analytical framework that theoretically has the ability to outline an answer and testable hypotheses to the question: what are the factors, related to what arenas'* (Strömbäck, 2007: 64). Having proposed and applied this framework to evaluate such issues in the Indonesian politics, this chapter unveiled that within the specific context of the 2014 parliamentary election: marketers/campaigners of political parties, which took position as the opposition to the ruling government and moderately or extremely suffered from the internal and external shocks, were more in favour of considering the importance of the media, electoral, governmental and parliamentary arenas, as compared to marketers/campaigners of political parties that lacked of experience of these shocks and ruled in the government. Meanwhile, within the specific context of the 2014 presidential election: marketers/campaigners of political parties that had larger campaign resources, followed secular ideological orientation and moderately or extremely suffered from the internal and external shocks, preferred accounting for the importance of the governmental and parliamentary arenas much more, as compared to marketers/campaigners of political parties that had smaller campaign resources, were unlikely follow this ideological orientation and suffered less from these shocks. This indicates that the magnitudes and directions of the effects of party ideology, experience of the internal and external shocks and position in the government on such perceptions are determined by the type of the elections and are inseparable from the characteristics of these political market arenas as well. This not only really substantiates the ideas of

Strömbäck (2007: 60-62, 2010: 28-29) and Strömbäck et al. (2012: 86), but also quite fulfils the Strömbäck's (2007: 64) expectation.

Thirdly, Johansen (2012: 162) theorized three types of political sub-markets that take shape in the party-centred democratic countries, while Lock and Harris (1996: 14), Kotler and Kotler (1999: 5), Hughes and Dann (2009: 250, 2012: 1364) and Ormrod (2005, 2006, 2007, 2009) highlighted diverse types of political sub-markets that are commonly addressed by political parties, which utilise political marketing and market-orientation. These authors lacked clarification of the ways of and the degrees to which these political sub-markets took shape in the new democracies, which were ruled under the presidential government system and indicated by the candidate-centre system, such as Indonesia. This chapter conversely, demonstrated that the following political sub-markets, which are the *parliamentary, governmental, internal party, electoral, the media and the non-electoral markets*, took shape in the new democracy of Indonesia. This chapter also revealed that the Indonesian political parties' leaders, candidates and marketers/campaigners perceived the importance of the following political sub-markets, which are *the internal party members and activists, the media, campaign contributors, competitors and the electorates/voters*. This considerably substantiates the ideas of these authors.

Finally, these authors lacked exploration of the effects of party-specific factors on perceptions of marketers/campaigners of political parties regarding the importance of these political sub-markets. This chapter alternatively, demonstrated that such effects took shape in the Indonesian politics within these elections. Within the specific context of the 2014 parliamentary election: marketers/campaigners of political parties that followed secular ideological orientation, had larger campaign resources and were experienced with the internal shock, were much more in favour of considering the importance of campaign donors, party members and electorates as political sub-markets, as compared to

marketers/campaigners of political parties that were unlikely to follow this ideological orientation, had smaller campaign resources and lacked experience of the internal shock. Meanwhile, within the specific context of the 2014 presidential election: marketers/campaigners of political parties, that followed this ideological orientation, had larger campaign resources and moderately or extremely suffered from the internal and the external shocks, favoured considering the importance of competitors, electorates and the media as political sub-markets much more, as compared to marketers/campaigners of political parties that were unlikely to follow this ideological orientation, had smaller campaign resources and suffered from these shocks less. This demonstrates that the magnitudes and directions of the effects of party ideology, campaign resources and experience of the internal and external shocks on such perceptions are determined by the type of the elections and are inseparable from the characteristics of these political sub-markets as well. This substantially develops the ideas of these authors.

Having reflected on such evidence, I offer the following propositions. *Firstly*, along with *the internal party, electoral, the media, parliamentary and governmental arenas*, the following political sub-markets are likely to take place in democratic countries, which share similarities with the Indonesian politics. They include *the parliamentary, governmental, internal party, electoral, the media and the non-electoral markets*. *Secondly*, in such countries, political parties' leaders, candidates and marketers/campaigners are likely to consider not only the relative importance of these political market arenas, but also the relative importance of the *party members, the media, electorates, competitors and campaign donors* as political sub-markets. *Thirdly*, in such countries, party-specific factors and type of the election are unlikely to determine perceptions of political parties' marketers/campaigners regarding the importance of the internal party arena. Similarly, neither party size nor party age category is likely to influence perceptions of these parties'

marketers/campaigners regarding the importance of the media, electoral, parliamentary and governmental arenas. Conversely, such perceptions instead, are likely to be determined by party ideology, campaign resources, position in the government and experience of internal and external shocks. The magnitudes and directions of the effects of these factors on such perceptions, however, are controlled by the type of the elections and dependent on characteristics of these political market arenas as well. *Fourthly*, in such countries, party size, age category and position in the government are unlikely to control perceptions of political parties' marketers/campaigners regarding the importance of the media, electorates, competitors, campaign donors and the party members, as political sub-markets. Such perceptions, however, are likely to be affected by party ideology, campaign resources and experience of the internal and external shocks. Magnitudes and directions of the effects of these factors on such perceptions are influenced by the type of the elections and not independent on characteristics of these political sub-markets.

10.3. The Structural Elements that Constituted Marketization and Professionalization of Campaigning of the Indonesian Political Parties.

Chapter 6 has evaluated the structural elements that construct marketization and professionalization of campaigning of Indonesian political parties. This chapter indicated that these parties overall, were likely to favour adopting the marketing procedures and techniques to advance market-orientation strategically. Regardless of the party-specific factors, these parties overall, strongly addressed voters, competitors and the media, moderately accounted for the internal party members and activists, but considered less the campaign-contributors. These parties in general, also strongly preferred establishing a proficient campaign structure and robustly developed professionalized-audiences/electorates targeting, news and event management and campaign personalization

strategies, but prioritized advancing professionalized-narrowcasting strategy less.

This chapter also uncovered the following evidences. *Firstly*, 'political marketing-orientation' takes place as a crucial variable to predict practices of market-orientation and professionalization of campaigning of political parties. The use of the market intelligence is seen as a necessary condition for political parties not only to follow 'market-orientation', but also to develop campaign structure and strategies. This quite meets with the ideas of Lees-Marshment (2001a: 22; 2008:13; 2010: 1-2), Lilleker and Lees-Marshment (2005a: 8-10), Nord (2007: 88-92), Brants and Praag (2007: 107), Papathanassopoulos (2007: 129-132), Negrine (2007: 36), Mancini (2007: 122), Maarek (2007: 146-52), Strömbäck (2007: 62-64; 2010: 18) and Strömbäck, et al. (2012: 85-86). *Secondly*, market-orientation is actually a multidimensional concept and practice, which is constructed from the following concepts and practices, which are: the internal-orientation, voter-orientation, media-orientation, competitor-orientation and campaign contributor-orientation. This quite substantiates the ideas of Lock and Harris (1996: 14), Lees-Marshment (2001a: 30; 2004a: 18; 2010: 5-6) and Lilleker and Lees-Marshment (2005a: 5) regarding the type of political sub-markets in which political parties that utilise a practice of market-orientation favour dealing with. This also fairly meets with Ormrod' (2005: 57-60, 2007: 79, 2009: 97-96), Ormrod and Henneberg' (2006a: 36-38), Ormrod and Henneberg' (2008: 11-12), Ormrod and Henneberg' (2010a: 299) and Ormrod and Savigny' (2012: 490) propositions regarding the diverse attitudinal dimensions commonly addressed by political parties, which follow market-orientation. *Thirdly*, 'professionalization of campaigning', as a concept and practice, is really composed from concepts and practices of 'professional-campaign engagement', 'professionalized-campaign structure' and 'professionalized-campaign strategy'. This quite meets with Papathanassopoulos et al. (2007: 13) prediction. *Fourthly*, professionalized-campaign strategy is

likely to emerge as a multidimensional concept and practice and is constructed from 'professionalized-audiences/electorates targeting strategy', 'professionalized-narrowcasting strategy', 'professionalized-campaign personalization strategy' and 'professionalized-news and event strategy'. This not only goes beyond the 'professional campaign index' postulated by Gibson and Rommelle (2001: 39, 2009: 269) and advanced by Strömbäck (2009: 101-104), but also substantiates the ideas of Tenscher et al. (2012: 149), Tenscher (2013: 247), Tenscher and Mykkanen (2013: 174-176), Tenscher and Mykkanen (2014: 26-28). This also quite fulfils Tenscher's et al. (2015: 14-15) suggestion regarding the need to explore the underlying factors/variables that systematically construct 'professionalized-campaign strategy'.

This chapter also revealed the subsequent evidences. *Firstly*, market-orientation and professionalization of campaigning are actually different concepts and practices, but, some elements that construct these concepts and practices are strongly, positively and significantly correlated to each other. This meets reasonably with the Lilleker and Lees-Marshment' (2005b: 209-210) proposition. *Secondly*, a choice (that has to be) made by political parties to advance market-orientation and/or run campaign structure and strategies is dependent on the types of structural elements that constitute such practices, which are prioritized by these parties. This somewhat substantiates the Strömbäck' (2007: 58-59) arguments. *Finally*, following market-orientation does not dampen the organisational capabilities of these parties to utilise professionalization of campaigning. This quite fulfils Strömbäck' (2007: 63) prediction.

This evidences validates that a political marketing orientation emerges as the most influential campaign paradigm (Strömbäck, 2007: 49) that determines the modes of marketization and professionalization of campaigning and the degrees of market-orientation and professionalized-campaigning adopted by political parties (Strömbäck, 2007: 62-63). This demonstrates that the political marketing orientation and market-

orientation and professionalization of campaigning are not in reality separate concepts and practices (Strömbäck, 2007: 50); rather that there are interdependent relationships between the structural elements that constitute such concepts and practices. The data substantiates the arguments of Strömbäck (2007: 64), Mykkanen and Tenscher (2014: 25-26) and Tenscher et al. (2015: 113). More importantly, it validates that integrating these concepts and practices into a single model allows us to holistically understand how political parties develop such practices within and across the elections. This model also helps us to systematically explore the effects of the micro/individual-specific factor, as postulated by Ormrod (2009: 102-105), the party-specific and the country-related factors, as proposed by some authors, such as Strömbäck (2010: 28-29), Strömbäck et al. (2012: 86) and Tenscher et al. (2015: 9), on the ways of and the degrees to which these parties advanced such practices within and across these elections.

10.4. Influential Factors that Determined Modes of Marketization and Professionalization of Campaigning and Degrees of Market-Orientation and Campaign Professionalisms of the Indonesian Political Parties Within and Across the 2014 Parliamentary and Presidential Elections.

➤ Perceptions of the Party Marketers/Campaigners, Leaders and Candidates Regarding the Relative Importance of Political Market Arenas.

Chapter 7 has chronicled the effects of perceptions of Indonesian political parties' marketers/campaigners, leaders and politicians regarding the relatives' importance of the internal party, the media and electoral arenas on marketization and professionalization of campaigning of these parties within and across the 2014 parliamentary and presidential elections. This chapter offers the following knowledge contributions. *Firstly*, Strömbäck (2007: 58-63, 2010: 21-27) and Strömbäck, et al. (2012:

83-84) argued that a choice (that has to be) made by the party to advance market-orientation and/or professionalization of campaigning is likely to be determined by the degree to which the party accounted for the relatives' importance and relevance of political market arenas. This chapter revealed that within the specific context of the new democracy of Indonesia, this choice is unlikely to be determined by the party assessment as an organisation, but is likely to be affected by individual perceptions of the party marketers/campaigners, leaders and candidates regarding the relative importance and relevance of these political market arenas.

Secondly, this author proposed that political parties are likely to have diverse political goals in the multiple political market arenas and perceive the relative importance and relevance of these political market arenas (Strömbäck, 2007: 60) and variations in such perceptions are likely to determine the degrees of market-orientation and professionalization of campaigning of these parties (Strömbäck, 2007: 62, 2010: 21-27; Strömbäck, et al. (2012: 83-84). While such prevailing propositions were speculative, this chapter, alternatively, revealed that the ways of and the degree to which the Indonesian political parties advanced professionalization of campaigning were likely to be determined by perceptions of these parties' marketers/campaigners regarding the relative importance of the internal party, the media and electoral arenas. However, the ways of and the degree to which these parties developed both market-orientation and professionalization of campaigning are likely to be influenced by the perceptions of these parties' leaders and candidates (elites) regarding the relative importance and relevance of these political market arenas. This chapter indicated that the more political parties' marketers/campaigners, leaders and candidates perceived the importance of the internal party arena, the much more likely these parties tend to be market-oriented and professionalized, in terms of campaign structure, news and event management and audiences/electorates targeting

strategies within the specific contexts of either the 2014 parliamentary or the 2014 presidential elections. Moreover, the more political parties' marketers/campaigners, leaders and candidates realized the importance of the electoral and media arenas, the much more likely these parties incline to be market-oriented and professionalized, in terms of: a) campaign structure, audiences/electorates targeting, news and event management and campaign personalisation strategies within the specific context of the 2014 parliamentary election; and b) campaign structure, audiences/electorates targeting, news and event management, campaign personalization and narrowcasting strategies within the specific context of the 2014 presidential election.

Thirdly, this author also stated that *'parties with weak internal arenas, or candidate-based rather than party-based campaigns, can be expected to be more dependent on success within the media arena in order to be successful in the electoral arena.... in such a case, running professional campaigns is of the utmost importance, but it does not mean that the party necessarily should adopt a market orientation'* (Strömbäck, 2007: 61). This chapter revealed that, based on the Indonesian case, it was not the weak internal party arena that stimulated the party to prioritize the media arena and run professionalization of campaigning. Instead, it was the increasing number of negative publications of the media related to the party and its public figures and expectation of the party' top-leader to pass the presidential election threshold and secure a presidential ticket to run in the presidential election that led to the party and its MPs candidates much more engaging in considering the importance of the media, the internal party, and electoral arenas arena, managing these arenas, advancing a market-orientation and developing a proficient campaign structure and strategies strategically.

Fourthly, this author posited that *'the strength of the internal arena and party organization, in particular, can be expected to be of decisive importance in understanding the degree of freedom the party leadership*

enjoys in choosing what orientation to follow and what kind of campaigns to run' (Strömbäck, 2007: 64). This chapter revealed that in the wake of the 2014 parliamentary election, a group of political parties that joined a coalition established by PDIP had a strong and solid internal arena and enjoyed much more freedom to advance not only market-orientation, but also campaign structure and strategies. In contrast, a group of political parties that joined a coalition arranged by Gerindra Party overall had a weak and fragmented internal arena and to some degree lost their freedoms to develop such practices; even though this party still strived to manage this arena and advance such practices. This quite affirms his proposition

Based on such evidence, I formulate the following propositions. *Firstly*, in the new democratic countries wherein political parties, as an organisation, have been under-developed, such as Indonesia, a choice (that has to be) made by the party to develop practices of either market orientation or professionalization of campaigning is unlikely to be affected by the party's assessment, as an organization, regarding the relatives' importance and relevance of political market arenas, as predicted by Strömbäck (2007: 64). Instead, this choice is likely to be controlled by individual perceptions of the party marketers/campaigners, leaders and candidates (elites) regarding the relatives' importance and relevance of the internal party, the media and electoral arenas.

Secondly, in democratic countries that share similarities with the Indonesian politics, perceptions of the party marketers/campaigners regarding the relatives' importance and relevance of these political market arenas are likely to generate significant effects on mode of professionalization of campaigning and the degree of campaign professionalism of the party; while perceptions of the party elites regarding the relatives' importance and relevance of these political market arenas are likely to produce significant effects on modes of marketization and professionalization of campaigning and levels of market-orientation and

campaign professionalism of the party. The directions and magnitudes of such effects are likely to be determined by the type of the election.

Finally, in such countries, having a weak internal party arena is unlikely to take place as a necessary condition for the party to prioritize the media arena and run professionalization of campaigning rather than market-orientation. Conversely, suffering from an increasing number of negative publications in the media, and expectation of the party' top-leader to pass the minimum number of the parliamentary threshold and get a presidential ticket significantly stimulates the party and its candidates to develop practices of market-orientation and professionalization of campaigning. In such countries, a political party, which suffered from negative publications in the media and gains competitive chances to meet this number, assemble a political coalition and nominate its top-leader/public figure as a presidential candidate and successfully nominated a marketable presidential candidate, is likely to enjoy a much more freedom to advance such practices strategically.

➤ **The Party-Specific Factors.**

Chapter 8 has evaluated the effects of the party-specific factors on marketization and professionalization of campaigning of the Indonesian political parties within and across the 2014 parliamentary and presidential elections. This chapter gives us the following knowledge contributions. *Firstly*, Strömbäck (2007: 61, 2010: 28) and Strömbäck et al. (2012: 86) argued that a choice (that has to be) made by the party to advance practices of market-orientation and/or run professionalization of campaigning is likely to be determined by party size and campaign resources. This chapter indicated that this choice is likely to be affected not only by such factors, but also by party age category, ideology and position in the government. The type of the election controlled the directions and magnitudes of the effects of these factors on this choice. This chapter visualized that the bigger the sizes and campaign resources

of political parties and more secular the ideological orientation of these parties, the much more likely these parties tend to be market-oriented and professionalized, in terms of: a) campaign structure and news and event management and campaign personalization strategies within the specific context of the 2014 parliamentary election; and b) campaign structure, audiences/electorates targeting and news and event management strategies within the specific context of the 2014 presidential election. The older the ages of political parties and the more these parties favoured taking a role as an opposition block against those who ruled the government, the much more likely these parties tend to be market-oriented and professionalized, in terms of: a) audiences/electorates targeting strategy within the specific context of the 2014 parliamentary election; and b) campaign structure and audiences/electorates targeting strategy within the specific context of the 2014 presidential election. This clearly substantiates the ideas of this author.

Secondly, Strömbäck (2010: 28) and Strömbäck et al. (2012: 86) voiced that along with party size and campaign resources, party experiences of the internal and external shocks are likely to stimulate political parties to advance market-orientation, while Gibson and Rommele (2001: 36, 2009: 281), Strömbäck (2009: 101-104), Tenscher et al. (2012), Tenscher and Mykkanen (2013: 181, 2014: 24) and Tenscher et al. (2015: 9) proposed that such factors are likely to propel political parties to run professionalization of campaigning. Whilst these authors studied such issues separately, this chapter evaluated such issues holistically. This chapter demonstrated that within the specific contexts of either the 2014 parliamentary or the 2014 presidential elections, political parties, which suffered from the internal shock incline to be much more market-oriented and professionalized, in term of campaign structure, audiences/electorates targeting and news and event management strategies, as compared to political parties, which lacked experience of this shock. Additionally, as compared to political parties, which suffered less from the external shock:

political parties, which moderately or extremely suffered from the external shock, were much more likely to favour inclining to be market-oriented and professionalized, in terms of: campaign structure and audiences/electorates targeting and news and event management strategies within the specific context of the 2014 parliamentary election; and b) campaign structure and audiences/electorates targeting, campaign personalization and news and event management strategies within the specific context of the 2014 presidential election. This clearly substantiates the ideas of these authors.

Based on such evidence, I argue that in democratic countries that share characteristics with the Indonesian politics, a choice (that has to be) taken by a political party to advance market-orientation and/or run professionalization of campaigning considered is likely to be determined not only by party size and campaign resources, as posited by Strömbäck (2007: 61, 2010: 28) and Strömbäck et al. (2012: 86), but also by party age category, ideology and position in the government. Along with such factors, party experiences of the internal and external shocks are likely to determine modes of marketization and professionalization of campaigning and degrees of market-orientation and campaign professionalisms of political parties. In this respect, the magnitudes and directions of the effects of: a) party ideology, age category, campaign resources, position in the government and experience of the external shock on the ways of and the degrees to which these parties advanced such practices are likely to be determined by the type of the election; and b) party size and experience of the internal shock on the ways of and the degrees to which these parties developed such practices are unlikely to be influenced by the type of the election.

➤ **The Emerging Factors**

Strömbäck (2007: 62) highlighted the need to examine diverse factors that influence levels of market-orientation and campaign

professionalisms of political parties. Strömbäck (2010: 28) and Strömbäck et al. (2012: 86) also argued that, alongside these aforementioned party-specific factors, the party's competitive chance of forming the next government is likely to take shape as an influential factor that determines the degrees of market-orientation of political parties. Chapters 7 and 8 however, confirmed that this factor is unlikely exists in Indonesian politics. These chapters, alternatively, indicated that in the new democracy of Indonesia, the following emerging factors are likely to take shape as influential factors. They are: a) the party's competitive chances to meet the minimum number of the 2014 presidential election threshold, assemble a political coalition and nominate its top-leader/public figure as a presidential candidate; and b) development of the political marketability level of the party' presidential candidate. Together with party ideology, size, campaign resources and position in the government and experiences of internal and external shocks, these factors really influenced the ways of and the degrees to which the Indonesian political parties advanced such practices within and across the 2014 parliamentary and presidential elections. Within and across these elections, political parties that gained such chances and successfully nominated a highly or potential marketable pair of presidential candidates incline to be much more market-oriented and professionalized in campaigning, as compared to political parties, which lacked such chances or these candidates.

Based on such evidence, I argue in democratic countries, which have been ruled under the presidential government system and indicated by the candidate-centred system, such as Indonesia, the party's competitive chance of forming the next government is unlikely to take shape as an influential factor. In such countries, however, the party's competitive chances to meet the minimum number of the presidential election threshold, assemble a political coalition and nominate its top-leader/public figures as a pair of presidential candidates and the party' presidential candidate-specific factors are likely to take place as prominent

factors. Along with these party-specific factors, such factors are likely to influence the ways of and the degrees to which these parties carried out such practices within and across the parliamentary and presidential elections.

➤ **The Party' Presidential Candidate-Specific Factors**

Chapter 9 was specifically written to capture and understand the effects of the party' presidential candidate-specific factors on modes of marketization and professionalization of campaigning and degrees of market-orientation and campaign professionalisms of Indonesian political parties within and across the 2014 parliamentary and presidential elections. This chapter offers the following knowledge contributions. *Firstly*, while proposed models of political marketing of political parties, Wring (2005: 4) and Lees-Marshment (2001a: 16-35, 2001b: 696-702; 2001d: 1074-1081, 2003a: 16-26, 2004a: 17-20; 2008: 16-35; 2009: 207-208, 2010: 4-9) theorized the party' candidates as an element of the party' political products. None of these authors however, evaluated the existence of the party' (presidential) candidate-specific factors in the emerging democratic countries, such as Indonesia. This chapter, alternatively, demonstrated that these factors really took place in the new democracy of Indonesia. These factors are inseparable from the party-specific factors posited by Strömbäck (2007: 60-62; 2009: 101-104; 2010: 28-29), Strömbäck et al. (2012: 86), Gibson and Rommele (2001: 36, 2009: 281), Tenscher, et al. (2012) Tenscher and Mykkanen (2013: 181, 2014: 24) and Tenscher et al. (2015: 9). These factors instead, are associated with the degrees of success of the party in nominating its top-leader as a presidential candidate (1), promoting its top-leader/public figure to run as a pair of presidential candidates (2) and having an influential presidential candidate (3). Within the specific contexts of either the 2014 parliamentary or the 2014 presidential elections, political parties, which succeeded in fulfilling both the first and second goals, favoured having a professional-

campaign and advancing professionalized-campaign structure and audiences/electorates targeting, news and event management and narrowcasting strategies much more, as compared to political parties, which lacked achievement of such goals. Political parties, which succeeded in fulfilling the third goal, were much more attracted to upgrade professionalized-audiences/electorates targeting and campaign personalization strategies within the specific context of the 2014 presidential election; while political parties, which lacked accomplishment of the third goal, were much more engaged in developing a professionalized-audiences/electorates targeting strategy within the specific context of the 2014 parliamentary election. Across these elections: political parties that successfully accomplished the first goal, but did not accomplish the second goal, tended to be much more professionalized in terms of campaign structure and audiences/electorates targeting strategy. From a slightly different view, political parties, which accomplished the third goal, preferred upgrading professionalized-campaign personalization strategy much more. In contrast, political parties, which lacked achieving the third goal, favoured improving professionalized-campaign structure and audiences/electorates targeting strategy much more. This evidence not only substantiates, but also goes beyond the ideas of these authors.

Secondly, while he posited a conflated model of political marketing and campaigning of the party' presidential candidate, Newman (1994: 12) theorized that the media and voters are likely to take shape as 'environmental forces'. Kotler and Kotler (1999: 5) proposed five types of political markets addressed by the party' presidential candidate. Whilst taking different perspectives, these authors, however, disregarded the elements that constitute the party' presidential-candidate-specific factors and the effects of such elements on marketization and professionalization of campaigning of political parties within and across the elections. The qualitative findings displayed by this chapter visualized the structural conditions that paved the way for these factors take place and the

elements that construct these factors. Such elements consist of the *personal political magnetism* and *gravitational powers* of those who were (potentially) nominated as a (pair of) presidential candidate(s) to run in the 2014 presidential election to attract and captivate the electorates/voters, as a primary political sub-market and the internal party members, political leaders and activists, the media, the media owners, campaign-volunteers, campaign donors, political lobbyists and the Internet and social media users, as secondary political sub-markets. Such powers influenced modes of marketization and professionalization of campaigning and degrees of market-orientation and campaign professionalisms of these parties within and across the 2014 parliamentary and the 2014 presidential elections. Within the specific context of the 2014 parliamentary election, political parties, which succeeded in having a highly marketable presidential candidate, were much more market-oriented and professionalized, in terms of campaign structure and audiences/electorates targeting and campaign personalization strategies. However, within the 2014 presidential election and also across the 2014 parliamentary and the 2014 presidential elections as well: political parties, which successfully nominated a highly marketable presidential candidate, were much more market-oriented and professionalized, in terms of campaign structure, audiences/electorates targeting, news and event management, campaign personalization and narrowcasting strategies.

Based on this evidence, I posit the following propositions. *Firstly*, in democratic countries, which are ruled under the parliamentary government system and indicated by the party-centred system, the party candidate is likely to take shape as one of the elements of the party' political products, as posited by Wring (2005) and Lees-Marshment (2001a, 2001b, 2001d, 2003a, 2004a, 2008, 2009, 2010). However, in emerging democratic countries, which followed the presidential government system and are characterized by the candidate-centred system, such as Indonesia, the party' presidential candidate likely paves the way for the party' presidential

candidate-specific factors to take shape. In such countries, having an influential presidential candidate with the following elements is widely seen as an essential condition for the party (and its coalition) to achieve success in the parliamentary and the presidential elections. Such elements include *personal political magnetism* and *gravitational powers* to attract and capture the primary and secondary political sub-markets. Transformations of such powers lead to the party's presidential candidate-specific factors evolving within and across the (primary, parliamentary and presidential) elections.

Secondly, in such countries, the media and voters are unlikely to take place merely as 'one of the environmental forces', as theorized by Newman (1994: 12). Moreover, these political sub-markets together with the media owners, campaign-volunteers and donors, political lobbyists and the Internet and social media users are likely to take shape as influential political players that determine the political marketability levels of the party's presidential candidate and presidential candidates nominated by its competitors. Within and across the parliamentary and presidential elections: political parties in such countries with highly or potential marketable presidential candidates are likely to incline to be much more market-oriented and professionalized in terms of campaign structures and campaign personalization, electorates targeting, narrowcasting and news and event management strategies.

Finally, in such countries, having a holistic understanding regarding the characteristics of these political sub-markets, and addressing these political sub-markets strategically, as prescribed by Kotler and Kotler (1999: 5-6), is important for the party to get its presidential candidate elected in the presidential election. However, getting a better trade-off that meets with the latent and expressive needs and expectations of these political markets, as suggested by Henneberg (2003: 13), Henneberg (2006a: 32) and Henneberg (2006b: 21), is much more crucial for both the party and its presidential candidate, as they want to win in this election.

10.5. Conclusion

Temple (2010: 274-275) argued that none of political parties that exist in the democratic countries *purely* performed as either product-oriented or sales-oriented or market-oriented parties. From a different stance, Lilleker and Lees-Marshment (2005b: 211) highlighted that there have been '*some element of inconsistency between the model and the practice*', while Lees-Marshment et al. (2010: 287) noted that political parties favoured developing '*mixed trends in strategy and orientation*'. Whilst she and her colleagues revealed that '*significant barriers to adopting a marketing-oriented strategy or to become market-oriented party*' remained prevalent (Lees-Marshment, et al., 2010: 287-289), Ormrod (2009: 188) realized that '*the ideal profile of market oriented party*' is unlikely to exist in real politics (Ormrod, 2009: 188).

Having considered such issues, I argue that the party's orientation regarding practices of political marketing-orientation and market-orientation, which take shape in democratic countries, are unlikely to take shape as either the matter of age, as posited by Wring (2005: 7) or the matter of type, as proposed by Lilleker (2006: 153), Lees-Marshment (2001a: 16-35, 2001b: 696-702; 2001d: 1074-1081, 2003a: 16-26, 2004a: 17-20; 2008: 16-35; 2009: 207-208, 2010: 4-9) and Lilleker and Lees-Marshment (2005a: 8-11, 2005b: 221-226). Instead, following Giasson' et al. (2012: 6) and Strömbäck' et al. (2012: 82) propositions, '*party orientation appears to be a matter of degree*'. However, the degree to which the party orientated to the structural elements that construct such practices are likely to be determined by the structural-systemic conditions and factors that exist in such countries.

My findings, as exhibited in Chapter 4, demonstrated that in the new democracy of Indonesia, such conditions result from the establishment of the democratic political party, government, media and election systems. My findings, as displayed in this chapter and Chapter 5, respectively, indicated that such conditions systematically encouraged

Indonesian political parties Post-Soeharto New Order to take up such practices strategically and shaped up nomenclatures of political market arenas and political sub-markets that took place in the Indonesia politics. As showcased in Chapter 6, these parties in general, favoured advancing the structural elements that constitute practices strategically. However, none of these parties fully manifested the ideal characteristics of either *the sales- or the market-oriented parties*, as imagined by Lees-Marshment (2001a: 28-31, 2001b: 695-696, 2004:18-20, 2008: 20-21, 2010: 5-9), Lilleker and Lees-Marshment (2005a: 8-11, 2005b: 221-226) or the *professional-electoral party*, as posited by Panebianco (1982: 481) and defined by Mancini (1999: 33).

My findings, as exhibited in these chapters, indicated that adopting the ideas of Strömbäck (2007: 60-62), Strömbäck (2010: 28-29) and Strömbäck et al. (2012: 86) is really useful to evaluate the structural conditions that propel developments of marketization and professionalization of campaigning of political parties in democratic countries that share similarities with Indonesian politics. Following the ideas of this author and refining the ideas of Lock and Harris (1996: 14), Kotler and Kotler (1999: 5), Hughes and Dann (2009: 250, 2012: 1364) and Ormrod (2005, 2006, 2007, 2009) is likely to be helpful in capturing the existence of political market arenas and political sub-markets that take shape in such countries and evaluating the effects of the party-specific factors and the type of the elections on the ways of and the degree to which political parties in such countries perceived the relative importance and relevance of these political market-arenas and political sub-markets within and across the (parliamentary and presidential) elections. Using and reconstructing the ideas of Lees-Marshment (2001a, 2001b, 2003a, 2004a, 2008, 2010), Lilleker and Lees-Marshment (2005a, 2005b), Ormrod' (2005, 2007, 2009), Ormrod and Henneberg (2006a), Ormrod and Henneberg (2008), Ormrod and Henneberg (2010a), Tenscher et al. (2012), Tenscher and Mykkanen, (2013, 2014) and Tenscher et al. (2015)

is likely to be advantageous to integrating concepts and practices of political marketing-orientation, market-orientation and professionalization of campaigning into a single workable model, which is needed to generate new understandings regarding not only the structural relationships between the elements that construct such practices holistically, but also the ways of and the degree to which political parties in such countries prioritized and advanced such elements strategically.

My findings, as displayed in Chapters 7, 8 and 9, respectively, also demonstrated that using the alternative structural model, which was validated previously in Chapter 6, and adopting the ideas of Strömbäck (2007: 63), Strömbäck (2010: 28-29), Strömbäck et al. (2012: 86), Gibson and Rommele (2001: 36, 2009: 281), Tenscher, et al. (2012) Tenscher and Mykkanen (2013: 181, 2014: 24) and Tenscher et al. (2015: 9) seems really helpful to identify and delve deeper into the influential factors that determined modes of marketization and professionalization of campaigning and degree of market-orientation and campaign professionalism of campaigning of Indonesian political parties within and across the parliamentary and presidential elections. Such factors include: a) perceptions of the party's marketers/campaigners, leaders and candidates regarding the relative importance of the internal party, the media and electoral arenas; b) the party-specific factors (especially party ideology, campaign resources, position in the government and experience of internal and external shocks); c) the party's competitive chances to pass the parliamentary election threshold, assemble a coalition and nominate a (pair of) presidential candidates; and d) the party' presidential candidate-specific factors.

Nonetheless, my findings, as showcased in these chapters, also indicated that the Indonesian political parties' marketers/campaigners and elites (leaders and candidates) realized and attempted to manage such factors strategically when they took part in the whole processes of marketization and professionalization of campaigning of these parties

within and across the 2014 parliamentary and presidential elections; but the ways these parties' marketers/campaigners carried out such practices, on the one hand, and these parties' elites advanced such practices, on the other, seem quite different. This indicates that political parties are likely to exist as what Ormrod and Savigny (2012: 487) defined as '*a multitude of actors rather than as monolithic entities*'. However, unlike these authors, my findings hinted that *the main issue is actually not whether political parties are likely to take shape as a multitude of actors or monolithic entities. The primary issue is, instead, to what extent the inherent character of the party, as a multitude of actors, took shape within and across these parties and determined the ways of and the degrees to which these parties developed such practices within and across the elections.* This is one of my findings that deserve a deeper discussion.

Based on such evidence, I argue that Giasson' et al. (2012: 6) and Strömbäck' et al. (2012: 82) propositions are likely to be helpful to evaluate the degree of party orientation regarding such practices. Their propositions are likely to help us to avoid what Savigny (2007: 43) called a '*conflation of prescription and prediction in the use of models and frameworks within the mainstream political marketing literature*'. Their propositions, however, seem to be less workable, as we want to capture the ways political parties advanced practices of market-orientation, as theorized by Ormrod (2005, 2006, 2007, 2009, 2011), Henneberg (2006b) and Ormrod and Henneberg (2008, 2009, 2011) and understand the ways political parties developed practices of (de-) professionalization of campaigning, as predicted by Tenscher et al. (2012), Tenscher and Mykkanen (2013, 2014) and Tenscher et al. (2015).

Having considered such issues, I propose that party orientation regarding such practices not merely *appears to be the matter of the degree*, as proposed by Giasson et al. (2012: 6) and Strömbäck et al. (2012: 82); more than that, this orientation seems to *be the matter of mode*. Following this proposition allows us to holistically capture and

understand: a) the structural elements and the leading and following elements of market-orientation prioritized and advanced by political parties, as suggested by Henneberg (2006a, 2006b); b) the structural elements that constitute and factors that influence practices of (de-) professionalization of campaigning of political parties, as posited by Tenscher et al. (2012), Tenscher and Mykkanen (2013, 2014) and Tenscher, et al. (2015); and, more importantly, c) structural conditions and factors that determine the ways of and the degree to which political parties within and across democratic countries advance such elements, as advocated by Strömbäck (2007: 60-62, 2010: 28-29) and Strömbäck et al. (2012: 82), within and across elections. To do so however, we need to take into account both wide and narrow interpretations of political marketing perspectives and develop better and workable methodological approaches and theoretical frameworks, as suggested by Henneberg (2002: 94-95), Hennerberg (2004a: 16), Henneberg (2008: 159-161), Henneberg and O' Shaughnessy (2007: 12), Ormrod (2012: 12-13) and Ormrod et al. (2013: 13).

Managing such efforts strenuously would help us, as political marketing scholars, to holistically capture and explore the ways of and the degrees to which developments of the inherent character of the party as a multitude of actors (Ormrod and Savigny (2012: 487) took shape within and across political parties and influenced modes of marketization and professionalization of campaigning and degrees of market-orientation and campaign professionalism of these parties within and across the elections. Organizing such efforts effectively seems really helpful to keep us a way from the danger of what Henneberg (2004b: 236) labelled as '*the static nature of research in political marketing*' and ensure that political marketing research we organize is always improving, innovative and generating invaluable novelty conceptual, practical and managerial knowledge contributions.

CHAPTER 11

PROPOSED THEORETICAL AND PRESCRIPTIVE MODELS AND THEIR KNOWLEDGE AND PRACTICAL CONTRIBUTIONS

Chapter 10 highlighted the main findings of this dissertation and displayed the research conclusion and knowledge contributions. In this chapter, I will propose the three theoretical models extracted from such findings and spotlight their potential contributions to the existing political marketing and campaign literature. I will also underline both theoretical and managerial benefits offered by the second and third proposed models, explain the ways we could possibly transform the second and the third proposals into some prescriptive models and generate practical benefits of adopting and using these models; as we want to manage the existing structural problems of the liberal democratic system that endanger the sustainability of the liberal democracy and society—in general—and keep the mainstream centre-left or centre-right parties surviving in the Western democracy—in particular.

11.1. The Structural Conditions and Factors that Determine Modes of Marketization and Professionalization of Campaigning and Degree of Market-Oriented and Campaign Professionalism of Political Parties in the New Democratic Countries: *The First Proposed Theoretical Model.*

As reflected in the main findings of this dissertation and their knowledge contributions summarized previously in Chapter 10, I posit a set of theoretical propositions visualized by the subsequent figure 11.1. *Firstly*, the following ‘structural conditions’ are likely to take place in the new democratic countries that share similarities with Indonesian politics. They consist of: 1) establishment of the multi-party and the candidate-centred systems; 2) the low level of partisanship of the electorates to political parties; 3) soaring numbers of disloyal voters and non-voters; 4)

increasing numbers of new and young electorates who participated in the elections; 5) emergence of ticket-splitting phenomena in the elections; 6) development of rational voters and rational voting behaviour; 7) a highly commercialized political journalism—in general—and political news programmes—in particular; 8) existence of moderate partisanship and polarisation of political news coverage and the media agenda regarding marketing and campaign activities and programmes of political parties and these parties' candidates who run in these elections; 9) robust ICT developments, followed by increasing uses of the Internet and social media as political communication, marketing and campaign platforms and tools; 10) rises of political consumerism and political activism; and 11) expanding roles of spin-doctors, media strategists, political consultants and pollsters in political spheres and affairs.

Secondly, once they have taken place in such countries, these 'conditions' shape political marketing exchanges, interactions and transactions carried out by political parties and these parties' leaders and candidates and political sub-markets within and across political market arenas. Such 'conditions' influence perceptions of these parties' leaders, candidates and marketers/campaigners regarding the relative importance and relevance of these political market arenas and political sub-markets and determine the magnitude of the effects of the party-specific factors on such perceptions as well. These 'conditions' stimulate these parties to use marketing principles, procedures and techniques as an organisational strategy to advance market-orientation and develop proficient campaign structure and strategies in facing the parliamentary and presidential elections. However, although they advanced such practices, none of these parties were likely to turn into either product-oriented or market-oriented or sales-oriented parties.

Thirdly, in such countries, the following factors are likely to determine modes of marketization and professionalization of campaigning and degrees of market-orientation and campaign professionalism of

political parties within and across the parliamentary and presidential elections.




Figure 11.1: The First Proposed Theoretical Model

They include: a) perceptions of the party leaders, candidates and marketer/campaigner regarding the relative importance and relevance of political market arenas, especially the internal party, electoral, and the media arenas; b) the party-specific factors, especially the party ideology, size, campaign resources, position in the government and experiences of internal and the external shocks; c) the party's competitive chances to meet the minimum number of the presidential election threshold, assemble a political coalition and nominate a pair of presidential candidates for running in the presidential election; and d) party' presidential candidate-specific factors.

Finally, in such countries, these 'conditions' are likely to be shaped by the structures, mechanisms and elements, which result from the establishment of the democratic political party, government, the media and election systems. Such structures, mechanisms and elements are likely to construct the characteristics of political market arenas and political sub-markets, influence the whole processes of political marketing exchanges, interactions and transactions that take place within and across these political market arenas and determine the magnitude of effects of these factors on the ways of and the degree to which these parties advanced the structural elements that constitute practices of market-orientation and professionalization of campaigning within and across these elections.

11.2. The Party' Presidential Candidate-Specific Factors as an Exploratory Factor to Explore Modes of Marketization and Professionalization of Campaigning and the Degree of Market-Orientation and Campaign Professionalism of Political Parties in the Democratic Countries That Share Similarities with Indonesian Politics: *The Second Proposed Theoretical Model.*

As visualized by figure 11.1, I have proposed that in democratic countries that share similarities with Indonesian politics, the party' presidential candidate-specific factors are likely to take place and

determine modes of marketization and professionalization of campaigning and the degree of market-orientation and campaign professionalism of political parties within and across the parliamentary and presidential elections. This proposition is actually extracted from the findings reported in Chapter 9. Points 9.4.2-9.4.4 of this chapter indicated that within and across the 2014 parliamentary and presidential elections, both Gerindra Party and PDIP, as compared to these parties' competitors, had a highly marketable presidential candidate. As showcased by figures 9.7, 9.11 and 9.18 of point 9.4.4 of this chapter, the electoral marketability level of Prabowo Subijanto of Gerindra Party had been continuously increasing from 11.10 % in September 2013 to 44.20 % in the first week of July 2014. Nonetheless, his rival, Jokowi of PDIP, had been much more acceptable within and across the primary political sub-markets (the electorates/voters and the secondary political sub-markets (the media, the media owners, campaign-volunteers, political lobbyists, campaign donators, political leaders and the Internet and social media users). Moreover, as indicated by figures 9.12-9.17 of that point, the degree of endorsement of these political sub-markets (especially campaign donors), to his rival between the last weeks of May and first week of July 2014 had been increasing substantially. Since they realized his personal quality and leadership style and feared his chance of getting elected in the 2014 presidential election, these political sub-markets enthusiastically endorsed his rival to win this election.

Having reflected on such evidence, I posit the following propositions. In democratic countries, which have been ruled under the presidential government system and indicated by the candidate-centred system, such as Indonesia, top-leaders/public figures of political parties who stepped into the presidential election race or were being nominated as a presidential candidate to run in this election are likely to have *personal political gravitational* and *magnetism powers* to attract, pull in and capture the primary and secondary political sub-markets. Such powers are

nearly invisible and unobservable; but, the *'real consequences'* of such powers on the development of political marketability levels of the party' presidential candidate and presidential candidates nominated by its competitors are quite observable and measurable within all the stages of these elections.

The following two-fold dimensions determine formations and transformations of such powers within and across these elections. The first one is the internal dimension, which is related to the personal qualities (political identity, charisma, credibility, integrity and leadership style) and performance of the party' presidential candidate and presidential candidates nominated by its competitors. The second one is the external dimension, which is associated with the degree of recognition, appreciation, support and endorsement of the primary and the secondary political sub-markets of this party' presidential candidate, on the one hand, and (potential) presidential candidates nominated by its competitors, on the other.

Transformations of these dimensions are likely to pave the way for the party' presidential candidate-specific factors taking shape. These factors refer to the development of political marketability level of the party' presidential candidate. This development is likely to take place as follows. The more the personal quality and leadership style of this party' presidential candidate is recognized, appreciated, supported and endorsed by these political sub-markets, the much more likely the political marketability level of this party' presidential candidate is highly marketable. The more the personal qualities and leadership styles of presidential candidates named by its competitors are undermined and rejected by these political sub-markets, the more likely the political marketability level of this party' presidential candidate increases substantially.

Based on such propositions, I formulate the second theoretical model, which is visualized by figure 11.2. This model is actually a basic, but a quite nested theoretical model. We could transform this model or use

it as either a descriptive or exploratory/predictive or prescriptive model to achieve particular objectives once we adopted a *critical realism* of Bhaskar (1975, 1998, 2008) as a research philosophy. This point is shortly spelled out as follows




Figure 11.2: The Second Proposed Theoretical Model

Firstly, we could deploy this model as a descriptive model to investigate the following questions. How have political parties, in facing the parliamentary and presidential elections, identified and selected the best presidential candidate who was, either explicitly or implicitly, expected and needed by the primary and/or the secondary political sub-markets? How and to what extent have these parties, within and across these elections, attempted to meet such needs and/or expectations? What has really an ideal personal profile of a presidential candidate mostly been expected by either the primary or the secondary political sub-markets? How has each of these political sub-markets defined and constructed this profile? What kinds of political sub-market have been much more influential in defining and constructing this profile? How has each of these political sub-markets approved and endorsed a presidential candidate who met with this profile, and disregarded and undermined the other presidential candidates who did not meet with this profile? How have the endorsements of these political sub-markets for a presidential candidate who fulfilled this profile on the one hand, and the disapproval of these political sub-markets for the other presidential candidates who lacked fulfilment of this profile, on the other, influenced the ways political parties selected and nominated them as a (pair of) presidential candidate(s) to run in the presidential election? How have such endorsements and disapproval carried consequences for developments of marketization and professionalization of these parties within and across the primary, parliamentary and presidential elections?

Secondly, we also could use this model as an exploratory or a predictive model to evaluate the following questions. How did and the degree to which political marketability levels of political parties' presidential candidates take place and transform within all the stages of these elections? How did and the degree to which these political sub-markets influence this transformation? How has each of these parties considered this transformation? How and the degree to which this transformation determined modes of marketization and professionalization of

campaigning and the degree of market-orientation and campaign professionalism of these parties within and across these elections? We could use this model to evaluate the first, second and third questions, but, as we want to address the last question, we need not only this model, but also the baseline structural model. The following point 11.3 will detail this point.

Finally, we also could transform this model into a prescriptive model that specifically offers a set of actions and directions to help political parties once these parties want to accomplish their goals, especially, to win elections (O' Shaughnessy, 2001: 1047). This prescriptive model provides a set of practical guidance and managerial directions needed by both those who run as a presidential candidate and a political party (and its coalition), which attempted to select and get a potential marketable presidential candidate and/or elevate the political marketability of a presidential candidate who this party (and its coalition) nominated to run in the presidential election. To do so however, we have to employ the following strategies and use the elements that constitute the baseline structural model.

First at all, we have to cautiously evaluate the personal qualities and leadership styles of those who (potentially) run or were being nominated as a presidential candidate or a pair of presidential candidates to run in the presidential election and holistically examine the degree of recognition, endorsement and support they achieved from the primary and secondary political sub-markets. *Secondly*, we should evaluate transformations of such elements within all the stages of these elections and assess the degree to which such transformations shaped their political marketability level as (a pair of) presidential candidates. *Thirdly*, we need to assess the following circumstances that likely determine the organisational capabilities of the party (and its coalition) in elevating the political marketability level of its presidential candidate and endorsing and backing its presidential candidate to win in the presidential election. Such

circumstances incorporate the condition of the internal arena of this party (and its coalition), levels of support for the existing social and political cleavages of this party (and its coalition) and campaign funds, resources, ideological orientation and position in the government of this party (and its coalition). *Finally*, while formulating this model into a particular prescriptive model that meets with such circumstances, we need to consider developments in: a) political marketability levels of the party' presidential candidate and also presidential candidates nominated by its competitors; and b) organisational capabilities of this party (and its coalition) in endorsing and getting this party' presidential candidate elected in the presidential election.

As displayed in Appendix C, I provide a set of examples of prescriptive models derived from the Indonesian specific case and formulated based on reflection of the quantitative and qualitative findings reported in Chapters 7, 8 and 9. In this appendix, I also outline a set of terms and conditions regarding adaptation of each of these models.

11.3. The Third Proposed Theoretical Model to Explore Modes of Marketization and Professionalization of Campaigning and the Degree of Market-Orientation and Campaign Professionalism of Political Parties.

As seen from Chapter 6, I evaluated the baseline structural model using the survey data collected from the Indonesian political parties' marketers/campaigners. The following figure 11.3 re-displays this model. Since this model is actually a good fit model with sufficient statistical power, this model is statistically plausible and practically workable to capture and understand the ways of and the degree to which political parties, especially in democratic countries, which shared characteristics with Indonesian politics, adopted political marketing orientation, advanced market-orientation and ran professionalization of campaigning within and across the parliamentary and presidential elections.




Figure 11.3: The Third Proposed Theoretical Model

Having considered its statistical power, I argue that this model would be helpful to investigate the ways of and the degree to which political parties in such countries addressed either the latent and/or the expressive needs and expectations of these political sub-markets and advanced campaign structure and strategies to persuade and capture these political sub-markets within and across these elections. Using this model allows us to holistically explore diverse factors that significantly determine modes of marketization and professionalization of campaigning and degrees of market-orientation and campaign professionalism of these parties within and across these elections.

11.4. Theoretical, Practical and Managerial Contributions of the Proposed Models.

11.4.1. Theoretical Contributions of the First Proposed Model.

The first proposed model charted by figure 11.1 offers the following theoretical contributions. *Firstly*, Butler and Collins (1994: 21, 1999: 57) formulated a descriptive framework that underpins the structural and process characteristics of political marketing. But, they considered various types of political sub-markets and political market arenas less. This model proposed diverse nomenclatures of these political market arenas and political sub-markets that take shape in emerging democratic countries, which share characteristics with Indonesian politics.

Secondly, Henneberg (2002) proposed ‘a structural model of political exchange’ and theorized its relationships with ‘political markets’ (the electoral, governmental and political activism markets). Having realized its innate weakness, Henneberg and Ormrod (2013: 93-94) and Ormrod et al. (2013: 18) also posited a triadic interaction model of political marketing exchange. Such models underpin multi-layered dimensions and circuits of political marketing exchange and interaction processes wherein political parties/candidates deal with the primary political markets (voters and citizens) within the contexts of either the elections or in between the elections. The first proposed model conversely, conceptualized such dimensions and processes less. However, this model took into account formations of political market arenas and political sub-markets in democratic countries that shared similarities with Indonesian politics and visualized the effects of such formations on political marketing exchanges, interactions and transactions carried out by political parties and these parties’ leaders and candidates in such countries when they dealt with these political sub-markets. More importantly, this model considered the structural conditions and factors that determine modes of marketization and professionalization of campaigning and the degree of market-

orientation and campaign professionalism of these parties within and across the (primary, parliamentary and presidential) elections.

Thirdly, O' Cass (2009: 195-197), having followed a resource-based view of the political marketing perspective, introduced a conceptual lens that underpins the relationships between political marketing of the party and its political markets (voters and stakeholders) in competitive environments. He also conceptualized the effects of the party resources on the party's capability in addressing these political markets and managing value creation (O' Cass, 2009: 201-203). He and his colleague also formulated the following three models, which are the proactive political market orientation (PPMO), reactive political market orientation (RPMO), and political brand orientation (PBO) and theorized the relationships between and among these orientations with political markets (voters and stakeholders) and political market-environments (O' Cass and Voola, 2011: 633-638). These models, however, lacked consideration of the nature and structure of political marketing exchanges and interactions (Henneberg and Ormrod, 2013: 91; Ormrod, et al., 2013: 18) and conceptualisation of the nomenclatures of political sub-markets and political market arenas wherein such exchanges and interactions take place. Unlike these models, the first proposed model accounted for such issues holistically. More importantly, it also offered a workable framework that allows us to holistically capture and understand such exchanges and interactions and explore diverse factors that determine the degree of market-orientation and campaign professionalism of these parties within and across the elections.

Finally, Lees-Marshment (2001a: 16-35, 2001b: 696-702; 2001d: 1074-1081, 2003a: 16-26, 2004a: 17-20; 2008: 16-35; 2009: 207-208, 2010: 4-9) and Lilleker and Lees-Marshment (2005a: 8; 2005b: 221-226) formulated the product-oriented party (POP), the sales-oriented party (SOP) and the market-oriented party (MOP). However, her models conflated the normative and prescriptive logics in underpinning practices

of political marketing orientations of political parties (Savigny, 2004, 2007b, 2008) and did not fully separate practices of political marketing-orientation and market-orientation (Ormrod, 2006, 2007, 2011a, 2011b). Her models considered various types of political markets and political market arenas that take place within and across democratic countries less (Ormrod, 2006, 2007; Ormrod, 2009: 80; Ormrod, 2011a: 5-7; Ormrod, 2011b: 396-402) and accounted less for the characteristics and conditions that determine parties to follow one of those models (Strömbäck, 2010:18). Having regarded such issues, Lilleker and Lees-Marshment (2005a: 8; 2005b: 221-226) and Lilleker (2006: 154) revised her models, while Strömbäck (2010: 28-29) and Strömbäck et al. (2012: 89) formulated some additional propositions to enhance the robustness of her models. Reflecting on the applicability, strengths and weaknesses of her models, he stated that '*party orientation appears to be a matter of degree rather than of type*' (Strömbäck, et al., 2012: 82). As considered that his proposition seems less helpful to evaluate modes of marketization and professionalization of campaigning of political parties, I, as highlighted in Chapter 10, point 10.5, favoured proposing that '*party' orientation not only appears to be the matter of the degree, but also seems to be the matter of mode*'. Following this argument, I argue that compared to her models, the first proposed model is much more likely to be helpful in holistically capturing and understanding the structural conditions and diverse factors that influence both modes of marketization and professionalization of campaigning and degrees of market-orientation and campaign professionalism of these parties within and across these elections.

11.4.2. Theoretical Contributions of the Second Proposed Model.

The second proposed model charted by figure 11.2 offers the following theoretical contributions. *Firstly*, Savigny (2007b: 42) voiced that '*a conflation of prescription and prediction in the use of models and frameworks*' remained as a crucial problem. Moreover, Lock and Harris

(1996: 23), O' Cass (1996: 59) and Lees-Marshment (2001a: 706) advocated the need to develop better and workable models to help marketization of political parties. Such issues, so far, have been not resolved properly. As stated previously by point 11.2, I argue that having followed a *critical realism* of Bhaskar (19975, 1998, 2008) as a research philosophy, we could deploy this model as either a descriptive or a predictive/exploratory model and transform this model into a prescriptive model as well²⁴¹. Taking such efforts allows us to resolve that problem and fulfil that need.

Secondly, Henneberg and O' Shaughnessy (2007: 17), Henneberg (2008: 161, 171) and Hennerberg and Ormrod (2013: 97) suggested applying the relational and network perspectives to understand political marketing phenomena. This model incorporates such perspectives and considers political exchanges, interactions, and transactions between and among the political party, the party' presidential candidate and the primary and secondary political sub-markets. Using this model allows us to evaluate such exchanges, interactions and transactions and explore transformations of two-fold dimensions that construct development of the political marketability level of the party' presidential candidate holistically.

Thirdly, Newman (1994: 12) posited a (descriptive) model that underpins political marketing of the party' presidential candidate. However, while lacking consideration of political exchanges, interactions and transactions between and among the party, the party' presidential candidate, the media, voters and interest groups, he theorised such

²⁴¹ A predictive or an explanatory model of political marketing, in this sense, is defined as a type of theoretical model that offers a realistic, lucrative and nested conceptual framework to capture and understand complex processes and dimensions of political marketing phenomena. Slightly differently, a prescriptive model of political marketing is a type of ideal framework that implicitly or explicitly prescribes a set of actions and directions that have to be carried out by political parties since these parties expect to '*fulfil their mission of winning elections*' (O' Shaughnessy, 2001: 1047). Once we followed a critical realism of Bhaskar (1975, 1998, 2008), the main issue is no longer related to the model itself. Instead, the most crucial issue is a type of logic we want to follow when we want to deploy this model to address particular types of political marketing and campaigning issues.

media, voters and interest groups merely as elements of what he called the 'environmental forces'. Unlike his model, this model places the voters/electorates, as primary political sub-markets, while the media, interest groups, which manifest as either campaign- volunteers or political lobbyists or campaign donors, comprise secondary political sub-markets. This model considers transformations of support and endorsement of these political sub-markets, either of the party' presidential candidate or the presidential candidates nominated by its competitors within and across the (primary, parliamentary and presidential) elections. Using this model allows us to be much more capable of capturing and understanding such transformations and their effects on developments of marketization and professionalization of campaigning of the party and its competitors within and across these elections.

Fourthly, Kotler and Kotler (1999: 5) introduced a conceptual framework to understand political market places and the marketing strategy of the party candidate. This framework however, lacked consideration of what Henneberg and Ormrod (2013: 91) called '*the complex linkages and interdependencies between actors and structures in political exchanges*'. This model considers the primary and the secondary political markets as inter-related and interdependent actors and placed them within the multi-layered structure of political exchanges, interactions and transactions. This model therefore would be much more useful as we want to capture and understand the 'real consequences' of the inclinations of these political sub-markets to either endorse the party' presidential candidate or undermine the presidential candidates nominated by its competitors on the ways of and the degree to which this party and its competitors advanced market-orientation and campaign professionalism within and across these elections.

Finally, Butler and Collins (1994, 1999), Lees-Marshment (2001a, 2001b, 2004, 2008) and Wring (2005) conceptualized the party candidates as one of the party political products. However, these authors lacked in

theorizing and exploring the relationships between the party, the party candidates and political sub-markets. Within the specific context of democratic countries that share similarities with Indonesian politics, the ideas of these authors seem less applicable. Due to the following reasons, this model is, otherwise, likely to be workable in evaluating such issues in these countries. In such countries, institutionalisation of political parties is still under-developed. The personal profiles and leadership styles of these parties' candidates as individual politicians are much more visible, as compared to these parties as an organisation. As compared to these parties, these parties' presidential candidates commonly have larger capabilities to create their own markets. Using this model allows us to be much more capable of not only capturing developments of political marketability levels of these parties' presidential candidates, but also exploring the ways of and the degree to which such developments determined modes of marketization and professionalization of campaigning and degrees of market-orientation and campaign professionalism of these parties within and across these elections.

11.4.3. Theoretical Contributions of the Third Proposed Model.

Likewise Lees-Marshment' (2001a, 2001b; 2001d, 2003a, 2004a; 2008; 2009, 2010) models, the third proposed model displayed previously by figure 11.3, entails some weaknesses. For example, this model considered less not only the whole stages that have to be carried out by either MOP or SOP, as posited by Lees- Marshment (2001a, 2001b, 2004a, 2008, 2010), Lilleker and Lees-Marshment (2005a, 2005b) and Lilleker (2006), but also the behavioural dimensions of market- orientation and strategic postures of political parties, as theorized by Ormrod (2005: 51-56, 2007: 77-78, 2009: 93-96, 137-138), Ormrod and Henneberg (2008: 10-12, 2010a, 2010b, 2011), Ormrod and Savigny (2011: 490) and Ormrod et al. (2013: 3-6). Regardless of such issues, this model offers the following unique knowledge and practical contributions.

Firstly, Lilleker and Lees-Marshment (2005b) and Lees-Marshment (2010b) reported that Lees-Marshment's models, especially SOP and MOP, have been widely adopted by political parties across the globe. Temple (2010: 274-275) however, argued that the purely and/or the perfectly MOP or SOP are unlikely to exist in the real world. Similarly, Ormrod, (2009: 188) voiced that *the perfectly market-oriented party* is unlikely to take shape in real politics. This model is not actually intentionally directed to address the existence of ideal profiles of either MOP or SOP; but, it seems realistic for us to deploy this model in order to detect the inclinations of political parties, especially in the new democratic countries, to follow either MOP or SOP and evaluate the degree to which these parties favoured performing what Lilleker and Lees-Marshment (2005: 201) called a *hybrid model* that incorporates elements of MOP and SOP.

Secondly, Strömbäck (2007: 59-63) theorized the relationships between concepts and practices of political marketing, market-orientation and professionalization of campaigning. However, while identifying diverse factors that influence the ways of and the degree to which political parties advanced such practices (Strömbäck, 2007: 64; Strömbäck, 2010:28-29; Strömbäck, et al., 2012: 86), he lacked proposition of an applicable framework to evaluate such issues holistically. This model, instead, offered this framework.

Finally, Henneberg (2006a: 33), Henneberg (2006b: 18), Ormrod (2009: 137-138), Ormrod and Henneberg (2010: 32-33), Ormrod et al. (2013: 3-6) proposed *the convinced ideologist, the tactical populist, the relationship builder and the political lightweight models* of market-orientation of political parties. However, while Henneberg (2006a: 33) and Henneberg (2006b: 18) suggested evaluating each of these models based on the primary priority made by the party in fulfilling either the latent or the expressive needs of political sub-markets, Ormrod (2005: 51-56, 2007: 77-78, 2009: 93-96, 137-138) and Ormrod et al. (2013: 3-6) otherwise examined these models based on *the primary concern undertaken by the*

*party in selecting and running such orientations*²⁴². Having regarded this condition, I argue that the primary concern that needs to be considered in evaluating the existence of these models *is actually not whether and to what extent the party favours running such orientations*, as Ormrod (2005, 2007: 77-78, 2009: 93-96, 137-138) and Ormrod et al. (2013: 3-6) did. Instead, the most important issue to do so *is whether and the degree to which the party accounted for the latent and the expressive needs of these political sub-markets when they advanced such orientations*²⁴³. Following such propositions, I argue that this model can be considered as an alternative, baseline and nested structural model to evaluate how and the degree to which political parties in democratic countries, especially, those sharing similarities with Indonesian politics, practiced these aforementioned models. Moreover, to this specific end, we need to include a set of behavioural dimensions of market-orientation of the party theorized by Ormrod (2005: 51-56, 2007: 77-78, 2009: 93-96, 137-138), Ormrod and Savigny (2011: 490), Ormrod and Henneberg (2008: 10-12, 2010a, 2010b, 2011) and Ormrod et al. (2013: 3-6) in this model.

11.4.4. Managerial Contributions of the Second and the Third Proposed Models.

O' Shaughnessy (2001: 1052) highlighted the need to generate political marketing knowledge that offers not only '*an analytic framework*',

²⁴² These authors posited that a political party performed the first model when this party prioritized the internal-orientation and societal orientation, but lacked in advancing the voters-orientation and competitor-orientation. Moreover, they proposed that a political party took up the second model when this party preferred prioritizing the voters-orientation and competitor-orientation and lacked running the internal-orientation and societal orientation. Furthermore, they postulated that a political party advanced the third model when this party accounted for not only the internal-orientation and societal orientation, but also voters-orientation and competitor-orientation. Additionally, they conceptualized that a political party carried out the fourth model when this party lacked in accounting such orientations.

²⁴³ For example, we could label a political party that leads these political sub-markets and takes up the convince ideologist model, as this party is much more engaged in addressing the latent needs rather than the expressive needs of these political sub-markets. In contrast, we could call a political party that follows these political sub-markets and runs the tactical populist model, as this party preferred dealing with the manifest needs rather than the latent needs of these political sub-markets much more.

but also '*a problem-solving tool*'. Most political communication and marketing scholars succeeded less in fulfilling his expectation however. For example, theoretical models proposed by Henneberg (2006a: 33; 2006b: 18), O' Cass and Voola (2011: 633-638), Newman (1994: 12), Kotler and Kotler (1999: 5) and Lees-Marshment (2001a, 2001b, 2004a, 2008, 2010) are actually descriptive-exploratory models. These models therefore lacked in offering effective and practical ways regarding market-orientation and professionalization of campaigning of political parties that could help these parties to successfully accomplish their goals, either within the specific contexts of the elections or in between the elections. The second proposed model offers the following potential managerial and practical contributions once this model is transformed into the prescriptive models.

As seen from point 11.2, I argued that the second and the third proposed models could be transformed into and spelled out the way to transform such models into prescriptive models. We could do so once we followed the critical realism perspective of Bhaskar (1975, 1998, 2008). I, as detailed in Appendix C, also proposed 8 prescriptive models. As compared to the models proposed by these aforementioned authors, these prescriptive models seem much more realistic and applicable to help political parties, especially, in democratic countries that share similarities with Indonesian politics, due to the following reasons. Each of these models provides a set of orientations regarding such practices that could be prioritized and advanced by these parties when they want to successfully address and meet the latent and expressive needs and expectations of political sub-markets, especially within the specific contexts of the parliamentary and presidential elections. Each of these models also has a set of terms and conditions that incorporates influential factors, which are likely to constrain and/or determine the organisational capability of each of these parties in developing such practices and achieving their goals in these elections.

In such countries, these models seem much more workable to help the big-size secular-nationalist parties rather than to assist either the small- or the medium-sized parties with either secular-Islamic or Islamist ideological orientations in achieving their goals in the parliamentary and presidential election. Nonetheless, these small- or medium-sized parties, which adopt these models, still possibly gain success in these elections. Each of these parties, however, has to develop a solid internal organization and robust organisational capability to collect sufficient campaign resources, obtain parliamentary seats that pass or are close to the presidential election threshold, assemble a solid political coalition (if needed) and nominate highly marketable MPs and presidential candidates successfully.

Meanwhile, in Western established democratic countries, these models seem much more applicable to help the mainstream centre-right or centre- left parties rather than to assist the small- or the medium-sized centre-right or centre-left parties to win the elections. Nonetheless, these small- or medium-sized centre-right or centre-left parties that adopt these models also still get a chance to achieve their goals in these elections. Each of these parties, however, has to establish a solid internal organisation, select influential and highly marketable (MPs and presidential) candidates and develop a robust organisational capability to collect sufficient campaign resources, assemble a solid political coalition (if needed) and capture political sub-markets (especially the electorates, the media and campaign donors) successfully.

11.5. Potential Contributions of the Second and Third Proposed Models and the Prescriptive Models for the Survivability of the Mainstream Centre-Left or Centre-Right Parties and the Sustainability of the (Existing) Liberal Democratic System and Society in Western Democratic Countries.

Some authors voiced that once political parties in democratic countries intensively adopted political marketing and advanced market-orientation and professionalization of campaigning, the ideal roles of political parties, the media and voters in political spheres and affairs in such countries were likely decline substantially (Lilleker, 2005a, 2005b; Savigny, 2004, 2005, 2007a, 2008; Coleman, 2007; Savigny and Wring, 2009; Savigny and Temple, 2010; Temple, 2010, 2013). The following authors instead, argued that adaptation of such practices is likely to facilitate such voters in gaining a greater opportunity to articulate their political interests (Scammell, 1995) and obtain various information related to the work performances of political parties and these parties' leaders and candidates (Harrop, 1990), pave the way for developments of much more dynamic relationships between political parties and voters (Shama, 1976; O'Shaughnessy, 1990; Lees-Marshment, 2001a, 2001c, 2010a, 2010b, 2012; Lilleker, 2005a) and between political parties, politicians and their publics/stakeholders (Lees-Marshment and Winter, 2009; Henneberg and O'Shaughnessy, 2009), enhance 'the representative function of a political system and democracy as a whole' (Lees-Marshment, 2004a: 239-240, 2004b: 12) and 'tackle increasing disengagement of the electorate and voters in politics and political participation and a high distrust of the electorates of political actors and organizations' (Henneberg, et al., 2009: 116). Having taken a different stance, subsequent authors, conversely, highlighted that adaptation of such practices carried out both positive and negative consequences for the media, electorates/voters political parties—in particular—and politics, political systems and democracy—in general (Giasson, et al., 2012: 18-19; Lees-Marshment, 2012: 373-378)

While controversial debates related to such issues remained prevail, Lilleker and Lees-Marshment (2005b: 219) and Lees- Marshment et al. (2010b: 294-295) suggested delving deeper into the nature of democracy and democratic political systems that take place within and across democratic countries. Slightly differently, Henneberg et al. (2009:

180-181) formulated *the selling-oriented, the instrumentally and the relational* models of political marketing managements (PPM) and displayed the compatibilities of these models with either competitive elitism or deliberative democracies. While offering invaluable thoughts, none of these authors, however, developed the (prescriptive) models needed to help the established political parties when they had to deal with what Foa and Mounk (2016: 7) labelled as '*the structural problems in the functioning of liberal democracy*'²⁴⁴ and tackle the emergences of what Schedler (1996) named as the '*anti-political-establishment parties*' and some authors (such as Rydgre, 2004, 2005; Zaslove, 2004, 2008; Keman and Krouwel, 2005; Eremina and Sedenko, 2015) called as '*radical right-wing populist parties*'²⁴⁵.

During the last two decades, such problems have been taking place in Western democratic countries. They have been much more visible since those who voted for Brexit won in the 2016 UK EU referendum, Donald Trump was elected in the 2016 US presidential election, Mateo Renzi lost in the 2016 Italian Referendum and the mainstream centre-left and centre-right French parties collapsed in the 2017 presidential and parliamentary elections. Being led by populist leaders, some far-right populist parties in

²⁴⁴ Such problems, according to Foa and Mounk (2015: 6-7) consist of: a) the increasing cynicism in the value of democracy as a political system; b) the declining public/electorates' trust in political institutions such political parties, parliaments and the government; and c) the soaring willingness of the publics/electorates to support either the populist candidates or the new authoritarian alternatives parties that define themselves in opposition to the established political parties.

²⁴⁵ Mudde (2004: 543) defined populism as *an ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, 'the pure people' versus 'the corrupt elite', and which argues that politics should be an expression of the general will of the people*. Political parties that followed this ideology are strongly opposed to what he called '*elitism*' and '*pluralism*' and stuck to a *Manichean perspective* that differentiates people/electorates into two groups, which are friends and enemies. He stated that as '*a thin-centred ideology, populism can be easily combined with very different (thin and full) other ideologies, including communism, ecologism, nationalism or socialism*' (Mudde, 2004: 544). Having had capability to mix and attract to those who followed one of these ideologies, this ideology has been widely seen as a threat to the established political parties, which commonly stick to either the centre-left or the centre-right ideological orientations and the liberal society. The primary reason is those who followed this ideology, according to Engesser et al. (2016: 3-5), favoured promoting the following issues: *the sovereignty of the people, advocating for the people, attacking the elite, ostracizing others, and invoking the 'heartland'*.

European politics, such as FN, FPO, AfD, Podemos, Syriza, the Italian Northern League and the Five Star Movement have been marching from the 'margins' to the 'mainstream' politics. Most of these parties advocated xenophobic and the ultra-nationalist/Nazism ideological orientations and poisoned European societies with racism and anti-globalisation, immigrants and Muslims intensively. However, whilst such trends jeopardized the sustainability of the (liberal) democracy²⁴⁶, especially, in Western democratic countries, none of political marketing scholars formulated prescriptive models of political marketing and professionalized campaign to help either the existing centre-right or centre-left parties in such countries to handle such trends effectively.

As regards to such conditions, I propose the following arguments. Katz (2001: 278) voiced that the ways political parties selected, nominated marketed and sold candidates for running in elections and managed public offices would define not only the organizational traits of these parties, but also the degree of support of the peoples/electorates' for these parties—in particular—and the political and government systems—in general. Following his proposition, I argue that the mainstream centre-left or centre-right parties in such countries have to select and nominate qualified and proper candidates for running in elections, market and sell them effectively to get them elected in the elections.

Winning and gaining parliamentary seats in such elections is very important for these parties to secure their 'roles and privileges' of what Mair (1995) called '*representative agencies*' and '*public office holders*'. Once they have successfully maintained and improved such 'roles and privileges', these parties would have had plenty of chances not only to tackle the decline of political partisanship and people's/electorates' trust in

²⁴⁶ There have been diverse types of the normative and practical models of democracies. As compared to the other variants of democracies, the liberal democracy has been much more widely accepted across the globe. Regardless of its weaknesses, this liberal democracy, according to Diamond (1999: 18) is much more capable in offering '*the best long-run prospects for reducing social injustices and correcting mistaken policies and corrupt practices*'.

these parties, but also to manage the structural problems in the functioning of liberal democracy and democratic political and government systems²⁴⁷. To achieve such goals, these parties could consider the second and the third proposed models charted previously by figures 11.2 and 11.3 and a set of examples of the prescriptive models displayed in Appendix C.

Though being derived from the very specific context of the new democracy of Indonesia, which actually had a limited fertile political foreground for development of either the radical-right or the radical-left wing populist parties (Ambardi, 2008) or the populist Islamist parties (see Hadiz, 2011, 2014), these models offer the following benefits. The second proposed model could help these parties to maximize their roles in nurturing and selecting qualified populist-leaders and/or hunting and nominating (populist presidential) candidates, whose strong personal political gravitational and magnetic powers to attract, pull in and capture the primary and secondary political sub-markets. This model would also be helpful to counter the increasing personal political gravitational and magnetic powers of leaders of the far-right populist parties and movements. Moreover, the third proposed model could assist these parties to strategically develop a set of attitudinal and behavioural orientations to address and mobilize these political sub-markets and deal with primary political actors who have been influential in the political market arenas within the specific contexts of either the elections or in between the elections. Additionally, the prescriptive models would be useful for these parties, as they want to develop market-orientation and professionalization of campaigning effectively in order to gain substantial

²⁴⁷ Such problems already took shape in US and the European politics (Foa and Mounk, 2015: 7-14). Within the specific context of the European politics, such problems paved the way for the increasing chances and powers of the radical-right wing populist parties and movements to attract and capture various groups of peoples/electorates who are heavily dissatisfied with these parties and, more specifically, the roles of these parties in the national and European parliament and government (Zaslave, 2004; Keman and Krouwel, 2005; Eremina and Sedenko, 2015).

parliamentary seats in the parliamentary election and/or win the presidential election.

Once ruling the parliament/government, these parties would have had plenty of chances to secure their roles and privileges as '*representative agencies*' and '*public office holders*' strategically (Mair, 1995). Having attained such roles and privileges, these parties could upgrade their organisational capabilities to manage what Mair (2005: 24-25) labelled as the 'popular' and the 'constitutional' elements of democracy effectively²⁴⁸. If these parties successfully managed such elements, these parties either individually or collectively would have had robust organisational capabilities to tackle the existing structural problems of the (liberal) democratic system and improve the workability and serviceability of existing political and government systems to generate many more real benefits to individual citizens and electorates and the people/society as a whole.

Does using these proposed models carry negative consequences for democracy? Savigny (2004) stated that the increasing applications of marketing principles, techniques and procedures in political spheres would undermine democratic ideals, especially once the '*elites/political actors seek to shape the preferences of the electorates for their own ends*' (Savigny, 2004: 275). She also stated that '*increasing use of marketing in politics is contributing to a depoliticisation of the political process, inhibiting democratic debate, expression and choice*' (Savigny, 2007a: 134). Similarly, Lilleker (2005a, 2005b) hinted that political parties that run such practices are likely to be incapable of fulfilling the latent and expressive needs and expectations of political sub-markets, especially the voters and their constituents and members inclusively. I totally agree with the ideas of these authors. However, unlike these authors, I favour advocating that the

²⁴⁸ The 'popular' elements refer to the political trust of the peoples/electorates in individual politicians of the party and to political institutions, particularly the parliaments and government, while the 'constitutional' elements relate to the party membership and levels of political partisanship and participation, especially in the elections (Mair, 2005: 24-25).

main issue for us, as either political marketing scholars or practitioners, is actually not whether the uses of marketing principles, techniques and procedures in political spheres generate negative consequences for either the democracy, as posited by Savigny (2004, 2007) or the capabilities of political parties to meet the diverse needs and expectations of political sub-markets, as highlighted by Lilleker (2005a, 2005b). Giasson, et al. (2012: 18-19) and Lees-Marshment (2012: 373-378) already offered quite fair assessments regarding this issue. The primary issue is instead, how can we ensure that the adaptations of such principles, techniques and procedures in the political spheres not only could improve 'the representative function of a political system and democracy as a whole' (Lees-Marshment, 2004a: 239-240, 2004b: 12) and upgrade the quality and levels of political engagement of the electorates and voters and their trust in political actors and organizations (Henneberg, et al., 2009: 116), but also could secure the sustainability of the existing democratic political and government systems and institutions—in particular—and the survivability of the (liberal) democratic citizen and society as a whole—in general.

From a different stance, Hamelink (2007: 185) voiced that within the framework of the 'limited democracy model', adaptation of practices of professionalization of political communication and campaigning by political parties could improve the ways these parties formulated and offered political products and policies to the peoples/citizens/electorates. While fully realizing that such adaptations would not totally resolve the innate problems of the current liberal democratic system in Western democratic countries (such as little or no civic confidence and little or no civic engagement), he, however, believed that such adaptations are likely to generate a crucial contribution to what he highlighted as '*the functioning and the legitimation of liberal representative democracy*' (Hamelink, 2007: 185). Having adopted the ideas of this author, I argue that adopting such practices is likely to stimulate political parties not only to manage their

interests effectively, but also to address and fulfil the needs and expectations of common people strategically. Once advancing such practices strategically, these parties would have had robust organizational capabilities in developing and delivering better political policies and products to these common people, offering these people what Hamelink (2007: 186) called '*real choices*' and '*participation in real choice making*' and more importantly, encouraging these people to get involved in what Hamelink (2007: 187) named the '*democratic minds*'.

These aforementioned proposed models are indeed not silver bullets to secure the (existing) liberal democratic, political party and government systems and political institutions in Western democratic countries. Nonetheless, I am quite confident that once the mainstream/established political parties in such countries adopted and advanced these models strategically and effectively, these parties would have plenty of chances to improve the functionality and serviceability of these systems and institutions for the people/society as a whole. However, while adopting and developing these models, these parties have to realize that taking power in the parliament/government is merely a *necessary political means to accomplish the most important political end*, which is to get more strategic roles and privileges as '*representative agencies*' and '*public office holders*'. Gaining such roles and privileges and keeping such roles and privileges publicly accountable and workable are necessary for these parties as an organisation and these parties' leaders and candidates as individual politicians, as they want to increase these people's/societies' trust in these systems and institutions, keep such systems and institutions surviving and become much more serviceable to these people and secure the survivability of liberal democratic society.

Bibliography

- Agustina, W., Wasono, H.T., Fitria, A.G., Trianita, L., Muhyidin, M. and Fikri, A. (2014). Mencari Restu Para Kyai (*Seeking the Approvals of Islamic Leaders*). In TEMPO. Koalisi Hiruk-Pikuk (*The Hurly-Burly Coalition*). Jakarta: PT TEMPO Inti Media. 7-13 April 2014. Pages 40-42.
- Abdulkaki, L. (2008) Democratisation in Indonesia: From Transition to Consolidation, *Asian Journal of Political Science*, 16:2, 151-172, DOI: 10.1080/02185370802204099
- Agustina, W., Teresia, A and Primandari, T. (2014). Malam Perkenalan Kawan Jauh (*The Night-Inauguration with the Detached Friends*). In TEMPO. Wakil Sehidup Semati (*A True-Hearted Running Mate*). Jakarta: PT Tempo Inti Media. 21-27 April 2014. Page 40.
- Ansori, M.H. (2009). Consumerism and the Emergence of a New Middle Class in Globalizing Indonesia. *EXPLORATIONS, a graduate student journal of southeast Asian studies*. Volume 9, Spring 2009. Pp.87-97.
- Ambardi, K. (2008), *The Making of the Indonesian Multiparty System: A Cartelized Party System and Its Origin*. Dissertation presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of The Ohio State University, The Ohio State University.
- Ambardi, K. (2014). Sentimen Kelas, Ketimpangan dan Pemilu Presiden (The Class Sentiment, Social and Economic Gaps and The 2014 Presidential Election), in TEMPO. Teror di Detik Detik Terakhir (*Political Intimidations in the End of the 2014 Presidential Race*). Jakarta: PT TEMPO Inti Media. 7-13 July 2014. Pages 100-1001.
- Ambardi, K, Parahita, G., Lindawati, L., Sukarno, A., and Aprilia, N. (2014), *Mapping Digital Media: Indonesia*. A Report by the Open Society Foundations. New York, United States

- Armando, A. (2014). The greedy giants: Centralized television in post-authoritarian Indonesia. *International Communication Gazette*, June–August 2014; vol. 76, 4-5: pp. 390-406.
- Aspinall, E. (2014). Why was the Jokowi effect limited?. *Mandala*, 10 April 2014. Retrieved from <http://www.newmandala.org/why-was-the-jokowi-effect-limited/>, 20 March 2015.
- Azwar, R.C. (2009). Poilitik Komunikasi Partai Golkar di Tiga Era: Dari Partai Hegemoni ke Partai Berorientaasi Pasar (*The Politics of Communication of Golkar Party Within and Across the Three Periods: From the Hegemonic Party to the Market-Oriented Party*). Jakarta: The Indonesian Institute.
- Bagozzi, R.P. (1975). Marketing as Exchange. *Journal of Marketing*, Vol. 39 (October 1975), pp.32-39.
- Baines, P.R. (2001). *Marketing and Political Campaigning in the US and the UK: What Can the UK Political Parties Learn for the Development of a Campaign Management Process Model? A Thesis submitted to the University of Manchester Institute of Science and Technology for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy at Manchester School of Management. February 2001*
- Baines, P.R., and Egan, J. (2001). Marketing and political campaigning: mutually exclusive or exclusively mutual? *Qualitative Market Research: An International Journal*, Vol. 4 Issue: 1, pp.25 – 34
- Baines P. R., Scheucher C. and Plasser F. (2001) The “Americanisation” myth in European political markets: a focus on the United Kingdom. *European Journal of Marketing*, vol. 35, no.9-10, pp. 1099-1116
- Bhaskar, R. (1975). *A Realist Theory of Science*. London: Routledge.
- Bhaskar, R. (1998). Philosophy and Scientific Realism, in Margaret Archer, Roy Bhaskar, Andrew Collier, Tony Lawson and Alan Norrie. *Critical Realism: Essential Readings*. London: Routledge. Page 16-47.
- Bhaskar, R. (2008) *A Realist Theory of Science*. London: Verso. Second Edition.

- Bhaskar, R. and Lawson, T. (1998). Introduction: Basic Texts and Developments, in Margaret Archer, Roy Bhaskar, Andrew Collier, Tony Lawson and Alan Norrie. *Critical Realism: Essential Readings*. London: Routledge. Page 3-15.
- Blumenthal, S. (1982). *The Permanent Campaign*. New York: Simon and Schuster
- Blumler, J.G. (1990), Elections, the Media and the Modern Publicity Process, in Ferguson, M (Eds). *Public Communication: The New Imperatives*. London: Sage Publication.
- Blumler, J.G. and Kavanagh, D. (1999), The Third Age of Political Communication: Influences and Features. *Political Communication*, Vol.16, 209-230. Taylor & Francais.
- Blumler, J.G. and Gurevitch, M. (2001). 'Americanization Reconsidered: UK-US Campaign Communication Comparisons across Time', pp. 380-403, in W. Lance Bennett and Robert M Entman (eds.) *Mediated Politics. Communication in the Future of Democracy*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
- Bryman, A. (2008), *Social Research Methods*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Third Edition.
- Burns, R. (2000), *Introduction to Research Methods*, London: Sage Publication
- Butler-Kisber, L. (2010), *Qualitative Inquiry: Thematic, Narrative and Arts-Informed Perspectives*. London: Sage Publications Ltd.
- Butler, D. (1996). Polls and Elections, in in Lawrence LeDuc, Richard G.Niemi and Pippa Norris (Eds). (1996). *Comparing Democracies: Elections and Voting in Global Perspective*. London: Sage Publication.
- Butler P., and Collins N. (1994). Political Marketing: Structure and Process. *European Journal of Marketing*, Vol. 28, No.1, pp. 19-34
- Butler, P. and Collins N. (1999). A Conceptual Framework for Political Marketing. In Bruce I. Newman (ed.) (1999). *Handbook of Political Marketing*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, pp. 55-72

- Butler, P. and Harris, P. (2009). Considerations on the evolution of political marketing theory. *Marketing Theory* 2009 9: 149
- Canovan, M. (1999). Trust the People! The Populism and the Two Faces of Democracy, *Political Studies*, 47(1): 2-16, DOI: 10.1111/1467-9248.00184
- Chandra, K., (2014). Konvensi Yang Terhalang Kursi (The Convention Result, Which Was Dampened by Number of Parliamentary Seat) . In TEMPO. Efek Puan, Efek Jokowi (*The Puan Effect, the Jokowi Effect*). PT Tempo Inti Media. 14-20 April 2014. Pages 52-53.
- Chandra, K., (2014). Andi Widjajanto: Kami Optimistis Jokowi Tetap Unggul (*We Are Confident that Jokowi Are the Champion*). In TEMPO. Teror di Detik Detik Terakhir (*Political Intimidations in the End of the 2014 Presidential Race*). Jakarta: PT TEMPO Inti Media. 7-13 July 2014. Page 47.
- Chandra, K., Prihandoko, Agustina, W. and Purnomo, W.A. (2014). Dua Keranjang Koalisi Matahari (Two Group of Coalitions Approached by PAN). In TEMPO. Wakil Sehidup Semati (*A True-Hearted Running Mate*). Jakarta: PT Tempo Inti Media. 21-27 April 2014. Pages 42-44.
- Chandra, K., Teresia, A., Paraqbugueq, R. and Maharani, S. (2014). Ada Samad di Tikungan. (*There Was Abraham Samad in the Roundabout*). In TEMPO. Berburu Kursi Wapres (Seeking a Vice Presidential Ticket). Jakarta: PT Tempo Inti Media. 14-20 April 2014, Page 38.
- Creswell, J.W. and Tashakkori, A. (2007). Editorial: Differing Perspectives on Mixed Methods Research. *Journal of Mixed Methods Research*, 1: 303
- Creswell, J. W., and Plano Clark, V. L. (2007), *Designing and Conducting Mixed methods research*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
- Creswell, J. W., & Plano Clark, V. L. (2011). *Designing and conducting mixed Methods Research*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. (2nd ed.).

- Coleman, S. (2007). Review of Political Marketing: A Comparative Perspective, *Parliamentary Affairs*, 70 (1): 180-186.
- Contrim-Macieira, J. (2005). Change to Win? The Brazillian Workers' Party's 2002 General Election Marketing Strategy, in Lilleker, D.G and Lees-Marshment, J. (2005). *Political Marketing: A Comparative Perspective*. Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press. Pages, 148-164.
- Diamond, L. (1999). *Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation*, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999. pp. 1–19.
- Denscombe, M. (2008). Communities of Practice: A Research Paradigm for the Mixed Methods Approach. *Journal of Mixed Methods Research*, 2: 270.
- Dhakidae, D. (2009). "Partai Politik di Persimpangan Jalan," (*Political Parties at the Crossroads*) Prisma, Vol. 28, Juni 2009.
- Denzin, K. and Lincoln, Y.S (2005). *The Sage Handbook of Qualitative Research*. London: Sage Publication. Third Edition.
- Doherty, B.J. (2012). *The Rise of the President's Permanent Campaign*. Kansas: The University Press of Kansas.
- Doolan, M.A. (2009). *Exploring the 'Americanization' of political campaigns: Croatia's 2003 and 2007 general elections*. MSc Dissertation, London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE). Retrieved from http://www.lse.ac.uk/media@lse/research/mediaWorkingPapers/MScDissertationSeries/Past/Doolan_final.pdf, 1 September 2012.
- Dulio, D.A. (2001), *For Better or Worse? How Political Consultants are Changing Elections in the United States*. Ph.D. dissertation, American University.
- Dulio, D.A and Garret, R. S. (2005). *Campaign Professionalism and Organizational Strength in the State Parties*. Paper for presentation at the "State of the Parties 2004 and Beyond" conference, Ray C. Bliss Institute of Applied Politics, University of Akron, Oct. 7, 2005.

- Egan, J. (1999) Political Marketing: Lessons from the Mainstream, *Journal of Marketing Management*, 15:6, 495-503. DOI: 10.1362/026725799785045806
- Elebash, C. (1984). The Americanization of British Political Parties. *Journal of Advertising*, Vol.13, No.3.
- Engesser, S., Ernst, N., Esser, F. & Buchel, F. (2016). Populism and Social Media: How Politicians Spread a Fragmented Ideology. *Information, Communication & Society*, DOI: 10.1080/1369118X.2016.1207697
- Eremina, N., and Seredenko, S. (2015). *Right Radicalism in Party and Political Systems in Present-day European States*. Cambridge: Cambridge Scholars Publishing.
- Eshbaugh-Shoha, M. and Nicholson-Crocty, S. (2009). Presidential Campaigning during Midterm Elections. *The American Review of Politics*, Vol., 30, Spring, 35-50.
- Espindola, R. (2002). Professionalised Campaigning in Latin America. *Journal of Political Marketing*, 1:4, 65-81.
- Esser, F. and Tenscher, J. (2005a). *The Professionalization Dilemma: Exploring a 'Strategic Approach' for Political Communication Experts*. Paper prepared for presentation to the Political Communication Division at the ICA conference in New York, May 26-30, 2005.
- Esser, F and Tenscher, J. (2005b). *Measuring The Professionalization of Political Campaign*. Paper prepared for presentation to the Political Communication Division at the ICA Conference in New York, May 26-30, 2005.
- Farrell, D.M. Kolodny, R. and Medvic, S. (2001). Parties and Campaign Professionals in a Digital Age: Political Consultants in the United States and Their Counterparts Overseas. *The Harvard International Journal of Press/Politics* 2001 6: 11
- Farrell, D. (1996). 'Campaign Strategies and Tactics', in Lawrence LeDuc, Richard G. Niemi and Pippa Norris (eds) *Comparing Democracies*.

- Elections and Voting in Global Perspective*, pp. 160–83. London: Sage Publication.
- Farrell, D. and Webb, P. (2000). Political Parties as Campaign Organisations', in Russell Dalton and Martin P. Wattenberg (eds), *Parties without Partisans*, Oxford University Press
- Fell, D.J., and Cheng, I. (2010). Testing the Market-Oriented Model of Political Parties in a Non-Western Context: The Case of Taiwan, in Lees-Marshment, Jennifer, Strömbäck, Jesper and Rudd, Chris (Eds). 2010. *Global Political Marketing*. London: Routledge Taylor & Francis Group. Pages, 143-156.
- Franklin, B. (2004). Packaging Politics: *Political Communication in Britain's Media Democracy*. London: Arnold Publishers. Second Edition.
- Friedenberg, Robert V. (1997). *Communication Consultants in Political Campaigns: Ballot Box Warriors*. Westport, Connecticut and London: Praeger.
- Foa, R.S., and Mounk, Y. (2016). The Democratic Disconnect. *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 26, No.3, July 2016, pp.5-17.
- Gans-Morse, J., Mazzuca, S. and Nichter, S. (2014). Varieties of Clientelism: Machine Politics during Elections. *American Journal of Political Sciences*, Vol.58, No.2, April 2014, Pp.415-432.
- Gazali, E. (2004), *Communication of Politics and Politics of Communication in Indonesia: Study on Media Performance, Responsibility and Accountability*. Unpublished Doctoral Thesis, Radboud University Nijmegen.
- Gazali, E., Hidayat, D.N and Menayang, V. (2009). Political Communication in Indonesia: Media Performance in Three Eras, in Willnat, L. and Aw. A. (2009) *Political Communication in Asia*. London: Routledge. Pp.112-134.
- Gerke, S. (2000). Global Lifestyles under Local Conditions: The New Indonesian Middle Class, in Beng-Huat, Chua (Eds). *Consumption in Asia: Lifestyles and Identities*. London: Routledge. pp, 135-158.

- Giasson, T., Lees-Marshment, J., and Marland, A. (2011). Introducing Political Marketing, Marland, A., Giasson, T., and Lees-Marshment, J. (ed). (2012). *Political Marketing in Canada*. Vancouver: The University of British Columbia Press, pp. 3-21.
- Gibson, R. K. and Rommele, A. (2001). Changing Campaign Communications: A Party-Centered Theory of Professionalized Campaigning. *The Harvard International Journal of Press/Politics* 2001 6: 31
- Gibson, R. K. and Rommele, A. (2007). *Political communication*, in: Daniele Caramani (ed). 2007. *Comparative Politics*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Gibson, R. K. and Rommele, A. (2009). Measuring the Professionalization of Political Campaigning. *Party Politics*, 15: 265
- Guest, G. (2013). Describing Mixed Methods Research: An Alternative to Typologies. *Journal of Mixed Methods Research* 2013 7: 141.
- Gurevitch, M. (1999). Wither the Future? Some Afterthoughts. *Political Communication*, 16:281-284.
- Hadiz, V.R. (2011). Indonesian Political Islam: Capitalist Development and the Legacies of the Cold War. *Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs*, 30, 1, 3-38.
- Hadiz, V.R. (2014). A New Islamic Populism and the Contradictions of Development. *Journal of Contemporary Asia*, 44:1, 125-143, DOI: 10.1080/00472336.2013.832790
- Hair, J.F., Hult, G.T.M., Ringle, C.M. and Sarstedt, M. (2014). *A Primer on Partial Least Squares Structural Equation Modeling (PLS-SEM)*. London: Sage.
- Hair, J.F., Ringle, C.M. and Sarstedt, M.: Partial Least Squares: The Better Approach to Structural Equation Modeling? *Long Range Planning*, Volume 45 (2012), Issue 5-6, pp. 312-319.
- Hair, J.F., Ringle, C.M. and Sarstedt, M (2013). *Partial Least Squares Structural Equation Modeling: Rigorous Applications, Better Results*

- and Higher Acceptance. *Long Range Planning*, Volume 46, Issue 1-2, pp. 1-12.
- Hallin, D. and Mancini, P. (2004). "Americanization, Globalization and Secularization' In F.Esser and B.Pfetsch" (Eds.). 2004. *Comparing Political Communication*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p.25-45.
- Hamayotsu, Kikue (2011), The End of Political Islam? A Comparative Analysis of Religious Parties in the Muslim Democracy of Indonesia, *Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs*, 30, 3, 133-159.
- Hanan, D. (2012). *Making Presidentialism Work: Legislative and Executive Interaction in Indonesian Democracy*. Dissertation presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of The Ohio State University, The Ohio State University.
- Hara, A.E (2001). The Difficult Journey of Democratization in Indonesia, *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, Vol. 23, No. 2, pp. 307-326
- Haryadi, R. (2014). Menyetel Orkes Partai Islam (*Playing The Islamic Ideological Sentiment*): Laporan Khusus (*A Special Report*). Gatra, 30 April 2014. Jakarta: PT Era Media Informasi. Pages 36-37.
- Harris, P. (2000). To Spin or not to Spin that is the Question: The Emergence of Modern Political Marketing. *The Marketing Review*, 2000, Westburn Publishers Ltd.
- Harris, P. and Andrew L. (2010) "Mind the gap": the rise of political marketing and a perspective on its future agenda. *European Journal of Marketing* Vol. 44 No. 3/4, 2010 pp. 297-307.
- Harrop M. 1990. Political Marketing. *Parliamentary Affairs*, vol. 43, pp. 277-291
- Hartwig, M. (2008) *Introduction* in Bhaskar R (2008) *A Realist Theory of Science*. London: Verso. Second Edition, pp. ix- xxiv
- Hill, D.T., Sen, K., 2005. *The Internet in Indonesia's New Democracy*. Routledge, London and New York.

- Henneberg, S.C.M (1996). Second Conference on Political Marketing: Judge Institute of Management Studies, University of Cambridge 27-29 March, 1996. *Journal of Marketing Management*, 12, 777-783.
- Henneberg, S.C.M. (2002). Understanding Political Marketing, in Nicholas J.O'Shaughnessy and Stephen C.M. Henneberg (Eds). 2002. *The Idea of Political Marketing*. London: Praeger Publishers.
- Henneberg, S.C.M. (2003). *General Functions of Political Marketing Management. Working Paper*. School of Management, University of Bath. Tahun 2003. No.19.
- Henneberg, S. C. (2004a). Political marketing and the relationship management paradigm. Paper presented at the PSA Conference, Lincoln, United Kingdom, April 2004.
- Henneberg, S.C.M (2004b). The Views of an Adboatus Dei: Political Marketing and Its Critics. *Journal of Public Affairs*, Vol. 4, No.3. Pages, 225-243.
- Henneberg, S. C. M. (2006a), "Leading or Following? A Theoretical Analysis of Political Marketing Postures". *Journal of Political Marketing*, Vol. 5 (1), pp. 29-46.
- Henneberg, S. C. M. (2006b), "Strategic Postures of Political Marketing: An Exploratory Operationalisation". *Journal of Public Affairs*, Vol. 6 (1), pp. 15-30.
- Henneberg, S.C.M. (2008), An Epistemological Perspective on Research in Political Marketing. *Journal of Political Marketing*, 7:2, 151-182
- Henneberg, S.C.M. and O'Shaughnessy, N.J. (2007). Theory and Concept Development in Political Marketing, *Journal of Political Marketing*, 6:2-3, 5-31
- Henneberg, S.C.M and O'Shaughnessy, N.J. (2009). 'Political Relationship Marketing: Some Macro/Micro Thoughts'. *Journal of Marketing Management*, 25, 1/2. 5-29.

- Henneberg, S.C.M, Scammell, M. and O'Shaughnessy, N.J. (2009). 'Political Marketing Management and Theories of Democracy'. *Marketing Theory*, 9, 2: 165-188.
- Henneberg, S.C.M. and Ormrod, R.P. (2013). The triadic interaction model of political marketing exchange. *Marketing Theory* 2013 13: 87
- Henseler, J., Ringle, C.M and Sinkovics, R.R. (2009), The use of partial least squares path modeling in international marketing, in Rudolf R. Sinkovics, Pervez N. Ghauri (ed.) *New Challenges to International Marketing (Advances in International Marketing, Volume 20)* Emerald Group Publishing Limited, pp.277 – 319
- Heryanto, A. (2006). *State Terrorism and Political Identity in Indonesia: Fatally belonging*. London: Routledge
- Hidayat, B., and Wijaya, I. (2014). Penataran Garuda Ranca Hambalang (*Training of Garuda Squads in Hambalang District*). In TEMPO. Efek Puan, Efek Jokowi (*the Puan Effect, the Jokowi Effect*). PT Tempo Inti Media. 14-20 April 2014. Pages 49-50.
- Hidayat, B., Paragbeuq, R., Teresia, A., Rosarian, F. and Sukma, A. (2014). Lamaran Tak Terjawan di Nusa Dua (*The Unanswerable Proposal of Vice Presidential Candidates in Nusa Dua*). In TEMPO. Akhir Perjalanan Hadi Purnomo (The End of Path of Hadi Purnomo). Jakarta: PT Tempo Inti Media. 28 April-4 May 2014. Pages 44-47.
- Hidayat, B., Paragbeuq, R., Chandra, K. & Rosarians, F. (2014). Setelah Pintu Tertutup di Teuku Umar (*After A Door at Teuku Umar Being Closed*). TEMPO, Duet Kepepet (*Incidental Coalition*). Jakarta: PT Tempo Inti Media. 19-25 May 2014. Pages 33-36.
- Hidayat, B. Ferdianto, R., Firdaus, F., Rizki, M. and Mahmudah, N. (2014). Kloter Kedua Menuju Kuningan (The Second Group of People Who Have Been Heading to Kuningan). TEMPO, Robek Kocek Tamu Tuhan (*The Pockets of God' Visitors Broken Up*). Jakarta: PT Tempo Inti Media. 2-8 June, 2014. Pages 33-36.

- Hidayat, B., Septian, A., Sufa, I.G. and Anam, K. (2014). *Kutak-Katik Calon Pendamping (Seeking the Best Way for Find a Running Mate)*. In TEMPO. Wakil Sehidup Semati (*A True-Hearted Running Mate*). Jakarta: PT Tempo Inti Media. 28 July-3 August 2014. Pages 32-35.
- Hidayat, B., Widiarsi, A., Hidayat, D. and Wiyana, D (2014). *Simpatisan Dari Seberang (The Overseas Sympathizers)*, TEMPO. Edisi Khusus Pemilu Presiden (*A Special Edition of the Presidential Election*). Jakarta: PT Tempo Inti Media. 6 July 2014. Pages 68-69.
- Hidayat, B., Widiarsi, A., Hidayat, D. and Wiyana, D (2014). *Tulang Punggung Nomor 1 (The Primary Back Bone of Campaign Fund Riser)*, TEMPO. Edisi Khusus Pemilu Presiden (*A Special Edition of the Presidential Election*). Jakarta: PT Tempo Inti Media. 6 July 2014. Pages 70-71.
- Hidayat, B., Widiarsi, A., Hidayat, D. and Wiyana, D (2014). *Anak Buah di Bawah Tanah (The Clandestine Campaigners)*. In TEMPO, Edisi Khusus Pemilu Presiden (*A Special Edition of the Presidential Election*). Jakarta: PT Tempo Inti Media. 6 July 2014, Pages 74-75.
- Hidayat, B., Widiarsi, A., Hidayat, D. and Wiyana, D (2014). *Strategi Maya Pendular Suara (The Online War Strategy that Grasped Substantial Supports of the Electorates)*. In TEMPO, Edisi Khusus Pemilu Presiden (*A Special Edition of the Presidential Election*). Jakarta: PT Tempo Inti Media. 6 July 2014, Pages 112-113.
- Hidayat, B., Widiarsi, A., Hidayat, D. and Wiyana, D (2014). *Teman Diskusi di Perjalanan (A Friend for Sharing Ideas During the Journey)*. In TEMPO, Edisi Khusus Pemilu Presiden (*A Special Edition of the Presidential Election*). Jakarta: PT Tempo Inti Media. 6 July 2014, Pages 121-122
- Hidayat, B., Widiarsi, A., Hidayat, D. and Wiyana, D (2014). *Tim Gorong-Gorong Dari Solo (A Clandestine Team from Solo)*. In TEMPO, Edisi Khusus Pemilu Presiden (*A Special Edition of the Presidential*

- Election*). Jakarta: PT Tempo Inti Media. 6 July 2014, Pages 124-125.
- Hidayat, B., Teresia, A. and Listyanti, A.S. (2014). Dia Yang Berlari (He Is Constantly Running). In TEMPO. Jakarta: PT TEMPO Inti Media. 14-20 July 2014. Pages 34-40.
- Hidayat, B., Triana, L., Maharani, S., Wasono, T. & Djunaidy, M. (2014). Pasukan Bawah Tanah Sang Presiden (*The Secret Army of the Elected-President*), TEMPO. Jokowi & Para Relawan (*Jokowi & Campaign-Volunteers*). Jakarta: PT Tempo Inti Media. 28 July-3 August 2014. Pages 34-38.
- Hidayat, D.N, Gazali, E., Suwardi, H., and Ishadi S.K. (2000) *Pers dalam "Revolusi Mei" Runtuhnya Sebuah Hegemoni*. Jakarta: Gramedia.
- Hildalgo, F.D. and Nitcher, S. (2016). Vote Buying: Shaping the Electorate through Clientelism. *American Journal of Political Science*, Vo.60, No.20, April 2016, Pp.436-455.
- Hopkin, J. (2006). *Conceptualizing Political Clientelism: Political Exchange and Democratic Theory*. Paper prepared for APSA annual meeting, Philadelphia, 31 August – 3 September 2006. Panel 46-18, 'Concept Analysis: Unpacking Clientelism, Governance and Neoliberalism'.
- Horowitz, D.L (2013, *Constitutional Change and Democracy in Indonesia*. Cambridge University Press, 2013.
- Hughes, A. and Dann, S. (2090). Political marketing and stakeholder engagement. *Marketing Theory*, Volume 9(2): 243–256. DOI: 10.1177/1470593109103070
- Hughes, A. and Dann, S. (2012), Political Marketing Redefined: Exploring the Consequences of Stakeholders on the Marketing Mix and Political Consumption. *Asia-Pacific Advances in Consumer Research*, Volume 10: 357-367.
- Holtz-Bacha, C. (2002). Professionalization of political communication: The Case of the SPD Campaign. *Journal of Political Marketing*, 1 : 23-37.

- Hotlz-Bacha. C. (2007). Professionalization of politics in Germany. In Negrine, R., Mancini, P., Holtz-Bacha, C. and Papathanossopoulos, S. (Eds). 2007. *The Professionalization of Political Communication*. Bristol: Intellect.
- Horowitz, D.L (2013). *Constitutional Change and Democracy in Indonesia*. Cambrigde: Cambridge University Press.
- Hughes, A and Dann, S. (2009). Political Marketing and Stakeholder Engagement. *Marketing Theory: an International Review*, vol.9, no.2, pp.243-256.
- Hunt, S.D., and Chonko, L.B. (1984). Marketing and Machiavellianism, *Journal of Marketing*, Vol. 48, No. 3 (Summer, 1984), pp. 30-42
- Ishadi, S.K. 2002. *Kontestasi di Ruang Berita Televisi : Analisis Kritis Praktik Diskursus Menjelang Jatuhnya Soeharto (Contestation in the Television's News Room: A Critical Analysis on Discourse Practices Approaching the Downfall of Soeharto)*. Unpublished doctoral dessertaion. Jakarta: University of Indonesia.
- Ispandriarno, Lukas S. (2008). *Political Communication in Indonesia: An Analysis of the Freedom of the Press in the Transition Process after the Downfall of the Soeharto-Regime (1998-2004)*. Unpublished PhD Dissertation of Institute of Media and Communication Science, Ilmenau Technical University. Germany.
- Jackson, S. (2011). The Australian Greens: Between movement and electoral professional party. *A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements of the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, Department of Government and International Relations, Faculty of Economics and Business, University of Sydney, July 2011*.
- Jimenez, O.F.D. (2012). *The Professionalization of Election Campaigning in Mexico: A Study on Continuity and Change in Presidential Campaign Practices and Communications (1988-2006)*. A thesis submitted to the for the degree of Doctor Philosophy, Department of Political Science and International Studies, School of Government

- and Society, College of Social Sciences, the University of Birmingham. March 2012.
- Johansen, H.P. M. (2005), Political Marketing. *Journal of Political Marketing*, 4:4, 85-105.
- Johansen, H.P. M. (2012), *Relational Political Marketing in Party-Centred Democracies*. Farnham: Ashgate Publishing Limited.
- Johnson, R. B., & Onwuegbuzie, A. J. (2004). Mixed methods research: A research paradigm whose time has come. *Educational Researcher*, 33(7), 14-26.
- Johnson, R. B., Onwuegbuzie, A. J., & Turner, L. A. (2007). Toward a definition of mixed methods research. *Journal of Mixed Methods Research*, 1(2), 112-133.
- Jones, D.N., and Paulhus, D.L. (2009). *Machiavellianism*, in M.R. Leary and R.H. Hoyle (Eds). (2009). Individual Differences in Social Behavior. New York: Guilford, pp. 93-108
- Katz, R.S. (2001). The Problem of Candidate Selection and Models of Party Democracy. *Party Politics*, Vol.7, No.3, pp.227-296.
- Kavanagh, D. (1995) *Election Campaigning: The New Marketing of Politics*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Kavanagh, D., (1996). New Campaign Communications. Consequences for British Political Parties. *International Journal of Press/Politics* 1 (3): 60-76.
- Kavagh, D (1996),"Speaking truth to power? Pollsters as campaign advisers", *European Journal of Marketing*, Vol. 30 Iss: 10/11, pp.104 – 113
- Keman, H., and Krouwel, A. (2005). *The Rise of a New Political Class? Emerging New Parties and the Populist Challenge in Western Europe*. Working papers Political Science No.2006/02. Department of Political Science, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam.
- Kiss, B. and Mihalyffy, Z. (2010). *Political Salesman in Hungary*, in Lees-Marshment, Jennifer, Strömbäck, Jesper and Rudd, Chris (Eds).

2010. *Global Political Marketing*. London: Routledge Taylor & Francis Group. Pages, 143-156.
- Kline, R. B. (1998). *Principles and Practice of Structural Equation Modeling*. New York: The Guilford Press.
- Kohli A.K. and Jaworski B.J. (1990). Market orientation: the construct, research propositions, and managerial implications, *Journal of Marketing*, 54, 2, 1-18.
- Koliastasis, P. (2014). *The permanent campaign strategy of Greek Prime Ministers (1996–2011)*. Unpublished PhD Dissertation to fulfill the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science at Queen Mary University of London (QMUL).
- Koliastasis, P. (2016). The Permanent Campaign Strategy of Prime Ministers in Parliamentary Systems: The Case of Greece. *Journal of Political Marketing*, DOI: 10.1080/15377857.2016.1193835
- KOMPAS. (2013). Hanura: Wiranto-Hary Tanoë untuk Pencitraan (*Hanura: the Declaration of Wiranto-Hary Tanoë as a Pair of Presidential Candidate for Political Marketing Purpose*), KOMPAS, 3 July 2013.
- KOMPAS. (2014). *Tingkat Kepercayaan Publik Terhadap Partai Politik Terus Merosot (Public Trusts to Political Parties Remained Declining)*. 5 January 2014.
- KOMPAS. (2014). *Survei: Mayoritas Publik Tak Percaya Partai Politik (Survey: Most of Public Distrusted Political Parties)*. 9 February 2014).
- KOMPAS. (2014). *Jokowi Effect Tak Seperti Yang Dibayangkan (the Jokowi' Effect Was Different with What Most Pollsters Predicted and People Imagined)*. KOMPAS. 3 April 2014.
- KOMPAS. (2014). *Efek Jokowi Tak Sedahsyat Efek SBY (the Jokowi's Effect Was unequal with the SBY' Effect)* . KOMPAS, 9 April 2014
- KOMPAS. (2014). *Partai Politik Berbasis Massa Islam Menjungkirbalikkan Survei (The Election Results Regarding with Numbers of Popular*

- Votes Collected by Secular-Islamic and Islamist Parties Constrained with the Survey Results*). KOMPAS, 10 April 2014
- KOMPAS. (2014). Akbar: Golkar Harus Jelaskan Target Pileg Meleset (*Akbar: Golkar Has to Explain Its Failure in Accomplishing its Target*). KOMPAS, 13 April 2014.
- KOMPAS. (2014). Partai Demokrat Resmi Dukung Prabowo-Hatta (*Democratic Party Officially Supported Prabowo-Hatta*), KOMPAS, 30 Juni 2014
- Kotler, Philip and Kotler, Neil. (1999). Political Marketing: Gerating Effective Candidate, Campaigns and Causes, in Bruce I. Newman (Eds). 1999. *Handbook of Political Marketing*. London: Sage Publication. Page 3-18.
- Kotler, P. and Andreasen, A. (1991), *Strategic Marketing For Nonprofit Organizations* (4th ed.), Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, NJ.
- Kotler, P. (1975). Overview of Political Candidate Marketing. *Advances in Consumer Research*, 2(1), 761.
- Kotzaivazoglou, I. and Ikonomoul, T. (2005). *The Americanization of Greek Politics : The Case of the 2004 General Election*. Political Science Asociation Conference.
- Lamprinakou, C. (2010). *The Party Evolution Framework: An Integrated Approach to Examining the Development of Party Communications and Campaigns*. A Thesis submitted for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy. Politics and History, School of Social Sciences, Brunel University. April 2010
- Larsson, A.O. (2014), Online, all the times? A quantitative assessment of the permanent campaign on Facebook. *new media & society*, 1–19
- Lee, J.Y. (2013). *Professionalisation of election campaigning in South Korea*. Unpublished PhD Dissertaion. Institute of Communications Studies. The University of Leeds
- Lees-Marshment, J. (2001a). *Political Marketing and the British Political Party: The Party Just Begun*. Manchester: Manchester University Press. First Edition

- Lees-Marshment, J. (2001b). Marketing the British Conservatives 1997-
Journal of Marketing Management, 2001,17,929-941
- Lees-Marshment, J. (2001c). The Marriage of Politics and Marketing.
Political Studies, Vol. 49: 692-713.
- Lees-Marshment, J. (2001d). The product-, Sales- and Market-Oriented
Party and How Labour Learnt to Market the Product, not Just the
Presentation. *European Journal of Marketing*, 35 (9-10): 1074-1084.
- Lees-Marshment, J. (2003a). *Political Marketing: How to Reach that Pot of
Gold*, *Journal of Political Marketing*, 2:1, 1-32.
- Lees-Marshment, J. (2003b). Marketing good works: New trends in how
interest groups recruit supporters. *Journal of Public Affairs*, Vol.3,
No.4: 358-370
- Lees-Marshment, J. (2004a). *The Political Marketing Revolution:
Transforming the Government of the UK*. London: Routledge
Publication.
- Lees-Marshment, J. (2004b). *The Political Marketing Revolution: is
marketing transforming the government of the UK?* Paper for the
2004 PSA Conference, Political Marketing group panels, University
of Lincoln, April 2004
- Lees-Marshment, J. (2006a). Political Marketing Theory and Practice: A
Reply to Ormrod's Critique of the Lees-Marshment' Market-
Oriented Party Model. *Politics*, Vol 26 (2), 119-125.
- Lees-Marshment, J. (2006b). The Trial of the Market-Oriented Party
Model: comparing UK and New Zealand political marketing. Paper
presented at the UK Political Studies Association Annual
Conference, Reading, 24 April 2006.
- Lees-Marshment, J. (2008). *Political Marketing and British Political Parties*.
Manchester: Manchester University Press. Second Edition.
- Lees-Marshment, J. (2009a). Marketing After the Election: The Potential
and Limitations of Maintaining a Market Orientation in Government.
Canadian Journal of Communication, Vol. 34 (2009) 205-227

- Lees-Marshment, J, (2010a). Global Political Marketing, in Lees-Marshment, Jennifer, Strömbäck, Jesper and Rudd, Chris (Eds). 2010. *Global Political Marketing*. London: Routledge Taylor & Francis Group. London: Routledge. Pages, 1-15.
- Lees-Marshment, J, (2010b). Global Political Marketing: Analysis and Conclusions, in Lees-Marshment, Jennifer, Strömbäck, Jesper and Rudd, Chris (Eds). 2010. *Global Political Marketing*. London: Routledge Taylor & Francis Group. London: Routledge. Pages, 278-297.
- Lees-Marshment, J. (2012). Conclusion: New Directions in Political Marketing Practice, Political Marketing and Democracy, in, Lees-Marshment, J (Eds). (2012). *Routledge Handbook of Political Marketing*. London and New York: Routledge. Pages, 366-386.
- Lees-Marshment, J. (2014). *Political Marketing: Principles and applications*. London and New York: Routledge. Second edition
- Lees-Marshment, J. and Winter, S. (2009). 'Reconciling Political Marketing Market-Oriented Party Theory with Deliberative Democracy: Initial Conceptual Thoughts', in Lees-Marshment, J (Eds). (2009). *Political Marketing: Principles and Applications*. London and New York: Routledge.
- Lev, D.S., (1990). Intermediate Classes and Changes in Indonesia: Some Initial Reflections, in Tanter, R., and Young, K. (Eds). *The Politics of Middle-Class Indonesia*. Glen Waverly, Australia: Aristoc Press. Pp, 25-43.
- Liddle, W. (1999). "Indonesia's Unexpected Failure of Leadership," in Adam Schwarz and Jonathan Paris (Eds). *The Politics of Post-Suharto Indonesia*. New York: Council on Foreign Relations.
- Lilleker, D.G. (2003). Interviewing the Political Elite: Navigating a Potential Minefield. *Politics*, 23/3:207-214.
- Lilleker, D.G. (2005a). The Impact of Political Marketing on Internal Party Democracy, *Parliamentary Affairs*, Vol.58, No.3: 570-584.

- Lilleker, D.G. (2005b). Political Marketing: The Cause of an Emerging Democratic Deficit in Britain?, *Journal of Nonprofit & Public Sector Marketing*, 14:1-2, 5-26,
- Lilleker, D.G. (2006). *Key Concepts in Political Communications*. London: Sage Publications.
- Lilleker, D. G and Negrine, R. (2001). Professionalization: of What? Since When? By Whom? *The Harvard International Journal of Press/Politics* 2002; 7; 98
- Lilleker, D.G. and Lees-Marshment, J. (2005a). *Introduction: Rethinking Political Party Behavior*, in Lilleker, D.G. and Lees-Marshment, J. (Eds). 2005. *Political Marketing: A Comparative Perspective*. Manchester: Manchester University Press, pp.1-14.
- Lilleker, D.G. and Lees-Marshment, J. (2005b). Conclusion: Towards A Comparative Model of Party Marketing, in Lilleker, D.G. and Lees-Marshment, J. (Eds). 2005. *Political Marketing: A Comparative Perspective*. Manchester: Manchester University Press, pp. 205-228.
- Lilleker, D. G., Jackson, N. A., and Scullion, R. (2006). *The Marketing of Political Parties*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
- Lim, M. (2002), Cyber-civic Space. From Panopticon to Pandemonium? *International Development and Planning Review*, 24(4), 383-400.
- Lim, M.(2003a), From Real to Virtual (and Back again): The Internet and Public Sphere in Indonesia. In K.C. Ho, R. Kluver & K. Yang (Eds.) *Asia Encounters the Internet*. 113-128. London: Routledge.
- Lim, M. (2003b), From war-net to net-war: The Internet and resistance identities in Indonesia. *The International Information & Library Review - Elsevier Publisher*, 35(2-4), 233-248.
- Lim, M (2003c). "The Internet, Social Network and Reform in Indonesia". In N. Couldry and J. Curran. *Contesting Media Power: Alternative Media in A Networked World*. Rowman & Littlefield. pp. 273–288.

- Lim, M., (2006). "Cyber-urban Activism and the political Change in Indonesia". *East Bound*, 1(1), <http://www.eastbound.info/journal/2006-1/>.
- Lim, M. (2011). Democratised/Corporatised: Contesting Media in the Post-Authoritarian Indonesia, in Puddephatt, A. et al., *A New Frontier, An Old Landscape*, Global Partners & Associates, pp. 156–181.
- Lim, M. (2012). *The League of Thirteen: Media Concentration in Indonesia*. Participatory Media Lab, Arizona State University: Arizona: USA and the Ford Foundation.
- Lim, M. (2013), "Many Clicks but Little Sticks: Social Media Activism in Indonesia", *Journal of Contemporary Asia*, 43:4, 636-657.
- Lisi, M. (2013). The professionalization of campaigns in recent democracies: The Portuguese case. *European Journal of Communication*, 28: 259
- Lowry, P.B., and Gaskin, J. (2014). Partial Least Squares (PLS) Structural Equation Modelling (SEM) for Building and Testing Behavioral Causal Theory: When to Choose It and How to Use It. *IEEE Transactions on Professional Communication*, Vol.57, No.2. June 2014.
- Lunde, A., Heggen, K. and Strand, R. (2013). Knowledge and Power: Exploring Unproductive Interplay Between Quantitative and Qualitative Researchers. *Journal of Mixed Methods Research* 2013, 7: 197
- Luyt, R. (2012). A Framework for Mixing Methods in Quantitative Measurement Development, Validation, and Revision: A Case Study. *Journal of Mixed Methods Research* 2012 6: 294.
- Maarek, P. J. (1995). *Political Marketing and Communication*. London: John Libbey.
- Maarek, P.J. (2011). *Campaign Communication Political Marketing*. Oxford: A John Willey and Sons, Ltd
- Mair, P. (1995). Political Parties, Popular Legitimacy and Public Privilege. *West European Politics*, Vol.18, Issue 3.

- Mair, P. (2005). Democracy Beyond Parties. *Centre for the Study of Democracy Working Papers*. Retrieved from <https://escholarship.org/uc/item/3vs886v9>, 10 December 2016.
- Mancini, P. (1999). "New Frontiers in Political Professionalism." *Political Communication* 16:231-245.
- Matuskova, A., Eibl, O., and Braun, A. (2010). The Czech Case: a Market-Oriented Party on the Rise?, in in Lees-Marshment, Jennifer, Strömbäck, Jesper and Rudd, Chris (Eds). 2010. *Global Political Marketing*. London: Routledge Taylor & Francis Group. Pages, 157-174.
- Mertens, Donna M. and Hesse-Biber, Sharlene. Triangulation and Mixed Methods Research: Provocative Positions. *Journal of Mixed Methods Research* 2012 6: 75.
- Mertens, D.M. (2010). Divergence and Mixed Methods. *Journal of Mixed Methods Research*, 4: 3.
- Mietzner, M. 2008, 'Comparing Indonesia's Party Systems of the 1950s and the Post-Suharto Era: From Centrifugal to Centripetal Inter-party Competition', *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies*, vol. 39, no. 3, pp. 431-454 (ERA 2010 Ranking: B).
- Mietzner, Marcus. (2009). Political opinion polling in post-authoritarian Indonesia: Catalyst or obstacle to democratic consolidation? *Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde, Vol. 165, no. 1 (2009), pp. 95–126*
- Moffit, B. and Tormey, S. (2004). Rethinking Populism: Politics, Mediatization and Political Style, *Political Studies*, 62(2), DOI: 10.1111/1467-9248.12032
- Moloney, K. (2004), *Is Political Marketing New Words or New Practice?* Paper delivered at the *UK PSA Conference*, Lincoln, 6–8 April.
- Moloney, K.(2008), *Is Political Marketing New Words or New Practice in UK Politics?*, *Journal of Political Marketing*, 6:4, 51-65
- Muhtadi, B. (2014). Ketika Jokowi Kembali Ke Bumi (*When Jokowi Down to Earth*). In TEMPO. Efek Puan, Efek Jokowi (*The Puan Effect, the*

- Jokowi Effect*). PT Tempo Inti Media. 14-20 April 2014. Pages 42-43.
- Mujani, S. (2003). *Religious Democrats: Democratic Culture and Muslim Political Participation in Post-Suharto Indonesia*. Unpublished PhD Dissertation to fulfill the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science at The Ohio State University, USA.
- Mujani, S. and Liddle, R.W. (2004). Politics, Islam, and Public Opinion, *Journal of Democracy*, Volume 15, Number 1 January 2004, 109-123.
- Mujani, S. and Liddle, R.W. (2007). Leadership, Party, and Religion: Explaining Voting Behavior in Indonesia. *Comparative Political Studies*, Vol. 40: 832-857.
- Mujani, S. and Liddle, R.W. (2010). Personalities, Parties, and Voters. *Journal of Democracy* Volume 21, Number 2 April 2010. National Endowment for Democracy and The Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Mykkanen, J. and Tenscher, J. (2014). *Adding or Weighting? Alternatives to Measure Parties' Campaign Professionalism*. Paper to be presented at ECPR General Conference Glasgow, September 5, 2014
- Narver J.C. and Slater S.F. (1990), The effect of a market orientation on business profitability, *Journal of Marketing*, 54, 4, 20-35.
- Needham, C. (2005). Brand Leaders: Clinton, Blair and the Limitations of the Permanent Campaign. *Political Studies*, Vo.53, 343-361
- Negrine,R. and Papathanossopoulos, S. (1996). The 'Americanization' of Political Communications : A Critique. *Harvard International Journal of Press/Politics*, 1: 45-62
- Negrine, R. and Lilleker, D.G. (2002). The Professionalization of Political Communication: Continuities and Change in Media Practices. *European Journal of Communication*, 17; 305.

- Negrine, R., Mancini, P., Holtz-Bacha, C. and Papathanossopoulos, S. (Eds). (2007). *The Professionalization of Political Communication*. Bristol: Intellect.
- Negrine, R. (2008). *The Transformation of Political Communication: Continuities and Changes in Media and Politics*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Newman, B. I. (1994). *Marketing of the President: Political Marketing as Campaign Strategy*. London: Sage Publications.
- Newman, B.I (Eds).(1999a). *Handbook of Political Marketing*. London: Routledge Publications.
- Newman, B.I. (1999b). *The Mass Marketing of Politics: Democracy in an Age of Manufactured Image*. London: Sage Publication.
- Neuman, W.L. (2000). *Social Research Methods: Qualitative and Quatitative approaches*. (4th ed.). Boston: Allyn and Bacon.
- Nimmo, D. (1970). *The Political Persuaders: The Techniques of Modern Election Campaigns*, Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, NJ.
- Nimmo, D. (1999). *The Permanent Campaign: Marketing as a Governing Tool*, in Bruce I.Newman (Eds). 1999. *Handbook of Political Marketing*. London: Sage Publication. Page 73-88.
- Nolan, M. (2005). 'Anti-Americanism and Americanization in Germany', *Politics & Society*, 33, 90.
- Nord, L.W., (2001). Americanization v. the Middle Way: New Trends in Swedish Political Communication. *The International Journal of Press/Politics*; 6 (2): 113-119.
- Nord, L.W. (2006). Still the Middle Way: A Study of Political Communication Practices in Swedish Election Campaigns. *The International Journal of Press/Politics*; 11 (1): 64-76.
- Norris, Pippa. (2000). *A Virtuous Circle: Political Communication in Postindustrial Societies*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Nugroho, Y. and Syarief, S.S. (2012). *Beyond Klik-Activism? Media and Political Processes in Contemporary Indonesia*. Berlin: Friedric-Ebert-Stiftung (FES).

- Nugroho, Y. Putri, D.A., and Laksmi, S., (2012) *Mapping the Landscape of the Media Industry in Contemporary Indonesia. Report. Engaging Media, Empowering Society: Assessing media policy and governance in Indonesia through the lens of citizens' rights*. Jakarta: Centre for Innovation policy and Governance, HIVOS Regional Office Southeast Asia, Ford Foundation Indonesia.
- Ornstein, N.J and Mann, T.E. (2000). *The Permanent Campaign and its Future*. Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute and The Brookings Institution.
- Ormrod, R. P. (2005), A Conceptual Model of Political Market Orientation. *Journal of Non-Profit and Public Sector Marketing*, 2005:14 (1/2): 47-65
- Ormrod, R. P. (2006), "A Critique of the Lees-Marshment Market-Oriented Party Model". *Politics*, Vol. 26, No. 2, pp. 110-118.
- Ormrod, R. P. (2007), "Political Market Orientation and its Commercial Cousin: Close Family or Distant Relatives?". *Journal of Political Marketing*, Vol. 6, No. 2/3, pp. 69-90.
- Ormrod, R.P. (2009). *Understanding Political Market Orientation*. Thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, Institute for Marketing and Statistics, Aarhus School of Business, University of Aarhus, Denmark. January 2009.
- Ormrod, R. P. (2011a). *Product-, Sales- and Market-Oriented Parties: Literature Review and Implications for Academics, Practitioners and Educators*. Working Paper Series in Management 2011/2 Institute for Economics and Management Aarhus University, Denmark
- Ormrod, R.P. (2011b). Limitations and Implications of Product-Oriented, Sales-Oriented and Market-Oriented Political Parties: Evidence for Public Affairs. *Journal of Public Affairs*, 11 (4): 395-405.
- Ormrod, R.P. (2012). *Defining Political Marketing*. Management Working Papers. Institut for Økonomi, Aarhus Universitet. 22 Oct 2012
- Ormrod, R.P. and Henneberg, S.C.M (2008). *Understanding Political Market Orientation*. Paper presented at International Conference on

Political Marketing, University of Manchester, Manchester UK, 27th-29th March 2008.

- Ormrod, R. P. and Henneberg, S. C. M. (2009). "Different Facets of Market Orientation: A Comparative Analysis of Party Manifestos", *Journal of Political Marketing*, Vol. 8, No. 3, 190-208
- Ormrod, R.P. and Henneberg, S.C.M. (2010a). Strategic political postures and political market orientation: Towards an integrated concept of political marketing strategy. *Journal of Political Marketing* 9: 294–313.
- Ormrod, R.P. and Henneberg, S.C.M. (2010b). An investigation into the relationship between political activity levels and political market orientation. *European Journal of Marketing* 44: 382–400.
- Ormrod, R.P, and Henneberg, S.C.M (2011). "Political Market Orientation and Strategic Party Postures in Danish Political Parties." *European Journal of Marketing*, 45 no. 6, 852-881.
- Ormrod, R.P, and Savigny, H. (2012). Political market orientation: A framework for understanding relationship structures in political parties. *Party Politics*, 18(4) 487–502
- Ormrod, R.P., Henneberg, S.C.M., and O'Shaughnessy, N.J. (2013). *Political Marketing: Theory and Concepts*. London: Sage Publication.
- Ormrod, R.P., Zaefarian, G., Henneberg, S.C., and de Vries, P. (2015). Strategy, market orientation and performance: the political context. *Journal of Public Affairs*, (2013) . DOI: 10.1002/pa.1494
- O'Cass, A. (1996). "Political Marketing and the Marketing Concept", *European Journal of Marketing*, Vol. 30, No. 10/11, pp. 45-61.
- O'Cass, A. (2001a). "Political Marketing: An Investigation of the Political Marketing Concept and Political Market Orientation in Australian Politics", *European Journal of Marketing*, Vol. 35, No. 9/10, pp. 1003-1025.

- O'Cass, A. (2001b). "The Internal-External Marketing Orientation of a Political Party: Social Implications of Political Party Marketing Orientation", *Journal of Public Affairs*, Vol. 1, No. 2, pp. 136-152.
- O'Cass, A. (2009). A resource-based view of the political party and value creation for the voter-citizen: an integrated framework for political marketing. *Marketing Theory*, 2009 9: 189.
- O'Cass, A. and Voola, R.(2011). Explications of political market orientation and political brand orientation using the resource-based view of the political party. *Journal of Marketing Management*. Vol. 27, Nos. 5–6, May 2011, 627–645.
- O'Shaughnessy, N. J. 1990a. *The Phenomenon of Political Marketing*. Macmillan, Basingstoke.
- O'Shaughnessy, N.J. (2001). The Marketing of Political Marketing. *European Journal of Marketing*, Vol. 35 No. 9/10, 2001, pp. 1047-1057.
- O'Shaughnessy, N.J., Baines, P.R. O'Cass, A. & Ormrod, R.P. (2012) Political Marketing Orientation: Confusions, Complications, and Criticisms. *Journal of Political Marketing*, 11:4, 353-366.
- Panbianco A. 1988. *Political Parties: Organisation and Power*. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge.
- Papathanassopoulos S, Negrine R, Mancini P, et al. (2007) Political communication in the era of professionalisation. In: Negrine R, Mancini P, Holtz-Bacha C, et al. (eds) *The Professionalization of Political Communication*. Bristol and Chicago, IL: Intellect, pp. 9–25.
- Parahita, G.D. (2012), 'Bisakah klik 'join' Bebaskan Mereka? Mengenal aksi kolektif dan gerakan sosial dijital' (*Can the Click Give Them Freedom: An Understanding of Collective Action and Movement of Social Media*), in Adiputra, W.M. & Sulhan, M. Media Baru: Studi Teoretis dan Telaah dari Perspektif Politik dan Sosiokultural (*The New Media: Theoretical Studies and Political and Socio Cultural Perspective in Understanding the New Media*). Yogyakarta: FISIPOL UGM.

- Paraqbueq, R. (2014). Bergembira Dalam Kampanye (*Being Happy in Campaigning*). TEMPO. Jokowi & Para Relawan (*Jokowi & Campaign-Volunteers*). Jakarta: PT Tempo Inti Media. 28 July-3 August 2014. Pages 42-43.
- Paraqbueq, R. (2014). Kisruh Penguni Rumah Besar (*A Chaos in the Big House*). TEMPO. Akhir Perjalanan Hadi Poernomo (*The Last Path of Hadi Poernomo*). Jakarta: PT Tempo Inti Media. 28 April-4 May 2014. Pages 40-41.
- Paraqbueq, R. and Purnomo, W.A. (2014). Kembali ke Sekutu Lama (*Back to the Old Political Ally*). In TEMPO. Efek Puan, Efek Jokowi (*The Puan Effect, the Jokowi Effect*). PT Tempo Inti Media. 14-20 April 2014. Page 51.
- Paraqbueq, R., Sundari, Fitria, A.G and Rosarians, F. (2014). Empat Lobi Partai Sliipi (Four Factions of Sliipi Party/Golkar Party). In TEMPO. Koalisi Hiruk-Pikuk (*The Hurly-Burly Coalition*). Jakarta: PT TEMPO Inti Media. 7-13 April 2014. Pages 44-46.
- Pavitt, C. (1999) The Third Way: Scientific Realism and Communication Theory. *Communication Theory*, Vol. 9, 2: 162-188.
- Petrova, B. (2012). *Professionalization of political parties' communication in the Czech Republic*. PhD Dissertation, Department of Political Science, Faculty of Social Studies, Masaryk University.
- Plasser, F. (2000). American Campaign Techniques Worldwide. *The Harvard International Journal of Press/Politics* 2000 5: 33
- Plasser, F. (2001). Parties' Diminishing Relevance for Campaign Professionals. *The Harvard International Journal of Press/Politics* 2001 6: 44
- Plasser, F., Scheucher, C., and Senft, C. (1999). Is There a European Style of Political Marketing?, in in Bruce I. Newman (Eds). 1999. *Handbook of Political Marketing*. London: Sage Publication. Page 89-112.
- Plasser, F. and Plasser, G. (2002). *Global Political Campaigning*. London: Praeger Publishers.

- Pratschke, J. (2003). Realistic Models? Critical Realism and Statistical Models in the Social Sciences. *Philosophica*, 71, pp.13-38.
- Qodari, M. (2010). 'The Professionalisation of Politics: The Growing Role of Polling Organisations and Political Consultants', in E. *Aspinall* and M. *Mietzner* (eds), *Problems of Democratisation in Indonesia: Elections, Institution and Society*. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, pp.122-140
- Ringle, C. M., Wende, S., & Becker, J. M. (2015). SmartPLS 3. Bönningstedt: SmartPLS. Retrieved from <http://www.smartpls.com>
- Rydgren, J. (2004) Explaining the Emergence of Radical Right-Wing Populist Parties: The Case of Denmark. *West European Politics*, 27:3, 474-502.
- Rydgren, J. (2005). Is extreme right-wing populism contagious? Explaining the emergence of a new party family. *European Journal of Political Research* 44: 413–437, 2005
- Sandelowski, M., Voils, C.I., Leeman, J., and Crandell, J.L. (2012). Mapping the Mixed Methods–Mixed Research Synthesis Terrain. *Journal of Mixed Methods Research* 2012 6: 317
- Sarstedt, M., Henseler, J. And Ringle, C.M. (2011), Multigroup analysis in partial least squares (PLS) path modeling: Alternative methods and empirical results. *Advances in International Marketing (AIM)*, Vol. 22, pp. 195-218.
- Savigny, H. (2004). *Political Marketing: A Critical Assessment-Caveat Emptor*. A Thesis submitted to The University of Birmingham for the degree of Doctor Philosophy, Department of political science and international studies, School of social science, The University of Birmingham, August 2004.
- Savigny, H. (2005). Labour, Political Marketing and the 2005 Election: A Campaign of Two Halves. *Journal of Marketing Management*, 21: 1-17.

- Savigny, H. (2007a). Focus Group and Political Marketing: Science and Democracy at Axiomatic, *British Journal of Politics and International Relations*, 9: 122-137.
- Savigny, H (2007b). Ontology and Epistemology in Political Marketing. *Journal of Political Marketing*, 6:2-3, 33-47, DOI: 10.1300/J199v06n02_03
- Savigny, H. (2008). *The Problem of Political Marketing*. New York: Continuum.
- Savigny, H. and Wring, D.J. (2009). 'An Ideology of Disconnection: for a Critical Political Marketing. *Central European Journal of Communication*, 2 (2), pp251-67.
- Savigny, H. and Temple, M. (2010). Political Marketing Models: The Curious Incident of the Dog that Doesn't Bark. *Political Studies: 2010 VOL 58, 1049–1064*
- Sayer, A. (2000) *Realism and Social Science*. London, Sage.
- Scammell, M. (1995). *Designer Politics: How Elections are Won?*. Basingstoke: Macmillan Press.
- Scammell, M. (1998). 'The Wisdom of the War Room: US Campaigning and Americanization,' *Media, Culture & Society*, vol. 20, pp. 251–75.
- Scammell, M. (1999). Political Marketing: Lesson for Political Science. *Political Studies*, 47 (4). pp. 718-739.
- Schedler, A. (1996). Anti-Political-Establishment Parties. *Party Politics*, Vol. 2, No.3, pp.291-312.
- Septian, A., Widjaya, I. and Sundari. (2014). Dalam Naungan Bintang dan Singa (*Under the Shelter of Star and Lion*). In TEMPO. Efek Puan, Efek Jokowi (*the Puan Effect, the Jokowi Effect*). Jakarta: PT Tempo Inti Media. 14-20 April 2014, Page, 54.
- Septian, A., Muhyiddin, M., Prihandoko and Rosarians, F. (2014). Poros Lama Bersemi Kembali (*The Old Political Circle Spring Up*). In TEMPO. Berburu Kursi Wapres (*Seeking a Vice Presidential*

- Ticket*). Jakarta: PT Tempo Inti Media. 14-20 April 2014, Pages 44-45.
- Septian, A., Primandari, T., Sinundyantoro and Maharani, S. (2014). Klandestin di Sepanjang Menteng (*the Clandestine-Advisers in the Menteng Area*). In TEMPO. Wakil Sehidup Semati (*A True-Hearted Running Mate*). Jakarta: PT Tempo Inti Media. 21-27 April 2014. Pages 32-35.
- Septian A., Suharman, T., Wijaya, I. and Purnomo, W.A. (2014). Ring Satu-Dua Penjaga 08 (*The First and Second Circles of Prabowo Subijanto*). In TEMPO. Akhir Perjalanan Hadi Purnomo (*The End of Path of Hadi Purnomo*). Jakarta: PT Tempo Inti Media. 28 April-4 May 2014. Pages 34-37.
- Shama, A. (1976). The Marketing of Political Candidate, *Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science*, 4:4, pp.764-777
- Slater, D. (2004). Indonesia's accountability trap: Party cartels and presidential power after democratic transition. *Indonesia*, 78, 61–92.
- Slater, D. (2011, November). *Proportional Presidentialism: Formal rules and informal power sharing in Indonesia*. Paper prepared for delivery at the workshop on "Ruling Politics: The Formal and Informal Foundations of Institutional Reform", Weatherhead Center for International Affairs. Harvard University.
- Slater, D. (2014). Unbuilding Blocs, *Critical Asian Studies*, 46:2, 287-315,
- Steger, W.P. (1999). *The Permanent Campaign: Marketing from the Hill*, in Newman, B.I (eds). *Handbook of Political Marketing*. London: Sage Publication. Page 661-686.
- Strömbäck, J. (2007). Political Marketing and Professionalized Campaigning. *Journal of Political Marketing*, 6:2-3, 49-67
- Strömbäck, J. (2009). Selective Professionalisation of Political Campaigning: A Test of the Party-Centred Theory of Professionalised Campaigning in the Context of the 2006 Swedish Election. *Political Studies*, VOL 57, 95–116

- Strömbäck, J. (2010). *A Framework for Comparing Political Market-Orientations*, in Lees-Marshment, Jennifer, Strömbäck, Jesper and Rudd, Chris (Eds). 2010. *Global Political Marketing*. London: Routledge Taylor & Francis Group. Pages, 16-33.
- Strömbäck, J., Lees-Marshment, J. and Rudd, C. (2012). *Political Party Market Orientation in a Global Perspective*, in Routledge Handbook of Political Marketing, Lees-Marshment, J (Eds). (2012). London and New York: Routledge. Pages, 79-92.
- Sufa, I.A. (2014). Kiat Menyokong Kandidat (*A Set of Efforts to Support a Presidential Candidate*). In TEMPO. Jokowi & Para Relawan (*Jokowi and Campaign-Volunteers of Presidential Candidates*). Jakarta: PT TEMPO Inti Media. 28 July-3 August 2014. Pages 48-49.
- Sugiharto, J., Rizki, M., Supriyanto, A., and Fajerial, E. (2014). Sokongan Tambahan Kolega Lama (*An Additional Endorsements of the Old Friend*). In TEMPO. Teror di Detik Detik Terakhir (*Political Intimidations in the End of the 2014 Presidential Race*). Jakarta: PT TEMPO Inti Media. 7-13 July 2014. Pages 42-44.
- Sussman, G. and Galizio, L. (2003) The Global Reproduction of American Politics, *Political Communication*, 20:3, 309-328, DOI: 10.1080/10584600390218931
- Sutrisno, D.E. (2014). Charta Politika: Deklarasi Jokowi Sebelum Pileg, PDIP Bisa Tembus 30 % (*Charta Politica: As Kicked Off the Jokowi Candidacy Before the Parliamentary Election, PDIP Could Get 30 %*). DetikNews, 3 March 2014. Retrieved 15 January 2015.
- Tashakkori, A. (2009). Are we there yet? The State of the Mixed Methods Community. *Journal of Mixed Methods Research*, 3, 287–291.
- Tashakkori, A., & Creswell, J. W. (2007). The new era of mixed methods. *Journal of Mixed Methods Research*, 1(1), 3-7.
- Temple, M. (2010). *Political marketing, party behavior and political science*, in Lees-Marshment, Jennifer, Strömbäck, Jesper and Rudd, Chris (Eds). 2010. *Global Political Marketing*. London: Routledge Taylor & Francis Group. Pages.263-277.

- Temple, M. (2013) The Media and the Message. *Journal of Political Marketing*, 12:2-3, 147-165.
- Tenscher, J. (2004). 'Bridging the Differences': Political Communication Experts in Germany. *German Politics*, Vol.13, No.3 (September 2004), pp.516–540
- Tenscher, J. (2007). Professionalisierung nach Wahl: Ein Vergleich der Parteienkampagnen im Rahmen der jüngsten Bundestags- und Europawahlkämpfe in Deutschland. In *Die Bundestagswahl 2005: Analysen des Wahlkampfes und der Wahlergebnisse*, in Brettschneider, F., Niedermayer, O., and Weißels, B.. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften.
- Tenscher, J. (2013). First- and second-order campaigning: Evidence from Germany. *European Journal of Communication* 28(3): 241–258.
- Tenscher, J., Mykkänen, J., and Moring, T. (2012) Modes of Professional Campaigning : A Four-Country Comparison in the European Parliamentary Elections, 2009. *The International Journal of Press/Politics* 2012 17: 145
- Tenscher, J. (2013) First-and second-order campaigning: Evidence from Germany. 28: 241 *European Journal of Communication*
- Tenscher, J. and Mykkänen, J. (2013). Transformations in second-order campaigning: A German-Finnish comparison of campaign professionalism in the 2004 and 2009 European parliamentary elections. *Central European Journal of Communication*, 2, 171-187.
- Tenscher, J. and Mykkänen, J. (2014). Two Levels of Campaigning: An Empirical Test of the Party-Centred Theory of Professionalisation. *Political Studies*: 2014 VOL 62(S1), 20–41. DOI: 10.1111/1467-9248.12104
- Tenscher, J., Koc-Michalska, K., Lilleker, D.G, Mykkanen, J., Walter, A.S., Findor, A., Jalali, C., and Roka. J. (2015). The Professional Speak: Practitioners' Perspectives on Professional Election Campaign. *European Journal of Communication*, 1-25.

- Teresia, A. (2014). Turun Tangan Untuk Transisi (Taking Part for Managing Transitional Government), in TEMPO. Mengapa Rini Soemarno (Why Rini Soemarno). Jakarta: PT TEMPO Inti Media. 11-17 August 2014. Page 39.
- The Jakarta Post (2014). *Jokowi's Declaration Decreases Swing Voters: Survey*. 4 April 2014.
- Trihartono, A. (2013). A *Vox Populi* Reflector or Public Entertainer? Mass Media Polling in Contemporary Indonesia. *Procedia Environmental Science*, Vol. 17, Pages 928-937
- Trihartono, A. (2014). Beyond Measuring the Voice of the People: The Evolving Role of Political Polling in Indonesia's Local Leader Elections, *Southeast Asian Studies*, 3(1): 151-182.
- Torrance, H. (2012). Triangulation, Respondent Validation, and Democratic Participation in Mixed Methods Research. *Journal of Mixed Methods Research*, 6: 111
- Ufen, A. (2008a) From Aliran to Dealignment. Political Parties in Post-Suharto Indonesia, *South East Asia Research*, 16/1: 5-41.
- Ufen, A. (2008b). *The Evolution of Cleavages in the Indonesian Party System*. Hamburg: German Institute of Global and Area Studies, WP 74/2008
- Ufen, A. (2008b) Political party and party system institutionalisation in Southeast Asia: lessons for democratic consolidation in Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand, *The Pacific Review*, 21/ 3: 327-350
- Ufen, A. (2009). Political parties and democratization in Indonesia, in Buntan, M and Ufen, A. (Eds). 2009. *Democratization in Post-Suharto Indonesia*. London: Routledge, pp.153-175.
- Ufen, A. (2010a). Electoral campaigning in Indonesia: The Professionalization and Commercialization after 1998. *Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs*, 29/4: 11-37.
- Ufen, A. (2010b). The Legislative and Presidential Elections in Indonesia in 2009, in: *Electoral Studies*, 29/2: 281-285.

- Uğur, Gökhan. (2012). Americanisation of Political Communication Practices. *Canadian Social Science*, Vol. 8, No. 3, 2012, pp. 1-7
- Uhlin, A. (1997). *Indonesia and the Third Wave of Democratization: the Indonesian Pro-Democracy Movement in a Changing World*. New York: St. Martin's Press.
- Vliegthart, Rens. (2012). The Professionalization of Political Communication? A Longitudinal Analysis of Dutch Election Campaign Posters. *American Behavioral Scientist* 2012 56: 135
- Wahyuni, H.I (2006). Indonesian Broadcasting Policy, *Media Asia*, 33: 3-4, 153-161, DOI: 10.1080/01296612.2006.11726827
- Wahyuni, H.I. (2008). *Broadcasting media regulation*. Yogyakarta: FISIPOL UGM.
- Wahyuni, H.I. (2014) Digitisation in Indonesian Broadcasting: Detriment or Advantage? Public Perspective Analysis on Digitisation in the Indonesian Broadcasting Context, *Media Asia*, 41:1, 43-54, DOI: 10.1080/01296612.2014.11689999
- Weismel-Manor, I. (2005). *Spinning lessons: The Professionalization of Campaign Consultancy*. Unpublished Doctoral dissertation. Cornell University, Ithaca, NY.
- Weismel-Manor, I. (2011). Spinning Forward: Professionalization Among Campaign Consultants, *Journal of Political Marketing*, 10:4, 350-371
- Webb, P. and Kolodny, R. (2006). Professional Staff in Political Parties, in Richard S.Katz and William Crotty. 2006. *Handbook of Party Politics*. London: Sage Publication. Page 337-347
- Webber, D. (2005). *A Consolidated Patrimonial Democracy? Democratization in Post-Suharto Indonesia*. Paper to be presented at the workshop, 'Post-Cold War Democratization in the Muslim World: Domestic, Regional and Global Trends', Joint Sessions of the European Consortium of Political Research, Granada, 14-19 April 2005

- Widiarsi, A, and Nurul, M. (2014). Penekan Gas Mesin Party (The Primary Driver of Political Party' Machine). In TEMPO. Jokowi. Jakarta: PT TEMPO Inti Media. 14-20 July 2014. Page 41.
- Widiarsi, A., Widjaya, I, Sundari, Paraqbueq, R., and Teresia, A. (2014). *Pesta Anyep Partai Pemenang (Inaudible Cheerfulness of the Winning Party)*. In TEMPO. Efek Puan, Efek Jokowi (*The Puan Effect, the Jokowi Effect*). Jakarta: PT TEMPO Inti Media. 14-20 April 2014. Pages 34-37.
- Widiarsi, A. Rosarians, F., Aditya, R., Rudiana, P.A. and Suka, A. (2014). Tebak Kancing di Ujung Tenggat (*Guessing the Studs in the End of Deadline*). In TEMPO. Duet Kepepet (*Incidental Coalition*). Jakarta: PT TEMPO Inti Media. 19-25 May 2014. Pages 46-47.
- Wiratraman, H.P. (2014). Press Freedom, Law and Politics in Indonesia: A *Socio-Legal Study*. PhD Dissertation to fulfill the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy at Leiden Law School, Leiden University.
- Withz-Shapiro, R. (2012). What Wins Votes: Why Some Politicians Opt Out of Clientelism. *American Journal of Political Science*, Vo.56, No.3, July 2012, Pp.568-583.
- Wring, D.(1996).'Political Marketing and Party Development in Britain: A "Secret" History'. *European Journal of Marketing*, 30:10/11
- Wring, D. (1997). Reconciling marketing with political science: theories of political marketing. *Journal of Marketing Management*, Vol. 13, pp. 651-663.
- Wring, D. (1999). The Marketing Colonization of Political Campaigning, in Bruce I.Newman (Eds). 1999. *Handbook of Political Marketing*. London: Sage Publication. Page 41-54.
- Wring, D.(2001) 'Power as well as Persuasion: Political Communication and Party Development', in Bartle, J. and Griffiths, D.(eds.) *Political Communication Transformed*. Hampshire: Macmillan-Palgrave.
- Wring, D. (2005). *The Politics of Marketing of Labour Party*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

- Zaslove, A. (2004). The Dark Side of European Politics: Unmasking the Radical Right. *European Integration*, Vo. 26, No.1, 61-81, March 2004.
- Zaslove, A. (2008). Exclusion, Community, and a Populist Political Economy: The Radical Right as an Anti-Globalization Movement. *Comparative European Politics*, 2008, 6, 169–189.
- Xifra, J. (2011). Americanization, Globalization, or Modernization of Electoral Campaigns? Testing the Situation in Spain. *American Behavioural Scientist* 2011 55: 667.

APPENDIX A

Interview and Personal Correspondence

The Indonesian Political Parties' Leaders/Secretaries, Candidates, Politicians and Activists

1. Ahmad Basyarah, MP of PDIP, 11 June 2014
2. Ahmad Farhan, an activist of PKS, 18 May 2014.
3. Ahmad Haerul Amri, a leader and an activist of Nasdem Party, 26 October 2014
4. Ahmad Muzani, MP of Gerindra Party, 5 November 2014
5. Dedi Supriadi, a leader of PKS, 18 May 2014, 24 April 2014 and 12 November 2014.
6. Elnino Mohi, MP of Gerindra Party, 18 December 2014.
7. Hasan Wahid, a vice general secretary of PKB, 24 July 2015.
8. Indra J.Pilliang, a leader of Golkar Party, 28 October 2014
9. Imam Nahrowi, a former general secretary of PKB—now as Minister of Youth and Sport, 14 May 2014
10. M. Arwani Thomafy, MP of PPP, 26 May 2014.
11. Pius Lustrilanang, MP of Gerindra Party, 22 November 2015
12. Ramadhan Pohan, a leader of Democratic Party, 13 May 2014
13. Rully C. Azwar, a leader of Golkar Party, 13 May 2014 and 16 December 2014.
14. Suharso Monoarfa, a leader of PPP—now a member of Presidential Privy Council, 18 May 2014.
15. Taufik Ridha, a former general secretary of PKS, 5 November 2014
16. Viva Yoga Mauladi, MP of PAN, 7 May 2014
17. Willy Aditya, a vice general secretary of Nasdem Party, 30 April 2014 and 29 October 2014
18. Yudhi Chrisnandi, a leader of Hanura Party, 14 May 2014.
19. Zaini Rahman, a former MP of PPP, 22 September 2014.

Senior Editors/Journalists of the Indonesian Media

1. Ahmad Khusaini, an editor-in-chief of ANTARA, 21 September 2013.
2. Arif Zulkifly, an editor-in-chief of TEMPO Magazine, 21 October 2014
3. Don Bosco Selamun, an editor-in-chief of Berita Satu TV—now being appointed as an editor-in-chief of METRO TV, 15 October 2014
4. Pasaoran Simandjutak, senior journalist of Trans 7, 23 September 2014
5. Rene Kawilarang, an editor-in-chief of VIVA NEWS, 26 September 2014
6. Richard Bagun, an editor-in-chief of KOMPAS, 12 November 2014

7. Sukri Rahmatullah, an editor-in-chief of Okezone.com, 10 October 2014
8. Suryo Pratomo, an editor-in-chief of Metro TV, 31 October 2014
9. Usman Kasong, an editor-in-chief of Media Indonesia, 31 October 2014
10. Yadi Endriana, an editor-in-chief of MNC TV, 13 November 2014
11. Yogie Arief Nugraha, a vice editor-in-chief of KOMPAS TV, 6 November 2014

The Indonesian Political Pollsters and Consultants

1. Ari, a Head of Media Centre of Gerindra Party, 28 October 2014
2. Akhmad Danial, a political consultant hired by a former MP of Golkar Party, 15 July 2014
3. Budi Purnomo, a media strategist hired by Gerindra Party/Prabowo Subijanto, 23 October 2014
4. Dewi Rahmawati, a media strategist hired by Nasdem Party, 4 November 2014.
5. Eka Kusmayadi, Director of Jaringan Suara Indonesia/The Indonesian Voice Network, 13 October 2014
6. Hanggoro D.P, Director of Citra Publik Indonesia, a pollster and political consultant, 17 November 2014.
7. Imam Brotoseno, a social media strategist, hired by PDIP/Puan Maharani, an influential leader of PDIP, 30 October 2014
8. M. Qodari, Executive Director of Indo Barometer, a pollster and political consultant, 19 May 2014
9. Popon S.G, Director of Jaringan Suara Indonesia/the Indonesian Voice Network, 12 October 2014
10. Sunarto Ciptohardjono, one of directors of the Indonesian Circle Survey, 12 September 2014.
11. Taftazani, a political consultant, affiliated with *Saiful Mujani Research and Consulting* (SMRC), 21 October 2014.
12. Totok Izzul Fatah, Director of Citra Komunikasi, 17 November 2014
13. Umar Bakrie, Executive Director of Lembaga Survey Nusantara/the Nusantara Survey Institute, 14 May 2014.

Campaign-Volunteers and Political Lobbyists

1. A, an activist and political lobbyist who supported one of influential campaign donators of Jokowi, 24 October 2014.
2. B.A.S., a top-leader of Pro Jokowi (Projo), 10 November 2014.
3. J.J, a leader of Pro Jokowi (Projo), 10 November 2014.
4. SH, a political activist and an unofficial campaign team/volunteer of Prabowo Subijanto, 24 October 2014.

APPENDIX B

Evaluations Results of the Measurements and Structural Elements that Construct the Baseline Structural Model

This work deployed the following statistical approaches to evaluate both the measurements and structural elements that construct the baseline structural model and reported the subsequent findings.

2.1. Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA) and Principal Component Analysis (PCA) Results of Indicators of Variables that Construct the Baseline Structural Model

Evaluations of indicators of variables that construct the baseline structural model using EFA and PCA of SPSS 23 generated the following statistical findings. *Firstly*, EFA and PCA results confirmed that PMO 1-8 seems fairly workable to explain variable ‘political marketing-orientation’. PCA results indicated PMO 1-3 and PMO 6-8, as factors’ components of this variable, have sufficient loadings values, while PMO 3-5 have insufficient loading values. Total variance of this variable explained by its indicators (PMO 1-8) is 48.48 %. This total variance is sufficient for formulation a formative variable, but it is seen as being less sufficient for formulation of a reflective variable. Each of these factors has Cronbach’s alpha (α) above the minimal threshold (0.708). Table B.1 illustrates the pattern matrix of the indicators underlying variable PMO, its scree plot and % of variance of this variable explained by its indicators (PMO 1-8).

No	Indicators of PMOa	Factor	Scree Plot
1	PMO 1	0.746	
2	PMO 2	0.753	
3	PMO 3	0.653	
4	PMO 4	0.596	
5	PMO 5	0.622	
6	PMO 6	0.702	
7	PMO 7	0.750	
8	PMO 8	0.729	
% of Variance Explained		48.48 %	
Cronbach’s Alpha (α)		0.844	

Table B.1: Pattern Matrix of Indicators underlying ‘Political Marketing-Orientation’ (PMO) and Its Scree Plot




Table B.2: Pattern Matrix of Indicators of Low-Level Variables Underlying A High-Level Variable of 'Political Market-Orientation' and Its Scree Plot With the Exclusion of indicator of IO

Secondly, EFA and PCA results also indicated that all indicators that underlay variable 'political market-orientation' seem applicable to explain this variable. Based on the EFA results: IO 1 and VO 1-3 seem to hang into the first factor, CO 1-3 belong to the second factor, MO 1-9 are associated with the third factors and CCO 1-4 are linked with the fourth factor. A single indicator underlying IO (IO 1) was then excluded when PCA analysis was carried out. The main reason was Internal Orientation (IO) is theoretically different from voter-orientation (VO). PCA analysis results indicated that indicators of VO 1-3, CO 1-2, MO 1-9 and CCO 1-4, respectively, belong to 4 following variables, which are voter-orientation, competitor-orientation, media-orientation and campaign contributor-orientation. PCA results uncovered that: a) total variance of VO, explained by its indicators (VO 1-3) is 10.33 %; b) total variance of CO, explained by its indicators (CO 1-2) is 5.65 %; c) total variance of MO, explained by its indicators (MO 1-9) is 35.83 %; and d) total variance of CCO, explained by

its indicators (CCO 1-4) is 15.03 %. All indicators underlying these variables have positive values, except for indicators underlying variable ‘campaigning-contributor’. Nonetheless, overall, these indicators have sufficient communalities values. Each of these variables has Cronbach’s alpha (α) above the minimal threshold (0.708). Cumulative total variance of low-level variables of VO, MO, CCO and CO explained by indicators of these variables was 66.84 %. This total variance is above 50 % and statistically substantial. Table B.2 indicates that pattern matrixes of indicators underlying these variables are slightly clear-cut.

Thirdly, EFA and PCA results affirmed that PCE 1 – 11 belong to one variable, which is professional-campaign engagement. PCA results indicated that total variance of this variable explained by its indicators was 64.15 %. This total variance is fairly high and statistically relevant. This variable has Cronbach’s alpha (α) of 0.944, which is above the minimal threshold (0.708) and indicators of this variable have sufficient communalities values, which stretch out from 0.521 (PCE 9) to 0.710 (PCE 4 and PCE 8). Table B.3 charts the pattern matrix of the indicators underlying this variable, its scree plot and total variance of this variable explained by its indicators.

No	Indicators	Factor 1	Scree Plot
1	PCE 1	0.773	
2	PCE 2	0.792	
3	PCE 3	0.822	
4	PCE 4	0.843	
5	PCE 5	0.816	
6	PCE 6	0.842	
7	PCE 7	0.830	
8	PCE 8	0.842	
9	PCE 9	0.722	
10	PCE 10	0.773	
11	PCE 11	0.738	
% of Variance Explained		64.15 %	
Cronbach’s Alpha (α)		0.944	

Table B.3: Pattern Matrix of Indicators underlying ‘Professional-Campaign Engagement’ and Its Scree Plot

Fourthly, EFA and PCA results confirmed that PCS 1-11 belong to one variable, which is professionalized-campaign structure. PCA results

indicated that total variance of this variable explained by its indicators was little bit low, which was only 42.39 %. This total variance is sufficient for a formative variable, but it is insufficient for a reflective variable. This variable has Cronbach's alpha (α) value of 0.859, which is above the minimal threshold (0.708). These indicators have quite low communalities values ranging from 0.219 (PCS 2) to 0.496 (PCS 4). However, since this variable was formulated as a formative variable, indicators of this variable do not need high communality values. Tenscher et.al, (2015: 13-14) indicated that professionalized-campaign structure seems likely to contain 3 factors/variables that consist of: a) organizational tasks of campaigning; b) campaign resources; and b) mobilizing and coordinating the campaign. Using a quite dissimilar set of indicators from those formulated by Tenscher (et.al, 2015), this work produced PCA results, which are slightly different with what was revealed by this author. Table B.4 summarizes PCA results and exhibits the pattern matrix of indicators underlying this variable and its scree plot and illuminates that these indicators are associated with one variable, which is 'professionalized-campaign structure'.

No	Indicators	Factor	Scree Plot
	PCS 1	0.723	
	PCS 2	0.526	
	PCS 3	0.686	
	PCS 4	0.673	
	PCS 5	0.729	
	PCS 6	0.723	
	PCS 7	0.735	
	PCS 8	0.475	
	PCS 9	0.711	
	PCS 10	0.577	
	PCS 11	0.612	
% of Variance Explained		42.39 %	
Cronbach's Alpha (α)		0.859	

Table B.4: Pattern Matrix of Indicators underlying 'Professionalized-Campaign Structure and Its Scree Plot

Finally, EFA and PCA results uncovered that indicators underlying professionalized-campaign strategy seem associated with 3 variables. These results confirmed that PATS 1-4 belong to the first variable, PNS 1-4 are linked with the second variable, PNEMS 1-4 and PCPS 1 and 2 are

closely connected with the third variable. As I considered this to be theoretically different with PNEMS 1-4, this work excluded PCPS 1 and 2 and run subsequent EFA and PCA. PCA results revealed PATS 1-3, PNS 1-5 and PNEMS 1-4, respectively, seem associated with 3 following variables, which are: a) 'professionalized-audiences/electorates targeting strategy'; b) 'professionalized-narrow campaign strategy'; and c) 'professionalized-news and event strategy'. PCA results displayed that: a) total variance of variable PATS explained by its indicators (PATS 1-3) is 9.78 %; b) total variance of variable PNS explained by its indicators (PNS 1-5) is 15.40 %; and c) total variance of variable PNEMS explained by its indicators (PNEMS 1-4) is 38.77 %. Indicators of these variables also have sufficient communalities values, which range from 0.540 (PNS 1) to 0.755 (PNS 3). These results also affirmed that each of these variables have Cronbach's alpha (α) above the minimal threshold (0.708). Table B.5 shows the pattern matrix of the indicators underlying these variables and its scree plot that indicate that that these indicators are associated with 3 variables.

No	Indicators	Factor			Scree Plot
		1	2	3	
1	PATS 1	0.786			
2	PATS 2	0.815			
3	PATS 3	0.828			
8	PATS 4	0.582			
4	PNS 1		0.860		
5	PNS 2		0.703		
6	PNS 3		0.832		
7	PNS 4		0.843		
9	PNEMS 1			0.805	
10	PNEMS 2			0.837	
11	PNEMS 3			0.837	
12	PNEMS 4			0.820	
13	PCPS 1			0.540	
14	PCPS 2			0.583	
% of Variance Explained		9.78 %	15.40%	38.77 %	
Cronbach's Alpha (α)		0.830	0.807	0.863	

Table B.5: Pattern Matrix of Indicators underlying 'Professionalized-Campaign Strategy (PATS 1-5, PNS 1-4, PNEMS 1-4 and PCPS 1-2) and Its Scree Plot

Overall, PCA results uncovered that there are three factors, which constitute professionalized-campaign strategy. These results are slightly different from reports released by Tenscher (et.al, 2015). Tenscher (et.al, 2015: 14-15) exposing that professionalized-campaign strategy is composed from four factors/variables, which are: a) the strategic use of information; b) campaign publicity; c) contacting and sharing information with voters; d) personal contact with voters and campaigning planning. As I used a dissimilar set of questioners and the extraction method of PCA analysis, this work revealed different statistical findings, as compared to PCA results presented by this author¹. Regardless of this issue, these findings to some degree confirmed the evidence uncovered by this author however. In this respect, 'campaign publicity' and 'campaigning planning' seem quite similar to 'professionalized-news and event management and campaign personalisation strategy'. 'Contacting and sharing information and personal contact with voters' seem to share similarity with 'professionalized-audiences/electorates targeting strategy' and 'professionalized-narrowcasting strategy'.

Nonetheless, since I considered that variable 'professionalized-campaign personalisation strategy' (PCPS) is theoretically different from variable 'professionalized-news and event management strategy' (PNEMS), this work conducted second principal component analysis. As I excluded indicators of PCPS 1 and 2, the second PCA results revealed that total variances of variables of PATS, PNS and PNEM that constitute a high-level variable 'professionalized-campaign strategy' were slightly higher. In this respect, total variance of variable PATS explained by its indicator (PATS 1-4) is 11.26 %, total variance of variable PNS explained by its indicator (PNS 1-4) is 17.15 % and total variance of variable PNEMS explained by its indicators (PNEMS 1-4) is 39.58 %. Each of these variables has Cronbach's alpha (α) value above the minimal threshold (0.708) with a cumulative total variance that is slightly higher, which is

¹ For example, unlike Tenscher (et.al, 2015), this work deployed indicators of the uses of polls and focus group discussion as elements of political marketing-orientation and did not include components of professionalized-campaign strategy.

67.99 %. Meanwhile, variable PCPS explained by its indicators (PCPS 1 and 2) has total variance of 74.37 %. This variance is statistically substantial for this variable, which is formulated as a reflective variable. Indicators of PCS (PCPS 1 and 2) are significantly correlated (Pearson' correlation 0.488 with ρ value < 0.0001). As components of variable PCPS, each of PCPS 1 and 2 has factor' loadings of 0.862. This variable has Cronbach's alpha (α) value of 0.655, which is little bit lower as compared to the minimal threshold (0.708). As a reflective variable, PCPS however, can be used as a workable lower-level variable of a high-level variable 'professionalized-campaign strategy'.

2.2. Evaluation Results of Measurements Elements of The Reflective Variables that Construct the Baseline Structural Model

Evaluations of measurements of the reflective variables that constitute the baseline structural were run to examine the internal consistency reliability, convergent validity and discriminant validity, as suggested by Hair (et.al, 2014: 101-107). Based on Fornell-Larcker criterion, this work confirmed that the reflective variables that compose this model seem reliable and valid and concluded that these variables were sufficiently convergent. As seen from table B.6, each of these variables has an Average Variance Extracted (AVE) value that is more than the minimum threshold, which is 0.50.

Table B.7 shows that each of these variables has Chronbach's alpha, which is higher than 0.70. Thus, they were internally and consistently valid. Indicator's outer loadings values of each of these variables were higher than 0.70, except for two indicators of variable media-orientation (MO), which are MO 1 and MO 8 and one indicator's outer loading of variable professionalized-audiences/electorates targeting strategy (PATS), which is PATS 4. The loading values of indicator s of MO 1, MO 8 and PNS 5 were 0.695, 0.662 and 0.539, respectively. This work favoured retaining these variables since they were theoretically important to evaluate this variable.

This work also confirmed that each of these variables has no substantial issues regarding the cross factor loading values. More importantly, as carried out the discriminant validity of the heterotrait-monotrait ratio of correlations (HTMT) approach as suggested by Henseller (et.al, 2014: 116-128), this work also revealed that the higher HTMT values and HTMT invariance values of these variables were less than 0.85 (for the most conservative validity criterion) and significantly different from 1. This assessment indicated that these variables were internally and consistently reliable and convergent and having no substantial issue regarding the discriminant validity

	CCO	CO	IO	MO	PMO	PCE	PATS	PCPS	PCS	PNS	PNEMS	VO
CCO	0.850											
CO	0.213	0.911										
IO	0.203	0.330	Single-Item Construct									
MO	0.208	0.447	0.278	0.767								
PMO	0.150	0.453	0.339	0.486	Formative Construct							
PCE	0.168	0.414	0.220	0.518	0.583	0.799						
PATS	0.148	0.348	0.197	0.379	0.533	0.623	0.863					
PCPS	0.209	0.384	0.207	0.405	0.483	0.647	0.565	0.885				
PCS	0.360	0.452	0.239	0.585	0.549	0.710	0.586	0.642	Formative Construct			
PNS	0.300	0.242	0.231	0.328	0.271	0.322	0.358	0.262	0.413	0.754		
PNEMS	0.257	0.366	0.223	0.460	0.446	0.626	0.492	0.622	0.678	0.331	0.844	
VO	0.182	0.447	0.407	0.360	0.482	0.446	0.509	0.442	0.396	0.291	0.319	0.830

Table B.6: Fornell-Larcker Criterion

Latent Variable	Indicator	Loading	IR	CR	AVE	DV?
VO	VO 1	0.835	0.697	0.869	0.688	Yes
	VO 2	0.812	0.659			
	VO 3	0.842	0.709			
CO	CO 1	0.904	0.817	0.908	0.831	Yes

	CO 2	0.920	0.846			
MO	MO 1	0.695	0.483	0.927	0.587	Yes
	MO 2	0.749	0.561			
	MO 3	0.841	0.707			
	MO 4	0.833	0.694			
	MO 5	0.809	0.654			
	MO 6	0.815	0.664			
	MO 7	0.730	0.532			
	MO 8	0.662	0.438			
	MO 9	0.741	0.549			
CCO	CCO 1	0.791	0.625	0.912	0.722	Yes
	CCO 2	0.828	0.685			
	CCO 3	0.897	0.805			
	CCO 4	0.880	0.774			
PCE	PCE 1	0.774	0.599	0.951	0.638	Yes
	PCE 2	0.792	0.627			
	PCE 3	0.823	0.677			
	PCE 4	0.841	0.707			
	PCE 5	0.814	0.662			
	PCE 6	0.840	0.705			
	PCE 7	0.826	0.682			
	PCE 8	0.839	0.704			
	PCE 9	0.713	0.508			
	PCE 10	0.778	0.605			
	PCE 11	0.735	0.540			
	PATS	PATS 1	0.822			
PATS 2		0.870	0.756			
PATS 3		0.864	0.646			
PATS 4		0.539	0.290			
PNS	PNS 1	0.785	0.616	0.895	0.682	Yes
	PNS 2	0.832	0.692			
	PNS 3	0.856	0.732			
	PNS 4	0.829	0.687			
PNEMS	PNEMS 1	0.789	0.622	0.908	0.713	Yes
	PNEMS 2	0.871	0.759			
	PNEMS 3	0.839	0.704			
	PNEMS 4	0.876	0.767			
PCPS	PCPS 1	0.889	0.790	0.878	0.783	Yes
	PCPS 2	0.881	0.776			

Table B.7: Results Summary for Reflective Measurement Models²

2.3. Evaluation Results of Measurement Elements of the Formative Variables that Construct the Baseline Structural Model

Having followed the ideas of Hair (e.at, 2014: 118-129), assessments of convergence validity, collinearity issues and the significance and relevance of indicators of the formative variables, were conducted as follows. *Firstly*, the convergence validity of these variables

² IR is an acronym of Indicator Reliability. CR is an acronym of Composite Reliability. AVE is an acronym of Average Variance Extracted. DV is an acronym of Discriminant Validity.

was assessed through the redundancy analysis. Following the ideas of Hair (et.al, 2014: 121-122), this analysis was carried out using the two following methods. The first one was conducted by employing PMO 1 as a global item that represents the variable PMO as an endogenous reflective variable of PMO and PMO 2-8 as exogenous formative variable of PMO. The second one was undertaken by employing PCS 1-5 as an endogenous formative variable of PCS and PCS 6-11 as exogenous variable.

As seen from table B.8, PMO produces path coefficient (β) value of 0.754 and coefficient determination (R2) value of 0.568, while PCS generates path coefficient (β) value of 0.798 and coefficient determination (R2) value of 0.636. According to Hair (et.al, 2014: 121), the redundancy analyses of formative variables that produce path coefficient value (β) more than 0.81 and R2 values more than 0.64 indicate that these variables have no convergence validity issue. The path coefficient value (β) values of PMO and PCS were still below these thresholds, but they were still close to these thresholds.

Formative Variables	Path Coefficients (β) and R2 values
Political Marketing-Orientation	
Professionalized-Campaign Structure	

Table B.8: Redundancy Analysis of Formative Variables

Secondly, the evaluations of the formative variables regarding the collinearity issues were also carried out to make sure that there were no

high correlations between indicators of these variables. This work uncovered that these variables have not suffered from collinearity issues. As seen from table B.9, indicators of these variables were having Variance Inflation Factor (VIF), which were above 0.20 and below 5. Following the ideas of Hair (et.al, 2014: 125-127), this condition indicates that these indicators are not highly correlated and did not suffer from the collinearity issues.

Finally, evaluations of the outer weights significance of the indicators of these variables were also conducted. As charted by table B.10, all indicators of PMO have outer weights, which are statistically significant and most of the indicators of PCS have outer weights that are statistically significant. Two indicators of PCS, which are PCS 2 and 3, have outer weights, which are statistically insignificant. PCS 3 has outer loading values above 0.50, while PCS 2 has outer loading close to 0.50. This work, as suggested by Hair (et.al, 2014: 131), favoured retaining these indicators since these indicators are theoretically seen of being important to evaluate professionalized-campaign structure.

Political Marketing-Orientation (PMO)		Professionalized-Campaign Structure (PCS)	
Indicators	VIF	Indicators	VIF
PMO 1	2.316	PCS 1	1.524
PMO 2	2.399	PCS 2	1.301
PMO 3	1.462	PCS 3	1.616
PMO 4	2.027	PCS 4	1.678
PMO 5	2.086	PCS 5	1.877
PMO 6	1.775	PCS 6	2.054
PMO 7	2.454	PCS 7	1.932
PMO 8	2.163	PCS 8	1.328
		PCS 9	1.819
		PCS 10	1.391
		PCS 11	1.269

Table B.9: Variance Inflation Factor Results of Formative Variables

Formative Variables	Indicators	OW (OL)	t Value	SL	p Value	Confidence Intervals of 90 %
PMO	PMO 1	0.131 (0.687)	2.422	**	0.016	(0.028, 0.225)
	PMO 2	0.137 (0.699)	2.414	**	0.016	(0.036, 0.241)
	PMO 3	0.152 (0.633)	4.159	***	<0.001	(0.074, 0.220)
	PMO 4	0.093 (0.556)	2.114	**	0.035	(0.007, 0.180)
	PMO 5	0.218 (0.622)	5.032	***	<0.001	(0.134, 0.305)
	PMO 6	0.172 (0.708)	3.887	***	<0.001	(0.081, 0.254)
	PMO 7	0.156 (0.767)	2.959	***	0.003	(0.051, 0.251)

	PMO 8	0.348 (0.806)	7.595	***	<0.001	(0.251, 0.434)
PCS	PCS 1	0.113 (0.606)	3.846	***	<0.001	(0.057, 0.179)
	PCS 2	0.023 (0.450)	0.961	NS	0.337	(-0.022, 0.070)
	PCS 3	0.039 (0.595)	1.557	NS	0.120	(-0.013, 0.087)
	PCS 4	0.064 (0.592)	2.482	**	0.013	(0.014, 0.127)
	PCS 5	0.281 (0.737)	9.324	***	<0.001	(0.226, 0.354)
	PCS 6	0.068 (0.641)	2.002	**	0.046	(0.004, 0.131)
	PCS 7	0.094 (0.627)	2.914	***	0.004	(0.028, 0.159)
	PCS 8	0.080 (0.462)	3.359	***	0.001	(0.030, 0.125)
	PCS 9	0.181 (0.673)	5.648	***	<0.001	(0.120, 0.244)
	PCS 10	0.262 (0.690)	10.485	***	<0.001	(0.211, 0.309)
	PCS 11	0.313 (0.659)	12.222	***	<0.001	(0.253, 0.359)

Table B.10: Assessment of Outer Weights Significance Testing Results of Indicators of Formative Variables³

2.4. Collinearity Assessments of Variables that Construct the Baseline Structural Model

Collinearity assessments of variables that construct the model (inner model) were conducted using Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) method of Smart-PLS 3.0. Such assessments indicated that there was no substantial collinearity issue. Table B.11 displays that Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) between these variables, were above 0.20 and bellow 5. This condition met with the criteria suggested by Hair (et.al, 2014: 107-116) and indicated that variables that constitute the baseline structural model did not suffer from collinearity issues.

	PCE	PATS	PCPS	PCS	PNS	PNEMS
CCO	1.084	-	-	1.085	-	-
CO	1.505	-	-	1.516	-	-
IO	1.282	-	-	1.292	-	-
MO	1.460	-	-	1.585	-	-
PMO	1.605	1.604	1.604	1.837	1.604	1.604
PCE	-	2.261	2.261	1.791	2.261	2.261
PCS	-	2.135	2.135	-	2.135	2.135
VP	1.530	-	-	1.580	-	-

Table B.11: The Collinearity Assessments of the Variables Used in the Baseline Structural Model⁴

³ OW = Outer Weights; OL = Outer Loadings; SL= Significance Level NS= Not Significant; Bootstrap confidence intervals for 10 % probability of error ($\alpha = 0.10$); ** $\rho < 0.05$, *** $\rho < 0.01$

⁴ A symbol (-) indicates that there is no path relationship between the variables of the model. Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) between PMO and IO, between PMO and VO, between PMO and CO, between PMO and MO, between PMO and CCO are 1.000, 1.000, 1.000, 1.000 and 1.000, respectively.

APPENDIX C

The Proposed Prescriptive Models with Their Terms and Conditions

I propose the following prescriptive models, which are charted by the subsequent figures C.1-C.8, based on the extractions of the second and third theoretical models and the reflections on the quantitative findings exhibited in Chapter 6 and the quantitative and qualitative findings reported in Chapters 7, 8 and 9. These models were specifically directed to help political parties in the democratic countries, which are ruled under the presidential government system and indicated by the candidate-centred system, such as Indonesia, and these parties' presidential candidates, leaders, consultants, strategists and marketers to accomplish their own goals in the parliamentary and presidential elections.

Each of these models, as displayed in such figures, is developed through the following five stages. The first, the second and the third stages respectively, are organising a research to collect the market intelligence data and using these data strategically to develop a market-orientation and establish a professional-campaign engagement and a proficient campaign structure. The fourth stage is advancing professionalized-narrowcasting, news and event management and campaign personalisation strategies. The last stage is managing and maximizing such strategies to upgrade a professionalized-electorate targeting strategy to persuade and capture the electorates/voters in these elections.

As exhibited in these figures, I also use the black arrow in each of these models to visualise a set of prescriptive directions regarding the elements of that construct such practices, which need to be utilised structurally by the party and a (pair of) presidential candidate(s) of this party and this party' leaders, consultants, strategists and marketers who ultimately preferred adopting each of these models. I also deploy the blue arrow in each of these models to indicate a set of prescriptive guidance regarding political marketability level of the party presidential candidate nominated by this party (and its coalition). Except for the symbols of the elements of 'collect and use the market intelligence data', 'political

lobbyists-orientation’ and ‘professionalized-electorates targeting strategy’, the symbols of the elements that construct these models are slightly similar with the acronyms of the elements that form the baseline structural model charted previously by figure 11.3 of Chapter 11. However, formations of the elements that construct these models are slightly dissimilar with the constructions of the elements that form that model.

I also formulate a set of acronyms used in these models, which is detailed by table C.1, and proposes a set of terms and conditions, which is displayed by table C.2, for these parties and these parties’ leaders, consultants and strategists who want to take up these models, as they want to achieve their goals in the parliamentary and presidential elections. A (pair of) presidential candidate(s) and professionals, strategists and marketers/campaigners hired by this (pair of) presidential candidate(s) who favour adopting these models also need to consider this set of terms and conditions, as they want to help political parties, which nominated A (pair of) presidential candidate(s), in getting the maximum number of parliamentary seats in the parliamentary election and get this (pair of) presidential candidate(s) elected in the presidential election.

Elements	Acronym
Collect and Use the Market Intelligence Data	CUMID
Internal-orientation	IO
Media-orientation	MO ⁵
Competitors-orientation	CO
Campaign contributor and political lobbyists orientations	CCO & PLO
Professional-campaign engagement	PCE
Professionalized-campaign structure	PCS
Professionalized-campaign personalization strategy	PCPS
Professionalized-narrowcasting strategy	PNS
Professionalized-news event and management strategy	PNEMS
Professionalized-electorates targeting strategy	PETS

Table C.1: Acronyms of the Structural Elements that Construct the Prescriptive Models

Term and Condition		Models and Figures
Political party, which ruled or took part in the government and had a solid internal arena and plenty of	A highly marketable (pair of)	The First Prescriptive Model (Figure 1)

⁵ Media-Orientation in the prescriptive models include the attitudinal and behavioural orientations to the Internet and social media users

campaign resources	presidential candidate(s)	The Third Prescriptive Model (Figure 3)
Political party, which ruled or took part in the government and had a less solid internal arena and sufficient campaign funds and resources		The Fifth Prescriptive Model (Figure 5)
The opposition party with a solid internal arena and plenty of campaign resources		The Seventh Prescriptive Model (Figure 7)
The opposition party with a less solid internal arena and sufficient campaign resources	A less or moderately marketable (pair of) presidential candidate(s)	The Second Prescriptive Model (Figure 2)
Political party, which ruled or took part in the government and had a solid internal arena and plenty of campaign resources		The Fourth Prescriptive Model (Figure 4)
Political party, which ruled or took part in the government and had a less solid internal arena and sufficient campaign resources		The Sixth Prescriptive Model (Figure 6)
The opposition party with a solid internal arena and plenty of campaign resources.		The Eighth Prescriptive Model (Figure 8)
The opposition party with a less solid internal arena and sufficient campaign resources.		

Table C.2: Terms and Conditions for Political Parties and These Parties' Presidential Candidates, Leaders, Consultants, Strategists and Marketers Who Want to Adopt the Proposed Prescriptive Models




Figure C.1: The First Prescriptive Model




Figure C.2: The Second Prescriptive Model




Figure C.3: The Third Prescriptive Model




Figure C.4: The Fourth Prescriptive Model




Figure C.5: The Fifth Prescriptive Model




Figure 6: The Sixth Prescriptive Model




Figure 7: The Seventh Prescriptive Model




Figure 8: The Eighth Prescriptive Model

APENDIX D

The Interview Guides

Appendix D.1: The Interview Guides For Interviewing the Indonesian Political Parties' Leaders/Secretaries, Politicians, Candidates and Activists

Theme 1:

Democratization of politics and structural systemic changes and their consequences for the Indonesian politics and developments of political marketing and campaigning of political parties post-authoritarian Soeharto regime

Questions:

1. Did you agree with an argument that sees that democratisation of politics led the structural systemic changes taking shape in the Indonesian politics Post-Authoritarian Soeharto regime? If so, how did you assess such changes?
2. Do you notice that the following developments (2.1-2.8)... took place in the new democracy of Indonesia? If so, how did you assess such developments?
 - 2.1. The re-formulations of the political, election and media regulations.
 - 2.2. Formations of the new political, media and election systems.
 - 2.3. Transformations of political participation, political alignment and the attitudes and behaviours of the Indonesian electorates and social and political cleavages and their associations with political parties and organisations.
 - 2.4. Increasing roles of the commercial/private media in the Indonesian politics.
 - 2.5. Ascendancy of domination of the media agenda over the political agenda.
 - 2.6. Reorganization of the ways the media organisations formulated their agenda and framed political agenda setting and journalists of the media covered and packaged political events and discourses.
 - 2.7. Increasing numbers of the citizens/peoples—in general and electorates/voters—in particular—who took part and engaged in political events and discourses and interested in evaluating political products and policies designed and delivered by the government.
 - 2.8. The increasing uses of the Internet and social media by the Indonesian citizens/peoples and electorates/voters in the political spheres
3. What kinds of efforts did the party you associated with take for managing these developments? How did you and the party affiliated organize such efforts?
4. Did you and your fellows feel the need to adopt the market intelligence research, such as survey and the focus group discussion, used commonly by the business organisations to evaluate and manage such developments? If so, how did you and your fellows organize this market intelligence research and for what purposes?
5. Did you and your fellows feel the need to establish a professional campaigning and hire political pollsters, consultants and media strategists to manage such development? If so, how did you and your fellows develop such efforts?
6. Did you and your fellows deal with some challenges when running such efforts? If so, how did you and your fellows handle such challenges?

Theme 2:

Formations of political market arenas and political markets and perceptions of political parties' leaders, politicians and candidates regarding the relative importance of these political market arenas within and across the 2014 parliamentary and presidential elections

Questions:

7. How did you and your fellows categorize various types political market arenas and political markets, which have been taking shape in the new democracy of Indonesia?
8. Did you and your fellows consider the internal party organisation, the electorates, the media, the government and the parliament as political market arenas? Did you and your fellows consider the party' members, the electorates/voters, the media, competitors and campaign-donators as political markets? If so, how did you and your fellows see changes in the natures and structures of these political market arenas and political markets?
9. Did you and your fellows notice the primary actors and organisations that have been politically influential within each of these political market arenas? If so, which of these actors and organisations were you and your fellows perceiving as being politically much more influential? Why did you and your fellows see that such actors and organisations were being much more influential? How did you and your fellows manage such actors and organisations and for what purposes?
10. How did you and your fellows see positions and roles of political pollsters/consultants, commentators and strategists and their roles in the Indonesian politics, especially within the specific contexts of the parliamentary and presidential elections? Based on your knowledge and experience, how and to what extent did these pollsters, consultants and strategists determine the attitudes and behaviours of these political markets?
11. Did you and your fellows notice characteristics of political actors and organisations that exist in these political markets? If so, which of these actors and organisations were you and your fellows perceiving as being politically much more influential? Why did you and your fellows see that these actors and organisations were being much more influential? How did you and they manage such actors and organisations and for what purposes?
12. How did you and your fellows who run as candidates in either the 2014 parliamentary or the 2014 presidential elections or supported these candidates perceive the relative importance of these political market arenas? How did you and your fellows address and prioritize these political market arenas and for what purposes? What types of political market arenas were you and your fellows prioritizing? Why did you and your fellows prioritize these political market arenas?
13. How did you and your fellows, especially those who run as candidates in either the 2014 parliamentary or the 2014 presidential elections or supported these candidates, perceive the relative importance of these political markets? How did you and they address and prioritize these political markets and for what purposes? What types of political markets were you and they prioritizing? Why did you and they prioritize these political markets?

Theme 3:

Political, election and media regulations, perceptions regarding the relative Importance of the internal party, the media and electoral arenas and their consequences for developments of marketisation and professionalisation of campaigning of the Indonesian political parties within and across the 2014 parliamentary and presidential elections

Questions:

14. Did you and your fellows realize that enactments of Laws No.40/1999, No.32/2002, No.2/2011, No.15/2011, No.8/2012 and No.42/2008 carried out impacts on formations of the political, media and election systems? If so, how and to what extent did such systems determine the natures of these political market arenas and political markets within and across the 2014 parliamentary elections? How did formations of such systems influence your and your fellows' perceptions regarding the relative importance of these political market arenas within and across these elections?
15. Did you and your fellows see that the implementation of presidential government system, as imposed by Articles No.1, Clauses No.1 and 2, No. 4, Clause 1 and No.10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16 and 17 of the Indonesian National Constitution of 1945 (amendment), shaped up and transformed configurations of these political market arenas and political markets within and across these elections? If so, how and to what extent did such configurations carry out impacts on the marketing and campaign organisations of the party you and your fellows associated with within and across these elections?
16. What types of political market arenas and political markets were you and your fellows, especially those who run as candidates in either the 2014 parliamentary or the 2014 presidential elections or supported these candidates, perceiving as being important within and across these elections? Why did you and your fellows perceive that these political market arenas and political markets were being important?
17. How did you and your fellows manage and address each of these political market arenas and political markets within and across these elections? What marketing and campaign efforts were you and your fellows advancing when running such efforts? Why did you and your fellows carry out such efforts and for what purposes?
18. In facing the 2014 parliamentary and presidential elections, were you and your fellows being interested in hiring political pollsters/consultants and media strategies to manage and address the internal party, the media and electoral arenas? If so, how long did you and your fellows hire them, how did you employ them and for what purposes? Did you feel that they were really helping you and your fellows to address political markets, especially competitors, the media and the electorates/voters you prioritized and targeted within and across these elections effectively? If so, to what extent have they helped you and your fellows in running such practices?
19. When advancing such practices, was a top-leader/public figure nominated by the party you affiliated for running as a presidential or a vice presidential candidates in the 2014 presidential election interested in employing such pollsters/consultants and media strategies? If so, why was this leader/figure interested in doing so? How long did this leader/figure hire them, how did this leader/figure manage them and for what purposes? How and to what extent did these pollsters/consultants and media strategies help this leader/figure and his campaign-teams and volunteers to achieve his goal in this election?

Theme 4:

The party-specific factors and their effects on developments of marketisation and professionalisation of campaigning of the Indonesian political parties within and across the 2014 parliamentary and presidential elections

Questions:

20. Did you see that the existing election regulations, especially Laws No.8/2008 and No.8/2012, likely constrain capability of the party you affiliated to address the internal party' members, the electorates/voters, the media, competitors and campaign-donors as political markets and develop campaign structure and strategies to persuade and mobilize these political markets within and across these elections? If so, how and to what extent did these regulations limit the party' capability to develop such practices? How did the party and its leaders, politicians and candidates strive for managing such practices?
21. Did you and your fellows notice that party age category (a), size (b), ideology (c), position in the government (d), campaign resources (e) and experiences with internal shock/leadership change (f) and external shock (g) likely carry out impacts on your and their capabilities in developing such practices within and across these elections? If so, how did you and your fellows manage such factors? Which of these factors that within and across these elections strongly affected your and their capabilities to advance such practices? How did these factors determine your and their capabilities to develop such practices?
22. Were you and your fellows been interested in exploiting some of these factors for developing workable models of marketisation and professionalisation of campaign to achieve in these elections? If so, which of these factors were you exploiting when advanced such models? How did you and your fellows manage such factors and for what purposes?
23. What type of challenges, which were related to the party' campaign resources and imposed by the campaign finance regulations (Article No.134, point 1 of Law No.8/2012 and Article No.227 of Law No.42/2008) did you and your fellows deal with when developing such models? How did you and your fellows tackle such challenges
24. Did you and your fellows within and across these elections exploit the party' ideology, size, position in the government and experiences with internal and external shocks when addressing the internal party' members, the media, electorates, competitors and campaign-donors and persuading and mobilizing these political markets? If so, how and to what extent did you and your fellows carry such efforts? Could you please tell me your stories regarding such efforts little bit further?
25. How did you and your fellows identify and target diverse voters populated in the parliamentary constituencies and manage competitors who strived for captivating these voters? Did you and your fellows develop marketing and campaign approaches to do so? If so, how did you and your fellows advance such approaches? What types of socio-demographic factors and cultural conditions were you and your fellows considering when advancing such approaches

Theme 5:

Formations of the party' presidential candidate-specific factors and their effects on developments of marketisation and professionalisation of campaigning of the Indonesian political parties within and across the 2014 parliamentary and presidential elections

Questions:

26. How did the party you associated with select a potential president or vice president candidates?
27. Did the party consider developments of the levels of the electorates' approval and positive media coverage of and endorsements of campaign donors and the Internet and social media users to these candidates? If so, how did the party carry out such efforts?
28. How did the party manage the consequences of such developments on the party' chances to get the targeted number of parliamentary seats in the 2014 parliamentary election, assemble a political coalition with the other political parties in the wake of this election and nominate a pair of presidential candidate for running in the 2014 presidential election?
29. Did the party in facing the 2014 parliamentary and presidential elections consider such developments when addressing political markets and developing campaign structure and strategies to persuade and mobilize these political markets within and across these elections? If so, how did they manage such efforts?
30. Did the party take special efforts to increase the degrees of endorsements of these political markets to the party' top-leader and public figure who want to step in the 2014 presidential election race? If so, what type of marketing and campaign models they developed to achieve this goal? How did they advance such models? What challenges did they face in doing so? How did they manage such challenges? To what extent did they success in tackling such challenges?
31. Did the party in facing these elections recruit particular media strategies and consultants and organize its campaign-team and professionals strategically? Did the party manage political lobbyists who work for, campaign-teams organized by and the campaign-volunteers of the party' presidential candidate and the relationships between and among these lobbyists, campaign-teams and volunteers to get the party' presidential candidate elected in the 2014 presidential election? If so, how and to what extent did the party carry out such efforts? What type of challenges did the party face in running such efforts? How did they tackle such challenges?

Appendix D.2: The Interview Guides For Interviewing Senior Editors/Journalists of the Indonesian Media

<p>Questions</p> <p>Theme 1: Democratization of politics and structural systemic changes and their consequences for the Indonesian politics and developments of political marketing and campaigning of political parties post-authoritarian Soeharto regime</p>
<p>Questions:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Did you agree with an argument that sees that democratisation of politics paved the way for establishments of democratic political and media systems in the new democracy of Indonesia? If so, how and to what extent did such systems have impacts on the Indonesian media organisations and management and political journalists? How and to what extent did such systems influence modes of productions, packaging and broadcasting political news and programs carried out by the media you and your fellow affiliated? 2. Did you see that establishments of such systems determined the attitudes and behaviours of the Indonesian political parties' leaders and politicians, especially those who run as candidates in the parliamentary and presidential elections? If so, how and to what extent did installations of such systems transform the attitudes and behaviours of these parties' leaders and politicians? Did formations of such systems cause changes in the ways you and your fellows cover and frame the attitudes and behaviours of and political events and discourses formulated by these parties' leaders, candidates and politicians in political spheres? If so, how and why did such changes take place? 3. Did you realize that establishments of such systems transformed the ways the media formulate their agenda setting and construct political agenda setting? If so, how did these media organize such practices? How did the media you and your fellows associated with develop such practices? 4. Did you notice transformations of practices of the media management and media relations advanced by these parties and these parties' leaders, and politicians? If so, how did you assess such transformations? Were they interested in hiring political consultants, spin-doctors and media strategists? If so, how did they employ these consultants, spin-doctors and media strategists and for what purposes?
<p>Themes 2 and 3: Formations of political market arenas and political markets, perceptions of the Indonesian political parties' leaders, politicians and candidates regarding the relative importance of these political market arenas and their consequences for developments of marketisation and professionalisation of campaigning of these parties within and across the 2014 parliamentary and presidential elections</p>

Questions:

5. Did you agree with an argument that sees that the Indonesian political parties and these parties' leaders, politicians and candidates likely consider the internal party' organisation, the media, the electoral, the parliament/the legislative body of government and the executive body of government as political market arenas? If so, how did you assess the ways they perceive the relatives' importance of these political market arenas and address and manage these political market arenas within and across the 2014 parliamentary and presidential elections?
6. Did you see that these parties and these parties' leaders politicians and candidates realized the media as a primary organisation and the journalists as a primary actor in the media arena? Did you notice that they recognized the Internet and social media users as a primary actor in the media and electoral arenas? If so, how did you evaluate the ways they in facing these elections address and manage such actors?
7. Within and across these elections, did these parties and these parties' leaders, politicians and candidates consider particular type of the media as an influential political market arena? If so, why did they do so? What factors were really driving them for doing so? How did these factors stimulate them to do so?
8. Did you agree with an argument that sees that these parties and these parties' leaders, politicians and candidates likely account for the internal party' member, the media, journalists the Internet and social media platforms users, the electorates, competitors, political lobbyists and campaign-donors as political markets? If so, how did you assess their perceptions they made regarding the relatives' importance and relevance of these political markets? How did you evaluate practices of political marketing-orientation, market-orientation and professionalisation of campaigning they carried out within and across these elections? Did you see that such perceptions carried out effects on the ways and the degree to which they advanced such practices? If so, how did you examine such effects?
9. Within and across these elections, did these parties and these parties' leaders and politicians consider the media as a unique political market? If so, what type of the media were they prioritizing and considering as influential political markets? What kind of efforts have they advanced to address and manage such political markets? Why did they carry out such efforts and for what purposes? What really were factors that driving them for developing such efforts?
10. Did you see transformations of these political market arenas and political markets that took shape within and across these elections? Did you see changes in the ways these parties and these parties' leaders, politicians and candidates managed these political market arenas and the degrees to which they addressed, targeted and persuaded these political markets that took place within and across these elections? If so, how did the media you and your fellows are associated with report such transformations? How did the media you and your fellows affiliated frame such changes? How did such transformations and changes shape up modes of marketisation and professionalisation of campaigning and the degrees of market-orientation and campaign professionalisms of these parties within and across these elections?

Themes 4 and 5:

The party- and party' presidential candidate-specific factors and their effects on developments of marketisation and professionalisation of campaigning of the Indonesian political parties within and across the 2014 parliamentary and presidential elections

Questions:

11. Did you notice the ways these parties and these parties' leaders, politicians and candidates managed and exploited the party' age category, size, ideology, campaign resources, position in the government and experiences with the internal and external shocks when they carried out such practices within and across these elections? If so, how did you assess the effects of these factors on the ways and the degrees to which they advanced these practices within and across these elections?
12. Based on your assessments, which of these factors were really shaping up modes of marketisation and professionalisation of campaigning and the degrees of market-orientation and campaign professionalisms of these parties within and across these elections? Why were these factors being influential? Could you please share your opinion regarding such issues little bit further?
13. Did you agree with an argument that sees that within and across these elections, developments of political marketability levels of these parties' leaders, politicians and figures, especially those who were run as a president or a vice president candidates in the 2014 presidential election, likely take shape as influential factor? If so, what kinds of elements were strongly shaping up this factor? How and the degree to which did these elements shape up this factor?
14. How and to what extent did this factor determine each of these parties' chances to get substantial number of parliamentary seats in the 2014 parliamentary election, assemble a political coalition and nominate a (pair of) presidential candidate(s) in the wake of this election and get elected this (pair of) presidential candidate(s) in the 2014 presidential elections? How and the extent to which did this factor determine the successes of each of these parties in collecting campaign fund, approaching and mobilizing various group political markets and establish professionalized-campaign structure and strategies to accomplish their goals within and across these elections?
15. Did you notice that these parties in facing these elections inclined to improve political marketability of their leaders and figures or select a potential presidential and/or vice presidential candidates who have been marketable within and across these political markets? If so, how did you assess such trends? Based on your knowledge and experiences, why did such trends take shape? How and to what extent did such trends have impacts on modes of marketisation and professionalisation of campaigning and the degrees of market-orientation and campaign professionalisms of these parties within and across these elections?

Appendix D.3: The Interview Guides For Interviewing the Indonesian Political Pollsters and Consultants

<p>Theme 1: Democratization of politics and structural systemic changes and their consequences for the Indonesian politics and developments of political marketing and campaigning of political parties post-authoritarian Soeharto regime</p>
<p>Questions:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none">1. Did you agree with an argument that sees that democratisation of politics led to establishments of democratic political and media systems taking shape in the Indonesian politics? If so, how and to what extent did such systems pave the ways for the emergences and developments of political pollsters and consultants in the new democracy of Indonesia? How did such developments take place? How and to what extent did such developments carry out impacts on the Indonesian politics and transform the attitudes and behaviours of the Indonesian political parties and these parties' leaders, politicians and candidates?2. Based on your knowledge and experiences, how did these parties and these' leaders, politicians and candidates perceive positions and roles of political pollsters and consultants in the Indonesian politics? Were they interested in hiring political consultants and pollsters? If so, under what conditions were they interested in doing so? What factors were really stimulating them to do so? How did they do so and for what purposes?3. Did these parties and these parties' leaders, politicians and candidates, especially in facing the parliamentary and presidential elections, favoured employing political pollsters/consultants? If so, how, to what extent and why did they favour doing so? What kinds of factors were really driving them to do so? How and the extent to which did these factors drive them to do so?4. How did you develop political product and services and offer such products and services to these parties and these parties' leaders, politicians and candidates? What types of political products and services have you been offering to them so far? Were they interested in getting such products and services? How many of them were really interested in obtaining such products and services? Why did they need such products and services and for what purposes? Could you please tell me your assessments and stories regarding such issues little bit further?5. Did some of these parties and these parties' leaders, politicians and candidates ever hire you or ask your helps to accomplish their goals in either the parliamentary or the presidential elections? How long and why did they do so? What types of political products and services were you offering to these parties and these parties' leaders, politicians and candidates? Did you see that such products and services really could help them in achieving their goals in these elections? If so, how and to what extent could such products and services help them in accomplishing their goals in these elections?6. Did you agree with an argument that the emergence and development of political pollsters and consultants in the post-authoritarian Soeharto regime have impacts on practices of political marketing-orientation, market-orientation and campaign professionalisms of the Indonesian political parties? If so, how did you assess the roles of such pollsters and consultants in the new democracy of Indonesia? How and to what extent did such pollsters and consultants have capabilities in transforming modes of marketisation and professionalisation of campaigning of these parties and these parties' leaders, politicians and candidates?

Themes 2 and 3:

Formations of political market arenas and political markets, perceptions of the Indonesian political parties' leaders, politicians and candidates regarding the relative importance of these political market arenas and their consequences for developments of marketisation and professionalisation of campaigning of these parties within and across the 2014 parliamentary and presidential elections

Questions:

7. How did you see the ways the Indonesian political parties and these parties' leaders, politicians and candidates categorize political market arenas? What indicators did they commonly use to identify and classify these political market arenas? Did they commonly realize the internal party organisations, the media, the electorates, the Internet and social media platforms, the parliament and government as a political market arena? If so, how did you assess the ways they perceive the relatives' importance and relevance of these political market arenas and manage these political market arenas within and across the 2014 parliamentary and presidential elections?
8. How did you evaluate the ways these parties and these parties' leaders, politicians and candidates categorize political markets? What indicators did they commonly use to classify these political markets? Did they commonly consider the internal party' member, the media, journalists the Internet and social media platforms users, the electorates, competitors, and campaign-donors as political markets? Did they categorize the Internet and social media users, the media owners, political lobbyists, the affiliated and unaffiliated political leaders and activists and campaign-volunteers as political markets? If so, how did you assess their perceptions regarding the relatives' importance and relevance of these political markets and the ways they addressed and prioritized these political markets and persuade and mobilized these political markets within and across these elections?
9. Base on your knowledge and experiences, were these parties and these parties' leaders, politicians and candidates in facing these elections interested in hiring political pollsters and consultants to manage these political market arenas strategically and address, target persuade and mobilize these political markets effectively? If so, how did they employ such pollsters and consultants to do so? What type of political products and services were you providing to them in doing so? How did you develop such products and services to help them in achieving their goals in these elections?
10. Did one or some of them in facing these elections hire you? If so, how did you see your positions and roles in the structure of these political market arenas? How did you manage your positions and roles as professionals when addressing these political markets? Did you face some problems in doing so? How did you tackle such problems?
11. Did you see transformations of these political market arenas and political markets within and across these elections? If so, how did you perceive and evaluate such transformations? How did you evaluate the effects of such transformations on perceptions of these parties' leaders, politicians and candidates regarding the relative importance of these political market arenas?
12. Did you take such transformations into account when helping those who hired you to develop workable models of market-orientation and professionalisation of campaigning within and across these elections? If so, how did you manage such efforts?

Themes 4 and 5:

The party- and party' presidential candidate-specific factors and their effects on

developments of marketisation and professionalisation of campaigning of the Indonesian political parties within and across the 2014 parliamentary and presidential elections

Questions:

13. Did you notice the ways the Indonesian political parties and these parties' leaders, politicians and candidates in facing these elections realized, managed and exploited the party' age category, size, ideology, campaign resources, position in the government and experiences with the internal and external shocks? If so, how did you evaluate such developments and their consequences on modes of marketisation and professionalisation of campaigning and the degrees of market-orientation and campaign professionalisms of these parties within and across these elections?
14. Based on your assessments, which of these factors were really influencing the ways these parties and these parties' leaders, politicians and candidates advanced market-orientation and professionalized-campaign structure and strategies within and across these elections? How did such factors shape up the ways and the degrees to which they performed such practices?
15. Did you agree with an argument that sees that the successes of the party in promoting its top-leader as a presidential candidate, nominating its top leader as a pair of presidential candidates and having an influential presidential candidate likely take shape as influential factors? If so, how and the extent to which did such factors take shape within and across these elections?
16. How and the extent to which did such factors determine the party' chances to get substantial numbers of parliamentary seats in the 2014 parliamentary election, assemble a solid political coalition in the wake of this election and accomplish its goal in the 2014 presidential election? Which of these factors were really determining such party' changes? Why and to what extent did they determine such party' chances?
17. How and the extent to which did such factors influence practices of market-orientation and professionalisation of campaigning of these parties within and across these elections? Which of these factors were really influencing the ways these parties as an organization and these parties' leaders, politicians and candidates as individual advanced such practices successfully within and across these elections?
18. Did you agree with an argument that sees that most of these parties in facing these elections strived for improving political marketability levels of their top-leaders and public figures or inclined to select a potential president and/or vice president candidates who have been politically marketable? If so, how did you assess such tendencies? Why did such tendencies take shape? How and to what extent did such tendencies influence orientations of these parties as an organisation and these parties' leaders, activists and officials as individual politician regarding such practices within and across these elections?

Appendix D.4: The Interview Guides For Interviewing Campaign-Volunteers and Political Lobbyists

1. Why did you favour endorsing this (pair of) presidential candidate(s)? What personal reasons and feeling, which have been really motivating you to do so?
2. Did you organize campaign-volunteers to support to this (pair of) presidential candidate(s) and get this (pair of) presidential candidate(s) elected in the 2014 presidential election? If so, what types of and how many campaign-volunteers were you organizing? When did you start to organize these campaign-volunteers? How did you manage these campaign-volunteers and for what purposes?
3. What types of voters, the media and the Internet and social media users were targeted, persuaded and mobilized by the campaign-volunteers you organized? How did they target, persuade and mobilize these voters, media and Internet and social media users? Did you evaluate and supervise them intensively? How did you manage such efforts effectively?
4. How did you manage the relationships between and among these campaign-volunteers? How did you organize the relationships between and among these campaign-volunteers and the official and unofficial campaign-teams established by either this (pair of) presidential candidate(s) or a coalition of political parties that nominated this (pair of) presidential candidate(s)? Did you face some challenges when running such efforts? If so, how did you resolve such challenges? Could you please share with me your stories regarding such issues little bit further?
5. How did you manage the relationships between and among these campaign-volunteers, campaign-teams and potential campaign donors? Did you face some challenges when running such efforts? If so, how did you tackle such challenges? Would you please share with me your stories regarding such issues little bit further?
6. Did you raise some funds to finance marketing and campaign events and programs carried out by these campaign-volunteers in facing the 2014 presidential election? If so, how did you do so? What types of challenges did you face in doing so? How did you manage such challenges? Would you please share with me your stories regarding such issues little bit further?
7. Did you intensively approach campaign-donors to support such events and programs and help this (pair of) presidential candidate(s) to win this election? If so, what types of campaign-donors were interested in doing so? Why were they interested in doing so? How did you approach, persuade and mobilize these campaign-donors tactically? How did you collect and spend fund or resources provided by these campaign donors effectively? Could you please share with me your stories regarding such points little bit further?
8. How did you deal with the other campaign-volunteers and political lobbyists who endorsed the competitor of this (pair of) presidential candidate(s)? Did you face some problems in doing so? If so, how did you handle such problems? What type of problem was really making to trouble you most in doing so? How did you tackle this problem? Could you please share with me your stories regarding such points little bit further?
9. Did the existing presidential election regulation—in general—and campaign fund regulation—in particular—dampen your capabilities to raise campaign funds and spend such funds to finance these campaign-volunteers? If so, how did you deal with such regulations? Would you please share with me your opinions and stories regarding such issues little bit further?