

The Decline of International Humanitarian Law *Opinio Juris* and the Law of Cyber Warfare

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INTRODUCTION

International Humanitarian Law (IHL) has developed largely through a pluralistic process.¹ Its earliest codifications were inspired in no small part by religious and moral thinking.² Secular academic writers soon joined the process, making central contributions that are still cited as authoritative centuries later.³ All the while, States published and refined military manuals and articles of war to instruct their armed forces in rules for the conduct of warfare.⁴ By the late nineteenth century, States began to codify accepted expressions of IHL that accounted broadly for military custom, as well as notions of humanity, in a budding corpus of positive international law.⁵ The compounded horrors of new weapons and industrial-scale battlefields fueled this and further codification.⁶ While the twentieth century saw treaties take pride of place among IHL sources, customary international law, judgments of military and international tribunals, military legal doctrine, and humanitarian and academic commentary also helped to shape the content and evolution of IHL.⁷

Pluralism, however useful at accounting for diverse interests, has not come without cost. Despite prolonged attention and development, IHL exhibits a high degree of ambiguity. Few legal disciplines rival the indeterminacy of IHL. As Sir Hersch Lauterpacht, then Whewell Professor of International Law at the University of Cambridge and later judge on the International Court of Justice, famously observed, “if international law is, in some ways, at the vanishing point of law, the law of war is, perhaps even more conspicuously, at the vanishing point of international law.”⁸ Confronted with a cacophony of inputs—private and public, military and civilian, domestic and international—the IHL lawyer frequently finds clarity and

1. LESLIE GREEN, *THE CONTEMPORARY LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT* 26–64 (3d ed. 2008); Christopher Greenwood, *Historical Development and Legal Basis*, in *THE HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW* 1, 15–35 (Dieter Fleck ed., 2d ed. 2008); see generally GEOFFREY BEST, *HUMANITY IN WARFARE* (1980).

2. See generally G.I.A.D. Draper, *The Interaction of Christianity and Chivalry in the Historical Development of the Law of War*, 5 *INT’L REV. RED CROSS* 3 (1965).

3. See generally M. H. KEEN, *THE LAWS OF WAR IN THE LATE MIDDLE AGES* (Michael Hurst ed., 1965).

4. The paradigmatic example is the Lieber Code approved by President Lincoln for use by the Union Army during the U.S. Civil War. Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field, General Orders No. 100, Apr. 24, 1863, reprinted in *THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTS* 3 (Dietrich Schindler & Jiri Toman eds., 2004); Rick Beard, *The Lieber Codes*, *N.Y. TIMES* (Apr. 24, 2013), <http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/04/24/the-lieber-codes/>.

5. E.g., Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded in Armies in the Field, Aug. 22, 1864, 22 Stat. 940, 129 Consol. T.S. 361; The Hague Convention (II) with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land and Its Annex: Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, July 29, 1899, 32 Stat. 1803, 187 Consol. T.S. 429.

6. This dynamic was represented most notably by the work of Henri Dunant. See PIERRE BOISSIER, *HISTORY OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS: FROM SOLFERINO TO TSUSHIMA* 19–25 (1985) (describing the gruesome aftermath of the Battle of Solferino that Dunant described in a book that was to inspire the creation of the International Red Cross).

7. See generally GEOFFREY BEST, *WAR AND LAW SINCE 1945* (1994).

8. Hersch Lauterpacht, *The Problem of the Revision of the Law of War*, 29 *BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L.* 360, 382 (1952).

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consensus elusive. Sorting IHL noise from notes requires considerable legal, military, and political experience. The content and operation of even cardinal IHL principles such as distinction remain subject to voluble debate.

While a measure of its indeterminacy is surely attributable to IHL's pluralistic process of development, an equal measure must be traced to the unique and peculiar purpose of IHL. IHL is a body of law that countenances intentional killing and deprivation of liberty on a grand scale in pursuit of national interests, which may not be benign. It expressly allows for the deaths of innocents and destruction of their property to achieve military aims, while imposing obligations and requiring precautions that can expose combatants to tangibly greater danger. Yet, IHL also humanizes bloody battlefields. When respected, it can save lives and ensure humane treatment, preserving a degree of humanity in both the victims and victors of war.

In light of these competing dynamics, the interpretation and development of IHL must be handled delicately. A highly reactive body of law, IHL has seen evolutionary and even revolutionary changes instituted by States following armed conflicts—the classic example being adoption of the four Geneva Conventions in the aftermath of the Second World War.⁹ Those with the expertise and experience to fully appreciate the fragile IHL balance between military necessity and humanity that provides its foundational *raison d'être* have been the key drivers of this process of change.¹⁰ Historically, States, and their military representatives in particular, have played this critical role in shaping the contours of IHL. To be sure, proposals by academics and non-governmental organizations have fostered significant enhancements of IHL. But this has occurred only after deliberate and studied consideration and acceptance by government experts and States uniquely positioned to evaluate the operational and even strategic costs of legal innovation. The result was an IHL reasonably assured to reflect the best achievable balance of military necessity and humanity—an IHL at once acceptable to the States and armed forces charged with its implementation and to the advocates for war's inevitable victims.

While the IHL dialogue remains vigorous, continuation of its pluralistic nature appears in doubt. In particular, a void of State participation, especially with respect to *opinio juris*, has formed. One no longer finds regular State expressions of IHL *opinio juris*. Nor does one regularly find comprehensive and considered responses by States to the proposals and pronouncements of non-State IHL participants. In many respects, as this article will demonstrate, the guns of State IHL *opinio juris* have fallen silent.

9. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 (entered into force Oct. 21, 1950) [hereinafter GC I]; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 (entered into force Oct. 21, 1950) [hereinafter GC II]; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 (entered into force Oct. 21, 1950) [hereinafter GC III]; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 (entered into force Oct. 21, 1950) [hereinafter GC IV].

10. See Michael N. Schmitt, *Military Necessity and Humanity in International Humanitarian Law: Preserving the Delicate Balance*, 50 VA. J. INT'L L. 795, 806–22 (2010) [hereinafter Schmitt, *Military Necessity*] (describing the discourse among States and military leaders, humanitarian NGOs, and nascent international courts and tribunals in shaping IHL's response to military necessity concerns).

Meanwhile, non-State IHL actors have been undeterred, even emboldened. The IHL contributions of the international legal academy have been particularly voluminous. Some are of exceptional quality. However, academia has also incentivized the production of decidedly unconventional IHL perspectives. While useful to illustrate or deconstruct normative architecture, many such efforts not only eschew rigorous legal analysis, but also display insensitivity to the realities of battle in favor of interpretive creativity or innovation. Indeed, many authors and pundits boldly masquerade legal innovations as accepted understandings of IHL.¹¹ Even more troubling is the fact that many scholars lacking the appropriate education or experiential background have responded to the fact that IHL is a topic *au courant* by claiming IHL expert status. Their work product misstates basic principles and rules with distressing frequency, and they are too often set forth in an ad hominem manner. All of these contributions, from the superb to the sub-standard, exert informal but real pressure on the shape of IHL.

Further complicating the IHL process, while helping to drown out what little State *opinio juris* one finds today, are the burgeoning efforts of humanitarian advocacy groups. These organizations and their members have long performed the valuable role of counterweight, urging States not to lead the law unduly askew in the pursuit of narrow national interests. Yet, assertions of law by humanitarian groups must be considered with some degree of care as their work in explicating IHL understandably (and often appropriately) reflects the legal causes and policies of their constituencies. Additionally, where they stand with respect to IHL depends on where they sit; what they observe and conclude about the battlefield and its law is always a function of their perceived mandates. Humanitarian activists working exclusively to alleviate the suffering of civilians and other protected persons will inevitably appreciate IHL differently than, for instance, soldiers charged with winning a battle or State policy-makers responsible for leading a nation to victory.

Other non-State entities also indirectly, but effectively, shape IHL. Foremost among these is the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). The ICRC is undoubtedly the most influential single body in the field; indeed, few organizations or States field the IHL expertise or experience of its impressive Legal Division. However, in assessing issues arising from the military necessity-humanity balance, the ICRC unsurprisingly (and again often appropriately) tends to resolve grey areas in favor of humanitarian considerations, much as militaries usually do vis-à-vis military necessity. The United Nations Human Rights Council has also now included IHL matters within its portfolio. Although the Council's efforts have sometimes reflected a misunderstanding of IHL and inappropriately conflated IHL and human rights law,¹² more recent work has proved quite sophisticated and well measured.¹³

11. Of particular note is the IHL blogosphere that has recently materialized. It serves to conveniently highlight emerging issues and provides a first glimpse of IHL analysis. However, bloggers are frequently unable to offer the depth or expertise called for by complex IHL issues.

12. See, e.g., Human Rights Council, *Human Rights in Palestine and Other Occupied Arab Territories: Rep. of the U.N. Fact-Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict*, para. 284, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/12/48 (Sept. 25, 2009) [hereinafter *Goldstone Report*] (“A convergence between human rights protections and humanitarian law protections is also in operation. The rules contained in Article 75 of Additional Protocol I (AP I), which reflect customary law, define a series of fundamental guarantees and protections, such as the prohibitions against torture, murder and inhuman conditions of detention, recognized also under human rights law.”).

13. See generally Human Rights Council, *Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and*

And, of course, the growing number of international tribunals—standing, ad hoc, and bifurcated—that also pronounce on the scope and meaning of IHL, often in confounding prolixity, must be added to this complex admixture of non-State influences on IHL content and vector.

In the face of these and other influences, it is essential to recall that States, *and only States*, “make” IHL.¹⁴ They alone enjoy legal competency to interpret international law beyond the confines of a particular case. States do so either through treaty or through “general practice accepted as law,” the latter component known as customary international law.¹⁵ As will be explained, expressions of *opinio juris* operate as the fulcrum around which new customary humanitarian law norms crystallize, as well as a basis for the contextual interpretation and development of existing treaty and customary IHL principles and rules.

Expressions of *opinio juris* are a tool by which States regulate the emergence, interpretation, and evolution of legal norms. Effectively employed, they may maximize achievement and protection of States’ perceived national interests. By failing regularly to offer such expressions, States risk unintended Grotian Moments, that is, “radical developments in which new rules and doctrines of customary international law emerge with unusual rapidity and acceptance.”¹⁶ Such episodes do not necessarily create “bad” law, nor do they always run contrary to States’ interests or intentions, but they often represent brief periods when States’ ability to reason objectively is at its nadir. They are therefore a suboptimal time for States to engage in activities that amount to norm formation and development.

This article sets forth thoughts regarding the performance of States, particularly the United States, in this informal process of meta-norm formation and evolution. Although the topic of the symposium from which the article emanated was the law of cyber warfare, the discussion is decidedly non-cyber in nature. It is intentionally so, as the objective is to identify recent tendencies in the process that might foreshadow how IHL governing cyber operations is likely to develop absent a reversal of current trends. Our examination suggests that non-State actors are outpacing and, in some cases displacing, State action in both quantitative and qualitative terms. States seem reticent to offer expressions of *opinio juris*, often for good reasons. We argue that such reticence comes at a cost—diminished influence on the content and application of IHL. In our view, States have underestimated this cost and must act to resume their intended role in the process.

Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms While Countering Terrorism, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/25/59 (Mar. 10, 2014) (by Ben Emmerson) [hereinafter *Emmerson Report*]; Human Rights Council, *Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions*, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/23/47 (Apr. 9, 2013) (by Christof Heyns) [hereinafter *Heyns Report*].

14. *But see, e.g.*, Anthea Roberts & Sandesh Sivakumaran, *Lawmaking by Nonstate Actors: Engaging Armed Groups in the Creation of International Humanitarian Law*, 37 *YALE J. INT’L L.* 107, 109 (2012) (“[I]t is worth questioning whether nonstate armed groups can and should be given a role in the creation of the international law that governs conflicts to which they are parties.”).

15. Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38(1)(b), June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031, 33 U.N.T.S. 993; *see generally* THE NATURE OF CUSTOMARY LAW: LEGAL, HISTORICAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES (Amanda Perreau-Saussine & James Bernard Murphy eds., 2009).

16. MICHAEL P. SCHARF, *CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW IN TIMES OF FUNDAMENTAL CHANGE: RECOGNIZING GROTIAN MOMENTS 1* (2013). The attacks of 9/11 undoubtedly generated one such moment for *jus ad bellum*.

I. *OPINIO JURIS*

State assessments of international law have long held a critical place in the law of nations. More than mere commentary, States' expressions of the perceived extent and content of their international legal obligations are key constitutive elements of international law. In particular, expressions of *opinio juris*, when combined with evidence of general State practice, form the basis of binding customary law.¹⁷ Like treaties and general principles of law, customary law is a primary component of international law.¹⁸ Absent meaningful and regular expressions of *opinio juris* by States, prospective customary law founders and extant customary law stagnates.

Opinio juris also animates the interpretation and application of IHL treaties.¹⁹ As noted in Article 31(3) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, “[a]ny subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation” is a relevant consideration when interpreting a treaty’s provisions.²⁰ *Opinio juris* serves as the vessel through which said agreement is revealed.²¹ Moreover, when the context in which treaty provisions apply changes, subsequent expressions of *opinio juris* as to their application in the new environment, combined with corresponding State practice in their implementation, are the mechanisms by which treaty law remains relevant.²²

Expressions of *opinio juris* are especially meaningful with respect to emerging domains of State interaction not anticipated when the present law emerged in the form of either treaty or customary law.²³ Few such domains rival cyber conflict in this regard.²⁴ It is understandable, therefore, that scholars and non-State organizations lavish attention on the question of how international law regulates cyber operations.²⁵ States, unfortunately, seem to be falling behind, continuing a trend that has been underway with respect to IHL generally for some time.²⁶

17. Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38(1)(b), June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031, 33 U.N.T.S. 993; *see also* 1 OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW 26 (Robert Jennings & Arthur Watts eds., 9th ed. 1996) [hereinafter OPPENHEIM] (“[T]he formulation in the [ICJ] Statute serves to emphasize that the substance of [international custom] of international law is to be found in the practice of states.”).

18. *See* Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38(1)(b), June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031, 33 U.N.T.S. 993 (stating that the International Court of Justice should consult customary international law when resolving disputes).

19. *See* Yoram Dinstein, *The Interaction Between Customary International Law and Treaties*, 322 RECUEIL DES COURS 243 (2006) (discussing the relationship between treaties and customary international law).

20. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31(3)(b), May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331.

21. *Id.*

22. *See generally id.*

23. *See id.* art. 38 (“Nothing in articles 34 to 37 precludes a rule set forth in a treaty from becoming binding upon a third State as a customary rule of international law, recognized as such.”).

24. Michael N. Schmitt & Liis Vihul, *The Emergence of Legal Norms for Cyber Conflict*, in BINARY BULLETS: THE ETHICS OF CYBERWARFARE (Fritz Allhoff et al., 2015) (forthcoming).

25. *E.g.*, MARCO ROSCINI, CYBER OPERATIONS AND THE USE OF FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (2014); NATO COOP. CYBER DEF. CTR. OF EXCELLENCE, PEACETIME REGIME FOR ACTIVITIES IN CYBERSPACE: INTERNATIONAL LAW, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, AND DIPLOMACY (Katarina Ziolkowski ed., 2013); Eric Talbot Jensen, *Computer Attacks on Critical National Infrastructure: A Use of Force Invoking the Right of Self-Defense*, 38 STAN. J. INT’L L. 207 (2002); Eric Talbot Jensen, *Unexpected Consequences from Knock-On Effects: A Different Standard for Computer Network Operations?*, 18 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 1145 (2003); Michael N. Schmitt, *Rewired Warfare: Rethinking the Law of Cyber Attack*, 96 INT’L REV. RED CROSS (forthcoming) [hereinafter Schmitt, *Rewired Warfare*], available at

II. *OPINIO JURIS* AVERSION

While there are frequently valid reasons for States' failure to offer clear, unequivocal indications of the practices they have undertaken or refrained from (or express their views on the actions of other States) out of a sense of international legal obligation,²⁷ risks attend inaction. Of greatest significance is the risk of legal vacuums left to be filled by actors who lack the *de jure* authority but not willingness to do so.

This willingness is especially evident with regard to IHL. Over recent decades, there has been a flurry of activity by non-State actors seeking to advance views of how IHL is to be interpreted and applied, and how it should develop.²⁸ Efforts by humanitarian and other non-governmental organizations, international tribunals, and academics have proved tremendously influential in this fecund normative environment,²⁹ one in which States have largely remained mute.³⁰ A brief examination of some of the more noteworthy instances illustrates the nature of this dynamic and presages how events may unfold if States do not engage proactively in the application of IHL to cyber operations during armed conflict.

The ICRC has led a number of recent efforts to clarify and progressively develop IHL.³¹ More than a private humanitarian relief organization, the ICRC has long held a special place in the field.³² It is commonly referred to as the "guardian of international humanitarian law."³³ Reflecting its mandate "to work for the understanding and dissemination of knowledge of international humanitarian law

http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2472800; Michael N. Schmitt, *The Law of Cyber Warfare: Quo Vadis?*, 25 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 269 (2014); Scott Shackelford, *From Nuclear War to Net War: Analogizing Cyber Attacks in International Law*, 27 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 192 (2009).

26. See, e.g., Roberts & Sivakumaran, *supra* note 14, at 108 (describing how States are "particularly hostile" to granting non-State actors any lawmaking power in international law); Schmitt, *Military Necessity*, *supra* note 10, at 811–14 (describing various States' apprehension regarding the adoption number of treaties adopted by international law).

27. See, e.g., Sean Watts, *Reviving Opinio Juris and Law of Armed Conflict Pluralism*, JUST SECURITY (Oct. 10, 2013), <http://justsecurity.org/1870/reviving-opinio-juris-law-armed-conflict-pluralism-2/> [hereinafter Watts, *Reviving Opinio Juris*] (explaining how an official of the federal government always prefaces his or her remarks with a "*pro forma* reminder that nothing [he or] she will say necessarily reflects the views" of his or her agency or the U.S. government on any international matters).

28. See, e.g., Schmitt, *Military Necessity*, *supra* note 10, at 822 ("Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) have increasingly moved from oversight and advocacy of human right into the field of international humanitarian law. In particular, a number of prominent organizations have begun to issue reports on IHL compliance during armed conflicts.").

29. See, e.g., *id.* at 816–37 (describing how NGOs, international tribunals, and academic writings have influenced the development of international law).

30. See, e.g., Watts, *Reviving Opinio Juris*, *supra* note 27 (describing how States' lack of participation in the dialogue regarding law of armed conflict is in contrast to the thriving commentary of non-States).

31. See Yves Sandoz, *The International Committee of the Red Cross as Guardian of International Humanitarian Law*, ICRC RESOURCE CTR. (Dec. 31, 1998) <https://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/misc/about-the-icrc-311298.htm> ("In short, [the ICRC] has made a very direct contribution to the process of codification, during which its proposals were examined, and which has led to regular revision and extension of international humanitarian law . . .").

32. *Id.*; see generally BOISSIER, *supra* note 6; ANDRÉ DURAND, HISTORY OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS: FROM SARAJEVO TO HIROSHIMA (1984); CAROLINE MOOREHEAD, DUNANT'S DREAM: WAR, SWITZERLAND AND THE HISTORY OF THE RED CROSS (1998).

33. Sandoz, *supra* note 31.

applicable in armed conflicts and to prepare any development thereof,”³⁴ the ICRC has recently published two highly influential studies and is in the process of producing a third.³⁵ Each has been, or is likely soon to be, viewed as a dependable expression of customary IHL, relied on by jurists and IHL practitioners, including State legal advisers.³⁶ Yet, as this Section will illustrate, the studies have provoked no serious response on the part of States and States have launched no comparable efforts of their own.

In 1995, the ICRC commissioned its Legal Division to conduct a large-scale study to codify “customary rules of IHL applicable in international and non-international armed conflicts.”³⁷ Carried out over a span of ten years in consultation with over 150 legal experts, the resulting *Customary International Humanitarian Law* study (the Study) includes three volumes of work, running to well over 3,000 pages.³⁸ The Study is a work of breathtaking breadth and depth, one deeply rooted in a conscientious effort to discern State practice and *opinio juris* applicable to armed conflict.³⁹ It has been profoundly influential and is regularly cited by courts and commentators as authoritative on a number of points relating to the state of customary IHL.⁴⁰

Considering the importance of the topics addressed, the comprehensiveness of its coverage, and the fact that the ICRC regularly informed States of its work, one might have expected the Study to rouse strong reactions from States, either in the form of approval or detailed disagreement therewith.⁴¹ It did not. On the contrary,

34. Statutes of the International Committee of the Red Cross art. 4(g), Oct. 3 2013, <http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/misc/icrc-statutes-080503.htm>.

35. 31st International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent, Geneva, Nov. 28–Dec. 1, 2011, *International Humanitarian Law and the Challenges of Contemporary Armed Conflicts*, 3, 31IC/11/5.1.2 (Oct. 2011) [hereinafter *ICRC Challenges*].

36. See *infra* note 41 and accompanying text; cf. Michael N. Schmitt, *The Law of Targeting*, in PERSPECTIVES ON THE ICRC STUDY ON CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 131, 168 (Elizabeth Wilmschurst & Susan Breau eds., 2007) [hereinafter Schmitt, *Law of Targeting*] (discussing the acceptance by States of general targeting Rules set forth in the Study “as a correct enunciation” of targeting norms).

37. 26th International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent, Geneva, Dec. 3–7, 1995, *International Humanitarian Law: From Law to Action—Report on the Follow-up to the International Conference on the Protection of War Victims*, Annex II, in 78 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 58, 84 (1996) [hereinafter ICRC, *From Law to Action*].

38. 1 INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW (Jean-Marie Henckaerts & Louise Doswald-Beck eds., 2005) [hereinafter 1 CUSTOMARY IHL STUDY]; 2 INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW (Jean-Marie Henckaerts & Louise Doswald-Beck eds., 2005) [hereinafter 2 CUSTOMARY IHL STUDY]; 3 INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW (Jean-Marie Henckaerts & Louise Doswald-Beck eds., 2005) [hereinafter 3 CUSTOMARY IHL STUDY]; see also Jean-Marie Henckaerts, *Customary International Humanitarian Law: A Response to US Comments*, 89 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 473, 474 (2007) [hereinafter Henckaerts, *Response*]. Volume I of the Study features 161 Rules and accompanying commentary. 1 CUSTOMARY IHL STUDY. Volumes II and III compile an impressive catalogue of support for the Study’s rules and commentary. 2 CUSTOMARY IHL STUDY; 3 CUSTOMARY IHL STUDY. An online database supplements these volumes, regularly updating its sourcing and citations. *Customary IHL: Practice*, ICRC, <http://www.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v2> (last visited Apr. 30, 2015).

39. Yoram Dinstein, *The ICRC Customary International Humanitarian Law Study*, 36 ISR. Y.B. HUM. RTS. 1, 1 (2006).

40. See e.g., *id.*

41. The Study provoked significant commentary from jurists and academic commentators. See

most States remained silent, thereby begging the question of whether the majority of States are of the view that the ICRC “got it right.”

The United States was one of only a few States to respond to the Study. Shortly after publication, the Legal Adviser to the U.S. State Department and the General Counsel to the U.S. Department of Defense published a joint 22-page response to the ICRC President.⁴² The letter, which purports only to review “a cross-section” of the Study, objects chiefly to the methodology used to identify customary international law, in particular alleging the Study affords too much weight to thin or selective samples of State practice.⁴³ The Legal Adviser and General Counsel also take issue with the Study’s approach to *opinio juris*, noting that only “positive evidence . . . that States consider themselves legally obligated” can satisfy the *opinio juris* element of customary international law.⁴⁴

Several of the letter’s criticisms are compelling, especially with respect to the Study’s reliance on non-binding instruments, such as United Nations General Assembly Resolutions and the ICRC’s own prior work on IHL.⁴⁵ Overall, though, the letter lacks the thoroughness and heft expected of a response to such a significant and influential work. Indeed, only four pages of the letter provide general remarks,⁴⁶ with the remainder devoted to comments on just four rules: respect and protection of humanitarian relief personnel; protection of the environment; expanding bullets; and universal jurisdiction.⁴⁷ Many experts in the field were surprised the United States would issue such a letter and select only four relatively peripheral topics to address, while avoiding such core issues as the law governing attacks or detention.⁴⁸

To be fair, the U.S. letter notes that the Study’s length precluded a full review so soon after publication. The letter states, “The United States will continue its review and expects to provide additional comments or otherwise make its views known in due course.”⁴⁹ Yet in the intervening eight years, the United States has offered no further official comment on the Study and no such effort appears to be underway. Meanwhile, the Study continues to grow in influence, in great part because it remains the sole comprehensive work dedicated to discerning customary IHL available to jurists, scholars, and even State practitioners and legal advisors.⁵⁰

generally id.; George H. Aldrich, *Customary International Humanitarian Law—An Interpretation on Behalf of the International Committee of the Red Cross*, 76 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 503 (2005). Chatham House conducted a year long study on the Study that resulted in PERSPECTIVES ON THE ICRC STUDY ON CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW (Elizabeth Wilmshurst & Susan Breau eds., 2007).

42. John B. Bellinger III & William J. Haynes II, *A US Government Response to the International Committee of the Red Cross Study Customary International Humanitarian Law*, 89 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 443 (2007).

43. *Id.* at 444–45.

44. *Id.* at 447.

45. *E.g., id.* at 457.

46. *See id.* at 443–46 (listing general marks about methodological concerns and international law principles).

47. *Id.* at 448–71

48. *See, e.g.,* Noura Erakat, *The U.S. v. the Red Cross: Customary International Humanitarian Law and Universal Jurisdiction*, 41 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 225, 226 (2013) (comparing and contrasting the approach taken by the Red Cross and the approach favored in the U.S. response).

49. Bellinger & Haynes, *supra* note 42, at 444.

50. *See generally* Schmitt, *Law of targeting*, *supra* note 36, at 134–35.

While the ICRC may lack the de jure competency to express *opinio juris*, in the absence of State action in that regard, the organization has de facto filled the void.

Between 2003 and 2008, the ICRC conducted a second major project aimed at developing and clarifying the legal consequences of civilian presence on the battlefield.⁵¹ A succession of conflicts in the Balkans during the 1990s led to an infusion of civilians onto the battlefield, both participants from the region (e.g., armed groups of civilians) and civilian contractors associated with foreign armed forces.⁵² Subsequent armed conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq continued and even accelerated these trends.⁵³ In response, the ICRC decided in 2003 to examine the parameters of an important exception to the requirement that armed forces distinguish between civilians and combatants and only direct violence at the latter.⁵⁴ The exception provides that civilians lose their protection from attack for such time as they directly participate in hostilities.⁵⁵

Participation in hostilities by civilians has long presented a host of humanitarian and tactical challenges.⁵⁶ Civilian fighters frequently fail to distinguish themselves visually from the surrounding civilian population,⁵⁷ a practice that frustrates the ability of armed forces to honor the foundational IHL principle of distinction.⁵⁸ Civilian fighters also regularly shift back and forth between peaceful activities and

51. NILS MELZER, INT'L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE ON THE NOTION OF DIRECT PARTICIPATION IN HOSTILITIES UNDER INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 8 (2009) [hereinafter DPH GUIDANCE].

52. See, e.g., Trevor A. Keck, *Not All Civilians Are Created Equal: The Principle of Distinction, the Question of Direct Participation in Hostilities and Evolving Restraints on the Use of Force in Warfare*, 211 MIL. L. REV. 115, 123–25 (2012) (discussing the increase in civilian casualties in the 1990s as well as the difficulties posed by humanitarian efforts during the Balkan wars).

53. See, e.g., *id.* at 126–27 (citing Afghanistan for exemplifying the increase in civilian presence on the battlefield).

54. *Civilian “Direct Participation in Hostilities”: Overview*, ICRC (Oct. 29, 2010), <https://www.icrc.org/eng/war-and-law/contemporary-challenges-for-ihl/participation-hostilities/overview-direct-participation.htm>.

55. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) art. 51(3), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter AP I]; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II) art. 13(3), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609 [hereinafter AP II]. The notion of direct participation is widely viewed as customary in nature. For instance, the United States is a party to neither instrument, having ratified neither, but the concept appears in DEP'T OF THE NAVY ET AL., NWP 1-14M/MCWP 5-12.1/COMDTPUB P5800.7A, THE COMMANDER'S HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF NAVAL OPERATIONS, 8-3 (2007) [hereinafter NWP 1-14M]. See also 1 CUSTOMARY IHL STUDY r. 6 (detailing civilians' loss of protection from attack). History can also be used to establish custom. See Keck, *supra* note 52, at 117 (stating that “the obligation to distinguish between combatants and non-combatants” has been recognized as early as the 5th century B.C.E.).

56. See, e.g., HUM. RTS. WATCH, “BETWEEN A DRONE AND AL-QAEDA”: THE CIVILIAN COST OF US TARGETED KILLINGS IN YEMEN 80–81 (2013) [hereinafter CIVILIAN COST] (discussing civilian casualties resulting from US targeted killings in Yemen).

57. This article uses the term “fighter” in lieu of “combatant” because combatancy is a concept involving issues of detention and belligerent immunity and has only derivative significance in the law of targeting. Moreover, the law of non-international armed conflict (NIAC) does not include a concept of combatancy. Cf. MICHAEL N. SCHMITT, CHARLES H.B. GARRAWAY & YORAM DINSTEIN, THE MANUAL ON THE LAW OF NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT WITH COMMENTARY 4 (2006) [hereinafter NIAC MANUAL] (employing the term “fighters” as opposed to “combatants” to avoid confusion with international law of armed conflict).

58. AP I art. 48; DPH GUIDANCE, *supra* note 51, at 993.

participation in hostilities—the so-called, “farmer-by-day-fighter-by-night” or “revolving door” dilemma—thereby raising the question of when such individuals may be attacked.⁵⁹ Although the challenge of how to deal with civilians on the battlefield was certainly not new in 2003,⁶⁰ the ICRC recognized the need to clarify the underlying law and accordingly convened a group of international law experts to consider the matter.⁶¹ In 2008, the ICRC published the *Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation* (the *Guidance*) setting forth its views on the subject.⁶²

The *Guidance*, and the process that produced it, examined the legal regime governing civilian direct participation in hostilities through the lens of the widely ratified 1977 Additional Protocols I and II (AP I for international armed conflict (IAC)⁶³ and AP II for non-international armed conflict (NIAC))⁶⁴ to the 1949 Geneva Conventions.⁶⁵ Articles in each of the Protocols provide: “Civilians shall enjoy the protection afforded by this section, unless and for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities.”⁶⁶ Though undoubtedly an important concession to the realities of combat, and although all of the experts involved in the project agreed that the provisions accurately restated customary law,⁶⁷ these two brief articles have been exceptionally difficult to interpret and implement in practice.⁶⁸ The range of activities that constitute direct participation in hostilities and the temporal aspect of the exception were especially unclear to many Parties to the Protocols.⁶⁹ Of course, the same problems attend their interpretation and implementation in their customary guise for non-Parties to the Protocols such as the United States, Pakistan, India, and

59. DPH GUIDANCE, *supra* note 51, at 1034–36.

60. *See id.* at 993 (noting that there has been “[a] continuous shift of the conduct of hostilities into civilian population centres” in recent decades).

61. *Id.* at 991–92.

62. *Id.* at 1034–37.

63. AP I art. 1(4).

64. AP II art. 1(1).

65. AP I; AP II. A number of militarily significant States have not ratified the Protocols including, *inter alia*, India, Indonesia, Iran, Israel, Malaysia, Pakistan, Singapore, Turkey, and the United States. On the U.S. position vis-à-vis particular provisions thereof, *see generally* George Cadwalader Jr., *The Rules Governing the Conduct of Hostilities in Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions of 1949: A Review of the Relevant United States References*, in 14 Y.B. INT’L HUMAN. L. 133 (Michael N. Schmitt & Louise Arimatsu eds., 2011).

66. AP I art. 51(3); AP II art. 13(3).

67. In remarks in 1987, the Deputy Legal Adviser to the State Department, Michael J. Matheson, stated, “We . . . support the principle . . . that immunity [is] not be extended to civilians who are taking part in hostilities.” Michael J. Matheson, Deputy Legal Advisor, U.S. Dep’t of State, The United States Position on the Relation of Customary International Law to the 1977 Protocols Additional to the 1949 Geneva Convention, Remarks at the 6th Annual American Red Cross-Washington College of Law Conference on International Humanitarian Law (Jan. 2, 1987), in 2 AM. U. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 419, 426 (1987).

68. *See id.* at 510 (noting Lieutenant Colonel Burrus M. Carnahan’s statement that “[t]he main problem in interpreting these provisions is how much civilians must participate in the war effort before the Protocol no longer protects them” and that “[t]he standard of the Protocol . . . furnishes little clarification”).

69. *See* 1 CUSTOMARY IHL STUDY r. 6 (“It is fair to conclude . . . that outside the few uncontested examples . . . in particular use of weapons or other means to commit acts of violence against human or material enemy forces, a clear and uniform definition of direct participation in hostilities has not been developed in State practice.”).

Israel.⁷⁰ Although the *Guidance* proposes understandings and interpretive glosses for both issues,⁷¹ the ICRC was unable to secure unanimity thereon among the experts it had convened.⁷² In fact, a group of notable experts withdrew from the project altogether in its final months.⁷³

Expert dissent notwithstanding, the *Guidance*, as with the *Customary International Humanitarian Law* study before it, has been a markedly influential cynosure. For instance, it has found its way into military training for a number of NATO States and has affected the content of NATO rules of engagement in Afghanistan.⁷⁴ Despite these important practical effects, the *Guidance* has not attracted any definitive and comprehensive reaction from States. The scarcity of sovereign responses is especially curious and concerning with respect to States thought to disagree with aspects of the *Guidance*.

The United States has long embraced, albeit not publically by means of an expression of *opinio juris*, an understanding of direct participation and its consequences somewhat at odds with the *Guidance*. As an example, the *Guidance* asserts that there must be a direct causal link between the act in question and the harm caused to the enemy.⁷⁵ If an intervening event is required to effect harm, the civilian in question generally has not taken direct part in hostilities and retains protection from attack.⁷⁶ Most often cited in expert discussions as an example of how this approach would be implemented is the ICRC's characterization of assembly and storage of an improvised explosive device (IED) as *indirect* participation.⁷⁷ The contrary view is that the nexus between such activities and the subsequent IED attack renders those individuals engaging in the assembly and storage targetable as *direct* participants.⁷⁸ Although this position has not been expressed in the form of

70. See for instance, discussion of the subject by the Israeli Supreme Court in H CJ 769/02 Pub. Comm. against Torture in *Isr. v. Gov't of Isr.* (2) IsrLR 459, 488–92 [2006], the holding of which is also summarized in Mark E. Wojcik, *Introductory Note to the Public Committee Against Torture in Israel v. The Government of Israel*, 46 I.L.M. 373 (2007).

71. DPH GUIDANCE, *supra* note 51, at 1012–37 (describing what constitutes direct participation in hostilities and the temporal scope of losing protection due to direct participation in hostilities).

72. *Id.* at 992.

73. For a published discussion on the points of contention by individuals who participated in the project, and an ICRC response thereto, see generally Bill Boothby, “*And for Such Time As*”: *The Time Dimension to Direct Participation in Hostilities*, 42 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 741 (2010); Nils Melzer, *Keeping the Balance Between Military Necessity and Humanity: A Response to Four Critiques of the ICRC's Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities*, 42 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 831 (2010) [hereinafter Melzer, *Response*]; W. Hays Parks, *Part IX of the ICRC “Direct Participation in Hostilities” Study: No Mandate, No Expertise, and Legally Incorrect*, 42 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 769 (2010) [hereinafter Parks, *Part IX*]; Michael N. Schmitt, *Deconstructing Direct Participation in Hostilities: The Constitutive Elements*, 42 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 697 (2010) [hereinafter Schmitt, *Elements*]; Kenneth Watkin, *Opportunity Lost: Organized Armed Groups and the ICRC “Direct Participation in Hostilities” Interpretive Guidance*, 42 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 641 (2010).

74. Cf. Schmitt, *Elements*, *supra* note 73, at 699–732 (providing examples of how direct participation in hostilities influences military performance and conflicts in countries such as Iraq and Afghanistan).

75. DPH GUIDANCE, *supra* note 51, at 995–96.

76. *Id.* at 1022–23.

77. *Id.* at 1021–22.

78. See Watkin, *supra* note 73, at 681 (“To limit direct participation to persons who place or detonate explosives is an artificial division of what is fundamentally a group activity.”).

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opinio juris, there is State practice in both Afghanistan and Iraq to suggest this is the U.S. position.⁷⁹

Similar disagreement revolves around the issue of *when* civilians who participate in hostilities may be targeted. The *Guidance* states that the “for such time” language in the rules is limited to periods in which the civilian in question is actually engaging in “[m]easures preparatory to the execution of a specific act of direct participation in hostilities, as well as the deployment to and the return from the location of its execution.”⁸⁰ It goes on to provide that “the ‘revolving door’ of civilian protection is an integral part, not a malfunction, of IHL.”⁸¹ In other words, the *Guidance* argues the “for such time” language should be interpreted literally as meaning that unless a civilian is then preparing the specific act, conducting it, or returning from that act, he or she is not targetable.⁸² U.S. practice is not in accord.⁸³ From a military operational perspective, it seems irrational to prohibit targeting a civilian who has, perhaps on several occasions, conducted attacks on U.S. forces, and is likely to do so at some point in the future, merely because he or she has managed to return home following an operation and is not yet in the process of preparing a specific future attack.⁸⁴ Unfortunately, the United States has offered no clear expressions of *opinio juris* on the matter to accompany their practice.⁸⁵ In this void, the ICRC view is increasingly gaining traction.⁸⁶

The issue of how to treat groups of civilian fighters, as distinct from individuals, also remains a point of contention. In the *Guidance*, the ICRC helpfully assimilates organized armed groups not meeting the requirements of combatant status to the armed forces for targeting purposes.⁸⁷ In other words, members of such groups may be targeted even when they are not directly participating in the hostilities.⁸⁸ And because they are targetable in the first place, any incidental harm to them caused during an attack on other persons or places would not qualify as collateral damage for the purposes of the proportionality and precautions in attack analyses.⁸⁹

79. *Cf. id.* (explaining that the approach in the *Guidance* is impracticable in situations such as the insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan).

80. DPH GUIDANCE, *supra* note 51, at 1031.

81. *Id.* at 1035.

82. *See id.* at 1007–08 (indicating that the “determination remains subject to all feasible precautions and to the presumption of protection in case of doubt”).

83. *Cf. Matheson, supra* note 67, at 420 (describing the U.S. policy to follow international guidance only when it is elevated to customary law status).

84. *See Melzer, Response, supra* note 73, at 879 (“[Air Commodore] Boothby contends that the [*Guidance*’s] interpretation of the temporal scope of direct participation in hostilities, and of the ensuing loss of protection, is too restrictive to make [] sense on the modern battlefield.”(internal quotations omitted)).

85. *Cf. Bellinger & Haynes, supra* note 42, at 446–47 (describing US opposition to existence of *opinio juris* necessary to elevate principles in ICRC study to customary law).

86. *See Melzer, Response, supra* note 73, at 909–13 (identifying recent agreement of several States—including Israel—with some principles set forth in the DPH Guidance despite U.S. reservation).

87. DPH GUIDANCE, *supra* note 51, at 1006–09.

88. *Id.*

89. *See AP I arts. 51(5)(b), 57(2)(a)(iii), 57(2)(b)* (describing generally precautions in attacks required under the protocol for civilians).

However, the *Guidance* restricts exposure to lawful targeting to those members having a “continuous combat function” in the group.⁹⁰ The parameters of the notion are roughly analogous to those of direct participation. By the *Guidance*’s approach, the “for such time” limitation does not apply to individuals who have a continuous combat function in an organized armed group; they may be attacked at any time irrespective of whether they are engaging in hostilities at the moment.⁹¹ But for those members of the group who do not have such a function, the paradigmatic case being a cook who accompanies the fighters, the basic direct participation in hostilities rule for individuals applies such that they may only be attacked while so participating.⁹²

The ICRC acceptance of the concept of a targetable organized armed group goes a long way towards meeting the long-standing U.S. concerns regarding the “revolving door.”⁹³ Nevertheless, U.S. State practice neither limits targeting of a group’s members to those with a continuous combat function nor requires harm to other members of the group to be considered in the proportionality or precautions in attack analysis when those with a continuous combat function are attacked.⁹⁴ On the contrary, such individuals would be treated analogously to members of the armed forces, that is, susceptible to lawful targeting based on mere membership in a group that has an express purpose of participating in the hostilities.⁹⁵ Given the importance of the issue vis-à-vis counterterrorist and counterinsurgency operations, one would have expected the United States to have staked out a firm position thereon. It has not, at least not in a manner that would constitute a clear expression of *opinio juris* on this important matter.⁹⁶

States’ interests in actively addressing the direct participation question are not limited to resolving interpretive challenges for purposes of targeting. The issue now appears to bear on other important IHL questions such as the use of civilian contractors to perform military functions more generally and whether civilian participation in hostilities constitutes an international war crime.⁹⁷ This trend,

90. DPH GUIDANCE, *supra* note 51, at 1007–08

91. *See id.* at 1007 (observing that individual membership in an organized armed group is contingent on a continuous combat function).

92. *See id.* (“[U]nder IHL, the decisive criterion for individual membership in an organized armed group is whether a person assumes a continuous function for the group involving his or her direct participation in hostilities . . .”).

93. *See generally* W. Parks Hays, *Air War and the Law of War*, 32 A.F. L. REV. 1 (1990).

94. *See id.* at 118–31 (discussing the historical development of the concept of the “revolving door” and the United States’ disagreement with it).

95. *Cf.* 1 CUSTOMARY IHL STUDY r. 6 (noting that the United States rejects a strict interpretation of the rule requiring the classification of an individual as a civilian when his status is in doubt and acknowledges a combatant’s discretion in making such a classification).

96. *Cf.* Bellinger & Haynes, *supra* note 42, at 443–44 (“[T]he United States is not in a position to accept without further analysis that the [ICRC’s] conclusions that particular rules related to the laws and customs of war in fact reflect customary international law.”).

97. *See e.g.*, Mark David “Max” Maxwell & Sean Watts, ‘Unlawful Enemy Combatant’: *Legal Status, Theory of Culpability, or Neither?*, 5 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 19, 20 (2007) (asserting that the classification of civilians as ‘unlawful enemy combatants’ confuses the distinct issues of legal status and culpability). *But see* David B. Rivkin, Jr. & Lee A. Casey, *The Use of Military Commissions in the War on Terror*, 24 B.U. INT’L L.J. 123, 131 (2006) (stating that the United States’ stance that unlawful combatants are subject ‘to trial and punishment by military tribunals’ is not universally favored).

unsupported by the ICRC and most serious IHL experts, is counter-normative.⁹⁸ But more active State *opinio juris* on the direct participation question in general, and responses to the *Guidance* in particular, would greatly clarify matters.

A further incentive for States to respond actively to the *Guidance* can be found in a controversial provision on the resort to lethal force. The *Guidance* asserts that “the kind and degree of force which is permissible against persons not entitled to protection against direct attack must not exceed what is actually necessary to accomplish a legitimate military purpose in the prevailing circumstances.”⁹⁹ Restated, attackers must resort to capture or other non-lethal means when feasible in the circumstances. As an example,

an unarmed civilian sitting in a restaurant using a radio or mobile phone to transmit tactical targeting intelligence to an attacking air force would probably be regarded as directly participating in hostilities. Should the restaurant in question be situated within an area firmly controlled by the opposing party, however, it may be possible to neutralize the military threat posed by that civilian through capture or other non-lethal means without additional risk to the operating forces or the surrounding civilian population.¹⁰⁰

The approach attracted significant pushback and criticism from numerous prominent IHL scholars.¹⁰¹ Indeed, the “least harm” provision prompted several experts to withdraw from the project.¹⁰² Moreover, the provision is at odds with many States’ practice vis-à-vis conducting attacks and crafting rules of engagement.¹⁰³ While it is common for States to require their forces to capture when possible, such instructions are motivated by the operational need to acquire actionable intelligence, not by any sense that they are legally obligated to do so.¹⁰⁴ Yet, the *Guidance*’s discussion appears to have spawned a movement to entrench the least-harmful-means requirement in contemporary IHL understandings¹⁰⁵ and has sparked a lively academic debate.¹⁰⁶ Meanwhile, State input on the issue has been

98. See 1 CUSTOMARY IHL STUDY r. 6 (stressing that a careful assessment of a civilian should be undertaken in determining his status and that attacks against civilians cannot be based on the civilian merely appearing dubious).

99. DPH GUIDANCE, *supra* note 51, at 1040.

100. *Id.* at 1043.

101. See Parks, *Part IX, supra* note 73, at 783–85 (detailing various experts’ objections to the “General Restraints on the Use of Force in Direct Attack” section in the DPH Guidance).

102. *Id.* at 784–85.

103. See *id.* at 795–96 (noting that the ICRC requested the advice of senior military lawyers from the United States, United Kingdom, Israel, and Canada who disagreed with the provision on resort to lethal force and were ignored by the ICRC).

104. See Ryan Goodman, *The Power to Kill or Capture Enemy Combatants*, 24 EUR. J. INT’L L. 819, 824–25 (2013) (acknowledging that critics of the least harm provision contend that States commonly require their forces to capture, instead of kill, based on “pragmatic strategic and policy choices, not legal obligations”).

105. See, e.g., *id.* at 819 (arguing that “the use of force should instead be governed by a least-restrictive-means” analysis in certain well-specified and narrow circumstances).

106. Compare Geoffrey Corn et al., *Belligerent Targeting and the Invalidity of a Least Harmful Means Rule*, 89 INT’L L. STUD. 536, 540 (2013) (offering a comprehensive rebuttal of the least harmful means interpretation), and Michael N. Schmitt, *Wound, Capture, or Kill: A Reply to Ryan Goodman’s ‘The*

negligible.¹⁰⁷ It is worth considering whether States might have preempted the brouhaha with a more active and deliberate response to the *Guidance* in the form of an expression of *opinio juris*.

Finally with respect to ICRC efforts to develop IHL, a long-term project is underway within the ICRC Legal Division to produce updates to the 1949 Geneva Convention Commentaries (the Commentaries).¹⁰⁸ Originally published in the decade following the Conventions' entry into force,¹⁰⁹ the current edition of the Commentaries includes a volume addressing each of the four Conventions in significant detail, compiling essential historical perspective and details of diplomatic processes that produced the Conventions.¹¹⁰ In 1987, the ICRC added a volume of similar commentary on the 1977 Protocols.¹¹¹ Altogether, the five volumes run to nearly 3,900 pages with commentary and doctrinal analysis of each of the articles of the four Conventions and their first two Additional Protocols.¹¹² The revised Commentaries will retain the format of their predecessors while significantly updating them with respect to interpretive developments and State practice.¹¹³ They are expected to occupy a staff of full-time ICRC legal researchers and part-time external contributors through the year 2019.¹¹⁴

Power to Kill or Capture Enemy Combatants, 24 EUR. J. INT'L L. 855, 855 (2013) [hereinafter Schmitt, *Reply to Ryan Goodman*] (arguing that, even under narrow circumstances, there is no obligation under the extant international humanitarian law to wound rather than kill enemy combatants nor to capture rather than kill), with Ryan Goodman, *The Power to Kill or Capture Enemy Combatants: A Rejoinder to Michael N. Schmitt*, 24 EUR. J. INT'L L. 863, 863–66 (2013) (addressing the author's points of agreement and disagreement with Michael N. Schmitt's assertion that there exists no obligation under international humanitarian law to capture rather than kill enemy combatants), and Jens David Ohlin, *The Duty to Capture*, 97 MINN. L. REV. 1268, 1272 (2013) (examining four potential reasons why the duty to capture might be thought to apply to targeted killings).

107. See Schmitt, *Reply to Ryan Goodman*, *supra* note 106, at 857 (“[S]ituations presenting a viable possibility of wounding instead of killing are so rare that it is counter-intuitive to conclude that states intended the ‘method’ language to extend to such circumstances . . . [M]ost states, non-state organizations dealing with IHL, and scholars do not interpret the provision in this manner. For them, neither killing nor capture constitutes a specific method of warfare, although certain tactics designed to kill or capture do.”).

108. Jean-Marie Henckaerts, *Bringing the Commentaries on the Geneva Conventions and Their Additional Protocols into the Twenty-First Century*, 94 INT'L REV. RED CROSS 1551, 1554 (2012) [hereinafter Henckaerts, *Twenty-First Century*].

109. See *id.* at 1552 (“[T]he International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) proceeded to write a detailed Commentary on each of their provisions. This led to the publication between 1952 and 1960 of a Commentary on each of the four Geneva Conventions . . .”).

110. E.g., ICRC, COMMENTARY: GENEVA CONVENTION FOR THE AMELIORATION OF THE CONDITION OF WOUNDED, SICK AND SHIPWRECKED MEMBERS OF ARMED FORCES AT SEA (Jean S. Pictet ed., A.P. de Heney trans., 1960) [hereinafter COMMENTARY: GC II].

111. See generally ICRC, COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949 (Yves Sandoz et al. eds., 1987) [hereinafter COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS].

112. See generally ICRC, COMMENTARY: GENEVA CONVENTION FOR THE AMELIORATION OF THE CONDITION OF THE WOUNDED AND SICK IN ARMED FORCES IN THE FIELD (Jean S. Pictet ed., 1952); ICRC, COMMENTARY: GENEVA CONVENTION RELATIVE TO THE PROTECTION OF CIVILIAN PERSONS IN TIME OF WAR (Jean S. Pictet ed., 1958); COMMENTARY: GC II, *supra* note 110; ICRC, COMMENTARY: GENEVA CONVENTION RELATIVE TO THE TREATMENT OF PRISONERS OF WAR (Jean S. Pictet ed., 1960) [hereinafter COMMENTARY: GC III]; COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS, *supra* note 111.

113. See Henckaerts, *Twenty-First Century*, *supra* note 108, at 1554 (“The update will preserve the format of the existing Commentaries . . . [and] will provide many references to practice, case law, and academic literature, which should facilitate further research and reading.”).

114. See *id.* at 1554–55 (discussing the drafting process of the update to the Commentaries).

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Also known as Pictet's Commentaries, after their lead editor Jean Pictet,¹¹⁵ the Commentaries, together with the 1987 commentary on the Additional Protocols by Yves Sandoz et al., have been leading sources of clarification and background on the Conventions and Protocols for decades.¹¹⁶ It is difficult to overstate their influential and nearly authoritative status. For instance, despite a clear disclaimer by the ICRC to the contrary, the United States Supreme Court recently cited the Commentaries as "the official commentaries" to the Geneva Conventions.¹¹⁷ It is reasonable to expect that the forthcoming revised Commentaries will enjoy similarly influential and revered status as de facto "official" expositions on the ambiguities of the Conventions and their Protocols. At present, no State or collection of like-minded State legal advisors appears resolved or resourced to match this ICRC effort.¹¹⁸

Alongside the work of the ICRC, international criminal tribunals increasingly contribute to the development of IHL.¹¹⁹ None has expounded on this body of law more actively or profusely than the International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia (ICTY).¹²⁰ More than a criminal adjudicative body, the ICTY has enthusiastically embraced a law declaration function.¹²¹ Since its earliest cases, the ICTY has offered exhaustive elaborations on perennially hazy IHL topics such as the threshold of armed conflict, the distinction between international and non-

115. See, e.g., W. Hays Parks, *Pictet's Commentaries*, in *STUDIES AND ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND RED CROSS PRINCIPLES IN HONOR OF JEAN PICTET* 495, 497 (Christophe Swinarski ed., 1984) (noting that "Pictet's 'Commentaries'—as they always are referred to—not only are of value because they are accessible; they are reliable").

116. See Henckaerts, *Twenty-First Century*, *supra* note 108, at 1553 (stating that "[o]ver the years, the ICRC Commentaries have come to be recognised as essential and well-respected interpretations of the Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols").

117. *Hamdan v. Rumsfeld*, 548 U.S. 557, 631 (2006). The Commentaries' editors were careful to observe that

the Commentary is the personal work of its authors. The Committee moreover, whenever called upon for an opinion on a provision of an international Convention, always takes care to emphasize that only the participant States are qualified, through consultation between themselves, to give an official and, as it were, authentic interpretation of an intergovernmental treaty.

COMMENTARY: GC III, *supra* note 110.

118. See generally Henckaerts, *Twenty-First Century*, *supra* note 108.

119. See Jean-Marie Henckaerts, *Response*, *supra* note 38, at 486 (2007) (discussing the contribution to IHL from the courts in the former Yugoslavia, Rwanda, and Sierra Leone).

120. See Allison Marston Danner, *When Courts Make Law: How The International Criminal Tribunals Recast the Laws of War*, 59 *VAND. L. REV.* 1, 26 (2006) (stating that "the laws of war had developed faster since the beginning of the atrocities in the former Yugoslavia than in the forty-five years after the Nuremberg Tribunals" (citing Theodor Meron, Editorial Comment, *War Crimes Law Comes of Age*, 92 *AM. J. INT'L L.* 462, 463 (1998))); INT'L HUMAN. L. CLINIC, EMORY U. SCH. OF L., OPERATIONAL LAW EXPERTS ROUNDTABLE ON THE *GOTOVINA* JUDGMENT: MILITARY OPERATIONS, BATTLEFIELD REALITY AND THE JUDGMENT'S IMPACT ON EFFECTIVE IMPLEMENTATION AND ENFORCEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 13 (2012) [hereinafter *ROUNDTABLE*], available at <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1994414> (noting that "[i]ndeed, one of the mandates of the tribunal [ICTY] is the progressive development of IHL").

121. See Danner, *supra* note 120, at 25–26 ("During the period of the [International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia's (ICTY)] greatest political weakness, its judges issued a surprising series of decisions that effected a fundamental transformation in the laws of war.").

international armed conflict, and the range of persons protected by the Geneva Conventions.¹²²

As an example, in *Prosecutor v. Gotovina*, an ICTY Trial Chamber issued a 1,377-page judgment that included highly controversial conclusions with respect to States' obligations when conducting attacks.¹²³ Based on those conclusions, the Chamber convicted two Croatian generals of war crimes related to artillery bombardments of urban areas.¹²⁴ Among other questionable findings, it concluded that shell craters located more than 200 meters from pre-planned military objectives in an urban area proved a criminal violation of the IHL principle of distinction.¹²⁵ The ICTY's Appeals Chamber reversed the convictions and rejected many of the Trial Chamber's characterizations of the principle.¹²⁶ The judgments set off a flurry of exchanges between respected IHL commentators concerning the relative merits of the Trial and Appeals Chambers' judgments.¹²⁷ States, however, were conspicuously absent from this important targeting and international criminal law dialogue.¹²⁸ Even States that frequently participate in armed conflict, and that would therefore be specially affected by the targeting standards at issue, declined to weigh in officially.¹²⁹

This was not always the case. The ICTY's early IHL work provoked meaningful State involvement.¹³⁰ For example, in 1995 the U.S. Department of State filed an amicus curiae brief in the Tribunal's first case, *Tadić*.¹³¹ The brief outlined

122. See, e.g., *Prosecutor v. Tadić*, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment, para. 68–145 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 15, 1999) (describing both when victims become protected persons under Art. 2, and when an internal armed conflict reaches the level of international armed conflict through the control of armed forces by a foreign power).

123. See ROUNDTABLE, *supra* note 120, at 4 (“Precisely because it is the only judgment addressing complex operational targeting considerations, the *Gotovina* case has the potential to be a great beacon for international law by adding significant definition to the legal paradigm that governs such targeting operations . . . [H]owever, . . . the legal analysis as presently conceived is flawed on multiple levels and therefore fails to achieve those goals.”); see generally *Prosecutor v. Gotovina*, Case No. IT-06-90-T, Trial Chamber Judgment (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Apr. 15, 2011).

124. *Gotovina*, Case No. IT-06-90-T, para. 2588.

125. *Id.* para. 1899.

126. *Prosecutor v. Gotovina*, Case No. IT-06-90-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment, para. 83–87 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 16, 2012).

127. See, e.g., *Prosecutor v. Gotovina*, Case No. IT 06-90-A, Application and Proposed *Amicus Curiae* Brief concerning the 15 April 2011 Trial Chamber Judgment and Requesting that the Appeals Chamber Reconsider the Findings of Unlawful Artillery Attacks During Operation Storm, Conclusion (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Jan. 12, 2012) (“[A]ny judgment that is interpreted as attenuating this symmetry risks undermining the efficacy of international humanitarian law and the ultimate humanitarian objectives of the law.”); Geoffrey S. Corn & Lt. Col. Gary P. Corn, *The Law of Operational Targeting: Viewing the LOAC Through an Operational Lens*, 47 TEX. INT'L L.J. 337, 339 (2012) (discussing the effect of *Gotovina* on the “interrelationship between law and military doctrine”); ROUNDTABLE, *supra* note 120, at 2 (criticizing the “potential flaws in the Trial Chamber's application of IHL; and . . . potential institutional concerns and second-order effects resulting from these flaws”).

128. See generally Corn & Corn, *supra* note 127; ROUNDTABLE, *supra* note 120.

129. E.g., Jamila Trindle, *Acquitted in Court, Still Blacklisted by the U.S.*, FOREIGN POLICY (Jan. 10, 2014), <http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2014/01/10/acquitted-in-court-still-blacklisted-by-the-u-s>.

130. See Danner, *supra* note 120, at 21–22 (noting that the Representative of Venezuela issued a report expressing the view that the Tribunal would not be empowered with setting the norms of International Law while Canada argued for more specifics in what fell under ICTY jurisdiction).

131. Submission of the Government of the United States of America Concerning Certain Arguments Made by Counsel for the Accused in the Case of The Prosecutor of the Tribunal v. Dusan Tadić (July 27, 1995) [hereinafter U.S. *Tadić* Amicus], available at <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/>

U.S. legal views on the threshold of armed conflict, characterization of armed conflicts as either IAC or NIAC, availability of the grave breaches enforcement regime in NIAC, and nature and content of the laws and customs of war.¹³² The brief continues to serve as a reliable expression of *opinio juris*.¹³³ Yet, since its filing, the United States has not participated meaningfully and substantively in other war crimes cases, nor has it offered a similarly thorough or reasoned reaction to a judgment of any international criminal tribunal.¹³⁴ The reasons for this inactivity are unclear, but the growing list of States party to the International Criminal Court and that Court's expanding caseload suggest that militarily active States would be well-advised to engage in the development of IHL through war crimes tribunals, lest they find themselves governed on the battlefield by legal norms developed in isolation by jurists.

The IHL advocacy efforts of NGOs are of similarly worthy note. For instance, Human Rights Watch (HRW), one of the most sophisticated of NGOs dealing with IHL, regularly issues reports on ongoing or recent conflicts.¹³⁵ The organization also takes strong advocacy positions on IHL-related matters.¹³⁶ An example is its 2013 *Losing Humanity* report, which argued, *inter alia*, that autonomous weapon systems are unlawful per se under IHL.¹³⁷ Although individual scholars protested at such an overbroad (and incorrect) statement,¹³⁸ no State has addressed the various IHL matters the organization raised head on.¹³⁹ Instead, the United States issued a Department of Defense Directive that places certain policy limitations on the

65825.pdf.

132. *See id.* at 27–37 (arguing that the Tribunal had jurisdiction over grave breaches, violations of customs of war, and crimes against humanity because the alleged offenses did occur during an international armed conflict).

133. *See* Watts, *Reviving Opinio Juris*, *supra* note 27 (observing the brief's contribution to a "more pluralistic, balanced, and active LOAC dialogue").

134. *Id.*

135. *E.g.*, HUM. RTS. WATCH, TURNING A BLIND EYE: IMPUNITY FOR LAWS-OF-WAR VIOLATIONS DURING THE GAZA WAR (2010), available at <http://www.hrw.org/node/89575>.

136. *See, e.g.*, HUM. RTS. WATCH, LOSING HUMANITY: THE CASE AGAINST KILLER ROBOTS 1–2 (2012) [hereinafter LOSING HUMANITY], available at http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/arms1112ForUpload_0_0.pdf (advocating for a ban on fully autonomous weapons); HUM. RTS. WATCH, TIME FOR JUSTICE: ENDING IMPUNITY FOR KILLINGS AND DISAPPEARANCES IN 1990S TURKEY 61–63 (2012), available at http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/turkey_0912ForUpload.pdf (recommending further steps the Turkish government needs to take to combat impunity in Turkey).

137. LOSING HUMANITY, *supra* note 136, at 1.

138. *See, e.g.*, Kenneth Anderson et al., *Adapting the Law of Armed Conflict to Autonomous Weapon Systems*, 90 INT'L L. STUD. 386, 387 (2014) (suggesting prohibiting autonomous weapons would be "misguided"); Marco Sassóli, *Autonomous Weapons and International Humanitarian Law: Advantages, Open Technical Questions and Legal Issues to Be Clarified*, 90 INT'L L. STUD. 308, 309–10 (2014) (contending that an autonomous weapon can reasonable comply with IHL); Michael N. Schmitt, *Autonomous Weapon Systems: A Reply to the Critics*, HARV. NAT'L SECURITY J. FEATURES (Feb. 2013) at 1–3 (arguing *Losing Humanity* "obscures the on-going legal debate over autonomous weapon systems").

139. *See* Matthew Waxman & Kenneth Anderson, *Don't Ban Armed Robots in the U.S.*, NEW REPUBLIC, Oct. 17, 2013, <http://www.newrepublic.com/article/115229/armed-robots-banning-autonomous-weapon-systems-isnt-answer> (arguing that States should engage in cooperative development of common standards and best practices within a law of war framework).

systems without offering meaningful comment on the relevant legal issues.¹⁴⁰ Such failure to engage the topic cedes control of the legal discourse to organizations such as HRW and the chapeau organization in the campaign against autonomous systems, Stop Killer Robots.¹⁴¹

United Nations bodies have also entered the fray in various instances, including appointments by the Human Rights Council of Special Rapporteurs on countering terrorism (Mr. Ben Emmerson) and extrajudicial, summary, or arbitrary executions (Mr. Christof Heyns).¹⁴² Both have issued reports on drone operations, including IHL issues, marked by a high degree of sophistication and normative detail.¹⁴³ Although the United States is actively involved in drone operations, it has issued no comprehensive statement on the legal questions surrounding drone strikes. Instead, the government's limited comments tend to be made, as will be discussed, in speeches by senior government officials at academic and professional gatherings or found in internal memoranda not intended to be made public.¹⁴⁴

Finally, scholars and other IHL experts have convened and collaborated with increasing frequency to produce legal manuals devoted to restating customary and treaty IHL, and in many cases clarifying difficulties concerning its application and operation.¹⁴⁵ Topics covered by these manuals include the law of naval warfare, non-international armed conflict law, and the law of air and missile warfare.¹⁴⁶ Each is widely cited in legal literature and has influenced practice in its respective field.¹⁴⁷

140. See U.S. DEP'T OF DEF., DIRECTIVE NO. 3000.09, AUTONOMY IN WEAPONS SYSTEMS (2012), available at <http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/300009p.pdf> (setting broad limitations and guidelines regarding the use of autonomous weapons systems).

141. CAMPAIGN TO STOP KILLER ROBOTS, <http://www.stopkillerrobots.org/> (last visited Apr. 18, 2015).

142. See *Drone Attacks: UN Experts Express Concern About the Potential Illegal Use of Armed Drones*, U.N. HUMAN RIGHTS: OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMM'R FOR HUMAN RIGHTS (Oct. 25, 2013), <http://www.ohchr.org/en/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=13905> (explaining involvement of Emmerson and Heyns as U.N. Special Rapporteurs and noting their roles). The most recent mandates for the Special Rapporteurs are, respectively, Human Rights Council Res. 22/8, Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms While Countering Terrorism: Mandate of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms While Countering Terrorism, 22nd Sess., Mar. 21, 2013, A/HRC/RES/22/8 (Apr. 9, 2013), and Human Rights Council Res. 26/12, Mandate of the Special Rapporteur on Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, 26th Sess., June 20, 2014, A/HRC/26/L.23 (June 20, 2014).

143. *Emmerson Report*, *supra* note 13, at 5; *Heyns Report*, *supra* note 13, at 8.

144. E.g., Harold Koh, Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep't of State, The Obama Administration and International Law, Remarks at the Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law (Mar. 25, 2010) [hereinafter Koh, American Society Remarks], available at <http://www.state.gov/s/l/releases/remarks/139119.htm>.

145. E.g., SAN REMO MANUAL ON INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO ARMED CONFLICTS AT SEA (Louise Doswald-Beck ed., 1995) [hereinafter SAN REMO MANUAL]; PROGRAM ON HUMANITARIAN POLICY AND CONFLICT RESEARCH AT HARVARD UNIV., HPCR MANUAL ON INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO AIR AND MISSILE WARFARE (2009) [hereinafter HPCR MANUAL]; NIAC MANUAL; see also PROGRAM ON HUMANITARIAN POLICY AND CONFLICT RESEARCH AT HARVARD UNIV., COMMENTARY ON THE HPCR MANUAL ON INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO AIR AND MISSILE WARFARE (2010) [hereinafter HPCR MANUAL WITH COMMENTARY].

146. See generally HPCR MANUAL; NIAC MANUAL; SAN REMO MANUAL.

147. See, e.g., Wolff Heintschel von Heinegg, *The Current State of the Law of Naval Warfare: A Fresh Look at the San Remo Manual*, 82 INT'L L. STUD. 269, 269 (2006) (analyzing the influence of the *San Remo Manual* on current policies and addressing the manual's shortcomings); see also *Symposium: The 2009 Air and Missile Warfare Manual: A Critical Analysis*, 47 TEX. INT'L L. J. 261, 261-379 (2012)

And each appears to have responded to concerns that participating experts harbored regarding the failure of States to provide legal practitioners sufficiently granular guidance on troublesome IHL issues.¹⁴⁸ Although these manuals were not intended to supplant the role of States in IHL interpretation and development, they are, to a degree, having exactly that effect.

In sum, it is clear that States have not kept pace with an ever-increasing flow of non-State international legal commentary; the volume and frequency of the latter drowns out what little comment and reaction States have offered. It is no exaggeration to say that jurists, NGOs, scholars and other non-State actors presently have greater influence on the interpretation and development of IHL than do States. The roles of the respective communities have, unfortunately, been reversed—the pluralistic process of formation and development that has long guaranteed the efficacy and relevance of IHL is in peril.

III. THE ROLE OF STATES

Notwithstanding their recent reserve with respect to *opinio juris*, States and their legal agents still enjoy unique relevance in the formation and interpretation of international law generally and IHL in particular. As the primary authors and subjects of IHL, States have authority to actively shape its content and direction, through both direct means, such as treaty formation and State practice, and indirect means, such as positions proffered in litigation, legal publications, public statements of legal intent, and diplomatic communications resorting to law.¹⁴⁹

Even as scholars challenge State-centric understandings of international law, near universal respect endures for the special role of sovereigns in the formation of international law.¹⁵⁰ To co-opt and modify a common observation with respect to Originalism in American constitutional interpretation, everyone is a sovereigntist sometimes.¹⁵¹ What distinguishes dyed-in-the-wool international law sovereigntists from non-sovereigntists is probably not acceptance of the legitimacy of State input, but rather attitudes toward non-State actors' international legal contributions. Few international lawyers contest that State expressions of *opinio juris* constitute legitimate sources of law and a principled form of international legal interpretation.¹⁵² Disagreements seem instead to concern the effect that absence of

(discussing in detail the Manual on International Law Applicable to Air and Missile Warfare).

148. HPCR MANUAL foreword; NIAC MANUAL preface; SAN REMO MANUAL introductory note.

149. See 1 OPPENHEIM, *supra* note 17, at 26 (“[Custom may be] evidenced by such internal matters as [States’] domestic legislation, judicial decisions, diplomatic despatches, internal government memoranda, and ministerial statements in Parliaments and elsewhere.”).

150. See, e.g., Christoph Schreuer, *The Waning of the Sovereign State: Towards a New Paradigm for International Law?*, 4 EUR. J. INT’L L. 447, 448 (1993) (mentioning the importance of State structure in the future development of international law while prognosticating the end of a traditional model of sovereignty for States).

151. David A. Strauss, *The Living Constitution*, REC. ONLINE (ALUMNI MAG.) (Fall 2010), <http://www.law.uchicago.edu/alumni/magazine/fall10/strauss> (“[A]s a matter of rhetoric, everyone is an originalist sometimes . . .”).

152. See Eric Engle, *U.N. Packing the State’s Reputation? A Response to Professor Brewster’s “Unpacking the State’s Reputation”*, 114 PENN ST. L. REV. PENN STATIM 34, 37 (2010) (operating under the assumption that international law is enforced by states).

State *opinio juris* has on an international norm.¹⁵³ And while there is surely value in the balanced pluralism that results from having both State and non-State contributions to the interpretation and development of international law, State input has always been singularly significant, particularly when armed conflict is the issue.¹⁵⁴ State *opinio juris* remains the critical bellwether for the degree of consensus, acceptance, and therefore effectiveness and legitimacy of any international legal rule.

In addition to formal authority, States possess unique competency, facility, and access with respect to the contextual ingredients of international law.¹⁵⁵ IHL is illustrative. Many commentators grasp the harsh consequences of armed conflict.¹⁵⁶ Yet, few outside the ambit of States' defense ministries and armed forces fully appreciate the operational challenges, demands, and limitations of combat so essential to fairly striking the delicate balance between military necessity and humanity that infuses IHL and informs its interpretation and evolution.¹⁵⁷ Even commentators with a military or military legal background can find that their IHL experiential base has become dated or passé.¹⁵⁸ There is truly no adequate substitute for the active input of IHL professionals immersed in States' current operations and legal deliberation.

The dearth of contextual IHL custom and States' viewpoints is often unavoidable. States frequently shield their battlefield conduct and decision making from public view for rational operational reasons.¹⁵⁹ And although they may acquire information concerning the practices of adversaries and other States by employing intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets, that information is typically classified and therefore unavailable to non-State actors. States do regularly share some classified information amongst themselves, the paradigmatic examples being "five-eyes" sharing¹⁶⁰ and the sharing of classified material among NATO allies,¹⁶¹ but, because release would reveal certain "sources and methods" of

153. See Ross E. Schreiber, *Ascertaining Opinio Juris of States Concerning Norms Involving the Prevention of International Terrorism: A Focus on U.N. Process*, 16 B.U. INT'L L.J. 309, 312 (1998) (detailing the difficult task of deducing *opinio juris*).

154. See *id.* (detailing the particular confusions that arise when trying to deduce international norms without State *opinio juris*, particularly in armed, nuclear conflict).

155. See Ingrid Wuerth, *The Alien Tort Statute and Federal Common Law: A New Approach*, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 101, 110 (2010) (bolstering an argument by stating that international law relies on a State's domestic laws and that a State actor's courts applying the State's own law is "normatively superior").

156. See, e.g., Ariel Zemach, *Taking War Seriously: Applying the Law of War to Hostilities Within an Occupied Territory*, 38 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 645, 646–47 (describing the human costs of war in Iraq and the Gaza Strip).

157. See *id.* at 675–76 (assessing the intricacies present in balancing human rights with the demands of wartime).

158. See Olivier Bangerter, *Reasons Why Armed Groups Choose to Respect International Humanitarian Law or Not*, 93 INT'L REV. RED CROSS 353, 370 (2011) ("[I]t is questionable how far knowledge of the content of IHL by many commanders and fighters really extends beyond some basic notions.").

159. See, e.g., Laura K. Donohue, *The Shadow of State Secrets*, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 77, 88–91 (2010) (discussing frequency and challenges of State military secrets).

160. See Paul Farrell, *History of 5-Eyes–Explainer*, THE GUARDIAN (Dec. 2, 2013), <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/dec/02/history-of-5-eyes-explainer> (delineating the history of the five-eyes partnership, involving intelligence sharing between the U.S., U.K., Canada, Australia, and New Zealand).

161. See generally Alasdair Roberts, *Entangling Allies: NATO's Security of Information Policy and the*

collection, non-State actors seldom see such material, for better or worse, except when it is leaked.¹⁶² The practical effect of this restricted informational environment is to stymie non-State efforts to discern State practices, thereby rendering the former's input to the IHL interpretation and development process, through no fault of their own, somewhat suspect.

Additionally, the reluctance of States to express *opinio juris* on particular topics of international law is in some senses understandable. A number of considerations recommend the increasingly prevalent wait-and-see approach. A State may conclude that too little is known about the implications of an emerging area of warfare to commit to any particular international regulatory doctrine or regime or to admit publicly to the existence of international norms bearing on the matter at all. It is also possible that State reticence is less the product of calculated caution rather than political impasse deriving from domestic political considerations. In many municipal legal systems, constitutional and statutory arrangements spread authority over international law matters among several agencies and even branches of government, frustrating coordination and consensus.¹⁶³ Interagency friction or disagreement may prevent government-level consensus, especially with respect to new or emerging legal debates.

Absence of expressed State *opinio juris* may even be explained as evidence of *opinio juris* itself.¹⁶⁴ In such a case, the State may intend its silence as an implied expression of the view that no relevant IHL norm exists.¹⁶⁵ Restated, although a State may undertake a continuous course of practice on the battlefield, that same State may assiduously refrain from accompanying expressions of *opinio juris* so as to preclude any purported crystallization of a customary norm. This might be the case, for example, when it imposes self-defense limits on the use of force in rules of engagement in situations in which status-based targeting is lawful or when it affords treatment to detainees in excess of what IHL would otherwise require.

On balance, however, the various rationales for State restraint on matters of *opinio juris* are overrated. State silence has not proved effective at stemming IHL's development, which appears to occur with or without active State involvement.¹⁶⁶ Plainly, the failure of States to produce or interpret specific rules of conduct for emerging areas of warfare has not counseled silence on the part of non-State legal

Entrenchment of State Secrets, 36 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 329 (2003).

162. See Afsheen John Radsan & Richard Murphy, *Measure Twice, Shoot Once: Higher Care for CIA-Targeted Killing*, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 1201, 1216–18, 1236 (2011) (detailing the relationship between the government's interest in preventing disclosure of sources and methods and the public's interest especially in the judicial context).

163. For example, the U.S. Constitution vests authority over international law to each of the branches of the federal government. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10 (enumerating the U.S. Congress's power to "define and punish offenses against the law of Nations"); *id.* art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (requiring Senate advice and consent for treaty ratification); *id.* (enumerating the U.S. President's power "to make Treaties"); *id.* art. III, § 2, cl. 1 (extending the judicial power to "all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under . . . Treaties").

164. *But see* MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI, FROM APOLOGY TO UTOPIA: THE STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ARGUMENT 437 (2006) ("It is impossible to make any presumptions about the *opinio juris* on the basis of such silence as a matter of *general rule*.").

165. *Contra id.*

166. See 1 CUSTOMARY IHL STUDY xlv–xlvi (stating that a state omission or abstention *may* be construed to support *opinion juris*).

actors.¹⁶⁷ They have aggressively stepped in to cultivate IHL in response to the vacuum left by States.¹⁶⁸ Rather than preserve operational and legal flexibility, State silence may simply cede significant initiative and power over IHL to non-State actors.

Two international legal controversies demonstrate how State delay, ambiguity, or silence with respect to *opinio juris* risks the imposition of very real costs. Soon after the al Qaeda terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the United States launched military operations in Afghanistan “in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United States.”¹⁶⁹ U.S. armed forces soon captured individuals believed to be affiliated with al Qaeda or organizations that were said to have supported or harbored al Qaeda, such as Afghanistan’s de facto Taliban government.¹⁷⁰ By early 2002, U.S. armed forces and intelligence agencies had transferred over 150 suspected high-level leaders or valuable fighters to the U.S. military base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.¹⁷¹

Questions concerning the legal status of the Guantanamo detainees quickly arose.¹⁷² Some speculated the detainees might qualify as prisoners of war, entitled to the protections of the Third Geneva Convention of 1949.¹⁷³ Others contended that both al-Qaeda and Taliban members were extra-legal persons and unlawful combatants, entitled to no specific international legal protections.¹⁷⁴ The U.S. government did little to quell or resolve debate.¹⁷⁵ Its public position on the matter was vague, especially as to the underlying legal reasoning upon which its actions were purportedly based.¹⁷⁶

This is not to say the government had ignored the issue of the detainees’ international legal status. As public and political debate swirled, a parallel, albeit cloistered, legal debate took place within and between several U.S. executive branch agencies.¹⁷⁷ The various positions broadly emulated those that had surfaced in public

167. See *supra* Part II.

168. *Id.*

169. Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF), Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001) (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1541 (2006)).

170. See 1 CTR. FOR LAW & MILITARY OPERATIONS, U.S. ARMY, LEGAL LESSONS LEARNED FROM AFGHANISTAN AND IRAQ, VOLUME I: MAJOR COMBAT OPERATIONS (11 SEPTEMBER 2001–1 MAY 2003), at 53 (2004) (describing legal issues concerning enemy personnel detained in Afghanistan in late 2001).

171. See Katharine Q. Seelye, *Troops Arrive at Base in Cuba to Build Jails*, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 7, 2002, <http://www.nytimes.com/2002/01/07/us/a-nation-challenged-the-prisoners-troops-arrive-at-base-in-cuba-to-build-jails.html> (detailing the number of prisoners present in Cuba in 2002 as over 300).

172. Bryan Bender, *Red Cross Disputes US Stance on Detainees*, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 9, 2002, at A1 [hereinafter *U.S. Stance*]; *Agency Differs with U.S. over P.O.W.’s*, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 2002, <http://www.nytimes.com/2002/02/09/international/09DETA.html>.

173. Bender, *supra* note 172, at A1.

174. E.g., Sean D. Murphy, *Decision Not to Regard Persons Detained in Afghanistan as POWs*, 96 AM. J. INT’L L. 475, 476–77 (2002).

175. See Kim Lane Scheppele, *Law in A Time of Emergency: States of Exception and the Temptations of 9/11*, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1001, 1030–34 (2004) (describing the ways in which the Bush Administration approached handling the legal status of terrorists captured and detained post-9/11).

176. *Id.*

177. See generally THE TORTURE PAPERS: THE ROAD TO ABU GHRAIB (Karen J. Greenberg & Joshua L. Dratel eds., 2005) [hereinafter THE TORTURE PAPERS]. The Papers are a compilation of dozens of U.S. government legal memoranda and investigations related to detainee policies in the Global War on

debate within the broader legal community.¹⁷⁸ However, at the time, the government neither publically proffered a comprehensively-reasoned legal analysis of its detention policy, nor provided any clear statement setting forth its views on U.S. legal obligations regarding the Guantanamo detainees' status and treatment.¹⁷⁹

In early 2002, President Bush ultimately settled the internal executive branch debate on the detainees' legal status.¹⁸⁰ However, the full legal bases for the government's ultimate position remained classified.¹⁸¹ The Bush administration appeared satisfied to justify its determinations of the detainees' legal status with short summary fact sheets.¹⁸² In fact, the full legal reasoning analyzing the detainees' status was never made public through any officially approved expression of *opinio juris*—it was instead leaked.¹⁸³ As the unauthorized release of photos depicting prisoner abuse at the Abu Ghraib military detention facility in Iraq took place in April 2004,¹⁸⁴ news outlets also began to receive and publish leaked copies of executive branch legal documents and memoranda addressing the Guantanamo detainees' legal status and the justifications for their indefinite detention.¹⁸⁵ The leaked memoranda fueled intense debate, litigation, and resentment, both in the United States and abroad.¹⁸⁶ They also inspired international lawyers to aggressively rebut the legal reasoning contained therein.¹⁸⁷ The U.S. executive branch quickly lost the initiative regarding characterization of the detainees' status under IHL to the judicial branch, Congress, and even the non-State international law community.

To be sure, not all of the negative fallout of the affair is attributable to absence of effective *opinio juris*. Substantive deficiencies in the legal analyses of the

Terrorism. *See generally id.*

178. *Id.*

179. *See* Murphy, *supra* note 174, at 477 (describing the Bush administration's changing stance on the status and treatment of Guantanamo detainees under the Geneva Convention).

180. Memorandum from President George W. Bush for Vice President, et al., Humane Treatment of Taliban and Al Qaeda Detainees (Feb. 7, 2002) [hereinafter Memo. from President Bush], available at http://www.pegc.us/archive/White_House/bush_memo_20020207_ed.pdf; *see also* Katharine Q. Seelye, *In Shift, Bush Says Geneva Rules Fit Taliban Captives*, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 2002, <http://www.nytimes.com/2002/02/08/world/nation-challenged-captives-shift-bush-says-geneva-rules-fit-taliban-captives.html> (reporting that the decision to apply of the Geneva Convention to Taliban captives ended an "internal legal debate").

181. *A Guide to the Memos on Torture*, N.Y. TIMES, http://www.nytimes.com/ref/international/24MEMO-GUIDE.html?_r=0 (last visited Apr. 28, 2015).

182. Fact Sheet, White House Press Office, Status of Detainees at Guantanamo (Feb. 7, 2002), available at <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=79402>; *see also*, Press Release, Dep't of Def., DoD News Briefing: Secretary Rumsfeld and Gen. Myers (Feb. 12, 2002), available at <http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=2636> (demonstrating Secretary Rumsfeld's failure to expand on the Administration's reasoning when questioned).

183. Memo. from President Bush, *supra* note 180.

184. *See* Seymour M. Hersh, *Torture at Abu Ghraib*, THE NEW YORKER, May 10, 2004, available at <http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2004/05/10/torture-at-abu-ghraib> (breaking the story of prisoner abuse by military personnel).

185. *See generally* THE TORTURE PAPERS, *supra* note 177.

186. *See, e.g.*, Arthur H. Garrison, *The Bush Administration and The Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) Torture Memos: A Content Analysis of the Response in the Academic Legal Community*, 11 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL'Y & ETHICS J. 1, 11–12, 6–26 (2012) (discussing the academic community's moral indignation).

187. *Id.* at 6.

memoranda supporting the policies are chiefly to blame.¹⁸⁸ The marginalization of seasoned professional legal expertise within the executive branch likewise contributed.¹⁸⁹ Yet, a more vigorous and public approach to *opinio juris* could have prevented much of the costly fallout. If U.S. executive branch officials felt it necessary to abandon long-settled principles with respect to the classification and treatment of persons detained in armed conflict, an active and public campaign of timely and tightly-reasoned *opinio juris* would surely have been a more effective way to develop international norms better suited to the modern security needs of States than secretive, unilaterally constructed memoranda. If the laws-of-war were indeed “quaint” and “obsolete” in some respects,¹⁹⁰ a carefully managed campaign of *opinio juris* that marshaled the full expertise and resources of the U.S. government’s legal community would surely have proved more successful in updating them in both the long and short term.

The expanding use of drones to target terrorists outside active theaters of combat operations is a second instance where the United States appears to prefer to operate under a shroud of legal ambiguity.¹⁹¹ These operations raise questions from an array of legal regimes—the *jus ad bellum*, sovereignty, human rights, and IHL.¹⁹² With respect to IHL, the core issues are 1) whether the drone operations are being mounted as an aspect of an “armed conflict” such that IHL applies and, if so, 2) whether the individuals attacked qualify as lawful targets, and 3) whether the operations comply with IHL rule of proportionality and the requirement to take precautions in attack.¹⁹³

There is no question that the admixture of normative regimes renders linear and compartmentalized legal analysis of the drone program challenging.¹⁹⁴ Indeed, much of the discussion to date has misstated the law and conflated separate and distinct legal regimes.¹⁹⁵ It is a discourse that has been marked by emotive assertions as much as by legal acumen.¹⁹⁶ However, non-State actors have lately started to

188. *Id.* at 6–7.

189. *See, e.g.*, Lt. Col. Paul E. Kantwill & Maj. Sean Watts, *Hostile Protected Persons or “Extra-Conventional Persons”: How Unlawful Combatants in the War on Terrorism Posed Extraordinary Challenges for Military Attorneys and Commanders*, 28 *FORDHAM INT’L L.J.* 681, 682–83 (2005) (discussing the role of judge advocates in giving legal advice to the ranking commander in Iraq at the time of the Abu Ghraib detainee abuses).

190. Draft Memorandum from Alberto Gonzales, White House Counsel, to George W. Bush, Decision re Application of the Geneva Convention on Prisoners of War to the Conflict with al Qaeda and the Taliban (Jan. 25, 2002), *reprinted in* THE TORTURE PAPERS, *supra* note 177, at 118.

191. CIVILIAN COST, *supra* note 56, at 80–81.

192. *Id.* at 26, 80–83; Rotem Giladi, *The Jus Ad Bellum/Jus in Bello Distinction and the Law of Occupation*, 41 *ISR. L. REV.* 246, 246–47 (2008) (“Every . . . practitioner of international humanitarian law (IHL) is familiar with the distinction between *jus ad bellum* and *jus in bello* (or IHL). Both are public international law regimes that regulate war but whereas the former regulates the *legality* of the use of force *per se*, the latter concerns the *legality* of the *manner* in which force is used. The distinction generally means that the rules of *jus in bello* apply irrespective of questions of legality under *jus ad bellum* and that, as a consequence, all belligerents are subject to the same rules of *jus in bello*, whatever their position under *jus ad bellum*.”).

193. AP I arts. 51(5)(b), 57(2)(a)(iii), 57(2)(b); 1 CUSTOMARY IHL STUDY r. 14–24.

194. *See generally* Michael Schmitt, *Narrowing the International Law Divide: The Drone Debate Matures*, 39 *YALE J. INT’L L. ONLINE* 1, 3 (2014) [hereinafter Schmitt, *Drone Debate*].

195. *Id.* at 3–9.

196. *Id.*

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produce analyses that are sophisticated and convincing.¹⁹⁷ Noteworthy in this regard are recent reports by HRW, Amnesty International, and the two U.N. Special Rapporteurs, all of which, appropriately so, have garnered significant attention in the international law community.¹⁹⁸

Yet to date, the government, under two very different administrations, has offered no thorough expression of *opinio juris* that draws together the various legal strands in a manner that would convincingly justify the strikes as a matter of international law.¹⁹⁹ Instead, both administrations have resorted to periodic speeches by senior officials who provide only vague glimpses of the U.S. position.²⁰⁰

Most often cited is a speech by former Department of State Legal Adviser Harold Koh at the 2010 Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law.²⁰¹ Although heralded at the time as the first full explanation of U.S. legal policy on drone strikes, for experts in the field it was a rather confusing explication.²⁰² For instance, it was unclear whether the use of force against members of al Qaeda was being justified on the basis of the law of self-defense (a *jus ad bellum* issue), because of U.S. involvement in an armed conflict with the organization (an IHL issue), or on account of both.²⁰³ The speech was likewise unexceptional. An announcement that the United States complies with the principle of distinction and the rule of proportionality hardly constitutes an epiphany.²⁰⁴ Failure to comply would not only violate IHL, but also amount to a war crime by those involved.²⁰⁵ And curiously, there is no mention of the requirement to take precautions in attack, which is central to the legality of drone strikes under IHL.²⁰⁶

197. See *id.* at 12–13 (describing analysis and comparison of prominent recent reports)

198. See generally *Emmerson Report*, *supra* note 13; *Heyns Report*, *supra* note 13; CIVILIAN COST, *supra* note 56; AMNESTY INT’L, “WILL I BE NEXT?”: US DRONE STRIKES IN PAKISTAN (2013) [hereinafter DRONE STRIKES IN PAKISTAN]. For an analysis of the four reports, see generally Schmitt, *Drone Debate*, *supra* note 194.

199. See, e.g., DRONE STRIKES IN PAKISTAN, *supra* note 198, at 49 (describing the refusal of the United States to provide public access to information about its drone program in Pakistan).

200. See, e.g., John B. Bellinger III, Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep’t of State, Address at the London School of Economics: Legal Issues in the War on Terrorism (Oct. 31, 2006) [hereinafter Bellinger, War on Terrorism], available at <http://www.state.gov/s/l/2006/98861.htm> (describing the U.S. views on the detention and treatment of terrorists since 9/11).

201. Koh, American Society Remarks, *supra* note 144.

202. See, e.g., COLUMBIA LAW SCH. HUM. RTS. INST., TARGETING OPERATIONS WITH DRONE TECHNOLOGY: HUMANITARIAN LAW IMPLICATIONS 2 (2011) (discussing former Department of State Legal Adviser Harold Koh’s explanation of U.S. legal policy on drone strikes and the legality of U.S. practice).

203. Koh, American Society Remarks, *supra* note 144, at 7. Adviser Harold Koh stated, “[a]s I have explained, as a matter of international law, the United States is in an armed conflict with al-Qaeda, as well as the Taliban and associated forces, in response to the horrific 9/11 attacks, and may use force consistent with its inherent right to self-defense under international law.” *Id.*

204. Koh, American Society Remarks, *supra* note 144, at 7–8.

205. See 1 CUSTOMARY IHL STUDY r. 1, 14, 156 (discussing the principle of distinction between civilians and combatants, proportionality in attack, and definition of war crimes, respectively).

206. See generally Koh, American Society Remarks, *supra* note 144 (lacking discussion of drone precautionary measures); see also ICRC Challenges, *supra* note 35, at 38–39 (discussing required precautions under IHL and its application to drone attacks).

Other noteworthy speeches include those by Koh's predecessor, John Bellinger, at the London School of Economics;²⁰⁷ John Brennan at Harvard Law School while he was serving as the President's Assistant for Counterterrorism;²⁰⁸ Attorney General Eric Holder at Northwestern University School of Law;²⁰⁹ former Defense Department General Counsel Jeh Johnson at Yale Law School;²¹⁰ and the President himself at National Defense University.²¹¹ A brief Fact Sheet was released by the White House contemporaneously with the President's speech.²¹² Each of these addressed particular aspects of IHL and other bodies of law governing drone operations, but none offered an analysis robust enough to draw any but the broadest of conclusions as to the U.S. view of the applicable law.²¹³ Moreover, the speeches not only failed to clearly distinguish the various legal regimes from which the relevant law derives, but left it uncertain whether the positions taken were the product of legal, operational, moral, or policy concerns. Paradoxically, the most comprehensive analysis by the government of the international law issues surrounding drone operations was that offered in an unsigned and undated draft Justice Department White Paper that was leaked to the press in 2013, hardly an exemplar of reliable *opinio juris*.²¹⁴

The vacuity of recent *opinio juris* is particularly surprising given the fact that the law of drone operations is exceedingly emotive and has underpinned widespread and impassioned condemnation of the United States as a "might makes right" State.²¹⁵ As a matter of law, the basis for the U.S. operations is arguably sound.²¹⁶ Articulating that basis publicly would not only have the immediate effect of tempering the criticism (much of which is levied on the basis of a lack of legal

207. Bellinger, War on Terrorism, *supra* note 200.

208. John O. Brennan, Asst. to the President for Homeland Sec. & Counterterrorism, Strengthening Our Security by Adhering to Our Values and Laws, Remarks at the Program on Law and Security at Harvard Law School (Sept. 16, 2011), *available at* <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/09/16/remarks-john-o-brennan-strengthening-our-security-adhering-our-values-an>.

209. Eric Holder, U.S. Att'y Gen., Remarks at Northwestern University School of Law (Mar. 5, 2012), *available at* <http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/ag/speeches/2012/ag-speech-1203051.html>.

210. Jeh Charles Johnson, Gen. Counsel, U.S. Dep't of Def., National Security Law, Lawyers and Lawyering in the Obama Administration, Address at the Dean's Lecture at Yale Law School (Feb. 22, 2012), *in* 31 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 141 (2012).

211. President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President at the National Defense University (May 23, 2013), <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/05/23/remarks-president-national-defense-university>.

212. Fact Sheet: The President's May 23 Speech on Counterterrorism, White House Press Office (May 23, 2013), <https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/05/23/fact-sheet-president-s-may-23-speech-counterterrorism>.

213. *See generally id.*; Bellinger, War on Terrorism, *supra* note 200; Brennan, *supra* note 208; Holder, *supra* note 209; Johnson, *supra* note 210; Obama, *supra* note 211.

214. *See generally* U.S. Dep't of Justice, Lawfulness of a Lethal Operation Directed Against a U.S. Citizen Who is a Senior Operational Leader of Al-Qa'ida or an Associated Force (Leaked Draft White Paper Nov. 8, 2011), *available at* http://msnbcmedia.msn.com/i/msnbc/sections/news/020413_DOJ_White_Paper.pdf.

215. *See generally* CIVILIAN COST, *supra* note 56 (detailing the civilian casualties of U.S. drone policy and recommending changes).

216. *See generally* Michael N. Schmitt, *Extraterritorial Lethal Targeting: Deconstructing the Logic of International Law*, 52 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 77 (2013).

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transparency²¹⁷), but also help preserve the option of conducting drone operations extraterritorially in the future.

Whatever the reason for the U.S. failure to issue an unambiguous expression of *opinio juris*, by now the United States and other countries that conduct such operations have lost control of the debate. Non-State actors are shaping the discussion as they wish, with States merely responding, or more often not responding at all, to the sundry objections they raise.²¹⁸ From this reactive stance, it is nearly impossible for States conducting drone strikes to muster sufficient support from other States to redirect the debate. The domestic political costs of supporting the strikes (at least those outside an active battlefield) are simply too high for them.²¹⁹ Additionally, the United States has not provided an adequately detailed and reasoned delineation of its legal position that could be assessed and embraced by other States.²²⁰ To employ military terminology, the drone debate and many other currently debated IHL issues are, for the United States especially, “self-inflicted wounds.”

Perhaps the most pressing need for an expression of *opinio juris* is with respect to those articles of AP I the United States believes accurately reflect customary law—and those it does not. The instrument was designed to supplement the four 1949 Geneva Conventions, which dealt primarily with protections for specified persons and objects.²²¹ Rules regarding how combat was to occur were the province of the 1907 Regulations annexed to Hague Convention IV.²²² Although a post-World War II tribunal at Nuremberg found that it reflected customary law,²²³ the treaty was sparse and clearly in need of expansion in the aftermath of two world wars and numerous post-World War II conflicts such as those in Algeria and Vietnam.²²⁴ AP I, addressed to international armed conflict, was intended to serve that process.²²⁵

217. See, e.g., Letter from the American Civil Liberties Union et al. to President Barack Obama (Dec. 4, 2013) [hereinafter Letter to President Obama], available at <http://justsecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/2013-12-04-Coalition-Follow-Up-Letter-to-Obama-on-TK.pdf> (calling on the government to “publicly disclose key targeted killing standards and criteria”); MICAH ZENKO, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, COUNCIL SPECIAL REPORT NO. 65: REFORMING U.S. DRONE STRIKE POLICIES 3 (2013) (stating that the “lack of transparency threatens to limit U.S. freedom of action and risks proliferation of armed drone technology without the requisite normative framework”); *Heyns Report*, *supra* note 13, at 21 (emphasizing to the U.N. the need for greater transparency regarding drone policy for all states).

218. See, e.g., Koh, American Society Remarks, *supra* note 144, at 7–8 (responding to criticisms against U.S. targeting practices); Letter to President Obama, *supra* note 217 (noting President Obama’s stated intention to limit the use of lethal force).

219. See ANTHONY DWORKIN, EUROPEAN COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, DRONES AND TARGETED KILLING: DEFINING A EUROPEAN POSITION 2–4 (2013) (discussing domestic opposition to drone strikes among E.U. member States).

220. See Letter to President Obama, *supra* note 217 (asking for a clearer standard for drone strikes); ZENKO, *supra* note 217, at 16–17 (noting that the United States has offered multiple legal justifications for drone strikes).

221. AP I art. 1(3).

222. Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, 1 Bevans 631.

223. United States v. von Leeb et al. [High Command Trial], 11 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW NO. 10, at 532 (1950).

224. See George Aldrich, *New Life for the Laws of War*, 75 AM. J. INT’L L. 764, 764 (1981) (noting that the Additional Protocols were created to address the deficiencies in the Geneva Conventions).

225. *Id.*

In the ensuing two and a half decades, the United States has remained a non-Party.²²⁶ Still, 174 States are Party to the Protocol, including most NATO allies and States with which the United States frequently operates militarily, such as Canada, the United Kingdom, and Australia.²²⁷

To date, the United States has issued no comprehensive expression of *opinio juris* regarding those provisions of AP I it regards as reflecting customary international law.²²⁸ Although it is clear from U.S. practice, training, and doctrine that certain key provisions, such as the proportionality aspects of Articles 51 and 57, are accepted as customary,²²⁹ little is known beyond that. For instance, does the United States accept the definition of perfidy only with the exclusion of the reference to “capture,” as is sometimes asserted?²³⁰ Does it continue to take the position that the provisions on the environment do not reflect customary law? Is the U.S. position on military objectives that “war-sustaining” objects are included, as appears to be the case from the Navy/Marine Corps/Coast Guard manual, but which has been criticized as a distortion of the law?²³¹ What is the current U.S. position regarding combatant status for those members of a militia group belonging to a Party to the conflict, but who do not wear distinguishing attire or symbols when conducting an attack?²³²

When trying to discern the U.S. legal position with respect to these and other unsettled issues, scholars and practitioners turn to three sources. The first two are internal Department of Defense memoranda, one to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,²³³ the other to an Assistant General Counsel.²³⁴ Both cover the same ground and are distinguished by their brevity and restatement of the obvious.²³⁵ The third is a speech by the then Deputy Legal Adviser of the State Department at an academic conference in 1987 that was reprinted in the *American University Journal*

226. *Treaties and States Party to Such Treaties: Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I)*, 8 June 1977, ICRC, https://www.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/States.xsp?xp_viewStates=XPages_NORMStatesParties&xp_treatySelected=470 (last visited Apr. 8, 2015) [hereinafter *ICRC Additional Protocol Parties*].

227. *Id.*

228. See generally Theodor Meron et al., Customary Law and Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions for Protection of War Victims: Future Directions in Light of the U.S. Decision Not to Ratify, Panel Discussion, in 81 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 26 (1987).

229. Cf. Koh, American Society Remarks, *supra* note 144 (discussing the rigorous implementation of proportionality and distinction throughout the planning and execution of lethal operations in the Obama Administration).

230. See AP I art. 37 (stating the prohibition of perfidy elements).

231. NWP 1-14M, *supra* note 55, para. 8.2; YORAM DINSTEIN, THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES UNDER THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT 95–96 (2d ed. 2010).

232. See AP I art. 44 (reciting the rule under the Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions).

233. Memorandum to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on Protocols I and II—Humanitarian Law during Armed Conflict, Office of the Ass't Sec'y of Def., (Nov. 7, 1977) [hereinafter Memorandum to the Chairman] (on file with author).

234. Memorandum from W. Hays Parks et al. to Mr. John H. McNeill, Ass't Gen. Counsel, Office of the Sec'y of Def. (May 9, 1986), in U.S. ARMY JUDGE ADVOCATE GEN.'S LEGAL CTR. & SCH., LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT DOCUMENTARY SUPPLEMENT 234–35 (William J. Johnson ed., 2014) [hereinafter Memorandum to John H. McNeill].

235. Compare Memorandum to the Chairman, *supra* note 233, with Memorandum to John H. McNeill, *supra* note 234, at 234–35 (listing the provisions of the 1977 Protocols Additional to the Geneva Conventions that were already part of customary international law).

of *International Law and Policy*.²³⁶ To provide guidance to its judge advocates, the U.S. Army has reprinted the second memorandum and a summary of the article in its current 2014 *Law of Armed Conflict Documentary Supplement*.²³⁷

This lack of *opinio juris* is problematic. U.S. forces have been at war over a decade with little official guidance as to those aspects of AP I, the most comprehensive conduct of hostilities treaty, the United States believes are customary in nature.²³⁸ Moreover, in both of its major conflicts, U.S. troops operated alongside forces subject to the Protocol and in many cases commanded those troops in combat, thereby raising important questions of legal interoperability.²³⁹

Finally, especially illustrative of the U.S. reluctance to set forth its IHL positions openly is the tortured process to produce a Department of Defense (DoD) Law of War Manual.²⁴⁰ Although military manuals are not themselves expressions of *opinio juris* because they are often based in part on operational and policy concerns, they serve as useful evidence thereof.²⁴¹ Presently, the Army Manual dates from 1956,²⁴² the Navy/Marine Corps/Coast Guard Manual is a 2007 product,²⁴³ and the Air Force no longer has a manual in force.²⁴⁴ In 1996, the Army Judge Advocate General's sensible proposal that a manual be produced for all four DoD services was accepted.²⁴⁵ It took nearly a decade and a half to produce a draft,²⁴⁶ a particularly

236. Matheson, *supra* note 67; see also Abraham D. Sofaer, Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep't of State, Remarks on the Position of the United States on Current Law of War Agreements (Jan. 22, 1987), in 2 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 460, 467-68 (1987) (discussing why the Joint Chiefs of Staff found AP I to be "militarily unacceptable").

237. U.S. ARMY JUDGE ADVOCATE GEN.'S LEGAL CTR. & SCH., LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT DOCUMENTARY SUPPLEMENT 232-35 (William J. Johnson ed., 2014).

238. See Cadwalader, *supra* note 65, at 135 ("Unfortunately, there is no single authoritative reference detailing those provisions of AP I the US accepts as an accurate restatement of customary international law or other legal obligations, or that it follows as a matter of policy during armed conflict.").

239. The U.S. has not ratified AP I, but many States that have assisted the U.S. in armed conflicts over the past decade have ratified AP I. ICRC *Additional Protocol Parties*, *supra* note 226.

240. See W. Hays Parks, Update on the DOD Law of War Manual, Address before the American Bar Association Standing Committee on National Security, at 6 (Nov. 30 2012) [hereinafter Parks, Update on the DOD Law of War Manual], available at <http://www.lawfareblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/12/Parks.Manual.pdf> (detailing the failure of the 2010 draft of the manual); Robert Chesney, *Hays Parks on the Demise of the DOD War Manual*, LAWFARE (Dec. 8 2012), <http://www.lawfareblog.com/2012/12/hays-parks-on-the-demise-of-the-dod-law-of-war-manual/> ("The effort to publish that manual now appears to be dead in the water, for better or worse, and the speech Hays gave at last week's meeting is something of a post-mortem providing his view as to why things stalled."); Edwin Williamson & Hays Parks, *Where is the Law of War Manual?*, 18 WKLY. STANDARD (July 22, 2013), http://www.weeklystandard.com/articles/where-law-war-manual_739267.html?nopager=1 (discussing both the fourteen year process of drafting the manual as well as the sudden thirty month delay in approving the manual); Cadwalader, *supra* note 65, at 156 (stating that "the author of this paper has been informed that the Manual remains under review and its release date is uncertain").

241. See Cadwalader, *supra* note 65, at 160-68 (interpreting AP I in light of the Army Field Manual and the Navy/Marine Corps/Coast Guard Manual).

242. DEP'T OF THE ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 27-10: THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE (1956) [hereinafter FM 27-10].

243. See generally NWP 1-14M, *supra* note 55.

244. The Air Force manual has been rescinded. DEP'T OF THE AIR FORCE, JUDGE ADVOCATE GEN., AIR FORCE PAMPHLET 110-34, COMMANDER'S HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT (1980).

245. Williamson & Parks, *supra* note 240.

246. See *id.* (remarking that the Department of Defense (DoD) working group spent fourteen years to

unfortunate pace given that two major wars replete with extraordinarily complex legal issues were underway for much of the period. Acceptance of the draft appears to have become the victim of interagency disagreement.²⁴⁷

As a result, the Army operates armed with a manual that is 58 years old and the Air Force “flies and fights” without any comprehensive published legal guidance.²⁴⁸ In the absence of formal guidance, U.S. forces are sometimes forced to train, operate, and render legal advice based on documents issued by non-State actors, including some of those mentioned *supra*.²⁴⁹ The situation is regrettable not only for its failure to support serving military lawyers and commanders, but also as yet another example of U.S. retreat from active IHL *opinio juris*.

IV. CYBER *OPINIO JURIS*

Clearly, the absence of authoritative State *opinio juris* impoverishes IHL discussions, debates, and deliberations, both descriptive and normative. Whatever one’s opinion of the substantive quality or correctness of a State’s particular expression of *opinio juris*, State legal opinions provide indispensable control samples for meaningful analysis and critique. The efforts of, inter alia, legal practitioners, judges, government legal advisers, scholars, commanders, humanitarian workers, members of the media, and policy makers inexorably suffer when States fail to clarify and update their views on the content, interpretation, and future direction of IHL.

The question is, of course, whether the unfortunate tendency of States to shy away from expressions of *opinio juris* will continue to plague IHL? It is a question of seminal importance in light of new forms and means of warfare. Of these, the emergence of cyberspace as a pervasive aspect of conflict²⁵⁰ presents the most pressing demand for *opinio juris*. Indeed, States’ armed forces have been quick to embrace cyberspace as a domain of military operations.²⁵¹

produce the first draft of the manual).

247. See *id.* (explaining major policy disagreements among Departments of State, Justice, and Defense); see also Parks, Update on the DOD Law of War Manual, *supra* note 240 (indicating consensus of the agencies involved after the first draft of the manual was produced in 2010 has since ended). *But see* Letter from Robert S. Taylor, Acting General Counsel, Dep’t of Def. to Editor of The Weekly Standard (July 18, 2013), available at http://www.lawfareblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/Letter-to-The-Weekly-Standard_18Jul2013.pdf (responding to the Williamson and Parks article *supra* note 240 and emphasizing that experts are still working cooperatively and diligently to produce the final version of the manual).

248. See FM 27-10, *supra* note 242 (dating from July 1956); see DEP’T OF THE AIR FORCE, *supra* note 244 (noting the Army Manual was written in 1956 and the Air Force manual has been rescinded).

249. E.g., *Emmerson Report*, *supra* note 13.

250. See, e.g., DEP’T OF DEFENSE, STRATEGY FOR OPERATING IN CYBERSPACE 2–4 (J2011) [hereinafter STRATEGY FOR OPERATING IN CYBERSPACE], available at <http://www.defense.gov/news/d20110714cyber.pdf> (describing various threats and potential vulnerabilities posed by malicious cyber attacks that could affect military, public, and private interests); JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUBLICATION 3–13, INFORMATION OPERATIONS vii (2012), available at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_13.pdf [hereinafter INFORMATION OPERATIONS] (“The nation’s state and non-state adversaries are equally aware of the significance of this new technology, and will use information-related capabilities . . . to gain advantages in the information environment, just as they would use more traditional military technologies to gain advantages in other operational environments.”).

251. See, e.g., STRATEGY FOR OPERATING IN CYBERSPACE, *supra* note 250, at 5 (“Though the networks and systems that make up cyberspace are man-made, often privately owned, and primarily

Cyber operations began to capture the attention of the international legal community in the 1990s.²⁵² However, the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, refocused attention on the law of counterterrorism and the law governing the counterinsurgency operations that came to characterize the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq.²⁵³ It was not until the massive cyber operations directed against Estonia in 2007, following that State's movement of a Soviet-era statue commemorating the "Great Patriotic War,"²⁵⁴ and the use of such operations during the international armed conflict between Russia and Georgia the following year,²⁵⁵ that the legal community began examining the topic of cyber law again.²⁵⁶

Initially, there was disagreement whether IHL applied at all to cyber operations given their non-kinetic nature.²⁵⁷ Assertions of non-applicability, however, fly in the face of the object and purpose of IHL. For instance, Article 36 of AP I mandates a review of new methods and means of warfare prior to their use.²⁵⁸ The requirement to review new means (weapons) is generally deemed to reflect customary law.²⁵⁹ And, as recently acknowledged by the "Group of Governmental Experts" representing fifteen countries convened by the U.N. General Assembly, international law applies to cyber activities.²⁶⁰ There is quite simply no cogent reason to exclude IHL from the ambit of applicable international law.²⁶¹

Although a majority of States, including the United States, appears to regard the existing IHL as the primary source of duties and obligations during cyber conflict,²⁶² no comprehensive treaty regime as of yet specifically regulates such

civilian in use, treating cyberspace as a domain is a critical organizing concept for DoD's national security missions. This allows DoD to organize, train, and equip for cyberspace as we do in air, land, maritime, and space to support national security interests."); *see generally* INFORMATION OPERATIONS, *supra* note 250.

252. The first conference on the subject was held at the U.S. Naval War College in 1999. *See generally Computer Network Attack and International Law*, 76 INT'L L. STUD. intro. (2002).

253. *See, e.g.*, Bellinger, War on Terrorism, *supra* note 200 (discussing changes in counterterrorism law and policy in the War on Terrorism since September 11, 2001).

254. *See, e.g.*, ENEKEN TIKK ET AL., COOP. CYBER DEF. CTR. OF EXCELLENCE, INTERNATIONAL CYBER INCIDENTS: LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS 15, 18–20 (2010), *available at* <http://www.ccdcoe.org/publications/books/legalconsiderations.pdf> (providing a history and overview of the 2007 cyber attacks on Estonia).

255. *Id.* at 67–79.

256. *Id.* at 79.

257. *See, e.g., id.* at 79–86 (discussing the applicability of international law to the Georgia conflict).

258. AP I art. 36.

259. *See* TALLINN MANUAL ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO CYBER WARFARE r. 48 (Michael N. Schmitt ed., 2013) [hereinafter TALLINN MANUAL] (identifying a review requirement as customary international law). Although some States do not acknowledge the customary nature of the norm vis-à-vis methods of warfare, this minor deviation from the text of Article 36 has little bearing on the general applicability of IHL to cyber operations.

260. U.N. Group of Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security, Rep., transmitted by the Secretary-General, para. 19, U.N. Doc. A/68/98 (June 24, 2013). The experts came from Argentina, Australia, Belarus, Canada, China, Egypt, Estonia, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Japan, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

261. The ICRC has taken this view, as did the Tallinn Manual International Group of Experts. *ICRC Challenges*, *supra* note 35, at 36–38; TALLINN MANUAL r. 22.

262. *See, e.g.*, Koh, American Society Remarks, *supra* note 144 (stating that international law applies to cyberspace). The Netherlands has likewise acknowledged that IHL applies in cyberspace. GOV'T OF THE NETH., GOVERNMENT RESPONSE TO THE AIV/CAVV REPORT ON CYBER WARFARE 5 (2012).

situations.²⁶³ There appears to be no political stomach on the part of States for adopting such treaties in the foreseeable future. As a result, the main focus of legal activity will inevitably be on interpreting existing international law in the context of cyber operations; for IHL, this means determining when cyber operations rise to the level of an armed conflict if unaccompanied by kinetic operations²⁶⁴ and ascertaining how extant IHL principles and rules designed for a kinetic environment apply to cyber operations.²⁶⁵

Continuing the trend discussed *supra*, States have offered no granular expressions of *opinio juris* on the subject. On the contrary, elucidation of the particulars and details of the purported international regulation of cyber hostilities has been left almost entirely to non-State legal conjecture. The emergence of cyberspace seems to have captured the attention of IHL scholars, and those concerned with the use of force under *jus ad bellum*, to a greater extent than any other community of international legal commentators. A growing body of scholarship on a broad range of IHL cyber issues now exists, the most significant of which is the 2013 *Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare*.²⁶⁶

Produced by an International Group of Experts (IGE) invited by the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCD COE), the *Tallinn Manual* identifies 95 customary international law rules of *jus ad bellum* and IHL and includes an extensive commentary that captures majority and minority viewpoints on their interpretation.²⁶⁷ The experts included academics, former senior military lawyers, and former NGO legal advisors, as well as non-voting observers from the ICRC, U.S. Cyber Command, and NATO.²⁶⁸ While the process relied upon the logistical and financial support of the CCD COE, the manual itself was not a NATO product.²⁶⁹ Its rules reflect only the views of the IGE, the members of which were all participating in their personal capacity.²⁷⁰ On many topics of relevance to cyber warfare, the *Tallinn Manual* provides the most extensive and thorough legal analysis currently available.²⁷¹

263. Mark A. Kochuk, *Symposium Review: Is There A Need for International Cyber Warfare Treaties?*, N. C. J. INT'L & COM. REG. BLOG (Feb. 13, 2014), <http://blogs.law.unc.edu/ncilj/2014/02/13/symposium-review-is-there-a-need-for-international-cyber-warfare-treaties/>.

264. JEREMY A. RABKIN & ARIEL RABKIN, HOOVER INST. STANFORD UNIV., TO CONFRONT CYBER THREATS, WE MUST RETHINK THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 3–6 (2012), *available at* http://www.hoover.org/sites/default/files/uploads/inline/docs/EmergingThreats_Rabkin.pdf.

265. *Id.* at 6.

266. *See generally* TALLINN MANUAL. The authors were both members of the International Group of Experts that produced the *Manual*.

267. *See generally id.*

268. *Id.* Int'l Grp. of Experts.

269. *Id.* intro.

270. *Id.*

271. *See* Liis Vihul & Michael N. Schmitt, *The Tallinn Manual on Cyber Warfare—A First Tool for Legal Practitioners*, FIFTEENEIGHTYFOUR (Nov. 13, 2013), <http://www.cambridgeblog.org/2013/11/the-tallinn-manual-on-cyber-warfare-a-first-tool-for-legal-practitioners-michael-schmitt-liis-vihul-nato/> [hereinafter Vihul & Schmitt, *First Tool for Legal Practitioners*] (recognizing the *Tallinn Manual* as the first detailed look at the law applicable to hostile cyber operations).

The *Tallinn Manual* has been cited widely in academic literature and at conferences.²⁷² Anecdotally, State reactions to it have been largely positive.²⁷³ But no State has commented on the *Manual's* conclusions in any comprehensive or definitive manner, nor has any State or group of States produced an analogous or competing product. And although the vast majority of the *Tallinn Manual's* statements of law and commentary appear consistent with what little is known of State views on the application of IHL to cyber warfare, actual State expressions of *opinio juris* on the topics it addresses remain exceedingly vague.²⁷⁴ For instance, shortly before publication, former State Department Legal Adviser Harold Koh delivered remarks on the applicability of international law to cyber operations.²⁷⁵ They included a firm commitment to apply existing IHL to situations of armed conflict involving cyber activities.²⁷⁶ But Koh failed to stake out clear or comprehensive positions with respect to most of the thorny legal issues identified in the *Tallinn Manual*.²⁷⁷ The remarks drew attention since they were the first foray into the subject,²⁷⁸ but they did little more than state the obvious.

There are, of course, colorable reasons for State reticence to set forth views on how IHL applies to cyber operations. To begin with, legal ambiguity may benefit States by affording them greater leeway to conduct and respond to cyber operations during an armed conflict.²⁷⁹ Moreover, at this nascent stage in the development of cyber capabilities and threats, States may be conflicted as to the optimal position to take when interpreting existing law.²⁸⁰ To illustrate, the United States is especially vulnerable to cyber operations due to the pervasive reliance of its armed forces on computers and computer networks, as well as the dependency of its civilian activities on cyber activities and infrastructure.²⁸¹ Yet, the country's armed forces also wield impressive cyber capabilities, as exemplified by the establishment of U.S. Cyber Command and its service components, which it can bring to bear on enemy forces.²⁸²

272. See, e.g., the forum on the *Tallinn Manual*, in 15 Y.B. INT'L HUMAN. L. 3–58 (2012); Dieter Fleck, *Searching for International Rules Applicable to Cyber Warfare—A Critical First Assessment of the New Tallinn Manual*, 18 J. CONFLICT AND SECURITY L. 331 (2013).

273. Vihul & Schmitt, *First Tool for Legal Practitioners*, *supra* note 271.

274. See generally Koh, American Society Remarks, *supra* note 144 (discussing the U.S. Government's views on international law and cyber warfare).

275. *Id.*

276. *Id.*

277. See generally Michael N. Schmitt, *International Law in Cyberspace: The Koh Speech and Tallinn Manual Juxtaposed*, 54 HARV. INT'L L.J. ONLINE 13, 15 (2012) [hereinafter Schmitt, *Speech and Manual Juxtaposed*] (providing “analytical granularity as to the legal basis for the positions proffered in the Koh Speech”).

278. Ellen Nakashima, *Cyberattacks Could Trigger Self-Defense Rule, U.S. Official Says*, WASH. POST, Sept. 18, 2012, www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/us-official-says-cyberattacks-can-trigger-self-defense-rule/2012/09/18/c2246c1a-0202-11e2-b260-32f4a8db9b7e_story.html.

279. See Schmitt, *Rewired Warfare*, *supra* note 25, at 2, 4–7 (explaining that the permissive approach to applying IHL to cyber operations allows for a wider range of cyber operations against the civilian population).

280. See *id.* at 2–3 (explaining the three different approaches used in interpreting how to apply IHL to cyber operations: permissive, restrictive, and the *Tallinn Manual's* new approach).

281. Michael Assante, *America's Critical Infrastructure Is Vulnerable to Cyber Attacks*, FORBES (Sept. 11, 2014), <http://www.forbes.com/sites/realspin/2014/11/11/americas-critical-infrastructure-is-vulnerable-to-cyber-attacks/>.

282. Schmitt, *Rewired Warfare*, *supra* note 25, at 2.

The United States resultantly finds itself on the horns of a dilemma. A normatively permissive regime would place its military operations and civilian population at risk, but empower it to conduct aggressive cyber activities; a restrictive regime would confine its military options, but likewise limit the enemy's ability to exploit its cyber vulnerabilities or target its civilian population. Justified or not, the hesitancy of States to offer expressions of *opinio juris* on the law of cyber warfare has become palpable.

While States may not be prepared to comment expansively or with any degree of precision on how they believe IHL governs cyber operations, a number of key topics are plainly ripe for expressions of *opinio juris*. With debate over these topics in the academy and the NGO community maturing, States risk forfeiting the opportunity to shape the future legal environment of this "fifth domain" of warfare.²⁸³ A sampling of four of the more contentious topics illustrates the importance of proactively engaging in their normative development.

First, the threshold question regarding the applicability of any IHL principle or rule is always whether a state of armed conflict exists, and, if so, whether that conflict is international or non-international in character.²⁸⁴ Should an armed conflict not exist, human rights and domestic law will govern any forceful cyber operations that are mounted, not IHL.²⁸⁵ These latter bodies of law do not countenance "attacks" (a term discussed *infra*) based on the status of the target (e.g., combatant, civilian direct participant in hostilities, military objective); there is accordingly no "belligerent immunity" for attacking lawful targets, as there would be during an armed conflict.²⁸⁶ Therefore, absent an armed conflict, cyber operations likely to cause direct or indirect physical harm may only lawfully be launched in self-defense, defense of others, or other situations allowing the use of force; in other words, cyber operations may be conducted only pursuant to a "law enforcement" legal regime.²⁸⁷

Of course, to the extent that kinetic hostilities qualify a conflict as international or non-international, IHL applicable in each of these two forms of armed conflict would apply to associated cyber operations.²⁸⁸ The problematic question is instead whether a cyber exchange that includes no kinetic component can qualify as armed conflict, thereby opening the door to IHL. International armed conflict requires that there be "hostilities" between two or more States.²⁸⁹ Although there are differences

283. See DEPT OF DEF., QUADRENNIAL DEFENSE REVIEW REPORT 37 (2010), available at <http://www.defense.gov/qdr/qdr%20as%20of%2026jan10%200700.pdf> (listing cyberspace as a relevant domain for the DoD along with "land, sea, air, and space").

284. See Michael N. Schmitt, *Classification of Cyber Conflict*, 89 INT'L L. STUD. 233, 233 (2013) [hereinafter Schmitt, *Classification*] (stating that classifying a conflict as either international or non-international "is always the first step" in ILH analysis).

285. See *id.* at 236–39 (describing the ways in which the Geneva Conventions apply to armed conflicts).

286. Michael N. Schmitt, *International Law and Cyberwar: A Response to the Ethics of Cyberweapons*, ETHICS & INT'L AFF. (Feb. 10, 2014), <http://www.ethicsandinternationalaffairs.org/2014/international-law-and-cyberwar-a-response-to-the-ethics-of-cyberweapons/>.

287. Eighth U.N. Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, Havana, Aug. 27–Sept. 7, 1990, Rep. of the Secretariat, at 108–14, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.144/28/Rev.1 (1991) (describing when law enforcement officials may properly use force).

288. Schmitt, *Classification*, *supra* note 284, at 239–40.

289. The accepted articulation of an IAC is found in Common Article 2 of the four 1949 Geneva Conventions. See *supra* note 9.

of opinion as to the requisite level of violence necessary to qualify a situation as an IAC,²⁹⁰ there is general consensus that the threshold is low.²⁹¹ The question is how low. Must there be physical consequences such as damage or injury? If so, how much? In this respect, the IGE was divided as to whether the damage to Iranian centrifuges during the Stuxnet operations crossed the armed conflict line, assuming, of course, that other States were behind the operation.²⁹² There is evidently ample room for States to begin the process of developing the threshold vis-à-vis cyber operations.

Characterization of a situation as a NIAC, that is, conflict between a State and an organized armed group, or between two or more organized armed groups, is even more challenging in the cyber context.²⁹³ Like IAC, once a situation qualifies as a NIAC, any cyber operations occurring as an element of that conflict will be governed by IHL.²⁹⁴ A purely cyber exchange would be assessed against the two requirements for a NIAC articulated in the *Tadić* judgment by the ICTY for kinetic conflict.²⁹⁵ There the tribunal held that the hostilities in question must have reached a particular level of intensity such that they can be distinguished from mere civil disturbances, riots, and the like, and they must involve an organized armed group.²⁹⁶

This test raises the question of whether a cyber campaign can qualify as sufficiently intense to satisfy the first criterion. Is the issue simply one of consequences, such that only cyber operations that, for example, result in widespread destruction or death qualify? Or does intensity refer to operations of a particular nature, like those that are violent in nature and occur openly? And may a group that is organized entirely online qualify as an organized armed group for the purpose of meeting the second criterion? It is common for members of online groups to not know each other.²⁹⁷ May such a group be “organized” in the IHL sense?²⁹⁸ How would it enforce discipline, a commonly accepted requirement for organization?²⁹⁹ What if, as happened in the Estonia and Georgia cases, individuals throughout a country, and even abroad, began conducting cyber operations against the State based solely on online calls to do so?³⁰⁰ Should such operations be considered a NIAC if

290. See TALLINN MANUAL r. 22 cmt. 12 (noting that “controversy exists as to the threshold of the requisite violence”).

291. *Id.*

292. *Id.* r. 22 cmt. 14.

293. The accepted articulation of a NIAC is found in Common Article 3 of the four 1949 Geneva Conventions. See *supra* note 9.

294. See Herbert Lin, *Cyber Conflict and International Humanitarian Law*, 94 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 515 (2012) (commenting that non-state actors’ relevance increases in cyber conflict and discussing what should be done about cyber conflict in international law).

295. See Schmitt, *Classification*, *supra* note 284, at 245 (discussing that the ICTY stated that a NIAC had to be “organized” and “armed”).

296. *Prosecutor v. Tadić*, Case No. IT-94-1-I, Decision on Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, para. 70 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995).

297. Schmitt, *Classification*, *supra* note 284, at 246.

298. *Id.*

299. *Id.*

300. Compare TALLINN MANUAL r. 23 cmt. 5 (discussing “the calls that appeared on the Internet for riots by the Russian minority in Estonia in 2007”), with Dancho Danchev, *Coordinated Russia vs Georgia Cyber Attack in Progress*, ZDNET (Aug. 11, 2008) <http://www.zdnet.com/blog/security/coordinated-russia-vs-georgia-cyber-attack-in-progress/1670> (discussing “self-mobilization of the local Internet users by

they meet the intensity requirement? The need for States to express *opinio juris* on the characterization of cyber conflicts is acute since the existence of an armed conflict, or not, will shape the response options available to them when facing hostile cyber operations.³⁰¹

Equally important is the second topic, the meaning of the term “attack” in the cyber context.³⁰² Many IHL rules that extend protection to particular persons and objects, or that dictate how certain military operations may be conducted, are framed in terms of “attacks.”³⁰³ For instance, it is prohibited to directly “attack” civilians or civilian objects.³⁰⁴ It is also prohibited to conduct an “attack” against a valid military objective if the expected collateral damage would be excessive to the anticipated military advantage of the operation.³⁰⁵ The question in the cyber context is whether these rules are applicable to a particular cyber operation such that, for example, it may not be directed at civilian cyber infrastructure, or is prohibited because the effect of the operation on civilian systems is likely to be excessive. They will apply if the cyber operation qualifies as an attack; they will not if the operation does not so qualify.

It is widely agreed that a cyber operation that directly or indirectly causes physical damage or injury to persons during an armed conflict qualifies as an attack and is therefore subject to the various IHL principles and rules governing such operations.³⁰⁶ General consensus also exists that cyber operations resulting in mere inconvenience or slight disruption to cyber activities are not attacks in the IHL sense.³⁰⁷ The unresolved question is: “When do cyber operations falling between these two ends of the continuum amount to attacks?” The IGE struggled with this issue throughout the three years of the *Tallinn Manual* project.³⁰⁸ Eventually, the majority agreed that a cyber operation significantly affecting the “functionality” of cyber infrastructure is an attack.³⁰⁹ This conclusion was not unanimous.³¹⁰ Moreover, there were differences of opinion within the majority. For example, the experts concerned disagreed on whether a cyber operation that required reloading the operating system or otherwise necessitated replacement of key data qualified.³¹¹

spreading ‘For our motherland, brothers!’ or ‘Your country is calling you!’ hacktivist messages across web forums”).

301. Schmitt, *Classification*, *supra* note 284, at 250 (explaining the role of *opinio juris* in regards to cyber operations).

302. *See id.* at 239–44 (discussing the difficulties of classifying cyber operations as an attack).

303. *See id.* (discussing attacks as defined by the ICRC).

304. ICRC, *From Law to Action*, *supra* note 37, at 62, 65.

305. *See id.* at 62 (condemning the massive killing of civilians in armed attacks and urging compliance with the principles of IHL).

306. *See* TALLINN MANUAL r. 30 (“A cyber attack is a cyber operation, whether offensive or defensive, that is reasonably expected to cause injury or death to persons or damage or destruction to objects.”).

307. *Id.* r. 94.

308. Schmitt, *Rewired Warfare*, *supra* note 25, at 9.

309. TALLINN MANUAL r. 30 cmt. 10.

310. Schmitt, *Rewired Warfare*, *supra* note 25, at 9–10.

311. *Id.*; *see also* Cordula Droege, *Get Off My Cloud: Cyber Warfare, International Humanitarian Law, and the Protection of Civilians*, 94 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 533, 557–59 (2012) (analyzing the functionality test in the *Tallinn Manual*).

The issue of the qualification of cyber operations as attacks lies at the heart of IHL's application in the cyber context. A narrow interpretation of the notion would open the door to highly disruptive cyber operations directed against the civilian population and other protected persons and objects.³¹² Consider the impact of non-destructive but widespread cyber operations targeting the enemy's economy or governmental functions.³¹³ The severity of the consequences would far outstrip those of many kinetic operations.³¹⁴ It would seem incongruent to interpret IHL to allow the former, but not the latter. On the other hand, a broad interpretation of attack could limit military operations well beyond what is currently acceptable. Psychological operations directed at the civilian population, for example, have long been conducted by militaries.³¹⁵ Should such operations now be prohibited merely because the medium used is cyber in nature? Unless States begin to address the issue of where the line between a mere operation and one that qualifies as an attack lies, the issue will be addressed for them by non-State actors in a manner that may prove difficult to reverse.

A third area of uncertainty involves who may be attacked by cyber means.³¹⁶ Objectively, the universe of lawful human targets is well settled: combatants, members of organized armed groups, and civilians who are directly participating in hostilities.³¹⁷ Practical application, however, remains muddled. Recall the debate over the purported continuous combat function criterion for targeting members of an organized armed group.³¹⁸ In contemporary conflicts, organized armed groups often rely heavily on cyber assets for, *inter alia*, communications, logistics functions, intelligence gathering, and psychological operations.³¹⁹ To what extent are members of the group who maintain and operate cyber infrastructure for these purposes engaging in a continuous combat function and, if they are not, should they be immune from direct attack on that basis? Assuming, solely for the purpose of analysis, that such individuals are immune from direct attack, any expected incidental harm to them during an attack on other members of the group would have to be factored into the proportionality calculation and would be a consideration in

312. See Droegge, *supra* note 311, at 538–40 (discussing cyber operations' possible effects on civilian infrastructure).

313. See, e.g., TALLINN MANUAL intro. (explaining that the United Kingdom considers cyber attacks to be Tier One threat to national security and "one of the most serious national security, public safety, and economic challenges we face as a nation").

314. Cf. *id.* (highlighting the seriousness with which the United Kingdom takes such threats).

315. See *id.* r. 11 cmt. 9(h) ("[I]nternational law does not prohibit propaganda, psychological operations, espionage, or mere economic pressure *per se*. Therefore, acts falling into these and other such categories are presumptively legal . . ."); DEP'T OF THE ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 3-05.30: PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS 1-7 (discussing psychological operations of the U.S. forces in Romania during World War I).

316. See TALLINN MANUAL intro. ("One of the challenges States face in the cyber environment is that the scope and manner of international law's applicability to cyber operations, whether in offence or defence, has remained unsettled since their advent."); Droegge, *supra* note 311, at 540–41, 553–56 (discussing various scholarly authors' arguments on the question of who can be attacked by cyber warfare).

317. TALLINN MANUAL r. 34 cmts. 1–9.

318. See *supra* notes 89–97 and accompanying text.

319. TALLINN MANUAL r. 6 cmt. 8; r. 22 cmts. 6–7; r. 31 cmt. 5.

determining the precautions that would be required in conducting the attack.³²⁰ On the other hand, if their role does qualify as a continuous combat function, or if no continuous combat function criterion exists as a matter of law, the individuals concerned could lawfully be attacked directly and any indirect harm they suffered during an attack on other persons or objects would have no proportionality or precautions in attack implications.³²¹

Similar interpretive dilemmas stand in the way of clear application of the direct participation by civilians in hostilities rule discussed *supra*. For instance, when does maintenance or operation of enemy cyber infrastructure by a civilian who is not a member of an organized armed group rise to the level of direct participation in hostilities? Is there a difference between maintenance of cyber infrastructure used by enemy forces for purposes unrelated to the conflict (e.g., at a military school) and maintenance of systems used to conduct cyber attacks? Does it matter if the cyber infrastructure is dual use (used for both military and civilian purposes) or used exclusively by the military? Is the creation of malware that is incidentally used by enemy forces an act of direct participation? Must the malware be intended for enemy use? Or must it be created for a particular enemy cyber operation? Is passive cyber defense of enemy systems an act of direct participation such that contractors who perform the task lose their immunity from attack? State expressions of *opinio juris* as to the proper criteria to employ in assessing these and many other activities would contribute measurably to consistent application of the rule in the cyber context and help shape it in a fashion that advances both military necessity and humanitarian concerns.

A final topic illustrating the need for expressions of *opinio juris* involves the requirement to take care to minimize harm to civilians and civilian objects when conducting an attack.³²² Assuming 1) IHL applies because the situation is one of armed conflict, 2) the cyber operation is an attack and therefore subject to the IHL rules thereon, and 3) the individual or object against which the cyber attack is directed qualifies as a lawful target, an attacker must still take all feasible measures to limit incidental harm to civilians and civilian objects.³²³ In particular, the attacker must engage in reasonable steps to verify the target, endeavor to employ methods or means of attack that minimize harm to civilians or civilian objects without sacrificing military advantage, and select targets the attack upon which will minimize civilian harm while achieving the attacker's sought after effect.³²⁴

320. See DPH GUIDANCE, *supra* note 51, at 1024 (determining that “a direct attack against the [civilian driver of an ammunition truck] would have to take the probable death of the civilian driver into account in the proportionality assessment”).

321. *Id.* at 994 n.6.

322. AP I art. 57; 1 CUSTOMARY IHL STUDY r. 15.

323. See AP I art. 57(2)(a)–(b) (requiring that those conducting military operations “[t]ake all feasible precautions in the choice of means and methods of attack with a view to avoiding, and in any event to minimizing, incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians and damage to civilian objects; [r]efrain from deciding to launch any attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated;” and cancel or suspend an attack “if it becomes apparent that the . . . attack may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated . . .”).

324. See generally *id.*

Application of the precautions in attack rule is problematic in the cyber context, in part because military commanders and operational planners generally lack the depth of understanding of cyber operations that they have of kinetic attacks.³²⁵ Therefore, when cyber operations are a component of an operation, it is more difficult for them to understand how best to verify the status of a potential cyber target as a lawful military objective, identify the various options available with respect to cyber weapons and potential cyber targets, and assess the collateral effects of the proposed cyber operations.³²⁶ Additionally, the complexity of cyber networking and the difficulty of assessing bleed over effects complicate application of the obligation to take precautions in attack.³²⁷ As an example, it will often be difficult to gauge likely collateral damage when attacking dual use cyber infrastructure or cyber infrastructure networked into civilian systems.³²⁸ Without fully understanding the scope of potential collateral damage, identifying and assessing those measures available to avoid potential collateral damage becomes problematic.

Perhaps the greatest obstacle to application of the rule is the fact that an attacker is only required to take “feasible” precautions in attack.³²⁹ Feasibility is assessed on a case-by-case basis taking into account such factors as the target setting, the availability of other weapons, competing demands for ISR assets, and the intended effect of the operation.³³⁰ Doing so in the kinetic environment is difficult;

325. See Schmitt, *Speech and Manual Juxtaposed*, *supra* note 277, at 25–31 (explaining the difficulties of applying international humanitarian law principles, particularly proportionality, to cyber attacks).

326. For instance, an object that has both military and civilian purposes can be classified as “military,” and, therefore, a proper target, even if the military use of the objective is only marginal. Droege, *supra* note 311, at 562–64. “The consequence of this would be that in some circumstances virtually all parts of the Internet might qualify as a military objective because they are all possible routes for the transmission of military information.” *Id.* at 564. See also TALLINN MANUAL r. 39 cmt. 3 (“Cyber operations pose unique challenges in this regard. Consider a network that is being used for both military and civilian purposes. It may be impossible to know over which part of the network military transmissions, as distinct from civilian ones, will pass. In such cases, the entire network (or at least those aspects in which transmission is reasonably likely) qualifies as a military objective.”).

327. See Droege, *supra* note 311, at 564 (discussing the difficulties in assessing whether cyber networks are civilian or military); TALLINN MANUAL r. 52 cmt. 6 (“Given the complexity of cyber operations, the high probability of affecting civilian systems, and the sometimes limited understanding of their nature and effects on the part of those charged with approving cyber operations, mission planners should, where feasible, have technical experts available to assist them in determining whether appropriate precautionary measures have been taken.”).

328. See, e.g., *id.* at 539 (“[I]t is to a large extent impossible to differentiate between purely civilian and purely military computer infrastructure. . . . [T]his poses a serious challenge to one of the cardinal principles of IHL, namely the principle of distinction between military and civilian objects. Moreover, even if military and civilian computers or computer systems are not entirely one and the same, interconnectivity means that the effects of an attack on a military target may not be confined to this target. . . . [A]n attack on a military computer system may well also damage civilian computer systems, which, in turn, may be vital for some civilian services such as water or electricity supply or the transfer of assets.”).

329. See AP I art. 57(2)(a)(ii) (“Those who plan or decide upon an attack shall . . . [t]ake all *feasible* precautions in the choice of means and methods of attack with a view to avoiding, and in any event to minimizing, incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians and damage to civilian objects” (emphasis added)).

330. See TALLINN MANUAL r. 53 cmt. 5 (“[F]easible precautions might include gathering intelligence on the network through mapping or other processes in order to allow those responsible reasonably to determine the attack’s likely effects, particularly on the civilian population or civilian objects. There is no

in light of the factors just mentioned,³³¹ assessing feasibility in the cyber environment will be even more so. As with the example, it is essential that States begin to shape expectations as to the requisite precautions in cyber attack. Inattention to this practical need risks the advent of requirements that may frustrate the achievement of legitimate military objectives.

The four examples are far from exhaustive. However they do illustrate the severity of risks that States will be assuming if the trend of refraining from offering clear expressions of *opinio juris* regarding IHL endures. The risks are particularly grave with respect to cyber operations because such operations are typically classified. Thus, there will often be no visible State practice from which to draw even inferences of *opinio juris*. As non-State actors engage in activities that take the place of State expressions of *opinio juris* in the development and interpretation of IHL cyber norms, they may well be operating on partial or faulty information as to actual State practice.

CONCLUSION

This has been an article about process, not substance. It is meant to be neither polemical nor Manichean. It offers no comment on any position that has been asserted by non-State actors or States with respect to the interpretation of extant IHL or its apparent evolutionary vector. Instead, we simply lament the fact that States, perhaps without even realizing they have been doing so, are ceding control over the content, interpretation, and development of IHL to others. Greater sensitivity on the part of States to the centrality of expressing *opinio juris* to law formation and interpretation appears merited.

The reluctance of States and their legal representatives to communicate and commit to clear views on IHL matters vitiates legal discourse, degrading the functioning and development of a critical aspect of the international legal system. Scholars, commentators, advocates, judges, and even States' own diplomats and legal advisors are by now accustomed to resorting to speculation to resolve ambiguity concerning any number of State views on IHL. Paradoxically, in the absence of State views, such speculation can become, over time, the law. Unless the trend is reversed, States stand in peril of losing sway over debates that may significantly and adversely impact their freedom of action on the battlefield, or even place their civilian population at increased risk.

In our view, a number of important and emerging legal issues related to cyber operations during armed conflict are now ripe for expressions of *opinio juris* by States, including the United States. This should be unsurprising since not one of the existing IHL principle or rules, treaty or customary, was crafted or crystallized with cyber operations in mind. Accordingly, State expressions of *opinio juris* take on added importance as cyber capabilities are developed and fielded.

Whether to announce doctrinal details and clarifications, preserve flexibility through confirmation of ambiguity, or simply reject or confirm the existence of

obligation to take measures that are not feasible.”).

331. See 1 CUSTOMARY IHL STUDY r. 22 (discussing the fact that “small and densely populated countries . . . would find it difficult to separate civilians and civilian objects from military objectives and that even large countries would find such separation difficult or impossible to arrange in many cases”).

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particular norms, such expression of *opinio juris* manage important State legal and operational interests. Therefore, State legal agencies and agents, particularly Ministries and Departments of Defense, must be equipped, organized, and empowered to participate actively in the interpretation and development of IHL. States, and specially affected States in particular, must make responses to emerging IHL scholarship, investigations and jurisprudence a regular facet of their *opinio juris*. Reinvigorating *opinio juris* would do more than satisfy international law sovereigntists. It would foster the restoration of the pluralistic IHL dialogue that formerly tested, updated, and enriched the balance between military necessity and humanitarian considerations that necessarily underpins IHL. In no field is such activism in greater demand than the international regulation of cyber warfare.