

From ‘Peace by Dictation’ to International Organisation: Great Power Responsibility and the Creation of the United Nations

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Abstract

This article examines the attitudes of US, British, and Soviet policy-makers as they planned for the forthcoming peace during the Second World War. It charts how they moved from planning a ‘peace by dictation’ of the great powers, to planning one which would be based on a model of collective security involving all members of the United Nations alliance. The latter plan would reflect both the great powers’ special responsibilities for maintaining international peace and security and the stake which lesser powers had in such a venture. In addressing these historical developments the article employs two concepts familiar to International Relations scholarship, namely concert and hierarchy. It shows how the understandings which the principal post-war planners had of these concepts – and crucially of their inter-relationship - changed over time and the consequences of these changes. The article makes two core claims: firstly, that as post-war planning progressed, the attitudes of the Big Three towards the acceptable nature of the great power–lesser power hierarchy changed radically; and secondly, that the structure and nature of today's United Nations Organisation is in significant part a consequence of these changes.

Keywords

great powers, responsibility, concert, hierarchy, United Nations

Introduction

On 25 May 2011 US President Barack Obama followed in the footsteps of Presidents Reagan and Clinton in addressing a joint sitting of the UK's Houses of Commons and Lords. His purpose, he said, was to 'reaffirm one of the oldest, one of the strongest alliances the world has ever known', the 'special relationship' between the United States of America and the United Kingdom.¹ In a speech which focused on the continuing centrality of the United State–United Kingdom alliance to global leadership, Obama repeatedly harked back to the role which his predecessor, Franklin Delano Roosevelt, and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill played in forging the post-war settlements which to this day continue to shape so much international political discourse and practice. 'It was', he told his audience, 'the United States and the United Kingdom and [their] democratic allies that shaped a world in which new nations could emerge and individuals could thrive' and in so doing they built 'upon the broader belief of Roosevelt and Churchill that all nations have both rights and responsibilities, and all nations share a common interest in an international architecture that maintains the peace'.²

This article reflects on such sentiments and examines just how far the United States and Great Britain³ were actually motivated by a 'broader belief' in an international order built on a shared conception of 'rights and responsibilities'. The public pronouncements of their leaders certainly emphasised such notions and in particular the idea that it was the greatest powers that bore the greatest responsibilities for building and maintaining the post-war peace. Their aim, they claimed, was to establish an international order in which the strength of the most powerful states would be harnessed to the collective good, for the preservation of international order, and the protection of weak and strong alike. But does an examination of the debates and discussions surrounding the establishment of the United Nations Organisation (UNO)⁴ – the institution which came into being as a consequence of the purported pursuit of these ideas – bear out the public rhetoric? And what of the other 'Big Three'⁵ leaders; where did Soviet Premier Josef Stalin and his foreign-policy subordinates stand on such matters?

This article addresses these issues. It shows how US, British, and Soviet leaders sought throughout the first half of the 1940s to build a sustainable post-war peace based on a great-power concert. But more innovatively it shows how these leaders' views of the hierarchical relationship between this concert and the remaining membership of international society changed over this period. The article makes two core claims: firstly, that as post-war planning progressed, the attitudes of the Big Three towards the acceptable nature of the great power–lesser power hierarchy changed radically; and secondly, that these changes were a significant factor in determining the structure and nature of today's UNO. Specifically, the article argues that the Big Three leaders came – albeit to varying degrees – to recognise that their success as keepers of the peace depended not only on their material superiority and concerted action, but also on the broader recognition of their leadership by the other members of international society. Consequently, Roosevelt's initial idea that there should be 'peace by dictation'⁶ of the great powers, unencumbered by the strictures of international organisation, transformed into a view which favoured just such a formal institutional structure, complete with the great-power tempering which this would bring.

The purpose of the article is neither to challenge the existing UN historiography nor to make claims which are new to the International Relations literature on the concepts of hierarchy and concert. Rather its objective is to draw together these two bodies of work to show how the post-war international order became possible, and how it could have taken a radically

different form had the attitudinal changes noted above not occurred. It provides, therefore, an additional, enriching perspective rather than an alternative account. Similarly, the article does not assert that the issues which it discusses account fully for the great power–lesser power balance which characterised the first forty-five years of the UNO's existence. In this regard the onset of the cold war is clearly crucial, but the article does not discuss the manner in which the great-power discord of that era came to further enhance the role and prominence of less powerful states within the organisation.⁷ Nevertheless, it might confidently be asserted that but for the changes in attitude which the article does analyse, these cold-war developments would not have been possible, if for no other reason than that the concert-based system initially anticipated would have collapsed altogether rather than have evolved as the UNO of the cold-war years was able to. One final limitation of the article is that whilst it says much about how the great powers came to agree on the overall shape and nature of the post-war framework which they would propose to the other UN members, it does not address (other than in passing) the subsequent debates – between the great powers at Dumbarton Oaks in August 1944 and then between the UN membership as a whole at San Francisco in April–June 1945 – over how this framework would be operationalised.⁸ Given these parameters, the article focuses primarily on the period August 1941 to July 1944.

The article defines a concert as an arrangement between great powers in which they agree to co-operate with one another in the pursuit of commonly agreed goals. It defines hierarchy as a positional relationship between superordinate and subordinate actors. Both definitions are deliberately minimalist. The definition of concert leaves open for further discussion the motives for co-operation and bases for agreement. Similarly, the definition of hierarchy omits any specification of the basis for hierarchy, but the article considers various possible foundations, ranging from material coercion to social empowerment. No argument in favour of a particular understanding of hierarchy or concert is made, but the article does endorse the view that hierarchical and concert relations cannot be fully understood in isolation from one another.

The article proceeds in three main sections. It begins with a theoretical discussion of the apparent incongruity of a hierarchical inter-state arrangement within an anarchic international system. This section focuses on the nature of the relationship between the great and lesser powers in international society. It shows how this relationship has two dimensions or axes, a 'horizontal concert' axis, which encapsulates the relationship between the great powers, and a 'vertical hierarchy' axis, along which the great powers relate to the remainder of international society. The section considers various explanations of how relations along these axes may be sustained – ranging from material coercion to social acceptance and empowerment – and the manner in which these axes relate to one another. The second section of the article focuses on issues relating to the horizontal axis of great-power concert relations. It shows how the Big Three leaderships sought to build a concert based on a complex combination of self and social interests and how tensions between these interests often necessitated compromises, not least with regard to the question of which other states might join the Big Three in the task of post-war policing. The section also demonstrates how the maintenance of cordiality within the concert was seen as essential to the successful bearing of great-power responsibility, before closing with a brief discussion of how this consensus alone came to be viewed as an insufficient basis for post-war order. Developing further this line of argument, section three examines issues of great power–lesser power hierarchy. It shows how initially, amongst the Big Three, there existed a view that hierarchy could be sustained through material means provided that great-power concert was maintained, and how this view gave way to a belief that concert had to be accompanied by social empowerment if peace were to last. The section

charts these attitudinal changes through an examination of two key aspects of post-war planning, namely disarmament and the development of the organisational structure of what eventually became the UNO.

I. Hierarchy, concert, and the great powers

The notion of an international hierarchy premised on the special role and responsibilities of the great powers seems ill suited to an international environment populated by sovereign equals. Indeed, in direct opposition to hierarchy, it is the concept of anarchy which is central to our understanding of international relations.⁹ No single scholar has done more to shape this view of the world than Kenneth Waltz who, in his seminal text *Theory of International Politics*, famously drew a distinction between hierarchic domestic political systems and anarchic international ones. According to Waltz:

The parts of domestic political systems stand in relations of super- and subordination. Some are entitled to command; others are required to obey. Domestic systems are centralised and hierarchic. The parts of international-political systems stand in relations of coordination. Formally, each is the equal of all others. None is entitled to command; none is required to obey. International systems are decentralized and anarchic. The ordering principles of the two structures are distinctly different, indeed, contrary to each other.¹⁰

Yet despite the influence which Waltz's structural account of international politics has come to exert over our understanding of state interaction, it is deeply problematic for the simple reason that it appears to be at variance with actual state practice. As David Lake has pointed out: 'There has always been a wide variety of hierarchical relationships within the international system ... in which the sovereignty of the subordinate polity is ceded in whole or in part to a dominant state.'¹¹

Waltz provides two defences against the charge that his work fails to account for this. Firstly, he stresses that his approach is microtheoretical rather than practical.¹² Secondly, he acknowledges that, in practice, 'all societies are mixed' with elements of both hierarchy and anarchy existing side by side.¹³ What enables Waltz to conceive of this mixture is the notion that the relative positioning of states (as either co-ordinate or alternatively as super- and subordinate) is 'not fully defined by [the] system's [anarchical] ordering principle ... The standing of units [i.e. states] also changes with changes in their relative capabilities.'¹⁴ On this basis Waltz is able to assert that hierarchy can arise as a consequence of material differences, with 'those [states] of greatest capability tak[ing] on special responsibility'.¹⁵ Put another way, because such states have 'a big stake in their system and the ability to act for its sake'¹⁶ they assume the superordinate position of 'managers of international affairs'.¹⁷ It is important to note, however, that despite his use of the term 'responsibility', Waltz gives little credence to the idea that inter-state hierarchy is socially rather than materially determined. Some states may be *able* to command by virtue of their material superiority, but they are not *entitled* to do so by virtue of social sanction. Similarly, other states may be *compelled* to obey by virtue of prudential calculation, but they are not required to do so by virtue of any sense of social *obligation*.

Other essentially capability-based accounts of great-power responsibility reject Waltz's assertion that 'whatever elements of authority emerge internationally are barely once removed from the capability that provides the foundation for the appearance of those elements'.¹⁸ Instead they explain international hierarchy and the role of the great powers within it by reference to super- and subordinate roles premised on authority and the entitlements and obligations which this entails. Inis Claude, for example, argues that because the material strength of the great powers 'so determines the state of the world, we impute to them a duty of looking after global well-being; responsibility in the sense of causation implies responsibility in the sense of obligation.'¹⁹ In similar vein Robert Jackson argues that because their power enables them to 'cause the greatest harm and do the greatest good',²⁰ great powers are 'in a position of responsibility' which, in turn, means that they are 'accountable to somebody [namely other states] and ... accountable for something [namely their behaviour and its consequences]'.²¹ In stressing not only causation as obligation but also responsibility as accountability and by seeing responsibility as an obligation imputed by others, these accounts introduce an inherently social dimension into the notion of great-power responsibility. This social dimension is, however, relatively thin, because while the great powers have to account for the manner in which they act, their responsibility to do so derives primarily from their material strength and the causal power to which this gives rise, rather than from a sense of social empowerment.

More overtly social accounts of hierarchy stress that it has to be understood primarily in terms of an authority relationship in which a subordinate actor recognises its obligation to obey the commands which a superior (or superordinate) actor is entitled to give. But within this approach views diverge regarding exactly what authority entails. Hence for David Lake authority structures may depend significantly on coercion and rational calculations of self-interest,²² whilst for Ian Hurd and likeminded scholars the legitimacy which necessarily underpins authority relationships is essentially about rightfulness rather than self-interest or coercion.²³ Perhaps the most influential 'social' account of hierarchy – though one which largely leaves questions of authority, coercion and such like implicit – is Hedley Bull's exposition on the role of the great powers within international society.²⁴ Bull identifies the great powers as being those states which are, firstly, 'comparable in status' and members of a 'club with a rule of membership'²⁵; secondly, 'in the front rank in terms of military strength', and finally and crucially, 'recognised by others to have, and conceived by their own leaders and peoples to have, certain special rights and duties'.²⁶ Bull's formulation performs the critical role of demonstrating the two-dimensional nature of the great power–lesser power relationship. The first dimension, *hierarchy*, relates to the relationship which the great powers have with the remainder of international society and it is the dimension with which the theoretical positions outlined above are primarily concerned. The second dimension, *concert*, relates to the relationship between the great powers themselves and is premised upon the rules of club membership to which Bull refers.

Ian Clark's work on hegemony has done much to illuminate this two-dimensional relationship, examining the nature and inter-relationship of what he terms its 'vertical hierarchy' (great to lesser power) axis and its 'horizontal concert' (great power to great power) axis.²⁷ Crucial to this study is Clark's observation that 'the recognition of the special responsibilities of the great powers' which are the essence of their hierarchical relationship with the rest of international society 'is conferred, not by the lesser members of international society alone', that is, via the vertical axis, 'but also by the other members of the peer group', that is, along the horizontal axis.²⁸ This observation compels us to ask what it is that gives rise, along both axes, to the recognition and conferment to which Clark refers. The theoretical

positions outlined above offer a number of possible answers, ranging from those premised on material attributes to those which depend on social acceptance, but such answers are not equally applicable to both axes.

Along the horizontal concert axis there is limited scope for relations between the great powers to be influenced through material means of coercion. By definition all states in the rank are of (at least) roughly comparable strength and thus relatively invulnerable to persuasion through force. Moreover, resort to coercive measures would in all likelihood wreak such damage as to render the notion of a great-power club meaningless. Consequently, the conferment of recognition along this axis is dependent at the very least on: acceptance that each member of the club is of equal standing and esteem; a commonly perceived sense of mutual interests and obligations; and an appreciation that compromise in the pursuit of interests may be necessary if concerted great-power action is to be sustained. But according to Clark a great-power concert bound together in this way is likely to prove even more durable if it is underpinned not only by rationally calculated common interests, but also by shared values. Put another way, where members of the concert share a view that their efforts are in some sense of intrinsic good and in particular if they believe that they serve the society as a whole, then the peer pressure to act in accordance with the rules of the club will be further enhanced.²⁹

Along the vertical hierarchy axis it is possible to envisage a wider spectrum of underpinnings for recognition and conferment of great-power responsibilities. At one end of this spectrum lies a Waltz-style hierarchy in which great powers exploit their material preponderance in order to compel lesser powers to accept their special responsibilities. Moving along the spectrum we find an alternative conception of hierarchy, akin to that offered by Claude and Jackson. Here the special role of the great powers is rooted in their material strength and the causal power to which this gives rise, but with the important constraining factor that great-power behaviour is tempered by the requirement that an account be given of the manner in which power is exercised. Further along the spectrum we encounter accounts in which social, rather than material, factors become more prominent. Here we find Lake and his suggestion that hierarchy is based on a 'relational conception of authority' in which 'authority rests on a bargain between the ruler and the ruled premised on the former's provision of a social order of value sufficient to offset the latter's loss of freedom.'³⁰ But Lake's premising of authority on interest and coercion requires that we extend the spectrum further to include more fully social accounts of hierarchy such as those offered by Hurd and Clark. These see hierarchy as being sustainable only where it is legitimated³¹ and where the great powers act in accordance with a 'logic of appropriateness' in which 'the pursuit of purpose is associated with identities more than with interests.'³²

The remainder of this article utilises the theoretical frameworks set out above in order to interpret and enhance our understanding of the events which led to the formation of the UNO. It shows firstly how the thinking of the Big Three focused initially on the horizontal axis of great-power concert and the need to maintain good relations between the concert's members. Thereafter attention turns to issues relating to the vertical axis of hierarchy, with the article showing how this was initially understood primarily in material terms until, as plans matured, the great-power leaders came increasingly to recognise the need for a more socially empowered basis of hierarchy. The analysis also shows how, along with these changes, the leaders came to appreciate the inter-relationship between concert and hierarchical relations.

II. The great-power concert and the post-war peace

Following the visit of British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden to Washington in March 1943 President Roosevelt held a press conference at which he lamented the lack of planning which had taken place prior to the establishment of the League of Nations. The message was clear: the United Nations would start planning now for a peace which, though perhaps still far off, would be more durable as a result of the thought and exchange of ideas that this would allow.³³ Amongst all those charged with contemplating what a post-war world might look like two points were axiomatic. Firstly, large-scale conflict, especially involving the most powerful states, was not a tenable means by which to pursue inter-state relations; modern warfare was so costly in terms of human lives and welfare, infrastructural damage, and disruption of trade that mechanisms had to be found through which its future occurrence could be averted. Secondly, it would be for the great powers to take the lead in ensuring future peace and, in order for them to do so, war-time co-operation had to continue into the post-war era. The collapse of the League of Nations and the outbreak of the Second World War demonstrated what happened when great powers failed to co-operate, but by the same yardstick, the successful prosecution of the War showed what happened when they did.

The notions that future wars must be prevented, that the actions of the great powers would be central to this task and that action in this cause was ultimately in the national interests of each of the great powers were common to the thinking of the Big Three leaderships. Nevertheless, for each of these states the reasoning which led to these conclusions differed. A powerful sense of great-power responsibility pervaded British and US planning in particular, but these two states also shared with the Soviet Union the inevitable desire to build a peace which served their own national interests. In President Roosevelt's thinking 'the universal need for peace would prove to be the "common denominator" that would bring the major powers to form a "genuine association of interest" for this was the sine qua non of postwar stability.'³⁴ But equally US policy-makers knew only too well that, as the least war-damaged of the great powers, with a dominant economic position and a military capability to match, the United States was best placed to reap the benefits which the resumption of peaceful inter-state relations offered. Moreover, building a post-war world in which the United States took centre stage represented a decisive step in casting off the shackles of isolationism, a policy which key administration figures viewed as 'unenlightened selfishness', based on 'folly and lack of vision'³⁵ and with 'suicidal'³⁶ implications.

For Britain's senior foreign-policy makers, great-power leadership was not simply necessary for the maintenance of peace and the success of a post-war security organisation: it was the ultimate rationale for these things. Eden set out this position succinctly in November 1942 when advising the War Cabinet that 'the aim of British policy must be, first, ... [to] continue to exercise the functions and to bear the responsibilities of a world Power.'³⁷ As Eden noted, this aim was only achievable if Britain 'maintain[ed its] ... position as an Empire and Commonwealth' and with notable frankness he continued 'we cannot realise [our objectives] through our own unaided efforts. We can only hope to play our part either as a European Power or as a world Power if we ourselves form part of a wider organisation.'³⁸

In its approach to planning for the post-war peace the Soviet Union sought to pursue four inter-related objectives. Firstly, the USSR strove for parity of prestige with the United States and Britain and they viewed the actual planning process and in particular their central

involvement in it as evidence that such equality had been achieved.³⁹ Secondly, the Soviets sought a period of post-war, great-power co-operation,⁴⁰ a condition deemed essential to the achievement of their third goal, namely post-war recuperation and security. Finally they aimed, at the very least, for ideological security, and for expansion if and when possible. Disentangling the latter two aims is difficult, since both tended to manifest themselves in territorial form through a preference for pro-Soviet Eastern European neighbours. Moreover, whilst as Silvino Pons has argued, the urge for Soviet expansionism was primarily ‘conceived in a strategic context dominated by the priority of Soviet security’⁴¹, for domestic political purposes Stalin frequently sought to legitimate such policies in terms of a mixture of socialism and nationalism.⁴² Further complicating matters is the apparent incongruity between expansionism (however motivated) and collaboration, but as Eduard Mark has shown, for Stalin ‘imperial ambition and [the] desire to preserve the alliance were different aspects of a single policy.’⁴³ According to this theory the spread of pro-Soviet regimes would result not ‘from the overt and brutal intrusions [which came to be] known to history’, but rather through the ‘relatively unobjectionable’,⁴⁴ organic development of indigenous national-front movements. Co-operation must, therefore, be continued, at least until this process bore fruit. Moreover, many Soviet policy-makers believed, as their Leninist viewpoint led them to, that by such a point the ‘inter-imperialist contradictions’ inherent in capitalism would have inevitably created divisions between the United States and Britain.⁴⁵ Taken in combination these events would create an environment in which the Soviets’ strategic position would be greatly enhanced, but only in such a propitious world could Stalin contemplate future conflict with his erstwhile allies and this was very much a ‘matter for the distant future not the immediate present’.⁴⁶

Inevitably given such divergent motivations, relations between the Big Three were at times strained. The Soviets feared Anglo-American connivance,⁴⁷ whilst US and British leaders questioned the Soviets’ trustworthiness and future intentions and on this basis initially ruled the Soviets out as a guardian of the post-war peace.⁴⁸ Indeed, as early as 1941 US leaders were privately contemplating scenarios in which military conflict with the USSR may arise.⁴⁹ Tensions in the Anglo-US–Soviet relationship manifested themselves most clearly over issues such as the opening of a second front⁵⁰, Soviet behaviour toward its immediate western neighbours (especially Poland)⁵¹, and the veto,⁵² but despite such stresses, considerations of power, coupled with avowed Soviet commitment to the policing project, served to ensure its place as a planned custodian of the future peace.⁵³ Moreover, it would be wrong to suggest that this was the only fault-line within the great-power alliance. For instance, Britain's post-war imperial ambitions ran counter to the decolonising sentiments of the United States and USSR,⁵⁴ whilst Anglo-US tensions arose over US moves – initiated through the Atlantic Charter – to use the leverage which the war gave it over Britain to secure market access into British colonial territories.⁵⁵

So within the Big Three triangle there existed policy tensions which at times became so intense as to threaten continued co-operation.⁵⁶ Given the ideological differences and divergent geo-strategic trajectories there is no real surprise in this. Yet against this backdrop the Allied leaders remained wedded to the idea of a post-war peace secured by their concerted action. Such views were aired publicly on numerous occasions through declarations such as those issued by the great-power foreign secretaries in October 1943⁵⁷ and by their premiers following their meeting in Tehran later the same year.⁵⁸ But crucially the same sentiments were also expressed in private. Stalin, for example, told Polish Communists that ‘like any compromise the alliance contained certain divergences of aims and views. [But nevertheless] ... there have not been any threats of disruption to the basic

nature of the alliance.’⁵⁹ Similarly, Secretary of State Cordell Hull's dismissal of Russia's actions toward Poland as a ‘piddling little thing’ which could not be allowed to get in the way of the ‘main issues’ of great-power co-operation demonstrated just how compromising the Allies were willing to be.⁶⁰ What the public and private records indicate is that there existed amongst the three greatest powers a determination to maintain co-operation and an understanding that, given the huge material strength of each, the only viable way to do this was through appeal to common interests and compromise. Put another way, pursuit of mutual interests and acceptance of the need for accommodation were recognised as the only means by which cohesion along the horizontal axis of great-power concert could be preserved; within the rank of the great powers there was little, if any, scope for the exercise of material might as a means to persuasion.

A notable example of Big Three compromise can be found in the deliberations that took place over which states, if any, might join the Big Three in the post-war great-power concert. The first additional power to be considered for entry into this rank was China. Its advocate was the United States.⁶¹ US leaders acknowledged that China did not currently meet the material threshold expected of a great power, but anticipated that it would do so in the future. In any case, counting China as a great power had a number of broader advantages from a US perspective: it would help stave off rising civil unrest or potential future imperial incursion into China; it would assist in the provision of a geo-strategic counterbalance to a resurgent Japan or expansionist Soviet Union; and it was likely to habitually side with the United States against the Soviet Union and, on issues of decolonisation, against Britain. Of course, for many of these same reasons Britain and the USSR objected to China's inclusion in their rank. Opposition was based primarily on a shared scepticism over US claims regarding China's material trajectory and consequently on a rejection of China as a power of equal standing.⁶² But it was supplemented for the British by apprehension regarding China's anti-imperialism⁶³ and for the Soviets by fears that any strengthening of China's position would be contrary to Soviet strategic interests in Asia (potentially through a future anti-Soviet Sino-US axis) as well as that closer links to China might serve to drag the Soviets into the Pacific war.⁶⁴ Nevertheless, both the British⁶⁵ and the Soviets reluctantly acquiesced to US demands as the price to be paid for ensuring continued US engagement in the building of the post-war peace.⁶⁶

Britain's championing of France's concert membership was premised predominantly on Churchill's preoccupation with the ‘revival of the glory of Europe’.⁶⁷ France was central to this vision because, as Eden told the War Cabinet in July 1943, ‘without the willing assistance of a rejuvenated France the problem of creating a sound and free Europe would be much more difficult.’⁶⁸ British thinking was also influenced by the belief that France could help as a counter-balance against Germany⁶⁹ and the Soviet Union⁷⁰, and it was also seen as a dependable ally on questions of empire (over which the British knew they would face US and Soviet opposition).⁷¹ In a partial reversal of the consideration of China, it was now the Americans and Soviets who questioned the material credentials of the aspirant state,⁷² with Soviet opposition accentuated by their scathing assessment of France's capitulation to the Germans.⁷³ US–Soviet accord also extended to their views on France's likely impact on future debates over colonialism, but thereafter their future geo-strategic objectives drove them down divergent paths on the question of French restoration, with France's potential as an additional counter-balance to the USSR becoming as appealing to the Americas as it was undesirable to the Soviets.⁷⁴ As planning progressed this factor, coupled with the view that France's expected leadership of the small European nations would help ‘dispel fears of four-power dictatorship’, became decisive in US thinking.⁷⁵ Faced with this US change of heart

the Russians accepted the idea that France be counted as a great power, the reason once again being 'simply the need to keep in step with the Americans'.⁷⁶

The only other state to be considered for promotion to the rank of the great powers was Brazil. Hull was a staunch advocate of Brazil's candidacy, citing its efforts in the war and its 'size, population and resources, along with her prospect of a great future'.⁷⁷ He also hoped that such a move would address the concerns of those Latin American states which felt marginalised in US post-war planning,⁷⁸ but whilst the President concurred, area specialists within the administration were far less enthusiastic, fearing that the promotion of Brazil would increase rather than placate regional sensitivities.⁷⁹ When the Americans tentatively raised the matter with the British and Russians they received a negative response from both; neither considered Brazil a great power and both balked at the disruption to their plans which introducing another state into their rank would cause.⁸⁰ Faced with Anglo-Soviet opposition and disagreement within the administration Roosevelt agreed not to push Brazil's case any further and no formal proposal that it be counted amongst the great powers was ever tabled.⁸¹

This examination of the issues regarding membership of the great-power rank unveils several important points. First, despite initial Anglo-US concerns over the Soviet Union's great-power credentials, post-war planning amongst the Big Three soon proceeded on the basis that their great-power status – and hence future policing role – was beyond question. Second, the fact that the guardians of the peace were to be self-appointed was, particularly in the early phases of planning (1941–3), considered to be unproblematic. Third, this unquestioning approach was premised on the notion that these three states alone combined the necessary combination of material power and willingness to safeguard the post-war peace. Fourth, the Big Three leaders believed that, beyond their own self-appointment, they were entitled to appoint other states to join them at the top table of great powers. Fifth, those states chosen for such elevation did not have to satisfy the criteria against which the great-power *bona fides* of the Big Three were measured; the classification of China and France as great powers could not be sustained in terms of either's material strength, but the patronage of one of the Big Three, combined with the acquiescence of the other two, was sufficient to secure their promotion. Finally, one consequence of this was that throughout the period of great-power post-war planning neither China nor France were viewed by their effective patrons as true peers, with the former largely marginalised⁸² and the latter totally excluded until the very final stages of planning in May 1945.⁸³ Amongst the great some were clearly greater than others.

The preceding discussion, imbued with talk of interest and compromise, might be taken to suggest that in planning for the post-war peace the Big Three leaders sought to build a great-power concert devised exclusively for the purpose of reinforcing their great-power status (an objective of particular importance to Britain and the USSR) and furthering their own national advancement. But as previously noted, concerns with national interests and the compromises necessary to secure them, while undeniably present, were only part of the story; the great powers – and in particular the United States and Britain – proceeded also on the basis that they had a broader social responsibility to preserve peace and provide for the security of weaker states. Hence, when the Americans and British deliberated over the Soviet Union's credibility as a future partner in global policing, they did so not because they questioned, in Roosevelt's words, that it had the 'practical means of taking any effective or, at least, considerable part in the task' of maintaining world peace⁸⁴ but rather because they doubted that Moscow was willing to 'assume responsibilities towards the world at large'⁸⁵ and in

particular to accept its 'military responsibility for maintaining order and preventing the build up of aggressive forces' in the world.⁸⁶

Viewed in this light the desire to pursue broader social interests can be seen as a critically important additional reason for wanting to maintain concert unity. Indeed, a consistent factor in Big Three post-war planning was the idea that what in part brought these states together – the desire to provide social goods – could only be achieved if they acted together and it was for this reason that their foreign secretaries agreed in 1943 to 'tighten up their policies in regard to preventing criticisms of each other'.⁸⁷ Moreover, whilst an appreciation of the need for great-power unity was ever present, it was particularly important in the early stages of planning, when the Big Three's sense of great-power responsibility was not allied to an acknowledgement that such responsibility had to be socially bestowed. Hence in this phase, captured so graphically by Roosevelt's phrase 'peace by dictation', the sense of responsibility exhibited was highly paternalistic; the peace planned by the great powers might not be what the lesser powers necessarily asked for or wanted, but it would be good for them and they would come to appreciate it in the longer term. Such a peace could only be preserved where its 'parents' were united.

Whether such a peace could ever be sustained even by great powers acting in concert is highly questionable. That it was ever contemplated demonstrates that some, such as Roosevelt and Stalin,⁸⁸ initially thought that it could. Equally, the fact that the idea was eventually abandoned appears to bear testament to the profound shortcomings of such an approach. What this in turn suggests is that to understand the dynamics of great-power concert, we need also to understand the relationship between the concert and the remainder of international society. Hence, we return to Clark's observation regarding the inextricably inter-related nature of (the horizontal axis of) great-power concert relations and (the vertical axis of) great power–lesser power hierarchical relations. It follows that, having considered the former, we must now turn to latter.

III. The evolving nature of attitudes toward post-war hierarchy

Attitudinal changes toward the nature of great power–lesser power hierarchy can be effectively traced through an examination in particular of the evolution of US thinking about the post-war peace. At times this was quite heterogeneous, but with the US State Department the most active agent of Big Three post-war planning⁸⁹ and the United States the *de facto* senior player in the Big Three club, these ideas tended to be the most influential, with Britain and the Soviets, as previously noted, often acquiescent partners.⁹⁰ Two issues are particularly illustrative of the ways in which ideas developed in this regard. Firstly, the notion of the great powers as 'policemen', unencumbered by institutional structures, slowly gave way to arguments favouring more elaborate organisational frameworks incorporating the broader membership of international society in structures within which they could voice their opinions and participate in decision-making. Secondly, initial plans to concentrate the means of waging war exclusively in the hands of the great powers were relaxed, allowing for broader possession of armaments and more extensive sharing of the burdens of maintaining peace.

The first major step in the articulation of post-war security thinking came in August 1941 at the Atlantic Conference where Roosevelt proposed to Churchill that Britain and the United States act as the world's two post-war policemen. Roosevelt's thinking, according to Herbert Feis, was that such a role befell these states because they were the two great powers able 'to dominate the peace settlements and [with] the power to suppress aggression'.⁹¹ Underlining his hierarchic credentials, the President opposed Churchill's counter-proposal for the creation of an 'effective international organisation' which would 'afford to all states and peoples the means of dwelling in security';⁹² citing domestic 'suspicions and opposition' he said he was opposed to the 'creation of a new Assembly of the League of Nations', at least until after a period of time had transpired during which the two policemen 'had had an opportunity of functioning'.⁹³ Despite this, with the support of Sumner Welles, the US Assistant Secretary of State, and other sympathetic US policy-makers, Churchill succeeded in getting Roosevelt to partially relent. The President committed to the eventual 'establishment of a wider and more permanent system of general security'.⁹⁴ This was less than Churchill had hoped for, but the difference between the two leaders' stances should not be exaggerated; Churchill may have been a more enthusiastic advocate of the establishment of an organisation to succeed the League, but he shared Roosevelt's view that a post-war peace should be based on a hierarchical arrangement within which the great powers would be at liberty to determine and protect the post-war peace.⁹⁵

Great-power superordination was, in expanded form, publicly unfurled on 1 January 1942 through the 'Declaration by United Nations'⁹⁶ in which, despite the previously noted concerns and objections, the Soviet Union and China 'officially' joined the United States and Britain in the great-power rank. With the titles of these four states appearing ahead of those of the others signatories, the Declaration was intended by Roosevelt to emphasise the dominant leadership role of the great powers.⁹⁷ Such a move was no mere diplomatic nicety. As Roosevelt told Soviet Foreign Commissar Molotov some five months later, he 'conceived it the duty of the four major United Nations ... to act as the policemen of the world' whose role would be to 'impose peace';⁹⁸ for the President the hierarchy of signatures would be transposed into a hierarchy in political reality. Sharing the President's reluctance to re-establish a 'League-style' international organisation and supportive of his hierarchical approach, Molotov approved of the plan. More importantly, so did Stalin.⁹⁹

Against this early diplomatic backdrop the 'Declaration of Four Nations on General Security', negotiated by the foreign secretaries of the Big Three but also signed up to by China and issued following the Moscow Conference of October 1943, heralded a less dictatorial approach to the maintenance of post-war peace.¹⁰⁰ Reflecting the work and preferences of the State Department (and the British Foreign Office) and building on discussions which had taken place between the United States and Britain (plus Canada) at the First Quebec Conference in August 1943¹⁰¹, it subtly recast post-war priorities, maintaining the hierarchical dominance of the great powers but stressing the 'necessity to establish at the earliest practicable date a general international organisation'.¹⁰² This declaration reflected the moderating approach which, under the counsel and influence of foreign-policy advisors such as Welles and Hull, Roosevelt was now beginning to adopt toward post-war policing. Welles, the President's close advisor and confidant, had always questioned his original 'policemen' model, believing that it failed to take account of the national pride, inter-state rivalries, and legitimate governmental responsibilities of the lesser powers.¹⁰³ Of similar mind (at least on this point), Hull returned from the Moscow conference and told Congress of plans to establish an organisation comprising 'all peace loving states, irrespective of size and strength, [acting] as partners in a future system of general security'.¹⁰⁴ Such sentiments echoed the

prevailing attitude and approach within the State Department which favoured the building of a more inclusive institution attuned to the sensitivities of states both large and small.

Roosevelt's increasing receptivity to arguments favouring models of peace reliant less on great-power dictation and more on inclusivity and participation – or less on coercion and more on social empowerment – was a crucial determinant of US post-war planning. Nevertheless, as the model which he outlined when the Big Three premiers met in Tehran in November 1943 showed, at this stage the President remained firmly committed to a hierarchical structure in which the great powers would dominate. His preference was for a three-tier structure, with the whole membership of the UN meeting in a discursive and advisory body (later to be called the 'General Conference'), an 'Executive Committee' comprised of ten states including the four great powers but with only recommendatory powers and a grouping of the 'Four Policemen' sitting in splendid isolation with the authority to deal decisively with disputes, using force if necessary.¹⁰⁵

This plan was modelled on the first draft constitution to emerge from the intensive discussion and planning which took place within the State Department during 1943.¹⁰⁶ In later plans the idea of a three-tier structure was streamlined to two, but there was a degree of equivocation over whether it should in effect be the Four Policemen or the Executive Council which should be jettisoned.¹⁰⁷ This uncertainty reflected the predicament in which US planners found themselves. On the one hand they were reluctant to propose plans which did not accord with the President's view that 'the real decisions should be made by the United States, Great Britain, Russia and China, who would be the powers for many years to come that would have to police the world.'¹⁰⁸ On the other hand, in keeping with the general departmental preference noted above, they felt that a structure in which the four great powers sat alone in an executive council, unaccountable to others and monopolising effective power, would be too 'top heavy', giving insufficient voice and too little responsibility to the lesser powers.¹⁰⁹ It was Roosevelt's eventual acceptance of the latter line of argument – a move which took him another step farther from a peace based on dictation and coercion and a step closer to one premised on inclusion and empowerment – which resolved this dilemma. By the Dumbarton Oaks conference of August 1944 the final US blueprint for a post-war security organisation was based on a 'General Assembly' of all members and an eleven-member 'Executive Council' comprised of the four great powers (plus France once its governmental status was clarified) and the seven elected states (decreasing to six once France assumed its seat).¹¹⁰

A similar transformation to that outlined above occurred with regard to US thinking about how great-power hierarchy should be reflected in the possession by states of military means. In the Atlantic Charter the United States and Britain had declared that the disarmament of aggressive, or potentially aggressive states was 'essential', whilst all other states, they agreed, should be 'aid[ed] and encourage[d]' to take 'practical measures which will lighten for peace-loving peoples the crushing burden of armaments'. For Roosevelt such burdens were not only 'crushing' but also futile – because armaments were ineffective as a means of protecting the weak from the strong – and unnecessary within the type of system of great-power policing which he envisaged. When later telling Molotov of his idea that 'all other nations save the Big Four should be disarmed', Roosevelt acknowledged that what he was contemplating amounted to 'peace by dictation', but, he maintained, ultimately its benefits would become apparent.¹¹¹

But with the acceptance that the lesser powers should be included within the membership of a post-war peace organisation came also an acknowledgement that they should contribute

toward the maintenance of world peace. Modified to account for this view, US planning during much of 1943 incorporated the idea that membership of the post-war organisation would entail the acceptance of minimum and maximum levels of armament, with failure to arm within these parameters constituting a threat to the peace which could give rise to enforcement action led by the great powers.¹¹² But this idea of prescribed armaments levels was, in turn, rejected as being too complicated to garner US public support and too inflexible and it was replaced by a commitment to regulate armaments and control the manufacture and trade in arms.¹¹³ A statement prepared by Hull and his State Department team, but approved and delivered in June 1944 by the now converted Roosevelt, captures well the new approach:

The maintenance of peace and security must be the joint task of all peace loving nations. ... We are seeking effective agreement and arrangements through which the nations would maintain, according to their capacities, adequate forces to meet the needs of preventing war and of making impossible deliberate preparation for war and to have such forces available for joint action when necessary.¹¹⁴

Similar evolutionary steps had been taken by British and Soviet planners, such that by the time the great-power delegations came to meet at Dumbarton Oaks in August 1944 to agree a draft charter for the proposed global security organisation there was considerable common ground regarding structure and disarmament.¹¹⁵ On the former both the British¹¹⁶ and Soviet¹¹⁷ plans concurred with that of the Americans, envisaging an assembly comprising all members of the organisation and some form of council involving the four great powers and a small number of other member states. On the issue of disarmament there was greater dissention, with the US and Soviet drafts making (somewhat vague) reference to the idea, but the British, ever sceptical on the topic, eschewing references to either disarmament or arms reductions. The British preference was instead to speak of the *regulation* of armaments linked to the ability of states to meet their responsibilities toward the maintenance of international peace and security.¹¹⁸ Despite initially being the minority view, it was this approach which ultimately garnered most support. Consequently the notion of arms 'reduction' was wholly absent for the conference's final draft and 'disarmament', whilst still mentioned, was relegated from a compulsory area of Council jurisdiction to a matter within the Assembly's non-compulsory remit.

What the above account reveals is the distance which the Big Three allies had travelled in the three years since 1941 when Roosevelt had broached with Churchill the most appropriate means of preserving post-war peace. The idea of 'peace by dictation' had given way to a far more consultative approach in which the great powers, though still dominant, would be obliged to confer with and persuade lesser powers in order to act in the name and for the sake of the post-war peace. Similarly, the idea of a world in which, in Roosevelt's words, 'the small powers might have rifles, but nothing more dangerous'¹¹⁹ was rejected in favour of one in which all of the United Nations would possess a level of arms commensurate with their domestic and, more significantly, their international responsibilities. This constituted a fundamental reassessment of the great power–lesser power hierarchy. Throughout the whole of the planning process the Big Three proceeded on the agreed assumption that 'the Great Powers would necessarily bear the major responsibility for peace',¹²⁰ but they ultimately came to accept that this was not their exclusive responsibility. In its final guise responsibility for the guardianship of post-war peace would lay in the hands of an organisation comprising the whole of the UN, with each member having a say in its running and being expected to contribute towards its primary function of keeping the peace. This is not, of course, to suggest that a significant element of hierarchy would not prevail. Each of the Big Three's plans

anticipated a council predominating over issues of security and military enforcement with the great powers in turn predominating over the council with permanent membership, the ability to veto certain decisions¹²¹ and the expectation that they would provide the vast bulk of the material resources on which it would depend. But it was a far cry from what had first been envisaged in 1941; this would not be a hierarchy premised primarily on dictatorial coercion but rather one based on a collectivised notion of security, with each state contributing to the maintenance of order in accordance with its capacity to do so.

Alongside this acknowledgement of shared responsibility came an acceptance of the need for enhanced great-power accountability and social empowerment. A degree of sensitivity to the probable concerns of those facing the prospect of great-power domination had been evident even in 1941; Roosevelt, leading proponent of the 'policemen' plan, had been 'concerned to emphasise the "trustee" aspect of the four policemen's role and to take the edge off their dominant position in a world otherwise totally disarmed'¹²² But the issue of consultation and engagement with the lesser powers had created a dilemma for the Big Three. The ironing out in secret of any differences of opinion over the post-war peace would ensure that the important sense of great-power unity could be maintained before other states. But conversely, as Hull noted, if the great-power negotiations went 'on until they turned out to the world a completed document and then undertook to send copies to the small nations in a "take it or leave it" manner', resentment would surely ensue.¹²³ As such, any attempt to impose peace on the world bore within it its own seeds of destruction. For their part the British response to the conundrum was to engage with the Dominion governments, with policies on both parts being modified as a consequence.¹²⁴ Bereft of such a political sphere of influence the Russians did not engage in any similar discussions and, despite the opportunity which western hemispheric relations presented, the United States chose not to do so until a point which was seen by their southern neighbours as largely too late.¹²⁵

These differing attitudes to consultation were in part driven by the relative material strengths and trajectories of the Big Three. It was no coincidence that the most consultative member of the group, Britain, was also the one facing a waning of material might. Contemplating such a predicament the Foreign Office knew that Britain's global standing could only be maintained through an engagement with and coupling to the Dominions. But material considerations provide only a partial account; an attitudinal change had also occurred. Hence, when Stalin railed against the idea that the great powers might be subjected to the judgement of the small, Churchill retorted that 'it was essential that they exercise their power with moderation and with respect for the rights of the smaller nations.'¹²⁶ Roosevelt supported Churchill's stance.¹²⁷ So whatever the lingering allure which great-power exceptionalism continued to occasionally exert over the three premiers¹²⁸, the die was now cast; whilst great-power concert would prevail, it would be located within a broad organisational framework which would in turn be premised not on a materially determined ability to dictate, but rather on the assent of the UN membership. Many details were yet to be determined and these would be argued over by the great powers at Dumbarton Oaks and by the whole UN membership when it met at San Francisco to consider proposals which were unrecognisable from those which Roosevelt had first presented to Churchill and later to Molotov. But by July 1944 a fundamental point had been agreed; the basic notion of peace by dictation had been rejected in favour of peace by social sanction.

For each of the Big Three this process of transformation had been different. It was most dramatic for the United States whose President, the original advocate of the 'policemen' plan, was ultimately amongst the strongest advocates of broad-based global organisation. In terms

of the hierarchy spectrum presented earlier, initial US thinking, at least as presented by Roosevelt, was heavily premised on acquiescence secured through the prospect of material coercion. It also entailed a commitment to the service of social interest based on a sense of great-power responsibility, but it did not attach any great significance to the need for great-power accountability or social empowerment. But as Roosevelt's views came more into line with those of his State Department advisors this approach was rejected and the more inclusive, assent-based model outlined above was adopted. Through this move US policy shifted, rejecting the idea of a materially imposed hierarchy in favour of a socially bestowed one.

For British policy-makers the transformative journey was shorter, essentially because they began the journey at a point closer to the final destination. At least within the corridors of the Foreign Office there was a long-standing preference for a more inclusive post-war arrangement which, though based on a hierarchy of material difference, nevertheless recognised the importance of lesser-power endorsement. Eden had found Roosevelt's initial 'sweeping opinions' on great-power policing and global disarmament 'alarming in their cheerful fecklessness',¹²⁹ and along with his ministry colleagues he was from the outset far more positively disposed to the approach which Washington eventually came to advocate. This was less true of Churchill – whose vacillating approach often favoured a more regionally segregated, great-power-based approach to peace¹³⁰ – but the Prime Minister's preoccupation with prosecuting the war resulted in his relative disengagement with post-war planning and the minimisation of the effect of his views on the matter.¹³¹ Consequently unencumbered, it was Foreign Office thinking, reflective of Britain's colonial position, its close relationship with the Dominions, but also its waning material power, which proved most influential. This position was attuned to the need to develop an inclusive global security structure within which all states – and in particular the Dominions – could contribute toward the maintenance of peace.¹³² This view was well captured in Britain's submission to the Dumbarton Oaks Conference which stated that 'in general, as regards *all* states, the more power and responsibility can be made to correspond, the more likely it is that the machinery [of peace] will be able to fulfil its functions.'¹³³ From the outset British planners placed relatively little faith in the merits of a coercive hierarchy and sought instead to build a post-war peace premised on a socially empowered sense of great-power responsibility.

For the Soviets the journey was also a relatively short one, but in their case this was because they did not travel as far along the track rather than because they started further down it. At the outset Stalin embraced Roosevelt's initial plan that the great powers utilise their material superiority to act as the world's 'policemen' and he had, in fact, independently suggested such an idea to Eden in December 1941.¹³⁴ Whilst Molotov had warned Roosevelt in 1942 that his policing system would 'be a bitter blow to the prestige' of key states such as France and Turkey¹³⁵, such concerns were never so great an impediment for the Soviets as to render the plan either unattractive or unworkable. Pursuant to their broader strategic objectives the Soviets proved acquiescent on this matter, but as such they remained the least enthusiastic of the Big Three in terms of the move towards a more socially empowered vision of what eventually became the UNO.

Conclusion

For the Big Three policy-makers responsible for post-war planning the essentiality of great-power concert was clear; great-power discord was a recipe for war and great-power war was not conducive to their national interests. But beyond this, concert was also viewed as the only plausible means through which the responsibilities attendant to great power could be realised. Peace served the interests of great and small alike, for the security of the latter could only be preserved if the former foreswore predatory intent and pledged themselves to the preservation of the independence of all. In this sense of inter-dependency lay the rationale for great power–lesser power hierarchy. The material might of the powerful meant not only that they could adopt a position of superordination, but also that they should do so.

That such reasoning underpinned the approach of British and US policy-makers – and perhaps, to a far lesser extent, Soviet ones – seems clear from the foregoing analysis. It sets out the inter-relationship between great-power concert – the horizontal axis of the framework of analysis – and great power–lesser power hierarchy: the vertical axis. But what it leaves unspecified is the basis for maintaining these axial relations. Along the horizontal axis of great-power concert there was little scope for the basing of relations on anything other than shared interests and, it was hoped, values. This is evident from the compromises which the Big Three were willing to strike as they proceeded with post-war planning, fully cognisant of the fact that an attempt to coerce any other member of the concert was likely to prove futile and indeed, to destroy the very pact upon which all depended.

But along the vertical axis there existed a greater degree of potential variation in the manner in which relations might be maintained. This is evident from the fact that, when post-war planning commenced, it was assumed that the great powers would be able to impose their preferred peace on the lesser powers. This might not seem controversial when viewed from an asocial perspective which focuses on material strength and the coercive capacity to which it gives rise. But this is not what US and British planners appear to have had in mind, since their objective was an inherently social one – the prevention of war for the sake of great and lesser powers alike – although they initially believed that it could be materially imposed. From this highly paternalistic standpoint there appeared to be no incompatibility between ends and means. As planning progressed, however, the contradictions in this approach became steadily more apparent. Great power ‘peace by dictation’ would deprive the lesser powers of their rightful stake in the peace and in so doing would make its maintenance all the more challenging. Conversely, to recognise this stake, to accept the contribution which the lesser powers could make to the peace, and to acknowledge that with the great powers’ primary (but not exclusive) responsibility for peace came a need for accountability to the broader membership of international society would anchor peace in a bedrock of social empowerment which would enhance its perceived legitimacy and hence its sustainability.

In this context the virtue of concert was to be found not in the overwhelming capacity which united action gave the great to coerce the weak. Instead it lay firstly in the demonstrative willingness of the great powers to compromise and to curb their behaviour for the sake of the collective good and secondly in the viability which such self-imposed restraint gave to such a project. That the peace which was intended to ensue also served the interests of the powerful does not run counter to this point, for as the Second World War so terribly demonstrated, when great powers fight, the weak suffer all the more. It was through this change in attitude toward the value of great-power concert that the UNO came to take shape. Atlantic Charter-style ‘peace by dictation’ required only great-power unity, since dictation negated the need for complex organisational encumbrances. But by the closing stages of the war, the notion of concert coupled with hierarchy by dictation had been rejected. In its place came the embrace

of concert with hierarchy by social sanction. The practical embodiment of this social acceptance was (and remains) the United Nations Organisation.

It can be concluded that, but for the profound shift in attitude toward great power–lesser power hierarchy analysed above, an institution such as the UNO would never have come into being. The continuation of an approach based on ‘peace by dictation’ would, in all likelihood, have resulted in an attempt to build a post-war peace more akin to that seen at the end of the Napoleonic wars, and with some confidence we might speculate that the onset of the cold war would have quite rapidly brought such a venture to a premature end. But it would be imprudent to suggest that this attitudinal shift was alone responsible for shaping the post-war peace, be it at gestation, inception, or during the decades which followed. Crucial as this changed perspective on hierarchy was, it must also be acknowledged that deteriorating relations within the concert – that is to say, along the horizontal axis – also had a profound effect on the form which the UNO was to take and, it may be conceded, especially on the practices which it adopted during the subsequent forty-five years of its existence. Yet the nascence of the cold war does not negate the thesis offered here. Rather an appreciation of the attitudinal developments which are the concern of this article, in conjunction with an understanding of the established portrayal of deteriorating Big Three relations, provides greater depth to our knowledge of the developments surrounding the dawning of the UN era. Moreover, this provides further support for the assertion that relations along the horizontal and vertical axes cannot be considered in isolation. Hence, if we are to understand how the UNO came into being, we must consider not only how the great powers related to one another, but also how they related to the wider membership of international society.

Despite his sometimes vacillating attitude to the matter, Churchill captured well the sentiment which ultimately came to prevail amongst the great powers when he addressed the House of Commons on his return from Yalta:

It is [he said] on the Great Powers that the chief burden of maintaining peace and security will fall. The new world organisation must take into account this special responsibility of the Great Powers, and must be so framed as not to compromise their unity or their capacity for effective action if it is called for at short notice. At the same time, the world organisation cannot be based upon a dictatorship of the Great Powers. It is their duty to serve the world and not to rule it.¹³⁶

We might well question whether the great powers have lived up to this duty, but the influence which its sense exerted during the latter stages of the Second World War did much to shape the world in which we live today.

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Notes

1. 'Remarks by the President to Parliament in London, United Kingdom', 25 May 2011, available at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/05/25/remarks-president-parliament-london-united-kingdom> [Accessed 26 May 2011].
2. Ibid.
3. The title, often truncated to 'Britain', is used in preference to United Kingdom throughout this article. This accords with the common usage (in discussions, government papers, etc.) of the period to which the article relates. Similarly, the titles 'Russia/Russian' and 'Soviet Union/Soviet' are used interchangeably as was common practice at the time.
4. Throughout this article the term 'United Nations' (and UN) will be used to refer to the wartime alliance of states which were parties to the 'Declaration by United Nations' of 1 January 1942. Where reference is made to the current United Nations Organisation it will be termed such and abbreviated to UNO.
5. This term will be used throughout this article to refer to the three most powerful members of the UN, namely the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union.
6. F[oreign] R[elations of the] U[nited] S[tates], 1942, iii. 569
7. On such cold-war developments see: Y.Z. Blum, *Eroding the United Nations Charter* (Dordrecht, 1993), 103–32; E. Johnson, 'British Proposals for a United Nations Force 1946–48' in A. Deighton (ed), *Britain and the First Cold War* (Basingstoke, 1990), 109–29; D.A. Kay, *The New Nations in the United Nations, 1960–1967* (New York, 1970); R. Righter, *Utopia Lost: The United Nations and World Order* (New York, 1995); and A. Roberts and B. Kingsbury, *United Nations, Divided World* (Oxford, 1993).
8. Given their significance and extent, the author intends to address these issues in a subsequent article.
9. H. Milner, 'The Assumption of Anarchy in International Relations Theory: a Critique', *Review of International Studies*, xvii (1991), 67–85.
10. K.N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (New York, 1979), 88.
11. D.A. Lake, 'Escape from the State of Nature: Authority and Hierarchy in World Politics', *International Security*, xxxii (2007), 48.
12. Waltz, *Theory*, 89, 91.
13. Ibid., 115.
14. Ibid., 82.
15. Ibid., 198.
16. Ibid., 195.
17. Ibid., 194–210.
18. Ibid., 88.
19. I.L. Claude Jr., 'The Common Defense and Great-Power Responsibilities', *Political Science Quarterly*, ci (1986), 726.
20. R. Jackson, *The Global Covenant: Human Conduct in a World of States* (Oxford, 2000), 139.
21. Ibid., 137 (original emphasis). See also Claude, 'The Common Defense', 725.
22. D.A. Lake, *Hierarchy in International Relations* (Ithaca, 2009), xi, 13, 21–3.

23. I. Hurd, 'Theories and Tests of International Authority' in B. Cronin and I. Hurd, *The UN Security Council and the Politics of International Authority* (London, 2008), 25; see also I. Hurd, 'Legitimacy and Authority in World Politics', *International Organization*, liii (1999), 379–408. See also C. Reus-Smit, 'International Crises of Legitimacy', *International Politics*, xlv (2007), 163–4
24. H. Bull, *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics* (Basingstoke, 1977), 200–29.
25. *Ibid.*, 200. See also C. Brown, 'Do Great Powers Have Great Responsibilities? Great Powers and Moral Agency', *Global Society*, xviii (2004), 11; and G. Simpson, *Great Powers and Outlaw States: Unequal Sovereigns in the International legal Order* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 67–76.
26. Bull, *Anarchical Society*, 201, 202.
27. I. Clark, *Hegemony in International Society* (Oxford, 2011), 48, 63–6.
28. *Ibid.*, 65.
29. *Ibid.*, 18–32.
30. Lake, 'Escape', 53. Also Lake, *Hierarchy*, 28–44.
31. Reus-Smit, 'International Crises', 158–65.
32. J.G. March and J. P. Olsen, 'The Institutional Dynamics of International Political Orders', *International Organization*, lii (1998), 951.
33. FRUS, 1943, iii. 41–3.
34. T. Hoopes and D. Brinkley, *FDR and the Creation of the U.N.* (New Haven, 1997), 74. See also FRUS, 1943, i. 591; and C. Hull, *The Memoirs of Cordell Hull* (London, 1948), 1277–91.
35. Hoopes and Brinkley, *FDR and the Creation of the UN*, 59. See also S. Welles, *Where Are We Heading?* (London, 1947), 1–50. For further discussion of 'isolationism' see R.A. Divine, *Second Chance: The Triumph of Internationalism in America During World War II* (New York, 1971).
36. FRUS, 1943, i. 592; Hull, *Memoirs*, 1228–9.
37. CAB 66/30/46, W[ar Cabinet]P[apers](42)516, 8 Nov. 1942.
38. For expression of a similar view by Churchill see CAB 65/50/1, W[ar Cabinet] M[inutes] (45)39, 3 April 1945.
39. V. Zubok and C. Pleshakov, *Inside the Kremlin's Cold War: From Stalin to Khrushchev* (Cambridge, MA, 1996), 33. V. O. Pechatnov, 'The Big Three After World War II: New Documents on Soviet Thinking about Post War Relations with The United States and Great Britain', Cold War International History Project, Working Paper 13 (May 1995), 20; See also FRUS, 1943, i. 576–7.
40. H. Feis, *Churchill Roosevelt Stalin: The War They Waged and the Peace They Sought* (Princeton, 1957), 641–8; Zubok and Pleshakov, *Inside*, 28–9; E. Mark, 'Revolution by Degrees: Stalin's National-Front Strategy for Europe, 1941–1947', Cold War International History Project, Working Paper 31 (February 2001), 12–3; and D. Reynolds, 'From World War to Cold War: The Wartime Alliance and Post-War Transitions, 1941–1947', *The Historical Journal*, xlv (2002), 218.
41. S. Pons, 'In the Aftermath of the Age of Wars: the Impact of World War II on Soviet Security Policy' in S. Pons and A. Romano (eds), *Russia in the Age of Wars 1914–1945* (Milan, 2000), 305.
42. *Ibid.*, 296. See also G. Roberts, 'Ideology, Calculation and Improvisation: Spheres of Influence and Soviet Foreign Policy 1939–1945', *Review of International Studies*, xxv (1999), 657.

43. Mark, 'Revolution by Degrees', 13. For a somewhat alternative account see M. Cox and C. Kennedy-Pipe, 'The Tragedy of American Diplomacy? Rethinking the Marshall Plan', *Journal of Cold War Studies*, vii (2005), 97–134.
44. Mark, 'Revolution by Degrees', 42, 43.
45. Pechatnov, 'The Big Three', 17.
46. G. Roberts, 'Stalin and the Grand Alliance: Public Discourse, Private Dialogues and the Direction of Soviet Foreign Policy, 1941–1947', *Slovo*, xiii (2001), 11.
47. Hull, *Memoirs*, 1277, 1278; Reynolds, 'From World War to Cold War', 219–20; see also M. E. Glantz, *FDR and the Soviet Union: The President's Battle over Foreign Policy* (Lawrence, 2005) and D. Reynolds, *From World War to Cold War: Churchill, Roosevelt and the International History of the 1940s* (Oxford, 2006).
48. Russell, *United Nations Charter*, 11–43; FRUS, 1941, i. 341–78. On the continuation of such concerns see CAB/66/37/17, WP(43)217, 25 May 1943.
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133. WP(44)370. On this basis Britain argued for the explicit recognition of a class of ‘middle powers’ and whilst unsuccessful in this regard at Dumbarton Oaks, the idea came in part to be reflected in the provisions of the Charter in the form of Article 23(1). See Goodrich and Hambro, *Charter of the United Nations*, 200–3; and U[nited] N[at]ions] C[onference on] I[n]ternational] O[rganisation], xi. 252–55 and 298–300.
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