

How to End Civil Wars: Approaches to Peace at the example of the Syrian Crisis

Cornelia Beyer

Introduction

The Syrian civil war grew out of the 2011 Arab Spring.¹ Violence erupted when protestors called for President Assad's removal, protests which he as violently suppressed. The war developed into a multiparty civil war, with rebels from various sides (Sunni, Shia, Kurdish, for example) fighting amongst each other and against the Presidential powers. The war got notorious when the Islamic State, an offspring of the notorious terrorist group Al Qaeda, got into the headlines for the excesses of violence. Worries were caused by individuals from the West to travel to Syria to join the Islamic State in their struggle², and a refugee crisis to the West³, which dominated the headlines for months, arguably caused by struggle and strife not only in Syria but in the wider region. In October 2015, Russia intervened in the war,⁴ which resulted in a near global confrontation between the West and Russia, which arguably could have escalated the war into a world war.⁵ At this time, it seemed that the Islamic State and Russia were the most dangerous parties in this conflict. However, Russia

¹ Cf. Micallef, Joseph (2015): *The Islamic State. Its History, Ideology and Challenge*. Vancouver: Antioch Downs; McHugo, John (2015): *Syria: A recent history*. London: Saqi; Erlich, Reese (2014): *Inside Syria. The Backstory of Their Civil War and What the World Can Expect*. Amerst: Prometheus Books; Kilcullen, David (2016): *Blood Year. Islamic State and the Failures of the War on Terror*. London: C. Hurst.

² Wood, Graeme (2015): *What ISIS really wants*. The Atlantic. <https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2015/03/what-isis-really-wants/384980/>.

³ Kingsley, Patrick (2016): *The New Odyssee: The Story of Europe's Refugee Crisis*. London: Guardian Faber; Lesser, Ian at al. (2015): *The Refugee Crisis: Perspectives from Across Europe and the Atlantic*. Brussels: German Marshall Fund of the United States.

⁴ Alhadeff, Iakovos (2015): *The Russian Expeditions in Afghanistan and Syria*. Amazon Digital Edition: Kindle; Quinn, Ben (2016): *Russia's military action in Syria: timeline*. The Guardian. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/mar/14/russias-military-action-in-syria-timeline>.

⁵ The situation resembled the Cuban Missile Crisis, the only situation in the Cold War where the US and Russia were close to a direct clash. In 2015, also, like in the Cuban Missile Crisis, threats with the use of nuclear weapons were made.

initially seemed to fight other rebel groups with deplorable violence,⁶ and only slowly could be convinced to target ISIS. Measures that were taken to de-escalate the conflict having even wider implications were an aid programme towards Syria in general⁷ and the attempt to integrate Russia into the global efforts to counter ISIS, to solve the re-activated Security Dilemma⁸.

There are at least three points to mention, that could be done with regards to Syria now, derived from the discussion above:

⁶ Itani, Faysal and Hossam Abouzahr (2016): Lessons from Russia's intervention in Syria. The Atlantic Council. <http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/syriasource/lessons-from-russia-s-intervention-in-syria>.

⁷ Cf. European Commission (2017): Syrian Crisis. https://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/aid/countries/factsheets/syria_en.pdf.

⁸ Cf. Booth, K. and N. J. Wheeler (2008): The Security Dilemma. Fear, Cooperation and Trust in World Politics. Basingstoke: Palgrave; Adler, E. and M. Barnett (eds. 1998): Security Communities. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Bunde, T. and T. Noetzel (2010): Unavoidable Tensions: The Liberal Path to Global NATO. Contemporary Security Policy, 31:2, 295-318; Collins, A. (1997): The Security Dilemma and the End of the Cold War. New York: St. Martin's Press; Collins, A. (2004): State-Induced Security Dilemma. Maintaining the Tragedy. Cooperation and Conflict: Journal of the Nordic Studies Association, 39:1, 27-44; Craig, C. (2004): Glimmer of a New Leviathan: Total War in the Realism of Niebuhr, Morgenthau, and Waltz. New York: Columbia University Press; Daalder, I. and J. Goldgeier (2006): Global NATO. Foreign Affairs, 85, 105-113; Glaser, C. L. (1997): The Security Dilemma Revisited. World Politics, 50:1, 171-201; Herz, J. H. (1950): Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma. World Politics, 2:2, 157-180; Herz, J.H. (1951): Political Realism and Political Idealism. A Study in Theory and Realities. Chicago: Chicago University Press; Jervis, R. (1978): Cooperation under the Security Dilemma. World Politics, 30:2, 167-214; Jones, S. G. (2003): The European Union and the Security Dilemma. Security Studies, 12:3, 114-156; Kupchan, C. et al. (1999): Power in Transition: The Peaceful Change of International Order. New York: United Nations University Press; Mitrany, D. (1966): A Working Peace System. Chicago: Quadrangle Books; Mowle, T. S. and D.H. Sacko (2007): Global NATO: Bandwagoning in a Unipolar World. Contemporary Security Policy, 28:3, 597-618; Shiping, T. (2009): The Security Dilemma: A Conceptual Analysis. Security Studies, 18:3, 587-623; Snyder, G. H. (1984): The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics. World Politics, 36:4, 461-495; Wheeler, N. and K. Booth (1992): The Security Dilemma. In: Baylis, J. and N. J. Rengger (eds.): Dilemma of World Politics: International Issues in a Changing World. Oxford Clarendon Press, 29-60.

⁸ Cf. Daalder, I. and J. Goldgeier (2006): Global NATO. Foreign Affairs, 85, 105-113; Mowle, T.S. and D.H. Sacko (2007): Global NATO: Bandwagoning in a Unipolar World. Contemporary Security Policy, 28:3, 597-618; Bunde, T. and T. Noetzel (2010): Unavoidable Tensions: The Liberal Path to Global NATO. Contemporary Security Policy, 31:2, 295-318; The Royal United Services Institute (2012). John Ikenberry Opposes a Global NATO. Online: http://www.dailymotion.com/video/xvm92n_john-ikenberry-opposes-a-global-nato_news.

However, while these publications do speak for an expansion of NATO towards the East, they do not go as far as calling for an integration of Russia into NATO.

First, with regards to the Islamic State, it would be necessary to try to negotiate with the group and other actors in this war and offer them some territory that they can administer in exchange for a cessation of violence and respect for human rights.⁹ Negotiation with terrorists is something that is often opposed, but most governments do negotiate with terrorists. The conflict in Northern Ireland, for example, would not have come to an end without negotiation and some sort of compromise.¹⁰ In addition, in any negotiation, something needs to be offered. So, because the main goal of the Islamic State is to create a state that is governed under Islamic principles, one could negotiate with the group by offering some territory that it could control, as long as it cedes violence and respects human rights. All sides would need to agree to cede violence, the Islamic State and those that fight it.

This raises the question what can be made a topic in the negotiations with ISIS and other actors.

This article argues for two points:

- 1) A Marshall Plan for Syria,
- 2) Integration of Russia into the NATO-led efforts with the goal to re-integrate Russia into NATO long term.

However, more importantly, this article makes an argument about the causes of the civil war in Syria, looking at Psychology and mental health in particular. It has become a more established

⁹ Faure, Guy O. and William Zartman (2011): *Negotiating with terrorists*. London: Routledge; Dolnik, Adam et al. (2007): *Negotiating Hostage Crises with the New Terrorists*. New York: Praeger; Rice, Mitchell B. (2010): *Negotiating with Evil: When to talk to terrorists*. New York: Open Road; Powell, Jonathan (2015): *Terrorists at the Table: Why Negotiation is the Only Way to Peace*. New York: St. Martin's Press; Feste, Karen A. (2010): *Terminate Terrorism: Framing, Gaming, and Negotiating Conflicts*. London: Routledge; Bond, Dottie (2016): *Negotiating with Separatist Terrorists*. London: LAP Lambert; Turner, C. (2015): *How terrorism ends: A comparative conflict analysis of Northern Ireland, the Basque Country and Corsica*. PhD thesis at the University of Hull, UK; Bew, J.; Frampton, M. I. Gurruchaga. 2009. *Talking to Terrorists. Making Peace in Northern Ireland and the Basque Country*. London: Hurst & Company; Cronin, A.K. 2009. *How Terrorism Ends. Understanding the Decline and Demise of Terrorist Campaigns*. Princeton: Princeton University Press; Goerzig, C. 2010. *Talking to Terrorists. Concessions and the renunciation of violence*. London: Routledge; Powell, J. 2015. *Talking to Terrorists: How to End Armed Conflicts*. London: Vintage.

¹⁰ Adams, Gerry (1996): *Before the Dawn. An Autobiography*. London: Mandarin.

position that political violence, such as insurgencies and terrorism, stem from trauma, which connects neatly all the previously existing literature on the causes of terrorism and the psychology of terrorism together. Trauma has also become a marker for mental health concerns. This means, we need to take a look at mental health to understand wars more widely, and in turn mental health problems globally can maybe aid us predicting violence such as the civil war in Syria in the future. This article will take up – from the above – the discussion of mental health with the call to establish an Early Warning System for War based on mental health data as well as briefly discuss the idea to follow this up with a Marshall Plan and intensive foreign aid towards civil war countries, such as Syria. The former fits in neatly with the WHO Mental Health Action Plan 2020.¹¹ For this purpose, the article will first discuss the relevant literature on ISIS, on the psychological and economic causes of terrorism, and then move on to discuss how they can be addressed long term with an Early Warning System for War based on mental health data and following this interventions with soft tools, hence the recommendation of a Marshall Plan for Syria now.¹²

Literature Review

On Syria and ISIS

In Syria after the Arab Spring a civil war developed. We could have talked about a failed state then with regards to Syria. Failed states are states in which government does not function anymore, and various factions are fighting each other.¹³ While a failed state does not necessarily have to develop into civil war, in the case of Syria it did. Failed states have a long history – at least since the end of

¹¹ World Health Organisation (2013): Comprehensive mental health action plan 2013-2020. http://www.who.int/mental_health/action_plan_2013/en/.

¹² Brown, Gordon (2016): The Syrian refugee crisis calls for a new Marshall Plan. The Guardian. <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/feb/04/gordon-brown-syrian-refugee-crisis-marshall-plan>; Crilly, Rob (2016): Former US General calls for Marshall Plan for the Middle East. The National. <http://www.thenational.ae/world/middle-east/former-us-general-calls-for-marshall-plan-for-the-middle-east>

¹³ Kaldor, Mary (2012): New and Old Wars: Organised Violence in a Global Era. London: Polity; Rotberg, Robert I. (2002): Failed States in a World of Terror. Foreign Affairs, 81:4, 127-140.

the Cold War – to be in the academic spotlight as a cause for concern and as the main concern for international security. Failed states were an important topic in the 1990s, when genocides and civil wars such as in Rwanda took place. What we seem to know about civil wars is that often they are caused by what Ostby and others have termed horizontal inequalities, hence inequalities between ethnic groups.¹⁴ So, in Rwanda, for example, this would mean inequality between the Hutus and the Tutsis. Inequality manifests for example in reduced status for one group, with less access to resources, such as medium and high status jobs and possibilities for effective participation and presence in political offices. This is thought to contribute to humiliation.¹⁵ Humiliation has been connected to the emotion of shame, and anger, and both of them are thought to contribute to the eruption of violence. Shame can be created when insults – and inequality could be such an insult – are not dealt with in a socially constructive manner. Braithwaite calls this unacknowledged shame.¹⁶ The literature on shame looked in particular at the Second World War and why it occurred and connected the emotion of shame to the personality of Hitler and why he developed his schemes and why he attracted support from the German population. Shame, in the case of Germany, was caused by the Treaty of Versailles, in which Germany was attributed the guilt for the First World War, as well as high reparation payments towards victorious powers. This resulted in a feeling of betrayal and humiliation in Germany, which Hitler played on. He promised the Germans to make Germany ‘great again’, and in the dire situation that Germany found itself in the

¹⁴ Cf. Ostby, Gudrun (2003): *Horizontal Inequalities and Civil War: Do Ethnic Group Inequalities Influence the Risk of Domestic Armed Conflict?* Thesis at the Department of Sociology and Political Science, Norwegian University of Science and Technology and Centre for the Study of Civil War, International Peace Research Institute (PRIO), Oslo, Norway; Cederman, L.E.; Weidman, N.B. and K.S. Gleditsch (2011): *Horizontal Inequalities and Ethnonationalist Civil War: A Global Comparison*. *American Political Science Review*, 105:03, 478-495; Stewart, F. (2010): *Horizontal inequalities as a cause of conflict: a review of CRISE findings*. Oxford: Centre for Research on Inequality, Human Security and Ethnicity.

¹⁵ Lindner, E. (2006): *Making Enemies. Humiliation and International Conflict*. Westport & London: Praeger Security International.

¹⁶ Braithwaite, J. (1989): *Crime, shame and reintegration*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Braithwaite, J. (2001): *Foreword*. In: Scheff, T. and S. Retzinger: *Emotions and Violence: Shame and Rage in Destructive Conflicts*. Lincoln: iUniverse, vii-xv, xi.

interwar years – with the Great Depression in addition to the aftereffects of the First World War – this promise seemed very attractive.¹⁷

Now, the question is if we can learn something from this for explaining the civil war in Syria. Potentially, we could explain it when looking at the Islamic State that it plays on a similar justification for its violence. The Islamic State is influenced by a branch of Islam that is called Sunni, utilising ideas from Wahhabism and Salafism¹⁸. There are at least two major branches, one Shia and one Sunni. One possible explanation is this: In Iraq, while there was a quasi-civil war or a civil war going on, and while there were attempts to create a functioning state, the Sunni were relatively marginalised, at least in their own perspective. Other groups, in particular the Shia and Kurds, had, as some believe, an advantage and some believe even attempted to destroy political Sunni Islam.¹⁹ The Sunni seem to have had a more prominent place in power in Iraq before the intervention of the Western coalition in 2003, but were pushed out of power afterwards, while the Shia and the Kurds were preferred. In addition, the Islamic State is an offspring of Al Qaeda, also Sunni, and which had been under attack in Afghanistan since 2001.²⁰ This might have created a similar situation as in Germany after the First World War, with humiliation as a factor. The Islamic

¹⁷ Scheff, T. and S. Retzinger (2001): *Emotions and Violence: Shame and Rage in Destructive Conflicts*. Lincoln: iUniverse.

¹⁸ Wood, Graeme (2015): What ISIS really wants. *The Atlantic*.

<https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2015/03/what-isis-really-wants/384980/>;

Lister, Charles R. (2015) : *The Syrian Jihad*. London: Hurst; McCants, William (2015): *The ISIS Apocalypse*. New York: St. Martin's Press; Stern, Jessica and J.M. Berger (2015): *ISIS: The State of Terror*. London: HarperCollins; Weiss, Michael and Hassan Hassan (2015): *ISIS: Inside the Army of Terror*. New York: Regan Arts.

¹⁹ Cf. Khalife, Nabil (2017): *The Attempt to Uproot Sunni-Arab Influence. A Geo-Strategic Analysis of the Western, Israeli and Iranian Quest for Domination*. Eastbourne: Sussex Academic Press. Khalife discussed the view that the international community is determined to weaken, even destroy, political Sunnism. Cf. also Collins, Tim (2015): Syria's Sunni Muslims need a homeland of their own. *The Guardian*. <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/syria/11915469/Syrias-Sunnis-need-a-homeland-of-their-own.html>; Martins, Alice (2016): *ISIS: A Catastrophe for Sunnis*. *The Washington Post*. http://www.washingtonpost.com/sf/world/2016/11/23/isis-a-catastrophe-for-sunnis/?utm_term=.fc6fb2b976a4.

²⁰ Mason, Noah (2015): *ISIS: The Comprehensive Insight into Islamic State of Iraq and Syria*. New York: Createspace, Atwan, Abdel Bari (2015): *The Islamic State: The Digital Caliphate*. London: Saqi.

State, as a Sunni group, probably plays on this humiliation, even though the main activity was in Syria, not Iraq.

First, in Syria we have at least three fighting factions: The government under President Assad, the Islamic State, and rebel groups, such as the Kurds and others. In the case of Syria, it is interesting that we refer to the Islamic States as the terrorists, but not to the rebel groups. Probably, these definitions are applied because the other groups don't use the same level of violence. But then it would also not make sense to talk about the Islamic State as a terrorist group, but rather as an insurgency or a revolution or whatnot. The Islamic State is not the same as what we traditionally have known as terrorism, even though it does employ terrorist tactics and methods. It is more than a traditional terrorist group, because it controls a large territory, and provides – or at least did until recently – over substantial resources, such as access to oil fields and military equipment.²¹ It also applied forms of violence that had not been used by terrorists in the past, such as mass scale killings of civilians in their own homeland and genocides of both members of their own religion as well as from other religions.²² Similar to the terrorism we have seen before with Al Qaeda, though, it is religiously inspired. It is inspired by an extreme interpretation of the Qur'an and Islam. For example, the Islamic State argues that they are in a struggle that will result in the coming of the Apocalypse.²³ This is thought to be the final showdown between the forces of good and evil. While it is not clear if this interpretation is derived from the Qur'an, it is present in some of the literature that the Islamic State uses for its ideology. The extreme religious motivation of the Islamic State

²¹ Cf. Lister, Charles R. (2015) : The Syrian Jihad. London: Hurst, Solomon, Erika et al (2016): Inside ISIS Inc: The journey of a barrel of oil. Financial Times, <http://ig.ft.com/sites/2015/isis-oil/>.

²² Shaheen, Kareem (2016): Up to 15.000 ISIS victims buried in mass graves in Syria and Iraq – survey. The Guardian. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/aug/30/up-to-15000-bodies-may-be-buried-in-mass-graves-in-syria-and-iraq-survey>; Holpuch, Amanda (2016): ISIS atrocities against religious minorities are genocide, says US House. The Guardian. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/mar/15/isis-genocide-of-religious-minorities-us-house-statement>.

²³ Byman, D. (2015): Al Qaeda, the Islamic State, and the Global Jihadist Movement. What Everyone Needs to Know. Oxford: Oxford University Press, McCant, William (2016): The ISIS Apocalypse: The History, Strategy and Doomsday Vision of the Islamic State. New York: Picador.

can probably explain why other groups were attacked by them (such as the Kurds and Christians, as well as others) and why they destroyed Christian heritage sites in the region. It is difficult to see how it can explain why ISIS conducted substantial human rights violations within their territory. Let us continue to look into terrorism and explanations for this. Terrorism is caused by many different factors, among which count military interventions²⁴, exclusion²⁵, deprivation²⁶, lack of democracy²⁷, religion²⁸, trauma²⁹ etc. The following will deal mainly with psychological and economic factors.

Psychology and Terrorism³⁰

Isolation, Exclusion and Inequality

For terrorism, some causal factors seem to be similar to those that cause mental illness. First, recently, the long held belief of the mentally healthy terrorist has been challenged. Some studies and scholars purported the belief that terrorists and radicalised individuals are to be found more in the isolated and depressed parts of society, both in the West as well as in the Middle East³¹.

²⁴ Beyer, Cornelia (2016): *Violent Globalisms: Conflict in Response to Empire*. London: Routledge.

²⁵ Beyer, Anna Cornelia (2017): *International Political Psychology: Explorations into a New Discipline*. London: Palgrave.

²⁶ A debate is going on in how far deprivation, poverty, inequality, overall economic factors, contribute to terrorism. See for a critical contribution Bjorgo, T. (2004): *Root Causes of Terrorism. Myths, reality and ways forward*. Abingdon, Routledge, ch. 3 and p. 132.

²⁷ Cf. for example Li, Q. (2005): Does Democracy Promote or Reduce Transnational Terrorist Incidents? *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 49:2, 278-297.

²⁸ Juergensmeyer, M. (2003): *Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

²⁹ Beyer, Anna Cornelia (2017): *International Political Psychology: Explorations into a New Discipline*. London: Palgrave.

³⁰ Parts of the following have been reproduced with generous permission from Beyer, Anna Cornelia (2016): *International Political Psychology: Explorations into a New Discipline*. London: Palgrave.

³¹ Bhui, K. et al. (2014): Might Depression, Psychosocial Adversity, and Limited Social Assets Explain Vulnerability to and Resistance against Violent Radicalisation? *PLoS ONE* 9(9): e105918. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0105918; Navarro, J. (2009): Unmasking Terrorists – Two Critical Characteristics! *Psychology Today*. Online: <http://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/spycatcher/200912/unmasking-terrorists-two-critical-characteristics>; Krishnan, M. (2014): Terrorism expert says isolation driving Calgarians to join ISIL. *Calgary Herald*. Online: <http://calgaryherald.com/news/local-news/terrorism-expert-says->

Furthermore, Silke mentions marginalisation as a cause of terrorism, which hints at processes of exclusion and deprivation, essentially a migration of the individual or group to the fringes of society, similar to mental illness³². Deprivation and poverty are hotly contested in the literature on terrorism. Some authors³³ contend that relative deprivation is responsible for a large percentage of terrorism.

Furthermore, more recently Borum has identified several vulnerabilities, which are responsible for terrorism³⁴. One of them is that there needs to be a need to belong, which is essential in his explanation: A feeling of being disconnected from society and a need to integrate into a group, which provides with meaning and purpose. Horgan has confirmed the need to integrate into a group as a primary motivation to join terrorism³⁵. Both would confirm the hypothesis that radicalization, as the preceding stage to terrorism, is causally connected to isolation first.

Socio-psychology

Trauma can be connected to the literature on terrorism. There have been theories going back to Freud where Narcicism has been connected to terrorist violence as well as a negative identity formation³⁶. Narcicism develops when a person is smothered in their childhood and later on fails

isolation-driving-calgarians-to-join-isil; Merari, A. et al. (2009): Personality Characteristics of “Self Martyrs”/ “Suicide Bombers” and Organizers of Suicide Attacks. *Terrorism and Political Violence*. 22:1, 87-101; Merari, A. (2010): *Driven to Death*. New York: Oxford University Press; Lankford, A. (2011): Could Suicide Terrorists Actually Be Suicidal? *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 34:4, 337-366. One study argues that depression is highest in the world in the Middle East, where most international terrorism is stemming from. Cf. Cousins, S. (2013): The Middle East and North Africe suffer the world’s highest depression rates, according to new research. *Middle East Monitor*. Online: <https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/articles/africa/8335-the-middle-east-and-north-africa-suffer-the-worlds-highest-depression-rates-according-to-new-research->

³² Silke, A. (2003): *Terrorists, Victims and Society: Psychological Perspectives on Terrorism and its Consequences*. Chichester: John Wiley & Sons.

³³ Beyer, C. (2016): *Violent Globalisms: Conflict in Response to Empire*. London: Routledge; Beyer, A.C. (2014): *Inequality and Violence: A Re-appraisal of Man, the State and War*. London: Routledge.

³⁴ Borum, R. (2004): *Psychology of Terrorism*. Tampa: University of South Florida.

³⁵ Horgan, J. (2014): *The Psychology of Terrorism*. New York: Routledge.

³⁶ Borum, R. (2004): *Psychology of Terrorism*. Tampa: University of South Florida.

to adapt their egocentric personality by testing it against reality. The world is increasingly seen as evil and the self inflated as good. This makes the basis for attributing blame to others for perceived injustices. The negative identity hypothesis posits that children perceive their father figure as rejecting. From this onwards, they develop an aversion towards authority, which then is not only directed against their own father, but in the long run also against the state as an authority. They develop an identity, which rejects all authority and come in conflict first with the law and then with the state. In fact, it has been found that sociologically many terrorist have been found to have had family problems, such as divorce or death in the family, and had offended and been in conflict with the law before them becoming terrorists.³⁷

A more prominent hypothesis is the frustration aggression hypothesis. It was established by psychologists to explain how aggression occurs in people, and the interesting finding in psychology is that much aggression is caused by negative stimuli³⁸. For example, in experiments with animals and humans it has been found that stressors such as noise, heat and overcrowding lead to higher levels of aggression. Pain, obviously, is a strong aggressor. With regards to heat it has even been found that under hot conditions, such as in summer time, there are more crimes conducted than when it is cold. These kind of stimuli led some previous researchers to conclude that frustration could cause aggression. Frustration refers to a stress situation in which goals are thwarted and needs cannot be fulfilled³⁹. This connects to Maslow's needs theory in which basic and more higher needs have to be fulfilled as the primary motivating force for humans more generally⁴⁰. If need fulfillment – or goal fulfillment – is hindered, this leads to frustration, and in many cases this is a precursor

³⁷ Borum, R. (2004): *Psychology of Terrorism*. Tampa: University of South Florida. Traumata in youth, though, are per se not a good predictor for determining who will become a terrorist as many people experience these problems and never consider terrorism

³⁸ Berkowitz, L. (1993): *Aggression: Its Causes, Consequences and Control*. New York: McGraw – Hill Higher Education.

³⁹ Dollard, J. et al. (1939): *Frustration and aggression*. Yale: Yale University Press.

⁴⁰ Maslow, A.H. (2013): *A Theory of Human Motivation*. Uitgever: Wilder Publications.

for aggression.⁴¹ But the mechanism has been established in the literature and Ted Robert Gurr applied it to explain why men rebel, in a publication with the same title. He referred to frustration being caused by relative deprivation, which refers essentially to relative poverty⁴². Kruglanski finally mentions trauma (and frustration) as a cause for suicide terrorism⁴³.

The traumata in the region stem, for example, from repeated interventions and economic backwardness.⁴⁴

Psycho-biology

There is little literature on the psycho-biology of terrorism. In the discussion, however, is the finding that, similar to mental illness, both suicidal behaviour and aggression are linked to an imbalance in neurotransmitters, especially serotonin and dopamine. Serotonin hypofunction and dopamine hyperfunction have been linked to aggression, suicide and depression⁴⁵. A lack of cortisol and an excess of testosterone have similarly been found present in aggression⁴⁶. Studies on the neurobiology of terrorism are still outstanding, but could possibly confirm these connections.

⁴¹ Initially, the researchers believed that frustration always leads to aggression, but they revised this hypothesis to argue that it is a possible cause. In people who just don't have the opportunities for aggression or who are generally more passive – learned helplessness is a keyword here – aggression does not need to occur from frustration.

⁴² Gurr, T. R. (1971): *Why Men Rebel*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

⁴³ Victoroff, J. (2009): Suicide Terrorism and the Biology of Significance. *Political Psychology*, 30:3, 397-400.

⁴⁴ Beyer, Cornelia (2016): *Violent Globalisms: Conflict in Response to Empire*. London: Routledge.

⁴⁵ Seo, D. et al. (2008): Role of serotonin and dopamine system interactions in the neurobiology of impulsive aggression and its comorbidity with other clinical disorders. *Aggression and Violent Behavior*, 13:5, 383-395; Ryding, E. et al. (2008): The role of dopamine and serotonin in suicidal behaviour and aggression. *Progress in Brain Research*, 172, 307-315.

⁴⁶ Schulz, K.P. et al. (1997): Plasma Cortisol and Aggression in Boys with ADHD. *Journal of the American Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry*, 36:5, 605-609; Pompa, A. et al. (2007): Cortisol Moderates in the Relationship between Testosterone and Aggression in Delinquent Male Adolescents. *Biological Psychiatry*, 61:3, 405-411.

Why do they adopt religion?

Why is religion so important in this new form of terrorism, if we want to call it terrorism? For one, religion in the Middle East is much more prominent generally than in the West, where we have more secular societies. Also, in many Middle Eastern states religion and politics are intertwined, meaning one cannot separate them, such as in Iran or Saudi Arabia. This is one interpretation. An additional interpretation stems from research in psychology and would be that religion is often turned towards in desperate situations. People are known to turn religious when they lack the resources to cope with their situations rationally. Religion then provides comfort and hope.⁴⁷ It is possible, maybe natural, that this is a common human reaction. In times of extreme helplessness, humans might turn towards a higher power, even if not proven, for protection and salvation. If we accept this interpretation, we would need to ask if it applies to the Islamic State?

The Islamic State is an outcome of Al Qaeda and has its origins in Iraq. So, we can say it has been under attack since 2001 when the intervention in Afghanistan started. While it has gained strength after the US withdrew militarily from Iraq, it had been, and again is, under constant attack. This could possibly explain the extreme religiousness.

⁴⁷ Pargament, K. I. (1997): *The psychology of religion and coping: Theory, research, practice*. New York: Guilford Press; Trevino, K. M. and K. I. Pargament (2007): Religious coping with terrorism and natural disaster. *Southern Medical Journal*, 100:9, 946-947, doi:10.1097/smj.0b013e3181454660; Soenke, M.; M.J. Landau and J. Greenberg (2013): Sacred armor: Religion's role as a buffer against the anxieties of life and the fear of death. In: Pargament, K.I., J.J. Exline and J.W. Jones (eds) (2013): *APA handbook of psychology, religion, and spirituality (Vol 1): Context, theory, and research*. APA handbooks in psychology, 105-122. Washington, DC, US: American Psychological Association, xxvii. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/14045-005>; Wink, P. and J. Scott (2005): Does Religiousness Buffer Against the Fear of Death and Dying in Late Adulthood? Findings From a Longitudinal Study. *The Journal of Gerontology. Series B*. 60 (4): 207-214. doi: 10.1093/geronb/60.4.P207; Soenke, M.; M.J. Landau and J. Greenberg (2013): Sacred armor: Religion's role as a buffer against the anxieties of life and the fear of death. In: Pargament, K.I., J.J. Exline and J.W. Jones (eds) (2013): *APA handbook of psychology, religion, and spirituality (Vol 1): Context, theory, and research*. APA handbooks in psychology, 105-122. Washington, DC, US: American Psychological Association, xxvii. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/14045-005>

When under threat and when no superordinate authority is present, it might make sense to believe in a higher power for protection. This might also explain the adoption of extreme Islam by the insurgent group the Islamic State.

A number of studies suggest that religious beliefs are used to cope with [the] extreme stress For example, one small study of 28 patients with severe mental illness living in Maryland, investigators found that 47% of these patients indicated that spirituality/religion had helped "a great deal," 57% prayed every day, and 76% thought about God or spiritual/religious matters on a daily basis. ... In fact, the majority of patients spent nearly half of the time trying to cope with their illness in religious activities.⁴⁸

Religion is believed to be a common coping mechanism after trauma⁴⁹ and against fear: 'A primary function of religiousness is to buffer the individual against anxiety'⁵⁰. Partly, this is explained with the belief, common in most religions, of an afterlife. This belief is thought to present psychological defences against the fear of mortality.

moderately religious individuals feared death more than individuals for whom religion played either a central or a marginal role in life. ... individuals who scored high on both belief in a rewarding afterlife and religiousness were less afraid of death than individuals

⁴⁸ Koenig, Harold G. (2007): Religion, spirituality and psychotic disorders. *Archives of Clinical Psychiatry (São Paulo)*, 34(Suppl. 1), 95-104.

⁴⁹ Pargament, K. I. (1997): *The psychology of religion and coping: Theory, research, practice*. New York: Guilford Press; Trevino, K. M. and K. I. Pargament (2007): Religious coping with terrorism and natural disaster. *Southern Medical Journal*, 100:9, 946-947, [doi:10.1097/smj.0b013e3181454660](https://doi.org/10.1097/smj.0b013e3181454660).

⁵⁰ Soenke, Melissa; Mark J. Landau and Jeff Greenberg (2013): Sacred armor: Religion's role as a buffer against the anxieties of life and the fear of death. In: Pargament, Kenneth I., Julie J. Exline and James W. Jones (eds) (2013): *APA handbook of psychology, religion, and spirituality (Vol 1): Context, theory, and research*. APA handbooks in psychology, 105-122. Washington, DC, US: American Psychological Association, xxvii. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/14045-005>.

who scored low on both. ... individuals who are consistently high in religiousness fear death the least because they construe death as personally meaningful and derive additional comfort from the prospect of being reunited after death with people who were close to them.⁵¹

Religion is thought to help cope with situations in which the individual (or here a group) believes not to have the resources to ensure its survival: 'adherence to religious ideologies may buffer anxiety by providing people with attachment, structure, and hope, particularly when people have doubts about having the internal or external resources to obtain desired outcomes and avoid undesired ones'⁵².

A possible model of emergence: Exclusion and the 'defeat syndrome'

In individuals with some social support, meaning individuals which are better integrated into a strong community, there might be the capacity to respond to the same stressors that can be discussed for mental illness⁵³ with the fight response rather than the flight response. This might explain why terrorists occur in areas where minorities are under threat (with ethno-separatist terrorism for example) and why terrorists are usually not schizophrenic. An exception might here be the lone wolf terrorist, who might be at the borderline between a schizophrenic response to

⁵¹ Wink, Paul and Julia Scott (2005): Does Religiousness Buffer Against the Fear of Death and Dying in Late Adulthood? Findings From a Longitudinal Study. *The Journal of Gerontology. Series B.* 60 (4): 207-214. doi: 10.1093/geronb/60.4.P207.

⁵² Soenke, Melissa; Mark J. Landau and Jeff Greenberg (2013): Sacred armor: Religion's role as a buffer against the anxieties of life and the fear of death. In: Pargament, Kenneth I., Julie J. Exline and James W. Jones (eds) (2013): *APA handbook of psychology, religion, and spirituality (Vol 1): Context, theory, and research.* APA handbooks in psychology, 105-122. Washington, DC, US: American Psychological Association, xxvii. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/14045-005>.

⁵³ Cf. Beyer, Anna Cornelia (2017): *International Political Psychology: Explorations into a New Discipline.* London: Palgrave. Causes of mental illness comprise: exclusion, isolation, trauma, deprivation, caused by migration, general low social status or other such factors.

prolonged stress and following isolation but might retain the capacity to choose the fight over the flight response.

It therefore is speculated here that some of the principal social and political processes – trauma and isolation, exclusion and deprivation - that contribute arguably to the emergence of mental illnesses⁵⁴, also contribute to the emergence of radicalisation, as the preceding stage for terrorism. If the radicalised individual is then recruited into an extremist group, this might counter the isolation and provide with tools to resist the perceived stressors (choosing the fight rather than the flight response). This might in fact protect against further mental illness and explain why terrorists are usually thought not to be mentally ill.

The above mentioned psychological background serves to explain a model of terrorism causation, which I will present in the following. The main assumption is that the principal causes – isolation and trauma, exclusion and deprivation – that cause mental illness also are contributing to terrorism. The difference is that the radicalised individual, when joining a terrorist group, might be protected against further mental illness due to inclusion into a community. It might provide the individual with resources to resist, rather than further withdraw into mental illness.

Terrorism is an attempt to solve a conflict. A misguided attempt, to be sure, involving the use of violence, but an attempt nonetheless. It has been stated that terrorism is the ‘weapon of the weak’⁵⁵. How has this weakness been brought about? At the very beginning of a lengthy process leading to terrorism stands exclusion. Groups are being put in a minority position and marginalised⁵⁶. This loss of status is then accompanied by material and social negative effects, such as exclusion from economic opportunities, geographic seclusion, and such⁵⁷. The status of the excluded minority,

⁵⁴ Cf. Beyer, Anna Cornelia (2017): *International Political Psychology: Explorations into a New Discipline*. London: Palgrave.

⁵⁵ Crenshaw, M. (1981): *The Causes of Terrorism*. *Comparative Politics*, 13:4, 379-399.

⁵⁶ Piazza, J.A. (2011): *Poverty, minority economic discrimination, and domestic terrorism*. *Journal of Peace Research*, 48:2, 339-353; Piazza, J.A. (2012): *Types of Minority Discrimination and Terrorism*. *Conflict Management and Peace Science*, 29:5, 521-546.

⁵⁷ Morrison, C. (2012): *Grievance, Mobilisation and State Response: An Examination of the Naxalite Insurgency in India*. *Journal of Conflict Transformation & Security*, 2:1, 53-75;

when repeatedly reinstated, leads to feelings of shame and frustration, which have long been linked to aggression in the psychological literature⁵⁸. The resulting aggression leads to oppositional behaviour, challenging the authorities responsible for marginalisation, by sometimes even attacking the majority population. This is usually responded to by repression. But in a game of tit for tat, this repression is responded to with further aggression⁵⁹. If force is used to repress the revolting minority, violence might well be the logical response. When we ask terrorists why they commit their crimes, they usually answer that they respond to violent oppression with violence⁶⁰. This is just the last stage in a process of escalation where one side is pushed outside the fringes of the social reference frame and stripped off their privileges and resources. The difference to mental illness is that the fight response, rather than the flight (withdrawal) response is chosen, which is possible due to the existence of a supporting group.

This process can possibly be observed in many cases of terrorism, from the RAF, to the IRA, to Al Qaeda and the Tamil Tigers and ISIS⁶¹. The process might be similar to that which leads particularly young individuals into criminal group activity. Different to schizophrenia, in terrorism it is always collectives that are finally affected. What also differs might be the scale of exclusion and marginalisation and the interpretation of this as an insult⁶². Lone wolf terrorists, finally, might

Kaarthikeyan, S. (2005): Root causes of terrorism? A case study of the Tamil insurgency and the LTTE. In: Bjorgo, T. (ed.): Root Causes of Terrorism: Myths, Reality and Ways Forward. London: Routledge.

⁵⁸ Beyer, A.C. (2014): *Inequality and Violence: A Re-Appraisal of Man, the State and War*. London: Routledge; Braithwaite, J. (1989): *Crime, shame and reintegration*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Braithwaite, J. (2001): Foreword. In: Scheff, T. and Suzanne R.: *Emotions and Violence: Shame and Rage in Destructive Conflicts*. Lincoln: iUniverse, vii-xv.

⁵⁹ Beyer, C. (2016): *Violent Globalisms: Conflict in Response to Empire*. London: Routledge.

⁶⁰ Speckhard, A. (2012): *Talking to Terrorists: Understanding the Psycho-Social Motivations of Militant Jihadi Terrorists, Mass Hostage Takers, Suicide Bombers & Martyrs*. Unknown: Advances Press.

⁶¹ The emergence of ISIS might be explained by the marginalisation of the previously dominant Sunni in Iraq after the US intervention and the intervention in Afghanistan against Al Qaeda. Possibly, this marginalisation and trauma is even further going back, as illustrated in Beyer, Cornelia (2016): *Violent Globalisms: Conflict in Response to Empire*. London: Routledge.

⁶² Victoroff, J. et al. (2012): Psychological Factors Associated with Support for Suicide Bombing in the Muslim Diaspora. *Political Psychology*, 33:6, 791-809.

be exposed to similar causal factors without integrating into a group while still retaining the capacity or willingness to respond with the fight response to their stressors.

Economic Causes of Terrorism⁶³

When arguing that a revised counterterrorism policy is needed, additional motivations for terrorism must be investigated. An effective counterterrorism policy should address these motivations, or ‘root causes’, of terrorism and thereby aim to reduce its renewed occurrence.

While the connection between underdevelopment and civil war has been clearly established⁶⁴, making a similar connection between terrorism and underdevelopment is more difficult. Part of the problem results from the structure of transnational terrorist groups because they operate across borders around all over the world. However, some successful attempts at showing a positive correlation between poverty in countries of origin and the emergence of terrorism from these countries have been made. Koseli, for example, showed a positive correlation between poverty and terrorism in the case of Turkey.⁶⁵

Ethan Bueno de Mesquita has presented more recent findings with regards to selected causes of terrorism.⁶⁶ Some of these most discussed causes of terrorism are poverty and underdevelopment. As Bueno de Mesquita finds, the results are mixed but suggestive. On the one hand, Krueger and Laitin find that ‘wealthy countries are more likely to suffer terrorist attacks and that economic performance is not a statistically significant predictor of which countries terrorists emerge from.’⁶⁷ Abadie finds no statistically significant relationship between per capita GDP and terrorism

⁶³ This paragraph has been previously published in Beyer, Anna Cornelia (2014): *Inequality and Violence: A Re-appraisal of Man, the State and War*. London: Routledge.

⁶⁴ Collier, Paul (2003): *Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy*. New York: World Bank.

⁶⁵ Mutlu Koseli, *Poverty, Inequality & Terrorism Relationship in Turkey* (Richmond: Virginia Commonwealth University, 2006).

⁶⁶ Ethan Bueno de Mesquita, “The Political Economy of Terrorism: A Selective Overview of Recent Work,” (working paper, University of Chicago, 8 February 2008), 2, <http://home.uchicago.edu/~bdm/PDF/pe-terror.pdf>.

⁶⁷ Alan B. Krueger and David Laitin, “Kto Kogo?: A Cross-Country Study of the Origins and Targets of Terrorism,” in *Terrorism, Economic Development, and Political Openness*, ed. Philip Keefer and Norman Loayza (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 148–73.

risk.⁶⁸ On the other hand, several authors have found a ‘statistically significant negative correlation between measures of economic performance and the level of terrorist violence.’⁶⁹ Also, Li and Schaub find that economic development in a country reduces terrorism in that country.⁷⁰ Finally, it is known that failed states and less democratic states breed more terrorism and serve as safe havens for transnational groups, and a link between these states and underdevelopment can be made.⁷¹ Relative deprivation as a cause for terrorism has also been positively discussed,⁷² as has exclusion from globalization⁷³.

Another approach focuses on the economic situation of terrorists themselves. Krueger, Maleckova and Berrebi find that terrorist operatives from Hezbollah and Hamas are ‘neither poor nor poorly educated.’⁷⁴ Usually they are well educated and come from relatively well-off backgrounds. Therefore, so the argument, improving economic conditions would help little to reduce the emergence of terrorism. However, this argument has been refuted many times over. For one, terrorist groups are complex entities, with their own internal hierarchies and structures. And it has been established that the lower ranks among these groups, such as the suicide bombers themselves, come from the unemployed poor rather than the middle ranks of researchers and technicians, or

⁶⁸ Alberto Abadie, “Poverty, Political Freedom, and the Roots of Terrorism,” *American Economic Review* (Papers and Proceedings) 96, no. 2, (2006): 50–6.

⁶⁹ S. Brock Blomberg et al., “Economic Conditions and Terrorism,” *European Journal of Political Economy* 20, no. 2 (2004), 463–78; Kostas Drakos and Andreas Gofas, “In Search of the Average Transnational Terrorist Attack Venue,” *Defence and Peace Economics* 17, no. 2 (2006): 73–93.

⁷⁰ Quan Li and Drew Schaub, “Economic Globalization and Transnational Terrorist Incidents: A Pooled Time Series Cross Sectional Analysis,” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 48, no. 2 (2004): 230–58.

⁷¹ Susan E. Rice, “The Threat of Global Poverty,” *The National Interest* 83, (2006): 76–82.

⁷² Caroline F. Ziemke, “Perceived Oppression and Relative Deprivation: Social Factors Contributing to Terrorism,” http://kms1.isn.ethz.ch:80/serviceengine/Files/ISN/100831/ichaptersection_singleedocument/0712d791-157e-44dd-b742-77b3a7ac533f/en/5%5B1%5D.pdf,110f.

⁷³ Li and Schaub, “Economic Globalization.”

⁷⁴ Alan B. Krueger and Jitka Maleckova, “Education, Poverty, and Terrorism: Is There a Causal Connection?” *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 17, no. 4 (2003): 119–44; Claude Berrebi, “Evidence About the Link Between Education, Poverty and Terrorism Among Palestinians,” (Working Paper 477, Princeton University Industrial Relations Section, 2003); Bueno de Mesquita, “The Political Economy of Terrorism,” 2.

leadership figures from the upper echelons of society. Also, it has been argued that terrorist groups apply strategies of recruitment similar to any business organisation: they try to select interested individuals who are the best qualified and best educated, who are usually not among the poorest. Finally, terrorist groups need not themselves be comprised of the poorest people in order to create a connection between underdevelopment and this form of violence; the connection exists if these groups adopt the plight of their fellow countrymen as a motivation to engage in political struggle.⁷⁵

Example Case studies

Let us look, therefore, how economic measures and soft tools enhance the probability of successful counterterrorism at the case of deradicalisation in several Muslim countries. For example, Harrigan and El-Said write about de-radicalisation in Egypt:

The initial response of the Mubarak regime to the insurgency of the 1990s was a harsh crackdown on Islamic militants and their sympathizers. In addition to rounding up the Islamists the regime also arrested family members, including women and introduced new anti-terror legislation which included the death penalty and limited detention without charge. Numerous terrorists were executed and torture was common in prison, as were extra-judicial arrests, military tribunals, arrests without warrants and prison stays without trials. In addition, the security apparatus were successful in dismantling the financial resources of the IG. Blaydes and Rubin ... argue that initially these harsh measures produced the opposite of what was intended and spurred the Islamists onto further violence and garnered support for them.⁷⁶

⁷⁵ Beyer, Cornelia (2016): *Violent Globalisms: Conflict in Response to Empire*. London: Routledge.

⁷⁶ Harrigan, Jane and Hamed El-Said (2013): *Group deradicalization in Egypt: the unfinished agenda*. In: El-Said, Hamed and Jane Harrigan: *Deradicalizing Violent Extremists*, 74-106, 80.

In Egypt, deradicalisation was mainly achieved by a ‘war of ideas’ or by countering the ideology of violent jihad. However, what is lacking is the economic ‘compensation’ side of the picture, which is why Harrigan and El-Said ask if this approach is durable:

Thousands of former Jihadists have been released from Egyptian jails as a result of the deradicalisation process. Their reintegration into society is very difficult, particularly in terms of finding jobs and marriage. Many suffer from very bad social conditions and some have even demanded that they be returned to jail where the conditions were better. ... Placing the onus on the Egyptian state alone would give rise to resource problems. It is estimated that as many as 30,000 former Jihadists have been released in a country which is already suffering from high unemployment rates. ... Western countries with deradicalization programmes that result in releases from prison have well developed social welfare programmes for society as a whole and parole systems that these people could benefit from. The Egyptian experience is one of the few cases of deradicalisation in the Muslim world in which ideological reorientation is not combined with some sort of approach aimed at improving the person’s practical living conditions.⁷⁷

Therefore, Harrigan and El-Said write that economic factors – such as social welfare programmes and inequality reduction – need urgent attention if new recruits to jihadist groups and a resurgence of their struggles are to be avoided.

El-Said also writes about Jordan, which took an even more repressive stance against radicalisation, with de-democratisation measures in particular, and concludes: ‘Observers of the developments in Jordan and of the country’s counter-terrorism policies are sceptical of the governments ability to

⁷⁷ Harrigan, Jane and Hamed El-Said (2013): Group deradicalization in Egypt: the unfinished agenda. In: El-Said, Hamed and Jane Harrigan: Deradicalizing Violent Extremists, 74-106, 97ff.

reduce the threat of violent extremism. On the contrary, the nature of these policies ... seemed to have caused more, not less, radicalisation in the country in general.⁷⁸

Malaysia seems to have a more successful programme of deradicalisation that includes a strong focus on rehabilitation, including counselling on religious issues, motivational classes, psychological support, and a reintroduction to work, education, and social life with leisure activities and such.⁷⁹

About Yemen, El-Said writes:

First, Yemeni authorities' failure to spread wealth, and reduce poverty and inequities, and manage relations with its various ethnic communities and tribes is a reflection of the country's weak development capacity. Developmentally weak states are at a higher risk of violent extremism than developmentally strong states. This is mainly because the environment in developmentally weak states, which are characterized by failure to manage economic growth, poverty, unemployment, inequities, as well as relations with their ethnic minorities, becomes more conducive to radicalization that in turn leads to violent extremism.⁸⁰

He concludes:

First, developmentally weak states (which fail to manage sustainable economic growth, reduce poverty, create employment opportunities and manage relations with their ethnic communities) are more susceptible to radicalization. ... Some Muslim-majority states, like

⁷⁸ El-Said, Hamed (2013): Jordan's response to jihadi salafism. In: El-Said, Hamed and Jane Harrigan: *Deradicalizing Violent Extremists*, 107-139, 133.

⁷⁹ Harrigan, Jane (2013): Malaysia: a history of dealing with insurgency and extremism. In: El-Said, Hamed and Jane Harrigan: *Deradicalizing Violent Extremists*, 140-160.

⁸⁰ El-Said, Hamed (2013): Yemen's passive approach to countering terrorism. In: El-Said, Hamed and Jane Harrigan: *Deradicalizing Violent Extremists*, 227-260, 253.

Malaysia, for example, have hitherto faced no major Islamic radicalization problems ... Out of the eight Muslim-majority states studied ... only Malaysia possessed a strong developmental capacity.⁸¹

Discussion

Building and Early Warning System

It is an established finding that mental illness occurs after war and violence. For example, post-traumatic stress disorder is a known outcome of experience of combat⁸². However, also other mental illnesses increase after war and violence, such as depression and even schizophrenia⁸³.

As mental illness is increasingly thought to be caused by trauma and following trauma, this makes logical sense.

However, what would be interesting would be to look into the question if mental illnesses can precede trauma, hence war. If this would be the case, it would be easier to predict violence and war.

⁸¹ El-Said, Hamed (2013): Conclusion. In: El-Said, Hamed and Jane Harrigan: Deradicalizing Violent Extremists, 261-271, 263.

⁸² Gamito, Pedro et al. (2010): PTSD Elderly War Veterans: A Clinical Controlled Pilot Study. *Cyberpsychology, Behavior, and Social Networking*. February 2010, 13(1): 43-48. doi:10.1089/cyber.2009.0237; Magruder, K and D. Yeager (2009): The Prevalence of PTSD across War Eras and the Effect of Deployment on PTSD: a Systematic Review and Meta-analysis. *Psychiatric Annals*, 39:8, doi: 10.3928/00485713-20090728-04; Horesh, D. et al. (2011): Delayed-onset PTSD among war veterans: the role of life events throughout the life cycle. *Society for Psychiatry Psychiatric Epidemiology*, 46: 863. doi:10.1007/s00127-010-0255-6; Wolfe, J. et al (2000): Trauma-related psychophysiological reactivity in women exposed to war-zone stress. *Journal of Clinical Psychology*, 56: 1371–1379. doi:10.1002/1097-4679(200010)56:10<1371::AID-JCLP8>3.0.CO;2-X.

⁸³ cf. Romme, M. et al. (2009) : *Living with Voices: 50 stories of recovery*. Herefordshire: PCCS Books; Karon, B.P. (2008): Trauma and Schizophrenia. *Journal of Psychological Trauma*, 6:2-3, 127-144; Yaktin, U.S. and S. Labban (1992): Traumatic war. *Stress & Schizophrenia. Journal of Psychosocial Nursing and Mental Health Services*, 30:6, 29-33.

For one, one has to be very cautious about any correlations and distinguish in two aspects here: individual effects and group effects. Individual effects would mean to assume that any individual with any mental illness has a higher risk of becoming violent than any individual without any mental illness. While this is not at all generally assumed to be true⁸⁴, some evidence points towards some suspicion that some mental illnesses pose a somewhat, even if very slight, higher risk of aggression.⁸⁵ However, what is even more important for our purposes is the question if mental illnesses in an aggregated form, meaning in the percentage that they occur in any society, pose a risk for violence in this society, not necessarily caused by the mentally ill individuals themselves. It seems, and this is my novel argument, that this could be so.⁸⁶

If we would find that an aggregated increase in mental illness, such as depression, in any society also raises the risk for violence in this society, we would need to ask after the mechanisms behind this.

Two options are possible here:

- 1) More depressed individuals put a strain on the system – psychologically (contagion effect of depression), economically (more unemployment as mentally ill people might be at risk to lose their jobs), socially (for example because they need to be cared for). This might cause societal tensions, which might result in the outbreak of violence.

⁸⁴ Rueve, ME and RS Welton (2008): Violence and Mental Illness. *Psychiatry* (Edgmont). 5:5, 34-48.

⁸⁵ Hiday, VA (1995): The social context of mental illness and violence. *Journal of Health and Social Behaviour*. 36, 122–137; Wessely, S. (1993): Violence and psychosis. In: Thompson, C. and P. Cowen (eds): *Violence. Basic and clinical science*. Oxford: Butterworth/ Heinemann; 119–134; Link, B. and A. Stueve (1995): Evidence bearing on mental illness as a possible cause of violent behaviour. *Epidemiological Review*, 17, 172–181; Noffsinger, S.G. and P.J. Resnick (1999): Violence and mental illness. *Current Opinion in Psychiatry*, 12, 683–687. Some studies seem to confirm a link between mental illness and violence: ‘The study showed that patients with serious mental illness — those with schizophrenia, major depression, or bipolar disorder — were two to three times as likely as people without such an illness to be assaultive. In absolute terms, the lifetime prevalence of violence among people with serious mental illness was 16%, as compared with 7% among people without mental illness.’ Cf. Friedman, Richard J. (2006): Violence and mental illness – How strong is the link? *New England Journal of Medicine*, 355, 2064-2066.

⁸⁶ Beyer, Anna Cornelia (2017): *International Political Psychology: Explorations into a New Discipline*. London: Palgrave.

- 2) An increase in the rates of depression might not be more than simply a sign of another imbalance in the society's health. For example, it might be a sign of increases in inequality, a weak economy leading to increases in poverty, failing social systems, or whatnot. Then, the rises in depression would be correlated rather than causal for the rise in aggression and conflict that leads to violence.

In all likelihood, the effect contains both elements explained above. In any case this would allow us to take national mental illness data as the basis for a risk assessment for conflict, and in extreme cases even violence, such as riots, civil wars, coups etc.

International data on isolation, trauma and even mental health are not widely available. However, the Washington Post published a global map of depression rates⁸⁷, which shows abnormally high rates of depression in the Middle East and MENA region, where also the main part of today's terrorism is stemming from.⁸⁸ This would mean that mental health problems turn more severe in populations where no resistance is possible and turn into political violence in populations where means to resistance persist. Furthermore, this would open up room for speculation that depression rates and other mental health problems could be indicative of future conflicts, like a canary in the mineshaft. It is known, for example, that the suicide rates in Germany before the First World War were abnormally high⁸⁹. In the US, suicide rates were extremely high before the First and Second World War, but fell significantly in both wars⁹⁰. Suicide is to 90 per cent caused by mental health

⁸⁷ Dewey, C. (2013): A stunning map of depression rates around the world. Washington Post. Online: <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2013/11/07/a-stunning-map-of-depression-rates-around-the-world/>.

⁸⁸ Cf. also Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation (unpublished paper): The burden of mental disorders in the Eastern Mediterranean Region, 1990–2015: findings from the Global Burden of Disease study 2015. Kirk, Ashley (2016): Mapped: Which countries suffer the most from terrorism? The Telegraph. <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/03/29/mapped-which-countries-suffer-the-most-from-terrorism/>. The hypothesis that can be derived from the above holds that trauma and isolation are at the root of both mental health problems as well as terrorism, with just the difference that terrorists can respond differently to the stressors as they are more integrated into a collective that provides them the means to resist these stressors with violent action.

⁸⁹ Durkheim, E.; Sennett, R. and R. Buss (2006): On Suicide. New York: Penguin.

⁹⁰ Silverman, C. (1968): The Epidemiology of Depression. Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 149.

problems, foremost depression. It is striking, that for some of the states with current conflicts, depression rates are abnormally high (Syria, Lybia, Afghanistan, for example, but also Russia). This would support my interpretation that possibly the origins of mental illness and political violence are linked. As the above mentioned map was published in 2013, we do not know if depression in the population, if widespread, can be an early warning sign of conflict or simply does accompany conflict. Data provided by the Institute of Health Metrics and Evaluation (IHME) indicate that depression might rise before conflict., especially if the conflict is happening within the home country. The US is a special case, as depression rates rose here without a war on their homeland before the war in Iraq (however, it could of course be explained with 9/11). Russia is a special case, as with the Ukraine conflict depression rates fell.

This observation, if it could be better supported, could possibly be very important. Knowing that depression rates increase before conflict could enable us to predict and prevent conflict in the future. It would, for example, be possible to monitor international depression rates and to intervene in countries where these rise with the help of NGOs, charities etc.

Furthermore, depression, as stated above, is a common cause of suicide. As 90% of suicides are caused by mental illness, suicide data should give a fairly good idea on the mental health of a nation overall. It is interesting, therefore, that a map on international suicides published by the WHO does not necessarily confirm the above discussed map⁹¹. According to the latter map, suicides are particularly prevalent in Russia, India and some East African states, but less so in the Middle East and MENA region. In fact, the latter seems to be surprisingly protected against suicide.⁹²

⁹¹ World Health Organization (WHO, 2015): Mental health. Online: http://www.who.int/mental_health/prevention/suicide/suicideprevent/en/.

⁹² This surprising and counterintuitive fact could possibly be explained as supporting my hypothesis, hence, that populations with depression in these countries are not withdrawing and isolating until the final flight from reality is suicide, rather they are integrated into communities that resist, engage in violence, and therefore turn the isolation and flight response back into a fight response. As it is assumed that not all individuals with mental health problems in these regions will engage in fighting, even a collective response with aggression and integration in such a collective might protect against suicide. Furthermore, the Middle Eastern countries follow a

Interestingly, as mentioned before, suicides have been particularly prevalent in Germany before the First World War⁹³ and in the US before both world wars, but in both countries declined in the wars. It is difficult to interpret this factoid. However, a possible interpretation would support my argument: If these suicides were an outcome of widespread depressive illnesses, then this could mean that depression rates rise before a country experiences or engages in political violence (hence wars or interventions, or even civil wars). If this connection would statistically hold, this would give us a prediction measure for conflict. It would then be possible to monitor international depression rates and provide warnings about crises (where depression rates increase) so that actors, such as charities, NGOs etc, could intervene to prevent these crises turning into violent conflict. Table 3 presents depression rates for countries with and without violent conflict. It seems, according to these data, that high depression rates not only accompany violent conflict, but that depression rates also increase before violent conflict breaks out. As the table shows, not only are violent conflicts often accompanied by high depression rates in a country, and depression rates in a country decline after the end of violent conflict, also, in some Middle Eastern countries depression rates increased years before violence broke out. To make this point again: this could mean that we could possibly predict future violent conflict by looking at general depression rates. If this connection would hold, this could mean we could possibly create an Early Warning System based on monitored mental health data on an international basis.⁹⁴

culture of collectivism. This might mean that depressed individuals generally remain more integrated, which might also explain the low rates of suicide.

⁹³ Durkheim, E.; Sennett, R. and R. Buss (2006): *On Suicide*. New York: Penguin Classics.

⁹⁴ If a serious rise in mental health problems in any one country would be detected, this could be responded to in various ways, such as intervention by NGOs or charities or foreign direct investment or whatnot (but not military intervention). In the long run, we could possibly create an index to broadcast mental health data generally (there might be ethical issues involved here, as mental health data are sensitive, but if they would not be personalised, this might not be a problem) and to call for addressing underlying issues.

Table 1: Depression rates per country in specific years⁹⁵

	Afgh. ⁹⁶	Iraq ⁹⁷	Somalia ⁹⁸	Sudan ⁹⁹	Syria ¹⁰⁰	Libya ¹⁰¹	Bosnia ¹⁰²	Russia ¹⁰³	Germ. ¹⁰⁴	Japan ¹⁰⁵
1990	193037	55562	29274	133395	69247	29753	23215	843002	368569	342130
2005	412544	92966	35671	202406	101975	44255	<i>13185</i>	882896	389551	363996
2010	483152	108539	41673	231659	115064	49412	13921	<i>817431</i>	406367	344312

The connection between rising depression/ mental illness rates and political violence is interesting enough to warrant further research. Also, this interpretation is not intended to claim that depression in individuals per se leads to aggression. However, high depression rates in a country seem to be a more likely candidate for predicting violence

Hence, it is proposed here that it might be possible to create an Early Warning System for violence and war - from coups, to civil wars, to foreign military interventions – from the mental health data gathered by the Institute of Health Metrics and Evaluation (IHME¹⁰⁶). IHME does provide over the most comprehensive collection of international data on mental illness, as well as other

⁹⁵ Data calculated based on data provided by the Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation (IHME, 2015). Online: <https://cloud.ihme.washington.edu/index.php/s/d559026958b38c3f4d12029b36d783da>.

Highlighted boxes mean countries at war in this year. Bold figures indicate a significant rise in depression. Italic figures indicate a significant decline in depression.

⁹⁶ While Afghanistan had been at peace in 1990, the US intervention started in 2001 and was ongoing in 2013.

⁹⁷ Iraq was at war in 1990, however, the war was mainly fought in Kuwait and only partially intruded Iraq. Iraq was subject to a US military intervention in 2003, which was still ongoing in 2013.

⁹⁸ Civil war since 1991, failed state, insurgency.

⁹⁹ Civil war 1983 to 2005.

¹⁰⁰ Syria was stable until 2011, when the Arab Spring resulted in a civil war in Syria, which is still ongoing.

¹⁰¹ Libya was stable in 2005, but the Arab Spring resulted in a civil war in 2011. It was stable in 2013.

¹⁰² Bosnia was stable in 1990, but was involved in a civil war in 1993.

¹⁰³ Russia was stable until 2013, when it was involved in the Ukraine crisis.

¹⁰⁴ Stable.

¹⁰⁵ Stable.

¹⁰⁶ Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation, <http://www.healthdata.org/>.

related data. These data could form the basis for building a system by which war can be predicted, which could facilitate early intervention with soft tools to prevent war and violence erupting (see below). For this purpose, presumably, it would be beneficial if the data collection by IHME would be continued and intensified. One would need mental health data, as collected by IHME, on a yearly or ideally monthly basis. Otherwise, this system would not work. If we had monthly global/international data, this would help us predict crises. Then, interventions via soft tools – such as foreign aid, diplomacy, medical aid, other support measures – could take place in countries in which a sudden increase in mental illness is detected (probably particularly depression is relevant here) to prevent crises erupting. Truly global data are needed, and they need to be provided on a yearly basis, or even more frequently, for fine tuning the early warning potential.¹⁰⁷

The following will be some basic recommendations for options to intervene with soft tools in countries with the goal to prevent violence erupting. These measures would particularly apply in countries devastated by civil war and resulting destruction and poverty.¹⁰⁸

Marshall Plan: Foreign Aid as a Tool against Terrorism¹⁰⁹

Military force has been argued not to be effective against terrorism, at least not long term.¹¹⁰ As Jones and Libicki write: “Terrorist groups end for two reasons: Members decide to adopt nonviolent tactics and join the political process (43 percent), or local law-enforcement agencies arrest or kill key members of the group (40 percent). Military force has rarely been the primary

¹⁰⁷ Even more frequent collections could be thought about for the future, depending on the national and local possibilities.

¹⁰⁸ For more developed countries, probably different and more advanced measures would have to be developed, even if some of the above tools would in all likelihood still remain beneficial, see the Excursion on Russia below for example.

¹⁰⁹ This paragraph has been previously published in Beyer, Anna Cornelia (2014): *Inequality and Violence: A Re-appraisal of Man, the State and War*. London: Routledge.

¹¹⁰ Cronin, Audrey Kurth (2013): *How Terrorism Ends. Understanding the Decline and Demise of Terrorist Campaigns*. Princeton: Princeton University Press; Crelinsten, Ronald (2009): *Counterterrorism*. Cambridge: Polity.

reason for the end of terrorist groups (7 percent), and few groups since 1968 have achieved victory (10 percent).¹¹¹

Early on, the primary tools in waging the Global War on Terror were military- and intelligence-based, but non-military foreign aid has also been used to counter terrorism. In fact, U.S. foreign aid to developing countries increased under President George W. Bush. The primary recipients of this aid were Afghanistan and Iraq, where schools, hospitals and infrastructure have been built.

However, using foreign aid as a counterterrorism tool is controversial. The main argument against foreign aid is the claim that most members of terrorist organisations like al Qaeda do not belong to the poorer strata of their societies. However, as the link between poverty and the emergence of terrorism is further drawn, non-military foreign aid will become increasingly important.

Several studies have researched the relationship between foreign aid and terrorism. Not surprisingly, two studies strongly confirm the positive impact of foreign aid on the reduction of terrorism. Bandyopadhyay, Sandler and Younas conclude that ‘targeted countries with global interests must bolster proactive measures through tied aid to countries where transnational terrorist groups reside. ... because counterterrorism aid generates global benefits in terms of reduced terrorism for all targeted countries.’¹¹² Azam and Thelen argue that ‘Western democracies, which are the main targets of terrorist attacks, should invest more funds in foreign aid, with a special emphasis on supporting education, and use military interventions more sparingly’.¹¹³

Foreign aid is thought to have the greatest positive effect against terrorism within the countries of origin of this aid. According to a study by Jean-Paul Azam and Veronique Thelen:

¹¹¹ Jones, Seth and Martin Libicki (2008): *How Terrorist Groups End*. Santa Monica: RAND, p. 18f.

¹¹² Subhayu Bandyopadhyay, Todd Sandler, and Javed Younas, “Foreign aid as counterterrorism policy,” *Oxford Economic Papers* 63, (2011), 423–47.

¹¹³ Jean-Paul Azam and Veronique Thelen, “Foreign Aid Versus Military Intervention in the War on Terror,” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 54, no. 2 (April 2010), 237–61. However, they also caution that foreign aid can be used by illiberal regimes to suppress political freedom and repress the population, which does not in fact help to decrease the emergence of terrorism.

The results confirm the effectiveness of foreign aid to reduce the number of terrorist attacks originating from the recipient country. In the host country, the impact of foreign aid may be different as counter-terrorism measures also influence the number of imported attacks. This finding suggests that there are incentive problems regarding the role of foreign aid, which must be not too intrusive in the policy of the recipient government. Foreign military interventions are also counter-productive and they seem to be a strong attraction factor for terrorists. A strong presence of foreign actors in the recipient country or foreign influence might in fact be counter-productive.¹¹⁴

This not only confirms the positive impact of foreign aid on terrorism, but also provides evidence against the use of military means in the struggle against terrorism. Oppressive counterterrorism approaches within recipient countries of foreign aid have also been found to be counterproductive:

The evidence suggests that repressive counterterrorism measures may not be the optimal way to fight terrorism. Government crackdowns and harsh repressive measures funded by foreign aid can create a societal backlash and lead to more support for terrorist groups and thereby increase the supply of terrorist attacks.¹¹⁵

Therefore, the policies pursued by Western countries should increasingly include measures of support for developing countries in the critical regions and beyond. The West needs to help bring about increases in employment rates, improved education, better social services and health care. Only by spreading wealth to the Middle East and other suffering areas, the international

¹¹⁴ Jean-Paul Azam and Veronique Thelen, "Where to Spend Foreign Aid to Counter Terrorism," (Paper for the 2011 Meeting of the European Public Choice Society), http://crem.univ-rennes1.fr/EPCS11/submissions/epcs2011_submission_175.pdf.

¹¹⁵ Burcu Savun and Jude C. Hays, "Foreign Aid as a Counterterrorism Tool: Aid Delivery Channels, State Capacity, and NGOs," (APSA 2011 Annual Meeting Paper, 2011), 25, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1900690.

community will be able to drain the potential support basis for current or future terrorism long term. The West needs to refocus its efforts away from being centred on the military and intelligence towards an even stronger inclusion of softer and more cooperative means.

In addition, as research seems to indicate that, for example, an increase in mental health conditions – such as depression, but also others – in any country can possibly predict the outbreak of (renewed) conflict.¹¹⁶ Hence, mental health should be taken seriously (but not as dogma) in addition to physical health in Syria and other post-war countries. It would be a normal occurrence of certain mental health conditions to increase after the experience of war. Also, it would be impossible, and not sufficient, to address such a development, i.e. an increase in mental health problems, with medication alone. While medications might be necessary for and wanted by some people, they should always remain a choice. Alternative options also should be offered (as soon as possible), as the experience in the West has shown that a reliance on drugs solely is often insufficient to treat mental illness. While a cessation of violence and a process of economic recovery, including full employment as soon as in any way possible, would be probably help relieve mental distress, additional options could possibly be considered¹¹⁷. They could include culturally acceptable therapeutic services, including alternative and new medical and therapeutic options that are available or becoming available in the West, sufficient supply with healthy nutrition that is high in nutrients (i.e. fresh produce) as this has also been shown to play an important role in recovery

¹¹⁶ Cousins, S. (2013): The Middle East and North Africa suffer the world's highest depression rates, according to new research. Middle East Monitor. Online: [https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/articles/africa/8335-the-middle-east-and-north-africa-suffer-the-worlds-highest-depression-rates-according-to-new-research-;](https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/articles/africa/8335-the-middle-east-and-north-africa-suffer-the-worlds-highest-depression-rates-according-to-new-research-) Dewey, C. (2013): A stunning map of depression rates around the world. Washington Post. Online: [https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2013/11/07/a-stunning-map-of-depression-rates-around-the-world/;](https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2013/11/07/a-stunning-map-of-depression-rates-around-the-world/) Durkheim, E.; Sennett, R. and R. Buss (2006): On Suicide. New York: Penguin; Silverman, C. (1968): The Epidemiology of Depression. Blatimore: John Hopkins Press, 149; World Health Organization (WHO, 2015): Mental health. Online: [http://www.who.int/mental_health/prevention/suicide/suicideprevent/en/.](http://www.who.int/mental_health/prevention/suicide/suicideprevent/en/)

¹¹⁶ Durkheim, E.; Sennett, R. and R. Buss (2006): On Suicide. New York: Penguin Classics.

¹¹⁷ Cf. Rothschild, Babette (2010): 8 Keys to Safe Trauma Recovery. New York: WW Norton, ch. 6. Rothschild talks about regaining a close to normal life with small steps after trauma for recovery. The measures indicated here would be reasonable tools to facilitate these steps.

from mental illness, social facilities of all sorts to recreate communities: from community and recreation centres, places of prayer (i.e. mosques), libraries, to cinemas, to sports clubs¹¹⁸, etc., free media and, importantly, as wide as possible access to the internet. Other options might be thought about or demanded by the populations. Vitamins and other supplements are recommended as add on to medication.¹¹⁹ Finally, mental health should not become an obsession replacing other development needs.¹²⁰

Excursion: How to respond to Russia

As the Russian aggression in Syria was a major point of concern that could have sparked a truly global war, it is necessary to conclude with some remarks on Russia.

First, In terms of security collaboration, Russia's integration into existing Western organisations (such as NATO) has been discussed at another place¹²¹. This is thought to be a necessary step to prevent a fundamental antagonism (similar to the Cold War) re-developing or remaining and to help facilitate full integration of Russia into the Western system as well as to achieve some sort of potential of cooperation and synchronisation in the activities that are pursued in the military arena. So, with regards to the crisis about the Russian intervention, we should also make reforms in the international system to be able to avoid crises such as these in the future. The 'missiles of October' could maybe have been avoided if Russia had been at the time included in NATO. As argued above, theoretically, one would need a world state to finally abolish the Security Dilemma. This idea has been thought about by many recently. Alexander Wendt was a forerunner to the renewed

¹¹⁸ Rothschild, Babette (2010): 8 Keys to Safe Trauma Recovery. New York: WW Norton, ch. 7.

¹¹⁹ Edelman, Eva (2001): Natural Healing for Schizophrenia and other common mental disorders. Eugene: Borage Books; Holford, Patrick (2007): Patrick Holfords Optimum Nutrition for the Mind. London: Piatkus, Tubman, H. (2004): Healing Depression Naturally. London: Kensington.

¹²⁰ For those who have made it to the West as refugees, the same principles apply, including integration into their respective welcoming societies. Cases such as the recent attack in Berlin illustrate that the social services helping with integration for refugees are in all likelihood not developed sufficiently and need more funding and capacities.

¹²¹ Beyer, Anna Cornelia (2017): Abolishing the Security Dilemma: Why we need to integrate the militaries. Unpublished manuscript.

discussion about the world state with his article 'Why a world state is inevitable'.¹²² It had been in discussion after the Second World War likewise, for example Albert Einstein was intensively engaged in it.¹²³ On the other hand, liberals would probably argue that we have enough world state-ism with the United Nations system. Realists would argue that the recent crises showed that this was not enough. For realists, the United Nations are not strong enough to abolish anarchy. A solution that I am proposing, is to take a more pragmatic approach and look at the military establishments. I propose that we could abolish the Security Dilemma if we would integrate the military organisations.¹²⁴ In particular, this would mean that we would need to integrate Russia into

¹²² Wendt, A. (2003): Why a world state is inevitable. *European Journal of International Relations*, 9:4, 491-542, cf. also Bummel, A. (2010): *Developing International Democracy. For a Parliamentary Assembly at the United Nations*. Berlin: Komitee fuer eine Demokratische UNO; Schwartzberg, J. E. (2013): *Transforming the United Nations System. Designs for a Workable World*. Tokyo et al.: United Nations University Press; Archibugi, D.; Koenig-Archibugi, M. and R. Marchetti (eds. 2012): *Global democracy. Normative and Empirical Perspectives*. New York: Cambridge University Press; Luis Cabrera (ed. 2011): *Global Governance, Global Government. Institutional Visions for an Evolving World System*. Albany: State University of New York; Hoeffe, O. (1999): *Demokratie im Zeitalter der Globalisierung*. Muenchen: C.H. Beck; and many others.

¹²³ Mazower, M. (2013): *Governing the World: The History of an Idea*. London: Penguin; Isaacson, W. (2008): *Einstein: His Life and Universe*. New York: Simon & Schuster.

¹²⁴ Cf. Booth, K. and N. J. Wheeler (2008): *The Security Dilemma. Fear, Cooperation and Trust in World Politics*. Basingstoke: Palgrave; Adler, E. and M. Barnett (eds. 1998): *Security Communities*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Bunde, T. and T. Noetzel (2010): *Unavoidable Tensions: The Liberal Path to Global NATO*. *Contemporary Security Policy*, 31:2, 295-318; Collins, A. (1997): *The Security Dilemma and the End of the Cold War*. New York: St. Martin's Press; Collins, A. (2004): *State-Induced Security Dilemma. Maintaining the Tragedy*. *Cooperation and Conflict: Journal of the Nordic Studies Association*, 39:1, 27-44; Craig, C. (2004): *Glimmer of a New Leviathan: Total War in the Realism of Niebuhr, Morgenthau, and Waltz*. New York: Columbia University Press; Daalder, I. and J. Goldgeier (2006): *Global NATO*. *Foreign Affairs*, 85, 105-113; Glaser, C. L. (1997): *The Security Dilemma Revisited*. *World Politics*, 50:1, 171-201; Herz, J. H. (1950): *Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma*. *World Politics*, 2:2, 157-180; Herz, J.H. (1951): *Political Realism and Political Idealism. A Study in Theory and Realities*. Chicago: Chicago University Press; Jervis, R. (1978): *Cooperation under the Security Dilemma*. *World Politics*, 30:2, 167-214; Jones, S. G. (2003): *The European Union and the Security Dilemma*. *Security Studies*, 12:3, 114-156; Kupchan, C. et al. (1999): *Power in Transition: The Peaceful Change of International Order*. New York: United Nations University Press; Mitrany, D. (1966): *A Working Peace System*. Chicago: Quadrangle Books; Mowle, T. S. and D.H. Sacko (2007): *Global NATO: Bandwagoning in a Unipolar World*. *Contemporary Security Policy*, 28:3, 597-618; Shiping, T. (2009): *The Security Dilemma: A Conceptual Analysis*. *Security Studies*, 18:3, 587-623; Snyder, G. H. (1984): *The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics*. *World Politics*, 36:4, 461-495; Wheeler, N. and K. Booth (1992): *The Security Dilemma*. In: Baylis, J. and N. J. Rengger (eds.): *Dilemma of World Politics: International Issues in a Changing World*. Oxford Clarendon Press, 29-60.

NATO and give it a membership.¹²⁵ If the West is not confident enough about a membership for NATO, it could offer Russia a conditional membership, in which it has all the rights of a member as long as it complies with NATO rules. What is already in existence, though, is a partnership of NATO with Russia. My argument is that we need to go further and integrate Russia into NATO with a conditional full membership.

Secondly, it is less likely that ‘reconstruction’ would also be a necessary measure towards Russia. Rather, according to the Human Development Index 2015¹²⁶, academic excellence and knowledge exchange with the West might be lacking in this case, which is probably the reason for the lack of business capacity and creation of intellectual property (as for example illustrated in the comparatively negligible number of patents from Russia). This should then be remedied by inspiring intensive knowledge transfer.¹²⁷

¹²⁵ Cf. Daalder, I. and J. Goldgeier (2006): Global NATO. *Foreign Affairs*, 85, 105-113; Mowle, T.S. and D.H. Sacko (2007): Global NATO: Bandwagoning in a Unipolar World. *Contemporary Security Policy*, 28:3, 597-618; Bunde, T. and T. Noetzel (2010): Unavoidable Tensions: The Liberal Path to Global NATO. *Contemporary Security Policy*, 31:2, 295-318; The Royal United Services Institute (2012). John Ikenberry Opposes a Global NATO. Online: http://www.dailymotion.com/video/xvm92n_john-ikenberry-opposes-a-global-nato_news.

However, while these publications do speak for an expansion of NATO towards the East, they do not go as far as calling for an integration of Russia into NATO.

¹²⁶ United Nations Development Programme (2015): Human Development Report 2015. New York: United Nations. http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/2015_human_development_report.pdf.

¹²⁷ Tools could include:

- 1) Creation of student exchanges with the West, similar to the Fulbright programme for exchanges between Germany and the US established after the Second World War.
- 2) Creation of Chairs for Russia Studies (apart from Russian language, where some chairs already exist) in the West, such as the UK. For example, topics could include: Russian economy, politics, history, society, culture etc.
- 3) The creation of one or more international universities in Russia, i.e. Moscow and/ or St. Petersburg, similar to the American University of the Emirates or other international collaborations.

These measures are thought to be necessary for long-term economic growth as well as the creation of intercultural understanding and soft diplomacy between Russia and the West. Similar programmes had been created between the US and Germany after the Second World War.

Conclusion

This article looked at the psychological and economic causes of terrorism generally with the hope to make this applicable to the case study, the civil war with ISIS in Syria, and civil wars more generally.

First, the conclusion is that mental illness might be related to terrorism and that – in opposition to the mainstream opinion – terrorism might be explained at least by the same causes as mental illness. This leads towards using this knowledge for constructive purposes, and while this includes addressing mental illness, the other option is to use mental illness data more widely to predict future crises, such as civil wars. If we had an Early Warning System based on mental health data, we could possibly predict and hence prevent civil wars by intervening in countries with rising depression rates early on.

Second, a Marshall Plan is needed – as soon as the violence really has stopped sufficiently – to rebuild any country that has experienced war. A Marshall Plan is a programme of intensive aid and reconstruction, such as was applied to Germany after the Second World War. A Marshall Plan with regards to Syria had been in the discussion since 2014, when a Foreign Affairs article mentioned this idea.¹²⁸ The idea has since then been taken on by various news outlets, and at the international level. In my view, it would help stabilise the country and would even help with the flow of refugees from Syria towards Europe. Prosperity can bring peace, as we also know from the literature on civil wars. Civil wars, such as we have seen in Syria, usually happen in countries below a certain developmental level.¹²⁹ This does not mean that we should help the Islamic State more, as long as they are fighting, with foreign aid. But it means to build up the rest of Syria, and help even the Islamic State as soon as they stop fighting and start complying with human rights and other demands. Such a Marshall Plan could be a joint project between the Western powers,

¹²⁸ Heffez, Adam and Noam Raydan (2014): The Syrian Marshall Plan. Foreign Affairs, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/middle-east/2014-08-27/syrian-marshall-plan>.

¹²⁹ Collier, Paul (2003): Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy. New York: World Bank.

and powers such as China, Russia, and Brazil. These countries and others should join a truly global NATO, as this would help prevent interstate war. The Marshall Plan should contain intensive economic reconstruction aid in terms of infrastructure creation, finance and investment, job creation, education, good governance, but also other aspects of support, such as might be fulfilled by first NGOs and later by good governance: including a welfare state comprising social services, medical and mental health services, welfare services, disability services etc.