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**NEW PERSPECTIVES ON
BRITISH FAR EASTERN POLICY
1913-19**

by
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DEPARTMENTS OF GOVERNMENT AND HISTORY

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**NEW PERSPECTIVES ON
BRITISH FAR EASTERN POLICY 1913-19**

I. FRESH LIGHT FROM THE NEWLY AVAILABLE BRITISH ARCHIVES

This paper is an early fruit of the recent liberalisation of the former restrictions on open access to the British archives. In February 1966 the so-called fifty-year rule was sufficiently relaxed to allow scholars to study in one block the records of the eight year period from the beginning of the First World War to the end of the Washington Conference. Then in January 1968 the British government narrowed the "access gap" between the British and American regulations by adopting a thirty-year rule.

Many historians are justifiably sceptical about the amount of fresh light which newly opened archives can throw upon the general appearance of recent diplomatic history. Undoubtedly the excitement and the sense of authenticity which such material induces in research scholars can all too easily result in myopic and astigmatic views rather than in clear-sightedness. After all, the foreign policies of modern states, particularly those of democratic states, can only be implemented with a large degree of openness, and while diplomacy might in many respects remain secret, the more important aspects of international relations cannot normally be concealed for very long. The visible areas of the diplomatic icebergs are generally large enough for astute contemporary analysts to gauge the breadth and depth, if not the exact shape, of the matter lying concealed beneath the surface. It is in full consciousness of this general limitation on the newness of the newly available documents that the paper argues that the recently exposed record of British diplomacy from 1914 to 1922 should lead to important modifications in the standard accounts of Far Eastern international relations in this period.

During these highly eventful years of what Winston Churchill was later to describe as the World Crisis, the British ship of state threaded a hazardous course through such a large field of icebergs that it is not surprising that the best informed cabinet ministers, as this paper illustrates in Section 3, failed to perceive some of them clearly. At the same time, those unofficial observers of Far Eastern affairs who did not become equally preoccupied with the European war were handicapped by unprecedented restrictions on their sources of information. Admittedly the wartime censors of the British press never succumbed to the degree of cautious anxiety which inspired the government of William Morris Hughes to prosecute an Australian Labour politician who publicised the Twenty-One Demands in an effort to frighten the somewhat Japanophobic electorate into defeating a referendum proposal to introduce conscription for overseas military service. Nevertheless, disquieting news cables from the Far East were severely handled by Whitehall officials; and efforts were made, not only to stem unwelcome articles at their source, but to propagate news of a more rosy coloration. "If we had been able to get rid of him out of China", wrote Sir Walter Langley, an Assistant Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs in reference to the celebrated journalist and author "Putnam Weale" (Bertram Lennox Simpson), "we should have done so long ago. But experience has shown that abortive proceedings are the worst mistake from the point of view of His Majesty's Government and the best possible advertisement for anyone in P.W.'s position."¹ Generally, moral pressure on newspaper owners proved more effective. The *Daily Telegraph* discontinued the services of "Putnam Weale", while the *Times*, under the control of Lord Northcliffe, together with his mass circulation *Daily Mail*, engaged in patriotic self-censorship. In March 1916, the *Times* foreign editor enquired of his Peking correspondent "if the British communities in China cannot see that all this newspaper abuse of the Japanese (by English-language journals in China) is injurious to British interests and likely to do great harm."² As the long-serving British Minister in Peking, Sir John Jordan, complained in late 1918, "except for the *Manchester Guardian* for which I have no special admiration otherwise, there is hardly a newspaper in England that has published a true account of Far Eastern affairs during four years of war."³

Successive Foreign Secretaries also profited from Parliament's over-riding concern with the European struggle to stifle discussion of Far Eastern questions. In this way they succeeded in avoiding a major debate on this subject for eight years; and as late as June 1921, Mr. Neil Maclean, M.P., was able to complain that the only interested legislature which had not now debated British Far Eastern policy was the British House of Commons.⁴ Awkward parliamentary questions during these years were handled in the first instance by private appeals to members to withdraw them from the notice paper in the national interest; questions regarded by the Foreign Office as "mischievous" were evaded either by peremptory refusals to answer at all or, as is shown by a comparison between the initial Foreign Office minutes on a question and the suggested answer, by half truths. All this sedulous management of press and parliament was backed by the skill and vigour of new propaganda agencies who succeeded in whitewashing the black and grey aspects of Far Eastern affairs so effectively that even preoccupied cabinet ministers themselves, as shown in Section 3, became, in part, the victims of their own efforts to maintain wartime public morale.

Although informed public discussion of Far Eastern questions gradually revived in the early post-war years, by that time some of the central diplomatic issues of the war period had either ceased to be important or no longer appeared important. In these circumstances there was very little public pressure on the government to reveal its wartime concerns about questions which now seemed distant in time as well as in place. Indeed, there was every reason for the post-war generation to assume that the wartime government had been as uninvolved in Far Eastern affairs as the published records suggested. Moreover, the post-war cabinet was not only disposed to minimise some major wartime issues, but they had current reasons for not wishing the records of these to become exposed (see Section 2).

In this way, the British government's grave concern about accelerating Japanese economic penetration of India and Japanese implication in Indian revolutionary conspiracies has never appeared to post-1919 historians as a paramount issue in British wartime policy, even though both cabinet and Foreign Office documents clearly indicate that this was so. The fact that these apparent Japanese threats seemed to have disappeared with the Allied victory in 1918 explains but does not justify the tendency of post-war cabinet ministers to believe that such dangers had never really existed in a serious way. It certainly no longer justifies interpretations of Far Eastern international relations during the First World War which emphasize questions that seemed important in the perspective of later decades at the expense of problems which the British saw as central issues at the time. Moreover, these wartime documents give a dramatic emphasis to the firm conclusion of recent studies of early twentieth century British documents that India was the cardinal point of imperial policies and strategy conceived in Whitehall.

While the principal objective of this essay is to expose the central role of British Indian interests in British Far Eastern policy during the First World War (Sections 5-9 are devoted to this purpose), the full complexion of British policies cannot be represented so simplistically. The image of their pluralistic and inconsistent aspects is inescapably reflected in the overall structure of the paper, which devotes the next three sections to setting the perspective in which the Indian questions must be seen. The first of these deals briefly with Anglo-American relations in the Far East. Its insertion at this key position in the paper is aimed at clearing away the distorted images of British policy which have been projected from thirty years of examining Far Eastern international relations through State Department lenses. Despite the great skill of outstanding diplomatic historians like A. W. Griswold in drawing some accurate inferences about British policies from the manner in which they were reflected in American documents, a great deal of the policies and activities of the four major Far Eastern powers—Japan, Britain, Russia and France—was scarcely reflected in American documents at all. For this reason the role of the United States, and the issues which interested the United States, have loomed as disproportionately large in the standard histories of the Far East for this period as they used to appear in histories of nineteenth century China before historians like Mary Wright demonstrated that Elgin, Alcock and Wade were far more important in the diplomacy of the 1860's than Seward and Burlingame.

A much knottier historiographical question than this is why the memoirs of Sir Edward Grey and Lloyd George and the standard biography of Arthur Balfour by his niece have nothing to say about the Indian issues which the wartime documents stress so much. In Section 3 an attempt is made to resolve this problem in the light of the manifest divergence between the better informed, yet more regionalised, perspectives of British departmental specialists and the somewhat wishful, though worldwide, perspectives of cabinet ministers, who had already begun to weigh the value of British interests east of Suez against the diplomatic risks involved in defending them without the requisite power to achieve this unilaterally. In large part this dualism in British attitudes towards the Far East was a response to the increasingly unrepentant dualism in Japanese external policies, which has been well analysed in recent studies by Marius Jansen and Hilary Conroy.⁵ The coexistence of two inconsistent Japanese policies resulted at one level in those superficial manifestations of Japan's loyalty to her obligations under the Anglo-Japanese Alliance which were so gratifying to British cabinet ministers and at another level in the undercurrents of hostile behaviour which preoccupied the permanent officials of the Foreign Office, India Office, War Office and Admiralty. As is shown in Section 4, Anglo-Japanese relations began to deteriorate rapidly within a year of the second renewal of the Alliance in 1911. This was largely due to the apparent failure of a policy of imperialist collaboration with Great Britain to ensure the prospects of a rapid expansion of Japanese interests on the mainland of Asia either in the Latin American pattern of investment imperialism or in the British

Indian pattern of political and military penetration. If the obstruction of British vested interests could not be moved by agreement, an alternative course of action was to undermine the foundations of the British Empire in Asia. In this way, the Indian questions, which this paper highlights, developed mainly out of Anglo-Japanese rivalry in China: even those Japanese who assisted the Indian revolutionaries most actively saw this work as an extension of their more immediate mission in China. Except for the China lobby, whose hitherto disproportionate influence in Westminster had been reduced to scale by the more acute sense of priorities resulting from the war, the British saw the conflict with Japan the other way round. East Asia for them was the outpost of a commercial and investment empire based in Southern Asia. Whether the preservation of the main empire called for the abandonment or rearguard defence of this outpost was a fundamental problem involved in the Indian issues discussed in the last four sections of the paper.

2. THE DISTORTIONS IN AMERICAN DOCUMENTARY PERSPECTIVES

In the fifty years since the First World War, the unavailability of the British records together with a massive American documentation have established a text-book pattern of Far Eastern international relations in which British wartime policy appears, very plausibly, as a virtual hiatus. Although this hiatus undoubtedly did exist for most members of the British cabinet, the recently opened documents reveal an intense undercover struggle between Great Britain and her equivocal ally, Japan, which by 1916 had forced the Foreign Office, despite an ardent desire to postpone the matter until the end of the great European war, into a troubled reappraisal of British Far Eastern policy. The dimensions of the conflict, which concerned, above all, a Japanese threat to British economic and political supremacy in India were successfully concealed at the time not only from the English-speaking public but also from the governments of the United States and the self-governing dominions. Subsequently the vastly changed diplomatic situation of the nineteen-twenties made both British and Japanese governments even more anxious to keep this inside story of their wartime relations buried in the archives.

In 1919 the Japanese were forced to suppress a serious nationalist rebellion in Korea, and since they attributed this, with some justification, to the influence of Anglo-Saxon missionaries, they did not wish to focus British attention on Japanese colonialism by pursuing their recent policy of aiding and abetting revolutionary nationalism in India. On the contrary, by greatly modifying their support for Indian nationalism they educed from the British government a consciously parallel policy of discouraging British support for the Korean nationalist exiles. On 29 April 1922, the future prime minister of South Korea, Dr. Syngman Rhee, wrote a letter to Mr. Llew Williams, the secretary of the London Friends of Korea Society which was transmitted through Sir Robert Newman M.P. to the British Prime Minister. When this was referred to the Foreign Office, that department's Japanese expert, F. Ashton-Gwatkin advised that "no good end can be served by giving any encouragement whatever to Dr. Rhee and his party . . . any encouragement given to them by British people will merely serve as an excuse to the Japanese to encourage anti-British movements in India and elsewhere."⁶

Moreover, the collapse of the German and Russian empires temporarily weakened Japan's diplomatic situation. Confronted now by a more militant American hostility, which was backed for the first time by a naval challenge she could not meet, Japan was in no position to antagonise the victorious British Empire. The threat of diplomatic isolation forced the Japanese to give tacit recognition to the British economic monopoly in India. For the next decade, at least, they concentrated on their own monopolistic avenues of expansion in Korea, Manchuria, and China, diverting their

attention away from their recent challenge to the British economic domination of India, which had aroused in the British administration of that country the same pathological fears which the previous advances of the Russian Empire had always excited.

The British government, for its part, had many reasons to pigeonhole wartime grievances against Japan. Although the Government of India's pent-up animosity against the Japanese led it to urge that Japan's implication in seditious and German conspiracies against British India should be laid before the Versailles Peace Conference,⁷ the Home Government was moved by larger considerations. It was a cardinal point in British Far Eastern policy to attempt to allay rather than to excite North American and Australasian fears of Japan. How the Home Government's not unfounded concern that Australia's immature and racist external outlook might undermine the foundations of imperial policy led it to conceal the full complexion of Anglo-Japanese relations from the dominion government has been described elsewhere.⁸ In their relations with the much better informed American government, the British were not encouraged by what Macleay⁹ described as the "sentimental rather than practical"¹⁰ Far Eastern policy of the United States to be much more frank. After British intelligence had infiltrated and broken open the worldwide Indian revolutionary conspiracy, with its main centres in Shanghai, Yokohama, Berlin and San Francisco, the British Government had been forced to put diplomatic pressure on the United States to take action against the movement on its own territory; but in doing this they had taken care not to implicate the Japanese any further than the evidence necessary to convict the fifteen Indians, eleven Germans and five American citizens who were sentenced in the dramatic Hindu Conspiracy Trial in San Francisco in 1917-18.¹¹ Indeed the British Government rejected a scheme proposed by their principal double agent, George Vincent Kraft (whose betrayal of the German Secret Service they had purchased for £15,000) to expose the connections of the Japanese Minister for the Interior, Baron Goto Shimpei,¹² with the German-Indian and German Mexican schemes on the ground that it might undo the improvement in American attitudes to Britain's Far Eastern ally which had resulted from the 1917 Ishii mission to the United States.¹³

Contrary to the rather wishful attempts of some historians to trace the roots of more recent Anglo-American co-operation in the Far East back into the early decades of the twentieth century, no politician or official with influence on the formulation of British Far Eastern policy advocated frank co-operation with the Americans until Sir John Jordan¹⁴ did this unequivocally in a series of historic communications in late 1918, documents which were regarded by the Foreign Office both at the time and subsequently as a turning point in British diplomacy in East Asia.¹⁵ Even then, it was the equally influential minutes on these documents by Ronald Macleay, head of the Foreign Office's Far Eastern Department and Foreign Secretary Balfour's principal expert at Versailles, which set the course which British diplomacy was to take towards the American Far Eastern policy for the next three years:

It would appear to be unwise for us to take the initiative in advocating a policy such as Sir John Jordan recommends until we know exactly what the U.S. government has in mind and how far they are prepared to go . . . it seems desirable that *we should at the Peace Conference leave the task of forcing the Japanese door in this manner to the United States delegates before we commit ourselves to the acceptance of the new American policy in China*, so that, in the event of the United States Government failing to bring Japan into line, we shall not incur the risk of antagonising Japan to no purpose by supporting a policy directly opposed to her interests.¹⁶

Foreign Secretary Balfour, the Cabinet's strongest advocate of trans-Atlantic co-operation, while agreeing "in principle" with Jordan's proposals, thought Macleay's criticisms of them "very able".¹⁷

In the perspective of later events it may seem only logical for the British to have welcomed the growing American initiative in the Far East long before 1919. Such an assumption underlay the myths that the British Government supported or even promoted the American annexation of the Philippines and the promulgation of the Open Door Notes.¹⁸ However, British policy was too pragmatic to build on the uncertain prospect that the United States might steadily move in to re-establish the principle of international co-operation in China. Even when Japan was exploiting Europe's preoccupation with the Great War, the British sought to avoid rather than encourage the American initiatives, which in their view merely antagonised Japan without restraining her. The failure of British attempts during the second half of 1916 to reconstitute the Consortium, with American capital buttressing Yuan's successors in the same way as British loans through the Consortium had enabled Yuan himself to pacify the country and crush Sun Yat-sen's Japanese-backed Second Revolution of 1913,¹⁹ had once again confirmed the British in their view that co-operation with the United States in the Far East was not a viable alternative to a policy of conciliating Japan.²⁰ Consequently, instead of looking forward to the prospect of American support in order to avoid making concessions to Japan, Cabinet decided on 5 February 1917 that "the possible entry into the war of the United States increased the necessity of an early decision in regard to Japan and Shantung and the occupied islands north of the equator in order to avoid negotiations on the subject with another power."²¹

During the first three years of the war, this British resolve not to aggravate the Far Eastern situation by making the United States aware of the full extent of the deterioration in Anglo-Japanese relations since 1911 had been reinforced by the ill-will engendered by American neutralist policies and by the suspicion that jealous American investors might be using "holier than thou" Wilsonian principles as a cover to displace the established British financial pre-eminence in China. An apparent example of this was the contract secured by the American Siems and Carey Corporation to finance the construction of a network of railways in China, portion of which encroached upon existing British railway concessions in the Yangtse region.²²

This feeling had found, perhaps, its most concrete expression in early 1917, when the colonial authorities in Malaya were authorised to prohibit further foreign investment in the rubber industry for the duration of the wartime restrictions on British capital.²³ In this case, however, there had been far greater concern about the strategic implications of the growing Japanese acquisition of plantations than about the activities of the big American rubber companies. Similarly the British efforts throughout the second half of 1916 to reconstitute the consortium on the foundation of available American capital, though primarily designed to avert precisely what was to happen in China as a result of the notorious Japanese Nishihara loans of 1917-18, had been partially motivated by the spectre of a partnership of the two isolated parties in China's foreign-dominated economy—American capital and the industry and growing expertise of the German community, who in the last decade had dealt a heavy blow to the complacency and established dominance of Britain's Old China Hands. In 1915 a Board of Trade mission to China was very impressed by German commercial successes and very critical of the British mercantile community.²⁴

These fears of an American-German economic combination in China were aroused rather than stilled by the vigorous diplomacy of the American Minister, Paul Reinsch,²⁵ whose pro-Chinese and anti-Japanese attitudes were suspected by Beilby Alston (head of the Far Eastern Department 1914-16 and acting counsellor and *Chargé d'affaires* at the Peking Legation 1916-17) as pro-German because of Reinsch's German-American birth, his German mother-in-law and, above all, his post-doctoral studies in Germany crowned by professorial appointments at Berlin and Leipzig universities as recently as 1911-13.²⁶ Although the British Minister, Sir John Jordan, who shared Reinsch's warm Sinophile attitudes, regarded his American colleague's diplomatic efforts with sympathy, he thought them futile without concrete support from the United States.²⁷ Certainly there is nothing in Jordan's voluminous

despatches or his private letters to suggest that Reinsch either enjoyed his confidence or played the central role in wartime diplomacy which his much-quoted memoirs have earned him in the textbooks.²⁸ Despite the restraints placed on Jordan by the exigencies of the European War and by policies which he bitterly disapproved, he clearly remained the central European figure in China until his retirement in 1920, and his experience was later invaluable to Balfour at the Washington Conference. The fact that American records say so little about British Far Eastern policy during the war does not validate the hypothesis that there is little to say. In few periods can American officials have been worse informed about what the British were thinking or doing about Far Eastern problems.

3. LONDON'S DUALISTIC PERSPECTIVES ON THE FAR EAST

Before the release of the British records it was not unreasonable to assume that the United Kingdom government was so completely preoccupied with the European War that it gave no serious attention to the Far East. As emphasized above, thirty years of inference from the American documents appeared to confirm this assumption. Indeed, this would have been the case if the Japanese had not become involved with the Indian revolutionaries, if they had not taken advantage of the war to accelerate their economic penetration of British India, and if they had pursued their ambitions in China with sufficient diplomatic skill to avoid arousing British fears that Japan's China policy formed part of a larger challenge to British imperial interests throughout Asia. Not only did British officials ardently desire to defer consideration of all major Far Eastern questions until the end of the European War, but the post-war attitudes of senior British cabinet ministers suggest that some continued to think that Anglo-Japanese relations had remained basically as they were in 1911. Others allowed themselves to become the victims of their own vigorous wartime propaganda, which had been designed to maintain public confidence in the loyalty of the Japanese ally.²⁹ Winston Churchill, who, as First Lord of the Admiralty, had in consultation with Sir Edward Grey made the irreversible appeal of 6 August 1914 which brought the Japanese into the war,³⁰ obviously absorbed so little of the rapidly changing situation in the Far East that in July 1921 he could suggest to Sir Eyre Crowe that Japan's intervention had occurred at her own initiative despite British opposition.³¹ The fact that the Permanent Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs was obliged to correct Churchill's garbled recollection of the circumstances and implications of his own historic decision in Far Eastern diplomacy seven years previously would be less remarkable were it not for Churchill's recent role. As Colonial Secretary he had taken a prominent part in the Cabinet debate of 30 May 1921 on the question of the proposed renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance and even more recently in the Imperial Conference discussions on the same subject. It is somewhat less surprising that Lloyd George, who had often excited anger and contempt in the Foreign Office over some of his ill-informed but thoroughly opinionated essays in foreign affairs, should have attempted to sway the balance of his cabinet's opinion with this weighty view:

Frankly he liked the Japanese. The reasons they gave very often for doing things were quite unintelligible, and they might have no conscience, but they did stand by those who stood by them . . . Japan, on the whole, had been faithful to her obligations. No doubt she had carried out one or two suspicious transactions, but he could tell the Cabinet of several things done by other Powers which were infinitely worse than anything which had been done by the Japanese. Reference had been made to Japanese intrigues in India, but he would like to know what would happen if we were now to drop Japan. The situation would be infinitely worse.³²

Foreign Secretary, Lord Curzon, who had recently seen a series of Foreign Office memoranda which plainly contradicted him, told the Cabinet that "he personally

could not think of a single instance in which the Japanese had not carried out their word".³³ Even more striking is the concurrence in Curzon's remarkable statement of his predecessor, A. J. Balfour. As First Lord of the Admiralty in 1916 and Foreign Secretary from 1917 to 1919, Balfour had had first-hand knowledge of the wartime difficulties with Japan. The sole dissident from this Cabinet whitewashing of recent Anglo-Japanese relations was E. S. Montagu, the Secretary of State for India. It was his recapitulation of the record of Japanese relations with the Indian seditionists and Japan's economic penetration of British India³⁴ which had prompted Lloyd George's observation on this subject.

So great was the gap in 1921 between what the Cabinet clearly wanted to believe about recent Anglo-Japanese relations and the Foreign Office memoranda on the subject that Victor Wellesley,³⁵ Assistant Undersecretary Superintending the Far Eastern Department wrote a special memorandum

... to protest most emphatically against the belief—unfortunately a growing one—that the Far Eastern Department is anti-Japanese in sentiment. The imputation implies prejudice, animus and unreasoned bias. I wish to state clearly that we approach all questions with an absolutely open mind and in a spirit of complete detachment and impartiality. We are merely seekers after the truth. If in the course of our search facts are brought to light, the mere mention of which—such as atrocities—can hardly fail to invest the subject with an anti-Japanese complexion, that is, I submit, not the fault of the Department. Again, if comments are made—and I admit that some severe things have been said—the test should be whether or not the facts justify them before the Department is convicted of bias. I am well aware that *much which has been said may have been unpalatable* but in all humility I submit that for the Department to *gloss over unpleasant facts because they do not fit in with our political desiderata* would be to arrogate to itself an authority which it has no right to assume.

Sir C. Eliot³⁶ need have no fear of playing the part of *Advocatus Diaboli* in his efforts to explain them away. He would be doing us on the contrary a real service in our search for truth by criticising these Memos freely, and *nothing would please me more were he to succeed in whitewashing the Japanese by proving that the records of the Office are merely the figments of a large number of irresponsible and deluded persons* . . . One day we might be called upon to substantiate these assertions by giving chapter and verse.³⁷

The Foreign Office's Japanese expert, F. Ashton-Gwatkin,³⁸ who had spent the war years in Japan and subsequently investigated Japanese activities in Malaya for the intelligence agencies of the War Office³⁹ made a similar protest:

Personally, I am entirely free from any animus against Japan. Like Sir Charles Eliot, I was educated at Oxford University and at Balliol College and was there taught to regard the phenomena of this transitory world in a spirit of balance and detachment . . . *Circumstances may have now changed: but the Department concluded that as these things had taken place in the past so they might conceivably again take place in the future.*⁴⁰

It should be remembered, however, that from a 1921 perspective it was not difficult for the British cabinet to review recent Anglo-Japanese relations so magnanimously; and given the increasing pluralism in Japanese policies after 1911 it was natural for senior ministers to believe that the Westernized "responsible" Japanese statesmen whom they had met—men like Ishii and Chinda—spoke for Japan rather than the shadowy figures whom British specialists encountered through intelligence channels. For whatever Foreign Office and India Office officials might be saying about recent Japanese behaviour and intentions, the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, as the Cabinet saw it, had played a vital role in the defeat of the Central Powers. Because of it—and this was the point which Lloyd George in particular emphasized repeatedly—600,000

Australasian troops and over 1,000,000 Indian troops had been safely sent to the major theatres of the war. Whether this had been due, as Lloyd George himself tended to argue, to the actual services of the Japanese navy, or as William Morris Hughes argued, to a greater sense of security in these dominions against Japan herself, the result was the same—a singular British triumph through a valuable diplomatic instrument. Against this enormous British dividend from the Alliance, all that Japan had gained were a few islands in the Northern Pacific (to which the British, perhaps with a greater objectivity, never attached the same strategic importance as did the Australians and Americans), and some concessions in Shantung, which had been won at Japanese cost, not at the expense of the territorial integrity of China, but from the grasp of the German imperial octopus.

Paradoxically the Cabinet's wishful thinking and self-deception about Anglo-Japanese relations was founded on a wider appreciation of diplomatic and strategic realities than was often shown by the Far Eastern specialists. Men like Sir John Jordan and Sir Conyngham Greene, the wartime ambassador in Tokyo, may have had a fuller view of Japanese policies and a clearer vision of China's future status in East Asia, but their picture of Far Eastern diplomacy was somewhat distorted by a more anachronistic concept of relative British power and a more idealised concept of British purposes. Jordan's immediate reaction to the end of the European War was to telegraph in December 1918 that it was

highly important that a strong British squadron be sent to Far Eastern waters as soon as circumstances permit. We should no longer incur the loss of prestige involved in leaving Colonies like Hong Kong and Singapore so largely to the protection of Japanese ships, and the disturbed state of China renders it imperative in the interests of our trade that (our) flag should be in evidence everywhere in Chinese waters.⁴¹

This request sprang from his firm conviction that the years 1914-18 marked "only . . . a temporary eclipse of Western influence which will pass away with the end of the European War."⁴² In September 1916, Greene had expressed the similar view that "Great Britain will emerge from her ordeal by battle with enhanced prestige—an inestimable advantage in the Orient—and vis-à-vis Japan, with an immense naval and military superiority."⁴³ Moreover in the tradition of his great Sinophile predecessors, Sir Thomas Wade and Sir Robert Hart, Jordan identified long-term British interests and influence in China with China's own long-term interests. But in spite of the total destruction of German naval power, the Peking minister's appeal was not gratified by the despatch of a strong British fleet to the Far East. Even the later and long delayed construction of a major naval base at Singapore was not designed to relocate a greater proportion of British naval strength to the Far East but to permit a unified home-based navy to operate in Eastern waters if diplomacy failed to avert such an undesirable exigency.

The progressive withdrawal of British power westward from the Pacific Ocean, which is so clear in the perspective of 1968, is dimly foreseen in the prescient realism of Cabinet documents in the 1911-21 decade. Not only is there a realisation that the widely extended imperial interests which had been built up in the nineteenth century behind the shield of a supreme British navy would have to be defended in the twentieth century by diplomacy and by a strategy of calculated risks, but there is a realisation that attempts to achieve too much through military power would defeat their own purpose by crippling the financial strength on which British power rested.

This sober realisation was nicely formulated in two Committee of Imperial Defence papers submitted to the Cabinet on the eve of the Great War. In discussing "the Probable Scales of Attack against Oversea British Ports" in April 1914, the Cabinet Committee observed that

in the year 1906 it was fully recognised that the rise of the German, Japanese and United States navies . . . had brought about a profound change in the political

and strategic situation throughout the world . . . Were the resources of the British Empire unlimited, it would no doubt be desirable to make every part of His Majesty's oversea dominions secure against all possible contingencies of war. There is, however . . . a limit to the total amount that can be spent on defence . . . It has been decided that the existence of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance relieves His Majesty's Government at the present time from the necessity of considering the scale of attack that Japan could bring to bear on British possessions in the Pacific. For, so long as the Japanese alliance remains operative, it is held that not only is *the risk of attack by Japan excluded from the category of reasonable probabilities to be provided against*, but that British naval requirements are adequately met if the combined British and Japanese forces in the Pacific are superior to the forces maintained in those waters by *any reasonably probable combination of naval powers*.⁴⁴

The possibility that Japan might terminate the Alliance and become hostile had been analysed earlier in a C.I.D. paper which was submitted to the 1911 Imperial Conference with the somewhat contradictory objectives of reassuring Australia and New Zealand of their present security against Japanese invasion and of goading them into greater future contributions to imperial naval defence. The Committee concluded that "in the event of an outbreak of war with Japan at a time when our relations with a European naval power or combination of European naval powers were strained or hostile, it was . . . conceivable that the local command of the Pacific might for a period rest with Japan until such time as British naval reinforcements could arrive from European waters . . . During that period it would no doubt be possible for Japan to convey oversea to Australia a military force of considerable size".⁴⁵ The C.I.D. argued, however, that this would be such a disastrous adventure for Japan that it was highly improbable that she would undertake it.

(For) it is necessary to draw a clear distinction between large operations, the success of which will depend on the power of the Japanese fleet to keep open oversea communications with its bases for an indefinite period and hasty raids dependent for success rather on surprise and rapidity of execution than upon the number of troops employed. The oversea conveyance from a distant base of operations of a powerful military expeditionary force, and the continuous supply of such a force, when landed in hostile territory, with munitions of war, would be possible only to a Power which was mistress of the seas and was able to destroy or mask all the hostile ships that might at any time be in a position to interrupt the communications of the expeditionary force. No such expedition has ever been carried to a successful conclusion unless this condition has been fulfilled, and *some of the great military disasters of history have resulted from a failure to secure or retain the assured sea command which is essential for the prosecution of an oversea campaign*. Until the combined fleets of our opponents were in a position to destroy or mask all the British naval reinforcements that might be despatched to the Pacific—that is *until the fleets of Japan and her allies had succeeded in wresting from the British navy the permanent command of the sea—it is highly improbable that organised invasion of Australia and New Zealand on a large scale would be attempted*.⁴⁶

Having assured the dominion governments that the vital necessity to concentrate British naval strength in European waters did not expose them to a reasonably conceivable risk of large-scale Japanese invasion, the Committee went on to argue, however, that the temporary command of the Pacific might conceivably encourage the Japanese to undertake such a devastating raid that

the British government might be compelled for political reasons to detach the requisite naval and military reinforcements for the protection of these Dominions, thereby disorganising our war plans and possibly jeopardising the success of opera-

tions in the main theatre of war . . . The probability of such raids being undertaken will vary inversely as the strength and efficiency of the local naval and military forces of the Dominions. For conditions which would give a raiding force considerable chances of being able to effect serious damage before being destroyed or compelled to surrender would act as a direct incentive to such enterprises.⁴⁷

It would seem reasonable to assume that the destruction of the German navy should have freed British policy towards Japan from the calculated risks involved in this complicated balance of diplomacy and naval strategy. Yet in June 1921 the Committee of Imperial Defence advised the Cabinet that

Great Britain is on the whole . . . in at least as weak a position to-day for operations in the Pacific as she was in 1914 . . . (For although in Europe) . . . the situation from a British point of view has improved in so far as there would not now on an emergency arising be strategic objections to moving the main British fleet to the Far East as there would have been in 1914 . . . the strategical situation in the Far East . . . has deteriorated from a British point of view. The United States of America and Japan . . . already possess the second and third strongest navies in the world and undoubtedly will in the next few years, unless further construction is undertaken in the British Empire, become the first and second naval powers in the world . . . and while the completion of the Panama Canal has from a strategical point of view added materially to the potential strength of the United States fleet . . . the strength of the Japanese fleet has increased out of all proportion to what it was in 1914. Again the "capital ship" of to-day has grown in size out of all proportion to the corresponding vessel in the years preceding the war, and docks such as those in the Far East and Pacific, which in the years preceding the war were capable of accommodating the largest warships can no longer be counted on as available for use by the larger vessels in the battle fleets of to-day. Further, *owing to the introduction of oil-fuel in the Royal Navy, it is actually the case to-day that for want of oil-fuel reserves at the ports in the Far East the main British fleet could not under existing conditions operate in the Pacific within any reasonable time after the outbreak of war.*⁴⁸

A year later, despite the diplomatic detente issued in by the Washington Naval Agreements, the Admiralty submitted to the Committee of Imperial Defence an even more pessimistic analysis.

We consider the position towards Japan requires grave and urgent consideration . . . In the coal era the British fleet was mobile to an extent not approached by any other navy in the world. A widespread system of coaling stations enabled us to move our main fleet wherever circumstances might require. Reliance upon oil, with all its advantages, has destroyed for the time being that mobility. The position of Japan during the next few years will be formidable. The United States, according to Lord Beatty, can do nothing against her across the enormous Pacific Ocean. Obviously we cannot hold Hong Kong in the event of a war with Japan. Unless Singapore is adequately protected before it is attacked, we cannot hold Singapore. *If Singapore fell in the first two or three months of the war, the whole of the Pacific would fall under the complete supremacy of Japan, and many years might elapse before either Britain or the United States could re-enter that ocean in effective strength.*⁴⁹

In considering these sombre strategic difficulties, however, the Committee of Imperial Defence—and particularly the Treasury representative on that body—were adamant that the solution would have to be found in diplomacy. To achieve the security both of the heart of the Empire and of British interests in the Pacific by naval power alone was

beyond our capabilities in these present times of financial stringency, since the necessary outlay would defeat its own end by crippling the wealth and therefore

the strength of the nation's resources. The utmost we can hope for in the near future is to possess a fleet as large as that of any other single power, and even this will tax our resources to a high degree.⁵⁰

The Treasury representative, opposing the immediate development of the Singapore base, observed

the financial position is such that there is in my opinion *no alternative but to face such risks as may be involved in the present conditions of our defences in the Far East and rely on diplomacy to obviate them.*

What this implied was nicely expressed by the War Department's General Staff who commented that should

the British Empire . . . find itself at war with Japan in circumstances where . . . Japan had no preoccupations as to the attitude of Russia or of the United States and that we were in an isolated position in the Far East . . . our policy (would have) completely broken down.⁵¹

It is clear from these documents of the immediate pre-war and early post-war periods that the Cabinet, or more particularly its most important committee, the C.I.D., never saw the problems of Far Eastern policy during the war years, as Jordan and Greene did, in terms of a temporary eclipse of British power in the Pacific, but in terms of evolving a diplomacy and strategy to underpin the permanent decline of British power in this region. Far from being abnormal, the situation from 1914–18, in which Great Britain attempted to secure her Eastern and Pacific interests by diplomatic manipulation of Japanese power while the fate of the entire British Empire was balanced critically on military engagements in France and naval struggles in the North Sea and Atlantic Ocean, was the very situation that the United Kingdom had envisaged in renewing the Anglo-Japanese Alliance in 1911. Nor did the 1918 victory alter this necessity to pursue British interests through diplomacy rather than power. For in addition to the new power relationship with Japan—which arose partly from the manner in which the European war had impoverished Great Britain and enriched Japan and partly from the new technological factors which had made it temporarily impossible for the larger oil-burning warships of the Royal Navy to be deployed against modern Japanese ships operating from home bases in East Asia—senior ministers knew full well that Lord Curzon was not raising a remote contingency in May 1921 when he gave Cabinet this warning:

Although Russia and Germany had for the moment ceased to be great powers . . . there was no certainty that in a few years we should not have a regenerated Russia; and whatever the form of the Russian government might then be, the dangers of the past would again be revived . . . With a resuscitated Russia and a revived Germany, it might well be that in ten year's time we might be faced with a combination of these powers in the Far East.⁵²

One consequence of this basic realisation of growing British weakness in the Far East was, as we have seen, the pronounced tendency of Cabinet Ministers to believe that Japanese policy was what British policy aimed that it should be. Because the deployment of Japanese power from 1914 to 1918 had contributed to the total destruction of the German Empire, it was tempting to ignore the evidence which demonstrated that this was not the goal of Japanese policy: that, on the contrary, they had desired the war to culminate in the exhaustion and continued deadlock of the European empires; and that their wartime efforts and animosity had been directed more against the entrenched position of their principal imperial rivals in Asia than against their formal German enemy.

The other consequence was the efforts in the Foreign Office, who could not ignore the steady deterioration in Anglo-Japanese relations from the Chinese Revolution of 1912 to their lowest point on the eve of the Battle of Jutland (with a fresh low during

the great German offensive in the spring of 1918), to find the diplomatic means of conciliating or restraining Japan. In contemplation of a wide-ranging settlement with Japan, the value of British imperial interests in China was reassessed in terms of overall British interests and found to be the least valuable and possibly expendable if the exigencies of the European war warranted such a sacrifice either to conciliate Japan or to purchase her more active co-operation in the war. Despite this resigned assessment, however, both the Foreign Office and the Cabinet rejected the possibility of a major imperial settlement with Japan during the war because the active, though unofficial, Japanese support for the Indian revolutionary movement and the accelerated Japanese economic penetration of British India aroused the fear that a Japanese domination of China, whether it took the form of imposing a virtual protectorate on the Chinese or of forcing them into a subservient anti-Western alliance, would threaten the security of British rule in India.

Such a drastic outcome could not be contemplated without a radical reconsideration of British aims in the war against the Central Powers. For though historians may never agree on a definitive scaling of the vital issues of that war, it is nevertheless clear that the security of Great Britain in Europe, unlike that of France, could not be isolated from the extra-European interests on which the economy of the United Kingdom and her status as a Great Power rested. After all it was the threat of the Franco-Russian Alliance to British imperial interests which had first driven Britain from her splendid isolation into her alliance with Japan. Then, in 1907, it was the threat of a German-dominated Turkey to British imperial interests in Asia which had led Britain to the lesser evil of an imperial settlement with Russia in 1907 and subsequently either inspired or partially justified the costly campaigns against Turkey, which weakened the Entente rather than its opponents in the central and decisive struggles of the Great War; and it was undoubtedly the extra-European foundations of Great Britain's commerce and power which made the British navy, in Winston Churchill's famous antithesis, a necessity, whereas the German navy was a luxury that his nation could not tolerate.

Not surprisingly, it was the South African statesman, General Smuts, who in August 1918 most strongly urged the British War Cabinet not to lose sight of the extra-European issues of the war.

Undoubtedly Germany would be lost if the war continued long enough. But was that worth our while? Our army would shrink progressively, and we might find ourselves reduced before the war ended to the position of a second-class power compared with America and Japan. It was no use achieving the object of destroying Germany at the cost of the position of our own Empire. From this point of view he considered many of the items in the Foreign Secretary's programme not as war aims to be secured in the treaty of peace, but as things that would come of themselves in the evolution that would follow the war. His own suggestion was that we should concentrate on those theatres where our military and diplomatic effort could be most effectively brought to bear together . . . i.e. on our weaker enemies.⁵³

While it is true that senior English ministers agreed with Curzon that "even more serious . . . than the prospect of the war ending with the United States and Japan relatively unexhausted and predominant was that of its ending with a predominant and unexhausted Germany",⁵⁴ the difference between the two viewpoints lay mainly in a different assessment of what constituted the greatest threat to Britain's worldwide position. This point emerged clearly from a Cabinet discussion at the much more critical period, in May 1917, of the possible consequences of the conclusion of a negotiated peace between Kerensky's Provisional Russian Republic and Imperial Germany. If this occurred before the arrival of an American army could change the balance of power in Western Europe, it might demand a negotiated peace in the West with the "consequent reorientation of our Asiatic policy which may be forced upon us

by the possible survival after the war of the mid-European bloc".⁵⁵ For the prerequisites of a Western settlement—"the complete liberation of Belgium and the evacuation of France"—could only be offered by Germany, Curzon warned his colleagues,

while her military strength and that of her Allies is still unbroken . . . at the price of conditions which Great Britain alone would have to pay and which would purchase the safety of our Allies by the acceptance of grave peril to the future of the British Empire.⁵⁶

The European war might well be considered lost from the British point of view if a negotiated peace left India—the hub of British imperial interests—as the hostage of Germany, Russia, or Japan, or any combination of these powers.

Just as it was the Japanese threat to the British domination of India which caused the United Kingdom to reject the idea of encouraging moderate Japanese policies by satisfying her legitimate expansionist needs at the expense of established British predominance in China, so it was also in their control of the Indian economy that British officials believed they had found a powerful diplomatic weapon to restrain Japan. It was the commercial attaché at the Tokyo Embassy, E. F. Crowe⁵⁷ who, in December 1916, first drew attention to the possibility that the dependence of the Japanese cotton textile industry on supplies of raw cotton from India might be used as an instrument of economic pressure, although this could prove a two-edged weapon if not wielded with great diplomatic skill.⁵⁸ After an excited Japanese reaction to the Government of India's imposition in early 1917 of a 7½ per cent import duty on cotton textiles had demonstrated the force of Crowe's idea,⁵⁹ the Foreign Office enthusiastically pursued the general notion to contemplate what might be achieved with dominion wool, strategic commodities in which Japan was deficient such as rubber, oil, and steel plating for naval armament,⁶⁰ and the dependence of Japanese industry on its exports to Allied markets, which had been well illustrated by the Japanese government's protests at the British attempt to conserve shipping by prohibiting the importation of cotton hosiery into the United Kingdom.⁶¹ Although the threat of Indian economic retaliation was not used against Japan during the war, Ambassador Greene, and his successor Chargé d'affaires Alston, were both instructed to use it in 1919 in an effort to force the Japanese Government to make amends for Japanese wartime attitudes to the Indian revolutionaries.⁶²

4. BRITISH IMPERIALISM IN JAPANESE DUALISTIC PERSPECTIVES AND POLICIES

The steady deterioration in Anglo-Japanese relations, which became so marked during the 1914–18 war, and which was accelerated or reversed according to the varying military fortunes of the Entente, began when the ink was scarcely dry on the second renewal of the treaty of alliance on 13 July 1911. Indeed, it is probable that the 1905 agreement, which would normally have run until August 1915, could not have been renegotiated in 1911 and extended to 1921 if the fortunes of Sun Yat-sen had not delayed the final fruition of his perennial conspiracies until 10 October 1911. Had one of Sun's pre-1911 schemes escaped miscarriage, the Japanese opponents of the Alliance, who were formidable enough as it was in the actual circumstances of mid-1911, would have been insuperable. For the Chinese Revolution of 1911–12 completely undermined the cautious and restrained policies which genro-dominated Japanese governments had been pursuing in East Asia since the beginning of the century. Broadly speaking, these governments had had to choose between two alternative policies. One was an "idealistic" policy propagated vigorously and even violently by the radical and reactionary nationalists and arousing varying degrees of sympathy in the ruling élite itself: a policy of supporting the Chinese nationalists against Western imperialism and the semi-colonial Manchu regime. The other was a "realistic"

policy of co-operating with the Western imperialist powers in their collective and competitive attempts to create an exploitable modern economic infrastructure in China. Whatever doubts the Meiji oligarchs might have had before the turn of the century were swept away by the series of Japanese diplomatic triumphs between 1895 and 1905. Co-operation with European imperialism brought Japan the status and prestige of a second class power; while the modernisation of the humbled Ch'ing regime along the lines recently pioneered by the Japanese Empire itself seemed more likely to prove beneficial to Japan than the encouragement of the more radical Chinese nationalists, which might well lead to revolutionary repercussions within the Japanese political system itself. This boomerang reaction was exactly what the nationalist critics of the oligarchy hoped for. First Korea, then China, and finally Manchuria they saw as nurseries for a regenerated Oriental society which could be transplanted back into Japanese soil after it had been cleared of the noxious Western plantations. The influence of these nationalist idealists, particularly on the subordinate officials through whom government policies had to operate, was already strong enough in the first decade of the century to produce a repressed dualism in Japanese policies and even a certain ambivalence in the most senior statesmen themselves. However, down until the annexation of Korea in 1910, the high tide of realist policies had brought in so many diplomatic successes to Japan that these undercurrents had scarcely disturbed the somewhat patronising benevolence with which most English policymakers regarded the Japanese. While Tokyo, in the first two decades of the twentieth century, was (as Marius Jansen pointed out in his study *The Japanese and Sun Yat-sen*⁶³) for Asian nationalists what Moscow was later to become, revolutionaries like Sun Yat-sen met with intermittent official harassment as well as unofficial succour. For this reason the attitude of the Japanese government towards refugee Asian nationalists could be represented internationally as being correctly liberal: like that of the British and French governments to political refugees from Tsarist Russia, for example.

Then, in the Chinese Revolution of 1912, the Japanese suffered an unrelieved diplomatic defeat. Unlike the British government, who observed an astute neutrality, the Japanese government persisted in the policy of strong support for the Manchus. The outcome was a diplomatic rift with Great Britain, the defeat of the Manchus, the defeat of the Chinese nationalists and their Japanese sympathisers, and the accession to power of the anti-Japanese Yuan Shih-k'ai. As a result of this débâcle, the established official policy of co-operating with the European powers to support the central government in Peking was almost submerged by the countervailing policy, and in the so-called Second Revolution of July 1913, the Japanese government supported Sun Yat-sen and the Kuomintang in their forcible attempt to depose the autocratic President Yuan Shih-k'ai. With strong British financial support, furnished through the Five Power Consortium, Yuan easily crushed the rebellion; and the Japanese government, who sent a disproportionately large punitive expedition to Nanking in September to avenge an attack on three Japanese nationals, drew a sharp note of protest from the British Government, reminding them of their obligations under Article I of the recently renewed Anglo-Japanese Alliance.⁶⁴

While still smarting from these defeats, the Japanese suffered two further blows from their ally in 1914. Again by the exercise of strong diplomatic pressure, this time on Yuan Shih-k'ai rather than on the Japanese government, the British defeated Japanese attempts to secure major railway concessions in the Yangtse region, which would have drained away the value of prior concessions already granted to British interests.⁶⁵ The British also rejected Japanese overtures for an economic alliance to parallel the political alliance on the grounds that in the existing financial situation the British would have to supply most of the capital for development in China proper, while Japan enjoyed a share of the fruits though continuing to enjoy a monopolistic position in Korea and Southern Manchuria.⁶⁶

Nevertheless, on the eve of the war some influential Britons were having second thoughts about the long-term wisdom of rejecting Japanese proposals for industrial

co-operation in China. The Shanghai branch of the China Association was considering the matter right up until the presentation of the Twenty-One Demands in early 1915 appeared to make it evident that what the British could now gracefully offer the Japanese was either too little or too late.⁶⁷ At the same time as "the Old China Hands" were thinking again about the future of British economic relations with Japan, Beilby Alston of the Foreign Office's Far Eastern Department returned from a period of duty in Peking as Embassy Counsellor and Chargé d'affaires so concerned about the future of Anglo-Japanese relations in China that he sketched out a memorandum on a possible understanding with Japan. He was obliged to put this aside during the European crisis of August 1914, but finally submitted it to the Foreign Secretary at the time of the Twenty-One Demands.⁶⁸ Alston never appears to have envisaged concessions to Japan on the same scale as Sir Edward Grey vaguely contemplated in early 1916; nevertheless, in his subsequent career this influential official continued to display a strong inclination to be the architect of an important Far Eastern settlement, which he may well have been if Grey's notions could have come to fruition.

Notwithstanding these ominous portents of 1912-14, Sir John Jordan found himself virtually isolated on 9 August 1914, when he warned that Japan's entry into the war "would endanger the stability of the existing regime in China to say nothing of our political influence in this country and our prestige in Asia generally" and would also lead to the "probable seizure by Japan of the islands lying between this country and Australia".⁶⁹ Sir Eyre Crowe, the influential Under-Secretary who was to head the Foreign Office after the war, advised the Foreign Secretary that he was "sorry to differ altogether from Sir John Jordan's view, which is limited to the Chinese horizon. He does not understand what is the nature of a war on which our existence is staked."⁷⁰ And although Alston and his colleagues in the Far Eastern Department had already balanced the issue so evenly as to produce successive reversals of British policy on the question on 3 August, 4 August, and 6 August, the telegrams from the Tokyo Embassy were entirely reassuring.

Ambassador Sir Conyngham Greene was relatively new to Far Eastern affairs; he had been schooled in the general Westminster benevolence towards Japan, and consequently he accepted Foreign Minister Kato Komei's assurances about Japan's intentions, thereby reinforcing the favourable impression which Kato had made on Sir Edward Grey during the frank discussions about the future of Anglo-Japanese relations which the two had had quite recently when Kato had been Japanese Ambassador in London. It is significant that Greene's benevolence towards Japan survived even the shock of the Twenty-One Demands, for in a private letter to Grey on 22 August 1915, he wrote:

With Baron Kato, I never had any misunderstanding, and the only unpleasant incident was the China Demands surprise. But I suppose no government can afford to be unpractical in time of war: at any rate I prefer to look back upon the episode in that light.⁷¹

Grey's attitude was very similar; for not only did he express his regret that Kato had been forced from office, but presented the Twenty-One Demands crisis to the Cabinet in such a way that Prime Minister Asquith reported to the King on May 7th, that

Sir E. Grey described the serious situation which had arisen between China and Japan. The Japanese have shown a want of frankness in keeping back some of their demands *none of which however seriously affect British interests in the Far East.*⁷²

Thus the British documents make it clear that British policy makers did not see the presentation of the Twenty-One Demands as a major turning point in Anglo-Japanese relations until the end of 1915, when they saw them in relation to a more general challenge to the British Empire in Asia. Greene's personal attitude towards Japan underwent a complete reversal in six months as a result of his unsuccessful

negotiations with the Japanese government in a series of crises centred on Indian affairs, the origins of which should now be traced.

5. FAR EASTERN QUESTIONS IN A NEW INDIAN PERSPECTIVE

Of the two issues which formed the basis of a recriminatory document entitled *The Indian Brief Against Japan*⁷³ which the Government of India forwarded to Westminster in February 1919, in the expectation that the long-awaited day of reckoning had come, the question of Japanese economic penetration into British India had already grown into a serious diplomatic dispute between the two Far Eastern allies before the outbreak of the First World War. Where British Indian interests were concerned, Sir Edward Grey, in contrast to his inclinations to reassess the relations between established British interests in China and growing Japanese interests in that country, was disposed to take a strong line with Japan. At a Cabinet meeting on 3 February 1914, Grey supported Lord Crewe's demand that the Government of India should be permitted to repeal the 1850 law which opened India's commerce to worldwide competition. This action was to be taken in order that the Japanese might be threatened with total exclusion unless they desisted from what the British claimed was a calculated policy of driving British ships out of the Indian coasting trade with the aid of government subsidies and other commercial methods regarded by the British as unfair.⁷⁴ Plaintiff in the dispute was the British India Steam Navigation Company (by then a subsidiary of the Peninsula and Orient Line) who complained that they had been fighting a losing battle with the Nippon Yusen Kaisha for three years, and that without intervention by the British government the whole of the Indian coasting trade would fall into Japanese hands. Not only would this be a grave matter from an economic point of view, they argued, but since the mercantile marine had always furnished a valuable supplement to naval strength in time of war both in personnel and in conversion of merchantmen to merchant cruisers, it would drastically weaken British naval potential in Asiatic waters. The British Indian company complained that in addition to the government subsidies the Japanese used underhand methods such as advertising that their ships were managed by Japanese captains and officers who were more likely to be friendly to Asiatic passengers than Englishmen. Furthermore by "doctoring the tap" the Japanese had made drinking water available at all times, whereas on British ships it was distributed only three times a day.⁷⁵

Direct negotiations between the British and Japanese companies broke down because the Japanese, though willing to withdraw from the Indian coasting trade, as defined by them, were unwilling to surrender the right to ply the lucrative route between Calcutta and Rangoon.⁷⁶ Burma, in the Japanese view, comprised a separate country from India, even if administratively combined with India. The British negotiators in the dispute were handicapped by the fear that the Japanese Government might meet the British case by formally throwing open the coasting trade of Japan to British ships, a concession which would cut the ground from under their feet and at the same time be completely negated by a nationalistic avoidance of British vessels by Japanese shippers.⁷⁷ Aware of the weakness of the British position, the Nippon Yusen Kaisha on 9 September 1914 snubbed the British Embassy's attempt to assist in the negotiations, informing Sir Conyngham Greene that there was no room for his assistance.⁷⁸ In view of the European crisis, which had moved Grey to tell the India Office that "the present juncture is inopportune for taking any step which might be construed as an endeavour to put pressure of any kind on the Japanese government",⁷⁹ the British Foreign Office was obliged to shelve the matter.⁸⁰

In the circumstances this was an important victory for the Japanese. Indeed, the plight of the British India Steam Navigation Company was worsened by the diversion of forty-nine of their ships, with a total tonnage of 245,699 to the carriage of troops and by the Royal Navy's requisition of a large number of British merchant ships in Asiatic waters for conversion into merchant cruisers.⁸¹ There was a grave danger,

B.I.S.N.C. officials protested, that the Red Ensign might be completely displaced in Indian waters by the Rising Sun.⁸² British Indian interests were further aggrieved when it became apparent that the Japanese were using British naval exigencies to accelerate the displacement of British sea-going commerce. The Japanese, they said, always pleaded a shortage of tonnage when they were asked to employ their merchantmen in the carriage of essential wartime supplies on routes where they were likely to suffer heavily from enemy action or where an entrenched commercial position for the future was not likely to be achieved.⁸³ Although these protests produced no concrete action from the British government beyond the exercise of more prudence in diverting British merchant shipping from Asian commerce,⁸⁴ the issue formed part of a more comprehensive submission on the Japanese threat to the British commercial position in India, which the Government of India contributed in March 1916 to the Home Government's reappraisal of British Far Eastern Policy.⁸⁵

On the question of revolutionary Indian nationalism, the Japanese Government appeared to be adopting a relatively co-operative line until the second half of 1915. After a great deal of pressure from the British, the Japanese authorities in 1912 suppressed an anti-British journal entitled *The Islamic Fraternity* edited by Barakatullah, a lecturer in Urdu at the Tokyo School of Foreign Languages; and in March 1914 his lecturer's contract was not renewed.⁸⁶ Even more gratifying was the predominant role played by marines from the Japanese fleet and by volunteers organised by the Japanese consul-general in suppressing a serious mutiny in the Indian garrison in Singapore in February 1915.⁸⁷

Japanese nationalists were subsequently to make great capital out of this blow to British prestige, though some of them questioned whether Japanese forces should have been employed against the victims of British imperialism.⁸⁸ Shortly afterwards, when the British Government asked the Japanese government to deny the use of Japanese postal facilities to Indian revolutionary literature flowing from the United States, the Japanese formally assented, with the escape proviso that they could not interfere with registered mail.⁸⁹ However, the events of 1915 not only made the Japanese Government much less receptive to British pressure, but they encouraged the Japanese nationalists to widen the patronage they had been giving to the Chinese nationalists to embrace this encouraging Indian movement.

The pre-Gandhian Indian revolutionary movement has not hitherto received much attention from historians.⁹⁰ There appear to be two causes of this neglect. First, the success of Gandhian techniques of non-violent resistance has overshadowed the historical significance of the revolutionaries of violence. Secondly, the successive British concessions stemming from the Montagu-Chelmsford Report gave to Congress nationalism a constructive and central role in the struggle for independence which weakened interest in either the future or the history of revolutionism in India. Consequently, such early post-war literature as gives some indication of the dimensions of revolutionary nationalism has been largely disregarded because there was little indication of just how seriously the British had regarded what was then classified as Indian sedition. In fact the report of the Government of India's Rowlatt Committee,⁹¹ which did stem from wartime concern with the activities of the revolutionaries rather than from an accurate appreciation of the current situation it sought to meet, was largely discredited after it led directly to the irrelevant Rowlatt Acts and in turn to the Amritsar Massacre. In the same way, the account of the abortive Ghadr rising of February 1915, given by Sir Michael O'Dwyer, the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab who had crushed the movement,⁹² appeared exaggerated in the light of the role which O'Dwyer played in General Dyer's action at Amritsar in 1919. However, it is now clear from the British records that all government departments dealing with Indian sedition during the war regarded the Indian revolutionary movement very seriously indeed.

The Japanese do not appear to have become directly involved with the Indian revolutionaries until Rash Behari Bose, who organised the attempt on Viceroy

Hardinge's life in 1912 and led the abortive Ghadr rebellion in February 1915, fled to Japan in May 1915 on the *Sanuki Maru*,⁹³ though naturally the Indian conspirators had always made use of the safety of Japanese shipping lines and the sympathy of Japanese mariners. The most noteworthy example of this had been the notorious voyage of the *Komagatu Maru* on the eve of the war. In an attempt to find a loophole in the restrictive Canadian immigration regulations or merely to inflame Indian revolutionary sentiments against the inferior status of Indians in the British Empire, a wealthy Sikh businessman named Gurdit Singh had chartered a Japanese steamer to transport 372 hopeful Indian immigrants to Vancouver. Refused permission to land, the passengers had forcibly repelled a boarding party of Canadian police and the *Komagatu Maru* had weighed anchor only under the threat of naval coercion. The resentful passengers had landed back in Calcutta in October 1914 in a most rebellious frame of mind, and many of them had participated in the abortive rising of February 1915.⁹⁴

As soon as the British Embassy learned of the presence in Japan of two of the most important Indian revolutionaries, Herambalal Gupta and Rash Behari Bose (alias Thakur), Greene put tremendous pressure on the Japanese Government to expel them from Japan in such a manner that they would fall into British hands. After two months of tortuous negotiations, in the course of which the Embassy counsellor, Lord Kilmarnock, at one stage made almost daily representations at the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Japanese government agreed to a plan whereby the two Indians would be expelled from Japan on an identified Japanese ship from which they would then be taken by an intercepting British warship. H.M.S. *Atlas* was despatched from Hong Kong to Yokohama for this purpose. However, the Japanese authorities made the expulsion order known to the Indians five days in advance, with the result that on the morning it was to take effect, 2 December 1915, they took refuge in the house of the powerful reactionary nationalist, Toyama Mitsuru,⁹⁵ which the Japanese police surrounded but dared not enter. In the meantime, Bose and Gupta escaped through the neighbouring house and were concealed for several months by Soma Aizo, one of Toyama's disciples, in the loft of his bakery, while the Japanese government professed their inability to discover the whereabouts of the wanted men.⁹⁶ As British agents subsequently learned, the "escape" had been pre-arranged with the Japanese authorities after an influential delegation which included Toyama, and Inukai Ki,⁹⁷ the leading radical nationalist parliamentarian, waited on the Premier, Count Okuma Shigenobu. Of all the genro Okuma leaned most towards Pan-Asian nationalism, and since that day in 1889 when one of Toyama's disciples had blown off one of his legs,⁹⁸ he had been peculiarly sensitive to pressure from Toyama and the nationalist critics of the oligarchy.

Four days after Bose and Gupta were taken under Toyama's protective wing, Greene learned from Baron Ishii, the Japanese Foreign Minister, of Japan's insuperable opposition to the proposal to bring China into the war, which had been submitted to him in a joint memorandum from the Entente ambassadors on 22 November.⁹⁹ The motives underlying this scheme were complex, especially when Russian and French diplomacy overlaid the original British initiative, but Foreign Office discussion of the issue during 1915 makes it clear that the principal British motive was to prevent the continued use of Chinese territory, particularly territory in which Chinese jurisdiction was limited by the unequal treaties, as one of the principal bases for German and Indian revolutionary conspiracies against British rule in India.¹⁰⁰ This policy was forced on the Foreign Office, despite the misgivings of the Far Eastern Department, and despite Jordan's prediction of the consequences for Anglo-Japanese relations and for the stability of the Chinese Republic if Japan, as was probable, decided to frustrate the endeavour.¹⁰¹

It is unlikely that a desire to obstruct the Government of India's campaign against seditious conspiracies played any role in the Japanese government's attitude to China's entry into the war, for their suspicion that this could only be an Anglo-

Chinese scheme to rob Japan of her gains of 1914–15 is understandable. Indeed, it may well have been the vigour of subsequent British diplomacy on the seditionist issue which encouraged the Japanese to believe that the revolutionaries might really be a threat to British power in India, worthy of Japanese support. However, what was particularly galling to the British about the situation in China was not only that the German concessions in Tientsin, Hankow, and Canton and the international settlement in Shanghai were such fertile ground for intrigues against India—since all large treaty ports had colonies of Sikhs,¹⁰² who had long been in favour as garrison troops, policemen and watchmen—but that Germany's large share in the Boxer indemnity enabled her to finance these intrigues from Chinese revenue, which in turn was now mainly derived from the maritime customs duties on Allied commerce.

At all events the British move led to a major rift in Anglo-Japanese relations. Not only were the Japanese incensed by the suspicion of an Anglo-Chinese conspiracy against Japan, but they deeply resented the fact that their ally had entered into prior discussions with Russia and France on Far Eastern questions and then presented the Japanese government with a joint proposal in which they had not been a negotiating party—a move which must certainly have recalled to sensitive Japanese the humiliating Triple Intervention of 1895. As a result of this débâcle, Grey laid down a firm policy, which the British adhered to until the abrogation of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance at the Washington Conference, of treating Japan as a full partner in Far Eastern affairs rather than as an associate member of the Entente.

Japanese bitterness may be gauged from the highly dramatic personal attack which Mr. Honda, Counsellor at the London Embassy, staged before Beilby Alston at the Foreign Office, accusing him of being the author of the scheme.¹⁰³ Shortly afterwards the Japanese newspaper *Nichi Nichi* campaigned for the recall of Sir John Jordan as a serious obstacle to Anglo-Japanese accord.¹⁰⁴ This formed part of an intense campaign in the Japanese press against Great Britain and the Anglo-Japanese Alliance,¹⁰⁵ which was initiated late in 1914 by accusations of British cowardice during the joint Anglo-Japanese operations against Tsingtau,¹⁰⁶ gathered momentum in 1915 with protests that British pressure had been mainly instrumental in the defeat of Group V of the Japanese demands on China,¹⁰⁷ and reached its peak in the first half of 1916. Thereafter it slowly receded after the Battle of Jutland, and more rapidly after America's entry into the war improved Britain's military position, but revived during the German offensive of Spring, 1918, when Prince Arthur of Connaught was sent to Japan to bestow a British Field Marshal's baton on the Japanese Emperor as part of a propaganda effort to improve the British image in Japan.¹⁰⁸

The press campaign of 1916 reached new heights after Admiral W. L. Grant¹⁰⁹ sent H.M.S. *Laurentic* to patrol off the China coast—a zone assigned in the informal operational agreement to the Japanese navy—at the very time when the British were negotiating for extended Japanese naval assistance. Acting under printed instructions from Grant that small Japanese steamers were especially suspect of smuggling arms into India and carrying enemy nationals and Indian seditionists,¹¹⁰ *Laurentic* stopped and searched six Japanese steamers between 5 February and 12 March 1916.¹¹¹ On 5 February, nine Indians were taken off the *Tenyo Maru* and landed at Hong Kong, where they were cleared and allowed to proceed on their way, although it was generally believed in Japan that they had been summarily executed.¹¹² On 5 March, outside Shanghai, *Laurentic*, according to the Japanese ambassador's protest, fired one blank and two ball cartridges at the *Chizuken Maru* and “the debris of shells falling on her decks, feelings of great consternation were created among those on board.”¹¹³

The Japanese press vigorously attacked this British outrage to the Japanese flag, and the Indian revolutionaries by now enjoying the firm sponsorship of Toyama Mitsuru and the members of the Black Dragon Society, added fuel to the flames by ghosting hostile articles on British rule in India, which Okawa Shumei¹¹⁴ translated into Japanese. Under the circumstances the British government had no alternative

but to instruct British warships to cease interfering with Japanese shipping and to recognise the patrol of the China coast as a Japanese preserve.¹¹⁵

British apprehension at the scope of Japanese intentions was heightened when the Government of India set its cipher experts to work on telegraphic messages which the Japanese has asked permission to transmit from a newly established Japanese consulate-general in Yunnanfu on the British wire through Burma and Singapore. Interpolated through a Japanese code, which they did not break, the Government of India experts discovered a Chinese cipher, which proved to be communications between Sun Yat-sen and the leaders of the provincial rebellions against Yuan Shih-kai's short-lived Empire.¹¹⁶ To the Government of India in particular, the prospect of the establishment of Japanese sponsored governments in south-western China, if not in China at large, was most alarming, the more so as British intelligence progressively uncovered the liaison between the revolutionary Indian nationalists and Sun Yat-sen through Sun's Japanese nationalist supporters. In the early months of 1916, it seemed impossible to British officials and statesmen charged with the operation of British policy in the East that a major reshaping of Anglo-Japanese relations could be postponed until after the war.

6. GREY'S HALF-FORMED VISION OF AN ANGLO-JAPANESE IMPERIAL BARGAIN

In early 1916, Sir Edward Grey saw the Far Eastern problem in these terms:

Japan is barred from every other part of the world except the Far East, and the Anglo-Japanese Alliance cannot be maintained if she is to be barred there also or if we are to take the German concessions in China as well as taking German concessions in Africa and elsewhere . . . I do not wish to make offers to Japan at the expense of China, but in my opinion if we had not made it clear that we should not bar Japan's expansion of interests in the Far East, it would clearly have been to Japan's advantage to throw in her lot with Germany.¹¹⁷

What rearrangement of Anglo-Japanese relations in the Far East Grey envisaged during 1916 cannot be clearly deduced from the documentary evidence, which is fragmentary, owing to his preoccupation with European affairs and to the lack of enthusiasm or opposition with which his Far Eastern advisers greeted his general idea. It seems clear though that he thought in terms of recent imperialist demarcations like the Anglo-French entente of 1904, the Anglo-Russian entente of 1907 or more immediately the Sykes-Picot agreement of 1916. Since the Japanese knew that the Entente had bought Italy's military assistance with territorial promises and had sought to boost Russian resolve with the promise of Constantinople, Grey felt unable to postpone the consideration of Japanese expansionist ambitions until the final peace settlement.¹¹⁸ It was at his initiative that a sub-committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence was established in August 1916 to furnish the government with

a clear idea of what increase of territory is desirable in the interests of the British Empire and how much of the territory already taken from the enemy by Great Britain and her Allies can be used (a) for surrender to the Allies as their share and (b) for bargaining with Germany in the event of the Allies being unable to impose their own final peace terms on Germany.¹¹⁹

It was along these lines that Grey had instructed Alston in February 1916 to work up a proposal which might satisfy Japanese aspirations, repair the breach in the Alliance, enlist greater Japanese cooperation in the war and achieve the objectives sought in the recent attempt to bring China into the war. Alston drew up a memorandum on the subject,¹²⁰ and with the Foreign Secretary's approval its substance was telegraphed to Sir John Jordan for his comments.¹²¹ In general the idea was that China should be brought into the war with Japan's assent; Japanese aspirations in China

could then be met with a share of German interests in that country, while China would be compensated for her sacrifices with the remaining share of German interests, which might be supplemented by the British retrocession of Wei-hai-wei and a substantial loan to the Chinese government.

Jordan was outspoken in his opposition to the proposal, which

so far as Chinese co-operation is concerned seems to me quite impracticable and to be based upon a misconception of the existing political situation in the country . . . Rather than divide existing German concessions with Japan the Chinese would in my opinion infinitely prefer to see them remain in the hands of Germany. A railway or other concession held by a European power is from a Chinese point of view a very different thing from a similar concession held by Japan. The latter becomes an instrument of peaceful penetration and of Japanese colonisation or a lever for obtaining preferential rights and exclusive privileges . . . In this connection it must not be forgotten that the . . . "assets" which it is proposed to divide are either Chinese property or at least properties over which China already possesses sovereign rights. The retrocession of Wei-hai-wei would offer little or no attraction to China, who would probably prefer its retention by us as a potential counterpoise to the Japanese positions at Port Arthur and Kiaochow on either side of the sea approach to the capital . . . But if, as I regret to learn from your telegram, the assistance of Japan is indispensable to enable us to pull through and cannot otherwise be obtained, then I think both we and the Russians should not hesitate to make the necessary sacrifice of our interests in China. We in the Yangtse Valley and the Russians in Manchuria can offer her co-operation in railway and other enterprises, and arrangements could if necessary be made independently of China. The French might also make a similar contribution. We should naturally alienate the goodwill of China, but that is inevitable in the circumstances. This might perhaps be minimised if Japan in return would agree to give her support to Yuan Shih-k'ai's government against revolution.¹²²

Grey was clearly disappointed at this response to his effort to find a solution for a major problem in British policy, and the confidence which he had hitherto reposed in Jordan that had made the Peking Minister the virtual source of British China policies was greatly reduced. Although he strongly supported Jordan in the face of *Nichi-Nichi's* campaign to have him recalled, Alston, whom the Foreign Secretary might well expect to identify himself less closely with Chinese and British China interests, was sent to Peking as Counsellor to assist Jordan and bring the Legation into closer touch with the current Westminster assessment of diplomatic realities.¹²³ Later in 1916 Jordan was brought home on leave, and it would appear from a private letter from Alston to Langley¹²⁴ that there was some question of retiring the sixty-four year old diplomatist.¹²⁵ At all events, Grey's successor, Balfour, did not see fit to inform Jordan, who was actually in the United Kingdom at the time, of the British government's promise in February 1917 to support Japan at the peace conference in her claims to the German concessions in Shantung and Germany's island colonies in the Northern Pacific. Nor was the Peking Legation, to which Jordan was to return later in 1917, advised of this secret treaty.¹²⁶ This failure to communicate a policy decision of such obvious importance in the future of Anglo-Chinese relations to the British diplomatic mission in China might conceivably be interpreted as an incredible oversight if it were not a repetition of a similar occurrence in 1916. Not long after Jordan had poured cold water on Grey's idea of a bargain with Japan, the Foreign Office failed to transmit to the Peking Legation copies of two important despatches to Tokyo (Nos. 37 and 39) in which Grey had recorded his verbal assurances to the Japanese ambassador that Great Britain did not intend to put forward claims to any of the German concessions in China.¹²⁷

In Tokyo the now embittered Greene was also sceptical about the prospect of moderating Japanese aspirations by sympathetic and graceful conciliation, and in a

private letter of February 1916 he warned Grey of the inadvisability of "cashing Japan's war credits" before the end of the European conflict.¹²⁸ However, Foreign Office officials who succumbed to anti-Japanese sentiments were not likely to appear either prescient or sagacious to British Cabinet ministers, as both Greene and Ronald Macleay, head of the Far Eastern Department 1917-18 and Balfour's Far Eastern adviser at the Versailles Peace Conference, were to find after the war. "Macleay hates the Japanese", Balfour advised his successor Curzon, in opposing the diplomatist's promotion to the Berlin Embassy; and although he had "found him both loyal and zealous", he "did not, however, see any special signs of diplomatic dexterity".¹²⁹ After Greene's contributions to a Foreign Office Committee report on the Anglo-Japanese Alliance in 1920, which Curzon as Foreign Secretary did not endorse and had confined to reference files, he refused to contemplate Greene's participation in the British delegation to the Washington Conference; nor did he show any enthusiasm about sending Sir John Jordan,¹³⁰ though he recognised that the retired official's unparalleled grasp of China problems and his standing with Chinese officials would make him invaluable in negotiating with the Americans.¹³¹

Historians can only conjecture whether Grey's undeveloped idea of a bargain with Japan was a viable path for Anglo-Japanese relations, just as Burton Beers has speculated on Robert Lansing's equally abortive scheme for a Japanese-American bargain,¹³² but it is abundantly clear that the opposition of British Far Eastern specialists could not have overridden what Cabinet ministers regarded as a broader view of the problem. The opposition of the Government of India was much more formidable, and their intervention in the 1916 debate was decisive. Quite apart from the central importance of India to Britain's worldwide position, a series of historical accidents placed the Government of India in an exceptionally strategic position to influence British wartime policy in the Far East. During Grey's frequent illnesses in 1915, his ministerial role was filled by the Marquis of Crewe, the Secretary of State for India, who in this Foreign Office role played an important part in the 1915 British scheme to bring China into the war: this partly explains how concern for Indian interests was allowed to override the sound misgivings of the Far Eastern specialists.¹³³ On the formation of the first coalition government, Lord Crewe was succeeded at the India Office by Austen Chamberlain, one of the most influential of Conservative ministers. Then in mid-1916, an official with a unique interest in Indian sedition was appointed Permanent Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs. This was Lord Hardinge,¹³⁴ recent Viceroy of India, and the near-victim of the would-be assassin who was now enjoying the protection and patronage of Toyama Mitsuru, with the connivance of the Japanese Government. All of these factors added great weight to the submissions of the Government of India when they entered the debate on British Far Eastern policy with two crucial memoranda in March and May of 1916.¹³⁵

7. ANGLO-INDIAN PERSPECTIVES ON JAPAN

The confidence with which the United Kingdom government viewed the growth of Japanese power within the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, had never been shared by the Government of India: its attitudes to Japan after the Russo-Japanese war more closely paralleled those of Australia and New Zealand. Although the 1905 renewal had provided for the possibility of Japanese military assistance in defending the frontiers of India against possible Russian attack, there appears to be no evidence that the Government of India had been consulted about the insertion of this provision.¹³⁶ At all events Viceroy Minto, after consultation with Lord Kitchener, advised Westminster only one year later that it would not be advisable in the case of hostilities "to employ Japanese troops in or through India", although they were "not, however, prepared to say that this might never be advisable".¹³⁷ In line with this view the General Staff recommended in 1906 that if the deployment of Japanese troops against Russia were required, this should be in the Far East;

to ask for assistance (in India) to ward off a single adversary would not be consistent with either our dignity or our self respect. Such a request on our part would, in fact, be interpreted and not without reason as clear proof of our national decadence and would be highly detrimental, if not absolutely fatal, to our prestige throughout the Asiatic continent.¹³⁸

When the treaty was renewed for the second time in 1911, reference to the security of India was confined to the preamble; and after the events of 1915–16, the Government of India insisted that if the treaty were to be renewed for a third time, all reference to the possibility of Japanese military assistance to British India should be omitted.¹³⁹

During the 1914–18 war, the Government of India strongly opposed two fanciful schemes proposed by British cabinet ministers—the first in late 1915 and the second in late 1917—to invite Japanese military assistance in South-Western Asia. Since the possibility of Japanese acquiescence in these projects was virtually negligible, they are of historical significance mainly because they illustrate the extent to which the British Cabinet deluded itself about Japan's role in the war. This was a delusion of considerable consequence, since the persistent quest for a suitable role for Japanese troops laid the foundations for the determined conviction with which the British promoted the Siberian intervention and the righteous self-justification with which they set out to conceal from the suspicious American president that they, even more than the Japanese, sought American agreement for a limited intervention as the thin end of a wedge to facilitate a large scale deployment of Japanese troops.¹⁴⁰ These 1915 and 1917 proposals also reveal the wide divergence between Cabinet and British Indian attitudes to Japan.

As late as November 1915, despite the Twenty-One Demands, Sir Edward Grey could still suggest that Japanese troops might be sent to garrison the Indian frontier in order to release British troops for service in Mesopotamia.¹⁴¹ The immediate and unanimous reply of India Office officials was that

nothing short of necessity should force us to have recourse to such an expedient which would have the worst effect on our prestige in India . . . The employment of Japanese troops in Persia and Mesopotamia would be only one degree less objectionable and would probably give rise to embarrassing claims by Japan hereafter.¹⁴²

However, the Viceroy was prepared in the exigencies of the war to contemplate asking the Japanese government to provide garrison troops to protect the Suez Canal, an international waterway, the security of which might appeal to Japanese self-interest. This would free British troops in Egypt for active service elsewhere.¹⁴³

At this point the question was decisively shelved by the major crisis in Anglo-Japanese relations caused by Japanese attitudes to the Indian seditionists. Despite this, Lord Curzon revived the question of Japanese assistance in Mesopotamia two years later, in September 1917, when the collapse of the Russian front appeared imminent.¹⁴⁴

However, in the intervening years the attitude of British Indian officials towards the question had considerably hardened. For example, the Political Department of the India Office submitted a memorandum to the Cabinet in May 1916 in which they argued that India might well become ungovernable after the war unless Turkey was decisively defeated by Britain alone.

For Great Britain the war with Turkey can never be a side issue. It is, of course, obvious that by defeating Turkey we have not defeated Germany, whereas if we succeed in defeating Germany, the collapse of Turkish power follows automatically. What is less obvious is why this will not suffice for our purpose. Great Britain is an Asiatic and a Moslem Power, and what makes the war with Turkey rather a separate war than a mere episode in the world war is the fact that we are waging it against another Moslem Power with the rest of the Moslem world

for spectators . . . In India itself the vernacular press is loth to believe Russian victories and loses no opportunities of admiring the feats of Turkish arms. With all these people we shall have to deal after the war, and live with them on terms of moral supremacy. We shall have to govern India itself, where besides the Moslem problem, the fact has to be reckoned with that the educated Hindus, though they have thrown in their lot with us, are not averse to seeing British pride humbled and humbled by an Asiatic power, and to convince the people of India that a handful of white men can still control them . . . We shall have to face in the Far East the ambitions and claims of a highly aggressive Japan, who will reckon thus: the Japanese have beaten the Russians, the Russians have beaten the Turks, the Turks have beaten the British: ergo . . . Until we are in the last ditch there can be no short cut to peace with Turkey. The war with Turkey was thrust upon us precisely because the Germans realised its vital importance to us, and we shall come to serious grief if we attach less importance to it and its ultimate results than they do.¹⁴⁵

The anxiety with which the Government of India regarded Japan after 1905 was not restricted to questions of comparative diplomatic prestige in Asia. No people were more acutely aware of the enormous impetus which Japan's victory over Russia gave to Indian nationalism than the tiny caste of British officials whose authority over 300 millions of Indians had stemmed so largely from their own self-confident sense of superiority and their subjects' resigned acceptance of their inferiority. The characteristic anxiety with which Anglo-Indian officials had regarded every move that Tsarist Russia made in Asia, they now focussed on the Japanese, whose activities in India and attitudes towards India they viewed with increasing suspicion. As early as 1906, according to a history of the Indian nationalist movement written in 1916 by Okawa Shumei, a leading figure in the Black Dragon Society and perhaps the most active Japanese supporter of the Indian revolutionaries, a certain Mr. Harada, "a benevolent Japanese philanthropist who visited India . . . to attend a meeting of the Young Men's Christian Association" received undignified treatment from Indian Government officials because he was suspected of having come to India to advocate Indian independence.¹⁴⁶ This was the forerunner of a series of analogous incidents. Two which became diplomatic issues were the restrictions placed on the movements of Count Otani and Baron Kujo, who visited India in January 1916,¹⁴⁷ and the expulsion from India in early 1919 of Professor Kanokogi Kazunobu, who had gone there in the summer of 1918 ostensibly to study Indian philosophy. Since Kanokogi was known as a Pan-Asianist sympathetic with the objects of the Indian revolutionaries, the Government of India expelled him from the country on the grounds that he had entered Nepal without waiting for permission to cross the frontier.¹⁴⁸

Although some weight should be given to the Government of India's continual rebuttals of Japanese charges of offensive and humiliating treatment of Japanese nationals in India—for the status-conscious Japanese were clearly as oversensitive as the Anglo-Indian officials were over-suspicious—it is clear from the Indian administration's own documents that Japanese were not only subjected to special surveillance but that this was inept and clumsy. The Viceroy reported to the Secretary of State for India

Shortly before the beginning of the war, we very carefully considered the question of initiating a system of contre-espionage on the Japanese in India, and although we had ample reason to believe that there was considerable prying or spying on the part of Japanese nationals we decided against this course for the following main reasons:

- (a) We did not think we could find agents who understood the Japanese sufficiently to keep an efficient watch on them;
- (b) We anticipated that an efficient system of watch on the Japanese in India would be irritating and harmful and likely to bring about incidents which would further strain the relations between the two governments; and

- (c) We considered that a wiser course was to start on higher ground than mere counter-espionage by keeping in touch with the political and commercial happenings in Japan through information supplied to us by His Britannic Majesty's Ambassador at Tokyo, by a careful examination of the Japanese press and other means.¹⁴⁹

This, no doubt, would have been an excellent policy if the alternatives to the creation of an efficient counter-espionage system in India had not included the intensification of inept police surveillance, which often resulted in the very sort of incidents the administration was seeking to avoid. What made ordinary police methods more unsatisfactory was the discriminatory way in which they were applied to the Subjects of Britain's Far Eastern ally. For example, in December 1909, the Japanese Government caused some embarrassment in London by complaining that Japanese residents in India were not treated comparably with European or American residents and by asking that all causes of discrimination (in particular the non-exemption of Japanese from the provisions of the Indian Arms Act) be removed. In its reply the British government believed it had made "a very strong case for adhering to existing practice" since the Japanese government did not pursue the matter.¹⁵⁰

Some of the difficulties in which the Government of India found itself in its attempts to keep itself informed about Japanese activities arose from a parsimony, which was no doubt appropriate to the poverty of India but was quite inconsistent either with the salary scales of the Indian Civil Service or the enormous British stake in India which they believed to be threatened by the Japanese. On the other hand a jealous fear of interference by home government departments in Indian affairs prevented it from making the best use of their specialist services. Until the events of 1915 proved otherwise, the Government of India minimised accumulating evidence from the British consular service that the Indian revolutionary conspiracies could not be effectively countered within the boundaries of India.¹⁵¹ When they did realise the necessity of dealing with the problem through an interdepartmental organisation in co-operation with the Foreign Office, War Office, Colonial Office and Admiralty, the Indian administration rarely took a generous view of the proportion of the costs it should bear. An Indian merchant residing in Yokohama, who was employed by the British consulate in the dangerous work of spying among the Indian revolutionaries in Japan and the Philippines, during two years received only a honorarium of £10 from the Government of India, until Greene's protests extracted another £15n.¹⁵² The Government of India also haggled about their share of the £15,000 paid to the German Secret Service agent, George Vincent Kraft, whose information and services more than any other factor caused all the German-supported conspiracies of 1915 to abort, thereby saving the Indian administration from enormous trouble and expense and considerable bloodshed.¹⁵³ When, in the light of wartime experiences, the Delhi Government decided in 1921 to establish a division of Japanese affairs within its external affairs department (the Political and Foreign Department) they coolly suggested that F. Ashton-Gwatkin, the Foreign Office's principal Japanese expert, might be seconded to the Indian Civil Service to launch the new venture.¹⁵⁴ On being offered a more junior officer from the Japan consular service, they dropped the whole scheme, rather than pay a salary adequate to effect the transfer.¹⁵⁵

Nevertheless, British India as a quasi-dominion did go a great deal further than Australia, for example, towards the goal of acquiring an independent source of information about Japanese affairs and an independent means of assessing this in its own interests. Like Australia, India asked the British Embassy to forward in translation all items in the Japanese press directly affecting its own interests;¹⁵⁶ but the Indian administration went a step beyond this by attracting from commercial employment Captain A. Cardew, a Japanese-speaking ex-army officer, with a Japanese wife, as a special adviser on Japanese affairs.¹⁵⁷ Moreover, the exigencies of the situation required direct communication between the Tokyo Embassy and the Viceroy; and the appointment in December 1915 of David Petrie of the Indian Criminal Intelligence Depart-

ment to head the new inter-departmental intelligence service created to deal with enemy and nationalist conspiracies in the Far East ensured that little of importance was withheld from the Government of India by home government departments.¹⁵⁸ The Indian submissions of 1916 were therefore well-informed and well-documented and certainly merited the serious consideration they received in the Foreign Office.

8. THE 1916 REAPPRAISAL OF BRITISH FAR EASTERN POLICY

The essence of the Home Government's reappraisal of Great Britain's position in the Far East can be found in the Foreign Office commentaries on two papers which Austen Chamberlain, as Secretary of State for India, submitted to Cabinet in May 1916 as one document. The first, entitled *Japanese Activities in China and India*, had been drawn up by the General Staff, and the second, entitled *Japanese Policy and Its Bearing on India*,¹⁵⁹ had been prepared by the India Office. In a lucid analysis, accompanying the General Staff Memorandum, John Duncan Gregory, head of the Far Eastern Department, 1916-17, restated in a more drastic form the doctrine which, as Pelcovits has shown, underlay British China policy in the second half of the nineteenth century.

The integrity and liberty of China is necessary to us on account of the enormous industrial and financial stake which we possess in the country. But in an emergency we could part with all that as incommensurate with the vital issues for which we are prosecuting the war. *Of all our world commitments they are relatively the least important, and we could part with them without courting Imperial disaster.*

Gregory continued, in what was to prove the decisive proviso,

But if the breakup of China and the ensuing intervention of Japan constitutes the danger to India just indicated then it may eventually become necessary to revolutionise our whole Far Eastern policy by means and with what consequences it is impossible to contemplate at this moment without dismay.¹⁶⁰

On the second memorandum, Sir Eric Drummond, Grey's private secretary and later General Secretary of the League of Nations, penned his dissent from this pessimistic view.

I believe that the danger that Japan will ever make China a great military nation is a very doubtful one. It seems to me more likely that Chinese passive resistance will absorb Japanese restlessness. As regards peaceful economic penetration of China by Japan, I doubt whether we should be wise to resist it even if we could. *If we desire to keep on good terms with Japan we must allow her to expand somewhere and China is the one safe place.*

Against this annotation, Grey significantly minuted: "I hold much the same view".¹⁶¹

However Grey's view that the danger to India lay not in a graceful accommodation of Japan's aspirations in China but in resistance to them, did not prevail with the powerful Conservative ministers in the two coalition governments. Lord Robert Cecil, Minister for the Blockade, 1916-18, and acting Foreign Secretary during his cousin Balfour's numerous absences from the Foreign Office, was not contradicted when he advised the Cabinet in May 1917 that

it might be possible to gain Japanese assent to our (proposed) alliance with the United States by adopting Lord Grey's policy of giving Japan a free hand over the whole of China . . . but he personally deprecated this as involving serious dangers to India and to our position generally.¹⁶²

A much fuller statement of this decision had already been conveyed to Greene in a crucial despatch from Balfour on 13 February 1917. Largely penned by Gregory, with a final editing by Sir Walter Langley, the document was annotated by Greene as

“the first exposition of government policy” he had seen since his arrival in Tokyo in 1913.¹⁶³

A general agreement with the Japanese Government about their aims in China has been ruled out as impracticable and dangerous, and so His Majesty's Government are thrown back on the consideration on its merits of each fresh case as it arises . . . The policy of His Majesty's Government towards such measures as Japan has thought fit to take has, as Your Excellency is aware, been one of forced acquiescence—not to obstruct and yet not to offer any concession gratuitously. But notwithstanding an accommodating attitude in the loan and kindred questions, His Majesty's Government are quietly resisting attempts from various quarters to allow the Japanese to get a footing in the industrial undertakings in China in those preserves where their exclusion is considered essential to British political interests, primarily in the provinces bordering India and Thibet, and in the Yangtse Valley . . . Any other policy towards Japan at the moment is clearly out of the question . . . it may indeed be practicable, as Your Excellency suggests, and the Secretary of State for India notices with hope, to safeguard the requirements of India in Thibet and the border provinces without any sacrifice of British interests elsewhere in the Chinese Empire. But, whatever the relative weakness of Japan may be, it is doubtful in the present condition of British political and financial helplessness in the Far East, that His Majesty's Government are secure enough to maintain the existing state of things against any pressure that may suddenly arise. Moreover, it must be realised that, should it be necessary at any time to ask for military and even largely increased naval favours from the Japanese, the price that would have to be paid could only be—as far as it is possible to see—at the expense of British interests in China.

It must indeed be a cardinal point in British policy that, in an extreme case, concessions to Japan could be looked for only in this direction, and not in the direction of India. On this point there can be no compromise, and it is important that no hopes should be held out to Japan of concessions by India, for India will not grant them . . . So long as the war lasts . . . it clearly behoves British policy to steer with the greatest care through the various cross-currents in which the interests of this country, India and Japan are involved. Questions containing the germs of controversy and friction must be avoided so far as is consistent with the requirements of this country for the effective conduct of the war. But at its close it will be without doubt necessary to arrive at distinct understandings as to our own and Japanese interests in the Far East.¹⁶⁴

It was in this spirit of typical British pragmatism that Sir Louis Mallet's C.I.D. sub-committee on territorial changes recommended only that Japan should be assured of diplomatic support in her claims in Shantung and the Northern Pacific;¹⁶⁵ and the British employed their diplomacy not, as Sir Edward Grey envisaged, in a spirit of sympathy towards Japan's problems but to resist or to concede to Japanese encroachments on British imperial interests point by point.

Thus the reappraisal of 1916 led to no major change in the outward character of British Far Eastern policy; but the spirit of Anglo-Japanese relations had been drastically changed by the events of late 1915 and early 1916. Certainly the British Cabinet continued to think of their Japanese ally largely in terms of the spirit of the alliance and remained optimistic that full-scale Japanese intervention in the war could be achieved if only the Allies could present Japan with a suitable role calculated to appeal to the Japanese public—a self-interested illusion which laid the foundations for the essentially British scheme for massive Japanese intervention in Siberia in early 1918.¹⁶⁶ However, the departmental officers charged with dealing with Japan became steadily more antagonistic towards the Japanese. The image of loyal Anglo-Japanese co-operation, sedulously fostered in England by the vigorous press censorship and an unprecedented propaganda campaign—efforts which Lord Northcliffe, who was

officially responsible for propaganda to the enemy, unofficially supported through his mass circulation *Daily Mail* and through the *Times*—was a hypocrisy which Jordan, Greene, and the Far Eastern Department found hard to stomach.

Within the Foreign Office and the India Office officials followed up Crowe's idea of using Japan's economic vulnerability as a weapon to bring her to heel. In Tokyo, although Greene pursued a normal pattern of relations with the Minister of Foreign Affairs as the legitimate and formal spokesman of Japanese policy, a considerable effort was now initiated to make contact with the realities of Japanese political life beneath the Westernised constitutional surface. David Petrie, who had been seconded from the Indian Criminal Intelligence Department to head a newly organised inter-departmental intelligence service for the Far East, was sent to Japan in July 1916 to assist the British vice-consul at Yokohama, C. J. Davidson,¹⁶⁷ one of the ablest and most resourceful Japanese linguists in the service, to build up an intelligence network in Japan. This was initiated with the appointment of Indian agents to work amongst the Indian revolutionaries in Japan and their Japanese supporters but was expanded to employ Japanese agents to make contact with people as highly placed as Baron Goto Shimpei, Minister for the Interior and later Foreign Minister in the Terauchi Government. By January 1918 Greene was calling for a secret service fund large enough to attract first rate agents of Japanese nationality and to provide them with the expense accounts needed to soften up their contacts with lavish dinners and geishas.¹⁶⁸ With singular industry Davidson also undertook the work of supplying the Foreign Office with extensive précis translations of nationalist literature.

The Embassy's newly created secret service was not only successful in supplying the Foreign Office with the information on which to make far better informed calculations of Japanese policies, but it circumscribed the activities of the Indian revolutionaries so well as to progressively neutralise them. Toyama Mitsuru, inspired, perhaps, by his own familiarity with extra-legal expedients, appears to have been convinced that British agents might assassinate or kidnap the revolutionary leaders wanted by the Government of India. To avoid this fate, or more probably to evade British surveillance and help maintain the fiction that only his unknown whereabouts prevented his arrest by the Japanese police, Bose changed his retreat seventeen times between November 1915 and July 1923, when he was granted naturalisation as a Japanese citizen.¹⁶⁹

High officials of the Japanese Ministry of the Interior were sufficiently embarrassed by the secret British activities to threaten Davidson's Japanese agents when they were discovered, and to obstruct their work.¹⁷⁰ On the other hand, with characteristic ambivalence, these high officials appear to have found the British agents a useful channel for attempting to assure the British that the police protection which Rash Behari Bose appeared to enjoy was in reality surveillance and that the Japanese government, far from underwriting Toyama, were attempting to keep a watch on his liaison with the Indian revolutionaries without coming into direct conflict with him.¹⁷¹

These secret British operations in Japan were not without their ludicrous aspects. In the approved style, Petrie's first two Indian agents, code-named P and Q, were ignorant of each other's true position, with the result that Q spent a great deal of his early time spying on P, finally taking up residence with him in order to observe his apparently seditious activities more closely.¹⁷²

9. POST-WAR PERSPECTIVES ON THE WARTIME INDIAN QUESTIONS

Even under the direction of the German Foreign Office and with substantial financial backing from the same source, the ill-organised Indian revolutionary conspiracies were thrown into confusion once a systematic and world-wide intelligence system was created to combat them. British consular or colonial officials in countries with a significant Indian community kept a close watch on inward and outward bound

Indian passengers, and in this way a great many conspirators were identified, questioned and arrested as their ships passed through Singapore and Hong Kong. In addition to their great breaks in 1915 when George Vincent Kraft en route from Berlin to Batavia arranged his own arrest at Singapore in order to sell his services to the British¹⁷³ and the similar defection to the consul-general in Batavia of a less important German agent code-named "Oren", British intelligence succeeded in infiltrating agents into the conspirators' ranks—even into the relevant section of the German Foreign Office, and they were about to infiltrate the German Legation in Peking when China's diplomatic rupture with Germany in March 1917 forestalled the necessity.¹⁷⁴

After the failures of 1915, the German Foreign Office, according to the reports of British agents, reached the conclusion that a rebellion in India could not be sparked off without extensive Japanese assistance. Thus after their failure in 1916 to purchase Japan's withdrawal from the war directly, the Germans concentrated on trying to secure official Japanese support for the growing assistance which the Japanese nationalists were already giving to the Indian revolutionaries and to co-ordinate this with the general schemes engineered by the Indian committee in Berlin. To further these aims they sent Taraknath Das, perhaps the ablest publicist among the revolutionaries, from Berlin to the Far East in mid 1916. Taraknath Das was no stranger to Japan having studied there in 1905–6 after fleeing from India; and despite the efforts of British diplomacy he had subsequently acquired a valuable shield for his revolutionary activities by successfully seeking naturalisation as an American citizen.¹⁷⁵ Although he did not achieve the principal aim of his Far Eastern mission of 1916–17, he was much more successful than his colleagues in presenting the Indian revolutionary cause in the context of Japan's national interests. One of his pamphlets, *The Isolation of Japan in World Politics*, which was translated into Japanese by Okawa Shumei, made such an impact, particularly on high-ranking Japanese officers, that the government officially suppressed it, yet failed to prevent it being distributed privately.¹⁷⁶ Taraknath Das also established more direct relations with the governing élite of Japan than had the resident Indian revolutionaries who had been obliged to work through intermediaries like Okawa and Toyama.

Despite this, most Japanese who were nominally responsible for the direction of Japanese policy were most careful not to become enmeshed in the German-directed schemes and careful to tolerate or encourage Japanese support for the Indian revolutionaries at an unofficial level only. Not only did the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs frequently promise Greene remedial action (which, however, never materialised) but Davidson's agents were unable to draw from Japanese statesmen more than expressions of sympathy for the Indian nationalist cause and assurances of good offices on a long term basis. British Indian agents failed to establish that the Marquis Okuma did more than acquiesce in the pressure put on him by Toyama and Inukai to save Bose, while "Panax", one of Davidson's agents of Japanese nationality, elicited only annoyance from Baron Goto Shimpei when he tried to sound him on the subject of Indian independence. Goto sharply rebuked "Panax" for a foolish interest in the activities of the Indians, for whom the Minister expressed contempt, saying that the German-supported schemes would all come to naught since the Government of India had the situation well in hand.¹⁷⁷

Combined with a cautious reluctance to become committed to a nationalist movement for which neither the diplomatic situation nor domestic Indian conditions augured well for direct Japanese initiative at this stage was a growing apprehension of the effect that the anarchistic ideas of the Indian revolutionaries might have on their Japanese supporters. For a motive not discoverable to Davidson, Agent "P" was approached by a man who identified himself as a Japanese Secret Service agent (but gave no indication of whether he believed "P" to be a disaffected Indian or knew his real role) and told him that the Japanese government had become greatly concerned that Toyama's association with socialistic-anarchistic elements in the Indian revolutionary party might have dangerous repercussions in Japan itself.¹⁷⁸

Yet despite these crosscurrents in official attitudes to the Indian revolutionaries, the Japanese Government found itself in 1919 unable to sacrifice the life of Rash Behari Bose even to avert an unequivocal threat by the Government of India of economic retaliation. Of course the Japanese may well have calculated that in the not too distant future the Indian administration would enact discriminatory legislation against Japanese commerce, whether Bose were surrendered or not, in which case acquiescence in the British demand would be a useless sacrifice. Nevertheless, in a diplomatic situation where Japan was now far more enthusiastic about renewing the Anglo-Japanese Alliance than was Great Britain, the Japanese Government was much more troubled by the renewed British demand than they had been during the war. In fact, in January 1919 a British agent of Japanese nationality, code-named A.15, was approached by a high official of the metropolitan police named Oshio, whose duty it was to watch over foreigners, and asked what the Government of India reward for the surrender of Bose was. A.15 said that it was 8,000 yen (£800), which was payable only if Bose were handed over to competent British officials in the British dominions or in China. Oshio said that it would be difficult to arrange rendition but possible if some British official gave a guarantee that the reward would be paid, and he asked for a down payment immediately.¹⁷⁹ A few days later he presented a concrete demand for 100,000 yen (£10,000) to keep A.15 fully informed of the doings of Rash Behari Bose and of his friends and also supply copies of correspondence. He added that he would not undertake to do this for a smaller sum as it would involve him in great personal danger and might at any time necessitate his leaving Japan for good; and he repeated that the question of the rendition of Bose was a far more serious matter than A.15 supposed.¹⁸⁰ A few days later the British commercial attaché was visited at his home by Oshio's younger brother, "a dissolute and somewhat disreputable person who claimed to have been educated at Eton and Cambridge and spoke English with great fluency."¹⁸¹ He repeated his brother's offer and "remarked somewhat inconsequently but very significantly that he himself was very well acquainted with both the Marquis Okuma and Baron Goto."¹⁸²

From these negotiations it would appear that the extradition of Bose might have been effected on an unofficial basis for a very large sum of money—more than the British were willing to pay. If in this case the British had any ethical objections to securing Bose through irregular channels, they had certainly had no such scruples in 1916 when Sir Edward Grey had authorised an attempt by the China consular service to kidnap Bhagwan Singh from within the quasi-neutral Austrian concession in Tientsin: "I leave it entirely to your discretion whether it is safe to embark on any form of kidnapping enterprise."¹⁸³

In 1919, however, the surrender of Bose had become less important in itself than as a symbolic gesture of Japanese repudiation of the Indian revolutionary cause and repentance for their wartime attitudes.

For their part the Japanese Government completely dropped the pretence they had maintained for three years since Bose and Gupta first disappeared into Toyama's house in 1915 while the police charged with carrying out a deportation order waited outside either through great awe of Toyama or, as later reported by British Indian agents, because of a secret instruction from the Premier, Marquis Okuma.¹⁸⁴ Now, in 1919, the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, with apparent candour, insisted that although Bose was a great embarrassment to the Government, his delivery to a British executioner would place senior Japanese statesmen and officials in great danger of assassination by Toyama's henchmen.¹⁸⁵ Such an extraordinary admission of the unconstitutional power of a ruthless nationalist leader was regarded somewhat sceptically by the British. Though willing to admit that Toyama's society would stop at nothing, their own information led them to believe that the society's support had been so undermined by post-war conditions that they could be persuaded by a sufficiently large financial inducement from the Japanese Government to sell out their Indian protégés. In support of this view was the statement made in August 1918 by

N. Oshima, Director of the Secretariat of the Superintendent-General of the Metropolitan Police, to British agent A.5. Oshima said that the Shina Ronin¹⁸⁶ were not by any means the most important factor in this question, as they could always be squared by the payment of a few thousand yen to Toyama Mitsuru, Uchida Ryohei, and a few others. The real difficulty, he said, lay in the fact that a certain section of the Government as well as a number of influential persons outside the Government, were strongly of the opinion that Japan's best interests would not be served in the long run by deporting Rash Behari. On the other hand, he added, there was a strong party both in the government and outside who were convinced that Japan was making a great mistake in protecting him in defiance of the order of deportation which was still in force against him.¹⁸⁷ Since this statement was so consistent with the whole wartime record of official equivocation on the Indian seditionist issue, the British could only suppose that many senior Japanese statesmen and officials were afraid of the incriminating revelations Bose might make in revenge if he were brought to trial in India. In fact, Davidson believed that high-ranking Japanese whom Bose might implicate would probably arrange to have him murdered if the Japanese Government did not resist the British pressure for his extradition.¹⁸⁸

At all events Toyama, who had arranged Bose's marriage in 1918 to Soma Toshiko, daughter of Soma Aizo, who had originally concealed the fugitive in the loft of his bakery, secured the would-be assassin of Viceroy Hardinge Japanese citizenship in 1922.¹⁸⁹ In growing isolation from the main stream of Indian history, Bose remained in Japan for the rest of an increasingly frustrated life, brightened only at its close by his figurehead status in the Japanese sponsored Indian National Liberation Army.¹⁹⁰

Although the Government of India thus failed to secure what Greene and then Alston in Tokyo were instructed to regard as a major objective of British policy, they nevertheless did secure in the short run the objectives of which the desired extradition of Bose had become more symbolic than important in itself. Despite the fresh wave of unrest in India, the Korean rebellion and American support for Chinese nationalism so turned the tables on the Japanese that their ambassador in London felt obliged in 1919 to suffer what amounted to a series of condescending lectures from the imperious Lord Curzon, during which the Foreign Secretary warned that if Japanese policies in Korea were not moderated the British government would find it impossible to prevent an outburst of public hostility towards Japan in Great Britain.¹⁹¹ In these circumstances it is not surprising that the hitherto copious Foreign Office files on Japanese relations with the Indian seditionists dwindled to a few pages in the early nineteen twenties.¹⁹² However, as part of a tacit bargain with Japan, the Foreign Office made it plain to English sympathisers that the question of Korean independence had been settled finally in 1910 and that the activities of Syngman Rhee and the expatriate Korean nationalists would meet with official British discouragement.

As a result the Government of India's day of reckoning with Japan, anticipated from the early days of 1916, did not materialise. Not only did the Government of India find it unnecessary to contemplate economic warfare with Japan because of vastly improved Japanese policies towards the Indian revolutionaries, but it was able to use Japan's failure to surrender Bose as an excuse for restrictive legislation aimed at halting Japanese economic penetration of India. Although this was thinly disguised as a measure against all foreign ownership of Indian resources, the threats of Greene and Alston must have left the Japanese in no doubt that the restrictions were directed against them.

What is most significant about the Anglo-Indian attitude to Japanese inroads into the Indian economy is that Japanese competition was resented as soon as it made a small dint in the virtual British monopoly. When the statistics with which the Government of India supported their plaintiff memorandum of March 1916 are examined, it is found that Japan's percentage of India's import trade rose from 2.6 per cent in 1913-14 to 5.6 per cent in 1915-16, while that of the British Empire fell almost in correspondence from 74.4 per cent to 70.6 per cent. Although the more detailed figures

show that some British firms and some industries were affected more severely than the general index suggests, nevertheless it is clear that the British strongly resented losing even a small share of their Indian preserve. In the shipping trade, where the British complaint about Japan was loudest, the statistics in the sequel memorandum of 1919 show the real British grievance to be that "while in 1912-13 less than one half of the trade between India and Japan was carried in Japanese bottoms . . . by 1918-1919 more than 85 per cent of the trade with Japan was carried by Japanese vessels."¹⁹³ The fact that Japan's proportion of the sea carriage between India and countries other than Japan rose from about one fifth of one per cent in 1912-13 to something like 6 per cent in 1918-19 moved the Government of India to complain that "they have also secured a very firm hold on the trade between India and other countries."¹⁹⁴

Aware, no doubt, that their supporting statistics scarcely bore the complexion of their general observations, the Government of India laid their main stress on the political implications of Japanese economic expansion into the Indian sphere:

Apart from the purely industrial issue we cannot regard it as other than undesirable that the Japanese should establish themselves on any large scale in this country. In fact to the political aspect of the question we attach the utmost importance. The prestige of Japan is great and her ambitions unbounded. A systematic commercial penetration may well be the precursor of wider schemes, the execution of which may not be imminent, but against which it is well to be forewarned. Her national design is to dominate the East and whatever be the sentiments of Indians towards her at the moment, the role of champion of the East against the West is sure to evoke a response in an Oriental country. We have had recent instances of the Indian revolutionary party counting on Japanese sympathy, and apparently not altogether in vain. For the acquisition of a strong commercial footing as a preliminary in the exercise of political influence there are many precedents, and in a country like India it is far easier for the Japanese to pursue their machinations unnoticed than it would be for any European power.¹⁹⁵

This was written in March 1916 before the full story of Japan's relations with the Indian revolutionaries had unfolded. Naturally the memorandum of December 1919 laid even greater stress on political factors:

. . . side by side with these developments there has sprung up in India a growing Japanese population. The political importance of these results cannot be over-estimated. The number of Japanese nationals in India may be insignificant among a population of over three hundred millions, but to ignore them on this ground would imply neglect of the lessons of the past.¹⁹⁶

Justified by the Japanese Government's refusal to surrender Bose even under threats of Indian retaliation, the Government of India initiated legislation which would enable them to

preclude foreigners except under licence from acquiring the ownership of any immoveable property or any interest therein conferring a title to possession of for a period exceeding seven years.¹⁹⁷

Although the legislation was non-discriminatory in the sense that it embraced all foreigners, India Office and Foreign Office documents made it quite plain that it was directed specifically against the Japanese:

. . . It is beyond question that the Japanese are making deliberate efforts to capture the trade of southern India and also to establish their own industries in this country. To fulfil this object they will be obliged to obtain a permanent footing in the country by acquiring land. We have thus been led to consider not only whether the Japanese should be allowed to develop their plans for exploiting the resources of India for the benefit of their own nation, but also whether there are not political objections to their obtaining a permanent footing in the country by acquiring land without restriction. The policy pursued by the Germans in Turkey,

Russia and elsewhere before the war has shown how it is possible for a foreign people to exploit the resources of a country of which they have not the political control. In India it is obvious that dangers might arise in the event of an outbreak of war if important minerals such as coal and oil were controlled by aliens. There is also, in our opinion, a certain risk that settlements established primarily for trade may become centres of anti-British or seditious propaganda and possible rallying points for the disaffected in the case of serious internal disorder. The presence of increasing numbers of Japanese settlements in India, even if not agreeable to Indian opinion itself, may at least be expected to encourage the sentiment of Asia for the Asiatic, and to that extent strengthen the opposition to the British government in India. We have indeed recently received some information, though not of a very definite character, that certain Japanese residents in southern India are spreading anti-British propaganda among Indians and making little secret of the fact that their purchases of land are a cloak to their policy of acquiring control of this country . . .

There is evidence that the Japanese are collecting detailed information regarding certain of our ports which would be useful for the purpose of naval intelligence, and it is not impossible that they will attempt to establish themselves permanently at strategic points along our coast and in the neighbourhood of our coaling stations . . .¹⁹⁸

It can never be known whether less obstructive policies towards Japanese economic expansion into areas of Asia where Britain had longstanding and prior vested interests would have modified or encouraged the Japanese attitude that British political control was choking Japan's economic growth. However, it is clear that the policy of the Government of India considered above was also the policy of the British administration in Malaya, which enacted wartime regulations to prevent Japanese investors buying Malayan rubber plantations at a time when British capital had to be channelled into war purposes;¹⁹⁹ and indeed a good deal of the British enthusiasm for the independence and territorial integrity of China arose from the fact that British interests were so firmly entrenched in the *status quo* as to give them a kind of quasi-protection against newer commercial competitors. Under these circumstances, it was inevitable that the feeling should spread in Japan that the destruction of British imperialism in Asia was essential. This sentiment was nicely expressed in a booklet written in 1916 by Okawa Shumei and distributed among the Japanese governing élite. Its first chapter was devoted to an attack on British India's policy towards Japanese commerce and Japanese visitors; and its title was prophetic: *Japan and England Must Collide*.²⁰⁰

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BIOGRAPHICAL APPENDIX

This appendix is not intended to be a comprehensive biographical gazetteer of all persons mentioned in the text. It simply incorporates some background material which could not be incorporated in the main body of the paper but was conveniently separable from the mass of reference footnotes.

ASHTON-GWATKIN, Frank Trelawney Arthur (b. 1889) began his career as a student interpreter in the Japan consular service in 1913. Rising in the service during the war years, he was seconded in April 1918 to the intelligence division of the G.O.C. Singapore to investigate Japanese activities in Malaya. After a further period as a language officer in Japan, he returned to the Foreign Office to assist in the preparations for a Far Eastern settlement, in which capacity he was the author of a great many of the memoranda on all aspects of Far Eastern questions which the Foreign Office prepared in 1920-21. He accompanied Balfour to Washington in October 1921 as the British specialist on Japan.

CROWE, E. T. F. (b. 1877) began his career as a student interpreter in the consular service in Japan in 1897, becoming commercial attaché at the Embassy in 1906 and commercial counsellor in 1918.

ELIOT, Sir Charles Norman Edgecumbe (1862-1931), after a varied career in the diplomatic service from 1887 to 1904, resigned to become Vice-Chancellor of the new University of Sheffield, 1905-11, and the new University of Hong Kong, 1912-18. He was a linguist and orientalist of considerable distinction. His most important work was a three volume study of Hinduism and Buddhism published in 1921, and he spent part of his relatively quiet term as Ambassador in Tokyo from 1920-26 collecting material for his standard study *Japanese Buddhism*, published posthumously in 1935. Since he had not experienced the great difficulties in Anglo-Japanese relations from 1913 to 1918 and was known to be well disposed towards the Japanese, Balfour recalled him from retirement in the Spring of 1918 to undertake the delicate task of coordinating Anglo-Japanese policies in Siberia as British High Commissioner in Vladivostock. Jordan reported "as a strange trait of his character" that on receiving the news while he was on a visit to Peking of his appointment to this position, "he went the same afternoon to the Temple of Heaven to return thanks" (Jordan to Langley, private letter of 14 August 1918; F.O. 350/16). Of all British officials involved in post-war Anglo-Japanese relations Eliot was clearly the most sympathetic towards the Japanese and appears to have been appointed to the Tokyo Embassy in 1920 for this reason. This enabled the Foreign Secretary, Lord Curzon, to present Eliot's views on the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance to Cabinet in May 1921, and to the Imperial Conference in June 1921, as Foreign Office specialist opinion, whereas Eliot appears to have been the only Foreign service official with specialist experience of Far Eastern affairs who thoroughly supported the Cabinet line.

JORDAN, Sir John Newell (1852-1925) began his long Far Eastern career as a student interpreter in the China consular service in 1876. From 1896 to 1906 he was successively Consul-general, Chargé d'affaires, and Minister in Seoul. From 1906 to 1920, when he retired, he was Minister in Peking. He emerged from retirement in 1922 to make his incomparable expertise available to the British Empire delegation at the Washington Conference.

MACLEAY, Sir James William Ronald (1870-1943) had a typical foreign service career in other parts of the world until he was appointed Counsellor at the Peking Legation in February 1914. In September 1916 he was brought back to London to head the Foreign Office's Far Eastern Department. He was Foreign Secretary Balfour's principal Far Eastern expert at the Versailles Peace Conference in 1919. After two years as Minister to the Argentine 1920-22, he returned to the Peking Legation as Minister (1922-26).

OKAWA, Shumei (1886–1957) later ranked with Kita Ikki as one of the most influential radical nationalists of the inter-war period. His political career is described in R. Storry, *The Double Patriots: A Study of Japanese Nationalism* (London, 1957).

REINSCH, Paul Samuel (1869–1923) was born in Milwaukee, Wisconsin. He received a Ph.D. from the University of Wisconsin in 1898, and held the position of Lecturer in Political Science there from 1898 to 1913. He lectured at the Universities of Leipzig and Berlin in 1911 and 1912. He was Minister to China from 1913 to 1919.

TOYAMA, Mitsuru (1855–1944). The political career of this supremely important Japanese nationalist cannot be captured adequately in biographical detail because of its peculiarly Japanese backstage character. Probably the best account to date in English is in M. Jansen, *The Japanese and Sun Yat Sen*.

WELLESLEY, Victor Alexander Augustus Henry (b. 1876) had had a desk career in the Foreign Office and had never served in the Far East. Nevertheless his former position as Controller of Commercial and Consular Affairs had kept him continuously briefed on developments in China.

FOOTNOTES

- ¹Langley to Greene, 24 May 1917; F.O. 371/2953; f. 10230/p.p. 102791.
- ²Jordan to Langley, private letter, 14 March 1916; Jordan Papers; F.O. 350/15; p. 43.
- ³Jordan to Macleay, private letter, 24 October 1918; Jordan Papers; F.O. 350/16; p. 89.
- ⁴House of Commons Debates, 7 June 1921; CXL II, 1681, Col. 1.
- ⁵Marius B. Jansen, *The Japanese and Sun Yat-sen* (Cambridge, Mass.: 1954); F. H. Conroy, *The Japanese Seizure of Korea, 1868-1910* (Philadelphia: 1960).
- ⁶F.O. 371/8046; f. 1994/205/23.
- ⁷Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, 2 December 1918; F.O. 371/3426; f. 327/p.p. 202333.
- ⁸D. K. Dignan, "Australia and British Relations with Japan, 1914-1921", in *Australian Outlook*, Vol. 21, No. 2 (August 1967).
- ⁹v. Appendix.
- ¹⁰Minute by Macleay, 12 December 1918; F.O. 371/3191; f. 174540/p.p. 993822.
- ¹¹A full transcript of this trial, which occupied 80 court days and cost the United States \$35,000 in shorthand reporting alone is available in the India Office Library. For an account of the conspiracy in America based on the court report and the files of the "San Francisco Examiner" see Giles T. Brown, "The Hindu Conspiracy, 1914-1917", *Pacific Historical Review*, XVII (1948), 299-310.
- ¹²v. Appendix.
- ¹³MI 1a to F.O., 6 February 1918; MI 5 to F.O., 21 March 1918; F.O. 371/3423; f. 327/p.p. 51422
- ¹⁴v. Appendix.
- ¹⁵Jordan to Balfour, Des. 474, 23 October 1918; F.O. 371/3191; f. 175334/p.p. 205337; Jordan to Balfour, Tel. 928, 11 November 1918; *ibid.*; Jordan to Balfour, Des. 564, 23 December 1918; F.O. 405/226; Pr. 16.
- ¹⁶Minute by Macleay, 12 December 1918; F.O. 371/3191; f. 174540/p.p. 993822. (Italicization in all quotations has been inserted by present writer.)
- ¹⁷*Ibid.*
- ¹⁸v. R. G. Neale, *Britain and American Imperialism, 1898-1900* (St. Lucia, University of Queensland Press: 1965).
- ¹⁹Memorandum by B. Alston, 1 February 1915; F.O. 410/64; Pr. 27.
- ²⁰Minute by J. D. Gregory, 9 May 1917; F.O. 371/2907; p.p. 86985.
- ²¹War Cabinet Minutes, 5 February 1917; Cab. 23/4.
- ²²v. A. W. Griswold, *The Far Eastern Policy of the United States* (New York: 1958), pp. 210-11.
- ²³War Cabinet Minutes, 31 May 1917 (Minute 10.); Cab. 23/4.
- ²⁴F.O. 371/2329; f. 39005.
- ²⁵v. Appendix.
- ²⁶Minute by Alston, 1 December 1914; F.O. 371/2021; f. 69679/p.p. 77210.
- ²⁷Jordan to Lampson, 16 February 1921; F.O. 371/6671; F 597/63/23.
- ²⁸P. S. Reinsch, *A Diplomat in China* (New York: 1923).
- ²⁹However, no British publication appears to have portrayed the Japanese ally in such a rosy light as did the ex-French Ambassador to Tokyo, A. Gérard, in his *Nos Alliés d'Extrême Orient* (Paris: 1918).
- ³⁰The assistance of Japan was sought to protect British shipping from the attacks of German raiders although no such attacks had taken place.
- ³¹Sir Eyre Crowe to Churchill, 11 July 1921; F.O. 410/71; F 2652/2652/23; Pr. 33.
- ³²Cabinet Minutes, 30 May 1921; Cab. 23/5.
- ³³*Ibid.*
- ³⁴*Ibid.*
- ³⁵v. Appendix.
- ³⁶v. Appendix.
- ³⁷Memorandum by V. Wellesley, 7 June 1921; F.O. 371/6699; f. 1823/p.p. 1823.
- ³⁸v. Appendix.
- ³⁹General Ridout (Singapore) to D.M.I., 22 December 1917; F.O. 371/3069; f. 1220/p.p. 244302.
- ⁴⁰Minute by F. Ashton-Gwatkin, 2 June 1921; F.O. 371/6699; f. 1823/p.p. 1823.
- ⁴¹Jordan to Balfour, Tel. 1026, 26 December 1918; F.O. 371/3191; f. 211785/p.p. 211785.
- ⁴²Jordan to Langley, private letter, 29 May 1918; F.O. 371/3191; f. 214187/p.p. 214187.
- ⁴³Greene to Grey, Des. 485, 26 September 1916; F.O. 410/65; Pr. 78.
- ⁴⁴Cab. 5/3; C.I.D., 109 C.
- ⁴⁵"Strategic Situation in the Event of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance Being Determined", 3 May 1911; Cab. 5/3; C.I.D., 78 C.
- ⁴⁶*Ibid.*
- ⁴⁷"Strategic Situation in the Event of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance Being Determined", June 1921; Cab. 5/4; C.I.D., 144 C.
- ⁴⁸"Reserves of Oil Fuel on the Eastern Route", Cab. 5/4; C.I.D., 175 C.
- ⁴⁹"Empire Naval Policy and Cooperation", February 1921; Cab. 5/4; C.I.D., 131 C.
- ⁵⁰"Singapore: Development of As a Naval Base", 7 June 1921; Cab. 5/4; C.I.D., 143 C.
- ⁵¹"The Defence of Hong Kong": Memorandum by the Secretary of State for War, 3 February 1920; Cab. 5/3.
- ⁵²Cabinet Minutes, 30 May 1921; Cab. 23/5.
- ⁵³Minutes of Imperial War Cabinet, 14 August 1918; Minute 7; Cab. 23/7.

- ⁵⁴Minutes of Imperial War Cabinet, 15 August 1918; Minute 9; Cab. 23/7.
- ⁵⁵"Policy in View of Russian Developments": Memorandum by Lord Curzon, 12 May 1917; Cab. 24/12; G.T. 703.
- ⁵⁶*Ibid.*
- ⁵⁷v. Appendix.
- ⁵⁸Crowe to Greene, 30 December 1916; in Greene to Grey, Des. 676 of 30 December 1916; F.O. 371/2951; f. 31166/p.p. 31166.
- ⁵⁹Minute by Foreign Office Commercial Department, 22 January 1917; F.O. 371/2950; f. 9266/p.p. 16546.
- ⁶⁰Spring-Rice (Washington) to Balfour, Tel. 2241, 3 August 1917; F.O. 371/2954; f. 153795/p.p. 153795.
- ⁶¹Minute by Gregory, 16 January 1917; F.O. 371/2950; f. 9174/p.p. 9174.
- ⁶²Greene to Balfour, Tel. 155, 3 April 1919; F.O. 371/4233; f. 117/p.p. 53741.
- ⁶³M. B. Jansen, *The Japanese and Sun Yat-sen* (Cambridge, Mass.: 1954).
- ⁶⁴Memorandum by B. Alston, 1 February 1915; F.O. 410/64; Pr. 27.
- ⁶⁵*Ibid.*
- ⁶⁶*Ibid.*
- ⁶⁷China Association to Foreign Office, 24 February 1915; F.O. 410/64; Pr. 79.
- ⁶⁸Memorandum by B. Alston, 1 February 1915; F.O. 410/64; Pr. 27.
- ⁶⁹Jordan to Grey, Tel. 144 B, 9 August 1914; F.O. 371/2016; f. 35445/p.p. 37505.
- ⁷⁰Minute by Sir Eyre Crowe, 10 August 1914; F.O. 371/2016; f. 35445/p.p. 37507.
- ⁷¹Greene to Grey, private letter of 22 August 1915; F.O. 800/88.
- ⁷²Asquith to George V, 7 May 1915; Cab. 37/128/4.
- ⁷³Government of India to Secretary of State, Montagu, 5 February 1919; F.O. 371/4243; f. 117/57 3.
- ⁷⁴Marquis of Crewe to F.O., 3 February 1914; F.O. 371/2010; f. 730/p.p. 6303.
- ⁷⁵Lord Inchcape, British India S.N.C. to F.O., 18 May 1914; F.O. 371/2010; f. 730/p.p. 22390.
- ⁷⁶Baron Kondo, Nippon Yusen Kaisha to Lord Inchcape, 12 August 1914; F.O. 371/2010; f. 7 0/p.p. 43774.
- ⁷⁷Board of Trade to Foreign Office, 24 July 1914; F.O. 371/2010; f. 730/p.p. 33701.
- ⁷⁸Greene to Grey, Tel. 133, 9 September 1914; F.O. 371/2010; f. 730/p.p. 43774.
- ⁷⁹Foreign Office to India Office, 27 August 1914; F.O. 371/2010; p.p. 43774.
- ⁸⁰Langley, F. O. to Lord Inchcape, 29 September 1914; F.O. 371/2010; f. 730/p.p. 52911.
- ⁸¹Foreign Office to India Office, 27 August 1914; f. 730/p.p. 43774.
- ⁸²*Ibid.*
- ⁸³"The Indian Brief Against Japan", F.O. 371/4243; f. 117/p.p. 57123.
- ⁸⁴Admiralty to F.O., 27 April 1916; F.O. 371/2692; f. 49311/p.p. 79523.
- ⁸⁵Government of India to Secretary of State, Austen Chamberlain, 31 March 1916; Cab. 37/148.
- ⁸⁶Greene to Jordan, 20 June 1914; F.O. 228/2299.
- ⁸⁷General Ridout (Singapore) to War Office, 13 November 1917; F.O. 371/3235; f. 13287/p.p. 13287.
- ⁸⁸Intelligence Notes from M. Tsukuda, *From Nanyo* (Tokyo: 1916); F.O. 371/3235; f. 13287/p.p. 162153.
- ⁸⁹Viceroy to India Office, 6 March 1915; F.O. 371/2387; f. 31603/p.p. 31603.
- ⁹⁰A comprehensive survey of the Indian revolutionary movement was attempted in a final honours thesis presented to the University of Queensland in 1967; Mary Varghese, "Militant Nationalism: A Study of the Indian Revolutionary Movement, 1885-1921".
- ⁹¹Report of the East India Sedition Committee; Cmd. 9190, 1918.
- ⁹²Sir Michael O'Dwyer, *India as I Knew It* (London: 1925).
- ⁹³J. G. Ohsawa, *The Two Great Indians in Japan* (Calcutta: 1954), p. 4.
- ⁹⁴F.O. 371/2387; f. 29003.
- ⁹⁵v. Appendix.
- ⁹⁶Greene to Grey, Des. 5, 5 January 1916; F.O. 371/2784; p.p. 31444.
- ⁹⁷The Pan-Asian outlook of Inukai Ki is discussed in Jansen, *op. cit.* As Premier in 1932, Inukai Ki was assassinated because of his attempts to subordinate the army to civilian control.
- ⁹⁸As Minister for Foreign Affairs Okuma was in the process of renegotiating the unequal treaties with Britain and France when news of concessions he had had to make leaked out and led to the attempt to assassinate him.
- ⁹⁹Greene to Grey, Des. 391, 8 December 1915; F.O. 410/220; Pr. 17.
- ¹⁰⁰F.O. 371/2341-2342; f. 167912.
- ¹⁰¹*Ibid.*
- ¹⁰²F.O. 371/2332; f. 60715.
- ¹⁰³F.O. 371/2342; f. 167912.
- ¹⁰⁴Greene to Grey, Des. 56, 14 February 1916; F.O. 405/220; Pr. 116.
- ¹⁰⁵The best published account of the anti-British press campaign is to be found in F. A. Coleman, *The Far East Unveiled: An Inner History of Events in China and Japan in the Year 1916* (London: 1918). Coleman was commissioned by the *Melbourne Herald* to find out what was happening in the Far East beneath the veil of an Australian censorship which was so severe that a Labour member of parliament was prosecuted for publicising Japan's Twenty-One Demands in the anti-conscription campaign.

- ¹⁰⁶F.O. 371/2388; f. 58208/p.p. 65118.
- ¹⁰⁷F.O. 371/2690; f. 26193.
- ¹⁰⁸F.O. 371/3234; f. 6083.
- ¹⁰⁹Vice-Admiral W. L. Grant succeeded Vice-Admiral Sir T. H. M. Jerram as Commander-in-Chief, China Station on 24 September 1915. As a result of an informal agreement to leave the patrol of the northern areas of Far Eastern waters to the Japanese navy, British naval headquarters had been transferred from Hong Kong to Singapore.
- ¹¹⁰Grant to Admiralty, General Letter No. 5, 16 December 1915; Adm. 125/63.
- ¹¹¹*Laurentic* log, February, March 1916; Adm. 53/46288-46289.
- ¹¹²Greene to Grey, Des. 557, 26 October 1916; F.O. 371/2791; f. 211/p.p. 247574; Governor Hong Kong to Colonial Secretary rcd. 15 January 1917; F.O. 371/3065; f. 1220/p.p. 55935.
- ¹¹³Grey to Greene, Des. 77, 13 March 1916; F.O. 410/65; Pr. 47.
- ¹¹⁴v. Appendix.
- ¹¹⁵Grey to Greene, Tel. 142, 5 April 1916; F.O. 410/65; Pr. 65.
- ¹¹⁶Government of India to India Office, 13 July 1916; F.O. 371/2648; f. 856/p.p. 164152.
- ¹¹⁷Minute by Grey, 16 February 1916; F.O. 371/2647; f. 50/p.p. 30061.
- ¹¹⁸Greene to Balfour, 27 January 1917; F.O. 410/66; Pr. 4.
- ¹¹⁹Cab. 24/3; G-118.
- ¹²⁰F.O. 371/2647; f. 50/p.p. 20152.
- ¹²¹Grey to Jordan, Tel. 30 K, 11 February 1916; F.O. 371/2647; f. 50/p.p. 20152.
- ¹²²Jordan to Grey, Tel. 68 K, 15 February 1916; f. 50/p.p. 30061.
- ¹²³Grey to Greene, Tel. 53, 11 February 1916; F.O. 405/220; Pr. 89; Draft telegram dated 7 July 1916 to Jordan in Grey Papers; F.O. 800/44.
- ¹²⁴Alston to Langley, private letter, 6 August 1917; F.O. 800/30; p. 847.
- ¹²⁵Alston to Sir Eric Drummond (Grey's private secretary) private letter, 16 August 1916; F.O. 800/30.
- ¹²⁶V. Wellesley, "Memorandum Respecting Shantung", p. 333; F.O. 410/71; F 4199/132/10; Pr. 185.
- ¹²⁷F.O. 371/3186; f. 34931/p.p. 34931.
- ¹²⁸Greene to Grey, private letter, 8 January 1916; F.O. 800/88.
- ¹²⁹Balfour to Curzon, 20 September 1919; Balfour Papers, Add. 49734, Vol. LIV (provisional classification, 1966).
- ¹³⁰Minute by Curzon, 25 August 1921; F.O. 371/6705; f. 2905/p.p. 3376.
- ¹³¹Minute by Curzon, 22 August 1921; *ibid.*
- ¹³²Burton F. Beers, *Vain Endeavour: Robert Lansing's Attempts to End the American-Japanese Rivalry* (Durham, N.C.: 1962).
- ¹³³F.O. 371/2341-2; f. 167912.
- ¹³⁴v. Appendix.
- ¹³⁵"Secret Despatch . . . on the subject of Japanese competition in Indian trade", March 1916; "Japanese Policy in its Bearing on India", May 1916; Cab. 37/148.
- ¹³⁶I. H. Nish, *The Anglo-Japanese Alliance, the Diplomacy of Two Island Empires, 1894-1907* (London: 1966), p. 318.
- ¹³⁷*Op. cit.*, p. 354.
- ¹³⁸*Ibid.*
- ¹³⁹Government of India to Secretary of State, Austen Chamberlain, 4 May 1917; F.O. 410/66; Pr. 22, encl.
- ¹⁴⁰Recent histories of the Far East neither list nor appear to have taken account of the thesis in Richard H. Ullman, *Anglo-Soviet Relations, 1917-1921: Intervention and the War* (Princeton: 1961).
- ¹⁴¹Grey to India Office, 4 November 1915; F.O. 371/2381; f. 691/p.p. 163972.
- ¹⁴²India Office to Grey, 4 November 1915; *ibid.*
- ¹⁴³Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, 7 October 1915; *ibid.*
- ¹⁴⁴Lord Curzon, "Military cooperation of Japan in the War", 3 October 1917; Cab. 24/28; G.T. 2206.
- ¹⁴⁵"The War with Turkey"; Memorandum by Political Department, India Office; Cab. 37/148.
- ¹⁴⁶Greene to Grey, Des. 63, 1916; F.O. 262/1269.
- ¹⁴⁷F.O. 371/2694; f. 155845.
- ¹⁴⁸Alston to Curzon, Des. 148, 19 March 1920; F.O. 410/69.
- ¹⁴⁹Government of India to Secretary of State, Austen Chamberlain, 4 May 1917; F.O. 410/66; Pr. 22, encl.
- ¹⁵⁰"Japanese Policy in Its Bearing on India", May 1916; Cab. 37/148.
- ¹⁵¹Peking Legation file on Indian Sedition; F.O. 228/2299.
- ¹⁵²Greene to Balfour, Des. 31, 15 January 1917; F.O. 371/3065; f. 1220/p.p. 40716.
- ¹⁵³The Government of India would pay only one third of the £15,000, and the Foreign Office had to find the other two thirds; F.O. 371/3424; f. 327/p.p. 72685.
- ¹⁵⁴Viceroy to India Office, 12 May 1921; F.O. 371/6699; f. 1908/p.p. 1908.
- ¹⁵⁵Viceroy to India Office, 7 November 1921; F.O. 371/6699; f. 1908/p.p. 4151.
- ¹⁵⁶Greene to Viceroy, Des. 155, 5 April 1916; F.O. 371/2693; f. 83294/p.p. 93911.
- ¹⁵⁷Government of India to ex-Viceroy Hardinge, 19 July 1917; F.O. 371/2693; f. 83294/p.p. 263898.
- ¹⁵⁸Viceroy to India Office, 16 November 1915; F.O. 371/2497; f. 281.

- ¹⁵⁹Cab. 37/148.
- ¹⁶⁰*Ibid.*
- ¹⁶¹*Ibid.*
- ¹⁶²War Cabinet Minutes, 22 May 1917; Cab. 23/4.
- ¹⁶³Minute by Greene on Des. 25, February 1917; F.O. 262/1269.
- ¹⁶⁴Balfour to Greene, Des. 25, 13 February 1917; F.O. 410/66; Pr. 13.
- ¹⁶⁵Interim Report of the C.I.D.'s Sub-committee on Territorial Changes, 25 January 1917; Cab. 24/3; G-118.
- ¹⁶⁶v. Ullman, *op. cit.*
- ¹⁶⁷v. Appendix; F.O. 371/3065; p.p. 63504.
- ¹⁶⁸Greene to Grey, Des. 527; 10 October 1916; F.O. 371/2790; f. 211; p.p. 234310; Greene to Balfour, Des. 32, 15 January 1917; F.O. 371/3065; f. 1220/p.p. 41717; Greene to Balfour, Des. 21, 14 January 1918; F.O. 371/3423; f. 327/p.p. 58914.
- ¹⁶⁹Ohsawa, *op. cit.*
- ¹⁷⁰Davidson to Greene, 28 August 1918; F.O. 371/3426; f. 327/p.p. 180767.
- ¹⁷¹*Ibid.*
- ¹⁷²Greene to Balfour, Des. 31, 15 January 1917; F.O. 371/3065; f. 1220/p.p. 40716.
- ¹⁷³Grant to Admiralty, General Letter 81; Adm. 125/65.
- ¹⁷⁴Consul-General Beckett (Batavia) to Government of India, 5 November 1915 in Grant to Admiralty, General Letter 2, 9 November 1915; Adm. 125/163; Langley to Alston, 7 January 1917, Very Secret Tel. F.O. 371/2791; f. 1220/p.p. 263555.
- ¹⁷⁵Maurice de Bunsen, F.O. to Grey (minute), 10 July 1916; F.O. 371/2787; f. 211/p.p. 130160.
- ¹⁷⁶Greene to Balfour, Des. 733, 27 October 1917; F.O. 371/3069; f. 1220/p.p. 235595.
- ¹⁷⁷Greene to Balfour, Des. 812, 28 November 1917; F.O. 371/3422; f. 327/p.p. 2613.
- ¹⁷⁸Davidson to Petrie, 3 May 1917 in Greene to Balfour, Des. 285, 7 May 1917; F.O. 371/3067; f. 1220/p.p. 130853.
- ¹⁷⁹Davidson to Greene, 9 January 1919 in Greene to Balfour, Des. 18, 14 January 1919; F.O. 371/4243; f. 117/p.p. 32914. The current exchange rate was 10 yen to the pound sterling.
- ¹⁸⁰*Ibid.*
- ¹⁸¹*Ibid.*
- ¹⁸²*Ibid.*
- ¹⁸³Grey to Jordan, Tel. 33, 15 February 1916; F.O. 371/2784; f. 211/p.p. 24633.
- ¹⁸⁴Greene to Balfour, Des. 571, 29 August 1917; F.O. 371/3068; f. 1220/p.p. 201662.
- ¹⁸⁵Alston to Balfour, Tel. 201, 3 May 1919; F.O. 371/4243; f. 117/p.p. 71804.
- ¹⁸⁶Historically *ronin* were the leaderless samurai of the Tokugawa period. After the Meiji abolition of legal class distinctions, those members of the former privileged samurai class and their descendants who were unable to find a position of status in the new social hierarchy became a discontented social strata which historians have termed the submerged samurai. A small group of them operated in Japanese political life as a new *ronin*, hired bullies or *soshi*. Toyama Mitsuru himself had been fostered in the home of an indigent samurai, while Soma Aizo, the baker who sheltered Bose and gave him his daughter in marriage was the son of a samurai and typical of Toyama's disciples. Because of their support for the Sun Yat-sen nationalists, many members of this group were known as the *Shina-ronin*, while those who took a particular interest in the Indian revolutionaries were sometimes known at the time as *Indo-ronin*.
- ¹⁸⁷Davidson to Greene, 28 August 1918 in Greene to Balfour, Des. 33, 12 September 1918; F.O. 371/3426; f. 327/p.p. 180767.
- ¹⁸⁸Alston to Balfour, Tel. 201, 3 May 1919; F.O. 371/4243; f. 117/p.p. 71804.
- ¹⁸⁹J. G. Ohsawa, *The Two Great Indians in Japan* (Calcutta: 1954). This work is based on a longer Japanese language biography of Bose by his mother-in-law Soma Kokkoh, who appears to have been Bose's greatest admirer.
- ¹⁹⁰An account of Bose's role in 1942 is given in W. H. Elsbrée, *Japan's Role in South-East Asian Nationalist Movements* (Harvard: 1953).
- ¹⁹¹Curzon to Alston, Des. 129, 22 July 1919; F.O. 410/67; Pr. 15.
- ¹⁹²Owing to the fact that the Foreign Office official in charge of the Indian seditious question was R. A. C. Sperling, head of the American Department, nearly half of the files of that department were in some war years filled with "Indian seditious" documents. While this cannot mean that the seditious issue played such a preponderant role in Anglo-American relations, for the issue is represented in the printed volumes *The Foreign Relations of the United States* by only one major document, the volume of Foreign Office papers does indicate the importance of the Indian revolutionary movement in British wartime policy.
- ¹⁹³F.O. 371/2696; f. 83294.
- ¹⁹⁴*Ibid.*
- ¹⁹⁵*Ibid.*
- ¹⁹⁶Government of India Department of Commerce and Industry: "Trade After the War—Japanese Activities"; 25 December 1919; F.O. 371/3823; f. 176302/p.p. 176302.
- ¹⁹⁷India Office to F.O., 11 June 1920; F.O. 371/f. 1387/p.p. 1387.
- ¹⁹⁸v. footnote 197 above.
- ¹⁹⁹v. footnote 23.
- ²⁰⁰Greene to Balfour, Des. 662, 18 December 1916; F.O. 371/3064; f. 1220/p.p. 31161.