The new world disorder:

The Prospects for Peace

IA and the quest for peace and justice 2002

Opening Speech, Donor Day

By

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Introduction

This time last year the September Board Meeting was overshadowed by the appalling terrorist attacks on the World Trade Centre in New York. In my introductory talk to donors then, I noted that this horror would prove to be a "hinge event" which would seriously challenge many taken for granted assumptions about international relations and the international rule of law. I noted that such a brazen attack on the most powerful nation in the world would generate a strong and decisive military response. I signalled that the strong instinct for revenge, which 9/11 generated, should be tempered by respect for the international rule of law under the leadership of the United Nations.

In the light of the events of the past week the question is whether the rule of international law or the rule of force and power will prevail. If I have a text it comes from that American exponent of non-violence, Martin Luther King. It was he who said: "Wars are poor chisels for carving out peaceful tomorrows". The challenge facing all of us is what sort of chisels the "War against terror" and the impending US war against Iraq are in relation to carving stable peaceful relationships, respect for the international rule of law and the promotion of economic, social and political justice.? In particular , how do we develop deeper and more fundamental questions about the development of new and creative ways of dealing with violence and ensuring -wherever possible-that violence is contained and only ever considered when all non-violent options have been exhausted in

the management and settlement of conflict.

In this speech I will discuss the problem of terrorism one year after September 11th 2001, the significantly changed global situation in which International Alert has had to work this year. I will then consider the roles for conflict transformation organisations such as International Alert and finally introduce some questions about how we measure our impact and effectiveness

Terrorism

The first thing that has to be stated is that terror and terrorism are not new phenomena. In fact the use of terror to achieve different objectives dates back to antiquity. Between 66 and 73 AD, for example, the Jewish zealots used terrorist violence to fight the Romans in occupied Judea. They assassinated individuals, poisoned wells and food stores and sabotaged Jerusalem's water supply. [1] Between 1090 and 1272 AD a Muslim Shi'a group called the Assassins attacked Christian crusaders throughout the Middle East. "If an assassin lost his life during an operation he was promised an immediate ascent to heaven, a promise still used by the leaders of some Muslim terrorist groups to encourage martyrdom in suicidal attacks." [2]

The words terror and terrorism assumed popular currency during the French revolution. In this context terrorism referred to state sponsored top down efforts to rule and govern through terror. It is important to remember this original understanding of terrorism - states can and do terrorize their own citizens and those of other nations when it suits them to do so. President Robert Mugabe in Zimbabwe and President Sadam Hussein are egregious examples of this top down type of terrorism.

Terrorism, however, can be an effective political instrument of the weak and oppressed as well. The state of Israel, for example, was brought into existence under pressure from the Jewish Stern and Irgun terror organizations. Two well-known Israeli terrorists (at least they were terrorists to the British - the Israelis called them freedom fighters) Yitzhak Shamir and Menachim Begin both became Israeli Prime Ministers. Nelson Mandela was imprisoned as a terrorist as was Jomo Kenyatta. Both became Presidents of their countries. One could go on.

There are high levels of subjectivity in the definition of who is a terrorist or what is a terrorist act and many of the attempts to define this term have been made in the context of groups which specific governments consider politically threatening rather than in terms of clearly defined or specific terrorist acts.

The Oxford English dictionary defines a terrorist as:

> *"Anyone who attempts to further his views by a system of coercive intimidation" as "a member of a clandestine or expatriate organization aiming to coerce an established government by acts of violence against it or its subjects."*

The FBI regards terrorism as

> *"The unlawful use of force or violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any*

segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives." [3]

Paul Wilkinson in his 1986 book on the subject says

> *"What distinguishes terrorism from other forms of violence is the deliberate and systematic use of coercive intimidation." [4]*

The British government in its attempt to define terrorism officially in the British Terrorism Act 2000 defines terrorism as

> *"The use or threat of action where the use or threat is designed to influence the government or to intimidate the public or a section of the public, and the use or threat is made for the purpose of advancing a political, religious or ideological cause. Action falls within the Act if it involves serious violence against a person, involves serious damage to property, endangers a person's life other than that of the person committing the action, creates a serious risk to the health or safety of the public or a section of the public, or is designed seriously to interfere with or seriously to disrupt an electronic system." [5]*

Rich Rubenstein of ICAR defines it as follows:

"Terrorism is violence by small groups claiming to represent massive constituencies and seeking by "heroic" provocative attacks to awaken the masses, redeem their honor, and generate an enemy over reaction that will intensify and expand the struggle." [6]

As Ambassador Philip C. Wilcox put it:

> *This problem of a definition masks a deeper problem of the need to resolve the grave conflicts that give rise to terrorism. We need an international consensus on definition in order to isolate and eliminate all sympathy and support for terrorism but we can't reach this definition unless we work harder to deal with the underlying conflicts. Let's face reality. So as long as there are weak, oppressed and aggrieved people and groups who can find no redress, there will be terrorism, and what for one man is a terrorist, will continue to be another's freedom fighter. Of course, there will always be terrorists whose causes have no merit and who must be defeated. I do not recommend, however, that we give up trying to win a consensus that terrorism is an unacceptable political weapon under any circumstances. In the search for a more peaceful, humane and civilized world, we need to keep trying to absolutely delegitimize terrorism in favor of more civilized forms of political action. [7]*

Definitional differences aside the main point is that terrorists and terrorism are not a recent phenomenon. On the contrary, in recent history throughout the 1970s and through much of the 1980s, the United States dealt with terrorist attacks from a number of sources in different parts of the world. For example, there were a number of U.S. Ambassadors killed in the early 1970s (e.g. in the Sudan and Lebanon). The Iranian

hostage crisis occurred in 1979 and that same year the American Ambassador to Kabul in Afghanistan was kidnapped and murdered. The U.S. Embassy in Beirut was blown up in 1983 followed by the bombing of the U.S. marine barracks at Beirut airport that killed 241 men. There were bombings of U.S. installations in Saudi Arabia (June 25 1996) followed by the bombings of U.S. Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania on August 7 1998. At the same time there were numerous instances of terrorist acts in Northern Ireland, Spain, Greece, Turkey, and then the systematic top down and bottom up terrorism that became genocide in Rwanda and Burundi where hundreds of thousands died. There have been a variety of diplomatic and military actions taken in response to each of these events but nothing that could be called a sustained war on terrorism.

While horrific, these earlier events did not have the visceral immediacy of 9/11 because they took place abroad and were not filmed in real time by most of the world's media. It is a source of some grievance to those who experienced these other acts of terrorism that they did not receive the same recognition and global acknowledgement as 9/11. On the contrary there is a sense of inequality in sensitivity to global pain especially for others who have experienced tragedies as calamitous as those that afflicted New York and Washington six months ago.

Commentators and observers of these past acts of terrorism feel that there was nothing new in the 9/11 events that had not in some way or other been anticipated in earlier terrorist incidents both against the U.S. and against a wide variety of other targets in Europe, Africa, and the Middle East. The novelty of the 9/11 terrorist acts lies in their combination, their lethality and the fact that they occurred on U.S. soil. As Niall Ferguson put it "Apart from its kamikaze character, it was essentially a multiple hijacking." [8]

The Global Situation

International support for the United States and the so-called "War on Terror" was overwhelming between September and December 2001. Certainly condemnation of terror and terrorist tactics in politics was near universal. The UN response was also very positive. Security Council resolutions 1373 and 1377 ,passed immediately after 9/11 gave the US and the global community international justification for removing the odious Taliban regime and for combating all forms of terrorism. They generated more sustained activity in the Department of Political Affairs (specifically the Committee on Counter Terrorism) than most other recent UN initiatives. The Committee on Counter Terrorism galvanised the international community to work to ensure that nation states, regional organisations and the UN developed capacity to deal with terrorist threats in a timely and efficient manner. It has received 180 reports on national capacity to defeat terrorism and many specific initiatives to generate the broadest possible fight against international terrorism. This is an unprecedented amount of support for a UN initiative. It has also helped generate much higher levels of shared information, and coordination between national, regional and global intelligence, police and military agencies than before.

Instead of building on this global goodwill to provide courageous and enlightened political leadership; the US administration and military, have made a number of decisions and mistakes which have perplexed many political leaders and dissipated much of the global unity of September-November 2001. The reality is that the United States had near universal support in the last 3 months of 2001 which rapidly eroded in the first 3 months of 2002. It did so because of concerns such as the following.

The violent suppression of the revolt at the Mazar-E-Sharif Prison; the possible complicity of the US in the Shiberghan massacre; the dubious jurisdictional status of Al-Qaida prisoners at Guantanamo Bay as well as concern about their living conditions and treatment; the killing of 3,600 Afghan civilians; the injudicious remarks about North Korea, Iraq, and Iran being "an axis of evil"; the direct challenge to the International Criminal Court and desire for US exemption from its provisions; support for the repressive activities of Ariel Sharon in Israel and confused signals sent to the Palestinian leadership; a stated desire for regime change in Iraq and a preoccupation with Iraqi weapons of mass destruction without mentioning others that have such weapons or are in the throes of developing them; the development of alliances with nations that have very mixed human rights and other records in order to pursue the War on Terror; not to mention assertion of unilateral US right against regional and multilateral interests. [9] The new spirit of American isolationism can be further seen with the US withdrawal from the Kyoto Convention; the low level representation to the Johannesburg summit on Sustainable Development and America's direct challenges to a variety of multilateral arms control agreements.

Most of these incidents have arisen because the United States is the world's unchallenged power and is asserting this power in as many bilateral, regional and multilateral for a as possible. In so far as the US is able to define its interests and values as global it generates near irresistable pressures for most other nations in the world. This would not matter if it were articulating multilateral values, asserting and abiding by the international rule of law and leading the world in exemplary global citizenship. The reality, however, is that it is asserting itself primarily as a military power able and willing to coerce when necessary to secure its interests. The new US Force Doctrine 2020 aims for "Full Spectrum Dominance in the air, in space, on land and on the sea". Within the US it is the Department of Defence and the National Security Council which is pre-eminent in defining the agenda of the War against Terror and in promoting regime change in Baghdad.

United States military might is now greater in terms of scope and lethality than that available to any other military power in world history. The US defence budget is $379 billion after a recent rise of 14%. This is the biggest rise in 20 years. The defence budget is larger than the combined total of the next nine biggest defence spenders. The US is responsible for about 40% of the world's military spending. It has 247,000 troops and civilians posted overseas with a presence in more than 130 countries covering every time zone. The US has 13 military bases in countries around Afghanistan. It has a military presence in Uzbekhistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgistan and Georgia , all former Soviet countries. The department of defence employs 1.4 million people on active duty. It is the largest employer in the US with more employees than Exxon Mobil, Ford, General Motors and GE combined. The Department of Defense owns 40,000 properties covering 18 million acres of land. It operates a fleet of more than 15,000 aircraft, including 20 stealth bombers in service. The navy operates more than 1,000 ocean going vessels. The Defence department buys enough fuel every day to drive a car around the world 13,000 times. The US headquarters at the Pentagon employs 23,000 workers and has 17 miles of corridors. The US spends an average of $28,000 on research and development for each member of its armed forces compared to the European average of $7,000. [10]

This overwhelming power, the mixed signals and the application of military force when and as necessary by the US issues have raised deep concerns about US global goals and

its willingness to pursue these within internationally agreed frameworks and conventions. President Bush's speech to the United Nations General Assembly on the 13th September 2002 followed a summer of unilateral and bellicose threat from the US to Iraq. The Administration has left no-one in any doubt about the US stated goal of regime change in Baghdad. The justifications for this have been somewhat tenuous. The best international legal opinion is that the Iraqi rejection of past UN resolutions does not, in itself, justify unilateral or even bilateral use of force against Iraq and certainly does not justify "regime change". [11]

In any event, Iraqi acceptance of the unconditional admission of weapons inspectors removes this justification in the short term. Recent US desire to prevent the United Nations Inspection team from entering Iraq under the old mandate also generates international concern. There is no "legal" justification for unilateral US military intervention. The challenge facing the UN now is whether future Iraqi non compliance with UN demands will trigger an automatic or near automatic application of Chapter 7 measures. This is by no means guaranteed and will be much more difficult to secure. Despite greater international willingness to support the US after the President's address to the UN, most nations feel that the US is engaging in a la carte multilateralism in order to secure regime change rather than as a genuine desire to enforce the international rule of law - as reflected in Security Council Resolutions? If it were the latter surely the US would be looking much more systematically at all Security Council Resolutions which have not been fulfilled and devising measures for ensuring universal compliance.

In any case all of these recent events at the UN are a challenge to the notion of sovereign equality. There is no other nation in the world that could have persuaded the UN to pass Security Council resolutions under threat of the unilateral use of force. US pre-occupation with Iraq - no matter how bad the regime-- seems somewhat disproportionate given all the other countries around the world whose leaders repress their citizens and seek to develop weapons of mass destruction. What sort of interventionist role does the US seek for itself in relation to these other countries and what role do US leaders expect the UN and regional organisations such as the EU to play in relation to their self appointed role of "global sheriff"? Is the world community currently trapped by war rhetoric and embarked on another "March of Folly" of the kind that led to the First World War or can regional and global organisations reassert their authority and insist on more pro-active approaches to the peaceful settlement of disputes?

The other challenge that has occurred post 9/11 has been a global tightening of security at the expense of human rights and liberty. Many countries have introduced anti terrorism laws, increased the powers of surveillance and detention without trial. Several have extended their use of the death penalty and restricted freedom of expression and worship. In the United States, itself, for example, 67% of the population in a recent opinion poll were willing to sacrifice the First Amendment right of Freedom of Expression in order to advance national homeland security. Many other regimes have also seized the opportunity presented by "the war on terror" to justify more extensive domestic repression-e.g Colombia, the Philippines, Uzbekistan, Egypt, Israel, and Kenya.

These macro dynamics are the backdrop against which International Alert is trying to do its work. They are undoubtedly beginning to restrict the spaces for the expression of non-violent alternatives to war. They are certainly aimed at the assertion of military rather than diplomatic or negotiated solutions to problems. In Eurasia, for example, the Russian

desire to bomb Chechen rebels in the Pankisi Gorge (as part of its own war against terrorists) has certainly placed a big question mark over the possibility of negotiated solutions to the frozen conflicts in Georgia/Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan. Similarly, defining the Maoist insurgency in Nepal as a "terrorist war" and the liberation movements in the Philippines in the same way is having a very negative effect on the development of peaceful processes for dealing with these problems in Asia.

A Peacebuilding Approach to counter terrorism?

What has been missing in recent debates has been the peacebuilding dimension to the war against terrorism. As the Americans have already found in Afghanistan military solutions are only the start- after any war or violent conflict, it is vital that new regimes are supported and a peacebuilding strategy developed. [12] The hard work of real regime change starts once the military have left yet there has been little large scale investment in this vital work. This is worrying given that the cost of conflict transformation is significantly less than support of military operations yet there is significantly less spent on conflict transformation than on conflict prevention. For example a single Tornado fighter-bomber costs between 20 and 30 million pounds sterling which would be enough to keep International Alert and its partners going for over six years. Earlier this year the UK House of Commons Select Committee on Foreign Affairs in its report on the Foreign Policy Aspects of the War Against Terrorism stated:

> *'We also need to determine how the conditions that have contributed to the development of terrorism can be eliminated or at least reduced. The answers to those questions will provide a far safer world than even the best intelligence and preparedness can provide. As the war against terrorism proceeds, this country and its coalition allies must seek out those answers and must learn about and deal sensitively with the causes of terrorism.' [13]*

Organisations such as Alert are working to help provide answers to these questions by addressing the underlying political, historical, economic and structural causes of violence as well as their symptoms. This cost effective response to terrorism should not be forgotten in the haste to move towards war. At International Alert we continue with our work because we know that military solutions rarely deliver long-term economic, political or social results. There is no alternative to that much more difficult and patient task of developing processes aimed at long term and sustainable peacebuilding.

The question that we in the conflict resolution community have to ask is what can we contribute from our tool box to make this open, vulnerable, interdependent world more secure and resilient? What will remove the root causes of terrorist violence and how can we do this so that 9/11 becomes an opportunity to develop institutions and processes that help people address their deepest concerns and solve their problems without recourse to suicide and violence?

I would like to make a clear distinction between the confusion that surrounds war (with all its short term aims, objectives and inevitable confusions) and the clarity that should be guiding what I call the much more problematic, long term, painstaking task of the quest for justice and peace and the holy grail of peace, justice, truth and compassion or what

some think of as that place called reconciliation. How do we ensure that the quest for truth, justice, peace, and compassion dispels the fog of war and generates some realistic alternatives to the apocalyptic promise of war, famine, pestilence and death?

Euripides, way back in antiquity stated that "reason can wrestle and overthrow terror". So the first thing that has to be said, therefore, is that there is no way in which the quest for peace and justice can be engaged and terrorist threat diminished unless there is a willingness to apply the best, the most creative and the most empathetic intelligence to the task of diagnosing and analysing the real nature of the problems generating concern. This means acknowledging that sometimes inaction can be positive; it means reminding politicians with short term time horizons of the importance of thinking in terms of what Elise Boulding calls a "two hundred year present". This means learning from the wisdom of those centenarians who are still alive today and making wise and reversible decisions on behalf of those born today since these babies have a reasonable chance of living a hundred years from now. There is a human obligation not to make damaging, short term irreversible decisions which may prejudice the future of the newly born. In addition to the morality of this, thinking long term helps contextualise contemporary problems and challenges. It also helps us understand something of the cycles of violence and non-violence and when it is most appropriate and inappropriate to intervene.

The second challenge is for political and military leaders to articulate and share their visions for the future since there is no quest without a vision and as the Bible reminds us "without vision the people perish". I do not have any clear sense of what vision the United States leadership adheres to at the moment, nor for that matter do I have a clear sense of what vision Prime Minister Tony Blair adheres to either. I would like to quote from a former US President Dwight de Eisenhower to illustrate the difference between Presidential and Prime Ministerial visions in 1953 and now.

> "The way chosen by the United States was plainly marked by a few clear precepts, which govern its conduct in world affairs. First: no people on earth can be held, as a people , to be an enemy, for all humanity shares the common hunger for peace and fellowship and justice. Second: no nation's security and well being can be lastingly achieved in isolation but only in effective cooperation with fellow nations. Third: any nation's right to a form of government and an economic system of its own choosing is inalienable. Fourth: any nation's attempt to dictate other nations their form of government is indefensible. And fifth: a nation's hope of lasting peace cannot be firmly based upon any race in armaments but rather upon just relations and honest understanding with all other nations.

> In the light of these principles the citizens of the United States defined the way they proposed to follow, through the aftermath of war toward true peace. This was faithful to the spirit that inspired the United Nations: to prohibit strife, to relieve tensions, to banish fears . This way was to control and to reduce armaments. This way was to allow all nations to devote their energies and resources to the great and good tasks of healing the war's wounds, of clothing and feeding and housing the needy, of perfecting a just political life, of enjoying the fruits of their own free toil. Etc". [14]

Third, the quest for peace and justice needs to begin with the interests and needs of the

weakest and most vulnerable. Are these people who are often most severely damaged by violent conflict and the insecurity that flows from it. Too much of the war against terrorism is being articulated by privileged elites for their purposes rather than for and on behalf of impoverished people who experience daily existential terror at being unable to satisfy their basic human needs. It is important, therefore to ask how and in what ways the current war against terrorism is going to help or is currently helping the weak and the vulnerable. Where are the consultations and discussions with the dispossessed, the internally displaced, the refugees, and those who are suffering in a variety of extreme political and economic environments? Starting with the most vulnerable populations and incorporating them into the analysis /diagnosis of the sources of terrorism is critical to legitimating the quest for peace and justice. This orientation contrasts very strongly with top down decision making based on Solomon's trap of non consultative decision, announcement and defence.

Fourth, given the shadowy nature of terrorist violence, it is difficult identifying who the key stakeholders/parties are and who has an ability to prevent violence against innocent civilians. Those interested in long term conflict prevention, therefore, need to spend time trying to discern the specific parameters of terrorist violence and which actors and issues are most likely to choose or trigger terrorist options. This is a very serious problem for our field since there is a strong disinclination on the part of most terrorists to engage in conversations with "do gooder" problem solvers. On the other hand we do not have much evidence that these individuals and organisations are interested in talking to those who are applying military solutions either. So we need to spend time and energy on mapping the contours of terrorist activity and identifying who does and who does not wish to converse about the dynamics propelling them into extreme terrorist activity-suicide and violence. This is clearly not a job for the fainthearted and cowardly but it needs to be done if we are interested in discovering who may be able to represent the interests of those who are willing to engage in violent acts to advance their cause. Gaining access to terrorist, guerrilla or rebel organisations is extremely difficult, however, and requires a lot of patience and a slow movement from outer to inner circles. Someone has to do this though if we are to move beyond arm chair theorising to try and identify the needs and motivations of terrorist groups. To do this properly will require a very sophisticated understand of what sorts of incentives might induce such groups and individuals into discussions. In particular there is a need to understand how amnesties and other inducements might be applied to begin engaging these individuals and groups. [15] This is all long term and difficult work in very taxing environments.

Fifth, if we manage to make contact, it is important that there be flexibility about process and a willingness on the part of the external intervening parties to let the terrorist groups identify who they would like to communicate with , set the initial agendas and to what socio-political end. Conflict resolvers need to assume the role of ethnographer/ anthropological analyst rather than problem solver in the first instance. This is going to be very difficult because there will be little or no inclination on the part of the terrorist group to extend trust to those who might be acting for intelligence agencies or foreign powers. Once trust and confidence have been developed it might be possible to think of more normal problem solving roles. It is particularly important, however, that considerable attention be devoted to such issues as not appearing or actually offering impunity to such persons because most of the evidence suggests that terrorists appreciate "firmness" and clarity of boundaries than softness, concessions and inconsistency. [16]

Sixth, as can be seen from the first five challenges, the quest for peace and justice

requires considerable courage. It is not a task for those seeking a quiet and tranquil life. This courage requires a new look at the concept of "heroism". The Roman poet Martial, stated that "My hero is he who wins praise without bloodshed". [17] As A.C Grayling noted in an insightful little essay on this subject, while heroism manifests itself in self defence against malign aggression or in the interests of principle all other fighting and killing, squabbling and destroying never does.

> "On the contrary, heroism is first and foremost the property of peacemakers. It takes infinitely greater courage to salvage a people or an epoch from a conflict than to start or continue it. The outstanding figures of our time, among whom Nelson Mandela is the exemplar, are those who seek reconciliation, forgiveness-very milksop notions , no doubt in the view of people who think it cleverer to let their guns do their thinking and talking." [18]

The problem is that when reason gives way to frenzy or calm reflective judgement gives way to revenge it becomes difficult to hear those who espouse alternative perspectives. Where are the voices against the war in the US right now ?

The seventh challenge has to do with the right sharing of the world's resources. Even if we can find courageous heroes on all sides of the terrorist/non terrorist , violence/non violence divide we still have some deep rooted, intractable structural violence to contend with. Globalisation has generated more rather than fewer inequalities and it has cursed us with something that earlier generations did not have to contend with; namely an ability to see the suffering of others in real time and across vast distances and yet a terrible inability to respond to that need directly and in the same real time. In the past if we were made aware of the need and suffering of others we could do something about it directly-give alms, develop welfare systems etc. Now we see the suffering and then respond indirectly-if at all. There is no collective ability to act globally and no global institutions yet capable of redistributing goods and services when and as needed. This is why the achievement of global poverty reduction targets by 2015 is so critical. [19]

The UNDP notes that 1 billion people in the world cannot satisfy their elementary needs. Among 4.5 billion residents of developing countries, three in every five are deprived of access to basic infrastructure; a third have no access to drinkable water, a quarter have no accommodation worthy of its name and a fifth have no use of sanitary and medical services. In 70-80 of the 100 or so "developing countries" the average income per head of the population is today lower than 10 or even 30 years ago. At the same time, three of the richest men in the world have private assets greater than the combined national product of the 48 poorest countries; the fortunes of the 15 richest people exceed the total product of the whole of sub Saharan Africa. [20] According to UNDP less than 4% of then personal wealth of the 225 richest people in the world would suffice to offer all the poor of the world access to elementary medical and educational amenities as well as adequate nutrition.

The eighth challenge has to do with the promotion of democracy, human rights and good governance . El Qaida , for example, had no interest in these things nor do most of the Middle East nations. Al Qaida are much more interested in the re-emergence of the caliphate and the imposition of Islamic theocratic rule. Equally, however, regimes which they oppose (e.g the House of Saud, the Egyptian and Iraqi governments and some of the Gulf States were not interested in more inclusive, participatory government either.

Similarly, throughout Africa (if the Zimbabwe elections are a guide) there is a willingness to sit lightly on issues of good governance. The challenge facing conflict resolvers is how to put these issues -and associated issues of corruption, transparency and clean as well as inclusive government-on the table without appearing to or actually imposing a Western agenda.

Ninth, the small amount of research that has been done on the psychology, sociology and politics of terrorist activity suggests the need for more understanding of what combination of positive and negative incentive will yield changes in terrorist behaviour and a willingness to think about alternative non-violent processes for dealing with their personal and political problems. The war against terrorism is extremely unclear about its objectives.

Tenth and finally, it is vital that the United States does not personalise terrorism as a US problem nor see the war against terrorism or the problems posed by Saddam Hussein as America's problems alone. In the days immediately after 9/11 there was genuine international outpouring of support for the US in its condemnation of terrorism and terrorist activity. The US administration in pushing unilateral solutions since remains in danger of spoiling this opportunity to mould a better world in collaboration with others. This opportunity requires sustained national, regional and multilateral effort. It requires the United Nations and it requires all individuals everywhere renouncing violence in general and terrorist violence in particular as unacceptable strategies for promoting political purposes.

It is certainly vital that there be no military adventurism in relation to Iraq. This is the moment to get UN inspectors back in to the country not to use UN weapons inspectors as a pretext for another US war in the Middle East. If the US and its allies do not back off a war in Iraq they will generate accusations of international double standards at work ; namely that it is alright for the US to apply its military might in pursuit of its national interests but not alright for other countries. This will generate all sorts of awesome and unacceptable consequences in return not least of which will be an accelerated recourse to assymetrical warfare on the part of America's enemies. This will mean heightened vulnerability for the US rather than heightened security.

This is the time for the US in collaboration with others to accelerate peace initiatives in Palestine and Israel (a heroic quest demanding courageous leadership). It is the time for the reconstruction of Afghanistan and for making sure that more resources are directed towards sustainable development everywhere in the world. This is the time to begin addressing terrorist activity through national police services, and Interpol and to keep military power in the background.

The elimination of terrorism at its roots requires a much more courageous quest for peace and justice than opening up new military fronts. It requires the enunciation of carefully calibrated non-violent steps, options to generate better understanding between the Middle East and the West (since 90% of the world's terrorist groups are located there). It requires a willingness to suspend but not abandon military options. On the contrary these coercive options should be kept firmly in the background as a last resort should all other less violent efforts and initiatives fail.

This is a big task for conflict resolvers but it is a noble one. Our object is not cathartic. It is not to exact revenge for 9/11 and feel good in the process. (This is not the wild west thank goodness). Rather the task is to bring terrorists to justice for the crimes that they

have committed. To hear these cases in internationally acceptable courts and to work to ensure that the root causes of terrorism and terrorists are eliminated. This is a never ending quest rather than a short airborne war or the rapid overthrow of odious regimes.

We are watching recent global events with great concern and recommit ourselves to working with others to enlarge the space for civil society groups to work harder on creating spaces for analytic and collaborative problem solving. We do so in the hope that we can continue to expand the range of non-violent options available to political leaders and thereby circumvent the use of the military. We have decided to focus on impact and effectiveness at this year's donor's meeting. This is a response to the stated needs of both donors and professionals in the field and part of our on going internal discussion about the ways in which we can deepen the professionalism of peacework and enhance better peace practice.

Impact and effectiveness

Supporting organisations such as International Alert is a cost effective way of dealing with the instability that we see in the world today. Despite our relatively small cost, however, donors and governments want to know that they are getting value for money and that we are being effective in our work. We, (i.e IA) wants to know also that our work is making a difference and how (in close collaboration with partners) we can maximise our peacebuilding effectiveness.

At minimum we need to know that our interventions are not going to generate harm for people. More optimally we want to ensure that our work makes some small contribution toward the ending of wars and the building of just and sustainable societies within which individuals and groups can resolve differences/conflicts non-violently.

This means that we need to become much more sophisticated about the nature of the relationship between processes (methods) , outputs (activities), outcomes (tangible and observable consequences) and impacts (long term changes in violent attitudes, behaviour and institutions). None of these things are simple and we need better quantitative and qualitative indicators to help us understand these dynamics . We also need to be clearer about the theoretical assumptions we bring to our work and ways of ensuring that our process/intervention designs are related to our theoretical assumptions, contextual analyses and the specific needs of stakeholders in the conflict. A lot of this work is related to what we are doing within our development and peace building programme-especially the work that we are doing on Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment (PCIA) ---- but it is something that all programmes need to become more intentional about as we engage in on going analysis and evaluation of all our work.

The normal project cycle goes through three specific phases-(i) analysis/design of projects (ii) implementation and (iii) evaluation, feedback and changes to the original design. In each of these areas as we have discovered in our Better Peace Practice project we can and must become more reflective about what we do and the consequences of what we do.

Dr Kenneth Bush - who has helped us conceptualise many of these issues feels that there are at least four areas in which to explore the wider peacebuilding impacts of a project. .

- Did the project produce substantial numbers of politically significant changes in access to individual or collective material and non material resources? : for example, access to water, land, food, political institutions and processes, economic resources, social and or cultural status, information , legitimacy , authority.

- Did the project create, exacerbate or mitigate socio-economic tensions : Did it serve to reinforce privileged access by one group over others in economic, educational, agricultural , industrial sectors or did it serve to reduce hierarchies and dependencies in these areas?

- Did the project produce substantial changes in the material basis of economic sustenance or food security: for example, did it provide new techniques/technology that directly affect livelihoods. Did it minimise the opportunities for warlordism?Did it create local economies capable of opting out of the political economy of civil conflict?

- Did the project produce challenges to or changes in content of or control over existing political, economic and or social systems? Did the project serve to empower individuals/groups to assert control over the political , economic, social aspects of their lives: to challenge existing systems of control and to develop alternative systems of governance?

He identifies five concrete reference points that might help us look in the right locations and ask the right questions to determine the overall impact and effectiveness of our work. The areas he outlines and which have been developed by FEWER/Saferworld and IA in our PCIA project are as follows.

Has the project/programme in question helped enhance

1. Institutional capacity to manage, resolve violent conflict and to promote tolerance and build peace

2. Military and Human Security

3. More democratic political structures and processes

4. Sustainable, accessible and fairer economic institutions and processes

5. Social reconstruction and empowerment.

These different reference points (from which endless indicators have been developed by all sorts of groups) should help us to focus our attention when doing analysis , clarifying assumptions about causality of conflict, contextualising our work, working out the utility of different sorts of dialogue processes and providing us with better and smarter ways of monitoring and evaluating our work.

None of this is easy. If we are to establish smarter ways of determining the impact and effectiveness of our work then we need to

1. Have clear base line information about what it is we are seeking to

change and why?

2. Understand the short term, medium term and long term goals-of projects, programmes and more macro policy frameworks-- and why we think that the pursuit of these goals will have a positive impact on the conflict in question.

3. Have some understanding about why the particular methods we are employing to advance these goals in our work - needs assessments, dialogue processes, trust and confidence building, creative accompaniment, partnerships, training programmes, NGO fora etc -- are likely to work. That is what is the theory of change or conflict that is being applied and why do we think that this will work?

4. Understand something of what is politically possible in each of the conflict zones within which we work. To what extent is this work providing "bandaid solutions" and leaving unjust, unequal, undemocratic political institutions intact? Are we paying enough attention to the mobilisation of radical, inclusive peaceful political movements capable of fundamental system change where this is necessary?

5. Maintain the right sort of relationship with our partners so that we do not impose a northern, didactic , mechanistic approach to our work. How do we develop a relationship that enables local control, flexibility, maximal levels of responsiveness to local needs etc etc

6. Understand the nature of the relationship between micro processes at programme/project levels, with wider community based processes and then national and regional processes. This is an underdeveloped area of our work. Without imposing any methodological straitjacket it would seem useful to have a more coherent sense of the ways in which micro processes have macro impacts and vice versa.

7. What impacts/consequences can we attribute to specific types of action? There is a need for more sophisticated "systems thinking" in relation to the " attribution problem". There is also a need to acknowledge that the ability of any individual, group or organisation to have final,determinate effects on deep rooted and intractable conflict is extremely limited. These conflicts cease through a wide variety of factors-some planned, some unplanned, some predictable and some not.

There are many different ways of addressing this impact and effectiveness question. It is on the agenda of many organisations at this time. It is a question asked by donors, it is a question asked by partners. One of the things that we wish to do at this meeting is provide some space for some of our partners to tell us what they have or have not found helpful about our engagement with them. This will be the basis of much of the discussion in the afternoon.

The point is that there is no (and maybe never will be) final agreement on criteria of effectiveness but there is an emerging consensus that a number of these criteria have to

be included in any reasonable assessment of what constitutes effective peacebulding.. I am hoping that we will be able to add other critreria and refine these ones at our discussions this afternoon.

As you can see from IA's Annual Review, we have been working hard over this past year to build on our Better Peace Practice Project to ensure that all of our own programmes are focussed on delivering measurable outputs, outcomes and the best possible evaluation of their wider peacebuilding impact .

We are integrating and focussing our work at local, national, regional and global levels . In doing so we continually ask what is the long term peace building significance of this or that activity.

Even though macro global dynamics-fuelled by the war on terror--seem to be moving in directions which are a long way from delivering sustainable peace; the processes that we are involved in within the Great Lakes and Kivus, in West and East Africa, in Eurasia, Sri Lanka , Nepal and Colombia, not to mention all the research and advocacy that we are doing with national governments, regional and multilateral organisations is making a small but vital contribution towards generating short and long term alternatives to violence. The challenge facing all organisations like ours is how to enlarge the spaces for peaceful dialogue; how to insist that non-violent solutions to problems are generated and exhausted before violent ones are proposed; and how to deal with all those individuals, groups and governments who are intent on applying force first and asking questions afterwards. We stand ready and willing to explore these questions with you and we hope that we may generate some mutually acceptable and generative solutions.

On behalf of the whole organisation I wish to thank you for all the material, moral and political support you have given us over this past year and in previous years.

Even though this century has not got off to a very auspicious start I remain convinced that it will eventually become a century of maturity, peace and justice. This will only happen however if individuals, states, intergovernmental organisations and civil society actors (i) acknowledge the limits of nationalism in a tightly interdependent world (ii) commit themselves to the difficult task of harmonising indidvidual and national interests in regional and global networks and institutions (iii) develop deep habits and instincts for multilateral consultation and dialogue (iv) prioritise human security as the major objective of economic and public policy and diminish the excessive reliance on military security and (v) start reconceptualising citizenship so that it includes some sense of the four fold rights and obligations of citizens at local, national, regional and global levels. Only when each of us assigns as much significance to our global as well our local/national citizenship will the sovereign claims of each individual be taken seriously. It is at such time that we will be able to say that we are living in a socially responsible world. IA alongside a wide variety of courageous local partners in many complex conflict zones is doing its part to turn some of these dreams into reality. We trust that you will continue to support us in this effort.

Endnotes:

1 See Frank Barnaby,*The New Terrorism:A 21st Century Biological, Chemical and Nuclear Threat*, Oxford ORG p12,

2 ibid

3 ibid p.13

4 Paul Wilkinson,*Terrorism and the Liberal State* London, MacMillan, 1986.

5 The Stationary Office, *Terrorism Act 2000*, London: the Stationary Office 2000

6 Richard Rubenstein, Unpublished talk to GMU on September 11 2001

7 Philip C Wilcox, talk to Conflict Resolution and Prevention Forum February 12 2002, "Defining Terrorism: Is one man's terrorist really another man's freedom fighter" Search for Common Ground, DC.

8 Niall Ferguson, 2001 "Clashing Civilisations or Mad Mullahys: The United States Between Informal and Formal Empire" in Strobe Talbott and Nayan Chanda (Eds) *The Age of Terror: America and the World after September 11*, UK Perseus Press. P 117

9 See for instance 'Bush warned over "axis of evil"', *The Guardian.* London & Manchester: February 5, 2002

10 *The Observer* op cit, p5

11 See Legal opinion of Rabinder Singh, QC and Alison McDonald, Matrix Chambers, Grays Inn London 10 September 2002 on "The Legality of use of Force against Iraq".

12 See for instance 'In Afghanistan, A Job Half Done' *The Boston Globe*, 15 September 2002

13 House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, 'Foreign Policy Aspects of the War Against Terrorism' *Seventh Report of Session 2001-02*, London: 12 June 2002, Paragraph 242.

14 *The Guardian* (Editorial) February 15 2002

15 See Richard E Hayes, "Negotiations with Terrorists" Chapter 25 in Victor Kremenyuk (ed) 1991 *International Negotiation*, Oxford Jossey Bass pp 364-376

16 ibid pp 373

17 A.C.Grayling, *The Guardian*, March 9 2002 p.6

18 ibid

19 Zygmaunt Bauman, "Quality and Inequality" *The Guardian* 29/12/01

20 ibid

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