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Pining for the Periphery: German Decolonisation and the Negative Nostalgia of Hans Grimm

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In the dying pages of *Culture and Imperialism*, Edward Said asserted the value of the state of exile as lying in its inherent marginality. For Said, exile is an enabling experience that offers its subject the ability to transcend the strategic identity politics implicit in belonging. However, this same empowerment, Said argued, is necessarily permeated by a nostalgic melancholia whose effects at least partially undermine any sense of empowerment gained through a life lived apart from a national community.¹

Exile then, Said argued, is intrinsically linked to notions of identity and identification — identification with a temporal, spatial and socio-political context that through acculturation becomes internalised as an important part of the self. In this respect, exile can be seen as linked to the nationalist sensibility,² insofar as nationalist movements and the types of nations they create³ are a product of a sense of estrangement or exile from an imagined social unit. In other words, the exilic sensibility can be seen as a creative sensibility, as in the example of Germany, where competing discourses of nationalism (for example, *großdeutsch* and *kleindeutsch*) simultaneously interacted with and acted upon the material conditions they evolved through to construct a nation whose existence was not dictated by geographical, linguistic, cultural or economic necessity. Paraphrasing Said, the creation of Germany can be seen as the struggle of a discourse community to overcome their sense of exile from “their rightful way of life”⁴ by materialising the homeland for which they longed. Arguably, this attempt to overcome a sense of national “exile” was a product of German liberalism and the strategy employed German liberals to bring about a nationalist sense of cohesion. The enlistment of imperialism as a means by which liberal Germany’s

*Identitätssehnsucht*⁵ could be salvaged offers a concrete example of the manipulation of political and material conditions in order to overcome a sense of exile from a perceived "rightful way of life".

It is something of a truism to state that the success of a particular postulation of nationalism is retrospectively justified by its success in materialising its proffered form of social organisation.⁶ A corollary of this is that unsuccessful postulations of the national project are often viewed retrospectively as necessarily unsuccessful — that is, fundamentally flawed, unworkable or plainly undesirable. Yet it is conceivable, if not likely, that the sense of "exile" from a desired social model is equally acute for adherents to failed or obstructed national projects as for disciples of successful nationalisms, and, unlike their successful counterparts, adherents to failed national projects are forever denied the satisfaction of a "homecoming through praxis", whereby their sense of social dislocation and resultant cognitive dissonance are overcome through the physical realisation of their theoretical nationalist constructs. For those aligned to unsuccessful nationalist projects, their sense of exile from their "rightful way of life" is permanent, resulting in a perpetual frustration, the intensity of which is in direct proportion to the sense of impotence engendered by the marginalisation of both the nationalist discourse and its adherents.

Unsurprisingly, the thwarting of heartfelt national projects is not a development conducive to a dispassionate transcendence of the more parochial aspects of identity, or the creation of a decentred observer-from-the-margins. Indeed it is arguable that this exile will lead to the inflammation of the denied sense of identity, resulting in a hypertrophic chauvinism. Where successful national projects encourage retrospective self-congratulation, denied national projects tend towards a tone of grievance, the tone that most informs the work of the Weimar Republic novelist Hans Grimm, a figure largely representative of a German nationalist but liberal social milieu.⁷

Hans Grimm can be seen as an exile both in spatial and ideological terms. Geographically, the outcome of the First World War dictated that he should lose his adopted home, the African colonies. Perhaps more importantly, the loss of Germany's

colonies after the First World War saw Grimm, and, to his eyes, the entire German nation exiled from their true destiny as a World Power commensurate with England and France. His literary output is usually recalled with the single-line title of his most famous work — *Volk Ohne Raum* — Nation Without Space,⁸ a title and work most quickly associated with the uses it was put to under the auspices of the NSDAP, as a justification of their *Drang nach Osten* policies. However it is important to remember that the majority of Grimm's major works were composed, and many published, prior to 1933, a factor that, seen in conjunction with Grimm's problematic relationship with the Nazis,⁹ suggests that Grimm's imperialist nationalism was of a different order to that of the Nazi party. Despite this difference, Grimm's imperialist writings were of immense instrumental value to the Nazi party, both as a form of "nationalist noise" contributing to a social environment of radicalised and racialised discourse, and as a theoretical bridge between older liberal forms of German imperialism and the new pastiche ideology of the NSDAP.

The legacy of the Hanseatic traders and some other scattered mercantile and missionary activity notwithstanding, the older, liberal imperial colonialism began for Germany in 1884, when Bismarck, for primarily domestic political reasons acquiesced to persistent National Liberal calls for an active imperialist policy.¹⁰ With a view to emulating the success of the bourgeois nations of Britain and France, Germany's own bourgeoisie viewed the German empire as evidence of Germany's arrival as a liberal nation, conflating liberalism with imperialism in a manner characteristic of many European nations at the turn of the twentieth century. Despite the colonial empire being a net financial impost on the German state, its discursive power and emblematic significance were considerable, initially as a vehicle for a National Liberal party revival and later as an ongoing symbol of progress, industry and trade — key indicators that Germany had embraced middle class liberalism as the receptacle of national identity, as opposed to the socialist workers' utopia, the retrograde agrarianism of the Elbian Conservatives or the socio-religious particularism of the Catholic Centre.

With the colonies operating as a vehicle for national cohesion in the absence of any other organic reason for it, the loss of the colonies in the Versailles settlement saw Germany's liberal imperialism internationally discredited. The notion of a fraternal, healthy imperialist rivalry with the other imperial bourgeois nations gave way under the strength of the resentment created by Versailles. Imperialism as the showpiece of German liberalism mutated into an imperialism as revanchist fantasy — a “politics in waiting”, as Pascal Grosse *et al.* have characterised it.¹¹ Central to this transformation was the novelist Hans Grimm.

Hans Grimm's pedigree was impeccably bourgeois liberal.¹² In a revealing dedication to his father at the beginning of his volume of short stories entitled *Lüderitzland*, Grimm recounts with some feeling the stages of his life, and his father's influence upon them. His first memory, he relates, of his father “as a German man” was of him at the table some time after 1880, discussing the “*altbürgerlich*” issues of Bismarck, Bennigsen and the National Liberals, along with a bemoaning of the rise of Social Democracy, the *nouveau riche* and their unseemly scramble after titles.¹³

Firmly wedded to the memories of discussions of these issues that lay at the heart of German national liberalism were memories of strong opinions in favour of colonial expansion. Grimm dates these discussions to 1882 — when he was just seven. As Grimm recalled it, this rapidly growing topic of discussion served as a counterweight to the fears of a changing society harboured by German liberals. Colonialism represented a cause that the National Liberals could work towards with a newfound zeal, a progressive project through which their vision of Germany's future could be articulated.¹⁴

Grimm's dating of these conversations is important, in that it demonstrates the primacy of pre-existent National Liberal colonialist sentiment in Bismarck's later acquiescence to an imperialist policy, as opposed to the sometimes made claim that the National Liberals merely “rode the colonial horse” provided by a magnanimous Bismarck in a tight election. However equally important is his explicit linkage of imperialist discourse to bourgeois-liberal circles, Grimm's own familial heritage and political orientation in the years prior to the First World War.

Critically, Grimm saw in the imperialist ideology of his father and his fellow National Liberals, the beginning of a truly German history. If Grimm's panegyric to his father reveals anything, it is that he viewed Liberal imperialism as having "opened the door" for "an entire young Germany" to meet their imperial destiny,¹⁵ and as a national policy that revealed the new nation's Romantic optimism in the same way that the First World War would do thirty years later.¹⁶

For Grimm, as for such liberals as Friedrich Fabri¹⁷ and Friedrich List¹⁸, the annexing of overseas colonies represented a necessary step in the growth of a world power. Imperialism was necessary in order to ensure the German *Volk* could expand, without any loss of its youth to other colonising nations.¹⁹ It was proof of a nation's worth and a process of national renewal and rejuvenation.²⁰ Moreover, it was a physical necessity for a *Volk* otherwise condemned to remain cramped by its lack of physical space.²¹

Accordingly, the liberal imperialism set in track during 1884-85 was seen by Grimm, as by most German liberals, as an unambiguously progressive step, both before and importantly after the First World War. Not surprisingly, the colonial losses sustained by Germany as a result of the First World War were viewed by Grimm not merely as a retrograde development, but also as evidence of the larger political framework of Great Power rivalries, that was viewed in terms of a coterie of imperialist powers excluding Germany from the ranks of the world powers, so as to further their own imperialist ambitions via the device of the Versailles settlement.

In his autobiographical and exculpatory post-Second World War work *Suchen und Hoffen*, Grimm argued time and again, that the plight of Germany during the Weimar Republic was largely the result of a European mindset that refused to countenance a Germany bestowed with power properly commensurate with its demographic, economic and spiritual potential.²² It was no wonder, Grimm argued, that the traditional liberal bourgeoisie sought solace in radical nationalism during the twenties, with the stripping of Germany's eastern and overseas territories and the economic colonisation of Germany by the victorious powers.²³ The national

liberals may not have been National Socialists by inclination, but the constraints imposed upon Germany by Versailles and the Young Plan led to a sense of fellow feeling with the Nazis²⁴ limited only by a distaste for their vulgar street theatrics, their lowly social origins and the lack of respect for the individual shown by this mass social movement.²⁵

As a novelist, Grimm simultaneously reflected and shaped the popular perception of the colonial issue in the post-Versailles Weimar Republic. With many of his works reaching the status of best-seller, Grimm enjoyed an enormous discursive power, crystallising Germany's amorphous pro-imperial liberalism into a series of embittered narratives that foregrounded a number of colonial experiences and ideas, not the least of which was an aggravated sense of exile — arguing for their centrality to the broader discourse of German national identity.

It is a commonplace to say that the novel is a bourgeois mode of textuality, however insofar as the novel form traces the experiences of the heroic individual, and his/her interaction with the wider world, in the case of Grimm, the medium was the message. Whether presenting the hardship inflicted upon the German hero by Germany's colonial rivals in *Der Ölsucher von Duala*, the racial killing that marked the colonial rite of passage into adulthood in *Wie Grete Aufhört ein Kind zu Sein*, or the tortuous process by which Cornelius Friebott came to realise the necessity of his nation's imperial destiny in *Volk Ohne Raum*, Grimm implicitly argued for the centrality of the heroic individual in the nation's rise to imperial greatness. As individuals struggled to better their own lives in the colonies, Grimm suggested, they simultaneously contributed to the glory of the nation — a notion that Grimm elsewhere defines as *Altbürgerlichkeit*.

As Grimm's audience read his works, an implicit understanding arose between the composer of the text and his respondents, that the colonised lands were rightly a realm for German narratives, German experiences, and German subjectivity. As such, the status of the indigenous population was that of minor characters, a subordinate adjunct to the dominant Germans. In this sense, textual order mimicked the previously existing social order of the colonies, as the indigenous population's subordination to the

social discipline of the colonisers was inscribed at a textual level. Indigenous people were thus marginalised in German narratives of their lands, textually excluded. This textual exclusion served to reinforce for German audiences the facts of colonial imperialism — that if Germans were to again have room to enact their imperialist fantasies in the colonies, those Africans who had lived there previously had to be forcibly marginalised — even eradicated. The colonial novel offered the forcibly decolonised Germans a simulation of the brute power politics of the liberal imperialism that had inscribed the belated nation's identity upon the colonies. Physically exiled from their rightful colonial "homeland", the bourgeois reader could, through fiction, experience vicariously his /her earlier sense of Self as a liberal imperialist, enacting Germany's rightful way of life. Literature offered an *ersatz* imperialism, thereby keeping alive imperial ambitions, and in the uncertain Weimar world, a representation of a time when the imperialist Germans exercised control over their own destiny.

In propagating a sense of nostalgia in the previous colonising centre, for a lost colonial periphery, Grimm consciously sought to further the decades old discourse of liberal imperialism, as a discourse of national identity through which the middle classes would consolidate their domestic social ascendancy through their trade with and administration of Germany's global empire. Using the metaphor of "space" as an expression of the frustration of bourgeois energies, Grimm's novels essentially externalised the sense that post-war Germany had become too *eng*, too claustrophobic.²⁶

To argue that Grimm was solely responsible for the post-war revival of German imperialism is of course a nonsense. As has been stated, the process was a two-way process, whereby Grimm articulated an existing sentiment amidst his readership — hence his enduring popularity that predated Nazi support for his works.²⁷ In essence, Grimm's success evinced a prevailing imperialist mood that had little to do with his rhetorical power, and much to do with the preceding eighty years of German imperialist discourse and Grimm's resurrection of its core tropes. That colonial fiction was still hugely popular after the First World War suggests that the

defeat had not persuaded the German middle classes that imperial conquest was an impossible basis for national unity.

Grimm's works, then, represented a determined continuance of the German liberal nation-building project that was firmly grounded in the imperial expansion of the 1880s and continued uninterrupted until the First World War. Despite his protests to the contrary,²⁸ Grimm offered a social vision that was essentially retrograde and nostalgic yet not marginal, in that it was firmly grounded in the expectations and beliefs of the German liberal middle classes, in their modernising social agenda, and in their notion of the role of the modern liberal citizen, all of which Grimm articulates through his concept of *Altbürgerlichkeit*. To be a little facetious, Grimm could be seen as operating as a Gramscian organic intellectual for the nationalist segment of German liberalism during the inter-war period.

This *Altbürgerlichkeit* became for Grimm if not a fully-fledged ideology of rule, then at least a foundation for national identity. At more than one point, Grimm remarked that without this inherently middle-class sensibility, Germany would cease to be Germany.²⁹ Ironically, however, Grimm defined this middle-class discourse of German national identity explicitly as based on English liberal mores, to which all Germans should aspire to subscribe.³⁰

Central to this proffered discourse of identity was a sense of civic duty and personal sacrifice, balanced by a refusal by the individual to become dissolved into the mass, as demanded by such rival discourses as socialism and National Socialism.³¹ The cornerstone to this paradoxical individualised selflessness in Grimm's view was private property, which ensured that the loyal citizenry were not fully subsumed by the national *Geist* they served.³²

It is too easy to see in this ideological formulation a modification of Fichtean or Hegelian theoretics, however, the notion of *Altbürgerlichkeit* had its more immediate origins in the nineteenth century search for a national identity and the solution to this problem proffered by the National Liberals, with whom Grimm's family were so closely aligned. Grimm explicitly argues that this gentlemanly citizenship, as he defines *Altbürgerlichkeit*, is

a necessary condition of any true German identity.³³ Rather than an extreme Right or Left immersion of the individual within the mass, Grimm argued for British-style High liberalism, as exemplified in the conduct of English imperialism by civic minded individuals who, so the rhetoric went, sought both national progress and personal betterment through colonialism.³⁴

It is this sense of middle-class citizenship that Grimm saw as the origin of all honest political conduct in German society, as he argued in various contexts. As spokes from the centre of a wheel, Germany's earlier colonial endeavours, the sense of loyal service during the First World War, the agitation for a revision of the Versailles treaty (particularly in terms of its provisions on Germany's colonial territories), and the resistance to the Young Plan all stemmed from a sense of *altbürgerlich* propriety.

In other words, colonial revisionism, resistance to the Young Plan and Versailles and a pride in past martial enthusiasm are core elements of a rightful German identity during the Weimar Republic, as Grimm defines it. Far from being seen as radical elements of the far-Right, they were posited as integral elements of a liberal *Weltanschauung*, whose roots reach back as far as Friedrich List.

Grimm's liberalism can be seen as perhaps the final incarnation of a German liberalism that saw territorial expansion, aggressive international trade and vociferous nationalism as compatible with, indeed a precondition for broader liberal aims of parliamentary control, and bourgeois social and economic domestic hegemony.³⁵

With Versailles radically altering the political landscape, the rhetoric of German liberalism was repositioned as a discourse of resistance, as calls for imperialism and an assertive national identity clashed violently with the broader European understanding of what an appropriate German national identity should now look like. The decades-old aspirations of German liberals appeared, in the new context of a defeated Germany, to resemble the radical and combative nationalism of the hard Right. Whereas the upper echelons of the new liberal political parties partially modified their political agendas to match the changed political landscape, their constituents did no such thing, largely adhering to their earlier

sense of what constituted Germany's rightful national identity and Germany's rightful way of life. In this sense, German liberals such as Hans Grimm felt themselves to be exiles — forcibly separated from their national destiny.

It is this adherence to a nineteenth century liberalism beyond its contextual appropriateness that has been misread by some critics as being symptomatic of Grimm's centrality to the "Conservative Revolution".³⁶ In the case of figures such as Grimm, this appellation is misleading in a number of ways. Firstly and most importantly, this view posits the "revolutionary" movement as having been made by the German liberal middle classes and their ideological position, whereas the movement should in fact be located in the radical shift in the post-First World War political context within which an enduring liberal imperialist discourse continued to be enunciated.

Secondly, the term "revolution" lends the impression that prior to Weimar a German discourse of imperial ambition and national self-assertion had not existed, rather that it was something radically new. In fact this discourse predated the revolutions of 1848 — and had continuously resurfaced throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. As Harmut Pogge von Strandmann has pointed out, "the German arguments for acquiring colonies in the first place and for demanding their return later on were sufficiently similar to create a certain link between pre-war imperialism and post-war colonial revisionism".³⁷ Friedrich List, Friedrich Fabri, Max Weber, and Hans Grimm are all links in a continuous discursive chain of German liberal imperialism that stretched across almost one hundred years. The discourse itself remained relatively constant, as did its internal disputes (overseas or Eastern expansion, settler or trade colonies) — what had altered was how this discourse was politically and culturally situated. Far from being a radical departure, much of what has been viewed as a new Weimar "conservatism" was consistent with (but not identical to) pre-war and post-war liberalism insofar as it saw nationalism and imperialism as being central to a discourse of national identity that could effectively combat rival discourses of nation — socialism, Elbian agrarian conservatism and Catholicism. As Sheehan has remarked: "those who voted for the Nazis after 1930

were continuing to vote against their traditional enemies, political Catholicism and the parties of industrial labour.”³⁸ Viewed from within as a continuous and internally consistent discourse, the change in context without saw German liberalism define itself *de facto* as a form of conservatism.

It is this immunity to contextual change that Dieter Langewiesche has inadvertently pointed to in his view that: “At the end of the day [...] democratic nationalism was unable to distinguish itself clearly enough from the integral nationalism of the right”.³⁹ Indeed Langewiesche states explicitly that it was the persistence of the twin liberal ambitions of regaining past colonial possessions and national expansion — in defiant contradiction of the Versailles settlement — that led to liberalism resembling hard Right ultra-nationalism.⁴⁰ Langewiesche is correct in his diagnosis that German liberals did indeed come to vote for increasingly Rightist parties, however, this was not so much a mindless lurch to the Right by a panicked *Mittelstand*,⁴¹ but rather a conscious decision to support parties that seemed to best articulate the longstanding tenets of liberal ideology. It is worth remembering that as early as 1912 Friedrich Meinecke had pointed out that it was imperialism that constituted the bond between National Liberals.⁴² As adherents to liberalism, the middle classes searched for a party that appeared to understand their perception of themselves and their social role — what the DVP’s Otto Most called liberalism’s self-perception as “the national idea of power,” a vehicle for the “salvation of the nation [...] by means of the salvation of the individual”.⁴³ Such liberal theorising overlapped considerably with Grimm’s notion of *Altbürgerlichkeit* — whereby civic-minded individuals furthered the extent of the nation’s power. As an historically expansionist discourse, liberalism’s imperialist heritage was seamlessly co-opted by Weimar’s Right wing parties, thereby making them an appealing option for embittered liberals, ideologically exiled from the official face of a political liberalism, that, under international pressure, sought to temper liberalism’s earlier expansionist dreams — hence Grimm’s association with the DNVP.

The literature of Hans Grimm is an expression of the intransigence of Germany’s liberals in the face of the historical

change brought about by the First World War and the persistence of imperialism as a central tenet of the liberal concept of German national identity. Since the time of Friedrich List, German liberalism had expressed its vision of modernity and progress in imperialist, colonial terms. Despite the defeat of this imperialist vision in the First World War, German liberals considered themselves as imperial masters in exile, and it was not until the *Untergang* of 1945 that the German middle classes jettisoned their colonial nostalgia and revised their understanding of what it meant to be a liberal nation.

¹ E. Said, *Culture and Imperialism* (London, 1984), p. 403.

² E. Said, *Reflections on Exile and Other Essays*, (Cambridge Ma, 2000), p. 176.

³ Ernest Gellner's axiom that "it is nationalism that engenders nations and not the other way around" underwrites the following argument. See E. Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism* (Oxford, 1983), p. 55.

⁴ Said, *Reflections*, p. 176.

⁵ The term is Horst Gründer's. See his *Geschichte der deutschen Kolonien* (Paderborn, 1985), p. 30.

⁶ Said, *Reflections*, p. 176.

⁷ Contra I. Stoehr, *German Literature of the Twentieth Century: From Aestheticism to Postmodernism* (Rochester, 2001), pp. 97, 189-91. For Stoehr, Grimm sits firmly in the ranks of warmongering, "reactionary and fascist literature". Martin Travers also catalogues Grimm as part of the "Conservative Revolution", albeit with an understanding of Grimm's origins in nineteenth century colonial imperialism. That nineteenth century German imperialism was largely liberal and not conservative is not mentioned. (M. Travers, *Critics of Modernity: The Literature of the Conservative Revolution in Germany, 1890-1933* (New York, 2001), p. 131ff.)

⁸ The edition used in this paper is H. Grimm, *Volk Ohne Raum* (München, 1935), the single volume edition.

⁹ W. Smith, "The Colonial Novel as Political Propaganda: Hans Grimm's *Volk Ohne Raum*", *German Studies Review*, Vol. 6, 2 (1983), pp. 221-2.

¹⁰ For more on this see H. Pogge von Strandmann, "Domestic Origins of Germany's Colonial Expansion Under Bismarck", *Past and Present*, Vol. 42, 1 (1969).

¹¹ T. Campt, P. Grosse, Y.C. Lemke-Muniz de Faria, "Blacks, Germans and the Politics of Imperial Imagination, 1920-60." in S. Friedrichsmeyer, S. Lennox and S. Zantop, eds, *The Imperialist Imagination: German Colonialism and its Legacy* (Ann Arbor, 1998), p. 216.

¹² This is primarily a biographical statement. His later flirtation with the DNVP in no way discounts his essentially liberal cultural context.

¹³ H. Grimm, *Lüderitzland* (München, 1934), p. 9. "Meine früheste Erinnerung an Dich als deutschen Mann [...] beginnt nach 1880 [...] immer mehr die Rede von Bismarck und von Bennisen und seiner Partei und immer unruhiger die Rede von Waren- und Menschenexport und von Sozialdemokratie und vom Aufkommen neuen Reichtums und neuer Titelsucht."

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 10. "Im Jahre 1882, als Siebenjähriger hörte ich [...] zum ersten Male das Wort Kolonie und begriff bald, daß etwas in Gange sei, das Dich mit Hoffnung gegenüber Deinen wachsenden Befürchtungen und mit einem neuen Eifer erfülle." It should be noted that this is not the same thing as Hans-Ulrich Wehler's Social Imperialism thesis of colonialism as a cynical spectacle designed by a conservative coterie specifically to divert the masses away from socialism. H. Wehler, *Bismarck und der Imperialismus* (Berlin 1969).

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 18. "Mein Vater, Du sprachst vor fünfzig Jahren von dem Tore, das Lüderitz aufgestoßen habe für ein ganzes junges Deutschland. Wo ein Tor aufgestoßen wird, beginnt Menschenschicksal."

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 15.

¹⁷ F Fabri, *Bedarf Deutschland der Colonien?* (Lewiston, 1998).

¹⁸ F. List, *Schriften / Reden / Briefe*, ed. A. Somner (Aalen, 1971).

¹⁹ Grimm, *Lüderitzland*, p. 16.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 18; "zu erneuern und zu verjüngen."

²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 16.

²² See for example H. Grimm, *Suchen und Hoffen* (Lippoldsberg, 1960), p. 49. "[...] wenn der Wahnsinn von Versailles dauere, Deutschland und in der Folge Europa verkommen müsse." See also pp. 188ff.

²³ *Ibid.*, pp. 33-37, 50.

²⁴ This fellow-feeling should not be confused with a proto-fascist sensibility or an uncritical acceptance of the Nazi state, as suggested by Joachim Warmbold's polemical *Germania in Africa: Germany's Colonial Literature* (New York, 1989) pp. 105ff, pp. 121ff.

²⁵ In a somewhat Thucydidean passage, Grimm speaks of a meeting with Hitler, in which the relationship between the two is spelt out precisely for the reader, leaving the reader with the feeling that Grimm has decided not to record the precise words spoken, but rather "to make the speakers say what [...] was called for by each situation". See Thucydides, *History of the Peloponnesian War*, trans. R Warner (Harmondsworth, 1972). In a private conversation with Hitler, Grimm appears to have delivered a set speech, in which he formally advised Hitler: "Herr Hitler, ich möchte sofort erklären dürfen, daß ich keinen Wunsch an Sie habe und daß ich nicht zu Ihnen gehöre und auch nie zu Ihnen gehören werde; aber der Sache der Sie dienen, diene

auch ich und werde immer dienen", to which Hitler formally replied: "Sie haben mir bei meinem Kampf für Deutschland bisher besser genützt, dadurch daß Sie nicht zu mir und zu uns gehörten. Ich konnte auf Ihr Hauptbuch hindeuten und konnte dazu erklären, der ist kein Nationalsozialist, aber für die deutsche Not sind seine Augen offen wie unsere". In this way, from the very outset, no lesser authority than Hitler himself exonerates Grimm from Nazi sympathies, whilst simultaneously endorsing Grimm's own *altbürgerlich* but no less messianic brand of German expansionism. See Grimm, *Suchen und Hoffen*, p. 12. The use of "representative" set speeches is a common characteristic of both this and other Grimm works.

²⁶ On the concept of space in the works of Hans Grimm, see T. Nolden, "On Colonial Spaces and Bodies: Hans Grimm's *Geschichten aus Südwestafrika*", in Friedrichsmeyer *et al.*, *The Imperialist Imagination*, p. 125ff.

²⁷ Smith, "The Colonial Novel as Political Propaganda", pp. 220-221.

²⁸ Grimm, *Suchen und Hoffen*, p. 8.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 50. "[...] ich begriff, daß ein Deutschland, welches die Mittel verlöre oder aufgabe, in immer neuen Schichten altbürgerlich unabhängig zu denken und altbürgerlich 'honorig' zu leben, seine besondere Wertigkeit verliere und eben dann kein Deutschland mehr sei." See also pp. 54, 202ff.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 51, 54.

³¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 51-54, 196, 202ff.

³² *Ibid.*, p. 51.

³³ *Ibid.*, p. 54. "Wenn es Altbürgerlichkeit bei uns nicht mehr geben kann [...] erst dann ist unser gequältes Deutschland nicht mehr Deutschland."

³⁴ Grimm, *Suchen und Hoffen*, p. 51.

³⁵ Both H.-Ulrich Wehler and J. Sheehan quote Friedrich Meinecke's 1912 sentiment that "the idea of imperialism was the most effective bond holding National Liberals together". See J.J. Sheehan, *German Liberalism in the Nineteenth Century* (Chicago, 1978), p. 276.

³⁶ See for example Travers, *Critics of Modernity*, pp. 10, 130-145; and Stoehr, *German Literature of the Twentieth Century*, pp. 189-91.

³⁷ H Pogge von Strandmann, "Imperialism and Revisionism in Interwar Germany" in W.J. Mommsen and J. Osterhammel, eds, *Imperialism and After: Continuities and Discontinuities* (London, 1986), p. 91.

³⁸ Sheehan, *German Liberalism in the Nineteenth Century*, p. 282.

³⁹ D. Langewiesche, *Liberalism in Germany*, trans. C. Banerji, (Princeton, 2000), p. 286.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 286.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, p. 264.

⁴² Sheehan, *German Liberalism in the Nineteenth Century*, p. 276, quoting H.U. Wehler, *Das deutsche Kaiserreich* (Göttingen, 1973), p. 195.

⁴³ Otto Most, quoted in Langewiesche, *Liberalism in Germany*, p. 281.