Tracing the Evolutionary Roots of Modern Islamic Radicalism and Militancy

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This paper takes an innovative approach to understanding Islamic radicalism and militancy by utilising charismatic leadership theory to understand the critical role of charismatic leaders in the evolutionary development of the modern Islamist movement's most radical and militant strains. The study of charismatic leadership, rather than focusing exclusively upon the individual leader, is concerned with understanding the complex interplay of social, cultural, historical, psychological and ideological dynamics that create a context conducive for the emergence of the charismatic leader-follower relationship. Consequently, this paper offers critical insights into the phenomenon of Islamic radicalism and militancy. To this end, I argue that the charismatic leader has acted as the *vehicle* for the evolutionary development of the more radical and militant strains of political Islam. To support this contention, I identify a chain of charismatic leaders stretching across the entire chronology of the modern Islamist movement, reflecting an increasing radicalisation and propensity towards violence with the rise of each leader. I argue that these leaders have emerged during ever present and intensifying perceptions of crisis within communities of potential support, due to the transformative charisma phenomenon in Islamic radicalism and militancy. This innovative and multidisciplinary approach to mapping the evolutionary roots of modern Islamist terrorism will reveal the critical factors at play in the evolutionary development of contemporary Islamic radicalism and militancy from its roots in Islamic modernism in the late 1800s to today's 'self-generating mini-groups'.

Tracing the evolutionary roots of modern Islamic radicalism and militancy

In a recent interview, renowned historian, Anthony Beevor, asserted that it was vital that the terrorism phenomenon be understood within the context of the universal laws of 'cause and effect'. Indeed, at times of conflict and threats to security some of the greatest errors in judgment have occurred when this basic principle was forgotten. This resulted in empathy, a critical ingredient in any successful approach to security, being discarded as 'camouflaged sympathy'. Unfortunately, these errors are frequently made when confronting the issue of Islamic radicalism and militancy. However, it is only in recognising the role of 'cause and effect' and learning from the past that we can move towards a more nuanced understanding of the emergence and evolutionary development of Islamic radicalism and militancy. This paper seeks to do this by utilising charismatic leadership theory to understand the role of the charismatic leader in the evolutionary development of the modern Islamist movement. The study of charismatic leadership, rather than focusing exclusively upon the individual leader, focuses primarily upon understanding the merger of

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social, cultural, historical, psychological and ideological dynamics that create a context conducive for the emergence of the charismatic leader-follower relationship. In this paper I argue that the charismatic leader has acted as the vehicle for the evolution of the modern Islamist movement's most radical and militant strains. The identification of a chain of charismatic leaders stretching across the entire chronology of the modern Islamist movement, from Jamal al-Afghani of the 1800s to Osama bin Laden and Abu Musab al-Zarqawi of today, reflects an increasing radicalisation of ideology and propensity towards violence with the rise of each leader. This paper argues that this phenomenon is due to the Transformative Charisma Phenomenon (TCP) in Islamic radicalism and militancy, which is the notion that an identifiable chain of charismatic leaders emerges due to both an ever-present and intensifying perception of crisis within communities of potential support and the ability of such leaders to build on the charismatic capital of their predecessors. In doing so, the paper offers insights into the critical factors at play in the evolutionary development of contemporary Islamic radicalism and militancy from its roots in Islamic modernism in the late 1800s to today's 'self-generating groups'.

Prior to delving into the TCP in Islamic radicalism and militancy, it is vital to establish a theoretical framework for understanding not only the charismatic leadership phenomenon but also the process of radicalisation in relation to Islamic orientation. While word limit constraints will not allow an in-depth analysis of the field of charismatic leadership theory, I will present a generic theoretical framework of charismatic leadership theory to inform the remainder of this paper. Following this, I will present my 'Model of diversity in Islamic orientation' which will illustrate not only the diversity within Islam, but the transitional and rationalised nature of the radicalisation process between its 'secularist', 'modernist', 'radical' and 'militant' orientations. I will argue that the charismatic leader plays an important role in the process of individual and collective radicalisation and propensity to violence by acting as the *vehicle* for this process.

An analysis and discussion of the TCP in Islamic radicalism and militancy will follow, focusing exclusively on the evolutionary development of the most radical and militant strains of political Islam. Two important findings will emerge here. Firstly, the evolutionary developments of the phenomenon reflect shifting *perceptions of crisis* that correspond to the socio-historical developments of any given period. Secondly, as the perception of crisis intensifies, there is a parallel increase in both the radicalisation of ideology and propensity towards violence. This study therefore gives critical insights into the evolutionary development of Islamic radicalism and militancy from the modernists of the 1800s to the Islamist militants of today.

Charismatic Leadership Theory: A generic theoretical framework[1]

The 'charismatic leadership phenomenon' can arguably be traced back to the early stages of human social development. 'Charisma has its roots long ago in human evolution. From the advent of symbolically-orientated behavior, charisma has existed as a latent potential in all social systems….' (Bradley 1987, p. 3). Comparatively, the theoretical study of charismatic leadership is a more recent development, its origins being found most significantly in Max Weber's *Economy and Society* (1968). Weber's work has greatly influenced the study of charismatic leadership and while an in-depth analysis of his work is not possible here[2], it is difficult to find a theory of charismatic leadership which has not been influenced by his work (see Bryman 1992; Freund 1968; Schweitzer 1984; and Shils 1965). While the field of charismatic leadership theory has moved on from Weber's original conception of the phenomenon into a diverse and complex area of study, for Weber and the great majority of subsequent theorists, charisma is understood not as a personality trait but rather, the bond between a leader and follower that must be accepted for charismatic appeal to be generated and a charismatic relationship to form (See Bradley and Roberts 1988; Bryman 1992; Conger 1988; Eisenstadt 1995a; Willner 1968). It is the nature of the charismatic relationship that has arguably generated the most controversial debate in the field[3] and it is this debate that forms the fault-lines which differentiate the sociological-symbolic approach[4] from the self-concept base approach[5], or the psycho-analytical[6] from the social formation approaches[7].

While it is unfortunate that word limit constraints will not allow a discussion of the field of charismatic leadership theory, I now seek to offer my own theoretical approach to the charismatic leadership phenomenon that builds upon preceding theories of charismatic leadership while containing a number of original contributions to the field. There are two purposes behind developing a generic theoretical framework: firstly, to establish a theoretical basis for the remainder of this discussion; and secondly, to argue that a *universalist* framework implies that the emergence of a charismatic leader is not due to inherent flaws in the socio-cultural environment or the irrationality of the individuals involved, but rather is due to universal social dynamics. The five-point framework is as follows:

1. The charismatic leader attracts followers due to personal attributes that are recognised by followers as exceptional and, as a consequence, he/she is followed with a sense of awe, hope and faith. Furthermore, charismatic leadership is a reciprocal, interdependent, empowering and rationalised relationship that develops between a leader and his/her followers.

2. While notions of heroism or great knowledge are attributes commonly ascribed to a charismatic leader, it is important to recognise that culture plays a crucial role in what attributes are considered exceptional in any given society. Consequently, cultural and socio-historical traditions and myths play a crucial role in the emergence of a charismatic leader. Indeed, charismatic leaders will both manipulate and emulate culturally specific myths, traditions and figures to empower both themselves and their followers by offering them a source of personal and collective identity, as well as to construct their image.

3. Charismatic leaders will use not only rhetoric or the presentation of a doctrine, but the manipulation of modern communication technology as tools and techniques to generate their images, charismatic appeal and support. Ideology plays a central role in the generation of charismatic appeal for a leader and modern communication tools are frequently manipulated not only to spread their message, but generate charismatic appeal.

4. The environment surrounding the emergence of a charismatic leader is characterised by the *perception of crisis* within both the individual and collective. While it may be possible to identify quantitatively the source of the perceived crisis (e.g. an increase in unemployment), this may not always be the case. In fact, a charismatic leader will often build upon, manipulate or even create the perception of crisis within the individual and collective. For example, a charismatic leader may create a sense of *moral panic[8]* within both the individual and collective. The perception of crisis within a community feeds the notion within both individuals and the collective that established authorities have failed to recognise, deal with or alleviate the crisis situation. This results in an increased susceptibility to the emergence of a charismatic leader.

5. The routinisation of charisma is inevitable due to the ephemeral nature of the phenomenon. While there is a tendency for charismatic leadership to be replaced by legal-rational or traditional forms of leadership if the movement is successful, the death of a charismatic leader poses a problem for the remaining members. Commonly, such a situation results in either the break-up of the movement, the replacement of the leader by traditional means, the designation of a new leader by the remaining followers or the charismatic leader before his/her death, or a search for a replacement through the identification of certain attributes. Nevertheless, it is important to recognise

that the process of routinisation does not necessarily signify the death of charisma. In fact, charisma may indeed emerge due to routinisation[9].

Diversity in Islamic orientation: Radicalisation and the charismatic leader

As outlined in the preceding framework[10], cultural and socio-historical traditions play a fundamental role in the charismatic leader-follower relationship. While an in-depth analysis of the Islamic tradition and its sectarian, ethnic, nationalistic, doctrinal and socio-political subtleties[11] is not possible here, nevertheless, the following model illustrates the diversity in Islamic orientations, the process of radicalisation and the relationship of both to propensity towards violence - a crucial relationship within the context of the current investigation. Although offering a unique approach, the following model was developed drawing upon the work of David Wright-Neville (2004)[12] and William Shepard (1987)[13].

The diversities in Islamic orientations, even within one sectarian division (e.g. the *sunni* division), are too numerous even to attempt to articulate here when doctrinal, cultural, linguistic, ethnic and nationalistic nuances are taken into account. By Islamic orientation, I mean that complex of belief and practice which exists at both the individual and group level and may be differentiated between both the collective and the individual. This paper is interested in not only recognising the diversity within Islamic orientations, but also in understanding that diversity *within the context* of the differing perception of the role of selectively literalist interpretations of Islamic doctrine within the socio-cultural realm. Building upon this, radicalisation is therefore understood as a comparative increase and broadening in the attitudinal belief in the role of selectively literalist interpretations of Islamic doctrine applied to the public's socio-cultural and political realm by an individual or identifiable collective. Consequently, a collective which believes that constructed orientation towards Islam is relevant only to the individual and should not be applied to the public realm will be considered *comparatively less radical* than a collective which believes that Islam should be the all-encompassing framework to govern all spheres of life, both private and public. Used in this context, 'radicalisation' lacks any moral and ethical judgment and merely refers to a comparative assessment of attitudinal belief.

It is necessary now to define four *ideal* categorisations of adherents to Islam that, while they do not necessarily reflect every potential orientation, nevertheless

aid in the process of identification, analysis and comparison of a diversity of manifestations. These categorisations are intentionally general and do not indulge in specific ideological nuances. The four categorisations[14] are as follows:

- <u>Secularist:</u> Secularists believe that there should be a separation between the realm of religion and politics. In other words, Islam should not act as a framework for shaping the political sphere. For secularists the role of Islam should remain purely personal.

- <u>Modernist:</u> Modernists are defined not only by their belief that Islam does provide an adequate basis for public and private realms of life, but that it is also *compatible* with secular ideological perspectives. For example, modernists will characteristically claim that Islamic principles are compatible with secular philosophies of democracy and capitalism.

- <u>Radical:</u> Radicals believe that selectively literalist interpretations of Islamic doctrine should play a crucial role in both the personal and collective spheres as an all-encompassing framework for life. For radicals, Islam as a framework for life is incompatible with any secular ideology. Radicals *do not* seek to impose this belief by personally engaging in violence.

- <u>Militant:</u> Militants see it as necessary to engage in violence to ensure that their selectively literalist interpretation of Islamic doctrine is institutionalised without contamination from secular perspectives. Militants engage in terrorism[15].

These categorisations have been applied to the spectrum below. The further right one moves along the spectrum represents an increasing perception of the need to apply selectively literalist interpretations of Islam to the socio-cultural realm. Hence, the further along the spectrum one moves, the more comparatively radical the individual or collective becomes. Due to the generalised nature of the categorisations and the position of these categorisations on a spectrum, the transitory nature of the radicalisation process is most effectively illustrated. Hence, an individual may move along the spectrum from a modernist perspective towards a radical perspective as their perception of the growing need to apply Islam to the socio-cultural spheres increases. This process of radicalisation is inevitably coupled with a growing *perception of crisis* related to the perceived divergence between their perception of the role of Islam in the socio-cultural realm and the manifestation of that perception in reality. Nevertheless, due to the growing perception of crisis that inevitably leads to radicalisation of the individual or collective in question, a growing propensity towards violence also occurs. The charismatic leader inevitably plays a pivotal role

in the process of radicalisation by both highlighting and accentuating perceptions of crisis and offering an alternative based upon religious adherence.

Figure 1: Model of Diversity in Islamic Orientation

Model of diversity in Islamic orientation:
Literalist interpretation of Islamic doctrine and perceived role in society versus inclination towards violence.

Increasing inclination towards *perception of crisis* and violence

Secularist   Modernist   Radical   Militant

Increasing perception of the need to apply selectively literalist interpretation of Islam to the socio-cultural realm
(Increasing radicalisation)

Ultimately, this model seconds as a framework within which to understand not just the radicalisation of religious adherents, but the emergence of religious terrorism. As adherents pass through the spectrum, and the process of radicalisation becomes more extreme as the associated *perception of crisis* becomes more severe, so to does the individual's propensity towards violence increase. As Sprinzak argues,

> What terrorists do - and other radicals do not - is to bring their rejection of the regime's legitimacy to the point of challenging it with unconventional violence. However, since terrorism never emerges overnight, this crisis of legitimacy unfolds through a prolonged process of delegitimation of the established society and the regime (Sprinzak 1991, pp. 51-52).

This is, in essence, the process that the model below illustrates: the process by which religious terrorism emerges. Juergensmeyer suggests that '…the perception that the problem with politics is, at some level, religious…. Means "religionising" politics… in two ways: by showing that political difficulties have a religious cause, and that religious goals have a political solution' (Juergensmeyer 1991). The charismatic leader plays a catalytic role in the radicalisation process by highlighting,

accentuating or even creating the *perception of crisis* within an individual or group. James Piscatori argues that the disparity between reality and the Islamic ideal '…tends to become greater and the disappointment more acute in times of rapid change' (Piscatoro 1986, p. 21). It is during periods of socio-economic, political and cultural breakdown in Islamic societies that Islamist charismatic leaders typically rise to prominence. This tendency will be explicitly exhibited in the following analysis of the TCP in Islamic radicalism and militancy.

Charismatic leadership and the transformative charisma phenomenon in Islamic radicalism and militancy: Tracing the roots of contemporary Islamist militancy

Charismatic leaders of Islamist radical and terrorist groups selectively use the traditions, teachings and values of Islam to not only legitimise their actions and the actions of their followers, but to shape the cognitive perceptions of their followers regarding both themselves and the world around them. Muslims, like adherents to any religious tradition or even secular citizens, raise ideological questions in times of rapid and intense socio-cultural change in an attempt to understand the world around them. Inevitably, charismatic leaders tend to arise in Islamic societies in similar situations. Because Islam does not have a single, hierarchically-based clerical leadership, as, for instance, in the Catholic Church, it tends to have more space for the emergence of charismatic individuals in such times[16]. Furthermore, in Islam there are certain ideological concepts, for example *ijtihad* (independent interpretation of Islamic doctrine), *jihad* (struggle) and *tajdid* (renewal), which ideologically gears the religion for a continual process of renewal and reform in the face of change and adversity[17]. The picture that emerges is of a religion that not only fosters charismatic leadership[18], but makes fertile the socio-cultural environment for the rise of charismatic individuals. While the emergence of individual charismatic leaders throughout the modern Islamist movement can be explained by identifying the existence of the factors and characteristics specified in the theoretical framework of charismatic leadership established earlier, this does not explain how an identifiable chain of charismatic Islamist leaders has emerged, stretching from the 1800s into the 2000s.

Throughout the entire chronological development of the modern Islamist movement a chain of charismatic leaders, stretching from Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (1838-97), arguably the father of the modern Islamist movement, to Osama bin Laden

and beyond, is indicative of the presence of the TCP in Islamic radicalism and militancy[19]. The TCP in Islamic radicalism and militancy is essentially a type of *routinisation* and refers to the notion that a series of charismatic leaders have emerged throughout the chronological development of the modern Islamist movement by building upon the charisma, ideology and leadership qualities of preceding Islamist leaders. Tracing this phenomenon towards the emergence of Islamist militancy (Islamic terrorism) will be the focus of the remainder of this paper. What will emerge is that it is impossible to understand the rise of each leader outside of the socio-historical conditions of the time. Indeed, it is in reaction to these socio-historical conditions that the charismatic leader emerges and constructs his image. Ideology plays a pivotal role in the construction of this image and their ideological nuances are inevitably in response to the socio-historical reality of the time. So, while such charismatic leaders build upon the charismatic capital of their predecessors, the charismatic leader-follower relationship will emerge only if they can develop their *own* ideological nuances and charismatic image in response to socio-historical conditions unique to their time. Consequently, the most effective way to map the dynamics of the TCP in Islamic radicalism and militancy is within the context of distinct historical phases.

The Colonialism Period (late-1800s to 1945): Egypt

The decline of the Islamic empires and the ascendancy of Europe provided the backdrop for the birth of the modern Islamist movement. As Wilfred Smith argues:

> The fundamental malaise of modern Islam is a sense that something has gone wrong with Islamic history. The fundamental problem of modern Muslims is how to rehabilitate that history, to get it going again in full vigor, so that Islamic society may once again flourish as a divinely guided society should and must. The fundamental spiritual crisis of Islam in the twentieth century stems from an awareness that something is awry between the religion which God has appointed and the historical development of the world which He controls (Smith 1961, pp. 47-48).

The general consensus within the field is that Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (1838-1897) was the founder of the modern Islamist movement. It is Afghani who encouraged the re-opening of the doors of *ijtihad* in the late 1800s and played a pivotal role in the emergence of Islamic modernism by instigating and encouraging political activism. Afghani's influence throughout the Middle East, but particularly in Egypt, was

immense and, while he mentored many prominent individuals, it was Muhammad Abduh (1849-1905) and Rashid Rida (1865-1935) who continued the work of their mentor after his death in 1897.

Afghani, Abduh and Rida were Islamic modernists who believed that to revive the Islamic world it was important to draw upon and learn from Europe while staying true to their Islamic values. However, the inability of Islamic modernists to find a universally accepted middle-ground between traditional Islamic values and the advancements of the West, coupled with the socio-historical environment of the time, caused a significant shift away from a perceived need to emulate and draw upon the West. By the 1920s, Rida had evolved away from his predecessors and was espousing an ideology that called for the rejection of the West and a return to Islam as an all-encompassing framework for human existence[20]. This ideological shift is significant because it represents the earliest move towards the more radical reformist movements. It is significant to note that, while Afghani, Abduh and Rida certainly published and lectured widely to 'the masses', they are differentiated from those whom they preceded in that they focused a great deal of their efforts upon directly influencing, and even advising, those in power. This shift regarding 'target audience' and 'sphere of influence' is critical when tracing the evolution of Islamic radicalism and militancy. In fact, one of Rida's disciples, who would go on to be the founder of modern Islamic radicalism, would not only take Rida's ideology and develop it further, but would be catalytic in this shift. This individual was Hassan al-Banna[21] (1906-1949), founder of the Muslim Brotherhood[22].

When tracing the TCP in Islamic radicalism and militancy, al-Banna emerges as a critical individual in the chain. Two critical evolutionary developments manifest in al-Banna: firstly, al-Banna argued that Islam must be made the central guiding force for all aspects of human life; second, *jihad* played a central role in al-Banna's ideology. These two developments, which represent a radicalisation in Islamist ideology, reflect an increasing perception of crisis within Egyptian society regarding the failures of indigenous authority to achieve independence from their British colonialists. The influence of the British occupiers not only stunted Egypt's development politically and economically, but many believed that their presence was destroying Egypt, both culturally and morally. Indeed, socio-economic and socio-political hardship appears to be a secondary, even latent, environmental characteristic of the context from which the charismatic leaders emerge. Rather, the primary factor appears to be the perception of socio-cultural crisis and this anxiety is accentuated by more 'tangible' factors, such as unemployment. The ideology of al-Banna not only reflected these sentiments, but accentuated them while offering his

audience a solution[23]. It is little surprise then, that al-Banna's Brotherhood derived most of its membership and support from Egypt's new 'urban class'. As thousands of Egyptians migrated from rural to urban zones, it was the Muslim Brotherhood who aided in their transition by offering social welfare facilities and services that the Egyptian government could not offer. With Egypt in a state of social, political, cultural and economic crisis, the Muslim Brotherhood would emerge as the most popular organisation in the region.

Organisationally the Muslim Brotherhood would become the prototype for many subsequent Islamic reformist and terrorist organisations. Most critical to this investigation is the emergence of the charismatic leader as the 'figure head' or *image* of the organisation. Furthermore, a number of important individuals would emerge from the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, arguably the most influential being Sayyid Qutb (1906-1966)[24].

The post-Colonialism or Nationalist Period (1945-1966): Egypt

After centuries of colonialism and decades of anti-colonialist struggle, the Nasser regime emerged as the first truly indigenous government of Egypt in 1952. The period immediately after World War II was characterised by a wave of nationalist, anti-colonialist independence movements emerging throughout the Middle East, Africa and Asia. In Egypt, after decades of struggle for independence and freedom from the influence of Europe, the Nasser regime came to power with the assistance of the Muslim Brotherhood. However, the Muslim Brotherhood were soon viewed as a threat by Nasser and were banned and brutally repressed. Many of the Brotherhood's members were forced into exile, imprisoned and tortured or killed. The physical, emotional and political betrayal was surpassed only by the symbolic one in its impact. The fact that after decades of struggle, an indigenous government would 'abandon' Islam for 'godless socialism' was viewed as an abhorrence. The ideological radicalisation that materialised from this period is encapsulated in the ideology of Qutb[25].

Qutb's ideology, particularly his 'prison writings', gained a pertinence in radical and militant circles in the 'Modern Period' because it reflected an almost universal experience of disappointment with indigenous governments. Qutb's seminal work, *Milestones,* represents the ideological manifestation of the cumulative product of Qutb's life experiences. Qutb, like al-Banna, was part of the mass rural-urban migration which saw Cairo's population triple in the first few decades of the

twentieth century. While al-Banna founded the Muslim Brotherhood in response to his experiences of poverty, socio-economic disparity and colonialism, Qutb was an active member of the predominantly secular Wafd and Sa'adist Party. It was not until the 1940s that Islamic ideology began to permeate significantly into Qutb's writings[26]. Prior to this point, the secularly educated Qutb was a poet and literary critic. However, as Qutb turned to Islam in a period of intense social, political, cultural and economic hardship, which was accentuated by World War II as well as personal crises[27], he did not join the Brotherhood until the early 1950s. In fact, Qutb played a critical role in the success of the July 1952 Revolution and was a trusted associate of Nasser and the Free Officers. However, by 1954 Qutb was imprisoned by the Nasser regime and eventually executed in 1966.

As noted previously, an in-depth analysis of Qutbist ideological principles is not possible here. However it is important to highlight the major ideological elements of Qutb's ideology in comparison to those of his predecessors. The central argument of Qutb's *Milestones* is that all modern societies are *jahiliyya* (the period of ignorance in pre-Islam Arabia) and an essentially covert vanguard needs to be established to 're-assert' true Islam back into society. While Qutb argued that this should be achieved via 'grassroots' engagement, he also argued that violent *jihad* had an important role to play. For Qutb, *jihad* was a constant fixture in society and was not for purely defensive purposes. The radicalisation evident in Qutb's ideology, when compared to Afghani, Abduh, Ridah and even al-Banna, must be understood within the context of socio-historical conditions specific to the 'post-Colonial' period. Qutb's ideology reflects not only an increasing emphasis upon *jihad*, but also an increasing perception that the disparity between reality and the Islamic ideal is so wide, and the broader society and its leaders so inherently 'un-Islamic' (even 'anti-Islamic') that sweeping ideological, political, cultural and organisational changes need to be made. Hence in the ideology of Qutb can be found the shift from the *foundationalist* ideological approach of his predecessors[28], to the *socio-humanist* approach. While the former argues that the most effective program for change is overtly engaging in the society and directly or indirectly participating in the political process, the latter argues that the wider society and its leadership are inherently 'un-Islamic' and therefore clandestine entities need to be established to reassert Islam into society. While Qutb's ideology emerged from the circumstances that characterised the 'Post-Colonialist Period', his charismatic appeal exploded in the 'Modern Period' of the TCP in Islamic radicalism and militancy. In Qutb's ideology contemporary Islamic militants discovered an explanation and solution to their perception of crisis. In Qutb's life they saw reflections of their own experiences and the legitimacy that comes with martyrdom.

The Modern Period (late 1960s to present)

Qutb's execution in 1966 passed with superficial acknowledgement from the rest of the world. For almost two decades, political Islam was practically abandoned in the name of Nasser's *pan-Arabism*. However, the shock of defeat in the 1967 Six Day War, and the inevitable questioning that emerges in times of crisis, instigated a revival of Islam. In countries throughout the Middle East, Africa and Asia the broken promises of indigenous nationalist movements, all of which inevitably emerged as bastardised socialist or democratic governments, left a feeling of bitterness and resentment towards not only their own governments, but the two Cold War superpowers. The 'Modern Period' is consequently characterised by a resurgence of Islam. As part of this Islamic resurgence, the more radical and militant Islamic groups have risen to particular prominence. Again, the heightened perception of crisis emerges due to the perceived need to return to Islam as a solution to the aftermath of failed 'secular governments'.

The personnel in this resurgence of radical and militant political Islam in the modern period emerged primarily from the tertiary educated, religiously pious middle class. This is not a manifestation of chance but a reflection of the complex interplay of social, economic, political, cultural and ideological factors that explicitly exhibits the tendency of radical and militant Islamism to emerge from the void between reality and hope. The failure of bastardised indigenous governments to deliver on the hopes that their promises encouraged in populations struggling to emerge from decades, even centuries, of colonialism was felt most bitterly by the new, educated class of the developed world, whose visions for their personal lives and the hopes for their society simply did not eventuate. It would be charismatic leaders such as Abdullah Azzam, Muhammad Qutb, Ayman al-Zawahiri and Mohammad Faraj who would build upon the ideology and charismatic appeal of Sayyid Qutb and continue the TCP in Islamic radicalism and militancy throughout the remainder of the twentieth and into the twenty-first century. It is these charismatic ideologues who would be catalytic to the emergence of Islamic militancy (terrorism).

It is possible to identify three types of charismatic leadership in contemporary Islamist terrorist organisations; *charismatic leaders*, *neo-charismatic leaders* and *spiritual guides*. It must be emphasised that these are idealised typologies designed to help explain manifestations of charismatic leadership in Islamist terrorist groups and are, by no means, the only manifestations of leadership in Islamic militancy. While word constraints will not allow an in-depth analysis of the *spiritual guide* type, suffice to

say that their emergence is a manifestation of the TCP in Islamic radicalism and militancy. *Spiritual guides* are characterised by their ability to subtly (or so it is perceived by outsiders) and indirectly encourage their supporters to engage in acts of terrorism. This is typically achieved through their ideological rhetoric. Arguably the most prominent *spiritual guide type* is Abu Bakr Bashir. The *charismatic leader type*, however, is a unique evolutionary step in the TCP in Islamic radicalism and militancy. While charismatic leaders of the 'Colonialist' and 'Post-Colonialist/Nationalist' periods were first and foremost ideologues, the *charismatic leader type* not only encourages, but facilitates terrorist violence. This type of charismatic leadership in Islamic terrorism is epitomised by Osama bin Laden[29] and his emergence can be understood within the context of the TCP in Islamic radicalism and militancy. Specifically, one of bin Laden's ideological mentors at King Abdul Aziz University was Muhammad Qutb, the brother of Sayyid Qutb[30]. Yet the ideology which bin Laden espouses is a significant evolutionary step from his predecessors. Bin Laden's rhetoric calls for an international *jihad* where there is no differentiation between civilians and military combatants. Furthermore, bin Laden not only encourages, but facilitates the use of terrorist violence. Once again, the increasing ideological radicalisation reflected in bin Laden's rhetoric mirrors a heightened and more intensified perception of crisis in his communities of potential support. While there is no room for even a brief discussion of other *charismatic leader types*, such as Sheikh Yassin and Omar Abdel Rahman, by continuing to trace the TCP in Islamic radicalism and militancy, a far newer and deadlier manifestation of charismatic leadership in Islamist terrorist groups emerges: the *neo-charismatic leader type.*

While the emergence of the *charismatic leader* phenomenon in Islamist terrorism reflects an evolutionary step from the charismatic leaders of the 'Colonial' and 'Post-Colonial/Nationalist' periods, the *neo-charismatic leader* represents a further evolutionary development in the TCP. The *neo-charismatic leader type* is a younger individual when compared with his predecessors and directly engages in violence. Zarqawi epitomised this new breed of charismatic leader as young, brash, militant in inclination and brutal. If the *charismatic leader type* is characterised by his/her call to 'do as I say', the *neo-charismatic leader type* is encapsulated in the phrase of 'do as I do'. Zarqawi is arguably the most widely recognised *neo-charismatic leader* of an Islamist terrorist group and is believed to have been responsible for a number of beheadings in the Iraq conflict, not to mention hundreds of deadly bombings throughout the country. Other *neo-charismatic leaders* include Ibn al-Khattab, who operated in Chechnya, and Saleh Awfi and Abdulaziz al-Muqrin, who were both from al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. The *neo-charismatic* leader, while having his

roots in the 'Modern Period', is very much emerging as a key feature of the 'Globalising World Phase' of the TCP in Islamic radicalism and militancy. Like the charismatic leaders who preceded them, this new generation of charismatic leaders of Islamist terrorist groups are destined to be used as the charismatic capital for subsequent manifestations of the TCP in Islamic radicalism and militancy.

Before concluding this article it is important briefly to mention arguably the newest manifestation in the phenomenon of Islamic radicalism and militancy: the self-generating mini-group phenomenon. While the '07/07' London bombers are arguably the most obvious example of this manifestation, similar terrorist 'cells' without tangible links to a wider terrorist organisation (e.g. an al-Qaeda or Hezbollah) have emerged in Australia, the United Kingdom and even Canada. While this evolutionary development in Islamic radicalism and militancy would appear to refute the notion of the TCP, or at least signal the fact it has become an obsolete method by which to understand this new manifestation, this is incorrect. While the charismatic leader acted as the vehicle for the radicalisation process throughout the 'Colonial', 'post-Colonial' and 'Modern' periods[31], advancements in communication technology have enabled individuals to access radical and militant Islamist ideology without direct contact with the human source. However, attraction to such an ideology, even in absence of the charismatic individual, is reliant upon a complex interplay of social, economic, political, cultural and psychological factors that create the context in which an individual and collective becomes attracted to an ideology[32]. Hence, a charismatic attraction of sorts emerges for the ideology itself, or what I describe as the 'charisma of ideology' and it is essentially the same 'formula' as attraction to a charismatic leader. Therefore, with the emergence of self-generating mini-groups, we are witnessing the *depersonalisation of charisma*. To a large extent the 'glue' that held together the chain of charismatic leaders stretching from the late 1800s to today was the 'charisma of ideology' and technological advancements have enabled the *depersonalisation of charisma* to occur while the TCP phenomenon continues. Consequently, while the personnel who made up the radical and militant Islamist movements and groups during the colonial period were the new urban class, in the post-colonial and modern periods it was primarily the educated middle classes, the self-generating mini-group phenomenon is comprised of individuals from all walks of life. This trend demonstrates two important facts: firstly, that the sources for personnel have been the demographics with the most intense perceptions of crisis; and secondly, that there is a growing perception of crisis which is resulting in a more intensified radicalisation and greater propensity towards violence. The prospect for security agencies in confronting this new phenomenon will be daunting, to say the very least.

Conclusion

While word constraints limited the scope and detail of this paper considerably, its primary purpose was to exhibit the effectiveness of the utilisation of the TCP in Islamic radicalism and militancy to understand the complex interplay of factors that has led to the emergence of increasingly virulent strains of radical and militant Islam. From the beginning of the modern Islamist movement to the present, this paper traced the TCP in Islamic radicalism and militancy from the 'Colonialism Period', through the 'post-Colonial/Nationalist' period and into the 'Modern Period' and 'Globalising World Phase'. It is evident from mapping the TCP in Islamic radicalism and militancy that the process of radicalisation is intimately linked with *perception of crisis* and it is within this context that the charismatic leader emerges. The fact that there exists an identifiable chain of charismatic leaders stretching across the entire chronology of the modern Islamist movement, and reflecting an increasing radicalisation and propensity towards violence with each proceeding leader, suggests that the *perception of crisis* is not only becoming more prevalent, but is intensifying. The picture that emerges from this study is of a phenomenon which will continue to evolve if the *perceptions of crisis* within communities of potential support are not addressed and alleviated. The laws of 'cause and effect' must not be abandoned by those whose occupation it is to prevent, confront and combat Islamic militants. Indeed, empathy will be a crucial tool in our fight against terrorism in all its varied manifestations.

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[1] The study of charismatic leadership theory is a complex, multi-disciplinary field and space considerations will not allow an in-depth analysis of the field (See Yukl[1] 1999; House[1]1999; Bass 1988; Conger 1988 for discussion of various debates).

[2] Due to word constraints, it will not be possible to fully analyse and critique Weber's theory of charismatic leadership (for such an analysis see Conger 1988; House 1999; Dowse and Hughes 1982; Eisenstadt 1995a; and Willner 1984).

[3] See Shamir 1991.

[4] For details of this approach refer to Shils 1965 and Eisenstadt 1995.

[5] See Shamir (1991, p. 91).

[6] See Freud or Robins and Post for examples of this approach.

[7] See Willner 1984; Bryman 1992; and Bradley and Roberts 1988 for examples of this approach.

[8] The notion of a 'moral panic' is a perception that certain moral values are being either undermined or attacked in a society.

[9] *Amtcharisma* ('charisma of office'), *Geltilcharisma* (charisma of kinship) and *Erbcharisma* (hereditary charisma). I believe that the 'charisma of ideology' is a critical addition to this list and certainly plays a fundamental role in the TCP in Islamic radicalism and militancy.

[10] Specifically point 2 of the framework.

[11] Instead see Esposito 1998 and Shepard 2004

[12] Wright-Neville's nuanced investigation into the nature of Islamist politics in Southeast Asia focused upon understanding, '…the attitudinal dynamics that are leading Southeast Asian and other

Muslims… to see as a legitimate form of politics individual acts of violence by non-state actors that contravene conventionally accepted notion of just war' (2004, p. 30). Building upon Sprinzak's theory of delegitmisation, Wright-Neville categorises a number of Islamist organisations into three categories, 'activist', 'militant' and 'terrorist', using both rhetoric and action as a measure, he categorises the groups, '…according to the degree of alienation they evince from the prevailing status quo' (Wright-Neville 2004, p. 31). The purpose of Wright-Neville's model was to categorise those religious adherents *already participating in the political sphere* as either activists, militants or terrorists (Wright-Neville 2004, p. 32) and a survey of those *who do not participate in the political sphere* was out of the scope of his model.

[13] While Shepard (1987) created a typology of 'ideological orientations' which looked at the relationship between the, '…doctrinal content of the ideologies and teachings…' (1987, p. 308) of 'secularist', 'Islamic modernist', 'radical Islamist', 'traditionalist' and 'neo-traditionalist' main types and modernity, his approach did not explicitly look at the relationship between these types and propensity towards violence. Furthermore, his approach did not explicitly delve into the process of radicalisation which could potentially transform a modernist into a radical and vice versa.

[14] The categorisations are formulated using generalised attitudinal beliefs regarding the role of selectively literalist interpretations of Islam to the public sphere as the defining criteria.

[15] Terrorist violence refers to the threat or use of violence with the intention of coercing change in the political/socio-cultural realm. My predominant use of the words 'militant' and 'militancy' are merely substitutes for 'terrorist' and 'terrorism'. My hesitancy to over use the term terrorist is the emotional connotations attached to them in the post-9/11 environment. The terms as they appear here are interchangeable.

[16] One of the implications of this is that in times of perceived crisis, due to the absence of a single, hierarchical leadership elite, followers turn to those individuals from either the *umma* or *ulema*. Without a 'traditional' or 'legal-rational' establishment, it is almost inevitable that charismatic individuals will emerge.

[17] In fact, many scholars suggest that the stagnation of the Islamic empires in the centuries prior to the twentieth century occurred as a result of the closing of the doors of *ijtihad,* hence the decline of the Islamic civilisations in the face of Western colonialism and imperialism.

[18] Charismatic leadership of secularist, modernist, radical or militant inclination.

[19] The chain is as follows: Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, Muhammad Abduh and Rashid Rida, Hassan al-Banna, Sayyid Qutb, Mohammad Qutb and Abdullah Azzam, Osama bin Laden, al-Zarqawi. This chain of charismatic leaders, each with tangible links connecting one to the other, stretches from the beginning of the modern Islamist movement in the late 1800s into the 21st century and beyond. This chain is focused specifically on the *sunni* chain of the TCP in Islamic radicalism and militancy and is the chain which leads to Osama bin Laden. However, it is possible to utilise the TCP in Islamic radicalism and militancy towards other leaders in the Modern period.

[20] We see in Rida the rationalized process of radicalisation as illustrated in the model earlier. Rida's shift is one from 'modernist' to 'radical'. The socio-historical realities of the period played a massive role in his radicalisation. The socio-economic, political and socio-cultural strain of World War I had accentuated perceptions of crisis in Egypt. Furthermore, the disintegration of the Ottoman empire and Egypt's inability to break from the grip of colonialism had an enormous effect upon those who believed that Islam was the key to rejuvenation public hope.

[21] For more on al-Banna see Hawwa 1985; Ushama 1995; and Esposito 2002.

[22] In al-Banna we see the beginnings of the radicalisation process from radical to militant. Although it is questionable that he made the transition to completion, he nevertheless created an organisation that facilitated this transition in others.

[23] At the height of its popularity, the Muslim Brotherhood enjoyed a following of almost 500,000.

[24] Again, Qutb is a curious study in that he went from being a rather 'secular-modernist' to a 'radical-militant' in the course of his life.

[25] For more on Qutb see Zeidan 2002; Qutb 2002; and Kepel 2003.

[26] While Qutb wrote a number of essays on the Quran his interest in the text was from a literary perspective, not a politico-religious one.

[27] Qutb's beloved mother died in the early 1940s and a few years later his last serious relationship ended prior to marriage. These two events had a major catalytic role upon Qutb at first turning to the Quran for sentimental (his mother was very pious) and personal comfort.

[28] Afghani, Abduh, Ridah and al-Banna.

[29] For more on bin Laden see Corbin 2003; Benjamin and Simon 2003; and Bergen 2001.

[30] The chain from Afghani to bin Laden and Zarqawi read as follows: Afghani, Abduh, Rida, al-Banna, Sayyid Qutb, Muhammad Qutb, bin Laden and Zarqawi.

30. The TCP in Islamic radicalism and militancy has recently generated a unique manifestation of Islamic terrorism which has already proven to be both deadly and hard to counter. While the charismatic leader acted as the vehicle for change in the earlier phases of the TCP in Islamic radicalism and militancy, the July 2005 London Bombers heralded a new era in the phenomenon. The emergence of terrorist cells with no tangible links with a wider organisation or charismatic leader signals the materialisation of the "self-generating mini-group" phenomenon.

[31] In fact, even the 'Globalising World Phase'. has seen a continuation of the TCP in Islamic radicalism and militancy through the charismatic leader, but especially neo-charismatic leader types.

[32] For example, if the ideology of Abdullah Azzam was read to a group of Evangelist preachers they are far less likely to be attracted to this ideology than a group of young, Islamist males from Leeds in the United Kingdom.

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