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05. Book II, Vol. 2: Events following the Watergate break-in, June 17, 1972 - February 9, 1973  
(allegations involving Presidential interference with the official Department of Justice investigation)

Don Edwards

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21. Following his meeting with H.R. Haldeman, Gordon Strachan shredded the Political Matters Memorandum regarding a sophisticated intelligence gathering system that he had shown Haldeman. Strachan also shredded other related documents, including a memorandum regarding Gordon Liddy, an April 4, 1972 talking paper prepared by Strachan for a meeting between Haldeman and John Mitchell, a memorandum from Jeb Magruder to Mitchell regarding Donald Segretti, and Segretti's telephone number. After Strachan destroyed these documents, he told John Dean what documents he had destroyed. On July 1, 1972 Strachan, Haldeman and Lawrence Higby were part of a Presidential party aboard Air Force One. Strachan has testified that during the flight he reported to Haldeman that the job had been accomplished, and Haldeman told him to reduce the number of copies made of future Political Matters Memoranda from three to two. Haldeman has testified that he does not recall receiving such a report.

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21.1 Gordon Strachan testimony, 6 SSC 2441, 2458-60.

21.2 John Dean testimony, 3 SSC 933-34.

21.3 H.R. Haldeman testimony, 8 SSC 3097.

PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES OF 1972  
SENATE RESOLUTION 60

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HEARINGS  
BEFORE THE  
SELECT COMMITTEE ON  
PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES  
OF THE  
UNITED STATES SENATE  
NINETY-THIRD CONGRESS  
FIRST SESSION

WATERGATE AND RELATED ACTIVITIES  
Phase I: Watergate Investigation  
WASHINGTON, D.C., JULY 18, 19, 20, 23, 24, AND 25, 1973  
Book 6



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that Mr. Mitchell and Mr. Dean were shocked by Liddy's plan; Mr. Magruder's staff man, Gordon Liddy, was apparently quite humiliated, and nothing was approved. In other words, if those meetings were routinely reported to Mr. Haldeman, as evidence of Mr. Magruder's administrative ability and judgment, the January and February meetings would not very likely inspire the confidence of Mr. Haldeman or the President.

Yet, Mr. Magruder testified that "as he recalled" he returned to his office after both these embarrassing meetings and routinely called Mr. Haldeman's staff assistant, me, and told me about his blunder, presumably so that I could inform Mr. Haldeman. That testimony is difficult to reconcile with good sense. Presumably, Mr. Magruder knew that Mr. Dean would report on the meetings to Mr. Haldeman—as Mr. Dean has testified he did—why would Mr. Magruder want two people reporting the same disaster to Mr. Haldeman?

It is true, however, that Mr. Magruder called me after he returned from the March 30, 1972, meeting at Key Biscayne with Mr. Mitchell and Mr. LaRue and reported on about 30 major campaign decisions. Each of these decisions was briefly described in that rather short phone conversation. During this call, he told me, and I am repeating his words rather precisely: "A sophisticated political intelligence-gathering system has been approved with a budget of 300." Unfortunately he neither gave me, nor did I ask for any further details about the subject.

Soon thereafter I wrote one of my regular "political matters" memos for Mr. Haldeman. This particular memo for early April was 8 to 10 pages long with more than a dozen tabs or attachments, but it contained only one three-line paragraph on political intelligence. That paragraph read almost verbatim as Mr. Magruder had indicated to me over the phone. I wrote in the memo to Mr. Haldeman—Again this is almost a quote:

Magruder reports that 1701 now has a sophisticated political intelligence-gathering system with a budget of 300. A sample of the type of information they are developing is attached at tab "H."

At tab "H", I enclosed a political intelligence report which had been sent to me from the committee. It was entitled Sedan Chair II. This report and two others somewhat like it that I had received began with a statement such as, "A confidential source reveals" or "a reliable source confidentially reports." This was followed by a summary of some political information.

In April 1972, I was mainly interested in reporting to Mr. Haldeman on those 30 campaign decisions and other relevant political items. I did not give much thought to what Mr. Magruder meant by "sophisticated political intelligence-gathering system." Nor did I give much thought to the real identity of Sedan Chair II, but I remember that the information dealt with Senator Humphrey's Pennsylvania organization.

However, on June 17, 1972, and afterward, as the news began unfolding about the break-in at the Democratic National Committee, I certainly began to wonder who else but people from 1701 could have been involved. I suspected that maybe the Watergate break-in was part of the sophisticated political intelligence operation Mr. Magruder had



Mr. DASH. Did you also pull out that memorandum or these little notes that you had taken concerning the communication that you had from Mr. Haldeman to contact Mr. Liddy about his capabilities being switched from Muskie to McGovern?

Mr. STRACHAN. Well, I pulled that document out but I did not take that up to Mr. Haldeman.

Mr. DASH. All right.

Now, what did you believe at that time when you took the document out?

Did you believe that a break-in at the Democratic National Committee headquarters was in fact related to this plan?

Mr. STRACHAN. I didn't know for sure, but I had pretty strong suspicions.

Mr. DASH. Did you meet with Mr. Haldeman shortly after you pulled that file out?

Mr. STRACHAN. Yes, I did.

Mr. DASH. Could you tell us when?

Mr. STRACHAN. I believe it was the morning of June 20. He had returned from Florida, I had given a note to Mr. Higby that I thought I should see Mr. Haldeman. Mr. Haldeman summoned me to his office, and I walked in with the political matters memorandum.

Mr. DASH. I think you had indicated that you were somewhat concerned about Mr. Haldeman's reaction to you about not being informed. Were you still concerned when you met with Mr. Haldeman on June 20?

Mr. STRACHAN. Yes, I was scared to death. I thought I would be fired at that point for not having figured that out.

Mr. DASH. Were you fired or did he berate you?

Mr. STRACHAN. No, he did not berate me. He said almost jokingly, "Well, what do we know about the events over the weekend?" And I was quite nervous and retreated to sort of legal protective terms and I said, "Well, sir, this is what can be imputed to you through me, your agent," and opened the political matters memorandum to the paragraph on intelligence, showed it to him. He acknowledged his check and that he had read that, and said that he had not read the tab, which had been attached, turned, began reading it, said, maybe I should have been reading these, these are quite interesting, and read the tab.

Mr. DASH. What tab was that?

Mr. STRACHAN. That was Sedan Chair II.

Mr. DASH. Then what, if anything, did you tell him or did he tell you after he had gone through this memorandum again?

Mr. STRACHAN. He told me, "Well, make sure our files are clean."

Mr. DASH. What did that mean to you?

Mr. STRACHAN. Well, I went down and shredded that document and others related.

Mr. DASH. Now, did you do that on your own initiative as such, or did you feel that you were making sure that you were following Mr. Haldeman's instruction that you should make sure the files are clean?

Mr. STRACHAN. No, I believed I was following his orders.

Mr. DASH. And you shredded all of No. 18, the political matters memorandum No. 18?

Mr. STRACHAN. That is correct.

Mr. DASH. What about the memorandum that you had made on the communication with regard to Mr. Liddy?

Mr. STRACHAN. Yes, I shredded that also.

Mr. DASH. Were there any other documents that you shredded?

Mr. STRACHAN. Yes, I did go through and make sure our files were clean. I shredded the talking paper between Mr. Haldeman and Mr. Mitchell on April 4, I shredded a reference to Mr. Segretti, I shredded Mr. Segretti's telephone number.

Mr. DASH. What reference was that to Mr. Segretti?

Mr. STRACHAN. Well, there had been a dispute between whether or not Mr. Segretti should continue out in the field functioning somewhat independent. Mr. Magruder wrote a memorandum to Mr. Mitchell entitled "Matter of Potential Embarrassment" in which he described this individual in the field and how that individual should be under the direction of Mr. Liddy. Mr. Mitchell had a copy of that and Mr. Haldeman had a copy of that. And Mr. Haldeman had told me to call up Mr. Segretti and to tell him to expect a call and his directions from Mr. Liddy. I shredded that memorandum also.

Mr. DASH. Were there any other documents that you shredded?

Mr. STRACHAN. Well, we gave the committee a list.

Mr. DASH. You may have stated, but did that include the talking paper that you had prepared for Mr. Haldeman for his meeting with Mr. Mitchell on April 4?

Mr. STRACHAN. Yes, I think I said that that was one of the items.

Mr. DASH. Now, after you shredded these papers on the 20th of June 1972, did you inform anybody that you had done this?

Mr. STRACHAN. Yes, I went over to John Dean's office and gave him a list orally of the documents that I had shredded and told him that those had been Mr. Haldeman's instructions.

Mr. DASH. Why did you inform John Dean?

Mr. STRACHAN. Well, John Dean was, as you know, the counsel to the President and the man who would presumably be handling this problem.

Mr. DASH. Did you inform anybody else?

Mr. STRACHAN. No.

Mr. DASH. Now, have you since had an opportunity to go through the White House records to look at the various memorandums that you have prepared in the past?

Mr. STRACHAN. Yes, I have gone back into an Executive Office Building office, room 522, to go through the files.

Mr. DASH. And did these files still have the political matters memorandum that you had prepared for Mr. Haldeman?

Mr. STRACHAN. Well, they contained all political matters memorandums except No. 18.

Mr. DASH. 18 was missing?

Mr. STRACHAN. That is right.

Mr. DASH. So you reaffirmed the fact that you had destroyed 18?

Mr. STRACHAN. Well, I did not forget that.

Mr. DASH. No. It had not been replaced, anyway?

Mr. STRACHAN. No.

Mr. DASH. Now, later, did you ever inform Mr. Haldeman that you wanted to make sure that the files were clean or that you had destroyed, in fact, the particular files that you were worried about?

Mr. STRACHAN. Yes. On July 1, I was invited to go out with the Presidential party on Air Force One. There were going to be a series of discussions out there with Mr. MacGregor and Mr. Malek regarding

the campaign. I had done a political matters memo for the preceding 2 weeks and I joined Mr. Haldeman and Mr. Highby on that flight. At that time, I reviewed both the most recent political matters memorandum and the fact that I had in fact made sure the files were clean.

Mr. DASH. What was Mr. Haldeman's reaction, if anything, when you told him that you had destroyed No. 18?

Mr. STRACHAN. I do not think he said anything. I just reported it as a matter of fact and we went on to something else.

Mr. DASH. And to your recollection, he accepted that as a matter of fact?

Mr. STRACHAN. Well, I would remember if he had told me that was a very stupid thing to do.

Mr. DASH. Now, was there any discussion as to how many copies of these memorandums in the future should be made?

Mr. STRACHAN. Yes; he asked me how many copies of the political matters memorandum had been prepared and I told him three, and he told me at that time to cut the number down to two.

Mr. DASH. Who received these copies? There were two, one for him and one for who?

Mr. STRACHAN. Well, one for Mr. Haldeman and one for me.

Mr. DASH. Now, after this event, and after, of course, the break-in at Watergate, what was your relationship with the Committee To Re-Elect the President? Did it continue, and did you continue as liaison?

Mr. STRACHAN. Yes, it did. I had talked with Mr. Malek on the trip out to California and he talked to Mr. MacGregor about how good I thought Bob Reisner was as an administrative assistant and the decision was made to move Bob Reisner to become Clark MacGregor's administrative assistant and I continued to work very, very closely with Mr. Reisner.

Mr. DASH. Did you have any responsibilities to report to Mr. Haldeman concerning the Watergate affair?

Mr. STRACHAN. None.

Mr. DASH. I take it that after the break-in, the so-called Watergate affair became an important matter of concern in the campaign?

Mr. STRACHAN. Well, everybody followed it rather closely.

Mr. DASH. And I take it various meetings were held, and I think that we've had considerable testimony from a number of witnesses concerning the meetings just after the break-in through June, the latter part of July and August. Were you aware of those meetings?

Mr. STRACHAN. No, not really. I certainly never attended any. I don't think I was specifically aware that they were having all these meetings on what has turned out to be the Watergate matter.

Mr. DASH. Were you aware of an interchange of information, let me say between Mr. Dean, Mr. Magruder, Mr. Mitchell, Mr. Mardian, Mr. LaRue, and then on the other side, Mr. Haldeman and Mr. Ehrlichman, involving these meetings?

Mr. STRACHAN. No, I don't think so and that sort of goes to the point of how Dean could keep all facts and people sort of in order. I don't think he ever told me that he was having all these meetings.

Mr. DASH. So as you testified earlier with regard to the meeting back on February 4 and also January 27, when Mr. Dean was present. Mr. Haldeman would rely on Mr. Dean's report and it was not necessary for you to be that messenger of the information. So it happened after-

PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES OF 1972  
SENATE RESOLUTION 60

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HEARINGS  
BEFORE THE  
SELECT COMMITTEE ON  
PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES  
OF THE  
UNITED STATES SENATE  
NINETY-THIRD CONGRESS  
FIRST SESSION

WATERGATE AND RELATED ACTIVITIES  
Phase I: Watergate Investigation  
WASHINGTON, D.C., JUNE 25 AND 26, 1973  
Book 3



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fensive and stated that he was merely on his payroll as a consultant because Ehrlichman had so requested. He asked me to determine if Hunt was still on his payroll and I said I would check. Colson also expressed concern over the contents of Hunt's safe. Several weeks later—probably 4 or 5—I learned from Paul O'Brien, who was representing the reelection committee, that he had learned from Mr. Hunt's attorney, Mr. William Bittman, that Hunt and Colson spoke on the telephone over the weekend of June 17-18, and that Hunt had told Colson to get the materials out of his—Hunt's—office safe.

Mr. Hugh Sloan called me to tell me he was worried. At that time I knew of no reason why Mr. Sloan should be worried so I told him not to worry. He told me that he would like to meet with me and I told him that I was trying to find out what had happened and requested we meet in a few days. I do not recall the precise date we did meet.

I next contacted Liddy and asked him to meet with me. He said he would come to my office. As he came into the office I was on my way out. I suggested we take a walk. It was shortly before noon and we walked down 17th Street toward the Corcoran Gallery.

I will try to reconstruct the conversation to the best of my memory. While I cannot recall every detail, I do indeed recall the major items we discussed.

Mr. Liddy told me that the men who had been arrested in the DNC were his men and he expressed concern about them. I asked him why he had men in the DNC and he told me that Magruder had pushed him into doing it. He told me that he had not wanted to do it, but Magruder had complained about the fact that they were not getting good information from a bug they had placed in the DNC sometime earlier. He then explained something about the steel structure of the Watergate Office Building that was inhibiting transmission of the bug and that they had gone into the building to correct this problem. He said that he had reported to Magruder that during the earlier entry of the DNC offices they had seen documents—which I believe he told me were either Government documents or classified documents—and Magruder had told him to make copies of those documents.

Liddy was very apologetic for the fact that they had been caught and that Mr. McCord was involved. He told me that he had used Mr. McCord only because Magruder had cut his budget so badly. I asked him why one of the men had a check from Mr. Howard Hunt and he told me that these men were friends of Hunt and Hunt had put him in touch with them. I do not recall Liddy discussing any further involvement of Hunt, other than Hunt's putting him in touch with the Cubans. I asked him if anyone from the White House was involved and he told me no.

As the conversation ended he again expressed his apology and his concern about the men in jail. I told him I couldn't help and he said he understood. He also told me that he was a soldier and would never talk. He said if anyone wished to shoot him on the street, he was ready. As we parted I said I would be unable to discuss this with him further. He said he understood and I returned to my office.

After returning to my office I arranged a meeting with Ehrlichman in his office for mid-afternoon. Gordon Strachan came to my office shortly after I had met with Liddy. Strachan told me that he had been



instructed by Haldeman to go through all of Mr. Haldeman's files over the weekend and remove and destroy damaging materials. He told me that this material included such matters as memorandums from the reelection committee, documents relating to wiretap information from the DNC, notes of meetings with Haldeman, and a document which reflected that Haldeman had instructed Magruder to transfer his intelligence gathering from Senator Muskie to Senator McGovern. Strachan told me his files were completely clean.

I spoke with Mr. Kleindienst and he told me that both the FBI and the D.C. Metropolitan Police were investigating, and he assumed that the FBI would take full jurisdiction of the case shortly. He also alluded to his encounter with Liddy at Burning Tree Country Club, but did not explain this in full until I later met with him. I do not have a record of when I met with Mr. Kleindienst, but it was either on Monday, the 19th, or the next day. I will describe that meeting shortly.

I met with Ehrlichman in the mid-afternoon and reported in full my conversation with Liddy. I also told Ehrlichman about the earlier meetings I had attended in Mitchell's office in late January and early February and my subsequent conversation with Haldeman. He told me he wanted to meet later with Colson and told me to attend. Ehrlichman also requested that I keep him advised and find out from the Justice Department on what was going on. I did not mention my conversation with Strachan because I assumed that Ehrlichman was aware of this from Haldeman himself.

Later that afternoon I attended a second meeting in Ehrlichman's office with Colson. I recall Ehrlichman asking where Hunt was. I said I had no idea and Colson made a similar statement. At that point, before the meeting had started, Ehrlichman instructed me to call Liddy to have him tell Hunt to get out of the country. I did this, without even thinking. Shortly after I made the call, however, I realized that no one in the White House should give such an instruction and raised the matter. A brief discussion ensued between Ehrlichman and myself. As I recall, Ehrlichman said that he was not a fugitive from justice, so why not. I said that I did not think it was very wise. At this point, Colson chimed in that he also thought it unwise and Ehrlichman agreed. I immediately called Liddy again to retract the request but he informed me that he had already passed the message and it might be too late to retract.

Following this brief telephone skirmish regarding Hunt's travel plans, the meeting turned to Hunt's status at the White House. I had learned from Fred Fielding, who I had asked to check on it, that Hunt had not drawn a check from his White House consultancy since late March of 1972. But as far as I knew, the records indicated that Hunt was still a White House consultant to Colson. After discussions of this by Colson, who at this point was disowning Hunt as a member of his staff, Ehrlichman called Mr. Bruce Kehrli and requested that he bring Hunt's personnel records up to Ehrlichman's office. Before Kehrli arrived, Colson raised the matter of Hunt's safe. Colson, without getting specific, said it was imperative that someone get the contents of Hunt's safe. Colson suggested, and Ehrlichman concurred, that I take custody of the contents of the safe.

PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES OF 1972  
SENATE RESOLUTION 60

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PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES  
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NINETY-THIRD CONGRESS  
FIRST SESSION

WATERGATE AND RELATED ACTIVITIES

Phase I: Watergate Investigation

WASHINGTON, D.C., JULY 31, AUGUST 1, AND 2, 1973

Book 8



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I have more—mostly bits and pieces of information I would like to ask you about to sort of fill in.

On this business with Mr. Strachan, cleaning up the files, and his later shredding, I think he testified, as I recall, that later on during an airplane trip on Air Force One he brought up this question with you. Do you recall that?

Mr. HALDEMAN. No, sir. As I said, I don't recall a report from him. I don't recall requesting him to do—to clean up the files nor do I recall a report that he had done so.

Senator GURNEY. Did you ever discuss with Mr. Mitchell anything about the break-in or the coverup of Watergate? And now I am—of course, I know you did late this year, in March, but I am talking about earlier, after the break-in, or during 1972?

Mr. HALDEMAN. After the break-in I am sure there were discussions—there were discussions regarding the break-in and the ongoing developments in the Watergate case and I am certain that Mr. Mitchell was in some of those discussions. So the answer regarding the break-in would be yes.

Senator GURNEY. I should have phrased my question a little better. Did you ever discuss any matters with him that indicated to you that there was a coverup, is what I really intended to ask.

Mr. HALDEMAN. No, sir; I attempted in my statement to try to draw a distinction between what now is termed coverup, which I feel is a loose term, that is not maybe defined in each person's mind the same as in each other person's, and it has so generally come to mean the illegal acts that have been made forth here, that when you say coverup, if by coverup you mean any of the illegal actions that were or have been alleged to have been taken, then my answer would be very clearly no.

Senator GURNEY. I did intend that. I did intend to refine it to include the illegal actions.

Mr. Magruder worked for you as a staff man in the White House; did he not?

Mr. HALDEMAN. He did for a short period of time. He came in to the White House as a special assistant under my direct responsibility as a project man and continued in that role for approximately 4 months, I believe, at which time he moved over to Herb Klein's office as Deputy Director of Communications, which was a post he held for a year, over a year I believe, before he went to the reelection committee.

Senator GURNEY. Were you at all close to him during this period of time in the White House? Were you close personal friends, see a lot of each other?

Mr. HALDEMAN. No. He was a member of my staff. During the time he was a member of my staff and I saw him fairly frequently on a business basis but I had no social relationship with him.

Senator GURNEY. Did he do any reporting to you when he was in his capacity of the Committee To Re-Elect the President as deputy campaign director?

Mr. HALDEMAN. Some, yes; but he primarily reported to Mr. Mitchell and I dealt primarily with Mr. Mitchell on matters relating to the reelection committee.

Senator GURNEY. Again in any conversations that you had with Mr. Magruder in the year 1972, did you discuss any of the illegal aspects of the coverup of Watergate?



22. On June 20 or 21, 1972 Robert Mardian and Fred LaRue met in LaRue's apartment with Gordon Liddy. Liddy told LaRue and Mardian that he and Howard Hunt had developed the plans for entries into the DNC and the McGovern presidential campaign offices; that he, Hunt and others involved in the Watergate break-in had been previously involved in operations of the White House, specifically an entry into the offices of Daniel Ellsberg's psychiatrist; that Hunt had acted to make ITT lobbyist Dita Beard unavailable as a witness at the Senate Judiciary Committee hearings on the nomination of Richard Kleindienst to be Attorney General; and that he had shredded all new, serialized \$100 bills in his possession and other evidence relating to the Watergate break-in. Later that day Mardian and LaRue met with John Mitchell and apprised him of their meeting with Liddy. Mitchell was told of Liddy's and Hunt's prior surreptitious entry into the office of Daniel Ellsberg's psychiatrist and of Hunt's earlier activities involving Dita Beard.

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22.1 Fred LaRue testimony, 6 SSC 2286-88, 2309, 2317-18.

22.2 Robert Mardian testimony, 6 SSC 2357-63.

22.3 John Mitchell testimony, 4 SSC 1621-22, 1628, 1643-44, 1660.

PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES OF 1972  
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Mr. LARUE. It would be the following Monday. It would be, I think, the 19th of June.

Mr. DASH. All right. On that Monday in the evening, did you attend a meeting in Mr. Mitchell's Washington apartment at the Watergate?

Mr. LARUE. Mr. Mitchell's apartment?

Mr. DASH. Yes.

Mr. LARUE. Yes, sir.

Mr. DASH. Who was at this meeting?

Mr. LARUE. Mr. Mitchell was at the meeting, I was at the meeting, Mr. Mardian came to the meeting, Mr. Dean, and Mr. Magruder.

Mr. DASH. Now, could you tell us generally what the meeting was about and what discussion took place?

Mr. LARUE. Mr. Dash, I have no specific recollection of any of the discussions other than I would assume, and I am sure from the participants, that the discussion centered on the Watergate incident. The only specific incident that I recall was a discussion by Magruder of some sensitive files which he had, about my understanding relating to this incident, and that he was seeking advice about what to do about those files.

Mr. DASH. Now, did the term or the name "Gemstone" used at that time? Did he refer to it?

Mr. LARUE. If it was used, I do not recall it, no sir. It would not have meant anything to me, anyway.

Mr. DASH. Had you ever heard of that term "Gemstone"?

Mr. LARUE. Not at that time, no sir.

Mr. DASH. Is there a possibility it was used at that time?

Mr. LARUE. There is a possibility, but as I say, it would not have meant anything to me.

Mr. DASH. You say Mr. Magruder asked what he should do about these sensitive files?

Mr. LARUE. Yes, sir.

Mr. DASH. Did he get a response to that?

Mr. LARUE. As I remember, there was a response from Mr. Mitchell that it might be good if Mr. Magruder had a fire.

Mr. DASH. Who said that?

Mr. LARUE. As near as I can recall, Mr. Mitchell said that.

Mr. DASH. That it might be a good idea if he had a good fire in his house?

Mr. LARUE. Yes.

Mr. DASH. Do you recall in any discussion of the politically sensitive files that the information they involved was electronic surveillance?

Mr. LARUE. As I recall, there was a reference to files pertaining to electronic surveillance, yes, sir.

Mr. DASH. Is it true that at this meeting on June 19, 1972, where a discussion was had about these files and the recommendations that it would be good if Mr. Magruder had a good fire in his house, was one of the overt acts which is included in the information, the conspiracy of information to which you pleaded guilty, the June 19 meeting?

Mr. LARUE. Yes, sir; that is true.

Mr. DASH. Now, was there a meeting in your apartment on June 20, 1972?

Mr. LARUE. Yes, sir.

Mr. DASH. Could you tell us who was there?

Mr. LARUE. Mr. Mardian, Mr. Liddy and myself.

Mr. DASH. And what was discussed at that time? This is Mr. Gordon Liddy?

Mr. LARUE. Yes, that is correct.

This discussion centered around Mr. Liddy's knowledge and involvement in the break-in.

Mr. DASH. You say centered around his involvement. Could you be a little more specific? What did Mr. Liddy say? Was he there to tell you what had occurred?

Mr. LARUE. I don't know that he was there for that purpose, but this is what evolved.

Mr. DASH. Who set up the meeting?

Mr. LARUE. Mr. Mardian set up the meeting.

Mr. DASH. What did you understand, since it was in your apartment, that the meeting was to be about?

Mr. LARUE. My presence in the meeting occurred in this manner: Mr. Mardian came to me on that day and wanted to know if he could borrow my, use my apartment, that he had a meeting set up with Gordon Liddy. I told him that would be fine. I gave him the keys to my apartment, and I think at that time, he said, you might as well join me.

Mr. DASH. Where, by the way, is your apartment located?

Mr. LARUE. At that time, I was in Watergate West.

Mr. DASH. Now, you knew that, especially from what Mr. Magruder had told you on his telephone call with Mr. Liddy, that Mr. Liddy had been one of those who was involved in the break-in?

Mr. LARUE. No, Mr. Dash, I do not think that was discussed at that time.

Mr. DASH. Well, you said that Mr. Magruder went back and said there was trouble, there was a break-in, that that was the day they were going to go into Democratic national headquarters when Mr. Liddy was on the phone. When Mr. Magruder came back, didn't you say that Mr. Liddy had told Mr. Magruder about the break-in?

Mr. LARUE. Yes; but I don't think that at that time, Mr. Liddy had indicated any involvement of himself at that operation.

Mr. DASH. Did he mention Mr. McCord?

Mr. LARUE. He did mention Mr. McCord, yes, sir.

Mr. DASH. At that time, did he mention himself at your apartment on June 20?

Mr. LARUE. Yes, sir.

Mr. DASH. Could you tell us what he did say about his involvement?

Mr. LARUE. Mr. Liddy told us that he had recruited the five people that had been caught in the Democratic National Committee, that he had, he and Mr. Hunt had set up this operation, that he and Mr. Hunt were at a hotel room at the Watergate Hotel during the actual break-in. He described the listening post that they had across the street at the Howard Johnson's.

Mr. DASH. By the way, did he tell you about any other activity he had been engaged in for intelligence purposes or covert activities besides the break-in at the Watergate?

Mr. LARUE. Yes, he did.

Mr. DASH. Could you tell us what they did?

Mr. LARUE. Mr. Liddy mentioned that he had on other occasions been involved in incidents or operations for the White House, and he specifically mentioned the attempted burglary of the office of the psychiatrist of Mr. Ellisberg. He specifically mentioned another incident in which Mr. Hunt used a disguise. I think—this was in Denver, Colo., when Mrs. Dita Beard was in the hospital. Mr. Hunt used a disguise to surreptitiously enter the room and have a conversation with Mrs. Beard.

Mr. DASH. Do you recall any other incidents that he talked about?

Mr. LARUE. I don't recall any, no, sir.

Mr. DASH. Do you recall Mr. Liddy telling you or Mr. Mardian about his shooting out the lights around the McGovern headquarters?

Mr. LARUE. Yes, I do recall that.

Mr. DASH. That was during an unsuccessful attempt to break into McGovern headquarters?

Mr. LARUE. An unsuccessful attempt. He had shot out some lights, I think in an alley or someplace around McGovern headquarters.

Mr. DASH. Do you recall Mr. Liddy discussing at that time whether or not there was any possibility he might get caught or might get found out?

Mr. LARUE. Mr. Liddy assured us that he had conducted this operation in such a manner that it could not be traced to him, that we should not have any fears that any subsequent investigation would lead to him.

Mr. DASH. Nevertheless, did Mr. Liddy offer any type of punishment that he would be willing to accept for his failure in this case?

Mr. LARUE. Yes; Mr. Liddy assured us that in any event, he would never reveal any information about this in the course of any investigation, even if it led to him, but if we were not satisfied with that assurance, that though he was, I think, personally or morally opposed to suicide, that if we would instruct him to be on any street corner at any time, he would be there and we could have him assassinated.

Mr. DASH. In other words, he was willing to be rubbed out?

Mr. LARUE. Yes, sir.

Mr. DASH. I take it nobody took him up on his offer?

Mr. LARUE. Not that I know of, no, sir.

Mr. DASH. Now, the meeting was between you, Mardian, and Mr. Liddy in your apartment?

Mr. LARUE. Yes, sir.

Mr. DASH. Now, it was this meeting that you had with Mr. Liddy in which these revelations came from Mr. Liddy. Was this information reported to Mr. Mitchell?

Mr. LARUE. Yes, it was.

Mr. DASH. Do you recall when it was, by whom?

Mr. LARUE. The best of my recollection would be the same day, the afternoon or late evening of June 20.

Mr. DASH. What was Mr. Mitchell's reaction when he heard what you had to say?

Mr. LARUE. Well, he was—Mr. Mitchell is not a person that demonstrates a great deal of emotion about anything. Mr. Dash, I don't recall any specific reaction.

Mr. DASH. Now, did Mr. Liddy tell you who had approved the operation when he was telling you about the break-in at the Democratic National Committee headquarters, or any of the other activities?

Mr. LARUE. Senator, I stand on the fact that I do not know who made these commitments, no, sir.

Senator TALMADGE. But you thought they ought to be carried out regardless of who made them and under what conditions?

Mr. LARUE. I thought that what?

Senator TALMADGE. You thought they ought to be carried out regardless of who made them and totally unknown to you?

Mr. LARUE. I thought they ought to be carried out because of the consequences if they were not.

Senator TALMADGE. Did you know anything about the break-in prior thereto?

Mr. LARUE. Pardon me, I am sorry.

Senator TALMADGE. Did you know the break-in was planned prior to that time? Did you know that Liddy and his associates were going to break into the Watergate and commit burglary?

Mr. LARUE. No, sir.

Senator TALMADGE. You did not?

Mr. LARUE. No, sir, I did not.

Senator TALMADGE. Did Mr. Mitchell know?

Mr. LARUE. Not to my knowledge, no, sir.

Senator TALMADGE. I believe you met with Mr. Liddy on June 20.

Mr. LARUE. Yes, sir.

Senator TALMADGE. And you discussed various things. Did Mr. Liddy tell you at that time that he had shredded a number of documents?

Mr. LARUE. Yes, sir.

Senator TALMADGE. Did he tell you the nature of those documents?

Mr. LARUE. He indicated that they were documents relating to the break-in, yes, sir.

Senator TALMADGE. And they were in the files of the Committee To Re-Elect the President?

Mr. LARUE. They were in—my understanding is they were in his files, yes, sir.

Senator TALMADGE. Now, I believe Mr. Mardian was present at that same conversation, was he not?

Mr. LARUE. Yes, sir.

Senator TALMADGE. What was his reaction to this Liddy story that—

Mr. LARUE. What was Mr. Mardian's reaction?

Senator TALMADGE. Yes.

Mr. LARUE. I think Mr. Mardian was—shared the same opinion I did. He was rather shocked by the revelations of what had been known, became known as the White House horrors, and I do not think he shared any enthusiasm that the investigation would eventually lead to Mr. Liddy.

Senator TALMADGE. Did Mr. Liddy tell you at that time about the Ellsberg psychiatrist break-in?

Mr. LARUE. Yes, sir.

Senator TALMADGE. Now, had not Mr. Mardian been in charge of the Internal Security Division of the Justice Department that was in charge of prosecuting the *Ellsberg* case?

Mr. LARUE. I do not know who was in charge of prosecuting it. Senator. Mr. Mardian, prior to his coming to the committee, was assistant attorney general in charge of Internal Security, yes, sir.



attempting to determine the amount of money that had been given to Mr. Liddy, and when I determined this amount of money I think I reported that to Mr. Mitchell.

Senator MONTROYA. But you are speaking of the period after June 17?

Mr. LARUE. After the break-in, yes, sir.

Senator MONTROYA. Did you have any discussion with Mr. Mitchell between January 17 or let us put it a little further, between April 1 and June 17 with respect to any disbursements to Mr. Liddy by Mr. Sloan?

Mr. LARUE. No, sir.

Senator MONTROYA. You did not.

Did you—but you did know that these disbursements were being made by Mr. Sloan to Mr. Liddy?

Mr. LARUE. No, sir, I did not.

Senator MONTROYA. Did you during this particular period converse with Mr. Magruder with respect to any disbursements to Mr. Liddy?

Mr. LARUE. No, sir, not that I can recall.

Mr. VINSON. Senator, may I interrupt. What period are you talking about?

Senator MONTROYA. Between the time that Mr. Mitchell took over, April 1 and June 17.

Mr. LARUE. No, sir, not that I can recall.

Senator MONTROYA. Now let us go to the meeting immediately after the break-in which occurred, I understand, in Mr. Mitchell's apartment on June 19, was that correct?

Mr. LARUE. Yes, sir.

Senator MONTROYA. Now, present at that meeting were you, Mr. Mardian, and who else?

Mr. LARUE. Mr. Magruder and Mr. Dean.

Senator MONTROYA. All right. Now, what was the main thrust of the discussion this particular evening?

Mr. LARUE. Senator, I can only assume that we had probably a wide discussion or a discussion of the numerous problems that were—we had encountered because of the Watergate break-in. I think I stated previously that I had a very hazy recollection of that meeting and specifically can only recall the discussion of the documents which Mr. Magruder had and the reference to the fact that he ought to have the fire.

Senator MONTROYA. Well, would you say that this meeting was a meeting of self-confession on the part of those present?

Mr. LARUE. No, sir.

Senator MONTROYA. As to what part they had played in this and what they knew?

Mr. LARUE. No, sir.

Senator MONTROYA. Well, what was it then? I understand that at this meeting you presented the information which Mr. Liddy had already imparted to someone?

Mr. LARUE. No, sir. That happened, that meeting with Mr. Liddy happened on June 20, the day after this meeting.

Senator MONTROYA. And then it was subsequent to the meeting with Mr. Liddy that—and, that another meeting was arranged at your apartment, is that correct? This was on June 20?

Mr. LARUE. The only meeting, Senator, that occurred that I had, that I can recall with Mr. Liddy would be on June 20 in my apartment. This was not, to my knowledge--this meeting was not set up--discussed at the June 19 meeting.

Senator MONTROYA. All right.

Now, on June 20, after you people met, what was discussed and what plan evolved from this particular meeting?

Mr. LARUE. Senator, could you be more specific about which meeting you are talking about? Are you talking about the meeting with Liddy or the meeting that Mardian and I had with Mr. Mitchell?

Senator MONTROYA. The meeting with--between you or among you--Mardian and Liddy?

Mr. LARUE. On June 20. Well, the topic discussion was Mr. Liddy's involvement in the Watergate break-in. I don't know of any--we discussed no plan of action.

Senator MONTROYA. Well, did you report any of the results of this meeting to Mr. Mitchell?

Mr. LARUE. Yes, sir.

Senator MONTROYA. How soon after?

Mr. LARUE. As I recall, that same day.

Senator MONTROYA. Immediately. Do you recall that Mr. Mitchell on that same evening at the hour of 6:08. I believe, called the President?

Mr. LARUE. Senator, I do not recall Mr. Mitchell calling the President. That is a possibility. I do not recall it, no, sir.

Senator MONTROYA. Well, I refer you now to the chart here, on the evening of June 20, at the hour of 6:08, it shows a telephone call to the President. Now, were you aware of this call?

Mr. LARUE. No, Senator. I cannot recall the call. Is that a call to the President or from the President?

Senator MONTROYA. It was a call to the President from Mr. Mitchell.

Mr. LARUE. I cannot recall the call, no, sir.

Senator MONTROYA. How late were you with Mr. Mitchell this particular evening?

Mr. LARUE. Senator, to the best of my recollection, probably until 10 o'clock.

Senator MONTROYA. Now, Mr. LaRue, during the course of these meetings there was no manifestation, or at least you have not related it, no manifestation of surprise on the part of any of you, you were merely trying to plan for the future because you knew by then that people in the CRP were involved. How did you arrive at this conclusion?

Mr. LARUE. That people in the CRP were involved?

Senator MONTROYA. Yes.

Mr. LARUE. Well, obviously the first fact, Senator, that Mr. McCord had been arrested in the DNC; Mr. Liddy's account of his involvement to Mr. Mardian and I; my conversations with Mr. Magruder.

Senator MONTROYA. Now, did Mr. Magruder relate to you subsequent to the--immediately subsequent to the first call in California, as to Mr. Liddy's involvement in this particular thing?

Mr. LARUE. No, sir, not at that time, as I recall. There was no discussion of Mr. Liddy's involvement.

Senator MONTROYA. Did you, before you left California, know of this particular involvement?



PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES OF 1972  
SENATE RESOLUTION 60

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HEARINGS  
BEFORE THE  
SELECT COMMITTEE ON  
PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES  
OF THE  
UNITED STATES SENATE  
NINETY-THIRD CONGRESS  
FIRST SESSION

WATERGATE AND RELATED ACTIVITIES  
Phase I: Watergate Investigation  
WASHINGTON, D.C., JULY 18, 19, 20, 23, 24, AND 25, 1973  
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Mr. MARDIAN. I think I would have recalled such a discussion had it taken place in my presence.

Mr. HAMILTON. Well, are you aware of any testimony by Mr. LaRue and Mr. Magruder that you left the meeting before destruction of the Gemstone file?

Mr. MARDIAN. I don't think anybody asked that question and I don't think anybody asked Mr. LaRue when I arrived. Maybe they did. I don't know.

Mr. HAMILTON. But you know of no statement by Magruder or LaRue here or otherwise that you were not present at this meeting when the destruction of the Gemstone file took place?

Mr. MARDIAN. Well, I haven't talked to them.

Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Mardian, did you, in the several days following June 19, have an occasion to interview Mr. Liddy?

Mr. MARDIAN. Yes.

Mr. HAMILTON. And who else was present in this interview?

Mr. MARDIAN. Mr. Fred LaRue.

Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. LaRue testified at page 4595 that this meeting was on June 20. Do you concur in that testimony?

Mr. MARDIAN. No. And I might state that there is doubt in my mind as to the date of that meeting. I originally, in response to questions put to me by the U.S. attorneys fixed the date of that meeting as the 21st or 22d. They told me that the meeting took place on the 20th. We finally settled on the 20th or 21st, and I believe I told your committee that it was the 20th or 21st. In checking my records I would have to say that the meeting took place on the morning of—and again I could be mistaken, the morning of June 21.

Mr. HAMILTON. What is there in your records, Mr. Mardian, that indicates to you that the meeting took place on this day?

Mr. MARDIAN. On the worksheet that has been turned over to your committee, I note that I got a call from Gordon Liddy and it coincides with my earliest recollection that I did not meet with Mr. Liddy at least on the first day of my return. I am not saying that that is absolute, I am just—my earliest recollection was the 21st or 22d, and I think I have testified that it could be the 20th or 21st but I would have to say that it was the 21st.

Mr. HAMILTON. Is it your recollection that this meeting with Mr. Liddy took place on the morning of the 21st?

Mr. MARDIAN. This is purely a surmise based upon that call. It looks to be the first call that I noted, and my recollection is he said he was leaving that day for Los Angeles.

Mr. HAMILTON. I notice in your diary that there are numerous meetings scheduled on June 21st, one at 8; one at 8:30; one at 9:30; one at 10; one at 11; and one at 12, that appears to have been canceled. Would this heavy load on the morning of the 21st suggest to you that perhaps the meeting took place on the 20th?

Mr. MARDIAN. That crossmark does not indicate a cancellation. I think you will find that crossmark on every Monday, Wednesday, and Friday, which was the time I was supposed to exercise, which I did not.

I note that the meeting—there is one, for instance, with a gentleman at 8:30 and then another one at 10 o'clock. I do not think I met with that gentleman twice on that day. One appears to be a reschedul-

ing, and the fact that I have it noted in my book does not mean that I kept the appointment.

I am trying to give you the best, my best recollection.

Mr. HAMILTON. How did this meeting come about, Mr. Mardian?

Mr. MARDIAN. Well, my recollection differs with that of Mr. LaRue. Again, Mr. LaRue could be right. My recollection was that Mr. LaRue told me Mr. Liddy wanted to talk to me. I do not recall whether it was Mr. LaRue that told me this or Mr. Liddy to come to my office. Mr. Liddy was reluctant to come to my office. He wanted to meet some place else, and we met in Mr. LaRue's apartment. I believe that, more than anything else, was the basis for my belief that it was Mr. LaRue that arranged for the meeting and indicated we could meet in his apartment.

Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Mardian, I wondered in your own words if you would, in some detail, tell us what occurred at this meeting and tell us what information Mr. Liddy imparted to you?

Mr. MARDIAN. My recollection is pretty vivid. I may forget some of the items that he disclosed to me, but I will try not to.

We arrived, Mr. LaRue and I arrived at his apartment and soon thereafter, Mr. Liddy came into the room. The first thing he asked Mr. LaRue was whether or not he had a radio. Mr. LaRue indicated a radio which was in the corner of the living room. Mr. Liddy went over and turned the radio on and asked me to sit by the radio in a chair, and he sat in a couch, as I recall, that was next to an end table that the radio was on.

He apologized to me by saying something to the effect that it is not that I do not trust you, but this conversation cannot be recorded. My inference from that was he thought I had some kind of a device on me, possibly something in the room, I do not know.

And again, I am going to have to say that I do not recall the sequence of events in which he related these things to me. But I do recall that he said that he wanted to hire me as his lawyer, as his personal attorney. I told him that I was acting as attorney for the committee and that I could not relieve myself of that responsibility to represent him. He then said it was imperative that he be able to talk to me in confidence and that under no circumstances could I disclose what he told me.

I told him that since he was an employee of the committee and I was acting as attorney for the committee, he could talk to me as a client to a lawyer and that I would maintain his confidence, but that I would have to be at liberty to disclose what he told me to Mr. Mitchell. At first, I believe he demurred, and I told him that was the only basis on which I could talk to him.

One of the things that he told me was that he had a message from Mr. Hunt, that Mr. Hunt felt that it was the committee's obligation to provide bail money to get his men out of jail. At that time, these people were incarcerated in the District of Columbia Jail.

I was interested in finding out what had occurred and I interrogated him as to the events of the evening of January 16—June 16, the morning of the 17th. And he related to me what had occurred about the break-in, told me that they had planned, as I recall, to break into the McGovern headquarters that same night.

About the arrest of the five people, Mr. McCord and the others, their flight, he indicated to me that there was nothing to fear, because the only person that could identify Mr. Liddy was Mr. McCord and Mr. McCord would not divulge his identity, that the Cuban-Americans were old soldiers who had worked in the CIA with Mr. Hunt since the Bay of Pigs, and that they would never under any circumstances disclose Mr. Hunt's identity, and that the committee had nothing to fear in that regard.

I told him that, based upon what he had related to me, the events of that evening, one of which included, as I recall, his sitting on the shoulders of one of the men at a distance—I don't recall, some 300 feet or 300 yards—shooting out a light behind the Democratic Committee headquarters. I pointed out to him that a person that he was that intimate with would certainly be able to identify him, pointed out that he had spent, that he had told us he had spent some time in the room with these people in their hotel room, they had eaten, that his fingerprints would be all over the place. He kept insisting that there was no chance that he would be identified.

I tried to convince him he would be identified, that his best bet was to give himself up rather than try to wait for them to arrest him.

He discounted this possibility. He did, after some discussion, indicate that it was possible that he could be arrested, but I inquired of him as to the—because of the news accounts of the arrest and the apparent bungled effort, the possibility that someone in the group had had it in mind that they would be arrested, to embarrass the Committee To Re-Elect the President. He discounted this completely by saying that this group had been operating together for some considerable period of time, that they were all real pros, that they had engaged in numerous jobs. And when I asked him what kind of jobs, he said, we pulled two right under your nose.

I inquired as to what he meant by that, and he said that they had invaded the office of the psychiatrist of Dr. Ellsberg and that they were the ones who got Dita Beard out of town.

I expressed my strong displeasure with respect to—I pointed out that the worst thing that had happened in the hearings was that Dita Beard disappeared.

I asked him because of the Ellsberg break-in what, if anything, they had obtained? He told me that they had obtained nothing, that they had searched all the files and couldn't find his record.

I asked him on whose authority he was operating, and I wish to be very careful here, because I don't know that he used the name of the President, but the words he did use were clearly meant to imply that he was acting on the express authority of the President of the United States, with the assistance of the Central Intelligence Agency.

I made some notes of—oh, I asked him what information they had obtained. He told me that the purpose of making this entry, that this entry was not of his doing, that neither he nor Mr. Hunt thought it was a good idea, that they had obtained nothing from the bug that they had previously implanted in the place. He told me that the only thing they had ascertained from that bug was the fact that somebody at the Democratic National Committee was talking to somebody at the—was talking to the people or a person at the Committee To Re-

Elect the President, that although he and Mr. Hunt were against the entry, that Mr. Magruder—

Senator BAKER [presiding]. Would you suspend for just a minute, Mr. Witness?

Anybody who wants to leave the room should do so now so we don't have disruption of the witness' testimony. And would the officer close the door, please, for quiet in the witness room.

Would you please proceed?

Mr. MARDIAN. I think I was explaining that neither he nor Mr. Hunt felt that any additional entries would be fruitful, but that he had, they had made the entry at the insistence of Mr. Magruder.

I recall again inquiring as to why the stupid adventure. It seems to me to be the most ridiculous thing I had ever heard of. As a politician, or as a person that had had political experience, I couldn't understand what they would hope to get out of the Democratic national headquarters before they even had a candidate, much less afterward. Party headquarters, at least Republican Party headquarters, are very sterile during this period of time.

He could not answer the question for me other than to say that he was carrying out his orders.

Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Mardian, did Mr. Liddy mention what type of budget he was operating under?

Mr. MARDIAN. I was asked a question about the budget this morning, and I responded both to you and to the chairman, and I stated—

Senator ERVIN. Excuse me, I have to interrupt this. It appears that a hoax has been perpetrated upon the committee, at least upon the chairman of the committee.

I was called to the telephone just before the lunch period and I was told before I went to the telephone that Secretary of the Treasury Shultz was calling and wanted to speak to me. I went to the telephone and a voice at the other end of the line informed me that it was Secretary of the Treasury Shultz. I am not familiar enough with the voice of the Secretary to be able to identify it and so I just assumed that the person at the other end of the line was Secretary Shultz, and he made the statement which I reported to the committee and the news media on this microphone.

In the meantime, there has been communications between White House counsel, Mr. Garment, and the staff, and Mr. Garment professed ignorance of any matters of that kind and, as I understand, an investigation was made, and Secretary Shultz was contacted and Secretary Shultz stated that he had no such conversation. So I had his office called and asked that he be placed on the phone, and so I was informed a few minutes ago—the reason I put it this way is because I hate to have my faith shattered in humanity—but I was called to the phone and I was informed that Secretary Shultz was indeed on the phone. I went to the phone and had a conversation with the man who really assured me he was the real Secretary Shultz [laughter] and he informed me that he had had no conversation with me today; that whoever did it was somebody else; that the only conversation he had with me recently by telephone was when he called me yesterday to tell me something about the White House and the witnesses from the Secret Service.



So it is just an awful thing for a very trusting soul like me to find that there are human beings, if you can call them such, who would perpetrate a hoax like this.

Additional information which I received from counsel, and which counsel assures me that they have received by telephone, and not in person, and which they believe was received from White House counsel is to the effect that the President has the request of the committee under advisement and will reach some decision about it early next week. So notwithstanding the fact that my trust in humanity has been grossly abused by someone I am going to—and notwithstanding the fact that some people think the telephone is an instrument of the devil anyway [laughter] I am going to assume that the information which counsel received at one end of a telephone line from somebody at the other end was indeed information conveyed to them by White House counsel and that the recent information is correct.

Senator BAKER. Mr. Chairman, it would be helpful if we could have found a secure telephone [laughter] but in any event, too, I would view with great distaste the apparent hoax that has been perpetrated on the committee. The fact that it was received here on a confidential phone number in the committee room would seem to lend credence at the first blush, and I can fully understand the transaction as it has transpired.

I would say for the record, however, that the thanks I expressed and the admiration I expressed for the accommodation of both parties still stands as an advance payment on what I hope will still happen.

Senator ERYN. I would add that the commendation I visited upon the committee members would still stand and I would like to expand it to include both the majority and the minority staff members. And I trust that nobody in the future will attempt to deceive and mislead a trusting and unsuspecting individual like the chairman of this committee in any such fashion [laughter]. In other words, the counsel suggests that we have had some talk about dirty tricks. I think it is a unanimous opinion of this committee that this was a right dirty trick. [Laughter.]

Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Mardian, I believe a minute ago we were talking about what Mr. Liddy told you about the budget that he was operating under.

Mr. MARDIAN. I think I responded to that earlier this morning. I mentioned the budget matter in a conversation with Mr. Mitchell present in California. It is possible that that subject came up after my discussion with Mr. Liddy because Mr. Liddy told me and it may have been for the first time, that he was operating under a budget approved by Mr. Mitchell and the White House during that June 21 meeting, if it is the 21st.

Mr. HAMILTON. Just to make the record clear, Mr. Mardian, did Mr. Liddy also say to you that the operations that he had been involved in such as the Ellsberg burglary and the Dita Beard incident had the approval of the President and the CIA. Is that a correct paraphrase, and if not, please correct me.

Mr. MARDIAN. As I told you before, the staff, I don't recall. I can't say that he said the President of the United States, but the words he used or the word he used were meant to imply that, and that is the impression he left with me.

Mr. HAMILTON. That they had been approved by the President, that was your impression?

Mr. MARDIAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. HAMILTON. Now, did Mr. Liddy mention to you that he had shredded any documents?

Mr. MARDIAN. Yes, in trying to demonstrate to me that there was no way of tracing him he told me he had shredded every bit of evidence that would have linked him to this operation as well as all of the other operations. He told me he had even gone home—he has a habit, he told me, or a hobby, I should say, of collecting soap from the various hotels. [Laughter.]

He had taken the soap wrappers off and shredded all the soap wrappers.

He also told me that during this process he had shredded all of the \$100 bills that he had in his possession that were new and serialized.

Mr. HAMILTON. Before I move on, have we exhausted the contents of this meeting to the best of your recollection?

Mr. MARDIAN. Yes, Mr. LaRue reminded me of another, he told us quite a bit that morning, and it may seem comical now. It certainly didn't seem comical to us at the time. He did make the statement that the committee could be assured that he would never talk and if they doubted that, as Mr. LaRue testified, if we would just tell him what corner to stand on he was ready to be assassinated.

Mr. HAMILTON. What did you do with this information, Mr. Mardian?

Mr. MARDIAN. I went immediately—as soon as I could get access to Mr. Mitchell I disclosed to him—I may not have disclosed all of this to him but—

Mr. HAMILTON. And you think it was the same day that you reported to Mr. Mitchell?

Mr. MARDIAN. Yes, my counsel advises me that despite my notes I neglected to tell you a very important part of another aspect of what he told me.

In explaining to me that they were a purely professional outfit, he told me that Mr. Hunt was the planner of the Bay of Pigs, the chief planner, as I recall, that he was extremely popular, I think he said, like a God in the Cuban community of Miami, that this was an explanation of why these Cuban-Americans would follow him to death, and that no one would disclose anything as far as they were concerned, they were absolutely loyal, worked with him for a number of years, had been working with them in these operations, that—and I don't wish to bring anybody else into it by implication, but he said that the—one of his friends in the Cuban community and one of the leaders was a particular person, I am not sure, and if I use the identification I may be identifying the wrong person, because at staff meetings I heard some of the staff members start mentioning some names and I am not even sure that the person was of the character that I described but he was extremely wealthy, and I told Mr. Liddy that I did not think Mr. Mitchell would approve the use of committee funds to bail out the defendants and he should so advise Mr. Hunt, and that it seemed to me that if Mr. Hunt had such good connections in the Miami community that they should look to that community for the bail money.

Mr. HAMILTON. When you spoke to Mr. Mitchell did you transmit this request for bail money to Mr. Mitchell?

Mr. MARDIAN. Included among all of the other matters that I related.

Mr. HAMILTON. More specifically, in regard to the bail money, what was Mr. Mitchell's reaction?

Mr. MARDIAN. Mr. Mitchell told me that under no circumstances would bail money be forthcoming, and for me to call Mr. Liddy and tell him. And I did so.

Mr. HAMILTON. Will you tell us the rest of your conversation with Mr. Mitchell? I don't want you to repeat everything that you told Mr. Liddy, but I would like to know what Mr. Mitchell said to you.

Mr. MARDIAN. I can't recall—oh, he asked me if Mr. Liddy—I might say that Mr. Mitchell appeared to be as sincerely shocked as I was when I got this information. He asked me if Mr. Liddy had disclosed any other of the activities of this group that had been arrested, Mr. Hunt and himself, and I told him that he had not, he had not disclosed any others to me.

Mr. HAMILTON. Did Mr. Mitchell confirm or deny that he had approved the budget for Mr. Liddy's operation?

Mr. MARDIAN. I don't think he did.

Mr. HAMILTON. He made no comment in any way as to whether or not he had approved the budget?

Mr. MARDIAN. Not at that time. That discussion took place later.

Mr. HAMILTON. A discussion on whether he had approved the budget took place later?

Mr. MARDIAN. Well, the discussion didn't start out in that vein. It took place when I confronted Mr. Magruder. I asked Mr. Magruder in the presence of Mr. Mitchell, I believe the next day, or as soon thereafter as I could, how much money he had given Mr. Liddy in addition, I forget the general nature of the entire conversation, I asked him whether he directed Mr. Liddy to go in there. He denied it. I asked him how much money he had given Mr. Liddy. He said he had authorized Mr. Sloan to give Mr. Liddy \$40,000. I asked him what he thought the \$40,000 was for. It seemed to me a sizable sum of money. Mr. Mitchell expressed the same concern and wanted to know, you know, how he could have spent \$40,000 already because the campaign had just started.

Mr. Magruder lied to Mr. Mitchell that he had authorized \$250,000, and this seemed but a very small part of that sum. That is how the \$250,000 budget matter came up.

Mr. HAMILTON. At some occasion during that week wasn't there a discussion between Mr. Magruder and Mr. Sloan as to the actual amount that had been approved?

Mr. MARDIAN. I was not—I don't recall being present at that discussion other than the—it has been testified that I confronted the two of them in Mr. Mitchell's presence, that may very well have occurred. I don't have a present recollection. But after talking with Mr. Magruder I then interrogated Mr. Sloan. Mr. Sloan told me that he had been authorized by Mr. Magruder to disburse in the neighborhood of \$200,000 which shocked me even further. I asked him if he was sure of the amount. He said he had not calculated the exact amount but that it was his opinion that it was in the neighborhood of \$200,000 that he had already disbursed.



PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES OF 1972  
SENATE RESOLUTION 60

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HEARINGS  
BEFORE THE  
SELECT COMMITTEE ON  
PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES  
OF THE  
UNITED STATES SENATE  
NINETY-THIRD CONGRESS  
FIRST SESSION

WATERGATE AND RELATED ACTIVITIES  
Phase I: Watergate Investigation  
WASHINGTON, D.C., JUNE 27, 28, 29, AND JULY 10, 1973  
Book 4



Printed for the use of the  
Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities

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Mr. DASH. All right, now, Mr. Mitchell, where and when did you first learn of the break-in of the Democratic National Committee headquarters that took place on June 17, 1972?

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, I was in California for the weekend on an extensive round of activities and, to the best of my recollection, Mr. Dash, it was on Saturday morning. I am not sure who the individual was who told me. We were, I was, moving with Governor Reagan from a hotel to a place where there was a series of political meetings, to the best of my recollection, when I arrived there I was advised of it. There was considerable concern about the matter because I was holding a press conference out there, and we did not know what the circumstances were. I believe that by that time that they had—Mr. McCord, his name had surfaced or Mrs. McCord had called somebody at the committee about it, and obviously, there was an involvement in the Committee To Re-Elect the President.

Mr. DASH. What, if anything, did you do, while still in California?

Mr. MITCHELL. While in California? I did a number of things. First of all, I continued to carry out the schedule that I had there which was quite extensive for 2 days. I asked the people, particularly Mr. Mardian who was there, to get as much information about it as he could. I put out a statement to the effect that, I do not know whether it went out there or after we came back, to the effect that we did not understand this, that Mr. McCord was one of our employees, he also had a separate consulting firm, that it was basically an attempt to carry on the extensive schedule that I had which, of course, is in the book that you are well aware about and, at the same time, trying to get information as to what had happened back in the District of Columbia.

Mr. DASH. At that time, out in California, did it ever cross your mind when you read about this that perhaps the Liddy plan had been put in operation?

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, that had crossed my mind but the players were different and, of course, there was a lot of discussion about CIA and because of the Cuban Americans who were involved in it. It wasn't until actually later on that it struck home to me that this could have been the same operation that had a genesis back in the earlier conversation.

Mr. DASH. Well then, after you returned from California, and I understand that was on June 19, 1972.

Mr. MITCHELL. Yes, sir, it was.

Mr. DASH. When and how were you briefed as to what actually happened in this matter?

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, how was I briefed as to what actually happened?

Mr. DASH. Yes.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, that is such a broad statement that I could tell you for the next 6 months I was being briefed on it.

Mr. DASH. I mean, let's take the—

Mr. MITCHELL. Excuse me, Mr. Dash, you are asking the questions.

Mr. DASH. That is all right. I think you were about ready to give me a shorter answer than a longer answer.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, I was giving you a shorter answer to the fact that the first so-called briefing on what had happened, and you used the word "actually" which I will have to omit from that for the time

being because I have never quite got to the bottom of it, was after Mr. Mardian and Mr. LaRue had met with Mr. Liddy and Mr. Liddy provided them with quite an extensive story on Mr. Liddy's activities.

Mr. DASH. Will you tell us briefly what that extensive story included?

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, it included the fact that he was involved with other individuals in the Watergate activity, that he had also made surveillance of McGovern headquarters, I believe it was, and that he had previously, as part of what has since become known as the Plumbers group, acted extensively in certain areas while he was at the White House in connection with the Ellsberg matter, in the Dita Beard matter and a few of the other little gems.

Mr. DASH. When you say the Ellsberg matter what specifically are you referring to?

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, I am referring to, well, it certainly wasn't the prosecution.

Mr. DASH. No.

Mr. MITCHELL. Obviously it had to do with the surreptitious entry of the doctor's office in California.

Mr. DASH. And when you refer to the Dita Beard matter what specifically did you learn through Mr. LaRue and Mr. Mardian?

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, if my recollection is correct he was assisting in spiriting her out of wherever they spirited her out of, either New York or Washington.

Mr. DASH. Was there a meeting in your apartment on the evening that you arrived in Washington on June 19, attended by Mr. LaRue, Mr. Mardian, Mr. Dean, Mr. Magruder—

Mr. MITCHELL. Magruder and myself, that is correct.

Mr. DASH. Do you recall the purpose of that meeting, the discussion that took place there?

Mr. MITCHELL. I recall that we had been traveling all day and, of course, we had very little information about what the current status was of the entry of the Democratic National Committee, and we met at the apartment to discuss it. They were, of course, clamoring for a response from the committee because of Mr. McCord's involvement, et cetera, and we had quite a general discussion of the subject matter.

Mr. DASH. Do you recall any discussion of the so-called either Gemstone files or wiretapping files that you had in your possession?

Mr. MITCHELL. No; I had not heard of the Gemstone files as of that meeting and, as of that date, I had not heard that anybody there at that particular meeting knew of the wiretapping aspects of that or had any connection with it.

Mr. DASH. Did either you or anybody in your presence at that meeting discuss Mr. Liddy having a good fire at his house?

Mr. MITCHELL. Not in my recollection was there any discussion of destruction of documents at that meeting.

Mr. DASH. You are aware of the testimony of Mr. Magruder that he did get the idea to destroy the documents and he did in fact burn the Gemstone documents?

Mr. MITCHELL. I am aware of his testimony and I think his testimony was one of these general things "It was decided that" or something to that effect but, to my recollection, there was no such discussion of it.

I know the individual, I know his reactions to things, and I have a very strong feeling that during the period of time in which I was in association with him and did talk to him on the telephone, that I just do not believe that he had that information or had that knowledge; otherwise, I think the type of conversations we had would have brought it out.

Mr. DASH. Generally, is it fair to say that much of your opinion that you express is based on your faith in the President and your knowledge of the man, rather than any specific statement the President made to you or that you made to the President?

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, I subscribe to the first two. I do have faith in the President and I do think I have knowledge of the man and I do think there were enough discussions in the area, in the general area, to the point where I think the general subject matter would have come out if the President had had knowledge.

Mr. DASH. Well, now, Mr. Mitchell, you did become aware, as you have indicated, somewhere around June 21 or 22, when you were briefed or debriefed by Mr. LaRue and Mr. Mardian about the so-called—as you described it, the White House horrors of the Liddy operation and the break-in. Did you, yourself, as the President's adviser and counselor, tell the President what you knew or what you learned?

Mr. MITCHELL. No, sir, I did not.

Mr. DASH. Why didn't you?

Mr. MITCHELL. Because I did not believe that it was appropriate for him to have that type of knowledge, because I knew the actions that he would take and it would be most detrimental to his political campaign.

Mr. DASH. Could it have been actually helpful or healthy, do you think?

Mr. MITCHELL. That was not my opinion at the particular time. He was not involved; it wasn't a question of deceiving the public as far as Richard Nixon was concerned, and it was the other people that were involved in connection with these activities, both in the White House horrors and the Watergate. I believed at that particular time, and maybe in retrospect, I was wrong, but it occurred to me that the best thing to do was just to keep the lid on through the election.

Mr. DASH. Then it is your testimony that you in fact did not say anything to the President at that time—

Mr. MITCHELL. No, sir, I did not.

Mr. DASH. So whether the President had any knowledge of it, certainly couldn't have come from his lack of knowledge or knowledge, from any statement that you made to him?

Mr. MITCHELL. That is correct, Mr. Dash.

Mr. DASH. Now, were you aware of the fact that actually prior to Magruder's testimony, Mr. Dean rehearsed Mr. Magruder for his testimony before the grand jury?

Mr. MITCHELL. I do not recall that. Mr. Dash, if you are talking about the testimony that took place on the—

Mr. DASH. In August.

Mr. MITCHELL. In August, the second appearance.

Mr. DASH. The second appearance.

and as to what the circumstances might be vis-a-vis the incumbent who was seeking reelection.

Mr. THOMPSON. Mr. Mitchell, let me ask you about another point. Here is an excerpt from the civil deposition which you gave in the Democratic Party suit against the Committee To Re-Elect the President and I think I am quoting you verbatim in your testimony, when you were asked this question: "Was there ever any discussion at which you were present or about which you heard when you were campaign director concerning having any form of surveillance of the Democratic National Committee headquarters?"

Your answer was: "No, sir, I can't imagine a less productive activity than that."

Is that a correct—

Mr. MITCHELL. I think the total context, as I remember it, Mr. Thompson, had to do with the discussion of Mr. McCord and the security group. The answer was given in that context.

Mr. THOMPSON. But this particular question, "Was there ever any discussion at which you were present"—and of course, I assume just from reading this question that that would involve any discussion with anyone. Are you saying that it is not your understanding of it?

Mr. MITCHELL. My recollection of the testimony that I gave had to do with the so-called security group in the Committee To Re-Elect the President which discussed Mr. McCord and the security group. And the answer was in response to that, to my recollection.

Mr. THOMPSON. Of course, as it reads, as I have read it, of course, it is not an accurate response?

Mr. MITCHELL. No, I say as you read it, but I think if you will look at the total context of the questioning, it referred to the security group that involved Mr. McCord which was the subject of the conversation.

Mr. THOMPSON. Were you not asked any other broader questions about any knowledge you might have had of any surveillance activities?

Mr. MITCHELL. I was asked broader questions with respect to did I ever receive documents that I could identify as coming from electronic surveillance and broad questions like that.

Mr. THOMPSON. Do you recall any broader questions concerning conversations that you had?

Mr. MITCHELL. No, sir, I do not.

Mr. THOMPSON. Is it just a case of not having asked you the right question?

Mr. MITCHELL. I think that that is the case.

Mr. THOMPSON. Let me refer to June 19 or 20, I am not quite sure when it was, Mr. Mitchell. As I understand it, Mardian and LaRue debriefed Liddy and found out what he knew about the break-in, his involvement, and the involvement of others. And at that time, he related to them some of the White House horror stories. I believe you characterized them as, the plumbers activities and so forth. I will go back to that in a minute, but as I understand your testimony this morning, the knowledge you got from that debriefing was really the reason why you, in effect, stood by while Mr. Magruder was preparing a story which, according to what you knew from Liddy, was going to be a false story, to present to the grand jury.

Mr. MITCHELL. Along, Mr. Thompson, with some of the other stories that Mr. Dean brought forward to him, the Diem papers and the suspected extracurricular wiretapping, and a few of the others.

Mr. THOMPSON. OK. That caused you to take that position with regard to Magruder. And also, I assume that those factors were the reasons why you, in effect, acquiesced, anyway, in the payments to the families of support money and lawyers' fees and that sort of thing, which I am sure you realize could have been pretty embarrassing, to say the least, if not illegal, at that time. Would that be correct as far as your motivations are concerned?

Mr. MITCHELL. That is a correct summary of my motivation and rationale for the actions that I did take.

Mr. THOMPSON. Do you recall the date on which Mr. Mardian and Mr. LaRue related this conversation of Liddy's to you?

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, he certainly didn't debrief them on the 19th, I am sure of that, because they were in transit. Whether it was the 20th or 21st, I am not certain.

Mr. THOMPSON. Did they talk to you the same day they talked to him?

Mr. MITCHELL. My recollection is they talked to me the next day, but I am not certain about that, either. But in any event, it was in the time frame of the 21st or 22d, to the best of my recollection.

Mr. THOMPSON. Can you recall in a little more detail what they said that Liddy had related to them? You have already mentioned the fact that Liddy said that Magruder had pushed him in the break-in at the Ellsberg psychiatrist's office, I believe, and the Dita Beard situation.

What did Liddy supposedly say with regard to the Dita Beard situation? What did he supposedly know about White House involvement?

Mr. MITCHELL. To the best of my recollection, and, of course, I have heard these horror stories in different versions from different people over the period of the years, the fact that he was either the one or assisted in spiriting her out of town, I believe was the discussion at that particular time.

Mr. THOMPSON. Did he indicate, according to them, that the budget for the electronic surveillance operation which led to the break-in of the DNC had been approved by the White House?

Mr. MITCHELL. You are testing my memory pretty hard. I am inclined to think that he did say that, but this is a--not that he said it, but that Mardian or LaRue reported to me that he had said it. But you are testing my memory pretty hard on a substance of which I have heard dozens and dozens of repetitions of it.

Mr. THOMPSON. Did you ever verify any of these facts with the President?

Mr. MITCHELL. No, sir. I never discussed them with the President.

Mr. THOMPSON. Did you ever verify any of them with Mr. Halde-  
man?

Mr. MITCHELL. I never discussed those specific factors with Mr. Halde-  
man until a later date. It was at that time that Mr. Dean was acting as a liaison between the White House and the committee with respect to these matters.

Mr. THOMPSON. Did you ever talk directly with Ehrlichman about these matters?



it was then that Mardian hit him on the back to buck him up and I don't want to take credit for this statement that was reported by me to be made that when the going gets tough the tough get going. It was Senator Muskie who had said it just a couple of days before it happened.

Senator TALMADGE. You did not make any such statement, is that correct?

Mr. MITCHELL. I made the statement and I made it in the context—

Senator TALMADGE. You did not quote Senator Muskie as being the author thereof?

Mr. MITCHELL. I did indeed in connection with respect to the nature of the tough campaign he had and the one that we were having.

Senator TALMADGE. Were you saying that for Mr. Sloan's benefit at that particular time?

Mr. MITCHELL. I was saying it for the total people there who were in a hell of a knock-down-drag-out donnybrook over what they could not agree on.

Now, the sequence is shown by my log that after that meeting Mr. Sloan apparently went back to Mr. Stans, who had received the information about the Liddy payments the day before, I believe, on June 23, Mr. Stans called me, and Mr. Stans came up and saw me alone. There was not any Jeb Magruder and there was not any Mardian in the meeting that according to Magruder I asked Mardian to step out so that I could discuss the matter. That would be the last thing in the world I would do because Mardian was investigating the circumstances at the time.

Senator TALMADGE. Was that the first—excuse me.

Mr. MITCHELL. I am going into this because Mr. Stans' credibility with respect to his knowledge of the Watergate was quite severely impugned apparently more severely in the executive committee meeting by Magruder than it was later in public testimony.

Senator TALMADGE. Was that the first time you had knowledge of the Watergate break-in, bugging that day, that conversation?

Mr. MITCHELL. On the 24th?

Senator TALMADGE. Yes.

Mr. MITCHELL. No, my—

Senator TALMADGE. That was the first time you were debriefed on it, was it not?

Mr. MITCHELL. No, I had been debriefed, Senator, as I mentioned a little earlier, either on the 21st or 22d.

Senator TALMADGE. Did you get full details of it at that time?

Mr. MITCHELL. It was coming from Liddy who was, as I went through with Mr. Thompson, was involving Magruder and said that he got his approval in the White House and a lot of things that—

Senator TALMADGE. Did he say who authorized the approval in the White House?

Mr. MITCHELL. No, he did not. No, he did not.

Senator TALMADGE. The White House was definitely interested in the campaign, of course, was it not?

Mr. MITCHELL. The campaign what, Senator?

Senator TALMADGE. The campaign for reelection.

23. Shortly after Hunt's involvement in the Watergate matter became known, without apparent reason, a White House telephone list bearing Howard Hunt's name and phone extension was recalled and the list was re-issued, deleting Hunt.

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23.1 Statement of CIA employee, January 1974 (received from CIA).



23.1 NOTE

The following statement was provided to the House Judiciary Committee by the CIA. It is the statement of a CIA employee who was assigned to a CIA liaison office at the Executive Office Building. The names of CIA personnel have been deleted at the request of the CIA.

SECRET

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CIA RECEIVED APRIL 10, 1974  
TITLED "2<sup>ND</sup> Volume I, CIA"

Volume I  
CIA Materials Furnished to the Special Counsel,  
Committee on the Judiciary, House of  
Representatives

CIA DV

SECRET

17 Janu 1974

My secretary, Mrs. ) , and I frequently speculated about the possible involvement of Howard Hunt and the Watergate affair and the possible involvement of the Agency. I was aware that Hunt had frequently transmitted sealed envelopes via our office to the Agency. We had receipts for these envelopes but were unaware of the contents. However, Mr.

who had temporarily occupied my post during the illness of my predecessor, ) and had been on hand to "break in" my immediate predecessor, ) (who held the post for 30 days), had told me that he had opened one of the packages one day to see what Hunt was sending to the Agency. He said that the envelope was addressed to ) and appeared to contain "gossip" information about an unknown person--he assumed that it had something to do with a psychological study of that person. Mrs. ) subsequently confirmed this information. *(The wife also gave that Hunt passed "gossip" from to Mrs. )*

Shortly after my assignment at the Executive Office Building, a new telephone list was issued by the White House and it contained Hunt's name. The Watergate news broke and Hunt was involved. The White House recalled the phone listings without reason and reissued them--we noted that Hunt's name had been deleted. As the news of the Watergate and Hunt's involvement spread, we--at a date unknown--decided that it was not prudent nor necessary to retain the receipts for envelopes which we had transmitted from him to CIA and we destroyed these receipts.

Earlier this year information appeared in the press which discussed Hunt and psychological studies. Linking the above information with these news reports I became concerned that the Agency might become publically involved in this publicity and that it would be an embarrassment which the Agency should be aware of and prepared for. I had no knowledge of whether or not Hunt had arranged with Mr. Helms or someone else in authority for ) do make psychological studies or whether Hunt had prevailed upon ) because of some past connection or whether or not ) was doing this officially or "free lance." But I felt strongly that the Agency should be aware of this Hunt ) connection, in case it did not already know.

I called Dr. Schlessinger and said that I had a confidential matter to discuss with him and visited him one night about 6:30. (I do not recollect the time but Mr. ) fixes it at 2 May.) I said that I was aware of some information that was not first hand but which I had verified and that I felt it had implications which might embarrass the Agency and therefore he should be aware of this information so that he could prepare for public involvement, in case he was not already aware of it. I related what I knew about envelopes from Hunt to the Agency and specifically about the transmittal of information to ) He seemed surprised and unaware of any such link. He asked me, "What shall I do with )" I said (somewhat taken aback at this question) that I thought he should first talk to ) and get his side of the story and that I found it hard to believe that an individual of the Agency would become

involved in something like this without some approval from higher authority within the Agency, also, that I was sure that someone had compiled the facts about the Agency's involvement with Hunt and the Watergate and that it should be available somewhere in the Agency if he had not already seen it. He seemed dismayed and bewildered that something like this could have happened and that he did not know about it. I repeated that I was sure that it was a matter of record somewhere and that it simply may not have been brought to his attention. He thanked me for reporting this information.

The following day I had a call from Mr. [redacted], Dr. Schlessinger's assistant and a former colleague on the NSC staff, asking for a review of what I had reported saying that Dr. Schlessinger was very upset and had asked him to look into this right away. He wanted to know if I had any more details. I subsequently remembered another tangent to this subject and stopped in his office the following day (which was about 3 May according to Mr. [redacted] timetable) and related it to him. It was that Mrs. [redacted] recalled that one day Hunt had come to see [redacted] and they had talked behind closed doors. After the talk [redacted] came out and remarked to her that he was amazed, shocked and bewildered by the things that Hunt told him he was doing. He scratched and shook his head, remarked what an interesting job Hunt had, but revealed none of the details of his conversation. The only specific item he mentioned was a film that Hunt was working on for educational TV which involved one of the Nixon daughters. (I confirmed with Mrs. [redacted] this date that this is her recollection of this event.) [redacted] said that my report to Dr. Schlessinger was the first that the latter had heard that the Agency was in any way involved and that the Agency and Dr. Schlessinger, in particular, owed me a debt of gratitude for coming forward with this information. I remarked again that I would be surprised if the Agency had not already compiled a report on Hunt's involvement with the Agency because I knew that Mr. Helms was probably aware of some of Hunt's activities and might have authorized the use of [redacted] and that because of his [redacted] and Schlessinger's newsness on the job they simply had not seen this material or had reason to ask for it. He said that he intended to find out.

[redacted] subsequently told me that [redacted] had been interviewed and said that he knew nothing of Hunt's activities. I suggested that [redacted] be interviewed because not only had he opened at least the one Hunt- [redacted] envelope, but he may have additional information to report from his personal talks with Hunt.

[redacted] told me sometime later that Schlessinger was awarding a medal to General Walters for his role in the Watergate affair and remarked again that my report had triggered the revelation of the iceberg. We joked about how the Generals always get the medals!

I do not believe that the subject has come up again until this time.

24. On June 20, 1972 John Mitchell, the Campaign Director of CRP, issued a prepared press statement. The statement denied any legal, moral or ethical accountability on the part of CRP for the break-in at the DNC headquarters.

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24.1 Washington Post, June 21, 1972, A9.

In a prepared press statement issued on June 20, 1972  
John Mitchell stated:

"This committee did not authorize and does not  
condone the alleged actions of the five men apprehended  
Saturday morning. We abhor such activity.

"The Committee for the Re-election of the Pres-  
ident is not legally, morally or ethically accountable  
for actions taken without its knowledge and beyond the  
scope of its control."

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Retyped from Washington Post, June 21, 1972, A9



# O'Brien Sues GOP Campaign

## Lays Blame For Bugging on White House

By Bob Woodward  
Washington Post Staff Writer

Democratic National Chairman Lawrence F. O'Brien, apparently seizing on the break-in and attempted bugging of party headquarters here as a major campaign issue, attempted yesterday to lay responsibility for the incident at the door of the White House.

He said there is "a developing clear line to the White House" and cited what he called the "potential involvement" of special counsel to the President, Charles Colson.

O'Brien made his remarks as the Democratic National Committee filed a \$1 million suit in U.S. District Court here against the Committee for the Re-Election of the President, whose chief security agent was one of five men arrested at the break-in 2:30 a.m. Saturday.

President Nixon's campaign chairman, former Attorney General John N. Mitchell, again deplored the bugging incident, denied any party responsibility for it and called the law suit "another example of sheer demagoguery on the part of Mr. O'Brien."

In other developments yesterday:

- White House consultant and former CIA employee Howard E. Hunt, whose name was found in two of the suspects address books, was reported to be a "good friend" of the suspects' first attorney, Douglas Caddy.

- Federal sources close to the investigation said that a diagram that could have been used in a past or future bugging attempt on Miami Beach headquarters of Sen. George S. McGovern was found among the suspects' belongings.

O'Brien charged that Mitchell attempted to make it appear that former CIA employee James W. McCord Jr., the security agent who was arrested Saturday, had ended his employment with the Nixon committee some months ago.

Until Monday McCord was the salaried security chief for

See BUG, A9, Col. 1

# Bugging Laid to White House

BUG, From A1

the committee, Mitchell's first statement Sunday on McCord's employment with the committee was that McCord was employed months ago.

"We know that as of the moment of his arrest at gunpoint just 10 feet from where I now stand, Mr. McCord was in the pay of the Committee for the Re-election of the President," O'Brien said.

"If John Mitchell's reflex attempt to conceal that fact is any signal of what is to come from the Republican Party and administration, I fear we shall be long in getting at the truth."

O'Brien went on to call the incident a "cheap cloak-and-dagger intrigue at the national political level. We learned of this bugging attempt only because it was bungled. How many other attempts have there been? And just who was involved?"

He said the lawsuit was an attempt to force the issue into examination by the court. A Democratic spokesman said court hearings on the matter could begin in "the near future."

"I believe we are about to witness the ultimate test of this administration that so piously committed itself to a new era of law and order just four years ago," O'Brien said.

In a prepared statement, Mitchell called O'Brien's suit a "political stunt."

"This committee did not authorize and does not condone the alleged actions of the five men apprehended Saturday morning. We abhor such activity."

"The Committee for the Re-election of the President is not legally, morally or ethically accountable for actions taken without its knowledge and beyond the scope of its control," Mitchell said.

In yesterday's editions, The Post reported the existence of Hunt's name in the suspects' address books and that he functioned at the White House as an assistant to Colson.

A White House aide confirmed that Colson, who is said to handle delicate assignments for the President, was the man who brought Hunt to the White House.

Presidential spokesman Ronald Ziegler said yesterday morning, "I talked to Mr. Colson after reading The Washington Post story this morning, and he made it clear that he is in no way involved with this matter . . ."

Later Ziegler told reporters that he was "finished with any comment on the subject."

Federal sources close to the bugging investigation said two large ballrooms scheduled to be used as Miami headquarters for McGovern during the Democratic Convention were diagrammed in another address book taken by authorities from the suspects' belongings.

The rough diagram, a sketch, shows the Regency and Mediterranean rooms at the Doral Hotel on the Ocean in Miami.

It also denotes the location of two emergency exits from the rooms. The word "May" was written by the diagram, apparently a reference to the month, the sources said.

Asked about the diagram yesterday, McGovern's convention coordinator, Owen Donley, confirmed that the rooms have been slated for use by McGovern convention staff since January.

Donley said one room would be used by the news media and the other for staff or delegate caucuses.

"If they wanted to bug the two rooms, it wouldn't bother anyone anyway. They are both

public rooms in the hotel. We will hold staff caucuses there, but they will be mass meetings. There wouldn't be anything said there that wouldn't be said out on the street."

Donley said the McGovern campaign staff was exploring various antibugging methods before the Democratic National headquarters incident.

"We didn't suddenly become paranoid. We were paranoid beforehand. That is just part of convention procedure," Donley said. He indicated that antibugging precautions would be taken at the headquarters in Miami.

Hunt, the White House consultant, has a full-time job in the public relations firm of Robert R. Mullen Co., 1700 Pennsylvania Ave. NW, directly across from Nixon's reelection headquarters and the chief White House offices.

Yesterday, Robert E. Bennett, president of the Mullen firm, said that Hunt was a "good friend" of the suspects' first attorney, Caddy.

Hunt and Caddy once shared an office at the Mullen firm, according to Bennett. Caddy was not employed there but acted as liaison with General Foods Corp. where he was employed.

In Superior Court here Saturday when the five suspects appeared for arraignment, Caddy was secretive and stayed in the background, bringing in another attorney to represent the five men.

Shortly after 3 a.m. Saturday, Caddy told a reporter, he received a call from Barker's wife. "She said that her husband told her to call me if he hadn't called her by 3 a.m. that it might mean trouble," Caddy said.

Caddy said he had met Barker once, a year ago, and that they had had "a sympathetic" conversation.

Barker, who owns a real estate firm in Miami, has been active in anti-Castro activities and is reported to have played a role in the Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba in 1961.

In addition to McCord and Barker, the other three suspects are: Frank Sturgis, also known as Frank Fiorini, an American who served in Fidel Castro's revolutionary army and has since been a leader in the anti-Castro movement in Miami; Virgilio R. Gonzales, a locksmith; and Eugenio R. Martinez, a real estate salesman for Barker.

McCord was still being held in D.C. jail yesterday on \$30,

000 bond. The other four were being held there on \$50,000 bond. All are charged with attempted burglary and attempted interception of telephone and other communication.

Their attorney, Joseph A. Rafferty Jr., filed a motion yesterday seeking a reduction on the bond.

Meanwhile, yesterday Sen. Bob Dole, head of the Republican National Committee, denied as totally false reports that the Republicans had urged Spanish community leaders and other Republicans not to discuss the bugging incident with anyone.

25. On June 20, 1972 at 6:08 p.m. the President spoke by telephone with John Mitchell. The President and Mitchell discussed the break-in at the DNC headquarters. According to a dictabelt recording made by the President on June 20, 1972 recollecting the events of that day, Mitchell expressed to the President his regret that he had not kept better control over the people at CRP.

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- 25.1 President Nixon daily diary, June 20, 1972, Exhibit No. 13, In Re Subpoena Duces Tecum.
- 25.2 President Nixon Remarks before Associated Press Managing Editors Association, November 17, 1973, 9 Presidential Documents 1346.
- 25.3 Dictabelt recording of President Nixon's recollections of events of June 20, 1972, and House Judiciary Committee transcript thereof.

PLACE DAY BEGAN

25.1 President Nixon daily diary

DATE (Mo., Day, Yr.)


JUNE 20, 1972

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON, D.C.

TIME DAY

8:40 a.m. TUESDAY

TIME		PHONE P. Placed R. Received		ACTIVITY
In	Out	Lo	LD	
8:40				The President had breakfast.
9:00				The President went to the Oval Office.
9:01	9:04			The President met with his Deputy Assistant, Alexander P. Butterfield.
10:20				The President went to his office in the EOB.
10:25	11:20			The President met with his Assistant, John D. Ehrlichman.
10:51	10:54	P		The President talked with his Deputy Assistant, Edward L. Morgan.
11:26	12:45			The President met with his Assistant, H. R. Haldeman.
12:32	12:33	R		The President talked with his daughter, Tricia.
12:46		P		The President telephoned Senator Margaret Chase Smith (R-Maine). The call was not completed.
12:53	12:55	P		The President talked with Senator Smith.
1:27	2:10			The President met with his Deputy Assistant, Maj. Gen. Alexander M. Haig, Jr.
1:30	1:35	P		The President talked with Senate Minority Leader Hugh Scott (R-Pennsylvania).
1:38	1:39		P	The President talked long distance with Joseph Trerotola Vice President of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, in New York City.
1:45	1:49	P		The President talked with his Counsel, Clark MacGregor.
2:16	2:17	P		The President talked with his Special Counsel, Charles W. Colson.
2:20	3:30			The President met with Mr. Colson.
3:33		P		The President telephoned Staff Assistant Stephen B. Bull. President talked with Beverly J. Kaye, Mr. Bull's secretary.
4:09	4:14	P		The President talked with his Special Assistant, Patricia Buchanan.
4:35	5:25			The President met with Mr. Haldeman.
5:25				The President went to the Barber Shop.



8

PLACE DAY BEGAN

DATE (Mo., Day, Yr.)

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON, D.C.

JUNE 20, 1972

TIME DAY

5:50 p.m. TUESDAY


TIME		PHONE P. Placed R. Received		ACTIVITY
In	Out	In	LD	
5:50	5:53			The President met with Mr. Butterfield.
6:01				The President returned to the second floor Residence.
6:08	6:12	P		The President talked with John N. Mitchell, Campaign Director for the Committee for the Reelection of the President.
6:30				The President and the First Lady had dinner in the Yellow Oval Room.
7:36				The President returned to his office in the EOB.
7:52	7:59	P		The President talked with Mr. Haldeman.
8:04	8:21	P		The President talked with Mr. Colson.
8:42	8:50	R		The President talked with Mr. Haldeman.
9:22				The President returned to the second floor Residence.
11:33	12:05	P		The President talked with Mr. Colson.





CONGRESSIONAL READING ROOM

25.2 President Nixon remarks  
November 17, 1973



*Weekly Compilation of*  
**PRESIDENTIAL  
DOCUMENTS**

Monday, November 26, 1973



Volume 9 • Number 47

Pages 1345-1361

# Administration of Richard Nixon

## PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS

Week Ending Saturday, November 24, 1973

### Upper Great Lakes Regional Commission

*Announcement of Intention To Nominate  
Raymond C. Anderson To Be Federal Cochairman.  
November 16, 1973*

The President today announced his intention to nominate Raymond C. Anderson, of Maple City, Mich., to be Federal Cochairman of the Upper Great Lakes Regional Commission. He will succeed Thomas F. Schweigert, who became Alternate Federal Member of the Delaware River Basin Commission on September 6, 1973.

From 1969 to 1971, Mr. Anderson served as executive assistant to Michigan Gov. William G. Milliken. He has been retired since 1971 and was also retired from 1964 to 1969. From 1959 to 1964, he served as administrative assistant to then-Congressman Robert P. Griffin, from 1952 to 1959, he was administrative assistant to Senator Charles E. Potter of Michigan, and he was administrative assistant to Congressman Roy O. Woodruff of Michigan from 1937 to 1944 and from 1946 to 1952.

He was born on March 5, 1912, in Grand Rapids, Mich. Mr. Anderson was graduated from Grand Rapids Junior College in 1932. From 1944 to 1946, he served as an officer in the U.S. Navy.

NOTE: The announcement was released at Key Biscayne, Fla.

### Associated Press Managing Editors Association

*The President's Remarks in a Question-and-Answer Session at the Association's Annual Convention in Orlando, Florida. November 17, 1973*

THE PRESIDENT. *President Quinn and ladies and gentlemen:*

When Jack Horner,<sup>1</sup> who has been a correspondent in Washington and other places around the world, retired after 40 years, he once told me that if I thought that the White House Press Corps answered (asked) tough questions, he (I) should hear the kind of questions the managing editors asked him. Consequently, I welcome this opportunity tonight to meet with the managing editors of the Nation's newspapers.

I will not have an opening statement because I know, with 400 of you, it will be hard to get through all of the questions you have, and I understand the President has a prerogative of asking the first question.

Mr. Quinn [John C. Quinn, Gannett Newspapers, and president, Associated Press Managing Editors Association]

#### WATERGATE AND THE FUTURE

Q. Mr. President, this morning, Governor Askew of Florida addressed this group and recalled the words of Benjamin Franklin. When leaving the Constitutional Convention he was asked, "What have you given us, sir, a monarch or a republic?" Franklin answered, "A republic, sir, if you can keep it."

Mr. President, in the prevailing pessimism of the lingering matter we call Watergate, can we keep that republic, sir, and how?

THE PRESIDENT. Well, Mr. Quinn, I would certainly not be standing here answering these questions unless I had a firm belief that we could keep the republic, that we must keep it, not only for ourselves, but for the whole world. I recognize that because of mistakes that were made, and I must take responsibility for those mistakes, whether in the campaign or during the course of an administration, that there are those who wonder whether this republic can survive. But I also know that the hopes of the whole world for peace, not only now, but in the years to come, rests in the United States of America. And I can assure you that as long as I am physically able to handle the position to which I was elected, and then reelected last November,

<sup>1</sup> Garnett D. (Jack) Horner was a reporter with the Washington Star from 1937 until his retirement in November 1973. Since 1954 he was White House correspondent for that newspaper.

I am going to work for the cause of peace in the world, for the cause of prosperity without war and without inflation at home, and also to the best of my ability to restore confidence in the White House and in the President himself. It is a big job, but I think it can be done, and I intend to do it.

#### PRESIDENTIAL TAPES

Q. Mr. President, I am George Gill of the Louisville Courier-Journal. Would you please tell us, sir, when did you personally discover that two of the nine subpoenaed White House tapes did not exist, and why did you apparently delay for a matter of weeks disclosing this matter to the Federal court and to the public?

THE PRESIDENT. Well, the first time that the fact that there were no recordings of the two conversations to which you referred—that they did not exist—came to my attention on approximately September 29 or September 30.

At that time, I was informed only that they might not exist because a search was not made, because seven of the nine recordings requested did exist, and my secretary, listening to them for me and making notes for me, proceeded to go through those seven tapes.

I should point out, incidentally, that the two which did not exist, in which there were no tape recordings of the conversations, were not ones that were requested by the Senate committee, and consequently, we felt that we should go forward with the ones that were requested by both the Senate committee and the others.

When we finally determined that they could not be in existence was on October 26 of this year. And we learned it then when I directed the White House Counsel, Mr. Buzhardt, to question the Secret Service operatives as to what had happened to make sure that there might not be a possibility, due to the fact that the mechanism was not operating properly, that we might find them in some other place.

He questioned them for 2 days and reported on the 27th that he could not find them. He then, having had a date made—and he asked for the date sooner with Judge Sirica, he asked for a date on Thursday, you may recall I pointed that out in my press conference on the 26th—Judge Sirica saw him on Tuesday *in camera*. The White House Counsel reported to Judge Sirica that the two tapes did not exist and gave him the reasons for it.

The judge decided, and I think quite properly, that the reasons for the tape not existing should be made public and those involved with access to the tapes and those who operated the machines should be questioned so that there would be no question of the White House, somebody around the President, or even the President himself, having destroyed evidence that was important even though the Senate committee had not, as I have already pointed out, subpoenaed either of these two tapes. And since we are on this subject, and I do not want to be

taking all of the time on it except that I know there is going to be enormous interest in it, not only among this audience here, but among our television viewers, let me point this out.

I have done everything that I possibly can to provide the evidence that would have existed had we found the tapes:

First, with regard to the tape of June 20, as you may recall, it was a 5-minute telephone conversation with the former Attorney General, John Mitchell, who had just left as campaign manager or was planning to leave as campaign manager at that time.

I have a practice of keeping a personal diary—I can assure you not every day. Sometimes you are too tired at the end of a day to either make notes or dictate it into a dictabelt.

On that particular day I happened to have dictated a dictabelt, and on the dictabelt for June 20, which I found, I found that I had referred to the conversation to John Mitchell, and I think it is fair to disclose to this audience what was there because it will be disclosed to the court. It has already been offered to the court and eventually I assume will be made public.

It said, first, that I called John Mitchell to cheer him up because I knew he was terribly disheartened by what had happened in the so-called Watergate matter. Second, he expressed chagrin to me that the organization over which he had control could have gotten out of hand in this way. That was what was on that tape.

Now, turning to the one on April 15, I thought I might have a dictabelt of that conversation as well.

Let me tell you first why the telephone conversation was not recorded, not because of any deliberate attempt to keep the recording from the public, but because the only telephones in the residence of the White House which are recorded—the only telephone, there is only one, is the one that is in the office, the little Lincoln Sitting Room right off the Lincoln Bedroom. The call I made to John Mitchell was made at the end of the day at about 6:30 just before going into dinner from the family quarters, and no telephones in the family quarters ever were recorded. That is why the recording did not exist.

Turning to April 15, the conversation referred to there was at the end of the process in which Mr. Dean came in to tell me what he had told the U.S. attorneys that day. He saw me at 9 o'clock at night, Sunday night. There should have been a recording. Everybody thought there probably was a recording. The reason there was not a recording is that the tape machines over the weekend only can carry 6 hours of conversation, and usually that is more than enough, because I do not use the EOB office, that is, the Executive Office Building office rather than the Oval Office, over the weekend to that extent.

But that weekend I was in the EOB for a long conversation with Dr. Kissinger on foreign policy matters. I was there for 2 other hours, or 2 or 3 other hours, and the tape

25.3 See "Transcript Prepared by the  
Impeachment Inquiry Staff for the  
House Judiciary Committee of the  
President's Dictabelt Recording of  
his Recollections of a June 20, 1972  
Conversation with John Mitchell."