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Chapter 4

A Revolution That Has Not Happened: The Potential of the Russian Nationalist Revival

Introductory remarks

World history abounds with revolutionary political changes. What does not seem important about that topic is the theoretical framework, which allows many scholars to discuss whether a political series of events can be put into the conceptual, systemic framework of “revolution” or not. What is widely accepted among theoreticians is the conviction that a revolution is a radical and anti-systemic political change. The theoretical understanding of revolution is related to the legitimacy of authority. The Weberian tradition includes 3 types of authority: traditional, legal-rational, and charismatic (comp. the critical remarks of Blau, 1963). According to it, a revolution can either violently break the people’s readiness to obey commands of a culturally rooted power or overthrow the old regime by acting according to a new system of laws, which replaces

the previous one without a sense of remorse. The new leaders and their style can often be defined as charismatic but theoretically we can easily think of a new, even more charismatic avant-garde, which steals the show: in revolutions a more radical kind of modernity usually replaces the previous style, which is perceived to be not revolutionary enough. In other words, revolutions undermine the base of all the three types of authority.

However, what really matters is the fact that after a revolution one's smaller or bigger world will never be the same. Revolutions are incongruent with Tancredi's (a character of Lampedusa's *Leopard*) conviction that "For everything to stay the same, everything must change". After a revolution not too many things stay the same: the main imperatives are either denied or even reversed – what was a vice in the old times becomes a virtue nowadays.

From the empirical or historical perspective, one can observe several types of revolutions. A classical study on the topic, Tanter & Midlarsky (1967, p. 265), lists four types: a mass revolution, a revolutionary coup, a reform coup and a palace revolution. This point of view, however, focuses on the technical aspect of change, whereas in the present study it is much more important to emphasize the object of contestation on the one hand, and the general objective, the imaginary future on the other. From the perspective of the first aspect, a lot of types can be distinguished but most of them boil down to three categories.

1. Some revolutions are generally directed against a monarchy or another kind of autocratic power. Most European revolutions, including the Puritan Revolution in England, the French Revolution and the February Revolution in Russia led to toppling the contested monarchy. The imperatives that lead the revolutionaries to the barricades consist mainly in such things as the elevation of the people or administrative liberalization.
2. When the "people's regime" turns out to be more invasive than the old system, especially if the leftist rules are imposed from

outside, an anti-socialist or an anti-communist revolution may demolish the radically egalitarian authorities. This is the case of the Thermidorian Reaction or the Autumn of Nations in Eastern Europe.

3. Another type of revolution is directed against the state that does not allow a people to develop its nationalistic desires: the will to unite, the desire for the fulfillment of pride, the *libido dominandi* among other nations or, finally, the desire to keep one's own *uniqueness*, which is expressed in Russian with the term of *samobytnost'* (*самобытность*). Historically, national revolutions and uprisings have taken various shapes such as the activities of the Spanish Falanga, which successfully fought the internationalist Republic, the Nazi upheaval in the 1930s or the Kurdish revival in Iraq in the 2010s. The theoretical aspect of the topic may not have been studied sufficiently; however, some publications concerning the issue are recommended (Unwalla, 2015; Kumar, 2015).

Russia can be described as a post-revolutionary country in at least two aspects. It underwent a deep deconstruction of its original civilizational structure after 1917 and, after more than 70 years of the communist experiment, it had to face the collapse of the "red empire" and try to build a democratic civil society and free market. As in the case of gnostic utopia and in international relations both at home and abroad, we have to deal with two acts of deconstruction, where old values and dichotomies were replaced by new ones. Old Russia was predominantly an Orthodox and East-Slavic, ethnically Russian (*rususkaya*) domain. The most typical oppositions in the political discourse oscillated around two topics:

1. "Russian" versus "Western", where for the Westerners Russia should approach the European standards or, according to the Slavophil thinkers, it should protect its uniqueness and avoid the poison of the Western spirit.

2. “Orthodox” versus “atheist or heretic”. For traditionalists and the vast majority of the Russian population participation in the Eastern Church was a *sine qua non* condition of being a “real Russian”.

What seems surprising, in spite of the fact that the social question – the situation of the people – was widely discussed by the intelligentsia and a kind of “state populism” was also present, it would not be relevant to say that the intellectual elite tried to set one of the social classes against the other. Contrary to the Marxist belief in class struggle, the Russian intelligentsia tried to be sympathetic toward the peasants and took many actions which varied from charity to political terror against the state officials (comp. Nahirny, 1983).

The Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 changed a lot in the narrative. In fact it became entirely deconstructed. The opposition between the West and traditional Russia disappeared to be replaced by another juxtaposition: nationalism (or Great Russian chauvinism even) versus socialist internationalism. Only political tactics made Vladimir I. Lenin support the national independence ambitions. According to the Bolshevik leader, severe steps against nationalisms would provoke the nations to abandon the only sensible objective which is the liberalization of the world proletariat. The nations, focusing on the national conflicts, could thus be successfully tempted by the exploiters to forget about the main task (Lenin, 1972; see also the study on the controversy about the issue in Löwy, 1976).

The clue to the problem lies in the fact that before 1917 the value of national patriotism among the opposition was a positive option, and Western cosmopolitanism was perceived as a problematic attitude (in most of the Russian press and in the educational narrative; for the leftist intelligentsia the destruction of the old regime and the old cultural paradigm was the main objective), whereas now resorting to Russian national sentiments was proclaimed reactionary and became the negative pole of the

new opposition. As mentioned above, Russian traditionalists glorified the Russian people, especially the peasantry, no less than the leftists did. The goal was different, of course, because the leftists aimed at the liberalization of the “dark mass” and the monarchists, Slavophiles or Pan-Slavists preached about the people as the solid foundation of tsarism and Orthodoxy. Nonetheless, the people and the elite (both reactionary and revolutionary) could agree on a certain kind of solidarity.

The revolution brought about a significant change, which, on a side note, was predicted by the Populist (*Narodnik*) and Bolshevik narratives, where the category of “the enemy of the people” played an important part. Previously, everybody praised the people, now the population was categorized into two different groups: the proletariat, the avant-garde of the proletariat (the Bolshevik Party), and, finally, the group of the enemies of the people. The term became very broad due to the fact that the Bolsheviks (or radical revolutionaries in general) did not enjoy general support. In the election to the Constituent Assembly in late fall of 1917 the socialist agrarian democrats – the Socialist Revolutionary Party with Victor Chernov at the helm won most of the votes in the house, whereas the Bolsheviks with the Left SRs did not even exceed a quarter of the general vote (comp. Radkey, 1950).

The other reason for the expansion of the category was the intention to wipe out not only the reactionary camp but also the left side of the political stage in all cases of real or imaginary disobedience. The Bolsheviks accused the other Russian revolutionaries, the Mensheviks or the Left SRs, of not being revolutionary enough and leading the people astray. The Bolshevik radicalism in the struggle for the ultimate dictatorship of the proletariat turned all the other leftists into the category of the enemy of the people. Moreover, under the Stalin regime many devoted Bolshevik activists were executed as a result of the same kind of accusations (see Stalin’s pamphlet: *Mastering Bolshevism*).

After more than seven decades, the great change of the 1990s brought about another kind of deconstruction. In fact it fits quite well in Tanter & Midlarsky's category of a "reform coup". After December 1991, the Russian people woke up in a different reality: not only had the peaceful revolution destroyed their big state but it also undermined the paradigm of social and moral values. The new times created new oppositions such as

- "democracy" versus "communist authoritarianism",
- "liberalism" versus "Soviet totalitarianism",
- "the self-made person" versus a collectivist "Homo Sovieticus" (*sovok*).

The axiological values of the poles were reversed: communism was now associated with the lack of personal freedom, the Soviet state was accused of crimes and, consequently, being a Homo Sovieticus became an insult (see the study on the *sovok* syndrome in Gogin, 2012). The older generation, which was deeply permeated with the idea of economic equality and social security could not understand foreign ideas and imperatives, which forced them to accept aggressive business games, spectacular careers of cunning swindlers, and painful pauperization of the majority of the citizens.

Seeking elements that were commonly present or absent in the axiological oppositions of the three periods mentioned above, one can realize that Post-Communist Russia was unexpectedly quite liberal in the economic sense. Individual freedom and private initiative turned out to be capable of subordinating the other needs and values. The common good, especially in the sense of the social security of the average citizen, was entirely forgotten. In the same way one of the most important triggers for ideologists was lost: the "just cause" or sacrifice in the name of the people. The tsarist doctrine, created in the 1830s by the Minister of National Education, count Sergei Uvarov, promoted the ideas of Orthodoxy (*pravoslavie*), Autocracy (*samoderzhavie*), and, surprisingly

enough – *narodnost*’, which can be translated as Nationhood or Peoplehood (Uvarov, 1832). On the other hand, the revolutionary and moderate intelligentsia was ready for jail or hard work in Siberia if their struggle for the happiness of the people demanded such dramatic decisions.

Nothing like that characterizes the latest period of Russian history. Even though the new elite that came to power with Vladimir Putin after the beginning of the new millennium became much more assertive and rejected the previous subordination to Western interests and naive liberalism, it only replaced the previous oligarchy and still avoided any commitments concerning the common good of the citizens. In this way the axiological base of Post-Soviet Russia owes a lot to radical revolutionary deconstruction: it moved away from obligations concerning the people. The new times appeared to be painfully real, they brought about a completely new reality, an odd kind of business-like social contract (Gallopín, 2009).

A historical study concerning any country or civilization ought to be based on facts and keep clear of “the alternative past”. In other words, historians describe facts and search for reasons. Political science, however, is not obliged to keep these standards since it is supposed to deal with current events and be confined to prognostic tasks. That is why it has to take into consideration probability and potentials in the same way as facts. Historians (despite being aware of their tasks) may not realize that their vision of the course of events is slightly deterministic whereas in fact none of the recorded and described historical events was entirely predictable *a priori*.

Sudden revolutions as well as longitudinal periods of duration are embedded in a complex structure of conditions, possibilities and decisions. Decisions made either by the leaders or by the people can be studied *a posteriori* but cannot be predicted with absolute certainty. However, the probability of events may be considered

while studying the well-known elements of the decision-making process and even ought to be taken into account in a prognostic study (Spetzler and Stael Von Holstein, 1975). Theoretically, our point of interest lies in possible revolutions or other series of events which could have happened, may happen or should happen because of some reasons.

The range of perceived probability can vary from “absolute impossibility” to the strong feeling that “something is in the air” and that we are supposed to experience political turbulence tomorrow. What has to be remembered is the fact that we are still dealing with *perceived* probability since probability in the mathematical or physical sense (in quantum mechanics) cannot be applied directly in political science analyses even if they are based on quantitative (e.g. statistical) research. This does not mean that hard data that are helpful in the explanation of some events such as the number of guns or aircrafts should not be valued. The problem probably lies in the infinite number of conditioning factors.

The present chapter is devoted to an “imaginary revolution”, a vital problem in the Russian political reality, which has manifested itself several times but never resulted in a mass uprising or in a reform coup. The topic is somewhat inspired by the considerations of Tat'yana and Valeri Solovei, whose brilliant and pessimistic study *Несостоявшаяся революция* (*The Unfulfilled Revolution*) published in 2011 paints a picture of the tragedy of the Russian nation within its own state and the story of a necessary change that could never be realized because of internal contradictions within the nationalistic camp.

The question of a nationalist revolution in Russia has been widely discussed not only by intellectuals but also among Russian politicians and in the media. In 2005 Andrei Savelyev, a prominent politician and member of the Rodina faction, openly declared in his lecture presented at the St. Petersburg Patriotic Forum that his party was not preparing a revolution but was getting ready for it (Савельев, 2005).

The hypothetical revolutionary option is treated by some circles as necessary because of the impossibility to realize the Russian national idea in a legal way. One of the very few nationalistic parties in Russia which work legally and enjoy their participation in the establishment is the Liberal-Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR) with Vladimir Volfovich Zhirinovskiy (Eidelstein) at the helm. However, his program and everyday narrative can be explained as a certain kind of “franchised nationalism” since Zhirinovskiy managed to register his party in the Communist era as the Liberal-Democratic Party of the Soviet Union; before that he co-headed the cultural organization Shalom, which was created to channel Jewish sentiments in the situation of increasing anti-Communist attitudes among that minority, which in turn led to mass migration, predominantly to Israel.

Another case of a legal nationalist-conservative political being is the Rodina (Homeland) Party, created in 2003 by Dmitry Rogozin. The party disappeared in 2006 because of a merge with Just Russia but was re-established in 2011 as an outcome of a conference of another nationalist organization: the Congress of Russian Communities. It was initially founded (in 1990) to promote the interests of ethnic Russians who were left beyond the Russian border as a result of the collapse of the USSR. The organization was officially registered in 2011.

The other nationalistic groups, however, were much less successful. The list below illustrates only some representative cases.

1. A relatively early creation – the National-Republican Party of Russia, founded in 1991 by Nikolai Lysenko, was not persecuted as a whole but its leader was charged with the organization of a terrorist attack in the State Duma. Although the accusation was finally rejected, Lysenko was found guilty of stealing a state computer. In 1996, after the arrest of Lysenko, the party split into two factions. The faction which was led by Yuri Belyaev was

- later transformed into The Party of Liberty (Партия свободы). Since the National-Republican Party of Russia could not be re-registered until the end of 1998, it practically ceased to exist.
2. The Russian National Unity (Русское Национальное Единство) movement, a relatively big radical and militaristic group, established in 1990 by Alexandr Barkashov, was banned after supporting the Parliament in 1993 and has since been functioning in this manner. The organization tried to take part in the elections of 1999 within the Spas bloc but the Moscow court did not recognize its registration. From that point onwards it has been functioning in a semi-legal capacity. In some interpretations the RNU, the Slavic Union and other organizations of that kind should be described as post-fascist (or post-Nazi even) rather than nationalistic in the classical western tradition of the term (comp. Hearst, 1999).
 3. The Union of Orthodox Banner-Bearers (Союз православных хоругвеносцев), which, in fact, is not a political party but an organization founded in 1992 with the goal of re-establishing absolute Christian monarchy, was not banned but had to face several court cases. Its slogan, "Orthodoxy or Death", was removed from a church building near St. Petersburg as a result of the prosecutor's inquiry.
 4. The People's National Party (Народная национальная партия), registered originally in 1994 as the Movement of the People's Nationalists (Движение народных националистов), proposed a racist program in which the bloodline conditions the predominance of the Russian nation in the state. The political line of the leader, Alexandr Ivanov-Sukharevsky, as well as that of some other activists, led to the decision about the refusal to re-register the party in 1998.
 5. An anti-immigrant nationalistic group – the Movement Against Illegal Immigration, which appeared in 2002 after an ethnic fight between Russians and Armenians in Krasnoarmeysk,

was officially banned by the court in 2011. The movement was originally led by Vladimir Basmanov, then by his brother, Alexandr Belov (Potkin), and, since 2011, by Vladimir Yermolaev. In October 2016 the movement's most influential leader – Alexandr Belov was sentenced to 7.5-year imprisonment in a collective labor colony.

6. The Slavic Union (Славянский союз), organized by Dmitry Demushkin in 2000 concentrated on the idea of an ethnically Russian nation-state. Clear links to some Nazi symbols (the acronym of the organization's name – SS or a kind of swastika) and Holocaust denial made the ban on the organization inevitable: the decision was made by the court in April 2010. After that Demushkin (accompanied by some other activists e.g. Belov-Potkin) decided to take part in the creation of a new organization – The Russians (Русские). However, this one was banned as well in October 2015. Demushkin was put under the travel ban whereas Vladimir Basmanov was forced to go abroad where he created a new nationalistic group: the Committee “Nation and Liberty” (Комитет «Нация и Свобода»).
7. The national-traditionalist Great Russia Party (Великая Россия), founded by Dmitry Rogozin and Andrei Savelyev in 2007 was refused registration twice, which led to a temporary break in its functioning. However, in 2010 another attempt to re-establish the party was made.
8. The National-Democratic Party (Национально-Демократическая Партия), which was created by Konstantin Krylov in 2012 on the base of two organizations: the Russian Social Movement (Русское Общественное Движение) and the Russian Civic Union (Русский Гражданский Союз), was officially registered in 2014 but later the registration information was refuted. Krylov himself was put on trial under Article 282 of the infamous bill of 2002 in connection with his public speech at the rally – “Stop feeding the Caucasus”, held on October 22,

2011 at Bolotnaya Square in Moscow, and sentenced to 120 hours of correctional labor, which made him legally unable to become the official leader of any party (Tipaldou 2015, p. 70).

This short overview suffices to reveal the range of Russo-centric nationalist sentiments in the Russian Federation. The main question, however, is about the reasons for the appearance of Russian nationalism nowadays in the country where the most important positions belong to ethnic Russians and where the widely promoted Russian language and culture are supposed to shape the behavioral patterns of the population. Two options seem the most obvious at first sight: the historical grounds – the soil for a possible nationalist change, or the current situation, which may have led the Russian nation to take such steps.

The traditions of Russian nationalism

From a theoretical point of view, we must be aware that there are various kinds of nationalism, and that Russia is by no means an exception: the term of nationalism can be applied there to phenomena which are conceptually far from each other. We may consider various typologies. For example, Hechter (2000) suggests such kinds of nationalism as:

- **state-building nationalism**, whose essence lies in creating a more homogenous society,
- **peripheral nationalism**, found in communities which try to avoid acculturation,
- **irredentist nationalism**, with a tendency to enlarge the state's territory,
- **unification nationalism**, which “involves the merger of a politically divided but culturally homogeneous territory into one state” (Hechter, 2000, pp. 15–17).

In fact we could also distinguish some other forms, such as the ethnic, cultural, political, nativistic or vitalistic kind of nationalism

(Bäcker, 2008, pp. 11ff). The general question probably lies in the definition of *la nation*, which generally boils down to three essentially different bases: **the ethnic (or racial) root, culture and statehood**. However, it seems that it is the empirical material that delivers some more convincing hints for structuring the tradition of nationalism in Russia.

At any rate, in order to attempt to clarify the structure of conditioning circumstances one has to look back to the traditions of Russian nationalism according to the shape they have taken in Russian historiography and in the classical works describing the history of Russian political thought. Nationalism in Russia is by no means an invention of the end of the 20th century. It generated several earlier incarnations. Here are the most representative ones:

1. Slavophilism (*slavyanofil'stvo*, *славянофильство*), which was originally constructed by a very small group of columnists such as Ivan Kireevsky, Konstantin Aksakov, Alexei Khomyakov or Yuri Samarin. The movement's thinkers preached about the superiority of Orthodoxy – the only true religion, the historical tradition of Old Rus' and the Eastern conciliarism over the Western legacy: the intellectualism of Western Christianity, the tradition of competition, social contract and papalism. The Slavophiles, who strongly criticized the Petrine reforms, were not the beloved child of the court, which made itself out to be a reliable and modern European monarchy rather than a museum of medieval folk culture (comp. Walicki, 1975).
2. *Pochvennichestvo* (*почвенничество*), which was a philosophy of the return to the roots, a trend that appeared among traditionalist publishers, critics and writers such as Apollon Grigoryev, Nikolai Strakhov or Fyodor Dostoevsky. The *pochvenniks* did not reject modernization but emphasized the necessity to cultivate Russian convictions, especially the ones that referred to Orthodox practices and national axiology (comp. Walicki, 1975).

3. Russian Pan-Slavism – the idea of uniting all Slavs. The trend began in the Austrian Empire but was soon taken over by Russian ideologists such as Mikhail Pogodin, Nikolai Y. Danilevsky, Ivan Aksakov, Vladimir Cherkassky, Rostislav Fadeev. The main ideological base for the doctrine was formulated by Danilevsky in his famous book *Russia and Europe* (Eng. trans. 2013), where he introduced the idea of a Slavic Union with the capital in Constantinople, which was supposed to be regained from the Turks (comp. MacMaster, 1967; Snyder, 1984, pp. 17–36).
4. The Black Hundred (Чёрная сотня) ideologies, which were represented by several organizations such as the Union of the Russian People (Союз русского народа), Russian Monarchist Party (Русская монархическая партия), White Two-Headed Eagle (Белый двуглавый орёл) or St. Michael's Union (Русский Народный Союз имени Святого Михаила Архангела), established by the famous and controversial activist Vladimir Purishkevich. Their programs, which were in fact a reaction to socialist and liberal movements, included such elements as devotion to the throne and Orthodox religion, anti-socialism, anti-Westernism, various forms of anti-Semitism including anti-assimilationism, and the conviction that building a nation state is a necessity (comp. Laqueur, 1993).

What may be surprising nowadays is the fact that modern Russian nationalism, although it is equally suppressed and marginalized as it was under the tsarist regime, does not descend from the old doctrines apart from the most basic idea that constitutes any nationalism – the elevation of the nation. The only visible convergence can be observed between modern Russian nationalism and the Black Hundreds. How can that be explained? Paradoxically, this historical reflection takes us to another line of explanation: to facts and numbers.

The ethnic and social reality after the Russian Revolution

What made the situation after 1905 in Russia under the old regime different from the last decades of the former century was the fact that the traditionalistic and nationalist circles realized that at that time not only a narrow elite but also a significant part of the working class, including the peasantry, which made up no less than 85% of the whole population, felt disappointed with the regime and was ready to promote significant reforms. The contestation of the emperor's court as well as of the church, which provided strong ideological support to the throne, made the Russian rightists aware that the spirit began to shift to the left. But was it simply a turn in the Russian soul?

The Russian Empire had never been a national state. As already mentioned, it was only ideologically integrated by the values of Orthodoxy, Authority and Peoplehood. The monarchs had no Russian blood in their veins, and many high-ranking officials were either foreigners or people of non-Russian descent. However, the 19th century brought about extraordinary interest in foreign social and political ideas. Moreover, some important political movements were created with significant presence of Jewish, Polish and other activists who represented various nations, which were by no means interested in the stability of the empire.

The importance of that issue can be illustrated by pure facts. The non-Marxist revolutionary Populist (*Narodnik*) organizations, which caused the original political unrest, owed a lot to people of foreign descent. Among the very few founders of the Black Repartition (Черный передел) there are such figures as Paul Axelrod and Leo Deutsch, who were born into Jewish families. In the more radical and terrorist faction *Narodnaya Volya* (People's Will) one should not forget the names of Yakov Yudelevsky, a Belarusian Jew and a significant French philosopher, as well as

the figure of the Polish nobleman Ignacy Hryniewiecki, the killer of tsar Alexander II. One of the most prominent theoreticians of Russian socialism was Vasily (Vilgelm) Bervi-Flerovskiy, son of William Bervy, an official of the Ministry of Justice of purely English descent. The theoreticians of legal Marxism: Nikolai Sieber and Petr Struve had well-known German ancestors; Struve was a grandson of a famous astronomer, Friedrich Georg Wilhelm von Struve. The Menshevik leaders were predominantly Jewish with Yulius Martov (Tsederbaum) at the helm. Vladimir I. Lenin, the leader of the Bolshevik faction, had Russian but also many other roots. His father was of Russian, Chuvash and Mordvin (or Kalmyk) descent whereas his mother had Swedish, German, Russian as well as Jewish ancestors. A brief look at the other prominent leaders of the party explains a lot: Leo Trotsky (Leiba Bronstein), Lev Kamenev (Rosenfeld), Grigory Zinoviev (Hirsch Apfelbaum) and Lazar Kaganovich were unquestionably Jewish, Joseph Stalin (Dzhugashvili), Sergo Ordzhonikidze and Lavrentiy Beria were Georgian, Anastas Mikoyan – Armenian; the founder of Cheka – Feliks Dzerzhinsky (Feliks Dzierżyński) – a Polish nobleman, whereas the most radical activist of that institution and the head of the Red Army Cheka, Martin Laci (Jānis Sudrabs) – a Latvian farmworker.

The feeling that citizens of foreign descent (rus. inorodcy, инородцы) were predominantly responsible for the destruction of the empire was strengthened by the ethnic structure of Russia, which evolved throughout the passing decades. Before the partitions of Poland (1772, 1793 and 1795) the Russian territory was settled mainly by Eastern Slavs. The tiny minorities, such as the Finno-Ugric peoples or Tartars did not play a big part in the country's policies. However, after the annexation of a significant part of Poland and the Napoleonic Wars, the Russian Empire began to grow again and absorbed numerous and "problematic" nations. The much better educated and technologically advanced

Poles gradually became more and more hostile toward the regime and to Russia in general. At the end of the 19th century the Jewish population, which became a “blessing” after the incorporation of Poland’s eastern territories, began to take active part in the revolutionary movement since its position in the empire was quite far from modern standards of civic equality. What seemed especially annoying to some Jews was the Pale of Settlement (*cherta osedlosti, черта оседлости*) proclaimed in a decree issued by Catherine the Great in 1791. According to the decree, which was later annexed by the bill of 1804, Jews could only settle in the Western territories of the empire in sixteen governorates. The other problem was the lack of political rights until the last days of the tsarist state. It was apparent that Russian Jews hoped for suffrage in the new form of the country; in a way their hopes came true after 1917.

In the second half of the 19th century the country experienced another inflow of ethnically non-Russian citizens (or, to be precise, subjects to the emperor) – the Muslim peoples of Central Asia, which at that time was usually named Turkestan. Russia’s expansion to the South was unwillingly directed to the Islamic and Turkic world. Initially, the people of Turkestan – Kazakhs, Uzbeks, the Kyrgyz people, Iranian Tajiks – did not seem a real challenge. Their demographic dynamics were not too impressive since the Orthodox and Slavic part of the population developed faster.

According to the first imperial census, which was held in 1897, Russia was inhabited by 126.5 million people. Orthodox and Old-Believer Christians amounted to more or less 109.1 million, which comprised 86.2% of the population, Roman Catholics – 11.5 million (9%), Jews – 5.2 million (4%), Muslims – 13.9 million (10.9%) (*Демоскоп, № 741–742*). Although the numbers draw a picture of a multi-cultural empire, the burden of the Southern, Western and Eastern frontiers did not seem too heavy for the vigorous and well-developing “state-forming nation” – ethnic Russians.

The territory of the Soviet Union after World War II was almost of the same size. Moscow only gave up the east-central Polish provinces. After the 1989 census it was possible to make some conclusions about the demographic tendencies in the last decade. It turned out that the dynamics were generally positive. However, some nations grew much more than others if one compares the results to those of the previous census, which was held in 1979. The main nation was still on its way up: in 10 years it managed to reach a 6% growth whereas Poles or Jews recorded a decline (98% and 76% respectively). However, there was a tendency that had continued for more than two decades: the fast growth of the Muslim nations such as the Uzbeks (34%), Chechens (27%), Turkmen people (35%), Kazakhs (24%), Azeri people (24%), Tajik people (45%), Ingush people (28%) and Avars (24%) (Лабутова, 1990).

These data might have caused some reflection but in fact they were ignored at that time since the main topic of intellectual disputes was strictly political and concerned the reforms that were supposed to revitalize the USSR as a whole. In 1991 the “red empire” collapsed, which correctly seemed to be the main issue. Moscow lost direct control over nearly a quarter (23.77%) of the territory of the USSR. Theoretically the Russian republic, now liberated from the non-Russian rest, should have created the best conditions for the development of the Russian nation. The coming decades brought about a colossal demographic disaster and a visible change of proportions of the particular ethnic groups (comp. Вишнеvский, 2016).

According to official data the Russian ethnic group within the territory of the Russian Federation comprised 81.53% of the whole population in 1989. It is in fact a weaker result than the percentage of Orthodox Christians in the Russian empire at the end of the 19th century. In 2010 the index only reached 80.9%. The second ethnic group – the Tartars – enjoyed a growth from 3.76 to 3.87%, whereas the Chechens – a dynamic jump from 0.61

to 1.04, the Ingush people from 0.15 to 0.32 and the Azeri group from 0.23 to 0.44 (in the case of the last two groups the index doubled) (Федеральная служба государственной статистики, 2012, p. 72). According to the data from 2010 the decrease in the ethnic Russian element (if compared to 2002) constituted 4.2 per cent, whereas in the case of the whole population it amounted to only 1.59%. At the same time the increase in the number of Chechens reached 5.23%, of Uzbeks – 135% (166 946 people) and of Kyrgyz people – 225.14%. The inflow of groups which did not determine their nationality was estimated at 285.38% (4 168 678 people) (Statdata, 2017). More recent data are going to be available after the next census.

The official data, although convincing enough, may not reflect the reality. In informal conversations Russian officials express their doubts about the methodology of the last census and are afraid that in reality the demographic situation of the Russian nation might be much gloomier. According to many commentators (whose opinions by no means come from the opposition) the real number of Russians is probably significantly lower, especially if one takes into account the extinction of the provincial areas (вымирание глубинки). In 2017 the analysts of “Realnoye Vremya”, apposing the demographic indices of the first halves of 2016 and 2017, discovered that the demographic dynamics in the whole territory of the Russian Federation once again began a catastrophic downfall, especially in Moscow (34.4%). The situation is also not good in Tatarstan. However, there are no indicators whether this concerns the Russian part of the population or rather the Tartars (Реальное Время, 2017).

Although before 2017 the demographic data became slightly more optimistic the nationalistic circles still complained that Russia managed to overcome the most dramatic decline only because the native Russian population had been for years gradually replaced by Muslim incomers from Central Asia and the Northern Caucasus (comp. Царский Путь. Русский Оперативный Журнал, 2017).

The problem is that the real range of this phenomenon is relatively difficult to estimate. According to Marlene Laruelle (2016) the number of Muslims in Russia is about 15 million with one in ten located in Moscow. As she says, “Given forthcoming demographic changes, by around 2050 Muslims will represent between one third (according to the most conservative estimates) and one half (according to the most alarmist assessments) of the Russian population”. Laruelle correctly points out the main trends of Moscow’s policy toward the growing number of Russian Muslims. Firstly, it emphasizes Russia’s openness and friendliness as a peaceful country, based on respect towards traditional religions. Secondly, it rejects radical Islam labeling all non-conformist groups as linked to Wahhabism. Thirdly, it also tries to present itself as a part of the Islamic world, a traditionalistic global power opposed to the “rotten West” (Laruelle, 2016).

This puts the Russian nationalistic circles in an awkward position. Trying to defend “traditional values” they unwillingly place themselves on the side of the Kremlin, which in fact introduces a kind of “creeping revolution”, deconstructing the exploited term of “traditional values”. There is no doubt that Christianity (including Orthodoxy) does not promote homosexuality and patchwork communities, trying to help traditional families instead. However, the most basic values of Christianity such as charity toward all people or devotion to the truth about the union of God and man in the person of Jesus Christ are incongruent with the Muslim ones. A Christian traditionalist cannot agree with a Muslim traditionalist in the dispute on the number of wives a man may have. The “traditionalists of all countries unite” imperative is a caricature of the Marxist slogan rather than a Christian objective.

The reflection on the two main types of reasons for a possible national revolution in Russia can only lead to a conclusion that the evolving ethnic situation in the contemporary state seems to be a much more important motivator than the traditional models

of Russian nationalism, which appeared before the political disaster of 1917. In other words, today's Russian nationalists are not Slavophiles, *pochvenniks* or Pan-Slavists; they are people who face the challenge of a dying "state nation", even if their obsession is based on a kind of individual fear rather than an analysis of statistical data.

* * *

Keeping in mind the historical and social grounds for a national revolution in Russia we still do not solve the main problem which is the question about the hypothetical possibility of such a change. To open a perspective for some attempts it is necessary to point to such issues as:

- a modern theoretical base that could be convincing for contemporary Russians,
- the organizational potential,
- the political conditions,
- the readiness of the Russian people to understand the ethnic question and appreciate the attempts of the potential revolutionary nationalists, the feeling that something has to be changed.

The theoretical base

Russian nationalism of the recent decades is represented not only by emotional pamphlets; there is also an abundance of important and valuable patterns and theoretical models, which have to be taken into deep consideration. However, not all proposals are widely known and kept in memory, which makes some relatively unproductive. The Russian political and social base of narratives after the Stalin era provides an interesting range of topics. They can be classified in various ways, according to chronological or typological criteria. However, it is obvious

that non-communist thought began with the “dissidents”, non-conformists of the Khrushchev and Brezhnev era. Some of them, such as Marxist revisionists (representatives of “economism”) appeared as a result of intellectual resistance which remained within the Soviet “internationalist” paradigm.

Generally speaking, Russian dissidents of the 1960s and 1970s represented various options. Originally the differences were interpreted in a simplified way: the dissidents were divided into “the lefts” – those who accepted Marxism (or socialism in general) but rejected Stalinism and the rights – those who rejected Marxism completely and were “genuine Russian patriots”. They were associated with a critical attitude both to Soviet policies and to the Russian authoritarian past. In fact, “the lefts” such as Andrei Sakharov, Andrei Siniavsky, Grigory Pomerants or Alexandr Yanov did not necessarily stick to Marxism. They simply tried to act in specific conditions. On the other hand, it is definitely true that many of them, such as Yanov, Pomerants or Siniavsky were of Jewish descent, which could make their ideas less popular among ethnic Russians.

The other group was associated with “Slavophilism” since it emphasized the values of the Orthodox tradition as well as the legacy of Old Russia and Russian culture. This group, which ought to be much more in focus in the present study, is associated with such figures as Alexandr Isaevich Solzhenitsyn, the famous writer and Noble Prize winner, Igor Rostislavovich Shafarevich, a distinguished mathematician, or Vadim Mikhailovich Borisov, whose name is nearly forgotten nowadays. However, it was Borisov who drafted the postulate of Russia’s obligation to find its own national face in his text placed in the famous collection *From Under the Rubble* (*Из-под глыб*, 1974, p. 200).

The greatest popularity was originally enjoyed by Solzhenitsyn who created an important pattern of modern and sublime nationalism whose essence boils down to a couple of points:

1. Communism is not a Russian invention. Its idea was imported from the West and implemented by an uprooted elite; it is followed by the new intelligentsia, which in fact lost its contact with the nation (*Из-под глыб*, 1974, pp. 217–260).
2. Russia should not seek inspiration in the West since the latter passively accepts communism and because of its consumerism is unable to struggle for higher values (Солженицын, 1978).
3. Russia should limit its expansionary ambitions and get rid of the Soviet ideology, especially the idea of materialistic progress (Солженицын, 1990).
4. The Russian nation should develop according to the spiritual model of Russian peasantry (Солженицын, 1998).

Solzhenitsyn's ideas, which became popular in the 1980s and 1990s, were quite congruent with the ones proposed by Igor Shafarevich, whose model contained similar postulates:

1. Socialism is an ancient and destructive tendency in the development of humanity. The doctrine was imposed on the Russian people because of a non-native harmful germ (Шафаревич, 1977).
2. Although socialist destruction appeared within the circles of Russian intelligentsia it would have never succeeded if it had not been for the presence of the Jewish element (Шафаревич, 2005, pp. 432–441).
3. The Western intellectual world as well as alienated intellectuals of foreign descent in Russia are permeated with russophobia, which rejects the Russian tradition and ambitions as well as the country's rural heritage (Шафаревич, 1988).

Shafarevich's concept of the Jews and alienated intellectuals as a destructive minority within the big nation (an idea borrowed from Augustin Cochin) still seems to be rather a reflection of Russian nationalism before World War I even though it was exploited within the circles of contemporary nationalists. What became especially productive is the notion of *russophobia*, a term

that became popular not only among the right camp activists but also in the narratives applied by Russian officials and governmental spin doctors.

Trying to determine the probability of a national revolution in Russia, one has to consider the model of nationalism which resorts to the Orthodox tradition such as the Union of Orthodox Banner-Bearers. However, it must be remembered that its adherents face an unsolvable problem. Since they treat Orthodoxy as the only true faith (единая православная вера) they are obliged to admit its universality. In other words, they cannot “privatize” or “nationalize” their religion, which is a common temptation in many cultural circles: to be a “real” Russian one ought to be an Orthodox, in the same way a “real” Japanese citizen should be a Shintoist, a “real” Jew – a Judaist, a “real” Englishman – an Anglican, a “real” Pole – a Catholic. This issue becomes problematic while discussing the Ukrainian question since the Ukrainians are predominantly Orthodox but have a strong conviction of being a separate nation.

A relatively odd model of nationalism was presented by the National Bolshevik movement, which took the shape of The National-Bolshevik Front, the National-Bolshevik Party, and (since 2010) of The Other Russia (Другая Россия), a party that was denied registration. Their *spiritus movens* was the scandalous writer Eduard Limonov. The ideology of “nazbols” was a combination of totalitarian communism and fascist nationalism. This trend of Russian nationalist thought was probably a reaction to the liberalization and democratization of Russia that took place in the 1990s. Limonov strongly resisted any kind of liberalism, democracy and capitalism promoting the idea of a strong state led by an authoritarian leader who would defend the interests of the people. In the area of foreign policy the nazbols intended to re-integrate the post-Soviet area and severely suppress the minorities. They identified the main enemy with the US (The National-Bolshevik Party website, 2007).

Another semi-nationalist product of post-Stalinist Russia was neo-Eurasianism, a trend that originated in the interwar time (and was at that point represented by such thinkers as duke Nikolai Trubetzkoy, Petr Savitsky, Petr Suvchinsky, Georgi Florovsky, Lev Karsavin, Dmitry Svyatopolk-Mirsky and Nikolai Alekseev). In the Soviet era it was continued by a highly popular ethnologist – Lev Nikolaevich Gumilyov, the son of famous poets: Anna Akhmatova and Nikolai Gumilyov. Gumilyov suggested that the Russian ethnos is a product of the modern era, not of Old Rus' and that it cultivates the legacy of Genghis-Khan. Consequently, the Russian people represent Eurasian virtues rather than European or Slavic ones. The Eurasian nation is the ethnic substrate of Eurasia, which is generally identical to the territory of the Soviet Union (Гумилев, 2002; Пальцев, 2011).

After the collapse of the USSR the neo-Eurasian idea was popularized by other ideologists with their unquestionable leader – Alexandr Gelevich Dugin. At the beginning of his intellectual journey he proclaimed a “conservative revolution” (a term borrowed from Armin Mohler) after the decades of communism. However, in what is probably his most popular book, Dugin discusses the grounds of geopolitics and develops a strikingly anti-Western theory. He exploits Mackinder's old scheme of the competition between the sea powers and the continental ones. According to Dugin, Russia is the medium of tellurocracy (the continental power), which stands for conservatism/tradition, autocracy and collective responsibility for the economy whereas the Atlantic powers (especially the US and the United Kingdom) represent talassocracy, the power of the sea, which dissolves collective obligations. The Western world proposes progress instead of tradition, democracy and capitalism, the free market, which is responsible for nothing and nobody (Dugin, 1998).

In Dugin's works the Russian nation is not an ethnic being but a Eurasian bedrock of tradition. If we treat neo-Eurasianism as

a kind of nationalism, we have to deal with a specific understanding of it. There is no doubt that Dugin delivered an influential model of Great Russia, an “immortal homeland”. In this concept the Russian people together with the other ethnic groups (which form the great nation of the Eurasian niche) are responsible for the communitarian and traditionalist ethos. Dugin is devoted to Orthodoxy in a specific sense. In his books and interviews the Russian faith is presented as a “tradition” rather than a “religion”, which is normally conditioned by specific rules and beliefs. This way Dugin ignores the differences between Orthodoxy and tribal Islam, and rejects Western Christianity as an intellectual doctrine.

Thus, the neo-Eurasianist concept cannot be categorized only in terms of nationalism. This refers both to the interwar, primary tradition of the movement and to its later forms. Bäcker (2000) describes the development of early Eurasianism as a transition from a kind of reaction against acculturation to totalitarianism; this well-grounded approach seems to be even better justified by today’s forms of the movement. According to some recent publications (e.g. Mostafa, 2013) Eurasianism is interpreted as a unifying political program where ethnic nationalisms are replaced by another kind of peaceful solidarity.

Another theoretical model was delivered by the “tribalists” (or racists even), where the nation bears a strictly ethnic meaning, and the underlying principle of nationalism lies in the idea of the purity of blood (usually known in its Iberian variations – the Portuguese *limpeza de sangue* or the Spanish *limpieza de sangre*), in the ties of kinship. This radical point of view was proposed in the founding texts of The People’s National Party, in the ideology of the Slavic Union and in the marginal national-socialist groups. One of the most interesting and, at the same time, most consistent visions of the Russian nation’s fate was presented by Alexei Shiropayev in his 2001 book *The Prison of the Nation* (*Тюрьма народа*), where Russia is illustrated as a place of great sufferings of the

Russian tribe. Shiropaev understands it as an Aryan community which originated in the North-Eastern territories of Europe and descends from Nordic Varangians and Vendens (Slavs). In the course of time the Russian tribe had to face dramatic challenges. The foreign influence – Eastern, Greek Christianity, which in fact originated in the Jewish den, and invasions from the East (the inflow of such peoples as Turkic Pechenegs and Polovtsy, Mongols, Tartars, etc.) subordinated the nation to Eastern rulers, who soon became princes and emperors. Under Soviet rule the Russian tribe was exterminated by Jewish commissars or Asian activists. The Soviet Union led most of the Russian people to death, with the Great Famine in Ukraine and ruthless tactics during World War II (Ши́ропаев, 2001).

Finally, we also have to account for a model which is visibly related to contemporary incarnations of European “defensive” nationalism. Some Russian nationalists make conclusions which are analogous to the ones of the Party for Freedom in Holland, the Alternative for Germany, Pegida or the National Front in France. The model includes mainly the hostility to immigration caused by the fear of a barbarian, predominantly Islamic flood. The most incisive narrative of that sort was presented in the program of the Movement Against Illegal Immigration (DPNI).

However, there is also a much more sophisticated and moderate version of “defensive” or “cultural” nationalism in contemporary Russia, a program which is also widely accepted among many intellectuals. It is connected mainly with the National-Democratic Party and its academic tribune in the form of “Voprosy nacionalizma”, an interesting and influential journal in which the questions of the possibility to build or re-create the Russian nation as well as nationalism in general are discussed on a relatively high level. Apart from Krylov, who is the head of the journal, Natalya Kholmogorova – the co-founder of the initiative, Nedezhda Shalimova – the Secretary of the Russian Social

Movement, as well as Sergei Sergeev (Сергеев, 2017a; Сергеев, 2017b), a respected and moderate historian, should also be taken into consideration as the ideological leaders of the trend.

To sum up, we can say that Russia has received a rich and diversified set of models that could be followed by a mass nationalistic movement. However, one should also realize that the exploitation of the theoretical concepts given above sketches a dichotomous explanatory model of Russian nationalism. Its internal divergence was also formulated by Tat'yana and Valerii Solovei, who make a distinction between **the supporters of a purely national state and the imperialists** (Соловей and Соловей, 2011, p. 402). Most of Russian nationalists are somewhere in between but the contradiction remains clear: imperialism is an efficient impediment to the perspective of an ethnically pure country. In other words, Russia for Russians would be inevitably smaller than a monstrous Great Russia (*Великая Россия*).

The organizational potential

Russian nationalism is represented by many groups and theoreticians. Most of these circles are (or were) relatively small and often had no real access to peripheral areas. Giving a full picture of nationalist organizations in Russia is hardly possible. Some of them are listed by Dubas (2008, pp. 47ff), some are described in other studies such as Laruelle et al. (2009). The list given below is by no means complete. However, for further studies it is advisable to remember such groups, organizations and parties as:

1. "National traditionalist" organizations:

Formerly:

- The Memory (*Память, Памят*), the oldest post-Stalinist nationalist organization, which goes back to the beginning of the 1970s and ceased to exist in 2003 after the death of its leader, Dmitry Vasilyev,

Currently:

- Great Russia (since 2007).

2. The xenophobic and anti-immigrant ones:
 - Rus – Party for the Defence of the Russian Constitution (Партия Защиты Российской Конституции “Русь”, ПЗРК),
 - Russian National Unity (Русское Национальное Единство),
 - The Movement Against Illegal Immigration (Движение Против Нелегальной Иммиграции).
3. Ethnic and racist nationalist groups:
 - The Russian Social Movement (Русское Общественное Движение),
 - The Slavic Union (Славянский Союз),
 - The National Union (Народный Союз),
 - National Socialist Society (Национал-социалистическое общество),
4. The National-Bolshevik organizations:
Formerly:
 - National Bolshevik Front (1993),
 - National Bolshevik Party (1994–2007).Currently:
 - The Other Russia (since 2010).
5. The Orthodox-nationalistic organizations:
 - The Union of Orthodox Banner Bearers (Союз православных хоругвеносцев),
 - The Union of Orthodox Citizens (Союз православных граждан),
 - Radonezh (Радонеж).
6. Eurasianist formations:
 - Eurasia Party (Партия “Евразия”),
 - the Eurasian Youth Union (Евразийский союз молодежи).
7. State nationalist (imperialist) parties and organizations:
 - Liberal-Democratic Party of Russia,
 - “Rodina” Party – The National Front (Партия “РОДИНА”),

- The Congress of Russian Communities (Конгресс русских общин).

The number of the members of the particular groups is difficult to estimate. Even the officially registered establishment organizations and parties do not publish such statistics. However, in 2008 the “Kommersant” magazine, pointing to the information available then in the Federal Registration Bureau (Федеральная регистрационная служба), provided the number of LDPR members which was supposed to be 155.86 thousand (“Коммерсант”, 2008). The radical groups are rather small and usually do not exceed 100 activists in each of the centers. The cores of the organizations, however, are surrounded by a changing number of supporters.

What seems to be a valuable source of information (from the organizational perspective) is the demonstration which is annually held on November 4 (the Day of National Unity) – the Russian March. The organizers declare that

the Russians are dissatisfied with the fact that they do not have their own national state, that their interests are not considered in Russia, because of the adoption of “substituting migration”, and because their existence and their right to determine their own future are now being questioned.

The organization of the demonstration is in the hands of the Center for the Russian Committee of the Russian March, which nominally consisted of 9 people in September 2017:

- Vladimir Basmanov – the founder of the anti-immigrant DPNI and of the Russian Association in exile, as well as the head of the “Nation and Freedom” Committee, one of the main organizers of the first Russian March and many subsequent ones,
- Alexandr Belov – his brother, a political prisoner since 2016, one of the leaders of the DPNI and the Russian Association,

another key organizer of the first Russian March and many subsequent ones,

- Maxim Vakhromov – one of the leaders of the National Union of Russia (Национальный Союз России), the leader of the nationalists in Yekaterinburg where he organizes the Russian marches,
- Vitaly Goryunov – one of the leaders of the National Union of Russia, the head of the nationalists of Tula and the organizer of the Russian Marches in Tula,
- Sergey Guzhev – the organizer of the Russian Marches in Vologda,
- Aleksey Kolegov – a political prisoner, one of the leaders of the Russian Association and the organization Frontier of the North (Рубеж Севера), formerly the main organizer of the Russian Marches in Syktyvkar (Komi Republic),
- Georgi Pavlov – the organizer of the Russian Marches in Pskov,
- Igor Stenin – one of the leaders of the Russian Association, the main organizer of the Russian Marches in Astrakhan,
- Alexei Bakhtin – a political prisoner, formerly the main organizer of the Russian Marches in Novosibirsk.

The Central Organizing Committee embraces interregional advisory groups which include all the organizers of the Russian March who would like to take part in the collegial discussion about preparations for the Russian March. There are also a number of functional commissions within the Committee, formed by various participants who devote their time to organizational issues (see *Русский марш*, 2017).

According to the Agency of Russian Information the number of participants of the march in 2006 exceeded 7000 (*Агентство Русской Информации*, 2006). The exact data referring to the march in 2016 and 2017 are not available. However, as one of the oldest organizers, Alexei Mikhailov, declared in an interview, after the march he was taken to the local police department

(Управление внутренних дел) and fined because the declared number of participants was exceeded: no fewer than 8 thousand people turned up (Михайлов, 2016). Such numbers (if one takes into account the size of Moscow) do not make a great impression. However, we have to remember that Russian national extremists are under constant control and a gathering such as the Russian March during a national holiday provides evidence for the determination of the nationalistic circles.

Political conditions

There is no doubt that the Russian authorities, both in the 1990s and later, found imperialist and statist nationalism much more suitable for the realization of their objectives than the racist or anti-immigrant versions (comp. Panov, 2010). People like Dmitry Rogozin (who has held the post of Deputy Prime Minister of the Russian Federation since 2011), the leader of Rodina and the Congress of Russian Communities, or Alexandr Dugin, the founder of the neo-Eurasianist movement (who received substantial financial support for his publications and even became the chair of the Sociology of International Relations at Moscow State University), were by no means treated as unwanted people within the Russian political establishment.

Since the imperial nationalists, unlike the liberals, supported the hard line toward the West, especially to the US, the Kremlin, especially after 2000, treated them as natural allies: they at least aimed at the extension of Moscow's influence to former Soviet republics, where a good part of the new states' population was ethnically Russian. The liberals of the 1990s did not see any chance of success in such assertive behavior and highlighted the possible negative consequences, especially in the sphere of international trade.

Putin's regime did a lot to not only get rid of the liberal opposition but also to hamper the budding development of

another potential enemy: the radical nationalist non-conformist groups. There were several reasons behind this course of action. First of all, they were difficult to control and resorted to direct public support with no intermediation of the Kremlin. Another problem lay and still lies in their exclusive style: appealing to ethnic Russian sentiments they exclude a large and still growing milieu of nations which were tempted by Putin's regime to unite under the control of Moscow. The Kremlin, as it previously was in the case of the Mongol Empire, Victorian Britain or imperial Russia, appeared to be unable to give up the idea of expansion. In other words, geopolitical imperatives (according to state documents, presidential addresses to the National Assembly and political practice in nearly all spheres) overshadowed the economic, or, more generally, the civilizational ones. Finally, at least some of the nationalistic groups such as the DPNI or People's National Party served programs which matched very well the European practice of extreme nationalism. This way they seemed to be much more pro-European than pro-Eurasian: they discovered that the Russians are white Christians or white Aryans, and that they constitute a part of the European civilization.

The main device used as a weapon in the struggle against the nationalist threat is the refusal to register a party under the pretext of extremism. Since 2002 a significant number of political parties and organizations have been denied registration because of real or imaginary extremism on the grounds of the Federal Law on Combating Extremist Activity (Федеральный закон от 25 июля 2002 г. N 114-ФЗ). Chapter 1 of the bill states that extremist activity also includes such things as "incitement to social, racial, ethnic or religious hatred; propaganda of exclusiveness, superiority or inferiority of an individual based on his/her social, racial, ethnic, religious or linguistic identity, or his/her attitude to religion". This way Putin's KGB team obtained a perfect device to eliminate ethnic nationalists from the main game of thrones. Since 2002 a great

number of nationalistic organizations and parties were refused registration; some were banned and persecuted.

The Russian state of mind

Russian nationalistic sentiments are not easy to study because the matter is somewhat elusive. However, we can take into consideration the results of the public opinion research conducted by Levada Center in which the respondents were asked about their attitude to the nationalist imperative: “Russia only for Russians”. The initial set of studies was done in the years 1998–2009. The results were unclear and did not reveal any unquestionable tendency. Strong support varied from 14% in 2007 to 19% in 2005. Relative support (“it would be advisable to realize this idea in a reasonable framework”) ranged from 31% in 1998 to 42% in 2008. Strong objection gained the least popularity (18%) in 2000 and was accepted most widely in 1998 (32%) (Левада-Центр, 2009).

In 2016 we received another portion of information which was discussed in the media. Levada Center revealed that the popularity of the nationalist slogan did not change significantly. Answering the question about the attitude to this imperative, 14% of respondents declared full support, 38% were more accurate and said that such a thesis would be a good idea to implement in reasonable limits. 21% of the respondents reacted sharply to the idea saying that this was real fascism. The same percentage of the respondents answered that they were not interested in the topic. Sociologists asked people whether they should restrict the residence in the territory of Russia to representatives of certain nationalities. 20% of the respondents said that no restrictions should be introduced, 34% advocated limiting residence in Russia to people from the Caucasus, 29% were against the incomers from the former Central Asian republics of the USSR, 24% were negative

towards the Chinese, 21% – to the Roma Gypsies, 19% did not want to see the Vietnamese in the Russian Federation, 13% – the Ukrainians, 6% – Jews (ZNAK, 2016; another study on the topic: Dubas, 2008, pp. 29–30).

Discussing the results presented above one has to remember that 52 per cent of the entire or relative support seems good for the nationalists for at least two reasons. Firstly, it is more than likely that in the territories which are traditionally settled by other nationalities, such as Chechnya, Buryatia or Tuva, Russian nationalistic slogans cannot be widely accepted. In other words, in the Russian ethnic territories such imperatives gain even stronger support. Secondly, the decreasing percentage of ethnic Russians in Russia leads to the tide of xenophobia. On the other hand, a strong feeling of an emerging demographic disaster in the sense of the ethnic composition of the population may lead to other acts of social unrest.

The readiness for radical action was proven in a series of violent events, especially the ones in Kondopoga, Karelia in 2006 and on Manezh square in Moscow in 2010. In Kondopoga, after a Chechen group killed two local Russians, crowds of people tried to take revenge and in fact forced many Chechens to leave the town. In Moscow the violent reaction was a result of the death of a Spartak soccer fan who was killed by five Dagestanis. During the riots 32 people were injured and, what makes the case more interesting, three members of the Other Russia: Igor Berezyuk, Ruslan Khubaev and Kirill Unchuk, were arrested, tried and sentenced to imprisonment (8, 4.5, and 3 years respectively) (Правозащитный центр “Мемориал”, 2014). The probability of such phenomena to occur in the future cannot be easily estimated. However, this potential cannot be entirely neglected because the trials after the Manezh events did not stop the tension (e.g. in October 2013 in Biryulovo, a district of Moscow, a huge crowd of local people attacked the properties of immigrants after the murder of a young Russian, Yegor Shcherbakov).

Concluding remarks

A critical review of the four constituting aspects leads to ambiguous conclusions about the perspectives of a national revolution in Russia.

First of all, it must be said that the first pillar of a possible revolution, the theoretical grounds, are relatively well-developed and logically structured. Russian nationalists have a lot of historical and new models of a nationalist political change at their disposal. The older models, however, seem less effective in the context of the situation in which the Russian nation is nowadays. The religious and ideological conflict with the West or another external enemy is far behind the other challenges such as the growing presence of Caucasian and Central Asian incomers, who may become the successors of ethnic Russians in the great state if the present demographic tendencies are to continue.

The analysis supports the opinion that the contemporary nationalism is conceptually divergent. One of its poles consists in Russian imperialism, political inclusivism and expansionism (deeply rooted in the previous periods of Russian history), and is generally supported by the Kremlin. The other trend – the ethnic and “exclusive” nationalism, is contested by the present elite, which perceives it as a threat to the state’s integrity.

The organizational potential of Russian nationalists cannot be neglected but is generally a disputable issue. The imperialist nationalists are represented in solid structures such as the Congress of Russian Communities or the Liberal-Democratic Party of Russia. However, they are strongly subordinated to the Kremlin camp and would not gain sufficient support without the help of the government. On the other hand, the ethnically and culturally-oriented nationalists are dispersed in customarily small and suppressed organizations with no coordinative center.

The political and legal conditions for a nationalist revolution are not favorable. The non-conformists have to take into account

significant problems with registration, official bans and difficulties with gaining access to the media. According to the 2002 Federal Law *On Combating Extremist Activity* several radical groups or relatively moderate organizations were erased from the official political life in Russia and no liberalization in this area can be expected.

The question about the readiness of the Russian people to support a nationalist political change in the future remains open. However, series of events such as the ones in Kondopoga in 2006 or in the very center of Moscow in 2010 provide evidence that awareness of the problem is hidden somewhere in the Russian souls and that the sleeping bear can wake up if the situation gets out of control. On the one hand, the feeling that the inner immigrants are getting a competitive advantage seems to be growing because of the objective demographic processes. On the other – the growing share of non-Russian inhabitants of the Federation may weaken the revolutionary potential.

* * *

In the 2010s, after the marginalization of oligarchs and liberal parties such as the Union of Right Forces (Союз правых сил) or the Yabloko Party (Партия “Яблоко”), Alexei Navalny, the founder of Anti-Corruption Foundation and the leader of the Progress Party, became the most recognizable symbol of Russian opposition. His political image was associated with his actions against corruption on the one hand and with the emphasis put on the interests of the Russian nation, especially in the context of the Caucasian threat, on the other. His views are perceived as “national democratic”. That is why Navalny ought to be described as a representative of “vitalistic” nationalism; he generally promotes a vision of an uncorrupted state to build a healthy market economy, which brings him closer to the liberals. However, he was also strikingly critical about the Caucasian elites: both the ones connected with the Kremlin and the Islamic traditionalists or fundamentalists. Laruelle (2014) correctly points to the fact that in the activities of Navalny nationalism and liberalism are in a way reconciled.

There is a widespread opinion that Navalny is not a really strong personality but rather an artificial creation: his blog and other texts on the internet were supposed to have been produced by a team with the leader being only a supposititious figure. This might be, however, a secondary problem. What is much more important is the fact that Navalny's popularity (which became clear during the election to Moscow's City Hall), no matter what kind of personality the politician really presented, revealed a genuine need for a seemingly odd combination: Russia's rapprochement to the Euro-Atlantic civilizational standards in order to build a state which the Russian nation could ultimately treat as its own. The "restless" perception of the difficult political reality in Russia, in which Navalny is only a personification of contestation seems to be more and more congruent with Andrei Savelyev's opinion that for those who think about the salvation of the Russian nation the evolutionary option is theoretically possible but in fact not accessible because of the lack of time (Savelyev, 2005).

Rewolucja, której nie było: potencjał odrodzenia rosyjskiego nacjonalizmu

W rozdziale omówiono perspektywy rewolucji nacjonalistycznej w Rosji. Badaniu poddano teoretyczną bazę, obiektywne okoliczności, mogące się przyczynić do ewentualnej zmiany, potencjał organizacyjny organizacji nacjonalistycznych, warunki polityczne i nastroje rosyjskiej części obywateli Federacji Rosyjskiej.

Pierwszy filar ewentualnej rewolucji, to jej fundamenty teoretyczne, stosunkowo dobrze rozwinięte i logicznie zorganizowane. Rosyjscy nacjonaści mają do dyspozycji wiele historycznych i współczesnych modeli nacjonalistycznych przemian politycznych. Jednak starsze modele wydają się mniej skuteczne w kontekście obecnej sytuacji narodu rosyjskiego. Religijne i ideologiczne konflikty z Zachodem czy innym wrogiem zewnętrznym, schodzą na dalszy plan wobec takich problemów jak rosnąca obecność kaukaskich i środkowoazjatyckich emigrantów, którzy mogą stać się następcami etnicznych Rosjan w państwie.

Analiza potwierdza pogląd, że współczesny nacjonalizm jest konceptualnie rozbieżny. Jednym z jego biegunów jest rosyjski imperializm, inkluzywność

i ekspansja polityczna (głęboko zakorzenione w poprzednim okresie historii Rosji), generalnie wspierane przez Kreml. Druga tendencja – etniczny i „uniikalny” nacjonalizm, poddawany krytyce przez obecną elitę, która postrzega go jako zagrożenie dla integralności państwa.

Nie należy nie doceniać organizacyjnego potencjału rosyjskich nacjonalistów, charakterystyczne są tu jednak rozproszenie i brak woli zjednoczenia. Imperialistyczni nacjonaści reprezentowani są w tak potężnych strukturach jak Kongres Wspólnot Rosyjskich czy Polityczna Partia LDPR (wcześniej Liberalno-Demokratyczna Partia Rosji). Są silnie podporządkowani Kremlowi i nie mogą odnieść sukcesu bez pomocy rządu. Natomiast etnicznie i kulturowo zorientowanej nacjonalści są rozproszeni w różnych organizacjach, pozbawieni koordynującego centrum i są prześladowani.

Polityczne i prawne warunki dla przeprowadzenia nacjonalistycznej rewolucji nie są korzystne. Należy wziąć pod uwagę duże problemy z rejestracją, oficjalnymi zakazami, trudnościami z dostępem do mediów. Na mocy federalnej ustawy z dnia 25 lipca 2002 r. N 114-ФЗ „O przeciwdziałaniu działalności ekstremistycznej” kilka radykalnych grup bądź relatywnie umiarkowanych organizacji zostało usuniętych z oficjalnego życia politycznego w Rosji i nie przewiduje się liberalizacji w tej dziedzinie.

Kwestia gotowości Rosjan do wspierania nacjonalistycznych zmian politycznych w przyszłości pozostaje otwarta. Niemniej jednak wiele wydarzeń, takich jak zamieszki w Kondopodze w 2006 r. czy na placu Manieźnym w grudniu 2010 r., pokazuje, że świadomość problemu kryje się gdzieś w rosyjskich duszach i, że śpiący niedźwiedź może się obudzić, jeśli sytuacja wymknie się spod kontroli. Z jednej strony, poczucie, że wewnątrzni imigranci są bardziej konkurencyjni, wydaje się wzrastać z powodu obiektywnych procesów demograficznych. Z drugiej – udział nierosyjskich mieszkańców Federacji może osłabić potencjał rewolucyjny.

Революция, которая не произошла: потенциал возрождения русского национализма

Глава рассматривает перспективы национальной революции в России. Предметом изучения является: теоретическая база, объективные обстоятельства, способствующие возможной перемене, организационный потенциал националистских организаций, политические условия и настроения русской части населения Российской Федерации.

Первое условие возможной революции, теоретические ее основания, относительно хорошо развиты и логически структурированы. У русских националистов в распоряжении есть много «исторических» и новых мо-

делей националистических политических перемен. Однако, более старые модели кажутся менее эффективными в контексте актуальной ситуации российской нации. Религиозно-идеологический конфликт с Западом или другим внешним врагом отходит на второй план перед такой проблемой как растущее присутствие кавказских и среднеазиатских инородцев, которые могут стать преемниками этнических русских в большом государстве.

Анализ подтверждает мнение о том, что современный национализм концептуально расходится. Одним из его полюсов является российский империализм, политическая инклюзивность и экспансионизм (глубоко укорененный в предыдущих периодах русской истории) и в целом поддерживается Кремлем. Другая тенденция – этнический и «исключительный» национализм оспаривается нынешней элитой, которая воспринимает его как угрозу целостности государства.

Организационным потенциалом русских националистов нельзя пренебрегать, однако, он подвергается дисперсии и характеризуется отсутствием воли объединения. Империалистические националисты представлены в таких мощных структурах, как Конгресс русских общин или Либерально-демократическая партия России. Они сильно подчинены кремлевскому лагерю и не в состоянии добиться успеха без помощи правительства. С другой стороны, этнически и культурно ориентированные националисты разбросаны в разных организациях, лишены единого координационного центра, и подвергаются гонениям.

Политические и правовые условия для националистической революции не благоприятны. Нонконформисты должны считаться со значительными проблемами: с регистрацией, официальными запретами, трудностями с доступом к средствам массовой информации. Согласно Федеральному Закону от 25 июля 2002 г. N 114-ФЗ «О противодействии экстремистской деятельности» несколько радикальных групп или относительно умеренных организаций были устранены из официальной политической жизни в России и никакой либерализации в этой области не ожидается.

Вопрос о готовности русского народа поддержать националистические политические изменения в будущем остается открытым. Тем не менее, ряд событий, таких как беспорядки в Кондопоге в 2006 году или на Манежной в декабре 2010 г., свидетельствует о том, что осознание проблемы скрывается где-то в российских душах и что спящий медведь может проснуться, если ситуация выйдет из-под контроля. С одной стороны, ощущение, что внутренние иммигранты получают конкурентное преимущество, похоже, растет из-за объективных демографических процессов. С другой – растущая доля нерусских жителей Федерации может ослабить революционный потенциал.