PRESIDENTIAL ETHOS:
LEADERSHIP AS A GOAL AND TOOL IN THE
RHETORIC OF RECENT AMERICAN PRESIDENTS

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ABSTRACT

PRESIDENTIAL ETHOS: LEADERSHIP AS A GOAL AND TOOL IN THE

RHETORIC OF RECENT AMERICAN PRESIDENTS

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This thesis discusses the role of leadership as an aspect of ethos in presidential rhetoric.

In it, a terminology is established to deal with two original applications of leadership

ethos in presidential rhetoric: *accumulating*, or building up leadership status as an

independent goal, and *wielding*, or using the established ethos of the presidency to affect

some other goal of persuasion. These terms provide the basis for an approach to

analyzing presidential rhetoric. Support for this approach is drawn from the theoretical

basis of authorities reaching as far back as Aristotle up to the much more U.S.-specific

observations of David Zarefsky, Richard Neustadt, and others. Applications of this

division are then applied to speeches from U.S. presidents from Reagan to Obama.

Finally, suggestions for the usage and application of the established *accumulating*/

wielding dichotomy are summarized.

CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

The Importance of Rhetorical Leadership

There may be no office or position in America that symbolizes the idea of leadership more clearly than that of the President of the United States of America. In the centuries since the establishment of the office, the American presidency has developed symbolically towards an ever increasing level of expected leadership. The president has evolved from being a representative who stood for the self-evident national interest to being one who leads the way preemptively in protecting the national interest from threatening special interests (Zarefsky, "The Presidency" 21). As David Zarefsky asserts in his essay, "The Presidency has Always Been a Place for Rhetorical Leadership," the power and resources available to the president "are limited by the Constitution, which reflect[s] the framers' fears of a strong executive who would lead the country rather than manage the government" (23). However, as modern life (and its accompanying politics) has increased in complexity and the presidency has become more central to the political system, there have been larger expectations placed on the individual in the office. "To fill the gap, presidents turn increasingly to rhetoric, regarding persuasion as a source of power that might restore equilibrium: constitutional power plus rhetorical leadership *together* would be commensurate with the needs" (Zarefsky, "The Presidency" 23).

Zarefsky is not the only one to note the president's dependence on rhetoric. Although he does not use the term "rhetorical leadership" in his influential book *Presidential Power*, Richard Neustadt also makes a point of describing the necessity of what he calls "personal influence of an effective sort on governmental action." He very

deliberately draws a distinction between this personal influence and "formal 'powers' vested in the Presidency by constitutional or statute law and custom" (ix). In Neustadt's view, because presidential powers are largely shared, the actual power of the office is at risk, since it is dependent on the consent of others. *Presidential Power* focuses on how the President can answer the question of how to make the powers of the United States' highest public office "work for him" (xx). Neustadt therefore lends considerable space to discussions of how to bargain with Congress to buttress his power and other "inside the beltway" issues. In other words, Neustadt is focused on politics, with rhetoric being of concern only as a major tool within that realm.

In matters of practical application for any president or potential president, such considerations as Neustadt presents must be writ large. To examine all such considerations, though, takes a book at least as thorough as *Presidential Power*. This study, however, is not so much concerned with the totality of personal power as with the part of the president's bargaining collateral made up of his reputation and prestige: that part that can most rightfully be called "leadership." It presents a small but crucial part of the elements that Neustadt calls presidential power. The focus here is the image and execution of powers through rhetorical leadership. At the root of this focus is a concentration on language. By analyzing the language of presidential and pre-presidential speeches, a dichotomy may be developed that can be applied to that specific part of presidential influence that comes from leadership as it is *accumulated* and *wielded* via presidential language. Although by no means an all-encompassing method for understanding presidential motives and success, such a dichotomy can add another layer of understanding to even some of the most highly analyzed speeches and add a useful

instrument to the toolbox of scholars as they attempt to understand the nuances of presidential rhetoric.

Definitions

The work of writers like Zarefsky and Neustadt—along with others, such as E.B. Portis, and Romesh Ratnesar, and Bligh, Kohles, and Meindl—makes it obvious that rhetorical leadership is a key element in carrying out the modern day demands of the office of President. The precise definition and terms of rhetorical leadership, on the other hand, are much less well-established. For the purposes of this study, it is important to define the specific meaning and application of several key terms as they are used in this paper: rhetoric, ethos, *accumulation*, *wielding*, and leadership, (with *accumulation* and *wielding* having very specific meanings in the context of this paper.)

By some definitions, all of the considerations in *Presidential Power*—political actions, ongoing negotiations, private choices, and public appearances—fall well within the scope of the term "rhetoric". Such broad definitions of rhetoric are certainly acceptable descriptions of the concerns of the field. In fact, Aristotle defined rhetoric broadly as "the faculty of observing in any given case the available means of persuasion" (1355b26-27). Although Aristotle's definition rightfully invites application in a variety of circumstances, the substance of his *Rhetoric* dwells mostly on the development and delivery of individual speeches. Here, the term "rhetoric" is used in that narrower sense.[1] "Rhetoric," in the context of this paper means the persuasive elements available

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[1] Zarefsky warns that such narrowing can endanger the credibility and accuracy of political rhetorical analysis, but in this case the narrowing is done intentionally, with knowledge of the larger rhetorical context, thereby hopefully avoiding the pitfalls with which Zarefsky is concerned (Zarefsky, "Presidential Rhetoric" 608-609).

for consideration in an individual text[2]. This narrow definition precludes the possibility of addressing ethical concerns as they apply broadly to the methods analyzed. While many of the methods here might be viewed in some circumstances as manipulative (particularly the use of crisis speeches to manipulate policy), this study holds with Aristotle's view that morality does not lie in the methods of rhetoric, but rather in its use. As he points out:

> And if it be objected that one who uses such power of speech unjustly might do great harm, *that* is a charge which may be made in common with all good things except virtue, and above all against the things that are most useful, as strength, health, wealth, generalship. A man can confer the greatest of benefits by the right use of these, and inflict the greatest of injuries by using them wrongly. (1355b3-7)

After all, it is possible that many rhetorical methods, such as those associated with charisma, may be used unconsciously by a rhetor, regardless of the rhetor's morality. It would hardly be fair to claim that the recognition of the method makes it immoral—and just as unfair to claim that a rhetor who uses the method consciously to level the playing field is somehow less moral.

While taking a particularly narrow view of rhetoric, this study takes an especially broad view of ethos. In the process of defining rhetoric, Aristotle divided the modes of persuasion into three kinds: ethos, or "personal character;" pathos, or "putting the audience in a certain state of mind;" and logos, or "proof" (1356a1-4). He then defends the element of ethos from potential denigration and strengthens his affirmation of it, claiming that "character may almost be called the most effective means of persuasion"

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[2] "Text" in this case means not only the words of the speech, but also the delivery, setting, and other rhetorical applications surrounding the words.

(1356a11-14). Aristotle cautions, however, "that this kind of persuasion, like the others, should be achieved by what the speaker says, not by what people think of his character before he begins to speak" (1356a7-10). This approach, in part, reinforces the method pursued in this paper, in that it is the language of the speaker that is used to establish his character. Here, though, ethos (and especially presidential ethos) is not treated as something that persists only in the immediate rhetorical situation. Instead, ethos is treated as a type of symbolic capital, not necessarily contingent on action, but certainly contingent on rhetorical *accumulation*.

Since Aristotle first labeled ethos as a fundamental element of rhetoric, views on ethos as a rhetorical tool have developed in fairly simple ways. New methods of employing ethos have been examined, new genres and adaptations have been studied, but in all these developments, ethos is still seen as a single tool that can be employed in any given speech for the purpose of the desired persuasive ends of that speech. In all of the readings and research leading up to this study, especially among those specifically focused on ethos-based rhetoric, there was not a single example that did not treat ethos as a single type of tool. The authors may focus on a unique application of that tool, but the application is still assumed to be directed towards a particular end that exists within a single rhetorical act. Part of the foundational principle of this study, however, rests on the idea that such is not the case. Instead, what is proposed here is the principle of a split-ethos. On one hand, ethos can, as is usually the case, be viewed merely as a tool for the ends of a given speech. On the other hand, in certain situations, ethos can be built up as a thing unto itself, a sort of capital to be used at a later date for a variety of ends, or even as a self-referential epideictic rhetoric to elevate the president and the office to a

higher degree of leadership status (a process that Neustadt, Zarefsky, and others all agree has been going on since the development of the presidency). To differentiate between these two approaches to ethos, this study uses the terms *wielding* and *accumulating* (and permutations and conjugations of those terms) in an original and specific way. It will employ the term *wielding* to apply to the use of ethos as a persuasive tool for some other goal, and *accumulation* to refer to ethos rhetoric that does not apply ethos towards a persuasive end, but rather builds it up seemingly for its own sake. Neither of these concepts is a novel approach to ethos in itself, but up to this point they have not been acknowledged as separate approaches, and there have therefore been no labels to differentiate them. The contribution offered by this paper is the intentional splitting and labeling of the two to create a split-ethos dichotomy that can conceptualize the two processes separately for analysis.

This study also assumes that among the qualities of ethos[3], there is a particular brand of ethos that relates to leadership. Although this idea shows up readily in related literature, it can be difficult to discuss accurately because leadership is often an even more slippery term to define than even rhetoric or ethos. In fact, much of the substance of this paper derives from the subtleties of understanding the meaning and application of leadership. Leadership is a term that is loosely applied to a variety of behaviors and roles. The purpose here is not to dispute any of those applications, but to narrow the understanding of the term "leadership" as it is applied in this paper—both in terms of

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[3] Aristotle notes, "three things which inspire confidence in the orator's own character - the three, namely, that induce us to believe a thing apart from any proof of it: good sense, good moral character, and goodwill" (1378a6-9).

what it means in this discussion and (perhaps more importantly) in terms of what it is not intended to mean.

What is it that leadership should *not* be taken to mean in this study? Richard Neustadt suggests that leadership involves exceeding the baseline role of national clerk, even though the means for doing so are not provided for in the Constitution. It is an action oriented definition that comes as result of the use of power. Leadership in the present context, though, is not the same as Neustadt's "power," although there is a high degree of interplay between the two; nor is it the result of power. It is more in line with what Neustadt calls "prospects," the storage unit of power.

Steven Skowronek defines leadership as the challenge of disrupting a pre-existing order, while simultaneously affirming the value of order and establishing a new one. According to Skowronek, situation—location in political time—affects the opportunities available and the standard against which presidential leadership may be judged. Leaders must control the way their actions are viewed in political and social terms, thereby controlling their standing in history (Zarefsky, "The Presidency" 22). This again is an action/results oriented definition. Similarly, the work of David Zarefsky provides much of the theoretical groundwork for this study. Zarefsky builds on the ideas of Neustadt, Skowronek, and others to refine a particularly well-developed concept of presidential leadership. According to Zarefsky, many theories provided by the likes of Neustadt and Stephen Skowronek, as well as James Macgregor Burns, Bruce Miroff, and Erwin Hargrove, show a common definition of presidential leadership as "rising above some baseline notion of the minimal constitutional requirements of the office [to bring] about change—not necessarily reversal, but change." And to top it off, the change must

be transformative and lasting—superseding the immediate circumstance to alter the nature and expectations of the presidential office. To do all of this, according to Zarefsky's summation of the theories, the president must discover and use the available means of persuasion in a given case, a very Aristotelian notion (Zarefsky, "The Presidency" 20-22). While this demonstration of the strong link between rhetoric and presidential leadership is very useful, the concept of leadership thus applied goes beyond its application here. It is a conception of leadership that is focused on results rather than symbolism. Many of the theories Zarefsky addresses concern the nature of actual presidential leadership in action (although often through the means of rhetoric), whereas the focus in this study is on how leadership takes part as a symbolic element in presidential rhetoric.

Another common definition of leadership that falls outside of the purposes of this study is the one that views leadership as an intrinsic trait of an individual. This definition is closely related to the ones presented in the preceding paragraphs. It is all too easy to think of leadership as a trait a person possesses and can be judged on. Indeed, there is nothing wrong with such a thought process in general when discussing leadership, but that line of thinking does blur the more specific application of the word as it is used throughout this study. It is important to keep in mind that the term "leadership" in this study is not viewed as a course of action or as an ability; it is viewed as a symbolic commodity, a subdivision of ethos. It is a customizable tool of the presidency, to be designed, built up, and then wielded by the president-as-rhetor. A president can fail to accumulate it or accumulate it and fail to wield it, but it remains something that is available in his or her symbolic realm, with the potential to be drawn out and used. The

notions of leadership as a tool and as a commodity/capital run throughout this paper. These metaphors apply specifically to leadership as it exists on the symbolic plane, where is plays a key part in the economics of political rhetoric.

Finally, to address a possible point of confusion that might arise from associating the Aristotelian notion of ethos with leadership, it is useful to discuss Aristotle's assertion that "we believe good men more fully and more readily than others: this is true generally whatever the question is" (1356a6-9). The notion of proving oneself to be a "good man" is undoubtedly still an important part of ethos in general, but it is not central to the concept of leadership as a foundation for ethos. In fact, in the realm of presidential politics, replacing the concept of "good man" with the concept of "leader" is likely to be more effective. (Clinton's continued popularity and ability to exert persuasion as a leader after several moral scandals proves that the idea of a "good man" ethos is either not necessary to leadership or has more to do with rhetoric than with personal history.) The substitution of the concept of "leader" for "good man" also works well with the following line of Aristotle's advice: "this is true generally whatever the question is, and more absolutely true where exact certainty is impossible and opinions are divided" (1356a6-9). What better description of the modern political landscape could there be? And who, when things are at their most confusing, is not looking for a leader to provide direction and inspiration? That is truly the definition of leadership in this paper—the rhetorical achievement of gathering an audience's trust and support as well as their dependence.

Method and Purpose

This study employs several theoretical models in order to isolate potential tools that a president might use to accomplish the dual purposes of ethos proposed in the accumulation/ wielding dichotomy. The theoretical grounding for these tools is described in "Chapter Two: Theory" Although not all of the tools isolated were used prominently in many of the speeches analyzed, their descriptions have been retained in order to provide a basis for more extended analysis in future studies, as discussed in "Chapter Five: Conclusion"

In order to show the soundness of the proposed dichotomy as well as to demonstrate its method of application, this study will analyze a sampling of presidential and pre-presidential speeches. These speeches will be purposefully selected for their usefulness as illustrations of the situations in which the techniques are employed and the richness of their use of said techniques. Kenneth Burke's pentad will be used to establish the motive of each speech or group of speeches as lying predominately in the realm of either accumulating or wielding—acknowledging that this is only one dimension of motive that could be derived from such an analysis—and then the study will look closely at the language to find the rhetorical methods used to reinforce that intent. It should be noted that not every speech analyzed here has been analyzed for all of the rhetorical elements listed, even where all of them might apply. Instead, each speech has been analyzed for key elements that it uses in a representative manner, the purpose here being to show the potential uses of the tools and terms of the split-ethos view, rather than to come to final conclusions about each particular scenario. Some speeches that provide particularly rich or unique examples are therefore analyzed a good deal more thoroughly

than others, whose presence merely helps to reinforce the frequency of use of the

methods indicated.

CHAPTER TWO: THEORY

An Approach to Presidential Rhetoric

In order to find real world applications of the principles described in this essay, it is crucial to use a consistent approach to the presidential rhetoric being examined. In his essay "Presidential Rhetoric and the Power of Definition," Zarefsky offers three dimensions of a rhetorical transaction for consideration: audience-message, rhetor-text, and scholarly analysis of the text itself (609). Each of these transactions can serve as the basis of completely different types of study. Studying the audience-message transaction, for example, involves evaluating the actual reaction of the audience to a rhetorical act. Zarefsky points out that after extensive research, George Edwards concluded that "'[engaging] in a prominent campaign for the public's support' has emerged in modern times as the president's 'core strategy for governing,' still 'presidents usually fail in their efforts to move the public to support them and their policies'" (607). He goes on to note that Edwards is troubled by the fact that while people tend to assume that presidential rhetoric has an impact, there are in fact "very few studies [that] focus directly on the effect of presidential leadership of opinion…" (607). There are three good reasons, Zarefsky points out, that social scientists and researchers such as Edwards often find no change in attitude or opinion when the "draw on presidential speeches as data… regard them as independent variables and measure their consequences for opinion and attitude change" (608).

> First, we know from communication research that attitudes are seldom changed
> on the basis of a single message. Second, replacement of an attitude or opinion
> with another is only one kind of attitude change. Reinforcement of one's initial

position, modification in the salience of a belief or attitude, changes in perception of what other beliefs or attitudes are related to the one at hand, or differences in interpretation of what the belief or attitude means are all examples of other types of change. And third, the focus on the message-audience relationship - looking for the effects of messages on audiences - is only one dimension of a rhetorical transaction, and not always the most helpful or informative. In particular, it tends to reduce the message to a verbal text and then to treat the text as a "black box," rather than seeing its dynamics as interesting and worthy of analysis in their own right." (Zarefsky, "Presidential Rhetoric" 608)

Essentially, the effects of a presidential speech are too subtle, too complex, and too interrelated with other contemporary and past events to be a reliable independent measure of the effects presidential rhetoric.

Studying the second transaction, rhetor-text, is largely a historical approach. It involves analyzing the development of the message, its relationship to the president's personal and historical agenda, the circumstances of its composition, and what the rhetorical choices can tell scholars about the president. Like the first audience-message transaction, this one can be heavily clouded by subtleties of circumstance. Primarily, it is clouded by the selective nature of the availability of internal memos and other accounts of the composition and the involvement of speechwriters in modern politics (609).

The final transaction, and the approach that is used in this paper, scholarly analysis, is focused on what techniques, motives, and other attributes can be discovered in the text itself (where the text includes all aspects of the rhetorical act), regardless of whom the author is and what the recorded results seem to show about its reception. It

also suggests how those techniques could be built upon by other speakers towards other ends. In this case, claims Zarefsky, "the key relationship is between the text and the rhetorical critic, who uses different reading strategies to reveal levels of meaning or significance in the text. This is a process of speculative reconstruction of the text, informed by the critic's insight into the text's possibilities" (609). Zarefsky does not let this approach off without criticism, either. He cautions that rhetorical scholars often "employ causal language and thereby suggest empirical claims when they really do not mean to make causal arguments but have other dimensions of rhetoric in mind. This conceptual sloppiness invites the rejoinder, especially from social scientists, that the rhetorician is making claims unencumbered by evidence, and therefore that no effect can be attributed to presidential rhetoric" (610). With that caution in mind, this paper seeks to evaluate the texts of presidential speeches for their internal qualities, the symbolic effects, and the possibilities they seek to achieve without making undefended assertions about the broad social and political effects of the act or the motives of the president. Where evidence or social consensus exists, the analyses may note aspects of public reception or political consideration that would be of interest in a more holistic research approach to each speech, but they will not attempt to attribute direct causality in the absence of rigorous evidence. The speeches that are analyzed in chapters three and four have not been analyzed to make any claims about the speech as a whole, but rather to study the application of accumulating and wielding techniques in those speeches. The understanding thus engendered will be helpful in analyzing speeches more holistically in further studies, where a historic or political approach might be applied in conjunction with additional external evidence to make broader judgments about the motives and

effects of the speech. The goal here, though, is to advance the understanding of presidential rhetoric "with an eye both to offering new perspective on the case at hand and to suggesting broader principles that will help to explain rhetorical practice more generally" (Zarefsky, "Presidential Rhetoric" 610-11).

General Leadership Ethos

As described in chapter one, the concept of building up and utilizing the character of the speaker as a tool for persuasion has firm grounding at the foundation of Western traditions of rhetoric. Because ethos is central to the success of other types of rhetoric, it is sometimes difficult to draw the line between the use of ethos and other types of rhetoric. To attempt to further draw a distinction between standard uses of ethos and leadership ethos requires an even subtler understanding. And further, to divide leadership ethos into accumulating and wielding uses may seem like splitting hairs. The purpose of this chapter, therefore, is to define the theoretical parameters and basis for such a subtle division of rhetorical devices.

First, it is important to use a consistent process and set of rules for determining if a given rhetorical method is predominately ethos-driven, and then to further decide if the use of that method works towards accumulating or wielding the symbolic power of ethos. One of the complicating factors surrounding the isolation of ethos in rhetoric is that it can sometimes be accumulated under the guise of pathos-based rhetoric (as when a charismatic leader uses emotional language to draw his audience into a certain type of relationship with him) or logos-based rhetoric (as when a politician must prove that he has a sufficient factual grasp of issues to be trusted as a leader). Also, when a speaker

wields ethos towards a separate persuasive goal, it is often used as a lever to make a logos- or pathos-based method work more effectively. It is not possible, then, to disqualify a rhetorical method from being ethos driven simply because it seems to use logic or emotion.

Ultimately, the question becomes not "Is this rhetoric employing ethos?", but "How is this rhetoric employing ethos?" This study asks the second question, and further qualifies it into three questions: "Does this rhetoric work to symbolically increase the speaker's status as a leader?" "Does this rhetoric make use of the leader's symbolic status as a leader to accomplish some persuasive goal?" and "How does the use of ethos in this speech correspond to the inferred motive of the rhetoric?" This third question may seem at odds with one stated goal of this study: to avoid making broad assertions about matters external to the text. Motive, though, in this case, is not being attributed to the speaker, but rather to the rhetoric itself, with the speaker merely being a consideration in how that motive is determined. To attempt to determine motive in that regard, this study will rely on Kenneth Burke's pentad. The pentad works as a well-established rhetorical lens for establishing motive outside of the stated purpose of the act or the externally assumed motives of the speaker. As laid out in the opening chapter of *A Grammar of Motives*, the five elements of the pentad—act, scene, agent, agency, purpose—each offer a different angle of perception for the text. By examining the relationships of these elements it is possible to extract a clearer understanding of the motives inherent in a given rhetorical text (xvii-15). The presidential speeches analyzed in chapters three and four of this study have been examined in both general and specific

terms to show the motives underlying the use of rhetoric for leadership and the aptness of the split-ethos concept.

One aspect of rhetoric that is of concern to several other rhetorical factors discussed in this chapter is the audience to whom the rhetoric is addressed. As Aristotle wrote, "We must also take into account the nature of our particular audience when making a speech of praise; for, as Socrates used to say, it is not difficult to praise the Athenians to an Athenian audience. If an audience esteems a quality, we must say that our hero has that quality" (1367b7-9). Burke refers to this ancient passage in *A Rhetoric of Motives* when he describes the concept of identification. According to Burke "You persuade a man only insofar as you can talk his language by speech, gesture, tonality, order, image, attitude, idea, *identifying* your ways with his" (579). Burke sees identification as a fundamental rhetorical element, holding that when the audience indentifies with the speaker, it is more likely to agree with him. He goes on to describe three modes of identification: common goals and background, common enmity, and unconscious association with values represented by the speaker (*A Rhetoric* 581-93)("Rhetoric" 58).

Although identification in all its forms is most definitely an ethos-based element of rhetoric, not all identification is necessarily symbolically related to leadership ethos. Each of the identification techniques isolated for this study has been chosen because it highlights not only the consubstantiality of the speaker with the audience, but also his representative nature and thus his place as a leader. This rhetorical fine-tuning requires delicate application, since any indication that the speaker is placing himself in a higher

status not only breaks with consubstantiality, but also could be seen as insulting or condescending by the audience.

Later in this chapter identification is further refined, using ideas from Zarefsky, Brandon Rottinghaus, Seyranian and Bligh, and Bligh, Kohles, and Meindl to separate its function into accumulating and wielding applications. In order to avoid discussing one caveat in several places throughout the rest of this study, it is worthwhile to address the complex issue of modern presidential audiences here. In Theodore Windt Jr.'s article defining the field of study for presidential rhetoric, he notes the complexity of the idea of audience in a media age. "The definition of 'audiences' has changed with the advent of television. The 'audience' for a presidential speech is not a group of people present for the speech ... The 'audiences' are target constituencies who see the speech on television and/or the media that reports the speech ... and often media is the more important audience" (Windt 105). Similarly, James Ceasar notes that televised speeches have moved constitutional government in the direction of government by assembly where "the President is under more pressure to act—or to appear to act—to respond to the moods generated by the news" (Ceasar 165). And while Ceasar's claims of fundamental changes in the American mode of government are outside the bounds of this study, the ever-present media audience and its expectations are definitely an issue that must be considered. One major consideration is that the pervasiveness of the media audience gives presidents a sort of consistent audience that allows accumulation and wielding to occur in separate speeches (which is one reason that only major televised speeches have been chosen for this study). Additionally, the nature of the modern media audience lends itself to a style of rhetoric that, by catering to certain expectations created by the new

dynamic, addresses an audience that on average has a shortened attention span, and an ear

that is somewhat numb to the ubiquitous use of heightened rhetoric (and therefore less

suspicious of it as well).   Given the complexity of the media audience, the issue of

audience in each case study will be addressed in terms of the general audience that the

president seems to be addressing most directly with his rhetoric.

<div align="center">**Accumulation**</div>

The idea of accumulating leadership ethos is one that is most well-supported by

Neustadt's conception of "prospective" presidential power. As described earlier, it is a

sort of symbolic leadership capital that a rhetor can earn in a variety of ways, some of

which are situation-specific devices to affirm aspects of the speaker's image, some that

use concepts of identification to frame the audience's perceptions, and others that

correspond to what G. Thomas Goodnight calls a "posture of persuasion."

To describe the posture of persuasion and its counterpoint the "posture of needing

to be persuaded" (which will be addressed as a wielding component), Goodnight makes

use of one of the examples used as a case study in this paper—Ronald Reagan's 1964-65

multi-use political speech, "A Time for Choosing." As Goodnight shows, there has been

plenty of debate over what made Reagan's "A Time for Choosing" speech successful

when a similar political message from several other sources had not been (although there

is not much debate over the fact that it was successful). Goodnight proposes that neither

Reagan's ability as an actor nor any deficiency on the part of his contemporaries fully

explains Reagan's success. He posits that there might be some other explanation, "some

other feature of leadership--some heretofore unnoticed code--at work in the peculiar

positioning of a friendly performance and a fighting rhetoric." Goodnight identifies the

signature of Reagan's rhetoric as "the displacement of time in the interests of persuading and being persuaded" (Goodnight 207).

Goodnight points out that the final paragraphs of "A Time for Choosing" summon up a team of characters from throughout history—Alexander Hamilton, Patrick Henry, Moses, Jesus, Concord patriots, Winston Churchill, Abraham Lincoln, FDR, World War II martyrs who would rather suffer on the battlefield than appease Nazis, and Barry Goldwater—to take on the communists and those who would appease them (207). In Goodnight's view, "'A Time for Choosing' is significant, not for its novelty, concepts, or word brilliance, but rather for the way it "assembles symbolic resources from momentous public discussions that are sufficiently durable, flexible, and distinctive enough to form an anointment-in-waiting for the rhetor who claims to be the bearer of a historic message." This concept of a rhetor building up an expectation of anointment via history is the "posture of persuasion" (207). That term, however, can confuse the issue. It is not intended to say that it states any particular direction of persuasion. Rather, it places Reagan in the company of men who decide the course of history and therefore in a position to persuade/lead his audience—either now or at some point in the future. It is a very effective accumulating strategy. In fact it gets to the core of what accumulation is all about and is nearly synonymous in its application— a symbolic posturing and positioning to create the ethos of a leader.

Goodnight includes several factors in his description of the posture of persuasion. In the illustration above from Reagan, he highlights what he later describes as "a rhetoric out of time." When a speaker employs a rhetoric out of time, he connects himself to visions of a glorious past, and often, by association, a glorious future. Both these

connections are removed from the present time and are therefore easier for the audience

to envision, since they are unencumbered by the mundane details and complexities that

often accompany the present situation. "Visions of leadership" immerge from the play of

discourse that connects the present to dreams of times past and future. Both are distant,

making the possibilities seem more real than the cloudy present (Goodnight 208). When

this is coupled with implied comparisons between the speaker and leader-figures from

history, then leadership ethos is accumulated.

Zarefsky furthers the idea of the efficacy of using the past as an accumulating

strategy. He asserts that not only does a leader make a connection between himself and

the past, but he can carry his audience with him, creating a frame for their view of the

present situation. "[N]o one has a monopoly on public memory. It is a resource that

inventive rhetors can use not to engage in antiquarian controversy but rather to frame the

context in which audiences see themselves and their own time" ("The Presidency" 37).

The use of history to elevate a speaker's leadership ethos is, in part, accomplished

through storytelling, which Howard Gardner describes as one of the chief tools of

leadership. "Leaders achieve their effectiveness chiefly through the stories they relate"

(Gardner 9). Another connection that a speaker can create through stories is between his

vision and the American Dream or some other shared dream of the audience. Gardner

writes of "stories of identity – narratives that help individuals think about and feel who

they are, where they come from, and where they are headed – that constitute the single

most powerful weapon in the leader's literary arsenal" (43).   Later on he asserts that

"the most fundamental stories fashioned by leaders concern issues of personal and group

identity; those leaders who presume to bring about major alterations across a significant

population must in some way help their audience members think through who they are"

(62). Beyond Gardner's claims that stories can "help" the audience think through their

identity lies the more profound claim that they can actually shape that identity into one

that is more compatible with the speaker and his vision. According to Syranian and

Bligh, "recent theorization suggests that leaders act as 'entrepreneurs of identity,' and

play a critical role in constructing group identity, sometimes to assure their leadership

position" (65). This concept dovetails nicely with Burke's theory of identification and

fulfills the requirements of accumulation quite nicely since the altered identity of the

audience places the speaker in the role of leader, since he not only is consubstantial to

them, but seemed to arrive at the point of consubstantiality first.

More in-depth insight into the ways that leaders use audience identification and

associations to accumulate leadership in the symbolic realm can be found in the work that

Bligh et al. and Seyranian et al. have done on charismatic leadership. After all, what is

charisma, other than the recognition that a leader seems to have some magic ability to get

an audience to follow him? And where could that magic reside other than in the

symbolic realm? Research shows—according to Bligh, Kohles, and Meindl—that

"charismatic leadership is able to 'arouse, as well as articulate, feelings of need among

followers'" (214). Arousing and articulating feelings of need that the leader might be

thought to fulfill is a perfect tool for accumulation.

Bligh, Kohles, and Meindl, borrowing from the work of Shamir, highlight seven

propositions about the content of speech that is "likely to produce charismatic effects

among followers:"

(1) more references to collective history and to the continuity between past and

present; (2) more references to the collective and collective identity, and fewer

references to individual self-interest; (3) more positive references to followers'

worth and efficacy as individuals and as a collective; (4) more references to

leader's similarity to followers and identification with followers; (5) more

references to values and moral justifications, and fewer references to tangible

outcomes and instrumental justifications; (6) more references to distal goals and

the distant future, and fewer references to proximal goals and the near future; and

(7) more references to hope and faith, (Bligh, Kohles, and Meindl 215)

The practice of these charisma-associated traits should play a role in the accumulation of

some of the most powerful and complex elements of leadership ethos.[4]

The work of Syranian and Bligh also points to the use of frame-breaking and

frame-moving as charismatic techniques that demonstrate how certain aspects of

identification and association can be used to encourage an audience to follow—and

eventually take action on—the visions of the leader. In Syranian and Bligh's model

during the frame-breaking stage the leader's concern is not only with building

identification, but in allaying any fears of change that the audience has that might inhibit

them from following his lead. Strong identification (in particular when the leader is seen

as a "representative character and potential role model") is helpful towards that end in

that it encourages trust. "Therefore, during frame-breaking, charismatic leaders may

stress similarity to their followers to present themselves as a familiar other who is

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[4] In support of this notion, Seyranian et al's research shows that Reagan used a high frequency of charismatic devices, which helps explain how he was able to maintain a reputation as a strong leader, and, according to Seyranian be rated as highly charismatic by political scholars (60)

representative of the group, thereby garnering follower identification and increasing trust through attraction and liking, which in turn may lead to increased influence during later phases" (66). Furthermore leaders might also alleviate the audience's fear of change by using inclusive language (such as collective pronouns) to increase identification, using self-references only when they "portray the leader in group terms to prototypicalize themselves and ensure influence" (Syranian and Bligh 66). A leader can also encourage the audience to follow him into the future by "creating a sense of dissatisfaction with the status quo" that uses displeasure with the current state to offset fear of change (65). "Leaders may also use language expressing and arousing emotional dissatisfaction in followers with the past and present, while relaying a sense of urgency or crisis to resolve or change the status quo. This will help eradicate in followers their: (a) desire to maintain the convention; and (b) fears of innovation" (Syranian and Bligh 67).

The tactics used for frame-moving form a sort of middle ground between frame-breaking, which can be firmly categorized as an accumulating strategy, and frame-realigning, which is more solidly a wielding strategy. Depending on the context and motive of the text, frame-moving could fall into either category. Like frame-breaking, frame-moving consists of two primary tactics: "negating components of the group identity that supported the convention" (through negating terminology) and "relaying a new hierarchy of values and defining an alternate identity based on these values that support the leader's vision of change" (Syranian and Bligh 67). The goal of altering group identity can be sought through several means:

(a) describing their positive vision of the future with imagery, less conceptual language, and increasing references to the future; (b) raising the salience of

specific group-level values (e.g., freedom, equality) that support the vision; (c)

relating group values to group identity and stressing the positivity of this identity

in striving for and attaining the vision; (d) connecting group identity and values to

expected followers' behaviors and efforts toward vision attainment; and (e)

linking the vision to utopian outcomes. (Syranian and Bligh 67)

Much like the accumulation/ wielding relationship, the symbolic results of frame-breaking are a pre-requisite of frame-moving. Negation and redefining values are both accumulation tactics, in that they work to further place the speaker symbolically into the role of leader, but they are also wielding tactics, in that they rely on the use of trust and identity that the speaker has already accumulated. This study will, therefore, note the use of frame-moving tactics in analyzing speeches for both accumulation and wielding.

Finally, returning to Goodnight's description of Reagan's posture of persuasion there is one other, casually mentioned, rhetorical device: "the peculiar positioning of a friendly performance and a fighting rhetoric" (207). Goodnight does not suggest just how that contrast helps, but Aristotle offers one suggestion.

Further, it is better not to have everything always just corresponding to everything

else - your hearers will see through you less easily thus. I mean for instance, if

your words are harsh, you should not extend this harshness to your voice and your

countenance and have everything else in keeping. If you do, the artificial

character of each detail becomes apparent; whereas if you adopt one device and

not another, you are using art all the same and yet nobody notices it. (1408b4-7)

The quality Aristotle describes—referred to here as "artlessness"—is a subtle one, but certainly an aspect of accumulation since the idea of a leader who seems overly polished

and forceful can raise the psychological defenses of the audience. Contrasting tone with message is just one method of employing artlessness. Kurt Ritter points out that when Reagan delivered "A Time for Choosing" in its various incarnations he often used index cards. "By speaking from three-by-five inch cards, rather than from a manuscript or memorized text, Reagan gave the impression of a well-informed 'citizen politician,' not of an actor reading his lines" (Ritter 342).

Wielding

Although it is true that accumulated ethos lays the groundwork for the success of all of the other modes of persuasion that might otherwise be categorized as pathos or logos, there are certain modes of persuasion that rely more heavily (or entirely) on the pre-existing symbolic store of leadership ethos to accomplish their persuasive ends. It is those modes that are classified here as the wielding aspect of leadership ethos. The ethos that wielding techniques use are present either through the nature of the office, previous accumulation techniques, and certain special circumstances, as described in the section of chapter four that addresses crisis speeches.

So then, what rhetorical tactics count as wielding techniques? According to one line of thought, the very act of a president "going public" and taking an issue purposefully to the American people rather than to its representatives in congress might be seen as a wielding technique (Zarefsky, "The Presidency" 31). Once a president has gone public, though, there are certain devices that he can use to wield his existing leadership ethos for persuasive ends. These consist primarily of a) various methods of using the "bully pulpit" to define the terms the audience uses to define a political or

social reality—and thereby the nature of their views of that reality; b) shifting the audience's identity towards action and support of new goals; and c) assuming a "posture of needing to be persuaded."

"Let me therefore advance a claim about what presidential rhetoric does: It defines political reality" (Zarefsky, "Presidential Rhetoric" 611). Defining political reality is a major wielding strategy. It makes use of the real power of the presidency to attract media coverage and the symbolic power of the presidency to label the terms of a situation (and have those terms repeated) in order to effect social, political, and physical outcomes. It does so by assigning names that shape the meaning of the situation. Zarefsky asserts that one method by which people participate in shaping and giving meaning to their environment is through naming situations. "Naming a situation," he says, "provides the basis for understanding it and determining the appropriate response. Because of his prominent political position and his access to the means of communication, the president, by defining a situation, might be able to shape the context in which events or proposals are viewed by the public" ("Presidential Rhetoric" 611). He goes on to note that not all attempts at defining evoke a positive response. Some definitions may even unintentionally create the opposite response of the one intended. In Zarefsky's view, the resonance between presidential definition and public response constitutes "one test of the effectiveness of presidential definitions" ("Presidential Rhetoric" 611).

Zarefsky goes into detail on the several ways that presidential definition affects public perception:

"The definition of the situation affects what counts as data for or against a

proposal, highlights certain elements of the situation for use in arguments and

obscures others, influences whether people will notice the situation and how they

will handle it, describes causes and identifies remedies, and invites moral

judgments about circumstances or individuals. Accordingly, presidential

definition resembles what William Riker calls heresthetic: 'the art of structuring

the world so you can win.'" (612)

He points to George W. Bush as an example of the effective use of definition. "President

Bush simply identified the estate tax as the 'death tax,' for example, or called intact

dilation and extraction 'partial-birth abortion,' or pronounced that rolling back future tax

cuts for the wealthy was really a tax increase. One could argue that each of these

definitions is right or wrong, but the point is that, in defining the situation, the president

makes no explicit argument" ("Presidential Rhetoric" 612). No argument is made; no

explicit analogy is drawn; no proof is presented. The definition and associations are

merely applied as if they belong, and the result is a shift in public perception.

One tactic that a president can employ to facilitate successful defining is the

strategy of "crafted talk." As Brandon Rottinghaus describes it, crafted talk makes use of

public opinion polling to identify the language that will be most well received by the

public. The speaker may then use that language to frame a policy item to achieve a

higher level of support (139). Rottinghaus notes that crafted talk is not the same as

pandering, since the policy itself is not changed, only the framing language. "In short,

pollsters don't reshape policies—they reshape arguments for policies" (Rottinghaus 139).

An advantage of crafted talk that Rottinghaus notes is that it can use "policy metaphors"

to affect the perception of even highly politically sophisticated audience members because the positive associations are embedded and more subtle than other types of defining activities (Rottinghaus 140). As with all defining and framing techniques, using crafted talk, however, requires wielding accumulated leadership ethos. Rottinghaus notes, "Scholars experimentally examining the limits of framing conclude that political actors might be limited by issues of credibility when succeeding at framing an issue in a manner persuasive to the public" (Rottinghaus 140). Unfortunately, in order to make observations about the subtle use of crafted talk requires research into the specific political and historical scene that goes beyond the bounds of this paper, and will therefore be difficult to comment on in the speeches analyzed here.

As was described in the previous section, Syranian and Bligh's description of frame-moving partly fulfils wielding purposes. To further the wielding capabilities of frame-moving a leader might also use frame-realigning. "Frame-realigning rhetoric entails solidifying the group's altered identity and channeling motivations set up in frame-moving into follower commitment and action. To achieve this end, charismatic leaders may: (a) positively affirm the group's altered identity; and (b) use language to foster commitment and encourage followers towards action" (67). Affirming the altered group identity through positive terms and associations encourages the audience to fulfill the leader's vision in order to maintain their connection to the new, positive identity. Meanwhile, the speaker can "frame pre-existing personal and group accomplishments and actions in terms of how they fulfill goals related to the [new] vision" thereby encouraging the audience that they can be effective in that direction if they take action (Syranian and Bligh 68). The speaker can also set himself up as a prototype of

commitment to the vision by highlighting personal (actual or symbolic) commitment to the group goal, thereby wielding any accumulated leadership ethos towards that end. He may even call on a reconstructed view of historical events "in order to contextualize present issues in a historical trajectory" allowing the audience to feel that they are part of the greater events of history when they take action on the vision (Zarefsky, "The Presidency" 35).

The final wielding technique analyzed here stems from a corollary that Goodnight adds to Neustadt's assertion that presidential power is the "power to persuade." In addition to being the power to persuade, Goodnight claims that "presidential power *is the power to appear to need to be persuaded"* (Goodnight 204). This does not mean that the president is actually open to manipulation, but rather that he creates a scenario in which opponents or allies might feel the need to persuade him in his perception of policy. This power is unique to the leadership ethos inherent in the office of president. Because of the degree of symbolic leadership, a president need only offer small openings to appear to need to be persuaded. One means by which a president can appear to need to be persuaded is through "waging controversy;" by using vague terminology, unpredictability, gaffs, and other controversial elements a president invites others to persuade him towards a more "reasonable" position, thereby allowing the president to play the role of arbiter (Goodnight 213-5). It means that the president's staff, congress, and even foreign powers have to figure out how to get the president to act in accord with reason as they see it. It is therefore a powerful posture for wielding the leadership ethos of the presidential office for power.

A Summary of Tools for Analysis

In summary, the rhetorical methods that should indicate accumulation are as follows: a) using a "rhetoric out of time" to establish a posture of persuasion, b) using stories to develop shared dreams and link the speaker to those dreams, c) using the tools of charisma enumerated by Bligh, Kohles, and Meindl, d) using frame-breaking and frame-moving techniques, and d) employing techniques to communicate artlessness. Each of these methods offers a means by which a president might attempt to build up his store of leadership ethos in regards to the modern media audience.

Likewise, the rhetorical methods that indicate wielding include these: a) selecting terms that define political reality, b) using frame-moving and frame-realigning techniques, and c) assuming the posture of "needing to be persuaded." By using these methods a president may apply leadership ethos in a focused way to move public opinion and shape political reality.

CHAPTER THREE: ACCUMULATING LEADERSHIP ETHOS

Pre-Campaign Speeches

There are certain situations when one can be nearly certain that part of the speaker's goal is to accumulate leadership ethos. When discussing presidents, an obvious starting place is in pre-presidential speeches. Modern day campaign speeches might be considered too volatile for analysis in this paper because of the intense on-going rhetorical battle they tend to be a part of. They could be analyzed given enough room to establish full context, but they have a clear persuasive goal—"Vote for me!"—that can detract from the focus on accumulation strategies. (Campaign speeches are also difficult to analyze for presidential wielding strategies due to the dynamic and volatile nature of the competition. Besides, as Windt points out, "persuasion in campaigning is quite different from persuading when governing… In a campaign the enemy is singular, visible, and constant; in governing, there are no enemies in this sense…. In a campaign one forces an either/or choice and frames issues that way; in governing, there are more alternatives and the goal often is compromise" (Windt 111).)

The two pre-campaign speeches analyzed here—Ronald Reagan's "A Time for Choosing" and Barack Obama's 2004 speech to the Democratic National Convention— were not selected randomly. Both of the Bushes rose to the level of presidential candidate through family and political connections and standard political paths; Clinton also rose through the standard political paths a step at a time. For Reagan and Obama, however, the rise towards the presidency was rapid and partly attributable in each case to an identifiable speech. Given this political elevation, each of these speeches, then, should provide examples of the to-be presidents' use of accumulation tactics/

More of the reasoning for the choice of these speeches can be seen in their motives as inferred by Burke's Pentad. The motive underlying the rhetoric of the two speeches can be seen by applying the pentad generally to the texts. The scene in both speeches involves speaking to a political audience during a presidential election cycle. The act is a public and publicized speech. The overt purpose of both speeches is to promote a candidate for the election. Those three elements, taken at face value, might indicate that the motive of the rhetoric is the advancement of that candidate. As a scholar with the perspective of history, however, it is possible to know that the agent in each situation is a politician on the rise, with the eventual goal (whether he acknowledges it or even knows it yet himself) of the highest elected office in the land. This element adds a new perspective to the possibilities of motive, which is reaffirmed on examination of the agency. As shown in the analysis of each speech, the agency employed to promote the current presidential candidate is predominately direct praise and represents only a small portion of each speech. Other aspects of agency, however, align very well with the accumulation strategies developed in chapter two. It is reasonable, then, to attribute accumulating functionality to these speeches and use them to illustrate the use of those strategies.

<div align="center">Reagan and "A Time for Choosing"</div>

As is the case with any highly analyzed speech, approaching "A Time for Choosing" for analysis can be intimidating. There was no other speech that came up more often during the course of researching accumulating tactics for this study. It is credited not only with launching Reagan's political career but with marking the beginning of a new era of presidential rhetoric (Goodnight 201). Reagan delivered what

he simply called "The Speech" in several forms on multiple occasions from 1964-1966, first as an endorsement for Barry Goldwater and later as an unannounced candidate for governor. It was the original Goldwater endorsement that drew the attention of political businessmen who urged Reagan to run for governor, and it is a commentary on the rhetorical content of the speech that it did not have to be much altered to serve as a campaign speech for Reagan (Ritter 337-41). The version of "The Speech" chosen for analysis here was a televised version that first aired on October 27, 1964—sixteen years before Reagan would run for presidential office. The impact of this speech and its implications for Reagan's destiny as an American president are highlighted by Goodnight's comment that "The 1980s began on October 27, 1964" (Goodnight 205).

To begin, it is helpful to return to the issue of motive in the speech. It was noted earlier that the agency of the speech points towards a motive other than simply the endorsement of Barry Goldwater. One telling factor is that at the halfway mark of the speech, he has mentioned Goldwater's name only twice, with only vague references to what he stands for or what he will do well. In the entire thirty minute speech he says Goldwater's name just seven times: twice in stories concerning his opponents and twice to make use of quotes that fit the issue Reagan is addressing at that point in the speech. Only three references to Goldwater come across as direct endorsements: a two and a half minute interlude recommending Goldwater's character in brief anecdotes and two statements regarding how Goldwater believes in "us." In this speech, supposedly with the express purpose of endorsing Goldwater, Reagan doesn't even work to include him in the strong collective identity that the entire speech has built up in association with Reagan. In a nod to the overt purpose of the speech, Reagan doesn't spend any time at all

praising himself. It is through the agency of accumulation strategies that Reagan fulfills

the suspicion that his nature as an agent suggests—that a dominant motive in the rhetoric

of "The Speech" is to place Reagan in the mold of a hero.

First, Reagan had several issues of leadership ethos that were specific to his

situation. As an actor, he had to overcome perceptions that he was using charm as a

substitute for know-how. Reagan addressed this issue subtly in the opening lines of the

speech. "The sponsor has been identified, but unlike most television programs, the

performer hasn't been provided with a script. As a matter of fact, I have been permitted to

choose my own words and discuss my own ideas regarding the choice that we face in the

next few weeks." By assuring the audience that he was speaking his own words rather

than a script, he is seen as genuine rather than artful. He also employed the tactics noted

earlier of "a friendly performance and a fighting rhetoric" (Goodnight 207) and of

sometimes delivering the speech from note cards (Ritter 342). Reagan's characteristic

swagger also addressed his lack of political background, declaring him ready to step into

the arena at the highest level. As Goodnight notes, Reagan represented a new style - not

necessarily poetic and high minded like Kennedy, but not humble and pleading like

Carter either. It was brash and full of swagger, with a hint of irreverence for established

tradition (202)[5].

Perhaps the most striking element of Reagan's speech is the degree to which it

uses identification principles. Consistent with principles of charismatic leadership and

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[5] In the later presidential campaign period, Reagan continued to use swagger to
demonstrate his status as someone who was not intimidated by the idea of stepping into
the role of a national leader. According to one account, after a debate in 1980 with Jimmy
Carter in San Francisco, Reagan was asked, "Governor, weren't you intimidated by being
up there on stage with the President of the United States?" Reagan answered, "No, I've
been on the same stage with John Wayne" (Berman 7).

frame-breaking, Reagan draws his audience into a shared identity with him. He does so partly through emphasizing common enmity.[6] Communists, liberals, and the government are all brought in as specters that his audience can unite with him against. Of the communists, Reagan says "We're at war with the most dangerous enemy that has ever faced mankind in his long climb from the swamp to the stars, and it's been said if we lose that war, and in so doing lose this way of freedom of ours, history will record with the greatest astonishment that those who had the most to lose did the least to prevent its happening." This construction is effective in that it not only provides a common and dangerous enemy, but also places the audience in the position of making a choice in the realm of ideals that Reagan has constructed. It also reaches out of time to connect the distant past to the distant future. Speaking of liberals, Reagan says, "Anytime you and I question the schemes of the do-gooders, we're denounced as being against their humanitarian goals. They say we're always 'against' things -- we're never 'for' anything." The language here is not as starkly negative concerning liberals as it was concerning communists, but it does draw a distinct line between "you and I" and "them." Similarly, when he talks about government it is invariably "we" when he speaks of whose money is being spent, whose honorable intentions are the root of a program, or who is working hard towards a goal. The problems with how the money is spent, how the program is run, and how the work is impeded are always addressed as originating from "them."

Overall, Reagan's use of inclusive language is remarkable. He uses a high frequency of collective nouns and pronouns. His use of collective pronouns seems all the

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[6] Although not always to the same degree. Reagan tailored the speech for individual audiences, putting more stress on the communist scare for conservatives and more on his ideas of positive programs for less conservative audiences. (Ritter 340-41).

more pronounced in comparison with his limited use of personal pronouns; he uses 158 collective nouns/pronouns and only 56 personal pronouns. Additionally, he develops the collective identity through the use of separating pronouns (46 uses of they/them, nearly rivaling the number of personal pronouns) that increase identification through contrast. Particularly interesting is the unusual frequency with which Reagan uses the terms "you and I" and "you and me." This construction is an effective one for accumulating the type of leadership ethos suggested as part of frame-moving tactics. It allows Reagan to include himself in the collective he is developing while still isolating himself as a prototypical member, and therefore as a leader of that collective. When he then declares "Now -- we're for a provision that..." and "But we're against those entrusted…" his place as a leader of those feelings is reinforced. And when repeats phrases like "I think we're for…" and "But I think we're against…" (a construction that he uses four times in close succession) his place as a leading prototype is again strengthened.

Reagan also effectively utilizes the frame-breaking strategy of emphasizing dissatisfaction with the status quo with sections like, "No nation in history has ever survived a tax burden that reached a third of its national income. Today, 37 cents out of every dollar earned in this country is the tax collector's share, and yet our government continues to spend 17 million dollars a day more than the government takes in." He lightens the dark tenor of the fears and dissatisfaction he is building by using humor: "When the government tells you you are depressed, lie down and be depressed!" "I'm not suggesting Harvard is the answer to juvenile delinquency." "Well, the trouble with our liberal friends is not that they're ignorant; it's just that they know so much that isn't so." "Actually, a government bureau is the nearest thing to eternal life we'll ever see on this

earth." All of this humor allows Reagan to come across as a reassuring and confident

figure in the face of a frightening situation—someone that the audience can trust in and

join with in confronting the challenges he presents.

Reagan's exemplary use of a rhetoric out of time to create a posture of persuasion

in the penultimate section of the speech has already been noted. In the final, short lines,

though, he extends and sharpens that effect. Whereas the earlier historical references

were designed to create an identity around him as a speaker without any focused action,

these lines, echoing Franklin Roosevelt about a "rendezvous with destiny," connect those

voices of the past to a vision of the future that is either bright and hopeful or full of

darkness, depending on the choices of the audience makes (Goodnight 208).   The

audience can choose "a thousand years of darkness" or join Reagan in preserving "the

last best hope of man on earth" for their children. This use of the distant past and the

distant future facilitates perceptions of charisma that build leadership ethos.

Barack Obama at the 2004 Democratic National Convention

Like "A Time for Choosing," Obama's 2004 keynote address at the Democratic

National Convention is credited with launching a bright national political career. Seeing

some potential in Obama, one article in *The Independent* speculated on the day of the

speech that "this 42-year-old politician, all but unknown nine months ago and who has

not yet set serious foot in Washington DC" might be a potential candidate for the 2016

presidential race (Cornwell). At the time, that probably seemed to be a piece of

imaginative conjecture. Something about the speech, though, helped Obama surpass

even that optimistic prediction. According to an article in *The New Republic,* "more than

any politician in recent history, Barack Obama's national career began with a speech--his keynote address at the 2004 Democratic National Convention" (Olopade).

Also like Reagan's speech, Obama's keynote address was intended as an endorsement for a presidential candidate who would eventually lose. An analysis of the agency of Obama's speech shows that like "A Time for Choosing" it has the motive of increasing the speaker's leadership ethos through accumulation while nominally praising John Kerry, the candidate he is speaking on behalf of. It is eight minutes into the speech before Obama mentions Kerry's name. Then, after a two minute interlude in which he praises Kerry directly, Obama mentions the presidential candidate only in a few scattered references through the rest of the eighteen minute speech. The remainder of the speech yields a remarkable showcase of accumulating strategies.

In contrast to the two minutes spent praising Kerry directly, Obama spends five minutes narrating his own family history. "My father was a foreign student, born and raised in a small village in Kenya." he states, evoking America's place as a wellspring of hope for people in countries less well off—" a magical place, America, that shone as a beacon of freedom and opportunity to so many who had come before." And his mother, born in Kansas, was the daughter of a man who "worked on oil rigs and farms through most of the Depression," and after Pearl Harbor "signed up for duty; joined Patton's army, [and] marched across Europe." This is a heritage of hope, hard work, and sacrificial patriotism. Yet the language of Obama's personal history contains no overt self-praise. Indeed, Obama doesn't mention any of his own personal achievements. What he does do, though, is connect himself to an optimistic conception of the American dream. "[My] story is part of the larger American story," he says. It is a dream that is

connected to America's glorious past through Jefferson and the Declaration of independence. It is, as he says, a "simple dream," "an insistence on small miracles" that he puts in opposition to realities that his audience will be opposed to. It is also a version of that dream (of equal access to American opportunities for citizens of any ethnic or cultural background) that his immediate audience, the Democratic core—the audience whose belief in him as a leader would be crucial in his political rise—is bound to want to identify with. For many of them, neither they nor their family ever lived the dream that he shares, but it is one that they are likely to want to believe in along with him. This encourages identification and allows Obama to be the prototype of the group value—all without seeming to be self-promoting.

Obama also invites identification and increases his status as a representative of the constructed identity by appealing to group values. When he talks about how "a child on the south side of Chicago who can't read" matters to him and says that he feels poorer knowing that "a senior citizen somewhere who can't pay for their prescription drugs, and [is] having to choose between medicine and the rent" he is serving as a prototype of the type of sympathy that his audience would like to see as a positive trait in themselves. He stresses the fact that such values are what American unity is built on. "It is that fundamental belief: I am my brother's keeper. I am my sister's keeper that makes this country work. It's what allows us to pursue our individual dreams and yet still come together as one American family." By elevating that value, he is continuing to accumulate leadership ethos.

After describing a common enemy that seeks to "slice-and-dice our country into Red States and Blue States," Obama uses inclusive language to construct an expanded

collective identity based on a variety of values. "We worship an 'awesome God' in the Blue States, and we don't like federal agents poking around in our libraries in the Red States. We coach Little League in the Blue States and yes, we've got some gay friends in the Red States. There are patriots who opposed the war in Iraq and there are patriots who supported the war in Iraq. We are one people, all of us pledging allegiance to the stars and stripes, all of us defending the United States of America." It is significant that despite the disparate values he lists, Obama uses inclusive language (we) to make himself a the unifying factor connecting red and blue state values.

In addition to identification techniques, Obama also engages in frame-breaking by expressing dissatisfaction with the status quo. In a move that helps promote the appearance of artlessness, he uses persistently optimistic language in the face of stark realities to talk throughout the speech about how "we have more to do" to address a variety of quite dismal social and political ills. In the face of these ills, however, Obama offers a vision that reaches beyond the immediate circumstances towards "Hope -- Hope in the face of difficulty. Hope in the face of uncertainty. The audacity of hope!" He goes on to emphasize himself as the embodiment of that hope by the repeated use of the personal pronoun "I" in terms of action.

> I believe that we can give our middle class relief and provide working families with a road to opportunity.

> I believe we can provide jobs to the jobless, homes to the homeless, and reclaim young people in cities across America from violence and despair.

I believe that we have a righteous wind at our backs and that as we stand

on the crossroads of history, we can make the right choices, and meet the

challenges that face us.

As the speech draws to a close and he calls for America to feel the same "urgency,"

"passion," and "hopefulness" that he does, the audience is encouraged to take action by

voting for Kerry, but their identity is left resting with Obama. Not only does Obama's

language employ frame-breaking, but in this instance it also seamlessly integrates

charisma via the use of less-tangible outcomes, particularly hope and faith (belief).

Both Obama and Reagan, in these pre-campaign speeches, focus heavily on the

type of language and rhetorical techniques indicated by the description of accumulation

in chapter two. The speeches, while serving as illustrations of those techniques, also

show that the application thereof can be anticipated through analysis with Burke's

pentad.

Inaugural speeches

David Zarefsky points out that "nowhere does the Constitution require that the

president deliver an inaugural address" (Zarefsky, "The Presidency" 24). George

Washington, however, started the tradition based on British custom, and later presidents

generally followed suit. Very quickly, however, the practice evolved from a purely

ceremonial speech into an occasion for the president to assert rhetorical leadership—

reuniting a politically divided country, building a general framework for a policy agenda,

and setting up an historical context for the upcoming presidency.   Zarefsky cites

Jefferson's use of the inaugural address to urge Americans to leave partisan division for

election time and rally behind the leader (Zarefsky, "The Presidency" 25). That early

application of unifying a constituency is a prime example of an accumulation technique.

It could be viewed as a dismissal of the practical applications of inaugural

speeches when Theodore Windt, in his attempt to define the field of Presidential

Rhetoric, calls them "ceremonial addresses in which policy concerns are secondary to

values, desires, and visions of the future" (Windt 104). Such a view, though, would

allow that values, desires, and visions of the future are passive things that on their own

are "mere" symbols. It is the symbolic potential of the inaugural address, however, that

offers an often overlooked practical application. Just as Zarefsky demonstrate the ways

in which presidents from Lincoln to Reagan have used and transformed the rhetorical role

of the inaugural address, this section will examine the ways in which more recent

presidents have used the inaugural address for the purposes of rhetorical accumulation.

Altogether, viewed through the lens of Burke's pentad, the inaugural address is

the perfect opportunity for rhetorical accumulation. The rhetorical scene is interesting

because the election has already transpired. The immediate persuasive ends that the

speaker has been seeking throughout the campaign period have been attained and the

nation is watching him take his first rhetorical steps as their officially recognized leader.

The act, an address surrounded by celebration and ceremony, makes detailed policy

details seem a crude intrusion. The agent is victorious and ready to lay the groundwork

for his policy agenda. The most readily apparent purpose for the speech is leadership

status, and indeed the rhetorical devices (agency) employed by the previous five

presidents, analyzed collectively here, bear that motive out.

One unique type of identification strategy employed in certain inaugural addresses is reconciliation with the "other side" politically. That rhetorical act signals a shift from the partisanship of the campaign period, when it can be rhetorically useful to strengthen the identity of the electorate by establishing opposition to political opponents. By offering reconciliation, the president may be genuinely seeking to unify a divided country but he also has rhetorical ground to gain for his own leadership ethos. The most convenient and ethos-effective means of accomplishing this feat when the outgoing president is from the opposing political party is by acknowledging and honoring the outgoing president personally. All of the presidents examined here besides the first president Bush, who was taking the reigns as a vice president from the previous administration, employed this strategy in one form or another.

In his 1981 inauguration speech, Reagan combined his olive branch approach with an additional accumulation strategy, using a rhetoric out of time to link the act—and himself—to the greater traditions of American history and the American spirit. He reminds the audience that "The orderly transfer of authority as called for in the Constitution routinely takes place as it has for almost two centuries and few of us stop to think how unique we really are. In the eyes of many in the world, this every-four-year ceremony we accept as normal is nothing less than a miracle." This invitation to share in the positive identity of being an American citizen is open to the whole nation. Immediately following it, Reagan thanks Carter for working with him on the transition of the office, showing himself to be open to appreciation of the efforts of his political opposites when they join him in showing "a watching world" how great America can be.

George W. Bush followed Reagan's example of invoking American traditions as part of the reconciliation act in his 2001 inaugural address. In shorter form than Reagan, he notes that the "peaceful transfer of authority is rare in history, yet common in our country. With a simple oath, we affirm old traditions and make new beginnings." When he immediately thanks the departing Clinton and his political opponent, Vice President Gore, he establishes his place as part those old traditions and representative of those new beginnings. He further acknowledges that connection when he says, "I am honored and humbled to stand here, where so many of America's leaders have come before me, and so many will follow." In briefer form, during his 1993 address Bill Clinton gave a simple "salute" to the first Bush for his "half-century of service to America" (although he defers credit for the ending of the cold war during Bush's presidency to "the millions of men and women whose steadfastness and sacrifice triumphed over depression, fascism, and communism," simultaneously denying Bush the credit and developing his audience's positive identity at an early stage in the speech). Obama followed Clinton's suit in his 2009 inaugural by acknowledging the second Bush in a brief sentence of appreciation: "I thank President Bush for his service to our nation, as well as the generosity and cooperation he has shown throughout this transition." Though brief, the nod towards reconciliation seems an effective, if not essential, aspect of accumulation in inaugural addresses.

Even when conducted separately from reconciling with the out going administration, it seems to have become a tradition to invoke a rhetoric out of time and visions of the American dream in the opening section of the inaugural address. Especially in such a formal, ceremonial speech, presidents have a unique opportunity to

link themselves to proud American traditions. George H.W. Bush explains, "I have just repeated word for word the oath taken by George Washington 200 years ago, and the Bible on which I placed my hand is the Bible on which he placed his." Clinton speaks of "a spring reborn in the world's oldest democracy that brings forth the vision and courage to reinvent America." And Obama reminds the audience that "Forty-four Americans have now taken the presidential Oath." Although more examples of a rhetoric out of time are sprinkled throughout the remainder of each speech in combination with other accumulation tactics, the establishment of the speaker as a representative of the historical American ideal sets the stage for other uses to elevate his leadership ethos all the more.

Reagan returns to a rhetoric out of time as he draws near the end of his address, when he quotes the words of Dr. Joseph Warren, president of the Massachusetts Congress, before the Revolutionary War. "Our country is in danger, but not to be despaired of. On you depend the fortunes of America. You are to decide the important question upon which rest the happiness and the liberty of millions yet unborn. Act worthy of yourselves." These words summon not just any moment of history, but a moment of decisive action. Reagan links that historical spirit of action to his own agenda as it might be carried out in the actions of his audience and then further links the outcomes of that spirit of action to future generations:

> Well I believe we, the Americans of today, are ready to act worthy of ourselves, ready to do what must be done to insure happiness and liberty for ourselves, our children, and our children's children. And as we renew ourselves here in our own land, we will be seen as having greater strength throughout the world. We will

again be the exemplar of freedom and a beacon of hope for those who do not now

have freedom.

Another example of a rhetoric out of time comes in the first President Bush's optimistic

observations in his 1989 inaugural. The optimistic tone is focused on a bright future:

We live in a peaceful, prosperous time, but we can make it better. For a new

breeze is blowing, and a world refreshed by freedom seems reborn; for in man's

heart, if not in fact, the day of the dictator is over. The totalitarian era is passing,

its old ideas blown away like leaves from an ancient, lifeless tree. A new breeze is

blowing, and a nation refreshed by freedom stands ready to push on. There is new

ground to be broken, and new action to be taken. There are times when the future

seems thick as a fog; you sit and wait, hoping the mists will lift and reveal the

right path. But this is a time when the future seems a door you can walk right

through into a room called tomorrow.

Bush brightens this image even further by contrast with the past. "For the first time in this

century," he says, "for the first time in perhaps all history, man does not have to invent a

system by which to live. We don't have to talk late into the night about which form of

government is better. We don't have to wrest justice from the kings. We only have to

summon it from within ourselves. We must act on what we know." According to this

language, Bush, along with his audience has the privilege of taking part in a turning point

in human history. Since he has the vision to see this possibility, Bush accumulates

leadership ethos as the leader who will help those visions be true.

Clinton employs a rhetoric out of time to note the rapid changes going on in the

world. "When George Washington first took the oath I have just sworn to uphold, news

traveled slowly across the land by horseback and across the ocean by boat. Now, the sights and sounds of this ceremony are broadcast instantaneously to billions around the world. Communications and commerce are global. Investment is mobile. Technology is almost magical. And ambition for a better life is now universal." He then turns it around to provide reassurance that America is up to the task of change. "Americans have ever been a restless, questing, hopeful people." he says, "And we must bring to our task today the vision and will of those who came before us. From our Revolution to the Civil War, to the Great Depression, to the civil rights movement, our people have always mustered the determination to construct from these crises the pillars of our history." He then calls on the philosophy of a founding father to make what is essentially a call to follow his lead in embracing the future. "Thomas Jefferson believed that to preserve the very foundations of our Nation, we would need dramatic change from time to time. Well, my fellow Americans, this is our time. Let us embrace it."

The younger Bush reminds his audience of the part they share in ongoing history with him. "We have a place, all of us, in a long story -- a story we continue, but whose end we will not see. It is a story of a new world that became a friend and liberator of the old, a story of a slave-holding society that became a servant of freedom, the story of a power that went into the world to protect but not possess, to defend but not to conquer." Later, he furthers his and his audience's association with a rhetoric out of time through a story. "After the Declaration of Independence was signed, Virginia statesman John Page wrote to Thomas Jefferson: 'We know the race is not to the swift nor the battle to the strong. Do you not think an angel rides in the whirlwind and directs this storm?'" He then ties the concept of the ongoing story and Jefferson's words to himself even more

closely by paraphrasing his vision of the present and future: "This work continues. The story goes on. And an angel still rides in the whirlwind and directs this storm."

Obama, like almost all of the other presidents listed here, uses America's founding fathers to establish a rhetoric out of time. "Our Founding Fathers," he says, "faced with perils that we can scarcely imagine, drafted a charter to assure the rule of law and the rights of man, a charter expanded by the blood of generations." He relates the spirit of that time in history to the present status of America in the world: "Those ideals [of the founding fathers] still light the world, and we will not give them up for expedience'[s] sake. And so to all the other peoples and governments who are watching today, from the grandest capitals to the small village where my father was born: Know that America is a friend of each nation and every man, woman, and child who seeks a future of peace and dignity. And we are ready to lead once more." He continue to draw parallels between America's past and present when he asks his audience to "Recall that earlier generations faced down fascism and communism not just with missiles and tanks, but with the sturdy alliances and enduring convictions. They understood that our power alone cannot protect us, nor does it entitle us to do as we please. Instead, they knew that our power grows through its prudent use; our security emanates from the justness of our cause, the force of our example, the tempering qualities of humility and restraint." Through this association with history under his leadership, Obama creates an identity that establishes him and his audience as "keepers of this legacy." He and the nation, "guided by these principles once more… can meet those new threats that demand even greater effort" with the same success as the founding fathers.

Other identification-based accumulation tactics are also used frequently in inaugural speeches. Inclusive language is the standard mode of address in all five speeches. In addition to the standard use of inclusive language (in just under 2,500 words he manages to use "we" fifty times, "our" sixty-four times, and "us" twenty-two times), Reagan also speaks of "We the people" as a special interest group that "knows no sectional boundaries, or ethnic and racial divisions, and… crosses political party lines." It is left to be assumed that the lobbyist for that particular special interest group is Reagan himself. Although he uses a lower frequency of inclusive pronouns, the elder Bush asserts that "America is never wholly herself unless she is engaged in high moral principle. We as a people have such a purpose today." That positive identity of morality is an appealing one for the audience to join. When Clinton tells his audience "Our Founders saw themselves in the light of posterity. We can do no less." He brings them on board with his own association with "the world's oldest democracy." Clinton also uses inclusive pronouns even more frequently than Reagan; in under 1,600 words he uses "we" forty-nine times, "us" sixteen times, and "our" fifty-five times. The "American story" described by the younger Bush (who uses "we" forty-five times, "us" eleven times, and "our" fifty-one times in a speech the same length as Clinton's) is "a story of flawed and fallible people, united across the generations by grand and enduring ideals." By joining the ranks of these "flawed and fallible people" with Bush his audience embraces "the grandest of these ideals[,] an unfolding American promise that everyone belongs, that everyone deserves a chance, that no insignificant person was ever born." He offers more of this positive identity when he speaks of the nature of Americans: "Americans are generous and strong and decent, not because we believe in ourselves, but because we

hold beliefs beyond ourselves. When this spirit of citizenship is missing, no government program can replace it. When this spirit is present, no wrong can stand against it." Obama, master of inclusive language, uses a similar high concentration of inclusive pronouns ("we" sixty-three times, "us" fourteen times, and "our" seventy-two times in 2,400 words) but moves into even stronger inclusive methods as he reminds his audience of the many things that "we are"—"…ready to lead once more," "... keepers of this legacy," "…a nation of Christians and Muslims, Jews and Hindus -- and non-believers," and more. Each illustration of this version of the American identity holds a unique appeal for a different segment of his audience.

Some new presidents use the inaugural address to engage in a period of frame-breaking and frame-moving. Like the reconciliation approach, this rhetorical application is especially fitting when the outgoing president is from the opposing party. Reagan dives into the process immediately after offering the olive branch to Carter. In contrast to his previous lines affirming the traditions Carter is helping to affirm, Reagan begins to build up dissatisfaction with the status quo. He claims, "These United States are confronted with an economic affliction of great proportions." Then he moves on to list the dire circumstances—mostly caused by the government—that America faces. "We suffer from the longest and one of the worst sustained inflations in our national history." he asserts. And he continues with strong language to describe its terrible effects. "It distorts our economic decisions, penalizes thrift, and crushes the struggling young and the fixed-income elderly alike. It threatens to shatter the lives of millions of our people. Idle industries have cast workers into unemployment, human misery and personal indignity." Moreover, Reagan tells his audience, the government as it now stands prevents workers

from rising above the woes. "Those who do work are denied a fair return for their labor by a tax system which penalizes successful achievement and keeps us from maintaining full productivity." Even worse, the problems are lining up to affect the next generation: "[G]reat as our tax burden is, it has not kept pace with public spending. For decades we have piled deficit upon deficit, mortgaging our future and our children's future for the temporary convenience of the present. To continue this long trend is to guarantee tremendous social, cultural, political, and economic upheavals." In light of such dire possibilities with the status quo, change seems much more attractive

In a similar frame-breaking move, Clinton reminds his audience that America survives through change, and although he acknowledges the bright side of having passed through the cold war, he warns that the nation is confronted with an economy "weakened by business failures, stagnant wages, increasing inequality, and deep divisions among our own people." Later, he says that while progress has rendered many positive results, the present circumstances are a time "when most people are working harder for less; when others cannot work at all; when the cost of health care devastates families and threatens to bankrupt our enterprises, great and small; when the fear of crime robs law-abiding citizens of their freedom; and when millions of poor children cannot even imagine the lives we are calling them to lead." In such a time, says Clinton, "we have not made change our friend." The implication is that the audience should be prepared to make friends with the change that Clinton will bring in order to make the world a better place.

George W. Bush does not step away from purely optimistic notes long enough to reject the status quo, but Obama employs the strongest rejection among the group. He lists the ills that make up the "crisis" that the country is in the midst of.

Our nation is at war, against a far-reaching network of violence and hatred. Our economy is badly weakened, a consequence of greed and irresponsibility on the part of some... Homes have been lost; jobs shed; businesses shuttered. Our health care is too costly; our schools fail too many; and each day brings further evidence that the ways we use energy strengthen our adversaries and threaten our planet."

Obama also cites a more insidious problem, "Less measurable, but no less profound, is a sapping of confidence across our land -- a nagging fear that America's decline is inevitable, that the next generation must lower its sights." He does not try to deny that this or any of the other problems are false or exaggerated. Instead, he says, "Today I say to you that the challenges we face are real. They are serious and they are many. They will not be met easily or in a short span of time." It is hard to see this list of ills and not want to find a way to move away from the status quo. As the leader, then, the president stands to accumulate leadership ethos as the one to take his audience towards a new future. Obama states this idea directly. "On this day," he says, "we gather because we have chosen hope over fear, unity of purpose over conflict and discord." The choice they have made that remains unsaid is choosing him as president.

This degree of negativity in all of these addresses, taken independently, might seem out of context with the demeanor of the inaugural address. By raising dissatisfaction with the status quo and negating conventions, however, the speaker reminds the audience of their need for a leader with a vision that can conquer current problems. Reagan gives reassurance to his audience through the positive identity they share with him as a country that is "special among the nations of the earth." He links that positive identity to striving towards his vision—"If we look to the answer as to why for

so many years we achieved so much, prospered as no other people on earth, it was because here in this land we unleashed the energy and individual genius of man to a greater extent than has ever been done before."—and to utopian outcomes—"It is time for us to realize that we are too great a nation to limit ourselves to small dreams." Similarly, Clinton links his audience's identity to the efficacy of the greater American spirit in the same passage as his rhetoric out of time as quoted earlier. Through Clinton's vision connecting history to the present circumstances he offers them the possibility (or even the mandate) of a glorious future. "Our democracy," he says, "must be not only the envy of the world but the engine of our own renewal." The audience can take solace knowing "there is nothing wrong with America that cannot be cured by what is right with America."

Obama establishes hope for overcoming what is wrong with the status quo by linking his audience's identity to the historical spirit that underlies America's greatness as a nation.

> [W]e understand that greatness is never a given. It must be earned. Our journey has never been one of short-cuts or settling for less. It has not been the path for the faint-hearted -- for those who prefer leisure over work, or seek only the pleasures of riches and fame. Rather, it has been the risk-takers, the doers, the makers of things -- some celebrated but more often men and women obscure in their labor, who have carried us up the long, rugged path towards prosperity and freedom.

The idea of taking part in a difficult but noble cause is the basis of this identity that invites the audience to take their place among those whose bravery, hard work, and self

sacrifice showed through as they "packed up their few worldly possessions and traveled across oceans in search of a new life," "toiled in sweatshops and settled the West; endured the lash of the whip and plowed the hard earth," and "fought and died, in places like Concord and Gettysburg; Normandy and Khe Sahn." By association with these figures that made America great, the audience can trust that they to can join Obama to help fix the problems facing the nation.

The examples in this section embody only a representative sample of the rich variety of accumulation strategies used in these inaugural speeches. The sheer density of those strategies, though sometimes repetitive, is staggering. Analysis of the agency in this case thoroughly bears out the motive indicated by the rest of the pentad. As with the pre-campaign speeches, the correlation of anticipated method with motive shows the relevance of accumulation as a specific application. Additionally, the ability to detect and label these methods helps to bring out rhetorical functionality in what might otherwise be regarded as merely ceremonial speeches.

CHAPTER FOUR: WIELDING LEADERSHIP ETHOS

It might seem odd that it is harder to isolate instances of presidents wielding the leadership ethos of the office for persuasive purposes than it is to isolate instances of the accumulation of that ethos. Consider, however, that much of the direct and specific policy persuasion that a president takes part in does not occur in major addresses, but rather within the environment of Washington, D.C. It is often politicians in Washington that a president must convince to act in a certain way if he is to accomplish policy goals. Much of what he has on his side in those circumstances consists of accumulated leadership ethos that might encourage other politicians to appear aligned with him. To what end, though, might a president wield leadership ethos when addressing the public?

As described in chapter two, most presidential wielding tactics focus on controlling the nature of public dialogue on a given topic and inspiring activism in the public. Presidents can also encourage policy action among other major political figures more directly through assuming the posture of needing to be persuaded. This tactic, however, though well-supported by the work of Goodnight, is difficult to isolate in the single-speech approach taken here. The speeches chosen for the following sections were selected because their rhetorical scenes suggested an opportunity or need for presidential wielding tactics. The analyses tend to be shorter than those for accumulation, however, because there are fewer devices to demonstrate and some that fall generally outside of the method of demonstration used here.

Crisis Speeches

"We know that on some occasions (primarily those involving foreign crises) the President can speak with a national voice and have the public rally behind him as they will rally behind no other public official. But what do we know beyond that?" (Windt 108). Windt's observation on the tendency of the American public to rally behind their leader in times of crisis seems like common sense. When there is confusion and worry, it is human nature to look to a higher authority for guidance. Bligh, Kohles, and Meindl explain the phenomenon in more rigorous terms:

> The plethora of emotions felt in the aftermath of a crisis, including shock, confusion, fear, anger, sorrow, and anxiety, can have a potentially devastating effect on individual self-concepts as well as collective national identity. Times of crisis thus enhance the likelihood that followers will want to invest increased faith in leaders, see leaders as more powerful, and identify more with their leaders as a coping mechanism. (212)

Followers are not only more likely to identify with and invest faith in their leaders during times of crises, they are also more likely to accept the leader's interpretation of events and believe in his ability to deal with the problems that arise, because doing so "relieve[s] followers of the psychological stress and loss of control created in the aftermath of a crisis" (212). All of which means that much of the work of accumulation is already accomplished, leaving a leader with a huge amount of leverage to use in terms of wielding in the ensuing rhetorical scene. Moreover, the leader's use of wielding is not only more likely to succeed, but the attempt at prompting action and change has the simultaneous effect of accumulating more leadership ethos because it is likely to be

accepted as a "coping mechanism, even a palliative, as followers seek to symbolically and emotionally 'restore their own sense of coping ability by linking themselves to a dominant and seemingly effective leader'" (Bligh, Kohles, and Meindl 212).

Applying Burke's pentad to examine the scene of a crisis and the agent's role as the official leader, it seems obvious to infer that the motive is directed in such a ways as to invite wielding tactics in the ensuing rhetoric.

<p style="text-align:center">Reagan and "Lebanon and Grenada"</p>

On October 27, 1983—the nineteenth anniversary of the first televised run of "The Speech"—Reagan addressed the nation in another personal, man-to-camera speech. From the Oval office he explained the events that occurred in Lebanon four days earlier and Grenada two days earlier. Although Reagan never used the word crises in his speech, the rhetoric of the speech makes efficient use of crisis-based wielding.

David Birdsell offers the following summary of the events in Lebanon and their implication:

> On October 23, 1983, a suicide bomber set off a truck full of explosives in the American Marine compound in Beirut, Lebanon. The Resulting Blast killed more than two hundred Marines. The soldiers were part of a multinational peacekeeping force... the bomb came as a complete surprise. Aside from the lives lost, the attack was deeply embarrassing to the unprepared U.S. troops and the Reagan administration. (196)

Not only could the event itself be seen as embarrassing to Reagan, but the very presence of troops in Lebanon was already controversial. As Reagan admits in the speech, he had been confronted by questions about U.S. involvement in Lebanon.

In contrast to events in Lebanon, the campaign in Grenada was short, successful and involved few casualties (Birdsell 196). Those factors did not guarantee public approval, however. As Alan Rosenblatt points out, presidents had felt the need to build support for the use of force in the post-Vietnam era lest they face the fate suffered by Lyndon Johnson in 1968 (226). The invasion of Grenada was one of the first major military operations attempted by the U.S. since Vietnam. Reagan faced the need to reassure the nation about the attack in Lebanon and justify the campaign in Grenada in order to maintain public support. This specific persuasive goal is the end that Reagan seeks partially through wielding tactics in his October 27th address.

Before analyzing those tactics, though, it is interesting to note that this speech offers a unique opportunity to observe tactics whose effects are born out by polling data. Using data from two independently conducted NBC polls—one taken a day before Reagan's speech and one taken soon after— Rosenblatt details the shift in public opinion associated with the speech. In his research he divides responses into three groups: "those interviewed after the invasion but before the address; those interviewed after the address who did not hear it; and those interviewed after the address who did hear it" (231). After accounting for outside factors, Rosenblatt concludes that "In virtually every question listed, support for the presidents use of troops in both Lebanon and Grenada significantly increased among those sampled after the speech, especially among those people who heard or saw the speech" (233). It does not seem out of bounds to say that this is a speech that achieved its persuasive goal.

The work of John Zaller, cited by Rosenblatt, shows that "messages addressing issues that are, in this particular sense, familiar to the public are likely to produce less

attitude change, all else equal, than messages that address novel or unfamiliar topics,"

Therefore, "the more obscure the conflict, the more influence the president will have"

(227). In light of that, it is interesting that Reagan chooses to spend the entire first half of

the speech taking his audience through a grueling account of the horror in Beirut. One

rhetorical advantage that this approach presents is inducing the feelings of crisis that can

accompany such an account. Throughout the speech, Reagan emphasizes the concept of

lurking danger and catastrophe and makes frequent use of variations on the term "threat."

He builds suspense around the scene of "a truck, looking like a lot of other vehicles in the

city, approached the airport on a busy, main road. There was nothing in its appearance to

suggest it was any different than the trucks or cars that were normally seen on and around

the airport." It is implied that there is no way that the innocent marines could have

expected that "this one was different. At the wheel was a young man on a suicide

mission." Reagan reinforces the marine's unsuspecting innocence and the accompanying

sense of dread in the next lines: "The truck carried some 2,000 pounds of explosives, but

there was no way our marine guards could know this." The tightly stated action of the

next lines capitalizes on that sense of dread as Reagan describes how "the truck crashed

through a series of barriers, including a chain-link fence and barbed wire entanglements.

The guards opened fire, but it was too late. The truck smashed through the doors of the

headquarters building in which our marines were sleeping and instantly exploded. The

four-story concrete building collapsed in a pile of rubble." The building up of this

lurking danger and the ensuing "horror" (as Reagan labels it) is part of what Reagan

relies upon to define the political realities and need for action addressed in the rest of the

speech. The sense of unavoidable and unexpected destruction is the essence of a crisis

situation. The time he spends detailing the seemingly unavoidable catastrophe reinforces the idea of defining the situation facing America in crisis terms. Describing death, danger, and fear inflicted by terrorists in Lebanon constructs a view of the world as a scary place.

Reagan addresses the lurking threats of the larger world scene as he moves into the speech. "The Middle East is a powderkeg," he says, and each time war has broken out in the region "the world has teetered near the edge of catastrophe." There are "powers hostile to the free world," who, if they were to gain control in Middle East, "would be a direct threat to the United States and to our allies." "Syria," Reagan informs his audience, "has become a home for 7,000 Soviet advisers and technicians who man a massive amount of Soviet weaponry, including SS - 21 ground-to-ground missiles capable of reaching vital areas of Israel." Israel, as Reagan puts it, is a nation that "shares our democratic values and is a formidable force an invader of the Middle East [such as ever threatening Soviet forces] would have to reckon with." Regan continues to broaden the scope of the possible threat. "If terrorism and intimidation succeed, it'll be a devastating blow to the peace process and to Israel's search for genuine security. It won't just be Lebanon sentenced to a future of chaos. Can the United States, or the free world, for that matter, stand by and see the Middle East incorporated into the Soviet bloc? What of Western Europe and Japan's dependence on Middle East oil for the energy to fuel their industries?" Like the explosives in the truck, the "powderkeg" of the Middle East is one that may not be noticed, but that can threaten catastrophe to America and its allies. This defining of political reality uses an incident that could be used to criticize American presence in the region to help justify it instead. Later, when Reagan discusses the success

in Grenada, he is also defining the possibility of success when America takes pre-emptive action.

When Reagan moves on to the events leading up to the invasion of Grenada, he broadens the scope of the threat in his message to the larger threat of Soviet expansion. He describes an insidious plot to force the communist regime onto a defenseless country. He tells how Maurice Bishop, "a protégé of Fidel Castro," "sought the help of Cuba in building an airport, which he claimed was for tourist trade, but which looked suspiciously suitable for military aircraft, including Soviet-built long-range bombers." After Reagan's description of the innocent looking truck that took American lives in Lebanon, this airport takes on a heightened air of sinister threat. Although Bishop moves out of the limelight as Reagan's story progresses, the lurking danger of an airport that can support Soviet bombers remains. In this case, though, America's preparedness for action allows the threat to be addressed before catastrophe strikes. When Bishop is overthrown, leaving Grenada "without a government, its only authority exercised by a self-proclaimed band of military men," a group of American marines (coincidently part of a force bound for Lebanon) joined with forces from nearby nations to seize control of Grenada, finding "a warehouse of military equipment -- one of three we've uncovered so far. This warehouse contained weapons and ammunition stacked almost to the ceiling, enough to supply thousands of terrorists." Again, one is reminded of the truck full of explosives, an association Reagan reinforces when he describes Grenada as "a Soviet-Cuban colony, being readied as a major military bastion to export terror and undermine democracy." The need for active and prepared American presence in the world is strengthened when Reagan observes with a sense of foreboding, "We got there just in time."

Building on the sense of crisis he has constructed, Reagan, without resorting to argument or engaging critics, defines a view of U.S. actions that goes beyond mere justification. Throughout the speech he continually uses versions of the terms "security", "safety", "freedom", and "stability". The repetition of these terms defines what it is that America is fighting for. Reagan continues to realign the frame of perception as he also reiterates terms that define a positive American identity—terms like "concern" and "responsibility" associated not only with defending America and its values, but also its allies. He uses stories of brave, heroic marines to reinforce these values and definitions. In the end, the poll data shows that Reagan's restructured view of the world was sufficient to sway public opinion. The definition of political reality through wielding the leadership ethos of a president in a crisis situation is heavily present in the language Reagan used to achieve that effect.

<div align="center">George W. Bush on September 20, 2001</div>

When George W. Bush spoke to a joint session of Congress on September 20, 2001, there was no need to work to define the situation as a crisis. The public response to the events of 9/11 involved all of the emotional elements that a crisis can invoke. According to Bligh, Kohles, and Meindl, "Many Americans perceived the events of 9/11 as an attack not only on the Pentagon and the World Trade Center but also as an attack on their fundamental values and beliefs" (212). In the time of fear and uncertainty that followed, the president was presented with an opportunity "to act in stronger, more decisive, and potentially more meaningful ways" (212). Before 9/11 Bush was not generally viewed as a strong or charismatic leader. In light of such a great national crisis, however, there is a desire to identify exceptional qualities in a leader regardless of

whether the leader's qualities are actual or attributed (212). The results of this desire

showed in the polls.

> Prior to the events of 9/11, there were real concerns about Bush's leadership, and
>
> many questioned his ability to rise to the challenge in the immediate aftermath of the
>
> attacks. Seemingly overnight, however, Americans embraced the President and his
>
> leadership. Before the terrorist attacks, 51% of Americans approved of Bush's job
>
> performance, whereas after the attacks, his approval ratings jumped to 86%. This 35-
>
> point jump in approval rating is the highest ever measured by the Gallup Organization
>
> in its over 60 years of polling history. (Bligh, Kohles, and Meindl 213)

Bligh, Kohles, and Meindl conducted rigorous statistical analysis of Bush's language

before and after 9/11, and their results showed a significant increase in language

theoretically linked to charismatic leadership in the days and weeks following the crisis

(227). The September 20th speech shows evidence of his use of such language as well as

other wielding techniques. The goals towards which Bush wields his crisis-bolstered

leadership ethos are not singular or necessarily simple, but the techniques are readily

apparent.

Bush begins the speech by affirming a positive identity for the American people.

It is an identity that, consistent with charismatic framing theory, is associated with action.

Using plenty of inclusive language, he describes the "strong" state of the union as it is

embodied in "the courage of passengers, who rushed terrorists to save others on the

ground… the endurance of rescuers, working past exhaustion… the unfurling of flags, the

lighting of candles, the giving of blood, the saying of prayers—in English, Hebrew, and

Arabic… and the decency of a loving and giving people who have made the grief of

strangers their own." It is altogether an identity that anyone could be proud to be a part of. In the very next paragraph, however, he wields his leadership ethos by shifting the focus of that identity to a new goal—revenge. The word Bush chooses to convey that concept is not "revenge" though. He chooses to define the concept with a term that has better connotations, "justice." He declares that, "Whether we bring our enemies to justice, or bring justice to our enemies, justice will be done." The strong, confident tone of the sentence declares his role is leader in seeking that justice. His confidence is evident throughout the speech as he uses an the unqualified verb "will" fifty-two times to describe all the actions he proposes in the manner of a prediction.

Bush further engages in defining the terms of the national discussion by declaring the attack "an act of war" and labeling the perpetrators as "terrorists" and "enemies of freedom." He repeats these labels multiple times, but perhaps the most significant application is in these lines: "Our enemy is a radical network of terrorists, and every government that supports them. Our war on terror begins with al Qaeda, but it does not end there. It will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped, and defeated." This first application of the term "war on terror" and the accompanying declaration of action wields leadership ethos in a powerful way. The success of this tactic rests almost entirely on the symbolic nature of the president-as-leader. Bush heightens the fear surrounding his label of "terrorist" by observing that, "The terrorists' directive commands them to kill Christians and Jews, to kill all Americans, and make no distinctions among military and civilians, including women and children." A specific target for animosity against the terrorists is defined when he notes that, "The leadership of al Qaeda has great influence in Afghanistan and supports the

Taliban regime in controlling most of that country. In Afghanistan, we see al Qaeda's vision for the world. Afghanistan's people have been brutalized; many are starving and many have fled… By aiding and abetting murder, the Taliban regime is committing murder." In this rhetorical act, Bush has used definition to give shape to the nations overflow of emotions and direct them towards a specific target.

Bush also uses his status as leader to put questions (and their accompanying ideas) into the mouths of his audience. When he says "Americans are asking, why do they hate us?" and "Americans are asking: How will we fight and win this war?" he is letting the assumption that there is an enemy who hates "us" and that there is already a war to fight originate with his audience, even if it did not exist there previously. He has, after all, already created an identity for the nation as one "awakened to danger and called to defend freedom." As the leader, he is then able to answer the questions he put into the mouths of the audience with his own plan of action—the plan that the country would indeed follow.

Issues Speeches

Aside from crises, there are other situations when a president's motives could be said to be consistent with wielding. To find such instances one need look no further than the single issue speeches that presidents make concerning eminent policy decisions. In such situations, the president-as-agent typically has an agenda that is already well-known; the scene often includes a focusing of the national spotlight on the issue and the president's words coupled with ongoing debate in the public sphere; and the act is a public speech with the declared purpose of convincing the audience to move forward on

the president's agenda. That description applies equally well to the speeches that both

Clinton and Obama delivered in the midst of a public debate over health care reform

legislation. Comparing and contrasting these two speeches is a useful exercise to show

how wielding tactics can be used to different degrees in quite similar circumstances.

      An article posted on *CBSNews* the day before Obama's speech to a joint session

of Congress on health care reform compared the obstacles faced by Obama to those faced

by Clinton sixteen years earlier. In both situations, public polls indicated a high level of

dissatisfaction with the current health care system and a desire for fundamental changes.

On the other hand, polls in both circumstances showed that the public did not understand

the reforms being considered and how they would be affected by those reforms. The

follow-up polls in Clinton's case show little improvement in public perception in the

wake of his speech (Dutton).   The author of that CBS article could not know that a few

months later a health care reform bill would pass the House and be awaiting Senate

approval. How much of the difference between the outcomes of these mirror situations is

the direct result of these speeches is hard to tell without more detailed research and more

historical perspective. The difference is interesting to note, though, in light of the

differences of rhetorical application between the two cases.

      Clinton's speech begins by linking American ideals and successes with embracing

change. "From the settling of the frontier to the landing on the Moon," he tells his

audience,

> ours has been a continuous story of challenges defined, obstacles overcome, new
>
> horizons secured. That is what makes America what it is and Americans what we
>
> are. Now we are in a time of profound change and opportunity. The end of the

cold war, the information age, the global economy have brought us both

opportunity and hope and strife and uncertainty. Our purpose in this dynamic age

must be to make change our friend and not our enemy.

This tactic has firm groundings in frame-moving tactics. It creates and identity that not

only attracts and affirms the audience, but refocuses their frame on the positivity of

change. On the whole, it seems to be a good wielding tactic to use to introduce a speech

about change that the public is wary of. Obama also uses framing tactics to introduce his

speech. He frames the present effort in terms of a struggle going back to Theodore

Roosevelt, inviting his audience to join in a sort of historic struggle for the success of an

important plan. He takes the framing one degree further than Clinton, though, by using

his introduction to frame past accomplishments—making headway in the face of the

economic crisis through "difficult votes that have put us on a path to recovery" —in

relation to new goals.

　　More distinct differences in rhetorical strategy show up as each speaker moves

into the body of his speech. Clinton takes the problem of public lack of understanding

head on, going into detail about the history of his proposed plan, the numbers that show

the need for it, and how it will be implemented. He, like Obama, uses stories as a tool for

pathos, but his primary mode seems to lie in the realm of logos—counterarguments,

justifications, and explanations. "Over 1,100 health care organizations" were consulted

and "the task force received and read over 700,000 letters from ordinary citizens in order

to form a plan. "On any given day, over 37 million Americans, most of them working

people and their little children, have no health insurance at all." "Under our plan, every

American would receive a health care security card that will guarantee a comprehensive

package of benefits over the course of an entire lifetime, roughly comparable to the

benefit package offered by most Fortune 500 companies." All of these specifics, and

many more, are firm grounding for a logos based mode of persuasion.

Obama, on the other hand, spends comparatively little time explaining how his

proposed reforms would work. In fact, most of the explanation he does concerns

addressing what they wouldn't do (kill senior citizens, involve bureaucrats in health care

decisions, provide for illegal immigrants, fund abortion). What Obama does do

throughout the body of his speech is emphasize his openness to compromise throughout

the process and the inclusion of multiple ideas, even from former opponents in the

proposals being considered. Whereas Clinton provides more facts but comes across as

argumentative and insistent, Obama makes the redirects the debate onto a reflection of his

character as a leader, bypassing the details. Where Clinton spends a large portion of his

speech covering six principles that it embodies, Obama briefly outlines three goals. In

one attempt at full disclosure, Clinton confesses "If you're a young, single person in your

twenties and you're already insured, your rates may go up somewhat because you're

going to go into a big pool with middle-aged people and older people, and we want to

enable people to keep their insurance even when someone in their family gets sick." In

doing so, his language and his message both serve to divide his audience, both from each

other and from him. In another section he seems to be haranguing his audience with the

phrase "We have to pay for it. We have to pay for it." He seems to be lecturing

uncooperative students. Obama meanwhile, sets himself up as a mediator—one of the

clearest examples of the posture of needing to be persuaded available in this study. All of

the rhetorical work he has put into making himself the figurehead of reason and

cooperation make the following lines all the more powerful—"I will not waste time with those who have made the calculation that it's better politics to kill this plan than to improve it. I won't stand by while the special interests use the same old tactics to keep things exactly the way they are. If you misrepresent what's in this plan, we will call you out. And I will not -- And I will not accept the status quo as a solution. Not this time. Not now."

All this is not to say that Clinton ignores leadership ethos altogether. In the closing paragraphs he returns to the tactic of linking his proposal to American ideals and values from history. He also engages in effective defining strategies, equating the passage of his plan to "a miracle" and "striking a blow for freedom." After an hour of policy details, though, the effect might be lessened by the audience's wandering attention.

The wielding techniques employed by Clinton, and more prominently by Obama, in these speeches are not displayed, as in other examples, in focused language use throughout the speech. The unique demonstration of wielding in these two speeches is more apparent in a wide view of the speeches' tenor and choices of overall rhetorical style. The resultant observations about wielding in practice derive primarily from the contrast between the two. Clinton's style, while possibly highly effective in the realm of logos and pathos, does not leave room for a high degree of leadership ethos. Obama's speech, by sparing some of the logos based detail (either through strategy or simply because the details were not available), allows his voice as a leader to show through more clearly. An additional observation worth noting in regards to these speeches is that they

demonstrate the lower level of correlation between motive as anticipated and application

of techniques than was apparent throughout the speeches chosen for accumulation.

CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSION

Summary

One of the interesting aspects of rhetoric in practice is that when it is done well, it is at its least visible. For all of the observations that are often made about the manipulative nature of political figures, it is often difficult for those who make such observations to put their finger on what exactly it is that politicians do to manipulate their audience. Similarly, people often have a difficult time defining what it is that makes a speaker "inspiring" or "leaderly." In an age when the speeches of political leaders, particularly presidents, are ubiquitous in the lives of Americans, it is unsettling to think that devices that can achieve quite powerful rhetorical effects might slide unnoticed by members of the audience. The rhetorical methods involved in ethos-based rhetoric that are isolated in this study could easily slide by in just such a way. In ceremonial speeches, when an audience might not be alert to a specific agenda, or in a crisis situation, when emotions are running high, it is all too possible for a leader to have effects on his audience that go unnoticed. Although these effects can just as easily be positive as negative, how are leaders to be judged (and either blamed or praised) when their methods are not noticed?

As far back as Aristotle part of the function of the field of rhetoric has been not only helping speakers use rhetorical tools, but also helping label those tools. To see an abstract concept and, more importantly, to think about one, requires the right words. Labels allow a complex world to be sorted into comprehensible bits. One goal of this study is to provide labels that can offer a lens to see the rhetorical actions of political leaders more clearly. A listener equipped with such labels might be able, among the

complexities of a work of political rhetoric, to pick out a leader's attempt to accumulate ethos or wield it by noting the use of inclusive language or the careful definition of political reality.

Further, in rhetorical scholarship, the accumulating and wielding strategies presented in the previous chapters should suggest a basis for a precise form of analysis that was hitherto somewhat ignored or fragmented. The concept and labels of the split-ethos dichotomy, along with the framework for uniting them create a unique tool. In combination with Burke's pentad they offer an additional way to qualify motive in an important area of rhetoric. When applied in conjunction with further research, it might also provide a method for judging the success of presidential rhetoric once motive has been established.

Using the tools and terminology provided here, scholars should be able to isolate rhetorical methods designed to accumulate the symbolic capital of leadership ethos and differentiate them from the methods employed in the application of ethos as a tool wielded towards another persuasive goal. The concept of accumulation as a separate term is perhaps the more novel aspect of the slit-ethos dichotomy. While an understanding of wielding techniques is an essential aspect of keeping the dichotomy firmly delineated, many of the applications seem to be part of what has become standard rhetorical analysis. It may be, though, that by defining some specific aspects of wielding, the use of ethos might be more readily apparent in that analysis. Also, in the following section some applications of wielding terminology in future research are suggested. The unique perspective offered by the concept of accumulation, however, is more of a departure from what is available in conventional approaches to the use of ethos in

rhetoric. The applications of accumulation techniques have readily definable attributes that illuminate the persuasive aims of speeches where those aims might not otherwise be accessible or might be clouded by aims that are more readily apparent to a more traditional approach. The fact that the techniques aligned so well with the predictions made in selecting the speeches is reassuring as an indication that their application has a correlation to the nature of the speech, allowing an analysis of accumulation techniques to serve as an indicator of at least one aspect of rhetorical motive. Unfortunately, the same correlation does not seem to apply to wielding techniques, however.

Using the insights suggested by the split-ethos concept should help scholars place rhetorical techniques that align with accumulation or wielding strategies into an appropriate context to aid in understanding the function of a speech either as an independent mode of analysis, or, perhaps more usefully, as part of a more complete analysis in conjunction with a broader social and historical scope and a wider array of rhetorical concepts.

Suggestions for Further Application and Research

Using the theories, tools, and terms provided here, future research could build off this study in a number of ways. The number of case studies in this study was both too small and too large: too small, in that a broader sampling might better show the development methods and links between accumulation and wielding, and too large, in that each specific case could be studied more thoroughly (in terms of background, political situation, outcomes, and language) to yield more insight into the accumulating and wielding methods used. Future studies in this vein might choose a

large sample of presidential rhetoric of a certain type in order to establish a chronology of trends in the strategies employed or expand the scope to examine ways that the techniques are used in situations other than major speeches.

Conversely, such studies might also focus on a single rhetorical event and its associated scene in order to theorize answers questions like whether Jimmy Carter's 1979 "A Crisis of Confidence" would have been more politically successful if had built off of a better foundation of accumulated ethos or defined his terms in a different way or whether Obama was able to engage in more aggressive yet optimistic framing because the situation at the end of the Bush era made negating the status quo almost a foregone conclusion. Research could also be done to compare the implementation of these tactics to the success of various administrations at leading, achieving and maintaining popularity, and achieving pre-existing goals.

Additionally, although it has already been asserted here that rhetorical methods are not in themselves ethically charged, the use of some of these methods, once recognized, could be analyzed in ethical terms. While the approach here is ethically neutral, the techniques isolated provide for an analysis of methods whose ethical considerations could be taken on a case-by-case basis. It might be possible, for example, to better identify when a president is using the rhetorical dynamics of a crisis situation to further his own pre-existing goals and examine the situation and outcomes in order to reach a conclusion as to whether the audience has been manipulated in a way that lies counter to their more rational intentions or own best interests.

While the applications of ethos in this study are focused on their use in leadership situations, future study need not be limited to the political sphere. Business leaders

addressing their employees, investors, and customers might employ these devices as well. Religious leaders and other public figures might also make use of them. Each of these areas might make for a fascinating analysis in future research.

The concept of waging controversy deserves investigation, and the rhetoric of George W. Bush seems to invite this application. Such research would require a broad sampling of the president's comments in a wide variety of settings and an attempt at correlating them to issues towards which they would construct a posture of needing to be persuaded. The work done by Seyranian, Bligh, et al. on charismatic leadership in particular deserves more examination into the way it intertwines with the split-ethos concept. The number of potential applications, refinements, and expansions to be made with the concepts of wielding and accumulating accentuates their usefulness in rhetorical scholarship.

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