

# Make No Enemies: The Tourist Contending With The Terrorist

## SEVİL F. SÖNMEZ

Department of Recreation Management and Tourism  
Arizona State University  
P.O. Box 874905  
Tempe, Arizona 85287-4905  
E-mail: [sevill@asu.edu](mailto:sevill@asu.edu)

## G. WESLEY BURNETT

Department of History and  
Department of Recreation Management and Tourism  
Clemson University  
263 Lehotsky Hall  
Clemson, South Carolina 29634-1005.  
E-mail: [karlosk@clemson.edu](mailto:karlosk@clemson.edu)

## ABSTRACT

This article examines the relationship between terrorism and tourism. Although the travel and tourism industry and government have done much to control it, terrorism remains a powerful form of communication which utilizes the tourist to convey messages. Despite their understandable expectations of government and industry action against terrorism, potential tourists must assess risk on their own and take action to protect themselves as they travel and recreate. An analogy may be drawn to touristic medicine: just as the first line of defense in health care is the tourist, so the first line of defense against terrorism lies with the tourist.

**Keywords:** International tourism, terrorism, decision-making

Sevil F. Sönmez Ph.D., is an assistant professor in the Department of Recreation Management and Tourism at Arizona State University. Her research interests include international tourism, tourism marketing, crisis management, tourism constraints and decision-making behavior.

G. Wesley Burnett Ph.D., is a professor in the Department of History and Department of Recreation Management and Tourism at Clemson University. His research interests include international parks and conservation, philosophy and ethnophilosophy of natural resources, leisure and literature.

## TURKISH SUMMARY

### TERÖRİZM VE TURİZMİN İLİŞKİSİ

Bu çalışmada temel olarak turizm ve terörizm arasındaki ilişki incelenmektedir. Makalede, öncelikle terörizm çeşitli açılardan ele alınarak tartışılmakta ve terörizmin tanımlanmasındaki güçlüklerden hareket edilerek, makalede terörizmin tanımındaki görecelilik üzerinde durulmaktadır. Geçmişte ve günümüzdeki terörist faaliyetlerden örneklerin de verilerek, terörizmin tipleri ve teröristlerin çalışma yöntemleri ortaya konulmaya çalışılmıştır.

Makalenin ilerleyen bölümlerinde turizm endüstrisinin ve turistlerin terörist faaliyetlerin doğrudan hedefi olduğu vurgulanmış ve terör faaliyetlerinin bir risk faktörü olarak turistlerin seyahate karar verme süreçleri içerisindeki yeri, bu alanda yapılmış çeşitli araştırma bulgularından yararlanılarak tartışılmıştır. Turizmin ve terörizmin küresel boyutta faaliyet içerisinde bulunması, bu iki olgunun birlikte değerlendirilmesine neden olmaktadır. Örnek olarak, uluslararası turizme katılmış bir turistin terör hareketlerine maruz kalması ve uluslararası politik alanda ses getirmesi, terör hareketlerinin yönünün bu alana kaymasına bir faktör oluşturmaktadır.

Makalenin sonuç bölümünde ise, uluslararası turizme katılan turistlerin olası terör hareketleriyle karşılaşmamak için seyahat öncesi ve seyahat sırasında takınacağı davranışlar örneklerle açıklanmaktadır.

*Our wise men have said that a traveller to distant places should make no enemies. I stand by it.*

*Chinua Achebe (1989)*

## INTRODUCTION

Chinua Achebe's (1989) West African travelers of the early colonial period needed go only a half-day's journey to encounter a new accent if not a new language, to brave new and strange norms defining the relations between individuals, and possibly to enter the realm of an unknown God of uncertain disposition. The traveler—stripped of religion, language, and habits defining his place in society—was vulnerable enough without the added danger of enemies. The lesson of history's great travelers is how exceptional they are. For many, travel and tourism have been guided by Achebe's (1989) wise men. People have stayed at home, probably within a day's walk of their birth places, and have conducted farther adventures as if they were face to face with enemies. They went abroad as a horde, armed to the teeth.

Over the course of humankind's history, the technology and management skills necessary to turn a day's journey into an intercontinental adventure have been acquired and can be considered one of the great achievements of modern times. This miracle is performed hundreds of millions of times each year with remarkably predictable success. In general, this achievement is understood to be fundamentally good. Mass international travel, particularly tourism, redistributes wealth, fuels economic development, generally contributes to international understanding, and is very likely a factor contributing to international peace (Burnett and Uysal 1988, 1990).

Sevil F. Sönmez - G. Wesley Burnett

People still, however, must abide the warning of the West African sages, that travelers are ill-advised to go amongst enemies, and to this end most governments warn their citizens against travel among known or suspected enemies, including criminals if their activities seem excessive, and it is absolutely forbidden by many. Political violence, or terrorism, against tourists bent upon their peaceful pursuits in areas where they have no obvious enemies, quite rightly frightens tourists. Since terrorism threatens one of the great achievements of modern times, it calls forth both concern and action from industry and government.

This article examines the relationship between terrorism and tourism. While industry and government can, and have, done much to control terrorism, the authors support Karber's (1971) argument that terrorism is a form of communication. As communication, terrorism entices groups who believe they have no other routes of effective communication but violence. Terrorists and their threat to tourists will be eliminated only in a "New World Order" allowing effective communication to all groups—an unlikely utopia. Meanwhile, potential tourists, while they may justly expect government and industry to take actions to protect them, must assess risk on their own and take action to protect themselves as they travel and recreate. An analogy may be made to touristic medicine: just as the first line of defense in health care is the tourist, so the first line of defense against terrorism lies with the tourist.

## **TERRORISM AS COMMUNICATION**

Terrorism, lacking both precise definition and a consistent classification, has no integrated explanatory theory (Bell 1975; Bolz, Dudonis and Schulz 1990; Crenshaw 1988; Horner 1980; Jenkins 1987, 1988; Karber 1971; Poland 1988; Schlagheck 1988; Schmid and Jongman 1988; Toman 1991; Watson 1976; Wilkinson 1973, 1976). By way of example, history has made Judas Maccabeus, leader of Jewish insurrection (168 BC) against the Seleucids, into a hero resisting oppression and tyranny, though his oppressor, Antiochus IV Epiphanes, probably thought of Judas as a brigand and terrorist. Likewise, the PLO, IRA, or for that matter the 1986 U.S. bombing of Libya, are honorable or vile depending largely on one's perspective. The fate of United Nations Resolution 3034 of 1972 symbolizes the difficulty of conducting reasonable discussion on terrorism in light of diverse perspectives. The Resolution, recognizing the difficulty of defining and classifying terrorism, established committees to provide a definition of terrorism, to examine its causes and to propose preventative measures; however, these committees failed to agree on a definition or even to distinguish between national liberation movements and terrorism. Similarly, a U.N. General Assembly approved "Convention on the Prevention...of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons..." has not been widely ratified (Charters 1991; Schiller 1988; St. John 1991). Given the diversity of opinion on the nature of terrorism, even statistical descriptions of terrorism's extent, of course, become debatable.

Make No Enemies: The Tourist Contending With The Terrorist

Nonetheless, terrorism has some distinguishing characteristics. It may be regarded as group or state use of, or threat to use, unpredictable, extraordinary and goal directed violence against symbolic victims without strategic or tactical value and the subsequent exploitation of resulting publicity to achieve political goals. Terrorism has been described as the use of violence for its psychological effect, an observation which contributes little since much warfare and a fair amount of criminal behavior uses violence for psychological purposes. One need only think of Sherman's March to the Sea, the fire bombing of Japan, or the torture often associated with gangland murders. Terrorism, therefore, seems to separate itself from other activities employing psychological violence by using violence to publicize the plight of the terrorists. As such, terrorism is often understood as inseparable from propaganda. Violence intends coercive behavior modification, propaganda achieves it by persuasion, and terrorism combines the two (Schmid and deGraaf 1982). It follows that while Judas Maccabeus might have employed terror to achieve his goals, to be an effective terrorist in the modern sense, Judas really needed television. Mass communication instantly linking terrorists to a global audience is a God-send to the terrorist, and is largely responsible for the escalating appeal of terrorism since WWII. The role of publicity should not be underestimated. In a statement to the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Internal Security, Austrian-American psychiatrist and behavioral expert, Dr. Frederick Hacker estimated that if publicity could be eliminated, 75% of national and international terrorism would be eliminated (Kupperman and Trent 1979).

Viewing terrorism as a symbolic act of communication, Karber (1971) analyzes it much like other forms of communication (Alexander 1988; Sandler and Lapan 1988): (1) the terrorist initiates communication by transmitting a message (possibly including certain demands weighted against the safety of innocent citizens); (2) the target is the intended recipient of the message (often a large and removed audience such as the government the terrorist is protesting); (3) the terrorist act (e.g., bombing, hijacking, kidnaping) is the message; (4) the medium of communication is often innocent victims of terrorist violence (such as international travelers); and (5) the reaction of the target is the feed-back the transmitter is interested in achieving (such as government compliance with terrorist demands). In this view, the international tourist is an ideal medium of communication.

The metaphor can be continued by drawing parallels between terrorism and more conventional forms of communication. Terrorism can be disrupted due to the ineffectiveness of the medium (for example, the choice of victim can convey a wrong message to the target); background noise can disrupt the effort (for example, other events competing for attention on the nightly news may obscure the terrorist's message); and the target can misunderstand the message (for example, the meaning can be misinterpreted, reducing the effectiveness of the feedback which the terrorist seeks). Furthermore, mass media performs

Sevil F. Sönmez - G. Wesley Burnett

several roles in advancing, if inadvertently, the terrorist's cause, namely: (1) information flow from mass media (print and broadcast) becomes a propaganda tool; (2) this flow of information can expose people to information which motivates, rationalizes or justifies the terrorist's use of violence; (3) by providing information regarding terrorists' tactics and strategies international communications systems unintentionally supply potential terrorists with technological information and ideological justification to support their use of violence; and (4) the flow of information resulting from successful terrorist attacks has the potential to inspire similar events elsewhere.

Studies of terrorism often include a discussion, even if only superficial, of the history of terror (Jenkins 1988, 1987; Redlick 1979; Wilkinson 1976). Throughout history both rulers and the ruled have certainly used terror to accomplish their goals; however, when viewed as a form of mass communication, contemporary terrorism differs from its historical precedents in both degree and kind. Predictions of terrorism's future trends portray it continuing, possibly doubling in volume, with escalating violence and more frequent and bolder action (D'Amore and Anuza 1986; Jenkins 1977, 1988; Schlagheck 1988). Most forecasts, however, predate the collapse of the Soviet Union and its Eastern European "empire" which were assumed to provide training and technology to many terrorists who were, in turn, assumed to pass their abilities on to other terrorists. The collapse of the Soviet Union suggests that forecasts of terrorism made in the 1980s may be excessive. In any event, the demise of the Soviet Union is not likely to reduce the motivation for terrorism, though without the training afforded by the Soviet Union, terrorists may become much less skilled and sophisticated and correspondingly more direct and brutal.

Offsetting the decline of influence of the Soviet Union is the fear that nuclear proliferation will allow nuclear components to fall into the hands of terrorists and the realization that many forms of biological (i.e., disease organisms) and chemical (i.e., poison gas) weaponry, for example dispersal of plague pathogens, require little technical skill. The March 20, 1995 attack on Japan's subway system using a deadly nerve gas, sarin, which affects the central nervous system and paralyzes nerves, killed 12 and injured 5,500 during morning rush hour, demonstrating a new kind of terrorism. Other recent terrorist attacks to make headlines include the March 1995 Oklahoma City bombing in the U.S.; IRA's efforts to disrupt peace talks between Ireland and Britain which began in March 1996; repeated attacks by Algerian Armed Islamic Group (GIA) in France; and the April 1996 attack on a tour bus by three Egyptian gunmen which left 18 dead.

In their discussion of the future of terrorism at the Tenth Annual Symposium on Criminal Justice Issues in 1995, government and industry security and counter-intelligence professionals from the U.S., Canada, Africa, Europe, Asia, and South America touched upon the daunting growth in terrorist attacks and threats. Some of the trends in terrorism include changes in the motives of ter-

**Make No Enemies: The Tourist Contending With The Terrorist**

rorist groups, their organizational structures, operations, and targets (Perry 1996). Experts pointed out that during the 1970s and 1980s terrorist motives were strongly tied to Marxist/Leninist political views. Islamic Fundamentalism has replaced communist/socialist goals. Additionally, terrorist organizations have become less structured and more fluid, making it more difficult for counter-terrorism officials to decipher connections between terrorists and their groups. A U.S. State Department Senior Intelligence Analyst predicted that, due to its ethno-political conflicts following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia will replace the Middle East in terrorist activity and some terrorism may overflow to other regions. It has also been predicted that Central Asia and the North and Trans-Caucasus regions will be host to problems of ethno-nationalism and Islamic terrorism. However, Iran was identified as the main state sponsor of terrorism by the State Department's 1995 terrorism report.

Terrorist tactics are unlikely to change; however, attacks will likely become more indiscriminate and terrorism may be institutionalized as a method of armed conflict, and consequently, spread geographically. As the media improves their ability to cover terrorist incidents, people will witness more terrorism and extraordinary security measures are expected to become permanent and accepted as terrorism becomes commonplace.

### **TARGETING THE TOURISM INDUSTRY**

As enterprises, international terrorism and international tourism have much in common (Abdoulwahab 1990; Enders and Sandler 1991; Norton 1987; Richter and Waugh, Jr. 1986; Ryan 1993; WTO 1991). Both cross national borders, target citizens of many nations and exploit the technologies of mass transportation and communication. The choice of the tourist as a "soft" (defenseless) target is not coincidental, the symbolism, high profile, and news value of the international traveler are too valuable for terrorists not to exploit. (American travelers have often been targets of terrorist violence by terrorists of countries with which the U.S. has had a strained political relationship.) Tourists are a superbly effective vehicle for conveying terrorists' messages because when a tourist is kidnaped or killed by terrorists, the situation is instantaneously hawked by the mass media and propelled to a global scale. Tourists are effective also because they patronize difficult to defend places (i.e., public areas, tourist attractions) and modes of transportation with strong national associations. These include airlines and their offices which are either national carriers or strongly identified with a particular nation as well as tourist destinations that are often conspicuous symbols of national identity. Attacks on such institutions and places, so much the better if they involve taking lives from several nationalities, convey a direct message to the target that virtually nothing is either safe or sacred. The proto-typical example is the 1972 attack on the Olympic Games in Munich, Germany, which was the catalyst institutionalizing terrorism as a tool of political communication.

Sevil F. Sönmez - G. Wesley Burnett

The magnitude of the tourism industry also makes it a significant victim of terrorism. Though "invisible," tourism has emerged as the largest item of international trade and represents a major enterprise in over 100 nations. Revenues from international and domestic tourism in 1993 were over three trillion U.S. dollars, while jobs based in tourism amounted to more than 126 million or about one job in every 15 (WTTC 1992). As any international traveler can plainly see, tourism is economically significant and involves millions of travelers in any given day, so that a terrorist attack on tourism at once defiles sacred symbols and menaces the international economic order. Few potential victims, therefore, offer the terrorist as much message for as little risk as does a tourist. Consequently, tourists are increasingly direct rather than incidental victims. Terrorism can sabotage the tourism industry which is dependent on stability and so may be among the biggest challenges to the industry.

### **TRAVEL DECISIONS INVOLVING RISK**

International terrorism generally, and that aimed at tourism specifically, have resulted in considerable international cooperation in the control of terrorism. A week after several suicide bombs threatened to derail the fragile Israeli-Palestinian peace process in March 1996, then U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher initiated a summit meeting on terrorism. The summit took place in Egypt and was attended by U.S. President Bill Clinton, Middle Eastern and European leaders, and Russian President Boris Yeltsin. Communicating to terrorists that these countries are determined to defeat terrorism appeared to be the primary purpose of the meeting. Cooperation between countries in their struggle against terrorism may provide the only hope of achieving a victory against it. The number of articles appearing in newspapers such as the *New York Times* on international cooperation in the control of terrorism is overwhelming—and predictably disorderly. International intelligence and law enforcement agencies have little reason to explain their methods to a public that includes the very terrorists they seek to control. Methods, however, include enhanced and standardized airport security and international coordination of law enforcement and intelligence gathering aimed at identifying and tracing the movement of known or potential terrorists as well as high technology equipment likely to be used in terrorists activities.

There is a declining return to such security efforts, however, for example, to make the global network of airports virtually impermeable to terrorist attacks would require that each have a security system equal to the most secure military airport, a costly undertaking compared with its results. The procedure of establishing such extreme security would be an anathema to democratic societies and unacceptable to both the public and the tourism industry. Likewise, any destination rendered impermeable to terrorists' attacks would likely be without tourists, while tourism, highly dependent on the tourist's freedom to explore and discover the unexpected, would be so regimented that the experience would become almost meaningless.

Make No Enemies: The Tourist Contending With The Terrorist

A goal of "zero defects" with respect to terrorist attacks on tourists or the tourism industry is idealistic in the extreme. Governments and the industry will, formally or informally, search for security systems that provide them with what they consider to be an acceptable level of risk. Governments are likely to make that decision in the political arena while the tourism industry will likely make it in the market place. In other words, how tourists evaluate risk will determine the level of security needed to protect them and types of marketing strategies needed to deal with traveler decision-making and perceptions of risk.

How tourists make decisions to travel and how they select among alternative destinations has been studied as a component of the consumer choice process in which the tourist is considered to be a rational consumer distributing income between various goods and services, including travel, in an attempt to achieve utility or satisfaction (Crompton 1992; Enders and Sandler 1991; Kent 1991; Mansfeld 1992; Raaij and Francken 1984; Woodside and Lyonski 1989). Potential travelers compare travel to non travel and alternative destinations according to perceived benefits and costs where a benefit is the prospect of satisfying an initial need to travel. The costs associated with travel are both monetary and nonmonetary and are both direct and indirect. Among costs are the potential risks associated with the trip—for example, becoming ill, or a victim of an accident, crime, or terrorism. The threat of terrorism on a trip or at a destination causes the trip or destination to be perceived as more costly than a safe trip or destination and when two trips or destinations are compared, the one perceived to be less costly will, more likely, be chosen. Low probability incidents with very high costs such as terrorist attacks, actually affect small numbers of people (*The Economist* 1986). For example, in 1985, 28 million Americans went abroad while only 162 were killed or injured in terrorist activities for a probability of less than .00057% of becoming a victim of terrorism. Despite the infrequency, however, extreme consequences appear to provoke serious consumer reaction. In 1986, 1.8 million Americans changed their foreign travel plans as a result of the previous year's terrorist activity (D'Amore and Anuza 1986). This is equivalent to about 6.43% of the previous year's overseas travel volume.

Despite a growing body of theory concerned generally with decision-making under risk, and consumer decision-making under risk specifically, the role of risk in travel decision-making has received surprisingly little attention. It is intuitively logical to think decisions to undertake international travel are influenced by real or perceived risks of terrorist threat. Theoretical support for this concept stems from several theories of decision-making under risk in general such as Prospect Theory (Kahneman and Tversky 1979), Protection Motivation Theory (Rogers 1975), and Catastrophe Theory (Svyantek, Deshon and Siler 1991)—and consumer decision-making under risk in particular such as Reactance Theory (Brehm 1966) and Information Integration Theory (Ander-



Sevil F. Sönmez - G. Wesley Burnett

son 1981, 1982). Risks associated with travel, travel constraints and inhibitors/facilitators have only recently been examined (Cook and McCleary 1983; Crompton 1992; Mansfeld 1992; Roehl and Fesenmaier 1992; Um and Crompton 1990, 1992). Due to the intangible nature of the travel experience, tourism is heavily dependent on positive perceptions (Gartner 1989), any consideration of travel risk, begins with the proposition that consumers do not so much purchase the assessed utility of tourism related products as the perceived attributes of those products. Attitudes or personality traits of consumers have been recognized as a major component in assessing attributes. Perceived positive attributes of a journey or destination, that is its hoped for utility or satisfaction, facilitate tourism. Other perceived attributes constrain tourism, such as distance, geographic characteristics, or political borders.

However, only recently has the idea of constraint begun to be clearly distinguished from risk. A constraint, for example lack of money, prohibits actualization of a perceived utility, whereas, risk assesses the probability of actualizing the utility given expenditure of money. Positive attributes and constraints have also been called "facilitators" and "inhibitors" which are thought to act with differing degrees of emphasis in different stages of the decision-making process (Um and Crompton 1992). Facilitators act early in the process and help the tourist to narrow the almost infinite set of destinations while inhibitors determine the selection between a limited set of destinations in the final stages of decision-making. In choosing a destination, the potential traveler is likely to narrow down a complex set of perceptions of destination attributes into simply facilitators and inhibitors at which point, the traveler must consider relative impacts of each. Where facilitators help to satisfy specific motives of the potential tourist, such as meeting new people, inhibitors such as a destination's remoteness, represent incongruencies with those motives. In order to reduce perceived risk for potential travelers, a destination must appear to offer satisfaction of motives within perceived constraints, for example, the opportunity to meet new people in a remote or "exclusive" vacation destination.

Within this conceptual framework, a particularly interesting and useful study by Roehl and Fesenmaier (1992), though not directly concerned with terrorism, sought to understand the influence on pleasure travel behavior of seven types of risks identified in consumer behavior literature, such as equipment, financial, physical, psychological, satisfaction, social, and time (Schiffman and Kanuk 1991). Roehl and Fesenmaier (1992) associated financial, psychological, satisfaction, and time risks most with tourism. Equipment (failure or accident during transportation or at accommodations), physical (injury or accidents), and social (disapproval of vacation choices or activities by friends, family, and acquaintances) risks did not emerge as having serious impacts on tourism. However, in a different study which investigated international vacation decisions involving the risk of terrorism and political instability, health,

**Make No Enemies: The Tourist Contending With The Terrorist**

terrorism, and political instability risks were added to the seven risk types (Sönmez 1994). When ranked, health, financial, political instability (becoming involved in political turmoil at country being visited), equipment, and terrorism (involvement in a terrorist occurrence) risks were most often associated with international travel, whereas, physical, psychological, satisfaction, time, and social risks were least often associated with international travel. According to Roehl and Fesenmaier (1992), different tendencies of individuals to take risks can be explained by different personality traits. Furthermore, risk assessment is situation specific with some dimensions of risk being given greater emphasis according to perceived importance in a given situation. The Roehl and Fesenmaier (1992) study identified three types of travelers according to risk attitudes: a risk neutral group (perceived least risk in travel in general and the destination of their most recent trip in particular), a functional risk group (perceived high physical and equipment risk), and a place risk group (perceived vacations to be fairly risky and the destination of their most recent trip to be very risky) and among these groups, financial (not getting value for money paid for vacation), psychological (disappointment with travel and tourism experience), satisfaction (dissatisfaction with trip), and time (spending or wasting too much time) risks were found to affect pleasure travel most often. Information search was a common risk reduction strategy. However, a destination's or travel mode's mere promotion of its safety or security might not significantly reduce risk perceptions among travelers. In other words, an advertised claim of safety and security may simply not be believed by a potential traveler once the traveler's own risk assessment suggests safety and security is an issue.

## **TERRORIST AND TOURIST INTERACTION**

While there is no unified theory of risk management which allows complete understanding of tourists' decisions in the face of terrorist threat, or of the interaction between terrorism and tourism, the current state of theory does allow some degree of generalization. The terrorist uses the threat or actuality of violence to convey political messages through mass communication. Part of the message conveyed is through the global travel industry, targeted largely because it is soft, economically important, and symbolic of the achievement of the modern world and the emerging global culture. The message is the disruption of the industry itself. Disruption is achieved partly through violence and partly by disturbing the mechanisms by which tourists make decisions. Tourists make decisions, drawing on their personality traits, based on perceived characteristics of a journey's or a destination's ability to actualize desired utility or satisfaction in the light of the journey's or destination's constraints. The decision involves an assessment of risk, and risk itself can be understood to have several dimensions. Pragmatically, the threat of terrorism, indeed part of the objective of terrorism, is to alter the balance of perceived benefits and constraints of a journey or destination or to alter the balance between various pos-

Sevil F. Sönmez - G. Wesley Burnett

sible journeys or destinations. One may elect to stay home or to visit the Grand Canyon instead of Paris.

Government action seeks to thwart terrorists' achievement of their objective. This can be thoroughly accomplished only by eliminating terrorism, a utopian solution possibly undesirable since it conflicts with other goals of democratic and free-market societies, and it is not likely to be realized, in any event, in the foreseeable future. Government action can only hope to restrain terrorism to levels acceptable to efficient operation of the market place.

Consumers will determine the efficient operation of that market place, and they have several possible responses (based on their individual personality traits and assessment of facilitators) to the terrorist. Tourists may decide: 1) not to travel at all; 2) to take evasive measures including altering travel plans; or 3) to proceed, risk be damned. To stay at home when assessment of other facilitators and inhibitors recommends travel, is to demand greater governmental or industry efforts to suppress terrorism. These demands must be acted upon by governments when the market becomes noticeably nervous. The third option, to proceed in the face of any and all risk, simply does not accord with the personality of most people.

Taking evasive measures is, therefore, the most common approach. Evasive measures require additional information, about other (safer) destinations, so that the traveler alters travel plans simply by acquiring information. However, industry or destination promotion on security issues is likely to avail little if the potential traveler has already decided security is a problem. This is particularly true if industry information appears only to reassure. The next most obvious evasive measure is to change travel plans—destinations, routes, modes of transportation or carriers. The industry finds this behavior inconvenient but it amounts to a spatial adjustment in the market. Changing travel plans is the consumer's way of telling government and industry that, at least locally, security is too lax for the locale to remain competitive in the market-place, and it may also be a consumer's way of siding with terrorist causes, or at least demanding that their cause be given a fuller hearing. The decline in tourism in South Africa prior to elections in 1994 is a case where the prospects of terrorism, even though tourists rarely fell victim to violence, may have decreased tourism and revenues from tourism, both in South Africa and regionally in southern Africa, for a cause generally supported by much of the world.

Other, less drastic, avoidance techniques are routinely employed, most often by more experienced travelers, and these are also generally congruent with avoidance of common crime. For example, narrow-bodied aircraft are preferable for hijackers over wide-bodied aircraft where passenger control is more difficult. So, selecting wide-bodied aircraft is an avoidance technique. Likewise, travelers in coach and window seats are more obscure than passengers in first class sections and aisle seats. Direct flight itineraries are more secure than

**Make No Enemies: The Tourist Contending With The Terrorist**

those involving stops and changes of air craft. The wise traveler will avoid leaving luggage unattended or in the care of strangers. Passports may be enclosed in nondescript covers. Experienced travelers maintain a low profile, dress "down," avoid ostentatious displays of wealth and predictable or scheduled behavior at their destination. And, so forth and so on through a long litany of cathartic rules which, if all were followed all the time, would result in sadly dull travel (Lee 1994).

Chinua Achebe (1989) recommended that travelers to distant places make no enemies. This is a luxury not available to modern travelers who must contend with enemies simply because they are travelers. Several techniques are available to overcome this challenge which can shape the future extent and spatial arrangement of the travel market. Given its infrequency, fear of terrorism is an irrational reason not to travel, but adjusting travel mode, route and destination, is as reasonable a response to terrorism as adjusting one's dress. Consumer responses to terrorism introduce instability into the travel market which are irritating to producers, but such instability helps the market set priorities in the provision of security every bit as much a service as selling airline tickets. Such adjustments help travelers avoid the enemies they may potentially encounter by virtue of traveling in the modern world.

## REFERENCES

- Abdoulwahab, S.E. (1990). Terrorism and Tourism. In R.H. Ward and A.G. Ezeldin (Eds.), *International Responses to Terrorism: New Initiation* (pp. 93-98). Chicago, IL: The University of Illinois at Chicago, Office of International Criminal Justice.
- Achebe, C. (1989). *Arrows of God* (p. 168). New York, NY: Doubleday.
- Alexander, Y. (1977). Communications Aspects of International Terrorism. *International Problems*, 16:55-60.
- Anderson, N.H. (1982). *Foundations of Information Integration Theory*. New York, NY: Academic Press.
- Bell, J.B. (1975). *Transnational Terror*. Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute.
- Bolz, Jr., F., Dudonis, K.J. and Schulz, D.P. (1990). *The Counter-Terrorism Handbook* (p. 38). New York, NY: Elsevier Science Publishing Co., Inc.
- Brehm, J.W. (1966). *A Theory of Psychological Reactance*. New York: Academic Press, Inc.
- Burnett, G.W. and Uysal, M. (1988). National Parks and Tourism: A Vector for Peace. In L. J.D'Amore and J.Jafari (Eds.), *Tourism—A Vital Force for Peace* (pp. 121-126). Montreal: First Global Conference.
- Burnett, G.W. and Uysal, M. (1990). On the Nature of Peace in Relationship to Tourism: Three Cases. *Zeitschrift für Fremdenverkehr*, 25:1-7.
- Charters, D.A. (1991) (Ed.). *Counterterrorism Intelligence: Sources, Methods, Process, and Problems. Democratic Responses to International Terrorism* (pp. 227-266). New York, NY: Transnational Publishers.
- Cook, R.L. and McCleary, K.W. (1983). Redefining Vacation Distances in Consumer Minds. *Journal of Travel Research*, 22(2):31-34.

Sevil F. Sönmez - G. Wesley Burnett

- Crenshaw, M. (1989). Terrorism and International Cooperation. Occasional paper series (11). New York, NY: Institute for East-West Security Studies.
- Crompton, J. (1992). Structure of Vacation Destination Choice Sets. *Annals of Tourism Research*, 19 (3):420-434.
- D'Amore, L.J. and Anuza, T.E. (1986). International Terrorism: Implications and Challenge for Global Tourism. *Business Quarterly*. November (pp. 20-29).
- Enders, W. and Sandler, T. (1991). Causality Between Transnational Terrorism and Tourism: the Case of Spain. *Terrorism*, 14(1):49-58.
- Gartner, W.C. (1989). Tourism Image: Attribute Measurement of State Tourism Products Using Multidimensional Scaling Techniques. *Journal of Travel Research*, 28(2):16-20.
- Horner, C.M. (1980). The Facts About Terrorism. *Commentary*, 69(6):40-42.
- Jenkins, B. (1987). The Future Course of International Terrorism. In A. Kurz (Ed.), *Contemporary Trends in World Terrorism* (pp. 150-159). New York, NY: Praeger Publishers.
- Jenkins, B. (1988). Future Trends in International Terrorism. In R.O. Slater and M. Stohl (Eds.), *Current Perspectives on International Terrorism* (pp. 246-266). London: The Macmillan Press, Ltd.
- Kahneman, D. and Tversky, A. (1979). Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk. *Econometrica*, 47(2):263-291.
- Kent, P. (1991). Understanding Holiday Choices. In M.T. Sinclair and M.J. Stabler (Eds.), *The Tourism Industry: An International Analysis* (165-183). Oxon, England: CAB International.
- Kupperman, R.H. and Trent, D.M. (1979). *Terrorism*. Stanford: Hoover Institution Press.
- Lee, E.L. (1994). Personal Security and Safety Abroad: Avoidance is the Key. In R.M. Dawood (Ed.), *Travelers' Health: How to Stay Healthy All Over the World* (pp. 173-288). New York, NY: Random House.
- Mansfeld, Y. (1992). From Motivation to Actual Travel. *Annals of Tourism Research*, 19(3):399-419.
- Norton, G. (1987). Tourism and International Terrorism. *The World Today*, 43(2):30-33.
- Perry, S. (1996). Terrorism: a Frightening New Perspective. Internet report on the Tenth Annual Symposium on Criminal Justice Issues, *Terrorism-Past, Present and Future*, Chicago, USA: University of Illinois at Chicago, Office of International Criminal Justice.
- Poland, J.M. (1988). *Understanding Terrorism*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
- Redlick, A.S. (1979). The Transnational Flow of Information as a Cause of Terrorism. In Y. Alexander et al. (Eds.), *Terrorism: Theory and Practice*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
- Richter, L.K. and Waugh, Jr., W.L. (1986). Terrorism and Tourism as Logical Companions. *Tourism Management*, 7 (4):230-238.
- Roehl, W.S. and Fesenmaier, D.R. (1992). Risk Perceptions and Pleasure Travel: An Exploratory Analysis. *Journal of Travel Research*, 30(4):17-26.
- Rogers, R.W. (1975). A Protection Motivation Theory of Fear Appeals and Attitude Change. *The Journal of Psychology*, 91:93-114.
- Ryan, C. (1993). Crime, Violence, Terrorism and Tourism: an Accidental or Intrinsic Relationship? *Tourism Management*, 14(3):173-183.
- Sandler, T. and Lapan, H.E. (1988). *The Calculus of Dissent: An Analysis of Terrorists' Choice of Targets*. *Synthese*, 76(2):244-261.
- Schiffman, L.G. and Kanuk, L.L. (1991). *Consumer Behavior* (pp. 180-181). 4th Edition, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.

Make No Enemies: The Tourist Contending With The Terrorist

- Schiller, D. (1988). From a National to An International Response. In H.H. Tucker (Ed.) *Combating the Terrorists: Democratic Responses to Political Violence* (pp. 185-200). New York, NY: Facts on File.
- Schlagheck, D.M. (1988). *International Terrorism*. Lexington, Mass: Lexington Books.
- Schmid, A.P. and Jongman, A.J. (1988). *Political Terrorism*. New York, NY: North-Holland Publishing Co.
- Schmid, A.P. and deGraaf, J. (1982). *Violence as Communication: Insurgent Terrorism and the Western News Media*. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.
- Sönmez, S.F. (1994). *An Exploratory Analysis of the Influence of Personal Factors on International Vacation Decisions Within the Context of Terrorism and/or Political Instability Risk*. Unpublished doctoral dissertation. University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University.
- St. John, P. (1991). Air Piracy, Airport Security and International Tourism: Wining the War Against Hijackers (pp. 135-190). New York, NY: Quorum Books.
- Syantek, D.J., Deshon, R.P. and Siler, M.T. (1991). The Illusion of Certainty: A Catastrophe Model of Decision Framing. *Current Psychology: Research and Reviews*, 10(2):199-209.
- The Economist* (1986a). East, West, Home's Best. 30(7455):28.
- Toman, J. (1991). Developing an International Policy Against Terrorism. In S. Flood (Ed.), *International Terrorism: Policy Implications* (pp. 111-128). Chicago, IL: Office of International Criminal Justice, The University of Illinois at Chicago.
- U.S. Department of State (1996). *Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1995*. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State.
- Um, S. and Crompton, J.L. (1990). Attitude Determinants in Tourism Destination Choice. *Annals of Tourism Research*, 17(3):432-448.
- Um, S. and Crompton, J.L. (1992). The Roles of Perceived Inhibitors and Facilitators in Pleasure Travel Destination Decisions. *Journal of Travel Research*, 30(3):18-25.
- van Raaij, W.F. and Francken, D.A. (1984). Vacation Decisions, Activities, and Satisfaction. *Annals of Tourism Research*, 11(1):101-112.
- Watson, F.M. (1975). *Political Terrorism: the Threat and the Response*. Washington DC: Robert B. Luce Co.
- Wilkinson, P. (1973). Three Questions on Terrorism. *Government and Opposition*, 8(3):293-306.
- Wilkinson, P. (1976). *Political Terrorism*. London: Macmillan.
- Woodside, A.G. and Lysonski, S. (1989). A General Model of Traveler Destination Choice. *Journal of Travel Research*, 27(4):8-14.
- WTTC (1992). *Travel and Tourism: The World's Largest Industry* (The WTTC Report 1992, Complete Edition). Brussels: WTTC.
- WTO (1991). *Impact of the Gulf Crisis on International Tourism*. World Tourism Organization Special Report. May 1991. Madrid: WTO.